Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel James Clements
Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel
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Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel James Clements
Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel
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Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel James Clements
© James Clements 2012 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–30354–6 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Clements, James, 1980– Mysticism in the mid-century novel / James Clements. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–230–30354–6 (alk. paper) 1. Mysticism in literature. 2. English fiction—20th century—History and criticism. 3. Australian fiction—20th century—History and criticism. 4. American fiction—20th century—History and criticism. 5. Philosophy in literature. 6. Ethics in literature. 7. Murdoch, Iris—Criticism and interpretation. 8. Golding, William, 1911–1993— Criticism and interpretation. 9. White, Patrick, 1912–1990—Criticism and interpretation. 10. Bellow, Saul—Criticism and interpretation. I. Title. PR888.M93C54 2011 823'.91409—dc23 2011029563 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
To Robert, for helping me find the words, And to Tia, for leaving me speechless.
‘What says any man when he speaks of Thee? And woe to him who keeps silent.’ St Augustine
Contents Acknowledgements
viii
Introduction: The Middle is Everywhere 1 2 3 4
1
Towards an Ideal Limit: Linguistic Authority in the Work of Iris Murdoch
31
From Apophasis to Aporia: William Golding and the Indescribable
67
Verbal Sludge: The Ethics of Instability in Patrick White’s Prose
102
Bliss from Bricks: Saul Bellow’s Moral Phenomenology
148
Conclusion: Drawing Circles in the Sea: Un-Defining the ‘Mystical Novelist’
183
Notes
189
Works Cited
195
Index
205
vii
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Richard Clements, Richard Gauvain, David Gooblar, John Harvey, Julia Jordan, Jane Lewty, Jan Schramm, Tia Seifert, Hugh Stevens, Lyndsey Stonebridge, and Mark Wormald for their guidance and feedback on early drafts of this book. Above all, I would like to thank Robert Macfarlane for his support and feedback throughout the writing process.
viii
Introduction: The Middle is Everywhere
The mid-century novelist has often been regarded as occupying an ambiguous intermediary period, lost somewhere in the no-man’s-land between modernism and postmodernism. David Lodge sees the midcentury novelist standing with his peers ‘at a crossroads’ (22) while Malcolm Bradbury sees him huddled in the ‘ruins’ (Modern 267) of a collapsed civilization, awaiting, but not contributing to, the establishment of the next. They are in the middle, and middleness is middling. The middle, however, is where decisions are pondered, where deliberation is done, before a stance is finally taken. The mid-century novelist can, to some degree, be correctly understood as occupying a period of reflection rather than decision, of humility rather than confidence. The question is whether this should be seen as contributing to their lack of definition, or as a definitive quality in itself. The dismissive views of Bradbury and Lodge have received some critical nuance in recent years, although there remains little agreement on how to characterize the writing of the mid-century, or even how, exactly, to define where the era begins and ends. Part of the difficulty extends from the fact that the mid-century novel is usually defined negatively; it appears as the gap between modernism and postmodernism, and its edges shift as critics relocate the borders of the two dominant movements. In recent years, there has been a growing critical focus on ‘late modernism’ that seeks to extend the borders of modernism to at least the end of the Second World War.i This tendency has spread into many literary surveys of the second half of the twentieth century, such as Brian W. Shaffer’s Companion to the British and Irish Novel, which similarly understands modernism to have persisted until 1
2 Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel
1945, albeit in a rather desiccated form in the latter decades. Some surveys, including Dominic Head’s Modern British Fiction and Steven Connor’s The English Novel in History, begin their studies neatly in 1950, but, in these cases, the literature of the two decades following the Second World War is treated in far less detail than the novels of the 1970s and 1980s; this carries the common implication that the ‘real’ literature of the second half of the twentieth century did not appear until several decades after the war, with the era’s early literature stuck in what Head calls ‘the post-war wilderness’ (14). Other surveys, including Randall Stevenson’s The Last of England? 1960–2000, elide the post-war years altogether, concentrating instead on the boom of postmodern literature. The mid-century novel is not properly modernist or postmodernist; therefore, it must be, at best, a literature of regrouping and readjustment, or, at worst, lost in the wilderness. Recently, a movement in criticism has arisen that attempts to treat the mid-century novel as a unique entity, distinct from modernism and postmodernism. Kristen Bluemel, in her introduction to the influential collection Intermodernism: Literary Culture in Mid-TwentiethCentury Britain (2009), argues for the utility of considering the fiction of the interwar, wartime, and immediate post-war periods as ‘intermodernism,’ a label she justifies by arguing that the writers of the period were united by a common ideology rooted in working- and middle-class political radicalism, rather than just temporal coincidence.ii Marina MacKay and Lyndsey Stonebridge, in their collection British Fiction After Modernism: The Novel at Mid-Century (2007), also approach the mid-century novel as mostly independent of both modernism and postmodernism, but they set the dates of the era slightly later, extending from the post-war years through to the late 1960s and early 1970s. Both of these collections have provided a crucial lens through which to approach twentieth-century literature, and have successfully complicated the derogatory ‘two movements’ paradigm that has contributed to the critical oversight towards this literature. However, much of the scholarship in these collections on the midcentury novel is primarily concerned with situating the literature of the period in its political and social climate; it is placed in relation to the end of imperialism, the diminishing sense of nationalism, re-engagement with problems of social inequality, the rise of nonliterary media, questions of the writer’s political duties and obligations, and so on. Consideration of the philosophical, spiritual, and,
Introduction: The Middle is Everywhere
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indeed, moral interests of these writers (outside the political or social spheres) has so far been largely neglected. This book presents a new perspective on the mid-century novel by proposing that many of the writers who occupied the liminal ground between modernism and postmodernism – Iris Murdoch, William Golding, Patrick White, and Saul Bellow – were united less by social or political ideologies than by metaphysical concerns: they wished to return what they considered to be the increasingly interior novel to the world, but not to a dry world of empirical facts and events; instead, they sought to unveil a world of inherent moral value. This was not a return to nineteenth-century realism, but a new form of realism; one that refused to ignore the philosophical ideas that had led to the novel’s apparent impoverishment – the opacity of language, and the loss of stable external sources of meaning – and sought new techniques and structures to overcome them. The shapelessness that characterized (or inhibited characterization of) mid-century literature is partly the result of the fact that a concrete vocabulary was only just beginning to emerge through which authors could articulate and overcome a growing dissatisfaction with the philosophical and literary assumptions that had shaped the thought and artistic output of the preceding decades. At the root of this discomfort was the status of ethical discourse, as it had been shaped and handed down, primarily via two major intellectual developments. The first was the idea, clearly presented in the writings of Kant, that goodness cannot be considered to be anything other than a product of the human will; ‘Nothing in the world,’ wrote Kant, ‘indeed nothing even beyond the world, can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will’ [his italics] (9). Goodness, consequently, became inextricably connected to duty, which effectively deontologized the Good; Goodness, suggested Kant, is not found, nor aspired towards – it is made. This concept was taken to its logical extreme in the 1940s and 1950s in the philosophy of Sartre and Camus, where ethical considerations almost disappeared completely while demonstrations of will became ends-in-themselves. The second major development was first articulated by Wittgenstein in his 1921 work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and subsequently adapted by the logical positivists and other philosophers of the early analytical school. It held that goodness, like all other metaphysical considerations, is either a) extra-linguistic and therefore beyond discussion, or
4 Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel
b) a linguistic illusion that can be dispelled through rephrasing or the substitution of an equivalent empirical term. This branch of philosophy considered ethical matters only insofar as they reveal language’s limits, or its deceptive capacities. As with the former development, ethics became little more than an interesting symptom or by-product of more pressing philosophical concerns. The consequence of both developments is that the worlds of fact and value, man and god, the objective and subjective, became segregated. If there is such a thing as goodness, it was perceived either as an entirely human construction, or as entirely beyond our understanding. To be in the middle of these extremes is not to be anywhere; it cannot be more than a moment of confusion before one chooses a side. The major shift away from realism in the early twentieth-century modernist novel can be seen as the result of the increasing influence of these philosophical trends, as writers began to retreat from the increasingly impoverished external world and sought refuge in subjective consciousness, which appeared to be the only place where meaning could lie. The modernist novel is commonly understood to have explored individual consciousness in isolation from society, rather than engage with the objects and events of the desiccated world; as John Barth explains in his essay ‘The Literature of Replenishment,’ modernist novelists often defined themselves through ‘the opposition of inward consciousness to rational, public, objective discourse’ (170). Value, argues Barth, was located, by the modernists, in the mind of the perceiver, with the external world of worth only when considered as a subject of an individual’s consciousness. Admittedly, there are many exceptions to this rather simplistic picture, as many modernist works have mystical overtones that gesture towards a reality beyond subjective experience. An interest in such metaphysical speculation in the form of occultism and theosophy was apparent from early in the era, and was a subject of great interest for poets and writers such as William Butler Yeats and D.H. Lawrence; however, this early strain of mysticism was less concerned with the development of an objective and moral vision than with the intricacies of arcane cosmologies and a solipsistic ‘perfecting of the I’ (qtd. in Webb 234–5). Alex Owen notes that this began to change in the decades following the First World War; he observes that the ‘highly systematized philosophy and world-view’ of the occultists began to dissipate in the 1920s and 1930s, and was replaced with a less dogmatic,
Introduction: The Middle is Everywhere
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more experiential form of mysticism, which can be observed in works such as T.S. Eliot’s Four Quartets and Virginia Woolf’s late autobiographical writing (176). However, as Owen notes, even this subtler form of mysticism remained firmly rooted in the self; he argues that it stayed focused ‘on the spiritual potential and experiential immediacies of the “I,”’ rather than on the external world (176). This tendency is reflected in modernist novels, which remained committed to depicting subjective impressions of the external world, rather than daring to suggest the existence of an objective reality. Woolf’s novel Between the Acts, which gestures to a permanent world that transcends the individual, may stand as the exception, yet Woolf remains constrained in the novel by her unwillingness to relinquish the primacy of subjective impressions. As James Naremore has argued, Woolf was never able to decide whether there is an ‘ultimate order’ or if there is only a ‘chaos from which we “create” order through the power of imagination’ (123); consequently, Woolf ‘waver[s] between mysticism and aestheticism’ (123). Stephanie Paulsell goes further, arguing that, even in the fleeting moments where Woolf appears convinced of a hidden reality, she never transcends subjectivity, as she holds that a reality that exists beyond the self is unimaginable (Paulsell 253). Regardless of whether or not the modernists were truly as inward looking as Barth, Owen, and others have suggested, many writers of the generation that followed modernism shared in this (mis)conception of their literary predecessors: Graham Greene scornfully remarked that Mrs. Dalloway shows us not ‘Regent Street … but Regent Street seen by Mrs. Dalloway’ (qtd. in Adamson 154). Iris Murdoch went a step further, arguing that, in the novels of James Joyce and Virginia Woolf, the physical world is not just subjugated to subjective consciousness, but ‘objects and scenes dissolve into words’ (Murdoch, ‘Art’ 251) – the real (and important) world disappears entirely, replaced only by the arbitrary signs of language. Murdoch’s words may be unfair when directed towards the modernists, but they would be entirely apt – and, indeed, not seen by their targets as negative criticism at all – if levied at modernism’s immediate heirs. In the 1950s, a new language-centred hermeneutic was emerging in the shape of an early form of structuralism, which would soon supersede existentialism as the philosophy du jour. It gave rise to a generation of experimental writers, including B.S. Johnson in the UK and John Barth in America, who rejected the antiquated notion of the
6 Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel
‘soul’; they considered the stream-of-consciousness to be not an emanation of self, but consciousness itself. The individual was the creation of language, not the other way around, and, if there is a world under the net of language, it cannot be known and should remain beyond consideration. These works consequently referred not to the world, but only to themselves. Concurrent to this development, however, writers such as William Cooper, Kingsley Amis, Ivy Compton-Burnett, and C.P. Snow were reacting to the perceived solipsism of experimental fiction by turning back towards the world in an attempted return to realism. Cooper argued, in 1959, that modernism’s short lifespan was due to the fact that, in its unwillingness or inability to recognize any relationship between self and world, it necessarily created alienating and socially irresponsible works: ‘it is a retreat into writing about the sensations of Man-alone by people who cannot stomach present day industrialized society’ (29). Cooper and his peers sought to remedy the perceived imbalance by turning back towards the world, but, in doing so, they fell victim to the other edge of the blade that had cleaved the interior from the exterior world. These novels were unable to recapture the unselfconscious gaze of the nineteenth-century novel, which so casually melded the objective and subjective worlds, because they unwittingly shared their opposition’s inability to locate value anywhere other than in subjective perception. This gave the neo-realist novel a dry and documentary tone; they are works stocked with facts and objects, but oddly devoid of humanity. In rejecting the modernist obsession with the self, these writers turned back towards the world, but found it populated only by empty shells. As argued by Scholes and Kellogg in The Nature of Narrative (1966) (and echoed by the majority of the early critical work on the mid-century novel),iii the period’s rejection of an external foundation of value effectively bifurcated the genre into soulless ‘novels of society’ and navelgazing experimentalism, effectively destroying what George Lukacs called the ‘antagonistic duality between soul and world’ (Lukacs 88) that contributed to the novel’s success (Scholes and Kellogg 15–16). The nineteenth-century realist novel had drawn its success from its concern with the ethical-objective; from its convincing illusion of a real world resplendent with meaning. This area was now off-limits, as it is either non-existent (according to Kant and existentialism) or extra-linguistic (according to Wittgenstein and his followers). This
Introduction: The Middle is Everywhere
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left only the empirical-objective (the neo-realist novel) or the ethicalsubjective (the self-referential experimental novel). As David Lodge stated in his 1969 essay ‘The Novelist at the Crossroads,’ ‘To anyone whose imagination has been nourished by the great realistic novelists of the past, both these side roads will seem to lead all too easily into desert or bog – self-defeating banality or self-indulgent excess’ (22). There was, however, a kind of novel emerging in the 1950s that did not fall victim to this dichotomy. The authors of these works believed that the argument that the ethical-objective cannot logically be proven to exist, while possibly true, by no means precludes its pursuit, as confidence in rational forms of knowing had been eroded by recent historical events. They also felt that the second claim – that the ethical-objective is extra-linguistic – while not necessarily wrong, does not stop it from being an artistic concern either; the notion that metaphysical concerns were beyond language was hardly a revelatory idea, and there already existed an artistic discourse regarding the relation between writing and the ineffable that could be drawn upon in developing a new canon of literature. These authors did not attempt to strike a compromise between the objective and subjective worlds, nor did they attempt to carve out a ‘third road’ as Lodge suggests; instead, they sought to effect the novelistic reintegration of the subjective and objective worlds by overrunning dichotomous definitions, by challenging the very nature of binary thought, and without turning a blind eye to recent philosophical developments, particularly those regarding the opacity of language. They suggested that it is a fallacy to believe that one can ever truly be on one side or the other of any issue. Despite rational thought’s tendency to reject whatever does not fit into its pre-established poles, the excluded never really disappears. Rather, it remains on the periphery, in the more nebulous areas of cognition, a pressing presence that constantly undermines adherence to either/or distinctions. If these writers are in the middle, it is because middleness is, in fact, the only enduring condition: the middle is everywhere.
Against Rationalism – Contexts In her 1970 essay ‘Existentialists and Mystics,’ Iris Murdoch argued that a type of novel had appeared in the decades following the Second World War that resisted the hard divide between subject and object.
8 Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel
She stated that, in contrast to existentialism’s claim that there is ‘nothing of inherent value except will-power itself’ (224), this new form, which she calls ‘the mystical novel’ (225), was marked by ‘an uneasy suspicion that perhaps after all man is not God’ (226). Where the protagonist of the early twentieth-century novel was ‘an anxious man trying to impose or assert or find himself’ in a meaningless world, the newer form contains a protagonist ‘trying to discipline or purge or diminish himself’ in an attempt to follow his ‘genuine intuitions of an authoritative good’ (227). Murdoch insisted that these writers did not revert to theism; on the contrary, they operated outside the ‘traditional trappings of religion,’ rejecting ‘familiar religious imagery,’ and often appearing ‘speechless’ in the face of the mystical fact (225). She includes among their number Patrick White, Saul Bellow, William Golding, and, in an early draft of the essay, herself.iv Murdoch’s essay is short and lacks depth, yet her argument is compelling insofar as it offers a convincing alternative to the familiar dichotomy of the mid-century novel, accurately positing a group of writers unwilling to relinquish the ethical-objective, while aware of the limitations of language. The same writers are characterized by their unknowing, by their comfort residing in between-places, by their inability to rest comfortably within any stable form of knowledge. Murdoch posits several reasons for their appearance. Her central contention is that the cult of rational thinking was no longer beyond reproach; the war had shown it to lead not to enlightenment but to moral chaos and confusion. The technological advances made during the Second World War, in particular, felt like not advancement but regression; she wrote, ‘Science today is more likely to make us anxious than to make us proud, not only because we are now able to blow up our planet, but because, oddly enough, space travel does not make us feel like gods. It makes us feel rather parochial and frightened’ (Murdoch, ‘Existentialists’ 226). Her description of society’s so-called advancement undermining confidence in rational thinking, rather than affirming it, is echoed in the concurrent reaction of Bellow, White, and Golding to their wartime experiences. Each felt that, rather than affirming any ideas about human nature and the world, either positive or negative, the logically organized and technologically assisted atrocities of the Second World War instead only served to emphasize the dangers and limitations of such enterprises. Each of the novelists wrote and spoke in depth of the way in which the war, nuclear proliferation, and the holocaust conditioned their
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views of mankind in the post-war years. Perhaps surprisingly, for each of these writers, these traumatic events created not a pessimism towards the human condition, nor an unequivocal optimism for the possibility of change; instead, they instilled a sense of suspension, of unknowing, of between-ness. In Britain, as Steven Connor has argued, novelists after the war found themselves in a suspended state, struggling for a sense of personal and national identity after the collapse of empire (Connor, English 3). This limp state of British identity had ramifications for Australia’s own sense of nationhood; as John D. McLaren argues, Australia’s identity was, at the time, largely predicated on ‘resentment of the continuing power of British capital to shackle Australian development,’ and this, coupled with massive immigration onto the continent, had left Australia’s sense of nationhood in a similarly liminal state (17). The situation appears to have been different in America, as the post-war period was an age of economic prosperity; nonetheless, the significance of the action against Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not yet fully understood, and the looming Cold War had reawakened a mainstream conservatism and religiousness that led to a burst of reactionary literature from political and cultural minorities that sought to define an identity in a country that seemed out of their control. Indeed, the striking absence, in the post-war period, of significant American literature dealing with the most horrific aspects of the war – Auschwitz, Hiroshima – suggests that it was, as Bellow calls it, a time of ‘adumbration’ (Sammler 73); a period rife with symbols, but with no sense of these symbols’ true significance, or how they should be interpreted. White, Golding, and Bellow wrote openly about their experiences in the Second World War. Patrick White served for the duration of the war as an operational intelligence officer in the Middle East and Greece, but considered his role a ‘pretty insignificant one’: ‘[m]uch of the time was spent advancing or retreating across deserts, sitting waiting in dust-ridden tents, or again in that other desert, a headquarters’ (‘Nobel’ 42). In his 1972 Nobel lecture, however, he reflected that the war had a profound effect on his worldview, although it left him not in despair, but, instead, confused and disconnected: ‘Occasionally during those years bombs or gunfire created what should have been a reality, but which in fact made reality seem more remote’ (‘Nobel’ 42). In White’s later years, he became actively involved in anti-nuclear campaigning, but, again, his involvement was not inspired by hopelessness or rage, but instead by a desire to reconnect a severed spiritual
10 Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel
cord; in the middle of a speech he gave at an anti-nuclear rally in Hyde Park, Sydney, White read the following words of Gandhi: I have been experimenting with myself and my friends by introducing religion into politics…. It is not the Hindu religion … but the religion which transcends Hinduism, which changes one’s very nature, which binds on indissolubly to the truth within and which ever purifies…. It is the permanent element in human nature which counts no cost too great in order to find full expression and which leaves the soul utterly restless until it has found itself, known its maker and appreciated the true correspondence between the Maker and itself. (‘Letter’ 110) For White, the significance of this passage, quoted at length in front of 40,000 people, is that, when morality has been reduced to agreements, treaties, laws, and duties – as he felt it had been in the twentieth century – it can only be rescued by locating a true source of metaphysical value through passive reflection, rather than through the constant re-creation of rational ethic systems. He believed that the absurd horrors of the twentieth century did not create despair or outrage, but called for a response based in reflection and humility. Golding had a significant military career; he was present at the sinking of the Bismarck, and participated in the Normandy invasion. His early response to the war was characterized by an unequivocal pessimism, very different from White’s seemingly ambivalent reaction: Before the Second World War, I believed in the perfectibility of social man; that a correct structure of society would produce goodwill; and that therefore you could remove all social ills by a reorganization of society. It is possible that today I believe something of the same again; but after the war I did not because I was unable to. I had discovered what one man could do to another. I am not talking of one man killing another with a gun, or dropping a bomb on him or blowing him up or torpedoing him. I am thinking of the vileness beyond all words that went on, year after year, in the totalitarian states. (‘Fable’ 86–7) His feelings, however, eventually developed into something more ambiguous and tentative, and more in line with the other authors
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considered in this study; in 1970 he said to Jack Biles, ‘I think I know far less now than I did after the war…. [A]fter the period of knowing what one thinks, one surely has to go through a period of knowing what one does not think, of being astonished’ (qtd. in Biles 31–2). In his undated manuscript draft, ‘Through the Dutch Waterways,’ Golding shares an anecdote that reflects a similar feeling; he relates the story of meeting a Dutch judge while on a family holiday in Veere in 1960. Looking out together upon the destruction wreaked upon Westkapelle by Golding’s regiment, the judge asks Golding what he feels; he replies, ‘strangely little’ (qtd. in Carey 109). Bellow voluntarily joined the merchant marines in April 1945, but spent the five months of his service at the barracks in Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn. While he did not have the combat experience of Golding and White he similarly understood the war to have undermined the rational enterprise, rather than to have solidified it. His Jewish heritage, as well, meant that the tragedy of the holocaust resonated to a greater extent in Bellow’s life and thought. In a 1963 speech, he stated: Just what the reduction of millions of human beings into heaps of bone and mounds of rag and hair or clouds of smoke betokened, there is no one who can plainly tell us, but it is at least plain that something was being done to put in question the meaning of survival, the meaning of pity, the meaning of justice and of … the individual’s consciousness of his own existence. (Recent 2) Bellow, like White and Golding, argued that the war did not affirm a negative picture of mankind, but rather, served to destroy one’s ability to make any affirmations at all. The eponymous protagonist of Bellow’s 1970 novel Mr. Sammler’s Planet – which is, significantly, a late work, and the first of Bellow’s novels to address the holocaust directly – is himself a holocaust survivor, and finds himself traumatized by the war in the sense that he has become ‘someone between the human and non-human states, between content and emptiness, between full and void, meaning and not-meaning’ (240). In ‘Existentialists and Mystics,’ Murdoch referred to this state of unknowing as a consequence of the ‘general demythologizing of the modern scene’ (233), and saw it as potentially heralding an age in which consoling illusions regarding the nature of man could – and
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should – be destroyed. In his 1976 Nobel lecture, Bellow suggested that the horrors of the twentieth century had given rise to a new kind of person in ‘whom there is an observable shrinkage of prejudices, a casting off of disappointing ideologies, and ability to live with many kinds of madness, and immense desire for certain durable human goods – truth, for instance, or freedom or wisdom’ (93). Each of these authors saw the potential for a new individual, one able to live with strangeness, ambiguity, and, perhaps, the pensionable metaphysical concepts such as goodness, and truth. They admitted, however, that the required suspension of rational knowledge, the feeling of awe in the face of the unknown, was anathema to the modern sensibility. William Golding saw the pervading rationalism to be a philosophy of desperation that grew from the human desire to resist astonishment, to apply logical order and structure to a world that constantly resists such control. ‘Looking out,’ he said, ‘I see with continuing astonishment the huge images, the phantasmata that condition our world. The simplistic popularization of their ideas has thrust our world into a mental straitjacket’ (‘Belief’ 186–7). Murdoch, too, often spoke of projections or ‘pictures’: organizing mental structures that individuals use to understand and delimit the world. ‘Psychic energy flows,’ she argues, ‘into building up convincingly coherent but false pictures of the world’ (‘Idea’ 36). ‘Reality is a projection of something or another,’ agreed Bellow, ‘[but] I don’t often believe that the truth could be as easy as that’ (‘Literature’ 92). These ‘pictures’ can take various shapes; they can exist overtly in the form of ideology – moral, political, psychological, spiritual – or more insidiously as subconscious metanarrative, or, crucially, as language itself. In a 1975 interview with Robert Boyer, Bellow said: It’s very difficult to escape from any system of metaphors which successfully imposes itself upon you. You begin to think that way and pretty soon you can’t think in any other way… All of these metaphors are very powerful and they’re very compelling. Are they the last word? Is this it?... Once you’ve given yourself over to one of these systems, you’ve lost your freedom in a very significant degree. (‘Literature’ 93) Golding concurred, agreeing with Biles’ contention that explanative thought-structures ‘either ignore or deny that part which their
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system does not comprehend’ (qtd. in Biles 103). These ‘exclusions’ can be subtle, but their consequences can be severe: in Riders in the Chariot (1961), White suggests that the followers of Nazism were drawn to Hitler’s own reductive systems because they served to simplify the chaos of German society between the wars; in that instance, morality was one of the system’s ‘exclusions.’ Mordecai Himmelfarb, White’s protagonist in the novel, claims, after escaping Auschwitz, that ‘[t]he intellect has failed us’ (198). A method of recovering the breadth of human experience without rational reduction or exclusion needed to be found.
