Reproduced from Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg >
MYANMAR Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives
The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publications, an established academic press, has issued more than 1,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publications works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.
MYANMAR Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives Edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing Robert H. Taylor Tin Maung Maung Than
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES SINGAPORE
First published in Singapore in 2005 by ISEAS Publications Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail:
[email protected] Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2005 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the editors and contributors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters.
ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Myanmar: beyond politics to societal imperatives / edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than. 1. Burma. 2. Burma—Politics and government. 3. Burma—Foreign relations. 4. Burma—Economic conditions. 5. Public health—Burma. I. Kyaw Yin Hlaing. II. Taylor, Robert H., 1943III. Tin Maung Maung Than. DS527.4 M991 2005 ISBN 981-230-300-6 (soft cover) ISBN 981-230-301-4 (hard cover) Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Utopia Press Pte Ltd
Contents Preface
vii
Abbreviations
xi
Contributors and Editors
xiii
Map of Myanmar
xvi
1
Pathways to the Present Robert H. Taylor
1
2
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World N. Ganesan
3
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches Martin T. Smith
4
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise David I. Steinberg
5
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development Rachel Safman
6
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy and the Need for Reform Alex M. Mutebi
v
30
56
86
117
140
vi
7
Contents
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar Morten B. Pederson
Index
161
185
Preface Professor David Steinberg, one of the contributors to this volume, had organized an international conference at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, D. C. in November 2002. The theme of the conference was “Burma: Reconciliation in Myanmar and the Crises of Change”.1 Among the participants were three of the contributors to this volume in addition to Professor Steinberg.2 This was one of innumerable such conferences which have been held in Asia, Europe, and North America since the late 1980s to discuss the current political, economic, and societal issues of Myanmar. Unlike most of these conferences which go over the same ground again and again, this one challenged participants to think of new initiatives and departures which might be constructive in attempting to open up and understand the seemingly intractable nature of Myanmar’s problems and issues. Coming fourteen years after the political upheaval, which led to the coming to power of the current military government, and twelve years after the annulled election, which many once saw as a first giant step towards that end, that challenge was most appropriate. One of the ideas which emerged from the discussions was that an academic conference should be held in Myanmar in order to try to understand how people within the country felt about the issues upon which so many thousands of words have been expended abroad. While since 1995 the Universities Historical Research Centre had been holding international conferences on social science and humanities issues at Yangon University, and a number of international scientific, commercial, and technical seminars had been held within Myanmar since the government had reopened the society to greater international exposure and joined many international organizations, many people assumed that the authorities would never permit independent discussions between foreign scholars and Myanmar citizens on the country’s sensitive issues.3 Thanks to the encouragement of Mr K. Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), an opportunity to test that proposition was created in February 2003, when a proposal to hold vii
viii
Preface
an eight-day workshop divided between Singapore and Yangon was submitted to the government of Myanmar. The title of the workshop was “Myanmar Issues and Myanmar Views: Searching for a Unified Perspective”. Word came back in April that such a workshop would be permissible with no prior conditions. Then the task of finding funds to bring together ten scholars, including two Myanmar nationals, and organize our meetings in Yangon. Thankfully, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) of Japan saw the purpose of our activities and provided financial support for the Yangon workshop while the Singapore end was supported by ISEAS funds. The editors went to Myanmar in December 2003, and again in January 2004, to meet with prospective participants. We are very grateful to the Rev. Dr Saboi Jum, Alan Saw Oo, U Chan Lan, U Min Kyaw, U Kyaw Win, Karin Eberhardt, and others for their assistance in making contact with many of the organizations and individuals with which we wished to meet. Dr David Koh’s valuable contribution in interpreting a crucial meeting with some ethnic nationals is much appreciated and the editorial assistance of Ms Anette Bastnes (ISEAS intern) is noted with thanks. In February 2004, the ten scholars who have come together in this volume met together for one day of discussions at ISEAS where a series of papers were presented. Following the Singapore meeting, we all flew to Yangon where meetings were held with more than a hundred individuals from twenty-one different groups of people representing twenty-five different organizations over five days. Included among them were groups representing women, business, research and education, economic and human development non-governmental organizations, religions, charitable activities, ethnic minority/ceasefire/peace groups, political parties, and two spokespersons from the government. On the third day of our meetings in Yangon we hosted a dinner for all those invited to meet with us at which more than a hundred persons attended. We are most grateful to the staff of the Traders Hotel, Yangon, for their assistance in hosting the seminar and dinner as well as the Myanmar-Britain Business Association. Special thanks are also due to Professor Tun Aung Chein who admirably served as our interpreter and facilitator. At the conclusion of our five days of meetings, the foreign participants flew back to Singapore for a final wrap-up discussion before returning home to either revise their papers or write new papers which are now gathered together to form this book. The editors would like to thank the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung for their financial support towards the publication of this book.
Preface
ix
In this book, Myanmar is used for the name of the country (previously Burma) as well as that which describes its citizens (previously Burmese), while Bamar (previously Burman) is used for the most populous ethnic group in the country in accordance with the official nomenclature instituted in 1989, except when referring to proper names and direct quotations. Similar usage also applies to the names for other ethnic nationalities (for example, Kayin instead of Karen; Rakhine instead of Arakanese) and for place names (Yangon for Rangoon).
Notes 1. A report on the conference has been published as “Burma: Reconciliation in Myanmar and the Crises of Change” (Washington, D. C., 2003), and is also available via the Johns Hopkins SAIS website at <www.sais-jhu.edu>. 2. Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Martin Smith, and Robert Taylor. 3. The late Martin Baumann had proposed a similar seminar several years earlier but met with objections before he submitted the idea. This led him not to persist with the idea at that time.
x
Preface
Abbreviations AFPFL AIDS ARF ASEAN BADP BBC BCP BIA BIMST-EC BSPP CIA CSSTB CSW DFID DSI ESCAP FAO FDI GCBA GDP HIV ICRC IDU ILO IMF KIO KMT KNU LDC MGC
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Border Areas Development Programme British Broadcasting Corporation Burma Communist Party Burma Independence Army Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Co-operation Burma Socialist Programme Party Central Intelligence Agency Civil Service Selection and Training Board commercial sex workers Department for International Development Defense Services Institute United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Food and Agricultural Organization foreign direct investment General Council of Burmese Association gross domestic product Human Immunodeficiency Virus International Committee of the Red Cross injecting drug users International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund Kachin Independence Organization Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang Karen National Union Least Developed Country Mekong-Ganga Co-operation Project xi
xii
MOGE MTA NASA NGOs NLD NSC NUP ODA OECD RC SAC SLORC SPDC SR SSA U.K. UN UNDCP UNDOC UNDP UNICEF USAID USDA VOA WHO YMBA
Abbreviations
Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise Mong Tai Army National Aeronautics and Space Administration non-governmental organizations the National League for Democracy New Security Concept National Unity Party Overseas Development Assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Revolutionary Council Security and Administrative Committee State Law and Order Restoration Council State Peace and Development Council Socialist Republic Shan State Army South United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Drug Control Programme United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations Development Programme United Nations Children’s Fund United States Agency for International Assistance Union Solidarity and Development Association Voice of America World Health Organization Young Men’s Buddhist Association
Contributors and Editors N. Ganesan is Associate Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute in Japan where he researches on issues of peace and conflict as they pertain to Southeast Asia. Prior to his current appointment, he taught in the Department of Political Science and the Southeast Asian Studies Programme at the National University of Singapore from 1990 to 2003. His most recent major publication is Realism and Interdependence in Singapore’s Foreign Policy (RoutledgeCurzon, 2005) Kyaw Yin Hlaing is Assistant Professor at the Political Science Department, National University of Singapore. His research and teaching interests range from political and social movements and democratization to state– society relations and political culture. His area of specialization is mainland Southeast Asia. Currently he is conducting research on the apprehension of Muslim Myanmar by Buddhist Myanmar, state–society relations in Myanmar, and ethnic politics in Myanmar. Alex M. Mutebi is Assistant Professor at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. His thematic research interests include the comparative political economy and political sociology of development; political participation and civic engagement; comparative public sector management and reforms; sub-national government; and economic geography. His geographic research interests are primarily based on Thailand, but also elsewhere in developing Southeast Asia. Morten B. Pederson is a research scholar in the Department of Political and Social Change, The Australian National University, and currently works as a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group and consultant to various governments and international organizations. He is co-editor and co-author of the book Burma/Myanmar: Strong Regime, Weak State (Crawford House, 2000) and author of several reports on contemporary Myanmar politics and international policies towards Myanmar since 1998. xiii
xiv
Contributors and Editors
Rachel M. Safman is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the National University of Singapore. Her research focuses on issues of health and development with particular emphasis on the implications of major health events on the welfare of families, communities, and societies. She has worked extensively in northern Thailand and also in Laos. She received her M.S. and Ph.D. in Development Sociology from Cornell University (USA). Martin T. Smith is a writer and analyst who has reported on Burma/ Myanmar for a variety of media, academic, and non-governmental organizations since the early 1980s. His most recent publications include Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change (Minority Rights Group International, 2002); “Army Politics as a Historical Legacy”, in Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy (Zed Books, 2002); and “Burma: The Karen Conflict”, in Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts (Greenwood Press, 2003). David I. Steinberg is Distinguished Professor and Director, Asian Studies, at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He is the author of four books on Burma/Myanmar, the latest being Burma: The State of Myanmar (Georgetown University Press, 2001). The author of over forty-five articles and book chapters on that country, he also writes extensively on Korea. Professor Steinberg was educated at Dartmouth College, Lingnan University (China), Harvard University, and the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London. His latest research is on contested legitimacies in Burma/Myanmar, and on the tensions between entourage and ideological political parties in South Korea. Robert H. Taylor was a former Pro-Director of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Retired Vice-Chancellor, Buckingham University, U.K., and Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He authored The State in Burma (Hurst, 1987), and edited Handbooks of the Modern World: Asia and the Pacific (Facts on File, 1991) and Burma: Political Economy under Military Rule (Hurst, 2001). He lives in London from where he provides consultancy services on Myanmar and Southeast Asian affairs.
Contributors and Editors
xv
Tin Maung Maung Than, a Myanmar national, is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. His research interests cover Myanmar politics and economics as well as political culture, democratization, civil–military relations and nuclear proliferation. A member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and the Association for Asian Studies (USA), he is also the Associate Editor of the ISEAS journal Contemporary Southeast Asia and the series editor of ISEAS Working Paper series. Over two decades, he has contributed more than seventy articles in newsletters, newspapers, journals, and edited volumes.
Source: Map reproduced with permission of the Cartographic Section, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations. Downloaded from <www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/ myanmar.pdf> on 25 February 2005.
xvi
Reproduced from Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual Pathways to the Present articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg > 1
1 Pathways to the Present Robert H. Taylor
To understand modern Myanmar, one needs to appreciate the various pathways to the present that have come together to create the country’s current condition. The inherent complexity of the issues involved is made easier to comprehend if one attempts to analyse separately the various historical forces and understandings that came together to shape the present. But in doing so, one must not lose sight of the actual interconnectedness of the strands of history that are described below. The issues which today concern the citizens of Myanmar are rooted in the country’s complex and often contested institutions and history. Those who perceive their solutions as simple, and to be solved quickly by the mere introduction of democratically elected civilian rule, are in danger of deluding themselves. Without attempting to understand how Myanmar came to its current condition, simplistically proffered recipes for change, democratic or authoritarian, are as likely to result in failure as success. Indeed, it can be argued that the country’s condition now is the result of often well-meaning but ultimately foolhardy attempts to apply currently popular political solutions, encapsulated in the most popular ideology of the day, to Myanmar’s myriad societal imperatives. “Nationalism”, “socialism”, and “autarky”, just as “federalism”, “autonomy”, and “centralization”, have all had their day as policy prescriptions in post-colonial Myanmar. People have fought and died during the past half century and more to promote and defend diverse sets of inchoate ideas which have marched behind each of these banners. Those that have come to be implemented have often persisted long after they demonstrated their inappropriateness. All have led to the present condition of Myanmar’s more than 50 million ethnically and linguistically diverse people.
1
2
Robert H. Taylor
The complexity of Myanmar is significant by any measure. Geographically it stretches some 1,275 miles from north to south and 582 miles from east to west at its widest point. In land area, 261,228 square miles, it is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia. Its terrain varies from mangrove swamps and low land paddy fields in the south to the highest and most rugged mountain ranges of Southeast Asia in the north. Its monsoonal climate is marked by seasons with prodigious quantities of rainfall in the southern parts of the country, while some areas of the north and centre remain nearly arid. If this geographical complexity is ignored, one can easily be drawn into advancing one size fits all policy prescriptions that fail to accommodate the ecological and climatic diversity of the country. Indeed, the differences among such diverse habitats require policies that can accommodate and adapt to local circumstances, making the formation of development policies for one part almost irrelevant to others. To drive from the far south at Myeik up to Putao in the far north takes one from the tropics to the temperate zone in a journey that has its counterpart in the distance from the Mexican to the Canadian borders of the United States or from Gibraltar to Brussels in Europe. The country’s natural diversity has led to shaping the contrasting cultural forms which have developed among the differing peoples of the country. There are more than a dozen linguistically distinct ethnic groups with perhaps as many as 100 different dialects and sub-groups residing there.1 The resultant diversity has posed a number of conceptual and governmental conundrums for all who have sought to govern Myanmar. How one describes the human diversity of Myanmar, or how one interprets the little historical evidence which is available as to how the society came to be formed, are highly contested issues and have serious political ramifications. The lack of a clear and widely accepted frame of reference for discussions of the nature of Myanmar’s society bedevils political discussion. The language one uses to describe the cultural and linguistic diversity of the country implies political meanings. The impossibility of finding a politically neutral or mutually agreed language to portray the human diversity of the country in terms of multiple ethnic groups has further frustrated efforts to come to terms with the issues which society has generated. Often the relative right to autonomy advanced by various elites on behalf of their communities vis-à-vis the central state is articulated in terms that are far stronger and uncompromising than is feasible if the territorial integrity of the state is to be maintained. Similarly, the central
Pathways to the Present
3
government’s articulation of its requirements often overstates the extent of its range or competence, thus exacerbating an issue where compromise is essential. The language of ethnicity and the language of politics in Myanmar have been shaped by the country’s history. In English, and also in Myanmar, discussions of ethnic rights are often advanced in language that evokes an earlier era when the ideas which they carry were first current. For many foreign observers, there is the sense of a time warp when following political debates within the country. Thus, discussions about ethnicity are couched in the terms “nationalities” and “national races”, harkening back to discourse which was introduced into Myanmar during the colonial era and became concretized at the time of independence in 1948 when various constitutional models for multiethnic states were being discussed. The examples of Yugoslavia, Stalinist Russia, and the United Kingdom were all advanced as alternatives for Myanmar as were notions of “national self-determination” which have their origins in the aftermath of the First World War. This language, which poses issues with no readily apparent solution other than compromise and obfuscation, has dogged Myanmar since the state attained sovereignty. Just as the language of political debate has shaped various policy approaches to the issue of linguistic and cultural diversity in Myanmar, so also the choice of words used to conceptualize the nature of colonial rule has had profound effects. By the 1930s various socialist and Marxist concepts had been introduced into Myanmar, just as ideas borrowed from Western liberalism had arrived earlier. As the nationalist elite which eventually took power in 1948 adopted these as the essence of their critique of British imperialism and colonial rule, the language of the political Left came to dominate almost all political discourse. But in many ways the use of Marxist concepts such as class became a trope for the more commonly accepted popular recognition of the greatest evil of colonialism. That was that it had allowed the indigenous population to be supplanted from their own land.2 The disproportionate wealth that European and Asian foreigners had gained during the colonial period, creating a situation where the Myanmar were poor people in their own rich land, meant that the removal of alien economic domination became a key goal of nationalist policy. But thanks to the Marxist legacy of the Myanmar politics of the 1930s, this was presented as socialism.
4
Robert H. Taylor
The Mapping of Myanmar and the Politicization of Ethnicity Though this flies in the face of the official nationalist historiography of the country, it is no exaggeration to say that the British made modern Myanmar. This was a result of the superior British Indian military power which defeated the armies of the kings of the Konbaung Dynasty in three wars during the nineteenth century. Those three wars resulted in the drawing of the map of Myanmar, establishing its borders with neighbouring states and demarcating the internal conceptual and administrative structures of the modern state. Myanmar or British Burma was incorporated as a province of the British Indian empire until 1937 and its current international borders largely represent British imperial interests at the height of that empire’s power. While the western reaches of Myanmar do not incorporate much of the territory that Myanmar kings had once included within their own empires, particularly the territories now known as Manipur and Assam, the northern, southern, and eastern reaches of the country extend into areas which Siamese kings and Chinese emperors would have claimed as their own had their military power been as strong as their territorial claims. For various reasons, the British perceived the governance of Myanmar as requiring two different models of administration. Following the first war between 1824 and 1826, the territories now known as Rakhine and Tanintharyi3 were absorbed into the administrative structures of the British East India Company through its agents in Bengal. Rakhine had only been conquered by King Alaungpaya, the founder of the Konbaung dynasty, in 1775 and elements of its population were still resisting his successor’s control when the British appeared on their frontier in Bengal. Equally, Tanintharyi had only come into the empire in recent years, having been an arena in dispute between the Myanmar and Siamese kings for many years. After 1826, however, they became the first elements of what eventually became British Burma and were directly governed by British officials with largely Indian staff.4 The defeat of the Konbaung armies at the end of the second war in 1852 saw the delta of the Ayeyarwady River and its tributaries, plus the territory of the former Mon kingdom at Bago, brought under British control. The delta was then largely a jungle of tall grasses and swamps but as a result of a major programme of dyke and dam construction, it was soon turned into arable land. This encouraged the migration of thousands
Pathways to the Present
5
of Myanmars from the central regions of the country still under the king’s administration to the delta where they were given land rights on the payment of three years taxes. Also, there began at this time the migration of Indian labour, some permanently settled on what were effectively sugar and cotton plantations, and others as migrant workers on public works projects and the construction of Yangon from a sleepy fishing village to a major international port. It was following the second war that Myanmar began to establish itself as the major rice exporting territory for India. The administrative model of British India was extended at this time to cover all of southern Myanmar. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and expanding demand for tropical products led to heightened imperialist rivalry in Southeast Asia, eventually sealing the fate of the Konbaung dynasty in the third British war in 1885. This resulted in the extermination of the Myanmar monarchy and the demarcation of the country to the north and west. The decision to abolish the monarchy, rather than to attempt to rule the country through indigenous institutions as the French did in Cambodia, Laos, and northern Vietnam, or as the British did in the Indian princely states, much of the Malay peninsular, and Siam, had significant consequences for the majority Buddhist population of central and southern Myanmar. The king had been not only the head of state and commander of his empire but was also the fount of authority for the Buddhist monkhood or sangha. Without a king to maintain the monastic hierarchy, the monkhood was soon bereft of any national disciplining institution. This led eventually to indiscipline in the sangha, stimulating sectarianism, wayward behaviour, and involvement in nationalist political affairs, all in violation of the traditional regulations and principles of the monkhood. Not until 1980 would the Myanmar state once more regain administrative control over the monkhood such as Thailand had established nearly eighty years earlier.5 Moreover, the removal of the king also, in effect, decapitated the existing social order in Myanmar. The monarchical state was hierarchical; some would argue castelike in character. In the years leading up to the third war, the apparent inability of an inexperienced young king, Thibaw, to control his subordinates led to competition among princes and other potential claimants for power at regional and state level. This incipient war of all against all for control of the state by elements of the ruling elites was turned against the British when they took the capital, then at Mandalay, in 1885. Thus ensued ten years of sustained warfare between the British Indian army and a variety of pretenders to the throne and supporters of the
6
Robert H. Taylor
old order. At the end of that decade of warfare, the British had created a military administration across all of central and southern Myanmar. In so doing, they inverted the old social order. Finding the former holders of power and authority to be untrustworthy or rebellious, the British sought those who would co-operate with them.6 In central and southern Myanmar, these tended to come from the bottom of the social order, rich landowners, or from the ethnic minorities which were the beneficiaries of the Christian missionary educational institutions that had flourished in southern Myanmar under the auspices of the British. In their new territory’s mountainous border areas, largely populated by ethnic minorities, however, the British choose, for reasons of economy and simplicity of administration, not to overturn the existing social and political order, but rather to harness it to their purposes. Therefore, rather than imposing a system of direct administrative authority manned throughout by British and Indian officials, the system of administration in the northern areas was referred to as “indirect rule”. Here in the territory which soon became known as the Frontier Areas, to distinguish it from “Burma Proper”, the British sought out and gave the imprimatur of authority to “traditional” headmen, chieftains and local lords, often known as sawbwas and duwas. The sawbwas and duwas or other recognized figures became the recipients of synods which vested in them political and administrative authority over their subjects in exchange for their loyalty to the new British authorities in Yangon, New Delhi, and London. In more sparsely populated territories, the British Indian army conducted periodic “flag marches” to assert their power over peoples and lands where they held only nominal control. In the wake of the British came Christian missionaries who, especially among animist populations of the north, were able to make many converts.7 The sparse population of the northern and eastern hill areas and their low productivity made them economic liabilities for the British administration, but their strategic importance on the Chinese and Siamese borders ensured that the army maintained control against their militarily inferior neighbours. The army, often through the agency of the Christian pastors who lived in some of the less remote hill areas, saw the populations of the frontier areas as potential recruits to the British Indian army and they soon developed a reputation as among the “martial races” of Myanmar in distinction to the lowland populations who were thought to be poor military material. Though the Bamar populations of the lowlands who formed the core of the king’s armies were thought of as effective fighters,
Pathways to the Present
7
following the third war, their military potential was seen as a potential threat to British control.8 The administrative and military distinctions that the British used in their administration of Myanmar — lowlands and highlands, Burma Proper, and the Frontier Areas — were only the beginning of the complexities which were soon conceptualized into an ahistorical “model” of the characteristics of Myanmar’s society. These have persisted to the present day and bedevil clear thinking about the society’s issues both inside and outside the country. Reified ethnicity, or “race”,9 has become the dominant modern expression of this model of Myanmar society for modern politics. Myanmar was colonized not only at the height of the power of the British empire but also at the height of racist conceptualizations of the moral meaning of empire. While it would be wrong to say that ideas of ethnic difference did not play a role in precolonial Myanmar politics and statecraft, that role was muted and modulated by patron–client relationships and religious bonds which overcame the potential saliency of other conceptualizations of societal relations. 10 Imperialism eventually undermined these premodern conceptualizations of social solidarity and replaced them with reified ethnicity which, in time, generated new forms of social and political action and reaction. The multiple nationalisms of modern Myanmar were the result. The British conceptual model of premodern Myanmar was one based on ethnic distinctions which had its model in the then current understanding of Britain’s own history as having being created by various invaders who dominated the indigenous populations. This model of history by invasion and violence was transferred to Myanmar. Thus the central valley kings were seen as in a state of semi-perpetual war against ethnic communities that lived in the hills surrounding them. A history of ethnic antagonism was created rather than a history of ethnic co-operation and accommodation where hill and valley peoples exchanged goods and services in a mutually beneficial manner.11 Even if the historical reality of the past was not one of harmonious co-operation between hill and plains peoples, a process of accommodation was possibly more the norm than continual ethnic conflict. The teaching of the conflictual model of Myanmar’s history thus became part of the justification of the colonial order. For some, the colonizer turned himself into a protector of the minorities against the allegedly inevitable exploitation of the majority population group, the Bamar. This version of history was adapted to fit the special characteristics or historical opportunities of various communities. The Kayah (or Karenni or
8
Robert H. Taylor
Red Karen) were allocated a special “independent” status which meant they existed in a “treaty” relationship with the colonial state. The tenacity of insurgencies in the poverty stricken Kayah state in their fight against the central government owes something to the ideological badge of their ancestors’ alleged modern territorial statehood prior to the formation of modern Myanmar itself. Similarly, the belief among some members of the Christian minority among Kayin (or Karen), that they are the lost tribe of Israel who had the book restored to them by the white missionaries, gained greater cogency for it being incorporated into the origin myth of the animist hill tribes of the eastern hills. The attempts by the Christian leadership of the Kayin National Union (KNU), the longest standing of the insurgent forces fighting the government, to create a Kayin nation out of the linguistic plurality of the Karennic-speaking peoples of Myanmar has its origin in the missionary’s model of their past.12 The KNU harks back to these myths as part of their claim to political legitimacy.13 Similarly, the claim by Shan insurgent bands that they are fighting to re-establish their pre-independence political autonomy is rooted in similar historical reconstructions. These claims were first advanced peacefully in the 1930s by the Shan sawbwas when they claimed that they should have been recognized by the British as autonomous rulers on the model of the rulers of the Indian princely states or the Malay sultans. This claim, which was rejected by the British, had its roots in the recasting of their historical relationship with the kings of central Myanmar from one of political client and symbolic emulator to one of an independent ruler fending off the imposition of the power of “alien” predatory invaders.14 While some of the sawbwas attempted to demonstrate the military independence of their states prior to the Second World War by somewhat feeble attempts to organize their own defence forces, more important for post-colonial politics was the recruitment of men from the Kachins, Chins, and other hill peoples into the British Indian armed forces during the colonial period. This reinforced the notion of the independence of the hill peoples within the Myanmar empire. The Second World War itself served to heighten the political saliency of the British model of Myanmar’s history. The recruitment by irregular anti-Japanese guerrilla forces by the British and Americans in northern Myanmar established a special position for some of the leaders of these peoples.15 The violent potential of ethnicity in Myanmar’s future was made salient during and after the war in attacks by members of the Burma Independence Army in co-operation with the occupying Japanese on Kayin Christians16 as well
Pathways to the Present
9
as the formation of a Kayin anti-Japanese resistance force along the Thai border.17 While the British denied the oft repeated claim by Myanmar nationalists that they were applying a policy of “divide and rule” in the colony, the effects of British policy created an impression that there was more that divided the people than united than. This was done by not merely denying that the peoples residing in the colony shared a common past, but also be ensuring that central and southern politicians could not gain access to the populations of the frontier areas in order to advance their nationalist claims. While the frontier areas remained largely undeveloped and cut off from the more vibrant political economy of the remainder of the country, so also the educational opportunities which were available in the towns and cities of the southern and central parts of the country did not exist in the minority territories except for a special school for the sons of the sawbwas. As noted above, the Second World War was to have a dramatic impact on the frontier areas. Not only did British, American, Japanese, and Chinese nationalist armies enter the territory, but the barriers that the British had created between the minority peoples and the ethnic majority, the Bamar, were removed during and after the Japanese occupation. As it became apparent soon after the end of the war that Myanmar’s political independence was not only inevitable but also imminent, elites throughout the country began to make claims and counterclaims about the historic rights of their peoples. Ethnicity now was transformed from an object of discussion and a principle of organization to political rallying cry. A plethora of nationalist claims were advanced. The “federal” constitution that the country adopted at independence in 1948 was the result of compromises that the British had encouraged, and General Aung San achieved at the Panglong Conference in 1947. Then the logic of a unified state and economy came up against the realities of a highly divided society with a variety of unmet and often inchoate ethnically perceived demands and expectations. The result was the widespread and armed ethnically motivated insurgency that is discussed in Martin Smith’s chapter in this volume (Chapter 3). The state, which the British bequeathed Myanmar politicians in 1948, had not been created to meet the expectations of the second half of the twentieth century. One of the primary requirements of the first constitution of independent Myanmar was to reshape the state to meet those expectations, and in that it failed.
10
Robert H. Taylor
British Rule and the Rise of Myanmar Nationalism The British, with the arrogance of power and the high imperialist notions of Caucasian racial superiority and laissez-faire liberalism, denigrated indigenous institutions. Nationalists were to make much of these slights in later years, in particular European disdain for both the Buddhist faith and the military prowess of the Konbaung armies. These were to become the bedrock of many nationalist arguments along with the perception that Myanmar’s society and culture faced inevitable deracination as a consequence of large-scale migration of Indian capital and labour into the colony, which the British encouraged as essential for economic change. The economic principles of laissez-faire liberalism were applied with a vengeance with extremely corrosive consequences for the old social order. The harshness of the initial years of foreign rule was exacerbated as a consequence of the fallacy of seeing Myanmar as an extension of India. Policies applied to Myanmar were often fit for the requirements of India, not the citizens of Myanmar, at least until 1937 when the country became an independent colony. At that point it came out from under the administration of the Viceroy in Delhi and subsequently the Governor of Burma reported directly to the Secretary of State for India and Burma in London. Prior to that time Myanmar was perceived as not only a source of food for India and a destination for Indian labour and capital, but also as a financial milk cow for the central Indian treasury.18 The abolition of the monarchy not only undermined the disciplinary power of the Buddhist hierarchy but also led to the “disestablishment” of Buddhism as the religion of the state. The British policy of “religious neutrality” meant that when the Konbaung dynasty was finally abolished in 1886, the faith no longer had a fount of authority in Myanmar. Monastic indiscipline faced little or no sanction, and the behaviour of the monkhood changed, allowing members of it to become involved in secular activities, especially politics, in violation of strict Buddhist teachings. One of the key social roles of the Buddhist monkhood, the sangha, had under the kings been the provision of moral and literary education to the young, especially young men. The role was soon undermined by British educational policy which viewed the primary function of education as secular and functional, not religious and moral. The introduction of secular education proved to be popular for it was the root to advancement in the new institutions of the colonial state, especially
Pathways to the Present
11
in fields such as administration, commerce, and the law. However, the new educational system was not only elitist, touching only a small minority of the indigenous population, but also an extension of the education then offered in the rest of India. For example, the muchheralded University of Rangoon was in fact a branch of Calcutta University until 1921 and remained an offshoot of the Indian Education Service until 1937. Even then, only about half of the students who attended it were Myanmars, and none of the senior faculty were from the country. The incorporation of British Burma into the Indian empire led not only to the extension of the British Indian army but also the British Indian administrative and legal system to British Burma. This had a number of consequences, all of which added to the list of grievances that the majority of the indigenous population felt towards their colonial rulers. The use of Indian as well as British administrators and police provided a daily reminder of the indignity of colonization. The administrative boundaries that the British drew, particularly at the village level, ignored natural economic and administrative units that had developed under the less formal administrative system of the kings. Indian legal codes, written in English, seemed arbitrary and often unfathomable to the local magistrates and those who appeared before them in court. Moreover, the British Indian codes privileged English or Christian and Islamic law in cases where Buddhists and members of other faiths were involved. This especially affected the rights of women in mixed marriages and was the first issue raised by politicians in the initial session of the legislative assembly elected in 1921. As the indigenous population was displaced from any significant role in the colony’s military or administrative affairs during the colonial period, so also were they dislodged from control of the economy and, in time, even ownership of much of the country’s prime agricultural land. This was the consequence of the encouragement of large-scale South Asian labour migration to British Burma as well as the superior economic resources that Indian capitalists brought to the colony. The rapid economic growth which British rule engendered turned British Burma into a labour-deficient area. There was particularly a labour shortage in urban areas, and Yangon, the capital, soon became a predominantly Indian city, alien to the indigenous population, which came to study or conduct business there. The volatility of this situation was expressed during the Great Depression by not only the Hsaya San peasants’ revolt, but also countless other attacks on British and
12
Robert H. Taylor
Indian individuals as well as race riots fuelled by employment disputes in the capital. The British were not blind to the consequences of their rule, but were limited in their ability to respond to the pressures they had created by the larger politics of India as well as their own often racially loaded concepts. Their primary response was to attempt to introduce representative political institutions in the belief that this would provide an outlet for nationalist and other forms of political and economic discontent. Again, the model which was applied to Myanmar was that invented for India.19 Not only were the minority “races” governed under different principles from the majority of the population, but also from the formation of the first legislative assembly in 1921, parliamentary constituencies were based on ethnicity and religion. Ethnic differences were thus incorporated into the representative structures of the colonial state. This was to continue to be the case until the 1951 elections, the first in independent Myanmar. Just as racial stereotyping was part of everyday discourse in Myanmar,20 so also racial categories became the stuff of discussions about how to resolve the colony’s social and economic problems. Given the range of issues which colonialism had posed for Myanmar’s society in the short years of British rule, it was not surprising that nationalists developed a complex and sometimes contradictory critique of foreign rule which emphasized each of the attacks they perceived on their culture and economy. The evolution of nationalist organizations from the beginning of the twentieth century saw attention shift from the perception of colonial policies as attack on Buddhism, to concerns about education and the denial of the military opportunities for the indigenous people, to a Marxistinformed critique of the effects of imperialism on the Myanmar peasantry. The first expression of widespread organized sentiment was evoked by the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) which took up the issue of British denigration of Myanmar Buddhist customs. Soon university and secondary school students commenced demonstrations over shortcomings in the colonial educational system. They were followed in the 1920s by the leaders of the General Council of Burmese Associations (Myanmar Athin Chokkyi or GCBA), some of whom established volunteer paramilitary corps (called tat), while others drew attention to the relative economic disadvantages of the indigenous peasantry vis-à-vis the Indian shopkeepers, moneylenders, and landlords with which they dealt. During the 1930s, each of these grievances was taken up by a next generation of nationalist leaders in the Do Bama
Pathways to the Present
13
Asiayone (We Burmans Association) or the Thakin (Master) movement as well as the All Burma Students Union. Culminating in the formation of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) and the People’s [Socialist] Party in 1939, on the eve of the Second World War, young men such as Thakin Aung San and Thakin Than Tun sought to protect Buddhism, encourage indigenous education, rescue the military reputation of the Myanmar people, and advance the economic interests of the indigenous peasants and workers. In their understanding of their opponent’s tactics, they saw the British as deliberately manipulating indigenous and alien minorities to disadvantage and disempower the unified Myanmar nation which they sought to lead.
The Birth of the Myanmar Army and the Struggle for Independence The colonial world that the most ardent Myanmar nationalists found unacceptable was dislodged initially not by their own actions but rather by a rival imperial power to the West, Japan. But the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia in late 1941 and 1942 unleashed social and political forces which proved to be overwhelming. In the cause of Myanmar, long suppressed nationalist energies became organized in a broad but diverse political movement, which the British were no longer able to control. The result was Myanmar’s independence from Britain only six years later following the determination of the British Labour government to grant India independence. The Second World War encouraged the birth and expansion of several political organizations which would compete for power in post-colonial Myanmar. Among these were the BCP, the Socialist Party, and the Myanmar army. Each, led by young men who had been active in national and student politics during the 1930s, sought to champion the nationalist cause and thus end the humiliation, which they felt the British had imposed on Myanmar. The Japanese, seeking to gain the co-operation of Myanmar nationalists in their push to hold Myanmar and push on into India, encouraged the formation of Myanmar armed force (Tatmadaw) prior to the war. This began with the famous Thirty Comrades, young men from the Thakin organization who gathered on Hainan Island for military training prior to the formation of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) on the cusp of the Japanese invasion. Among the Thirty Comrades, led by Thakin Aung San, were a number of the post-war political and military leaders, most
14
Robert H. Taylor
particularly Thakin Shu Maung, who took the nom de guerre of Ne Win. Their role in the BIA during the war has now become part of the Myanmar nationalist tale of heroism, which all are taught and most accept. Like the heroic role of students in Myanmar’s nationalist movements in the 1920s and 1930s, the Tatmadaw is seen as one of the leading pillars of the nation. Founded seven years before independence, the army preceded the independent Myanmar state and thus its leaders claim a supervisory role in maintaining the state’s independence. Aung San’s astute political manoeuvring towards the end of the war, when the Myanmar national army turned on their Japanese mentors and joined forces with the returning British army, ensured a political future for the army which none of its rivals for power could match. This is so much nationalist hagiography today, but developments at the time were much more complex. The Communists, led by the Minister for Agriculture in the wartime government as well as Aung San’s brotherin-law, Thakin Than Tun, organized the peasantry in large parts of the country. Other leftists, who had formally opposed collaboration with the Japanese in what they described as the fascist war, also organized extensively among the Myanmar peasantry and formed an underground resistance movement. So too did the much smaller People’s Revolution Party of U Kyaw Nyein and U Ba Swe which became the kernel of the post-war Socialist Party element of the first independent government. The extensive organizational work of these organizations resulted in what was effectively a nationalist uprising during the brief period between the defeat of the Japanese and the return of the British. Faced with the threat of armed revolt in post-war Myanmar, the British, having decided to grant independence to India (and Pakistan), had no choice but to do the same for Myanmar. The nationalist forces, military, Communist and Socialist, which came together in 1945 in the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), were only some of the political groups which became active in the chaos that followed the war. The leaders of the ethnic minorities who had stood aside from the nationalist struggles of the 1920s and 1930s realized that the autonomous future that the British had promised them before the war would be undone in a unified, democratic Myanmar. They, like the lowland nationalists, began to organize to advance their interests and protect what their opponents and rivals perceived as their British-guaranteed privileges. While the established leaders of the frontier areas were persuaded to seek guarantees from Aung San and the leaders of the AFPFL that their interests
Pathways to the Present
15
would be recognized by a post-independence state, the Christian minority leadership of the Karen National Union (KNU) sought to unify all Karennicspeaking peoples in a demand for an independent “Karenistan”. Myanmar on the cusp of independence faced an uncertain future. Without the power of the British Indian empire, which had grouped its various elements in a single state to hold it together, Myanmar looked set to dissolve in a sea of chaos as political rivals took up arms to advance their claims to power. Within months of independence, the BCP, which had been excluded from power in the months prior to independence, went underground in armed revolt, taking with it several thousand members of the new state’s armed forces. By the end of the first year of independence, the KNU had also gone into revolt, taking many of the ethnic minority troops which had previously been part of the colonial armed forces underground with it. Soon the Socialist dominated rump AFPFL government of U Nu, backed by Ne Win’s 4th Burma Rifles, controlled little more than Yangon. Though the new government received some modest support from India and Britain during these months, it became increasingly dependent upon the tatmadaw to retain power and to retake control of the country. Thus, the saga of the ever-loyal-to-the-state Tatmadaw in Myanmar’s political history came to be enhanced. Not only did the remaining troops of the Myanmar armed forces, under their commander, General Ne Win, who U Nu also briefly appointed as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, face and eventually suppress the Communist and KNU insurrections, but also they faced remnant U.S. Central Intelligence Agencybacked Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang or KMT) troops in the Shan State.21 The army thus became more than a pillar of the post-colonial state, it became the state’s guarantor and protector. As the army grew and consolidated its economic and political power during the 1950s, it developed its own ideology which sought to ensure that the “lessons” of the civil war which Myanmar experienced at independence would not be forgotten. In particular, the danger of divisions among nationalist forces was held up as the greatest of these lessons and from then on the search for national unity became paramount in the army’s definition of national security.22 While relying on the army as well as its political allies in the Socialist and other political parties to remain in power, the initial post-colonial government under Prime Minister Nu pursued a number of policies designed to address the issues which the nationalist movement had identified as crucial for Myanmar’s well being. Religion and the future of Buddhism as the faith of the overwhelming majority of the Myanmar population was
16
Robert H. Taylor
one of these. Another was the introduction of economic reforms, usually in the guise of socialism but often intended to take control of the economy from Indian and British to Myanmar hands. However, U Nu’s socialism was tempered by shortages of skilled personnel and the need to satisfy a number of interests, foreign and domestic, in the political economy of the country. Thus, measures such as land reform were only partially implemented and the nationalization of foreign-owned assets was often only half completed. The parliamentary political system installed by the AFPFL government at the time of independence had within it its own dynamic that encouraged competition and divisiveness among the political elite of the country. This eventually generated divisions within the ruling party, and in 1958 the army was “invited” by Prime Minister Nu to take power in what was in effect a consensual coup encouraged by one of the civilian political factions, the Socialist group. The army, ruling through a largely civilian Cabinet, then held power for eighteen months before holding elections and returning power to U Nu and his winning faction of the political elite. However, as Nu and his colleagues sought through political means to hold the Union of Myanmar together, they appeared willing to enter into compromises with political forces in the former frontier areas which the army leadership interpreted as antithetical to the unity of the country. The result was a second military coup on 2 March 1962. Many have interpreted the coup as a grab for power by Ne Win and his military colleagues, but their version of events has become part of the belief system of the contemporary army leadership.
The Myanmar Road to Bankruptcy Freed from the apparent need to satisfy any other force in Myanmar’s political economy, the army commenced slowly to remake the country in its own image. Security was central to the army-dominated government’s understanding of their approach to governing Myanmar for the following twenty-six years under the leadership of General Ne Win. Justifying the coup in the name of national unity, the Revolutionary Council, as the coup group referred to itself, began a gradual process of restructuring the institutions of the state as well as the policies it applied. In keeping with its highly nationalistic ethos, as well as its understanding of the international situation in its region, the regime pursued its approach to governance largely unaided and unadvised by the outside world for most of the twelve
Pathways to the Present
17
years the Revolutionary Council governed. Its militarily shaped successor, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, which came into existence in 1974 under a new one-party state constitution, followed in a similar manner. Its leadership, including Ne Win, became increasingly remote and out of touch with economic and political realities both within its own country and also abroad. The Revolutionary Council’s policies were informed not only by the legacy of the nationalist movement of the 1930s and 1940s and its own version of the army’s role in “saving” the nation during the 1940s and 1950s, but also by a critique of the first ten years of civilian rule which proceeded the establishment of the army Caretaker Government in 1958. That critique had as a central tenet the argument that civilian politicians could not be trusted with the security of the state because of their willingness to enter into compromising arrangements with domestic and foreign opponents of the government, including ethnic separatists, Communists and potentially compromising foreign powers including the United States or the Soviet Union. The army saw itself as being above such politics and acting in the interest of the state as a whole, not the partial interests that elected politicians allegedly represent. This self-serving argument provided part of the justification for the attempted, but ultimately failed, reordering of Myanmar’s administrative and political systems in the name of the Burmese Way to Socialism. The central policy tenets of the Revolutionary Council government and its constitutional successor were socialism, equality, and neutrality. Socialism led not only to the nationalization of all major foreign and domestically owned businesses, but also many petty shops and stalls. Under government control, production soon declined and towards the end of the 1960s the country, once Asia’s largest rice exporter, was facing food deficits. State-owned factories and mills gradually ran down and without the capital to invest in spares and new technologies, they became perennial financial drains on the state. Soon a significant black market developed which became a source of income for the armed opponents of the government. Thus, the inefficiency of the state-managed economy became the source of the financing of the state’s enemies, creating a self-perpetuating series of conflicts. Hampered by inadequate finances, the army proved incapable of militarily defeating its multiple foes. The state also lost the ability to reform itself and the economy because of the need politically to protect large numbers of unproductive positions
18
Robert H. Taylor
in the bureaucracy, party and state-owned industries. Moreover, the leadership of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and the civilian government bureaucracy came increasingly to be filled by the less competent of the army officer corps. Those who were competent were eased out of office because of their inability to conform to the norms of the system or for showing off the hopelessness of their superiors. When dismissed, officers tended to take their entire entourages with them. Those proven incompetent to command in the armed forces were given sinecures in the ever-growing civilian administration. Stagnation, and a system which preferred misinformation to reality, became the inevitable result. Antagonism between those who remained in the armed forces and those in the party also grew as the competition for scarce resources became increasingly intense.23 As David Steinberg shows in his chapter in this volume (Chapter 4), this style of administration has become chronic in Myanmar and threatens to undermine future regimes, democratic or authoritarian. The Revolutionary Council and its constitutional successors also championed equality as a corollary to their doctrine of socialism. This was done in two ways. One was through economic management; the other was in its attempts to undermine the ethnic conflicts that continued to threaten the unity of the union by attempting to create national unity and limit the political appeal of ethnic separatists. In terms of economic management, some of the attempts flew in the face of reason and were soon abandoned. One example was the declaration that rice prices in the delta where most of the crop was grown would prevail throughout the country regardless of the transport and marketing costs involved in getting basic foodstuffs to rice deficit regions. Another was severe wage restraint, which in the face of inflationary pressures, led to widespread petty corruption.24 Indeed, even the government and the ruling party themselves soon became dependent on “gifts” and bribes provided by business people who often operated outside the law in a system of mutual complicity.25 The other effort at equality was to disband any ethnic basis upon which political and economic rights were granted. The ethnically designated separate administrative units, created under the 1948 constitution, were maintained but their administrations increasingly came under the control of central, often army and ex-army, personnel. This had the effect of placing an increasingly large proportion of the administration of the more remote parts of the country into the hands of
Pathways to the Present
19
Bamar from central and lower Myanmar. Similarly, in an effort to create national unity out of the plethora of languages, cultures, and religions that exist in Myanmar’s multi-ethnic society, the government halted the teaching of languages other than Bamar (or Myanmar) in schools and universities, halted the activities of Christian missionary organizations, and nationalized all private and parochial schools. These actions, regardless of their intent, were seen as an attack on the values and cultures of the country’s ethnic minorities and further fuelled ethnic separatist sentiments. Even when the policies behind these moves were articulated in a manner which made allowance for cultural and religious differences in people’s private lives, the increasingly incompetent administers of the state and ruling party often applied them in an arbitrary and insensitive manner. The third pillar of the army and socialist governments was a neutralist, inward-looking, foreign and defence policy. Coming to power at the time of armed conflict between Communist and anti-Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam and a brief border war between China and India, Ne Win’s regime took U Nu’s neutralist foreign policy to its logical conclusion, including in 1979 withdrawal from the Non-Aligned Movement perhaps because it was seen as too pro-Soviet and therefore potentially anti-Chinese. Myanmar increasingly withdrew from a number of international organizations and bodies, and soon relied largely on its membership of the United Nations as the pillar of its foreign policy along with bilateral relations with friendly states. As N. Ganesan discusses later in this volume (Chapter 2), this pattern has only been broken since 1988. While foreign economic assistance was once more received from the early 1970s, the absence of foreign investment ensured that the economy remained as isolated from the world as did the schools and universities of the country. The regime perceived that the major threat to its security came from China and, to a lesser extent, the possibility of being drawn unwillingly into the Cold War. Realizing that its very limited and under-funded armed forces would be no match for any of its major neighbours, defence in depth was perceived as the only way to defend the country. Therefore all of the state’s class and mass organizations, the BSPP, its youth, women’s, mass and class organizations and the Red Cross each had their defence-related activities.26 In the border areas, however, which the army rarely controlled outside of the towns and cities, the existence of various insurgent bands, some financially and militarily supported by external forces, including the
20
Robert H. Taylor
Chinese Communist Party, belied the regime’s claims to having achieved national unity. The beginning of the end of the increasingly sclerotic BSPP government came in 1987 when it became apparent that Japan and perhaps other international donors were becoming increasingly unwilling to continue to underwrite a regime with no capacity to reform itself and eventually Myanmar successfully applied to be declared a “Least Developed Country” by the United Nations, along with the poorest states of Africa. Repayment dates on international debts incurred in the early to mid-1970s became increasingly frequent as foreign exchange earnings became ever scarcer. Corruption and black marketing continued to grow, and in August– September 1987 the government acted with the few blunt instruments it had at its disposal. On 10 August BSPP Chairman U Ne Win made a speech to senior party and government officials. Noting that the system over which he had presided for twenty-five years was increasingly incapable to producing honest and reliable accounts of economic production and consumption, and that world and domestic economic and political conditions had changed since the army took power in 1962 and the new constitution adopted in 1974, he suggested that the existing political order was in need of revision. An opportunity for reform would not come until two years at the next planned BSPP Congress. But the regime did not have time on its side. Within days of Ne Win’s unexpected speech, the government took steps to deregulate key basic agricultural crops in an apparent orientation towards a market economy. The hopes of those expecting further liberalization were quickly dashed six days later, on 6 September, when Ne Win, in a surprise move unbeknownst to even his most senior government associates, demonetized (invalidated) 25, 35, and 75 kyat banknotes. Both the legal and blackmarket economies were thrown into chaos as people had their savings eliminated without compensation. Just twenty-two months earlier 20, 50, and 100 kyat notes had also been demonetized. Prospects for further changes in the economy and politics were promised by Ne Win in a subsequent speech in October. The regime had publicly admitted that the socialist revolution introduced in 1962 had been a failure but the message of what was to follow in its place were so occluded as to be of no value to a populace which was increasingly losing what little faith it had in the credibility of the regime. Presiding over an economy of scarcity and with no clear idea of how to reform itself, the old order appeared to be incompetent even to its own leaders and its few remaining ideologically motivated supporters.
