Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management (Ashgate Studies in Environmental Policy and Practice)

MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PLATFORMS FOR INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT To Prof. Niels Röling, the Daddy of all things multi-stak...

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MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PLATFORMS FOR INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT

To Prof. Niels Röling, the Daddy of all things multi-stakeholder

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Edited by JEROEN WARNER Wageningen University and Research Centre, The Netherlands

© Jeroen Warner 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Jeroen Warner has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identiﬁed as the editor of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Multi-stakeholder platforms for integrated water management. – (Ashgate studies in environmental policy and practice) 1. Integrated water development – Decision-making 2. Water resources development – Decision making 3. Interprofessional relations 4. Group decision making I. Warner, Jeroen 333.9'1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Multi-stakeholder platforms for integrated water management / edited by Jeroen Warner. p. cm. -- (Ashgate studies in environmental policy and practice) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7065-0 1. Water-supply--Management. 2. Integrated water development. 3. Water-supply-Management--International cooperation. 4. Sustainable development. 5. Environmental policy. I. Warner, Jeroen TD353.M83 2007 363.6'10684--dc22 2006103144 ISBN 978-0-7546-7065-0

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall.

Contents List of Figures List of Tables Notes on Contributors Preface 1.

The Beauty of the Beast: Multi-Stakeholder Participation for Integrated Catchment Management Jeroen Warner

vii ix xi xv

1

2.

The Nature of the Beast: Towards a Comparative MSP Typology Jeroen Warner and Annemiek Verhallen

3.

Collaborative Capital: A Key to the Successful Practice of Integrated Water Resources Management Nigel Watson

31

Integrated Catchment Management and MSPs: Pulling in Different Directions? Bruce Mitchell

49

Contrasting UK Experiences with Participatory Approaches to Integrated River Basin Management Malcolm Newson

69

Århus Convention in Practice: Access to Information and Decisionmaking in a Pilot Planning Process for a Flemish River Basin Annemiek Verhallen

95

4.

5.

6.

7.

The International Zwin Commission: The Beauty of a Mayﬂy? Leo Santbergen

8.

Participating in Watershed Management: Policy and Practice in the Trahunco Watershed, Argentinean Patagonia Alejandra Moreyra and Jeroen Warner

9.

‘Yakunchik’: Coming to Agreement after Violence in Perú María Teresa Oré

21

111

125

137

vi

10.

11.

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Surface and Groundwater Management in the Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico Philippus Wester, Jaime Hoogesteger van Dijk and Hans Paters Less Tension, Limited Decision: A Multi-Stakeholder Platform to Review a Contested Sanitation Project in Tiquipaya, Bolivia Nicolas Faysse, Vladimir Cossío, Franz Quiroz, Raúl Ampuero and Bernardo Paz

151

165

12.

Multi-Stakeholder Dissonance in the South African Water Arena Eliab Simpungwe, Pieter Waalewijn and Bert Raven

191

13.

Mekong Region Water-Related MSPs – Unfulﬁlled Potential John Dore

205

14.

Against the Conventional Wisdom: Why Sector Reallocation of Water and Multi-Stakeholder Platforms Do Not Take Place in Uzbekistan Kai Wegerich

235

Unpacking Participatory NRM: Distinguishing Resource Capture from Democratic Governance Bruce Currie-Alder

245

15.

16.

Index

Towards Evaluating MSPs for Integrated Catchment Management Annemiek Verhallen, Jeroen Warner and Leo Santbergen

259

273

List of Figures 2.1

Nine dimensions of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs)

24

3.1 3.2 3.3

Goals and means The Fraser Basin Fraser Basin Council organigram

35 40 42

5.1

Sustainable river basin management, assisted by political debate, ecological knowledge, economic assessment and public participation Location map for the four North-east England catchments to which environmental capital approaches have been applied Quality of Life Capital attributes and scales of importance in Upper Wharfedale

5.2 5.3

70 77 78

6.1 6.2

The links between data, capta, information and knowledge Eight steps in interactive decision-making

98 100

7.1

The Zwin scenic area and its surroundings

116

10.1 10.2

Location and topography of the Lerma-Chapala Basin The Lerma-Chapala River Basin Council

153 155

11.1 11.2 11.3

Activities of the facilitator for the design and facilitation of an MSP Main points to be considered for the design of an MSP The valley area of Tiquipaya

166 170 174

12.1

Water management areas in South Africa

193

13.1 13.2

Mekong Region Key concepts of MSPs

207 211

15.1

Envisioning participatory NRM

256

16.1 16.2

Four negotiation strategies Four problem types, with the strategy to tackle them

265 266

This page intentionally left blank

List of Tables Tables 5.1 5.2 5.3

5.4

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

11.1 11.2

The QoLC matrix of attributes used to guide the Upper Wharfedale Best Practice Project Steps involving public participation, worked around QoLC assessments in the Upper Wharfedale Best Practice Project The Quality of Life Capital for Coquetdale – results of initial survey of community members, indicating their perception of priorities Comparative elements of the UWBPP and the Upper Coquetdale applications of QoLC assessment techniques Negotiation rounds of the International Zwin Commission (1939–2004) Arena composition International Zwin Commission in Round VII (2001–2004) MSP assessment dimensions in the international Zwin arena (1939–2004) Additional MSP assessment dimensions in the international Zwin arena (1939–2004)

80 82

86 88

112 117 122 123

Possible design objectives of an MSP Objectives of the facilitator in designing and facilitating the Technical Roundtable

167

13 1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6

Mekong Region country overview Major river basins of the Mekong Region Desirable MSP characteristics Governance forums – Tracks 1–4 Recent regional water-related governance forums (Tracks 1–2) Recent regional water-related governance forums (Tracks 3–4)

208 210 212 214 218 222

14.1

Amu Darya distribution limits and actual utilization

237

15.1 15.2

Unpacking participatory NRM Evaluating participatory NRM processes

254 255

16.1

Revised assessment dimensions and their main indicators

268

175

x

16.2

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Three MSP models based on the dominant approach of the content and the process of the deliberations in the platforms

269

13.1

Recent civil society-led local/national MSPs

220

15.1

Shared objectives

248

Boxes

Notes on Contributors Bruce Currie-Alder currently works with Canada’s International Development Research Centre and maintains a research interest in multi-stakeholder processes for water governance in Latin America. His past experience includes working with the China National Petroleum Corporation, studying Mexican policies and institutions for participatory park management, and assessing the impacts of oil development in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Email: [email protected]. John Dore is the Director of M-POWER water governance network which implements the Mekong Program On Water Environment and Resilience. Much of his recent work at the World Conservation Union (IUCN), Chiang Mai University and Australian National University has focused on water and energy politics across Asia. He is very interested in coordinating high quality transboundary research, integrated water resources management (IWRM) which takes ecosystem and livelihoods issues seriously, supporting multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) for social learning and negotiation, the changing political economy of the energy industry, and testing the rationales and decision-making processes for large water resources development projects. Nicolas Faysse is an economist, and currently works with CIRAD in Montpellier. He studied water management institutions in France, Tunis, South Africa and Bolivia, especially on issues of coordination, power inequities, and tools to support multi-stakeholder processes. He has published on the management of common-pool resources and water resource management in South Africa. From 2004 to 2006, he worked in Bolivia within the Negowat programme. About his co-authors: Vladimir Cossío is an agronomist. He holds an MsC from the Wageningen University. He studied community management of irrigation systems in Bolivia. Bernardo Paz, also an agronomist, worked on the reform of university in Bolivia, the production of quinoa and multi agent modelling. Franz Quiroz is an economist. He studied water supply and sanitation organization in Cochabamba and its peri-urban areas. Raúl Ampuero is an Agronomist and holds an MsC from the Wageningen University. He worked on water quality and waste water reuse in periurban areas of Bolivia. Bruce Mitchell is Professor of Geography and Associate Provost, Academic and Student Affairs at the University of Waterloo. His research specialization is the institutional and policy aspects of water management, and integrated water resource management. Professor Mitchell has written/edited 25 books and over 135 articles. He has received the Award for Scholarly Distinction in Geography from the Canadian

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Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Association of Geographers, and the Distinguished Service Award from the Canadian Water Resources Association. He is Concurrent Professor at Nanjing University and Honorary Professor at the Dalian University of Technology, both in China. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, and a Fellow of the International Water Resources Association. Alejandra Moreyra of Buenos Aires has a background in forestry and 20 years of practical experience in consultancy, research, organization and facilitation of workshops and training courses for NGOs, government projects and international organizations and universities. She has worked in a wide range of settings within Argentina, as well as Costa Rica, Bolivia and Chile Her current PhD project at Wageningen University concerns watershed management policy issues in Patagonia, Argentina. Email: [email protected] Malcolm Newson, a hydrologist and geomorphologist by training, is Professor of Physical Geography at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. After 25 years of conventional scientiﬁc research in these two ﬁelds he began to research and write about the necessary concepts and techniques for the delivery of sustainable development in river basins. His book Land, Water and Development (Routledge: 1992, 1997) promoted considerable international interest in strategic concepts vital to river basin planning and management. With colleagues in the University’s Planning Department, he became the sole independent reviewer of NRA’s Catchment Management Plans, taking the Wesley Dougill Prize for their paper in Town Planning Review, 1994. In the last ﬁve years he has turned his attention to more practical management techniques which secure stakeholder participation, especially in ‘best practice’ projects for catchment-scale land use and land management. He played a leading role in the application of ‘natural capital’ approaches in the recent EU-supported Upper Wharfedale Best Practice Project, the Northumbrian Rivers Project and the Team Revival Project. Email: [email protected]. María Teresa Oré has a MSc in sociology. Based in Lima, she is currently researching water management in Perú, Ecuador and Bolivia in peasants comunities and indigenous settlements. She published articles and two books on irrigation in Perú, such as: Riego y Organización (ITDG, 1992) and Agua, Bien Comun y Usos Privados. Riego, Estado y Conflictos en La Achirana del Inca, Catholic University of Perú, Wageningen University and WALIR Program, 2005. Email: teresaore@ amauta.rcp.net.pe. Leo Santbergen is senior policy advisor at the ‘Brabantse Delta’ water management board, West Netherlands. He took his MSc in Biology specializing in aquatic ecology and nature conservation at Wageningen University in 1991. He gained experience at the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, then worked. as assistant professor on integrated water management at Wageningen University. Currently Leo combines coordinating the implementation of the European Water Framework Directive at the Brabantse Delta water board with PhD research on

Notes on Contributors

xiii

critical (f)actors of multi-stakeholder dialogues in integrated river basin management. Email: [email protected]. Eliab Simpungwe, a Zambian-born resident of South Africa’s Eastern Cape, is an agricultural economist by training. He recently completed hiis dissertation on multistakeholder platforms in the Kat and Mtata rivers, Eastern Cape, at Wageningen University. Email: [email protected]. About his co-authors: Bert Raven, a Dutchman has a background in public administration and law. He was Secretary of the Eemszijlvest Water Board in Groningen and a policy advisor of the National Association of Dutch Water Boards in The Hague. He carried out PhD research on local water institutions in South Africa. Currently he works an independent consultant. Pieter Waalewijn was born in South African, and obtained his MSc in Irrigation from Wageningen University, for which he carried out thesis research in South Africa. He also holds an MSc in Philosophy at the Univeristy of Utrecht. He currently works as a humanitarian aid worker in Darfur, Sudan. Annemiek Verhallen obtained her MSc degree in Sociology at Leiden University, the Netherlands and worked for 14 years on the innovation of vocational training. She subsequently obtained an MSc in Hydrology and Water Management at the University of Wageningen and is currently an associate professor of Integrated Water Management at that university. She published about decision support tools and the use of vision building in river basin management. Currently she is completing a PhD thesis on interactive policy making in multistakeholder platforms in the management of the international river basin Scheldt. E-mail: [email protected]. Jeroen Warner took his MSc in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He specializes in environmental conﬂict, risk and participation as a theorist, researcher, lecturer, trainer and coordinator. Between 2001 and 2005 he coordinated the MultiStakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management research project, with case studies on four continents, organized two international conferences on MSPs at Wageningen University, and published Conflictos y Participación wth Alejandra Moreyra (Montevideo: Nordan 2004). He is now a Senior Researcher with the Centre for Sustainable Resource Management at Radboud University, Nijmegen and publishes widely on water issues. E-mail: [email protected]. Nigel Watson is a Lecturer in Environmental Management in the Department of Geography and a Research Associate in the Centre for Sustainable Water Management at Lancaster University in the UK. He received an MA and PhD in Geography from the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada where he conducted research on institutional aspects of water and land management. His primary research interests are in institutional analysis, integrated land and water management, and river basin governance in Europe and North America. He is an elected Fellow of the International Water Resources Association (IWRA), a member of the Council of the Mersey Basin Campaign (MBC) and a UK advisor for the European Network of Municipalities and Rivers (ENMaR). Email: [email protected].

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Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Kai Wegerich took his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London in 2003, focusing on water management and institutional change in Central Asia. Since August 2004 he is Assistant Professor at the Irrigation and Water Engineering group, Wageningen University. He continues to research water management and institutional change in Central Asia and teaches on irrigation and development. Email: [email protected]. Philippus Wester is Assistant Professor, Water Reforms at the Irrigation and Water Engineering Group, Wageningen University. Trained as an interdisciplinary water management researcher, he has studied water governance processes in Senegal, Pakistan, the Netherlands, Bangladesh, and Mexico. His current research focuses on water reforms, river basin governance, and environmental and institutional change processes. E-mail: ﬂ[email protected]. Both his co-authors Jaime Hoogesteger van Dijk and Hans Paters obtained their MSc degree in International Land and Water Management at Wageningen University, carrying out thesis research for the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) in Mexico. Jaime Hoogesteger van Dijk completed his second thesis research in Iran (also for IWMI). He focused on water governance, drought management and conjunctive water use. He presently works as a researcher for the Irrigation and Water Engineering Group at Wageningen University. His research focuses on river basin management, water rights and collective action in water governance. Email: [email protected]. Hans Paters recently completed his study with a second MSc thesis research for the Water Research Commission (WRC) in South Africa, focusing on land- and water reforms, collective water management strategies and contract farming. He currently works with the Dutch Water Management Inspectorate.

Preface Multi-Stakeholder Platforms, by any other name, are currently ‘hot’ in the water sector. As a recent phenomenon, they attract NGOs, national governments and multilateral donor agencies under the same banner. Yet, to my knowledge, the phenomenon has not been analysed with a global focus so far. It became possible to take stock of many examples and – in spite of very local idiosyncrasies – pick out the common threads when I was given the opportunity to coordinate the ‘Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management’ project for Wageningen University’s Irrigation and Water Engineering group from 2001 and 2004 – thanks to generous funding from Partners for Water, the Dutch multiorganisational water consortium. I started to work with a motley crew of enthusiastic PhD candidates from all corners of the world,1 all amazing personalities who soon became friends, as well as a gaggle of enthusiastic Dutch MScs who chose to do their thesis projects on MSPs and brought in fresh insights. Working with such a diversity of backgrounds, we were soon facing puzzling and often hilarious cultural differences. As a dynamic network rather than a static team (the Wageningen Hydrology group, Alterra, and several highly mobile overseas partners joined in) the MSP project became the very embodiment of the concept, a celebration of diversity, perplexing entry and exit strategies and, most of all, lots of energy, fun and learning, which to me are the main spin-offs of any successful multi-stakeholder process. As we went along, we connected with a wide variety of international researchers with similar interests, several of whom are represented in this book, though ten times as many contributed their ideas at water MSP workshops in Wageningen, Hoggsback, Cochabamba, Hyderabad, Ghent and Kyoto (the 3rd World Water Forum) in 2003 and in so doing made it all happen. My colleagues at the Irrigation and Water Engineering Group loyally supported the project, presiding over workshop sessions and putting up with my idiosyncrasies. Flip Wester and Marijn Beuling lent great support in editing and formatting of the text, and Alex Bolding gamely gave me his blessing to let me do the project he foreshadowed, my way. Leo van den Berg and Judith Klostermann from Alterra, Thea Hilhorst from Disaster Studies, Jim Woodhill from the International Agricultural Center and several people in the Communication and Innovation group lent practical and mental support to the process. Professor Adrian McDonald, the series editor, has been a patient and enthusiastic supporter of the book project. I hope it was worth the wait! 1 In alphabetical order: Alejandra Moreyra, Maria Teresa Oré, Sriprakashsingh Rajput, Bert Raven, Eliab Simpungwe and Annemiek Verhallen – with guest appearances by Alfredo Duran, Nawal el Haouari and Salem Shouhan.

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Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

But I would never have been able to develop the project, nor the book, without the keen support of the ‘Wageningen IWRM team’, Annemiek Verhallen and Leo Santbergen – hats off to those two greats! Like the Manic Street Preachers,2 not to mention Members of Scottish Parliament, with whom they share their acronym, Multi-Stakeholder Platforms attract their share of die-hard fans and ruthless critics. The present book reﬂects that difference in a weird and wonderful panorama of multi-stakeholder processes from around the world. While there is no uniformity of approach, I detect an overriding theme: what makes water MSPs tick? While the book does not provide deﬁnitive answers or twelve-step ‘how to’ guidelines, I am positive it contains some valuable clues. I hope both scholars and practitioners will enjoy and beneﬁt from our experiences. Jeroen Warner

2

A politically driven British rock band, popular in the late 1990s.

Chapter 1

The Beauty of the Beast: Multi-Stakeholder Participation for Integrated Catchment Management Jeroen Warner1

Introduction Policymakers, donors, NGOs, water managers – all are intrigued by the sound of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) as new forms of cooperation in the face of (imagined or real) water conﬂict. MSPs appear as networks for cooperation and negotiation involving multiple sectors or actors within a watershed. A widely accepted deﬁnition deﬁnes a platform as a ‘decision-making body (voluntary or statutory) comprising different stakeholders who perceive the same resource management problem, realise their interdependence for solving it, and come together to agree on action strategies for solving the problem’ (Steins and Edwards 1998: 1). It is like a roundtable, where people are gathered with very different perspectives. From a functionalist perspective, MSPs are perceived as problem-solving institutional innovations, to democratise water management, to manage conﬂict, even to make water management more efﬁcient. Once people see the sense of involving multiple voices, it is felt, they will be broadly accepted as the way forward in dealing with the increasing complexity, diversity and dynamics of water management. But what is actually going on, and how do we approach our research and analysis? What are we actually talking about? Are ‘platforms’ even physical organisations or are they loose networks for planning? Studying Multi-Stakeholder Platforms means zooming in on a phenomenon without very clear prior deﬁnitions (see below). Like the elusive ‘regimes’ of International Relations, they are not necessarily ‘things out there’, institutions with ofﬁces, bye-laws and secretariats, but inferred patterns of behaviour and interaction, singled out of a complex reality and labelled ‘MSP’ because having this class of constellations seems to add to our understanding of reality. As a new phenomenon, Multi-Stakeholder Platforms are beset with problems, which are easy to expose. However, rather than dismiss the phenomenon out of hand, we propose a more constructive approach. Multi-Stakeholder Platforms 1 Annemiek Verhallen, Flip Wester and Nicolas Faysse merit special thanks for their constructively critical comments – all disclaimers apply.

2

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

for Integrated Catchment management (MSP-ICM), the Wageningen project on which much of the present volume is based, sought to study and analyse what MSPs are, how they came about (development) and what they do for stakeholders in practice (functioning): do they make a difference? Can their performance be improved and their sustainability enhanced? This latter objective includes the question whether MSPs bring on the kind of learning and empowerment their proponents expect. Rather than call out for the hunter as soon as we spot one, let’s look out for the beauty of what we like to refer to as ‘the Beast’. Key research questions for this book: 1. Do multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) make a difference? 2. Are MSPs compatible with integrated water resource management (IWRM)? 3. Can (and should) MSPs be sustainable? MSP, IWRM and ICM Dialogue is now increasingly recommended and applied to the management of common-pool resources like coastal management, ﬁsheries, land care (Campbell 1998) and, especially, forest resources (Grimble et al. 1995; Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001, Shannon 2003). In the run-up to the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto (March 2003) the International Water Management Institute, IWMI, organised the Dialogue on Water, Food and Environment and the Dialogue on Water and Climate especially to promote basin-wide deliberative platforms. Water supply companies now organise MSP-type consumer panels. A workshop at Wageningen explored the usefulness of MSPs for disaster response. While obviously an increasingly popular pet, MSP as a newly emerging social life form still requires proper determination. The present study applies MSPs to integrated catchment management – a ‘holy trinity’ of three currently almost unassailable water governance ideals: integration (IWRM), participation and catchment management within hydrological rather than political boundaries. IWRM is about decompartmentalising water management, respecting the interactions and internalising the externalities that come with a sectorial approach. After Mitchell (1990, 1998) we can see it as a multi-layered systems approach to water management, integrating: 1. Relations between surface and groundwater, quantity and quality 2. Relations between water and land use 3. Relations between water and stakeholder interests To which we would add 4. Relations between water institutions (coordination) Combining these four seems a perfectly logical way forward for a water sector in need of modernisation. But they inevitably bring a multitude of daunting

The Beauty of the Beast

3

challenges: holistic management needs to take many aspects into account that are hard to model and to square with each other; and then they need to be squared with participation. First of all, it requires a radical change in management culture. IWRM is not just the sum total of all the isolated facets of water management, but a search for the added value of integrating relevant (f)actors. Nigel Watson (Chapter 3) decries the tendency of some to see IWRM as ‘more of the same’. He argues that IWRM requires a totally different institutional set-up along the lines of MSPs. The particular beast this institutional zoologist has spotted is a Cariboo – in fact an acronym for seven criteria: Common vision, Adaptive capacity, Resources, Interdependence, Balance, Output and Outcomes. MSPs seem helpful in realising common visions, realising a balanced outcome of adaptive processes, once people realise their resource interdependence. Still, as Bruce Mitchell (Chapter 4), an early and authoritative champion of IWRM notes, integration and participation seem to pull in opposite directions – people are motivated to participate in a clear, single-issue, close-to-the-bone area, while integrated management, because of its complexity, seems to invite centralisation. There are clear similarities between the two, though: both IWRM and MSP are ways of managing increasing degrees of variety and variability. In that respect, MSPs are a logical companion to IWRM, reﬂecting the same variety of interconnected social uses and users that IWRM reﬂects (Grigg 1996). As the third leg of the tripod, the catchment level is emerging as the natural unit for water management. Slowly but surely, these adopted dogmas are set to revolutionalize water governance arrangements (regimes), in Europe (under the Framework Directive), South Africa (the 1998 Water Act) and elsewhere. Water resource management has long been a top-down concern of many states, and water authorities followed administrative boundaries. Now that hydrology and ecology rather than territorial administrative or cultural boundaries dictate the management scale, states and regional authorities are forced to work together across boundaries, and treat water bodies as part of ecosystems. Involving stakeholders in decision-making, with the accountability and transparency requirements that brings, these developments necessitate a new phase in an already changing deal between the public, private and civil-society sectors, which, as Malcolm Newson of Newcastle University maintains (Chapter 5), challenges and revolutionises the prior ‘technocratic’ outlook. The catchment as best practice is not without its detractors. Wester and Warner (2002) question its current unquestioned, ‘naturalised’ status. Not only may, as Allan has it, the ‘problemshed’ transcend the scale of the watershed, neither stakeholders nor decision-makers naturally gravitate to this level. Fischhendler and Feitelson (2003) argue that due to the common spatial discrepancy between beneﬁts and costs of cooperation at the basin scale, other special scales are to be advanced in order to offset this discrepancy. Their US-Mexico case presentation includes similar denotations on the importance of issue-linking across river basin borders as Meijerink (1998) does in his dissertation on the multilateral rivers Scheldt and Meuse negotiations.

4

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Fighting or Learning? While nobody disputes the legitimacy of stakeholder participation, the writings on MSPs come from very different worldviews – one in which people change things by cooperative learning (‘cognitive school’), and one in which things only change by changing the power balance (the ‘power school’). These diametrically opposed worldviews are most clearly expressed in the view of cooperation and conﬂict. A conﬂict framework sees negotiations as zero-sum with winners and losers, a cooperation approach sees win-win. On the cooperation side, the cognitive school is interested in whether joint gains can be obtained through learning. Aarts and Van Woerkum (1999) usefully contrast two types of negotiation – distributive and integrative negotiation. Distributive negotiation is antagonistic, interest-based, mainly concerns the cutting of the cake, actors keep their cards close to their chests. Integrative negotiation starts from a commonly perceived challenge, involves ‘baking the cake together’ and joint social learning. The cognitive or Social Learning approach is deeply inﬂuenced by the ideas of Jürgen Habermas, who advocates aiming for an authentic speech situation. The idea is that as stakeholders start talking, a process of learning by doing takes place in which power gaps and institutional hindrances are broken down. The attraction of the Habermasian approach is that it presupposes that through dialogue, perceptions and problem deﬁnitions will change and converge (Poncelet 1998). An aversion to (party) politics and conﬂict informs this particular literature (Hemmati 2002). In a situation of complexity, actors are advised to leave their sectoral perspective behind to develop a shared perspective in a process of reframing (van Woerkum 2002). This requires skilful facilitation – if badly done, a reframing process can of course result in a totally strategic (or expedient) ‘vision’ with a high deal of equiﬁnality (each interpreting the result in highly particular ways), without addressing the actual dilemmas. In a genuine dilemma, each side is defensible from a particular perspective (Hoebeke 2004). The important thing is to bring the dilemmas, the conﬂicts, out into the open and discuss them. A good facilitator puts sufﬁcient time into divergence before aiming for convergence. In fact, it may not be possible to converge and it may be necessary for all to accept a hard-won compromise. But that openness and responsiveness requires a great deal of social trust, something that for example in Perú, as in many other locations, is still developing. Thus, any ‘concertation’2 means a combination of conﬂict, negotiation and, where possible, consensus-seeking. The effect of multi-stakeholder participation, then, is not to depoliticize issues (quite the contrary), but to expand the legitimacy base beyond government, beyond ‘the experts’. The ‘cognitive school’ of MSP sees facilitated social learning as a helpful modality enabling new forms of governance – as IAC Wageningen puts it, ‘between 2 The word ‘concertation’ is not really English, but has taken pride of place in the French and Spanish discourse on roundtables. It has the connotations of ‘concerted action’ or ‘co-ordinated consensus-seeking’.

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5

the extremes of top-down “expert”-driven decision making by government and “letting free markets rule” lies the idea of facilitated social learning’.3 The Århus convention expresses the belief that, in the environmental issue-area, improved access to information and public participation in decision-making will enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions and contributes to the public awareness of environmental issues (UN-ECE 1998). Indeed there are known cases where the stakeholders themselves collect, manage and interpret the information, using a joint information system. Multi-stakeholder platforms may be set up to act as a sounding board rather than a policy-making body. They are like think tanks or focus groups, providing policymakers with ideas and feedback from selected social groups. This arrangement interestingly seems to bring enough beneﬁts to both initiators and consultees. In addition to this outside-in beneﬁt, platforms can help a better spread of ideas (within the platform and inside-out). Communication then may be a vehicle for two-way information/knowledge exchange, joint knowledge building and dissemination. Indeed, Annemiek Verhallen’s Flemish case study (Chapter 6) shows that, when it is clear that the platform is only consultative, stakeholders are happy to give feedback and, crucially, be in the loop about what is going on. Her contribution discusses a platform in the Nete, a sub-basin of the river Scheldt, where 13 stakeholder categories were invited to join in developing a vision. She investigated attendance, adequacy and exchange of information and satisfaction with the process. It should be noted that this was a situation in which savvy, well-educated stakeholder representatives negotiated. Yet it is hard to prove that any joint learning occurred due to participation. While no doubt people learn by doing, i.e. acquire new information and ways of thinking due to their participation, we ﬁnd that the ‘social’, mutual, collaborative aspect, is not necessarily happening. The critical condition here is not only the recognition of interdependence, but also the willingness of all involved to take joint responsibility and learn their way into addressing the issue facing all. Negotiation that looked integrative may turn out to be distributive after all, but also free-riding, opportunism and double agendas are obvious pitfalls. In the Nete case, for example, there was very little social learning in evidence – several actors were listening in, but not really contributing. What Should MSPs Do? Multiple Rationales The deﬁnition of MSP that started the chapter off comes from the prescriptive end – the ideal-type MSP is imbued with a positive value connotation. The quest for preconditions for MSP success is related to the level of expectation and ambition as to what platforms should do. Expectations of MSPs are rather high. From the emerging literature, we take three key strands: MSPs as a mechanism of Alternative Dispute Resolution, for adaptive management and as a vehicle for democratisation and emancipation. 3

www.iac.wur.nl/services/training/index.htm?regular/MSP_seminar.htm

6

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Dealing with Conflict According to Jaspers (2003), a stakeholder platform plays a vital role in conﬂict prevention and conﬂict resolution. Resource conﬂict at different levels continues to ring alarm bells. In the mid-1990s, water discourse brieﬂy became dominated by the literature on water wars. Water, it was claimed, is in crisis (Gleick 1993), and increasing scarcity would lead to violent conﬂict (Starr 1991). This came on top of an already widening post-Cold War security agenda, as new security threats were identiﬁed (Kaplan 1994) in a combination of Malthusian worries about environmental degradation and Hobbesian faith in the ‘strong state’. While Malthusian doomsayers still occasionally make headlines (McLoughlin 2004), the debate between the optimists and pessimists has progressed signiﬁcantly. As Allan (2001) has put it succinctly: the optimists are right but dangerous, the pessimists are wrong but useful. The debate has opened a more serious look into the connection between conﬂicts and scarcity. Intermediate factors between scarcity and violent conﬂict have been identiﬁed: society’s social-institutional resource capital for regulating conﬂict. While international water wars have yet to happen, local water disputes continue to break out. MSPs may be less than suitable in adversative cultures where social changes develop with clashes and jumps – ‘litigation cultures’ such as the United States or Chile – rather than gradual motion. In a traumatised postviolence society like Perú however, and in countries where states are eager to reach out to society like South Africa, the MSP approach as Alternative Dispute Resolution can be a breather, a novel option worth exploring. Both in terrorstricken Perú and anarchic Bolivia, where social trust is low, novel ways of local consensus-building and ﬁne-tuning (concertación) are welcomed, as case studies by María Teresa Oré (Chapter 9) and Nicolas Faysse et al. (Chapter 11) in this volume underscore. For many, the lack of harmony, incompatibility and struggle inherent in conﬂict continues to have a negative connotation. However, our research ﬁnds that MSPs are of necessity political and – especially at the start – often conﬂictive, as participants stake out their territories. ‘Conﬂict’ can range from disagreement to violent war – a word that has been diluted by excessive labelling of local disputes as ‘water wars’. Both critical and cognitive schools, however, perceive conﬂict as essentially healthy, as it brings people’s preferences out in the open. The situations we research are the result of a diversity of needs, interests, perceptions and cultures in the dealing with water resources. Such diversity should not necessarily result in a violent confrontation. Understanding conﬂict as a natural part of social life, within a framework of respect for difference, can be in fact an open window of opportunity for social change. Therefore conﬂict should be understood as something that is not negative or positive in itself and that will occur in every age, culture and space.4 4 Robert Wright (2000) argues conﬂict is ultimately positive, because a sufﬁcient amount of conﬂict produces the necessary level of co-operation needed to survive as a human species.

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Adaptive Management While water wars may not be close at end, it does not change the fact that in many areas of the world, basins are closing, requiring a stressful process of reallocating water resources, necessitating an adaptive water redistribution process away from major guzzlers. This adaptation process brings social dilemmas, which Jiggins and Röling (2004) usefully deﬁne as the unfeasibility or non-existence of an equitable distribution of a resource. As Turton and Ohlsson (1999) note, scarcity can bring a reﬂective process, spawning social and environmental NGOs who demand greater inﬂuence in the decision-making process. MSPs can facilitate such n adaptive process in which actors face a changing environment, realise their common predicament and mutual interdependence in realising solutions and decide to take joint action (Röling 1994). If they see the interdependencies of their stakes in the shared resource, and agree to sit together to negotiate about pressing issues, they may develop the sense of ownership required to manage these issues, and through their collective action manage the common-pool resource in a more sustainable way (Steins and Edwards 1998). Water management presents especially apt examples of the aforementioned social dilemmas. Just like public managers have learned to face up to the inevitable shortcomings in tackling all governance problems,5 water managers are faced with the realization that you cannot eliminate all water risks. The 1990s have seen serious erosion on the claim to the engineerability, or even governability, of the sociopolitical system – most notably Beck’s ‘Risk society’ (1986). Ensuring and allocating sufﬁcient water of acceptable quality for all, in the face of dwindling supply is a complex task indeed. A diversity of different uses and users compete for the same resource (Grigg 1997). Because of the complexity and uncertainty surrounding water management issues, they easily lead to value conﬂicts. This makes water (re)allocation issues ‘wicked’ (intractable) problems (van de Graaf and Hoppe 1992; Fischer 1995). A great many issues can easily be decided: they are straightforward and the evidence for and against is tidy, and people are clear on what they want. Not all water issues are straightforward, exactly because of the different social values people attach to them, not least in light of the resource’s irreplaceability. The great number of recent controversies over water projects attests to the intractable nature of those water issues, and they are likely to be intensiﬁed as the realisation sinks in that an adaptive shift to ‘demand management’ implies tough socio-economic choices (Ohlsson 1998). Stress is the difference between a challenge and coping capacity – to ease the stress, one either needs to reduce the stress or increase the capacity for coping, that is, tap as many capabilities as possible. Similarly, if governability is the ratio of challenges to capabilities (cf. Kooiman 1993) there are two sides to the equation. Not only can we seek to reduce challenges, we can also seek to enhance capabilities. 5 In the discipline of Public Administration, a similar systemic approach became popular in the 1990s to cope with complexity in response to a sense of ungovernability of socio-political problems (e.g. Kooiman 1993). The ‘limits to governability’ are increasingly recognised.

8

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Because the stakeholders represent different partial interests, a wider spectrum of water management issues at basin level will be covered. This may facilitate tradeoffs, package deals and win-win situations that promote a more integrated approach than a single-issue platform would. Geldof (2004), for example, shows that in participatory replanning processes in urban areas solving non-water issues such as trafﬁc congestion can help raise the visibility of water management and increase commitment to it. Bringing in a variety of actors, thus increasing feedback within the system, might help improve the quality of system governance, increasing the range of options, opening up a ﬂexible repertoire. Democratisation and Empowerment There is a need for profound change in the way water is managed if we are to achieve any sense of sustainable water use in the near future. The empowerment of people at the local level to manage their water resources – the ‘democratization’ of water management – is essential (2nd World Water Forum in The Hague, March 2000).

MSPs are highly compatible with so-called DIPs (Deliberative and Inclusionary Processes) seek to ‘democratise democracy’, increasing the range of alternatives and scope of action by relying more on an argumentative turn (Bloomﬁeld et al. 1998). The inclusion of disenfranchised groups and perspectives is pivotal in this process. MSPs represent a particular approach to democracy. By giving allocated seats to different groups rather than majority vote, and making room for extensive deliberation, the idea is to give voice to weaker or smaller interests that would otherwise be outvoted. This is especially promising in deeply divided areas or societies, where one group dominates in number and/or power positions. Apart from or additional to water-use sectors or the nine ‘major groups’ identiﬁed in the Rio Summit of 1992, it could also be relevant to include different ethnic, linguistic, cultural or age groups (Warner and Simpungwe 2003), while in South Asian panchayats, women are given a speciﬁc quota. Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001) and Leroy (2002) have called attention to problems of inequality in platforms, which we shall highlight below. Action-oriented researchers however see it the other way round: unequal access to scarce resources is a key rationale for setting up platforms. They feel mobilising stakeholders can be an important factor in bringing about social change, wresting greater control over water resources from the hands of the powerful. Platforms can promote the emancipation of the previously powerless, the underprivileged, the disenfranchised. In such a case the MSP may start out as an alliance of multiple non-powerful actors seeking reform, co-opting the powers that be in the course of time. A multi-stakeholder process may empower those participants who are equipped to negotiate and take advantage of their voice and of new information. But marginal groups may well be badly organised and easily co-opted or bribed. The poorest may not participate, because their opportunity costs are too steep. An especially serious problem occurs when marginalized stakeholders remain unheard and even stand to lose from the consultation process. Thus, participatory processes can actually disempower groups (Edwards and Wollenberg 2001). As Bruce Currie-Alder

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maintains in his contribution (Chapter 15), MSPs for participatory natural resource management (e.g. Christie et al. 2000) can in fact degenerate into a mechanism for resource capture if responsibilities are not truly shared. In conﬂictive settings, what may look like consociational arrangements may in fact be hegemonic control on the part of a state or social elite (Lustic 1997). As noted by Faysse et al in this book, to enable change, empowerment may well be needed outside as much as inside the MSP context. An inventory what MSPs should do turns out to be all things to all people: • • •

Conﬂict resolution Adaptive water management Democratization and empowerment

Prevent violence Prevent environmental degradation Equity

Yet, MSPs for Integrated Catchment Management do not necessarily serve all three sets of goals. The best result for sustainable resource management and integrated management does not necessarily have the best social outcome given existing power differences. Conversely, when many actors bring their strategies and power positions to bear, to bend the outcome in their direction, the outcome may be a monster and water management may deteriorate rather than improve. As the Africans say, it does not matter to the grass whether elephants ﬁght or mate on it – it suffers anyway. The gain will then be political (the prevention of violent conﬂict) rather than serve environmental or social goals. For a New Governance Deal Deﬂating expectations may be needed not just to prevent disappointment on the part of the stakeholders, but also on behalf of the donors and sponsors – especially now that multi-stakeholder participation is well on its way to becoming a conditionality. In part in response to successful NGO protests against interventions such as the construction of large dams and extensive ﬂood protection schemes – skilfully playing the international media and embarrassing donors. The World Bank, ADB and IADB’s policies now routinely call for participatory processes, and are nudging closer to requiring participation as a conditionality for new loans, as exempliﬁed by the grudging creation of the CONIAG national roundtable after the Cochabamba war (Warner 2004) The interest of multilateral donor institutions in participation is part of their emphasis on ‘good governance’ thinking (World Bank 2000). The rediscovery of civil society replaces state-led and market-led models which, on their own, fail at providing adequate water management. This integrates civil society in a new, more complex governance arrangement of public, private and civil-society governance (Kooiman 1993), widening the range of options in dealing with water issues (Warner 2002). In exchange for taking more responsibilities, civil society actors are given a greater voice in the management of the resource base they take a stake in. In this context, Lankford and Hepworth (2006), among others, advocates a distributed, decentralised rather than top-down mode of basin governance.

10

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Resource Management and at catchment level seeks to accommodate the complexity of uses, the diversity of users and the dynamics of uncertainty and change: Challenge/Opportunity

The 3 ‘u’s

Goal

Complexity of Diversity of

Uses Users

Dynamics due to

Uncertainty and change

IWRM Multi-Stakeholder Participation Adaptive Management

In terms of Kooiman (1993, 1997), the governance challenges are complexity, diversity and dynamics: present-day resource management throws up complexity of uses and linkages, a diversity of actions, a dynamic physical and policy environment creating uncertainty. These are played out in different modalities of governance: topdown intervention, comanagement (network management) and self-governance. Creative governance (Kooiman 2000) is, in this context, the way these modalities are crafted together tapping the strength of each, in response to the failure of government-only or market-only approaches. Even where formal government has broken down, hitherto unrecognised systems are in place that achieve remarkable feats – as Long stresses (2001), social actors continuously participate in altering their social context, whether or not they are invited to do so in a bounded context. Norman Uphoff (1992) and Elinor Ostrom (1990) found impressive examples of participatory self-organisation in resource management. Evidence from many different contexts has shown that stakeholders are perfectly capable of working together in regulating access to, allocation of and control over resources (Ostrom 1990). This rediscovery of civil society also cross-links with the New Public Management (Osbourne 1992) which promoted the introduction of business management tools in the running of public sector, shedding public functions. This not only recast government as an enterprise, but also the citizen as a calculating, critical, savvy client judging the public sector by its outputs. The client however is increasingly expected to take co-responsibility for resource management in a new governance arrangement. The government still tends to be the leading actor, though – it is not always decisive enough in assuming that leadership. Unpacking MSPs What is a multi-stakeholder platform? Let us unpack the three constitutive elements of the compound; ‘multi’, ‘stakeholder’ and ‘platform: Stakeholder... The word ‘stakeholder’ itself is of recent vintage. In issues of corporate governance, it is increasingly realised that apart from the (often shortterm) interests of shareholders, other interests such as employees, suppliers, the community and the environment should be taken into account if the company is to

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be legitimate and sustainable (sources). Anthony Giddens coined the ‘stakeholder society’ as a (‘Third’) way of extending this concept to the way that nations should be governed. Society is thus represented as an enterprise, with all the risk-taking, proﬁt and loss that involves, rather than a secure living environment. Stakeholders are individuals, groups or institutions that are concerned with, or have an interest in the water resources and their management (World Bank 2003). They include all those who affect and/or are affected by the policies, decisions, and actions of the system (Grimble et al. 1995). That means not only direct water users but those affected by (waste)water management. They include those involved in water resource development, management and planning, including public-sector agencies, private-sector organisations and NGOs and external (such as donor) agencies. Multi... The ‘multi’ in MSP does not refer to ‘multiple stakes’ but to the diversity of identities of stakeholders. The ‘multi’, then, is contrasted with ‘single-sector’ forms of interaction as practised in, e.g., Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM). PIM is nominally concerned with agriculture, not with ﬁsheries, industry, navigation or urban water uses – although PIM may indeed seek to represent different interest within agriculture – high-, mid- and lowland farmers, or smallholders and latifundists – or allocate special voice to the traditionally disenfranchised such as landless or women. Stakeholders still tend to be solely deﬁned in terms of economic identity groups while it would make sense to assign stakeholdership to cultural, religious or other identities, where these identities are salient, in the tradition of consociationalism (Lijphart 1971). Unrepresented interests may also ﬁnd their way through coopting formally sanctioned identities where the platform’s bye-laws provide strict barriers to (later) entry. For example, barriers to entry to the executive boards of Dutch waterschappen are high – it would take a statutory change to allow a seat for a new stakeholder group – which forces environmental groups to co-opt one of the incumbent stakeholder groups. But barriers may be more subtle: as Warner and Simpungwe (2003) have noted on the basis of Simpungwe’s experience with South African MSPs that platforms are unlikely to remain captivating to the rural poor when the meetings are held in urban block ofﬁces with lots of people in suits toting laptops, or when the local language is not understood. Physical and cultural accessibility of the participatory process is therefore graded. In terms of number, to deserve the ‘multi’ preﬁx, we would expect more than two, three interests to be represented in the platform. We would also expect different levels to be represented (e.g. local government and state government) as both impact on the catchment’s management, at the strategic and operational level. A rough measure of the ‘multi’-inclusiveness of MSPs is whether state, civil-society and private-sector actors at several levels are represented. However, if this means that three minority interests at three levels getting together equals an MSP, perhaps we are on the wrong track. We have to look at actor relevance and roles within the network comprising MSPs as well. Role descriptions such as proposed by Moench et al. (2000) can be useful in this respect. Moench et al. distinguish ‘managers’ from ‘auditors’ who, as they rarely hold a great direct stake in the resource itself, can facilitate or support bargaining

12

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

between user interests. Likewise, Gavin and Pinder (1995) identify primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are those who are ultimately affected, i.e. who expect to beneﬁt from or be adversely affected by the intervention; secondary stakeholders: those with some intermediary role. Note however that even with the best of intentions, it may not be possible for the facilitator to avoid powerplay due to structural power differences, i.e. ‘level the playing ﬁeld’. Platform... Finally, a ‘platform’ is a forum for negotiation. The word ‘platform’ suggests that this joint action takes place on a raised but level playing ﬁeld. Raised, to be able to step out of sectoral issues and take a broader overview of the issues, while the raised surface also connotes the conspicuous nature of MSPs, which act in the public space and are therefore open to public scrutiny. Level, in the sense that the stakeholders (ideally) have (or come to a situation of) equal rights and power balance (Den Hond 2003). The assumption of a level playing ﬁeld is one of the most conspicuous ﬂaws in MSP thinking given the obvious power gaps, or indeed politics, between the participating actors (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). Participation and Politics Power Sharing for Real? The present book involves many cases which explicitly take the political aspect into account – within the platform and in its broader environment. Since water policy in most countries is primarily in the hands of the state and mostly the initiator of a water forum is the public sector, the level of participation in fact denotes the level of power sharing (Bruns 2003). One important political reality is that states do not much like sharing power. For all the sea changes in public management in response to state overload and policy failures – working with societal actors, network management in which the state is a primus inter paris – many states are still not relinquishing much of their power primacy. Governments have certain exclusive resources at their disposal: sizeable budgets and personnel, special powers, access to the mass media, a monopoly on the use of force and democratic legitimation. Access to these resources generally means that governments have considerable power in particular to deﬁne the strategic space of any other actor. ‘Real participation’ requires devolving mandates down to the lowest practicable level (cf. the Dublin Principles of 1992) and giving people the right to say ‘no’ to interventions – even if they make perfect sense technically, economically and environmentally. Rather than preparing for the possibility of a ‘no’, agencies often prefer a controlled participatory processes that seeks to change people’s minds about a controversial issue – in other words, the initiators take a ‘selling approach’ to participation, hearing ‘participation’ as the magic word that will ‘create’ a support base for acceptance of new policies and interventions such as water pricing. as tends to be the rationale for basin committees in Brazil (Brannstrom 2004; Mostertman

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2005) and new infrastructure such as dams in Gujarat and Maharashtra, India (Rajput 2002). While opponents may be vocal about the consequences of the intervention, they are not fundamentally opposed to the principle, and did not feel it worth their while to frustrate the process. However if the initiating party seeks to keep control of the process, while ofﬂoading some of the less desired tasks, such ‘selling’ is unlikely to be effective. Bangladesh is a striking example of a state that is very happy to devolve (ofﬂoad) responsibility for the operation and maintenance of decrepit water infrastructure onto users themselves, who by taking charge of operation and maintenance are expected to develop a sense of ownership. However, the latter have no choice in the matter, or on the budget. As a form of communicative governance – learning together – MSPs can increase understanding and acceptance of new ideas and policies. But communication experts will tell you that you cannot change people’s attitudes and behaviour if they are fundamentally unhappy with the policy (e.g. Aarts and van Woerkum 2000). You cannot ‘sell’ an unpopular plan. If the starting point cannot be subject to discussion, strong opponents will question the legitimacy of the process itself (second-order conﬂict). Rather more successful MSP processes are especially found in planning and visioning processes, convocated by the government, where plans for the future may be at a less detailed stage, with a discrete number of sessions and enough room for adaptation of plans. The philosophy of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms has deep roots in the Dutch culture of consensus seeking, emphasising the need to involve minorities. That is not so surprising giving its history of accommodating interests in deeply divided society by way of ‘poldering’ between farmers and ‘consociationalism’ between elites. (Lijphart 1971; Warner and Simpungwe 2003). But Jiggins, Röling and van Slobbe’s work (2002, also Jiggins and Röling 2004) ﬂags some important pitfalls of Dutch ‘poldering’: formal platforms with ofﬁcial stakeholders can lead to endless discussion, especially where participants have conﬂicting compensation structures. Moreover, consensus seeking may not ﬁt every situation or culture. Seeking general consensus, to prevent surprises, means that the game may draw on forever. The Dutch experience is like a supertanker. Goals may change in response to the feedbacks during the process. The representatives may start to bond with their negotiation partners and lose touch with their constituency, which may disown them or their results at the negotiation table. In Holland, environmental groups that were heavily involved in so-called ROM projects (Glasbergen 1995) have sometimes pulled out for this reason. In many instances of top-down MSPs, the government as network manager presents itself as facilitator and/or secretary, seeking to co-opt all stakeholders. In South Africa the state seems quite willing to leave more political space to citizens. The joint role of initiator and facilitator however has its drawbacks, as Eliab Simpungwe, Bert Raven and Pieter Waalewijn (Chapter 12) show in their South African case. The role conﬂict of a government seeking to keep water management governable clashes with the neutrality and leadership required of a facilitator. To devolve more power to society, you need both a willing government and an active, well-developed civil society. This is not a universal given. Kai Wegerich

14

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

(Chapter 14) makes a convincing argument why MSP-type dialogues are unlikely to even emerge in Uzbekistan. By the example of the province of Khorezm, Wegerich shows that since independence, the state’s inﬂuence on decision making over water allocation has grown rather than been reduced, while civil society is highly underdeveloped. A new comanagement arrangement is not so likely in such circumstances. Managing the Catchment Level: Is There a Catch? The importance of integrated water management at catchment level is now almost a truism in water policy circles. The underlying idea is that water is so fundamental to life that we should live our lives in harmony with these natural boundaries (Franks 2004). Integrated Catchment Management in this way provides us with a beacon, as well as a well-delimited focus for research. Our concern with MSPs for Integrated Catchment Management is inspired by the European Water Framework Directive of 2000 (Directive no. 200/60/EG), which postulates the need for integrated water management, with due stakeholder participation, with the catchment as the deﬁning unit. River basins are the management units, their management should involve surface, ground- and wastewater and to the extent that they are transboundary the European member states have to cooperate in the management of such river basin areas. Since river basins do not respect administrative boundaries, we can expect many bigger and smaller transboundary MSPs in Europe in the years to come. A famous example, often hailed as a success, is the Lerma-Chapala river basin council, which covers a host of stakeholder groups including multiple Mexican states. Philippus Wester, Jaime Hoogesteger van Dijk and Hans Paters (Chapter 10) however note that in the eyes of many the river basin council has led to more conﬂicts rather than to conﬂict resolution. They argue that the continued involvement of the federal government is both a key to the longevity and to the weakness of this MSP. While the Lerma-Chapala RBC seeks to accommodate different states within a federal context, collaboration across sovereign countries is even harder. Indeed, at the international level, international water conﬂicts are the headline-grabbing focus of water management at catchment level. Wolf (1995) showed that international water treaties far outnumber violent disputes, yet the substance of these treaties leaves much to be desired. Even commissions regulating international rivers shared by friendly states often cooperate as little as possible. In this context, the space for stakeholder involvement in transboundary stakeholder platforms seems an uphill battle. Devolving power to lower-level actors is hard enough for states, delegating power to trans- and international actors proves out to be even harder. Sovereignty is sacrosanct both with respect to societal actors and other nations. However, on special occasions a multi-stakeholder dialogue can be an interesting ‘Track Two’ activity.6 6 The term ‘Track Two’ refers to informal, unofﬁcial interaction outside the formal governmental power structure, providing the means for historically conﬂicting groups to improve communication and gain a better understanding of each other’s point of view. In so

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Some Track-Two partnerships were in fact concluded or formulated during the 2002 World Summit in Johannesburg, which explicitly promoted voluntary partnerships. Leo Santbergen’s study of the Zwin Commission (Chapter 7) is emblematic of both the usefulness and rarity of Track Two processes – like a may ﬂy, the Commission only showed in exceptional political ‘weather conditions’, not so much to solve but to take the pressure off a policy crisis. Going beyond Track-Two, MSP processes can be relevant at multiple levels of social interaction as John Dore (Chapter 13) shows in his chapter on multi-stakeholder initiatives in the Mekong. They give examples of opportunities and realities of MSPs on four separate Tracks known in international informal diplomacy. Next to ofﬁcial Mekong River Commission processes, he sees the potential of MSPs in Track-Two, Track-Three and even Track-Four processes, with promising initiatives but daunting, formidable political realities. Results Needed... This book approaches MSPs as a multi-legged beast, often mentioned in tales, but as yet rarely spotted in broad daylight. Our research is about why these platforms in water management are promoted, whether they indeed emerge and how they are functioning. MSPs do not solve problems in themselves, and are not going to function in any context, for any problem. The water MSP case studies from around the world show achievements and limitations of the concept. As noted above, not all ‘habitats’ are conducive for the beasts to thrive in. We have attempted to frame the analysis by developing a set of assessment indicators, introduced in Chapter 2, organised by the Mitchellian triad of process, context and outcome. The contributions by Dore, Faysse and CurrieAlder provide relevant ‘MSP desirables’ that we draw on as we evaluate the utility of our own indicators in the Conclusion, which also provides a questionnaire for MSP evaluation. In our concluding chapter (Chapter 16) these are tied together in a ‘mixed model’ of ﬁghting and learning. The examples, while illustrative rather than exhaustive, show that while MSPs are an exciting and popular idea, they are not a panacea. According to van der Veen (2004) there are three ways of arriving at an outcome: force (the prerogative of the state), trade (the market) and deliberation (civil society). Currently, dialogue is enthusiastically embraced in the water world. But is anyone listening? Without a mandate, there is no obligation to do anything with the outcome of all the talk. Without an audience, MSPs are dialogues of the deaf, and if too many fruitless MSP processes are being set up, MSPs as a new institutional species may well join the ranks of the red herring, the paper tiger, the dodo and the white elephant. One the ﬁrst amendments the MSP-ICM research group made to the working deﬁnition of MSPs was therefore to include an action component, to avoid the danger of MSP turning into a talking shop (although we qualiﬁed this later, see

doing, it reduces anger, fear or tension, and facilitates the resolution of substantive conﬂicts. (http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two)

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the Conclusions chapter of the present volume). Management books on innovation suggest you need quick wins to carry the revolution through. For its participants not to lose interest MSPs need to produce ‘food on the table’. The saying can be taken quite literally for the poor – to the hungry man, ‘the beauty of the beast is in the pot’.7 References Beck, U. (1986), Die Risikengesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. Bindraban, P. (2004), ‘Water voor voedsel of natuur, of voor beide? Mondiaal vraagstuk vergt fundamenteel technologische oplossingen’, Spil 207–208, 5–8. Bloomfield, D., Collins, K., Fry, C. and Munton, R. (1998), ‘Deliberative and Inclusionary Processes: Their Contributions to Environmental Governance’, Paper presented at the first ESRC ‘DIPs in Environmental Decision-making’ seminar, London, 17 December 1998. Bond, P. (2002), Unsustainable South Africa: Environment, Development and Social Protest, University of Natal Press, Scottsville. Brannstrom, C. (2004), ‘Decentralizing Water Resources Management in Brazil’, European Journal of Development Research (special issue), 16(1), 214–234. Bruns, B. (2003), ‘Water Tenure Reform: Developing an Extended Ladder of Participation’. Paper read at Politics of the Commons: Articulating Development and Strengthening Local Practices, at Chiang Mai, Thailand, July 11–14, 2003. Checkland, P. and Holwell, S. (1998), Information, systems and information systems, Wiley, Chichester. Christie, P. et al. (2000), Taking care of what we have. Participatory Natural Resource Management on the Caribbean Coast of Nicaragua, IDRC/CIDCA 2000. Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (2001), Participation, The New Tyranny?, Zed Books, London. Edmunds, D. and Wollenberg, E. (2002), Disadvantaged Groups in MultiStakeholder Negotiations, CIFOR report, www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_ files/Strategic_Negotiation_report.pdf Franks, T. (2004), ‘Water Governance – what is the consensus?’, Paper prepared for the ESRC-funded seminar on The Water Consensus – Identifying the gaps, Bradford Centre for International Development, Bradford University, 18–19 November, http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bcid/seminar/water/seminar1/papers/Franks_Water_ Governance_04_11_15.pdf Gavin, T. and Pinder, C. (2001), Impact Assessment and Project Management Cycle, IDPM, University of Manchester, UK, www.enterprise-impact.org.uk/word-files/ stakeholderanalysis.doc Geldof, G. D. (2004), Omgaan met complexiteit bij integraal waterbeheer. Op weg naar interactieve uitvoering. Edited PhD thesis, Tauw, Deventer. Glasbergen, P. (ed.) (1995), Milieubeleid, VUGA, The Hague. Gleick, P. H. (ed.) (1993), Water in Crisis. A Guide to the World’s Freshwater 7

African saying quoted in Bindraban 2004.

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Resources, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Grimble, R., Chan, M-K., Aglionby, J. and Quan, J. (1995), Trees and trade-offs: a stakeholder approach to natural resource management. Gatekeeper Series No. 52. London, International Institute for Environment and Development. Grigg, N.S. (1996), Water Resources Management. Principles, Regulations, and Cases, McGraw-Hill, New York. Gudykunst, W. B. and Kim, Y. Y. (1992), Communicating with strangers: An approach to intercultural communication, McGraw-Hill, New York. Gleick, J. (1988), Chaos. Making a New Science, Heinemann. Hemmati, M. (2002), Multi-Stakeholder Processes for Governance and Sustainability – Beyond Deadlock and Conflict, Earthscan, London. Hoebeke, L. (2004), ‘Dilemmas and paradoxes in organizing change processes: a critical reflection’, in J. Boonstra (ed.), Management of organizational change and learning, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester. Homer-Dixon, T. F. and Percival, V. (1996), Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: Briefing Book. Population and Sustainable Development Project, American Association for the Advancement of Science & University of Toronto. Jaspers, F. G. W. (2003), ‘Institutional arrangements for integrated river basin management’, Water Policy 5, 77–90. Jiggins, J., Röling, N., van Slobbe, E. (2002), Social Learning in Relation to Integrated Water Management at Catchment Scale (SLIM), The Netherlands Team’s Theoretical Framework, Open University, Milton Keynes. Jiggins, J. and Röling, N. (2004), Key informant studies II: water conservation project in North Brabant and Limburg (2nd Generation project), SLIM (Social Learning for Integrated Management and Sustainable Use of Water at Catchment Scale) Case Study Monograph 2b. Kaplan, R.D. (1994), ‘The Coming Anarchy’, Atlantic Monthly, February. Kickert, W. J. M. (1993), ‘Complexity, governance and dynamics: conceptual explorations of public network management’, in J. Kooiman (ed.), Modern Governance, London: SAGE, 191–204. Kooiman, J. et al. (2000), Creative Governance, Ashgate, Aldershot. Lankford, B. A. and Hepworth, N. (2006), The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Centralised versus Decentralised River Basin Management. Workshop 4: ‘Benefits and Responsibilities of Decentralised and Centralised Approaches for Management of Water and Wastewater’. World Water Week 2006. Stockholm International Water Institute. Leroy, P. (2002), ‘Environmental politics, participation and political inequality’, Europaea, 8 (1–2): 153–167. Lijphart, A. (1971), ‘Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration’, Canadian Journal of Political Scence, iv (March), 9. Lustick, I. (1997), ‘Lijphart, Lakatos, and consociationalism’, World Politics, 50 (1), pp. 88–117. Manzungu, E. (2001), ‘More than a headcount: towards strategic stakeholder representation in river basin management in South Africa and Zimbabwe’. Paper presented at the 2nd WARFSA/WaterNet Symposium: Integrated Water Resources Management: Theory, Practice, Cases; Cape Town, October.

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McLaughlin, C., (1996), ‘The multi-stakeholder dialogue approach to consensus building’, www.visionary/lead.org/multis.htm, 1996. McLoughlin (2004), ‘Scienctists Say Risk of Water Wars Rising’, http://www. planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/26728/story.htm. Meijerink, S. V. (1998), Conflict and cooperation on the Scheldt River Basin. Dissertation, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands. Moreyra, A. and Warner, J. (2004), ‘La gestion participativa de cuencas en la practica: el caso de la Comunidad. Usuarios del arroyo Trahunco, San Martin de los Andes, Patagonia, Argentina’, in Jeroen Warner and Alejandra Moreyra (eds), Conflictos y Participacion. Uso Multiple del Agua, Nordan, Montevideo, 151–166. Mostertman, I. (2005), ‘Paying for the commons: an investigation into a participatory decision making process in implementing a bulk water pricing system in the Paraiba do Sul river basin’, MSc thesis, Irirgation and Water Engineering Group, Wageningen University. Oré, M. T. (2004), ‘Yakunchik: Un mecanismo de concertación después de la violencia’, in Jeroen Warner and Alejandra Moreyra (eds), Conflictos y Participación. Uso Multiple del Agua, Nordan, Montevideo, 121–139. Poncelet, E. C. (1998), ‘A Kiss Here and a Kiss There: Conflict and Non-Confrontation in a Multi-Stakeholder Environmental Partnership in Belgium’. Presented at ‘Crossing Boundaries’, the 7th annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10–14, 1998. http://www.indiana.edu/~iascp/abstracts/474.html. Rajput, S. (2002), ‘Emergence, functioning and the impact of (multi)-stakeholder platforms in Western India: An institutional inquiry in river basin management. A Research proposal’. http://www.dow.wau.nl/msp/content/uk/india/articles/ Research%20proposal%20S.%20Rajput.doc. Ramirez, R. (1999), ‘Stakeholder Analysis and Conflict Management’, Chapter 5 in D. Buckles (ed.), Cultivating Peace: Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management, The International Development Research Center and The World Bank, Ottowa. Röling, N. and Woodhill, J. (2001), Background Document for Dialogue on Water, Food and Environment: National and Basin Dialogue Design Workshop. Workshop on national and basin level dialogue, Bonn, December 1 and 2. Shannon, M. A. (2003), ‘Collaboration and Communication in NFPs – Challenges for the Future’, in Glueck P. and Voitleithner, J. (eds) NPF Research: its Retrospect and Outlook. Proceedings of the COST action. National Forest Programmes in a European Context. Seminar, Vienna, 15–16 September, Publication Series of the Institute of Forest Sector Policy and Economics, Vol. 52. Starr, J. (1991) ‘Water Wars’, Foreign Policy, Spring, pp. 17–36. Steins, N. A. and Edwards, V. M. (1998), ‘Platforms for Collective Action in Multiple-Use CPRs’, Paper Presented at ‘Crossing Boundaries’, the seventh annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10–14, http://www.indiana. edu/~iascp/abstracts/612.html. UN-ECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) (1998), Århus Convention www.unece.org/env/pp/.

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Uphoff, N. (1992), Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science, Cornell University Press. Vanderwal, J. (1999), Scientific Knowledge, Lay Knowledge and Public Participation: Environmental Restoration of Hydropower Impacted Rivers, MSc thesis, SCARP, Canada. www.interchange.ubc.ca/plan/thesis/vanderwal. Warner, J., Hilhorst, D. and Waalewijn, P. (2003), ‘Public Participation in DisasterProne Watersheds: A time for Multi-Stakeholder Platforms?’, Disaster Sites, No. 6, Disaster Studies Group, Wageningen University. Warner, J. F. and Simpungwe, E. (2003), ‘Stakeholder participation in South Africa: Power to the people?’, Paper presented at the 2nd International Symposium on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM): Towards Sustainable Water Utilization in the 21st Century, ICWRS/IAHS, Stellenbosch, Western Cape, South Africa, 22–24 January 2003. Warner, J. and Verhallen, A. (2005), ‘Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management: Towards a comparative typology’, in Gössling, T., Jansen, R. J. G. and Oerlemans, L. A. G. (eds), Coalitions and Collisions, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen. Warner, J. (2005), ‘Multi-Stakeholder Platforms: Integrating Society in Water Resource Management?’, Ambiente e Sociedade, 8 (2) 17–28. Warner, J. (2006), ‘More Sustainable Participation? Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Resource Management’, International Journal for Water Resources Development, March 2006, 22 (1): 15–35. Warner, J. and Oré, M. T. (2006), ‘El Niño platforms: participatory disaster response in Perú’, Disasters, 30(1), March 2006, 102–117. Wester, Ph. and Warner, J. (2002), ‘River basin management reconsidered’, in A. Turton and R. Henwood (eds), Hydro-politics in the developing world – A southern African perspective, Pretoria: African Water Issues Research Unit, Ch. 4. Wolf, A. T. (1995), Hydropolitics along the Jordan River: Scarce Water and its Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, United Nations University Press, Tokyo. Wright, R. (2000), Nonzero. History, evolution and human co-operation, Abacus (Little, Brown and Co.): London.

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Chapter 2

The Nature of the Beast: Towards a Comparative MSP Typology Jeroen Warner and Annemiek Verhallen

Introduction: Is It a Bird? Is It a Plane? Piecing together the parts introduced in Chapter 1 results in a photoﬁt of a presumed, but highly elusive phenomenon. Like a biologist we are pursuing a (potential) new species, knowing that the jungle we are about to enter harbours an exciting breed, but we are not sure whether it walks or ﬂies, preys on cadavers or forages on clover, whether it has two heads and six legs or slithers through the long grass like a snake. It is not even clear whether that species is a fascinating mirage like the Terrible Snowman or the Loch Ness monster; of if it is just a workaday bug or toad, of interest to zoologists only. We found that the deﬁnition of MSP can be stretched so as to include many varieties of beasts, to the point one may wonder if we are still talking about the same animal. From a research perspective, we should deﬁne what a ‘proper’ MSPs would be like, an ideal type at the far end of multiple continua. As we infer from the literature and debate, genuine MSPs represent multiple, relevant identities, facilitate ‘real’ negotiation and generate ‘real’ outputs. Not all MSPs are set up to do this, and in fact they may serve quite different goals. But the normative ideal provides a strong legitimising impetus for the establishment of MSP-type networks. Researching the Beast in itself can teach us about the workings and behaviour of the whole and its parts, but it won’t tell us much about its chances of survival. A structuralist approach helps us understand the niche, the role the Beast comes to occupy in the organisational ﬁeld as a whole, which then impacts on the expected longevity of the Beast. An MSP can only function in interaction with its local institutional ecosystem – the legal-administrative context, its resources and mandate, its competitors and territory. Whether the initiative, once started, persists, and in what form, depends both on the constitution of the Beast (is it strong, adaptive, aggressive?) and its environment (is it enabling, volatile, competitive?). Its ‘energy level’ is important, as any ﬂedgling organism needs great dynamism to grow, to earn respect, a territory and a mandate to qualify as a player. The Beast would then take on more and more ‘pure’ MSP characteristics. A dynamic approach also highlights that to maintain its niche, an MSP may slowly mutate into something else. So far the MSPs have not been described and studied very well as a new type of institutional ‘beast’, let alone the kind of ‘habitat’ it will thrive in. In the course of the MSP-ICM project, we have developed a typology, to create some order

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but also to understand contextual success and failure factors for multi-stakeholder processes. Thanks to the project, we could draw on international experiences gained with multi-stakeholder process in the water sector in ‘North’ (Western Europe) and ‘South’ (South Asia, Southern Africa and Latin America). Nine dimensions were identiﬁed, preliminarily to gauge the performance of participatory processes in terms of context, content and structure. It is expected that a good score on these dimensions can serve as a ‘birth certiﬁcate’ to help identify able the development of an MSP. History Matters: MSP Dynamics The central question of the MSP-ICM project interrogated the evolution, functioning and sustainability of MSPs. Given this research brief, it is also advisable to incorporate a dynamic element in the analysis. A constellation may be moving towards or away from the ‘ideal-type’ MSP. A developing MSP (an ‘MSP process’) would then shift appreciably to the right on many indicators. Its degree of MSP-ness may grow or fall, which we may indicate by an arrow pointing left-or rightward on the continua. Of course there is always the possibility of overshooting, such as where the number of involved stakeholders is so great that the result is a fragmented constellation. Especially in the absence of a regulatory environment, organisations can be usurped (captured) by one or more stakeholders, looking for the beneﬁts organisations can bring: jobs, prestige, resources, power. The Beast can turn into a blood-sucking Frankenstein or into a harmless Bambi. It cannot be assumed a priori that platforms will or should endure. As Röling and Woodhill (2001) have noted, a ‘one-shot’ platform may serve its purpose, while an institutionalised forum with great longevity may have lost is teeth and survive only on an artiﬁcial life support. Also, institutional ecology reminds us we cannot assume that an MSP will in fact do – or keep doing – what it says on the tin. Thus we need to follow an MSP through time to see whether they still conform to originally stipulated tasks, for the organisation as well as for individuals. As a phenomenon that is developing as we speak, with no certain longevity, all we can do is take snapshots in time. An in-depth description of the developmental path can yield indicative pointers of triggers and milestones. To contextualize this dynamics, we may place the developmental life cycle of the MSP itself, in the context of the life cycle of its habitat, that is, the relevant era of water management. Provenance: Indigenous and Introduced Species The ‘beast’ metaphor suggests that the Beast can be indigenous as well as introduced by (domestic or foreign) actors outside the habitat. The increasing currency of Stakeholder Dialogues in the international arena is likely to promote the introduction, reformation or reformulation (relabelling) of participatory platforms into MSP where they were not in evidence before – in exactly the same way as Participatory Irrigation Management was (and still is) introduced in countries. Donors, NGOs and

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some states are now keen to fund and facilitate MSPs. Where they are the result of conditionality tied up with loans or a state’s own efforts, they are a new or newly introduced species in an environment that is not necessarily friendly. Where MSPs are introduced by the state or a donor, co-opting the grassroots proves a difﬁcult task. Conversely, where MSP initiatives are bottom-up, it may be difﬁcult to co-opt the public and private sectors, for whom joining may pose a greater risk than staying out. In South Africa, stakeholder fora are now stipulated by law, but early signs show that their approval is a tortuous application process. This means that the survival of the new species currently introduced in a habitat that has seen rapid change itself is by no means certain. On the upside, the institutional environment in South Africa still seems imbued with energy and legitimacy, on the downside, it can easily be bogged down in bureaucracy and patronage. There is a scenario of expectations, but the script is not very detailed, so there is no telling how the co-opted actors, supposed to make the story work, will behave. While the habitat may be supportive, providing food (resource) and shelter, internal (bottom-up) legitimacy may be low. In such a case, it is important to see whether the MSP develops substance so that its participants develop ownership. Finally, the external institutional environment for MSPs may be limiting or enabling. Usually the ﬁeld had been divided up before the new actor got on the scene. This means that some actors will expect to lose some of their power and resist the new actor who may be regarded as competing for the same resources and niche or territory. Other actors may seek to ofﬂoad some of their responsibility load onto the new actor, without giving it a real mandate and meaningful resources to make and implement autonomous decisions. The ofﬁcial mandate, then, may be greater or smaller than the actual room for manoeuvre. Developing a Typology Above, we noted that in the different case study areas (‘habitats’) we come across a variety of life forms (‘beasts’) that somehow ﬁnd themselves lumped under the genus ‘platforms’. Platforms are the result of interrelations among different social actors, embedded in different social and political contexts and therefore there is no room for normative deﬁnitions on how they must be structured or which methodology is the best for their functioning. There is no such thing as a ‘standard MSP’. Are there even indeed sufﬁcient commonalities to warrant a comparison? Part of our research project has been about developing a context-independent typology of platform characteristics to enable such a comparison, to help determine the degree of MSP-ness, predict platform strengths and weaknesses, and identify opportunities for change and dos and don’ts. For this, we start from an ‘ideal-type’ dialogue and see how the participatory process under scrutiny compares, whether it moves towards it or away from it. Inspired by Mitchell’s work, we focus on process, content and context of multistakeholder platforms. The nine dimensions in Figure 2.1 build on and advance on that framework. Next, we will brieﬂy discuss these dimensions one by one.

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Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management Assessment dimensions Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues in river basin management

Fig 2.1

Nine dimensions of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs)

Process Arenas (Domains) From only NGOs, public sector-only or private sector–only platforms to bipartite and tripartite partnerships. In most cases, water authorities are not used to sharing responsibilities with users and other stakeholders. The inclusion of non-expert voices can make the established decision-makers feel uncomfortable. The same awkwardness can be felt when one sector is required to share decisionmaking powers with others. Dutch water boards are moving from unipartite (farmer-only), drainage-oriented platforms to a multi-sectoral, multi-focal water management institution. For many this involves an uneasy transition to a more contested, changeable environment. Power balance from dominated by one actor to an equilibrium among the different stakeholders. MSPs appear to take the currently fashionable ideas on public-private partnerships and sectoral participation (Water Users Associations) one step further

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by allocating speciﬁc seats for a multitude of interests: farmers, ﬁshermen, tourism, industry, government, environmental and community groups and so on. But sectors and ‘communities’ are not homogeneous wholes, but fragmented into groups. Societies are driven by structural power differences making it easy for some groups to paralyze decision-making processes. If the powerful do not want it and the less powerful are not well-organized and focused, nothing will happen despite the most beautiful MSP structures being in place. Content Multiple use From unilateral to multiple-use, including environmental ﬂows. The composition of many MSPs does not cover all bases required for Integrated Catchment Management. Rural MSPs can ofﬂoad problems onto urban stakeholders. Thus rural South Africa the black and white middle classes may ﬁnd themselves uneasy bedfellows in an alliance against the Big City. Also, MSPs tend to be anthropocentric, and thus the ‘nature’ (environmental ﬂows) aspect of water is not always represented. Here, the (positive) South African example of the ‘environmental reserve’ comes to mind. It may also be necessary for different identity groups to be represented, such as ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities – in Ecuador, for example, indigenous people are in fact more like a ‘majority’, but still have to struggle for their place in decision making. Salient goal When the problem is experienced as urgent and salient, a resource platform will seem logical for its participants. For example, the Netherlands, half of which is below sea level: at the time Water Boards were established, it was of crucial importance that everyone participated in raising, maintaining and paying for dikes and embankments. If one actor stubbornly refused to cooperate, the whole collective would suffer immensely from ﬂoods or groundwater congestion. Generally, an MSP does not address routine policy making, but complex issues (see also the concluding chapter of this volume). They often involve all four levels of integration (Ch. 1, this volume). It must be reasonably clear what must be done and easily explained to others what is the relevance for the interests at stake. The reason for starting such a group must be worth the trouble for the initiator and the potential participants to invest their time, energy and resources. Context Support generating capacity from a ‘talking shop’ of individuals to a diversity of resources. This has an internal and external dimension. Internal: Platform members who are highly motivated to make their endeavour work will contribute and attract a variety of resources ranging from public support (constituencies) to legal support (mandate) to ﬁnancial support (a budget). External: For the MSP to work, it must also have an impact on the surrounding institutions and show tangible outcomes in water and risk management. Without

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demonstrated impacts on salient problems, the platform can lose legitimacy and political and ﬁnancial support will dwindle. The external dimension is therefore bound up with acceptance of the interinstitutional ﬁeld. Adaptivity over time a range from rigid inﬂexibility to focussed ﬂexibility. The development of new institutions such as a platform takes years. The Kat platform in South Africa, for example, took 9 years to take off. This kind of time frame runs the risk of donors or facilitators losing interest. But it is too easy to dismiss the concept of platforms because they do not show up results soon. Where people did not know each other very well before, and lacked trust, an MSP functioning as an information network was already a major gain in Perú (Oré, this volume). In the course of time, the platform’s goals and environment may change. A ‘water platform’ in South Africa may turn out to encompass a whole range of socialeconomic challenges – housing, health, employment, land rights, poverty alleviation. Therefore it is essential that the platform rules and platform deﬁnition (what is in and what is out) do not constrain adaptive capacities (Ruijgh and Verhallen 2002). Institutional ecology theory even notes that the mission and identity of an institution can totally be transformed, e.g. the YMCA transforming into a budget hotel chain (Perrow 1986). This has a risk of excess ﬂexibility, where the institution loses its focus. Ideally the platform is ﬂexible, but remains focussed on land and water resource management. Synergy for innovation from a narrow interest-representing function to a platform where people try to understand and augment each other’s perspectives and jointly come up with new and bold approaches. If a platform remains a space for negotiation of narrowly deﬁned interests, it will not exceed the level of business-as-usual. When social learning take place (which cannot be taken for granted), it can beneﬁt from the range of capacities, knowledge’s and energies present with the various stakeholders, and in so doing tackle the complexity, diversity and dynamics of natural resource governance (Kooiman 1993). In so doing, they develop into a ‘SMART’ organisation. Synergy is usually dependent on proper facilitation which, in Röling’s (pers. comm.) phrase, helps to translates cubic meters into human interaction. This issue will be discussed in some more detail below. This dimension points at the ‘reframing’ or ‘social learning capacity’ of a MSP (see section below). Decision space runs from no mandate, only consultative or informative to plenty of mandate, with inﬂuences in decision making processes. In practice, participation in water management tends to depend on the degree to which the central governments are willing to share power (Bruns (2003), see also Chapter 1, present volume). Warner and Oré (2006) argue that both internal (mandate from constituency to representatives) and external legitimacy (from enabling environment to platform) are highly important in keeping a platform aﬂoat, based on two Perúvian case studies. Neither the emerging platforms in Perú (Oré, this volume) nor the South African Catchment Fora (Simpungwe et al, this volume) are formally recognised in the law, so whatever they decide can be ignored. It is true, though, that a consultative

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process cannot always be ignored or dismissed if its participants ‘speak with one voice’. Once the body has become statutory, as in France or Brazil, it can take meaningful decisions, and the MSP becomes a force to be reckoned with. But what matters most is not the de jure recognition by law, but the de facto political support for a platform from the participants’ constituencies (internal) and the institutional environment (external), enabling it to act decisively. Output is it a place to gauge opinions and stay abreast of new government plans, or does the platform produce visions, plans, projects that are actually implemented? Is the MSP dormant, only talking or also acting? Several MSPs we encountered produce paper rather than action, that is, minutes of meetings and workshops rather than concrete projects for action. Brief, they do not take any meaningful decisions! That may have to do with the participants being content to give feedback and ask questions for clariﬁcation, but also with the lack of concrete means and mandate (decision space) to make a signiﬁcant change in the way that the resource is being managed. We have however come across MSPs that produced meaningful output in the form of a coherent vision for the near future (cf. Ruijgh and Verhallen 2002). The Role of Facilitation and Framing The above typology does not include the facilitation function, which impacts on all those dimensions, although this is not often taken into account in the dialogue’s design. Platforms do not tend to come together spontaneously. When people are not aware of the urgency of a problem, or do not feel they can make a change, they will not feel motivated to participate. On the other hand, it might be the case that the actors that are most responsible for a perceived problem are the less interested in being part of a platform where they will have to negotiate with other stakeholders affected by their activities. Our research ﬁnds that just sitting together does not solve problems. People have to bring, or develop, skills for making a multi-stakeholder process work. Ideally, persons collaborating in a platform form a dialogue in which they fully grasp the complex situation, including an understanding of the different perspectives and interests. They are able to acknowledge those perspectives but can go beyond that to come to innovative and inspiring ways to tackle the complex issue, in an accountable and transparent process that can be communicated to their constituencies. This is likely to require proper awareness-raising, training and facilitation. We found in several of our case studies that it is usually a charismatic leader or facilitator (or facilitating organisation) that convenes and motivates the platform. When platforms are top-down, a government agency or hired consultancy-university may be the facilitator. When bottom-up, an NGO or university will usually be the leader.

