MULTI-LEVEL ISSUES IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND LEADERSHIP
RESEARCH IN MULTI-LEVEL ISSUES Series Editors: Francis J. Yammarino and Fred Dansereau Previous Volumes: Volume 1:
The Many Faces of Multi-Level Issues – Editors, Francis J. Yammarino and Fred Dansereau
Volume 2:
Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Strategy – Editors, Fred Dansereau and Francis J. Yammarino
Volume 3:
Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Processes – Editors, Francis J. Yammarino and Fred Dansereau
Volume 4:
Multi-Level Issues in Strategy and Methods – Editors, Fred Dansereau and Francis J. Yammarino
Volume 5:
Multi-Level Issues in Social Systems – Editors, Francis J. Yammarino and Fred Dansereau
Volume 6:
Multi-Level Issues in Organizations and Time – Editors, Fred Dansereau and Francis J. Yammarino
Volume 7:
Multi-Level Issues in Creativity and Innovation – Editors, Michael D. Mumford, Samuel T. Hunter, and Katrina E. Bedell-Avers
RESEARCH IN MULTI-LEVEL ISSUES VOLUME 8
MULTI-LEVEL ISSUES IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND LEADERSHIP EDITED BY
FRANCIS J. YAMMARINO State University of New York at Binghamton, NY
FRED DANSEREAU State University of New York at Buffalo, NY
United Kingdom – North America – Japan India – Malaysia – China
JAI Press is an imprint of Emerald Group Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2009 Copyright r 2009 Emerald Group Publishing Limited Reprints and permission service Contact:
[email protected] No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy of information contained in the text, illustrations or advertisements. The opinions expressed in these chapters are not necessarily those of the Editor or the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-84855-502-0 ISSN: 1475-9144 (Series)
Awarded in recognition of Emerald’s production department’s adherence to quality systems and processes when preparing scholarly journals for print
CONTENTS ABOUT THE EDITORS
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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OVERVIEW: MULTI-LEVEL ISSUES IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND LEADERSHIP Fred Dansereau and Francis J. Yammarino
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PART I: ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR A NEW KIND OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR Francis J. Yammarino and Fred Dansereau
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THICK OR THIN? A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR Neal M. Ashkanasy
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A NEWER ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR Francis J. Yammarino and Fred Dansereau
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PART II: OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP CHARISMATIC, IDEOLOGICAL, AND PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP: AN EXAMINATION OF MULTI-LEVEL INFLUENCES ON EMERGENCE AND PERFORMANCE Michael D. Mumford, Samuel T. Hunter, Tamara L. Friedrich and Jay J. Caughron v
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LEVELS OF PERFORMANCE: MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES ON OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP James G. (Jerry) Huntw and John N. Davis
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PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP STYLES: HOW DO THEY MAP ONTO CHARISMATIC, IDEOLOGICAL, AND PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP? Dean Keith Simonton
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CHARISMATIC, IDEOLOGICAL, AND PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP: WHERE WE ARE, AND WHERE DO WE NEED TO GO? Michael D. Mumford, Jay J. Caughron and Tamara L. Friedrich
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PART III: LEADERSHIP AND SOCIAL RELATIONS A COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP USING THE SOCIAL RELATIONS MODEL David A. Kenny and Stefano Livi
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CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING THE SOCIAL RELATIONS MODEL TO THE STUDY OF LEADERSHIP EMERGENCE IN GROUPS: A LEADERSHIP CATEGORIZATION PERSPECTIVE Rosalie J. Hall, Robert G. Lord and Katey E. Foster
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THOUGHTS ON STUDYING LEADERSHIP IN NATURAL CONTEXTS Stefano Livi and David A. Kenny
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PART IV: LEADERSHIP SIMULATION A LEVELS-BASED LEADERSHIP SIMULATION: INSIGHTS REGARDING GROUP DECISION OPTIMIZATION Shelley D. Dionne and Peter J. Dionne
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COMPARING SIMULATION RESULTS OF LEADERSHIP STYLE IMPACTS ON EMERGENT VERSUS SPECIFIC TASK OUTCOMES AND REQUIRED SIMULATION MODEL COMPONENTS Janice A. Black, Richard L. Oliver and Lori D. Paris
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MAKING IT PRACTICAL: SIMULATION, NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING, AND COMPLEXITY IN TEAM PERFORMANCE Jessica L. Wildman and Eduardo Salas
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SINS OF OMISSION AND ENVY: REDEMPTION AND SALVATION THROUGH LEVELS OF ANALYSIS Shelley D. Dionne and Peter J. Dionne
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PART V: ENVIROSCAPES ENVIROSCAPES: A MULTI-LEVEL CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP Richard Reeves-Ellington
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TARGETING THE CULTURAL PROCESSES OF PARTNERING FOR ANALYSIS Elizabeth K. Briody
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ENVIROSCAPES: THE CHALLENGES OF CULTURAL PARTNERING CONCEPTS Richard Reeves-Ellington
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PART VI: ABOUT THE AUTHORS ABOUT THE AUTHORS
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ABOUT THE EDITORS Francis J. Yammarino, Ph.D., is SUNY Distinguished Professor of Management and Director and Fellow of the Center for Leadership Studies at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He received his Ph.D. in Organizational Behavior (Management) from the State University of New York at Buffalo. Dr. Yammarino has extensive research experience in the areas of superior–subordinate relationships, leadership, self–other agreement processes, and multiple levels of analysis issues. He has served on the editorial review boards of eight scholarly journals, including the Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Leadership Quarterly, Organizational Research Methods, and Personnel Psychology. Dr. Yammarino is a Fellow of the American Psychological Society and the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology. He is the author of 13 books and has published more than 100 articles. Dr. Yammarino has served as a consultant to numerous organizations, including IBM, Textron, TRW, Lockheed Martin, Medtronic, United Way, Skills Net, and the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Department of Education. Fred Dansereau, Ph.D., is Professor of Organization and Human Resources and Associate Dean for Research in the School of Management at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He received his Ph.D. from the Labor and Industrial Relations Institute at the University of Illinois with a specialization in Organizational Behavior. Dr. Dansereau has extensive research experience in the areas of leadership and managing at the individual, dyad, group, and collective levels of analysis. Along with others, he has developed a theoretical and empirical approach to theorizing and testing at multiple levels of analysis. He has served on the editorial review boards of the Academy of Management Review, Group and Organization Management, and Leadership Quarterly. Dr. Dansereau is a Fellow of the American Psychological Association and the American Psychological Society. He has authored 12 books and more than 80 articles and is a consultant to numerous organizations, including the Bank of Chicago, Occidental, St. Joe Company, Sears, TRW, the United States Army and Navy, Worthington Industries, and various educational institutions. ix
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Neal M. Ashkanasy
UQ Business School, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
Janice A. Black
Department of Management and Marketing, School of Business and Public Administration, California State University, Bakersfield, CA
Elizabeth K. Briody
General Motors R&D, Warren, MI
Jay J. Caughron
Department of Psychology, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK
Fred Dansereau
School of Management, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY
John N. Davis
Hardin-Simmons University, Kelley College of Business, Abilene, TX
Shelley D. Dionne
Binghamton University, School of Management and Center for Leadership Studies, Binghamton, NY
Peter J. Dionne
Sensis Corporation, East Syracuse, NY
Katey E. Foster
Department of Psychology, University of Akron, Akron, OH
Tamara L. Friedrich
Department of Psychology, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK
Rosalie J. Hall
Department of Psychology, University of Akron, Akron, OH
James G. (Jerry) Huntw
Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX
Samuel T. Hunter
Department of Psychology, Penn State University, University Park, PA xi
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
David A. Kenny
Department of Psychology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT
Stefano Livi
Department of Social and Developmental Psychology, University of Rome ‘‘La Sapienza,’’ Rome, Italy
Robert G. Lord
Department of Psychology, University of Akron, Akron, OH
Michael D. Mumford
Department of Psychology, The University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK
Richard L. Oliver
Department of Accounting and Information Systems, College of Business, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM
Lori D. Paris
Department of Management and Marketing, School of Business and Public Administration, California State University, Bakersfield, CA
Richard ReevesEllington
School of Management, Binghamton University, State University of New York, Binghamton, NY
Eduardo Salas
Department of Psychology, and Institute for Simulation and Training, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL
Dean Keith Simonton
Department of Psychology, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA
Jessica L. Wildman
Department of Psychology, and Institute for Simulation and Training, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL
Francis J. Yammarino
School of Management and Center for Leadership Studies, State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The publication of the Research in Multi-Level Issues annual series and this volume have been greatly facilitated by Rachel Brown and Emma Smith at Emerald Publishing Group in the United Kingdom, and the staff at Macmillan Publishing Solutions, India. Closer to home, we thank our Schools of Management, the Center for Leadership Studies at Binghamton, and the Jacobs Management Center at Buffalo as well as our assistants, Marie Iobst and Cheryl Tubisz, and our copyeditor, Jill Hobbs, for their help in preparing this book for publication. Finally and perhaps most importantly, we offer our sincere thanks to our contributors. The authors of the essays, commentaries, and rebuttals in this volume have provided new ideas and insights for unraveling the challenges of dealing with multiple levels of analysis and multi-level issues in a wide variety of areas. Thank you all.
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OVERVIEW: MULTI-LEVEL ISSUES IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND LEADERSHIP Fred Dansereau and Francis J. Yammarino INTRODUCTION Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Leadership is Volume 8 of Research in Multi-Level Issues, an annual series that provides an outlet for the discussion of multi-level problems and solutions across a variety of fields of study. Using a scientific debate format of a key scholarly essay followed by commentaries and a rebuttal, we present, in this series, theoretical work, significant empirical studies, methodological developments, analytical techniques, and philosophical treatments to advance the field of multi-level studies, regardless of disciplinary perspective. Similar to Volumes 1 through 7 (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2002, 2004, 2006; Dansereau & Yammarino, 2003, 2005, 2007; Mumford, Hunter, & Bedell-Avers, 2008), Volume 8 contains five major essays with commentaries and rebuttals that cover a range of topics, but in the realms of organizational behavior and leadership. In particular, the five ‘‘critical essays’’ offer extensive literature reviews, new model developments, methodological advancements, and some data for the study of organizational behavior, outstanding leadership, leadership and social relations, leadership simulation, and enviroscapes. While each of the major essays, and its associated
Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Leadership Research in Multi-Level Issues, Volume 8, 1–9 Copyright r 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1475-9144/doi:10.1108/S1475-9144(2009)0000008018
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commentaries and rebuttals, is unique in orientation, all of the essays share a common bond in raising and addressing multi-level issues or discussing problems and solutions that involve multiple levels of analysis in organizational behavior and leadership.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR In the first essay, following from the cutting-edge work of Stephen Wolfram in A New Kind of Science (2002), we (as authors) propose ‘‘a new kind of OB’’ (organizational behavior) based on the varient approach to theory building and testing. In particular, we offer four simple, yet comprehensive theories to account for individual behavior, interpersonal relationships, group dynamics, and collectivized processes in organizations. We believe that our approach differs from contemporary approaches to OB in two ways. First, we provide four sets of two constructs, each of which is proposed in different multi-level configurations. Second, we propose very simple theories that we suggest may underlie very complex processes. Thus, although the theory is multivariate (eight variables), the constructs, their association, and the levels of analysis are considered two at a time. While the four sets of variables and levels and potential interactions proposed here seem simple notions, we believe that taken both alone and in combination, they may explain a variety of complex phenomena and behavior in organizations. In his commentary, Ashkanasy notes some possible problems in our essay and suggests some alternative strategies. He identifies three core areas of concern. The first is that the essay sets out a ‘‘thin’’ theory, which is at odds with the idea that OB in real organizations is inherently complex and addressable only though ‘‘thick’’ descriptions. Second, while the theory covers four levels of analysis, Ashkanasy feels that we may have neglected the time dimension. Third, he suggests that the theory seems an example of ‘‘grand’’ theorizing, suggesting it might also share the disappointing fate of such theories in the past. In our reply to Ashkanasy’s commentary, we argue that we are not taking a logical positivist approach that ignores the complexity of the situation. We suggest that some basic processes may underlie what may appear to be complex processes. We also agree that the time dimension is an important part of our theory and point out where in the essay we considered this issue. Finally, we argue that even if the result of empirical work does not support a grand theory, we believe following this line of research has the potential to
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make a significant contribution to the field of OB, particularly, in terms of including multiple levels of analysis in the field.
OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP In the second essay, Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron begin by pointing out that theories of outstanding, historically notable, leadership have traditionally emphasized charisma. Recent research, however, suggests that charisma may represent only one pathway to outstanding leadership. Outstanding leadership, according to these authors, may also emerge from ideological and pragmatic leadership. In their essay, they examine the multilevel conditions influencing the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. They argue that different conditions operating at the environmental, organizational, group, and individual levels influence the emergence and performance of each of these three types of leaders. Implications for understanding the origins and impact of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders are discussed. This essay clearly extends the field by adding multiple levels of analysis to the area of outstanding leadership. In regard to the commentary by Hunt and Davis, we were deeply saddened by the death of Jerry Hunt, who was one of the most open-minded professionals whom we have ever met. It was in his biannual research series on leadership that one of the editors of this volume, Fred Dansereau, had his first article on levels of analysis published. To our knowledge, it was the first article published on levels of analysis in leadership. Jerry will be deeply missed both by the editors of this volume as a person, supporter, and colleague, and by the field for his superior intellectual capability as a scholar. In line with Jerry’s open-minded approach to the field, in their commentary, Hunt and Davis attempt to push the work of Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron forward by asking how scholars might use their work to make predictions about outstanding leadership and the conditions that might be ideal for the emergence of each of the three types of outstanding leadership. Three of the questions that they ask provide a direction for future research based on Mumford et al.’s work. First, Hunt and Davis state that all other things being equal, according to Mumford et al., the strongest case for the emergence and performance of outstanding charismatic leadership would seem to be when trust is present at the group level (at the time of emergence) and under conditions of
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socio-technical change and lack of elite consensus at the environmental level. They then suggest that this idea allows future researchers to follow Mumford et al.’s lead and address the question of when these conditions that favor charismatic leadership might prevail. Second, they state that all other things being equal, according to Mumford et al., the strongest case for the emergence and performance of ideological leadership would seem to be when leadership can be shared at the group level, when culture is strong at the organizational level, and in collectivist cultures facing social disruption at the environmental level. They suggest that this notion allows future researchers to build on Mumford et al.’s work and address the question of when these conditions that favor ideological leadership might prevail. Finally, Hunt and Davis state that all other things being equal, according to Mumford et al., the strongest case for the emergence and performance of pragmatic leadership would seem to be when support is based on elite reactions, when the leader possesses strong cognitive skills at the individual level, and when the leader takes action to maintain perceptions of fairness at the group level, the amount of follower professionalism at the organization level, and consensus among elites at the environmental level. As was typical of Jerry Hunt’s work, the question then becomes how one makes advances based on previous work. In this case, Hunt and Davis again suggest that this assumption allows future researchers to follow Mumford et al.’s lead and address the question of when these conditions that favor pragmatic leadership might prevail. In his commentary, Simonton raises the question of whether the general framework in the Mumford et al. essay applies to more focused domains of leadership. More specifically, Simonton discusses his own research on leadership styles in the U.S. presidency – interpersonal, charismatic, deliberative, creative, and neurotic – and then examines how these five styles have some correspondence to the three broad types of extraordinary leadership discussed by Mumford et al. His essay also includes a table that provides scores for all U.S. presidents on two key dimensions: charismatic – creative and interpersonal – deliberative. We believe that this integrative thinking and these applications make an excellent contribution and addition to the area of outstanding leadership. Mumford, Caughron, and Friedrich, in their reply, suggest that the comments by Hunt and Davis and by Simonton raise a variety of questions about how the charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership styles should be measured and how hypotheses should be developed with regard to multi-level influence on leader emergence and performance. They effectively
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respond to such issues but also point out that, although evidence is often available for charismatics, it is rare for studies to have contrasted charismatics with ideological and pragmatic leaders. Thus the authors hope their work and the work of Hunt and Davis and of Simonton will provide the impetus for future studies that address the issues raised by the commentators.
LEADERSHIP AND SOCIAL RELATIONS In the third essay, Kenny and Livi present their social relations model (SRM), which explicitly proposes that leadership simultaneously operates at three levels of analysis: group, dyad, and individual (perceiver and target). According to the authors, by using their model, researchers can empirically determine the amount of variance at each level as well as those factors that explain variance at these different levels. This essay attempts to show how the SRM can be used to address many theoretically important questions in the study of leadership and can be used to advance both the theory of and research in leadership. For example, based on their analysis of leadership ratings from seven studies, Kenny and Livi suggest that there may be substantial agreement (i.e., target variance) about who in a group is the leader. In a second analysis, the authors examine the effects of gender and gender composition on the perception of leadership. They also explore how self-ratings of leadership may differ from group members’ perceptions of leadership. Finally, they discuss how their model can be used with conventional software. This essay offers an extension of the SRA approach to leadership from a multi-level perspective. In their commentary, Hall, Lord, and Foster critically consider limits to the generalization of the variance components analysis results described in Kenny and Livi’s first example, and briefly summarize results of an additional study that supports the original findings. They also suggest interpretational issues and problems of interest to researchers who may wish to continue to apply the SRM to multi-level issues in the study of leadership. In their response, Livi and Kenny focus on whether the SRM variance partitioning would be the same when groups are long term in duration and have formal leaders. In particular, they speculate about how the variance partitioning might change if these dimensions change. They also consider the design and analysis issues, as well as the estimation of group effects, in natural workgroups using their SRM approach.
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LEADERSHIP SIMULATION In the fourth essay, Dionne and Dionne begin by pointing out that previous literature has compared the effectiveness of different styles of leadership, yet most of this research has not compared different levels of analyses regarding leader styles or behaviors. In their essay, these authors develop and present a computational model and describe a levels-based comparison of four types of leadership that represent three different levels: individual, dyad, and group. When examined across a dynamic group decision-making optimization scenario, group-based leadership is found to produce decisions that are closer to optimal than do dyadic- and individual-based leadership. An alternative computational model, in which individual cognitive and experience-based components vary among group members, also indicates that group-based leadership produces more optimal decisions. The essay offers an introduction that discusses simulation as a theoretical development tool and supplies additional evidence related to the use of simulation methods in leadership research. In their commentary, Black, Oliver, and Paris begin by pointing out that clear specification of leadership efforts spanning levels of analysis has lagged behind leadership research in general. Black et al. use agent-based modeling, along with Dionne and Dionne’s choices of leadership styles, to examine the impact of those styles on the generation of an emergent group resource, context-for-learning (CFL), instead of the specific task outcome (group decision making) studied by Dionne and Dionne. In their work, they find consistent effectiveness across leadership styles for workgroups with both high and slightly lower initial individual levels of a CFL. Using a second agent-based model that includes the ability of agents to forget previous learned skills, these authors then report a reduced effectiveness of all leadership styles. However, the effectiveness of the leadership styles differs between the two outcomes (specific group task model and emergent group resource model). Black et al. note reasons for these differences and describe the implications of the comparisons of the two multi-levels models. In their commentary, Wildman and Salas also begin by highlighting the lack of focus on multi-level issues within leadership research. They suggest that while the work of Dionne and Dionne makes a strong contribution to the sciences of leadership, group decision making, and team complexity, many aspects of these authors’ research demonstrate potential for great expansion and improvement. In their commentary, Wildman and Salas discuss and provide suggestions related to the topics of computer simulation in team research, group decision-making theory, and the modeling of team
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complexity. The authors’ intention is to stimulate continued critical thinking and inspire more innovative, practical, and carefully designed multi-level research efforts. In their reply, Dionne and Dionne focus on the importance of multi-level issues in their simulation. They point out that Wildman and Salas suggest more descriptive decision-making models and more sophisticated simulation techniques would improve the practicality of their work. They also note that Black, Oliver, and Paris employ an agent-based model within an emergent task context to examine a leader’s influence on group context-for-learning and, in doing so, found differences from their own work. Dionne and Dionne demonstrate the practicality of their model and contrast their approach with the suggested additional simulations. Their reply, along with their earlier work and that of the commentators, offer an exciting glimpse into the future of group decision-making research from a multi-level perspective.
ENVIROSCAPES In the fifth essay, Reeves-Ellington offers a paradigm for understanding organizational leadership realities through a multi-level understanding of the organizational environments of climate, knowledge, ethos, and time. To do so, he presents and discusses five enviroscapes: climate, knowledge, ethos, time, and leadership. The author suggests that each of these enviroscapes has two phenotypes: business and commerce. Each of these enviroscapes, with its concomitant phenotypes, is viewed as being used differently at multiple levels of management and leadership by senior managers, middle managers, and entry-level managers. After reviewing these conceptual and theoretical ideas, Reeves-Ellington applies the theory and model to an extended-time case study of land purchase in Indonesia by a U.S. pharmaceutical firm. This essay is likely to surprise readers who are more accustomed to traditional organizational behavior essays, in that it takes an anthropological approach to understanding leadership. In her commentary, Briody focuses on the case study presented at the end of the essay by Reeves-Ellington. Specifically, she attempts to examine the successful integration of an expanding U.S. pharmaceutical firm into Indonesia’s multicultural environment, by viewing the situation as a context marked by the interweaving of market exchange and reciprocity exchange. Her analysis directs her attention to the interactions occurring both among key leaders within the firm, and between those leaders in the firm and their
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counterparts in the peasant and governmental communities. By focusing on the cultural processes of partnering, Briody attempts to show the contribution of cooperative, healthy relationships in achieving the firm’s business goals. In his response, Reeves-Ellington responds to Briody’s three major areas of concern related to the original case: methodology, theoretical concepts, and leadership processes. He argues that Briody takes an anthropological approach, whereas the original case took the perspective of a business practitioner/researcher. The response essentially casts Briody’s observations as encouraging an ongoing dialogue among academic, practitioner, and anthropological researchers.
CONCLUSION The essays, commentaries, and replies in this book illustrate the kind of issues that arise in dealing with multiple levels of analysis in organizational behavior and leadership. The definitions of concepts (i.e., organizational behavior, outstanding leadership, leadership and social relations, leadership simulation, and enviroscapes) change depending on which combination of levels of analysis is involved and added to them. The nuances of analytical methods (i.e., multi-level quantitative or qualitative in nature) change when one moves from one level of analysis to multiple levels of analysis. Moreover, although different paradigms may guide different scholars’ theories and research methods and techniques, levels of analysis issues must be resolved to have a viable paradigm (i.e., traditional or novel). We believe that the explorations of these issues in organizational behavior and leadership found in this volume show that these insights, applications, and advances will apply to numerous areas of scholarly investigation. The authors in this volume have challenged theorists, researchers, and methodologists to raise and address multi-level issues in all their disciplinary and interdisciplinary work. If you would like to be a part of contributing ideas to this scholarly endeavor, please contact us directly or visit our website at www.levelsofanalysis.com.
REFERENCES Dansereau, F., & Yammarino, F. J. (Eds). (2003). Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and strategy. Vol. 2 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
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Dansereau, F., & Yammarino, F. J. (Eds). (2005). Multi-level issues in strategy and methods. Vol. 4 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Dansereau, F., & Yammarino, F. J. (Eds). (2007). Multi-level issues in organizations and time. Vol. 6 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Mumford, M. D., Hunter, S. T., & Bedell-Avers, K. E. (Eds). (2008). Multi-level issues in creativity and innovation. Vol. 7 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Yammarino, F. J., & Dansereau, F. (Eds). (2002). The many faces of multi-level issues. Vol. 1 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Yammarino, F. J., & Dansereau, F. (Eds). (2004). Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and processes. Vol. 3 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Yammarino, F. J., & Dansereau, F. (Eds). (2006). Multi-level issues in social systems. Vol. 5 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
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PART I ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
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A NEW KIND OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR Francis J. Yammarino and Fred Dansereau ABSTRACT Following from the cutting-edge work of Stephen Wolfram in A New Kind of Science (2002), in this chapter we propose ‘‘a new kind of OB’’ (organizational behavior) based on the varient approach to theory building and testing. In particular, we offer four simple, yet comprehensive theories to account for individual behavior, interpersonal relationships, group dynamics, and collectivized processes in organizations. In each case, two constructs, their association, and the levels of analysis of their operation are proposed. While the four theories proposed here are simple notions, they can explain a variety of complex phenomena and behavior in organizations.
INTRODUCTION Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. – Carl Sagan, Billions and Billions (1997) The evidence is crummy. There’s a much simpler explanation. – Carl Sagan, The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark (1996)
Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Leadership Research in Multi-Level Issues, Volume 8, 13–60 Copyright r 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1475-9144/doi:10.1108/S1475-9144(2009)0000008001
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In 2002, Stephen Wolfram – PhD in theoretical physics (at age 20), MacArthur award recipient, and creator of the Mathematica software system – published his tome A New Kind of Science. Wolfram’s key point, which aimed to revolutionize how we view and conduct ‘‘science’’ (broadly defined), was that simple notions can explain complex phenomena. He asserted and then demonstrated in a variety of disciplines and areas (i.e., mathematics, physics, biology, social sciences, computer science, philosophy, art, technology, artificial intelligence, artificial life, catastrophe theory, chaos theory, complexity theory, computational complexity theory, cybernetics, dynamical systems theory, evolution theory, experimental mathematics, fractal geometry, general systems theory, nanotechnology, nonlinear dynamics, scientific computing, self-organization, and statistical mechanics) that simple rules (ideas, notions, theories) can lead to simple or complex phenomena. Moreover, Wolfram demonstrated that more complex or complicated ‘‘rules’’ do not ultimately lead to more complex behavior; using more complicated rules may be ‘‘convenient’’ but they do not add fundamentally new features (p. 62). In line with Wolfram’s postulations, with which we wholeheartedly agree, in this chapter we propose ‘‘a new kind of OB’’ (organizational behavior) based on the varient approach to theory building and testing (see Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino, 1984; Dansereau, Cho, & Yammarino, 2006; Dansereau & Yammarino, 2000, 2006; Yammarino, 1994, 1998; Yammarino & Markham, 1992). Specifically, following from the key assertion made by Wolfram, we propose four simple, yet comprehensive theories to account for both simple and complex organizational behavior. These theories, again analogous to the crisp nomenclature of Wolfram, are called Theory 1, Theory 2, Theory 3, and Theory 4. They attempt to understand and explain (1) individual behavior and decision making, (2) interpersonal relations and leadership, (3) group dynamics/team processes and norms, and (4) collectivized processes and roles, respectively. In each case, a theory consists of two constructs, their association, and the levels of analysis of their operation. The four proposed theories that form a new kind of OB are summarized in Table 1. Before elaborating the details of each ‘‘simple’’ theory, we offer a brief summary of those portions of Wolfram’s work that are relevant for our approach and propositions here. We also review briefly ‘‘an old kind of OB’’ – the current approach to building and testing theories in organizational behavior. We then present an overview of a contrasting approach – the varient approach – to generating and testing theories for a new kind of OB. Next, we develop each of the four theories for understanding behavior in
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Table 1.
Four Theories for a New Kind of OB.
Theory
Entities/Levels of Analysis
Theory 1: individual behavior and decision making Theory 2: interpersonal relations and leadership Theory 3: group dynamics/ team processes and norms Theory 4: collectivized processes and roles Theory Theory Theory Theory
1: 2: 3: 4:
Whole persons
Variables/Relationship
Option cutting
Whole dyads
Investments
Whole groups
Interdependence
Whole collectives
Titles
þ
! commitment
þ
! returns þ
! cohesion
þ
! expectations
level-specific at the person level level-specific and emergent at the dyad level level-specific and emergent at the group level cross-level to the collective level
organizations in terms of persons, dyads, groups, and collectives. In each case, we assert and justify a general formulation of a theory and then offer a more specific formulation for empirical testing in organizations. Finally, we discuss the implications of our approach and theories for future work in organizational behavior including multi-level empirical testing and the potential integration of our ideas for developing a new kind of OB.
A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE Wolfram (2002) presents a comprehensive new paradigm for science in general as well as for its many disciplines, fields, and subfields in particular. Our purpose here is not to review his work in its entirety, but simply to provide an overview of key points to justify and demonstrate Wolfram’s position and our own position that simple ideas are valuable, are preferred, and explain a great deal of both simple and complex behavior for all of science, including OB. Simple Rules Wolfram (2002) uses the notion of rules – ideas or theories – to describe and explain behavior and states that ‘‘in reality even systems with extremely simple rules can give rise to behavior of great complexity’’ (p. 110). Moreover, he notes that ‘‘the simpler a structure is, the more likely it is that it will show
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up in a wide diversity of different places. And, this means that by studying systems with the simplest possible structure, one will tend to get results that have the broadest and most fundamental significance . . . looking at systems with simpler underlying structures gives us a better chance of being able to tell what is really responsible for any phenomena one sees – for there are fewer features that have been put into the system and that would lead one astray’’ (p. 109). This is a goal we hope to accomplish with the four simple theories for OB proposed here. This approach, according to Wolfram, leads to an interesting possibility: ‘‘to consider completely random initial conditions . . . one might think that starting from such randomness no order would ever emerge. But in fact . . . many systems spontaneously tend to organize themselves, so that even with completely random initial conditions, they end up producing behavior that has many features that are not random at all’’ (p. 223). When starting with a fixed or given state, there are three basic types of behavior/patterns identified by Wolfram: simple or repeating; nested or fractal; and complex or random. In terms of randomness, ‘‘something should be considered random if none of our standard methods of perception and analysis succeed in detecting any regularities in it’’ (p. 556). Regularities are repetitions or nesting patterns. More formally, ‘‘something should be considered random whenever there is essentially no simple program [rule, theory, model] that can succeed in detecting regularities in it’’ (p. 556). In terms of complexity, ‘‘when we say that something seems complex what we typically mean is that we have not managed to find any simple description of it – or at least those features of it in which we happen to be interested’’ (p. 557). The simplest descriptions are repetition and nesting: If we don’t ‘‘see’’ these, then we consider things to be complex. Relevant for our work here in OB, our four proposed theories are simple ones that can detect, predict, and help understand regularities in behavior. Other, more complex and complicated theories in OB appear to do no better in detecting regularities, as evidenced by the oftentimes nonreplicability of studies and/or findings in the field, and so may be merely tapping randomness. In Wolfram’s words, ‘‘From the intuition of traditional science we might think that if the behavior of a system is complex, then any model for the system must also somehow be correspondingly complex. But . . . this is not in fact the case, and . . . even models that are based on extremely simple underlying rules can yield behavior of great complexity’’ (2002, p. 364). Our contention is that our four simple theories proposed here meet these conditions – that is, beyond being ‘‘simple,’’ they can account for or explain complex behavior and actions of various entities.
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A New Kind of OB
Wolfram goes on to state, ‘‘Typically it is not a good sign if the model ends up being almost as complicated as the phenomena it purports to describe. And it is an even worse sign if when new observations are made the model constantly needs to be patched in order to account for them’’ (2002, p. 365). Unfortunately, this pattern is often observed in OB, where new variables are constantly added to models, increasing their complexity, to account for unexplained behavior. In contrast, ‘‘[it] is usually a good sign . . . if a model is simple, yet still manages to reproduce, even quite roughly, a large number of features of a particular system. And it is an even better sign if a fair fraction of these features are ones that were not known, or at least not explicitly considered, when the model was first constructed’’ (Wolfram, 2002, p. 365). This goal, in fact, underlies our proposing of four simple theories to account for OB at the person (individual), dyad (interpersonal), group (team), and organizational (collective) levels of analysis.
Computations and Rules Wolfram (2002) creates simple models for explaining complex ‘‘everyday systems’’ such as the growth of crystals, the breaking of materials, the flow of fluids (e.g., air and water), fundamental issues in biology (e.g., molecular structure and natural selection), the growth of plants and animals, biological pigmentation patterns, and financial systems. He also demonstrates how simple models can explain complex phenomena in fundamental physics (e.g., conservation of energy, equivalence of direction in space, models of the universe, space–time and relativity, elementary particles, gravity, and quantum phenomena) and in processes of perception and analysis (e.g., randomness, complexity, data compression, visual and auditory perception, statistical analysis, cryptography and cryptanalysis, mathematical formulas, and human thinking). Wolfram accomplishes this by focusing on the notion of computation. For him, systems can be viewed as simple computer programs or in terms of the computations they can perform. The initial conditions are the input; the state of the system after some number of steps corresponds to the output. Also, different systems may have very different internal workings but the computations the systems perform may be very similar, such that ‘‘any system whatsoever can be viewed as performing a computation that determines what its future behavior will be’’ (p. 641). A further notion Wolfram discusses is universality: ‘‘if a system is universal, then it must effectively be capable of emulating any other system, and
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as a result it must be able to reproduce behavior that is as complex as the behavior of any other system’’ (p. 643). He notes that cellular automata, Turing machines, substitution systems, and register machines are examples of systems that, despite the great differences in underlying structures, can be made to emulate each other – that is, ‘‘universals.’’ Also, ‘‘any system whose behavior is not somehow fundamentally repetitive or nesting will in the end turn out to be universal’’ (p. 698) and ‘‘universality is in a sense just associated with general complex behavior’’ (p. 713). This behavior results from simple rules and from altering the initial conditions. More specifically, the general underlying hypothesis for Wolfram’s whole paradigm is the principle of computational equivalence (PCE). It applies to any kind of process, whether natural or artificial. The key underlying idea that leads to PCE is the notion that ‘‘all processes, whether they are produced by human effort or occur spontaneously in nature, can be viewed as computations’’ (p. 715). PCE asserts that ‘‘when viewed in computational terms there is a fundamental equivalence between many different kinds of processes . . . almost all processes that are not obviously simple can be viewed as computations of equivalent sophistication’’ (pp. 716–717) and that ‘‘even extremely simple rules can be universal’’ (p. 718). While we are not dealing with computations per se here, our four proposed theories of OB are simple rules that are universal in Wolfram’s sense. Moreover, PCE ‘‘introduces a new law of nature to the effect that no system can ever carry out explicit computations that are more sophisticated than those carried out by systems like cellular automata and Turing machines’’ (Wolfram, 2002, p. 720). PCE suggests ‘‘that beyond systems with obvious regularities like repetition and nesting most systems are universal, and are equivalent in their computational sophistication’’ (p. 735). Again, this idea also applies to the four theories of OB presented in this chapter. Lastly, ‘‘even though a system may follow definite underlying laws its overall behavior can still have aspects that fundamentally cannot be described by reasonable laws’’ (Wolfram, 2002, p. 750). According to Wolfram, this idea explains the phenomenon of free will. In other words, PCE explains and helps us understand why persons, dyads, groups, and collectives can follow option cutting/commitment, investments/returns, interdependence/cohesion, and titles/expectations, respectively, yet still show variation in behavior that is not accounted for by the theories (rules) per se. In short, systems/entities have ‘‘free will’’; thus, in OB as in science in general, despite our simple theories’ attempts to account for a variety of complex behavior, we can still expect some variability in behavior of persons, dyads, group, and collectives.
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A New Kind of OB
AN OLD KIND OF OB Complex Rules In contrast to the approach of Wolfram (2002), the field of OB is replete with complicated and complex ‘‘rules’’ (ideas, notions, theories) that do not appear to add new explanations for the behavior and actions of systems/ entities. While not wishing to single out any particular publication outlet (because we view this issue as a general problem for OB journals), a typical article published in the Academy of Management Review proposes a theory with ‘‘multiple boxes and arrows,’’ all of which are interconnected to form a complex web of relationships. These complex explanations, which often are never tested or at least never fully tested or replicated in subsequent publications, strain to account for behaviors that may be explained by simpler ‘‘rules,’’ such as those offered in this chapter. These ideas are reflected in the quotations at the outset of this chapter from Carl Sagan, who some have suggested may be the second greatest scientist of the twentieth century (after Albert Einstein) based on not only his discoveries but also his role in making science readily accessible to the general public. In brief, the quotes from Sagan’s work indicate that there are too many theories and not enough data, too many untested or weakly tested theories, and weak evidence for complicated theories, especially when simpler explanations are available. These ideas seem to readily apply to OB, where they are further supported by weak or at best marginal results in meta-analyses on most complex (rather than simple) theories. Levels of Management versus Levels of Analysis Another problem with current approaches in OB is that they often ignore entities (or systems) per se, instead focusing and building upon on levels of management or assuming levels of analysis (without making them explicit) or both. Even now, despite more than two decades of levels work, there is still confusion and misunderstanding about levels of analysis versus levels of management issues. These issues have been discussed in detail for a variety of areas in OB in general (see Dansereau et al., 1984, 2006; Dansereau, Yammarino, & Kohles, 1999; Dansereau & Yammarino, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007; Yammarino & Dansereau, 2002a, 2004, 2006; Yammarino, 1994; Yammarino & Markham, 1992) as well as for specific areas within OB such as leadership research (see Dansereau & Yammarino, 1998a, 1998b; Yammarino, Dionne, Chun, & Dansereau, 2005; Yammarino, 1998).
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Levels of Management: Organizational Chart (4 Levels)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Levels of Analysis: 15 Persons, 14 Dyads, 7 Groups, 2 Collectives, 1 Organization
Fig. 1.
Levels of Management and Levels of Analysis.
While levels of analysis issues are more fully explicated later in this chapter, Fig. 1 begins this clarification and highlights the differences between levels of management and levels of analysis. The same people within the same organization are shown in the upper (levels of management) and lower (levels of analysis) portions of the figure, but a different configuration or view occurs by rearranging the nodes in the figures (adapted from Wolfram, 2002, on network systems). The nodes are individuals who, in the upper portion of the figure, are placed in an organizational chart of four levels of management (with the CEO, e.g., at the top). In the lower portion of the figure, these same individuals (with the CEO in the middle) account for various levels of analysis – that is, 15 persons, 14 dyads (one-to-one relationships), 7 groups (or teams), 2 collectives (e.g., departments), and 1 organization – and can be
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A New Kind of OB
viewed in terms of any of these ‘‘lenses.’’ Note that specifying and/or testing levels of management is not the same thing as specifying and/or testing levels of analysis. Summary Given the previously identified issues, it is time to dispense with ‘‘an old kind of OB’’ and begin to focus on a new kind of OB that values simple ‘‘rules’’ (Wolfram, 2002) or what we might call ‘‘little ideas that are well tested’’ rather than complex ‘‘rules’’ or what we might refer to as ‘‘big ideas that are poorly tested.’’ These simple theories should ideally include the smallest number of constructs and variables possible and should explicitly incorporate entities, systems, or levels of analysis. As noted by Chaitin, ‘‘a theory has to be simpler than the data it explains, otherwise it does not explain anything . . . The simpler the theory, the better you understand something’’ (2006, pp. 76–77). In this sense, we are well served by William of Occam and Occam’s razor – a rule of thumb that states when faced with two hypotheses (theories or ‘‘rules’’) that explain the data or evidence equally well, one should choose the simpler one. So, following the tradition of Occam, Sagan, and Wolfram, we offer four simple theories and a comprehensive approach for testing and gathering better evidence about them for a new kind of OB.
A NEW KIND OF OB: THE VARIENT APPROACH Endorsing the notion that simple rules, ideas, and theories are better and explain as much or more than complex ones (e.g., Einstein’s famous equation E ¼ mc2), we wish to formulate theories with a minimal number of constructs that explain the behaviors and actions of entities or systems. In fact, the absolute minimum (simple) specification for a ‘‘theory’’ is two constructs, with a relationship specified between them, about something (i.e., entities or objects of study), as exemplified by Einstein’s equation for energy. Our four proposed theories have these characteristics and are notions that have ‘‘deep roots,’’ as they are linked to traditional or classical ideas. We begin this discussion with a focus on the entities or levels of analysis. Levels of Analysis Levels of analysis issues and multiple-level approaches are becoming increasingly important in many areas of OB and closely related research (see
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Dansereau & Yammarino, 1998a, 1998b, 2003, 2005, 2007; Yammarino & Dansereau, 2002a, 2004, 2006). Various scholars (Dansereau et al., 1984, 1999; House, Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994; Rousseau, 1985; Yammarino et al., 2005) have noted the importance of clearly specifying the levels of analysis at which phenomena are expected to exist theoretically, and have stated that it is critical to ensure that the measurement of constructs and data-analytic techniques correspond to the asserted levels of analysis, so that inference drawing is neither misleading nor artifactual. Levels of analysis are inherent in theoretical formulations. In some formulations, the levels of analysis are implicit or assumed. In other cases, levels of analysis are used to formulate the boundary conditions under which a theory is expected to hold. In still other instances, theories, propositions, and hypotheses explicitly incorporate levels of analysis as an integral component of the formulation. Understanding how and if levels are specified permits an examination of the potential for or degree of prevalence of theoretical misspecification. Moreover, identification of relevant levels of analysis issues may help account for mixed, inconsistent, and contradictory findings in prior research. Without explicit incorporation of levels of analysis issues, incomplete understanding of a construct or phenomenon may lead to faulty measures, inappropriate data-analytic techniques, and erroneous conclusions. Theoretical revolutions in science often emerge when other levels of analysis are considered. For example, a revolution in biology occurred when some theorists suggested, and subsequently demonstrated, that evolution can occur at a level of analysis higher than the organism level. Likewise, a well-known revolution in physics arose when some theorists asserted, and subsequently demonstrated, that quantum mechanics operate at a level of analysis lower than the atomic level. In this same way, OB theory building can advance when we include lower and higher levels of analysis in theory development and hypothesis generation. Levels of analysis are the entities or objects of study. In the current work, we are interested in human beings in work organizations. Entities are typically arranged in hierarchical order such that higher levels (e.g., groups) include lower levels (e.g., persons), and lower levels are embedded in higher levels (see Dansereau et al., 1984; Yammarino, 1996; Yammarino & Bass, 1991). In the various areas of OB research, four key levels of analysis of human beings are relevant: individuals or persons (independent human beings), dyads (two-person groups and interpersonal relationships), groups (workgroups and teams), and organizations (collectives larger than groups
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and groups of groups) (see Dansereau et al., 1984; Yammarino, 1996; Yammarino & Bass, 1991). First, human beings in organizations can be viewed as individuals or persons, independent of one another. In this case, we can focus on an employee, a manager, a leader, or a follower/subordinate, or how these individuals differ from one another. Individual differences are of interest here. Second, human beings in organizations can be viewed as dyads, or two individuals who are interdependent on a one-to-one basis. A dyad is a special case of groups – that is, a two-person group. In this case, we can focus on superior–subordinate dyads, leader–follower dyads, peer–peer dyads, coworker–coworker dyads, or interpersonal relationships, independent of the formal workgroup. Third, human beings in organizations can be viewed as groups or teams. While there are some potential differences between groups and teams, we view them similarly here – as a collection of individuals who are interdependent and interact on a face-to-face or ‘‘virtual’’ (non-colocated) basis with one another. Formal workgroups or teams generally consist of a leader or a manager and his or her immediate followers or direct reports. Fourth, human beings in organizations can be viewed as collectives. In this case, the focus is on clusterings of individuals that are larger than groups and that are interdependent based on a hierarchical structuring or a set of common or shared expectations. Collectives include groups of groups, departments, functional areas, strategic business units, and organizations. They often do not involve direct interaction among people (as in groups), but rather are held together by echelons or hierarchies. These four levels of analysis – person, dyad, group, and collective – represent different perspectives on the human beings who make up organizations. In this sense, they can be thought of as different lenses through which human beings can be observed. A key characteristic of these levels is their embeddedness; for example, two persons make up a dyad, multiple persons make up a group, multiple dyads make up a larger group, and multiple groups make up a collective. In other words, as one views human being from increasingly higher levels of analysis, the number of entities decreases (e.g., there are fewer collectives than groups in an organization), and the size of the entities increases (e.g., collectives include a larger number of human beings than do groups). Wholes and Parts In our approach, there are four alternatives to consider for each level of analysis (see Table 2). Two of these alternatives are plausible views of the
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Table 2.
