NARRATIVE BODIES TOWARD A CORPOREAL NARRATOLOGY
Daniel Punday
Narrative Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Narratology
This...
83 downloads
2064 Views
902KB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
NARRATIVE BODIES TOWARD A CORPOREAL NARRATOLOGY
Daniel Punday
Narrative Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Narratology
This page intentionally left blank
Narrative Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Narratology
By
Daniel Punday
NARRATIVE BODIES
© Daniel Punday, 2003. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published 2003 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS. Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–6241–3 hardback Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Punday, Daniel. Narrative bodies : toward a corporeal narratology / by Daniel Punday. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–6241–3 1. Narration (Rhetoric). 2. Body, Human, in literature. I. Title. PN212.P88 2003 808⬘.001—dc21
2003041312
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: June, 2003 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
C on t e n t s
Preface
vii
Introduction
Narrative’s Lost Body
1
Chapter 1
Conceiving Modern Narrative
17
Chapter 2
Sorted and General Character Bodies
53
Chapter 3
Plot and the Unruly Body
85
Chapter 4
The Body and Kinetic Space
117
Chapter 5
Embodiment and Lightness in Narration
149
Conclusion Redefining Narrative
185
Notes Bibliography Index
191 213 225
This page intentionally left blank
Preface
A corporeal narratology approaches the writing and reading of stories in a way that may at first seem counterintuitive. To ask about the role of the body in narrative means suspending a long tradition that imagines reading as a disembodied, intellectual, and frequently spiritual experience. Frederick Douglass speaks articulately for this tradition when he describes coming to literacy as what makes him aware of his brute physical existence as a slave and starts him on the “upward” path to intellectual and political freedom. Douglass describes his first encounter with the disembodied life of reading as making his own corporeality all that much harder to bear: “I would at times feel that learning to read had been a curse rather than a blessing. It had given me a view of my wretched condition, without the remedy. It opened my eyes to the horrible pit, but to no ladder upon which to get out.”1 Critics today continue to urge readers to embrace literature in general as a means of moving beyond our individual bodies into a wider social understanding. As Harold Bloom has recently urged, “Read deeply, not to believe, not to accept, not to contradict, but to learn to share in that one nature that writes and reads.”2 If insisting on the body’s presence within the story seems to sin against narrative’s spirituality, suggesting that we can speak about the body in the story likewise seems to sin against the particularity that we attribute to our own physical existence. Indeed, if asked about the body in the story many of us might think first of the uncomfortable body that intrudes on our reading—the stiff neck that comes from reading too long in bed, the squinting eyes from trying to read a bestseller on the beach, the momentary disorientation we feel when we close a book and reenter the everyday world. In such cases, the body seems to be distinctly individual; it is what designers of reading chairs and book lights seem never quite to get right. Likewise, while we may recognize that there are bodies in stories— and anyone who has seen the stage at the end of Hamlet littered with bodies can hardly think otherwise—these bodies seem to be precisely what intrude at the end of the narrative, what is left after the plot has run its course.
viii / preface
There is, of course, something quite appealing in the narrative’s promise to lift us out of our individual bodies, just as there is something comforting in the idea that our bodies stubbornly resist plotting and give us a reference point for our individuality. What I argue in this book is that these appeals and comforts are neither natural nor inevitable. They are, instead, the result of a tradition that has worked to shape the body’s relevance to narrative in very particular and sometimes contradictory ways. In a recent defense of the value of traditional reading in the face of technological change, Sven Birkerts describes the “shadow life of reading” as a matter of escaping our everyday existence in a way that nonetheless makes us aware of this escape: “When we read, we create and then occupy a hitherto nonexistent interior locale. Regardless of what happens on the page, the simple fact that we have cleared room for these peculiar figments we now preside over gives us a feeling of freedom and control. No less exalting is the sensation of inner and outer worlds coinciding, going on, simultaneously, or very nearly so.”3 This commonplace image of reading a story as being caught up within a wholly private experience depends in part on our having left the body behind. Not only do we escape from the body while reading, but the experience of that escape, the suspension of corporeality, is part of what makes reading pleasurable. Birkerts describes only one of many ways that we can imagine the body in reading, but the way that he describes the relationship between story, reader, and interpretation is typical for depending on the body even while it argues that stories help us to escape it. In describing the “shadow life of reading” Birkerts is quite intentionally blurring the line between individual bodies and some general experience of corporeality that reading engenders. This elision is part of any attempt to articulate a phenomenology of reading, of course, but it is also the fundamental paradox of a corporeal narratology. What makes the body so important to narrative and to our ways of thinking about reading is how it seems to resist powerfully textual representation. When we examine our ways of telling and talking about stories, however, we discover very specific and regular patterns in the ways that the body manifests itself in narratives. In other words, far from being an irrepressibly individual “other” to narrative representation, the body is constantly given meaning and used as a part of textual representation. And, as Birkerts makes clear, often the value of the body to our ways of telling stories and talking about reading is precisely its “otherness”—its ability to stand in for what ought to be outside of representation. Both our ways of telling stories and the narratologies that we have constructed
preface / ix