Pathways to the Present
21
The ultimate demise of the BSPP took seven months, from March to September, of 1988, in a series of events, each one progressively demonstrating not only the government’s incompetence, but also the growing anger of the public at the years of privation that they had suffered. Often called pro-democracy demonstrations, their origins were probably more inchoate than this ideologically and Western-centric description suggests. As hundreds and thousands of persons came onto the streets of Yangon and other cities, the authorities lost control of the situation. Believing that they were facing more than a mob of their own angry citizens, but perceiving the alleged organizational capacities of the BCP or perhaps Western-backed groups behind the protest,27 the government responded with force. In July, at a special congress of the BSPP, Ne Win resigned. There followed another period of nearly two months of demonstrations as the government stumbled from one ineffectual response to the situation to another. More deaths resulted including some members of the security forces. Finally, on 18 September, the army established itself as the government in the form of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).
Myanmar under Army Rule Again There is not enough space in this chapter to deal fully with what happened next. What follows is a very abbreviated account of the main features of the following fifteen years of army rule pertinent to the issues of this volume. A full history has yet to be written. SLORC, composed of completely new faces other than its first Chairman, former BSPP Defence Minister General Saw Maung, initially asserted that it would not remain in power for long. Rather, its goal was to hand power over to a civilian regime as soon as one could be formed. Claiming that it stood above politics, or pursued only “national politics”, as opposed to the partisan politics of others, the army government echoed the positions of its military antecedents thirty years earlier. The ruling SLORC maintained the promise of the last BSPP Chairman and President, Dr Maung Maung, that elections would be held in due course so that a multi-party political system could be established. Critics of the regime inside and outside the country, however, saw the army’s position as self-serving and a sham designed to protect the members of the old regime and to cling to power indefinitely. After the establishment of the SLORC regime, the government authorized the formation of political parties to prepare for elections. Over
22
Robert H. Taylor
two hundred parties emerged but only a few had significant followings. Both old and new politicians put their names forward as leaders of the country. Among them were former Prime Minister U Nu, former members of the Revolutionary Council Brigadier Aung Gyi, former BSPP Defence Minister General Tin Oo, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of independence hero General Aung San. Elections were finally held in May 1990. Prior to that, however, there was a period of twenty months during which the military and the new political parties and their leaders tested the limits of tolerance as all sides came to understand the new political world they were creating. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a new prominent elite figure who had no direct connections with Myanmar’s tainted political past, drew strong support from younger persons and, as the election would eventually reveal, the larger public. Her outspoken public criticism of the regime and its predecessor, including General Ne Win, drew the ire of SLORC, which attempted to limit the newly found political freedoms of the country. In July 1989, Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest the day after she and her supporters in the National League for Democracy (NLD) attempted to demonstrate in Yangon by organizing a mass parallel ceremony to that of the government to honour her father and others assassinated national leaders. Aung San Suu Kyi was to remain under house arrest until late 1995 but her fame grew, not least as a result of the receipt of many international awards, in particular the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. While the junta maintained the pledge to hold multi-party elections, it was not made clear what the election was actually to elect. The previous constitution had been annulled at the time of the 1988 coup, and nothing had been done in regard to establishing a new legal framework for the state to operate under. As the constituencies which the government appointed election commission used for the election were the same as those for the Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Assembly) of the previous order, presumably the electorate thought they were electing a new legislature. But the relationship, if any, that legislature would have with the executive and judicial organs of the state was unclear and would remain so until a constitution was put in place. Despite this ambiguity, the election proceeded and the National League for Democracy received about 62 per cent of the votes cast, taking some 80 per cent of the 485 seats contested. The reincarnation of the BSPP, the National Unity Party (NUP), won only ten constituencies as under Myanmar’s first past the post-electoral system, its share of 21 per
Pathways to the Present
23
cent of the vote being devalued. Despite the severely constrained conditions under which the parties were forced to campaign in the months leading up to the election, foreign diplomats and media tended to say the elections had been “free and fair”. A stand-off between the military and the NLD ensued. The party, demanding the army convene a meeting of the Pyithu Hluttaw to form a new government under its auspices, was confronted by the army which persisted in stating that until a new constitution was promulgated, the SLORC would continue to hold all legislative, executive, and judicial power. Retribution was also in the air as an NLD leader, former Colonel Kyi Maung, was ambiguously quoted in Asiaweek magazine to the effect that perhaps Nuremberg-type trials for the top generals in the SLORC, such as then Major General Khin Nyunt could be held by a new NLD government to establish justice for the victims of the army’s repressive behaviour in 1988.28 The stasis that set in following the election has been maintained to the time of writing with only two instances in which the army has shown a way out of the impasse that they and the NLD had created in 1990. The first was the convening of a constitutional convention in 1993. The NLD, complaining of the manner in which the government conducted the convention and their inability to get their positions listened to and accepted despite their democratic mandate, walked out of the convention in late 1995 after Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest. Soon the convention was adjourned. In August 2003, the government, renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, announced that the constitutional convention would resume. Thus, a second opportunity was created for either ending or regularizing military rule through peaceful means. While the army has tended to revert to attitudes and postures reminiscent of earlier years in dealing with Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters in the NLD, in regard to its armed opponents, the myriad ethnic insurgents in the north of the country, it has pursued strikingly new and accommodating policies. These are detailed in Martin Smith’s chapter in this volume (Ch. 3) and point to the fact that new departures are possible in the morass of Myanmar politics if political leaders are willing to compromise and accommodate the interests of their former foes. The violent clashes between demonstrators and the armed forces in 1988 and the assumption of power again by the army caused Western governments and Japan to halt all aid programmes to the government of Myanmar and to suspend any new assistance via the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the Asian Development Bank. Since that
24
Robert H. Taylor
time, international financial assistance has remained very limited and constrained to what is defined as “humanitarian” assistance. In recent years Myanmar has received less than US$1 per capita in comparison, for example, to approximately US$78 per capita for neighbouring Laos. The mandate of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has also been especially defined for Myanmar to ensure that the agency does not assist the central government in its developmental efforts or reforms. Even this limited assistance has been a subject of international controversy, and from time to time there have been efforts to make it conditional on approval by Aung San Suu Kyi. While international assistance for Myanmar has been minimal since 1988, in the first few years after the army retook sole power, foreign direct and indirect investment flows quickly became significant. Tourism, textiles, mining, and gas and oil became major developmental sectors. However, the 1997 Asian economic crisis brought these flows, mainly from regional states, to an abrupt halt and continued pressure from the West, plus the government’s own inept economic policies, have ensured that new foreign investment following the return to growth in Southeast Asia has been minimal. Though published data is not available, China is probably the largest source of funds in Myanmar for nonhydrocarbon investments.29 New investments from the United States have been prohibited by U.S. law since 1996, and following a deadly attack on Aung San Suu Kyi’s convoy in May 2003, all trade and commercial dealings with U.S.-based organizations were declared to be illegal. The squeezing of foreign trade and investment, combined with the absence of substantial foreign aid, has led the government to finance a large number of development and infrastructure programmes through two negative forms of resource mobilization. One is the use of compulsory labour, often referred to as “voluntary”, or minimally reimbursed labour, requiring villagers to provide labour or services for military and civilian infrastructure projects. The other is the resort to the printing press to finance both the annual central government budget deficit and to purchase goods and services with a currency with a continuing decline in real value. Inflation has been estimated to run at the rate of 20 to 40 per cent per year. Furthermore, the government has relied on a number of schemes to allow local military and government units to become partially self-financing, placing an informal and arbitrary tax burden on local businesses and individuals. This, and the government’s inconsistencies in the making of
Pathways to the Present
25
national economic policy, has made Myanmar a doubtful investment site for foreign investors from Asia as well as the West regardless of the American prohibition on new investments.
Conclusion: Political Stalemate and Societal Stasis Myanmar is not unique among the former colonial states of Asia and Africa in terms of the political and economic challenges which it faced at the time of independence. However, among the societies of Southeast Asia, it is the only major country which appears nearly six decades after independence not to have yet resolved the consequences of its past in order to build a more prosperous and open society for its people. The legacy of civil war, separatism, ideological conflicts, socialism, underinvestment, inadequate infrastructure, and other consequences of an overemphasis on security have created a poverty stricken society in crisis in terms of health and educational provision. As the chapters by Rachel Safman and Alex Mutebi in this volume (Chs. 5 and 6) attest, these issues are not insolvable, but finding a solution to them will not be easy unless the politics of the past are overcome and a new approach to addressing Myanmar’s critical issues is addressed. That new approaches are possible has been demonstrated by the success of the government in achieving ceasefires with a large majority of the country’s former insurgent groups. That step has reduced the casualties of war and created the conditions for peaceful development in large parts of the country previously contested by multiple armed groups. But going beyond a ceasefire to finding a permanent solution to Myanmar’s political issues will require compromises which at the time of writing, on the day the reconvened national convention met,30 looked as far away as ever. Similarly, the approach to Myanmar’s issues by the international community requires a new approach and new thinking. While during the Cold War years the international community was content to allow Myanmar gradually to decline to the sorry state it reached in 1988, since then major Western governments have persisted in a policy of ever tighter sanctions, making the country a pariah in the eyes of Western media. Myanmar’s neighbours, by contrast, have attempted to draw the current military regime out of its shell and show them an alternative to their current situation. Neither strategy has proved effective to date and, as Morten Pederson argues in the final chapter to our volume (Ch. 7),
26
Robert H. Taylor
new thinking is required if the international community is serious about assisting the people of Myanmar to the brighter future which they deserve.
Notes 1. See Ethnologue (2004). 2. In a further twist to the complexity of the ethnic issue in Myanmar, the use of Marxist class categories as a trope for ethnicity came also to be used in the minority areas where the Bamar were seen as the ruling and exploiting class which had internally “colonized” a minority’s “historically given territory”. 3. Including what is now the Mon state. 4. Furnivall (1939), pp. 1–138. 5. See Smith (1965) and Tin Maung Maung Than (1993). 6. See Thant Myint-U (2001). 7. See Tegenfeldt (1974). 8. For a fuller account, see Taylor (forthcoming b). 9. In contemporary Myanmar public discourse, individuals are referred to as belonging to a “National Race”, one of the country’s many “National Races”. 10. Lieberman (1978), pp. 455–82. 11. See, for example, Harvey (1967) and Cocks (n.d.). 12. See Renard (2003), pp. 1–15, and Keyes (2003), pp. 210–18. 13. See Ananda Rajah (2001). 14. See the papers Burma Office File 1506/37, India Office Library and Archives, the British Library, London. See also Taylor (1988), pp. 13–62, esp. pp. 32–45. 15. See Fellowes-Gordon (1971). 16. See Guyot (1978). 17. See Morrison (1947). 18. Making Myanmar an Indian province also required the colonial government to protect and propagate Christianity, but the Church of England primarily concerned itself with Europeans and only about 7 per cent of the Christian minority in the country were member of that faith. 19. See Taylor (forthcoming a). 20. See, for example, Orwell (2001). 21. For a contemporary account, see Lewis (1954). 22. Callahan (2003); and Aung Myoe (1999). 23. See Maung Maung (1999). 24. Which is not to say there was no corruption under the previous regime. See, for example, the account in Lewis (1954). 25. See Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2003).
Pathways to the Present
27
26. On Saturday morning children in villages could be seen marching with sticks and wooden rifles in an effort to ensure that the whole country was aware of and engaged in the country’s security. 27. See, for example, News and Periodicals Enterprise (1989a and b). 28. Faulder (1990), p. 28. The fact that the Nuremberg trials were raised by Kyi Maung in the interview revealed to the generals in Yangon that the possibility was being considered by the NLD leadership. 29. Official published figures provide no information on Chinese direct investments in Myanmar. In March 2000, Singapore, the United Kingdom (including Bermuda and the Virgin Islands), Thailand, Malaysia, and the United States were the largest foreign investors in that order. See Central Statistical Organization (2000), pp. 250–51, Table 12.03. This rank order was confirmed by a government announcement in February 2002. However, in terms of foreigners officially residing in Myanmar, China has the largest cohort with nearly 5,500 out of a total of 13,000. South Koreans, Indians, and Japanese came next. (“13,000 Expatriates Living Here Says Govt.”, Myanmar Times, 3–9 May 2004, p. 1.) 30. 17 May 2004.
References Aung Myoe. “Military Doctrine and Strategy in Myanmar: A Historical Perspective”. Working Paper, No. 346. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1999. Callahan, Mary. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. Central Statistical Organization (CSO). Statistical Yearbook 2000. Yangon: CSO, 2000. Cocks, S. W. Burma Under British Rule. 2nd ed. Bombay: K. and J. Cooper (n.d.). Ethnologue. “Languages of Myanmar”, at <www.ethnologue.com show_country. asp?name= Myanmar>, accessed on 25 May 2004. Faulder, Dominic. “We Will Play Fair”. Asiaweek, 13 July 1990, p. 28. Fellowes-Gordon, Ian. The Battle for Naw Seng’s Kingdom. London: Leo Cooper, 1971. Furnivall, J. S. “The Making of Leviathan”. The Journal of the Burma Research Society, XXIX, no. 3 (1939): 1–138. Guyot, Dorothy Hess. “Communal Conflict in the Burma Delta”. In Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches through Social History, edited by Ruth T. McVey, pp. 191–234. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Program, 1978. Harvey, G. E. History of Burma. Reprint. London: Frank Cass, 1967 (1925).
28
Robert H. Taylor
Keyes, Charles F. “Afterward: The Politics of ‘Karen-ness’ in Thailand”. In Living at the Edge of Thai Society: The Karen in the Highlands of Northern Thailand, edited by Claudio O. Delang, pp. 210–18. London and New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2003. Kyaw Yin Hlaing. “Reconsidering the Failure of the Burma Socialist Programme Party Government to Eradicate Internal Economic Impediments”. Southeast Asia Research 11, no. 1 (2003): 5–58 Lewis, Norman. Golden Earth: Travels in Burma. London: Jonathan Cape, 1954. Lieberman, Victor B. “Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth Century Burma”. Modern Asian Studies, 12, no. 3 (1978): 455–82. Maung Maung. The 1988 Uprising in Burma. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1999. Morrison, Ian. Grandfather Longlegs. London: Faber and Faber, 1947. News and Periodicals Enterprise (NPE). Burma Communist Party’s Conspiracy to Take over State Power. Yangon: NPE, 1989a. ———. The Conspiracy of Treasonous Minions with the Myanmar Naing-ngan and Traitorous Cohorts Abroad. Yangon: NPE, 1989b. Orwell, George. Burmese Days. Reprint. London: Penguin, 2001 (1934). Rajah, Ananda. “Burma: Protracted Conflict, Governance and Non-Traditional Security Issues”. Working Paper No. 14. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001. Renard, Ronald D. “Studying Peoples Often Called Karen”. In Living at the Edge of Thai Society: The Karen in the Highlands of Northern Thailand, edited by Claudio O. Delang, pp. 1–15. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Smith, Donald Eugene. Religion and Politics in Burma. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Taylor, Robert H. “British Policy and the Shan States, 1886–1942”. In Changes in Northern Thailand and the Shan States 1886–1940, edited by Prakai Nontawasee, pp. 13–62. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988. ________. “British Policy toward Burma in the 1920’s and 1930’s: Separation and Responsible Self-Government”. Paper submitted to the 50th Anniversary Conference of the Myanmar Historical Commission, Yangon, forthcoming a. ________. “Colonial Forces in British Burma: An Army Postponed”. In Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia, edited by Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig. London: Routledge, forthcoming b. Tegenfeldt, Herman G. A Century of Growth: The Kachin Baptist Church of Burma. Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 1974. Thant Myint-U. The Making of Modern Burma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Pathways to the Present
29
Tin Maung Maung Than. “Sangha Reforms and Renewal of Sasana in Myanmar: Historical Trends and Contemporary Practice”. In Buddhist Trends in Southeast Asia, edited by Trevor Ling, pp. 6–63. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.
Reproduced from Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg > 30 N. Ganesan
2 Myanmar’s Foreign Relations Reaching out to the World N. Ganesan
Myanmar’s foreign relations have been subjected to significant changes from the late 1980s. These changes derive both from domestic political changes within the country as well as international responses to these changes. Depending on the country involved, specific issues have also tended to have an overwhelming impact on bilateral relations. This chapter examines the domestic contours and considerations in Myanmar’s foreign policy output as well as the nature of its relations with the United States and the West, China, India, Japan, and the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It would not be an exaggeration to note from the very outset that the policy output of the major powers towards Myanmar has tended to be reactive rather than proactive. The policy output of China and ASEAN has tended to be more proactive but these relationships are in turn determined by China’s and ASEAN’s greater strategic consideration of the bilateral relationship. Organizationally, this chapter is divided into seven major sections. The first section examines normative values that have informed Myanmar’s foreign policy as well as significant historical conjunctions that have led to major shifts in policy positions. The next five sections examine Myanmar’s bilateral relations with the United States and the West, China, India, Japan, and ASEAN. Finally, the last section summarizes the nature of Myanmar’s bilateral relations with the countries examined.
Significant Historical Conjunctions and Policy Priorities Myanmar’s foreign relations with the external world since the country gained its independence in 1948 were a function of domestic political 30
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
31
developments, as noted at the outset, as well as a number of important general perceptions. In terms of important political developments, major historical turning points occurred in 1962 when the military wrested power from the civilian government, and in 1988 when the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government was replaced by the military junta. Depending on how well the developments are nuanced, 1990 may be added as an important year when the outcome of nationwide elections called by the military government was annulled. Whereas the leadership transition in 1988 was marked by violent repression, subsequent developments, at least in the lowlands, tended to be less violent. It may be noted however that since 1962, notwithstanding important developments, there has been leadership but not regime transition.1 The importance of noting significant political developments lies in the fact that these developments affected the country’s foreign relations. Since 1988 onwards, relations with Western countries, in particular the United States and European Union (EU) have deteriorated significantly. Myanmar’s relations with major Asian powers have tended to be rather mixed — relations with India have been subjected to some turbulence, those with Japan were subjected to external pressures and political considerations, but relations with China have certainly improved. Relations with regional countries represented in ASEAN have been quite complicated. Such broad-based observations are generally accurate but the devil is in the detail. As a medium-sized and relatively underdeveloped Asian country, Myanmar’s foreign policy has naturally tended to be reactive rather than proactive. The country’s relative inability to determine or influence international relations was realized by the indigenous elite rather early. Myanmar, not unlike Indonesia, upon independence, professed an independent and non-aligned foreign policy.2 Nonetheless, both conditions are dependent on actions as well as circumstances. For all its assertions, independence and non-alignment evaded the country. It began in the first instance owing to the presence of a large detachment of Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang [KMT]) troops in the Shan states. The situation was complicated by Communist China’s interest in defeating the KMT threat in order to consolidate its own political legitimacy and sovereignty. To make matters worse, the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), funded and equipped this KMT detachment to attack and create instability in Communist China. Hence, as soon as Myanmar obtained its political independence, it was dragged into the Cold War, notwithstanding
32
N. Ganesan
its foreign policy pronouncements. It may therefore be argued that from 1948 to 1961, Myanmar’s most important external relations were not of its own making. These early developments not only had a sobering effect on the government, but more importantly, reinforced a pre-existing elite perception. From the time of British colonization, Myanmar elite began to distrust foreigners and foreign interests. Although such elite perceptions were common during the later colonial period in most Asian and African countries, post-independence elites typically reconciled themselves to the structural dictates of the international system and tended to retain some linkages with their colonial masters. Myanmar ended such linkages fairly early on, at least in part owing to negative sentiments on both sides regarding resistance to Japanese imperialism and the role of the highland minorities in the post-independence period.3 The negative perception of foreign countries and the nature of their interests also spilled over into Myanmar’s appraisal of the larger Asian powers. Domestic elites were always conscious of the fact that the country is sandwiched between two large Asian powers — China and India — and retain historical memories of Japanese power and Thai enmity. In view of the circumstances surrounding Myanmar’s postindependence experience with foreign countries, a number of observations may be made regarding the country’s disposition to its external environment. Firstly, historically, the country’s elite has always been queasy and suspicious about foreign interests and, in particular, Western interests. A second observation is elite realization that the country has little or no leverage to alter the tone and temper of international relations. Although Myanmar declared its foreign policy principles repeatedly from 1948 to 1961, many of its dealing with foreign countries were literally beyond its control. As a result, from 1962, when the military staged a coup against the civilian government, it became introverted and attended to internal matters. By this time, threats deriving from the KMT had dissipated. Consequently, in place of a simply declared policy of non-alignment, beginning from 1962, it adopted a policy of neutrality that was obtained through selfimposed isolationism. This second and more active policy of neutrality characterized the foreign policy output during the entire tenure of the BSPP government. Since 1988, Myanmar has attracted much international attention. Most of such attention pertains to domestic political developments, in particular the violence associated with the 1988 protests for democracy and the
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
33
annulment of the 1990 election results. Whereas self-imposed isolationism allowed the country to cocoon itself during the BSPP period, by 1988 the world had become significantly more interdependent, communications and technology had improved vastly, and socialism had become widely discredited. The Western euphoria that greeted the collapse of communism was accompanied by an equally euphoric tendency to promote the virtues of liberal democracy globally. As a result, the military elite that headed the country must have simply been overwhelmed by the amount of international attention that the country has been subjected to since 1988. The immediate precedence of self-imposed isolationism clearly did not prepare the military junta for taking international pressures into account on seemingly domestic political developments.
Myanmar’s Relations with the United States and Western Countries Among Western countries in general, the United Kingdom retained a residual interest in Myanmar after the country’s independence in 1948. The United States engaged Myanmar within the framework of its security interests in the 1950s. Its policy involved support for the KMT troops trapped in Myanmar to engage Chinese Communist troops. However, the United States was also involved in a technical aid programme in the early 1950s that was terminated by the Myanmar government in 1953 in light of the former’s support for KMT troops. Later on, the programme was restarted and stopped a number of times and following the coup of 1988, the USAID mission was dismantled.4 The U.S. ambassador was eventually withdrawn and more recently, lesser ranking charge d’affaires represent U.S. interests in the country. In 1990, the U.S. Customs and Trade Act called for economic sanctions against Myanmar and since then, the sanctions regime has been significantly enhanced.5 There is also a very critical and vocal Myanmar migrant community that brings pressure to bear on the U.S. government in its dealings with Myanmar. A number of vocal Senators have maintained a hard line in U.S. dealings with Myanmar. Consequently, in 1997, the sanctions bill was expanded to cover new investments as well. In terms of political and strategic considerations, Myanmar is considered to have little significance to the United States and the West in general. Communism is no longer viewed as a threat, and in any event, the Burma Communist Party (BCP) has collapsed. Traditionally, therefore,
34
N. Ganesan
Myanmar is not a high priority for U.S. foreign policy output. Nonetheless, to the extent that it has enormous influence in international relations and its policy has been guided by “democratic” considerations, Myanmar is viewed as a rogue state that has to be punished for violating the norms of international society. Most Western countries have generally taken the cue from the United States and refused to engage with Myanmar as well. Of the Western countries that are most involved in Myanmar, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries maintain a visible presence. Other than its colonial linkages, the United Kingdom is involved since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who leads the domestic political opposition in Myanmar, through the National League for Democracy (NLD), resided there for some two decades and was married to a British academic. Her two sons continue to reside in the United Kingdom. Suu Kyi’s 1991 Nobel Peace Prize and regular detentions also raised her stature in the West. Many of the other European countries have tended to follow the American lead albeit they have also tended to be more sympathetic with developmental concerns. Consequently, developmental aid from these countries is often funnelled through local and foreign NGOs. In fact, many European NGOs maintain a strong presence in Myanmar and are involved in developmental work at the ground level. The United States, on the other hand, had typically only been interested in programmes that lead to the eradication of drugs and especially opium poppies. The United States and Western countries, notwithstanding their criticisms, have traditionally been interested in economic opportunities in Myanmar. The oil and gas industry is viewed favourably, and there was strong representation from Western firms in response to SLORC calls for investments in 1988. Despite the initial enthusiasm, the interest of most such companies has petered out. The prospects for offshore gas are much more promising and Total (France) and Unocal (U.S.) are involved in a production-sharing arrangement with Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) to develop the Yadana field in the Gulf of Martaban.6 In 1995, a formal agreement was signed between the Myanmar government and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand for the gas to be exported. The tremendous negative publicity given to the Tatmadaw’s treatment of the political opposition and allegations about the forced use of unpaid labour and prisoners as porters for military offensives against ethnic insurgents eventually led to the Geneva-based International Labour
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
35
Organization (ILO) to threaten to sanction Myanmar in 2001. Negative publicity for large multinationals in their home countries has led to a number of U.S. and European firms to divest their interests in Myanmar. The most significant of such divestments were those of Levi Strauss & Co. and Liz Clairborne in 1992 and 1994 respectively.7 Dutch brewery Heinneken also withdrew from Myanmar, and the most recent evacuee was British American Tobacco in 2003. The irony of the situation is that Myanmar was host to a fairly large number of multinationals in the 1990s but many of them have withdrawn as a result of political pressure rather than economic considerations. Myanmar’s chief attraction for labour-intensive production facilities, especially in the textile and garment sector, is disciplined and Englishspeaking low-cost labour. However, for many of the companies that have withdrawn, the negative publicity associated with their investments was too great to ignore. Nor does the situation appear to be getting any better. In May 2003, following a violent confrontation between the governmentsupported Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and the NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi was detained for what the Myanmar government called “protective custody”. This development in turn led to a significant expansion of the U.S. sanctions regime, including the banning of all imports, freezing of all financial assets and property holdings of junta members and halting all foreign remittances.8 The U.S. expansion of the sanctions regime was preceded earlier in April 2003 by an extension of the EU sanctions regime as well — a decision that is subjected to annual review. The immediate impact of the new U.S. initiative led to some 20,000 textile workers being laid off and the closure of small and medium-sized production facilities. A pre-existing banking crisis meant that in 2003, Myanmar’s economic situation was rather bleak. Although there is an ongoing debate abroad between the proponents and opponents of sanctions, it is quite clear that sanctions have had a significant impact on the domestic population. Nonetheless, after more than a decade, the prospects for dialogue between the Tatmadaw (military) government and the NLD remain as bleak as ever, thereby prolonging the maintenance of sanctions.
Myanmar’s Relations with China Myanmar’s relationship with China was often difficult from the time of its independence in 1948 to the end of the BSPP government in 1988.
36
N. Ganesan
Despite recognizing the People’s Republic of China early on in 1949, Myanmar’s problems with China pertained to security in the first instance. The KMT soldiers who were ensconced in Myanmar organized attacks against China that had already involved itself in the Korean War. CIA support for the KMT soldiers further complicated the situation, while Chinese support for the BCP added on to the government’s woes of stabilizing domestic politics. Hence, from very early on, although the civilian government in Myanmar decided to steer clear from great power rivalry and pursue an independent and non-aligned foreign policy, the ability to exercise such a policy was clearly elusive. Myanmar’s elite thus concluded that the greatest threat to the country’s security actually obtained from China.9 The KMT threat receded by 1961, although the BCP threat continued until 1989 when the guerilla armies achieved a truce with the government and were resettled. Accordingly, from 1989 onwards, Myanmar’s relations with China have become very cordial. At the present time, the general consensus is that China–Myanmar relations are extremely strong and that China is Myanmar’s most important trade partner and benefactor. The violent suppression of the 1988 uprising and the annulment of the 1990 election results led to Myanmar’s international diplomatic isolation. The dissipation of the BCP threat, combined with the difficult domestic situation, provided a window of opportunity for Myanmar and China to rework their bilateral relationship. China’s Tiananmen incident in 1989 and the general decline of socialism globally were presumably other important factors. Myanmar’s geographical location between India and China, opportunities arising from the long common border between both countries, and Myanmar’s long coastline along the Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean appear to be motivating factors for China. Myanmar, on the other hand, is generally appreciative of strong and unconditional diplomatic support, trading opportunities and aid and weapon procurements. Official relations between the two countries are strong and cordial, and there are frequent visits by high-ranking officials between both countries.10 China also continues to affirm that domestic political developments in Myanmar should not be subjected to external pressures or interference as these would compromise the country’s sovereignty.11 Such an approach is articulated within the framework of a good neighbourliness policy. To begin with strategic and political interests in the bilateral relationship, China has approached the relationship within the framework of a broader
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
37
regional policy that is partly aimed at stabilizing and consolidating its interests and influence in Asia as well as to cultivate allies on broader policy positions against Western countries and in particular the United States on issues like democracy, press freedom, and human rights. Apart from securing its borders and stabilizing the external environment, many analysts also point to Chinese interest in gaining access to seaports and facilities along Myanmar’s coastline. Such access has included the development of road linkages as well as naval facilities for surveillance and eavesdropping.12 In this regard, China has explicitly expressed an interest in naval access to the Indian Ocean, much to the chagrin of Thailand and especially India, which maintains major naval facilities in the Andaman Islands.13 On the Myanmar side of the equation, maintaining cordial relations is important in securing the border areas and having a large power ally in the immediate vicinity to deflect internal and external threats. China, since 1989, has consistently supported Myanmar politically and reaffirmed the legitimacy of the regime. An important feature of the latter, especially for domestic political consolidation, has been the regular supply of weapons from China.14 Economic co-operation between the two countries has also developed very significantly in the post-1988 period. Cross-border trade from Yunnan Province in China, into Kachin and Shan states in Myanmar has been significantly enhanced. Bilateral trade thus far appears to have been profitable for both countries and has escalated dramatically in the 1990s. On the Chinese side of the border, the three districts in Yunnan Province are Yingjiang, Lungchuan, and Tengchung, while on the Myanmar side, the link to Mandalay is via the Shan cities of Lashio and Muse via the Chinese cities of Wanding and Ruili. The legalization of cross-border trade since 1989 has also led to the construction of bridges and roads along the old Burma Road, the Silk Road, and the Ledo Road in the 1990s to encourage cross-border trade. Both countries have promised to usher an era of “relatives born together” (swemyo pauk hpaw).15 Infrastructural development has also included the development of power, satellite and television retransmission stations, dams, and ports. In 1996, joint fisheries agreements were also signed allowing 300 Chinese trawlers access to Myanmar waters and a joint-venture cold storage facility.16 In the main, the China–Myanmar bilateral relationship is deemed to be in the neighbourly interest of both countries. There is a good measure of convergent political and economic interests. However, there are also a number of areas where the relationship is regarded as potentially
38
N. Ganesan
injurious to Myanmar. Chief among such concerns is the fear that diplomatic and moral support and weapon sales by China have significantly altered the size and capability of the Myanmar military, significantly leveraging it vis-à-vis other social forces and made the process of domestic political reconciliation much more difficult. In other words, the distributive impact of the positive relationship is highly skewed in favour of the military. There are also some fears relating to perceptions of Myanmar’s overly close alignment with China on economic and political matters, both domestically and externally. Domestically, there is some evidence of unease among residents along the border areas regarding the pervasive impact of China in terms of overwhelming the domestic population and culture.17 Both the trade and political relationship are generally perceived to be asymmetrical, in China’s favour, although it should be noted that the high level of fluctuation in the foreign exchange rate of the Myanmar kyat and the high level of inflation are not necessarily in China’s economic interest. Issues related to ethnicity and culture is also sensitive in the border areas where these have in the past been correlated to insurgency and the production of natural and synthetic drugs.18 However, there is some evidence to suggest that the political elite in Myanmar is aware of such complications and has in the past been sensitive to being overwhelmed by China.19 Externally, the situation is complicated by the fact that a strong bilateral relationship between China and Myanmar will tilt the regional balance of power in China’s favour. India, Thailand, and ASEAN countries in general, especially those with external threat perceptions pointing in the direction of China like Indonesia and Vietnam, have been uncomfortable with the relationship. In fact, some analysts have suggested that extending ASEAN membership to Myanmar was meant to partially stave off the threat arising from a strong China–Myanmar bilateral relationship. Generally, however, the current trajectory of positive bilateral relations is set to continue.
Myanmar’s Relations with India India is the other large Asian power after China that flanks Myanmar. The bilateral relationship, unlike the case with China, began on a cordial footing and subsequently deteriorated after the violence associated with the crackdown on the 1988 democracy movement. Indian policy output then became ideological in nature and there were public pronouncements and diplomatic actions in support of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
39
Since about 1992, however, following the death of Rajiv Gandhi, Indian policy output has been considerably less ideological and much more realist in its orientation. Indian policy towards Myanmar appears to be at least partly motivated as a reaction to strong Myanmar–China relations and with a view to stabilizing the strategic equation. Like China, India shares a long common border with Myanmar in the northeast. Myanmar also has a long coastline that faces India along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea.20 In the immediate postindependence period, India provided Myanmar with much-needed small arms together with Britain, and also assisted the latter in raising funds in the British Commonwealth.21 Politically and ideologically, apart from common historical experiences, both countries shared the common articulation of an independent and non-aligned outlook in foreign policy. As Myanmar became inward-looking following the 1962 military coup, relations between the two countries generally remained fair albeit with some hiccups in the late 1960s following the exodus of Indian nationals due to nationalization measures by the government. Since 1988, however, there have been dramatic changes in the bilateral relationship, beginning with a hostile attitude between the two before the situation became positive again in the 1990s. The Myanmar–India bilateral relationship appears to be more affected by political and strategic considerations rather than economic ones. As in the case with China, there are some ethno-cultural considerations. However, unlike the case with China, there are some rather serious considerations pertaining to insurgent activities along the common border. The deterioration of the bilateral relationship from 1988 was in large measure owing to India freezing its relations with Myanmar. Additionally, the Indian government expressed open support for the pro-democracy movement. It sympathized with Myanmar students and activists and had the equivalent of an open door policy towards such activists along the common border. At the state level, the mass media condemned the political situation in Myanmar. It was also reported that India provided some technical and financial assistance to the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the Karen National Union (KNU) through its consulate in Chiangmai.22 The aim of such involvement was apparently to assist Myanmar return to democracy. In terms of political and strategic concerns, the Indian decision to engage Myanmar is at least partly derived from threat perceptions related to the positive relations between China and Myanmar since 1989. It is
40
N. Ganesan
generally thought that the turning point in the relationship took place as a result of India’s “Look East” policy as well as the visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit to Yangon in March 1993. Since then, India has considerably toned down its support for the democracy movement and regards internal developments in Myanmar as purely domestic issues. The situation improved considerably with this new seemingly realist orientation, although the award of the Nehru Prize for International Understanding to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1995 temporarily set back the situation once again. A major consideration in India’s policy towards Myanmar is ethnic insurgency in the border areas. After the signing of a Common Border Trade Agreement between the two countries in January 1994, the armies of both countries launched a joint operation against ethnic insurgents in 1995 called “Golden Bird”.23 The operation, however, suffered from a lack of trust on both sides as a result of seeming Indian support for the democracy movement with the Nehru Prize being awarded to Aung San Suu Kyi the same year. Since 1998, the new Indian government led by Prime Minister Vajpayee has concentrated more on nuclear issues and deteriorated relations with Pakistan, although the bilateral relationship with Myanmar has been significantly strengthened through official visits on both sides to reaffirm cordial ties.24 Apart from such visits, India has also undertaken a number of initiatives in order to express goodwill and support for the current government in Myanmar. Such activities include less liberal policies towards political and student activists from Myanmar and closer co-operation with its military government.25 For India, the strategic equation is also coloured by growing ties between Pakistan and Myanmar. India believes that such a situation is directly correlated to the amount of leverage that China is able to exert on Myanmar and against Indian interests.26 As a result of the strengthened bilateral relationship between India and Myanmar, the Indian consulate in Mandalay was officially reopened in 2002, and Myanmar reciprocated with a consulate in Calcutta. Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention since May 2003 has invited criticisms from India, although the response has been much more measured and discreet, so as not to negatively affect the bilateral relationship. In terms of economic relations between the two countries, the level of co-operation and trade is significantly lower than the relationship with China. The Border Trade Agreement of 1994 only allows for the trade of some twenty-two items and the overall trade between the two countries in 2001–02 reached a value of $323.4 million.27 India’s major exports to
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
41
Myanmar are primarily chemicals, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and engineering and building goods. On the other hand, it imports lentils, wood products, sugar, fruits, and nuts from Myanmar. However, the trade balance is significantly in Myanmar’s favour by a 1 to 8 ratio since India imports much more than it exports. More recently, there has also been a small shipment of weapons.28 Other than direct economic linkages, India has tried to include Myanmar in regional co-operation fora in South Asia. Such efforts include the BIMST-EC initiative (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Co-operation) launched in 1997, the Mekong-Ganga Co-operation (MGC) project launched in July 2000, in seeming response to China’s Mekong Basin Project and Kunming Initiative. The present Indian strategy appears to involve Myanmar in projects where the former exercises disproportionate power. In this regard, India tends to deal with China on a bilateral basis rather than in regional fora, notwithstanding a common interest in cultivating Myanmar. In fact, until very recently when China announced its New Security Concept (NSC) that is much more favourable towards multilateral efforts at international problem solving, it tended to operate like India as well, often dealing with important relationships on a bilateral basis. The India–Myanmar relationship is much less developed than the China–Myanmar relationship. Given the lesser flow of goods and people, there is also a lesser possibility of friction. Problem areas in the past were primarily related to insurgency and the Indian preference for democracy and democracy activists in Myanmar over the military regime in power. However, the ideologically driven foreign policy has been changed in the 1990s in favour of a more accommodative approach. This policy is motivated, at least in part, by perceived vulnerabilities arising from a robust China–Myanmar bilateral relationship. The current trajectory of bilateral relations may however be subjected to change, depending on the calibration of the elected government in India.
Myanmar’s Bilateral Relations with Japan Japan’s relations with Myanmar is characterized by a measure of sentimental attachment to the country, important economic interests, and a primarily aid and grant-driven foreign policy output. Whereas Japan does not have political and strategic considerations the way that China and India do, it is interested in how much leverage the other two countries will eventually
42
N. Ganesan
have in Myanmar. In this regard, it would be fair to note that Japan is more concerned about Chinese than Indian influence on the Myanmar government. Additionally, any realignment that affects or threatens shipping routes via the Straits of Malacca, a vital artery for Japanese shipping interests, would also be regarded an important development. Of the three major Asian countries and their relations with Myanmar that this chapter examines, Japan’s policy output is most prone to pressures from the West and in particular the United States. The reason for this vulnerability is at least partly a function of Japanese policy alignment on important issues with the West, especially on matters relating to state–society relations and democratization. Arising from Japan’s training and support of the “Thirty Comrades” that led the independence movement, Japan has always had a sentimental attachment to Myanmar. Its relations towards the country were generally cordial during the BSPP period that ended in 1988. The aid policy initially began with the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries in 1954. This Treaty, which provided for wartime reparations, was the first treaty that post-war Japan concluded with an Asian country. At the outset, the terms of the treaty provided for the delivery of $250 million in goods and services over a ten-year span from 1955 to 1965.29 Subsequently, to supplement the initial amount, another $131.5 million was paid out between 1965 and 1972. Between 1973 and 1988, Japan disbursed aid to Myanmar totalling another $1.87 billion. By the last stage, it was estimated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that Japan provided almost two-thirds of all foreign aid that Myanmar received.30 In return for such generous and unconditional aid from the outset, Japan always had ready access to the military elite during the BSPP period, including Ne Win. Apparently, notwithstanding the regime’s paranoia regarding foreign interests and intentions, the BSPP government was favourably disposed towards Japan and “as the least of many foreign evils and less threatening than Myanmar’s huge neighbours, India and China, whose nationals had played a dominant role in the colonial-era economy”.31 It is perhaps instructive to observe that Japan’s refusal to grant further loans to Myanmar in 1987 unless widespread economic reforms were undertaken, was followed by the demonetization of Myanmar currency that led to events which in turn were catalytic in triggering the 1988 demonstrations.32 Immediately after the violent suppression of the demonstrations, Japan suspended all Overseas Development Assistance
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
43
(ODA) to Myanmar. Such a suspension was a difficult decision for Japan since major economic stakes are involved in the relationship. However, in the last fifteen years or so, it has sought to behave like a responsible member of the international community of states in not rewarding violent behaviour. Since 1994, Japan’s policy output towards Myanmar is not unlike that of Australia and the European Union (EU) that reward behaviour favouring political reconciliation and democratization. In fact, it was probably owing to some pressure from Japan that Myanmar agreed to accept a UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights. Similarly, the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in July 1995 is generally attributed to nudging from Japan.33 Conversely, Japan has on occasion not only frozen aid when the Myanmar government ignored its appeals for political dialogue and reconciliation, but also rewarded pro-democracy groups. So for example, when the SPDC ignored a personal letter from the Japanese Prime Minister in May 1998 to improve human rights and allow the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to prisoners, Japan granted $75,000 in aid to Myanmar refugees in Thailand. The Japanese government is however not always able to respond with the proverbial stick or carrot depending on the situation. The reason for this observation is the fact that there is a strong and sizeable Japanese business lobby group that sometimes acts independently of the Japanese government. So for example, in 1997, Keidanren, the Japanese confederation of business and industry, opened an office in Yangon. Additionally, Japan also attempts to nuance its policy by working “patiently and persistently for improvements through ongoing dialogue with the present regime”.34 Hence, there are both pulls and pushes motivating Japan’s aid policy towards Myanmar. Finally, in all fairness, it must be noted that Japan is aware that the SPDC government is highly nationalistic, regularly views foreign advice on its domestic politics as interference in its internal affairs, and is potentially reactionary to negative policy instruments. Such a position also augurs the possibility of strengthening the China–Myanmar bilateral relationship — a situation that does not inherently favour Japan and one that it is anxious to avoid. Since 1998, Japan has continued its assistance to Myanmar, although as just noted, the situation has become considerably more nuanced. Compared to policy output during the time of the BSPP government, Japan’s aid policy towards Myanmar has become much more contingent on the internal political situation, particularly the SPDC government’s treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi and members of the NLD as well as the
44
N. Ganesan
general situation in relation to the observation of human rights and maintaining dialogue with the political opposition.35 The second observable and changed feature of Japanese aid policy towards Myanmar is that it no longer offers loans. Rather, it tends to be outright grant aid. This development may very well be a function of Japan’s realization that Myanmar will quite simply be unable to repay loans disbursed to it in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, most disbursements of recent aid have tended to be grants as well as debt relief.36 Finally, it may be noted that the most significant recent policy gesture has been the suspension of all aid to Myanmar following the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi by the SPDC in May 2003 after the outbreak of violence between NLD and SPDC supporters near Dipeyin in central Myanmar. There has only been a single exception to this blanket rule — aid for a seed multiplication programme granted to Rakhine state through the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).37 Apart from economic interests and the provision of aid and being wary of China’s emerging influence in Myanmar, Japan has little other interests. The special relationship that characterized the state of affairs during the BSPP period will eventually dissipate over time, especially since Ne Win himself has expired. Simultaneously, the situation will mean that Japanese aid to Myanmar is likely to become more contingent on democratic reforms. However, attempting to use aid to leverage the reform process risks the whiplash effect of rejection by the junta, inadvertently leading to Myanmar’s even greater reliance on China.