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Facilitators have an important say in stakeholder selection / categorising and limiting the number of stakeholders. Even though everyone may be invited to come, as they are indeed in South Africa, it is unfeasible to have 40 million people around the table. This gives the one in charge of stakeholder selection an important in- and exclusionary role. Facilitators can be ‘facipulators’ when they manipulate the process for their own political or ﬁnancial ends, or when they are not truly independent and act on behalf of the institution or group that hires them, having an overt or hidden agenda and organiser. All too often, MSP is a controlled space in which speciﬁc problem frames are discussed with speciﬁc people, with a speciﬁc goal participants and duration. This includes some people, topics and data at the expense of others. In Alejandra Moreyra and Jeroen Warner’s case study (Chapter 9) the demarcation of the Trahunco arroyo in Argentinean Patagonia was such that the ‘difﬁcult’ indigenous groups (Mapuche) were bracketed out of the MSP process, which meant they had to strategize to reach their goals by working around the MSP. It is therefore important not to ‘box the process in’ from the start and make space for problem (re)framing to happen. Reframing starts with the recognition of problems and interests of the other people involved. In the process of reframing actors learn to understand the paradigms, metaphors, mindset or mental models that underpin how they operate. Insight is gained on the relationship between one’s own problem and problems of others. In ‘integrative negotiation’ collective frames might develop (Aarts and Van Woerkum 2002). It therefore seems highly important that the platform and its facilitator obtain the legitimacy and mandate from the participants, and that the facilitator’s activities are monitored by all. References Arnstein, S. R. (1969), ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’, Journal of the American Planning Association, v35 i4: pp. 216–224. Boelens, R. and Dávila, G. (eds) (1998), Searching for Equity, Conceptions of justice and equity in peasant irrigation, Van Gorcum, Assen. Bruns, B. (2003), Water Tenure Reform: Developing an Extended Ladder of Participation. Paper read at Politics of the Commons: Articulating Development and Strengthening Local Practices, at RCSD Conference, July 11–14, 2003, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Retrieved 24 December 2003 on http://www.bryanbruns. com Campbell, A. (1998), ‘Fomenting synergy: experiences with facilitating landcare in Australia’, in Röling, N. and Wagemakers, M. (eds), Facilitating Sustainable Agriculture: Participatory learning and adaptive management in times of environmental uncertainty, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Edmunds, D. and Wollenberg, E. (2001), ‘A Strategic Approach to Multi-stakeholder Negotiation’, Development and Change, v31 i2: pp. 231–253. EU (European Union) (2000), Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Union and of the Council, of 23 October 2000, establishing a framework for community action in the field of water policy, Official J. European Communities, L327, 1–73.

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Frey, F. W. (1993), ‘The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International River Basins’, Water International, v18 i1: pp. 54–68. Hoebeke, L. (2004), ‘Dilemmas and paradoxes in organizing change processes: a critical reflection’, in J. Boonstra (ed.), Management of organizational change and learning, Wiley. Mitchell, B. (ed.) (1990), Integrated Water Management. International experiences and perspectives, Belhaven Press, London. Perrow, C. (1986), Complex Organisations: A Critical Essay, New York: Random House (3rd edition). Röling, N. and Woodhill, J. (2001) ‘From paradigms to practice: foundations, principles and elements for dialogue on water, food and environment’, Background papers prepared for Dialogue on Water for Food and the Environment: Workshop on design for national and basin level dialogues. Bonn, 1–2 December. Ruijgh-van der Ploeg, M. and Verhallen, J. M. (2002), Envisioning the future of transboundary river basins, Technical University/Wageningen UR, Delft. Steins, N. A. and Edwards, V. M. (1998), Platforms for Collective Action in MultipleUse CPRs, Paper Presented at the 7th annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10–14,1998. www.indiana.edu/~iascp/abstracts/612.html. UN ECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe), Århus Convention (1998), http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ Warner, J. and Moreyra, A. (2004), ‘Introducción: Participación para solucionar conflictos por el agua: sueño, pesadilla o espejismo?’, in J. Warner and A. Moreyra (eds), Conflictos y Participación. Uso Multiple del Agua, Montevideo: Editorial Nordan (Ecoteca No. 35), pp. 7–21. Warner, J. and Oré, M. T. (2006), ‘El Niño platforms: participatory disaster response in Perú’, Disasters 30 (1).

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Chapter 3

Collaborative Capital: A Key to the Successful Practice of Integrated Water Resources Management Nigel Watson

Introduction There is widespread agreement that integrated water resources management (IWRM) is an imperative for sustainable development (Young et al. 1994; Mitchell and Shrubsole 1997; Gleick, 2000). Although the fundamental importance of water for human advancement and ecological maintenance is now generally acknowledged, most societies have only recently attempted to move away from the dominant water management paradigm that emerged in the twentieth century whereby available water resources were exploited for development purposes with little appreciation of their economic value or the long-term impacts of heavy river engineering on the environment. Consequently, continued growth in water consumption was often left unchecked. As a further consequence of this previous paradigm, ecologically important and aesthetically attractive waterside environments effectively ‘disappeared’ from the urban landscape, as communities turned their backs on polluted and degraded streams and rivers. IWRM seeks to correct some of the imbalances and mistakes of the past and to ensure that policies, plans and projects for water are coordinated with those for other resources within an overall river basin development framework. However, as an approach, IWRM is not easy to put into practice and actually poses an enormous institutional challenge for governments, water users and society as a whole. In the past, many governments have tried but failed to implement IWRM through existing agency structures and institutional arrangements for water management. There has been a general reluctance on the part of those with responsibility for water policy to accept that alternative systems of governance are needed in order for IWRM to be translated from a noble statement of intent into an operational reality. Furthermore, attempts to bring about institutional reforms in pursuit of a more integrated approach have often been met by ﬁerce opposition from government agencies themselves, which have perceived IWRM as a threat to their authority as well as a challenge to the fundamental values and beliefs of the dominant water management paradigm. This chapter is concerned with the institutional conditions that are required for the successful implementation of IWRM. Although many people appear to adopt a ‘business as usual’ attitude to IWRM and regard it as something that can be delivered

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through conventional bureaucratic means, it is argued here that a radically different institutional approach is required that requires planned collaboration among government agencies, private sector organisations, voluntary groups and other stakeholders. Consequently, researchers and practitioners of water management need to develop a much clearer and more sophisticated understanding of the interorganisational environment and how collaborative processes may be applied to the implementation of IWRM. The chapter begins with a discussion of the meaning and origins of IWRM in order to demonstrate why existing institutional arrangements in the water sector often act as a barrier to implementation. This is followed by an examination of the case for a collaboration, which draws on some of the theoretical literature to demonstrate some of the potential advantages and beneﬁts for IWRM. Attention is then turned to the key institutional conditions that are required for a collaborative approach to work in practice. Reference is made to an example of collaborative river basin management in British Columbia, Canada. The chapter concludes by highlighting some of the lessons and implications for the future practice of IWRM. Integrated Water Resources Management If IWRM is understood to be the uniﬁed or holistic management of water, land and other natural resources within the boundaries of entire river basins, watersheds or catchment areas, then clearly it is not a completely new idea. Indeed, there is an extensive research literature on integrated management of river basins and the idea itself was interpreted and applied in a variety of different ways during the last century. The origins of IWRM can be traced to the 1920s and 1930s, when the development of water resources within the hydrologic limits deﬁned by river basins gained credence in several countries. Perhaps the best-known example of IWRM from this early period is the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United States (Owen 1973; McDonald and Kay 1988). The TVA was created during the New Deal era to plan and develop available natural resources in a comprehensive fashion in order to improve economic and social conditions in what was, at that time, one of the poorest regions of the country. As such, the TVA linked environmental, economic and social policy together and established the principle that water management should be used as a means to an end, and should not simply be viewed purely as an end in its own right. Furthermore, the TVA symbolized the belief that governments could achieve integrated water resources management by creating multi-functional bureaucracies that had jurisdiction over entire river basin areas. Although the precise TVA institutional model was not replicated, several governments in other countries did subsequently adopt the same underlying philosophy and approach to water resources management. For example, beginning in the 1940s, the provincial government of the Province of Ontario in Canada actively encouraged municipalities to joint together and create watershed-based Conservation Authorities (CAs) with broad responsibilities for the planning, development and management of water, land, timber and other renewable natural resources. Today, the Ontario CAs are internationally recognised as leading examples of an integrated approach to water

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management. According to Mitchell and Shrubsole (1992), the success of the CAs stems from the fact that their institutional design is based on six key principles: the watershed as the management unit, local initiative, provincial-municipal partnership, a healthy environment for a health economy, a comprehensive approach and lastly, cooperation and coordination. Nevertheless, the efﬁcacy of some of the CAs has been reduced in recent years due to budgetary restrictions and the emergence of government ministries and other organisations with overlapping responsibilities and powers (Shrubsole 1996). As many western countries experienced rapid economic and population growth during the 1950s and 1960s, IWRM was reinterpreted to take account of a shift in objectives. While initially IWRM had been about comprehensive resource development, much heavier emphasis was placed on unified resource management in order to satisfy escalating demands for water and potential resource conﬂicts in the post-war era. This modiﬁed approach was exempliﬁed by the institutional arrangements for river basin management created in England and Wales during the 1960s and 1970s. In essence, responsibility for water management was progressively removed from the control of local governments and other public organisations whose jurisdictions were deﬁned by political and administrative, rather than hydrologic, boundaries. In their place, new all-purpose water management authorities were created that had control over the full range of substantive functions (water supply, waste disposal, ﬂood control etc) and generic functions (planning, development, regulation etc) within entire river basins. Although the approach was considered revolutionary at the time, it was not entirely successful because each authority was responsible for both the regulatory and operational aspects of water management in each river basin area and, from the late 1970s onwards, lacked the ﬁnancial resources to maintain infrastructures and control pollution. At around the same time, a number of governments invested heavily in the production of comprehensive river basin development and management plans. For example, Mitchell (1983) described how such plans were generated for major river basins across Canada so that available water resources could be used to their fullest potential. However, the planning exercise had only limited success because the desire to examine every aspect of each river basin created enormous data requirements, the plans themselves took too long to complete, and circumstances had often changed by the time each plan was published. Thus, experiences in England, Wales and Canada suggest that whilst the objectives of water management had changed somewhat by the late 1970s, governments continued to subscribe to the idea that IWRM could be achieved through a bureaucratic institutional and managerial approach. A further interpretation of IWRM, with two important differences, started to emerge in the early 1980s. First, it was recognized that there is a fundamental difference between a comprehensive and an integrated approach to water resources management (Mitchell 1990). Whilst the former requires consideration and management of all the different elements and processes within a water resources system, the latter focuses only on the interactions among elements that are signiﬁcant in a particular river basin. For example, in one river basin the relationship between pollution and declining ﬁsh stocks may be of critical importance, whereas in another the key concern may be related to water abstraction for domestic or industrial use.

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As such, IWRM in its most recent form is a more focused approach that potentially avoids some of the analytical and management challenges associated with the more comprehensive interpretation of the past. Second, it was recognised that IWRM implied the uniﬁed management of both the land and water components of river basins and that an exclusive water-centric view was inappropriate. Land uses such as agricultural production and urban development often have a major impact on the water environment and equally manipulation of river systems can produce ﬂooding or drought on land. IWRM in this form was applied in a number of countries during the latter part of the 1980s. For example, in Australia the state governments of Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia each adopted policies for Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) or Total Catchment Management (TCM) (Wallis and Robinson 1991; Mitchell and Hollick 1993; Johnson et al. 1996; Margerum 1999). In England and Wales, institutions were reformed in order to improve public water services and at the same time to provide a sharper focus on the protection and restoration of whole catchments and river basins. The operation of regional water supply systems and sewerage was privatised in 1989 and a new public organisation (the Environment Agency) was created for river basin management and regulation (Watson 1997). The preceding account illustrates the point that IWRM has been conceptualised and applied in a wide variety of ways during the last eighty years. Nevertheless, throughout this entire period IWRM was characterised by two common features. Firstly, there has been a signiﬁcant ‘implementation gap’ since the idea of IWRM as uniﬁed management of water, land and related natural resources across entire river basins has rarely, if ever, been achieved in reality (Watson et al. 1997; Ducros and Watson 2002). Secondly, most interpretations and applications have rested on the assumption that IWRM can be achieved through improved interorganisational coordination. Indeed, leading organisations such as the Global Water Partnership (GWP) continue to promote the idea that IWRM is really a question of coordination: IWRM is a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems Global Water Partnership (2001, 1).

For clariﬁcation, coordination is deﬁned here as an arrangement whereby two or more organisations or units create and/or use existing decision rules in order to align their separate policies, programmes and practices (Mulford and Rogers 1982; Alexander 1993). Coordination refers to a static institutional relationship involving existing networks of organisations (Gray 1989). In essence, administrative fragmentation and duplication of effort among government departments and public agencies within the water sector have been regarded as the major institutional obstacles for IWRM. What is more, inter-organisational coordination has been presented as the preferred response to this situation or ‘administrative trap’ (Baker 1989). The observations made above demonstrate that there is an implementation gap associated with IWRM and also that the majority of governments have approached

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the task by creating more coordinated sets of institutional arrangements. The implementation gap and the over-reliance of governments upon coordinated efforts are not unrelated. Indeed, there are some compelling arguments that suggest inter-organisational coordination alone is not likely to be an adequate strategy for IWRM. One argument is related to the way in which water resources systems and their associated management problems are framed. Christensen (1985) proposed a framework in which problems can be categorised according to the degree of certainty associated with the technology (means) available and the goals (ends) to be achieved (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1

Goals and means (Adapted from Christensen 1985)

In Box A, the ends are agreed and the means to achieve them are known. In such situations, water resources management problems can be solved through a standard bureaucratic approach in which a single organisation follows prescribed procedures in a routine, repeatable, fashion. In Box B, the problem is characterised by agreement on ends but uncertainty regarding the means to achieve them. Thus, there may be public commitment to addressing a water resources problem but an obvious method is lacking, management organisations tend to adopt pragmatic, trial and error, approach or attempt to reduce the level of uncertainty through scientiﬁc research or increased knowledge acquisition. In such situations, water management agencies may choose to coordinate their activities in order to search for an effective solution to the problem. Box C represents a set of circumstances in which a particular technology or ‘means’ is already available but there is disagreement about how or where it should be applied. A case in point is the addition of ﬂuoride to public water supplies, in which there are competing arguments about the beneﬁts and risks to health. These conditions call for an entirely different approach in which competing interests are accommodated through bargaining, negotiation and mediation. Finally, Box D represents a situation in which there are multiple, or unarticulated, goals coupled

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with uncertainty regarding the means of achieving them. According to Christensen (1985, 68), a strategy of problem ﬁnding is required for such conditions: … problem ﬁnding is problem deﬁning; it elicits order and meaning from ambiguity. The discovery of a compelling articulation may come from a single planner or from interactive processes. Such problem ﬁnding – that is, identifying or articulating – may require planners and participants to reformulate the problem: casting the problem in a new light so that people can agree that it is the right problem to tackle. To do that planners need insight both of the nature of the problems and into political forces to ensure that participants agree as to what the problem is.

An important lesson for IWRM emerges from the preceding account of responses to different management situations. To date, the implementation strategies of governments and agencies with responsibilities for IWRM have largely been designed for the conditions described in Box A and B. The bureaucratic and coordinated intergovernmental institutional arrangements that have been devised for IWRM were suited to conditions in which the ends to be achieved were agreed and the means of achieving them were fairly certain. However, in reality, river basins are highly complex and dynamic socio-biophysical systems, which generate water resources management problems characterised by high levels of uncertainty and conﬂict. As such, successful implementation of IWRM requires a type of institutional response that is suited to the conditions represented in Box C and D. As such, intergovernmental coordination alone is not a sufﬁcient strategy for IWRM. A further reason why bureaucratic or even coordinated institutional arrangements are unsuitable for the implementation of IWRM relates to the organisational environment in governments and water management agencies now operate. Trist (1980, 1983) argued that the world is in transition between an industrial and a postindustrial order. For much of the twentieth century, organisations operated in an arena described by Trist as the ‘disturbed reactive environment’. Such an environment is occupied by big industrial organisations and equally large government institutions, each of which seeks to amass power, resources and expertise in order to compete and survive. In the context of water resources management, this type of environment led to the development of highly centralised, multi-functional and bureaucratic government institutions during the later part of the twentieth century. However, in the last few decades a new type of organisational environment has started to emerge, which Trist labelled the ‘turbulent ﬁeld’: In such a ﬁeld, large competing organisations all acting independently, in many diverse directions, produce unanticipated and dissonant consequences in the overall environment in which they share. These dissonances mount as the common ﬁled becomes more densely occupied. The result is a contextual commotion – as if the ‘ground’ were moving as well as the organisations. This is what is meant by turbulence. Subjectively we experience it as a loss of the stable state (Trist 1980).

In today’s turbulent environment, therefore, water resource management constitutes a type of ‘meta-problem’ or ‘mess’, which is characterised by increased complexity, change, uncertainty, and conﬂict. Overall, this implies increasing inter-dependence

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among the numerous public, private and voluntary organisations involved in the management water, land and other river basin resources. Unfortunately, most of our existing institutional arrangements for IWRM have been designed for the conditions of the disturbed reactive environment, and are maladaptive responses to the turbulent ﬁeld. It is clear that advances in institution-building that go well beyond unilateral action and inter-organisational coordination are required. Such institutions will be very different and are likely to be based on a kind of negotiated order in which stakeholders interact, identify common values, continuously learn, evaluate and adapt as part of an open-ended process (Nathan and Mitroff 1991). The Case for Collaboration If it is accepted that bureaucratic and even coordinated institutions are inadequate for the implementation of IWRM in an environment characterised by unknown goals, uncertain means, complexity, change and conﬂict (turbulence), then the question arises as to what sorts of arrangements and responses should be developed in the future? In the last few years, a growing number of commentators have argued that the key to success lies with the development of collaborative institutions in which a wide range of stakeholders are engaged in a process of joint decision-making and problem-solving (e.g. Dorcey 1986; Glasbergen 1998; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). The merit of such claims is that, in most heterogeneous societies, river basins are contested spaces and water management itself is shaped by a multitude of different attitudes, values and beliefs. As there can be no single correct interpretation or application of IWRM, some sort of collaborative institutional process is required in order to deﬁne problems, identify what is desired and achievable and to produce agreement as to how common goals will be reached. Viewed in this way, IWRM can be understood as an exercise in social problem-solving (McCann 1983). Because collaboration appears to ‘ﬁt’ many of the requirements for the implementation of IWRM, it is argued here that researchers need to examine collaborative institutions and processes much more closely than they have in the past. Many different deﬁnitions of collaboration appear in the literature, most of which is located within the ﬁeld of behavioural science rather than water resources management (Wood and Gray 1991). Gray (1985, 912) provided one of the most widely cited deﬁnitions: By collaboration we mean: (1) the pooling of appreciations and/or tangible resources, e.g., information, money, labor, etc., (2) by two or more stakeholders, (3) to solve a set of problems which neither can solve individually.

Unlike coordination, which is a static arrangement, collaboration is an emergent and adaptive process that allows different organisations to deal effectively with their joint task environment through information exchange, dialogue, deliberation, negotiation and shared agreements (Selin and Chavez 1995). Coordination can be viewed as one element of a broader collaborative process, which requires organizations to re-examine their basic assumptions, beliefs, attitudes and values regarding the environment in which they operate. As Beyerlein et al. (2003, 18) observed:

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Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management The collaborative organisation is designed for effective coordination, shared decision making, and decision implementation. The emphasis is on a collaborative approach, because that provides an opportunity to utilize multiple perspectives and generate synergies and commitment. The collaboration occurs across both vertical and horizontal boundaries, so ﬂow of information, people, coordination, and materials escape the constraints of silos. The collaboration rests on a culture of shared responsibility, authority, and accountability for results.

As an approach to IWRM, inter-organisational collaboration is less adversarial, coercive, and regulatory in style compared to other long-standing bureaucratic methods. Furthermore, collaboration can be used in two different situations related to IWRM. Firstly, it may be used as an alternative approach to resolving resource disputes and secondly it may be used to advance a vision for the future of an interorganisational domain, such as a river basin, that is shared by public and private stakeholders. Several perceived advantages of the collaborative approach can be identiﬁed from a review of the literature: •

• • • • • • • •

•

Collaboration may increase access to knowledge and information that lies beyond the realm of ‘expert’ researchers and managers and lead to more creative solutions to uncertainty. Collaboration improves response capabilities by drawing on a more diverse set of organisational resources. Collaboration encourages differences in values, beliefs and attitudes as well as preferences to be explored. Collaboration can help to legitimise decisions and decision processes. Collaboration reduces the risk of impasse and can be used to break deadlocks in negotiations. Collaboration may enable the transaction costs associated with other methods, such as command and control regulation, to be avoided. Collaboration may improve organisational efﬁciency by limiting overlaps and duplication of effort. Collaboration may reduce the risk of ‘implementation failure’ by involving stakeholders in the design of solutions and creating a sense of ownership. Collaboration improves the ﬂexibility of institutional responses, and may enable joint agreements to be adapted according to practical experience and changes in circumstances. Collaboration can improve social relations and create a latent problem-solving capacity for the future.

Most writers have conceptualised collaboration as an iterative process that involves a number of different phases. Waddock (1989) and Selin and Chavez (1995) argued that collaboration is often initiated due to a number of different factors, such as a perceived environmental threat or crisis, a legal mandate, an inﬂuential leader or the availability of ﬁnancial incentives. This is followed by a problem-setting phase in which groups with a legitimate stake are identiﬁed, and the nature of the issue or problem they face is articulated (McCann 1983, Gray, 1985, 1989). At this point in the

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process the stakeholders begin to appreciate their common predicament and the need for joint action. In the next direction-setting phase, the participating organisations focus on desirable future conditions and the values, beliefs and principles guiding their aspirations. In essence, a common understanding of ‘ends’ that are mutually desirable is developed. This is followed by a structuring phase in which speciﬁc objectives are established, programmes or activities are designed and roles are assigned to the various participating organisations. Whilst some commentators regard structuring as the ﬁnal phase in collaboration, Selin and Chavez (1995) argued that outputs such as policies and programmes must be implemented in order to produce outcomes or ‘impacts’ on the collective problem or set of conditions. Whilst the different phases of collaboration will tend to occur in sequence, it is important to note that lessons learned or changes in circumstances may require the collaborating partners to return to an earlier point in the process. Organisations with responsibility for river basin resources must have a capacity to collaborate with other organisations and groups if IWRM is to be successfully implemented. Beyerlein et al. (2003) used the term ‘collaborative capital’ (CC) to describe this vitally important asset which represents the networks, processes, structures, communication mechanisms and cultures that enable different organisations and interests to work effectively together. A further important point concerns the nature of the organisations that should be engaged in collaborative processes for IWRM. Collaboration should not just occur within government, since IWRM requires interaction among government interests and other groups within society. As such, successful implementation of policies for IWRM requires collaborative systems of governance, which are less ‘state-centric’ in character and attempt to bridge the divide between the traditional bases of political power and other groups within civil society with interests in the management of land and water resources (Kooiman 1993; Pierre 2000). Collaborative Governance in Practice Collaborative governance appears to be a highly appropriate approach for the implementation of IWRM. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that collaboration can be difﬁcult and is subject to a wide range of constraints and obstacles. As such, multi-stakeholder partnerships or ‘platforms’ (Watson 2001; Wester and Warner 2002), referent organisations (Trist 1983), collectivist organisations (Rothschild-Whitt 1979), third sector organisations (Taylor and Warburton 2003) and other collaborative institutional arrangements should not be seen as a panacea for the integrated management of land and water in the context of river basins. A key research task therefore is to develop a set of principles or criteria for the design of effective collaborative arrangements for IWRM. In this section, key institutional factors that are likely to determine the success of a collaborative approach are examined, drawing on theoretical literature and empirical research carried out by the author, which examined the organisation of the Fraser Basin Council (FBC) in British Columbia, Canada. In order to set the context, a brief outline of development and resource management in the

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Fraser Basin is provided before attention is turned to the analysis of collaborative institutional arrangements. The Fraser Basin drains ¼ of the provincial area, includes fourteen different watersheds and supports more than 2.5 million people who generate 80% of Gross Provincial Product (GPP) from what is still a largely resource-based economy (Figure 3.2). During the 10,000 years prior to the arrival of European settlers, the natural resources of the Fraser sustained an indigenous population of approximately 50,000 people. However, in the last 200 years activities such as mining, timber

Figure 3.2

The Fraser Basin

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production, ﬁshing, agricultural settlement, port development and urban expansion have produced a complex mix of land and water-related problems. Responses to these problems were generally piecemeal and management efforts were concentrated on ﬂood control, port development, ﬁsheries and pollution abatement. By the late 1970s, it was evident that a more integrated approach was needed to effectively tackle land and water management problems in the Fraser. A key step was taken in 1985 with the establishment of the Fraser River Estuary Management Program (FREMP). FREMP was designed to coordinate the activities of federal departments, provincial ministries, municipalities, harbour commissions and other groups but was conﬁned to the tidal waters. By the early 1990s, there was signiﬁcant interest among governmental ofﬁcials in the idea of basin-wide integrated planning and management. This led to the launch in 1992 of the Fraser Basin Management Program, which was based on a ﬁve-year agreement to pursue sustainability signed by representatives from the federal, provincial and local tiers of government. The Program was developed through a multi-stakeholder Board, which included representatives for the four orders of government – federal, provincial, municipal and First Nations – and also economic, social and environmental interests from different parts of the Fraser Basin. Whilst the FRMP did have some success, it was essentially an intergovernmental arrangement dominated by powerful federal and provincial interests. At the end of the agreement in 1997, several members of the Board recognized that further institutional change was needed in order to engage a wider range of stakeholders and to galvanize commitment for balanced, integrated and sustainable river basin management. As a result, the Fraser Basin Council was established in 1997 as a successor organization to the Fraser Basin Management Board. The Fraser Basin Council The Fraser Basin Council is a not-for-proﬁt organization with a mandate to pursue sustainable development through integrated river basin planning and management. It is important to stress that the Council does not replace existing government agencies or seek to duplicate their management functions. Rather, the role of the Council is to address multi-jurisdictional issues and to resolve disputes using a consensual rather than a legal or bureaucratic approach. The Council has a corporate structure, with a Chairperson, a group of Directors and a series of sub-committees with responsibilities for different functions and geographical areas within the Basin (Figure 3.3). Important initial tasks for an organization such as this include the development of a shared understanding among the disparate groups of the problems to be addressed and a common set of values, rules and principles to guide collective actions. In the case of the Fraser Basin Council, a ‘Charter for Sustainability’ was prepared to meet these requirements. The Charter outlines an agreed vision of the economic, social and environmental character of a sustainable Fraser Basin system, plus twelve principles to guide action towards the achievement of the vision. Crucially, the Charter acknowledges the need to strengthen institutional arrangements by

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adopting a watershed approach, by encouraging collective action at the local level, by facilitating the participation of indigenous people in decision-making and by creating transparent and accountable procedures.

Figure 3.3

Fraser Basin Council organigram

A key challenge for collaborative governance is to provide equitable representation, recognizing that some groups are likely to be more economically or politically powerful than other groups that have legitimate interests in river basin management. The Fraser Basin Council is governed by 36 Directors drawn from the federal and provincial government, regional districts, First Nations and sectoral interests from different parts of the basin. In addition, there is a neutral Chairperson and representatives for basin-wide economic, social and environmental interests. The four orders of government make their own appointments to the Council and jointly select Directors to represent basin-wide and sectoral interests. Whilst this may appear to be a fair and balanced arrangement, there are still some limitations. For example, although the 8 Directors from the First Nations do represent the different indigenous language groups within the Basin, there are more than 90 separate Bands each of which is a separate kinship group with its own social and administrative system. As such, the 8 Directors cannot directly speak on behalf of the very diverse mix of First Nations groups. Furthermore, there are some concerns about the role of the Operations Committee, which was created to deal with administrative matters and to maintain momentum between the full meetings of the Council, which take place three times in each year. The Operations Committee includes the neutral Chairperson plus 8 Directors, 6 of whom are drawn

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from the four orders of government. When interviewed, a number of participants in the Council expressed a concern that the Operations Committee had a tendency to make policy and strategic decisions that should have been more widely debated among the Directors. An additional challenge stems from the fact that river basins are complex dynamic systems that evolve in a chaotic and unpredictable fashion rather than in a linear direction. One implication of this is that river basin management institutions must be sensitive to local conditions, ﬂexible and capable of adapting to new circumstances. The Council has dealt with these requirements by establishing ﬁve Regional Committees, each of which is supported by a full-time coordinator and is responsible for several watersheds within the Basin. Each Regional Committee includes Council Directors who represent municipal, First Nations and sectoral interests within the relevant geographical area. As such, Directors representing federal, provincial and basin-wide interests do not participate at the regional level. The Regional Committees provide a valuable mechanisms for responding to change as they enable the Council to be alerted to emerging concerns and enable actions to be taken at the local level that are consistent with the vision, values and principles contained in the Charter. Like all other forms of organization, collaborative institutions require adequate funding and resources to function effectively. However, in the context of collaboration, funding is a politically sensitive issue since it has the potential to exert political power and inﬂuence. Although some stakeholders may be well positioned to contribute ﬁnancially towards collaborative efforts, others with equally legitimate interests and claims may not. The Fraser Basin Council operates an innovative funding arrangement in which municipal, provincial and federal governments contribute in equal measure. Municipal governments provide approximately $300,000 to the Council on an annual basis at a rate of 20 cents per head of population. However, the Greater Vancouver Regional District contributes at rate of 10 cents per head because it allocates an equal amount of funding to the Fraser Estuary Management Program. Whilst funding is provided by three orders of government, this is still a less than ideal situation. It is generally accepted that few, if any, First Nations groups are able to contribute ﬁnancially to the Council at present given the legacy of economic and political marginalization. What is also striking, however, is the lack of ﬁnancial contribution to the Council from the private sector, given that several of the Directors do represent economically powerful sectoral interests. One of the main criticisms aimed at collaborative systems of governance is that whilst they provide opportunities for deliberation and wider participation in decision-making, they often produce implementation failures because insufﬁcient attention is given to outputs that will have an impact on the problem at hand. As a result, participants may lose enthusiasm for further collaboration if there is little sign of their efforts having a positive effect. Fortunately, policy delivery and monitoring of impacts appear to be particular strengths of the Fraser Basin Council. Examples include the production of sustainability indicators to measure progress over time, the publication of State of the Basin reports, an integrated ﬂood hazard management strategy and a nutrient management plan. The Council has also contributed to the resolution of long-

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standing controversies in the Nechako watershed in the Upper Fraser Region. The Aluminium Company of Canada (Alcan) constructed the Kenney Dam in the upper reaches of the Nechako during the early 1950s as part of a scheme to generate electricity for aluminium smelting at Kittimat. An agreement signed by the BC government and Alcan in 1997 provided a $100 million Enhancement Fund for the mitigation of the environmental impacts of the dam and water diversions. The Fraser Basin Council was instrumental in establishing the Nechako Watershed Council in 1998, which works towards cooperative resolution of water management issues and involves representatives for government, First Nations, business and community groups. In December 2000, the Nechako Watershed Council recommended that the Enhancement Fund should be used to construct a cold water release facility at the Kenney Dam in order to restore the Murray-Cheslatta river systems and to improve the timing, volume and temperature of water released into the Nechako River. Lessons and Implications The success of IWRM is dependent on the ability of government and nongovernment groups to collaborate effectively in the appreciation and deﬁnition of inter-related resource problems, the development of policies and programmes, the implementation of joint actions and the monitoring and evaluation of impacts. There are strong theoretical arguments in favour of a collaborative approach and practical experience in the Fraser suggests that partnerships can have a positive impact on the sustainability of river basin systems. Nevertheless, collaboration should not be viewed as a universal remedy for land and water management problems or a ‘silver bullet’ that guarantees the success of IWRM. Ultimately, it is people and not institutional structures or processes that determine the outcomes of collaboration. There are no substitutes for mutual respect, patience, dedication, trust, negotiation skills and endurance (Pinkerton 1989). Effective collaboration can help to improve coordination, generate public and political commitment for action and resolve disputes in a constructive and fair manner. At the same time, it is important to recognize that collaboration is not always an appropriate response and that traditional governmental institutions are always likely to retain ultimate responsibility for the provision of water supplies and other essential services, or at least the regulation of those services. In implementing IWRM, decision-makers must be able to recognize the type of environmental condition that prevails according to the degree of uncertainty, complexity, change, and conﬂict that exists in a particular river basin, watershed or catchment area. Collaboration is not required for every type of situation or management problem, although the conditions in which it is needed appear to be increasingly common. As such, collaborative systems of governance are perhaps best understood as useful additions that can compliment and improve the effectiveness of existing bureaucratic and coordinated inter-governmental institutions, rather than as their substitutes. The theoretical literature and the analysis of the FBC provide some useful insights into the particular institutional conditions that should be created in order for

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collaborative approaches to work well. Indeed, the essential features of a successful collaborative system for IWRM are captured by the acronym ‘CARIBOO’: A Common Vision: of the desired future conditions in the river basin and the underlying values, beliefs and principles that will guide joint actions towards realising them. Adaptive Capacity: to enable policies and practices to adjust to changes in circumstances, new information and knowledge and to local conditions. Adequate Resources: to enable collaborative arrangements to function effectively and to progress through problem-setting, direction-setting, structuring and implementation. Independence: to enable joint decisions to be made without undue government control, but with continued government involvement and support. Balance: to enable diverse groups with different values, beliefs, expectations and interests to be fairly represented throughout the collaborative process. Outputs: to ensure that the arrangement is action-oriented as well as a forum for information exchange, deliberation and negotiation. Outcomes: to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of joint agreements and to demonstrate to stakeholders the positive impacts of collaboration on the state of land and water resources in the river basin. These seven features can be thought of as design principles for the planning of collaborative institutions, or as criteria to evaluate the performance of existing institutions. In conclusion, many western societies appear to be on the threshold of a major transition in the way land and water resources are managed. Collaborative capital (CC) will be required in the future in order to implement IWRM for sustainable development in a world faced with increasing turbulence. Institutions can, and must, be reformed to create the conditions and processes needed for effective collaboration. In particular, there is a growing need for organisations such as the FBC to facilitate collaboration among a broad range of interests. However, the success of collaboration will ultimately depend on the willingness of ofﬁcials in government departments and agencies to engage, and share decision-making power with, private sector organisations, voluntary groups, communities and other stakeholders with legitimate interests in the integrated management of land and water resources. References Alexander, E. (1993), ‘Interorganizational Coordination: Theory and Practice’, Journal of Planning Literature, 7(4), pp. 328–343.

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Baker, R. (1989), ‘Institutional Innovation, Development and Environmental Management: An “Administrative Trap” Revisited, Part 1’, Public Administration and Development, 9, pp. 29–47. Beyerlein, M., Freedman, S., McGee, C. and Moran, L. (2003), Beyond Teams: Building the Collaborative Organization, The Collaborative Work Systems Series, John Wiley and Sons, Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer, New York and San Francisco. Christensen, K. (1985), ‘Coping with Uncertainty in Planning’, Journal of the American Planning Association, 51(1), pp. 63–73. Dorcey, A. (1986), Bargaining in the Governance of Pacific Coastal Resources: Research and Reform, Westwater Research Centre, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada. Ducros, C. and Watson, N. M. (2002), ‘Integrated Land and Water Management in the United Kingdom: Narrowing the Implementation Gap’, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 45(3), pp. 403–423. Glasbergen, P. (1998), Cooperative Environmental Governance: Public-Private Agreements as a Policy Strategy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Gleick, P. (2000), ‘The Changing Water Paradigm: A Look at Twenty-first Century Water Resources Development’, Water International, 25(1), pp. 127–138. Global Water Partnership (2001), Integrated Water Resources Management Toolbox: Sharing Knowledge for Equitable, Efficient and Sustainable Water Resources Management, Global Water Partnership, Stockholm, Sweden. Gray, B. (1985), ‘Conditions Facilitating Inter-Organizational Collaboration’, Human Relations, 38(10), pp. 911–936. Gray, B. (1989), Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco and London. Kooiman, J. (ed.) (1993), Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi. Johnson, A., Shrubsole, D. and Merrin, M. (1996), ‘Integrated Catchment Management in Northern Australia: From Concept to Implementation’, Land Use Policy, 13, pp. 303–316. Margerum, R. (1999), ‘Integrated Environmental Management: lessons from the Trinity Inlet Management Program, Land Use Policy, 16, pp. 179–190. McCann, J. (1983), ‘Design Guidelines for Social problem-Solving Interventions’, Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 19(2), pp. 177–192. McDonald, A. and Kay, D. (1988), Water Resources: Issues and Strategies, Longman, Harlow, Essex. Mitchell, B. (1983), ‘Comprehensive River Basin Planning in Canada: Problems and Opportunities’, Water International, 8(4), pp. 146–153. Mitchell, B. (Ed.) (1990), Integrated Water Management: International Experiences and Perspectives, Belhaven Press, London. Mitchell, B. and Hollick, M. (1993), ‘Integrated Catchment Management in Western Australia: Transition from Concept to Implementation’, Environmental Management, 17, pp. 735–743. Mitchell, B. and Shrubsole, D. (1992), Ontario Conservation Authorities: Myth and Reality, Department of Geography Publication Series Number 35,

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University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. Mitchell, B. and Shrubsole, D. (eds) (1997), Practising Sustainable Water Management: Canadian and International Experiences, Canadian Water Resources Association, Cambridge, Ontario, Canada. Mulford, C. and Rogers, D. (1982), ‘Definitions and Models’, in Rogers, D. and Whetten, D., Interorganizational Coordination: Theory, Research and Implementation, Iowa State University Press, Ames, USA, pp. 9–31. Nathan, M. and Mitroff, I. (1991), ‘The Use of Negotiated Order Theory as a Tool for the Analysis and Development of an Interorganizational Field’, Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 27(2), pp. 163–180. Owen, M. (1973), The Tennessee Valley Authority, Praeger Publishers, London. Pierre, J. (ed.) (2000), Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Pinkerton, E. (1989), ‘Attaining Better Fisheries Management Through Comanagement: Prospects, Problems and Propositions’, pp. 3–33, in E. Pinkerton (ed.), Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries: New Direction in Improved Management and Community Development, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, BC, Canada. Rothschild-Whitt, J. (1979), ‘The Collectivist Organization: An Alternative to RationalBureaucratic Models’, American Sociological Review, 44, pp. 509–527. Selin, S. and Chavez, D. (1995), ‘Developing a Collaborative Model for Environmental Planning and Management’, Environmental Management, 19(2), pp. 189–195. Shrubsole, D. (1996), ‘Ontario Conservation Authorities: principles, practice and challenges 50 years later’, Applied Geography, 16(4), pp. 319–335. Taylor, M. and Warburton, D. (2003), ‘Legitimacy and the Role of UK Third Sector Organizations in the Policy Process’, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14(3), pp. 321–338. Trist, E. (1980), ‘The Environment and System-Response Capability’, Futures, 12(2), pp. 113–127. Trist, E. (1983), ‘Referent Organizations and the Development of Inter-organizational Domains’, Human Relations, 36(3), pp. 269–284. Waddock, S. A. (1989), ‘Understanding Social Partnerships: An Evolutionary Model of Partnership Organizations’, Administration and Society, 21(10), pp. 78–100. Wallis, R. and Robinson, S. (1991), ‘Integrated Catchment Management: the Western Australian Experience’, Environment, 33, pp. 231–40. Watson, N. (1997), ‘Policy and Practice for Sustainable Water Management in England and Wales’, in Mitchell, B. and Shrubsole, D. (eds), Practising Sustainable Water Management: Canadian and International Experiences, Canadian Water Resources Association, Cambridge, Ontario, Canada, Chapter 12. Watson, N. (2001), ‘The contribution of multi-stakeholder partnerships to sustainable river basin management in Canada’, pp. 319–326, in Proceedings of the 2001 International Sustainable Development Research Conference, University of Manchester, ERP Environment, Shipley. Watson, N., Mitchell, B. and Mulamoottil, G. (1997), ‘Nitrate in Water: the Application of a Conceptual/Analytical Framework’, International Journal of Water Resources Development, Volume 13 (2), pp. 223–240.

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Wester, P. and Warner, J. (2002), ‘River Basin Management Reconsidered’, in Turton, A. and Henwood, R. (eds), Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective, African Water Issues Research Unit, University of Pretoria, South Africa, Ch. 4. Wondolleck, J. and Yaffee, S. (2000), Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovation in Natural Resource Management, Island Press, Washington DC. Wood, D. and Gray, B. (1991), ‘Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Collaboration’, Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 27(2), pp. 139–162. Young, G., Doodge, J. and Rodda, J. (eds) (1994), Global Water Resources Issues, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Chapter 4

Integrated Catchment Management and MSPs: Pulling in Different Directions? Bruce Mitchell

Introduction As explained in the introductory chapter, three main questions are addressed in this book: (1) do multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) make a difference? – in the sense of creating a meaningful change for those represented by them, and successfully co-opting the public, private and civil society sectors? (2) are MSPs compatible with integrated water resource management (IWRM)? – in that the latter emphasises a ‘whole of system’ perspective and the former usually emphasises a more local perspective, and (3) can MSPs be sustainable? – in that many MSP platforms are slow to grow but quick to wither or die. Against that background, this chapter has several objectives, in order to address the three questions posed above, with particular attention to the second. The ﬁrst objective is to review the rationale for and nature of IWRM, and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of different interpretations of this approach. A second is to consider the strengths and limitations of MSPs, in the context of IWRM. A third and ﬁnal objective is to outline some practical ways in which the limitations of MSPs can be addressed in the context of IWRM. Integrated Water Resource Management The concept of integrated water resource management (IWRM) is not new (White 1957; Weber 1964; Schramm 1980; OECD 1989; Young et al. 1994). For example, in 1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was established so that initiatives related to hydropower development, navigation and ﬂood control in the Tennessee River basin could be pursued in a coordinated and integrated manner. Without the TVA, it was recognised that different agencies responsible for power, navigation and ﬂood control would likely operate independently, and lose opportunity to design and operate activities to complement one another (Hodge 1938; Ransmeier 1942; Lilienthal 1944; Clapp 1955; Kyle 1958; Hubbard 1961; Selznick 1966; Owen 1973; Callahan 1980). The TVA was preceded by watershed conservancy districts in Ohio, starting as early as 1913 (Browning 1949; Craine 1957; Giertz 1974; Jenkins 1976). In Canada, legislation was passed in Ontario during 1946 to create Conservation Authorities, catchment-based organizations modelled

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after the experience in Ohio and the Tennessee River valley and formed through a partnership of municipalities with the provincial government (Pleva 1961; Richardson 1974; Mitchell and Gardner 1983; Mitchell and Shrubsole 1992). The trigger was realization that individual municipalities often did not have the resources or authority to take initiatives (such as construction and operation of upstream dams and reservoirs for ﬂood damage protection) which would beneﬁt an individual municipality, as well as other downstream communities. Under the statute, Conservation Authorities could be established when a majority of municipalities in a basin agreed to work together with the provincial government. Once that agreement was reached, they could access provincial funding designated for such basin organizations. These examples highlight that for over 90 years the value of integrated river or catchment management and collaborative approaches had been recognised in the United States and Canada. IWRM also has been applied for decades in other regions. In England and Wales, a catchment-based approach began in the 1960s, with a steady evolution toward fewer but larger organizations with more management functions (Funnel and Hey 1974; Okun 1977; Sewell and Barr 1978; Parker and Penning-Rowsell 1980; Kinnerley 1988; Bullen 1996; Watson et al. 1996). In Britain, there also has been considerable debate regarding the role of the private sector as a partner with public agencies in catchment-based management (Kinnersley 1994). Basin agencies were established in France during 1964 (Lamour 1961; Harrison and Sewell 1976; Bullen 1996), and in Australia the concept of total or integrated catchment management was introduced in the mid 1980s, with agencies created or redesigned with reference to experience in the United States, Britain and Canada (Sewell et al. 1985; Burton 1986; Cunningham 1986; Australian Water Resources Council 1988; Mitchell and Pigram 1989; Mitchell and Hollick 1993; Johnson et al. 1996; May et al. 1996; Robinson and Humphries 1997; Bellamy et al. 1999; Bellamy and Johnson 2000). Similar attention was given to the links between land and water in New Zealand, especially during the 1980s (Howard 1988; May et al. 1996) Rationale For and Nature of an Integrated Approach A major driver for IWRM has been recognition that management responsibility within a catchment or for an aquifer often is divided among various public agencies at different spatial scales (national, state, municipal) as well as is shared among different agencies (agriculture, economic development, forestry, water, wildlife) at the same spatial scale. The outcome is that different agencies’ activities frequently act at cross purposes with each other, such as when an agricultural agency provides grants to drain wetlands to increase food production while at the same time a natural resources agency provides grants to protect or expand wetlands to increase habitat for migratory birds or to reduce ﬂood damage potential. A common outcome is that ‘when everyone is charge, no one is in charge’ (Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront 1992, xxii). Given the potential beneﬁts for coordination and collaboration among public sector agencies, as well as with the private sector and civil society organizations, there has been growing interest in and application of IWRM.

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Kindler (2000, 314) identiﬁed 10 generally accepted characteristics of IWRM. With some minor modiﬁcations, these are: •

• • • •

• • • • •

Moves beyond traditional approaches, which tend to be sectorally oriented and fragmented, and instead seeks to manage water resources as a whole, applying an ecosystem approach when feasible. Is analytical, providing advice on priorities, trade-offs, problems and solutions. Is dynamic and continuous, including development, management and protection of water resources towards democratically agreed objectives. Employs an interdisciplinary, holistic perspective that recognises the interconnections between different elements of aquatic systems. Maintains balance between protection of valuable ecosystems and development of water-related economies. Priorities for water use are set with regard to the need to minimise and mitigate adverse impacts on the environment. Seeks input from stakeholders to establish policies for equitable allocation of water. Is evolutionary, often requiring iterative solutions to complex issues involving economic, social, environmental, legal and regulatory dimensions. Provides a mechanism to reduce or resolve conﬂicts related to resource allocation as well as approval or permits or licences. Promotes awareness by all government and community levels about sustainable development and the importance of environmental protection. Promotes capacity enhancement and building, including human resource development.

The above ideas and concerns are reﬂected in the design of organizations such as the Saskatchewan Watershed Authority, established in Canada in October 2002. As explained in the ﬁrst annual report, the rationale was a desire for ‘a comprehensive approach to water management’ (Saskatchewan Watershed Authority 2003, 4). The vision for the SWA is ‘excellence in watershed management that promotes safe, sustainable water supplies within healthy ecosystems’, and the following principles (from a total of 10) guide its activities: • • • •

•

Shared Responsibility: recognizing that wise management and use of water is an individual and collective responsibility. Stewardship: caring for watersheds to sustain the natural processes on which life depends. Partnership: working cooperatively with citizens, stakeholders, other governments and First Nations. Watershed/ecosystem Approach: considering implications to the entire aquifer and/or watershed when taking decisions, and recognizing that all components in an ecosystem are closely linked and cannot be managed in isolation from one another. Sustainable Development: promoting development and diversiﬁcation which is environmentally, economically and socially sustainable.

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• •

Beneﬁcial Practice: adopting beneﬁcial management practices that are based on good science. Empowerment: providing staff with the proper tools and authority to make decisions and take action within a policy framework.

However, Hooper et al. (1999, 749–752) have cautioned that ‘integrated catchment management’ should not be advocated or implemented uncritically, as it requires signiﬁcant time and resources. As a result, the beneﬁts of an integrated approach should be capable of being identiﬁed, or else the concept may become discredited. Furthermore, there will be many situations in which relatively straightforward initiatives by one agency will be sufﬁcient to deal with an issue. While an integrated approach often will be needed when situations are characterized by complexity, uncertainty and conﬂict, it should not be assumed that it is always appropriate or even desirable (Fitzsimmons 1996, 1998, 1999). As Kindler (2000, 313–314) noted, ‘it cannot be automatically accepted that integration leads to the improved effectiveness of water resources management. Fragmented and shared responsibilities are a reality and are always likely to exist’. Different Interpretations of IWRM Downs et al. (1991) reviewed the research literature, and identiﬁed 36 different approaches to IWRM. Many others have discussed the meaning of IWRM as a concept by itself, such as Mitchell (1983; 1986; 1990), Margerum and Born (1995; 2000), Heathcote (1998). Hooper et al. (1999), Margerum (1999a to d), and, Kindler (2000), or have viewed IWRM as one type of a broader ecosystem approach, such as Grumbine (1994; 1997), Slocombe (1998a; 1998b), and Bunch (2003). IWRM represents one interpretation of a holistic or ecosystem approach, and Mitchell (1990, 4–5) distinguished between ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ interpretations. At a strategic level, it is appropriate to use a comprehensive approach, where that means striving to identify and consider the broadest array of variables, relationships and processes with implications for coordinated management of aquatic and terrestrial resources. However, when moving to an operational level, maintaining a comprehensive perspective may be counterproductive, since not all variables, relationships and processes have equal value in shaping structures and dynamics in a catchment. If continuing with a comprehensive approach, the likelihood is high that an unreasonably long period of time will be taken for data collection, analysis and plan development, and that the resultant plan will be dated before it is completed. Therefore, at an operational scale it is more appropriate to take an integrated approach, which is more selective, focusing on those variables, relationships and processes understood to be the main inﬂuences on the behaviour and variation in the catchment system and for which management intervention can be expected to make a difference. In this way, plans should be able to be prepared more quickly, and therefore be more likely to be relevant to management problems and issues. Experience in Canada indicates that the distinction between comprehensive and integrated approaches is not an academic nicety, but does lead to different approaches to scoping issues, deﬁning problems, and developing a plan (Mitchell

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1983; Mitchell and Gardner 1983; Ontario Watershed Planning Implementation Project Management Committee 1997). Several comments deserve attention relative to the above observations. IWRM has been conceived to ensure a holistic or ecosystem approach, and to facilitate the coordination of initiatives by different stakeholders. With regard to the latter aspect, a strong motivation is to break down what is often referred to as the ‘silo effect’, or the tendency of agencies to take decisions only with regard to their own mandates and authority, without reference to those of other organizations. In this manner, there is a reasonable expectation that catchment management will be more effective and efﬁcient. However, in promoting a whole of systems perspective, IWRM can experience tension with MSPs, since many individuals, communities or stakeholder groups do not always give attention to the entire system, but rather only to that part or aspect which reﬂects their own needs and interests. Thus, individuals often focus only on the impacts of catchment management on their own property, while municipal governments frequently worry only about the area under the responsibility of themselves. As a result, if IWRM and MSPs are to be used together, care has to be taken to understand not only the strengths and limitations of IWRM, but also those of MSPs, and especially when they are used together. In that spirit, the following section considers some key aspects of MSPs. Multi-Stakeholder Platforms Rationale For and Nature of MSPs The beneﬁts from MSPs are increasingly being recognized, and it is also being appreciated that collaboration can occur for various purposes. Collaboration allows stakeholders to come together to alert others about their views regarding different aspects of a problem, and then together explore differences and search constructively for solutions going beyond any one stakeholder’s capacities and limitations, thereby sharing resources, and enhancing each other’s capacity for mutual beneﬁt and to achieve a common purpose by sharing risks, responsibilities and rewards (Gray 1989; Himmelman 1996, 22). To achieve effective partnerships. Mitchell (2002, 186) and Gunton and Day (2003, 13–17) suggest the following attributes are all important: • • • • • • • • • •

Shared vision Compatibility between participants, based on integrity, mutual trust and respect, as well as patience and perseverance by all partners Adaptability and ﬂexibility Inclusive representation Beneﬁts to all partners Equitable power for partners (which does not mean equal power) Clear ground rules Process accountability Sound process management Communication channels

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• • •

Realistic timelines Implementation and monitoring processes in place Multiple-objective evaluation

In addition to the above features, Gunton and Day (2003, 13–14) highlighted that it is essential to determine if a collaborative approach is appropriate in any speciﬁc situation since in their view a collaborative approach, or MSPs, ‘may not work in all circumstances’ (the same observation was made earlier regarding IWRM). Furthermore, they noted that trying to use MSPs in inappropriate circumstances ‘can lead to frustration and discrediting of the entire concept’. To help determine when MSPs are appropriate, they identiﬁed ﬁve pre-conditions for success: (1) commitment of decision-making agencies to MSPs, (2) commitment of all stakeholders, (3) urgency for resolution of an issue or issues, (4) absence of fundamental value differences, and (5) existence of feasible solutions. In their view, the challenge is not whether all pre-conditions are met perfectly, but whether they are met sufﬁciently to allow an MSP process to be started. In an earlier section focused on IWRM, reference was made to the silo effect, the inclination of public agencies and others to interpret their mandates without regard to the mandates of others, and to develop initiatives reﬂecting only their responsibilities and authority. When this occurs, the ﬁrst and second pre-conditions noted above will not be satisﬁed adequately. And, if there are sharp value or interest differences among stakeholders, the fourth pre-condition will not be met. In such situations, the application of a MSP becomes questionable. Another challenge, not explicitly noted in the previous ‘attributes of success’ and ‘pre-conditions’, deserves consideration. Partnerships assume a willingness to collaborate and cooperate, yet humans often are competitive and primarily motivated by self interest. Indeed, ‘economic man’, the basis of many models used by economists, assumes that many individuals making decisions in their own self interest, and in competition with others, will result in scarce societal resources being allocated optimally (Mitchell 2003). Even if the view is only partially accurate that competition is as likely or more likely to prevail than collaboration, care should be taken when creating management processes based on willingness to share, be open, and cooperate, when the presence of competition related to satisfying self interest may be much more dominant. Thus, in addition to some of the challenges for MSPs posed by IWRM, other fundamental obstacles can hinder successful implementation of MSPs. Empowerment and Transformation? A further aspect deserves careful attention. Advocates of MSPs often believe that, through participation in and engagement with issues and problems, the general public will become empowered, and then subsequently be transformed through new insight about processes related to civil societies (Mitchell, 2003). In that regard, Ellis (2002, 46–63) completed a comprehensive and systematic review of the concept of ‘empowerment’. While ﬁnding that no clear or readily accepted deﬁnition exists, she concluded that six basic components usually characterise empowerment:

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1. Self-efﬁcacy, or a range of feelings related to self worth, ability to be affective in a broad sense, self conﬁdence, and positive self image. 2. Knowledge and skills relevant to the goal of empowerment. Key knowledge includes understanding of social and political power systems and power structures, government policies, policy-making processes, and how to obtain resources. Key skills include decision making, social and political participation, communication, lobbying, organizing, critical thinking and problem solving. 3. Opportunity to take action, including how to make decisions and provide input to an organization, or to mobilise without being repressed. Opportunities can be offered (such as through an invitation to participate in a government or community decision-making process), or can be created (such as through lobbying or community action). 4. Action, through a wide range of activities, from trying to take greater control of one’s own life, to running for elected ofﬁce. This can be pursued by lobbying, or by participating in community or government-based decision processes. 5. Resources, with speciﬁc resources of interest usually being funding, time, human resources, information and training. 6. Impact, and can range from taking greater control of one’s own health or well being to greater ability to do one’s job. In practice, impact involves having a desired affect on policies, events or decision-making processes. Combining the above characteristics, Ellis (2002, 57) concluded that empowerment usefully can be interpreted in the following manner: To be empowered, individuals or groups must perceive that they have selfefﬁcacy, knowledge and skills, opportunity and resources. They must engage in some sort of action(s) directed towards a desired impact, and have some sort of desired impact resulting from that/those action(s). They must also perceive that they engaged in that/those action(s) and had a desired impact resulting from that/those action(s). Through engagement and empowerment, advocates of MSPs normally believe that individuals and groups can be transformed as a result of social learning. As Diduck (2001, 3) observed, learning can help to overcome personal constraints on participation, such as lack of knowledge, understanding, or skills, aspects all identiﬁed by Ellis as important for achievement of empowerment. Social learning through participation also can help to clarify terms and conceptual models, provide a common base of understanding and, thereby, resolve cognitive conﬂict .... As well, it could clarify and make explicit the opposing values, interests, options or actions at the heart of other forms of conﬂict. Learning ... could also illuminate unknown situations and identify problems, and thereby, reduce ignorance .... (Diduck 2001, 3).

However, the work by both Ellis and Diduck raises questions about how much empowerment and transformation should be expected through MSPs. In her work,

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Ellis (2002) examined a shared decision-making process based on a round table in the Okanagan-Shuswap Land and Resource Management Planning Process in British Columbia, Canada to determine whether participants became more empowered, and what variables affected empowerment. This was one instance of the Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) process introduced in that province during the early 1990s (Duffy et al. 1996; Day et al. 2003). LRMPs are processes based on principles of consensus building, sustainability, and consideration of all resource values. They are usually two to ﬁve year sub-regional processes designed to involve all parties with a key interest in the plan. The sub-regions normally cover 15,000 to 25,000 km2. Ellis collected data between February 1996, when monthly meetings started, and July 2001, after implementation had begun. She attended all the round table meetings in 1996, and then selected meetings through to 2000. She focused on all 39 table representatives who had joined the process by the ﬁfth meeting, and conducted interviews with all participants on three different occasions (July and August 1996; May 1997; September 1998). In addition, she observed and interviewed participants informally on an ongoing basis. Of 30 participants from the public groups who she was able to interview for all three stages, she concluded that 4 became very highly empowered, 8 became highly empowered, 12 became moderately empowered, and 6 did not become empowered. Her analysis revealed that only 6 of the highly or very highly empowered participants were highly or very highly empowered as a result of participating in this MSP process; the other 6 participants in those categories all had a high level of empowerment before the LRMP process started. Diduck (2001) addressed two questions: (1) to what extent do environmental assessment processes facilitate learning by individuals who participate in the process? and (2) what are the forms of and constraints on learning by individuals who participate in environmental assessment processes? His case study was a hog processing facility in Brandon, Manitoba. Evidence was assembled through review of documents, participant observation, and semi-structured qualitative interviews. During the environmental impact assessment process, Diduck interviewed 27 individuals selected from ‘key publics’, which included proponents, federal and provincial government regulators, non-governmental organizations both supportive and critical of the project, the business sector, the news media, academics, and private citizens. He also attended two public meetings in October and November 1999. His main conclusions were that ‘the extent to which EA as currently practised facilitates mutual learning among participants is quite limited, that is, EA processes deviate quite substantially from the ideal conditions of learning’, ‘the emancipatory potential of participation in environmental assessment is highly restricted’, ‘opportunities for all participants to deﬁne their own meanings, intentions and values are limited, which restricts opportunities to self-deﬁne broader goals and community futures’, and restrict ‘opportunities for collective mobilization in opposition to dominant social forces’ (Diduck 2001, 152–153). More speciﬁcally, he found serious constraints related to accessible and complete information, freedom from

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manipulation and control, openness to diverse perspectives, opportunity to reﬂect critically on presuppositions, equitable opportunity to participate, and opportunity to have arguments evaluated in a systematic manner (Diduck 2001, 148). In that context, he concluded that ‘the emancipatory potential of involvement in EA, and opportunities for mutual learning, could be increased with greater ﬂexibility in EA institutional arrangements to accommodate incremental or transactive approaches to public involvement’ (Diduck 2001, 154). Diduck’s ﬁndings are consistent with those of Ellis. That is, the assumed beneﬁts of participatory approaches and partnerships do not automatically emerge. The above discussion suggests that a basic belief is that partnerships, built on collaboration and cooperation, will trigger learning which will lead to empowerment which in turn results in a transformation for an individual, a group, and eventually, perhaps, a society. However, some research suggests that the assumed beneﬁts of empowerment and transformation may not always emerge as signiﬁcantly as is usually believed. At the same time, a basic human characteristic, to be motivated by self interest which leads to competitive behaviour, may impede, hinder or block realization of the potential beneﬁts of partnerships and participatory approaches. The next section considers some recent studies focused on the extent to which learning and transformation do or do not occur. Strategies and Approaches regarding IWRM and MSPs General Lessons The following lessons have emerged from analysis of IWRM and MSPs in Western countries, especially Canada, but also Australia, Britain and the USA (Ontario Watershed Planning Implementation Project Management Committee 1997; Mitchell 1998; Hooper et al. 1999; Born and Genskow 2000; Leach et al. 2002). They summarise points made earlier in this chapter, and provide a context for identifying strategies and approaches to overcome the tension in using IWRM and MSPs together. They are not presented in order of importance. It is important to recognise the signiﬁcance of them all, and to be prepared to move forward opportunistically on each. None by itself is sufﬁcient to ensure effective implementation of IWRM and MSPs. • •

• •

Importance of understanding and appreciating the context or local conditions which require capacity to custom design solutions. Appreciation of the need to take a long-term perspective, since problems usually were not created in a few years and therefore are unlikely to be resolved quickly. Decades often are required to stop or reverse degradation, or to resolve scarcity problems. Importance of having a vision or desirable direction so that there is a clear understanding about the desired future condition. Legitimacy or credibility for an integrated and collaborative approach must

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•

• • •

• •

•

•

•

•

•

be established, best achieved through ongoing commitment from political and other leaders in local communities. Such commitment is not always easy to obtain and sustain, since politicians are more attracted to initiatives which provide tangible and short-term outputs, and the outcomes from an integrated and collaborative approach often are intangible and long term (point 2 above). A leader or champion who will continue to work for and support an integrated and collaborative approach through inevitable set backs, disappointments and frustrations. Such a committed leader often is the key factor related to success. Willingness to share or redistribute power is usually necessary, if signiﬁcant change is to occur. A multi-stakeholder group should be created to ensure that processes are representative, open, transparent and accessible. Decisions by the multi-stakeholder group should be based on consensus, the best way to ensure long-term commitment from the community to accept decisions. Awareness of the likelihood of burnout by volunteers from the community who participate in IWRM. It should be accepted from the outset that a process for an integrated and collaborative approach normally will unfold in an atmosphere characterised by turbulence, uncertainty and surprises. As a result, participants need to be ﬂexible, adaptable and willing to learn from mistakes. There never can be enough time devoted to communication within and between groups. Such communication should be done in ‘plain language’ to ensure all participants are kept informed and updated. Demonstration projects should be used to provide tangible evidence of progress, and to allow a role for those who feel more comfortable with a ‘hands-on’ rather than a planning approach. Long-term change and improvement require attention to information and education, as change is most likely to occur from different attitudes and values in the community. Explicit provision should be given to means for implementation and monitoring of progress regarding decisions and plan recommendations. It is in this manner that it becomes possible to learn from doing’, and to beneﬁt from experience (point #10). Accomplishments should be noted and celebrated.

With speciﬁc reference to MSPs, many initiatives with community-based planning, management and development in the context of catchments have occurred throughout the world, and lessons are being learned (Pinkerton 1996; Cantwell and Day 1998; Litke and Day 1998; Grifﬁn 1999; Habron 2003). Stout (1998, 6) reported that the United States Department of Agriculture Conservation Technology Information Centre has a ‘Top Ten Hint List’ for successful catchment management. In Stout’s words, the hints are, in decreasing order of importance:

Integrated Catchment Management and MSPs

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

59

Think small. The smaller the watershed, the easier the partners can relate or connect to it. In addition, the smaller the watershed, the faster it will react to changes in management practices such as precision farming or land uses such as green strips. Bring everyone to the table. Successful watershed efforts include everyone who has a stake. This enables the group to build a consensus on what needs to be done and how to do it. Leaving a critical stakeholder out of the process at any step may cause unnecessary problems later. Great leaders plant seeds and nurture them. They facilitate the groups to reach consensus, plant new and different ideas when necessary, and assist the group in nurturing those ideas. Effective leaders are great communicators, they listen and expand on others’ ideas, and make sure every idea is explored and that all stakeholders are heard. Ask for free advice and in-kind services. For example, if you need a video, ask the local television station for script and production assistance. If you need monitoring or assistance, work with your local water department and your local school system. And don’t forget that saying thank you in public will go a long way toward getting additional help the next time. One bonus tip: No one gives money to a group without a plan for how to use it. Financial assistance can come from unusual places and innovative sources once the group has a solid plan. Encourage teaching. Allow stakeholders to teach each other. No idea is too simple to be discussed. For example, a farmer can teach the basics of watering, fertilizer application, and pest management to homeowners. Seek common interests, not positions. By working to ﬁnd the common interest of all stakeholders, you will establish a strong foundation for an effective watershed management plan. One way to do this is to get past opposing positions by asking why stakeholders have taken a particular position. Keep asking why again and again. It usually takes seven layers of ‘whys’ to uncover the interest common to other stakeholders. Celebrate successes. Regardless of how small, celebrate progress. Whether your groups measure progress by the number of canoe trips, kilometres of buffer strips, or hectares of no-till farming, reaching benchmarks is important. One more bonus tip: Be kind to each other; you may need that person to agree with you later. Ask not ‘do you like it?’ but ask, ‘can you live with it?’. Remember that you probably will propose many ideas before the group reaches a common point of agreement. What is important in reaching a consensus is that everyone can agree to live with a decision. Conﬂict can be healthy – if managed positively. Conﬂicting views or ideas often become a third view or idea that can be healthy for the group’s efforts and the watershed’s health. Patience. Patience. Patience. We didn’t get to where we are today overnight, and we won’t get to where we are going tomorrow. When we set a lofty goal, break it down in smaller steps. Before knowing it, you will have reached your goal.

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Practical Implications The above lessons or guidelines provide a solid framework for using MSPs in the context of IWRM. A good starting point to overcome the tension due to IWRM addressing an entire catchment or aquifer, and MSPs tending to focus on more local areas within the larger system, is to work simultaneously at two scales: Entire catchment It is common to have a catchment-based MSP with representation from all sub-areas and sectors in the basin. In this manner, it is possible to maintain a ‘big picture’ perspective, and to consider a full range of values and interests, and associated conﬂicts, such as those involving different priorities due to different spatial interests (such as from upstream and downstream communities) or due to different sectoral interests (such as from forestry, agriculture, wildlife, recreation, etc.). To be effective, the members of a catchment-based MSP must report regularly to their constituents, and represent the views of their constituents to the catchmentwide MSP. Sub-catchments In parallel with the catchment-wide MSP, increasingly subbasin catchment MSPs are used to ensure the catchment-wide group does not get overwhelmed by the many interests and conﬂicts across an entire basin, and also does not develop strategies or initiatives that do not make sense in all the sub-catchments since each usually has distinctive characteristics. It is common that several members from each sub-basin catchment MSP become members of the catchment-wide MSP, to ensure that the spatial and sectoral views from each sub-basin are shared at the catchment scale. Overall Implications Tension undeniably is generated when IWRM and MSPs are combined. Some occurs because of the different orientation or perspective required by each (IWRM: whole of system, MSP: subpart of system), and some is due to some fundamental challenges underlying MSPs which are independent or unrelated to IWRM per se. However, considerable insight has accumulated from initiatives which have used MSPs within IWRM. While the challenges and issues are not trivial, there is now understanding which allows us to generate principles or guidelines to help shape the way in which MSPs and IWRM can be merged. Returning to the three questions at the beginning of this chapter, answers can be provided: •

•

Do multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) make a difference? Answer: a qualiﬁed yes. MSPs can make a difference, as long as there is (1) appreciation that empowerment and transformation of stakeholders are not automatic, and (2) recognition that many people are competitive and driven by self interest rather than predisposition to cooperate and collaborate. Are MSPs compatible with integrated water resource management (IWRM)?

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•

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Answer: yes, especially if blended initiatives use parallel approaches of basin-wide and sub-basin MSPs, and also include appropriate mechanisms for communication. Can MSPs be sustainable? Answer: yes, as long as those responsible for MSPs recognise the need for a shared vision to provide a common purpose, that there can be burn out of stakeholders from civil society, and that it is important in early stages to undertake initiatives that lead to tangible results which can be celebrated. Furthermore, it is critically important to have key leaders or champions who will continue to pursue the desired future, even when daunting obstacles are encountered.

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Chapter 5

Contrasting UK Experiences with Participatory Approaches to Integrated River Basin Management Malcolm Newson

Introduction: Water and Sustainability In many ways, those concerned with the development and management of water and related river basin resources have spearheaded international efforts to understand and operate the principles of sustainability during the last decade. In the Dublin Statement, issued by water specialists before the Rio ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992 (WMO 1992), the essential, but missing, interdisciplinarity of water (and land) resource management became established. The shortfall between the ideals and actualities of integration was clear to those who had worked to show the links between hydrology and other biophysical sciences and with the social sciences (Falkenmark 1997). Partly as a consequence of its widespread appearance in Agenda 21 (four chapters), international support has risen sharply for integrated approaches to water resource management (IWRM) within river basin frameworks (IRBM). Whilst there is a growing body of criticism of the approach (e.g. Biswas 2004) there are equally strong signs of government acceptance (e.g. in the European Union’s Water Framework Directive). To the framework of integration have been added bolder, cross-bracing approaches to ecosystem protection, new frameworks for water governance (framed in the language of participation – our focus in this Chapter) and treatment of water as an economic resource. Latterly, the prioritisation of poverty alleviation through urgent provision of water supply and sanitation has raised questions about the forbidding breadth, duration and technical demands of IWRM/IRBM (Hens and Nath 2003; Mwanza 2003). Despite prestigious support on the international stage, IWRM/IRBM represents extremely complex biophysical and socio-economic agendas (Calder 1999); some authors seek to represent the complexities pictorially with ‘wiring diagrams’ (see Newson 2004). Figure 5.1 here is a gross simpliﬁcation of the aims of sustainable management inspired by ‘catchment consciousness’ (Tane 1996), but this simpliﬁcation allows a convenient mapping of some of the key elements of the new water transition: •

An initial focus on allocating demands for water, both human and ecosystemic.

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• • •

A separation of strategic from operational decisions The role of knowledge in decision support and of uncertainty in that knowledge The inclusion of public participation, economics and, above all, hydropolitics (for an introduction to hydropolitics see Ohlsson 1995; Turton and Henwood 2002)

Figure 5.1

Sustainable river basin management, assisted by political debate, ecological knowledge, economic assessment and public participation

The political dimension of water is not hard to reconstruct from Wittfogel’s (1957) unique and outspoken historical treatment of the ‘hydraulic civilisations’, focusing on hierarchical societal structures in support of irrigation economies. In some senses, our apparently more democratic, Western model for water development has in fact facilitated a water management ‘technocracy’ (Newson, 1997) in which the heroic role of the water engineer in supply-side operations has meant a strategy of ‘cometh

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the need, cometh the dam and the pipes’. In an era of ‘water crisis’ (Newson 2000) it is a reﬂection of the inbuilt technocracy of water, reﬂected in protective management styles, that the whole ﬁeld of governance and hydropolitics is only slowly emerging, behind ‘hydroeconomics’ and other obviously highly-structured managerial attempts to secure public accountability (not participation). It must, however, be admitted that in the initial stages of a new water paradigm, some aspects of its predecessor may need to be retained. Issues such as scientiﬁc uncertainty, legal accountability and professional standards need close scrutiny before the widespread adoption of adaptive management (Newson and Clark 2007). Paradoxically, during this process, the IWRM/IRBM agenda may be badly served by unquestioning addiction to the apparent rationality of the river basin management scale: IWRM/IRBM needs to be questioned effectively and ‘ﬁt for purpose’ (e.g. applied at appropriate scales) so that the new orthodoxy does not merely repeat the failings of its predecessor. For example, Rhoades (1998, 5) is explicitly sceptical: The newness, complexity and ambition of multi-purpose, multi-scale watershed approaches makes success elusive even in the best of circumstances. The assumption that a precisely deﬁned geophysical unit also serves as a socio-political or economic unit for planning and management is clearly ﬂawed. Watersheds as closed human management units are external bureaucratic or researcher fantasies, not indigenous ones.

