Multiculturalism Reconsidered: 'Culture and Equality' and its Critics

Multiculturalism Reconsidered Culture and Equality

and its Critics

Edited by Paul Kelly

Cambridge,

UK,

polity

2002

Copyright © this collection Polity Press 2002 First published in 2002 by Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd, a Blackwell Publishing Company. Editorial office: Polity Press 65 Bridge Street Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK Marketing and production Blackwell Publishers Ltd 108 Cowley Road Oxford OX4 1JF, UK Published in the USA by Blackwell Publishers Inc. 350 Main Street Maiden, MA 02148, USA All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Multiculturalism reconsidered: 'Culture and equality' and its critics / edited by Paul Kelly, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7456-2793-5 - ISBN 0-7456-2794-3 (pbk.) 1. Barry, Brian M. Culture and equality. 2. Multiculturalism. 3. Equality. 4. Assimilation (Sociology) 1. Kelly, P. J. (Paul Joseph) HM1271 .M8434 2002 305.8-dc21 2002006341 Typeset in 10 on 12 pt Times New Roman by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong Printed in Great Britain by MPG Books, Bodmin, Cornwall This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Contents

Acknowledgements Contributors I n t r o d u c t i o n : B e t w e e n C u l t u r e and E q u a l i t y P a u l Kelly 1 Liberalism and the Accommodation of Group Claims Samuel Freeman --•2 C h o i c e , C h a n c e a n d M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m

vii ix 1

18

31

Susan Mendus 3 L i b e r a l i s m , E q u a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s and Cultural C o m m i t m e n t s

45

David Miller 4 Defending Some Dodos: Equality and/or Liberty? P a u l Kelly

62

5 E q u a l T r e a t m e n t , E x c e p t i o n s a n d Cultural Diversity Simon Caney

81

6 T h e Illiberal Liberal: B r i a n B a r r y ' s P o l e m i c a l A t t a c k on Multiculturalism J a m e s Tully

102

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Contents

7 C u l t u r e , E q u a l i t y a n d Diversity .. Judith Squires 8 B a r r y a n d the D a n g e r s o f L i b e r a l i s m Bhikhu Parekh 9 All M u s t H a v e Prizes: T h e Liberal C a s e for Interference Cultural P r a c t i c e s Clare Chambers ..,10 D e m o c r a t i c Justice a n d M u l t i c u l t u r a l R e c o g n i t i o n Ian Shapiro 11 T h e Life o f B r i a n , or N o w for S o m e t h i n g C o m p l e t e l y Difference-Blind Chandran Kukathas 12 S e c o n d T h o u g h t s - a n d S o m e First T h o u g h t s R e v i v e d Brian Barry Index

Aeknowledgements

In editing this b o o k I h a v e i n c u r r e d a n u m b e r o f debts. T h e first a n d m o s t sig­ nificant is to D a v i d H e l d . T h i s b o o k w o u l d n o t h a v e existed w i t h o u t h i s contin­ u e d s u p p o r t a n d helpful, b u t always polite, p r o d d i n g . However, his i m p r i n t o n t h e b o o k g o e s further t h a n that o f m e r e publisher, b e y o n d t h e u s u a l caveats a b o u t all t h e r e m a i n i n g e r r o r s a n d infelicities b e i n g m y o w n . D a v i d b e g a n this project as an o p p o r t u n i t y to e x p a n d t h e d e b a t e s s t i m u l a t e d b y B r i a n B a r r y ' s Culture and Equality, also p u b l i s h e d b y Polity. D a v i d a s k e d m e to j o i n h i m as co-editor. A l t h o u g h h e d e c i d e d to w i t h d r a w in order to c o m p l e t e a n u m b e r o f his o w n p r o ­ j e c t s - even p u b l i s h e r s can delay their p u b l i s h e r s ! - h e w a s central at t h e p l a n ­ n i n g stages a n d particularly helpful in attracting t h e contributors. It is only fair that h e s h o u l d retain a c o n s i d e r a b l e share o f t h e credit ( a n d b l a m e ) for this b o o k . T h e contributors are also to b e t h a n k e d for t h e generally g o o d - h u m o u r e d r e s p o n s e to t h e invitation to r e s p o n d to Barry, a n d d e v e l o p further their o w n p a r t i c u l a r per­ spectives o n t h e d e b a t e s h e raised. M a n y o f t h e contributors h a v e c o m m i t m e n t s in p u b l i c life that p u t t h e t i m e t a b l e s o f editors a n d p u b l i s h e r s in s h a r p p e r s p e c ­ tive; all have s h o w n a d i l i g e n c e a b o v e a n d b e y o n d t h e call o f duty. A p a r t from David, t h e other o b v i o u s essential c o n t r i b u t o r to this project w a s D a v i d ' s p r e d e ­ c e s s o r as G r a h a m Wallas Professor of Political S c i e n c e at L S E , n a m e l y B r i a n Barry. H a v i n g recently c o m p l e t e d a 4 0 0 - p a g e b o o k (actually 3 9 9 p a g e s ) a n d d i s ­ c u s s e d the issues over a n u m b e r o f years w i t h c o l l e a g u e s , friends a n d a c a d e m i c a u d i e n c e s a n d s t u d e n t s , h e c o u l d well h a v e b e e n forgiven for d e c l i n i n g t h e invi­ tation to divert his attention from other m o r e p r e s s i n g projects. N e v e r t h e l e s s , h e r o s e t o t h e c h a l l e n g e w i t h his u s u a l v i g o u r a n d g o o d h u m o u r , a n d in transatlantic p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n s a n d over l u n c h e s h e c o n t r i b u t e d greatly to t h e s h a p e o f t h e final w o r k . M o s t importantly, h e w a s p r e p a r e d to r e t u r n to a n d r e t h i n k issues that h e t h o u g h t h e h a d dealt w i t h t o his o w n satisfaction earlier. Finally, I w o u l d like

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t o t h a n k t h e staff at Polity for their efficiency. It is c u s t o m a r y for editors a n d a u t h o r s to finish b y a c c e p t i n g responsibility for a n y failings that r e m a i n . I sin­ cerely h o p e t h e r e a r e n ' t any, b u t as responsibility is a p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y p r o b l e m ­ atic c o n c e p t , I a m only p r e p a r e d to a c c e p t it as long as I c a n also freely avail m y s e l f o f all t h e e x c u s e s I can. P a u l Kelly LSE

Contributors

B r i a n B a r r y is A r n o l d A . S a l t z m a n P r o f e s s o r o f P h i l o s o p h y a n d Political S c i e n c e at C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y a n d Professor E m e r i t u s at L S E . H i s r e c e n t p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e Justice as Impartiality ( O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1995), Culture and Equality (Polity P r e s s , 2 0 0 0 ) . Why Social Justice Matters (Polity) w i l l b e p u b ­ lished in 2 0 0 3 . S i m o n C a n e y is S e n i o r L e c t u r e r at t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Politics, U n i v e r s i t y o f N e w c a s t l e . H e is c o - e d i t o r ( w i t h Peter J o n e s ) o f Human Rights and Global Diversity (Frank C a s s , 2 0 0 1 ) . H i s m a i n r e s e a r c h interests are in c o n t e m p o r a r y egalitarianism a n d in ethics a n d g l o b a l politics. H e h a s recently p u b l i s h e d articles in Political Studies a n d t h e Journal of Political Philosophy a n d is cur­ rently c o m p l e t i n g a b o o k for O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s entitled Global Political Theory. C l a r e C h a m b e r s is a L e c t u r e r in Political T h e o r y at t h e L o n d o n S c h o o l o f E c o n o m i c s a n d is c o m p l e t i n g a D P h i l at Nuffield C o l l e g e . S a m u e l F r e e m a n is P r o f e s s o r o f P h i l o s o p h y a n d L a w in t h e P h i l o s o p h y D e p a r t ­ m e n t at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P e n n s y l v a n i a . A m o n g his r e c e n t p u b l i c a t i o n s is t h e Cambridge Companion to Rawls ( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 2 0 0 2 ) . P a u l Kelly is S e n i o r L e c t u r e r in Political T h e o r y at t h e L o n d o n S c h o o l o f E c o n o m i c s . H e is a u t h o r a n d editor o f n u m e r o u s b o o k s , i n c l u d i n g Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice ( E d i n b u r g h U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1998) a n d (edited w i t h D a v i d B o u c h e r ) Social Justice ( R o u t l e d g e , 1998) a n d is executive editor o f Political Studies.

X

Contributors

C h a n d r a n K u k a t h a s is A s s o c i a t e Professor in the School o f Politics, University C o l l e g e , University o f N e w South Wales at the Australian D e f e n c e Force A c a d e m y . H e is a u t h o r o f The Liberal Archipelago (Oxford University P r e s s , f o r t h c o m i n g , 2 0 0 3 ) a n d c o - e d i t o r (with G e r a l d G a u s ) o f The Sage Handbook of Political Theory- ( f o r t h c o m i n g , 2 0 0 3 ) . S u s a n M e n d u s is Professor o f Politics and Director of the M o r r e l l Studies in Toleration P r o g r a m m e at the University o f York. H e r b o o k , Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, will b e p u b l i s h e d by O x f o r d University Press in 2 0 0 2 , and she is currently w o r k i n g on a further b o o k on p r o b l e m s o f political integrity. D a v i d M i l l e r is Official Fellow in Social a n d Political T h e o r y at Nuffield C o l l e g e , Oxford. His recent p u b l i c a t i o n s include Principles of Social Justice ( H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1999) and, as editor (with Sohail H a s h i m i ) , Boundaries and Justice (Princeton University P r e s s , 2 0 0 1 ) . H e is currently w o r k i n g on national responsibility a n d international j u s t i c e , a n d o n p r o b l e m s o f j u s t i c e in m u l t i c u l ­ tural societies. B h i k h u P a r e k h is C e n t e n n i a l Professor at the C e n t r e for G l o b a l G o v e r n a n c e at t h e L o n d o n S c h o o l o f E c o n o m i c s a n d a u t h o r o f several b o o k s o n political p h i ­ losophy, t h e latest b e i n g Rethinking Multiculturalism ( H a r v a r d University P r e s s , 2 0 0 0 ) . H e is active in British public life a n d w a s n o m i n a t e d to t h e H o u s e of L o r d s in 2 0 0 0 . I a n S h a p i r o is W i l l i a m R. K e n a n , Jr., Professor a n d C h a i r m a n o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f Political S c i e n c e at Yale University. H e is author, a m o n g s t other w o r k s , o f Democratic Justice (Yale University Press, 1999). His n e w b o o k The Moral Foundations of Politics (Yale University Press) will be p u b l i s h e d in 2 0 0 3 . J u d i t h S q u i r e s is Senior L e c t u r e r in Political T h e o r y at the University o f Bristol. She is a u t h o r o f Gender in Political Theory (Polity, 1999) a n d is o n t h e editorial b o a r d o f Ethnicities a n d the International Feminist Journal of Politics. J a m e s Tully is the J a c k m a n Professor o f P h i l o s o p h i c a l Studies, D e p a r t m e n t o f Philosophy, University o f T o r o n t o . His recent publications include, as co-editor, Multinational Democracies ( C a m b r i d g e University P r e s s , 2 0 0 1 ) a n d ' T h e U n f r e e d o m o f the M o d e r n s in Relation to their Ideals o f Constitutional D e m o c r a c y ' , Modern Law Review, Spring 2 0 0 2 .

Introduction: Between Culture and Equality Paul Kelly

1. The Claims of Groups and the 'Circumstances of Multiculturalism' ' M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' is a r e c e n t p h e n o m e n o n in political a n d social t h e o r y : the standard w o r k s are n o m o r e t h a n t w e n t y years old (see K y m l i c k a 1989; Young 1990). Yet the issues that are loosely g r o u p e d together u n d e r the h e a d i n g o f m u l ­ t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' - i n c l u d i n g g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d rights, the rights a n d status o f i m m i g r a n t s , the r e c o g n i t i o n o f m i n o r i t y n a t i o n s a n d t h e status o f n e w social m o v e ­ m e n t s (with the possible e x c e p t i o n o f t h e latter) - are familiar l o n g - s t a n d i n g p r o b ­ l e m s of political t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e . Self-consciously multicultural societies m a y well b e a r e c e n t addition to political e x p e r i e n c e b u t the p h e n o m e n a o f diversity and g r o u p difference are features o f a l m o s t all b u t the m o s t i n s u l a t e d political societies. All m o d e r n states face t h e problems o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m even if they are far from e n d o r s i n g m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m as a policy a g e n d a or official ideology. T h e y d o so b e c a u s e they face the conflicting c l a i m s o f g r o u p s o f p e o p l e w h o share identities a n d identity-conferring p r a c t i c e s that differ from t h o s e o f t h e majority in t h e states o f w h i c h they are a part. T h e c a u s e s o f these differences are m a n i f o l d a n d c o m p l e x . All o f h u m a n history h a s seen t h e m o v e m e n t of p e o p l e across t h e face of t h e earth, b u t only in relatively r e c e n t t i m e s h a s this m o v e m e n t b e e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d as ' b o r d e r c r o s s i n g ' , i m m i g r a t i o n , e m i g r a t i o n o f even c o l o n i z a t i o n . In m o r e recent h u m a n history w e are able to trace that m o v e m e n t a n d its c a u s e s w i t h greater p r e c i s i o n a n d classify it w i t h c o n c e p t s that distinguish b e t w e e n types of, a n d r e a s o n s for, t h e m o v e m e n t o f p o p u l a t i o n s . We can see t h e e m e r g e n c e of m o v e m e n t s to c o l o n i z e s u p p o s e d l y e m p t y territories a n d establish n e w e m p i r e s a n d states. C o l o n i z a t i o n , as w e know,

2

Paul Kelly

n o t only involved the influx o f ' w h i t e ' E u r o p e a n i m m i g r a n t s into t h e so-called ' n e w w o r l d s ' o f N o r t h a n d S o u t h A m e r i c a a n d A u s t r a l a s i a , as well as into t h e m u c h older w o r l d s of Africa a n d Asia; it also involved t h e m o v e m e n t o f n o n w h i t e p o p u l a t i o n s within t h o s e e m p i r e s in o r d e r to serve t h e e c o n o m i c n e e d s o f colonial overlords. In itself, it usually followed on from a form o f internal colonization that has always b e e n part o f the p r o c e s s o f state b u i l d i n g , with its e m p h a s i s on uniformity. I m m i g r a t i o n from the Indian s u b - c o n t i n e n t into Africa a n d S o u t h Asia, as well as Pacific Islands such as Fiji, are well recorded, a n d the s o u r c e of m a n y s u b s e q u e n t political p r o b l e m s . W i t h the retreat o f E u r o p e a n e m p i r e s , first w i t h the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e A m e r i c a s and, m u c h m o r e signifi­ cantly, w i t h the collapse o f the old E u r o p e a n e m p i r e s following t h e S e c o n d World War, there has b e e n a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f that earlier colonialist legacy. In the U n i t e d States the retreat o f t h e E u r o p e a n p o w e r s in the late e i g h t e e n t h a n d early n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y b e g a n a p r o c e s s that o p e n e d u p t h e ' n e w w o r l d ' as n o t m e r e l y a ' m u l t i - n a t i o n ' state (including all the various original first n a t i o n s ) b u t also a g e n u i n e l y p o l y e t h n i c state (including significant C a t h o l i c , O r t h o d o x a n d J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s as well as t h e original largely Protestant E u r o p e a n settlers), as g r o u p s o f i m m i g r a n t s from all over N o r t h e r n , S o u t h e r n a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e c a m e and settled in w h a t h a d b e e n the p r e s e r v e of t h e British, French a n d Spanish. T h e first significant d e m o c r a t i c republic w a s , from its v e r y inception, a ' m u l t i c u l t u r a l ' state in practice even if n o t in t e r m s o f political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . E u r o p e a n states - especially t h e o l d colonial p o w e r s s u c h as Britain, F r a n c e , Holland, B e l g i u m and, to a lesser extent, S p a i n and Portugal - b e c a m e m u l t i c u l t u r a l states as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f colonial retreat. T h e e c o n o m i c c o n s e q u e n c e s o f that retreat, as well as the ties established b e t w e e n t h e various c o m p o n e n t p o p u l a t i o n s o f t h e e m p i r e s , c r e a t e d the idea o f transnational a n d cultural ties w h i c h b e c a m e easy to exploit in t i m e s o f l a b o u r s h o r t a g e s , such as t h o s e faced in Britain in t h e i m m e ­ diate p o s t w a r period. In t h e British case, the retreat from e m p i r e b e g a n a p r o c e s s by w h i c h i m m i g r a t i o n from f o r m e r c o l o n i e s t r a n s f o r m e d t h e c o u n t r y into a m u l t i e t h n i c a n d multiracial society. T h e c h a r a c t e r a n d c o l o u r o f British cities ( i m m i g r a n t p o p u l a t i o n s r e m a i n largely c o n g r e g a t e d in cities) a n d p u b l i c life h a s b e e n i m m e a s u r a b l y i m p r o v e d by i m m i g r a t i o n , as i n d e e d h a v e o u r p u b l i c s e r v i c e s , w h i c h have c o m e to d e p e n d o n a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e n u m b e r o f r e c e n t i m m i g r a n t s a n d their offspring to sustain t h e m . T h a t said, this p r o c e s s has n o t b e e n w i t h o u t its p r o b l e m s a n d costs, not least to the i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t i e s t h e m s e l v e s a n d s u b s e q u e n t g e n e r a t i o n s o f racial a n d ethnic m i n o r i t i e s w h o h a v e found their w e l c o m i n g host to b e rather less w e l c o m i n g than originally t h o u g h t . R a c i s m a n d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n have b e c o m e a m a j o r p r o b l e m in Britain as well as in m a n y other ' l i b e r a l ' d e m o c r a t i c societies w i t h significant i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t i e s . R e g r e t ­ tably, the issue o f r a c i s m is t o o easily e x c u s e d b y t h o s e w h o see i m m i g r a t i o n as a threat to t h e distinctive c h a r a c t e r o f o u r national culture (see A l h i b i - B r o w n 1999 a n d 2 0 0 0 ) . W h i l s t this m i g h t h a v e b e e n e x p e c t e d ( a l t h o u g h not e x c u s e d ) as p a r t o f t h e a d j u s t m e n t to 'retreat from e m p i r e ' in states s u c h as Britain a n d F r a n c e , it is also a p r o b l e m in societies that h a v e always b e e n ' i m m i g r a n t ' or ' p o l y e t h n i c ' ,

Introduction: B e t w e e n Culture a n d Equality

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such as C a n a d a a n d A u s t r a l i a (at least since their ' d i s c o v e r y ' b y E u r o p e a n s - the i n d i g e n o u s p o p u l a t i o n s w e r e of c o u r s e never lost), a n d w h i c h , at least in the Australian c a s e , h a v e seen its politics d o m i n a t e d by issues o f r a c i s m , m u l t i ­ c u l t u r a l i s m a n d identity. We should not, however, see these p r o b l e m s as u n i q u e to t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f the liberal d e m o c r a t i c states of Western E u r o p e and their f o r m e r c o l o n i e s . With the fall of t h e Berlin Wall, t h e c o l l a p s e o f Soviet C o m m u n i s m and the retreat a n d internal collapse o f t h e old R u s s i a n E m p i r e , similar p r o b l e m s of g r o u p a n d c u l ­ tural difference have e m e r g e d w i t h r e n e w e d v i g o u r a n d often violent results. T h e issue of national m i n o r i t i e s is particularly a c u t e in the states o f E a s t e r n E u r o p e , such as t h o s e of the Baltic, w h e r e the legacy o f c o n q u e s t and forced s e t t l e m e n t has left national m i n o r i t i e s that actually form the majority in s o m e cities, a n d w h e r e m a n y a m o n g s t the political elite have c o m e to see parallels b e t w e e n their o w n political e x p e r i e n c e a n d that o f o t h e r m u l t i c u l t u r a l and m u l t i n a t i o n a l states (for a t h o r o u g h d i s c u s s i o n , see K y m l i c k a a n d O p a l s k i 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e fact o f p l u r a l i s m in the sense o f the i n t e r m i n g l i n g o f national, ethnic a n d religious cultures t h r o u g h g r o u p m i g r a t i o n h a s c r e a t e d w h a t m i g h t b e called the ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' - that is, the context w i t h i n w h i c h t h e p r o b ­ l e m s raised by g r o u p differences arise a n d in w h i c h the issues a d d r e s s e d b y multicultural theorists can be located. M a n y o f t h o s e active in the field o f g r o u p politics or the politics o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m are r e s p o n d i n g to general issues o f dis­ c r i m i n a t i o n a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e faced by m i n o r i t i e s within societies c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' . T h e s e issues are often stark o n e s of racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d v i o l e n c e . T h e y p o s e p r o b l e m s a n d e x p o s e injustices that all should b e c o n c e r n e d about. It is for this r e a s o n , p e r h a p s , that the d e b a t e s b e t w e e n multiculturalist theorists a n d their p h i l o s o p h i c a l critics can b e c o m e so fraught w i t h m u t u a l i n c o m p r e h e n s i o n . T h i s is further e x a c e r b a t e d b y the m u l t i ­ culturalist d e b a t e s cutting across familiar ideological b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n left and right. T h e political left (both liberal a n d radical) is generally hostile to t h e k i n d s o f ' n a t i o n a l i s t ' a r g u m e n t s offered b y political c o n s e r v a t i v e s against i m m i g r a t i o n . T h e a n t i - i m m i g r a t i o n m o v e m e n t , from E n o c h Powell in late 1960s Britain to P a u l i n e H a n s o n in 1990s Australia, have b e e n m o v e m e n t s of t h e right, d e p l o y i n g v e r s i o n s of an a r g u m e n t from culture to defend ' w h i t e ' n a t i o n s against t h e d e c a d e n c e o f c o l o u r e d i m m i g r a t i o n . T h e left's denial of culture in this c a s e has, however, b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d b y a failure to c o m p r e h e n d the g r o u p c l a i m s o f i m m i ­ g r a n t s , first n a t i o n s and ethnic m i n o r i t i e s in a w a y that h a s b e e n seen to e n d o r s e an alternative form o f r a c i s m or cultural d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . T h e refusal to r e c o g n i z e g r o u p difference in order to assert the equality o f all individuals a n d deny dis­ c r i m i n a t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f race or b e l i e f is a c c o m p a n i e d b y a similar c h a r g e that this in itself s u p p o r t s inequality b y d e n y i n g g r o u p s t h e recognition a n d status that is derived from their beliefs a n d p r a c t i c e s . In this respect t h e left can be cultur­ ally d o m i n a t i n g t h r o u g h its use o f universalist c l a i m s , w h e r e a s the conservatives a n d t h o s e on the right, w h o are m o r e c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h the l a n g u a g e a n d d i s c o u r s e o f identity, a u t h o r i t y a n d culture, can be seen as m o r e a t t u n e d t o t h e c l a i m s of

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g r o u p s , especially w h e n this involves a c c o m m o d a t i n g traditional p r a c t i c e s and hierarchies. H e n c e , confusion arises b e t w e e n left a n d right. Is b e i n g in favour o f multicultural policies t h e natural r e s p o n s e to rejecting g r o u p d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , r a c i s m a n d bigotry, or is it to fall p r e y to a subversive c o n s e r v a t i s m that e n d o r s e s hierarchy, tradition a n d the denial o f o p p o r t u n i t y ? (For a feminist p e r s p e c t i v e o n this c o n f u s i o n , see O k i n 1999.) T h e familiar l a n g u a g e o f left a n d right, it is often argued, is s i m p l y not helpful as a g u i d e . T h u s , natural political allies can a n d often d o find t h e m s e l v e s on o p p o s i t e sides o f the d e b a t e ; this results in a shared i n c o m ­ p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e notion o f ' m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' so that to o n e side it is a t e r m o f c o n t e m p t , to the other a b a d g e o f honour. But w h a t d o e s m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m m e a n ? If w e stick to the ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' , it s e e m s to m e a n little m o r e than the fact o f societies w i t h m o r e t h a n o n e culture in t h e p u b l i c r e a l m . T h e c l a i m s of t h e s e cultures m a y conflict a n d t h e h o l d e r s o f o n e m a y find t h e m s e l v e s s u b o r d i n a t e d to a n o t h e r c u l t u r e , b u t t h e point is m e r e l y that there is m o r e t h a n o n e . In this sense, m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is largely uncontroversial, as it is a fact; b u t clearly that is n o t w h a t is at stake. After all, o n e p o s s i b l e r e s p o n s e to the fact o f g r o u p difference is c o e r c e d u n i f o r m i t y this is p r e c i s e l y t h e p o l i c y a d o p t e d w i t h i n states d u r i n g the p r o c e s s o f state b u i l d ­ ing, w h e r e a single national l a n g u a g e is enforced at t h e deliberate e x p e n s e o f t h e local l a n g u a g e s a n d dialects. W h e r e the p r o b l e m o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m arises is w i t h the c l a i m that t h e ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' c h a l l e n g e the ability o f traditional ideological f o r m s or political t h e o r i e s to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m s e l v e s t o these c i r c u m s t a n c e s . For s o m e , the ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' simply r e q u i r e a r o b u s t application o f egalitarian or libertarian p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e a n d rights such that the c o n s e q u e n c e s of g r o u p difference a n d conflict - for e x a m p l e , d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d r a c i s m - c a n b e dealt w i t h . For o t h e r s , t h e s e familiar f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t are i n a d e q u a t e to face t h e p r o b l e m s o f difference t h r o w n u p b y ' c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' . To r e s p o n d to these n e w c i r c u m s t a n c e s , it is argued, we n e e d to rethink o u r categories a n d values a n d offer a n e w form o f theoretical l a n g u a g e or ideology. ( B y ideology, I simply m e a n a political t h e o r y that is r o o t e d in political p r a c t i c e a n d e x p e r i e n c e a n d n o t any t e c h n i c a l or p h i l o ­ sophical c l a i m a b o u t the cognitive or e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l status o f political c o n c e p t s a n d discourse.) In this latter sense m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is a n e w ideology or politi­ cal t h e o r y - it is t h e latest ' i s m ' . It is primarily in this sense that w e will b e dis­ c u s s i n g m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m in this b o o k . It is as a n e w ideology or form o f political t h e o r y that m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m h a s b e c o m e t h e focus o f such h e a t e d d e b a t e . That said, even w i t h i n the respective c a m p s o f b o t h theoretical or ideological multiculturalists a n d anti-multiculturalists t h e r e are also h e a t e d d e b a t e s a b o u t w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r p u b l i c policies are best suited to deal w i t h the issues o f g r o u p r e c o g ­ nition, integration or a c c o m m o d a t i o n . T h e s e will not be o u r direct c o n c e r n in this b o o k . W h a t can be said w i t h s o m e authority is that, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the c l a i m o f Will K y m l i c k a that on the issue o f the inherent j u s t i c e o f m i n o r i t y rights ' t h e d e b a t e is over a n d the d e f e n d e r s o f m i n o r i t y rights have w o n the d a y ' ( K y m l i c k a 2 0 0 1 a : 33), the d e b a t e is far from over, a n d that, d e p e n d i n g u p o n w h a t o n e m e a n s

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b y ' m i n o r i t y r i g h t s ' , it is far from clear that the d e f e n d e r s have w o n the day. Indeed, it is t h e task of this b o o k to c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is, as Brian B a r r y s u g g e s t s , a d e a d end, a n d if it is not, h o w it can o v e r c o m e the c h a l l e n g e s h e raises. E v e n if w e c o n c e d e that m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is a n e w ' i s m ' a n d n o t m e r e l y a w a y o f referring to the fact o f p l u r a l i s m a n d diversity in m o d e r n societies, w e are still left w i t h the variety or diversity of theories that c a n be d e s c r i b e d as multiculturalist. A s w e shall see in the s u b s e q u e n t c h a p t e r s in this b o o k , m u l t i ­ c u l t u r a l i s m , even w h e n it is actively e n d o r s e d as a self-description, b y n o m e a n s indicates a single a n d uncontroversial p e r s p e c t i v e . T h a t said, w e can identify t w o fundamental c o m p o n e n t s of multiculturalist a r g u m e n t s .

2. Multiculturalism W h a t e v e r else it is that the i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t i e s , ethnic minorities, first nations or n e w social m o v e m e n t s want, w h a t multiculturalist theorists defend is the equal recognition o f culture. W h a t that involves a n d w h a t either culture or equality m e a n s provides a g o o d w a y of explaining the differences b e t w e e n different multi­ culturalist theories. To characterize t h e different c o m p o n e n t s of multiculturalism as an ideology or theory a n d to provide a useful overview o f it, w e can start by assessing the role o f each o f these two c o n c e p t s in multiculturalist theories.

Culture T h a t culture plays a central role in multiculturalist a r g u m e n t s is so o b v i o u s that it hardly n e e d s stating, but w h a t that precise role is a n d w h a t w e m e a n by ' c u l t u r e ' are o f c o u r s e m u c h m o r e controversial issues. D e f e n d e r s of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , as w e shall see in this v o l u m e , are far from a g r e e d a b o u t t h e role a n d significance of culture a n d w h y it m a t t e r s . However, it is p o s s i b l e to identify a b r o a d p a t t e r n of a r g u m e n t w i t h i n w h i c h variations can b e located. T h e c o n c e p t a n d value o f culture is essential for multiculturalists for a n u m b e r of o v e r l a p p i n g r e a s o n s , b u t despite this overlap, w e can n e v e r t h e l e s s distinguish two significant roles that culture plays in multiculturalist a r g u m e n t s . T h e first is m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d parallels t h e a r g u m e n t s that are u s e d by c o m m u n i t a r i a n s w i t h regard to t h e n a t u r e o f t h e ' s e l f o r t h e ethical subject. T h e s e c o n d role is less ' c o m m u n i t a r i a n ' , in that it is e m p l o y e d by political liberals ( R a z 1986 a n d 1994; K y m l i c k a 1995) in o r d e r to p r o v i d e a foundation a n d c o n t e x t for liberal values s u c h as autonomy. T h a t said, m a n y thinkers w h o have b e e n d e s c r i b e d as ' c o m ­ m u n i t a r i a n s ' w o u l d e n d o r s e this latter v i e w o f t h e role o f culture. Let us look at the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issues first. M a n y critics o f John R a w l s ' s r e s u r r e c t i o n o f liberalism a n d t h e social contract tradition d r e w o n the familiar a r g u m e n t s e m p l o y e d b y c o n t r a c t a r i a n s c o n c e r n i n g the ' a t o m i s t i c ' a n d ' a s o c i a l ' n a t u r e o f t h e p e r s o n o r m o r a l subject ( S a n d e l 1982). R a w l s u s e d t h e idea o f a

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c h o o s i n g subject b e h i n d a veil o f i g n o r a n c e , w h i c h denies that subject o f k n o w l ­ e d g e o f crucial a s p e c t s o f h e r identity, as a way o f justifying his t w o p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e ( R a w l s 1971). C o m m u n i t a r i a n s such as M i c h a e l S a n d e l , C h a r l e s Taylor ( 1 9 8 5 ) a n d A l a s d a i r M a c l n t y r e ( 1 9 8 1 ) criticized this c o n c e p t i o n o f the p e r s o n on the g r o u n d s that it e m p l o y s a n a r r o w l y a t o m i s t i c a p p r o a c h . By t h i s , they m e a n t that it p r e s u p p o s e s that the p e r s o n or self can be d e t a c h e d from all t h e c o n t i n g e n t a s p e c t s o f p e r s o n a l i t y p r o v i d e d b y society, history, culture and family w i t h o u t u n d e r m i n i n g its c a p a c i t y to c h o o s e its e n d s or the rules that s h o u l d g o v e r n its interactions with others. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e self p r e s u p p o s e s t h e idea o f a p r e socially individuated c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n , w h o can c o n t r i b u t e to the artifi­ cial c o n s t r u c t i o n o f social relations. A n t i - c o n t r a c t a r i a n s since at least H e g e l have d e n i e d the plausibility o f this i d e a o f pre-social individuation o n t h e g r o u n d s o f its logical i n c o h e r e n c e a n d its historical and p s y c h o l o g i c a l implausibility. In contrast, ' c o m m u n i t a r i a n ' critics o f R a w l s i a n a n d contractualist liberalism have a r g u e d that t h e idea o f p e r s o n a l i t y a n d the individual is a social creation. Persons b e c o m e p e r s o n s in a social context a n d as s u c h are not pre-socially individuated. C o n s e q u e n t l y , c o m m u n i t a r i a n s are seen to c h a l l e n g e the n a r r o w individualism o f political a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l liberals a n d to p u t in its p l a c e t h e p r i m a c y o f c o m ­ m u n i t y - this is the ' s o c i a l t h e s i s ' . T h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o i n t is a r e n e w a l o f a p e r e n n i a l d e b a t e in social t h e o r y a b o u t the priority o f the individual or the collec­ tive. C o m m u n i t a r i a n s , however, favour the c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i t y over the collec­ tive b e c a u s e o f the unfortunate association o f collectivism with t h e discredited (since 1989) politics o f ' r e a l l y e x i s t i n g ' socialism. D e s p i t e Will K y m l i c k a ' s c l a i m that d r a w i n g attention t o t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m and c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m is increasingly unhelpful ( 2 0 0 1 b : 3 3 8 ) , it n e v e r t h e l e s s r e m a i n s the c a s e that this m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m d o e s explain t h e a p p e a l o f t h e multiculturalist c a s e a c r o s s s u c h a b r o a d s p e c t r u m o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d social theories. We can see this especially in the c a s e o f two o t h e r w i s e v e r y different multiculturalist theorists, Iris M a r i o n Young a n d B h i k h u P a r e k h . Iris M a r i o n Young is a radical d e m o c r a t i c theorist w h o h a s b e c o m e a m a j o r figure in t h e political t h e o r y o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . She argues ( 1 9 9 0 ) that social g r o u p s p r o v i d e the contexts w i t h i n w h i c h o u r identities are shaped, a n d c o n s e ­ quently that t h e w a y t h o s e social g r o u p s are treated h a s a b e a r i n g o n the treat­ m e n t o f individuals w h o c a r r y t h o s e g r o u p characteristics. Young is keen to distance h e r s e l f from t h o s e w h o w i s h to assert an ' e s s e n t i a l ' identity for w o m e n or m e m b e r s o f o t h e r social g r o u p s b a s e d on race or ethnicity. H e r a r g u m e n t is that identity is a w h o l l y social c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d that in m o d e r n pluralistic societies that c o n s t r u c t i o n takes p l a c e in c o m p l e x o v e r l a p p i n g c o n t e x t s . P e o p l e d o not simply inhabit single h o m o g e n o u s social g r o u p s , but are c o n s t i t u t e d b y m e m b e r s h i p o f o v e r l a p p i n g g r o u p s , n o o n e o f w h i c h h a s an a u t o m a t i c p r e c e d e n c e over any other. A l t h o u g h Young s p e a k s o f social g r o u p s having a distinct culture, she is a m b i g u o u s a b o u t t h e form a n d c o n t e n t she w i s h e s to attribute to that idea in the context o f t h e constitution of a p e r s o n ' s identity. H a v i n g a culture is part o f w h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s social g r o u p s from e a c h other. T h e identity o f that c o n -

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c e p t i o n o f culture n e e d not c o n c e r n us here; w h a t is i m p o r t a n t is that w h a t e v e r culture is, it f o r m s part o f t h e c o n t e x t out of w h i c h identities are c o n s t r u c t e d and, as such, Young e n d o r s e s the p r i m a c y o f the social over the individual. B h i k h u P a r e k h is also a radical, b u t his c o n c e p t i o n o f culture is m u c h less fluid t h a n Young's. W h e r e a s Young's c o n c e p t i o n of culture can b e e x t e n d e d to include s u c h t h i n g s as ' g a y ' culture, P a r e k h w i s h e s to confine the t e r m to ' a way of life' with a n o r m a t i v e authority that is t h o u g h t to b e b i n d i n g u p o n a c o m m u n i t y ( 1 9 9 9 : 163). In so d o i n g he d i s t i n g u i s h e s culture from self-chosen practices or lifestyles in a way that Y o u n g w o u l d r e g a r d as d a n g e r o u s l y essentialist. However, despite this difference, t h e c o m m o n a l i t y o f their respective p o s i t i o n s is revealed by the similar e n d o r s e m e n t o f t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n ' s o c i a l t h e s i s ' - namely, that indi­ vidual identity is s h a p e d by and p r o v i d e d t h r o u g h m e m b e r s h i p o f g r o u p s , o f w h i c h cultural g r o u p s are p e r h a p s t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t . Parekh's e n d o r s e m e n t o f cultural g r o u p s as an e x e m p l a r o f t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n 'social t h e s i s ' is i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e it illustrates t h e way in w h i c h culture offers an identity-conferring a s s o ­ ciation that is m o r e p r o x i m a t e t h a n that offered by t h e increasingly distant n a t i o n state, b u t w h i c h n e v e r t h e l e s s has a structure and institutional m a n i f e s t a t i o n w h i c h is l a c k i n g in other sorts o f v o l u n t a r y g r o u p s a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s . A s such, ' c u l t u r e ' p r o v i d e s our identities with thick c o n t e n t s , w h i c h w e m a y a t t e m p t to reject, b u t w h i c h we c a n n o t simply ignore or deny. It is for this reason that a t t a c k s o n culture or its denial constitute an attack on t h e p e r s o n s o f the b e a r e r s o f that culture. P a r e k h famously uses this k i n d o f analysis in his criticism o f political liberalism's failure to g r a s p the g e n u i n e hurt felt by the Islamic w o r l d w i t h the p u b l i c a t i o n of S a l m a n R u s h d i e ' s The Satanic Verses and the s u b s e q u e n t fatwa. For P a r e k h , those w h o failed to g r a s p w h y the publication o f this b o o k c o u l d c a u s e s u c h hurt h a d an i n a d e q u a t e and a t o m i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f the p e r s o n , as m u c h as an i g n o r a n c e o f Islam. Young a n d P a r e k h are only two p o s s i b l e e x a m p l e s from the e n o r m o u s litera­ ture o n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m that s h o w w h y culture m a t t e r s . T h e y a r g u e that culture as p a r t o f the c o n t e x t from w h i c h o u r identities are s h a p e d is i n s e p a r a b l e from w h o w e are as p e r s o n s . If y o u attack m y culture, y o u attack m e , in a way that I c a n n o t avoid a n d w h i c h g o e s to the heart of w h o I a m . B o t h theorists e x t e n d the c o m m u n i t a r i a n ' s ' s o c i a l t h e s i s ' b y a p p l y i n g it to culture as a significant identityc o n f e r r i n g association, b u t both follow that thesis to the extent that t h e y see g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p as prior to o u r individual identities. C o n s e q u e n t l y , b o t h reject the voluntarist individualism o f R a w l s a n d t h o s e w h o follow h i m . E v e n Will K y m l i c k a a d v a n c e s a version o f the ' s o c i a l t h e s i s ' in his defence o f the role a n d significance o f culture. H e simply d e n i e s that this is a significant c o n c e s s i o n to c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m , as this ' s o c i a l t h e s i s ' is perfectly c o m p a t i b l e with h o l d i n g liberal political values such as the p r i m a c y of a u t o n o m y ( K y m l i c k a 1989 a n d 1995). W h a t is distinctive about K y m l i c k a ' s position is that he r e g a r d s t h e 'social t h e s i s ' a n d the significance o f culture in p a r t i c u l a r t o b e perfectly c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e n d o r s i n g liberal values. T h u s , m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is not m e r e l y t h e prerogative of e x - M a r x i s t s a n d the collectivist left.

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Paul Kelly

T h i s b r i n g s u s to the s e c o n d role that culture plays in multicultural a r g u m e n t s . A s well as p r o v i d i n g t h e context from w h i c h personal a n d m o r a l identity is c o n ­ structed, multiculturalists s u c h as K y m l i c k a see culture as p r o v i d i n g a m o r a l r e s o u r c e . K y m l i c k a follows R a z in b e i n g a perfectionist liberal, at least to t h e extent that liberalism is about autonomy. For K y m l i c k a and R a z , t h e c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y is t h e key liberal value, a n d the task o f political liberalism is to e n c o u r ­ a g e a n d defend the value o f autonomy. Perfectionist liberals reject t h e n a r r o w n e u t r a l i s m o f R a w l s and B a r r y as an i n a d e q u a t e basis for the defence o f liberal v a l u e s ( B a r r y 1995). Liberals are s u p p o s e d to be neutral b e t w e e n differing c o n ­ c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d life, or w h a t p e o p l e c o n s i d e r to m a k e their life g o well. T h e r e are v a r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n s for w h y liberals s h o u l d b e so sensitive to t h e life c h o i c e s of individuals. T h e perfectionist explanation sees the value o f a g o o d life in t e r m s o f its b e i n g s o m e t h i n g that manifests the freedom a n d equal status o f the m o r a l subject by not b e i n g s o m e t h i n g that is c o e r c e d from t h e o u t s i d e a n d e n d o r s e d from the inside. W h a t m a k e s a p e r s o n ' s life g o well is ultimately that it is s o m e ­ t h i n g that can b e e n d o r s e d from the inside b y the p e r s o n w h o s e life it is, and if this is so then that p e r s o n is entitled to have their choices p r o t e c t e d from the external c o e r c i o n o f others or o f the state. We can see in this way that t h e value o f a u t o n o m y p r o v i d e s only t h e form o f a g o o d life; it tells u s w h a t the m i n i m a l c o n d i t i o n s o f a g o o d life m u s t b e regard­ less o f w h a t e v e r else it m a y consist of. In so d o i n g , t h e perfectionists are n o t m a k i n g a wholly e m p t y or formal c l a i m ; the e n d o r s e m e n t constraint r e q u i r e s t h e e n d o r s e m e n t to b e r e a s o n a b l e , i n f o r m e d a n d u n c o e r c e d , a r e q u i r e m e n t that rules o u t quite a lot. T h a t said, the e n d o r s e m e n t o f a u t o n o m y d o e s n o t give c o n t e n t to a g o o d o r w o r t h w h i l e life. It is h e r e that K y m l i c k a a r g u e s that culture m u s t play a crucial part, for it is culture that p r o v i d e s t h e r e s o u r c e s o u t o f w h i c h an a u t o n o m o u s a n d valuable life can be c o n s t r u c t e d . C u l t u r e in this s e n s e is a m o r a l r e s o u r c e , as it p r o v i d e s t h e lived structure o f v a l u e s , beliefs a n d obligations that w e n e e d in o r d e r to m a k e a u t o n o m y p o s s i b l e . W i t h o u t a context of c h o i c e there w o u l d b e n o t h i n g from w h i c h w e c o u l d m a k e an a u t o n o m o u s c h o i c e a b o u t t h e g o o d life. A u t o n o m y is always situated in a thicker ethical life, a n d this is w h a t is p r o v i d e d b y culture. For K y m l i c k a , culture is u n i q u e l y suited to p r o v i d e the m o r a l c o n t e x t for a u t o n o m o u s lives b e c a u s e it is ' a n intergenerational c o m m u n i t y , m o r e or less institutionally c o m p l e t e , o c c u p y i n g a given territory or h o m e l a n d , s h a r i n g a dis­ tinct l a n g u a g e a n d h i s t o r y ' ( 1 9 9 5 : 18). In this way, culture p r o v i d e s t h e c o n t e n t to c o n c e p t i o n s o f m o r a l p e r s o n a l i t y w h i c h are t h e subject o f a u t o n o m o u s e n d o r s e ­ m e n t . A u t o n o m y is n o t then to be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h culture, but, rather, a u t o n o m y is that w h i c h t r a n s f o r m s t h e fact o f a lived m o r a l e x p e r i e n c e into a g e n u i n e l y v a l u a b l e life. A s a liberal perfectionist, K y m l i c k a is not c o m m i t t e d to e n d o r s i n g all t h e r u l e s a n d practices o f all existing cultures. In this w a y he d r a w s m o r e strongly liberal c o n c l u s i o n s t h a n s o m e o n e like P a r e k h , w h o certainly e n d o r s e s a similar view a b o u t the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n culture a n d t h e g o o d life. Liberals are n o t r e q u i r e d

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to e n d o r s e e v e r y t h i n g , b u t equally for K y m l i c k a , liberals have a d u t y to respect and, w h e r e necessary, to p r o m o t e those cultures from w h i c h p e o p l e can derive g o o d a n d w o r t h w h i l e lives, especially w h e r e these are t h r e a t e n e d by t h e h o m o ­ g e n i z i n g t e n d e n c y o f m a s s c o n s u m e r i s m a n d the g l o b a l i z a t i o n o f trade. Whilst e m p h a s i z i n g that not all cultures are a u t o n o m y facilitating, and therefore d e s e r v ­ ing of liberal p r o t e c t i o n , t h e liberal multiculturalist is m o r e likely to b e g i n w i t h a w o r k i n g a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e equal value o f cultures (Tully 1995). S o the perfec­ tionist view s h o w s n o t m e r e l y h o w culture plays a role in w h a t it is to lead a g o o d life, it also s h o w s h o w culture can form the b a s i s o f c l a i m s for g r o u p rights a n d the duty o f the w i d e r state to protect cultures from external threats. K y m l i c k a p r e s e n t s u s with a c o m p l e x m o r a l picture in w h i c h culture d o e s not p r o v i d e a self-sufficient g r o u n d for value c l a i m s in that they n e e d to satisfy the test of a u t o n o m o u s e n d o r s e m e n t . But equally, a u t o n o m y d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a sufficient a c c o u n t o f ethical life w i t h o u t the n e c e s s a r y input or structured m o r a l c o m m u n i t i e s a n d r o l e s w h i c h are m a d e possible by cultures as intergenerational c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e liberal perfectionist a n d liberal multiculturalist c a s e for the sig­ nificance o f culture e x t e n d s b e y o n d the c o m m u n i t a r i a n 'social t h e s i s ' even t h o u g h it partly relies u p o n it. T h i s is b e c a u s e t h e liberal multiculturalists are c o n c e r n e d w i t h the n a t u r e o f values a n d not s i m p l y w i t h t h e s o u r c e s o f p e r s o n a l identity or self-hood or a w i t h social theorist's c o n c e r n w i t h t h e p r o p e r m e t h o d for analysing social p h e n o m e n a . T h e significance o f culture, therefore, can b e b a s e d o n either a m e t h o d o l o g i ­ cal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , the ' s o c i a l t h e s i s ' , or on an a c c o u n t of the values that m a k e possible t h o s e t h i n g s w h i c h w e c a n r e g a r d as g o o d or w o r t h w h i l e lives. In m o s t multicultural theories t h e s e two a p p r o a c h e s overlap. T h e y are, however, also c o u p l e d w i t h a further c o n c e p t - equality - in o r d e r to give rise to the distinctive family o f t h e o r i e s w e call m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m .

Equality T h e significance o f culture is n o t sufficient to identify a t h e o r y as m u l t i ­ culturalist. Various f o r m s o f relativism, p a r t i c u l a r i s m or c o n s e r v a t i s m m i g h t attach significance to t h e c o n c e p t . O n e m i g h t r e g a r d o n e ' s o w n political culture as h a v i n g a p a r t i c u l a r a n d o v e r r i d i n g c l a i m o f obligation but regard t h e cultures of others as o f n o value or m o r a l c o n c e r n . It d o e s not follow from t h e fact that m y culture is a s o u r c e of value that y o u r culture m u s t b e a s o u r c e o f value to m e or p e o p l e like m e . Indeed, this is an i m p o r t a n t issue r a i s e d by t h o s e w h o u s e a r g u ­ m e n t s similar to those of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s t s to defend the idea o f ' n a t i o n a l i t y ' . D o e s m y c o m m i t m e n t to m y culture entail any k i n d o f c o m m i t m e n t to r e c o g n i z e the culture o f a n y o n e else? O n e could, for e x a m p l e , m a k e a r g u m e n t s , such as are m a d e by those on t h e e x t r e m e right, w h i c h u s e t h e l a n g u a g e o f culture in order to enforce u n i f o r m i t y or t o deny rights to i m m i g r a n t s o f ethnic m i n o r i t i e s . Multiculturalists t e n d to distinguish t h e m s e l v e s ( m o r e or less explicitly) from o t h e r theorists w h o u s e t h e c o n c e p t o f culture by also c l a i m i n g to b e egalitarians.

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Paul Kelly

T h e respect for culture entails a duty to r e c o g n i z e t h e s t a n d i n g a n d c l a i m s o f other cultures. A n d clearly, given the c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , m u l t i ­ culturalist theorists a n d p o l i t i c i a n s e x t e n d this to a c c o m m o d a t i n g the c l a i m s o f m i n o r i t y cultures and nationalities rather than i m p o s i n g uniformity. In t h e p r e v i ­ o u s section w e saw t w o b r o a d general g r o u n d s for w h y multiculturalist theorists think that culture is an a p p r o p r i a t e subject for equality o f c o n c e r n a n d respect. However, equality plays as c o m p l e x a role in multiculturalist theories as d o e s t h e c o n c e p t o f culture. A g a i n , o n e c a n identify t w o b r o a d strands o f a r g u m e n t that c o n n e c t t h e c o n c e p t s o f culture a n d equality. Liberal multiculturalists such as K y m l i c k a are egalitarians in t h e D w o r k i n i a n sense o f a c c e p t i n g the idea o f equality o f c o n c e r n a n d respect as t h e basis o f any viable m o r a l a n d political t h e o r y ( D w o r k i n 2 0 0 0 ) . T h i s u n d e r l y i n g intuition d o e s n o m o r e than identify t h e terrain o f a r g u m e n t a n d still leaves o p e n the q u e s t i o n o f ' e q u a l i t y o f w h a t ? ' . W h a t is it that s h o u l d b e distributed equally in order to s e c u r e for e a c h p e r s o n equality o f c o n c e r n a n d r e s p e c t ? D w o r k i n , R a w l s a n d m o s t liberals are not c o n c e r n e d with overall equality of o u t c o m e s . T h e y accept the view that equality is a distributive criterion that a p p l i e s to the distribution o f s u c h things as r i g h t s , welfare or r e s o u r c e s , w h i c h s h a p e equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s . A s a g e n t s ex­ ercise their o p p o r t u n i t i e s in different w a y s , they will result in u n e q u a l o u t c o m e s . However, as l o n g as t h e s e o u t c o m e s are t h e result o f a fair distribution, w i t h suf­ ficient c o m p e n s a t i o n for t h o s e w h o as a result o f natural b a d luck a r e d i s a d v a n ­ taged, t h e n any differences in o u t c o m e will n o t in t h e relevant sense b e a c o n c e r n for egalitarians. In this way, e g a l i t a r i a n i s m e n c o m p a s s e s other values such as freedom. T h e r e are a n u m b e r o f w a y s in w h i c h this c o n c e p t i o n of o p p o r t u n i t y egalitari­ a n i s m m i g h t g i v e special p r o t e c t i o n to culture. First, individuals m i g h t use their r i g h t s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o constitute cultures as a significant c o m m o n project. A l t h o u g h cultures are not t h e artificial c o n s t r u c t i o n o f individuals p o o l i n g their rights a n d r e s o u r c e s , w e can n e v e r t h e l e s s u s e a liberal d i s c o u r s e o f rights, liberty a n d o p p o r t u n i t y to s h o w w h y cultures s h o u l d b e a c c o r d e d respect. In this w a y cultures enjoy a derivative n o r m a t i v e status - a l t h o u g h they m a y enjoy a p r i m a r y status o n t e r m s of social t h e o r y - b u t this derivative status is still e n o u g h to s h o w w h y w e h a v e g r o u n d s for r e s p e c t i n g cultures and, i m p o r t a n t l y in t h e a r g u m e n t s o f Will K y m l i c k a , for creating g r o u p rights w i t h i n liberal theories. T h e d e b a t e b e t w e e n K y m l i c k a a n d K u k a t h a s over w h e t h e r there are any g e n u i n e g r o u p rights, t u r n s o n t h e significance o n e attaches to this derivative quality. For K u k a t h a s ( 1 9 9 2 ) , t h e r e are n o g r o u p rights as such, there are only individual rights; however, he g o e s o n to a r g u e , p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , this liberal view o f freedom o f a s s o c i a ­ tion is all that is n e c e s s a r y to p r o v i d e quite r o b u s t defences o f culture a n d g r o u p practices. A further a r g u m e n t u s e d by liberal multiculturalists is that j u s t i c e is achieved b y t h e distribution o f certain p r i m a r y g o o d s such as i n c o m e a n d wealth, civil a n d political rights a n d the b a s e s o f self-respect. T h i s is an e x t e n s i o n o f R a w l s ' s argu­ m e n t for the p r i m a r y g o o d s in his t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e . T h e denial o f any o f these

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p r i m a r y g o o d s , or their u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t , constitutes an injustice b e c a u s e it denies the equal c l a i m or m o r a l status o f e a c h p e r s o n . If one's culture is a c o n ­ dition o f one's self-identity - a n d following t h e ' s o c i a l t h e s i s ' c o n s i d e r e d a b o v e this is a w i d e l y h e l d view - then o n e can a r g u e that t h e denial of o n e ' s culture is a significant injustice a n d d e p a r t u r e from equal t r e a t m e n t as long as that denial is not p r e m i s e d on s o m e equal p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n or status o f o t h e r s . To illustrate this p o i n t we m i g h t c o n s i d e r the issue o f s y m b o l i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the public sphere t h r o u g h military o r p o l i c e u n i f o r m s . If a m e m b e r o f t h e resident cultural m i n o r i t y o f a society is d e n i e d a c c e s s to career or other o p p o r t u n i t i e s b e c a u s e t h e uniform c o d e o f that society p r e c l u d e s s o m e a s p e c t o f traditional dress, such as w e a r i n g a t u r b a n as o p p o s e d to a Stetson hat b y the Royal C a n a d i a n M o u n t e d Police, a n d if c h a n g i n g the u n i f o r m w o u l d n o t u n d e r m i n e t h e public function o f the military or c a u s e danger, then w e can a r g u e that t h e denial is a c a s e of u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t , b e c a u s e it i m p o s e s a b u r d e n o f cultural denial on, for e x a m p l e , the Sikh c o m m u n i t y w h i c h is n o t i m p o s e d u p o n o t h e r s . In this c a s e w e m i g h t a r g u e that e x t e n d i n g equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s or equal p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e laws involves m a k i n g group-specific e x c e p t i o n s to a c c o m m o d a t e cultural differences. T h e r a t i o n a l e for n o t s i m p l y i g n o r i n g t h e s e cases ( s o m e t i m e s c a l l e d b e n i g n neglect) a n d instead r e g a r d i n g t h e m as issues o f u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t is that culture a n d its manifestation is s o m e t h i n g that g o e s to the h e a r t o f a p e r s o n ' s identity. For a Sikh, a t u r b a n is not m e r e l y a h a t that c a n b e e x c h a n g e d for any o t h e r k i n d o f h e a d g e a r ; it is instead an e x p r e s s i o n o f religious a n d cultural identity a n d t h e r e ­ fore s o m e t h i n g that g o e s t o the h e a r t o f the c o n d i t i o n s o f that p e r s o n ' s self-respect. Parallel a r g u m e n t s m i g h t b e m a d e w i t h respect to l a n g u a g e r e c o g n i t i o n in the public s p h e r e . T h e c o n d i t i o n s of self-respect a r e an i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t o f equal treatment, but they can result in differential o u t c o m e s . B u t again, the issue of cul­ tural recognition is s e e n to follow from the p r i o r obligation to treat p e r s o n s as equally w o r t h y o f c o n c e r n a n d respect. N o t all multiculturalist theorists are satisfied w i t h the liberal egalitarian reliance on equality o f opportunity. For radical multiculturalists s u c h as Iris M a r i o n Young or N a n c y Fraser (Fraser 1997) t h e turn t o w a r d s g r o u p or cultural recognition follows from the false neutrality of liberal distributive n o r m s . Indeed, these radical theorists a r g u e that it is liberalism's failure to take seriously the extent to w h i c h o p p o r t u n i t i e s reflect u n e q u a l p o w e r relations w h i c h creates the n e e d for a g e n u i n e l y multicultural theory. T h a t is o n e that a c c o m m o d a t e s t h e dif­ ferences in p o w e r b e t w e e n social g r o u p s . Young's egalitarian a r g u m e n t can b e seen as a direct critique o f the liberal egalitarianism d i s c u s s e d above. T h e point o f h e r a r g u m e n t , a n d o f s i m i l a r radical theorists, is that it p l a c e s c o n c e r n for social a n d cultural g r o u p s in the w r o n g p l a c e . T h e p r o b l e m is not s i m p l y o n e of distributing rights a n d r e s o u r c e s t o g r o u p s a n d cultures in o r d e r for their m e m b e r s to b e r e g a r d e d as ' e q u a l ' ; t h e p r o b l e m is w i t h t h e u n d e r l y i n g social n o r m s that constitute o p p o r t u n i t i e s in the first p l a c e . In other w o r d s , Young is n o t c o n c e r n e d with w h a t additional r e s o u r c e s are n e e d e d by social a n d cultural g r o u p s to a c c e s s the o p p o r t u n i t i e s that o t h e r s h a v e o n an

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equal footing; rather it is w i t h t h e n o r m s that structure t h o s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s in t h e first p l a c e . T h i s m a t t e r s for Young, b e c a u s e not all relevant denials o f equal r e c o g ­ nition take the form o f overt d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . For e x a m p l e , one can d i s c r i m i n a t e against w o m e n in the w o r k p l a c e b y not o p e n i n g u p j o b o p p o r t u n i t i e s to t h e m for e x a m p l e , by r e s e r v i n g all senior m a n a g e m e n t roles for m e n . S u c h d i s c r i m i ­ n a t i o n did for m a n y years disfigure the w o r k p l a c e and has b e e n r e m o v e d by c h a n g e s in t h e law that n o w offer equal p r o t e c t i o n . However, these c h a n g e s have n o t necessarily b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d by g r e a t e r a c c e s s by w o m e n t o such p o s i t i o n s in b u s i n e s s or g o v e r n m e n t . T h e r e a s o n for this is that t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e m ­ selves, a l t h o u g h o p e n to all talents, n e v e r t h e l e s s reflect w i d e r p a t t e r n s of social a n d g e n d e r e x p e c t a t i o n s . W o m e n are still seen as m o r e likely to b e c o m e the p r i m a r y carers o f p r e - s c h o o l c h i l d r e n a n d therefore less c o m m i t t e d to a career, w h a t e v e r c h o i c e s individual w o m e n m i g h t h a v e m a d e a b o u t their lives. Similarly, m a n y o p p o r t u n i t i e s reflect cultural e x p e c t a t i o n s w h i c h m a y not be universally s h a r e d a n d w h i c h m a y systematically d i s a d v a n t a g e certain social g r o u p s . A s i m p l e e x a m p l e is p r o v i d e d b y statutory rest days w h i c h privilege the Christian S u n d a y over Friday a n d Saturday, t h u s d i s a d v a n t a g i n g M u s l i m s a n d J e w s . E v e n w h e n t h e legislation m a y not h a v e b e e n b a s e d o n any religious a r g u m e n t s about S u n d a y o b s e r v a n c e , the m e r e fact o f a convention, t h e origin o f w h i c h is n o l o n g e r considered, can still bring w i t h it culturally b a s e d e x p e c t a t i o n s that d o not fall equally on all. T h e p o i n t h e r e is that o p p o r t u n i t i e s are n e v e r neutral b u t are always social c o n s t r u c t i o n s that c a r r y with t h e m inequalities o f p o w e r a n d relations o f d o m i n a t i o n a n d s u b o r d i n a t i o n . T h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s are the issue, a n d n o t m e r e l y a c c e s s to t h e m . H o w this affects the issue o f multicultural politics in practice is m o r e c o m p l e x t h e n in t h e c a s e o f liberal egalitarianism, as it d o e s not m e r e l y involve s o m e 'stuff' s u c h as r i g h t s or r e s o u r c e s w h i c h are distributed in order to equalize a c c e s s to o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Instead, t h e radical egalitarian is less likely to b e c o n c e r n e d with the distribution of resources as a p r i m a r y task a n d m o r e likely to b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h issues o f g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and proportionality. For e x a m p l e , Young r e g a r d s the a b s e n c e o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y o f o u t c o m e s as e v i d e n c e o f struc­ tural g r o u p d i s a d v a n t a g e w h i c h m u s t be c o m p e n s a t e d for. We c a n n o t m e r e l y explain away t h e d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e a b s e n c e of, for e x a m p l e , black m a l e s in certain professions on the g r o u n d s that there w e r e n o cases o f direct d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d that this difference in o u t c o m e is m e r e l y a function o f different c h o i c e s . Young's a r g u m e n t a n d those of similar radical egalitarians are m o r e likely to regard the lack o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y as a g r o u n d for affirmative action p r o g r a m m e s w h i c h target r e s o u r c e s at g r o u p s in order to b r i n g their levels o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n into line w i t h t h o s e o f o t h e r social g r o u p s . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that all black m e n s h o u l d b e brain s u r g e o n s or r o c k e t scientists, but it d o e s m e a n that t h e p r o p o r ­ tion w h o are should be b r o a d l y in line w i t h t h o s e from other social g r o u p s . We can m a k e similar k i n d s o f a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g all sorts o f social g r o u p s , for e x a m p l e the representation o f C a t h o l i c s in t h e p o l i c e service of N o r t h e r n Ireland, or J e w s in the military, or w o m e n in professorial posts in British universities. All

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o f t h e s e cases o f lack o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y will require different a n d targeted political r e s p o n s e s . W h a t will not b e sufficient is t h e equal distribution o f rights or r e s o u r c e s , a l t h o u g h this m a y b e p a r t o f the solution. A l t h o u g h Young's radical egalitarian t h e o r y is not d e s i g n e d simply to s u p p o r t t h e c l a i m s o f the traditional h i e r a r c h i e s o f ethnic a n d national cultures, h e r a r g u m e n t s d o assist t h o s e w h o w i s h to defend cultural difference b y p r o v i d i n g a w a y o f d e f e n d i n g g r o u p rights a n d g r o u p e x e m p t i o n s on the b a s i s of egalitarian a r g u m e n t s . A s with K y m l i c k a , t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f culture is a s e c o n d a r y o u t c o m e o f h e r egalitarianism o f social g r o u p s (not all o f w h i c h are cultural). T h a t said, h e r a r g u m e n t , like K y m l i c k a ' s , p l a c e s the i d e a o f g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p at t h e centre o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t egalitarianism. B y c o m b i n i n g culture and egalitarianism, multiculturalism, despite its inherent diversity, a t t e m p t s to c h a l l e n g e the d o m i n a n t position of liberal egalitari­ a n i s m as the only w a y to r e s p o n d to the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . It is precisely this i n t e r w e a v i n g of respect for culture a n d the c l a i m s o f egalitarianism that B r i a n B a r r y w i s h e s to distinguish in h i s b o o k Culture and Equality ( 2 0 0 1 ) . 1

3. Culture versus Equality B r i a n B a r r y ' s b o o k a t t e m p t s to e x a m i n e t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the c o m m i t m e n t to t h e value a n d role o f culture a n d its c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h an equal c o m m i t m e n t to egalitarianism. In a c o m p l e x and w i d e - r a n g i n g discussion, w h i c h covers rival theorists, p a r l i a m e n t a r y a n d S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c i s i o n s a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e s u p ­ p o s i t i o n s , he a d v a n c e s t h e r o b u s t c l a i m that culture a n d equality are f u n d a m e n ­ tally i n c o m p a t i b l e c o m m i t m e n t s a n d that the ' m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s t ' turn in political t h e o r y a n d practice, a d v o c a t e d in different w a y s by K y m l i c k a , Young, Tully, P a r e k h a n d K u k a t h a s , is ultimately a d e a d end. H i s p r i m a r y c o n c e r n is to provide a r o b u s t defence o f egalitarian liberalism a n d to s h o w h o w this is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a c o m m i t m e n t to cultural p r o t e c t i o n a n d group-specific rights a n d e x e m p ­ tions. T h i s is all the m o r e striking as B a r r y offers this c h a l l e n g e from t h e liberal left rather than from the familiar s o u r c e o f m a n y rejections o n the political right. T h e multiculturalist p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h culture is a distraction from the real sources o f u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a n d injustice. T h e p r i m a c y attached to culture o b s c u r e s the fact that w h a t m i n o r i t y g r o u p s really w a n t are t h e rights and r e s o u r c e s enjoyed b y t h o s e in p o s i t i o n s o f d o m i n a n c e a n d power, rather t h a n the p r o t e c t i o n o f cultural h i e r a r c h i e s that benefit t h o s e w h o enjoy t h e position of cultural e n t r e p r e n e u r s . T h u s he d o e s n o t see the critique o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m as an assault on t h o s e g r o u p s a n d individuals w h o are d e n i e d rights, o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d r e s o u r c e s . T h e a r g u m e n t is a b o u t w h e t h e r a n e w form o f political t h e o r y is n e c e s s a r y or w h e t h e r these c l a i m s can b e covered by reference to liberal egalitarian n o r m s . In order to sustain the a r g u m e n t that r e s p e c t i n g a n d giving rights to cultures is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a c o m m i t m e n t to equality, B a r r y sets a b o u t a t t a c k i n g the

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p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d o u t c o m e s o f multiculturalist a r g u m e n t s . H i s p r i m a r y task is to s h o w that t h e a p p e a l to culture either d o e s n o m o r e work t h a n a direct appeal to equality or else it d o e s w o r k b u t at t h e e x p e n s e o f equal or fair t r e a t m e n t . Culture and Equality is divided into three sections. Part I focuses on the issue o f equal treatment. In particular, B a r r y e x a m i n e s a r g u m e n t s for e x c e p t i o n s to e q u a l laws o n t h e g r o u n d s o f cultural identity. H e r e , h i s a r g u m e n t is to c h a l l e n g e the point o f e x c e p t i o n s to e q u a l laws on the g r o u n d s that either there is a general interest in t h e equal application o f t h e law, w h i c h m a k e s n o a p p e a l to a distinct cultural practice, or else there is a reason for c h a l l e n g i n g the p r o p r i e t y o f any regulation in t h e first p l a c e . T h e key p o i n t is that t h e a p p e a l to culture d o e s n o additional w o r k in this sort o f p u b l i c r e a s o n i n g . A s i m p l e e x a m p l e w h i c h B a r r y d i s c u s s e s is the issue o f w h e t h e r t h e r e is p u b l i c interest in r e g u l a t i n g the s l a u g h t e r o f a n i m a l s . If t h e r e is, t h e n it is n o t m e r e l y the i m p o s i t i o n o f a majority's p r e f e r e n c e , so it follows that there is n o g r o u n d for a culture-based e x c e p t i o n . If t h e m a t t e r is g e n u i n e l y indifferent, t h e n t h e r e is n o g r o u n d for t h e e x c e p t i o n b e c a u s e there is n o g r o u n d for the g e n e r a l r u l e in the first instance. Similarly, w e m i g h t reject t h e a r g u m e n t for an e x c e p t i o n to the p r o h i b i t i o n o f c a n n a b i s for R a s t a f a r i a n s w h o u s e it as part o f ritual a n d w o r s h i p . If t h e r e is a g e n u i n e issue o f p u b l i c health, t h e n there is n o g r o u n d for e x c e p t i o n s . If, o n the other hand, t h e r e is n o real public interest here, t h e s o l u t i o n is general d e c r i m i n a l i z a t i o n for all rather t h a n m e r e l y for sacra­ m e n t a l u s e s . A s B a r r y g o e s on to a r g u e , in m a n y cases t h e i m p e r a t i v e is not to a c c o m m o d a t e g r o u p s t h r o u g h e x e m p t i o n s , but to a c c o m m o d a t e g r o u p s t h r o u g h liberalization. T h e s e c o n d section of B a r r y ' s b o o k focuses o n issues o f g r o u p rights. H e r e B a r r y d i s c u s s e s t h e g r o u n d s for g r o u p rights, in p a r t i c u l a r t h o s e a d v a n c e d by Will K y m l i c k a a n d his followers, a n d the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a l l o w i n g g r o u p s to b e fully self-regulating on m a t t e r s that t h e y regard as part o f their culture. B a r r y explores a n u m b e r o f cases in the fields o f religious freedom, e d u c a t i o n a n d parental rights over children to show h o w affording recognition to g r o u p rights d e n i e s t h e equal t r e a t m e n t o f individuals. A s e x a m p l e s o f e d u c a t i o n a l freedom, B a r r y l o o k s at t h e c a s e of Wisconsin v. Yoder w h i c h allows A m i s h p a r e n t s to e x e m p t their children from a full s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n in order to m a k e exit from their c o m m u n i t y m o r e difficult, as well as at similar p r o v i s i o n s u n d e r U K e d u c a t i o n acts w h i c h e x e m p t 'traveller' p a r e n t s from the obligation to send their children to s c h o o l for the s a m e length o f t i m e as other children. T h e point o f t h e s e illustrative e x a m p l e s , as well as the m a n y others d i s c u s s e d b y Barry, is to s h o w h o w the p r a c t i c e o f g r o u p rights reinforces u n e q u a l restrictions o n children and adults, b e c a u s e it m a k e s the g r o u p t h e p r i m a r y b e a r e r o f significance and not the individual p e r s o n . Far from assist­ ing individuals to seek equal recognition a n d p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e law, g r o u p rights r e n d e r t h e e n j o y m e n t of individual rights c o n d i t i o n a l o n t h e g o o d will of t h o s e w h o exercise p o w e r within a culture. A g a i n , t h e a r g u m e n t is that t h e c o m m i t m e n t to culture a n d equality pulls in different directions, a n d w e m u s t m a k e a c h o i c e , for w e c a n n o t have both.