Myanmar’s Relations with ASEAN and Member States Owing to Myanmar’s location in Southeast Asia and its lengthy border with Thailand, geographically it falls well within ASEAN’s footprint. Nonetheless, for much of the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, there was little formal interaction between ASEAN and Myanmar. The former’s preoccupation with political developments in Indochina and the latter’s isolationist policy precluded interaction. Structural changes associated with the resolution of the Cambodian political situation in 1989 and ASEAN’s interest in expanding its membership to include all the countries of Southeast Asia were significant motivations for the Association’s engagement of Myanmar in the 1990s. Within Myanmar, domestic political changes associated with the collapse of the BSPP government in 1988 and the national election of 1990 prompted the country to look outwards. The imposition of sanctions against Myanmar by Western countries, in particular
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
45
the United States and the EU, also led to ASEAN’s greater interaction with Myanmar to break the political deadlock. Notwithstanding Myanmar’s formal membership in ASEAN in 1997, there are also significant differences and issues involved in the bilateral relations between individual member countries and Myanmar. Owing at least in part to historical interactions and geographical proximity, Thailand has the most extensive bilateral dealings with Myanmar. Of ASEAN’s political and strategic imperatives, the earliest publicly articulated position of the’“constructive engagement” of Myanmar began in 1991 and is normally attributed to then Thai Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin.38 This policy that was in stark contrast to the Western approach was premised on the assumption that engagement rather than isolation would yield political change and progress in Myanmar. ASEAN was in general agreement with this position also because it helped maintain the Association’s principle of non-interference in the domestic politics of member states. On the back of this new initiative, Thailand invited Myanmar to the 1994 ASEAN meeting in Bangkok. This initial engagement was followed by Myanmar’s announcement in 1995 that it would accede to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, by then a protocol required of new member states. Meanwhile, in 1995, the Myanmar military junta released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest.39 Subsequently, Myanmar was admitted as an observer at the ASEAN meeting in Bangkok in July 1996 and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In July 1997, on the occasion of ASEAN’s Thirtieth Anniversary meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Myanmar, together with Laos, was formally admitted into ASEAN. Influential members of ASEAN had different interests and priorities in admitting Myanmar, especially since the decision was a controversial one with potential diplomatic reverberations. Indonesia had a certain historical appreciation of foreign policy neutrality — a position favoured by Ne Win’s BSPP government. The SLORC and SPDC governments were also keen on appropriating the Indonesian military’s dual-function (dwifungsi) role that legitimated military involvement in domestic politics. Indonesia and Malaysia were concerned about Myanmar’s treatment of its minority Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state and their mass exodus to Bangladesh. Malaysia was also interested in creating a politically defining moment, since the original plan called for all three remaining candidate countries to obtain membership at the same time. Singapore was more interested in engagement leading to economic reforms and a more favourable climate for foreign investments.
46
N. Ganesan
Even after obtaining membership in 1997, ASEAN’s engagement of Myanmar has undergone some changes. Some of these shifts are attributable to domestic political changes in Thailand and the Philippines assuming the Secretary Generalship of ASEAN. The Democrat Party that came into power in Thailand in 1997 and Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan began calling for “flexible engagement” as opposed to “constructive engagement”, since the latter had not yielded substantial political reforms in Myanmar.40 Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were opposed to it since the terms of reference remained unclear, and there was a lurking suspicion that the new phrase implied intervention in Myanmar’s domestic politics and the Thai initiative did not produce any substantive results. Thereafter, ASEAN appears withdrawn in its efforts to engage Myanmar, although the present Thai government led by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra favours a softer interactive approach in dealings with Myanmar. Of all member countries, Thailand has the most complicated bilateral relationship with Myanmar, and it spans a number of issues. Political and strategic issues in the relationship include Sino-Myanmar military cooperation and China’s access to the Bay of Bengal. The long and porous land border that is home to a number of minority highland ethnic insurgent groups has also been a source of considerable tension. Tatmadaw military offensives against the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Shan Mong Tai Army (MTA) have on a number of occasions spilled over into Thailand, leading to engagements with the Thai army.41 The Tatmadaw has also accused Thailand of providing sanctuary to Karen insurgents and the Shan State Army South (SSA). Separately, as a result of the Tatmadaw offensives against the KNU there are some 120,000 refugees in Thailand. Poor conditions in these refugee camps often earn Thailand negative international publicity. The Thai–Myanmar security situation is conflated with a number of other non-traditional issues.42 These include illegal migration and in particular the trafficking of synthetic and natural drugs from Myanmar into northern Thailand. The drug problem in turn is often correlated to the spread of HIV/AIDS. Another major source of tension has been Myanmar claims of illegal fishing by Thai trawlers in its territorial waters. When commercial fishing arrangements were violated, the Myanmar government imposed a ban on Thai trawlers in 2000. As with the security situation, Thailand has the most broad-ranging economic interests in Myanmar. Myanmar’s offshore natural gas supply has become a significant factor in Thailand’s energy equation. These have
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
47
traditionally included teak, gems and precious stones, and marine products. There is also a great demand for low-wage labour from Myanmar by Thai industries. Malaysia and Singapore, in particular, have extensive investments in the tourism and hotel industry. As far as economic interests are concerned, the general rule of thumb is that only the more developed and affluent countries in ASEAN have a presence in Myanmar. To conclude this section, it may be noted that ASEAN’s policies towards Myanmar have undergone some changes. It began from almost an absence of interaction to engagement that culminated in Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN in 1997. However, since then, there is a general feeling in ASEAN that the Myanmar military junta is not favourably disposed towards any form of political dialogue with the opposition or change. Consequently, much of the enthusiasm that characterized early overtures has dissipated. In fact, most of the older ASEAN members are beginning to regard the Myanmar political situation as stalemated and not amenable to resolution in the near term.
Conclusion Myanmar’s bilateral relations with China, India, and Japan are all quite old and significant at least compared to the ASEAN countries, perhaps with the exception of Thailand. The relationship with the U.S. and Western powers has generally been poor since the collapse of the BSPP government in 1988 and especially after SLORC’s annulment of the 1990 election results and the detention of opposition politicians. In fact, with the expansion of the sanctions regime by the United States in 2003 and the continued stalemate between the NLD and the SPDC, Myanmar’s relationship with the United States and its Western allies is unlikely to improve any time soon. Whereas the bilateral relationship with China had its ups and downs during Myanmar’s first four decades of independence, the situation has improved considerably after the BSPP government was replaced in 1988. For the most part, China is motivated by an admixture of economic and strategic interests. Among strategic interests, access to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar appears to be a major consideration. China’s bilateral relationship with Myanmar is unconditional and policy pronouncements by both countries indicate that the relationship is likely to remain strong in the future. Nonetheless, there is also some doubt whether Myanmar could maintain its much-cherished tradition of an independent and nonaligned foreign policy as it tends in the direction of China. Additionally,
48
N. Ganesan
there is some indication that indigenous people in the northern border areas in the country may be overwhelmed by Chinese influence to the point of resisting it. There has also been international concern about the large influx of Chinese weapons and the role of drugs in the bilateral relationship. Myanmar’s relations with India, on the other hand, began cordially as a result of common historical experiences. However, the relations took a turn after the collapse of the BSPP government in 1988 and the violence associated with regime transition. India’s open and public support of democracy and democratic activists in Myanmar further worsened the relationship. The thaw in the bilateral relations occurred after 1993 when India decided to deal with Myanmar on more realist terms, leaving aside ideological considerations. Since then, the relationship has steadily improved. India’s policy towards Myanmar appears to be at least partly motivated by strategic considerations, in particular Chinese naval access to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar’s coastline. It is also keeping a wary eye on the growing bilateral relationship between Myanmar and Pakistan. Economically, the bilateral trade relationship is heavily weighted in Myanmar’s favour, a situation that is just the opposite of Myanmar’s bilateral trade relationship with China. In the case of Japan, Myanmar’s relations with it began with special significance, since Japan armed and trained the “Thirty Comrades” that were at the heart of the Myanmar independence movement. This special relationship continued throughout the tenure of the BSPP government, buttressed by direct access to Ne Win. However, the situation in the 1990s has become much more complex. Japan continues to be a substantial provider of financial assistance to the Myanmar government, although in more recent times, loans have been replaced by grants. Additionally, Japan has been much more prepared to attach conditions relating to human rights and political dialogue and reconciliation to the offer and resumption of aid. Japan’s interest in Myanmar is primarily economic, although it is concerned about growing Chinese influence and how Chinese access to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar may in turn affect shipping routes. There is an interactive effect among the three bilateral relationships. It appears that although China, India, and Japan articulate policies towards Myanmar independently, India and Japan are at least in part motivated by what is perceived as China’s significant influence on Myanmar. There appears to be some concern that Chinese access to Myanmar’s coastline
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
49
may alter the regional strategic balance of power. On the Myanmar side, the bilateral relationships have generally been positive since the country suffers from widespread international sanctions. Relations with the regional powers are often free from conditionalities although Japanese aid is increasingly being tied to political developments as well. All three bilateral relationships help cushion Myanmar from international diplomatic isolation and make domestic conditions more manageable. Conversely, however, major Asian countries, in their engagement on Myanmar, have little impact on the attitude of the West, in particular the United States and the EU on their opinion or engagement of Myanmar. ASEAN’s engagement of Myanmar was prompted at the outset by structural changes in the international relations of Southeast Asia and the winding down of the Indochinese conflict and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The deteriorated domestic political situation in Myanmar after 1988 and its location in Southeast Asia prompted ASEAN to engage Myanmar and eventually grant it membership in 1997. However, ASEAN’s attempts at facilitating reconciliation and dialogue in Myanmar have come to naught. The general opinion of the international community and observers of Myanmar politics at this stage is that internal changes will take time to occur and even then, such changes are likely to have a domestic origin.
Notes 1. Notwithstanding the different names that have been given to the military junta in power, the fact remains that it is a military regime. 2. See Taylor (1987), pp. 261 and 263. 3. The British distrusted Bamar nationalists for their training and collaboration with Japanese forces, including the “Thirty Comrades” that formed the core of the independence movement. As a result of such distrust and the British preference for “martial races”, both British regular troops and covert operatives relied heavily on the highland Kachin, Chin, and Karen for military recruitment. In fact, at the time of independence, the Myanmar Army was disproportionately dominated by highland minorities, especially in command positions. See Callahan (2003), pp. 104–106 and 129–35. 4. See Steinberg (2001), pp. 258–59. 5. See Bray (1995), p. 56. 6. Ibid., p. 31. 7. Ibid., p. 33. 8. See Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2004), p. 90.
50
N. Ganesan
9. See Taylor (1987), p. 262, and Callahan (2003), pp. 154–56. At least to partly deflect this threat, the U Nu government was the first non-communist country to recognize China in 1949. Also see Bray (1995), p. 45. 10. The most significant of such visits on the Myanmar side include those of the top leadership of the ruling junta. On the Chinese side, Li Peng and Jiang Zemin visited Myanmar in 2000 and 2001 respectively, reaffirming cordial bilateral ties. See Mya Maung (1998), pp. 185–89 and Muni (2001), pp. 40– 41 and 77–78. In January 2003, Chinese Vice-Premier Li Lanqing, during a visit to Yangon, expressed the desire to push the bilateral relationship to a new and higher level (“China, Myanmar to Step up Cooperation: VicePremier”, People’s Daily, 15 January 2003). 11. See “China Opposes Interference in Myanmar”, China Daily, 21 August 2003. 12. Such facilities include those in Hainggyi in the Ayeyarwady River estuary near Pathein, Ramree Island south of Sittwe in Rakhine state, Zadetkyi Kyun (St. Matthew’s Island) off the Tanintharyi coast and Coco Island in the Andaman Sea. See Chi (1997), p. 85 and Mya Maung (1998), p. 189. Also see Seekins (1997), p. 535. 13. This position is attributed to a statement made by General Zhao Nanqi, Director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences in 1993 in which he is reputed to have said that China cannot accept the Indian Ocean being India’s Ocean. See Malik (1997), p. 58. 14. Most writers refer to a large defence procurement exercise in August 1990 valued at some US$1.4 billion as the start of this weapons acquisition programme. Such acquisitions include fighter, ground attack and trainer aircraft, frigates and fast patrol boats, main battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns and missiles and assorted small arms. Between 2001 and July 2003 alone, four shipments of weapons were reported. See Chi (1997), pp. 84–86 and Military Balance (1998–99 and 2000–01). In 1993 and 1999, Myanmar’s defence expenditure was at its highest, at nearly 50 per cent of the state budget. See Selth (2002), p. 332. 15. See Mya Maung (1994), pp. 186–87. 16. See Davis (1999). 17. See Seekins (1997) and Mya Maung (1994) 18. See Arnott (2001), pp. 74–77. China is itself wary of the inflow of drugs from Myanmar and the international community has expressed reservations about the drug-related activities of certain members of the ethnic groups, in particular the Shan, Wa, and the Kokang. 19. For example, in 1998, the Myanmar government announced a restricted list of items for import and export, leading to a fall in the total bilateral trade turnover from $749 million in 1997 to $400 million in 1998. See Davis (1999), p. 3. It has also been reported that the SPDC apparently turned down
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
20. 21. 22.
23.
24. 25.
26. 27. 28.
51
a Chinese proposal to build a container port at Bhamo and improve the port facilities at Kyaukpyu in Rakhine state. See Steinberg (2001), p. 233. The common 1,643 kilometre-long common border is shared with the Indian provinces of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram. Immediately prior to the1956 national election, India also offered Myanmar a loan of $46 million (Taylor 1987, pp. 262–63). See Renaud (2003), p. 4, and Malik (1994), pp. 140–41. It was also noted that Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes sheltered student activists from Myanmar and is a harsh critic of the military government. The border agreement resulted in the opening of a cross-border point between Moreh in Manipur, India and Tamu in Sagaing Division, Myanmar. India is also building the Monywa-Kalaywa Road, together with two major river bridges in Myanmar. The military operations targeted the United Liberaton Front of Assam, National Socialist Council of Nagaland, People’s Liberation Army of Manipur, Manipur People’s Liberation Front, and the Kuki National Army. For details, see Thin Thin Aung and Soe Myint (1998), pp. 94–97. In September 1998, Indian police arrested sixty-four Myanmar activists who were subsequently charged and then released on bail. Similarly, in February 1999, another fifty activists were arrested and charged. In 1998, the Indian Home Ministry intervened to cancel a seminar on Myanmar at the Constitution Club in New Delhi. Additionally, it is reported that the Home Ministry requested that Myanmar nationals not be recognized as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Office in New Delhi. In July 1999, the Indian government also banned a Burma Democracy Conference to be held in Calcutta and refused to issue visas to Myanmar activists in exile (ibid., pp. 97–98). There has also been much more joint crackdown on insurgency movements by both countries. So for example, between 1995 and 1999, India’s Assam Rifles have put great military pressure on the Chin National Front (CNF) in Mizoram to enter a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar government. The Indian Armed Forces launched “Operation Leech” in the border areas in February 1998 and seized a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. During the operation six leaders of the National United Party of Arakan were killed and another seventy-three were captured. Finally, in August 1999, Myanmar soldiers entered 300 metres inside Indian territory, in hot pursuit of Rakhine Muslim insurgents and the intrusion was deemed “accidental”. See ibid., p. 107. See Malik (1994), pp. 140–41. See Renaud (2003), p. 9. The weapon shipment includes eighty Indian-made 75 mm. mountain guns and thirty truckloads of signalling devices and ammunition. See “Myanmar gets low caliber Indian artillery”, Asian Tribune, 17 December 2002. More recently, high level military exchanges included the visit of the Indian Naval
52
29. 30.
31. 32. 33.
34. 35.
36.
N. Ganesan
Chief M. Singh to Yangon and the visit of Myanmar Air Force Chief Myat Hein to New Delhi in September 2003. See Seekins (1992), p. 249. Ibid., p. 250. The financial aid was disbursed in the form of project loans, commodity loans, grant aid, technical assistance, and food aid. In the last decade of the BSPP government, grants were disbursed primarily in the mining, manufacturing and energy sectors, public works, and commodity loans. Ibid., p. 254. See Lidell (2001), p. 143. Ibid., p. 144. Immediately after the release, Japan responded by providing $11 million for agricultural development in minority areas that was in turn followed by a $4 million debt relief package. “Japan’s Position Regarding the Situation in Myanmar”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Press Statement, March 1997. For a sampling of Japan’s policy pronouncements urging political dialogue and reform in Myanmar, see Statement by the Press Secretary/DirectorGeneral for Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Complete Reopening of Universities in Myanmar, 24 July 2000; Statement by Mr Yohei Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Release of the Members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) of Myanmar, 26 January 2001; Statement at the Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Mr Yasuo Fukuda on the Release of Political Prisoners in Myanmar, 22 June 2001; Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Ms Makiko Tanaka on the Release of Political Detainees in Myanmar, 9 October 2001; Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi Concerning the Situation in the Union of Myanmar and the Lifting of Restrictions on the Movements of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 6 May 2002; Statement by Ms Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Release of the Political detainees in Myanmar, 22 November 2002 and 6 May 2003; Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Protective Custody of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD members by the Myanmar government, 2 June 2003; and Statement by Ms Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Present Situation in Myanmar, 5 June 2003. The following projects are representative of recent Japanese grant aid: “The supply of Judo equipment to the Myanmar Judo Federation” — 40 million yen, 9 July 2001; “Grant Aid for Debt Relief” — 18.17 billion yen, 1 November 2001; “Project for the Improvement of Road Construction Equipment for Kokang Region in Northern Shan State” — 5.84 billion yen, 13 December 2001; “The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship” — 2.03 billion yen, 15 January 2002; “The supply of Japanese language learning equipment to the University of Foreign Languages,
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
37.
38. 39. 40. 41. 42.
53
Yangon” — 35 million yen, 29 March 2002; “The Project for Rehabilitation for Baluchaung No. 2 Hydro Power Plant” — 6.28 billion yen, 10 May 2002; “The Project for Improvement of Medical Equipment for Hospitals in Yangon” — 7.92 billion yen, 22 April 2002; “The Project for the Improvement of Maternal and Child Health Care Service (Phase IV) (through UNICEF) — 6.09 billion yen, 31 July 2002; “Emergency Assistance for Flood Disaster in the midland of Myanmar” — 10 million yen, 18 September 2002; “The Project for Aforrestation in Central Dry Zone” — 4.8 billion yen, 30 September 2002; “The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship” — 2.66 billion yen, 30 September 2002; “Grant Aid for Debt Relief” — 76 million yen, 20 December 2002; “Assistance for Opium Poppy Eradication in the Shan State of the Union of Myanmar by the Trust Fund for Human Security” — $1.2 million, 28 March 2003. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. The “Farmer Participatory Seed Multiplication in Rakhine State, Myanmar”, valued at $1,450,142 was initiated through the Trust Fund for Human Security in December 2003. See Aung Zaw (2001), p. 41. Ibid., p. 42, and Ott (1998), pp. 76–77. See Haacke (1999), pp. 581–611. See, for example, Lintner (1994), p. 23, and idem. (1995), pp. 31–32; Vatikiotis and Tasker (1995), p. 32. See Ganesan (2001), pp. 136–43.
References Arnott, David. “China-Burma Relations”. In Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Report, pp. 69–86. Sweden: IDEA, 2001. Aung Zaw. “ASEAN-Burma Relations”. In Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Report, pp. 37–56. Sweden: IDEA, 2001. Bray, John. Burma and the Politics of Constructive Engagement. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995. Callahan, Mary P. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003. Chi Shad-Liang. “Burma’s Relations with the People’s Republic of China: From Delicate Friendship to Genuine Cooperation”. In Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society, edited by Peter Carey, pp. 71–93. London: Macmillan, 1997.
54
N. Ganesan
Davis, Anthony. “Burma Casts Wary Eye on China”. Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1999. Ganesan, N. “Thailand’s Relations with Malaysia and Myanmar in post-Cold War Southeast Asia”. Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, no. 1 (2001): 127–46. Haacke, Jurgen, “The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practise of Enhanced Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the ‘ASEAN Way’”. Pacific Review 12, no. 4 (1999): 581–611. Liddell, Zunetta. “International Policies Towards Burma: Western Governments, NGOs and Multilateral Institutions”. Challenges to Democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral Responses. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Report, pp. 131–82. Sweden: IDEA, 2001. Lintner, Bertil. “Loss and Exile”. Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 February 1994, p. 23. ———. “The Fall of Manerplaw”. Asiaweek, 17 February 1995, pp. 31–32. Kyaw Yin Hlaing. “Myanmar in 2003: Frustration and Despair?”. Asian Survey 44 no. 1 (2004): 90–97. Malik, J. Mohan. “Sino-Indian Rivalry in Myanmar: Implications for Regional Security”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 2 (1994): 137–56. ———. “Myanmar’s Role in Regional Security: Pawn or Pivot?”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 1 (1997): 52–73. Military Balance 1998–99. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998. Military Balance 2000–01. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000. Mya Maung. “On the Road to Mandalay: A Case Study of the Sinocization of Upper Burma”. Asian Survey 34, no. 5 (1994): 446–59. ———. The Burma Road to Capitalism: Economic Growth versus Democracy. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998. Muni, S. D. China’s Strategic Engagement with the New ASEAN. Singapore: Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001 Ott, Marvin C. “From Isolation to Relevance: Policy Considerations”. In Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future, edited by Robert I. Rotberg, pp. 69–83. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. Renaud, Egreteau. “India and Burma/Myanmar Relations: From Idealism to Realism”. Paper presented at a conference in New Delhi, 11 September 2003. Seekins, Donald M. “Japan’s Aid Relations with Military Regimes in Burma, 1962–91: The Kokunaika Process”. Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (1992): 246–62. ———. “Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire”. Asian Survey 37, no. 6 (1997): 525–39.
Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World
55
Steinberg, David I. Burma: The State of Myanmar. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001. Selth, Andrew. Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk, Connecticut: Eastbridge, 2002. Taylor, Robert H. The State in Burma. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987. Thin Thin Aung and Soe Myint. “India-Burma Relations”. In Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future, edited by Robert I. Rotberg, pp. 87–116. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Brookings Institution Press, 1998. Vatikiotis, Michael and Rodney Tasker. “Rude Neighbour”. Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 March 1995, p. 32.
Reproduced from Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg > Smith 56 Martin T.
3 Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar The Need for New Approaches Martin T. Smith
Overview: A Land in Transition Ethnic conflict and political stasis have been at the heart of Myanmar’s legacy of underachievement in social and economic development since independence from Great Britain in 1948. The two crises are interlinked and stand in contradiction to the many expectations at independence that Myanmar, a land of abundant human and natural resources, would have the most prosperous future of any of its neighbours. However, with an estimated per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of just US$300 in 1999, a recent United Nations (UN) study concluded that Myanmar was the poorest country in Asia in terms of purchasing power parity at the beginning of the twenty-first century.1 Furthermore, in a fast-developing region, it is increasingly recognized that the twin ethnic and political crises in Myanmar have significant international dimensions. Located on a strategic crossroads in Asia, Myanmar reflects its heritage as a land of vibrant ethnic and cultural diversity. But such geopolitical complexities also place nationality issues in Myanmar in the front-line of regional developments. For not only do ethnic minorities constitute an estimated third of Myanmar’s 53 million population, they also inhabit all the borderlands with the neighbouring countries of China, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Laos. With an international frontier-line of 3,650 miles, Myanmar’s border territories make up around half its total landmass. All have been the scenes of modern-day conflict in some of the longest running insurgencies in the world.2 56
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
57
As a result, it can be concluded from both internal and external experiences since independence that, rather than being marginal or secondary issues, ethnic peace and political inclusiveness in Myanmar are integral preconditions for sustainable development and economic progress in the new century.3 At present, under the military State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) government, Myanmar is engaged in its third different era of political transition following the British departure. Since 1988, a series of events have redefined the ethnic landscape. Significant developments include a ceasefire movement which began in 1989 and had spread to seventeen armed ethnic groups by 2003; the 1990 general election, won by the National League for Democracy (NLD) and in which nineteen ethnic nationality parties also gained seats; and a constitutional National Convention that the military government started in 1993 and resumed in May 2004 as the first stage in the SPDC’s “road map” for reform (see Appendix). In addition, in 1997 Myanmar joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and, through such initiatives as the Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC), business and development projects in many once war-torn border regions are either on the drawing boards or beginning to accelerate. In particular, the People’s Republic of China transformed its policy from support to the insurgent Burma Communist Party (BCP), which collapsed in 1989 due to ethnic mutinies, to becoming Myanmar’s major trading partner, a dynamic that was greatly enhanced by the ethnic ceasefires that spread in the Shan and Kachin states during the 1990s. As a result of such incremental changes, the Myanmar of 2004 is no longer the regionally isolated Myanmar that existed under General Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” in 1988. This was graphically highlighted in December 2003 when Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, while quietly encouraging the armed opposition Karen National Union (KNU) to make peace, hosted the “Bangkok Process” meeting of representatives from twelve Asian and Western governments, as well as the UN, in support of the SPDC road map. A great many challenges, however, still lie ahead. As yet, there has been no quantum leap of change. In regional and ethnic terms, a variety of humanitarian crises continue to be at their most serious in minorityinhabited areas, all of which have severely detrimental impact on human and economic development in the country. The causes can be attributed to
58
Martin T. Smith
a combination of factors, including decades of conflict, militarization, under-expenditure on health and education, and failures to achieve consensual reform. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the result of this cycle of impasse is a pattern of “human insecurity” in which three “disparities” are significant: regional and ethnic, rural–urban, and gender.4 Critical issues include poverty, internal displacement, environmental degradation, illicit narcotics, and the spread of HIV/AIDS, with populations in border areas regarded as especially at risk from this spreading epidemic.5 It also needs to be stressed that there are a few ethnic minority areas where armed conflict has continued, especially in the Kayin (Karen), Shan, Kayah (Karenni), Chin, Rakhine (Arakan), and Naga borderlands. This has been reflected in the exodus of refugees into neighbouring countries. In Thailand alone, there were over 120,000 official refugees and in excess of one million migrants from Myanmar, many of whom were illegal, in the first years of the twenty-first century.6 The borderlands with India, Bangladesh, and China have also witnessed scenes of ethnic turbulence and greatly increased human flow since 1988. Sometimes such population movement has been in response to violence, such as the refugee exodus of over 250,000 Muslims (most of whom have since returned) from the Rakhine state into Bangladesh during 1991–92. But the growing scale of such movement is also indicative of the broader search for opportunity on either side of the modern borders in a pivotal frontier region where many of the former barriers have started to come down. Under the SPDC, a Border Areas Development Programme (BADP) was instituted in 1989 with the advent of the ethnic ceasefires. This was upgraded into a Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National Races in 1992. Road and bridge-building projects especially were initiated in the Ministry’s eighteen administrative areas.7 Access was also allowed to border regions for the first time to a variety of UN agencies and, subsequently, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that began to return to Myanmar from the mid-1990s. A particular focus was on drug eradication; during the 1990s Myanmar had become, by most international estimates, the world’s largest producer of illicit opium, a status from which it has since declined.8 However, despite such initiatives, there are still many rural areas and border regions where public health outreach, educational provision, and modern infrastructure are either minimal or non-existent, bearing testimony to political stasis and the devastating impact of over five decades of
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
59
conflict. Furthermore, as in many other strife-torn countries, the greater access allowed to aid and development agencies in remote regions, while generally improving mobility and understanding of different aspects of political and humanitarian crises, has not immediately prompted socioeconomic change. Rather, the generally lower indicators reported by different agencies for health and education attainment in many ethnic minority areas have confirmed the gravity of the situation and how far there is still to go. Maternal mortality rates of over 500 per 100,000 live births in the northern and eastern Shan state (as compared with a low of 136 in the Sagaing division) or access rates of only 42–47 per cent to improved drinking water in the Chin, Karen, and Rakhine states (as compared to 89 per cent in urban areas and a national average of 72 per cent) are serious evidence of the regional disparities.9 Recent mappings of social demographics also confirm the high levels of food insecurity and vulnerability that exist in all of the ethnic minority borderlands surrounding Myanmar’s central Ayeyarwady plains.10 In addition, although there are no reliable figures, community leaders estimate that illiteracy rates of up to 90 per cent (and even higher) still exist in several border areas, such as the Wa hills.11 The political and ethnic linkages are inescapable. As the UN Country Team concluded in 2003: The cultural diversity of the people and their political relations with the central government represent a challenge to their integration and to lasting political peace and unification of the country. For these reasons, the populations living in the border areas tend to be more vulnerable to economic and social shocks, conflict and abuse.12
The situation is not beyond hope, however. Both the ceasefires and the changing socio-political discussions between different stakeholders and actors during the past decade have opened up to much greater focus the scale of developmental challenges that Myanmar now faces. A new realism is evident, which is also reflected in the breadth of international discussions. But this new sense of awareness does not mean that anything will be easy in the future. Indeed, with many communities living at subsistence level only, many ethnic nationality leaders already express the view that the tasks of reform and transition are the challenges for a generation during which it is imperative that all peoples and regions are enabled to take part. There are no exceptions in regional need, and it is important to stress that this includes many Bamar majority areas of Myanmar as well.
60
Martin T. Smith
On this basis, community leaders acknowledge that the present ceasefires and acceptance of the necessity for political change between once opposing groups have created an initial peace dividend as a first stage in transition. Certainly, the numbers of lives lost annually in armed conflict have declined from the late 1980s on a countrywide scale. However many community leaders are also concerned that the potential of this moment could be allowed to evaporate through a general lack of initiative, planning and support. A reform momentum must be maintained. This dilemma was summarized by Seng Raw, director of the Metta Development Foundation, an indigenous NGO in Myanmar set up in the aftermath of the Kachin ceasefire: Creating ceasefires between former antagonists has been a major and often unacknowledged achievement, which could only be instituted by the key parties themselves. But how do we now go about building from these ceasefires into lasting peace?13
Indeed some ethnic nationality leaders believe that uncontrolled logging, illicit narcotic production, and resource profiteering by powerful business interests could threaten the creation of a new generation of grievances, if there is not more rapid progress soon.14 Clearly, the achievement of political reform, social development, and sustainable democracy will stand at the top of any list of priorities in the coming decade. But whatever the potential for transition, for the present it still needs to be recognized that, after decades of such conflict and division, even finding a common language over many aspects of Myanmar’s future and identity has yet to be achieved. As in any modern nation-state, the issues of ethnic representation, territory, and geographic division are sensitive questions that can provoke very different perceptions of history. For example, on the fifty-sixth anniversary of Independence Day on 4 January 2004, the SPDC chairman Senior General Than Shwe stated: “For years countable by the thousand, the Union of Myanmar stood as an independent and sovereign nation, with her own civilization” (New Light of Myanmar, 4 January 2004). In contrast, Myanmar’s oldest nationality party, the armed opposition Karen National Union (which resumed peace talks with the SPDC in December 2003), has long claimed the identity of a separate nation as the basis for autonomy and the right of ethnic selfdetermination. “The Karens are much more than a national minority. We are a nation,” claims one official KNU publication.15
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
61
In addition, as David Keen has warned from the experiences of other internal conflicts in the modern world, it is important to acknowledge the divisive impact that armed struggle can have on ethnic perceptions in any country. The very fact of local warfare, the battle for control of natural resources, the responses of international aid groups, and even the ways that journalists can come to write of divisions in “immutable” terms rather than questioning how they have come about, all combine to ethnicize political and development issues. “Conflict generates ethnicity,” Keen concluded.16 Such, it can be argued, has been the experience of Myanmar, a land that was once better known for Edmund Leach’s pioneering studies on the fluid nature of cultural and ethnic inter-change in societies.17 As such, it must be remembered that there was nothing preordained about Myanmar’s legacy of post-independence conflict. It is also important to emphasize that ethnic issues should not be perceived as simply a Bamar majority versus ethnic minority question. Over the decades, there have also been local conflicts between various armed ethnic forces, such as between Mon and Karen or Shan and Wa, which have been economic and territorial rather than political or ideological in origin. All these conflicts have generally emerged in the militarized atmosphere of front-line warzones. In Myanmar today, there are over twenty-five armed groups still representing different ethnic minority designations (see Appendix).18 The result is a paradigm which Robert Taylor warned of over twenty years ago: “Ethnic politics is the obverse of the politics of national unity.”19 This is a view that has been especially prevalent in government circles, especially under the previous Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) of General Ne Win. But certainly, ethnicity has become almost an ideology in modern-day Myanmar,20 a situation given credence to by the “tripartite” formulation of national politics into three groups by the UN and other international actors during the 1990s as the equation by which dialogue and reform should be achieved: i.e., the armed forces (Tatmadaw) government of the SPDC, the National League for Democracy, and the country’s diverse ethnic minority groups, some of which have been under arms against the central government for decades.21 On the surface, therefore, the present political and development challenges can appear daunting and complex. Many difficulties are looming. But to begin with, at this critical moment in the country’s post-independence evolution, it is also vital that a fundamental re-evaluation is undertaken of the political causes and developmental underpinnings by which Myanmar came to reach deadlock in such a militarized and ethnically divided state
62
Martin T. Smith
in the second half of the twentieth century. There is nothing that is necessarily unique about Myanmar’s challenges of nation-building after the disruptions caused by colonial rule. But what is unusual is how rarely these questions have been analysed and discussed face to face — and on the basis of shared experiences — by all the key parties and actors in the country. For this reason, as the road map began in 2004, many nationality leaders believed that, to properly set the scene, it is necessary to recall the Panglong “spirit” and the historic conference of that name in February 1947 when Shan, Chin, and Kachin representatives from the Frontier Areas Administration agreed with ethnic Bamar leaders to unite as partners in the new Union on the basis of Aung San’s pledges of “unity in diversity”. As Zau Seng, vice-chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), reminded: “The Kachin, Shan, and Chin states, as they stand today, are not dominion states mandated by the government of the Union of Burma. Rather, it was primarily through the consent of the ethnic nationalities to integrate that the Union came into existence.”22 First, therefore, it is important to return to the Panglong era and the challenges that Aung San and the different nationality leaders were facing in early 1947. The very structures of many contemporary problems in both development and politics have their root in the bygone days of colonial rule.
Colonial Rule: A Legacy of Inequality Prior to independence in 1948, the crucial role that ethnic parity and regional development should play in the establishment of Myanmar as an integrated nation-state was expressed by two leaders on very different sides of the political spectrum. In his Blueprint for a Free Burma, written in Japan in 1941, the independence hero Aung San proposed: … the essential pre-requisite is the building of one unified nation. In concrete terms it means we must bridge all gulfs now existing through British machinations between the major Burmese race and the hill peoples, the Arakanese, the Shans, and unite all these peoples into one nation with equal treatment, unlike the present treatment which divides our people into “backward” and “administered” sections. All the natural barriers that make mutual associations and contacts difficult shall be overcome, for instance, by construction of effective modern communications, such as railways and roads.23
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
63
A very similar view was expressed by H. N. C. Stevenson, Director of the Frontier Areas Administration during the last years of colonial rule: “I believe that the multiplication of and strengthening of the economic relations between the hills and the plains will be the shortest and most inexpensive route to a unified Burma.”24 At the time, Stevenson was much criticized for his support for greater concentration on the economic and political rights of the ethnic minority peoples, which, many pro-independence groups feared, would be used by the British as a delaying device to hold back the country’s freedom. However, a close reading of Stevenson’s arguments confirm that, like Aung San, he was very aware of the potential scale of problems if the right foundations were not first laid. Indeed, as both men recognized, the disparities in political and economic development between the different regions had only been exacerbated by the death and destruction of the Second World War. As a result, the analyses of both men have powerful resonance today. Indeed many contemporary leaders contend that the challenges that they outlined are yet to be addressed. Every part of the country was affected in different ways by the experiences and turbulence under colonial rule. For example, the Lower Ayeyarwady Delta region, which was regarded as a swamp-infested “frontier area” inhabited by different ethnic peoples (especially Kayins and Mons) on the eve of the British invasion, was transformed by mass immigration and rice cultivation, leading the country to become, by the 1920s, the world’s largest exporter of rice.25 In contrast, economic activities in the border regions were characterized by singular, exploitative industries of natural resources, such as logging or the wolfram mines at Mawchi in the then Karenni states, the lead and silver mines at Bawdin and Namtu in the Shan states, or the tea factory in the nearby Palaung areas at Nahmsam. Only in 1938 was the Burma Road completed through to China (which had been an original objective of British expansion in the nineteenth century), but this, in turn, precipitated Imperial Japan’s invasion from Thailand in 1941. These economic and developmental disparities were then compounded by political and geographic divisions under colonial rule. British Burma was administered under a diarchic system of government between Ministerial Burma, where the majority Bamars predominated and a limited degree of parliamentary home rule was allowed, and the ethnic minority frontier areas, where local rule was generally left under the control of the local chieftains or headmen. Anomalies abounded. Few areas of the country
64
Martin T. Smith
are truly ethnically homogeneous; rather the ethnic map in many regions represents more of a mosaic. British rule, however, did little to acknowledge this, despite a general myth often repeated today that British rule favoured the ethnic minority peoples who were mostly preferred for recruitment into the armed forces. In reality, the arbitrary divisions under British rule impeded the development of responsive, modernized, and inclusive political movements among many nationality groups, which in the long-run undermined their ability to compete on equal terms at independence.26 Kayin-inhabited areas, for example, were divided into five different districts under the British administration, and the Karenni states, despite twelve official enquiries between 1873 and 1939, were never formally incorporated into British Burma.27 As a result, British Burma may have resembled the land under territorial boundaries achieved by Alaungpaya and his successors during the Konbaung Dynasty. But the nation-state that gained independence in 1948 was a very new and transfigured entity. In particular, internal borders and divisions had been ossified, especially between hills and plains, in ways that often took little account of regional dynamics or the needs and aspirations of local populations. Moreover, for over a century the country had been placed under the political and economic orbit of colonial India. In short, as Michael Aung-Thwin has contended, British rule can be characterized as a system of “order without meaning”.28 Equally important, reformers at the royal court in Inwa (Ava) and Mandalay proved unable to adapt to the intense political and economic pressures of the British invasion.29 Progressive as much as traditional elements in society were undermined. As a result, the manner by which the once multi-ethnic kingdom was cut down to what was essentially an ethnic Bamar “core” around Mandalay has left a lasting legacy in institutional weaknesses and differing perceptions concerning “Burmese ethnic nationalism” that continue to have implications for the building of a modern nation-state in the twenty-first century.30 Many Bamar and nonBamar views of national identity — as well as those represented in such institutions as the Tatmadaw, the Buddhist sangha, Christian churches, or ethnic nationality parties — are based upon different traditions and understandings of both the precolonial and colonial experiences. On a more positive note, there were indications during the 1930s that a new generation of leaders was emerging, seeking ways for different nationality groups to work together in building a united and pluralistic country after independence. Such discussions, however, tended to be among elite, educated groups in Yangon and a few other urban centres, highlighting
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
65
the lack of political space and connection between different peoples in the country at large. Therefore, as the independence movement gained momentum during the 1930s, it was always likely that the future postcolonial state would face formidable challenges in ethnic and political bridge building after the British departure. Then came the devastating intervention of the Second World War. The destruction inflicted during 1941–45 could not have been worse timed as “scorched earth” policies were pursued by both British and Japanese forces fighting across the country. In some areas, different parties and communities were pitted against each other, giving rise to new ethnic tensions. Even in the twenty-first century, there are still parts of the country where lasting peace and the infrastructure are yet to be fully restored.
Arrested Development: Myanmar after Independence (1948–88) Two very different periods mark Myanmar politics in the first forty years after independence: that of parliamentary democracy (1948–62) and General Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” (1962–88). Both are characterized by political failures, and the ethnic and developmental challenges which the Union’s founders had hurriedly discussed during 1946–47 remained unresolved. In terms of democratic practices and relations with Asian neighbours, the country was generally well regarded on the international stage during the parliamentary era. However, national unity and socio-economic development were always undermined by the countrywide insurgencies that broke out during 1948–49. The first major insurrection was initiated by the BCP within three months of independence in March 1948, and conflict then rapidly spread to the Kayin, Mon, Kayah, Rakhine, Pao and other ethnic groups. Vast areas fell under the control of a complex array of different — and often competing — insurgent and quasi-state forces, in which pro-government units often constituted just one element. The crisis in national government was then compounded when remnant Kuomintang (KMT) forces from China invaded the Shan state during 1949–51, introducing international dimensions to the country’s internal conflict. These heavily armed forces were able to ensconce themselves in the Yunnan and Thai borderlands where they quickly became part of the local insurgent and economic fabric. The boom in illicit narcotics production
66
Martin T. Smith
was just one debilitating borderland legacy that is still significant today. As the KMT General Tuan Shi-Wen described, “To fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains, the only money is opium.” (Weekend Telegraph [London], 10 March 1967.) Against this fractious backdrop of armed conflict, the central government always struggled to maintain authority as well as formulate and develop policy. By the mid-1950s governmental control had been established by the Tatmadaw in Yangon and all the main conurbations, but insurgent groups continued to control much of the rural countryside and many borderland areas. An ambitious “Pyidawtha” (welfare state) plan was announced in 1952 by the U Nu government under which sections of the economy were nationalized and national health and educational programmes were set to be introduced. Implementation, however, was very limited. Furthermore ethnic dissatisfaction continued, exacerbated by anomalies in the 1947 constitution at independence, which, in many cases, mirrored or sought to deal with inconsistencies in rights and representation that had existed under British rule. For example, while the Shan and Karenni states were allowed the nominal right of secession after a ten-year period, there was no ethnic state representation as such for the Mon, Chin, or Rakhine peoples.31 Equally striking, the Karen state which was eventually created in the Thai borderlands in 1952 probably did not include more than a quarter of the Kayin population in the country at that time. Significantly, the KNU had boycotted elections to the 1947 constituent assembly and thus took no part in its creation. As a result, in the late 1950s and early 1960s a new wave of ethnic nationalist movements began to emerge, some of which were legally based, such as the Federal Movement during 1961–62, and others which resorted to arms, such as new militant groups among the Shans and Kachins. A sense was growing that the central government was taking little notice of local ethnic needs and aspirations. A particular grievance was underdevelopment and the state of the economy. In 1961, for example, just one month before the Kachin Independence Organization took up arms, the Kachin state government publicly complained about the appalling condition of the state’s few roads, which had rapidly deteriorated after the British departure (The Nation [Yangon], 23 January 1961). Indeed the only main road through the Kachin state was virtually impassable in the rainy season; just 27 miles of its 174-mile length had been tarred or metalled.