Speaking the Unspeakable Each of the writers under consideration believed in the existence of extra-linguistic or supra-rational modes of thinking, although they remained sceptical towards any codified religious belief, choosing instead to maintain their ‘faith’ on an experiential level only. White stated in 1969 that ‘I belong to no church, but I have religious faith’ (‘Making’ 19), and Golding claimed to ‘suffer those varying levels or intensities of belief which are, it seems, the human condition’ (‘Belief’ 192). Saul Bellow was uncomfortable with the word ‘God,’ but claimed a religious sensibility nonetheless; in a 1978 interview with Henrietta Buckmaster he admitted that, to him, religion is ‘necessarily nondenominational. It’s something that comes out of your intuition, and it’s not something that you grow up believing’ (‘Risks’ 131). Murdoch maintained an ambivalence towards Catholicism throughout her youth, but was unequivocal at the time regarding her belief in a ‘soul.’v In her 1969 essay ‘On “God” and “Good,”’ she attempted to refine her position by introducing a vocabulary that posits the Platonic notion of the Good as a replacement for God. While this may distinguish Murdoch’s belief from religious individuals who hold to an exceedingly conventional image of God, when seen in comparison to the broad religious conceptions of Golding, Bellow, and White, the difference is little more than semantic. Regardless of the trappings, each of these writers believed in the existence of an objective source of meaning and value that is immanent, transcendent, or both, and were simultaneously convinced that this source can never be grasped by the intellect, or put into words. White considered the moral sense to be something that is
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inherent in human beings, but is gradually abandoned when, acclimatized by society and education, we begin to prioritize intellect over intuition. Bellow made a similar claim in a 1984 interview with Matthew C. Roudané: There appears a primordial person. He is not made by his education, nor by cultural or historical circumstances. He precedes culture and history…. This means that there is something invariable, ultimately unteachable, native to the soul. A variety of powers arrive whose aim is to alter, to educate, to condition us. If a man gives himself over to total alteration I consider him to have lost his soul. If he resists these worldly powers, forces of his own come into play. (‘Junkyards’ 160) This ‘unteachable’ thing is, for each writer, tied to morality. The moral sense is innate and ineffable, and to logically systemize it can only reduce or pervert its substance. William Golding, speaking of his father to Jack Biles in 1970, said: My father … ended up with a kind of system, as I firmly believe that rationalists and many others do, a system in which there was no place, logically, for right and wrong. But all the same, right and wrong were there… [He] never saw that the morals by which [he] lived were not deducible from the system which [he] held to apply. (Qtd. in Biles 84–5) For these writers ‘true’ morality cannot be consciously formulated – on the contrary, rational formulation can blind one to it – because it transcends the tenets of politics, laws, and duty. As Bellow said to Jo Brans in 1977, ‘What a woman does for her children, what a man does for his family, what people most tenaciously cling to, these things are not adequately explained by Oedipus complexes, libidos, class struggles, or existential individualism – whatever you like’ (‘Unexpressed’ 103). The use of the term ‘mystical,’ as it relates to these writers, describes a mode of perception through which one sheds or suppresses the rational mental constructs that form, organize, and distort immediate experience, in order to experience the world without mediation.vi It therefore has a phenomenological dimension, but it differs from
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Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology in that the knowledge imparted by the experience includes the revelation of intangible objective qualities such as meaning, value, and goodness. As such, it is a sub- or supra-rational way of knowing, intrinsically connected with experience, through which one is brought into contact with ontological value, rather than sheer Being. As the object necessarily transcends organizing devices such as language and form, the question remains as to whether or not it can exist as a topic of discussion. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, the answer is clearly negative; as it states in the Tractatus ‘There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical’ (187), and, so, ‘whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ (189). To a certain extent, the writers of the ‘mystical turn’ would not disagree with the contention that language can never capture or explain the object; but this is not to say that there is no benefit in the creation of literature.
A Greater Realism It may still appear peculiar, however, that these writers, so concerned with the intangible, the ineffable, and the transcendent, and so sceptical of society, language, and rational thinking, would choose to write in a relatively traditional form that strongly resembles, at least superficially, the nineteenth-century realist novel. The realist novel, after all, is necessarily interested in things: in objects, in society, in the tangible world – the very things that the mystic invariably wants to transcend. Nonetheless, Murdoch, White, and Bellow (if not Golding) each considered the nineteenth-century realist novel to be the primary model for their own work. Murdoch described Tolstoy as ‘the greatest of novelists’ (‘Sublime’ 261), and stated, ‘The most obvious difference between nineteenth-century novels and twentieth-century novels is that the nineteenth-century ones are better’ [her italics] (‘Existentialists’ 221). Bellow listed his literary masters as Dickens, Balzac, Hardy, Melville, Hawthorne, and ‘the Russians,’ Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky (Atlas 186), while White’s two most re-read novels were Madame Bovary and The Brothers Karamazov (the latter of which plays an important part in the narrative of his novel The Solid Mandala) (Marr 448, 487). While White and Bellow do admit that Joyce – who is not usually considered a Realist – was a major influence in their
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formative years, they were both primarily attracted to his lively prose, rather than to his formal innovation; as Bellow argued, ‘Joyce was a Flaubertian to begin with’ (qtd. in Atlas 187). Only Golding claims no major influence from the nineteenth-century realists; in fact, his first encounter with Dickens’ Pickwick Papers almost turned him off writing entirely, as he felt he could never share Dickens’ interest in other people (Carey 259). Golding, however, is an odd case, as he showed no interest in the modernists either, and instead claimed to read nothing except the Greeks. Regardless, he stated that ‘no novelist is influenced in more than his punctuation by any other novelist’ (qtd. in Carey 259). But what is it about the realist novel that appealed to these writers who appear so driven to see beyond empirical detail? Virginia Woolf, whose own mystical sensibilities are well documented,vii made a strong case against the realist novel in her essay ‘Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,’ on the basis that the realist novel necessarily becomes mired in mimesis, and is unable to transcend its base materials: ‘They [the Edwardian realist novelists] have looked very powerfully, searchingly, and sympathetically out of the window; at factories, at Utopias, even at the decoration and upholstery of the carriage; but never at her, never at life, never at human nature’ (28). The realist novelist, she argues, ‘hypnotise[s] us into the belief that, because he has made a house, there must be a person living there’ (26). Her argument, however, reveals her understanding, typical of modernism, that, if material things are significant, it is only when and because they are approached through a subjective perceiving consciousness. It is this belief that led Woolf to place the subjective consciousness at the forefront of her fiction; Graham Greene’s afore-mentioned comment that Mrs. Dalloway shows us not ‘Regent Street … but Regent Street seen by Mrs. Dalloway’ would not, therefore, have necessarily disturbed Woolf, as, to her, the real Regent Street is the one seen through Mrs. Dalloway’s eyes.viii What does not appear to have been of great concern to Woolf – and certainly was for Murdoch, Golding, White, and Bellow – is the way in which the reader’s own subjective consciousness plays a part in the experience of a text. To best understand the role of the reader’s consciousness in the play of the ‘mystical’ novel, it is useful to turn briefly towards recent arguments in literary criticism concerning literature-as-event and literature-as-cognition.
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This field has roots in Wolfgang Iser’s reader-response hermeneutic, but has gained recent momentum through its absorption of the concerns of critics of the ‘ethical turn.’ It holds that literature is, among other things, a facilitator of thought, a record of a writer’s struggle, and, perhaps most importantly, a generator of knowing that is activated by an encounter with a reader. As Derek Attridge argues in The Singularity of Literature (2004), it is more useful to think of literature as an event than an act (56); words, when read, initiate a process in which the literary comes to being within a newly created domain inhabited by both text and reader. The effect of a work of literature is not restricted by a text’s ‘realism,’ because, even if the words of a text refer to things in the world, the text, taken as a whole, does not have to; it can deal implicitly with the ineffable without being a description of the ineffable. A realist text – one filled with recognizable characters, things, and events – can move past ‘the upholstery of the carriage’ through the employment of a wide range of literary devices that agitate a text so that it moves from being purely descriptive to acting as an experience/event. By grounding these techniques in a realist narrative, the writers of ‘mystical’ novels maintain the reader’s focus on a recognizable world, rather than on the techniques themselves. Consequently, the more experimental elements of these novels remain no more than tools that facilitate knowledge or experience, and do not become ends-in-themselves. As Murdoch warned, literature that is written in an overtly experimental or non-realistic style runs the risk of reducing the world to ‘objects and words.’ By foregrounding their texts in a realistic world, the writers of ‘mystical’ novels resist this reduction. Literary realism is therefore no less apt a genre for these authors than more experimental forms, and, indeed, may be more suitable, as experimental fiction runs the converse risk of becoming too mired in language, and ignoring the world altogether. The indescribable content received from a work of art is often relegated to the difficult realm of the aesthetic; according to Wittgenstein’s argument, the reason the aesthetic cannot be described is because it has no cognitive content. This argument is comforting in its clarity, but it oversimplifies the character of cognition by denying the existence of extra-linguistic thinking. It is more useful to put aside the category of the aesthetic and instead consider all mental activity as a form of cognition with both active and passive elements. When we
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ask ourselves ‘what does this mean?’, or when we solve an equation or plan a party, we are ‘actively’ thinking, and, indeed, this form of thought appears to be conducted in our minds in something resembling language. Analysing problems and answering questions often involves trapping complex and multifarious situations and options in language (or language-like shapes), and this relieves the anxiety of not-knowing, in a similar way that ‘explaining’ our nebulous moods to a diary or analyst can remove our neuroses. Yet cognition is not always so goal-oriented; we are, after all, also thinking when we listen to music, even when we are not actively seeking to understand or engage with the piece. This form of cognition necessarily has some linguistic content – we cannot avoid recognizing individual instruments within the wordless harmony as ‘cellos,’ ‘flutes,’ and so on, and we will also undoubtedly ask ourselves, at some point, what it is we are feeling as we listen – but this does not comprise the totality of the experience. To relegate the remainder of the experience to the world of ‘emotion’ or ‘feeling’ is a mistake, as it implies the Cartesian fallacy that non-linguistic experiences rest somewhere other than in the mind, and are clearly bifurcated from what has been described as the cognitive realm; to say we are feeling, rather than thinking, does not account for the blurry mid-region of cognition where words hazily flicker in and out as we listen, where ‘active’ thoughts slowly coagulate and gently disperse within a wider wordless understanding. Peter de Bolla, in Art Matters (2001), divides the listening experience into ‘attentive’ and ‘inattentive’ moments, but insists that inattention exists within attention; giving conscious focus to a particular element of a piece of music ‘allows the release of focus in the inattentive. The sound of music floods over us’ (65). These passive elements of the listening experience are not entirely separate from the moments of active focus; rather, they are a subset: mute thoughts that exist in the negative space of active thinking. To insist on the impossibility of such wordless cognitive content is to enforce a rigid dichotomy between articulable knowledge and mute emotion that is not sympathetic to the subtler and more amorphous nature of living thought. A dose of lithium may stop the listener from crying at a sonata, but it will not stop him from learning things he cannot describe. It is not difficult to recognize the presence of passive cognition in the experience of non-linguistic art forms such as music or painting,
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but can we experience a linguistic art form such as literature extralinguistically? As Attridge and others have argued, literature, even realist literature, is considerably more than a mimetic reflection of its object of consideration; Walter Benjamin argued that literature’s ‘essential quality is not statement or the imparting of information’ (70), and, to use Wolfgang Iser’s terminology, literature is not a ‘denotative’ art (109). In The Act of Reading (1978), Iser argues that the knowledge imparted by literature is not finite, as reading generates an overflow of possibilities, from which the reader selects, rejects, or ignores, either knowingly or unknowingly, throughout the event. The unselected or ungraspable possibilities – Iser’s ‘alien associations’ (126), or Attridge’s Levinasean Other – remain on the periphery of knowing, exerting pressure on the reader, indefinable yet experientially real. Peter de Bolla argues that one of the chief characteristics of art is that it provides us with the impalpable sense that it contains something we ‘already know but have yet to figure to [ourselves] as knowledge… [We] sense the artwork as containing something [we] strive to uncover or appropriate’ (13). De Bolla rightly insists, however, that while we cannot state with any confidence the substance of something we have not yet ‘figured’ as knowledge, this does not perturb us, nor does it cause us to dismiss it as a delusion or a projection; on the contrary, we are used to situating ourselves in relation to these things, and we spend a great deal of our lives seeking out such experiences. Certainty is never more than part of any experience: its edges always bleed into nebulous concepts that elude a firm grasp, and this all takes place within the cognitive realm. Indeed, as Emmanuel Levinas has argued, it is that which eludes our finite understanding that provides our desire to engage in the world; if our lives were comprised only of understandable things, we would have few qualms in tucking it away, a puzzle solved. A work of literature, therefore, can contain – or, better, radiate – things that transcend its finite content, as there are forms of knowing that will never sit as still as ‘knowledge.’
A ‘Mystical Turn’ It is in light of such conclusions that the term ‘mystical novel’ seems particularly apt. The canon of mystical literature is comprised of texts
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created by individuals also attempting to do justice to their knowledge of the extra-linguistic. In the majority of cases, ‘doing justice’ meant not just to mimetically represent the mystical experience, but to help engender a similar encounter or state of mind for the reader. The majority of comparative mystical literature is not comprised of accounts of mystical experiences, but of tools, and similar tools were adopted and employed by the authors under consideration in this study to fashion works that did not seek directly to articulate the mystical fact, but rather to usher in new ways of thinking. The techniques used in the mystical canon, and by Murdoch, Golding, White, and Bellow, can be divided into two broad categories: the apophatic (unspeaking), and the kataphatic (overspeaking). Apophasis, from the Greek apophatikos (apo –‘other than’ and phanai – ‘speak’), means to speak negatively. God cannot be discussed, as he necessarily overruns any human concept; He is greater, or other, than human thought. However, as Clement of Alexandria wrote, ‘we may somehow reach the idea of the Almighty, knowing not what he is, but what he is not’ (5.71.3). The first, and lowest, form of apophasis involves the denial of affirmative propositions; by systematically noting everything that is not God, God will eventually be revealed in the negative space, just as a sculptor reveals an image by chipping away the marble that surrounds it. An example can be found in Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s Mystical Theology: ‘There we say that the Causes of all … has neither body [soma] nor shape [schema] nor form [eidos] … neither is He a place [topos] nor seen … nor perceived [by the senses]’ (4.1). This, however, is a limited form of apophasis, because, as J.P. Williams explains, it indirectly offers truth-claims, where really none should be made (4). That is to say, by describing God as being without shape, Dionysius implicitly affirms that God is shapeless. The higher order of apophatic language, explains Williams, ‘denies the accuracy of both whatever affirmative proposition is at stake, and its contradictory’ [his italics] (4). An example of this can be found in a later passage from the same Mystical Theology, where PseudoDionysius writes that God does not ‘belong to the category of nonexistence or to that of existence … nor is It darkness, nor is It light, or error; or truth, nor can any affirmation or negation apply to It’ (5.1). Use of this form of mystical language has a great deal of precedence in late modernism; Samuel Beckett’s use of negative language, albeit
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without a clear theological goal, has been well documented,ix as has the place of the via negativa in Joyce’s Finnegans Wake.x T.S. Eliot, also, in the Four Quartets, draws heavily on this higher form of apophasis: At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless; Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is, But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity, Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards, Neither ascent nor decline…. (62–6) In this passage, because all statements are negated, the author relays no information about God at all. What the passage says, however, is less important than what it does. For the speaker, it provides the longed-for opportunity to speak about God without error. This is Austin’s language-as-performance, a ritual and supplicative gesture; as Augustine wrote of the Trinity, ‘the formula three persons has been coined, not in order to give a complete explanation by means of it, but in order that we might not be obliged to remain silent’ (5.9.10).xi For the reader, an encounter with this higher form of apophasis serves to emphasize the artificiality of linguistic construction, and propel him or her towards supra-linguistic thought. In one branch of the Buddhist tradition, the Zen koan (e.g. ‘What is the sound of one hand clapping?’) serves a similar purpose: to expose the illusory mechanisms of language, using words to destroy words in order to usher in higher forms of thinking. Apophasis does not only exist on the statement level. The method of un-writing, of undermining one’s own enterprise, can be employed on a structural level, as well as in a more general conceptual sense. Some of the novelists under consideration engage in negative selfanalysis throughout, drawing attention to their limitations and conventions in order to reveal the illusory influence of their rational mechanisms. They destabilize their own narrative authority through experimentations with ‘unreliable narrators’; they self-consciously use clichéd or blatantly ‘constructed’ structural devices that emphasize their own fictionality; they draw metafictional parallels between deluded protagonists and the author; they undercut their novels’ purported themes to reveal the fraudulence of self-constructed ‘meaning.’
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However, the effect is different from the neurotic self-effacement common in postmodern fiction, as the goal is primarily to reveal, rather than to undermine. Apophasis, however, is a very limited tool, as it is the most rational of anti-rational techniques; Paul Tillich has gone so far as to describe it as the progenitor of rational enlightenment philosophy, rather than its antithesis (287). It is based upon a strict dichotomy, and works by very strictly demarcating the limits of language. The great danger of the apophatic is that systematic negation of all statements can potentially leave the reader facing not the ineffable God, but nothingness – as often occurs in the writing of Samuel Beckett. More overtly ‘deconstructionist’ writers such as William Gass and David Markson would later capitalize upon this nihilistic consequence of negation; but, for those employing negative language to approach positive metaphysical realities, it presents a significant problem. Philip Blond, in Post-Secular Philosophy, argues that in order for apophasis to avoid presenting the reader with nothingness, it ‘requires a positum, a positum reserved for theology alone’ (5): in other words, it requires faith.xii Apophasis, therefore, can serve only one positive function: it can dispel illusion by revealing the limits of language and rational understanding. It cannot, however, contribute in any way towards our knowledge of that which lies beyond these limits. The writers of the twentieth-century mystical turn experimented with apophasis, but each eventually became frustrated with the limitations of such a logical system; as mentioned, apophasis was, to some extent, an inheritance from late modernism, and needed to be adapted to fit the new enterprise. The more successful novels written in this period are those that draw upon kataphasis (from the Greek kataphatikos – kata: intensifier and phanai – ‘speak’). Kataphasis is ‘up-speaking’: a technique of pushing language to its breaking point, utilizing its inherent ambiguity and aporia as a generator of unresolving meaning. Kataphatic techniques include the use of overdetermined symbols, an emphasis on the non-signifying elements of language (musicality, prosody, ontology), the adoption of cabbalistic and anagogic interpretive techniques, and the suggestion of the universal interconnectedness of meaning implied by the possibility of endless interpretation. As Thomas Carlson argues, both apophasis and kataphasis play on ‘the ever ambiguous edge where language wavers between its own production and failure, the unstable border
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where language is generated precisely – and impossibly – with the aim of undoing itself’ (168). Kataphasis, however, treats the ‘edge’ as a gradated territory, rather than a defined line, and is less pessimistic about the potential of human consciousness. It implies that consciousness is not a blindfold placed upon intuitive knowledge, but an unrefined vessel of knowing that can be stimulated into adopting a more fluid and flexible relationship with the strangeness, mystery, and aporia that exceeds it. Ian T. Ramsey argues that much religious language serves a kataphatic purpose, in that it destabilizes knowledge, rather than proclaiming or negating it (75). Pseudo-Dionysius’s claim that God does not ‘belong to the category of non-existence or to that of existence’ is a simple paradox; it is basic apophasis and, as such, does no more than demonstrate the limitations of language. A phrase such as ‘infinite goodness,’ however, is not a simple paradox; to misquote Eliot, the words strain and crack under the tension, but they do not quite break. Ramsey observes that many biblical phrases are like this; they take familiar words and make them strange by coupling them with unusual qualifiers or with terms that undermine the first-order definition. While Russell or Wittgenstein might declare a sentence such as ‘infinite goodness’ to be nonsensical, it is not technically a paradox, nor is it without purpose. While apophasis does nothing more than emphasize God’s distance from linguistic characterization, kataphatic language, while also not making any claims for transparency, nonetheless provides a direction for our thoughts. Ramsey argues that ‘[T]he first logical function of the word “infinite” is to stimulate us’ but without any ‘intention of arriving at “God” as a last term’ (77). This stimulation is provided by the ‘impropriety’ of the phrase itself; this ‘impropriety’ creates a strain that ‘reminds us that the phrase, while having such a basis as we have indicated in ordinary language, points to something outside “good language” altogether’ (Ramsey 77). Ramsey’s argument finds support in the work of Ian Crombie, who argued that religious language is primarily evocative, rather than denotative; it points us ‘outside the range of possible conception [but] in a determinate direction’ [his italics] (40). Kataphasis compels the reader to engage in an endless process of chasing meaning; ultimate understanding remains beyond its grasp, but, in the pursuit, the reader is pushed away from stable forms of knowledge, and forced to wrestle with something wholly other.
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This argument for kataphasis has useful parallels in the work of literary critics such as Wolfgang Iser, Michael Wood, and Derek Attridge, and in the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and Emmanuel Levinas. Each of these writers will be explored in more depth in the following chapters, but it is worth noting at this stage that, while some of these critics would reject the notion of an infinitely unknowable Other, each considers the process of destabilizing forms of knowledge in order to accommodate the Other to be at the root of ethical engagement, and, for some, the very foundation of the literary. It is at the limits of language – where words necessarily exist but are pushed to breaking point – where we can encounter (without encompassing) the Other as other, without reducing or destroying it through its appropriation within common language. Consider the similarity of the kataphatic technique to Derek Attridge’s description of the confrontation with the Other in The Singularity of Literature: [The introduction of otherness] is achieved not just by fashioning into a new shape the materials at hand – in literature these materials include the rules and regularities that govern its forms and its operation as well as its sonic, rhythmic, and graphic properties; in philosophy these are ideas – but, more importantly, by destabilizing them, heightening their internal inconsistencies and ambiguities, exaggerating their proclivities, and exploiting their gaps and tensions, in such a way as to allow the otherness implicit in these materials – the otherness they exclude in order to be what they are – to make itself explicit. (56) While these critics differ on whether the other is ultimately knowable – Attridge, for instance, rejects Levinas’ argument for the wholly Other – each shares the notion that the indescribable is a real presence, and exerts pressure on us, and on our language. Kataphatic mystical texts hold that God can never be contained within a word, but language, when overdetermined, oversaturated, pushed to breaking point, can give rise to forms of thought that rise above linguistic cognition, and lead us towards confrontation with the Other. While kataphasis lacks the logical clarity of apophasis, it is, as such, perhaps more suited to its task. Even if it (necessarily) falls short of conveying absolute knowledge, kataphasis is comfortable occupying the middle ground between
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certainty and strangeness, and it is an intermediary domain where the mid-century novelist stands. As Gadamer wrote in Truth and Method, ‘The true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between’ (295).