Nevertheless, if political viability is indicated by policy incorporation, the decade since Agenda 21 has seen two major practical contributions to the establishment of both strategic and operational principles for IWRM/IRBM – the Water Act in South Africa (Schreiner et al. 2002) and the EU Water Framework Directive (hereafter ‘WFD’: EC 2000). Our focus here, however, is also on the plethora of smaller-scale actions that seem to incorporate blind faith in ‘catchment consciousness’ as a policy guide. From ‘Technocracy’ to Participation in UK Water Management Water management has an inescapable heroic technological past (see Binnie 1981; Rennison 1979 for the UK). We should not assume that engineering science blindly follows its own obsessions, but its radical nature often makes it vulnerable to incorporation in increasingly sophisticated but unsustainable ‘mega-projects’ rather than providing technical assistance to the ‘Blue Revolution’ (Calder’s title, 1999). In the period of transition under review there has been considerable progress in the relevant science and technology – part of a genuine professional effort by engineers and scientists to play a major part in sustainable water development (Bailey 1996). Yet, engineering design remains accountable to an increasingly litigious society and there are few signs that the water management ‘mind set’ is genuinely and pro-actively open to e.g. indigenous knowledge, adaptive management and, thus, meaningful public participation. A UK ﬂood project manager has complained that, for effective public participation, professionals must ‘give the project away’. Compared with this generosity, there is considerable hesitation about incorporating public participation in both the South Africa Water Act and the EU Framework Directive. The critical

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agenda may therefore be that of hydropolitics, since changes of governance and conﬂict resolution are as vital as those of protocols and procedures. We should brieﬂy mention a recent and considerable assault on the technocratic agenda, the World Commission on Dams. The Commission’s report (WCD 2000) is of substantial inﬂuence, given the international inﬂuence of its Chair (Professor Kader Asmal, former Minister of Water Affairs, South Africa) and the critical backlashes against precautionary approaches to dam building unleashed by e.g. the International Commission on Large Dams and the World Bank. Such battles are, in a sense, side issues in the search for a new model of water governance for the ‘New Environmental Age’ (Nicholson 1987). Rationality and reality are often mismatched in the new uncertain environment for decisionmaking and traditional conceptual models of the interdisciplinary ‘ﬁx’ are suspect (Newson 2004; Newson and Clark 2007). As a general decision-making model under conditions of uncertainty, Kai Lee (1993) has suggested, on the basis of his experience in managing the problems of the Columbia Basin USA, that science is a ‘compass’ to guide our options, but open democratic debate and argument are the ‘gyroscope’ that keeps us level. There is an explicit implication in Lee’s thesis that the model will only ﬂourish under conditions of adaptive management but the implicit implication is more relevant to participatory processes: information and its exchange form a vital hub. However strongly general principles of realistic governance are advocated, there is little evidence that they are followed outside celebrated examples of ‘localism’ or in river basins, like the Columbia (Lee’s example), where there have been long-lasting ‘wicked problems’ (Wester and Warner 2002). Many other, apparently successful, examples of inclusive IRBM exist in the USA, Canada, Australia and Europe and their common feature is that of appropriate, generally local, scaling of ‘the problem’, the relevant institutions and the involved community, of both stakeholders and general public. There are, however, widespread inadequacies in both the nature of the science input and the workings of the broader democracy implied by better water governance. Some of these are addressed in our case studies (below) but, again, at a very small scale. Issues of governance relate strongly to issues of scaling, in both space and time; to set up an involved and creative polity it is vital to understand and appreciate the appropriate scale of water issues and the potentially different scales at which the public reacts to them. In most cases, especially when viewed from national government, it is appropriate to envisage a nested hierarchy of spatial scales for water management, with due regard for existing political and administrative boundaries. Subsidiarity is a strong component of sustainability but there need to be linking processes or plans between each level of the hierarchy and in both directions. The European Union’s WFD represents a sharp move away from the ‘technocratic’ tradition of water management, conﬁrming as it does the central preoccupation with water bodies as part of an ecosystem. It is by the achievement of ‘good ecological quality’ that successful system management is legally judged (with the exception of ‘Heavily Modiﬁed’ waters where an anthropocentric priority is permitted). The Directive’s adoption of ‘strong’ sustainability (Pearce 1993) is tempered by its equally demanding inclusion of public participation and the use of economic valuation in the

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formulation of the core River Basin District Plans and the subsequent programme of measures. It is in the context of the dearth of operational guidance on participatory processes for implementing the WFD in the UK that our case studies are presented below. In a recent review of IRBM across Europe, WWF (2003) concluded that public participation is ‘poor or very poor’ in almost half of the surveyed countries, that the public is seldom capacitated enough to participate, resulting in disappointing outcomes and that projects are far from transparent to the public. Public Participation in the Planning and Management of UK Rivers The British public have, in the past, shown considerable faith in the robustness of UK water (supply side) management which ﬁrst gained an acclaimed welfare role during the vital public health reforms of the Victorian era. When travelling abroad Britons were always apt to lay blame for a range of vacation health problems on local water supply quantity and quality. Partly as a result of national complacency the public remained, however, largely ignorant of how their water supply was abstracted, prepared and delivered. In the New Environmental Age, and particularly in the wake of privatisation, the public now wants and uses a powerful voice in the regulatory framework for water management. Their role as consumers has opened a much richer awareness, achieved prominently through the ﬂow of information from the water services companies and in news coverage of their regulatory strictures. Public participation has also been facilitated by changes in environmental science (widespread provision of information and a stronger attempt to couch predictions in terms of risk) and by changes in governance (particularly within new bureaucratic territories such as river basins). During the 1990s the National Rivers Authority and subsequently the Environment Agency gained experience ‘the hard way’ during consultation on ﬁrstly Catchment Management Plans and then LEAPs (Local Environment Agency Plans). These were initially seen as documents rather than planning processes and made very little effort to understand the two-way ﬂows inherent in the compass-gyroscope relationship (Slater et al. 1994; Newson et al. 1999). Improvement is both essential and expected as water managers move to the statutory planning and consultation processes implied by the WFD (White and Howe 2003). Amongst the problems looming is the need to reconcile the plethora of water sector plans now unleashed on the UK public at various ‘rungs’ on the ‘Arnstein ladder’ of consultation (Ellis et al. 2002). There are also signs that public agencies may slowly move towards adaptive management as a means of coping with the very long timescales inherent in the sustainability vision. Viable techniques of decision support must therefore deliver: ‘the alluring prospect of combining the rigour of the scientiﬁc method with the contingent realities of policy and politics’ (Dovers and Mobbs 1997: 40). Information (and its management – Enserink and Monnikhof 2003) can now be seen as a vital core to public involvement in environmental issues, a message delivered from both river basins (Edwards-Jones 2003) and the coastal zone (King 2003). As well as being involved nationally and regionally as consumers of domestic water supply and as consultees in river basin plans, the involvement of the UK

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public has been sought locally in a range of small-scale river basin management projects. Most of these have no reported evaluation but publications are beginning to appear now from both the UK, USA and Australia (e.g. Edwards-Jones 1997a, 1997b; Hillman et al. 2003; Connick and Innes 2003; King 2003 – the latter example being from Integrated Coastal Zone Management). Almost unanimously these evaluations assert the central role of decisions based upon a broad but systematic body of information whose compilation and shared value becomes part of the ‘social capital’ of the participatory venture (Hillman et al. 2003, 221). King (2003, 142) suggests that ‘An information strategy is vital for participation and the two aspects should be conceived together.’ Another common thread is to put emphasis on quality of process rather than on mechanistic measures of outcome; ‘collaborative practices are more ﬂuid and less predictable than traditional forms of policy making’ (Connick and Innes 2003, 178). Natural Capital – A Potential Information Framework in Basin-Scale Public Participation It has frequently been argued that an holistic framework for both strategic environmental planning and the resulting operations might best be provided by the concept of nature (and its anthropogenic transformations) as ‘capital’. Natural processes are seen as counteracting anthropogenic impacts and are delivered to human societies as ‘services’ by intact ecosystems. As Daily (1997, 3) puts it: In addition to the production of goods, ecosystem services are the actual life-support functions, such as cleansing, recycling and renewal and they confer many intangible aesthetic and cultural beneﬁts as well.

Thus, in the ecosystem model for river basin management (Marchand and Toornstra 1986), ‘spontaneous regulation’ services are provided by e.g. undamaged soils, natural forests, ﬂoodplains and other wetlands; if damaged during development their services are often replaced by less sustainable anthropogenic mimics. Natural capital appears to integrate logically with ‘strong’ sustainability at the ecosystem scale (such as that explicit in the WFD) – since the systems view is essential to both. An inconvenient paradox of applying simple ‘systems thinking’ to environmental management is the complexity inherent in our understanding of the system being managed; whilst fundamental to the approach (Clayton and Ratcliffe 1997), it requires translation into ‘useable knowledge’. The assignment of values and risks to options is vital to permit participatory selection of priorities. Clearly, however, ecosystem goods and services can only be valued (even in qualitative ways) if sufﬁcient information exists from systems science or by indigenous processes of ‘social learning’. Social learning can be deﬁned (Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 1999; Rist et al. 2003) as ‘the way in which people learn to get insight into, predict and control the manner in which their actions affect natural and human life’ (Rist et al. 2003, 263). There are longer and softer deﬁnitions but this one accords best with the transition to adaptive management under way in the UK and with the environmental policy envelope for water and land use planning.

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In 1997 four public agencies in England and Wales funded the development of a survey and appraisal technique, based on natural capital but known as ‘Environmental Capital’. It was based on natural systems guidance (using mainly that of Clayton and Radcliffe 1997) for sustainable development (CAG/LUC 1997). Terminology and labelling proved important to emphasise the inclusion, within the proposed survey technique, of elements of human and cultural capital as well as natural capital. The name was later changed to Quality of Life Capital (QoLC) as a further means of developing a holistic image of a technique with no built-in bias towards particular elements of the capital concept (CAG/LUC 2001). The technique set out to emphasise functions, rather than features, of a given geographical unit and the main themes of sustainable development were promoted by the pattern of the environmental capital enquiry: from attributes to importance and thence to trends/sufﬁciency and substitution or trade-offs (between forms and features of environmental capital). The CAG/LUC report came too early to be matched to the framework of multi-stakeholder processes (Hemmati 2002) and gives much of the responsibility for steering the technique to professionals within the participating agencies, but with an equally clear potential for participation. ‘Professional judgement should be supported by assessment of public perceptions of the characteristics of the environment’ (CAG/LUC 1997, 22) An essential question surrounding the ecosystems approach to management is that of the costs surrounding data collection (Clark 2002). An holistic survey system such as QoLC could be particularly demanding in this respect. In fact, our experience in four river basin applications is that much of the essential information is already available in a developed country and therefore the basic requirement is for collation, within a new conceptual framework, rather than primary survey. A vital additional dimension, where information and its management are the hub of a public participation exercise, is the ‘indigenous knowledge’ or ‘vernacular science’ which is contributed to the process as part of continued social learning. Test-Bed Projects for QoLC in Northern England The sample river basins described here are small; the operational size for participatory catchment-based actions is that of the community’s interest and, in turn, that of the perceived problem or opportunity for change. A vital immediate concern for establishing a project is to evaluate the level of interest and motivation of all potential stakeholders. O’Riordan and Rayner (1991, 91) provide a warning note: Most people in the world are necessarily preoccupied with the immediate demands of making a living from their local environment. The privilege of observing and understanding the complex interaction of biophysical and socio-economic systems over long distances and historical timescales is the property of a tiny elite.

Lee (1993) puts a gloss on this view by describing environmental activism as majority rule ‘by the minority who care’. Working between rhetorical scepticism and optimism, an empirical examination of the motivation for positive public responses

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to participation (Filho 1999, 35) has created a list of some of the most common reasons: • • • • • •

The matter is perceived as relevant by individuals Individual participation is seen as making a difference Motivation is provided by authorities, family, friends or peers Financial beneﬁts/direct proﬁt Improvements in infrastructure Concern for the environment

Experience of applying natural capital matrices to river basin projects derives from four basins in the north of England, but in only three cases (the Upper Wharfe, Coquet and Team) has the methodology so far been carried forward to project management. In one of these, the Team, the methodology failed at the stage of professional consultation (for reasons conjectured below); in the Coquet it was much less successful than in Upper Wharfedale and it is this comparison that is used analytically to probe the process of participation initiated in a QoLC framework (see also Newson and Chalk 2004). Common elements of the Upper Wharfedale and Coquet projects are their funding through the European Commission via the Objective 5B Programme’s rural development route and their management through the Environment Agency (the primary environmental management authority in England and Wales – the competent authority under the WFD) and a Steering Group. Both projects are also opportunistic in that they exploit recent political willingness to consider the riparian zone of river networks as ‘special’ and of immediate practical, economically supported relevance in the management of catchments. At that point, similarities between the two projects end and contrasts, vital to our experience of QoLC, will be introduced below. Both projects entailed costs to the public purse of £500,000 (Newson and Chalk 2004). The Upper Wharfedale ‘Best Practice’ Project (UWBPP) was carried out between 1998 and 2002 as a partnership to demonstrate the principles, techniques and beneﬁts of an integrated way of achieving good land and water management, based on an ecological approach, protecting habitats and water quality in the catchment, while encouraging a move to more sustainable hill farming. Upper Wharfedale is an upland river catchment area (100 km2) within the Yorkshire Dales National Park, with the highest point approximately 670m above sea-level (Figure 5.2). Local residents number 5,600, but numbers are heavily inﬂated by tourists –the Yorkshire Dales are one of Britain’s most popular tourism centres. The initial idea of an exemplar project on land and water management arose at a meeting between the Environment Agency and the National Trust, major landowners in Upper Wharfedale. The idea was positively received at both a brainstorming session of local organisations and a public community meeting. This support, aided by Upper Wharfedale’s location in the well-known and well-studied Yorkshire Dales National Park, led to the development of the Upper Wharfedale ‘Best Practice’ Project through the commissioning of a Feasibility Study (RKL-ARUP 1998). The existence, through the area’s National Park status, of a ready-made institutional support structure with considerable experience of integrating the needs of ‘nature’

Contrasting UK Experiences

Figure 5.2

77

Location map for the four North-east England catchments to which environmental capital approaches have been applied

(including scenery) with those of humans is seen as facilitating the Environmental Capital approach (as it was then ofﬁcially known). The Feasibility Study comprised a ‘general geography’ of the valley, including a guide to the available environmental monitoring data and other issues of high relevance to the Environmental Capital approach. Thus, an information ‘hub’ was created in advance of the Project. It listed the ‘main programme elements’ which might feature in the Project as: •

River bank erosion

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Figure 5.3

• • • • • • •

QoLC attributes and scales of importance in Upper Wharfedale (after Newson and Chalk 2004)

Regeneration of ‘gill’ (headwater valley-side stream) habitats Flood Defence strategy Pollution control Biodiversity Moorland drainage Livestock farming practice Education

Immediately this agenda is both serious and yet broad in terms of conventional scientiﬁc guidance; its combination of biophysical and socio-economic elements at the river basin scale demands an adaptive management philosophy and an innovative approach to formally progressing the Project. The Project was developed and implemented through a partnership, led by the Environment Agency, and managed by a Steering Group. The Steering Group adopted, and offered the ﬁrst contributions (beyond the Feasibility Study) to, the Environmental Capital matrix. Part of the reason for acceptance of the technique was that it was seen to bridge the gap that inevitably develops between Steering Groups and ‘best practice’ operations ‘on the ground’. It was also part of the desire amongst participants to have an holistic view of priorities, rather than a piecemeal, ad hoc approach to funded work. Day to day management on the ground was coordinated by a Project Ofﬁcer with overall management coordinated by a Project Manager. Operations included letting contracts, organising delegated grants, producing legal agreements and obtaining permissions. The role of identiﬁable and approachable ‘product champions’, able to take rapid and effective action, is also seen as an essential contribution to the success of multi-stakeholder platforms in such projects.

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Some issues were debated/decided using sub-groups led by institutional stakeholders, with themes such as sustainability (within which the Quality of Life Capital approach was selected and developed), education and habitats; these convened and met as and when necessary. Workshops, public meetings in the Parish Hall, individual meetings at the farmhouses, walk events at locations in the Dale and the production by local artists and the community of a ﬂoor-scale river game (WHARFE: We Have A River For Everyone) were some of the other methods used to disseminate information and seek public input to the core Environmental Capital survey, to which we now turn. The working ‘environmental capital’ features identiﬁed by professionals and the public in Upper Wharfedale are identiﬁed in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3. The identiﬁcation process was professionally and academically led but much of the information base was already widely available and routes to the remainder had been sketched at feasibility stage. Environmental Capital surveys need not inﬂict lengthy delays or high costs in the prelude to setting up multi-stakeholder platforms, through which they evolve, but they must occur early in the project’s life, for example as part of the strategic plan (Newson and Chalk 2004). Information and Participation: Conflict and Compromise Information confers power in the setting of strategic and operational goals; it is a vital element of decision support and requires very careful attention in project management as the currency of participation (Enserink and Monnikhof 2003). Indigenous knowledge is a vital counterbalance to the normal domination of debate by academic and institutional data. In some senses there is dialectical rivalry between the two, which, if sensitively managed, enhances the debate prior to decision making. Knowledge of the features identiﬁed by consultation at the feasibility stage, including their relationship with one another, historical changes and the objectives of people involved was collected as described above. Information was held by a number of statutory and non-statutory organisations, local societies, members of the community and academic institutions. Collection, collation and distribution of information continued throughout the Project’s lifetime through the sub-groups addressing particular topics, community and academic input and surveys. There is a seamless transition to essential monitoring and research to ﬁll gaps in the matrix (see below). Stakeholder participation invariably identiﬁes crucial issues, many of which are only tangential to river management. The Quality of Life Capital approaches offer a framework which is ﬂexible enough to admit these issues to the holistic picture and encourages community thinking about scientiﬁc processes at a ‘no nonsense’ level. Teasing out the objectives of all stakeholders and the wider public helped to identify the vital areas of consensus as well as issues of direct conﬂict which needed to be addressed. For example, a notable area of conﬂict was the tension between farming and environmental objectives in aiming for drier conditions in vital hay meadows (through improved drainage) or managing for a wetter, more natural drainage pattern with extended and enhanced wetlands. This remains a key longer term issue:

Table 5.1 The QoLC matrix of attributes used to guide the Upper Wharfedale Best Practice Project (Newson and Chalk 2004) FEATURE

ATTRIBUTES/ SERVICES Stores carbon from atmospheric pollution, stores water, key habitat Absorbs carbon from atmospheric pollution, ground stabiliser, habitat

WHY IT MATTERS Environmental control (stores water, carbon) – vital to all Amenity, nature conservation, local economy

SCALE WHICH MATTERS Global/ catchment/ Wharfedale valley ﬂoor Local and regional/ catchment

Plantation woodland

Economic services, absorbs carbon from polluted air

Local economy and Conservation potential

Local/ catchment

Limestone features

Pavements, caves scientiﬁcally import, attract visitors

Part of ‘spirit of place’ of the Dales, biodiversity / tourism

River channel and gills

Oxygenation, sediment storage, aesthetic attraction, angling, biota

Central to the catchment and to identity of place. Local water supplies

Local (river regime, tourism, water supply) national, biodiversity Local, regional/ catchment

Blanket peat moorland

Native woodland

SUBSTITUTABILITY Impossible to substitute: peat growth rates very slow Impossible to substitute, existing woodland can be managed/ extended Restore where past practices unsustainable

IMPORTANCE High

TREND

Medium/ high

Undermanaged – area below critical threshold

Medium

Mitigation (e.g. habitat, runoff) welcome

Impossible to recreate. Can be lost through quarrying etc

High

Enhancement of past ﬂood works (e.g. gravel trap) to assist recovery

High

Eroding and thinning due to grazing/gripping

MANAGEMENT/ MONITORING Block drains, ‘assisted recovery’, low intensity use. Monitor hydrological recovery, monitor access, grouse, cover/stocking etc. Proof against stock, regenerate, extend in upper catchment and riparian zone

Forestry Commission ‘guidelines’ retroactive for existing plantations. Stream sampling and wildlife monitoring Pavement needs Related to peat moorland, but protection, caves: also to recreation management access, pollution / pressure and farm pollution protection (cave ecosystems)

Works in the past created erosion and deposition problems

Research on past and present sediment and ﬂow regime of the channel followed by restoration including ﬂood protection

River floodplain Hay meadows, wetland pastures, ﬂood deposits Farmland in general excluding moorland and ﬂoodplain

Economic core, visitor focus, ﬂood storage, wildlife habitat

Key element of farming economy but some services are to communities downstream

Local and regional/ catchment

We may make publicly funded substitutes (e.g. agri-environment incentives)

Basic natural resource for human occupancy, fabric of landscape

Provides food for farm stock and a habitat for wildlife

Built environment villages, farmsteads, barns, walls Routes roads, lanes, tracks, paths

Homes, fabric of the landscape, habitat, economic core. Major aesthetic appeal Add high value to landscape, limits and diversiﬁes human exploitation

Provides cultural, aesthetic and economic services to humans

Local, national, international. Essential to livestock economy, landscape Local, national and international

Potentially High improvable but intensiﬁcation may be unsustainable or damaging None, except via Critical new livelihoods –e.g. high-tech cottage industries

Local, national: access to care, accessibility to delivery vehicles and to scenery

Archaeology Prehistoric to industrial & agricultural

Context to human Provides cultural occupation, setting and sense attractive to visitors of renewal, educational values

Technology, mobility substitutes make no impact yet in this economy and culture None

Cultural, aesthetic and economic services, set ‘carrying capacity’ for dale

Local, national. Greater in the context of landscape

High

Critical

High

Flood defence and drainage schemes led to damage. Aims now are natural rivers May degrade if farming income falls, best practice conservation strategy essential

Hydraulic modelling and geomorphological / ecological studies to plan sustainable ﬂoodplain environment

House prices, loss of services, visitor pressure may threaten farm economy Maintenance essential to sustainability at all scales

Basic economic structure must be retained but perhaps subtly modiﬁed in response to changing agricultural activity/roles

Limit visitor pressure, make accessible, protect against vandalism

Manage according to stocking density/fertiliser in relation to ecology but in tune with farm ﬁnance. Monitor cover/ stocking

Conditions and status of infrastructure must be recognised, pressures must be monitored on a regular basis

Full survey, designation, sustainable exploitation, restoration where appropriate

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it illustrates the tension remaining between ecological and community visions, the latter being governed, understandably, by ‘security’ in its broadest sense. Once again, information was seen by contributors as providing the best opportunity for compromises. Triggered by questions arising from scientiﬁc uncertainty behind issues such as ﬂoodplain restoration, a major long-term research project has now been set up by Leeds University with new networks of data collection feeding into improved models to predict the impact of land management on runoff and sediment delivery (McDonald et al. 2003). It may seem a paradox that transparent, participatory projects demand ﬁrm structures and management; there are some contradictions, for example, within and between categories of consultation such as the celebrated model of Arnstein (1969). Project momentum is essential, even as driven by the time-line of public spending. Determining what short term improvements should be carried out and the techniques to be used, coupled with the ideas generated through the Environmental Capital approach and visionary, holistic thinking by some of the project partners led to the development of an agreed, disciplined set of management steps, following the ‘map’ set out in Table 5.2. Table 5.2 Steps involving public participation, worked around QoLC assessments in the Upper Wharfedale Best Practice Project STEP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

AIMS/OBJECTIVES Establish study area Determine features Understand features and their functions Identify beneﬁts and evaluate features Produce management principles Produce short term objectives Implement and monitor success of short term objectives Fill long term information gaps Produce long term objectives Implement and monitor success of long term objectives

Maintaining the Vision: Strategy becomes Operations It is vital to appreciate that water management is a ‘24–7’ activity, requiring a distinctive operational mode that often bafﬂes and frustrates strategic thinkers. It is valuable, therefore, to retain the distinction between strategy and operations (Mitchell 1990). Too often, the mature composure and global view of a precautionary strategy are rendered redundant in situations of rapid response to e.g. ﬂooding. Additionally, strategic consensus tends to weaken or fail as real machines arrive to change the landscape in speciﬁc locations. Individual operational schemes were generated from the basic strategic vision through personal contact between the Project Ofﬁcer and the farmer/landowner

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concerned. Overall, an average of 12 hours was spent per farmer/landowner with about four visits per scheme design. The Project worked with 34 farmers/landowners/ angling clubs. For some more complex and/or controversial schemes group meetings were held bringing Parish Council, farmer/landowner, angling and academic interests together. Each scheme derived from the agreed project principles: •

•

• •

• • •

•

Apply a holistic approach to river management, for example by management of grazing, moorland drainage channel blocking, gill (small stream) regeneration. Manage the physical and ecological dynamics of the river, enabling it to dynamically form wetlands in areas where most environmental beneﬁt can be obtained at least economic cost. Unpick past ‘hard’ (machine engineered) works to create a softer and more diverse river landscape. Prior to the implementation of longer-term solutions, carry out emergency repairs to banks where the river poses an imminent threat to the conservation and/or economic value of the adjacent land. Carry out works to sustain access to at least the current level and enable new access to newly enhanced areas. Improve riverside and ﬂoodplain habitat to create an irregular, wide buffer zone e.g. tree planting, river vegetation enhancement. Manage existing native trees, shrubs and cultural features e.g. lopping of tree branches, stopping browsing on the landward side or riparian trees, stone pitching restoration. Use local materials such as local native willow, local stone.

A series of Project leaﬂets (available as Environment Agency 2003) have formed a principal information outlet; they cover sheep dip treatment, river erosion and the uplands, moorland gripping (drainage), gravel management, the Environmental Capital approach and river management techniques. A self guided walk leaﬂet on the beneﬁts of managing land and water together has provided an opportunity to support local tourist accommodation, pubs, shops and schools in the area. Everybody in the community received factﬁles via The Link parish magazine. Kettlewell school pupils designed the project’s logo and Upper Wharfedale School, Grassington helped produce the walk leaﬂet. Project events always made use of village facilities to support the local economy. A job was created for a local farmer’s son to network and cascade essential walling and fencing skills, moorland grip blocking, river stone pitching restoration and tree maintenance. The Vital Context of Participatory Approaches – Contrasting Experiences in Northern England It is a grave temptation to academic participants in environmental management (possibly welcome news to the responsible public authorities!) to prescribe uniform

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protocols and procedures; the Water Framework Directive advocates ‘common implementation’. However, there is no ‘one size ﬁts all’ approach to multi-stakeholder platforms or to the general process of public participation. Even within a single region of the UK it is vital to consider the context of failures for QoLC approaches, as well as success. The River Coquet drains the southern ﬂanks of the Cheviot Hills in Northumberland, UK; its upper part, known as Upper Coquetdale, has an area of 358 km2, a population of 3,200 (without the level of visitor pressure of Upper Wharfedale) and is similar in relief, climate and land-use to Upper Wharfedale. The river has the same conservation status as the Upper Wharfe (Site of Special Scientiﬁc Interest: SSSI), part of the area is in the Northumbrian National Park and a number of agri-environment ‘best practice’ policies have been carried out in the catchment. The application of Environment (Quality of Life) Capital did not, however, fully commence until the Northumbrian Rivers Project, also an EU ‘Objective 5b’ scheme, chose the Coquet as one of its target catchments in 1997. The Northumbrian Rivers Project’s main targets were to improve riparian land management in order to conserve and extend the ﬁshery interest, thus supporting both the farming community through grant aid and attracting important income from tourism. The Environment Agency, concerned that riparian initiatives did not conﬂict with their Flood Defence function, commissioned Newcastle University to apply QoLC to the river and its geomorphology (Newson 1999). Table 5.3 illustrates the attributes listed for the River Coquet; catchment attributes were given a less prominent role but these were developed by a further bio-physical survey and by the socio-economic survey (structured interview) techniques of Fox (2003). Because of the narrower river channel and riparian focus of the Northumbrian Rivers Project (and also partly the result of differences in land ownership patterns with Upper Wharfedale) little controversy or discussion was aroused by the ‘expert’ QoLC assessment, despite the fact that each was well publicised during contact with local people. There were no formal public meetings and no publications were produced (cf. Upper Wharfedale), and it was not until Fox (2003) gained access to a wide sample of Upper Coquetdale residents, during a very detailed survey of QoLC attributes, that a number of tensions showed through in the relationship between environmental managers and environmental values based on indigenous perceptions. Broadly, local people viewed the ‘natural’ environment of the valley as heavily anthropogenic (farmed, gardened) and placed meaning and identity in relation to the degree to which the landscape is ‘worked’. They did not lack insights into natural capital and some of the goods and services provided by intact ecosystems, but they generally refused to participate in ﬁnancial or trade-off exercises. It is an important contextual element that, at the time of Fox’s survey, no speciﬁc proposals were in hand for best management practices beyond the river channel and the riparian corridor. There was a dominant popular impression that environmental management should be, at least partly, a means of representing indigenous pride in a very highlyregarded ‘worked’ landscape to institutions outside (such that they supported

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its ﬁnancial bases), rather than as a delivery mechanism for national and transnational policy, i.e. bringing the ‘outside’ in. Table 5.4 illustrates what the author regards as the institutional strengths of the UWBPP and the comparative ‘score’ of these variables in Upper Coquetdale. Whilst such contrasts carry multiple messages, these tend to merge as one raft of guidance. The contributors to success were the spatial and temporal focus (and clarity!) of a project’s objectives, its activity rate in both consultation and operations, its coordination and facilitation by clearly identiﬁable leaders and its use of knowledge and information. Clearly, it is in the latter role that QoLC makes a major contribution; our experience is also that it is a ﬂexible device for team building through short-term social learning processes. The ethos of the Upper Wharfedale project was to establish a relationship of trust between professional and public views of environmental problems, focusing where feasible and supported on the river and ﬂoodplain. The socialisation of professionals, interest groups, academics and local people was a serious component of the Project: contentious public meetings often ﬁnished by translocation to a new, relaxed forum in which disagreements became resolved or accommodated. Such experiences may be unique to the Yorkshire Dales and should not lead to idealism about ‘localism’ (Marvin and Guy 1997). It is more difﬁcult to explain the early demise of the natural capital approach in the Team Revival Project in Gateshead (and an apparent rejection as part of decision support for the Ouseburn Project in Newcastle upon Tyne). Once again, the establishment of the natural capital matrix for both catchments did not represent a costly process beyond compilation and collation. In the case of the Team, before public consultation, the matrix was offered for consultation to a Steering Group of the institutional stakeholders, largely drawn from local government, the private sector and conservation bodies. This Steering Group, however, preferred to work opportunistically, instead of strategically. In the urban and suburban environment of Newcastle and Gateshead the creative use of external (principally agricultural) funding to support catchment land use initiatives is far less feasible than in rural National Parks (such as Upper Wharfedale and Upper Coquetdale). In the urban and suburban context, the creativity options for ofﬁcers of most public bodies lie in exploiting public/ private partnerships and ‘win-win’ funding opportunities; this mitigates against the much longer, more ‘messy’ engagement with the public. Furthermore, in the case of the Ouseburn, local environmental democracy is already being promoted along the lines selected by ‘Local Agenda 21’ in the UK, with an established ward-scale (division of the city electorate) system of public representation and sustainability checks. Nevertheless, the unique challenges of the urbansuburban-rural catchment context have now been recognised by EU funding under ‘INTEREG’ for four North-east England catchments (including the Team and the Ouseburn) to collaborate with international partners in the search for appropriate participatory, planning and regulatory models. Quality of Life Capital may make a return under this aegis.

Table 5.3 The QoLC for Coquetdale – results of initial survey of community members, indicating their perception of priorities Features

Benefits and services

Importance

River Coquet

Character of Coquet Dale, Sense of place, Aesthetic value, Pristine, Wildlife habitat, Fishing, Recreation, Tourist attraction, Water for stock

Critical

Pasture

Character of Coquet, Tourist attraction, Economic beneﬁt, Aesthetic value Maintain sense of community Sense of identity Culture maintained

Critical

Wildlife habitat, Aesthetic value, Character of Coquet, Stock proof fence, Shelter, Prevents erosion

High-critical

Character to Coquet Dale, Aesthetic value, Historical value, Adds to ones sense of place Wildlife habitat, Recreational value, Adds variety, Aesthetic value, Characteristic of Coquet Dale, Soil erosion prevention, Air puriﬁcation, Livestock shelter

High-critical

Community buildings/ Services Hedges

Traditional houses Indigenous forest

Critical

To whom it matters most Farmers Local people Environmental experts Tourists Farmers Local people Tourists Local people

Enough

Trend in Trend in quality quantity Very high quality and has increased in recent years

Yes

Management issues

Rank

Planting riparian corridors; Decline in ﬁshing Flooding

1

Erosion Wilderness/ managed

2

Yes

3 Under threat due to out-migration of local people

High-critical

Farmers Local people Environmental experts Local people Tourists

No

Local people Environmental experts Tourists

No

Decreasing

Increasing

4 Under-managed Lack of labour

Yes

Decreasing

Slightly increasing

6

Moorland

Modern Houses Stone walls

Archaeological ruins

Agricultural Fields Traditional Hay meadows

Wetlands

Plantations

Grazing land Recreational services (grouse shooting and walking) Aesthetic value Tourism beneﬁt Provides housing Low maintenance

High

Aesthetic value Historical value Wildlife habitat Educational beneﬁt Connects local people to their past

Highmedium

Adds variety to landscape High economic value Beneﬁt of being locally self sufﬁcient Critical habitat for birds and ﬂowers (seed bank) Aesthetic value Nutritional livestock forage

Highmedium

Wildlife habitat Flood control Water ﬁltering service Recreational beneﬁt Employment beneﬁt Beneﬁt to the local economy Provides shelter belts Refuge for the red squirrel

Highmedium

Highmedium

Highmedium

Farmers Environmental experts Local people Tourists Local people Incomers Local people Farmers Tourists Tourists Environmental experts Local people Farmers Local people

Local people Environmental experts, Wildlife enthusiasts Tourists HighEnvironmental medium experts Wildlife enthusiasts Low-medium Local people

Yes

Decreasing

No

Slightly increasing

Increasing

Yes

Heather burning; Bracken control; Peatland drainage;

7

Desperately short of affordable houses for local people Stone mason’s skills and knowledge disappearing

8

Yes

9

10

Yes

Decreasing

Staying the same

No

Decreasing

No

Increasing

Rapid decline which has now stabilized Increasing

Yes

Increasing

Fertilizers; Oil seed rape;

11

12

Drainage

Decreasing Flooding Increase mixed woodland Gentriﬁcation

13

14

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Table 5.4 Comparative elements of the UWBPP and the Upper Coquetdale applications of QoLC assessment techniques Element Spatial focus

UWBPP Catchment wide, with prominent moorland and valley-side as well as riparian activities. Sole focus for ﬁnancial aid.

Temporal focus

Five year Project lifetime followed by landowner responsibility

for maintenance but with monitoring continuing. Public consultation Began at feasibility stage and – timing and context integral throughout. Project set in a geographical context of heavy visitor pressure and a plethora of institutional consultations. Coordination and ‘Expert’ and voluntary members project management of Steering Group in close coordination with community representatives. Clear responsibility of Project staff (from Environment Agency); no staff changes. Operations EA able to facilitate aspects of river management (machinery) and monitoring (e.g. hydrology), although majority undertaken by local contractors, landowners, tenants and angling clubs. Knowledge and Indigenous knowledge sought from information feasibility, collated with ‘expert’ management knowledge in QoLC attributes and valuation. Dissemination at all levels including schools and events linked to best practice leaﬂets.

Dissemination and continuity post-project

Trials of best practice a speciﬁc aim – hence dissemination by variety of media: education and training. Monitoring and research tasks set for longer term.

Upper Coquetdale Channel obstructions, bank erosion and riparian support to river ecosystem. Finance shared with three other rivers. Five year Project lifetime followed by landowner responsibilities for maintenance. Expert-led until quite late in Project lifetime. Experience of environmental consultation developed only by National Park and Catchment Management Plans. Identical ‘expert’ (institutional) bodies represented on Steering Group but closest voluntary linkage to ﬁshing community. Project ofﬁcers from FFWAG. Several staff changes. Landowner responsibility – no Project labour force.

Catchment Management Plan and knowledge of anglers used to guide priorities (largely also ﬁxed by modus operandi of Project). Public information events and river geomorphology training courses. Project followed, rather than led, best practice. Relatively little innovation: survey directed to problem sites, funding guided by opportunity. Publicity, not publications a project aim since heavy links to tourism economy (ﬁshing).

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In Conclusion: The Water Framework Directive – Ideals and Actualities The EU Water Framework Directive makes heavy demands on both stakeholder participation and economic evaluation. The chosen units – River Basin Districts – are larger but most have substantial environmental databases. QoLC techniques certainly have potential for delivering a framework for both these innovative contributions to sustainable development. They at the very least act as ‘formal ways of integrating stakeholder and science’ (Osidele et al. 2000) even if they do not create multi-stakeholder platforms, deﬁned by Röling and Maarleveld (1999) as ‘devices or procedures for social learning and negotiation about effective collective action’. It is doubtful whether multi-stakeholder processes can be designed (as by Hemmati 2002, who gives 15 design principles) but the characteristics of the projects used as case studies here offer signposts about the general characteristics of ‘collective action to reduce a collective impact’ (Röling 2000). By comparison of the two headwater (small-scale) RBMP processes and some of their early outcomes we can conclude that: •

• • •

•

•

Variants of the environmental capital approach, however titled, have a major contribution to make to modern, project-related, ‘social learning’ where outcomes begin in the short-term and are ﬁrmly deliverable; It acts as a ‘check list’ to ensure that catchment attributes are considered at strategic and operational scales; It is important that information management makes an early, participatory, entry to projects; Project structure and information conﬁgured as ‘currency’ are vital, making the role of project managers critical – they hold both the democratic and economic keys, both features being difﬁcult to achieve in large-scale RBMPs; It is valuable to bridge the gap between strategy and operations, particularly in the ﬁeld of water management; QoLC and other techniques add a valuable strategic checklist to ‘works’; Unpredictable elements include the cultural experience of a project area in decision-making, the available information and the culture of management of the project.

It is clearly undesirable to set down ﬁrm guidance, beyond general principles, and this contribution is regarded as a contribution to the participatory ‘toolbox’, rather than as a prescriptive statement for river basin management planning. Most importantly it has been a successful way to involve a wide range of interests and provoke debate between specialists and people in the community and thus provide a catalyst for some visionary longer-term thinking and initiatives to further understanding. It has placed professional judgement alongside the concerns of local people, thus helping those concerned to be aware of, and ‘own’ change. Our experience is also that its relevance is enhanced when the terminology used (unlike for a learned journal) is simple and backed by visual, spatial and experiential (ﬁeldwork) interpretation.

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The QoLC methodology is a very informal manifestation of a Decision Support System in river management – much more so than the model SURCoMES which was also calibrated to run in Upper Wharfedale (Clark and Richards 2002). Rule-based models with ‘fuzzy’ decision-making circuits, such as SURCoMES, will inevitably play a part in future adaptive management scenarios. As Clark (2002, 349) puts it ‘decision support itself strengthens sustainability, which may be unachievable without it, and enables informed and aware stakeholder participation.’ The UWBPP intends to leave the community in Upper Wharfedale with both a role and an interest in monitoring the ‘best practices’ established during the life of the project. The example of the Australian ‘Catchment Health’ project (Walker and Reuter 1996) has been copied informally for future activity by schools and voluntary groups. It would clearly be a considerable additional burden of survey to the QoLC techniques to undertake separate analysis of the multi-dimensional ‘values’ of e.g. the ‘natural’ and anthropogenic assets of Upper Wharfedale. Catchment scale applications of valuation for environmental goods and services are slowly arriving (Bockstael et al. 1997). Perhaps the most widely publicised recently has been the example of water managers in New York City who decided, on cost grounds, to conserve the watershed supplying the city, rather than invest in further puriﬁcation works (Salzman et al. 2001). Techniques abound for the indirect valuation of environmental goods and, indeed, have been applied to the Yorkshire Dales before (Garrod and Willis 1999). However, full realisation of the power of QoLC may need to await a formal incorporation of environmental services in valuation schemes (Salzman et al. 2001); currently the only widespread operational model is the US Environmental Protection Agency’s use of ‘wetland mitigation banking’ (Ruhl and Gregg 2001). QolC is capable, via its natural systems analytical approach, of introducing ‘hard’ economic values by ‘parallel accounting’. For example, if the volume of water passing through a speciﬁc ﬂoodplain wetland can be estimated and the water quality beneﬁts of this passage can be inferred from the hydrological literature, then the costs foregone to the local or regional or global economy can be calculated – as those of not needing to build artiﬁcial puriﬁcation facilities. Hydrological systems are generally well calibrated and many scientists might support the view that: All we need to do now is to apply accounting to environmental capital … attempting to bring measurable elements into the process as our knowledge improves. But to wait until everything falls properly into place will mean that we shall have to wait for ever. (El Sefary 1991: 175).

However, a diagnostic of the levels of ‘localism’ achieved in the Upper Wharfedale project is given by McDonald et al. (2004) who reveal that, for one of the prominent river restoration sites in the valley, a notable and unpredictable balance was reached between the vision of the local community and the scientiﬁc guidance they received from geomorphologists. The Wharfe became, in one reach, a ‘river of dreams’.

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the shadow falls, International Institute for Environment and Development, Gatekeeper Series No. 81, London. Rist, S., Delgado Burgo, F. and Wiesmann, U. (2003), ‘The role of social learning processes in the emergence and development of Aymara land use systems’, Mountain Research and Development, 23(3), pp. 263–270. RKL ARUP (1998), ‘Upper Wharfedale “Best Practice” Project – Feasibility Study’, Leeds. Röling, N. (2000), ‘Gateway to the Global Garden’, 8th Annual Hopper Lecture, University of Guelph. Röling, N. and Maarleveld, M. (1999), ‘Facing strategic narratives: An argument for interactive effectiveness’, Agriculture and Human Values, 16, 295–308. Ruhl, J. B. and Gregg, R. J. (2001), ‘Integrating ecosystem services into environmental law: a case study of wetlands mitigation banking’, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 20(2), pp. 365–392. Salzman, J., Thompson, B. H. Jr. and Daily, G. C. (2001), ‘Protecting ecosystem services: science, economics and law’, Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 20 (2), 309–332. Schreiner, B., van Koppen, B. and Khumbane, T. (2002), ‘From bucket to basin: A new water management paradigm for poverty eradication and gender equity’, in Turton, A. and Henwood, R. (eds) (2002), Hydropolitics in the Developing World. A Southern African Perspective, CIPS, University of Pretoria. Slater, S., Marvin, S. and Newson, M. (1994), ‘Land use planning and the water sector. A review of development plans and catchment management plans’, Town Planning Review, 65(4), 375–397. Tane, H. (1996), ‘The case for integrated river catchment management’, in Cresser, M. and Pugh, K. (eds), Multiple Land Use and Catchment Management. Proceedings of an International Conference, Macaulay Land Use Research Institute, Aberdeen. Turton, A. and Henwood, R. (eds) (2002), Hydropolitics in the Developing World. A Southern Africa Perspective, CIPS, University of Pretoria. United Nations (1993), The Global Partnership for Environment and Development: A Guide to Agenda 21 (post-Rio Edition), UN, New York. Walker, J. and Reuter, D. J. (1996), Indicators of Catchment Health. A Technical Perspective, CSIRO, Collingwood, Victoria, Australia. Wester, P. and Warner, J. (2002), ‘River basin management reconsidered’, in A. Turton and R. Henwood (eds), Hydropolitics in the Developing World. A Southern Africa Perspective, CIPS, University of Pretoria, pp. 61–71. White, I. and Howe, J. (2003), ‘Planning and the European Water Framework Directive’, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 46(4), 621–631. Wittfogel, K. A. (1957), Oriental Despotism, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. World Commission on Dams (2000), Dams and Development. A New Framework for Decision-making, Earthscan, London. World Meteorological Organisation (1992), International Conference on Water and the Environment: Development Issues for the 21st Century, WMO, Geneva. World Wildlife Fund (2003), Water and Wetland Index: Critical issues in water policy a-cross Europe, WWF, Gland, Switzerland.

Chapter 6

Århus Convention in Practice: Access to Information and Decisionmaking in a Pilot Planning Process for a Flemish River Basin Annemiek Verhallen

Introduction This chapter deals with an example of a Multi-Stakeholder Platform (MSP) in the northwest of Europe. In 2002 the government of Flanders, Belgium started involving civil society and private parties in the development of a sub-basin management plan for the river Nete, based on the principles of Integrated Water Management. It was an attempt to innovate the normal central planning and as such was a very interesting case to study. I focus here on the MSP as a temporary information system (Checkland and Holwell 1998), by answering three questions. (1) How to organize the information system so that information exchange between multiple stakeholders is equitable, efﬁcient and enriches the process? (2) Are there requirements as to the accessibility, format, adequacy, timeliness and quality of the information? (3) Does the exchange and debates lead to better plans, increased joint knowledge on the functioning of water systems and more transparent decision-making? By looking into the actual exchange and use of information on water issues that takes place in a multiple stakeholder platform as the Nete platform, recommendations for improvement are suggested. First, the European context is sketched with its environmental legislation and the adoption of the Århus Convention as the main factors shaping the making of river basin management plans. In both legislations public participation plays a key role. Second, some theoretical notions are given about information systems and about interactive planning/decision making. In the third part these notions are applied to results from the research in the Nete sub-basin in Flanders. The fourth part draws conclusions, discussing MSPs as information systems. European Context The European Water Framework Directive (Directive 2000/60/EC) contains clear requirements for the protection and restoration of European water bodies. The

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Directive refers to both surface- and groundwater as well as coastal waters. River basins are the management units and to the extent that they are transboundary the European member states have to cooperate in the management of such river basin areas. This move towards management units with physical boundaries instead of administrative ones requires a far-reaching change in governmental administration on different spatial scales ranging from small watersheds to large river basins, from local administration to international collaboration. These changes will be implemented in the next decade. Besides this tendency towards upscaling and internationalisation, the EU Water Framework Directive (EWFD) calls explicit attention to public participation in the management of river basin areas. The general public should not only be informed, but also be consulted on the formulation of management plans (Article 14 of the EWFD). Member states should even encourage the active participation of all parties involved as ‘good practice’. Three years in advance of the settling of a management plan, the general public should be provided with a time plan and working programme for the planning process, two years in advance with an intermittent review of the major issues in water management, and one year in advance with a copy of the draft plan. Recently Europe issued the Directives 2003/4/EG and 2003/35/EG to implement the UN-ECE Århus Convention on the ‘Access to information, public participation in decision making and access to justice in environmental matters’. ‘Recognising that, in the ﬁeld of the environment, improved access to information and public participation in decision making enhance the quality and implementation of decisions, contribute to the public awareness of environmental issues, give the public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due account of such concerns…’ (UN-ECE 1998: 1). The Convention has been signed by 35 European and Non-European countries, including France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The incentives for this Convention were earlier calls for environmental information supply such as in the ‘Stockholm declaration on the human environment’ (1972), Principle 10 of the ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (1992),1 the ‘European Charter on Environment and Health’ (1989) and the ‘World Charter for nature and for the need to ensure a healthy environment for the well-being of individuals’ (1990). The adoption of the Århus Convention can in itself be considered an example of a Multi-Stakeholder Process (Hemmati 2002). Article 2 in Directive 2003/35/EC mentions the early involvement of the public when all options are still open and suggestions and opinions of the general public can seriously play a role in the process (EU 2003). The authorities have to account for what they do with these comments. Here we encounter a serious difﬁculty: 1 Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned Citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.

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authorities think that they cannot go to the public with open–ended questions or options. They are more used to dealing with a professional lobby and representative bodies. So far, experiences with public consultation on strategic matters show that only a few persons will debate in strategic terms and that citizens do want to know where, when and how their stake is at risk. Such public participation can be reached as recent research in Flanders demonstrates. Focus groups were used successfully to discuss a strategic environmental plan in Flanders – but this requires careful preparation and facilitation (Vandenabeele 2003). River basin management plans are essentially the prime responsibility of administrative bodies, as an account of how the public water resources will be managed. Nevertheless, feedback from society would improve the quality of the policy process by providing ﬁrst-hand information from an historical perspective. Moreover, this participation would guarantee information transfer to individuals with a large stake in the problem under consideration, which indirectly strengthens the legitimacy of the management measures being implemented (MacKenzie 1996). Administrative bodies see the need to have civil society and private economic sectors to collaborate. Non-governmental organisations in the ﬁeld of nature conservation and environmental concerns (such as local Agenda 21 groups) represent civil society as do other citizen pressure groups. Their input concerns information about the physical area, calls for speciﬁc concerns, and draws on information from their (international) networks. Private economic sectors have environmental specialists who cover all of the water-related aspects and bring in concerns about economic equity or water use reduction efforts. There are now several European initiatives in which such (semi)-permanent platforms have been started up to create information sharing, debate and joint fact ﬁnding from the very beginning of a planning or decision making process onwards. The ‘Mainport Rotterdam’ project where conﬂicting interests between the Harbour of Rotterdam and ecologists on enlargement of the harbour area was successfully solved by getting new stakeholders round the table and identifying common ground (Anonymous 2001). Success factors were the balanced representation of different views, the possibility to broaden the problem deﬁnition, generation of own ideas, process and output oriented search for information (joint fact ﬁnding), focus on ambition and political will instead of on the truth. In such processes access to information is encapsulated in the access to decisionmaking and the use of information is part of the integrated negotiation (Van de Kerkhof 2004). Multi-stakeholder platforms are thus a particular form of informed participation because the sharing of information is practised. Ideally, to solve a complex issue in the ﬁeld of river basin management, all relevant perspectives should be represented by persons who have the capacity to capture the content, the process and the context of the issue (Mitchell 2002). Capturing the content implies the capacity to assimilate further information, to process this information into knowledge and practical capabilities. Such individuals constitute a multi-stakeholder platform because they understand interdependencies that require solving complex issues. The process stretches beyond competing claims, and participants are inspired to ﬁnd innovative ways for solving the issue (social learning) or enhancing the manageability of the issue. The concerted action that results from this should be

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documented and communicated in a transparent way to the respective constituencies and the transactional environment (inhabitants, regulatory administration, legal organizations, media). MSP as a Temporary Information System ‘If what is to be decided is to be defensible, well-informed, and better than simply thrashing around’ (Checkland and Holwell 1998), the platform should put great emphasis on organizing its information system. Checkland and Holwell give a framework distinguishing between data, information and knowledge. Data are the myriad number of facts about the world. These facts can, in principle, be veriﬁed, if disputed evidence is produced to support or refute them. Some facts are agreed on and accepted as meaningful by all, some are disputed; some are private to an individual or group. When a platform starts to work they sub-sample from this abundance of facts certain data because the platform thinks these data are relevant for their work and therefore capture them. Data are a starting point and by selecting data new categories are formed that are meaningful for the issue at hand. Example: how many hectares are ﬂooded each year and what is the personal or material damage in Euros? Selected data are called capta to distinguish them from the mass of data/facts (Checkland and Holwell 1998). These capta are enriched because we relate them to other things, as part of a larger whole and the capta gain signiﬁcance. This is called the attribution of meaning to capta. The attribution of meaning in context converts capta in information. Context can even make meaningful information out of no information (e.g. when agreed that no telephone call will mean that a meeting can go ahead) (Holwell 1989). Capta than becomes information, or meaningful facts.

Figure 6.1

The links between data, capta, information and knowledge

Source: Checkland and Holwell 1998, 90 Note: Formats that related to data (1) are numbers or parameter values, for capta (2) it is tables and spreadsheets typically, to information (3) a graph, ﬁgure or photo and to knowledge (4) casual diagram, a system diagram or an analytical framework.

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This process is depicted in Figure 6.1. Only when this information is linked with larger and longer living structures of meaningful facts will it become knowledge, for instance a body of knowledge about the function and behaviour of aquifers or the responses of ecosystems to all sorts of pressures. An information system is deﬁned as all activities of members, chair and secretary that lead to an informed decision to initiate purposeful concerted action. As a platform almost by deﬁnition consists of members with diverse backgrounds as to ambition, skills, ﬁeld of expertise and information and perspectives on the issue at hand, they have to start from scratch, getting to know each other. For those who are professional advocates of interests one can assume that they are well informed about their ﬁeld of endeavour but it is still difﬁcult to be informed in all other ﬁelds related to river basin management and corresponding legal implications. For authorities there is an information deﬁcit as well: it may be the ﬁrst time that information needs to be gathered from distributive sources outside the administration. At the same time, information exchange inside the administrative levels is not that obvious as holding information always represents power. If a platform starts with deﬁning their agenda and goes from there it is obvious that they deﬁne their own information system as a joint exercise. Facts are selected, captured and cognitive appreciation attached to them as speciﬁc interests of the participants and context are added, a process often referred to as joint fact ﬁnding. By debating the capta of data and the attribution of meaning and context, the platform gains a better understanding of the issue and of the position and ambition of the different participants in the platform. Reﬂection on the information collected individually or group-wise is very important to appreciate the relevance, accessibility and quality of this information, including uncertainty aspects. This may increase individual knowledge or add to a joint body of knowledge of the platform. All activities concerning data capture, attributing meaning and reﬂection on the information by the platform members, chair and secretary, are deﬁned here as its information system. Transparency of the information process is important, certainly when the information is produced by others (scientists, organizations). In many cases there seems to be existing information abundance or a vast body of knowledge in e.g. scientiﬁc institutions that cooperate in the process. But in all processes the gathering of relevant facts and ﬁgures for the speciﬁc task means the search for meaningful data and information for the speciﬁc situation (Checkland and Holwell 1998). Normally, existing information is not adequate because of different formats of time and space, the use of insigniﬁcant indicators, and because information on other causal factors is sought (Klinkers 2002). As each MSP is a particular form of interactive decision-making it is useful to distinguish speciﬁc steps in this process – data, capta, information and knowledge – with respect to platform activities related to decision-making and information process (Figure 6.2). A skilfully managed process is designed to take one step at the time to avoid repetitive debates and to ensure clear closures. Often agreement on the problem deﬁnition is too easily assumed, or too soon members start talking about measures. All this may stiﬂe creativity or foreclose new options that can accommodate conﬂicting interests better.

Figure 6.2

Eight steps in interactive decision-making

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In the Århus Convention all kinds of information requirements are expressed with respect to the accessibility of the information, its completeness and adequacy, its timeliness and its suitability of its format for the general public where it wants to participate in and comment on the development of plans (UN-ECE 1998). It is assumed that people know what their information needs are. In most cases this is difﬁcult; however; only after having acquired and reﬂected on some basic capta is one able to express one’s information needs. In case of participation in a platform these requirements are or should be discussed in the meetings. Members can express their information needs or suggest other capta to complete the picture, to be able to discuss the issue and so on. It boils down to requirements as: • •

• • •

Accessibility: physically accessible because it is in the right language, downloadable (soft copy) or on paper (hard copy); Suitable format: graphs, tables, maps with clear legends and data labels are understandable for the average platform member. In-depth scientiﬁc and technical information in experts reports is explained or avoided; Documentation is adequate to be able to discuss the issue: not too much or too little. Some directions as to what to read ﬁrst are given; Timely: digestible before the next meeting; Information is of good quality: up-to-date, accurate, comparable, the context of data gathering and processing is given and the scope of validity of the data/information indicated. It gives information about uncertainties that come with it.

Participation in the Making of a Nete Catchment Management Plan The Nete sub-basin is part of the international river Scheldt system, comprising 37,000 km2 and 13 million people and shared by three countries: France, Belgium and the Netherlands. One out of the eleven sub-basins is the Nete, comprising 1,700 km2 and 600,000 inhabitants. While the majority of the other sub-basins are shared by other countries or federal States, the Nete is entirely situated in Flanders. The Flemish Government has started a pilot project drafting an integrated water management plan for this sub-basin according to the new European legislation. This project uses a predeﬁned tripartite methodology (Staes et al. 2002): a detailed mapping of the physical, chemical and biological characteristics of the basin by external engineering companies; a participatory mapping of impacts and pressures of human use in the sub-basin, using questionnaires and interviews, and meetings in which authorities and a representation of stakeholders analysed these constraints and drew up goals for the period 2004–2010. These meetings were organised in three working groups that met six times, during 3½ sessions. The process in these three working groups can be called a multi-stakeholder process, a temporarily information system characterised by active participation. To study the information process in depth I closely observed this multi-stakeholder process in two out of the three groups My observations were non-participatory and covered: the information setting (materials used during the sessions) and information

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use by the different participants, the process of the meeting and the content of the dialogue. I wrote down as many of the participant’s statements as possible in verbatim form. Semi-structured interviews were held with a selection of the participants representing the users/uses from civil society and from private economic sectors. The interviews addressed their eagerness to cooperate, their ambition, their information and meeting skills, their ideas about the dialogue, the perceived effectiveness of the process, and the transparency of the decision-making process. The MSP was organised and presided over by a representative of the AMINAL department of the Ministry of Environment, Infrastructure and Nature; the stakeholders were representatives of public and private organisations. A consortium of a private engineering company and the department of Aquatic Biology and Integrated Water Management at the University of Antwerp designed the process and facilitated the dialogue. After that, the Ministry is to draft a plan and subject it to public consultation before it becomes legal. After evaluation the tripartite methodology will be applied to all eleven Flemish sub-basins. In Flanders the interactive drawing-up of sub-basin management plans started with the new Law on Integrated Water Management (2003) which fully encapsulated the requirements of the EU Water Framework Directive. Context Active participation in this planning process should be understood in the context of strong political support for Integrated Water Management as well as a new style of governance in Flanders. Political support had come from a ‘Green Party Minister’ who appointed several young ofﬁcers, fresh from university and keen on environmental issues. Modernising the government was also due to the Federalisation process in Belgium. The Minister wanted Flanders to be the ﬁrst region to have a river subbasin management plan to comply with the new EU rules, way before the ofﬁcially required timeline. Great efforts were made to draft a new Law on Integrated Water Management, although in the period of this Nete process the exact features of the Law were not very secure. The pilot process was carried out under great time pressure. The time frame of the process was designed to ﬁt the term of the new Minister. However, the Flemish Government collapsed early, the Green parties lost parliamentary seats and the Nete pilot process eventually lost momentum. In Flanders the aim to establish integrated river basin management had been strongly supported by the world of academia, with several universities acting as knowledge providers for ideas about basin management. These universities were asked to develop drafts of the aforementioned Law (Maes and Lavrysen 2003), design a methodology or work out sustainable water use policies and measures (Staes et al. 2002). Unlike France, Great Britain or the Netherlands; Flanders had no prior experience with integrated water management plans. Flanders has a four-layered water management structure from municipal level up to the national level, but only the national level has the right to develop policies. Until then national and provincial departments were used to develop generic policies or operations, such as policies on ﬁsh migration and drinking water supply that were not speciﬁc related to river (sub) basins.

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Participation The ﬁrst contact with stakeholders consisted of an extensive, time-consuming list with questions, which irritated the stakeholders. Neither municipalities nor private stakeholders returned their forms. Accordingly, the coordinators changed plans and interviewed them later. This proved to be a wise move, many stakeholders felt taken seriously for the ﬁrst time. In two workshops the results were presented in the form of large lists of impacts on and pressures from the different uses/users on the Nete water systems. In the next part I observed, the Flemish government invited one representatives from each of the twelve economic social sectors, preferable acquainted with and active in the sub-basin Nete, to join and give input for a river basin management plan 2004–2010. These representatives could be from either different administrative departments or from syndicates/ interest groups. More than a hundred persons contributed, their contribution ranged from subscription to the e-mail list to being a key actor in the process. They represented more than ﬁfty organisations. Seven of 12 sectors joined the meetings frequently while ﬁve sectors were absent or attended sparsely. These ﬁve sectors were ﬁsheries, wildlife, the hydro-energy sector, tourism, and the extraction industry. Although invited, they probably thought the beneﬁts too small to invest the time. Twenty-ﬁve people showed up more than four times and it is assumed that they had a substantial stake in the process. From this group 72% were from the different administrative levels or from public services, 20% from the private sector and eight percent from civil organisations. Clearly, the balance between people from the administration and related services and representatives of interest groups was very much in favour of the former. Civil servants from different sectors and different administrative levels were urged to join because the administration is not organized yet as one integrated water management body but as separate sectors like water quantity management, waste water treatment, nature conservation, and spatial planning. The estimated time needed to participate was approximately one hundred hours in a three-month period, including travel, preparation such as downloading reports and reading them, and attending the six meetings which lasted about 3½ hours each. Sixteen to eighteen people attended such meetings. The meetings were held during ofﬁce hours. Only the farmer representatives complained about meeting in the daytime and in the growing season. The representatives can be called experts in their ﬁelds (nature conservation, agricultural policy, engineering, ecology, spatial planning) and most have an academic background. Almost all of them defended their own organisational interests in the meetings citing this as the main reason for attending. The interests of the representatives are strongly related to their respective professions (policy preparation, farming, industry). Some participants expressed their feeling that the ‘green representatives’ were in the majority. This was caused by ‘multiple hats’ as some civil servants were (board) members of environmental NGOs also. The majority of the participants lacked speciﬁc knowledge of the Nete sub-basin, because they

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were responsible for the whole of Flanders in a certain sector or ﬁeld and/or they did not live or work in the basin. Information As noted above, integrative sub-basin planning was a new development phenomenon and great effort was required to collect the data on this spatial scale, to discuss capta and process information, because normally the data and information gathered concerned administrative territories like municipalities, provinces or the whole of Flanders. Given the four-layered water management structure it meant assemblage of data and capta from these levels as well as from diverse sectors within the administrative levels. Examples are water transport, ground water, spatial planning, agricultural development, sanitation, forest and nature conservation, tourism and recreation. Last but not least inclusion of data and information from private sector and civil society was aimed for, such as non-ferrous industry using water resources and discharging polluted water in the channels, non-governmental nature conservation organisation owning wetlands, farmer organisations representing the agricultural perspective in the sub-basin. The process was totally prepared by the government and external consultancies. They strove after one interactive database containing electronic ﬁles and GIS maps of the water system made accessible in an interactive format. Physical, chemical and biological data of the Nete water system were captured and processed into information as the basis for the development of the river basin management plan, all according to a strict format. To inventory the users/uses of the Nete system, data were captured by the organising team in strict categories. These categories were derived from an extensive list of impacts and pressures on the water environment such as mining, discharge of polluted water by households, agriculture and industry and so on. Impacts and pressures were then compared with the carrying capacity as assessed in the water systems analysis, and negative discrepancies would be accommodated in the plan. Based on the categories mentioned (capta) a questionnaire was sent to more than a hundred actors. The private sector responded with irritation, arguing that the government already possessed that kind of information which is requested when applying for environmental permits, such as the amount of water abstracted or the amount and quality of polluted efﬂuent. Farmers and farmer organisations complained that the information on crop growth and nutrients were obligatory and submitted to another department. The answering of this questionnaire took a lot of time because the data had to be captured in a different spatial unit (that of the basin) which was not regular before. The organisers provided a background document to the members of the working groups via the Internet. This document presented information on the actual state and functioning of the water system of the Nete and on the current and prospective integrated water management policy and legislation of Flanders. In addition much of the document consisted of the list of 207 conﬂicting impacts/uses and possibilities that needed to be dealt with. At the end of this document, the text provided objectives for the planning period to be discussed in the meeting. When needed, the organisers

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sent extra scientiﬁc reports and GIS maps and ﬁles by e-mail. Approximately two third of the participants were not able to download, process and print the special GIS ﬁles, maps and legends which require an A3 printer. Due to time pressure sometimes large documents were sent the day before and people were supposed to be able to open, read and digest these before the next day. The background document was regularly updated and ﬁlled in further, but it was not clear to all which version it was due to different formats and dates when printed on their machines. Concrete maps pointing out the location of the problems to be solved were not yet available, but GIS maps were projected in the room. However, participants had trouble relating these maps with more speciﬁc local information or they did not have the exact boundaries of the basin in their heads and the map was not layered with a topographic map. Instead, they knew speciﬁc areas or names of sites that were meaningful to their work. For example, the representative of the drinking water company brought his own map with the drinking water abstraction points and with an indication of the European Natura 2000 habitat-protection areas. The representative of the administration responsible for mining knew on a topographic map where a certain extraction had been ﬁnished but could not point it out on the GIS basin map. These problems proved time-consuming. Projecting GIS maps of the drainage system on the wall during the meetings irritated some because the manipulation with legends, as is easy done on line, was found both confusing and suspicious. Content The organising team planned the topics of the meetings. The meetings themselves were formally structured: minutes of the previous meeting, remarks, and discussion of the topic planned for that particular meeting, as presented in a draft text. It started with the particular constraints and possibilities from the list of 207 connected with this topic. Sometimes the organisers or an invited expert clariﬁed the topic. Much time was spent elucidating the constraints and some remarked that this list was too literally compiled and needed other wording. Overall: debating this list of constraints made it difﬁcult to speak about ambition and more strategic points. Debates were thus seldom strategic but more about minor things like the hindrance of rainwater inﬁltration by concrete cycle paths. It was remarkable that discussions of time series, trends or graphs were not very thorough or were absent altogether and taken for granted while the debate concentrated on the measures or the implementation problems. When specialised information was presented at the meetings, some overtly mentioned that they could not judge the content but had questions as to the why, the how and the procedure for implementation. For example, buffer zones next to a riverbed can serve different functions and their efﬁciency can be calculated according to breadth, width, depth and maintenance, but the need to do this on agricultural land and to involve farmers is a different issue. When participants asked for extra information, experts were invited and they enriched the process. However when an invited expert acted as an advocate for a contested idea, like creation of more natural versus arable land, this was counterproductive because participants felt intimidated.

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From the interviews it became apparent that the participants found it important that the meetings provided a place where all interests were presented as a broad picture. Some stakeholders have their own bilateral meetings with authorities, e.g. to apply for permits; however, they appreciated the multi-stakeholder setting. Transparency of Decision-making The decision-making process was not transparent for the participants as it emerged from the interviews. This was because the Law on Integrated Water Management, in which the river sub-basin management plan was announced, was not yet legally approved by the Flemish Parliament, as was the case with several other policies like e.g. the Water Resources Policy. Though the intentions of the proposed policies gave little space for decisions, some participants who had a great interest doubted if it was wise to work on the basis of intentions. On the other hand, the participants knew that this project was a pilot project in Flanders and served as a model for ten future projects. But some participants could not grasp the required speciﬁcity of such a plan, which led to caution and low ambition because of the presumed consequences; and this caused others to be disappointed. Both the organisers and the public/private partners struggled with the format, content and area speciﬁcity of a sub-basin plan, as there was no existing example. This frustrated all parties and caused inefﬁcient meetings. Thus the transparency of the decision-making was poor as many participants did not see exactly what was to be decided and the decision-making process was very vague. Despite that, a majority valued the process positively, mainly because the sessions enabled them to point out stakes and hear about other stakes. Knowledge- building occurred: the awareness of multiple uses and multiple perspectives was raised. This is a ﬁrst step in creating an integrated water management policy. However, when speciﬁcally queried on this issue, many representatives said they had learned only little from other participants. Furthermore, the whole procedure of the meetings (agenda), the nature of the ﬁnal product (the plan) to be produced, and when and who had the ﬁnal say were not clear to all. Still, very few participants asked procedural questions during the meetings. Participants were far more outspoken in the interviews than in the meetings. Conclusions and Recommendations When drawing main conclusions on the functioning of the Nete platform it should be kept in mind that this was the ﬁrst time authorities made the effort to organize an interactive way of drafting a sub-basin management plan based on integrative thinking about water- and land resources. They did succeed in bringing together the main actors and got them involved for more than a year. How did the Nete process function as a temporarily information system? Was the information exchange equitable and did it enrich the process (1)? Part of the information gathering was done in the ﬁrst part of the tripartite methodology and the participants were involved in that by responding to the information needs of the Administration while adding their own perspectives, constraints and concerns. In

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the meetings of the third part, they could ask for other capta and add context and appreciation of the information laid down in the background document. Water system information was not much debated, however. Information exchange was equitable in the sense that there was ample time to bring information in, but not equitable when contrasted with the time needed to assemble these capta; several civil servants from different sectors were by far not ready assembling their own information base. Each department had been sitting on their own data, database and information. The fact that this information search had to be done during the meetings was boring and annoying for the other participants. The majority of the participants were administrators who proved to have their own stakes. They combined different roles (licensing, informing, and competing with other departments). The administration was not ready yet for integrative thinking. Farmer representatives were not able to respond to questions about strategy, prospects, crop patterns and possibilities for adaptation of the farming businesses in the sub-basin. They stressed the overall problem situation of the farmers over and over again. The industrial sector was well organised in local circles and could clearly inform the meetings about their industrial water processing (im) possibilities. However, they did not respond on the issue of historical pollution, stating that they acted on governmental permits to pollute. When asked by the environmental NGOs to give and take they were reluctant to do so. Environmental NGOs were well represented and very well informed on policies, strategies and terrain information. The public drinking-water industry was well informed on the terrain and on European legislation such as the Bird and Habitat Directives. Overall the process was enriched by the information exchanged. Participants from some governmentrelated institutions specialised on land reform and spatial planning did hesitate to exchange information on interactive planning which could have enriched the process even further. Was the information accessible, of a suitable format, adequate to debate the issues, timely available, and of good quality (2)? All participants and people of subscription list were provided with all information available. Due to time pressure accessibility was sometimes very low, because documents were large, disseminated just prior to meetings and GIS maps could not easily be printed. The well-educated participants did not have many problems with the formats, but for them, too, spatial maps and terrain visits would have made discussions more down-to-earth and suitable than GIS manipulation in the meetings. Adequacy of the documentation could be improved: mainly because the organisers could not properly prepare for the sessions due to time stress, partial information was supplied in abundance and was not very well suited to discussions and decision-making. On the other hand, whenever participants asked for new information it was organised by asking experts to inform the groups. The time schedule was too short to digest all this information. Does participation lead to better plans, increased knowledge on the functioning of the water systems and more transparent decision-making (3)? I observed knowledge building on the consequences of thinking in terms of basin boundaries instead of administrative boundaries as well as on the need for an integrated approach to water management problems, like weighing the social, economic and environmental effects of certain measures. The water systems analysis was not much debated as a

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whole. In discussing issues knowledge was shared on the functioning of ﬂoodplains or hydrological measures. In the platform participants gained more insight in new or pending policy development in the Flemish administration. Recommendations Information exchange was found not adequate enough. Although the participants were well educated and experts in their ﬁeld of interest, they found the decision-making process vague, which led them to contribute less, to stick to their own interests and restrict their ambition. However, they appreciated the multiple-stakeholder setting and made great effort to attend the meetings. An independent facilitator who could stimulate a real dialogue rather than mere information exchange could improve the process and stimulate a more integrative negotiation. Also other ways of convening, such as terrain visits and more creative gatherings can stir up the process. Since there are always participation costs for the participants involved, more condensed debates on major points with adequate selected information and directions for reading would be more efﬁcient. With respect to the eight steps of interactive decision making what was missing in this process was the in-depth problem and causal analysis as a joint activity after the list of 207 constraints and challenges was inventoried. This is an important step in the deliberations of a multi-stakeholder platform as it gives deeper understanding and a basis for choice between options and measures. Also lacking was a written commitment by the stakeholder groups to act, each in their own way, to bring integrated water and land resources a step further to implementation. Making a subbasin management plan is one thing, getting there and jointly monitor the progress is another thing. Maybe there will be installed advisory multi-stakeholder councils for each sub-basin as was foreseen in the Law in Flanders, but not yet formalised. This could secure a sustainable contribution of the actors towards monitoring and improvement. Acknowledgements I would like to thank the Flemish Administration AMINAL for the opportunity to observe the Nete planning process, which was facilitated by Jan de Schutter and Erwin de Meyer, both sub-basin coordinators at that time. References EU (European Union) (2000), Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Union and of the Council, of 23 October 2000, establishing a framework for community action in the field of water policy. Official J. European Communities L327, 1–73. UN-ECE Århus Convention (UN-ECE): 28 p. (2003). Ontwerp van Decreet betreffende het Integraal Waterbeleid. Stuk 1730 (2002–2003) – Nr. 5: 44. Brussel.

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Anonymous (2001), Over een andere boeg. Naar procesgestuurde besluitvorming. Project Mainport Rotterdam. Den Haag, Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat en DHV Management Consultants: 31. Checkland, P. and Holwell, S. (1998), Information, systems and information systems, Wiley, Chichester. Hemmati, M. (2002), Multi-stakeholder processes for governance and sustainability. Beyond deadlock and conflict, Earthscan, London. Holwell, S. (1989), Planning in Shell: joint learning through action research, Lancaster. Klinkers, L. (2002), Beleid begint bij de samenleving. Een zoektocht naar de menselijke maat. Over de essentie van interactief beleid maken, Lemma, Utrecht. MacKenzie, S. H. (1996), Integrated resource planning and management. The ecosystem approach in the Great Lakes Basin, Island Press, Washington DC. Maes, F. and Lavrysen, L. (2003), Integraal Waterbeleid in Vlaanderen en Nederland. Verslagboek van de studiedag van 31 oktober 2003 (Gent), Die Keure, Brugge. Mitchell, B. (2002), Resource and Environmental Management, Prentice Hall, Harlow. EU (2003), Richtlijn 2003/4/EG inzake de toegang van het publiek tot milieuinformatie en tot intrekking van richtlijn 90/313 EEG van de raad. EU (2003), Richtlijn 2003/35/EG tot voorziening van inspraak van het publiek in de opstelling van bepaalde plannen en programma’s betreffende het milieu en, met betrekking tot inspraak van het publiek en toegang tot de rechter, tot wijzigingen van de Richtlijnen 85/337/EEG en 96/61/EG van de Raad. Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie. Staes, J., R. De Sutter, et al. (2002), Methodology for the development of river subbain management plans: Concept and application, Mallorca congres. Van de Kerkhof, M. (2004), Debating climate change. Atudy of stakeholder participation in an integrated assessmentof long-term climate policy in the Netherlands, Lemma, Utrecht. Vandenabeele, J. (2003), Milieu-Burgers-Plannen. Antwerpen.

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Chapter 7

The International Zwin Commission: The Beauty of a Mayﬂy? Leo Santbergen

Introduction Mayﬂies are sound indicators for good water quality as they are very vulnerable to pollution. Frequent car drivers in the Netherlands are very familiar with them due to the ‘summer snow-swarms’ the insects may cause. As adults, they leave the mysterious ‘aquatic society’ almost simultaneously,1 after having spent their entire lifetime below the watermark, hidden for most human beings who might not be aware of their presence. Hibernation is a natural aspect of their life cycle (Gysels 1991). Since 1939, the International Zwin Commission (IZC), a group of governmental ofﬁcials and experts from Belgium and the Netherlands, has discussed trans-boundary issues related to the management of the Zwin, a scenic border area. Although the commission has existed for more than half a century, one may wonder if this platform has been successful over the years. The silting-up process of the nature reserve, the ofﬁcial issue on the agenda for many years, seems to have affected the platform itself from time to time, getting the members bogged down in endless discussions and hibernation. In some decades the adults, a beautiful natural diversity of personalities, woke up from their hibernation and met once every one or two years. In other (lengthy) periods, the species of the Zwin platform seemed to continue their life cycles as invisible larvae. Might the remarkable return of the commission between 2001 and 2004 be interpreted as an indicator for better relationships between close neighbours, and the annual meetings, although complicated and laborious in nature, as necessary inconveniences? Are those inconveniences worth the investments because of powerful decisions, or are the ofﬁcials and experts only keeping up appearances? 1 The life cycle of every mayﬂy is more or less similar; only the seasonal patterns differ between species. Some species show two generations a year (with adults appearing in May and September), others show only one generation per one or two years (with adults appearing in May, June or July). The adults live very shortly, from only a few hours to a few days. The male adults, packed together in swarms, dance above ditches, lakes, brooks and rivers in the early mornings and evenings. They die shortly after having mated with the females. The eggs are dropped in the water. The larval stage takes four up to eleven months, depending on the species. The name mayﬂy is related to the swarms that appear in May for most species (Gysels 1991).