for analyzing those stories deploy the body in very specific ways as part of a strategy of textual representation. Since the body is a part of our narratives and our narratologies, we have two different paths of inquiry that cross and double back throughout this study. First, we can ask how the body is used as a component of stories, and can do so using traditional narrative elements like plot, character, and setting. A corporeal narratology pursued in this direction enriches these traditional terms for speaking about narrative, and provides practical analytic tools for categorizing stories and analyzing their effects. A corporeal narratology in this sense helps us to see the body at work in elements of the story where we may not have recognized it otherwise. Likewise, since different cultures and periods think about the body in different ways, we can see how these different conceptions of the body lead writers to construct plot or setting, for example, differently. Second, a corporeal narratology can ask how the body contributes to our ways of speaking about and analyzing narrative. Birkerts’s description of reading in terms of the suspension of the body makes clear that the body is useful not just for telling stories, but for talking about why stories matter and for describing the experience of reading. A corporeal narratology in this sense moves naturally from an analysis of narrative terms to a theory of narrative hermeneutics—how stories become meaningful to readers. Most interesting, it seems to me, is the point where the historical comparisons occasioned by the different ways of imagining the body in different cultures and periods prompts us to think about the historical condition of our own narrative hermeneutics. In other words, although we tend to think that reading a story is a matter of stepping outside of our historical and social moment, it may well be that this way of thinking about reading itself is historically conditioned by, among other things, a conception of the human body. And if our terms for studying narrative have been developed by critics from the perspective of a particular historical moment—let us say, twentieth-century European and American culture—our most basic narratological terms and assumptions may bear the imprint of a particular way of thinking about corporeality. I will, in fact, argue that modern storytelling, defined by the “rise of the novel” in the eighteenth century, depends in part upon the emergence of scientific culture and resulting changes in our thinking about the body. Narratology in turn has reflected this particular conception of human corporeality. We can say that modern narrative, the modern body, and narratology itself are all deeply entwined, and emerge out of series of mutually supporting assumptions about human identity, textuality, and
x / preface
corporeality. As new paradigms emerge for thinking about human embodiment, so too we will see changes both in what it means to read a story, and in where writers put those bodies in their stories. A corporeal narratology, then, can not only correct theories of character or plot, and describe a richer sense of narrative hermeneutics, but can also help to anticipate the way that the writing and study of narrative will change as we begin to think about bodies, for example, as the result of a genetic blueprint or as infinitely reproducible through cloning. I have many people to thank for helping me to think through and develop this study. The shape of this project developed during my summer at Cornell’s School of Criticism and Theory (1998). In particular, Cathy Gallagher’s session on narratives of “undoing” forced me to think about the historical context of narrative concepts in a way that is absolutely central to this study. In many ways, this book can be seen as an attempt to start a dialogue between narratology and new historicism. Back at Purdue Calumet, I have the School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences to thank for a series of partial releases from teaching that provided me with the time to write individual chapters. Among the faculty there, Judith Burdan was a constant source of information and suggestions about the history of the novel, especially in the eighteenth century, which is far afield from my period of training. Kit Hume provided advice throughout the project and a thorough reading of the first draft. Brian Richardson read an earlier version of chapter 2 as an essay for Style, and the advice and encouragement that he gave me had an impact on the rest of the book. Philip Jenkins provided suggestions and sources that helped to give shape to chapter 1. Many of these chapters were first presented in some form at the annual Narrative conference, and benefited from the response and advice that I received there. I would like to thank the reader for Palgrave, whose suggestions were helpful especially in conceiving the book’s preface. Part of chapter 2 appeared first in Style under the title “A Corporeal Narratology?” (Style 34.2 [Summer 2000]: 227–42). The figure that appears in chapter 2 is reprinted from Fredric Jameson: The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Copyright © 1981 by Cornell University Press. Used by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press. My thanks, finally, to Carol and Sam for their patience and support during the writing and revising of this book. They know as well as anyone that books are born not out of the disembodied mind, but from the often messy labor of the body.
INTRODUCTION Narrative’s Lost Body
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the human body to recent literary and cultural theory. Even the briefest survey of recent research reveals the body to be a fundamental element of theories that explain representation within texts and culture. A work like Lakoff and Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh (1999) is typical of the signal importance of the human body in recent theory. Their earlier and well-known Metaphors We Live By (1980) defined a series of important and general metaphors operating within philosophical and everyday thought.1 In this more recent study, Lakoff and Johnson now focus specifically on the human body as a crucial element within such metaphors. The body emerges here as the source of most of these metaphors: Reason is not disembodied, as the tradition has largely held, but arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experience. This is not just the innocuous and obvious claim that we need a body to reason; rather, it is the striking claim that the very structure of reason itself comes from the details of our embodiment. The same neural and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to perceive and move around also create our conceptual systems and modes of reason. Thus, to understand reason we must understand the details of our visual system, our motor system, and the general mechanisms of neural binding.2
We can find no better example of the importance of the body as a figure within current thinking about representation than the way it functions in this passage to explain Lakoff and Johnson’s previous theory of metaphor. It should be obvious why Lakoff and Johnson—like so many other theorists writing today—have found the body so compelling a subject. After a decade of suspicion about language’s ability to refer to anything beyond itself, the body has emerged as a site where the power and problems of reference play themselves out. Although some critics have taken this theoretical interest in the body as an occasion to return to older
2 / narrative bodies