Mysticism and the Mid-Century Novel The following chapters trace the use of techniques and concepts drawn from, and with parallels to, mystical writing, as they were put to use in overcoming the stark subject/object divide that had impoverished the mid-century novel, moving from Murdoch’s and early Golding’s use of apophasis, through to the kataphatic novels of later Golding, White, and Bellow. This study concentrates on novels written between 1953 and the late 1970s. Between 1953 and 1955, each of the writers under consideration published the novels that would establish their reputation. It was in 1953 that Bellow’s first major novel, The Adventures of Augie March, was published. He had published two earlier works – Dangling Man (1944) and The Victim (1947) – but has dismissed them as apprentice works (‘his M.A. and his Ph.D’) (qtd. in Hoberek 75). They are also philosophically and stylistically dissimilar to the novels that followed, leaning on an inherited existentialism that runs contrary to the more inclusive worldview apparent in his later works. Golding and Murdoch’s first novels (Lord of the Flies and Under The Net, respectively) followed in 1954, and both works were career making. Patrick White, like Bellow, played down his first two novels, Happy Valley (1939) and The Living and the Dead (1941), and they remain out of print. His 1948 novel, The Aunt’s Story, showed increasing confidence, but it was not until 1955’s The Tree of Man that White’s thematic interests reached maturity and he began to achieve recognition as a major novelist. The end date of this study is more arbitrary. For the most part, by the end of the 1970s, each of the writers had received recognition for their body of work (each had received the Nobel Prize, with the exception of Murdoch who won the Booker Prize in 1978), but their major work was behind them.xiii Importantly, I make no claim that these novelists were aware of working together as a group or movement with a unified focus or purpose. They were separated by their geographical locations, had little interaction, and each, for the most part, refused to comment on their literary peers with any specificity, in either praise or derision. Suggestions of mutual respect amongst these writers exist nonetheless: White praised
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Bellow for his ‘detachment’ (‘Making’ 23) and Golding spoke highly of Murdoch’s achievement of depicting ‘actuality’ in her novels (Conradi, Life 449), and taught Under The Net to his students at Hollins in 1961 (Carey 253). Jeanne Delbaere-Garant, attempting to wring Golding for comments on the contemporary literary scene, writes that the only ‘novelist whose name was met with an eloquent silence was Patrick White’ (206). There is also some evidence of face-to-face meetings between the novelists. In a letter to his friend Geoffrey Dutton, White mentions that Murdoch visited him on her tour of Australia in the spring of 1967: with characteristic meanness, he described her as ‘plump, homely, and dowdy,’ but he also lamented the brevity of her visit, as he felt they were ‘on the same wavelength’ (White, Letters 310–11). White also met with Golding on at least two occasions, once while both were vacationing in Molyvos, Greece in 1963 (Carey 277), and again in Australia in 1974 (Carey 344); there is, however, no record of their conversations. Nonetheless, stylistic and ideological similarities unite the works of these writers, and a general sense of concurrent progression – a rise and eventual dissolution – of technique and intent can be traced within them. Throughout this book, connections will also be drawn between the four writers by tracing common lines of influence and placing them within relevant philosophical and intellectual currents. Many of the philosophical works mentioned are direct and well-documented influences, such as Wittgenstein’s influence on Iris Murdoch, the medieval mystic’s place in William Golding’s thought, and Rudolf Steiner’s formative impression on Bellow. In several cases, however, the precise nature of the influence of philosophy upon these writers is less clear, as is the case with the suggestive connection between Patrick White and the moral phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas. In situations such as this, any possible direct influences are highlighted through synoptic readings of passages from philosophical works that appear to have inspired the novel or novels in question; where no direct allusions exist, these texts are approached only as concurrent writing projects that stand as exemplars of the eras’ philosophical concerns, and that serve to illuminate the complex ideas woven into the primary texts. While the authors considered in this study are sometimes seen as occupying different points on an imaginary grey scale that extends from modernism to postmodernism – White’s stylistic similarities to
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Lawrence and Woolf have caused him to be seen as a late modernist, or at least modernist inheritor, while Murdoch’s formal innovation has led critics to see her as an early postmodernist – this study resists a structure that places these novelists as intermediary stepping stones between these dominant movements. Consequently, the chapters are not organized in relation to these paradigms. Further, as their writing was mostly concurrent, no attempt is made to discuss these authors’ works chronologically. Instead, the study follows the spectrum of approaches to the problem of expressing the ineffable Good, moving from the apophatic to the kataphatic. The first chapter posits that Iris Murdoch’s novels, and her ethical philosophy, may at least in part be viewed as an ambivalent response to Wittgenstein’s claim in the Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus that metaphysical concerns are wholly beyond discussion. It explores her early novelistic struggle with the problem of linguistic authority, through to her later successes with apophatic structure in the ‘writer’ novels of the late 1970s. It may seem counterintuitive to place Murdoch, who appears to have the most postmodern affinities of the authors in question, at the beginning of the study. However, her seemingly postmodern traits arise less out of an affinity with post-structuralism than from an apophatic mysticism that draws directly from Plato, and, more ambivalently, from Wittgenstein. As mentioned earlier, the combination of apophaticism with literary experimentalism is not a purely postmodern trait, as it had a strong precedent in the modernist era. This is particularly true of the later work of Eliot, Joyce, and Beckett, each of whom negates language in their writing in order to move beyond it. It is useful to begin this study with Iris Murdoch because, of the four writers under consideration, she is the only one to directly discuss morality, mysticism, and their place in the novel in any depth outside her fiction; consequently, an exploration of her philosophical writing provides an important framework for this book’s wider concerns. Furthermore, by exploring the way Murdoch’s philosophical mode of thinking sometimes clashes with her act of literary creation, this chapter gestures towards many of the challenges that faced the other novelists when they attempted to approach the supra-rational through rational means. The second chapter explores William Golding’s progression from the apophatic novels of his early career through to the kataphatic
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revelation of The Spire. Golding’s early work, born out of his post-war pessimism, located evil solely in the rational mind. He held that the human compulsion to organize the world into pictures, structures, and words separated individuals from each other, and from the world; morality was consequently deemed the product of rational thought, rather than a form of intuitive knowledge. His early novels, from Lord of the Flies through to Free Fall, followed an experimental pattern not dissimilar to Murdoch’s, in which his puzzle-like literary constructions attempted to undo themselves in order to approach a supra-rational silence. Golding, however, unlike Murdoch, eventually became dissatisfied with this approach, and sought the creation of a new literary language that emphasized excess, rather than asceticism, so that language began to serve as a generator of thought, rather than a limiting container. His fifth novel, The Spire, is presented as the site of this transformation, where a rigid structure (both the spire within the novel, and the novel itself), instead of collapsing into nothingness, is transfigured as an endlessly equivocal and overflowing vessel of supra-rational thought. In The Spire, human consciousness is no longer seen as being entirely ‘other’ from the external world; rather, the boundaries between self and other can be overcome by agitating the habitual structures of thought in order to open up the possibility of new forms of thinking. The third chapter focuses on the more developed (and less selfconscious) use of this kataphatic technique as it occurs in the novels of Patrick White. Through close readings of White’s novels, this chapter reveals the ways in which White encouraged cognitive overflow and linguistic aporia through the use of overdetermined symbols, dislocated syntax, and ‘painterly’ techniques, such as his inventive use of ekphrasis. Throughout, connections are drawn between the effect of these techniques upon the reader and White’s moral-phenomenological worldview, which is elucidated through the parallel readings of works by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas. White’s goal was to enact, within his novels, a phenomenological assault on the subject/object divide, in order to reveal that subject, object, and goodness itself are, to use Merleau-Ponty’s phrase, part of the ‘flesh of the world.’ White had similar aspirations to Murdoch and early Golding, in that he wished to overcome limiting rationalism in a quest for transcendent goodness; his approach, however, was different, in that he rejected the either/or distinction
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between self and non-self, and concentrated on revealing that the seemingly rigid border was, in fact, dappled and amorphous. The fourth chapter continues to explore the collapsing subject/ object divide as it appears in the mid-period novels of Saul Bellow. Bellow, like White, rejected the distinction between the physical and spiritual worlds, arguing, instead, that ‘corporeal things are an image of the spiritual and visible objects are renderings of invisible ones’ (Henderson 74). This chapter presents how Bellow’s belief was largely indebted to the scientific writings of Johann Wolfgang Goethe, and to his follower Rudolf Steiner, who both believed that objective truth could be found through subjectivity. Bellow, however, employs a more tempered kataphatic technique than Golding and White, and views the human condition with a more sympathetic eye; he is less interested in leading the reader into new levels of thought than in depicting his characters’ very human struggle against the limits of their own understanding. The chapter focuses on the way Bellow’s philosophical influences manifest in his complex appraisal and depiction of human cognition, which, for Bellow, is ultimately not as rational or limited as the more pessimistic Murdoch and Golding believed. Throughout this book, the focus will be on the ways in which this literature ‘thinks,’ rather than on the thoughts it contains, with the aim of showing how these novelists attempt to use language to get beyond language, and to use fiction to approach truth, in the pursuit of a higher morality than exists outside rational thought, but which had been lost in the mire of an increasingly rational age.
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1 Towards an Ideal Limit: Linguistic Authority in the Work of Iris Murdoch
Iris Murdoch began her postgraduate degree at Cambridge in 1947, the same year that Ludwig Wittgenstein retired from teaching at Trinity College to concentrate on his writing. Wittgenstein remained a significant presence on campus during Murdoch’s stay, and his ideas came to dominate the thought and conversation of the young Murdoch and her coterie. Murdoch’s interest in Wittgenstein was and remained centred on his 1921 publication, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, despite the fact that Wittgenstein had long since rejected its argument by the time Murdoch arrived in Cambridge.i The Tractatus claimed, in Wittgenstein’s words, to provide the ‘final solution to the problems of philosophy’ (4). As Murdoch explains it, Wittgenstein’s book claimed two subjects (which she facetiously refers to in her Metaphysics as two ‘godheads’): the world of fact (or what Wittgenstein calls ‘states of affairs’), which can be expressed and discussed in words and combinations of words, and another ‘which is totally independent of that world’ (Metaphysics 27). The reason that philosophy has never resolved the problems surrounding the realms of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics is, according to Wittgenstein, that they lie outside the realm of facts, and, as such, are beyond discussion, philosophical or otherwise. The Tractatus is divided into seven sections. The first six attempt to systematically break down and delineate the potential and, more importantly, the limits of language. It is the seventh, however, that haunted Murdoch; it consists of only one sentence: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’ (189). Bertrand Russell, in his otherwise admiring introduction to the first edition of the Tractatus, dismisses the mystical implications of this sentence, arguing that, if 31
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something cannot be spoken of, it should not even be considered to exist at all. The metaphysical realm implied by the seventh section is, according to Russell, not only ‘inexpressible, but a fiction, a mere delusion’ (23). Wittgenstein, however, publicly resisted Russell’s interpretation of his book, which he felt misunderstood and misrepresented his central contention; as he wrote to Ludwig Ficker in 1919 (in a letter quoted by Murdoch in her Metaphysics), the Tractatus ‘consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely the second part that is the important one’ (qtd. in Janik and Toulmin 192). Despite the unpopularity of his position among the Cambridge set, Wittgenstein insisted that ‘There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical’ (Tractatus 189). Peter Conradi, in Iris Murdoch: A Life (2001), recognizes in Murdoch a Bloomian anxiety towards Wittgenstein; he writes that Murdoch dreamt of Wittgenstein throughout her life, and described him as both ‘numinous’ and ‘evil’ on separate occasions (263). The Tractatus is a regular point of reference throughout Murdoch’s essays and novels, and, judging by the content of these allusions, she was not captivated by the passages that interested the analytical school – the methodical analysis of grammatical propositions – but, instead, by the implications of that brief final sentence. Murdoch was not naturally inclined towards the type of philosophy that pervaded Cambridge at the time of her attendance, as she was and remained, at heart, an ethical philosopher (and, unfashionably, a Platonist).ii Wittgenstein’s claim at the end of the Tractatus that the metaphysical realm exists but is beyond discussion provided a contemporary distillation of an intellectual and artistic problem that was of great relevance to Murdoch: what is the relation of forms of human expression – language, art, literature – to greater metaphysical concerns? It also instilled within her a profound ambivalence, as she was shocked by the extremity of Wittgenstein’s position, but was also compelled to accept its veracity, to at least some extent. In her philosophical writing, she returns again and again to spar with Wittgenstein and his immediate followers;iii she never manages to quite lay to rest these opponents in her philosophical writing, but, as her recurring entreaties to ‘common sense’ within these passages of intellectual jousting suggest, it is likely she believed that the argument would not be won in the logical medium of philosophy anyway, but through other more intuitive or artistic means.
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The Problem of the Novel Murdoch published her first novel Under The Net in 1954, only seven years after first meeting Wittgenstein.iv The novel was published into a literary scene that Murdoch felt to be ‘in turmoil’ (‘Existentialists’ 221). In each of her major essays on the state of the novel – ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited’ (1959), ‘Against Dryness’ (1961), and ‘Existentialists and Mystics’ (1970) – she draws a connection between the linguistic turn in philosophy, as represented by Wittgenstein, and the central problem of the novel in the post-war period: its bifurcation into the ‘journalistic’ novel which dealt with the real world of facts and objects but eschewed the metaphysical, the aesthetic, and the ethical; and the ‘crystalline’ novel which was concerned with the ‘human condition,’ but had no relation to the objective external world (‘Against’ 291). In ‘Against Dryness,’ she explains the source of the novel’s impoverishment: From Hume through Bertrand Russell, with friendly help from mathematical logic and science, we derive the idea that reality is finally a quantity of material atoms and that significant discourse must relate itself directly or indirectly to reality so conceived. This position was most picturesquely summed up in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. (287–8) As words can only attach themselves to objects and things, and not to issues of value, the novel should only concern itself with ‘straightforward stor[ies] enlivened with empirical facts’ (291); this leads to the ‘journalistic’ novel. If the novel does not take this approach, it is really only presenting fantasy; hence the ‘crystalline’ novel. This kind of novel may appear to discuss metaphysics concepts, but it is in fact only referring to ‘linguistic quasi-things’ (292). This follows logically from Wittgenstein’s thesis: it is impossible to discuss extra-linguistic concepts (ethics, aesthetics, religion); consequently, any non-journalistic ‘art’ – art that purports to discuss non-empirical data – is not actually referring to anything ontologically real, but only to itself: it is about words, not worlds. Novels of this sort, at best, will be consoling fantasy, ‘small myth[s]’ (292). They can help the reader understand language and the subjective mind, but not the world. The modernist novel, Murdoch suggests, was ‘crystalline’ in form, as, within its stream-of-consciousness passages, ‘objects and scenes dissolve[d] into words’ (‘Art’ 250).
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While Wittgenstein provided Murdoch with a contemporary proponent of the inexpressibility dilemma, she did not believe the idea to be entirely original, except in its extremity. She argued that Plato’s own rejection of the arts was related to a similar belief that higher concepts cannot comfortably exist within language, especially writing. In her long essay ‘The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists’ (1976), she explained: [According to Plato, t]he ideal of knowledge is to see face to face not (eikasia) in a glass darkly. However, truth involves speech and thought is mental speech, so thought is already symbolism rather than perception: a necessary evil… Language itself, spoken, is already bad enough. Writing and mimetic art are the introduction of further symbols and discursive logoi or quasi-logoi which wantonly make a poor situation even worse and lead the mind away in the wrong direction. (413) This is a very Wittgensteinian reading of Plato, although Wittgenstein would not have considered the discussion of metaphysical concepts to be a ‘necessary evil,’ as he held any discussion of these topics to be absurd. Elsewhere, however, Murdoch argues that Plato in fact shared Wittgenstein’s contention that metaphysical ideas cannot be expressed in words to any degree, despite the fact that the majority of Plato’s writing was devoted to the direct discussion of these concepts. Plato, she writes in her Metaphysics, mostly attempted to approach these concepts in extra- or supra-linguistic ways; she quotes a passage from Stanley Rosen’s The Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry, which explains that Plato himself ‘sought to avoid a speech which would temporalise, objectify, or rationalise being itself’ and that ‘the dialogues become intelligible only when we perceive this unstated luminosity which is directly present as the silence of Plato’ (180–1). She mentions Plato’s awareness that language’s real function is not denotative, but evocative: it can serve as a bridge towards ‘private inexplicable states of consciousness’ (183). The Cave myth, she says, shows that ‘a higher moral level appears to us first, at our own lower level, as an image, reflection, or shadow’ (183). She believed that Plato, while recognizing the impossibility of capturing metaphysical notions in language, was not willing to say that the indescribable is also the unknowable; as she asks, ‘Can we not see a little beyond
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those transcendental barriers, do we not have intimations, gleams of light, glimpses of another scene?’ (36). Murdoch wrote regularly, in her novels and in her philosophy, of mystics and their attempt to approach the ineffable through words. Over centuries, mystics, east and west, had developed linguistic and formal techniques through which to convey, rather than directly articulate, their experience to the reader; if, as Wittgenstein stated, the extra-linguistic is mystical, then perhaps, in order for it to have a place in philosophy and art, it needed to be approached mystically.
Murdoch’s Theory of the Good Iris Murdoch believed that goodness is not created, formed, or chosen, but discovered. As such, it is primarily encountered negatively, when other aspects of life – language, self, ego, and so on – are suppressed. It is consequently perception, or attention, a term she borrowed from Simone Weil, that impels moral improvement. As she explained in ‘Against Dryness,’ paraphrasing Weil, ‘morality [is] a matter of attention, not will’ (293). In her later Metaphysics, she wrote, ‘moral change comes from an attention to the world whose natural result is a decrease in egotism through an increased sense of the reality of, primarily, of course, other people, but also other things’ (52). The concept of attention, in both Weil and Murdoch’s writing, has a distinctly mystical character: Weil described it as a passive and outward gaze ‘so full that the “I” disappears’ (107). How, though, is this increased vision to be achieved? With a nod to Wittgenstein, Murdoch states that people necessarily see and understand the world through mental forms, pictures, constructs, and metaphors. These forms cannot be removed altogether, because vision without mental mediation is unimaginable. Wittgenstein explained this concept through a metaphor of language as a net, an image that provided Murdoch with the title of her first novel, Under The Net: Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots. We now say: Whatever kind of picture these make I can always get as near as I like to its description, if I cover the surface with a sufficiently fine square network and now say of every square that it is white or black. In this way I shall have brought the description of the
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surface to a unified form. This form is arbitrary because I could have applied with equal success a net with a triangular or hexagonal mesh. It can happen that the description would have been simpler with the air of a triangular mesh; that is to say we might have described the surface more accurately with a triangular and coarser, than with the finer square mesh, or vice versa, and so on. (Tractatus 175) Reliance upon such forms of organization is intrinsic to the structure of human consciousness; such mediation necessarily imposes a false sense of order upon a contingent world, but the world cannot be seen without the net (Murdoch frequently refers to the story that the natives could not see Cook’s ships, because they had no conceptual framework) (Metaphysics 216). However, selfish interests and the desires of the ego frequently influence the shape of the net; consequently, the forms are often a poor ‘fit’ for the reality in view. A great disjuncture between truth and one’s impression of it can lead to poor judgement, and the actions and choices that follow from this misunderstanding can cause suffering. Moral work, then, is the process of questioning the mental forms that condition our vision of the world by positing new ones, and assessing the impressions in relation to one another. The better, more accurate, form is kept, while the poorer is discarded (the difficulties with assessing what is ‘better’ or ‘more accurate’ will be discussed shortly). Murdoch provided an example of this process in her 1962 essay, ‘The Idea of Perfection’: A woman (M) initially sees her new daughterin-law (D) as ‘undignified’ and ‘juvenile,’ but, by reassessing her own moral vocabulary – one of the forms through which people understand the world – she is eventually able to see her as ‘spontaneous’ and ‘youthful’ (17). Murdoch, abiding by Wittgensteinian tenets, was adamant that M does not adopt her new vocabulary as a consequence of a more accurate moral vision (unmediated perception is impossible); rather, she is able to perceive D differently because she has changed her vocabulary. However, there are moments within the example that suggest Murdoch did not truly believe this, and it is here that her deep-rooted resistance to Wittgenstein begins to emerge. In the passage from the Tractatus quoted directly above, Wittgenstein is ambiguous in regard to the relative worth of one ‘net’ over another. He first says the
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form is ‘arbitrary’ and that a different ‘net’ may be substituted with ‘equal’ success; however, he then appears to contradict his point by saying a different net could potentially have described the surface ‘more accurately.’ This is a paradox, because, if our only access to the world is through language, how could one ever objectively assess the accuracy of the language we use? This is one of the problems that led Wittgenstein to revise his position in the later Philosophical Investigations. Regardless, even the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus would have rejected Murdoch’s suggestion that a value word could ever be more ‘accurate’ than another, as he never relinquished his belief that moral words are either nonsensical or disguised statements of relative empirical value (a ‘good’ runner is, in fact, just a ‘faster’ runner). Murdoch, however, does not think that ‘youthful’ is just a more useful word than ‘juvenile’; she insists that it is also more accurate. As M reassesses her vocabulary, writes Murdoch, she moves closer to seeing D ‘as she really is’ (‘Idea’ 36). So, while Murdoch explicitly states that we can only see and know through mediating forms and structures, she appears to contradict herself by implicitly suggesting that individuals possess a way of seeing that is not bound by language. The vision that upsets M’s understanding of words and caused her reassessment cannot be structured by language; if it were, it would similarly be open to augmentation, and an infinite regress would occur through which M would never approach the world ‘as it is.’ If a word can ever be judged to be more accurate than another, the difficult concept of ‘pure vision’ must exist (Murdoch suggested as much when she hinted of the possibility of seeing ‘purely, without self’) (‘God’ 64). Reality, she implies, is perceived in the strange hinterland we encounter in the moments when our linguistic understanding collapses and we are briefly presented with a world beyond our comprehension, before our language adjusts and we once again relax into habit. This is the mystical element that provides the ‘background’ of her moral philosophy. The mystical aspect of her moral philosophy is further emphasized when it is understood that M’s transition from the term ‘juvenile’ to the term ‘youthful’ is not a terminal transition from one clear-cut, socially defined word to a relatively better one; as Murdoch explains in ‘The Idea of Perfection’: ‘M has confronted D with an endless task. Moral tasks are characteristically endless not only because “within,” as it were, a given concept our efforts are imperfect, but also because as
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we move and as we look our concepts themselves are changing’ (27). A properly moral individual, therefore, will be one who is never willing to rest upon the definitions provided by ‘ordinary language,’ or, indeed, those previously constructed by oneself: ‘The movement of understanding,’ said Murdoch, ‘is onward into increasing privacy, in the direction of the ideal limit, and not back towards a genesis in the rulings of an impersonal public language’ (‘Idea’ 28). Language at the ‘ideal limit’ would reflect the complexity of the fullest (mystical) level of attention: it would be fluid, in perpetual flux like the contingent world, and never permanently binding. The apparent goal, then, is to reach a stage in which language either cannot catch up with observation, or is rendered so infinitely complex that it bears no relation to what we know as language (ursprache). Murdoch sometimes said that this is an unimaginable endpoint that provides individuals with a sense of direction but could not be reached; at other times, however, such as when she described M seeing D as ‘she really is,’ she appears less sure. Thirty years after ‘The Idea of Perfection,’ Murdoch published Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, in which she finally stated explicitly the previously implied idea that, for an individual to be able to evaluate the accuracy of a linguistic statement, he or she must have access to an extra-linguistic reality. She wrote: Ordinary-life truth-seeking, a certain level of which is essential for survival, is a swift instinctive testing of innumerable kinds of coherence against innumerable kinds of extra-linguistic data…. Of course we are constantly conceptualising what confronts us, ‘making’ it into meaning, into language. But what we encounter remains free, ambiguous, endlessly contingent, and there. (195–6)
The Transcendent Good (Ontological Proof) Throughout her philosophical writing, Murdoch argued that accurate vision is a moral necessity; the closer we are to a selfless and accurate vision of the world, the less likely we are to do harm. Such a vision would destroy illusion and selfishness, remove personal prejudice, and help one to see past temptation. It would help one ‘guard one’s tongue’ and ‘expel bad thoughts’ (Metaphysics 503). In each case, however, Murdoch presents attention as suppressing or removing one’s ego
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and one’s inclination towards misguided and harmful actions, which makes one quieter and more tolerant. This is an ascetic form of morality, if such total passivity can be called ‘morality’ at all. Schopenhauer’s argument for the denial of the Will to Live is similarly dependent on a concept of unselfing, but he refused to think about the outcome in moral terms: he argued that evil is the result of individual manifestations of a cosmic Will, and one must ‘die to the world,’ utterly suppressing the ego, to escape the wheel of suffering. However, as Murdoch recognized in her Metaphysics, ‘Schopenhauer’s totally will-less state is not to be thought of as an automatic release into an unselfish condition of virtuous activity … it is above or beyond compassion and any “ordinary morals”’ (61). Murdoch, however, resisted this conclusion; she did not agree that to transcend the self is to rise above morality, as she believed that goodness, unlike evil, does not exist within the individual alone and is consequently not dependent upon human agency. This is a crucial difference between Murdoch’s ethical philosophy and the Buddhist mysticism that influenced Schopenhauer (and which often appears as the subject of light satire in Murdoch’s novels). The Buddhist ideal state of Nirvana is not a state of goodness, but of nothingness – it is beyond good and evil. Murdoch, however, felt that goodness is ontologically real; it is present in the world, and also transcends it (Plato’s influence is clear). In response to existentialism’s argument that there is ‘no point in talking of “moral seeing” since there is nothing morally to see’ (‘Idea’ 34),v Murdoch countered that there is indeed something to see, as morality has an ontological existence. Indeed, it is only in the light of a supreme Good that transcends the human that one can have any ethical comprehension whatsoever. Murdoch’s argument for the existence of the transcendent Good unfolds in this way: ‘A deep understanding of any field of human activity (painting, for instance) involves an increasing revelation of degrees of excellence’ (‘God’ 60). These increments, she insisted, are not simply understood in relation to one another, but exist in relation to an absolute standard, of which they are necessary degradations. To defend this claim, Murdoch, in her 1969 essay ‘On “God” and “Good,”’ turned to Anselm’s Ontological Proof for the existence of God: we have in our mind the idea of perfection, which Anselm calls God. This concept is a priori, not something we conjure or choose.