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
67
Equally important, while politicians argued, it was the national armed forces or Tatmadaw that had become, in terms of economic expansion, the largest commercial institution in the country, with interests in everything from construction to banking, providing the Tatmadaw with financial resources outside of civilian control. This institutional capacity growth by the Tatmadaw was little commented on at the time.32 But constantly in the front-line of conflict, many officers were becoming more and more concerned about the country’s failures, increasingly coming to regard themselves as “state-builders” rather than soldiers and policemen alone.33 This divisive rift between soldiers and politicians set the backdrop for General Ne Win’s second military takeover in March 1962. Ne Win, in particular, was concerned about the growing demands of nationality leaders, many of whom wanted the quasi-federalism of the 1947 constitution to be made explicit in an attempt to resolve the political crisis. In contrast, Ne Win stated, “Federalism is impossible; it will destroy the Union.” (The Times [London], 3 March 1962.) Ne Win’s solution, however — the idiosyncratic “Burmese Way to Socialism” — provided no sustainable answers. For twenty-six years, the country retreated into international isolation as Ne Win sought to build up a monolithic, one-party system of government that would radiate out from Yangon into ethnic minority areas under the BSPP. However, the admixture of Marxist, Buddhist, and nationalist principles in Ne Win’s guiding philosophy was never deeply elucidated.34 Indeed, far from resolving nationality issues, ethnic rebellion once again flared. Following a largely unsuccessful peace parley in 1963–64, armed resistance escalated in virtually all the borderlands. In 1968 a new North-East Command was opened by the BCP along the China border with Beijing’s full military and political backing; this intervention followed anti-Chinese riots in Yangon the previous year. In the same period, the deposed prime minister U Nu also attempted to set up an armed movement allied with the KNU and other ethnic forces in the Thai borderlands. As a result, within a few years of Ne Win seizing power, nearly half the country had reverted to conditions of socio-political conflict comparable to the “multi-coloured” insurgencies of the early 1950s in their complexity. As the one major marker of BSPP government, in 1974 a new constitution was introduced. Ethnic and geographic elements of this configuration are likely to be retained in the country’s future constitutional arrangements. For the first time, a notion of ethnic symmetry and representation was established in the national political framework through
68
Martin T. Smith
the creation of seven divisions, where primarily the Bamar majority live, and seven ethnic minority states: the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. The BSPP government, however, never won general support from ethnic minority groups, many of whom perceived Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” as a political guise for what they term “Bama” or “Burmanization”. Particular disquiet was felt over the suppression of ethnic parties and the nationalization of many aspects of daily life and the economy, including all schools and the media, meaning that ethnic minority languages disappeared from most official curricula. Furthermore, the continuing failure of governmental health, economic, and developmental programmes to reach out into minority areas enhanced the sense of marginalization. Meanwhile the armed conflicts continued. Indeed, almost paradoxically, the BSPP era marked a relative boom period for many of the country’s diverse armed opposition groups which were then largely grouped into two major blocks: those allied with the BCP on the China border and those in the nine-party ethnic minority National Democratic Front (established in 1976), which was headquartered with the KNU on the Thai border. Large self-administered territories, with networks of clinics and schools, were established along all the country’s borders. Insurgency became a virtual way of life. But the relative stability of many of these areas once again reminds that the economics and management of internal conflict can be very structured between the different stakeholders and actors — rather than chaotic or reflecting societal collapse as is often believed.35 In essence, the real failures in Myanmar since independence have lain in the failure in state institutions and not in society or between communities per se. As Mark Duffield recently noted on aid challenges in other countries of contemporary conflict, … the situation on the ground invariably proves to be more complex and ambivalent than the images of regression suggest. When subject to close examination, the reflexive systems that support conflict have a tendency to fracture and reveal hidden or unexpected realities.36
The post-colonial experiences of Myanmar very much bear this observation out. The attempt to build a socialist nation in such international isolation was never likely to succeed, let alone in such a strategic frontier region as Myanmar where there are many markets for regional trade. As the government-controlled economy failed and the black market grew, goods such as timber, cattle, jade, and opium daily poured out of the
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
69
country through different rebel checkpoints on the Thai, Chinese, Indian, and Bangladesh borders, with products such as medicines, motors, and luxury goods passing the other way. The pragmatism of such trade meant that most communities could survive, and central government control was never seriously endangered. However, the end result was military and political stasis between different forces in the country, a widespread culture of corruption, and a further quarter century without sustainable peace or development in many ethnic nationality areas. Indeed regular electricity supplies, if at all, barely existed outside of Yangon, Mandalay and the main conurbations for most citizens, while the quality of borderland roads and infrastructure declined even further due to both the insurgencies and governmental neglect. The economy and country were declining to the point of bankruptcy. By the mid-1980s, it was estimated that as much as US$3 billion or 40 per cent of the gross national product annually changed hands on the black market.37 Then in December 1987, as the clearest international evidence yet of socio-economic collapse, Myanmar successfully applied for the Least Developed Country status by the UN as one of the world’s ten poorest nations. The following July, General Ne Win resigned, prompting several weeks of upheavals and pro-democracy protests during which the present military government assumed power. The desire for change was clearly widespread throughout the entire country.
The Present Landscape Given the scale of failures in the past, Myanmar today faces a formidable array of challenges and problems. Since 1988, the processes of transition and reform have been slow, and the issues of political and ethnic inclusiveness are yet to be settled. Decades of conflict and economic underdevelopment also mean that many humanitarian problems have become embedded, creating different opinions about the hierarchy of socio-political needs as the country faces the future.38 Such perspectives also divide or affect the international community where arguments have continued, including over aid and development issues, about how to best support the path to national reform.39 By any international standards, Official Development Assistance to Myanmar has been minimal, estimated by the UN at just US$1 per capita in 2001 as compared with US$35 for Cambodia and US$68 for Laos.40 Similarly, all the Bretton Woods’ institutions, including the World Bank, International
70
Martin T. Smith
Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank, suspended in-country assistance in 1988. The general restriction on official development aid has not been lifted; nor is it likely to be until there are political reforms that most major donor countries approve. This acts as a significant constraint on the diversity of international sources that can be approached or utilized for regional development. Against this backdrop, the centrality of ethnic issues has risen considerably in both national importance and international profile since 1988 in ways that have not occurred for decades. The main basis for this change originates in the ethnic ceasefire policy initiated by the military government in 1989. Indeed the SPDC chairman, Senior General Than Shwe, has contended that the ethnic ceasefires, through a policy of “national reconsolidation”, are the most defining characteristic of his government’s rule. “National unity has been fostered,” he has said (The New Light of Myanmar, 27 February 1998). Despite this, many senior Tatmadaw officers remain apprehensive about a resumption of fighting or upheaval if the reform process should fail. Moreover they fear that, this time, an escalation in conflict could even bring in the military involvement of their neighbours. In 2001, one government press release claimed, “A return to the postindependent situation could become analogous to a ‘Balkanization of South-East Asia’.”41 This is an eventuality, however, that few of Myanmar’s peoples or neighbours consider likely — and it is a scenario that most would strenuously seek to avoid. Indeed one of the most significant changes since 1988 is the ways in which all of Myanmar’s neighbours have sought to build bridges with the government in Yangon while encouraging ethnic nationality groups to make peace along the borders. As a 2003 report by the Asian Dialogue Society stated, “The small wars along Myanmar’s borders are a form of contained balkanization and it is not in the interest of Myanmar or Asia that a process towards stabilization be derailed. Asia cannot afford to lose Myanmar and Myanmar cannot afford to lose Asia.”42 In particular, the economy of China’s Yunnan province has grown dramatically in the past decade along with a significant expansion of trade with Myanmar.43 As new roads and other infrastructure projects take root, journey times for both goods and travellers are being slashed, bringing up unprecedented issues about imports and exports, taxes, banking, public health controls, tourism, and the international issues of human flow in what was, until very recently, one of Asia’s most inaccessible frontier regions.44 At the same time, ambitious plans — and the attendant
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
71
implications — are being considered in both India and Thailand to take part in Myanmar’s economic opening, including a major India-MyanmarThailand highway and a deep-seaport in the Andaman Sea off Dawei. Significant gas fields are also being explored by Indian and South Korean companies off the Rakhine state coast, which are likely to surpass in potential the Andaman Sea fields already in production in Myanmar’s far south. In the midst of such planning, however, many of Myanmar’s peoples feel left behind, whether on the individual, community, or regional levels. The long-standing political stasis and lack of reforms inside Myanmar have continued, while expectations and frustrations have risen in equal measure. As a result, there is a tangible conviction and purpose among the different nationality parties that, if a new constitution is to be agreed and development decisions taken which will affect their lives, this time they must all be included, unlike during previous eras of change. A new beginning has to be achieved, and ethnic nationality parties are eager to take their part. For example, as is often recalled, the KNU boycotted the elections to the 1947 constituent assembly and for over five decades has remained out of the political mainstream. In consequence, Kayin leaders say that this experience and the advent of the SPDC road map in 2004 have provided the impetus behind the recent resumption in ceasefire talks and the efforts to bring peace to longdivided communities. Similar views are also expressed by representatives of the Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayan, Kokang, Mon, Pao, Rakhine, Shan, Wa, and other ethnic groups. Thus, while the present landscape may appear complex, many ethnic leaders contend that what should be highlighted at this critical moment in Myanmar’s political history is not the diversity of ethnic parties calling for change but the unity of voices from different groups supporting dialogue and reconciliation in the twenty-first century. In essence, they argue, many of the present divisions in society are the divisions of self-survival inherent in any country that has endured so many decades of conflict and national underdevelopment. On the present national stage, three major groupings of ethnic organizations stand out in politics: ceasefire groups, electoral parties that stood in the 1990 election, and the remaining non-ceasefire groups, including the KNU. In private, however, there is a considerable degree of consensus, and many groups have long sought an appropriate platform or opportunity to voice their views. Where there have been differences of opinion between
72
Martin T. Smith
different groups, it has largely been over strategies and methods by which to try and achieve reform — not over ideologies or territories which was frequently the case in the past. At root, the recent outlooks can be characterized as a difference between a “politics first” priority (i.e., political agreements must precede reform), which both electoral and non-ceasefire groups have supported in their different ways, and a “politics through development” strategy, which has been pursued by the ceasefire groups as their basis for national reconciliation. Certainly, such a developmental priority has been the private advice to representatives of both the SPDC and ceasefire groups by officials in neighbouring China where ethnic peace and equality have been advocated as providing the preconditions for economic progress and reforms in their own country. In Myanmar’s case, a fourth social grouping, community-based organizations, should also be mentioned in ethnic and developmental terms. During the past decade, there has been a notable increase in the activity by different community-based organizations in different parts of the country, which, in many cases, are independent of projects supported by government agencies or local ceasefire groups. Many such activities have long-standing roots and were initiated by existing religious organizations, such as the Myanmar Council of Churches, the Catholic Bishops Conference, and various Buddhist groups in the communities. Since the mid-1990s, however, a variety of small, local aid groups have also been formed, including the Metta Development Foundation, the Shalom Peace (or Nyein) Foundation, and the Karen Development Committee, which seek to help communities rebuild after conflict. In December 2003, for example, the local NGO directory listed sixty-four indigenous or Myanmar-based organizations with offices in Yangon alone. As a result, some observers perceive in these efforts the fledgling re-emergence of civil society without which, it is often argued, democratic reforms and institutions are unlikely to be sustainable.45 Indeed, although it remains to be seen just how long-lasting many of the new groups will be, the past decade has witnessed the most rapid growth in NGO formation in Myanmar’s history. This trend is likely to accelerate if social and political transition continues. Far from being moribund, it is evident that communities and organizations remain very alive and diverse in many adaptive forms in Myanmar. Equally important, such new initiatives and organizations have been supported during the past decade by both UN and international NGO agencies to bring humanitarian aid to some of the most needy and vulnerable
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
73
communities in the country. Save the Children (U.K.), for example, has initiated a programme to address the trafficking of women and children along the China, Myanmar, and Thailand borders.46 In 1996, World Concern began aid programmes on both sides of former conflict zones in Kachin state, training over 550 village health workers that serve a population of 130,000 people in the first four years alone.47 Similarly, as new roads and projects extend into the once remote Kokang and Wa borderlands with China, a new sense of optimism was expressed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) which began a joint programme with Wa and other local stakeholders. “The vicious linkage between opium and poverty is being broken. Until recently, the elimination of opium cultivation in the ‘Golden Triangle’ would have been considered impossible. It is now within reach,” claimed UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa in June 2003.48 However, despite such international recognition, optimism needs to be constrained. Few observers believe that a continuing decline in illicit narcotics production will be possible without sustained assistance and alternative development programmes for many years to come. Villagers in the Kokang, Shan, and Wa borderlands are among the most impoverished in Asia, with estimates of per capita incomes of just US$100 per annum for the majority of local inhabitants. Moreover the humanitarian imperatives are only likely to increase when a proposed deadline for the ending of opium farming is enforced in 2005. Similar humanitarian and economic difficulties are likely to remain in other ethnic nationality areas, especially if armed conflict continues. At the same time, the advent of permanent ceasefires with the KNU and other remaining non-ceasefire groups will also bring considerable challenges in their wake, including refugee repatriations, internal resettlement and community-rebuilding, in the decade ahead. As a result, the international momentum towards greater humanitarian aid engagement within Myanmar seems set to continue. Interestingly, the timing of this recent change in humanitarian aid perspective reflects a shift in opinion in the general aid and development community worldwide towards countries in crisis, especially where poverty or conflicts are involved. In particular, there has been growing reflection since the end of the Cold War that good intentions and concentration simply on such issues as good governance, humanitarian emergency and corruption often fail to deliver successful or sustainable aid programmes, especially if the agendas of international organizations fail to recognize the basis of needs and
74
Martin T. Smith
societies on the ground.49 Indeed the recent studies of Mushtaq Khan and others into the notions of corruption, rent-seeking, and intra-societal relations in different countries in Asia suggest fundamental rethinking is needed into what conditions of aid may actually produce economic growth and intended developmental outcomes.50 In Myanmar’s case, poverty, internal displacement, refugees, illicit narcotics, and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in the past decade have acted as significant focuses in the efforts by international aid organizations to broaden their understandings of problems and their relationships with different actors on the ground. Most notably, although restrictions on development aid remain, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) announced in an apparent change of policy in 2003 that it would contribute US$15.7 million over three years to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar. In line with DFID’s “Drivers of Change” philosophy,51 a new country plan was also developed, which includes the presence of DFID-supported staff and programmes in Myanmar, to better target health- and poverty-related issues. As a 2003 DFID discussion paper acknowledged, in the international aid world more generally there is the contemporary need: “for much more realism about what’s achievable and politically feasible in a particular country context; to develop local solutions rather than relying on best practice models from elsewhere; and to be realistic about timescales for fundamental reform.”52 Such an outlook undoubtedly has many echoes with the complicated landscape for approaching aid and development issues effectively in Myanmar.
The Road Ahead All concerned, however, recognize that there remains the overriding question of political reform in Myanmar. The processes of transition and future aid policies are likely to be considered by different parties on the basis of judgements about the legitimacy of political reforms. But as different ethnic and political leaders discussed their responses to the SPDC road map in early 2004, many argued, as a first step, for a most fundamental reappraisal of lessons from the past and models for the future before appropriate reforms can be achieved. The atmosphere was highly cautious. Certainly, precedent suggests that there will be many likely controversies along the way. In developmental terms, some ethnic nationality representatives remain concerned that, even with peace, their existing territories will never be
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
75
sufficient to undertake the scale of social and economic progress that their communities desire to see — especially if the present boundaries of the seven states and seven divisions from the 1974 constitution are maintained. For example, the Chin state without the inclusion of the adjoining KaleKabaw valley in the Sagaing division or the Kayin state without a seaport and linkages to other Kayin populations in the country are perceived by some ethnic leaders as truncated mountain areas which are not realistically sustainable on their own. For this reason, Kayin and Mon leaders recall that the KNU and Mon nationalist parties put a proposal to the 1948 Regional Autonomy Enquiry Commission for a joint “Mon-Karen” state to include Mawlamyine in the areas of the former region of British Tenasserim that they were both claiming at that time. This is an interesting suggestion, for this notion of inter-ethnic inclusiveness and co-operation provides new models for regional development that may one day be the key to economic progress and reform. The territories that include the modern-day Tanintharyi division and the Mon and Kayin states were historically regarded as one geopolitical region, as the British recognized in the process of annexation. It is therefore not difficult to conceive such developmental formulations being reconstructed in the twenty-first century. The divisions of the recent past must be overcome and integrated plans developed at the community, regional and national levels to include all local peoples and interests. Significantly, then, in both the Shan and Kachin states — both of which are multi-ethnic and have many of the characteristics of sociopolitical regions historically recognized in law — there is cautious acceptance that the likely creation of “autonomous” territories in the new constitution for such groups as the Kokang, Wa, Pao, and Palaung should not prove a divisive problem as long as such new territories are regarded as a mark of social inclusiveness rather than ethnic separation. In this case, the political model being envisaged is generally similar to the autonomous prefectures or counties in China’s neighbouring Yunnan province. In private, ethnic leaders say that this is not all that they want politically, but it is what they are prepared to realistically accept. In this respect, it should be added that greater autonomy and economic rights are also sought by many local communities in the borderland states. In particular, during 2003 there remained the restrictive situation where not only were many exports not permitted into neighbouring countries from ceasefire areas (such as sugar or tin) but trade with the rest of Myanmar was itself subject to limitations. Such controls on the rights of
76
Martin T. Smith
local decision-making and trade most definitely hold back regional development in the border areas. But many leaders are confident that, if equal opportunity and the rights of free trade are genuinely allowed to all, their communities will have the ability to quickly revive. Until such time, however, many commodities and monopolies are likely to remain in the hands of a few vested interests that are generally linked to armed groups.53 Clearly, the process of conflict resolution has a long way to run. For such reasons, a light restructuring of the political map or only tentative steps towards new reforms are unlikely to be accepted on the national scale in every part of Myanmar in the coming years. Many groups have long considered more radical changes in approach. In particular, some nationality representatives continue to assert that so important is the need to enshrine the basis of ethnic equality for all the peoples in the new constitution that the only way to do this will be by the creation of an extra eighth state for the Bamar majority, a constitutional change that will, in turn, need to be backed up by words that reflect the aspirations of federalism. These twin guarantees, it is argued, would place all the major ethnic groups and territories in Myanmar on an equal ethnic and political footing.54 Other ethnic leaders, however, believe that such an eight-state system would prove unworkable because of the imbalance in population numbers and also the scale of ethnic diversity within the country. Instead, they argue that the existing demarcation of seven states and seven divisions (mooted to become known as regions) is already parity enough. The main challenge is to ensure that, whatever the nuances of political formulation, the real intention and determination exists to guarantee ethnic inclusiveness and equality of opportunity in the new constitution this time around. It is instructive to remember that two constitutions have already failed to achieve peace and progress in the past six decades. In conclusion, therefore, what is perhaps most significant during the current speculations over reform is that, rather than an argument of reductio ad absurdum over every detailed point, many ethnic nationality leaders consider that a “rights-based” constitution will be the most important guarantee for future development and democracy in such an ethnically diverse country as Myanmar. As one community leader said: I am a Karen who has never lived, and never will live, in the Karen state. So I am unaffected by political events there. But as a non-Bamar citizen of Myanmar, what I do want is equality as a Karen and the rights to express and enjoy my culture wherever I go.55
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
77
A similar view was expressed by the Pao National Organization leader, Aung Kham Hti, who believes that the exact demarcation of a Pao territory in Shan state is not the key issue: rather the existence of a Pao region and the guarantee of ethnic cultural and political rights will be to the benefit of Pao people wherever they live or travel in the country.56 Implicit in such arguments by different ethnic representatives, it needs to be emphasized, are the right to development, the right to health, the right to education, the right to freedom of religion and the right to take part in policy decisions about issues that affect different ethnic nationality lives, including the use of natural resources. All such rights are embodied in the different declarations and protocols of the United Nations. Without such rights, whatever the political or development processes, it is unlikely that Myanmar will ever find lasting peace. As the Rev. Saw Mar Gay Gyi, a Karen peace go-between and President of the Myanmar Council of Churches, said to an audience of government ministers, ethnic ceasefire leaders, and international aid officials in the Kachin state in December 2001: “Only if there is justice will there be peace. No peace without justice: no justice without peace.” In January 2004, the state-controlled media argued that a “golden opportunity” existed as a KNU peace delegation prepared to travel to Yangon (The New Light of Myanmar, 15 January 2004). It is thus concomitant on leaders and parties on all sides that this moment is not lost. Myanmar’s troubled experiences since independence clearly testify that new ideas and new approaches are needed for the new century in which every sector of the country is enabled to take part.
78
Martin T. Smith
APPENDIX Status of Ethnic Parties, May 2004 1. Main ceasefire groups at National Convention Name in state media
Usual name/other details
Burma Communist Party (Rakhine Group)
Communist Party of Burma (Arakan)*
Kachin State Special Region-1 Kachin State Special Region-2
New Democratic Army (Kachin)* Kachin Independence Organization**
Kayah State Special Region-1
Kayah State Special Region-3
Kayan National Guard (breakaway group from KNLP) Karenni Nationalities Peoples Liberation Front* Kayan New Land Party* **
New Mon State Party
New Mon State Party**
Shan State (North) Special Region-1
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang)* United Wa State Party* Shan State Army (formerly Shan State Progress Party)** National Democratic Alliance Army (eastern Shan state)* Kachin Defence Army (1991 split from KIO 4th brigade) Pao National Organization** Palaung State Liberation Party** Shan State National Army (1995 split from MTA) Shan State Nationalities Liberation Organization*
Kayah State Special Region-2
Shan State (North) Special Region-2 Shan State (North) Special Region-3 Shan State (East) Special Region-4 Shan State (North) Special Region-5 Shan State (South) Special Region-6 Shan State (North) Special Region-7 Shan State National Army Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization
* Former ally or breakaway group from BCP ** Former National Democratic Front member
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
79
2. Splinter ceasefire groups at National Convention from larger ethnic forces (a) From the Karen National Union (non-ceasefire) Democratic Kayin Buddhist Association Haungthayaw Special Region Group Phayagon Special Region Group
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army: 1994 split Karen Peace Force (ex-KNU 16th battalion): 1997 split 1998 split: Hpa An district
(b) From the Karenni National Progressive Party (non-ceasefire) Kayinni National Development Party Dragon Group Kayinni National Progressive Party
1999 split 1999 split: Hoya district (Splinter, Hoya)
Kayinni National Unity and Solidarity Organization (c) From the defunct Mong Tai Army (1996 “surrender” ceasefire) Homein Region Welfare and Development Group Shwepyi Aye (MTA) Group Manpan Regional Militia Group (d) From the National United Party of Arakan (non-ceasefire) Arakanese Army (AA)
Ex-armed wing in NUPA: 2002 split
(e) From the New Mon State Party (1995 ceasefire) Mon Armed Peace Group (Chaungchi Region) Mon Splinter Nai Saik Chan Group
Mon Army Mergui District: 1996 split
3. Ethnic parties from 1990 General Election at National Convention Kokang Democracy and Unity Party Lahu National Development Party Mro-Khami National Solidarity Organization Union Kayin League Union Pao National Organization Wa National Development Party
80
Martin T. Smith
4. Ethnic parties from 1990 election in 2002 United Nationalities Alliance (not at National Convention) Arakan League for Democracy Chin National League for Democracy Kachin State National Congress for Democracy Kayah State All Nationalities League for Democracy Kayin National Congress for Democracy Mara People’s Party Mon National Democratic Front Shan Nationalities League for Democracy Zomi National Congress
5. Main non-ceasefire groups (not at National Convention)*** Arakan Liberation Party** Arakan Rohingya National Organization Chin National Front** Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (2001 split from NMSP) Karen National Union** (1995–96 talks broke down; resumed 2003) Karenni National Progressive Party** (1995 ceasefire broke down) Lahu Democratic Front** Mergui-Tavoy United Front* National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang faction) National United Party of Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Organization Shan State Army [South] (reformed 1996 after MTA surrender) Wa National Organization** (1997 talks broke down) * Former ally or breakaway group from BCP ** Former or present National Democratic Front member *** A number of other small, armed groups also exist in name on the borders. Most are affiliated to the National Council Union of Burma, but they do not have broad or active organization inside the country.
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
81
Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
16. 17. 18.
See UN Country Team (2003), p. 11. For a history of these conflicts, see, for example, Smith (1999). For a more detailed frontier analysis, see, for example, Smith (1997). UN Working Group (1998), pp. 11–13. See, for example, UNAIDS/WHO (2002); and UNAIDS (2001). For an overview, see BBC (2003). See, for example, Thein Han (1997). For a contemporary analysis, see TNI (2003). UN Country Team (2003), pp. 32–33, 41. See, for example, FIVMS (2002). Estimate of Bao You-Xiang, chairman of the United Wa State Party, 25 January 2004. UN Country Team (2003), p. 13. Seng Raw (2001), p. 161. See, for example, Global Witness (2003). The Government of Kawthoolei (1984), p. 3. This position was reiterated by the KNU president, Saw Ba Thin Sein, in 2003: “The Karen people have all the characteristics of a nation, but today they have been reduced to the status of a minority or an ethnic group. This is because the Karen people are not fully united.” Office of the Supreme Headquarters, transcript of Address by KNU President Saw Ba Thin Sein on 31 January 2003, the 54th Anniversary of Karen National Revolutionary Resistance Day (in author’s possession). Keen (2001), pp. 7–8. See Leach (1954). Ethnic and political identities are a complex issue in Myanmar that have been little studied in the field since the time of E. Leach. For example, while bearing the collective “Kachin” name, the Kachin Independence Organization is mainly based among the Jinghpaw, Maru, Lashi, and other related groups in northeast Myanmar, but does not include many Shans or other local inhabitants. Similarly, “Karenni” (“Red Karen”) is a collective and historic name preferred by armed nationalist leaders from around a dozen sub-groups in the present-day Kayah state. This separates the Kayah state peoples from their close Kayin relatives. Other claimed identities have also arisen, such as the “Democratic Karen Buddhist Army” which broke away from the KNU in 1994, although it does include Christians. Generally, the one nationality that has not been represented by aspirations of a singular ethnic identity is the Bamar majority, but there have also been insurgent movements based among the Bamar population, such as the BCP which collapsed in 1989, U Nu’s Parliamentary Democracy Party in the early 1970s, and the more recent All Burma Students Democratic Front.
82
19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
27. 28. 29. 30. 31.
32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.
Martin T. Smith
Taylor (1982), p. 7. For a contrasting view, see Silverstein (1980), pp. 6–25. See Brown (1994), pp. 1, 33–65. For a discussion, see Smith (2002), pp. 11–14, 29–33. Statement by Zau Seng, vice-chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization, 25 November 2003. As quoted in Maung Maung (1969), p. 299. See Stevenson (1946). For a detailed analysis of this process, see Adas (1974). Interview with KNU vice-president Bo Mya, 15 December 2003. Bo Mya’s contention was that, while there have been no doubts about Kayin aspirations or goals, political formulation and organization has been a weak point of the Kayin movement. This, he says, was highlighted at independence when different Kayin groups emerged (including the KNU: formed 1947), meaning that the Kayin case was not effectively articulated at that crucial time. For a discussion of ethnic minority administration under British rule, see Smith (1999), pp. 41–53. Aung-Thwin (1985), p. 245. See Thant Myint-U (2001). Ibid., pp. 253–54. For an account of the British invasion of the Shan, Karenni and Wa states, see Mangrai (1965). For Chins in the former Frontier Areas, a “Special Division” was created. For analyses and documents from the constitution-writing period, see UHRC (1999); see also, Smith (1999), pp. 71–87. For a contemporary analysis of the Tatmadaw’s evolution during 1948–62, see Tinker (1967). For a retrospective account, see Callahan (2003). Ibid. See, for example, Government of Burma (1964). For a discussion, see Keen (2001), pp. 1–20; Smith (1999), pp. 88–101. Duffield (2002), p. 1052. Smith (1999), p. 98. For an overview of conflict and the human legacy, see, for example, Smith (2002), pp. 21–28. See, for example, ICG (2002). UN Country Team (2001), p. 2. SPDC (2001). ADS (2003), p. 2. See, for example, Global Witness (2003), pp. 80–91. See, for example, Fullbrook (2004). For a discussion, see the essays of Steinberg, Smith, Lidell, and Purcell in BCN/TNI (1999). Nwe Nwe Aye and Maher (2003). D. Tegenfeldt (2001), p. 116.
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
83
48. Press Release, United Nations Information Service, 18 June 2003, as quoted in TNI (2003) p. 4. 49. See, for example, Duffield (2002); and Pirotte, Husson, and Grunewald (1999). 50. See Khan and Jomo (2000). 51. See DFID (2003b). 52. See DFID (2003a). 53. See, for example, Global Witness (2003). 54. Such a political structure has various proponents, including representatives of both electoral ethnic parties that stood in the 1990 general election as well as non-ceasefire groups. 55. Interview, 9 December 2003. 56. Interview, 18 February 1998.
References Adas, M. The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on the Asian Rice Frontier, 1852–1941. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. Asian Dialogue Society (ADS). Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community. Singapore: ADS, 2003. Aung-Thwin, M. “British ‘Pacification’ of Burma: Order without Meaning”. Journal of South East Asian Studies (September 1985): 245–62. Brown, D. The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia. London: Routledge, 1994. Burma Center Netherlands (BCN) & Transnational Institute (TNI). Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999. Burmese Border Consortium (BBC). “Burmese Border Consortium Relief Programme: January to June 2003”. Bangkok: BBC, 2003. Callahan, M. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. Department for International Development (DFID). “Which Aspect of Governance Matter Most for Growth and Poverty Reduction?” Discussion paper, August 2003. London: DFID, 2003a. ———. “Drivers of Change”. Statement, November 2003. London: DFID, 2003b. Duffield, Mark. “Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Governance”. Development and Change 33, no. 5 (2002): 1049–71. Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping Systems (FIVIMS). “Union of Myanmar: Vulnerable Townships”. Unpublished report, August 2002.
84
Martin T. Smith
Fullbrook, David. “Bumpy Road: Thai-China Trade Efficiency”. Asia Times, 8 April 2004. Global Witness. “A Conflict of Interests: The Uncertain Future of Burma’s Forests”. London: Global Witness, 2003. Government of Burma. “The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment”. Yangon: Burma Socialist Programme Party, 1964. Government of Kawthoolei. “The Karens and their Stuggle for Independence”. n.p: KNU publishing, 1984. International Crisis Group (ICG). “Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid”. Asia Report No. 32. Bangkok/Brussels: ICG, April 2002. Keen, D. “War and Peace: What’s the Difference?”. In Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century, edited by A. Adebajo and C. L. Sriram, pp. 1–22. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001. Khan, M. H. and K. S. Jomo. Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Leach, E. Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure. London: G. Bell and Son, 1954. Mangrai, Sao Saimong. The Shan States and the British Annexation. Ithaca: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 57, 1965. Maung Maung. Burma and General Ne Win. New York: Asia House, 1969. McCoy, A. The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. New York: Harper Torchbacks, 1972. Nwe Nwe Aye and Katie Maher. Field Notes from Myanmar: Developing Children and Young People’s Participation in the Border Areas. Bangkok: Save the Children [UK], 2003. Pirotte, C., B. Husson, and F. Grunewald, eds. Responding to Emergencies and Fostering Development: The Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid. London: Zed Books, 1999. Seng Raw. “Views from Myanmar: An Ethnic Minority Perspective”. In Burma: Political Economy under Military Rule, edited by R. H. Taylor, pp. 159–63. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2001. Silverstein, J. Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of National Unity. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980. Smith, M. “Burma’s Ethnic Minorities: A Central or Peripheral Problem in the Regional Context?”. In Burma: The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society, edited by P. Carey, pp. 97–128. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997. ———. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. 2nd ed. London and New York: Zed Books, 1999. ———. Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change. London: Minority Rights Group, 2002. SPDC. “Information Sheet”. No. B-1884 (I/L), 10 July 2001.
Ethnic Politics and Regional Development in Myanmar: The Need for New Approaches
85
Stevenson, H. N. C. “Economic Relations between the Frontier Areas and the Plains of Burma”, Appendix E, Government of Burma Despatch, no. 14, 30 April 1946. London: India Office Records: M/4/2811. Taylor, R. H. “Perceptions of Ethnicity in the Politics of Burma”. Southeast Asia Journal of Social Science 10, no. 1 (1982): 7–22. Tegenfeldt, D. “International Non-Governmental Organisations in Burma”. In Burma: Political Economy under Military Rule, edited by R. H. Taylor, pp. 109–18. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2001. Thant Myint-U. The Making of Modern Burma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Thein Han, Lt. Col. “Human Resource Development and Nation Building in Myanmar: Unity in Diversity”. In Human Resource Development and Nation Building in Myanmar, Proceedings of the Symposium on Human Resource Development, pp. 9/1–9/21. Yangon: Office of Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, 1997. Tinker, H. The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Transnational Institute (TNI). “Drugs and Conflict in Burma (Myanmar): Dilemmas for Policy Responses”. TNI Debate Papers, No. 9 on Drugs and Conflict. Amsterdam: December 2003. UNAIDS. “United Nations Response to HIV/AIDS in Myanmar: From Joint Plan to Action 2001–2”. New York: UN, 2001. UNAIDS/WHO. “Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections”. Myanmar update 2002. UN Country Team (Myanmar) “Myanmar: A Silent Humanitarian Crisis in the Making”. Yangon: 30 June 2001. ———. “A Review of the Humanitarian Situation in Myanmar”. Unpublished monograph, Yangon, United Nations, February 2003. UN Working Group. “Human Development in Myanmar: An Internal Report”. Yangon: UNDP, 1998. Universities Historical Research Centre (UHRC). The 1947 Constitution and the Nationalities: Vols. 1 and 2. Yangon: Innwa Publishing House, 1999.
Reproduced from Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg > 86 David I. Steinberg
4 Myanmar The Roots of Economic Malaise David I. Steinberg
Introduction Compartmentalization has been all too prevalent in analysing the economic problems facing that complex society called, today, Myanmar. An unfortunate academic predisposition exists towards maintenance of the purity of disciplines which often leads observers to separate social sectors into clear and distinct categories. This Cartesian approach may be academically appropriate, but it neglects reality and tends to obfuscate the possibilities of policy formation that could lead to practical results. The development of watertight disciplinary departments that feed within exceedingly limited and abstracted perspectives seems especially rife in the field of economics, where specialists create models that, although internally consistent, may ignore other critical elements that relate to social reality beyond the periphery of the discipline. Complexities in the social sciences that transcend disciplinary categories and are not quantifiable are often attributed to the amorphous arena of “culture”, an ill-defined but exceedingly useful, intellectual quagmire usually denigrated by economists and others as beyond the disciplinary pale. Are they the academic equivalent of Joseph Goebbels who, if memory serves, said that when he heard the word “culture”, he reached for his gun? The question of disciplinary segregation has also been prevalent in other states and in economic assistance organizations; their experience may offer some lessons for Myanmar and for its future and necessary economic rehabilitation. For example, when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank criticized South Korea (among other 86
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
87
states) during the Asian financial crisis of 1997 for the deleterious link between the state, the supposedly autonomous financial institutions, and big private businesses (chaebol or zaibatsu) that resulted in non-viable lending, favouritism, and corruption among all three groups, they decried it; they were quite accurate that such collusion was rampant and deleterious. The multilateral institutions thus called for reforms which the Korean government agreed to implement. Although the diagnosis may have been correct and the medicine prescribed may have been appropriate, all groups naively believed (or said they believed) that the disease could be isolated by an administrative tourniquet — that there were watertight compartments separating economic reform from other societal aspects. They ignored the traditional intrusive role of the Korean state and the very narrow distance between the state and private individuals and institutions. Several years later, the disclosure of the “buying” (with some US$500 million in funding) of the 2000 Pyongyang summit meeting between President Kim Dae Jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il illustrated that this was a blatant demonstration of the perpetuation of this intrusive nature of the state with its incestuous continuing links to the banking system and to big business. This, ironically, was perpetrated by the president who was the leading advocate of business and conglomerate reform.1 These factors were part of a complex set of relationships transcending economics and deeply rooted in the political system and social values and norms of that society — the Confucian authority system of state leadership. The temporal continuity of the intrusive nature of state–society relationships beyond hortatory attempts at reform is a factor that should not be dismissed when considering the future of Myanmar, which has a history of similar relationships but for reasons other than a Confucian authority system. Such norms no doubt will evolve in Korea, and may do so in Myanmar, but change is likely to be slow, when it does take place. The necessity to understand the problems involved in economic reform in Myanmar requires us to look beyond economics if we are to understand how the dynamics of governance shape perceptions of what is politically possible in economic policy terms, what is deemed desirable by the leadership, and what policies might successfully be implemented. So when we analyse the issues of the Myanmar economy, we must look both into and beyond the normal economic factors needed for progressive change. Although economic reform measures are both relevant and necessary, they are inadequate to explain why such reforms so well articulated over so many years by organizations such as the World Bank,
88
David I. Steinberg
the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, and a multitude of scholars, both Myanmar and foreign, have either yet to be implemented or have been inadequately pursued by the top leadership. To paraphrase, in the Myanmar context, never have so many reforms been suggested by so many and ignored by so few. If academic disciplines tend to isolate, ideologies may attempt to link them, but not always effectively. Such an ideological position is prevalent among many in industrialized societies, and one quite widespread in the United States, that democracy and a market economy go together and are inextricably linked. This is supposedly part of the “Washington consensus”. This nexus between politics and economics, the obverse of disciplinary segregation, has become the mantra of multilateral and bilateral development programmes and even foreign policy and foreign aid positions of some nations, especially the United States. There is some validity to this approach. There seems little question that an open market system requires a degree of freedom in decisionmaking and broad access to timely information and accurate data that dictatorial regimes often find repugnant and sometimes even dangerous to their survival. Over time, market economies force pressures on states to open their political systems to liberalized approaches to governance and freer flows of information. But the time span may indeed be long–bridging a generation or even more in some cases, such as South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan, and in others, for example China and Vietnam, the connection has yet to be made. Thus the cry from the international business community that if sanctions were eliminated and foreign investment were to be encouraged in Myanmar, democracy would inevitably follow, and rather quickly, is a fallacy. In addition, even though in 1988 Myanmar chose to abandon socialism and adopt a private sector market economy, there are substantive questions, discussed below, whether any foreseeable government would adopt an economic regimen that could reasonably be described as an open market system. In Myanmar, the relationship between economics and politics has been especially close, with the latter taking the lead position. This has resulted in the argument, often made by the foreign supporters of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and related political parties, that if there were to be political change, then economic reforms would necessarily and easily follow. The NLD has not publicly stated this view, but its concentration on political solutions first, and its current position of
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
89
discouraging foreign investment and the tourist industry, indicate that at this stage politics is also in command in the NLD. The argument is as follows: if there were no substantive political liberalization, then economic progress would be virtually impossible and any suggested or mandated reforms could not be implemented. As one dissident publication noted, “Only political reform can solve Burma’s [drug] problem.”2 Is this connection an accurate appraisal of present conditions or future reality? To put the issue differently, what has been and is likely to continue to be the link, if any, between governance and economic change in Myanmar in fact and in perception? Will “democracy” — “disciplined” as the military advocate or under a free multi-party political system — lead to the implementation of the economic reforms that already have been so often prescribed and would they stimulate the economy? What has been the fate of previously decreed reforms and why? What factors encourage or impede change? What role has foreign advice played in the formation of present economic policy and what are its likely future roles, if any? As we know from the experience of other countries, such as the Korean example cited above, these are highly complex issues transcending economics. These problems are the subject of this chapter.
Economic Prescriptions and Their Checkered Fates Politics has continuously played a critical role in economic policy formation and implementation in Myanmar since independence. Although socialism in some modified and pluralistic form had been a hallmark of civilian governments before 1962 in an effort to extricate the economy from foreigners and place it back under indigenous control, it was only following the military coup of that year that a rigidly dirigiste form of socialism was introduced that eventually pauperized this potentially wealthy country. In substituting loyal and vigorous officers who were untrained in bureaucratic and economic affairs for a small but elite group of talented and experienced civilian civil servants, the military garnered assured loyalty but almost guaranteed the failure of the socialist system. An untrained or incompetent bureaucracy obviously cannot manage a centrally planned economy. This failure was effectively masked until the late 1980s by policy changes in the early 1970s following the first Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) Congress in 1971 approving the encouragement, and then the delivery, of foreign economic assistance. Together with the extensive natural resources
90
David I. Steinberg
of the country and its limited population, foreign aid kept the economic ship of state afloat.3 Foreign assistance cloaked economic attrition from the government’s attention, or at least from that of its leadership, for a decade and a half. Following the reintroduction of foreign aid, which generally was encouraged by the socialist government as long as extensive policy changes related to the ideology of socialism and planning were not advocated, the World Bank’s modest efforts to introduce reforms into the extensive State Economic Enterprises (i.e., the public sector) by providing greater autonomy to factory managers to price products and to hire and fire staff were approved, but rarely implemented. Two factors seemed to prevent even minor changes: fear of innovation because of the dire political implications of firing those who had joined the BSPP, the sole legal party in the state, to attain or keep their jobs, and the fear of retribution from higher authorities if there were complaints or the changes were not approved from on high.4 The socialist system could continue until, in the late 1980s, the balance of trade deteriorated, foreign reserves dried up, import costs increased, foreign debt mushroomed through lending for projects and through the revaluation of the Japanese yen,5 and finally when in the spring of 1988 the Japanese government warned the Myanmar government that unspecified economic reforms were necessary or Japan would have to rethink its economic assistance programme on which Myanmar relied. In December 1987, Myanmar was declared by the UN to be a “least developed nation” (LDC), a designation for which the government had assiduously lobbied. Under this category that equated Myanmar with Nepal, Laos and a number of poor African states, it could receive more favourable loan rates as well as debt relief. In fact, Myanmar did not qualify for LDC status because its literacy rate was too high. This blow to the regime’s claim to economic competence was officially withheld for several months and then only indirectly released to the public. It was, however, widely known through the broadcasts of the BBC and the VOA. By 1988, the economic problems facing the state had been evident to a wide segment of Myanmar watchers for some time, and one must suspect also to many in the government itself, although these deficiencies could not publicly be discussed.6 Little has changed since that time. Broadly, these economic inter-related problems relate to a lack of understanding of macroeconomic forces, misconceived priorities, mismanagement, excessive centralization, absence of incentives to improve the economy, mistrust of
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
91
the private sector and those outside of ruling circles, lack of capital for long-term development, and poor understanding of foreign markets and economic conditions. As one report noted, “The SPDC appears incapable of coherent economic policymaking...”7 In all of these areas, there has been a lack of mediating or pluralistic centres of influence to moderate or question decisions. The Central Bank is not autonomous; the amount of money printed is in question (increasing annually over the past few years at about 35–42 per cent). While economic decisions are highly centralized, individual business decisions, including the formation of joint ventures with foreign investors, seem ad hoc and closely associated with those individuals in power or their families. Regulations are changed with short-term effects in mind, if not with regularity, and with little regard for longer term implications. The private sector, although encouraged, is subject to intense regulation and interference. The agricultural sector, the backbone of the economy and employment, has been buffeted, egregiously taxed at various times through an unfair government procurement plan, inadequate productive credit, and often coercive regulations. When attempts have been made to rectify problems, such as increasing woefully inadequate civil service salaries or withdrawing restrictions on agricultural marketing, they have been inadequate responses to more systemic problems. To this catalogue of continuing economic needs must be added associated problems based on events since 1988. These include consideration of the urgent need to develop minority areas that have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government, and to which the government has promised additional support. There is the growing phenomenon of rural landlessness, a relatively new factor that seems to have increased rural poverty and fosters the push towards urbanization (now 29 per cent). There is also an immediate problem of finding capital which could be used by the “private” banks to finance private sector development in accordance with state policies, as to date, the majority of funds available (59 per cent in 2001) has gone into ventures, both indigenous and joint with foreign firms, in which the state has directly been involved.8 Without such capital, the economic role of the Chinese community in Myanmar will expand exponentially because of its own social access to capital and knowledge of foreign markets through clan and other relationships. Thus, the already overwhelming economic influence of the Chinese is likely to increase, creating potential political problems and exacerbating latent jealousies in the society.9
92
David I. Steinberg
Since the memorandum previously cited was written, the military has engaged in a series of economic ventures that will profoundly affect the economy and that need to be studied and understood if we are accurately to consider Myanmar’s economic future, yet the internal operations of which are closely held. Through the formation of “private sector” militaryowned and -run conglomerates — the Myanmar Economic Holdings Corporation and the Myanmar Economic Corporation — the military has engaged in massive economic activities that employ tens of thousands of workers in an array of industries and have formed joint ventures with dozens of foreign firms.10 These institutions, not considered as part of the state or public sector, are large enough to affect other economic sectors, create monopolies, and influence markets making the change to a veritable “market economy” somewhat questionable.11 It is unlikely that these conglomerates will be eliminated under any future government whether it be civilian, military, or mixed. With the diminution of the insurgencies following the ceasefires with most ethnic groups and the demise of the Burma Communist Party, together with the legalization of overland trade, legal border commerce has vastly increased. Undervaluing imports is prevalent, however, and smuggling in all fields has mushroomed, thus denying to the state considerable value in import duties, and allowing more rent-seeking activities. Since 1988, in order to garner foreign exchange, the government has authorized widespread exploitation of the state’s natural resources, especially timber, but also mining. The government has also provided extensive business opportunities to a number of the ceasefire ethnic groups, including such fields as mining and timber extraction. This has lead to additional and severe environmental degradation in some areas under nominal government control. The environmental impacts of these industries are rarely, if ever, considered or monitored. This problem has been exacerbated by timber smuggling by the remaining insurgent groups along all of Myanmar’s frontiers as well as uncontrolled felling by ethnic ceasefire and other business interests, thus further diminishing the state’s resources and its potential.12 The planned major dam on the Thanlwin River in the Shan state and another on the Chindwin may create potential environmental crises. The opening to private foreign investment since 1988 has been disappointing in spite of initial optimism. The comparison with Vietnam, which opened up at about the same time, but with a larger internal market and a population about 50 per cent higher, is instructive. By the close of 2003, Vietnam had approved of some 4,100 foreign direct investment
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
93
(FDI) ventures with capital of US$39.8 billion, of which some 2,100 projects had begun operations with more than US$23.5 billion of capital. In contrast, Myanmar has done poorly. By December 2002, Myanmar had approved US$7.46 billion in FDI of which perhaps one-third were operational. The largest investors were Singapore, the United Kingdom, Thailand, Malaysia, and the United States. In 2003, 372 foreign companies were linked with Myanmar, the largest number were from Japan, the United States, and Singapore.13 There is no question that the boycotts mobilized by external human rights groups and expatriate Myanmars have negatively affected Western foreign investment and that U.S. and other sanctions, as well as moral suasion by external human rights lobbying groups, have undercut attempts to attract foreign support and investment, which is not only important for foreign exchange earnings but also for creating politically critical employment especially in potentially volatile urban areas.14 Other internal factors, however, have also had a considerable negative impact. These include the unpredictability of regulations, which seem to change at the whim of the leadership or perhaps tactical policy differences within the SLORC/SPDC, the lack of a neutral arbitration process and legal procedures, and the need to associate one’s investment with the critical actors related to the power process.15 Although corruption may be a major problem, the unpredictability of corruption and rent-seeking activities (in contrast to predictable corruption) has probably had even a more negative impact on investment than sanctions as such. “Governance in Myanmar is blighted by the complete lack of accountability and transparency of the ruling junta, the SPDC.”16 The broad problems facing the state not only include corruption and expanding money supply, but a completely unrealistic exchange rate, hidden subsidies to the public sector enterprises, a public sector deficit, a poor record of privatization, little foreign investment, an import substitution programme, and a shortage of foreign exchange reserves. Investment in the social sector has fallen: education receives 0.3 per cent of the GDP and health budgets are even worse: 0.1 per cent of GDP. Although figures widely vary, per capita income is said to be US$145 at a realistic exchange rate. A comprehensive study of the economic development needs of Myanmar entitled Economic Development of Burma: A Vision and a Strategy was published at the turn of the century. It details the state of and requirements for, a revitalization of the economic fabric of the society.17
94
David I. Steinberg
This study offers a vision of Myanmar’s development in the period 2020– 25 in a comprehensive approach to both social and economic needs. Its conclusions on problems and requirements, which need not be restated here, are in general conformity with those of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the IMF, all of which at various times have conducted surveys on the economic state of affairs in the SLORC/SPDC period. In contrast to other studies that have been carried out by foreigners conversant with Myanmar affairs, this volume was written by Myanmars, all of whom have been involved in Myanmar’s economic affairs at various periods in their professional lives. Thus, any charges that prescriptions of problems are those of foreigners either ignorant of actual conditions in the country or with external agendas should be assuaged. There has been virtual uniformity of opinion on needed changes in economic policy and performance, and a long period, at least a decade and a half if not a whole generation, during which these issues have been known and communicated to the authorities in Myanmar. There is evidence that internally some members of the military elite had also recognized these shortcomings and even in one instance had publicly discussed these issues. On other occasions, policy questions have been raised — sometimes obliquely, sometimes directly, but always constructively — in those few officially sponsored fora. The most salient question is, then, not what medicines need to be prescribed to treat the disease, but why have successive military governments rejected these internal warnings and refused to carry out those within their capacity to implement, or implemented them so haphazardly or contradictorily? What non-economic forces have thus negatively affected economic policy reform? Then, how can these negative factors be diminished?