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The aim of this chapter is to test the applicability of the MSP assessment dimensions as proposed by Warner and Verhallen (Chapter 2, this volume), by analyzing a case of integrated river basin management.2 The central question is: How effective has the International Zwin Commission been as a multi-stakeholder platform? In this chapter, a two-step approach is followed. First, a case description is presented, based on the author’s interpretation of ofﬁcial documents and meeting minutes from 1939 until 2004. Some bias was unavoidable since the author was a stakeholder himself.3 Based on a theory of Teisman’s (1992), seven negotiation rounds can be distinguished. Second, the MSP assessment dimensions (Chapter 2) are evaluated for two periods (1939 till 1986 and 1987 till 2004). Table 7.1 Negotiation rounds of the International Zwin Commission (1939–2004) Round I II III

Period 1939 1940-1945 1946-1959

# of meetings 1 0 7

IV

1960-1986 0

V

1987-1997 3

VI VII

1998-2000 0 2001-2004 3

Driver(s) for activity or hibernation Awareness of values of the scenic area Second World War Illegal construction of an enclosure dam Distrust and disagreement Joint fact ﬁnding 1953 sea ﬂood Finance of ﬁeld works Distrust and disagreement Other trans-boundary conﬂicts Refreshed playing ﬁeld Impact of sand supplementing works Installation of the Technical Study Group A conﬁdential Belgian report Formal letter of an excluded stakeholder Formal inclusion of new members Fourth progress report of TSG Diplomacy of both IZC chairmen Long term envisioning process for the river Scheldt estuary

2 Within this case study integrated river basin management is deﬁned as ‘an inclusive, integrative and iterative multi-stakeholder process of developing trans-boundary policies and management approaches for interrelated land-water-atmosphere systems on different temporal and hydro-geographical scales, aiming at matching ﬁve dimensions of sustainability: healthy ecosystems, social equity, economic efﬁciency, adaptive institutions and ﬂexible technology’ (adapted after Santbergen 2005). 3 From 2000 until 2003 the author was the Dutch chairman of the Technical Study Group.

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Case Description Between 1939 and 2004, seven negotiation rounds can be distinguished (Table 7.1). Round I (1939) The whole process started with the 1926 request of the Belgian (private) owner of the Zwin area to reclaim the entire area, which the Dutch national authorities refused. Gradually, awareness of the natural values grew on both sides of the border. An important driver was the question how to preserve those values (vegetation and birds), related to hydro-morphological processes in the coastal zone. In 1939, for the ﬁrst time, Belgian and Dutch delegations met to discuss transboundary management issues of the Zwin area (formally, the nature area did (and still does) not have the status of a reserve).4 Round II (1940–1945) During the German Occupation (1940–1945) and in the years immediately after, no formal meetings took place. Round III (1946–1959) The most important driver for the restarted formal meetings was the fact that the Belgian authorities had not been informed about the ‘illegal’ construction of an enclosure dam in the mouth of the Zwin area,5 established by a Dutch water board (1948–1950). The Dutch nation state ‘refused to force’ the water board to remove the dam. Instead, civil engineers proposed to periodically deepen and widen another entrance channel (1950). Disagreement, distrust and repetition of positions and statements dominated the discourse during the ofﬁcial meetings, whilst on the other hand informal joint ﬁeld excursions and technical studies contributed to a process of joint fact-ﬁnding. Another driving force was the 1953 sea ﬂood in the south-west Netherlands. The illegal dam had been ﬂushed away; the strength of the (weakened) International Zwin dike became a political issue, apart from the question of how to share the costs for all trans-boundary management activities. The Dutch delegation proposed the

4 This is due to the private ownership of the Belgian part of the Zwin area. The private owner fears restrictions and management rules imposed by the authorities if the formal status of a nature reserve is obtained. 5 The mouth is where water from the North Sea enters and leaves the area with the tide. Due to natural conditions and human activities, the mouth and the inland parts silt up. If nothing is undertaken, this relatively small but ecologically rare tidal zone will develop gradually into a desalinated and silted up dune valley, dominated by grasses, reed and willows. Biologically rich mudﬂats and marshes will disappear. The importance of the nature areas for migrating and hibernating birds will decrease considerably (Santbergen 2004; Herrier 2003; De Wolf 2003).

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enclosure of the entrance channels in the mouth (‘as the safest and cheapest option’) whilst the Belgian delegation stuck to their wish to maintain the natural values as long as possible (by means of an open entrance channel as the best option). Based on recommendations of an expert panel, the IZC advised the Belgian and Dutch national authorities to enforce the International Zwin Dike and periodically re-allocate and deepen/widen the entrance channel. The Commission moved the ‘hot potato’ of allocating the costs to them (1955). A draft agreement, as composed by the Dutch national authorities (1958), has never been signed. The International Zwin Dike enforcement works just have been carried out due to the perceived sense of urgency. Round IV (1960–1986) In this round, according to one of the former secretaries of the IZC, ‘the silting up process of both the Zwin and the negotiation arena accelerated’. No formal meetings took place, probably related to other bilateral (historical) conﬂicts. The Dutch authorities continued ﬁeld works (entrance channel re-allocation) unilaterally. Round V (1987–1997) Restart of the Commission with a completely refreshed playing ﬁeld. New issues concerned the sand suppletion works in the Belgian coastal zone, which seemed to accelerate the silting-up process. In 1987 a Technical Study Group (TSG) was established in order to study long-term, sustainable options.6 A ﬁrst result was an agreement to re-allocate the entrance channel once more, in combination with the establishment of a sand trap. The Flemish state authorities were to take care of the costs and a joint monitoring program was initiated. Evaluation of the sand trap showed that this measure helps to keep the entrance channel open, but it does not stop the silting-up process in the scenic area. Another important impetus was a conﬁdential Belgian report (1993) in which enlargement of the Zwin area with (parts) of the adjacent Willem-Leopold polder was introduced as the so-called ‘de-poldering’ option. The IZC asked the TSG to study this new option. In 1997, the IZC approved the recommendations as proposed by the TSG in its third progress report. The Commission asked for further studies on different options (restoration of inland freshwater discharge via the Zwin area, dynamic coastal-zone management, enlargement of the

6 The formal task of the Technical Study Group, formulated by the IZC in 1987, is to inventory the natural values of the Zwin reserve and to make recommendations on the most desirable future developments concerning the natural values and the technical solutions and management options that are considered to be necessary to maintain those natural values in relation to the continuing silting up process of the entrance channel. Starting point is the preservation of the tidal mud ﬂats and marshes. To safeguard the saline character of the reserve, a regular inundation with salt water is a prerequisite. The silting up process should be tackled by active forms of management.

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tidal volume within the present scenic area and de-poldering scenarios). A transboundary, shared vision should be made ﬁrst, followed by a management plan. Round VI (1998–2000) A period of ‘silent diplomacy’ followed, partly provoked by one of the Belgian keyplayers who was not formally involved in the International Zwin Commission. In fact, awareness grew among the IZC members that the scope of the commission should be enlarged, both technically and institutionally. A process of exchange of (formal) letters and informal discussions on the extension of the Commission with other stakeholders (public and private) started to take place. At the end of this round, representatives of municipalities, water boards and the owners/ managers of the Zwin area were invited to become formal members of the commission. Attempts of the Flemish state and provincial authorities to arrange the formal status as a nature reserve with the Belgian owner failed again. Round VII (2001–2004) This round saw the restart of the IZC with the new members on board. Ten years after the introduction of the ‘de-poldering’ option, the fourth progress report of the TSG emphasises the potential of de-poldering options to generate win-win outcomes (2001). Although proponents and opponents derive arguments from the TSG documents to persuade their opposite numbers, both chairmen move diplomatically and steer the process to a supported memorandum on starting up an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure based on a ‘political compromise scenario’ (2003). Given several statements in the minutes of the meetings, this does not necessarily mean that this scenario is fully supported by all members. A strong window of opportunity appears with the long-term envisioning process on the entire Scheldt estuary, in which the options for the Zwin area are mentioned among the most promising ones (2004). Figure 7.1 shows a map with the Zwin area and studied alternatives (from Santbergen 2004). Assessment Dimensions Arenas From the start until 2001, the public sector dominated the platform advised by two experts (civil sector; arena: bi-partite, multi-focal, i.e. water and nature). In Round VII the private sector entered the platform (Table 7.2), transforming the platform into a tri-partite, multi-focal (i.e. water, nature, agriculture, tourism and recreation) arena. Remarkably, two of the major stakeholders, the managers of the nature reserve, were not been represented formally in the IZC until mid-2001. Furthermore, those

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Figure 7.1

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The Zwin scenic area and its surroundings (Santbergen 2004)

Note: The dark coloured sites are vegetated silted up-patches. ‘25%’ indicates the political compromise scenario, i.e. enlargement of the Zwin area with 25% of the adjacent WillemLeopold polder; 50% indicates the de-poldering option with best (estimated) guarantees on a long-term sustainable solution (E-Connection 2001).

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Table 7.2 Arena composition International Zwin Commission in Round VII (2001–2004) Type of stakeholder↓ Decision maker Ministry of Transport, Public Works & Water Management (VenW; D) Ministry of Environment and Infrastructure (B) Implementer Province of Zealand (D; chair) Province of West-Flanders (B; chair) Rijkswaterstaat Zealand (D) AWZ – Coastal Waters Division (B) AMINAL – Nature Division (B) Water Board Zeeuws Vlaanderen (D) Zwin Polder Board (B) Nieuwe Hazegras Polder Board (B) Municipality Sluis-Aardenburg (D) *) Municipality Knokke-Heist (B) *) Users ‘t Zeeuwse Landschap (D) *) Compagnie ‘t Zoute (B) *) Experts Two advisors of the IZC (D, B) Institute of Nature Conservation (B) Hydraulics Laboratory (B) Coastal Water Division (RIKZ; D) Economic Study Ofﬁce of West-Flanders (WES; B) ALTERRA (D)

Sector↓

Level↓

Public

National

Public

National

Public Public Public Public Public Public Public Public Public Public

Regional Regional Regional National National Regional Local Local Local Local

Private Private

Regional Local

Civil Public Public Public Private Civil

National

National National National

B = Flemish stakeholders; D = Dutch stakeholders; AMINAL = Flemish Administration of Environment, Water, Land and Nature; AWZ = Flemish Administration of Waterways and Coastal Zone Management. *) Member since June 2001. In italics: TSG member only.

who stand to lose or beneﬁt from management options proposed by the IZC, like NGOs, farmers, recreational entrepreneurs, tourists, ﬁshermen, journalists and residents have been excluded and not pro-actively informed. Although international sensitive relations are at stake, it is still striking that regional authorities should chair the commission. Given a long history of political distrust and disagreement, the IZC might be considered a regional paciﬁcation instrument for the national authorities involved, at least where overcoming conﬂict is concerned. There is no representation from the international and inter-regional levels. Notwithstanding the Zwin nature reserve being subject to European legislation like the Birds and Habitats Directives, the EC is not an observer to the IZC, but is

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informed indirectly by the relevant authorities. The same applies to the International Scheldt Commission that coordinates the implementation of the European Water Framework Directive in the Scheldt River Basin District. Moreover the Technical Scheldt Commission, which deals with issues of nature conservation, navigation and ﬂood control in the river Scheldt estuary, is not a member or observer to the IZC, but is informed on the progress of the IZC by the chairmen (only by request). Power Balance For this case study, no extensive stakeholder and power balance analysis has been conducted. For an explorative description of positions of the stakeholders within the IZC/TSG arena (Round VII) see Santbergen (2004). There has been equitable power for the participants within the TSG, although some players have been more active than others. Concerning the IZC, it is doubtful that all players had equitable power. In Rounds I through VI some important stakeholders were explicitly excluded from the process. The media were (unilaterally) informed in a controlled way at certain predetermined moments. Environmental NGOs, scientiﬁc and advisory institutes seemed to pay low attention to the work of the IZC and were not actively requesting membership. Multiple Use From the beginning the main focus of the IZC has been nature-oriented: conservation of ﬂora and fauna has been the main driver for the establishment of the platform. Gradually, an evolution took place towards water system management, focusing on water quantity issues. Human beneﬁts, other than ﬂood defence and fresh water discharge, were hardly included. In Round VII, issues of social equity and economic efﬁciency related to ecosystem sustainability started to show up in the reports of the TSG. Examples are prospects for farmers in the surrounding polders of the nature reserve and potential inter-regional beneﬁts from (nature-oriented) tourism and recreation. Although those studies provide (slightly) more insight in opportunities for social equity and economic efﬁciency, no consensus is reached on (some) underlying (controversial) assumptions and conclusions. Salient Goals The platform emerged in an attempt to overcome conﬂicts between Belgium and the Netherlands. From the start goals have been diffuse, based on short-term interests of involved actors. One might say that the nature reserve survived due to disagreement and distrust. If the Dutch national government would have had full authority in this case, the area would have been disconnected from the North Sea against the lowest possible cost. With the establishment of the TSG (1987; Round V), the goals started to become more focused, based on a shared sense of urgency. In 1997, the IZC asked the TSG to initiate a long-term shared vision on the management of the nature reserve. Although some preliminary attempts were made, such a vision never appeared. This might be due to the ‘wicked’ nature of the issues at stake, in which

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actors’ norms, values, perceptions and interests differ signiﬁcantly (cf. De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2002). Support Generating Capacity The IZC has a limited (formal) mandate to provide technical recommendations only and not to investigate resources allocation in detail. Since the start of the IZC, the national authorities have not come to any agreement on cost sharing. The IZC has no ﬁnancial and human resources of its own. Resources available to its members fund study reports. External support may be obtained by looking for coalitions with other national, (inter-) regional initiatives and (European) funding. Given the broadened scope and the start of a new negotiation round in which the (potential) cross links with inter-regional initiatives and the long term visioning process for the entire Scheldt estuary becomes more prominent, it might be wise to reconsider the constellation of the IZC and its TSG. The IZC does not have the explicit aim to develop partnerships and strengthen networks between and among stakeholders. The frequency of the IZC meetings is too low for that purpose anyway; a frequency of three to ﬁve meetings a year (TSG) may also be considered too low for that purpose. Adaptability Over Time Although clear in itself, attempts were made within the TSG to ‘discuss and improve’ the task description. The main question was if the TSG should limit its work to marine natural values only or should also aim at restoring historical fresh water – salt-water gradients. Some actors advocated a pragmatic approach in order to prevent endless debates. Discussions also took place on the boundaries of the study area. Although some actors argued for a broader study area but a strict planning envelope (the borders of the present Zwin area itself), others moved the process in the direction of political compromise with a broader boundary than the reserve itself. One may say that, although the stakeholders did not completely agree on the norms, values and goals underlying the task description, there was at least a shared view on the range of management options and required knowledge. In negotiation Rounds I-IV, hardly any progress was made, due to the fact that the issues on the table had an unstructured, ‘wicked’ character. In Rounds V-VII, the issues then developed into the direction of ‘ill-structured problems’. In such cases, the process is oriented at peacekeeping, as described by Hendriks et al. (1999). Paciﬁcation points at reaching consensus on management options, while controversies around a problem have not disappeared. Paciﬁcation as a planning process may keep important stakeholders on board, but holds a danger of symbolic planning outcomes. In Round VII, TSG members started to invest more in developing a sound advice to the IZC. Both the number (and extent) of formal and informal meetings increased. Additional study reports were produced. A shared ownership started to develop. Room was provided for confronting opinions and ideas and gradually a multi-stakeholder dialogue started to develop based on mutual respect. Although

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in the beginning ‘media incidents’ occurred initiated by individuals or small coalitions of stakeholders (looking for options outside and around the platform), (informal) agreements on external communication were increasingly respected. On the other hand, historical distrust among some of the members continued to cause incidents. For example, the discussions between the Dutch and Flemish authorities concerning the approach of oil spill from the Tricolor tanker into the Zwin mouth collapsed and entirely took place outside the IZC. One might explain this as proof of the weak (formal) position of the IZC, or on the contrary, as an attempt to keep the platform alive during ‘stormy tides’. The same actors were in the ﬁeld, but the platform seemed to be temporarily hidden. Synergy for Innovation Within both the TSG as the IZC, a gradual evolution took place from a rigid task-oriented planning process – technical solutions on the silting up process in the nature reserve only – to a more integrated approach, including (save and timely) discharge of inland fresh water, dynamic coastal zone management and ﬂood defence in relation to climate change. Hence, the study area was enlarged from the present nature reserve to adjacent inland polders and the coastal zone. This provided space for innovative options and including social and economic aspects, although the attempts to fully integrate the latter failed due to limited mandates. Decision Space There have been no clear, formalized, written down ‘rules of the game’. Implicit, informal and oral agreements predominated the process both in the TSG as the IZC. Informal coalitions arose and disappeared around the platforms, sometimes frustrating – when unexpected press publications appeared – or stimulating – when innovative ideas came up – the cooperation process. Within the TSG, a mix of persuasion, seeking dialogue and formation (after De Kock 2002) occurred. In fact, opponents and proponents tried to persuade each other and the neutral actors. The chairs tried to stimulate scientiﬁc discussions, based on both external studies and internal advice from individuals or coalitions of members. After a ﬁrst stage of seeking an (open) dialogue based on a synthesis of available information, the chairs tried to steer the process towards a ‘ﬁnal’ memorandum leaving scope for additional studies. At the formal IZC meetings, the chairs of the IZC informed the members on the progress of the TSG, and balanced carefully among the diverging interests, in order to keep everybody in the arena. In informal (sometimes secret) meetings with individual members, the chairs tried to both examine the negotiation space and to carefully guide the process in the direction of the most promising management options. In fact, the chairs followed a formative communication strategy in which the exchange of information, ideas and diverging opinions among different actors is aimed at guiding a planning or decision-making process to a consensus, supported by the key actors (after De Kock 2002).

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This strategy aimed to put an end to a long period of debates, conﬂicts and controversial short-term management measures. Finally, the IZC chairs decided to inform the media jointly, but in practice, the chairs informed their own regional media independently from one another. Table 7.3 summarizes the assessment dimensions for the IZC (period 1939–1986 compared with period 1987–2004). Outcome Given the lack of formal decision-making competencies, the absence of both ‘rules of the game’ as instruments for conﬂict resolution and the limited (technical) scope, the platform seemed to be not very effective. In case of trouble, the IZC moved around in circles in the outskirts of the political activity networks, becoming dormant or talking about ‘harmless’ issues. In a 65-year period, the commission formally met only 14 times. Given the repeatedly stated sense of urgency, the commission has not been overactive and did not initiate plenty activity. Its climax has been Round IV: for 28 years there were no formal meetings. The most signiﬁcant activity was the adoption of the ﬁnal memorandum (2003) and presenting it to the competent national authorities. Supported by numerous study reports, the TSG progress reports, and informal meetings on both expert and political level, the stakeholders involved in the IZC/TSG arena grew towards a common sense that at least an EIA procedure could be applied here. In this respect, the IZC seems to have stimulated a shared ownership development. To outsiders, the IZC might still seem a frequently hibernating mayﬂy, only showing up – with luck – once a year. Discussion: MSP Assessment Dimensions Although one may argue if some of the assessment dimensions belong to ‘process’ or ‘context’, Warner and Verhallen have presented a comprehensive tool for the ‘identiﬁcation’ and ‘evaluation’ of MSPs that aim for solving complex issues of integrated river basin management. The degree of complexity, as expressed by Mitchell’s levels of integration (1990), is implicitly included in the ‘multiple use’ dimension. As Watson (Chapter 3, this volume) shows, the nature of the issues at stake inﬂuences the degree of deliberation that is required. In the case of issues on which there is no agreement on the goals, collaboration is desirable instead of coordination only (ibid). Hence, to my opinion, an extra assessment dimension might be useful, i.e. ‘degree of interaction’, ranging from persuasion via consultation and coordination to collaboration. De Bruijn et al. (2002) plead for the ex-ante formulation of explicit process rules that are adopted by all participants. In this case study I have included ‘rules of the game’ in the ‘decision space’ dimension (see Table 7.3). The local institutional context is important as well and is implicitly expressed by the presented assessment dimensions. However, in the Zwin case as in other international cases (e.g. Hofstede, 1984, 2004; Meijerink, 1998) the role of cultural factors might not be underestimated. Hence, I propose to take them into account as an additional assessment dimension for those cases.

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Table 7.3 MSP assessment dimensions in the international Zwin arena (1939–2004) Dimension↓

Expected efficacy of an ideal-type MSP

Multiple use

Single human function, Without nature Goals Short-term, self-interest/ diffuse Arenas Uni-partite, single focus Power balance Two players, one dominant Decision space

Support generating capacity Synergy for innovation

Adaptability over time Outcome

Small mandates, no explicit rules of the game Individual

Individual interests, no synergy

Multiple human functions, without nature Short-term, shared/clear

Single human Multiple human function, nature functions, included nature included

Uni-partite, multi-focus Two players, equitable power Small mandates, implicit rules of the game Shared process, own means Individual interests, joint fact ﬁnding

Bi-partite, multi-focus Multiple players, dominant ones Broad mandates, implicit rules of the game Shared process and means

Long-term, self Long-term, interest/diffuse shared/clear

Shared ownership, process of reframing and social learning Flexible, unfocused

Inﬂexible, own positions Dormant Talking

Advising

Tri-partite, multi-focus Multiple players, equitable power Broad mandates, explicit rules of the game Shared process/ means, external support Innovative group synergy

Flexible, shared focus Acting. workable agreements

Finally, the formulation and monitoring of evaluation indicators by the MSP members will be important as well. I propose to include them explicitly as an assessment dimension. Table 7.4 shows the performance of the proposed, additional assessment dimensions for the Zwin case. Conclusion The International Zwin Commission started within a context of historical distrust, cultural differences and (potential) conﬂicts between Belgium and the Netherlands. In the ﬁrst period, the arena was dominated by stakeholders from the public sector (and

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Table 7.4 Additional MSP assessment dimensions in the international Zwin arena (1939–2004) Dimension↓

Expected efficacy of the multi-stakeholder dialogue

Evaluation indicators

Content Not formulated, no monitoring

Evaluation indicators

Process Not formulated, no monitoring

Degree of interaction

Cultural (f)actors

Persuasion

Formulated implicitly, some monitoring

Formulated explicitly, full monitoring

Formulated Formulated explicitly, implicitly, some Full monitoring monitoring Coordination Collaboration Information exchange and consultation

Context Emphasis on Implicit differences; no recognition action

Explicit recognition

Emphasis on added value; embedded action

Note: Boxes shaded light grey: performance of the International Zwin Commission in the period 1939–1986 (negotiation rounds I–IV). Shaded dark grey: performance of the International Zwin Commission in the period 1987–2004 (negotiation rounds V–VII). If there is no colour for an assessment dimension, the performance is similar to that of the ﬁrst period

two scientiﬁc experts), who were circling around the issues at stake and driven by self-interest. Although the players exchanged information and talked about a shared focus, they were caught within their small mandates and different positions. Probably due to other controversial issues outside the Zwin arena, the national authorities did not support the Commission which became dormant for more than 25 years. In the second period, the Commission enlarged the scope, both in a technical and institutional sense, leading the way to a more open, though limited debate fed by arguments and with more ﬂexible players working on a shared focus. Although the Commission managed to decide on a shared memorandum for the national authorities, this does not necessarily mean that the political compromise scenario is fully supported by all its members. Given the explanation of the Commission as a paciﬁcation instrument, the danger of a symbolic planning outcome is still present. The IZC may hit history records as a beautiful indigenous mayﬂy species – in its role of indicator on both high environmental and institutional quality – or become a harmless larvae, hidden in the aquatic society and only showing up at unexpected moments for keeping up appearances. If it will be the second option, no doubt a second lengthy hibernation sleep might be the ﬁnal outcome of this multi-stakeholder platform. The case study shows that the assessment dimensions as introduced by Warner and Verhallen (Chapter 2, this volume), are appropriate to identify MSPs and

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evaluate their efﬁcacy over time. As such they are a promising additional tool for historical analysis of a given policy domain. References Bruijn, H. de and Heuvelhof, E. ten (2002), ‘Conflicting interests. Policy analysis and decision making in a network: how to improve the quality of analysis and the impact on decision making’, in Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, volume 20, number 4, pp. 232–242. Bruijn, H. de, E. ten Heuvelhof and R. in ‘t Veld (2002), Procesmanagement. Over procesontwerp en besluitvorming.2e herziene druk, Academic Service, Den Haag. E-connection (2001), Overzicht van verschillende maatregelen en scenario’s voor het behoud van het Zwin. Study report on behalf of the Technical Working-Group of the International Zwin Commission. Gysels, H. (1991), Haftelarventabel: determineersleutel voor de larvale eendagsvliegen van het Benelux-gebied, Jeugdbondsuitgeverij (eerste druk), Utrecht. Hendriks, F., et al. (1999), Handreiking voor interactieve planvorming, Den Haag, RIZA White Paper 99.055. Herrier, J-L. (2003), ‘Het Zwin in de context van het Europees en Vlaams natuurbeleid’, in Mees et al. (eds), Feestzitting ter afsluiting van het jubileumjaar 50 jaar Zwin – Het Zwin: van gisteren naar morgen, Vlaams Instituut voor de Zee (VLIZ) and Compagnie ‘t Zoute. VLIZ Special Publication 13, Oostende (Belgium). Hofstede, G. (2004), Cultures and organizations. Software of the mind. Amsterdam: Contact (17th edition). Hofstede, G. (1984), Culture’s consequences. International differences in workrelated values, Sage, London/New Delhi. Kock, T. de (2002), Checklist voor het doordenken van een beleidsproces. in Course Reader ‘Overheidscommunicatie – Beroepsniveau C’, RM, Amsterdam. Meijerink, S. V. (1998), Conflict and cooperation in the Scheldt River Basin, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands. Mitchell, B. (1990), ‘Integrated Water Management’, in Mitchell, B. (ed.) (1990), Integrated Water Management: International Experiences and Perspectives. Belhaven Press, London/New York; pp. 1–21. ProSes (2005), Ontwikkelingsschets 2010 Schelde-estuarium. Besluiten van de Nederlandse en Vlaamse Regering. Antwerpen/Bergen op Zoom. Santbergen, L. L. P. A. (2004), ‘The international Zwin project: an example of European co-operation?’, in Geres, D. (ed.), River restoration 2004: principles, processes, practices: proceedings of 3rd ECRR Conference on River Restoration in Europe, Zagreb, 17–21 May, 2004 (pp. 325–336), Croatian Waters & European Centre for River Restoration, Zagreb (Croatia). Santbergen, L. L. P. A. and Barneveld, R. J. (eds) (2005), Integrated Water Management (HWM21306). Course Manual/Reader, Wageningen University and Research Center, Wageningen. Teisman, G. R. (1992), Complexe besluitvorming; een pluricentrisch perspectief op besluitvorming over ruimtelijke investeringen. ’s-Gravenhage: VUGA Wolf, P. de (2003), ‘Naar een oplossing van het verzandingsprobleem?’, in Mees et al. (eds), Feestzitting ter afsluiting van het jubileumjaar 50 jaar Zwin – Het Zwin: van gisteren naar morgen, Vlaams Instituut voor de Zee (VLIZ) and Compagnie ‘t Zoute. VLIZ Special Publication 13, Oostende (Belgium).

Chapter 8

Participating in Watershed Management: Policy and Practice in the Trahunco Watershed, Argentinean Patagonia Alejandra Moreyra and Jeroen Warner

Introduction Urban expansion and increasing industrial activities encountering rural activities, coupled with the lack of access to basic services like drinking water and sanitation by most of the poor population call attention to existing water management schemes (2nd World Water Forum 2000). This subject is debated over at innumerable international and regional gatherings where the best ways to approach these problems are discussed from the perspective of different interests and ideologies. Many academic and technical institutions, as well as policy makers, national and international organisations and the like, have generated a mainstream advocacy towards the idea that changes in water policies should go in the direction of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), deﬁned as: ‘a process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’ (GWP 2000, 15). For its implementation, river basin organizations (river basin authorities, river basin committees, communities of users, multiple stakeholders platforms, etc.) are promoted (Cosgrove and Rijsberman 2000). River basin organizations are deﬁned as a way of ‘generating a mixed (public and private), ﬁnancially independent, socially oriented, and environmentally sensitive system that is able to act in a democratic and participatory way’ (Dourojeanni 2001). Some analysts maintain that, in this way, participatory and just management systems would be promoted (Cepal 2000; 2001; Heathcote 1998). The need for a rational and efﬁcient water use at the local level is also emphasized as long as it is facilitated by appropriate institutions adapted to local settings, and not centrally imposed (Heathcote 1998). These academic and technical prescriptions intend to keep all political actors informed towards implementing more inclusive water policies. However sound the theory seems, practices not always follow linear paths and complexity always ﬁlters in. The ‘ideal’ scenario, in which collective action, fairness, egalitarian participation, and sustainability are the goals, promoted by emphasizing harmony and consensus,

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ignores or denies existing differences and conﬂicts. The political dimension of water as a disputed resource therefore is overlooked. Another concept used unproblematically is the ‘natural boundaries of the river basin assumed to be the most appropriate unit of planning’ (Wester et al.2003). This assumption presents policy making with a neutral character. Participation of users’ representatives and other ‘relevant’ social actors of the river basin are part of the new value added of participatory water policies at watershed level. Implicit or explicitly, these proposals search for optimal management strategies towards win-win solutions in a concerted fashion. Nevertheless, institutional arrangements for catchment management are neither isolated from the context in which they are promoted nor from the individuals responsible for implementing them within the institutions mandated to do so. This article, therefore, examines the implementation process of a participatory water management policy in the Trahunco watershed in San Martín de los Andes. Ongoing conﬂicts which are not part of the policy agenda are also explored. The analysis of the ethnographic research centers on: (a) theoretical assumptions that support watershed organizations as the way for implementing participatory management policies (b) the ways in which the institutions implementing the policies and the other participating actors, transform or reshape them according to their interests and understandings and c) issues of inclusion and exclusion. The Trahunco Stream’s Context: The Conflicts In Neuquén province, water is considered a public resource owned by the provincial government. The General Water Resource Ofﬁce (DGRH for its initials in Spanish), responsible for applying the Water Code in the province is in charge of granting water quotas. Together with the Environmental Management Unit Ofﬁce (UGA in Spanish) from the municipality of San Martín de los Andes, they evaluate the projects presented by private investors and – among other issues – decide upon the viability of the water requests. The Trahunco watershed is a hotspot because of an international ski centre also known as El Cerro (the Hill) on its top. It is located 20 km from San Martin de los Andes city and it is the most populated rural watershed in the region. Current plans for tourist development in the area (commonly called Loteos) contemplate the construction of around 800 additional houses to accommodate visitors. In the higher part of the watershed, the international ski centre receives more than 78,800 visitors per high season (average of years 2000–2002, accounting for July and August). In addition to the tourist sector, two Mapuche indigenous communities, two periurban urbanizations and one residential neighbourhood as well as two tourist developments, are located in the watershed. This sums aproximately 1600 inhabitants. The growth of economic activities in the watershed, some of which contribute to the population’s subsistence all year round and others during the tourist seasons, has generated a substantial growth in the demand for water resources. In the year 2000, the provincial and municipal agencies estimated that the latest applications for water supply (quotas) by the tourist development investors, when

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added to the already existing demands, exceeded the streams’ resource availability. They took a preventive measure limiting the grant of water quotas; these measures were received as obstaculising economic activities and conﬂicts arose mainly between the investors in the area, the ski centre and the governmental authorities. In an attempt to resolve this conﬂict, the governmental institutions called for a meeting where the speciﬁc demands for water supply would be renegotiated (from minutes of the meetings). Along the negotiation process, the different actors invited1 discussed about water supply and were asked to adjust their initial demands to the minimum supply required for their current activities. In addition, they decided to study alternative water sources for the future, to provide for the tourist projects at the height of their development; when the quotas initially requested will be needed. A latter agreement was to distribute the resource on a monthly basis, according to the needs of each project. The seasonal requirements of each user vary, since the tourist developments are busy only a few months per year. The amount for human consumption is ﬁxed throughout the whole year for the watershed’s inhabitants (Moreyra 2003). To coordinate the arrangements reached, the DGRH proposed the creation of the User’s Community for the Trahunco watershed, which would also be a pilot initiative they could replicate in several other catchments in the area with the same type of development. The Users’ Community was then formed by the tourist development investors, the Skiing centre managers, the representatives of the Drinking Water Cooperative, representatives of one of the Mapuche indigenous communities and the different government agents involved. At the same time, the Mapuche communities settled around the Quitrahue stream – a tributary of the Trahunco – downstream of the ski centre, were in conﬂict with the provincial government, the municipality and the ski centre. The claim was about the lack of efﬁcient treatment of the ski centre’s wastewater, which was polluting their water sources. The claims were put to the government because the centre is owned by the provincial government and is granted in concession to Nieves de Chapelco S. A. which is managing and administrating it. By the year 2000 the communities were already planning the second protest: a blockade of the road leading up to the skiing centre at the heart of the sporting season. The strategy was to stop tourists from reaching the ski centre so they could

1 They were: - Private investors of tourist developments; - Representative of the Ski Centre; - Representative of the Mapuche community settled next to the Trahunco stream (Vera Community); - Drinking Water Coperative (that supplies drinking water to the urbanizations from a toma next to the stream); - Provincial government, forestry agency (owner of a disputed nursery in the catchment); - DGRH representatives; - Provincial Government representatives; - Muncipal Government Environmental Unit representatives.

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get the provincial government down to the site, listen to their claims and negotiate with them (from interviews woth Mapuche community members). The Mapuche communities also allied with the urbanizations represented in neighborhood commissions. They put claims against erosion processes and sedimentation caused by house and golf course constructions at the tourist developments in the scarps of the watershed: ... the problem appeared when the turbid water started to come down; we suspected that it was related to displacements of earth. With some other neighbours we went to look at the small tributary streams of the Trahunco; we saw that the sediments in the water were connected to movement of earth for building the golf course in the upper valley and the Las Pendientes tourist development (interview with president of Los Radales urbanization committee).

Neighbours of the settlement also foresee problems coming from the upstream tourist developments due to uncertain sewage systems, since the numerous streams of water running down the slopes could, in the future, become focal points of contamination (interview with the President of Los Radales urbanization committee).

The Trahunco Users’ Community: The Included Despite the Major’s proposal of ‘joint decision making’, the DGRH deﬁned the problem and the way to solve it. Therefore, the scale for implementing the solution had to ﬁt their needs, limiting the river basin to the upper part of the Trahunco stream. In this way, they had also deﬁned who were to be considered stakeholders: mainly the users who were granted or required water quotas from that sector of the stream, the private investors. The point of departure in the meetings was a discussion on the effective water availability, but parties could not agree on who had the most reliable data. After several meetings discussing the data the DGRH managed to impose their data with the following argument: DGRH is to make the ﬁnal decision in relation to quantities granted, as this is a political decision given that the provincial law gives priority to water for human consumption (as expressed by a DGRH representative in one of the meetings).

The creation of the Users’ Community was signed. According to the commitment sealed, water demands from private investors would ﬁt within the limits set by the DGRH and the private investors would install water meters in each area. The Users’ community would be the institutionalized arena for adjusting on a yearly basis the amount of water to be used by each, in a negotiated and well-coordinated manner. In order for the Users’ Community to be recognized legally, the provincial government should pass a decree formalizing it. DGRH agents had to lobby within the governments’ institutional hierarchies to get this Users’ Community recognized within their own institution.

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For the DGRH ofﬁcials involved, the key issue was to stop granting water quotas until they could get private investors to install water meters, which they did. However, according to interviews with a DGRH agent, conducted in 2004, the decree was never passed by the provincial government and in the end, nobody controls how much water they actually take from the stream. The tourist development investors (or their administrative representatives), as members of the Users’ Community, expressed their interest in participating in the organization because they needed to solve the problem of water distribution so as to have some degree of certainty to continue with their projects: … instead of acting individually (each private investor with the State), the consortium would be the one who negotiates with the State. Internally, resources would be distributed among us, as the usage is temporary and does not necessarily overlap (interview with one investor, who is the technical representative for two other projects).

However, they have not promoted more meetings and they are still waiting for the DGRH and the Municipality to summon them again. In any case, this situation does not hinder the completion of private projects. As a government agent puts it: The private sector in general keeps on going with its projects … so by when the State says no … with the slowness that is characteristic to its bureaucracy, they answer: But we already have all this done! ... so there are new negotiations. They have the cleverness of submitting the papers to the most insigniﬁcant ofﬁce or to whom they know is inefﬁcient and they gain time for advancing their projects (interview with Government ofﬁcial).

This strategy is probably more beneﬁcial to them than lengthy negotiations within the Users’ community. For the drinking water cooperative the Users’ Community was important in terms of negotiating the water quota: ... it is important to be able to maintain the 23 l/sec. rate that the Cooperative receives already from the Trahunco River to supply drinking water to Los Radales urbanization. The alternative for permanently pumping water from other streams would be very expensive for all the neighbours (interview with a technician from the Water Cooperative).

The Vera Mapuche community was invited to participate. This community was divided into those living in the upper part and those downstream. At the time (2001), the representatives represented those living upstream, next to the tourist developments. These representatives had internal conﬂicts with some of the community members downstream and with the representatives of the Curruhuinca mapuche community in the watershed. These internal problems concerned their approach to the state, who to seek legal advise and representation from, their confrontations with the representatives of the Mapuche Confederation and their ideology. Even though the Vera Community representatives were invited because of there good relationship with the local government, they would argue that ‘... we are convoked to the Users Community but we are stone guests, the Community is them, the wealthy people from San Martín de los Andes’.

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The Excluded The majority of settlers of the river basin were summoned to participate in the Users’ Community. The argument put forward by the government not to summon the suburban districts was mainly that they receive drinking water from a Water Cooperative. The Curruhuinca Mapuche community was not considered a stakeholder arguing that they did not belong to the Trahunco catchment but to the Quitrahue one (the tributary of Trahunco stream). We will come back later to this subject. In this sense, the Municipal Agent head of the Environmental Unit, would say: We invite them [the Vera Community] because they are easier to get a long with, we are even supporting their representative to receive environmental training … instead the Curruhuincas [the other community] are conﬂictive and contesting our policies all the time (from ﬁeldnotes AM, 2001).

The Curruhuinca Community, together with some members of the Vera community are active in the Confederación Mapuche Neuquina (Neuquen’s Mapuche Confederation), the political body of most of the Mapuche communities of the province. At that time they were protesting against the ski center mainly because of the lack of wastewater treatment which was polluting the Quitrahue water resources. The Confederation supports Mapuche Communities’ contestation to provincial policies that are perceived to affect their identity and livelihoods. Los Radales urbanization committee met for the ﬁrst time with representatives from the Vera Mapuche Community and El Arenal urbanization committee, to jointly discuss the erosion problems and decide which action to take. … we called for a meeting in the Municipality to which some representatives from the Deliberative Council and the Water Cooperative were invited, to discuss the problem, ask for more information and think out a strategy of joint action (Interview with President of the Los Radales neighbourhood committee).

In this meeting they were promised that when the DGRH agents travelled to SMA they would be invited to a new meeting. However, … when the meeting was held we were not invited. The Major understood that we would be represented by the Water cooperative (which supplies their drinking water). This was not consulted with us. Our complaints presented to the Deliberative Council were not attended (Interview with President of the Los Radales neighbourhood committee).

These actors and their perceptions of the problems in the watershed were not considered in the Users’ Community agenda. The Construction of Problems and Solutions Analyzing the rhetoric used in the nature and construction of a complaint or problem raised in an environmental dispute, Hannigan (1995) identiﬁes three components: Data, Justiﬁcation and Conclusion, and maintains that the combination of these

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three elements determines the nature of the complaint. Once a problem is deﬁned, the discourse is constructed by giving examples for a better understanding and it is closed with a series of numerical estimations (Data). It is this point that ‘technical knowledge’ plays an important role. Other authors have shown how some policy makers have handled this component of the complaint, by displaying a selected set of data that are actually hiding assumptions on the shortage of water, incipient water wars, etc., as a way of justifying their actions. As time goes by, these assumptions settle down and become received wisdom, so they gain power and manage to survive in the realm of policies and projects. In spite of the frequent absence of empirical data to support them, they become part of the discourse used to assess the state of the resource (Leach et al. 1997). The DGRH presented ﬂow rate estimations calculated for the lower section of the river basin as a way of justifying their assumption of water scarcity. These data were presented as ‘the truth’ despite other actors having seriously questioned their validity and presented their own data. The solutions proposed by the DGRH were presented as the required policies. Although estimations of available water ﬂow rates are sometimes imprecise or even absent, the way some data are presented suggests that they are ‘common knowledge’, with no chances for contesting them. In normal practice, institutions tend to deny the existence of conﬂicts in order to avoid controversy. There is a tendency to implement pre-selected solutions or technologies based on a simple agreement. Once a technology or tool is chosen it becomes received wisdom, an example of what ‘must’be done2 (Wester and Warner 2002). It is also attractive to opt for an easily executable solution that guarantees control on the decision-making process. The adoption of a given technology is strongly inﬂuenced by social, cultural and political dynamics (Pool 1997). Integrated catchment management and watershed entities are part of these technological packages for management implementation. Nevertheless, decisions taken within a catchment entity don’t necessarily constrain excluded actors from taking action. ‘The language of experts cannot simply render invisible the experience of the people on their development problems’3 (Arce 2003, 172). Indeed, those actors have the capacity to counteract ‘predominant’ policies or instruments by developing strategies to manipulate, reformulate, and/or adapt them to their own interests and perspectives. The proposal put forward by DGRH and UGA concerning the management and distribution of water between private users was overlooked not only by excluded actors but also by the included. On the one hand, the Curruhuinca community 2 The existence of so-called technological ‘trajectories’ severely limits the development of ‘alternative’ technologies, which may lack behind forever. Once a certain ‘pathway’ is followed, the development of the main technology and all the adjacent technologies becomes so overwhelming that going back may be impossible even if an abandoned technology is known to be better. Besides, lobbies and the establishment gain so much power that it´s hardly possible to ﬁght against them. In addition, the assumption that ‘optimization’ has limits is difﬁcult to sustain (e.g. the PC, communications technologies, rocket science, and so on) (Seghezzo 2004). 3 This is freely translated from the original text: ‘el lenguaje de expertos no puede simplemente hacer invisible la experiencia de la gente sobre los (sus) problemas de desarrollo, como parte de un estado de situación que una perspectiva necesita abordar.’

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managed to put the issue of water quality and the need for sewage treatment at the ski center on the political agenda through road blocks, informing tourists, mass media, and the general public as well as bringing the case to court (Balazote 2003). On the other hand, private investors in the tourist sector did nothing for the Users’ Community, since they were able to individually negotiate their interests outside it. The result was that traditional ways of policy implementation did not improve solely on the basis of participation, presented as a more democratic and integrating approach. Ofﬁcial institutions sometimes place a problem on the socio-political agenda as a way of justifying their ‘action’ to solve it. This approach is particularly interventionist since problems are not identiﬁed by the different actors involved in the use and handling of the resources of the region. Policies for the integrated management of natural resources are currently including participation of the actors involved. However, actors are generally ‘invited to participate’ by ofﬁcial institutions who prepare the agenda beforehand. Only then the actors who ﬁt this particular agenda are identiﬁed as ‘ﬁt to participate’. Therefore, the design of actions is a priori restricted since ‘the deﬁnition of a particular problem ... is very much related to and restricted by the nature of the speciﬁc capacities of the development [or governmental] agencies involved’ (Quarles van Ufford 1993). In the case we are presenting here, the actors perceived the problems at hand quite differently. The process of setting up a Water Users’ Community responded to the particular needs of the DGRH; not to collective action from the part of the other stakeholders. In this case, the search for consensus was a way of legitimizing the interests of the institution responsible for the implementation of speciﬁc water policies. The Nature of Boundaries Many policymakers, researchers and water managers assume that the river basin is the logical planning unit for integrated water management, given its ‘natural’ characteristic. This geographic unit is imposed over the different forms in which societies had historically constructed their administrative units, their social interrelations, their political divisions etc (Barham 2001). Pre-existing situations like these are presented as causes of failure (Dourojeanni 2001) instead of departure points for designing management arrangements. Based on an historical review of the river basin concept, Barham (2001) concluded that ‘there is no historical precedent for what is currently being attempted in environmental planning, e.g. ecosystem or catchment thinking: the establishment of systematic social coordination and cooperation systems aiming to achieve a sustainable interaction with nature based on ecosystems (like river basins) ...’. Apparently, the technical-scientiﬁc knowledge supporting the idea of river basins managed to enlist powerful political actors and an important portion of the public in general, placing the river basin approach on national and international agenda. The advocates of this idea seized the right moment to make its perspective heard, taking advantage of the space created many years ago by water and environmental problems in international relations. However, the practical determination of the limits of a river basin is related to the deﬁnition of the problem and the working scale. This delimitation is a political decision, no matter how ‘natural’ the limits might appear technically, especially when it comes

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to management, where decisions involve the resources that will be taken into account and the people that are inside and outside the system (Schlager and Blomquist 2001). Different delimitations imply different decision-makers and therefore different effects. The Water Users’ Community included only those who used water from the upper basin part of the Trahunco stream4 and therefore the Quitrahue stream was excluded. This delimitation was not innocent since Mapuche communities Curruhuinca and Vera, who had been very outspoken for years about water quality and the lack of sewage treatment at the ski center, were located around the Quitrahue stream. From a catchment perspective, both streams seem to belong to the same river basin, since their waters run jointly to the same collector. Technically speaking, like Russian dolls, each river basin can be considered as a sub-river basin of a larger one. Socioeconomically both basins are intimately connected. On the one hand, the ski center (operated by the company Nieves del Chapelco) located in the upper section, at the source of both streams, impacts on the entire basin. On the other, Mapuche populations established in both basins have all kinds of relationships (kinship, cultural identity, commercial and labour links) among themselves and with the tourist sector. These communities and the (non-Mapuche) districts Los Radales, El Arenal, and Oasis, constitute the stable population of the lower section of the river basin. In the upper section (Trehuaco stream) there is also a real-estate development (locally called loteos) oriented at tourism. Private investors in charge of these developments don’t live in the region, but they have interests in water due to their projects. The deﬁnition of scale in the Trahunco stream was conﬂicting in itself. When it comes to the implementation of water policies, the determination of a river basin may be arbitrary (due to ignorance) or strategic (driven by interests), but not natural or neutral. The Assumptions Underlying Participatory Processes In recent years, the struggle to include the voices of excluded people in water management entered into the speeches of international funding agencies, cooperation agencies, and international NGOs. This approach emerges in the 1980s as a critic to the historic verticality in which policies and programs were implemented, at a time when power and decision making capacity was monopolized by some groups, especially in the ﬁelds of the environment, natural resources management, and social development. It was also an answer to the sectorialized way in which management programs were handled (Hirsch 2002). Participation has been deﬁned as ‘the process through which stakeholders inﬂuence and share control over priority setting, policy-making, resource allocations, and access to public goods and services’ (Participation Learning Group Final Report, http://www.worldbank.org/participation). This perspective seems to assume that actors share common interests and a desire to cooperate peacefully, and that the decisions taken reﬂect the interests of all stakeholders (Crespo Flores 2001). On the 4 At its source, the Trahunco Stream is called Trehuaco stream (in Mapuche: ‘water dog’) by Mapuche settlers and some non-Mapuche as well. It takes its deﬁnitive name (in Mapuche: ‘place where waters join’) when it joins the Quitrahue stream (Mapuche for ‘place where pipes are made’).

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contrary, the perspective of conﬂict negotiation takes for its starting point that interests are intrinsically divergent, and therefore disputes can hardly be avoided (Wester and Warner 2002). The participatory discourse also assumes that all actors want to ‘participate’ and have a say in the ‘ofﬁcial’ process of decision making, together with other actors and the government (Boelens 2001; Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001; Hildyard et al. 1998). The lack of desire to participate is then attributed to lack of clear information, lack of motivation, or to cultural reasons (Ramírez 1999). In this case study we found that nonparticipation could also be a strategy. The explicit argument for excluding the Curruhuinca community from the Community was that they are settled outside the [chosen] limits of the catchment. However, off the record, the UGA’s agent admitted that the real reason was that this community was too outspoken, with a history of problems with provincial and municipal authorities. But, on the other hand, representatives of the Curruhuinca community declare to have neither the intention nor the desires to belong to the Users’Community since they consider their participation only to be required to legitimate governmental decisions (interview with the Lonko (Mapuche chief) and other members of the community). Although these actors were deliberately excluded to avoid ‘problems’, they generated local debate around their own interests, from outside the ofﬁcial channels of participation. Their resistance strategies seem to cost the government more than their inclusion in the meetings would have. The Mapuche people prefer not to be included because they don’t need to commit to the rules of the game then. In many cases, speciﬁc strategies displayed by some actors are very effective. For example, Mapuche communities Curruhuinca, Vera and Atreuco managed to exact better control of the sewage discharged by the ski center. Their court suits and protests led to the construction of a sewage treatment plant at the center. Besides, the local government had to commit to supplying them with drinking water until the stream would be clean again. They have also managed to make the municipal government demand the commitment of the water cooperative to search for a long-term solution for their drinking water supply. Although there was a history of almost ﬁve years of conﬂicts, these topics were never in the agenda of the catchment organization. Minorities can confront traditionally powerful groups only through alliances and common strategies that can not be submerged within the type of consensus seeking within catchment organizations. In these organizations, traditional patterns of power tend to persist and manipulate the identiﬁcation of problems and the deﬁnition of agendas.5 Conclusions Local realities carry speciﬁc ways of solving problems with them. Fixed categories for catchment organizations and theoretical ‘should be’ usually do not reﬂect these contextspeciﬁc characteristics. Although their implementation is not totally arbitrary, they may be used to validate political agendas ﬁxed a priori. Policies deﬁned with technicalscientiﬁc data biases are implemented as ‘solutions’ to ‘problems’ unproblematically. 5 From: Proceedings of the workshop: MSPs as an alternative for the resolution of conﬂicts about natural resources, ENDEPA, June 21–23, 2003.

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A catchment organization, as a tool for implementing management solutions, is not a necessity in itself if it is not linked to social dynamics and local politics. The promotion of a Users’ Community was an effective way of de-politicising the issue of water management, especially since conﬂicts among private investors and Mapuche communities were involved. The issue was set as ‘how much’ water could be taken from the stream, instead of what type of development was wanted for the region, who had the right to discuss it, and how this process could be facilitated. These subjects were totally ignored. Distribution of water among all those who need it, when they need it, may seem a win-win solution (for the government and the private sector). However, it is the policy of doing nothing. Nobody actually wins in the long run because the river basin deteriorates each day, reducing the support base for local populations, the attractiveness for tourism and private companies, and the natural capital of municipal, provincial, and even national jurisdictions. The limited (or absence of) participation from settlers makes long-term initiatives questionable. These actors are the most affected by the environmental effects of tourism activities and developments. They raise problems that demand complex political decisions. The very existence of catchment organizations could be questioned if the most important decisions end up being taken outside of them. Therefore the use of the river basin as a management unit can be a form of manipulation of interests from those who deﬁne its boundaries. Management recommendations can only be made effective when the social and political context is taken into account. What may be obvious from a technical point of view may not be socially and politically appropriate. Therefore, catchments, and abstract catchment organizations, should not be recommended as a panacea that could solve contextspeciﬁc development problems. Acknowledgement This chapter is based on PhD thesis research conducted at Wageningen University, and funded by WOTRO (Stichting voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek in de Tropen). References Arce, A. (2003), ‘Value contestations in development interventions: Community development and sustainable livelihoods approaches’, Community Development Journal 38 (3) July 2003, pp. 199–212. Balazote, A. (2003), ‘Feliz Dia Montaneses: Impacto del turismo en las comunidades mapuches proximas a San Martin de los Andes’, paper presented at the Fifth Reunión de Antropologia del Mercosur (30 Nov/3 Dec.), Florianopolis, Brasil. Barham, E. (2001), ‘Ecological Boundaries as Community Boundaries: The politics of watersheds’, Society and Natural Resources, 14: 181–191. Boelens, R., Dourojeanni, A., Duran, A. and Hoogendam, P. (2002), ‘Water rights and watersheds. Managing multiple water uses and strengthening stakeholder platforms’, in Boelens, R. and Hoogendam, P. (eds), Water Rights and Empowerment, Van Gorcum, Assen, pp. 153–189.

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Crespo Flores, C. (2001), ‘La Guerra del Agua: Nuevos Movimientos Sociales y Crisis de Dispositivos del Poder’, Centro Estudios Superiores Universitarios – Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Cochabamba, Bolivia/Oxford Brookes University. In Spanish. Cosgrove, W. and Rijsberman, F. (2000), World Water Vision: Making Water Everybody’s Business, Earthscan, London. Dourojeanni, A. (2001), ‘Water management at the river basin level: challenges in Latin America’, LC/L 1583-P, Santiago de Chile. Edmunds, D. and Wollenberg, E. (2001), ‘A Strategic Approach to Multistakeholder negotiations’, in Development and Change, Vol. 32 (2001), 231–253. Institute of Social Studies. Gaviño Novillo, M. and Castañeda, S. (1995), ‘Diagnóstico y Evaluación Socioeconómica para la Gestión y Desarrollo de las Cuencas de los Arroyos TrabuncoQuitrahue’, in Plan de Sistematización de las cuencas de los arroyos TrabuncoQuitrahue, Convey SOPYC-MSMA, in Spanish. Hannigan, J. (1995), Environmental Sociology, A Social Constructivist Perspective, Routledge, New York and London. Heathcote, I. (1998), ‘Integrated Watershed Management’, Principles and Practice, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. Hirsch, P. (2003) ‘Modes of Engagement: Negotiating River Basin Development in Mainland South East Asia’, keynote paper presented at Montane Mainland Southeast Asia conference (MMSEA III), Lijiang, Yunnan, China 25–28 August 2002. Long, N. (1997), ‘Agency and Constraint, Perceptions and Practice. A theoretical Position’, in de Hank, H. and Long, N. (eds), Images and Realities of Rural Life, Wageningen Perspectives on Rural Transformations, Van Gorcum, The Netherlands. Moreyra, A. (2003), ‘Entidades de Cuencas: supuestos, intereses e implementación: el caso de la Comunidad de Usuarios de la Cuenca Trahunco, San Martín de los Andes, Neuquen, Argentina’, Revista Búsqueda, Instituto de Estudios Sociales y Económicos, Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Cochabamba, Bolivia. Municipalidad de San Martín de los Andes (1998), ‘Algunas Consideraciones sobre la Gestión del Arroyo Trabunco’, Documento interno. Pool, R. de (1997), Beyond Engineering: How Societies Shape Technology, Oxford University Press, New York. Quarles van Ufford, P. (1993), ‘Knowledge and ignorance in the practices of development policy’ in Hobart, M. (ed.), An anthropological critique of development: The growth of ignorance, EIDOS-Routledge. Ramirez, R. (1999), ‘Stakeholder analysis and conflict management’, in Daniel Buckles (ed.), Cultivating Peace: Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management, IDRC/WBI. Salomon, M. and Engel, P. (1997), Networking for innovation a participatory actororiented methodology, Royal Tropical Institute, KIT Press, The Netherlands. SOYSP/MSMA (1994), ‘Plan de Ordenación de la Cuenca Trabunco-Quitrahue’, Convenio Secretaria de Obras Públicas y Comunicaciones de la Nación-Municipalidad de San Martín de los Andes. In Spanish. Wester, P. and Warner, J. (2002), ‘River Basin Management Reconsidered’, in Turton, A.R. and Henwood, R. (eds) Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern African Perspective, AWIRU, Pretoria.

Chapter 9

‘Yakunchik’: Coming to Agreement after Violence in Perú María Teresa Oré

‘Huamanga tierra que duele, grandiosa en la desgracia’1 Introduction The multi-stakeholder platform ‘Yakunchik’, after the Quechua word for ‘our water’, was established at the end of 1998 in the city of Huamanga, the capital city of the Department of Ayacucho located in the central highlands of Perú, when the region experienced the effects of a severe drought caused by El Niño (EN 98). A workshop on water management which was held in Huamanga at the end of that year brought together a small cluster of concerned local institutions which would later give rise to the platform. Not only is Ayacucho one of the departments with the highest percentage of population living in conditions of extreme poverty. In terms of the violence that seized the country in its grips from 1982 to 1993, it is also the most emblematic because it was the cradle of Shining Path, the guerilla that had the Perúvian government on the rack throughout those years. The confrontations between the guerrilla and the military forces took a toll of 60,000 victims, and it is estimated that Ayacucho contributed with an astounding 40%. Although the high level of violence fell in the area towards the mid-90s, its legacy is still being confronted, not only in terms of human and physical losses but also in terms of lost social, intellectual, and technical capital. Violence changed the panorama of Ayacucho: intense local and regional migration gave rise to the abandonment of the country, on the one hand, and to the explosive growth of cities like Huamanga and Huanta on the other, as well as to the massive migration of Ayacuchanos to other cities such as Ica, Huancayo and Lima. During the years of violence, both State and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were forced to restrict their activities or simply to withdraw from the region. However, in the late 1990s the Government encouraged the return of migrants to Ayacucho and the department became the focus of public institutions, international

1 Huayno by Carlos Falconí, Ayacucho composer, winner of the 1985 Perúvian National Folklore Festival.

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cooperation, and development projects. At present, Ayacucho ranks among the principal departments in terms of the presence of NGOs and international cooperation programs in the country. Around the same time, the ﬁrst group of local institutions that would later contribute to the establishement of Yakunchik emerged in the city of Huamanga. How can we explain the constitution and development of this multi-stakeholder platform after such a difﬁcult period? What is a Platform? In terms of our current analysis, we shall understand the concept of a platform as a collective mechanism used in the negotiation of integrated water resource management, including both the rural and urban areas. It involves the participation not only of the direct users but also of the multiple stakeholders comprised within the basin area. The appearance of water management platforms is quite a new phenomenom in Latin America and is related to the institutional and political changes that have affected the role of the State regarding water management. These changes include the transition from centralist management of this resource to a decentralized model involving the transfer of management functions to water users organisations. This transition has taken place within the context of a neo-liberal economic model, but also within speciﬁc economic, social, and political processes undergone by each country. In Perú, the years of violence came to an end with the administration of engineer Alberto Fujimori (1990–1995; 1995–2000) who was able to stop the escalation of violence. A neo-liberal economic model was implemented while an authoritarian and vertical style, which did not recognize grassroots and several civil-society organizations or even eliminated them, was the most characteristic trait of this administration. During the last years of Fujimori’s second government (1998–1999) the ﬁrst Mesas de Concertación y Diálogo (Negotiation Tables) emerged in response to the speciﬁc demands raised by local and regional groups. These new forms of civilsociety participation were characterized by the negotiation of conﬂicts and a search for agreement and consensus that differed from Perú’s cultural tradition of conﬂict and confrontation. The Negotiation Tables (mesas de concertacion) became very important during the transition government of Dr. Valentín Paniagua (2000–2001) which encouraged and promoted them to deal with the issues of extreme poverty, human rights, and to elaborate regional strategic development plans. It is in this context of a new and increasing participation of the civil society searching for consensus and dialogue that the platforms on water management appeared. However, unlike the Negotiation Tables, which responded mostly to a government initiative, the platforms were established separately to deal with water management-related issues. Platforms are collective negotiation mechanisms characterized by the stakeholders’ voluntary participation and by their propensity to reach agreements,

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both aspects resulting from the existing interdependence among the various stakeholders. Although we view the Yakunchik platform as a collective resource through which the multiple stakeholders reach agreements regarding an integrated water management in the basin, we also see it as a space where the different groups express and play out conﬂicts and power struggles. Therefore, our concern is to analyze how power is exerted and which levels of agreement are reached within the platform. Some of the conﬂicts originate from national and local laws on water management, particularly those regarding water rights in the communities. An analysis of the Yakunchik platform seeks to answer the following questions: What local and regional processes played a role in the establishment and sustainability of Yakunchik? Which stakeholders participate in the platform, and what are their objectives? Which conﬂicts are negotiated within the platform, which conﬂicts are not, and why? How do the various legal frameworks inﬂuence these negotiations, and with what results for the different stakeholders? What options does the platform have for/regarding action strategies? What inﬂuence can the platform have in the new context of regional governments? The Physical and Social Context The platform has its area of inﬂuence in Huamanga, between the basins of the Cachi and Huatatas rivers. The Cachi River originates in Churiac, 4,600 meters above sea level, where a group of interconnected rivers originate. They create the basins of Apacheta, Paccha, Allpachaca, Chicllarazo, Chocoro and Huatatas, all different subbasins of the great Cachi basin. The region does not have snowcapped mountains. Its basins are small and river ﬂows vary considerably throughout the year. Rainfalls occur from December through March. The river ﬂow is low during the rest of the year, and droughts are frequent. The agriculture developed in the area is basically dependent on rainfall, but irrigation has been developed in a complementary way. Initiated in 1987, the Cachi River Special Project (CRSP) is the most important hydraulic project implemented in the Perúvian Highland in the last few years. The project’s goals were to bring water from this basin to increase the supply of potable water in the city, to expand the agricultural area by 9,000 hectares, to increase the electric power potential, and to improve the ecological conditions (reforestation). This project ended in 2001. In institutional terms the CRSP operates in the whole basin of the Cachi River, except for the Paccha, while the Huatatas basin – the traditional source of drinking water for the city of Huamanga – is under the jurisdiction of EPSASA – Entidad Prestadora de Servicios de Saneamiento Ayacucho (Ayacucho’s Water and Sanitation Company). Many rural communities and small farms are located in both basins. As in most of the Perúvian highlands, each rural family owns several plots located at different altitudes to allow for different uses and crops. Unirrigated farmlands and natural pastures prevail both in Huanta and Huamanga, while irrigated lands are mostly concentrated in the middle and lower areas of the basin. The most important crops are corn, potatoes, barley, grains, wheat and beans. There is also important

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fruit production in Huanta. Livestock-related activities take place in the higher area (3,800 meters above the sea level) where American camelidae, sheep and cattle are bred (Yakunchik 2001a). Both agriculture and cattle-breeding activities are mainly oriented to self-consumption. The topography of the area produces many small irrigation systems, which are controlled by community organizations. The most important community irrigation-related activity is cleaning out the ditches. Turns are assigned among the comuneros and a judge on water issues is elected to supervize its control while the cleanup activity is carried out. The community organization is responsible for the maintenance of the infrastructure, the construction of channels, reservoirs, etc. as well as for the resolution of conﬂicts. This is performed in close coordination with the district municipal authorities, which then coordinate with other local or regional institutions. However, irrigation is not a common practice in the department of Ayacucho, and with a few exceptions, e.g. the valleys of Huanta and Quinua, irrigation-related know-how is very basic. Thus, water is used in excess, with the subsequent soil wash and erosion. The infrastructure is also very poor. In most cases, and even in irrigated farmlands, rain is the basic source for agriculture. Irrigation, on the other hand, has two speciﬁc functions: a) to complement rainwater to start the seeding season earlier, and b) to allow for a second crop. Nevertheless, this scenario began to change as the works carried out by the Cachi Project were about to be completed. The irrigation organization described above had never been ofﬁcially recognized, since the Law on Waters did not provide for an organization of this kind, but such a recognition would prove necessary to be entitled for it to the new water supply and to the lands that were going to be irrigated. The Yakunchik Platform Emergence The effects of a severe drought related to ‘El Niño’ were perceived both in urban and rural areas by the end of 1998, and was considered a nation-wide disaster. The phenomenon occurred at a time when the city had grown considerably, mainly due to political violence. This growth which took place spontaneously, mainly through the establishment of shantytowns and urban settlements, also produced a completely new situation: a competition between the countryside and the city for the use of the same water resources. Due to the greater urban demands for water, the Huamanga Water Company, which had diverted some water sources from the community of Chiara to the city since the ﬁfties, practically took all of them, in so doing creating a serious conﬂict. On the other hand, although violence had dropped in those years, the conditions of poverty which had increased considerably brought about greater State involvement in many different areas, as well as the more frequent participation of non-governmental organizations and international cooperation in Ayacucho. One of the areas they

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focused on was the construction of small hydraulic works: dams, reservoirs, intakes, and channels. However, these works were carried out without any preliminary studies, planning or follow-up of their possible impact. With the end of violence, many of the internally displaced populations that had been forced out by the war returned with fresh expectations. The communities tried to orient their production towards market-oriented agriculture, which required a greater use of irrigation techniques. Although the Cachi project was about to be concluded in those years, no determination had been made about the type of agricultural development project that would be implemented in the new irrigated areas, or about who the beneﬁciaries would be. The peasants, mostly community members, had their own local users organization, which lacked ofﬁcial recognition from the ATDR (Irrigation Technical Administration) and the Ministry of Agriculture. This prevented them from being considered as possible beneﬁciaries of the new project and limited their possibilities to successfully solve the conﬂicts they had with EPSASA. The ﬁrst nucleus of the platform was established by a group of organizations at the end of 1998 following a workshop on water management problems which was sponsored by the Instituto de Promoción y Gestión del Agua (IPROGA). Some of the local organizations that participated in this workshop continued meeting during 1999 and elaborated a ﬁrst diagnosis on the irrigation problems in Ayacucho.2 The initial aim of these organizations was irrigation water management, but after carrying out a workshop on basins, which was cosponsored by Proagua/GTZ towards the end of that year, they began to discuss more integrated water management; that is, oriented to both agricultural and urban uses. The workshop on basins was particularly important as it provided a forum which, for the ﬁrst time, brought together representatives of regional and local public companies and institutions (CTAR Ayacucho, the Cachi River Special Project, the provincial and district municipalities, the Water Company, the Electric Energy Company), as well as representatives from a wide range of local and national NGOs, the University, and international technical cooperation, among others. All of these institutions became members of the newly created platform. However, it did not include organizations of urban and rural users. The platform was originally established as a space where different conﬂicting groups could voluntarily meet to resolve their differences.3 The platform did not engage in the elaboration of strategic general plans or projects, but rather in promoting spaces for dialogue which on several occasions brought together conﬂicting parties for the ﬁrst time and contributed to settle their disputes (Interview with Richard Haep, Proagua-GTZ representative, Sept. 20/2001). This initiative facilitated the solution of at least two important conﬂicts, and motivated other organizations, such as the Water and Sanitation Company (EPSASA), to enroll as members of the platform. However, Yakunchik went beyond searching for solutions to conﬂicting 2 These organizations were CTAR Ayacucho, ADES, TADEPA, CEDAP, and SNV. 3 As stated by the SNV representative: ‘The platform is a space to reach agreements, to debate, to get training and expertise, to solve conﬂicts, but not an executive organization. Our added value is the space … We are not going to manage great resources or implement great projects’. Interview with Carlos Pereyra (SNV), 19 September 2001.

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interests, and elaborated a local agenda which, although expressing widely shared needs, had not been dealt with: the integrated management of water, which would include environmental issues and search for sustainability in the use of resources. There isn’t a water resource inventory for Ayacucho. The communities are misinformed and FONCODES4 policies require regulations regarding the construction of channels. It is necessary to deﬁne the environmental agenda for Ayacucho on the water issue. The challenge is to build a political and administrative framework on water management. Citizen control is a must, and this should be the task of the platform.5

This way, the platform members not only became aware of the basin as a concept and management unit, but also of the need to join efforts and work together. In conclusion, the main axes on which the ﬁrst arena of the platform was structured were: to establish an agreement space to deal with conﬂicts, and to work toward the integrated and sustainable management of the basin. Internal Dynamics While some institutions became members of the platform in order to resolve certain conﬂicts, others were interested in executing agricultural development projects, or in learning more about integrated water management. There were extreme disparities not only in terms of resources but also in terms of institutional capacity. Members of the platform ranged from the most important hydraulic project in the whole Perúvian highlands to cooperation agencies, to small local NGOs. Reciprocal prejudice among State organizations, NGOs, companies, municipalities was not uncommon. Moreover, there has been a clear prevalence of government institutions participating as members of the platform since its inception, both in terms of number and in terms of institutional importance. As this was an unprecedented experience and there were no previous models to follow, how could the platform integrate the great variety of its members? Two external actors, the GTZ adviser appointed to the Water and Sanitation Company (EPSASA), Richard Haep and the SNV adviser Carlos Pereyra, were key to the progress of the platform. Not only did they have the knowledge and professional experience but they also had charisma and a great commitment to the work they carried out in Huamanga. These two attributes gave them legitimacy vis-à-vis the members of the platform and allowed them to bridge differences among governmental entities, NGOs and the rural organizations. The SNV and GTZ cooperation agencies were perceived on the basis of these two advisers who developed a relationship of trust and friendship with the Yakunchik members. The support they provided was never in terms of ﬁnancial or technological resources: it involved motivation, ideas, and joint work. The fact that neither of them was from Ayacucho gave them greater possibilities to interact with the different stakeholders.

4 Acronym for Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social (the Perúvian social fund). 5 Interview with Andrés Solari (CIDRA), Yakunchik member, 21 September 2001.

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In 2000, the platform held a workshop on strategic planning to deﬁne its vision, mission and role: ‘An institutionalized and negotiated water management in Ayacucho … on the basis of a plan coordinated and implemented by all the stakeholders within an appropriate legal and administrative framework’ (Yakunchik 2000). A ﬁrst work plan was elaborated on the basis of several diagnoses on the conditions of water management and the basins in Ayacucho. The activities were carried out by working groups, which included a representative of each of the organizations relevant for the issue under discussion. It was clear from the beginning that the platform had to be ﬁnancially autonomous and independent of international cooperation.6 Therefore, each institution contributed with whatever material and human resources they could offer to carry out the activities agreed upon. As the platform lacked an institutional facility, the workgroups held their meetings at the ofﬁces of associate organizations. This contributed to the development of both personal and institutional relationships of trust and conﬁdence among the members, which was particularly important as the members in many cases had never had previous contact. An internal contest to determine the platform’s name and logo, and the publication of the Directorio de la Plataforma de Gestión del Agua en Ayacucho (Water Management Platform Directory) were among the ﬁrst activities that contributed to an institutional establishment. The presentation and dissemination of this Directory granted the platform a certain level of legitimacy in the city of Huamanga. The platform also enhanced its possibilities by establishing a network with other national organizations, such as the Comisión Coordinadora de Tecnología Andina (CCTA) and the Instituto para la Gestión y Promoción del Agua (IPROGA), among others. IPROGA has had a permanent relationship with Yakunchik since the latter’s inception, playing a considerably active role which has led it to be viewed as the institutional referent for water management platforms in the country. The formulation of Yakunchik’s plan for the period 2001–2002 responded to local demands.7 Its various activities included a diagnosis study of the Cachi Huatatas basin, a rural development project proposal for the Cachi project, the elaboration of a project proposal on soil and agricultural biodiversity conservation, environmental education, organizing a seminar to elaborate proposals for the new Irrigation Law, and carrying out workshops on conﬂict resolution. Due to the lack of funding, only some of these activities could be carried out. However, both the Platform’s seminar on proposals for the new Irrigation Law and its participation in the resolution of the conﬂict between EPSASA and Chiara community contributed to legitimize the platform not only among its members, but also among the population of Huamanga. 6 ‘Many negotiation tables, platforms, etc. have been launched, funded, managed, and even dominated by the European Community. Their failure may be attributed to this kind of intervention which, despite the good will involved, produced undesired outcomes in most cases’ (Yakunchik 2000). 7 The Fujimori regime had been replaced by the Provisional Government headed by Valentín Paniagua. His Minister of Agriculture, Carlos Amat y León, invited all relevant groups to participate in a national debate aimed at formulating a new Irrigation Law.

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The Conﬂict between EPSASA and Chiara Community Ayacucho had already been under the effects of a severe drought since the end of 1998. In August 2000, the situation became critical: August 24 through 26 were critical days in Huamanga as the city had no water at all. Most people didn’t know why. A cistern truck was assaulted by some people while EPSASA aroused the indignation of the population. Having used up its water reserves, EPSASA began a drastic rationing of only 3 to 4 hours of water supply per day using the waters provided by the Cachi Project.’ This, however, ‘increased the losses due to ﬁltration and forced EPSASA to unilaterally divert all the water from Chiara towards Huamanga, disregarding the rural population’s needs and forcing it to spend money on guards and controllers along the channel (Yakunchik 2001b).

An urban group called the Frente de Defensa de Ayacucho had pressured EPSASA decided to divert the water of some streams traditionally used by the Chiara community members for both agricultural and domestic purposes, thus sparking off a serious confrontation between the company and the community. The comuneros threatened to blow up the pipes EPSASA had installed. This led the platform to bring together all the principal parties involved in the conﬂict to participate in a workshop: the Chiara community, water authorities, irrigation users and farmers committees, EPSASA representatives, Cachi Project representatives, as well as representatives of rural communities and of the Frente de Defensa de Ayacucho. The results of the workshop were multiple. First, it produced real settlements, the most important of which included a more balanced from of water management from which the communities beneﬁted most, and the water company’s commitment to adequately inform the users thereof. Tasks and speciﬁc responsibilities were also deﬁned. Secondly, it promoted a dialogue-based methodology which was a signiﬁcant phenomenon given the fact that Ayacucho had been marked by political violence for over 20 years, that social and cultural barriers had existed for centuries, and that power had always been exerted vertically, reproducing a dominator-dominated relationship.8 Thirdly, a methodology was used that allowed each of the parties to express their view of the problem and common elements were highlighted. The most important problem was the water shortage. It was understood from then on that they had to discuss the issue of the basin both in terms of a space and in terms of a group of shared resources for which all of them were responsible and interdependent. Besides the conﬂict between the Chiara community and EPSASA, the platform also contributed to the resolution of a speciﬁc confrontation involving two governmental organizations: EPSASA and the Cachi Project Although this case had already been elevated to the central Government, the local representatives 8 ‘The platform made EPSASA sensitive to our problems. For years, the actions carried out by the company were detrimental to us, but they never saw this. Now at the platform, we have worked things out; they have listened to us.’ Interview with the Mayor of Chiara. 1 December 2002.