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It provides our understanding of ourselves as ‘selves,’ as well as our place within the world. It exists because it cannot not exist. Like the vanishing point in a perspective painting, we cannot see it, but we know it is there, because everything we know is situated in relation to it. Murdoch rejected Anselm’s use of the term ‘God’ (‘Useless confusion arises from attempts to extend the meaning of our word “God” to cover any conception of a spiritual reality’ [Metaphysics 419]), replacing it with the concept of the Good, a concept she borrows from Plato. Murdoch explained her idea of the Good in relation to Plato’s metaphor of the Sun: ‘The idea of perfection is … a natural producer of order. In its light we come to see that A, which superficially resembles B, is really better than B’ (‘God’ 60–1). The Good is the necessary foundation that presupposes moral thought, but, importantly, it also transcends thought, which is why the process of unselfing is crucial. Murdoch admitted that ‘the ontological proof is seen to be not exactly a proof but rather a clear assertion of faith’ (‘God’ 61). Indeed, in ‘On “God” and “Good,”’ she closed with an unsubstantiated plea for her readers to perform a leap of faith over the gaps in logic: Are we not certain that there is a ‘true direction’ towards better conduct, that goodness ‘really matters,’ and does not that certainty about a standard suggest an idea of permanence which cannot be reduced to psychological or any other set of empirical terms? […] This view is of course not amenable even to a persuasive philosophical proof and can easily be challenged on all sorts of empirical grounds. However, I do not think the virtuous peasant will be without resources. (59) When a philosopher starts appealing to the common sense of the ‘virtuous peasant,’ we tend to find that we are standing in a different place than we thought, but this is the logical endpoint of Murdoch’s moral philosophy: Evil and cruelty stem from our separation from and lack of knowledge of the world. Moral improvement comes from improving our understanding and closing this distance, but the consequence is that, because the self is constituted by this separateness, it tends to dissipate the closer one is to the goal of union. Evil disappears as the self dissolves, but goodness does not share its fate because, unlike evil, the good does not reside solely in the self;
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it is the essence of reality, while evil is human ignorance. The moral dimension of her entire argument, therefore, rests upon a single contention: that goodness is not a human construct, but a transcendent reality, and, in order to perceive it, one must suppress or destroy the egotistic self. Mysticism, therefore, is more than a ‘background’ to Murdoch’s moral philosophy; it is its foundation.
Murdoch’s Early Theory of Art Murdoch’s appeal to common sense should not necessarily be seen to undermine the strength of her moral philosophy. Rather, it should be accepted that Murdoch’s moral theory ventured into domains that are difficult (or impossible) to explore with the tools typically associated with philosophical writing. Consequently, Murdoch turned her attention to the potential of language within the discipline of art, where, she suggested, the mysterious and intuitive elements of experience can be more readily explored. Murdoch’s move towards the moral and spiritual potential of art and language was two-pronged: she discussed it from a distance within her philosophical writing and also worked directly with it in her creative fiction. The latter is more illuminating, but it is the former with which we shall first concern ourselves. As discussed earlier, Murdoch felt the novel had become impoverished in the first half of the twentieth century as it could no longer successfully demonstrate what George Lukacs called ‘the antagonistic duality of soul and world’ (88). The novel was either flat and ‘journalistic,’ or fantastical and ‘crystalline.’ In ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited’ Murdoch stated, with characteristic boldness, that ‘great’ art – she refers directly to the nineteenth-century realist novel – presents us with an accurate vision of the contingent world, and this is illustrated most clearly through its portrayal of the infinite expanse of character. The great novelists – Murdoch mentions ‘Scott, Jane Austen, George Eliot, Tolstoy, especially Tolstoy’ (272) – were unhindered by the twentieth century’s scepticism towards the limits of language, and were consequently able to create a plethora of ‘real’ and ‘free’ characters; that is, individuals who are more than projections of the novelist’s own ego. She argued that the ‘individuals portrayed in [great] novels are free, independent of their author, and not merely puppets in the exteriorisation of some closely locked psychological
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conflict of his own’ (271). She goes so far as to argue that the writers of these novels are necessarily ‘good’ people, as their ability to create ‘free’ characters is a direct result of their capacity to suppress self in order to apprehend that other people really exist. The great author’s chief virtue is therefore ‘tolerance’ (of difference, of others), although Murdoch stated that, at its highest level, this quality looks more like love. Furthermore, it is not merely the author who approaches the good as a result of the creation of these novels; the reader is able to perceive fictional characters with a level of distance and detachment difficult to attain in their messy and engrossing lives where the stakes are so much higher. The vision of other people achieved through reading is translatable to real-life experience, so the novel can, in fact, aid one’s ability to attend to the world, which is the cornerstone of the moral life. Murdoch’s argument for the moral benefit of literature was taken up and refined in the theoretical writing of the late 1980s and 1990s by proponents of the so-called ‘ethical turn’ in literary criticism, including Wayne Booth, Cora Diamond, and Martha Nussbaum, all of whom admitted a debt to Murdoch. These critics wrote, in part, in reaction to the Anglo-American literary theory of the 1970s and 1980s, which tended towards treating texts as self-contained things, and addressing moral concerns only insofar as to reveal the linguistic assumptions and biases present within texts. While the approaches of the critics of the ethical turn vary, each considers literature as something that enters into dialogue with the real world, and that can affect the reader’s life, behaviour, and vision. This is not to say that they attempt to evaluate a novel upon the strength of its overt moral pronouncements; as Todd F. Davis insists, ‘few critics wish to return to a dogmatically prescriptive or doctrinaire form of reading’ (Davis and Womack x); instead, they explore the way texts portray moral decision-making, and the ways in which a reader’s encounter with a text challenges their ethical thinking. There are significant differences, however, between Murdoch’s early theories of art and the respective stances of the leading critics of the ‘ethical turn,’ and they serve to highlight the difficulties of Murdoch’s position. Both Booth and Nussbaum, for example, reject Murdoch’s early idea that novels present ‘real characters’ or real life. Nussbaum, who is less resistant than Murdoch to twentieth-century philosophical
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developments, insists that ‘Life is never simply presented by a text; it is always represented as something’ [her italics] (8): [N]ovels do not function … as pieces of ‘raw’ life: they are a close and careful interpretive description. All living is interpreting; all action requires seeing the world as something. So in this sense no life is ‘raw,’ and (as James and Proust insist) throughout our living we are, in a sense, makers of fictions. (8) While both Murdoch and Nussbaum agree that literature positively aids the reader’s awareness of ‘particulars,’ Nussbaum insists that goodness is not found within these particulars, but through an individual’s response to them. Nussbaum – as an Aristotelian opposed to Murdoch’s neo-Platonism – believes ‘there is not only no single metric along which the claims of different good things can be meaningfully considered, there is not even a small plurality of such measures’ (36). As such, there is a necessary place within Nussbaum’s argument for a subjective interpretive authorial or narrative consciousness; if A is not objectively better than B, it requires a perceptive and intelligent mind to decide between them. Nussbaum goes so far as to condemn any novel that does not recognize the subjectivity of the authorial consciousness: ‘The authorial voice … reminds us that, even when we do attend, our attention, like all human attention, is interested and interpretive’ (144). Murdoch’s neo-Platonist beliefs, however, led her to reject this position as it locates goodness within individual choice or interpretation: she felt that this idea of various non-commensurable ‘goods’ likens morality to shopping (‘Idea’ 8). Murdoch, as discussed, believed that goodness exists outside human consciousness, so that A can be ‘really better than B’ (‘God’ 61). Unlike Nussbaum, she did believe in the existence of ‘raw’ life, and, if a novel presents only a personal interpretation of it, it is presenting a dangerous illusion of reality. It was this issue that led Plato to reject the moral role of the arts; he believed that fiction could not present reality, and therefore has no connection to the Good. Murdoch, however, could not bring herself to share Plato’s conclusion, which forced a dilemma: If form and language inhibits perception of reality, how can a novel, comprised of these very things, aid one’s understanding of the Good?
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In her early essays, she was only able to offer an unconvincing solution: accepting that ‘Art has got to have form, whereas life need not’ (‘Sublime’ 285), she stated: Our sense of form, which is an aspect of our desire for consolation, can be a danger to our sense of reality as a rich receding background… Against the consolations of form … we must pit the destructive power of the now so unfashionable naturalistic idea of character. (‘Against’ 294) Form, she contended, does not have to operate as a prison, but can be a ‘house fit for free characters to live in’ (‘Sublime’ 295). This argument, however, is indefensible. Language itself, as Murdoch herself insisted, is one of the ‘forms’ that limit our perception of reality, and literary characters are, of course, presented, described, and contained entirely within language. The claim, then, that characters can somehow transcend the very conditions of their fictional existence is groundless, even when considered in relation to Murdoch’s own understanding of language.
The Problem of Authority The development and improvement of Murdoch’s argument concerning the moral benefit of literature can be seen within the formal experimentation of her novels of the 1970s. The nature of these innovations suggests that she grew to consider the central problem of the contemporary novel to be the issue of narrative and linguistic authority. ‘Few questions are more important than: “Who is the boss?”’ declares Julius King in A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970) (216). As discussed, Murdoch believed that error is inherent any time one resolutely adheres to a single perspective or reading of a situation, or to a rigid definition of a word, as moral improvement comes from an understanding of the complex, flexible nature of any given situation. In the nineteenth-century novel, multiple and conflicting perspectives on a situation or individual could be provided by the differing views of separate characters. This could, of course, still be attempted in the twentieth-century novel, but the era’s self-consciousness meant that neither reader nor writer was able to overlook the fact
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that these seemingly different perspectives remained the creations of a single dominating authorial consciousness. When Murdoch takes the omniscient position, she sometimes appears to attempt to compensate for her limited perspective by clumsily grasping for a god-like descriptive comprehensiveness; an example of this can be seen in her much-criticized tendency to pile up premodifiers, usually in threes, but often in fours or fives:vi a bag is not just a bag, but a ‘little brown silk woven vanity bag’ (Murdoch, Honourable 35); a towel is not a towel but a ‘crispy starchy embroidered face towel’ (Murdoch, Honourable 44); a table is not a table but a ‘long solid burly wooden table’ (Murdoch, Good 109). However, this habit tended only to remind the reader of the struggling and limited humanity of the narrator. It is tempting, in light of Murdoch’s philosophy of language, to consider this awkwardness intentional. A defence of this argument can be made by observing the ambivalence in contemporary scholarship towards Murdoch’s ‘failings.’ Philip Hensher’s introduction to the 2001 Vintage edition A Fairly Honourable Defeat is a good example of this, as it describes Murdoch as ‘undeniably facile’ (ix), and her entire opus as ‘vulgar, careless, embarrassing’ (xv), while admitting it also has a ‘magnetic force’ (ix), and is ‘big, nourishing, grand’ (xv). It is unusual to find such stern criticism in a place normally reserved for unreserved praise, yet Hensher argues that Murdoch’s flaws are in fact part of her success. He writes that, without them, Murdoch would not have been better, but ‘more ordinary’ (x): ‘It is largely for the self-obsessed fecundity of spirit that we read her, and not in a wish for careful perfection’ (x). Peter J. Conradi elaborates on this claim in his book The Saint and the Artist: [Murdoch’s] style deliberately defaults on the demand that it be narcissistically ‘perfect’ and austere, in the interests of the human truths to which it points. The books are wounded so that their meanings can, as it were, leak back into life rather than create a hermetically sealed world. (371) While this argument is, of course, impossible to prove, it is compelling when seen in light of Murdoch’s later novels, written not in the traditional omniscient mode, but from more overtly experimental perspectives.
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In the 1970s, Murdoch began to experiment overtly with narrative perspective and authority, in order to create a novel that would be neither ‘crystalline’ nor ‘journalistic,’ and would resonate with her idea of what ‘good’ art should be. While some of these manipulations employ traditional devices, such as the unreliable narrator of The Black Prince, some, including An Accidental Man (1971), A Word Child (1975), and The Sea, The Sea (1978), use more subtly experimental approaches to the problem of narrative authority. An Accidental Man represents Murdoch’s first major attempt to confront these difficulties formally. The effort is largely unsuccessful, but served as an important step towards her more successful later novels. Murdoch’s awareness that language can only interpret and never present reality led her to envision a novel not dominated by any single authoritative voice, so that no single utterance is allowed to create the illusion of imparting ‘truth.’ She explained in a 1968 interview, prior to beginning the novel, that she was considering the creation of a work ‘entirely composed of peripheral characters with no main characters’ (as in real life) (‘Lively’). In a 1971 interview, she confirmed that An Accidental Man was the product of this venture, ‘a deliberate attempt to exclude the central nucleus and to have a lot of different attachments pulling the plot and the interest away into further corners’ (‘Now’). The apparent goal was to disturb the two central organizing consciousnesses that underpin every novel – that of the central character, and that of the author – in order to create a more ‘accidental’ novel that reflects the contingent nature of reality. Murdoch hoped that, without a central character’s consciousness dominating the novel, different characters would vie for centrality, and the form and content of the novel would twist and turn accordingly. Indeed, it is difficult to decide who is the central character of An Accidental Man, although there is, unavoidably, a central group. To enforce the notion that the members of this group are just a random selection, Murdoch fills the novel with minor characters, many of whom never really enter into the narrative at all, existing only in offhand references. The final three pages of the novel, for example, reference no fewer than twenty-seven different characters, some for the first time. Nonetheless, these mystery figures appear to be important to the main characters, and some appear to be having novel-worthy experiences of their own: a couple has brought a mysterious stranger back to London from their holiday; a young woman has been diagnosed with
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cancer; another has fallen in love with a female acrobat. To mention such events so casually provides the reader with the illusion that the novel could very easily have widened or altered its focus on the ‘world’ displayed within it, and that such an alteration would have greatly altered the seeming importance of one character over another. In doing so, Murdoch partly achieves her goal of denying a single character the right to serve as controlling consciousness of her novel. Murdoch appears aware, however, that this technique does not solve the real problem, which is that of the novel’s ultimate authority: the author. Therefore, she also had to attempt to remove her own voice. To do this, she employed not Flaubertian elision, but two more obvious devices that allow the characters to speak without overt authorial intrusion. While the philosophical impetus to apply these devices is somewhat original, the devices themselves hearken back to literary forms that precede the modern novel. Several chapters are written in the epistolary style, with a barrage of undated and sometimes unsigned letters placed one after the other with no authorial commentary. Other chapters feature nothing but line after line of non-attributed and largely non-contextualised stichomythic dialogue that resembles drama. Both forms resist the omniscient narrative voice; instead, the reader encounters language much as he or she would encounter it in life: as the flawed and personally formed utterances of imperfect individuals. However, the approach is unsuccessful in evoking or even gesturing towards the contingent world. This can be partially attributed to the ways in which these sections differ from our usual encounter with subjective pronouncements in our lives: we rarely encounter letters without a knowledge of the recipient or context, for example; we also never encounter dialogic utterances that have been severed from the tone or body language of the speakers. In dayto-day life, Murdoch wrote, an individual is able to move beyond the limitations of language and approach the Good by attending to the world that exists beyond the constraints of self and language. An Accidental Man allows no room for this world – or a useful illusion of this world – to appear. In these passages, there is nothing to be ‘seen’ or known except words; we are provided only with a Beckettian encounter with disembodied language. This effect contributes to the overall dourness of An Accidental Man, a novel that Valentine Cunningham describes as Murdoch’s
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‘most discomfited and most discomforting’ novel due to its ‘arrestingly awesome’ pessimism and bleakness (vii). She suggests rightly that the magnitude of the novel’s negativity makes it unique among Murdoch’s oeuvre (vii–viii). That An Accidental Man is also her most stylistically experimental work suggests that the novel’s formal properties may have contributed in some way to this darkness. Murdoch, in An Accidental Man, erects an impenetrable wall of language that allowed no suggestion of an ineffable ‘reality’ lurking beyond. While the experimental sections comprise only a portion of the narrative, the negative impressions of language they convey reflect outwards upon the entire work; the reader cannot help but see that the whole novel is constructed of words that refer not to elements of real life, but to a fictional world that does not exist outside the trappings of its creation.
The Metafictional Aspects of A Word Child There was an uncharacteristic two-year gap between An Accidental Man (1971) and her next novel, The Black Prince (1973); and, judging by the latter novel’s drastically different formal structure, it appears that Murdoch herself was not entirely satisfied by the experiment of An Accidental Man. In her first thirteen novels, Murdoch had used a first-person narrator only three times, and, in each case, the device was used inconspicuously;vii in comparison, three of the five novels that followed An Accidental Man use a first-person narrator, and, in each case, the novels directly confront the difficulties that arise from presenting a world through the subjective gaze of a deluded and manipulative consciousness. She allows these narratives to become dominated by characters that have no reservations towards treating language as a stable, transparent, and dominant authority. Once she had accepted the impossibility of eliding authority, Murdoch changed her approach, and chose instead to draw negative attention to it. The post-Accidental Man novels are characterized by an acceptance that literature cannot aspire to present ‘real’ people, and should instead acknowledge itself as a ‘kind of magic’ that can ‘inhibit magic in its more familiar and consoling uses’ (Murdoch, Metaphysics 104). A novel can do this apophatically: it can be formed – or, more
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accurately, punctured – so that ‘reality’ can be glimpsed through the holes punched in its illusion: The art object points beyond itself, the world is seen beyond it, somewhat as the artist saw it when he attempted his statement, although of course he is not just copying the world. The art object is porous or cracked, another reality flows through it, it is in tension between a clarified statement and a confused pointing, and is in danger if it goes too far either way. (Metaphysics 88) The artist, explained Murdoch, is a person who fashions work that accepts the limitations of vision and then capitalizes upon them. It is beyond literature’s ability to contain an individual or to discuss the metaphysical realm, but it is able indirectly to reveal, or at least gesture towards, these ineffable realities. As Alain Badiou wrote, ‘the maxim of art-thought is simple: To produce something finite (artificial) to rival the infinite (natural)’ (36). Hilary Burde is not explicitly the writer of A Word Child in the way that Charles Arrowby is the writer of The Sea, The Sea or Bradley Pearson is the writer of The Black Prince, but his first-person narration has a similar (if not greater) degree of control over the composition of the narrative. Hilary Burde is a philologist who explicitly propones the view of language that inadvertently gave rise to the pessimism of An Accidental Man. He is not concerned with the possibility of a world beneath the net of words; he is only interested in language as a self-contained and totalizing system, and ‘never became concerned with the metaphysical aspects’ (23). He rejects ‘fluffy vague’ words, believing that, when studied properly, language is as precise as math and ‘did not yield’ to the contingent world (22). The irony is that, as a fictional narrator of a fictional world, Hilary is correct. As there is no contingency in his world, only the illusion of it, there is nothing for his language to ‘yield’ to. His world exists only in his description. Murdoch is conscious of this, and plays with this idea throughout the novel. Unlike The Black Prince, A Word Child does not attempt to impart any information other than that thought or experienced directly by Hilary, and very little attempt is made at providing, through irony or implication, the unstated thoughts or motivations of others. This leads Hilary to have an extreme level of control over
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the presentation of events. His explanations and perspectives do not ‘yield’ to the world he describes; how could they, when there is no world outside his description? Anything Hilary describes is necessarily the truth, as long as he says nothing to contradict it. Murdoch employs several devices in the novel to emphasize the extent of Hilary’s control. She brazenly indulges in the pathetic fallacy throughout the novel: each time Hilary emerges from a closed environment into the London streets, the weather is described in detail and, without fail, it reflects his mood. After ‘bad dreams’ it is ‘a cold day with a lot of low scurrying brown clouds and a bitterly cold wind’ (129). After receiving a liberating letter from Lady Kitty that leaves Hilary feeling ‘extraordinary,’ the ‘fog had gone, to be replaced by a vivid russet-yellow light, cloud almost pierced by sun, which lent bright but strange colours to all things visible’ (177). On the day Gunnar visits Crystal, the weather, ‘which had seemed to be as cold as it could be, had suddenly become even colder and the sky had assumed a thick gathered grey congested awfulness which betokened snow’ (294). At first, only two explanations seem to present themselves: either Murdoch is naïvely and unknowingly indulging in the fallacy or Hilary’s mood is affecting his perception of the weather. The former is unlikely, as the error is uncharacteristic. If we try to prove the latter hypothesis, however, one finds it impossible to do so. One cannot argue convincingly that an ‘unreliable narrator’ is imparting questionable empirical information if there is no evidence in the text that he is lying. Our scepticism towards the unnatural correlation between mood and weather has been aroused not by anything in the text itself, but by our conviction that real life is ‘not like that.’ But we cannot do this, as we can only evaluate the veracity of a character’s claims in relation to the novel’s internal verisimilitude. In these passages, Murdoch evokes G.E. Moore’s paradox, which gained prominence through its treatment in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: ‘It’s raining outside, but I don’t believe it is.’ The difficulty of the sentence is not that there is faulty information in the statement – it may be raining outside, and I may not believe it – but that it is absurd to make such a pronouncement in the firstperson. When presented in the third-person – ‘It’s raining outside, but John doesn’t believe it is’ – the statement is not absurd. Wittgenstein considered the problem to be related to the word ‘believe.’ He argued that the first clause – ‘it’s raining outside’ – is also an assertion of
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belief, even if the word ‘believe’ is absent; the things we know are necessarily things we believe in. Consequently, the sentence could be rewritten to read ‘I believe it’s raining outside, but I don’t believe it’s raining outside,’ which transforms the sentence into a simple contradiction. The problem disappears when presented in the thirdperson, because, as such, the statement merely presents two sets of beliefs held by two different people: John’s belief that it is not raining, and the speaker’s belief that it is raining.viii While one person is certainly wrong (providing that the two share a common object), the statement itself is not paradoxical. When spoken in the first-person, however, the statement implies that one person (the speaker) is holding the two contradictory beliefs, which is nonsensical. The presence of this allusion in Murdoch’s narrative emphasizes her understanding that a) linguistic pronouncements are always subjective statements of belief, and b) the validity of our beliefs/assertions cannot be tested in monologue. To be tested, they must either enter into dialogue with the assertions of others or, ideally, confront extralinguistic information (see the above example of M and D). Because the novel’s world is not accessible (and does not exist) outside Hilary’s pronouncements, his assertions can never be tested, and therefore can never be considered to be false. Hilary is not, therefore, an unreliable narrator; in fact, Murdoch throws the entire concept into question. For a narrator to be unreliable, the reader must assume that there is a ‘reality’ beyond what the speaker says. The reader suspects, for example, that the Duke of Ferrara murdered his wife, even if the Duke refuses to admit it. The reader’s suspicion of him is raised by implicative or contradictory statements in the poem, which gives the reader the sensation (and only the sensation) of perceiving the ‘truth’ through the cracks in what he says. Murdoch’s playful twisting of the ‘unreliable narrator’ convention serves to expose this illusion; it critiques the artifice of fiction itself, and, by extension, the limitations of language. As with An Accidental Man, the experiments of A Word Child emphasize that fiction cannot present the real world: any sense of a ‘reality’ beyond what is said is nothing more than fantasy generated through textual implication and projected by the reader. The reader of A Word Child eventually grows aware that the very content, form, and structure of the novel and its fictional universe is entirely at the whim of Hilary’s pronouncements. For example: Hilary structures his life around an unalterable seven-day routine,
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which, he explains, ‘gave a comforting sense of absolute subjection to history and time’ (27). This schedule provides the formal structure for the entire novel: the first chapter is headed ‘Thursday,’ and describes only the events of that day. The second is ‘Friday,’ the third ‘Saturday,’ and so on. The novel itself aligns itself to Hilary’s perspective to such an extent that, because Hilary believes nothing happens on Sundays, they are left out of the narrative for the first two cycles. These days disappear altogether; they are never referred to after the fact, or reflected upon, as if the day never existed at all. This is reminiscent of Georgina Hogg, in Muriel Spark’s more overtly metafictional novel The Comforters (1957), who literally disappears whenever not in contact with the main characters. The extent of Hilary’s control over the composition of the novel’s internal universe is similarly emphasized in the novel’s dénouement. The story, for the most part, follows the traditional narrative arc of a tragedy, climaxing in the death of Kitty. Yet, after Kitty’s death near the end of the novel, Hilary declares (echoing Murdoch’s claim in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals): ‘[I]t was not a tragedy…. Tragedy belongs in art. Life has no tragedies’ (382).ix Once Hilary has made this proclamation, the novel abruptly changes its structure and tone. It breaks from its repetitive days-of-the-week structure, and concludes with two sections entitled, respectively, ‘Christmas Eve’ and ‘Christmas Day.’ The dramatic alteration of structure and tone in this section is emphasized by the altered print-style of the chapter headings, which are written in a large, comic font reminiscent of pulp magazine mastheads, in contrast to the simple capitalized headings of all preceding sections. These chapters eschew the foreboding tone of the preceding chapters, and take on the frothy character of romance novels; they concern themselves only with three weddings: those of Arthur and Crystal, Biscuit and Christopher, and Hilary and Tommy. By declaring that his narrative was not a tragedy, Hilary transforms the story into a comedy.