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T h e final p a r t of B a r r y ' s b o o k e x a m i n e s multiculturalist a r g u m e n t s against the universalism of liberal egalitarianism. In particular, he a d d r e s s e s the various argu­ m e n t s for t h e significance a n d equal value o f a culture a n d d r a w s t o g e t h e r s o m e of t h e criticisms he has m a d e earlier a b o u t the r e d u n d a n c y o f a p p e a l i n g to culture. F u r t h e r m o r e , h e m a k e s explicit his a r g u m e n t that t h e cultural turn h a s actually distorted t h e real issues o f injustice a n d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n that are p o s e d b y t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . In m a k i n g these criticisms, B a r r y d o e s not p r o v i d e a fully w o r k e d - o u t alternative c o n c e p t i o n o f egalitarian j u s t i c e , a l t h o u g h the a r g u m e n t is s k e t c h e d in outline. T h e m a i n task o f Culture and Equality is a largely negative o n e , in that it is c o n c e r n e d w i t h e x p o s i n g the a p p a r e n t i n c o ­ h e r e n c e of the multiculturalist position. B a r r y h a s o u t l i n e d t h e f o u n d a t i o n for his liberal egalitarianism in t h e first two v o l u m e s o f his Treatise of Social Justice ( 1 9 8 9 a n d 1995) a n d will d e v e l o p his liberal p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e in s u b s e q u e n t v o l u m e s . However, m a n y o f the criticisms r a i s e d d o not d e p e n d u p o n a particu­ lar liberal t h e o r y o f equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y b u t rather o n the inherent t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e conflicting claims o f cultural recognition a n d individual equality. W h a t e v e r multiculturalists a r g u e to the contrary, B a r r y ' s c l a i m is that m u l t i ­ culturalism replicates traditional p r o b l e m s about r e c o n c i l i n g t h e c l a i m s o f g r o u p s w i t h t h e fundamental ethical status o f the p e r s o n . W h a t multiculturalists h a v e not b e e n p r e p a r e d to a r g u e is that ' c u l t u r e ' as a set o f beliefs a n d p r a c t i c e s has a prior ethical a n d political claim to that of t h e p e r s o n . Yet as t h e t w o often clash in politics, it is precisely this w h i c h m u s t be a d d r e s s e d if m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is to provide a viable way o f r e c o n c i l i n g the plurality o f c l a i m s that are p o s e d by the circumstances of multiculturalism.

4. Overview of Multiculturalism

Reconsidered

T h i s d o e s not o f c o u r s e give B a r r y the last word o n t h e subject; indeed, the point o f this v o l u m e is to e x a m i n e a n d a n s w e r his c l a i m that m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is inher­ ently flawed. A l t h o u g h t h e contributors a d d r e s s their a r g u m e n t s to B a r r y ' s b o o k , the p r i m a r y focus o f all of the r e s p o n s e s is his general claim that culture a n d equality stand in o p p o s i t i o n and that m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m as a n e w a p p r o a c h to the politics o f ethnically plural societies is m i s t a k e n . T h i s b o o k b e g i n s with an c h a p t e r by S a m u e l F r e e m a n , w h i c h p r o v i d e s a broadly s y m p a t h e t i c o v e r v i e w o f B a r r y ' s liberal critique o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . However, F r e e m a n g o e s on to raise a n u m b e r o f issues d i s c u s s e d by Barry, a r g u i n g that the logic o f the liberal egalitarian position should take h i m m u c h closer to the c l a i m s o f multiculturalists. T h i s is followed by four c h a p t e r s by Susan M e n d u s , D a v i d Miller, Paul Kelly a n d S i m o n Caney, all o f w h i c h e x a m i n e B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t for equality of opportunity. M e n d u s a r g u e s that B a r r y ' s egalitarianism d e p e n d s on a controversial distinction b e t w e e n inequalities that are t h e result o f c h o i c e , a n d w h i c h therefore d e s e r v e n o special treatment, a n d t h o s e that are the result of c h a n c e a n d for w h i c h individuals should not be e x p e c t e d t o bear t h e

16

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b u r d e n . M e n d u s applies this distinction to a n u m b e r o f cases a n d a r g u e s that it d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e c l a i m that culture is distinct from t h e c a t e g o r y o f g e n u i n e s o u r c e s o f injustice. T h i s t h e m e o f opportunity, responsibility a n d e q u a l t r e a t m e n t is t a k e n u p in D a v i d Miller's c h a p t e r in his a r g u m e n t for an alternative c o n c e p ­ tion o f equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y w h i c h i n c l u d e s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to d o w h a t e v e r any p a r t i c u l a r culture p r e s c r i b e s . Kelly p r o v i d e s a qualified defence o f Iris M a r i o n Young's a r g u m e n t for o u t c o m e equality a n d g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y as o p p o s e d to B a r r y ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f equality o f opportunity. C a n e y offers a m o r e s y m p a t h e t i c defence o f B a r r y ' s egalitarianism, b u t g o e s o n to a r g u e that this is still c o m ­ patible w i t h t h e r u l e - e x c e p t i o n a p p r o a c h to m u l t i c u l t u r a l a c c o m m o d a t i o n that B a r r y rejects in t h e first p a r t o f his Culture and Equality. T h e n e x t t h r e e c h a p t e r s , b y J a m e s Tully, Judith Squires a n d B h i k h u P a r e k h , focus o n e s s e n t i a l i s m a n d t h e n a t u r e o f culture. All a r g u e that B a r r y ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f ' c u l t u r e ' is a straw m a n , as it is t o o n a r r o w l y essentialist a n d static. If B a r r y h a d e m p l o y e d the m o r e n u a n c e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f culture that are e m p l o y e d b y m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s t s a n d difference theorists, t h e n h e w o u l d h a v e b e e n forced t o qualify h i s thesis a b o u t t h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y o f culture a n d equality. T h i s leaves o p e n the q u e s t i o n s o f w h e t h e r t h e s e m o r e n u a n c e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f culture a d e q u a t e l y c a p t u r e t h e often fairly traditional a n d static v i e w s o f s o m e m i n o r i t y g r o u p s , a n d w h e t h e r a p p e a l to t h e s e m o r e n u a n c e d v i e w s allows multiculturalists to d r a w strong or n o r m a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s . T h e three r e m a i n i n g c h a p t e r s , b y C l a r e C h a m b e r s , Ian Shapiro a n d C h a n d r a n K u k a t h a s a d d r e s s , in v e r y different w a y s , liberal a n d d e m o c r a t i c criticisms o f Barry's argument. Shapiro's chapter provides a sympathetic endorsement of B a r r y ' s p o s i t i o n from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f d e m o c r a t i c j u s t i c e . C h a m b e r s offers the interesting a r g u m e n t that B a r r y ' s p o s i t i o n is insufficiently r o b u s t in t h e face o f g r o u p restrictions o n a u t o n o m y a n d opportunity. H e r c o n c l u s i o n w o u l d entail a far m o r e interventionist l i b e r a l i s m rather t h a n a m o r e tolerant m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . K u k a t h a s , o n t h e other hand, p r o v i d e s a defence o f a classical liberal a p p r o a c h to individual f r e e d o m o f association a n d s c e p t i c i s m as a g r o u n d for radical tolera­ tion o f g r o u p p r a c t i c e s . K u k a t h a s ' s m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is interesting in this case, b e c a u s e h e fully privatizes the issue o f the v a l u e o f culture a n d only deploys an a r g u m e n t for equal liberty. A s a result, his o w n tolerant b r a n d o f m u l t i ­ c u l t u r a l i s m d o e s n o t entail c o m b i n i n g any controversial thesis a b o u t culture a n d equality. T h e b o o k c o n c l u d e s w i t h an e x t e n d e d c h a p t e r in w h i c h B a r r y r e s p o n d s to all t h e s e criticisms. T h i s collection b r i n g s t o g e t h e r s o m e o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t n a m e s o n either side o f t h e multiculturalist d e b a t e , a n d enables t h e m to defend their v i e w s a b o u t t h e s c o p e a n d significance o f culture a n d its e q u a l value against B a r r y ' s criticisms. In this w a y t h e collection p r o v i d e s an insight into s o m e o f t h e m o s t p r e s s i n g issues in m u l t i c u l t u r a l political theory. A s m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m h a s b e g u n to establish itself as a n e w orthodoxy, it is timely that it s h o u l d b e subject to careful reconsideration.

Introduction: B e t w e e n Culture a n d Equality

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Note 1. In the chapters that follow, Barry's Culture and Equality will, after the first citation in each case, be referred to in the text as CE.

References Alhibi-Brown, Y. 1999: True Colours: Public Attitudes to Multiculturalism and the Role of Government (London: IPPR). 2000: Who Do We Think We Are? (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane). Barry, B. 1989: Theories of Justice (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester). 1995: Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 2001: Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity). Dworkin, R. 2000: Sovereign Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Fraser, N. 1997: Justice Interruptus (New York: Routledge). Kukathas, C. 1992: Are There Any Group Rights? Political Theory, 20: 105-39. Kymlicka, W. 1989: liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 1995: Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 2001a: Politics in the Vernacular (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 2001b: Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Kymlicka, W. and Opalski, M. 2001: Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Maclntyre, A. 1981: After Virtue (London: Duckworth). Okin, S. M. 1999: Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Parekh, B. 1999: The Logic of Intercultural Evaluation. In J. Horton and S. Mendus (eds), Toleration, Identity and Difference (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 2000: Rethinking Multiculturalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Rawls, J. 1971: A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Raz, J. 1986: The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 1994: Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective. In Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Sandel, M. 1982: Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Taylor, C. 1985: Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Tully, J. 1995: Strange Multiplicity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Young, I. M. 1990: Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

1 Liberalism and the Accommodation of Group Claims Samuel Freeman

1. Setting the Stage O n e o f t h e m o s t persistent criticisms o f liberalism is that the priority it a s s i g n s to freedom a n d individual rights is not simply disruptive o f conventional social n o r m s but also u n d e r m i n e s t h e value o f c o m m u n i t y . T h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m that arose in t h e 1980s is a recent e x a m p l e o f this r e s p o n s e to liberalism as a politi­ cal project as well as a political theory. S o m e c o m m u n i t a r i a n s a r e m o r e liberal than others (for e x a m p l e , M i c h a e l Walzer a n d C h a r l e s Taylor are m o r e so than A l a s d a i r M a c l n t y r e ) . B u t if a n y t h i n g unites c o m m u n i t a r i a n s , it is t h e conviction that basic f r e e d o m s a n d other r e q u i r e m e n t s of liberal j u s t i c e are s e c o n d a r y (at best) to a p e r s o n ' s a c h i e v i n g the g o o d o f c o m m u n i t y . Liberals reply that t h e y can a c c e p t that individuals realize a large part o f their g o o d t h r o u g h participation in social g r o u p s (not j u s t families a n d friendships, but larger a s s o c i a t i o n s too), a n d that t h e values o f c o m m u n i t y are w o r t h p u r s u i n g for their own s a k e . L i b e r a l s , however, reject the c o m m u n i t a r i a n contention that certain c o m m u n a l interests are to b e politically enforced, t a k i n g priority over equal basic liberties a n d o p p o r t u ­ nities and the freedom to define o n e ' s own g o o d . M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is the heir to this non-liberal d o c t r i n e a n d p e r h a p s its natural d e v e l o p m e n t . It is n o a c c i d e n t that m a n y c o m m u n i t a r i a n s are also theorists o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . L i k e c o m m u n i t a r i a n s , multiculturalists insist that a p e r s o n ' s g o o d is primarily defined by m e m b e r s h i p a n d active participation in a ( d o m i n a n t ) c o m m u n i t y o f s o m e kind. B u t w h e r e a s c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m is an ideal t h e o r y out­ lining the b a s e s o f social unity in t e r m s o f e v e r y o n e ' s pursuit o f c o m m u n a l e n d s , m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m t a k e s c o g n i z a n c e o f t h e fact that often t h e r e a r e a multiplicity o f cultures coexisting w i t h i n t h e s a m e society a n d u n d e r o n e g o v e r n m e n t . It then

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p r o v i d e s c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m with a n o n - i d e a l t h e o r y w h i c h says h o w societies a n d their g o v e r n m e n t s should deal with the real world o f ' d i f f e r e n c e ' . Put in t h e m o s t s i m p l e t e r m s , multiculturalists a d v o c a t e that, b e c a u s e a c h i e v i n g o n e ' s cultural ' i d e n t i t y ' is so central to a p e r s o n ' s good, each distinct cultural g r o u p in a m u l t i ­ cultural society should r e c o g n i z e a n d respect the cultural practices o f others and not i m p o s e its n o r m s , particularly its libera] n o r m s , on them. For the liberal e m p h a s i s o n i n d i v i d u a l s ' equal freedom to find their o w n g o o d m a k e s a c h i e v i n g o n e ' s cultural identity difficult, if not practically i m p o s s i b l e , a n d u n d e r m i n e s the distinctness o f cultural g r o u p s . M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m p r e s c r i b e s a policy o f not j u s t toleration, but also o f a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f d i s p a r a t e cultural g r o u p s , m a n y o f w h i c h d o not e n d o r s e liberal social or even political n o r m s . Brian B a r r y ' s Culture and Equality is a liberal r e s p o n s e to m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d its criticisms of liberalism. T h e b o o k is a sustained attack on m u l t i c u l t u r a l ism's m a i n theses and p r o p o n e n t s from the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the kind o f egalitarian liberalism a s s o c i a t e d with John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (see B a r r y 2 0 0 1 : If, 16) B a r r y h a s b e e n o n e of R a w l s ' s m o r e i n f o r m e d a n d p r o b i n g liberal critics. But for all h i s differences with R a w l s , he still sees 'justice as f a i r n e s s ' as the major s t a t e m e n t o f ' t h e classical ideal o f liberal c i t i z e n s h i p ' a n d the egalitarian ' d e m a n d s o f social a n d e c o n o m i c c i t i z e n s h i p ' that define egalitarian liberalism (CE: 7). F u r t h e r m o r e , he sees multiculturalists as d e n y i n g the equality of basic liberties and fair o p p o r t u n i t i e s that define equal liberal citizenship; m o r e o v e r , they even help to u n d e r m i n e the e c o n o m i c c l a i m s o f the p o o r by t r y i n g to shift politi­ cal focus away from q u e s t i o n s o f distributive j u s t i c e to a 'politics o f r e c o g n i t i o n ' o f different cultural g r o u p s (CE: 3 2 5 ) . B a r r y ' s attitude t o w a r d s m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is evident early on: T have found that there is s o m e t h i n g a p p r o a c h i n g a c o n s e n s u s a m o n g those w h o d o not write about it that the literature o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is not w o r t h w a s t i n g p o w d e r a n d shot o n ' (CE: 6). W h a t m a k e s critical e n g a g e m e n t w i t h m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m w o r t h w h i l e for B a r r y is that it receives such w i d e s p r e a d sympathy, if not allegiance, in acad e m i a a n d A m e r i c a n intellectual life, a n d those w h o write on multiculturalism are a l m o s t uniformly s y m p a t h e t i c to it. W h i l e n o n - p h i l o s o p h e r s (such as R o b e r t H u g h e s a n d Todd Gitlin) have r e s p o n d e d to m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m on b e h a l f of liber­ a l i s m , B a r r y sees a sustained critical t r e a t m e n t from within political p h i l o s o p h y as long overdue. Culture and Equality is divided thematically into three parts. In Part 1, B a r r y c o n c e n t r a t e s on the idea o f equal t r e a t m e n t . H e takes on the multiculturalist view that equal t r e a t m e n t requires treating p e o p l e a c c o r d i n g to their different cultur­ ally derived beliefs and practices. He a r g u e s that this m i s c o n s t r u e s the liberal ideal of equal treatment, w h i c h requires that p e o p l e b e treated a c c o r d i n g to the s a m e r u l e s . Part II focuses o n t h e c l a i m s o f g r o u p s a n d particularly the m u l t i ­ culturalist i d e a o f ' g r o u p r i g h t s ' . B a r r y a d d r e s s e s t h e a r g u m e n t that liberal prin­ ciples tend to u n d e r m i n e o r destroy the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f m i n o r i t y cultures a n d that these g r o u p s should have special g r o u p rights to protect their cultural p r a c ­ tices. H e focuses especially on the c l a i m s of illiberal religions (the A m i s h , for

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e x a m p l e ) a n d religious p r a c t i c e s of sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n (CE: ch. 5 ) ; t h e n h e turns to religious a n d other g r o u p s ' c l a i m s r e g a r d i n g the r e a r i n g a n d e d u c a t i o n o f chil­ d r e n (CE: ch. 6). T h e n in Part III B a r r y a d d r e s s e s p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t s for m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m that p r o c e e d from the idea that m o r a l u n i v e r s a l i s m is false (CE: ch. 7). T h e b o o k e n d s w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f the a d v e r s e practical c o n s e q u e n c e s o f e n a c t i n g multiculturalist p r o g r a m m e s (CE: ch. 8). H e r e , B a r r y a r g u e s m a i n l y that these policies d o not benefit the p e o p l e they are d e s i g n e d to help, a n d p r e v e n t the e n a c t m e n t o f liberal social p r o g r a m m e s that really w o u l d benefit the d i s a d v a n ­ taged members of minority groups. L i b e r a l i s m for B a r r y is a universal d o c t r i n e that a p p l i e s to all p e r s o n s in all societies as a m a t t e r o f right a n d j u s t i c e . It requires e q u a l basic liberties, a strong v i e w o f equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d g u a r a n t e e d e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s for all p e r s o n s . Societies w h o s e institutions are not sufficiently d e v e l o p e d to p r o v i d e all these rights a n d g o o d s still have a d u t y to work t o w a r d s institutions that eventually will. B a r r y will h a v e n o t h i n g to d o with M i c h a e l Walzer's a n d o t h e r m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s t s ' p o s i t i o n that t h e rights a n d liberties p e o p l e o u g h t to have d e p e n d on the ' s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s ' or p r a c t i c e s o f their cultures (CE: 136). T h i s is cultural relativism a n d it is u l t i m a t e l y incoherent; m o r e o v e r , it m a k e s j u s t i c e d e p e n d e n t o n t h e values a n d v i e w s o f d o m i n a n t elites, a n d d i s c r i m i n a t e s against m i n o r i t i e s w h o d o not share t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f a majority (CE: 196). B a r r y sees m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m as regressive. It is ' a n t i - e g a l i t a r i a n ' , if n o t in inten­ tion, t h e n certainly in effect (CE: 12). T h e privileges it p r o v i d e s to special inter­ ests are ' c o n d u c i v e to a politics o f " d i v i d e a n d r u l e " that can only benefit those w h o benefit m o s t from t h e status q u o ' (CE: 11). H e finds it especially ironic that the multiculturalist left w o u l d seek to revive t h e r o m a n t i c doctrine that e a c h cul­ tural g r o u p h a s an identity u n i q u e l y suited to it w h i c h o u g h t to b e preserved, cul­ tivated and, if necessary, even resuscitated. S i n c e cultural identity is n o t c h o s e n b u t is largely b a s e d o n descent, the multiculturalist left's e m b r a c e o f ' r o m a n t i c n a t i o n a l i s m ' flirts with t h e w o r s t t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y r i g h t - w i n g ideologies (CE: 260-1). For Barry, equal t r e a t m e n t is an integral feature o f liberalism. E q u a l treatment d o e s n o t imply equal impact, h e says, but g o v e r n i n g e v e r y o n e a c c o r d i n g to the s a m e legal rules. A l m o s t a n y law will affect p e o p l e differently, and, b y itself, there is n o t h i n g inherently unfair about this (CE: 3 4 ) . H e rejects, then, t h e ' r u l e - a n d e x e m p t i o n ' a p p r o a c h to religious a n d other m i n o r i t i e s a d v o c a t e d b y multicultur­ alists, w h i c h e x e m p t s m i n o r i t y practices from general legal r e q u i r e m e n t s . So h e o p p o s e s the e x c e p t i o n s m a d e in Britain's a n i m a l slaughter laws w h i c h allow J e w s a n d M u s l i m s to u s e traditional m e t h o d s o f ritual slaughter, as well as Britain's e x e m p t i o n for Sikhs from w e a p o n s a n d m o t o r c y c l e h e l m e t laws (CE: 4 1 - 6 ) . H e further argues that the U n i t e d States S u p r e m e C o u r t , in Oregon v. Smith, w a s right to deny N a t i v e A m e r i c a n s the right to use peyote s a c r a m e n t a l l y in exception to a n t i - d r u g laws, since (regardless o f the w i s d o m o f anti-drug laws) to constitu­ tionally require a n e x e m p t i o n for religious u s e o f illegal d r u g s w o u l d violate liberal equal t r e a t m e n t (CE: 170ff, 183f), I will return to this subject in section 2.

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Multiculturalists c o n t e n d that liberalism p r o v i d e s i n a d e q u a t e p r o t e c t i o n s for multicultural ' d i f f e r e n c e s ' . L i b e r a l i s m protects the integrity o f m i n o r i t y g r o u p s a n d cultural p r a c t i c e s m a i n l y b y a s s i g n i n g priority t o , a n d enforcing such e q u a l basic rights as, liberty o f c o n s c i e n c e a n d freedom o f t h o u g h t , a n d freedom o f association. B a r r y argues (CE: ch. 4 ) , that freedom o f association especially p r o ­ v i d e s for a liberal culture of t o l e r a n c e that allows for t h e diversity a n d flourish­ ing o f m a n y different cultural traditions. F r e e d o m of association i m p l i e s p e r m i s s i o n for g r o u p s to treat their m e m b e r s in illiberal ways, as u n e q u a l s (for e x a m p l e , as in religious a n d other traditional restrictions o n w o m e n ' s roles) a n d by limiting individual freedom as a condition o f m e m b e r s h i p (e.g. religious dietary a n d sexual c o n d u c t restrictions). A s B a r r y says, 'It is n o p a r t o f liberal­ ism . . . to insist that e v e r y g r o u p m u s t c o n f o r m to liberal p r i n c i p l e s in its inter­ nal s t r u c t u r e ' (CE: 147). So long as restrictions on c o n d u c t are voluntarily a s s u m e d by m e m b e r s , there is n o violation o f liberal political n o r m s . B u t m a n y multiculturalists reject liberal diversity a n d a r g u e instead for ' d e e p d i v e r s i t y ' , w h i c h involves i m p o s i n g coercive political restrictions on the liberties o f m e m b e r s o f m i n o r i t y c u l t u r e s , to p r e v e n t t h e m from deviating from cultural n o r m s (CE: 128). B a r r y perceptively e x p l a i n s h o w such p r o p o s e d restrictions i m p l y a rejection of liberal f r e e d o m o f association. For essential t o freedom o f association is a p e r s o n ' s right to refuse associational d e m a n d s a n d to exit a s s o c i ­ ations at any t i m e (CE: 149f). G r o u p s m a y restrict i n d i v i d u a l s ' f r e e d o m in m a n y regards as a condition o f m e m b e r s h i p , but t h e y m a y not coercively restrict t h e freedom to disavow affiliation w h e n a p e r s o n is n o l o n g e r willing to a c c e p t the c o n d i t i o n s of m e m b e r s h i p . 1

B a r r y ' s m o s t t r e n c h a n t criticisms a r e directed against liberals w h o s e e k to a c c o m m o d a t e multicultural aspirations. Will K y m l i c k a especially is criticized, since ' h e p r e s e n t s h i m s e l f as [a l i b e r a l ] ' (CE: 137), b u t in fact h e is not, since h e w o u l d c o m p r o m i s e liberalism's universalistic a n d egalitarian c o r e in t h e n a m e o f the ' r o m a n t i c n a t i o n a l i s m ' that h e a d v o c a t e s ( a l o n g w i t h C h a r l e s Taylor a n d m u l ­ ticulturalists generally). B a r r y b a s e s t h e s e criticisms o n K y m l i c k a ' s ( a n d M i c h a e l Walzer's) w i l l i n g n e s s to g r a n t national m i n o r i t i e s ( s u c h t h e Q u e b e c o i s ) rights o f self-government w i t h i n a liberal constitution, a n d a l l o w t h e m to m a k e e x c e p t i o n s ' t o m e a s u r e s i m p o s e d by a liberal state to prevent violations o f liberty a n d e q u a l ­ ity' (CE: 138). B a r r y cites (as an e x a m p l e ) K y m l i c k a ' s w i l l i n g n e s s to allow P u e b l o tribal c o u n c i l s the authority to limit freedom o f c o n s c i e n c e and i m p o s e sexually d i s c r i m i n a t o r y political m e m b e r s h i p rules. A n d against Kymlicka's c o n t e n t i o n that his ' a s y m m e t r i c f e d e r a l i s m ' d o e s not involve any i n e q u a l i t y for C a n a d i a n s outside Q u e b e c , B a r r y c o n t e n d s that K y m l i c k a i g n o r e s the o b v i o u s inequality that allows Q u e b e c representatives to v o t e o n laws that a p p l y n o t to Q u e b e c b u t only to t h e rest o f C a n a d a (CE: 311). In fairness, I s h o u l d p o i n t out that K y m l i c k a d o e s object to t h e P u e b l o violation o f liberal liberties previously m e n t i o n e d , b u t o p p o s e s t h e U S g o v e r n m e n t ' s ' i m p o s i n g l i b e r a l i s m ' by c o e r c i n g t h e P u e b l o council ( K y m l i c k a 1995: 165). Since K y m l i c k a sees a violation o f rights here, it p e r h a p s p r e s u m e s t o o m u c h to say that ' K y m l i c k a clearly b u y s into t h e i d e a that

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h u m a n rights are a form o f "cultural i m p e r i a l i s m " ' (CE: 138). T h i s is especially so if not all equal liberal liberties (e.g. equal political rights to vote a n d h o l d office) are also h u m a n rights. A p h i l o s o p h i c a l notion o f respect for p e r s o n s as such (or as citizens) informs m o s t liberal t h i n k i n g and is o n e basis for the idea o f h u m a n (and liberal consti­ tutional) rights. T h e liberal idea o f respect is different from t h e idea o f ' r e c o g n i ­ t i o n ' that attracts multiculturalists (e.g. C h a r l e s Taylor, Iris Young, N a n c y F r a s e r a n d J a m e s Tully, a m o n g others w h o m B a r r y d i s c u s s e s ) . T h e 'politics o f r e c o g n i ­ t i o n ' d o e s not deny t h e universalist i d e a o f respect for p e r s o n s as such; rather, it insists that a c o n d i t i o n o f equal respect is that the diverse cultural practices a n d values affirmed b y different p e r s o n s receive r e c o g n i t i o n o f their equal w o r t h . B a r r y finds this position incoherent: ' U n l e s s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s are m a d e , a s c r i b i n g value to s o m e t h i n g ceases to have any p o i n t ' (CE: 2 6 9 ) . Liberal r e q u i r e m e n t s o f e q u a l respect, equal t r e a t m e n t a n d equal rights a r e political duties o f j u s t i c e o w e d to p e r s o n s , a n d d o not d e p e n d on m o r a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f the equal w o r t h o f their lifestyle. O n e d o e s n o t have t o affirm another's religion as equally w o r t h y o f belief as one's own c o n s c i e n t i o u s convictions in o r d e r t o respect equal liberty o f c o n ­ science. L i k e w i s e , B a r r y says in r e s p o n s e to A n d r e w Sullivan's a n d o t h e r s ' a r g u ­ m e n t s , ' W e should totally reject the n o t i o n that t h e only w a y in w h i c h the c a s e for equal rights for h o m o s e x u a l s can b e m a d e is to establish first t h e equal wor­ t h i n e s s o f h o m o s e x u a l a n d heterosexual lifestyles' (CE: 2 7 9 ) . It is n o t only b a d philosophy, but also a self-defeating political strategy (CE: 2 7 6 - 7 ) . In the n e x t t w o sections I focus o n two p a r t i c u l a r d i s c u s s i o n s of B a r r y ' s , a n d a r g u e that h e e x a g g e r a t e s the d e g r e e to w h i c h liberals m u s t o p p o s e certain m e a s ­ u r e s a d v o c a t e d by multiculturalists. L i b e r a l i s m is m o r e flexible, I argue, t h a n B a r r y ' s depiction o f it.

2. Freedom of Religion and Sex Discrimination T h e first o f t h e s e issues h a s to d o with B a r r y ' s d i s c u s s i o n in c h a p t e r 5 o f Culture and Equality o f a n t i - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n laws as t h e y a p p l y to t h e internal w o r k i n g s o f religious institutions. B a r r y says: 'It is n o part o f liberalism . . . to insist that every g r o u p m u s t c o n f o r m to liberal p r i n c i p l e s in its internal s t r u c t u r e ' (CE: 147). In r e s p o n s e to Ian Shapiro's suggestion that t h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h b e d e n i e d taxe x e m p t status b e c a u s e it r e c o g n i z e s only m a l e priests, B a r r y says h e thinks this is m i s t a k e n . A s s u m i n g that c h u r c h e s should have favourable tax e x e m p t status at all (a position w h i c h B a r r y d i s a g r e e s w i t h ) , 'their d o i n g so s h o u l d not b e con­ tingent u p o n their a b a n d o n i n g their position o n the n e c e s s a r y qualifications for h o l d i n g r e l i g i o u s office' (CE: 168). H e d e v e l o p s this a r g u m e n t in t h e following section, ' I n D e f e n c e o f " A s y m m e t r y " ' . H e r e a g a i n h e c o n c l u d e s that w h e t h e r or n o t priests should be all m a l e is a ' p u r e l y internal d i s p u t e w i t h i n a c h u r c h ' (CE: 176) and that the C a t h o l i c C h u r c h should n o t b e p r o h i b i t e d or p e n a l i z e d for its rejection o f a female p r i e s t h o o d .

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I a g r e e w i t h B a r r y here, but I w a n t to raise s o m e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t this m a t t e r in relation to his d i s c u s s i o n of the 1990 S u p r e m e C o u r t c a s e , Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith ( 4 9 4 U S 8 7 2 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ) . In Smith, t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , in an o p i n i o n by Justice Scalia, h e l d that t h e N a t i v e A m e r i c a n C h u r c h ' s s a c r a m e n t a l p r a c t i c e o f ingesting p e y o t e w a s not p r o t e c t e d by the First A m e n d ­ m e n t 'free e x e r c i s e ' of religion clause. B a r r y says: ' T h e i m p l i c a t i o n of Smith . . . is that if an act o f s o m e k i n d is illegal in g e n e r a l , t h e m e r e fact that s o m e o n e p e r f o r m s an act o f that k i n d in pursuit of religion d o e s n o t protect it' (CE: 190). In this c o n t e x t B a r r y takes u p C a s s Sunstein's a r g u m e n t that e x e m p t i n g religions from sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n laws is i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e C o u r t ' s position in Smith. B a r r y d i s a g r e e s , saying there is n o i n c o h e r e n c e in the two positions: ' F o r the C o u r t ' s position is that it is o p e n to legislatures to create e x e m p t i o n s from general laws if they so c h o o s e , a n d t h e e x e m p t i o n from sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n laws for reli­ g i o u s b o d i e s is covered by the p r o v i s i o n s o f the law on d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i t s e l f (CE: 173). T h e real issue t h e n (the issue Sunstein s h o u l d raise, even if h e d o e s n o t d o so explicitly) is, s h o u l d any religious e x e m p t i o n s h a v e b e e n allowed by C o n g r e s s to the sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n laws to begin w i t h ? B a r r y clearly thinks so. Indeed, h e a p p e a r s to a r g u e that specific legal e x e m p t i o n s s h o u l d b e u n n e c e s s a r y , since sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in religious h i e r a r c h y is a p r a c t i c e that w o u l d b e constitutionally p r o t e c t e d b y 'free e x e r c i s e ' (CE: 1 7 5 - 6 ) . T h e liberal p o s i t i o n e n d o r s e s B a r r y ' s c l a i m that t h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h should not b e required to c o m p l y with sex discrimination laws w h e n it c o m e s to decid­ ing w h o m a y a d m i n i s t e r Christian s a c r a m e n t s , or w h o m a y serve in favoured posi­ tions w i t h i n t h e C a t h o l i c hierarchy. If o n e believes that a m a l e h i e r a r c h y h o l d s t h e keys to h e a v e n , then this p u r p o r t e d l y apostolic practice should b e constitu­ tionally protected b y freedom o f religion a n d association. B u t if C a t h o l i c d o c ­ trine (like N a t i v e A m e r i c a n C h u r c h d o c t r i n e ) h a d t a u g h t for two m i l l e n n i a that s e r v i n g t r a n s u b s t a n t i a t e d p e y o t e at M a s s w a s n e c e s s a r y to salvation, then so t o o s h o u l d s a c r a m e n t a l p e y o t e b e p r o t e c t e d . I fail to see w h y o n e can b e p r o h i b i t e d b u t n o t t h e other. But h e r e B a r r y e n d o r s e s Justice Scalia's o p i n i o n in Smith, that in n o t a l l o w i n g a religious e x c e p t i o n to d r u g laws p r o h i b i t i n g p e y o t e t h e law is consistent with the 'free e x e r c i s e ' clause of the Constitution. It is this p o s i t i o n o f B a r r y ' s that I c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d . T h i s is n o t to say that the A m i s h s h o u l d b e exempted, as t h e U S S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d in Wisconsin v. Yoder ( 4 0 6 U S 2 0 5 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , majority o p i n i o n written by C h i e f Justice B u r g e r ) , from s e n d i n g their children to s c h o o l until t h e a g e o f 16, like e v e r y o n e else in W i s c o n s i n a n d o t h e r states w h e r e A m i s h reside. In Yoder the C o u r t h e l d that the First A m e n d m e n t 'free e x e r c i s e ' clause required an e x e m p ­ tion for the A m i s h ( w h o w e r e willing to provide an e i g h t h g r a d e e d u c a t i o n for their children). T h e C o u r t said that, b e c a u s e o f its impact, ' C o m p u l s o r y school a t t e n d a n c e to a g e 16 for A m i s h children carries w i t h it a very real threat of u n d e r ­ m i n i n g the A m i s h c o m m u n i t y a n d r e l i g i o u s practice as it exists t o d a y ' (see B a r k e r et al. 1999: 132). T h e p r o b l e m with this decision is that q u e s t i o n s of parental control o f children's n o n - r e l i g i o u s e d u c a t i o n , and o f h o w long children are

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schooled, are n o t central to t h e content of A m i s h doctrine or s a c r a m e n t . A n d even if they w e r e , still t h e A m i s h practice o f n o m o r e than r u d i m e n t a r y e d u c a t i o n u n d e r m i n e s t h e rights of children to d e v e l o p their capacities so t h e y c a n effec­ tively exercise basic liberal rights a n d take a d v a n t a g e o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Yoder is m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m w i t h a v e n g e a n c e , for it e n s u r e s that A m i s h children will not b e p r e p a r e d to leave the A m i s h fold a n d take u p a life outside t h e faith. It p r e s e r v e s t h e A m i s h c o m m u n i t y at t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e civic freedom a n d individual devel­ o p m e n t a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e o f its m e m b e r s ; as such, it is i n c o n s i s t e n t with a liberal egalitarian p o s i t i o n . Still, laws like t h o s e in Smith are different. A n t i - d r u g laws, even if, o n the face o f it, neutral, directly prohibit a religious s a c r a m e n t o f t h e N a t i v e A m e r i c a n C h u r c h . T h i s is different from t h e u n i n t e n t i o n a l i m p a c t that neutral laws ( s u c h as c o m p u l s o r y school a t t e n d a n c e ) have o n t h e e a s e o f practising or raising o n e ' s children in a religion. O n l y t h e m o s t c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s o f j u s t i c e , t h o s e r e g a r d ­ ing t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f o t h e r s ' f u n d a m e n t a l rights, s h o u l d b e allowed to o u t w e i g h t h e f r e e d o m o f religious d o c t r i n e , s a c r a m e n t s a n d liturgical p r a c t i c e s . A n d t h e integrity o f religious d o c t r i n e , s a c r a m e n t a n d liturgy is j u s t the issue w h e n q u e s t i o n s are r a i s e d a b o u t t h e a l l - m a l e C a t h o l i c hierarchy, t h e s a c r a m e n t a l u s e o f p e y o t e or (for that m a t t e r ) t h e s a c r a m e n t a l u s e o f w i n e d u r i n g the Prohibition era. 2

3

Granted, there m a y b e difficulties a p p l y i n g this position. It requires that c o u r t s a n d legislatures e n g a g e in t h e k i n d o f i n q u i r y that Justice Scalia s o u g h t to rule out in Smith, n a m e l y t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f w h e t h e r a state p r o h i b i t i o n o f c o n d u c t is sufficiently c o m p e l l i n g to o u t w e i g h a q u e s t i o n o f doctrinal o r s a c r a m e n t a l sig­ nificance. B u t , as Justice O ' C o n n e r said in dissent in t h e Smith case: The Court's parade of horribles [which Scalia enumerated] as, 'the prospect of con­ stitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind - ranging from compulsory military service . . . payment of taxes . . . health and safety regulation . . . child neglect laws . . . compulsory vaccination laws . . . drug laws . . . traffic laws . . . social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws . . . child labor laws . . . animal cruelty laws' not only fails as a reason for discarding the compelling interest test; it instead demonstrates just the opposite: that courts have been quite capable of applying our free exercise jurisprudence to strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing state interests. (Forster and Leeson 1998: 152) T h e C o u r t ' s m i n o r i t y position implies that, in d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r a religious p r a c ­ tice is constitutionally e x e m p t , courts m u s t c o n s i d e r n o t j u s t h o w c o m p e l l i n g the state interest is, b u t also w h e t h e r a religious p r a c t i c e is m o r e or less central t o that religion's doctrine. O t h e r w i s e the n e c e s s a r y b a l a n c i n g o f conflicting religious a n d state interests c a n n o t be carried t h r o u g h . B u t there is n o w a y to e s c a p e this, except by w a t e r i n g d o w n t h e 'free e x e r c i s e ' provision so that it p r o v i d e s little s u b ­ stantial p r o t e c t i o n for religious practices. B u t this s e e m s to b e j u s t the i m p l i c a ­ tion o f the Scalia o p i n i o n in t h e Smith c a s e .

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S o m y q u e s t i o n is, h o w can B a r r y a c c e p t both (1) ' t h a t Smith w a s rightly d e c i d e d ' (CE: 174), even t h o u g h it p r o h i b i t s a s a c r a m e n t a l p r a c t i c e that d o e s not e n d a n g e r o t h e r s ' b a s i c rights a n d liberties, a n d also (2) that there is a constitu­ tional right for C a t h o l i c s to d i s c r i m i n a t e in d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the g e n d e r o f its p r i e s t h o o d ? H i s stated position s e e m s to b e that sex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in t h e priest­ h o o d is p r o t e c t e d o n g r o u n d s o f b o t h freedom o f association a n d f r e e d o m o f reli­ g i o n . N o w it m a y be that the s a c r a m e n t a l u s e o f p e y o t e d o e s not receive protection u n d e r freedom o f association. B u t given its centrality to t h e liturgy o f the N a t i v e A m e r i c a n C h u r c h p l u s t h e fact that it d o e s not p o s e a threat to o t h e r s ' basic liberties, I d o not u n d e r s t a n d the liberal b a s i s for a r g u i n g that s a c r a m e n t a l peyote s h o u l d n o t b e p r o t e c t e d by f r e e d o m o f religion. To s u m m a r i z e : B a r r y e x a g g e r a t e s the d e g r e e to w h i c h the liberal egalitarian a c c o u n t o f j u s t i c e h e relies on always requires equal t r e a t m e n t a c c o r d i n g to t h e s a m e legal rules. S o m e t i m e s there are legitimate liberal objections to rigid appli­ cation o f this r e q u i r e m e n t o f formal j u s t i c e . E q u a l t r e a t m e n t u n d e r o n e rule m a y involve n o t j u s t u n e q u a l i m p a c t , b u t u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t u n d e r a n o t h e r r u l e . T h e n the i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n for liberals is not (as multiculturalists m a i n t a i n ) w h e t h e r equal t r e a t m e n t d a m a g e s s o m e o n e ' s cultural identity, b u t w h e t h e r s o m e i m p o r ­ tant right or other r e q u i r e m e n t o f j u s t i c e is violated. Given the priority liberals assign to equal liberty o f c o n s c i e n c e , there s h o u l d h a v e b e e n an e x c e p t i o n m a d e in Smith to d r u g laws for s a c r a m e n t a l practices that t h e m s e l v e s d o n o t violate anyone's basic rights or o t h e r i m p o r t a n t r e q u i r e m e n t s o f j u s t i c e . N o d o u b t Justice Scalia ( w h o w r o t e Smith) a n d the C o u r t w o u l d not have enforced a general p r o ­ hibition o n alcohol against the u s e o f w i n e d u r i n g C a t h o l i c M a s s . T h e r e is n o dif­ ference with the s a c r a m e n t a l use o f p e y o t e ( a s s u m i n g it is a central part o f t h e 4

5

Native A m e r i c a n C h u r c h ' s liturgy). In Smith, equal t r e a t m e n t u n d e r d r u g laws resulted in u n e q u a l a n d unjust t r e a t m e n t u n d e r t h e First A m e n d m e n t .

3. Equality of Opportunity and Preferential Treatment of Disadvantaged Minorities I turn n o w to B a r r y ' s t r e a t m e n t o f equal opportunity. R a w l s d i s t i n g u i s h e s two positions w i t h i n t h e liberal tradition. First, t h e r e is ' f o r m a l equality o f o p p o r t u ­ n i t y ' , t h e n a m e R a w l s gives to A d a m Smith's idea o f ' c a r e e r s o p e n to t a l e n t s ' . T h i s position forbids legal a n d c o n v e n t i o n a l i m p e d i m e n t s to educational a n d o c c u p a t i o n a l positions o n g r o u n d s o f r a c e , ethnicity, gender, religion a n d o t h e r characteristics u n r e l a t e d to a p e r s o n ' s qualifications to successfully execute t h e p e r f o r m a n c e d e m a n d s o f ( p e r m i s s i b l e ) social positions. Second, there is 'fair equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y ' , w h i c h a d d s to these s a m e p r o h i b i t i o n s on d i s c r i m i n a ­ tion positive r e q u i r e m e n t s that society p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e a n d fair e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s for all, as well as health care n e e d e d for citizens to take a d v a n t a g e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s . R a w l s also says that fair o p p o r t u n i t y r e q u i r e s that society p r e v e n t c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f wealth, b u t h e d o e s not elaborate ( R a w l s 1999: sects

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12, 14; 1 9 9 3 : 184, 3 6 3 ) . T h e s e two liberal p o s i t i o n s are to b e c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the i d e a that a certain p r o p o r t i o n o f e d u c a t i o n a l a n d o c c u p a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s s h o u l d b e p r e s e r v e d for m e m b e r s o f salient social, ethnic a n d r e l i g i o u s g r o u p s . B a r r y clearly rejects this p o s i t i o n ( w h i c h m i g h t be called equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y for g r o u p s ) ; it is part o f his rejection o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d the politics o f difference. A g a i n , I a g r e e w i t h B a r r y ' s position h e r e . B u t enforcing p r o p o r t i o n a t e r e p r e ­ sentation for g r o u p s in desirable social p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t e m p o r a r y m e a s u r e s that give preferential t r e a t m e n t to d i s a d v a n t a g e d social c l a s s e s for p u r p o s e s o f r e m e d y i n g past d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . E q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y for g r o u p s differs from familiar forms o f preferential t r e a t m e n t for d i s a d v a n t a g e d m i n o r i t i e s that c o m e u n d e r t h e n a m e o f 'affirmative a c t i o n ' , since t h e former p o s i ­ tion says that u n d e r any c i r c u m s t a n c e , a n d even if there h a s n o t b e e n a history o f unjust d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , salient racial, ethnic a n d g e n d e r g r o u p s s h o u l d be p r o p o r ­ tionately r e p r e s e n t e d in favourable social p o s i t i o n s . T h e k i n d o f preferential treat­ m e n t it affords is a p e r m a n e n t condition a n d p a r t o f an ideal o f social relations. Familiar p r a c t i c e s o f preferential t r e a t m e n t are not like this. T h e y are n o t i n t e n d e d to b e p e r m a n e n t , b u t are r e s p o n s e s to the p r e s e n t effects o f p a s t injustices. O f t h e familiar form o f preferential t r e a t m e n t , B a r r y says that it is not g o o d politics, since 'it is b o u n d to create r e s e n t m e n t . . . w h i c h c a n n o t b e d i s m i s s e d as unjustified' (CE: 115). A l s o , preferential t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m m e s as p r a c t i s e d are both u n d e r - i n c l u s i v e a n d over-inclusive. T h e y d o n o t n o r m a l l y i n c l u d e all the p o o r or all p e r s o n s w h o h a v e suffered a history o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . A n d t h e a d v a n t a g e s afforded m o s t often g o to m i d d l e - c l a s s m i n o r i t i e s a n d n o t to the poor. But m i d d l e class m i n o r i t i e s , B a r r y says, should have to c o m p e t e w i t h e v e r y o n e else o n equal t e r m s (CE: 115). T h e s e are familiar criticisms. T h e y w o u l d b e effective criticisms on the a s s u m p t i o n that the p u r p o s e o f preferential t r e a t m e n t is directly to benefit the p o o r a n d i m m e d i a t e l y to c o m p e n s a t e d i s a d v a n t a g e d m i n o r i t y m e m b e r s for injus­ tices d o n e to their a n c e s t o r s . A s B a r r y ' s criticisms indicate, t h e preferential p r o ­ g r a m m e s n o w in p l a c e are grossly inefficient m e a n s for t h e s e p u r p o s e s , since m i d d l e - c l a s s m i n o r i t i e s are t h e m a i n direct beneficiaries. B u t m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the p r i m a r y a i m o f these p r o g r a m m e s is that they are n o t c o m p e n s a t o r y , or d e s i g n e d to i m m e d i a t e l y benefit d i s a d v a n t a g e d m i n o r i t i e s . Instead, they are i n t e n d e d to effect structural c h a n g e s , by p r o v i d i n g a secure b a s i s for a n d b o l ­ stering the g r o w t h o f a b l a c k m i d d l e class, w i t h the l o n g - t e r m a i m o f increasing t h e b a s e s for self-respect o f black m i n o r i t i e s as a w h o l e . In t h e 1960s, w h e n pref­ erential t r e a t m e n t w a s first instituted, a black m i d d l e class s i m p l y did not exist in m a n y p a r t s o f the South a n d e l s e w h e r e in the U n i t e d States. A black m i d d l e class thrives n o w in m a n y p l a c e s in the South, a n d h a s a foothold even in the m o s t b a c k w a r d rural areas w h e r e segregation a n d black poverty w a s (and still is) m o s t e n t r e n c h e d . T h i s is largely d u e to the effects o f preferential p r o g r a m m e s . H e r e , it s h o u l d b e recalled that preferential t r e a t m e n t for blacks in t h e s e a n d other areas usually r e p l a c e d or at least s u p p l e m e n t e d a different form o f preferential treat-

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m e n t for w h i t e s , b a s e d on n e p o t i s m , political c o n n e c t i o n s a n d often outright racism. T h e s e p r o g r a m m e s have b e e n a r e s o u n d i n g success, even if they have n o w b e c o m e increasingly u n p o p u l a r as a result o f w h i t e r e s e n t m e n t . W h a t e v e r the w i s d o m o f such p r o g r a m m e s , their historical s u c c e s s should n o w - several d e c a d e s later - b e e m p h a s i z e d , even celebrated, a n d n o t r e g r e t t e d by t h e liberal press a n d b y liberal academics. T h e existence of a black m i d d l e class fostered by preferential t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m m e s h a s given p o o r blacks s o m e g r o u n d s for h o p i n g that the d e c k is not entirely stacked against t h e m a n d m e m b e r s o f their class, and that t h e p r o m i s e of fair o p p o r t u n i t i e s is, to s o m e d e g r e e at least, g e n u i n e in A m e r i c a . So I a m m o r e s a n g u i n e about the role a n d history o f preferential t r e a t m e n t as a r e m e d i a l device t h a n B a r r y is. It is not, I believe, c o n t r a r y to fair equality of opportunity, in R a w l s ' s sense, since w e d o not live in the ideal c i r c u m s t a n c e s of a R a w l s i a n w e l l - o r d e r e d society, w h e r e liberal egalitarian p r i n c i p l e s are generally a c c e p t e d a n d realized in institutions. S o m e d e p a r t u r e from t h e liberal ideal o f fair equal o p p o r t u n i t y is p e r m i s s i b l e in less than ideal c i r c u m s t a n c e s , to rectify past and p r e s e n t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , a n d w h e n it will p r o m o t e the c o n d i t i o n s o f black equality n e e d e d for a w e l l - o r d e r e d society. N o w c o n s i d e r a fourth sense o f equal opportunity, w h i c h h a s b e e n s u g g e s t e d by radical d e m o c r a t s . This is the v i e w that individuals s h o u l d h a v e equal c h a n c e s o f s u c c e e d i n g in life, w h a t e v e r their social position, and, w h e r e differences in natural talents exist, the less fortunate s h o u l d b e c o m p e n s a t e d for their short­ c o m i n g s . Call this 'perfect equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y ' . T h i s s e e m s to b e t h e con­ ception o f equal o p p o r t u n i t y Rawls h a s in m i n d w h e n he says: 'It s e e m s that even w h e n fair o p p o r t u n i t y is satisfied, the family will lead to u n e q u a l c h a n c e s b e t w e e n individuals. Is the family to be a b o l i s h e d t h e n ? Taken by itself and given a certain primacy, t h e idea o f equal o p p o r t u n i t y inclines in this d i r e c t i o n ' ( 1 9 9 9 : 4 4 8 ) . H e goes on to say: ' B u t within the context of the t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e as a w h o l e , there is m u c h less u r g e n c y to take this c o u r s e ' (ibid.). In this perfect sense o f equal opportunity, it s e e m s that w e w o u l d not simply have to a b o l i s h t h e family to provide a n y t h i n g close to equal c h a n c e s in life, but also love, friendship, religious ties a n d any other form of association that m i g h t influence a p e r s o n ' s c h a n c e s o f success or failure in life. It s h o u l d g o w i t h o u t saying that perfect equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is inconsistent with liberal basic liberties. S o far as a n y o n e affirms it, it is a h o l d o v e r left from the d e m i s e of M a r x i a n u t o p i a n i s m . It s h o u l d be b a n n e d from the c u p b o a r d o f liberal ideals as a situation that is not w o r t h a s p i r i n g to, since it c o m e s at such great costs to liberal f r e e d o m s . Given that perfect equal o p p o r t u n i t y is inconsistent w i t h liberalism, it is s o m e ­ w h a t d i s c o n c e r t i n g to see the idea c r o p p i n g u p in B a r r y ' s discussion o f e d u c a t i o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s for children. H e says: I believe it is essential to the maintenance of even rough equality of opportunity to make it illegal for any private school to spend more per head on its students than the average amount spent by the state system, unless the state can show that it has

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disproportionate numbers of children with special physical, psychological or edu­ cational needs. . . . Its only effect would be to prevent already advantaged parents from buying unfair educational advantages for their children. (CE: 206) Let's a s s u m e that w e c a n achieve and enforce equality o f funds p e r child allo­ cated for e d u c a t i o n b y every s c h o o l district. W o u l d it then b e a p p r o p r i a t e to limit w h a t private s c h o o l s s p e n d for e d u c a t i o n p e r child, so that it d o e s n o t e x c e e d t h e a m o u n t allocated for public s c h o o l s ? If so, w o u l d it t h e n also b e a p p r o p r i a t e to limit the a m o u n t that p a r e n t s m a y s p e n d for the e d u c a t i o n o f their children o u t s i d e o f school (private tutoring, m u s i c lessons a n d so on)? T h e p r o b l e m w i t h the s u g ­ gestion o f such limits is n o t j u s t t h e d e g r e e o f p o l i c e s u p e r v i s i o n that w o u l d b e n e e d e d to enforce such restrictions. It is the s u g g e s t i o n that m o r e e d u c a t i o n a n d k n o w l e d g e for the m o r e a d v a n t a g e d (or for a n y o n e ) s o m e h o w d i s a d v a n t a g e s t h o s e w h o d o n o t enjoy this benefit. G i v e n the a m o u n t o f t i m e children devote to w a t c h ­ ing television (19 h o u r s p e r w e e k on average in the U S A ) , a n d t h e e n o r m o u s influence that T V a n d p o p u l a r culture h a v e on children, it w o u l d b e an unfortu­ nate strategy to d i s c o u r a g e a n y o n e from s p e n d i n g m o r e on s c h o o l i n g . A better solution w o u l d b e to p r o v i d e loans for extra private e d u c a t i o n or t u t o r i n g or m u s i c l e s s o n s for t h o s e u n a b l e to pay for t h e m . B u t given that p a r e n t s have different p r e f e r e n c e s for e d u c a t i o n for their children, t h e desire for m o r e e d u c a t i o n s h o u l d n o t be frustrated, but rather e n c o u r a g e d . 6

In fairness to Barry, it m a y b e that w h a t he m e a n s w h e n h e s u g g e s t s limits o n s p e n d i n g by private s c h o o l s for e d u c a t i o n , is a limit on further s p e n d i n g o n w h a t h e later calls ' c r e d e n t i a l i s m ' (CE: 2 1 3 - 1 4 ) , that is, w h e n students are p r e p a r e d to c o m p e t e for scarce e d u c a t i o n a l a n d j o b o p p o r t u n i t i e s . If so, t h e n he m a y not have i n t e n d e d that his suggestion apply to w h a t h e calls ' e d u c a t i o n for l i v i n g ' , or k n o w l e d g e for its o w n sake. A s B a r r y says o f this perfectionist ideal: ' E d u c a t i o n [for living] is if a n y t h i n g c o m p l e m e n t a r y : so far from o n e p e r s o n ' s trained ability i m p o v e r i s h i n g t h e p r o s p e c t s o f others, it is likely to enrich t h e m ' (CE: 2 2 1 ) . B u t if this is t r u e , t h e n it is all t h e m o r e reason n o t to limit s p e n d i n g p e r student b y private s c h o o l s .

4. Concluding Remarks S o m e will think that B a r r y s h o u l d b e criticized for n o t b e i n g sufficiently a t t u n e d to s o m e m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s t s ' m a i n c o n c e r n s . Multiculturalists are not j u s t w o r r i e d that t h e distinctness o f cultures a n d their p r a c t i c e s will be lost in a liberal society; a n o t h e r w o r r y is that t h e y are b e i n g m e l d e d into w a y s o f life typical o f m i d d l e A m e r i c a as it r e s p o n d s to t h e influences o f global capitalism. O n e d o e s not have to b e a r o m a n t i c nationalist to regret the effects o f p o p u l a r culture ( i n c l u d i n g c o m ­ m e r c i a l television) in h o m o g e n i z i n g life a n d u n d e r m i n i n g culturally a n d region­ ally distinct ways o f life. T h e ever p r e s e n t depiction of brutality a n d carnality b y t h e e n t e r t a i n m e n t industry is not a p r o b l e m liberalism can easily a d d r e s s by politi-

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cal m e a n s . L i b e r a l i s m leaves it m a i n l y up to families to exercise control in these m a t t e r s . But multiculturalists k n o w this is s o m e t h i n g m o s t p a r e n t s , even w h e n they are able, fail to d o , however m u c h they m a y regret w h a t their children are e x p o s e d to. B a r r y is right in saying that liberalism d o e s n o t seek to m e l d all cultures into a distinct pattern. O n t h e contrary, liberalism (unlike other political v i e w s ) r e s p e c t s cultural differences (so long as they respect the liberal political rights o f their m e m b e r s ) by a l l o w i n g freedom o f association a n d o t h e r liberties n e e d e d for a d i s ­ tinct culture to survive in a diverse society. W h a t liberalism refuses t o d o is to e n s u r e a culture's survival b y enforcing politically the p r a c t i c e s o f any p a r t i c u l a r cultural g r o u p . Instead, it politically p e r m i t s individuals (in effect) to revise their 'cultural i d e n t i t i e s ' . T h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f this is t h e thriving ( a n d d y i n g ) o f m a n y different cultural g r o u p s , a c c o m p a n i e d b y a largely traditionless a n d c o m m e r c i a l i z e d 'civil s o c i e t y ' w h i c h individuals turn t o , often to e s c a p e t h e confines o f their particular cultural g r o u p s . It is p e r h a p s t h e h o m o g e n i z i n g effects of liberal civil society, seen by multiculturalists as largely individualistic and c o m m e r c i a l l y infused, w h i c h they object to m o s t . W h i l e its e n o r m o u s c o m m e r c i a l influences m i g h t b e regulated, this individualistic m a s s culture is p e r h a p s an ineradicable part o f liberalism. H e g e l p r o p o s e d t h e unifying forces o f ' t h e s t a t e ' as a s o u r c e o f c o m m u n i t y to t e m p e r the individualistic a n d c o m m e r c i a l i z e d bias of liberal civil society. Liberals (fortu­ nately) d o n o t h a v e that option. G o v e r n m e n t ' s role is not to enforce a c o m m u n i t y o f (non-political) values, b u t to establish j u s t i c e a n d p r o m o t e t h e c o m m o n g o o d o f free a n d equal citizens. T h i s is the c o m m o n liberal political culture that p r o v i d e s the basis for social unity a m o n g d i s p a r a t e s u b c u l t u r e s a n d g r o u p s . Still, a p r o b l e m (if that is w h a t it is) r e m a i n s , a n d liberalism's r e s p o n s e to it (thus far) is u n s a t i s f a c ­ tory for m a n y p e o p l e . B a r r y t h o r o u g h l y a n d effectively criticizes all the illicit ( a n d a few licit) w a y s by w h i c h multiculturalists s e e k t o a d d r e s s t h e p r o b l e m s they see in liberal political a n d social culture. It is to b e h o p e d that he a n d o t h e r liberals m i g h t n o w devote greater attention to liberal m e a n s that c o u n t e r a c t the disintegrating effects o f c o m m e r c i a l institutions in liberal civil society. 7

Notes I am grateful to Samuel Schemer and R. Jay Wallace for their comments. The second and third sections of this chapter derive from a discussion paper presented at a workshop on culture and equality at Columbia University School of Law in April 2001. Sections 1 and 4 previously appeared in The Journal of Philosophy. 1. Freedom of association with an inalienable right of exit is one way in which liberals differ significantly not just from many multiculturalists, but also from libertarians. Essential to libertarianism is the idea of absolute freedom of contract, which allows for the alienation of one's freedom to exit associations as well as alienation of all other liberal basic liberties. 2. As Justice Douglas said in dissent in Yoder: 'It is the student's judgement, not his parents, that is essential if we are to give full meaning to . . . the Bill of Rights and the

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4.