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of both institutions had enough autonomy and were able to settle their conﬂict within the space provided by the platform. The platform contributed to breaking the communication barriers. Limitations of the Platform Yakunchik took off during the years 2000 and 2001, and consolidated its legitimacy at the local and regional levels. Notwithstanding, it had yet to face several problems to be fully and satisfactorily operational. Although it lacked resources, e.g. an institutional facility and logistics support to carry out its activities, these deﬁciencies were to a certain extent compensated for by a spirit of commitment, which in many cases engaged the members, not only at an institutional but also at a personal level. Still, the limitations were clear: the work to be carried out at the platform was an additional activity to the one each member carried out in his or her respective organization. There were also professional weaknesses that, at least partly, may be attributed to the impact of the period of violence on the educational, scientiﬁc and professional areas (Interview with Ana María Villacorta, Lima, January 7, 2003). In the year 2002 new circumstances appeared and changed the context in which the platform had been established. The period of severe drought ended and rainfall was abundant, while the Cachi Project began to supply potable water to the city of Huamanga as well as to Huanta, and thus relieved Huamanga of the water problem. In other words, the urban explosive situation that had triggered the constitution of the platform the previous year disappeared. Thirdly, upon completion of his contract, Richard Haep, one of the chief external supporters of the platform, left Huamanga. Both Paniagua’s Provisional Government (2000–2001) and Toledo’s government (2001–2006) appointed new ofﬁcials as heads of the public organizations, companies, and projects. The new appointees had little or no knowledge of both the area and of the previous involvement their organizations had had in the platform, and continued to participate without formulating any important initiative. It is worth mentioning here that organizations such as the Cachi Project and EPSASA had played a key role in the platform. Hence, the context was drastically modiﬁed because of these institutional changes. Finally, a new situation affected the NGOs. For the ﬁrst time, many professionals who had previously worked for NGOs began to work for the State and, therefore, some of the platform representatives left. Simultaneouly, funding to NGOs was considerably reduced, causing several of them to downsize or even to close. Although many former NGO representatives continued participating in the platform, they now participated on a personal basis. Moreover, other institutions such as the University or the Provincial Municipality experienced serious institutional and budgetary problems, and reduced their participation at Yakunchik as a consequence. As a result of all of the above, the level of activities carried out by the platform decreased drastically. Just then, a new and important actor appeared on stage.

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The ‘JUDRA’: A Challenge for Yakunchik One of the phases of the Cachi Project, expanding the area under irrigation by 9,000 ha within a region inhabited mostly by peasant communities, culminated towards the end of 2001. Shortly after this, in March 2002, the government carried out a national consultation on the new legislation, which would regulate irrigation uses. These two circumstances would lead to the establishment of the Junta de Usuarios de Riego de Ayacucho – JUDRA (Ayacucho’s Union of Irrigation Users). As explained by the Mayor of the district of Chiara: Users’ associations strengthened their activities since 2001. This was also the case of the Administración Técnica del Riego – ATDR.9 ... We only had irrigation judges, who were community authorities. But, as of 2001, the users began to wake up. There were a lot of requirements to be complied with in order to be legally recognized as associations. The Cachi Project was about to ﬁnish, so we had to organize ourselves. This was a must (Interview carried out on Dec. 2, 2002).

Other causes leading to the establishment of this organization included the expansion of farmlands under irrigation following the return of former refugees to Ayacucho, the increase of urban population – which reduced irrigation areas – and the culmination of the Cachi Project. As mentioned previously, the Cachi Project did not contemplate the implementation of an agrarian development project nor had the beneﬁciaries been determined. The uncertainty this aroused motivated irrigation users –mostly comuneros – to seek the ofﬁcial recognition of their organizations by the ATDR and the Ministry of Agriculture in order to guarantee their water rights under the new conditions the Project had generated. This recognition, which ofﬁcially came into effect in December 2001, marked the culmination of an organization process that had taken several years and that led to the establishment of the JUDRA. This organization currently claims to represent 17,000 members. Comunero users have had conﬂicts with the ATDR, feeling its uniformly disregarded the geographic and social diversity of the country. The new regulation on irrigation reproduces this pattern because users’ organizations did not take part in its formulation. In the words of the President of the JUDRA, Zenón Calle: It was because of the inequities in terms of water distribution that in 1998 and 1999 we decided to organize ourselves as a union. The Junta was a response to the abuses commited by the ATDR, which is too rigid. The regulations are not adequate for Ayacucho, but they want to apply them just like on the coast. The Crops and Irrigation Plan is the same as that for the coast. Irrigation tariffs are too high (Interview with Pablo Atauje, President of Chiara’s Water Users’ Association, 2 December 2002).

For this reason, the JUDRA held several workshops in 2002 with the active participation of a great number of users to elaborate an alternative proposal for this regulation. It should be highlighted that despite the conﬂictive relationship between the JUDRA and ATDR, these activities were coorganized by both organizations. 9

Technical Administration for Irrigation.

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Moreover, in the conﬂict between the Community of Chiara and EPSASA, as a result of which the community got a better deal so that it could increase its water supply in two hours per day. In other words, the peasants took advantage and beneﬁted from the conﬂict of jurisdictions between the two State entities. The JUDRA held a regional workshop and promoted a peasant protest in order that its ofﬁcial recognition be effective. At the time, it raised two kinds of demands: on the one hand, national-scope demands in terms of the agrarian policy (restrictions on food imports, credit, agrarian debt, taxes, property titles, new irrigation law, etc.), which were coordinated by the Junta Nacional de Usuarios de Riego (National Union of Irrigation Users). On the other hand, regional demands included that the coordinated planning and implementation of water management initiatives and infrastructure irrigation works be coordinated between the State and NGO sectors, the dismissal of some ATDR ofﬁcials on the basis of their incompetence, the investigation of cases of ‘ghost’ or unﬁnished construction projects, among others. Most of JUDRA’s demands focused on the ATDR, and constituted a conﬂict axis that was completely different from the one the platform had previously dealt with. The irrigation users did not participate in the platform at that time, and although the ATDR was a Yakunchik member, it had not played a relevant role within the platform. After all, the conﬂicts Yakunchik had helped settle were not related to water management systems.10 The Relationship between the JUDRA and Yakunchik While both organizations are involved in irrigation-related problems, it seems that the Yakunchik platform only learned about the JUDRA’s existence long after the latter was established. The JUDRA criticizes the fact that the platform membership mainly consists of public and private institutions, and that the users were excluded. The degree of users’ participation is, in short, the main difference between Yakunchik and the JUDRA. The JUDRA is also a political agent that acts in rural and urban areas, both locally and nationally, through its own networks, so its scope differs from that of any other member participating in the platform. The JUDRA leaders have been quite critical vis-à-vis the platform and its membership, and claim that the platform parallels the Junta as both organizations carry out similar activities. They also say that the platform is inefﬁcient and that it has no social base: ‘Where are the users in the platform?’ Despite the fact that the JUDRA is not ofﬁcially part of the platform, its participation within Yakunchik has been very intense since 2002, which was precisely when the platform activities began to decrease. The issue of whether the JUDRA 10 It is worth pointing out the characteristics of JUDRA’s leaders, and particularly of its President, Zenón Calle. Most of them are very young. Unlike other peasant leaders, they have university degrees. They feel equally comfortable and can interact equally well in rural and urban milieus, both in Ayacucho and Lima. They have social and political views on the country’s problems, but are autonomous from political parties. All these features contrast with those of previous peasant leaders. Peasant organizations were formerly integrated by the poorest strata, and land was their chief demand.

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should become a member of Yakunchik or not generated an internal conﬂict within the platform. Several NGOs and international cooperation agencies were in favour, in spite of all JUDRA’s criticism vis-á-vis this organization and the harsh style that characterizes its leadership. State agencies, on the other hand, were quite reluctant. Yakunchik Reoriented As a result of this tense situation, an emergency meeting was held to decide whether the platform should continue carrying out its activities. Several critical issues regarding the platform’s performance were discussed: the non-accomplishment of the activity plan; the instability of institutional representatives; the lack of own resources; the lack of commitment of some institutions; and the non-participation of the users, all of which pointed at problems concerning the sustainability and role or mission of Yakunchick within the platform’s new context and membership. These critical issues had shaped Yakunchick’s performance since it was ﬁrst established. The organization’s limited resources did not play a signiﬁcant role while it operated on an irregular basis and carried out a few speciﬁc activities. However, this prevented Yakunchik from minimally consolidating itself as an institution and made it very dependent on organizations which were able to provide funding. In terms of membership, a decision on the JUDRA’s participation was still pending, although the Junta’s demands constantly reoriented the platform’s agenda. In terms of its role, on the other hand, a group of members wanted to carry out a series of water management activities in order to obtain legitimacy in the region, but this would not differentiate the platform from other local NGOs. Other members proposed instead to concentrate efforts on the particular role of the platform within the new regional context. Several important agreements were reached during this meeting: mechanisms were established to provide the platform with a certain degree of autonomy in ﬁnancial terms, all the members reafﬁrmed their participation, a monthly ﬁnancial contribution was agreed to enable the platform’s operational performance, which would from thereon use the institutional facilities of one of the organization members as its headquarters. In terms of its new membership, all the organization members approved the JUDRA’s incorporation, although the latter’s president made its participation conditional on the platform’s future performance. In terms of its mission, the members agreed to strengthen its role as a platform: to be a forum for the negotiation and solution of conﬂicts and for the discussion of irrigation-related problems: As stated by the Cachi Project representative: Yakunchik provides a platform for ideas and efforts aimed at ﬁnding solutions for irrigation problems. No one has been forced to participate; this is a forum where freedom prevails… the doors are open for those institutions willing to participate…the people are tired of violence and of considering public institutions as their enemies. We have to struggle for ideas that lead to negotiation and to solutions.

Agreement was also reached in that the platform should not compete with other NGOs in the implementation of projects but rather concentrate efforts in its cooperation and

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negotiation roles. Finally, it was agreed that the platform should play a political role in the national agenda and act as an interlocutor of the new Regional Government. All the member organizations reafﬁrmed their participation and agreed to strengthen the platform under these new guidelines. Closing Remarks: Yakunchik in the Context of Ayacucho’s Development All of the Yakunchik members, both as institutions and as individuals, have dramatically experienced the political violence that Shining Path perpetrated from 1980 to 1995. As a result of this, they feel strongly committed to the cause of the development of Ayacucho.11 They are fully aware of the implications of this commitment, as evidenced by the fact that they did not migrate to other areas.12 How was it possible to establish a multi-stakeholder platform after such a difﬁcult period? In general terms, the internal warfare did not generate solidarity bonds among those affected by it. Like Perúvian society in general, Ayacucho is marked by strong hierarchical relationships, multiple inequalities, and deeply rooted social and cultural divides. The social landscape is characterized by a great many groups which compete for the scarce resources and limited spaces this society offers. In such a context, therefore, the establishment of a multi-stakeholder platform which was able to carry out activities and consolidate itself without signiﬁcant internal conﬂicts is remarkable. The severe drought which affected the country is an aspect which undoubtedly may have contributed to this outcome, but it does not explain why the platform continued operating once the drought was over, or why it was not decommissioned or blocked by confrontations among its members. One of the platform’s greatest achievements – which is currently at an initial stage – is to have placed irrigation and water-related problems on the national agenda. In terms of civil society, human rights have been the major issue. As a result of the platform’s initiatives, irrigation has been placed on the regional agenda, and has led to the discussion of other issues such as the rural-urban relationship, conﬂict negotiation, organizational and institutional water management-related problems, and rural development. In other words, the platform is contributing not only to the development of a new social fabric, but also to activate the agenda of regional development (Suberón 2001).

In brief, Yakunchik’s commitment with Ayacucho, the legitimacy it has consolidated, and the inclusion of irrigation issues on the regional agenda are some of the values and goals this organization has achieved in its short existence. It should be pointed out, however, that the context in which the platform currently develops is also a new context. 11 Most of them are from Ayacucho and belong to a generation that witnessed – and in some cases, directly participated in – the reforms carried out by the Military Regime (1968), and the rise of popular movements and leftist political parties. 12 A member of the platform told us that his house was blown up by Shining Path. Both he and his family rejected the possibility of asylum offered by an European country, and decided to remain in Ayacucho. Cases like this one are common among the platform members.

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The multi-stakeholder platform is an unprecedented mechanism in the country,. Throughout its history, Perú has developed a culture based on confrontation rather than one based on negotiation. Therefore, experiences such as that of Yakunchik imply learning to negotiate after a long tradition of domination, submission and violence. Yakunchik arose in a context of major local, regional, and national changes. Rapid urban growth had taken place in a region which, in general terms, lacked development opportunities. In this particular context, the Cachi Project was exceptional but represented a relief vis-à-vis the great urban demands raised. New legal parameters were also established (e.g. the code regulating irrigation users; the new irrigation law, which has not been enacted), but the most signiﬁcant change took place at the level of the State with the creation of new regional governments whose authorities began to take ofﬁce in February 2003. In Ayacucho, irrigation is an issue which has been highlighted by the Cachi Project (PERC).13 So far, irrigation has had no signiﬁcant economic importance and the users’ associations are at initial stages of consolidation. Now, with the end of the Cachi Project, ‘integrated basin management’ is a discourse that attracts wide support. However, Yakunchik has clearly pointed out that this is a long-term goal that is currently beyond its capabilities and that, at present therefore, it will concentrate all efforts on water management. Unlike other basins, this basin not only comprises a considerable rural population but also important urban centers: Huamanga and Huanta. Here, water management embodies a central conﬂict between the countryside and the city, but with an additional aspect: that these are cities with a great political relevance. The platform had managed conﬂicts which originated within the city – e.g. the conﬂict led by the Frente de Defensa de Ayacucho, which represented urban consumers of water – but not conﬂicts originating in the rural areas. The JUDRA’s current participation in the platform drastically changes this situation. In these new circumstances, after a 4-year period of invaluable experiences and after having reoriented its mission and role, the multi-stakeholder Yakunchik platform is entering a new stage with new possibilities. References Suberón, Luis (2001), ‘Informe de Evaluación Externa del IPROGA del Plan Trienal 1998–2001’, report, Lima. Yakunchik (2001a), ¿Quién es Quién en Agua? Directorio Institucional de los Miembros de la Plataforma de Gestión del Agua de Ayacucho, Lima. Yakunchik (2001b), Taller El Agua en Huamanga: Acuerdos para Resolver la Emergencia, Huamanga, February. Yakunchik (2000),’Planificación Estratégica: Plataforma de Gestión de Agua de Ayacucho’, Appendix V, Huamanga, August.

13 As previously stated, irrigation know-how is quite precarious. This has been evidenced in several training courses on irrigation carried out so far.

Chapter 10

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Surface and Groundwater Management in the Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico Philippus Wester, Jaime Hoogesteger van Dijk and Hans Paters

Introduction Water management in the Lerma-Chapala Basin in central Mexico is strongly contested between different stakeholders. From a water perspective this basin is in serious trouble. While average annual rainfall from 1993 to 2003 (at 675 mm), was only 5% below the historical average of 711 mm, and efforts were made by the government to reduce water use in irrigation through water saving programs, the total amount of surface and groundwater used in the basin exceeded supply by 9% on average during this period (Wester et al. 2001). Groundwater is being mined, and surface water depletion exceeds supply in all but the wettest years, causing Lake Chapala, the water body into which the Lerma River ﬂows, to dry up. As Mexico’s largest natural lake, Lake Chapala generates signiﬁcant tourism and real estate revenues, while also providing Guadalajara, Mexico’s second largest city, with 190 Million Cubic Meters (MCM) of water annually. It is highly valued by the inhabitants of Jalisco State, where the lake is situated, as well as some 30,000 retirees living on the lakeshores. Despite efforts by the federal government to shore up lake levels through water transfers from upstream irrigation districts to the Lake, by June 2002 the lake had dropped to 14% of its capacity, the second lowest level recorded since systematic data collection began in 1934. The water transfers have increased conﬂicts between states and water users in the Basin, not least because their impact on lake levels were minor and farmers in the irrigation districts were not compensated for the reduction in water allocations for irrigation. This chapter reviews the emergence and functioning of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) for surface and groundwater management in the Lerma-Chapala Basin. Since the late 1980s, the federal government in Mexico has initiated reforms to create polycentric governance structures for water management, after more than 100 years of centralization in which the federal government increased its control over water (Aboites 1998; Rap et al. 2004). As part of the reforms, the government created new coordinating bodies for water management, such as River Basin Councils (RBCs) and technical committees for groundwater management, to bring together interdependent stakeholders in a forum setting to resolve conﬂicts and to advise on water policies. What is interesting about these MSPs is that they were

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formed relatively quickly, and have continued to function. This contrasts with the received wisdom on MSPs, namely that they are slow to grow, and quick to die. This chapter posits that the central role of the government in forming these MSPs is an explanatory variable for their continued existence and relevance, but also for their relative weakness. Since 1999, political conﬂicts and negotiation processes surrounding the allocation of surface water have dominated the functioning of the Lerma-Chapala RBC. While providing a forum for stakeholders to vent their frustration with unilateral decision-making by the federal water agency, in the eyes of many the RBC has led to more conﬂicts rather than to conﬂict resolution. In parallel to the multi-stakeholder processes for surface water management, 14 technical committees for groundwater, called COTAS (Comités Técnicos de Aguas Subterráneas) in Mexico, have been created in the basin in the past nine years. These COTAS consist of the users of an aquifer, bringing together farmers, industries, municipalities, and state governments in a platform setting. They have been formed to reach negotiated agreements on reversing groundwater depletion, but to date none has yet devised effective ways to reduce groundwater extractions. This chapter analyzes these MSPs for surface and groundwater management, focusing on the complicated transition from a highly centralized management of water resources to one in which states and water users have a larger say. It shows how stakeholder representation and participation in water management decisionmaking is constrained by the legacy of the bureaucratic-authoritarian Mexican state. While it is tempting not to view people as strategic actors and laudable to argue for alternative narratives stressing collaboration and social learning (Röling and Maarleveld 1999), the politics of water management in the Lerma-Chapala Basin show that multi-stakeholder processes aimed at reaching negotiated agreements are very fragile and steeped in struggle. The Lerma-Chapala Basin The Setting The Lerma-Chapala Basin, covering some 54,300 km2, lies between Mexico City and Guadalajara and crosses ﬁve states: Querétaro (5%), Guanajuato (44%), Michoacán (28%), Mexico (10%) and Jalisco (13%).1 The basin accounts for 9% of Mexico’s GNP and is the source of water for around 15 million people (CNA 1999a). The headwaters of the Lerma River rise in the east near the city of Toluca at an elevation of 2,600 m.a.s.l. (meters above sea level) to discharge into Lake Chapala in the west at an elevation of 1,500 m.a.s.l. (see Figure 10.1). Lake Chapala, with a length of 77 km and a maximum width of 23 km, stores 8,125 MCM and covers 111,000 ha when full. The shallow depth of the lake (average 7.2 m) results in a lake evaporation of some 1,440 MCM (25% of the basin’s average annual runoff) each year (de Anda et

1

Percentages indicate the area of the basin that falls in each state.

Figure 10.1 Location and topography of the Lerma-Chapala Basin

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al. 1998). When full, Lake Chapala discharges into the Santiago River, which ﬂows to the Paciﬁc Ocean. Irrigation is the main water user in the basin, accounting for 68% of current water use. Evaporation from water bodies (Lake Chapala, other lakes and storage reservoirs) accounts for 23% of water consumed (Wester et al. 2001). Nine large-scale canal irrigation districts cover around 284,000 ha, while some 16,000 farmer-managed or private irrigation systems cover 510,000 ha. Twenty-seven large reservoirs provide 235,000 ha in the irrigation districts with surface water while around 1,500 smaller reservoirs serve 180,000 ha in the farmer-managed systems. An estimated 26,000 tubewells provide around 380,000 ha in the basin with groundwater, of which 47,000 ha is located in irrigation districts (CNA 1993; CNA/MW 1999). The average annual runoff in the basin from 1940 to 1995 was 5,757 MCM. Figures on groundwater recharge are inconclusive, with best guestimates placing it at 3,980 MCM (CNA 1999a), giving a total of 9,737 MCM annual renewable water. Informed estimates place total consumptive water use at 10,637 MCM, yielding an annual deﬁcit of 900 MCM (CNA 1999a). This deﬁcit is covered by the overextraction of groundwater and the drying up of lakes in the basin. While the river basin was closing in water quantity terms, water quality also deteriorated severely, with increased efﬂuent discharges and hardly any treatment of urban and industrial wastewater before 1989. Although large investments were made in treatment plants in the 1990s, the Lerma River and its tributaries are still classiﬁed as strongly contaminated (CNA 1999a). Institutional Change Concern about water quantity and quality issues in the basin prompted institutional changes from the mid-1980s onwards. Inspired by the French model of river basin management, the federal water agency sought to decentralize water management in the Lerma-Chapala Basin (Mestre 1997). The prospects for institutional reform improved further after 1988, with the newly elected president for Mexico, Carlos Salinas, giving high priority to water issues and decentralization (Rap et al. 2004). This resulted in far-reaching water reforms, such as the creation of the Comisión Nacional del Agua (CNA, National Water Commission) in 1989, the transfer of government irrigation districts to users (1991–present), the establishment of technical committees for groundwater (1995-onward), the decentralization of domestic water supply and sanitation to states and municipalities (starting in 1983), the creation of state water commissions (1991-onward), and the promulgation of a new water law in 1992 (Wester et al. 2003). An important step in the creation of a basin level MSP in the Lerma-Chapala Basin was taken in April 1989 when the Mexican president and governors of the ﬁve states falling in the basin signed an agreement to strengthen mechanisms for water allocation, to improve water quality, to increase the efﬁciency of water use and to conserve the basin’s ecosystems. Crucially, the signatories recognized that the agreement could not be implemented without the support and efforts of a broad range of stakeholders. In September 1989, a Consultative Council (CC) was created consisting of federal and state government representatives as well as stakeholder

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representatives to implement the agreement. Further, the CC established a Technical Working Group (TWG) of 60 government and user representatives to translate the agreement into action. Achievements of the CC include the formulation of a river basin master plan in 1993, a wastewater treatment program initiated in 1991, a surface allocation water treaty signed in 1991 and annual meetings to determine surface water allocations (Mestre 1997). The initial success of the CC led to the inclusion of an article in the new water law of 1992 on River Basin Councils, deﬁned as coordinating and consensus-building bodies between the CNA, federal, state and municipal governments, and water user representatives (CNA 1999b). While responsibility for water management was retained by CNA, the RBCs were conceived as important mechanisms for negotiation and conﬂict resolution (CNA 2000). The Lerma-Chapala Consultative Council became a RBC in January 1993. It consists of a Governing Board made up of the CNA director, the ﬁve state governors and a representative for each of six water use sectors (agriculture, ﬁsheries, services, industry, livestock and urban). In addition, the RBC includes a Monitoring and Evaluation Group (MEG), the successor of the TWG, an Assembly of User Representatives and a number of Specialized Working Groups (see Figure 10.2). The decision-making body of the RBC is the MEG, which is a carboncopy of the Governing Board except that state governors send representatives in their

Figure 10.2 The Lerma-Chapala River Basin Council

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stead, while CNA is represented by the head of its regional ofﬁce. The MEG meets on a regular basis and is charged with preparing and convening Council meetings and applying the 1991 surface water treaty. Ensuring effective representation of water users and uses has been a challenge for the Lerma-Chapala RBC from the start. Formally, the representatives of water users on the Council are elected but links with their constituencies are often weak (Wester et al. 2003). If MSPs are deﬁned as ‘contrived situations in which a set of more or less interdependent stakeholders in some resource are identiﬁed, and, usually through representatives, invited to meet and interact in a forum for conﬂict resolution, negotiation, social learning and collective decision making towards concerted action.’ (Röling 2002, 39), then the Lerma-Chapala RBC was one of the ﬁrst MSPs for river basin management in the developing world. To date it is one of the few examples of MSPs that have worked to make a difference in water management. However, not all is well in the Lerma-Chapala Basin, and the pressure that the RBC has come under in the past few years bodes ill for its future. Multi-Stakeholder Processes and Surface Water Allocations The Mexican Constitution deﬁnes surface water as national property placed in the trust of the federal government. Through the CNA, the federal government can grant water use concessions to users for periods ranging from 5 to 50 years (CNA 1999b). The concession titles set out the maximum volumes concession holders are entitled to, although CNA may adjust the quantity each receives annually based on water availability, with priority given to domestic water use (CNA 1999b). In the Lerma-Chapala Basin surface water is allocated annually based on the surface water allocation treaty signed by the governors of the ﬁve states in the basin and the federal government in August 1991 (CCCLC 1991). An important objective of the treaty was to maintain adequate water levels in Lake Chapala and to ensure Guadalajara’s domestic water supply. To preserve Lake Chapala, the treaty set out three allocation policies, namely critical, average and abundant. For each allocation policy, formulas have been drawn up to calculate water allocations to the irrigation systems in the basin, based on the surface runoff generated in each of the ﬁve states in the previous year. Based on extensive modeling of these formulas, it was concluded that the resulting water allocation would not impinge on the 1,440 MCM needed by Lake Chapala for evaporation. Since 1991, the MEG of the Council has met each year to apply the water allocation rules set out in the 1991 treaty. According to CNA’s data the WUAs in the irrigation districts never used more water than allocated to them under the treaty. Nonetheless, Lake Chapala’s volume more than halved between 1994 and 2002 (cf. Wester et al. 2001). This has led to intense debates in the RBC, with environmentalists and the Jalisco State government blaming the upstream irrigation districts in Guanajuato for using too much water. However, CNA’s weak control over surface water use in the farmer-managed irrigation systems and direct pumping from the river and lake combined with ten years of lower than average rainfall and reduced river base ﬂows due to groundwater overexploitation are also plausible reasons for the reduced

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inﬂows from the Lerma River to the Lake. In addition, the 1991 treaty itself is partly at fault, as it overestimated annual water availability2 and underestimated Lake Chapala’s evaporation. Because of critically low lake levels, the CNA decided to transfer 240 MCM of water from the Solis dam, the main water source of the Alto Río Lerma irrigation district, the largest district in the basin, to Lake Chapala in November 1999. A second transfer of 270 MCM followed in November 2001, as lake levels continued to deteriorate (CNA 2001).3 These water transfers met with staunch resistance from farmers, mostly from the middle of the basin, and undermined the legitimacy of the Council as a body for conﬂict resolution. Farmers felt that their water was being ‘stolen’, as they received no compensation, and because the 1991 treaty does not outline procedures for water transfers. On the other hand, environmentalists and the Jalisco State government argued that much more water had to be transferred to save the Lake, as 10 MCM are needed to raise the Lake level by 1 cm. This led many in Jalisco to refer to the water transfers as ‘aspirins’ for the Lake’s headaches, with the media calling for much stronger medicine to cure the Lake’s ills. The transfer of 1999 led to reduced allocations to the Alto Río Lerma irrigation district and resulted in some 20,000 ha out of 77,000 ha not being irrigated with surface water in the winter season of 1999/2000. For many of the better off farmers who could switch to groundwater, this was not too problematic, but for poorer farmers who mainly rely on surface water, the consequences were serious. In addition, many poor farmers who traditionally pumped return ﬂows from the Lerma River were hit hard as the use of this precarious source of water was prohibited and enforced through army patrols along the river. The surface water allocations for all the irrigation districts in the basin for the 2000/2001 winter season were so low that the WUAs decided to let 200,000 ha out of a total of 235,000 ha in the irrigation districts lie fallow. In the summer of 2001 Lake Chapala had dropped to its lowest levels in 50 years, which triggered environmental NGOs and the Jalisco representative on the RBC to demand a transfer of 500 MCM to the Lake in 2001 (CNA 2001). Through intense negotiations between the governments of Jalisco and Guanajuato, and political dealings at the federal level this amount was reduced to 270 MCM. The RBC approved this decision, although the agricultural water user representative strongly opposed it, thus further weakening its legitimacy in the eyes of many farmers. Before 1999 none of the WUA leaders in the Alto Rio Lerma irrigation district (see Kloezen 2001) were actively involved in the RBC. However, the lack of irrigation water in 1999 and 2000 galvanized WUA leaders to act. In May 2000, the presidents of WUAs from Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacán met each other for the ﬁrst time to discuss ways to strengthen their representation in the RBC and to inﬂuence the water allocation process. Until then, WUAs of a particular irrigation district only dealt with the CNA, and there were no horizontal linkages between WUAs from 2 The treaty was based on hydrological data from 1950 to 1979, which in later analyses turned out to be a relatively wet period. 3 As a rule of thumb, 1 MCM is sufﬁcient to irrigate 100 ha, thus with each transfer 24,000 to 27,000 ha could not be irrigated.

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different irrigation districts. In 2001, WUAs from Querétaro and Mexico joined the discussions, and the WUAs established a new working group in the RBC, under the leadership of the representative for agricultural water use on the RBC. From mid 2000 until the end of 2002 this Grupo de Trabajo Especializado en Planeación Agrícola Integral (GTEPAI, Specialized Working Group on Integral Agricultural Planning) attempted to strengthen multi-stakeholder processes in the RBC. Its aim was to improve the participation of farmers in the RBC by developing links between the representative for agricultural water use and farmers throughout the basin, and to reach negotiated agreements concerning surface water allocations that took into account the needs of farmers (Monsalvo and Wester 2003; Paters 2004). A central element of the GTEPAI’s strategy was to show that the irrigated agriculture sector was serious about saving water and hence a credible negotiating partner. To identify more proﬁtable crops that use less water, GTEPAI brought together farmers, government agencies, agro-industries, and research institutes to elaborate a Crop and Marketing Catalogue. This Catalogue sets out which crops can feasibly be grown under each of the three water allocation policies of the 1991 surface water treaty, and links these with contract farming guarantees from agro-industries. The cooperation of government agencies, agro-industries and producers under the GTEPAI initiative in 2000 and 2001 resulted in a change of cropping patterns for the winter season of 2001/2002. Throughout the basin, GTEPAI facilitated the conversion from wheat (four irrigation turns) to barley (three irrigation turns) on 47,000 ha, from wheat to chickpea (two irrigation turns) on 5,000 ha and from wheat to safﬂower and canola (one irrigation turn) on another 5,000 ha. This resulted in a record production of barley, reduced imports for the involved industries (mainly breweries), and claimed water savings of 60 MCM. While GTEPAI considerably improved farmer representation and participation in the RBC, the efforts by GTEPAI to save water went unrecognized by most of the other members of the RBC. Environmental NGOs and the Jalisco State government continued to blame irrigated agriculture for the decline of Lake Chapala, and in the course of 2002 the representative of agricultural water use on the RBC came under increasing attacks in the media. While the farmer representatives took the lead, grass roots tensions and the threat of civil disobedience by farmers decreased, but remained dormant. However, when the CNA decided in November 2002 that another water transfer of 280 MCM was to take place during the summer of 2003, tensions increased and farmers warned that they would occupy the Solis dam so that it could not be opened. Simultaneously, the representative of agricultural water use on the RBC and the leader of the GTEPAI initiative was pressured to resign from the RBC during the MEG meeting in November 2002. The disappointment of farmer representatives and others involved with GTEPAI was such that they decided to dissolve the GTEPAI and to revert to interest group politics. During the summer of 2003, unexpectedly heavy rains coincided with the third water transfer, causing ﬂoods in many parts of the basin. Instead of being accused of stealing irrigation water from farmers, the CNA was blamed for aggravating ﬂooding through the water transfer. During the transfer, farmers from Guanajuato occupied the CNA ofﬁce and diverted water in transit from Solis dam to Lake Chapala to

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Lake Yuriria to express their fury. Although the exceptionally good rains of 2003 led to a spectacular recovery of Lake Chapala, with stored volumes jumping from 1,330 MCM in June 2003 to 4,250 MCM in January 2004, this did not cool down tempers. In November 2003, the Jalisco representative on the RBC again demanded the transfer of water from upstream dams to Lake Chapala, fuelling the anger of farmer representatives and further straining the relationship with Guanajuato. How the current standoff develops will be essential for the future of agriculture and the environment in the basin. The collapse of active stakeholder participation and representation in the RBC through the dissolution of the GTEPAI and the strained relationship between Jalisco and Guanajuato highlights the challenges the Council faces in reaching consensual water management decisions in the basin. Despite the good rains in 2003, it is clear that the conﬂicts surrounding surface water have not been resolved and that negotiated agreement is far from sight. Groundwater Management Arguably a more pressing issue in the Lerma-Chapala Basin than surface water allocation is the serious overdraft of the basin’s aquifers. Considering that some 380,000 ha in the basin are irrigated with groundwater and that industrial and domestic uses depend almost entirely on groundwater, the long-term consequences of continued groundwater depletion overshadow those of Lake Chapala drying up. While it is difﬁcult to accurately portray the degree of groundwater depletion in the basin, as various studies by the CNA report widely differing data on annual extraction and recharge rates, what is clear is that 30 of the 40 aquifers in the basin are in deﬁcit. In the Middle Lerma region static water levels have been dropping at 2.1 m/year on average for the past thirty years (Scott and Garcés-Restrepo 2001). Studies from the CNA indicate that total groundwater extractions in the basin exceed recharge by some 641 MCM, which accounts for some 71% of the total water deﬁcit in the basin (CNA 1999a). Studies by the Comisión Estatal del Agua de Guanajuato (CEAG; Guanajuato State Water Commission) indicate that the situation is even more alarming, as in Guanajuato alone there is an annual and increasing deﬁcit of around 1200 MCM (CEAG 2001). In addition, pollution of aquifers around the major cities of Guanajuato and land subsidence of up to three cm a year are visible signs that the groundwater situation is worrying. In various areas wells are drying out as water tables continue to decline. Nevertheless, ever deeper wells are still being drilled throughout the basin, as well as around and in Lake Chapala in order to irrigate some 30,000 ha of the former lake bed. Although the Council signed a coordination agreement to regulate groundwater extraction in the basin in 1993, progress on the ground has been slow (CCCLC 1993). The weak control of the CNA over groundwater extractions and the high social and political costs of reducing groundwater exploitation are primary obstacles. Although the Constitution mandates the federal government to intervene in overexploited aquifers by placing them under veda, thereby prohibiting the sinking of new wells without permission from the federal government, the experience with vedas has been disappointing (Arreguín 1998). For example, the number of wells in Guanajuato

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alone increased from approximately 2,000 in 1958 to 16,500 in 1997, although the drilling of new wells in the whole state was already forbidden in 1983 (Guerrero 2000). Based on the recognition that vedas had not worked and to counter the continued depletion of groundwater in the basin, CNA started promoting the formation of COTAS in selected aquifers in the Lerma-Chapala Basin in 1995 (Marañón and Wester 2000). Through the establishment of COTAS, the CNA sought to organize aquifer users with the aim to establish mutual agreements for reversing groundwater depletion, in keeping with Article 76 of the water law regulations (CNA 1999b). Based on recent developments in the State of Guanajuato, where the CEAG enthusiastically promoted the creation of COTAS (Guerrero 2000; Marañón and Wester 2000), the structure of the COTAS has been deﬁned at the national level in the rules and regulations for river basin councils (CNA 2000). In these rules the COTAS are deﬁned as water user organizations, whose membership consists of all the water users of an aquifer. They are to serve as mechanisms for reaching agreement on aquifer management taking into consideration the needs of the various sectors using groundwater (CNA 2000). As with the RBC, government has played an active role in forming and promoting the COTAS, but with a much larger involvement of state governments. In the State of Guanajuato 14 COTAS (of which 11 fall in the Lerma-Chapala Basin) have been formed with the ﬁnancial, logistical and technical support of CEAG (Hoogesteger 2004). While CEAG has encouraged the COTAS to set their own agenda, it has retained an important inﬂuence on the COTAS. Because agriculture is the major and supposedly least efﬁcient groundwater consumer, most of the discussions in the COTAS in Guanajuato revolve around increasing irrigation efﬁciencies and reducing water use by the agricultural sector. In the State of Querétaro the COTAS have been created in a relatively top down manner (Marañón and Wester 2000). Decision-making comes primarily from the State Water Commission whereas user participation has been minimal. The city of Querétaro has a supply deﬁcit of 47 percent, the aquifer is overexploited and agricultural users have refused the State Water Commission’s intentions of buying their water. The discussions in this COTAS are mainly on reducing water use for irrigation and wastewater reuse. On paper COTAS are platforms where all the users of an aquifer meet to reach agreements on aquifer management. However, user participation has been quite low, notwithstanding attempts by the State Water Commissions to involve as many stakeholders as possible. In part, this is due to a lack of reliable information on the owners of pumps in an aquifer and the lack of infrastructure and human resources on the part of the COTAS, making it difﬁcult to summon all the users. Hence, during the formation stage of the COTAS only well-known people were invited to participate (Marañón and Wester 2000). In the majority of the cases, the representatives of the agriculture sector in the COTAS are commercial farmers or agro-industrialists. This procedure, which has not brought together all the pumpers in an aquifer but rather builds on a small group of leaders that are not necessarily representative, has hamstrung the effectiveness of the COTAS. Although nearly all stakeholders agree that the situation is grave, this has not yet translated into a multi-stakeholder

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process to reach a negotiated agreement on reductions in groundwater extractions. Hence, the overall impact of the COTAS has been minimal. None has yet devised mechanisms to signiﬁcantly reduce groundwater extractions and the tough issue of how to reach agreement on an across-the-board reduction in pumping has not yet been broached. Furthermore, many participants and staff of the COTAS and CEAG have become frustrated because COTAS have little power to make a real difference in groundwater extractions. This is because they have no faculties to control groundwater extractions and have to rely on the goodwill of users and other institutions, particularly the CNA. As the CNA is the only government agency that can issue pumping permits, and is responsible for the enforcement of aquifer regulations, groundwater users are keen to maintain good relations with the CNA. The CNA has taken a backseat in the COTAS, and has emphatically not given them a mandate, thus sending the message to groundwater users that the COTAS are irrelevant. CEAG has continued to promote the COTAS, in the hope that it can wrestle some control over groundwater away from the CNA. However, as long as the CNA continues to give preference to the lucrative business of legalizing ‘irregular’ pumps instead of throwing its weight behind the COTAS, the chances of a negotiated agreement on reductions in groundwater extractions are bleak. Conclusions To understand multi-stakeholder processes and the emergence, functioning and sustainability of MSPs, it is necessary to focus on institutional practices, and how these have been formed historically. This chapter brings out that MSP’s for water management created by government agencies can emerge quickly and show longevity, but at the same time are very dependent on the role the government plays for their effectiveness. While they are set up to deal with resource management problems that affect interdependent stakeholders, this does not necessarily mean that an agreement can be reached within the MSP. The legacy of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state in Mexico and the highly centralized management of water in the past make it difﬁcult for the CNA to play the role of facilitator and enforcer. Rather, decision making over water management at basin level is highly politicized and dominated by unilateral actions by the federal water agency. As water management tends to be highly centralized in many countries, with water bureaucracies dominating decision-making, the experiences with MSPs for water management in Mexico are not particularly encouraging. In this regard, the emergence and demise of the GTEPAI initiative teaches important lessons about multi-stakeholder and integrated water management decisionmaking processes. It shows that a democratization process has taken place in water management since the start of the Mexican water reforms, reﬂecting wider changes in Mexican society. However, this is a fragile process, which is easily derailed by power politics and interest group behaviour. While agricultural water users are ready to negotiate agreements on surface water allocations based on the recognition of mutual dependency, the antagonistic position of the Jalisco

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government has blocked negotiations and severely undermined the legitimacy of the RBC. The perception that the federal water agency is siding with Jalisco, through its approval of water transfers from irrigation to Lake Chapala, has further weakened the RBC. The multi-stakeholder processes in groundwater management are less clear cut. Although groundwater use is not as politicized and contested as surface water allocation in the Council, individual interests prevail over the common good. What really happens underground is depoliticized by mystifying studies, biased discourse and weak law enforcement, which works to conceal an enormous interest in underground water and independent access to this ‘liquid gold’. The marked absence of groundwater management on the agenda of the CNA and the Council and the thwarted efforts of the CEAG to make groundwater management platforms work give substance to this conclusion. In water management, creating polycentric governance structures based on substantive stakeholder participation is fraught with contradictions. On the face of things, stakeholder platforms democratize river basin management by giving voice to a multiplicity of interested actors. However, much depends on the existing institutional arrangements from which stakeholder platforms for river basin management emerge and operate in, as many roles, rights, and certainly the technologies and physical infrastructure for controlling water are already in place. If there is not a full recognition of interdependence by stakeholders, including water bureaucracies, and the need for concerted action, MSPs will remain paper tigers. References Aboites, L. (1998), El Agua de la Nación. Una Historia Política de México (1888– 1946), CIESAS, Mexico City. Arreguín, J. (1998), Aportes a la Historia de la Geohidrología en México, 1890– 1995, CIESAS-Asociación Geohidrológica Mexicana, Mexico City. CEAG (2001), Actualización de los Balances de los Estudios Hidrológicos y Modelos Matemáticos de los Acuíferos del Estado de Guanajuato, CEAG, Guanajuato. CNA (1993), Plan Maestro de la Cuenca Lerma-Chapala. Documento de Referencia, CNA, Mexico City. CNA (1999a), El Consejo de Cuenca Lerma-Chapala 1989–1999. 10 Años de Trabajo en Favor de la Gestión Integral y Manejo Sustentable del Agua y de los Recursos Naturales de la Cuenca, CNA, Guadalajara. CNA (1999b), Ley de Aguas Nacionales y su Reglamento, CNA, Mexico City. CNA (2000), Reglas de Organización y Funcionamiento de los Consejos de Cuenca, CNA, Mexico City. CNA (2001), Volumenes Maximos de Extraccion de Agua Superficial para los Sistemas de Usuarios de la Cuenca Lerma-Chapala, Boletin No. 11 de Consejo de la Cuenca Lerma-Chapala, CNA, Guadalajara. CNA/MW (1999), Proyecto Lineamientos Estratégicos para el Desarrollo Hidráulico de la Región Lerma-Santiago-Pacifico. Diagnostico Regional, CNA/ Montgomery Watson, Guadalajara.

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CCCLC (1991), ‘Acuerdo de Coordinación de Aguas Superficiales’, Colección Lerma-Chapala, Vol. 1, No. 5, CNA, Queretaro. CCCLC (1993), Propuesta de Acciones para Reglementar la Distribución, Uso y Aprovechamiento de las Aguas del Subsuelo en los Acuiferos que se Ubican en la Cuenca Lerma-Chapala, CNA, Queretaro. Consejo de Cuenca Lerma-Chapala (2000), Actualización de las Bases y Procedimientos para el Cálculo de Disponibilidad y Distribución de las Aguas Superficiales, Consejo de Cuenca Lerma-Chapala, Guadalajara. de Anda, J., Quiñones-Cisneros, S.E., French, R.H. and Guzmán, M. (1998), ‘Hydrologic Balance of Lake Chapala (Mexico)’, Journal of the American Water Resources Association, Vol. 34 (6), pp. 1319–1331. Guerrero, V. (2000), ‘Towards a New Water Management Practice: Experiences and Proposals from Guanajuato State for a Participatory and Decentralized Water Management Structure in Mexico’, Water Resources Development, Vol. 16, pp. 571–588. Hoogesteger-van Dijk, J. D. (2004), The Underground; Understanding the Failure of Institutional Responses to Reduce Groundwater Exploitation in Guanajuato, MSc Thesis Irrigation and Water Engineering Group, Wageningen University, Wageningen. Kloezen, W. (2002), Accounting for Water. Institutional Viability and Impacts of Market-Oriented Irrigation Interventions in Central Mexico, PhD Thesis Wageningen University, Wageningen. Marañón-Pimentel, B. and Wester, P. (2000), Respuestas Institucionales para el Manejo de los Acuíferos en la Cuenca Lerma-Chapala, México, IWMI, Serie Latinoamericana No. 17, International Water Management Institute, Mexico City. Mestre, E. (1997), ‘Integrated Approach to River Basin Management: LermaChapala Case Study – Attributions and Experiences in Water Management in Mexico’, Water International, Vol. 22 (3), pp. 140–152. Monsalvo, G. and Wester, P. (2003), Por un Manejo Integral, Sostenible y Equitativo de la Cuenca Lerma-Chapala, Mexico, Universidad Iberoamericana-Leon, Guanajuato. Paters, H. (2004), Farmers Efforts to Manage Decentralization and Save Surface Water in the Lerma-Chapala Basin, MSc Thesis Irrigation and Water Engineering Group, Wageningen University, Wageningen. Rap, E., Wester, P. and Pérez-Prado, L.N. (2004), ‘The Politics of Creating Commitment: Irrigation Reforms and the Reconstitution of the Hydraulic Bureaucracy in Mexico’, in Mollinga, P.P. and Bolding, A. (eds), The Politics of Irrigation Reform. Contested Policy Formulation and Implementation in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, pp. 57–94. Röling, N. (2002), ‘Beyond the Aggregation of Individual Preferences. Moving from Multiple to Distributed Cognition in Resource Dilemmas’, in Leeuwis, C. and Pyburn, R. (eds), Wheelbarrows Full of Frogs. Social Learning in Rural Resource Management, Koninklijke Van Gorchum, Assen, pp. 25–47. Röling, N. and Maarleveld, M. (1999), ‘Facing Strategic Narratives: An Argument for Interactive Effectiveness’, Agriculture and Human Values, Vol. 26, pp. 295–308.

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Scott, C.A. and Garcés-Restrepo, C. (2001), ‘Conjunctive Management of Surface Water and Groundwater in the Middle Río Lerma Basin, Mexico’, in Biswas, A.K. and Tortajada, C. (eds), Integrated River Basin Management: The Latin American Experience, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 176–198. Wester, P., Burton, M. and Mestre, E. (2001), ‘Managing the Water Transition in the Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico’, in Abernethy, C. L. (ed.), Intersectoral Management of River Basins, International Water Management Institute, Colombo, pp. 161–181. Wester, P., Merrey, D. J. and de Lange, M. (2003), ‘Boundaries of Consent: Stakeholder representation in River Basin Management in Mexico and South Africa’, World Development, Vol. 31, pp. 797–812.

Chapter 11

Less Tension, Limited Decision: A Multi-Stakeholder Platform to Review a Contested Sanitation Project in Tiquipaya, Bolivia Nicolas Faysse, Vladimir Cossío, Franz Quiroz, Raúl Ampuero and Bernardo Paz

Introduction The Tiquipaya Municipality is situated in the peri-urban zone of Cochabamba City, in Bolivia. 26,000 inhabitants live in the valley part of the municipality. Drinking water is distributed by community-based Water Committees, without the intervention of the Municipality. With the exception of the city centre, the whole municipality lacks a sanitation network. In light of a very fast urbanization process, Tiquipaya and the nearby Municipality of Colcapirhua decided in 2001 to design a US$ four million inter-communal water and sanitation project called MACOTI. A sanitation network will provide bulk treated water to the Water Committees. The project was funded through a loan from the National Fund for Rural Development (FNDR), which itself got a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank. The project was heavily criticized by many Water Committees, for the following reasons: (i) the project was not publicized and there were presumptions of corruption; (ii) the 25 year duration of the loan was judged too long and the interest rate too high; (iii) the project was initially to take over the assets and the management of the Water Committees’ infrastructure, without any compensation. The local irrigation farmer association, ASIRITIC, was also opposed to the project, for the previous reasons and because the project would speed up the urbanization process and may take control of the upstream lakes managed by ASIRITIC, in order to get the water needed to operate the water and sanitation system. This lack of agreement led to a series of conﬂicts in 2003, with the Army called to intervene at one stage of the conﬂict. As a consequence, the Mayor had to resign and a group of communities which were part of the project, called the Chillimarca Villas, decided to walk out of the project and set up their own alternative sanitation project. The Vice-Minister of Basic Services looked for a negotiated solution to the conﬂict. In June 2004, during workshops with the opponents of the project, he

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proposed to organize a Technical Roundtable in Tiquipaya (Mesa Técnica in Spanish) to undertake an in-depth review of the project and achieve a negotiated agreement. The Negowat project was a European Union-funded research project that aimed at developing and testing methodologies to support discussion on access to water and land use in peri-urban areas. In Bolivia, it was mainly composed of Centro AGUA, a research centre of Cochabamba University, and the CIRAD Research Institute. The Negowat team proposed its help in the organization of the Technical Roundtable, which was accepted by the Vice-Ministry, the Tiquipaya Municipality, and various social organizations of Tiquipaya. This chapter presents the implementation of this Technical Roundtable. A generic methodology for Multi Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) was designed to support the process and is presented in a ﬁrst section. A Methodology for Intervention in the Design and Evaluation of an MSP The methodology presented here was designed with a focus on short term MSPs, although many of the aspects it considers would also be relevant to a permanent one. In this methodology, there is also an attempt to formalize the evaluation phase, which is often done in an informal way in the case studies describing MSPs. The methodology presented here is based on an Habermasian approach (see Faysse 2006), which entails that more importance is given to getting the communication right than to power relationships. This means that such methodology is pertinent in situations where there are no large power asymmetries between stakeholders. Though there are negotiation roundtables functioning without facilitation, most frequently an organization will intervene in the design of the negotiation process and

Figure 11.1 Activities of the facilitator for the design and facilitation of an MSP

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facilitate the roundtable. This is the case considered here. Clearly, process design and facilitation are not the only activities that the facilitator may plan in order to pave the way for a negotiated solution of the common problem. The main points of the methodology are summarized in a check-list, which helps to keep in mind the key points to be addressed without adopting an ill-placed normative stand. Other authors such as Hemmati (2002), Sextón (2003), or Susskind and Cruishank (1987) also propose helpful ideas for the design of MSPs. The section is organized as follows. First, MSPs are presented in terms of their objectives and the facilitation activities to be considered. These activities are then presented in the same order as they are to be undertaken: baseline analysis, ex-ante evaluation, MSP design, and organization of the sessions (see Figure 11.1). The last section presents the methodology for the monitoring and evaluation of the process. Table 11.1

Possible design objectives of an MSP

Intermediary goal The process enables stakeholders to i) participate in the deﬁnition of the design of the MSP; and ii) have an impact on the solution of the problem through the MSP Regarding Stakeholders have the stakeholders capacity and the legitimacy to participate, and accept to pay attention to other participants’ point of view

Regarding the process itself

Examples of Design Objectives Deﬁne the objectives and design of the process with the participation of the stakeholders Make MSP process and results be considered by formal authorities Promote that participants are genuine representatives and accountable to their constituencies Improve the power balance among representatives Ensure that participants have adequate information and access to human, material and ﬁnancial resources for an effective participation Ensure that participants know and respect each other

General Structure of a MSP Though MSPs can be very different from each other, the general objective of an MSP can be deﬁned as follows: to enable the empowered and active participation of stakeholders in the search for solutions to a problem that affects them. This objective can be split into two intermediary goals (see Table 11.1). Given these two intermediate goals, the participants in an MSP may deﬁne design objectives. Design objectives can be also deﬁned by the facilitator, in order to plan the intervention activities. Table 11.1 presents examples of common design objectives.

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Baseline Analysis The baseline analysis will serve as a basis for the whole design of the process, from the decision of the facilitator to intervene or not, to the agenda of negotiation during the sessions. It can encompass at least the four following elements. Analysis of the common problem and the stakeholders The baseline analysis will usually start with an assessment of the problem and a mapping of all stakeholders involved, their interests and positions regarding this problem. In practice, it may be difﬁcult to identify stakeholders, as they may not be organized or unable to express their interests (Steins and Edwards 1999). Stakeholder groups are not easily delimitated, identiﬁed or grouped (Bickford 1999) and the deﬁnition of a group involves unstable and complex processes of self identiﬁcation and representation (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). If necessary, getting a historical perspective of the problem may be considered. It may be useful to validate the stakeholder analysis with the groups themselves, for instance showing them the list of groups as seen by the facilitator and asking if any group were left out. Analysis of stakeholder positions should be achieved before the design of the intervention, but it is also a task to be followed up during the process, because stakeholder characteristics may change. Assessment of on-going negotiation processes In order to evaluate existing negotiation processes set up to solve the problem, three characteristics are of special interest: whether they are public, whether they involve authorities and whether they are linked to an ofﬁcial decision-making process. Analysis of the reasons for failing to reach an agreement In a generic way, four different reasons may be considered to explain why the stakeholders did not ﬁnd a solution yet to the common problem: •

•

• •

Lack of information: For instance, in situations of groundwater over pumping, information regarding the recharge and the amounts pumped by users will likely be necessary. Lack of legal or management system: In the same case of groundwater depletion, the lack of a legal system to back an agreement up or a management system to implement it will probably prevent the success of the negotiation process. Lack of willingness of some stakeholders to enter into negotiation. When there is an attempt to set up a negotiation, failure to achieve a consensus regarding the negotiation design: Some stakeholder groups may complain that they are not given enough options in the negotiation, that they do not have sufﬁcient access to information, or that they do not have sufﬁcient control over the decision that is to be made within the MSP.

Analysis of stakeholders’ willingness to reach an agreement The previous analysis may be completed by assessing stakeholders’ willingness to reach an agreement.

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Ex-ante Evaluation of the Intervention During the ex-ante evaluation, the facilitator will assess if an intervention is necessary and opportune, and (if the answer is afﬁrmative) what could be its role in the process. Evaluation of the opportunity to intervene The facilitator will need to evaluate whether its intervention is really needed and may lead to positive results. An illprepared intervention may increase the conﬂict instead of solving it, or may reinforce existing power relations instead of weakening them. The facilitator will also need to evaluate the risks of the MSP itself. First, it may be of interest to try to identify ex ante the risks that would lead to the failure of the MSP. Second, participation of the weaker groups in the MSP may lead to negative outcomes for them (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). Finally, it may be also possible that the conﬂict is too strong to allow the use of an MSP-type approach to solve it. Evaluation of the kind of intervention needed Intervention should be planned in accordance with the analysis of the reasons for a lack of agreement. If there is a lack of information, the facilitator may collect the needed information and organize capacity-building events for stakeholders to understanding the issue. For instance, in California, in several cases of groundwater depletion, the State only committed itself to providing information regarding the dynamics of the groundwater system, and let stakeholders negotiate afterwards without its intervention (Blomquist 1992). If a legal or management system is lacking, the facilitator may involve the organisations able to set up these systems in the discussion. If some stakeholders are not willing to negotiate, the facilitator may design the “negotiation space” in such a way that each stakeholder would prefer an agreement to no agreement. Finally, if there is no initial consensus over the negotiation process, the facilitator may pay special attention to get the MSP design discussed in a comprehensive way with all stakeholders. The facilitator will also need to choose its stand in relation to the solutionseeking part of the process. Susskind and Cruishank (1987) differentiate between facilitation, where the organization supports the process (e.g. organizes the meetings), but does not provide any proposal contributing to a commonly agreed solution; and mediation, where the organization puts proposals on the table as an input for the discussion. Undertaking parallel activities with some stakeholders may sometimes be useful. These activities would be dis-linked to the negotiation process, and would be undertaken in order to create trust or to enhance stakeholders’ willingness to sit at the MSP table. Position of the facilitator The legitimacy of the facilitator is dependent on the acceptance by all stakeholders of its role in facilitating the MSP process. A facilitator is never completely neutral: trying to achieve this would be pointless. What matters is that stakeholders accept the facilitator as a neutral organization.

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Design of a MSP This section presents a framework for the structure of an MSP. This may serve three purposes: • • •

to design the MSP if the facilitator is in charge of it; to adapt an existing MSP to the solution of a speciﬁc problem; to set a frame for the evaluation of an MSP structure and functioning.

Stakeholders must reach an agreement on the design of the MSP. The degree of involvement of participants in the MSP’s design can be chosen between two extremes: on one side the participants design themselves the MSP, with the facilitator only supporting the discussion. On the other side, the facilitator designs alone the MSP. Another choice to make is whether there will be a formally signed agreement on this design. The following subsections present some key points to consider in the design of the MSP. For each of these points, it will be necessary to deﬁne (a) stakeholders’ involvement in the decision-making regarding the design; (b) the degree of ﬂexibility once the MSP has started. Six points can be outlined when designing an MSP. This section reviews these points, according to the order shown in Figure 11.2.

Figure 11.2 Main points to be considered for the design of an MSP

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1. Deﬁnition of the convening organization and the facilitator It may be of interest to differentiate between the organization inviting, i.e., the organization in charge of calling for the MSP, and the facilitator, in charge of facilitating the discussion. For the ﬁrst one, what matters is the weight it gives to the process, while for the second one it is being accepted as neutral. These two roles could be played by a single organisation, or two ones, depending on the local context. Though the facilitator may take the lead in terms of organizing the MSP, delegating responsibilities to other participating organizations would be helpful to get them committed to the process. 2. Basic structure of the MSP The aim and scope of the MSP must be very clear to all stakeholders involved. At least one ofﬁcial objective of the MSP should be deﬁned, possibly complemented with several design objectives. The decision power of the MSP can range from a mere role of socialization and capacity-building (but in that extreme case it may not be considered an MSP) to a role of fully-ﬂedged decision-making body. Stakeholder groups may refuse to participate if they do not trust the process will have any impact. 3. Negotiation structure It is of interest to analyse, for each stakeholder group, what it will get if there is no negotiation, i.e., the Best Alternative to A Negotiated Agreement (cf. Ramírez, 1998). In order to get all stakeholders interested in coming to the MSP to negotiate, it may be possible to add more issues to the initial common problem. Other points of concern are: •

•

•

Structure of the sessions It will be necessary to organize the order in which the themes under discussion will be addressed. There may be a single body of participants or an alternating sequence of plenary sessions and work with smaller groups. If decisions are taken, which kind of decision-making rule MSPs function often with the consensus rule, the reason being their frequent lack of formal insertion in the ofﬁcial decision-making process. However, this is not a universal rule. Tools to facilitate the discussion and the negotiation It is possible to differentiate four types of tools. First, some tools facilitate the deﬁnition of a shared initial assessment of the situation and the common problem. This involves for instance: i) improving stakeholders’ understanding of the technical and social aspects of the problem and of other stakeholders’ points of view; ii) help reveal stakeholders’ actual interests in the problem. Examples of such tools are role-playing games or the RAAKS methodology (Salomon and Engel 1997). Second, some tools facilitate the discussion itself. This can be a set of rules of debate, or an invitation to participants to prepare background papers before the sessions. Third, tools can support the comparison of possible alternatives during the negotiation of the agreement. Fourth, tools are used to create social links among participants, e.g. sharing a meal (for other typologies of these tools, cf. Morardet and Rio 2003 or Grimble and Wellard 1997).

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Rules to organize the debates Some rules may be deﬁned to organize the debates, for instance the deﬁnition of a bye-law for debating agreed by all participants at the beginning of the negotiation process (see Hemmati 2002).

4. Relationship between constituencies and their representatives This issue is one of the toughest in deﬁning and implementing an MSP, since the relationship between representatives and their constituencies is often weak. Effective social control is based on a satisfactory circulation of information, both top-down and bottom-up. In a bottom-up way, the issue is how representatives are elected or designated and how the latter learn the opinions of his/her constituency, especially to know if they would accept an agreement under negotiation at the MSP. The top-down direction relates to how the representative is accountable and how he/she informs about what took place at the negotiation table. In the common cases where this relationship is not satisfactory, the facilitator will have to decide whether to intervene to improve it. An example is the situation where the group is not organized. For instance, in large-scale basins, it may be difﬁcult to get representation of small-scale water users for a water-resource management MSP. In such a case, the facilitator may help organize this stakeholder group. 5. Link with unrepresented stakeholder groups and the general public In the case where some stakeholder groups are not represented, the facilitator may use speciﬁc media to inform them about what takes place at the MSP. 6. Speciﬁc activities of the facilitator Some stakeholder groups may be less knowledgeable of the issues dealt with in the MSP, and they may come to the negotiation table without other stakeholder groups paying attention to their points of view (Edmunds and Wollenberg 2001). Therefore, it may be necessary to organize capacity-building events for these groups’ representatives before the process implementation. The facilitator may need to collect additional information in order to support the negotiation process. It is necessary to deﬁne if the MSP will have a ﬁxed duration or if it may get prolonged in the case difﬁculties appear to reach an agreement. Based on this decision, the facilitator needs to plan the requirements in terms of ﬁnancial and human resources. This may be done for its own activities, as well as for the participation costs of the stakeholders. In several cases of MSPs in developing countries, though participants are not paid, transport costs are reimbursed. Such an assessment is needed if funding organizations are expected to support the process. Finally, publicizing the source of the funds used by the facilitator to support the MSP may be important in order to show a neutral position. Monitoring and Evaluation The evaluation of an MSP can be deﬁned as the analysis of the achievement of its objectives and the efﬁciency of actions undertaken during its course in the view of implementers and stakeholders involved. Though the former seems to place

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evaluation as the ﬁnal stage of an MSP, to include evaluation activities all along this type of processes is unavoidable. The MSP evaluation can be useful to: • • •

assess the established objectives and actions taken by the facilitator during the implementation process; know the results and effects of the overall process and stakeholders’ perception about it; contribute to a better design and implementation of future MSPs through documentation of experiences.

Results are deﬁned here as the short-term consequences of actions undertaken along the process. In that sense, they are related to the design objectives of the platform, allowing the evaluation of their achievement. Effects are deﬁned as more long-term products of the whole platform, and therefore can be used to assess the achievement of the MSP’s general objective. Both results and effects could be inﬂuenced by external factors as much as by actions taken during the platform process. Evaluation activities will consist of the deﬁnition and construction of indicators and the gathering of information through the monitoring of the process, its results and effects. Efﬁcacy refers to the success of the platform, i.e., the degree to which its objectives were attained. Efﬁciency is used to evaluate the performance of actions and efforts undertaken (Quintero 1995) to achieve the outlined objectives, including an analysis of time and ﬁnancial resources used to reach some results. Evaluation indicators have the purpose of measuring and/or qualifying the efﬁcacy of objectives and efﬁciency of carried out actions, given the results and effects of the process. The Mesa Técnica MSP This section presents the design, implementation and evaluation of the Mesa Técnica MSP. It follows the same structure as the methodology presented in the previous section. Baseline Analysis This section presents a summary of the conﬂict and stakeholder analysis. The Negowat team already knew the local context, because of past projects managed by Centro AGUA and CERES. A speciﬁc baseline analysis was carried out, as summarized below (Quiroz and Cuba 2004). In Bolivia, communities are legally structured by way of OTB (Base Territorial Organization). The Valley part of Tiquipaya is composed of 46 OTBs. The Municipality was split between groups supporting the project and others opposing it. The majority of the OTBs from District 5 were opposed to the MACOTI project. The other part of District 5 and the whole District 6 supported the project and had created a Committee for the Defence of the Sanitation, in order to counter the ﬁrst group. The Representatives of District 4 also decided to walk out of the project in August 2004, but on the contrary the main Water Committee present in this District, with

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Figure 11.3 The valley area of Tiquipaya around 1500 connections, supported the project (see Figure 11.3). Finally, municipal elections were due for December 2004, and many actors used the MACOTI theme as an opportunity to show his/her presence in the local political arena. In June 2004, there was no on-going discussion between the supporters and the opponents to the project. According to the groups supporting the MACOTI project, the Chillimarca Villas did not want to pay the required share of the project, while ASIRITIC would be opposed to any sanitation project, as it would accelerate the urbanization process, and therefore would decrease ASIRITIC’s power. The groups opposing the project argued that the two Mayors, during the period 1998–2003 and in 2004, did not want to organize a public debate about the project. Generally speaking, there was indeed a lack of willingness as well as capacity on the part of the Municipality to organize a Negotiation Roundtable. The Vice-Ministry wanted an agreement, because they needed projects to be implemented in a climate of social peace. That is why they proposed the Technical Roundtable. The Tiquipaya Municipality were interested in getting an agreement, to be able to start the works without a new conﬂict and to prove its goodwill to the Vice-Ministry and the funding Banks. ASIRITIC accepted to participate in part in the idea of trying to initiate a discussion on the urbanization process and the means to control it. The Chillimarca Villas were ofﬁcially out of the sanitation part of the project. However, the funding

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of their alternative project was not secured. They needed to negotiate changes in the MACOTI project, in order to secure their return in case funding of the alternative project would fail. The stakeholder groups supporting the MACOTI project were not interested at ﬁrst in participating in the Negotiation Roundtable. They eventually did it to support the Municipality, albeit under the condition that the Technical Roundtable would not impede the initiation of the works. Ex-ante Evaluation of the Intervention Evaluation of the opportunity to intervene The Negowat team evaluated some of the possible risks ex ante: (i) some stakeholder groups boycott the Technical Roundtable and do not accept its legitimacy; (ii) no agreement is reached regarding the Technical Roundtable methodology; and (iii) the socialisation of the information about the project leads to an increase in the conﬂicts. There was no real risk of forcing agreements on weak stakeholder groups, since on both sides, there were wellorganized and well-connected groups. Actually, during the Technical Roundtable, only the ﬁrst two risks appeared important and much time was devoted to discuss with stakeholders the methodology for the Roundtable itself. The representatives at the Technical Roundtable underlined that there was a risk that their presence would be interpreted as an acceptation of the project. This was ofﬁcially discarded: attendance to the sessions did not mean acceptation. Actually, there was a real opportunity to organize a Technical Roundtable, because: (i) the atmosphere had calmed down 6 months after the toughest events in 2003; (ii) the Mayor who arrived in 2004 was more open to discussion than his predecessor; (iii) the Vice-Ministry supported ofﬁcially and continuously the Technical Roundtable.

Table 11.2

Objectives of the facilitator in designing and facilitating the Technical Roundtable

Objective 1

Identify all the stakeholders, their positions and relations around the MACOTI project

Objective 2

Deﬁne the objectives and design of the process with the participation of the stakeholders Promote that representatives can adapt the methodology of the platform during the process Ensure the Technical Roundtable process and results are considered by formal authorities Promote that participants are genuine representatives and accountable to their constituencies Inform the public about the development and results of the Technical Roundtable Ensure that participants have adequate information and access to human, material and ﬁnancial resources for effective participation Facilitate that all participants can exert inﬂuence on decision-making

Objective 3 Objective 4 Objective 5 Objective 6 Objective 7 Objective 8

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Evaluation of the required form of intervention From the outset the Negowat team was designed as the facilitator for the Technical Roundtable. The Negowat team had to start the Technical Roundtable from scratch, as there was no on-going negotiation process. It did act as a mediator sometimes, for instance proposing phrasing of the resolutions that had come out of the debates, in order to be discussed and improved by the participants. This Technical Rountable can be considered an MSP of limited duration, designed to address a speciﬁc topic. In this regard, the objectives of the facilitator in designing and facilitating the Technical Roundtable are listed in the following Table 11.2. When the Negowat team decided to facilitate the process, it sent a proposal to the Municipality, the Vice-Ministry, ASIRITIC and the Chillimarca Villas. The proposal was well accepted because no local organisation was accepted as both and able to support the process. The Vice-Ministry could have been accepted as a neutral broker, but it did not have the capacity to organize the Technical Roundtable in practice. For the sake of being accepted as neutral, the Negowat team decided not to make any proposal on the project itself (though they made proposals to improve the negotiation process). However, the team had their own analysis of the weak aspects of the MACOTI project, and made sure these points were dealt with during the sessions of the Technical Roundtable. During this Roundtable, the representatives did not question much Negowat’s neutrality; rather they contested the relevance of discussing a project that was already about to start. But it proved very important to clarify the funding of the Negowat project, i.e., it did not receive any funds from a Tiquipaya organization or the Vice-Ministry. Design of the MSP Degree of involvement of the stakeholders and the facilitator Originally, the idea was to agree on an MSP design during an informal meeting with some 10 key representatives of the different stakeholder groups, and then call for a plenary meeting with all OTBs, Water Committees and ASIRITIC to validate this design. Though an MSP design was indeed agreed during the informal meeting, it became evident that tensions were too strong to reach consensus in a plenary session with all groups involved. The Negowat team then took a two-step approach. First, during 3 weeks, several meetings were held with representatives of all stakeholder groups in the conﬂict, to learn under which conditions they would accept to participate and to convince them of the importance of the Technical Roundtable. Second, once a draft design was ready, three meetings were organized in each District. This enabled to discuss the MSP design in a much calmer way, but it did not permit in-depth changes in the design based on participants’ comments. The MSP design was not ofﬁcially signed by the stakeholders. The Negowat team wrote a short document that presented the aim and design of the Technical Roundtable, and distributed it to all participating organizations. No comments were made during the ﬁrst session, therefore the design was considered accepted. Deﬁnition of the organization and the facilitator The Negowat team played the role of facilitator, with the Tiquipaya Municipality and the Vice-Ministry as formal

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inviting organizations. Though in practice the Negowat team assumed the whole responsibility of organizing the meetings, the presence of the Municipality and the Vice-Ministry was a key element in providing legitimacy to the process. It provided stability as well: one of the ﬁrst invitation letters sent to all stakeholder groups was signed by the Vice-Ministry, the Municipality and the groups opposing the MACOTI project. The group supporting the project disliked, because it had not been invited to sign the invitation letter, and at ﬁrst rejected the proposal of a Technical Roundtable. The process would have stopped if there had not been the support of the ViceMinistry. Status and scope of the MSP The ofﬁcial objective of the Technical Roundtable was to: 1) create a space for socialization, analysis and discussion of the InterCommunal project; 2) to make suggestions for improvement. The decision-making power initially proposed by the Negowat team was that the Technical Roundtable would just have the capacity to present proposals to the Municipality Councils of Tiquipaya and Colcapirhua, that would afterwards accept them or refuse them. The decision was made on the grounds that: (i) many groups had no legal status, while the relationship between the constituency and its representatives was weak; (ii) District 6 feared that the Technical Roundtable might lead to proposals that would harm the project. From the ﬁrst session on, the participants requested that the Tiquipaya Municipal Council automatically implement the decisions they would take. The Council did not want at ﬁrst, but eventually accepted to issue a note indicating this commitment. Another heavily discussed issue was the question whether the works would be stopped during the Technical Roundtable. There was a strong social pressure in District 6 and part of the District 5 for the works to start as soon as possible. From the Negowat team point of view, this issue was not of such importance since the conﬂict was more on the ﬁnancial and institutional aspects. However, ASIRITIC and the Chillimarca Villas wanted this clause. It was ﬁnally decided that the works would start only in zones that had already accepted the MACOTI project. Composition of the platform Three themes were strongly disputed with respect to the composition of the Technical Roundtable. First, given the existing tensions, it was initially judged that a maximum of 30 representatives should be invited. However, all OTBs and Water Committees wanted to have their own representatives, which would end up with a Roundtable of 70 persons. Eventually the Negowat team accepted this, betting that not all organizations would send their representatives (this proved to be true in practice). Second, leaders from District 6 initially refused the presence of the opponents to the project, on the grounds that ASIRITIC was managing irrigation water and had nothing to do with a drinking water and sanitation project, and that the Chillimarca Villas did not have a say in the project since they had ofﬁcially walked out. Leaders of District 6 would also contend that they were representing all inhabitants in their areas of jurisdiction, and therefore also represented irrigation farmers. Such a position shows that these leaders were not used to MSPs, where stakeholders usually participate through deﬁned stakeholder groups rather than the classic representative

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system. Eventually, these leaders accepted the presence of the two opposing groups after the Municipality intervened to convince them. Third, a Baseline group was eventually deﬁned, which became the ofﬁcial composition of the Roundtable. However, several persons came to the ﬁrst sessions that were not part of this baseline group, e.g. the Committee for the Defence of Sanitation. It was eventually agreed that anybody could come and participate in the discussion as long as the interventions would be positive and would enhance the debate. Negotiation Structure Deﬁnition of the points to be discussed and the limits of the discussion The object of the discussion was very well deﬁned as it was focused on an already existing project of water and sanitation. The main issue in terms of deﬁning the boundaries of the discussion was whether or not to get Colcapirhua on board at the Technical Roundtable. This point was discussed in-depth during the ﬁrst meeting on the design of the MSP. The project was an inter-communal one, and many of its components had to be dealt with at the inter-communal level. However, it was decided that there were already many conﬂicts in Tiquipaya, and that adding those in Colcapirhua would lead to an unmanageable Roundtable. Therefore, Colcapirhua was not part of the discussion but representatives of the Municipality were invited at each session of the Technical Roundtable. The conﬂict had been existing for several months already, and discussions with various groups enabled the Negowat team to gain knowledge of each position. Given this information, a short ex-ante analysis of the points that the stakeholder groups would raise was prepared before each session, as well as the way to ﬁnd an agreement. In particular, before the ﬁrst session, the Negowat team organized a meeting with representatives of the Municipality and of the designers of the project, to see what would be the points the opponents to the project would raise, and how the latter would answer to them. The sessions were organized in the following order: the technical design, the ﬁnancial one and ﬁnally, the institution that would be in charge of operating and maintaining the network afterwards. Consensus rule was decided, so that the leaders of the OTBs supporting the project would accept the presence of ASIRITIC and the Chillimarca Villas. If consensus could not be reached, the proposal would simply be discarded. In practice, consensus was always achieved for the technical and ﬁnancial aspects, but failed for the institutional one. Tools to facilitate the discussion and negotiation Three types of tools were used. First, in order to present some information about the project, several Powerpoint presentations were organized during each of the sessions. Second, participants were invited to present some position documents, which was indeed done by two stakeholder groups. Third, in order to organize the discussions, newsprint and slide shows were used to summarize the points addressed and the outcome of the discussions, and to help participants focus on the topic discussed.

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Relationship between Constituencies and their Representatives During the preparation meetings, the Negowat team proposed that each stakeholder group (OTBs, Water Committees, ASIRITIC) would accredit a representative, and would publicize its choice with a nomination letter. This was followed by almost none of the stakeholder groups (anyway, this proposal was very ambitious given the internal functioning of many of these groups). In practice, the Management Committee of each group named in an informal way a person to represent them at the Technical Roundtable, who was often a member itself of the Management Committee. Given this situation, the Negowat team only required participants at the Technical Roundtable to register as a titular or deputy. Eventually, this ﬂexibility did not harm the negotiation process. Stakeholder Groups not Represented in the MSP and the General Public All stakeholder groups involved in the conﬂict were invited to participate in the process. Besides, each session of the Technical Roundtable took place during a Friday and the following Saturday. At ﬁrst, it was scheduled that the Saturday afternoon would be dedicated to discussion with the public. However, nobody came to the ﬁrst Saturday afternoon session, (1) for lack of communication about the MSP to the general public; and (2) because the grassroots users are used to meeting at OTB or Water Committee level and rarely travel to places far from their home for this kind of meetings. The ﬁrst problem was due to Negowat’s lack of capacity to disseminate information beyond the leaders of each group. Eventually, the main way of communicating the progress of the Technical Roundtable was the distribution of information bulletins between two sessions that would contain a summary of the past session and the information prepared for the next one. This bulletin was distributed to all OTBs, Water Committees of the valley area of Tiquipaya, as well as to the Municipality and ASIRITIC. Furthermore, several newspapers and local television channels were invited to attend a session, but they eventually did not show up. Speciﬁc Activities of the Facilitator Capacity-building No capacity-building meetings with speciﬁc stakeholder groups were organized. The Negowat team proposed such capacity building to ASIRITIC, which refused, because they contented that they had the capacity to undertake their own assessment of the project. Anyway, the Technical Roundtable was as much a place to learn about the project as a place to discuss about it. Collection of information A summary of the MACOTI project, and especially its ﬁnancial structure, was designed by Negowat in cooperation with the designers of the project. This summary was distributed to all stakeholder groups before the ﬁrst session. During the preparation sessions, the Negowat team clariﬁed that the MACOTI team took full responsibility of its content, and that in no way this summary meant an opinion of the Negowat team regarding the project. Writing the summary also enabled the Negowat team to gain in-depth knowledge of the project.