Negative Assertions in A Word Child Unlike an Accidental Man, however, A Word Child does not lead the reader to dismiss the relevance of fiction to the reader’s experience of the real world. Rather, it provides an important reformulation of how both novelist and reader should approach both the creation
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and the experience of fiction. Murdoch appears to have realized that the question should not be ‘what can fiction teach us about reality?’ but ‘what can fiction teach us about fiction?’ This does not mean that reality has disappeared from Murdoch’s equation, but that she has realized it can only be approached apophatically, existing in the cracks of her ‘porous’ text. The success of A Word Child is partly due to the fact that it carefully and consciously treats the problem of language as a theme, whereas in An Accidental Man it appeared more as the accidental by-product of a failed experiment to excise the problem of narrative authority. Wittgenstein suggested in the Tractatus that philological study would reveal that the only problems language can solve are the problems of language. Once this has been realized, one could approach the silent metaphysical world and kick away the linguistic ladder that led to the realization. This endeavour is enacted in A Word Child within Hilary’s endless verbal examinations of the novel’s conflicts. Large sections of A Word Child are devoted to endless lists of questions, as Hilary naïvely seeks, through linguistic logic alone, to find explanations for events. After having a dream about Crystal’s death, Hilary asks himself: Whatever should I do if Crystal died?... Did she really know how she felt? Did she really know what it would mean? Did she imagine that she could marry Arthur and still have me? Was I not being stupidly heroic about the whole business? Should I not simply, as I had said to Clifford, prevent it? (83–4) As the novel progresses, these passages of neurotic self-questioning expand dramatically in length. During the final Saturday section, there is a paragraph in which, in the space of twenty-six lines, Hilary asks twelve questions and proposes six different and unresolved hypotheses regarding his relationship with Kitty and Gunnar. The majority of the second half of the novel is taken up by such cyclical conjecture. Despite Hilary’s faith in the all-encompassing power of language, he does not manage to find convincing or stable answers for his questions; they only generate more questions because they are seeking answers that exist beyond language. After each burst of self-questioning, he escapes the loop only by dismissing the path of enquiry and either focusing his attention outwards or replacing
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speculation with random and unpredictable demonstrations of will. For example, the ‘haze of black thoughts round [his] head’ (84) caused by Hilary’s questions regarding Crystal is ‘pierced and dispelled’ (84) only by the distracting appearance of Biscuit. The lengthier passage of questions regarding Kitty and Gunnar ends when Hilary illogically asserts that, regardless of the details of the situation, he must see Kitty. Only then does he come ‘to some sort of conclusion’ regarding the matter, and becomes ‘able to set [the problem] aside’ (334). The implication is that purely linguistic thinking, conducted in isolation and without awareness of the world, cannot shed light on reality; it is an enclosed system, going round and round like the Inner Circle line which Hilary rides for pleasure. To get to one’s destination, one needs to disembark; language can only process itself, and cannot touch the world that exists apart from it. However, A Word Child, unlike An Accidental Man, does not end on this dour note. Murdoch, like early Wittgenstein, suggests that the limitations of language do not deny the existence of a realm that cannot be contained or approached in words. While a novel cannot present this vision of reality, it can help the reader map language’s limited territory in order to reveal its borders. This is implied throughout the novel by emphasizing the restrictions of Hilary’s worldview, but made explicit in a scene in which Christopher drugs Hilary without his knowledge; in his hallucinogenic haze, he relates the following: I was looking at the kettle. I had never really noticed it properly before. It is odd how one lives among things and fails to notice them. Yet each thing is an individual with a deep and wonderful being of its own. The kettle was shiny and blue, glittering like a star in the bright electric light. It was a strange blue, injected somehow with black, reminding me of something. I had never noticed before how black a blue could be and yet remain blue. In fact the kettle was both black and blue all over at the same time which I had been told was impossible. Only of course it was possible since the colour was not really in the kettle. Whoever thought colours were in things? Colours surge out of things and stray about in clouds, in waves, yes in waves, is not everything supposed to be made up of waves. I could see the waves. The kettle was glowing and vibrating rhythmically and I was glowing and vibrating with it. (297)
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In this passage Murdoch emphasizes the role of attention in overcoming the limitations of language, and links it to a mystical awareness and union with the physical world. Hilary realizes that the sensory information transmitted by the world is not received without distortion; organizing systems within his mind and body alter the information. The kettle can have a single colour, and yet be both ‘black’ and ‘blue.’ This is because the kettle remains stable while the language used to describe it changes. Hilary then realizes that, when he perceives the colour of the kettle, he is not even seeing the kettle’s colour but rather the light waves that have bounced off the object and then been received and translated by his sensory organs. This light exists not in the kettle, or within himself, but in ‘waves’ that oscillate between them, and the structure of its waves is formed by the physical structure of the kettle and interpreted by the construction of his eyes. This realization does not put Hilary in contact with the kettle ‘as it is,’ but his growing awareness causes him to reassess his understanding of the relationship between himself and the world, improving his ability to attend properly. The light, in this sense, can be understood as a metaphor for language. Hilary learns that language is not ‘in things’ but ‘between’ himself and the world. If one could ‘see the waves,’ one would understand that words are but one element of the fluctuating relationship between self and world, which would temper resolute adherence to language as truth. But do we, the readers, learn anything from the kettle? We, after all, have not seen a kettle at all, but only Hilary’s description of it. Murdoch’s choice of a kettle as the object of Hilary’s mystical revelation suggests another Wittgensteinian allusion that helps to answer this question. In his later Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes, ‘If water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of [a] pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the picture of the pot?’ (101e). Wittgenstein is drawing attention to the human propensity to assume hidden elements beyond what is explicitly shown or stated, an idea that resonates with Murdoch’s critique of the ‘unreliable narrator’ device. Wittgenstein’s question reveals the human tendency to conflate a representation of a thing with the thing itself. A Word Child is not showing the world, but a representation of a world, and any sensation that the novel presents
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a world beyond the words that appear on the page is an illusion. But, as the later Wittgenstein argued, this does not render the representation useless. He relates the steaming kettle to a crying man: A public moan, he argues, is not related to a private pain in the same way that real steam is related to real boiling water. When we see steam, we can assume boiling water; however, when we hear a human cry we cannot assume the existence of pain. Nonetheless, we often do make this assumption. The implication is that hearing someone cry and assuming they are in pain is actually more like seeing a painting of a kettle and assuming it contains water. The obvious difference is that a cry can be a symptom of real pain, while painted steam cannot be an indication of water. This does not change the fact, however, that our experience with a representation is not totally unlike the experience of our day-to-day encounters with real people. Murdoch only hints at the implications of this analogy in A Word Child, but in The Sea, The Sea, written three years later, she explored in greater depth the benefits, dangers, and methods of living with illusions, and the complex overlap between experiencing fiction and fictionalizing experience.
Reflective Structure in The Sea, The Sea Murdoch first attempted a first-person ‘writer’ text in her novel The Black Prince (1973), which followed An Accidental Man. Bradley Pearson, arrested for murder, writes, in the form of a novel, the events of his life that led up to the death of his friend Arnold Baffin, in order to vindicate himself from blame. Pearson, however, is manipulating the truth within his novel, and this is emphasized in the appendix, in which other characters offer their criticisms and corrections of Pearson’s narrative. The novel is considered one of Murdoch’s finest – Peter Conradi describes it as an ‘extraordinary achievement’ (Conradi, Saint 233) – but, compared to the formal experimentation of An Accidental Man and A Word Child, The Black Prince is structurally conservative. The strength of the work stems from its plot, characters, and themes, rather than from its traditional ‘unreliable narrator’ structure. As Lorna Sage has written, the core of the novel would, for the most part, operate unaffected if this formal device was removed: it ‘could have been told in the omniscient third person – there would have been much lost in the way of local effect, but nothing of consequence in “placing” the story as a whole’ (70).
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The same cannot be said of The Sea, The Sea. In The Black Prince, the events described in the novel are in Pearson’s past, and he has had sufficient time to absorb them, alter them, and set them on paper. He claims, ‘I shall, that is, inhabit my past self and, for the ordinary purposes of story-telling, speak only with the apprehensions of that time, a time in many ways so different from the present,’ but he also admits that his ‘later wisdom … will not be absent from the story’ (xii). The Sea, The Sea, on the other hand, while also a first-person ‘writer’ text, is written, for the most part, from within the events described in the work. Its form and temporal perspective is never rigid, but constantly fluctuates: it is at different points described as a diary, a memoir, a novel, and a philosophical rumination. Unlike The Black Prince, the form remains in constant flux, so that the novel is able to illustrate the process of living with language, of reflection, reappraisal, and self-doubt in a way that the earlier novel was unable to achieve. This shows that we can, to a degree, test the validity of our claims in monologue, as monologue occurs over time, allowing us to cast a backward look over our changing beliefs. Charles Arrowby has retired to a house by the sea, longing for a mystic’s asceticism ‘where I can honestly say that I have nothing else to do but to learn to be good’ (2). He speaks of becoming a ‘hermit’ (1), and his desire to ‘repent of egoism’ (3); he longs to remove the attachments that bind and blind him to others. He wishes to relinquish magic, Prospero-like: ‘Have I abjured that magic, drowned my book? Forgiven my enemies? The surrender of power, the final change of magic into spirit?’ (39).x In the first section, entitled ‘Pre-History,’ he adopts a loose stream-of-consciousness form that is fitting to his spiritual goal; he allows his writing to contain his ever-changing thoughts and reflections, and this section, for the most part, resists the drive towards comprehensiveness and singularity of language and mind. He writes: Of course there is no need to separate ‘memoir’ from ‘diary’ or ‘philosophical journal.’ I can tell you, reader, about my past life and about my ‘world-view’ also, as I ramble along. Why not? It can all come out naturally as I reflect. Thus unanxiously (for am I not now leaving anxiety behind?) I shall discover my ‘literary form.’ (2) Charles reads and re-reads his previous entries, which leads him to question and reconfigure his statements and beliefs: ‘Rereading these
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paragraphs I feel again that I am giving the wrong impression. What a difficult form autobiography is proving to be!’ (63). The form aids his realization of the problems of language: he is enacting Wittgenstein’s suggestion that progression comes from an increased awareness of the character of language, without settling into its conventions. However, as internal and external forces begin to threaten Charles’ world – he is haunted by repressed demons from his unconscious, as well as by individuals he has unknowingly harmed throughout his life – he quickly begins to realize that rigidly formalizing his past and present views within his writing can relieve his anxiety. He writes about his terrifying hallucination of a sea-monster, and, the next morning, pens the following: ‘I slept well after writing about my monster and I still think my explanation is the right one. Anyway he recedes and the horror has gone away. Perhaps it did me good to write it all down’ (22). Charles begins to calm other worries through the act of writing. He sets down in print that the troubling noise in the attic is caused by rats, although it is later revealed that the scuffling was made by Rosina Vamburgh, who has stowed away in Charles’ house in an attempt to ‘haunt’ her ex-lover. Charles then begins to take pleasure, like Hilary Burde, from the aesthetic attraction of language itself, a severe shift away from his early insistence that he will ‘make no attempt at “fine writing,” for fear it will spoil my enterprise’ (2). He begins to take pride in his ability to encapsulate his friends in tidy little prose descriptions, although he initially admits that they lack veracity: ‘I have been looking back over my little sketch of James and it is quite stylish. Is it true however? Well, it is not totally misleading, but it is far too short and “smart”’ (67). By the ‘History’ section, Charles has rejected all of his doubts regarding his work’s ability to capture the world: ‘This novelistic memoir, as it has now become, is however, as far as its facts are concerned (though, as James would say, what indeed are facts?), accurate and truthful’ (239). After Charles meets Hartley, his projected delusions begin to permeate every aspect of his experience; eventually he comes to see his writing not as a memoir, or even as a ‘novelistic memoir,’ but, simply, as a novel. He writes: So much has been happening, I thought I would write it as a continuous narrative without too many reversions to the present
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tense. So I am writing my life, after all, as a novel! Why not? It was a matter of finding a form, and somehow history, my history, has found a form for me. (153) Most of the second half of the book, until the postscript, is ostensibly written in a single burst of energy, several months after the events described. There is consequently little reflection here. Charles attempts to force a contingent and unruly world into a closed narrative form; the form parallels his mental impulse to ignore any details that complicate or undermine his self-centred desires, and the catastrophic events that occur near the end of the work – Charles’ near-death experience, and Titus’ drowning – appear to be the direct result of this ignorance, of this book. Immorality has stemmed from inattention. Unlike The Black Prince, Charles’ shifting placement within the book’s temporal arc allows Murdoch to illustrate how the linguistic reworking of past experience does not just provide personal consolation regarding prior events, but also colours his future behaviour. Charles does not only use writing to cope with his obsession for Hartley; his infatuation appears, in fact, to have been partially manufactured by the act of literary creation. In the book’s early pages he states that he intends to tell the story of his long relationship with Clement Makin, which, he later admits, ‘made me’ (484). However, various unresolved issues surrounding this complex relationship – Clement was at least twenty years older than Charles – lead Charles to avoid its discussion. Instead, while ruminating on his seemingly idyllic childhood, he begins, randomly, to discuss Mary Hartley Smith, his first love. Although Charles begins the account of this relationship by admitting that his feelings are ‘nebulous’ and ‘untellable’ (78), they are quickly absorbed into a rigid and traditional tale of lost love and innocence (77).xi When, by sheer coincidence, Charles encounters his childhood love in the village the day after writing this passage, the newly written and romanticized account of their relationship asserts itself as truth in his mind, and the rest of the book emerges as an attempted continuation of ‘writing’ the relationship, until the disparity between reality and illusion becomes too much to bear and Charles is forced to relinquish the novel form and settle back into a reflective and fluid narrative structure. As Charles’
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cousin James later informs him, the whole romantic drama occurred because Charles made the relationship ‘into a story and stories are false’ (335). By the end of the book, Charles has learned to abandon his false view of his childhood relationship with Hartley, but Murdoch does not go so far as to imply that he has travelled the Platonic road from ignorance to truth; his mental state in the closing pages of the novel is not one of enlightenment. The end of the ‘History’ section appears to depict Charles experiencing a moment of lucid vision: throughout the novel, he has been frustrated by his inability to see the seals that, he is told, populate the waters surrounding Shruff End. James often chides Charles for this, as if it is a sign of his self-centredness. Finally, however, the seals appear to him: I had a moment of sheer fear as I turned and leaned towards the sea edge. Then I saw below me, their wet doggy faces looking curiously upward, four seals, swimming so close to the rock that I could almost have touched them. I looked down at their pointed noses only a few feet below, their dripping whiskers, their bright inquisitive round eyes, and the lithe and glossy grace of their wet backs. They curved and played a while, gulping and gurgling a little, looking up at me all the time. And as I watched their play I could not doubt that they were beneficent beings come to visit me and bless me. (476) Despite the serene tone of this passage, there are several suggestions that Charles has not achieved any form of mystical unselfing. ‘I’ and ‘me’ are used eleven times in these eight lines, and the final phrase (‘visit me and bless me’) suggests that Charles’ vision has not come from loosening his linguistic control over his vision of the world, but instead from a feeling that the whole world has adjusted itself to him. Murdoch was not content to let this irony speak for itself; she tagged a postscript onto the book, entitled ‘Life Goes On.’ This section, again narrated by Charles, begins: That no doubt is how the story ought to end, with the seals and the stars, explanation, resignation, reconciliation, everything picked up into some radiant bland ambiguous higher significance,
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in calm of mind, all passion spent. However life, unlike art, has an irritating way of bumping and limping on, undoing conversions, casting doubt on solutions, and generally illustrating the impossibility of living happily or virtuously ever after… Then I felt too that I might take this opportunity to tie up a few loose ends, only of course loose ends can never be properly tied, one is always producing new ones. Time, like the sea, unties all knots. Judgments on people are never final, they emerge from summings up which at once suggest the need of reconsideration. Human arrangements are nothing but loose ends and hazy reckoning, whatever art may otherwise pretend in order to console us. (477) Charles spends the following pages realizing misconceptions and creating new ones. He accepts James’ passing, then begins bizarrely to conjecture that James has faked his own death. He begins to realize that Hartley was hardly a god-like figure – he describes her as ‘not really very intelligent’ (489) and ‘untidy, frowzy, dirty, old’ (492) – but also seemingly re-deifies her by calling these statements ‘blasphemies’ (491). Charles, despite his realizations, is still writing, still creating fictions, despite the less rigid structure of the postscript. Near the end of the book, Charles writes: What an egoist I must seem in the preceding pages. But am I so exceptional? We must live by the light of our own self-satisfaction, through that secret vital busy inwardness which is even more remarkable than our reason. Thus we must live unless we are saints, and are there any? There are spiritual beings, perhaps James was one, but there are no saints. Well, I will try to reflect, but not today. When this is all done, will I ever write anything else? The story of Clement? Or that book about the theatre that my friends kindly profess to think so necessary? Or shall I simply sit by the fire and read Shakespeare, coming home to the place where magic does not shrink reality and turn it into tiny things to be the toys of fairies? There may be no saints, but there is at least one proof that the light of self-satisfaction can illuminate the whole world. (482) Charles appears to have accepted Murdoch’s later view of art as a necessary ‘magic’ endeavour that nonetheless manages to illuminate.
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Charles mentions Shakespeare, who, as Murdoch herself insisted, creates ‘magic,’ but in an ideal form that ‘does not shrink reality,’ and is able to ‘inhibit magic in its more familiar and consoling uses’ (Metaphysics 104).
The Ideal Limit of Literature In The Sea, The Sea, Murdoch developed a formal structure that allowed her to show language in both its limiting and reflexive capacities. While Charles’ development is not linear (he learns and he regresses), the changing forms within the novel demonstrate a graded span of language use – sometimes rigid, sometimes reflexive – that evokes Murdoch’s claim, discussed earlier, that ‘The movement of understanding is onward into increasing privacy, in the direction of the ideal limit, and not back towards a genesis in the rulings of an impersonal public language’ (‘Idea’ 28). This ‘ideal limit,’ towards which Charles stumbles and regresses, is a state of mystical attention in which perception is not constricted by static language or form. The variety of uses of language in The Sea, The Sea help Murdoch address, for the first time, the concept of the ‘ideal limit’; that is, the possibility of attaining unhindered knowledge of an ultimate Good. She does this, not through Charles, but through his cousin James, upon whom, Elizabeth Dipple argues, ‘rests the deep infrastructure of the book’ (275). Charles’ cousin, James, is attempting to become Murdoch’s ideal mystic. He is an ex-soldier who spent a great deal of time in Tibet, developing a Buddhist faith and an interest in mysticism. He is described as having an almost otherworldly detachment, but with an intense understanding of and attention to the natural world. Peter J. Conradi, in his book Going Buddhist (2001), argues that James’ Buddhism greatly resembles Murdoch’s moral philosophy (140). James says that Buddhists see human beings as imprisoned in the wheel of samsara, a cycle of death and rebirth into a cage-like world of attachment (384). The goal is, by relinquishing attachments, to escape the wheel into a state of nirvana, which, James insists, is a state of absolute goodness. The character of James greatly resembles Matthew in An Accidental Man, who also spent time in an Eastern monastery, and was drawn back to London by his attachment to a relative: in his case, his brother Austin. Both characters are collectors of pottery and carvings, which
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suggests they are concerned less with art that reflects the contingent world than with an ideal and otherworldly ‘crystalline’ perfection. James and Matthew are both motivated by the idea of the transcendent good but remain frustrated by the earthly limitations of self, language, and contingency; they are ‘in no mood for second bests’ (Accidental 104). Matthew left the monastery because he believed that he was incapable of escaping self and could consequently only ‘play … at the contemplative life’ (103). James also considers himself tied to ‘The Wheel’ through his unshakeable attachments to others, and admits to causing harm through his past loves; he appears, for example, to have indirectly caused the death of a beloved Sherpa named Milarepa through a vain gesture to impress him. It is also suggested that James may have somehow drawn Titus to Shruff End – and consequently to his death – in order to please his cousin. Matthew never rises above An Accidental Man’s pessimism. The impenetrable wall of speech in that novel leads Matthew to a spiritual dead end; he is left, at the novel’s end, trapped in the net of language: Matthew knew with a sigh that he would never be a hero. Nor would he ever achieve the true enlightenment. Neither the longer way nor the shorter way was for him. He would be until the end of his life a man looking forward to his next drink. He looked at his watch and drifted down to the bar. (372) The Sea, The Sea provides a more positive conclusion: James attains the ‘ideal limit,’ although he does so by stopping his own heart. Murdoch does not discount the mysterious existence of the ‘ideal limit,’ but she also admits that the telos of her philosophy is unimaginable and undepictable; she is only able to hint at it playfully (and with a hint of self-mockery) through James’ death.xii The depiction of James within Murdoch’s narrative, particularly seen in relation to her portrayal of Matthew in An Accidental Man, suggests a belated and benign acceptance of the incompatibility of daily existence and mystical knowledge of the good. In The Sea, The Sea, Murdoch confidently accepts the limits of her art (and, indeed, human experience as a whole), but she has reached a position in which these restrictions no longer cause her to doubt the existence of an ineffable world beyond. She realizes that the longing for this unworldly world
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must be balanced with a sympathetic eye towards the fallibility of human experience; she consequently chooses to depict the enlightened James as strangely and off-puttingly inhuman: she colours her description with details such as his ability to perform mental magic tricks create people with his mind, and climb on walls with his strange prehensile feet. Murdoch ends The Sea, The Sea on another tongue-in-cheek note, this time in reference to the unattainable perfect art form that results from unimaginable perfect vision. At the end of the novel it is revealed that James, like Charles (and Murdoch), is an author. In the postscript of the book, Charles writes: I cannot think what to do about James’s poems. Yes, James’s POEMS! I think I have not mentioned these before! So James did, in some sense at any rate, do what he said he would do: join the army and become a poet. There, in the otherwise bare top drawer of this desk, they were, and indeed there they are: all neatly typed out and filling several large looseleaf books…. In fact I cannot bring myself to look at them, even to glance at them, for fear that they should turn out to be embarrassingly bad! I had almost rather destroy them unread. (483) The only capitalized word in the entire book is Charles’ ecstatic ‘POEMS!’ The poems, presumably the ideal art of the enlightened mystic, are never presented to the reader; they remain unknowable, unrepresentable. Charles will not show them to James’ friend Toby Ellesmere, who longs to see them, and he will not look at them himself. As hidden examples of Murdoch’s ideal form of art, they linger in the reader’s imagination as an impossible possibility. It is perhaps significant that James wrote poems, rather than novels. Hilary Burde said, in A Word Child, that ‘Novels explain. Plays don’t’ and Arthur responds to Hilary, saying, ‘Poetry is best of all. Who wouldn’t rather be a poet than anything else? Poetry is where words end’ (88). Murdoch stated in ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited’ that prose is best suited to the reflexive and self-inquisitive ‘porous’ work of art attempted by Charles, because (she quotes Sartre) it is the ‘word which is lived’ (277). Poetry, on the other hand, is the ‘word which is met’ (277), as it ‘lies outside us, separate, thing-like, complete’ (277). In all but the ideal circumstance, Murdoch considered
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this ‘thing-like’ quality to be dangerous; it is the ‘crystalline’ projection of a single ego masquerading as pure vision. However, the ideal mystic author, hypothetically, would have no self to project, and his creation would contain the world ‘as it is.’ Such work would best be served, not by discursive and fluctuating lines of prose, but by motionless poetry. In her Metaphysics, Murdoch writes that zen poetry is theoretically closest to being the ideal form of art. The haiku, she states, attempts to show ‘that outer and inner subject and object, are one, in a way which does not lose or subjectivize the world’ (245); it has a ‘hardness’ that ‘leave[s] no holes or surfaces’ (245), a far cry from the ‘porous’ work she otherwise champions. This perfect but impossible zen poetry is no doubt the sort of work she imagines the mystical James to have written: it is language at the ideal limit, written by individuals who have overcome the limitations of the subject and the ego. However, Murdoch could only appreciate this form of art in theory, as she believed it is only in theory that art can truly overcome the limitations of language; such an achievement remains, like James’ poetry, nothing more than a teasing yet compelling conjecture. The artist, as Murdoch wrote in an early review from 1943, ‘sees the earth freshly and strangely but he is ultimately part of it, he is inside the things he sees and speaks of as well as outside them. He is of their substance, he suffers with them. Of saints I know nothing…’ (‘Rebirth’ 125–6). Saints, she implies, if they exist at all, cannot be artists, except hypothetically. The restrictive force of form and language hinders a true vision or presentation of the world. Art, like life itself, must therefore be imperfect in nature; it is the product and record of a striving, changing, and fallen human being. Murdoch suggests, however, that our encounters with art are not necessarily limited in the same way. A novel presents us with a flawed human voice, privy to all the dangers and limitations of form and language, but, if it correctly handles its own restrictions, it can create the illusion of a rich and bottomless life, and point beyond itself. This, she claimed, can help the reader by inhibiting ‘magic in its more familiar and consoling uses.’ Imperfection is a necessary aspect of life and art, but through it one could potentially glimpse momentary perfection, the real and absolute good that transcends normal vision. Murdoch never spoke in any detail of the nature of the ideal mystical state, but this does not belie its centrality to her thought; her focus on the
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path, rather than the goal, was a pragmatic necessity, as the absolute position, towards which a normal person stumbles and staggers, is beyond description. The mystic may be unimaginable, but the enigmatic pull created by the idea of a perfect language, a perfect vision, a perfect person, provides the direction and impetus that helps redeem the myriad of imperfections, and lays the foundation for Murdoch’s artistic and philosophical enterprise.