The Interplay of Societal Norms and Economic Policies Non-economic factors impinging on economic policies may include the personal preferences of leaders whose authority cannot be questioned, institutional requirements, political calculations, and foreign policy decisions. These intertwining factors can create disharmonies and distortions in their effects. There is a broad range of examples from Myanmar that indicate how positive economic policies may be undermined unintentionally by parallel negative non-economic decisions. Perhaps the most damaging case ironically followed the most progressive policy change since 1962. General Ne Win on 1 September 1987 opened up the economy to allow the
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
95
free marketing in grain, most importantly paddy (unhusked rice). Abroad, this was widely heralded as the most liberal change since 1962 and promised well for the future of the country, dependent as it was on the agricultural sector. Increased agricultural production was immediately anticipated, as farmers then had incentives to improve yields. Yet five days later the same leader announced the demonetization without compensation of perhaps two-thirds of the currency, thus vitiating the positive effects of the earlier decision. This latter highly arbitrary action was taken for obscure, and many would argue personal reasons, but publicly it was said to curb the black market on which, in fact, the country relied. As the currency was distrusted, farmers then held back paddy from the market to protect their only asset, paddy, precipitously forcing up the urban price. Food price inflation thus contributed to public anger that culminated in the demonstrations of 1988. At the same time, urban dwellers bought any staple or manufactured products to gain non-monetary assets, thus opening the country to a wave of Chinese imports.18 The import of such goods effectively destroyed Myanmar’s light industry. There have subsequently been a number of examples of seemingly arbitrary changes to regulations that have negatively affected the economy on the import and export of commodities and on those qualified to engage in the trade. Many economic policies have been made without adequate staff work from those few resident Myanmar specialists, usually civilians, who know the intricacies of economic policy efficacy. If this is so, then the obvious question is why? Military rule is not necessarily the answer. How, then, did President (formerly General) Park Chung Hee move South Korea from poverty to relative affluence under a period of authoritarian leadership. He did this by using trained Korean civilian economists whom he trusted for that singular purpose.19 Similarly, how did President (formerly General) Soeharto employed the “Berkeley mafia” of Indonesian civilian economists trained at the University of California, Berkeley, to stabilize the rupiah and develop the economy starting after 1965? In both cases military leaders recognized military incompetence in economic affairs, drew on indigenous civilians, and used them effectively to achieve military and state goals. In neither case was military control diminished; it could even be argued that economic successes increased military power in the short term. Why then has not Myanmar drawn on its own talented civilian specialists? Why is the distrust of civilian technocrats so profound in Myanmar compared to other countries? After all, in many other respects Indonesia had been a model for much of the Myanmar military’s policies.
96
David I. Steinberg
Two possible, but inadequate, answers are apparent. The first is that the Tatmadaw (military) regards civilian politicians as corrupt, venal, and insensitive to the needs of the state, and bureaucrats as too closely associated with colonial power or civilian politicians. This denigration of technocrats is not a product of the SLORC/SPDC, but rather dates back to the coup of 1962, or even to the “Caretaker” military government of 1958, although the latter did use and build on the extensive civil service under military leadership. It has thus been deeply ingrained in military thinking.20 The second is the military’s belief in their own efficacy and capacities to run the government and the economy. This stems from the very good performance of the military during the 1958–60 Caretaker Government period21 (a carefully defined, short-term programme), but should have been re-evaluated following the disastrous performance of the economy run directly and almost exclusively by the military after 1962. In the late 1960s, General Ne Win could say at a meeting of regional commanders that because of maladministration, Myanmar — the largest rice exporter in the world in 1939 — could not then feed itself. Although both answers are largely accurate, they are not sufficient. Yet there seems to have been no lessons learnt from this experience, even after the opening to the private sector beginning in 1988. The military has regarded loyalty to its command structure together with the enthusiasm of its staff as generating sufficient competence to administer a complex state and economy operating internally and, somewhat reluctantly, internationally. This has clearly not worked in economics. Some may explain that, aside from the military, there were no institutions capable of managing the economy or indeed administering the state or any of its activities, or even of operating former nongovernmental activities of any scope. Thus the military has had to take on roles it may not originally have wanted and were not trained to perform. This is a rather disingenuous argument, because such civilian institutions (for example, the legislature, private banking, a trained bureaucracy, and independent central bank) or non-governmental institutions do not now exist because those that were in place before the 1962 coup were either co-opted or suppressed by the military under the BSPP. The Tatmadaw has in effect eliminated or emasculated those institutions that might have been used to build a viable economic system. There are no institutional checks and balances on its use of power. Even in 2003, when the government indicated that it planned to move to a
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
97
degree of civilian administration, especially in minority areas, there has been little effort to reform the training of civilians in the basic skills of public administration. An explanation seems to lie more deeply imbedded in the currently prevailing conceptual and social norms of the society and those of its leadership. Simply to list such norms is hazardous to our intellectual health, for all such generalizations must be subject to intense scrutiny. First, any such approach must be considered tenuous as best. Second, it could too easily be reduced to facile formulae unless great care is taken. Third, these points may become reified and given greater permanence than are historically warranted. Thus it is important to note that any discussion here of social factors is not meant to be mechanistic or deterministic; that is, patterns of power and authority are not absolute and are changeable, albeit slowly. Hierarchies are capable of being modified; social mobility or the lack thereof transient. Whatever validity the following generalizations may have, they do not necessarily apply in any particular case. These are thus simply tendencies that may help explain seemingly inexplicable or inscrutable state or other institutional approaches to problems that the society has faced, and are likely to encounter. If, however, they are basically accepted as accurate, they carry policy implications. Here, then, is no “clash of civilizations”, no absolutes, but rather a spectrum along which societies may be placed so that problems may be analysed and anticipated and then overcome with deftness of policies and approaches required by both internal and external states and institutions. It is important to stress that these forces operate not only among ruling military elites, but among all elites, civilian and minority as well, in various institutional settings. It should also be emphasized that these forces do not negate that the possibility of “democracy” — disciplined, guided, or open — may develop over time, as other societies have demonstrated. Myanmar is a society that has been cut off from exposure to broad discourse on political or economic systems through rigid censorship of internally published or imported materials and an educational curriculum wanting in free inquiry into these subjects. Except for a few, “democracy” is not yet understood or experienced.22 This no doubt will change over time if controls are loosened. But it is always understood that whatever approaches and answers may develop, they will come from the Myanmar community itself and reflect its own unique characteristics.
98
David I. Steinberg
Concepts of Power, Authority, and Hierarchy In contrast to modern public administration theory where power is considered infinite and thus expandable and can be shared to the benefit of all, power in many traditional societies is unconsciously conceived as finite and limited.23 In governance, this concept is very similar at the level of village economies of the “limited good”, which also prevails in many traditional societies.24 That is, because of the limited nature of wealth in traditional and closed economies, the accumulation of comparatively egregious wealth of one farmer will mean the perception that there are fewer assets available to others within this closed economy because the total amount of “good” remains constant. The analogy with the limited store of power is apt, and the political consequences of this attitude are multiple. At the head of any institution, but especially the state, there is an unwillingness to share power because it is finite; to do so would diminish the authority of the leader. Power thus tends to be a zero-sum game. Delegating power institutionally (in political governance, from the centre to the periphery or downwards in any organization) or personally becomes more difficult than if power is considered, even if unconsciously, infinitely expandable. The status of the leadership and the finite nature of power thus lead to the latter’s personalization. Loyalty is to the individual with power, and not to the institution whether state or private (this particular king or president — not the monarchy, presidency, etc.). This has been evident from the Bagan Dynasty25 and throughout the precolonial period. Apparent under military leaders as well, this seems also to have been the case under civilian rule. Personalization of power leads to loyalty rather than competence as the prime requisite of hierarchical relationships, and mistrust of those outside of the relationship, who almost by definition must be seeking to take power from the state or institution and its leader. In some societies, such as South Korean, the “loyal opposition” is an oxymoron. There is thus a lack of institutional trust, or social capital; the personalized channel is paramount.26 This may be one reason why the civilian bureaucracy has not been trusted by the military, or so some Myanmar bureaucrats have personally explained. Power, while personalized, must be administered through some organizational structure. Its efficacy is dependent on developing patron– client relationships and entourages based on personal loyalties, which in turn encourages factionalism.27 These entourages tend to become unstable
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
99
over time as attempts are made to vie for the leadership position. The effectiveness of entourage systems requires the distribution of assets (financial, prestige, subordinate authority) both down the system from the top, and in the case of financial assets, often up from the bottom. Succession remains at the whim of the leader, and is subject to change. Succession plans, if they exist, are often kept secret to ensure the power of the leader remains undiminished, and potential adversaries are kept off balance. To achieve the same goal, the leader has a tendency neither to share plans nor consult easily, as this would diminish his/her power and perceived authority. Thus what the leader may plan or think at any time may be obscure even to his/her closest associates. As power is consolidated at the apex, senior officials, even cabinet ministers or senior military officers, under the leader may not be consulted and may find their authority and autonomy diminished. Any alternative centre of power is viewed as a potentially destabilizing influence in the zero-sum game. An independent judiciary or an autonomous legislative branch becomes difficult to achieve. There are thus strong forces against institutional pluralism and autonomy in the society or the development of civil society — those organizations independent of government. The socialist period virtually destroyed civil society, which had been limited but still active under civilian rule. It is gradually returning with the entry of international NGOs and local self-help groups into Myanmar, where local groups often act as counterparts to foreign ones, and there are said to be some dozens of indigenous, apolitical communitybased and non-advocacy NGOs in the country. 28 They often are unthreatening at local levels. Even state-sponsored groups in local communities may develop particularized interests that create modest centres of pluralism. Yet the growth of institutions autonomous of the state is treated with singular suspicion, as control over possible alternative centres of influence, including the private business sector (and thus private capital), is regarded as desirable. Any government in Myanmar in the foreseeable future is likely to be highly dirigiste.29 Too strong a private sector without personal ties (and thus elements of social control) to the leadership may appear threatening, and should economic assets appear to be centring on minority groups such as the Chinese or Indian communities, the spectre of a return to a foreign-dominated economy might again occur with dire consequences. One partial exception to this aura of direct control in Myanmar is at the level of the village Buddhist monastery; yet the sangha as an institution and its hierarchy are controlled as in some other Buddhist
100
David I. Steinberg
societies. Only certain sects are authorized, the curriculum of monastic educational institutions is approved, and all monks are registered with the state. Orthodoxy is pervasive within the sangha.30 To ensure power and the cohesiveness of the entourage, orthodoxy of views generally is required on important issues, and dialogue on policy questions does not seem to be possible once an authoritative position has been articulated by the leader. Information is an aspect of power and is rarely shared. Thus, censorship is a natural concomitant of orthodoxy, and state censorship of anything published internally and of all imported material has been evident since the coup of 1962, and some censorship existed in the civilian period and under the British.31 If information is shared, there is a tendency to manipulate its timing and contents for power purposes (for example, production figures, statistics on money supply, inflation, budgets, and company reports). The release of too much data, or questionable statistics, is said to create concerns that such material will be used by the opposition against the government, which wishes to portray itself in the most favourable light.32 Sometimes official explanations of events, which are the only published ones, are patently inadequate and are treated both internally and externally as such, such as the official account of the number of deaths related to the 18 September 1988 coup or the 30 May 2003 incident. Fear prevails throughout the system, so that bad news, such as mistakes or inability to reach targeted goals, tends to be unstated or hidden. The BSPP authorities developed an elaborate feedback system so that local concerns could reach the attention of the authorities in the legislature and be addressed, but this never worked because of this factor. Too much exposure to the outside world could also make one suspect in the system, and there are cases of staff shifted to obscure posts because they seemed to be too influenced by foreign views. Since official salaries are exceedingly low and below increases in the cost of living, rent-seeking and corruption are required to generate the funds to live and to make the entourage system work. Personalization of power at any level leads to the need for personal dyadic relationships to achieve positive results, such as the awarding of contracts, licences, promotions, and assignments. This reinforces rent-seeking and corruption. As the leader has great powers symbolically and in practice, and may conceive or is conceived by associates in regal style, the leader is able, and has the moral authority and indeed imperative, to intervene into the society at all levels to achieve personal, and by direct association and implication,
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
101
national or societal ends. These interventions, including the formation of economic policies or projects, may be based more on personal inclination and sometimes on the limited experience of the leader, since external advice is often absent. Since the leader has a tendency not to consult with others who might appropriate his/her position or question such approaches, policies thus are subject to constant, unpredictable changes. Thus enforcement of such edicts is based on what in Myanmar is called “policy” — whatever the leadership determines as desirable at any point — and not on law, which is more constant and abstracted. This has important implications for foreign or internal investment, which is based on reasonable predictability. For example, changes in foreign trade regulations have damaged exports and foreign exchange earnings. In March 2002, the government revoked the licences of all foreign trading firms, throwing the economy in confusion. Although there is and was social mobility (there was traditionally no planned succession to the throne or to the military leadership33), hierarchy is extremely important, and has been reinforced by the military system. Social mobility avenues have been channelled and controlled by the military. These include the military itself, even before independence an avenue of prestige and mobility for even the poorest; education, now strictly controlled as to entry and curricula; mass organizations, now all under military dominance; and the sangha, as we have seen, controlled. As Andrew Selth has written, the military has become a state within the state with its own resources for production, distribution, and consumption.34 The private sector, a potential avenue of mobility and so important in many societies, has yet to emerge as a vital source of mobility among Bamar, as opposed to the Chinese or Indian (those from the subcontinent) minorities. The tendencies for orthodoxy and control are evident in the mass mobilization efforts of all governments since independence. These include the various workers and peasant societies under civilian rule, the ubiquitous BSPP apparatus, and under the SLORC/SPDC the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), which at last count had some 20 million members, or about 38 per cent of the total population.35 The USDA is directly under military control and patronage, with Senior General Than Shwe as its patron, and offers some educational and paramilitary training as well, and its explicit purpose is to support the military government. The corollary to mass mobilization is efforts to keep potentially disruptive groups from forming.36 Students have historically since colonial
102
David I. Steinberg
times been the most active of such category. After the U Thant riots of 1974, a variety of regional colleges were established to disperse students outside Rangoon and Mandalay. It did not succeed. Since 1988, universities have been closed for long periods, often years, distance learning stressed that allows students to study but not congregate on campuses, campuses split and constructed away from the centres of cities, and tertiary educational institutions administratively separated. Regional universities have been established. Yet, suspicion of students remains strong and at the slightest sign of even minor protests, institutions are closed and students sent back home to their provincial roots. The leader (under both civilian and military governments) maintains secret information on all associates to command loyalty and conformity, and this is effective because (a) breaking of existing laws is required for economic survival; (b) the entourage system requires extra-legal funding; (c) policy replaces law and is controlled at the apex of the system and what is appropriate today may be considered dangerous or illegal tomorrow; and (d) the follower must obey leadership commands even when they contradict legal norms or common sense. The personalized system effectively discourages shared responsibility at the top, and such sharing when it occurs may result in splits (for example, the AFPFL in 1958) and the eventual emergence of a single leader. The authority of the leader is such that the state or sub-national administrative levels become virtually personal fiefdoms, and can be exploited for personal (not necessarily financial), and thus considered national, interests. So, foreign aid is viewed as equivalent of a gift to the state to be used at the discretion of the leader of the state. Fear of conspiracies against the leadership, reinforced by historically accurate attempts to destabilize governments and rulers by foreign powers or elements, have led to extensive and deeply felt anxieties concerning negative motivations of foreign governments towards the state and its leaders, and nationalistic tendencies reinforced by derogatory foreign comments about the regime, its goals, and its leaders. Thus, foreign economic advice is sometimes perceived as against the national or political interests of the state. The avowed goal of U.S. sanctions, which to some in the U.S. Congress and administration is “regime change”, makes any other U.S. advice or suggestions obviously suspect. United States support for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD is considered in the same category. The military has constantly maintained in the media that foreigners cannot “love” Myanmars or the nation.
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
103
To many in the military, foreign states are generally suspect, for all its neighbours and others have a half-century or so ago supported or encouraged various insurrections. The situation has drastically changed, and the Balkanization of the state is now obviously eschewed by all parties; but memories are long and persistent, seemingly frozen in aspic. At various times in the past, East Pakistanis and Bangladeshis tacitly supported the Muslim or Rohingya rebels in the Rakhine state (Arakan) who were also helped with Middle Eastern funding, local authorities in India helped or sympathized with Chin and Naga rebels, the Chinese government provided direct assistance to the Burma Communist Party (also called the Communist Party of Burma) on the Chinese border,37 and the Thai helped create a series of buffer “states” to protect a conservative and anti-communist government in Bangkok from a “radical” regime in Rangoon. In addition, various British individuals had indicated they favoured an independent Karen state, while the United States clandestinely through the CIA and Taiwan provided extensive assistance to the retreating Chinese Nationalist forces (Kuomintang) who were supposed to stage a counterattack against the People’s Republic of China. External Christian groups obviously favoured Christian minorities in the country and provided moral and sometimes material help. The beleaguered Bamar, the only major ethnic group totally within the borders of the state, had been the most isolated. They have not forgotten these traumatic events. Given the touted natural resources of the state, there is a belief that, if necessary or desirable, the state can continue to be effective with limited foreign economic investment and indeed contacts. This is widespread and articulated among some leaders, sometimes perhaps expressed as a reaction to foreign rejection. But the actuality of the country is now far different from its previous status, where once isolation was possible. In 1962, General Ne Win could cut the country off; as internal communications were limited, international communications almost non-existent, little foreign business, few tourists, there was little imported information, and exit and entry visas were severely restricted. There was then, before rigid socialism was introduced, enough food for the population. This has changed with the growth of international communications including satellite television dishes, Internet, short-wave radios, and the influx of tourists, which annually are perhaps many times the numbers in 1988, and the migration of Myanmars. Population has grown, urbanization has increased, natural resources (timber, irrigation systems, and fish reserves) have been mismanaged resulting in environmental degradation, and the economy has
104
David I. Steinberg
become more complex while management skills have fallen short of the demands of the market economy. Globalization has changed the climate in which Myanmar must interdependently operate. There is no effective return to the “Suvanabumi”, the golden land of myth. Nationalism as a traditional concept and reinforced by colonial oppression has become a central factor in political legitimacy and affects negotiations in foreign relations and foreign assistance. Public foreign criticism of the regime or its leaders invokes natural negative and defensive responses. So senior military officials publicly state that their policies cannot be “bought” by World Bank or other assistance agencies, and that the regime will stand up to U.S. pressure under its sanctions and freezing of assets policies. As the foreign minister said in 1998, “For us, giving a banana to the monkey and then asking it to dance is not the way. We are not monkeys.” (Asiaweek, 25 December 1998). They will, so they say, “Go it alone.” But this is no longer possible. It should be noted that these tendencies are not the exclusive domains of the government, but pervade all leadership positions, public and private, and others who seek authoritative positions in the society.38 Orthodoxy is as much a policy of the opposition as it is of the government. If these tendencies are accepted as being at least partly relevant, then what are the implications of the policies of foreign nations towards Myanmar?
Policy Implications The Myanmar scene has been a compendium of policy misjudgements. These have been committed by the military, the opposition, the minorities, and by many foreign states and institutions, including the multilateral aid agencies.39 The errors of commission and omission have resulted in an atmosphere of mistrust that pervades relationships, including personal, institutional, and ethnic and religious groups, and across national boundaries. This miasma of suspicion must be overturned, and reconciliation advanced. Yet one of the policies that in fact contribute to this mistrust is that of sanctions. It becomes evident that the broad policy of foreign-induced isolation, of which sanctions are a part, simply exacerbates the tensions that are listed above.40 They are not effective in addressing the societal patterns that dominate responses to economic issues. They also do not address the fundamental issues facing the society, but rather exacerbate some of the tendencies that negatively affect the economic efficacy of the state. Enforced isolation
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
105
encourages atavism and is destructive of economic progress. It pushes policy-makers back onto themselves, and indirectly on China, their principal foreign supporter which is a dubious model for political change no matter how economically successful. India, apparently recognizing the danger of a Myanmar that is too close to the Chinese, changed its policy towards the military to ensure that it had influence in that society. ASEAN states are supportive of the regime, especially Thailand for its security, economic, and vision of the Thai role as the leader of the region. The Myanmar leadership’s limited experience bodes ill for future policies. Foreign isolation discourages training for a younger group of technocrats who will be essential for any future government of any political persuasion. As one U.S. official put it, sanctions are “chicken-soup diplomacy”, meaning that they make the advocate feel good but do nothing to resolve the disease. Isolation not only has a negative impact on these fundamental issues facing the society, it also does not address the institutional issues that are manifestations of these problems in practical form. And institutional development is the means through which the more fundamental questions of societal growth and conciliation can be approached, economic reform institutionalized, and problems perhaps alleviated. It may be one, albeit slow, means through which to diminish the scourge of personalism. These dilemmas are at the core of many of the country’s problems and include the following: equitable (in the Myanmar context) centre–periphery relations — the minority problem; the rebirth of civil society and institutional pluralism; growth of alternative avenues of political and social mobility; improvement in human rights and the gradual widening of the distance between the state and individuals and their institutions; the rebuilding of educational and health institutions that have expanded in numbers but atrophied by a lack of resources; the care of the environment; policies providing incentives for increased improvement and productivity in agriculture; the furtherance of impersonal and impersonally administered law and dispute settlement and adjudication by an independent judiciary; the need for unfettered intellectual inquiry; and the elimination of mandated orthodoxy through censorship and fear. All these remain unaffected. There is no silver bullet that will solve all the issues, but clearly engagement and dialogue, whatever their limitations and they are apparent, offer at least the possibility for change and absorption of ideas, while isolation cuts off possibilities. The fundamental policy prescription is to encourage the opening up of the leadership and populace to new ideas and experiences enabling them to
106
David I. Steinberg
cope effectively with inevitable changes. This means the import of information through all kinds of media, training for technicians and planners, travel abroad, tourism, and investment. This approach is one that concentrates not on the immediate goal of “democracy”, that inclusive word encompassing many different interpretations, but first by building pluralism — those centres of influence in all fields, and the development of social capital.41 Myanmar culture does not seem threatened by such innovations. It has illustrated resilience to foreign imports and seems in no real danger of foreign inundation. In general terms, the following are some policy approaches by interested parties that might be considered under any government that might emerge from the process of any road map. Within the fundamental objective of building pluralism and institutions, the following should be considered: • • •
•
• •
•
•
The acquiescence, if not support, of the leader must be assured if policy is to be changed and implemented. Policies should be presented as in the interests (political and power) of the leader (and his entourage), and not in abstract moralistic terms. Change presented as strengthening the immediate interests of a regime, however, may have important implications for development of political and economic pluralism in the society over the longer term, such as the supply of services to ethnic nationalities to keep the ceasefires operative. Changes in the political environment over time are possible. Events in societies that often begin as symbolic or even corrupt can assume vital forces for desirable change. For example, once manipulated elections can turn into demands for proper ones, civil society can become an important pluralistic force. If access to the top is denied, working at local levels towards pluralism may be an immediate, if less attractive, alternative. Explanations that humanitarian assistance and work at povertyalleviating assistance might well be couched in terms of avoiding social and political unrest rather than in moralistic terms, and in assuring that the ceasefires continue. Any attempts to improve the business community through training should endeavour to train Bamar and other indigenous groups to assume a greater role in the economy. The positive goals of the state and military administration, such as national unity, state sovereignty, better health, education, and protection
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
•
•
•
107
of cultures, should be supported, and proposed changes described in manners which indicate that these stated objectives are unattainable under current policies or programmes, and thus proposed new programmes or reform would contribute towards achieving these official ends. Attention should be directed toward the process of change, the development of pluralism, rather than on democracy as product — the instant solution to the problems of the state. Such attention, if focused on a single event or outcome, such as elections alone even if they were to be fair and to succeed, would probably result in eventual reversion to traditional patterns of control and authority that would be antithetical to the intended goals. The need for training is acute, and should first be concentrated in fields associated with basic human needs, such as education, health, and agriculture, and in the management of foreign assistance. Immediate humanitarian assistance is needed for the victims of economic mismanagement and the policies affecting them. Although such donors may believe they are addressing the core of the problem, they are instead dealing with effects not just of inappropriate of misguided policies, but with more basic issues.
The Future of the Economy In any future government that may now be anticipated under any scenario — a military-run state, a military state in mufti, a mixed military and civilian state, or a state in which the military retires to the barracks and which is civilian-controlled — the military are more than likely to retain veto power over what it regards as critical elements of national sovereignty. This it has done under all regimes since independence. These views are not propaganda, intended to soothe indigenous or foreign peoples, but strongly held beliefs. These concerns are those connected with the unity of the country, the autonomous operation of the military within any administration, and the military’s own economic assets. There are differences among various actors in this process: between the military and some of the minorities and among some of the minorities themselves; between the written statements of the SPDC and the NLD over civilian control over the military — obviously an NLD position to which the SPDC has objected; and what road to follow and what map is most efficacious.
108
David I. Steinberg
Whatever the form of government, the military’s influence under any one is likely to be profound and both institutional and personal; first, through the role of the military as guardian of state sovereignty and the institutions they command beyond those today considered in the public sector (i.e., the State Economic Enterprises). These are at present the Myanmar Economic Holdings Corporation and the Myanmar Economic Corporation. The military’s important economic base in the Ministry of Defence’s Directorate of Procurement will likely continue to provide economic assets to the military system. Second, the Tatmadaw’s influence will be apparent through the personal potency of individuals in the military high command who will retain respect and authority within the society at large. Third, the military will remain an attractive career, and families will encourage their children to enlist. Fourth, the military will continue to be an important consumer of the state’s assets through large budgets, which even if they diminish somewhat, will still be a substantial drain on meagre resources. This amalgam of influences will be of vital importance in predicting the future economy of the state. Under even a completely civilian administration, the economy is likely to be highly dirigiste, with many elements within the leadership, including a civilian government, concerned about too autonomous a role for economic forces that could prompt a rejuvenation of foreign influence or control, and be threatening to those in power. Thus, the military will be both producers and also consumers. Whatever government evolves, it will need to support the enlarged military to some highly significant degree, thus limiting the state’s ability to invest in other activities unless extensive foreign assistance is forthcoming. Although some expatriate Myanmars call for massive demobilization of the military, such an effort under any government is unlikely unless extensive new employment opportunities are found, for an unemployed ex-military can be a political danger, as Myanmar witnessed just prior to and following Independence. If the military is to assume a less prominent role in the society, then there must be alternative avenues for mobility in Myanmar society. In Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, the business sector offered such possibilities for bright young people who would otherwise have chosen the military as a career. In Thailand as well, the political process encouraged many in the military to retire and run for public office. In Myanmar at the present time, there are few such avenues that seem open to the Bamar population.
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
109
If personalism has been important in the military period, there is no evidence that it would be any less important under any civilian government. Power will still likely to be considered hierarchical, but perhaps not to the degree under military command, but the personal influence of key civilians probably would be retained. Whatever political forces which come into play that are not based on institutional links, such as the military, are likely to be based on entourages as well. In effect, the nature of politics may not substantially change over the medium term, although those in charge could. If personalism has been so important, then what accounts for the fact that throughout most of the independence period the military has held together even under the SLORC/SPDC period when the Tatmadaw has been subject to more internal and external strains and criticism than heretofore? In the earlier era, the commanding influence of General Ne Win was critical. His own faction, those in the Fourth Burma Rifles that he headed before independence, rose to authority under him, and his personality and power were paramount. When he retired as Chairman of the BSPP in July 1988 (he had retired as president and head of state in 1980, but retained his pervasive control), many say he continued to exert strong influence on major issues although not on mundane affairs. In this later period, the military elite has obviously felt it critical to remain united, although the differences in policies at various periods are probably surrogate indicators of cracks in the military policy edifice. But they know they need each other during these potentially explosive times. It is significant that the most heinous crime is that of attempting to split the military, indicating the military’s own concerns over this tendency. Nationalism, one hallmark of all governments, will likely continue to be central, and this will limit the amount of overt influence that foreigners can have on the economic system, although indirect policy suggestions could be quite helpful to any government and could be quietly accepted. No government can be seen to be under the undue influence of the IMF or the World Bank, let alone any particular power.42 This may also affect the potential influence of those expatriate, forced or voluntary, exiles who have lived abroad for long periods. A government based on coalition politics may welcome some back, as did the Cambodian government in the early 1990s, but their roles may be circumscribed by those who have remained in the country and who feel they have endured more hardships and thus deserve leadership.
110
David I. Steinberg
To return to the central themes of this chapter, is it necessary to have political change before there can be economic transformation? Or should there be economic change first? Both questions imply a dualism that may not be appropriate in these situations. Ideally, a parallel pattern of intertwined change would seem to be most desirable, but is it feasible under present circumstances? If the above societal factors are present to any considerable degree, would that parallelism work? Whether economics or politics takes precedence or whether change is parallel, any approach will require some important modifications in the social order. These cannot be mandated from outside, and any government that relied heavily on foreign advice, in contrast to foreign aid, would be in a hazardous political situation because change and progress are likely to be slow, discontinuous across sectors, and popular resentment would likely grow. A new political or economic order will not spring, full blown, from the forehead of some Myanmar Zeus or nat (spirit). Thus, even if some reforms were quickly accomplished, the most obvious from a social viewpoint might be the stopping of egregious inflation, social change would be tedious and progress is likely to be differential and uneven across sectors. The reforms need to begin now, but under any predictable scenario of political or economic priority progress will be difficult. Could the military institute reforms now? Yes, but it would require rethinking the societal aspects of military rule as noted above. Ironically, the strong leadership required for implementing reforms, whether that leader were civilian or military, might encourage the very absolutist tendencies that in the past have prevented such reforms. Even if economic or political reforms were simply mandated, this would not necessarily mean permanent change, although it would mean progress. After U Nu’s disastrous attempt to use Buddhism as his legitimating tool, the military used socialism as the secular avenue to legitimacy and acceptance.43 With that failure, and although encouraging a degree of private sector development, the military has significantly not turned to “market economics” as a new legitimating tool since 1988, as have a number of other societies. Rather, they have used the construction of infrastructure of all varieties as demonstrations of their economic and political efficacy. Although they have built more of diverse varieties than all other governments since independence combined, their accomplishments have not been recognized abroad. They have likely done so by printing more money (thus increasing inflation), using corvée labour when funds were lacking, and allocating to such work the modest available resources
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
111
that might have been spent on basic human needs projects. More fundamentally, the Tatmadaw has turned to its own history and created its own mythology as its legitimating argument; it has rewritten history and its role, and extolled its position in society.44 For this reason alone, it is unlikely that they will quietly return to the barracks without broader influence, as has the South Korean military. These observations and prognostications should not be interpreted as an argument against both political and economic change; both will come in some form and both are clearly necessary. But predicting is an arcane art, and as Dante wrote, soothsayers end up in a very low circle of hell. Change is on the cusp, and whatever form it may take, it is likely to be more positive than the present circumstances. But change is most unlikely to occur as a product of U.S. sanctions — “regime change” as some members of the U.S. Congress have demanded. This is tantamount to the call for “unconditional surrender” by the military government. The effect of such remarks is likely to strengthen resistance to change, rather than encouraging it. But before change occurs, we need a realistic set of expectations of what kind of economy might develop under any government and how the interplay with political and social forces will occur. “Regime transformation” might be a more apt goal, but that is likely to be a slow, frustrating process, and thus politically unattractive to external observers. As the Korea case, cited above, on the 1997 financial crisis and the 2000 Pyongyang summit, and as Indonesia today illustrates, traditional patterns of authority and governance are not stopped by an election or a new constitution alone. It is important to understand these historical and societal factors, for as Mark Twain is said to have remarked, if history does not repeat itself it often rhymes. These patterns will evolve as society is able to articulate its changing expectations and needs, and as governments begin to respond to protect, if nothing else, their own interests. Such changes may be attributed to increases in standards of education, income, and access to information. So we return to the issue of understanding the social fabric of Myanmar society as the sine qua non of promoting enduring change and recommending policies to achieve such goals over what is likely to be a long period. This should not deter those concerned with the society to begin such efforts. This chapter raises some of the issues associated with economic transformation; it, alas, answers few, but may help alert us to the complexities of positive change. It will be up to the Myanmars to determine whether such changes which may be instituted fit the needs of a new
112
David I. Steinberg
Myanmar in the new world environment, whether the institutional means to deliver the goods and services will perform well, and whether there will be some form of perceived equity in their distribution among diverse ethnic groups, regions, classes, and religious forces. More basically, such changes need to restore the hope of which the total, multi-ethnic population has for so long been deprived.
Notes 1. When a policy or a programme, such as the “Sunshine Policy” of improving relations with North Korea, becomes an obsession and the hallmark of an administration, internally there is little to stop it across the society as a whole. 2. Concluding remark in a report entitled “Show Business” published by Thailandbased Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N.); quoted in Naw Seng (2003). 3. Priorities also shifted from the development of an industrial proletariat, a plan obviously inappropriate to Myanmar at that stage, to the exploitation of Myanmar’s natural resources: agriculture, forestry, and mining, especially oil. For details, see Steinberg (1980). 4. When the military cut state paddy procurement in 1987, it could not fire the thousands of employees who were involved in this process, as the BSPP objected (personal interview, Yangon, 1988). The SLORC/SPDC has not been able to sell off or lease many of the state industries it had wanted to relinquish because they refused to allow possible new owners to fire staff or change the line of business. The featherbedding of employees made many of the industries unprofitable. 5. Japan held about half of all debt, today about US$6 billion. 6. 5 November 1988, author’s memorandum to the World Bank. See Steinberg (2001), pp. 315–20. 7. EIU (2004). 8. “Private” banks include some that are sub-central, such as one run by the Yangon Municipality and by the Ministry of Co-operatives, and others that have strong links to the military at various levels. 9. In 1967, with the failure of the Myanmar economy coupled with the public and fervent expressions of the cultural revolution among Chinese in Myanmar, riots broke out against the Chinese involving the loss of dozens of lives. Many believe the allegation that the government allowed this expression of economic frustration to be directed against the Chinese as a scapegoat for their own failures. 10. In the case of Myanmar Economic Holdings, the external audits carried out in the first few years of operation did not account for the costs of military personnel, equipment, and facilities, thus throwing into question whether the
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
11.
12. 13.
14.
15. 16. 17. 18.
19. 20.
21.
113
profits were real by international accounting standards (personal interview, Yangon, 2002). In addition to these conglomerates, the Ministry of Defence through its Directorate of Procurement runs a number of non-defence related factories that contribute to military income and provide employment for a considerable number. For the role of the military in the economy, see Steinberg (2002). For example, see Global Witness (2003). Chinese investment, however, is grossly understated in official statistics, as most does not go through the Myanmar Investment Commission. Although it cannot be proved, the Chinese are probably Myanmar’s largest investor, and commercial centres of many towns in central and upper Myanmar have become virtually Chinese in the eyes of many Myanmars. Although the 2003 U.S. sanctions resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of jobs in the export garment industry, the end of the multifiber agreement on 31 December 2004 will likely result in a massive outpouring of jobs from many Southeast Asian states, including Myanmar, to China. See Dalpino and Steinberg (2004). Should some leaders fall out of favour, companies associated with them might well suffer. EIU (2004). Khin Maung Kyi et al. (2000). For a recent study by another Myanmar economist, see Myat Thein (2004). By that time, Myanmar’s light industry had been suffering because of a lack of capital, intermediate goods, and spare parts, and were thus operating far below capacity. The Chinese imports (which were illegal at that time) were cheaper and of better quality than similar Myanmar goods and flooded the market. This was the period when the border with China was becoming more accessible, although the Burma Communist Party along that frontier did not collapse until 1989. It was also the era of internal Chinese private sector economic liberalization and more provincial and local autonomy in economic affairs. He offered economic incentives and, most importantly, promised to take their suggestions seriously. It is significant that only one civilian, Dr Maung Maung, was close to General Ne Win, and he was Ne Win’s biographer and a former student of the Japanese occupation era military school ran by the Myanmar national army. He became president during August/September 1988 in a last ditch and unsuccessful effort to save the regime. There have been no civilians on either the SLORC or the SPDC. Myanmar in the 1958–60 period was used by international social scientists as an example of the future, effective role of the military worldwide in the developmental process. The short-term success may have resulted because of
114
22.
23. 24. 25. 26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31. 32.
David I. Steinberg
military esprit, the short-term and limited nature of the objectives, and the comparison with the rather inept previous civilian regime. Callahan (2003) forcefully argues that the military administration of parts of the Shan state during the Kuomintang incursion in the early 1950s was a factor in the development of the belief in their own administrative efficacy. Many of the cries for democracy may be rather a demand that the military, long a prestigious career in itself, no longer control civilian administration. This seems to have been a factor in the 1960 elections, in which the military’s favourite party lost to U Nu. See Anderson (1972). See Foster (1967), pp. 300–23. See Aung Thwin (1985). The breakdown in the civilian government in 1958 may in large part be attributed to this personalization of power and the inability to develop a loyal opposition willing to work within prescribed political and legal norms. For example, when Brigadier Tin Oo was sacked as chief of intelligence, his whole hierarchy was also dismissed, decimating military intelligence and leading to the failure of military intelligence to thwart the North Korean attempted assassination of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in 1983. There is a growing group of academic analysts who note that at a very localized level many civil society organizations continue to exist. These are, however, apolitical and non-advocacy community-based groups. There are also said to be more than sixty private non-profit organizations engaged in social welfare or development activities, and most operate under the watchful eye and with the approval of the military authorities. In the Myanmar context, political parties and insurgent or anti-state groups are excluded from the definition of civil society. For example, Aung San Suu Kyi was believed to have said that Myanmar would never be a site for low-wage foreign manufacturing industries, indicating a strong role for state-directed economic activities. Each Myanmar government has used Buddhism as an element of political legitimacy, and, probably based both on belief and political acumen, fostered a close association with the religion by purifying the sangha, building pagodas, and supporting the monkhood. See Larkin (2003), pp. 64–101. The civilian government used some of the restrictive legislation of the colonial era to enforce a degree of orthodoxy. This approach of only publicly revealing successes was illustrated anecdotally when some Myanmars were taken on a tour of some of the slums of Bangkok to illustrate social problems. They were bewildered that the Thai would expose their problems, not their advantages, and said this never would be done in their country.
Myanmar: The Roots of Economic Malaise
115
33. General Ne Win constantly changed those expected to be his successor: Brigadier Aung Gyi, Brigadier Tin Pe, General Tin Oo, etc. 34. See Selth (2002). 35. Personal interview (Yangon, 2004). Fifty-five per cent of members are reportedly male. 36. For example, see Callahan (2003), pp. 1–2. 37. Deng Xiaoping distinguished between state-to-state relations between Myanmar and China, and party-to-party relations. 38 The government has tried many dissidents for “treason”, but the NLD had also dismissed some who had disagreed over policies as “traitors”, and some opposition student groups had actually killed those also regarded as “traitors” or “spies.” 39. For a discussion, see Steinberg (2004). 40. It is ironic that once, where Myanmar had cut itself off from the world, it has been intentionally isolated by much of the industrialized states. 41. For a general study of the problem of promoting democracy as a goal, see Dalpino (2000). 42. The picture of President Soeharto sitting signing an agreement and the head of the IMF standing over him with his arms folded was interpreted in Indonesia as IMF dictating the terms of the bailout from the financial crisis of 1997, and greatly contributed to his loss of legitimacy. 43. Buddhism is still critical for legitimacy for any government in Myanmar, and this is evident to anyone perusing the media in the country. 44. See Callahan (2003), Epilogue.
References Anderson, Benedict. “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture”. In Culture and Politics in Indonesia, edited by Clare Holt, pp. 1–69. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. Aung Thwin, Michael. Pagan: The Origins of Modern Burma. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985. Callahan, Mary. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. Dalpino, Catharine. Deferring Democracy. Promoting Openness in Authoritarian Regimes. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000. ——— and David I. Steinberg, eds. Georgetown Southeast Asia Survey 2003. Washington, May 2004. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). “Myanmar Country Report”. March 2004. Foster, George M. “Peasant Society and the Image of the Limited Good”. In Peasant Society: A Reader, edited by Jack M. Potter, May N. Diaz, and George M. Foster, pp. 300–23. Boston: Little Brown, 1967.
116
David I. Steinberg
Global Witness. “A Conflict of Interests. The Uncertain Future of Burma’s Forests”. London, October 2003. Khin Maung Kyi, Ronald Findley, R. M. Sundrum, Mya Maung, Myo Nyunt, and Zaw Oo. Economic Development of Burma: A Vision and a Strategy. Stockholm: Olof Palme International Center, 2000. Larkin, Emma. “The Self-Conscious Censor. Censorship in Burma under the British, 1900–39”. The Journal of Burma Studies 8 (2003): 64–101. Myat Thein. Economic Development of Myanmar. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004. Naw Seng. “Junta’s War on Drugs ‘A Charade’”. Online News Alert, Irrawaddy (Internet edition), 16 December 2003. Selth, Andrew. Burma’s Armed Forces. Power Without Glory. Norwalk, Connecticut: EastBridge, 2002. Steinberg, David I. Burma’s Road Toward Development: Growth and Ideology Under Military Rule. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. ———. Burma: The State of Myanmar. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001. ———. “Burma/Myanmar: The Role of the Military in the Economy”. Unpublished paper, September 2002. ———. “Burma/Myanmar: A Guide for the Perplexed?”. In Reconciling Burma/ Myanmar: Essays on U.S. Relations with Burma, edited by John H. Badgley. National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Analysis 15, no. 1 (2004), pp. 41– 54.