claims about the power of representation, most writing uses the body as a way to balance suspicion toward representation with a recognition that such representation plays a profound and productive role within culture. Typical in this regard is Alan Hyde’s critical legal theory in Bodies of Law (1997). Hyde seeks out contradictory treatments of the human body in law not only to reveal problems in legal theory, but also to speculate on the inescapable presence of the human body as a fundamental element of such theory: “We surely have knowledge of others’ bodies only through the mediation of discourse. The very ease with which we construct the body as machine, as property, as consumer commodity, as bearer of privacy rights or of narratives, as inviolable, as sacred, as object of desire, as threat to society, demonstrates that there is no knowledge of the body apart from our discursive constructions of it.”3 Ultimately, Hyde’s theory operates as a call to construct the body in responsible ways. Having recognized that “[t]he body is the way we represent to ourselves that there are other people, with lives, in the world” (258), Hyde uses the contradictions that he finds in the legal body to urge readers to consider alternate constructions of the body: “Most importantly, every aspect of the legal body on the above list [of legal formulations] might be changed. Often competing discursive constructions of the body have a contemporary subterranean existence, or were once popular but have passed from the scene, or have a vivid life in literature that has not yet influenced law” (261). Hyde’s wary recognition of the incoherence and inescapability of the human body within representation—its problems and its power—captures the spirit with which the body has emerged within theories of representation across the disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Despite the excitement that the body has generated in literary and cultural criticism, it has had almost no impact on narratology. This is surprising, since in many ways narratology is the area of literary criticism most traditionally concerned with extraliterary forms of cultural and folk representation. Narratology has particularly been receptive to media like graphic novels, television, and film. As a fundamental element of culture, we can expect that the representational dynamics of the human body would have a profound impact on storytelling in all forms. And yet, we have no “corporeal” narratology—no serious or sustained attempt to give the human body a central role within narrative. Certainly critics have been interested in the body’s place within individual narratives. Most collections of narratological criticism will make some use of the body as a social element to be thematized and debated. And yet a quick glance through any of the classic introductions
narrative’s lost body / 3
to narratology (Bal, Chatman, Martin) or through the best-known attempts at overall synthesis (Scholes and Kellogg, Stanzel, Coste) reveals an almost complete lack of interest in the body as a narratological category.4 The body appears in such studies usually as one of many “things” that a narrative might describe—in the same category as chairs, desks, and rocks. A telling instance of this dismissal of the human body’s importance in narrative is Seymour Chatman’s offhand comment in Story and Discourse, “[a]n existent . . . is either a character or an element of setting, a distinction based on whether or not it performs a plot-significant action” (32). Chatman’s assumption that everything material (inactive) about a character merely serves to define a setting for events seriously undervalues the role of the body in providing significance for characters, and defining the position of the narrator within the story. While there are many reasons why narratology has not become caught up in the theoretical excitement about the body, the most important arise from the way in which narratology has framed its subject. Probably the broadest reason for narratology’s disengagement with the human body is its fondness for what Gerald Prince has called questions of “how” over questions of “what.” An overview like Mieke Bal’s influential Narratology breaks narratology down into the study of “aspects” and “elements.” The former represent those components of a text manipulated in the telling of the story, like the order in which the events are related and the way that narration is focused on certain characters. The “elements” of the narrative refer to the actual events, actors, and places that make up the story. Clearly, a narrative cannot exist if it lacks both aspects and elements—both the careful rhetorical manipulation of actors and events, and those actors and events themselves. Yet, as Prince notes, narratology has traditionally been interested in the former: in the most common type of narrative criticism “the narratologist pays little or no attention to the story as such, the narrated, the what that is represented, and concentrates instead on the discourse, the narrating, the way in which the ‘what’ is represented.”5 There are many reasons for this focus on the manipulation of story elements rather than on the elements themselves. One reason is historical. Narratology as an academic discipline, especially in America, can be traced back to Wayne Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961), which set the tone for narrative criticism for the next twenty years by demanding that critics consider the rhetorical effectiveness of any narrative style, rather than holding writers to abstract and arbitrary standards. Although narratology went in many different directions after Booth’s book, it oriented American criticism toward a kind of rhetorical analysis of individual texts in a way that
4 / narrative bodies
continues to produce interesting readings.6 A more important reason for narratology’s focus on the rhetorical manipulation of aspects rather than on story elements is that how one is to study such elements is by no means clear. While students at the undergraduate level can usually grasp with relatively little difficulty the idea that a narrative is a series of choices made by an author to achieve a certain effect and meaning, we have considerably more difficulty in explaining what an inquiry into the construction of “event” or “action” entails.7 Vicissitudes of Feminist Narratology We can see what forces are working directly and indirectly against integrating an interest in the human body into narratology by considering calls for a “feminist narratology.” Susan Lanser has offered a widely influential challenge to narratology to take gender as an important element of narrative in her article, “Toward a Feminist Narratology” (1986). Lanser suggests three specific areas in which feminism can force narratology to rethink some basic assumptions: “the role of gender in the construction of narrative theory, the status of narrative as mimesis or semiosis, and the importance of context for determining the meaning in narrative.”8 Although narratology has hardly undergone a fundamental transformation because of Lanser’s article, most critics recognize the validity of her claims. We can easily point to a series of feminist narratologies that have challenged the past focus on abstract questions of typology or temporality. Nonetheless, with a very few exceptions, these feminist narratologists have remained interested in questions of “how” rather than “what.” Indeed, Lanser sees the development of a feminist narratology as specifically a matter of turning away from a concern with plot and content issues toward narrative aspects of technique. In Fictions of Authority (1992), the book that develops her article-length call for a feminist narratology, Lanser specifically decries the lack of interest among feminists in the technical aspects of narrative: “With few exceptions, feminist criticism does not ordinarily consider the technical aspects of narration, and narrative poetics does not ordinarily consider the social properties and political implications of narrative voice.”9 The same kind of call for a turn to the “technical aspects of narration” can be seen in Robyn Warhol’s Gendered Interventions, which describes differences between male and female ways of using narrators and direct address in the Victorian novel: “realist novels—engaging narrators functioning as their authors’ surrogates in earnestly trying to foster sympathy for real-world sufferers—work to engage ‘you’ through the substance