2 From Apophasis to Aporia: William Golding and the Indescribable
Arriving back in England after the war, William Golding returned to his teaching position at Bishop Wordsworth’s School in Salisbury. Golding was, for the most part, a reserved and aloof teacher, unsure of his abilities and dispassionate towards the prescribed lesson topics. However, he would on occasion find a reason to become energized by a subject, and speak to his class with candour and enthusiasm. One of his former students, Robert Naish, remembers one day on which Golding began enthusiastically to discuss religious experience. He recalls Golding carefully and systematically explaining his own method of stripping away the ego in order to approach the moment of revelation: He seemed at one point to hesitate, leaning towards his blackboard, chalk in hand, and evidently wondering whether to bare his soul before such an audience. Then, deciding it was too late to draw back, he continued: ‘When you have completely penetrated past the trappings of your personality, you are left with… A presence? A feeling? I can only describe it as a shape like this’ – and he drew on the blackboard something rather like a pear lying on its side. The class erupted in silent hysteria. (Carey 126) The schoolboys’ reaction is understandable, yet it is likely that the situation was incredibly painful for Golding. Naish does not mention the exact date of this event, but it certainly occurred several years before the publication of Golding’s first novel, Lord of the Flies. During this period, Golding had completed at least three manuscripts, but each was rejected, an experience that wreaked havoc upon his confidence. 67
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At the centre of this frustration was his inability to develop a style and vocabulary through which he could express his personal spiritual experiences, which had been central to his personal and artistic life. Golding’s earliest proper memory was of an ‘indistinct and indescribabl[y] white’ cockerel perching on a curtain rail in his room (Carey 1). Although he was less than eighteen months old at the time, he held onto the memory of its ‘utter friendliness … like a whole atmosphere of natural love’ that came ‘from the centre of all rightness’ (Carey 1). This was his first glimpse of a transcendent reality, but it also brought him face-to-face with ‘the brute impossibility of communicating’ such an experience (Carey 2). Golding had several such visions throughout his life, but with diminishing frequency, which led him to believe that individuals are born with an understanding of ‘the spiritual, the miraculous’ that fades as they grow older. He believed that discomfort with the irrational leads individuals to reduce the totality of their experience through the imposition of false patterns upon reality, which leads to faulty vision and, consequently, to moral error. He believed that the role of the novelist is to break down these patterns, to ‘scrape the labels off things’ (Carey 210), and help usher in a vision of unadulterated reality; however, he was aware of the paradox inherent when language is the only tool available in the pursuit of the extra-linguistic, and narrative structure the only weapon against restrictive patterning. Golding eventually began to develop a method through which he could approach his spiritual beliefs. In his early, published novels, perhaps fearful of eliciting amongst critics the laughter once received from discourteous schoolboys, he employs a stark and austere apophasis, the most rational approach to the irrational. Unlike Murdoch’s ‘porous’ texts through which the indescribable reality steadily flowed, Golding’s early novels are thick and impermeable shells that, following careful and intricate construction, are brutally and suddenly hacked away from what they conceal. He does not expose the sham of the text subtly, playfully, or with any regularity. He works to instil a sense of comfort in the reader through the employment of familiar genres and seemingly predictable story arcs, and then, through violent shocks, he challenges the faith engendered in the transparency of language, the benefits of form, and the authority of the novelist. It is in these moments of disorientation that the reader is pushed towards the irrational, the unknowable, which is not contained in the novel at
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all. Vision comes for his readers much like it comes for his characters: in blows. In his later novels, he develops a more evocative, generative, and kataphatic style, only after reaching the limits of apophaticism.
Pincher Martin and the Darkness of God All day long the trains run on rails. Eclipses are predictable. Penicillin cures pneumonia and the atom splits to order. All day long, year in, year out, the daylight explanation drives back the mystery and reveals a reality usable, understandable and detached…. All day long action is weighed in the balance and found not opportune nor fortunate or ill-advised, but good or evil. For this mode which we must call the spirit breathes through the universe and does not touch it; touches only the dark things, held prisoner, incommunicado, touches, judges, sentences and passes on. Her world was real, both worlds are real. There is no bridge. (Golding, Free 252–3) There are two worlds: one physical, observable through the senses, and often predictable; the other spiritual, mysterious, and unknowable, at least to the rational mind. Human beings, suggests Golding, are more comfortable with the former, as the strength of an individual’s relationship to the latter world is directly proportionate to his ability to live with the rationally unknowable. An acceptance of mystery, Golding believed, is a necessary predicate for moral behaviour. Morality, in the rational world, is the product of individuals and communities, and is consciously applied to events and actions after rational reflection; it is, as he writes in Free Fall (1959), ‘a parliamentary decision like no betting slips or drinks after half past ten’ (226). In the second world, however, morality is real and transcendent, not decided by individuals, but existing as an ontologically unique property. ‘My guess,’ said Golding, ‘is that there are infinite cosmoses, infinite universes, and beyond that there is a thing that I call the Good’ (Golding, ‘Haffenden’ 111). In Golding’s work, this mysterious moral realm is not initially figured as illuminatory. His struggling protagonists often see it first as a paralysing darkness. This has precedent in the writing of the early Christian mystics – who, as Gunnel Cleve has shown, were influential on Golding’s worki – who often present God in or as darkness.
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Gregory of Nyssa’s fourth-century work The Life of Moses, for example, glosses the ‘dark cloud’ of Exodus 20:21 (‘Moses approaches the dark cloud where God was’) as not shielding God, but as God himself: For leaving behind everything that is observed, not only what sense comprehends but also what the intelligence thinks it sees, it keeps on penetrating deeper until by the intelligence’s yearning for understanding it gains access to the invisible and the incomprehensible, and there it sees God. This is the true knowledge of what is sought; this is the seeing which consists in not seeing, because that which is sought transcends all knowledge, being separated on all sides by incomprehensibility as by a kind of darkness… [W]hat is divine is beyond all knowledge and comprehension. (94–5) God is dark because unknowable, or because not knowable through the senses or the rational mind. He can only be ‘seen … in darkness,’ which suggests a mysterious kind of perception that can only be defined through apophatic paradox: a ‘seeing which consists in not seeing.’ The ‘darkness’ metaphor, of course, has connotations beyond the visual, as darkness is a more typical symbol of the fearful, the terrifying or, indeed, the evil. These negative implications have caused some critics to challenge Golding’s representation of the moral/spiritual realm, and question the purported desirability of confronting it. Golding’s 1956 novel, Pincher Martin – which Ian Gregor describes as ‘arguably his most explicit religious novel’ (Gregor 84) – relates the events of a seaman, Christopher Martin, as he struggles for survival on a small rock in the middle of the ocean, where he has washed up after a shipwreck. Throughout the novel, Martin battles against death and dissolution by maintaining his physical wellbeing, asserting his identity against impinging disintegration, and by imposing dominion upon his surroundings. The surface narrative, like many of Golding’s novels, is familiar, echoing works from Robinson Crusoe to Golding’s own Lord of the Flies. Golding, however, supplies a twist ending to Pincher Martin, in which the reader learns that Martin never reached the rock at all, as he died shortly after falling into the water: ‘He didn’t even have time to kick off his seaboots’ (208). The implication is that Pincher’s struggle on the rock was not, as it initially appeared, for physical survival, but to maintain his ego after
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death, and to resist his soul’s integration into a greater unity. The terrifying and dark force oppressing him was not Death, but God, presented as an awe-inspiring darkness.ii Eleanor Wikborg, in her essay ‘The Control of Sympathy in William Golding’s Pincher Martin,’ suggests that Golding’s apparent argument – Martin’s battle against dissolution of self into God stems from an unpleasant egotism that has blighted his life and led to outrageously immoral acts – is unlikely to resonate with his readers, as one is more likely to identify with Martin than condemn him for his resistance. The allegorical parallel, she argues, between death on a rock in the middle of the ocean and dissolution into God figures the latter as distinctly undesirable. We can sympathize with Wikborg’s sympathy. Golding’s powerful descriptions of Martin’s suffering do elicit a natural empathy towards Martin. In one particularly startling passage, Martin’s tears of pain mingle with the water around him, suggesting the beginning of corporeal breakdown, and the event is portrayed in horrifically violent language: They were falling freely, dropping on him. One came, a dot, a pearl, a ball, a globe, that moved on him, spread. He began to scream. He was inside the ball of water that was burning him to the bone and past. It consumed him utterly. He was dissolved and spread throughout the tear an extension of sheer, disembodied pain. (145) Even though the phrase ‘disembodied pain’ suggests that the agony is not physical but emotional or symbolic, Wikborg retorts, ‘the physical illusion (or metaphor) of his experiences is so compelling that it is simply impossible not to sympathize with him’ (181). Indeed, the visceral impact of Martin’s literal struggle is so vivid that it threatens to overwhelm its allegorical import. Golding himself appears to invite this result by refusing to distinguish clearly between what is happening literally and what is occurring symbolically. Martin is physically ‘spread’ upon the rock, but, read in relation to the language of consumption, he also appears as a different kind of ‘spread’: the meal of a devouring God. The word ‘past’ – also evoking ‘repast’ – in the phrase ‘to the bone and past’ can be read as both preposition and noun: there is the physical metaphor of being burned ‘past’ the bone, but also the suggestion that he is being symbolically welded to the ‘past.’ Martin’s wept ‘tear’ also tears him; there is no separation
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between the emotional and physical struggle. By refusing to insist on a purely symbolic interpretation, Golding appears to hurt his apparent argument; it is far more difficult, after all, for a reader to understand the positive ramifications of agonizing physical torture than to see benefit in a difficult spiritual struggle. Wikborg goes so far as to suggest that the reader’s sympathy for Martin engenders a strong antipathy for the force that opposes him. She contends that, as the terrifying opposition bears no trace of the familiar image of the compassionate God, it is difficult to see Martin’s subsumption in a positive light: [If] Martin’s struggle on the rock can be read as presenting a fight against blank nothingness, complete obliteration, which I think it can, then in opposition to the Christian elements which condemn Martin for his wilful blindness, there stands a view of his struggle as an existential one, and once more our moral judgement is complicated by an instinctive sympathy. (185) As discussed earlier, an apophatic rendering of God invites the danger of presenting Him as a nothingness, which is how Wikborg interprets Pincher Martin’s deity. Indeed, Martin does see his antagonist as a consuming darkness, a blank and terrifying nothingness. He is also occasionally figured in even more blatantly negative metaphors: a destroyer, a devourer, a ‘black lightning’ (70). He is the last maggot left in a tin, swollen and fat after consuming the others (136). There is truly no trace of the ‘compassionate God’ in these images (Wikborg 182). What Wikborg fails to observe, however, is that the novel is presented from Martin’s perspective, not Golding’s. Despite being a third-person narrative, all the events and images within the novel are products of Martin’s own mind; he is the creator, the pattern-maker, the labeller. His control of events extends beyond the seaweed he arranges unnaturally on the rock, and beyond the naming of the sections of the rock after London landmarks. He is the creator of the rock itself, which he has shaped from a dim memory of toothache, and has formed his own living body, his red chapped hands and freezing feet. Even his identity is entirely created from memory, as it has no place beyond death.
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The purported agony of Martin’s dissolution is solely the result of his attachment to the self beyond death. Of course human beings are attached to self, to life, and the reader will naturally side with a character fighting against his own destruction. By using a familiar survival narrative, Golding actively conditions us to side with Pincher; the sympathy that Golding engenders for Martin is not unintentional. By concealing the truth of Martin’s situation until the final page, Golding forces the reader violently to confront his or her own attachment to self, to question its validity, to inspect its relationship to morality. It is in this way that the novel resists mere didacticism; as Golding said: Anyone can say, ‘Don’t drink and drive. You must drink coffee.’ But then this doesn’t begin to touch the reason why people drink and drive. You know that the only way you can really get hold of somebody who drinks and drives is not by talking about drinking and driving, but by putting him in a position where he understands some kind of process – it may be emotionally understanding, not intellectually understanding. (Qtd. in Biles 66) Human beings, desperate for coherence, fear the unknown; the strangeness of God causes Him to appear dark and terrifying, but He is only dark to a particular kind of perception, one rooted in the self, in rational consciousness. As Golding explained, in reference to Pincher Martin, ‘When you turn away from God, He becomes a darkness; when you turn towards Him, He becomes a light, in cliché terms’ (qtd. in Biles 76). Golding’s narrative does not simply explain this; it forces the reader to confront directly his or her fears before Golding allows the darkness to illuminate. The work functions as an encounter, rather than a lesson; what one takes away from it remains partly beyond the author’s control, as what is imparted is not contained within the text; nonetheless, the experience has a far greater chance of resonating with the reader than a simple sermon. Nonetheless, the fact that Wikborg saw darkness where others saw light reveals the difficulty of Golding’s early apophatic method, which offers little middle ground to readers. A less divisive method would emerge in his later works. The God/darkness parallel exists throughout Golding’s oeuvre, although it is less strictly presented in his other novels. In his first novel, Lord of the Flies, the darkness appears actively to impel or create
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evil, which complicates Pincher Martin’s correlation between the darkness and God/Good. Consequently, critics often read darkness in Lord of the Flies as a more conventional symbol: as the font of the children’s cruelty, representative of evil itself. Arnold Johnston, for instance, insists that ‘darkness’ is used through the novel only as a symbol of man’s ‘inner devil’ (13). However, Golding’s portrayal of darkness in this novel is more complex than Johnston suggests. Jack and his tribe, by the end of the story, appear to have embraced evil, yet they remain uncomfortable with darkness. It remains for them a source of fear and an object of hostility, which suggests that evil and the darkness are separate entities. In Chapter Eight, the darkness appears within the mouth of a severed pig’s head, yet the murder of a pig remains the central act of the boys’ tribal rituals; the hunt for Ralph, too, is punctuated by the chant, ‘Kill the pig. Cut her throat. Bash her in’ (229) [his italics]. How can the boy-savages be on the side of evil, and also fear it and desire its destruction? Simon’s confrontation with the pig’s head – the one moment in the allegory that Golding admits got ‘out of hand’ (Golding, ‘Fable’ 99) – is riddled with uncertainty regarding the character of the darkness. The Head, which contains the darkness, speaks to Simon, and appears to have malevolent intentions, scolding and threatening him. However, as in Pincher Martin, the hostility of the darkness can be seen as a projection of Simon’s fears, rather than as a quality of the darkness itself. The fact that the Head ‘spoke in the voice of a schoolmaster’ (178) supports that the malicious voice is the result of Simon’s own fear of a terrible authority. Simon’s relationship to the darkness is complex, and makes little sense if the Head is seen to represent evil alone. When the Head asks Simon ‘Aren’t you afraid of me?’ Golding writes only ‘Simon shook’ (177). But does he shake from fear, or is he shaking his head in disagreement? This is followed by a moment of strange union between Simon and the Head: ‘Simon’s head wobbled. His eyes were half-closed as though he were imitating the obscene thing on the stick’ (178). In The Inheritors, discussed later in more depth, Golding shows acts of imitation to be expressions of empathy. Seen in these terms, Simon makes a preliminary connection with the darkness, which, at the end of the chapter, develops into total union: Simon found he was looking into a vast mouth. There was blackness within, a blackness that spread…
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Simon was inside the mouth. He fell down and lost consciousness. (178) Mouths and throats feature regularly in Golding’s work, standing as the borderline between the ineffable darkness and the rational mind. Teeth and tongues form words, but behind them lays a passage that leads to a wordless blackness. Simon, in this scene, is pushed past conscious thought into the mouth, but his experience within the darkness is not described. The chapter ends – or runs out of words – immediately after. But soon it becomes apparent that Simon has not succumbed to evil. On the contrary, after being consumed by the darkness, Simon is impelled towards benevolent selflessness; he runs to help the other boys, to show them that their fear of the Beast is misguided. Jack and the rest of the savage schoolboys never integrate the otherness of the darkness, choosing instead to keep it at a distance, fearing its strangeness, and seeking to appease it through ritual and sacrifice. The implication is that it is the fear of the darkness, of the unknown, rather than anything intrinsic to it, which compels evil. A similar argument is put forth in The Inheritors, where the evil New Men keep their deity at bay through blood offerings and sacrifice; they consequently continue to fear the irrational and attempt to suppress it, rather than live comfortably and peacefully within the strangeness like the more peaceful Neanderthals. It is impossible to define fully the nature of darkness in Golding’s novels, especially as it changes throughout his life’s work. However, as Mark Kinkead-Weekes and Ian Gregor argue, ‘One element remains constant throughout [Golding’s novels]: darkness itself is morally significant’ (32). The unknown represents a profound and everpresent power. One’s relationship to it can impel either good or evil: immersion within it causes the dissolution of self, which, although terrifying, has a positive moral and spiritual benefit, exemplified by Simon, and by characters in Golding’s other novels, such as Darkness Visible’s Matty and Free Fall’s Sammy Mountjoy. Attempting to keep darkness at a distance, to appease it rather than recognize it, can lead to extreme acts of cruelty and sacrifice, demonstrated by Jack’s tribe and the group of the New Men in The Inheritors. Understood this way, the darkness shares characteristics with the mystical characterization of God: evil is the result of one’s distance from Him, and goodness the product of union.
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Consciousness as Original Sin in The Inheritors Golding suggested, in several interviews and throughout his novels, that selfishness and rationality are the source of evil and they are also an inextricable part of human consciousness. ‘Original sin and selfishness,’ stated Golding, ‘the words could be interchangeable’ (Golding, ‘Carey’ 174). Gabriel Josipovici writes: One of the results of the fall, Golding suggests, is the creation of individual character. Indeed, the fall can be seen as man’s sudden consciousness of himself as unique and distinct from other men; and the fall is perpetuated because once this discovery has been made man is at pains to protect and nurse this unique self till all its desires are fulfilled, including the most basic desire of all, the desire to be immortal, to retain our consciousness of ourselves for ever and ever. (253) We are born into consciousness and therefore born into sin. Golding elaborated: [With] our awareness of ourselves as individuals inescapably comes in this other thing, this destructive thing, the evil, if you like. It seems to me that this self-awareness, intelligence, with these come the defect of their virtue.... That will be the last thing which will trip us up, our own intelligence and our own lusts. (Qtd. in Biles 109) Ethical movement is movement away from the isolated rational mind towards mystical unity. ‘The only progress is the progress of the individual towards some kind of – I would describe it as ethical – integration,’ said Golding (qtd. in Biles 41). ‘Somehow or other,’ he said, ‘he has got to bring the whole thing together’ (qtd. in Biles 102). It is the union with God and the acceptance of the darkness, say Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor, that ‘holds the promise and danger of wholeness’ (34). The fall, for Golding, is an allegory that represents the development of the mind’s use of language and other organizing systems. In his second novel, The Inheritors, Golding attempts to link the development of modern consciousness with moral decay, and chooses to do
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so by depicting the confrontation of modern man with individuals from an earlier stage in cognitive development. By juxtaposing the Neanderthals’ primitive minds with the fully conscious New Men, Golding attempted to illustrate the more nefarious aspects of the patterning mind. Golding’s Neanderthals cannot think, or, more specifically, they cannot actively form thoughts; they can only instinctively respond to the immediately perceptible. They have limited memories – they can mentally visualize things that are not present – but these ‘pictures’ remain purely documentary; they cannot reflect upon them, analyse them, or connect them to other ‘pictures.’ They also cannot see relationships between objects if the connections cannot be perceived through their senses. When Lok has an arrow fired upon him, for example, he cannot deduce that the arrow stuck in the tree beside him came from a bow; he immediately sees the arrow as a part of the tree that simply was not there before (96). The same applies to Lok’s inability to connect different moments in time. When Lok lies down to sleep, Golding writes (awkwardly), ‘Tonight was colder than last night though he made no comparisons’ (73). Lok can experience tonight and he can receive a ‘picture’ of last night, but to connect the two would require an active mode of thinking of which he is incapable. This inability to make abstract connections means that Lok cannot understand cause and effect; he wonders ‘what it was that joined a picture to a picture so that the last of many came out of the first’ (96). It is therefore not only analytical thought that is impossible but also the creation of narrative. This limitation firmly lodges the Neanderthals in the moment. They are unable to plan for the future or to learn from the past. Despite the practical problems of this limitation, it has a moral benefit; as Gabriel Josipovici explains, ‘If I can plan ahead then I can also desire what I do not at present have; I can envy what another man has and I have not; I can imagine and desire the embrace of another man’s wife’ (240). The Neanderthals have no desire to covet or horde: Lok comes across a store of gold, which has been collected and treasured by the New Men: ‘Lok saw that it was one of the pretty, bending yellow stones that the people sometimes picked up and played with until they tired of them and threw them away’ (156). The Neanderthals cannot foresee the desire to want to play with the gold again in the future, so they discard it. This animal consciousness exempts the Neanderthals from a certain sort of evil.