5.

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right of students to be masters of their own destiny. If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed' (quoted in Barker et al. 1999: 135). Here it is to be noted that the Eighteenth Amendment (1919, repealed by the Twentyfirst Amendment in 1933) prohibited 'the manufacture, sale or transportation of intox­ icating liquors . . . for beverage purposes', but not for sacramental purposes. The Amendment was specifically worded so as not to apply to sacramental uses of alcohol. Barry says 'it is consistent to say (1) that Smith was rightly decided and (2) that nev­ ertheless the "free exercise of religion" clause of the US Constitution would require churches to be given a waiver from a law prohibiting discrimination in employment even if no provision permitting one were written into the law itself. If this is taken to be the "asymmetry thesis", it is not incoherent and is indeed correct' (CE: 174). Barry says 'the case for "asymmetry" turns on a particular aspect of free association' (CE: 175). He also approvingly quotes a US court which said that it 'is a purely eccle­ siastical question' who preaches from the pulpit of a church (CE: 175). Barry adds that questions of priest's or parson's gender is 'a purely internal dispute within a church' (CE: 176). The figures are for children aged 3 - 1 1 , with teenagers watching on average more than 17 hours per week (Robinson and Godbey 1997: 211, 209). One such effort is offered by Joseph Raz (1994: 170-91).

References Barker, L. J. et al. 1999: C m / Liberties and the Constitution: Cases and Commentaries (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall). Barry, B. 2001: Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity). Forster J. C. and Leeson S. M. (eds) 1998: Constitutional Law: Cases in Context, vol. II (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall). Kymlicka, W. 1995: Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Rawls, J. 1993: Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press). 1999: A Theory of Justice, rev. edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Raz, J. 1994: Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Robinson, J. P. and Godbey, G. 1997: Time For Life (University Park: Penn State Press).

2 Choice, Chance and Multiculturalism Susan Mendus

H i s t o r y t e a c h e s u s that p r o n o u n c e m e n t s o f death are always risky a n d often p r e ­ m a t u r e . M a r k Twain, s u r p r i s e d to r e a d his o w n o b i t u a r y in an A m e r i c a n n e w s p a ­ per, c a b l e d A s s o c i a t e d Press w i t h t h e m e s s a g e : ' t h e r e p o r t o f m y d e a t h w a s an e x a g g e r a t i o n ' . A n d Peter Laslett's f a m o u s declaration that 'for t h e m o m e n t , anyway, political p h i l o s o p h y is d e a d ' c a m e j u s t at the m o m e n t ( a n y w a y ) w h e n a certain J o h n R a w l s w a s ' w r i t i n g a b o o k a b o u t j u s t i c e ' . In b o t h cases w e m i g h t reflect wryly, ' N o t dead, p e r h a p s . O n l y s l e e p i n g . ' H i s t o r y also repeats itself, a n d in a recently p u b l i s h e d essay, ' T h e N e w D e b a t e O v e r M i n o r i t y R i g h t s ' , Will K y m l i c k a , t o o , h a s a death to a n n o u n c e - t h e d e a t h o f liberal o p p o s i t i o n to m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . K y m l i c k a writes: ' i n m y view, t h e d e b a t e over j u s t i c e is d r a w i n g to a close . . . a n d the defenders o f m i n o r i t y rights h a v e won the d a y . . . it is n o l o n g e r possible to a r g u e that all forms o f m u l t i c u l ­ turalism are inherently unjust' ( 2 0 0 1 : 3 3 ) . N o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e , that is, from the p e r s p e c t i v e o f liberalism itself. We are, it s e e m s , all multiculturalists now, a n d t h e interesting question is h o w to refine a n d d e v e l o p m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , not w h e t h e r to s u b s c r i b e to it. Enter (stage left) B r i a n Barry, w h o s e m o s t r e c e n t b o o k , Culture and Equality, argues that m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , u n d e r s t o o d as a d v o c a t i n g special rights for m i n o r ­ ity g r o u p s , c a n n o t b e d e f e n d e d on g r o u n d s o f j u s t i c e . Moreover, his a r g u m e n t to this c o n c l u s i o n is a liberal a r g u m e n t , specifically a liberal egalitarian a r g u m e n t . If the d e b a t e over j u s t i c e is i n d e e d ' d r a w i n g to a c l o s e ' , n o o n e h a s b o t h e r e d to tell Brian Barry, for h e is clear that h e h a s c o m e , n o t to refine, n o r to d e v e l o p , m u c h less to praise m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . H e h a s c o m e to b u r y it, a n d h e p l a n s to d o so u s i n g the tools of liberal e g a l i t a r i a n i s m itself. H e r e , then, is the central q u e s ­ tion: c a n liberals, specifically liberal egalitarians, b e multiculturalists? C a n they

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support, as a r e q u i r e m e n t o f j u s t i c e , the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f special rights for m i n o r ­ ity g r o u p s ? B a r r y ' s n e g a t i v e a n s w e r d e p e n d s u p o n two c l a i m s : the first is that j u s t i c e is a m a t t e r o f equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s ; t h e s e c o n d is that an o p p o r t u n i t y is an objective state o f affairs. A r m e d with these c l a i m s , he h o p e s to deny that j u s t i c e requires special rights for m i n o r i t y g r o u p s , w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y p r e s e r v i n g his credentials as an egalitarian, for it is a c o n c e r n for equality, a n d specifically for equality of opportunity, that will deliver the c o n c l u s i o n that special rights are not a requirement of justice. For t h e p u r p o s e s o f this c h a p t e r I will a c c e p t B a r r y ' s first claim - the c l a i m that j u s t i c e is g u a r a n t e e d by equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Many, of c o u r s e , deny it, and still m o r e a r g u e a b o u t its interpretation. T h e j o u r n a l s are replete with articles d e b a t i n g the relative m e r i t s o f equality o f opportunity, equality o f welfare, e q u a l ­ ity o f r e s o u r c e s , equality o f a c c e s s to a d v a n t a g e , equality o f capabilities a n d s o on. T h e list is w e l l - n i g h e n d l e s s , a n d I d o not i n t e n d to a d d to it. Instead, I shall c o n c e n t r a t e o n the s e c o n d o f B a r r y ' s c l a i m s - t h e c l a i m that an o p p o r t u n i t y is an objective state of affairs, for it is on this that m u c h of his resistance to m u l t i c u l ­ t u r a l i s m s e e m s to rest. To see h o w this is so, contrast B a r r y ' s position w i t h that o f B h i k h u P a r e k h , w h o a g r e e s that j u s t i c e is a m a t t e r o f equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s b u t a r g u e s that special rights for m i n o r i t y g r o u p s are a r e q u i r e m e n t of j u s t i c e pre­ cisely because j u s t i c e is a m a t t e r o f equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s . For P a r e k h , however, ' o p p o r t u n i t y is a s u b j e c t - d e p e n d e n t c o n c e p t in t h e sense that a facility, a r e s o u r c e , or a c o u r s e of action is only a m u t e a n d p a s s i v e possibility a n d n o t an o p p o r t u ­ nity for an individual if she lacks the capacity, the cultural disposition, or the n e c ­ e s s a r y cultural k n o w l e d g e to take a d v a n t a g e o f it' ( 2 0 0 0 : 2 4 1 ) . For Barry, on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e fact that s o m e o n e lacks the 'cultural d i s p o s i t i o n ' is neither here n o r there. Cultural disposition, religious a n d m o r a l b e l i e f certainly affect m y will­ i n g n e s s to take a d v a n t a g e o f an opportunity, b u t they d o not affect the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r I h a v e t h e opportunity. To p u t s o m e flesh o n t h e rather abstract b o n e s here, c o n s i d e r t h e state o f English law b e t w e e n 1972 a n d 1976. T h r o u g h o u t that period, all m o t o r c y c l e riders, irrespective o f culture or religion, w e r e r e q u i r e d to w e a r a crash helmet. S i k h s p r o t e s t e d on t h e g r o u n d s that religious c u s t o m r e q u i r e d t h e m to w e a r a turban, a n d they a r g u e d that by m a k i n g the crash h e l m e t c o m p u l s o r y English law d e n i e d t h e m equal o p p o r t u n i t y to ride a m o t o r c y c l e . In 1976 their protests w e r e accepted when the Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act was passed. S i k h s are n o longer r e q u i r e d to w e a r a crash h e l m e t but m a y instead w e a r a turban. T h e q u e s t i o n n o w is w h e t h e r this special right, g r a n t e d on religious g r o u n d s , is or is not a r e q u i r e m e n t of j u s t i c e . P a r e k h insists that it is b e c a u s e h e believes that o p p o r t u n i t y is s u b j e c t - d e p e n d e n t a n d that, prior to the g r a n t i n g o f t h e special right, Sikhs w e r e denied an o p p o r t u n i t y w h i c h t h e rest o f us h a d n a m e l y the o p p o r t u n i t y to ride a m o t o r c y c l e . Barry, by contrast, says that it is not: u n d e r t h e original 1972 law Sikhs had exactly the s a m e o p p o r t u n i t y to ride a m o t o r c y c l e as e v e r y o n e else. O f c o u r s e , they t e n d e d not to avail t h e m s e l v e s o f it, a n d t h e fact that they did n o t is explicable b y reference to their religious beliefs.

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But if t h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r the special right w a s n e e d e d in o r d e r to e n s u r e equality o f opportunity, the answer, a c c o r d i n g to Barry, is ' N o ' . A s so far described, the d i s p u t e s e e m s to turn o n w h e t h e r ' o p p o r t u n i t y ' is or is n o t s u b j e c t - d e p e n d e n t . W h e r e B a r r y d r a w s a clear, indeed ' c r u c i a l ' , distinction b e t w e e n h a v i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y and b e i n g d i s p o s e d to avail o n e s e l f o f it, P a r e k h elides that distinction a n d c o n c l u d e s that a w o r l d in w h i c h I c a n n o t avail m y s e l f o f an o p p o r t u n i t y is a world in w h i c h there is n o opportunity. T h a t is to say, n o o p p o r t u n i t y for me. B u t if this is t h e crucial distinction, t h e n it is r e m a r k a b l e that neither writer offers m u c h by way o f justification for his o w n claim. Indeed, a n d in the end, P a r e k h s e e m s to c o n c e d e that 'cultural inabilities' d o n o t invariably destroy opportunity, for h e n o t e s that there m a y b e cases in w h i c h a cultural ' i n c a ­ p a c i t y ' can by o v e r c o m e w i t h relative e a s e , a n d he c o n c l u d e s that, in such a case, the m e m b e r s o f the m i n o r i t y g r o u p m a y legitimately be a s k e d to o v e r c o m e it, or at least to b e a r the financial costs o f a c c o m m o d a t i n g it ( 2 0 0 0 : 2 4 1 ) . M e a n w h i l e , B a r r y b e a t s an u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c retreat to etymology, a n d defends the alleged objectivity of o p p o r t u n i t y b y r e m i n d i n g us that P o r t u n u s w a s the god w h o looked after h a r b o u r s : ' w h e n the w i n d a n d the tide w e r e p r o p i t i o u s , sailors h a d t h e o p p o r ­ tunity to enter or leave the harbour. T h e y did n o t h a v e to d o so if they d i d n o t w a n t t o , o f c o u r s e , b u t that did n o t m e a n that t h e o p p o r t u n i t y s o m e h o w d i s a p ­ p e a r e d . T h e existence o f the o p p o r t u n i t y w a s an objective state o f affairs' (CE: 37). A n d for Barry, it r e m a i n s so. However, it is d e e p l y unsatisfactory to b e told that the j u s t i c e o f m i n o r i t y rights in t h e twenty-first c e n t u r y d e p e n d s ( s o m e h o w ) on the j o b description o f a m i n o r R o m a n deity. We m i g h t , for i n s t a n c e , think that w h e t h e r s o m e o n e h a s an o p p o r t u n i t y d e p e n d s , in part, o n t h e costs a t t a c h e d to t h e activity in q u e s t i o n , a n d that w h e r e s o m e o n e w o u l d be r e q u i r e d to pay v e r y h e a v y costs for e n g a g i n g in an activity (social o s t r a c i s m or e x c o m m u n i c a t i o n , for e x a m p l e ) , it is i m p l a u s i b l e to insist that h e or she has a g e n u i n e o p p o r t u n i t y to d o that thing (for a detailed d i s c u s s i o n o f this q u e s t i o n , see D a v i d Miller's c o n ­ tribution to this v o l u m e ) . I therefore dig deeper, a n d I find that t h e d i s p u t e over w h e t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y is or is n o t s u b j e c t - d e p e n d e n t rests, in turn, o n a d i s p u t e over the status o f religious a n d cultural beliefs t h e m s e l v e s . P a r e k h w r i t e s : A Sikh is in principle free to send his son to a school that bans turbans, but for all practical purposes, it is closed to him. The same is true when an orthodox Jew is required to give up his yarmulke, or the Muslim woman to wear a skirt, or the vegetarian Hindu to eat beef as a precondition for certain kinds of jobs. Although the inability involved is cultural not physical in nature and hence subject to human control, the degree of control varies greatly. In some cases a cultural inability can be overcome with relative ease by suitably re-interpreting the relevant cultural norm or practice; in others it is constitutive of the individual's sense of identity and even of self-respect and cannot be overcome without a deep sense of moral loss. (2000: 241) S o the Sikh has n o g e n u i n e o p p o r t u n i t y t o s e n d his child to a s c h o o l that b a n s t u r b a n s , a n d the r e a s o n is that religious a n d cultural beliefs, w h i l e not entirely

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b e y o n d h u m a n control, are sufficiently intractable to m a k e t h e m a n a l o g o u s to physical incapacities. T h e p e r s o n w h o is confined to a w h e e l c h a i r c a n n o t get to t h e t o p o f York Minster, a n d t h e Sikh w h o is r e q u i r e d to w e a r a t u r b a n c a n n o t attend a school that insists o n a u n i f o r m w h i c h i n c l u d e s a c a p . To w h i c h B a r r y retorts: The position of somebody who is unable to drive a car as a result of physical dis­ ability is totally different from that of somebody who is unable to drive a car because doing so would be contrary to the tenets of his or her religion. To suggest that they are similarly situated is in fact offensive to both parties. Someone who needs a wheelchair to get around will be quite right to resent the suggestion that this need should be assimilated to an expensive taste. And somebody who freely embraces a religious belief that prohibits certain activities will rightly deny the imputation that this is to be seen as analogous to the unwelcome burden of a physical disability. (CE: 36-7) So the Sikh does have a g e n u i n e o p p o r t u n i t y to send his child to a school that b a n s t u r b a n s . B e c a u s e of his religious beliefs, h e c h o o s e s not t o , but insofar as t h o s e beliefs are 'freely e m b r a c e d ' they a r e n o t at all a n a l o g o u s to p h y s i c a l dis­ abilities a n d it is b o t h i n a c c u r a t e a n d offensive t o p r e s e n t t h e m as such. I have q u o t e d at length from P a r e k h a n d B a r r y b e c a u s e t h e s e t w o p a s s a g e s highlight an i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n t h e m : t h e difference b e t w e e n seeing religious and cultural beliefs as m a t t e r s o f c h a n c e ( a n d t h u s a n a l o g o u s to p h y s i ­ cal disabilities), a n d s e e i n g t h e m as matters o f c h o i c e ( a n d t h u s a k i n to e x p e n ­ sive tastes). T h e p o i n t at issue is w h e t h e r s u c h beliefs are like physical capacities a n d incapacities, w h i c h w e h a v e w h e t h e r w e like t h e m or not, o r w h e t h e r they are c h o i c e s in that w e freely e m b r a c e and e n d o r s e t h e m . P a r e k h favours t h e former, B a r r y the latter. N e i t h e r is c o m p l e t e l y c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h his o w n categorization, but neither can afford to give g r o u n d to t h e other, a n d the r e a s o n is s i m p l y this: e a c h w i s h e s to defend his o w n c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t m i n o r i t y rights as a c o n c l u s i o n of egalitarianism, and a central aspiration o f m o d e r n liberal egalitarianism is to secure a political order that will extinguish t h e effects o f b a d luck. S i n c e this is so, it is crucial to B a r r y ' s overall project to deny that religious a n d cultural beliefs are a m a t t e r o f luck in t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s e n s e ; a n d it is crucial to P a r e k h ' s overall project to insist that they are, for it is only if t h e s e beliefs are in s o m e sense given rather than c h o s e n (only if t h e y are a m a t t e r o f c h a n c e rather t h a n a m a t t e r of c h o i c e ) that special rights c a n b e justified in the name of justice. H e r e , t h e n , is t h e central q u e s t i o n : can egalitarians b e multiculturalists? A n d h e r e is a p r e l i m i n a r y answer: Yes, if religious a n d cultural beliefs fall o n the c h a n c e side o f t h e c h a n c e - c h o i c e distinction. N o , if they fall o n t h e c h o i c e side o f t h e c h a n c e - c h o i c e distinction. S i n c e this distinction is so central to m o d e r n egalitarianism, I shall s p e n d s o m e t i m e e x p l a i n i n g its significance before g o i n g on to q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r it really can d o t h e w o r k required of it. R o u g h l y s p e a k ­ ing, m y a r g u m e n t will b e that, in o r d e r to attack m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m from t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f liberal egalitarianism, B a r r y n e e d s to a s s u m e a clear a n d p r e -

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institutional distinction b e t w e e n c h o i c e a n d c h a n c e , a n d h e also n e e d s to s h o w that religious a n d cultural beliefs fall o n the c h o i c e side o f the line. It is, however, doubtful w h e t h e r there is a clear a n d pre-institutional distinction b e t w e e n c h o i c e a n d c h a n c e , a n d ironically t h e r e a s o n s for d o u b t c o m e from w i t h i n egalitarian­ ism itself. S o to the extent that B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t s u n d e r m i n e m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , they also threaten to u n d e r m i n e his o w n egalitarianism. That, however, is m y con­ clusion. I turn n o w to the first p i e c e o f the a r g u m e n t for t h e c o n c l u s i o n - the e x p l a n a t i o n o f the role of c h a n c e in egalitarian political t h o u g h t .

1. Chance and the Egalitarians In section 17 of A Theory of Justice John R a w l s argues that ' s i n c e inequalities o f birth a n d natural e n d o w m e n t are undeserved, these inequalities a r e s o m e h o w to be c o m p e n s a t e d for. . . . [I]n order to treat all p e r s o n s equally, to provide g e n u i n e equality o f opportunity, society m u s t give m o r e attention to those with fewer native assets a n d to t h o s e b o r n into less favourable social p o s i t i o n s ' ( 1 9 7 1 : 100). A n d h e g o e s on to e m p h a s i z e that his o w n t h e o r y - j u s t i c e a s fairness - satisfies these c o n d i t i o n s : ' I n j u s t i c e as fairness m e n a g r e e to share o n e another's fate. In design­ ing institutions they u n d e r t a k e to avail t h e m s e l v e s o f the accidents o f n a t u r e a n d social c i r c u m s t a n c e only w h e n d o i n g s o is for the c o m m o n benefit. T h e t w o prin­ ciples a r e a fair w a y o f m e e t i n g the arbitrariness of fortune' (ibid.: 102; e m p h a ­ sis a d d e d ) . S o it is a desire to c o u n t e r a c t the arbitrariness of fortune that motivates Rawls's egalitarianism. Moreover, this desire h a s b e e n central to egalitarianism for at least thirty y e a r s . R i c h a r d A r n e s o n characterizes the a i m o f distributive j u s t i c e as b e i n g ' t o c o m p e n s a t e individuals for misfortune. S o m e p e o p l e a r e blessed with g o o d luck, s o m e are c u r s e d w i t h b a d luck, a n d it is the responsibil­ ity o f society - all o f u s r e g a r d e d collectively - to alter t h e distribution o f g o o d s and evils that arises from the j u m b l e o f lotteries that constitutes h u m a n life as w e k n o w it' (as q u o t e d in A n d e r s o n , 1999: 2 8 9 - 9 0 ) . A n d again, G. A. C o h e n c o n c u r s : ' a large part o f the fundamental egalitarian a i m is to extinguish the influence o f b r u t e luck on d i s t r i b u t i o n ' ( 1 9 8 9 : 9 3 1 ) . In the B o o k o f Ecclesiastes w e r e a d ' a n d I r e t u r n e d a n d saw u n d e r t h e s u n that the race is n o t to t h e swift n o r t h e battle to the strong, neither yet b r e a d to t h e w i s e n o r riches to m e n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g n o r favour to m e n of skill, but time a n d c h a n c e h a p p e n e t h to t h e m a l l ' ( 9 : 11). In the B o o k s o f the Egalitarians w e r e a d that politics, suitably constituted, c a n c h a n g e all this. N o t , of c o u r s e , b y e l i m i n a t i n g c h a n c e itself, but by e l i m i n a t i n g its effects on individuals: egalitarian politics will release us, if not from t i m e a n d c h a n c e , t h e n at least from b e a r i n g the full b u r d e n o f their c o n s e q u e n c e s . However, if this egalitarian a i m is to b e realized, t h e r e m u s t b e a clear, a n d pre-institutional u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t c o u n t s as c h a n c e . W e c a n only expect politics to m i t i g a t e t h e worst effects of c h a n c e if w e already k n o w w h a t c h a n c e is, a n d the d i s p u t e b e t w e e n B a r r y a n d P a r e k h s u g g e s t s that w e k n o w n o such t h i n g . A s indicated in t h e t w o p a s s a g e s q u o t e d earlier, they p l a c e religious a n d

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cultural belief o n different sides o f the c h o i c e - c h a n c e line a n d (yet m o r e w o r r y ingly) e a c h cites the very i m p o r t a n c e o f religious a n d cultural b e l i e f as the reason for his o w n favoured categorization. T h u s , P a r e k h n o t e s that often such beliefs ' a r e constitutive o f the individual's sense o f identity a n d even o f self-respect a n d c a n n o t b e o v e r c o m e w i t h o u t a d e e p sense of m o r a l l o s s ' , a n d it is in light of this that h e p r e s s e s the a n a l o g y b e t w e e n cultural b e l i e f a n d physical incapacity or inability. B u t Barry, too, takes religious a n d cultural belief seriously. H e writes: [T]he argument of this book is not that the fact of multiple cultures is unimportant (or in most instances regrettable) but that the multiculturalist programme for responding to it is in most instances ill-advised. Indeed, it is just because the fact of multiple cultures is important that the politicization of group identities and the development of group-specific policies should be resisted. (CE: 23^1) For Barry, however, t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f cultural belief, a n d t h e r e a s o n it should n o t be c o n s i d e r e d a m a t t e r o f c h a n c e , or a s s i m i l a t e d to p h y s i c a l incapacity, is that characteristically the p e r s o n w h o s e identity is constituted b y cultural or religious belief h o l d s that belief freely a n d willingly. S h e d o e s not regret h a v i n g it and d o e s n o t say to h e r s e l f 'Sadly, I believe in God, b u t h o w I w i s h it w e r e o t h e r w i s e . ' It is for this r e a s o n that B a r r y d e c l a r e s it 'offensive to both p a r t i e s ' to m a k e reli­ g i o u s beliefs a n a l o g o u s to p h y s i c a l disabilities. S o w h i l e b o t h B a r r y a n d P a r e k h a c k n o w l e d g e t h e significance of r e l i g i o u s a n d cultural b e l i e f for the believer, t h e y d r a w diametrically o p p o s e d c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t w h e r e that leaves such beliefs in t h e c h o i c e - c h a n c e d e b a t e . It is an implication of B a r r y ' s v i e w that w e o u g h t not to c o u n t t h o s e features o f m y p e r s o n a l i t y w h i c h I d o not regret h a v i n g as m a t t e r s o f c h a n c e . Indeed, it is m o r e t h a n an implica­ tion, it is a v i e w that h e explicitly asserts in an earlier article, w h e r e he p r o p o s e s that ' p e o p l e are r e s p o n s i b l e for their p r e f e r e n c e s w h e n e v e r they are c o n t e n t with t h e m . H o w t h e s e p r e f e r e n c e s originated is irrelevant, a n d t h e e a s e with w h i c h they c o u l d b e c h a n g e d is relevant only in this way: that w e w o u l d h a v e to q u e s ­ tion the sincerity o f y o u r claim n o t to w a n t to have t h e p r e f e r e n c e s y o u actually d o have if it w e r e e a s y for you to c h a n g e t h e m ' ( 1 9 9 1 : 156). A n d he g o e s o n to r e c o m m e n d that w h e r e s o m e o n e w h o h a s religious beliefs regrets h a v i n g t h e m a n d w i s h e s to rid h i m s e l f o f t h e m , it w o u l d be legitimate to m a k e p s y c h o t h e r a p y available o n t h e N a t i o n a l H e a l t h S e r v i c e . S u c h a c a s e w o u l d i n d e e d b e o n e in w h i c h r e l i g i o u s beliefs w e r e a disability a n d w h e r e t h e individual w o u l d there­ fore, a n d o n egalitarian g r o u n d s , b e entitled to b e relieved o f t h e costs o f t h e m . T h e n o r m a l c a s e , however, w h e r e t h e religious believer h a s n o such regret, is, for that v e r y r e a s o n , o n e in w h i c h t h e belief s h o u l d p r o p e r l y b e c o n s i d e r e d a m a t t e r o f c h o i c e . It is not, o f c o u r s e , a m a t t e r o f c h o i c e in the sense that it is easily alter­ able; it is a m a t t e r o f c h o i c e in t h e sense that an egalitarian society will not as a m a t t e r o f j u s t i c e be r e q u i r e d to pay t h e costs c o n s e q u e n t u p o n it. Clearly, t h e v e r y general issue that is raised h e r e is whether, a n d to w h a t extent, o u r personalities t h e m s e l v e s a r e a m a t t e r o f c h o i c e or c h a n c e . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l

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literature o n this topic is vast, a r c a n e a n d labyrinthine. A g a i n , a n d for r e a s o n s that will b e c o m e clear, I d o not intend to a d d to it. Rather, I have two a i m s in the r e m a i n d e r o f this chapter: the first is t o s h o w w h y egalitarians o u g h t t o be w a r y of invoking a pre-institutional distinction b e t w e e n c h o i c e a n d c h a n c e . T h e s e c o n d is to s u g g e s t that insofar as they d o invoke s o m e such distinction, they are par­ ticularly u n w i s e to m a k e the cut w h e r e B a r r y m a k e s it. In o t h e r w o r d s , they are u n w i s e to treat religious and cultural belief, or p e r s o n a l i t y generally, as a m a t t e r o f c h o i c e . M a k i n g the cut in that p l a c e certainly u n d e r m i n e s multiculturalism, but it also t h r e a t e n s to u n d e r m i n e i m p o r t a n t tenets o f egalitarianism. So m y q u e s ­ tion is, ' C a n egalitarians b e m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s t s ? ' and m y a n s w e r is, ' I f B a r r y is right, egalitarians c a n ' t b e multiculturalists, b u t that's b e c a u s e they c a n ' t b e egalitari­ ans either.' Fortunately, however, B a r r y isn't right, so egalitarians can b e egali­ tarians, a n d they can also b e multiculturalists. O n t h e w h o l e , t h o u g h , I think they had better not be multiculturalists. B a r r y gets the a n s w e r right, b u t for all the wrong reasons.

2. Choice, Chance and Oppression Why, then, s h o u l d egalitarians b e w a r y o f s u p p o s i n g that there is a clear, a n d pre-institutional, distinction b e t w e e n c h o i c e a n d c h a n c e ? O n e r e a s o n - w h i c h w e h a v e e n c o u n t e r e d already - is that intuitions a b o u t w h a t c o u n t s as c h a n c e a n d w h a t as c h o i c e vary quite d r a m a t i c a l l y as b e t w e e n egalitarians t h e m s e l v e s . Both B a r r y a n d P a r e k h c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r special rights s h o u l d b e a c c o r d e d to m i n o r i t y g r o u p s from an egalitarian perspective. Yet they give conflicting a n s w e r s to that q u e s t i o n , and the conflicting a n s w e r s s p r i n g from conflicting intuitions a b o u t t h e status of r e l i g i o u s a n d cultural beliefs. T h i s sug­ gests to m e that t h e conflicting intuitions are t h e m s e l v e s i n f o r m e d b y m o r a l a n d political beliefs, rather than b e i n g data for u s e in the construction o f m o r a l a n d political beliefs. E v e n a m o n g s t egalitarians t h e m s e l v e s the c h o i c e - c h a n c e distinction a p p e a r s to follow from, rather t h a n p r e c e d e , m o r a l a n d political commitments. M o r e o v e r , this a p p e a r a n c e is reinforced if w e m o v e from internal d e b a t e s a m o n g s t egalitarians to t h e w i d e r political context. In ' C h a n c e , C h o i c e and J u s t i c e ' B a r r y raises (only to set aside) the libertarianism o f R o b e r t N o z i c k ' s Anarchy, State and Utopia. H e c h a r a c t e r i z e s N o z i c k ' s position as o n e that d e n i e s the significance o f c h a n c e , and c o m m e n t s :

Nozick postulates a framework of rights and then says that just outcomes are those arising from the choices made by people in the exercise of those rights. You might have the bad luck to starve to death under these arrangements because you have not been so fortunate as to inherit or be given enough to live on. . . . But Nozick simply has no provision for modifying the outcomes arising from choice so as to deal with bad luck. (1991: 143)

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T h e criticism o f N o z i c k (as given here) is that h e d o e s n o t see it as the p r o p e r role o f politics to extinguish the effects o f c h a n c e , w h i c h is simply a n o t h e r way o f saying that h e is not an egalitarian. However, there is a d e e p e r p o i n t t o b e m a d e about N o z i c k , w h i c h is not that his political p r o g r a m m e is o n e that refuses to c o m p e n s a t e for b a d luck, but that his very classification o f t h i n g s as m a t t e r s o f luck is politically a n d m o r a l l y loaded. W h y s h o u l d w e accept n o t only that it is b a d luck not to inherit in the first p l a c e , b u t also that it is b a d luck to r e m a i n i m p o v e r i s h e d in the s e c o n d ? It is only if we are a n t e c e d e n t l y c o m m i t t e d to an entitlement t h e o r y that w e n e e d to believe that a w o r l d in w h i c h t h o s e w h o have inherited prosper, w h i l e t h o s e w h o h a v e n o t starve, can plausibly b e d e s c r i b e d as a w o r l d in w h i c h luck prevails. P u t differently, the egalitarian c l a i m is not (or should not be) s i m p l y that e n t i t l e m e n t theorists are w r o n g to refuse to m i t i g a t e the effects o f luck. Rather, t h e egalitarian claim s h o u l d b e that this m a y not be luck at all, b u t t h e o u t c o m e of the operation o f unjust political institutions, and t o a c c e d e to its b e i n g c a t e g o r i z e d as luck is s i m p l y to play into t h e h a n d s o f the e n t i t l e m e n t theorist. T h u s , by insisting on a pre-institutional distinction b e t w e e n c h o i c e and c h a n c e , egalitarians not only fail to resolve their internal d i s p u t e s , they also deprive t h e m s e l v e s o f a very significant objection to l i b e r t a r i a n i s m a n d leave t h e m s e l v e s with only secondary, if n o t s p u r i o u s , criticisms o f it. O r so it s e e m s to m e . T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r e s h a d o w s a third, w h i c h is that, by insisting on the significance o f the c h o i c e - c h a n c e distinction, egalitarians deflect attention from a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t a i m o f egalitarianism, w h i c h is not simply to c o u n t e r a c t the effects of b a d luck, b u t to r e m o v e social o p p r e s s i o n . In h e r article ' W h a t is the Point of E q u a l i t y ? ' Elizabeth A n d e r s o n e m p h a s i z e s this d a n g e r w h e n she writes: ' t h e p r o p e r n e g a t i v e a i m o f egalitarian j u s t i c e is n o t to e l i m i n a t e t h e impact o f b r u t e luck from h u m a n affairs, b u t to e n d o p p r e s s i o n , w h i c h b y definition is socially i m p o s e d . Its p r o p e r positive a i m is n o t to e n s u r e that e v e r y o n e gets w h a t they m o r a l l y d e s e r v e , b u t to create a c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h p e o p l e stand in relations o f equality to o t h e r s ' ( 1 9 9 9 : 2 8 8 - 9 ) . A n d she c o n c l u d e s that luck egalitarianism u n d e r m i n e s b o t h these a i m s . Before r u s h i n g too hastily to that c o n ­ clusion, however, w e should c o n s i d e r the precise r e l a t i o n s h i p that h o l d s b e t w e e n the aspiration to e x t i n g u i s h luck a n d the aspiration to r e m o v e o p p r e s s i o n . In par­ ticular, w e s h o u l d c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r there are cases w h e r e these two a i m s conflict and, if so, w h i c h should h a v e priority from an egalitarian point o f view. It is h e r e that t h e d e b a t e b e c o m e s deeply p r o b l e m a t i c . A n d messy. In alluding to B a r r y ' s critique o f N o z i c k , I objected to his ( B a r r y ' s ) claim that w h a t is w r o n g w i t h a N o z i c k e a n society is that it refuses to a c k n o w l e d g e t h e significance o f luck, a n d I s u g g e s t e d that w h a t is really objectionable a b o u t it is that it c o n s t r u e s as luck w h a t is, in fact, injustice. It is n o t true that w e first identify s o m e t h i n g as a p i e c e of b a d luck a n d t h e n ( b e i n g g o o d egalitarians) resolve t o c o m p e n s a t e for it. Rather, a n d as g o o d egalitarians, w e should resist t h e s u g g e s t i o n that this is a c a s e o f luck at all, a n d insist that it is the o u t c o m e o f t h e operation o f unjust insti­ tutions. However, it m i g h t b e retorted that t h e s e different d i a g n o s e s m a k e n o sig-

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nificant difference ' o n the g r o u n d ' . All a terrible thing. All are a g r e e d that we d i s a g r e e m e n t is a b o u t w h e t h e r w h a t w e individual fortune or t h e fact o f social

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egalitarians a r e a g r e e d that p o v e r t y is m u s t d o s o m e t h i n g a b o u t it. T h e only d o is a r e s p o n s e to the arbitrariness of o p p r e s s i o n , but w h i c h e v e r a n s w e r w e

give, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f luck a n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f o p p r e s s i o n dictate the s a m e practical policies. All this c h a n g e s , however, w h e n w e turn o u r attention to t h e multiculturalist c a s e , b e c a u s e this is a c a s e w h e r e the d i s p u t e is not solely a b o u t the g r o u n d s on w h i c h w e r e s p o n d to terrible t h i n g s . It is, in e s s e n c e , a d i s p u t e about w h i c h things really are terrible. Multiculturalists give priority to the significance o f identity, a n d especially to the significance o f religion a n d culture in the f o r m a t i o n a n d m a i n t e n a n c e o f identity. For t h e m , the really terrible thing is to lose o n e ' s sense o f self a n d o f self-respect b y finding one's c o m m u n i t y w i t h e r i n g away t h r o u g h n e g l e c t or a n t a g o n i s m , a n d it is for this r e a s o n that they urge t h e introduction o f special rights for m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . B y contrast, f o r m s o f egalitarianism w h i c h are hostile to m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m are so b e c a u s e they are m o r e universalistic in their a s s u m p t i o n s : for these egalitarians, poverty, u n e m p l o y m e n t , lack o f e d u c a t i o n are t h e truly terrible things, a n d (crucially) they a r e so i n d e p e n d e n t o f o n e ' s cultural or religious allegiance. So w h e r e egalitarians resist m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m that is b e c a u s e they subscribe to a different u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the m i s c h i e f against which egalitarianism is directed. T h u s , P a r e k h e m p h a s i z e s t h e n e e d to resist ' t h e w i d e r society's h o m o g e n i s i n g or assimilationist thrust b a s e d on the b e l i e f that there is only o n e correct, true or n o r m a l w a y to u n d e r s t a n d and structure the relevant areas o f life' ( 2 0 0 0 : 1), w h i l e B a r r y urges the impossibility of leading any k i n d o f w o r t h w h i l e life w i t h o u t , for e x a m p l e , educational o p p o r t u n i t i e s that will e q u i p o n e t o c o m p e t e successfully o n the j o b market. T h e provision o f these o p p o r t u ­ nities m a y well conflict with the preservation o f cultural identity, b u t if that h a p p e n s , so m u c h the w o r s e for cultural identity. T h u s he c o n c l u d e s Culture and Equality w i t h the c l a i m that ' a d m i n i s t e r e d in d o s e s o f any strength y o u like, m u l ­ ticulturalism p o s e s as m a n y p r o b l e m s as it solves . . . [and] it c a n n o t in t h e n a t u r e o f the c a s e a d d r e s s the h u g e inequalities in o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d r e s o u r c e s that dis­ figure - a n d increasingly d o m i n a t e - societies such as those of Britain a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' (CE: 3 2 8 ) . To repeat, both B a r r y a n d Parekh w i s h to present their theories a s egalitarian, a n d both defend their c o n c l u s i o n s by reference to t h e c h o i c e - c h a n c e distinction, but, as w e have seen, neither can offer a c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n for a d o p t i n g his p r e ­ ferred categorization, a n d that is b e c a u s e there is n o n e . W h a t t h e distinction b e t w e e n luck egalitarianism a n d o p p r e s s i o n egalitarianism reveals is that the real issue is n o t w h e t h e r religious a n d cultural beliefs are given or c h o s e n . T h e real issue is w h e t h e r religious and cultural c o m m i t m e n t can run c o u n t e r to o n e ' s ability to lead a fulfilling life, or w h e t h e r w h a t c o u n t s as a fulfilling life is partly a function o f religious a n d cultural c o m m i t m e n t . M o r e o v e r , the e m p h a s i s on luck is not m e r e l y different from the e m p h a s i s o n o p p r e s s i o n , it is also in conflict with it. Egalitarians w h o believe that t h e truly terrible t h i n g s are i n d e p e n d e n t o f culture

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c a n n o t , I believe, defend their egalitarianism b y p l a c i n g r e l i g i o u s belief o n t h e c h o i c e side o f t h e c h o i c e - c h a n c e distinction. I will give an e x a m p l e to illustrate this before m o v i n g on to m y final section. In c h a p t e r 2 o f Culture and Equality B a r r y c o n s i d e r s the case o f Mandla v. Dowell Lee ( 1 9 8 3 ) . T h i s w a s a c a s e in w h i c h a S i k h b o y w a s refused a d m i s s i o n to a private s c h o o l in B i r m i n g h a m b e c a u s e h e refused to c o m p l y w i t h the school's rules w h i c h ' p r e s c r i b e d a p a r t i c u l a r u n i f o r m , i n c l u d i n g a c a p , a n d r e q u i r e d boys to have their h a i r cut short so as n o t to t o u c h the c o l l a r ' . W h a t d o e s luck egali­ tarianism say a b o u t this c a s e ? G i v e n that P a r e k h p l a c e s religious belief on t h e c h a n c e side o f the original distinction, a n d given his insistence that religious a n d cultural b e l i e f are central to o n e ' s identity a n d sense o f self-respect, w e w o u l d e x p e c t h i m to u r g e that the b o y b e g r a n t e d a special right to w e a r a t u r b a n instead o f a cap. A n d that is exactly w h a t h e d o e s urge. G i v e n that B a r r y p l a c e s religious b e l i e f o n the c h o i c e side o f t h e distinction, w e w o u l d expect h i m to u r g e that n o special right b e granted. H i s line o f t h i n k i n g o u g h t to b e : ' t h e b o y freely e m b r a c e s h i s religion and, for that r e a s o n , it w o u l d b e offensive to grant h i m a special right. To d o this w o u l d b e to treat his religious b e l i e f as ( a n a l o g o u s to) a disability.' B u t this is n o t at all w h a t B a r r y says. O n t h e contrary, h e cites this c a s e as o n e in w h i c h there is an a r g u m e n t for e x e m p t i o n . W h a t , t h e n , is the a r g u m e n t ? It is n o t explicitly stated, b u t it m u s t , I think, b e that if t h e r e q u i r e m e n t to w e a r a cap is enforced, t h e b o y is likely to a t t e n d an inferior s c h o o l ( p r e s u m a b l y a school o f t h e r e l i g i o u s c o m m u n i t y ) and, as a result, t o r e m a i n poorly e d u c a t e d a n d u n e m ­ p l o y a b l e . H i s religious a n d cultural beliefs will, if nurtured, blight his e m p l o y ­ m e n t p r o s p e c t s a n d d i m i n i s h his c h a n c e s o f l e a d i n g a fulfilling life. So w h e r e P a r e k h sees t h e r e l i g i o u s beliefs as significant c o m p o n e n t s o f a ful­ filling life, a n d urges e x e m p t i o n for that reason, B a r r y sees t h e m as at best irrel­ evant, a n d at w o r s t as significant i m p e d i m e n t s to a fulfilling life. In g e n e r a l , h e resists d e m a n d s for special r i g h t s b e c a u s e , in g e n e r a l , h e believes that t h o s e rights will simply c o n s o l i d a t e linguistic a n d e d u c a t i o n a l difference in such a w a y as to r e n d e r t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e cultural g r o u p s p o o r l y educated, p o o r l y e q u i p p e d to c o m p e t e o n t h e j o b m a r k e t and, h e n c e , poor. T h e r e a s o n for g r a n t i n g e x e m p t i o n in this c a s e (the c a s e o f t h e Sikh s c h o o l b o y ) is that h e r e , a n d unusually, t h e special right, or e x e m p t i o n , is n o t i n i m i c a l t o , b u t n e c e s s a r y for, t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f a w o r t h ­ w h i l e a n d flourishing life. B u t if this is t h e a r g u m e n t , then it is straightforwardly i n c o m p a t i b l e with B a r r y ' s earlier insistence that religious beliefs fall on the c h o i c e side o f t h e c h o i c e - c h a n c e distinction. A s s u m i n g that t h e b o y is o l d e n o u g h to u n d e r s t a n d a n d e n d o r s e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f his religion (as h e in fact w a s in t h e original legal case), w h a t B a r r y ' s official p o s i t i o n requires is that n o special r i g h t b e g r a n t e d . H i s belief that this is a c a s e w h e r e e x e m p t i o n is a p p r o p r i a t e s u g ­ gests to m e that it is not t h e c h o i c e - c h a n c e distinction that is d o i n g t h e work h e r e , b u t rather a c o m m i t m e n t to objective interests a n d a universalist c o n c e p t i o n o f flourishing. O f c o u r s e , B a r r y is n o t coy about t h e fact that h e d o e s i n d e e d have s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n , so this c o n c l u s i o n will not e m b a r r a s s h i m . W h a t is m o r e a w k w a r d , however, is that this c o n c e p t i o n is built o n t o a p r i n c i p l e o f individual

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responsibility w h i c h c o n s t r u e s r e l i g i o u s a n d cultural beliefs as m a t t e r s o f c h o i c e , n o t o f c h a n c e . T h e resultant edifice is, in m y view, u n s t a b l e , a n d to s h o w this, I will n o w r e d e s c r i b e t h e central a r g u m e n t o f Culture and Equality so as to e x p o s e the instability. A s w e h a v e seen, the overall a i m of B a r r y ' s b o o k is to d e n y that special rights are a r e q u i r e m e n t o f j u s t i c e from a liberal egalitarian perspective. T h i s a i m c a n be s e c u r e d by c a t e g o r i z i n g religious beliefs as m a t t e r s of c h o i c e , n o t c h a n c e . G r a n t this and it t h e n follows that religious believers a r e j u s t l y r e q u i r e d to b e a r the costs o f their o w n religious beliefs. T h e y a r e n o t entitled to special rights or e x e m p t i o n s . However, t h e c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f religious belief as a m a t t e r o f c h o i c e delivers t h e ' w r o n g ' c o n c l u s i o n in the c a s e o f t h e Sikh schoolboy, a n d in o r d e r to r e a c h the ' r i g h t ' c o n c l u s i o n B a r r y m u s t a p p e a l to a different a r g u m e n t - the a r g u m e n t from t h e objectivity o f interests. Unfortunately, however, t h e t w o argu­ m e n t s are n o t c o m p a t i b l e : either t h e Sikh boy h a s interests that are i n d e p e n d e n t o f w h a t h e identifies w i t h a n d freely e m b r a c e s , or h e d o e s not. If h e d o e s , t h e n the c h o i c e - c h a n c e distinction is ultimately irrelevant. If h e d o e s n o t , t h e n t h e a r g u m e n t from objectivity o f interests falls. Either way, s o m e t h i n g h a s to give, b u t B a r r y c a n n o t afford t o r e n o u n c e either o f the two a r g u m e n t s . If h e r e n o u n c e s his stand on t h e c h o i c e - c h a n c e distinction, h e delivers h i m s e l f into the h a n d s o f the multiculturalists, a n d if h e r e n o u n c e s his stand on t h e objectivity o f interests, he c a n n o t explain the e x e m p t i o n in t h e Sikh c a s e , n o r can h e d e f e n d his m o r e general a n t a g o n i s m t o special rights for m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . I shall e x p a n d o n this a little m o r e in the next, a n d final, section. T h e c o n c l u ­ sion o f this section, however, is that egalitarians are u n w i s e to a p p e a l to a p r e institutional distinction b e t w e e n c h o i c e a n d c h a n c e . Such a distinction p r o d u c e s conflicting intuitions even b e t w e e n egalitarians t h e m s e l v e s ; it deflects attention from t h e really i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t s against c o m p e t i n g political p h i l o s o p h i e s (such as l i b e r t a r i a n i s m ) ; a n d in B a r r y ' s case it d o e s n o t even deliver t h e right c o n ­ c l u s i o n s in p r o b l e m cases such as that o f t h e Sikh schoolboy. E g a l i t a r i a n s n e e d to d e c i d e w h e t h e r their real c o n c e r n is t o r e m o v e social o p p r e s s i o n or w h e t h e r it is to extinguish individual luck. T h e y n e e d to d e c i d e w h e t h e r o p p r e s s i o n is t h e s a m e for all a n d t r a n s c e n d s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f cultural m e m b e r s h i p a n d religious c o m m i t m e n t . However, if (with B a r r y ) t h e y d e c i d e that it is, t h e y will b e h a r d p r e s s e d to c o m b i n e that form o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m w i t h c o m m i t m e n t to a p r i n c i p l e of individual responsibility w h i c h c o n s t r u e s o u r p e r s o n a l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g o u r reli­ g i o u s a n d cultural c o m m i t m e n t s , as a m a t t e r o f c h o i c e rather t h a n c h a n c e .

Choice, Chance and Personality I said earlier that I h a d two a i m s in this chapter. T h e first w a s to s h o w that egalitarians are u n w i s e to s u p p o s e that there is a clear, a n d pre-institutional, dis­ tinction b e t w e e n c h o i c e a n d c h a n c e . T h a t a i m p r o v i d e d t h e focus o f t h e p r e v i o u s section. T h e s e c o n d a i m is to s h o w that insofar as egalitarians d o m a k e a dis-

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tinction b e t w e e n c h o i c e a n d c h a n c e , they are u n w i s e to m a k e t h e cut b e t w e e n t h e two at the level o f personality. T h e reason for this is that significant egalitarian a i m s c a n n o t b e realized if the cut is m a d e there. C o n s i d e r the familiar c a s e o f t h e t a m e d h o u s e w i f e . She is s o m e o n e w h o s e lot in life is poor, but w h o is n o n e t h e ­ less c o n t e n t with that lot b e c a u s e she believes it to b e t h e best available to her. She d o e s not envy others, n o r is she dissatisfied w i t h h e r o w n life despite t h e fact that it is a life o f a l m o s t u n r e l i e v e d drudgery. She h a s w h a t is k n o w n in the j a r g o n as ' a d a p t i v e p r e f e r e n c e s ' . T h a t is to say, she has revised her e x p e c t a t i o n s to fit w h a t she believes to b e p o s s i b l e for her. A n d , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , she m a y well b e right a b o u t w h a t is possible for her. W h a t is to b e said a b o u t this w o m a n ? If w e m a k e t h e cut b e t w e e n c h o i c e a n d c h a n c e at t h e level o f p e r s o n a l i t y (as B a r r y d o e s ) , t h e n v e r y little can b e said about her. Insofar as she freely e m b r a c e s h e r beliefs a n d d o e s not regret h a v i n g t h e m , she s e e m s to fall squarely o n the c h o i c e side o f t h e c h o i c e - c h a n c e dis­ tinction. N o w it m i g h t b e replied that t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g to b e said about the t a m e d h o u s e w i f e , a n d that is that s h e h a s m a d e h e r c h o i c e s u n d e r unjust c o n d i ­ tions a n d that therefore it is not, after all, legitimate to expect h e r to b e a r t h e costs. T h i s is certainly o n e w a y o f a p p r o a c h i n g the p r o b l e m , b u t it is n o t o b v i o u s that it is a w a y that is officially o p e n to Barry. T h e r e a s o n s are threefold: first, if h e is to s h o w that politics o u g h t to c o m p e n s a t e for b a d luck, b u t not for free c h o i c e , t h e n h e n e e d s a pre-institutional distinction b e t w e e n c h a n c e a n d c h o i c e . H e n e e d s to s u p p o s e that t h e r e is such a t h i n g as c h a n c e , a n d that the j o b o f politics is to extinguish its effects. B u t that a i m is u n d e r m i n e d b y t h e claim that c h o i c e s m a d e u n d e r unjust c o n d i t i o n s are not really c h o i c e s at all but m o r e like bits o f b a d luck. Second, if h e d o e s m a k e this riposte, t h e n h e r e n e g e s o n his o w n insistence that t h e crucial feature w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r beliefs are a m a t t e r o f c h a n c e or c h o i c e is w h e t h e r t h e agent d o e s or d o e s n o t regret h a v i n g t h e m . T h e t a m e d h o u s e w i f e , j u s t like the religious believer, d o e s n o t regret h a v i n g h e r beliefs. W o u l d it not, then, b e j u s t as offensive to c o m p e n s a t e h e r as it w o u l d b e to c o m p e n s a t e h i m ? Third, if B a r r y m a k e s this riposte, h e r e n o u n c e s t h e distinctively liberal feature o f his a c c o u n t , w h i c h dictates a s t r o n g p r i n c i p l e o f individual responsibility. A t root, t h e difficulty is this: in m a t t e r s o f practical politics, B a r r y is strongly egalitarian a n d strongly universalist. H e believes that m o d e r n societies are ' d i s f i g u r e d ' b y ever i n c r e a s i n g inequalities o f wealth, h e believes that t h o s e inequalities are d a m a g i n g to e v e r y o n e , i n d e p e n d e n t o f their r e l i g i o u s a n d cultural c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d h e believes that a c c o r d i n g special rights to m i n o r i t y g r o u p s will serve only to e x a c e r b a t e t h e situation. L o c k e d in their cultural c o m m u n i t i e s , d e p r i v e d o f a c c e s s to h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , possibly lacking even c o m p e t e n c e in t h e E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e , m e m b e r s o f these g r o u p s are d o o m e d to real a n d increasing p o v e r t y of a sort that c a n n o t b e justified b y m i d d l e - c l a s s invocation o f the value o f ' b e l o n g i n g ' . T h i s is w h a t h e believes, a n d this is t h e r e a s o n h e resists, even fears, special rights for m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . T h a t fear strikes m e as justified.

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However, B a r r y believes a n o t h e r thing, too. If, in m a t t e r s of practical politics, h e is strongly egalitarian a n d strongly universalist, in m a t t e r s o f political p h i l o s o p h y he is also strongly liberal and strongly individualist. H e believes that, as adults, we m u s t take responsibility for those d e c i s i o n s a n d beliefs that w e m a d e freely a n d e n d o r s e freely. W h e n w e c h o o s e to lead a certain k i n d of life, w e also, a n d thereby, c h o o s e to pick u p t h e bill for it. At first blush, these t w o beliefs a p p e a r to b e p l e a s i n g l y c o m p a t i b l e . T h e y a p p e a r to r u l e out special rights for r e l i g i o u s a n d cultural m i n o r i t i e s ( b e c a u s e reli­ g i o u s beliefs are a m a t t e r o f c h o i c e ) w h i l e also justifying redistribution t o t h e dis­ a d v a n t a g e d ( b e c a u s e d i s a d v a n t a g e is a m a t t e r o f c h a n c e ) . T h e a p p e a r a n c e , however, is deceptive a n d its initial plausibility d e p e n d s u p o n an e q u i v o c a t i o n b e t w e e n a form o f egalitarianism that a i m s to r e m o v e objectively identifiable a n d socially i m p o s e d o p p r e s s i o n , a n d a form o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m that a i m s to e x t i n g u i s h t h e effects o f subjectively identified a n d individually e x p e r i e n c e d luck. If w e r e s o l v e t h e e q u i v o c a t i o n in o n e way, then egalitarians can indeed b e m u l t i c u l t u r ­ alists. If w e think that egalitarian politics s h o u l d extinguish t h e effects o f luck, a n d j o i n P a r e k h in c o u n t i n g religious a n d cultural b e l i e f as m a t t e r s o f luck, then w e c a n indeed b e egalitarian multiculturalists. B u t for t h e r e a s o n s B a r r y a d d u c e s , I t h i n k w e s h o u l d b e w a r y o f d o i n g that. I think w e are better a d v i s e d to a d o p t a form o f egalitarian politics that a i m s at t h e r e m o v a l o f objectively identifiable o p p r e s s i o n a n d a c k n o w l e d g e that, in m a n y c a s e s , that will involve the denial o f special rights to m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . Connectedly, it will require that w e not take p e o p l e ' s subjective a s s e s s m e n t s o f their o w n lives as definitive, a n d n o t e n d o r s e the c l a i m that ' p e o p l e are r e s p o n s i b l e for their p r e f e r e n c e s w h e n e v e r they are c o n t e n t with t h e m ' . T h e s e are high costs, not least b e c a u s e they cast d o u b t o n t h e liberal credentials o f liberal egalitarianism: the m o r e willing liberals are to w e a k e n the c o n d i t i o n s o f p e r s o n a l responsibility, the less plausible is their c l a i m to b e liberal at all. However, if t h e alternative is to e n d o r s e B a r r y ' s c l a i m that w e are r e s p o n s i b l e for t h o s e beliefs w e d o not regret h a v i n g , then the p r o s p e c t s for a g e n u i n e l y egalitarian society s e e m slender, a n d p r o b l e m s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m t h r o w this fact into stark relief. It h a s not b e e n m y intention h e r e to defend o p p r e s s i o n e g a l i t a r i a n i s m against luck egalitarianism. A l t h o u g h m y h u n c h is that t h e m o v e to luck e g a l i t a r i a n i s m w a s a m i s t a k e , I have n o p r o o f o f that, n o r even an a r g u m e n t in d e f e n c e o f it. Rather, m y intention has simply b e e n to s u g g e s t that, insofar as luck egalitarian­ ism a i m s to e l i m i n a t e the effects o f c h a n c e w h i l e leaving p e o p l e r e s p o n s i b l e for the c h o i c e s they m a k e , it faces serious, a n d p e r h a p s fatal, objections. If I a m right a b o u t that, t h e n w e m i g h t be forced to return to a form o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m that focuses o n o p p r e s s i o n a n d h a s little to say a b o u t the distinction b e t w e e n c h o i c e a n d c h a n c e . We m i g h t , b u t there again, w e m i g h t not. It m a y b e that there is, after all, a way o f r e n d e r i n g luck e g a l i t a r i a n i s m consistent w i t h a c o m m i t m e n t to the objectivity o f flourishing. All I h a v e a t t e m p t e d to s h o w h e r e is that, if there is s u c h a way, B r i a n B a r r y d o e s n o t p r o v i d e it.

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Note I am grateful to audiences at the Open University, the University of Oxford and the University of York, where earlier versions of this paper were delivered, and to David Held, Paul Kelly, Catriona McKinnon, Matt Matravers and David Owen, who provided extremely helpful written comments on earlier drafts.

References Anderson, E. 1999: What Is the Point of Equality? Ethics, 109 (2): 287-337. Barry, B. 1991: Chance, Choice and Justice. In Liberty and Justice: Essays in Political Theory 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 142-58. 2001: Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity). Cohen, G. A. 1989: The Currency of Egalitarian Justice. Ethics, 99 (3): 9 0 6 ^ 4 . Kymlicka, W. 2001: The New Debate Over Minority Rights. In Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 17-38. Nozick, R. 1974: Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell). Parekh, B. 2000: Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Rawls, J. 1971: A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

3 Liberalism, Equal Opportunities and Cultural Commitments David Miller

T h e p r i n c i p l e o f equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y stands at the v e r y h e a r t o f c o n t e m p o r a r y liberalism. A liberal society m u s t , a m o n g other t h i n g s , b e o n e that gives each o f its m e m b e r s an equal c h a n c e to get w h a t they w a n t out of life. But that loosely f o r m u l a t e d claim c o n c e a l s a host o f a m b i g u i t i e s a n d difficulties that c o m e b u b ­ b l i n g to the surface w h e n w e ask, as B r i a n B a r r y d o e s in Culture and Equality, w h a t equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y s h o u l d m e a n in a multicultural society. I shall b e g i n b y setting cultural q u e s t i o n s t e m p o r a r i l y aside in an a t t e m p t to pin d o w n t h e m e a n i n g , or m e a n i n g s , of t h e p r i n c i p l e itself. T h e n I shall a s k h o w cultural c o m ­ m i t m e n t s can b e b r o u g h t into the p i c t u r e . 1

1. Equality of Opportunity: Meaning and Limits E q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y is often u s e d in political d e b a t e in a relatively n a r r o w sense to refer to access to p o s i t i o n s o f a d v a n t a g e . G i v e n that there are scarce g o o d s such as w e l l - p a i d careers a n d p l a c e s at t o p universities - scarce in t h e sense that m o r e p e o p l e w a n t to have t h e s e g o o d s than there are g o o d s to g o r o u n d equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y obtains w h e n p e o p l e can c o m p e t e for t h e s e g o o d s on equal t e r m s . T h a t i m p l i e s that a c c e s s to the g o o d s in q u e s t i o n d e p e n d s only o n relevant features o f individuals such as talent a n d effort, a n d not o n circumstantial fea­ t u r e s such as c o m i n g from a wealthy family or a t t e n d i n g a p a r t i c u l a r t y p e o f s c h o o l . T h e r e is o f c o u r s e c o n t i n u i n g d e b a t e about w h e r e this line s h o u l d b e d r a w n - o n w h a t s h o u l d c o u n t as a relevant feature d e t e r m i n i n g a c c e s s a n d w h a t s h o u l d c o u n t as an irrelevant c i r c u m s t a n c e . B u t the u n d e r l y i n g i m a g e is of a fair race in w h i c h all the r u n n e r s c o m p e t e o n e q u a l t e r m s , so that at t h e e n d t h e p r i z e s g o to those w h o are s i m p l y the fastest.