Summary of Single-Level Formulations.
Alternative Views of Entities
Members of Units
Wholes Parts Equivocal Inexplicable
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Independent Not relevant
Associations among Unit Members
Between-Entities Differences
Within-Entities Differences
Positive Negative Independent Not relevant
Systematic Error Systematic Error
Error Systematic Systematic Error
focal entities (parts and wholes as units of analysis), and two of them indicate that focal entities are not relevant but that other entities may be plausible (equivocal and inexplicable). We distinguish conceptually between two different views of any level of analysis (also see Lerner, 1963). A wholes view is defined as a focus between entities but not within them; differences between entities are viewed as valid, and differences within entities are viewed as error (random). This perspective can be described as a between-units case (Glick & Roberts, 1984; Pedhazur, 1982). In this instance, members of a unit are homogeneous, the whole unit is of importance, and relationships among members of units with respect to constructs of a theory are positive. Relationships among theoretical constructs are a function of differences between units. A parts view is defined as a focus within entities but not between them; differences within entities are valid, and differences between entities are erroneous. This perspective can be described as a within-units case (Glick & Roberts, 1984; Pedhazur, 1982) or a frog pond effect (Firebaugh, 1980). In this instance, members of a unit are heterogeneous, a member’s position relative to other members is of importance, and relationships among members of units with respect to constructs of a theory are negative. Relationships among theoretical constructs are a function of differences within units. These two views – wholes and parts – are conceptually different ways to indicate that a particular level of analysis is relevant for understanding constructs and variables of interest. In addition to permitting effects at a particular level of analysis, various authors indicate that effects may not be evidenced at that level (Lerner, 1963; Miller, 1978; Pedhazur, 1982). Thus the focal level is considered not relevant, and other levels must be considered. In one case, there is a focus both between and within entities at a focal level. Determining whether a wholes or parts view is occurring is difficult because both between- and within-entities differences are valid. Thus the
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focal level of analysis does not clarify our understanding of the constructs and variables of interest. Consequently, other levels must be considered. If the assumption is made that only one level of analysis can be considered, then seemingly both conditions (wholes and parts) are occurring. Because there are always other levels of analysis to consider (Miller, 1978), however, this condition must be viewed as equivocal – between- and within-entities differences are equally likely. The more parsimonious conclusion is that neither wholes nor parts views at the focal level are appropriate (Dansereau et al., 1984; Yammarino & Markham, 1992). In this instance, members of a unit are independent, members are free of the unit’s influence, and relationships among members of units with respect to constructs of a theory are independent. In short, relationships among theoretical constructs are a function of differences between members (e.g., persons) independent of higher-level units (e.g., groups). Another possibility – namely, error or lack of focus between and within entities – is an inexplicable or traditional null view of a focal level. In this case, the focal level also is not relevant for understanding the theoretical constructs of interest; instead, other levels of analysis should be specified conceptually. In summary: Wholes are homogeneous entities that display similarity among members, where between-entities differences are systematic and within-entities differences are error. Parts are heterogeneous entities that display complementarity among members, where within-entities differences are systematic and betweenentities differences are error. Equivocal reflects independence among members, where between- and within-entities differences are systematic and other entities should be considered. Inexplicable indicates a null case where between- and within-entities differences are error and other entities should be explored. Given these alternatives, it becomes a matter of selecting among them based on theory and data analysis. Multiple Levels Beyond these single levels of analysis (i.e., individuals, dyads, groups, or collectives viewed separately), a key issue is that of multiple levels of analysis. In other words, levels can be viewed in combination or simultaneously
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Table 3.
Summary of Multiple-Level Formulations.
Multiple-Level Formulation
Lower-Level View
Higher-Level View
Cross-level wholes Cross-level parts Level-specific wholes Level-specific parts Emergent wholes Emergent parts Equivocal Inexplicable
Wholes Wholes Wholes Parts Equivocal Equivocal Equivocal Inexplicable
Wholes Parts Equivocal Inexplicable Wholes Parts Equivocal Inexplicable
Source: See Dansereau et al. (1984, p. 186) for eight additional (null) alternatives and their interpretation.
(see Table 3). In these cases, we are concerned with multi-level or cross-level effects, as well as with mixed determinants and mixed-level effects (for details and a review, see Dansereau et al., 1984; Dansereau & Yammarino, 2000; Klein et al., 1994; Rousseau, 1985). For us, multi-level or meso formulations (theories, propositions, and hypotheses) are explanations linking variables, which operate at different levels of analysis (e.g., person-level X is positively related to group-level Y) (see Behling, 1978). Rousseau states that such theories specify ‘‘relationships between independent and dependent variables at different levels’’ (1985, p. 20). (Rousseau calls these cross-level – not multi-level or meso – formulations.) Models of this type provide among-level explanations because they link variables in terms of multiple levels of analysis. Included here are mixed-effects models, in which a single variable of interest may have effects at multiple levels with multiple criteria of interest, as well as mixed-determinants models, in which multiple predictor variables at various levels of analysis affect a single criterion at a single level of analysis. For us, cross-level formulations (theories, propositions, and hypotheses) are statements about relationships among variables that are likely to hold equally well at a number of levels of analysis (e.g., X and Y are positively related for individuals and for groups) (see Behling, 1978; Dansereau et al., 1984; Miller, 1978). Rousseau notes that such cross-level formulations ‘‘specify patterns of relationships replicated across levels of analysis’’ (1985, p. 22). (Rousseau, however, calls these multi-level – not cross-level – formulations.) Models of this type are uniquely powerful and parsimonious (simple) because the same effect is manifested at more than one level of analysis (e.g., E ¼ mc2, which holds at multiple levels of analysis).
A New Kind of OB
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Assuming only one level of analysis in a study, or choosing only one level without consideration of other levels, can either mask effects or indicate an effect when none truly exists (Lerner, 1963; Miller, 1978; Pedhazur, 1982; Roberts, Hulin, & Rousseau, 1978). These issues are especially important when individuals are embedded within larger units such as dyads, groups, and collectives in organizations. Thus considering only one level of analysis is insufficient. Instead, multiple levels should be identified in combination. Regarding the particular formulations in Table 3, relationships among constructs may be hypothesized to hold at a lower (e.g., person) level but not at a higher (e.g., group) level. These relationships are discussed as a discontinuity thesis (Miller, 1978), as level-specific formulations (Dansereau et al., 1984; Miller, 1978), or empirically as disaggregated, individual, or level-specific effects (Pedhazur, 1982; Robinson, 1950). In these cases, the higher level of analysis is not relevant for understanding the theoretical constructs. In contrast, relationships among constructs may not be asserted at a lower level but may be hypothesized to manifest themselves at a higher level of analysis. These relationships also are discussed as a type of discontinuity thesis (Miller, 1978), as emergent formulations that hold at a higher (e.g., group) level after not being asserted or found to hold at a lower (e.g., person) level (Dansereau et al., 1984; Miller, 1978), empirically as a higher-level effects that do not disaggregate, or as emergent effects (Miller, 1978; Robinson, 1950). In these cases, the lower level of analysis is not relevant for understanding the theoretical constructs. Thus, in the case of level-specific and emergent formulations, even though a single level of analysis is of primary concern, other levels are considered but defined as not relevant. Alternatively, relationships among constructs may be hypothesized to hold at higher (e.g., collective) and lower (e.g., group) levels of analysis. These relationships are discussed as a homology thesis (Miller, 1978) or empirically as aggregated or ecological effects (Glick & Roberts, 1984; Pedhazur, 1982; Robinson, 1950). As noted previously, they are of two types: Cross-level explanations (Behling, 1978; Miller, 1978; Dansereau et al., 1984) specify relationships among theoretical constructs that hold equally well, or are replicated across, higher and lower levels. Multi-level or meso explanations (Behling, 1978) assert relationships among theoretical constructs (independent and dependent variables) that operate at different levels of analysis (e.g., individual-level X is related to group-level Y).
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We focus on multiple levels of analysis simultaneously and in conjunction with wholes and parts views of levels. Using such specifications for identifying multi-level views, eight cases can be developed. First, wholes at a lower level can aggregate or manifest themselves as wholes at a higher level. This cross-level wholes formulation means that members are homogeneous with respect to the constructs of interest in all entities (e.g., groups and collectives) at both levels of analysis, but the entities (e.g., groups and collectives) differ from one another. Second, wholes at a lower level can aggregate or manifest themselves as parts at a higher level. This cross-level parts formulation means that members are homogeneous with respect to the constructs of interest in all the lower-level entities (e.g., groups), and that these differ from one another. In contrast, in all higher-level entities (e.g., collectives), there is heterogeneity as members within the entities differ from one another. Third, wholes at a lower level may not aggregate or manifest themselves at a higher level (equivocal). This level-specific wholes formulation means that members are homogeneous with respect to the constructs of interest in all lower-level entities (e.g., groups), but that higher-level entities (e.g., collectives) are not relevant. Fourth, parts at a lower level may not aggregate or manifest themselves at a higher level (inexplicable). This level-specific parts formulation means that members are heterogeneous with respect to the constructs of interest in all lower-level entities (e.g., groups), but that higher-level entities (e.g., collectives) are not relevant. Fifth, for an emergent wholes formulation, constructs are expected to hold at a higher (e.g., group) level where members are homogeneous with respect to the constructs after not having been expected or observed at a lower level (equivocal). Sixth, for an emergent parts formulation, constructs are expected to hold at a higher (e.g., group) level where members are heterogeneous with respect to the constructs after not having been expected or observed at a lower level (equivocal). Finally, multi-level formulations can be specified as equivocal (case 7) or inexplicable (case 8) where both higher and lower levels are asserted to be equivocal or inexplicable, respectively, and not relevant for the constructs of interest. In these two cases, additional (other) levels of analysis must be considered for understanding the phenomena of interest. These eight formulations are presented in Table 3 for sake of completeness, but only some are relevant here to specify our four simple theories.
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Having outlined an approach for understanding entities in terms of single and multiple levels of analysis, it is now possible to consider variables and constructs and their relationships in conjunction with the entities to specify four simple, yet comprehensive theories for a new kind of OB. As noted earlier, each theory consists of two variables, an association between them, and a specification of the levels of analysis at which they are expected to operate (i.e., entities for which they are asserted to hold). These ‘‘little ideas that can be well tested’’ are simple ‘‘rules’’ [in Wolfram’s (2002) terms] that can account for or explain a variety of behaviors and actions in OB.
A THEORY OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR AND DECISION MAKING Theory 1. Option cutting and commitment are positively related based on between-person differences (interindividual differences or whole persons); a level-specific theory at the person level of analysis. General Formulation Individuals form psychological attachments to all kinds of entities – family, friends, supervisors, coworkers, and organizations, among others. Such a psychological binding or attachment is typically called commitment (see Becker, 1960; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002; Meyer & Allen, 1984, 1991, 1997; Meyer, Becker, & Vandenberghe, 2004; Meyer & Herscovitch, 2001; Naughton, 1982; Price & Mueller, 1986; Staw, 1976). In OB, commitment to an organization, a superior, and a role are particularly critical, and the basis of this psychological attachment can be cognitive, emotional, or both. How such psychological attachments arise, whether and how they develop over time, and whether certain individuals are more prone to make or form commitments have been the subject of much theorizing, empirical research, and speculation. A traditional view, first espoused by March and Simon (1958), is that organizations or other entities provide ‘‘inducements’’ to individuals to be committed. Thus, the more investments or ‘‘side bets’’ individuals make in various entities, the more likely they are to become committed to them (Becker, 1960). In Becker’s (1960) side-bet theory, as an employee accumulates more significant investments in an organization, the
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more important it becomes to maintain a relationship with that organization; as the number of side bets increases, so does the commitment. Staw (1976) describes this escalation of commitment to a chosen course of action. The psychological mechanism seems to be powerful enough that individuals continue to commit to various entities or courses of action even when facing continual negative consequences (Staw, 1976). For Meyer and Allen (1984, 1991), continuance commitment occurs when the cost of leaving (an organization) is perceived as prohibitively high, causing the employee to remain at the organization. In brief, individuals, when faced with various alternative courses of action – options or behaviors – appear to become more committed to certain entities as options decrease (i.e., continuance commitment; Meyer & Allen, 1984), as side bets increase (i.e., other options are cut off or viewed as not feasible; Becker, 1960), and as their calculations regarding such costs, investments over time, and lack of alternatives become more salient (‘‘calculative commitment’’; Hrebiniak & Alutto, 1972; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). As such, for individuals, things persist over time and involve a rejection of feasible alternatives that, presumably, are less desirable. We refer to this process simply as option cutting (also see Naughton, 1982). An interesting issue here is (1) whether these individual differences are a reflection of relatively stable individual traits or characteristics such that we can observe interindividual differences where commitment and option cutting vary from person to person or (2) whether these individual differences shift or develop over time such that we can observe intraindividual differences where commitment and option cutting change within persons. The former view is a whole-person perspective; the latter is a person-parts perspective. Both are plausible levels of analysis alternatives for defining and explaining the option cutting–commitment connection (see Naughton, 1982). Given these points, it seems useful to elaborate some notions about commitment (especially to organization, roles, and superiors), option cutting (and its various forms or types), and person level of analysis issues to develop a testable theory of these ideas.
Specific Formulation In terms of commitment, psychological attachments to organizations, roles (or jobs), and one’s superior/supervisor have all been the subject of prior work (e.g., Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Meyer et al., 2002, 2004). Organizations in general, and work roles (or occupations) and supervisors in particular, are
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an important part of our lives. Oftentimes, beyond spending a large portion of their working hours in organizations and in work roles as well as interacting with superiors, individuals identify with their organizations and jobs and endorse or adopt the values espoused by their superiors. As such, our interest in commitment per se is more specifically focused on an individual’s psychological attachment to his or her (1) organization, (2) role, and (3) superior. In terms of option cutting, several different mechanisms or types may be involved (see Naughton, 1982). First, individuals can display an option-cutting orientation. In other words, perhaps owing to personality traits or characteristics, some individuals may have a greater propensity to seek out and evaluate information on options relative to one another. They might then be more inclined to cut off options as compared to other individuals. Second, this process may be behavioral based and evidenced in terms of option-cutting actions. Some individuals may cut options by engaging in behaviors or actions that preclude or prevent them from engaging in other forms of behavior. Physical activities, emotional energy, and psychological efforts are all limited in some way, so engaging in some activities means not partaking in other ones. Finally, environmental option-cutting is setting- or context-based. In this case, because of various situational constraints or contingencies, individuals may find themselves in environments or contexts where they do not know about options or alternatives or cannot gather information to evaluate them. Their location in such situations may result either from their own choices or from factors beyond their control. When considered together, it seems plausible that option-cutting orientation, option-cutting actions, and environmental option cutting are associated with commitment to an organization, a work role, and a superior based on individual differences (i.e., the person level of analysis). A variety of OB and related literatures appear to support this assertion at the person level of analysis as well as in terms of both stable trait differences (betweenpersons view; i.e., wholes) and changes in individuals over time (withinpersons view; i.e., parts). At what is often recognized as the beginning of OB, March and Simon (1958) extended the classical economics view and discussed the notions of ‘‘bounded rationality’’ and ‘‘satisficing.’’ Individuals are not able to pursue multiple courses of action simultaneously because of physical (space–time) and biological restrictions. Moreover, they often do not know or cannot even conceive of the consequences of their actions because information is not 100% complete or accurate, nor is unlimited information processing
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time available to assess costs and benefits of alternatives. As such, individuals make rational decisions within limits (bounded rationality) that are satisfactory rather than optimal in nature (satisficing). Individuals are, therefore, viewed as restricting their alternative courses of action or cutting off options that are unknown, viewed as not feasible, perceived as not available, and so on. The more options that are cut or eliminated, the more individuals become committed to the options that remain. Choices or investments that individuals make in various courses of action can explain their attitudes such as commitment to an organization, job, or superior. Becker’s (1960) discussion of side bets aligns with this view. As a function of time, the cost of leaving a system (e.g., organization) increases because an individual has made more and more bets or developed extraneous interests in the system, and as such remains committed to staying. This ‘‘consistent behavior’’ – that is, consistent lines of activity – implies a rejection by the individual of feasible alternatives, resulting in a ‘‘commitment by default’’ (see Becker, 1960). An underlying issue for side bets is that by placing these bets, an individual gives up other alternative courses of actions or options. In a related development, Staw (1976) noted that even in light of negative consequences, individuals tend to hold to a decision and continue investing in a failing course of action, rather than reversing the decision. Individuals appear to continue to commit to these decisions because their behavioral actions prevent them from entertaining or engaging in other options. Individuals cannot optimize their decision, so they use satisficing criteria to justify remaining with the current option and cut off other options (also see March & Simon, 1958). This strategy then yields an escalation of commitment to the current course of action (see Staw, 1976). The preceding discussion suggests two different possibilities to account for how individuals cut options and become committed (also see Naughton, 1982). First, at the person level of analysis, the option cutting–commitment relationship may be based on stable traits or enduring characteristics of individuals. In this case of interindividual differences, option cutting and commitment are properties of individuals and vary from person to person (between-person differences or a wholes perspective). For example, workaholics, by their very nature, may be more committed and cut off more options than non-workaholics. Even so, if option cutting and commitment are viewed as individuals’ stable traits, then organizations might make selection decisions based on these constructs and their specific dimensions. Second, and also at the person level of analysis, the option cutting– commitment relationship may evolve over time as shifts or changes occur
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concomitantly for the two main constructs and their specific dimensions. In this case of intraindividual differences, option cutting and commitment constitute an internal process that varies within each person (within-person differences or a parts perspective). For example, a state of cognitive dissonance or tension might motivate a person to change his or her option cutting, and therefore commitment, so as to restore harmony or balance in the individual’s life. If option cutting and commitment are viewed as changeable internal processes of individuals, then organizations might make training and development decisions based on them. A third possibility is that a shift in levels of analysis – rather than a shift in variables – occurs over time [see Dansereau et al. (1999) for a detailed explanation of this phenomenon] for the option cutting and commitment relationship. In this case, a parts (or wholes) view of option cutting and commitment at a focal time period might ‘‘transform’’ up (or down) to a wholes (or parts) view at a subsequent time period. While this process is plausible, as are the other two previously mentioned views at the person level of analysis, in the spirit of simplicity endorsed here, as well as based on the more traditional view in the literature (see Becker, 1960; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Meyer et al., 2002, 2004), we offer below what we believe is the more likely alternative as an initial assertion for empirical testing in future work. In summary, these notions result in the following specific testable formulation: Option-cutting orientation, option-cutting actions, and environmental option cutting are positively related to commitment to an organization, commitment to a role, and commitment to a superior based on between-employee differences (interindividual differences or whole employees).
Etiology of the Effect Why do we expect this person-level hypothesized effect to hold? Or, stated differently, from an evolutionary theory perspective (Gould, 2002), does the effect make a difference in terms of the human condition and survival? We believe that this effect may matter because without it, or something like this effect, it would likely be impossible for individuals to make decisions and stay with or attach to them. The hypothesis means that an individual can commit to a course of action and pursue it. Without this capability, or something similar to it, when faced with a threat, there would be too many (virtually unlimited) options to pursue, and the individual would likely experience analysis paralysis. In such a situation, if a predator was starting
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to attack, this paralysis would have resulted in extinction. Thus this effect, or something like it, may be quite important for the survival of humans. Those individuals with capabilities to cut options and become committed may have been likely to pass that characteristic on in an evolutionary sense. As an additional issue, if a person is committed, how can that commitment change? For a change to occur requires that a new set of behaviors or choices arise, such that then the commitment changes. But these behaviors and choices will be resistant to change until the person perceives that the current behavior or option does not satisfy him or her any longer, and that it no longer warrants commitment. In other words, the person would become dissatisfied with the current choice and no longer remain committed to it. Barring such a situation, the original option remains the viable one that the person follows.
A THEORY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND LEADERSHIP Theory 2. Investments and returns are positively related based on betweendyad differences (whole dyads); a level-specific theory that emerges at the dyad level of analysis. General Formulation Our theory of interpersonal relationships and leadership is a formulation derived from a general theory of social exchange (see Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976; Homans, 1958, 1961), which links equity, inequity, and law of effect notions (see Dansereau et al., 1984). As a general theory, social exchange theory can be viewed as a positive relationship between investments and returns. Investments are what one party gives to another party; returns are what one party receives from another party. The ideas of giving and receiving are linked via the principle of reciprocal reinforcement: investments trigger returns and returns trigger investments. A key point of these ideas is that two interdependent parties are involved. Moreover, the dyadic partners are in a balanced relationship where the amount of giving and receiving for each party is similar – that is, whole dyads. Some dyads are rich, with a lot of giving and receiving by both partners; other dyads are poor, with little giving and receiving by both partners. If such dyadic relationships are not balanced, they tend to be short-lived.
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A key assumption of exchange theory is that people are rational, and perhaps hedonistic, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain – or, more realistically, seeking rewards and avoiding punishments. This assumption underlies the law of effect and permits mutual reinforcement – the norm of reciprocity – based on common needs and interests, to hold for exchange formulations (see Gouldner, 1960). This traditional theoretical work from psychology, sociology, and anthropology underlies the giving and receiving (investments and returns) between partners upon which this theory is based.
Specific Formulation In work organizations, the key partners involved in social exchange relationships of investments and returns are superiors and subordinates. Superiors make investments (e.g., salary, office space) in and receive returns (e.g., performance) from subordinates. Subordinates, in turn, make investments in and receive returns from superiors. These investments and returns occur on a one-to-one basis in each superior–subordinate dyad (e.g., Yammarino & Dubinsky, 1992; Yammarino, 1995). According to the individualized leadership approach (see Dansereau, 1995; Dansereau et al., 1995; Mumford, Dansereau, & Yammarino, 2000), a critical superior investment is providing support for feelings of self-worth to a subordinate. This can be accomplished by a superior providing attention, support, and assurance to a subordinate. Conversely, a key subordinate investment is providing exceptional performance to a superior. This can be accomplished by a subordinate providing performance at or beyond standards, particularly, in terms of quality, and doing a job in line with a superior’s preferences. These same sets of variables then also serve as subordinate returns (receiving support for his or her self-worth from a superior) and superior returns (receiving satisfying performance from a subordinate), respectively. Again, whole superior–subordinate dyads are involved; that is, some relationships are rich while others are poor, and the relationships tend to be balanced. A key element of such dyadic leadership is the notion of support for selfworth that one individual provides another. This concept is defined as (1) supporting another individual’s actions and ideas; (2) assuring the other individual of confidence and his or her integrity, ability, and motivation; and (3) paying attention to the individual’s feelings and needs. The objective of support for self-worth is not to get people working together (traditional leadership genre) or to establish a vision (new leadership genre), but rather
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to develop the individual’s competencies. Individualized leadership is a dyadic theory that involves empowerment. One can have empowerment without goals or visions and without getting people to work together. As such, the latter concepts are different aspects of leadership than support for self-worth and individualized leadership (see Dansereau & Yammarino, 1998b; Yammarino, Dansereau, & Kennedy, 2001). Of course, not all ‘‘designated leaders’’ become ‘‘real leaders’’ for all subordinates, as the approach is individualized for each unique dyadic relationship. In other words, individuals (superiors) become leaders for (some, but not necessarily all) subordinates by providing a subordinate with a sense of support for the subordinate’s self-worth as an individual. In turn, (some but not necessarily all) subordinates become followers of a leader by perceiving and receiving a sense of self-worth from the leader and performing in ways that satisfy both the leader and themselves. Their performance is valued by the leader, and in the process these subordinates validate their own sense of self-worth. From a superior’s perspective, subordinates are viewed as independent, unique individuals who can be assessed in terms of specific variables. For example, a superior can assess the degree to which a subordinate’s performance satisfies that superior. Based on exchange theory, one would expect that those subordinates viewed by superiors as performing in ways that satisfy the superior would, in turn, receive reinforcement of their sense of self-worth from the superior. Homans (1961) notes that people give social approval (a sense of self-worth) as a generalized reinforcer to others who have given them commodities they value (satisfying performance), which makes it more likely that the other parties will continue giving valued commodities. Homans (1961) also hypothesizes that individuals who can give rare and highly valued services or commodities as rewards can command in return a great deal of esteem from others. In terms of leadership, then, the key variables are (1) the performance of a subordinate that satisfies a superior and (2) support by a superior for a subordinate’s sense of self-worth. Leadership researchers traditionally focus on subordinate performance as perceived by a superior (see Bass, 1990). A focus on performance that satisfies a superior allows for the possibility that a subordinate’s performance may satisfy one superior but not others. As such, a leader is defined, in part, as one who obtains satisfying performance from another person. Therefore, the ability to satisfy a superior reflects differences between individual subordinates, independent of their formal hierarchical arrangement with a superior.
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Support for self-worth is a judgment or perception that a superior supports a subordinate’s individual self-worth in a variety of ways. Our focus is on the degree to which a superior perceives himself or herself as supporting a subordinate’s feelings of self-worth rather than on the selfesteem of a subordinate independent of the superior. A superior’s perception of one assigned subordinate is independent of the same superior’s perception of other subordinates assigned to him or her. From the perspective of subordinates, subordinates perform in a satisfying manner for superiors based on their perceptions of the superiors. Given social exchange theory, when a subordinate perceives that a superior supports his or her sense of self-worth, the subordinate takes more personal responsibility for the support received because this support focuses on the subordinate’s individual differences in terms of elements such as needs, feelings, and integrity. Based on exchange theory, subordinates reciprocate by adjusting the degree to which they satisfy a superior. Moreover, the perceptions of any one subordinate are independent of the perceptions of the other subordinates who are formally assigned to the same superior. Thus a subordinate’s perceptions of self-worth support and satisfying performance are independent of the perceptions of other subordinates who are formally assigned to the same superior. Combining the subordinate and superior perspectives, subordinates are viewed by themselves and by their superiors as unique individuals, regardless of their formal group assignments. This is the essence of an individualized view of superiors and subordinates. Overlaying leadership concerns on this individualized view requires the notion of reciprocal interdependence between superiors and subordinates (see Bass, 1990). Although there may be a lack of interdependence when superiors and subordinates interact initially, interdependence develops over time in more well-established superior–subordinate (dyadic) relationships. For less well-established superior–subordinate interactions, support for self-worth and satisfying performance, as viewed by both superiors and subordinates, are not reciprocally interdependent. When superiors and subordinates first enter into a social exchange relationship, their relationship can be characterized as pooled interdependence. Over time, however, reciprocal interdependence will increase and superiors’ and subordinates’ perceptions will become related. This evolution will occur because subordinates begin to reciprocate with satisfying performance when they perceive that superiors provide them with support for their sense of self-worth. Superiors then complete the cycle by actually reinforcing perceptions of self-worth in exchange for satisfying performance.
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For more well-established superior–subordinate interactions, support for self-worth and satisfying performance are reciprocally interdependent. This dyadic notion – the dyad level of analysis – means that there is interdependence between superiors and subordinates on the dimensions of support for self-worth and satisfying performance. Variation or disagreement within dyads (i.e., differences between superiors and subordinates) is viewed as ‘‘error’’ and occurs rarely. If it does happen, usually one party terminates the relationship by transferring to another department or leaving the organization. In contrast, variation between dyads occurs more often. Thus support for feelings of self-worth and satisfying performance from a superior’s perspective depend on the specific subordinate with whom a superior interacts. Feelings of support for self-worth on the part of subordinates vary from one subordinate to another (who report to the same superior). This is a very individualized view, in which the individual is the subordinate and the individuality of the subordinate is enhanced by the superior. The leadership component of individualized leadership is evident because a superior and a specific subordinate (leader and follower) are interdependent. This linkage occurs between the follower as a person and a ‘‘part’’ of the leader (superior) that views the subordinate as a unique person. Such a dyadic perspective depends on the leader’s view of the follower and the follower’s view of the leader – that is, a superior–subordinate dyad. The most typical source of the initiation of this individualized leadership process is superior investments as perceived by the subordinate. A key pivotal event – the initial investment – usually initiates a rich interpersonal connection if it is reciprocated. Beyond the general investments and returns noted previously, specific dimensions of investments and returns can include showing respect, cooperativeness, openness, being task-centered, endorsing values, benevolence, acceptance, authenticity, having fun, providing learning opportunities, communication, and allowing self-responsibility and mistakes. Specific behavioral indicators of investments and returns can include head nods (i.e., agreement), direct eye contact (i.e., attention), praise, questions (by one party), and answers (by the other party). In these behavioral ways, the dyadic bonds can be enhanced and reinforced to richer levels. (For an extended discussion of these notions, see Dansereau et al., 1984, 1995; Mumford et al., 2000; Wallis, 1999; Yammarino & Dansereau, 2002b). In summary, these notions result in the following specific testable formulation: Superior investments (support for self-worth) and returns (satisfying performance) are positively related to subordinate investments (satisfying performance) and returns
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A New Kind of OB (support for self-worth) based on between-superior–subordinate dyad differences (whole superior–subordinate dyads).
Etiology of the Effect Why do we expect this dyad-level hypothesized effect to hold? Stated differently, from an evolutionary theory perspective (Gould, 2002), does the effect make a difference in terms of the human condition and survival? We believe that this effect may matter because without it, or an effect like this one, it seems unlikely that individuals would have seen benefits from interacting with others (making investments), even if only for a very short time. For example, those individuals who are likely to see returns (e.g., of a sexual nature) from interacting with others are those who are more likely to have children. Thus the capability implicit in the effect would be passed on in an evolutionary sense. Moreover, without this effect, it would be difficult for a child to survive because a child cannot fend for himself or herself. Thus, if providing for the child did not provide some benefit to the parent or other caregiver, the child would be unable to survive. An additional issue regarding this effect relates to change. The basic idea is that if a focal individual’s investments in another individual do not relate to that focal individual’s returns from the other individual, the dyadic relationship may collapse because it will be perceived as unfair. This effect can be viewed as underlying equity theory. For example, various changes may be made by members of the dyad to equalize or balance the investments and returns. In addition, the manner in which people learn what is equitable is expected, in part, to be a function of the previous reinforcement contingencies.
A THEORY OF GROUP DYNAMICS/TEAM PROCESSES AND NORMS Theory 3. Interdependence and cohesion are positively related based on between-group differences (whole groups); a level-specific theory that emerges at the group level of analysis. General Formulation Norms are standards shared by group/team members and, when highly agreed upon, permit the group/team to regulate individual behavior.
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(Aligned with our theme of ‘‘simplicity,’’ we use the terms ‘‘group’’ and ‘‘team’’ interchangeably.) Group/team norms are the shared beliefs about members’ expected social behaviors. These norms can guide behavior, exert social control, and influence performance, either positively or negatively, at both individual and team/group levels of analysis. Group/team norms emerge formally or informally, are transmitted, and then persist through team members’ actions and beliefs. They lead to greater conformity in behavior, beliefs, and attitudes among group/team members, tend to be established early in the group/team formation and development cycle, and are based on interpersonal agreement that arises from members’ interactions, often resulting in cooperation. (For an extended discussion of these issues, see Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1958, 1961; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Kelley & Thibault, 1978; Thibault & Kelley, 1959.) From a social exchange theory perspective (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1958, 1961; Katz & Kahn, 1978), norms create obligations that form from relationships among team members and from each member with the whole team. As a result, team members decrease the variability in their individual behaviors, and their behaviors converge on the agreed-upon norm. The norms then enhance group/team functioning as they facilitate team survival (keeping the team together and protecting it), provide regularity and predictability to team members’ expected behaviors, help the team avoid interpersonal problems, and express the team’s central values and identity (see Taggar & Ellis, 2007; Feldman, 1984). In short, group/team norms facilitate the alignment of individual needs, goals, and expected outcomes across the team so that it operates as a homogeneous entity (i.e., whole team or group). In an interdisciplinary review of social exchange theory, Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) note that theorists from multiple disciplines agree on the following points: Social exchange involves a series of interactions that generate obligations. These interactions, or transactions, are governed by rules or norms of exchange to which the parties must abide. These interactions are viewed as interdependent and contingent on the actions or behaviors of the parties involved. The resources or ‘‘commodities of exchange’’ may be economic or socioemotional in nature and involve short- or long-term time horizons. Importantly, the interdependent transactions have the potential to generate high-quality relationships involving trust, loyalty, and mutual commitment that evolve over time.
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Collectively, these points suggest the importance of interdependence and cohesion, and their association, which can build to ‘‘cohesive relationships’’ and cooperation over time in groups and teams. Following from the earlier social exchange discussion, interdependence comprises the interconnections among parties that result from their contingent transactions. Cohesion is the motivation to remain in the group or team and the mutual commitment to the other members of that group or team (see Shaw, 1976). In particular, cohesion seems to occur based on the key exchange rule of reciprocity (repayment in kind), which depends on interdependence or outcomes that are based on the parties’ combined efforts (see Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1958, 1961; Blau, 1964). As such, a bidirectional transaction (e.g., investments and returns at the dyad level), involving mutual arrangements, is a basis for reciprocal exchange. When such contingent interpersonal transactions occur across various individuals and dyads within a group or team, the potential arises for (whole) group- or team-level interdependence and cohesion.
Specific Formulation Team or group dynamics can focus on the entire team or unit and influence how they operate collectively. In this approach – and especially in highperforming teams – there is a key reliance on shared mental models and shared knowledge and cognition within the team or unit (Baba, Gluesing, Ratner, & Wagner, 2004; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001; Gibson, 2001; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Mohammed & Dumville, 2001). No one member of a team stands out always and everywhere; rather, roles and responsibilities are shared and distributed throughout the team depending on the issue, circumstance, expertise needed, time constraints, and other factors. In brief, through team processes of communication, face-to-face interaction, collaboration, and cooperation, there is considerable knowledge acquisition and sharing in teams. Knowledge and information sharing lead to cognitive elaboration, wherein new knowledge structures are created and old structures are modified. Over time, cognitive convergence occurs such that team members gradually acquire enhanced overlap among their cognitive structures. Shared cognitive structures and knowledge, or shared mental models, then can reduce variance in team performance, enhance cohesiveness, build a positive team climate, and promote successful goal accomplishment. These shared mental models, or shared cognitions, are
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similar, overlapping, compatible, or complementary knowledge or belief structures that represent features of the context such as task-specific knowledge, task-related knowledge, knowledge of team members, and attitudes and beliefs (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001). As noted by these authors and others (e.g., Mohammed & Dumville, 2001), shared and overlapping knowledge and belief structures support the alignment of expectations that permit rapid and smooth coordination of behavior (via shared mental models), lead to greater availability of and access to a larger pool of information for problem solving and task completion, enhance the creation of new knowledge, enable team innovation and learning, and foster faster agreement on problem definition and strategic decisions. In turn, all of these elements result in enhanced team effectiveness and efficiency. As a process-based view, this approach involves ‘‘teamwork’’ with high levels of expended collective effort and high-quality interpersonal relationships. Cohesion, communication, cooperation, and conflict management are both drivers of and outcomes from this process. In this approach, each team member is viewed as being capable of influencing and being influenced by every other member and the team as a whole. Thus team members have a collective influence on one another, which permits members to identify with and be motivated by the team. As such, the focus is on the team level, including how team members evaluate and perceive the influence of the team and the collective responsibility of the team. In this case, there is a shift in the level of analysis (or referent) from the individual to the entire team as a whole. According to this perspective, highly effective teams are characterized as having a clear focus or vision regarding when members are willing to sacrifice individual goals and accomplishments for the team fulfillment of the mission. Team members identify so closely with the team purpose and mission that they are willing to make individual sacrifices for the team and to enhance other team members’ potential and capabilities. This approach results in the building of team/shared mental models, as mentioned previously. Through the evolution of a collective belief structure that is shared among members, teams develop a shared understanding of their behaviors, values, and ideas; develop a sense of cohesiveness; and set expectations of one another that facilitate learning and the ability of the team to lead itself collectively. These notions can be summarized simply by considering the ideas of interdependence and cohesion, and their association, at the whole group/ team level of analysis. Here, interdependence may be viewed as a form of ‘‘positive functioning’’ in which members make contributions and receive
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rewards based on cooperation and reciprocity. This notion stands in contrast to dependence, which can have dysfunctional consequences as a result of over-reliance on conformity and sanctions. Interdependence is the degree to which the ‘‘contingent transactions’’ create interconnections or relationships among parties (group/team members): The more transactions, the more members rely on or are bonded to one another, and the more interdependence. Wageman (1995) notes that both task interdependence (from inputs and process; e.g., group/team task or technology requirements), also called structural interdependence, and outcome interdependence (from goals and rewards; e.g., social demands to work together to accomplish joint outcomes), also called psychological interdependence, to some extent determine how individuals experience or perceive interdependence in groups and teams. In particular, positive functioning interdependence could include the following elements: Group potency: the group’s generalized belief about its ability or capacity to perform (Gibson, 1999) Group efficacy: the group’s belief about its capability to perform a specific task (Gibson, Randel, & Earley, 2000) Group effort: the amount of effort that group members are willing to exert to complete their tasks (Price & Mueller, 1986) Cohesion is the degree to which members of groups/teams are motivated to remain in the same group/team (Shaw, 1976). As such, cohesion is an emergent notion that becomes relevant at the group/team level, is typically psychological and affective in nature, and indicates the degree of shared commitment and attraction among group/team members resulting from their transactions. Highly cohesive teams tend to have less absenteeism; high involvement in team activities; high levels of member coordination and cooperation during tasks; high satisfaction, productivity, and member interactions; a shared vision; and overall higher performance. In particular, cohesion is included in Cohen and Bailey’s (1997) discussion of group psychosocial traits as shared understandings, beliefs, or emotional tones. These also include shared (team) mental models, and (group) affect, and are referred to as ‘‘real group-level phenomena’’ by Cohen and Bailey (1997). In summary, these notions result in the following specific testable formulation: Task interdependence (from inputs and process) and outcome interdependence (from goals and rewards – potency, efficacy, effort) are positively related to shared mental models and shared understandings, beliefs, and emotional tone (affect) based on between-workgroup or team differences (whole workgroups or teams).
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Etiology of the Effect Why do we expect this group-level hypothesized effect to hold? Stated differently, from an evolutionary theory perspective (Gould, 2002), does the effect make a difference in terms of the human condition and survival? We believe that this effect may matter because without it, or one similar to this effect, it seems unlikely that people would have cooperated with or bonded to one another. Specifically, when faced with the need to hunt or protect themselves, individuals are almost by definition interdependent with each other because they would likely be unable to eat or survive without one another. As a result, cooperation and cohesion serve as ways for human beings to compete successfully relative to other species. As a result, and in a somewhat interesting way, cooperation provides a way to compete with other species. Because those individuals who cooperate will likely survive, it is their capability for group-level cooperation and cohesion in response to interdependence that would be passed on in an evolutionary sense. An additional issue regarding this effect is: How does change occur? Here, the point is that as the degree of interdependence faced by individuals increases, cooperation and cohesion increase among them. In other words, changes in the degree of cooperation and cohesion depend on changes in the degree of interdependence faced by individuals.
A THEORY OF COLLECTIVIZED PROCESSES AND ROLES Theory 4. Titles and expectations are positively related based on betweencollectivity differences (whole collectives); a cross-level theory from person to dyad to group to collective levels of analysis.
General Formulation Several collectivized processes in organizations operate at levels of analysis above the group or team level. One way to capture many of these processes is in terms of the notion of roles (see Alutto, 1968; Biddle, 1979; Dansereau et al., 1984; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Yammarino & Naughton, 1988). To formulate a testable theory of roles per se (rather than role outcomes) that accounts for many organizational processes, it is important to focus on
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positions (or identities) and expectations, which provide information about forms, condition of occurrence, causes, and effects of roles (see Biddle, 1979). The notions of position and expectations (e.g., rights and duties) are common themes included in most definitions of roles (see Alutto, 1968; Biddle, 1979; Dansereau et al., 1984). In general, only expectations that are shared by a number of individuals are considered to be relevant to roles. Likewise, the notion of position implies an individual’s rank or status, which is presumably shared by individuals in similar positions. Moreover, these aspects of roles have been described as applicable to multiple levels of analysis. For example, the concept of ‘‘role’’ has been characterized as an interdisciplinary concept of interest in psychology, social psychology, sociology, and anthropology (see Alutto, 1968; Biddle, 1979; Katz & Kahn, 1978), with individuals in each discipline focusing on different levels of analysis. Following this tradition, Katz and Kahn (1978) have suggested that sociological concepts can be translated to lower levels of analysis. This interdisciplinary focus and associated assumptions of multi-level effects leads us to conclude that any formulation of roles should hold across levels rather than being level-specific in nature. At the person level of analysis, individuals are frequently viewed as actors playing a role, which suggests that individual personalities do not determine the nature of a role. Instead, factors external to an individual (at higher levels of analysis) specify how an individual is to play a role. For example, Blau (1974) notes a fundamental difference between the social processes external to individual personalities that are responsible for playing a role and the internal psychological processes that are not responsible for playing a role. Likewise, at the dyad and group levels of analysis, Katz and Kahn (1978) have proposed a role-taking model. Their model implies that the relationship between two individuals is rather impersonal, in that each actor behaves or is socialized to behave in a way compatible with a role rather than with the personal preferences of the individuals taken either separately or together. In contrast, Miller (1978) has asserted that roles and social systems are composed of human beings and should not be viewed as independent of them. For us, roles do not exist independent of people. If human beings did not exist, roles as we know them could not exist. In other words, roles can be viewed as human contrivances. However, this assertion in no way suggests that one individual or human being will find it very easy to change roles. Indeed, from the perspective of a role-player, roles may appear to be nonmalleable – a perception that may arise from the entities that underlie roles. Nevertheless, this focus on roles as embedded in the social fabric of human existence provides the basis for a theoretical formulation of roles.