Reproduced from Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. available < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg > Assessing the Individual Impact of articles HIV andare Other HealthatIssues on Myanmar’s Development 117
5 Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development Rachel M. Safman
The intimate and complex relationship between health and socioeconomic development is most readily seen in the close and presumably causal relationship between improvements in a country’s socioeconomic status and gains in health status and life expectancy. In particular, improvements in the quality and stability of the food supply, progress in housing and sanitation, and advances in the quality and availability of health services have consistently translated into gains in such macrosocial health indicators as healthy life expectancy (Folch et al. 2003). Less evident but no less important is the close association between major population-level health events — phenomena such as epidemics of severe infectious disease or famine — and declines in a country’s social and economic well-being (Bhagava et al. 2001; Watts 1997). This relationship is readily seen in the case of the plague epidemics in medieval Europe (Orent 2004) or the social, economic, and political disruptions effected by AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa (Barnett and Whiteside 2002; de Waal 2003). Other less dramatic but no less important examples include the chronic depression of economic productivity attributable to endemic malaria (Bonilla and Rodriguez 1993; Chima, Goodman, and Mills 2003; Sharma 1996; Utzinger et al. 2002) and seasonal peaks in worker absenteeism (with associated costs) which occur in conjunction with an outbreak of influenza (Szucs 1999). For a country such as Myanmar where per capita income is low, health care services limited in coverage and sophistication, and general infrastructural development including housing and sanitation, wanting, the 117
118
Rachel M. Safman
drag of adverse health conditions on socioeconomic progress is likely to be considerable, and the issue thus cannot be excluded from any discussion of the country’s present status or future prospects. What this chapter sets out to do, therefore, is first to sketch in very broad terms the state of health and health services in Myanmar, and then to look in greater detail at the way in which one significant health event, the recent spread of HIV/AIDS, might be impacting upon national and regional (sub-national) development. It also seeks to draw attention to ways in which strategic interventions, based largely on extent resources, might be used to mitigate the social and developmental impact of major health events including but not limited to HIV/AIDS. Thus the point of this chapter is not merely to paint a static picture of Myanmar’s health and its plausible developmental impact, but rather to suggest directions for future collaboration and growth.
Myanmar’s Health: A Brief Profile Data on the health status of Myanmar’s population, like most socioeconomic data on this country, is sparse and often dated. Nevertheless, there are certain striking features of the country’s health situation which can be pieced together from available sources. First, various indicators suggest that health conditions in Myanmar lag significantly behind those in other parts of Southeast Asia and even Bangladesh, Myanmar’s impoverished western neighbour. The World Health Organization (WHO), in 2000, placed Myanmar’s health sector performance 190 out of 191 countries ranked.1 This position reflects, at least in part, the fact that the life expectancy at birth in Myanmar, which currently stands at 58.9 years, is significantly shorter (more than a decade in many instances) than that in any other ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member country except Laos (WHO 2000). A significant share (24 per cent) of the country’s total mortality occurs among children (UNICEF), with 10.9 per cent of the children who are born alive dying before reaching their fifth birthday (UNDP 2003). Indeed, within the first year of life alone mortality is reported to be 7.7 per cent (77 per 1,000 live births), and this statistic may significantly understate the actual rate of infant mortality (Chandler 1998).2 This caveat notwithstanding, it should be noted that recent figures represent a modest improvement over those reported for 1970 when infant mortality in Myanmar was 122 per 1,000 live births, and under five mortality was 179 per 1,000 (UNDP 2003).
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
119
Child mortality in Myanmar is attributable to a variety of causes, most prominently malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, acute respiratory infections, and vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles (Chelala 1998). The severity of these acute conditions is often exacerbated by undernutrition which is estimated to affect almost 59 per cent of the children under five, 15.8 per cent of them severely (Chandler 1998). Apart from the deaths occurring among the young, another significant proportion of Myanmar’s total mortality occurs among women in their childbearing years. Maternal mortality is estimated at about 230 maternal deaths for every 100,000 live births (UNDP 2003).3 High rates of maternal mortality are unsurprising given that only about half of Myanmar’s births are attended by trained health care providers (UNICEF) and more than 60 per cent of pregnant women suffer from anaemia (Chandler 1998), which increases their susceptibility to severe complications during labour and delivery. In addition, it has been claimed that a significant number of deaths occurring among women of childbearing age are due to incomplete or unsanitary abortions (Chelala 1998), which may again be reflective of limited health care availability. Finally, infectious and parasitic (vector-borne) diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis (the latter often secondary to HIV-infection) make significant contributions to total mortality in Myanmar (Chelala 1998; UNDP 2003). The prominence of these diseases, particularly in the adult population, identifies the country as one which has not yet undergone the “epidemiological transition”, a shift in the mortality profile which characteristically accompanies modernization and is reflective of the availability of clean drinking water and sanitation, adequate nutrition and basic medical care (Omran 1971). As such, Myanmar’s current health profile can be said to be the result of economic or developmental factors as much as medical or epidemiological causes.
Health Services and Health Care Availability in Myanmar Central to any discussion of the current health situation in Myanmar is a description of the quality and availability of health services. For much of Myanmar’s population, routine health care is an unaffordable and/or inaccessible luxury. Chandler (1998) has estimated that only 60 per cent of Myanmar’s population has access to public health services. As a result, many of those outside the public health network, who fall ill, suffer
120
Rachel M. Safman
needlessly or die from conditions that could be treated at relatively low cost, but are not.4 Barriers to accessing health care in Myanmar are manifold. Indeed, the country’s rugged topography and cultural diversity made this an issue in colonial times (Sargent 1994). But in the present day, many of the barriers to health care access can be traced to one of two root causes: a shortage (local as well as national) of trained health care providers and a low level of overall government investment in health and social services. With respect to personnel constraints, there were at last count only thirty physicians and twenty-two trained nurses for every 100,000 people in Myanmar (WHO 2000). The impact of these providers on population health and health access is further limited by the fact that the majority of these professionals are concentrated in and around the capital, Yangon (Myat Thein and Khin Maung Nyo 1999). Apart from the care provided by such formal health professionals, a significant proportion of the population’s health needs are attended to by traditional practitioners, a term which encompasses those employing a wide variety of practices, among them acupuncture/acupressure, herbal medicine, massage, divination, spirit mediation, midwifery, the use of amulets and (bodily) inscriptions (Jaspan 1969). The skill level and efficacy of traditional providers (and hence their likely impact on the health profile of the population) and the pattern of utilization of traditional health services varies widely and — with the exception of traditional birth attendants — had been little studied until quite recently when the Myanmar government launched an initiative to both study and systematize traditional practice. To date little information on this effort is publicly available. An interesting aspect of Myanmar’s traditional health sector is its evolving relationship to the so-called “modern” or allopathic health sector. There have been fledgling attempts by both governmental and private organizations to incorporate traditional health care providers into health campaigns aimed improving perinatal care and birth outcomes, reducing parasites and malnutrition, increasing immunization coverage and speeding the delivery of timely and efficacious treatments for malaria and diarrhoeal diseases (Cho Min Naing and Gatton 2002; Khin Lin et al. 2000; UNICEF). The still largely untapped potential of traditional healers as locally accepted and respected, widely disseminated resources for the delivery of health-related knowledge and care holds great potential for the expansion of health options in low resource or remote areas of Myanmar. However, the expansion or improvement of such services
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
121
should not be taken as a substitute for adequate and accessible allopathic care. Apart from constraints imposed by the paucity of trained providers, Myanmar’s health system suffers from severe financial constraints. To some extent these can be said to be the inevitable consequence of a country mired in poverty, but there are also indications of resources being diverted from health and other social services to national defence and security (Chelala 1999; Myat Thein and Khin Maung Nyo 1999; von Hauff 2002). Indeed, in 1999 (the latest year for which reliable figures are available) the Myanmar government spent just 2.1 per cent of its total budget on health, down from 3.73 per cent in 1995 (UNICEF). As such, health care spending comprised 0.18 per cent of the total GDP in 1999, a slight reduction in real terms from the country’s health expenditures in 1995 when these comprised 0.40 per cent of GDP (IMF 1999 cited in von Hauff 2002; UNICEF).5 One might hope that the worrying trend of declining public investment in health has slowed or even reversed in recent years as ceasefire agreements have been concluded between the government and most armed opposition groups, a development which has reduced the imperative for military expenditures. Indeed, statements by government officials working in the area of social development indicate that this has been their goal. However, anecdotal evidence from areas most directly affected by the ceasefire agreements (which in this case are consistent with official government statistics) would suggest that much of the money diverted from military purposes has been invested in infrastructural improvements, including the construction of thousands of kilometres of highways and bridges rather than social services. Such projects, though important for state building, have decidedly ambiguous implications for public health.6 Moving in opposition to, and in some ways compensating for, the stagnant public spending on health in Myanmar, is a trend towards increased private spending on health as individuals seek care through a significant and growing network of private hospitals and clinics, which are now estimated to supply more than 60 per cent of Myanmar’s health care (based on number of visits) (Myat Thein and Khin Maung Nyo 1999). The most sought-after providers who staff these clinics are, in the main, concurrently employed by the government, but operate private practices on the side to supplement their incomes. Care provided in private settings is often faster, more comfortable, and more comprehensive than that available through public or even military facilities, since the clinics are not subject to the same shortfalls in budget or materials, and so the growth of
122
Rachel M. Safman
this parallel system has been heralded by some as a social advance. However, it must be emphasized that private health care is available to only a small fraction of Myanmar’s population, bounded by economic and geographical constraints.
Relating Health and Development in Myanmar: The Case of HIV/AIDS The complex, bidirectional linkages between health and development have been the focus of growing scholarly interest in recent years (Bhagava et al. 2001; Price-Smith 2001; Watts 1997; Wills 1996), and it is impossible to do justice to this rich literature in the space of this chapter. In brief, however, what their models describe is a more or less cyclical relationship in which advances in a population’s socioeconomic status both reduce morbidity and mortality from existing causes and produce changes in the population’s lifestyle and interactions with their natural and social environment. These changes, in turn, expose the population to new health risks, which take their toll on the people’s ability to participate in productive economic activity. The abstract relationship between health and development is perhaps best understood by reference to a concrete example, and to that end the remainder of this chapter is devoted to fleshing out the putative relationship between health and development in Myanmar using the example of a novel disease threat, HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS was selected as the basis for this case study for both practical and illustrative purposes; the fact that the international attention focused on the pandemic has made it one of the best characterized of diseases, both in Myanmar and internationally. HIV/ AIDS is also a disease with particularly profound and far-reaching socioeconomic implications, given its tendency to strike individuals in the prime of life when they are most economically productive. Finally, while the exact scope of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Myanmar is not known, there is reason to believe that the virus is already quite widespread and that the number of people infected could grow substantially in coming years. These points notwithstanding, it is important to make clear that HIV/ AIDS is not the only — and arguably not even the most important source of morbidity and mortality in contemporary Myanmar. That dubious distinction probably belongs to malaria (Cho Min Naing et al. 2000). Nor are the developmental implications of HIV/AIDS or the pathways through which they are manifest unique to this condition. It is therefore hoped that
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
123
many of the interventions suggested in this chapter will be understood as relevant (with some adaptation) to a variety of health concerns affecting different subsets of the Myanmar population.
The Current State of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Myanmar Any appraisal of the current state of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Myanmar must be prefaced by an admission that the available data are quite limited. Since the early 1990s the Ministry of Health has been collaborating with UNAIDS on developing an increasingly sophisticated system of sentinel surveillance to monitor the prevalence of HIV infection in various groups and locations nationwide (Beyrer et al. 2003), and the findings from these sentinel surveys provide the best foundation for estimating the magnitude as well as the demographic and geographic distribution of the Myanmar AIDS epidemic. However, to date only a fraction of the data so collected has been made publicly available. Published sources vary widely in their estimates of the number of persons presently infected with HIV in Myanmar. Towards the low end of this range are figures of 46,000 reported by the Ministry of Health (Xinhua News Agency, 2003). At the high end is an estimate of 700,000 (Beyrer et al. 2003). The WHO’s estimate, which is likely one of the more reliable, places the number of HIV-infected persons at 510,000, corresponding to about 1.99 per cent of the Myanmar population between the ages of 15–49 years (WHO 2001). This makes the HIV epidemic in Myanmar the second most severe in Asia (Piot, quoted in Beyrer et al. 2003). The published reports are all in agreement that the prevalence of HIV is increasing, with both infection rates and reported AIDS cases7 on the rise. Among the more significant attributes of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Myanmar is the fact that infection rates are highest in the eastern and northern parts of the country, with a steady decline in prevalence rates across risk groups as one moves to the south and west (Beyrer et al. 2003; Goodwin and Mra 1997). This suggests that HIV entered Myanmar from Thailand and/or southern China and was then disseminated to other parts of the country.8 It also points to a fairly significant rate of movement to and from the epicentres of infection and highlights the importance of both internal and international migration in fuelling Myanmar’s HIV/AIDS epidemic.
124
Rachel M. Safman
Another important dimension of the Myanmar epidemic, affecting its impact on the larger economy and society, is the association between HIV infection and specific risk or occupational groups. Some of these associations will be highlighted here, specifically: injecting drug users (IDU), female commercial sex workers, military personnel, persons employed in or in close proximity to the mining industry, and longdistance truckers.
Injecting Drug Users (IDU) The national HIV/AIDS epidemic in Myanmar is one of the few9 which appears to be fuelled to a large extent by drug injection. Despite the government’s increasingly aggressive efforts in recent years to reduce both opium production and drug consumption, Myanmar remains one of, if not the, largest producer of opium and heroin in the world (UNDCP 2002). It is estimated that between 400,000 and 500,000 Myanmars are drug addicts (UNDCP 2002) with the vast majority consuming drugs by injection (Morineau and Prazuck 2000). Given the large population of drug users and the efficiency of shared needles in spreading infection, it is unsurprising that a substantial number of drug injectors in Myanmar are HIV-positive. What is surprising, however, is just how high the proportion of infected persons is in the IDU community. Sentinel surveillance testing carried out in 1999 suggested that nationwide about 67 per cent of Myanmar’s IDU were HIV-infected (WHO 2001). Even more alarmingly, these same data revealed that in Mandalay (central region) and Myitkyina (northern region) HIV-seroprevalence rates were 87.8 per cent and 77.1 per cent, respectively (Beyrer et al. 2003). These infection rates are among the highest levels observed in any population anywhere in the world. It should also be noted that injecting drug usage in Myanmar is not confined to a single urban centre or even to regions of intensive poppy cultivation. Rather, injecting drug use in Myanmar arises in response to developmental inequities and a lack of economic opportunities in much of the society (Beyrer 1998) and is spread across broad swathes of the society. Noteworthy in this sense is that fact that the areas of peak drug usage coincide not with areas of highest production, but rather with regions providing the most limited economic opportunities, and conversely, mining communities and other similarly focal destinations for internal migrants (see discussion below) (Hirsch 2003; UNDCP 2002). Control of drug use
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
125
is thus intimately tied to larger social and economic issues, even as the widespread use of drugs drags down the productivity of a large portion of the population.
Commercial Sex Workers (CSW) Another subset of the population among whom disturbingly high levels of HIV-infection have been recorded are female commercial sex workers, whose infection rates (according to published national surveillance data) averaged 52 per cent in 1999. Somewhat more recent independent estimates put this figure in excess of 60 per cent infected (Beyrer et al. 2003). Sex work is illegal in Myanmar and the practice highly secretive. There are thus no valid estimates available on the scale of the commercial sex industry (Beyrer et al. 2003), nor the patterns of patronage among its clients. These gaps make it nearly impossible to assess how important a contributor commercial sex may be to HIV transmission within Myanmar’s borders. Of clear consequence, however, given the geographic gradient of infections, is the well-documented involvement of large numbers of women of Myanmar origin in the commercial sex industry in Thailand (Sultan 2003). While estimates of the size of this population also vary widely, it is believed that there are 30,000–60,000 Myanmar women working as CSW in Thailand (Stern 1998), where HIV infection rates among CSW range from 6.9 per cent to 17.6 per cent (MOPH 2001). In addition, there are many thousand men who travel to Thailand from Myanmar in search of employment and while in Thailand avail themselves of commercial sex services (as do the Thai men with whom they work). As was the case for injecting drug use, the involvement of Myanmar women in commercial sex — in particular, their willingness to migrate to Thailand to be employed in this capacity — seems to be fuelled in large part by economic necessity and by the disruptive effects of warfare and militarization along the Thai-Myanmar border (Stern 1998). Gaps in physical security and economic and social development can thus be seen to be driving the movement of HIV into and ultimately across Myanmar through networks of recruitment and commercial sexual partnership.
Military Personnel New military recruits in Myanmar, consisting of men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine, are routinely screened for HIV seroprevalence,
126
Rachel M. Safman
although these data have not been released through UNAIDS as have results of testing on other groups (WHO/UNAIDS 2000). Beyrer et al. (2003) cite point estimates of HIV-seroprevalence among military recruits in Yangon and Mandalay, which put the average rate of infection at 5.3 per cent, a significant though not catastrophic level. What may be most significant about infection levels in the military and what makes this a subgroup worthy of special consideration here is the importance of these infections in raising awareness of HIV/AIDS among Myanmar’s senior leadership, as well as the potential impact of significant levels of infection in a group which may someday attain positions of power. In the early years of the HIV epidemic in Myanmar, military personnel were perhaps the only group targeted by the government for prevention education (Lintner 1992), and while education efforts have since been expanded (Thwe 2004; UNICEF 2000), the military remains a focal point of special interest on this matter. Throughout the world, military personnel show significantly higher rates of HIV infection compared to civilian populations (Whiteside and Winsbury 1996) and in countries where the military’s role in national governance is prominent, these infection levels may translate into broader stability concerns (Lyerly 1996). In addition, elevated rates of HIV infection among active military personnel pose a threat to civilian populations in areas where these personnel are posted, particularly when the presence of the military is tied to active combat (Winsbury 1992).
Mine Workers As is the case with infection levels among military personnel, the importance of infection levels among mine workers and those employed in areas adjacent to the jade, gem, and mineral mines lies primarily in the impact which these infections may have on the broader economy and society. The mining sector, which accounts for only a fraction of Myanmar’s total GDP, is nevertheless an important source of foreign exchange, accounting for about 6 per cent of the country’s official exports (and a higher proportion of illegal exports) in fiscal 1999/2000 (Myat Thein 2004). It is also a sector of the national economy which is rapidly expanding and has been targeted for capital investment (IMF 1999). The gem mining sector in Myanmar, as in much of the world, employs a large, highly mobile labour force drawn from across the country and the region (Kidson, Singhasivanon, and Supavej 1999; Stern 1998). Separated
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
127
in many instances from family members for long periods of time and employed in remote areas with little access to other forms of entertainment, these men — and in some instances, women — turn to locally available sources of comfort including drugs and commercial sex. Indeed, injecting drug use in Myanmar is strongly associated with (though not confined to) regions in which mining is taking place, especially the jade and ruby mines in Shan and Kachin states (Chelala and Beyrer 1999). These areas, in turn, become epicentres of HIV infection as shared needles and sexual partners effectively transmit the virus throughout the mining camps and eventually back to the sending communities from which these workers originated.
Long-Distance Truckers Finally, the implication of long-distance truckers in the spread of HIV in Myanmar is, at this point, largely speculative, though the UNDP has documented a rise in HIV in communities along the corridor traversed by the Mandalay-Muse Highway (Hsu 2001). The main reason for including mention of the land transport sector in a discussion of the prevalence and dissemination of HIV in Myanmar is the congruence between this avenue of transmission and the recent pattern of development-related expenditures by the Myanmar government and others interested in expanding highway access to remote and/or economically significant areas. Given that many of the centres which the highways are meant to integrate into the national transport system are already recognized to be epicentres of HIV infection and that the construction of these highways will increase the movement of people within and between these areas, careful attention should be given to the public health implications of this development strategy.
From Epidemiology to Development To this point the discussion has focused primarily on the contributions which development or the absence of development has made to the spread of HIV/AIDS within Myanmar and throughout the region. The remainder of the discussion will examine ways in which the spread of HIV/AIDS — or other similarly widespread and destructive health events — might impact upon Myanmar’s economy and social development. The discussion is based primarily on the experiences of Thailand and hard-hit areas of East and Southern Africa where the epidemics are more mature and their developmental consequences better characterized.
128
Rachel M. Safman
The global literature on the consequences of widespread HIV disease identifies a significant impact in three major areas: demographic, economic, and social. From a demographic perspective, countries in which the rate of HIV-infection population-wide rise above a threshold level of between 2 and 3 per cent experience a marked diminution in the rate of population growth, reflecting the epidemic’s impact on both fertility and mortality. The magnitude of this impact is particular striking in the case of several sub-Saharan Africa countries including Uganda where infection rates reached a height of almost 30 per cent. As a result, life expectancy in Uganda has declined from fifty-two to forty years and the projected size of the population in 2010 has decreased from 37 million to just 20 million (Stover 2004). In Thailand where fertility rates have been much lower and hence the rate of population growth much smaller (estimated at about 1.3 per cent per annum until 1995) it has been argued that the overall size of the population may actually decrease over the next twenty years as a result of HIV (Surasiengsunk et al. 1998). Another demographic phenomenon associated with widespread HIV infection is a change in the structure of the population, in particular, a dramatic decline in the number of economically active adults between the ages of twenty and forty (the age range most severely impacted by AIDS), resulting in a rise in the dependency ratio (the proportion of children and elderly individuals relative to that of working aged adults). This increase in the burden borne by each working adult can, in turn, result in reductions in agricultural productivity. In rural Zimbabwe, for example, it has been estimated that food production declines by 30 to 60 per cent in households which experience an AIDS death (Stover and Bollinger 1999). It can also lead to an increase in the prevalence of food insufficiency and malnutrition (du Guerny 2002). As declining populations make agriculture increasingly unviable, there is also a tendency for surviving family members to depart their rural communities of origin, heading either for neighbouring communities with larger populations or for urban areas. This displacement and concentration of populations itself may contribute to economic marginality and poor health status as the migrant populations find themselves in environments where they lack adequate social support and the skills needed to succeed economically (Haour-Knipe and Rector 1996). Independent of place of residence, the loss of working aged adults also implies the creation of a population of children who have lost either one or both of their parents. In Africa, AIDS is estimated to have doubled the rate
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
129
of orphanhood among children under fifteen years of age (Caldwell 1997), leaving upwards of 10 per cent of the children in some countries without any parental caregivers (Ntozi 1997). In Thailand where the number of children affected by each adult’s death is typically smaller (due to lower fertility), there are nevertheless estimated to be between 75,000 and 100,000 children under fifteen years of age who have lost at least one parent to AIDS-related causes (Save the Children 1998). Furthermore, for every child who has been orphaned by the disease there are as many as twelve others who are living with a mother who is HIV-infected (Brown and Sittitrai 1995). The burden of Thailand’s AIDS orphans, like that of orphaned children in Africa, is being borne primarily by members of their extended families, especially unmarried maternal aunts (an apparent cultural preference among Thai) and grandparents (Safman 2004). Given that the phenomenon of widespread orphanhood is so recent in both Thailand and sub-Saharan Africa, it is impossible to gauge its long-term impact. However, initial indications are that AIDS orphans are less likely to be enrolled in school and more likely to find themselves frequently displaced and entering the workforce at a young age than are children who have not been impacted by AIDS (Foster 1997). AIDS deaths in the present generation thus undermine the accumulation of human capital for future generations, suggesting a long-term social and economic cost to communities and societies experiencing a high rate of mortality (Basu 1995). The economic implications of HIV/AIDS for affected individuals, families and communities is also felt in much more direct ways, of course, and varies greatly from place to place and even among different families within a given location, depending on the socioeconomic status of those affected and the aggressiveness with which they pursue treatment. Estimates drawn from other venues or social settings are thus most useful for getting a qualitative feeling for the impact of an AIDS death as well as building a conceptual model of where the costs accrue. A relatively comprehensive model of the costs experienced by a household in conjunction with an AIDS death has been developed for families living in rural Thailand, where the cost of a single AIDS case has been estimated at between US$30,000 and US$50,000. This estimate includes not only direct medical and funeral expenses but also lost labour, travel expenses and other indirect costs (Pitayanon et al. 1997). The variation in this figure is attributable in large part to the nature of the households’ participation in the formal economy with households composed
130
Rachel M. Safman
of more working members suffering a greater economic loss than those with fewer wage earners. These figures notwithstanding, the qualitative burden which AIDS creates on a household follows an inverse relationship with poorer households — typically those with more dependants and fewer persons formally employed — suffering greater hardship in conjunction with the AIDS death. This is because they have fewer resources upon which to draw during times of crisis and so are more dependent on maladaptive responses such as the sale of productive assets and reductions in the consumption of high quality foods, educational and health services, all of which build the household’s earning potential and resilience to crisis over the long term. Nor are the economic implications of AIDS contained at the family or community level. The same declines in agricultural and economic productivity associated with HIV deaths at this micro-social level accrue at the national scale with noticeable qualitative and quantitative effects. Indeed, even in a country such as Thailand where the economic base has shifted in large part away from agriculture — a sector particularly vulnerable to the labour scarcity induced by AIDS mortality — and where the trajectory of the epidemic was contained in a relatively short period of time, it has been estimated that national economic development has been curtailed by between 10 per cent and 20 per cent over a thirty-year period (1990–2020) when compared to an “AIDS-free” scenario (Anand 1995). In parts of Africa where these mitigating factors are absent it has been estimated that the AIDS epidemic will set back economic development by twenty to thirty years, reversing gains not only in GDP and per capita income, but also almost all other measures of social welfare (Foster 1997). Indeed, questions have been raised as to the extent to which AIDS may contribute to a larger social breakdown, undermining the legitimacy of governments or the stability of nation-state systems (de Waal 2003).
Assessing Prospects for Myanmar’s Future Health In the absence of more comprehensive, situationally specific data on the status of the AIDS epidemic in Myanmar, it is impossible to more accurately project its ultimate scope or magnitude. What should be emphasized at this point, though, is that disease statistics are not destiny, especially in so far as social impact is concerned. While the AIDS epidemic in Myanmar is currently on a trajectory that could easily result in severe social and economic disruption, there are also measures being taken to curb the
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
131
epidemic’s spread as well as efforts which might be undertaken to mitigate its downstream implications. Encouragingly with respect to the first point, there has since the late 1990s been a significant increase in the amount of attention devoted to health issues in Myanmar and other countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion (which also includes Thailand, Laos, China, Cambodia, and Vietnam). Since 1997 the governments of the region, spurred by a significant investment of resources by WHO and other multilateral donors (Asian Development Bank, UNESCAP, and UNDCP), have been working to enhance their technical sophistication in the area of disease control and have been meeting regularly to collaborate on the control of infectious and communicable diseases including malaria, filariasis, cholera, vaccinepreventable infections, tuberculosis, and AIDS, as well as in the suppression of drug production and drug trafficking in the region. Out of these collaborations have grown projects such as the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance initiative, the Roll Back Malaria campaign, and the Mekong Malaria and Filariasis Tracking Programme. Of specific interest with respect to the issue of HIV/AIDS has been the establishment of the ASEAN Work Programme on HIV/AIDS (2002–05) and the convening of a special ASEAN summit on HIV in Brunei Darussalam in 2001. Also in 2001, the six governments of the region signed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate in reducing the vulnerability to HIV among mobile people (i.e., cross border migrants). This collaboration is an important step since — as has been demonstrated — the problem of HIV’s spread extends beyond national boundaries. Such high level collaborations have undoubtedly had an effect on heightening public officials’ awareness of the linkages between health and development, improving national governments’ capacity to identify and measure existing or emerging health threats and enhancing the exchange of information on same. These gains are demonstrated in the aforementioned creation of a national HIV sentinel surveillance system for Myanmar. What is less clear, as yet, is the extent to which these large multinational collaborations have resulted in meaningful programming at a sub-national level. In particular, to what extent have gains in countries’ (especially Myanmar’s) ability to document disease been translated to effective interventions to contain or even track disease within communities? With respect to certain health conditions, the evidence is encouraging. Malaria control, identified as the first priority in the National Health Plan
132
Rachel M. Safman
(1996–2001), is one area in which significant strides have been made, though the disease remains a major public health threat (Hla Shein et al. 1998; Kidson, Singhasivanon, and Supavej 1999). Among the key components of the malaria control effort have been efforts to enhance local health workers’ understanding of the problem and their ability to evaluate its severity locally (Cho Min Naing and Gatton 2002). Traditional health care providers, such as midwives, have also been included in this effort (Khin Lin et al. 2000), and through their participation the reach of the public health officials has been greatly extended. Another important component of the malarial disease control effort has been the substantial investment of outside parties to leverage the efforts of local and national actors. In the case of the anti-malarial campaign, major pharmaceutical firms (for example, Zeneca), bilateral and multilateral donors (ODA, WHO, UNDP, World Bank, NASA, the Thai Ministry of Public Health), and non-governmental organizations (Save the Children, World Concern) have all contributed both technically and materially, providing expertise on the surveillance and tracking of the disease and its vectors, techniques for quickly diagnosing malaria cases and drugs for treating them on the spot, insecticides for the containment of malarial mosquitoes or to prevent their coming into contact with vulnerable human populations, and educational materials. Finally, malarial control efforts have taken place with the explicit support and participation of the local communities themselves, which have long recognized the threat which the disease posed to their people. Indeed, the common agenda held by local and national leaders with respect to health issues to a degree not shared in many other aspects of social or economic programming (for example, education, where curricular content can be an issue) provides yet another impetus for prioritizing this as an area of public investment. In seeking to translate the example of malaria control to HIV/AIDS, there are certain obvious parallels. First, AIDS, like malaria, is already widely recognized at both a local and national level to pose a major health (and increasingly, developmental) threat. This has been demonstrated to a certain degree by the overwhelming positive response to HIV education efforts which have been launched on a limited basis since 2001 (Thwe 2004). In addition, HIV/AIDS is an issue with a high international profile as demonstrated by the unprecedented establishment of a separate United Nations (UN) body devoted to this disease as well as numerous AIDS-
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
133
specific programmes within extant UN agencies and within the framework of bilateral and multilateral consortia. This interest has, in turn, translated into significant outside investment in HIV-related programming in Myanmar, including efforts by UNAIDS, UNDP, UNDCP, UNICEF, ADB, the government of Thailand, Rockefeller Foundation, Save the Children, World Concern and CARE — and this list is far from exhaustive. This infusion of resources, if carefully managed so as to enhance rather than overwhelm local efforts to respond to the epidemic, can greatly magnify the resources which could be mustered within Myanmar proper. For a national — or even local — response to HIV/AIDS to be successful, however, requires more than just the kinds of technical interventions which have been effective in stemming the spread of malaria. HIV/AIDS is a disease which can only be contained through behavioural modifications and these require a much more prolonged and locally adapted intervention. Furthermore, as the disease is one that becomes apparent and debilitating over a period of many years, HIV/AIDS remains a residual health threat in a population for an extended time. This means that even with aggressive and effective efforts to control the spread of new infections, there must be a simultaneous effort to respond to the downstream consequences of the epidemic, which will not be forestalled simply by preventing additional individuals from being exposed to the virus. This means that both the government of Myanmar and interested independent actors must begin immediately to identify relevant areas of vulnerability (issues such as food security, care for orphaned children, re-enforcement of the labour supply — with adequate protections to prevent the further dissemination of infection — and of social institutions in areas with high concentrations of infection). Even under the most optimistic scenario it seems unrealistic to expect that Myanmar will escape significant social and economic disruption related to the spread of HIV/AIDS, especially in areas where the infection rate is already quite high. But even in such areas there is the potential to mitigate the disease’s impact and to truncate the duration of its effects. For this to happen, though, international, national, and local actors must be brought together in a co-ordinated fashion. Should such a collaboration be effected around HIV/AIDS, as it has to a certain degree in the case of malaria, the effort would no doubt have long-term positive developmental implications for the people of Myanmar, turning one of their greatest current liabilities into an area of advantage. Failure to act quickly and effectively on this matter, however, may spell disaster for many of the most
134
Rachel M. Safman
affected communities in the country and may pose a long-term impediment to economic and social progress.
Notes 1. On this same inventory Thailand ranked 47th, Bangladesh 88th, and Laos 165th (WHO 2000). 2. Chandler (1998) has convincingly argued that mortality occurring in the first few days of life is probably widely under-reported in Myanmar given the logistical complexities of registering either births or deaths officially. Infants dying soon after birth, he posits, are simply omitted from the official record entirely. 3. By contrast, Thailand’s maternal mortality rate is estimated to be less than 20 deaths per 100,000 live births. 4. The UNDP (2003) has estimated, for example, that only 24 per cent of those requiring oral rehydration therapy — among the most basic and efficacious of emergency health measures — actually receive it. 5. Note from 1995 to 1999 nominal expenditures on health rose from 2,411 million kyat to 2,799 million kyat (government sources cited in Myat Thein and Khin Maung Nyo 1999). 6. Data from the Brazilian Amazon and other regions where access has been expanded through highway construction suggests that while improved transportation results in better access to health facilities, it also encourages the immigration of workers from other regions who bring with them exotic diseases (du Guerny, Chamberlain, and Hsu 2000; Wills 1996). Furthermore, the development of highways is meant to encourage the growth of extractive industries such as mining and timber which, as will be discussed later in this chapter, are often associated with high-risk behaviours such as substance abuse and prostitution (Linhares and Mello 1989; Hsu 2001). 7. The rate of HIV infections refers to the proportion of a given population which has been infected with the HIV virus which causes AIDS. The vast majority of these individuals are completely asymptomatic. AIDS cases, by contrast, are persons whose immune status has been so compromised by HIV-infection that they are falling ill to one or more defining opportunistic infections (based on US CDC/WHO definitions). 8. Virological evidence also supports this explanation (Motomura et al. 2003; Takebe et al. 2004). 9. Other examples include Vietnam, Russia, and Ukraine.
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
135
References Anand Panyarachun. “AIDS and Social and Economic Progress in the Asian and Pacific Countries”. Plenary Address before Third International Conference on AIDS in Asia/Pacific. Chiang Mai, Thailand, 1995. Archavanitakul, K. and P. Gersawang. “Migrant Women from Thailand’s Neighboring Countries in Thailand’s Commercial Sex Industry”. Institute of Population and Social Research, Mahidol University (in Thai), 1997. Barnett, A. and P. Blaikie. AIDS in Africa: Its Present and Future Impact. London: Guilford Press, 1992. ——— and A. Whiteside. AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Basu, Alaka. “Poverty and AIDS: The Vicious Circle”. Working Paper No. 95.02. Population and Development Program, Department of Rural Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1995. Beyrer, Chris. War in the Blood: Sex, Politics and AIDS in Southeast Asia. London: Zed Books, 1998. Beyrer, C., Myat Htoo Razak, A. Labrique and R. Brookmeyer. “Assessing the Magnitude of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Burma”. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 32 (2003): 311–17. Bhagava, A., D. T. Jamison, L. J. Lau and C. J. L. Murray. “Modeling the Effects of Health on Economic Growth”. Journal of Health Economics 20, no. 3 (2001): 423–40. Bonilla, E. and A. Rodriguez. “Determining Malaria Effects in Rural Colombia”. Social Science and Medicine 37, no. 9 (1993): 1109–14. Brown, T. and W. Sittitrai. The Impact of HIV on Children in Thailand. Bangkok: Program on AIDS, Thai Red Cross Society and Save the Children (UK), 1995. Caldwell, John C. “The Impact of the African AIDS Epidemic”. Health Transition Review 7, suppl. 2 (1997): 169–88. Central Statistical Organization (CSO). Statistical Yearbook 2000. Yangon: CSO, 2000. Chandler, D. “Health in Burma: An Interpretive Review”. In Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future, edited by R. Rotberg, pp. 247–65. Cambridge: World Peace Foundation and Harvard Institute for African Development, 1998. Chelala, Cesar. “Burma: A Country’s Health in Crisis”. Lancet 352 (1998): 556. Chelala, C. and C. Beyrer. “Drug Use and HIV/AIDS in Burma”. Lancet, 354, no. 9184 (1999): 1119. Chima, R. I., C. A. Goodman, and A. Mills . “The Economic Impact of Malaria in Africa: A Critical Review of the Evidence”. Health Policy 63, no. 1 (2003): 17–36.
136
Rachel M. Safman
Cho Ming Naing and M. L. Gatton. “Performance Appraisal of Rapid On-Site Malaria Diagnosis (ICT Malaria Pf/Pu Test) in Relation to Human Resources at Village Level in Myanmar”. Acta Tropica 81 (2002): 13–19. Cho Min Naing, Somrat Lertmaharit, Pirom Kamol-Ratanakul, and A. Saul. “Modeling Factors Influencing Malaria Incidence in Myanmar”. Southeast Asian Journal of Public Health and Tropical Medicine 31, no. 3 (2000): 434–38. Cox, F. E. G. “History of Sleeping Sickness (African trypanosomiasis)”. Infectious Disease Clinics of North America 18, no. 2 (2004): 231–34. Danzinger, R. “The Social Impact of HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries”. Social Science and Medicine 39, no. 7 (1994): 905–17. de Waal, A. “How Will AIDS Transform African Governance?”. African Affairs 102 (2003): 1–23. du Guerny, J. “Meeting the HIV/AIDS Challenge to Food Security: The Role of Labor Saving Technologies in Farm-Households”. Bangkok: UNDP-Southeast Asia, HIV and Development, 2002. ———, J. Chamberlain, and Lee-Nah Hsu. “From AIDS Epidemics to an AIDS Pandemic: Is an HIV/AIDS Hub Building in South East Asia?”. Bangkok: South East Asia HIV and Development Project, UNDP-Southeast Asia, HIV and Development, 2000. Folch, E., I. Hernandez, M. Barragan, and C. Franco-Paredes. “Infectious Diseases, Non-Zero-Sum Thinking, and the Developing World”. American Journal of the Medical Sciences 326, no. 2 (2003): 66–72. Foster, Geoff. “Orphans”. AIDS Care 9 (1997): 82–87. Goodwin, D. J. and Rai Mra. “Geographic Distribution of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar: Evidence of a Major East-West Gradient”. Poster presented at the Fourth International Congress on AIDS in Asia/Pacific, Manila, 25–29 October 1997. Haour-Knipe, M. and R. Rector. Crossing Borders: Migration, Ethnicity, and AIDS. London: Taylor & Francis, 1996. Hill, Hal and S. Jayasuriya. “An Inward-Looking Economy in Transition: Economic Development in Burma since the 1960s”. Occasional Paper No. 80. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986. Hirsch, S. “Interview with UNODC Myanmar Representative Jean-Luc Lemahieu”. Published by UN Wire, 18 December 2003. Hla Shein, Than Tun Sein, Soe Soe, Tin Aung, Ne Win, and Khin Saw Aye. “The Level of Knowledge, Attitude and Practice in Relation to Malaria in Oo-Do Village, Myanmar”. Southeast Asian Journal of Tropical Medicine and Public Health, 29 no. 3 (1998): 546–49. Hsu Lee-Nah. Building and Alliance with Transport Sector in HIV Vulnerability Reduction. Bangkok: UNDP South East Asia HIV and Development Project, 2001. International Monetary Fund (IMF). “Myanmar: Recent Economic Developments”. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1999.
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
137
Janin, H. The India-China Opium Trade in the Nineteenth Century. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1999. Jaspan, M. A. Traditional Medical Theory in South-East Asia. Hull: University of Hull, 1969. Jochelson K., M. Mothibeli, and J. P. Leger. “Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Migrant Labor in South Africa”. International Journal of Health Services 21, no. 1 (1991): 157–73. Khin Lin, Soe Aung, Saw Lwin, Hla Min, Nwe Nwe Aye, and Roger Webber. “Promotion of Insecticide-Treated Mosquito Nets in Myanmar”. Southeast Asian Journal of Tropical Medicine and Public Health 31, no. 3 (2000): 444–47. Kidson, C., Pratap Singhasivanon, and Suvanee Supavej. “Malaria, Multi-Drug Resistance and Economic Development in the Greater Mekhong Subregion of Southeast Asia”. Southeast Asian Journal of Tropical Medicine and Public Health 30, suppl. 4 (1999). Kiple, K. and K. Ornelas. “After the Encounter: Disease and Demographics in the Lesser Antilles”. In The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European Expansion, edited by R. L. Paquette and S. Engerman, pp. 50–67. Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 1996. Linhares, A. C. and W. A. Mello. “The Prevalence of HIV-Antibody in a Gold Mining Camp in the American Amazon Region as a Guide to the Date of Entry of AIDS into Brazil: The Future Importance of Such Communities as ‘Distribution Centers’”. Revue de Instituto de Medicin Tropico de Sao Paolo 31 no. 1 (1989): 59. Lintner, Bertil. “Final Solution’ in Myanmar?”. WorldAIDS 22 (1992): 4. Lyerly, W. H. “Rationale for an HIV/AIDS Prevention and Mitigation Strategy for Africa: Combatting the Multi-Sectoral Impact of the Epidemic”. TB and HIV 11 (1996): 10–11. Ministry of Public Health (Thailand). “National HIV Sentinal Surveillance Study Preliminary Findings”. Bangkok, 2001. Morineau, G. and T. Prazuck. “Drug Related Behavior in a High HIV Prevalence Rate Population at Myktyina Drug Treatment Centre, Kachin State, Northern Myanmar (Burma)”. AIDS 14, no. 14 (2000): 2203–204. Motomura, K., S. Kusagawa, Hla Htut Lwin, Min Thwe, K. Kato, K. Oishi, N. Yamamoto, Myint Zaw, T. Nagatake, and Y. Takebe. “Different Subtype Distributions in Two Cities in Myanmar: Evidence for Independent Clusters of HIV-1 Transmission”. AIDS 17, no. 4 (2003): 625–36. Myat Thein and Khin Maung Nyo. “Social Sector Development in Myanmar: The Role of the State”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin 16, no. 3 (1999): 394–404. Myo Thet Htoon, Hla Htut Lwin, Khin Ohmar San, E Zan, and Min Thwe. “HIV/ AIDS in Myanmar”. AIDS 8, suppl. 2 (1994): S105–S109. Ntozi, J. “Widowhood, Remarriage and Migration during the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Uganda”. Health Transition Review 7, suppl. 2 (1997): 125–44.
138
Rachel M. Safman
Omran, A. “The Epidemiological Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change”. Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly 49 (1971): 521. Orent, W. Plague: The Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World’s Most Dangerous Disease. New York: Free Press, 2004. Pitayanon, Sumalee, Sukontha Kongsin, and Wattana Janjaroen. “The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS Mortality on Households in Thailand”. In The Economics of HIV and AIDS: The Case of South and South East Asia, edited by David Bloom and Peter Godwin. Delhi: UNDP and Oxford University Press, 1997. Price-Smith, A. The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. Safman, Rachel. “Assessing the Impact of Orphanhood on Thai Children Affected by AIDS and Their Caregivers”. AIDS Care 16, no. 1 (2004): 11–19. Sargent, I. Twilight Over Burma: My Life as a Shan Princess. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994. Save the Children (UK). “Children Affected by AIDS in Thailand”. Unpublished report, Bangkok, 1998. Seeley, Janet, et al. “The Extended Family and Support for People with AIDS in a Rural Population in South West Uganda: A Safety Net with Holes?”. AIDS Care 3, no. 3 (1993): 117–22. Sharma, V. P. “Malaria: Cost to India and Future Trends”. Southeast Asian Journal of Tropical Medicine and Public Health 27, no. 1 (1996): 4–14. Stern, A. “International Population Movements and Public Health in the Mekong Region: An Overview of Some Issues Concerning Mapping”. Southeast Asian Journal of Tropical Medicine and Public Health 29, no. 2 (1998): 201–12. Stover, J. “Projecting The Demographic Consequences of Adult HIV Prevalence Trends: The Spectrum Projection Package”. Sexually Transmitted Infections 80, suppl. 1 (2004): 43–54. ——— and L. Bollinger. “The Economic Impact of AIDS”. Durham: The Futures Group International in collaboration with Research Triangle Institute (RTI), 1999. Sultan, Ahmed. “HIV/AIDS Vulnerability of Migrants from Myanmar Working as Seafarers and Sea Food Processing Workers in Thailand”. Unpublished manuscript, 2003. Surasiengsunk, S., S. Kiranandana, K. Wongboonsin, P. Geoffrey, R. Anderson, and G. J. P. van Griensven. “Demographic Impact of the HIV Epidemic in Thailand”. AIDS 12 (1998): 775–84. Szucs, T. “The Socio-Economic Burden of Influenza”. Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 44, suppl. B (1999): 11–15. Takebe, Y., Y. Ma, C. Yang, Y. Yokota, S. Kusagawa, R. Yang, X. Xia, K. Ben, M. Thwe, T. Aung, K. Y. Oo, and H. H. Lwin. “Geographical Hotspots of
Assessing the Impact of HIV and Other Health Issues on Myanmar’s Development
139
Extensive Intersubtype Recombination in Asia: ‘Melting Pot’ That Generates Diverse Forms of HIV-1 Unique Recombinant Forms”. Paper presented at the XV International AIDS Conference, Bangkok, Thailand, 11–16 July 2004. Thwe, M. “HIV/AIDS Education and Prevention in Myanmar”. AIDS Education and Prevention 16, 3 (2004): 170–77. UNAIDS. “Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections, 2000 Update: Myanmar”. Available at
. UNDCP. “Regional Drug Control Profile for Southeast Asia and the Pacific”. Bangkok: United Nations Drug Control Program, Regional Center, February 2002. UNDP.”“Human Development Indicators, 2003: Myanmar”. Available at . UNICEF. “Prevention of HIV/AIDS through Reproductive Health in Myanmar”. Bangkok: UNICEF, July 2000. ———. “Statistics at a Glance” Available at . Utzinger, J., Y. Tozan, F. Doumani, and B. H. Singer. “The Economic Payoffs of Integrated Malaria Control in the Zambian Copperbelt between 1930 and 1950”. Tropical Medicine and International Health 7 no. 8 (2002): 657–77. von Hauff, M. “The Relevance of Social Reforms for Economic Development in Burma/Myanmar. Dialogue and Cooperation 2/2002”. Proceedings of a conference on “Parliaments and Human Rights Policy: An Asia-Europe Dialogue”. Sponsored by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Foundation, Manila, 3–4 December 2001. Watts, S. Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. World Health Organization (WHO). World Health Report 2000. Geneva: WHO, 2000. WHO. Evidence and Information for Policy (2004). Available at . WHO/UNAIDS. “Epidemiological Fact Sheet – Myanmar”. Geneva: WHO, 2001. Whiteside, A, and R. Winsbury. “Vancouver AIDS Conference Special Report. The Role of the Military: To Protect Society — and Themselves”. 1996. Wills, C. Yellow Fever, Black Goddess: The Coevolution of People and Plagues. New York: Perseus, 1996. Winsbury, R. “Condoms and Conflict: AIDS and the Military”. WorldAIDS 24 (1992): 4. World Concern. “Community Health Option Project, Kachin State Myanmar”. Unpublished report, 2004. Xinhua News Agency. “Myanmar Expands Anti-AIDS Programs”. 1 December 2003.