narrative’s lost body / 5
and, failing that, the stance of their narrative interventions and addresses to ‘you.’ ”10 Clearly Warhol brings to her study of narrative an interest in gender that previous narratology lacked; nonetheless, she also remains focused on the traditional narratological issues of narrative “aspects,” how a given story is manipulated by an author for particular purposes. The result has been a productive but limited feminist narratology, a narratology that questions the way that writers tell stories but does not study the structure or limitations of the objects that they use in those stories. Feminist critics like Lanser and Warhol see themselves as attempting to break from a feminist tradition that focused on the “content” of narratives rather than on their textual presentation. Such older forms of feminist criticism might look at the ways in which women are described or the social order implied by narrative texts—all without a concern for how these issues are presented narratively. An interesting transitional work is Judith Fetterley’s influential study, The Resisting Reader (1978). Fetterley brings to the classic American literary texts that she studies a distinctly narratological framework focused on the experience of reading: Not only does powerlessness characterize woman’s experience of reading, it also describes the content of what is read. Each of the works chosen for this study presents a version and an enactment of the drama of men’s power over women. The final irony, and indignity, of the woman reader’s relation to American literature, then, is that she is required to dissociate herself from the very experience the literature engenders.11
This theoretical interest in the way that women can read these American literary texts leads Fetterley to a study not so much of how these narrative texts control perspective or voice—the sorts of things that Lanser and Warhol are interested in—but instead of the representation of women themselves within the text. Fetterley assumes that female readers will be alienated from or involved in the text to the degree that the representation of women in those texts matches their experience of being female. While there is no doubt a degree of truth to such a claim, more recent feminist work has insisted on asking about the specifically narrative choices made by authors. Thus, in Kathy Mezei’s Ambiguous Discourse: Feminist Narratology and British Women Writers we find essays like the editor’s study of how “free indirect discourse” reflects the problems of female authority in Austen’s Emma.12 Such studies embody some of the same political concerns of earlier feminist work, but do so by examining the ways in which specific narrative choices reflect, sharpen, or defuse those concerns.
6 / narrative bodies
Strangely enough, as feminist narratology has become increasingly more sophisticated, it has also migrated away from concern with the body itself. One of the complaints frequently leveled at even rather upto-date feminist writing like that represented by Mezei’s collection is that it links narrative devices to the gendered bodies of the writers in an essentialist way. Warhol notes that Mezei’s collection assumes that “writing about gender necessarily has something to do with women’s writing.”13 More sophisticated feminist narratologies reject this link between gender and the actual bodies of the writers or characters. Warhol herself is careful to distinguish between the actual gender of the writers that she discusses and their decision whether to adopt masculine or feminine styles of narration: “My question for the novels I study is: What happens to a text when the writer is writing as a woman? Although the question is not at all a strictly biographical one (since male writers borrowed feminine-gendered techniques, and vice versa), I consult author’s personal circumstances and historical contexts, as well as textual signs of the kinds of interventions they use, in considering the ‘situation of enunciation’ that their texts reproduce.”14 It is hard to argue with Warhol when she distinguishes actual physical bodies from the feminist narratology that she articulates. And yet in making this distinction, Warhol takes us even further from a narratology organized around the representation of the human body and instead suggests that narratology should be interested in cultural categories and modes of discourse. The body, as very much a matter of the “what” of narrative rather than of its “how,” has had very little attention from such feminist narratologies. When feminist critics have turned to representations of the body, it is frequently at the expense of an interest in narrative itself. The special issue of Poetics Today on the female body edited by Susan Suleiman in 1985 is typical and revealing. In reviewing the recent history of narratology, Bal cites this issue as an instance of how recent criticism has drifted away from core narratological issues: “although this volume is definitely not devoid of narratological concerns, these certainly do not predominate.”15 And, indeed, Bal is right. This volume certainly talks a great deal about narrative and about the body, but the two rarely come together in a way that we could say that a narratology of the body has been produced. Suleiman’s own essay on alternatives to traditional ways of representing the female body is a case in point. Suleiman first discusses the reaction to recently popular female erotic texts, like Erica Jong’s Fear of Flying and Rita Mae Brown’s Rubyfruit Jungle, and concludes, “If the popularity of these books is, on the one hand, a positive sign, suggesting that the American public is ready to
narrative’s lost body / 7
admit some real changes in what is considered an acceptable story or an acceptable use of language by women, it may also be a sign that neither book is felt to imply a genuine threat to existing ways of seeing and being between the sexes.”16 Suleiman then goes on to consider the alternatives to traditional representations of gender, concluding with Angela Carter’s The Passion of New Eve, in which “it is impossible to say who is woman and who is man, where one sex or one self begins and the other ends” (63). While Suleiman certainly discusses the way that the representation of women’s bodies might be inappropriately treated using male models, she does not consider the conditions and effects of representing those male bodies. It is as if, for Suleiman, the representation of male bodies raises no issues interesting to narratology. Indeed, even when she is discussing the female body Suleiman implies that the problem is not that inherently this body is textually complex; rather, she is concerned more with how conventional representations of women’s bodies might be allowed to fall into traditional gender patterns and not “shake up and transform old habits of thought and old ways of seeing” (48). Despite her interest in how narrative represents gender, Suleiman does not ask the question that seems to me the central one of a