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At the collectivity level of analysis, individuals are expected to view themselves as ‘‘small’’ compared to the collectivity and as dependent on a large number of indirect connections with other actors. Collectivities are based on hierarchical or other types of impersonal and indirect linkages rather than on personal, face-to-face interactions. In a collectivity, an individual should, in a sense, be able to view himself or herself as simply a cog in a large gear. Moreover, the greater number of connections with other individuals at the collectivity level of analysis (as opposed to the group, dyad, and person levels of analysis) may enhance the feeling that roles are not easily changed. With whole collectivities, the connections between individuals can be viewed as impersonal and not based on group or team processes inside a collectivity. Given these assumptions, variables associated with whole collectivities should be homogeneous within collectivities and different between collectivities. Next, we consider two variables – titles and expectations – and their relationship as key for understanding collectivized processes. Titles constitute a labeling process residing within human beings who occupy physical space. (In contrast, the term ‘‘position’’ can be taken to mean a location in some type of social and perhaps nonphysical space.) We define titles as categories or labels that are properties of collectivities and that reside in human beings. This definition is compatible with prior work on roles (Alutto, 1968; Biddle, 1979). Expectations have typically been defined as having an anticipatory and normative quality and as referring to activities or behaviors (Katz & Kahn, 1978). We define expectations as beliefs about what should or will be done by oneself or by others. Our key assertion – that titles are related to expectations – can be examined in a number of ways. For example, a change in a title may be followed in time by a change in expectations. Alternatively, a change in expectations may result in a change in title over time. Another part of this assertion is that titles and expectations are properties of collectivities. Therefore, collectivities are predicted to differ in terms of their titles and expectations, and these differences are hypothesized to be related. Suppose human beings could associate titles and expectations only at a person level and not at a collectivity level of analysis. In this scenario, each individual would construct titles and expectations independent of other human beings. A similar formulation would result if groups or dyads based on face-to-face interactions were viewed as forming titles and expectations. Therefore, as a cross-level formulation, we suggest that titles and expectations are based on large-scale social movements (see Weber, 1924/1947); persons, dyads, and groups remain important but are viewed differently.
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Specifically, in this formulation, face-to-face interactions in groups or dyads are viewed as reflecting the titles and expectations associated with the collectivities within which these other entities are embedded. Likewise, differences between persons are viewed as simply reflecting the different collectivities within which different persons are embedded. When an individual takes a new job and title, for example, his or her expectations are hypothesized to be drawn in line with the titles and expectations associated with a new collectivity. This cross-level view of persons, dyads, and groups is compatible with previous work (see Alutto, 1968; Biddle, 1979, Katz & Kahn, 1978). From a reductionist perspective, our cross-level formulation means that collectivities are dependent on an alignment of persons, dyads, and groups within each collectivity. Titles and expectations are viewed as somewhat fragile because their maintenance depends on a large number of individuals sharing a similar set of titles and expectations. In contrast, titles and expectations can seem quite powerful when viewed from the perspective of an individual, because a large number of persons, dyads, and groups share similar titles and expectations for themselves and for others in similar roles. If human beings were unable to associate titles and expectations at a collectivity level of analysis, the use of titles (e.g., professor, nurse, doctor, production superintendent) would not trigger any expectations about what an individual with such a title would or should do. Moreover, a collectivitylevel formulation implies that a number of individuals recognize such titles and that the titles are not the result of each person’s idiosyncratic ideas or face-to-face interactions with others. Therefore, in formal cross-level terminology, titles and expectations are expected to be associated based on differences between whole collectivities, whole groups, whole dyads, and whole persons.
Specific Formulation One way to define titles in a more specific fashion is in terms of their function in society (Weber, 1924/1947; Katz & Kahn, 1978). From this perspective, considering shared (collectivized) individual preferences (values) for producing outputs, the earliest titles may well have been production titles, which focused on the production of goods and services. As people attempted to produce goods and services, the law of entropy (which, in oversimplified form, means that things tend to fall apart) likely influenced organizing processes. This tendency may then have been
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overcome by activities that involved the maintenance of the production function (maintenance titles). Another method of keeping an organization from decomposing and helping it to survive is to control inputs and outputs. As a result, a new set of titles, support titles, may have evolved. An additional way to overcome entropy is by making changes inside an organization and helping it to evolve or adapt based on adaptive titles. These four functional categories have been suggested by numerous theorists (see Katz & Kahn, 1978) and provide one method for systematically categorizing titles. For example, titles such as production superintendent, foreman, general foreman, and the like are viewed as production titles. Titles such as maintenance engineer, mechanical engineer, and personnel supervisor are viewed as maintenance titles because their function is to provide service to production titles. Production control, quality control, and purchasing can be viewed as support titles because their focus is on controlling inputs and outputs. Titles such as research engineer and chemist can be viewed as adaptive titles because of their focus on change or research and development. In work settings, titles also are linked within a hierarchy in which upperlevel titles involve integrating various functions, and lower-level titles focus mainly on the performance of a function. Therefore, eight types of functional titles can be asserted as having theoretical meaning: upper- and lower-level production, maintenance, support, and adaptive titles. Titles can also be categorized in terms of degree of professionalism. The concept of professionalism has been tied to a general (collectivity-level) shift in individuals’ preferences (values) for providing goods and services to society at large. For example, Kornhauser (1962) identified a mutual dependence between organizations and professionals. From this perspective, organizations are viewed as having evolved from small, family-centered economic units, and the criterion for filling jobs became functional knowledge rather than inherited status. In this way, professional associations can be thought of as providing certification or a title, which indicates that an individual has a certain degree of functional knowledge. Because professionalism involves an association or organization of individuals, the collectivity level again seems appropriate for understanding titles. Although conflicts may arise for individuals who are members of both a profession and a work organization, this type of conflict is not inevitable. In work settings, professional titles may complement functional titles. For example, adaptive or research and development titles in a work setting may require greater professionalism on the part of individuals who hold such titles. In contrast, production titles may rely on the specifics of the particular
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situation, rather than on professional titles and expectations. Essentially, collectivities in work settings are hypothesized to have different titles and degrees of professionalism. Different titles may trigger various specific expectations about how much freedom from constraints should be given to an individual. For example, some titles (such as ‘‘production’’) may trigger an expectation of greater attention to rules and regulations, greater interaction with a superior, and greater use of machines, equipment, and technology. Other titles (such as ‘‘adaptive’’) may trigger less attention to rules and regulations, less interaction with superiors, and less reliance on machines, equipment, and technology. Expectations of greater freedom from various constraints might be expected in upper-level adaptive collectivities than in lower-level production collectivities. These specific definitions of expectations are of particular interest because expectations that are shared across levels imply that, within work settings, the behavioral latitude expected of or given to an individual may vary with his or her title. One individual may have greater control over his or her jobrelated behaviors, whereas another may possess less freedom. Perhaps due to a variety of social and personal values, titles that imply a lack of freedom from constraints are often viewed as objectionable. As a solution to this problem, it is occasionally suggested that collectivities should be enriched to incorporate greater freedom from various constraints, thereby granting increased latitude to all members regardless of title. An individual who holds a title implying a great deal of latitude can experience at least as many problems as one who holds a title signifying little freedom from constraints. The titles and expectations are viewed as determined by collectivity-level processes and not just by individual preferences. Thus differences between whole persons, whole dyads, and whole groups are expected to be cross-level manifestations of membership in different collectivities. In summary, these notions result in the following specific testable formulation: Functional and professional titles are positively related to expectations about freedom from constraints (such as from machines, equipment, technology, or superiors) at the whole collectivity (department, business unit, or organization), whole workgroup (or team), whole superior–subordinate dyad, and whole employee levels of analysis.
Etiology of the Effect Why do we expect this collectivity-level hypothesized effect to hold? Stated differently, from an evolutionary theory perspective (Gould, 2002), does the
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effect make a difference in terms of the human condition and survival? We believe that this effect may matter because without it, or a similar effect, it seems unlikely that language would have developed. Language provides a way to learn from the knowledge of the past about how things occur. Thus the ability to title an event and use this title in the future provides an advantage in the competition of a species for survival. Obviously, without language, each event and approach to it would have to be rediscovered by each generation. With the learning of words (titles) and their meaning (expectations), it becomes possible to use the successes of the past to cope with the present. As such, this capability increases the likelihood of human survival and so would be passed on in an evolutionary sense. An additional issue is: How does change occur in this effect? In this scenario, different titles may be used to label new situations in an attempt to more effectively deal with those situations. Moreover, new situations may occur that are somewhat widespread and may generate new titles and new expectations. Indeed, dictionaries are updated periodically as new words evolve to capture new situations.
IMPLICATIONS Brief Recapitulation Our purpose here, following from the work of Wolfram (2002), has been to propose four simple, yet comprehensive theories for a new kind of OB. Each general theory, as summarized in Table 1, asserts a relationship among two constructs and the levels of analysis of operation to explain individual behavior and decision making (Theory 1), interpersonal relationships and leadership (Theory 2), group dynamics/team processes and norms (Theory 3), and collectivized processes and roles (Theory 4) in organizations. We believe these simple notions can account for a variety of both simple and complex behaviors and actions in OB. We have also proposed more specific formulations of these simple ideas by considering specific types of entities (e.g., superior–subordinate dyads rather than dyads in general) and variables (e.g., superior–subordinate investments and returns, including support for self-worth and satisfying performance, rather than investments and returns in general) in work organizations. Table 4 summarizes these specific formulations of our four theories for a new kind of OB. For each theory, the entities/levels of analysis
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Table 4.
Specific Formulations of Four Theories for a New Kind of OB.
Theory
Entities/Levels of Analysis
Theory 1: individual behavior and decision making
Whole employees/ managers
Theory 2: interpersonal relations and leadership
Whole superior– subordinate dyads
Theory 3: group dynamics/team processes and norms
Whole workgroups/ teams
Theory 4: collectivized processes and roles
Whole departments/ business units/ organizations
Constructs/Variables
Option-cutting orientation Option-cutting actions Environmental option cutting Commitment to organization Commitment to role Commitment to superior Superior investments (support for selfworth) Subordinate investments (satisfying performance) Superior returns (satisfying performance) Subordinate returns (support for selfworth) Task interdependence (from inputs and process) Outcome interdependence (from goals and rewards: potency, efficacy, effort) Shared mental models Shared understandings, beliefs, and emotional tone (affect) Functional titles Professional titles Freedom from constraints (machines, equipment, technology, superiors)
in work organizations are presented along with the specific variables in work organizations that are manifestations of the general constructs. Given our emphasis here on simplicity, we do not wish to complicate these notions further. Nevertheless, after verification (or disproof) of these ideas, it would be possible to provide theoretical extensions that include multiple variables (e.g., mediators) and multiple relationships (e.g., moderators) involved in the four theories. While beyond the scope of this chapter, as part of the varient approach, both multiple variable analysis (MVA) and multiple relationship analysis (MRA) have been developed to specify theoretically mediators and moderators, respectively, and then test these notions empirically (see Dansereau et al., 1984, 2006; Dansereau & Yammarino, 2000, 2006; Yammarino, 1994, 1998). Also, theoretical specifications and empirical tests of potentially changing variables
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and shifting levels of analysis over time are plausible (see Dansereau et al., 1999). When considering the four hypothesized effects simultaneously or in combination, the effects can create a variety of frames of reference for viewing organizations and the people in them. Here, for illustrative purposes, we focus on one such frame of reference. Beginning at the individual level of analysis, individuals are viewed as joining an organization: (1) because not working is not an option and (2) by not accepting other jobs or because there were no other jobs (option cutting). These individuals are viewed as, to some degree, committed to the organization, at least initially. Over time, as the individuals interact in dyads, they may receive what they want from others and form relationships that work for them (i.e., provide returns for their investments). At the same time at the group level, they may form cohesive relationships and bond as a way to accomplish various interdependent tasks that require cooperation. All of these processes occur within the context of a structure where labels (titles) provide expectations from the past that guide current activities. Over time, the outcomes from the effects at one level of analysis may actually contradict the outcomes from other levels of analysis. For example, individuals may construct interpersonal agreements at the dyad level of analysis that contradict the titles and expectations of their positions based on the collectivity level of analysis. Consider the corporate scandals at the beginning of this century. Here, despite the (collectivity-level) titles of CEO and Vice President, which carry an expectation of stewardship or watching out for the organization’s welfare and benefit, a number of individuals had interpersonal (dyadic) agreements regarding what would be acceptable to them. These interpersonal agreements contradicted the expectations of their titles. From this multi-level perspective, providing help in and benefit to organizations depends on the ability to understand which outcomes occur at multiple levels of analysis and how to affect them. Clearly, to more fully understand what these outcomes are and how they are affected by the four hypothesized effects will require additional empirical research.
Empirical Testing Focusing on the four theories as highlighted in Table 4, all the specific formulations are readily testable. In particular, established measures – both quantitative and qualitative in nature – are available for the variables (see
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the previously cited work for each theory). Moreover, it is possible to easily identify all of the specific entities (i.e., employees, managers, superior– subordinate dyads, workgroups, teams, departments, strategic business units, organizations) in the ‘‘real world.’’ As such, our four simple theories can be tested empirically in field studies (as well as laboratory studies if so desired). Because the four theories for a new kind of OB include multiple levels of analysis, a multi-level, data-analytic technique must be used to test empirically for effects and to draw conclusions about them. Within and between analysis (WABA) is such an analytic-inferential technique based on the varient approach employed here (for details on WABA, see Dansereau et al., 1984, 2006; Dansereau & Yammarino, 2000, 2006; Yammarino, 1998, 2003; Yammarino & Dubinsky, 1992; Yammarino & Markham, 1992). WABA is an extension of Robinson’s (1950) seminal work for testing levels of analysis effects when multiple levels (entities) – such as persons embedded within dyads, groups, and collectives – are present. Compatible with the work of Pedhazur (1982), WABA integrates various correlational, ANOVA, and ANCOVA procedures to assess both variation and covariation in variables within and between entities (levels of analysis) and across levels. Thus WABA is ideally suited for testing the four theories proposed here. Although details about these procedures are beyond the scope of this chapter, an overview of the empirical conditions in WABA and associated inferential conditions is presented in Table 5. For each conceptual view of a single level of analysis (wholes, parts, equivocal, inexplicable), an aligned empirical view, based on between-cells/units and within-cells/units
Table 5. Alternative Views of Entities
Wholes Parts Equivocal Inexplicable
Single-Level Formulations and Inferences.
Conceptualization
Empirical Specification WABA I (X and Y variation)
Between- Withinentities entities focus focus
Betweenentities differences
Valid Error Valid Error
Variable Constant Variable Constant
Error Valid Valid Error
Withinentities differences Constant Variable Variable Constant
Source: Adapted from Dansereau et al. (1984, p. 42).
WABA II (X–Y covariation)
Betweenentities differences
Within-entities differences
Systematic Nonsystematic Systematic Nonsystematic
Nonsystematic Systematic Systematic Nonsystematic
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differences, is shown in the table. Empirical determinations are made for the variation of each variable separately (called WABA I), the covariation among variables (WABA II), and the consistency of variation and covariation when combined (WABA components) to draw an overall inference. These empirical specifications, when aligned on a one-to-one basis with the conceptual conditions, permit the drawing of inferences about levels of analysis effects for all cases discussed previously and shown in Tables 2 and 3, and (1) at a single level, (2) for multiple levels, and in terms of (3) multiple variables (e.g., mediators), and (4) multiple relationships (e.g., moderators). (For extensive details about and examples of WABA for all these instances, see Dansereau et al., 1984, 2006; Dansereau & Yammarino, 2000, 2006; Yammarino, 1998, 2003; Yammarino & Dubinsky, 1992; Yammarino & Markham, 1992.)
Additional Considerations Beyond testing – or more accurately, if empirical tests of the four theories for a new kind of OB are supported and replicated – we might then consider some additional implications of these simple notions. For example, we might investigate the implications for professional and managerial practice. Our four theories suggest a variety of considerations for practice. First, if option cutting and commitment do, in fact, operate in terms of betweenperson differences and are trait-like and stable over time (i.e., whole persons), then organizations might focus on these issues as part of the hiring and selection process. In this case, it might be easier to select committed or potentially committed individuals for employment rather than try to develop commitment in individuals. In contrast, if option cutting and commitment operate in terms of within-person differences and develop or change over time (i.e., person parts), then organizations might use training and development programs and experiences to enhance employer and manager commitment. Likewise, superior–subordinate investments and returns as well as interdependence and cohesion based on social exchanges in dyads and groups/ teams, respectively, could be used as the basis for assignment and relocation decisions. If leadership and team dynamic processes do not develop as anticipated, then individuals could be reassigned based on potential social exchanges with more ‘‘compatible’’ individuals. Finally, titles and expectations could form the basis of standard operating procedures and policies in various organizational collectives. Clearly, until
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supported through multi-level empirical testing of the four theories, these ideas for professional and managerial practice are pure speculation. Another interesting arena for speculation about and extension to the four theories is future theory building and testing that includes multiple variables and multiple relationships (i.e., MVA and MRA), as noted earlier. Clearly, the previously cited work used for the development of our four theories suggests several directions here. An even more fascinating possibility, and one that is consonant with our theme of ‘‘simplicity,’’ is the possibility of a ‘‘GUT of OB.’’ The search for and development of a grand unified theory (GUT) of OB would be analogous to that endeavor in physics. Physicists are seeking a ‘‘GUT of the four forces’’ (i.e., electromagnetism, gravity, strong nuclear bonds, and weak nuclear bonds) in an attempt to create ‘‘a theory of everything’’ that is a simple unifying description of the world and universe. In OB, we might seek to link and integrate the four simple theories, if empirically supported and replicated, in much the same way to fully and simply account for organizational behavior. Extending this speculation a bit further, it is interesting to note a potential physics–OB ‘‘rules’’ parallel [in Wolfram’s (2002) sense] here for the four forces in physics and our four theories in OB. A potential alignment might be as follows: Electromagnetism with the person level and option cutting and commitment Strong nuclear bonds with the dyad level and investments and returns Weak nuclear bonds with the group level and interdependence and cohesion Gravity with the collective level and titles and expectations While this is an entertaining exercise and analogy for us to ponder, a more useful approach might be to speculate about how a simple ‘‘GUT of OB’’ might begin to be formulated in terms of the variables and entities involved in our four theories. From an entity perspective, a unifying integration seems readily plausible given that, in work organizations, persons are embedded in dyads, groups, and collectives; dyads are embedded in groups and collectives; dyads are a special case of groups (two-person groups); and groups are embedded in collectives. From a variable perspective, cognizant of the entities involved, a GUT of OB also seems possible given the simple theories proposed here. In particular, option cutting and commitment result in individual (personlevel) decisions; and one type of decision individuals make is with whom they choose to form dyadic relationships. Thus persons can make choices
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and commitments about in whom to make investments and from whom to receive returns in dyadic relationships. Moreover, investments and returns, and interdependence and cohesion, as noted earlier, are both social exchange-based formulations, so they have a common theoretical foundation. Also, making investments in and receiving returns from another individual create a type of interdependence that, over time and in multiple dyads, may lead to group cohesion. Likewise, cohesion and interdependence are a way to describe (group) norms; these norms come with and are based on a set of expectations. As such, norms and group functioning may be linked to other expectations and various titles. Again, however, each of our four simple theories would first need to be verified and replicated before venturing into the realm of a GUT of OB.
CONCLUSION Following from Wolfram (2002), we believe that simple ‘‘rules,’’ or ‘‘little ideas that are well tested,’’ can explain a variety of both simple and complex behavior and actions in organizations. The four simple, yet comprehensive theories proposed here are an attempt to integrate much prior work and form the basis for a new kind of OB. We do not believe that (1) option cutting and commitment at the whole person level (for understanding individual behavior and decision making), (2) investments and returns at the whole dyad level (for understanding interpersonal relations and leadership), (3) interdependence and cohesion at the whole group level (for understanding group dynamics/team processes and norms), and (4) titles and expectations at the whole collective level as well as at the whole group, whole dyad, and whole person levels (for understanding collectivized processes and roles) are the explanation for all the behavior in organizations. However, we do believe that they provide one way to account for many behaviors and actions, and that they do so as well as more complex theories in OB. Clearly, multi-level empirical testing and replication of these ideas will demonstrate whether our assertions and beliefs are correct. Whatever the outcome of such investigations, our hope is that we have pushed the science of OB a bit further with Theory 1, Theory 2, Theory 3, and Theory 4 for a new kind of OB.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Joseph Alutto, MacDonald Dumas, Steven Markham, Sidney Nachman, and Thomas Naughton for their contributions to the line of
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research on which this chapter is based. We also thank Marie Iobst for her extraordinary efforts.
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Wageman, R. (1995). Interdependence and group effectiveness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 145–180. Wallis, N. C. (1999). Follow the leader: Understanding the initiation of individualized leadership from follower and leader perspectives. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Fielding Institute. Weber, M. (1924/1947). The theory of social and economic organization (T. Parsons, translator). New York: Free Press. Wolfram, S. (2002). A new kind of science. Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media. Yammarino, F. J. (1994). A conceptual–empirical approach for testing meso and multi-level theories. In: H. L. Tosi (Ed.), Extensions of the environment/organization/person model (pp. 20–50). Stamford, CT: JAI Press. Yammarino, F. J. (1995). Dyadic leadership. Journal of Leadership Studies, 2(4), 50–74. Yammarino, F. J. (1996). Group leadership: A levels of analysis perspective. In: M. A. West (Ed.), The handbook of work group psychology (pp. 189–224). Chichester, UK: Wiley. Yammarino, F. J. (1998). Multivariate aspects of the varient/WABA approach: A discussion and leadership illustration. Leadership Quarterly, 9, 203–227. Yammarino, F. J. (2003). Modern data analytic techniques for multisource feedback. Organizational Research Methods, 6(1), 6–14. Yammarino, F. J., & Bass, B. M. (1991). Person and situation views of leadership: A multiple levels of analysis approach. Leadership Quarterly, 2, 121–139. Yammarino, F. J., & Dansereau, F. (Eds). (2002a). The many faces of multi-level issues. Vol. 1 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science. Yammarino, F. J., & Dansereau, F. (2002b). Individualized leadership. Journal of Leadership and Organization Studies, 9, 90–99. Yammarino, F. J., & Dansereau, F. (Eds). (2004). Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and processes. Vol. 3 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Yammarino, F. J., & Dansereau, F. (Eds). (2006). Multi-level issues in social systems. Vol. 5 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Yammarino, F. J., Dansereau, F., & Kennedy, C. (2001). A multiple-level multidimensional approach to leadership: Viewing leadership through an elephant’s eye. Organizational Dynamics, 29, 149–163. Yammarino, F. J., Dionne, S. D., Chun, J. U., & Dansereau, F. (2005). Leadership and levels of analysis: A state-of-the-science review. Leadership Quarterly, 16, 879–919. Yammarino, F. J., & Dubinsky, A. J. (1992). Superior–subordinate relationships: A multiple levels of analysis approach. Human Relations, 45, 575–600. Yammarino, F. J., & Markham, S. E. (1992). On the application of within and between analysis: Are absence and affect really group-based phenomena? Journal of Applied Psychology, 77, 168–176 (correction, 77, 426). Yammarino, F. J., & Naughton, T. J. (1988). Time spent communicating: A multiple levels of analysis approach. Human Relations, 41, 655–676.
THICK OR THIN? A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR Neal M. Ashkanasy ABSTRACT In their essay, Yammarino and Dansereau (2009) present a new multilevel theory of organizational behavior (OB), based on the idea that simplest solutions are usually the best. This commentary discusses the strengths and shortcomings of their essay and suggests some alternative strategies. In particular, it identifies three core areas for discussion. The first is that the authors set out a ‘‘thin’’ theory, at odds with the idea that OB in real organizations is inherently complex and addressable only through ‘‘thick’’ descriptions. Second, while the theory covers four levels of analysis, the authors may have neglected the time dimension. Third, the theory is an example of ‘‘grand’’ theorizing, suggesting it may also share the disappointing fate of such theories in the past.
INTRODUCTION The imperative for simplicity in theory is an important one, and I applaud Yammarino and Dansereau (2009) for their insights presented in their superb essay. The imperative for simplicity in theory building is often Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Leadership Research in Multi-Level Issues, Volume 8, 61–67 Copyright r 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1475-9144/doi:10.1108/S1475-9144(2009)0000008002
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forgotten. This is especially the case in the field of organizational behavior (OB), where so many theories have come and gone over the past 50 years, and where our understanding of the discipline seems to be mired in complex and competing, even sometimes unfathomable, explanations. The idea of simplicity in theory building is not a new one. As long ago as the fourteenth century, Franciscan friar William of Occam expounded on the ‘‘lex parsimoniae’’ (law of parsimony), more commonly known as ‘‘Occam’s Razor.’’ In Latin, this principle is stated as ‘‘Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitate,’’ which translates to ‘‘Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity’’ or, in plain English, ‘‘All things equal, the simplest solution is always best.’’ Indeed, Occam’s Razor is generally regarded as the foundation of modern scientific method. It is why, for example, scientists reject the null hypothesis (the simpler model) only when the evidence to the contrary is overwhelming (see Popper, 1959, especially Chapter 7). Clearly, the framework proposed by Yammarino and Dansereau fits into the mold of Occam’s Razor. I especially appreciate how the authors have formulated their framework in terms of levels of analysis – although this is not surprising, given their outstanding contributions to multilevel theory over the past decades. Moreover, the four theories they describe have an essential elegance that makes them intuitively attractive. I have little doubt that researchers will take up their challenge to begin testing these intriguing theories and to use this framework to develop further relationships along similar lines to those elucidated by Yammarino and Dansereau. Nonetheless, three aspects of the Yammarino and Dansereau theory deserve further attention: Theirs is inherently a ‘‘thin’’ theory. Is there still a place for ‘‘thick’’ explanations of behavior in organizations? While Yammarino and Dansereau cover four levels of analysis, they may have missed one important level, time. Yammarino and Dansereau’s chapter represents an attempt at ‘‘grand theory’’ building. Such theories do not have a good track record, so why should we go along with this one? This chapter addresses each of these issues in turn.
THICK VERSUS THIN EXPLANATIONS One of the fundamental debates in OB concerns the issue of whether explanations of behavior should be thick, detailed and contextualized, or thin, simplified but ostensibly context free. Both Yammarino and Dansereau
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come from an epistemological background of logical positivism, where phenomena are assumed to be accessible via scientific method (Lincoln & Guba, 2000), so their natural inclination is toward thin explanations. But some of the most esteemed publications in the OB discipline are derived from thick explanations, as exemplified by the writings of Karl Weick (1993). Weick’s descriptions of behavioral phenomena are detailed and interpretive, yet the principles derived from his work are widely cited and widely taught in OB classrooms. [At the time of this writing, the Social Sciences Citation Index listed a total of 253 citations to Weick (1993).] Another example that combines qualitative and quantitative approaches is Meyer’s (1982) study of change in San Francisco hospitals, which he characterized as ‘‘adapting to environmental jolts’’ (p. 515). Interestingly, both Weick and Mayer derived theoretical positions that were intuitive yet illuminating. It will be interesting to see if Yammarino and Dansereau’s multilevel theory will ultimately yield explanations with the same level of intuitive elegance. A further downside of strongly theoretical approaches to studying OB is that theories can end up becoming Procrustean (after the Greek mythological giant Procrustes, who cut off the legs and arms of his victims to make them fit his bed). In other words, scholars may try to force naturally occurring phenomena to fit a theoretical position, even if this involves metaphorically cutting off the arms and legs of real phenomena. Advocates of grounded theory (see Corbin & Strauss, 1990), by contrast, argue that data determine theoretical positions, not the other way around. In the specific context of leadership research, for example, Parry (1998) advocates that leadership as a social process is beyond abstract theorizing, and that only a grounded theory approach can ‘‘overcome the deficiencies’’ (p. 85) in the traditional approaches. Of course, as Yammarino and Dansereau point out, there is an inherent risk that such contextualized explanations will become overly conditional and require qualifications that render them opaque. Nonetheless, advocates of context recognition in OB such as Johns (2006) and Rousseau and Fried (2001) would see this narrowing of the explanations as a necessity if real phenomena are to be appropriately dealt with in the OB literature.
IS TIME MISSING? Since the inception of OB as a discipline, scholars have tended to present phenomena in terms of static relationships. Yammarino and Dansereau’s model appears to continue this tradition. The levels they address encompass individuals, dyads, groups, clusters, and organizations.
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Of course, behavior is not static in real life. People in organizations fluctuate from moment to moment in terms of their performance levels, cognitive function, and emotion. The need for researchers to address withinperson temporal fluctuations emerged as a component of the shift to study emotions in organizations (Fisher, 2008; Weiss & Brief, 2001). As Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) point out, it simply does not make sense to study emotions using the traditional (static) between-person models of OB. More recently, Fisher and Noble (2004) have shown how traditional theories of OB that neglect within-person temporal variability lead to erroneous conclusions about the relatedness of job performance and satisfaction (cf. Judge, Thoresen, Bono, & Patton, 2001). Thus, the following question arises here: What would their model look like if Yammarino and Dansereau were to add an additional level to account for within-person variations of behavior and motivation? Would recognition of this level fundamentally alter the model they present? Would it negate the claimed simplicity of their model? Clues to the answers to these questions may be found in the multilevel model of emotion that I published earlier in this book series (Ashkanasy, 2003). In this model, I addressed five levels: (1) within person, (2) between person, (3) dyadic, (4) group, and (5) organization. More importantly, I presented a model integrating the five levels that was based around a within-person perspective [Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) affective events theory]. In this sense, temporal variations in behavior, cognition, and affect were envisaged to permeate all levels of the model. For example, groups and even organizations fluctuate in terms of performance, group cognition, and group affect, just as individuals do. As an example, Sy, Coˆte´, and Saavedra (2005) found that the meso-level process of emotional contagion led to temporal fluctuations in group affective states and performance.
GRAND THEORIES Albert Einstein spent the greater part of his career in a futile search for the Grand Unification Theory that would unify time and space (Hawking, 2001), and physicists today continue his search – so far with no luck, although some maintain they are close (e.g., see Mohapatra, 2002). If a unifying theory in the physical science has proved this elusive, why should we expect to be able to identify such a theory in the context of the much more complex and subjective world of human behavior, especially in one isolated corner of OB? Even a brief list of the complexities of behavior – for
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example, bounded rationality (Simon, 1997), bounded emotionality (Mumby & Putnam, 1992), and cross-cultural psychology (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004) – would suggest the futility of such a quest. Another issue is that so many of the grand theories in OB have failed to withstand the test of time. Maslow’s and Herzberg’s theories of motivation come to mind here. Although still taught to students of OB, most textbooks mention that these theories have been discredited in empirical testing (e.g., see Robbins & Judge, 2008). Major theories of leadership (e.g., path-goal theory; see House, 1971), although again still featured prominently in modern-day textbooks, have met with similar fates. All of these theories purported to model important aspects of OB, yet were found wanting when put to the test. Yammarino and Dansereau respond that theirs is a ‘‘new’’ OB, and is differentiated from traditional theory-building approaches in OB. But their approach depends on the veracity of the propositions set out in Wolfram’s (2002) A New Kind of Science and, in particular, the Principle of Computational Equivalence, which in turn depends on the existence of a set of universal, underlying rules. The answer, of course, is that Yammarino and Dansereau’s theory probably won’t stand up in the long run. This statement is not meant to imply that I am advocating their theory is not a good one; nor do I posit that OB researchers should prematurely consider consigning it to the trash. On the contrary, although essentially a critical realist in terms of my own approach, I am a strong advocate for an elective approach that does not constrain research approaches based on either ontology or epistemology. Each ontological perspective provides a unique view of phenomena. In Yammarino and Dansereau’s model, what is truly unique is the multilevel formulation, where each of the four theories is grounded in the simple universal theory they advocate. At the very least, this approach enables us to appreciate an underlying connection across the theories that is not otherwise obvious. Moreover, each of the theories provides us with a new lens to understand behavior in organizations.
CONCLUSION While I have expressed some misgivings about the theoretical model proposed by Yammarino and Dansereau, I have no doubt that it will come to be seen as an important and impactful contribution to the OB literature.
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Controversies surrounding the issue of thick versus thin descriptions and explanations of OB phenomena, however, will be with us for some time yet.
REFERENCES Ashkanasy, N. M. (2003). Emotions in organizations: A multilevel perspective. In: F. Dansereau & F. J. Yammarino (Eds), Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and strategy. Vol. 2 of Research in Multi-Level Issues (pp. 9–54). Oxford, UK: Elsevier/ JAI Press. Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (1990). Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and evaluative criteria. Qualitative Sociology, 13, 3–21. Fisher, C. D. (2008). What if we took within-person performance variability seriously? Industrial and Organizational Psychology: Perspectives on Science and Practice, 1, 185–189. Fisher, C. D., & Noble, C. S. (2004). A within-person examination of correlates of performance and emotions while working. Human Performance, 17, 145–168. Hawking, S. (2001). The illustrated brief history of time, updated and expanded. New York: Bantam. House, R. J. (1971). A path-goal theory of leader effectiveness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 16, 321–339. House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (2004). Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 societies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Johns, G. (2006). The essential impact of context on organizational behavior. Academy of Management Review, 31, 386–408. Judge, T. A., Thoresen, C. J., Bono, J. E., & Patton, G. K. (2001). The job satisfaction–job performance relationship: A qualitative and quantitative review. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 376–407. Lincoln, R. S., & Guba, E. G. (2000). Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences. In: N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds), Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed., pp. 163–188). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Meyer, A. D. (1982). Adapting to environmental jolts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27, 515–537. Mohapatra, R. (2002). Unification and supersymmetry. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Mumby, D. K., & Putnam, L. A. (1992). The politics of emotion: A feminist reading of bounded rationality. Academy of Management Review, 17, 465–486. Parry, K. W. (1998). Grounded theory and social process: A new direction for leadership research. Leadership Quarterly, 9, 85–105. Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Basis Books. Robbins, S. P., & Judge, T. A. (2008). Organizational behavior (13th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson. Rousseau, D. M., & Fried, Y. (2001). Location, location, location: Contextualizing organizational research. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 1–13. Simon, H. A. (1997). Administrative behavior (4th ed.). New York: Free Press.
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Sy, T., Coˆte´, S., & Saavedra, R. (2005). The contagious leader: Impact of the leader’s mood on the mood of group members, group affective tone, and group processes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 295–305. Weick, K. E. (1993). The collapse of sensemaking in organization: The Mann Gulch disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 628–652. Weiss, H., & Cropanzano, R. (1996). Affective events theory: A theoretical discussion of the structure, causes and consequences of affective experiences at work. In: L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 18, pp. 1–74). Westport, CT: JAI Press. Weiss, H. M., & Brief, A. P. (2001). Affect at work: A historical perspective. In: R. L. Payne & C. L. Cooper (Eds), Emotions at work: Theory, research, and applications for management (pp. 133–172). Chichester, UK: Wiley. Wolfram, S. (2002). A new kind of science. Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media. Yammarino, F. J., & Dansereau, F. (2009). A new kind of OB. In: F. J. Yammarino & F. Dansereau (Eds), Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and leadership. Vol. 8 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Bingley, UK: Emerald.
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A NEWER ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR Francis J. Yammarino and Fred Dansereau ABSTRACT This reply to Ashkanasy’s commentary (2009) on our chapter ‘‘A New Kind of OB’’ (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009) offers some additional thoughts on theory building and theory testing in terms of our four simple theories about individual behavior, interpersonal relationships, group dynamics, and collectivized processes in organizations. We reiterate the key point that these simple notions can explain a variety of complex phenomena and behavior in organizations.
INTRODUCTION We thank Neal Ashkanasy for his thorough and insightful commentary (2009) on our chapter ‘‘A New Kind of OB’’ (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009). Neal’s depth of knowledge in so many areas of organizational behavior (OB) has allowed him to offer a series of comments on our work that few others would have been able to provide. In this reply to his commentary, after a brief recapitulation, we address three key issues raised by Neal – namely, formulating (1) ‘‘thin’’ theories (2) without the inclusion of ‘‘time’’ that (3) constitute a ‘‘grand theory.’’ We then offer another
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perspective on the dialogue to enhance theory building and theory testing in OB, especially in terms of our four simple theories about individual behavior, interpersonal relationships, group dynamics, and collectivized processes in organizations.
BRIEF RECAPITULATION A key point of our work (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009) follows directly from the work of Wolfram (2002): Simple notions can explain complex phenomena. Wolfram asserted and then demonstrated in a variety of disciplines and areas (e.g., mathematics, physics, biology, social sciences, computer science, philosophy, art, technology, artificial intelligence) that simple rules (ideas, notions, theories) can lead to simple or complex phenomena. Moreover, Wolfram (2002) demonstrated that more complex or complicated ‘‘rules’’ do not ultimately lead to more complex behavior or add fundamentally new features. This is a point we have tried to make previously (Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino, 1984) as well as here (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009) regarding complex theories of OB as compared to our four simple theories. This trend is consistent with and continues across the sciences. A few examples should suffice. In his comprehensive review of evolutionary theory, Gould (2002) first recounts the history of evolution from simple to complex and then wends his way back to simple explanations of evolution and its various aspects and applications. In physics, Ambjorn, Jurkiewicz, and Loll (2008) have proposed a back-to-basics approach to reconcile quantum theory and Einstein’s general theory of relativity. Unlike complex string theory approaches to reconciliation that require multiple components (both ‘‘real’’ and hypothetical) and n dimensions, their theory of quantum gravity (called casual dynamical triangulations) relies on the simpler Euclidean quantum gravity theory proposed by Stephen Hawking (1988) and four-dimensional spacetime approximated as a mosaic of triangles. In a study of human origins and migrations utilizing DNA analysis, Stix (2008) contrasts the current competing theories. This more complex multiregional theory posits that modern characteristics evolved from archaic hominid populations in Africa, Asia, and Europe that interbred so they remained a single species. The simpler out-of-Africa theory asserts that humans with modern traits left Africa and settled the world. The most recent data and DNA analysis and tracking favor the latter, simpler view.
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So, for OB, like the other sciences, simple notions or theories can hold great promise for explaining a variety of both simple and complex behaviors in organizations. Complexity, and explaining complex behaviors, does not require complex underlying rule structures (i.e., complex theories or ideas). For us, simple rules or simple theories suffice, and these simple ideas are summarized as follows: Theory 1. A theory of individual behavior and decision making. Option cutting and commitment are positively related based on between-person differences (inter-individual differences or whole persons); this levelspecific theory emerges at the person level of analysis. Theory 2. A theory of interpersonal relationships and leadership. Investments and returns are positively related based on between-dyad differences (whole dyads); this level-specific theory emerges at the dyad level of analysis. Theory 3. A theory of group dynamics/team processes and norms. Interdependence and cohesion are positively related based on betweengroup differences (whole groups); this level-specific theory emerges at the group level of analysis. Theory 4. A theory of collectivized processes and roles. Titles and expectations are positively related based on between-collectivity differences (whole collectives); this cross-level theory emerges from person to dyad to group to collective levels of analysis.
KEY ISSUES FROM ASHKANASY Ashkanasy (2009), while complimenting us on the comprehensiveness and elegance of our work (Thank you very much!) and endorsing the notion of simplicity in science (a` la Occam’s Razor), notes some limitations with our approach to theory building and theory testing for a new kind of OB. His position, simply stated, is that formulating (1) ‘‘thin’’ theories (2) without the inclusion of ‘‘time’’ that (3) constitute a ‘‘grand theory’’ has not worked in the past and will not work in the future to advance theory building and theory testing in OB. We respond briefly to each of Ashkanasy’s points.
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‘‘Thin’’ Theories Ashkanasy (2009) indicates that a fundamental debate in OB is whether explanations of behavior should be ‘‘thick’’ (detailed and contextualized) versus ‘‘thin’’ (simplified but ostensibly context free). He notes our work as an exemplar of the latter approach, but suggests we may have neglected the former approach. He frames his comments in terms of different philosophy of science positions (e.g., phenomenology versus logical positivism, respectively) and research methodologies (i.e., qualitative versus quantitative methods, respectively). For us, this ‘‘debate’’ is illusory, as the best theory building should be able to begin from any philosophical position – or, more accurately, without regard for philosophical position. Similarly, the best theory testing should be able to employ any methodology – or, more accurately, both qualitative and quantitative methods, seeking triangulation between them. Whether one begins with a thick approach (e.g., studying one instance intensely with qualitative methods) or a thin approach (e.g., searching for general laws with quantitative methods) is irrelevant. What does matter is that both approaches are integrated at some point to thoroughly understand the notions of interest. In qualitative work on Theory 2 (investments and returns in individualized leadership) using a grounded theory approach, for example, these same underlying simple notions were revealed (Wallis, 1999; Wallis & Yammarino, 2008). We have also employed unobtrusive and qualitative methods along with quantitative ones in other research on Theory 2 (see Dansereau et al., 1995). Our point is that combining approaches ultimately provides an opportunity to resolve an Aristotelian either-or controversy with a Galilean integration. While our preference is to begin with one, we clearly would not dismiss the other. But, like the obesity problem in the United States, the field of OB is overweight and needs to thin down!
Inclusion of ‘‘Time’’ Ashkanasy specifies and gives examples of the importance of ‘‘time’’ in OB theory building and theory testing. He also asks in a subheading whether ‘‘time’’ is missing in our work. We fully agree with him about the importance of the time issue and the inclusion of developmental notions as well as the need to examine changes over time in OB. Moreover, we can answer his question with an unqualified ‘‘No!’’
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In our original work on these matters (Dansereau et al., 1984), we provided an extended treatment on the inclusion of time in theory building and theory testing (see pp. 264–275). Subsequently, we (Dansereau, Yammarino, & Kohles, 1999) elaborated notions regarding stability and changes over time in variables/relationships as well as levels of analysis/ entities. In our work on Theory 2 (investment and returns in individualized leadership), for example, we specifically included tests of developmental notions over time both quantitatively (Dansereau et al., 1995) and qualitatively (Wallis, 1999; Wallis & Yammarino, 2008). Moreover, for each of our four theories presented in the current volume (Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009), we specifically discuss developmental ideas in their formulation and the etiology of the effects from an evolutionary perspective. To Ashkanasy’s specific point, for Theory 1, we discussed within-person variation, differences in persons, and potential changes and development in individuals’ option cutting and commitment over time. These were presented as alternative explanations framed in terms of other levels of analysis effects for testing. So, yes, for our four theories, we wholeheartedly agree with and endorse Ashkanasy’s position that temporal variations and time matter!
A ‘‘Grand Theory’’ Ashkanasy characterizes our work as being in the realm of a ‘‘grand theory,’’ based on the assumption of underlying law-like principles, and ultimately subject to the same fate as prior similar work – scholarly death! Ashkanasy may prove correct, but at this time we are unwilling to accept that fate. Instead, we take a somewhat different view on this matter. Again, in our original work on these ideas (Dansereau et al., 1984), we addressed the notion of grand theories in OB (see pp. 65–66). Our position then and now is that any attempt to make distinctions among grand, middle-range, and simple theories is arbitrary as the differences are of degree rather than kind. We prefer to focus on general theories or law-like propositions first (see Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009, Table 1), as we did for each of our four theories (with two variables, a relationship, and the entities of focus), and then present more specific theories for testing per se (see Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009, Table 4). Moreover, we mentioned the possibilities and inclusion of mediators and moderators for our four theories, preferring to begin with simple notions and test them well with replication before proceeding to (perhaps unnecessary) elaborations.