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During the sessions of the Technical Roundtable, the participants often asked for more detailed information, e.g. on which bases the designers of the MACOTI project had calculated that 6,000 connections were going to be made during the ﬁrst year, or a more detailed explanation of the ﬁnancial structure. Duration of the MSP and planning of the ﬁnancial and human resource requirements At ﬁrst, four sessions were planned of two days each. However, during the process itself, a dilemma emerged. On the one hand, it was important not to extend the process too much, in order not to tire the representatives and because, apart from the representatives of the Municipality and from the Vice-Ministry, none had expenses allowance to attend the meetings. On the other hand, the Negowat team did not want to force the closure of a theme and wanted to make sure the participants were satisﬁed with the discussion that had taken place. Anyway, it ﬁnally appeared that to solve the dilemma, much time could be saved thanks to a better organization of the discussion, especially by trying to prevent that participants would not talk about things unrelated to the themes under discussion. In order to organize the Technical Roundtable, three persons were needed full-time during a period of 4 months. Furthermore, a vehicle was used to distribute the information bulletins, invitations and documents prepared for each session among the stakeholder groups. Around 10,000 photocopies were produced during the whole process. The representatives of the social organizations that came to the Roundtable did not receive any participation fee, not even the transport costs. The Negowat team paid all the costs linked to the organization of the Technical Roundtable, with the exception of the lunches, which the Municipality agreed to pay. It required much effort to get the Municipality to comply with its commitment, but such – ﬁnancial – involvement was important to make sure the Municipality would develop a sense of ownership. Activities during the Technical Roundtable Sessions organized Eventually, ﬁve sessions were organized. During the ﬁrst four sessions, the technical, ﬁnancial and institutional components of the project were tackled, in this order. At ﬁrst, it had been scheduled to devote one session for each of the three components, but eventually much mixing occurred, as participants often asked information that the Negowat team had then to prepare for the next session. At the end of the fourth session, several Technical Commissions were named to follow up on some speciﬁc topics. Three commissions were to work on (1) supervising the quality of the construction works; (2) reviewing the ﬁnancial structure and ﬁnding external funds to lower the total costs to be borne by users; (3) examine the possibility to use a pipeline to be built by the nearby Cochabamba water company, in order to decrease costs as well. However, none of these commissions got results after 2 months. The last Commission was to review possible institutional designs for the future organization in charge of operating and maintaining the system. This Commission worked continuously and successfully, and was able to propose two alternatives for the institutional design, during the ﬁfth and last session. This session served to present a document summarizing the

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Technical Roundtable and the resolutions that came out of it, and to discuss how the process would be carried forward after the Negowat team’s departure. New Municipal elections had taken place between the fourth and the ﬁfth sessions, and it was agreed that the Municipality would continue to communicate and discussion process in some form. During the ﬁrst session, the Negowat team proposed a set of rules for debating, mainly to make sure the debate would remain calm and participants would respect each other. The maximum duration of any intervention was also set at 3 minutes. Spanish is the most common language in the valley part of Tiquipaya. The other language spoken in the Municipality, quechua, is more used in the rural area. Though use of quechua was ofﬁcially accepted in the debating rules, the language used in practice was Spanish. Animation of the session Often, questions during the sessions would call for more information about the project. Therefore, between two sessions, the Negowat team would collect the information and prepare it, mainly (but not only) with the designers of the MACOTI project. During the sessions also, many outside contributors were invited to intervene, for instance the FNDR, the companies in charge of the construction and of the supervision, a demographer from the University, and a representative of the Water Committee of Tiquipaya Old Centre. Each discussion theme was often introduced by a presentation (for instance by a representative of the designers of the MACOTI project). The participants were then free to intervene and ask questions or make statements. The Negowat team would try to organize the discussion. After each half-day or complete day, what had come out of the discussion was summarized in the form of proposals, that would be discussed and preferably command consensus among all members. Although the unstructured nature of the discussion caused great delay, the Negowat team preferred this freedom of speech to having the facilitator cut off somebody’s intervention. Evaluation of the Technical Roundtable The evaluation activities were carried out independently from the implementation of this platform as the person responsible had no responsibilities in the execution of the Technical Roundtable. They included the participation in each of the sessions, the analysis of document produced and the interview of nine representatives to get their opinion on the process, after the fourth session. The main results of the evaluation were presented during the last Technical Roundtable session and included in a document summarizing the whole process and its outputs. This document was distributed to the representatives and ofﬁcially handed to the newly elected Tiquipaya Municipality leaders. This section ﬁrst describes the methodology used during the evaluation and then presents the results of this evaluation. A ﬁrst step for the evaluation was the deﬁnition of efﬁcacy and efﬁciency indicators of the Technical Roundtable. It was based on a previous identiﬁcation and clariﬁcation of the general and design objectives of the platform and the actions carried out to attain the design objectives. The ofﬁcial objective of the Technical Roundtable was:

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Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management To create socialisation, analysis and discussion space for the MACOTI project in order to reach a negotiated agreement among the participants regarding a common vision of the project and propose changes to improve it.

Though the former was disseminated as the objective of this platform, to ‘reach a negotiated agreement among the participants about a common vision’ was very ambitious. What actually was intended was to create a deeper understanding of the project among stakeholders. As the design objectives are in this case the objectives of the facilitator of the Technical Roundtable (Negowat), this section analyses the actions of the facilitator based on the indicators chosen for this purpose. Compliance with General Objectives Objective 1. To identify all the stakeholders, their positions and relations around the MACOTI project

Efﬁciency Indicators

Indicator All the stakeholders and their relationships were identiﬁed Changes in stakeholders’ positions and relationships along the process were known

Result An important stakeholder was not identiﬁed initially Yes

The rapid stakeholder mapping carried out by the facilitator failed to identify one key stakeholder who complained about being excluded. While this eventually did not stop the process, it underlines the importance of gathering knowledge about the stakeholders around a problem and their possible evolution in the course of the MSP. Failure to consider important stakeholders can impair the legitimacy of a platform or even prevent its establishment. Objective 2. To deﬁne the objectives and design of the process with the participation of the stakeholders

Efﬁcacy Indicators

Indicator Stakeholders’ interests and their requirements to accept participation in the Technical Roundtable were identiﬁed Technical Roundtable’s characteristics include some stakeholders’ suggestions Degree of acceptance of the Technical Roundtable by the stakeholders

Result Yes Yes The process was accepted

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Informal meetings were effective to check the proposal and include the requirements of stakeholders to become involved in the Technical Roundtable. Formal meetings succeeded to reach the commitment of all the important groups to participate. However, it did not allow an in-depth revision of the proposed methodology. The objectives and methodology were not questioned afterwards despite: i) the fact that some stakeholders did not know the scope of the Technical Roundtable at the beginning of its implementation; ii) the preparation meetings were carried out with relatively few stakeholders. This stresses the importance of the previous informal meetings that helped to identify the main hopes and fears the stakeholders harboured with respect to the implementation of the Technical Roundtable. Objective 3. To promote that representatives can adapt the methodology of the platform during the process

Efﬁciency Indicators

Indicator Revision of the methodology was allowed during the process Methodological changes were introduced, based on stakeholders’ suggestions

Result Yes Few changes

The methodology was questioned during the implementation in an informal way. There was no speciﬁc moment dedicated to discuss the methodology itself. However, participants that gave opinions about it were not stopped by the moderator. Some changes were introduced, based on outcomes of discussions in the group (e.g., the composition of the group itself). Objective 4. To make sure the Technical Roundtable process and results are considered by the formal authorities

Efﬁcacy Indicators

Indicator Result Governorship and vice-Ministry Yes supported the Technical Roundtable The Municipal authorities considered No (see general evaluation) the results of Technical Roundtable

The Vice-Ministry gave its support to the Technical Roundtable from the beginning. They coorganized its implementation (with Negowat) and leaned on the Municipality of Tiquipaya to support it. The latter was fundamental to the set-up of this platform, since it was the only organization with the legitimacy and authority to convene the stakeholders to participate in the process.

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Objective 5. To promote that participants are genuine representatives and accountable to their constituencies

Efﬁcacy Indicators

Indicator There is an agreement about the procedure for appointing representatives Constituencies’ knowledge about the process Constituencies ratify agreements reached at the Technical Roundtable

Result Yes, but not accomplished Not known Not known

The discussion about the procedure for appointing representatives to the Technical Roundtable concluded with an agreement of formally nominating representatives, but this was only accomplished by a minority among the stakeholder groups. Most of the stakeholder groups were represented by their current leaders. The decision-making procedure did not require consultation with constituencies and the facilitators did not take action to inform the constituencies. When asked about the way they informed their constituencies, several interviewed representatives answered that they would wait until the conclusion of the Roundtable process before informing them about the Technical Roundtable: Others however reported that they informed them regularly about the Technical Roundtable. Objective 6. To inform the public about the development and results of the Technical Roundtable

Efﬁciency Indicators Efﬁcacy indicator

Indicator Direct participation of public allowed The public received information about the Technical Roundtable Public knowledge about the Technical Roundtable

Result Yes, but no public came No In some cases

The actions taken did not succeed in keeping the public informed about the Technical Roundtable. On the one hand, the planned open meetings did not gain the interest of the public and on the on the other hand, the invitation to the media (newspapers and television) did not elicit a positive response. As a result, the Technical Roundtable was merely known to the representatives of the stakeholder groups involved.

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Objective 7. To ensure that participants have adequate information and access to human, material and ﬁnancial resources for effective participation

Efﬁciency indicators

Efﬁcacy Indicators

Indicator The discussion process can be followed easily Participants can visualize the topics being discussed Participants are previously informed about the topics of the meetings Participants have access to different professionals involved in the project and related issues Participants give well-grounded opinions about the treated issues

Result No Not clearly Yes, written information Yes, through presentations and participation of experts Sometimes

The facilitator supplied written information, made invitations to professionals with expertise on the project and related themes, and provided communication materials and equipment. Some presentations were not clear to the public. This led to many questions from the participants, which in some cases were not satisfactorily answered. The irregular attendance of many participants caused difﬁculties in the effective supply of oral and written information. Communication tools to help the discussion remain focused were not used enough and, combined with the irregular attendance of many participants, led to many interventions being not to the point, for example, somebody raising a point on the ﬁnancial part of the project while the point under discussion was about the technical part. This caused a lack of focus and organization in the discussion and many repetitions of similar arguments, which in turn made it difﬁcult to discuss indepth a topic before moving to another. Objective 8. To permit all participants to have inﬂuence in the decision making Indicator Efﬁciency indicator Efﬁcacy indicator

Result

Participants can freely give opinions Yes, adequate moderation Participants agree with all the decisions taken in the Technical Roundtable

No, but decusuibs are accepted

While the set-up of the meeting allowed broad participation of the representatives, some people evidently gave their opinions more frequently. The application of participation rules was of great help in eliciting contributions from the others. As the decisions were to be taken by consensus, it promoted a large discussion about every topic during the meetings. This, combined with the lack of clear structure to discuss every issue, caused a lack of time to discuss some topic sufﬁciently.

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Compliance with the Technical Roundtable General Objective This section analyzes the accomplishment of the general objective. It can be broken down into two aspects: the socialization of the project and the proposals to improve the project. Socialization of the project The socialization of the project was an aspect of common interest to all the involved stakeholders. Though it was not possible to make in-depth changes in the technical and ﬁnancial aspects, a deeper understanding of the project was reached. At the end of the process, the participants were able to distinguish the positive and negative aspects of the project and did not reject it as a whole anymore. An indirect achievement of the Technical Roundtable was the improvement in the relationship among the stakeholders with different positions regarding the project. Against the initial doubts, the stakeholders have accepted to sit together and review the MACOTI project in an atmosphere that became progressively more peaceful. Though some stakeholders stated afterwards that their positions did not change much, they were much more prone to dialogue than initially. Propose changes to improve the project A weakness of the Technical Roundtable was its moment of implementation: it was difﬁcult to introduce changes in a project already at the beginning of its implementation stage. With the exception of the institutional part, very few changes were proposed. The Technical Roundtable came up with two proposals for an institutional model for the organisation that will manage the sewage system in Tiquipaya, which is different of the initially proposed model for the MACOTI project. The weakness of this proposal is that it was not discussed with the stakeholders of Colcapirhua. In December 2004, a new municipal government was elected, and the new municipal team did not feel compelled to implement the motions approved during the roundtable. In 2005, the project also faced technical problems and signiﬁcant delays in its execution phase because of disagreements between the two municipalities, the credit bank and the constructing and supervising companies. In 2005 and 2006, the project management focused on the technical side. First, the ﬁnancial component, which had been discussed in detail during the Mesa Técnica, was ignored by the Tiquipaya Municipality, which was eventually more interested in building the project, and which expressed the idea of renegotiating the loan once the project had been built. Second, because of the delays in the implementation, the institutional component had not yet been tackled again in mid-2006. As a consequence of all this, the motions that came out of the Mesa Técnica were not implemented. Because of this, several participants were of the opinion that the technical roundtable had turned out to be a mere simulacrum of participation. The achievement of stakeholders’ objectives Stakeholders had different objectives in relation with their engagement in the MSP. During the Technical Roundtable, the following objectives were distinguished, which were reached in most of the cases.

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The objective of the Vice-Ministry was to boost the support for the project among Tiquipaya inhabitants. The Technical Roundtable was seen as a way of reaching this objective. Thus, the vice-Ministry provided organizational support and ensured the presence of its representatives in all the platform meetings. The Municipality of Tiquipaya also had the objective of executing the project as soon as possible. It caused them to approach the implementation of the Technical Roundtable with some distrust. Later on they accepted to support and participate in the platform under pressure from the Vice-Ministry but kept their objectives in mind. As reﬂected by one of their employees: ‘The Technical Roundtable served to distract the stakeholders’ leaders while the execution of the project started’. Its erratic participation in the meetings also reﬂects this position. The group of organizations (OTBs and drinking water systems) that defended the project sought to stop opposing groups form tabling modiﬁcations to the project that would cause further delays in project execution. Thus, most of these organizations participated in an irregular way or were absent. The group of organizations that questioned the water project and decided not to take part wished to introduce some changes in the project, especially the ﬁnancial aspect, on the basis of which they could contemplate returning to the project. This interest promoted an active and constant participation of these organizations in the platform, which made it more dynamic. This last group was the least satisﬁed with the results of the Technical Roundtable, because of its lack of in-depth changes in the technical and ﬁnancial parts. They were, however, empowered to propose sizeable changes in the institutional part. General balance The MSP was built on Habermas principles (all stakeholders should participate; the important is getting the communication right, etc.). However, it appeared later that though power was fairly balanced between local communities, important decision-makers such as FNDR or the construction and supervision companies managed to remain uninvolved in the debate. In front of these actors, probably a more strategic approach would have been needed. Other major weaknesses were that the technical roundtable was set up when the project was already at the beginning of its execution stage, which limited the scope for change. Moreover, participants’ lack of capacity to criticize the technical components of the project limited the possibilities to come up with signiﬁcant proposals for change on these issues. Finally, the municipality saw the MSP much more as a way to ease tensions than as a real opportunity to improve the project. However, it did manage to move from general judgments, even insults, between local leaders and other representatives to quite detailed and positive discussions on the different aspects of the project. Local leaders were capacitated about the different components of the project, and a proposal for an institutional model for the entity to be in charge of operating the water and sewerage system was formulated. Finally, the reasons for not implementing the different motions – being the election of a new municipal team in 2005, and delays in the execution of the project – could not have been foreseen at the beginning of the Mesa Técnica. Therefore, while results were limited, this MSP cannot be considered a mere manipulation exercise.

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Some Lessons Learned The generic methodology presented in the ﬁrst section of the document proved useful to verify that all aspects were considered during planning, implementation and evaluation. In turn, its practical application in this case helped us to improve the list. It was important to keep the structure of the platform ﬂexible. The facilitator made strong efforts to deﬁne the composition of the Technical Roundtable (number and appointment of representatives) but at the end it was more useful to manage the participation openly. This is not to say that it will be always the best solution: it obviously depends on the particular situation. Considering the dimensions of this project (USD2 million for the Tiquipaya part) the cost of implementation of the Technical Roundtable was quite limited. That justiﬁes the conclusion that this process could have been planned during the design stage of the project. Finally, the main question that came out of this experience is whether MSPs are relevant in context such as the one experimented in the Mesa Técnica, where important power asymmetries appeared between local communities and larger government agencies or companies. The Negowat team may have refused to facilitate an MSP and may have supported some groups in their refusal of the project. However, with such a conﬂict-based approach, the very interesting and constructive discussions between supporters and opponents of the project on the institutional component, would not have taken place. This leaves open the question whether it is possible to mix an MSP with some strategic actions based on power asymmetry analyses. Acknowledgements John Butterworth from the IRC Water and Sanitation Institute offered some key ideas for this document. Afterwards it was greatly improved using suggestions made during a workshop held in December 2004 in Cochabamba. Special thanks are expressed to Rocio Bustamante and Alfredo Duran from Centro AGUA, the Negowat team in Brazil, and Jeroen Warner from Wageningen University. References Bickford, S. (1999), ‘Reconfiguring pluralism: identity and institutions in the inegalitarian polity’, American Journal of Political Sciences, 43 (1), 86–108. Blomquist, W. (1992), Governing groundwater in Southern California, ICS Press, San Francisco, USA. Edmunds, D. and Wollenberg, E. (2001), ‘A strategic approach to multistakeholder negotiations’, Development and Change 32, 231–253. Faysse, N. (2006), ‘Troubles on the way: An Analysis of the Challenges Faced by Multi-stakeholder Platforms’, Natural Resource Forum, 30 (3), 219–229. Grimble, R. and Wellard, K. (1997), ‘Stakeholder methodologies in Natural Resource Management: a review of Principles, Contexts, Experiences and Opportunities’,

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Agricultural Systems, 55 (2), 173–193. Hemmati, M. (2002), Multi-Stakeholder processes for governance and sustainability: Beyond deadlock and conflict. Earthscan, London. Morardet, S. and Rio, P. (2003), ‘Approches et instruments pour aider à formuler un problème de négociation’, Ponencia a la conferencia internacional CIID, Montpellier, September 2003. Quintero, V. (1995), Evaluación de proyectos sociales, Fundación para la educación superior (FES) Colombia. Quiroz, F. and Cuba, P. (2004), ‘Análisis de grupo de interés clave en relación al proyecto mancomunado de agua potable y alcantarillado Tiquipaya Colcapirhua’, Informe del proyecto NEGOWAT, CERES, Cochabamba, Bolivia. Ramírez, R. (1999), ‘Stakeholder analysis and conflict management’, in D. Buckles (ed.), Cultivating Peace Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management, International Development Research Centre/The World Bank, Ottawa/Washington. Salomon, M. L. and Engel, P. G. H. (1997), Facilitating innovation for development – a RAAKS resource box, Royal Tropical Institute, KIT Press, The Netherlands. Sextón, D. (2003), Gestión social de los recursos naturales y territories. Debates y propuesta pedagógica desde un contexto andino. Consorcio CAMAREN, CICDA, RURALTER. www.ruralter.org/buscar/bdd_txt/art_104.pdf Steins, N. A. and Edwards, V. (1999), ‘Platforms for collective action in multiple-use common-pool resources’, Agriculture and human values, 16, 241–255. Susskind, L. and Cruisbank, J. (1987), Breaking the impasse. Consensual approaches to resolving Public Disputes, MIT Harvard Press.

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Chapter 12

Multi-Stakeholder Dissonance in the South African Water Arena Eliab Simpungwe, Pieter Waalewijn and Bert Raven

Introduction The ambition of this chapter is to explore South Africa’s endeavours in implementing Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs). This is achieved through analytical presentation of lessons emerging from speciﬁc case studies undertaken in three different parts of South Africa, where stakeholders are striving to respond to a government mandate to engage in partnerships in developing strategies for managing their own catchment water resources. South African experience illustrates the dilemmas a state may face; when the emergence and functioning of Multi-Stakeholder Platforms is pursued from the perspective of the state, as a democratisation and/or decentralisation process, rather than from the perspective of the stakeholders themselves, as an endogenous social movement by local stakeholders who decide to take control of their natural resource management through institutions created by themselves for themselves, to better their own lives and livelihoods. Furthermore the chapter strives to demonstrate the complexity of achieving meaningful stakeholder participation among different stakeholders coming from extremely diverse socio-economic and cultural backgrounds, who share little or no common livelihood goals. This exploration concludes that when MSPs emerge as a state initiative implemented through the enactment of laws, all stakeholders come with ‘limitations’ in dealing with the new arrangement. It is these ‘limitations’ that block a successful implementation of Multi-Stakeholder Processes for Integrated Catchment Management. The State therefore has a crucial role in developing new capacities to empower (all) stakeholders to overcome their ‘limitations’ and become legitimate owners of the process. Each group of stakeholders requires a different kind of empowerment according to its own ‘limitations’ in understanding and being able to contribute effectively to the partnership. Secondly, in order to maintain the commitment of stakeholders in terms of both political and socio-economic support, water reforms should yield tangible results that beneﬁt the underprivileged in real terms. Resolving Claims over a Vanishing Resource South Africa is faced with an ever-increasing water scarcity situation and deteriorating water quality. The International Water Management Institute (IWMI) projects that

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by 2025 South Africa will face physical water scarcity (Manzungu 2001). Covering an area of 1,221,000 km2, South Africa lies in a semi-arid to arid subtropical climate with a highly variable rainfall pattern and high evaporation rates. Average annual rainfall is estimated at 497 mm per annum.1 Only 25% of South Africa’s rivers are perennial most of which are irregular. Four major river basins, which together cover about 60% of South Africa’s land area and account for around 40% of the total surface runoff, are shared with neighbouring countries. With a combined mean annual ﬂow of 49 000 million m³ for all rivers in the country, South Africa is said to have less than half the water yield ﬂowing in the Zambezi River, the major river closest to South Africa. Groundwater plays a pivotal role, especially in rural water supplies. Nonetheless, the predominantly hard rock nature of the South African geology means that only about 20% of groundwater occurs in major aquifer systems (DWAF 2004). Current water issues in the country include lack of important arterial rivers or lakes, consequently requiring extensive water conservation and control (as a result South Africa has resorted to dam building and extensive inter basin water transfers), pollution of rivers from agricultural runoff and urban discharge; sedimentation of rivers and dams resulting from excessive soil erosion and an ever increasing water demand threatening to outpace supply. For instance, over 50% of South Africa’s 45 million people reside in urban areas creating substantial demands for domestic water and the low-income population continues to lay vociferous claims to their promised 25 litres per day per person of free water. Like its people, South Africa’s water arena presents a troubled history. The apartheid-government mooted legislations and laws that granted exclusive water rights to a secluded group of white minority. The institutional development of the water sector, as far back as the ﬁfteenth century, had been characterized by restrictions and inequitable distribution of the resource (Gakpo et al. 2001). A combination of laws that allowed owners of properties adjoining a river to consequently gain exclusive rights to use surface and underground water, together with a freehold land tenure system led to heavily skewed access to water in favour of whites, a privileged minority of private landowners (Findlay 1973; Rabies 1989). Soon after the ﬁrst democratic election in April 1994, the ANC-led Government embarked on a democratisation of socio-economic institutions as means for improving the lives of all South Africans. In the water arena, the 1998 National Water Act No.36 (NWA) became the main legal instrument aiming to ensure equitable, efﬁcient and sustainable management of water resources. The NWA was designed to replace the formerly technocratic and centrally driven ‘command and control’ approach, with a participatory and multi-stakeholder-driven system. Institutional Water Management Environment in the New South Africa Through the promulgation of the NWA in 1998, the government declared the establishment of water management institutions and the ‘Catchment’ (a river basin or watershed in South African usage) became the primary unit for water 1

This is well under the world average which is estimated at 860 mm per annum.

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Figure 12.1 Water management areas in South Africa resource management. As a management strategy, South Africa was divided into 19 hydrological zones called Water Management Areas (WMA) whose boundaries traverse provincial and local government boundaries (Figure 12.1). A WMA is a large-scale contiguous region of the country, deﬁned generally by macro-hydrological boundaries, which provides the focus for national water balance planning under the National Water Resources Strategy (DWAF 1998). Within each of the Water Management Areas, a Catchment Management Agency (CMA) is required to be established. A Catchment Management Agency is a selfregulatory body with a Governing Board and an executive or administrative structure that has the statutory responsibility, power and ﬁnancial autonomy to perform a range of catchment management functions in a declared Water Management Area. CMAs become responsible for the implementation of Water Management Strategies in their designated areas. To sufﬁciently allow for micro-level participation in the establishment of CMA, DWAF has suggested the formation of a micro-level water institution referred to as the Catchment Management Forum (CMF). A Catchment Management Forum (CMF) is a non-statutory body, representative of stakeholders and organs of state in a catchment or part thereof, which promotes catchment management implementation through consensual participation. Even though there is no speciﬁc mention of the CMFs in the NWA, they have become the ﬁrst level of participatory catchment management. The NWA also requires the formation of new Water Users Associations (WUA) or transformation of the old water user boards

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such as Irrigation Boards (IBs) that existed during the apartheid government, to be reconstituted in accordance with the new regulations. A Water User Association (WUA) is a statutory body, representative of water users in a declared Catchment Management Area or part thereof, which has the power to develop and operate individual water supply schemes or engage in any (operational) water-related activity, states the NWA. The Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF) was mandated to ensure the implementation of this elaborate institutional framework. CMFs became the ﬁrst water management institutions to be established since as non-statutory institutions, their establishment required no state registration and was not dictated by any accompanying strict guidelines and stringent regulations. By the end of 2002, there were 200 CMFs reported to have been established in various catchments (DWAF, 2002). The process of establishing CMAs and WUAs posed unsuspected challenges. By the end of 2004, only three completed proposals for the establishment of CMAs had been submitted to DWAF Head Ofﬁces. Six years since the promulgation of the NWA, only one CMA (Inkomati Catchment) had been approved (DWAF 2003/2004 Annual report). As for WUAs, only 43 proposals for the transformation of the old Irrigation Boards had been accepted by DWAF out of the 272 that were submitted by the end of 2002. The main reason for the rejection of most proposals was attributed to a poor public participation in the transformation process. The NWA speciﬁes a stakeholder approach, which recognizes the importance of involving civil society, private sector, industry, NGOs and government departments. Notwithstanding, South African water arena presents a complex maze of structure, purpose and function, in which it is easy to get lost. While water resource management is regulated by the NWA and falls under the jurisdiction of DWAF and its participatory institutions, domestic water supply and sanitation services are designed to be governed by a different Water Act (Water Services Act of 1997) and controlled by provincial and counterpart local governments. Both these legislations form channels through which the public may be participate in water management. However it is still not clear how institutions governed by these two pieces of legislation relate to each other considering that local governments use political structures to achieve public participation while DWAF chooses to link directly with civil society. Several other government departments control issues which impact directly or indirectly on water resource management. For instance, in the Inkomati catchment, the Department of Agriculture holds and manages all irrigation permits for the previous Kangwane homeland. The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, which controls conservation-related issues, also monitors estuaries and aquatic life. Different government departments have delegated differing levels of management responsibilities to their respective provincial and local government counterparts. Civil society is also engaged in water management through their own institutions such as Farmers’ Unions, traditional local water committees and other civil society lobby organisations such as the South Africa National Community Organisation (SANCO). In addition, there is also a number of private and public industries engaged in utilising water resources that is too large to account here. Clearly, programmes and projects of each of these organs do impinge on the overall management of the quantity and quality

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of water within a given catchment. The ambition of the NWA is to bring all these organs to a consensual and collaborative management of water resources through the prescribed institutions. Stakeholder Participation at Micro-level In South African water resource management framework, the notion of MSP can be ascribed to the CMAs, CMFs and WUAs. This article will therefore use these acronyms interchangeably with MSP. CMFs have emerged as the broad-based micro-level ‘committees’ of stakeholders representing a wide range of users with a stake in water within a designated catchment. The establishment of Forums in each catchment is said to constitute the ﬁrst level of cooperative governance. It is the level at which community members forge partnership with government departments, industries, private businesses, NGOs and WUAs that operate in the catchment to negotiate the optimum utilization of catchment water resources. One group of stakeholders at the micro level, whose participation the government wants to ensure, is an emasculated group of stakeholders now referred to as the Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs) or Previously Disadvantaged Individuals (PDIs) (Faysse 2003; Mohammad et al. 2003). HDIs are deﬁned as South African citizens, who due to the apartheid policy had no franchise in national election prior to the introduction of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 110 of 1993). Past apartheid policies completely removed opportunities for consensual and mutual understanding among different races. As a result, the marginalized groups, speciﬁcally the black majority, having been excluded from decision making for a long time, were disenfranchised to the extent that they are often unable to make a meaningful contribution to the current situation without having to undergo some kind of capacity building. The difﬁculty of achieving a well-balanced representation and active participation of all stakeholders can be captured from the experience of establishing CMFs in the Eastern Cape Province. An approach in Mthatha in which DWAF took the initiative to establish a CMF with the help of consultants resulted in poor participation from community members while a different approach in the Kat River Valley, used by researchers from Rhodes University to facilitate an emergence of a pro-poor community based CMF, resulted in poor participation from the government and private sector. The Mthatha Catchment Management Forum (Mthatha CMF), having been initiated by a government department, was characterized by dominance of government and private sector organizations followed by a gradual withdrawal of community representation. On the other hand, the emergence of the Kat River Valley Catchment Management Forum (Kat CMF) placed greater emphasis on social mobilization, ensuring that local people, including women, were mobilized to take interest in their environment. Participatory Rural Appraisal methods, including theatre, were used in this process (Motteux and McMaster 2002). The result was a high representation and active participation by community members in the CMF but little interest from government and private sector. In the Mthatha catchment, DWAF paid a consultant to function as a secretariat and met the CMF’s running costs. With DWAF actively visible in the Mthatha

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CMF, it is probable that the community viewed the CMF as a government institution. Wester et al. (2003), commenting on the stakeholder participation in river basin management in Mexico and South Africa, argue that in cases where the process is driven by government agencies as the major stakeholders, the process is essentially driven by a combination of technical and economic concerns and interagency politics. In such approaches there is no room for less organized, ‘informal’ interests, especially poor people, to fully participate and gain access to water resources. Wester et al.’s observation can be afﬁrmed by a reaction made by a community representative to the presentation of the Basin Study report made by a consulting engineer to the second Mthatha CMF meeting. During that meeting, community stakeholders complained that the presentation was just too technical, such that it was difﬁcult for them to assimilate, let alone translate the information for their respective constituencies (DWAF 2001). On the other hand, the Kat CMF where state organs and NGOs have shunned the initiative, exempliﬁes a situation where state organisations view the CMF as an informal, community pressure group, formed by community members to lay claims on their long lost entitlements. Representatives from local communities join the Forums with anticipation and great expectation of reaping practical benefits from the collaborative initiative. Responses to interviews of local people pointed to the fact that local people participated in expectation of action that would change their lives. In Mthatha catchment for example, local people mentioned their desire for better quality water, access to piped domestic water and agricultural land. In the Kat River Valley Catchment, in addition to piped domestic water, local people were concerned about the degradation of their environment and access to agricultural land. Unfortunately however, government and NGOs attached a different purpose to these Forums. They perceived them as platforms for dialogue and planning, not for decision-making or implementation. DWAF describes the intended purpose of CMFs as simply to initiate the participation process that must underpin the establishment of CMAs (DWAF 1999, 2). It is difficult to imagine how a process that makes demands on local people’s time and money could attract their interest for the sake of dialogue as a form of participation. The Kat CMF currently boasts a platform that has sustained local people’s interest because it has managed to engage its membership in a land-care project, which does not only address soil erosion problems in the catchment but also provides an income to participants. To further emphasize the hiccups and bottlenecks that can arise when bringing together stakeholders from diverse backgrounds, let us proceed with a visit to the Komati Basin to explore the processes around the emergence of WUA’s and the development of the proposals for the formation of CMAs. The Komati Basin is a sub-catchment of the Inkomati Basin, an international basin that covers parts of the Northeast of South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique. It is a warm and humid region with huge economic interests. The largest water users are agriculture, forestry and nature conservation (a part of the Kruger National Game Park falls within the Inkomati Basin). The area has had a relatively short but intensive history of struggle over water control. Virtually all commercial white farms in the area are less than 100 years old. Like elsewhere in South Africa, their establishment

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ushered in the era of evictions, resettlements and displacement of local people to homelands.2 Agriculture is by far the largest water user in this basin. The agricultural sector can be roughly divided along the old apartheid boundaries whereby large commercial enterprises are owned by white families located mainly in the downstream parts of the catchment and recent (from the early 1990s onwards) government-initiated, communal small-scale farming schemes for blacks were constructed along the upstream banks near the homelands. In 1995, black farmers were allowed to join the management structure of the local Irrigation Board. The Irrigation Board had to transform to a WUA in line with the requirements of the NWA. Meanwhile, stakeholders in the water resources of the catchment were also engaged in a process of establishing a CMA. The ﬁrst striking observation that one makes in the Komati Catchment is the vast asymmetry between two major stakeholder groups. White farmers are on average highly educated entrepreneurs operating in a dynamic agricultural system. They are historically a highly organized community who enjoy direct professional contacts with government bureaucrats and have proven to be able to form effective lobbying groups. Black farmers on the other hand tend to have a background of a poor education system and high unemployment rates. Many of the current black farmers were previously working on white farms as unskilled labourers and thus possess limited farm business management skills. They have a far less developed political and marketing network. Unlike their white colleagues, black farmers are largely unaware of catchment-wide water management issues or legislative changes. Their operations are distracted by numerous local problems, which include poor storage facilities, lack or bad state of infrastructure, illiteracy, poor market access, etc. The Difﬁcult Birth of a WUA In 1995, when small-scale farmers could join the Irrigation Board to which they previously did not have access, three main problems emerged. The ﬁrst was a problem of representation. The Department of Agriculture without a clear mandate or representative constituencies selected representatives for the black farming community. As a result, many small-scale farmers felt poorly represented and were confused about who to inform or to consult regarding water issues that bothered them. Second, communal farmers had little knowledge of the basin’s issues and suffered many hardships with their irrigation infrastructure. It was obvious that they needed some education and lots of assistance. Their white colleagues, on the other hand, were much experienced with problem solving and unless it was a major problem, they were good at quick-ﬁx approaches. This situation led to conﬂicts in the board, more especially because both groups failed to understand each other’s problems. The third problem was partly a consequence of the other two. It was a problem of legitimacy. The Irrigation Board, though legislatively the lowest tier in 2 These were settlements established by the apartheid government for the habitation of black people, They were largely marginal lands with limited socio-economic infrastructure. As a result of emigration restrictions, these areas became extremely densely populated.

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water management institutions at catchment level, is regarded in this region as a very powerful body. It constitutes the traditional stronghold of white farmer’s autonomous regulation. Historically, the apartheid government avoided meddling in the affairs of such governing bodies of local economic structures as most group actions and lobbying originated from them. The Irrigation Board draws on many years of experience in executing day-today water management operations. That history, however, also remains the main drawback of the organization. The board is perceived to be a remnant of the apartheidera organizations, which are biased towards white command-and-control. There are indications that many black farmers do not trust the Irrigation Board sufﬁciently enough to contribute towards its management. It also appears that the transformation process from the old Irrigation Board to the new WUA had not involved sufﬁcient public participation. As a result of inadequate representation, the vast majority of small-scale farmers were unaware of the whole process. As evidence of this assumption, DWAF Head Ofﬁce rejected the proposal for the formation of a WUA for the Komati basin, as it did to most of the proposals from across the country, mentioned earlier in this chapter. CMA Formation – Pathﬁnding? Under the NWA, the inhabitants of a Water Management Area can draft proposals for the establishment of a CMA. The Inkomati catchment was the ﬁrst in South Africa to have a proposal sent to the DWAF Minister. The process of putting the proposal together was initiated by a group of commercial farmers way before the promulgation of the NWA. They had realized that the NWA would severely limit their autonomy and decided that forming a CMA offered the possibility to retain relative independence from state interference in local water management. However DWAF soon took over the process both in order to avoid the capture of the CMA by a white minority and also in an effort to use the Inkomati as a pilot case for implementation of its CMA policy. Thus the process of establishing the CMA in Inkomati basin was often ahead of national legislation and planning. In the early stages, stakeholder forums were established and representatives were invited to the discussions. Numerically, there was a larger representation of stakeholders from black communities. Forum discussions took about three years. Some attendants of these forum discussions were appointed to become members of steering committees that would lead the process of drafting a proposal under the guidance of a consultant hired by DWAF. Many of the seats in steering committees were logically, but problematically assigned to Irrigation Board members. Problematically because the structure of the steering committees was not inﬂuenced by the presence of large numbers of local black community participants. Even though DWAF made serious efforts to include the stakes of small-scale farmers in the forum discussions, a large majority of them were not aware of what the CMA entailed and how they would beneﬁt from it (Waalewijn 2002). This was partly due to cultural and communication problems. The mode of communication used by DWAF ofﬁcials when dealing with water management issues was that

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which applied to the sensibilities of commercial farmers rather than small-scale farmers. Consequently, DWAF could not achieve its good intentions of securing the stakes of small-scale farmers. To most small-scale producers and representatives of black communities, DWAF policies were not clear regarding the eradication of past imbalances in water resource management. As far as they were concerned, the role of DWAF as a facilitator was not clear enough to guarantee fair terms of cooperation. This problem, combined with poor representative structures and the hegemonic position of (some of) the commercial farmers, who desired co-optation over cooperation, resulted in generating a proposal, which missed out concerns of small-scale agricultural producers. The initial proposal for the establishment of the Inkomati CMA was ﬁnally rejected by DWAF head Ofﬁce because of its poor public participation process. DWAF participated as a stakeholder in the process of generating a proposal for the formation of CMA. The majority of water management staff in the area was employees of DWAF and in accordance with the NWA, they were to be assimilated into the CMA. Besides being a crucial stakeholder, DWAF also facilitated the process by coordinating meetings and appointing consultants to generate the proposal. Both the commercial and small-scale farmers were apprehensive of this multiple role of DWAF, that of overseer of water resources, facilitator of institutional formation, as well as stakeholder. The apprehension was confounded by the distrust that small-scale farmers held that stem from the suspicions that state organs carried an institutional legacy of the past into present practices. Commercial farmers, coming from a background in which they were dearly nurtured by the apartheid government, shared a similar distrust in the present government organs. Negotiations in the process of CMA formation were largely focused on organizational issues such as the number of staff to be engaged and the size of the ofﬁces. This was in spite of there being so many unresolved issues that affected a large number of participants such as land claims made on most of the white farms, unresolved compulsory water licensing procedures, controversial redistribution of water in this water-stressed catchment, obfuscated environmental reserve, the relationship of the CMA with other (trans) national bodies, etc. In the Inkomati, the CMA had little legitimacy among the black community. With little or no access to water, black communities did not see advantages of participating in the CMA steering committee. Their representatives even contemplated to completely withdraw from the process, having not seen any tangible beneﬁts coming out of it. However the process was fully acceptable to white farmers and DWAF since on their part, they understood that the committee was only a negotiating body and not a regulative or implementing body designed to yield immediate tangible beneﬁts. When the black community threatened to withdraw from the process, DWAF started considering offering tangible beneﬁts such as allocating more water to emerging farmers, a solution which was to be largely temporal and could not achieve the anticipated equity for all citizens in the catchment. Achieving equity entailed serious re-allocation of water rights and land redistribution, a complicated process that included involvement of many other actors as well as evoking the land rights Act.

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During the process of formation of the CMA, the tourist sector did not show interest in being involved in water management, purporting that their activities did not directly impact on river ﬂow. Farmers however argued that a healthy river and ecology was in the interest of the tourism industry too. Hence the tourism sector needed to be represented in the CMA, more importantly, to be listed as a ﬁnancial contributor. These experiences indicate how membership of an MSP can be contested (as white commercial farmers did), be necessary for reasons of legitimacy (as in the case of small-scale black farmers) or be imposed on a stakeholder out of ﬁnancial motivations (as was required from the tourism sector). Challenges of Unity in Diversity To further demonstrate how notoriously difﬁcult stakeholder participation can become in circumstances where participants have divergent livelihood goals, let us explore the transformation of an Irrigation Board to a Water User Association in the Lower Blyde River. Located in the Northern Province of South Africa, the Blyde River catchment covers an area of approximately 200 km2. The Blyde River is unique in the region because of its continuous ﬂow of good-quality water. Irrigation of white-owned commercial farms and domestic water use constitute the two main competing water uses in the Blyde river catchment. The irrigation area is located in the extreme north of the catchment. It covers an area of approximately 42,366 ha. Its importance is demonstrated by the fact that in 1997, its annual monetary value of crops exceeded 50 million Rands (EIS 1997). Piped domestic water is mainly supplied to residents of relatively wealthy white communities and a few pockets of afﬂuent blacks. Ninety percent of the population of the catchment lives adjacent to these areas in densely populated compounds. They occupy arid, dry marginal lands where little agriculture can be practiced. There is poor socio-economic infrastructure and an anticipated high population growth rate considering that 50% of the population is below 15. Approximately 10,000 people from these communities work as farm labourers on commercial irrigation farms. Unemployment rates still remain at about 80% of the population. Socio-economically, borders between the former homelands and white areas still exist (USAID 2002). Poor domestic water infrastructure is considered the most important problem among the impoverished black communities. These communities depend on groundwater for their domestic water supply. This groundwater is often saline and polluted. Water is pumped from boreholes to reservoirs from where it then runs to public village taps. Residents have to collect water from their nearest tap using containers pushed on wheelbarrows. DWAF is still technically responsible for the boreholes, even though it seems logical and more cost effective to delegate this function to the local authorities. This water supply system is fraught with numerous technical problems. The water supply systems are plagued with illegal water connections, which disturb proper water-ﬂow to public taps. When water supply from boreholes fails, communities fall back on potentially highly polluted water collected directly from the river.

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In addition to agricultural and domestic water users mentioned above, other stakeholders in the wider area include the Phalaborwa phosphate mines that lie further downstream, the booming sectors of (eco)tourism, private game farms, nature conservatories (Kruger National Park, Biosphere Kruger to Canyon) and the Maruleng local district municipality which is responsible for water and sanitation services. Each one of these groups of stakeholders uses its own unique policies to manage its own interests, creating an extremely diverse and dynamically complex water management arena. In January 2002, a WUA, a Multi-Stakeholder Platform in this regard was established in the Blyde River Catchment. For a long time, white commercial farmers worked in cooperation under their own Irrigation Board formed as far back as 1952. The newly constituted WUA included three categories of members; category A composed of affected parties such as industry and tourism, category B were irrigation water users, mainly white commercial farmers and category C composed of other water users such as municipalities and nature conservationists. A Management Committee (MC) of 16 members runs the affairs of the WUA and elects the Chairman and Deputy Chairman who serve for a period of 12 months. Each category nominates its own representatives to the MC. The constitution of the WUA provides that 12 of the 16 members on the MC represent the white commercial farmers, 2 come from category A and 2 others from category C. The WUA is self-ﬁnanced by its members through levies for water use, loans and cost recovery systems. Only white commercial farmers are currently ﬁnancing the WUA, owing to their commercial activities. There was no representation from emerging farmers because the irrigation scheme had not yet been inaugurated. Representatives from category C are also constantly absent from meetings. A municipal respondent argued that it was understandable for an understaffed institution such as the municipality to stay away from WUA meetings in which the main agenda was internal commercial farmer issues and the inﬂuence in the decision making process on their part was minimal. This has left the WUA with the old Irrigation Board membership. Thus it is difﬁcult to differentiate the WUA from the old Irrigation Board. In 1997 the (former) Irrigation Board ofﬁcially proposed to build a water pipeline as replacement for the old canal system. The new South African government policy had suspended all subsidies towards so-called ‘formerly advantaged’ irrigation schemes. Therefore the pipeline project was to be privately ﬁnanced by commercial farmers with assistance from a commercial Bank. The plan consisted of connecting a pipeline between the Blyde Dam and the main irrigation network. The total length of the main network pipeline would cover approximately 105 km, with pipe diameters varying from 1300 mm to 100 mm with approximately 130 irrigation off-takes (EIS 1997). DWAF’s interest in the pipeline was to save water, to empower formerly disadvantaged people and the possibility of tapping domestic water from the same pipeline. It was estimated that using the pipeline to supply irrigation water would save an extra 10% of water. The saved water could then be channeled to a newly established 800 hectares to be occupied by emerging black farmers. Based on this

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interest, DWAF provided seed money for the pipeline prompting the bank to provide the required loan. Complicated implementation difﬁculties delayed the completion of the project even stalling the work at some stage. The estimated costs to farmers reached R4000 per hectare from an initial estimated cost of R1500. It was clear that the burden of loan repayment would rest upon ﬁnancially endowed white commercial farmers. Consequently, a number of commercial farmers withdrew their interest in the project owing to its exorbitant cost. These difﬁculties pointed to a collapse of the project and DWAF, motivated by its speciﬁc interest to attract formerly disadvantaged people into active participation by empowering them decided to subsidize the project. It was however clear that the major beneﬁciaries would be commercial farmers whose position to use the facility was already well entrenched. The supply of domestic water from the pipeline had created high expectations and excitement among black communities. However, the modalities of how this could be achieved could not be resolved. It was not even clear who was supposed to effect this initiative. The municipality, to which most stakeholders looked up to, had no human or ﬁnancial capacity to undertake such a task. Consequently, the black population remains further alienated and frustrated, seeing the pipeline come into operation and yet still being left with their water predicament unresolved. Commentary Lessons emerging from different regions in South Africa all conﬁrm the difﬁculty of establishing Multi-Stakeholder Platforms that begin to address issues affecting all stakeholders. It is apparent that in countries grappling with issues of poverty and where the largest population is largely dependent on agriculture, the ambition for a Multi-Stakeholder Platform lies beyond mere dialogue and negotiation over water resources. Sufﬁcient mandate for MSPs that allows participants to voice their concerns as well as take action, i.e. produce beneﬁcial results, is desirable. DWAF’s response for the Inkomati basin to consider allocating more water to emerging farmers as a way of maintaining their interest in the local MSP initiative is an indication that expert systems are beginning to learn the importance of setting the purpose of an MSP as both a deliberative democratic initiative as well as a platforms that produces tangible beneﬁts to participants. Local people in the Kat river catchment attached legitimacy to the Forum particularly because it implemented a Land-care programme that addressed real issues and provided tangible beneﬁts. The South African case studies also reveal that MSPs can present a speciﬁc advantage of social integration. Even if this exploration presents images of struggle, capturing of institutions and co-optation, it is important to stress that a picture where black versus white stakeholders and small-scale versus large-scale producers, with groups bitterly opposed against each other, would be a misrepresentation of the facts. The real situation in the Inkomati is such that people are slowly getting used to working together. Irrigation Board members acknowledged that working relations had gradually improved over the 5–6 years of co-governance. Some mutual commercial initiatives have developed from a realization of interdependence

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of stakeholders. Poncelet (2001) has shown in his study of multi-stakeholder partnerships, that collaborative processes constitute fertile ground for participating actors to experience change in their subjective understandings of and relationships to each other. The research strategy in Eastern Cape Province included joint workshops with catchment tours between the Mthatha and the Kat CMF. The social learning that resulted from this initiative created friendships between stakeholders from the two catchments with a better-informed interpretation of problems among participants. Thus MSPs provide a new arena that offers opportunities not only for negotiations and conﬂict resolution but also opportunities for new alliances. The South African experience also shows that MSPs present participants with communication and interpersonal skills challenges. In Inkomati, DWAF staff readily reckoned and sympathized with commercial farmers’ position because they spoke the same language and had been to similar schools. DWAF staff however related poorly to black emerging farmers since this group spoke no English and had little education. This behaviour demonstrates the limited capacity of state agencies to become ﬂexible and innovative enough to stimulate genuine participation. In Mthatha catchment, local community representatives felt left out in the process because the accepted language of communication was English. It is such challenges that constitute some of the limitations of stakeholders and impinge on the functioning of MSPs. At policy level, DWAF seems determined to deal with these limitations. This is evident from the number of workshops on participation and personal transformations being held for government staff and the production of guidelines on participation (e.g. DWAF 2001). As Multi-Stakeholder Platforms continue to emerge in different styles in the various catchments in South Africa, policymakers and water resource management experts in South Africa admit that it will take a while before the concept and practice of participatory basin management is properly resolved and understood (Republic of South Africa, 2000; see also Raven, Warner and Leeuwis 2006). References DFID (2003), Handbook for the Assessment of Catchment Water Demand and Use, London. DWAF (Department of Water Forestry) (1998), Integrated Water Management, Draft paper No. 06, Pretoria. DWAF (Department of Water Forestry) (2002), National Water Act News, April 2002 Edition, Pretoria. DWAF (Department of Water Forestry) (1998), Generic Public Participation Guidelines, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Pretoria. Faysse, N. (2003), Possible outcomes of smallholders’ participation in water users associations in South Africa, IWMI Pretoria. Gakpo, E. F. Y., Du Plessis, L. A. and Viljoen, M. F. (2001), ‘Towards Institutional Arrangements to Ensure Optimal Allocatrion and Security of South Africa’s Water Resources’, Agrkon, 40 (2), pp. 87–103. Karar, E. (2003), Governance in water resources management: progress in South

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Africa. Presentation at the 3rd World Water Forum, Shiga, Japan, 20 March 2003. Manzungu, E. (2001), ‘The emergence of Multistakeholder Platforms in Integrated Water Resource Development and Management in the Southern African Region’, Paper presented at the Multi-stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Resource Managemnet Workshop held at Wageningen International Conference Centre from 2nd–5th October 2001. Irrigation and Water Engineering Group. Wageningen University. Mohammad, M., Mohapi, N., Roger, S. (2003), ‘Challenges for the Effective and Sustainable Participation of Previously Disadvantaged Individuals in Water Resource Management’, Paper presented at the 2nd International Symposium on Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM): Towards Sustainable Water Utilization in the 21st Century, ICWRS/IAHS, Stellenbosch, Western Cape, South Africa, 22–24 January 2003. Motteux, N. and McMaster, A. (2002), Kat River Valley Water User Association: particulars of public consultation process, Catchment Research Group, Rhodes University. Poncelet E. (2001), ‘Personal Transformation in Multi-stakeholder Environmental Partnerships’, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Raven, R., Warner, J. and Leeuwis, C. (2006), ‘Beyond the new South African Water Act: integrating water and society in the Lower Blyde’, in de Visser, J. and Mbazira, C. (eds), Water Delivery in South Africa and the Netherlands: public or private?, Cahier series, Inst. of Constitutional and Administrative Law, Utrecht University. Turton, A., Nicol, A. and Allan, T. (2003), ‘Policy Options in water-stressed states: Emerging lessons from the Middle East and Southern Africa’, African Water Issues Research Unit, Pretoria and Overseas Development Institute, London. USAID (2000), ‘Socio-economic survey of the communal areas west of Kruger National Park’, Final report, Ebi Consulting. Waalewijn, P. (2002), ‘Squeezing the Cow’, Perceptions and Strategies of Smallholders, Concerning River Basin management in the Lower Komati River, South Africa. Thesis submitted in Partial fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Sciences in Tropical Land Use, Wageningen University. Wester, P., Merrey, D. J., de Lange, M. (2003), ‘Boundaries of Consent: Stakeholder Representation in River Basin Management in Mexico and South Africa’, World Development, 31 (5), pp. 797.

Chapter 13

Mekong Region Water-Related MSPs – Unfulﬁlled Potential John Dore

Introduction Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) are a technology for democratic governance which can assist society to reﬂect on the wisdom of past actions, more comprehensively explore and assess future options, and more openly negotiate workable strategies and agreements. The central ingredient is informed debate which gives ample opportunity for learning and possible reshaping of opinion. This may lead to the creation or strengthening of bridges of understanding between actors representing wide-ranging interests, and the satisfactory resolution of at least some differences. The MSP may also bring into sharper focus substantive differences of approach and priorities that may not be easily reconcilable. Either way, by articulating these differences in the public sphere, an MSP can contribute to a sounder basis for charting a forward path. The vision for MSPs put forward in this chapter is for important transboundary water-related governance, affecting Mekong Region livelihoods and ecosystems, to be more informed and inﬂuenced by public deliberation. In this vision MSPs would be accepted as a legitimate element of governance, providing a mechanism for many different stakeholders in the State-society complex to explain, defend and potentially adjust their perspective. This is not a utopian vision constructed in ignorance of the daunting Mekong Region political context where many substantive decisions are made without an airing in the public sphere. The power relationships embedded in this context, within and between countries, undoubtedly influence the extent that meaningful MSP participation and negotiation is possible. But, it is noted that there are some inspirational examples of MSPs at the local and national scales. The contention is that regional water-related MSPs could also display desirable characteristics, more conducive to socially just and ecologically sustainable development. This chapter unfolds in the following way. First, the Mekong Region is introduced. Second, the relationship between governance and MSPs is made clear. Third, the existing diversity of regional water forums in the Mekong Region is shown, but no claim is made that all ‘earn the label’ of MSP. Some of the most prominent forums are discussed. Some issues are of region-wide signiﬁcance, still others: transboundary, transborder, crossborder, or interbasin. This chapter

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uses the term ‘regional’ to encompass any issue involving at least one of these characteristics. Fourth, some key challenges for MSPs are identiﬁed, evident from current practice and debate. Finally, I point to several major infrastructureheavy, mega-projects with transboundary dimensions. These include current plans for large-scale hydropower development in China’s Yunnan Province, a hydropower-reliant energy grid being promoted via the Association of South East Asian Nations and the Asian Development Bank, a multi-faceted water grid being explored by the Government of Thailand, and a ‘regional water stategy’ being developed by The World Bank. The governance of each would be enhanced by a high-quality, transboundary MSP. The core argument is that MSPs have unfulﬁlled potential in the Mekong Region, within but also well beyond the realms of water-related governance. The Mekong Region The Mekong Region comprises the ﬁve countries of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam – plus China’s Yunnan province (see Table 13.1 and Figure 13.1). The territorial area is 2.3 million km2, which is home to a rapidly growing population of about 255 million people. Since the early 1990s the region is enjoying an unprecedented period of relative peace between the countries. This is remarkable, given the tumultuous recent history of the region, and becomes particularly relevant to regional governance and the prospects for regional MSPs. The present dynamic of the Mekong Region is heavily inﬂuenced by its shared and overlapping regional history. As with elsewhere in the world, the borders of the modern nation States do not neatly subdivide cultural afﬁliations. The numerous indigenous cultures of the region were heavily inﬂuenced by a fusion of Indian and Chinese (Han) culture beginning two thousand years ago. The Mon, the Karen, the Chin, the Burmese, the Kachin, the Khmer, the Tai, the Viets, etc. had their languages, religions and other customs heavily shaped, whilst of course retaining their own distinctive elements. Signiﬁcant parts of the region were isolated for much of the latter half of the twentieth century as a result of a series of wars and internal turmoil. In the last 70 years the Mekong Region has been a battleﬁeld for the Second World War, postSecond World War independence struggles against colonial powers, ideological struggles between the communists of Vietnam-Cambodia-Lao PDR (and their allies, including at different times the former Soviet Union and China) versus other parts of Mekong societies and the USA (who had another wide range of ‘allies’). New nation States were created in Myanmar in 1948, China in 1949, Vietnam and Lao PDR in 1975, and (effectively) Cambodia in 1993. In the last 25 years there have been various invasions and skirmishes between Cambodia and Vietnam, China and Vietnam, Thailand and Lao PDR, and Thailand and Myanmar. These and the earlier conﬂicts have left many scars and continue to inﬂuence regional perceptions. For example: Thais are constantly reminded of their wars with the Burmese, people from Lao PDR remember various interfering

Mekong Region Water-Related MSPs

Figure 13.1 Mekong Region Source: United Nations map number 4112, Revised January 2004.

207

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Table 13.1

Mekong Region country overview Chinaa

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Thailand

Vietnam

(x 1,000km2) 181

9,561

237

677

513

330

Population (millions)

13.4

1,285.0

5.4

48.4

63.6

79.2

($ billion)

3.4

1,159.0

1.8

4.7b

114.7

32.7

GDP per head ($ in PPP)c

1,790

3,950

1,540

1,500b

5,230

2,070

Median age

17.5

30.0

18.5

23.4

27.5

23.1

Cambodia Area

GDP

a

b c

The data concern China as a whole (minus Hong Kong and Macau). Yunnan has a population of approx. 43 million people (2000 census) of which more than one third are ethnic minorities. It is the 8th largest province in China, covering an area of 394,100 km2. It shares 4,060 km of border with Myanmar, Lao PDR and Vietnam. Whilst the Yunnan economy is growing fast, the province remains relatively poor compared to China’s eastern and coastal regions. In 1997 36% of the population was classiﬁed by China’s government as still living in poverty (annual income less than USD 77). An estimate as ofﬁcial Myanmar economic data are unavailable or unreliable. PPP refers to purchasing power parity, which adjusts for cost of living differences.

Source: The Economist (2004). Data refer to the year ending 31 December 2001.

forces which made for a long hard revolutionary road, Cambodians remember the Vietnamese territory encroachments and military invasions (or liberation from the Khmer Rouge), and the Vietnamese remember Thailand providing air bases for enemy bombers during their struggle with the USA. Sometimes these past enmities are unnecessarily stirred by elites appealing to nationalism for various political purposes. Current social and economic conditions, ethnicity, intra-regional and international negotiating powers all vary enormously. Aggregated national statistics do not adequately reﬂect the cultural and political diversity of the region, nor the gender and environmental complexity, but they do highlight some obvious similarities and differences (see Table 13.1). The Mekong Region is taken to encompass the territory, ecosystems, people, economies and politics of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and China’s Yunnan Province. In the Mekong Region, disparate regionalisms have emerged from desires related to peace, poverty reduction, disease control, infrastructure installation, drugs, wealth-seeking, and preference for ecoystem approaches, all of which

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209

may favour a regional logic which transcends State borders. These are reﬂected in various political solidarities between actors in the State-society complex – whether governments, bureaucrats, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector, militaries, ethnic minorities, or lobby groups.1 These are manifested in an array of regionalisations, identiﬁable via many regional organisations, initiatives, networks and coalitions. Actors in old and new regionalisations are learning how to co-exist, compete or combat with each other.2 Water Concerns One of the key social challenges for the region is to negotiate the reasonable and equitable utilisation of water.3 The major river basins of the region – from west to east – are the Irrawaddy, Salween, Chao Phraya, Mekong and Red (see Table 13.2).4 Conﬂicts exist and others are looming,5 over many, often-connected issues, such as: growth in water and energy demand, interference with natural ﬂows via dams, timing of dam releases for energy or irrigated production, water diversions, altered sediment and nutrient loads, and reshaping rivers to rivers to make navigation easier and safer.

1 The concept of the State-society complex resonates well in the Mekong Region. It transcends the more simplistic notion in which actors have often been classiﬁed as either State, business, or civil society. Such a classiﬁcation ignores many other key groups, such as the military and donors/funders, implies homogeneity within groups, and ignores multiple roles. For example, business or military actors may dominate government. 2 The conceptual difference between regionalisms and regionalisations is elaborated by Schulz et al. 2001. The point has been made that ‘the identiﬁcation of new patterns of regionalisation (co-existing with older forms) is more relevant than attempting to identify a new era of regionalisation’ (Hettne 1999, 8). The later section distinguishing between Tracks 1–4 is an attempt to do just that. 3 There are many other challenges which transcend Mekong Region borders, such as: pressures on forests and biodiversity, ethnic minority marginalisation, labor migration, human trafﬁcking, HIV-AIDS, narcotics, dealing with the pressure to embrace agriculture biotechnology including genetically modiﬁed crops, and other impacts of international economic integration (see Mingsarn Kaosa-ard and Dore 2003). 4 The Salween, Mekong and – to a lesser extent – the Irrawaddy have their ﬂow inﬂuenced by the annual Himalayan/Tibetan snow melt, in addition to the monsoon rains. The Chao Phraya and Red are shorter rivers which originate below the snowline, hence their ﬂow is dependent on the monsoonal climate. Across the region, there are also countless sub-basins, natural lakes, aquifers, and human-built dams and reservoirs. Plus there are many coastal river basins, some of which are quite large. Collectively, they comprise the visible and accessible freshwater ‘life source’ or ‘resource’. 5 I agree with the view that non-violent ‘conﬂict is not necessarily bad, abnormal or dysfunctional’, but rather an inherent element of human interaction (Moore 1986) due to the common incompatibility of goals, interests, perceptions or values. However, many Mekong actors prefer to speak of disputes, or differences, as the English word conﬂict is tainted by bad memories of the particularly troubled, not too distant past.

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Table 13.2

Major river basins of the Mekong Region

River basin Unit

Irrawaddy

Salween

Mekong

Countries in basin

China, Myanmar

China, Myanmar, Thailand

Cambodia, Thailand China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam

China, Vietnam

413,710

271,914

805,604

178,785

170,888

Ave. water Million yield m3/ y

410,000

151,000

475,000

29,800

177,000

Average population density

people / km2

79

22

71

119

191

Water supply

m3 / cap / year

18,614

23,796

8,934

1,237

3,083

6

1

9

3

3

Basin area

km2

Large cities >100,000 in the basin people

Chao Phraya

Red

Source: Water Resources e-Atlas (WRI, UNEP, IWMI, IUCN), and Mekong Region Environment Atlas (ADB and UNEP 2004)

Governance and MSPs Although the English word ‘governance’ has been in existence since at least the 14th century, its use was limited and for a lengthy time rather unfashionable. In the latter part of the 20th century the word had been widely resurrected ‘as something of a catch-all’ (Mehta et al. 1999, 18) helping explain a more complex world, where there is: … a growing role of active and skillful publics and their protests ... [and] greater salience of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), corporations, professional societies … [and] many other new actors now crowding the global stage (Rosenau 2004, 11).

MSPs are just one part of governance where actors with either a right, risk or general interest (stakeholders) are identiﬁed, and usually through representatives, invited and assisted to interact in a deliberative forum, aiming for all participants to learn, understand alternative perspectives, and possibly negotiate workable strategies and agreements (see Figure 13.2). An MSP may involve regular meetings between core participants, conferences/discussions open to the wider public, locally hosted ﬁeld visits, electronic exchanges, government brieﬁngs, ﬁlms, plays, historical texts, testimony, or commissioned research. MSPs (the term Dialogues is also commonly used; this is synonymous with the platform conception) have been deﬁned as:

Mekong Region Water-Related MSPs

211

Figure 13.2 Key concepts of MSPs …a contrived situation in which a set of more less interdependent stakeholders in some resource are identiﬁed, and, usually through representatives, invited to meet and interact in a forum for conﬂict resolution, negotiation, social learning and collective decision making towards concerted action’ (Röling 2002, 39).

Table 13.3

Desirable MSP characteristics

Desirable context Well-intentioned

Catalysed by a genuine need or desire to do something constructive about a complex situation or problem.

Clear purpose, and scope

Clear articulation of: MSP purpose; political and practical boundaries to enquiry; the derivation, extent and duration of mandate; and justiﬁcation as to how the MSP might improve existing governance.

Sufﬁcient political support

Sufﬁcient political space and momentum to permit or encourage establishment and support.

Sufﬁcient time

Sufﬁcient time for the MSP to make its contribution/s.

Sufﬁcient resources

Adequate resources to pursue and achieve goals, including human, ﬁnancial, informational, and intellectual.

Appropriate levels and scales

Cognisant that analysis and action may best occur at various levels and scales. The appropriate level for one MSP may be predominantly within government, for another at the local community. The appropriate scale of analysis may be local, provincial, watershed, national, basin, regional; however, cross-scale issues may also be important.

Desirable process Inclusive

Enables ‘representation’ of a wide range of ‘stakeholders’ and their disparate interests via a ﬂexible process which may have many different facets

Facilitated

Exempliﬁes, to the extent possible, a fair and forward moving process, guided by an independent facilitator committed to transparency

Ethical

Respectful of diverse ‘ethics’ – ways of reasoning, world views and priorities of actors. However, also committed to privileging ‘goods’, such as: respect and care for life, ecological integrity, social and economic justice; democracy, non-violence and peace.*

Both visionary and focused

Encourages expression of alternative views of preferred, long-term visions for people and places, whilst also identifying and focusing on key issues.

Holistic

Takes an integrated or holistic view of issues taking account of: social, cultural, economic and ecological issues, their actions and interdependencies.

Informed

Utilises and shares the best available information, building the knowledge base. Whilst not essential to be integrated with them all, the MSP should become familiar with other relevant forums, plans, agendas etc..

Deliberative

Induces reﬂection upon preferences, without coercion, by representatives of competing points of view.

Communicative

Effectively communicates high-quality, honest information to MSP participants, and the wider public sphere, State or transnational authorities.

Desirable outcomes Options assessed

Assesses nuances of positive and negative aspects of alternative options.

Rights and risks established

Acknowledgement and scrutiny of the multiple rights and risks (borne voluntarily or involuntarily) of stakeholders.

More understanding

More learning, understanding and appreciation by all of the positions of other stakeholders.

Workable agreements

Depending on the mandate, negotiation of workable strategies and agreements for proposing to decision makers.

Discursive legitimacy

MSP earns legitimacy by demonstrating these desirable characteristics!

Constructive inﬂuence

Has a constructive inﬂuence on the situation, enhancing the overall governance.

* These are the pillars of the Earth Charter (ECC 2000) which resonate well with the author. However, there are many other examples of ethical/moral frameworks to which actors may aspire, whether determined by religon (eg. Buddhist teachings), secular norms (eg. UN Declaration of Human Rights), ecocentricity (eg. Ecosystems Approach), or livelihoods (e.g. Sustainable Livelihoods Approach). Sources: Adapted from Dore and Woodhill (1999:43 ES), Dovers and Dore (1999: 128), with additional ideas from Dryzek (2000, 2001).

Mekong Region Water-Related MSPs

213

But, a problem with Röling’s deﬁnition is the inclusion of decision making in the remit. Many MSPs are not vested with, nor do they claim, decision-making authority. To claim such authority may invite resistance and be counter-productive. Hemmati is aware of the danger of including decision-making. She has described MSPs as a ‘political phenomenon’ which: ‘… aim to bring together all major stakeholders in a new form of communication, decision ﬁnding (and possibly decision making) on a particular issue’ (2002, 63). Supporters of MSPs believe: … there is integral value in messier, participatory arenas which value negotiating and social learning within a more open democratic process which encourages exploration and bounded conﬂict (Dore et al. 2003, 176).

An important characteristic of MSPs is that they be a site of ‘authentic deliberation,6 meaning debate between people with different world views and prioities which ‘induces reﬂection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion’ (Dryzek 2000, 2). But, there is a range of other desirable characteristics for each of context, process and outcomes which are introduced in Figure 13.2 and elaborated in Table 13.3. Water Governance Forums in the Mekong Region In all the waters of the Mekong Region, local communities, governments, civil society organisations (local, national, regional and international), business interests, donors and international agencies have interests which they wish represented in governance. Few would claim that historical or current regional water governance is adequate, which partly explains the interest of some actors – but not all – to make ‘genuine’ MSPs part of regional governance orthodoxy. There is a hope that using MSPs may contribute to greater transparency, and more informed, and equitable decisions. For now, there are many regional water-related governance forums, but few MSPs. How might they be better understood? While some of them are ‘old’ style, State-centric and grounded in State interventions, others are qualitatively different and ‘new’ with lead roles being taken by non-State actors. The new wave of younger regionalisations is coexisting with older types. The terminology of tracks 1–4 is one 6 To the deliberative democrat, John Dryzek, deliberation is ‘multifaceted interchange or contestation across discourses within the public sphere’ (2001, 652) where discourses are seen as ‘shared sets of assumptions and capabilities embedded in language that enables its adherents to assemble bits of sensory information that come their way into coherent wholes’ (1999, 34). MSPs provide a mechanism for such ‘contestation across discourses’. In so doing, they are in accord with the social learning perspective, the ‘building blocks’ of which are: the constructivist paradigm, an orientation towards reﬂection and action, and commitment to a holistic approach (Maarleveld and Dangbegnon 2002, 70–75). Just as MSPs are diverse in their purpose and emphasis, so is the ‘broad church’ (Hay 2002:208) of constructivism which ‘both seeks and serves to restore politics and agency to a world often constituted in such a way as to render it ﬁxed and unyielding’ (2002, 201). So it can be seen that deliberative democrats, the social learning school, and constructivists have much in common. Each approach emphasises the role of ideas as signiﬁcant in reshaping the world.

214

Table 13.4

Summary

In eyes of States Dominant logic

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Goverance forums – Tracks 1–4 Track 1 Formal and informal processes of governments and associated bureaucracy, including inter- and intra- State forums. In the eyes of States these are ‘ofﬁcial’ and most legitimate. Ofﬁcial For the most part, still implicitly accepting the dominance of rational, self-interested behaviour, particularly in international affairs.

Track 2 Governance processes involving State, UN family, donor/lender, civil society, interactive forums but led by an actor closely aligned with States ensuring States remain privileged actors. Semi-ofﬁcial

Track 3 Research, dialogue and advocacy efforts led by civil society, less impeded by or subordinate to State actors.

Track 4 Civil society organisations supporting (where possible) locally-led governance processes.

Unofﬁcial

Unofﬁcial

Trying to enhance the effectiveness of States by widening the ﬁeld of ideas and inﬂuences.

Activist, optimistic about the potential of MSPs to ﬁnd and assist negotiate better ways forward for society.

Activist, localist; low expectations of State capacity and intent; more explicit concerns about power imbalances, domination and cooption.

Source: Adapted from Dore (2003: 412)

way of differentiating the forums. Track 1 depicts the ‘old’ type of forum. But the spectrum in the Mekong Region has widened to now include more examples akin to tracks 2, 3 and 4. Each of the Tacks 1–4 can be discerned at the local/national scale, and also the regional scale. Each can adopt an MSP approach to address any particularly complex problem. However, at the regional scale in the Mekong Region, Track 1 has shown little inclination to use an MSP approach, mostly remaining hostage to the ‘traditional’ political norms manifested in international diplomacy and national conventions where State actors see themselves as the only legitimate representatives of a country’s citizens – in water issues, self-interested State approaches dominate.

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215

Track 2 and track 3 are more likely to take an MSP approach to tackle regional issues. Track 4 users are more likely to see regional platforms as advocacy stages. As with track 1, in track 4 the multi-stakeholder and deliberative elements tend to be downgraded, with other political strategies and approaches being considered more effective (see Table 13.4). To illustrate the present situation, in the next few pages I will refer to a sample of the wide array of regional water governance forums in the Mekong Region.7 There is plenty of room for improvement, and no shortage of regional opportunities to experiment more with an MSP approach. Track 1 There are many Track 1 water-related governance forums in the Mekong Region (see Table 13.5). Within countries the State government and bureaucracies dominate water governance. There are also many bilateral negotiations between government representatives which are pure Track 1, vitally important, but not the focus of this chapter. The comments here are restricted to the most obvious transboundary example, that being the Mekong River Commission (MRC) which has a State government mandate in the Lower Mekong Basin (the territory of the Mekong River Basin, excluding Myanmar and China). The 1995 Mekong River Agreement (Governments of Cambodia-Lao PDRVietnam-Thailand 1995) created a formal inter-government forum committing signatories to cooperate in all ﬁelds of sustainable development, utilisation, management and conservation of the water and water-related resources of the Mekong River Basin, including but not limited to irrigation, hydropower, navigation, ﬂood control, ﬁsheries, timber ﬂoating, recreation and tourism. The 1995 Agreement put water utilisation negotiations and basin development planning on the agenda. Amongst others, a third agenda item which has emerged is the need for transboundary environment assessment in the Mekong Region. Various dialogues – relatively exclusive – are occurring around each of these tasks. None resemble ideal-type MSPs. Thus far, all have been primarily the domain of State agency ofﬁcials, international donor representatives, many international consultants, and just a few local consultants. If you believe that these actors will adequately represent the interests of all Lower Mekong country citizens, such exclusiveness may be untroubling. However, many local and international actors do not have such conﬁdence and are pressing the MRC secretariat to be more inclusive, meaning greater involvement of civil society, and to allow for more open to alternative knowledge and ideas. This is not so easy for the secretariat to do, as to a large extent their scope is set by their governing Council, 7 Whilst this chapter is focused on the regional scale, it is not meant to deny or overshadow the existence of an equally diverse plethora of water governance forums focused on the national and sub-national scales. Tracks 1, 2, 3 and 4 are also discernible at these scales. To acknowledge these, some promising national/sub-national MSP examples are included in the section discussing Track 3. These examples are provided partly to inspire transboundary efforts which could be similarly motivated and constructed.