corporeal narratology: how do certain ways of thinking about the body shape the plot, characterization, setting, and other aspects of narrative?17 Suleiman’s sidestepping of narrative issues in her discussion of the female body is in many ways typical of past criticism. Too often the body is taken to be a simple object of narrative, a thing to be represented like a town or a table, with little thought given to how it participates in the construction of narrative plot, location, agency, and so on. Suleiman clearly recognizes that the body has some role in these narrative issues, since she links the traditional image of the female body with traditional plot models like the Bildungsroman of the artist hero, “where the moment of self-discovery coincides with the decision to write a novel” (48). Suleiman is certainly right to suggest that body models support certain plot forms, but this and other details about the construction of the narrative body are left unexplored. Very often attention to the body as an object of representation within narrative seems to return to an older form of feminist criticism that fails to make use of the sophisticated narrative categories used by more recent critics like Lanser, Warhol, and Mezei. We seem, then, to have a sophisticated narrative criticism to the extent that the body is treated as mere raw material for rhetorical (and political) manipulation. Or we have a criticism sensitive to the description of the human body to the extent that we ignore how this portrait is being filtered through specifically narrative channels.
8 / narrative bodies
Problems of a Corporeal Narratology I have used shifts and debates in feminist narratology to suggest the problems facing a critic who would hope to develop a narrative theory organized around the human body. Certainly, there are other ways in which we might have told the same story and revealed the same dynamics. Criticism that focuses on the narrative presentation of the racially marked body reveals a similar pattern, where we see a tension between those critics who would study the types of bodies presented within the text and those that would study the rhetorical manipulation of the narrative.18 In neither feminist nor race criticism do we see a consistent articulation of the relationship between the bodies represented within a narrative and the way that the narrative itself is constructed. There are, however, exceptions to the rule that bodies and narrative structures are two separate objects of inquiry, never to meet within a single theory or study. Let me mention, briefly, two examples from relatively distinct periods. Deidre Lynch’s recent study of literary character in the eighteenth century, The Economy of Character (1998), argues that our modern ways of thinking about character developed only in the later nineteenth century.19 Earlier models of character depended heavily on their relationship to caricature, as well as to the “character” stamped upon a coin. Lynch’s study links the particular ways of thinking about human physiognomy prevalent at the time to the ways in which plots and perspective were constructed throughout the literature of this period. While not precisely narratological—Lynch rarely uses language of “implied authors” or “free indirect discourse”—this study clearly links traditional narrative categories to specific details of the human body. Likewise, Mark Seltzer sees in the relationship between individual bodies and statistical averages a problem that shapes American narrative at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as mass production and manufacturing take a firm hold on the national imagination. This strain in how we are to understand human corporeality produces specific patterns in how naturalist writers create “typical” persons. Concerns about being merely typical influence the aesthetics of narrative consumption and the positioning of readers, in which the “still life” of people-as-commodities is contrasted to the agency of the reader: “Whether enacted in the stop and go of the anticipatory ritual of window-shopping or in the identification, in passing, with the still-life representations of the model or manikin, such a rhythm of suspended and recovered motion and agency, such a rhythm of reification and personification, makes up the reanimating ritual of consumption.”20
narrative’s lost body / 9
Here, just as Lynch managed, Seltzer brings together a specific interest in the body with a concern for how this body influences basic narrative categories like the positioning of the narratee. What is remarkable about both Lynch’s and Seltzer’s studies—and these are part of a much larger group of texts that manage to strike the same balance between body and narrative concerns—is that they are relentlessly historical. Quite in contrast to the kind of transhistorical and comparative studies that we associate with narratology, the work that has best linked narrative and the body is decidedly new historicist. This should come as no surprise, since we can trace much of the popularity of the body within contemporary thought to Foucault, whose work remains a touchstone for new historicist theory. In many ways we have here a gap between two theoretical schools, with two entirely separate ways of approaching the body within narrative. Narratology constructs abstract, generalized models of narrative, which—in part because of this insistence on abstraction—has had difficulty dealing with the concrete historical object of the human body. New historicism, conversely, develops a nuanced understanding of the human body as a site in which particular conflicts can be observed within discourses of the time, but has made no attempt to generalize its analysis of the body in these narratives beyond the particular historical moment that it studies. This should not surprise us, since such particularity is a fundamental assumption of this historicist criticism. In asking about the place of the human body within narratology, I am in many ways applying a new historicist topos to a discipline in which it does not initially seem to apply. Likewise, in trying to develop a narratology of the human body, I may seem to be trying to generalize an object of study that is interesting precisely because of its historical specificity. A narratology of the body, in other words, threatens to be no narratology at all, and to evacuate from the human body all the interest and power that it has for new historicist work. I will show in this book that this need not, however, be the case, and that the tension between these two disciplines can help to produce a rich understanding of the concept of narrative. Unlike many of the terms that critics use in studying texts and cultural objects, the basic terms of narratology have a role within everyday discourse that cannot be restricted to one historical moment. Foucault’s work seems to me to depend on just such transhistorical concepts. After all, his writing is always comparative and likewise works between periods. His analysis of the transition from torture to incarceration works precisely by examining the changing
10 / narrative bodies