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Even accepting the grand theory label and the failures of such theories in the past does not imply we should stop trying. In physics, for example, although work on the ‘‘four forces’’ separately has gone quite well, work on the GUT or ‘‘theory of everything’’ has been less than fully successful. Nevertheless, physicists have not given up, and new work continues to seek this desirable end state (see Ambjorn et al., 2008). Likewise, in a variety of other areas and fields, Wolfram (2002) shows how such grand unifications are possible, plausible, and derived from simple notions or theories, not complex ones. While not in our lifetimes, after fully understanding the ‘‘four forces of OB’’ presented in our chapter, we remain optimistic regarding the emergence of a similar GUT for OB!
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON THE DIALOGUE We continue to believe there is some value in four ‘‘thin’’ theories that include ‘‘time’’ and that someday may constitute a ‘‘grand theory’’ of OB. In fact, these four simple notions can be used to provide some entertainment regarding our commentary–reply dialogue here about theory building and theory testing in OB. Ashkanasy’s view – which is perhaps the view of the vast majority of the OB field – can be summarized as follows using our four theories: 1. At the extreme there are two options: pursue traditional OB approaches or pursue our ‘‘new kind of OB’’ approach. Believing our approach will not work (given that other approaches, perhaps similar to ours, have failed in the past), this option is cut off and the field becomes even more committed to doing ‘‘the same old OB.’’ 2. Investing time and effort in a new approach and others who wish to pursue it will not result in personal gains, so the formation of strong dyadic interpersonal relationships will be with others who share the traditional or older set of interests. 3. Taking a Weickian view in the field (for example) can result in advancements for endorsing the group norms. Essentially, there is cooperation within traditional groups with others holding the Weickian view, so cohesiveness and interdependence within the group of Weickian scholars (and those in allied fields) persist. 4. The new OB approach (title) is logical positivism and quantitative methods, so it is limited and likely to fail (expectations).
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In contrast, our position – though perhaps a minority view within the OB field – can be summarized as follows using these same four theories: 1. The current options are not very attractive to us, so we have created a new option, cut off traditional ones, and become committed to this new approach to OB. 2. Investing time and effort in our approach and others who wish to pursue it will result in personal gains for us (e.g., the process of scientific discovery is rewarding) as well as the formation of strong dyadic interpersonal relationships based on common interests. 3. Taking a non-Weickian view in the field (for example) can result in sanctions for violating the group norms. Essentially, cooperation between groups with others holding the Weickian view will be limited, but there are cohesiveness and interdependence both within our group (and the physical sciences) with this new approach and within the group of Weickian scholars (and allied fields) regarding their approach. 4. Labeling (titles) individuals, groups, and collectives as logical positivists and/or quantitative methodologists creates expectations about them. Likewise, labeling (titles) individuals, groups, and collectives as grounded theorists and/or qualitative methodologists creates different expectations about them. Similarly, labeling (titles) individuals, groups, and collectives as ‘‘integrators’’ creates still different expectations about them and their pursuits.
CONCLUSION We again thank Neal Ashkanasy for his insightful and thoughtful commentary on our work. Through this dialogue among scholars about simple notions explaining complex behaviors in organizations, we hope to stimulate others to enhance theory building and theory testing for a newer OB – one that explains and tests individual behavior, interpersonal relations, group dynamics, and collectivized processes in organizations to advance our field further faster.
REFERENCES Ambjorn, J., Jurkiewicz, J., & Loll, R. (2008). The self-organizing quantum universe. Scientific American, 299(1), 42–49.
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Ashkanasy, N. M. (2009). Thick or thin? A fundamental question in OB. In: F. J. Yammarino & F. Dansereau (Eds), Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and leadership. Vol. 8 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Dansereau, F., Alutto, J. A., & Yammarino, F. J. (1984). Theory testing in organizational behavior: The varient approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Dansereau, F., Yammarino, F. J., & Kohles, J. (1999). Multiple levels of analysis from a longitudinal perspective: Some implications for theory building. Academy of Management Review, 24, 346–357. Dansereau, F., Yammarino, F. J., Markham, S. E., et al. (1995). Individualized leadership: A new multiple-level approach. Leadership Quarterly, 6, 413–450. Gould, S. J. (2002). The structure of evolutionary theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Hawking, S. (1988). A brief history of time. New York: Bantom Books. Stix, G. (2008). Traces of a distant past. Scientific American, 299(1), 56–63. Wallis, N. C. (1999). Follow the leader: Understanding the initiation of individualized leadership from follower and leader perspectives. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Fielding Institute. Wallis, N. C., & Yammarino, F. J. (2008). Individualized and transformational leadership: A qualitative study of senior executive leaders. Manuscript under revise – and – resubmit invitation for Leadership Quarterly. Wolfram, S. (2002). A new kind of science. Champaign, IL: Wolfram Media. Yammarino, F. J., & Dansereau, F. (2009). A new kind of OB. In: F. J. Yammarino & F. Dansereau (Eds), Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and leadership. Vol. 8 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Bingley, UK: Emerald.
PART II OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP
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CHARISMATIC, IDEOLOGICAL, AND PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP: AN EXAMINATION OF MULTI-LEVEL INFLUENCES ON EMERGENCE AND PERFORMANCE Michael D. Mumford, Samuel T. Hunter, Tamara L. Friedrich and Jay J. Caughron ABSTRACT Theories of outstanding, historically notable, leadership have traditionally emphasized charisma. Recent research, however, suggests that charisma may represent only one pathway to outstanding leadership. Outstanding leadership may also emerge from ideological and pragmatic leadership. In this article, we examine the conditions influencing the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. It is argued that different conditions operating at the environmental, organizational, group, and individual levels influence the emergence and performance of each of these three types of leaders. Implications for understanding the origins and impact of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders are discussed.
Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Leadership Research in Multi-Level Issues, Volume 8, 79–116 Copyright r 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1475-9144/doi:10.1108/S1475-9144(2009)0000008004
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INTRODUCTION Traditionally, students of leadership have sought to identify the individual and situational variables that influence leader emergence and performance in routine, day-to-day, organizational settings. Thus, the literature has stressed behaviors such as consideration, initiating structure, participation, and change management (e.g., Fleishman, 1953; Hunt, 2004; Marta, Leritz, & Mumford, 2005; Yukl, 2006), and situational variables such as follower expertise (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982), leader–follower relationships (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1998), and the degree of task structure (House, 1971) that might moderate the impact of these behaviors on leader emergence and performance. Although this research has contributed much to our understanding of leadership in its normative form, it is open to question whether it has told us much about incidents of truly outstanding leadership – incidents where leaders exercise exceptional influence over followers to obtain notable results (Bass, 1985; Mumford, 2006). Recognition of the limitations of normative leadership theory in accounting for incidents of outstanding leadership, for example, Winston Churchill in the Battle of Britain, Michael Collins in the foundation of the Irish Republic, and Thomas Watson in the creation of IBM, has led students of leadership to seek to identify the attributes of leaders that make these incidents of outstanding leadership possible (House, 1977). Theories of charismatic and transformational leadership have become the dominant models applied in attempts to account for incidents of outstanding leadership (Avolio, Howell, & Sosik, 1999; Bass & Avolio, 1990; Conger, 1999; Conger & Kanungo, 1988; House & Howell, 1992). Although theories of charismatic and transformational leadership differ from each other in some notable ways, they share a common core (Hunt, 1999; Yukl, 1999). More specifically, they hold that outstanding leadership is based on effective articulation of a future-oriented vision that motivates and directs others while providing a sense of meaning and affective engagement (Bass, 1990; Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993). In fact, the available evidence indicates that a leader’s articulation of a viable vision is positively related to various indices of organization performance (Deluga, 2001; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996), follower motivation (Sosik, Kahai, Avolio, 1999), effective group interaction (Parry & Proctor-Thomson, 2003), and satisfaction with both the leader and the group (Dumdum, Lowe, & Avolio, 2002). Although there is evidence available indicating that charismatic visioning may contribute to outstanding leadership, charismatic theories have been subject to some noteworthy criticisms (Beyer, 1999).
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For example, charismatic leadership seems to exert stronger effects in bureaucratic than non-bureaucratic organizations (Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996) and may prove ineffective in some groups such as research and development professionals (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange, 2002). Similarly, de Hoogh, den Hartog, and Koopman (2004) found that charismatic leadership was more strongly related to perceptual outcomes (e.g., subordinate attitudes) than some organizational criteria (e.g., organizational liquidity and solvency). These perceptual relationships, moreover, appeared stronger under conditions of environmental uncertainty. There is also evidence indicating sociocultural context may moderate the relationship of transformational leadership and organizational innovation (Elenkov & Manev, 2005), highlighting the notion that charismatic leadership may not prove equally effective across all conditions. Finally, charismatic leadership theories seem to discount, or ignore, some key functions of leaders such as planning and decision-making and may place too great of an emphasis on dyadic relationships (Yukl, 1999, 2006). These observations led Mumford and his colleagues (Mumford, 2006; Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001; Strange & Mumford, 2002) to argue that it may be necessary to examine alternative pathways to, or alternative types of, outstanding leadership. Drawing from earlier work by Weber (1924), they argued that three distinct types of outstanding leadership may exist – types they have labeled as charismatic leadership (e.g., John F. Kennedy), ideological leadership (e.g., Ronald Regan), and pragmatic leadership (e.g., Dwight Eisenhower). In the present chapter, we will examine the conditions shaping the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders at the environmental, organizational, group, and individual levels. Before examining these multi-level influences on charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership; however, it would seem germane to consider the general model of outstanding leadership giving rise to these three alternative pathways.
OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP Crises and Mental Models Perhaps the most straightforward conclusion one can draw about outstanding leadership is that outstanding leadership requires placing the right person in the right situation. Abraham Lincoln’s greatness is inexorably linked to the U. S. Civil War. Bill Gates’ achievements at Microsoft
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depended on the phase of development of the computer industry. These observations about the situations giving rise to outstanding leadership; however, point to a broader conclusion. More specifically, outstanding leadership appears to emerge under conditions of crisis, change, and turbulence (Beyer, 1999). This point is illustrated by John F. Kennedy, who, when discussing Lincoln’s greatness appeared keenly aware of the role crises played in outstanding leadership: ‘‘War, he observed, made it easier for a [Lincoln] to achieve greatness’’ (Schlesinger, 1997, p. 180). Some support for the above conclusion may be found in a study by Hunt, Boal, and Dodge (1999) who asked management students to work on two business tasks under crisis and noncrisis conditions where a crisis involved high-priority goals where little response time was available. They found that visionary charismatic leadership proved especially important to follower perceptions of leadership under crisis conditions. Some further support for this conclusion has been provided by Halverson, Holladay, Kazma, and Quinones (2004) who found that followers were more likely to attribute charisma to a leader under conditions of crisis, as well as Pillai and Meindl (1998) who found that crisis conditions cause people to prefer leaders evidencing charisma. Similarly, Merolla, Ramos, and Zechmeister (2007) found that President George W. Bush was rated higher on charisma in experimentally manipulated crisis conditions, with these perceptions of charisma also impacting perceptions of blame and failure in Iraq. Finally, Chiozza and Goemans (2003) examined 1,505 leaders from the years 1919–1992 and found that as risk of international violence increased, leaders were less likely to lose office. These studies appear to indicate that, crisis, or change, creates conditions where the emergence of charismatic leaders, and perhaps other forms of outstanding leadership, becomes possible. One potential explanation for the impact of crisis, change, and turbulence on outstanding leadership is that these situations, by undermining normative routines, provide leaders with discretion allowing the exercise of exceptional influence (Lowe, 2001). Another potential explanation for these effects; however, may be found in Mumford (2006). He argued that under conditions of crisis, change, and turbulence, the behavior of complex social systems becomes unpredictable. This unpredictability not only allows for the emergence of new threats and opportunities, but the actions needed to effectively respond to these threats and opportunities will be ambiguous, or unclear, because people lack an understanding of the causes and consequences of these change events. Under these conditions, leaders can exercise exceptional influence by engaging in sensemaking activities that clarify goals and paths to goal
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attainment (Weick, 1995). These sensemaking activities on the part of leaders induce feelings of control, provide a framework for collective action, reduce perceptions of threat, clarify opportunities, and minimize the feeling of anomie and identity diffusion associated with change. Some support for this conclusion may be found in a series of studies by Gioia and his colleagues (Gioia & Thomas, 1996; Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994). They examined sensemaking activities on the part of people moving into leadership positions in academic institutions. They found that leader sensemaking provided a basis for guiding organizational change – although this sensemaking may, at times, depend on sensebreaking or the prior reconfiguration of extant interpretive structures being applied by followers (Fiol, Harris, & House, 1999; Pratt, 2000). Some further support for this conclusion may be found in a qualitative study of a new product development effort by Drazin, Glynn, and Kazanjain (1999). They found that successful new product development efforts require leaders to engage in sensemaking concerning the origins of crises occurring during the course of the product development effort which, in turn, provided project teams with a framework for resolving the crisis. Mumford and Strange (2002) have examined how leaders might go about sensemaking. They argued that, ultimately, sensemaking activities on the part of leaders will be based on a mental model of the social system under consideration. These mental models represent an abstract schematic knowledge structure describing the key causes of the behavior of a social system vis-a`-vis select functional goals (Frankwick, Walker, & Ward, 1994; Goldstone & Sakamoto, 2003; Hemlo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004; JohnsonLaird, 1999). The descriptive mental model people form over time with exposure to a social system provides a basis for construction of a prescriptive mental model that represents an idealized image of this social system. That is, a prescriptive model presents a situation as it could be. The development of this prescriptive mental model is based on analysis and reconfiguration of the descriptive mental model. More specifically, in model reconfiguration people are held to analyze the goals being pursued and the key causal operatives influencing attainment of these goals in relation to personal experiences. This reflective, experiential, appraisal of goals and causes gives rise to a prescriptive mental model. This prescriptive mental model permits sensemaking, and sensemaking behavior, on the part of leaders while allowing formation of a vision as the prescriptive mental model is recast to articulate an image of the future to followers. In a recent experimental study intended to test this theory, Strange and Mumford (2005) asked undergraduates to assume the role of principal of a
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new experimental school. They were asked to write a speech describing their vision for the school. Prior to writing this speech; however, they were provided with (1) good and poor case models, (2) asked, or not asked, to analyze goals and causes, and (3) asked, or not asked, to reflect on goals and causes in relation to prior personal experiences in school. It was found that analysis of goals and causes in relation to descriptive models and prior experiences resulted in the production of stronger vision statements as appraised by students, parents, and teachers.
Charismatic, Ideological, and Pragmatic Leadership Within this general model of outstanding leadership, charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership are held to arise from the strategies leaders apply in the formation of prescriptive mental models. Charismatic leaders, in the formation of their prescriptive mental models, are held to stress goals – typically positive, future-oriented goals (Conger & Kanungo, 1988). Accordingly, charismatic leaders’ prescriptive mental models will stress goals as opposed to causes. The causes applying in available descriptive mental models will be those that are retained by charismatic leaders in formation of their prescriptive mental model. In model formation, however, charismatic leaders will tend to retain causes that are subject to control as a result of peoples’ actions. Thus, charismatic leaders define future goals pointing others to causes they might act on to bring about the attainment of these goals. In other words, charismatic leaders see people as creators of their own destiny through the actions they take on a set of known, relatively unambiguous, causes. This charismatic logic is aptly illustrated in John F. Kennedy’s statement ‘‘Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country.’’ Charismatic leaders must encourage people to act, and act on relevant causes of goal attainment. One way charismatic leaders may motivate this kind of action is through role modeling and self-sacrifice (Yorges, Weiss, & Strickland, 1999). Another way charismatic leaders can motivate people to act on the causes giving rise to goal attainment is through communication (Fiol et al., 1999). Not only will charismatic leadership require communication, it will require mass appeal intended to build commitment and encourage follower actions with regard to relevant causes of goal attainment. Thus, charismatic leaders exert influence, and maintain control, through goals while allowing followers the freedom to act on causes that will bring about goal attainment.
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Ideological leaders, like charismatic leaders, apply prescriptive mental models that emphasize goals. Ideological leaders, however, do not construct models around future goals. Instead, the goals emphasized by ideological leaders are those that have proven viable in the past based on the leader’s personal experiences. Causation, in the logic of ideological leaders, is not under people’s control but rather it is controlled by situational forces that are operating to undermine current attempts to attain known, valued, goals (Moghaddam, 2005; Mumford, Espejo et al., in press; Post, Ruby, & Shaw, 2002). This negative framing of causation results in a tendency for ideological leaders to attempt to induce change in the situation that will remove blockages to attainment of goals that will naturally come about under appropriate conditions. Thus, Ronald Regan believed that America must remain a shinning light on the hill – a light that had been dimmed by big government and its’ tax bill. Ideological leaders seek followers who intrinsically believe in the goals and values that provide a basis for the prescriptive mental model being advocated. As a result, ideological leaders attempt to appeal to a cadre of like-minded followers rather than the masses. This commonality in beliefs and values, of course, promotes shared leadership (Mumford, 2006). Debate centers less on goals and values than the actions that must be taken to induce change in the causes undermining attainment of these goals. In contrast to ideological and charismatic leaders, the prescriptive mental models underlying the actions of pragmatic leaders do not stress goals. For pragmatic leaders, goals are created by objective threats and opportunities evident in the situation at hand. Thus, the prescriptive mental models formulated by pragmatic leaders stress the causes giving rise to these threats and opportunities within the local situation (Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001). Accordingly, the prescriptive mental models constructed by pragmatic leaders tend to be situational based rather than global images. Pragmatic leaders, moreover, see causes as involving both people and situational factors, subject to varying degrees of control, with actions being framed in terms of key controllable causes. This mindset is evident in Dwight D. Eisenhower’s patience in waiting for conditions that would allow him to act to halt McCarthyism. The tendency of pragmatic leaders to build prescriptive mental models around causes, those key controllable causes subject to influence, implies that pragmatic leaders will prefer logical argumentation to emotionally evocative arguments. These arguments, moreover, will not be framed to appeal to people in general but rather knowledgeable elites who understand, and can induce control, over relevant causes and contingencies.
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The commitment of these elites to the leader, however, will be based on mutual interest rather than personal commitment to the leader.
Prior Research An ongoing series of studies conducted by Mumford and his colleagues (Mumford, 2006; Mumford, Espejo et al., in press; Mumford & Strange, 2002; Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001; Strange & Mumford, 2002, 2005), have sought to provide some support for the distinctions drawn between charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. In this first study along these lines, Mumford and colleagues (2006) attempted to demonstrate that the behavioral differences suggested by this model were, in fact, observed across outstanding, historically notable, leaders. He obtained biographies for 120 historical leaders where leaders were assigned, on an a priori basis, to a charismatic, ideological, or pragmatic group. Using the historiometric approach (Simonton, 1990), the ‘‘rise to power’’ and ‘‘in power’’ chapters included in these biographies were content analyzed to assess the expression of behaviors relevant to (1) problem-solving, (2) leader–member exchange, (3) communication strategies, and (4) political tactics. Additionally, the prologue and epilogue chapters included in these biographies were analyzed to obtain information about leader performance (e.g., number of contributions, number of institutions established). As expected, charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders did not differ with respect to overall performance – although pragmatic leaders were more likely to build lasting institutions while charismatic leaders were more likely to initiate mass movements. Charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders did, however, differ with regard to their characteristic behavior. For example, pragmatic leaders relied on expertise in problem-solving while, in contrast, expertise was less important to charismatic leaders. Moreover, pragmatics tended to employ logical appeals in communication and rely on rational influence tactics. Charismatic and ideological leaders, on the other hand, tended not to employ rational influence tactics and logical appeals. Instead, they relied on emotional appeals to followers. Ideological and charismatic leaders, as expected, also differed with respect to leader–member relationships with ideological leaders, but not charismatic leaders, who evidenced shared direction of the group. Some further support for this model has been proved by another historiometric study conducted by Ligon, Hunter, and Mumford (2008). Drawing from the proposition that prescriptive mental models are based in
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part on reflection on prior life events, they content coded biographies to determine whether charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders differed with respect to exposure to different types of life events. They found that ideological leaders were more likely than charismatic and pragmatic leaders to have been exposed to anchoring events giving rise to strongly held personal goals and values. Charismatic leaders, in contrast, were more likely to have been exposed to turning point events than ideological and pragmatic leaders – events that require adaptation, futureoriented adaptation, to change. A final comparative study conducted by Bedell, Hunter, Angie, and Vert (2006) content analyzed the Machiavellian behaviors of 80 historical leaders who were a priori categorized into pragmatic, ideological, and charismatic groupings. Machiavellian behaviors were rated by means of communications between the leader and their respective subordinates. Results indicated that pragmatic leaders evidenced the greatest number of Machiavellian behaviors, followed by charismatic leaders. Ideological leaders, in contrast, evidenced the least amount of Machiavellianism – a finding that is not particularly surprising given the ideological leader’s strong commitment to a core set of beliefs and values; a set of beliefs they are apparently unwilling to compromise. In addition to these comparative studies, other studies have focused on the characteristics of a particular type of leader. For example, Mumford, Espejo et al. (in press) obtained biographies for 80 leaders who were violent, and nonviolent, ideologues and violent, and nonviolent, charismatic and pragmatic leaders. These biographies were content analyzed for expression of common group, organizational, and environmental characteristics. It was found that ideological leaders differed from charismatic and pragmatic leaders with regard to both just world commitments and ideological extremism or expression of strongly held beliefs and values. In another study along these lines, Mumford and Van Doorn (2001) conducted a qualitative study of the social innovations (e.g., subscription libraries, volunteer fire departments, secular collegiate education) attributed to Benjamin Franklin – a pragmatic leader. An ‘‘in-depth’’ analysis of Franklin’s writings bearing on these initiatives indicated that extensive analysis of social causes was integral to Franklin’s development of these innovations. More centrally, when there was not general agreement about goals, as was the case in the Albany Plan of Union, Franklin failed to exercise the influence that characterized his more successful leadership efforts. In addition to these qualitative and historiometric studies, evidence for the plausibility of this model of the origins of charismatic, ideological,
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and pragmatic leadership has been provided by a series of experimental studies. For example, Strange and Mumford (2005), in their study of vision formation, found that viable visions could be constructed by using the causes evident in successful prior models (a charismatic strategy) or by rejecting the goals evident in unsuccessful models (an ideological strategy). In another study along these lines, Bedell, Hunter, and Mumford (in press) developed measures to assess people’s proclivity to a charismatic, ideological, or pragmatic leadership style. Subsequently, she assessed forecasting strategies and found that charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders displayed the expected differences with regard to the causes and goals applied in projecting the outcomes of future events. A final experimental study conducted by Hunter, Bedell-Avers, and Mumford (2009) also assessed participant’s proclivity for a leader type. Researchers then asked participants to engage in a computerized leadership simulation that allowed for the manipulation of multiple contextual factors, including environmental complexity and situational framing. Results of the study indicated that the three leader types performed differently under varying contextual conditions. It should be noted that, although moderated performance effects were observed, no main effect differences were found among the three leader types on any of the study’s criteria. This ‘‘nonfinding’’ combined with the situational moderator effects highlight the general notion that the three pathways represent distinct, yet equally viable pathways to outstanding leadership (Mumford, 2006).
MULTI-LEVEL INFLUENCES If it is granted that at least some support is available for the distinction we have drawn between charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership, a new question comes to the fore: What multi-level variables might operate to shape the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders? The question of multi-level influence is critical to understanding leadership for a number of reasons. The most straightforward is that leadership is an inherently multi-level phenomenon (e.g., Yammarino, Dionne, Chun, & Dansereau, 2005; Yammarino & Dansereau, 2008). Going further, failure to correctly specify the unit of analysis can result in misguided and even erroneous conclusions (e.g., Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Yammarino, 1996). A series of studies illustrate this concept, as well as the idea that correct conclusions may be drawn if appropriate methods and approaches are used (e.g., Kenny, Mannetti,
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Pierro, Stefano, & Kashy, 2002; Schriesheim, Castro, & Yammarino, 2000; Yammarino, 1996). In addition, multi-level consideration of a phenomenon may also bring to light issues that were previously unimagined. For example, in their investigation of multi-level innovation, Mumford and Hunter (2005) discovered a series of multi-level paradoxes – where what was necessary for innovation at one level of analysis seemingly contradicted what was required at another. With respect to the structure of the chapter, we will use a multi-level framework employed in a number of prior investigations of multi-level phenomena (e.g., Mumford & Hunter, 2005; Mumford, Bedell et al., 2008; Mumford, Espejo et al., in press). More directly stated, we will consider the variables that might operate to shape the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders operating at the individual, group, organization, and environment levels.
Individual-Level Influences Leadership, at its most basic level, involves contact and interaction between a given leader and a follower. In this sense, there are a number of individuallevel variables that may impact the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders, including: (1) leader skills, (2) follower contact, (3) follower identity, and (4) leader commitment. One set of skills relevant to leader emergence and performance is implied by our foregoing discussion with regard to the distinctive characteristics of pragmatic leaders. Earlier, we argued that pragmatic leadership involves the extended analysis of causation in complex systems. This rather straightforward observation has two important implications with regard to leader emergence and performance. First, pragmatic leadership will depend on the acquisition of especially complex mental models describing the causes and consequences of system operations (Mumford, Marcy, Eubanks, & Murphy, in press). In other words, pragmatic leadership will require prior opportunities to acquire requisite expertise and, thus, will evidence some domain specificity. Second, the performance of pragmatic leaders will depend on the skills needed to analyze and resolve organizational problems vis-a`-vis this expertise. Thus, pragmatic leadership will call for intelligence, creativity, critical thinking, judgment, wisdom, and tacit knowledge (Hedlund et al., 2003; Mumford & Connelly, 1991). Some support for this conclusion may be found in a series of studies by Mumford and his colleagues (Connelly et al., 2000; Mumford, Marks,
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Connelly, Zaccaro, & Reiter-Palmon, 2000; Mumford et al., 2000; Vincent, Decker, & Mumford, 2002; Zaccaro, Mumford, Connelly, Marks, & Gilbert, 2000). They administered an extensive battery of cognitive skill tests to 1,818 army officers – leaders working in an organization known to value pragmatic leadership. They found that indices of leader performance, ranging from critical incident performance to medals awarded, were positively related (R ¼ .40) to the leader’s expression of complex social problem-solving skills such as creative thinking skills, intelligence, expertise, and wisdom. These findings, taken in conjunction with our foregoing observations, imply the following proposition: Proposition 1. At the individual level, the emergence and performance of pragmatic leaders will be more strongly influenced by expertise and cognitive skills than charismatic and ideological leaders, and will, vis-a`-vis expertise requirements, evidence greater domain specificity. Although charismatic and ideological leadership will make more limited demands on complex problem-solving skills and expertise, charismatic and ideological leaders will still need sufficient expertise to permit the formation of viable prescriptive mental models. The basis for the prescriptive mental models being articulated by charismatic and ideological leaders; however, lies in the identification of shared social goals (Prati, Douglas, & Ferris, 2003). The implication of this statement is that charismatic and ideological leaders must be sensitive to, and aware of, the concerns and motivations of followers. This point, in turn, implies that social intelligence will be more important to the emergence and performance of charismatic and ideological leaders than pragmatic leaders (Zaccaro, Gilbert, Thor, & Mumford, 1991). This point is illustrated in a number of studies including Barbuto and Burbach (2006) who, using a sample of 80 elected officials, found that transformational/charismatic leaders exhibited higher levels of social intelligence. More directly, Wesphal and Stern (2006) found that differing leaders received board appointments via alternative skill pathways. Specifically, the researchers observed that stronger interpersonal skills could ameliorate a lack of expertise (i.e., expertise typically associated with pragmatic leaders), and allowed these leaders to receive high-level promotions. The aggregate of these studies, then, leads to our second proposition. Proposition 2. At the individual level, social skills will exert a stronger influence on the emergence and performance of charismatic and ideological leaders than pragmatic leaders.
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Along related lines, charismatic and ideological leadership requires sensemaking and sensegiving through articulation of relevant goals. The need for effective communication, in turn, implies that charismatic and ideological leaders must know their audience. In other words, they must minimize psychological, if not physical/structural distance, if they are to perform effectively (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002; Howell & Hall-Merenda, 1999; Shamir, 1995). Thus, interpersonal engagement will prove necessary for charismatic and ideological leaders. In contrast, direct engagement, and the affect unveiled in the course of this engagement, may undermine the kind of complex causal analysis on which pragmatic leadership depends (Mumford, Schultz, & Osburn, 2002). As a result, the emergence and performance of pragmatic leaders will depend on structures that allow them to distance themselves from the immediate concerns of followers and manage follower interactions in such a way as to minimize the need for emotional processing. These observations, in turn, led to our next proposition. Proposition 3. At the individual level, the emergence and performance of charismatic and ideological leaders will require low psychological distance and high contact between leaders and followers while the emergence and performance of pragmatic leaders will require high psychological distance and more limited contact with followers. One of the key variables shaping people’s willingness to follow charismatic and ideological leaders lies in the clear articulation of a prescriptive mental model in terms of a global, goal-oriented, vision (Conger & Kanungo, 1998). The attraction of this vision is that it provides followers with a sense of meaning and identity that promotes affective social engagement (Ashkanasy, 2002; Shamir et al., 1993). One implication of these observations is that charismatic and ideological leaders are most likely to emerge and effectively exercise influence when followers have a weak and fragile sense of identity. Although change, conflict, and social loss can induce a weakened sense of social identity (Beyer, 1999), immaturity, inexperience, and identity diffusion may have similar effects (Dvir & Shamir, 2003; Sy, Tram, & O’Hara, 2006). Under these conditions, the performance of charismatic and ideological leaders will be tied to the quality of the vision statement and the strength of the prescriptive mental model that provides a basis for the vision statement. In contrast, pragmatic leadership does not depend on the leader creating a sense of identity in followers. This point is of some importance because it implies that pragmatic leaders are most likely to arise in autonomous,
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high achieving, populations where identity is provided by the individual activities of followers and threat is low – a notion illustrated in a study by Sy et al. (2006) who found that stable, socially aware employees did not need a leader that was cognizant of their emotional needs; they could perform well and were satisfied with their jobs independent of a leader who provided a sense of support and identity. These origins of pragmatic leadership are noteworthy, in part, because they suggest that the performance of pragmatic leaders may depend as much on the quality and capabilities of followers as on the prescriptive mental model being articulated (Collinson, 2006). Taken together, these observations suggest the following two propositions. Proposition 4. At the individual level, charismatic and ideological leaders will emerge in vulnerable populations while pragmatic leaders will emerge in autonomous high achieving populations. Proposition 5. At the individual level, the performance of charismatic and ideological leaders will depend on the quality of the prescriptive mental model underlying the vision being articulated while the performance of pragmatic leaders will depend on the skills and capabilities of the followers they recruit as much as the prescriptive mental model of the leader. Although charismatic and ideological leaders both rely on followers investing in a vision, it is important to recognize the differences evident in the prescriptive mental model underlying the visions being articulated by charismatic and ideological leaders. Charismatic leader’s prescriptive mental models are based on the feasibility of attaining future goals through collective action. Thus, charismatic leadership depends on the articulation of opportunity. When positive collective action is not possible, however, the removal of threats to traditional patterns of behavior, the logic provided by ideological leaders through their prescriptive mental models, will prove more attractive. Along related lines, one would expect that charismatic leaders will perform effectively in the pursuit of opportunities while ideological leaders will perform more effectively when salient emerging threats loom in the environment. Proposition 6. At the individual level, charismatic leaders are more likely to emerge and perform effectively when the pursuit of opportunities is crucial while ideological leaders are more likely to emerge and perform effectively when the removal of threats is crucial.
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Not only do the conditions that give rise to charismatic and ideological leaders differ, vis-a`-vis the key characteristics of their prescriptive mental models, the characteristics leaders must evidence to allow for the effective exercise of influence will also differ. Charismatic leadership will generally benefit from openness, displays of optimism, and manifest confidence on the part of the leader. Although these dispositional characteristics may also contribute to ideological leadership, under conditions of threat peoples’ range of information processing tends to narrow (Jackson & Dutton, 1988) – focusing on the leader and his/her behavior with respect to perceived threats. This observation is noteworthy because it suggests that followers will attend more to the behavior of ideological leaders and respond more negatively to incongruent, non-value consistent, behavior. As a result, ideological leaders, as opposed to charismatic leaders, must evidence greater conformity to group values and a greater willingness to make personal sacrifices for these values (Yorges et al., 1999) – point illustrated by Bedell et al. (2006) who found that ideological leaders, in comparison to charismatic and pragmatic leaders, were the more strongly committed to their values and were unwilling to compromise their beliefs for personal attainment or gain. Accordingly, the following proposition seems indicated. Proposition 7. At the individual level, self-sacrifice and sustained personal commitment to a vision will be more important to the emergence and performance of ideological leaders than charismatic and pragmatic leaders. In sum, we proposed that a number of variables operating at the individual level impact the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Broadly, we suggest that pragmatic leaders will emerge and largely rely on their expertise to lead, while ideological and charismatic leaders will, in general, emphasize social skills and emotional appeals when interacting with followers. Such observations have implications for other individual-level factors, including physical and psychological distance, where strong social skills would seem to play a larger and more substantive role in leader success. Along related lines, pragmatic leaders appear more likely to excel in populations that respond well to logical, rational appeals. Finally, the differing aspects of the leaders’ mental models would appear to impact the responses of subordinates in varying ways. For example, the ideological leaders’ emphasis on a core value or set of values would seem to suggest that sacrifice for those ideals would be more critical to the emergence and performance of this leader type. The propositions generated highlight the dynamic interplay between leader, follower, and context, with the congruence of all three being necessary for high-level achievement.
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Group-Level Influences Our foregoing observations with regard to self-sacrifice and sustained personal commitment on the part of leaders point to a variety of potential group-level influences on the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Although a variety of group-level variables might influence leader emergence and performance, four variables appear especially noteworthy: (1) trust, (2) cohesion, (3) interdependence, and (4) exchange relationships. Although trust has been conceptualized in different ways by different investigators (e.g., Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998), it can be argued that trust arises from both interpersonal appraisals and the fairness of exchange relationships. In fact, trust appears integral to the emergence and performance of ideological leaders. Ideological leaders appear to emerge in response to perceived unfairness and victimization of a group (Moghaddam, 2005). Thus, Mumford et al. (2008) found that incidents of other’s corruption were often associated with the emergence of ideological leaders. The emergence of ideological groups in reaction to conditions where trust is low; however, requires ideological leaders to evidence unusually high levels of interpersonal trustworthiness if they are to exercise effective influence over followers. Proposition 8. At the group level, ideological leaders will emerge under conditions where trust is low; however, the performance of ideological leaders will require high levels of interpersonal trust in the leader. Interpersonal trust also appears integral to both the emergence and performance of charismatic leaders. Thus, Pillai, Williams, Lowe, and Jung (2003) in a study of presidential voting found that trust mediated the relationship between attributed charisma and perceived voting patterns. Along similar lines, Bommer, Rubin, and Baldwin (2004) found that cynicism within groups tended to undermine transformational leadership behavior. When these findings are considered in light of the fact that futureoriented visions, by virtue of their intangibility, require placing trust in the leader, the following proposition seems indicated. Proposition 9. At the group level, the emergence and performance of charismatic leaders will depend on high levels of trust. In contrast to charismatic and ideological leaders, interpersonal trust does not appear to be integral to the emergence and performance of pragmatic
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leaders. Pragmatic leadership, however, does require people to work together for shared interests (Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001). The basis of interaction in shared interest, in turn, implies that the emergence and performance of pragmatic leaders will be related more to perceptions of equity and justice than interpersonal trust. Hence, the emergence and performance of pragmatic leaders will be conditioned by perceptions of process, procedural, and distributive justice – with distributive justice proving a particularly important influence on performance. Proposition 10. At the group level, perceptions of process, procedural, and distributive justice will prove more important to the emergence and performance of pragmatic leaders than interpersonal trust. In addition to trust, cohesion also seems to influence the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. The importance of cohesion to the emergence and performance of ideological leaders is illustrated in a recent study by Mumford et al. (2008). They examined the characteristics of the groups giving rise to ideological, charismatic, and pragmatic leaders. Qualitative material describing group processes was content coded for a variety of variables including group exclusivity, strong group affect, and peer group influence. In a subsequent discriminant analysis contrasting groups, it was found that groups led by ideologues differed from groups led by charismatics and pragmatics with respect to group insecurity and oppositional bonding (actions taken to differentiate the group from other groups). Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that high levels of group cohesion, cohesion that may in fact be created by the leader through techniques such as oppositional bonding, are necessary for the emergence and performance of ideological leaders. In the case of charismatic and pragmatic leaders, however, cohesion appears to operate in a somewhat more complex fashion. Charismatic leaders, by articulating a future-oriented vision that defines the group and provides a basis for action, will require cohesion for the effective exercise of influence through people. This point is well illustrated by Sanders and Schyns (2006) who found positive relationships between charismatic behaviors and group consensus. However, charismatic leaders emerge, in part, because the vision being articulated provides a basis for cohesion – an observation suggesting that low levels of group cohesion may promote the emergence of charismatic leaders. On the contrary, because pragmatic leaders cannot function effectively when there is no consensus about shared goals and interests, the emergence of pragmatic leaders will depend on at
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least a minimal level of cohesion in the group. These observations about cohesion, in turn, suggest the following three propositions. Proposition 11. At the group level, the emergence and performance of ideological leaders will depend on high levels of group cohesion. Proposition 12. At the group level, the emergence of charismatic leaders will be linked to low levels of cohesion while the performance of charismatic leaders will depend on the leader creating high levels of cohesion. Proposition 13. At the group level, the emergence of pragmatic leaders will depend on some minimal level of cohesion but the performance of pragmatic leaders will not depend on high levels of cohesion. Cohesion, of course, proves beneficial to group performance when the level of interdependence in the activities of group members is high (Zaccaro, Gualtieri, & Minionis, 1995). Interdependence also calls for shared mental models (Day, Gronn, & Salas, 2004). Thus, charismatic and ideological leaders may prove more likely to emerge under conditions where interdependence is substantial by virtue of their articulation of a common vision. Moreover, the interdependence of group members may promote the spread and acceptance of this model through social reinforcement (Klein & House, 1998) while the institutional frameworks arising from this interdependence will promote effective group action in relation to the vision being articulated by the leader (Jacobsen & House, 2001). Although interdependence will facilitate the emergence and performance of both charismatic and ideological leaders, interdependence will prove less important to pragmatic leaders. In fact, it seems reasonable to suggest that when group members evidence low levels of interdependence and high levels of autonomy, the ability of pragmatic leaders to orchestrate action through planning and the analysis of causation will prove especially beneficial. Proposition 14. At the group level, high levels of interdependence will contribute to the emergence and performance of charismatic and ideological leaders while low levels of interdependence will contribute to the emergence and performance of pragmatic leaders. A final group-level variable that appears of note in understanding the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders may be found in the nature and quality of leaders’ exchange relationships with followers. Not only is there reason to suspect that the nature of exchange relationships differ across leader types but also that these
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exchange relationships will have differential effects on leader emergence and performance. Thus, Strange (2004) in contrasting charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders with respect to variables characterizing interactions with lieutenants, or close followers, found that charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders differed with respect to follower interaction. More specifically, charismatic leaders, but not pragmatic leaders, were likely to have relationships characterized by a mutual exchange of support. This finding suggests that joint commitment to a vision is critical for charismatic leadership. Ideological leaders, but not charismatic leaders, however, were more likely to share direction of the group with key lieutenants. Shared leadership is likely to prove effective, and contribute to the performance of ideological leaders, due to the foundation of ideological groups in shared beliefs and values. For charismatic leaders, however, the central role played by the leader in articulating his/her personal vision may effectively prohibit shared leadership. Proposition 15. At the group level, the emergence and performance of ideological but not charismatic leaders will be influenced by shared leadership. To summarize, there appear to be a number of noteworthy and interesting variables operating at the group level that would appear likely to impact the performance and emergence of the three leader types. Because group-level phenomena typically involve the coordination and interaction among multiple individuals, variables such as cohesion and interdependence are of notable impact to the performance of the differing leader types. For example, pragmatic leaders would appear to perform well in autonomous, high achieving, and independent populations. In contrast, interdependence, cohesion, and shared leadership are more relevant to the success of ideological and charismatic leaders, albeit with a few notable differences. These observations seem to highlight the challenges leaders face when attempting to coordinate and interact with collections of individuals. Moreover, available evidence on the three leader types appears to indicate that charismatic, pragmatic, and ideological leaders approach group-level tasks in qualitatively different ways and may perform differently as the context and follower composition varies.