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This inability to actively form one’s own interpretation of the world negates the uniqueness of the individual; it means that everyone is experiencing the exact same thing, which leads to less distinction between individuals, which in turn instils a sense of sympathy and understanding among the Neanderthals that verges on unity. When they are following Mal, for example, they blindly and happily adopt his behaviour: The people behind him followed each of his actions easily out of the fullness of their health. Focused on his struggle they became an affectionate and unconscious parody. As he leaned and reached for his breath they gaped too, they reeled, their feet were deliberately unclever. (23) It only appears as ‘parody’ to the distanced reader; the Neanderthals themselves are ‘unconscious’ of it being such, and are in fact responding with the ‘fullness’ of themselves. This sense of holism extends beyond regard for the other Neanderthals; they also refuse to draw boundaries between their group and other species. For example, they do not see snails as a lesser or even a distinct species; they refer to them as ‘snail-people’ (63), mere variations on themselves. The reader may assume distanced and conscious personification of the snails, but the Neanderthals’ ignorance of metaphor refutes this possibility. This sense of connectedness with all life has a moral consequence: their lack of hierarchical distinction leads them to avoid inflicting harm on others, as hurting one another is too much like hurting oneself. They consequently refuse to take life, eating only animals that have died naturally. As the novel progresses, however, the Neanderthals begin to discover active forms of thinking, which changes their worldview. Fa says: ‘“This is a picture of a picture. I am—” She screwed up her face and scowled—“thinking”’ (62). Instead of understanding a picture as an image directly connected to an experience in the world, Fa uses a picture only in relation to another picture; the world, suddenly, is nowhere to be seen. There now exists the possibility of entirely abstract thought; this newly discovered and unanchored second world is the realm of purely subjective thought, of cognition detached from objects, of circular thinking. This, Golding suggests, is the natural end
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result of metaphoric thinking: when ideas are formed entirely in the detached second world, and subsequently applied to the unrelated first, great harm can occur: the danger of fantasy. Golding emphasizes this by having Lok discover metaphor over the course of the novel, through the word ‘like.’ This revelation dramatically transforms Lok’s consciousness, as well as his moral character: ‘Likeness,’ he realizes, ‘could grasp the white-faced hunters with a hand, could put them into a world where they were thinkable and not a random and unrelated irruption’ (194). The New Men are ‘grasp[ed]’; they are in Lok’s selfish possession. His newfound ability to compare brings with it a dangerous propensity to evaluate. In the following scene, Fa states ‘The water is a terrible thing,’ and Lok replies, ‘The water is better than the new people’ (197), a pronouncement he could not have made before his discovery. There are problems, however, with Golding’s depiction of the Neanderthals. Most importantly, he fails to acknowledge properly his own claim, made in an interview with John Carey, that ‘I don’t think there is any language but metaphor’ (Golding, ‘Carey’ 184). As all language relies upon an abstract connection between a word and a thing, the Neanderthals technically use metaphor from the outset of the novel, a fact that Golding chooses to downplay. Lok does, at one point, realize that words can be separated from visual ‘pictures’ of reality – ‘There need not even be a picture with the words’ (96) – but Golding does not explore the implications of this statement. The reason for this is surely practical: he wishes to explore the faults of modern human consciousness, but cannot do so by contrasting it with the unimaginable pre-fallen, pre-linguistic state, as such a state is necessarily beyond depiction.iii The Neanderthals consequently serve only to illustrate an earlier, less developed position in the evolution of consciousness. As such, Golding’s novel delivers an argument regarding the limitations of common thought, but cannot move beyond this; it is an allegory of the fall only, and does not attempt to illustrate or evoke the Edenic state. As such, it is a rational attack on rationalism; it champions supra-rational thinking, but does not engage in such forms of cognition. At this early point in his career, Golding appeared content to work within these limitations, but in his later novels, he grew increasingly uncomfortable with this approach, realizing its inherent paradox, and wishing to transcend it.
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Apophatic Technique in Free Fall Golding’s early novels make few obvious concessions towards realism. They take place in fantastic and historical/mythological settings that, while rendered vivid by Golding’s prose, bear little resemblance to the reader’s world. They are strongly patterned and thematically calculated, and of uniform length and chapter division. They appear, as Golding himself concedes, to lean ‘towards ideas rather than towards people’ (qtd. in Biles 8). To this extent, they appear to be fabulist in nature, as Golding himself admitted in his essay ‘Fable’ (85). Despite their interest in the objective world, they most resemble Murdoch’s disdained ‘crystalline’ novels. And yet, as Mark Kinkead-Weekes and Ian Gregor have noted, ‘These books, so emphatic in pattern, so exclusive in structure, have as an increasingly dominant theme the limitations of the pattern-maker and the tragic consequences of his vision’ (203). There is no denying this inclination, as we have seen the correlation Golding made between evil and rational thought. But did this distrust of pattern remain only a thematic interest? ‘Basically a Golding novel grows through the tension between its form and his imagination,’ write Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor (204). ‘Tension,’ however, is a misleading metaphor. It would be an apt word to describe Murdoch’s The Sea, The Sea, in which the form repeatedly adapts itself to apparently contingent events, but this does not occur in Golding’s inflexible fiction. It is more useful to understand the relationship between fiction and reality in Golding’s novels in terms of negative space, through a sculptural metaphor. Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor gesture towards this: We might say that a Golding novel gives the effect of something dedicatedly made, every strain and stress calculated and overcome, so that the final product leads us to think in terms of sculpture. (203) They begin their next paragraph with the words, ‘This however is only half the story’ (203), although they do not elaborate upon the relevance of this phrase in relation to the sculpture metaphor. For a sculpture is only half the story: its shape is as much defined by the space it does not occupy as by the space it does. In Golding’s work, God is not in the text or confined within the structure, but He presses
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upon it, in the space between the lines or pushed against the contours of the form. The limitations of rationality had been a theme in Lord of the Flies, The Inheritors, and Pincher Martin, but, in those novels, Golding’s focus was limited to the characters’ own struggles towards or against understanding; he did not overtly recognize his own participation in the endeavour as a writer. In 1959’s Free Fall, Golding makes an implicit connection between individuals’ effort to acquire suprarational knowledge and the artist’s attempt to convey this information, or at least facilitate its acquisition. To achieve this, Golding, like Murdoch, wrote a first-person narrative, allowing the speaker, Sammy Mountjoy, to comment directly upon his attempt to attain suprarational vision and to articulate this experience in a work of art. Sammy Mountjoy is writing to locate the moment in his past at which he lost his ‘freedom.’ Freedom, in Free Fall, is taken to mean the moment in which Sammy’s behaviour became ‘mechanical and helpless’ (131) after intellectual systemization of knowledge and perception began to choke his intuitive awareness of the breadth of experience. To isolate this moment, Sammy attempts to reflect upon the entirety of his life by writing a memoir, but he finds the scope impossible: ‘The mind cannot hold more than so much; but understanding requires a sweep that takes in the whole of remembered time’ (7). This realization causes him to reflect upon the difference between time-as-experienced and time-as-recalled: Time is two modes. The one is an effortless perception native to us as water to the mackerel. The other is a memory, a sense of shuffle, fold and coil, of that day nearer than that because more important, of that event mirroring this, or those three set apart, exceptional and out of the straight line altogether. (6) Free Fall is Sammy’s backward glance at the life behind him, and consequently falls into the second category. He knows he will not be able to recover or relate the sensation of immediate experience: ‘I am not a man who was a boy looking at a tree. I am a man who remembers being a boy looking at a tree. It is the difference between time, the endless row of dead bricks, and time, the retake and coil’ (6). The metaphor of the ‘dead bricks’ implies that time-as-experienced is lost to him; now there is only conscious reflection. Sammy cannot recall
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the value inherent in his past experiences; meaning can now only be applied or deduced consciously, after the fact. He accepts the structure of time-as-recalled for his memoir, rejecting linear chronology to reflect memory’s necessary fragmentation. He hopes that an honest exploration of his memories will reveal something unexpected, while accepting that, to a great extent, his past is lost to him. Sammy is strongly aware of the danger of patterning, and is conscious of his misguided but irrepressible desire to see structures in life. Remembering the lodger who lived with him during his childhood, Sammy writes: As I remember him and his breathing it occurs to me that what he had was lung cancer; and I notice with a certain wry amusement my instant effort to fit that uninformed guess into a pattern…. Do I still expect a pattern? What am I looking for? (25) The form of Mountjoy’s investigation – the written word – necessarily inhibits the achievement of his goal; the limited and delimiting structure of writing, like consciousness itself, does not allow for the full recollection of a life ‘subtle and copious’ (7). On the few occasions that Sammy manages to recall the experience, rather than just the facts, of his childhood, he finds himself unable to describe it; his language breaks down: When he remembers his mother objectively, ‘as a stranger might see her’ (69), he is able to describe her as ‘a massive, sagging creature, mottled and dirty’ (69). But, when he attempts to articulate his early sense of her, he can only describe ‘her hugeness and reality, her matter-of-fact blocking of the view’ (15), so he turns to apophasis: ‘Beyond her there is nothing, nothing… She is the unquestionable, the not good, not bad, not kind, not bitter’ (15). Sammy follows this apophatic utterance with a sculptural image, once again relying on negative imagery to articulate the ineffable: ‘As far as communication goes,’ he writes, ‘there are only the things that surrounded her to be pieced together and displayed with the gap that was Ma existing mutely in the middle’ (16). Despite his limitations, Sammy continues to write, claiming: I may communicate in part; and that surely is better than utter blind and dumb; and I may find something like a hat to wear of my own. Not that I aspire to complete coherence. Our mistake is
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to confuse our limitations with the bounds of possibility and clap the universe into a rationalist hat or some other. But I may find the indications of a pattern that will include me, even if the outer edges trail into ignorance. (9) Sammy accepts here that his investigation will not produce a finite result, but may bring him closer to the suspended awe that characterizes the wordless outer regions. He understands that rational knowledge – ‘our limitations’ – cannot encompass the universe, but he suggests that there is something to be gained by attempting to approach the edges of an ultimate pattern. After his later revelation in the prison-camp, Sammy speaks of ‘a curious reversed beauty … that could only be seen, out of the corner of the eye’ (188). The unexpected comma serves to emphasize the word ‘seen’; it is not just that this beauty can only be seen indirectly, but that it can only be seen, as opposed to remembered, articulated, or explained. Reality remains just outside the realm of Sammy’s knowledge, but, at least at this point in his process of writing, he believes there is a benefit in approaching the edges of his limitations. Sammy’s solitary confinement in the German camp is a direct consequence of his inability to reconcile rational with supra-rational knowledge. Halde, the interrogator, asks Sammy if he has any information regarding a potential prison break. Sammy insists that he knows nothing, believing this to be the truth. He has no concrete information, no empirical facts. Halde accepts that this may be true, but pushes Sammy because of what he calls ‘the gap between “almost” and “certain”’ (145). Sammy does, in fact, know something, although it is unresolving and unstable knowledge that has come from intuitive perception, from an artist’s eye, rather than from concrete information or empirical fact. It is not verifiable knowledge, but it is still knowledge. ‘Day after day,’ Sammy thinks, ‘a complex of tiny indications had added up and now presented me with a picture. I was an expert. Who else had lived as visually and professionally with these faces and taken knowledge of them in through his pores?’ (149). This is knowledge-from-experience, received intuitively (‘through his pores’) rather than through the analytical mind. However, Sammy’s rational compulsion causes him to doubt whether this is knowledge at all; he yells, ‘I don’t know whether I know anything or not!’ (151).
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For his confusion, Sammy is punished by solitary confinement. His experience in the cell facilitates a mystical experience by serving as a via negativa, a dark and painful blow to his rational mind and sense of self that brings him directly towards acceptance of the unknowable. The Christian mystical tradition often figures the path towards God not in terms of ascent and affirmation, but of descent and negation. The via negativa is the path described by Evelyn Underhill in her seminal work Mysticism: The Nature and Development of Spiritual Consciousness (1911) as the Mystic Way, a three-stage process towards mystical union with God. It usually unfolds in this way: the mystic realizes their own sin, ego, or their false understanding of the world. This is followed by the difficult and often excruciating purgation of desire and self, which serves to destroy the personal qualities that inhibit objective perception of the world; St John of the Cross described this as the ‘dark night of the soul’ (67). This purification cannot be achieved fully on one’s own: individuals cling too strongly to self, and the endeavour is doomed to fail. However, this failure can serve as the last blow to the now-fragile ego, and, while in this state of despair, the mystic is illuminated by God to the true nature of reality. The via negativa parallels the function of apophatic language: it is only after all affirmative knowledge has been denied that one can confront God. In the cell, Sammy is confronted by absolute darkness. Earlier in the novel, he discusses: [T]he unnameable, unfathomable and invisible darkness that sits at the centre of him, always awake, always different from what you believe it to be, always thinking and feeling what you can never know it thinks and feels, that hopes hopelessly to understand and to be understood. (7) He had previously kept this darkness at bay, like Jack’s tribe in Lord of the Flies, but in prison he is forced into contact with it, now so close it lies ‘against the ball of the eye’ (167). Sammy is first deprived of his sight, his sense of space, and his physical orientation. In order to resist the apparent nothingness, his mind begins to create images to replace what has been lost: ‘Eyes that see nothing soon tire of nothing. They invent their own shapes that swim about under the lids’ (168). These shapes, by placing themselves between the eye and the darkness,
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initially provide Sammy with a comforting but illusory sense of space. He then tries to console himself by giving names to the ineffable horrors: it is just ‘damp,’ just ‘dark.’ The absoluteness of the darkness, however, allows the irrational aspects of his mind to wander unrestrained: his ‘feelings,’ his ‘gross sensuality,’ and his ‘skipping brain’ cannot be eradicated by these labels (183). Despite his attempts to create consoling images and ideas, these shapes cannot solidify in the face of nothingness: ‘I pictured a corridor leading away,’ says Sammy, ‘and this picture had definition and was restful therefore; but then I guessed that at the far end would lie some warped thing…’ (169). Sammy cannot impose stable definition on utter blackness. He finally comes ‘up against an absolute of helplessness,’ and cries out ‘not with hope of an ear but as accepting a shut door, a darkness, and a shut sky’ (184). Accepting this nothingness provides the final step of the via negativa: Everything is stripped away – time and space, self, logic, invention, and, finally, hope – and what is left is the mystical fact. Sammy’s experience in the cell mirrors Christopher Martin’s terrifying confrontation on the rock, but where Pincher Martin ended with the protagonist’s subsumption into God, Free Fall presents Sammy’s consequent re-emergence. Sammy is released from the cell, and sees his surroundings with a detached and mystical eye. He sees ‘the huts as one who had little to do with them’ (186). He refers to his eyes as ‘dead,’ in that they are strictly passive, ‘desiring nothing, accepting all things and giving all created things away’ (186). His self, too, is ‘dead’ (187). He has achieved an objective attention to the world around him, without imposition of self. His rational tendency to delimit perception through language also disappears; he is stunned by the sheer being of shapes that ‘a day before [he] would have disguised … as trees’ (186). His mind does not separate objects into distinct entities, but sees that ‘everything is related to everything else’ (186–7). He speaks of existing in a fourth dimension, one that exists ‘at right-angles to the other three’ (187), a metaphor of geometry where geometry cannot exist. He explains that his consequent cry ‘was directed to a place I did not know existed, but which I had forgotten merely’ (187). This strange statement confounds different forms of knowing: properly, the sentence should read ‘a place I did not know existed, because I had forgotten’ or ‘a place I did not know existed or had forgotten.’ The unexpected ‘but’ suggests Sammy can know or have known something on one level of consciousness, but
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not know it on another. The grammar also destabilizes the usual temporal sense of knowing, so that, illogically, Sammy can have forgotten something he never learned. However, despite the apophatic and paradoxical gestures in the passage, the description of the revelation is primarily composed of familiar religious symbols and material metaphors: for example, Sammy describes the spiritual fire as ‘miraculous and pentecostal’ (188) and then speaks of ‘sceptred kings’ (186), ‘fantastic crystals’ (186), ‘purple glass’ (186), ‘richness’ (186), ‘ten thousand fortunes’ (186), and ‘a burst casket of jewels’ (186): all earthly wonders.iv Sammy may have experienced the ineffable, but when he reflects on the experience, he collapses into the egoistic language of possession and desire. He says that during the vision, ‘the paper wrappings of use and language dropped from me’ (186), but, because the vision can only be related to the reader in words, the passage can do no more than present the ordered and structured memory of it. Sammy cannot present his revelation to the reader. In the prison yard, Sammy is not confronted by sheer ‘being’ (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 159), but by a world of ‘vital morality, not the relationship of man to remote posterity or even to a social system, but the relationship of individual man to individual man…. [A] forge in which all change, all value, all life is beaten out into a good or bad shape’ (189). Golding wrote in his 1980 essay ‘Belief and Creativity’ that ‘it is a signature scribbled in the human soul, a sign that beyond the transient horrors and beauties of our hell there is a Good which is ultimate and absolute’ (201–2). Sammy sees morality as absolute, with an ontological existence that transcends the subjective mind; actions are ‘not opportune nor fortunate or illadvised, but good or evil’ (252). True morality, he discovers, enters life through the unknown, the supra-rational. It is not created but discovered, and only by approaching selflessness can this occur, as it does for Sammy Mountjoy in the prison yard. This causes Sammy to reflect upon the difference between the selfless, innocent Beatrice and his own fallen nature. Early in their relationship, Sammy criticized Beatrice’s seeming lack of personality, yelling, ‘Aren’t you human, then? Aren’t you a person at all?’ (121). Her response only serves to frustrate Sammy: she replies to his question, as she does to all his questions, with the word ‘maybe’ (121). Sammy is initially disgusted by this tendency, viewing it as the result
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of what he considers to be an appalling emptiness. It is only immediately after the prison revelation that Sammy realizes: That negative personality, that clear absence of being, that vacuum which I had finally deduced from her silences, I now saw to have been full…. She was simple and loving and generous and humble; qualities which have no political importance and do not commonly bring their owners much success. (191) Beatrice’s mystical selflessness was the essence of her virtue: by refusing to impose her own thoughts and patterns upon others, she remained essentially good, and protected from the fall suffered by Sammy. Sammy’s love was born of a desire to possess Beatrice, to impose his own patterns upon her; he wanted Beatrice to be ‘safely mine beyond doubt and jealousy’ (109). Beatrice’s love for Sammy, in contrast, was pure and detached.
From Negation to Suspension Sammy proclaims sadly that his book, through which he sought to transcend the restraints of self and language, has failed to bring the two worlds – the physical and the spiritual – together: ‘There is no bridge,’ he laments. Even his one moment of supra-rational vision in adult life – the experience in the prison-camp – cannot lift his account by its inclusion, as it too has been relegated to time-as-recalled, and draws too heavily on inherited language to facilitate knowledge of the ineffable. We should not, however, feel obligated to take Sammy on his word. As the book itself has repeatedly shown, the admission of failure is a necessary step towards God, and Sammy’s book may know something that Sammy does not. Throughout the novel, each section concludes with a variation upon the following statement: Is this the point I am looking for? No. Not here. (52, 70) Any apparent significance of the preceding scene is undercut by this denial, which uses the lower form of apophasis discussed earlier: the
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‘No’ implies that the last scene did not depict the moment of Sammy’s fall, but it also implicitly affirms that a fall did indeed occur at some other point in time. As the novel progresses, the form of the recurring phrase changes. In Chapter Eleven, for example, it simply reads: Here? Not here. (78) The ‘no’ is elided, as is the long-form of the question, which changes the effect. Despite the presence of the question mark, the effect of the refinement is to place two contradictory phrases upon the page: ‘here’/‘not here.’ The loss of freedom did occur here, but also did not. Now, the phrase does not deny the preceding scene’s significance, but instead signals the impossibility of making any positive affirmation at all. This is a suggestion of a higher form of apophasis, a denial of both affirmation and negation. All knowledge is becoming unstable as language begins to cancel itself out. The recurring phrase provides the reader with a sense of apprehension for the moment in which it will presumably be answered clearly and affirmatively, but the moment never comes. After Sammy writes of his epiphany in the camp, he turns his attention to the moment he decided to get Beatrice by sacrificing ‘everything’ (236). Virginia Tiger suggests that this scene provides ‘the answer to the book’s overriding question’ (135). But at the end of the account, Sammy writes not the expected ‘Here’ but, instead: ‘Here?’ (236). The question mark functions in a manner somewhat similar to the previous ‘not here’: it undermines the word ‘here,’ stopping it from becoming definitive. But it does this, not through apophatic paradox, but through subtle disturbance. This hints at an important evolution in Golding’s thought, which will form the core of his following novel, The Spire: apophasis, the rejection or denial of language, is too definitive. Dichotomous thought, even when presented within apophatic paradox, remains the product of the rational mind. Beatrice knew this all along, as is suggested by her repeated use of the phrase ‘maybe,’ an alternative to the binary options of affirmation and negation. The question mark after the word ‘Here’ indicates not negation but unresolved, suspended thought, the product of a mode of thinking that resists the closure desired by the rational mind.
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Golding emphasizes this more subtle method of denying linguistic authority by providing the novel with two endings, one strictly apophatic, the other suspended and ambiguous. Despite knowing the danger of dichotomous thought, Sammy finds himself, at the end of the novel, unable to shed binary thinking: he cannot see any ‘bridge’ between the rational (language, logic, science) and the spiritual/ moral worlds. The first ‘ending’ of the novel concludes with a pessimistic statement: ‘Her world was real, both worlds are real. There is no bridge’ (253). One must occupy one or the other. This metaphor, however, rests on dichotomous thought, which is the mode of thinking at the root of the problem. Even if there was a ‘bridge,’ one could not occupy both worlds at the same time; but, maybe one could live in both. Golding suggested as much in an interview: We do live in two worlds. There is this physical one, which is coherent, and there is a spiritual one. To the average man – with his flashes of religious experience, if you like to call them that – that world is often very incoherent. But nevertheless, as a matter of experience, for me and I suspect for millions of other people, this experience of having two worlds to live in all the time – or not all the time, (but) occasionally, is a vital one and is what living is like. (Qtd. in Biles 79) Looking again at the last sentence of the first ‘ending’ of the novel, it now appears significant that it does not read, as might be expected, ‘Her world was real, his world was real’; instead, it is ‘both worlds are real’ [my italics]. Sammy does not appear properly to understand the implications of this, but perhaps the novel does. The second ‘ending’ of the novel reverts suddenly and unexpectedly to the moment in which Sammy was released from the cell. The passage is mostly comprised of brief statements made by the liberating commandant. He makes four cryptic comments, one of which elicits a brief and equally mysterious response from Sammy: ‘Heraus!’ […] ‘Captain Mountjoy. This should not be happening. I am sorry.’ […] ‘Captain Mountjoy. You have heard?’
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‘I heard.’ […] ‘The Herr Doctor does not know about peoples.’ (253) ‘Heraus’ is German for ‘out.’ As it is spoken in German, rather than English, it is unclear whether or not the commandant is speaking to Sammy. The commandant speaks to Sammy in English in the rest of their communication, making the object of this first sentence ambiguous. This uncertainty lingers in the second two comments. The object of ‘this’ in the second sentence is not defined, nor is what Sammy admits to have heard in the third. Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor suggest that each of these comments can be read in two ways; they write: We must also complete ‘You have heard?’ in two opposite ways at once. Have you heard the good news? that there is no judgement, that you are free, forgiven, have died into a new life? And – we remember the same words on the lips of the lieutenant – Have you heard the bad news? The two indefatigable cricketers have been shot, the weeping Sammy tortured. (169) They suggest that these phrases ‘must mean their contradictions simultaneously. The moment that we “explain” them as meaning one thing, or even one thing or another, we fail the challenge of seeing that they mean both at once. We fall again into pattern, into reduction’ (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 168). Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor suggest that these phrases serve to open up the play of meaning, to resist the sense of closure against which Sammy has battled throughout the novel. The very last line of the novel appears at first to serve a purely negative function: ‘The Herr Doctor does not know about peoples.’ In a letter to Virginia Tiger, Golding described this sentence as being the ‘handprint on the canvas that changes the whole thing’ (Tiger 160). The implication of this admission is that it is not just Halde who ‘does not know about peoples,’ but also Golding himself. Seeing a ‘handprint on the canvas’ has several effects on the viewer. First, it ties the painting to its creator and stresses its ‘made-ness.’ Second, it emphasizes the flatness of the work: the painter may have employed perspective to create an illusion
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of depth, but a handprint on the surface destroys it. Third, the handprint distorts the image, implying an act of violence or at least a violation of its self-containment. By smearing his novel, Golding shows that its reality is a handmade creation: the reader has not been presented with a world, but with an illusion of a world. Golding uses the last sentence of his novel to negate this illusion. But is this the cynical act it appears to be, performed in a spirit of distaste and disappointment? Does Golding, like Sammy, admit failure with no hope of revelation? Halde, who ‘does not know about peoples,’ has something of the novelist in him. He says to Sammy: ‘I am objective because although I can get inside your skin I can leave it at will.’ He is also not ‘inhibited by conventions and human kindnesses’ (144). Iris Murdoch talked of this sort of disconnection as essential to a novelist’s vision. However, while Halde’s vision is great, it is, like Golding’s, still limited. Halde openly admits this to Sammy: ‘There is a mystery in you which is opaque to both of us’ (145). But, crucially, Halde still manages to facilitate Sammy’s revelation in the cell. Is Golding suggesting that he, like Halde, despite his necessarily limited knowledge and ability, can direct the reader towards revelation? ‘All arts,’ wrote Golding in ‘Rough Magic,’ ‘have necessary conventions, unrealities to which the audience assent in advance so that they may be ushered into the presence of more vivid reality’ (125). These necessary conventions do not present reality but ‘usher’ the reader towards it. And ‘Halde’ means ‘slope,’ which does not have to move in order to usher a free-falling object in a new direction.
The Spire: The End of Allegory Golding followed Free Fall with The Spire (1964), a novel that Virginia Tiger suggests marks ‘the completion of one phase in the novelist’s development’ (146), as it solves the problems raised by the earlier works. Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor write that where ‘Free Fall diagnosed the reductiveness of pattern; The Spire takes up the challenge to see without it’ (201). Like Free Fall, The Spire is a novel about writing a novel (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 191). This time, however, the protagonist’s text is not the one held in the reader’s hand, but one described within the novel; it is Jocelin’s spire, a ‘bible in stone’ (51).