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and most of the staff – from either riparian countries, or international recruits – are understandably cautious about moving out of synch with national processes. There is insufﬁcient political support from the member States for the MRC to be proactive in controversial areas. Member States continue to act unilaterally whenever possible, and either bilaterally (stronger members – Thailand and Vietnam) or multilaterally (weaker members – Lao PDR and Cambodia) as a last resort. Nevertheless, some complex interdependencies and donor support keep the MRC cooperation alive. The fact that China and Myanmar are not members of the MRC further cripples the organisation, particularly at a time when China is building a substantial cascade of dams on the upstream portion (Dore and Yu Xiaogang 2004). A united front from MRC member countries towards effective dialogue with China has also been scuttled, at least in part by effective bilateral diplomacy by the Chinese circumventing and undermining the MRC forum. China has demonstrated considerable power and inﬂuence over downstream countries to stop protests emanating from MRC. Indicative of the marginalisation of the MRC within some of its own member States, the commission was also excluded from playing any role in the track 1 forum which negotiated the signing of a commercial navigation agreement for the Mekong River, between the four upstream riparian countries (Governments of China-Lao PDR-Myanmar-Thailand 2001). The signatories, from transport and communication ministries, have since presided over the installation of Chinese-funded extensive new navigation aids, and blasting of rocky navigation impediments. Improving the navigability of the river, and the alteration to the natural ﬂows – depending on the operations of the hydropower dams – will come at a cost to the integrity of the ecosystem, with as yet unquantiﬁed livelihood costs for river-dependent communities. It would be reasonable to expect some level of protest, or at least enquiry, from downstream government elites via their river basin commission. However, Cambodia has pragmatically accepted Chinese offers for railway support in exchange for muting its disquiet. Similarly, the Thailand government and associated bureaucracy has also refrained from supporting the MRC to become more proactively involved, accepting boat-building and river transport contracts from the Chinese, whilst at the same time continuing with plans for more tributary interventions of their own. Lao PDR is caught in the middle of the navigation project between China and Thailand, unempowered and with few obvious beneﬁts to the country. The MRC will not proactively lead any MSP process relating to Thailand’s resurgent plans for water resources development, which have Mekong (and other) basin implications. Thailand’s reluctance to publicly share its national water resources development agenda with neighbours caused a crisis in the Mekong River cooperation in the early 1990s (Bui Kim Chi 1997, 302–316). More than ten years later the MRC secretariat is still unable or unwilling to provide any comment on the the basin-wide, cross-basin and cross-border implications of various Thailand development possibilities. Of course, inﬂuential actors in Lao PDR, Vietnam – and to a lesser extent Cambodia – have plans of their own which are already substantively changing the river basin. The MRC has also struggled to sustain a proactive role in a recent high proﬁle conﬂict between Cambodians and Vietnamese caused by loss of life and other

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problems stemming from the operation of the Yali Falls dam, situated on a stretch of the Se San River in Vietnam’s territory. In theory, MRC would be able to play a key role in fostering deliberative processes which could lead to more informed decision making. In practice, due to a lack of political support, it has not yet been possible for the MRC secretariat to countenance leading MSPs which are fully informed and holistically assess all options. Track 2 Relevant to the Mekong Region are the Track 2 forums led or inspired by groups such as the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Paciﬁc (ESCAP), that have convened meetings exchanging information on issues such as water allocation policies and practices in Asia-Paciﬁc, including all Mekong countries (ESCAP 2000). Between 2000 and 2005 ESCAP has continued leading national ‘strategic water planning’ processes in partnership with others, such as Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Slightly less formal have been the track 2 regional forums held under the auspices of the Global Water Partnership, namely the Southeast Asia Regional Dialogue on Water Governance in 2002, and the ensuing South East Asia Water Forum in 2003. Both the ESCAP and GWP forums mostly involve government ofﬁcials, UN agencies, natural sciences technical experts and international NGOs. Thus far there has been virtually no participation by local civil society (see Table 13.5). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is also initiating track 2 water governance initiatives as the key component of its new ‘Asia-Paciﬁc’ (but Mekong Basin focused) Regional Environmental Governance program, attempting to play the role of honest broker facilitating between governments, communities and different interest groups, and/or capacity building others (such as the various parts of the Mekong River Commission) to do the same. UNDP have yet to prove they can catalyse and sustain Mekong Region MSPs, but they now have another chance. The most important of the Track 2 regional initiatives is the ‘Greater Mekong Subregion’ (GMS) economic cooperation initiative facilitated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This GMS programme has brought together the six countries to focus on the coordinated development of infrastructure (ADB 2001, 2002). Many ‘master plans’ have been completed which are unrealistic dreams, or visionary guides, depending upon your point of view. The GMS program was endorsed at the November 2002 summit meeting of the political leaders from each of the Mekong Region countries. The forward workplan at that time outlined ‘ﬂagship projects’ requiring more than $900 million in investment ﬁnancing and almost $30 million in technical assistance. The ﬂagships are intended as multi-disciplinary, large-scale interventions with high visibility and signiﬁcant economic impact on the GMS economies. There are 11 projects relating to: north-south, east-west and southern economic corridors (roads plus associated infrastructure); completion of a regional telecommunications ‘back bone’; regional power grid completion plus power trading arrangements; private sector ‘participation and competitiveness’ boosting; cross border trade and investments support; implementing a region-wide Strategic Environmental Framework (SEF)

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Table 13.5

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Recent regional water-related governance forums (Tracks 1–2)

Track 1 Mekong River Commission inter-government processes between Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam. Negotiations between transport ministries leading to signing of Navigation Agreement between China, Burma/Myanmar, Lao PDR and Thailand 2000, and subsequent river modiﬁcations. Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Leaders Summit 2002 which signed an agreement to establish an electricity grid between Mekong Region and some other ASEAN countries. ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation 1996+, thus far focused on railway, not water. Bilateral negotiations between governments, such as: □ Thailand with its neighbours over proposed water diversions and associated dam and tunnel constructions □ Vietnam and Cambodian governments formal meetings over Se San River dams downstream impacts 2000+

Track 2 ESCAP technical meetings about water allocation policies, GMS development cooperation 2001–2009 etc. Global Water Partnership regional ‘dialogues’, such as the Chiang Mai 1st South East Asia Water Forum 2003, and Bali 2nd South East Asia Water Forum 2005, building on earlier national dialogues. UNDP Asia-Paciﬁc regional environmental governance initiatives 2004+ inc. support to Mekong River Commission and crossborder local community ‘dialogues’. Asian Development Bank (ADB) processes, such as: □ the GMS program of economic cooperation activities 1992+ □ development of the Strategic Environment Framework (SEF) for the GMS 2001+ □ fostering establishment of Tonle Sap lake/basin management authority 2004+ □ review of ADB policy on decision-making about large scale water resources projects 2005+

(SEI et al. 2002); and supporting country efforts to control ﬂoods and ‘manage’ water resources; and tourism. The main participants in the GMS initiative are State government representatives, ADB bank ofﬁcials and consultants. A signiﬁcant role is also played by shareholder member governments that contribute ﬁnancially to the Bank, principally USA and Japan. The latter augments its inﬂuence via extra mechanisms such as the Japan Special Fund. A primary aim is to entice the private sector to become more involved either supplying funds (eg. money market) or implementing projects. In recent years civil society has taken an active role on the periphery of this Bank-led process eg. parallel forums coinciding with the annual meeting of the Bank’s Board of Governors etc. Civil society has faced the question of whether to become more involved with ADB or to maintain its critical advocacy from outside. Critical advocacy has resulted in changes to the ways in which the GMS program operates, in particular with regard to transparency, expansion into social areas such as health, and willingness to engage

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with non-State actors. However, insiders admit that the ADB still struggles to initiate and sustain dialogue efforts which in any way resemble MSPs. Track 3 Lack of faith in Tracks 1 and 2 by parts of civil society has led to the emergence of Tracks 3 and 4, both of which may proceed with or without direct State involvement. In the eyes of States, track 3 is ‘unofﬁcial’ but this does not, and should not, deter activists optimistic about the power of discursive forums to enhance the quality of problem identiﬁcation and solving, or, more positively, goal-setting and attainment. There is an increasing number of examples in Mekong Region countries of civil society led governance forums in water and water related areas, such as energy and ﬁsheries. At the local/national level these include MSPs about Se San hydropower, Cambodian ﬁsheries law, and community-led research and watershed management (see Table 13.6). There are also many track 3 initiatives focused on the regional scale. Again, space precludes doing more than discussing one example, with its couple of offshoots. World Resources Institute (WRI) and Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) were the drivers of the Resource Policy Support Initiative (REPSI) – mostly via a WRI ofﬁce in northern Thailand, at which I was based. My role was to support the construction and facilitation of a two year dialogue on environmental governance which emerged from a meeting about cooperation on international rivers, held in Yunnan in 1999 (He Daming et al. 2001). A wide range of regional actors were recruited/invited to participate in a process intended to learn about, and where necessary challenge, the ways in which decisions are made about ‘environment’ issues in Mekong Region countries (Badenoch 2001).8 The Regional Environment Forum (REF) is a WRI-led evolution from REPSI which has a more explicit role for local organisations in the management of the initiative, with Thailand Environment Institute (TEI) and Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) taking leading roles. Despite this supposed local independence the initial outputs of this forum (REF participants 2002) have closely mirrored the general WRI environmental governance agenda, exempliﬁed in the The Access Initiative (Petkova et al. 2002), which closely parallels the European Århus Convention (UNECE 1998). In 2004 WRI has closed its regional ofﬁce, and SEI is now countering with its own new network initiative. Of the two, SEI in particular sees a niche for itself as a ‘boundary organisation’ occupying a mediating space between science, policy, business (Guston 1999, 2001) and perhaps even civil society advocacy groups. IUCN – The World Conservation Union is increasingly using its convening capacity in the Mekong Region to focus on signiﬁcant water-related governance challenges. An example was a recent ‘high-level roundtable’ at the 2004 World Conservation Congress held in Bangkok. IUCN is an unusual hybrid organisation 8 Whilst to funders REPSI was focused on the uplands, to encourage the participation of a wider range of regional actors it was necessary to broaden the geographic scope to encompass the Mekong Region.

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Box 13.1 Recent civil society-led local/national MSPs Cambodian fisheries law dialogue The adoption of Cambodia’s Community Fisheries Sub-decree, drafted between 2000 and 2004, is critical if there is to be non-violent and ‘sustainable’ accessing of the extraordinary Tonle Sap ﬁshery. The drafting has involved an MSP including small-scale ﬁsher representatives, plus local and national ofﬁcials. Critical facilitation has been provided by NGOs such as Oxfam Great Britain and the local Fisheries Action Coalition Team. The MSP has been supported by various international organisations such as the Environmental Justice Foundation, other Oxfams and the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation. Critical context for the MSP was the political support provided by Prime Minister Hun Sen since 2000. Progress has been made in a process shaped by civil society actors working with sympathetic government ofﬁcials. Thai Baan action research and dialogue Villager-led research groups are now operating in northern and northeast Thailand. This movement is commonly referred to as the Thai Baan research. The villagers are the researchers. Those helping them are research assistants. Thus, traditional research hierarchies are being turned upside down. Thai Baan is boosting the understanding of communities and government ofﬁcials of the links between rivers, wetlands and rural livelihoods. Thai Baan groups are being supported by partnerships between local organisations such as the Chieng Khong Conservation Group, regional NGOs such as the South East Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN), tambon and provincial ofﬁcials, and other organisations such as IUCN and Oxfam America. This chain of MSPs is focused on the local scale. Thai Baan has rapidly gained credibility by ‘bringing in’ and respecting the knowledge of local ﬁshers and farmers, and effectively communicating their knowledge to other actors through photo exhibitions, Thai and English booklets and videos. Se San hydropower dialogue The Se San Protection Network (see (Hirsch and Wyatt 2004) is an initiative of ‘downstream’ Cambodian villagers in the Se San River Basin seriously affected by operations of Vietnam’s Yali Falls dam. The network is gradually succeeding in working cooperatively with formal State actors such as the Cambodian National Mekong Committee Secretariat, and the Cambodian Standing Committee for Coordination on Dams and Canals along Cambodia – Lao PDR, Vietnam, Thailand Borders. External support to the network is being provided by NGOs such as Both Ends, the Oxfams, and the Australian Mekong Resource Centre. Civil society groups have created and are sustaining their efforts to lead a constructive MSP. Yunnan community-based watershed management The Lashi watershed management committee in Yunnan Province brings together local communities and government ofﬁcials in an MSP to aid watershed decision making (Igbokwe et al. 2002, Lazarus 2003). The establishment process has been facilitated by Green Watershed, a local Chinese NGO, with support from Oxfam America. The MSP started in sixteen villages with awareness raising through watershed management trainings, participatory rural appraisal activities, gender training, historical reviews and trust building among two ethnic minority groups. It has now advanced to tackle more difﬁcult subjects, such as an upcoming county-level project to raise the level of the small dam (dike) to increase the water ﬂow to Lijiang town and the potential impacts on local livelihoods (such as loss of ﬁsheries, water, agricultural crops and land). Having established a solid base it is now scaling up to be more relevant to other townships and the whole of the watershed and is seen by parts of the Chinese government as a model learning site.

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being a union of some 80 state government and 1000 non-state organisation members. IUCN’s secretariat can use its membership base as a justiﬁcation for a discussion format quite unlike the normal inter-government meetings on offer. Engaging in the Bangkok deliberation were Ministers from 5 of the 6 Mekong countries (excluding Burma/Myanmar), and many non-State representatives, some of whom delivered focused presentations on substantive and controversial issues such as Nu-Salween river development in China, Burma/Myanmar and Thailand; water basin diversions, with special reference to Thailand; and threats to the Tonle Sap freshwater lake in Cambodia. IUCN is committed to supporting waterrelated MSPs at different scales throughout the Mekong Region, in part as the regional manifestation of its global Water and Nature Initiative (WANI) (see www. waterandnature.org). They recognise that MSPs need to have a diverse, but robust, knowledge base. For this reason IUCN remains keen to continue its support to local research institutions in the Mekong Region. Many of these institutes are now collaborating in a water governance network whose joint activities are undertaken via M-POWER (Mekong Program on Water Environment and Resources) which is coordinated from Chiang Mai University’s Unit for Social and Environmental Research (www.sea-user.org). Track 4 It is sometimes difﬁcult to distinguish between Track 2 and Track 3 forums, but Track 4 is quite different. It reﬂects the position of what are often called ‘localists’, increasingly prominent in water governance. In general, civil society localists assert the signiﬁcance of the rural community and local governance as an opposition to discourses propounding economic growth, urbanisation and industrialism (Hewison 2001, 22). They usually have a greater emphasis on self sufﬁciency and lower expectations of government, often believing that States and dominant elites are neither sufﬁciently legitimate, competent or inclined to adequately represent local communities. Sufﬁce to say that there are numerous localists in the Mekong Region acting constructively in communities where the State is largely absent, until such time as large projects or resource extraction opportunities arise. A recent, high-proﬁle Track 4 water governance forum was the ‘Dialogue on River Basin Development and Civil Society in the Mekong Region’ embodied in forums held in Australia and northeast Thailand. The forums included policy researchers, government agencies from Mekong countries, Mekong River Commission, Murray-Darling Basin Commission, NGOs and other advocates, farmers, ﬁshers, plus representatives from many different people’s movements and campaigns. The dialogue took a critical look at the types of knowledge included in decision making processes and the development paradigms of States. It aimed to shake up the Track 1 river basin management commissions. The meeting in Thailand, in particular, provided a stage for airing the grievances of local communities negatively affected by some of the development in the region (Local people 2002). The Vietnamese National Mekong Committee (VNMC) attended and issued the ﬁrst public apology from Vietnamese government ofﬁcials to those affected by the Yali dam tragedy (see Table 13.6).

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Table 13.6

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Recent regional water-related governance forums (Tracks 3–4)

Track 3 Forums of the Mekong Learning Initiative 1998+, concentrating on community based natural resources management, and transboundary learning partnerships between a group of Mekong Region universities. Forums of the Oxfam Mekong Initiative and its partners which have concentrated on trade, poverty reduction strategies, infrastructure and capacity building. Annual meeting of the Regional Environmental Forum 2002+, driven by World Resources Institute, focused on environmental governance. Mekong Region water governance network 2003+ focusing on crossborder research partnerships and dialogue about water and food, water and energy, water and nature via M-POWER (Mekong Program on Water Environment and Resources). Southeast Asia consultations in World Commission on Dams, and follow-up, such as IUCN-supported Dams and Development dialogues in Mekong countries 2001+ IUCN-convened Mekong Region roundtable at World Conservation Congress, Bangkok 2004.

Track 4 Dialogue on River Basin Development and Civil Society in the Mekong 2002 run by coalition of NGOs including Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA) and the Australian Mekong Resource Centre. NGOs partnering in campaigns challenging the sensibility of the energy paradigm embedded in the ASEAN/GMS electricity grid proposal, as at 2004. Meetings of the Dam Affected People and their Allies – Rasi Salai, Thailand 2003. International Rivers Network advocacy against projects such as Nam Theun 2 dam in Lao PDR. Probe International advocacy against the approach being taken in projects such as the GMS/ ASEAN electricity grid. Activities of the Rivers Watch East and Southeast Asia (RWESA) network which focuses on linking communities and advocacy efforts related to dams and river development.

The Ubon Ratchatani and Brisbane events did not emerge from a vacuum, and should be seen as just a part of an ongoing political struggle led by those opposed to the dominant water resources development paradigm. They were moments when stakeholders with different views and interests came together, but these actors are already, and will remain, involved in the highly political, often polarised, governance processes surrounding Mekong Region development decision making. Each participant has a history shaped by and shaping past events, represents particular views and has different objectives and preferred strategies for interacting and negotiating (or not). The 2nd International Meeting of Dam Affected People and their Allies was also held in northeast Thailand the following year. Again a localist discourse dominated

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(Dam affected people and their allies 2003). This is not meant to infer that track 4 leaders/participants only ‘support’ their own forums and ‘reject’ others. Rarely are issues so clearly cut. For example, the declaration from Rasi Salai expressed clear support for the track 3 World Commission on Dams process. However, regionalscale track 4 forums in the Mekong Region have thus far been more associated with assembling and proﬁling public testimony for lobbying purposes and discourseshaping, and less optimistic or interested in engaging in any genuine deliberation with most actors representing either developmental States or business interests. Issues Concerning MSP Prospects in the Mekong Region An investigation of water forums, seeking an understanding of MSP prospects, turns up many issues. In this section just a few will be discussed. Comments are made about some of the issues related to context, process and outcomes. Context – Windows of Opportunity Proponents of MSPs have no magic formula to sweep away the many hurdles to trying the approach more widely in the Mekong Region. The countries are now ruled by various forms of multi-party, single-party and military junta systems of government. Cambodia is a pseudo-democracy, trending back to authoritarianism, with internal violence on the increase. China is a single party system, but there is increasing political space permitted for questioning leadership decisions, and the media is increasingly opening up. Lao PDR is a single party system, led by mostly military ﬁgures, where no internal public dissent about national policies is permitted – although it should be noted that very recently new types of citizen organisations are being allowed to form. The Burma/Myanmar government is a military junta which strictly controls internal media, and suppresses dissenting views as a threat to national security (or regime survival). Thailand’s citizens have hard-won democratic freedoms. Vietnam is a single party system, but where recently there has been a substantial expansion of political space. The dominant political culture does not provide the most supportive setting for regional MSPs to realise their potential, however, already at the local/national level there have been some praiseworthy MSP efforts which provide a basis for cautious optimism. Advocates of ‘well motivated dissent’ have also been encouraged by particular events in 2004 which may have opened the door for the MSP approach to be more seriously incorporated into regional water governance. In China, Premier Wen Jiabao responded to extensive domestic lobbying and suspended plans to develop the Salween River hydropower cascade until a more complete impact assessment of the proposed development is undertaken. In the following year more than 60 projects were halted in China by the State Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and ordered to go through an impact assessment process, which has at least some deliberative character. These positive moves have been offset by a reassertion at the provincial level of the power of government ofﬁcials, many of whom resent any interference by central government or civil society actors.

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In Thailand, protests resulted in the government altering its privatisation plan for the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) which is a major regional water resources development actor. In Cambodia, the government has ﬁnally joined the chorus of concerns from local and international actors about the future of the Tonle Sap Lake ﬁshery in the Mekong River Basin, which is threatened by upstream dams (and local over ﬁshing). In Lao PDR, debate about whether to build the Nam Theun 2 dam spilled over regional borders, with the World Bank feeling compelled to conduct multi-stakeholder brieﬁngs, albeit in an attempt to ‘sell’ the beneﬁts of the now-approved project. All of these examples are connected threads of the Mekong Region water and energy web. Key actors are now engaging more openly in a battle for transnational discursive legitimacy in which regional MSPs could play a valuable role. In any regional MSPs, there is a need to clarify the scope for negotiations. In water governance the need to negotiate is integral due to ‘the mundane fact that modern societies are complex, multicultural, and populated by individuals who are often quite sensitive about their personal rights’ (Baber 2004, 333). However, formal negotiations are not an essential element of MSPs, as MSPs may not have any formal decision making or formal negotiating mandate. Far from being problematic, this may actually give participants more space to explore options and propose workable agreements. A concern for some people heavily committed to the learning possibilities of MSPs is that widening the scope to allow negotiation encourages MSP actors to act in a self-interested manner. This is seen as regressive by those committed to MSP participants being completely impartial, and MSPs being a-political ‘time-outs’ from an external world where all negotiations should take place. But, MSPs do not have to unrealistically deny that actors have interests that they will continue to pursue, inside or outside the MSP. Nor do MSPs have to function as an impartial jury. It is quite plausible for ‘parallel learning and negotiation trajectories (to be) taking place at more or less the same time’ (Leeuwis 2000:950) either in the same or separate forums. MSP facilitators need to be quite explicit about all this. There are some general preconditions before substantive negotiations can take place: divergence of actors’ interests; actors’ recognition of mutual interdependence in resolving problems; and actors capability of communicating with each other (Leeuwis 2000:951). At the regional scale, the ﬁrst condition is invariably met – actors do have different interests. Mutual interdependence is another matter – in reality there is often independence-dependence. For example, an upstream water user such as China or Vietnam is able, with relative impunity, to act independently of dependent downstream neighbours, such as in Lao PDR or Cambodia. The ﬁnal point about communication is central to MSPs. A platform without effective modes of communication will be an MSP failure. Process – Legitimacy from Representation and Political Responsibility Legitimacy has been usefully deﬁned as ‘moral justiﬁcations for political and social action’ (Atack 1999:855). A key aspect of MSP legitimacy relates to the inclusiveness

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of an MSP process. This relates to notions of accountability, representation and political responsibility. For many commentators, actor participation in an MSP is only legitimate if they are, or are formally representing, a ‘direct’ stakeholder. Agents of the State, such as government or bureaucracy ofﬁcials, have a formal constituency whom they can usually claim to represent. Similarly, company executives are, or should be, accountable to shareholders they are entrusted to represent. However, this framing is often used to deny bestowing legitimacy on actors who do not claim to represent others, whose status as a stakeholder may be contested, but who have much to offer in improving the quality of public debate. Civil society groups in the Mekong Region are often challenged in this way. Political responsibility is a normative concept that differs slightly from accountability in that accountability has formal obligations embedded within its deﬁnition (Jordan and Van Tuijl 2000, 2053). The concept of political responsibility offers a way forward through the ‘legitimacy’ impasse encountered when some actors challenge an actor’s accountability, and right to be involved in an MSP. The NGO Focus on the Global South (FOCUS – http://www.focusweb.org), active in the Mekong Region, is an illustrative example. FOCUS is neither bound – nor empowered – by an external mandate. In the absence of a formal legitimising mechanism such as membership endorsement, they have to clearly deﬁne their position. FOCUS’s commitment to addressing the marginalisation of large numbers of people throughout ‘the South’ has deﬁned their constituency; however, they do not claim to ‘represent’ these diverse peoples, as they recognise they have no such mandate. But, they do have their own accountability mechanisms, linked to political responsibility for particular interests. This argument has been persuasively made by an NGO member: … the right to speak claimed by NGOs is not necessarily derived from a strict or formal notion of direct representation of particular group interests but rather from a commitment to a set of values and insights which form the basis for an analysis of particular situations and a strategy to act on that analysis. Sometimes these are best expressed as impacts on local people or environments… (For example) there would be no inherent contradiction for an NGO to make submissions and arguments relating to a proposed big dam even when no ‘local’ group shares those views – the arguments should be taken up in public debate and dealt with on their own merits (Greeff 2000, 75).

In the absence of formal accountability to constituents, and without necessarily claiming to represent another, the notion of political responsibility is sufﬁcient to claim legitimacy as a social actor wishing to participate in regional MSP. Outcomes – Consensus, Consent, Consultations In many MSPs, where diverse representation has been obtained, there is confusion about whether the goal is consensus. For example, the WCD sought ‘consensus’, at least between the commissioners, driven by a view that ‘without consensus, a commission will be seen to have reproduced divisions among stakeholders, rather

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than transcending them’ (Dubash et al. 2001, 4). However, if consensus is ‘unanimous agreement not just on a course of action, but also on the reasons for it’ it follows that ‘in a pluralistic world consensus is unattainable, unnecessary and undesirable. More feasible and attractive are workable agreements in which participants agree on a course of action, but for different reasons’ (Dryzek 2000, 170). Using this deﬁnition, failure by an MSP to reach a complete consensus should not be seen as a disappointment, provided that progress is made in the search for an acceptable and workable agreement. Fundamental disagreements about rights will remain problematic. This is part of the MSP context, and is not a criticism of the approach. For example, waterrelated MSPs are still grappling with diverging opinions about the principle of free prior informed consent (FPIC) which is often now included in generic international declarations. If accepted, FPIC explicitly recognises indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights to give or withhold their consent to activities affecting their land and water resources. FPIC holds that consent must be freely given, obtained prior to implementation of activities and be founded upon an understanding of the full range of issues implicated by the activity or decision in question (MacKay 2004). In MacKay’s view, articulated in a brieﬁng note for the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review (EIR), but applicable also to the water resources development debate: Decisions about when, where and how to exploit natural resources are normally justiﬁed in the national interest, which is generally interpreted as the interest of the majority. The result is that the rights and interests of unrepresented groups, such as indigenous peoples and others, will often be subordinated to the majority interest: conﬂict often ensues and the rights of indigenous peoples are often disregarded (MacKay 2004).

The issue is whether the rights of local resource users/occupiers have primacy? If so, FPIC is a right to veto development. The ﬁnal EIR report supported FPIC. The Bank response was that they too support FPIC, but they ‘stole’ the acronym and redeﬁned it as free prior informed consultation! (World Bank 2004 annexed responses – points 15–16). FPIC was also a hot issue for the World Commission on Dams (WCD). Adoption of ‘gaining public acceptance’ as a strategic priority recommendation of the ﬁnal WCD report represented a compromise by the commissioners and a restriction of the FPIC principle. FPIC becomes critically important to any MSPs which is mandated with decision making powers. Non-acceptance of FPIC signiﬁcantly reduces the negotiating power of local resource users/occupiers. FPIC is closely related to the concept of ‘meaningful participation’. Both are highly relevant to MSPs. According to Goodland (2004), ‘meaningful participation’ became mandatory in World Bank assisted projects from the late 1980s and early 1990s. He claims the Bank interpreted this to mean the people being consulted about a proposal had a right to say no. If this was the case, it would appear that the trend is now in reverse. As with Dryzek, the international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) seem to be accepting that consensus is just not always possible. The ADB provides a good example of what is at stake. Their current policy for large water resources projects says (ADB 2004):

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Paragraph 32: ADB will adopt a cautious approach to large water resource projects – particularly those involving dams and storage – given the record of environmental and social hazards associated with such projects. All such projects will need to be justiﬁed in the public interest, and all government and non-government stakeholders in the country must agree on the justiﬁcation. Where the risks are acceptable and ADB’s involvement necessary, ADB will ensure that its environmental and social impact assessment procedures are rigorously applied. Any adverse environmental effects will be properly mitigated, the number of affected people in the project area will be minimised, and those adversely affected will be adequately compensated in accordance with ADB’s policy on involuntary resettlement. In line with its energy sector policy, ADB will continue to extend its support for technically and economically feasible hydropower projects that form part of a country’s least-cost energy development plan, provided their environmental (including impact on ﬁsheries) and social effects can be satisfactorily managed in accordance with ADB policies.

The Bank now sees this policy as unworkable because of (in the Bank’s words) the ‘impractical requirement for all stakeholders to agree on the justiﬁcation of large water resources projects’. In 2004 ADB proposed the following revision (italics added): … All such projects will need to be justiﬁed in the public interest and stakeholders must be provided the opportunity to comment regarding the justiﬁcation with their views considered. The ADB will promote the participation of government, civil society and other stakeholders in the country towards this end. Where the risks are acceptable…

This is a signiﬁcant shift in approach by both the World Bank and the ADB. They have backed away from endorsing MSPs which have negotiating mandates. They now support only consultative/advisory MSPs. For a brief period, MSP policy of the IFIs had strengthened the negotiating positions of less powerful actors. However, the IFIs are now reafﬁrming the priority they attach to the decisionmaking authority of governments. Whilst noting the oscillation of the IFIs, it should be clearly noted that even a shift towards accepting consultative/advisory MSPs in the Mekong Region would be a signiﬁcant step forward, as at present regional water governance is largely devoid of multi-stakeholder deliberative processes. Opportunities Something needs to be done to lift the standard of regional water governance in the Mekong Region. Despite many types of regional water forums, large-scale water resources development is still deﬁcient with negative domestic and transboundary impacts consistently ignored or outweighed by decision makers. Important next steps for the region would be to add robust regional MSP elements – giving space for the airing and scrutiny of all perspectives – to the governance of, for example: the Salween in China, Burma/Myanmar, and Thailand; the GMS/ASEAN electricity grid impacting on all six Mekong coutries, and Thailand’s nebulous water grid, plans for which directly affect several of its neighbours.

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Salween River – Prioritising Big Business, Natural Heritage or Human Rights? Substantial hydropower expansion is part of Chinese national planning and Yunnan’s role is key. Yunnan is seen as having 24% of China’s hydropower potential for ‘medium’ and ‘large’ sized projects (He Jing 2002). In late 2003 much more information ﬁltered into the public domain outlining extensive hydropower development proposed for the Salween which ﬂows from China into Burma/Myanmar. The upper watersheds of the Salween, Mekong and Yangtze are known as the Three Rivers region, declared a UNESCO World Heritage site in July 2003. There are advanced plans for a cascade of thirteen dams on the Chinese reaches of the presently undammed Salween River, which, if built, would have a profound impact. The China Huadian Corporation is one of the ‘big 5’ power generation companies receiving assets from 2003 onwards which were previously ‘owned’ by the giant State Power Corporation. The ‘right to develop’ the Salween River is seen by Huadian as one of the transferred ‘assets’ now in their portfolio. Since major energy industry reforms were announced late 2002 there has been a stampede by the ‘big 5 + 1’ – not forgetting the Three Gorges development group – to secure their assets, principally coal-related, and move to develop their new assets, including ‘rivers for hydro’ in various types of partnership with local authorities (Dore and Yu Xiaogang 2004). The decision-making and approvals processes were initially far from transparent. The economic justiﬁcation unspeciﬁed, and the ecological and cultural risks downplayed (both in China and further downstream). Moreover, the lines between public and private interest and ownership have become increasingly blurry as the energy companies blend State authority with private sector competitive opportunism. Remarkably, as the plans entered the public domain, broader civil society – beyond the usual ofﬁcials, business operatives and ‘experts’ – became much more involved. There are ﬁve other dams being promoted downstream of China, including Ta Sang – planned to produce 7,000 megawatts. The Ta Sang dam, involving many actors including the Bangkok-based MDX company, is already controversial due to numerous reports of human rights abuses of the Shan people in the dam area by the Burma/Myanmar military. Another two are planned for further downstream where the Salween forms the border between Burma/Myanmar and Thailand. Without any public debate, ofﬁcials from both those countries have supposedly already committed in August 2004 to jointly ‘develop’ the river (Pradit Ruangdit 2004). All this has major implications for local livelihoods in each of these countries and a proposed regional electricity grid (see below). The situation is ripe for a regional MSP to ensure the driving assumptions, proposed development beneﬁts, tradeoffs and transboundary impacts are more fully considered. GMS/ASEAN Electricity Grid – The Best Option? The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) are the major promoters of two overlapping schemes known as: the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Power Interconnection and Trade, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Power Grid. An inter-

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governmental agreement forming an electricity grid was signed in 2002 by the leaders of the six Mekong Region countries. ADB has prepared a list of USD 4.58 billion worth of loans and grants for ﬁnancing 32 grid and grid-related projects in the Mekong Region (Ryder 2003:3). A further USD 43 billion would be needed for the twelve hydropower dams and the transmission system (IRN 2004:10). Proponents cite the logic of ‘no alternative’. Opponents challenge the economic and technical justiﬁcation. Embodied in the plan is a massive change in the way in which water resources are developed throughout the region. In the last 10 years of planning, there has been practically no involvement by civil society in any related governance process. This is now changing as local, national, regional and international actors are becoming involved. For the ADB, the grid should become a test case of their Strategic Environment Framework (SEI et al. 2002), intended to guide bank investments in the Mekong Region water and transport sectors. A properly conducted, regional MSP focused on the electricity grid would be a very constructive governance intervention. Thailand Water Grid – For Irrigation, Agribusiness Transformation or Urban Supply? At present contained primarily within the domestic political arena of Thailand, are the intra-government negotiations concerning the demand and distribution aspects of Thailand’s proposed, but somewhat vague (at least in its publicly presented form) national water grid. A key driver for the grid is the increasing water scarcity in the Chao Phraya River Basin which is the principal food bowl of Thailand, and provides much of the water for the capital city of Bangkok. Many parts of the ‘grid’ have been previously conceived, designed and touted in the past. Recently, new life has been breathed into quite a few of the old plans but publicly available information is scarce. Numerous potential diversions have implications for the river dependent communities in Lao PDR, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia and Vietnam. The future of millions of Thai farmers is also unclear as the only way of funding such a scheme is if water pricing policies are introduced and agribusiness contract farming is given access to the ‘new water’. So is it water for a new ‘war on poverty’, or water for agribusiness, or water for Bangkok? Whose water is it anyway? Many wish to shift the debate about the water grid into the public sphere. A regional MSP about the Thailand water grid would allow these types of questions to be addressed. The World Bank’s Mekong Region Water Resources Assistance Strategy The World Bank is now back into funding large-scale water resources infrastructure. This is evidenced in the contents of the Bank’s Water Resources Assistance Strategy (WB 2004), the substantial forward budget allocations, and the subsequent burst of efforts to develop national and/or regional strategies in places such as Pakistan, India and China. The Mekong Region is one of the places designated to receive a regional strategy. In 2004 there was a pseudo-consultative process involving donors, governments and civil society. The blueprint is being developed and is scheduled for

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release in 2005 or 2006. The implications for the region could be very signiﬁcant. Again, it would seem that a more genuine MSP could lead to more informed public deliberation and choices. Conclusion MSPs are rooted in a belief in the added value provided by deliberation which is inclusive, information-rich and ﬂexibly facilitated, actively promoting analysis of different views. However, MSPs are seen by some as disrespectful of, and at times subversive to, existing public decision making structures. MSPs in the Mekong Region led by civil society have been accused of being undemocratic, and too empowering of interest groups with policy positions which may differ from dominant policy positions within State governments or parts of their associated bureaucracy. Advocates claim the opposite, that in fact these types of processes are complementary to formal State decision making processes, serving as a counter weight to many undemocratic water-related governance forums and, thus actually ‘deepen democracy’. There is some new political space in the Mekong Region created by globalisation, and corresponding ‘new regionalisms’ which is providing oxygen to MSP approaches. However, proponents will invariably continue to meet resistance from State actors and others with vested interests reinforced by the status quo. Many State actors still believe, or at least rhetorically pretend, that domestic-led criticism is unpatriotic, and – despite an emerging body of international water law – crossborder enquiry/ criticism of water resources development plans is an unacceptable encroachment on hard-won State sovereignty. This political resistance to MSP approaches, grounded in self-interest and transboundary geopolitics, should not be underestimated. Other forms of advocacy will remain important to encourage more and less powerful actors to give MSPs a chance to fulﬁll their regional potential by being sites for authentic deliberation, learning by all actors, and (possibly) negotiation. Acknowledgements In addition to this global Ashgate production, the paper is being included in a set of Mekong papers on wider water governance issues by the M-POWER network (www.mpowernet.org). This paper has beneﬁted from interaction with and many suggestions from various colleagues, especially Louis Lebel, Mary Jane Real, Jeff Rutherford, Kate Lazarus, Noel Rajesh and Masao Imumura. Others such as Mingsarn Kaosa-ard, Surichai Wun’Gaeo, Yu Xiaogang, Steve Dovers, Jim Woodhill and Jeroen Warner have also helped shape the ideas. The writings of John Dryzek and Niels Röling have been especially helpful. Of course, all errors or misconceptions are my responsibility.

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References ADB (2001), ‘Building on success: a strategic framework for the next 10 years of the GMS programme’, Endorsed by the 10th Ministerial Conference held in Yangon, Myanmar on 29 November 2001, Asian Development Bank, Manila. ADB (2002), ‘Economic Cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion: An overview’, Asian Development Bank, Manila. ADB (2004), ‘Proposed revision in ADB’s water policy regarding large water resources projects’, Asian Development Bank, Manila. http://www.adb.org/Water/Policy/proposed_revision.asp. ADB and UNEP (2004), Greater Mekong Subregion Atlas of the Environment, Asian Development Bank, and the United Nations Environment Programme Regional Resource Centre for Asia and the Pacific. Atack, I. (1999), ‘Four criteria of development NGO legitimacy’, World Development 27, 5, 855–864. Baber, W. F. (2004), ‘Ecology and democratic governance: towards a deliberative model of environmental politics’, Social Science Journal 41, 331–346. Badenoch, N. (2001), ‘Environmental governance: principles and practice in mainland Southeast Asia’, World Resources Institute, Washington. Bui Kim Chi (1997), From Committee to Commission? The evolution of the Mekong River Agreements with reference to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreements, University of Melbourne, PhD thesis. Dam affected people and their allies (2003), ‘Rivers for life! The Rasi Salai Declaration’, Statement from the Second International Meeting of Dam Affected People and their Allies held in Rasi Salai, Thailand, 28 November–4 December 2003. Dore, J. (2003) ‘The governance of increasing Mekong regionalism’, in Mingsarn Kaosa-ard and J. Dore (eds), Social Challenges for the Mekong Region, White Lotus, Bangkok. Dore, J. and Woodhill, J. (1999), Sustainable Regional Development, Greening Australia, Canberra [Final Report (384 pages) and Executive Summary (52 pages)]. Dore, J., Woodhill, J., Andrews, K. and Keating, C. (2003), ‘Sustainable regional development: lessons from Australian efforts’, in S.R. Dovers and S. Wild River (eds), Managing Australia’s Environment, Federation Press, in collaboration with Land & Water Australia, Canberra. Dore, J. and Yu Xiaogang (2004), ‘Yunnan Hydropower Expansion: Update on China’s energy industry reforms and the Nu, Lancang and Jinsha hydropower dams’, Working Paper from Chiang Mai University’s Unit for Social and Environmental Research, and Green Watershed. http://www.sea-user.org/pubs/ user-wp-2004-04.pdf. Dovers, S. (2001) ‘Institutions for sustainability’, Australian Conservation Foundation, Melbourne. Dovers, S. and Dore, J. (1999), ‘Adaptive institutions, organisations and policy processes for river basin and catchment management’, in Proceedings of 2nd

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International River Management Symposium. Brisbane, 29 September–2 October 1999. Dryzek, J. S. (1999), ‘Transnational democracy’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 7, 1, 30–51. Dryzek, J. S. (2000), Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations, Oxford Political Theory, Oxford University Press. Dryzek, J. S. (2001), ‘Legitimacy and economy in deliberative democracy’, Political Theory 29, 5, 651–669. Dubash, N.K., Dupar, M., Kothari, S. and Lissu, T. (2001), A Watershed in Global Governance? An Independent Assessment of the World Commission on Dams, World Resources Institute, Lokayan and Lawyer’s Environmental Action Team. ECC (2000), The Earth Charter, Earth Charter Commission c/o University for Peace, Costa Rica. http://www.earthcharter.org. ESCAP (2000), ‘Proceedings of Principles and Practices of Water Allocation Among Water-use Sectors’, Water Resources Series 80. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok. Goodland, R. (2004), ‘Roundtable comments on “prior informed consent” and the World Bank Group’, in Proceedings of Prior Informed Consent Conference convened by American University, Centre for International Environmental Law, and Washington College of Law, Washington DC, 2 March 2004. Governments of Cambodia-Lao PDR-Vietnam-Thailand (1995), Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. Signed in Chiang Rai, Thailand, 5 April 1995. http://www.mrcmekong.org. Governments of China-Lao PDR-Myanmar-Thailand (2001), Agreement on Commercial Navigation on the Lancang-Mekong River. Signed in Tachilek, Myanmar, 20 April 2000. Greeff, L. (2000), ‘Comments submitted January 2000 responding to December 1999 draft version of participation, negotiation and conflict management in large dams projects’, Thematic Review V.5. A thematic review prepared by RESOLVE Inc et al. as an input to the World Commission on Dams, Cape Town. Guston, D. H. (1999), ‘Stabilising the boundary between US politics and science’, Social Studies of Science 29, 1, 87–111. Guston, D. H. (2001), ‘Boundary organisations in environmental policy and science: an introduction’, Science Technology and Human Values 26, 4, 399–408. Hay, C. (2002), Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, Palgrave. He Daming, Zhang Guoyou and Hsiang-te Kung (eds) (2001), Towards Cooperative Utilisation and Coordinated Management of International Rivers, Proceedings of International Symposium 25–30 June 1999 Kunming, China. Science Press & United Nations University, New York & Tokyo. He Jing (2002), ‘A research on the development strategy of the 21st century’s hydropower in China’, Electricity 13, 1. Hemmati, M. (2002), ‘The World Commission on Dams as a multi-stakeholder process’, Politics and the Life Sciences 21, 1. Hettne, B. (1999), ‘Globalization and the New Regionalism: The Second Great Transformation’, in B. Hettne, A. Inotai and O. Sunkel (eds), Globalization and the New Regionalism, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 1–25.

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Hewison, K. (2001), ‘Nationalism, populism, dependency: Southeast Asia and responses to the Asian crisis’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 2, 3, 219–236. Hirsch, P. and Wyatt, A. (2004), ‘Negotiating local livelihoods: scales of conflict in the Se San river basin’, Asia Pacific Viewpoint 45, 1, 51–68. Igbokwe, K. N., Espinelli, M. B., Yu Xiaogang and Lazarus, K. (2002), ‘Towards developing and implementing a multi-stakeholder capacity building program for participatory watershed management: A case of Lashi watershed, Yunnan Province’, in Xu Jianchu et al. (eds), 3rd Symposium on Montane Mainland South East Asia. Yunnan Science and Technology Press, Kunming, Lijiang, PR of China. IRN (2004), ‘Sizing up the grid: How the Mekong power grid compares against the policies of the Asian Development Bank’, International Rivers Network, Berkeley CA. Jordan, L. and van Tuijl, P. (2000), ‘Political responsibility in transnational NGO advocacy’, World Development 28, 12, 2051–2065. Lazarus, K. (2003), ‘A multi-stakeholder watershed management committee in Lashi watershed: A new way of working’, Commentary in China Environment Series No 6. Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington DC. Leeuwis, C. (2000) ‘Reconceptualising participation for sustainable rural development: towards a negotiation approach’, Development and Change 31, 931–959. Local people (2002) ‘Declaration by the local communities of the river basins in Thailand’, in Press Release from the Dialogue on River Basin Development and Civil Society in the Mekong Region. Distributed by TERRA, Ubon Ratchatani, Thailand, 9–12 November 2002. Maarleveld, M. and Dangbegnon, C. (2002) ‘Social learning: major concepts and issues’, in C. Leeuwis and R. Pyburn (eds), Wheelbarrows Full of Frogs, Koninklijke Van Gorcum, Assen. MacKay, F. (2004), ‘Indigenous peoples’ right to free prior and informed consent, and the World Bank’s extractive industries review’, Briefing note from Forest Peoples Programme, 17 March 2004. Mehta, L., Leach, M., Newell, P., Scoones, I., Sivaramakrishnan, K. and Way, S-.A (1999), ‘Exploring understandings of institutions and uncertainty: new directions in natural resource management’, IDS Discussion Paper 372, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer. Mingsarn Kaosa-ard and Dore, J. (eds) (2003), Social Challenges for the Mekong Region, White Lotus, Bangkok. Moore, C. W. (1986), The Mediation Process, Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco. Petkova, E., Maurer, C., Henninger, N. and Irwin, F. (2002), ‘Closing the Gap: Information, Participation and Justice in Decision Making for the Environment’, Based on the findings of The Access Initiative. World Resources Institute, Washington. Pradit Ruangdit (2004), ‘No backing for rebels, PM tells junta’, Bangkok Post, 26 August 2004.

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REF Participants (2002) ‘Regional environmental forum consensus statement’, in Press Release from the First Annual Regional Environmental Forum for Mainland Southeast Asia. Distributed by World Resources Institute, Phnom Penh, 14–15 November 2002. Röling, N. (2002), ‘Moving beyond the aggregation of individual preferences’, in C. Leeuwis and R. Pyburn (eds), Wheelbarrows Full of Frogs, Koninklijke Van Gorcum, Assen. Rosenau, J. N. (2004), ‘The theoretical imperative: unavoidable explication’, Asian Journal of Political Science 11, 2, 7–20. Ryder, G. (2003), ‘Behind the ASEAN power grid’, Probe International, Toronto. Schulz, M., Soderbaum, F. and Ojendal, J. (eds) (2001), Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes, Zed Books, New York. SEI, UNEP, ADB and MRC (2002), ‘Strategic Environmental Framework for the Greater Mekong Subregion: Integrating Development and Environment in the Transport and Water Resources Sectors’, Executive Summary, SEF Main Report Volume I, Issues and Trends Volume II, GMS Hotspot Profiles Volume III, SEF Case Study Reports Volume IV. Stockholm Environment Institute, United Nations Environment Programme, Asian Development Bank, Mekong River Commission, Available from ADB Manila. The Economist (2004), Pocket World in Figures. Profile Books, London. UNECE (1998), Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva. www.unece.org/pub_cat/lpenv0. html. WB (2004), ‘Water Resources Assistance Strategy’, The World Bank, Washington DC. World Bank (2004), ‘Draft response of the World Bank to the final report of the Extractive Industries Review’, Posted on the web 4 June 2004 to be available for public comment for 30 days.

Chapter 14

Against the Conventional Wisdom: Why Sector Reallocation of Water and Multi-Stakeholder Platforms Do Not Take Place in Uzbekistan Kai Wegerich

Introduction Currently integrated approaches to water management, reallocation of water resources between sectors and multi-stakeholder platforms are common frameworks in the hegemonic discourse of the international water community. The paper argues that none of these paradigms have manifested themselves in Uzbekistan. On the contrary, reallocation of water from the agricultural to the urban sector to meet rising demands does not take place, and water scheduling in the tertiary cities in Uzbekistan is common practice. While in the literature attention is drawn to strategies how to make multistakeholder platforms more efﬁcient and how to increase the participation of stakeholders, this paper focuses on the political aspects in Uzbekistan which do not support the creation of multi-stakeholder participation for water management. The remainder of the paper is structured into six sections. It continues with a short theoretical section on the political aspects of water management, which is followed with a description of the water situation in Uzbekistan. Here the focus is on water availability and the water utilization of the urban sector. The third section focuses on the organizational structure of the different water departments on the national level and the power structure between the departments since independence. The section is followed by a small case study of the water management organization, and the problems of water supply in two tertiary cities in the Khorezm Province in Uzbekistan. The ﬁfth section focuses on the relationships between the state and civil society and the strong inﬂuence of the state on the creation of civil society organizations. The last section concludes that the institutional development of the Uzbekistan Communal Services Agency shows that since independence its inﬂuence on decision making over water allocation has been undermined. Multi-stakeholder platforms are not wanted, and the currently hegemonic water management frameworks are not yet on the agenda in Uzbekistan.

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Multi-Stakeholder Platforms Ohlsson and Turton distinguish between three historical stages of water management: • • •

supply management, to ‘get more water’ demand management which increases the end-use efﬁciency, to achieve ‘more use per drop’ a second step in demand management towards ‘allocative efﬁciency’ to get ‘more value per crop’ (Ohlsson and Turton n.d., 2).

Allocative efﬁciency would imply the reallocation of water from the agricultural to the urban and industrial sectors. Perry et al. (1997, 12) states the conventional wisdom: ‘For the most part, in the real world, water is allocated ﬁrst to municipal and commercial use, and third to agriculture’. On the other hand, conﬂicts over scarce water resources occur between the agricultural sector and the urban and industrial sector. The conﬂicts arise because ‘thirsty cities, drought and crisis suggest that these transfers do not catch up with growth in demand’ (Molle, e-mail discussion 16.09.04). Perry’s statement foregrounds the political argument that the non-agricultural sector has more inﬂuence and power compared to the agricultural sector; therefore their interests prevail. Water allocation between the sectors is based on political decisions. Water allocation to the sectors could be renegotiated between the sectors: as Mosse emphasizes, ‘existing systems of water use are supported by structures of authority’ (Mosse 1997: 499). Multi-stakeholder platforms could question this authority and change the structure of the system from a hierarchical structure to a horizontal structure. As Currie-Alder (this volume) argues, with multi-stakeholder platforms the ‘top-down approaches operating with hierarchical structures must shift to a more horizontal network structure where responsibilities and roles are more freely shared with others’. This would directly question the role of the state and the form of governance of the state. Data on Uzbekistan suggests that the current water demand of the urban and industrial sectors outstrip its water supply. Hence, the water allocation to the sectors would have to be renegotiated and multi-stakeholder platforms could be arenas for negotiating water allocation. However, even though it is recognized that the current supply to the urban sectors is insufﬁcient, re-negotiations between the sectors do not occur. Instead of ﬁxing the problem through reallocations between the sectors, the international agencies (World Bank and Asian Development Bank) focus only on productive efﬁciencies, which would increase the efﬁciency of the supply side and decrease the demand of the users in the urban sector. Hence, the political renegotiation of water allocation between the sectors and the change of the structure of authority is avoided. The case study on Uzbekistan will show that as the current system is manifesting and expanding the hierarchical authority line for water management, the reproduction and therefore manifestation of the existing authority line gives no space for horizontal platforms and stakeholder participation.

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Water Situation in Uzbekistan Even though Uzbekistan has only a few rivers originating within its own territory, the country is utilizing the transboundary Syrdarya and Amudarya rivers and their (former) tributaries for the agricultural, industrial and urban sectors. The water allocation limits for the Amudarya riparian states were set in 1987 and have been reafﬁrmed after independence in 1991. In Uzbekistan agriculture is mainly based on irrigation. In 1989, 4.3 million hectares were irrigated, that is about 82 per cent of cultivated land. The irrigated land produces more than 90 per cent of crop production. Of the total irrigated area, 56 per cent is situated in the Amu Darya river basin (compare SIC ICWC 1999, 41). The data in Table 14.1 show that Uzbekistan is at the stage of supply management of water. The country tries to utilize water beyond its ofﬁcial water distribution limits (cf. Wegerich 2005b).

Table 14.1

Amu Darya distribution limits and actual utilization

Water Distribution Limits 1987 km3 % Kyrgyzstan 0.4 0.6 9.5 15.4 Tajikistan Turkmenistan 22 35.8 Uzbekistan 29.6 48.2

Average ofﬁcial BVO data 1993-99 km3 % 0.15 0.29 7.32 14.47 21.52 42.53 21.61 42.71

Average unofﬁcial BVO data 1991-01 km3 % 7 10.6 20.6 29.8 42.8 59.6

According to a DFID study, in Uzbekistan the agricultural sector uses 94 per cent of total utilised water. Only four per cent are used in the industrial sector and two percent in the urban sector (DFID 2001: 17). A recent Asian Development Bank report states that ‘the distribution system tends to be old, in varying stages of disrepair, and prone to high levels of leakage. … Water rationing is common in all cities’ (ADB 2001, 5). The utilization in the urban sector ranges between ‘250 liters per capita per day (lcd) to nearly 1000 lcd. … The use is in addition to the supply of between 200 to 400 lcd of hot water’ (ADB 2001: 6).1 1 The ﬁgures of the ADB include industries, losses and wastages, and even though the Bank is making a general statement about the water utilization in urban areas in Uzbekistan, their project is only based on two provincial capital and one district capital cities; hence it is questionable whether the data merely reﬂects the situation in the three cities (Djizzak, Gulistan and Karshi) or also include other cities. In addition, as the ADB points out, only 1.8 per cent of domestic consumption is metered, hence it is questionable whether the above data is reﬂecting actual household consumption. A report by Development Alternatives, Inc. argues that the ofﬁcial ﬁgures do not distinguish between industrial and urban supply. According to the report 25 per cent of the supplied amount is utilized by industries. In addition the leakage losses are estimated to be between 11 to 30%, or even higher (DAI 1996: 43).

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Research conducted in the Khorezm province in 2004 suggests that public water supply in tertiary cities (district capitals) is very unreliable and that households rely heavily on groundwater, to compensate for the public water supply shortages (Wegerich 2006). The ﬁndings also show that potable water and not privately pumped groundwater is used for watering gardens, and therefore contributes to the shortages of supply. The ADB report points out that ‘poor condition of irrigation systems leading to the alternative use of potable water for garden and land watering’ (ADB 2001: 5). The data collected suggests that water shortages occur mainly during the spring and summer period while during the autumn and winter period water supply is sufﬁcient. This would imply that the shortages are not based on leakages, but that either the agricultural and the urban sector are in competition over the water resources, or that the ﬁxed supply limits for the urban sector are insufﬁcient to meet the demand during the summer period. However, the latter would also suggest a competition between the agricultural and the urban sector. Considering that Uzbekistan is in a transitional period facing ﬁnancial constraints, it seems likely that the investments in operation and maintenance of the infrastructure for potable water and irrigation of urban gardens have decreased. The next section will show that this is not only based on ﬁnancial constraints, but that it is the government’s policy to strengthen the agricultural sector and to weaken the urban sector and their water supply organizations. The Changing Organizational Setting of the Water Sector Stakeholders After independence the Ministry for Water Resources was responsible, amongst other things, for water policy and strategy development and implementation, water resource planning and the formulation of water legislation. In addition, it was charged with the provision of water resources to the various sectors of the economy (WARMAP Project 1995: 34). The Ministry of Communal Economy was dealing with municipal water supply and sewage. Hence, at the time of independence the Ministry for Water Resources provided water resources to the Ministry of Communal Economy. Both Ministries were structured hierarchically with their branches on the provincial and district levels. The Ministry of Water Resources distributed the surface water resources through their provincial and district departments to the collective farms and the Ministry for Communal Management distributed the potable water resources on the provincial and district level through two organizations to the urban areas, industries and to the households in the rural areas (WARMAP Project 1997: 10). These organizations were Vodokanal, which was responsible for water distribution to the urban areas and industries, and Agrovodokanal, which delivered water to the rural households. In 1997 the Ministry for Agriculture and the Ministry for Water Resources were merged and the Ministry had ‘no autonomous body for water management in form of a department or association’ (SIC 1999: 18). The new Ministry for Agriculture and Water Resources was responsible (among others) for:

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• •

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‘Intensiﬁcation of economic reforms in the water sector, extending the economic independence of water enterprises, combining their interests with agricultural enterprises for rational organization of agricultural production; Accounting and supervision of effective water use in all water consumption sectors; Water planning and allocation among all economic sectors and provinces, setting up the limits of water diversion and consumption in all water consumption sectors and control of observation’ (SIC ICWC 1999: 18).

The list of responsibilities shows that the Ministry for Agriculture and Water Resources stayed in charge of water provision to all the sectors. However, the main emphasis of the Ministry became the water provision for the agricultural sector. Even though there were two Ministries which had to compete about water resources, and although the Ministry for Communal Management provided services to the high value users, the Ministry for Agriculture and Water Resources was responsible for water planning and allocation. This emphasizes the focus on agricultural production instead of water delivery to the urban areas and industries. As O’Hara observes, Uzbekistan’s GDP declined from 1989 to 1998 by 20 per cent; the ‘economic crisis ... placed even greater importance on agriculture, which has been and continues to be the mainstay of the economy’ (O’Hara 2000: 366). Since independence the budget of the Ministry of Water Resources had declined. It was estimated that the budget of the Ministry was only sufﬁcient to cover 50 per cent of the operation and maintenance costs of running the system (Bucknall et al. 2001, iv and 6). The merger further decreased the ﬁnancial power of the water department within the Ministry as well as its ability to make decisions for water allocation and distribution (compare Wegerich 2005a). Hence, the agricultural department within the Ministry grew stronger and had direct inﬂuence in terms of water allocation. Under Presidential Decree No 2791 (19 December 2000) the Ministry of Communal Services was transformed into the Uzbekistan Communal Services Agency (UCSA). ‘The department responsible for water in the ministry was reorganized into a general directorate responsible for operation and development of interregional trunk water mains only. All other responsibilities for the delivery of drinking water were devolved to the oblast (province) and city levels’ (ADB 2001, 39). An ADB member of staff working in Uzbekistan stated that the transformation was a ‘downgrading’ (Mamatkulov, ADB, e-mail correspondence). On 21 July 2003 the cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan passed a resolution which introduced a new water management framework. According to this resolution the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources is supposed to introduce a ‘rational management of the surface water resources on the territory of the republic by the basin principle, the application of the market principles and mechanisms of water use’ (Resolution N320, Attachment N5, II3). The resolution could be interpreted as water reallocation to high-value users. However, as the name of the Ministry suggests, the main focus of the Ministry is still very much on agriculture. The head of the Communal Services Agency is nominated by decree of the Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources (Resolution N320, Attachment N5, III7). Hence, the Ministry for Agriculture and Water Resources does not only

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allocate water to the urban and industrial sectors, but also appoints the head of the Communal Services Agency. To sum up, there seems to be a governmental policy of decreasing the ﬁnancial means and decision-making power of the Communal Services Agency. Contrary to this the ADB report states that ‘as water is a basic need, the Government is giving improvement to the water supply a high priority in its program’ (ADB 2001: 5). Vodakanal and the Vodakanal Branch of Khorezm The city vodakanals receive their water through the provincial departments. The territorial communal exploitation agency (TCEA) in each province ‘is responsible for large capital development and infrastructure programs in the oblast and is in charge of the province vodokanals, which manage the city vodakanals. “The TCEA reports to the province government, ‘but maintains a working relationship with UCSA in reforming the communal services system’ (ADB 2001: 39). The TCEA in Khorezm is responsible for the public water supply to the urban centers in Khorezm Province. According to the corporate development plan (CDP) of the Khorezm TCEA, the total water supply coverage of the urban areas was 96% in 2003, and it was anticipated that the coverage would increase to 98 % in 2004. The CDP states that there were only 5 water supply failures in 2003, and it was anticipated that the number of interruptions would be reduced to 3 by 2004. In addition, the plan states that in 2003 the reaction time following a pipe burst was shorter than 4 hours, and that it was anticipated that this would decrease further to under 2 hours in 2004. The CDP was developed in cooporation with a World Bank project; after the termination of the project, the CDP has been continuously updated. The data of the CDP Khorezm TCEA suggest, that the organization can provide sufﬁcient water supply to the cities in Khorezm Province, and that interruptions of the public water supply are negligible because of their small number. Also the reported short response time to interruptions implies that there are no shortages of public water supply. However, research conducted in the district cities Khanka and Khiva indicated that water supply is not sufﬁcient. Both cities receive water from the same source, the Tuyamuyun reservoir. Khanka is geographically closer to the reservoir than Khiva. While in Khanka the majority of interviewees stated that they had on average more than 6 hours of water supply per day, in Khiva the majority of the interviewees stated that they had on average less than 6 hours of public water supply per day. These differences cannot be explained by the seasonal variation (see above), but would have to be explained by management shortcomings to sustain the infrastructure and to respond to infrastructure breakdowns. There could also be a second explanation: water is distributed according to the ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served principle. Hence, over utilization ‘upstream’ leads to water shortages ‘downstream’ in the public water supply system. This would indicate that the public water supply faces the problem of a common pool resource and is in need of stronger regulations and enforcement mechanisms in terms of sharing allocation and sharing utilization. Above all, it demonstrates that the cities are in competition with each other over water resources.

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The organizational map indicates that there is a hierarchical structure, which ends at the city level. Even though there are indications about the interactions above city level, it does not seem that there are formalized network interactions, which could be utilized also in terms of information exchange and coordinated bargaining for water resources. The State and its Influence on Civil Society ‘Soviet policies and institutions in Central Asia created, transformed and institutionalised regional political identities’ (Jones Luong 2000, 1). These regional political identities persisted after independence, which ‘ensured that the very same actors, interests and the basis for evaluating power asymmetries would continue to dominate decision-making in the post Soviet period’ (Jones Luong 2000, 1). Jones Luong’s argument is conﬁrmed by Spoor who argues that the vested interests of the political economy of the cotton sector has affected decision making after independence (cf. Spoor 1998, 411). Weinthal argues similarly, ‘Uzbekistan sought to keep the general population on the farms and engaged in cotton production to ensure their hold on social control and stability. [...] Uzbekistan could not jeopardise the foreign revenue earned by cotton sales abroad’ (Weinthal 2001: 26). The state had to continue with the full control over cotton production and sales because it allowed the elite to reinforce regionally-based patronage networks (cf. Weinthal 2001, 29). Two forms of civil society organizations can be identiﬁed in Uzbekistan: local NGOs and community based organizations (mahallas). Even though these different organizations are described by international donors (World Bank, Asian Development Bank) as representing civil society, it is questionable that they represent the interests of civil society or whether these organizations are used by the government to promote a foregrounded or even its own agenda. The International Ecology and Health Foundation (ECOSAN) which was established in 1992, and claims to have 5 million members, is state-sponsored and, Weinthal states, ‘while I was in Nukus, Karakalpakstan, in August 1994, some members of the Union for the Defence of the Aral Sea and Amu darya suggested that the creation of this ofﬁcial NGO was to counter the rise of indigenous social movements and for the government to have its own showpiece NGO to present to foreign delegations’ (Weinthal 2002, 165). Describing the rise of NGOs in the environmental disaster zone near the Aral Sea she argues that ‘indeed the rise of NGOs provides a good measure for the development of local civil society. The Central Asian leaders also recognize this, and as a result, have sought to co-opt local NGO activities and only allow them to have an environmental and educational component, rather than a political one.’ She concludes that ‘these NGOs do not act as a form of opposition to government policies’ (Weinthal 2002, 170). Even though during the Soviet Union the state order on cotton production (i.e. the farmer has no option but plant cotton on his/her plot) was identiﬁed as ‘colonization’ by Moscow, after independence the state order on cotton production continued. However, the local environmental organizations do not question irrigation agriculture and state order on cotton production. Their focus is not on the causes of the environmental problems, but on their consequences.

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Massicard and Trevisani (2003) write on the role of the mahallas. The law of 2nd September 1993 deﬁned the status of the mahalla in the framework of a reorganization of the state. Massicard and Trevisani point out that the role is integrated in the vertical hierarchy of state authority. The head of the mahalla is strongly recommended by the governors of the administrative unit, and can be dismissed by the governors as well. Hence, the election of the mahalla is not a bottom-up process. They argue that ‘through the mahalla ofﬁces, a two dimensional broadening of the state has taken place, one which can be interpreted as a symptom of the latter’s propensity to monopolize the norms and rules of every area of social life. This evolution is important as it demonstrates – more than the Mahalla itself – how the state attempts to create, in the form of the Mahalla ofﬁces, new ﬁelds of control through which it can intervene’ (Massicard and Trevisani 2003: 208). Considering the reasoning of Weinthal on NGOs and their co-optation of the NGOs by the government, as well as the environmental organisation mobilised by the government mobilized for its own purposes and Massicard and Trevisani’s reasoning on the mahallas, it seems that these organizations are strongly integrated into the hierarchical structure of the state and could not be considered as platforms for local voices which challenge the policies of the government. In the cities of Khiva and Khanka the water shortages did not lead to a uniﬁcation and mobilization of the customers. Instead the households found strategies to cope with the water shortages at the individual level. Households use hand pumps for groundwater extraction. Although the urban households blame the allocation of water resources to agriculture for the shortages, they focus on individual strategies rather than on collective action. Hence, it seems that the urban households are aware that the mahallas would not or could not represent their interest against the established power structure. In addition, as Weinthal reasons, NGOs do not challenge the political establishment, therefore it seems likely that they would not challenge the hegemony of the agricultural sector and its thirst for water. Conclusion: Why Reallocation and MSPs do not Happen Despite integrated approaches to water management, reallocation of water resources between the sectors and multi-stakeholder platforms being common frameworks in the hegemonic discourse of the international water community, the data of Uzbekistan emphasises that all these approaches are not yet on the agenda. The evidence suggests that the current authoritative structure does not allow horizontal platforms which could challenge the current political agenda and the manifestation of the political structure in agriculture. The historical data on the institutional development of the Uzbekistan Communal Services Agency on the other hand show that since independence its inﬂuence on decision-making on water allocation has been undermined, its role has decreased from Ministry to Association, its ﬁnancial support has changed from governmental funding to consumer fees funding and even the head of the association is appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water resources. Hence, the inﬂuence of the department has been continuously decreased. This was more than just an occasion, it

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was a long political process in which the power of the agricultural sector grew. The rising importance of the agricultural sector after independence is reproduced in the downgrading of the former Ministry of Communal Services. The current top-down inﬂuence of the authorities on NGOs and mahallas indicate that the raise of inﬂuence of the civil society is seen as a threat to the system. Multi-stakeholder platforms which would be symbolic of a change from authoritarian, vertical management to participation and democratic, more horizontal management are not encouraged, because they would also challenge the current vertical structure of the political decision making and the manifestations of the structure, such as agricultural production and cotton monoculture. The top-down inﬂuence is manifested at all levels. This inﬂuence puts the members of one level into competition with each other, rather than allowing them to unite and to manage the water resources as a common pool resource. The fact that the different cities in Khorezm are competing for water resources and utilize the resources in a seemingly un-institutionalized manner only underlines how unwanted horizontal cooperation is. Instead of relying on the public water supply, urban users found alternatives to compensate for the shortcomings. It can be assumed that having these alternatives prevented them from questioning and challenging the current system of water distribution and management However, it is questionable whether the focus on technical efﬁciency and an increase of the water tariffs will solve the water problem in the urban areas. First of all, the costs for implementing these changes are high, and water consumers will not be able to ﬁnance it. The ADB report on the three cities states that 45% of the total population are poor. The household gardens, which have to be irrigated, are an important source of the livelihood strategies of the urban population. Increasing the prices of potable water, but not maintaining the irrigation channels in the cities might increase the vulnerability of the poor. The long process of increasing productive efﬁciency is in sharp contrast with the urgent needs of the urban population. Therefore, this strategy might have the opposite effect: instead of creating stability, it may well create political instability. References ADB (2001), Report and Recommendation of the president to the board of directors on a proposed loan and technical assistance grant to the republic of Uzbekistan for the urban water supply project, RRP: UZB 33548. ADB (2002), Report and Recommendation of the president to the board of directors on a proposed loan to the republic of Uzbekistan for the western Uzbekistan rural water supply project, RRP: UZB 35496. Bucknall, J., Klytchnikova, I., Lampietti, J., Lundell, M., Scatasta, M. and Thurman, M. (2001), ‘Irrigation in Central Asia: where to rehabilitate and why’, Report. DAI (1996), ‘An environmental profile of the Republic of Uzbekistan’, Report, Prepared for the ADB (contract number ADM/96–196). DFID (2001), ‘Addressing the water crisis – healthier and more productive lives for poor people’, Department for International Development, London.

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Jones Luong, P. (2000), ‘Sources of institutional continuity: the Soviet legacy in Central Asia’, http://www.duke.edu/web/licep/2/luong/luong.pdf. Massicard, E. and Trevisani, T. (2003), ‘The Uzbek mahalla: between state and society’, in Everett-Heath, T. (ed.), Central Asia: aspects of transition, Routledge Curzon, London, pp. 205–219. Mosse, D. (1997), ‘The symbolic making of common property resources: history, ecology and locality in a tank-irrigated landscape in South India’, Development and Change, 28, pp. 467–504. O’Hara, S. L. (2000), ‘Lessons from the past’, Water Policy, Vol. 2, pp. 365–384. Ohlsson, L. and Turton, A. R. (1999), ‘The turning of the screw’, SOAS Water Issue Group, Occasional Paper No. 19, pp. 1–8. SIC ICWC (1999), ‘Institutional, technical and financial issues facing the irrigation sector in the Central Asian Republics’, consulting report, Tashkent, pp. 1–54. Spoor, M. (1998), ‘The Aral Sea basin crisis: transition and environment in former Soviet Central Asia’, Development and Change, Vol. 29 (3), 409–435. Sokolov, V. (1999), ‘Integrated water resource management in the Republic of Uzbekistan’, Water International, Vol. 24 (2), pp. 104–115. Perry, C. J., Rock, M. and Seckler, D. (1997), ‘Water as an economic good: a solution, or a problem’, IWMI Research Report 14, Colombo. Rogers, P., de Silva, R. and Bhatia, R. (2002), ‘Water is an economic good: How to use prices to promote equity, efficiency, and sustainability’, Water Policy, Vol. 4, pp. 1–17. WARMAP Project (1995), Volume 6 – Legal and Institutional Aspects. Wegerich, K. (2005a), ‘What happens in a merger? Experiences of the State Department for Water Resources in Khorezm, Uzbekistan’, Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Vol. 30, pp. 455–462. Wegerich, K. (2005b)‚ ‘Wasserverteilung im Flusseinzugsgebiet des Amudarja. Offene und verdeckte Probleme – heute und in der Zukunft’, in Neubert, S., Scheumann, W., van Edig, A. and Huppert, W. (eds), Integriertes WasserressourcenManagement (IWRM): Ein Konzept in die Praxis überführen, Nomos-Verlag, pp. 201–216. Wegerich, K. (2006), ‘Groundwater utilization as adaptive capacity to public water supply shortages: Case study of two cities in Khorezm, Uzbekistan’, in Tellam, J.H. et al. (eds), Urban Groundwater Management and Sustainability, Springer, pp. 479–491. Weinthal, E. (2002), State making and environmental cooperation, MIT Press, Cambridge. Weinthal, E. (2001), ‘Sins of Omission: Constructing Negotiating Sets in the Aral Sea Basin’, Journal of Environment and Development, Vol. 10 (1), pp. 50–79.

Chapter 15

Unpacking Participatory NRM: Distinguishing Resource Capture from Democratic Governance Bruce Currie-Alder

Introduction A participatory approach that seeks to involve multiple stakeholders in natural resource management (NRM) does not guarentee more equitable and effective outcomes in practice. Research has shown that people can and do organize to promote collective action for managing natural resources held in common (Ostrom 1990). This research has identiﬁed governance principles for forming institutional arrangements and evaluated case studies to validate this list and provide insight into how common property users deﬁne their membership, exclude outsiders from resource use, and monitor each other’s activities, distribute costs and beneﬁts, and reduce incentives for free-riding (Agrawal 2002, Dietz et al. 2003). Nonetheless, the relative value of scarce resources can also prompt powerful groups within society to assert control over and capture natural resources in order to appropriate wealth and enhance their position (Khagram et al. 2003) and participatory NRM can either empower local people to make their own decisions or reproduce existing power inequities (Sithole 2002). Thus a key challenge for NRM research is to unpack participation to distinguish initiatives that lead to resource capture from initiatives that democratize NRM for those people whose livelihoods directly depend on access to natural resources. This paper unpacks participatory NRM using examples from the literature and research projects funded by Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The following sections describe how the performance of participatory NRM depends upon the mixture of stakeholders involved, and how NRM addresses both the shared objectives and stakeholder incentives. Later sections descibe the challenge of evaluating participatory NRM, which depends upon stakeholdersupported interpretations of: (1) the efﬁciency, equity, and effectiveness of participation in achieving outcomes; (2) the rights, responsibilities, and role of each stakeholder in the process; and (3) the scale, scope, and structure of the management process. Finally, four key insights are presented for designing future initiatives in participatory NRM.

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Unpacking Participation Participation is a process through which a powerful stakeholder begins to share responsibility with other interested stakeholders. The powerful stakeholder, often a governmental agency, may voluntarily seek the participation of others, or it can be coerced to accept such input. For example, in Mexico, watershed councils are promoted by the federal government as a means to implement integrated water management, yet protests by producer groups and NGOs forced the federal government to accept a consultative council for the Terminos Lagoon Protected Area (Currie-Alder 2004). As such, participatory NRM encompasses a spectrum of power relations among stakeholders stretching from one extreme where control over natural resources is concentrated in a single powerful stakeholder to another extreme where other stakeholders inform, inﬂuence, or perform NRM. Towards the midpoint of the spectrum, no single stakeholder can act unilaterally, instead management actions and decisions must be negotiated. Participation may occur formally or informally. In addition to formal recognition on behalf of the powerful stakeholder, participatory approaches can create informal situations where other stakeholders fulﬁl responsibilities for performing tasks. For example, on the northern coast of Mexico’s Yucatan peninsula, the Actanchuleb reserve was established by local ﬁshers and lies outside the formal state and national-level protected areas (Fraga et al. 2002). Such examples set a precedent and can establish a custom of participation that can cause stakeholders’ expectations to increase over time. Stakeholders can feel empowered to acquire a greater role or new responsibilities; thus participation can create positive feedback and an initially weak form of participation may evolve into a stronger one. Participatory NRM can be bottom-up, top-down, or a combination of both. In top-down participation a powerful stakeholder seeks to share responsibilities, while in bottom-up participation stakeholders pressure for a greater role in management or share responsibilities in the absence of an existing authority. Government convened advisory boards are top-down, and community-based NRM tends to be bottom-up, while co-management regimes are a mixture of both. Yet participatory NRM also tends to be context speciﬁc, making comparisons difﬁcult. Different authors have proposed different typologies for participation (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996, Biggs and Farrington 1991, Arnstein 1969), yet the key to understanding participatory NRM lies in the relationships among stakeholders. Identifying Stakeholders ‘Stakeholders’ are individuals or groups who stand to lose or gain from the management process and thus possess some form of personal investment in NRM outcomes. Often this ‘stake’ considered is a livelihood dependence on the resource in question, yet the nature of a stakeholder’s relationship to these resources can change over time as peoples’ interests and positions are ﬂuid and dynamic. Participants can switch ‘stakes’ and stakeholders can change roles depending on changes in their understanding of each other and of the dynamics of the natural resource base.