Organizational-Level Influences Not only will group-level variables influence the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders, it appears that a
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number of variables operating at the organizational-level will also exert some noteworthy effects in this regard. Although a host of variables have been used to describe organizations, five variables appear especially noteworthy in shaping the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders: (1) order, (2) complexity, (3) professionalism, (4) politics, and (5) culture. The concept of order, or its inverse chaos, derives from recent applications of complexity theory in attempts to account for organizational behavior (e.g., Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000; Colbert, 2004). Chaos may be defined as the amount of uncertainty resulting from actions taken on potential causal operatives within an organizational system. In other words, chaotic environments are characterized by shifting and unstable causation. Instability in causal operatives, of course, limits the feasibility and effectiveness of the kind of causal analysis that provides a basis for formation of the prescriptive models commonly applied by pragmatic leaders. Chaotic environments, as a result, will tend to inhibit pragmatic leadership. Under chaotic conditions, however, the future, goal-oriented models constructed by charismatic leaders may prove more effective. A futureoriented vision allows for emergent causes, which are subject to potential exploitation in the service of goal attainment. Charismatic models, moreover, can be readily adjusted to take into account shifts in causation provided that the opportunities being pursued remain stable. In this regard, however, it is important to bear in mind a caveat. In highly chaotic settings, uncertainty may become so pronounced that it becomes effectively impossible to envision a future – any future. These conditions will, of course, limit the effectiveness of charismatic leaders. By the same token, however, in highly chaotic organizational settings, where the future is clouded in uncertainty, shared beliefs and values arising from the past might provide a framework for organizational action. As a result, ideological leadership may prove particularly compelling, and particularly effective, in a highly chaotic setting. These points are highlighted by Hunter (2007), who found that charismatic leaders demonstrated decrements in performance in highly chaotic, vision-framed situations. Ideological leaders, on the other hand, seemed to generally excel in the majority chaotic conditions. Taken as a whole, these observations about chaotic organizations imply the following proposition. Proposition 16. At the organizational level, emergence and performance will vary as a function of the amount of chaos in organizational
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operations with pragmatic leaders emerging and performing well in stable settings, charismatic leaders emerging and performing well in ordered settings, and ideological leaders emerging and performing well in highly chaotic settings. The amount of order, or chaos, in organizational operations represents only one variable that might be used to understand the opportunities giving rise to different leader types. Another variable likely to prove of some importance in this regard is the complexity of the organization’s operations. Complexity, as it operates at the organizational level, is a multifaceted construct. Complexity is a function of technology and the nature of the production process, the number and nature of shareholders, and the structure of roles and responsibilities within the organization. Broadly speaking, the available evidence indicates that as the complexity of organizational operations increases, planning becomes a progressively more important influence on organizational performance (Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Miller & Cardinal, 2004; Mumford et al., 2002). The need for planning, in turn, suggests that complexity will call for pragmatic leaders. However, as complexity increases past a certain point, the effectiveness of planning will decrease. High levels of complexity require overarching directive structures such as those found in the future-oriented visions of charismatic leaders (Jacobsen & House, 2001). Although the future-oriented prescriptive models underlying the vision of charismatic leaders will prove useful in guiding planning, by virtue of their focus on past shared beliefs and values, the visions articulated by ideological leaders will prove of substantially less value in this regard. Proposition 17. At the organizational level, organizational complexity will facilitate the emergence and performance of pragmatic and charismatic leaders but not ideological leaders. Complex organizational systems, as a result of their dependence on technology and functional specialization, are characterized by a high degree of professionalization (Damanpour, 1991). In professionalized organizations, expertise, vis-a`-vis role demands, provides a basis for decision-making. Professionalized organizations, moreover, typically grant substantial autonomy, or discretion, to those people who possess requisite expertise encouraging development of a professional identity that goes beyond the organization. The focus of experts on their professional identity and the value placed on autonomy with regard to professional decisions suggests that visionary leadership will not garner widespread support in professional
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organizations thereby inhibiting the emergence and performance of charismatic and ideological leaders. In keeping with this observation, studies of innovation (Jaussi & Dionne, 2003; Kahai, Sosik, & Avolio, 2003) and leadership in research and development organizations indicates that charismatic and transformational leadership often prove ineffective in these settings. Accordingly, these findings suggest the following proposition. Proposition 18. At the organizational level, professionalism will facilitate the emergence and performance of pragmatic leaders and inhibit the emergence and performance of charismatic and ideological leaders. In addition to complexity and professionalism, organizations also differ with respect to the nature of the political behavior that characterizes organizational decision-making and the intensity of people’s involvement in political behavior (Ammeter, Douglas, Gardner, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2002; Ferris, Adams, Kolodinsky, Hochwarter, & Ammeter 2002). Moreover, there is reason to suspect that the nature and integrity of organizational political behavior will influence leader emergence and performance. Thus, Mumford (2006) found that pragmatic leaders are more likely to apply rational influence tactics, such as resource control and appeals to expertise, than control-based influence tactics such as aggression, coalition building, appeals to status, and personal appeals. In fact, by virtue of others’ commitment to their vision and greater group cohesion, these control-based influence tactics may prove more effective for charismatic and ideological leaders. Charismatic and ideological leaders, moreover, may find these tactics appealing due to the conflict that often surrounds the goals upon which the prescriptive mental models underlying vision-based leadership are founded. These observations imply the following. Proposition 19. At the organizational level, charismatic and ideological leaders will emerge and prove more effective in organizations evidencing high levels of political conflict while pragmatic leaders will emerge and prove more effective in organizations evidencing low levels of political conflict. Political behavior, of course, is influenced by the culture of the organization. Although culture may have a diverse set of effects on the emergence and performance of different leader types, one key aspect of organizational culture permits us to draw some general conclusions about leader emergence and performance. Organizations differ with respect to the strength of their cultures (Ployhart & Schneider, 2002). Variations in cultural strength are noteworthy because in strong cultures it will prove difficult to acquire
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support for a future-oriented vision inconsistent with current organizational culture. This point is explicitly noted by Tsui, Zhang, Wang, Xin, and Wu (2006) who, in their investigation of CEO leadership in the Republic of China discovered two distinct leader types which may, in this context, be referred to as charismatic and ideological leaders. The researchers noted that the charismatic leaders, termed ‘‘performance builders’’ were ‘‘found in weak cultures because of their exclusive focus on external adaptation priorities’’ (p. 120). In contrast, the ideological leaders, referred to as ‘‘institution builders,’’ were ‘‘associated with strong cultures because of their attention to internal integration (institutionalizing the values and systems of the processes)’’ (p. 120). Thus, it appears that strong culture may act to undermine charismatic leadership, and by the same token, however, the tendency of ideological leaders to anchor their vision in culture should allow ideological leaders to exercise unusual influence. Proposition 20. At the organizational level, strong organizational culture will promote the emergence and performance of ideological leaders and inhibit the emergence and performance of charismatic leaders advocating culturally inconsistent visions. In sum, the available evidence on organization-level variables seems to indicate that there are a number of variables that may impact the emergence and influence of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. The variables that appear most noteworthy, at this level, are those that directly impact the functioning and operations of the organization. For example, as chaos increases in an organization, it may prove difficult for leaders emphasizing a future-oriented vision to develop and get others to commit to that vision. Thus, under such organizational conditions, pragmatic leaders rather than charismatic leaders may exhibit greater performance. Other influences include organizational culture, where ideological leaders, given their ability to construct their vision anchored to and existing within a given culture may perform particularly well. In general, the organizational variables considered seem to underscore the importance of congruence between a given leader and their operating environment. Failure to do so, it seems, may lead to potentially negative outcomes.
Environmental-Level Influences Our foregoing observations concerning organizational culture and politics, of course, suggest that broader environmental variables will also influence
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the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Although a number of environmental variables might exert some effects in this regard, four environmental-level variables appear especially important: (1) culture, (2) social disruption, (3) turbulence, and (4) elites. Organizations, of course, exist within a broader cultural context. As one might suspect, the existence of a strong, tradition-oriented culture appears to promote the emergence and acceptance of ideological leadership (Post et al., 2002). Culture, however, is a multifaceted phenomenon. Thus, it is possible, and indeed likely, that certain cultural values will promote the emergence of certain types of leaders. In fact, Hofstede’s (1983) distinction between individualistic and collectivist cultures suggests a relatively straightforward hypothesis bearing on cultural conditions and leader emergence. More specifically, by virtue of their emphasis on individual autonomy and the individual’s pursuit of their own future, individualistic cultures may be especially prone to produce pragmatic leaders. Illustrating this point, Choi and Yoon (2005) found that participants in an individualistic culture were more responsive to a leader’s individual expertise and competence than those in the collectivist culture. In contrast, collectivist cultures, due to their emphasis on shared social traditions, may be especially prone to produce ideological leaders (Kuhnen, Hannover, & Shubert, 2001). Proposition 21. At the environmental level, the emergence of ideological leaders will be facilitated by collectivist cultures while the emergence of charismatic and pragmatic leaders will be facilitated by individualistic cultures. Not only will broader cultural trends influence leader emergence, and at least potentially leader performance, conditions where little agreement exists about the future course of society, and extant social systems have failed, will prove difficult for charismatic and pragmatic leaders. Charismatic leadership will be undermined by disagreement about goals and a negative appraisal of the future while pragmatic leadership will be undermined by disorder. However, one might expect these conditions to promote ideological leadership as people look to shared traditional values as a way of rebuilding society. Some support for this conclusion has been provided by Mumford et al. (2008). They obtained book length qualitative descriptions of ideological and nonideological groups that emerged across the 20th century in Western and non-Western societies. The environmental conditions characterizing the society during the development of these groups were assessed with respect to variables such as globalization, loss of institutions, and economic
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displacement. A discriminant analysis indicated that ideological groups could be distinguished from nonideological groups by three variables: (1) social disruption, (2) social conflict, and (3) institutional replacement. These findings, in turn, suggest. Proposition 22. At the environmental level, social disruption and the failure of extant institutions will promote the emergence of ideological leaders. Of course, turbulence and change in the environment need not always undermine society and extant social institutions. Turbulence and change may also arise from the introduction of new technologies and the emergence of new patterns of social relationships. Although changes in technology and social interaction patterns are more ordered than the conditions giving rise to ideological leaders, they are also associated with the emergence of new opportunities as well as the need to adapt extant institutions. Keck and Tushman (1993), for example, found that turbulence caused by such events as technological discontinuities led to greater team change and heterogeneity; conditions that tend to promote charismatic leadership (Mumford, 2006). In keeping with this observation, Tushman and O’Reilly (1997) found that the survival of organizations under conditions of radical technological change was often associated with the emergence of charismatic leaders articulating a positive vision for adaptive change through their prescriptive mental model. Proposition 23. At the environmental level, conditions of social and technological change will contribute to the emergence and performance of charismatic leaders. Societies, of course, are commonly held to be composed of elites controlling access to resources and key institutions. Elite control, however, is likely to be threatened by turbulence and social disruption. Thus, when societies have strong, stable elites the potential influence of charismatic and ideological leaders will be limited. Elites, moreover, by virtue of their power and autonomy will tend to pursue their own interests. These observations imply that negotiation and the ability of leaders to work through multiple elites will be a critical influence on leader emergence and performance in stable societies – especially stable meritocratic societies. These observations led Mumford and Van Doorn (2001) to argue that the operation of viable elites will give rise to a preference for pragmatic leadership; at least under conditions where there is agreement among elites about relevant goals. When this goal consensus does not exist; however, charismatic leaders,
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by bringing about a new consensus with regard to relevant goals, may be preferred. These observations, in turn, led to our final proposition. Proposition 24. At the environmental level, when institutions are subject to viable elite control, pragmatic leaders will emerge and perform effectively under conditions of goal consensus while charismatic leaders will emerge and perform effectively under conditions of goal conflict. To summarize, there appear to be a number of critical environment-level variables that may impact the emergence and performance of the three leader types: including turbulence, social disruption, a broader social culture and the existence of an elite control group. Generally speaking, as turbulence and social disruption increase, followers are likely to seek the guidance of charismatic and ideological leaders, respectively. With respect to cultural issues, available evidence seems to indicate that ideological leaders will emerge in more collectivist cultures, while pragmatic and charismatic leaders will be preferred by those in more individualistic societies. Finally, pragmatic leaders would seem particularly suited to dealing with an elite social group – particularly when those individuals agree on the general pursuit of a common goal. Clearly, leaders do not operate within a vacuum and these propositions, broadly speaking, highlight the importance of considering leadership within the larger environmental context.
DISCUSSION Before turning to the broader conclusions flowing from the present effort, certain limitations should be noted. To begin, no attempt was made in the present effort to provide a comprehensive description of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership. In part, the limitation reflects the fact that more complex descriptions of charismatic (e.g., Conger & Kanungo, 1998), ideological (e.g., Strange & Mumford, 2002), and pragmatic (e.g., Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001) leaders are available. More directly, however, this limitation arises from the unique focus of the present effort on the individual, group, organizational, and environmental variables influencing the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Along related lines, it should be recognized that the present study could not, and in fact has not, examined all of the individual, group, organizational, and environmental variables that might conceivably influence the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic
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leaders. Instead, in the present effort we have focused on variables that account for differential emergence and performance on the part of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Thus, less attention was given to communication skills (e.g., Fiol et al., 1999) than cognitive skill requirements for pragmatic leaders (e.g., Marcy & Mumford, in press; Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001) and social skill requirements for charismatic and ideological leaders (e.g., Zaccaro et al., 1991). Similarly, we chose to engage in a somewhat narrowed multi-level discussion of leadership. For example, we did not discuss issues of aggregation, expressly specify the level at which phenomena should be explored or address issues of data analysis and investigation. Moreover, our discussion of multi-level influences was directed at the emergence and performance of the three leader types, with less discussion on the dynamic interplay between leader and follower as well as other constituencies. Along related lines, we focused our commentary on broad issues impacting leader emergence and performance and did not, with regard to the chapter, consider issues of time frame and shifts in relationships over time (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). This somewhat narrowed investigation was intentional, however, to allow for a reasonably concise multi-level consideration of the new leadership model. Such focused multi-level discussion, moreover, is somewhat beyond the scope of this largely theoretical piece. These issues stand as important, however, and we hope they will be addressed as more empirical studies are conducted that investigate multi-level influences of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Finally, observations with regard to individual, group, organizational, and environmental influences on differential leader emergence and performance were formulated with respect to a given level of analysis. This within-level formulation is, of course, consistent with the current stage of development of research on charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership – despite the existence of many studies on charismatic leadership systematic studies of ideological and pragmatic leadership have appeared only in the last few years. This approach, while perhaps dictated by the current status of the literature should not, however, be taken to imply that significant cross-level effects do not exist. Indeed, these effects should be examined in future studies exploring charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership. Nonetheless, our observations with regard to multi-level influences on the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders do suggest some cross-level phenomena that might be of interest in future work along these lines. For example, it is possible that charismatic
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and ideological leaders may at times induce political conflict to create conditions that favor their emergence and performance. In contrast, pragmatic leaders may seek to minimize political conflict due to the detrimental effects of intense conflict on the effective application of complex problem-solving skills. Shared leadership, and the cohesion of ideological groups, may serve to minimize the tendency of followers to scrutinize ideological leaders thereby limiting the potential detrimental effects of follower evaluations on ideological leadership. Ideological leaders, moreover, may create perceptions of victimization and unfairness to engender the threat perceptions that make their prescriptive mental models more attractive to followers. Although other examples of this sort may be cited, the foregoing examples seem sufficient to illustrate the potential value of cross-level studies examining the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Even bearing these caveats in mind, we believe that our examination of individual, group, organizational, and environmental influences on the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders has some noteworthy implications. These implications are summarized in Table 1. To begin, prior studies contrasting charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders have focused primarily on demonstrating the existence of different patterns of behavior across these three types of outstanding leaders (e.g., Mumford, 2006; Strange & Mumford, 2002). In this regard, our observations in the present effort are noteworthy because they suggest not only that charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders differ in their behavior but also in (a) the conditions promoting emergence of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders, and (b) the conditions that facilitate effective exercise of influence on the part of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Thus, our observations in the present effort provide some further support for the substantive meaningfulness of these three alternative pathways to outstanding leadership. In addition to providing some further evidence pointing to the distinction we have drawn between charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership; our observations provide some support for the general model of outstanding leadership held to give rise to these alternative pathways. More specifically, this model holds that outstanding leadership ultimately arises from sensemaking activities in relation to crises (Hunt et al., 1999). In sensemaking, however, leaders make different assumptions about causation and the relative emphasis to be placed on goals and causes in the formation of the prescriptive mental models that will be applied in sensemaking and vision formation (Mumford, 2006).
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Table 1.
Summary of Hypotheses about Multi-Level Influences.
General characteristics of outstanding leaders Crisis, change events present Sensemaking by leader Formation of viable mental models Strength of follower commitment to leader Goals stressed in mental models Causes stressed in mental models Support based on mass reactions Support based on elite reactions Individual-level Cognitive skills Social skills Amount of follower contact Importance of leader mental model to followers Pursuit of opportunities Removal of threats Self-sacrifice by leader Group-level Trust required for emergence Trust required for performance Actions taken to maintain perceptions of fairness Group cohesion and emergence Group cohesion and performance Level of group interdependence for emergence and performance Amount of leadership shared with group Organizational-level Lack of order Amount of complexity Amount of professionalism Amount of political conflict Strength of organizational culture Environmental-level Collectivist cultures Individualistic cultures Social disruption Conditions of sociotechnical change Consensus among elites Lack of elite consensus Note: þ, indicates positive relationship.
Charismatic
Ideological
Pragmatic
þ þ þ þ
þ þ þ þ þ
þ þ þ
þ þ
þ þ
þ þ þ
þ þ þ þ
þ þ þ þ þ
þ þ
þ þ
þ þ
þ þ þ
þ
þ þ þ
þ
þ
þ þ
þ þ
þ þ
þ þ
þ þ þ
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These differential frames for sensemaking are, in fact, consistent with the findings obtained in recent studies examining individual, group, organizational, and environmental influences on the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. For example, social disruption, social conflict, and institutional failure should lead to an emphasis on situational causes, a focus on threats, and a tendency to stress traditional goals and values – all characteristics of the ideological prescriptive mental model. And, consistent with these observations, Mumford et al. (2008) found that these conditions promote the emergence of ideological leaders. Not only does this theory produce hypotheses that have been confirmed in recent studies examining individual, group, organizational, and environmental influences, it also generates hypotheses that seem consistent with much of what we know about the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. For example, the proposition that pragmatic leaders rely on cognitive skills is not only consistent with the prior observations of Mumford and Van Doorn (2001), but it is in keeping with the findings of Marcy and Mumford (in press) indicating that causal analysis contributes to social innovation – a hallmark of pragmatic leaders. Along similar lines, prior studies of charismatic leadership indicate that the formation of cohesive groups dedicated to the future-oriented goals being articulated by charismatic leaders may represent a critical determinant of the ability of charismatic leaders to exercise influence (Klein & House, 1998). Another piece of evidence pointing to the viability of this theory is that it leads to some new hypotheses about the conditions giving rise to the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. For example, chaos and complexity appear to exert a rather complex set of effects on the emergence and performance of these three types of leaders. Chaotic conditions favor ideological leaders while ordered conditions favor pragmatic leaders. Pragmatic leaders, however, along with charismatic leaders, appear more likely to emerge and perform effectively in complex environments. Alternatively, it appears plausible to argue that the viability of the leader’s prescriptive mental model may be more important for charismatic and ideological leaders than pragmatic leaders – a hypothesis that warrants some attention in future studies. A final piece of evidence bearing on the validity of this model arises from its ability to permit differential predictions with regard to leader emergence and performance. Thus, while social disruption and conflict may promote the emergence of ideological leaders, this conflict, when coupled with
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oppositional bonding at the group level, may act to undermine performance. Similarly, trust may not be necessary for the emergence of ideological leaders, but trust building does appear central to long-term performance. For charismatic leaders, however, trust appears integral to both emergence and performance. Taken as a whole, these observations not only provide support for the validity of the model of outstanding leadership under consideration but also the existence of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic pathways to outstanding leadership – pathways that emerge from a dynamic interaction of leaders and their environments as they seek to make sense of crises. Although the potential existence of multiple alternative pathways to outstanding leadership is not new (Weber, 1924), it is also true that leadership theory has for some time now focused almost exclusively on one form of outstanding leadership – charismatic leadership. Our focus on charismatic leaders, however, may have resulted in a simplistic, indeed an overly simplistic, image of outstanding leadership. This image results in an assumption that an emotionally evocative future-oriented vision is the way to lead despite the fact that a variety of conditions operating at the individual, group, organizational, and environmental levels condition the emergence and performance of charismatic leaders and result in differential opportunities for charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership. Hopefully, the present effort by illustrating how various conditions operating at different levels influence the differential emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leader will set the stage for a new, more sophisticated, set of studies that recognize the complex nature of the different pathways to outstanding leadership.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We would like to thank Allison Antes, Katrina Bedell-Avers, Jill Strange, and Ginamarie Scott-Ligon, for their contributions to the present effort. Parts of this effort were supported by a series of grants from the U. S. Department of Defense, Michael D. Mumford Principal Investigator. Significant portions of this article were published in Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 19, Michael D. Mumford, Alison L. Antes, Jay J. Caughron, and Tamara L. Friedrich, Charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership: Multi-level influences on emergence and performance, pp. 114–160, Copyright Elsevier 2008.
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LEVELS OF PERFORMANCE: MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVES ON OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP James G. (Jerry) Huntw and John N. Davis ABSTRACT Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron (2009) consider and evaluate conditions that may influence how charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders emerge and perform. In particular, they look at differing conditions that operate at the individual, group, organizational, and environmental levels, and suggest how conditions at these multiple levels of observation may drive how each of the three types of outstanding leaders emerges and performs in society. This commentary considers how scholars might use their work to make predictions about outstanding leadership, and which conditions might be ideal for the emergence of each of the three types of outstanding leadership.
INTRODUCTION Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron (2009) consider and evaluate conditions that may influence how charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders emerge and perform. They note that recent theories of outstanding
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leadership have emphasized charisma, but, continuing a stream of research by Mumford and colleagues (Mumford, 2006), they also consider how outstanding leadership may emerge from ideological and pragmatic types of leadership. In particular, they look at differing conditions that operate at the individual, group, organizational, and environmental levels. Mumford et al. then suggest how conditions at these multiple levels of observation may drive how each of the three types of outstanding leaders emerges and performs in society. Prior to their consideration of the multi-level variables that might shape the emergence and performance of the three types of leaders, Mumford et al. describe outstanding leadership. In this section of their chapter, they consider the impact of crisis and mental models; they define the characteristics of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership; and they review prior research in support of the distinctions among these three types of leadership. These authors claim that the emergence of all three types of outstanding leadership requires some sort of crisis or major change, some amount of sense making by the leader, and the formation of viable mental models by the leader. They also discuss other general characteristics of outstanding leaders. In a section on multi-level influences, Mumford et al. consider ‘‘which multi-level variables might operate to shape the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders.’’ In this, the heart of their multi-level analysis of outstanding leadership, they review the relevant literature and develop 24 propositions. Table 1 in their chapter summarizes these influences, dividing them into general characteristics of outstanding leaders as well as influences at the individual, group, organization, and environmental levels. We were particularly intrigued by the summary of information in Table 1 in Mumford et al.’s chapter and want to consider how one might use it to make predictions about the three types of outstanding leadership, including how they operate at each level. The remainder of this commentary is organized as follows. We first consider the general characteristics of outstanding leadership. We then discuss, in turn, predictions that might flow from conditions that might be ideal for the emergence of each of the three types of leadership. We conclude, as is usual, with suggestions for future research.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP Our look at Table 1 of Mumford et al. (2009) first impressed us with the fact that every type of outstanding leadership requires, as noted earlier, some sort
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of crisis or major change, some amount of sense making by the leader, and the formation of viable mental models by the leader. We think these requirements are significant in that Mumford et al. have specified necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the emergence of all three types of outstanding leadership. Likewise, we note some interesting parallels. Specifically, these three hypotheses parallel the traditional perspectives on leadership of traits, behaviors, and contingencies. That is, outstanding leadership would require (1) the trait (or capability) of sense making, (2) the behavior of forming viable mental models, and (3) a situation of crisis or radical change. Much like the poor, these three perspectives seem to be with us always. In addition, Table 1 of Mumford et al. (2009) summarizes 34 hypotheses about influences on the three types of leadership at the individual, group, organization, and environmental levels of analysis. Twelve of these hypotheses are proposed to have positive relationships with only one of the three types of outstanding leadership. We found this linkage to be of interest, and we wondered what might be predicted by stacking hypotheses that apply to only one type of outstanding leadership, thereby creating what one might call an ideal context in which each type of leadership might be most expected to emerge and perform.
UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF OUTSTANDING CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP Three of Mumford et al.’s 34 hypotheses are proposed to have a positive relationship only with charismatic leadership. These are (1) at the group level, trust required for performance; (2) at the environmental level, conditions of sociotechnical change; and (3) at the environmental level, lack of elite consensus. No hypotheses that are proposed to have a positive relationship only with charismatic leadership are provided: (1) about general characteristics of outstanding leaders, (2) at the individual level, or (3) at the organizational level. Thus, all other things being equal, the strongest case for the emergence and performance of outstanding charismatic leadership would seem to be when trust is present at the group level (at the time of emergence), and under conditions of sociotechnical change and lack of elite consensus at the environmental level. When might these conditions prevail? Suppose that, in a crisis, a leader emerges who has the skill of sense making and has the trust of group members based on previously demonstrated
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successes. In an environment of social and technological change when elites present conflicting goals, that leader’s vision of a consistent, desirable end state could, indeed, prove compelling to others in the group. We can easily imagine such a leader being described as charismatic both by followers and by researchers. Nevertheless, it seems counterintuitive that there are no general characteristics of only outstanding charismatic leaders. We would have thought that the more than two decades of research that have transformed the field of leadership studies (Hunt, 1999) would have produced at least one. Similarly, we would have expected that studies of both close and distant charisma (e.g., Shamir, 1995) would have identified conditions unique to outstanding charismatic leadership at either the individual or organizational level of analysis.
UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF OUTSTANDING IDEOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP Four of the 34 hypotheses are proposed to have a positive relationship only with ideological leadership. These are (1) at the group level, the amount of leadership shared with the group; (2) at the organizational level, strength of the organizational culture; (3) at the environmental level, collectivist cultures; and (4) at the environmental level, social disruption. No hypotheses that are proposed to have a positive relationship only with ideological leadership are provided: (1) about general characteristics of outstanding leaders or (2) at the individual level. Thus, all other things being equal, the strongest case for the emergence and performance of ideological leadership would seem to be when leadership can be shared at the group level, when culture is strong at the organizational level, and in collectivist cultures facing social disruption at the environmental level. When might these conditions prevail? Suppose that, in a crisis, a leader emerges who has the skill of sense making, is willing to share leadership within his or her group, and is a member of an organization with a strong culture in an environment of social disruption in a collectivist culture. Suppose further that this leader presents a vision of a return to solutions that have proven themselves valuable to the leader and his or her followers in the past. We can easily imagine these followers responding to this vision. Indeed, we can imagine like-minded followers coming out of the woodwork in response to what they see as responsible, commonsense goals that can (in their minds) resolve the crisis.
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While these followers might not necessarily refer to the leader as an ideological leader, their view of the leader as bringing good sense to the situation certainly fits the ideological leader as described by Mumford et al. We again find it somewhat counterintuitive that there are no general characteristics of outstanding ideological leaders alone. Similarly, the lack of a hypothesis unique to the individual level surprises us. We might have expected one or more unique responses at the individual level to a strong ideological appeal.
UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF OUTSTANDING PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP Five of Mumford et al.’s 34 hypotheses are proposed to have a positive relationship only with pragmatic leadership. These are (1) as a general characteristic of outstanding leadership, support based on elite reactions; (2) at the individual level, cognitive skills; (3) at the group level, actions taken to maintain perceptions of fairness; (4) at the organizational level, amount of professionalism; and (5) at the environmental level, consensus among elites. Thus, hypotheses outlining a positive relationship only with pragmatic leadership are proposed as a general characteristic of outstanding leaders and at each of the four levels of analysis under consideration. Thus, all other things being equal, the strongest case for the emergence and performance of pragmatic leadership would seem to be when support is based on elite reactions, when the leader possesses strong cognitive skills at the individual level, and when the leader takes action to maintain perceptions of fairness at the group level; the amount of follower professionalism at the organization level, and consensus among elites at the environmental level. When might these conditions prevail? Suppose that, in a crisis, a leader of high individual intelligence, with the support of elites, promotes perceptions of fairness in an organization of professionals in an environment of elite consensus. We can easily imagine this as fertile ground for outstanding pragmatic leadership. We were intrigued by the fact that hypotheses unique to pragmatic leadership were presented as general characteristics of outstanding pragmatic leadership as well as at the individual, group, organization, and environmental levels. We also wonder if there is something inherent in outstanding pragmatic leadership that requires unique multi-level perspectives, whereas outstanding charismatic and ideological leadership apparently do not.
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CONCLUSION The specification of necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the emergence and performance of outstanding leadership strikes us as a valuable contribution to the literature. Our first suggestion would be to continue this stream of research to see how well this claim is supported. Similarly, we wonder if this line of research could eventually lead to the specification of conditions sufficient for outstanding leadership. This would be a significant contribution indeed. In addition, we would be intrigued to see studies that compared any of the theoretically ideal situations for the emergence and performance of outstanding charismatic, ideological, or pragmatic leadership to less than ideal conditions. Findings that supported the emergence and performance of outstanding leadership in the ideal conditions would lend support to Mumford and his colleagues’ (2006, 2009) research.
REFERENCES Hunt, J. G. (1999). Transformation/charismatic leadership’s transformation of the field: An historical essay. Leadership Quarterly, 10, 129–144. Mumford, M. D. (2006). Pathways to outstanding leadership: A comparative analysis of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Mumford, M. D., Hunter, S. T., Friedrich, T. L., & Caughron, J. J. (2009). Charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership: An examination of multi-level influences on emergence and performance. In: F. J. Yammarino & F. Dansereau (Eds), Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and leadership. Vol. 8 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Shamir, B. (1995). Social distance and charisma: Theoretical notes and an exploratory study. Leadership Quarterly, 6, 19–47.
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP STYLES: HOW DO THEY MAP ONTO CHARISMATIC, IDEOLOGICAL, AND PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP? Dean Keith Simonton ABSTRACT Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron (2009) discuss at length three generic types of extraordinary leadership: charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic. This commentary raises the question of whether this general framework applies to more focused domains of leadership. More specifically, the author discusses his own research on leadership styles in the U.S. presidency – interpersonal, charismatic, deliberative, creative, and neurotic – and then examines whether these five styles have some correspondence to the three broad types of extraordinary leadership.
INTRODUCTION Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron’s (2009) work represents an impressive scholarly achievement. These authors provide a comprehensive treatment of three major forms of outstanding leadership. Besides defining
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the nature of these three forms, the authors articulate how leader emergence and performance are differentially contingent on variables operating at individual, group, organizational, and environmental levels. Mumford et al. also present their integration at the highest level of abstraction so that it would presumably be applicable to any domain of historically notable leadership, such as political, military, religious, and entrepreneurial leadership. This inclusiveness sets their treatment apart from other typologies. For instance, Ludwig’s (2002) sixfold typology – monarchs, tyrants, visionaries, authoritarians, traditionalists, and democrats – is applicable only to political leadership. Of course, it is useful to inquire about the extent to which abstract models apply well to concrete domains of exceptional leadership. This is where my own work comes in. For more than 30 years, I have been conducting empirical and theoretical research on the determinants of history-making leadership. Some of these investigations have concerned military leaders (e.g., Simonton, 1980) and others hereditary monarchs (for a review, see Simonton, 2001). Nevertheless, the vast majority of these studies have focused on presidents of the United States (for a review, see Simonton, 2008). As part of this line of research, I have examined hundreds of individual and situational factors that influence presidential performance as gauged by a diversity of subjective and objective criteria (Simonton, 1987, 1993). Of the tremendous wealth of empirical findings, one subset has special relevance to the target article – namely, my work on styles of presidential leadership. This commentary first provides an overview of these results and then discusses how these styles might fit with the three forms of leadership proposed in Mumford et al.’s chapter.
PRESIDENTIAL STYLE In 1986, I published an article on presidential personalities in which I extracted quantitative information from character sketches compiled from biographical sources (Simonton, 1986). These sketches had all identifying material removed and were placed in random order before they were subjected to analyses by several independent raters. Further analyses yielded factor scores on 14 personality dimensions for 39 presidents from George Washington to Ronald Reagan. Two years later, I used these same sketches to derive measures of presidential style (Simonton, 1988), in this case taking advantage of an inventory that had been developed at the Institute for Personality Assessment and Research (IPAR) at the Berkeley campus of the University
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of California (Historical Figures Assessment Collaborative, 1977). After seven blind and independent raters applied this style scale to the sketches, a factor analysis was executed for those items that displayed the highest reliability coefficients (49 items out of the initial 82). The result was five stylistic factors: interpersonal, charismatic, deliberative, creative, and neurotic (listed in order of variance explained in the items). The remainder of this section describes these five styles and indicates some of the personality traits and performance criteria associated with each (for the biographical experiences associated with each style, see Simonton, 1988).
Interpersonal Style Interpersonal style is evident when the president ‘‘allows Cabinet members considerable independence,’’ ‘‘encourages the exercise of independent judgment by aides,’’ ‘‘gives credit to others for work done,’’ ‘‘endears himself to staff through his courtesy and consideration,’’ ‘‘is flexible,’’ ‘‘emphasizes teamwork,’’ ‘‘is frequently in contact with his advisers and Cabinet,’’ ‘‘maintains close relationships with wide circle of associates,’’ is ‘‘willing to make compromises,’’ ‘‘relies on working in a staff system, deciding among options formulated by advisers,’’ ‘‘keeps members of his staff informed on matters concerning other departments,’’ ‘‘knows his limitations,’’ and sometimes even ‘‘permits himself to be outflanked.’’ In contrast, such a chief executive seldom ‘‘accepts recommendations of others only under protest,’’ rarely ‘‘believes he knows what is best for the people,’’ and is much less likely to be ‘‘emphatic in asserting his judgments,’’ to be ‘‘suspicious of reformers,’’ or to be ‘‘impatient, abrupt in conference.’’ He is also less prone to base ‘‘decisions on willfulness, nervousness, and egotism’’ or to ‘‘force decisions to be made prematurely.’’ In short, such presidents ‘‘work well with others.’’ Interestingly, Woodrow Wilson and Richard Nixon scored especially low on this style. In terms of personality traits, presidents with an interpersonal style tend to be pleasant, good-natured, easy-going, friendly, flexible, moderate, conservative, and nonbelligerent, but not forceful, petty, distrustful, or Machiavellian (i.e., sly, deceitful, unscrupulous, evasive, shrewd, greedy but not sincere or honest). Interpersonal leaders in the White House also tend to be more physically attractive. On the ‘‘Big Five’’ personality dimensions, the interpersonal style is positively correlated with agreeableness but negatively correlated with neuroticism (see Table 1). The interpersonal style is also negatively associated with interpersonal dominance – the desire to exert
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Correlations between the Big Five Personality Factors and the Five Presidential Styles.
Factor
Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness Openness Neuroticism
Presidential Style Interpersonal
Charismatic
Deliberate
Creative
Neurotic
0.11 0.68*** 0.07 0.10 0.42*
0.55** 0.40* 0.26 0.06 0.20
0.47** 0.20 0.40* 0.39* 0.07
0.12 0.49** 0.12 0.21 0.16
0.10 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.12
Notes: Based on presidential style scores published in Simonton (1988) and Big Five factor scores published in Rubenzer and Faschingbauer (2004) for the 29 presidents that were shared between the two studies. These correlations are published here for the first time. *po0.05, **po0.01, ***po0.002.
control over others in personal relationships. All in all, this style is the most amiable from the perspective of face-to-face interaction. Turning our attention to the criteria of leader performance, presidents exhibiting the interpersonal style are likely to experience fewer Cabinet resignations, indicating an ability to get along with their appointees. Such presidents also tend to get along better with Congress: Interpersonal presidents use the veto power less often, have fewer of their vetoes overturned, and have fewer of their nominees to the Cabinet or Supreme Court rejected by the Senate. Lastly, although interpersonal presidents are not more or less likely to go down in history as great presidents, their standing with posterity is much less controversial. Such presidents neither awe nor alienate.
Charismatic Style A president operating under the charismatic style is a leader who ‘‘finds dealing with the press challenging and enjoyable,’’ ‘‘enjoys the ceremonial aspects of the office,’’ ‘‘is charismatic,’’ ‘‘consciously refines his own public image,’’ ‘‘has a flair for the dramatic,’’ ‘‘conveys clear-cut, highly visible personality,’’ is a ‘‘skilled and self-confident negotiator,’’ ‘‘uses rhetoric effectively,’’ is a ‘‘dynamo of energy and determination,’’ is ‘‘characterized as a world figure,’’ ‘‘keeps in contact with the American public and its moods,’’ ‘‘has ability to maintain popularity,’’ ‘‘exhibits artistry in
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manipulation,’’ and ‘‘views the presidency as a vehicle for self-expression.’’ By comparison, he is rarely ‘‘shy, awkward in public.’’ The highest scorers on this style were Andrew Jackson and Franklin Roosevelt. It is worth pointing out that presidents who score high on this style have been shown to display a distinctive rhetoric in their speeches (Emrich, Brower, Feldman, & Garland, 2001). The rhetoric is actually comparable to what is found in great poetry! With respect to personality traits, charismatic presidents are prone to be outgoing, natural, and witty, rather than shy or withdrawn. They are also inclined to be intellectually brilliant, Machiavellian, forceful, immoderate, and progressive rather than conservative. In addition, the charismatic style is linked with elevated scores on two basic motives: the need for power and the need for achievement. Charisma also correlates with two Big Five factors: positively with extraversion and negatively with agreeableness (see Table 1). Hence, charismatic presidents are more dominant than friendly. In fact, high charisma tends to go with high interpersonal dominance: These are pushy people. Turning to performance criteria, charisma is positively correlated with the number of significant acts passed, specific legislative victories, and special messages sent to Congress. The charismatic chief executive also likes to promulgate more executive orders to exert his will without needing the approval of Congress. Most significantly, charismatic presidents are great presidents, at least according to posthumous assessments. Besides tending to receive higher overall ratings, charisma has a positive correlation with ratings of prestige, strength, activeness, and accomplishment.
Deliberative Style Deliberative style describes that chief executive who ‘‘understands implications of his decisions; exhibits depth of comprehension,’’ is ‘‘able to visualize alternatives and weigh long-term consequences,’’ ‘‘keeps himself thoroughly informed; reads briefings, background reports,’’ and is ‘‘cautious, conservative in action.’’ At the same time, such a president infrequently – if ever – ‘‘indulges in emotional outbursts.’’ This style was most characteristic of George Washington. The deliberative style has a positive correlation with the interpersonal style. An example of a president who was low on both is Andrew Jackson. Deliberative presidents are organized, insightful, polished, methodical, intelligent, sophisticated, flexible, and moderate to an almost passive degree.
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With regard to the Big Five personality factors, these chief executives score high on conscientiousness and openness but low on extraversion (see Table 1). Similar to interpersonal presidents, deliberative chief executives are less likely to suffer numerous Cabinet resignations. In this case, the low turnover may indicate superior wisdom in making the appointments in the first place. The deliberative style is also similar to the interpersonal style in that such presidents tend to veto fewer bills sent to their desk. Otherwise, this style appears much less successful. The deliberative president has fewer bills passed by Congress, including fewer really important bills, and tends to have a shorter administration – he is more like a transient caretaker. The only plus is that such leaders have lower odds of having major scandals dishonor their administrations. Clearly, in this area of performance their deliberative nature pays off; they do not appoint anyone to high office who has no business being there. Strangely, when we look at posthumous greatness assessments, the leadership performance of deliberative presidents is no better or no worse than the norm. Perhaps they are so risk adverse that they are unwilling to take the risks necessary for bona fide greatness – yet they avoid out-and-out failure en route to leader mediocrity.
Creative Style A creative orientation is associated with a leader who regularly ‘‘initiates new legislation and programs’’ and who ‘‘is innovative in his role as an executive.’’ Yet he is very seldom a ‘‘middle-of-the-roader.’’ Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Franklin Roosevelt are counted among the best exemplars of this style. The creative style often coexists with the charismatic style; many presidents are high (or low) on both together. The creative style is correlated with being inventive and artistic – with pervasive intellectual brilliance – as well as being Machiavellian, inflexible, immoderate, forceful, aggressive, and progressive rather than conservative. Furthermore, the creative style is associated with higher scores on the need for power and the need for achievement. Although the charismatic style is also connected with these two motives, charisma is more strongly correlated with power motivation while creativity is more strongly correlated with achievement motivation. Nonetheless, the creative style is even more conspicuously linked with interpersonal dominance than is the charismatic style. Perhaps as a consequence, the creative style has a somewhat more negative correlation with the Big Five agreeableness dimension than does
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the charismatic style (see Table 1). It would seem that creative presidents are so concerned with getting where they want to go that they are more willing to step on a lot of toes than are charismatic presidents. The latter have much less interest in alienating people to get the job done. Like the charismatic style, the creative style is positively correlated with the number of significant acts passed, specific legislative victories, and special messages sent to Congress. However, creativity – unlike charisma – is more predictive of reelection to a second term, and hence serving more years in office. Even more important are the relations with expert evaluations of ultimate presidential performance. Like charismatic chief executives, creative leaders earn higher posthumous ratings, including higher assessments on specific criteria of prestige, strength, activeness, and accomplishment. Nevertheless, the correlations are almost always higher for the creative style relative to the charismatic style. Moreover, charismatic chief executives have a higher likelihood of becoming controversial, of provoking disagreements about the president’s global success. Thus, if one were a voter deciding between a creative candidate and a charismatic candidate, the wiser choice would be the first. Not only are creative presidents better, on average, but they are less likely to be seen by some as worse.
Neurotic Style The last of the five styles is the most peculiar. The neurotic style applies to that president who most frequently ‘‘places political success over effective policy’’ and who ‘‘suffers health problems [that] tend to parallel difficult and critical periods in office.’’ Making matters even worse, presidents with this style are almost never exhibit a ‘‘direct, uncomplicated approach’’ to political leadership. The neurotic style is best exemplified by James Polk, whereas Ronald Reagan’s style was the least neurotic. Presidents featuring the neurotic style tend to exhibit Machiavellian and petty (i.e., greedy and self-pitying) personalities, and to display higher than average levels of achievement (but not power) motivation. These leaders have a ‘‘chip on their shoulder’’ and, therefore, manipulate politics to meet their ego needs. Although the neurotic style is positively correlated with the Big Five factor neuroticism, this correlation is far from statistically significant (see Table 1). This null result may partly reflect the poor reliability of this particular factor. The inferior reliability may also explain why the neurotic style is not a conspicuous predictor of leadership performance. It correlates with only one criterion – the number of failures in getting the
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president’s legislative proposals through Congress. Evidently, neuroticism is not very persuasive on Capitol Hill.
DISCUSSION Now how do these five styles line up with the three forms of outstanding leadership advanced by Mumford and his coauthors? Let us simplify the analysis by dismissing the neurotic style. High scores on this factor are very rare, and it has very few correlates, especially regarding performance criteria. That leaves the interpersonal, charismatic, deliberative, and creative styles. It might be reasonably argued that these four can be collapsed into just two – to wit, the interpersonal–deliberative style and the charismatic– creative style. This consolidation can be defended on two grounds: The two sets of styles have strong positive correlations. Although there are exceptions, interpersonal leaders tend to be deliberative (r ¼ 0.55) and charismatic leaders tend to be creative (r ¼ 0.62). The two sets tend to correlate the same way with personality traits and performance criteria (and with biographical experiences; Simonton, 1988). To be sure, contrasts do emerge for each set, but these differences may be judged smaller than the affinities. If so, then we might offer two correspondences: Most obviously, charismatic leadership would be associated with some integration of charismatic and creative styles. More tenuously, pragmatic leadership might be identified with some combination of interpersonal and deliberative styles. If we then consolidate these four styles into the two leadership types, we obtain the new set of scores shown in Table 2. The highest-scoring presidents on the charismatic–creative dimension are Franklin Roosevelt and Jackson; the lowest-scoring presidents are Grant, Coolidge, and Taft. In contrast, the highest scorers on the interpersonal–deliberative dimension are Fillmore and Washington, and the lowest scorers are Jackson and Wilson. For good or ill, chief executives since Franklin Roosevelt have not scored more than one standard deviation above or below the mean on either of the two collapsed dimensions. The attractions of this unification notwithstanding, we are still left with an irksome question: What happened to ideological leadership? One possibility is that the original IPAR presidential style inventory did not
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Table 2. President Washington J. Adams Jefferson Madison Monroe J. Q. Adams Jackson Van Buren W. Harrison Tyler Polk Taylor Fillmore Pierce Buchanan Lincoln A. Johnson Grant Hayes Garfield Arthur Cleveland B. Harrison McKinley T. Roosevelt Taft Wilson Harding Coolidge Hoover F. Roosevelt Truman Eisenhower Kennedy L. Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan G. H. W. Bush Clinton
Standardized Scores Combining Charismatic–Creative and Interpersonal–Deliberative Styles. Charismatic–Creative
Interpersonal–Deliberative
0.04 0.15 0.84 0.61 0.66 0.44 2.18 0.53 1.26 0.52 0.24 0.15 1.35 0.32 0.68 0.38 0.37 1.86 0.94 0.62 0.69 0.92 0.60 0.30 0.64 1.84 0.21 1.08 1.86 0.01 2.16 0.45 0.21 1.27 1.51 0.94 0.32 0.14 1.24 0.06 1.51
1.72 0.23 1.08 1.47 0.72 0.09 2.12 0.26 0.30 1.36 0.89 0.46 2.12 0.27 0.44 0.93 1.19 1.64 0.65 0.44 0.13 0.07 0.31 1.12 1.23 0.76 2.07 0.24 0.08 0.51 0.89 1.22 0.19 1.14 0.53 1.15 1.06 0.48 0.01 0.47 0.69
Note: All scores are published here for the first time. Scores for Bush and Clinton are based on imputed scores for the two presidents based on the Big Five factor personality scores in Rubenzer and Faschingbauer (2004). Accordingly, these must be considered more tentative than the others. In any case, the two combined factors have a correlation of 0.33 (po0.05), indicating a slight antagonism between the two leadership types. Kennedy is the only chief executive who was more than one standard deviation above the mean on both styles.