Reproduced from Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg 140 Alex M.>Mutebi
6 “Muddling Through” Past Legacies Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy and the Need for Reform Alex M. Mutebi
Introduction All too often when discussing contemporary Myanmar, the focus tends to shift quickly to its national politics, its ethnic schisms, or its state–society relations, crowding out everything else. Some have referred to this phenomenon as the “hostage” model, a one-dimensional approach to change in Myanmar in which any such discussion unrelated directly to the struggle between the military and the opposition over national power bumps hard against heavy scepticism or cynicism (or both) because political reform is seen by some as the sine qua non of everything else.1 While not discounting the importance of any of those issues, the aim of this chapter is an attempt to redirect some attention among Myanmar watchers and researchers to something seemingly more innocuous but of no less importance: the country’s anodyne but enduring civil bureaucracy. Socioeconomic research and analysis has long been preoccupied with the role of public institutions, particularly the “bureaucracy” in fostering or impeding socioeconomic transformation. That socioeconomic growth crucially depends on governance is not only a widely acknowledged fact today, but is also the basis for continuing fascination with the role of bureaucracies in any country for theorists and practitioners alike.2 Specifically, this chapter tries to make the sometimes not so obvious case that understanding the history bequeathed by Myanmar’s various postcolonial governments to its contemporary civil bureaucracy is critical not only to understanding the bureaucracy’s tribulations, but also for prescribing 140
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy
141
appropriate remedies. Indeed, regardless of its various ills, Myanmar today has a public service that refuses to wither away; for the moment it is all the country has. Accordingly, the first principle when considering reform options is to accept that it is crucial, at least in the medium term, to work with the existing bureaucratic machine, and seek merely to turn it from its negative attributes inherited from past legacies. In the absence of a fair dose of realism to inform any bureaucratic reform, there is always the risk of compromised change. Such realism demands that any starting point is to comprehend how Myanmar’s current civil bureaucracy came to be what it is today. At a minimum, it is imperative the country’s colonial legacies as well as the effect on the bureaucracy of Myanmar’s various post-independence governments’ ideologies, policies, and practices are revisited. To be sure, the old notion that somehow a civil bureaucracy is a professional structure insulated from the vicissitudes of a country’s politics, blissfully impartial and objective — if it ever was true — is certainly not found in present-day Myanmar. Bureaucracy is the arm of government that ultimately must deliver political promises and face the public in dayto-day matters. Yet concerns about the nature and role of Myanmar’s civil bureaucracy have been overshadowed by the salience of the seemingly more central political issues mentioned in the first paragraph. It is hardly surprising there is little time or thought for Myanmar’s “public administration machinery” — a machinery ironically now burdened with an ever-expanding role in the transition away from the very distortions with which, since the country’s independence, it was identified. As is usually the case in developing states under extended periods of either direct or indirect military rule, Myanmar’s civil bureaucracy has long been characterized by a high degree of centralization, a weak degree of administrative and managerial autonomy and an almost non-existent consultative process.3 The few recent studies that examine Myanmar’s civil bureaucracy note several other difficulties plaguing the country’s post-1988 civil bureaucracy: poor organization; decision-making processes that are at times irrational and arbitrary; mismanaged, undertrained and underutilized staff; weak accountability mechanisms particularly in the higher ranks dominated by deputized military personnel; poorly designed public policy programmes; and badly implemented public services.4 Because the term “bureaucracy”, as applied to Myanmar, is redolent with negative connotations and otherwise one of opprobrium, there is a deep-seated belief that the flaws of the country’s civil service are ineluctable, inevitable, endemic, almost
142
Alex M. Mutebi
fated. For such observers, the general attitude of Myanmar’s present leadership towards its civil bureaucracy is reminiscent of the co-option of the gigantic and often grotesque bureaucracy by Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) apparatchiks during the socialist era. Thus, as the discussion on Myanmar remains hostage to narrow conversation about its politics, greater is the temptation to grudgingly accept the inevitability of the country’s dysfunctional civil bureaucracy and to ignore any serious consideration about that bureaucracy’s reform and transformation. To be sure, Myanmar’s civil bureaucracy is not unique among developing countries in its challenges. However, unlike many of those other countries, Myanmar has yet to undertake any comprehensive attempt at reforming its civil bureaucracy — something that is increasingly an intrinsic part of the whole national and political reform ethic in many states. Indeed, starting around the mid-1980s, a number of developing states embarked upon various bureaucratic reform initiatives, many of which are still underway.5 Many of those reforms were rationalized on the grounds of efficiency and triggered by a convergence of political opportunity, economic crisis, and the spread of ideas about reform.6 Often, although not always, promoted by multilateral and bilateral agencies, and drawing on the experiences and rationales of selected Western countries, many of those reform initiatives promised, and sometimes actually did deliver, substantial returns in terms of improving how bureaucracies should and could work. Other times the initiatives failed. It is almost inevitable that Myanmar will eventually also attract these off-the-shelf “state of the art” skills and ideas, often run by outsiders who have absolutely no time, nor inclination, to understand historical provenance, nor who have effective local counterparts cognizant of this broader need. Such an approach of importing alien packages reflects a naïve belief in the universal application of certain all-purpose “models” of public administration. Indeed, in the absence of clear reformist values, strategies, policies and legislation, the easiest approach to bureaucratic reform is to opt for technocratic gimmicks that employ the supposedly generic management skills and mantras of the leading gurus of the day. Before proceeding, several caveats are in order. The first: A highly simplified periodization of the country since independence is adopted to make the discussion more tractable.7 Table 6.1 summarizes the simple periodization used herein: Parliamentary rule (covering the period from 1948 when the nation became sovereign, as the Union of Burma, through the end of democratic rule in 1962); Socialist one-party rule (covering the
Mostly ad hoc Partly federal
Form of Centre-Local Organization
Mostly pluralistic
Form of Political Organization
Basis of Policy Style
Mostly pluralistic
Democratic Socialism
Yes: Constitutional
State–Society Relations
Dominant State Ideology
Legal Basis for the “State”?
Parliamentary Rule (1948–62)
Mostly unitary; Highly centralized
Top-down
Authoritarian: Socialist
Antagonistic
Socialism; Nationalism; Buddhism
Yes: Constitutional
Socialist Rule (1962–88)
TABLE 6.1 Key Features of the State in Post-Independence Myanmar
Partly centralized
Top-down; “Muddling through”
Authoritarian: Military
Antagonistic
Nationalism
No: Extra-Constitutional
Stratocratic Rule (1988–Present)
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy 143
144
Alex M. Mutebi
period from 1962 through the twenty-six years of General Ne Win’s rule; and Stratocratic8 Myanmar (covering the period since 1988 when Myanmar came under military rule to the present). As an illustration of the oversimplification of such periodization, what I refer to here as Socialist rule can in fact be divided into two institutionally well-marked phases: the Revolutionary Council (RC) period (1967–74), when the chairman of the RC ruled by decree, and the Socialist Republic (SR) period (1974–88) when Myanmar was granted a one-party constitution. However, those and other such details are not entirely necessary for the purposes of this chapter. The second: It is worth keeping in mind that regardless of the period under discussion, never has the entire breadth of territorial Myanmar been under complete central control, and, as a consequence, been fully integrated. Myanmar is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, with various ethnic nationalities making up about one-third of the population and occupying roughly half of the land area. For years, many parts of Myanmar — particularly the frontier regions of the colonial territory drawn up by the British in the nineteenth century — saw little, if any, central state penetration.9 Consequently, any discussion, however general, of institutions of the central government’s civil bureaucracy should be conducted against that backdrop. The third: Whereas this chapter obviously discusses the bureaucracy under military rule, it does not delve into the use of the army for extramilitary purposes, in particular the role of the armed forces in the sort of state-building normally associated with the civil bureaucracy. That topic warrants separate treatment, which several authors have already done.10 Likewise, the chapter does not explore the close, though not necessarily desirable links between the military and the civil bureaucracy in postindependence Myanmar, as well as the nature of the boundaries between state-building military institutions and the civil bureaucracy. The fourth: Up-to-date data on contemporary Myanmar’s bureaucracy are either hard to come by, not current or incomplete. Indeed, even in instances where data exist, they are often difficult to obtain for research purposes. The discussion herein is thus kept at a general level but is nonetheless based on a combination of in-country research, selected interviews and secondary sources. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The next section briefly discusses the two most common usages of the term bureaucracy and how it is mostly used in this chapter. The section after that then gives a broad historical overview of Myanmar’s civil bureaucracy since independence
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy
145
in order to provide some context. The last section sketches, again, in very general terms, some prospects for bureaucratic reform in present-day Myanmar.
Weberian Bureaucracy Revisited Demarcating what constitutes bureaucracy in most countries is not a straightforward undertaking. A common complication with the term is that it is used both normatively as a synonym for the civil service (in the way it is used here), and also more abstractly in reference to models for organizing public administration as in the Weberian tradition. Max Weber pioneered the observation and study of bureaucracies that developed in nineteenth century Germany. In his monumental essays, Economic and Society, Weber made a case for the fundamental value of bureaucracy as one of the institutional foundations of capitalist growth. Weber considered the bureaucracies he studied not only efficient, rational, and honest, but also a major improvement over the rather chaotic administration that they replaced. For Weber, “bureaucracy” was thus an “ideal type” of modern officialdom based on six precepts. First, bureaucracies have fixed and official jurisdictional areas which are ordered by rules, that is, laws and administrative regulations. Second, bureaucracies are hierarchical in the sense that they have levels of graded authority in which the lower offices are supervised by the higher ones. Third, management of those bureaucracies is generally based on official documents. Fourth, bureaucrats tend to have thorough and expert training. Fifth, the bureaucracies necessitate the full time work of the bureaucrats. Lastly, the management of those bureaucracies generally follows some prescribed rules and procedures.11 Whereas Weber’s observations seem obvious today, at the time he made them German government agencies were pioneering modern administration to replace practices stretching all the way back to the Middle Ages, and which mostly emphasized patrimonial and prebendal forms of public administration. From a Weberian perspective, the central feature of bureaucracy was thus its rationality, which in turn reflected the advance of a reliable, predictable and, above all, efficient means of social organization. Bureaucracy was essentially the characteristic form of organization found in modern society and whose expansion, due to both the technical superiority of bureaucracy over other forms of administration as well as various significant economic, political, and cultural developments, was irreversible. Weber saw the development of
146
Alex M. Mutebi
bureaucratization as closely linked to increasing pressures for economic efficiency and the emergence of large-scale business units, or in essence, the emergence of capitalist economies. The development and extension of the responsibilities into socioeconomic spheres of the modern state led to the expansion of powerful government bureaucracies. It is important to note, however, that Weber was also aware that bureaucracy, in the abstract sense, could be a mixed blessing. Not only could organizational efficiency be purchased at the expense of democratic participation, but bureaucratization could very well strengthen hierarchical tendencies based on merit. In contrast, the everyday pejorative use of term bureaucracy as a synonym for the civil service is strictly speaking not the Weberian sense of a set of administrative organizations with specific structural features. Indeed, when used that way, it is often still not clear what the term exactly delineates, given especially the complexity of modern government in which public employees have a range of employment relationships with the state. Weber viewed bureaucracy not as a generic collection of state employees, but rather as a particular kind of organizational structure. When used in this latter sense in this chapter, the focus is limited to Myanmar’s civil bureaucracy proper, that is that core part of the public sector whose employees are paid directly by the national treasury and who are both subject to the state’s conditions of service and engaged in shaping or more commonly implementing government decisions.12
Myanmar’s Post-Independence Civil Bureaucracy in Historical Perspective No complete appreciation of the state of Myanmar’s civil bureaucracy in the years following the country’s independence on 4 January 1948 is possible without the historical backdrop of the British colonial period, the Japanese occupation that started in 1942, and the brief restoration of British rule between 1945 and 1947. Whereas space and other considerations preclude a full examination of those momentous years in the country’s history, a few key observations are in order.
Civil Bureaucracy in the Parliamentary Era (1948–62) By and large, the British system of colonial administration in Myanmar was stable and efficient although, by far, not free of corruption.13 As in
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy
147
several other British colonies, the system of public administration was characterized by a three-tier organization: at the top were British expatriates, the intermediate tier comprised of specialized professionals (mostly Indians), and the lower tier by a combination of indigenous, Chinese, and Indian personnel. In 1942, for example, Myanmar was administered by some 3,200 civil officers (including everyone from the governor’s counsellor and high court judges to local administrative officers but excluding clerical staff and other lower ranked personnel) of whom only 14 per cent were English.14 During World War II when most of the country was under Japanese occupation, the colonial government fled into exile in India. Because virtually all the British and most of their Indian subjects had left the country, the entire administration from top to bottom, public and parastatal, industry and commerce, was run by locals using the British-built civil administrative system, which the Japanese retained with very little structural change during their three-year occupation. The end of the war brought not only the restoration of British authority (a reappointment of the British civil servants at the top of the civil administrative structure), but also the rebuilding of the British and Indian domination of economic life. Yet the haste with which the British had fled coupled with the fact that a largely Myanmar personnel had run the civil administrative machinery during the period of the British bosses’ absence, helped to ruin both the latter’s prestige as well as the Myanmar’s continued acceptance of British political, economic, and cultural thought.15 To re-establish their control over post-war Myanmar, the British made use of a military government in much the same way they did in most other reoccupied British territories following World War II. Through a military government and largely subject to the needs of military necessity at the time, the British sought to quickly re-establish an administration similar to the one they had had in place prior to the war and then hand this over as early as possible to the civilian government. Indeed, the re-establishment of British rule following the war presaged the sort of civil–military relations that some of those new leaders would subsequently refine and later turn into the leitmotif of much of post-independence Myanmar. In the meantime, the fact that almost all of Myanmar’s leading pre-war political figures had been replaced by younger leaders, many of whom styled themselves socialists and communists, was to have as many repercussions for civil administration as for other aspects of Myanmar society. For this younger group of nationalists, the bitter experiences under
148
Alex M. Mutebi
Japanese and British domination established an association between foreign rule and capitalism as well as between the necessity of Myanmar’s independence and the necessity of a state economy organized according to socialist principles. When Myanmar became a sovereign independent state outside the British Commonwealth on 4 January 1948, Article 221 of the country’s new constitution provided for a Public Service Commission “to assist the Union Government in matters relating to recruitment to the civil services of the Union and to advise in disciplinary matters affecting the services.” As highlighted elsewhere by many others, the first decade following independence was a period of much social unrest, political intrigue, and rivalries. With regards to civic administration, independence caused the withdrawal of many senior officials from the public services and their replacement by less trained and less experienced personnel, even as the administrative machinery was deteriorating and the number of public services increased. At the time of Myanmar’s independence, the ranks of civil administration included a core of very capable literate and experienced officers whose experience and competence could have been passed on to the new indigenous government. Instead, the bureaucracy found itself affected by the anarchy and chaos of the ensuing civil war and thus never quite translated into a reasonably stable public administrative system the way colonial bureaucracies did generally in, say, post-independence India and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka).16 The weakening and corruption of that system can be partly attributed to “the introduction of a system of government workable in European countries, but alien and imperfectly understood in Burma, and though perhaps the people of Burma might have been able to assimilate it in the future, they were certainly not ready to do so at the time of its introduction”.17 When, at the end of 1958, a caretaker government was put into place under General Ne Win, he appointed military men as heads of many public agencies. In particular, state-owned industrial and commercial enterprises were operated by the military Defence Services Institute (DSI). In March 1962 the military seized power once again and quickly suspended the 1947 Constitution as well as parliament. They then set up a “Revolutionary Council” (RC) composed of high-ranking military officers who assumed supreme executive, legislative, judicial, and economic powers and proceeded to pursue the infamous “Burmese Way to Socialism”, a sufficiently vague, though highly emotive doctrine with which the state could justify almost
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy
149
everything.18 In order to secure political legitimacy the Revolutionary Council banned all political parties while founding a new one, the BSPP, under military leadership in 1964.
Civil Bureaucracy in the Socialist Era (1962–88) Whereas in general one would expect the civil bureaucracy in a socialist regime, much like the military, to be a powerful institution given that, by definition, other institutions of representation (elections, competitive parties, and freely organized interest groups) are weak or absent, this was only partially true for Myanmar during the socialist era. True, the military had earlier on dispensed with all democratic forms of representation and ruled directly. However, the military officers who ran the country still needed the civil bureaucracy to implement their will. And whereas in some nondemocratic states, the civil bureaucracy in conjunction with the military becomes a leading political force by virtue of its technical expertise and ability to resist popular pressures, Myanmar bureaucracy was mostly the RC and BSPP regimes’ service agency.19 One of the first things the military did after assuming power in 1962 was to create the Central Security and Administrative Committee, headed by a high-ranking military officer and directly responsible to the RC. In addition, a hierarchy of Security and Administrative Committees (SACs), headed by military officers, was instituted at each regional and local level, and made responsible for public order, administration of law, government directives, and co-ordinating projects. In the decade following the coup, many private enterprises, both domestic and foreign-owned, were nationalized, and new corporations, mostly operated by government ministries and headed by military officers, were set up. Like all other state and non-state institutions in Myanmar, civil bureaucracy was also greatly affected by the new socialist one-party constitution approved by the Second BSPP Congress in October 1973 and promulgated in January 1974. In that constitution, presumably based on the concept of democratic socialism, several chapters had a direct impact on Myanmar’s public administration.20 Among other things, the new constitution maintained the existence of seven sub-national states named after the dominant ethnic groups all the while abolishing all administrative, economic, judicial and political differences between those seven states and the seven administrative divisions in upper and lower Myanmar. A comprehensive twenty-year plan (1974–94) was adopted whose aim was
150
Alex M. Mutebi
to achieve an industrialized socialist state that would satisfy the basic needs of the population while preserving Myanmar values. It is thus unsurprising that with such lofty aims the position of Myanmar’s civil bureaucracy during that period was characterized by one thing: its sheer scale.21 Indeed, the size of the civil bureaucracy under BSPP rule followed from the authoritarian character of the ruling party’s operating principles. To achieve its grand mission of building a new society, the BSPP had to control all aspects of development, both economic and social, throughout the country.22 As previously mentioned, by 1974 the private sector had been reduced to a fraction of its former size and much of the economy had essentially become an aspect of state administration. The numerous state enterprises that comprised part of the bureaucracy, for example, required a large army of workers to do the work as well as many administrators to provide the necessary co-ordination.23 In addition, Myanmar’s civil bureaucracy became highly politicized, with the BSPP penetrating deeply into the administration. Indeed, the essence of BSPP rule lay in combining bureaucratic and political rule in one gigantic system. Ne Win regarded the bureaucracy as both indispensable and potentially unreliable — as a force through which its control of implementation might one day challenge its political BSPP masters. Hence the party sought to dominate the bureaucracy in the same way Ne Win controlled the armed forces: by controlling all major appointments to significant posts in the bureaucracy.24 Such appointments doubled as a powerful incentive for the ambitious to gain and retain a sound endorsement from patrons within the party. The state’s exclusive power and its attempted ownership and control of all the factors of production and distribution during the socialist era led to the latent indifference of bureaucrats and the monopolies they ran to the provision of service, negative attitudes towards the public, and other pathologies. And whereas the system was not specifically designed to bring out the worst in human nature, it sometimes seemed it was. Again, everything functioned in parallel with services performed outside the orbit of recorded activity. In that context, the bureaucracy offered, through nearuniversal monopoly, unique opportunities for brokering petty power. Licences, permits, tickets — the whole range of the bureaucratic monopolistic paper chase — provided endless silage for this hungry fiend. In such a system many bureaucrats had a vested interest in increasing opportunities for erecting hurdles, since that boosted the potential for spoils.
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy
151
In essence, Myanmar’s bureaucracy, under BSPP rule, operated, therefore, within a system — indeed it can be called a culture — preoccupied with petty secrecy and that micro-managed, distorted, and manipulated information to disguise inadequacies, root out dissension, exaggerate performance, and misinform. With its civil bureaucracy bloated, overpoliticized, inefficient, and acting as a drag on rather than a stimulus to further progress, Myanmar became one of the most bureaucratic states in Southeast Asia.25 Battered by a combination of bad politics and policy, the BSPP socioeconomic system proved ultimately unsustainable. By the mid-1980s, almost forty years after the country’s independence, the BSPP recognized the need for economic, political, and constitutional reforms. With the restive population increasingly taking to the streets, the BSPP Central Committee finally agreed to introduce a multi-party system. As already documented elsewhere, the belated process of political liberalization was brought to a grinding halt on 18 September 1988 when the Tatmadaw (armed forces) once again took power in the name of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). A hierarchy of Law and Order Restoration Councils — very similar to the 1962-era Security and Administrative Committees — was established at central, regional, and local levels. The SLORC government also quickly suspended the 1974 Constitution, dissolved both parliament and local administration and purged the civil service of several thousand personnel suspected of participating in mass demonstrations.26
The Civil Bureaucracy in Stratocratic Myanmar (1988—present) Among other things, military regimes are usually characterized by a high degree of centralization, an emphasis on authority, little, if any, civil administrative and managerial autonomy, and few consultative bodies and proceedings. Post-1988, Myanmar’s military regime has not been much different. Indeed, the post-1988 military period provides both similarities and contrasts with the BSPP approach to the country’s civil bureaucracy. This is unsurprising since one of the fundamental legacies from the socialist era is the inheritance of a largely unaccountable and corrupt bureaucracy. As seen earlier, under the old regime presided over and dominated by General Ne Win, the civil bureaucracy was a central linchpin of the highly centralized, inward-looking idiosyncratic rule. The dominant test of
152
Alex M. Mutebi
appointment to the civil service was loyalty to the regime. In operation, the bureaucracy remained largely overstaffed, lethargic, and prone to corruption albeit with only a few changes as the BSPP era morphed into the current one headed by the Tatmadaw.27 In the transition to a mostly market-oriented economy, Myanmar experienced the inevitable economic distortions, uncertainties, and instabilities. Many of the economic changes of the post-1988 period had some impact on the bureaucracy as well. Yet even after Ne Win’s BSPP order collapsed, restructuring of the civil bureaucracy remained a low priority amid the drama of the prolonged struggle between Myanmar’s military government and the political opposition and the military’s attempts at state building and consolidation. Though the end of the BSPP era ushered in the end of Ne Win’s authoritarian rule, it never quite translated into the complete disintegration of the allpervasive, over-extended, and over-politicized state bureaucracy. True, the change in state ideology led initially to administrative confusion, especially during the period leading up to the 1990 election. Many civil servants, particularly in the period immediately following the coup, found their salaries inadequate to keep up with inflation, more or less forcing them to fraudulently supplement their income through the exploitation of the colossal stockpile of formal regulations inherited from the socialist era as well as through other extra-legal means. As such, the post-BSPP era civil bureaucracy has largely remained pre-Weberian–operating by the inconsistent application of formal and informal rules and regulations in a state that can probably best be described as institutional ataxia. Though still extensive today, Myanmar’s bureaucracy is generally only selectively controlled, allowing its personnel to continue to extract “rents” from society in an arbitrary and unaccountable fashion when and if they can get away with it. Indeed, although grossly underpaid, jobs within the bureaucracy are still largely valued as an opportunity to extract as much lucre as possible where and when opportunities exist, especially as many bureaucrats find themselves well positioned to exploit the continuing transition to a more market-oriented economy.28 The ideology of Myanmar’s current military rulers is still largely that of mobilization, seeking to place the key resources of society at the service of an expansionist state, as was the case during the socialist era. For example, the military retains a vast planning machinery that it uses to institute multi-year socioeconomic plans, particularly in social and infrastructure ministries. Bent primarily on preserving a unitary state, on
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy
153
containing civil unrest, on bringing the rest of territorial Myanmar under central government control, and on state-building, the military government does not seem particularly interested in civil administrative affairs. Instead, the military leadership regards itself and its structures of power and control as generally superior to the ineffective rules and bureaucratic procedures inherited from the BSPP era, particularly as the leaders emphasize the “caretaker” and “transitory” nature of the current government. In most government ministries as well as departments, corporations as well as state economic enterprises, active and retired military officers are appointed or seconded as executives. In addition to a 1991 decree banning civil servants and their relatives from participation in overt political activity, SLORC’s successor, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), set out to revamp the Civil Service Selection and Training Board (CSSTB), the agency responsible for the recruitment and training of university-educated (or gazetted) officers as well as for scrutinizing any proposals by government agencies regarding civil service personnel.29 Yet rather than expand governmental prerogatives through the civil bureaucracy, the military’s reassertion into all aspects of the state machinery has progressively overwhelmed already inefficient civil administrative structures. Indeed, the subversion of Myanmar’s civil administration under military rule since 1988 has been piecemeal and extemporized, the effect, perhaps, of a combination of ineptitude, impatience, and neglect rather than the pursuit of any obvious alternative. In that way, the relatively less bureaucratic character of the military rule contrasts with practices during the BSPP’s socialist era. Whereas space considerations preclude a discussion of the state-building roles of the Tatmadaw during the post-BSPP era, it should be noted that since taking up the reigns of power, the armed forces have also taken on many responsibilities that are traditionally associated with the civil bureaucracy including the initiation, co-ordination, and implementation of policies in almost all areas of government.30 And in the countryside, where the General Affairs Department of the central government’s Home Ministry has essentially ceded administrative authority to the regional military commanders, the role of the civilian bureaucracy is marginal at best.31 In the frontier provinces that have only recently come under some form of central government control especially, but also elsewhere in provincial Myanmar, there is an almost personal form of sub-national rule where local Tatmadaw commanders and ceasefire group leaders wield all but complete power.32 Elsewhere local government generally takes the form of
154
Alex M. Mutebi
local representation of both central government and a central budget within the military government’s Yangon-based planning system. In many ways, these forms of’“local government” are the grass-roots end of the military regime’s control and patronage system, ensuring that regional commanders and ceasefire groups are acquiescent, thereby maintaining internal “security” and preserving the country’s territorial integrity. The corruption and dysfunction that exist at local levels are thus indivisible from the corruption and dysfunction of the individuals who represent it, and this is better known and understood here than it is with the more remote individuals higher up, often shielded by the government’s powerful information machinery.
Challenges and Prospects for the Civil Bureaucracy during Myanmar’s Transition The Myanmar bureaucracy can almost be said to be a synonym for inflexibility, lethargy, anachronism, unresponsiveness, and interference. The bureaucrats are seen as people whose dull working lives are spent pushing paper, an act that results only in confusion, circumlocution, and unnecessary red tape. One of the first challenges in overcoming the bureaucracy’s present shortcomings is to recognize publicly not only that problems once existed but that they have enduring repercussions today. Myanmar’s postindependence history cannot be swept under the rug along with the memory of General Ne Win and the BSPP. The socialist era, much like the parliamentary and colonial eras before it, left living, breathing legacies locked into contemporary Myanmar’s body politic in the form of the civil bureaucracy, an institution that each of the ruling elite in the respective periods tried hard to fashion to its needs and ideals. Accordingly, the first step is to be clear and open about that long post-independence legacy, to appreciate and understand it, and to decide just what is to be done about it. Otherwise, rather than the civil bureaucracy facilitating change, it will, if only through inertia and lethargy, continue to play its part in the frustration of state transformation. Many of these problems and obstacles stem from the fact that for the latter half of the twentieth century for most people in Myanmar that is how bureaucracy was “supposed to work”. During much of that time, change, except by fiat from the centre, represented a threat, and was seldom, if ever, envisaged by those who presided over that bureaucracy. Some far-reaching and bold statement will thus have to be
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy
155
made making clear just what is the role of the bureaucracy in relation to the public and the political ethos of twenty-first century Myanmar. And the people of Myanmar are going to want to know in what ways their bureaucrats will be held responsible for their actions, since they will no longer be able to hide behind the shield of indifference so common in the past as well as today. As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, it is rather unfortunate that the focus of the national debate in Myanmar today is overwhelmingly on the struggle between the military government and the political opposition, as well as on lack of compromise among the protagonists’ ideological paradigms, and not with the nature of the agency that must, ultimately, translate those paradigms and policies into goods and services for the common folk. It is little wonder then that in these circumstances discussion on the nature of public service in general, and of the bureaucracy in particular, is largely absent. Thus it is still a bit premature to say when and whether a much more professional bureaucracy will take root in Myanmar. In this uncertain period of Myanmar’s history, while much of the rest of the world is trying to cope with change, time becomes the enemy of real reform. Yet it is imperative that policy debate on the nature and role of bureaucracy in contemporary Myanmar takes place at the highest levels to facilitate effective agreement on the relevant rules and principles. Under the present military government there has been seen no failure to swiftly pass new laws nor to update old ones and thus, at least hypothetically, new laws could be written specifying procedures for, say, the recruitment, promotion, compensation, and dismissal of bureaucrats. The critical issue, however, is the basis upon which such laws, or for that matter, any broader public sector reform laws can be constructed, and whether or not the country’s civil bureaucracy needs much more than the passage or amendment of laws and regulations to give it direction and momentum and push it in a Weberian direction characterized by, among other things, meritocratic recruitment and predictable, long-term career rewards.
“What Then?” and Other Concluding Thoughts Overcoming the difficult inheritances from Myanmar’s past is an important component of state consolidation amidst new challenges. With regards to civil bureaucracy, the task is to move it away from the highly political
156
Alex M. Mutebi
mode of operation that peaked during the socialist era towards a more professional Weberian model. Only when that long-term goal has been achieved will it make any sense to contemplate applying the latest fads and fashions in public management to the country’s bureaucracy or the wider public sector. Indeed, any premature preoccupation with hardware, software, styles, and gimmicks is likely to produce only a bureaucracy efficiently worse than it was previously or, in fact, still is. For contemporary Myanmar, a public administration steeped in “old fashioned” Weberian concepts remains a reasonable and even demanding aspiration even as it comes to be seen as inadequate for the longer term. Whatever the ultimate form of Myanmar’s political economy, it is clear that a reformed civil bureaucracy will play a vital role. Again, how that is to be defined is contingent upon the country’s unfolding political process. Whatever the outcome of that process, the bureaucracy ought to help facilitate that change, limit abuse in the public sector, and otherwise aspire to the prerequisites of a modern economy. Facilitating events is a world away from insisting, as a part of the bureaucracy, on doing them yourself, and will require new attitudes, new skills, and new dynamism aimed at results rather than routinized procedures of yesteryear. These are hardly traits to be found in Myanmar’s monopolistic, highly centralized post-independence bureaucracy in which many of its rank-and-file are ever seeking out opportunities for privilege, nepotism, and kickbacks. But that is precisely what is being advised: that one system is transformed into the other. To be sure, comprehensive change as handmaiden of both state transformation and a modern bureaucracy in what is essentially still a traditional spoils context will certainly work against the perceived interests of those who have long benefited from exploiting their positions in the public service. This calls for cutting down the number of lucrative hurdles and unravelling the complex system of “rents” and kickbacks. Indeed, moving away from such a spoils and patronage system will represent a personal setback for those who continue to benefit enormously from the way the civil bureaucracy has functioned since Myanmar’s independence, but particularly since the dawn of the socialist era. And far from mere indifference and lassitude from them, one would expect resentment to be a natural outgrowth of any efforts at serious bureaucratic reform under these circumstances. In this context it is important that Myanmar’s bureaucrats be given a new set of rules to replace the old ones, and even more important, be
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy
157
availed a set of ethics and values to govern their role, attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour. Perhaps the central guiding tenet should be that which seeks to the greatest possible extent that control of the civil bureaucracy should rest with the public and officials who are representative of that public. Whereas this may sound implausible today when the control mindset is still strong and national politics not quite sorted out, it is not inconceivable at some future point.
Notes 1. See Cook and Minogue (1993). 2. See, for example, World Bank (1997) which examines the role of the state in economic development. 3. See, for example, Guyot (1966). 4. See, for example, Cook, Kennedy, and Raitt (1989), and de Weerd (1992). 5. Bureaucratic reform programmes specially tailored for developing countries have been around in one form or another since the inception of “development administration” in the 1950s. However, their mostly late twentieth century manifestations starting in the 1980s and 1990s were far more radical than the incremental efforts of those earlier years. 6. See, for example, Peters (2001), pp. 348–56. 7. For other efforts at the periodization of modern Myanmar as well as more detailed treatments of the respective periods, see, for example, Mya Maung (1991); Steinberg (2001); and Tinker (1957). 8. A stratocracy is a government of armed forces (coined from Greek stratos “army”). 9. See, in this regard, Smith (1991), Lintner (1994), and ICG (2003). 10. See, for example, Callahan (2003); and Callahan (2001), pp. 413–29. 11. See, in this regard, Weber (1968). Subsequent analysis by others (for example, Polanyi 2001) also echoed Weber’s views. 12. Sometimes the term is used more broadly to refer to the “public sector” (also referred to as the “public service” or “public administration”), which encompasses all employees whose salary comes directly or indirectly from the public purse. For the purposes of this chapter, teachers, law enforcement and military personnel, for example, are all excluded even though the public sector is normally taken to include them. 13. See, for example, Donnison (1953), p. 110, and Guyot (1966). 14. See, in this regard, Harvey (1946), pp. 30–48. 15. Ibid., p. 91. 16. Ibid., pp. 89–105. 17. Ibid., p. 110.
158
Alex M. Mutebi
18. See, in this regard, Taylor (1987), p. 296. 19. The civil bureaucracies of several Middle Eastern regimes, for instance, undoubtedly played positive roles during the 1950s and 1960s, when they helped to foster economic modernization. In particular, modernizing bureaucracies were able to initiate state-sponsored development even against the opposition of conservative landowners, in conjunction with the military and a strong national leader such as Egyptian President Abdul Nasser (1956–70). Similarly, during the 1970s in several Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina, bureaucratic technocrats, protected by repressive military governments, imposed more modern economies against opposition from some social groups — a phenomenon sometimes referred to as “bureaucratic-authoritarianism. (See O’Donnell 1979.) Likewise, several of the high-performing economies of East Asia (Malaysia, for example) provide more recent examples of the contribution civil bureaucracies can make to economic development in non-democratic settings. A powerful civil bureaucracy in Malaysia was able to ensure that long-term investment occurred, with strong political leaders helping to resist pressures for short-term improvements for ordinary Malaysians. 20. For example, Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 10, respectively, deal with: the structure of the state, the powers of the Council of State, the role of the Council of Ministers, and the general pattern of local authorities. 21. For more on the rapid expansion of the bureaucracy during the socialist era, see Taylor (1987), pp. 309–11. 22. See, in this regard, Taylor (1987), and Guyot (1966). 23. Even in the agricultural sector where most of the farmland did in fact remain in private hands with freedom of choice in cultivation and marketing, those farms, mainly in the dry zone, that fell under the ministry of agriculture entailed a sizeable workforce. 24. See, in this regard, Maung Maung Gyi (1983), pp. 184–224. 25. See, in this regard, Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2003). 26. See, in this regard, de Weerd (1992), pp. 89–102, Tin Maung Maung Than (2001), p. 221. 27. SLORC transformed itself into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997 in a major shake-up of the junta whereby only the top four generals in the eighteen-member ruling body remained. 28. See, for example, Tin Maung Maung Than (2001), p. 222. 29. Ibid., p. 221. 30. Callahan (2001), pp. 425–26. 31. The General Affairs Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs is the key agency, at least in theory, through which sub-national administration down to the township level is exercised. 32. See, in this regard, Tin Maung Maung Than (2001), pp. 217, 237.
“Muddling Through” Past Legacies: Myanmar’s Civil Bureaucracy
159
References Callahan, M. P. “Soldiers as State Builders”. In Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, edited by M. Alagappa, pp. 413–29. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 2001. ———. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003 Cook, P., J. Kennedy, and R. Raitt. “Initial Assessment Mission into Rehabilitating and Modernizing the Public and Private Sectors in Myanmar”. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 1989. Cook, P. and M. Minogue “Economic-Reform and Political-Change in Myanmar (Burma)”. World Development 21, no. 7 (1993): 1151–61. de Weerd, G. “Macro-Analysis of the Public Administration of the Union of Myanmar”. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 1992. Donnison, F. S. V. Public Administration in Burma: A Study of Development during the British Connexion. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953. Guyot, J. F. “Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma”. In Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, edited by R. J. D. Braibanti, pp. 354–443. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966. Harvey, G. E. British Rule in Burma, 1824–1942. London: Faber and Faber, 1946. International Crisis Group (ICG). “Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics”. Asia Report No. 52. Brussels, ICG, 2003. Kyaw Yin Hlaing. “Reconsidering the Failure of the Burma Socialist Programme Party Government to Eradicate Internal Economic Impediments”. Southeast Asia Research. 11, no. 1 (2003): 5–58. Lintner, B. Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. Maung Maung. Burma’s Constitution. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1959. Maung Maung Gyi. Burmese Political Values: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarianism. New York: Praeger, 1983. Mya Maung. The Burma Road to Poverty. New York: Praeger, 1991. Mya Sein, Daw. The Administration of Burma. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. (First published Rangoon: Zabu Meitswe Pitaka Press, 1938). O’Donnell, G. A. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979. Peters, B. G. The Politics of Bureaucracy. 5th ed. New York: Routledge, 2001. Polanyi, K. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001. (First published Farrar & Rinehart, 1944.)
160
Alex M. Mutebi
Pye, L. W. “The Army in Burmese Politics”. In The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, edited by J. J. Johnson, pp. 231–51. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962. Silverstein, J. Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. Smith, M. J. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London: Zed Books, 1991. Steinberg, D. I. Burma, the State of Myanmar. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001. Taylor, R. H. The State in Burma. London: C. Hurst, 1987. Tin Maung Maung Than. “Myanmar: Military in Charge”. In Government and Politics in Southeast Asia, edited by John Funston, pp. 203–51. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001. Tinker, H. The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Weber, M. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Translated by Ephrain Fischoff et al. and edited by Ruenther Roth and claus Wittich. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968. Originally pubslihed as Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 4th ed. World Bank. The State in a Changing World. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997.
Reproduced from Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg > The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar 161
7 The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar Morten B. Pedersen
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, policy-makers and students of comparative government alike have celebrated the large number of countries which supposedly have made the “transition to democracy”. Yet, behind the numbers lies an extraordinarily complex reality and immense problems for most of these countries in making democracy “real”. The mere fact of “free and fair” multi-party elections, the most commonly used indicator of democracy, says little about the actual distribution of power and almost nothing about the quality of governance and broader development of the countries in question. “Democratization” is a highly complex, multi-faceted and openended process, involving shifts in many different spheres of governance and social relations, often including a stop to armed conflict, the introduction of regular elections for government office, greater freedom of speech and association, an expansion of civil society, and improvements in economic and educational opportunities for the general population. It is the totality of these processes that matters, both for the sustainability of democracy as a system of government and for progress in human security and welfare. When considering the challenges of transition in Myanmar, it is critically important to keep these complexities in mind. The Myanmar people may both want and need “democracy”, although perceptions of what that entails differ greatly within the country. But there is no single path forward, no one event — whether the inauguration of a new constitution, the holding of multi-party elections or the convening of an elected parliament — that would define success, and no endgame to win 161
162
Morten B. Pedersen
or loose. Instead, the focus should be on the multitude of issues that needs to be resolved to facilitate the country’s progress towards peace, prosperity, and participatory government. Only then may we begin to capture the true meaning of democratization, and realize the many potential benefits that such a process undoubtedly holds. This chapter reviews the current situation in Myanmar and discusses key elements of any meaningful transition process, all of which present their own unique challenges but at the same time are closely inter-linked. It also considers the role of the international community in helping the country and its people overcome the structural constraints to political and economic progress.
The Current Situation Since the collapse of Ne Win’s idiosyncratic military-cum-socialist regime in 1988, several attempts have been made at finding an accommodation among Myanmar’s diverse political forces on the nature of a political transition from military to civilian rule, but so far without results. The military government effectively annulled the 1990 election following a landslide victory for the National League for Democracy (NLD), and work on a new constitution, which began in 1993, was abandoned three years later after the NLD withdrew from the military-controlled national convention. The release of opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in May 2002 under conditions which allowed the NLD to resume some political party activities seemed to provide a new window for reconciliation. Yet, deep-seated disagreements continued to hamper dialogue between the two sides and escalating tensions eventually led to another clampdown on the NLD in May 2003. The government has since announced a seven-step “roadmap” to democracy, which includes a reconvening of the National Convention to finish deliberations on the basic principles of a constitution, followed by a referendum and fresh multi-party elections. In the border areas, the cessation of hostilities between the central government and some twenty ethnic nationalist armed groups since the late 1980s has increased communication and confidence among longstanding enemies. The ceasefire agreements, however, are primarily military accords concerned with troop movements and a temporary division of authority. While the former insurgent groups have been accorded varying degrees of autonomy within “special regions”, no real
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
163
progress has been made on resolving the underlying political issues and large areas, particularly in a ribbon along the Thai border, have remained mired in low-level armed conflict and subject to harsh counter-insurgency campaigns. Ongoing peace talks between the government and the Karen National Union (KNU), the strongest of the remaining guerrilla armies, could pave the way for a final stop to fighting across the country. Yet, the sustainability of this embryonic peace will remain open to question unless the long-standing grievances of ethnic nationalists concerning local autonomy, economic equality and cultural rights are effectively dealt with. There are people within the government and the NLD, as well as most ethnic nationalist organizations, who recognize that the only viable way forward is a gradual transition, which accommodates vital interests on all sides. However, others remain committed to irreconcilable “principled” positions. While not discounting the importance of national reconciliation efforts so far, the prospects for a breakthrough in the political deadlock thus remain uncertain. Further progress depends on the ability of moderate forces to overcome long-standing tensions and agree to a framework for co-operative solutions. Meanwhile, the socioeconomic situation continues to deteriorate.
Economic Trends The current military regime has tried to reverse the deteriorating socioeconomic situation, which saw Myanmar designated “Least Developed Country” by the UN in 1987 and fuelled a popular uprising the following year. The benefits of new market economic reforms, however, have accrued primarily to a small privileged elite and have not translated into broadbased improvements in the standard of living. While official government figures show average annual growth rates since 1990 of 7–8 per cent, primarily driven by expanding agricultural production, most qualitative data indicate that socioeconomic conditions are becoming more difficult for a majority of the population. For several years, inflation has greatly outpaced increases in wages and other income opportunities thus seriously eroding the purchasing power of many households.1 This situation was compounded in 2003 by a major banking crisis and new U.S. economic sanctions, which disrupted trade, caused widespread job losses in the cities, and resulted in a significant contraction in overall economic activity.
164
Morten B. Pedersen
Some farmers have gained from rising prices on agricultural produce. However, most land holdings are too small for efficient production, and subsistence farmers and landless labourers, like their urban counterparts, have been hit hard by inflation. Many rural areas are facing growing ecological problems, particularly in the form of deteriorating soil quality arising from overuse or misuse of the land, compounded by widespread deforestation. The results are evident in sharply declining yields for several key cereals. Other natural resources are also coming under increasing pressure as people supplement their income by gathering firewood and other “free” resources. Unable to meet government demands or produce enough food for their families, a growing number of small-scale farmers are falling into debt and losing their land. Worse still are conditions in the remote, mountainous areas along Myanmar’s borders with Thailand, Laos, China, India, and Bangladesh, which have suffered from decades of armed conflict and neglect. Many villages remain inaccessible except by foot or water and lack access to markets and government services. They have no schools or health centres, no electricity, no improved water or sanitation, and little commerce except for visiting traders who supplement otherwise self-sufficient and largely cashless subsistence economies. In the “black” areas along the Thai border, hundreds of thousands of people have been relocated as part of the army’s counter-insurgency campaigns or are hiding in the jungle. These populations are subject to extreme hardships and particularly vulnerable to a range of serious human rights violations. Under increasing strain, many affected families are adopting extreme coping strategies such as cutting meals, taking children out of school, or selling their meagre capital assets. Poverty is also feeding large-scale migration flows around the country and across its borders to Thailand, India, and countries further afield.