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Not all stakeholders are equal, and there is no simple distinction between who is and is not considered a stakeholder in participatory NRM. Stakeholders can be powerful individuals or groups that have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on NRM, and may include wealthy landowners, industry, and government. Stakeholders may also have had a previously limited or unrecognized role in the formal management process. Such stakeholders may include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), indigenous peoples, and civil society in general. In the Social Analysis System, Chevalier (2003) suggests using the criteria of power, interests, and legitimacy to distinguish the degree of saliency of potential stakeholders. This method offers the potential to reveal the complexity of social reality at a given moment; yet by exploring stakeholder perceptions, the method can also inﬂuence how people perceive their situation and can be repeated to capture how these relationships change over time. Shared Objectives vs. Stakeholder Objectives Participatory NRM must consider what motivate peoples to participate. Bulkeley and Mol (2003) describe four goals for adopting participatory NRM: (1) to bridge scientiﬁc and experiential knowledge, (2) to clarify stakeholder perceptions of the problem, (3) to promote learning, and (4) establish commitment among stakeholders. These goals are perceived to be superior to unilateral action on behalf of any single stakeholder, and require stakeholders to share their perspectives, interests, values, knowledge, or acceptance of the management process. Nonetheless, it is essential to ask what motivates a stakeholder to share, especially when there are powerful incentives against working together – such as inequalities in power, wealth, access and control over resources – or when stakeholders are unaware of either the potential beneﬁt of collective action or the collective cost of non-cooperation (Singleton 1999). Thus participatory NRM must balance shared objectives, intended to achieve a collective beneﬁt for multiple stakeholders, and the stakeholder objectives including the more personalized beneﬁts that motivate individuals and groups to participate. Shared objectives may include improving the understanding, legitimacy and capacity among multiple stakeholders (Box 15.1), yet stakeholders also become involved in participatory NRM as a means of achieving more personal goals. For example, individual stakeholders may seek prestige and the recognition of others, training to acquire needed technical and administrative skills, entitlement to access to and use of resources upon which their livelihood strategies depend, or to maintain their cultural identity and practices related to resource use. The combination of shared objectives and stakeholder incentives represent the value added of participatory NRM as compared with more centralized management process. Both shared objectives and stakeholder objectives are often implicit in the decision to adopt a participatory approach, yet these objectives must be stated explicitly and revisited periodically to ensure stakeholders commitment. Such incentives for participation are balanced against incentives for resistence, conﬂict and confrontation. Stakeholders who lack formal power may opt for more

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Box 15.1 Shared objectives

Understanding Participatory NRM is a means to cope with complexity and share understanding among stakeholders. Holling (2001) describes a paradigm for ecological research that interprets natural and social systems as interconnected ‘panarchies’ that function simultaneous at multiple scales and exhibit dynamic behaviour and possess multiple equilibria. This paradigm suggests that NRM needs to foster the ability of people and ecosystems to adapt to change, rather than the predictability and control of natural resource yields, thus participatory NRM seeks to improve understanding by incorporating multiple sources of knowledge held by different stakeholders. Legitimacy Participatory NRM is a means to build acceptance of the management process among multiple stakeholders. Participatory NRM allows different voices to be heard, each of which requires outcomes that are relevant to their own needs and interests. Participatory NRM can be a way forward in situations deadlocked by distrust where no single stakeholder has sufﬁcient legitimacy to act alone in managing natural resources. Participatory NRM explores how different stakeholders have different rights and power over natural resources. Capacity Participatory NRM is a means to build the capacity of stakeholders to become involved in the management process, including opportunities to gain skills, exchange experiences and share information. As a disproportionate share of the costs and impacts of NRM outcomes are often borne by disadvantaged groups (Sithole 2002), participatory NRM can also empower these stakeholders groups to deﬁne and defend their customary rights and practices related to resource use. Participatory NRM can foster self-governance by increasing the skills of individuals and groups to gain voice within management.

covert forms of social negotiation ranging from protest to sabotage in order to strengthen their voice and assert their rights to resources (Sithole 2002). Thus, the existence of participatory initiative is insufﬁcient to guarantee the involvement of all relevant stakeholders, and facilitators must strive to make participatory NRM inclusive and sufﬁciently attractive for stakeholders to value the process over alternate forms of social negotiation. Moench (2002) states that people with diverse livelihood options are less likely to seek social change through protest; nonetheless, stakeholders may still pursue alternate forms of negotiation while involved in participatory NRM, especially if such action enhances their position (Singleton 1999). An appreciation of stakeholder objectives, both for and against participation, and a dose of creativity can facilitate a participatory NRM even under apparently adverse conditions. Understanding the incentives that motivate stakeholders is essential in Latin America and the Caribbean given the region’s active civil society and historical practices of social protest. As the complexity of management

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challenges surpasses the capacity of governmental NRM agencies, new niches have opened for non-governmental stakeholders to take a more active role in NRM. Yet, if the motivations of these new stakeholders are ignored, they can lose their desire to participate. Evaluating Participation The success of participatory NRM depends, in part, upon the extent to which it achieves shared objectives and responds to stakeholder incentives; nonetheless, there are other means of evaluating participation. For example, Conley and Moote (2003) suggest that participatory NRM be evaluated by monitoring three categories of outcomes, including improvements in the participatory process, environmental quality and social-economic conditions. Such evaluations cannot be value-free and impartial; instead they must be foster reﬂection and learning among stakeholders through group discussion and other shared activities. In particular, it is useful to explore stakeholder understanding of certain key concepts. In the participatory evaluation method of ‘Outcome Mapping’, participants build towards consensus on team vision, mission, boundary partners, progress markers, and monitoring (Earl, Carden and Smutylo 2001). Participatory NRM is enhanced when participants discuss and have mutually compatible understanding of: (1) the efﬁciency, equity, and effectiveness of participation in achieving outcomes; (2) the rights, responsibilities, and role of each stakeholder in the process; and (3) the scale, scope, and structure of the NRM process. Achieving Outcomes In evaluating participatory NRM it is essential to understand that different stakeholders can have different notions of effectiveness, equity and efﬁciency. Fostering dialogue on the meaning of these criteria can improve stakeholder understanding of participation and suggest indicators for monitoring the process. Effectiveness is the extent to which participatory NRM achieves desired outcomes, including the extent to which participatory NRM both satisﬁes shared objectives and individual stakeholder objectives. For example, the Sustainable Development Consultative Council (Consejo Consultivo de Desarollo Sustentable) in Tabasco, Mexico, appears to be efﬁcient and equitable, as this Council operates with little funding and all stakeholder representatives have ample opportunity to contribute to group discussions. Yet the absence of a single key stakeholder, in the form of the state legislature, means the Council is ineffective as its proposals are seldom implemented (Currie-Alder 2004). Even in the absence of improved environmental quality or changes in stakeholder behaviour, participatory NRM may be considered effective if it contributes to the shared objectives of understanding, legitimacy, and capacity. Equity is the degree of fairness in the distribution of costs and beneﬁts among stakeholders involved in achieveing the outcomes of participatory NRM. Different stakeholders can have different notions of fairness. Equity can mean an equal share in

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costs and beneﬁts among each stakeholder, a proportional share based on the extent of a stakeholder’s participation in the process, or a situational share depending on a stakeholder’s needs or dependence on the resource. For example, in Andean irrigation systems managed by indigenous people, Trawick (2003) observes that in times of abundance water is distributed in proportional shares according to each farmer’s position in the social hierarchy, yet in times of scarcity available water is distributed in situational shares depending on the size of farmers’ ﬁelds. Measuring equity requires deﬁning the criteria used for valuing and distributing the resource. When participatory NRM is supported by international donors, participation is expected to lead to improved resource access for the poor and empower disadvantaged groups in order to obtain greater voice in NRM. Efficiency is the ratio of management outcomes to the costs of achieving those outcomes. Yet this ratio can be interpreted in different ways, including: Pareto efﬁciency where improved outcomes ensure that no stakeholder is adversely affected, Kaldor-Hicks efﬁciency where those who beneﬁt from an outcome compensate those who are adversely affected by it, and allocative efﬁciency where resources are allocated to maximise the net beneﬁt attained through their use. For example, one study of the El Angel watershed in Ecuador, considers the ratio of income generated to the quantity of water used in agriculture and is thus a form of allocative efﬁciency (Evans et al. 2003). In practice, measuring efﬁciency is complex as it invloves deﬁning which outcomes and costs are considered and assigning comparable values to each. For example, desirable outcomes can include building trust among stakeholders, enhancing resource productivity, or maintaining environmental services, while costs include the ﬁnancial costs of the management process as well as the costs of stakeholders’ time, energy, and personal expenses. Considerations of efﬁciency depend upon the timeframe considered. Participatory NRM is generally assumed to require greater shorter-term costs to set up than more centralized NRM, yet result in longer-term beneﬁts and avoid potentially costly resolution of disputes resulting from centralized NRM. For example, Alurride et al (2002) note that the lack of legitimacy and stakeholder support lead to the costly repeal of national water legislation in Bolivia. Stakeholder Participation How stakeholders are involved in participatory NRM is at least as important as the outcomes achieved. Participatory NRM must engage and negotiate multiple perspectives on, and relationships to, natural resources held by different stakeholders. Thus, participatory NRM is a political activity in which the representation of stakeholder interests and the accountability of decision makers are vital to achieving outcomes (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Indeed Olson proposed that efﬁcient and equitable outcomes in public choice processes, of which participatory NRM can be considered a special case, result when the mix of stakeholders involved is representative of the collective interests of society (1982, 37). As an entry point for engaging the politics of stakeholder interaction, successful participatory NRM fosters dialogue among stakeholders towards understanding each other’s rights, responsibilities and roles.

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Rights are the entitlements that each stakeholder possesses -including property, cultural, and legal rights- that deﬁne their relationship to natural resources. Rights provide a means of distinguishing stakeholders based on the level of control over or connection to a particular natural resource. Property rights include claims to use, manage, or alienate natural resources (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). For example, each member of the ﬁshing cooperative in Actanchuleb reserve has a right to ﬁsh within the reserve, a network of local elders, known as the Fuerzas Vivas, has a quasi-formal right to manage the reserve, but cannot sell or give away these ﬁshing grounds (Fraga et al. 2002). Cultural and legal rights may also inﬂuence the relationship between actors and natural resources, for example many indigenous groups have preserved or reinvented a culture of living within the landscape that grants its members a social licence to interact with natural resources even in the absence of formal recognition to do so by government agencies. The absence of rights –whether property, cultural, and legal– is not sufﬁcient reason to exclude potential stakeholders from participatory NRM when disadvantaged groups and other stakeholders have interests and needs that are tied to their acesss and use of these resources. Nonetheless, discussion of formal and informal rights can enrich stakeholder understanding and assist in assessing whether key stakeholders are excluded from management or whether some stakeholders participate in a disproportionate or inappropriate manner. Responsibilities describe how stakeholders contribute to the management process, including the activities they perform and the support they give to the process. Where rights describe what a stakeholder is entitled to do, responsibilities describe the activities a stakeholder performs. In weaker forms of participation, stakeholders are merely responsible for informing NRM authorities of their perspectives and interests, while in stronger forms of participation stakeholders take responsibility for tasks such as convening meetings, collecting and analyzing data, budgeting, planning, or allotting resource use. Roles are deﬁned by a stakeholder’s responsibilities and describe their overall purpose in participatory NRM. Roles describe how stakeholders perceive their participation and are deﬁned by the sum of the responsibilities they fulﬁl. While stakeholders can include local people, NGOs, producer groups, and government agencies, any of these groups may play a range of roles such as decision-maker, planner, data collector, enforcer, advisor, critic, etc. Roles imply both the degree to which a stakeholder participates in the NRM process and the relative inﬂuence he or she has in decision-making. Roles and Responsibilities can change over time. Stakeholders may initially adopt a role of critic and take responsibility for identifying weaknesses in existing policies and practices; yet as participation matures, stakeholders can feel empowered and adopt new roles, such as planner or data collector. The dominant managerial role of government NRM agencies is challenged with the inclusion of other stakeholders. As participation matures, government NRM agencies must adopt a new role to coordinate activities and facilitate communication among others who fulﬁll management responsibilities. With experience and learning, over time stakeholders can renegotiate their rights, acquire new responsibilities and adopt new roles.

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Nature of Management The nature of NRM is potentially transformed by the participation of stakeholders. The diversity of perspectives and interests that different stakeholders contribute to participatory NRM reveals how the natural resources are connected to social and ecological processes. Participatory NRM may begin with a narrow focus on a single resource within a deﬁned geographic space, yet meaningful participation will challenge these boundaries. Without understanding these potential consequences of participatory NRM, stakeholders may feel frustrated as the scale, scope and structure of management shift over time. Scale refers to the spatial and temporal boundaries of management, or the expanse of management in time and space. The temporal and spatial limits of management are challenged both by greater understanding of ecological processes and the diversity of perceptions and interests brought to the table in a participatory approach. For example, the Carchi Consortium, a multistakeholder forum for discussing NRM issues in northern Ecuador, initially focused on subsection of the El Angel watershed. Yet as researchers learned the importance of local conﬂicts over water, and local people became more involved, the Consortium extended its boundaries to consider the higher-elevation Páramo wetlands (Poats et al 2002). Such scale-forcing is to be expected in participatory NRM when stakeholders learn how different natural resources are embedded in multiple processes extending across time and space (Holling 2001). This scale-forcing potential for expanding NRM boundaries is particularly prominent with highly fugitive or mobile resources, such as wildlife and water, that cut across political and administrative boundaries. Additionally, as the interests of different stakeholders have different geographical footprints, the overlap of these footprints in participatory NRM can also force management to consider larger scales of time and space. Scope concerns the conceptual and institutional boundaries deﬁning what and who is considered in management: the resources managed, the goals of NRM, and the stakeholders involved. Where scale describes management in time and space, scope describes what is to be managed and by whom. Scope expands when more stakeholders become involved, and the overlap of stakeholder interests can expand the scope of the NRM process to include additional resources, challenges and objectives. For example, the Terminos Lagoon Protected Area in southern Mexico was established by a presidential decree which states that the area’s purpose is to protect wildlife habitat, yet the involvement of local stakeholders in designing the management plan expanded the scope of the NRM to encompass additional goals related to regulating activities in the oil industry and promoting community development (Currie-Alder 2004). Scale and scope can combine to trigger a continually expanding management horizon. As more actors introduce more objectives and more resources into the management process, these objectives and resources force management to consider larger temporal and geographic scales. As mentioned above, the scale considered by the Carchi Consortium, shifted to consider the Paramo ecosystem and adjacent watersheds. Yet this shift in scale also triggers a shift in scope,

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as the new scale forces the Consortium to engage new stakeholders initially excluded from the process, such as large landowners, the provincial government and the municipal governments (Waldick 2003). Expanding scale and scope will encounter a limit, however, as transaction and information costs of participatory NRM increase. It takes time and energy for stakeholders to meet and decide how natural resources are to be managed, and these costs increase as more stakeholders enter the process and are spread over greater distances. Additionally, the understanding of natural processes over larger scales –or even the data to describe these processes– may simply not exist. Institutional constraints or arbitrary decisions may determine the limits to expanded management scale and scope. Scaling-up management to encompass larger geographic areas can depend upon the participation of a key stakeholder and a barrier is reached if they cannot be enticed into participating in the process. In such situations, participatory NRM must either remain at a more restricted scale and scope, or invest time in building relationships and courting the participation of the key stakeholder. Structure describes the relationships between stakeholders, including the ﬂows of information and decision-making. With participation, the NRM process undergoes a structural shift away from hierarchies, contained within a single organization, towards networks connecting multiple stakeholders. Centralized NRM concentrates responsibilities within a single organization, often a government agency, which has a pronounced internal hierarchy. Through participation, the ﬂow of information and management responsibilities initially contained within this single hierarchy are distributed among other stakeholders. These new stakeholders may have more horizontal internal structures -such as ejidal assemblies in Mexico or many NGOs- or they may possess their own internal hierarchies -such as municipal governments, other governmental NRM agencies, or universities. Nonetheless, participatory NRM implies that the hierarchies within organizations become secondary to network relationships between different stakeholders. Topdown approaches operating within hierarchical structures must shift to a more horizontal network structure where responsibilities and roles are more freely shared with others. The network among stakeholders that exists within participatory NRM requires powerful stakeholders to surrender some control over the management process. With greater sharing of responsibilities among multiple stakeholders, it is increasingly difﬁcult for any one stakeholder to dominate NRM. As the network develops, stakeholders can question conventional assumptions and practices. Going participatory can be perceived as threatening to agency control as outcomes do not necessarily coincide with existing policy and programs. Ironically, this reduced control over the management process may cause such a powerful stakeholder to resist or withdraw from participatory NRM precisely when social learning begins. It is thus necessary to enter participatory NRM with a degree of ﬂexibility. Government agencies must deﬁne a set of core values that are non-negotiable, such as the framework of existing legislation, but accept that other aspects of NRM may be transformed through meaningful participation.

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Insights Olson’s coalitions (1982) represent two extremes: • •

the distributional coalition being resource capture by an elite for private beneﬁt, the encompassing coalition is representative of society’s interests and leads to democratic governance.

In practice, participatory NRM is often somewhere in between these extremes as not everyone is a stakeholder, nor are all stakeholders necessarily interested in all aspects of NRM. The following are four key insights for the design of future initiatives in participatory NRM. 1. Effective facilitators must foster dialogue among stakeholders regarding each other’s rights, responsibilities and roles, and seek opportunities for experimentation and adaptation. Participatory NRM needs to tap the creativity and energy of stakeholders to explore and deﬁne their own role in management. Facilitators need to assist stakeholders to understand each other and the host of factors that deﬁne the framework within which participation can occur, including legislation, economic incentives, and market conditions. Participatory NRM encounters barriers when stakeholder disagree as to the purpose of their participation, yet dialogue that explores stakeholder perceptions (Table 15.1 and 15.2) can reduce frustration and burnout. In particular, facilitators must work with stakeholders to determine how participatory NRM will be evaluated and building awareness of the potential shifts in the nature of management. Table 15.1

Unpacking participatory NRM

1. Who participates? 2. Who does not participate? 3. What is the purpose of participation? 4. Why do they participate?

5. 6. 7. 8.

Stakeholders involved in the process. Stakeholders excluded from the process. The collective, shared objectives of participatory NRM, including: understanding, legitimacy, and capacity. The individual objectives that motivate stakeholders to participate in the process, including: prestige, training, livelihoods, and/or culture. How do they participate? The activities shared in participatory NRM, such as monitoring, research, planning. Are there power imbalances? Differences in power, capacity and/or authority between stakeholders. Does scale-forcing occur? Changes in the scale or scope of management due to learning. What are the barriers The factors that limit stakeholder participation, to participation? that can suggest which strategies facilitators should use to overcome these barriers.

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2 To facilitate the emergence of democratic governance, participatory NRM must seek a mixture of stakeholders that reﬂects wider society where the process remains tractable, but has sufﬁcient participation to achieve shared objectives. Initially as each new stakeholder enters the process, there is a high marginal beneﬁt from their participation since their inclusion adds a signiﬁcant proportion of perspectives and interests excluded from centralized NRM. Yet there is a point of diminishing returns where the beneﬁt of involving new stakeholders is outweighed by additional costs in communication and negotiation. Forming encompassing coalitions, therefore, is a matter of ﬁnding a balance where participatory NRM remains tractable, but has sufﬁcient participation to enrich the management process and achieve shared objectives. The point of optimal participation depends upon the costs, beneﬁts and outcomes considered in evaluating the process. Table 15.2

Evaluating participatory NRM processes

Achieving Outcomes Effectiveness Equity Efﬁciency Stakeholder Participation Rights Responsibilities Roles Nature of Management Scale Scope Structure

To what extent are the desired outcomes achieved? How are costs, beneﬁts and power distributed among stakeholders? What is the ratio of outcomes to the costs of achieving them?

What are each stakeholder’s entitlements to natural resources? What tasks does each stakeholder perform? What is the purpose of each stakeholder’s participation? Which spatial and temporal scales are considered? Which resources and stakeholders are considered? How are the relationships among different stakeholders organized?

3. The appropriate scale, scope, and structure for participatory NRM shift over time as stakeholders learn, rights and responsibilities are redistributed, and roles change. The scale and scope of participatory NRM depend on factors such as the natural resources involved, the legal framework for participation, and the willingness of key stakeholders to participate. In general, the integration of stakeholder objectives will force participatory NRM to expand in scale and scope, and shift from hierarchies to networks. With learning, there is a tendency for the spatial and temporal scale of management to expand outwards, crossing boundaries and encompassing multiple stakeholders each with their own jurisdiction and entitlements. This phenomenon of scale-forcing necessitates the inclusion of additional stakeholders and where the internal hierarchies of government agencies become secondary to the network among stakeholders (see Figure 15.1). Topdown approaches to NRM are structured as hierarchies while bottom-up approaches are structured as networks. Bridging the gap between these structures through participatory NRM creates networks in which the internal hierarchies within different stakeholder groups are embedded in a more horizontal web between stakeholders.

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Figure 15.1 Envisioning participatory NRM 4. Such changes prompt a shift in the structure of NRM towards networks where government agencies must scale down and grassroots organizations must scale up to ﬁt. For grassroot organizations, engaging government and powerful stakeholders can enhance the effectiveness of participatory NRM initiated from the bottomup. Governments can contribute legal support for grassroots-initiated NRM, institutionalizing and making participation less vulnerable to external disturbance. For government agencies, involving other stakeholders can help bridge the gap between government and local commmunity visions and increases the legitimacy of government’s role in resource management. As government agencies transfer responsabilities to other stakeholders, participatory NRM can challenge established policies. Government must deﬁne a core set of values which are non-negotiable, yet when the outcomes of participatory NRM assist in achieving the agency’s mandate, government must be willing to adapt its policies to match the learning among stakeholders. Conclusion Participatory NRM that encourages democratic governance is a transformative process. The conceptual framework presented in this paper – based on the literature and supported by examples from Latin America – proposes that participatory NRM processes that encourage democratic governance include: a mix of stakeholders that reﬂects wider society; dialogue among stakeholders regarding each other’s rights, responsibilities and roles; shifts in the nature of management over time; and a

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requirement for stakeholders to scale down or scale up to ﬁt. Conversely, the absence of these characteristics can signal that participatory NRM merely legitimates a process that facilitates resource capture, or at very least fails to tackle core issues regarding the power relations among stakeholders. The understanding offered by this framework can lead to better management by identifying and tackling with weaknesses in participatory NRM. Processes that do not demonstrate these characteristics can be enhanced if stakeholders critically examine different aspects of the power relationships among them, including: • • • • •

who is excluded from NRM; tension between collective objectives and stakeholder incentives; distribution of rights, responsibilities and roles in NRM; criteria for evaluating the effectiveness, equity and efﬁciency of NRM outcomes; and shifts in the scale, scope and structure of management.

Conversely, awareness of these characteristics of democratic governance can assist stakeholders involved in such processes to avoid frustration and burnout. In particular, a government agency can perceive changing roles and shifts in the nature of management as a challenge to its authority, yet such an agency should be willing to adjust its policies so long as participatory NRM assists to achieve its mandate and encourages democratic governance. Acknowledgements My thanks to Philippa Wiens, Simon Carter and Merle Faminow for their comments on earlier drafts. This paper was made possible through the support of the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa. References Agrawal, A. (2002), ‘Commons resources and institutional sustainability’, in The Drama of the Commons, National Academy Press, Washinton, DC. Agrawal, A. and Gibson, C. C. (1999), ‘Enchantment and disenchantment: the role of community in natural resource conservation’, World Development 27(4), 629–49. Agrawal,A. and Ostrom, E. (2001), ‘Collective action, property rights, and decentralization in resource use in India and Nepal’, Politics & Society 29(4), 485–505. Alurralde, T., Cralos, J., Solon, P. and Orellana, R. (2002), Water Legislation in Bolivia: Finding Common Ground, La Paz, Bolivia: Comision para la Gestion Integral del Agua en Bolivia. Arnstein, S. R. (1969), ‘A ladder of citizen participation’, Journal of the American Planning Association 35, 216–224. Biggs, S. and Farrington, J. (1991), Agricultural Research and the Poor: A Review of Social Science Analysis, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada. Borrini-Feyerabend, G. (1996), Collaborative Management of Protected Areas: Tailoring the Approach to the Context, International Union for the Conservation

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of Nature, Gland, Switzerland. Bulkeley, H. and Mol, Arthur P. J. (2003), ‘Participation and environmental governance: consensus, ambivalence and debate’, Environmental Values 12, 143–54. Chavelier, J. (2003), Social Analysis System, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada: [accessed March 5, 2004] Availabile at www.trican.com/sas. Conley, A. and Moote, M. A. (2003), ‘Evaluating collaborative natural resource management’, Society and Natural Resources 16, 371–386. Currie-Alder, B. (2004), ‘Sharing environmental responsibility in Southeast Mexico: Participatory Processes for Natural Resource Management’, Paper presented at the 10th Congress of the International Asscoiation for the Study of Common Property. Availabile at www.iascp04.org.mx Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. and Stern, P. (2003), ‘The struggle to govern the commons’, Science 302 (5652), 1907–11. Earl, S., Carden, F. and Smutylo, T. (2001), Outcome Mapping: Building Learning and Reflection into Development Programs, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada. Evans, E. M. et al. (2003), ‘Achieving efficiency and equity in irrigation management: an optimization model of the El Angel watershed, Carchi, Ecuador’, Agricultural Systems 77, 1–22. Fraga, J. et al. (2002), ‘Manejo comunitario de una reserva marina en San Felipe, Mexico.’, in Balance Entre Población y Recursos: Investigación Interdisciplinaria y Manejo de Áreas Costeras en el Gran Caribe, Editorial Fundación UNA, Heredia, Costa Rica. Holling, C. S. (2001) ‘Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological and social systems’, Ecosystems 4, 390–405. Khagram, S., Clark, W. C. and Dana Firas Raad (2003), ‘From the environment and human security to sustainable security and development’, Journal of Human Development 4(2), 289–313. Moench, M. (2002), ‘Water and the potential for social instability: livelihoods, migration and the building of society’, Natural Resources Forum 26(3), 195–204. Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities, Yale University Press, London, UK. Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Poats, S. et al. (2002), Planificación estratégica del manejo participativo a diferentes escalas de los recursos naturales en la cuenca alta del Río Mira, Ecuador, Project Final Report; http://www.idrc.ca/library. Singleton, S. (1999), ‘Commons problems, collective action and efficiency: past and present institutions of governance in Pacific Northwest salmon fisheries’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(3), 367–391. Sithole, B. (2002), Where the Power Lies: Multiple Stakeholder Politics over Natural Resources, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, Indonesia. Trawick, P. (2003), ‘Against the privatization of water: an indigenous model for improving existing laws and successfully governing the commons’, World Development 31(6), 977–96. Waldick, L. (2003), ‘Water management in Ecuador’s Andes mountains’, IDRC Reports, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, http://www.idrc.ca/ reports.

Chapter 16

Towards Evaluating MSPs for Integrated Catchment Management Annemiek Verhallen, Jeroen Warner and Leo Santbergen

The Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management project (MSP-ICM project) set out to track the emergence, functioning and sustainability of multi-stakeholder platforms. We started the book with three research questions:

1. Are MSPs compatible with integrated water resource management (IWRM)? 2. Do multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) make a difference? 3. Can (and should) MSPs be sustainable?

As a starting point, let us be reminded that MSPs are beasts ﬁnding their multiple feet (like centi- or millipedes) in a widely varied habitat with multifarious challenges. From a systems (cybernetics) perspective, a multi-stakeholder platform deliberately brings in extra diversity, and due to the multiple interactions between the actors, extra complexity. After Ashby’s Law (Ashby 1964), we can say that the complexity of the governing system aims to reﬂect the complexity of the system to be governed – both the task at hand and the policy environment habitat. As hinted by the ‘sustainability’ aspect of our project’s mission, there is a time element here: if the MSP manages to be adaptive over time in the face of change and uncertainty, we can understand MSPs as complex adaptive institutional organisms as they move between the Scylla of order (energy) and the Charibdys of chaos (entropy) – given that, in Dourojeanni’s lucky phrase, MSPs are slow to grow and quick to die. In this concluding chapter we shall answer these three research questions stated in the ﬁrst paragraph. From the chapters we draw theoretical and empirical notions and take them a step further. We ﬁrst discuss the compatibility of MSPs and Integrated Water Resource Management, second we discuss the efﬁcacy and efﬁciency (do MSPs make a difference?) and the topic of sustainability. We introduce the topic of the evaluation of MSPs and suggest revision of the main assessment dimensions of Chapter 2 in light of several contributions in this issue. Finally we present a mixedmode (‘Vlecht’) model as an alternative to the ‘learning’ and ‘ﬁghting’ approaches to MSPs, as we feel this gives the most realistic ‘ﬁt’ with the every-day functioning of MSPs and Integrated Water Management.

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Are MSPs Compatible with Integrated Water Resource Management? Although there is a widespread agreement that IWRM is an imperative for sustainable development, Watson (this volume) notes a general reluctance on the part of responsible water policy authorities to accept alternative systems of governance. They may perceive IWRM as a threat to their authority as well as a challenge to their fundamental values and beliefs. This may prove a serious barrier to opening up windows to more deliberative ways of governance which upgrade (scale up) the level of ambition of MSPs from information and consultative sounding-boards to opportunities for strategic dialogues, collaborative planning and/or co-decision making. A recognition that management responsibility within a catchment or for an aquifer is often divided among various public agencies at different spatial scales (national, state, municipal) and shared between different agencies at the same spatial level, is a key driver for creating MSPs for horizontal and vertical co-ordination (Mitchell, this volume). Yet, Mitchell notes, because of its complexity integrated management invite centralization. Indeed, IWRM and MSPs appear to have their conceptual optimum at different scales. In promoting a comprehensive, a whole-of-systems perspective (river basin scale), IWRM can experience tension with MSPs, since many individuals, communities or stakeholder groups do not always take the entire system into account, but rather only to that part or aspect which reﬂects their own needs and interests (local and/or regional scale; Mitchell, this volume). Thus, individuals often focus only on the impacts of catchment management on their own property, while municipal governments frequently worry only about the territory under their responsibility (ibid). This is also the case with regional or national administrative levels. The geographic river basin unit is imposed over the different forms in which societies had historically constructed their administrative units, their social interrelations, their political divisions etcetera (Barham, 2001). Pre-existing management units are presented as causes of failure (Dourojeanni, 2001) instead of departure points for designing management measures. The advocates of the river basin approach seized the right moment to make their perspective heard, taking advantage of the space created many years ago by water and environmental problems in international relations (Moreyra and Warner, this volume). The delimitation of the working scale is a political decision, no matter how “natural” the limits might appear technically, especially when it comes to management, where decisions involve the resources that will be taken into account and the people that are inside and outside the system (Schlager and Blomquist 2001). The challenge for IWRM and MSPs pulling in the same directions is to work simultaneously at two or more scales: from a small watershed to large transboundary basins. To see them as nested systems. So in parallel with a catchment-wide MSP, increasingly sub-basin catchment MSPs are used to ensure the catchment-wide group does not get overwhelmed by the many interests and conﬂicts across an entire river basin, and also does not develop strategies or initiatives that do not make sense in all the sub-catchments since each usually has distinctive characteristics. It is critical

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that several members from each sub-basin catchment MSP become members of the catchment-wide MSP, to ensure that the spatial and sectoral views from each subbasin are shared at the catchments scale (Mitchell, this volume). This is also the case in transboundary basins. Do MSPs Make a Difference? Participatory natural resource management encompasses a spectrum of power relations among stakeholders stretching from one extreme where control over natural resources is concentrated in a single powerful stakeholder to another extreme where other stakeholders inform, inﬂuence, or perform natural resource management. Towards the midpoint of the spectrum, no single stakeholder can act unilaterally, instead management actions and decisions must be negotiated (Currie-Alder, this volume). In this midpoint MSPs can make a difference. Critical conditions to make a difference are recognition of interdependence, but also the willingness of all involved to take joint responsibility and learn their way into addressing the dilemmas facing all. Negotiation that looked integrative may turn out to be distributive after all, but also free-riding, opportunism and double agendas are obvious pitfalls (Verhallen, this volume). To make a difference MSPs need to overcome the key criticism aimed at collaborative systems of governance providing opportunities for deliberation: that of producing implementation failures as insufﬁcient attention is given to outputs that will have an impact on the problem at hand. As a result, participants may lose enthusiasm for further collaboration if there is little sign of their efforts having a positive effect (Watson, this volume). Stakeholder participation invariably identiﬁes crucial social issues, many of which are only tangential to river management. In that case admitting these issues to the holistic picture and encouraging community thinking about scientiﬁc processes at a ‘no nonsense’ level helped to identify the vital areas of consensus as well as issues of direct conﬂict which needed to be addressed (Newson, this volume). A major risk of multi-stakeholder platforms ﬁlled with well-informed representatives who are capable to understand interdependencies needed for solving complex issues is the group-think phenomenon: they start looking at each other for guidance than to their constituencies. They can become like antidemocratic, unaccountable consociational cartels (Lustick 1997). Wester et al. (this volume) point at weak links between representatives and their constituencies which can hamper a MSP to make a difference in Mexico. Wester et al. (2003) argue that if the process is driven by government agencies as the major stakeholders, the process is essentially driven by a combination of technical and economic concerns and interagency politics. In such approaches there is no room for less organised, ‘informal’ interests, especially poor people, to fully participate and gain access to water resources. Making a difference depends also on the ability to combine a top-down approach, a MSP pursued from the perspective of the state as a democratisation and/or decentralisation process, or bottom up approach, pursued by local stakeholders as an endogenous social movement to take control of their natural resource management

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through institutions created by themselves for themselves, to better their own lives and livelihoods. In the South Africa case, when MSPs emerge as state initiative implemented through the enactment of laws, all stakeholders come with ‘limitations’ in dealing with the new arrangement. It is these ‘limitations’ that block a successful implementation of MSPs for Integrated Catchment Management (Simpungwe et al., this volume). Achieving meaningful stakeholder participation will be complex if stakeholders come from extremely diverse socio-economic and cultural backgrounds, who share little or no common livelihood goals (Simpungwe et al., this volume). According to Dore (this volume) and Faysse et al. (this volume) a conﬂict might be too strong for the establishment of a MSP that can make a difference. At the same time, after long periods of conﬂict and/or violence, there often is a momentum, a sense of urgency for change. In those cases MSP may offer opportunities for substantial evolutions. To the question if multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) make a difference, Mitchell answered that they do, as long as there is (1) an appreciation that empowerment and transformation of stakeholders are not automatic, and (2) a recognition that many people are competitive and driven by self-interest rather than predisposition to cooperate and collaborate. Towards Evaluating MSPs Does the platform fulﬁl its own goals and that of their constituencies? Does the platform have the potential to create something new, when energy is added? Or does the platform itself already create energy and transformation? Evaluation of the functioning of the platform has different connected levels. An overall strategic evaluation focuses on the above-mentioned questions. But also the process, content, and outcome of the platform need to be evaluated and on the tactic level the work processes of the platform. Besides that evaluating a platform has a time dimension: the results are related to the moment of evaluation. To capture the full dynamics of the platform the evaluations must be repeated. We propose evaluation focused on efﬁcacy, efﬁciency and sustainability dimensions (see also Dore, this volume). First efﬁcacy relates to the question if an MSP is an effective means to address complex [not everyday] water management issues, in a synergetic, sustainable way. Are multi-stakeholder platforms a vehicle to bring the goals of integrated sustainable water management (social equity, economic viability and ecosystem integrity) any closer? Note that a MSP in itself is no guarantee that the outcome is equitable and effective with regard to the issue (Currie-Adler, this volume). Efﬁciency homes in on the issue whether the resources indeed bring the hopedfor value-for-effort, or whether these efforts could more proﬁtably be deployed elsewhere. As for platform sustainability over time – a key question in the MSPICM project – we will argue that sustainability is in fact adaptive efﬁcacy over time. This of course presumes that longevity is a desirable feature in itself – Röling and Woodhill, 2001 have noted with justiﬁcation that one-shot platforms can be

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highly efective. The current analysis however is geared to longer-term networks, as sustainable relations are a long term investment. Whether an MSP will ‘work’ is ultimately in the eye of the stakeholders themselves – if they and their constituencies are happy, this is a measure of success, no matter how bizarre or insigniﬁcant the result may seem to the observer. When the MSP-ICM research group started out in 2001 it attached great importance to an action component, to avoid aimless talking shops. But we found that both Perúvian and South African MSPs set great store by the existence of the network itself, as social capital for contacts and information. From a slightly different perspective, the Zwin case analysed by Leo Santbergen too suggests that an inactive, hibernating policy body can have long-term beneﬁts, coming to life when necessary as a secondtrack safety valve for acute conﬂicts and impasses in normal policy-making.We can therefore not put ‘action’ as a straightforward criterion and have dropped this as an assessment dimension for MSPs. Revised Main Assessment Dimensions and Main Indicators We will now consider the nine Assessment Dimensions introduced in Chapter 2, in the light of the three evaluation criteria: efﬁcacy, efﬁciency and sustainability. The overall expected efﬁcacy of the MSP is higher on the right-hand side of the spectrum. Most examples in the book conﬁrmed this. We will go over these dimensions in terms of the Goal and Outcome, Context of the MSP, Content and Process and make remarks. In his contribution (Ch. 8 of this volume), Santbergen looked at the assessment dimensions in light of these four domains. While claiming that these dimensions were useful for the analysis of a case study, he proposed to elaborate them in respect to the context dimensions (different governance styles, to the content (discussing evaluation indicators by the platform). Also Verhallen (this volume) proposed to add a ‘joint fact ﬁnding’ dimension related to the Content section. Furthermore we noticed from our own research and the case studies that the assumption that social learning takes place when sitting together is not that justiﬁable as it hampers in a lot of cases on the lacking of signiﬁcant attention to group reﬂection. Based upon these comments and the discussions above we added thus four dimensions: favourable context, governance structure, joint fact ﬁnding and reﬂective capacity to the list of assessment dimensions. In the dimensions Saliency of goal, we put ‘type of issue’. Goal and Outcome To discuss the efﬁcacy of MSPs, in reaching their own goals (the outcome) we ﬁrst have to see what an MSP is for – its goal. Steins and Edwards see MSPs working in concert towards adaptive management, to ﬁnd ‘solutions’ for resource use problems. Based on Steins and Edwards’ (1999a) understanding of the goal of MSPs, Faysse and Cossio in their contribution came up with a generic objective of an MSP: ‘To enable the empowered and active participation of stakeholders in the search for solutions to a problem that affects

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them.’ As intermediary goals they ﬁrst name enabling participants to participate in the design as in the solution of the problem. Beside that, these participants have the capacity and legitimacy to participate while also are open minded to the views of others. The question here is whether the emphasis should lie on the problem resolution or on the enabling of active and empowered participation – in other words, on outcome or on process (see also Faysse 2006 on this aspect). Several contributions in this book showed that in reality there are a variety of socalled multi- stakeholder platforms but they do not automatically lead to a common understanding, solving social dilemmas and undertake actions by empowered and active participation (see also chapter 1). The South African, Perúvian and Flemish cases suggests that the social ‘by-catch’ aspect can be as central an outcome of MSPs as the ‘catch’ of problem-solving potential. These ﬁndings represent two schools of thought about what platforms are for, and as a result, two dimensions of ‘efﬁcacy’, which we may perhaps allocate to different time dimensions: short term problem solving and long term social capital. Stated differently: to a substantial outcome that addresses a management issue in a practical way or the network resulting from the platform itself is seen as highly relevant for tackling the complex water management issues. Context Can we give some general indication as to what kind of MSP environment is deﬁnitely inauspicious for a ‘working’ MSP? Authorities have a choice ranging from non-intervention in a chaotic, unwanted and contested situation to taking full control, which often comes with oppression. Both ways of doing can seriously harm society. In between these two there is room for dialogues and multi-stakeholder processes. Where governments see managing public goods as their main reason for existence they will take up to organise these dialogues. A matrix can be devised for interest parallelism (interdependency) and conﬂict intensity (Figure 16.1). If interests run parallel and there is little conﬂict, a MSP or roundtable may well be too cumbersome for the purpose. On the other hand in the face of acute conﬂict and little sense of interdependency, perhaps courts of justice or mediation are more apposite than an MSP. In each of these examples, the MSPs ﬁnd themselves somewhere down the middle on the continuum running from ‘order’ to ‘chaos’ – too much of either of those is likely to cause breakdown. Note the element of dynamics: a MSP can start in a situation where it is not obvious that it is needed but due to external or internal causes may end up being very much needed. On the other hand they start coming reluctant to the table as ‘ﬁghters’, traking absolute, non-negotiable positions, and in the course of the process able to ﬁnd common interests and interdependencies (Poncelet 1998). Our ﬁeld observations add an interesting dynamic time dimension to this. While an MSP may start with an inauspicious set-up, over time it may shift from one corner of the matrix (Figure 16.1) to another. This may happen spontaneously, due to multiple interactions, or it may be a conscious process, for example of active linkage to achieve more parallelism of interests, to arrive at a package deal.

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Figure 16.1 Four negotiation strategies (based on Kok 1998) Note: Positions and interests can shift over time.

Content Different types of context (Figure 16.1) and issues (Figure 16.2) steer the content of the deliberations in MSPs. When there is low consensus about facts, information and knowledge a careful ‘joint fact ﬁnding’ is required in case there is not much information available yet. When there is a lot of information and knowledge already available but contested among stakeholders a ‘joint assessment’ of this ‘facts’ is advisable. In both cases points of departure and assumptions in the research studies, that will be or are conducted, should be open for input from the participants. During the information gathering process expertise of the platform is valued, content contributions are taken seriously and discussed. New options are welcomed. In case of low consensus about values the content of the deliberations should be pointed to an open debate on the different values, dilemma’s and discuss ways to accommodate these dilemmas. The accommodation could be a modiﬁcation of goals, new options or mitigation measures to solve the unwanted effect for certain groups. The following table can give us indicative guidance as to what kind of issues are conducive to what kind of MSP. Hisschemöller (1993) and Hisschemöller and Hoppe (1998) identify four problem types, distinguished according to the convergence on values and agreement on and certainty of facts. If both these indicators are positive, there is little point in mounting an expansive platform – a technical (multi-disciplinary)

266

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management Consensus on values

Low

Low

High

Unstructured problem

Poorly structured problem Policy as negotiation

Certainty on data/knowledge

Policy as learning/joint fact-ﬁnding High

Poorly structured problem

Structured problem

Policy as paciﬁcation

Policy as regulation

Figure 16.2 Four problem types, with the strategy to tackle them (Hisschemöller, 1993) smaller commission to regulate will do. If both are negative, negotiation-oriented MSPs may not be of much use as likely breakdown is round the corner; however an MSP oriented at learning and trust-building may be of use here. A situation with high value consensus but low certainty requires the MSP to accommodate uncertainties and negotiate standards to handle them. In a conﬁguration of low value consensus, high certainty we can expect a pragmatic distributive pact in the vein of Lijphart’s consociationalism (1971) (see Figure 16.2). In light of the above, we would suggest completing the list of desirable MSP characteristics suggested by Dore et al. (Table 13.3, this volume) with a Content category additional to the categories of context, process and outcome: Desirable content is a complex land- and water issue that is tackled with ‘joint fact ﬁnding’, an overall open, accessible and inclusive information exchange typiﬁed by: 1. Values, goals and means are open for debate; 2. Dilemma’s are debated; 3. The content of the issue is discussed and adapted; 4. Points of departure and assumptions are open for reﬂection; 5. New options are generated; 6. All expertise is valued within the platform; 7. Content contributions are valued, taken seriously and discussed. Process This section will discuss ‘number of actors and the desirable balance between them. More ‘arenas’ and ‘multiple uses-users’ can indeed generate more problemsolving capacity over time. In so doing, there is enough ‘slack’ to hit multiple

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267

targets in the course of the MSP’s life span. But the multiplicity of actors and arenas contribute signiﬁcantly to the complexity of the processes of interaction, and as a result have an enhanced feedback potential for both polarities – positive (energy) and negative (entropy). Somewhere there is a cut-off point where too much slack becomes unmanageable, that is, where it stops being value added and starts promoting chaos and breakdown. Careful selection but also combination of participants in terms of capabilities is therefore of the essence. Our research suggests that it is not so much the actual number of participants that is the crux here but the availability within the platform of different competencies (such as legislative and executive) and roles (e.g. initiator, critical questioner, visionary) and contributions (information, innovative practices, manpower and other resources) that is of great importance as they contribute to the dimension of synergy and innovation. The dimensions: ‘power balance’, ‘generating support’, ‘synergy’ (innovation) are indicators for the modality and degree to which the platform overcomes power asymmetries – as this is more common than a level playing ﬁeld (Edmunds & Wollenberg 2002). There are again two schools of thought about whether greater power equality brings greater sustainability and constructive cooperation. According to ‘Realists’ (Mearsheimer…), the dominance of one actor is an essential precondition of policy efﬁcacy, as the hegemonic actor provides stability of expectations, has the resources (side payments) that allows the others to free-ride and co-operate. Others however will claim that low equality will means low participation, loss of faith in the process because of the bias of the process towards the needs and preferences of those in power. It is clear however that too much power distance makes MSPs perhaps less suitable for conﬂict resolution than political action and empowerment (Faysse, this volume and pers. comm. 2006). In an MSP context, this issue particularly concerns the role of the state. Essential actors in virtually any water management policy debate, central governments or their regional ofﬁces tend to take on the role of initiator and facilitator/power broker of multi-stakeholder processes. This gets things done – but also means an attractive opportunity for divide and rule. A combined role of chair and decision-maker means a role confusion that easily instils distrust in non-governmental participants. That is why many in this book see as an important process requirement that of a facilitator who in the eyes of the platform members is capable to be there for all and not just for dominant players. The dimensions ‘goal’, ‘decision space’ (mandate) and ‘outcome’ relate to the efﬁcacy of the platforms to address a salient goal, gain a mandate and legitimacy and come to action. Additional to being a sustainability criterion, adaptivity of a platform to a changing context and new, emerging goals is also an efﬁciency criterion for platforms that are of a durable character: how ﬂexible and focussed do they remain? For temporary platforms: are they acknowledged as relevant networks of people to tackle new emerging issues? Table 16.1 displays the revised assessment dimensions. We stated the main indicator and its contribution to the three evaluation aspects. In our opinion they

268

Table 16.1 Assessment dimensions Arenas

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

Revised assessment dimensions and their main indicators Main indicator

Two or more arena’s and multi-sectored Multiple use Different human uses including ecological goods and services Power balance Imbalance is (in)directly addressed Saliency Organisers and platform are of goal able to maintain saliency and urgency. So that continued attendance is safe guarded Joint fact Open and inclusive information ﬁnding and knowledge process Decision space Mandates problems are accommodated. Decision makers and implementers are both present.. Generating The extent of the support support (human, and ﬁnancial resources) generating capacity Synergy Platform is able to generate added value Adaptivity The platform is able, after evaluation, to redirect their work for land-and water resources; Context The MSP functions in a context favourable? absent of severe conﬂict, chaos. It needs some civil organisations. Governance Government, non coercive, structure? guarantees stable preconditions and shares power. Outcome The outcome is substantial to address the water management issue in a practical way. The platform is seen as a relevant network to tackle land- and water management issues Reﬂective The platform takes time for capacity reﬂection of the outcome, the process, the content: their efﬁcacy and efﬁciency;

Efficacy

Efficiency

Sustainability

X X X X

X

X X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

form an enabling environment for the MSPs to come to full bloom or to fully use the potential of the platforms. Dore et al. (Table 13.3, this volume) came up with the useful table of desirable MSP characteristics. These desirable characteristics go in the same direction of Steins and Edwards’ deﬁnition, the generic deﬁnition of Faysse/Cossio and the effectiveness of the dialogue as in the assessment dimensions of Warner & Verhallen

Towards Evaluating MSPs for Integrated Catchment Management

Table 16.2

269

Three MSP models based on the dominant approach of the content and the process of the deliberations in the platforms

Scientific-rational model Content Means and ends can be determined in a predominantly scientiﬁc-rational process Experts exclusively take care of information and analysis and pre-select political alternatives. Multi-criteria and cost-beneﬁt analyses One best way Process Closure: Seats allocated on the basis of representation – such are the rules Distributive negotiation: lobbying, jockeying, advocacy voting, confrontation, coalitions.

Communicative or social learning model

Mixed-mode model

Values guide determination of means and ends

Both vales and facts guide the substantive process

Joint fact-ﬁnding; everyone is an expert. Isolated from science and authorities

Combination and interlocking (extended peer community)

No privileged solutions

Coherent set of ‘better’ solutions

Open access. Adaptive, organic growth.

Core people are invited for the speciﬁc interests, resources or ideas they represent Mix of learning and ﬁghting, consensus with representation of divergence.

Competition (market) of interests

Integrative negotiation: roundtable, skilled discussion, argumentation, no (intentional) coalitionbuilding, strive for consensus. Interdependency is a prime condition

Hierarchical, positional

Egalitarian

Institutional learning

Social learning

Focus on interdependencies, with due regard for inidvidual agendas. Recognises inherent differences in position and power, strives for equivalence. Coalition learning. Learning across stakeholder interests, but not necessairly for the platform as a whole.

Note: The deﬁnitions of the scientiﬁc-rational and the communicative model are partly based on Shannon, 2004, while the mixed-mode model was developed by Verhallen and Warner).

(chapter 2). These desirable characteristics make the main indicators operational. Thus it can be used for facilitators and members to see what could be improved in the conditions and to formulate evaluative indicators. As such they contribute to level 2 and 3 of the evaluation (Outcome, Content, Context and Process and the underlying work processes). The Mixed-Mode Model In Chapter 1 we found, as a ﬁrst exploration, a contrast between two approaches to MSPs; integrative (social learning) and distributive (tough negotiation, ﬁghting). We

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found in our research project and from the case studies presented in this volume that both occur. While stakeholder representatives almost inevitably start to emphatise and learn together, they also have a mandate to represent their constituency’s interests, and have a duty to ﬁght it tooth and claw. At different points in the process, either ﬁghting or cooperative learning will have the upper hand. Upon reﬂection, we found that the two contrasting approaches have multiple corollaries that stand opposed to each other, springing from different philosophies – identiﬁed by Röling (1999) as ‘rational individualism’ and ‘social rationality’. In actual MSP practice, again we ﬁnd a combination of the two. Also given the need to upscale local participation and come to nested participation models, from small watersheds to international river basins, scientiﬁc rationalism will be imposed because the larger the scale of the issue and the environmental impacts the more it is reality that Environmental Impact Assessments are obligatory. Then a communicative or social learning model is not good enough and a platform and their facilitators need to think on how to get to a more participatory assessment procedure that takes the best of both worlds. As the scientiﬁc-rational approach tends to be dominant over the communicative model, we think that the mixedmode model is more realistic and provides help to designers of multi-stakeholder processes. Conclusion MSPs are social animals that feed, and feed on, their environment. Whether they can ﬂourish depends on the enabling or disabling environment. In Europe, the Water Framework Directive has been an inﬂuential impetus for participatory governance, the political momentum for participation seems to be letting off somewhat. In other regions such as South Africa, Perú but also Brazil, we found MSPs attract considerable curiosity but difﬁculties in implementation. A fresh impulse may come from the climate change community, who feel participatory adaptive management is the way forward through uncertainty. This book has highlighted several encouraging experiences with multi-stakeholder participation. MSPs can enhance accountability and adaptivity to autonomous social and environmental challenges, as well as the tensions generated by interventions to counter them. We have also pointed out the multiple pitfalls of multi-stakeholder participation which can make an MSP a lap dog rather than a tiger, inviting justiﬁed accusations of ‘smokescreen participation’ and ‘talking shop’. Non-participation and extra-MSP participation are still attractive options to skeptical and disappointed social groups. MSPs should therefore be organised in co-production with the stakeholders themselves. ‘Do it well, or don’t do it at all.’ References Ashby, W. R. (1964), An Introduction to Cybernetics, Methuen, London. Dourojeanni, A. (2001), ‘Water management at the river basin level: challenges in Latin America’, LC/L 1583-P, Santiago de Chile.

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Faysse, N. (2006), ‘Troubles on the way.An analysis of the Challenges faced by Multi-Stakeholder Platforms’, Natural Resource Forum, 30 (3), 219–229. Hisschemöller, M. (1993), De democratie van problemen. De relatie tussen de inhoud van problemen en de methoden van publieke besluitvorming, VU-Uitgeverij Amsterdam. Hisschemöller, M. and Hoppe, R. (1998), ‘Weerbarstige beleidscontroversies. Een pleidooi voor probleemstructurering in beleidsontwerp en analyse’, in R. Hoppe and A. Peterse, Bouwstenen voor argumentatieve beleidsanalyse, Elsevier, Den Haag, pp. 53–75. Kok, A. (1998), Internationaal onderhandelen. Problemen bij internationaal zakendoen, Kluwer, Deventer. Lijphart, A. (1971), ‘Cultural Diversity and Political Integration’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV: 1 (March) 1–14. Poncelet, E. C. (1998), ‘A Kiss Here and a Kiss There: Conflict and NonConfrontation in a Multi-Stakeholder Environmental Partnership in Belgium’. Presented at “Crossing Boundaries”, the 7th annual conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, June 10-14, 1998, http://www.indiana.edu/~iascp/abstracts/474.html Röling, N. and Maarleveld, M. (1999), ‘Facing strategic narratives: An argument for interactive effectiveness’, Agriculture and Human Values (16) 3, 295–308. Shannon, M. A. (2003), ‘Collaboration and Communication in NFPs – Challenges for the Future’, in Glueck, P. and Voitleithner, J. (eds), NPF Research: its Retrospect and Outlook. Proceedings of the COST action, National Forest Programmes in a European Context. Seminar, Vienna, 15–16 September, Publication Series of the Institute of Forest Sector Policy and Economics, Vol. 52.

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Index Page numbers in italics refer to tables, ﬁgures and boxes. adaptive management 7–8, 72, 73, 263–4 adaptivity over time 26, 119–20 agriculture see farmers; farmland; irrigation Alternative Dispute Resolution 6 Aluminium Company of Canada (Alcan) 44 Århus convention 5, 95, 96, 101 Arce, A. 131 arenas (domains) of MSPs 24, 115–18, 266–7 Argentinean Patagonia see Trahunco watershed, Argentinean Patagonia Asian Development Bank (ADB) 9 Mekong region 217–219, 226–7, 228–9 Uzbekistan 237, 238, 240, 243 Atack, I. 224 ATDR (Irrigation Technical Administration), Perú 141, 146, 147 Australia 34, 50 ‘authentic deliberation’ 213 Ayacucho, Perú ATDR (Irrigation Technical Administration) 141, 146, 147 Cachi River Special Project (CRSP) 139, 140, 143, 144–5, 150 Chiara community vs Water and Sanitation Company (EPSASA) 144–5, 147 development context 149–50 drought 137, 140, 144, 149 institutional dynamics 142–3 ‘JUDRA’ (irrigation users’ union) 146–9 migration 137–8, 149 physical and social context 139–40 political violence 137, 140, 149 rural-urban conﬂict 139, 150 ‘Yakunchik’ platform 137, 140–5 Baber, W.F. 224 Barham, E. 132, 260 Belgium see International Zwin Commission (IZC)

Beyerlein, M. et al. 37–8, 39 Bird and Habitat Directive, EU 107, 117–18 Bolivia see Tiquipaya, Bolivia boreholes 200 boundaries, nature of 3, 126, 132–3 Bulkeley, H. and Mol, A.P.J. 247 bureaucracy see organisational/institutional issues burnout of participants 58, 254 Cachi River Special Project (CRSP), Perú 139, 140, 143, 144–5, 150 Calle, Z. 146 Cambodia ﬁsheries law dialogue 219, 220 see also Mekong region Canada 33, 52–3 First Nations 41–2, 43 Fraser Basin Council (FBC) 39–45 funding 42, 44 Nechako Watershed Council 43–4 Okanagan-Shuswap Land and Resource Management Planning Process 55–6 Ontario Conservation Authorities (CAs) 32–3, 49–50 Royal Commission on the Future of Toronto Waterfront 50 Saskatchewan Watershed Authority (SWA) principles 51–2 catchment level 3, 14–15, 60 Catchment Management Agency (CMA), South Africa 193, 194, 195, 198–202 Catchment Management Forum (CMF), South Africa 193, 195–6 celebration of success 58, 59 Checkland, P. and Holwell, S. 98, 99 Chiara community vs Water and Sanitation Company (EPSASA), Perú 144–5, 147 Christensen, K. 35–6

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civil society (incl. NGOs) 7, 9, 10, 13–14, 50 Flanders 97, 104, 107 Mekong region 219–21, 225, 230 Perú 142, 145, 148–9 South Africa 194, 195, 196 and state, relationship between 256 Uzbekistan 241–2, 243 Clark, M.J. 75, 90 coalitions 254 cognitive school see cooperative/social learning collaboration 54 interorganisational 37–9, 44–5 ‘collaborative capital’ (CC) 39 collaborative governance 39–41 comanagement (network management) 10 communication 5, 13, 58, 203 tools 185 see also information community-based organizations (mahallas), Uzbekistan 241, 242 compass-gyroscope relationship 72, 73 competing organisational environment 36–7 complexity 10 comprehensive resource development 33 comprehensive vs integrative approaches 52–3 compromise and conﬂict 79–82 ‘concertation’ 4 conﬂict 6 Argentinean Patagonia 126–8 Bolivia 165–6 and compromise 79–82 healthy 59 Mekong region 206–8, 223–4 Mexico 151, 158–9, 161–2 Perú 137, 139, 140, 144–5, 147, 149, 150 political 137, 140, 149, 206–8 rural-urban 139, 150, 151, 236 South Africa 197–8 Uzbekistan 236 conﬂict resolution 6 Conley, A. and Moote, M.A. 249 Connick, S. and Innes, J.E. 74 consensus 13, 58, 225–7 consent 225–7 constituencies and representatives, relationship between 172, 179 consultations 225–7 content 23, 25, 105–6, 265–6 context 23, 25–7, 57, 264 see also speciﬁc case studies

cooperation agencies 142 cooperative/social learning 4–5, 55, 74, 85, 89 coordination, interorganisational 34–5, 36, 37 Coquet, UK 76 cultural diversity, Mekong region 208 dams Canada 44 illegal, Zwin area 113–14 Mekong region 216–17, 220, 221–3, 228 Mexico 157, 158–9 World Commission on Dams (WCD) 72 ‘de-poldering’, Zwin area 114–15 decision power 171, 213 decision space 26–7, 120–1, 267 decision-making 99, 100, 106 Deliberative and Inclusionary Processes (DIPs) 8 democratic governance 255 democratisation and emancipation 8–9 demonstration projects 58 Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF), South Africa 192, 194, 195–6, 198–9, 201–2, 203 dialogue 4, 15, 23, 24, 27 Diduck, A. 55, 56–7 Directors, Fraser Basin Council (FBC), Canada 42–3 disparate regionalisms, Mekong region 208–9 distributive and integrative negotiation 4, 5, 269–70 distrust 113, 117, 118–19, 120 diversity 10 cultural and political 208 domains (arenas) of MSPs 24, 115–18, 266–7 domestic water, black communities, South Africa 200 Dore, J. et al. 213 and Yu Xiaogang 216, 228 Dourojeanni, A. 125, 132, 260 Dovers, S.R. and Mobbs, C.D. 73 drinking water cooperative, Argentinean Patagonia 127, 129, 130 industry, Flanders 105, 107 Water Committees, Bolivia 165 drought, Perú 137, 140, 144, 149

Index Dryzek, J.S. 213, 226 Dubash, N.K. et al. 225–6 dynamics 10, 22–3 ecosystem/holistic approach 52, 74, 79, 83 Edmunds, D. and Wollenberg, E. 2, 8, 12, 134, 169, 267 education 58, 59 effectiveness 249 efﬁciency 250, 262–3 El Niño 137, 140 El Sefary, S. 90 Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) 224, 228–9 Ellis, J.B. et al. 73 Ellis, J.L. 54–6 emancipation 8–9 empowerment 54–7 England and Wales 33, 34, 50 see also Northern England river basins projects Environment Agency, UK 34, 73, 76, 78, 83, 84 environmental assessment (EA) processes 56–7 environmental capital approach 75, 76–8, 79, 82, 83, 89 see also natural capital/quality of life capital (QoLC) Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 115, 121 environmental issues Mekong region 219–21 see also International Zwin Commission (IZC); Northern England river basins projects environmental NGOs 107 equity 249–50 Mekong region 209 European Union (EU) Bird and Habitat Directive 107, 117–18 Water Framework Directive (2000) (WFD) 14, 71, 72–3, 83–4, 89–90, 95–8 evaluating participation 249–51 excluded/unrepresented stakeholders 130, 134, 179, 216 experts/professionals 4–5, 38, 84 Argentinean Patagonia 131 Bolivia 185 Flanders 99, 103–4, 105, 107, 108

275 International Zwin Commission (IZC) 111, 114, 115, 121, 123 Mekong region 217, 228 Perú 142, 145 South Africa 202, 203

facilitation 27–8, 166–72 passim, 254–5 Bolivia 176–7, 178, 179–80, 185 leaders 58, 59 farmers association (ASIRITIC), Bolivia 165, 174–5, 176–7 Flanders 105, 107 South Africa 196–9, 200, 201–2, 203 UK 82–3 Uzbekistan 242–3 Zwin area 118 farmland 139–40, 146–9, 196–7 see also irrigation federal and state government representatives 154–5, 157 feedback within systems 8 Filho, W.L. 75–6 Flemish river basin drinking water industry 105, 107 European Water Framework Directive (2000) (WFD) 95–8 experts 99, 103–4, 105, 107, 108 farmers 105, 107 Nete Catchment Management Plan 101–8 stakeholders 103–4 FNDR (National Fund for Rural Development), Bolivia 165 FOCUS (NGO) 225 Fox, H. 84 framing 27–8 Fraser Basin Council (FBC), Canada 39–45 Fraser River Management Program (FRMP), Canada 41 free prior informed consent (FPIC) 226 funding Bolivia 165, 166, 174–5, 180 Canada 42, 44 Mekong region 229–30 GIS maps 104–5, 107 Global Water Partnerships (GWPs) 34 GMS see Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) governance 9–10, 210–13 government agencies 256

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institutions 142 representatives 154–5, 157, 215–16, 218 see also organisational/institutional issues; state and civil society, relationship between; speciﬁc case studies Gray, B. 34, 37, 38, 53 Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 217–20 ASEAN electricity grid 228–9 Greeff, L. 225 groundwater Mexico 159–61, 162 South Africa 192, 200 Uzbekistan 238 groundwater management committees (COTAS), Mexico 152, 154, 160–1 Gunton, T.I. and Day, J.C. 53–4 Habermas, J. 4, 166, 187 Hemmati, M. 4, 75, 96, 167, 213 historic development of IWRM 32–7 holistic/ecosystem approach 52, 74, 79, 83 Hooper, B.P. et al. 52, 57 hydropower see dams IADB (Inter-American Development Bank) 9, 165 implementation gap/failures 34–5, 43 and monitoring 58 incentives for participation 247–9 indigenous people black South Africans 196–7, 200 First Nations, Canada 41–2, 43 Mapuche, Argentinean Patagonia 127–8, 129, 130, 131–2, 133, 134 information and education 58, 59 formats 104–5, 107 lack of 168 leaﬂets 83 MSP as temporary system 98–101, 106–7 and participation 72–8 passim, 79–82, 103–5, 106–8 requirements 101 see also communication institutional issues see organisational/ institutional issues

integrated water resources management (IWRM) 2–3, 32–7, 49–53 characteristics 51 deﬁnition 125 different interpretations of 52–3 and MSPs 2–3, 57–61, 260–1 rationale and nature of 50–2 integrative and distributive negotiation 4, 5, 269–70 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 9, 165 interactive decision-making 99, 100 international consultants 215–16, 218 international donors 215–16, 218 International Zwin Commission (IZC) 111 adaptability over time 119–20 arenas 115–18 assessment dimensions 115–23 ‘de-poldering’ 114–15 decision space 120–1 distrust, history of 113, 117, 118–19, 120 experts 111, 114, 115, 121, 123 illegal dams 113–14 multiple use 118 negotiation rounds 112, 113–15 outcomes 121 power balance 118 public sector 115, 123 salient goals 118–19 stakeholders 115–17, 118, 119–20 supporting generating capacity 119 synergy for innovation 120 Technical Study Group (TSG) 114, 118, 119, 120, 121 interorganisational collaboration 37–9, 44–5 interorganisational coordination 34–5, 36, 37 irrigation Mexico 151, 154, 156–9 Perú 139–50 passim South Africa 197–8, 201–2 Thailand 229 Uzbekistan 237, 238 see also farmers; farmland Irrigation Board, South Africa 197–8, 200, 201 Irrigation Technical Administration (ATDR), Perú 141, 146, 147 IWRM see integrated water resources management (IWRM) ‘joint fact ﬁnding’ 265, 266

Index Jones Luong, P. 241 ‘JUDRA’ (irrigation users’ union), Perú 146–9 Khorezm Province, Uzbekistan 236 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 237, 238, 240, 243 changing organizational setting of stakeholders 238–40 city/province supply 240–1 community-based organizations (mahallas) 241, 242 farmers 242–3 government ministries 238–40 groundwater 238 irrigation 237, 238 state and civil society, relationship between 241–2, 243 water situation in 237–8 Kindler, J. 51–2 King 73, 74 Kooiman, J. 9, 10, 39 Lake Chapala see Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico Land and Resource Management Planning (LRMP) 56 land use 2, 34 landowners 82–3, 113, 192 Lao PDR see Mekong region leaders 58, 59 legitimacy 57–8, 169, 224–5 see also facilitation Leeuwis, C. 224 legal system, lack of 168 legitimacy 57–8, 169, 224–5 Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico 152–6 CNA (master plan) 152, 154, 155, 156–7, 158–60, 161 conﬂict 151, 158–9, 161–2 Consultative Council (CC) 154–5, 157 groundwater management 151–2, 154, 159–61, 162 institutional change 154–6 irrigation 151, 154, 156–9 Monitoring and Evaluation Group (MEG) 155–6 River Basin Council (RBC) 14, 155–6, 157–8, 161–2 Solis dam 157, 158–9 surface water management 151–2, 154, 156–9, 161–2

277

Technical Working Group (TWG) 155 tourism 151 localism/localists 72, 85, 90, 221–3 MacKay 226 MACOTI project, Tiquipaya, Bolivia 165, 173–82 passim ‘Mainport Rotterdam’ project 97 management adaptive 7–8, 72, 73 nature of 252–3 network (comanagement) 10 see also integrated water resources management (IWRM) Marañón-Pimentel, B. and Wester, P. 160 Massicard, E. and Trevisani, T. 242 mayﬂies 111, 123 mediation vs facilitation 169 Mekong region 206–9, 210 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 217, 218, 219, 226–7, 228–9 civil society 219–21 and state, relationship between 225, 230 conﬂict political 206–8 resource 223–4 context 223–4 cultural and political diversity 208 dams 216–17, 221–3, 228 disparate regionalisms 208–9 environmental issues 219–21 equity 209 excluded stakeholders 216 experts 217, 228 funding 229–30 governance and MSPs 210–13 water governance forums 213–23 MSP prospects/issues 223–7 negotiation 224 opportunities 227–30 outcomes 225–7 political issues 206–8, 223 power relation 205 process 224–5 Salween River 228 water concerns 209 Mekong Region Commission (MRC) 215–17 Mesa Técnica, Tiquipaya, Bolivia 165–6, 173–87

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Mexico see Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico migration, Perú 137–8, 149 mining 44, 104, 105, 210 Mitchell, B. 2, 33, 52–3, 54, 57, 82, 97 and Gardner, J.S. 49–50, 52–3 and Shrubsole, D. 31, 33, 49–50 mixed-mode model of MSPs 269–70 Monitoring and Evaluation Group (MEG), Mexico 155–6 multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) 53–7 deﬁnitions 1, 11–12, 15–16 evaluation of 262–9 impact of 261–2 and IWRM 2–3, 57–61, 260–1 mixed-mode model 269–70 typology 23–7 multiple use of MSPs 25, 118, 266–7 municipal governments 43, 50, 130 municipal agencies 126–7 Myanmar see Mekong region National Fund for Rural Development (FNDR), Bolivia 165 National Water Act (NWA), South Africa 192–5 natural capital/quality of life capital (QoLC), UK 74–9, 83–5, 86–8, 90 nature conservatories 201 Nechako Watershed Council, Canada 43–4 negotiation distributive and integrative 4, 5, 269–70 International Zwin Commission (IZC) 112, 113–15 Mekong region 224 ‘platform’ as forum for 12 Tiquipaya, Bolivia 166–89 passim Nete Catchment Management Plan, Flanders 101–8 Netherlands see International Zwin Commission (IZC) network(s) interorganisational 34–5, 36, 37–9, 44–5 management (comanagement) 10 stakeholder 119, 121, 236, 253, 255–7 Newson, M.D. 70–1, 72, 84 et al. 73 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) see civil society (incl. NGOs) Northern England river basins projects contrasting participatory approaches 83–8 Environment Agency 34, 73, 76, 78, 83, 84

environmental capital approach 75, 76–8, 79, 82, 83, 89 farmers/landowners 82–3 natural capital/quality of life capital (QoLC) 74–9, 83–5, 86–8, 90 participation in planning and management 73–4, 75–9 Steering Group 76, 78, 85 Team Revival Project 85 technocracy to participation 71–3 Upper Coquetdale 84, 85, 86–8 Upper Wharfedale ‘Best Practice’ Project (UWBPP) 76–83, 85, 88, 90 O’Hara, S.L. 239 Ohlsson, L. and Turton, A.R. 236 Okanagan-Shuswap Land and Resource Management Planning Process, Canada 55–6 Olson, M. 254 Ontario Conservation Authorities (CAs), Canada 32–3, 49–50 organisational/institutional issues 34–5, 36–9, 44–5 Mexico 154–6 Perú 142–3 South Africa 192–9 Uzbekistan 238–40 O’Riordan, T. and Rayner, S. 75 Osidele, O.O. et al. 89 outcomes/outputs 27, 39, 263–4, 267 attributes of successful MSPs 45, 53–4, 58–9, 249–50 International Zwin Commission (IZC) 121 Mekong region 225–7 participation 246 contrasting approaches 83–8 deﬁnition 133–4 in environmental assessment (EA) processes 56–7 evaluating 249–51 incentives 247–9 and information 79–82, 103–5, 106–8 and politics 12–14 technocracy to 71–3 see also stakeholders; speciﬁc case studies Patagonia see Trahunco watershed, Argentinean Patagonia Perry, C.J. et al. 236 Perú see Ayacucho, Perú

Index political issues 125–6, 132–3, 138, 223 participation 12–14 political responsibility 224–5 political violence 137, 140, 149, 206–8 pollution 104, 130, 200 mayﬂy as indicator of 111 wastewater/sewage 127–8, 131–2, 133, 134 poverty 69, 197, 200, 243 power balance 24–5, 267 International Zwin Commission (IZC) 118 vs cooperative/social learning (‘cognitive school’) 4–5 power sharing 12–14, 58 private landowners 82–3, 113, 192 private sector/investors 50, 97, 104, 194 Argentinean Patagonia 126, 128, 129, 132 process 23, 24–5, 266–9 Mekong region 224–5 professionals see experts/professionals Project Ofﬁcer, UK 78, 82–3 provincial agencies, Argentinean Patagonia 126–7 provincial government water authority (DGRH), Argentinean Patagonia 126, 128–9, 131 public sector 10, 12, 50 International Zwin Commission (IZC) 115, 123 Perú 141 Qarles van Ufford, P. 132 quality of life capital (QoLC)/natural capital, UK 74–9, 83–5, 86–8, 90 rationales 5–9, 53–4 reframing 28 representation and political responsibility 224–5 representatives and constituencies, relationship between 172, 179 resource conﬂict see conﬂict Rhoades, R.E. 71 rights/responsibilities of stakeholders 251, 254 riparian zones/countries/states 76, 84, 215–16, 237 Rist, S. et al. 74 River Basin Council (RBC), Mexico 14, 155–6, 157–8, 161–2 river basins 14

279

roles of stakeholders 251, 254 Röling, N. 7, 89, 156, 210–13, 270 and Maarleveld, M. 89 Rosenau, J.N. 210 Royal Commission on the Future of Toronto Waterfront, Canada 50 rural-urban conﬂict Mexico 151 Perú 139, 150 Uzbekistan 236 salient goals 25, 118–19, 263–4, 267 Salween River, Mekong region 228 sanitation project see Tiquipaya, Bolivia Saskatchewan Watershed Authority (SWA), Canada 51–2 scale/scope of natural resource management (NRM) 252–3, 255–6 Scheldt Commission 118 Se San hydropower dialogue 220 self-governance 10 sewage/wastewater, Argentinean Patagonia 127–8, 131–2, 133, 134 shared vs stakeholder objectives 247–9, 255 Shining Path, Perú 137, 149 ‘silo effect’ 53, 54 social dilemmas 7 social/cooperative learning 4–5, 55, 74, 85, 89 Solis dam, Mexico 157, 158–9 Sout, G.E. 58–9 South Africa black communities 196–7, 200 Catchment Management Agency (CMA) 193, 194, 195, 198–202 Catchment Management Forum (CMF) 193, 195–6 CMA formation 198–202 conﬂict 197–8 Department of Water and Forestry (DWAF) 192, 194, 195–6, 198–9, 201–2, 203 experts/professionals 202, 203 farmers 196–9, 200, 201–2, 203 groundwater 192, 200 institutional issues 192–9 irrigation 197–8, 201–2 National Water Act (NWA) 192–5 resolving claims over vanishing resources 191–7 stakeholder participation, micro-level 195–7

280

Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Water Management

tourism 200, 201 Water Management Areas (WMA) 193 Water Users Association (WUA) 193–4, 195, 197–8, 200, 201 stakeholders 246–7, 254–7 deﬁnitions 10–12 excluded/unrepresented 130, 134, 179, 216 interests 2 networks 119, 121, 236, 253, 255–7 objectives vs shared objectives 247–9, 255 participation 250–1 see also organisational/institutional issues; participation; speciﬁc case studies state and civil society, relationship between 256 Mekong region 225, 230 Uzbekistan 241–2, 243 Steering Group, UK 76, 78, 85 Steins, N.A. and Edwards, V.M. 1, 7, 263–4, 268–9 structure of natural resource management (NRM) 253, 255–7 sub-catchments 60 Suberón, L. 149 successful MSPs, features of 45, 53–4, 58–9, 249–50 supporting generating capacity 25–6, 119, 267 surface water, Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico 151–2, 154, 156–9, 161–2 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. 167, 169 sustainability 69–71, 74, 262–3 synergy for innovation 26, 120, 267 Team Revival Project, UK 85 Technical Roundtable see Mesa Técnica, Tiquipaya, Bolivia Technical Study Group (TSG), International Zwin Commission (IZC) 114, 118, 119, 120, 121 Technical Working Group (TWG), Mexico 155 technology 35–6, 131 technocracy 70–1 to participation 71–3 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 32, 49–50

Thailand Thai Baan action research and dialogue 220 Water Grid 229 see also Mekong region Tiquipaya, Bolivia conﬂict 165–6 facilitation 176–7, 178, 179–80, 185 funding 165, 166, 174–5, 180 irrigation farmers association (ASIRITIC) 165, 174–5, 176–7 MACOTI project 165, 173–82 passim Mesa Técnica MSP 165–6, 173–87 MSP intervention and design methodology 166–73 National Fund for Rural Development (FNDR) 165 negotiation 166–89 passim Negowat team 175, 176 professionals 185 Water Committees 165, 173–4, 176, 179 top-down governance 10 tourism 118 Mexico 151 ski centre, Argentinean Patagonia 126, 127–8, 131–2, 133 South Africa 200, 201 Trahunco watershed, Argentinean Patagonia conﬂicts 126–8 and solutions 130–2 drinking water cooperative 127, 129, 130 experts 131 Mapuche (indigenous people) 127–8, 129, 130, 131–2, 133, 134 nature of boundaries 126, 132–3 participation 133–4 private sector/investors 126, 128, 129, 132 provincial agencies 126–7 provincial government water authority (DGRH) 126, 128–9, 131 sewage/wastewater 127–8, 131–2, 133, 134 tourism/ski centre 126, 127–8, 131–2, 133 users’ community excluded 130, 134 included 128–9 water quotas/distribution 126–7, 129, 135 trans-national issues see International Zwin Commission (IZC); Mekong region transparency of decision-making 106

Index Trist, E. 36, 39 trust 4, 85, 142, 143 and distrust 113, 117, 118–19, 120 ‘Two Track’ partnerships 14–15 typology of MSPs 23–7 uniﬁed resource management 33, 34 United Kingdom see England and Wales; Northern England river basins projects United Nations (UN) 217 United States (US) 50, 72 Department of Agriculture Conservation Technology Information Centre 58–9 Environmental Protection Agency 90 unrepresented/excluded stakeholders 130, 134, 179, 216 Upper Coquetdale, UK 84, 85, 86–8 Upper Wharfedale ‘Best Practice’ Project (UWBPP), UK 76–83, 85, 88, 90 urban supply/use 229, 236, 238, 240–1, 243 urbanization 128, 130, 140, 150, 165 Uzbekistan see Khorezm Province, Uzbekistan value conﬂicts 7 Vietnam see Mekong region violence political 137, 140, 149, 206–8 see also conﬂict vision 45, 57 Wageningen, I.A.C. 1–2, 4–5 Warner, J. 9 Wester, P. and 3, 39, 72, 131, 133–4 Warner, J.F. and Simpungewe, E. 8, 11, 13 wastewater/sewage, Argentinean Patagonia 127–8, 131–2, 133, 134

281

Water Committees, Bolivia 165, 173–4, 176, 179 Water Framework Directive (2000) (WFD), EU 14, 71, 72–3, 83–4, 89–90, 95–8 Water Management Areas (WMA), South Africa 193 water quality see pollution water quotas/distribution, Argentinean Patagonia 126–7, 129, 135 Water and Sanitation Company, Perú (EPSASA) 141, 142, 143, 144–5, 147 Water Users Association (WUA), South Africa 193–4, 195, 197–8, 200, 201 ‘water wars’ 6, 7 Weinthal, E. 241, 242 wells, illegal 159–60 Wester, P. et al. 126, 154, 156, 196, 261 Marañón-Pimentel, B. and 160 and Warner, J. 3, 39, 72, 131, 133–4 ‘wetland mitigation banking’ 90 World Bank 9, 11, 72, 226, 227, 229–30 World Commission on Dams (WCD) 72 World Conservation Union (IUCN) 219–21 World Water Forum (2nd) 8, 125 ‘Yakunchik’ platform, Ayacucho, Perú 137, 140–5 Yunnan province, China community-based watershed management 220 see also Mekong region Zwin nature reserve see International Zwin Commission (IZC)

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