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contain items tapping this aspect of presidential leadership. Unfortunately, a glance at the items indicates that this may be the case (Simonton, 1988, Table 1). Only two items seem relevant to capturing this dimension: ‘‘uncompromising in matters of personal principle’’ and ‘‘is idealistic.’’ Worse still, neither of these items entered the factor analysis. Their reliability coefficients were too low. Accordingly, it was impossible to tap variation in ideological leadership among the 39 U.S. presidents sampled. Even so, these same deficiencies can be interpreted in a more positive fashion. Perhaps the inventory omitted lots of items concerning ideological leadership because that form of leadership is not a prominent feature of the U.S. presidency. Consequently, there is too little variation on that dimension. This interpretation would also explain the low reliabilities of the items that do seem relevant to ideological leadership. If the sampled presidents varied very little on these traits, then the variance is not large enough to support a conspicuous consensus. Thus U.S. presidents may really come in just two types: charismatic (charismatic and creative styles) and pragmatic (interpersonal and deliberative styles). Admittedly, it is possible to extract from historians’ ratings (published in Maranell, 1970) a bipolar dogmatism factor that features idealisticinflexibility at one pole and pragmatic-flexibility at the other pole (Simonton, 1986, 1987). Moreover, posthumously assessed presidential performance is a U-shaped function of this dogmatism assessment. The greatest presidents are either idealistically inflexible or pragmatically flexible! However, this finding does not solve the problem because the dogmatism factor places ideological and pragmatic presidents on opposite poles of a single dimension. Hence, a pure ideological type of leadership remains elusive among those who have assumed the highest political office in the United States. Naturally, some observers might like to brand this or that president as an ideologue. In truth, such ideological leaders are very rare, if nonexistent. Perhaps George W. Bush came closest, yet he was probably a far cry from a genuine ideological leader from either right or left (but see Simonton, 2006). Because the U.S. system of electing presidents requires that each candidate seek the largest electorate, and because voters as a whole tend to place themselves in the middle of the political spectrum, a forthright ideologue may be unelectable – as libertarian Republican Barry Goldwater learned in the 1964 presidential election. Presidents of the United States may really come in only two alternative flavors: charismatic (and creative) or pragmatic (interpersonal and deliberative). Whether this binary decision is an asset or a deficit of American democracy, I let others determine.
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REFERENCES Emrich, C. G., Brower, H. H., Feldman, J. M., & Garland, H. (2001). Images in words: Presidential rhetoric, charisma, and greatness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46, 527–557. Historical Figures Assessment Collaborative. (1977). Assessing historical figures: The use of observer-based personality descriptions. Historical Methods Newsletter, 10, 66–76. Ludwig, A. M. (2002). King of the mountain: The nature of political leadership. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. Maranell, G. M. (1970). The evaluation of presidents: An extension of the Schlesinger polls. Journal of American History, 57, 104–113. Mumford, M. D., Hunter, S. T., Friedrich, T. L., & Caughron, J. J. (2009). Charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership: An examination of multi-level influences on emergence and performance. In: F. Yammarino & F. Dansereau (Eds), Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and leadership. Vol. 8 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Rubenzer, S. J., & Faschingbauer, T. R. (2004). Personality, character, and leadership in the White House: Psychologists assess the presidents. Washington, DC: Brassey’s. Simonton, D. K. (1980). Land battles, generals, and armies: Individual and situational determinants of victory and casualties. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, 110–119. Simonton, D. K. (1986). Presidential personality: Biographical use of the Gough Adjective Check List. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 149–160. Simonton, D. K. (1987). Why presidents succeed: A political psychology of leadership. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Simonton, D. K. (1988). Presidential style: Personality, biography, and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 928–936. Simonton, D. K. (1993). Putting the best leaders in the White House: Personality, policy, and performance. Political Psychology, 14, 537–548. Simonton, D. K. (2001). Kings, queens, and sultans: Empirical studies of political leadership in European hereditary monarchies. In: O. Feldman & L. O. Valenty (Eds), Profiling political leaders: Cross-cultural studies of personality and behavior (pp. 97–110). Westport, CT: Praeger. Simonton, D. K. (2006). Presidential IQ, openness, intellectual brilliance, and leadership: Estimates and correlations for 42 US chief executives. Political Psychology, 27, 511–639. Simonton, D. K. (2008). Presidential greatness and its socio-psychological significance: Individual or situation? Performance or attribution? In: C. Hoyt, G. R. Goethals, & D. Forsyth (Eds), Leadership at the crossroads: Psychology and leadership (Vol. 1, pp. 132–148). Westport, CT: Praeger.
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CHARISMATIC, IDEOLOGICAL, AND PRAGMATIC LEADERSHIP: WHERE WE ARE, AND WHERE DO WE NEED TO GO? Michael D. Mumford, Jay J. Caughron and Tamara L. Friedrich ABSTRACT Mumford, Friedrich, Hunter, and Caughron (2009) propose a multilevel theory of leadership intended to allow for the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. In their commentaries, Hunt and Davis (2009) and Simonton (2009) provide additional support for this model. Their observations also broach questions about how charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership styles should be measured, and how hypotheses should be developed with regard to multilevel influence on leader emergence and performance. This commentary discusses the implications of these observations for future research on styles of outstanding leadership.
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INTRODUCTION Leadership comes in many forms (Bass, in press; Yukl, 2005). As a result, most scholars conceive of leadership as a domain-specific phenomenon. For example, one might focus on the leadership of creative ventures (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange, 2002), leadership under conditions of complexity (Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007) or ethical leadership (Trevino & Brown, 2004). Of the many domains in which one might study leadership, scholars often stress the importance of outstanding, historically notable, leadership (Bass, in press) – that is, the leaders who change the world in which we live. Although there has long been an interest in outstanding leadership, little real substantive progress was made in advancing this field until some 20 years ago, when theories of charismatic leadership emerged (Conger & Kanungo, 1998; House, 1995; Sharmin, House, & Arthur, 1993). Broadly speaking, research on charismatic leadership served to demonstrate the importance of vision, vision articulation, and follower infusion of identity in the vision being articulated by the leader (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996). Although we would not dispute the importance of this work, by the same token it is clear that charismatic leadership does not always lead to success (Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996; Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli, Waldman, & Yammarino, 2004). Even more importantly, it is not clear where vision comes from and why it has such a powerful effect on followers, at least under certain circumstances. These observations were the impetus for our development of the theory of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership (Mumford, 2006; Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, & Caughron, 2009; Mumford & Van Doorn, 2001; Strange & Mumford, 2005); this theory is outlined in the chapter to which Hunt and Davis (2009) and Simonton (2009) address their commentaries. In response to the commentaries of Simonton as well as Hunt and Davis, the remainder of this commentary contains three sections. The first section focuses on describing the theory of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership as proposed by Mumford and colleagues (Mumford, 2006; Mumford et al., 2009). The second section emphasizes issues surrounding measurement. While measurement was not a focal point of the Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron’s chapter, the Simonton review raises some interesting points about measurement that should be recognized and addressed. Finally, the last section addresses the comments of Hunt and Davis as they pertain to the development of hypotheses about and examination of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership styles. It is
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our hope that this response addresses the most substantive issues relating to the current theory under examination to the fullest extent possible given the available research on this recently developed conceptualization of leadership.
THE THEORY Before turning to the commentaries of Hunt and Davis (2009) and Simonton (2009), it is useful to briefly reconsider the theoretical model being proposed. Hunt and Davis provide a succinct, and accurate, summary of this theory, which holds that (1) outstanding leadership emerges in response to crises; (2) crises – as complex, ambiguous, high-risk events – require sense making for effective leadership; and (3) the basis for sense making lies in the formation of a viable mental model that allows others to understand and respond to the crisis. In fact, the available evidence indicates that this is a plausible basis for understanding the emergence (Hunt, Boal, & Dodge, 1999) and psychological basis (Strange & Mumford, 2005) of outstanding leadership. Although this theory strikes Hunt and Davis as well as Simonton as plausible, the key aspects of this theory raise a number of questions. For example, which characteristics of crises lead people to engage in sense making (Weick, 1995)? What are the origins and key characteristics of leaders’ mental models (Ligon, Hunter, & Mumford, 2008)? How do leaders translate these mental models to followers (Senge, 1990)? Of course, all of these questions need to be far more thoroughly addressed than has occurred up to this point. Indeed, a new wave of research on normative aspects of outstanding leadership is clearly needed. The charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic theory under consideration in the Hunt and Davis (2009) and Simonton (2009) commentaries is a microtheory within the context of this broader theory. The charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic theory is based on a simple, well-established proposition (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). Mental models are complex cognitive constructions, and different mental models may be constructed by different people to account for the same phenomenon. Thus, we argue that people may formulate mental models with respect to crisis events, different temporal frames, experience, outcomes sought, nature of causes emphasized, agents of causation, and the sources of control in these causes (Mumford, 2006). Preferred patterns in constructing these causal explanatory systems, in turn, give rise to the three styles of outstanding leadership referred to as charismatic (e.g., future time frame, people as causes, positive
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outcomes sought), ideological (e.g., past time frame, situations as causes, negative outcomes to be avoided), and pragmatic (e.g., present time frame, interactive causes, both positive outcomes sought and negative outcomes to be avoided). With regard to the charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic theory proposed by Mumford et al. (2009), four key points should be noted. First, this theory is an inherently cognitive theory. Second, the styles by which people formulate these mental models are not mutually exclusive. More specifically, different combinations of base elements will give rise to different mental models. Thus, one might view people as causes of negative events in mental model formation – an alternative type of outstanding leadership that warrants consideration. Third, this theory refers to three generic, or prototypical, styles by which leaders construct mental models for understanding crisis-related events. Fourth, these mental models are held to represent stable organizing systems that, although they may not be applied in addressing every issue confronting a leader, develop early in life (Ligon et al., 2008) and are used to describe, explain, and predict (Rouse & Morris, 1986) the effects of crises, and guide interactions with others in addressing these crises. These stable organizing principles, in turn, broach the question addressed by Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron: When does an individual expressing a particular style – charismatic, ideological, or pragmatic – emerge, and when does this style prove effective in crisis resolution?
MEASUREMENT Simonton (2009), in his commentary, is ultimately examining the applicability of this theory to one area where outstanding leadership is commonly observed – U.S. Presidents. In his study of these leaders, Simonton (1988) obtained behavioral and personality ratings based on sketches provided of their actions. Five styles were identified: (1) interpersonal, (2) charismatic, (3) deliberative, (4) creative, and (5) neurotic. For example, charismatics were characterized by behaviors such as ‘‘uses rhetoric effectively’’ and ‘‘has a flair for the dramatic.’’ Subsequently, Simonton agrees, in part based on correlations observed among those styles, that U.S. Presidents can be characterized by a charismatic or pragmatic style when those five dimensions are collapsed. Thus, bearing in mind the point that ideologues are rarely elected to presidential office, a finding that confirms our arguments with regard to selective emergence of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders, Simonton’s findings provide some critical support for our proposal
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that outstanding leaders may exhibit distinct styles – styles that Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron refer to as charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic. Like most scholars, we applaud any effort that provides support for our theory. When one considers Simonton’s research in the context of the theory sketched out earlier, however, certain questions come to the fore with regard to the measurement of those styles. These questions are of fundamental importance to advancing our understanding of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership in particular, and perhaps leadership in general. Those issues do not constitute a criticism of Simonton’s work per se, but rather point to a set of broader issues that must be considered. To begin, the theory at hand is ultimately a cognitive theory focusing on how leaders construct different mental models for understanding their world. Those mental models, in turn, affect behavior, interactions, and followers’ perceptions. What should be recognized here is that Simonton (2009) did not assess the mental models applied by leaders, but rather derivative behaviors. This use of second-order measures is not inappropriate, but it does result in certain ambiguities with regard to interpretation. For example, in prior work (Mumford, 2006), Ronald Reagan, based on the mental model he applied, was classified as an ideological leader rather than a charismatic one, as was the case in Simonton’s (2009) study. Thus, in studies seeking to measure charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership, one must carefully consider the specific nature of the measures being applied visa-vis this theory. Although we can envision cases where behaviorally based measures might prove appropriate, development of these measures may call for scaling based on differential expression of key behaviors distinguishing these three types. More centrally, for the assessment of leader style, we now generally prefer measures based on direct measurement of the mental model applied by the leader (Marshall-Mies et al., 1996). Recently, Bedell-Avers, Hunter, and Mumford (2008) took an alternative approach to the assessment of the charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership styles. In their work, study participants were presented with an illustration of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic actions in addressing certain kinds of leadership problems. People were presented with an illustration of each style and asked to indicate the incident most like their own leadership style. The resulting measure evidenced good validity in accounting for leader’s problem-solving performance, with people expressing a certain style – charismatic, ideological, or pragmatic – displaying good performance on problems that matched their style. What is notable with regard to this procedure for measuring leadership style is that it is
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consistent with the idiographic nature of mental models. Simonton (2009), of course, applied a normative model. Although it is interesting that a normative approach produced convergent results, the question remains as to whether we should be applying a normative or an idiographic measurement model in style assessments. Also, it must be recognized that these two approaches may not always yield equivalent results. A final issue bearing on assessment of the charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership styles relates to their distribution. The theory on which these styles are based is a cognitive theory that makes no assumptions about the normative distribution of these styles. Rather, Bedell-Avers, Hunter, and Mumford’s (2008) findings indicate that in an undergraduate sample, a pragmatic leadership style is frequently observed (55%), a charismatic style is somewhat frequently observed (30%), and an ideological leadership style is not frequently observed (15%). As Simonton (2009) notes, the relative frequency of style expression must be taken into account in drawing conclusions. Most centrally, measures must be developed that take into account the nonconstant frequency with which these styles are expressed.
HYPOTHESES Mumford et al. (2009) are not primarily concerned with measurement issues. Rather, they focus on developing a theory about when charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders emerge, and when they perform well, taking into account contextual variables at the individual, group, organizational, and environmental levels that will influence emergence and performance. The Hunt and Davis (2009) commentary directly speaks to this issue, focusing on the propositions proposed. Hunt and Davis focus on the unique propositions that would account for the emergence and performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders. Essentially, they ask a question about differential validity. Broadly speaking, these authors find the evidence acquired for this differential validity of these three styles compelling. That said, we would caution readers with regard to the application of differential validity arguments in part based on the theory at hand and in part based on the status of current research. The theory on which the charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership styles were based is, ultimately, a general theory of outstanding leadership. As noted earlier, this theory holds that all outstanding leaders emerge under conditions of crisis, where the crisis conditions require sense making, and this sense making is held to depend on the viability of the
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mental models formulated. Charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders alike emerge under these kinds of crisis conditions. Moreover, their performance is ultimately based on the quality or viability of the mental models used in sense making. Of course, this observation implies that we need studies, far more studies than are currently available, examining key attributes of crises, sense-making activities engaged in at the individual and social levels, and the characteristics of viable mental models. In fact, we believe that studies examining these cross-style variables may prove as important, if not more important, than studies contrasting charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership. We suspect that Hunt and Davis (2009) would agree with this point. However, they argue that by proposing charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic styles, Mumford et al. (2009) essentially have proposed a model in which differential propositions are critical to assessing the validity of the theory. When one reads the theoretical basis for these three styles, we believe this assumption is questionable. As Mumford (2006) has pointed out, these styles differ not in their basic elements, all mental models involve assumptions about causation, but rather in their specific instantiation of these elements (e.g., positive vs. negative causes, people as causes vs. situations as causes) and the organization of these elements in the creation of a mental model. What is noteworthy about this observation is that the mental models of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders are not viewed as independent entities, but instead are observed as overlapping entities. Thus, both charismatic and pragmatic leaders focus on external causes in formulating their mental models, whereas ideological leaders focus more on internal crises. Similarly, although pragmatic leaders focus on the present, exactly what constitutes ‘‘the present’’ is subject to vagaries in the time frame applied (Jaques, 1976). As a result, pragmatic leaders may, in forming mental models, like charismatics, consider the future. The implication of this observation, of course, is that distinctions between charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders cannot be absolute but rather will be based on a pattern of effects (Mumford, Stokes, & Owens, 1990). This observation, in turn, leads one to question whether differential hypothesis formation and testing will be desirable as Hunt and Davis (2009) would assume. Perhaps even more fundamental to Hunt and Davis’s critique is their argument with regard to the pattern of hypothesis formation. More specifically, unique hypotheses were not formulated with respect to each style of leadership at each level. At one level, this is a fair criticism. On another level, we would caution readers against accepting this argument too
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quickly. More specifically, Mumford et al. (2009) formulated hypotheses based on the available evidence to clarify similarities and differences across leader types – charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic. What should be recognized here is that discussion of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership as a set of distinct styles is a recent event. Often adequate evidence is not available concerning ideological and pragmatic leaders. Although evidence is often available for charismatic leaders, it is rare for studies to have contrasted charismatic leaders with ideological and pragmatic leaders. Although we recognize this inherent limitation of the Mumford, Hunter, Friedrich, and Caughron’s effort, we hope this effort, and the commentaries of Hunt and Davis as well as Simonton will provide the impetus for future studies intended to address this issue.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We would like to thank Sam Hunter and Katrina Bedell-Avers for their contributions to the present effort.
REFERENCES Bass, B. M. (in press). Handbook of leadership. New York: Free Press. Bedell-Avers, K. E., Hunter, S. T., & Mumford, M. D. (2008). Conditions of problem-solving and the performance of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders: A comparative experimental study. Leadership Quarterly, 19, 89–106. Conger, J. A., & Kanungo, R. S. (1998). Charismatic leadership in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Goldvarg, E., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2001). Naı¨ ve causality: A mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning. Cognitive Science, 25, 565–610. House, R. J. (1995). Leadership in the twenty-first century: A speculative inquiry. In: A. Howard (Ed.), The changing nature of work (pp. 411–450). San Francisco, CA: JosseyBass. Hunt, J. G., Boal, K. B., & Dodge, G. E. (1999). The effects of visionary and crisis-responsive charisma on followers: An experimental examination of two kinds of charismatic leadership. Leadership Quarterly, 10, 423–448. Hunt, J. G., & Davis, J. N. (2009). Levels of performance: Multi-level perspectives on outstanding leadership. In: F. J. Yammarino & F. Dansereau (Eds), Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and leadership. Vol. 8 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Jaques, E. (1976). A general theory of bureaucracy. London: Heinemann.
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Kirkpatrick, S. A., & Locke, E. A. (1996). Direct and indirect effects on three core charismatic leadership components on performance and attitudes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, 36–51. Ligon, G. M., Hunter, S. T., & Mumford, M. D. (2008). Development of outstanding leadership: A life narrative approach. Leadership Quarterly, 19, 312–334. Lowe, K. B., Kroeck, K. G., & Sivasubramaniam, N. (1996). Effectiveness correlates of transformational and transactional leadership: A meta-analytic review of the MLQ literature. Leadership Quarterly, 7, 385–425. Marshall-Mies, J. C., Martin, J. A., Fleishman, E. A., Zaccaro, S. J., Baughman, W. A., & McGee, M. L. (1996). Development and evaluation of cognitive and metacognitive measures for predicting leadership potential. Bethesda, MD: Management Research Institute. Mumford, M. D. (Ed.) (2006). Pathways to outstanding leadership: A comparative analysis of charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Mumford, M. D., Hunter, S. T., Friedrich, T. L., & Caughron, J. J. (2009). Charismatic, ideological and pragmatic leadership: An examination of multi-level influences on leader emergence and performance. In: F. J. Yammarino & F. Dansereau (Eds), Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and leadership. Vol. 8 of Research in Multi-Level Issues. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Mumford, M. D., Scott, G. M., Gaddis, B., & Strange, J. M. (2002). Leading creative people: Orchestrating expertise and relationships. Leadership Quarterly, 13, 705–750. Mumford, M. D., Stokes, G. S., & Owens, W. A. (1990). Patterns of life history: The ecology of human individuality. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Mumford, M. D., & Van Doorn, J. R. (2001). The leadership of pragmatism: Reconsidering Franklin in the age of charisma. Leadership Quarterly, 12, 274–309. Rouse, W. B., & Morris, N. M. (1986). On looking into the black box: Prospects and limits in the search for mental models. Psychological Bulletin, 100, 349–363. Senge, P. M. (1990). The fifth discipline. London: Century. Sharmin, B., House, R. J., & Arthur, M. B. (1993). The motivational effects of charismatic leadership: A self-concept based theory. Organizational Science, 4, 577–594. Simonton, D. K. (1988). Presidential style: Personality, biography, and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 928–936. Simonton, D. K. (2009). Presidential leadership styles: How do they map onto charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leadership? In: F. J. Yammarino & F. Dansereau (Eds), Multi-level issues in organizational behavior and leadership. Vol. 8 of Research in MultiLevel Issues. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Strange, J. M., & Mumford, M. D. (2005). The origins of vision: Effects of reflection, models and analysis. Leadership Quarterly, 16, 121–148. Tosi, H. L., Misangyi, V. F., Fanelli, A., Waldman, D. A., & Yammarino, F. J. (2004). CEO charisma, compensation and firm performance. Leadership Quarterly, 15, 405–420. Trevino, L. K., & Brown, M. E. (2004). Managing to be ethical: Debunking five business ethics myths. Academy of Management Executive, 18, 69–81. Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., & McKelvey, B. (2007). Complexity leadership theory: Shifting leadership from the industrial age to the knowledge era. Leadership Quarterly, 18, 298–318. Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Yukl, G. (2005). Leadership in organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
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PART III LEADERSHIP AND SOCIAL RELATIONS
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A COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP USING THE SOCIAL RELATIONS MODEL David A. Kenny and Stefano Livi ABSTRACT The social relations model (SRM; Kenny, 1994) explicitly proposes that leadership simultaneously operates at three levels of analysis: group, dyad, and individual (perceiver and target). With this model, researchers can empirically determine the amount of variance at each level as well as those factors that explain variance at these different levels. This chapter shows how the SRM can be used to address many theoretically important questions in the study of leadership and can be used to advance both the theory of and research in leadership. First, based on analysis of leadership ratings from seven studies, we find that there is substantial agreement (i.e., target variance) about who in the group is the leader and little or no reciprocity in the perceptions of leadership. We then consider correlations of leadership perceptions. In one analysis, we examine the correlations between task-oriented and socioemotional leadership. In another analysis, we examine the effect of gender and gender composition on the perception of leadership. We also explore how self-ratings of leadership differ from member perceptions of leadership. Finally, we discuss how the model can be estimated using conventional software.
Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Leadership Research in Multi-Level Issues, Volume 8, 147–191 Copyright r 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1475-9144/doi:10.1108/S1475-9144(2009)0000008008
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INTRODUCTION Leadership is a complex phenomenon that can be explained using a variety of models. In spite of the impressive amount of empirical findings in more than 7,500 articles reviewed by Bass (1990), however, leadership research has not accumulated many consistent results. Part of the explanation for this failure is that scholars have been influenced by periodic fashions in research theory (Chemers, 2000), fluctuating from leader characteristics and perceptual factors of leadership to a more complex view integrating cultural and contextual factors at a wider level of analysis. As a result, leadership research might appear to some as disconnected and directionless (Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001) with little cross-fertilization of ideas (Van Vugt, 2006). These criticisms have forced leadership researchers to make efforts both to build a theoretical integration of current knowledge (Chemers, 2000) and to find conceptual and methodological instruments able to empirically clarify the relative weight of different approaches at the correct level of analysis (Livi, Kenny, Albright, & Pierro, 2008; Yammarino, Dionne, Chun, & Dansereau, 2005). At least three levels have been postulated to be important for leadership: the individual, the dyad, and the group. (Culture could potentially be viewed as a fourth level, but it is very often at the level of individual when groups contain members of different cultures.) Moreover, the individual level can be conceptualized in two ways: as the target (i.e., who is perceived to be a leader) and as the perceiver (i.e., who is judging leadership). The statistical model considered in this chapter examines leadership at all three of these levels. Before we discuss that model, we review theories of leadership at these levels to enhance understanding of the conceptual, as opposed to statistical, meaning of these different levels. Perhaps, the dominant view is that leadership is the level of the target (the individual). In these theories, leadership depends on a stable characteristic that may be linked to a consistent behavioral disposition, an internal characteristic of the person (i.e., a personality trait), or shared perception about leadership (i.e., a prototype). From this point of view, the oldest scientific approach to creating a psychological explanation of leadership is based on individual differences and is rooted on the nineteenth-century notion of Carlyle’s great man theory of leadership (Chemers, 2000). This theory proposed that the individual characteristics of a leader distinguish leaders from subordinates or an effective leader from inadequate ones, regardless of the situation (group, culture, or organization) or personal relationships with followers.
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The most traditional view of the individual differences approach of leadership is based largely on studies that correlate ratings of leadership with the targets’ personality characteristics. The focus on traits had declined after Stogdill (1948), and others reported the unreliable results of reported traits and found that no trait consistently predicted leadership, but interest in the trait approach has since been revived. For example, studies have shown that leadership demonstrates a substantial stability of leadership across situations (Bono & Judge, 2004; Foti & Hauenstein, 2007; Zaccaro, Foti, & Kenny, 1991). Moreover, the meta-analysis by Lord, De Vader, and Alliger (1986) found that some traits do consistently predict leadership. Research on this topic found consistent evidence that some traits are systematically associated with leadership emergence and effectiveness – namely, intelligence, dominance, masculinity, adjustment, conservatism, social sensitivity, self-monitoring, extraversion, and efficacy, among others (Chemers, 2000; Lord et al., 1986; Zaccaro et al., 1991). Scholars continue to have a strong interest on leader personality, as evidenced by the fact that 12% of articles about leadership still focus on this topic (Bono & Judge, 2004). Another fertile line of research examining individual characteristics of leaders highlights the importance of behavioral styles (Bass & Avolio, 1993). Beginning with the pioneering work of Bales (Bales & Strodtbeck, 1951) on task and socioemotional leadership, research has pointed to two main clusters related to leader behavior: consideration and initiation of structure (Hemphill, 1950). Behavioral observations from laboratory studies show that leader emergence is clearly associated with behaviors such as talkativeness (Dabbs & Ruback, 1987; Mullen, Salas, & Driskell, 1989) and interruptions (Hall, Coats, & LeBeau, 2005; Malloy & Janowski, 1992; Ng, Brooke, & Dunne, 1995). Moreover, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the examination of more complex styles of leadership, such as charismatic leadership (House & Shamir, 1993) and transformational leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1993). Successful charismatic leaders gain their position by exhibiting self-confidence, task ability, emotional expressiveness, and conviction in their beliefs, and they are able to induce in their subordinates a high level of loyalty, intellectual stimulation, and consideration (Bass, 1990). Although individual differences in personality or in behavioral styles can influence leadership emergence, other authors posit that certain variations emerge as a function of the context (e.g., group or organization) in which the leader is embedded. These theories vary in placing anywhere from a strong to a moderate emphasis on context, depending on the relative
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influence attributed to the leader. In essence, these theories emphasize other levels besides the target. A variety of theories attempt to describe leadership behavior in a more dynamic, interpersonal system of perceivers and the perceived. The cognitive perspective to leadership has emphasized that leadership is as much a property of the person who is doing the perceiving as it is a property of the person who is being perceived (Norris-Watts & Lord, 2004). According to Calder’s (1977) attribution theory, leadership is an inferred disposition or internal quality based on shared beliefs about a leader’s behaviors and traits that affect members’ perceptions, information encoding, and retrieval of relevant information (Kenney, Blascovich, & Shaver, 1994). Attributions play a prominent role in most implicit theories of leadership as well as in Meindl, Ehrlich, and Dukerich’s (1985) theory about the romance of leadership. In these models, the perceiver’s schemas guide the perception of a target more than the target’s actual behaviors. In this way, leadership traits are not a stable property of a person, but rather a perceptual abstraction that followers use to categorize leaders and to make sense of the leader’s behavior (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004). Following categorization theory (Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984), the prototype of leadership is an abstract conception or representation of the most representative leader (Phillips, 1984). The attributes of a particular leader, both traits and behaviors, are compared to the prototypic attributes of a preexisting leader category (Rush & Russell, 1988). Prototypes are also used by leaders as a vehicle for expressing their behavior and to manage their leadership perception. The result is a holistic, context-free, implicit theory of leadership (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004). Interestingly, recent developments of these theories, such as the connectionist models of leadership (Lord, Brown, & Harvey, 2001), hypothesize that the contextual constraints play a more important role, suggesting that strong variation across and within perceivers is a function of different contexts (e.g., when the context changes or is based on their experience; Brown & Lord, 2001). The social identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003) emphasizes that a leader’s effectiveness heavily depends on that leader’s similarity to the group’s prototype. In this way, leadership perceptions vary among groups depending not only on the leader fit to the group prototype, but also on the group identification of the followers (Cicero, Pierro, & van Knippenberg, 2007). Thus, these theories of leadership perception suggest that if an organization or a workgroup shares a common knowledge of leadership owing to shared cultural values, members should agree about who is and who
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is not the leader in the group. Conversely, if group members are involved in different socialization processes or if leaders have different functions for different followers, less agreement will be apparent. Classic contingency theories, such as Fiedler’s (1978) contingency theory, or path-goal theory (House, 1971) and normative decision theory (Vroom & Yetton, 1973), assume that leadership effectiveness depends on fit between the leader’s personal characteristics and style, and the demands of the situation. For example, Fiedler’s theory assumes that leader effectiveness is a joint function of leader’s personal style (task or relationship oriented) and situational control (the ability of a leader’s relations to provide follower clarity in group tasks and authority). Relationship-oriented leaders are predicted to be more effective when they have a moderate control over the situation, whereas task-oriented leaders are more effective when they have low or high control. Other theories have pointed out that the contingency is at a dyadic level between leader and follower, and that the development of the relationship is maintained through the exchange of valued resources (Hollander, 1958). Thus, leadership is viewed as a reciprocal process in which leader and follower exist in a mutual relationship, such that leadership cannot be determined independently of followership (Chemers, 1997; Hogg, 2005; Hollander, 1992; Messick, 2005). Beginning with the early intuition of Hollander (1958) in his theory of idiosyncratic credit, many theories have emphasized that leadership is a process that involves followership and reciprocal action between leader and follower – as in leader–member exchange theory (Yukl, 1994) or vertical dyad linkage theory (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975). For example, the leader–member exchange theory assumes that leaders have different relationships with different subordinates; as a consequence, leadership effectiveness depends on a dyadic relationship between leader and follower (Levine & Moreland, 1998). Finally, other theories give more importance to context and, therefore, emphasize effects at the group level (Emrich, 1999). For instance, Lord, Binning, Rush, and Thomas (1978) showed that greater levels of leadership are perceived when a group is successful than when it fails. Schyns and Sanders (2003) demonstrated that mood can affect the perception of leadership. Pierro, Mannetti, De Grada, Livi, and Kruglanski (2003) showed the positive effect of temporal pressure in groups on leadership perception. According to the theory of substitutes of leadership (Kerr, 1977; Kerr & Jermier, 1978), environmental, social, and organizational factors all strongly influence task performance and are able to reduce the necessity of leadership: Subordinates (e.g., ability, experience), task (e.g., low
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ambiguity), and organization (e.g., group cohesion, support by supervisors, organizational formalization) may all potentially render the function of leadership unnecessary. Thus, leadership varies as a function of type of organization, the structure, and group characteristics in which the leader operates. Other researchers have emphasized cultural factors that affect leadership perception and the expressions of leader’s and followers’ personal and common needs (Ayman & Chemers, 1991). In this case, successful leaders are able to help followers to reach goals and personal needs, but those needs are oriented by socialized values that are settled at the cultural level (Chemers, 2000). With some notable exceptions (Brown & Lord, 2001), few theories of leadership have explicitly hypothesized effects due to the perceiver, although some measures of the implicit theories of the leadership recently developed assume differences in the way individuals perceive the leadership prototypes (e.g., Epitropaki & Martin, 2004). If, for some people, their prototype would be easier to match than it would be for others, these perceivers would see more leadership than others.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS CHAPTER As we have just described, leadership has been shown to operate at the level of the relationship, the person (both perceiver and target), and the group. A fundamental challenge of leadership research is to simultaneously study leadership at multiple levels. The social relations model (SRM) represents one way of responding to that very difficult challenge. The remainder of this chapter begins by presenting a detailed description of the components of the SRM. We discuss both variances of and correlations between these components. In the next section, we follow the lead of Lord et al. (2001) and examine the sources of variance in group members’ perceptions of leadership. Using data from seven studies that included multiple measures of leadership, we partition the variance in leadership ratings to determine the relative importance of group, relationship, perceiver, and target in the perception of leadership. In addition, we examine reciprocity of the perception of leadership: If Jack thinks that Jill is a leader, does Jill think that Jack is a leader? After reviewing the results of these SRM analyses, we consider them within the context of leadership theory.
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Next, we consider correlations of variables with leadership using the SRM. First, we explore the differences between task-oriented and socioemotional leadership, using the model to study convergent and discriminant validity of these two leadership styles. Second, we examine gender differences in the perception of leadership, considering gender differences at the three levels of analysis. These first two sections illustrate how we can attempt to explain the components of leadership. Third, we consider the overlap between self-perception of leadership and the perception of leadership by group members. The fundamental question here is how selfperception of leadership differs from the perception of others. The final and most technical section of the chapter focuses on the statistical analysis of the SRM. We show how standard statistical packages (i.e., SAS and SPSS) and structural equation modeling (SEM) packages (i.e., Amos) can be used to estimate the model’s parameters. We have tried as much as possible to keep the technical, statistical details to a minimum in this chapter. These details, while important, are likely to not be of interest to leadership researchers. Nevertheless, our discussion of the estimation of the model probably includes more detail than most readers would prefer to see.
SOCIAL RELATIONS MODEL Most multi-level models consider just two levels of analysis, in which the two levels have a hierarchical structure – that is, units from one level are nested within the other level (e.g., persons in groups). Another multi-level model allows for an examination of all of the levels – group, individual (perceiver and target), and dyad. Known as the social relations model (SRM; Kenny, 1994; Kenny & La Voie, 1984), it can be used to empirically determine the amount of variance in a particular measure at each level. To do so, there must be a group of persons such that each group member rates every other member in the group on leadership. Such a design is commonly called a round-robin. Self-ratings may be constructed as well, but they are set aside because they may be qualitatively different from ratings of others. (In a later section of this chapter, we return to the question of what to do with self-ratings.) The SRM includes five random variables, each of which is a source of variance: Group: differences among groups in how much leadership is perceived. Perceiver (individual): differences among individuals in how much leadership they perceive in others, in general.
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Target (individual): differences among individuals in how much each is perceived as a leader, in general, by the others. Relationship (dyad): idiosyncratic perceptions of the extent to which someone is perceived as a leader by a particular other. Error: measurement noise in the judgment of leadership. We review each of these components in more detail. Is there more leadership in some groups than others? Group variance would be indicated by a large amount of variance in the group means of leadership. There are two opposing ways to think about whether leadership would show group effects. The first perspective on leadership is that it is a zero-sum phenomenon; that is, in a group one person becomes the leader and the others become followers, as in a rank ordering. In this case, there would be no expectation that leadership would vary by group, because one member tends to emerge as a leader in each group. The second view is that leadership represents a potential that may or may not be met. For example, if a group fails, the cause for the failure may be that it lacked actual or perceived leadership (Lord et al., 1978). Within this perspective, one would expect group variance, because leadership could be unequally allocated among groups due to different leadership styles, differential participation of the individual group members, unequal power expressed or assigned to each group member, different leadership prototypes (Hogg, 2001), or different group social constructions of leadership responsible for a specific or co-constructed perception of leadership (Meindl et al., 1985). The perceiver effect represents how much individuals see leadership in others in general: Do some people view others in general as leaders, whereas others do not? For leadership, the perceiver is probably the least theoretically interesting component. However, for measures of socioemotional leadership (i.e., leadership focusing on member relations, rather than productivity), the perceiver effect might reflect how much the person enjoys being in the group, how much the individual likes the other group members, and how much the person is involved and participates in group activities. The target effect represents the extent to which a person is seen as a leader in the group; target variance taps into whether people agree as to how much leadership each member exhibits. With social perception, a qualification becomes necessary: A person may be seen one way by members of the group, but the person may not actually be that way. In other words, perception may not necessarily match reality. At the same time, it can be argued that a major part of being a leader is being seen by other group
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members as a leader. In this sense, individuals who are perceived as showing more leadership are actually leaders, whereas those perceived as showing less leadership are actually followers. Consensus about the degree to which members are leaders in the group could be based on the amount of influence each person actually has or on shared stereotypes about how leaders are supposed to behave (e.g., leaders are tall, attractive, white males who talk a great deal). The relationship effect represents the idiosyncratic perception that a perceiver has of a target’s leadership. In the context of leadership ratings, the bulk of relationship variance would represent disagreement between perceivers, but it might also reflect personal preferences or alliances between particular group members. Moreover, leadership, especially socioemotional leadership, might potentially exist at the level of the relationship, as it better reproduces dyadic asymmetries among group members. That is, some members of the group may be more in need of leadership than other members of the group, and those members who are in need of leadership may find it from different members. Yet another view of the relationship effect is that it represents the biases and needs of the perceiver. We return to this notion when we discuss the difference between self-perception and other perception later in this article. Error represents sources of variance in the judgments that are neither systematic nor replicable. To separate error variance from the relationship variance in the SRM, at least two measures of the construct must be present – either repeated measures in time or different measures of the same construct. For instance, leadership might be measured by five items: contribution to the task, influence over the group’s solution, leadership exhibited, control of the group’s activities, and preference to have as a leader (Lord, Phillips, & Rush, 1980). As discussed later in this chapter, the SRM makes it possible to conceptualize four different types of error. The SRM is a random effects model. That is, its components are random variables. Consider the target effect: The interest in a study of leadership is not in knowing which individuals have the highest and lowest target effects, but rather in the amount of variance produced by perceptions of targets in the population. Thus, the major focus in a univariate SRM analysis is the sources of variance in the perception of leadership. A further complication of the SRM is that it includes two sources of nonindependence that can be interpreted as reciprocity correlations. The first source is a correlation between a person’s perceiver and target effect: If Jill is seen by others as leader, does she think that others are leaders? This correlation might well be negative. That is, if Jill is seen as leader,
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she may think the others in the group are not leaders. This correlation, which has been called generalized reciprocity, is defined only if there is both perceiver and target variance. The second source involves a correlation between two relationship effects from the same dyad. If Jack especially thinks that Jill is a leader (i.e., more than Jack thinks others are leaders and more than others think Jill is a leader), then does Jill especially think that Jack is a leader (i.e., more than Jill thinks others are leaders and more than others think Jack is a leader)? This correlation, which has been called the dyadic reciprocity correlation, could be negative – for instance, if the group is very hierarchical. Later in this chapter, we discuss the correlations between two variables measured in a round-robin design. The estimation of the SRM is complicated because it contains five random variables and two covariances. We consider the rather complicated statistical details in the estimation of the SRM variances and covariances in the last section of this chapter.
SOURCES OF VARIANCE AND COVARIANCE IN JUDGMENTS OF LEADERSHIP Recently, Lord et al. (2001) reviewed several studies of leadership that examined the sources of variance in judgments of leadership. In our review, we did two things a bit differently from these authors. First, we included only studies that had multiple measures or indicators of leadership. With multiple measures, we can separate error from relationship variance. Second, we used the SRM to estimate sources of variance for all of the studies, whereas Lord et al. (2001) sometimes used alternative methods.
Studies To qualify, the study had to employ round-robin measures of leadership (i.e., each member of the group rated every other member in the group on leadership). Also, either the studies needed to report the SRM variance partitioning or we had to have access to the raw data so that we could perform the analysis ourselves. The seven studies with multiple measures of leadership are as follows: Campbell, Simpson, Stewart, and Manning (2003) studied 57 four-person, all-male groups who were given a leaderless group discussion task.
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Dabbs and Ruback (1984) studied 20 five-person, same-gender groups who were asked to get acquainted. Dabbs, Ruback, and Evans (1987) studied 20 five-person, mixed-gender groups who were asked to discuss what they would bring from a list of items to a desert island. Lord et al. (1980) studied 24 four-person, mixed-gender groups who worked on four problem-solving tasks. Malloy and Janowski (1992) studied 10 six- to eight-person, mixed-gender groups. Montgomery (1986) studied 45 four- and five-person, mixed-gender groups. Groups met for three sessions, and the last two ratings of leadership are used as two measures of leadership. Ruback, Dabbs, and Hopper (1984) studied 20 five-person, mixed-gender groups who were asked how they could increase tourism for a community. Across the seven studies, there were 820 participants who were placed in 180 groups.
Variance Components The seven studies used multiple measures of leadership, so we were able to examine the extent to which the variances remained stable across these multiple measures. This allowed us not only to separate error from relationship variance, but also to differentiate four sources of ‘‘error.’’ This process yielded eight components that gave rise to the eight SRM sources of variance: Stable group: differences among groups in how much leadership is perceived that is consistent across measures. Unstable group: differences among groups in how much leadership is perceived that is inconsistent across measures. Stable perceiver: differences among individuals in how much leadership they perceive in others in general that is consistent across measures. Unstable perceiver: differences among individuals in how much leadership they perceive in others in general that is inconsistent across measures. Stable target: differences among individuals in how much each individual is perceived as a leader that is consistent across measures. Unstable target: differences among individuals in how much each individual is perceived as a leader that is inconsistent across measures.