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L i b e r a l s also believe in equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y in a w i d e r s e n s e , however. Liberal societies are m a d e u p o f individual p e o p l e w i t h a m y r i a d o f different a i m s a n d a m b i t i o n s in life, a n d as far as possible they s h o u l d afford e a c h p e r s o n an equal c h a n c e to realize those a m b i t i o n s . T h u s not only the q u e s t i o n o f h o w g o o d s are to b e distributed b u t also t h e q u e s t i o n w h i c h g o o d s are c r e a t e d or p r o d u c e d in t h e first p l a c e is relevant h e r e . O n e o f the c h i e f liberal d e f e n c e s o f t h e m a r k e t e c o n o m y consists in t h e o b s e r v a t i o n that m a r k e t s r e s p o n d in t h e right k i n d of w a y to individual a i m s : if I w a n t to eat cherries a n d you w a n t to eat p e a r s , a wellfunctioning m a r k e t should b r i n g it a b o u t that e a c h o f us h a s the o p p o r t u n i t y in question. A parallel a r g u m e n t can b e m a d e w h e n g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s are supplied b y t h e state. S u p p o s e that for o n e r e a s o n or a n o t h e r sports facilities a r e publicly p r o v i d e d . E q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y entails that j u s t as footballers get a c c e s s to foot­ ball p i t c h e s , so s h o u l d s q u a s h players get access to c o u r t s a n d skaters to ice rinks. T h e r e are o f c o u r s e p r o b l e m s o f relative cost h e r e , a n d I shall return to t h e s e shortly. But a b s t r a c t i n g from t h e s e c o m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e m o m e n t , a g o v e r n m e n t that w a n t e d to give sports fans equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y w o u l d l o o k to s e e h o w m a n y i n t e n d e d to participate in e a c h sport a n d t h e n p r o v i d e facilities in p r o p o r ­ tion to d e m a n d . It w o u l d b e unfair to favour footballers, say, o n t h e g r o u n d s that a n y o n e w a n t i n g to play sport c o u l d a n d s h o u l d take u p football. Liberal equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y m e a n s r e s p o n d i n g in an e v e n - h a n d e d w a y to the a i m s a n d a m b i ­ tions that p e o p l e actually h a v e . A further r e q u i r e m e n t o f equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y in this w i d e r sense is that as far as p o s s i b l e t h e costs p e o p l e h a v e to b e a r in o r d e r to take a d v a n t a g e o f an o p p o r t u n i t y s h o u l d b e e q u a l i z e d . T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t is difficult to c o m p l y w i t h fully, b u t o n t h e other h a n d few w o u l d j u d g e that equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y h a d b e e n a c h i e v e d if t h e r e w e r e wilful disregard o f relative costs. For i n s t a n c e , if a g o v ­ e r n m e n t h a s to d e c i d e w h e r e t o site t h e national football s t a d i u m , o n e i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n is that it s h o u l d b e a c c e s s i b l e at a r e a s o n a b l e cost in t i m e a n d m o n e y from different p a r t s o f the country. Ideally, it s h o u l d b e centrally l o c a t e d so that t h e s e costs are e q u a l i z e d as far as p o s s i b l e . Equally, if t h e n a t i o n a l theatre c o m p a n y p u t s o n plays exclusively in the capital a n d never tours the p r o v i n c e s , this w o u l d b e a violation of equal o p p o r t u n i t y t o enjoy the arts, given the feasi­ bility a n d cost o f travelling u p to see a show. T h e fact that a r g u m e n t s a l o n g these lines are frequently v o i c e d s u g g e s t s that t h e implicit n o t i o n o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s is cost-sensitive in the w a y I h a v e indicated. 2

For liberal equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y to obtain, therefore, a society m u s t p r o v i d e a w i d e r a n g e o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s , in line w i t h its m e m b e r s ' a i m s a n d a m b i t i o n s , it m u s t try to e n s u r e that t h e costs involved in t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of t h e v a r i o u s o p p o r ­ tunities are equalized, a n d in cases o f scarcity it m u s t e n s u r e that t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for a d v a n t a g e s is c o n d u c t e d on fair t e r m s . S i n c e t h e s e are d e m a n d i n g c o n d i t i o n s , I s h o u l d also say s o m e t h i n g a b o u t w h a t equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y d o e s not require. First, it s h o u l d be o b v i o u s e n o u g h that o p p o r t u n i t i e s to t r e s p a s s on other p e o p l e ' s legitimate a i m s a n d a m b i t i o n s are not g o i n g to c o u n t as p a r t o f the r a n g e . If I a m to h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to practise m y religion, y o u c a n n o t have the o p p o r -

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tunity t o p r e v e n t m e from p r a c t i s i n g a religion o f w h i c h you d i s a p p r o v e . W h e r e t h e relevant lines are to b e d r a w n is a controversial q u e s t i o n , but it s h o u l d b e clear that w h e r e a i m s a n d a m b i t i o n s c o m e into direct conflict t h e y c a n n o t all b e satis­ fied, a n d an i n d e p e n d e n t criterion h a s to b e b r o u g h t in to d e c i d e w h i c h o n e s are g o i n g to c o u n t as legitimate. M o r e generally, a liberal society will w i s h to restrict o p p o r t u n i t i e s w h o s e exercise w o u l d be d a m a g i n g to t h e interests o f its m e m b e r s , w h e t h e r directly or indirectly, as for instance w o u l d b e the case with activities that d a m a g e the natural e n v i r o n m e n t . So equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y d o e s n o t m e a n that e v e r y o n e s h o u l d have an equal c h a n c e to realize their a i m s n o m a t t e r w h a t their a i m s h a p p e n to b e . It applies only to goals a n d a m b i t i o n s that a r e n o t inher­ ently h a r m f u l to others - that i m p i n g e o n others only b e c a u s e r e a l i z i n g t h e m requires r e s o u r c e s that are typically in short supply. Second, a p e r s o n ' s o p p o r t u n i t i e s have to b e j u d g e d at s o m e suitably c h o s e n starting point, since each decision that is m a d e to avail o n e s e l f o f an opportunity, or n o t to d o so, is likely to affect t h e o p p o r t u n i t y set at a later point. For e x a m p l e , a p e r s o n w h o d e c i d e s to leave school at sixteen c a n n o t later c o m p l a i n that she w a s d e n i e d the o p p o r t u n i t y to g o to university, if by staying o n at school she c o u l d have a c h i e v e d that goal. B y t h e s a m e t o k e n , a p e r s o n w h o s e b u d g e t allows h i m to p u r c h a s e either a R e n a u l t or a Ford, a n d w h o c h o o s e s the R e n a u l t , h a s t h e n c l o s e d off t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to b u y a Ford for the foreseeable future, b u t this is n o t a restriction o f o p p o r t u n i t y in the sense that c o u n t s ( w h a t does count, however, is t h e fact that this p e r s o n h a s a s m a l l e r o p p o r t u n i t y set overall t h a n s o m e o n e w h o can b u y b o t h a R e n a u l t a n d a F o r d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ) . T h e liberal ideal, then, is that initial o p p o r t u n i t y sets s h o u l d b e e q u a l , n o t n e c e s s a r i l y o p p o r t u n i t y sets at s o m e later t i m e w h e n c h o i c e s have a l r e a d y b e e n m a d e . 3

Third, the p r i n c i p l e o f equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y g o v e r n s t h e way social institu­ tions b r o a d l y c o n c e i v e d o p e n or close o p p o r t u n i t i e s for different p e o p l e . B u t m y o p p o r t u n i t i e s also d e p e n d on w h a t o t h e r p e o p l e can d o a n d w a n t to d o . In c o m ­ petitive situations, m y o p p o r t u n i t i e s will b e r e d u c e d if t h e r e are m o r e p e o p l e w i t h b o t h the ability a n d t h e desire to fill the p l a c e or take t h e j o b that I a m a i m i n g for. In o t h e r cases, t h e costs o f t a k i n g u p an o p p o r t u n i t y will d e p e n d o n the pref­ e r e n c e s a n d t h e b e h a v i o u r o f other p e o p l e . In the e x t r e m e case, an o p p o r t u n i t y m a y d i s a p p e a r altogether if n o t e n o u g h p e o p l e are w i l l i n g to c o l l a b o r a t e to k e e p it o p e n . M y o p p o r t u n i t y to play football closes if t w e n t y - o n e others c a n n o t be found to m a k e up a g a m e . B u t this d o e s n o t fall w i t h i n t h e a m b i t o f t h e princi­ p l e as I u n d e r s t a n d it. (If, o n the o t h e r hand, the r e a s o n for their u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o play is the h i g h cost of hiring a pitch, a n d this is institutionally d e t e r m i n e d , t h e n equal o p p o r t u n i t y issues c o m e b a c k into the picture.) It follows that the b r o a d characterization of equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y w i t h w h i c h I b e g a n - o p p o r t u n i t i e s are equal w h e n each p e r s o n has the s a m e c h a n c e to get w h a t they w a n t out o f life - n e e d s refinement. O n t h e o n e hand, it is not e n o u g h that e v e r y o n e s h o u l d have the s a m e o p p o r t u n i t y set r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e c o n t e n t o f that set: that c o n d i t i o n w o u l d b e satisfied in a society that only p e r m i t t e d t h e p l a y i n g o f football, so long as e v e r y o n e h a d a c h a n c e t o play. O p p o r t u n i t y sets

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h a v e to b e sensitive to t h e a i m s a n d a m b i t i o n s that p e o p l e actually have. O n t h e other hand, it is not n e c e s s a r y that e v e r y o n e s h o u l d be equally successful in a c h i e v i n g their a i m s . A p e r s o n ' s d e g r e e o f s u c c e s s can legitimately d e p e n d o n their o w n abilities - think o f s o m e o n e w h o s e a m b i t i o n is to r u n 100 m e t r e s in ten s e c o n d s , in a society that is g e n e r o u s in p r o v i d i n g athletics t r a c k s - and o n the cost o f realizing their a i m s , w h e r e the cost is a function o f (say) natural scarcity - t h i n k o f s o m e o n e w h o s e a m b i t i o n is to a m a s s a large collection o f Impressionist p a i n t i n g s . T h i s s e c o n d p o i n t u n d e r l i n e s the difference b e t w e e n equality o f o p p o r ­ t u n i t y and equality o f o u t c o m e . W h e r e t h e line b e t w e e n t h e m s h o u l d b e d r a w n , however, is a disputed question. We find p e o p l e d i s a g r e e i n g a b o u t w h i c h factors can and c a n n o t legitimately affect s o m e o n e ' s c h a n c e s o f realizing their a i m s . T h i s d i s a g r e e m e n t will e m e r g e later in t h e chapter, w h e n w e e x a m i n e w h e t h e r cultural c o m m i t m e n t s can b e seen as i m p e d i m e n t s to equality o f opportunity. Let m e c o n c l u d e these o p e n i n g r e m a r k s w i t h t w o m o r e general o b s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t liberalism a n d equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y as laid out a b o v e . L i b e r a l i s m is often said to b e g r o u n d e d in the idea o f equal respect for p e r s o n s . T h i s idea is h a r d to pin d o w n , but insofar as w e can give it a c o n c r e t e s e n s e , it i m p l i e s m o r e than equality o f opportunity. In particular, it r e q u i r e s that p e o p l e should n o t b e forced to act in w a y s that c o n t r a v e n e their c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y h e l d beliefs. So if, for instance, s o m e o n e h a s religious beliefs that p r o h i b i t her from eating certain food, or t a k i n g part in military c o m b a t , t h e n there is a very strong p r e s u m p t i o n that she s h o u l d not b e m a d e to d o t h e s e t h i n g s . T h e relevance of this to m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m s h o u l d b e o b v i o u s : in a multicultural society, r e s p e c t i n g p e o p l e equally i n c l u d e s r e s p e c t i n g their cultural c o m m i t m e n t s , a n d this g r o u n d s not only t h e positive c l a i m that t h e y s h o u l d have an equal c h a n c e to live the k i n d o f life that their culture p r e s c r i b e s , but t h e negative c l a i m that they s h o u l d not be m a d e subject to legal or o t h e r r e q u i r e m e n t s that w o u l d force t h e m to violate t h o s e c o m m i t m e n t s . 4

S o in o n e respect liberalism r e q u i r e s m o r e than equality o f opportunity, i m p o r ­ tant t h o u g h that p r i n c i p l e is. In a n o t h e r respect, however, it m a y require s o m e ­ t h i n g less. Liberals n e e d to b e c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a liberal society can r e m a i n stable over t i m e , in the sense that its m e m b e r s r e m a i n c o m m i t t e d to p r e s e r v i n g it, a n d c o m m i t t e d to settling their differences in w a y s that are c o n s i s t e n t with liberalism itself (not t r a m p l i n g o n the rights or interests of m i n o r i t y g r o u p s , for instance). To achieve this, citizens are likely to n e e d to share not only political p r i n c i p l e s b u t also s o m e w i d e r cultural v a l u e s : I have a r g u e d at s o m e length e l s e w h e r e that a s h a r e d s e n s e o f nationality is an essential p r e c o n d i t i o n for d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s t o w o r k effectively a n d for citizens to s u p p o r t the institutions a n d policies that deliver social j u s t i c e (Miller 1 9 9 5 ; 2 0 0 0 : ch. 4 ) . T h e r e is s o m e d i s p u t e a b o u t h o w ' t h i c k ' t h e s e shared cultural values n e e d to b e . All I w a n t to say h e r e is that liberal societies m a y justifiably favour t h o s e cultural v a l u e s that in any given p l a c e play this s u p p o r t i n g role. For instance, it is n o t w r o n g to favour the national l a n g u a g e or l a n g u a g e s w h e n d e s i g n i n g e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m s or o t h e r public institutions, even if this limits t h e o p p o r t u ­ nities o f those w h o s e native t o n g u e s are different. Liberals s h o u l d s e e k to a c c o m 5

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m o d a t e the m i n o r i t y cultures in cases like this, but they n e e d not a i m for strict equality. In the r e m a i n d e r o f the c h a p t e r I shall set these qualifications aside in o r d e r to focus on equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y itself. In a society w h e r e p e o p l e h a v e differ­ ent cultural c o m m i t m e n t s , w h a t is a liberal w h o believes in equality o f o p p o r t u ­ nity c o m m i t t e d to d o i n g ? H o w far m u s t law a n d public policy b e n d to a c c o m m o d a t e t h o s e differences?

2. Culture and Opportunity To get these q u e s t i o n s into clearer focus, i m a g i n e a culturally h o m o g e n e o u s society that h a s a c h i e v e d equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y - it h a s found an institutional structure that gives e v e r y o n e an equal c h a n c e to realize their a i m s a n d a m b i t i o n s , in the sense j u s t defined - a n d c o n s i d e r the effect o f that society's b e c o m i n g m u l ­ ticultural, w h e t h e r b y i m m i g r a t i o n or in s o m e other way. W h y m i g h t equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y n o longer o b t a i n ? To a n s w e r that, s o m e t h i n g m u s t b e said a b o u t w h a t a culture is - a notoriously h a r d c o n c e p t t o define. Let us say provisionally that a culture exists w h e n a g r o u p of p e o p l e share a distinctive c o n c e p t i o n a b o u t h o w life o u g h t to be lived, a n d e m b o d y that c o n c e p t i o n in s h a r e d p r a c t i c e s that they e n g a g e in. T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f h o w life o u g h t to b e lived can b e m o r e or less c o m ­ p r e h e n s i v e . At o n e e x t r e m e we find certain religious cultures w h o s e p r e c e p t s tell their a d h e r e n t s h o w to b e h a v e pretty m u c h t h r o u g h o u t their w a k i n g lives; at the other e x t r e m e w e have, for instance, m u s i c a l cultures that are e m b o d i e d in p r a c ­ tices that their m e m b e r s e n g a g e in only d u r i n g leisure t i m e . However, a culture as I u n d e r s t a n d it m u s t be m o r e than a shared taste or preference. T h e fact that lots o f p e o p l e enjoy w a t c h i n g football is n o t b y itself e n o u g h to m a k e u s s p e a k about football culture. T h a t exists only w h e n fans b e g i n to d e v e l o p rituals, s y m b o l s , e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t h o w o t h e r fans o u g h t to b e h a v e and so forth. D r a w i n g that distinction is i m p o r t a n t , b e c a u s e it reveals that a culture m a k e s t w o k i n d s of i m p a c t o n its a d h e r e n t s . O n t h e one hand, it e n d o w s certain activ­ ities and e x p e r i e n c e s w i t h value - it m a k e s r e l i g i o u s o b s e r v a n c e or w a t c h i n g foot­ ball a valuable activity in a w a y that they w o u l d not be for n o n - a d h e r e n t s - b u t on t h e o t h e r it i m p o s e s certain constraints. T h e s e constraints can b e either direct or indirect. T h e y are direct if the culture c o n t a i n s n o r m s that p r o h i b i t m e m b e r s from e n g a g i n g in certain activities. R e l i g i o u s cultures provide a m u l t i t u d e o f e x a m p l e s , b u t I believe that any culture, s i m p l y by virtue o f the fact that it values certain activities, m u s t also contain implicit n o r m s d e b a r r i n g m e m b e r s from b e h a v i n g in w a y s that w o u l d u n d e r m i n e those activities (to take a trivial e x a m p l e , football culture involves identifying with a t e a m a n d that o f c o u r s e prohibits you from c h e e r i n g for the o p p o s i t i o n ) . Indirect constraints are also i m p o r t a n t , however. B e c a u s e y o u m u s t d o certain t h i n g s if y o u are to e n g a g e in t h e culture at all, you are p r e v e n t e d from d o i n g o t h e r things that w o u l d o c c u p y t h e s a m e p e r i o d o f t i m e or m a k e c o m p e t i n g d e m a n d s on y o u r p o c k e t . A religious believer

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m a y find that p r o p e r o b s e r v a n c e takes up a significant part o f t h e day. O f c o u r s e , any taste or preference h a s o p p o r t u n i t y costs, in t h e sense that in the c o u r s e o f satisfying it you are u s i n g r e s o u r c e s that c o u l d o t h e r w i s e be u s e d to satisfy s o m e other preference. But in the c a s e o f cultures, you m a y not be free to d e c i d e the level o f y o u r involvement, b e c a u s e the relevant n o r m s o f b e h a v i o u r are shared n o r m s . R e l i g i o u s services usually have a b e g i n n i n g a n d an end, a n d believers are usually e x p e c t e d to stay for the duration. A n d even football culture h a s its r o u ­ tines, w h i c h m a y involve m o r e than j u s t a t t e n d i n g the g a m e s . To b e really part o f it, y o u m a y n e e d to b e in the p u b b e f o r e h a n d and afterwards. A r m e d w i t h that u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f culture, let us return to t h e q u e s t i o n w h y i n t r o d u c i n g cultural diversity into a previously h o m o g e n e o u s society m i g h t have an impact o n equality o f opportunity. Following the a r g u m e n t o f t h e last p a r a ­ g r a p h , it c o u l d d o so in two w a y s . First, b e c a u s e a d h e r e n t s o f the i n c o m i n g culture attach value to different pursuits a n d practices, existing p a t t e r n s o f state s u p p o r t m a y turn o u t t o b e unfairly b i a s e d against t h e m . S u p p o s e the n e w culture is o n e in which baseball h a s a high profile, w h e r e a s cricket a n d tennis r e c e i v e state s u b ­ sidies u n d e r p r e s e n t policy. Or, to take w h a t m a y turn out to b e a m o r e serious c a s e , s u p p o s e that c h u r c h e s a n d s y n a g o g u e s enjoy favourable t r e a t m e n t u n d e r the existing tax r e g i m e , b u t m o s q u e s d o not. T h e n it s e e m s p r i m a facie that if the i n c o m i n g culture is I s l a m i c , its m e m b e r s will n o t enjoy equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s w i t h C h r i s t i a n s a n d J e w s . W h e t h e r this is i n d e e d the c a s e will require further investi­ gation, but it a p p e a r s at least that for equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y to be restored in the n e w situation, public policy m u s t c h a n g e so that t h e distinctive cultural prefer­ e n c e s o f t h e i n c o m i n g g r o u p are treated on a p a r with the equivalent preferences o f the established c o m m u n i t y . Second, m e m b e r s o f the i n c o m i n g g r o u p m a y face constraints that d o not apply to other m e m b e r s o f t h e society in question. T h i s is o f c o u r s e not a p r o b l e m w h e r e the c o n s t r a i n t s are simply inherent in the culture in question. It is n o failure o f equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y that J e w s c a n n o t eat p o r k w h i l e others can. T h e p r o b l e m arises w h e n cultural n o r m s intersect with the legal o r other n o r m s o f the w i d e r society in such a way that t h e g r o u p faces c o n s t r a i n t s over a n d above t h o s e inher­ ent in the culture itself. S u p p o s e that the society p r o h i b i t s k o s h e r b u t c h e r y : then t h e constraint faced by O r t h o d o x J e w s on the eating o f n o n - k o s h e r m e a t t u r n s into a c o n s i d e r a b l y m o r e o n e r o u s constraint o n t h e eating o f m e a t in any form. O r s u p p o s e that t h e culture i m p o s e s a dress c o d e that p r e v e n t s m e m b e r s from b e i n g e m p l o y e d in a significant r a n g e o f j o b s . T h e s e are e x a m p l e s o f h o w the impact o f direct constraints can be magnified by existing social n o r m s . T h e effect o f indi­ rect constraints can also b e magnified: I noted a b o v e h o w a culture that involves extensive religious o b s e r v a n c e will close off other o p p o r t u n i t i e s to its a d h e r e n t s , b u t in a multicultural society this m a y m e a n , for e x a m p l e , that they have n o c h a n c e o f regular e m p l o y m e n t in m a i n s t r e a m j o b s . It s e e m s again that equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y b e c o m e s m o r e d e m a n d i n g u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of cultural diversity. This a p p e a r a n c e m a y be challenged, however. Indeed, Barry's b o o k can b e seen as a sustained challenge to t h e line o f a r g u m e n t sketched in the foregoing p a r a -

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g r a p h s about equal opportunities a n d cultural diversity. For it is o n e o f Barry's central contentions that opportunities have to be assessed independently o f the dis­ positions o f cultural g r o u p s to take a d v a n t a g e o f t h e m . A c c o r d i n g to Barry, there is a critical distinction ' b e t w e e n limits on the r a n g e o f opportunities o p e n to p e o p l e a n d limits on the choices that they m a k e from within a certain range of o p p o r t u ­ n i t i e s ' (CE: 37). A t t a c k i n g Parekh's claim that o p p o r t u n i t y is ' s u b j e c t - d e p e n d e n t ' in the sense that ' a facility, a resource, or a course of action is j u s t a m u t e and passive possibility and not an opportunity for an individual if she lacks the c a p a c ­ ity, the cultural disposition, or the n e c e s s a r y k n o w l e d g e a n d resources to take a d v a n t a g e o f it' (Parekh 2 0 0 0 : 2 4 1 ) , B a r r y argues that an opportunity is 'an objec­ tive state o f affairs'. For e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r a ship's c r e w has the o p p o r t u n i t y to leave the h a r b o u r d e p e n d s entirely o n the w i n d s and the tide, a n d not at all on t h e cultural dispositions or other such subjective features o f the crew (CE: 3 7 ) . W h i c h o f these starkly o p p o s e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f o p p o r t u n i t y is c o r r e c t ? N e i t h e r will d o as it s t a n d s . To b e g i n w i t h Barry, h i s position relies o n an artifi­ cially s i m p l e e x a m p l e . In the c a s e o f a sailing ship, especially, it m a y i n d e e d b e a s i m p l e a n d objective m a t t e r w h e t h e r it is feasible for the ship to leave h a r b o u r at a given t i m e , or not. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y to leave is o n e thing, t h e s a i l o r s ' c h o i c e w h e t h e r or not to take a d v a n t a g e o f it another. B u t n o w c o m p l i c a t e t h e story j u s t a little by s u p p o s i n g that at low tide there are reefs j u s t o u t s i d e the h a r b o u r wall that w o u l d g r o u n d and d a m a g e t h e ship, t h o u g h a skilful c r e w will s u c c e e d in a v o i d i n g t h e m three t i m e s in four. D o e s the o p p o r t u n i t y to leave at low tide still exist? Clearly it d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r a one-in-four c h a n c e o f serious d a m a g e to the vessel c o u n t s as a cost that is g r e a t e n o u g h that n o r e a s o n a b l e c r e w w o u l d attempt to leave u n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d in order to settle that w e n e e d to a p p e a l to ' s u b j e c t i v e ' features o f h u m a n b e i n g s generally, including their d e g r e e o f risk aversion. T h e q u e s t i o n is not w h e t h e r a particular c r e w d e c i d e s to try to leave the h a r b o u r at low tide; that c r e w m a y prove either to be foolhardy or to b e u n d u l y fearful. T h e q u e s t i o n is whether, given w h a t w e k n o w in general a b o u t h u m a n interests a n d h u m a n psychology, the p r o s p e c t i v e cost o f leaving is suffi­ cient to deter a r e a s o n a b l e person. T h e o p p o r t u n i t y to d o X, in o t h e r w o r d s , is not j u s t t h e physical possibility o f d o i n g X. At the very least, it is the possibility of d o i n g X w i t h o u t i n c u r r i n g e x c e s ­ sive costs, or the risk o f such costs. S u p p o s e that students have to pay the full costs o f their h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n - there is n o s y s t e m o f s c h o l a r s h i p s , g r a n t s or l o n g - t e r m loans - but that p a r e n t s o f m o d e s t m e a n s could pay t h e s e costs by r e m o r t g a g i n g their h o m e s ( s o m e t h i n g that the p a r e n t s in question turn out to be e x t r e m e l y reluctant to d o ) . S h o u l d w e say that the o p p o r t u n i t y to enter higher e d u c a t i o n still exists for the students in q u e s t i o n , o n the g r o u n d s that there is a possible c o u r s e o f action that w o u l d allow t h e m to d o this? P r e s u m a b l y w e s h o u l d not: the financial obstacle they face is sufficiently high that the o p p o r t u n i t y is blocked. Saying this p r e s u p p o s e s a j u d g e m e n t , n a m e l y that the costs a n d risks involved in e x t e n d i n g a h o u s e m o r t g a g e by an a m o u n t large e n o u g h to fund the costs of a university e d u c a t i o n are such as to deter a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n o n a

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m o d e s t i n c o m e . T h e j u d g e m e n t w o u l d b e s u p p o r t e d b y o b s e r v i n g h o w the major­ ity o f p e o p l e b e h a v e w h e n faced with the c h o i c e ; it w o u l d n o t be u n d e r m i n e d by t h e fact that a few p e o p l e turn out to be willing to take the risk. O p p o r t u n i t i e s are not, then, ' o b j e c t i v e ' in t h e s t r o n g physicalist sense s u g ­ g e s t e d b y B a r r y ' s original ship e x a m p l e . A r e they then ' s u b j e c t - d e p e n d e n t ' in the w a y that P a r e k h indicates? N o t entirely. B a r r y is clearly right w h e n h e argues that w e m u s t d r a w a distinction b e t w e e n h a v i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y and h a v i n g the c u l ­ tural disposition, or m o r e generally the preferences, that w o u l d lead o n e to take a d v a n t a g e o f it. J e w s h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o eat p o r k : w h a t p r e v e n t s t h e m is s i m p l y their b e l i e f that it w o u l d b e w r o n g to d o so. I have the o p p o r t u n i t y to g o g r e y h o u n d r a c i n g : my c h o i c e not to d o so reflects a c o n v e n t i o n a l m i d d l e - c l a s s cultural b a c k g r o u n d in w h i c h g r e y h o u n d r a c i n g d o e s not feature. B u t these are n o t the k i n d o f e x a m p l e s that P a r e k h h a d in m i n d w h e n h e m a d e his s o m e w h a t i n c a u t i o u s s t a t e m e n t a b o u t opportunity. A s his n e x t s e n t e n c e b u t o n e indicates, he is t h i n k i n g o f cases like that o f a Sikh w h o w i s h e s to send his son to a school that b a n s t h e w e a r i n g of t u r b a n s . In such a c a s e , s h o u l d w e say that the boy has t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to g o t o the s c h o o l , or n o t ? T h e crucial feature o f this c a s e , d i s t i n g u i s h i n g it from t h e t w o cited above, is that Sikh culture d o e s n o t in itself prevent or d i s c o u r a g e the boy from a t t e n d i n g t h e school in question. W h a t Sikh culture d o e s , let us a s s u m e for t h e m o m e n t , is t o r e q u i r e t h e w e a r i n g o f t u r b a n s , a n d t h i s , t a k e n in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e s c h o o l ' s n o - t u r b a n policy, is w h a t creates the obstacle. T h e r e is s o m e d i s p u t e a b o u t w h e t h e r t u r b a n - w e a r i n g is strictly a religious or m e r e l y a c u s t o m a r y r e q u i r e m e n t for S i k h s , b u t let's s u p p o s e that either w a y n o t w e a r i n g t h e t u r b a n w o u l d m e a n that the b o y in q u e s t i o n w a s e x c l u d e d from t h e p r a c t i c e s o f t h e c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h he h a d b e e n raised, that he w a s o s t r a c i z e d b y n e i g h b o u r s , a n d so forth. T h e s e costs are sufficiently g r e a t that, b y parity o f r e a s o n i n g w i t h t h e h i g h e r edu­ cation e x a m p l e given a b o v e , t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to attend t h e school is effectively b l o c k e d . P a r e k h gives us the right answer, despite his m i s l e a d i n g reference to 'cultural d i s p o s i t i o n s ' . W h a t r e m o v e s the o p p o r t u n i t y to attend t h e school in q u e s ­ tion is not that the boy lacks t h e ' c u l t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n ' to attend, b u t that h e h a s cultural c o m m i t m e n t s that are inconsistent with the a c c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s i m p o s e d by the school.

3. Responsibility for Cultural Commitments T h i s answer, however, can b e c h a l l e n g e d from several different directions, and e x p l o r i n g t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s gets us to the h e a r t o f t h e d e b a t e a b o u t equal oppor­ tunities and cultural c o m m i t m e n t s . O n e c h a l l e n g e takes the following form. We a g r e e that t h e i d e a o f opportunity, a n d m o r e b r o a d l y equality o f opportunity, m u s t b e cost-sensitive. If t a k i n g a c o u r s e o f action i m p o s e s h e a v y costs on an agent, it is not in t h e relevant sense an o p p o r t u n i t y o p e n to her, a n d m o r e o v e r equality o f opportunity, as w e saw earlier, requires that the costs o f the c o u r s e o f action in

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question s h o u l d as far as possible b e e q u a l i z e d a c r o s s a g e n t s . But these costs m u s t be ' r e a l ' costs. We can a g r e e that w i t h d r a w i n g financial s u p p o r t from students in h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n destroys equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s , b e c a u s e finding £ 3 0 , 0 0 0 , say s u p p o s i n g this is w h a t it costs to s u p p o r t a student w i t h fees a n d m a i n t e n a n c e t h r o u g h three years o f university - is for m a n y p e o p l e a prohibitive cost o f an u n d i s p u t e d kind. However, w h e n w e switch to cases that arise specifically as a result o f cultural diversity, t h e costs involved are t h e m s e l v e s d e p e n d e n t on cul­ tural c o m m i t m e n t s that are not o f c o u r s e universally shared. G o i n g to school turb a n l e s s is a major cost for the Sikh b o y only b e c a u s e his cultural c o m m u n i t y h o l d s t h e belief that t u r b a n s m u s t b e w o r n . B u t is there a g e n u i n e difference h e r e ? If w e say that, for t h e r e a s o n s s u g g e s t e d earlier, g o i n g t o school w i t h o u t a t u r b a n is n o t a real option for t h e boy, w e are a p p e a l i n g to the fact that, if you g r o w up in a cultural c o m m u n i t y a n d identify with it, then violating o n e o f the c o m m u n i t y ' s n o r m s in a w a y that will effectively e x c l u d e y o u from further participation in t h e life o f that c o m m u n i t y i m p o s e s u n r e a s o n a b l e costs. T h i s is a j u d g e m e n t that any o f us can m a k e w h a t e v e r o u r p a r t i c u l a r feelings a b o u t t h e c o m m u n i t y in q u e s t i o n . We m i g h t believe that it s h o u l d c h a n g e its p r a c t i c e s : I shall r e t u r n to that q u e s t i o n in a m o m e n t . But given the facts as they n o w stand, a n d given s o m e e l e m e n t a r y k n o w l e d g e of h u m a n p s y ­ c h o l o g y and behaviour, the costs o f b r e a k i n g the n o r m are as ' r e a l ' as the e c o ­ n o m i c costs w e r e in the h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n e x a m p l e . In that c a s e I said that o u r j u d g e m e n t a b o u t o p p o r t u n i t y could b e b a c k e d u p by l o o k i n g e m p i r i c a l l y at t h e way p e o p l e in general b e h a v e , a n d this applies h e r e too. If m o s t S i k h s are u n w i l l ­ ing to attend s c h o o l s that p r o h i b i t t u r b a n s , a n d are p r e p a r e d to send their s o n s to p o o r e r s c h o o l s rather than a b a n d o n t h e n o r m , that is g o o d e v i d e n c e a b o u t the m a g n i t u d e of t h e costs. T h e fact that o n e or t w o m a y r e a c h the o p p o s i t e d e c i s i o n is not decisive here a n y m o r e t h a n it w a s in t h e e d u c a t i o n c a s e . A second, a n d different, c h a l l e n g e a c c e p t s t h e c l a i m a b o u t costs, a n d c o n c e d e s that the Sikh boy d o e s not have t h e opportunity, h e r e a n d now, to a t t e n d his p r e ­ ferred school. But it is then c l a i m e d that this involves n o d e p a r t u r e from e q u a l ­ ity o f opportunity, b e c a u s e it is the result o f a collective c h o i c e , on t h e p a r t o f the Sikh c o m m u n i t y , to insist on t u r b a n - w e a r i n g as o n e of their cultural n o r m s . Recall that equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y d o e s n o t require that e v e r y o n e s h o u l d have t h e s a m e set o f options to c h o o s e from n o m a t t e r w h a t p r i o r c h o i c e s they have m a d e . T h e c h a l l e n g e a p p e a l s to that p r i n c i p l e a n d c h a r a c t e r i z e s cultural c o m m i t m e n t s as collective c h o i c e s for w h i c h m e m b e r s o f the relevant c o m m u n i t i e s can p r o p ­ erly be h e l d responsible. Just as you m a y have the o p p o r t u n i t y to c h o o s e a R e n a u l t or a Ford, but not b o t h , h e r e you m a y have the o p p o r t u n i t y to a d o p t a n d p r a c t i s e a p a r t i c u l a r dress c o d e or have a free c h o i c e o f s c h o o l s , b u t n o t b o t h . Putting t h e c h a l l e n g e a n o t h e r way, a restricted c h o i c e o f s c h o o l s for their offspring is s i m p l y part o f the price that S i k h s m a y r e a s o n a b l y be e x p e c t e d to pay for insisting o n the w e a r i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r style o f h e a d g e a r . O n e t e m p t i n g r e s p o n s e to this c h a l l e n g e is to say that, w h e r e a s individuals can p r o p e r l y b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for their individual p r e f e r e n c e s , it m a k e s n o s e n s e

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to d o this in t h e case o f c o m m u n i t i e s a n d their cultural c o m m i t m e n t s . N o t i o n s o f responsibility s i m p l y d o n o t a p p l y h e r e : cultural c o m m i t m e n t s are g i v e n s , a n d t h e issue is h o w t h e w i d e r society s h o u l d a d a p t t o t a k e t h e m into a c c o u n t . S u c h a r e s p o n s e would, I think, b e m i s g u i d e d . To b e g i n w i t h , there is n o t h i n g in general w r o n g w i t h t h e idea o f collective responsibility. We do h o l d collective g r o u p s r e s p o n s i b l e , b o t h for w h a t t h e y d o to others a n d for w h a t t h e y d o to t h e m s e l v e s . W e d o this o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n that g r o u p s are m a d e u p o f p e o p l e w h o are able collectively to reflect on, d i s c u s s a n d assess their existing v a l u e s a n d c o m m i t ­ m e n t s , so that if t h e y d e c i d e to leave t h e m u n c h a n g e d , it is n o t w r o n g in p r i n c i ­ p l e that t h e y s h o u l d b e a r t h e costs o f d o i n g so. A n d i n d e e d w e k n o w that t h e history of cultures is o n e o f c o n t i n u o u s a d a p t a t i o n w h e r e b y c u s t o m s a n d p r a c ­ tices are m o d i f i e d or even a b a n d o n e d if t h e y n o l o n g e r serve the g r o u p well in t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s it faces. B a r r y is right to p o i n t o u t that w e s h o u l d n o t treat reli­ g i o u s a n d other cultural c o m m i t m e n t s as t h o u g h t h e y w e r e o n a p a r w i t h p h y s i ­ cal disabilities (CE: 3 6 - 7 ) . If s o m e o n e c a n n o t a t t e n d a s c h o o l b e c a u s e its lack o f w h e e l c h a i r r a m p s m a k e s it i m p o s s i b l e for h e r to enter t h e b u i l d i n g , t h e r e is absolutely n o t h i n g she or a n y o n e else outside the s c h o o l c a n d o a b o u t it. T h e Sikh b o y is n o t in that position: his c o m m u n i t y could opt to a b a n d o n t h e w e a r i n g o f t h e t u r b a n . In that light, it is n o t w r o n g to say that Sikhs as a c o m m u n i t y are collectively r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e restricted o p p o r t u n i t i e s that their offspring face. To say o t h e r w i s e w o u l d b e to p o r t r a y t h e m as in t h e grip o f s o m e collective c o m ­ p u l s i o n , u n a b l e to stand b a c k a n d reflect o n t h e cultural n o r m s that t h e y currently embrace. 6

T h e r e is, however, a n o t h e r w a y to r e s p o n d to t h e c h a l l e n g e . T h i s takes us b a c k to m y o p e n i n g r e m a r k s a b o u t equality o f opportunity, w h e r e I said that t h e liberal ideal entailed that t h e state s h o u l d r e s p o n d in an e v e n - h a n d e d w a y to the various a i m s a n d a m b i t i o n s that p e o p l e h a v e . T h e e x a m p l e I u s e d there w a s t h e provision o f s p o r t i n g facilities, in a society w h e r e p e o p l e h a d different p r e f e r r e d sports. We k n o w that, in g e n e r a l , p e o p l e c h o o s e w h i c h sports to take u p a n d p r a c t i s e . S o m e o n e w h o enjoys cricket c o u l d a l m o s t certainly get c o n s i d e r a b l e p l e a s u r e from p l a y i n g b a s e b a l l if, for s o m e reason, h e w a s t r a n s p o r t e d to a society in w h i c h only b a s e b a l l is available. So w h a t w o u l d b e w r o n g w i t h the state d e c i d i n g that in future it w o u l d only s u p p o r t t w o or t h r e e d e s i g n a t e d sports ( p e r h a p s catering for t h e m a i n b r a n c h e s o f s p o r t i n g activity, a n d w i t h transitional a r r a n g e m e n t s so that t h o s e w h o h a d a l r e a d y c o m m i t t e d t h e m s e l v e s to a p a r t i c u l a r sport w o u l d b e allowed to p l a y out their c a r e e r s ) ? C h i l d r e n w o u l d b e e n c o u r a g e d in school to c h o o s e o n e or m o r e o f t h e d e s i g n a t e d sports a n d t h e m e s s a g e w o u l d b e 'it's y o u r responsibility, b u t if y o u w a n t access to d e c e n t facilities y o u ' d better opt for soccer, b a s e b a l l or s a i l i n g ' . T h e answer, o f c o u r s e , is that liberals think p e o p l e should b e free to take u p t h e sport o f their c h o i c e , b e a r i n g in m i n d t h e cost o f d o i n g so a n d t h e n u m b e r o f others likely to share their p r e f e r e n c e , a n d that fairness requires that the state s h o u l d t a k e t h e s e c h o i c e s as givens w h e n it c o m e s to allocating t h e p u b l i c sports b u d g e t . T h e r e m i g h t b e legitimate overriding r e a s o n s for w a n t i n g to influence

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t h e s e c h o i c e s - i m a g i n e that a p a r t i c u l a r sport t o o k a h e a v y toll o n the n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t - b u t in t h e a b s e n c e o f s u c h r e a s o n s s p o r t i n g p r e f e r e n c e s h a v e simply t o b e t a k e n for granted. T h e restrictive p o l i c y o u t l i n e d a b o v e c o u l d n o t b e d e f e n d e d b y saying that e v e r y o n e h a d an e q u a l c h a n c e to take u p o n e o f t h e p r e ­ ferred sports, so if t h e y c h o s e n o t to d o so that w a s their responsibility. B u t this r e a s o n i n g m u s t surely apply, at least p r i m a facie, to cultural c o m m i t m e n t s o f t h e k i n d w e have b e e n discussing. If a society c o n t a i n s a substantial Sikh minority, t h e n insofar as law a n d p u b l i c p o l i c y h a v e an u n e q u a l i m p a c t o n the o p p o r t u n ­ ities available to that minority, fairness r e q u i r e s that these b e c h a n g e d in t h e direc­ tion o f equality. Indeed, o n e m i g h t well t h i n k that t h e r e a s o n i n g a p p l i e s still m o r e strongly in these cases: it is surely m o r e difficult t o c h a n g e one's cultural c o m ­ m i t m e n t s t h a n it is to c h a n g e one's s p o r t i n g p r e f e r e n c e s . S o a l t h o u g h I h a v e dis­ m i s s e d t h e c l a i m that cultural c o m m i t m e n t s are fixed, a n d a r g u e d that it is r e a s o n a b l e to h o l d g r o u p s r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e cultural values that t h e y hold, it is also r e a s o n a b l e to a s s u m e that r a p i d revision o f t h e s e c o m m i t m e n t s w o u l d b e costly, a n d m i g h t even c a u s e t h e g r o u p to disintegrate. T h i s gives us g o o d r e a s o n to t h i n k that an e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y state s h o u l d treat cultural c o m m i t m e n t s as givens w h e n d e c i d i n g a b o u t legislation a n d t h e allocation of p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s . 7

4. Distributing the Costs of Cultural Diversity T h e r e is, however, a further difference b e t w e e n t h e sports c a s e a n d t h e cultural case that m i g h t lead us to m o d i f y that c o n c l u s i o n . G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , i n c r e a s ­ ing t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o play o n e p a r t i c u l a r sport h a s n o w i d e r effects e x c e p t insofar as it involves w i t h d r a w i n g r e s o u r c e s from other activities. If w e start w i t h a h o m o ­ g e n e o u s cricket-playing society into w h i c h b a s e b a l l is t h e n introduced, n o b o d y loses if b a s e b a l l is g r a n t e d p u b l i c s u p p o r t , except cricketers w h o b e f o r e h a n d h a d b e e n enjoying an unfairly large share o f p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s . B u t t h e culture-related issues that have p r o v o k e d t h e p r e s e n t d e b a t e characteristically involve t h e larger society p a y i n g a cost of s o m e k i n d in order to create equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s for cul­ tural m i n o r i t i e s . For i n s t a n c e , to r e t u r n to t h e y o u n g Sikh d e n i e d a c c e s s to his p r e f e r r e d school, w e m u s t a s s u m e that t h e b a n n i n g o f t u r b a n s w a s p a r t a n d p a r c e l o f a school u n i f o r m p o l i c y that w a s seen as generally beneficial to all p u p i l s . W i t h o u t that a s s u m p t i o n , t h e b a n w o u l d p r e s e n t itself m e r e l y as an arbitrary p i e c e o f cultural d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . In other cases the cost m a y b e e c o n o m i c . If m e m b e r s o f a cultural g r o u p cannot, for religious or other r e a s o n s , c o m p l y w i t h t h e r e q u i r e ­ m e n t s o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l w o r k i n g w e e k , so that special a r r a n g e m e n t s h a v e to b e m a d e to give t h e m equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s in e m p l o y m e n t , this m a y i m p o s e a cost o n e m p l o y e r s , w h o h a v e t o k e e p p l a n t r u n n i n g for l o n g e r t h a n t h e y o t h e r w i s e would, or hire additional staff in order to m e e t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f their c u s t o m e r s . T h e s e costs m u s t ultimately fall o n t h e political c o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e . 8

9

B e c a u s e r e s p e c t i n g existing cultural c o m m i t m e n t s m a y i m p o s e costs o n t h e w i d e r society o f t h e k i n d j u s t referred t o , t h e q u e s t i o n arises w h e t h e r cultural

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g r o u p s s h o u l d n o t after all b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e c o m m i t m e n t s that t h e y hold, a n d for m e e t i n g t h e costs that arise from acting o n t h e s e c o m m i t m e n t s . In particular, a l t h o u g h cultural b e l o n g i n g is often a m a t t e r o f p e r s o n a l identity, a n d therefore n o t s o m e t h i n g that individuals c a n r e a s o n a b l y b e e x p e c t e d t o give u p , the p r e c i s e r e q u i r e m e n t s that a given culture i m p o s e s o n its m e m b e r s m a y b e m o r e flexible. D e b a t e w i t h i n t h e culture m a y lead to t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s b e i n g modified. S o , for i n s t a n c e , in countries such as N o r w a y , S w e d e n a n d S w i t z e r l a n d w h e r e t h e ritual slaughter o f a n i m a l s h a s b e e n b a n n e d , m e m b e r s o f t h e J e w i s h a n d M u s l i m c o m m u n i t i e s h a v e r e l a x e d their r e q u i r e m e n t s for m e a t t o b e k o s h e r or halal, so that a n i m a l s that h a v e b e e n a n a e s t h e t i z e d p r i o r to killing can qualify. So why, m o r e generally, s h o u l d cultural c o m m u n i t i e s n o t b e p r e s e n t e d w i t h a c h o i c e : either b e a r t h e costs that follow from c o m p l i a n c e w i t h existing cultural n o r m s , o r r e v i s e t h o s e n o r m s so that t h e costs are d i m i n i s h e d or e l i m i n a t e d altogether? 10

Barry, characteristically, p o s e s this q u e s t i o n in its m o s t p r o v o c a t i v e form w h e n h e c h a r a c t e r i z e s ' c o s t s that arise from m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n s or r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s ' as ' e x p e n s i v e t a s t e s ' , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n b e i n g that as a m a t t e r o f j u s t i c e t h e costs s h o u l d b e b o r n e b y t h o s e w h o h o l d t h e beliefs in q u e s t i o n (CE: 4 0 ) . B u t t h e idea o f e x p e n s i v e tastes only c o m e s into p l a y in c o n t e x t s w h e r e w e a l r e a d y k n o w o n i n d e ­ p e n d e n t g r o u n d s w h a t a fair distribution o f f r e e d o m s , r i g h t s a n d r e s o u r c e s l o o k s like. T h u s , if t h e issue is t h e fair distribution o f m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s , a n d w e h a v e an i n d e p e n d e n t r e a s o n t o t h i n k that m a r k e t p r i c i n g is a fair w a y o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e relative v a l u e o f different c o m m o d i t i e s , t h e n w e c a n say that s o m e o n e w h o h a s a p r e f e r e n c e for h i g h l y p r i c e d g o o d s h a s e x p e n s i v e tastes, a n d s h o u l d either b e p r e p a r e d to a c c e p t a l o w e r level o f preference-satisfaction, or else w o r k o n a c q u i r i n g c h e a p e r tastes. B u t in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t it is p r e c i s e l y t h e p r o p e r dis­ t r i b u t i o n o f f r e e d o m that is at issue. If w e a l r e a d y a s s u m e that t h e ritual s l a u g h ­ ter o f a n i m a l s is n o t s o m e t h i n g that p e o p l e s h o u l d b e free to c a r r y out, t h e n w e c a n if w e c h o o s e characterize t h e J e w i s h a n d M u s l i m b e l i e f in eating k o s h e r a n d halal food as an e x p e n s i v e taste. B u t if o n e t o o k t h e other v i e w a n d c l a i m e d that ritual slaughter, p r o p e r l y c a r r i e d out, is an a c c e p t a b l e w a y o f killing a n i m a l s , a n d therefore a p r a c t i c e that p e o p l e s h o u l d b e free to e n g a g e in, t h e n t h e b e l i e f o f a n i m a l welfarists that such killing is w r o n g w o u l d c o m e to b e s e e n as an e x p e n ­ sive taste. T h e p r o p e r c o n c l u s i o n to d r a w in that c a s e w o u l d b e that t h e a n i m a l welfarists s h o u l d p a y J e w s a n d M u s l i m s to a b a n d o n their d i e t a r y p r a c t i c e s , either b y c h a n g i n g t h e k o s h e r / h a l a l r u l e s as their S c a n d i n a v i a n c o u n t e r p a r t s h a v e d o n e , or b y b e c o m i n g vegetarian. A better w a y to a p p r o a c h t h e q u e s t i o n , however, is to a b a n d o n t h e e x p e n s i v e tastes a p p r o a c h altogether, a n d t o r e c o g n i z e that w h a t is at stake is h o w t h e costs o f cultural diversity s h o u l d b e distributed b e t w e e n t h e various c o m m u n i t i e s that m a k e u p t h e larger society. R e c a l l that w h a t is at stake h e r e is n o t t h e costs that follow directly from cultural c o m m i t m e n t s - n o b o d y is s u g g e s t i n g t h a t J e w s w h o w a n t to eat p o r k or M u s l i m s w h o find a t t e n d i n g e v e n i n g p r a y e r o n e r o u s s h o u l d b e c o m p e n s a t e d for their frustration - b u t the costs that arise w h e n g r o u p s w i t h

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conflicting c o m m i t m e n t s h a v e to live together u n d e r the s a m e legal a n d p o l i c y r e g i m e . O n c e t h e q u e s t i o n is p o s e d in that form, it s e e m s evident that w h a t w e s h o u l d b e a i m i n g for is a fair distribution o f t h e costs, so that e a c h g r o u p is a s k e d either t o c h a n g e its p r a c t i c e s o m e w h a t , or else to b e a r s o m e p a r t o f t h e cost. To p u t s o m e flesh o n t h e s e abstract b o n e s , c o n s i d e r a typical c a s e in w h i c h a cul­ tural m i n o r i t y finds a n established rule - say a dress r e q u i r e m e n t - difficult to c o m p l y w i t h . W e c a n i m a g i n e a d i a l o g u e b e t w e e n representatives o f t h e m i n o r ­ ity a n d representatives o f t h e social majority, w h i c h m i g h t p r o c e e d r o u g h l y as follows. T h e first q u e s t i o n w o u l d b e w h e t h e r t h e r u l e is n e e d e d at all, or w h e t h e r it is m e r e l y a c o n v e n t i o n that m i g h t h a v e suited p e o p l e at s o m e earlier t i m e b u t n o longer h a s any p a r t i c u l a r r a t i o n a l e . In t h e latter case, t h e r e is n o cost t o t h e major­ ity in a b a n d o n i n g the rule a n d t h e solution is evident. N e x t , s u p p o s i n g t h e r u l e t u r n s out to b e a useful o n e , c o u l d it b e modified so that t h e p r o b l e m s facing t h e cultural m i n o r i t y w e r e e a s e d - for i n s t a n c e , to take a s i m p l e case, c o u l d trousers b e w o r n b y w o m e n in p l a c e o f a skirt? O n c e again, an affirmative a n s w e r p r o ­ vides an e a s y solution. B u t n o w s u p p o s e that t h e r u l e c a n n o t b e c h a n g e d , or c a n n o t b e c h a n g e d sufficiently to r e s o l v e the p r o b l e m . T h e n e x t q u e s t i o n m i g h t b e w h e t h e r t h e cultural m i n o r i t y w a s insisting o n t o o rigid an application o f their cultural n o r m s . H e r e , issues s u c h as w h e t h e r a dress c o d e w a s m a n d a t e d o n reli­ g i o u s g r o u n d s , or w h e t h e r it w a s n o w largely a m a t t e r o f cultural tradition, c o u l d p r o p e r l y b e raised. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e m i n o r i t y m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y b e a s k e d to p r o d u c e e v i d e n c e a b o u t t h e status o f t h e c o d e - it w o u l d n o t b e e n o u g h for t h e m to t h u m p t h e table a n d say that t h e y c o u l d n o t a p p e a r in p u b l i c w i t h o u t t h e cloth­ ing or h e a d g e a r at issue. In other w o r d s , t h e majority c a n r e a s o n a b l y t r y to e s t a b ­ lish j u s t h o w costly it w o u l d b e for t h e m i n o r i t y to relax its cultural n o r m s somewhat. S u p p o s e , however, that the cultural c o m m i t m e n t that creates t h e p r o b l e m t u r n s out to b e d e e p l y e m b e d d e d a n d n o t susceptible to revision, in t h e short t e r m at least. T h e n the q u e s t i o n straightforwardly b e c o m e s o n e o f t h e distribution o f costs. H o w m u c h will the majority lose if t h e r u l e is a b a n d o n e d ? Conversely, h o w m u c h o f a b u r d e n d o e s it p l a c e o n t h e m i n o r i t y c o m m u n i t y if their m e m b e r s are, say, e x c l u d e d b y t h e r u l e from t a k i n g o n certain f o r m s o f e m p l o y m e n t ? T h i s m u s t d e p e n d o n h o w m a n y m e m b e r s actually w a n t t o enter t h o s e lines o f w o r k , a n d w h e t h e r there are c o m p a r a b l e alternatives available. T h e r e is n o s u c h t h i n g as a right t o have a particular o p p o r t u n i t y o p e n t o o n e - say, t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to w o r k in o n e p a r t i c u l a r j o b . W h a t m a t t e r s , from t h e e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y p e r s p e c t i v e , is that o p p o r t u n i t y sets s h o u l d as far as p o s s i b l e b e e q u a l i z e d . A n d in a s s e s s i n g t h e s e sets - s o m e t h i n g that can only b e d o n e in a r o u g h - a n d - r e a d y m a n n e r - o n e n e e d s to p a y attention b o t h to h o w m u c h p e o p l e actually w a n t to avail t h e m s e l v e s o f p a r t i c u l a r o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d h o w like or u n l i k e t h e s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s are. It m a t t e r s less that s o m e o n e is p r e v e n t e d b y a r u l e from b e c o m i n g a street-cleaner t h a n that h e is p r e v e n t e d from b e c o m i n g a s u r g e o n , a n d it m a t t e r s less that h e is p r e v e n t e d from b e c o m i n g a n ear s u r g e o n if h e h a s a g o o d c h a n c e to b e c o m e a n eye surgeon.

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B a r r y in fact s e e m s to a c c e p t this b a l a n c i n g o f costs a p p r o a c h w h e n h e dis­ c u s s e s t h e r u l e - a n d - e x e m p t i o n solution - i.e. k e e p t h e rule in p l a c e for the major­ ity, b u t create an e x e m p t i o n for the m i n o r i t y w h o find it b u r d e n s o m e . B u t h e p r e s e n t s this solution as involving a sacrifice o f j u s t i c e in the n a m e o f the utili­ tarian p r i n c i p l e o f alleviating h a r d s h i p . T h e a r g u m e n t I have presented, in c o n ­ trast, is that if o n e b e g i n s w i t h a liberal c o m m i t m e n t to equality o f opportunity, then it is a m a t t e r o f j u s t i c e that the legal a n d p o l i c y r e g i m e s h o u l d as far as p o s ­ sible p r o v i d e p e o p l e w i t h differing cultural c o m m i t m e n t s with equivalent oppor­ tunity sets. If r u l e A p u t s m e m b e r s o f a p a r t i c u l a r cultural g r o u p at a d i s a d v a n t a g e c o m p a r e d with others, w h i l e rule B p u t s t h e m o n all fours w i t h the rest, t h e n j u s t i c e requires rule B, a n d it is n o a d e q u a t e d e f e n c e o f r u l e A that formally speak­ ing it treats every citizen equally. I have m a d e it clear, I h o p e , that cultural c o m ­ m i t m e n t s c a n n o t be taken as fixed - that w h e r e an existing cultural c o m m i t m e n t c l a s h e s w i t h a rule or r e q u i r e m e n t that is i n d e p e n d e n t l y justifiable, o n e o f the q u e s t i o n s that can p r o p e r l y b e a s k e d is h o w difficult it w o u l d b e to m o d i f y the c o m m i t m e n t . But j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s us to w e i g h t h e costs o f this k i n d o f c h a n g e against t h e costs o f c h a n g i n g t h e rule or, w h e r e this is feasible, p r o v i d i n g an e x e m p t i o n for the minority.

5. Conclusion O n e implication o f the position d e f e n d e d h e r e is that equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y c a n n o t b e achieved b y a n a r r o w l y legalistic a p p r o a c h that invites us to begin by identifying the relevant p r i n c i p l e s o f equality, and then simply to p r o c e e d to apply t h e m consistently. Instead, w e m u s t envisage a political p r o c e s s in w h i c h a dia­ logue of the k i n d that I s k e t c h e d above actually o c c u r s in e a c h c a s e w h e r e a cul­ tural g r o u p believes that it is d i s a d v a n t a g e d b y existing law or p r a c t i c e . We cannot tell a priori h o w b u r d e n s o m e t h e g r o u p finds the status q u o , n o r can w e assess h o w realistic it is to ask the g r o u p to c o n s i d e r m o d i f y i n g its o w n n o r m s unless w e e n g a g e in a real discussion w i t h representatives o f t h e g r o u p . B a r r y is, I think, s o m e w h a t sceptical o f this k i n d o f a p p r o a c h , b e l i e v i n g that there will be a ten­ d e n c y for g r o u p representatives to c a p t u r e the issue, a n d to h o l d out for p o s i t i o n s that are m o r e e x t r e m e than t h o s e held by m o s t of t h e m e m b e r s . T h e r e is certainly a d a n g e r h e r e , a n d I a g r e e w i t h B a r r y that w e should n o t b e t e m p t e d by Iris Young's proposal to give g r o u p s a v e t o over issues that they regard as essential to their interests (CE: 3 0 1 - 5 ; Young 1990: ch. 6). B u t I believe that eventually w e have to put o u r trust in d e m o c r a t i c deliberation, and in the incentives it gives to m e m b e r s o f particular g r o u p s to seek for a fair c o m p r o m i s e over issues of t h e kind discussed here." M y c l a i m h e r e is not that equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y should b e defined in t e r m s o f t h e o u t c o m e o f a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e . It r e m a i n s an o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r in any given c a s e d e m o c r a t i c deliberation w o r k s in such a way that w h a t is finally d e c i d e d u p o n treats cultural g r o u p s equally. W h a t I d o w a n t to claim, however, is

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that only d e m o c r a t i c d e b a t e can yield the k i n d o f information that w e n e e d to apply the p r i n c i p l e in a multicultural context, given w h a t h a s b e e n said above a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g o f o p p o r t u n i t y . A c o u r t m i g h t p e r h a p s try to s i m u l a t e such 12

d e b a t e by c o n s u l t i n g d o c u m e n t s w h i c h set d o w n t h e traditions o f p a r t i c u l a r c u l ­ tures, or inviting s p o k e s m e n to give testimony, but this w o u l d be a p o o r substi­ tute for g e n u i n e deliberation w h e r e t h e search for a g r e e m e n t e n c o u r a g e s g r o u p s to reveal j u s t h o w strongly they are c o m m i t t e d to p a r t i c u l a r w a y s o f b e i n g or b e h a v i n g . It also allows q u e s t i o n s o f p u b l i c interest - for instance, t h e health a n d safety i m p l i c a t i o n s o f p a r t i c u l a r cultural p r a c t i c e s - to b e b r o u g h t into c o n s i d e r ­ ation, w h e r e a s a legalistic a p p r o a c h m i g h t focus n a r r o w l y o n t h e issue o f equal t r e a t m e n t even in cases w h e r e a c o n c e r n for equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s n e e d s to b e q u a l ­ ified b y t h e s e w i d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . I a m not in the e n d sure w h e t h e r B a r r y w o u l d d i s a g r e e w i t h this c o n c l u s i o n . For there are p a s s a g e s in Culture and Equality w h e r e he s p e a k s e l o q u e n t l y in favour o f an inclusive d e m o c r a t i c politics, b a s e d o n a s h a r e d sense o f 'civic n a t i o n a l i t y ' , a n d a t t a c k s multiculturalists for s u p p o r t i n g policies that w o u l d u n d e r m i n e a politics o f this kind. B u t such a 'politics of solidarity' can only w o r k successfully if the m e m b e r s o f m i n o r i t y g r o u p s are able to raise issues o f c o n c e r n to t h e m , especially issues h a v i n g to d o with o p p o r t u n i t y - r e s t r i c t i n g laws a n d p o l i ­ cies, a n d feel that their a r g u m e n t s are b e i n g given a fair h e a r i n g . T h a t c a n n o t h a p p e n if t h e majority a d o p t t h e k i n d o f doctrinaire liberalism that B a r r y c o m e s close to d e f e n d i n g e l s e w h e r e in his b o o k , w h i c h says that j u s t i c e is satisfied so long as e v e r y o n e lives u n d e r a u n i f o r m set o f laws a n d other r u l e s , even if t h e s e laws a n d r u l e s i m p o s e g r e a t e r b u r d e n s or restrictions on s o m e t h a n o n o t h e r s . If liberalism o f this k i n d b e c o m e s the r u l i n g creed, there is v e r y little that m i n o r i t y g r o u p s can d o to a d v a n c e their a r g u m e n t s , e x c e p t p e r h a p s in t h o s e c o m p a r a t i v e l y rare cases w h e r e an existing law restricts e v e r y o n e ' s opportunity, a n d so a general appeal to individual freedom gives g r o u n d s for a b a n d o n i n g it. In contrast, I have a r g u e d that a liberalism c o m m i t t e d to equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s m u s t take into a c c o u n t t h e r a n g e o f cultural beliefs a n d cultural c o m m i t m e n t s that are actually p r e s e n t in a given society, a l o n g w i t h o t h e r p r e f e r e n c e s o f a m o r e p r o s a i c k i n d (such as tastes for different sports). H a v i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y t o d o X does n o t m e a n wanting to d o X, b u t it d o e s m e a n b e i n g able to d o X w i t h o u t b e a r i n g excessive costs. S o to establish w h e t h e r equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y obtains, w e d o not have to s h o w that m e m b e r s o f different cultural g r o u p s m a k e identical choices from their o p p o r t u n i t y sets, but w e d o h a v e to s h o w that t h e sets t h e m ­ selves are roughly equivalent, a n d that in turn involves l o o k i n g at the costs attached to t a k i n g u p p a r t i c u l a r o p t i o n s . To get at the costs, w e have to step inside the culture, in order to see, for i n s t a n c e , w h e t h e r a t u r b a n is a religious necessity or m e r e l y a fashion item. W i t h o u t k n o w i n g that, w e c a n n o t tell w h e t h e r a r u l e that p r o s c r i b e s the w e a r i n g o f t u r b a n s is d e e p l y restrictive to S i k h s , or j u s t a m i l d i n c o n v e n i e n c e . O f c o u r s e w e c a n n o t step inside t h e culture in a literal sense. S o o u r liberalism has to m a k e r o o m for political d i a l o g u e in w h i c h g r o u p s a r e able to explain the significance o f p a r t i c u l a r r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d p r o h i b i t i o n s , a n d can

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at t h e s a m e t i m e b e a s k e d h o w far these r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d p r o h i b i t i o n s can b e c h a n g e d , given t h e interests o f the w i d e r society. T h e dialogue h a s to b e t w o - w a y a n d c o n d u c t e d in g o o d faith. S o it is v u l n e r a b l e to the distortions that B a r r y iden­ tifies. B u t since cultures are invariably o p a q u e to o n e a n o t h e r to a g r e a t e r or lesser extent, I can see n o other w a y o f discovering w h a t equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y really r e q u i r e s in a multicultural society.

Notes This chapter has been much improved by the very helpful comments provided by Peter Jones, Paul Kelly and Sue Mendus on an earlier draft, for which I am very grateful. 1. By cultural commitment, I mean a requirement on somebody to be or do (or not be or not do) something that is entailed by his or her participation in a particular culture. I assume, in other words, that if you want to be part of a cultural group G, then this typically entails having to act in certain ways and refraining from acting in other ways. By belonging to or joining G you take on these commitments. I recognize that this way of thinking about cultures is artificial to the extent that in many cases the idea of 'cultural membership' is a very blurred one - there is no sharp division between in­ siders and outsiders, but instead it is possible to position yourself on the fringe of a culture, so to speak. In this chapter I make the simplifying assumption that we can straightforwardly identify who participates in a culture and who doesn't, and what commitments follow from such participation. I say a little more about the meaning of 'culture' itself later. 2. One of the many failings of Britain's ill-fated Millennium Dome was that it was built in an area to the east of London which made travelling to it from most parts of the country both difficult and prohibitively expensive. 3. Whether this inequality in choice sets violates the principle depends in turn on how it has arisen: if the person who can buy both cars earned her higher income, then there is no violation. This highlights the fact that liberal equality of opportunity is not equiv­ alent to equality of outcome. 4. This is not all that equal respect includes. It also includes respecting people as poten­ tially autonomous agents capable of changing their cultural commitments in the light of experience and reflection, so it may also require that people be given access to cul­ tures other than their own to allow this capacity for autonomy to develop. Nonethe­ less, where people identify strongly with one particular culture, inherited or acquired, liberals should respect the commitment that this entails. 5. For the claim that nothing more is needed than allegiance to the constitutional prin­ ciples that underpin the state - so-called 'constitutional patriotism' - see Habermas 1996. For a sceptical appraisal of this position, and an argument that liberal demo­ cracies need stronger ties to hold them together, see Canovan 2000. 6. I have discussed this question at some length in an unpublished paper, 'Holding Nations Responsible'. 7. As I noted in the first section of the chapter, the unequal impact of a law does not violate fairness in cases where the law is designed to prevent harm to others or to the public good. It is not an objection to the law against arson that it has an unequal impact on the opportunities of would-be arsonists. But plainly the action of wearing a turban

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is not harmful in that way. I consider in the next section whether it might still be regarded as costly because it violates a generally beneficial rule. 8. Thus if the sports budget allows for £100 per person to be spent on the provision and upkeep of sports grounds, etc., and 20 per cent of the population convert from cricket to baseball, then if a cricket-only policy is pursued the remaining cricketers will be getting a £125 per head subsidy for their sport. 9. Of course it may in some circumstances be advantageous to have employees who prefer to work unconventional hours - who prefer to work on Sundays than on Fridays, say, and who therefore don't need to be paid special bonuses to do this. So cultural diversity may also reduce economic costs. Nonetheless, the possibility canvassed above is more than merely hypothetical, as the much discussed case of Mr Ahmad the Muslim schoolteacher who insisted on attending mosque on Friday afternoons, reveals. (For reflections on this case, see especially Jones 1994.) 10. This is Barry's claim, following Peter Singer (CE: 35). I have not been able to check the position in Norway or Switzerland, but in Sweden the accommodation appears to have been made by Muslims, but not by Jews, who now rely on imported meat killed in the traditional way. I am grateful to Hans Roth for information on this point. 11. I have defended the view that deliberative democracy can give minority groups a fair chance to promote their interests and concerns in Miller 2000: ch. 9. 12. For a fuller (and critical) discussion of the reasons we might have for thinking that democracy is a privileged procedure for reaching such decisions in a multicultural context, see Jones 1998.