relationship between power and knowledge in these two periods.21 These periods are not self-contained and built out of concepts entirely their own, but instead the product of the translation of broader philosophical concepts like power from one period and episteme to the next.22 Narratologists perhaps depart from this comparative approach to texts by searching for a general slate of textual options available at all times, while new historicism considers discursive limits unique to particular sociopolitical configurations. Still, the give and take between general categories and particular historical manifestations seems to be a point at which these seemingly contradictory methodologies can be brought together. New historicism depends on, then, concepts that transcend one particular historical moment, even if they are not universal and timeless. The link between power and knowledge in Discipline and Punish is, we can say, moderately historical. It transcends some historical periods and gives us a way of speaking about how different periods can manifest a similar series of philosophical or social possibilities in different ways. Narrative concepts seem particularly appropriate for transhistorical use because they describe the most traditional forms of artistic representation.23 Indeed, in many ways narratology reflects the belief of so many critics and general readers have that concepts as story and character are a fundamental part of everyday experience. Roland Barthes exemplifies the tendency to see narrative in all cultures and periods at the outset of his influential narratological essay, “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives” (1966): “narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor has been a people without narrative. All classes, all human groups, have their narratives, enjoyment of which is very often shared by men with different, even opposing, cultural backgrounds.”24 The belief that narrative is transhistorical does not belong only to universalist critics who would claim that certain works or modes transcend their historical moment. Certainly much of the work that we associate with early poststructuralism insisted along with Hayden White that all discourse is a form of storytelling. While we might be tempted now to insist that the conditions of narrative vary a great deal from historical moment to historical moment and from culture to culture, there is a strong urge among many sophisticated critics to see narrative concepts as crossing these moments and providing a way of thinking about discourse in general. This, I think, is one of the paradoxes of corporeal narratology—that narrative categories have emerged precisely at the moment when our suspicion toward transhistorical analysis is
narrative’s lost body / 11
particularly strong. Narrative provides moderately historical concepts that enable historicist analysis. That is, narrative both reflects epistemic conditions of particular historical moments and yet at the same time strives to be more general and less limited by these conditions. Precisely because of its claim to be a natural and commonplace form of discourse, narrative has a larger historical sweep than many of the concepts that are frequently studied by historicists. Precisely this sort of cross-cultural but not timeless concept tends to fall between the cracks of new historicist work. I will argue in this book that narratology as we have understood it— as comprising a series of fairly concrete theoretical terms as well as a general approach to understanding narrative texts—depends on modern conceptions of the body. The vicissitudes of narrative that we can observe since the Renaissance can be traced, in part, back to smaller shifts of emphasis within a more general way of understanding the human body inaugurated at roughly this same time. Plan of the Book This book opens by defining the historical scope for the moderately historical concept of narrative by looking at the corporeal assumptions in the most fundamental element of any narrative text—the way that it refers to the extratextual world, how it imagines mimesis. Specifically, I start my consideration of how the human body shapes narrative concepts by describing the way that we speak of the “fictional world” of the narrative text. The concept of fictional worlds developed over the last twenty years in narratology as a response to structuralist emphasis on the anti-referential, self-contained quality of texts as sign-systems. Theorists claim that any text projects a world of places, objects, and events, in part, as a way to make sense of thorny metaphysical issues about how fictional texts refer. Recent work on fictional worlds has increasingly emphasized the operation of such projected fictional worlds in everyday thinking and reasoning. In chapter 1 I link the acceptance of such fictional possibilities to changes in thinking about human conception. As embryology struggles during the early eighteenth century to escape from the traditional belief in a single source for fetal identity— either the female egg or male sperm—narrative struggled toward a definition of hypothetical identity that likewise was organized around a combination of real and imagined events. Such “accidental” combinations did not emerge consistently in embryology until the middle of the century, when at the same time the European novel begins to lay claim
12 / narrative bodies
to fictional narrative as morally and philosophically valid. Treating narrative as creating a fictional world depends, then, on a particular image of human biological identity that is historically specific and limited in the kinds of biological changes that it can posit within fiction. I conclude chapter 1 by suggesting that this time period marks the emergence of narrative as a historical category, and arguing that the concept can be applied before this period only in limited and problematic ways. Having argued that a particular way of understanding the human body can influence even so pervasive and abstract a narrative concept as that of fictional worlds, chapter 2 offers an analysis of the narrative use of the human body in characterization. When we imagine a theory of narrative bodies, characterization is likely to be the first narrative term to come to mind. I begin by considering what is necessary for the body to emerge as a meaningful object within a story, suggesting four basic types of relations that need to be defined directly or indirectly by a narrative: bodies must be distinguished from other objects within the text, must be sorted into types, must be defined in relation to the world outside of themselves, and must be granted a degree of embodiment. Such a schematic provides a way of distinguishing different forms of characterization and outlines many of the concerns that will appear throughout the remainder of the book. At the same time, however, this discussion is constantly haunted by the problems of treating the body merely as a textual object. Turning to some recent feminist work on corporeality, I supplement this theory of character bodies as objects with a broader and more elusive sense in which the human body provides a metaphor for thinking about the relation between text and reader. Such metaphors reveal a more basic truth in our relationship with character bodies: that our encounter with texts is always mediated by the corporeality of bodies, which provides an inevitable model for textual hermeneutics in general. Chapter 3 turns to the concept of narrative plot, in many ways the most fundamental concept within narratology. I begin by noting within narratology that the temporal arrangement of narrative is always assumed to operate on events and objects that are otherwise meaningless, brute facts. This is especially important for an understanding of narrative bodies because such meaningless facts are frequently equated with the body. Paradoxically, the exact opposite is also the case: the narrative structures that give order to narrative—both the overarching cosmological patterns that we can observe in archetypal criticism like that of Northrop Frye, as well as the patterns of inevitable social trajectory that so many feminist critics have discussed in the novel—are also