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Stable relationship: disagreement about the extent to which someone is a leader that is consistent across measures. Unstable relationship: disagreement about the extent to which someone is a leader that is inconsistent across measures. For instance, stable target variance implies that some persons are seen as leaders and others as followers across all the measures, whereas unstable target variance implies that someone who is seen as leader on one measure is not seen as a leader on the other measures. In past SRM studies, the group variance, whether stable or unstable, has been ignored, and all remaining unstable variances have been added together and treated collectively as error variance. However, unstable relationship variance comes closest to what most investigators would treat as pure error variance. Thus, the ability to separate stable and unstable variance across measures of leadership provides a more detailed picture of the variance partitioning. If all indicators measured the same construct and were equally reliable, then ideally no unstable perceiver and target variance would exist. Under normal circumstances, then, we would hope to have small amount of unstable perceiver and target variance.
Results To help us better understand the meaningfulness of each component, we have included its reliability (Bonito & Kenny, 2007) assuming a six-person group with three measures of leadership – fairly typical values for the research that we reviewed. Reliability represents how much ‘‘true’’ variance is present in a measurement of a given component. Variances To determine whether the group has an effect on judgments of leadership, we estimated the random variance due to the group. When we examined the data from several studies, we did not find any evidence for group variance. In fact, we often obtained estimates of negative variance – a result consistent with the view that leadership is a zero-sum game. On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that groups do not vary in the amount of leadership perceived. For this reason, we do not include the group factor, both stable and unstable, in our table of results. Table 1 presents the results from the variance partitioning. On average, the amount of target variance is 0.427, which indicates that group members
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Table 1. Proportions of SRM Variance from Seven Studies. Stablea
Study
Campbell et al. (2003) Dabbs and Ruback (1984) Dabbs et al. (1987) Lord et al. (1980) Malloy and Janowski (1992) Montgomery (1986) Ruback et al. (1984) Average Reliabilityc
Unstableb
Perceiver
Target
Relative
Perceiver
Target
Relative
0.126 0.135 0.124 0.122 0.061 0.000 0.040 0.087 0.558
0.355 0.457 0.465 0.363 0.449 0.304 0.598 0.427 0.861
0.179 0.140 0.200 0.132 0.241 0.315 0.136 0.192 0.736
0.034 0.030 0.021 0.093 0.033 0.082 0.014 0.044 0.714
0.039 0.070 0.039 0.022 0.069 0.006 0.059 0.043 0.707
0.267 0.168 0.151 0.267 0.148 0.294 0.153 0.207 –d
a
Stable variance is variance that correlates across different measures of leadership. Unstable variance is variance that is specific to a given measure of leadership. c Presuming that there are six people in the group and three measures. d Undefined. b
agree substantially on the degree of leadership displayed by each participant. A small variance would have indicated that targets are perceived differentially by perceivers. The reliability of the target is 0.861, the highest reliability of any component. Notably, the variance partitioning from these seven studies is very similar to the variance partitioning from studies in which there is a single measure of leadership and when leadership is considered a rank-order measure (Livi et al., 2008). The literature demonstrates that substantial consensus has been reached regarding variance and leadership. First, agreement concerning leadership is greater than agreement found for personality traits, which averages to 0.275 (Kenny, 1994). Second, roughly equal amounts of relationship and target variance for physical attractiveness ratings have been identified (Ho¨nekopp, 2006). Thus, perceivers agree much more about leadership than they agree about physical attractiveness. Third, in an interesting study, Vargas (1986) found that college athletes nearly agreed about as much who was a leader on their team (proportion of target variance ¼ 0.404) as they agreed about athletic skill (0.413). Fourth, there is more target variance than error variance in leadership studies, another unusual result that indicates people agree about who is the leader of the group. Relatively small but not trivial amounts of perceiver variance have been found, with the average being about 10% of the variance. The reliability of the stable perceiver effect is somewhat disappointing, being only 0.558.
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There is more evidence of stable relationship variance, which averages around 20% of the total variance and is much more reliable (0.736). Because perceiver variance and relationship variance both index disagreement about who is a leader in the group, it is interesting to note that target variance or agreement (0.427) is larger on average than disagreement (0.279 ¼ 0.087 þ 0.192). In summary, about 10% of the variance is due to perceiver variance, 20% to relationship variance, 40% to target variance, and 30% to error variance. Correlations As we outlined in the previous section, the SRM encompasses two types of reciprocity correlations. The first, called generalized reciprocity, correlates the perceiver effect with the target effect: If someone is seen as a leader by others, does that person see others as leaders? The second, called dyadic reciprocity, correlates relationship effects: If Alice thinks Bob is more of a leader than do others, does Bob see Alice as leader more than do others? Reciprocity in the perception of leadership, both negative and positive, could arise for several reasons. First, reciprocity would emerge when leaders have legitimacy. That is, if a leader is legitimated, he or she would also be perceived as an authority. Explicit asymmetries might lead to negative reciprocity correlations (i.e., if Bob is seen as a leader, he sees others as followers). Additionally, groups under temporal pressure are more likely to be centralized, forming a more clear structure of asymmetries among members (Pierro et al., 2003). This could lead to a stronger target effect, and possibly negative reciprocities. Positive or no correlations could be revealed in groups where leadership is more distributed, as in groups characterized by decentralized or laissez-faire leadership style (Bass, 1990). Second, certain factors could lead to positive reciprocity. Because leadership is ordinarily positively valued, then if two people like each other, they would both be biased to see each other as leaders, given that liking shows strong positive reciprocity (Kenny, 1994). This would imply a positive correlation at the dyadic level. Table 2 presents the reciprocities for a stable perceiver with a stable target (generalized reciprocity) and between the stable relationship effects (dyadic reciprocity). Although there is some variation in the correlation shown in Table 2, on average there is little correlation at both the generalized and dyadic levels. Reciprocity appears not to be present in the perception of leadership, at least in leaderless groups. Nonetheless, it is useful to know that these correlations are near zero, for two reasons. First, when group size is 3, as in the study conducted by
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Table 2.
Generalized (Perceiver–Target) and Dyadic Reciprocity Correlations for Seven Studies.
Study Campbell et al. (2003) Dabbs and Ruback (1984) Dabbs et al. (1987) Lord et al. (1980) Malloy and Janowski (1992) Montgomery (1986) Ruback et al. (1984) Average a
Generalized
Dyadic
0.203 0.194 0.274 0.321 0.272 –a –a 0.144
0.034 0.020 0.106 0.163 0.084 0.331 0.177 0.034
Insufficient variance to compute a meaningful correlation.
Zaccaro et al. (1991), the full SRM cannot be estimated (i.e., the model is not identified). If we can assume that the dyadic reciprocity correlation equals zero, the model is identified with as few as three persons per group. Thus, the dyadic correlation is beneficial in that, if we assume it to be zero, we are making a valid assumption. Second, the SRM may be estimated using a SEM approach, as described later in this chapter. That model is very complicated, so adopting the assumption that some correlations are zero would greatly simplify an otherwise overly complicated model.
DISCUSSION OF THE SRM RESULTS In this section, we relate the empirical findings in Tables 1 and 2 to our earlier review of the theoretical literature. Recall that our results came from leaderless discussion groups where there was no formal leadership role, so the perception of leadership was determined only by peers in the group discussion, and not by formal roles.
Target Variance We have seen that the dominant component in leadership judgments is the target: Group members agree that some members in the group are leaders and other members are followers. In our survey of seven studies that used multiple measures of leadership, we found that 43% of the variance was target variance. Livi et al. (2008) report variance partitioning in the four
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studies that employed a single measure of leadership and found 49% of this variance to be target variance. Also, in the five studies of leadership ranking, Livi et al. found that 48% of the variance was target variance. Clearly, leadership is not totally ‘‘in the eye of the beholder,’’ and the obstinacy that many authors demonstrate in continuing to analyze target variance has a strong empirical basis. Livi et al. did find that there is less target variance and more relationship and perceiver variance when leadership is socioemotional than when it is task oriented. Thus, task-oriented leadership is more clearly consensual, in the sense that members agree on task-oriented leadership rather than on socioemotional leadership. Because leadership consensus on transformational and laissez-faire leadership have been shown to moderate the emotional exhaustion–work commitment relationship (Cole & Bedeian, 2007), it would be interesting to determine whether more transformational leadership styles (e.g., charismatic leadership) are less consensual and laissez-faire style is more consensual. Given that the target component represents the leadership perception of a member, controlling for other sources of variance, it can be correlated with external criteria; in this way, we may examine the behavior and trait correlates of consensually perceiver leadership. We might first examine which behaviors leaders, rather than followers, exhibit. We might then take that behavioral profile and try to match it with the group prototype of leadership (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Hogg, 2001) or leadership stereotypes (Lord, Brown, Harvey, Hall, 2001). Alternatively, we could examine which personality characteristics of the leader predict the perception of leadership (Lord et al., 1986). We could then examine whether behaviors or alternative prototype or stereotype matches mediate the effect of traits on the perception of leadership. Another interesting question is the extent to which agreement about leadership reflects appearance-based (not behavior based) stereotypes. In zero acquaintance (Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988) and thin-slices (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992) studies, perceivers with minimal information have been shown to arrive at consensual and accurate judgments of targets. To date, no studies have specifically examined the perception of leadership using minimal information, although a thin-slices study did focus on the effectiveness of negotiation (Curhan & Pentland, 2007). It is also known that baby-faced targets are seen as low in dominance, making it unlikely that they would be perceived as leaders (Zebrowitz-McArthur & Apatow, 1983–1984). Finally, stereotypes about gender and leadership
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(Ridgeway, 2001) have been extensively studied. (The effect of gender on the target effect is discussed later in this chapter.) Livi et al. (2008) found that target variance increases with group size. Perhaps, leadership becomes both more necessary and more evident in larger groups, much in the same way that extroversion becomes more apparent in groups than in dyads (Kenny, 2004). These results provide further empirical support for the claim that the emergence of a more hierarchical structure within groups is determined in part by a larger group size. Finally, just because members agree about a target’s leadership in their group, it does not necessarily imply that the same person would be a leader in another group. Although information on this topic is limited, data from rotation designs (Foti & Hauenstein, 2007; Zaccaro et al., 1991) and other sources (Albright & Forziati, 1995) indicate that leaders in one group are very likely to be leaders in other groups.
Perceiver Variance We also find evidence for perceiver variance that indicates the extent to which some perceivers see others as leaders, and other perceivers see others as followers, though this component explains only 10% of the variance. In addition, a small, positive generalized reciprocity (correlation between perceiver and target effect) is present. This result may reflect the fact that leaders believe leadership is important and are then biased to see leadership in others. This correlation is not very large, however, averaging only 0.144. Although the level of perceiver variance is small, it is important to underscore, as other authors have done (Lord et al., 2001), that the perceiver effect could be an important factor in leadership perception. As Livi et al. (2008) show, much more perceiver variance is present in the perception of socioemotional leadership.
Relationship Variance Relationship variance reflects idiosyncratic perception of leadership. For example, perhaps Peter sees Paul as a leader, but no one else does, and Peter does not just see everyone as a leader. Oddly enough, although relationship variance is the second largest source of variance (after target variance), it has traditionally received very little attention from researchers in this field.
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Future research might, therefore, focus on within-group dyadic dynamics, as proposed by leader–member exchange theory (Yukl, 1994) and by vertical dyad linkage theory (Dansereau et al., 1975). An alternative explanation for relationship variance might also involve the presence of triadic effects (Hoff, 2005). For instance, a group might have two factions, such that each faction has a different leader. In this case, subgroups might disagree about the identity of the larger group’s leader. Ideally, future leadership research studies will investigate such phenomena. Categorization and attribution analysis of leadership perception (Lord et al., 2001) might benefit by focusing more intensely on relationship variance. In particular, to avoid confounding factors in relationship and error variances, a study would need to employ multiple measures of leadership. Intragroup dyadic dynamics – which are especially important in long-term groups, such as organizations and teams (Tsui, Porter, & Egan, 2002) – could be intensively investigated in this manner. The results in Table 2 show a weak dyadic reciprocity effect, and we expect this result might be likewise found in other studies of leaderless groups, such as those involving college students. Members in leaderless groups, where status is not predetermined and where interaction is limited to a short discussion session, have less of a chance to make transactions or exchanges among members (e.g., leader–member exchange theory; Yukl, 1994). Perhaps in more long-standing groups, dyadic reciprocity of leadership might be found. To examine this hypothesis, we reviewed the Montgomery (1986) study, which did examine groups overtime. Her data do, indeed, show evidence of increasing positive dyadic reciprocity overtime.
Group Variance We failed to find any evidence of group variance in the perceptions of leadership. Although most prior SRM studies of person perception in college students have not attempted to find group variance, studies of families that have used the SRM have looked for variance in family effects (i.e., group effects). For instance, Cook (2001) studied influence and control in families and found that only 4% of the total variance was at the level of the group. It may be especially difficult to find group variance in leadership because it may operate in zero-sum fashion. In other words, leadership, much like status and power, may be a finite resource that is divided among group members: Not everyone in the group can be a leader.
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Our failure to find group variance may be somewhat surprising, given that various theories propose that groups could have significant differences relative to one another (e.g., Brown & Lord, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003). All of the studies that we reanalyzed involved leaderless, largely college student groups, however, and it is likely that there are only small differences between groups owing to their shared stereotypes and socialization histories. Also, our results were obtained in laboratory experimental settings, where there is low acquaintanceship and likely shared prototypes that do not differ from group to group. Moreover, many theories have explicitly pointed out that groups should have differences in leadership perception as a function of culture (Chemers, 2000) or group context characteristics (Kerr, 1977). Ideally, to properly assess these factors, the research design should manipulate group composition to measure the effect of these variables.
UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TASK-ORIENTED AND SOCIOEMOTIONAL LEADERSHIP We now consider the correlation between two or more variables, at least one of which is an SRM component. In this section, we take up the question of correlation between task-oriented and socioemotional leadership; that is, we take an SRM component in task-oriented leadership and correlate it with its parallel component in socioemotional leadership. The interest here focuses on convergent and discriminant validity. In the next section, we consider gender as a predictor of leadership. In the third section, we consider the relationship between self-perceptions of leadership and the perception by fellow group members. This examination reveals that self-ratings can be thought to have perceiver, target, and relationship components. A classic distinction in leadership research is task-oriented versus socioemotional leadership (Bales & Strodtbeck, 1951). Simply put, taskoriented leaders are more concerned with productivity, whereas socioemotional leaders are more concerned with member relations. Livi et al. (2008) examined the differences between task-oriented and socioemotional leadership, and found a very different pattern of variance partitioning for the two types of leadership. First, more than twice as much target variance was observed when leadership was task oriented than when it was socioemotional. Second, nearly twice as much relationship variance and
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perceiver variance were observed in conjunction with socioemotional leadership than with task-oriented leadership. We consider here the correlations between SRM components across leadership types. In the Dabbs and Ruback (1984) study, 20 groups of size 5 – specifically, same-gendered, leaderless discussion groups with college students – were involved in a get-acquainted session. The indicators of taskoriented leadership were attention, leadership, and contribution, and the indicators of socioemotional leadership were encouragement of participation and showing interest. The correlations of the stable components were as follows: Perceiver: 0.869; Target: 1.000; Relationship: 0.431. We were somewhat surprised by the poor discriminant validity at the level of target in this study. The results indicate that task-oriented and socioemotional leadership are most distinct at the level of relationship. One way of understanding this result is to note that task-oriented leadership resides more in the target, whereas socioemotional leadership resides more in the relationship. Recall Livi et al.’s (2008) finding that task-oriented leadership showed nearly twice as much target variance as socioemotional leaders, whereas the reverse pattern was observed for the relationship. When we performed the same analysis on the data gathered by Ruback et al. (1984), we found no discriminant validity between the two types of leadership for any of the three components. That is, the correlation between the two types of leadership was perfect for stable effects due to perceiver, target, and relationship. Recall that the Ruback et al. study involved a production-focused task (i.e., trying to increase tourism in a community), whereas the task in the Dabbs and Ruback study was simply ‘‘to get acquainted.’’ In these short-term groups, the separation of these two types of leadership may not occur as it does in more task-oriented groups.
GENDER AND PERCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP Over the years, many studies have examined the effect of gender on leadership. Since the 1980s, two analyses have made particularly important contributions to this line of research. In the first study, Deaux (1984) argued that there was no biological basis in gender differences in social behavior. In the second contribution, the meta-analyses of Eagly and colleagues
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(Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Eagly & Karau, 1991; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992) demonstrated that some weak effects are present in terms of gender differences in leadership effectiveness and perception of leadership. These differences are mainly due to social categorization. In particular, men are more likely to emerge as leaders when measures of general or task leadership are used, whereas women are more likely to emerge as leaders if socioemotional measures are used (Eagly & Karau, 1991). It seems that when the situational requirements match those associated with the feminine stereotype, women emerge as leaders. According to the social-role theory of gender differences (Eagly, 1987), these stereotypes tend to work against women by creating negative expectations, which mitigate the likelihood that women will be perceived as leaders in task-oriented situations. Another relevant issue is the effect of solo status or tokenism. Of particular concern is the extent to which women’s contributions might be devalued when the group includes only one woman (Fuegen & Biernat, 2002). Using the SRM can clarify the empirical and theoretical meanings of gender differences in the study of leadership, answering long-standing questions and proposing other interesting and intriguing novel queries. We begin by noting that there is not just one gender-related issue to be addressed in the study of leadership. Among the questions that have been considered are the following: Are men or women more likely to be seen as leaders? Do men or women see more leadership? Are men more likely to be seen as leaders when men (rather than women) are judges? How are men and women affected by the gender composition of the group? For instance, are women less likely to be seen as leaders when the group includes fewer women? We examined each of these questions simultaneously using the SRM. In so doing, we used the data gathered by Lord et al. (1978). In that study, there were 24 groups, each with 4 persons in laboratory settings. Specifically, groups of Carnegie–Mellon students worked together on several tasks. To simplify the analysis, we averaged the five measures of leadership and created three variables: gender of the perceiver, called Pgender (1 ¼ female; 1 ¼ male); target gender, called Tgender (1 ¼ female; 1 ¼ male); and number of females, called Nfem (0–4). Note that the interaction of Pgender with Tgender captures the difference between same-gendered pairs (þ1) and mixed-gendered pairs (1). We also allowed Nfem to interact with
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Pgender, Tgender, and their interaction. In terms of levels of analysis, Pgender and Tgender are at the individual level of analysis, their interaction is at the dyadic or relationship level, and Nfem is at the group level. So far in our discussion of the SRM, we have focused on the components of perceiver, target, and relationship. Each of these is a random variable. Considering the target effect, our interest in that component lies not in determining which person in particular is seen as a leader in the group, but rather in estimating the population variance due to target. The gender variables are all fixed variables. We are interested in particular values (i.e., the means) of the levels of that variable. For instance, we want to know if men are more likely to be seen as leaders than are women. The addition of the fixed variables to the SRM greatly complicates the statistical model and the analysis. For technical reasons, the complications are especially problematic when the fixed variables are at the level of relationship (e.g., Pgender Tgender). Standard SRM software cannot properly handle such a model. Fortunately, advances in multi-level modeling have been made and computer programs such as SAS can accomplish such analyses. We used SAS to estimate the model and controlled for nonindependence due to the SRM variances and covariances. In a later section of this chapter, we describe the details of the estimation method. The model includes seven fixed effects; and the four SRM variances of group, perceiver, target, and relationship; and the two covariances, perceiver– target and relationship. Table 3 shows the results for the fixed effects.
Table 3.
Solution for the Fixed Effects of Gender from Lord et al. (1978) Study.
Effect
Estimate
df
t
p
Pgendera Tgenderb
0.1503 0.1286 0.0338 0.0384 0.0528 0.0434 0.0669
118 199 141 77.3 153 129 106
2.01 1.55 0.54 0.45 0.75 0.53 0.88
0.0469 0.1231 0.5879 0.6538 0.4564 0.5971 0.3805
Pgender Tgenderd Nfemc Pgender Nfem Tgender Nfem Pgender Tgender Nfem a
Perceiver gender coded 1 ¼ female and 1 ¼ male. Target gender coded 1 ¼ female and 1 ¼ male. c Number of females in the group, 0–4. d Same-gender (1) versus mixed-gender (1) dyads. b
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Note that some of the degrees of freedom in the t tests are fractional; fractional degrees of freedom can occur within multi-level modeling because error variances are pooled across levels. Interestingly, we found only one statistically significant fixed effect: Female perceivers see more leadership than do male perceivers. The gender of target effect was not significant, and we even found that women tend to be seen as leaders more than men. If men devalue women’s contributions more than women do (Eagly et al., 1992), there should be an interaction between gender of the perceiver and gender of target – something we did not find. Moreover, unlike Fuegen and Biernat (2002), we did not find any statistically significant effects of the gender composition of the group. The analysis in this case resembles a multiple regression, so all effects are controlling for all other effects in the analysis. Unlike a traditional multiple regression, the analysis allows for all sorts of nonindependence. Of course, our study had some serious limitations. First, it took place at Carnegie–Mellon University, a school with a reputation for strong quantitative ability. Second, of the 96 participants in the study, only 42 were female. Thus, there were very few groups with large numbers of females. Nonetheless, our work illustrates how many interesting and important questions about leadership and gender can be analyzed. The results emerging from this study confirm the results from previous studies showing a lack of target gender differences in leadership when measured in a university context (Eagly & Karau, 1991). Moreover, the absence of the interaction effects of the actor’s gender with the gender of target, even when controlling for the composition of the group, confirms a substantial fairness in leadership perceptions. A more intriguing and perhaps original finding is the significant effect due to the perceiver: It seems, at least in this study, that the bias of a gendered evaluation of leadership is mainly in the eye of the beholders. We know of no prior studies or theories that explicitly analyze gender differences in the perceiver effect of leadership perceptions. Nevertheless, we can speculate that, following the social-role theory of gender differences, women more than men see more influence in the group. Another explanation of the gender differences in the perceiver effect could be an extension of the ‘‘contrastive effects’’ of stereotyped judgment (Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997): Members seem to judge leadership expressed in groups by comparing others to the expectations of their own gender. Thus, women perceive a greater extent of leadership in groups because they judge the influence of other members to be stronger in
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comparison to their negative leadership expectations and not in comparison to their actual expressed influence. In most of the previous studies, this gender difference in the perceiver effect was not measured and controlled. If a study included more men than women, and if women also tended to see more leadership than men, then it would falsely appear that men would be seen more as leaders than women because of the hidden gender difference in the perceiver effect. One last issue should be addressed. When we study a fixed effect, such as Pgender, we might ask how much of the variance in the perceiver effect gender explains. To answer this question, we conducted the run twice – once with gender variables in the model and once without them – and each time we determined the perceiver variance. Conducting such an analysis, we found that the variance due to the perceiver declined by 12.8% when we included gender variables in the model. Thus, we conclude that gender variables, mainly Pgender, explain 12.8% of the variance in the perceiver effect. Because the perceiver effect itself explains approximately 12.2% of the total variance (see Table 1), gender explains only 1.6% of the total variance, at least when only the perceiver effect is considered. Including the fixed effects of gender in the model reduced the perceiver variance while having little or no effect on the target or relationship variance. This result bolsters the conclusion that the effect of gender in this study is at the level of the perceiver. The strategy illustrated here could also be applied to the study of variables that predict the target effect. If such research were carried out, we would have a much better understanding of the percentage of variance that traits explain in the random effect of target than we currently have. That is, because error variance is measured in SRM analyses, a much larger proportion of variance would almost certainly be explained than is possible when using conventional methods.
SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP The relationship between self-perception and the perception of others has been a focus in the leadership literature. Notably, Atwater and Yammarino (1997) have examined the role of self–other agreement. More recently, Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, and Chatman (2006) examined the self-enhancement of status in groups: Do people over- or underestimate their status in the group, and do people know how others view their status? Anderson et al. (2006) found little or no evidence of self-enhancement of
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status, but did find appreciable levels of understanding of how others view their status. Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, and Robins (2004) proposed applying the SRM to the study of self-perception. Kenny and West (2008) have extended the Kwan et al. (2004) approach and have developed a detailed, and relatively complicated, SRM approach to the comparison between selfperceptions and the perceptions of other members in the group. In this section, we apply their approach to the study of leadership. Kenny and West (2008) propose four ways in which self- and other perception of leadership can differ: Self-enhancement: Do people, on average, see themselves more as leaders than the other members of the group see them and more than they see others as leaders? Assumed similarity (the weighting of perceiver effect): If a person tends to see others in the group as a leader, does the person also see himself or herself as a leader? Self–other agreement (the weighting of the target effect): If a person tends to be seen by others in the group as a leader, does the person see himself or herself as a leader? Relationship variance: Is there more relationship variance in self-ratings (i.e., self-enhancement) than in the ratings of others (i.e., other enhancement)? We detail these four differences next: First, the equality of the means of self-ratings and the ratings of others may produce differences. If the self on average sees himself or herself as more of a leader than do the members of the group and more of a leader than he or she sees others, then self-enhancement would be present. Also possible is self-effacement: People see themselves as less of a leader than they see others as a leader and less than others see them as a leader. This difference refers to the average across all perceivers and targets; later, we discuss individual differences. Second, the weight of the perceiver effect in self-ratings, a parameter denoted as k in Kenny and West (2008), may lead to differences. If k is 1, then the idiosyncratic tendency of people to see others as leaders (the perceiver effect) is reflected equally for perceptions of the self. That is, selfratings operate in the same way as ratings of others. If k is less than 1 but greater than zero, there is some assumed similarity, but self is seen somewhat differently than others. While possible, we do not usually find much evidence for k to be greater than 1. It is also possible for k to be
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zero (i.e., no assumed similarity) and even for k to be negative (i.e., a contrast effect). Third, the weight of the target effect in self-ratings, a parameter denoted as q in Kenny and West (2008), may produce differences. If q is 1, then the tendency of others to see a person as a leader is the same for the perception of self. That is, the target effect is equally well reflected in self-ratings as in ratings of others. If q is less than 1 but greater than zero, some self–other agreement is present, but self is seen somewhat differently than others. If q is greater than 1, then self has some sort of special insight: Self agrees more with a member in the group than two members agree with each other. It is possible for k to be zero (i.e., no self–other agreement) or even negative. Although negative or zero values for k seem implausible for traditional measures of leadership, they may be more plausible for certain types of transformational leaders. Certain sorts of leaders (e.g., Gandhi) may feel that they are not leaders at all, but see themselves as followers instead. Fourth, there are differences in relationship variances, denoted as s2g , for self and others. This is perhaps the most difficult comparison to understand. Kwan et al. (2004) conceptualized relationship variance as individual differences in enhancement. Thus, for self, it would represent individual differences in self-enhancement. For example, persons who experience high self-efficacy (Foti & Hauenstein, 2007) may have larger scores in relational self-perceptions. If someone has a positive relationship effect for self, then that person would think he or she is better than others – even better than members of the group see the person. Following the reasoning of Kwan et al. (2004), perhaps this measure of the individual difference in selfenhancement might moderate leader effectiveness (Atwater & Yammarino, 1992). For other perception, we can interpret the relationship effect as other enhancement. That is, the relationship effect represents the biased perception of a perceiver of a given target. Thus, the variances in both of the relationship effects quantify the biases of the perceivers. The question in terms of the comparison of self and other is whether there is more or less variance in the two types of judgments. Kenny and West (2008) argue that, because self-perception is generally considered to be more biased than the perception of others, we might expect more relationship variance in selfperception than in other perception. To be clear, relationship variance reflects differences in bias, rather than the overall level of bias. Another useful aspect of the approach taken by Kenny and West (2008) is that we can evaluate for the first time whether self-ratings operate in the same way as do the ratings of others. In such a situation, we would find that the means and relationship variances were the same in the two types of
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ratings and that k ¼ q ¼ 1. For instance, Kenny and West (2008) found that for ratings of emotions in groups of strangers, the model for self- and other ratings was the same. The estimation of the model is complex and uses SEM, a method detailed later in this chapter. The parameters k and q can be viewed as factor loadings; that is, self-ratings load on perceiver and target factors. For instance, Jack’s self-rating of his leadership loads on Jack’s perceiver and target factors.
Example The Dabbs and Ruback (1984) study included 20 same-gendered groups of size 5. To reduce the complexity of the analysis, we did not separate error from relationship; rather, we simply summed the indicators to form the measure. We consider both task-oriented leadership (the sum of ‘‘attention,’’ ‘‘leadership,’’ and ‘‘contribution’’) and socioemotional leadership (sum of ‘‘encourages participation’’ and ‘‘shows interest’’). Table 4 presents the parameters in ratings of self and others for the two types of leadership. Of key importance is the test that both k (assumed similarity) and q (self– other agreement) equal 1. Both assumed similarity parameters were less than 1 for self-ratings. Consistent with the prior analyses undertaken by Kenny (1994), we found that the k paths were greater than 0 but less than 1. However, for q (self–other agreement), the pattern was different for the two types of leadership. For task-oriented leadership, the pattern was the typical one of q being less than 1: Members agree more with one another than they Table 4.
Comparison of Ratings of Self and Others.
Effect
ma kb qd s2g e a
Task Oriented Others
Self
Others
Self
15.307 1.000c 1.000c 5.785
15.140 0.656 0.706 6.152
10.260 1.000c 1.000c 4.094
10.680 0.934 1.357 1.455
Mean rating. Assumed similarity parameter. c Fixed to 1. d Self–other agreement parameter. e Variance in enhancement. b
Socioemotional
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do with the self. Conversely, for socioemotional leadership, q is greater than 1: The self is a better informant concerning socioemotional leadership than are the other group members. In addition, we examined whether the self-mean and dyadic means were different. As can be seen in Table 4, they were not. Although mean differences were found, they were rather small. These results are consistent with the results of Anderson et al. (2006), who found little or no selfenhancement for perceptions of status. We also examined whether relationship variance differed for the perception of self and others. We did find a large difference for socioemotional leadership. Contrary to our expectations, less relationship variance was found in self-ratings than in the ratings of others. Another explanation for the task and socioemotional differences in self-enhancement is that socioemotional leadership is more closely linked to group belongingness than to more observable task activities. In essence, members refrain from making judgments that decrease social acceptance so as to maintain their belongingness in a group (Anderson et al., 2006). Generally, for both types of leadership, the parameter estimates are not all dramatically different in the two types of ratings, self and other. There is little or no self-enhancement or effacement, and both k and q are close to 1. Although some differences in relationship variance are apparent, they arise only with socioemotional leadership. The bottom line is that it would not be especially problematic to include self-ratings in the measurement of the target and perceiver effects.
ESTIMATION OF SRM USING SPECIALIZED SOFTWARE If the SRM were so useful in the study of leadership, then why is it applied so infrequently? There are several reasons for its lack of popularity, but one of the most important is the difficulty in estimating the SRM variances and covariances using standard software, such as SPSS. In this section, we show how it is possible to estimate the model with such software. We warn the reader in advance that this section is much more technical than the rest of this chapter. In constructing our example, we consider the simple univariate model. We also use traditional SRM terminology, meaning that we replace ‘‘perceiver’’ with ‘‘actor’’ and ‘‘target’’ with ‘‘partner.’’ The SRM equation for actor i
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with partner j in group k is X ijk ¼ mk þ aik þ bjk þ gijk where Xijk is the score for person i rating (or behaving with) person j, mk the group mean, aik person i’s actor effect, bjk person j’s partner effect, and gijk the relationship effect. The terms m, a, b, and g are random variables and the following variances are parameters of the model: s2m ; s2a ; s2b ; and s2g . The SRM also specifies two different correlations between the SRM components of a variable, both of which can be viewed as reciprocity correlations: At the individual level, a person’s actor effect can be correlated with that person’s partner effect and can be denoted as sab, generalized reciprocity. At the dyadic level, two members’ relationship effects can be correlated and can be denoted as sgg, dyadic reciprocity. The final parameter is the mean of mk or m, which is an overall intercept or ‘‘grand mean.’’ Thus, there are seven univariate SRM parameters: one mean, four variances, and two covariances.
ANOVA Estimation Prior to the current work, almost all published papers used the method of moments – sometimes called the ANOVA (analysis of variance) method – to estimate these variances and covariances. This method is described in some detail in Kenny, Kashy, and Cook (2006). Basically, a term is computed, such as an estimate of the target effect; its variance is computed; and then the expected value of that variance is determined. This process is then repeated for the other SRM components. What results is a series of simultaneous equations, such that linear algebra can be used to solve for the unknown SRM variances and covariances from the variances and covariances of the estimated components. A computer program for the estimation of these components called SOREMO (SOcial RElations MOdel; Kenny, 1998) has been developed to estimate the SRM parameters from round-robin designs. In our example, we use data gathered by Lord et al. (1980). Their study, which involved a total of 24 four-person groups, measured how much each person in the group stated the other member contributed to the group, using a rating scale from 1 to 6. We denote this variable as LEAD. The data
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Table 5.
Summary of Results Using Different Programs.
Term
Symbol
Mean Actor variance Partner variance Group variance Actor–partner covariance Error variance
m s2a s2b s2m sab s2g sgg
Error covariance
SOREMO
SAS Ia
SPSSa
SAS IIb
SEM
3.868 0.233 0.240 0.091 0.059 0.222
3.868 0.198 0.192 0.000 0.000c 0.237
3.868 0.198 0.192 0.000 0.000c 0.237
3.868 0.198 0.204 0.000 0.024 0.230
3.868 0.233 0.240 0.094 0.059 0.222
0.032
0.032
0.022
0.014
0.014
a
Actor–partner covariance is assumed to be zero. Dummy variables with equality constraints. c Fixed to zero. b
structure is a round-robin design, which has an n n structure in which the diagonal (self-ratings) is missing. Table 5 presents a summary of the results from the computer program SOREMO. We now consider how conventional software can estimate the SRM variances and covariances. Table 1 provides the SOREMO estimates of the seven parameters, which include a negative estimate of the group variance. Conventional Multi-Level Modeling: SAS and SPSS Increasingly, multi-level models can estimate models with cross-classified or crossed variables. In these models, the actor–partner covariance is assumed to be zero, which is a major limitation of this method. We describe this approach in three steps, and describe how both SAS and SPSS can be used to carry out the model’s calculations. Presumably, the program HLM could be used for this purpose as well. Step 1: Data Organization and Preparation Create a data set in which each record is the response of one person about another person in a dyad on all variables (e.g., person A’s rating of person B on leadership, talkativeness, and intelligence). For a one round-robin of 5 persons, there would be 20 records, assuming that self-ratings are not included. Make sure the following variables are included in each record: A unique actor number: For example, for group 1, the actor numbers would range from 1 to 5, and for group 2, the actor numbers would range from 6 to 10.
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A unique partner number. A unique dyad number: For a five-person group, there are 10 dyads. A unique group number. Step 2: Syntax We first present the syntax for SAS, followed by the syntax for SPSS. Note that the actor–partner covariance is not modeled and that LEAD is the outcome of interest. The syntax for SAS is as follows: PROC MIXED COVTEST; CLASS ACTOR PARTNER DYAD GROUP; MODEL LEAD ¼ /S DDFM ¼ SATTERTH NOTEST; RANDOM INTERCEPT/TYPE ¼ VC SUB ¼ ACTOR; RANDOM INTERCEPT/TYPE ¼ VC SUB ¼ PARTNER; RANDOM INTERCEPT/TYPE ¼ VC SUB ¼ GROUP; REPEATED/TYPE ¼ CS SUB ¼ DYAD; The syntax for SPSS is as follows: MIXED LEAD BY GROUP /FIXED ¼ /PRINT ¼ SOLUTION TESTCOV /RANDOM INTERCEPT|SUBJECT(GROUP) COVTYPE(VC) /RANDOM INTERCEPT|SUBJECT(ACTOR) COVTYPE(VC) /RANDOM INTERCEPT|SUBJECT(PARTNER) COVTYPE(VC) /RANDOM INTERCEPT|SUBJECT(DYAD) COVTYPE(VC). With SPSS, the REPEATED statement cannot be used for the dyad, so one must presume that the dyadic covariance is positive. Also, for SPSS, error variance equals the dyad variance plus the error variance, and the dyadic correlation equals the dyad variance divided by the sum of the dyad variance plus the error variance. As can be seen in Table 5, the SAS and the SPSS programs yield the same results. These outcomes would have been different if the reciprocity covariance were negative. In that case, it would be estimated as zero by SPSS and properly estimated by SAS. Note also that the estimates are different from SOREMO. The major reason for this difference is the assumption of the zero actor–partner covariance. Because that covariance is small, the differences are small. As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the
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study of leadership, the actor–partner covariance is typically small, so this method can be used fruitfully.
SAS with Dummy Variables An approach to estimating the full SRM was initially proposed by Snijders and Kenny (1999) and illustrated using the program MLwiN. Here, we apply their approach but use the package SAS. Currently, this approach cannot be applied using SPSS and HLM. We warn the reader that this approach is very complicated. With this approach, 2n dummy random variables are created and constraints are placed on the variance–covariance matrix of those dummy variables. We describe their approach in three steps. We used this approach to analyze gender effects in the Lord et al. (1978) data earlier in this chapter. This method is most appropriate when explicit predictors (i.e., fixed effects) of the SRM components are available. Step 1: Data Organization and Preparation Create a data set where each record refers to a data point or n(n1) data points for each group, where n is the group size (assuming no self-data). For each observation, we have a variable that designates which group the person is in, which dummy is used, and which observation is relevant. We create two sets of dummy variables: A(1) through A(n), where n is the largest group size. For a dummy variable A(i), if the actor is person i, the dummy equals 1; otherwise, the dummy equals 0. P(1) through P(n), where n is the largest group size. For a dummy variable P(i), if the partner is person i, the dummy equals 1; otherwise, the dummy equals 0. The following SAS code might be used to create the dummy variables for a four-person round-robin in which there is a variable for actor and partner that goes from 1 to 4: A1 ¼ 0; A2 ¼ 0; A3 ¼ 0; A4 ¼ 0; IF ACT ¼ 1 THEN A1 ¼ 1; IF ACT ¼ 2 THEN A2 ¼ 1; IF ACT ¼ 3 THEN A3 ¼ 1; IF ACT ¼ 4 THEN A4 ¼ 1;
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P1 ¼ 0; P2 ¼ 0; P3 ¼ 0; P4 ¼ 0; IF PART ¼ 1 THEN P1 ¼ 1; IF PART ¼ 2 THEN P2 ¼ 1; IF PART ¼ 3 THEN P3 ¼ 1; IF PART ¼ 4 THEN P4 ¼ 1; Step 2: Force Constraints This step is the least intuitive, but the most important part of the analysis. We need to place constraints on the variance–covariance matrix of the dummy variables. For instance, the covariances of the actor’s effects are set to zero. So far as we know, SPSS and HLM (but not MLwiN) do not allow for such constraints. To do so, we create a data file, in this case called G, to set the n actor variances (parameter 1) equal, the n partner variances (parameter 2) equal, and the n actor–partner covariances (parameter 3) equal. The file for a fourperson group has the following structure: DATA G; INPUT PARM ROW COL VALUE; DATALINES; 1111 1221 1331 1441 2551 2661 2771 2881 3151 3261 3371 3481 4 9 9 1; The four values in each record in the data file are input in the following order: Parameter number (where 1 refers to actor variance, 2 refers to partner variance, 3 refers to actor–partner covariance, and 4 refers to group variance). Row of the variance–covariance matrix.
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Column of the matrix. Value in the matrix (almost always 1). For instance, the first line refers to actor variance in row 1 and column 1 and that value is set to 1. In summary, the first four lines set the actor variances equal, the next four lines set the partner variances equal, the next four lines set the actor–partner covariances equal, and the last line refers to the group variance. If an element is not referenced, then it is fixed to zero. Step 3: Run the Multi-Level Model Following is the SAS code for PROC MIXED: PROC MIXED COVTEST; CLASS DYAD GROUP; MODEL LEAD ¼ /S DDFM ¼ SATTERTH NOTEST; RANDOM A1 A2 A3 A4 P1 P2 P3 P4 INTERCEPT /G SUB ¼ GROUP TYPE ¼ LIN(4) LDATA ¼ G; REPEATED/TYPE ¼ CS SUB ¼ DYAD(GROUP); Note that the ‘‘ldata ¼ g’’ statement in the RANDOM statement sets the equality constraints. There are nine (2nþ1) terms in the RANDOM statement, A1 through INTERCEPT, which are ordered as in G (actor first, then partner, and finally group). If the model included predictor variables (e.g., gender), they would be included in the MODEL record after the equality sign, but before the slash. As seen in Table 5, the results obtained with SAS are similar to those yielded by SOREMO. We did not include the analysis using MLwiN, but the results are essentially the same estimates as those produced by SAS, even though the two programs use somewhat different estimation methods. This method is currently complex, but we would expect that it will eventually become simpler to use and be adapted to other packages (e.g., SPSS and HLM).
Structural Equation Modeling The method of SEM is a generalization of the method developed by Olsen and Kenny (2006) for dyadic analysis. When we analyzed the relationship between self- and other perception earlier in this chapter, we used an extension of the SEM approach. This method is not especially difficult, but it is messy and awkward.
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Step 1: Data Preparation Unlike in the other methods, the group is the unit of analysis with the SEM approach. If n members are in the largest group size, there would be n(n1) scores read per group. For n ¼ 4, the variables would be X12, X13, X14, X21, X23, X24, X31, X32, X34, X41, X42, and X43. Self-measures and other predictors could be included. The order of the variables does not matter, and scores can be missing. Normally, there must be at least two more groups (i.e., ‘‘individuals’’) than the number of variables to use SEM. However, Amos can accommodate in the case in which there are fewer groups than variables if one tells the program to allow for nonpositive definite input matrices. So far as we know, this option is not currently available in other SEM computer programs. Step 2: Latent Variables There would be n actor factors, n partner factors, and one additional latent variable for the group. A given measure loads on its actor factor, a partner factor, and the general mean factor. For instance, the measure X32 loads on the actor factor for person 3, the partner factor for person 2, and the mean factor. All factor loadings are fixed to 1. Parallel actor and partner effects would be correlated. Thus, the actor factor for person 1 would be correlated with the partner factor for person 1. All other factor correlations are fixed to zero. Additionally, there would be correlations between pairs of errors for the two members of the dyad (e.g., the errors of X12 and X21). Step 3: Equality Constraints To achieve an identified model, many equality constraints must be applied. The n(n1) means would be set equal, as well as the n actor variances, the n partner variances, the n(n1) relationship variances, the n actor–partner covariances, and the n(n1)/2 error covariances. Because a large number of equality constraints are made and many parameters are fixed to 1 (i.e., all factor loadings), the total number of parameters in the model is only seven. Thus, if n is 4, there are 78 elements in the moment matrix, and 71 degrees of freedom in the model. Step 4: Model Testing The fit of the model does not matter, because the fit varies depending who is assigned to persons 1, 2, 3, and so on. The model is treated as an I-SAT (i.e., interchangeable saturated) model, as described by Olsen and Kenny (2006). Nevertheless, specialized models (e.g., setting actor and partner variances
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equal) can be estimated, and the changes in fit in these restricted models from the saturated model can be ascertained. Also note that the estimates are maximum likelihood estimates, rather than restricted maximum likelihood estimates like those obtained in the multi-level modeling program. We used the program AmosBasic to estimate the model. Using AmosGraphics worked, but the model included so many variables and constraints that it was difficult to implement and verify its correctness. (This is why we described this approach as ‘‘messy.’’) We suggest always outputting the ‘‘implied moments,’’ to determine whether the constraints were successfully implemented.