References Barry, B. 2001: Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity). Canovan, M. 2000: Patriotism is Not Enough. British Journal of Political Science, 30: 413-32. Habermas, J. 1996: Citizenship and National Identity. In Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity). Jones, P. 1994: Bearing the Consequences of Belief. Journal of Political Philosophy, 2: 24-43. 1998: Political Theory and Cultural Diversity. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 1: 28-62. Miller, D. 1995: On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 2000: Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity). Parekh, B. 1997: Equality in a Multicultural Society. In J. Franklin (ed.), Equalitv (London: IPPR). 2000: Rethinking Multiculturalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Young, I. M. 1990: Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

4 Defending Some Dodos: Equality and/or Liberty? Paul Kelly

M u c h o f t h e r e c e n t w o r k o n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m in political t h e o r y focuses, natu­ rally e n o u g h , o n q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the identity of cultures a n d their significance for issues o f p u b l i c policy a n d legislation. Multicultural theorists discuss at length the q u e s t i o n o f w h y culture is of v a l u e and w h a t , if any, rights s h o u l d b e afforded to cultures or cultural g r o u p s . T h i s cultural t u r n is also, albeit negatively, reflected in B r i a n B a r r y ' s ruthless dissection o f t h e c l a i m s b e i n g m a d e for cultural g r o u p s b y political theorists a n d b y cultural g r o u p s t h e m s e l v e s in political d e b a t e s and constitutional adjudication. A n o t h e r central c o n c e r n o f thinkers w h o can loosely be d e s c r i b e d as m u l t i ­ culturalists, m o s t notably but n o t exclusively Iris M a r i o n Young, is the nature a n d s c o p e of equality. For t h e s e multiculturalist t h i n k e r s the idea of g r o u p r e c o g n i ­ tion is a result o f t a k i n g equality seriously. For Young a n d N a n c y Fraser, t h e ' c u l ­ tural t u r n ' is driven by a desire t o b r o a d e n a n d extend the s c o p e of egalitarianism b e y o n d t h e confines o f liberal a c c o u n t s o f equality o f opportunity. It is in this s e n s e that they differ from liberal egalitarian multiculturalists s u c h as Will K y m l i c k a a n d not s i m p l y in their a c c o u n t o f cultural g r o u p s . It is also for this reason that m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is not a single s c h o o l o f t h o u g h t but, rather, a loose confederation of thinkers, s o m e of w h o m are m o r e properly ' c u l t u r a l i s t s ' and others egalitarians. Young's m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m follows from egalitarianism j u s t as m u c h as B a r r y w o u l d c l a i m that liberalism follows from egalitarianism. T h e d e b a t e b e t w e e n Young a n d B a r r y is m o s t clearly a d e b a t e b e t w e e n t w o v i e w s o f w h a t egalitarianism entails. It is as central to m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m as a r e the d e b a t e s a b o u t the relative merits o f g r o u p beliefs a n d p r a c t i c e s . It is also m o r e central to B a r r y ' s critique o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , b e c a u s e the ultimate plausibility o f his a r g u ­ m e n t that respect for equality and respect for culture are fundamentally i n c o m ­ patible d e p e n d s on the s c o p e and c h a r a c t e r o f egalitarianism.

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W h e r e a s Young ( 1 9 9 0 ) is c o n c e r n e d w i t h respect for g r o u p identity, it is liberty that l o o m s large in B a r r y ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f egalitarianism, as equality o f o p p o r t u ­ nity a n d this idea o f liberty is not m e r e l y the distribution o f rights o f exit from v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s that give rise to liberty as self-determination. Instead, as B a r r y ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f the rights o f p a r e n t s over their children's e d u c a t i o n s h o w s (CE: 2 3 8 - 4 9 ) , his c o n c e p t i o n o f liberty also c o n t a i n s a s t r o n g e r c o n c e p t i o n o f ' i n d i v i d u a l i t y ' w h i c h is similar to J. S. Mill's idea o f ' m a n as a p r o g r e s s i v e b e i n g ' . W h a t this clearly d e m o n s t r a t e s is that a l t h o u g h B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t is egalitarian, it is at the s a m e t i m e strongly liberal egalitarian. In this c h a p t e r I w a n t to a d d r e s s the w a y this affects B a r r y ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e c l a i m s o f Young a n d h e r m o r e robustly egalitarian r e s p o n s e to the p r o b l e m o f cultural difference a n d its social a n d economic consequences. I shall a t t e m p t to p r o v i d e a partial defence o f Young's a r g u m e n t against Barry. I should, however, point out that in d o i n g this I a m n o t s u g g e s t i n g that Young is one o f the d o d o s o f m y title, w h i c h n e e d s d e f e n d i n g . M y c o n c e r n is not s i m p l y with the n a r r o w l y textual issue o f w h e t h e r B a r r y has been fair to Young, b u t with the m o r e substantive issue o f d e f e n d i n g h e r claim for equality o f o u t c o m e s a n d r o u g h g r o u p proportionality. In so d o i n g , I will a r g u e that she c a n n o t avoid attach­ ing priority to equality o f opportunity, b u t I will also a r g u e that s o m e o f B a r r y ' s critique o f h e r position b e g s t h e q u e s t i o n a n d that in t e r m s of o u t c o m e s their respective p o s i t i o n s are closer than B a r r y a d m i t s . Finally, I w i s h to d r a w from this defence of Young a defence o f r o u g h g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y w h i c h w o u l d entail ' d e f e n d i n g s o m e d o d o s ' but will s h o w that this strategy is less s y m p a t h e t i c to g r o u p e x c e p t i o n a l i s m t h a n s o m e multicultural g r o u p s want. T h i s c h a p t e r offers a defence of Young a n d h e r c h a l l e n g e to t h e costs a n d limitations of a n a r r o w l y liberal egalitarianism - a liberal egalitarianism that is m a r k e d by the l o n g s h a d o w o f J. S. Mill. A s such, it leaves out o f t h e a c c o u n t m u c h that is central to h e r p o s i ­ tion that I d o n o t w i s h to defend h e r e , n o r d o I think that w e should a c c e p t e v e r y ­ thing. T h a t said, w e s h o u l d b e less h a s t y in d i s m i s s i n g w h a t Young b r i n g s t o t h e debate b e t w e e n culture a n d equality.

1. Equality of Outcomes and Equality of Opportunity In a wonderfully cruel a n d suggestive dismissal o f Young's claim for g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y in distributions, B a r r y relates w h a t h e calls the D o d o ' s d i c t u m (derived from t h e C a u c u s R a c e in L e w i s Carroll's Alice in Wonderland) which is ' E v e r y b o d y h a s w o n , a n d all m u s t have p r i z e s ' (CE: 9 5 ) . Young's c o n c e r n w a s that despite policies of equal opportunity, certain g r o u p s r e m a i n d i s p r o p o r ­ tionately unsuccessful in o b t a i n i n g s o m e g o o d s or social p o s i t i o n s . W h a t this s u g g e s t s to Young is that t h e traditional c o n c e r n o f distributive j u s t i c e with issues o f equality of o p p o r t u n i t y n e e d s to b e r e p l a c e d by a politics o f difference ( 1 9 9 0 : 1 5 - 3 8 ) . O n this v i e w g r o u p s d e t e r m i n e a n d define their o w n identities a n d issues o f j u s t i c e are t r a n s f o r m e d into issues o f g r o u p recognition a n d self-

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d e t e r m i n a t i o n . H e r solution is that w e a d o p t a p r i n c i p l e o f g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as the first step to dealing w i t h such issues, b e c a u s e it is only w h e n o t h e r w i s e o p p r e s s e d g r o u p s are p r o p o r t i o n a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d that it will b e possible to c o n ­ struct fair n o r m s o f inclusion to deal w i t h real injustices. B y such a t r a n s f o r m a ­ tion, w e refocus from issues o f access to o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d g o o d s and b e c o m e m o r e s y m p a t h e t i c to t h e i d e a o f e q u a l i z i n g o u t c o m e s . E q u a l i t y o f r e c o g n i t i o n , w h i c h is Young's a c c o u n t o f ' m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' , r e q u i r e s a m o r e r o b u s t c o m m i t ­ m e n t to equality than B a r r y ' s equality o f opportunity, a n d is m o r e sensitive to issues o f g r o u p d i s a d v a n t a g e familiar in feminist theory. A key strand o f B a r r y ' s r e s p o n s e to Young focuses on issues o f j o b distribu­ tion a n d t h e likely c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a p p l y i n g a s y s t e m o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y to t h e distribution of j o b s , such as brain s u r g e r y (CE: 9 0 - 8 ) . A t an intuitive level his a r g u m e n t is h a r d to contest: all o u r intuitions t e n d t o w a r d s s u p p o r t i n g the idea o f a c a d e m i c m e r i t a n d individual skill a n d dexterity as t h e sole relevant criteria for t h e distribution of j o b s in this field. O u r intuitions are right. T h e criteria a p p r o ­ priate for distributing s u c h skilled j o b s are n o t group-specific, t h u s w e s h o u l d n o t i m p o s e group-specific criteria o n t h e distribution o f g o o d s or allocation o f j o b s . In this c a s e B a r r y ' s logic is faultless a n d Young's a r g u m e n t looks b i z a r r e . B u t h a s B a r r y b e e n entirely fair in his criticism? I w o u l d s u g g e s t not. F u r t h e r m o r e , this m a t t e r s for it o b s c u r e s g o o d r e a s o n s w h y a m o r e o u t c o m e - o r i e n t a t e d egalitarian­ ism m i g h t b e a p p r o p r i a t e in l o o k i n g at issues o f j u s t i c e .

2. Barry and Equality of Opportunity B o t h B a r r y a n d Y o u n g are p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h issues of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f a m o r e o v e r r i d i n g c o n c e r n for social j u s t i c e . B a r r y is, b y his o w n a c c o u n t , in t h e R a w l s i a n c a m p , favouring s o m e variant o f fair equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y as t h e solution to q u e s t i o n s o f social j u s t i c e . T h e task o f the liberal egalitarian political theorist is to e x p o u n d and d e f e n d a distributive p r i n c i p l e that identifies a set o f rights and benefits that m a k e s possible fair equality o f oppor­ tunity. O n c e t h e baseline o f liberal egalitarianism is adopted, t h e n t h e o u t c o m e s are indifferent to t h e liberal. It is n o p a r t o f t h e liberal's c o n c e r n that certain g r o u p s will suffer d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in c a r e e r s or the distribution o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s as long as these o u t c o m e s result from a fair distribution o f rights a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Indeed, given that liberty is distributed as the p r i m a r y c o m ­ p o n e n t o f liberal egalitarianism, then t h e exercise o f that liberty h a s to allow indi­ v i d u a l s to p e r f o r m differently in t e r m s o f o u t c o m e s . S o m e p e o p l e m a y c h o o s e to surf others to cultivate their g a r d e n s a n d others still to devote their t i m e to e d u ­ cation a n d training. E a c h option m i g h t well h a v e a value from the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the ' M i l l i a n ' idea o f ' e x p e r i m e n t s in l i v i n g ' , but w h e t h e r it d o e s or not is irrele­ vant to the liberal egalitarian. T h e crucial p o i n t is that as long as o u t c o m e s v a r y o n t h e basis o f individual liberty within a j u s t distribution o f rights a n d o p p o r t u ­ nities, this is a neutral m a t t e r and o f n o c o n c e r n to the liberal. T h e idea o f e q u a l -

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ity o f rights a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s gives rise to a version o f strict equality, w h e r e e a c h m e m b e r of society can g e n u i n e l y enjoy a certain equal distribution with all others in that society (CE: 9 5 ) . T h e issue o f distribution is unaffected by the relative subjective value of this set o f b a s i c rights and o p p o r t u n i t i e s across m e m b e r s o f the s a m e society. It m i g h t well be the c a s e that an A m i s h family m a y attach little value to t h e civil a n d political rights a n d liberties p r e s c r i b e d b y liberal egalitari­ a n i s m a n d that B u d d h i s t m o n k s m i g h t attach little or n o value to the level o f e c o ­ n o m i c benefits distributed, b u t in b o t h cases that has n o b e a r i n g o n the p r i n c i p l e of distribution. T h e a r g u m e n t s for B a r r y ' s position are not d e v e l o p e d at length in Culture and Equality, but are e x p l o r e d in a various other w r i t i n g s , a n d are the familiar cur­ rency o f liberal egalitarian w r i t i n g s o n equality. Interestingly, B a r r y attaches n o great w e i g h t to issues o f responsibility in t h e w a y that m a n y egalitarians follow­ ing R o n a l d D w o r k i n have ( 1 9 8 1 a a n d b). For Barry, responsibility is m e r e l y the o u t c o m e o f the exercise o f free c h o i c e in t h e context o f an initially fair distribu­ tion. It d o e s not involve t a k i n g any v e r y substantial m e t a p h y s i c a l view a b o u t indi­ vidual freedom a n d d e t e r m i n i s m , or the n a t u r e o f the m o r a l subject. Equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is given priority w i t h i n B a r r y ' s egalitarianism b e c a u s e the pursuit o f equality o f o u t c o m e s w o u l d result in the frustration o f individual liberty a n d the c o n s e q u e n t denial o f incentives that are n e c e s s a r y to sustain an a d e q u a t e overall level o f e c o n o m i c w e l l - b e i n g . T h i s is not t o r e d u c e B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t to a utili­ tarian o n e , but m e r e l y to a c k n o w l e d g e that his egalitarianism identifies equality as a distributive principle for a variety o f g o o d s a n d rights w h i c h can be u s e d in ways that differ, t h u s resulting in o u t c o m e inequality. T h i s o u t c o m e inequality is c o n s t r a i n e d by the n e e d for a rectification p r i n c i p l e to m a i n t a i n a fair b a s e l i n e for s u b s e q u e n t g e n e r a t i o n s given that n o society is ever static. Within this s c h e m e , g r o u p s h a v e s t a n d i n g only insofar as they fall within t h e s p h e r e o f individual choice a n d freedom o f association. T h e r e is n o special obligation to a c k n o w l e d g e the c l a i m s o f cultural g r o u p s as such, h e n c e B a r r y ' s r o b u s t d i s m i s s a l o f the m a i n c l a i m s o f m o s t multiculturalists.

3. Young and Outcome Equality Young's radical egalitarianism is d i s m i s s i v e o f liberalism's n a r r o w focus on e q u a l ­ ity of opportunity. A s a l r e a d y n o t e d a b o v e , h e r a r g u m e n t is b a s e d o n a politics o f difference w h i c h c h a l l e n g e s the so-called distributive p a r a d i g m at t h e heart o f liberal political theories (Young 1990). In so d o i n g , she is a t t a c k i n g t h e suffi­ c i e n c y o f o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism o f t h e sort defended b y Barry. However, h e r a r g u m e n t for g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d h e r critique o f o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism take her t h e o r y b e y o n d t h e confines o f simple d e b a t e b e t w e e n herself a n d n e o R a w l s i a n s such as Barry. Indeed, a careful r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f h e r a r g u m e n t s h o w s that in certain respects B a r r y and Young are a r g u i n g past each other b y a d d r e s s ­ ing different issues. M y s u g g e s t i o n is that this e x p l a i n s w h y equality o f o p p o r t u -

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nity as B a r r y c o n c e i v e s it a n d o u t c o m e egalitarianism as Young p u r s u e s it n e e d not b e in such direct conflict. T h e r e are t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s o f Young's a r g u m e n t that I w i s h to c o n s i d e r in d e f e n d i n g the plausibility o f h e r version o f o u t c o m e equality. T h e s e c o n c e r n the n a t u r e o f g r o u p s , o u t c o m e equality a n d the idea o f g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in c o n ­ structing e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s .

Social groups and cultural groups Multiculturalist theories w i s h to p r o v i d e an a c c o u n t o f cultural g r o u p s that dis­ t i n g u i s h e s t h e m from o t h e r k i n d s o f g r o u p s that are not to be afforded the s a m e level o f recognition. A cultural g r o u p is not like a v o l u n t a r y association, such as a g o l f c l u b , n o r is it an interest g r o u p , nor, a c c o r d i n g to a multiculturalist t h e o ­ rist such as Parekh, is it a g r o u p o f p e o p l e s h a r i n g a similar lifestyle ( 2 0 0 0 : 150). C u l t u r e s involve richly t e x t u r e d p r a c t i c e s that p r o v i d e t h e c o n t e x t for practical deliberation in a c o m m o n f o r m o f life. T h e y p r o v i d e the l a n g u a g e , s y m b o l s a n d rules within w h i c h we n a v i g a t e , w h a t e v e r t h e c o m m o n p u r p o s e is that c o n n e c t s u s w i t h i n a culture. N o t e v e r y c o m m o n p u r s u i t is, or gives rise to, a culture. W h e r e a s multiculturalist theorists such as P a r e k h are c o n c e r n e d primarily ( t h o u g h not exclusively) with the ' c u l t u r e s ' o f i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t i e s in p o l y e t h n i c societies, a n d K y m l i c k a a n d Tully w i t h t h e c l a i m o f first n a t i o n s a n d aboriginal p e o p l e s ( K y m l i c k a 1995: 3 5 ; Tully 1995: 1-30), Young's c o n c e r n is with social g r o u p s a n d n o t directly w i t h cultures. Social g r o u p s include, but are n o t solely identified with, cultural g r o u p s . It is clear that Young w i s h e s h e r c o n c e p t i o n o f social g r o u p s to b e m u c h m o r e inclusive a n d flexible t h a n o t h e r multiculturalist theorists, w h o w i s h to privilege a certain k i n d o f g r o u p over others t h r o u g h special p r o t e c t i o n . T h e k i n d s of social g r o u p Young h a s in m i n d are t h o s e b a s e d o n gender, race a n d ethnicity, a l t h o u g h she also i n c l u d e s religion a n d culture as b a s e s o f social g r o u p s ( 1 9 9 0 : 4 3 ) . T h e s e g r o u p s derive their identity from c o m m o n p r a c t i c e s a n d w a y s o f life a n d from external r e c o g n i t i o n a n d identification. G r o u p identity is n o t s h a p e d b y the self-conscious a d o p t i o n o f p r a c t i c e s b u t rather by social recognition on b e h a l f o f other social g r o u p s . In the c a s e o f t h o s e social g r o u p s that a r e m o s t i m p o r t a n t t o Young - n a m e l y t h o s e defined a r o u n d g e n d e r a n d race - identity is not s h a p e d b y any c o m m o n characteristic b u t rather b y the recognition o f a c o m m o n history and social status. T h i s d o e s n o t give social g r o u p s a v e r y d e t e r m i n a t e character; indeed, in t h e c a s e o f g e n d e r a n d race, t h e y s e e m to b e little m o r e t h a n c e n s u s categories, b u t this is intentional for Young rather than an oversight, as the p o i n t is not to give t o o rigid a definition w h i c h m i g h t set h a r d b o u n d a r i e s a r o u n d g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p . Similarly, a l t h o u g h subjective identification h a s a role in h e r a c c o u n t o f social g r o u p s , it is not always necessary. In the case o f race, for e x a m p l e , a p e r s o n ' s identity as a m e m b e r o f a social g r o u p is fixed b y t h e w a y others see that p e r s o n . Social g r o u p s are not t h e s a m e as v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s (Young 1990: 4 6 ) . T h e significance o f social g r o u p s is n o t that they are i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e o f the diver-

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sity o f their substantive p r a c t i c e s a n d forms o f life. In real life there are m a n y social g r o u p s w h i c h are constituted b y only v e r y thin c o m m o n a l i t i e s of practice. A n d p e r s o n a l identity is s h a p e d by t h e c o m p l e x overlap o f g r o u p identities. R a c e , for e x a m p l e , m a y involve little, if a n y t h i n g , o f significance in t e r m s o f c o m m o n p r a c t i c e s , yet it m i g h t prove a very s t r o n g tie a n d s o u r c e o f identity a m o n g s t those w h o o t h e r w i s e share this ascription, s i m p l y b e c a u s e o f t h e w a y it is u s e d by o t h e r s . T h a t is the i m p o r t a n t p o i n t for Young, a n d it is o b s c u r e d by B a r r y ' s partial p r e ­ sentation o f h e r position. If c o m m o n culture f o r m s t h e basis o f social g r o u p s , then w e d o indeed have the p r o b l e m a t i c idea o f e x p l a i n i n g precisely w h a t k i n d o f culture is shared, for e x a m p l e , by t h e disabled in the United K i n g d o m . O n this, B a r r y is n o d o u b t right to a r g u e that there is p r e c i o u s little to the idea o f such a culture. B u t Young g o e s o n to a r g u e that social g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p c a n b e c o n ­ stituted by c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e . In this sense, o n e c o u l d plausibly c o n s t r u c t a case to show that the disabled d o , or certainly did, share a c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e . It is also in this sense, as I have suggested, that race and g e n d e r constitute g r o u p iden­ tities, despite t h e a b s e n c e o f a culture as a discrete set of authoritative practices. G r o u p s are at the centre o f Young's a c c o u n t of g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n as t h e basis of injustice. It is for this reason that she focuses o n p r o p o r t i o n a l g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a ­ tion as an indicator o f injustice rather t h a n as an issue o f opportunity. W h a t m a t t e r s for the d e f e n c e o f Young against t h e p r o p o n e n t s of equality o f o p p o r t u ­ nity is that h e r c o n c e p t i o n o f social g r o u p s , a n d therefore g r o u p proportionality, is not confined to a relatively static identity such as A m i s h ' . T h u s , to c h a l l e n g e h e r idea o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y a n d o u t c o m e equality b y focusing o n g r o u p s such as t h e A m i s h is m i s l e a d i n g . W h i l s t Young's a c c o u n t o f g r o u p s m i g h t be t o o inclusive a n d require h e r to m i x in c o m p a n y she n e e d n o t k e e p , h e r c o r e idea o f social g r o u p s is far less d u b i o u s than B a r r y s u g g e s t s , a n d this is i m p o r t a n t for her defence o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y a n d o u t c o m e equality.

From social groups to outcome equality B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t against Young's c l a i m for g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y u s e s t h e e x a m p l e o f j o b distribution to illustrate t h e irrelevance o f group-specific criteria in the distribution o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s . T h e key h e r e is the distribution o f fair e q u a l ­ ity o f opportunity, a l l o w i n g all suitably qualified p e o p l e to gain a c c e s s to the rel­ evant o p p o r t u n i t i e s . If this is satisfied, t h e n t h e issue o f g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o u g h t to b e irrelevant, since the c h a r a c t e r o f a profession, trade, craft or w o r k task will simply reflect t h o s e w h o c h o o s e to enter a n d have the relevant skill. If that s h o u l d turn out to b e m i d d l e - a g e d w h i t e m a l e s , that is an indifferent m a t t e r for B a r r y a n d equal o p p o r t u n i t y theorists. Young's a r g u m e n t , o n the other hand, is that there should be s o m e r o u g h g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y in t h e distribution o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d j o b s - that is, equality o f o u t c o m e s across g r o u p s , t h o u g h not b e t w e e n indi­ v i d u a l s . T h i s s u g g e s t s t h e i d e a o f q u o t a s a n d affirmative action p r o g r a m m e s . W h y d o e s Y o u n g a r g u e for g r o u p proportionality, w h i c h d o e s s e e m t o s u p p o r t B a r r y ' s idea of t h e ' D o d o ' s d i c t u m ' , n a m e l y that ' E v e r y b o d y h a s w o n , a n d all

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m u s t h a v e p r i z e s ' ? H e r e I t h i n k w e c a n see t h a t B a r r y a n d Y o u n g are a r g u i n g for two v e r y different things. Young is clearly s u s p i c i o u s o f t h e e a s e w i t h w h i c h equal o p p o r t u n i t y theorists s u g g e s t that b y r e m o v i n g o b s t a c l e s for entry to careers, p r o f e s s i o n s a n d j o b s t h e issue o f j u s t distribution can b e solved. Similarly, she is objecting to t h e t e n d e n c y o f political p h i l o s o p h y to see issues o f injustice s i m p l y in t e r m s o f t h e easily r e c tifiable a b s e n c e o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s as a c c e s s rights. H e r intuition, w h i c h leads to h e r p r e f e r e n c e of equality of o u t c o m e s , is that, given t h e b r o a d c h a r a c t e r of social g r o u p s s u c h as r a c e a n d gender, w e s h o u l d expect to see b r o a d l y similar d i s ­ tributions of representation across the distribution o f social g o o d s i n c l u d i n g j o b s , a n d that t h e a b s e n c e of s u c h g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is indicative o f g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n . B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t is t h e o p p o s i t e : even given fair equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y w e s h o u l d not e x p e c t to see b r o a d g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y b e c a u s e interest a n d ability are r a n d o m l y distributed a n d this is j u s t a fact o f life. For Young, equality o f o u t c o m e , interpreted as b r o a d g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y in distribution, is t h e desired end o f a social p o l i c y o f distribution, since this w o u l d m a k e evident t h e t r a n s c e n d e n c e o f g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n a n d d i s e m p o w e r m e n t . In t h e a b s e n c e of such g r o u p proportionality, w e s h o u l d b e c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e c a u s a l ­ ity of u n e q u a l o u t c o m e s . H e r e , it s e e m s to b e B a r r y rather t h a n Young w h o helps h i m s e l f to cultural a r g u m e n t s to e x p l a i n t h e a b s e n c e o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in t h e distribution o f c a r e e r s a n d other p o s i t i o n s o f responsibility (CE: 9 7 ) . B a r r y is k e e n that w e s h o u l d c h a l l e n g e Young's c o n c e r n a b o u t differ­ ential g r o u p o u t c o m e s a n d h e s u g g e s t s , w i t h a n u m b e r o f e x a m p l e s , w h y this s h o u l d not trouble us. Indeed, he m a k e s m u c h o f t h e irrelevance o f statistical vari­ ations b e t w e e n g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s unless w e can u n c o v e r s o m e g e n u i n e causal structure o f o p p r e s s i o n . Statistical variations b e t w e e n g r o u p s are neutral from the p o i n t o f v i e w o f social j u s t i c e , t h u s they reveal u n e q u a l o u t c o m e s that have n o political significance. However, w e m i g h t c o n s i d e r this r e s p o n s e rather hasty a n d s u g g e s t that it d e p e n d s on w h i c h g r o u p s w e are talking a b o u t a n d what k i n d o f social history is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h that g r o u p . Clearly, B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t gains plausibility from the relative a b s e n c e o f r o c k e t scientists, theoretical physicists a n d brain s u r g e o n s a m o n g s t t h e old o r d e r A m i s h . T h i s is a c a s e in w h i c h bur­ d e n s o m e g r o u p p r a c t i c e s inevitably explain the a b s e n c e o f g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d equal o u t c o m e s . However, if w e look at r a c e a n d g e n d e r t h e issue b e c o m e s m o r e c o m p l e x . Young's c l a i m is that the p r e s e n c e o f persistent a b s e n c e s of sig­ nificant social g r o u p s from social roles m i g h t b e c o n s i d e r e d as p r i m a facie indica­ tive o f g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n . W h e r e B a r r y is inclined to see such o u t c o m e s as b e n i g n u n l e s s there is e v i d e n c e to the contrary, Y o u n g is p e r s u a d e d that the existence o f g r o u p differences is precisely w h a t n e e d s justification. For Young, equal o u t c o m e s form the b a s e l i n e against w h i c h d e p a r t u r e s a r e j u d g e d . U n d e r l y i n g h e r a r g u m e n t is t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r g e n d e r a n d race (for e x a m p l e ) p r o v i d e g o o d r e a s o n s for differential c h o i c e s a n d abilities. Given the historical t r e a t m e n t o f w o m e n a n d b l a c k s in w e s t e r n societies, w e s h o u l d be s u s p i c i o u s o f a s s u m i n g that any lack o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y has a b e n i g n explanation.

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B a r r y defends the implausibility o f f o c u s i n g o n statistical u n d e r representation b y c l a i m i n g that equal o u t c o m e s in t e r m s o f g r o u p p r o p o r ­ tionality require b o t h the equal g r o u p profiles o f t h e relevant professional a n d educational qualifications a n d the s a m e distribution o f ' a c h i e v e m e n t - o r i e n t a t e d d i s p o s i t i o n s ' (CE: 9 4 ) . H e r e , t h e p o i n t is that w e c a n n o t take g r o u p s seriously if w e a s s u m e that they m u s t h a v e t h e s a m e a c h i e v e m e n t dispositions as well as educational qualifications. T h e p r o b l e m with this c l a i m is that it b e g s t h e q u e s ­ tion. For the actual distribution of e d u c a t i o n a l a n d professional qualifications will certainly d e p e n d on t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e society a n d will reflect b o t h m a t e r i a l a n d r e g u l a t o r y o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d o b s t a c l e s . T h i s c a n n o d o u b t be a c c o m m o d a t e d w i t h i n B a r r y ' s a p p r o a c h b y the a d o p t i o n o f a liberal egalitarian b a s e l i n e o f fair equality, b u t that o f c o u r s e d o e s n o t o b t a i n in any society a n d d o e s n o t even a p p e a r to b e a p p r o x i m a t e d in liberal w e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s . If w e c a n n o t a s s u m e that exist­ ing societies d o even a p p r o x i m a t e the fair egalitarian b a s e l i n e o f liberal t h e o r i e s o f j u s t i c e , t h e n t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n b e c o m e s h o w far c a n w e a s s u m e t h e extent o f difference in t e r m s o f a c h i e v e m e n t d i s p o s i t i o n s ? T h e fact that different social g r o u p s d o reflect different, a n d p e r h a p s even culturally constituted, a c h i e v e m e n t dispositions d o e s n o t give s t r o n g s u p p o r t for t h e rejection o f g r o u p proportionality. It is at best a fact that reflects t h e c h a r a c t e r o f relations within a p a r t i c u l a r society. U n l e s s w e can a s s u m e that a c h i e v e m e n t d i s p o s i t i o n s are ' n a t u r a l ' a n d n o t a reflection o f g e n u i n e o p p o r t u n i ­ ties, social e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d roles, t h e n w e c a n n o t d r a w any v e r y s t r o n g c o n ­ clusions a b o u t their role in u n d e r m i n i n g g r o u p proportionality. T h e relative plausibility o f B a r r y ' s c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s is d i m i n i s h e d in c o n t e x t s that are n o t s h a p e d by a b a c k g r o u n d egalitarian b a s e l i n e o f t h e sort that his n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y prescribes. If w e w e r e j u d g i n g differential o u t c o m e s against a b a c k g r o u n d o f fair e q u a l ­ ity of o p p o r t u n i t y a l o n g the lines of B a r r y or R a w l s , w e m i g h t b e in a stronger position to a r g u e that differential g r o u p o u t c o m e s are always b e n i g n . U n t i l w e h a v e such a b a s e l i n e w e will never b e able to distinguish u n e q u i v o c a l l y b e t w e e n t h o s e i n n o c u o u s r a n d o m distributions that B a r r y relies on a n d t h o s e w h i c h are tainted by the legacy o f g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n a n d injustice. W h e n w e return from the r e a l m o f ideal theory, Young's c h a l l e n g e to o u r ability to say with certainty w h i c h if any g r o u p differential o u t c o m e s are purely b e n i g n d i s a p p e a r s . W e c a n n o t say that the a b s e n c e o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y is o p e n to p u r e l y b e n i g n e x p l a n a t i o n s u n l e s s t h e r e is e v i d e n c e to the contrary. A g a i n s t B a r r y a n d t h e liberal egalitari­ ans, Young is s u g g e s t i n g that t h e a b s e n c e o f g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y is strong e v i d e n c e o f g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n a n d d i s e m p o w e r m e n t . Egalitarians s h o u l d b e s u s p i c i o u s o f d e p a r t u r e s from equality o f o u t c o m e s , as these are likely to reflect inequalities of power. T h a t said, Young's a r g u m e n t is n o t m e r e l y that t h e a b s e n c e o f g r o u p p r o p o r ­ tionality is e v i d e n c e for s o m e t h i n g deeper, w h i c h theories o f equal o p p o r t u n i t y n e e d to take m o r e seriously. H e r p o i n t is that o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarians start in t h e w r o n g p l a c e . T h i s takes m e to the t h i r d c o m p o n e n t of h e r a r g u m e n t .

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Group representation and equality of opportunity B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t a s s u m e s that equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y can b e a c h i e v e d b y t h e distribution o f rights, liberties a n d r e s o u r c e s : o p p o r t u n i t y sets are constituted by these p r i m a r y g o o d s . T h e o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarian d o e s not distribute equally t h i n g s to w h i c h t h e s e p r i m a r y g o o d s give a c c e s s . T h u s there will be c o m p e t i t i o n for careers a n d other social g o o d s . T h e key point is that this c o m p e t i t i o n s h o u l d be fair. T h e c o m p e t i t i o n for a c c e s s to university p r o f e s s o r s h i p s should b e b a s e d on a c a d e m i c qualifications a n d n o t m e r e l y ' g e n d e r e d ' e x p e c t a t i o n s or racial simi­ larities. T h u s B a r r y is p r e p a r e d to c o n c e d e that g e n d e r i m b a l a n c e s in professions such as a c a d e m i a m i g h t well reflect d i s c r i m i n a t o r y practices, b u t he contrasts this v i e w with Young's, w h i c h h e c l a i m s a r g u e s that t h e ' g e n d e r ' i m b a l a n c e s are not e v i d e n c e for putative d i s c r i m i n a t i o n but, rather, reveal o p p r e s s i o n . If the d e b a t e w e r e m e r e l y a b o u t e v i d e n c e o f injustice, then w e m i g h t c o n c l u d e that there is n o t h i n g v e r y substantial d i v i d i n g Y o u n g a n d B a r r y other than p e r h a p s a greater caution on the p a r t o f B a r r y to see o p p r e s s i o n in differences that m i g h t have a purely b e n i g n origin. A l t h o u g h t h e issue o f e v i d e n c e is p a r t o f Young's a r g u m e n t , it is not t h e sole issue. T h e r e a s o n for this t u r n s o n h o w o n e m i g h t r e s p o n d to the issue o f evi­ d e n c e . H e r attack o n the distributive p a r a d i g m is an attack o n the idea that j u s t i c e is simply a b o u t rectifying w e a k n e s s e s o f distributive r e g i m e s such as the m a r k e t or even t h e state. M a r k e t s a n d states can fail t o distribute fairly b y u s i n g d i s ­ c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e s b a s e d on irrelevant characteristics such as race or gender. T h e task o f liberal egalitarianism is to identify t h o s e sources o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h a distribution o f b a s i c p r i m a r y g o o d s such as rights a n d r e s o u r c e s , a n d then, w h e r e there are cases o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in t h e real world, they s h o u l d be rectified. T h e rectificatory c h a r a c t e r o f t h e distributive p a r a d i g m i g n o r e s the way in w h i c h d i s c r i m i n a t o r y practices are a manifestation o f m o r e significant sources o f d i s e m p o w e r m e n t w h i c h u n d e r l i e g r o u p o p p r e s s i o n . S i m p l y b y rectifying t h e s e distributive s h o r t c o m i n g s w e fail to a d d r e s s the root c a u s e o f these obstacles to a c c e s s a n d in Young's c a s e inequalities of o u t c o m e . T h a t this m i g h t r e m a i n a p r o b l e m even w i t h the distribution o f liberal rights a n d r e s o u r c e s e m e r g e s if w e turn to t h e w a y in w h i c h prejudice can still function in the operation of r e g i m e s o f rights a n d equal a c c e s s b y the w a y it creates n e g a t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s of c a n d i d a t e s for p o s i t i o n s a n d social g o o d s . Barry, for e x a m p l e , m a k e s m u c h o f the view that it is not part o f liberal equality to require all p e o p l e to respect equally all o t h e r s ' lifestyles a n d c h o i c e s . H e u s e s this a r g u m e n t to g o o d effect in his critique o f t h e t e n d e n c y o f s o m e multiculturalists w h o a r g u e that e d u c a t i o n s h o u l d be a b o u t affirming cultures and t h e self-respect o f m e m b e r s to the e x p e n s e o f all else (CE: 2 3 3 - 8 ) . In criticizing this legacy o f the multicultural m o v e m e n t , h e is m e r e l y d r a w i n g out an implication o f his liberalism. F o l l o w i n g J. S. Mill, a n d m o s t other liberals, B a r r y takes the view that a c c o r d i n g equal rights a n d protections to all d o e s not entail a p p r o v i n g the legitimate u s e their b e a r e r s m a y

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m a k e o f t h e m . A s long as liberal citizens d o n o t violate rights, liberties or duties, they are free to h o l d any o p i n i o n s about o t h e r s u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g ' d i s ­ approval a n d c o n t e m p t ' . T h e liberal sees n o n e e d to t r a n s f o r m such beliefs a n d j u d g e m e n t s as long as t h e y d o not result in a c t i o n s c o n t r a r y to liberal rights a n d e n t i t l e m e n t s . F u r t h e r m o r e , m o s t liberals think t h e k i n d o f ' s o u l - c r a f t ' n e c e s s a r y to c h a n g e all o u r beliefs and j u d g e m e n t s into a h a r m o n i o u s w h o l e w o u l d be undesirable. Yet if t h e liberal theorist takes this tolerant view, h e c a n n o t have a n y t h i n g to say a b o u t the w a y in w h i c h negative v i e w s o f g r o u p s are sustained t h r o u g h r e p ­ resentation, n o r a b o u t the w a y t h e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c a n sustain g r o u p o p p r e s ­ sion. T h i s b r i n g s us b a c k to the issue o f ' a c h i e v e m e n t - o r i e n t e d d i s p o s i t i o n s ' d i s c u s s e d in the last section. If s u c h dispositions are a p r o c e s s o f socialization, they will reflect n o t s i m p l y the g r o u p s ' attitudes t o w a r d s o p t i o n s , b u t m o r e i m p o r ­ tantly t h e w a y in w h i c h the interaction o f different g r o u p s s h a p e s that internal p r o c e s s o f self-representation a n d c o n s e q u e n t e x p e c t a t i o n s in light o f external e x p e c t a t i o n s . F e m i n i s t s , for e x a m p l e , c o n t i n u e to a r g u e that t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f w o m e n to b e c o m e t h e p r i m a r y carers of p r e - s c h o o l children can s h a p e career p r o s p e c t s in w a y s that d o n o t involve o l d - f a s h i o n e d direct d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against w o m e n in t h e w o r k p l a c e (Okin 1990). T h i s k i n d o f e x p e c t a t i o n can s h a p e t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s of w o m e n irrespective o f their aspirations a n d c h o i c e s . However, as this m i g h t s i m p l y m a n i f e s t itself t h r o u g h c h o o s i n g the m a l e c a n d i d a t e for a senior p o s i t i o n a m o n g s t o t h e r w i s e equally qualified c a n d i d a t e s , it is m u c h h a r d e r to identify a n y t h i n g that r e s e m b l e s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n that is p r o h i b i t e d b y a liberal egalitarian p r i n c i p l e . Indeed, it m i g h t b e t h e case that o u r only suspicion that any­ t h i n g is w r o n g in such a c a s e is t h e p r o p o r t i o n a l inequality b e t w e e n m e n a n d w o m e n in senior b u s i n e s s , a c a d e m i c or political offices. It m i g h t , however, b e t h e c a s e that a c h i e v e m e n t - o r i e n t a t e d d i s p o s i t i o n s differ b e t w e e n m e n a n d w o m e n . B u t this c o u l d b e a result o f self-censorship in r e s p o n s e to w i d e r social e x p e c t a t i o n s . It is m o r e or less i m p o s s i b l e to s h o w w h e t h e r this self-censorship is a sufficient e x p l a n a t i o n o f g r o u p disproportionality, b u t equally it is not t h e c a s e that w e can j u s t rule it out. W h a t this issue d o e s d r a w our attention to is the fact that o p e n i n g a c c e s s to institutions a n d focusing on rectification o f o u t c o m e s is n o t a sufficient r e s p o n s e to the q u e s t i o n o f o u t c o m e inequality. B a r r y is k e e n to s u g g e s t that he is n o t m e r e l y r e h e a r s i n g the idea that r e l i g i o u s or cultural beliefs are m e r e l y a species o f e x p e n s i v e taste or p r e f e r e n c e s and t h e r e b y not o f interest to the liberal. T h e i d e a h e r e is that certain o p t i o n s will b e m o r e e x p e n s i v e t h a n o t h e r s and, therefore, the individual agent h a s to b e a r the b u r d e n o f those costs. If o n e has a taste for e x p e n s i v e c h a m p a g n e and plover eggs t h e n o n e c a n n o t c o m p l a i n w h e n o n e b e c o m e s w o r s e off relative to t h o s e with m o r e frugal and s i m p l e tastes. T h e inequalities that result from t h e relative costs o f an individual's c h o i c e s following from a fair distribution c a n n o t form the basis o f a c l a i m for further redistribution, as these inequalities are not c o n s i d e r e d a m a t t e r o f injustice. T h e p o i n t is that not all inequalities are issues o f injustice. T h i s m i g h t s e e m t o underlie B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t against Young, b u t h e is clear in

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his rejection o f the e x p e n s i v e preferences a r g u m e n t . T h e r e a s o n h e gives early in the b o o k is that the e x p e n s i v e tastes a r g u m e n t m a k e s t o o m u c h o f the idea o f responsibility for preferences w h i c h are in relevant respects similar to beliefs, in that w e c a n n o t b e held r e s p o n s i b l e for h o l d i n g t h e m (CE: 3 6 - 7 ) . E g a l i t a r i a n i s m is s i m p l y a b o u t the distribution o f a certain k i n d o f 'stuff', as B a r r y likes to call it, n a m e l y rights a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s . T h e q u e s t i o n o f subjective satisfaction or actual o u t c o m e s is simply irrelevant to that distributive question, as is the a t t e m p t to get a r o u n d the p r o b l e m by referring to the e x p e n s i v e n e s s o f p r e f e r e n c e s a n d tastes. However, I t h i n k this a r g u m e n t is t o o hasty a n d leaves a significant source o f inequality u n a d d r e s s e d . In r e s p o n d i n g to this issue, w e m i g h t well c o n s i d e r that in s o m e cases t h e d o d o is right, or at least c a n b e d e f e n d e d in a w a y that is c o n ­ sistent with egalitarianism. T h i s p r o b l e m arises in relation to the beliefs h e l d by various social g r o u p s . We n e e d n o t b o t h e r about w h e t h e r these sets o f beliefs c o n ­ stitute cultures or m e r e l y lifestyle c h o i c e s ; either way, t h e issue is t h e s a m e . E v e n given a n initial j u s t distribution o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s , r i g h t s a n d liberties, a n d with a rectification principle to sustain that s y s t e m over t i m e t h r o u g h fair taxa­ tion, it is n o t only possible b u t likely that certain g r o u p s o f individuals will b e identifiable as w o r s e off. This is p a r t i c u l a r l y likely w h e n t h e inequality o f o u t c o m e can b e directly attributable to the beliefs or lifestyle to w h i c h they a d h e r e . S u c h inequalities m i g h t b e t h e result o f religious beliefs or m e m b e r s h i p o f c o m m u n i ­ ties that i m p o s e certain b u r d e n s u p o n t h e m s e l v e s relative to o t h e r g r o u p s , such as r e q u i r i n g rest days or days o f w o r s h i p that d e p a r t from t h e societal n o r m . T h e r e m a y also b e g r o u p s w h o s e lifestyle p l a c e s t h e m o u t s i d e societal n o r m s b e c a u s e o f t h e attitudes the w i d e r society h o l d s a b o u t s u c h lifestyles. W h a t e v e r i n e q u a l i ­ ties result from beliefs a n d s e l f - i m p o s e d d i s a d v a n t a g e s will b e c o m p a t i b l e with t h e initial distribution o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d liberties, a s will inequalities that result from lifestyle c h o i c e s that the w i d e r society finds r e p u g n a n t or c o n ­ t e m p t i b l e . However, unlike e x p e n s i v e tastes, t h e distribution o f such inequalities will have s t r o n g g r o u p - b a s e d characteristics in that they will reflect culture, lifestyle or religious beliefs, but, a s B a r r y fails to n o t e , these beliefs will also b e s h a p e d b y t h e external e x p e c t a t i o n s o f others a n d o f g r o u p - i m p o s e d identities. T h e q u e s t i o n p o s e d by the e x p e n s i v e tastes a r g u m e n t s is w h e t h e r such inequali­ ties matter, since t h e y result from free c h o i c e s taken against a b a c k g r o u n d n o r m o f equality o f opportunity. After all, a g r o u p o f surfers or fine claret drinkers m i g h t also b e identifiable, a s , indeed, will a g r o u p o f h e r o i n addicts, b e c a u s e o f their c h o i c e s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . U n l e s s o n e h a s a w h o l l y u n i q u e set o f beliefs, values a n d p r e f e r e n c e s , t h e n o n e will always face t h e p r o s p e c t of g r o u p identification s i m p l y on t h e basis o f c h o i c e s or p r e f e r e n c e s . T h i s s e e m s to b e B a r r y ' s r e a s o n ­ ing for w h y liberal egalitarianism o u g h t to r e m a i n indifferent to o u t c o m e s a n d subjective v a l u a t i o n s . Yet o n e m i g h t a r g u e that certain k i n d s o f g r o u p inequality that a r e related to beliefs a n d lifestyle c a n n o t b e i g n o r e d so easily, a n d this is certainly p a r t o f Young's point. W h a t e v e r c h o i c e s o n e m a k e s o n the basis o f one's beliefs or pref-

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e r e n c e s will b e c o m e costly relative to similar c h o i c e s and p r e f e r e n c e s o f others. T h e c h o i c e s c o n c e r n i n g e d u c a t i o n o f t h e A m i s h c o m m u n i t y for their y o u n g p e o p l e b e c o m e costly only relative to b r o a d e r societal n o r m s , w h i c h n o w attach h i g h e r value a n d h i g h e r r e w a r d s to t h o s e w h o have a m o r e a d v a n c e d e d u c a t i o n . A s a conservative c o m m u n i t y , t h e A m i s h m e r e l y reflect attitudes to e d u c a t i o n that w o u l d h a v e b e e n w i d e l y s h a r e d for t h e majority o f p e o p l e a c o u p l e o f c e n t u r i e s back. T h e s a m e is t r u e o f the p r a c t i c e s o f other k i n d s o f traditional s o c i e t y such as first nations, or even s o m e i m m i g r a n t c o m m u n i t i e s in Britain. But, m o r e i m p o r ­ tantly, t h e s a m e position h o l d s for t h e self-censuring c h o i c e s of m e m b e r s o f social g r o u p s that are identified relative to historical o p p r e s s i o n a n d m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n . A s t h e w i d e r society c h a n g e s , t h e p r a c t i c e s o f such g r o u p s b e c o m e m o r e costly to their a d h e r e n t s , as a result o f w h i c h inequalities not only arise b u t also b e c o m e e n t r e n c h e d features o f g r o u p e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s rise o f g r o u p - r e l a t e d inequalities m i g h t b e s e e n to d r a w B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t b a c k o n t o the terrain o f the e x p e n s i v e tastes a r g u m e n t . T h i s is b e c a u s e in ignor­ ing the structural p a t t e r n o f inequality that m i g h t still result from a liberal egali­ tarian distributive p r i n c i p l e , B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t leaves the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the exercise o f liberty as a m a t t e r o f p e r s o n a l responsibility, at least to t h e extent that it is n o part of t h e egalitarian's responsibility to r e s p o n d further t o c o n s e q u e n t inequalities. However, these individual c h o i c e s m a p o n t o the w i d e r p a t t e r n of social e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d prejudices that characterize t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f s o m e social g r o u p s in existing liberal d e m o c r a c i e s . O f c o u r s e , o n e d o e s n o t n e e d to take a p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w on t h e issue o f p e r s o n a l responsibility, a n d B a r r y certainly avoids d o i n g so - this is w h y he rejects t h e e x p e n s i v e tastes a r g u m e n t . However, it r e m a i n s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f inequalities that arise following t h e liberal egalitar­ ian distribution that individuals m u s t still b e a r t h o s e c o n s e q u e n c e s w h e t h e r they are genuinely r e s p o n s i b l e or not. It is for this r e a s o n t h a t it is n o t e n o u g h for B a r r y to simply ignore t h e e x p e n s i v e tastes a r g u m e n t as an irrelevance. His rejec­ tion o f t h e e x p e n s i v e tastes a r g u m e n t o n t h e g r o u n d s that beliefs a n d p r e f e r e n c e s are n o t o r i o u s l y difficult to c h a n g e n e e d s t o b e c o n s i d e r e d carefully. H e w r i t e s : It is false that the changeability of preferences is what makes it not unfair for them to give rise to unequal impact. It is therefore not true that the unchangeability of beliefs makes it unfair for them to give rise to unequal impacts. (CE: 36-7) T h e q u e s t i o n that a n i m a t e s Young in p a r t i c u l a r is w h e t h e r t h e attitude o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarian can avoid t r a d i n g o n the e x p e n s i v e tastes a r g u m e n t . U n d e r t h e liberal interpretation o f liberal egalitarianism it d o e s n o t m a t t e r w h a t i m p a c t follows from the s y s t e m o f fair equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y a n d rights. Fur­ t h e r m o r e , w e m i g h t n o t e from a M i l l i a n r e a d i n g o f this p r i n c i p l e that it d o e s n o t require t o l e r a n c e or s y m p a t h y for difference b u t can actually a c c o m m o d a t e dis­ approval, c o n t e m p t a n d distaste. Young clearly w i s h e s to u n d e r m i n e such attitudes o f disapproval a n d c o n t e m p t , as they foster self-censorship a n d c o m p l i c i t y in disempowerment.

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In r e s p o n s e to this p r o b l e m o f self-censureship a n d institutional e x p e c t a t i o n s , Young a r g u e s that w e have to look b e y o n d the c o n c e r n for equal o p p o r t u n i t y as e q u a l i z i n g a c c e s s t h r o u g h t h e distribution of rights a n d instead focus on the way in w h i c h social g o o d s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s are constituted. H e r p o i n t is that w e n e e d to be sensitive to t h e way in w h i c h a c c e s s criteria, such as t h e t h o s e that p e r t a i n to entry to p r o f e s s i o n s a n d careers ( a n d all o t h e r social g o o d s ) , are structured by t h e existing p a t t e r n o f p o w e r relations. T h i s f o r m s p a r t o f h e r assault o n the ' m y t h o f m e r i t ' - the idea that t h e c h a r a c t e r o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d t h e criteria o f access a r e t h e m s e l v e s of c o n c e r n p r i o r to the issue o f a c c e s s . In o t h e r w o r d s , b e f o r e w e can s p e a k o f e q u a l i z i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s , w e n e e d to c o n s i d e r the w a y in w h i c h o p p o r t u n i t i e s a r e constituted by social e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s c o n c e r n takes u s b e y o n d t h e focus o n e q u a l i z i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d t u r n s o u r attention t o the w a y in w h i c h o p p o r t u n i t i e s are s h a p e d . B a r r y h a s s o m e fun with t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f this a p p r o a c h w h e n a p p l i e d to t h e recognition o f culture as a w a y o f affirming g r o u p identities. A g a i n , his criticisms trade o n t h e idea that criteria o f e x c e l l e n c e in distributing social g o o d s can b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d from culture specific attributes. T h e idea that g r o u p s n e e d to be equally h e a r d in s h a p i n g ' o p p o r t u n i t i e s ' , for e x a m p l e in the m e d i c a l profession, d o e s look b i z a r r e . But again t h e a p p a r e n t intuitive plausibility o f B a r r y ' s critique can i n d e e d b e c o u n t e r e d w i t h equally p l a u s i b l e i n s t a n c e s w h e r e e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s h a v e b e e n s h a p e d by false c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s o f g r o u p characteris­ tics. If w e turn a g a i n to the issue o f g e n d e r a n d r a c e , w e are in a stronger p o s i ­ tion to see h o w t h e s e g r o u p s h a v e in the past b e e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t ability w h i c h have restricted their a c c e s s to o p p o r t u n i t i e s that have t h e m ­ selves c o n t i n u e d to reflect e x p e c t a t i o n s o n t h e basis o f these i m p o s e d g e n d e r e d a n d racial identities. T h e key issue h e r e is that the sufficiency o f o p p o r t u n i t y e g a l i t a r i a n i s m d e p e n d s on an ability to distinguish b e t w e e n t h o s e characteristics n e c e s s a r y for access to o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d social g o o d s that are neutral b e t w e e n social g r o u p s a n d those that are not. To b e fair to Barry, Young m a k e s t h e c l a i m that this is true of all characteristics a n d that is w h a t allows B a r r y to pick out situations w h e r e this s e e m s h o p e l e s s l y counterintuitive. A c a d e m i c ability a n d qualification are cer­ tainly difficult to define, b u t it is hardly p l a u s i b l e to s u g g e s t that they are purely subjective o r group-relative. But equally w e can a r g u e in Young's favour that, whilst she m a y overstate h e r a r g u m e n t , she d o e s raise t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w far w e c a n identify neutral o p p o r t u n i t i e s in a n o n - q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g way.

4. Identifying and Defending Dodos So far, I have tried to s h o w that B a r r y a n d Young are t a c k l i n g two different sets o f issues. W h e r e B a r r y w a n t s to s h o w that m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m will result in frus­ trating equality o f opportunity, Young w a n t s to a r g u e that the n a r r o w focus o n o p p o r t u n i t i e s leaves o n e blind to the structural s o u r c e s o f o p p r e s s i o n a n d disad-

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v a n t a g e w h i c h can p e r m e a t e even o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism. However, m y p o i n t has n o t b e e n to s h o w that B a r r y h a s g o t Young w r o n g or that Young is c o r r e c t in her critique o f t h e sufficiency o f o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism. It certainly is t r u e that s h e is guilty of overstating h e r c a s e a n d o p e n i n g h e r s e l f to s o m e o f t h e criti­ c i s m s that B a r r y a d v a n c e s . T h a t said, B a r r y ' s o w n critique o f Young is also less t h a n satisfactory, as it still d o e s n o t t a c k l e h e r central insight a b o u t the way in w h i c h s o m e g r o u p identities a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s can be s h a p e d b y their characteri­ zation a n d identification by other g r o u p s a n d that this can sustain o u t c o m e inequalities that c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d as purely neutral. T h e dispute b e t w e e n Y o u n g a n d B a r r y s u g g e s t s that w e m u s t c h o o s e b e t w e e n o u t c o m e or o p p o r t u n i t y egali­ t a r i a n i s m . However, it is n o t clear that we m u s t m a k e a s i m p l e c h o i c e . Instead, a satisfactory egalitarian t h e o r y m u s t c o m b i n e b o t h a p p r o a c h e s . T h e r e is a sense in w h i c h b o t h Young a n d B a r r y a c c e p t that. B a r r y d o e s not, for e x a m p l e , r e m a i n wholly indifferent t o d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l g r o u p o u t c o m e s , at least to t h e extent that h e t h i n k s there o u g h t to b e a ceiling to t h e relative differences in e c o n o m i c w e a l t h a n d p o w e r b e t w e e n the richest a n d t h e poorest. F u r t h e r m o r e , he is p r e p a r e d to c o n s i d e r the d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l o u t c o m e s as e v i d e n c e , other t h i n g s b e i n g equal, o f p o s s i b l e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n (CE: 9 3 ) . Similarly, Young c a n n o t w h o l l y e x c l u d e a c o m ­ m i t m e n t to equality o f opportunity, as she d o e s n o t r e g a r d differential o u t c o m e s w i t h i n g r o u p s as n e c e s s a r i l y e v i d e n c e o f d i s e m p o w e r m e n t a n d o p p r e s s i o n ( 1 9 9 0 : 1 5 - 3 8 ) . T h e fact that equality o f o u t c o m e s is s u p p o s e d to apply a c r o s s g r o u p s and n o t b e t w e e n individuals clearly s u g g e s t s that at s o m e level she a c k n o w l e d g e s t h e existence o f different a c h i e v e m e n t - o r i e n t a t e d d i s p o s i t i o n s a n d abilities. T h e key q u e s t i o n is t h e significance t h e y s h o u l d have. O n this p o i n t she d o e s n o t a r g u e that they s h o u l d h a v e n o significance at all, j u s t as B a r r y d o e s n o t a r g u e (as a strict libertarian m i g h t ) that they h a v e limitless significance. A n o t h e r o b v i o u s illustration o f t h e fact that Young gives s o m e significance to o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism is that she is u n p r e p a r e d to u s e straightforward coer­ cion to bring a b o u t g r o u p proportionality. She d o e s n o t a r g u e that a specific n u m b e r o f w o m e n , b l a c k s , g a y s , etc. s h o u l d be c o m p e l l e d to take u p p o s i t i o n s in o r d e r to b r i n g about e q u a l o u t c o m e s overall, n o r that c o e r c i o n c o u l d o v e r c o m e the a b s e n c e of representation. W h e r e she differs from B a r r y is in t e r m s o f t h e priority o f structural inequalities over inequalities b e t w e e n individuals a n d the m e t h o d u s e d to identify a n d rectify inequality. T h e s e are still significant differ­ e n c e s , w h i c h I d o n o t w i s h to u n d e r s t a t e . That said, t h e fact that n e i t h e r w i s h e s w h o l l y to reject t h e relevance o f o u t c o m e s a n d o p p o r t u n i t y is i m p o r t a n t , e s p e ­ cially for the t r e a t m e n t o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m or g r o u p recognition. T h i s is b e c a u s e c o m b i n i n g a s p e c t s o f o u t c o m e a n d o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism from b o t h B a r r y a n d Young w e a r e in a p o s i t i o n to defend s o m e d o d o s (that is, defend b r o a d g r o u p p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y in spite o f the c h o i c e s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s o f g r o u p m e m b e r s ) , b u t w i t h o u t necessarily collapsing into a s p e c i o u s cultural relativism or affording all cultural g r o u p s sub-state sovereignty. In o r d e r to m a k e this c a s e w e n e e d to c o n s i d e r equality as t h e basis not m e r e l y o f a strict distributional p r i n c i p l e , b u t also o f w h a t G. A . C o h e n a n d J o Wolff have

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d e s c r i b e d as an egalitarian e t h o s or b r o a d social m o r a l i t y that c o m b i n e s b o t h o u t c o m e a n d o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism ( C o h e n 1997; Wolff 1998). A n egalitar­ ian ethos is o n e w h e r e t h e idea o f substantive equality p e r v a d e s all social rela­ t i o n s h i p s ; it d o e s not m e r e l y cover t h e distribution o f rights a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s . It d o e s not m e a n strict equality or s a m e n e s s , but, equally, it d o e s not m e a n that the issue o f overall o u t c o m e s is an indifferent matter. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f egalitarian­ ism can be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h Mill's libertarian ethos w h i c h p e r v a d e s m u c h liberal egalitarian t h i n k i n g (see D w o r k i n 1981a a n d b ) . T h e latter s u g g e s t s the priority of liberty in t h e h i e r a r c h y o f values a n d as t h e k e y t o the h u m a n condition char­ acterized b y t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f individuality. In Mill's ( 1 9 8 9 [1859]) libertarian e t h o s , equality h a s a s e c o n d a r y a l t h o u g h i m p o r t a n t role as a distributive princi­ p l e , rather t h a n a substantive value. B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t is m o r e egalitarian in a s p i ­ ration, yet it bears m a n y similarities to Mill's. A g a i n s t t h e M i l l - B a r r y v i e w o f o p p o r t u n i t y e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , or the Young view o f o u t c o m e egalitarianism, w e can c o m b i n e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y a n d o u t c o m e per­ spectives in a substantive e g a l i t a r i a n i s m that c o n c e i v e s o f equality as t h e core value u n d e r p i n n i n g social a n d m o r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s in a civilized a n d inclusive society. In this way, equality is a g o o d o f political structures a n d institutions a n d not m e r e l y a p r i n c i p l e that a p p l i e s to t h e distribution o f individual g o o d s . T h i s v i e w is central to the radical egalitarian's dissatisfaction w i t h liberalism a n d p u r e o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism. S u c h a v i e w c a n be f o u n d in R. H . Tawney's n e g l e c t e d defence o f an egalitarian society ( 1 9 5 1 ) . In Tawney's view, a n d that o f m a n y egali­ tarians, the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f i n e q u a l i t y is itself a m a t t e r o f m o r a l a n d political c o n c e r n , even w h e n it arises from a distribution that is initially fair. For this t y p e o f egalitarian, equality is n o t s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f a c c e s s to key social g o o d s b u t is, rather, a m a t t e r o f the c h a r a c t e r o f a society. A s such, it involves a c o m m i t ­ m e n t to b o t h o u t c o m e a n d o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism. T h i s is n o t to s u g g e s t that there s h o u l d be n o social g r a d a t i o n s or differences in i n c o m e a n d r e s o u r c e s - this w a s n o t Tawney's view. T h i s egalitarian c o n c e r n h a s to r u n a l o n g s i d e o t h e r values s u c h as social efficiency a n d freedom. However, if t h e inequalities that arise from these other social goals b e c o m e t o o great, t h e n society is t h e p o o r e r , even if they arise from the exercise of freedom. W h y m i g h t this b e so? Part of t h e c o n c e r n o f egalitarians such as T a w n e y is t o c h a l l e n g e r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f status as well as i n c o m e differentials, w h e r e status reflects u p o n attitudes a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s , b o t h within individuals a n d g r o u p s b u t also b e t w e e n g r o u p s . In par­ ticular, status is s h a p e d b y h o w o n e is v a l u e d b y others. Status a n d i n c o m e dif­ ferentials are related, b u t not simply, such that equality a n d s a m e n e s s o f material r e s o u r c e s w o u l d b e identical. W h e n social g r o u p s are m a r k e d out as a result o f their beliefs a n d practices, they can also suffer a form o f alienation from the w i d e r society in w h i c h they exist as well as a d e c l i n e in status. T h e p r o b l e m h e r e is n o t m e r e l y inequality o f r e s o u r c e s , since s o m e g r o u p s that o p t o u t o f c o m p l i a n c e w i t h s o m e c o m m o n l y h e l d social p r a c t i c e s will not necessarily suffer e c o n o m i c a l l y as a g r o u p - this is p e r h a p s true o f the A m i s h . E v e n if t h e y d o suffer, w e m i g h t w i s h to say that t h e y have to b e a r the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f their beliefs, as B a r r y s u g g e s t s .