Social Conditions Myanmar is today one of the poorest country in Asia in purchasing power parity terms (UN Country Team 2003). According to a 1997 national government survey of household income and expenditure, about onefourth of the population, or 13 million people, are living below minimum subsistence level, with another 5 million living precariously just above it. Many households were spending 70 per cent or more of their budget on food, leaving them highly vulnerable to shocks (World Bank 1999, p. 11).
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
165
More recent figures are unavailable, but economic stagnation and high inflation have undoubtedly made the situation worse. The real poverty incidence may thus be over 50 per cent. Malnutrition is widespread, particularly among children, reflecting general food insecurity, bad maternal health, and limited knowledge about nutrition. About one-quarter of Myanmar babies are born underweight, with long-term implications. At the age of five, almost half is moderately to severely malnourished (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2000). Not surprisingly, infant and under-five mortality rates are also very high, at 71 and 105 per 1,000 live births respectively (Fertility and Reproductive Health Survey, 1997). These are the national average; the figures for most of the border states and divisions are significantly higher and comparable to the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS is increasing rapidly, fuelled by population mobility, poverty, and frustration that breeds risky sexual activity and drug-taking, and is now firmly established in the general population. UNAIDS estimates that over 530,000 people are living with HIV, a third of them women (2000 figures). This translates into about 2 per cent of the most sexually active (and productive) age bracket of fifteen to forty-nine and results in 50,000 new AIDS deaths a year, many of them fathers, mothers, and breadwinners in their families. Sentinel surveillance data show HIV infection rates of 60 per cent among injecting drug users and 38 per cent among sex workers.2 The morbidity and mortality rates of malaria and tuberculosis are also very high. Low educational attainment is also an increasingly serious social, economic, and political problem. Only three out of four children enter primary school, and of those only two out of five complete the full five years. In other words, only 30 per cent of Myanmar children get proper primary schooling (UN Country Team, 2000). Meanwhile, secondary and tertiary education suffers from frequent closures of schools and universities, and falling standards. The official literacy rate is 84.4 per cent; yet, a 1999 UNICEF survey found the real functional literacy rate to be only 53 per cent (ibid.). In many remotes areas, particularly in northern Rakhine state and eastern Shan state, hardly anyone can read and write. Over the past few years, the military government has become more willing to discuss key social problems such as regional disparities and HIV/AIDS. There has also been significant progress in combating certain diseases, reflecting improvements in the delivery of vaccinations and nutritional supplements, as well as wider access to safe water and sanitation,
166
Morten B. Pedersen
much of it supported by the UN and other aid agencies. The prospects for further progress are limited, however, by minimal and falling social sector investments, and current economic trends threaten to erase past achievements.
The Challenges of Transition Four decades of military rule have contributed significantly to Myanmar’s political, social and economic malaise. The top-down, authoritarian approach to governance, compounded by failed economic policies, distorted budget priorities, and widespread human rights violations, has devastated a country once rich in both natural and human resources. Yet, it will require a lot more than regime change to turn the situation around. Many of the obstacles to progress are systemic and deep-rooted and will continue to hamper national development efforts in the foreseeable future whatever the government in charge.
National Reconciliation One of the most difficult challenges facing current and future leaders is the lack of experience with peaceful means of dealing with disagreement. From the independence struggle, through a democratic period marred by high levels of political violence, followed by more than forty years of military stewardship, arms have been the primary means used not just in the pursuit of power but also to settle differences over state policy and direction. It is no historical coincidence that the mobilization of supporters during Aung San Suu Kyi’s party organizational tours around the country in 2003 was cut short by violence, or that dissident groups overseas have since renewed calls for a U.S. invasion and armed struggle. The ongoing peace talks between the government and the KNU and the reconvening of a fairly inclusive National Convention to draft the principles for a new constitution demonstrate a perception on all sides that military solutions are untenable. Yet, so far, as exemplified by the NLD’s boycott of the National Convention, the perceived need to break the longstanding political deadlock has not been matched by sufficiently widespread confidence that a satisfactory outcome can be reached through co-operation and compromise. Five decades of continuous conflict, compounded by the often confrontational positions assumed by both the military government and pro-democracy forces since 1990, culminating in the May 2003 attack
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
167
on the NLD leadership, have created an atmosphere of alienation, distrust and a lack of basic understanding and empathy. These conflicts are not just an elite-level phenomenon. Racial, ethnic, and religious tensions run high in the general population, reinforced by an intensifying struggle over scarce resources. Many people in Myanmar identify strongly with their own group against outsiders, and prejudices against other groups are often strong. Pervasive discontent over tough economic conditions and frustration in the absence of any real prospect for change fuel conflicts between insiders and outsiders. The situation in many ways is roughly comparable to India or Indonesia, although it has yet to be expressed in the same levels of communal violence. The 1988 uprising, which had a dark underside in lynchings and extensive looting, as well as the religious violence between Buddhists and Muslims that has rocked several main towns since 2001,3 reflect these tensions. This lack of cohesion in society and resultant psychological resistance to co-operation constitutes a fundamental obstacle to political and economic progress which transcends the nature of the political system. A democratic process could facilitate inclusion of presently excluded groups and interests and allow the healing to begin, but it would also open the door for demagoguery and agitation based on racial and religious identity that could fuel latent violence.
State-Building The long years of armed conflict have not only divided the country but also weakened the state. Despite significant improvements since the early years of independence when the U Nu government, faced with a plethora of mutinies and insurgencies, controlled only the main cities and towns, the authority of the central state is still contested in many parts of the country. Moreover, co-ordination among state institutions is weak. This undermines the ability of the government to implement policies effectively across the country and thus to initiate and guide appropriate development efforts. While the ceasefire movement in the 1990s has extended government presence — or, at least, army presence — further into the border areas than at any time in the past, “special regions” remain formally under control of ethnic nationalist armies or militias. The degree of autonomy varies from group to group, but in parts of eastern Shan state under control of the United Wa State Army central government officials apparently need consent to enter Wa territory. These and other regions along the Chinese border are
168
Morten B. Pedersen
for most intents and purposes identified with China rather than Myanmar. The common language is Chinese; the practical currency is the yuan; they use the Chinese telecommunication system; and most trade and investment comes from China. Further south, along the border with Thailand, other areas are essentially ungovernable due to continued armed conflict. The situation is further complicated by unclear demarcations of authority within the central state. Since 1988, there has been a de facto devolution of power to regional army commanders, who have almost unlimited authority over military, political, economic, and social affairs in their areas. This system works quite well for security purposes, but has been detrimental to the state’s development capacity. While some commanders are efficient managers, others are not, and there is little oversight or co-ordination among them. They act largely with impunity, and routinely override ministerial directives from Yangon.4 The widespread perception that democracy would reunite the country more or less automatically is not borne out by talks with ethnic nationalist leaders, many of who distrust all Burman-dominated organizations, including the NLD, and might well resist closer incorporation into the central state.5 Moreover, any new government would continue to rely on the army for security in the border areas and thus be limited in its ability to assert civilian supremacy and bring regional commanders under control.
Civil Service Reform These macro-level obstacles are compounded by the weakness of the civil service. Since the military coup in 1962, the administrative structure has been greatly weakened (see Chapter 6 by Alex Mutebi in this volume). The military culture of top-down decision-making has further stifled creativity and independent thinking at all levels, while the erosion of real wages has fuelled corruption and absenteeism. There are still a significant number of well-educated civil servants (although many are close to, or beyond, retirement age), and in some areas reasonable technical and professional skills have been maintained even if there is limited scope for applying them. Yet, the capacity of the institution as a whole has been severely compromised. There is no transparency or accountability, no culture of reform and improvement, and little commitment to public service.6 Even if there were a political transition, a new government would be dependent on the existing administrative apparatus. This, in turn,
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
169
would pose immense obstacles to effective governance, at least in the short- to medium-term. The administrative problems are compounded by an acute lack of capacity at the local level. Any effective democracy would depend critically on a decentralization of both power and administrative responsibility to the fourteen states and divisions. Indeed, support for a democratic government by the country’s ethnic minority groups would depend on such decentralization. Yet, the experience of the ceasefire groups, which currently have authority over the special regions, stems from wartime administration and economics. Few, if any, are familiar with modern government methods.
Overcoming Budget Constraints The weakness of governance structures has created another structural problem. The Myanmar government today generates less than 3 per cent of GDP in revenue, one of the lowest levels in the world. This greatly limits its capacity to carry out necessary social investments, and contributes to corruption and other violations of power. Many of the human rights violations most often cited today, such as forced labour and illegal expropriation of land and other assets, are linked to the self-reliance policy of the army, which requires each unit to largely feed and fund itself. Like the weakness of the civil service, the poverty of the state will continue to constrain the ability of a new civilian government to address key issues such as economic reform, social sector expansion, and human rights violations. Increased international assistance might ease the burden, but cannot compensate for a sufficient, balanced national budget. In fact, pressure for market-economic reforms from the international financial institutions could make the situation worse.7 The need to rebuild public confidence in the government, revamp the tax system, root out deeply ingrained structures of corruption, and cut military expenditures through demobilization may well be beyond the means of inexperienced civilian leaders subject to electoral pressures.
Empowerment Finally, and most importantly, a truly inclusive, democratic political system that gives all groups a voice in the governance of their areas and protects both individual and group rights does not result simply from the reform of
170
Morten B. Pedersen
formal structures of government, but depends on the empowerment of ordinary people. Absent this, democracy will remain essentially elitist and do little to overcome the root causes of conflict and inequality. Yet, the large majority of the population in Myanmar is subsistence farmers, often functionally illiterate and with limited or no experience of the world beyond their villages. Many people have had little contact with the central state and thus can hardly be expected to show commitment to its political structures, whether democratic or not. Further, local power structures are deeply authoritarian, with little capacity for self-governance or space for community participation. Even if democracy were introduced, few citizens would be able to participate, and most would remain voiceless, subject to the powers that be. Before a future democracy can take root in and be meaningful to local communities, it is necessary to transcend the barriers created by the daily struggle for survival, as well as the cultural and structural legacy of repressive, autocratic rule, and build a more vibrant civil society. This requires major efforts to combat poverty, improve access to education and information, and strengthen local organizations.
The Role of the International Community8 The path to the creation of a government and society capable of realizing Myanmar’s great potential will be long and torturous. In order to help move the process forward, international actors therefore need to match principles with a pragmatic search for solutions, and develop a strategic framework that has long-, medium-, and short-term components. They would also do well to embrace a more holistic concept of human security and welfare.
Long-Term Goals One of the greatest weaknesses of international policies over the past fifteen years has been the lack of a long-term perspective. By identifying a transfer of power to the NLD as the immediate and, in some cases, only objective, Western countries have given up the opportunity to help improve current conditions and build the basis for a gradual transition. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s regional neighbours have failed to demonstrate a clear, strategic purpose in the country beyond furthering short-term, national, or corporate interests.
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
171
Despite disagreements over strategy, Western and Asian countries should be able to agree on three long-term goals for Myanmar, which together provide a set of benchmarks against which particular developments and policies can be judged: • • •
A stable country that is at peace with itself and its neighbours. A modern, growing economy that meets the needs of the general population. A democratic government that represents and protect the interests of all citizens.
These goals are closely inter-linked. Until Myanmar has a truly representative government, genuine peace and sustainable economic development is likely to remain illusive. The exclusion of major groups from the political process, compounded by deteriorating socioeconomic conditions for the general population, fuels conflict at all levels of society. Moreover, the military government lacks both the will and capacity to implement much-needed economic reforms. Yet without peace and development, democracy may never materialize and would have little meaning, particularly for the many dispossessed. The persistence of conflict and poverty exacerbates the military’s siege mentality and diminishes its willingness to consider political and economic power-sharing. It also greatly weakens political, civil and economic society outside the state.
Short- and Medium-Term Strategies The challenge facing the international community today is how to become more actively engaged in Myanmar in ways that promote the long-term aim of building a peaceful, prosperous and democratic society. There is a need for actions that foster political, economic, and social changes within Myanmar that increase domestic pressure for change and build the basis for successful reform once the opportunity arrives. This, in turn, requires a multi-track approach that combines mediation with broader peace-building initiatives and carefully targeted technical and material assistance to help revitalize and reorient a stagnating and increasingly unequal society and economy. Mediating a Negotiated Settlement Since 1988, Western policy has been predicated on the assumption that the military government, given sufficient pressure, could be forced to hand
172
Morten B. Pedersen
over power to an elected parliament. This approach is self-defeating. While it is important that the people’s aspirations expressed in the 1990 election be recognized, the demand for the military to withdraw from politics effectively obstructs any process of change. There is virtually no chance that any military leader, now or in the foreseeable future, would agree to such conditions. The aim of the international community should be to help resolve the political deadlock and the conflicts feeding it rather than promote the interests of one party over others. There is a need to focus on process over outcome, to maintain strict impartiality, and to take the cue from domestic actors in promoting realistic solutions. The objective is not to push or impose a particular outcome, but to facilitate a co-operative process, which will allow all sides to move creatively from stalemate towards new positions. If a sound process can be established, the outcome is likely to be positive for everyone involved. This necessarily means paying equal attention to the interests, real and perceived, of all significant stakeholders. No solution is possible that ignores vital interests of those who have the power to veto any process of change; nor should principled positions by any group be encouraged if they impede a reasonable compromise between competing interests. The National Convention proposed by the government as part of its seven-point road map provides a possible way forward. While critics perceive the constitution-drafting process merely as a delaying tactic, it provides important opportunities which must be explored in good faith by all involved. The hostility and resultant rigidity between key military leaders and Aung San Suu Kyi always made it unlikely that any substantive agreements could be reached at that level. Also, past discussions across this divide have sidelined other important political forces, most notably those representing ethnic minority interests. Of the three main actors in Myanmar politics only the political parties are primarily concerned about democracy; for the military and the ethnic nationalist armies, the core issue at stake is the degree of centralization of state power. It is imperative therefore that future reconciliation talks embrace all sides in the conflict and engage issues of the distribution of power both at the centre and between the central government and the regions. Democrats at home and abroad, understandably, are concerned that constitutional discussions dominated by the military will simply serve to enshrine military rule. However, this process is not the endgame. A constitution is a living document, which in most countries is changed or
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
173
adjusted regularly as power relations and interests change. This may even be written into the constitution by including sunset clauses or other mechanisms for amendments. In the meantime, agreement on a set of rules for political competition, even if significant constraints remain, would create new space for political activity which could be used to work for further reform. The challenge is to ensure that the National Convention and subsequent steps on the road map are as inclusive as possible and allow substantial participation and exchange of views. All sides should emerge from the process with some significant gains and confidence that their vital interests are protected. Increasing Information Flows One of the most important functions of foreign governments and international organizations in Myanmar today is to help the government and its citizens to acquire, process, and critically evaluate the information they need to move forward. This not only involves basic data gathering, analysis, and dissemination, but also introduction to new models, approaches, and values aimed at reforming established attitudes and behaviour patterns. Knowledge plays a critical role in producing change in all areas and at all levels. Whether the objective is democratization, good governance, or specific policy reforms, progress ultimately depends on (a) an understanding by all stakeholders of the nature of the problems faced, (b) a perception of relevant solutions, and (c) institutional capacity to implement them. This, in turn, requires a free flow of information, both within the government, between government and society, and in and out of the country, the exact opposite of what results from isolation whether self-imposed or enforced from the outside. There is a critical distinction between censuring a government that violates international norms, and isolating it. While the former may increase the pressure for reform, the latter tends to diminish it. As a regime becomes more isolated, it becomes easier for it to insulate its members from the kind of discomfiting exchanges with critics that require them to defend and possibly begin to question and eventually rethink their perceptions of economic, political, and other realities. In fact, the more isolated a regime is, the more likely it is that it will only come into contact with outsiders who support it and agree with its view of the world.
174
Morten B. Pedersen
Donors can help to create new imperatives and inducements for change by linking aid commitments to increased transparency and accountability in specific areas. This will involve government officials in co-operative efforts to identify the nature and extent of current problems and develop serious policies to address them. Over the longer term, when exercised with a clear focus and understanding of the obstacles, international engagement can encourage the development of a new bureaucratic culture by exposing current and future government officials to more modern, public service-minded ways of thinking. It can also provide much-needed, alternative institutional models. Of course, international actors should never simply parachute in anything. They need to work incrementally and patiently, and develop yardsticks for measuring progress in areas of concern. None of these changes come easily. Most people and institutions resist reforms, particularly if they are perceived to involve a loss of power and perks. Militaries tend to be more self-contained than most institutions, often seeing openness to outsiders as a mark of weakness. However, even small changes can have immediate benefits for a long-suffering population and help to build the conditions for a successful political transition. The alternative would be for a new democratic government to take over institutions ill-equipped to fulfil their new roles. Of course, critical engagement should not be directed at the current government and state institutions alone. Myanmar can only ever begin to realize its potential if all major stakeholders work together. International actors can support this, not just by pushing for political dialogue, but also by helping the government, the political parties, and other groups develop a common understanding of the challenges at hand in a variety of policy areas.9 Strengthening the Independent Sectors The independent sectors (here understood to include political and civil society, as well as the private business sector) provide another critical focus for international efforts to promote a better future for Myanmar.10 The “success” of military regimes since 1962 in co-opting or destroying most organizations outside the state, compounded by the country’s general underdevelopment and a huge brain drain, greatly diminishes the prospects of a smooth transition from military rule, and of democracy taking root. Motivation for change rarely builds up sufficiently within states to generate genuine reforms unless there is strong pressure from political parties,
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
175
professional associations, or broader social movements. Such groups also serve as important partners for the state. Political and civil society organizations help governments by providing ideas, information and feedback, by performing much-needed services, and by mobilizing the population in support of government programmes. The private business sector is a source of the skills, capital, entrepreneurial drive and connections that are needed to compete in the global economy. International pressure on the government may have helped the NLD survive as a legal political party. However, the links between Western governments and political opposition groups have reinforced the military regime’s natural propensity to suppress all political activity. In contrast, the activities of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are helping create some space for local groups involved in social welfare and development activities. Such work should be stepped up, and expanded to include support for business organizations and private sector service delivery networks. This is not primarily about building political opposition. The main value lies in reshaping attitudes and ideas, to empower people at a very basic level, and help them establish co-operative links with each other and, eventually, with local and national authorities. Several major challenges confront international actors in this area (and the independent sector groups themselves): First, the military government remains hostile to many forms of social action outside the state and is intent to enforce absolute orthodoxy across a full range of policy areas. This reflects authoritarian values common to militaries around the world, but also its deep fear of society. The rise of powerful, militant challenges to the state from particularistic groups (ethnic insurgencies) and society at large (the 1988 uprising) have brought down state repression of a broad and indiscriminate character, which has greatly diminished the space for the independent sectors. Secondly, Myanmar society exhibits a pronounced lack of “social capital”.11 The country, historically, has suffered from paralysing divisions, which have seen organizations divide internally around rival leaders and prevented groups from coalescing around common national goals. The issue of ethnicity has created some particularly deep fault lines. However, factionalism is rife also within ethnic and other communities. The persistence of these traits today is evident in the inability of opposition groups, both inside the country and exile groups abroad, to build a broad anti-authoritarian front. Only the central coalition of opposition forces around Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD has maintained a reasonable
176
Morten B. Pedersen
unity, largely due to the unique status and charisma of the opposition leader. Thirdly, the political behaviour of people in Myanmar, like everywhere, tends to mirror the culture, state, and society in which they live. Authoritarian thinking and structures are evident among most civilian groups, as is the obsession with unity. There is a strong inclination among subordinates not only to defer to the leader, but also to push responsibility upwards. Even democratically inclined leaders tend to be placed in position of almost absolute power by the behaviour of other members. These attributes go beyond the fear and constraints generated by state repression.12 Such characteristics, however, should not be perceived as definite obstacles to grass-roots mobilization, but as challenges to be overcome. The military government clearly would not rush to embrace a programme aimed at strengthening the independent sectors in all their shapes and forms. However, many military officers, and not least their wives, children and relatives, are now trying to carve out roles for themselves outside the core of the state, primarily in business but also in various social organizations. There are also government officials who are beginning to understand that independent organizations create an opportunity to begin a process of societal healing and rebuilding that could reinforce and supplement negotiations on the political front.13 Training programmes among exile groups in Thailand and overseas do not represent a viable alternative. The effect of this work, so far, is ambiguous at best. Moreover, the belief that democracy can be built in freedom outside the country and transferred back home once the military regime collapses is highly questionable. There is little room for dissidents in a gradual process of liberalization-by-negotiation which is the most likely scenario for change in Myanmar. The exiles may also find that their colleagues, who stayed behind in the country and have suffered through a decade of intense repression, will be reluctant to share future leadership positions. Alleviating Poverty International efforts to alleviate poverty are both a humanitarian and political imperatives and must proceed irrespective of the ebbs and flows of national level politics, subject only to reasonable criteria of transparency, accountability, and efficiency. Millions of children and adults, right now, are suffering from illnesses, malnutrition, and lack of education. By the time a new government takes over, many may be dead or too disadvantaged
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
177
to reap the rewards. This situation requires immediate action by all who have the power to make a difference. The political imperative of poverty alleviation is perhaps less well understood, but no less important. The potential for a social collapse and resultant large-scale social conflict has generally been played down by both the military government and the NLD. However, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, reflected in high inflation, rising landlessness, large migration flows across the country and its borders, widespread ecological damage, and spreading urban unemployment and poverty, suggest that there could be major problems ahead. Certainly, the often-heard argument that Myanmar’s climate and rich agricultural land preclude a social disaster is not persuasive in the context of continuing state budget deficits, government intervention in agriculture, increasing inequality and continued population growth. Some argue that social unrest is just what Myanmar needs to press the need for political and economic reform home to the military rulers. However, it is more likely to reinforce the military’s siege mentality, lead to heightened repression, and delay any process of national reconciliation. In any case, the dangers to a new government of taking over at the height of a socioeconomic crisis would be immense. As the frequency of stalled, and even reversed, democratic transitions around the world shows, it is extremely difficult for new, democratic governments faced with deep-seated social and economic problems to satisfy the massive expectations of a long-suffering people who are suddenly set free. The result all too easily could be a rejection of the whole system of government, and quite possibly another military take-over that would set the democratic cause back decades.14 Foreign aid has increased significantly over the past couple of years. Yet, it remains minuscule and is focused in a few areas (mainly primary health care and major diseases, including HIV/AIDS), which — somewhat arbitrarily it seems — have been defined as “humanitarian”. Other areas of equal or greater importance to the welfare of the Myanmar people are largely ignored and under-funded. The primary challenge throughout Myanmar is poverty alleviation. Given that the great majority of poor households depend on subsistence agriculture or farm labour on increasingly marginal land, much more needs to be done to promote appropriate agricultural technologies, facilitate access to land, micro-credit and other inputs, improve conservation knowledge and techniques, and support cottage industries for diversification of incomes. Most communities further identify basic education as an important factor in escaping poverty. This requires
178
Morten B. Pedersen
assistance for school construction, training of teachers, revision of curricula to fit local needs, emphasizing the use of local languages and basic “facts of life” messages, and income generation activities that can be used to subsidize the costs associated with school attendance. Many large-scale development activities are inappropriate while the state remains unable or unwilling to provide a political and administrative environment more conducive to poverty alleviation and effective aid delivery.15 However, humanitarian aid must be redefined to encompass programmes aimed at developing the full range of assets which poor households possess and integrating local communities into the national economy and social infrastructure. Such programmes, by promoting longer term, sustainable improvements in people’s livelihoods, would also go a long way towards addressing specific problems such as internal displacement, opium-growing, human trafficking, and deforestation.16 It is necessary also to re-examine the broader sanctions regime, and in particular the use of trade and investment sanctions. Since the mid 1990s, factory closures and production cut-backs resulting from consumer campaigns against U.S. and European companies sourcing from Myanmar have cost tens of thousands of jobs in Yangon and other cities. The July 2003 U.S. import ban may have cost another 30,000 to 50,000 jobs, mainly for unskilled young women in the garment sector and associated industries.17 Many of these women were the principal breadwinners in their families, which now are struggling to put food on the table and have had to take the children out of school or borrow from local moneylenders at exorbitant rates that push them further into poverty.18 Proponents of these and similar measures may feel that they are “striking a blow” for democracy, but they do so at the expense of Myanmar workers and their families who are losing their jobs and losing hope. This is not to suggest that foreign aid should be expanded mindlessly or that private companies should be sheltered from scrutiny or criticism. The primary aim, however, must be to ensure that both aid agencies and investors operate in politically and socially responsible ways, not to keep them out of a country where they are, or could be, a critical means of development and sustenance for millions of ordinary people.
Conclusion The seriousness of the conflicts dividing Myanmar society and the complex emergencies that flow from them is hard to overestimate. Since
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
179
independence, up to a million people have died in hidden wars in the jungle that continue to take lives every month; and millions more have wasted away as a result of underdevelopment. The installation of an elected government would be an important step forward, but democracy cannot function properly suspended from social realities; nor will it provide a panacea for the country’s deep-seated development problems. Future civilian leaders may well support much-needed economic reforms and efforts to combat corruption and human rights violations. However, few of the structural constraints to peace and prosperity would be resolved, or even significantly lessened, simply by a change in the political system. Myanmar politics historically lacks the qualities of moderation and compromise which lie at the heart of the democratic process, and the central state has neither the authority nor the institutional capacity to effectively implement policies across its realm. The expansion of stable, modern governance structures and the rule of law into areas currently under control of local, army commanders or former insurgent groups will be a difficult and extended process. The greatest challenges to future democratic leaders, though, are the low level of development and the deepening humanitarian crisis which leave the general population disempowered, but increasingly frustrated and expecting much too much from a regime change. Unless more is done to prepare the ground, democracy is likely ultimately to disappoint and could all too easily fail.
Notes 1. In 2002 alone, the price of rice and cooking oil, the two main elements of the traditional Myanmar diet, increased by 2–300 per cent. 2. See the International Crisis Group (2002). 3. More recently, clashes between Buddhist monks and Muslims in Kyaukse in central Myanmar resulted in some fatalities. While dissident groups routinely blame such violence on military agents provocateurs, who allegedly are trying to divert attention from government failures, such explanations ignore the extreme animosity towards Muslims among many of Myanmar’s majority Buddhists and the fact that the government has not attempted to exploit these events for political purposes. On the contrary, it has clamped down hard on those responsible and put a lid on news, clearly fearing an escalation of unrest. 4. Several international agencies report arriving up-country with permission from their counterpart ministries to initiate new development projects, only
180
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Morten B. Pedersen
to be told that central authorities in Yangon had “no power here” (personal communication, Yangon, 2003–04). One member of the Wa Central Executive Committee put it this way: “We only trust [General] Khin Nyunt. He has helped us the past fifteen years. We hear that many Burman support Aung San Suu Kyi, but we do not know her” (personal communication, Wa region, March 2004). In one of the few relatively recent evaluations of the Myanmar bureaucracy, Cook and Minogue conclude that key administrators have little conception of the methods of modern management and lack communication and human relation skills as well as analytical skills. They link this to the lack of job incentives, arguing that low salaries, little delegation to lower levels, and absence of career paths and development opportunities have crippled individual initiative and led to low morale (Cook and Minogue, 1993). The experience so far is not encouraging. While the introduction of market economic reforms since 1988 has significantly increased private sector economic activities, small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs suffer from strong biases in the system, which favours large military holding companies and businesses with close links to the government. In many rural areas, powerful vested interests have taken control of natural resources, including land, forest areas, and waterways, which were previously owned by the state and freely available to everyone, thus crowding out local villagers. Similar problems arise from the increasing privatization of the health and education sectors, which has expanded the overall level of services but raised the costs of access beyond the means of many poor families. Parts of this section draws on the International Crisis Group report, Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?, published in April 2004, but the author takes sole responsibility for any and all arguments and recommendations expressed herein. Incidentally, this would also help all sides in Myanmar realize a value that most seem to share: nationalism. By developing a consensus on how to take the country forward, domestic actors can establish national ownership of the country’s development process and approach the international community to support home-grown solutions to its problems. In authoritarian states, the role of political society (organizations whose primary goal is to win control of the state, or at least some position for themselves within it) is similar to that of civil society (organizations that are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state, and are formed voluntarily by people to protect or extend their interests or values) to the extent that the political parties remain outside, clearly distinct from, and in opposition to the dominant state institutions. Further, both political and civil society are often based in or at least supported by private business. These three “societies” therefore constitute an inter-connected web of
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
181
independent institutions providing a critical counter-weight to those of the state. Social capital is defined here as features of social organization and of culture that improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions, including reciprocity, co-operation and trust (as opposed to hierarchy, fragmentation, and distrust). For a comparative examination of the importance of these characteristics for democracy, see Putnam (1993). The absence of internal democratic structures, as Larry Diamond points out, does not mean that independent sector organizations cannot “represent group interests, check the power of the state, and perform many other democratic functions”. However when, in their own patterns of governance, they “perpetuate norms that penalise dissent, exalt the leader over the group, and cloak the exercise of power”, one thing they will not do is build a culture of democracy (Diamond 1999). This is evident, for example, in the formal registration of two civil society organizations, the Shalom Foundation and the Metta Development Foundation, as well as in the slightly greater latitude given by the authorities to informal community development groups, private media, and so forth, in recent years. If a gradual transition process were to get underway, these areas would likely be among the first to benefit from liberalization. There is a parallel between sanctions as a tool and socioeconomic crisis as a condition for change (with the two obviously being related): While some pressure may be necessary to push a recalcitrant government into action, too much pressure may undermine longer term progress. The space for effective aid delivery remains limited while national pride, military security obsessions, limited understanding of poverty alleviation systems and a rigid bureaucracy continue to obstruct UN agencies, international NGOs and local development groups alike. However, the trend over the past decade has been improving, as aid organizations have been able to expand their geographical spread and begin to address sensitive issues such as HIV/ AIDS. The government, while still woefully ineffective, has slowly begun to acknowledge the seriousness of the situation, and is currently considering ways to improve the institutional framework for aid co-operation. It has also granted increased access to rights-based institutions, including the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and Amnesty International. Critics argue that foreign aid, even for basic needs, could obstruct political reform. However, such fears are not substantiated by experiences on the ground. Humanitarian aid programmes have little political value (except if one believes in revolution through starvation); in fact, the top military leaders seem largely indifferent to them. There are no signs of replacement of
182
Morten B. Pedersen
government investments either. Most foreign aid goes to remote areas and programmes, which would have been unlikely to attract government funding. Also, the amounts are so small compared to the needs that it is hard to see how they would allow the government to switch its investments. On the contrary, by exposing problems and initiating new programmes, aid agencies are pressuring the government to address issues which were previously ignored. See the International Crisis Group (2002). 17. According to a confidential survey by an independent consulting company in Yangon, around 30,000 workers in the garment industry were laid off between July and November 2003 as a direct result of new U.S. sanctions, while an undetermined number stayed on at greatly reduced salaries. Another survey by World Vision found that sixty factories had closed at the cost of 40,000 to 60,000 jobs and with serious spin-off effects for support industries including vendors and hostels. 18. The ultimate tragedy is that the worst hit sector, the garment export industry, was one of the few expanding job markets for unskilled labour, prized for its better salaries and benefits than any other comparable sector. The only alternative for many young women is prostitution and the high risk of attracting HIV/AIDS.
References Cook, P. and M. Minogue. “Economic Reform and Political Change in Myanmar”. World Development 21, no. 7 (1993): 1151–61. Department of Health Planning, Ministry of Health, Myanmar, with support from UNICEF. “Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2000”. Yangon: Department of Health, n.d. Department of Population, Ministry of Immigration and Population and UNFPA.“Fertility and Reproductive Health Survey 1997”. Yangon: Department of Population, n.d. Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. International Crisis Group (ICG). Myanmar: The HIV/AIDs Crisis. Asia Briefing. Bangkok/Brussels: ICG, 2 April 2002. ———. Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid. Asia Report No. 32. Bangkok/ Brussels: ICG, April 2002. ———. Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward? Asia Report No. 78. Yangon/Brussells: ICG, April 2004. Putnam, Robert. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993. UN Country Team (Myanmar). “Country Paper”. Internal working paper. Yangon: UN, January 2000.
The Challenges of Transition in Myanmar
183
———. “A Review of the Humanitarian Situation in Myanmar”. Unpublished monograph. Yangon: UN, April 2003. World Bank. “Myanmar: An Economic and Social Assessment”. Confidential draft. New York: World Bank, 1999.
184
Morten B. Pedersen
Reproduced from Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor and Tin Maung Maung Than (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Index Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg > 185
Index
Abdul Nasser, President, 158 Alaungpaya, King, 4 All Burma Students Union, 13 Amnesty International, 181 Andaman Islands, 71 naval facilities, 37 Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), 14 anti-Japanese guerilla forces, 8 armed conflict, 164 armed groups, 61 Arsa Sarasin, 45 ASEAN Regional Forum, 45 Asia poorest country in, 56 Asian Development Bank, 23, 70, 88, 131 Asian Dialogue Society, 70 Assam, 4 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 30, 57 relations with Myanmar, 44–47, 49 Aung San, General, 9, 62 Blueprint for a Free Burma, 62 Aung San Suu Kyi, 22, 23, 24, 34, 35, 40, 43, 45, 114, 162, 166, 172 Aung-Thwin, Michael, 64
Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC), 57 banking crisis, 163 black market, 20 Border Areas Development Programme (BADP), 58 Bretton Woods’ institutions, 69 British American Tobacco, 35 British conceptual model, 7 British East India Company, 4 British imperialism, 3 consequences, 12 contrasting, 2 distrust towards Bamar nationalists, 49 divide and rule policy, 9 British Indian military power, 4 British Labour government, 13 Buddhism disestablishment, 10 Buddhist monkhood, see sangha budget constraints, 169 bureaucracy, 141 Burma Communist Party (BCP), 13, 33, 57, 92, 103, 113 Burma Independence Army (BIA), 8, 13 Burma Road, 37, 63 Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), 18, 20, 45, 61, 89, 142, 150
Bagan Dynasty, 98 balance of trade, 90 Bamar nationalists, 49 Bamar population, 6, 7, 61, 103, 108 185
186
Burmese ethnic nationalism, 64 CARE, 133 Catholic Bishops Conference, 72 Caucasian racial superiority, 10 censorship, 100 Central Bank, 91 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 15, 31 Central Security and Administrative Committee, 149 Chin National Front, 51 China, 88, see also People’s Republic of China imports from, 95 relations with Myanmar, 35–38, 47 security threat, 19 Chinese minority economic role, 91, 112 Chins, 8 Christian groups external, 103 Christian minority, 8, 15 Christian missionary education institutions, 6, 19 Christianity churches, 64 propagation, 26 civil bureaucracy, 142, 144 challenges, 154, 155 Malaysia, 158 parliamentary era, 146–49 socialist era, 149–51 stratocratic Myanmar, 151–54 civil service inadequate salaries, 91 reforms, 168, 169 colonial rule, 3 Common Border Trade Agreement, 40 communists, 14 compulsory labour, 24
Index
conflicts ethnic, 61 Confucian authority system, 87 constitutions guarantee for future development, 76 constructive engagement, 46 consultative process non-existence, 141 corruption, 20, 93, 100 culture, 106 debts repayment, 20 defence policy, 19 democratic political system, 169 democratization, 161 demonetization, 20, 95 development and infrastructure programmes, 24 diarrhoeal diseases, 120 Director of the Frontier Areas Administration, 63 Dixit, J. N., 40 Do Bama Asiayone (We Burmans Association), 13 drug problems, 46 drug users, 124 Duffield, Mark, 68 duwas, 6 economic assistance foreign, 89 Economic Development of Burma, 93 economic policies need for changes, 93 personal preference of leaders, 93 economic policy formulation, 89 economic problems analysis, 86 economic reforms
Index
governance, link with, 89 problems, 87 economic sanctions, 33 economists civilian, 95 economy centrally planned, 89 elections, 31 ethnic distinctions, 7 ethnic equality, 76 ethnic issues centrality, 70 ethnic leaders, 76 ethnic minorities armed conflict, 58 ethnic nationality parties, 64 status, 78–80 ethnic rights discussions, 3 factories closures, 178 financial assistance, 24 flag marches, 6 flexible engagement, 46 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 44 foreign aid, 90, 102 foreign assistance economic, 89, 90 foreign criticisms, 104 foreign debt, 90 foreign exchange, 92 foreign exchange reserves, 90 shortage, 93 foreign investors, 27, 91, 93 foreign-owned assets nationalization, 16 foreign policy, 19 reactive, 31 foreign relations, 30, 31 foreign rule
187
critique, 12 foreigners disproportionate wealth, 3 distrust, 32 France, 34 4th Burma Rifles, 15 Ganesan, N., 19, 30 gas and oil industry, 24, 34 General Council of Burmese Association (GCBA), 12 geography, 2 Germany, 34 globalization, 104 Golden Triangle, 73 governance link with economic change, 89 grass-roots mobilization, 176 gross domestic product, 56 Gulf of Martaban, 34 health, 117 brief profile, 118, 119 future, 130–34 health campaigns, 120 health services, 119–22 history complex, 1 HIV/AIDS, 118, 122–30, 181 rate of infection, 134 spread, 46, 74, 127–30 Home Ministry General Affairs Department, 153 household income, 164 human trafficking, 73 humanitarian assistance, 24, 107 immunization coverage, 120 import and export restricted list, 50 independence, 13 after, 65
188
Independence Day, 60 independent sectors strengthening, 174–76 India, 71 relations with Myanmar, 38–41, 47, 48 India-Myanmar-Thailand highway, 71 Indian Education Service, 11 Indian labour migration, 5 Indian Ocean access to, 37, 47 indigenous population displacement, 11 indirect rule, 6 Indonesia stabilization of rupiah, 95 Indonesian military dual function, 45 inflation, 24 information import, 106 increasing flow, 173 infrastructural development, 37 institutional checks, 96, 97 International Committee of the Red Cross, 43, 181 international community role, 170 short- and medium-term strategies, 171 International Crisis Group report, 180 International Labour Foundation (ILO), 34, 35, 181 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 23, 69, 70, 86, 88 isolation negative impact, 105 Japan, 112 relations with Myanmar, 41–44, 47, 48
Index
Japanese invasion, 13 Jiang Zemin, 50 joint ventures, 91 Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), 39, 62, 66 Kachins, 8, 81 Kale-Kabaw valley, 75 Karen, 58, 103 Karen Development Committee, 72 Karen National Union (KNU), 15, 39, 46, 57, 60, 71, 73, 77, 82, 163 Kayah (Karenni), 7, 8 Kayin National Union (KNU), 8, see also Karen National Union Kayin state, 75 Keen, David, 61 Kim Dae Jung, President, 87 Kim Jong Il, Chairman, 87 Konbaung Dynasty, 4, 64 Kuomintang troops, 15, 31, 33, 36, 65 labour migration, 11 laissez-faire liberalism land area, 2, 56 land reform, 16 landlessness rural, 91 languages teaching halted, 19 Least Developed Country status, 69, 90, 163 Ledo Road, 37 legislative assembly first, 12 Levi Strauss & Co., 35 Li Peng, 50 literacy rate, 90, 165 Liz Clairborne, 35 logging uncontrolled, 60
Index
Lower Irrawady Delta region, 63 malaria, 120, 165 Malaysia, 93 powerful civil bureaucracy, 158 malnutrition, 120, 165 Mandalay, 5 Manipur, 4 market economic reforms, 180 martial races, 6 Marxist concepts, 3 Maung Maung, Dr, 113 Mekong-Ganga Co-operation project, 41 Metta Development Foundation, 60, 72, 181 military control of social mobility, 101 engagement in economic activities, 92 instituting reforms, 110 personnel, 125, 126 self-financing, 24 military administration, 6 four decades, 166 mine workers, 126 mining, 24 Ministry of Defence Directorate of Procurement, 108 Ministry of Home Affairs General Affairs Department, 158 minority races development, 91 governing of, 12 monarchy abolition, 10 extermination, 5 mortality rates malaria, 165 maternal, 59 Muslims exodus to Bangladesh, 58
189
Mutebi, Alex, 25, 140 Myanmar Council of Churches, 72, 77 Myanmar Economic Corporation, 92, 108 Myanmar Economic Holdings Corporation, 92, 108 external audits, 112 Myanmar Investment Committee, 113 Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, 34 narcotic production, 60 nation-building challenges, 62 National Convention, 162, 166, 172 National Democratic Front, 68 National League for Democracy (NLD), 22, 34, 57, 61, 88, 107, 162, 163, 170, 175 leadership, 167 National Unity Party (NUP), 22 nationalism, 109 nationalist policy, 3 nationalists, 13 nationalization, 16, 17, 19 natural resources exploitation, 92 Ne Win, General, 15, 67, 69, 94, 109 collapse of regime, 162 Nehru Prize for International Understanding, 40 New Security Concept, 41 Nobel Peace Prize Aung San Suu Kyi, 34 Non-Aligned Movement withdrawal, 19 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 58, 72, 99, 175, 181 North Korea, 112 Nuremberg trials, 27 Official Development Assistance, 69
190
oil and gas industry, 24, 34 open market system, 88 Overseas Development Assistance, 42, 43 Panglong Conference, 9 Panglong era, 62 Pao National Organization, 77 paramilitary corps (tat), 12 Park Chung Hee, President, 95 Pederson, Morten, 25, 161 People’s Republic of China, 57, 103 People’s Revolution Party, 14 People’s Socialist Party, 13 Petroleum Authority of Thailand, 34 political parties formation, 21 political reform, 140 politics economic policy formulation, role in, 89 poorest country in Asia, 56 population, 56 ethnic diversity, 1 post-colonial experience, 68 post-independence civil bureaucracy, 146–54, 156 key features of state, 143 poverty alleviating, 176–78 power willingness to share, 98 private schools nationalization, 19 private sector development financing, 91 pro-democracy demonstrations, 21 public administration models, 142 public administration theory, 98 public service, 141 Pyithu Hluttaw (People’s Assembly), 22, 23
Index
Pyongyang, 87 Rakhine, 4 rebel checkpoints, 69 reforms call by multilateral institutions, 87 instituted by military, 110 Regional Autonomy Enquiry Commission, 75 rent-seeking activities, 93, 100 Revolutionary Council, 16, 17, 18 Revolutionary Council period, 144 rice cultivation, 63 free marketing, 95 prices, 18 Rockefeller Foundation, 132 Rohingya Muslims, 45, 103, see also Muslims rural landlessness, 91 Russia, 3 Safman, Rachel, 25, 117 sangha, 5, 10, 64, 101 control, 99 Save the Children, 73, 132, 133 Saw Mar Gay Gyi, Rev., 77 sawbwas, 6, 8, 9 Selth, Andrew, 101 Seng Raw, 60 sex trade workers, 125 Shalom Peace Foundation, 72, 181 Shan Mong Tai Army, 46 Shan State Army South, 46 Shu Maung, 14 Silk Road, 37 Singapore, 93 skilled personnel shortage, 16 Smith, Martin, 23, 56 social mobility, 101 socialism
Index
abandoning, 88 Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 17 Socialist Republic period, 144 socioeconomic development, 117 Soeharto, President, 95 South Korea, 86–88, 108 State Economic Enterprise, 90, 108 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 21, 45, 101, 151, 158 state-managed economy, 17 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 23, 45, 57, 71, 72, 101, 107 accountability, lack of, 93 Steinberg, David, 18, 86 succession plans, 99 Suez Canal, 5 Surin Pitsuwan, 46 Taiwan, 88, 108 Tanintharyi, 4 Tatmadaw, 13, 14, 61, 64, 66, 67, 96, 108, 111, 151, 153 Taylor, Robert, 1, 61 terrain, 2 Thailand, 88, 93, 108 refugees in, 58 Thakin movement, 13 Thaksin Shinawatra, Prime Minister, 46, 57 Than Shwe, Senior General, 70, 101 Thanlwin River, 92 Thirty Comrades, 13, 42, 48 timber, 92 Total (France), 34 tourism, 24 traditional health practitioners, 120 training importance, 107 programme, 176
191
truckers long distance, 127 Tuan Shi-Wen, General, 66 tuberculosis, 165 U Nu, Prime Minister, 15 U Thant riots, 102 UN Country Team conclusion, 59 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 51 UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 73 UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, 43, 181 Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), 35, 101 United Kingdom, 3, 33, 34, 93 United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, 74 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 24, 134 United States, 93 ideology, 88 relations with, 33, 47 sanctions, 111, 163, 182 United Wa State Army, 167 universities regional, 102 University of Rangoon, 11 Unocal (U.S.), 34 U.S. Customs and Trade Act, 33 Vajpayee, Prime Minister, 40 Vietnam, 88, 92 wage restraint, 18 Weber, Max theory, 145, 146, 156 Western liberalism, 3 World Bank, 23, 69, 86, 87, 90 World Concern, 73, 133
192
World Health Organization (WHO), 131 World War I, 3 World War II, 13, 63, 65 Yadana field, 34 Yangon, 5
Index
Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA), 12 Yugoslavia, 3 Yunnan province economy, 70 Zeneca, 132