narrative’s lost body / 13
associated with the body. In a quite literal way that critics have been aware of for some time, in the novel the body frequently defines the destiny of the character. In a broader sense, we can say that the body seems to provide two contradictory things to our thinking about narrative events. On the one hand, the body represents all of those brute physical events that work against overarching pattern; on the other, the body provides the order that the narrative gives to events. This duality of the human body reappears throughout our thinking about narrative and desire, where the most conventional plots are created precisely through the attraction to something that initially troubles social patterns or narrative trajectory but which is eventually integrated when—as is most common—the initially troubling love interest of the narrative turns out to be a perfectly acceptable social match for the hero or heroine. The duality of the body that we see in narrative plot plays itself out not only in conventional marriage plots, but also in ways of thinking about the difference between interior consciousness and external actions. Turning to Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative, I discuss the “distention” of time as the basis for narrative, and locate this distention within the gap between body and mind. I argue that we can read the transformation of conventional narrative patterns into modernist studies of consciousness as a shift in the role given to the unruly body within thinking about narrative events. This transformation of the unruly body from raw material or vehicle of desire into the outside world to which the mind responds occurs whenever modern and contemporary thinkers describe the relationship between individual and world. The example that I use to conclude chapter 3 is the way in which social practice is imagined by cultural critics. Picking up from Foucault’s theory of social practice as potentially independent of an existing cultural episteme, I note the way in which the concept of practice repeats the use of the unruly body as a object that resists larger narrative patterns. The body here remains a fundamental trope in our ways of thinking about order and narrative’s ability to represent challenges to it. Chapter 4 turns to theories of narrative space and setting. Picking up from an observation made by Elaine Scarry, I note that settings are always organized by reference to the other places into which character bodies can travel—physically, imaginatively, and perceptually. Such distinctions provide a sophisticated and very flexible way of thinking about narrative setting. Using this idea that setting conceived of corporeally always gestures beyond itself, I develop what I call a “kinetic” theory of narrative based as much on the instability of space as the
14 / narrative bodies
constant movement of time. Just as the body in narrative temporality challenges pattern and creates “distention” within the story, so too the body is what makes setting unstable and forces constant movement. Such an observation raises the possibility that we might do better to treat narrative more as a matter of spatial movement than as a matter of temporal change. Making such a shift in our way of thinking about narrative may well lead to a significant improvement in our ability to speak about the aesthetics of narrative—which the theory of “virtual space” borrowed from Susanne Langer helps to articulate. My theory of kinetic space leads naturally to issues of our own positioning in the text—to the ways that we occupy a place within the whole narrative circulation—and returns us to the issues of chapter 2. There I note that at its extreme a corporeal narratology ultimately becomes an issue of textual hermeneutics. Certainly this is the case with an understanding of narrative aesthetics based on the process of following through the circulation of the narrative. I conclude chapter 4 by considering the issue of circulation itself in detail. Catherine Gallagher has written about the role of circulation in eighteenth-century thinking about public health and the body politic, and has noted the ways in which this metaphor raises fundamental problems about where an observer “stands” in relation to such an object of study. Ultimately, then, such a study encounters fundamentally narrative problems—how is an object to be viewed, narrated, and described? In chapter 5 I take up this positioning in more detail as I turn to the narratological treatment of narration. Focusing on writing about the body politic— especially Hobbes’s description of the “artificial man” of the social state in Leviathan—I note that this figure for representing the whole society itself obeys largely narrative demands. Hobbes makes clear that we should think about the society as an artificial man because doing so provides us with a position from which to view the whole. We can say, then, that a corporeal narratology leads us back naturally to the problems of positioning and reading, and that the principle way of understanding these problems is through the human body. Chapter 5 treats the problem of narrative positioning specifically within the larger context of the struggle to create narrative authority. Although narratology frequently takes a rhetorical approach to the question of authority, histories of the early novel suggest that authority is established first and foremost by manipulating embodiment within the narrative. Specifically, critics of the eighteenth-century novel have noted the use of what I call the differential embodiment of characters—the creation of central, relatively disembodied heroes or heroines, and more
narrative’s lost body / 15
embodied peripheral characters for whom physiognomy is a far more important element of characterization. This differential embodiment encourages us to identify with the main character at the expense of the peripheral ones, and provides a base for reading transformations of this model in the later history of the novel. In particular, I discuss how embodiment is handled to create narrative authority and a position through which to view the narrative first in sentimental fiction, and later in modernist narrative. In all these cases, authority is a matter of negotiating the embodiment of characters. That central issue of embodiment reflects the fundamentally corporeal nature of narrative. Narrative is corporeal not simply because it needs to use character bodies as a natural part of the stories that it tells, but also because the very ways in which we think about narrative reflect the paradoxes of the body—its ability to give rise to and resist pattern, its position in the world and outside of it, and so on. Narrative, then, always first and foremost depends upon a corporeal hermeneutics—a theory of how the text can be meaningfully articulated through the body—even if narratology has frequently treated it, or seemed to treat it, as something quite different.