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B u t w h a t m a t t e r s m o r e is t h e way t h e w i d e r society v i e w s s u c h g r o u p s , a n d this is precisely the issue that b o t h Barry, following Mill, is indifferent to. Mill is quite h a p p y for his r e g i m e o f liberty to persist a l o n g s i d e individuals treating t h e c h o i c e s and w a y s of life o f others with c o n t e m p t a n d r e g a r d i n g t h e m with disapproval. B a r r y similarly argues that liberal egalitarianism d o e s n o t entail toleration or the value of diversity as foundational g o o d s . Clearly, n o political p h i l o s o p h y can require p e o p l e to love one a n o t h e r a n d not d i s a p p r o v e o f t h i n g s that o t h e r s m i g h t freely d o . However, t h e s e legitimate feelings a n d p a s s i o n s have also to b e cur­ tailed by a w i l l i n g n e s s to see society n o t only as a fair s y s t e m o f social c o ­ o p e r a t i o n but also as an inclusive s y s t e m o f social c o o p e r a t i o n : that is, w h e r e o n e is n o t e x c l u d e d from equality of status s i m p l y by t h e costs of o n e ' s beliefs a n d practices relative to societal n o r m s . T h e liberal egalitarian a p p r o a c h o f B a r r y a n d Mill d o e s n o t take seriously e n o u g h the issue o f social inclusion, instead focus­ ing solely o n the issue o f equality o f opportunity. Social inclusion m a t t e r s if g r o u p s are n o t to b e c o m e subject to s y s t e m a t i c dis­ c r i m i n a t i o n on t h e b a s i s of their c h o i c e s and exercise of associational liberty. A g a i n , the point is not that c h o i c e s a n d the exercise o f associational liberty c a n n o t h a v e c o n s e q u e n c e s ; rather, it is that t h o s e c o n s e q u e n c e s m a t t e r if they result in g r o u p s suffering significant inequalities over t i m e w h i c h , in turn, give rise to dif­ ferences o f status. T h e issue is not s i m p l y h o w differences in status arise b u t also their c o n s e q u e n c e s . U n d e r l y i n g t h e a m a l g a m a t i o n of o p p o r t u n i t y a n d o u t c o m e egalitarianism is an a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f the n e e d to take a c c o u n t o f c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s as a m e a n s o f setting limits to the extent o f g r o u p inequality. Ironically, o u t c o m e egalitarianism o f t h e sort a d v o c a t e d by Young offers s c o p e for a c o n s e quentialist a p p r o a c h to the o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism o f c o n t e m p o r a r y liberal­ ism. It is the difference o f status that m a t t e r s , as this can reinforce n e g a t i v e v i e w s o f difference and foster d i s a d v a n t a g e and o p p r e s s i o n w h i c h c a n n o t b e t r a c e d to the direct violation o f i n d i v i d u a l s ' rights a n d titles. T h e insight o f Tawney's egal­ itarian ethos is that s y s t e m a t i c differences o f status h a v e a t e n d e n c y to reinforce d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d d o m i n a t i o n b e t w e e n g r o u p s . W h e n inequalities are particu­ larly great a n d fall on distinct g r o u p s t h e r e is a t e n d e n c y for t h e s e g r o u p s to b e a c c o r d e d a different social status: this equality o f status m a t t e r s , even if it is t h e result o f religious beliefs and lifestyle c h o i c e s that differ from the societal n o r m . T h e s e inequalities o f status will arise even w h e n the g e n e r a l level o f w e l l - b e i n g in a society is high, if the beliefs a n d p r a c t i c e s o f certain g r o u p s m a r k t h e m out as significantly different in their general e c o n o m i c s a n d social p e r f o r m a n c e . S u c h s y s t e m a t i c g r o u p inequalities c a n have a disintegrative effect o n the w i d e r society a n d this t h r e a t e n s t h e ideal o f society as an inclusive s y s t e m o f social cooperation. W h a t follows from a d o p t i n g this a p p r o a c h to egalitarianism as o p p o s e d to B a r r y ' s liberal egalitarianism? All I w i s h to a r g u e h e r e in r e s p o n s e to B a r r y ' s Millian indifference to o u t c o m e s is that s o m e u n e q u a l o u t c o m e s d o matter. A c c e p t i n g this d o e s not necessarily e n d o r s e o t h e r t h i n g s that Young and similar egalitarians w o u l d also a r g u e for. In particular, it d o e s not follow that w e n e e d to

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i g n o r e totally t h e w a y that g r o u p s can i m p o s e costs o n t h e m s e l v e s . Indeed, this h a s to be so, as s o m e o f t h e s y s t e m a t i c g r o u p inequalities w i t h w h i c h I a m c o n c e r n e d arise b e c a u s e t h e m e m b e r s o f s o m e g r o u p s deliberately afford less value to certain o p p o r t u n i t i e s than d o others. Similarly, g r o u p r e p r e s e n ­ tation d o e s n o t follow from this version o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m as a general rule for all social g o o d s a n d o p p o r t u n i t i e s . W h a t it d o e s entail is that w e should b e m o r e sensitive to t h e w a y in w h i c h institutions a n d the p r a c t i c e s o f d o m i n a n t g r o u p s s h a p e the o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f others, so that it is n e v e r a straightforward issue w h e t h e r g r o u p s can b e r e q u i r e d to take responsibility for their o w n p r e d i c a ­ m e n t . W h a t m i g h t , however, follow from this a p p r o a c h is a m o r e a c c o m m o d a t ­ ing stance on t h e issue o f e x c e p t i o n s to strict egalitarianism, particularly in the distribution o f r e s o u r c e s b e t w e e n g r o u p s . T h e ideal o f liberal e g a l i t a r i a n i s m m i g h t well result in a g e n e r o u s level o f social provision t h r o u g h a citizen i n c o m e or s o m e o t h e r m e t h o d w h i c h p l a c e s significant restraints on t h e d e g r e e o f differen­ tial o u t c o m e s that result even from fair equality o f opportunity. T h i s w o u l d n o t entail e x c e p t i o n a l t o p - u p p a y m e n t s t o g r o u p s that h a v e particularly costly beliefs a n d p r a c t i c e s , but it m i g h t m i n i m i z e ( t h o u g h not eradicate) those differences o f outcome. N o t all issues are, however, a b o u t r e s o u r c e s . S o m e have to d o w i t h creating a n d sustaining g r o u p p r a c t i c e s . However, as the regulative ideal h e r e is equality, t h e s e p r a c t i c e s can b e a c c o m m o d a t e d only within s y s t e m s o f generally equal out­ c o m e s . T h i s m i g h t allow for differential provision in a c o m m o n s y s t e m such as e d u c a t i o n - h e r e I have in m i n d t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n a n d regulation o f religious s c h o o l s within t h e British state e d u c a t i o n s y s t e m . A s the intention is to secure b r o a d equality o f o u t c o m e s , w e n e e d to secure certain restrictions o n g r o u p p r a c ­ tices. S u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e c o u l d offer v e r y little b y w a y of a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f g r o u p s that deliberately i m p o s e costs on their m e m b e r s in order to sustain the g r o u p over t i m e , such as t h e e x c e p t i o n s to a general r e q u i r e m e n t for h i g h school e d u c a t i o n s e c u r e d u n d e r Wisconsin v. Yoder. Taking o u t c o m e egalitarianism seri­ ously as a c o m p o n e n t of a b r o a d e r egalitarian ethos entails limiting the extent to w h i c h g r o u p s can i m p o s e disabilities o n children. O t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w o u l d also have to c o m e into p l a c e r e g a r d i n g issues o f t h e level a n d s c o p e o f discretion over t h e c u r r i c u l u m , b u t i n c o r p o r a t i n g c o m m u n i t y s c h o o l s in a c o m m o n s y s t e m h a s the effect o f m i n i m i z i n g the e x c l u s i o n o f g r o u p s from t h e w i d e r society. W h a t clearly isn't r e q u i r e d by this egalitarian ethos is the idea o f sub-state sovereignty for g r o u p s , such as is a r g u e d for by s o m e multiculturalist theorists. If t h e c o n c e r n o f egalitarianism is equality o f status a n d inclusion, then sub-state sovereignty c a n n o t b e p a r t o f the solution, since it a d v o c a t e s societal disintegration as a policy. T h e justification o f d e p a r t u r e s from strict equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y in o r d e r to b a l a n c e the c l a i m s o f o u t c o m e equality d o e s n o t p r o v i d e all that is c l a i m e d b y radical egalitarians such as Young. T h a t c o m b i n i n g o u t c o m e a n d o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarianism a p p e a r s to h a v e the effect o f affording special t r e a t m e n t to s o m e g r o u p s , by c o m p e n s a t i n g t h e m for their c h o i c e s , is a c o n s e q u e n c e o f its c o n c e r n

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with equality, the s u s t e n a n c e o f diversity is m e r e l y a side effect. S o m e o f the g r o u p s that are afforded special p r o t e c t i o n m a y well be ' d o d o s ' , at least to t h e extent that t h e y will eventually face extinction. O u r c o n c e r n is not to protect e n d a n g e r e d species o f h u m a n cultural variety; rather, it is to protect a g a i n s t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of u n e q u a l status a n d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , w h i c h r e m a i n b a d even if a d d r e s s e d against cultures that are in t h e e n d ultimately u n s u s t a i n a b l e . W h a t is at issue is equality n o t culture. However, this defence o f s o m e ' d o d o s ' is also i m p o r ­ tant, as m a n m i g h t well b e less o f a p r o g r e s s i v e b e i n g t h a n Mill s u g g e s t s . It m i g h t well b e t h e c a s e that Mill's ideal o f individuality is only possible for relatively few r o b u s t souls a n d that t h e majority will retain s t r o n g a t t a c h m e n t s to religions o f various forms a n d other k i n d s o f cultural practices. If this is so, t h e n egalitar­ ians have a d u t y to take p e o p l e as t h e y c o m e a n d to e n s u r e their status w h a t e v e r their c h o i c e s , in o r d e r to u n d e r m i n e the possibility o f distorted e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d aspirations. It is only in a context w e r e the s y s t e m a t i c distortion o f aspirations a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s can b e s e c u r e d that w e can b e g i n to assess the a d e q u a c y of a purely o p p o r t u n i t y egalitarian p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e r e is n o r e a s o n w h y B a r r y s h o u l d n o t a d o p t a m o r e a c c o m m o d a t i n g stance t o w a r d s o u t c o m e equality whilst r e t a i n i n g his justifiable rejection o f sub-state sov­ ereignty. It is only as a result o f a d o p t i n g an u n d u l y M i l l i a n a p p r o a c h to t h e c l a i m s of his multiculturalist o p p o n e n t s that h e fails to take t h e issue o f equality o f status and o u t c o m e m o r e seriously. However, this issue is s o m e t h i n g that c a n b e a c c o m ­ m o d a t e d w i t h i n a c o n c e p t i o n o f equality that attaches significance to liberty, a n d d o e s n o t require m a n y o f t h e policy p r e s c r i p t i o n s a d v a n c e d by t h e m u l t i c u l t u r a l ­ ists, such as g r o u p rights a n d sub-state sovereignty for cultural g r o u p s . W h a t it c a n n o t a c c o m m o d a t e is a Millian c o n c e p t i o n of liberalism that attaches a strong ideal o f individuality w i t h a libertarian h a r m p r i n c i p l e . T h a t B a r r y d o e s n o t offer m o r e by w a y o f a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f inequalities o f status a n d o u t c o m e that arise even u n d e r a s y s t e m o f fair equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is a result o f the long s h a d o w that Mill casts over Culture and Equality.

References Barry, B. 2001: Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity). Cohen, G. A. 1997: Back to Socialist Basics. In J. Franklin (ed.), Equality (London: IPPR). Dworkin, R. 1981a: What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10: 185-246. 1981b: What is Equality? Part II: Equality of Resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10: 283-345. Fraser, N. 1997: Justice Interruptus (New York: Routledge). Kymlicka, W. 1995: Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Mill, J. S. 1989 [1859]: On Liberty (Harmondsworth: Penguin). Okin, S. M. 1990: Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books). Parekh, B. 2000: Rethinking Multiculturalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Tawney, R. H. 1951: Equality (London: George Allen and Unwin).

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Tully, J. 1995: Strange Multiplicity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Wolff, J. 1998: Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27: 97-122. Young, I. M. 1990: Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

5 Equal Treatment, Exceptions and Cultural Diversity Simon Caney

R e c e n t years h a v e seen a great e m p h a s i s , a m o n g political theorists, b o t h on t h e n e e d to a c c o m m o d a t e a n d respect cultural diversity o f various k i n d s a n d also on t h e s u p p o s e d i n a d e q u a c i e s o f existing v e r s i o n s o f l i b e r a l i s m in a d d r e s s i n g such diversity fairly. S o m e , such as Will K y m l i c k a , h a v e s o u g h t to r e c o n s t r u c t liber­ a l i s m a n d to show h o w liberal p r i n c i p l e s actually justify the p r o t e c t i o n of m i n o r ­ ity cultures ( 1 9 9 5 : 2 0 0 1 ) . O t h e r s see n o h o p e for liberal p r i n c i p l e s , a r g u i n g that they h a v e p r o v e d i n a d e q u a t e to deal w i t h m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies. T h e y t h u s ex­ coriate liberalism for b e i n g inherently unfair to cultural m i n o r i t i e s . In h i s Culture and Equality ( 2 0 0 1 a ) , Brian B a r r y defends the traditional liberal individualistic r e s p o n s e a n d sharply criticizes w r i t e r s s u c h as B h i k h u P a r e k h , Iris M a r i o n Young, Tariq M o d o o d , J a m e s Tully and, indeed, Will K y m l i c k a . I a m highly s y m p a t h e t i c to B a r r y ' s political p h i l o s o p h y in general. L i k e h i m , I believe that an egalitarian liberal a p p r o a c h that m a n d a t e s extensive redistribu­ tion a n d defends the civil a n d political liberties o f all individuals is correct. I a g r e e , moreover, w i t h what B a r r y calls his ' t w o - p r o n g e d ' r e s p o n s e to t h e m u l t i ­ culturalist critics, w h e r e a t w o - p r o n g e d r e s p o n s e a r g u e s that t h e criticisms either rest o n m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f the n a t u r e of liberalism or get liberalism right b u t are s i m p l y u n p e r s u a s i v e (CE: 118; cf. also p . 8). N o n e t h e l e s s , w i t h i n this b r o a d c o n t e x t o f a g r e e m e n t there are a n u m b e r o f issues o n w h i c h I think B a r r y ' s a r g u ­ m e n t is u n p e r s u a s i v e or i n c o m p l e t e . To d e v e l o p t h e s e criticisms I w a n t first to outline his position in m o r e length a n d to m a k e several clarificatory r e m a r k s . I shall then criticize B a r r y ' s c o n t e n t i o n that the state s h o u l d a d o p t e x c e p t i o n l e s s r u l e s and should not m a k e e x e m p t i o n s for cultural m i n o r i t i e s . In m y third section I a r g u e that B a r r y ' s liberal t h e o r y m u s t , a n d d o e s , rest o n an a c c o u n t o f p e r s o n s ' h i g h e r - o r d e r interests a n d on a critique o f the m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s t s ' a c c o u n t o f p e r s o n s ' h i g h e r - o r d e r interests. B a r r y ' s a c c o u n t is, I shall a r g u e , u n d e v e l o p e d a n d 1

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h e fails to establish w h a t is w r o n g w i t h t h e a c c o u n t o f h i g h e r - o r d e r interests o n w h i c h a r g u m e n t s for multicultural p o l i c i e s d e p e n d . T h i s section a g a i n p r o v i d e s s o m e s u p p o r t for s o m e m e a s u r e s for protecting p e o p l e ' s cultural identities, m e a s ­ ures that B a r r y rejects. M y final section, however, t u r n s to a critique o f s o m e p r e ­ vailing a s s u m p t i o n s m a d e b y t h o s e in favour o f cultural rights a n d a r g u e s that w e s h o u l d not u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y a s s u m e that cultural p r a c t i c e s a n d n o r m s o u g h t to b e protected.

1. A Preliminary of Culture and

Equality

Let m e b e g i n t h e n b y outlining four key features o f B a r r y ' s general a p p r o a c h . First, as w a s stated above, B a r r y defends a liberal p r o g r a m m e o f individual civil a n d political liberties. Second, a n d related to this, h e defends t h e ideal of state neutrality w h e r e this stipulates that t h e state's a d o p t i o n o f any p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e s h o u l d n o t be g r o u n d e d in a c o n c e p t i o n o f the g o o d (CE: 2 5 - 9 ) . A third feature o f B a r r y ' s a c c o u n t is that all citizens have t h e s a m e liberal rights. T h i s follows from B a r r y ' s egalitarianism. H e is o p p o s e d to difference-sensitive policies that allocate s o m e rights d e n i e d to o t h e r s . To give s o m e e x a m p l e s , B a r r y is critical o f the d e c i s i o n to allow J e w s a n d M u s l i m s an e x e m p t i o n from laws c o n c e r n i n g t h e h u m a n e killing o f a n i m a l s for food (CE: 4 0 - 2 ) . H e is also critical o f the d e c i s i o n t o allow S i k h s to b e e x e m p t from the law that r e q u i r e s m o t o r c y c l e u s e r s t o w e a r c r a s h h e l m e t s (CE: 4 4 - 9 ) . B a r r y ' s v i e w is that if t h e r e is a r a t i o n a l e for a rule, it should, a l m o s t always, b e a p p l i e d u n s w e r v i n g l y a n d w i t h o u t deviation (CE: 32-A9). Privileges s h o u l d n o t b e g r a n t e d to s o m e j u s t in virtue o f their social identity. B a r r y t h u s e n d o r s e s a difference-blind c o n c e p t i o n o f rights (CE: 7 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 3 , 2 4 , 3 2 , 7 1 ) . Fourth, a n d finally, it is worth stressing that B a r r y ' s liberal v i e w is i n t e n d e d to have global applicability a n d is n o t i n t e n d e d to a p p l y only to m o d e r n w e s t e r n d e m o c r a c i e s (CE: 1 3 2 - 3 , 136—40, 2 8 3 - 6 ) . T h e r e is, of c o u r s e , m u c h m o r e to B a r r y ' s egalitarian liberalism ( i n c l u d i n g its p o s i t i o n o n distributive j u s t i c e ) , b u t t h e a b o v e are t h e e l e m e n t s of liberalism that are m o s t relevant to h i s discussion of multiculturalism. H a v i n g o u t l i n e d B a r r y ' s vision, it is w o r t h situating it in t h e c o n t e x t of c u r r e n t d e b a t e s a b o u t cultural diversity. B a r r y ' s b o o k is subtitled ' A n Egalitarian C r i t i q u e o f M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' , b u t it is interesting to n o t e that m a n y o f the m e a s u r e s d e f e n d e d by c o n t e m p o r a r y multiculturalists are a c c e p t a b l e to Barry. J a c o b L e v y h a s p r o d u c e d a useful t a x o n o m y o f t h e t y p e s o f m e a s u r e a d o p t e d in t h e n a m e o f cultural j u s t i c e . H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n the following: 1. 2. 3. 4.

E x e m p t i o n s from laws w h i c h p e n a l i z e or b u r d e n cultural p r a c t i c e s . A s s i s t a n c e to d o t h o s e t h i n g s the majority can d o unassisted. S e l f - g o v e r n m e n t for ethic [sic], cultural, or ' n a t i o n a l ' m i n o r i t i e s . E x t e r n a l r u l e s restricting n o n - m e m b e r s ' liberty to p r o t e c t m e m b e r s ' culture.

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Internal rules for m e m b e r s ' c o n d u c t enforced by ostracism, e x c o m m u n i ­ cation. R e c o g n i t i o n / e n f o r c e m e n t o f traditional legal c o d e b y t h e d o m i n a n t legal system. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f m i n o r i t i e s in g o v e r n m e n t b o d i e s , g u a r a n t e e d or facilitated. S y m b o l i c c l a i m s to a c k n o w l e d g e the w o r t h , status, o r e x i s t e n c e o f various g r o u p s . ( L e v y 2 0 0 0 : 127)

W i t h this in mind, it is i m p o r t a n t to r e c o r d that B a r r y actually e n d o r s e s a c o n ­ siderable n u m b e r of these. C o n s i d e r , first, ' e x e m p t i o n s ' . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g his strong e m p h a s i s o n u n b e n d i n g rules, B a r r y d o e s , however, allow e x c e p t i o n s for t w o t y p e s o f r e a s o n . H e a c c e p t s , for e x a m p l e , that t h e r e are powerful pragmatic r e a s o n s for n o t w i t h d r a w i n g already existing e x e m p t i o n s . To d o so w o u l d b e likely to u n d e r m i n e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n the state a n d m e m b e r s o f s o m e cultural m i n o ­ rities (CE: 5 0 - 1 ; b u t also p p . 5 1 - 4 ) . Second, h e allows that deviations from r u l e s are s o m e t i m e s s a n c t i o n e d b y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f j u s t i c e . H e gives three s u c h e x a m ­ ples. First, h e allows that Sikhs w o r k i n g o n b u i l d i n g sites m a y be e x e m p t e d from the r u l e that builders m u s t w e a r h a r d hats. His r e a s o n i n g for this is that Sikhs are heavily d e p e n d e n t o n the b u i l d i n g b u s i n e s s (CE: 4 9 - 5 0 ) . Second, he a c c e p t s that s c h o o l s m a y i m p o s e a dress c o d e o n their s t u d e n t s , b u t that s o m e m a y b e e x e m p t e d (CE: 6 1 - 2 ) . Third, h e t h i n k s that t h e r e s h o u l d b e a r u l e against e m ­ ployers d i s c r i m i n a t i n g against j o b a p p l i c a n t s b e c a u s e o f their religion, b u t a c c e p t s that religious institutions should b e e x e m p t from this r u l e (CE: 1 6 7 - 8 , 1 7 5 - 6 ) . O n this issue, the difference b e t w e e n Barry, on t h e o n e hand, a n d Taylor ( 1 9 9 2 : 6 0 - 1 ) , P a r e k h ( 1 9 9 5 : 3 1 4 ; 2 0 0 0 : 2 4 3 - 4 ) a n d K y m l i c k a ( 1 9 9 5 : 1 1 4 - 1 5 ) , o n the other, is t h u s s i m p l y o n e o f d e g r e e . C o n s i d e r also ' s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ' . B a r r y a c c e p t s that ' m u c h of every n o r m a l individual's w e l l - b e i n g derives from m e m b e r s h i p in a s s o c i a t i o n s a n d c o m m u ­ nities. If the fulfilment o f individuals d e p e n d s o n t h e flourishing o f g r o u p s , it follows that g r o u p s m u s t have rights o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ' (CE: 117). H e d o e s stress that t h e latter c o m e at a cost, but that does n o t detract from t h e p o i n t that h e e n d o r s e s the value o f s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t (CE: 2 2 6 ) . Indeed, h e h a s e l s e w h e r e e n d o r s e d self-determination for t h e Scots if a majority o f Scots w e r e to favour it ( 1 9 9 9 : 5 6 ) . H e also w r o t e a powerful defence o f n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , ' S e l f - G o v e r n m e n t R e v i s i t e d ' , a c o n s i d e r a b l e t i m e before the r e c e n t d e b a t e s o n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ( 1 9 9 1 : 1 5 6 - 8 6 : cf. also B a r r y 1987). If w e turn n o w t o t h e fourth c a t e g o r y L e v y m e n t i o n s , ' e x t e r n a l r u l e s ' , a m e a s u r e e n d o r s e d b y writers such as K y m l i c k a ( 1 9 9 5 : 3 5 - 4 4 , 1 0 9 - 1 0 , 123, 152; 2 0 0 1 : 2 2 ) , w e can s e e h e r e too that B a r r y is not o p p o s e d in p r i n c i p l e to such poli­ cies. H e is, o f c o u r s e , critical ( a n d rightly) of those w h o invoke external r u l e s to p r o t e c t rights a b u s e s . B u t I d o n o t t h i n k that h e is o p p o s e d to external rules p e r se a n d h e h a s d e f e n d e d the right of states to e n g a g e in cultural p r o t e c t i o n i s m to p r o t e c t their o w n w a y s o f life ( 1 9 9 8 a : 1 2 - 2 5 , especially 1 3 - 1 5 , 1 9 - 2 2 ) . T h u s , in

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a d i s c u s s i o n o f free t r a d e h e e n d o r s e d t h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t ' s decision to restrict t h e n u m b e r o f U S films and series o n F r e n c h television (ibid.: 13; cf. also 1 9 9 1 : 1 8 2 - 3 ) a n d h e a r g u e d for m e a s u r e s to protect E n g l i s h rural life a n d l a n d s c a p e s (1998a: 2 1 - 2 ) . Consider, finally, L e v y ' s fifth category, ' i n t e r n a l r u l e s for m e m b e r s ' c o n d u c t e n f o r c e d b y o s t r a c i s m , e x c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' ( 2 0 0 0 : 127). A s L e v y e m p l o y s this cat­ egory, it refers t o the d e m a n d that associations s h o u l d n o t b e r e q u i r e d to act a c c o r d i n g to liberal values. B a r r y , however, m e e t s this d e m a n d for his egalitar­ ian l i b e r a l i s m a n d d o e s n o t c l a i m that s e c o n d a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s (like c h u r c h e s or m o s q u e s ) m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y b e egalitarian or liberal in their internal o r g a n i z a t i o n (CE: 128, 1 3 1 , 147, 1 5 6 - 9 , 165). C h u r c h e s can, for e x a m p l e , d i s c r i m i n a t e against w o m e n (CE: 176). T h e y can, also, b e g o v e r n e d in an u n d e m o c r a t i c way. E g a l i ­ tarian l i b e r a l i s m s p e a k s to the p r i n c i p l e s that s h o u l d b e a d o p t e d b y political authorities s u c h as states - n o t all h u m a n a s s o c i a t i o n s . Indeed, B a r r y criticizes o n e leading multiculturalist - Will K y m l i c k a - for b e i n g t o o intrusive in t h e lives o f c o m m u n i t i e s (CE: 1 6 2 - 5 ) . 2

T h u s w e c a n see that there is a c o n s i d e r a b l e a m o u n t o f c o m m o n g r o u n d . I a m not, o f c o u r s e , a r g u i n g that there is n o real d i s p u t e b e t w e e n B a r r y a n d t h o s e h e criticizes; t h a t w o u l d b e absurd. B a r r y rejects s o m e of t h e m e a s u r e s listed b y L e v y and, even w h e r e h e a g r e e s on t h e legitimacy o f a class o f action ( s u c h as e x e m p ­ tions), he allows far fewer i n s t a n c e s o f that t y p e o f action t h a n d o t h o s e h e crit­ icizes. M y c l a i m is j u s t that w i t h i n t h e controversy t h e r e is m u c h c o m m o n g r o u n d . If I a m right, B a r r y ' s b o o k is n o t so m u c h ' a n egalitarian critique o f m u l t i c u l t u r ­ a l i s m ' as an egalitarian s t a t e m e n t o f w h i c h m e a s u r e s p u t forward in t h e n a m e o f cultural j u s t i c e are a c c e p t a b l e a n d w h i c h are n o t . H a v i n g set t h e s c e n e , however, let m e t u r n t o o n e o f B a r r y ' s key t e n e t s . 3

2. The Rule-and-Exemption Approach' Considered A s I have m e n t i o n e d above, B a r r y m a i n t a i n s that t h e r e s h o u l d rarely b e e x e m p t i o n s to r u l e s a n d h e is sharply critical o f multiculturalist c l a i m s that e x c e p t i o n s to liberal l a w s should b e m a d e for v a r i o u s cultural m i n o r i t i e s . B a r r y t e r m s this t h e ' r u l e - a n d e x e m p t i o n a p p r o a c h ' (CE: 3 3 ) . H i s r e s p o n s e to this is that either there is a g o o d a r g u m e n t for a r u l e , in w h i c h c a s e it s h o u l d apply, or t h e r e is a c a s e for an e x c e p ­ tion, but, if this case is p e r s u a s i v e it t e n d s to s h o w that t h e r u l e s h o u l d b e a b a n d o n e d altogether a n d not that t h e r u l e s h o u l d r e m a i n b u t b e qualified to allow e x c e p t i o n s (CE: 3 2 - 5 0 , especially p . 3 9 ) . To s h o w that there s h o u l d b e a r u l e p l u s an e x e m p ­ tion o n e h a s t o a r g u e that (1) t h e r e is a g o o d case for a rule, (2) there is s o m e r e a s o n for e x e m p t i n g s o m e from this rule, and (3) this r e a s o n p e r t a i n s only to s o m e a n d n o t to all (CE: 4 3 , 4 8 , 6 2 ) . B a r r y ' s v i e w is that t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s are rarely m e t , a l t h o u g h t h e r e will b e s o m e legitimate e x c e p t i o n s (CE: 3 3 , 3 9 , 171). H e n c e o n e s t a n d a r d t y p e o f multiculturalist policy is u n s o u n d . 4

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Legitimate exemptions A n a d h e r e n t to a difference-sensitive political m o r a l i t y can, I believe, m a k e three p o i n t s in r e s p o n s e to this. First, w e s h o u l d n o t e , as a p r e l i m i n a r y p o i n t , that w e think, o n m a n y o c c a s i o n s , that r u l e s w i t h e x e m p t i o n s are quite legitimate. T h i n k of s o m e e x a m p l e s u n r e l a t e d to cultural diversity: • • • • •

students m u s t h a n d in essays b y a fixed d e a d l i n e u n l e s s t h e y h a v e s o m e special excuse; p e o p l e s h o u l d n o t b e a r a r m s u n l e s s t h e y are soldiers; c o m m o d i t i e s s h o u l d b e subject to v a l u e - a d d e d t a x a t i o n , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f s o m e specific g o o d s ( s u c h as b o o k s ) ; transfers o f m o n e y s h o u l d b e taxed, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of d o n a t i o n s to regis­ t e r e d charities; p e r s o n s m a y m a r r y a n o t h e r p e r s o n o f t h e o p p o s i t e sex, w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f close family m e m b e r s a n d children.

E x c e p t i o n s are a staple o f e v e r y d a y life a n d w e r e c o g n i z e m a n y instances (includ­ ing t h o s e above) in w h i c h t h e y are perfectly sensible a n d fair. O t h e r e x a m p l e s are d i p l o m a t i c i m m u n i t y ( w h e r e w e a l l o w d i p l o m a t s t o b e e x e m p t from s o m e laws) a n d n o n - c o m b a t a n t i m m u n i t y ( w h e r e w e think that o n e subset o f p e o p l e s h o u l d n o t b e the i n t e n d e d object o f v i o l e n c e ) . A general p r e s u m p t i o n against h a v i n g r u l e s - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s is t h u s h a r d to sustain. N o n e o f t h e above e x a m p l e s , o f c o u r s e , raises i s s u e s o f cultural j u s t i c e . T h e y w e r e i n t e n d e d s i m p l y t o call into q u e s t i o n B a r r y ' s general a s s u m p t i o n that r u l e s - p l u s - e x c e p t i o n s are r a r e a n d gen­ erally p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y incoherent. L e t us n o w turn directly to the a p p l i c a t i o n o f this p o i n t to q u e s t i o n s o f cultural j u s t i c e . B a r r y ' s c l a i m , as w e have seen, is that few multiculturalist m e a s u r e s satisfactorily m e e t t h e three strictures listed a b o v e . I b e l i e v e that m o r e p r o p o s a l s t h a n h e c o u n t e n a n c e s c a n m e e t t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s . C o n s i d e r t h e following seven e x a m p l e s , all o f w h i c h are o f practical r e l e v a n c e . First, t h e c a s e o f t h o s e w h o a r g u e that M u s l i m students s h o u l d b e e x e m p t e d from t a k i n g e x a m i n a t i o n s o n days of r e l i g i o u s i m p o r t a n c e s u c h as E i d al-fitr. T h e latter takes p l a c e at t h e e n d o f R a m a d a n a n d is a day o f c e l e b r a t i o n o n w h i c h M u s l i m s visit their friends a n d family a n d e x c h a n g e gifts. Since R a m a d a n , a n d h e n c e E i d al-fitr, fall o n different dates e a c h year, o n e c a n n o t avoid the clash b y fixing, o n c e a n d for all, a date d u r i n g w h i c h s c h o o l a n d university e x a m s take p l a c e . G i v e n this, I w o u l d s u g g e s t h a v i n g a rule specifying w h e n e x a m s t a k e p l a c e a n d t h e n a n e x e m p t i o n a l l o w i n g M u s l i m s to t a k e their e x a m ( s ) at a later day if it c l a s h e s with E i d al-fitr. T h i s is i n d e e d t h e p r a c t i c e r e c o m m e n d e d b y t h e U K D e p a r t m e n t for E d u c a t i o n a n d E m p l o y m e n t (Versi 2 0 0 0 : 19). T h e c a s e for this is straightforward: if you t h i n k it w o u l d b e unfair t o h o l d e x a m i n a t i o n s o n C h r i s t m a s Day, t h e n y o u s h o u l d similarly t h i n k it unfair t o specify that M u s l i m s

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m u s t take e x a m i n a t i o n s d u r i n g E i d al-fitr. C o n s i d e r a p r o p o s a l to h o l d e x a m s in J u n e in t h e light o f the t h r e e criteria listed a b o v e . T h e r e is a g o o d c a s e for h o l d i n g e x a m i n a t i o n s t h e n b e c a u s e it is a c o n v e n i e n t t i m e o f year to assess end-of-year p r o g r e s s : h e n c e the rule. O n e s u b g r o u p h a s a r e a s o n for e x e m p t i o n (sitting the e x a m i n a t i o n s r e q u i r e s b e t r a y i n g their m o r a l obligations): h e n c e t h e e x e m p t i o n . T h i s r e a s o n a p p l i e s only to M u s l i m s a n d n o t to o t h e r s : h e n c e the r e t e n t i o n o f t h e rule. L e t us n o w c o n s i d e r a s e c o n d instance w h e r e a r u l e - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n is legiti­ m a t e . T h e c a s e c o n c e r n s M u s l i m s a n d t h e injunction to a t t e n d Friday prayers. C o n s i d e r t h e case o f M r A h m a d (Ahmad v. ILEA ( 1 9 7 8 ) a n d Ahmad v. UK ( 1 9 8 1 ) ) . M r A h m a d w a s a full-time s c h o o l t e a c h e r w h o a s k e d if h i s t e a c h i n g t i m e t a b l e c o u l d b e a r r a n g e d so that h e c o u l d a t t e n d Friday prayers. T h e s c h o o l refused, offering h i m p a r t - t i m e e m p l o y m e n t . W i t h o u t w a n t i n g to g o into the details o f this specific case, it s e e m s to m e r e a s o n a b l e , w h e r e p o s s i b l e , to orga­ n i z e t h e t e a c h i n g o f M u s l i m t e a c h e r s s u c h that t h e y h a v e free p e r i o d s o n Friday afternoon a n d c a n fulfil their q u o t a o f h o u r s b y n o t h a v i n g free p e r i o d s earlier in t h e w e e k . It is likely in m o s t cases to b e p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e it is a feature of sec­ o n d a r y t e a c h i n g in the U K that, a l t h o u g h t e a c h i n g t a k e s p l a c e from 9 a m to 4 p m e a c h w e e k d a y , t e a c h e r s d o n o t t e a c h for all t h o s e h o u r s a n d h a v e free p e r i o d s allotted in w h i c h to d o m a r k i n g . Teachers, in g e n e r a l , have five free p e r i o d s (that is, five h o u r s ) e a c h w e e k , so in o r d e r to a c c o m m o d a t e M r A h m a d it is n e c e s s a r y s i m p l y to adjust t h e t i m e t a b l e . A g a i n , t h e n , w e h a v e a r u l e ( t e a c h i n g will take p l a c e from M o n d a y to Friday a n d n o t o n w e e k e n d s ) a n d a c a s e for a n e x e m p t i o n ( t e a c h i n g o n Friday i m p o s e s a h e a v y cost o n M u s l i m s , for it p r e c l u d e s t h e m from M u s l i m w o r s h i p ) , b u t t h e c a s e for the e x e m p t i o n a p p l i e s only t o M u s l i m s . For a t h i r d e x a m p l e o f a legitimate r u l e - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n , c o n s i d e r a n o t h e r e x a m p l e c o n c e r n i n g M u s l i m s . M a n y s c h o o l s have a r u l e stipulating that all p u p i l s attend t h e s c h o o l c a n t e e n d u r i n g l u n c h t i m e ( i n c l u d i n g those w h o w o u l d rather p l a y outside). T h e justification o f this universal rule is p r e s u m a b l y , in part, that it enables t h e t e a c h e r s to k e e p an eye o n their c h a r g e s in a relatively efficient a n d e a s y way. P a r e n t s of M u s l i m c h i l d r e n h a v e , however, a s k e d if their children c o u l d b e e x e m p t e d from this d u r i n g t h e m o n t h o f R a m a d a n o n t h e g r o u n d s that it is n o t e a s y to k e e p to o n e ' s fast s u r r o u n d e d b y children d e v o u r i n g their l u n c h - even if it is s c h o o l l u n c h (Versi 2 0 0 0 : 19). T h i s s e e m s a r e a s o n a b l e e n o u g h r e q u e s t a n d c o u l d b e dealt w i t h at only m i n o r i n c o n v e n i e n c e : t h e students in q u e s t i o n could s i m p l y sit e l s e w h e r e . H e r e w e h a v e a g o o d case for a rule, p l u s a c a s e for e x e m p t ­ ing s o m e , a n d t h e reason for the e x e m p t i o n a p p l i e s j u s t to t h e m . A fourth instance w h e r e e x e m p t i o n s to rules m i g h t b e a p p r o p r i a t e c o n c e r n s s y m b o l i c a l l y significant j o b s , i n c l u d i n g , for e x a m p l e (but n o t restricted to), b e i n g a m e m b e r o f t h e p o l i c e force or a r m e d services. T h e r e are certain p r o f e s s i o n s w h e r e it is h i g h l y i m p o r t a n t that t h e y are n o t s e e n simply as t h e p r e s e r v e o f t h e majority. And, in s u c h c a s e s , o n e m i g h t have g o o d r e a s o n for a r u l e b u t also r e a s o n to waive it if it p r e c l u d e s cultural m i n o r i t i e s from t a k i n g u p that profession. O n e o f t h e j u d g e s i n v o l v e d in t h e A h m a d case, S c a r m a n , in fact m a d e this point, a r g u i n g that 5

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it w a s i m p o r t a n t n o t to e x c l u d e M u s l i m s from t e a c h i n g (Poulter 1 9 9 9 : 1 0 5 ) . B h i k h u P a r e k h e m p l o y s t h e s a m e r e a s o n i n g in h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e R o y a l C a n a d i a n M o u n t e d Police. T h e traditional u n i f o r m o f t h e latter involves c a r r y i n g a stetson, b u t o n e can r e a s o n a b l y a r g u e that an e x c e p t i o n should b e m a d e to this r u l e for Sikhs b e c a u s e t h e R C M P is a s y m b o l i c a l l y significant p r o f e s s i o n (Parekh 2 0 0 0 : 2 4 5 ; cf. p p . 2 4 4 - 5 ) . O n e can thus p r e s e r v e t h e stetson in t h e n a m e o f m a i n t a i n i n g tradition b u t g r a n t a special d i s p e n s a t i o n to s o m e in the n a m e o f integration. T h i s , indeed, w o u l d s e e m to e n c a p s u l a t e t h e spirit o f m u t u a l a d j u s t m e n t b e t w e e n the majority culture a n d i m m i g r a n t cultures that B a r r y h i m s e l f e n d o r s e s in h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f assimilation (CE: 72, 8 1 ; cf. M a s o n 2 0 0 0 : 145, n. 7 0 ) . For a fifth e x a m p l e , c o n s i d e r t h o s e w h o object to m i l i t a r y service o n c o n s c i ­ entious g r o u n d s . O n e c a n a r g u e that, in w a r t i m e , c o n s c r i p t i o n to t h e a r m e d forces is justified. O n e m i g h t , however, justify e x e m p t i n g t h o s e w h o s e c o n v i c t i o n s (secular or religious) forbid t h e t a k i n g o f life from s e r v i n g as soldiers o n the g r o u n d s that this i m p o s e s a n even greater cost o n t h e m t h a n it d o e s o n others. O n e p r o p o s a l t h u s m i g h t b e that pacifists m a y b e e x e m p t e d from m i l i t a r y service b u t m u s t serve in a n o t h e r c a p a c i t y (as m e d i c a l staff, s a y ) . 6

A sixth case for g r a n t i n g an e x e m p t i o n to a rule c o n c e r n s t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f rural c o m m u n i t i e s . O n e m i g h t a c c e p t as a general r u l e that t h e p r i c e a p e r s o n s h o u l d p a y w h e n b u y i n g a h o u s e s h o u l d b e dictated s i m p l y b y the m a r k e t . O n e c o n s e q u e n c e o f this, however, is that rural c o m m u n i t i e s are destroyed b e c a u s e w e a l t h y t o w n f o l k b u y u p h o u s e s in t h e c o u n t r y as h o l i d a y h o m e s to b e u s e d in the s u m m e r . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e rural c o m m u n i t y c a n n o t afford to live there a n d a w a y o f life is t h u s e r o d e d . To p r e v e n t this, a local political a u t h o r ­ ity m i g h t g r a n t an e x e m p t i o n to t h e r u l e (of t h e m a r k e t ) b y allocating s u b s i d i e s 7

(or other rights) to locals w h o w i s h to b u y h o u s e s : a n d it m i g h t d o so in t h e n a m e o f cultural j u s t i c e . 8

Finally, o n e m i g h t argue, at a m o r e general level, that s o m e p r o t e c t i o n i s t m e a s ­ u r e s constitute a n o t h e r legitimate k i n d o f r u l e - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n . A s in t h e p r e v i ­ ous e x a m p l e , o n e m i g h t d e f e n d t h e m a r k e t as a r u l e . B u t one m i g h t also t h i n k that s o m e g o o d s s h o u l d b e treated differently (via tariffs, subsidies or tax e x e m p ­ tions), n o t for e c o n o m i c or perfectionist r e a s o n s , b u t s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e g o o d in q u e s t i o n is an integral p a r t o f s o m e o n e ' s w a y of life. British farmers, for e x a m p l e , have a r g u e d for e x e m p t i o n s a n d subsidies o n this b a s i s . B a r r y h i m s e l f h a s e x p r e s s e d s y m p a t h y for this k i n d o f p o l i c y ( 1 9 9 8 a : 1 9 - 2 2 , especially 2 1 - 2 ) . T h e above seven cases r e p r e s e n t , I think, at least r e a s o n a b l e cases w h e r e a r u l e - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n is justified. If this is right, t h e n rather m o r e e x e m p t i o n s get t h r o u g h t h a n B a r r y w o u l d s e e m to r e c o g n i z e .

Exemptions and equal liberty I w a n t to s u p p l e m e n t the above a r g u m e n t for e x e m p t i o n s b y c o u n t e r i n g o n e intu­ ition that a p p e a r s to give s u p p o r t to B a r r y ' s position. O n e t h o u g h t that a p p e a r s to tell against a s y s t e m o f r u l e s - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s is that e x e m p t i o n s a r e unfair

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b e c a u s e t h o s e w h o are e x e m p t from a rule that constrains others h a v e m o r e freedom. E x e m p t i o n s t h u s violate e q u a l f r e e d o m . J a c o b L e v y gives e x p r e s s i o n to this view: ' E x e m p t i o n s . . . g r a n t liberties t o s o m e w h i c h others lack. T h i s is p a r ­ ticularly a p r o b l e m for r e p u b l i c a n or liberal t h e o r i e s w h i c h p l a c e o v e r w h e l m i n g i m p o r t a n c e on equal l i b e r t y ' (Levy 2 0 0 0 : 132). It is i m p o r t a n t , however, to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n two t y p e s of r u l e - p l u s e x e m p t i o n . S o m e d o s i m p l y e x e m p t p e o p l e from a b u r d e n that others h a v e to bear. O n e e x a m p l e o f this w o u l d b e a p r o h i b i t i o n o n b e a r i n g d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n s and t h e n e x e m p t i n g S i k h s from this rule. B a r r y d i s c u s s e s this e x a m p l e and, indeed, d o e s stress, against B h i k h u P a r e k h , that such laws are u n e q u a l (CE: 3 8 ) . A s such, this e x a m p l e l e n d s s u p p o r t to B a r r y ' s position. N o t all r u l e s - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s are, however, o f this character. In s o m e c a s e s , t h e p r o p o s a l is that t h e r e is a r u l e , that s o m e are e x e m p t from it, but that t h e y can m a k e it up in s o m e way. So pacifists can b e e x e m p t e d from m i l i t a r y service, b u t m a k e it u p b y d o i n g m e d i c a l w o r k . M u s l i m s c a n b e e x e m p t e d from t a k i n g e x a m s o n c e r t a i n d a y s , b u t b e r e q u i r e d t o d o t h e m o n o t h e r days. M u s l i m s can b e e x e m p t e d from w o r k i n g o n Friday after­ n o o n s , b u t m u s t m a k e u p t h e shortfall o f h o u r s o n o t h e r o c c a s i o n s . J e w s can t r a d e o n S u n d a y s , but, if t h e y d o , c a n n o t t r a d e o n S a t u r d a y s . Sikh b u i l d e r s are e x e m p t e d from d e m a n d s that t h e y w e a r h a r d h a t s , but, a c c o r d i n g to P a r e k h , h a v e less o f a c l a i m to c o m p e n s a t i o n in t h e event o f an a c c i d e n t ( P a r e k h 2 0 0 0 : 2 4 3 ^ ) . R u l e s p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s t h u s d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y y i e l d u n e q u a l liberties. O f c o u r s e , o n e can a r g u e that this p o i n t s t r e n g t h e n s B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t against r u l e s - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s in that it n o w a d d s a fourth condition that m u s t b e m e t . I w o u l d m a k e two c o u n t e r p o i n t s . First, I a m n o t c l a i m i n g that e x e m p t i o n s are legitimate only w h e n t h o s e e x e m p t e d m a k e u p t h e shortfall in s o m e way. O n e m i g h t g r a n t S i k h m e m b e r s o f t h e R C M P e x e m p t i o n from c a r r y i n g a stetson w i t h o u t c o m p e l l i n g t h e m to p a y for that privilege. Second, as t h e e x a m p l e s cited in the p r e v i o u s p a r a g r a p h show, m a n y r u l e s - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s d o m e e t this additional egalitarian constraint.

Cultural justice and new rules A final p o i n t a b o u t B a r r y ' s critique o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is that a l t h o u g h I h a v e b e e n d e f e n d i n g r u l e s - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s , it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that m a n y a d v o ­ cates o f cultural j u s t i c e are n o t in fact c a m p a i g n i n g for this. Rather, t h e y are c a m ­ p a i g n i n g for new rules, a r g u i n g that p r e v i o u s r u l e s or existing r u l e s are d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a n d p e r n i c i o u s . T h i s is a p p a r e n t from a c u r s o r y e x a m i n a t i o n o f r e c e n t instances w h e r e individuals a n d c o m m u n i t i e s h a v e c h a l l e n g e d existing laws. R e c e n t c a m p a i g n s i n c l u d e , for e x a m p l e , a S i k h w h o c h a l l e n g e d a b u s c o m p a n y w h i c h insisted that b u s c o n d u c t o r s m u s t w e a r a c a p a n d a Sikh w h o c h a l l e n g e d a t r a n s p o r t c o m p a n y that stipulated that all e m p l o y e e s m u s t b e clean shaven (Poulter 1999: 2 8 5 - 6 ) . W h a t is b e i n g c a l l e d for h e r e is n o t an e x e m p t i o n b u t the r e p u d i a t i o n o f an o b t u s e r u l e . Turning from historical cases to the p r o ­ p o s a l s m a d e b y a c a d e m i c s a n d p r e s s u r e g r o u p s , it is again n o t a b l e that m u c h o f

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their p r o g r a m m e is not calling for e x e m p t i o n s to r u l e s , b u t for n e w rules. O n e p r o m i n e n t p r o p o s a l , for e x a m p l e , is for a rule to p r o h i b i t d i s c r i m i n a t i n g against p e o p l e b e c a u s e o f their religion. T h i s h a s r e c e i v e d s u p p o r t from t h e U K A c t i o n C o m m i t t e e on I s l a m Affairs ( U K A C I A 1 9 9 3 : 18), the 1997 R u n n y m e d e Trust R e p o r t o n I s l a m a p h o b i a ( 1 9 9 7 : 5 6 - 9 ) , a n d t h e 2 0 0 0 R u n n y m e d e Trust R e p o r t (the P a r e k h R e p o r t ) , The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain ( 2 0 0 0 : 2 4 0 - 1 , 2 6 5 , 3 l l ) . A n o t h e r frequently m a d e p r o p o s a l is that t h e r e s h o u l d b e a law c r i m i n a l i z i n g i n c i t e m e n t s to r e l i g i o u s h a t r e d ( U K A C I A 1 9 9 3 : 17; R u n n y m e d e Trust 1 9 9 7 : 6 0 ) . T h i s is a r u l e in t h e sense that it p r o s c r i b e s i n c i t e m e n t to h a t r e d o f a n y religion; all religions are covered b y this r u l e . T h o s e w h o m B a r r y is criticizing are t h u s not n e c e s s a r i l y c o m m i t t e d to e x e m p t i o n s from r u l e s a n d are m o r e often t h a n n o t h a p p y for there t o b e new, m o r e sensitive, r u l e s . 9

To d e v e l o p t h e p o i n t further, it is w o r t h n o t i n g that in s o m e cases t h e o u t c o m e a s k e d for b y t h e m e m b e r s o f a cultural m i n o r i t y n e e d n o t in fact r e q u i r e a r u l e p l u s - e x e m p t i o n : it r e q u i r e s only a different rule. T h e existing rule s h o u l d b e neither r e t a i n e d n o r m o d i f i e d w i t h an e x e m p t i o n . It s h o u l d also n o t s i m p l y b e abolished: it s h o u l d b e recast or r e p l a c e d b y a n o t h e r law. L e t m e explain. C o n ­ sider t h e following: the rule-plus-exemption: 'One must not trade on Sundays with the exception of Jews who may do so' the rule: 'One must not trade on (at least) one day in the week' T h e s e d o not y i e l d identical o u t c o m e s . (For e x a m p l e , n o n - J e w s are p e r m i t t e d to t r a d e o n S u n d a y b y the rule, b u t p r o h i b i t e d from d o i n g so b y t h e r u l e - p l u s e x e m p t i o n . ) W h a t is pivotal, however, is that t h o s e w h o t h i n k it unfair t h a t J e w s should n o t b e allowed to w o r k o n S u n d a y s are n o t c o m m i t t e d to a r u l e - p l u s e x e m p t i o n b e c a u s e t h e y c a n instead g e t the o u t c o m e t h e y w i s h b y c a m p a i g n i n g for a ( n e w ) r u l e . A n d if this is s o , a refutation o f t h e c a s e for r u l e s - p l u s e x e m p t i o n s d o e s n o t u n d e r m i n e w h a t t h e y seek. W h a t is i m p o r t a n t in this e x a m p l e is h o w w e d e s c r i b e t h e action in question. J e w s w h o t r a d e o n S u n d a y c a n b e d e s c r i b e d either as b e i n g e x e m p t from a r u l e o f ' w o r k i n g M o n d a y t o Saturday a n d r e s t i n g o n S u n d a y ' or as c o m p l y i n g w i t h a r u l e o f ' w o r k i n g six days a w e e k a n d resting o n o n e d a y ' . W h e t h e r w e d e s c r i b e their c o n d u c t as c o m p l y i n g w i t h a r u l e or as constituting an e x e m p t i o n t o a rule j u s t d e p e n d s o n w h a t description o f t h e action is taken. In cases such as this ( a n d I a m n o t c l a i m i n g that all cases fall into this c a t e g o r y ) , a critique o f r u l e s - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s d o e s n o t hit t h e nail o n the h e a d b e c a u s e t h e p r o p o n e n t s o f such r u l e s - a n d - e x e m p t i o n s are funda­ m e n t a l l y c o m m i t t e d to a l l o w i n g a certain o u t c o m e a n d n o t to t h e m e a n s o f deliv­ ering that o u t c o m e ( r u l e s - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s ) . B a r r y is o p e n to t h e i d e a o f r e c a s t i n g existing r u l e s (CE: 3 9 ) . However, if this is t h e c a s e , t h e n t h e r e is m u c h less o f a g a p b e t w e e n h i s p o s i t i o n a n d that o f m u l ­ ticulturalists, for w r i t e r s s u c h as P a r e k h call for ' m o r e flexible r u l e s ' ( 2 0 0 0 : 2 4 7 ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , to t h e extent that t h e objectives o f an e x e m p t i o n a d d e d to a rule can

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b e m e t ( w i t h o u t other u n a c c e p t a b l e side-effects) b y a r e f o r m u l a t e d r u l e , criticisms o f r u l e s - p l u s - e x e m p t i o n s fail to u n d e r m i n e t h e f u n d a m e n t a l m o r a l p o i n t b e i n g m a d e b y multiculturalists.

3. The Significance of Cultural Practices 1 have d e f e n d e d a n u m b e r o f e x e m p t i o n s t o o t h e r w i s e universal r u l e s . I n o w w a n t to explore in g r e a t e r d e p t h t h e t h e o r y u n d e r l y i n g B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t against grant­ ing an e x e m p t i o n to a r u l e w h e r e t h e latter contradicts s o m e o n e ' s cultural p r a c ­ t i c e . In s e e k i n g t o justify or reject any p r o p o s e d e x e m p t i o n to a r u l e , it is imperative to establish w h e t h e r there are cogent r e a s o n s that p e r t a i n to s o m e (the w o u l d - b e recipients o f t h e e x e m p t i o n ) that d o n o t a p p l y to others ( w h o w o u l d b e b o u n d b y t h e r u l e ) . T h e multiculturalist c a s e is that t h e r e are and that they stem from people's cultural identity. B a r r y ' s claim is that t h e latter s h o u l d n o t inform the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e . J u s t i c e s h o u l d b e blind to s u c h differ­ e n c e s . So let m e turn n o w to the s e c o n d aspect o f B a r r y ' s p o s i t i o n I w i s h to q u e s ­ tion. In this section I w i s h to a r g u e that B a r r y ' s p o s i t i o n m u s t , a n d d o e s , rest o n a n a c c o u n t o f p e o p l e ' s h i g h e r - o r d e r interests. H e fails, however, t o p r o v i d e a full defence o f it a n d to u n d e r m i n e t h e sort o f c l a i m s a b o u t p e r s o n s ' interests t h a t u n d e r p i n a r g u m e n t s for cultural j u s t i c e . M y a r g u m e n t is d e v e l o p e d v i a six points. First, it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that any t h e o r y o f distributive j u s t i c e m u s t o p e r a t e w i t h an a c c o u n t o f p e o p l e ' s interests ( K y m l i c k a 1988: 1 8 5 - 9 0 ) . To d e t e r m i n e t h e distribution o f b u r d e n s and benefits, a t h e o r y o f distributive j u s t i c e m u s t obvi­ o u s l y say b o t h w h a t constitutes a b u r d e n and a benefit a n d also why. A n d to p e r f o r m this task a t h e o r y m u s t rely o n s o m e v i e w s a b o u t p e r s o n s ' interests. To see why, c o n s i d e r t h e alternative. C o n s i d e r a t h e o r y w h i c h states that p e r s o n s are entitled to certain r e s o u r c e s b u t fails to say w h y t h e s e t h i n g s c o u n t ( D w o r k i n 2 0 0 0 : 6 5 - 1 1 9 ) . T h i s w o u l d b e v u l n e r a b l e to t h e c h a r g e that A m a r t y a Sen h a s per­ suasively m a d e against R a w l s ' s c l a i m t h a t ' p r i m a r y g o o d s ' are w h a t are of fun­ d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e for a t h e o r y o f distributive j u s t i c e . Sen's p o i n t is that to r e g a r d ' p r i m a r y g o o d s ' as w h a t fundamentally m a t t e r is to b e guilty o f fetishism, for it treats w h a t is o f i n s t r u m e n t a l value as h a v i n g intrinsic value ( S e n 1982: 3 6 6 , 3 6 8 ; 1987: 1 6 - 1 7 ) . To avoid this, then, a t h e o r y o f distributive j u s t i c e has to defend w h a t is distributed b e c a u s e it enables s o m e m o r a l l y relevant capacities or h i g h e r - o r d e r interests. T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s p r o v i d e s u p p o r t for t h e v i e w s o f G. A . C o h e n a n d Sen, w h e r e t h e s e m a i n t a i n that states should b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h p e o p l e ' s ' c a p a b i l i t y to function' (Sen 1982; 1987) or their ' a c c e s s to a d v a n t a g e ' ( C o h e n 1989; 1993). L e t m e a d d two ancillary p o i n t s . First, to say that w e s h o u l d t a k e p e r s o n s ' interests into a c c o u n t w h e n c o n s t r u c t i n g a t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e is not t o say that ' e q u a l t r e a t m e n t entails equal i m p a c t ' (CE: 3 5 ) . A s such, it is n o t v u l n e r a b l e to B a r r y ' s refutation o f that position (CE: 3 4 - 8 ) . Second, the a b o v e a r g u m e n t d o e s n o t define

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religious g r o u p w h i c h n e e d to b e c o n s i d e r e d . First, t h e r e a r e religious c o m m u ­ nities s u c h as t h e A m i s h , w h i c h are n o t politically o r g a n i z e d b o d i e s d e p l o y i n g d e v o l v e d state p o w e r b u t g r o u p s w h o s e authority d e p e n d s o n t h e w i l l i n g n e s s o f m e m b e r s to s u b m i t to g r o u p d e c i s i o n s . T h e q u e s t i o n in this case, for Barry, is s i m p l y w h e t h e r that s u b m i s s i o n is v o l u n t a r y (CE: 187). Second, t h e r e are reli­ g i o u s g r o u p s s u c h as the P u e b l o I n d i a n s , w h i c h are, essentially, self-governing, sub-state polities, w h o s e m e m b e r s are citizens. T h e q u e s t i o n in this instance is w h e t h e r a sub-state can, ' c o n s i s t e n t l y with liberal p r i n c i p l e s , o p e r a t e a religious test for t h e e n j o y m e n t o f t h e benefits o f m e m b e r s h i p ' (CE: 189). B a r r y ' s a n s w e r to b o t h o f t h e s e q u e s t i o n s is ' n o ' . L e t u s c o n s i d e r t h e s e c a s e s in turn. W i t h respect t o t h e P u e b l o , B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t is that, b e c a u s e t h e y constitute n o t a religiously defined c o m m u n i t y b u t a political society, t h e y c a n n o t r u n a s u b state that is religiously exclusive. T h u s the P u e b l o authorities c o u l d n o t d e n y a c c e s s to c o m m u n a l r e s o u r c e s a n d functions to those P u e b l o Indians w h o h a d b e c o m e Protestant C h r i s t i a n s . In A m e r i c a n law, h a d t h e federal c o u r t s a c c e p t e d j u r i s d i c t i o n in the c a s e b r o u g h t b y these C h r i s t i a n P u e b l o , they w o u l d have to h a v e found in their favour o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e First A m e n d m e n t g u a r a n t e e o f freedom o f religion. B a r r y ' s p o i n t is that states are n o t v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s , so l i b e r a l i s m requires that individuals w i t h i n t h e m h a v e certain f r e e d o m s , i n c l u d i n g f r e e d o m o f religion. R e l i g i o u s a s s o c i a t i o n s can restrict religious f r e e d o m - b u t only p r o v i d e d t h e y m e e t the test o f b e i n g v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s . T h e P u e b l o authorities c a n n o t h a v e it b o t h w a y s : m a i n t a i n the status o f a sub-state a n d b e free t o restrict r e l i g i o u s f r e e d o m . W h a t is a s s u m e d b u t u n a r g u e d in all this, however, is that sub-states o u g h t to b e liberal. B u t w h y s h o u l d this b e so? T h i s is an a w k w a r d question, b e c a u s e b o t h a n s w e r s to it are right, d e p e n d i n g o n h o w the ' o u g h t ' or ' s h o u l d ' is read. A n y liberal w o u l d a r g u e that sub-states o u g h t to b e liberal sub-states in t h e sense that it w o u l d b e preferable that t h e y b e so. It w o u l d b e g o o d if sub-states ran a l o n g libera] p r i n c i p l e s , j u s t as it w o u l d b e g o o d if all states did so. B u t t h e other side o f t h e question asks w h e t h e r sub-states s h o u l d b e forced to b e liberal s u b states. B a r r y ' s v i e w s e e m s to b e that they should, for t h e y are n o n - v o l u n t a r y associations. W h i l e I a g r e e that it w o u l d b e g o o d if sub-states like t h e P u e b l o w e r e t h e m ­ selves liberal polities, I w o u l d a r g u e that, in p r i n c i p l e , sub-states, like religiously defined c o m m u n i t i e s , o u g h t n o t to b e c o m p e l l e d to b e liberal. T h e larger q u e s ­ tion h e r e is o n e a b o u t t h e s t a n d i n g o f states w i t h i n a liberal federation a n d t h e p o i n t of t h e devolution of power. A t this p o i n t B a r r y d o e s not offer m u c h b y w a y o f a r g u m e n t b u t s i m p l y m a i n t a i n s that if ' t h e P u e b l o I n d i a n s w a n t to retain their special political status, t h e y s h o u l d b e r e q u i r e d to o b s e r v e t h e constraints o n t h e u s e o f political p o w e r that are i m p o s e d by liberal j u s t i c e ' (CE: 189). Yet o n e m i g h t equally a r g u e that o n e o f t h e m e r i t s o f a federation is that it allows differences o f ethical o u t l o o k , i n c l u d i n g differences over m a t t e r s of j u s t i c e , to coexist in a s y s t e m that r e c o g n i z e s different j u r i s d i c t i o n s and different authorities. A t t h e s a m e t i m e , a federation h a s t h e v i r t u e o f m a k i n g it p o s s i b l e for p e o p l e to m o v e 6

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n i n g B a r r y ' s egalitarian liberalism. O n c e w e d o s o , however, w e face q u e s t i o n (2), namely, w h y are these interests? W h a t is t h e r a t i o n a l e for this a c c o u n t ? F u r t h e r ­ m o r e , h o w d o w e c o m m e n s u r a t e a n d a g g r e g a t e t h e interests to p r o d u c e policy decisions? For e x a m p l e , w h e n B a r r y says that t h e rights o f p e o p l e to associate w i t h e a c h o t h e r s h o u l d b e b a l a n c e d against t h e r i g h t s ( a n d external costs) o f t h o s e e x p e l l e d or e x c l u d e d (CE: 1 5 2 - 3 ) , h o w d o e s o n e c o m m e n s u r a t e t h e s e costs? I am not arguing that Barry cannot answer these questions. M y m u c h m o r e m o d e s t p o i n t is s i m p l y that before w e a c c e p t B a r r y ' s egalitarian liberalism w e n e e d a n s w e r s t o these q u e s t i o n s , a n d it is n o t a p p a r e n t in Culture and Equality h o w w e v i n d i c a t e these interests. H e d o e s not, for e x a m p l e , d r a w u p o n his c o n tractarian t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e , as d e f e n d e d in Justice as Impartiality (1995). Without this (or s o m e o t h e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d ) , his c o n c e p t i o n o f h i g h e r - o r d e r inter­ ests r e m a i n s u n d e f e n d e d ; and, w i t h o u t this, h i s c l a i m that distributive j u s t i c e defines p e o p l e s ' e n t i t l e m e n t s solely in t e r m s o f i n c o m e a n d civil, e c o n o m i c a n d political rights (CE: 13, 35) also r e m a i n s u n d e f e n d e d . M y third p o i n t is that for B a r r y ' s critique to b e c o m p l e t e , h e m u s t n o t j u s t g r o u n d h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f h i g h e r - o r d e r interests; h e m u s t also s h o w that t h e a c c o u n t s o f o u r h i g h e r - o r d e r interests o n w h i c h multiculturalist a r g u m e n t s rest are defective in s o m e w a y (cf. q u e s t i o n s (3) a n d (4) above). We n e e d to k n o w w h y ' b e i n g able to p u r s u e o n e ' s cultural p r a c t i c e s ' is not, for Barry, a 'benefit' that s h o u l d b e c o u n t e d b y a t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e (CE: 3 8 - 9 ) . U n l e s s h e establishes this c o n c l u s i o n , his a r g u m e n t r e m a i n s unfinished a n d h i s c a s e u n p r o v e n . A n d this, I think, is t h e case. Conversely, to defend t h e state p r o t e c t i o n of cultural p r a c ­ tices, a t h e o r y m u s t , inter alia, p r o v i d e an a c c o u n t o f p e r s o n s ' interests, explain w h y p e r s o n s ' interests r e q u i r e t h e existence o f their culture a n d explain w h y this n e c e s s i t a t e s state action. To b e a r out this point, a n d illustrate it, I shall outline four t y p e s of a r g u m e n t , e a c h o f w h i c h links a p e r s o n ' s culture to their higherorder interests. In d o i n g so, I shall t r y to m o t i v a t e s u p p o r t for t h r e e o f t h e m . 1 0

T h e first t h r e e t y p e s o f a r g u m e n t are as follows. P e r s o n s h a v e a h i g h e r - o r d e r interest in t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f their cultural p r a c t i c e s b e c a u s e : 1. 2.

M e m b e r s h i p in their culture enables t h e m to m a k e c h o i c e s . B e l o n g i n g to a c o m m u n i t y is p a r t o f a g o o d life a n d h e n c e s h o u l d b e reflected in a c c o u n t s of p e r s o n s ' e n t i t l e m e n t s .

3.

M e m b e r s h i p in their o w n culture is causally c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e g o o d of 'self-respect'.

T h e s e first t h r e e c o n c e r n the sort o f ' b e n e f i t s ' w i t h w h i c h a t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e s h o u l d b e c o n c e r n e d . A fourth t y p e of a r g u m e n t a d d r e s s e s t h e n a t u r e of t h e ' b u r d e n s ' t h a t s h o u l d b e c o m p e n s a t e d . It m a i n t a i n s : 4.