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As with Free Fall, the thrust of the novel is provided by the protagonist’s desperation to build a work that climbs upwards and onwards, rooted in the earth but stretching into the spiritual realm. Sammy embarked upon his creative endeavour with hesitancy and doubt, and, in the end, found he could only gesture towards the higher realm. In contrast, Jocelin believes from the outset that his finger-like spire will do more than merely point; he hopes to pin its tip to the sky. The pinnacle of his tower will, he believes, like the holy nail that will eventually be housed within it, pierce the divine Word. It will ‘join … earth to heaven, straight up there, where one day and soon, the geometric lines would leap into a picture of infinity’ (69). In Free Fall, it became difficult to understand where Sammy’s novel ended and Golding’s began. Their goals appeared virtually identical: to move beyond rational language towards supra-rational knowledge. It was consequently difficult not to see Sammy’s admission of failure as Golding’s. The third-person narration of The Spire, on the other hand, allows for a degree of distance through which the reader is more able to separate Jocelin’s creation from Golding’s (at least, as we will see, until the final pages). Free Fall provided the reader with the Murdochian sense that any apparent ‘meaning’ or structure was not intrinsic to the events described within the novel, but was supplied by the patterning narrator. As the reader has no access to the events described in the novel except through Mountjoy’s consciousness, the reader is led to assume that Sammy is imposing meaningful patterns and structures on top of a chaotic reality. Consequently, one cannot comfortably claim that Free Fall is an allegory; the most one can say is that Sammy, like Charles Arrowby in The Sea, The Sea, attempts to read his life as such. The Spire, on the other hand, appears, at least initially, to be more traditionally allegorical. While Jocelin, like Sammy, does read meaning into events and objects, the fact that he is not the sole perceiving consciousness causes the reader to see meaning intrinsic to the shape and events of the novel itself. On the surface, The Spire resembles a traditional tragedy: an individual attempts to accomplish a goal he thinks is important, but is so blinded by self-interest that he neglects to see the trouble that he is causing. His eyes are eventually opened to the error, but it is too late: great harm has already been inflicted. The Spire appears to follow this arc closely. It is, as E.C. Bufkin claims, an ‘exploration of the theme
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of pride’ (136). Dean Jocelin receives a vision of a spire that would stand as a physical manifestation of devotion. He embarks upon a quest to have this spire built, despite the protestations of all around him. His master builder, Roger Mason, says that the church lacks the necessary foundations, but Jocelin insists the construction continue regardless: God, he believes, will provide the foundation. ‘At this point,’ says Laurence Lerner, ‘the sophisticated reader … knows what is coming. Everyone is aware that The Spire is a story about Faith v. Reason, Vision v. Common sense’ (5). Superficially, Lerner’s assumption is correct. Jocelin employs workmen who corrupt the sanctuary of the church, as they are eventually revealed to be pagans and devilworshippers. He overlooks an adulterous relationship between Mason and Goody Pangall, the church caretaker’s wife, which leads to her impregnation and death in childbirth. He represses the knowledge that Pangall himself was killed in a superstitious ritual performed to maintain the foundations. Despite all of this, Jocelin maintains a belief that the construction is ordained by God’s will, until the weight of catastrophes add up, the spire becomes unstable, and he comes to realize that he was partly motivated by repressed sexual desire and pride. This theme is emphasized throughout by the evolving symbolic treatment of the spire. Jocelin initially reads the spire as representing a ‘diagram of prayer’ (120) but he is eventually led to see it as a phallus, born of sexual frustration rather than piety. The Dean dies after realizing the errors of his ways, but not before receiving an epiphanic and untainted vision of the objective world. But the allegory, like the spire itself, is unstable. In his essay ‘Fable,’ Golding described the scene in Lord of the Flies between Simon and the Head as a moment in which the allegory ‘bid fair to get out of hand’ (99). Reflecting upon this in the same essay, he wrote ‘May it not be that at the very moments when I felt the fable to come to its own life before me it may in fact have become something more valuable, so that where I thought it was failing, it was really succeeding?’ (100). Despite appearances, symbol and metaphor in The Spire are not used in the conventional one-to-one correlation of traditional allegory. ‘Golding’s symbols,’ writes Richard S. Cammarota, ‘work with the moral significance of the fable, but they also work independently to create a wider range of suggestion’ (152). This is an understatement. In The Spire, symbols are used so freely, their meanings so multivalent, that they become overdetermined and impossible to grasp
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fully. The seemingly endless store of critical readings of the novel’s symbols and themes serves to emphasize this: in Jeanne Delbaere’s article ‘The Evil Plant in The Spire,’ for example, she provides a multitude of symbolic readings, but is unable to draw her interpretations together. The result is that, rather than clarifying the text’s meaning, Delbaere only manages to draw attention to its interpretive flexibility. On the character of Pangall, for example, she writes: Pangall is the link with the past … as a myth he is Balder, the Norse vegetation god who dies with mistletoe between his ribs; as a Christian figure he is Christ with his broom-cross and the pack of men driving him out of his ‘Kingdom’; as an individual he is a mock-Pan, a limping satyr unable to give his wife a child. (109) Delbaere then attempts to focus on the novel’s intertexts, with similarly unsatisfying results: in the eight pages of her short paper, she mentions The Golden Bough, Piers Ploughman, The Ancient Mariner, and The Master Builder as precedents. Hubert Teyssandier’s similar quest for sources mentions The Monk and Notre-dame de Paris as literary influences (93), while Virginia Tiger discusses Barchester Towers. Laurence Lerner, in his essay ‘Jocelin’s Folly,’ mentions Ibsen, Browning, Greek tragedy, Carlyle, T.S. Eliot and Kierkegaard (7). It is only after gaining familiarity with a variety of criticism – or embarking upon such endless analysis oneself – that one realizes the surprising bagginess of Golding’s seemingly intricate construction. Golding makes the dangers of rigid interpretation clear throughout his text by indulging in the same precarious and erroneous acts of symbolic analysis through the characters and his own authorial voice. While Jocelin himself can be seen, at least until his deathbed revelation, to proceed in a linear fashion from a religious to a psychosexual interpretation of symbolic meaning of the spire, Golding complicates the transition by overdetermining the symbol’s resonance: at various points in the novel, the spire itself is described – to mention just a selection of examples – as: ‘a construction of wood and stone and metal,’ ‘Jocelin’s Folly,’ a ‘vision in stone,’ ‘the bible,’ ‘a relic,’ ‘a chimney,’ a projection ‘from between his legs,’ a bride, a sprouting branch, ‘will,’ a ‘forbidden tree,’ a ‘cliff of stone,’ a ‘great finger sticking up,’ ‘the apocalypse,’ a ‘mother,’ a ‘dunce’s cap,’ a ‘stump,’
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a ‘ship,’ an ‘arrow shot into the earth,’ a ‘world,’ a ‘mast,’ a ‘stone hammer,’ a ‘flame of fire,’ ‘the crown,’ a ‘plant,’ a ‘puzzle,’ and a ‘division.’v Jocelin’s motivations are similarly multivalent, despite critical interpretations to the contrary. Betty Jay claims that, on his deathbed, ‘Jocelin’s previous illusions are overturned, his first vision negated and the psychosexual interpretation is confirmed’ (163). But this is not the case, or, at least, it is not the only case. The integrity of Jocelin’s faith is more than once confirmed by the builders, as well as by the Inquisitor himself at the novel’s end. Similarly, the account of Jocelin’s vision, read by Father Adam in the closing chapters, is not recounted ironically, but with conviction. However, Jocelin is also driven by pride, and by a longing to escape the world, by love for his fellow builders, and to compensate for tragedies that have already befallen the construction. John Haffenden suggested to Golding that ‘The reader is enabled to interpret [Jocelin’s] idée fixe in psychopathological terms, for example, or as sexual sublimation, or as complete vaingloriousness. Equally he might be a true mystic or a false mystic, or his obsession might be the product of a psychological illness’ (Golding, ‘Haffenden’ 108). To this Golding replied: The book [The Spire] is on its own…. Whether the character is a psychopath or a dedicated mystic who is chosen – like Ezekiel, if you like – to construct a spire which will stand as a sign to the faithful…. The writer is aware of that whole spectrum [of meaning], but he doesn’t choose between them. What does the right choice matter, so long as the spectrum is there? (Golding, ‘Haffenden’ 108–9) Unlike Free Fall, which functioned apophatically by denying the validity of every claim, The Spire rejects closed definition by kataphatically overdetermining each potential source of meaning. It is no longer that patterns are false; The Spire instead suggests that patterns cannot be seen in isolation, that vision must aspire towards seeing all things as interconnected and infinite sources of wonder. The ‘spectrum’ is not a container of multiple truths, but a truth in itself. Laurence Lerner complains that Golding asks the reader to read more into phrases than ‘small words can possibly bear’ (12). He is correct to notice this, but wrong to condemn it.
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The Spire: Uniting the Spectrum After Jocelin, upon his deathbed, makes the psychosexual interpretation of his own motivations, he has a revelatory vision of the spire: The two eyes slid together. It was the window, bright and open. Something divided it. Round the division was the blue of the sky. The division was still and silent, but rushing upward to some point at the sky’s end, and with a silent cry. It was slim as a girl, translucent. It had grown from some seed of rosecoloured substance that glittered like a waterfall, an upward waterfall. The substance was one thing, that broke all the way to infinity in cascades of exultation that nothing could trammel. (223) ‘Two eyes’ suggests binary vision; the spire is either this or that: either a vision in prayer or a grotesque phallus. As Jocelin’s eyes slide together, such divisive interpretation ceases, and the spire simply is. Paradoxical language rushes into the description of the spire: it is a ‘silent cry,’ ‘still and silent, but rushing upward,’ an ‘upward waterfall.’ The paradoxes do not, however, negate meaning entirely. Single definite meaning is rejected, but its collapse does not lead to nothingness; instead, it creates a vision of complex, supra-rational meaning. The spire contains within itself a ‘spectrum’ of seemingly contradictory significance. Sammy Mountjoy was wrong; if there are two worlds, they are not irreconcilable, but already part of something larger, ‘a Good which is Absolute.’ When Jocelin makes his deathbed claim ‘Now I know nothing at all’ (223), he is not suggesting that the world is nothing, but only that static knowledge is gone, replaced by an unrestrictive and perpetual knowing. Binary analysis has been rejected in favour of a vision that can hold, without contradiction, the complexity and disparity of the world. The lack of interpretive closure in the novel mirrors Jocelin’s final mental state: he has attained a form of knowledge that endlessly unravels and branches out, generating an infinite matrix of significance. ‘Speech was so complex,’ says Jocelin, ‘when you only had access to one mouth’ (218). A person needs ‘three tongues to say three things at once’ (214). The novel itself manages, to a degree, to speak in more than one voice by compounding and accumulating
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contradictory meaning over the course of its narrative. Golding explained: [I] pre-empt the privilege of God by seeing the situation from the point of view of two people, and therefore – since no two people can ever see the same universe – undercut both of them. Once you start to see the universe from more than one point of view, all hell breaks loose: characters start turning over in a great wind – like one of Dante’s circles – and I think, to some extent, that’s the way I feel about life. (Golding, ‘Haffenden’ 104) The lack of a fixed interpretation is the very source of meaning, rather than its adversary. As Betty Jay notes, ‘Golding’s text falls short of embracing the theological implications of Barthes’ antiauthoritarian position, and refuses, in the end, to erase the possibility of the sacred from his work’ (169). Free Fall ended with language versus reality: ‘there is no bridge,’ followed by the author’s violation of his own canvas and pessimistic smearing of the possibility of speaking truth. As Golding himself said, ‘That may be what I feel is unsatisfactory about the book [Free Fall]: we go down and down and we don’t come up’ (Golding, ‘Haffenden’ 117). In The Spire, we receive a more hopeful acquiescence towards language, a ‘gesture of assent.’ Jocelin says, or appears to say, one more thing before he dies; in reference to an earlier vision, he cries out ‘It’s like the appletree!’ (223). The novel has gone to great lengths, as we have seen, to complicate and undercut any simple correlation between signifier and signified. So why does Golding end Jocelin’s life with a simile? Jocelin is referring to an experience that occurred slightly earlier in the novel. In a moment of grief, with his eyes welled with water, he had the following vision: He twisted his neck and looked up sideways. There was a cloud of angels flashing in the sunlight, they were pink and gold and white; and they were uttering this sweet scent for joy of the light and the air. They brought with them a scatter of clear leaves, and among the leaves a long, black, springing thing. His head swam with the angels, and suddenly he understood there was more to the appletree than one branch. It was there beyond the wall,
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bursting up with cloud and scatter, laying hold of the earth and the air, a fountain, a marvel, an appletree; and this made him weep in a childish way so that he could not tell whether he was glad or sorry. Then, where the yard of the deanery came to the river and trees lay over the sliding water, he saw all the blue of the sky condensed to a winged sapphire, that flashed once. (223) The passage relates a religious vision as simultaneous explosion and condensation. It begins, appropriately, with the image of a cloud. A cloud is a between-thing: a vaporous entity, suspended between heaven and earth, hovering on the verge of either releasing or becoming rain or ice or powder (or something in between). The larger clouds become, the closer they are to collapsing, to not being clouds at all. Clouds both cleanse and obscure; they flood and they purify. Jocelin is only able to see the cloud because he has ‘twisted his neck’ in an unusual manner. From this strange angle he sees the strange angels bringing with them a ‘scatter of clear leaves.’ We expect ‘scatter’ as a verb, not a noun; it is an unusual use of the word, one that confuses time and tense. A ‘scatter’ is a still thing defined by the manner in which it was arranged in the past. Can one tell a scatter without knowing it was scattered? Would it cease to be a scatter if it had been carefully arranged? The term equates a present stillness to a past in motion. Its appearance as a noun also serves to draw our attention to the words ‘clear’ and ‘leaves,’ both of which can be transformative verbs, but here are used as an adjective and a noun, respectively. As with the ‘scatter,’ it is the frozen moment that is emphasized: nothing is being cleared, but it is clear; nothing is leaving, but there are leaves. The words themselves could be transformed from stillness to movement without changing a letter, by only altering their surroundings; as such, like all words, they contain latent potential energy, poised just on the precipice of cloudburst. There is more to a word than the way it is first read; there is more to an ‘appletree than one branch.’ ‘Branch’ is yet another transformative verb used as a noun: branches are things, and things branch. An ‘appletree’ – even more so than an apple tree – is sturdy in comparison, yet, as a symbol, it is similarly multivalent, and richly overdetermined. Jocelin sees the branched tree in relation to the journey of interpretation, with each branch leading to more branches, which themselves branch off. It is interpretation as growth, as life. But this,
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of course, is only one interpretation. It is not just a tree, but an appletree, and this cannot help but evoke that first transgression, where God’s own instructions were not sturdy enough. The punishment for that was the fall (yet another transformative verb as a noun), when language ceased to be univocal, when the Word became words. Jocelin revels in the fruit of that first transgression, in the ecstasy of equivocation, and he weeps like a child, as if he had never left the garden at all. He ceases to be able to tell if he is ‘glad or sorry’ – the labels are scratched off his emotions. In the moment of realization, he encounters further condensation, as the very blue of the sky turns to a refracting crystal. It is not a frozen gem, however, but a ‘winged sapphire’ – this compression has in fact given it mobility; its atoms could not be more still, yet it is in motion. Jocelin refers to this vision on his deathbed, looking up at his spire, and declaring ‘It’s like the appletree.’ The italics are Golding’s, emphasizing the instability of his words, which lean like the spire as they plead to be understood. Virginia Tiger claims that ‘In a cryptic cry “It’s like the appletree,” the division between pagan and Christian, the distance between cellarage and sky, the duelling dualities set in motion metaphorically, are brought into essential relationship’ (148). Tiger’s argument may hold up if seen in relation to Jocelin’s initial vision of the appletree (although it is more accurate to describe such dichotomies as being abolished, rather than balanced), but something different is going on during the deathbed exclamation. The significance of the final outcry is not ‘the appletree’ but the suspended ‘like.’ In The Inheritors, Golding presented a negative view of ‘like’: he suggested that similes and metaphors stopped individuals from directly experiencing the world, causing them to move from concrete and unmediated knowledge to a form of abstract thought that was detached from reality. Nothing is truly ‘like’ anything else, he says, except insofar as it is twisted by the human mind; metaphorical thinking or speaking, he suggests, is simply a fancy way of lying. In Free Fall, Golding took this argument further, applying the same criticism to all language. In The Spire, however, language, metaphor, and symbol are treated with greater ambivalence. Metaphorical thinking, he now appears to suggest, can be a form of cognition that, while not directly imparting truth, can open up the way we see the world. Metaphor reveals that what may appear to our rational minds as stable objects are in fact pulsing with potential energy, constantly
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shifting and overrunning definition. Metaphor, as Paul Ricoeur writes, does not so much fashion our perception as emphasize the possibility of re-fashioning it (245). Such thinking is innovative, transformative, deviant; it emphasizes language’s equivocality, but somehow does not reduce it to nothingness. Using metaphor in this way is, in part, an admission that what we actually want to say sits between words, in that ‘like.’ But it is the opposite of apophasis; instead of saying God is not this and not that, Golding is saying God is like this and like that; indeed, He is like everything. This draws all knowledge towards unity, with everything seen in relation to everything else. Closed and finite knowledge (which is always a lie) cannot exist; instead the compound ‘likes’ act as a generator of unresolving meaning. On his deathbed, Jocelin realizes that the spire is ‘like’ the appletree, which, in turn, is ‘like’ the endless act of interpretation (and ‘like’ an endless list of other things). Infinity does not just exist as the vehicle at the end of that chain of comparisons, but also within both ‘likes,’ which, placed side by side, act as infinity squared. Jocelin finally learns to read the spire as we should learn to read The Spire: he realizes that acceptance of ambiguity is not an abandonment of understanding, but an attempt to embrace a greater knowledge. Despite language’s inherent flaws, if it is allowed to unravel, gesture, and contain contradiction, it can impart the knowledge that it more often delimits. To project beyond that [said Golding to John Haffenden] would imply that one had some kind of knowledge of what it is like to perfect a man, and who knows that? The most a novelist can do is to suggest that this process will go on, and my guess is that, if it were carried far enough, you would disappear. (112) Murdoch would have agreed. She suggested, through the character of James in The Sea, The Sea, that complete escape from the fluctuations of language and meaning cannot occur in life. If one does manage to achieve the resolution of meaning in the conscious mind, it is because meaning has become closed and limited, not because it has embraced infinity. Murdoch ended The Sea, The Sea by suggesting that absolute, unchanging knowledge of God can only be gained after death. Golding
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makes a similar intimation at the end of The Spire. The final image of the novel is of the ‘Host on the dead man’s tongue’ (223). Golding returns, once again, to the recurrent image of the mouth, the borderland between the ineffable and unknowable darkness of God and rational, consciously formed words. In the final sentence of The Spire, the body of Christ – the divine Logos, the Word of God – reaches Jocelin’s tongue, but the tongue is now lifeless. Golding has presented two conclusions; the first flawed but in vibrant motion, the last perfect but unimaginable. One may perceive stable and unified meaning once one has shuffled off this mortal coil, but, in life and in language, Golding suggests, the relationship between world and spirit remains in flux. Aporia, however, is not the sin of language, but its potential salvation. Golding slowly approached this realization over the course of five novels. Where Golding ended in The Spire is where Patrick White had begun, a decade earlier.
3 Verbal Sludge: The Ethics of Instability in Patrick White’s Prose
Hardly anything can strike the mind with its greatness, which does not make some sort of approach toward infinity; which nothing can do whilst able to perceive its bounds; but to see an object distinctly, and to perceive its bounds, is one and the same thing. A clear idea is therefore another name for a little idea. Edmund Burke In December of 1951, Patrick White experienced a spiritual awakening. David Marr writes in his biography Patrick White: A Life: White was carrying bowls of slops to a litter of wormy pups. Somewhere between the jacaranda and the old piggery he slipped in the mud. Swearing and laughing he dragged himself to his feet. ‘I stood in the rain, the water up to my ankles, and pouring off me, as I proceeded to curse God.’ But could he curse what did not exist? As he puzzled at this, he had an inkling of the presence of God. ‘Faith began to come to me.’ (281) Or, in White’s own words: During a season of unending rain at Castle Hill when I fell flat on my back one day in the mud and started cursing a God I had convinced myself didn’t exist. My personal scheme of things till 102
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then at once seemed too foolish to continue holding. (White, ‘Herring’ 137) The specific conditions of this conversion shaped the nature of his subsequent belief. Marr explains that while White’s spiritual interest had been latent prior to this experience, he had always held a desire to ‘melt, to merge, to disappear into the landscape’; the moment in which he plunged into the formless mud provided ‘that consummation in his own shabby paddock’ (Marr 282). In the personal correspondence and fiction that followed this experience, White repeatedly suggested that God is found in instants where the ‘purity’ of individual distinctness is lost, and contact with the world beyond the ego can be achieved. Consequently, White’s artistic approach towards the mystical is distinctly different from that condoned by Iris Murdoch and early William Golding. As we will see, White rarely indulged in apophasis and negative theology; in such systems, there can only be self or no-self, language or no-language. White’s obsession with malleability led him to challenge the impregnability of this border between the two poles. Where Murdoch and Golding prior to The Spire used a sculptural method – creating stark and welldefined works in which the mystical existed in the negative space that surrounded their immediate content – White is impressionistic and painterly. As this chapter will illustrate, he attempts to evoke the mystical not by erasing language and metaphor, but, instead, by complicating and destabilizing his prose so that meaning is never allowed to settle, endlessly unwinding itself towards the suprarational. The first half of this chapter will explore White’s prose, and the second will investigate the ways in which his style both shapes and reflects his moral philosophy.
Mud, Immersion, and Revelation Versions of White’s experience of self-dissolution in the storm appear again and again in his work; in Voss, where the title character experiences a similar epiphany: ‘he was running into crannies, and sucked into the mouths of the earth, and disputed, and distributed’ (249); during Elizabeth Hunter’s epiphanic moment in The Eye of the Storm: ‘In fact, to be received into the sand along with other deliquescent
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flesh, strewn horsehair, knotted iron, the broken chassis of an upturned car, and the last echoes of a hamstrung piano, is the most natural conclusion’ (425). The first novelistic depiction of White’s conversion appeared in The Tree of Man, the novel that immediately followed the experience and which established White’s reputation: The storm came. It bent the garden. Large flat drops of rain were plastering the leaves and hard earth. Soon the land was shining whenever lightning opened its darkness. That torment of darkness, of lashing, twisted trees, became, rather, an ecstasy of fulfilment. The man who was watching the storm, and who seemed to be sitting right at the centre of it, was at first exultant. Like his own dry paddocks, his skin drank the rain. He folded his wet arms, and this attitude added to his complacency. He was firm and strong… But as the storm increased, his flesh had doubts, and he began to experience humility. The lightning, which could have struck open basalt, had, it seemed, the power to open souls. It was obvious in the yellow flash that something like this had happened, the flesh had slipped from his bones, and a light was shining in his cavernous skull…. In his new humility, weakness and acceptance had become virtues…. As the rain sluiced his lands and the fork of lightning entered the crests of the trees. The darkness was full of wonder. Standing there somewhat meekly, the man could have loved something, someone, if he could have penetrated beyond the wood, beyond the moving darkness. But he could not, and in his confusion he prayed to God, not in specific petition, wordlessly almost, for the sake of company. Till he began to know every corner of the darkness, as if it were daylight, and he were in love with the heaving world, down to the last blade of wet grass. (151) The first image in the passage is of the garden itself bending, becoming malleable; this is shortly followed by Stan himself being permeated by the falling rain: ‘his skin drank the rain.’ Stan’s flesh has ‘doubts’; the deluge challenges his confidence in his own physical integrity. As the hard earth is turned to impressionable and enveloping mud, so, ‘like his own dry paddocks,’ is Stan. This experience in the mud, and as mud, evokes Sartre’s repulsion with slime: ‘I understand the snare of the slimy: it is a fluidity which holds me and which compromises me’ (48). The horror of which Sartre writes came from a philosophic
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worldview that prioritizes will and self, and recoils in horror at the idea of the self being broken down. Santanu Das, writing of soldiers’ understanding of mud in the First World War, echoes Sartre’s claim: ‘Dissolution of this too solid flesh in mud is an absurd image of matter consuming human form’ (36); he continues, ‘it combined disgust and horror with a sense of almost metaphysical bewilderment’ (37). This, however, runs in opposition to White’s mystical sensibility, which, like that of Murdoch and Golding, holds that the impregnable ego is the source of moral and spiritual error. White’s emphasis on the importance of self-dissolution provides a positive and contrary interpretation of the concept of acquiescence to and subsumption in the physical world. For White, ‘metaphysical bewilderment’ is a