Comparison of Different Methods Each of the various methods has its own advantages and disadvantages. We believe that the SAS dummy variable estimates would be the same as those produced with SOREMO, which uses the ANOVA method when there are equal group sizes, no missing data, and all variances greater than or equal to zero. SEM results are slightly biased because the program uses a maximum likelihood estimation. Note that SOREMO and SEM do allow for negative variances (although some SEM programs can prevent negative estimates of variance). The multi-level program MLwiN offers the option of allowing for negative variances. In the case of our example, we obtain the value of 0.091 for the group variance with this approach. Using conventional software offers several advantages over using SOREMO. First, conventional software can handle the situation in which there are missing data. By contrast, SOREMO presumes that there are no missing data; if there are, either the entire group must be removed or some method must be used to impute missing values. Second, SOREMO requires that the group contain a minimum of four people. With these alternative methods, smaller-sized groups can be retained. Third, when group sizes are unequal, the results from different groups are optimally weighted. Fourth, one can estimate specialized models, such as a model that sets group variance to zero, a model that sets the actor–partner and relationship covariances to zero, or a model that sets the actor and partner variances equal. SOREMO estimates only the ‘‘saturated model’’ – that is, the model with all parameters. For instance, using SAS with dummy variables and setting the group variance to zero with our example yields actor variance of 0.1989, partner variance of 0.2056, actor–partner covariance of 0.04404, dyadic covariance of 0.03828, relationship variance of 0.2098, and intercept of 3.8640.
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The one major advantage of SOREMO is that it can estimate, in a single run, all the variances and correlations for a large number of variables. Perhaps, SOREMO might be used for initial analyses of the variables, and these other programs used once more specific models are available. The discussion here has considered only univariate models. Elsewhere, we have used the dummy variable approach with SAS to estimate a bivariate model (Kenny, West, & Cillessen, 2007). In this case, we constructed two additional dummy variables for the means of each variable and fixed the error variance to a very small value, essentially zero. We have also used the SEM approach to estimate a path model in which the actor and partner effects caused self-ratings (Kenny & West, 2008), a method applied earlier in this chapter.
CONCLUSION Although this chapter has highlighted many interesting and theoretically important uses of the SRM in the study of leadership, it has not discussed all of the possibilities. Here, we briefly review other types of analyses that could be performed using this model.
Further Extensions Two major topics were omitted from this chapter: group-level outcomes (e.g., group productivity) and data gathered from persons who are members of multiple groups or persons who are not members of the group (e.g., observers). We briefly consider each of these topics here. Some of the major outcomes of analyses in the study of leadership in natural settings are at the level of the group: group productivity, cohesiveness, and type of team (Greguras, Robie, & Born, 2001). Grouplevel predictor variables are not problematic, they can just be added as predictors in the model. For instance, we considered a group-level predictor of gender composition when we discussed gender differences. Group-level outcomes, however, do present challenges. To study group outcomes, we can follow the pioneering work of Dabbs and Ruback (1987). They performed a separate SRM analysis for each group and correlated SRM variances and covariances with group-level outcomes. For instance, we could ask whether agreement about the target
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effect (i.e., the proportion of total variance that is due to the target) predicted group productivity. Sometimes, the same person may be a member of more than one group. One key question is whether a component varies across different group compositions and tasks. A rotation design (Kenny & Hallmark, 1992) places the same person in multiple groups with different persons; the analysis then considers whether the person is seen the same way in all of those groups. Using a rotation design, which involves a series of carefully constructed round-robin designs, Zaccaro et al. (1991) examined the extent to which the target effect correlated across four different tasks. In their study, the correlation of the target effect of leadership across four highly heterogeneous tasks was 0.59. More recently, Foti and Hauenstein (2007) used a rotation design to study leadership in a military context. They found that the correlation of the target effect of leadership across heterogeneous tasks was 0.44. It is also possible to examine the stability of perceiver and even relationship effects (If Alex is in a group with Bob, is it more likely that Alex will be a leader?). For more information about the rotation design, consult Kenny and Hallmark (1992). In our earlier example, we included data from only the members of the group. Often, data are available from other persons, besides those who are members of the group. For instance, others might observe or supervise the group. If multiple people observe each group member (as in studies of 360-degree feedback; Yammarino & Atwater, 1997), the SRM design called block design is applicable (Kenny, 1994). With this design, one set of persons constitutes the perceivers and the other set forms the targets. In addition, sometimes the group interacts with another group. If there are ratings of persons in the other group or out-group judgments, the study is said to have a block round-robin design. A very interesting question is whether someone who is seen as a leader of his or her own group is also seen as a leader by members of the other group. Boldry and Kashy (1999) have tested this interesting hypothesis and have found agreement in the perceptions of leadership across groups (r ¼ 0.52).
Correlations of Components This chapter began with a traditional partitioning of variance into SRM components. If we are to understand the theoretical meaning of those components, we need to determine the correlations between variables. Earlier in this chapter, we illustrated the correlations between two random
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variables (task-oriented and socioemotional leadership), and the correlation between a fixed variable (gender) with a random variable (dyadic perceptions of leadership). Here, we provide examples of other potential correlations. One obvious possibility is to correlate behavior in the group with leadership perceptions. For instance, we could measure how much a person participated in the group and correlate that behavior with perceiver, target, and relationship effects in leader perceptions. Most likely, the strongest correlations would be the target effect, but we should be open to other possibilities. Almost certainly, the major focus in future research will be in the target effect, representing the tendency to be perceived by others as a leader. This component could be correlated with other external variables, such as personality variables. In this way, SRM allows us examine the correlation between this ‘‘true’’ leadership score with individual differences, such as extraversion, intelligence, and self-efficacy (Malloy & Janowski, 1992). In groups with formal leaders, a dummy variable could be used to code that variable, which could then be correlated with the target effect. In that way, we would learn how much of the random variance in consensual leadership is explained by the fixed variable of formal leadership. Perceiver effect could also be correlated with individual characteristics, much as we have done in this chapter with gender. We might also investigate correlations of followers’ personality traits (extraversion and agreeableness) with the perception of transformational leadership (Schyns & Felfe, 2007).
Final Comments Although the SRM is a very powerful tool for the study of leadership, it is a tool that is often best left in the toolbox. That is, many questions of leadership do not require the SRM. In particular, when the data collected employ designs that are not round-robin (each member judging each other member), the SRM need not be employed. The SRM can be used to answer many important and neglected questions in the study of leadership, but it most surely does not answer every question. One problem with the SRM is the sheer volume of information in an analysis. If one measures only five variables in a round-robin study with self-ratings, for example, more than 100 correlations are possible – many of which are of little theoretical and empirical use. Thus, the researcher needs to focus on the variances and correlations that are particularly relevant to
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the research. For instance, we have seen that group variance and reciprocities seem to contain little information that is valuable for the study of leadership, so they might be safely ignored. The SRM paints a very complex picture of leadership perception because leadership perceptions are, indeed, very complex. For example, traditional leadership emergence studies use as the influence measure the mean rating given to the person by the other members of the group; that measure contains not just target effect but also relationship, perceiver, and group effects. The SRM applied to round-robin data greatly enlarges the leadership perception picture, disambiguating different sources of variance that could be explored either to gain a clearer picture of perception itself or to correlate each component level with external criteria. The analysis in this chapter has concentrated on the perception of leadership as perceived influence within group. Nonetheless, many other leadership-related measures (e.g., leadership styles) could be employed effectively, and with such measures, the SRM components could be analyzed. The SRM is not a simple method to employ. It requires complicated research designs, such as round-robin designs, complicated data structures, and difficult statistical analyses that require specialized software or conventional software to be used in unconventional ways. It also yields many complicated results. Nevertheless, these complications are, in some sense, required by the study of leadership. Leadership itself is very complicated, in that this construct has created great interest in the social and behavioral sciences. No doubt part of that interest derives from the fact that the construct operates simultaneously at multiple levels. As a means to help scholars both manage the integration theory challenge and comply with a multi-level view of leadership, SRM represents a valuable instrument for both theory development and testing. This methodological application and statistical tool is able to answer old questions and stimulate new ones. We encourage readers to tap its potential despite the fact that it requires a lot of work and a rethinking of many ideas. This hard work has the potential to deliver a large payoff because the model yields a mother lode of rich information.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank Marialuisa Farnese, Tessa V. West, and Randi Garcia, who provided feedback on an earlier version of this chapter. We also thank
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Andrew Knight and Joseph Olsen, who provided helpful suggestions concerning software implementation. Significant portions of this article were published in Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 19, Stefano Livi, David A. Kenny, Linda Albright, and Antonio Pierro, A social relations analysis of leadership, pp. 235–248, Copyright Elsevier 2008.
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CONSIDERATIONS IN APPLYING THE SOCIAL RELATIONS MODEL TO THE STUDY OF LEADERSHIP EMERGENCE IN GROUPS: A LEADERSHIP CATEGORIZATION PERSPECTIVE Rosalie J. Hall, Robert G. Lord and Katey E. Foster ABSTRACT This commentary on Kenny and Livi (2009) expands on aspects of leadership categorization theory that are consistent with the application of the social relations model (SRM). It critically considers limits to the generalization of the variance components analysis results described in Kenny and Livi’s first example, and briefly summarizes results of an additional study that supports their findings. Finally, this commentary suggests interpretational issues of interest to researchers who wish to continue to apply the SRM to multi-level issues in the study of leadership.
Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Leadership Research in Multi-Level Issues, Volume 8, 193–213 Copyright r 2009 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1475-9144/doi:10.1108/S1475-9144(2009)0000008009
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INTRODUCTION We have long been fans of David Kenny’s social relations model (SRM), and believe that leadership researchers can gain from a thorough understanding of both the theoretical implications of the SRM and the unique design and analytical techniques developed or refined in association with it. For those who want a more in-depth treatment of issues raised by Kenny and Livi (2009), we heartily recommend both the Kenny (1994) book titled Interpersonal Perception: A Social Relations Analysis, and the more recent Kenny, Kashy, and Cook (2006) book titled Dyadic Data Analysis. In addition, readers may wish to consult the recent article appearing in The Leadership Quarterly by Livi, Kenny, Albright, and Pierro (2008). In this volume, Kenny and Livi cover substantial ground by introducing the topic and main ideas of the SRM, providing two illustrations of the potential benefits of applying the model to the analysis of existing data, and showing how to implement the variance components analysis techniques using commonly available statistical software packages. The SRM seems well suited to address issues of leadership perceptions. Questions surrounding leadership perceptions play an important role in the extensive literature on leadership in work or political organizations. The study of leadership perceptions focuses on factors determining the extent to which a given individual is seen by others to be a leader. Leadership perception is clearly important to the understanding of leader emergence (Lord, Brown, & Harvey, 2001) and to the effective maintenance of a leadership position (Brown & Lord, 2001; Epitropaki & Martin, 2005; Maurer & Lord, 1991). Especially if meta-perceptions are considered, selfperceptions as leaders may also potentially play a role in the ability of leaders to themselves develop and change (e.g., Lord & Brown, 2004; Lord & Hall, 2005). [Interestingly, the perception of leadership may – but does not necessarily – directly relate to one’s actual performance in the leader role as noted by Kaiser, Hogan, and Craig (2008).] To fully benefit from applications of the SRM, leadership researchers now need to carefully consider how the concepts and techniques of the general SRM approach mesh with the particulars of the theoretical and empirical work on the topic of leadership in organizations. This will likely mean thought and empirical research on the issue of how the particular group type and context might (or might not) influence the values of the variance components and correlations estimated as part of the SRM. For example, we will argue later in this chapter that although the empirical results from the reanalyses presented by Kenny and Livi provide a compelling ‘‘proof of
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concept’’ for applying SRM to the study of leader emergence, we do not at this time know the extent to which the generalization of their results is limited by the characteristics of the studies that were available to them. Among other things, the available studies involve artificial groups performing very shortterm tasks and tend to involve student samples, which are relatively homogeneous in age and experience. First, however, we briefly describe our theoretical perspective on leadership. This discussion is followed by comments on the first empirical example presented by Kenny and Livi (2009). After that, we briefly describe an additional SRM study that two of the current chapter authors (Hall and Foster) are in the process of analyzing. Although this study suffers from some of the same boundary conditions as those reanalyzed by Kenny and Livi, the longitudinal design allows a focus on longer-term group interactions in a context where task performance has meaningful consequences. Finally, we summarize the implications for researchers.
LEADERSHIP CATEGORIZATION APPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP PERCEPTION The theoretical leadership framework from which we evaluate the work of Kenny and Livi (2009) is a leader categorization approach (Lord, Foti, & Phillips, 1982; Medvedeff & Lord, 2007), which draws heavily from basic concepts in social and cognitive psychology. Past theory and empirical research suggests that perceiving leadership may occur through at least two general types of social-cognitive processes: recognition processes, which involve a match of perceived leader characteristics to the internal cognitive structures used by the perceivers in an effort to identify and categorize leaders, and inferential processes, in which the leadership (or lack of leadership) of a target individual is attributed based on the outcomes of important organizational events (Lord & Maher, 1990, 1991). Both of these perceptual processes imply the existence of both a perceiver and a target. Thus leadership perception may be understood as involving, at a minimum, two persons (later comments in this chapter will address the role of larger groups). We will refer in our discussion to a subordinate follower as the ‘‘perceiver,’’ and to either a peer or a hierarchical superior other individual as the ‘‘target.’’ Leadership categorization theory suggests that both of these individuals are influenced by internal cognitive structures relating to leadership. The leader categorization approach has evolved over time. Essentially, this approach emphasizes the importance of cognitive structures, variously
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considered as implicit leadership theories (ILTs), schemas, prototypes, exemplars, and so forth, in the recognition and attribution of leadership. Within individuals, these cognitive structures develop over time and with experience (Lord & Maher, 1991). Leadership schemas influence both the behavioral observations of perceivers and the categorization of behavior as being leader-like (or not); they also influence the thoughts and actions of the target person who generates those behaviors. When leadership schemas are highly available, prototypical behaviors are easily encoded in terms of leadership. In contrast, when leadership schemas are inhibited – as may happen when inconsistent cues, such as being female, are present – prototypical behaviors are less easily categorized in terms of leadership (Scott & Brown, 2006). Similarly, schemas guide the behaviors of leaders and may be partially responsible for individual differences in transactional and transformational leadership (Wofford, Goodwin, & Whittington, 1998). Recent approaches to leadership schemas suggest (1) that they are not immutably fixed in content and structure, but rather are constituted anew in an accessible cognitive workspace at each activation, and (2) that they are context sensitive (Hanges, Lord, & Dickson, 2000; Lord & Brown, 2004; Lord et al., 2001). Thus somewhat different instantiations of a leadership schema are currently activated depending on numerous factors, including characteristics of the perceiver and the target such as activated identity level (e.g., individual vs. relational vs. collective), the social context, the task, and current goals. Research shows that certain personal characteristics or attributes are commonly associated with leadership and, therefore, are often present in a given individual’s leadership schema (Cronshaw & Lord, 1987; Epitropaki & Martin, 2004; Lord, Foti, & De Vader, 1984; Lord, De Vader, & Alliger, 1986; Offerman, Kennedy, & Wirtz, 1994). These characteristics include physical attributes such as physical attractiveness, height or being male, personality traits such as dominance or extraversion, and cognitive characteristics such as intelligence. In other words, whether or not these characteristics are actually associated with higher leadership performance, their mere presence increases the likelihood that a given individual will be perceived as a leader. Much empirical research has been done to abstract common elements of leadership schema, many of which show considerable generality across cultures (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). In addition, some individuals tend to see themselves as being leaders. For such individuals, leadership is a central – rather than peripheral – aspect of the self, and is used to guide both that person’s own behavior and the perceptions of others (Gradwohl, Lord, Brown, & Engle, 1996). Interestingly,
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individuals who rate high in leadership self-schema may be more stringent in evaluating the leadership status of others (Brown, Marchioro, Tan, & Lord, 1998), possibly because they hold more rigorous standards or have more complex prototypes that are more difficult to match. Leadership selfschema may also provide important cognitive structures that facilitate the organization and development of leadership skills, in part because seeing oneself as a leader helps one to proactively seek the leadership experiences required to develop leadership skills (Chan & Drasgow, 2001; Lord & Hall, 2005). With specific reference to the SRM, the leadership categorization approach provides theoretical explanations for a variety of phenomena of interest, including consensus across perceivers, dyadic uniqueness in perceptions, reciprocity correlations, and self-perceptions. For example, both consensus (or consistency) across different followers in leadership perceptions and some degree of stability in within-follower perceptions of leadership across time are explained by the presence of cognitive structures that share common elements across perceivers. Also, although schema may show some within-person change over time, they often do so in an incremental fashion or at least are instantiated somewhat similarly when there is consistency in environmental cues over time (Epitropaki & Martin, 2004). These same cognitive structures also help explain why agreement across observers is not perfect (e.g., observers will vary at least somewhat in their prior experiences of leadership and may have incomplete overlap in opportunities to observe targets) and why changes in perceptions may occur over time (e.g., changes in contextual cues, changes in the leadership self-schemas of perceivers that redefine their rating criteria). Different experiences can lead to person-to-person variability in leadership schema content. Also, aspects of schema such as their learned nature and sensitivity to context suggest the activated portion of the schema will differ over time within the same person. For example, Brown et al. (1998) found that observers changed from a more masculine leadership schema to a more feminine leadership schema when they repeatedly observed an experimental group in which the dominant leadership role shifted from a male target to a female target. Moreover, when this change was modeled with catastrophe analysis, an additional 20% of the variance in leadership was explained. These considerations imply that researchers will make the following observations: Variability in leadership perceptions across perceivers due to consistent differences in leadership schema content
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Variability in the performance of behaviors (which may be generated in accord with idiosyncratic leadership self-schemas) across the targets of leadership perceptions Instability or change in leadership perceptions within an individual over time In addition, negative generalized reciprocity correlations (in which an individual’s perceiver effect negatively relates to his or her target effect) might be expected given the tendency for persons who are self-schematic for leadership to themselves emit more leader-like behaviors while evaluating the leadership behaviors of others more harshly.
ADDITIONAL RELEVANT LEADERSHIP THEORY With apologies to the large number of additional theoretical and empirical leadership works that could be tied into this topic, we briefly describe here two other theoretical frameworks that may be helpful to understanding the application of the SRM to leadership. First, the extensive literature on leader–member exchange (LMX) theory (and its earlier version known as vertical dyadic linkage theory) suggests the preeminence of dyadic relationships in leadership perceptions (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Scandura, 1987). From this perspective, the same leader is viewed as having multiple dyadic relationships that vary in quality across different leader–follower dyads. Thus LMX theory implies that perceptions of the same leader may vary systematically from one follower to another because of differences in the quality of their exchange relationship, even though some level of agreement may be apparent among the followers on the relative ranking of a given leader with respect to other target leaders. Empirical studies suggest that the quality of dyadic relationships becomes established fairly quickly as the dyadic relationship is formed, and that this quality tends to remain relatively stable over time (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993). Recent work has also made links between LMX and ILTs (i.e., leadership schemas). For example, Epitropaki and Martin’s (2005) longitudinal study demonstrated the extent of match between an ideal leadership schema and perceptions of actual leader characteristics predicted LMX quality. Thus LMX theory provides a solid theoretical foundation for expecting what the SRM terms ‘‘relationship effects.’’ Relationship effects refer to variability in perceptions, affective reactions, or behaviors that is not
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explainable as simple perceiver or target effects. In other words, they reflect something about the unique dyadic relationship that has been established between two particular persons. These effects may be based on any number of factors, such as similarity in background or attitudes or an affective bond that develops over time. A leadership-related variable that might particularly be expected to show strong relational effects is liking (Liden et al., 1993), which may be subsumed in some LMX measures such as Liden and Maslyn’s (1998) affect dimension of the MDM. LMX theory also provides a theoretical basis for expecting positive dyadic reciprocity correlations, in which a correlation exists between the relationship effects of two paired members (e.g., if Bob likes Dave or perceives him as particularly leader-like, Dave has a similarly uniquely high perception of Bob). Second, the leadership literature suggests group-level influences may affect leadership perceptions, so that factors such as common experiences, shared contexts, social norms, group identities and goals, and communications among group members may lead to greater agreement in leadership perceptions within groups. For example, recent research that takes a social identity theory perspective indicates that with experience and increased group identification, groups develop their own unique prototype of an effective leader (Hogg, 2001). Thus, when members’ identification with the group is high, perceivers may rely more heavily on group-level prototypes than on general leadership prototypes (van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004). Such a process would likely produce larger target effects in leadership perceptions than when group identification is low. In sum, there is a strong theory-based logic for expecting leadership perceptions to show perceiver, target, and relational effects, as well as negative generalized reciprocity correlations and positive dyadic reciprocity correlations. At the same time, it is not clear to what extent the estimates of variance components from the Kenny and Levi application of the SRM may be generalized to naturally occurring groups, because of the nature of the studies available to them for reanalysis. We turn now to a general description of the characteristics of their studies as compared to groups of interest to organizational leadership researchers.
CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO KENNY AND LIVI’S FIRST EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE In their first illustrative analysis, Kenny and Livi (2009) reanalyzed data from seven studies that involved the collection of ratings either of overall
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leadership or of a more circumscribed aspect of leadership perceptions or leadership-related behavior following a period of group interaction. All of these studies used a round-robin design, in which each group member rated each other group member. These studies were notable not only because of their round-robin designs (which are demanding to implement), but also because they provided leadership ratings on multiple measures. This design allowed for an assessment not only of the relative magnitudes of different sources of variance in leadership ratings (i.e., perceiver, target, and relationship), but also a determination of the stability of those effects across multiple measures. In brief, key empirical results found by Kenny and Livi were as follows: Groups do not vary in the total extent of leadership perceived. Target variance is substantial and has high reliability, indicating that perceivers tend to agree with one another in their perceptions of a specific other person’s leadership ability. Different measures of leadership tend to give similar results. Perceiver variance is much lower and not nearly as reliable. Relationship variance, which is the unique effect associated with a specific perceiver and a specific target, is moderate and approximately as reliable as the target variance. Kenny and Livi comprehensively demonstrate how the variance component and reciprocity correlation estimates are interpreted, and tie the results back to relevant leadership literature. In our comments here, we consider a slightly different issue. We are already convinced that this technique is valuable, and for the most part we agree with Kenny and Livi in their general interpretations of the meanings of the different SRM components. We would like to address the issue of what their specific estimates do and do not tell us about leadership in typical applied settings, and identify the implications of the limitations of that knowledge for where leadership studies using this technique may want to go in the future. In other words, we consider the kind of studies that the leadership field needs to be more confident that SRM estimates of the variance components describe real-life leadership situations and that reveal the potential effects of contextual factors.
Group History and Composition We begin by summarizing some salient aspects of the studies that went into the analysis. All seven studies were conducted in the laboratory, with college
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students as research participants. Six of the seven studies involved groups that had a very short ‘‘life’’ of less than one hour, and the seventh study (Campbell, Simpson, Stewart, & Manning, 2003) was only nominally better in this respect. (In the Campbell et al. study, participants were first assigned to a group in an initial session, and then a week later interacted for roughly one-half hour.) It is difficult to gauge from the written accounts of the studies whether the persons interacting in the groups knew one another previously. There may have been some degree of previous relationship, given that the participants may have been drawn from a subject pool that included preexisting acquaintances and friendships. (In fact, it is a good practice for researchers utilizing these types of study designs to collect a measure of prior acquaintance in case it is needed for explanation or as a covariate in later analyses.) In none of the studies did there appear to be an explicit expectation that the group members would continue to interact as an intact group in the future. The short-term nature of the group members’ acquaintances, especially coupled with the knowledge that the group itself would not continue to exist after the study ended, contrasts with most groups of interest to organizational researchers. Even those sorts of workgroups intentionally designed to have a short life (e.g., committees, project groups) typically exist substantially longer than an hour. In addition, even though members of these groups may not have met face-to-face until the group is constituted, their reputations may be known to one another before they even meet, and they may reasonably expect that there will be further interactions after the group is dissolved. Also, some of the same group members may interact in multiple groups that pursue differing goals, both within the same organization and in the larger community, thus bringing experiences with one another from other contexts. One implication of the inclusion of short-term groups is that the resulting ratings of leadership perceptions may primarily be driven by recognition processes, because there may have been fewer opportunities for performance information to accumulate and engender inferential processes. This could yield underestimates of relationship effects relative to target effects. It might also imply the potential for changes in the relative proportions of target and relationship variance components over time as information leading to inferences becomes more available. In addition, in contrast to the groups that are characteristically found in many applied settings, the groups in the analyzed studies appeared to be fairly homogeneous in age composition (and, as a consequence, probably in task-relevant experience). That is, the participants in most studies were
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students, so in terms of age they were likely primarily in their late teens to mid-twenties. Replications in groups with greater heterogeneity in age and experience might result in changes in the estimates of both target and perceiver effects. For example, older and more highly experienced perceivers might have systematic tendencies to underrate the targets, thus resulting in larger perceiver variance components. There was less of an issue with homogeneity in terms of the gender composition of the groups. Depending on the study, the groups were either single gender (e.g., Campbell et al., 2003; Dabbs & Ruback, 1984) or mixed gender (Dabbs, Ruback, & Evans, 1987; Lord, Phillips, & Rush, 1980; Ruback, Dabbs, & Hopper, 1984); one study appears to have deliberately created groups that had balanced gender (Montgomery, 1986). Of the studies that assigned participants to groups without considering gender, we do not know what the gender balance was. This factor could influence the variance component results, as masculinity has been shown repeatedly to be a predictor of leadership perceptions (Eagly & Karau, 2002). For example, target variance may be increased in situations where a group contains a single male relative to groups with more balanced compositions. This result might also be consistent with Kenny and Livi’s reanalysis of the Lord et al. (1980) data set, in which they found a systematic effect of female perceivers perceiving greater amounts of leadership. Group sizes in the seven reanalyzed studies ranged from four to eight persons. Having undertaken research using round-robin designs ourselves, we can completely understand the attractiveness of using such relatively small group sizes simply for practical reasons. Collecting and analyzing data from larger groups requires extensive coordination and a large pool of research assistants. If group-level analyses are planned, it also means that a large number of individuals must participate to have a large enough N at the group level. Yet, although many naturally occurring organizational groups have sizes similar to those in the Kenny and Livi reanalysis, organizational researchers may also desire to have data from samples that provide information on leadership perceptions in larger groups, which may have different dynamics for leader emergence. Furthermore, no formally designated hierarchical status differences occurred among the members of the groups in the studies reanalyzed by Kenny and Livi, and the study designs did not appear to impose any formal role differences among group members or acknowledge expertise-based differentiations. In contrast, in many workgroups the authority of at least one member is legitimated externally, as signaled by a formal title such as supervisor or chair. In addition, both the designated group leader and other
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group members may be further differentiated in terms of specialized roles or knowledge. Adding even more to the complexity, groups composed of persons from different functional backgrounds may show shifts in attributed expert power as the task domain shifts over time. Both in the current chapter and in the Kenny and Livi chapter, the SRM analyses were conducted using methods that do not explicitly take such role or expertise differences into account. In some cases, a more appropriate approach might be to consider Kenny et al.’s (2006) SRM designs with roles.
Task and Reward Structure Considerations The assigned group tasks in the seven reanalyzed studies may or may not have been perceived by research participants as meaningful. For example, these tasks included a ‘‘get acquainted’’ session (Dabbs & Ruback, 1984), the desert island survival task (Dabbs et al., 1987), a brainstorming task in which participants were asked to generate ideas for increasing tourism to the United States (Ruback et al., 1984), and other tasks of a similar nature. In addition, other than potentially as a source of research credit, there does not seem to have been much in the way of rewards or sanctions for the behaviors exhibited by group members. In contrast, in a typical work setting, a variety of factors might make task meaningfulness much higher. In real work settings, performance on a task may be important for several reasons. For example, performance may be seen as reflecting on one’s career identity or work reputation, people may work at jobs or tasks that are high in intrinsic motivation, or cultural and normative forces may help define tasks as meaningful to employees. Given these possibilities, we wonder if the research contexts may have cued more social loafing than might be expected in tasks occurring in an organizational setting. If so, this behavior could have the effect of increasing the variance in target effects. Also, in real-world workgroups, one’s superior typically has the formal authority to dispense rewards and punishments, such as pay increases, promotions, sanctions, or firing decisions. Other group members may also have some control over rewards and punishments, especially those of a social nature (e.g., acceptance by the group or ostracism, assignment or division of favorable vs. unfavorable tasks). We also note that an important aspect to consider is whether group members’ performance will be evaluated and rewarded on an individual basis or a group-level basis. Individual-level rewards tend to create individual-level identities and qualitatively different
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social exchanges than the collective identities that result from a practice of bestowing group-level rewards (Flynn, 2005). Collective identities may create strong norms for cooperation among individual group members and strong norms for leaders to treat all members alike, whereas individual-level identities promote dyadic differentiation in leadership behavior and more competition among group members. As a consequence, reward structures may indirectly affect the behavior of group members and leaders. Further, because collective identities highlight the importance of group norms, as noted by social identity theory, they result in a different basis for leadership perceptions than individual identities (Hogg, 2001; van Knippenberg et al., 2004).
Miscellaneous Considerations All of the reanalyzed studies were conducted in a laboratory setting, which itself may have influenced the leadership rating process. For example, perhaps none of the group members in the study was perceived as particularly leader-like compared to the researcher who conducting the study (this might have washed out group-level effects). Also, several of the studies included the presence of an evaluator (Campbell et al., 2003) or use of recording devices such as microphones or video cameras (Dabbs & Ruback, 1984; Dabbs et al., 1987; Ruback et al., 1984; Lord et al., 1980). These cues may have elevated participant self-awareness and influenced their behaviors, as they bear a similarity to experimental inductions of increased self-focus. This could produce greater perceiver effects if raters’ leadership self-schema become activated due to increased self-focus. Increased self-focus may result in more severe ratings of others by persons who are more leadership schematic (Brown et al., 1998). Such awareness-heightening cues may or may not be present in natural settings. Another design consideration is the choice of leadership measures used in the seven reanalyzed studies. Those measures varied in nature from direct ratings of leadership perceptions to ratings of likeability, judgments of smiling and friendliness, desire to interact with the target, judgments of task performance, influence, and openness. There is room for debate about the extent to which some of these measures reflect leadership perceptions per se or are more appropriately considered antecedents and/or consequences of leadership perceptions (e.g., likeability). Regardless, we might expect variance component estimates to differ systematically across some of these different measures. For example, we would expect that more affectively loaded
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measures such as liking would show higher proportions of relationship variance. Finally, all of the studies are embedded in a middle-class, mainstream American culture. We do not know how the results would differ (if at all) across different socioeconomic and cultural groups. For example, an increasing amount of work is focusing on distinctions in leadership in more individualistic versus more collectivistic cultures (House et al., 2004). It is not clear how these differences along the individualism–collectivism continuum might affect study outcomes. For example, more collectivistic settings might be associated with decreased target variance because informationprocessing schemas that direct attention to context rather than focal individuals are more common in such environments (Kuhnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001). Conversely, more collectivistic settings might be characterized by more collectively held norms about authority associated with target characteristics such as age, gender, family background, and position, which might have the opposite effect of increasing target variance. In sum, the groups in the studies summarized by Kenny and Livi differed in many characteristics from the naturally occurring applied groups to which leadership researchers would like to generalize their results. Their results likely very closely describe population values for the variance components and reciprocity correlations that might be expected from relatively small, homogeneous groups in which people have very short-term acquaintance and work at tasks with few serious personal consequences. We do not know for certain how such differences between these groups and the groups more typically found in real-world organizations might affect the values of the estimated variance components and reciprocity correlations for studies conducted either in organizational settings or in other artificial settings that have greater fidelity. Some theoretical considerations would suggest that Kenny and Livi’s results might be fairly accurate estimates of leadership perceptions in many different types of groups. These considerations include the rapidity with which LMX relationships become established, perceivers’ reliance on recognition processes that depend on fairly easily observable and stable surface characteristics of targets, and cumulative, self-perpetuating effects of the relationship between attributed leadership status and social power. At the same time, changes in task and environmental demands, the development of social processes including identities over time, and other potential factors that were discussed suggest that their results may be limited in generalizability. Studies of more realistic groups can help us determine the boundary conditions of Kenny and Livi’s results.
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Because we believe that the extended acquaintance of group members potentially may influence SRM variance component and reciprocity correlation estimates, we next present results from the analysis of an additional data set that repeatedly assessed leadership perceptions. Although it is only one sample with a relatively small N, the results may help us begin to gauge the extent to which Kenny and Levi’s results can be generalized from ad hoc to ongoing leadership processes.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ADDITIONAL SRM STUDY OF LEADERSHIP This section briefly reports partial results from a study of leadership perceptions that used an extended longitudinal design and a realistic task in which the group level of performance has meaningful implications for group members. These data were collected from 95 students in three sections of a Social Psychology course at the University of Akron. An initial measurement period involved the collection of individual difference measures early in the semester before groups were formed. It was followed by six additional data collections of perceptions of group members (and other variables) that occurred roughly every 2–3 weeks across the 15-week semester. Members of the class were randomly assigned to four- or five-person groups, and the groups worked on an assigned class project that accounted for 25% of students’ final course grade. The project involved the design, conduct, analysis, and written report of the results of a simple psychological study on a topic related to the course material. Here we report the results of two sets of analyses of the composite global leadership impression (GLI) score collected in this study. The GLI (Cronshaw & Lord, 1987) is a short, cognitively oriented scale measuring leadership categorization. One set of analyses was based on the 77 persons in 20 groups with complete or virtually complete data. The group sizes for these analyses ranged from 3 to 5 persons (some initial 4- and 5-person groups experienced dropout). The analyses were then repeated using only the 45 persons who were in 10 groups of size 4 or 5. The second set of analyses was performed to estimate the relationship (dyadic) reciprocity correlation, which cannot be calculated for groups of 3 or fewer persons. Recall that the studies reanalyzed by Kenny and Livi were chosen at least in part because they used multiple leadership measures, allowing for an estimate of composite leadership. As a consequence, these authors’
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reanalysis was able to partition variance in leadership perceptions into stable and unstable components, by looking for consistency across different measures. We used a similar analytic strategy, except the repetition of measurement was over time rather than across different measures of leadership. In this study, ‘‘stability’’ refers to consistency in perceptions across time and across different indicators of leadership in the Kenny and Livi results. Despite some design differences between this study and the studies included in the Kenny and Livi reanalyses, the overall partitioning of variance into actor, partner, and relationship components showed very similar results (see Table 1). The largest variance component was stable target variance, which accounted for 48% of the variance in our full set of 20 groups, 47% for the subset of groups with more than 3 persons, and 43% averaged across the seven studies reanalyzed by Kenny and Livi. The ratios of stable to unstable target variance were quite similar across studies, even though the Kenny and Livi samples represent stability across measures while our sample assesses stability across measurement periods. Also, in both the Kenny and Livi reanalyses and our sample, relationship variance was the second largest component, with estimates tightly clustered between Table 1.
Estimation of Social Relations Model Variance Components and Reciprocity Correlations: Comparison of Studies. Relative Variance Partitioning
Reciprocity Correlation
Perceiver
Target
Relationship
Generalized
Dyadic
Current (our) study All groups Stable component Unstable component Groups W3 persons Stable component Unstable component
.15 .01
.48 .06
.15 .15
.24 .56
– – –
.12 .01
.47 .05
.17 .17
.09 .30
.29 .20
Kenny and Livi reanalysis Average of seven studies Stable component Unstable component
.14
.03
.09 .04
.43 .04
.19 .21
Notes: Stability is across time using same measurement method (GLI) for our current study but is across multiple measures administered at the same time for the Kenny and Livi reanalyses. The number of groups is 20 in the first set of our analyses and 10 in the second set of our analyses. Dyadic reciprocity correlations were not estimated in our full current sample because of the inclusion of groups with three persons.
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.15 and .21 for both the stable and unstable components. Although the proportion of stable to unstable variance differed a bit between our sample and the Kenny and Livi reanalyses, in both cases the perceiver variance estimates were smallest and of very similar magnitudes across the studies, although our study did show larger perceiver effects than the Kenny and Levi reanalyses. Finally, the results of our study supported the expected positive dyadic reciprocity correlation. This correlation indicated that there was reciprocity in ratings between dyad members after controlling for the ‘‘main effects’’ of perceiver and target. In total, these results are consistent across our and the Kenny and Livi analyses, especially given the variability in measurement and contexts across the studies. In contrast to the results obtained by Kenny and Livi, our sample may have shown meaningful group-level variance. Kenny and Livi do not explicitly describe how this component was calculated, so we do not directly reproduce their analysis here. Nevertheless, in our sample, the composite GLI values for each of the 20 groups, going across group members and across time, ranged from 2.28 to 3.89. (The composite value of the GLI across all groups was 3.01.) The GLI response scale was a 5-point Likerttype format, so this range seems meaningful. One expectation that was not supported was the idea that greater amounts of variance would be associated with the relationship component in our study. This may reflect the use of a more cognitively oriented measure of leadership (the GLI) or, alternatively, as Liden et al. (1993) found, dyadic effects may occur relatively early in leader–member exchanges and then remain quite stable. In support of the idea that more affectively laden measures may demonstrate greater relationship variance, in our data set a separate round-robin measure of perceived group contributions (e.g., helping others, contributing) showed a relationship variance component in the mid-.40’s, which was larger than that observed for the GLI. Another expectation that was not cleanly supported was generalized reciprocity correlation. We expected that the relationship between the ratings received by an individual and the ratings given by that individual would show a negative relationship, based on an argument that raters high in leadership self-schema would act more leader-like themselves, but would give more stringent ratings. When the generalized reciprocity correlation was estimated in the entire sample, which included groups consisting of three, four, and five persons, the relationship was unexpectedly positive. By contrast, when it was estimated in a subsample containing only groups of four or five persons, the correlation was negative, although the bulk of it was an unstable component. We do not know at this point if these
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contradictory results are artifactual or if they reflect different dynamics in the larger groups. The longitudinal nature of our study suggests a variety of additional interesting analyses, which we do not pursue here. For example, because the study involved project-focused groups, the relative contributions of different group members likely changed over time as different aspects of the class project became important. Likewise, the relative variance components may have shifted systematically in value. This issue could be addressed by moving from an inspection of the more aggregate-level results presented here (i.e., cumulated over time) to a consideration of the changes in variance components across the six time periods. Yet, despite these differences in tasks, motivation, and time, the most noteworthy result in Table 1 is the overall similarity to the results reported by Kenny and Levi. These similarities provide added confidence in their results.
CONCLUSION In this final section, we raise (but do not answer) a few more theoretical issues that we feel deserve a more extended discussion among researchers of leadership and the SRM. First is the issue of how observed target effects should be interpreted. Target effects initially may appear to be a function solely of the individual characteristics of the target, which may include physical appearance, personality, and behaviors. However, further consideration suggests that the interpretation of the level of these target effects as purely due to individual characteristics is not so straightforward. For example, some aspects of the rating of the target will likely be affected by group-level processes and issues that vary with the nature of the group. For example, the development of a strong group identification may supplant the influence of a general (individual-level) leadership prototype (e.g., Hogg, 2001; van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Alternatively, group consensus might arise as a result of discussion among group members about their current (and potentially future) supervisor and about events in which other group members may have demonstrated the presence or absence of leadership. These factors could increase target effects, but would be interpreted by many leadership researchers as reflecting the existence of a group-level phenomenon. If the group has existed for an extended period of time, these sorts of group-level effects on target variance potentially could be quite large.
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In addition, more dynamic models of prototype activation (Hanges et al., 2000; Lord et al., 2001) maintain that the prototype used by perceivers is influenced, in part, by target characteristics. For example, male targets may elicit more masculine prototypes than female targets, and vice versa. Because gender is easily recognized and is strongly associated with leadership prototypes, such target-based cuing of perceiver prototypes would likely produce consistent effects across perceivers and, therefore, would appear as a target effect. To the extent that variability in the gendered aspects of leadership prototypes exists across perceivers, this target-based cuing of prototypes would become manifest as a relational effect. Another issue concerns the potential reciprocal relationship between some leadership behaviors and leadership perceptions. It is well known that individuals who talk more tend to emerge as group leaders. For example, a review by Stein and Heller (1979) reports a very consistent pattern across studies of correlation between these two variables. At the same time, it is also known that individuals whose verbal contributions are not favorably acknowledged by the group reduce their subsequent verbalizations. Thus some behavioral measures of verbal participation may reflect leadership differentiation that has already occurred. This problem can be avoided by using trait-based measures known to be related to verbal ability, such as intelligence and extraversion (Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002; Lord et al., 1986). In short, verbal contributions and leadership perceptions co-develop over time so that manifest verbal activity may be problematic because it is a confounded process explanation of leadership emergence. Finally, while it may be tempting to consider the unstable portions of variance components as measurement error, they may, in fact, be a mixture of error and other systematic effects that indicate the need for further dissection. For example, unstable components in a longitudinal design should be further probed to determine whether they signal systematic changes or development in the group process or whether they might be associated with changes in task or environmental demands on the group. These demands might include new tasks or changes in the nature of the existing task, crisis situations that increase the relevance of leadership to group processes (e.g., Emerich, 1999), and changes in the relative importance of task contributions versus group maintenance (e.g., socioemotional) activities. Unstable components in cross-sectional designs with multiple measures may indicate a need to carefully consider whether the existing set of measures fully and reliably sample the relevant leadership content domain. In sum, Kenny and Livi (2009) highlight exciting possibilities for increasing our understanding of leadership through the application of the
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SRM. Both the SRM theory and the accompanying analytic techniques can be important tools that allow us to meet the increasing demands of scholars in the leadership domain to explicitly consider multi-level theories and processes (e.g., Yammarino & Dansereau, 2008). As leadership researchers, our mission is to tailor aspects of the SRM to include considerations already present in leadership theory and empirical findings, and to allow us to move beyond our current state of knowledge.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We would like to acknowledge the assistance of Jeanne Makinney and Christopher Marchioro, who were graduate students in the Industrial/ Organizational Psychology program of the University of Akron at the time the empirical study described in this chapter was conducted. They played key roles in the design and implementation of the study.
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