T h e n a t u r e o f a b u r d e n is, in s o m e instances, culturally defined a n d h e n c e c o m p e n s a t i o n c a n n o t b e c o n d u c t e d in a difference-blind fashion; rather, it varies from p e r s o n to p e r s o n d e p e n d i n g o n their cultural identity.

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W h a t all four t y p e s o f a r g u m e n t s e e k to s h o w is that a culture-blind a p p r o a c h is i n a d e q u a t e b e c a u s e ( s o m e ) h i g h e r - o r d e r interests c a n n o t b e d i v o r c e d from a p e r s o n ' s culture. L e t m e c o n s i d e r e a c h in turn. I shall say little a b o u t (1), w h i c h is, o f c o u r s e , the a p p r o a c h d e v e l o p e d a n d d e f e n d e d by Will K y m l i c k a . In Multicultural Citi­ zenship ( 1 9 9 5 ) - o n e of the targets o f B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t s - K y m l i c k a a r g u e s that culture is (as m u c h as i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h ) a p r i m a r y g o o d (cf. K y m l i c k a 1989: I66ff) b e c a u s e it instantiates o p t i o n s from w h i c h p e o p l e can c h o o s e w h a t to d o in their lives. T h e c l a i m is that w i t h o u t t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f this culture p e o p l e will b e u n a b l e to exercise c h o i c e ( 1 9 8 9 : especially 1 3 5 - 2 0 5 ; 1995: especially 8 0 - 9 3 ; 2 0 0 1 : 5 3 - 5 ) . K y m l i c k a ' s t h e o r y is well k n o w n a n d I d o n o t w i s h to outline it in g r e a t depth. T h e salient p o i n t in this c o n t e x t is that it g r o u n d s the protection o f cultural identities on a specific a c c o u n t o f p e r s o n s ' h i g h e r - o r d e r interests. For B a r r y to s h o w this a r g u m e n t to b e defective, h e m u s t s h o w either t h a t p e r s o n s d o n o t h a v e this interest in a culture or that they d o a n d that this d o e s n o t r e q u i r e state support. N o t d o i n g so r e p r e s e n t s a l a c u n a in h i s refutation o f m u l t i c u l ­ turalism. H e criticizes K y m l i c k a o n m a n y q u e s t i o n s - including, for e x a m p l e , K y m l i c k a ' s t r e a t m e n t o f i m p o s i n g l i b e r a l i s m (CE: 1 3 8 - 4 1 ) a n d h i s t a x o n o m y o f cultural c o m m u n i t i e s (CE: 2 1 7 - 2 0 ) - b u t he d o e s n o t a d d r e s s the key p r i n c i p l e at t h e h e a r t o f K y m l i c k a ' s defence o f cultural rights. I w a n t , however, to g o further t h a n this a n d to s u g g e s t that (2), (3) a n d (4) h a v e s o m e validity: their a c c o u n t of p e r s o n s ' interests is p l a u s i b l e and this p r o v i d e s s u p p o r t for multiculturalist m e a s u r e s that B a r r y r e p u d i a t e s . L e t u s t u r n t h e n to (2), w h i c h n e e d s to b e d e v e l o p e d a n d e l a b o r a t e d further, a n d w h i c h m a k e s t h e following c l a i m : b e i n g a m e m b e r of a culture h a s v a l u e , n o t b e c a u s e it e n a b l e s c h o i c e , b u t j u s t b e c a u s e p e o p l e value b e l o n g i n g to a tradition ( B u c h a n a n 1 9 9 1 : 5 4 ) . T h e g o o d at stake celebrates c o n t i n u i t y w i t h t h e p a s t a n d t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f an existing cultural practice. It d o e s not, however, c l a i m that cultural practices s h o u l d b e p r e s e r v e d in an identical form for eternity. T h e c l a i m is that one g o o d is t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of a tradition w h e r e this is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a radical r u p t u r e or t h e tradition's c o m p l e t e d i s a p p e a r a n c e . T h e p o s i t i o n I a m s k e t c h i n g p l o u g h s a m i d d l e w a y b e t w e e n t h e v i e w that cultures m u s t b e p r e s e r v e d in a static form ( w h i c h is as u n d e s i r a b l e as it is i m p r a c t i c a l ) a n d t h e v i e w that t h e r e is n o p r o b l e m if a p e r s o n ' s culture is j u s t c o m p l e t e l y obliterated. T h i s , in itself, d o e s n o t g r o u n d any m e a s u r e s to defend cultural p r a c t i c e s . For that, w e n e e d the further a s s u m p ­ tion that the protection o f cultural p r a c t i c e s often necessitates state action. B a r r y i n d e e d q u e s t i o n s t h i s , a s k i n g w h y w e d o n o t j u s t give e v e r y o n e m o n e y (CE: 1 9 6 - 7 ) . T h e a p p r o p r i a t e a n s w e r t o this, however, is that s o m e t i m e s a collective r e s p o n s e is r e q u i r e d to r e s o l v e collective action p r o b l e m s a n d also t o resist t h e i m m e n s e p o w e r o f global m a r k e t s w h i c h t h r e a t e n s to e l i m i n a t e i n d i g e n o u s p r a c t i c e s b y p r o v i d i n g c h e a p e r c o m m o d i t i e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , one c a n n o t p r o t e c t a l a n g u a g e b y giving all individuals m o n e y : a collective p o l i c y is n e c e s s a r y to a c h i e v e this goal.

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O n t h e a c c o u n t I a m s u g g e s t i n g , t h e n , this g o o d s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d as a 'benefit' (there are o f c o u r s e m a n y others) a n d its lack as a ' b u r d e n ' , a n d h e n c e it s h o u l d b e reflected in a n y a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e j u s t i c e o f a state o f affairs. T h u s , c o n t r a Barry, two p e o p l e m a y enjoy t h e s a m e i n c o m e a n d civil a n d political liberties a n d yet n o n e t h e l e s s b e u n e q u a l in a m o r a l l y relevant sense (CE: 1 3 , 3 5 ) . To this, let m e a d d t w o p o i n t s . First, this r e a s o n i n g m a y b e e m p l o y e d to defend l a n g u a g e rights. Indeed, u n l e s s we a s s u m e s o m e t h i n g like the a c c o u n t o f an interest I have j u s t sketched, it is h a r d to see w h y states s h o u l d protect their o w n l a n g u a g e s a n d r e q u i r e p e o p l e to learn t h e m in s c h o o l . In his d i s c u s s i o n o f l a n g u a g e provision, B a r r y t e n d s t o r e g a r d l e a r n i n g a l a n g u a g e in t e r m s o f (a) its utility in securing a j o b (CE: 1 0 6 - 7 , 2 1 5 ) a n d (b) t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f b e i n g able to c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h e v e r y o n e in o n e ' s society (CE: 107). O n t h e basis o f t h e s e criteria, however, t h e r e w o u l d b e a c a s e for e v e r y o n e in t h e w o r l d to learn A m e r i c a n - E n g l i s h . U n l e s s w e a l l o w p e r s o n s to h a v e an interest in the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f their o w n culture, t h e n B a r r y m u s t r e l i n q u i s h his c l a i m that ' e v e r y b o d y s h o u l d h a v e an o p p o r t u n i t y to a c q u i r e the country's language' (CE: 107; m y e m p h a s i s ) . Second, o n e irony h e r e is that B a r r y h i m s e l f m a k e s a similar p o i n t a b o u t t h e right o f states to p r o t e c t their culture. A s w e h a v e seen earlier, h e defends t h e right o f states to e n g a g e in cultural p r o t e c t i o n i s m ( 1 9 9 1 : 1 8 2 - 3 ; 1 9 9 8 : 1 2 - 2 5 ) . T h i s point, however, surely applies w i t h the s a m e force t o g r o u p s w i t h i n t h e state. B a r r y m a y p e r h a p s b e h a p p y t o a c c e p t t h i s , b u t t h e n in d o i n g so h e is e m b r a c i n g w h a t Taylor is d e f e n d i n g in ' T h e Politics o f R e c o g n i t i o n ' ( 1 9 9 2 ) . H a v i n g d i s c u s s e d (2), let us n o w discuss (3). T h e third t y p e o f a r g u m e n t for the p r o t e c t i o n o f cultural practices w h i c h d r a w s on p e r s o n s ' h i g h e r - o r d e r inter­ ests defends cultural p r o t e c t i o n neither b e c a u s e it e n a b l e s c h o i c e nor b e c a u s e b e l o n g i n g is a good, b u t b e c a u s e it is t i e d to a n o t h e r p r i m a r y good, n a m e l y 'selfr e s p e c t ' . B a r r y briefly d i s c u s s e s this line o f r e a s o n i n g a n d is h i g h l y critical o f it (CE: 2 6 7 - 9 ) . M y v i e w is that t h e r e is m o r e to b e said for this t h a n B a r r y allows. Let m e b e g i n b y outlining t h e central a r g u m e n t . T h e a r g u m e n t p r o c e e d s as follows: first, it is highly i m p o r t a n t that p e r s o n s p o s s e s s ' s e l f - r e s p e c t ' . It is t h e n argued, second, t h a t this g o o d can, in s o m e i n s t a n c e s , b e s e c u r e d only t h r o u g h difference-sensitive policies. A s y s t e m o f difference-blind liberal rights m i g h t well result in s o m e p e r s o n s , in this c a s e s o m e m e m b e r s o f cultural m i n o r i t i e s , l a c k i n g this i m p o r t a n t p r i m a r y g o o d . H e n c e , w e s h o u l d a d o p t a differencesensitive a p p r o a c h . S u c h r e a s o n i n g is d e v e l o p e d b y a n u m b e r of t h i n k e r s , including Kymlicka (1995: 8 9 - 9 0 ; 2 0 0 1 : 24, 47, 233), Parekh (1995: 315), R a z and M a r g a l i t ( 1 9 9 4 : 119) a n d J a m e s Tully ( 1 9 9 5 : 1 8 9 - 9 1 ) . B a r r y d i s c u s s e s this r e a s o n i n g , focusing in p a r t i c u l a r o n Tully's discussion. A g a i n s t it h e m a k e s two p o i n t s . First, h e a r g u e s that to secure self-respect o n e n e e d s the r e s p e c t o f other p e o p l e but, h e a d d s , it n e e d n o t b e t h e respect o f all p e r s o n s : t h e r e s p e c t of other m e m b e r s of y o u r c o m m u n i t y / c o m m u n i t i e s w i l l suffice (CE: 2 6 8 ) . T h e v a l i d a t i o n o f one's v i e w s t h r o u g h t h e law is n o t r e q u i r e d and as such n o difference-sensitive laws are justified. Second, h e a r g u e s that Tully m i s c o n s t r u e s R a w l s , for on the R a w l s i a n v i e w p e r s o n s have a p r i m a r y g o o d in

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' t h e social b a s e s of self-respect' a n d n o t in ' s e l f - r e s p e c t ' p e r se, a n d further that the f o r m e r is s e c u r e d b y t h e n o r m a l liberal rights (CE: 2 6 8 - 9 ) . H o w p e r s u a s i v e is this r e s p o n s e ? I t h i n k o n e c a n m a k e two c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t s . First, B a r r y might b e right that self-respect requires only t h e r e s p e c t o f likem i n d e d p e r s o n s , b u t this is essentially an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n a n d I c a n see n o r e a s o n to think, in an a priori way, that in all i n s t a n c e s p e e r - g r o u p s u p p o r t is suf­ ficient. It d o e s not, for e x a m p l e , s e e m i n c o n c e i v a b l e to m e that o n e c o u l d h a v e a g r o u p o f p e o p l e w h o d o identify w i t h e a c h other b u t w h o are so d e s p i s e d a n d vilified b y the rest o f society that, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g their m e m b e r s h i p in a g r o u p o f l i k e - m i n d e d p e o p l e , t h e y lack self-confidence a n d respect for t h e m s e l v e s . A s I said, this is an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n a n d b e f o r e w e a c c e p t or reject B a r r y ' s p o s i t i o n h e r e w e n e e d to h a v e an e m p i r i c a l a s s e s s m e n t . A similar p o i n t c a n b e m a d e a b o u t B a r r y ' s s e c o n d point. H e is right to stress that there is a distinction b e t w e e n ' p o s s e s s i n g self-respect' a n d ' b e i n g p r o v i d e d w i t h political institutions that n o r m a l l y secure it'. R a w l s is, m o r e o v e r , right t o e m p h a s i z e t h e latter, for w e c a n n o t g u a r a n t e e that e a c h p e r s o n actually enjoys self-respect. W h a t m a t t e r s is creating social a n d political institutions that t e n d to foster it. T h e q u e s t i o n t h e n is: w h a t institutions will t e n d to g e n e r a t e ( a l t h o u g h n o t n e c e s s a r i l y g u a r a n t e e ) self-respect? R a w l s ' s a n s w e r - a n d it is o n e that B a r r y e n d o r s e s - is that civil a n d political rights c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e difference princi­ p l e (or p e r h a p s a m o r e egalitarian p r i n c i p l e ) will t e n d t o d o so (CE: 2 6 8 - 9 ; R a w l s 1999a: 2 0 5 - 6 , 4 7 7 - 8 ; a n d 1 9 9 9 b : 171). A g a i n , however, this is an e m p i r i c a l q u e s ­ tion and, as such, r e q u i r e s e m p i r i c a l confirmation. To r e t u r n a g a i n t o t h e e x a m p l e o f t h e vilified minority, c o n s i d e r M u s l i m s in c o n t e m p o r a r y w e s t e r n societies. Wealthy a n d powerful social institutions s u c h as t h e m e d i a a n d the film i n d u s t r y quite clearly d o s t i g m a t i z e all M u s l i m s as ' f u n d a m e n t a l i s t s ' , as ' f o r e i g n ' a n d as c o m m i t t e d to ' t e r r o r i s m ' ( R u n n y m e d e Trust 1997; 2 0 0 0 : 1 6 9 - 7 0 ; B B C 2 2 0 0 1 ) . Given t h e terrorist attacks of 11 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 1 , it is h i g h l y likely t h a t m e m b e r s o f M u s l i m m i n o r i t i e s in liberal states will b e t h e object o f vilification. It is t h u s conceivable that, for s o m e , liberal r i g h t s will n o t t e n d to g e n e r a t e self-respect a n d that additional p o l i c i e s are r e q u i r e d t o p r o m o t e t h e latter ( D w o r k i n 2 0 0 0 : 1 3 8 - 9 ) . T h e latter n e e d n o t take t h e form o f r e q u i r i n g ' t h a t t h e cultures o f different g r o u p s m u s t b e publicly affirmed as b e i n g o f e q u a l v a l u e ' (CE: 2 6 7 ) w h i c h , as B a r r y p o i n t s out, is intolerant a n d i n c o h e r e n t (CE: 2 6 9 - 7 1 ) . T h e y m i g h t , t h o u g h , i n c l u d e n o n - c o e r c i v e policies s u c h as g r a n t i n g r i g h t s o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n to d e s p i s e d n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s . S y m b o l i c acts o f r e c o g n i t i o n ( s u c h as i n c o r p o r a t i n g vilified cultural m i n o r i t i e s in n a t i o n a l c e r e m o n i e s ) m i g h t b e another. M y m a i n point, however, is n o t t o defend specific policies. It is that w h a t is at stake h e r e is an e m p i r i c a l d i s p u t e a b o u t t h e social b a s e s o f self-respect a n d that in a d v a n c e o f t h e e m p i r i c a l d a t a w e h a v e n o r e a s o n to a c c e p t that liberal rights a l o n e will b e sufficient. T h e c a s e for a d o p t i n g a culture-sensitive set o f r i g h t s c a n b e d e v e l o p e d further, as t h e sixth a n d final p a r t o f m y a r g u m e n t , if w e t u r n n o w to (4). T h u s far, w e h a v e d i s c u s s e d t h e sort o f a d v a n t a g e s w i t h w h i c h a t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e s h o u l d b e

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c o n c e r n e d . L e t u s , however, c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f h a r m s a n d their c o m p e n s a ­ tion. M y s u g g e s t i o n is that a w h o l l y culture-neutral c o n c e p t i o n o f d i s a d v a n t a g e s is n o t desirable. T h i s is distinct from t h e c l a i m a b o u t cultural c o n t i n u i t y (2) a n d t h e c l a i m a b o u t self-respect (3). It is a b o u t t h e fourth t y p e o f a r g u m e n t listed above, t h e intersubjective character of s o m e b u r d e n s . C o n s i d e r a n u m b e r o f legal issues. Consider, for e x a m p l e , t h e c a s e o f Seemi v. Seemi ( 1 9 9 0 ) : [A] Muslim woman was awarded £20,000 in an action for slander brought against her former husband, who had falsely accused her of not being a virgin on her wedding night. The court bore in mind the impact which a slur of this sort would have on a Muslim wife and her family, recognizing that it would be regarded by her community as a very grave insult in a way which would not be true of most accu­ sations of this nature made in England. (Poulter 1999: 64)

H e r e , it s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e that t h e w o m a n in q u e s t i o n s h o u l d receive g r e a t e r r e m u ­ neration t h a n a n o t h e r w o m a n w h o is also falsely said n o t to h a v e b e e n a virgin on h e r w e d d i n g day b u t w h o is a m e m b e r o f a culture in w h i c h chastity is n o t r e g a r d e d as essential to m o r a l purity. To a c c e p t t h i s , however, is to reject or qualify a p u r e l y culture-blind c o n c e p t i o n o f rights, for it is to treat ' p e o p l e differently in r e s p o n s e to their different culturally derived beliefs a n d p r a c t i c e s ' (CE: 17: cf. also 7, 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 3 ^ 4 , 3 2 , 3 9 , 7 1 ) . W h a t constitutes a b u r d e n may, thus, d e p e n d o n a p e r s o n ' s culture. A n o t h e r e x a m p l e illustrates t h e p o i n t b e i n g m a d e . T h e c a s e o f Bakhitiari v. The Zoological Society of London ( 1 9 9 1 ) involved an I r a n i a n girl w h o w a s attacked b y a c h i m p a n z e e , as a result o f w h i c h she lost three fingers. She w a s a w a r d e d m o r e m o n e y t h a n a n o t h e r child w o u l d h a v e b e e n o n t h e g r o u n d s that in h e r culture any physical i m p a i r m e n t s are s e e n as quite g r o t e s q u e and w o u l d seriously d a m a g e h e r m a r r i a g e p r o s p e c t s (Poulter 1999: 6 4 ) . A g a i n , there is a case for reflecting this in the award, w h i c h w o u l d m e a n treating h e r differently from a child suffering the s a m e a c c i d e n t but w h o is n o t a m e m b e r o f a cul­ ture with s u c h attitudes to s u c h m i n o r physical h a r m . To define p e o p l e ' s entitle­ m e n t s , then, solely w i t h r e s p e c t to civil, e c o n o m i c a n d political rights is thus inadequate. H e r e it is a p p r o p r i a t e to r e t u r n to t h e p o i n t s m a d e b y Sen a n d C o h e n against ' p r i m a r y g o o d s ' a n d ' r e s o u r c e s ' (cited above on p . 9 0 ) . O n e o f their key c o m ­ plaints against t h e latter is that to focus on r e s o u r c e s or p r i m a r y g o o d s is to b e inappropriately blind to the effects that r e s o u r c e s have a n d t h e u s e s to w h i c h they can be p u t ( S e n 1982, 1987; C o h e n 1989, 1 9 9 3 ) . We s h o u l d b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h their effects. B u i l d i n g o n this, I h a v e a r g u e d that w e s h o u l d factor p e o p l e ' s ability to p u r s u e their culture into their e n t i t l e m e n t s . T h i s in turn m o v e s u s a w a y from Barry's account of persons' entitlements. C o h e n , it s h o u l d b e noted, h a s a p p l i e d his egalitarian t h e o r y t o m u l t i c u l t u r a l ­ ism. In a p e n e t r a t i n g article entitled ' E x p e n s i v e Tastes a n d M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' h e 11

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a r g u e s , in line w i t h his earlier w o r k ( 1 9 8 9 , 1 9 9 3 ) , that j u s t i c e r e q u i r e s that p e r s o n s s h o u l d b e c o m p e n s a t e d for involuntary e x p e n s i v e tastes ( 1 9 9 9 : 8 3 - 7 ) . A s h e t h e n a r g u e s , if w e a c c e p t this, w e s h o u l d a c c e p t s o m e state s u p p o r t for m i n o r i t y cultures b e c a u s e , a n d to the extent that, they are relevantly a n a l o g o u s (ibid.: 8 1 , 8 9 - 9 0 , 9 9 - 1 0 0 ) . C o n t r a B a r r y , t h e n , e g a l i t a r i a n i s m n e e d not result in a critique of multiculturalism. 12

4. The Limits of Cultural Justice I have argued t h u s far that B a r r y ' s critique o f multiculturalist m e a s u r e s r u l e s out s o m e m e a s u r e s that s h o u l d b e a c c e p t e d . In t h e r e m a i n d e r o f this c h a p t e r I w a n t to qualify the a b o v e a r g u m e n t s a n d to d r a w attention to a w e a k n e s s in a n u m b e r o f a r g u m e n t s for cultural j u s t i c e . To m a k e m y a r g u m e n t , two p o i n t s s h o u l d b e m a d e . First, it is o f crucial i m p o r ­ t a n c e to clarify t h e c o n c e p t o f a c u l t u r e . A s m a n y , i n c l u d i n g Barry, o b s e r v e , t h e t e r m ' c u l t u r e ' i n c l u d e s w i t h i n it m a n y disparate p h e n o m e n a . It i n c l u d e s , for e x a m p l e , c u s t o m s a n d h a b i t s - e.g. l a n g u a g e (CE: 107) - w h i c h d o n o t m a k e b e l i e f claims a n d o f w h i c h n o p o s i t i o n is better t h a n another. It also i n c l u d e s , however, b e l i e f c l a i m s , a n d h e r e , to say 'it's p a r t o f m y c u l t u r e ' is, as B a r r y b r i n g s out, n o a r g u m e n t (CE: 2 5 2 - 8 , 2 7 0 ; J o n e s 1994: 2 1 8 - 1 9 ; 1999: 8 1 - 3 ; W a l d r o n 2 0 0 0 : 1 6 4 - 5 , 1 6 9 - 7 1 ) . Second, it is w o r t h n o t i n g that if ' c u l t u r e ' i n c l u d e s t h e beliefs a n d values h e l d b y a g r o u p o f p e o p l e , it follows that t h e r e is n o a priori r e a s o n for us to a s s u m e that a ' c u l t u r e ' h a s value. It m i g h t affirm r e p u g n a n t beliefs a n d ideals. It m i g h t b e stultifying, repressive a n d u n i m a g i n a t i v e , w i t h n o r e d e e m ­ ing features whatsoever. T h e latter p o i n t , however, considerably c o m p l i c a t e s t h e a r g u m e n t for cultural j u s t i c e . To see this, c o n s i d e r the w o r k o f K y m l i c k a a n d Taylor. B o t h b e l i e v e that p e r s o n s have an interest in flourishing a n d that it is their m o s t crucial interest ( K y m l i c k a 1989: 1 0 - 1 2 ; 1990: 1 2 - 1 7 , 2 0 2 - 3 ; 1995: 8 0 - 2 ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , b o t h reject a subjectivist a c c o u n t w h i c h c o n s t r u e s a p e r s o n ' s w e l l - b e i n g in t e r m s o f p r e f e r e n c e satisfaction. Part I o f Taylor's Sources of the Self"(1989) is, in m y view, a c o m p e l l i n g critique o f this k i n d o f subjectivism, a r g u i n g that s o m e c o n c e p t i o n s o f the g o o d are m o r e w o r t h w h i l e t h a n o t h e r s . Similarly, K y m l i c k a h a s c o n v i n c ­ ingly a r g u e d that p e r s o n s have an interest in a fulfilling life w h e r e t h e latter is n o t defined in t e r m s o f p r e f e r e n c e satisfaction or p l e a s a n t e x p e r i e n c e s ( 1 9 9 0 : 1 2 - 1 7 ) . T h u s , a l t h o u g h h e e m p h a s i z e s f r e e d o m ( a n d its n e e d i n g a 'societal c u l t u r e ' ) , freedom, for h i m , is v a l u a b l e b e c a u s e it enables p e o p l e to flourish. B o t h t h i n k e r s , t h u s , m a i n t a i n that s o m e c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d are shallow or w o r t h l e s s . B u t given this, it follows that K y m l i c k a a n d Taylor s h o u l d a d o p t a conditional a p p r o a c h to multicultural m e a s u r e s a n d p r o t e c t only t h o s e that c o n t a i n w i t h i n t h e m r e w a r d i n g a n d e n r i c h i n g c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d . G i v e n their c o m m i t m e n t s , t h e y are logically driven to this c o n c l u s i o n , a c o n c l u s i o n that requires a c o n s i d ­ erable qualification to any c o m m i t m e n t to cultural j u s t i c e . 13

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A n u m b e r o f c o m m e n t s s h o u l d b e a d d e d to this a r g u m e n t . First, it is, o f c o u r s e , i m p o r t a n t to r e c o g n i z e that w e s h o u l d n o t j u d g e cultures as indivisible entities that can b e d e e m e d w o r t h y or unworthy. Rather, cultures will i n c l u d e s o m e fea­ tures that are r e w a r d i n g a n d fulfilling a n d others that are not. Second, it s h o u l d b e stressed that t h e a b o v e analysis is not c o m m i t t e d to a cultural c h a u v i n i s m a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h m i n o r i t y cultures are j u d g e d a c c o r d i n g to s o m e traditional w e s t e r n p e r s p e c t i v e . T h i s w o u l d only b e the c a s e if o n e w e r e to m a k e t h e o b n o x ­ ious a n d p a t e n t l y u n t r u e a s s u m p t i o n that only w e s t e r n cultures h a v e value. Third, t h e a b o v e r e a s o n i n g d o e s n o t entail t h e r e p r e s s i o n o f unfulfilling c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d . F o u r t h , it is also n o t a n a r g u m e n t against minority c u l t u r e s : t h e p o i n t can a n d frequently will tell a g a i n s t a majority culture. M y point, to restate it, is that given K y m l i c k a a n d Taylor's b e l i e f that cultures p o s s e s s value if, a n d b e c a u s e , t h e y enable p e o p l e to flourish, a n d given t h e e m p i r i c a l c l a i m that it is n o t t r u e that all a s p e c t s o f c u l t u r e s , o f necessity, foster flourishing, it follows that w e s h o u l d reject u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t for m i n o r i t y cultures a n d s h o u l d a d o p t a perfectionist a p p r o a c h . T h i s is, in turn, w e m i g h t n o t e , a c a s e for a r u l e - p l u s e x e m p t i o n , for w e h a v e a g e n e r a l r u l e c o n c e r n i n g w h e t h e r t h e state s h o u l d or s h o u l d n o t s e e k to p r o t e c t cultural p r a c t i c e s as well as a n e x e m p t i o n ( w o r t h w h i l e c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d differently from w o r t h l e s s o n e s ) . 14

5. Conclusion T h i s c o n c l u d e s m y a r g u m e n t . A s is evident, I a m s y m p a t h e t i c t o B a r r y ' s egali­ tarian liberalism. M y claim, however, is that this allows m o r e r o o m for cultural rights t h a n h e allows. T h i s is in part, as I h a v e a r g u e d above, b e c a u s e m o r e e x e m p ­ tions to r u l e s get t h r o u g h t h a n h e a p p e a r s to allow. It is also t r u e b e c a u s e h e h a s n o t p r o v i d e d a v i n d i c a t i o n o f his c o n c e p t i o n o f p e r s o n s ' h i g h e r - o r d e r interests a n d e x p l a i n e d w h a t is defective w i t h t h o s e that g r o u n d claims for cultural j u s t i c e . H i s case h e r e is ' u n p r o v e n ' . F u r t h e r m o r e , I h a v e argued, w e have t h r e e r e a s o n s to a d o p t a m o r e culture-friendly c o n c e p t i o n o f h i g h e r - o r d e r interests t h a n t h e o n e that B a r r y e m p l o y s . Finally, t h o u g h , I have a r g u e d that this h a s to b e b a l a n c e d against a perfectionist c o n c e r n for t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f e v e r y o n e . Notes I have benefited greatly from many discussions of the issues contained in this paper with my colleague Peter Jones. 1. In referring to 'multiculturalists', I am not making the false assumption that those grouped under this heading (including writers as diverse as Iris Marion Young and Will Kymlicka) hold identical positions. I use it simply to refer to those who think that the state should protect persons' cultural practices. 2. See also Barry's discussion of restrictions on immigration (1992: 280-3). Barry is sympathetic to internal migration restrictions, writing: 'it would be an excellent idea

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4.

5.

6.

7.

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if in rural areas (especially culturally distinct ones such as Wales) nobody were allowed to buy or rent long-term accommodation who did not live or work locally' (p. 284). In this vein we might also note that Barry (CE: 60-1), like Parekh (2000: 249-54), is quite sympathetic to the French Muslim girls who wished to wear headscarves at school. Exemptions to rules are defended by Kymlicka (1995: 114-15), Kymlicka and Norman (2000: 25), Parekh (1995: 314; 2000: 243^1) and Taylor (1992: 60-1). For a good dis­ cussion, see also Levy (2000: 128-32). Barry appears to recognize this. In his discussion of Sikhs and motorcycles, he writes: '[I]t would also be a matter of specific concern if the inability to ride a motorcycle prevented Sikhs from joining the police force, because it is important that the police should be open to all, and should in fact contain representatives of all minorities' (CE: 49). My point is that this can legitimate another class of exemptions. Barry would not object to this policy. In an earlier draft of his book he did in fact include this issue as a justified exception, but removed it for lack of space. Barry pointed this out to me in a discussion of his book at the PSA Roundtable on Culture and Equality at the LSE. The national park authorities in Exmoor, Somerset, have proposed that, as of 2003, those wishing to buy a second house in certain parts of Exmoor will require permis­ sion and this will only be granted to those living locally. The aim here is to protect the rural community and to limit the extent to which housing is owned by people who use it only during holiday periods (White 2001: 21). Consider in this light Barry's statement, quoted earlier, that 'it would be an excellent idea if in rural areas (especially culturally distinct ones such as Wales) nobody were allowed to buy or rent long-term accommodation who did not live or work locally' (1992: 284). Barry might here be endorsing the argument given in the text: his refer­ ence to Wales being 'culturally distinct' suggests this. On the other h a n d his argu­ ment might instead be a straightforward economic and non-cultural argument against unrestricted markets.

9. Barry mentions this policy (CE: 56-60, 62). His view (clearly expressed on p. 62) is that we should not restrict our concern to 'religious' discrimination and that appoint­ ments should simply be on the basis of ability to perform the job. Here though he is in agreement with the Parekh Report, which is not concerned simply with religious discrimination (Runnymede Trust 2000: 240, 311). 10. Here, it is interesting to compare Barry's position in Culture and Equality with that taken in 'Self-Government Revisited'. The latter defends national self-determination. In doing so, it relies explicitly on an account of persons' interests. Furthermore, it dis­ cusses sympathetically the importance of protecting one's national culture (1991: 180-6). 11. I should make clear that Cohen's and Sen's views are not equivalent. See Cohen's cri­ tique of Sen (1989: 9 4 1 - * ; 1993: 17-28). 12. I read Cohen's discussion only after this chapter had been written and cannot discuss his argument more fully. It is, however, worth adding that Cohen's paper also contains a persuasive critique of Kymlicka. Cohen argues that one cannot, as Kymlicka does, employ 'equality of resources' to ground multiculturalist policies, for, as a resourcist, he should regard minority cultures that are struggling to survive as 'expensive tastes' (Cohen 1999: 88-99). As such, under a resourcist scheme, they merit no support (a conclusion that Barry endorses: CE: 3 4 - 5 , 40-1). Cohen concurs with Kymlicka's

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multiculturalist conclusions (although cf. Cohen 1999: 95-7) but rejects his resourcist argument (ibid.: 81, 89-90, 99-100). Cohen's argument thus has three im­ plications. First, resourcism is incorrect (contra Kymlicka and Barry); second, resourcism cannot ground multiculturalism (contra Kymlicka but not Barry); and, third, egalitarian justice may demand support for minority cultures (contra Barry but not Kymlicka). 13. Taylor recognizes this and is critical of the belief that all cultures are equally valuable (1992: 68-70). His view is that when first engaging with a culture we should start with the presumption that it is equally valuable to ours, but, and this is crucial, we might then conclude that it is rich and fulfilling or that it is staid, repressive and super­ ficial (ibid.: 66-73). But if we accept this, then Taylor should also qualify his com­ mitment to 'the importance of cultural survival' (ibid.: 61). 14. Barry's own position is complex. He thinks that principles of justice should be neutral but allows the state to make judgements about the good when not deliberating about matters of justice (1995: 109-10, 132, 143-5, 161). Barry both grounds his neutral­ ity on a commitment to scepticism (1995: 169-72) and yet also presupposes an account of what is valuable in his views on education (CE: 221-5, 238, 245). The latter is plausible but is hard to square with the former.

References Barry, B. 1987: Nationalism. In David Miller (ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 352-5. 1991: Self-Government Revisited. In Democracy and Power: Essays in Political Theory, vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 156-86. 1992: The Quest for Consistency: A Sceptical View. In B. Barry and R. Goodin (eds), Free Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 279-87. 1995: Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 1998: Is More International Trade Better Than Less? In A. Qureshi, H. Steiner and G. Parry (eds), The Legal and Moral Aspects of International Trade: Freedom and Trade, vol. Ill (London: Routledge), pp. 12-25. 1999: Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique. In I. Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer (eds), Global Justice: NOMOS Volume XLI (New York: New York University Press), pp. 12-66. 2001: Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity). BBC 2 2001: 'Islamaphobia', BBC 2, 18 August. Buchanan, A. 1991: Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder: Westview). Cohen, G. A. 1989: On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice. Ethics, 99: 906-44. 1993: Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities. In M. Nussbaum and A. Sen (eds), The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 9-29. 1999: Expensive Tastes and Multiculturalism. In Rajeev Bhargava, Amiya Kumar Bagchi and R. Sudarshan (eds), Multiculturalism, Liberalism and Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 80-100. Dworkin, R. 2000: Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Jones. P. 1994: Rights (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

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1999: Beliefs and Identities. In J. Horton and S. Mendus (eds), Toleration Identity and Differences (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Kymlicka, W. 1988: Rawls on Teleology and Deontology. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17: 173-90. 1989: Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 1990: Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 1995: Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 2001: Politics in the Vernacular (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. 2000: Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts. In W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Soci­ eties (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 1-41. Levy, J. 2000: The Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Mason, A. 2000: Community, Solidarity and Belonging (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer­ sity Press). Parekh, B. 2000: Rethinking Multiculturalism (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 1995: The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political Philosophy. In Will Kymlicka (ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 303-20. Poulter, S. 1999: Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Rawls, J. 1999a: A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 1999b: Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). Raz, J. and Margalit, A. 1994: National Self-Determination. In Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Runnymede Trust 1997: Islamaphobia: A Challenge for Us All. The Report of the Run­ nymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamaphobia, chaired by Professor Gordon Conway (London: Runnymede Trust). Runnymede Trust 2000: The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (London: Profile Books). Sen, A. 1982: Equality of What? In Choice, Welfare and Measurement (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 353-69. 1987: The Standard of Living (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Taylor, C. 1992: The Politics of Recognition. In Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition' (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 2 5 - 7 3 . 1989: Sources of the <Se//'(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Tully, J. 1995: Strange Multiplicity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) 1993: Need for Reform: Muslims and the Law in Multi-Faith Britain (London, UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs). Versi, A. 2000: Sorrow Clouds Ramadan Joy. The Times, 8 January, p. 19. Waldron, J. 2000: Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility. In W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). White, R. 2001: Moor for your Money. The Sunday Times, 9 September, pp. 2 0 - 1 .

6 The Illiberal Liberal: Brian Barry's Polemical Attack on Multiculturalism James Tully

1. The Argument H o w are citizens o f constitutional d e m o c r a c i e s to r e c o g n i z e a n d relate to o n e a n o t h e r in their m a n y f o r m s o f c o o p e r a t i o n u n d e r three n o r m s o f legitimacy: t h e traditional n o r m s of freedom a n d equality, a n d the newer, t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y n o r m o f m u t u a l r e s p e c t for r e a s o n a b l e cultural or identity-related similarities a n d dissimilarities? T h i s is w i d e l y t h o u g h t to b e o n e o f t h e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s o f m o d e r n political p r a c t i c e a n d theory. B r i a n B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t in Culture and Equality ( 2 0 0 1 ) , an 'egalitarian critique o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ' , is that t h e p h i l o ­ sophical w o r k in this b r o a d field o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s m , r e a s o n ­ able p l u r a l i s m a n d the politics o f r e c o g n i t i o n is d e e p l y flawed a n d s h o u l d h a v e s u n k u n d e r t h e w e i g h t of its o w n 'intellectual w e a k n e s s e s ' (CE: 6). U n f o r t u n a t e l y for h i m , t h e field h a s c o n t i n u e d t o g r o w rather t h a n c o l l a p s e and so h e h a s h a d to set aside h i s o w n w o r k a n d p o i n t out the fatal w e a k n e s s e s that p h i l o s o p h e r s such as W i l l i a m Galston, Will K y m l i c k a , B h i k h u P a r e k h , J o h n R a w l s (after 1971), C h a r l e s Taylor, Iris Y o u n g a n d m y s e l f h a v e failed t o see in o u r o w n a n d e a c h other's a r g u m e n t s . B y the e n d o f h i s b o o k B a r r y c l a i m s , first, to have s h o w n n o t only that t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t s are d e e p l y flawed, b u t that the p r e m i s e o f the entire field is false: namely, the p r e m i s e that t h e r e is a t h i r d - g e n e r a t i o n n o r m o f legitimacy, respect for r e a s o n a b l e cultural diversity, w h i c h n e e d s to b e c o n s i d e r e d o n a p a r w i t h t h e n o r m s of f r e e d o m a n d equality, a n d so to modify p o l i c i e s o f 'free a n d equal t r e a t m e n t ' a c c o r d i n g l y (CE: ix, 7, 1 2 - 1 3 , 17). H i s s e c o n d c o n c l u s i o n , w h i c h u n d e r p i n s t h e first, is that t h e a s s u m p t i o n that t h e r e are i m p o r t a n t a n d divisive p r o b l e m s in political p r a c t i c e c o n c e r n i n g the r e c o g n i t i o n or n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n o f

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c i t i z e n s ' identity-related differences is m i s t a k e n (CE: 3 0 5 - 1 7 ) . In p r a c t i c e as in theory, m o s t o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s can a n d s h o u l d b e r e d u c e d to traditional p r o b l e m s o f abstract social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t y (CE: 3 1 9 ) . W h a t e v e r is left over ( ' n o t m u c h ' ) c a n b e dealt w i t h b y t h e earlier liberal r e m e d i e s o f n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d affirmative action, as h e argues against t h e multiculturalists w i t h h i s ' e g a l i ­ tarian l i b e r a l ' a p p r o a c h to individual a n d g r o u p rights in t h e first two p a r t s o f t h e book. Consequently, B a r r y c l a i m s , t h e a t t e m p t s to r e c o g n i z e a n d a c c o m m o d a t e m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s m t h r o u g h legal, political a n d constitutional policies in p r a c t i c e a n d t h e critical reflection o n these a r r a n g e m e n t s in t h e o r y t u r n out to b e an u n n e c e s s a r y ' s i d e s h o w ' (CE: 321) w h i c h , m o r e o v e r , t e n d s to u n d e r m i n e the solidarity n e c e s s a r y for the politics o f redistribution (CE: 3 2 5 ) . W e are t h u s e n c o u r a g e d o n t h e last p a g e to a b a n d o n this n o w discredited pseudo-field o f m o d e r n politics a n d return to t h e m a i n show, with w h i c h B a r r y has always b e e n p r e o c c u p i e d , ' t h e h u g e inequalities in o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d r e s o u r c e s ' in c o n t e m p o ­ r a r y societies, a n d a d d r e s s t h e s e u n d e r t h e u n r e c o n s t r u c t e d n o r m s of f r e e d o m a n d equality, and, m o r e narrowly, u n d e r his particular t h e o r y of egalitarian liberalism, free from the distractions o f the p h i l o s o p h y a n d policies o f cultural recognition.

2. Caricature and Polemic D e s p i t e the p r o f e s s e d a i m to deal w i t h equality a n d diversity in a fair a n d evenh a n d e d m a n n e r (CE: 2 4 ) , r e p e a t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f m o s t sections, a n d several s o u n d yet u n o r i g i n a l a r g u m e n t s in individual c a s e s , B a r r y ' s foray into t h e t h e o r y a n d practice o f culture a n d e q u a l i t y is flawed b y his p r e f e r e n c e for caricature a n d p o l e m i c over p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t a n d c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t . A p h i l o s o p h e r enters into a r g u m e n t s w i t h t h e interlocutors w i t h w h o m h e or she d i s a g r e e s w i t h t h e a i m o f r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t o n a difficult truth t h r o u g h t h e further e x c h a n g e o f r e a s o n s a m o n g free a n d equal p a r t n e r s in a d i a l o g u e in w h i c h their initial v i e w s are reciprocally e l u c i d a t e d a n d m o d i f i e d b y t h e force o f t h e better a r g u m e n t s . In contrast, B a r r y c o m e s p r i m a r i l y as a p o l e m i c i s t , a r m e d w i t h caricatures of t h e m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s t s ' a r g u m e n t s w h i c h translate h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l p a r t n e r s into e n e m i e s w h o s e w o r k constitutes a threat to his t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e . H e t h e n p r o ­ c e e d s to d o battle w i t h t h e caricatures, e m p l o y i n g t h e stiletto a n d rapier of ridicule, s c o r n , m o c k e r y , l a m p o o n , travesty a n d a b s u r d e x a m p l e s , to b r i n g a b o u t t h e t r i u m p h of t h e c a u s e h e h a s b e e n u p h o l d i n g from t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g (see his p r a i s e for this style at CE: 3 1 ) . O n c e t h e s e offensive i n - c r o w d p o l e m i c s are over, w e are s i m p l y i n s t r u c t e d to r e t u r n to his allegedly objective a n d liberal t h e o r y o f equality o f opportunity, yet this t u r n s out to offer o p p o r t u n i t i e s only to t h o s e citizens w h o are w i l l i n g to s u b ­ ordinate their identity-conferring c o m m i t m e n t s to a n assimilative ' n a t i o n a l i d e n ­ t i t y ' (CE: ch. 3). Too b a d for S i k h s (CE: 4 3 - 8 ) a n d other similar m i n o r i t i e s , for official m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m in C a n a d a ( 2 9 2 - 8 ) a n d t h e E n g l i s h - l a n g u a g e m i n o r i t y in

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Q u e b e c (CE: 6 7 - 8 ) , a n d especially first-generation i m m i g r a n t s w h o seek s o m e p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n o f their first l a n g u a g e s , for, as B a r r y u n a b a s h e d l y p u t s it in this latter case, ' " T h i s is h o w w e d o t h i n g s h e r e " - t h e a p p e a l t o local c o n v e n ­ tion - is a self-sufficient r e s p o n s e ' (CE: 107). I n s t e a d o f t a k i n g u p t h e a r g u m e n t s that this ' s o l u t i o n ' m a y b e to treat culturally diverse citizens illiberally a n d unequally, a n d t h u s itself f o r m p a r t o f t h e p r o b l e m , his p r e d o m i n a n t r e s p o n s e is to ridicule his o w n caricatures o f t h e a r g u m e n t s - a n d h e w i n s e v e r y t i m e . A s a result, o n e o f t h e m o s t p r e s s i n g p r o b l e m s o f o u r t i m e s - h o w to a d d r e s s fairly a n d effectively b o t h g r o w i n g inequalities a n d t h e o p p r e s s i o n o f cultural m i n o r ­ ities - is o c c l u d e d m o r e t h a n it is illuminated. I w o u l d like to e x a m i n e briefly four caricatures t h a t get in t h e w a y o f a d d r e s s ­ ing t h e difficult q u e s t i o n s B a r r y c l a i m s to h a v e a n s w e r e d o n c e a n d for all. W h i l e his p o l e m i c a l style m i s t r e a t s t h e a r g u m e n t s o f a l m o s t all t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s h e c l a i m s to d i s c u s s , I will c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e s w e e p i n g caricatures that m i s r e p r e ­ sent m y o w n w o r k , as t h e s e a r e t h e m a i n o n e s h e u s e s t o tar all o f u s . M y a i m is t o clear away t h e s e r i d i c u l o u s s t e r e o t y p e s so w e c a n m o v e o n to a p r i n c i p l e d dia­ l o g u e o n t h e irreducible a n d interrelated p r o b l e m s o f equality and culture.

3. The Billiard-ball Concept of Cultures T h e first t h r e e caricatures B a r r y e m p l o y s are v e r s i o n s o f w h a t M i c h e l F o u c a u l t called ' E n l i g h t e n m e n t b l a c k m a i l ' : that is, to discredit a n d d i s m i s s an o p p o n e n t ' s a r g u m e n t s b y c o n s t r u i n g t h e m as ' a n t i - E n l i g h t e n m e n t ' . T h e first v e r s i o n is B a r r y ' s false c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e a r g u m e n t s o f Iris Y o u n g a n d myself, as if t h e y rely o n a c o n c e p t of cultural g r o u p s as ' q u a s i - b i o l o g i c a l c o l l e c t i v e s ' : 'inter­ nally h o m o g e n e o u s , clearly b o u n d e d , m u t u a l l y exclusive, a n d m a i n t a i n i n g spe­ cific d e t e r m i n a t e i n t e r e s t s ' . T h i s c o n c e p t o f a culture is t h e n said t o 'fit in nicely w i t h t h e e s s e n t i a l i s m o f t h e C o u n t e r - E n l i g h t e n m e n t ' and, b y t h e e n d o f the p a r a ­ g r a p h , to b e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e ' n e w r i g h t ' a n d 'racial p u r i t y ' (CE: 11). T h i s s w e e p i n g litany of a s s o c i a t i o n s - internally h o m o g e n e o u s g r o u p s , t h e C o u n t e r E n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d t h e r a c i s m o f t h e n e w right - is t h e n r e p e a t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e b o o k , as if it w e r e an accurate description o f o u r a r g u m e n t s . Yet it is entirely false. Y o u n g a n d I h a v e p u t a critique of this billiard-ball c o n c e p t o f culture at t h e centre o f o u r o w n w o r k . M y b o o k , Strange Multiplicity, o p e n s w i t h t h e a r g u m e n t that cultures are n o t separate, b o u n d e d a n d internally u n i f o r m , b u t rather, o v e r l a p p i n g , interactive a n d internally n e g o t i a t e d ( 1 9 9 5 : 7 - 1 4 ) . W h e n B a r r y c o m e s to discuss m y s y m b o l for cultural diversity, The Black Canoe b y t h e H a i d a artist Bill Reid, in this p o s t m o d e r n sense, h e r e p e a t s this a b h o r r e n t caricature, a d d i n g references t o fascism for h e i g h t e n e d effect (CE: 2 5 8 - 6 4 ) , even t h o u g h I carefully e x p l a i n t h a t t h e m y t h i c a l creatures (not ' a n i m a l s ' ) o f t h e sculpture s y m b o l i z e t h e exact o p p o s i t e : t h e overlap, interaction a n d c o n t i n u o u s r e n e g o t i a t i o n a n d t r a n s f o r m a ­ tion o f cultures b y their m e m b e r s (Tully 1995: 1 7 - 2 9 , 1 9 8 - 2 0 9 ) . In a footnote, B a r r y even a d m i t s that this refrain is a c o m p l e t e caricature o f Young's w o r k , yet

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this is a p p a r e n t l y fair g a m e b e c a u s e s o m e o n e else h a s a r g u e d that Y o u n g r e q u i r e s s u c h a c o n c e p t o f culture for h e r t h e o r y o f g r o u p rights (CE: 3 3 0 , n . 1 6 ) . F o r m e , as a n y o n e w h o r e a d s m y b o o k s a n d articles k n o w s , the c o n t e m p o r a r y conflicts s u b s u m e d u n d e r the r u b r i c o f ' c u l t u r a l r e c o g n i t i o n ' arise in p a r t because c i t i z e n s ' cultural or identity-conferring a l l e g i a n c e s are n o t separate b u t overlap, interact a n d are c o n t i n u o u s l y contested, a n d so these s t r u g g l e s s h o u l d b e a n a l y s e d from this c o m p l e x b a s i s (Tully 1995: 1-17; 2 0 0 0 a ) . Yet B a r r y n e v e r m e n t i o n s , let a l o n e e n g a g e s w i t h , this dialogical c o n c e p t of culture. Instead, h e p r o c e e d s to dis­ credit a n d d i s m i s s a caricature I a r g u e against (the billiard-ball v i e w o f cultures) u n d e r the p r e t e n c e that h e is refuting m y a r g u m e n t s (CE: 2 5 8 - 6 4 , 3 0 5 ) . M o r e ­ over, it is s o m e w h a t p u z z l i n g that B a r r y h i m s e l f e m p l o y s a n d defends a separate, m o r e or less h o m o g e n e o u s a n d n a r r o w l y n e g o t i a b l e c o n c e p t o f a n a t i o n a l culture w h e n he p r e s e n t s t h e k i n d o f ' a d d i t i v e a s s i m i l a t i o n ' to a ' n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y ' h e c l a i m s is n e c e s s a r y for citizen solidarity a n d b e l o n g i n g (CE: 7 1 - 8 8 ) .

4. Universal versus Particular B a r r y ' s s e c o n d caricature is that liberal a n d non-liberal p h i l o s o p h e r s o f m u l t i ­ c u l t u r a l i s m such as R a w l s (in Political Liberalism), Taylor a n d m y s e l f are ' a n t i E n l i g h t e n m e n t ' d e f e n d e r s of p a r t i c u l a r i s m a n d relativism, w h e r e a s h e is a d e f e n d e r o f E n l i g h t e n m e n t u n i v e r s a l i s m a n d n o n - r e l a t i v i s m (CE: 4 - 5 , 9 - 1 5 , 140, 2 6 0 - 1 , 2 8 3 - 9 1 , 3 3 3 , n . 2 7 for R a w l s ' s ' a n t i - E n l i g h t e n m e n t p a r t i c u l a r i s m ' ) . T h i s c r u d e travesty m i s r e p r e s e n t s o u r different yet c o m p l e m e n t a r y a p p r o a c h e s in two crucial w a y s . First, t h e f r e e d o m o f i n d i v i d u a l expression, t h e r i g h t s o f linguistic, religious a n d ethnic m i n o r i t i e s , t h e right o f internal s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f state­ less p e o p l e s s u c h as i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e s a n d t h e rights o f n a t i o n s w i t h i n m u l t i ­ n a t i o n a l liberal d e m o c r a t i c a s s o c i a t i o n s , s u c h as t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m , C a n a d a , Spain, India, the U n i t e d States a n d t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n , are j u s t as universal a n d n o n - r e l a t i v e as first-generation civil a n d political r i g h t s a n d s e c o n d - g e n e r a t i o n social a n d e c o n o m i c rights. T h e s e t h i r d - g e n e r a t i o n universal cultural rights, w h i c h p r o t e c t m i n o r i t i e s from t h e t y r a n n y o f d e m o c r a t i c majorities, also derive from t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t ( a m o n g other s o u r c e s ) ; t h e y are d e c l a r e d in t h e f u n d a m e n t a l d o c u ­ m e n t s a n d c o n v e n t i o n s of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ; a n d t h e y are c o m m o n p l a c e in t h e constitutional c o u r t s o f liberal d e m o c r a c i e s (Tully 2 0 0 0 c ; 2 0 0 1 ) . In m a n y c a s e s , t h e y are civil a n d political rights a n d social a n d e c o n o m i c rights for m i n o r i t i e s . B a r r y m i s c o n s t r u e s t h e s e t h i r d - g e n e r a t i o n h u m a n rights as ' p a r t i c u l a r ' , ' s p e c i a l ' a n d ' e x e m p t i o n s ' for two r e a s o n s . First, a l t h o u g h h e is careful n o t to m a k e t h e m i s t a k e o f e q u a t i n g equality w i t h ' s a m e n e s s o f t r e a t m e n t ' in e v e r y case, h e n e v e r t h e l e s s s e e m s to take s a m e n e s s o f t r e a t m e n t as t h e standing n o r m against w h i c h a n y c l a i m for r e c o g n i t i o n m u s t b e m a d e g o o d b y c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s in o r d e r to g a i n an e x c e p t i o n , a n d so, w i t h this ' e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y ' f r a m e w o r k firmly in p l a c e , any m o d e o f r e c o g n i t i o n will b e seen as a special or p a r t i c u l a r e x e m p t i o n from t h e n o r m , rather t h a n an a t t e m p t to w o r k out w h a t a liberal

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c o m m i t m e n t t o equality (of o p p o r t u n i t y a n d respect) m e a n s in today's c o n d i t i o n s o f cultural diversity (CE: 7 - 8 ; I v i s o n 2 0 0 1 ) . Second, t h e s e universal rights p r o t e c t different w a y s o f b e i n g citizens a n d p e o p l e s a n d different w a y s o f exercising one's equality o f opportunity. W h e n B a r r y p u r p o r t s to d i s c u s s a p h i l o s o p h e r , legisla­ ture or a c o u r t a p p l y i n g n o r m s o f f r e e d o m a n d equality in c o n d i t i o n s o f r e a s o n ­ able p l u r a l i s m b y e m p l o y i n g t h e s e universal rights a n d their institutional devices o f r e c o g n i t i o n a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n - from individual e x e m p t i o n s to diverse f o r m s of federalism - h e m i s t a k e s t h e n o n - u n i v e r s a l features t h e s e r i g h t s a r e m e a n t to p r o t e c t ( r e a s o n a b l e w a y s o f s h a r i n g identity s p a c e in c o n t e m p o r a r y political a s s o ­ ciations) for t h e universal rights that p r o t e c t t h e s e features (this m i s t a k e is per­ vasive in c h a p t e r 7). T h e s e c o n d m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in this a n t i - E n l i g h t e n m e n t caricature is B a r r y ' s m i s t a k e n c o n t e n t i o n that t h e r e a s o n s for t h e p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n a n d a c c o m m o d a ­ tion o f r e a s o n a b l e cultural p r a c t i c e s are always p a r t i c u l a r a n d relativistic. A c c o r d ­ ing to h i m , t h e r e are only three r e a s o n s : t h e p r a c t i c e in q u e s t i o n forms an ' e l e m e n t ' o f a culture; it is ' e s s e n t i a l ' to t h e cultural g r o u p ' s ' w e l l - b e i n g ' ; a n d ' c u l t u r e s are o f e q u a l v a l u e ' . M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s t s t h i n k that it is n o t n e c e s s a r y to a p p e a l to ' s o m e universalistic criterion o f v a l u e ' a n d (inconsistent w i t h t h e third r e a s o n above) t h e y h o l d that ' t h e r e is n o c o m m o n s t a n d a r d b y w h i c h cultures, a n d t h e p r a c t i c e s e m b e d d e d in t h e m c a n b e e v a l u a t e d ' . In short, a c c o r d i n g to B a r r y ' s a n t i - E n l i g h t e n m e n t p a r o d y o f multiculturalists, all that n e e d b e said is, 'this is t h e w a y w e d o t h i n g s a r o u n d h e r e ' , or 'it's p a r t o f m y c u l t u r e ' (CE: 2 5 2 - 3 ) . I n s t e a d o f a b i d i n g b y t h e d e m o c r a t i c n o r m o f audi alteram partem a n d lis­ t e n i n g to t h e p u b l i c r e a s o n s given b y m e m b e r s o f o p p r e s s e d m i n o r i t i e s , j u s t i c e s of Supreme Courts, m e m b e r s of commissions of national enquiry and philo­ s o p h e r s for t h e r e c o g n i t i o n a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n of unjustly s u p p r e s s e d cultural differences, e n t e r i n g into t h e d i s c u s s i o n himself, a n d p e r h a p s even l e a r n i n g s o m e ­ t h i n g a b o u t t h e limits o f his o w n ' u n i v e r s a l i s t i c ' beliefs, B a r r y trots out this trav­ esty a n d tilts away at o n e a b s u r d inference from it after another, i n c l u d i n g the justification o f ' i n d i s c r i m i n a t e s l a u g h t e r ' (CE: 2 5 4 - 9 1 ) . E v e n w h e n h e d o e s o c c a ­ sionally take u p other r e a s o n s for a n d against a p a r t i c u l a r m u l t i c u l t u r a l policy, such as t h e e x e m p t i o n o f S i k h s from c r a s h h e l m e t legislation, h e r e h e a r s e s t h e n o n - i d e n t i t y related r e a s o n s o f abstract liberalism a n d i g n o r e s t h e identity-related p u b l i c r e a s o n s o f S i k h s a n d other m i n o r i t i e s , related to respect for r e a s o n a b l e reli­ g i o u s p l u r a l i s m in a free a n d o p e n society (CE: 4 3 - 8 ) , p r e s u m a b l y o n t h e fore­ g o n e c o n c l u s i o n that t h e y have n o r e a s o n s w o r t h y o f consideration, only three particularistic a n d relativistic a r g u m e n t s characteristic o f C o u n t e r - E n l i g h t e n m e n t racists. A typical e x a m p l e o f B a r r y ' s t e c h n i q u e o f substituting h i s caricatures for t h e actual a r g u m e n t s is his t r e a t m e n t o f a C a n a d i a n c o u r t case I m e n t i o n briefly in Strange Multiplicity. T h o m a s , a m e m b e r o f a C o a s t Salish First N a t i o n , w a s forced b y t h e B a n d C o u n c i l to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e C o a s t Salish spirit d a n c e . H e s u c c e s s ­ fully sued for assault, b a t t e r y a n d false i m p r i s o n m e n t . In Strange Multiplicity I q u o t e Avigail E i s e n b e r g ' s s u m m a r y o f t h e court's r e a s o n i n g :

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'that the Spirit Dance, and more specifically, the involuntary aspect of it, was not a central feature of the Salish way of life'. Therefore, 'the group claim to involun­ tarily initiate participants into the Spirit Dance could not override' the individual members' 'rights to be protected from assault, battery and false imprisonment.' (Eisenberg 1994, cited in Tully 1995: 172) B a r r y q u o t e s this a n d g l o s s e s it as follows: We are given to understand by Tully that the crucial issue was the degree to which the initiation rite was a central feature of Salish culture. This implies that, had the court found that the initiation rite was central to the culture, Thomas would have lost the case, and rightly so. (CE: 257)

H e t h e n g o e s o n to s u g g e s t that a n y o n e w h o r e a s o n s as t h e c o u r t d o e s h e r e a p p r o v e s o f ' a s s a u l t , b a t t e r y a n d false i m p r i s o n m e n t ' in t h e n a m e o f cultural dif­ ference, and, c a r r i e d away b y h i s o w n rhetoric, w o u l d c o n d o n e o t h e r f o r m s o f ' i n t r a e t h n i c v i o l e n c e ' against 'disloyal e l e m e n t s ' a n d ' d i s s i d e n t s ' , as well as l e n d s u p p o r t to t h e ' K u K l u x K l a n ' a n d (retrospectively) ' s l a v e - o w n e r s in t h e S o u t h ' (CE: 2 5 7 - 8 ) . T h e a b s u r d c o n c l u s i o n that C a n a d i a n courts c o n d o n e assault, b a t t e r y a n d false i m p r i s o n m e n t follows from the c a r i c a t u r e , n o t from t h e form o f c o m m o n - l a w r e a ­ s o n i n g I t r y to illustrate h e r e . T h e court's first q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r t h e cultural p r a c t i c e in q u e s t i o n is ' c e n t r a l ' to t h e C o a s t Salish w a y o f life. If it is not, t h e n t h e r e is n o conflict w i t h t h e rights in question, a n d so t h e plaintiff w i n s . If it is ' c e n t r a l ' , t h e n t h e r e is a potential conflict b e t w e e n t h e rights o f m e m b e r s a n d t h e right o f t h e cultural c o m m u n i t y to p r o t e c t this central feature o f their w a y o f life. In s u c h cases, t h e c o u r t d o e s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y e n d o r s e t h e cultural p r a c t i c e a n d c o n d o n e assault, b a t t e r y a n d v i o l e n c e , as B a r r y infers. Rather, u n l i k e Barry, t h e j u s t i c e s m o v e o n to c o n s i d e r t h e r e a s o n s that can b e g i v e n o n either side and, if t h e r e are g o o d p u b l i c r e a s o n s for t h e p r a c t i c e (other t h a n its b e i n g ' c e n t r a l ' ) that m a k e it w o r t h y o f p r o t e c t i o n , a n d g o o d r e a s o n s for r e q u i r i n g individual m e m b e r s to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e practice, t h e n t h e c o u r t seeks to r e a c h an ' a c c o m m o d a t i o n ' w h i c h protects a defensible a n d suitably modified cultural p r a c t i c e w h i l e also p r o ­ tecting t h e r i g h t o f individual m e m b e r s to b e free from assault, b a t t e r y a n d false i m p r i s o n m e n t . A s I s u m m a r i z e , t h e ' q u e s t i o n t h e j u s t i c e s a s k is h o w t o a p p l y r i g h t s so t h e y d o n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t c i t i z e n s ' identity-related differences that c a n b e s h o w n to b e w o r t h y o f p r o t e c t i o n ' (Tully 1995: 172). T h i s e x a m p l e a n d other, m o r e extensive e x a m p l e s c o n c e r n i n g m i n o r i t y lan­ g u a g e s ( w h i c h B a r r y d o e s n o t d i s c u s s ) a r e d e s i g n e d t o illustrate the f o r m o f ' e v e n h a n d e d ' r e a s o n i n g a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n involved in adjudication w h e n individual a n d cultural rights c o m e into conflict (Tully 1995: 1 6 7 - 8 2 ; also see E i s e n b e r g 1994; C a r e n s 2 0 0 0 ) . A l t h o u g h this form o f general a n d non-relativistic legal rea­ s o n i n g is a major t h e m e o f m y b o o k ( 1 9 9 5 : 3 0 ) , B a r r y i g n o r e s it, c o n c l u d i n g that I c o m m e n d t h e ' w a i v i n g o f g e n e r a l r u l e s ' in t h e face o f a p p e a l s to fixed a n d

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u n c h a n g i n g cultural practices (CE: 2 5 5 ) . H i s disregard of t h e variety o f general r e a s o n s that liberal d e m o c r a t i c courts w e i g h in multicultural a n d m u l t i n a t i o n a l cases is p a r t o f a b r o a d e r failure to c o n s i d e r t h e a n a l o g o u s p u b l i c r e a s o n s that citizens e x c h a n g e over c l a i m s for r e c o g n i t i o n in d e m o c r a t i c societies, to w h i c h I n o w turn.

5. Disregarding Democratic Multiculturalism T h e r e are t w o d i m e n s i o n s to m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s m i n practice a n d theory. T h e first is t h e d e m o c r a t i c d i m e n s i o n . T h i s c o m p r i s e s t h e n o r m s , p r o ­ c e d u r e s a n d institutions in w h i c h free a n d equal citizens a n d their trusted r e p r e ­ sentatives c a n e x c h a n g e p u b l i c r e a s o n s over (1) a c l a i m that a p r e v a i l i n g rule o f public. recQgnitLQn_is unjust to s o m e citizenSj_and, if .this claim is successful, (2) the just_form o f r e c o g n i t i o n a n d accommo.dation_iiLthe. s u p p r e s s e d cultural dif­ ference at i s s u e . T h e s e c o n d d i m e n s i o n of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is to w o r k out t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e w n o r m o f r e c o g n i t i o n in t e r m s o f m i n o r i t y rights a n d institutions o n c e a c l a i m h a s b e e n m a d e g o o d d e m o c r a t i c a l l y (Tully 2 0 0 0 a ) . A l t h o u g h t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o m B a r r y discusses w o r k o n b o t h aspects o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , h e ignores t h e d e m o c r a t i c d i m e n s i o n of their w o r k s a n d p r o c e e d s directly to t h e o ­ ries o f individual a n d g r o u p cultural rights. P h i l o s o p h e r s such as K y m l i c k a a n d Young t e n d e d initially to focus o n g r o u p rights, t h e s e c o n d d i m e n s i o n o f m u l t i ­ culturalism. However, political p h i l o s o p h e r s such a s J o s e p h C a r e n s ( 2 0 0 0 ) , D a v i d O w e n ( 1 9 9 9 a ; 1999b) a n d Taylor ( 1 9 9 4 ) , deliberative liberals s u c h as R a w l s ( 1 9 9 6 ; 1999), M o n i q u e D e v e a u x ( 2 0 0 0 ) a n d A n t h o n y L a d e n ( 2 0 0 1 ) , a n d n e o r e p u b l i c a n s s u c h a s R i c h a r d B e l l a m y ( 1 9 9 9 ; 2 0 0 1 ) , Philip Pettit ( 1 9 9 7 ) a n d D e b o r a h R u s s e l l (2001) ( w h o e x p l o r e s t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f t h e s e t h r e e a p p r o a c h e s ) , focus o n t h e d e m o c r a t i c d i m e n s i o n . M y w o r k h a s b e e n focused a l m o s t exclusively o n t h e d e m o c r a t i c e x c h a n g e o f r e a s o n s over c l a i m s for r e c o g ­ nition (Tully 1 9 9 5 : 1; 1 9 9 9 ; 2 0 0 0 a ) . If B a r r y h a d e x a m i n e d this side of the literature, a n d if h e w e r e t h e n t o e x a m i n e the m o r e r e c e n t literature, h e w o u l d see that his caricature - that t h e r e a s o n s for m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m are C o u n t e r - E n l i g h t e n m e n t , n o n - u n i v e r s a l a n d o b s t a c l e s to d e m o c r a t i c solidarity - is entirely u n f o u n d e d . F o u r features o f d e m o c r a t i c m u l t i ­ culturalism w h i c h h e disregards e x p o s e the 'intellectual w e a k n e s s e s ' of his caricature. First, n o t h i n g is m o r e faithful to t h e b e s t t h i n k e r s o f t h e E u r o p e a n E n l i g h t e n m e n t t h a n t h e d e m o c r a t i c ideal that t h e laws s h o u l d rest o n t h e a g r e e ­ m e n t o f t h e p e o p l e g a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e e x c h a n g e o f p u b l i c r e a s o n s a m o n g free a n d e q u a l citizens a n d their representatives, as M a r y Wollstonecraft, a m o n g others, classically p u t it (Tully 1 9 9 5 : 1 7 8 - 8 0 ) . To cite H a b e r m a s ' s c u r r e n t refor­ m u l a t i o n , citizens ' t h e m s e l v e s m u s t a g r e e on t h e relevant aspects u n d e r w h i c h equals s h o u l d b e treated equally a n d u n e q u a l s u n e q u a l l y ' ( H a b e r m a s 1996: xlii). B a r r y m a l i g n s R a w l s for t a k i n g this d e m o c r a t i c t u r n in Political Liberalism, yet R a w l s a n d o t h e r s have s h o w n that it is n e c e s s a r y for both l e g i t i m a c y a n d

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stability in c o n d i t i o n s o f cultural diversity ( R a w l s 1996; 1999; L a d e n 2 0 0 1 ; Bellamy 2001). Second, t h e e x c h a n g e o f r e a s o n s over a c o n t e s t e d r u l e o f r e c o g n i t i o n t a k e s p l a c e in a c c o r d w i t h universal p r i n c i p l e s o f reciprocity. In Strange Multiplicity I p r o p o s e t h r e e : m u t u a l recognition, continuity a n d c o n s e n t . T h e s e p r i n c i p l e s e n s u r e that every p e r s o n affected b y t h e p r o p o s e d r u l e h a s a d e m o c r a t i c voice in t h e deliberations a n d that n o a p p e a l to existing cultural p r a c t i c e s , or to allegedly universal theories o f equal opportunity, is i m m u n e from criticism b y t h o s e affected. T h e s e are p r i n c i p l e s a p p r o p r i a t e to t h e c o n c e p t o f cultures as over­ l a p p i n g , interactive a n d n e g o t i a t e d (Tully 1995: 14, 9 9 - 1 1 6 , 1 4 0 - 8 7 ) . B a r r y d o e s n o t d i s c u s s t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s w h e n h e hastily c o n c l u d e s that Taylor a n d I are ' p a r ticularists' w h o w a i v e ' g e n e r a l r u l e s ' , yet I a r g u e that t h e s e general r u l e s , w h i c h a p p l y w i t h i n m i n o r i t i e s as well as t h e larger society (ibid.: 1 6 5 - 8 2 ) , s h o u l d n e v e r b e w a i v e d (ibid.: 2 1 1 ) . W h e n B a r r y takes u p the rights o f dissidents w i t h i n cultural m i n o r i t i e s , h e discusses t h e n o n - d e m o c r a t i c right o f exit p r o p o s e d b y C h a n d r a n K u k a t h a s a n d f o r m s o f i n t e r v e n t i o n b y t h e d o m i n a n t society (CE: 1 4 6 - 5 4 ) , b y p a s s i n g t h e e m p o w e r i n g d e m o c r a t i c right o f voice e n s h r i n e d in the p r i n c i p l e s o f m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n a n d consent, yet t a k i n g a n o t h e r u n w a r r a n t e d s w i p e at his caricature o f m y a r g u m e n t (CE: 127). Third, o n t h e d e m o c r a t i c a p p r o a c h to m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , g a i n i n g p u b l i c r e c o g ­ n i t i o n o f an identity-related difference consists in s h o w i n g that a c l a i m that d r a w s o n an a s p e c t o f a p e r s o n ' s or g r o u p ' s particularity (a ' p r a c t i c a l i d e n t i t y ' ) can b e m a d e g o o d to free a n d equal citizens generally, t h r o u g h t h e e x c h a n g e o f r e a s o n s in civil, legal, political a n d constitutional f o r u m s . W h i l e t h e ' i n t e r n a l r e a s o n s ' that m e m b e r s of a culture give t h e m s e l v e s for t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f their cultural p r a c t i c e m a y b e particular, t h e ' e x t e r n a l r e a s o n s ' t h e y give to their fellow citizens are general a n d p u b l i c . T h e s e latter r e a s o n s have to b e g e n e r a l in c h a r a c t e r to a p p e a l to t h e v a l u e s , principles a n d g o o d s that o t h e r citizens, w h o d o n o t share this cultural feature, c a n e n d o r s e . T h e s e are various a n d are partly d i s c o v e r e d in t h e c o u r s e o f t h e e x c h a n g e s ( L a d e n 2 0 0 1 : 9 9 - 1 3 0 ; Tully 2 0 0 0 a ) . I a r g u e that m a n y p u b l i c r e a s o n s in t h e s e cases rest o n m o r e general a p p e a l s t o w i d e l y h e l d ideas o f liberty, self-rule a n d m u t u a l r e s p e c t (Tully 1995: 6 passim; Tully 2 0 0 0 c ; O w e n 1999a). T h i s caricature-deflating t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e is n o t a d d r e s s e d in Culture and Equality. L a t e in t h e b o o k B a r r y a c k n o w l e d g e s that t h e r e a s o n s for r e c o g n i t i o n a d v a n c e d b y nationalists often a p p e a l t o self-rule or ' n a t i o n a l a u t o n o m y ' , b u t b e c a u s e this is n o t a direct a p p e a l t o ' c u l t u r e ' in t h e n a r r o w sense h e u s e s it, h e sees it as different from m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d m u l t i n a t i o n a l i s m a n d so o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e o f his critique (CE: 3 0 9 ) . If, as this s u g g e s t s , his entire critique is directed only at c l a i m s for r e c o g n i t i o n b a s e d o n his three caricature r e a s o n s , t h e n virtually all t h e theorists h e p u r p o r t s to criticize w o u l d a g r e e w i t h his critique, b u t t h e y w o u l d a d d that this is to fail to a d d r e s s actual existing m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d multinationalism. F o u r t h , u p h o l d i n g this d e m o c r a t i c ideal requires a m u t u a l o p e n n e s s a n d respect t o w a r d s t h e v i e w s a n d a p p e a l s o f fellow citizens a n d a w i l l i n g n e s s to discover

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a n d revise t h e unrefiective partiality in one's o w n v i e w s t h r o u g h d i s c u s s i o n . I call this civic attitude 'diversity a w a r e n e s s ' , R a w l s ' r e a s o n a b l e n e s s ' , a n d Taylor a defeasible ' p r e s u m p t i o n o f equal v a l u e ' (see t h e d i s c u s s i o n in L a d e n 2 0 0 1 : 1 9 4 - 9 ; O w e n 1999b; O w e n a n d B e n t l e y 2 0 0 1 ) . B a r r y is so certain that h i s p a r t i c u l a r interpretation o f f r e e d o m a n d equality is a l r e a d y universal a n d culture-free, the ' s t a n d a r d o f r e a s o n a b l e n e s s ' (CE: 2 6 2 ) , a n d that t h e v i e w s o f multiculturalists are p a r t i c u l a r a n d u n r e a s o n a b l e , that h e c a n see n o r e a s o n for this tolerant, liberal ethos (CE: 140, 2 6 2 , 2 6 4 - 7 1 ) . A l t h o u g h h e s u p p o r t s t h e ideal o f d e m o c r a t i c d i s ­ cussion, it is so c o n s t r a i n e d b y t h e p r e e m p t o r y universality o f h i s o w n t h e o r y that t h e r e is little r o o m t o discuss diversity u n d e r his c a t e g o r y o f e x e m p t i o n s t o general r u l e s (CE: 1 7 1 - 6 , 3 0 5 ) . T h i s m o n o l o g i c a l stance is n o t only w r o n g in t h e o r y (Taylor 1994: 6 6 - 8 , m i s i n t e r p r e t e d b y B a r r y at CE: 2 6 4 - 8 ) ; it also leads to the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t into ideological conflict a n d h e n c e to instability in p r a c t i c e . T h e w a y to e n g e n d e r stability a n d a sense o f b e l o n g i n g in culturally diverse societies is n o t to i m p o s e a p r e s u m p t i v e l y u n i v e r s a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of equality of opportunity, p e r m i t t i n g only a n a r r o w m a r g i n for d e m o c r a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n (CE: 8 0 - 9 0 , 2 9 9 - 3 0 5 ) . N o r is it to u p h o l d t h e prevailing ' n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y ' w i t h p u b l i c power, leaving t h e l a n g u a g e s a n d cultures o f m i n o r i t i e s publicly u n s u p p o r t e d a n d n o t p a r t o f t h e p u b l i c face o f an o n g o i n g m u l t i c u l t u r a l a n d m u l t i n a t i o n a l identity, o n t h e d u b i o u s g r o u n d s that m e m b e r s o f m i n o r i t i e s in these m a s s i v e l y u n e q u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s c a n b e said to ' p r e f e r to let it [their culture or l a n g u a g e ] g o ' (CE: 6 5 , 1 0 4 - 9 ) a n d that their a s s i m i l a t i o n is n o t directly c o e r c i v e (CE: 7 5 - 6 ) . T h i s is a r e c i p e for alienation, p e n t - u p r e s e n t m e n t a n d instability. Stability a n d a sense o f b e l o n g i n g are e n g e n d e r e d in m u l t i c u l t u r a l a n d m u l t i n a t i o n a l societies b y u p h o l d i n g t h e four features o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c ideal: that is, to e n s u r e t h a t citizens are always free to c h a l l e n g e t h e prevailing r u l e s o f r e c o g n i t i o n a n d that others h a v e a duty to listen a n d respond, and, insofar as t h e c h a l l e n g e c a n w i t h s t a n d t h e test o f p u b l i c r e a s o n s , t o n e g o t i a t e revisable f o r m s o f a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f cultural plurality over t i m e (Tully 1995: 1 9 8 - 2 0 8 ; 2 0 0 0 a ; 2 0 0 0 b ; L a d e n 2 0 0 1 : 1 8 6 - 2 1 1 ; O w e n a n d B e n t l e y 2 0 0 1 ) . B a r r y s u g g e s t s that liberal d e m o c r a t i c societies have d o n e fairly well in c o p i n g w i t h cultural diversity. Insofar as t h e y h a v e , a n d there is a m p l e r o o m for i m p r o v e m e n t , it is b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e a d o p t e d iri p r a c t i c e this t o l e r a n t a n d d e m o c r a t i c a p p r o a c h w h i c h h e either caricatures or i g n o r e s , as c o m ­ parative a n d historical studies s h o w ( G a g n o n a n d Tully 2 0 0 1 ) . Finally, in t h e real w o r l d o f politics it is n o t t h e m e m b e r s o f v u l n e r a b l e m i n o r ­ ities w h o h a v e t h e privilege o f u s i n g ' t h i s is h o w w e d o t h i n g s h e r e ' as a conver­ sation stopper. It is m e m b e r s o f m a j o r i t y cultures. T h e y say ' s p e a k t h e majority l a n g u a g e in p u b l i c a n d act as w e d o if y o u a n d y o u r children w a n t to get a h e a d ' . A n o t h e r p u z z l i n g feature o f Culture and Equality is t h a t B a r r y h i m s e l f e m p l o y s t h e caricature a r g u m e n t ' t h i s is h o w w e d o t h i n g s h e r e ' w h e n h e a r g u e s that w e s h o u l d assimilate to a relatively h o m o g e n e o u s n a t i o n a l identity a n d privatize o u r cultural differences if w e w i s h to m a x i m i z e o u r o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d m i n i m i z e o u r costs (CE: 1 0 6 - 9 , 2 8 6 ) . H e r e t h e a r g u m e n t is 'self-sufficient' (CE: 107), w h e r e a s

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w h e r e h e falsely attributes it to t h e multiculturalists a n d attacks it (ch. 7), h e says it could n e v e r 'function as a self-contained justificatory m o v e ' (CE: 2 5 3 ) . Insofar, then, as B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t s against t h e caricature are valid ( w h e r e h e c l a i m s t h e multiculturalists e m p l o y it), t h e s e a r g u m e n t s d o n o t refute m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , since it rests firmly o n t h e types o f g e n e r a l r e a s o n I h a v e outlined, but, ironically, t h e 'self-sufficient'justification of his o w n theory.

6. Distribution versus Recognition T h e last caricature B a r r y r e p e a t e d l y e m p l o y s is t h e p r e s u m p t i o n that theorists o f r e c o g n i t i o n i g n o r e a n d d r a w attention away from issues o f distribution, o f social a n d e c o n o m i c inequality (CE: 5, 7 - 8 , 17, 3 2 , 34, 5 4 - 5 , 3 1 7 - 2 9 ) . H e asserts that c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n t h e issues o f r e c o g n i t i o n u n d e r m i n e t h e solidarity n e c e s s a r y for struggles over distribution a n d that o n e o u g h t t o a b a n d o n t h e f o r m e r for t h e latter. T h i s is a false d i c h o t o m y . T h e m i n o r i t i e s t h a t suffer t h e injustices o f m i s r e c o g n i t i o n - exclusion, m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n , d i s p o s s e s s i o n , loss of c o m m u n i t y control, ethnic c l e a n s i n g , direct a n d indirect d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , u n r e a s o n a b l e a s s i m i ­ lation - are also in m a n y cases t h e w o r s t off socially a n d economically. T h e s e are the cases that theorists o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m h a v e b r o u g h t to the attention o f a w i d e r a u d i e n c e . T h e m e m b e r s o f such m i n o r i t i e s are s t r u g g l i n g for e q u a l t r e a t m e n t e c o n o m i c a l l y a n d socially, b u t n o t at t h e p r i c e of a b a n d o n i n g or s u b o r d i n a t i n g r e a s o n a b l e identity-related differences that are i m p o r t a n t t o t h e m , or at t h e p r i c e o f h a v i n g t h e u n n e c e s s a r y identity-related differences o f the majority i m p o s e d o n t h e m u n d e r t h e g u i s e o f a n a t i o n a l identity. T h e s e p r e s c r i p t i o n s are t h e solvent, n o t t h e c e m e n t , o f citizen solidarity. T h e s t r u g g l e s w e confront exhibit b o t h r e c o g ­ nition a n d distribution d i m e n s i o n s a n d t h e s e are interrelated in c o m p l e x w a y s . To set u p the issue as o n e o f either r e c o g n i t i o n or distribution is to m i s c o n s t r u e the theoretical literature a n d the struggles the literature a d d r e s s e s . Political p h i l o s o ­ p h e r s are t r y i n g to d e v e l o p a p p r o a c h e s that d o j u s t i c e to b o t h t h e r e c o g n i t i o n a n d t h e distribution a s p e c t s o f t h e s e s t r u g g l e s (Tully 2 0 0 0 b ; D e v e a u x 2 0 0 0 ; Young 2000). O n e w o u l d h o p e that B a r r y w i l l p u t aside h i s u n h e l p f u l c a r i c a t u r e s a n d p o l e m i c s in the light o f t h e e v i d e n c e , a n d j o i n in t h e i m p o r t a n t w o r k o f s t u d y i n g equality and culture together. However, this m a y b e difficult b e c a u s e , as D a v i d O w e n suggests, t h e disposition to caricature a n d p o l e m i c s m a y b e closely related to t h e general w a y o f d o i n g political p h i l o s o p h y that h e a d o p t s , a n d so setting this a s i d e caricature a n d p o l e m i c s m a y involve setting aside, or at least m o d i f y i n g , h i s a p p r o a c h to political p h i l o s o p h y ( O w e n 1999a; 1 9 9 9 c ; 2 0 0 2 ) . O w e n s u g g e s t s that there are t w o different E n l i g h t e n m e n t traditions o f p u b l i c r e a s o n . O n e sees reflection o n p u b l i c r e a s o n as an abstract a n d universalizing activity that reflects o n historically a n d culturally situated p r a c t i c e s o f practical r e a s o n i n g from a b o v e a n d legislates their character a n d limits. T h e other sees reflection o n p u b l i c rea­ son as always d e p e n d e n t to s o m e extent o n historically a n d culturally situated

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p r a c t i c e s o f practical r e a s o n i n g a n d so as the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n o f the self-reflective c h a r a c t e r of such p r a c t i c e s ( O w e n 1999a: 5 2 1 - 2 ) . A s a result o f their orientation, m e m b e r s o f t h e first tradition have a t e n d e n c y to take their c u r r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f r e a s o n a b l e n e s s a n d o f free a n d equal as the u n d e r ­ standing. W h e n a n o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f freedom or equality is p u t forward as r e a s o n a b l e , or an additional n o r m o f legitimacy is a d v a n c e d , t h e r e s p o n s e is n o t to treat it p r e s u m p t i v e l y as equal to their o w n a n d enter into a d i a l o g u e o f r e c i p ­ r o c a l elucidation, b u t to j u d g e it from their o w n interpretation, as the universal s t a n d a r d of j u d g e m e n t . F r o m this lofty p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e c h a l l e n g e is j u d g e d to be u n r e a s o n a b l e a n d p a r t i c u l a r a n d so t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to enter into an e x c h a n g e o f r e a s o n s o n equal footing. Rather, t h e t e m p t a t i o n is to resort to 'scornful a d m o n ­ i s h m e n t s as to one's u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s ' or ' i m p a t i e n t d e n u n c i a t i o n s o f o n e ' s ratio­ n a l i t y ' ( O w e n 1999a: 546). If this is correct, setting aside the inclination to p o l e m i c s m a y involve setting a s i d e or at least m o d i f y i n g t h e u n d e r l y i n g orienta­ tion a n d e n g a g i n g in t h e dialogical a n d d e m o c r a t i c orientation o u t l i n e d above.

Note I would like to thank Richard Bellamy, Avigail Eisenberg, Duncan Ivison, Anthony Laden, Jocelyn Maclure and David Owen for their helpful criticisms of earlier drafts.

References Barry, B. 2001: Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity). Bellamy, R. 1999: Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise (London: Routledge). 2001: The 'Right to have Rights': Citizenship Practice and the Political Constitution of the European Union. In R. Bellamy and A. Warleigh (eds), Citizenship and Gover­ nance in the European Union (London: Continuum). Carens, J. 2000: Culture, Citizenship and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Deveaux, M. 2000: Cultural Pluralism and the Dilemmas of Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Eisenberg, A. 1994: The Politics of Individual and Group Difference in Canadian Jurispru­ dence. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 27: 3 - 2 1 . Gagnon, A.-G. and Tully, J. (eds) 2001: Multinational Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Habermas, J. 1996: Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Ivison, D. 2001: Moralism and Public Reason: the Case of Aboriginal Rights. Unpublished conference paper. Laden, A. 2001: Reasonably Radical: Deliberative Liberalism and the Politics of Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Owen, D. 1999a: Political Philosophy in a Post-Imperial Voice: James Tully and the Poli­ tics of Recognition. Economy and Society, 28 (4): 520^19.

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1999b: Cultural Diversity and the Conversation of Justice. Political Theory, 27 (5): 579-96. 1999c: Orientation and Enlightenment: An Essay on Critique and Genealogy. In S. Ashenden and D. Owen (eds), Foucault contra Habermas (London: Sage). 2002: Genealogy as Perspicuous Representation. In C. Heyes (ed.), Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Owen, D. and Bentley, R. 2001: Ethical Loyalties, Civic Virtue and the Circumstances of Politics. Philosophical Explorations, 4 (3), forthcoming. Pettit, P. 1997: Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Rawls, J. 1996: Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press). 1999: The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. In Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Russell, D. 2001: Republicanism and Multiculturalism. PhD dissertation. Department of Philosophy, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Taylor, C. 1994: The Politics of Recognition. In Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Tully, J. 1995: Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 1999: The Agonic Freedom of Citizens. Economy and Society 28: 161-82. 2000a: The Challenge of Reimagining Citizenship and Belonging in Multicultural and Multinational Societies. In C. McKinnon and I. Hampsher-Monk (eds) The Demands of Citizenship (London: Continuum Press), pp. 212-34. 2000b: Struggles over Recognition and Distribution. Constellations 7 (4): 469-82. 2000c. The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom. In D. Ivison, P. Patton and W. Sanders (eds). Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 36-59. 2001: Introduction. In A.-G. Gagnon and J. Tully (eds), Multinational Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-34. Young, I. M. 2000: Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

7 Culture, Equality and Diversity Judith Squires

B r i a n B a r r y ' s Culture and Equality ( 2 0 0 1 ) r e p r e s e n t s an u n a p o l o g e t i c refusal to e n g a g e positively w i t h t h e c u r r e n t l y m o d i s h m u l t i c u l t u r a l theory, a n d all its p r e ­ s u m p t i o n s . B a r r y takes as his object o f critique t h e theoretical t u r n that w o u l d politicize g r o u p identities, w h e r e t h e s e are c l a i m e d to b e cultural. H e c l a i m s that, c o n t r a r y to t h e a s s u m p t i o n w i t h i n t h e m u l t i c u l t u r a l literature that m u l t i c u l t u r a l ­ i s m h a s w o n t h e day a n d t h e issue is s i m p l y to d e t e r m i n e t h e specific details or arbitrate b e t w e e n p a r t i c u l a r articulations, t h e r e is actually w i d e s p r e a d rejection a n d hostility to t h e multicultural project - a n d that h e is fulfilling a n i m p o r t a n t g a p in b o t h e r i n g to say so. T h e a r g u m e n t for g r o u p , rights a n d criticisms o f E n l i g h t e n m e n t u n i v e r s a l i s m is, B a r r y claims in characteristic style, ' n o t so m u c h a c a s e o f r e i n v e n t i n g t h e w h e e l as forgetting w h y the w h e e l w a s i n v e n t e d a n d a d v o c a t i n g t h e r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the s l e d g e ' (CE: 11). M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m h a s b e c o m e t h e topic of the m o m e n t , n o t only for political theorists, b u t also for social theorists, sociologists, political scientists a n d e d u c a ­ tionalists. C e r t a i n n o r m s a n d c o n v e n t i o n s h a v e e m e r g e d quite quickly. T h e i d e a that l i b e r a l i s m is difference-blind, that m o d e r n polities h a v e t e n d e d to a s s i m ­ ilation, that t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f difference is i m p o r t a n t , that t h e differences in q u e s ­ tion are cultural - all t h e s e h a v e b e e n c o m m o n p l a c e a s s e r t i o n s . B a r r y t a k e s all o f t h e s e o n a n d r o u n d l y rejects t h e m . B u t t h e a g g r e s s i v e rejection o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m h i d e s t h e diversity w i t h i n m u l ­ ticultural theory, a n d also t h e c o m m o n a l i t y b e t w e e n s o m e o f B a r r y ' s c l a i m s a n d t h o s e o f certain m u l t i c u l t u r a l theorists. Culture and Equality is a p o l e m i c a l p i e c e o f w r i t i n g . It serves as a w a r n i n g against t h e w o r s t e x c e s s e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d offers a t r e n c h a n t defence o f an egalitarian liberalism. B o t h o f t h e s e are w o r t h y projects, a n d o n e s B a r r y carries off w i t h conviction. B u t w h a t gels, s w e p t aside in t h e p r o c e s s is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f m o r e n u a n c e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e

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c o m p l e x array o f issues currently b e i n g d e b a t e d a m o n g s t multicultural theorists. I w a n t to focus o n j u s t t w o e l e m e n t s o f t h e a r g u m e n t in Culture and Equality: t h e depiction o f multiculturalists as essentialists a n d t h e lack o f attention to the rela­ tion b e t w e e n j u s t i c e as impartiality a n d d e m o c r a c y as inclusion. M o r e positively, I will offer a defence o f a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m that is g r o u n d e d in a 'diversity p o l i t i c s ' framework, w h i c h stands in contrast to b o t h a f r a m e w o r k of impartiality politics, w h i c h B a r r y e n d o r s e s , a n d identity politics, w h i c h h e rejects. I also w a n t to s u g g e s t that any c o m p e l l i n g defence o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m from a diversity f r a m e w o r k r e q u i r e s an a c c o u n t o f d e m o c r a t i c inclusion. Yet diversity theorists have, to date, p a i d insufficient attention to t h e institutional details o f s u c h an a c c o u n t .

1. Essentialism and Hybridity B a r r y is c o n c e r n e d to reject t h e millet m o d e l o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d t h e e s s e n tialist m o d e l o f g r o u p identity. T h i s is a sensible project. Yet B a r r y is intent o n d e p i c t i n g all m u l t i c u l t u r a l theorists as a d v o c a t e s o f this m o d e l , a n d u s i n g t h e rejection of b o t h t h e millet m o d e l a n d essentialism as a k n o c k - d o w n refutation o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l t h e o r y p e r se. H e w a n t s to c h a r a c t e r i z e all his p e r c e i v e d o p p o ­ n e n t s as a d o p t i n g this p o s i t i o n b e c a u s e it is t h e easiest o n e to reject. A c c o r d i n g l y , h e p r e s e n t s Iris M a r i o n Young's p r o p o s a l s for g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as r e q u i r i n g an essentialized a n d n a t u r a l i z e d c o n c e p t i o n o f g r o u p s as internally h o m o g e n e o u s , clearly b o u n d e d , m u t u a l l y exclusive a n d m a i n t a i n i n g specific d e t e r m i n a t e inter­ ests (CE: 11). We h a v e to turn to t h e footnote to r e a d that B a r r y is aware o f the fact that Young actually 'explicitly r e p u d i a t e s this c o n c e p t i o n o f g r o u p s ' ( 2 0 0 1 : 3 3 0 , n. 16). 1

M o s t a d v o c a t e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m that I c a n t h i n k o f share B a r r y ' s c o n c e r n a b o u t this essentialized c o n c e p t i o n o f g r o u p s a n d d o n o t see it as an inevitable c o n s e q u e n c e o f their theory. Taylor is p e r h a p s the closest to a d v o c a t i n g t h e n o t i o n o f g r o u p s that B a r r y w a n t s to reject in his a p p e a l to the n o t i o n s o f authenticity a n d s u r v i v a n c e , b u t even h e believes identity to b e dialogical (Taylor 1992: 3 2 ) . It is a c o m m o n m i s t a k e to confuse an essentialist identity politics w i t h a c o n structivist diversity politics, b u t I t a k e t h e m to b e quite distinct. E s s e n t i a l i s m can b e u n d e r s t o o d as ' a b e l i e f in t r u e e s s e n c e - that w h i c h is m o s t irreducible, u n c h a n g i n g , a n d therefore constitutive o f a given p e r s o n or t h i n g ' ( F u s s 1989: 2 ) . C o n s t r u c t i v i s m , o n t h e other hand, stands in direct o p p o s i t i o n to essentialism, insisting that w h a t a p p e a r s as e s s e n c e is historical c o n s t r u c t i o n rather t h a n natural given. T h e s e t w o c o n t r a s t i n g a c c o u n t s o f subjectivity g r o u n d v e r y different polit­ ical projects. A n identity politics invokes essentialist c l a i m s : it 'is a b o u t e s t a b ­ lishing a viable identity for its constituency, of c l a i m i n g social r e c o g n i t i o n a n d v a l u e o n the b a s i s o f s h a r e d c o m m o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ' that are attributed to t h e par­ ticular social g r o u p o f an identity ( G r o s z 1994: 3 1 ) . Its project is to establish for its m e m b e r s t h e rights, r e c o g n i t i o n a n d privileges t h a t d o m i n a n t g r o u p s have

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a t t e m p t e d to k e e p for t h e m s e l v e s . A politics of diversity, in contrast, rejects ideas o f essential unity, integrity, discreteness a n d fixity. Its f o u n d i n g anti-essentialism involves t h e d e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s s u m p t i o n s a n d c l a i m s b o t h that identity h a s s o m e intrinsic e s s e n c e a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g that identities are always socially con­ structed, c o n t e x t u a l a n d n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h e x c l u s i o n ( N a s h 2 0 0 1 ) . A s William Connolly notes: Identity is thus a slippery, insecure experience, dependent on its ability to define difference and vulnerable to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert definitions applied to them. Identity stands in a complex, political relation to the difference it seeks to fix. (1991: 64) H a v i n g m a d e this distinction, I n e v e r t h e l e s s a c k n o w l e d g e that, a l t h o u g h t h e essentialist a n d anti-essentialist p e r s p e c t i v e s a p p e a r to b e b o t h analytically dis­ tinct a n d politically a n t a g o n i s t i c , in p r a c t i c e it is rather difficult to d i s e n t a n g l e t h e t w o . Indeed, F u s s a r g u e s t h a t ' t h e r e is n o sure w a y to b r a c k e t off a n d t o c o n t a i n essentialist m a n o e u v r e s in anti-essentialist a r g u m e n t s ' ( F u s s 1989: 4 ) . F e r g u s o n e x p a n d s on this insight, s h o w i n g that essentialism c o m m o n l y entails at least three different p o s i t i o n s , w h i c h she labels ' e s s e n t i a l i s m p e r s e ' , ' u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n ' a n d ' c o h e r e n t c a t e g o r i z a t i o n ' . E s s e n t i a l i s m p e r se is defined as that w h i c h attributes p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d social e x p e r i e n c e s to fixed a n d u n c h a n g i n g traits r e s i d e n t in p h y s i o l o g y or in s o m e larger o r d e r o f t h i n g s ( F e r g u s o n 1 9 9 3 : 81). U n i v e r s a l i z a ­ tion is defined as that w h i c h ' t a k e s t h e p a t t e r n s visible in one's o w n t i m e a n d p l a c e to b e a c c u r a t e for a l l ' (ibid.: 82). T h e final form o f e s s e n t i a l i s m distin­ g u i s h e d b y F e r g u s o n entails any constitution o f a unified set o f categories (ibid.: 82). Given that a n y analysis r e q u i r e s s o m e set o f c a t e g o r i e s a b o u t w h i c h gener­ alizations can b e m a d e , it is unlikely that even t h e m o s t t r e n c h a n t c r i u V o f ' e s s e n ­ tialism p e r s e ' or o f ' u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n ' will avoid this f o r m o f essentialism. N o n e t h e l e s s , I m a i n t a i n that it is politically significant t h a t a d v o c a t e s of diversity politics aspire to d i s t a n c e t h e m s e l v e s from e s s e n t i a l i s m w h e r e v e r p o s s i b l e , whilst a d v o c a t e s o f identity politics c o n s c i o u s l y invoke it. D r a w i n g this distinction b e t w e e n identity a n d diversity politics is relevant in relation t o B a r r y ' s a c c o u n t o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m b e c a u s e it allows o n e to a c c e p t h i s rejection o f identity politics, w h i l s t n o n e t h e l e s s d e f e n d i n g t h e calls for the ' r e c o g ­ n i t i o n o f differences' that e m e r g e from a diversity politics p e r s p e c t i v e .

2. Multicultural Citizenship A c c o r d i n g to m u c h o f t h e multicultural citizenship literature, t h e u n i v e r s a l i s m o f traditional citizenship t h e o r y h a s b e e n ' f a l s e ' n o t b e c a u s e it e x c l u d e d s u b o r d i n a t e g r o u p identities as an a b e r r a t i o n , b u t b e c a u s e this e x c l u s i o n w a s integral to the t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e o f citizenship in b o t h the r e p u b l i c a n a n d liberal traditions. B o t h traditions o f citizenship are criticized for b e i n g 'falsely u n i v e r s a l i s t i c ' in

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their p o r t r a y a l o f t h e citizen: t h e liberal tradition, it is argued, t r a n s c e n d s p a r t i c ­ ularity a n d t h e r e p u b l i c a n o n e s u p p r e s s e s it. D e s p i t e t h e l o n g history o f dispute b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o c a m p s , t h e r e c e n t ' p o l i t i c s of difference' p e r s p e c t i v e w o u l d c h a l l e n g e b o t h ( s o m e t i m e s i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y ) as failing to r e c o g n i z e t h e cultural particularity o f identities. W i t h i n this m o d i s h desire to criticize universality a n d ' r e c o g n i z e difference', there is a w i d e r a n g e o f distinct p o s i t i o n s : from t h e s w e e p i n g rejection o f all m a n ­ ifestations o f t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t ideal o f impartiality a n d t h e correlative c e l e b r a ­ tion of ' d i f f e r e n c e ' p e r se (Young 1990), to t h e m o r e m e a s u r e d critique o f p a r t i c u l a r m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f either liberalism or r e p u b l i c a n i s m in t h e n a m e o f a v e r y p r e c i s e form of p o l y e t h n i c cultural p l u r a l i s m ( K y m l i c k a 1995). Yet t h o s e w h o w o u l d r e p l a c e traditional citizenship t h e o r y w i t h a m o r e m u l t i ­ cultural a n d feminist v i s i o n o f social a n d political i n c l u s i o n w a n t to critique u n i v e r s a l i s m whilst r e c o g n i z i n g that it is p r e c i s e l y in t h e universality o f citizenship that it g a i n s its political force for s u b o r d i n a t e ethnic g r o u p s . C u r r e n t a t t e m p t s to d e v e l o p a m o r e inclusive citizenship are p r e m i s e d n o t o n a rejection of universalism p e r se, b u t o n a differentiated u n i v e r s a l i s m as o p p o s e d t o t h e false u n i v e r s a l i s m o f 'traditional citizenship t h e o r y ' (Lister 1998). I a m s u g g e s t i n g that it is helpful t o c a t e g o r i z e t h o s e w h o a r g u e for a 'differentiated u n i v e r s a l i s m ' into three distinct g r o u p s : t h o s e w h o a r g u e from i m p a r t i a l i t y politics, from identity politics a n d from diversity politics. T h e impartial form o f differentiated citizenship, or w h a t Taylor calls t h e p o l i ­ tics o f equal dignity, focuses o n t h e centrality o f a u t o n o m y , or 'rational revisa b i l i t y ' : t h e ability o f t h e individual to rationally assess a n d revise their c u r r e n t e n d s . W h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s this impartiality p e r s p e c t i v e from m o r e directly universalist f o r m s o f liberalism, as a d v o c a t e d b y Barry, is t h e c l a i m that a t h e o r y o f culture is n e e d e d in o r d e r t o a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r t h e c o n t e x t o f c h o i c e . People's c a p a c i t y to m a k e m e a n i n g f u l c h o i c e s d e p e n d s o n a c c e s s to cultural structures that r e q u i r e 'institutional c e m e n t ' if t h e y are to survive ( K y m l i c k a 1995). G r o u p differentiated rights p r o v i d e s u c h c e m e n t a n d are a r e q u i r e m e n t o f citizenship. K y m l i c k a therefore argues that m i n o r i t y rights are consistent w i t h u n i v e r s a l i s m . T h e c l a i m s o f m i n o r i t y cultures are, after all, justified t h r o u g h reference to the universal rights o f individuals. O n K y m l i c k a ' s m o d e l , all individuals h a v e t h e s a m e right to c h o o s e h o w to lead their lives. C u l t u r e p r p v i d e s t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h individuals m a k e m e a n i n g f u l c h o i c e s . So, given this, p e o p l e ne^d-the-security o f t h e i r o w n culture in order to enjoy t h e s a m e individual rights as others. Identity p o l i t i c s T o c u s e s o n t n e centrality of authenticity: t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e individual t o b e in t o u c h w i t h their m o r a l feelings. O u r m o r a l salvation, as Taylor a r g u e s , c o m e s from r e c o v e r i n g a u t h e n t i c m o r a l c o n t a c t w i t h o u r s e l v e s (Taylor 1992: 2 9 ) . Identity politics is c o n c e r n e d w i t h authenticity as distinct from dignity, self-realization as o p p o s e d to rational revisability. W h e r e a u t o n o m y r e q u i r e s c u l ­ tural structures, authenticity requires dialogical interaction. T h e d i s c o v e r y o f o n e ' s t r u e identity is not, o n Taylor's a c c o u n t , a m o n o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s ; it c a n n o t take p l a c e in isolation b u t rather n e e d s t o b e n e g o t i a t e d w i t h others a n d therefore

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d e p e n d s u p o n one's dialogical relation w i t h others. C i t i z e n s h i p is u n d e r s t o o d as that m e c h a n i s m w h i c h g u a r a n t e e s universal r e c o g n i t i o n a n d so e n s u r e s that the fundamental h u m a n n e e d for authenticity is equally realized. R e c o g n i z i n g the u n i q u e identity o f e v e r y o n e requires n o t an identical set o f rights for all, b u t public a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f the p a r t i c u l a r w o r t h of each. W h e r e a s t h e impartial defence of r e c o g n i t i o n e m p h a s i z e s rationality as the potentiality that p e o p l e universally h a v e in c o m m o n , this a p p r o a c h e m p h a s i z e s the identity that is original to each. In contrast to e a c h o f t h e above, diversity politics focuses o n the centrality of t r a n s g r e s s i o n . It entails t h e q u e s t i o n i n g of the relation b e t w e e n reality a n d lin­ guistic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . R a t h e r t h a n s e e k i n g to discover t r u e identities, this a p p r o a c h a i m s to e x p l o d e s u c h e x p r e s s i o n s o f ' i d e n t i t y ' , v i e w i n g all c l a i m s to c o h e r e n c e a n d u n i t y as p r o d u c e d rather t h a n uncovered, ' a s artefacts o f analysis rather t h a n its finds' (Ferguson 1 9 9 3 : 12). Identity is n o t only socially constructed, it is h e r e u n d e r s t o o d to b e constituted t h r o u g h a d i s p a r a t e a n d shifting n e t w o r k o f interrelated d i s c o u r s e s , w i t h n o single causal or d e t e r m i n i n g factor. F r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e subject turns out to b e discursively constituted b y t h e v e r y political s y s t e m that is s u p p o s e d to facilitate its e m a n c i p a t i o n . Politics is h e r e m a d e to q u e s t i o n g r o u p loyalty a n d subvert g r o u p identities. It p r o v i d e s t h e basis for an ' a g o n i s t i c d e m o c r a c y ' w h i c h ' d i s t u r b s t h e d o g m a t i z a t i o n o f iden­ t i t y ' ( C o n n o l l y 1 9 9 1 : x ) . W h e r e t h e impartiality o f equality politics g e n e r a t e s t h e political m i n i m a l i s m o f d e m o c r a t i c i n d i v i d u a l i s m a n d identity politics generates t h e political e x p a n s i v e n e s s o f d e m o c r a t i c c o n s e n s u s , diversity politics generates a c o n c e r n to q u e s t i o n each, to c h a l l e n g e t h e confinement o f d e m o c r a c y to the g o v e r n m e n t a l institutions o f t h e territorial state (ibid.: xi). It s e e k s to overflow state b o u n d a r i e s in a m a n n e r that leaves it little c o n c e r n e d w i t h q u e s t i o n s o f territorially b o u n d citizenship. T h i s distinction b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e distinct defences o f a differentiated citi­ z e n s h i p m a t t e r s largely b e c a u s e its critics t e n d to take t h e m o s t p r o b l e m a t i c defence as t h e o n e they d o battle w i t h . Barry, for instance, a r g u e s that t h e p o l i ­ tics o f difference is a f o r m u l a for m a n u f a c t u r i n g conflict b e c a u s e it r e w a r d s the g r o u p s that c a n m o s t effectively m o b i l i z e to m a k e claims o n t h e polity, or at any rate r e w a r d s ethnocultural political e n t r e p r e n e u r s w h o can exploit its potential for their o w n e n d s b y m o b i l i z i n g a c o n s t i t u e n c y a r o u n d a set of sectional d e m a n d s . H e w a n t s to characterize all h i s p e r c e i v e d o p p o n e n t s as a d o p t i n g this p o s i t i o n b e c a u s e it is t h e easiest o n e to reject. T h e r e are a d v o c a t e s o f b o t h identity politics a n d diversity politics w i t h i n m u l ­ ticultural theory, a n d charges o f essentialism only a p p l y to the former. T h e s e dif­ ferent c o n c e p t i o n s o f subjectivity g e n e r a t e different m o d e l s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m . T h e essentialist multicultural view, s o m e t i m e s called a millet m o d e l , s o m e t i m e s p r i m o r d i a l i s m , ethnic a b s o l u t i s m or culturalism, offers a c r u d e v i s i o n o f h o m o ­ g e n e o u s , discrete m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . It is p e r h a p s b e c a u s e o f its c r u d e n e s s that m a n y p u b l i c policies a r o u n d E u r o p e a d o p t this m o d e l . B u t if o n e l o o k s at t h e a c a ­ d e m i c literature, it is o v e r w h e l m i n g l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y critics o f essentialism a n d rejections o f this m o d e l o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m .

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S o B a r r y ' s c o n c e r n about a reductive identity politics a n d the e m p o w e r i n g o f strident voices w i t h i n g r o u p s is justified, b u t m a n y multiculturalists share this c o n c e r n . For e x a m p l e , W o m e n A g a i n s t F u n d a m e n t a l i s m , a g r o u p set u p in the w a k e o f t h e R u s h d i e affair to ' c h a l l e n g e t h e a s s u m p t i o n that m i n o r i t i e s in this c o u n t r y exist as a unified, internal h o m o g e n e o u s g r o u p ' , o p p o s e t h e i d e a of t h e s e e m i n g l y s e a m l e s s M u s l i m c o n s e n s u s in Britain. A n d Y a s m i n A l i b h a i - B r o w n , w h o is arguably d o i n g m o r e t h a n a n y o n e to d e v e l o p a British m o d e l o f m u l t i c u l ­ turalism, a c k n o w l e d g e s that there is a problem for liberal democracy in trying to reconcile equality and differ­ ence through the British approach to 'multiculturalism', which has made it much too easy for politicians to deal with self-appointed 'community leaders', and much too difficult for black and Asian Britons to have rich, multiple identities. Worse, it has enabled white Britons to carry on excluding us. (Alibhai-Brown 1999) So, B a r r y ' s a r g u m e n t against this form o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is entirely justified, b u t h i s a s s u m p t i o n that all a d v o c a t e s o f m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m share it is s i m p l y m i s ­ p l a c e d . A m o r e interesting project is to p r e s s those w h o a d o p t a n o n - e s s e n t i a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f identity a n d a diversity politics t o e x p l a i n h o w o n e c a n institu­ tionalize a differentiated citizenship w i t h o u t also reifying g r o u p identities.

3. Feminism and Multiculturalism: Tensions and Commonalities In s u r v e y i n g t h e s e c o m p e t i n g a c c o u n t s o f differentiated citizenship, I h a v e n o t d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n feminist a n d m u l t i c u l t u r a l p e r s p e c t i v e s , i m p l y i n g that t h e y share a c o m m o n project a n d can b e c o n s i d e r e d a c c o r d i n g to a c o m m o n typology. N o t e v e r y o n e shares this a s s u m p t i o n . S o m e difference theorists d o see a close link b e t w e e n f e m i n i s m a n d m u l t i c u l ­ turalism. A s A n n e Phillips n o t e s , ' b o t h tackle issues o f inequality a n d o p p r e s ­ s i o n s ' and, importantly, t h e o p p r e s s i o n s they a d d r e s s arise from a failure to r e c o g n i z e p e o p l e as equal, a failure that ' s e e m s to b e b o u n d u p in s o m e w a y w i t h an inability to a c c e p t difference' (Phillips 2 0 0 1 : 6). She s u g g e s t s that t h o s e p u r ­ suing cultural a n d sexual equality share a critique o f false universalism, w h i c h g e n e r a l i z e s b o t h from o n e sex a n d from o n e culture. O t h e r s , notably Susan M o l l e r O k i n , s u g g e s t that m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d femi­ n i s m n o t only stand in t e n s i o n o n e to another, b u t that m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m is b a d for w o m e n . M u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m frequently entails a l l o w i n g e x e m p t i o n s to universally a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s . In m o s t cases t h e s e e x e m p t i o n s a l l o w for greater i n e q u a l i t y b e t w e e n w o m e n a n d m e n t h a n d o e s t h e universal rule. She argues that w e m u s t therefore d e c i d e w h e t h e r to prioritize cultural g r o u p rights or w o m e n ' s equality ( O k i n 1999). M a r t h a N u s s b a u m ( 1 9 9 9 ) similarly s u g g e s t s that the liberal e m p h a ­ sis o n individual rights is crucial for w o m e n , w h o s e interests are frequently s u b -

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s u m e d u n d e r t h e ' g r e a t e r g o o d ' o f the family or c o m m u n i t y . S h e , like O k i n , a s s u m e s f e m i n i s m a n d m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m to b e in tension, w i t h f e m i n i s m d e m a n d ­ ing g r e a t e r liberal individualism a n d m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m calling for less. T h e p r o b l e m w i t h this stance is that it invokes a form o f u n i v e r s a l i s m already c h a l l e n g e d b y n u m e r o u s feminist a s s e r t i o n s o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f r e c o g n i z i n g sexual difference. H a v i n g focused its critique o n 'false ( g e n d e r e d ) u n i v e r s a l i s m ' , f e m i n i s m o p e n s u p t h e possibility that the universal rule of sexual equality could itself b e a f o r m of 'false (cultural) u n i v e r s a l i s m ' . T h e prioritization o f t h e r i g h t s o f individuals over t h e rights o f g r o u p s , o f a u t o n o m y over duty, o f c h o i c e over responsibility, m a y itself b e t h e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f a culturally specific n o r m . T h e r e are legitimate c o n c e r n s a b o u t u n i v e r s a l i s m , t h e n . A s Phillips n o t e s : ' P r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e are always f o r m e d in a p a r t i c u l a r historical context, a n d often reflect t h e p r e o c c u p a t i o n s o f m o r e powerful g r o u p s ' ( 2 0 0 1 : 16). T h i s d o e s n o t n e c e s s i t a t e t h e denial o f t h e universal applicability o f p r i n c i p l e s , b u t it d o e s require that o n e b e attentive to t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f their derivation, a n d r e m a i n o p e n to t h e possibility o f their reformulation. O n t h e other hand, there are also legitimate c o n c e r n s a b o u t cultural relativism. C u l t u r e s a r e n o t m o n o l i t h i c a n d internally self-consistent. T h e r e will always b e internal disputes a n d difference o f beliefs w i t h i n cultures. M o r e o v e r , given t h e p o r o s i t y o f cultures, beliefs that e m e r g e w i t h i n o n e culture can usefully b e u s e d to a s s e s s the p r a c t i c e s o f another, c o n t r a r y to s o m e r e n d e r i n g s o f cultural relativism. In other w o r d s , t h e t e n s i o n s b e t w e e n f e m i n i s m a n d m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a p p e a r greatest w h e n f e m i n i s m is u n d e r s t o o d to e m b o d y impartiality politics a n d m u l ­ t i c u l t u r a l i s m identity politics. T h e s h a r e d a g e n d a , in contrast, a p p e a r s strongest w h e n b o t h are a d d r e s s e d from t h e diversity politics framework. T h e diversity a p p r o a c h rejects the false u n i v e r s a l i s m implicit in n a r r o w a c c o u n t s o f i m ­ partiality a n d also refuses t h e cultural relativism implicit in reductive adcounts o f identity. For t h e s e r e a s o n s s u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e has g a i n e d significant n u m b e r s o f a d v o ­ cates, w i t h i n theoretical d e b a t e s at least. It is, however, w i d e l y a c k n o w l e d g e d that a d v o c a t e s o f this a p p r o a c h , h o w e v e r c o m p e l l i n g theoretically, h a v e b e e n largely u n a b l e to clarify t h e n o r m a t i v e c l a i m s implicit in their politics. Critics a c c u s e its a d v o c a t e s o f b e i n g unable to e l a b o r a t e universal p r i n c i p l e s that m i g h t constrain t h e unjust possibilities that w o u l d inevitably arise if contestation a n d diversity w e r e the only ideals to w h i c h o n e s u b s c r i b e d ( B e n h a b i b 1996). In an a t t e m p t to m o v e diversity politics in t h e direction o f p o s i t i v e n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t a n d even practical institutional e n g a g e m e n t , I w a n t to a r g u e that it s h o u l d e n d o r s e a ' c o n t e x t u a l i m p a r t i a l i t y ' a n d e m p h a s i z e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of m e c h ­ a n i s m s o f inclusive d e m o c r a t i c deliberation. T h e s e t w o facets o f t h e diversity m o d e l of differentiated citizenship are i n t e r c o n n e c t e d in t h a t t h e u n i v e r s a l i s m c l a i m e d is likely to b e a 'false u n i v e r s a l i s m ' as l o n g as certain g r o u p s are m a r ­ g i n a l i z e d from t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a r e n a s . In s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , Young is right to s u g g e s t t h a t a p p e a l s to i m p a r t i a l i t y will h a v e t h e effect o f r e a s s e r t i n g a d o m i ­ n a n t p e r s p e c t i v e as if it w e r e a universal p o i n t o f view, b u t she is w r o n g to i m p l y

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that impartiality itself n e e d s to b e rejected (Young 1990; see also M o o k h e r j e e 2 0 0 1 ; Tully 1995).

4. Contextual Impartiality T h e a t t e m p t to n e g o t i a t e a p a t h b e t w e e n u n i v e r s a l i s m a n d difference - b o t h sexual a n d cultural - to c r e a t e a c o h e r e n t m o d e l o f differentiated u n i v e r s a l i s m rather t h a n an oppressive m o d e l o f false u n i v e r s a l i s m , r e q u i r e s an ideal of impartiality, b u t o n e that is attentive to issues o f inclusion as well as uniformity. S u c h an ideal of impartiality will inevitably entail an a c c o u n t o f d e m o c r a t i c participation. T h e sorts o f d e m o c r a t i c practice a d o p t e d will b e crucial in d e t e r m i n i n g j u s t h o w inclu­ sive the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s is, a n d h e n c e h o w impartial t h e p o l i c i e s a n d n o r m s g e n e r a t e d are. It is vital that t h e m e c h a n i s m s o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n allow for real inclusivity, w h i c h m e a n s both that t h e y n e e d to c h a l l e n g e existing inequalities v i a affirmative a c t i o n p o l i c i e s to b r i n g n e w p e o p l e in, a n d that t h e y n e e d t o avoid institutionalizing that form o f cultural relativism w h i c h a s s u m e s h o m o g e n e i t y w i t h i n g r o u p s a n d i n c o m p r e h e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e m . I m p a r t i a l i t y will h a v e to b e u n d e r s t o o d in a dialogical rather t h a n a m o n o l o g i c a l way if the c h a l l e n g e o f t h e difference theorists is to b e a d e q u a t e l y addressed, a n d this will entail l i n k i n g theories o f j u s t i c e as impartiality w i t h detailed a c c o u n t s o f t h e practical ar­ rangements of democratic inclusion (Squires 2000). A n e n d o r s e m e n t o f c o n t e x t u a l i m p a r t i a l i t y offers a w a y t h r o u g h t h e a p p a r e n t a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n B a r r y , w h o d e f e n d s impartiality, a n d Young, Tully a n d others, w h o reject it. T h o s e w h o reject impartiality d o so o n the g r o u n d s that the r e a s o n a n d rationality p r e s u p p o s e d in liberal defences o f impartiality either d e n y or distort t h e c l a i m s that m i n o r i t y cultures w i s h to m a k e . A s M o n i c a M o o k h e r j e e suggests:

[Djominant accounts of impartiality in political theory trivialise, or in some sense fail to comprehend, the special claims of cultural minorities. This is because these dominant accounts rely on a contentious 'anthropological' claim, namely that the precondition of inclusion in political debate is our common possession and acceptance of one predetermined conception of reasonableness. (Mookherjee 2001: 1) However, t h e r e a r e other p o s s i b l e a c c o u n t s o f impartiality, w h i c h a r e - 1 a m s u g ­ gesting - w o r t h y o f exploration. M o o k h e r j e e , offering o n e such a c c o u n t , defends a m o d e l o f 'justice as p r o v i s i o n a l i t y ' . She a r g u e s that: as a consequence of historic injustice (and the current inequalities resulting from that), the state should recognize that citizens' reasons for action arise out of their diverse partial identifications; and that, therefore, any public or 'common' language of reason is provisional and incomplete. (Ibid. 2001: 1)

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Moreover: the state should recognize a person's capacity for reason is itself vulnerable, and hence dependent on a special kind of provision and protection in both public and nonpublic spheres. This is because persistent inequalities and imbalances of power may prevent citizens, sometimes women in minority cultures, from the very practice of having and giving reasons at all. (Ibid. 2001: 1) M o o k h e r j e e ' s defence o f a p r o v i s i o n a l i m p a r t i a l i t y differs from t h e ' p o s i t i v e ' f o r m o f impartiality articulated b y multiculturalists s u c h as K y m l i c k a . K y m l i c k a ( 1 9 8 9 ) s u g g e s t s that r e s p o n d i n g fairly to cultural diversity involves c o r r e c t i n g inequalities in m i n o r i t i e s ' b a c k g r o u n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s , so that t h e y h a v e an equal o p p o r t u n i t y in relation to the w i d e r political c o m m u n i t y to participate in public institutions, a n d so t o p u r s u e their rationally c h o s e n life p l a n s . B y contrast, M o o k h e r j e e insists that rectification o f t h e s e u n e q u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s cannot be achieved by applying preconceived interpretations of the term equality itself. This is because a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of equality is the enabling of excluded groups to unsettle and destabilize meanings and interpreta­ tions which the institutional culture has hitherto taken as universal and complete. (Mookherjee 2001: 4-5) S h e s u g g e s t s that t h e c o m m o n l a n g u a g e s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d as an unfinished project, s o m e t h i n g that even positive f o r m s o f impartiality rarely r e c o g n i z e . This s u g g e s t s that the c o m m i t m e n t to impartiality b e retained, but that the p r o c e s s for g r o u n d i n g impartiality is t r a n s f o r m e d . B o t h S h a n e O ' N e i l l a n d M e l i s s a W i l l i a m s c o n t e n d that t h e ideal o f deliberative d e m o c r a c y e m b o d i e s a dialogical f o r m o f impartiality, sensitive t o issues o f collective o t h e r n e s s , w h i c h m i g h t usefully r e p l a c e the m o n o l o g i c a l form o f impartial m o r a l r e a s o n i n g . T h o s e e n g a g e d in t h e pursuit of impartial j u s t i c e w o u l d t h e n b e e n a b l e d ' t o s p e a k a n d b e heard, to tell one's o w n life-story, to press o n e ' s c l a i m s a n d p o i n t o f v i e w in one's o w n v o i c e ' (Fraser 1986: 4 2 8 ) . T h i s s u g g e s t s that t h e c o m m i t m e n t to i m p a r ­ tiality b e retained, b u t that the p r o c e s s for g r o u n d i n g impartiality is transformed. T h e project, as articulated b y O ' N e i l l , is ' t o c o n c e i v e o f h o w w e m i g h t reflect critically, a n d impartially, o n p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e w i t h o u t abstracting from con­ crete n e e d s a n d interests that are p a r t i c u l a r to s o m e social g r o u p or o t h e r ' ( 1 9 9 7 : 55). His s u g g e s t i o n is that this will o n l y b e possible ' i f w e c a n g r o u n d impar­ tiality n o t in a h y p o t h e t i c a l contract b u t rather in a c o n c e p t i o n o f a r e a s o n a b l e yet o p e n a n d unrestricted d i a l o g u e in the p u b l i c d o m a i n ' (ibid.: 56). Similarly, W i l l i a m s argues that ' o n e o f t h e central a i m s of deliberative t h e o r y is to r e d e e m t h e ideal o f impartiality by defining political p r o c e s s e s in a m a n n e r w h i c h avoids b i a s against valid social i n t e r e s t s ' ( 2 0 0 0 : 126). L i k e O ' N e i l l , W i l l i a m s declines to r e p u d i a t e t h e c o n c e p t o f impartiality altogether, rejecting the n e c e s s a r y a s s o ­ ciation o f impartiality with only a 'juridical m o d e l o f j u s t i c e ' a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

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deductive r e a s o n i n g , t h e i m p e r s o n a l j u d g e a n d u n s u s t a i n a b l e c l a i m s to m o r a l authority (ibid.: 128). Yet W i l l i a m s also indicates that if deliberative t h e o r y n e g l e c t s to articulate t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h its aspirations c a n b e realized, it fails to realize its p r o m i s e of impartial d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g (ibid.: 134). In other w o r d s , if w e opt for a c o n t e x ­ tual i m p a r t i a l i s m t h e n w e m u s t also p r o v i d e t h e practical details o f t h e m e c h a ­ n i s m s for e n s u r i n g inclusiveness a n d a b s e n c e o f bias w i t h i n deliberative arenas. P u t m o r e s i m p l y still, the d e b a t e a b o u t impartial j u s t i c e requires a d e b a t e a b o u t d e m o c r a t i c participation.

5. Justice and Democracy B a r r y is p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h e q u a l t r e a t m e n t , w h e r e u n i f o r m r u l e s create identical c h o i c e sets, e n s u r i n g that o p p o r t u n i t i e s are equal. B u t is it sufficient that the rules are a p p l i e d u n i f o r m l y ? Is j u s t i c e o n l y a b o u t the application o f r u l e s a n d n o t a b o u t their f o r m u l a t i o n ? Surely it also m a t t e r s that citizens h a v e an equal o p p o r t u n i t y to t a k e p a r t in the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s w h e r e b y r u l e s are for­ m u l a t e d ? M y o w n inclination is to a r g u e that if t h e r e w e r e real inclusiveness in t h e p r o c e s s o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t h e n t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f u n i f o r m application w o u l d l o o k m u c h m o r e j u s t t h a n it c u r r e n t l y d o e s . In other w o r d s , a m o r e detailed c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f h o w j u s t i c e is b o u n d u p w i t h d e m o c r a c y w o u l d b e helpful. T h e a r g u m e n t is n o t simply that laws will h a v e differential i m p a c t s o n differ­ ent p e o p l e a n d that s o m e will like t h e m better t h a n others. T h e a r g u m e n t is m o r e that if s o m e p e o p l e are structurally m a r g i n a l i z e d from the r u l e - f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s , the r u l e s are likely to b e systematically distorted. It w a s for this r e a s o n that R a w l s w e n t to all t h e trouble o f p r o p o s i n g t h e veil o f i g n o r a n c e . A n o t h e r , m o r e dialogical, r e s p o n s e is t o s u g g e s t that w e d e v e l o p a fully inclusive political citizenship that e n a b l e s all citizens to p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e r u l e - f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s . B a r r y s u g g e s t s that t h e r u l e - a n d - e x e m p t i o n a p p r o a c h is a p o o r o n e : ' T h e alter­ native is to w o r k o u t s o m e less restrictive alternative form o f t h e l a w that w o u l d a d e q u a t e l y m e e t t h e objectives o f t h e original o n e w h i l e offering t h e m e m b e r s o f the religious or cultural m i n o r i t y w h a t e v e r is m o s t i m p o r t a n t to t h e m ' (CE: 39). I t h i n k that this is entirely right. M y c o n c e r n t h o u g h is twofold. First, B a r r y d o e s n ' t actually give any details a b o u t h o w this p r o c e s s c o u l d b e institutional­ ized. Second, he a r g u e s that w h a t m o t i v a t e s this a t t e m p t to d e v e l o p a m o r e inclu­ sive articulation o f t h e law is n o t j u s t i c e b u t p r u d e n c e or generosity. In d o i n g so, h e u n d e r p l a y s the significance of this p r o c e s s , a n d offers n o theoretical or c o h e r ­ e n t criteria for d e c i d i n g w h e n this s h o u l d take p l a c e , or h o w it is to p r o c e e d . Yet it is precisely t h e s e q u e s t i o n s that s e e m to m e t o b e central. I fail to see w h y this s h o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d a q u e s t i o n o f j u s t i c e , or w h y w e s h o u l d n o t feel c o m ­ p e l l e d to t h e o r i z e t h e p r o c e s s by w h i c h rules are d e v e l o p e d . C o n s i d e r this issue in t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e p a s s a g e w h e r e B a r r y d i s c u s s e s Young's a r g u m e n t s a b o u t the ' m y t h o f m e r i t ' . Y o u n g argues that t h e i d e o l o g y o f m e r i t

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s e e k s to depoliticize the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f criteria a n d standards for allocating p o s i t i o n s a n d a w a r d i n g benefits. She p r o p o s e s , in its p l a c e , that d e m o c r a t i c deci­ s i o n - m a k i n g ( a b o u t t h e filling o f j o b s a n d offices) is a crucial c o n d i t i o n o f social j u s t i c e . B a r r y ' s r e s p o n s e is that, ' o n c e it b e c o m e s t h e o r t h o d o x view that the cri­ teria for filling j o b s are u p for g r a b s , j o b s will g o to the m e m b e r s of w h i c h e v e r faction or coalition c o m e s o u t o n t o p ' (CE: 102). We are apparently p r e s e n t e d w i t h a straight c h o i c e : j u s t i c e or d e m o c r a c y - fairness or majority interests. B u t in m u c h o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n B a r r y h i m s e l f notes that the exist­ ing criteria o f m e r i t (formal qualifications a n d test scores) constitute an u n ­ reliable p r e d i c t o r of ability to d o a j o b well, a n d a p p e a r systematically to d i s a d v a n t a g e A f r o - A m e r i c a n s . D o e s B a r r y w a n t to s u p p o r t these criteria n o n e t h e ­ less? A r e they fair? H e clearly d o e s n ' t w a n t to opt for Young's ' d e m o c r a t i c ' alter­ native, a n d I accept that there are real p r o b l e m s w i t h it. But surely w e o u g h t to b e c o n c e r n e d to allow for s o m e m o r e inclusive c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f w h a t j u s t cri­ teria of m e r i t m i g h t entail? To say that a m o d e l o f d e m o c r a t i c deliberation with g r o u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n l o o k s p r o b l e m a t i c s h o u l d n ' t necessarily b e to e n d o r s e t h e status q u o . B a r r y says that ' t h e liberal c o n c e p t i o n o f fairness in e m p l o y m e n t d e p e n d s o n t h e possibility o f r e a s o n e d a r g u m e n t a b o u t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e criteria' (CE: 103). I a g r e e . T h i s s o u n d s positive.