This page intentionally left blank
CHAPTER 1 Conceiving Modern Narrative
In the last decades of the seventeenth and the first decades of the eighteenth centuries, European thought saw the emergence of the idea of a “world” in many fields. In Germany, G.W. Leibniz theorized the concept of “possible worlds”—the idea that our reality can be viewed as one of a nearly infinite number of possible other states of being through which God sorted in the process of deciding how the human world should unfold (1686). In Italy, Giambattista Vico proposed studying the history of human societies in contextualist terms—emphasizing, in other words, attention to the particular “world” in which people within a particular society at a particular time operated (1725).1 In France, Madame de Lafayette wrote La Princesse de Clèves (1678), often considered the first modern European novel because of its treatment of character psychology, thus ushering in an artistic period, which continues today, of constructing texts for mass consumption that transport readers into a “world” described through a character’s distinct, personal perspective.2 At about the same time as these changes, scientists began to develop modern theories of human reproduction by postulating the existence of the female egg and shortly after using the newly developed microscope to study the composition of sperm. Although it would be some time before the biology of reproduction was fully understood, the basic components of human generation were discovered by the beginning of the eighteenth century. At first blush, of course, this last scientific development seems at best tangentially related to the first three, all of which describe what we can call modern contextualist thinking. All four partake of modern scientific assumptions about human and natural life. If, as Michael Crowe has argued in The Extraterrestrial Life Debate 1750–1900, Leibniz’s writing about possible worlds should be read against the backdrop of the new astronomy and the development of the telescope, the same seems to be true of discoveries about human sexuality.3 Likewise, Vico’s observations about
18 / narrative bodies
historiography appear as part of a general attempt to redefine the study of history and societies as a “New Science” grounded in universal principles and in the search for knowable causes.4 Literary critics have likewise thoroughly established the relationship between the development of the novel and the scientific revolution, which fits hand-in-glove with the former’s emphasis on individual perception, secular life, and progressive humanism. I would like to suggest, however, a deeper and less frequently recognized link between the growing recognition of the distinct “worlds” in which individuals and societies live in Leibniz, Vico, and Lafayette and early modern changes in thinking about human reproduction. In other words, I will argue for a relationship between the science of human reproduction and the concept of distinct imaginative “worlds” at work within philosophy, the human sciences, and, especially, thinking about narrative. Explicating this link between embryology and ideas of possible worlds is important because it helps to explain the historical emergence of the concept of “fictional worlds” as a way to speak about narrative, and the historical limits of the concept of narrative itself. A narrative’s ability to construct a “world” is its most basic textual act. The concept of world is a good place to begin a study of corporeality in narratology precisely because such abstract concepts seem to have almost nothing to do with the human body. Indeed, the concept of world is in this sense the exemplary narrative concept, since it reflects narratology’s abstraction and emphasis on traditional logic. In locating the body as a component of fictional world, we imply its relevance to narratology in general, and suggest the problems and limitations of narratology as it is currently imagined. The issue of fictionality has been a point at which narratology has in fact come under fire from historians of the novel. Narratologists suggest that we live in a world surrounded everyday by fictions. We plan career moves by imagining likely futures for ourselves, we listen to political advertisements about hypothetical creatures like “the American people,” and we judge our and others’ actions based more often on models provided by films, novels, and video games as on philosophical reasoning. According to these critics, fiction is a fundamental and unremarkable part of how we negotiate the everyday world. And yet at the same time, other critics—especially those working on the early European novel—have constructed rich and sophisticated cultural histories to show that many of the seemingly universal characteristics of fictional narrative are the product of very specific social and historical forces. Where in the past critics were wont to stress the timeless relevance of certain plots and fictional characters,
conceiving modern narrative / 19
recent histories of the novel have shown that the very idea of creating fictional characters through which readers explore morality and develop their sense of social and individual identity is no more than two hundred years old. As Catherine Gallagher writes, for too long we have emphasized the rise of the novel when studying modern narrative: “We should ask, not why the novel became the preferred form of fiction, but why fiction became a preferred form of narrative.”5 The very idea of creating unabashedly “untrue” stories—an idea criticized, defended, and worried over at least since Plato—achieved its current formulation and acceptance only because of philosophical, demographic, and economic changes in the eighteenth century, these critics suggest. Despite narratology’s tendency to take narrative’s creation of fictional worlds as a logical given, then, the historical specificity of such possible worlds is very much in question. This chapter articulates corporeality within the concept of narrative worlds. In doing so, it encapsulates the concerns of the project as a whole, since I will critique narratology’s insistence on generalizable textual patterns and abstract logical conditions. More specifically, this project will sketch out the scope and limitations of narratology, suggesting that the type of narrative that it concerns itself with is ultimately modern. As this project will argue overall, narratology is the study of modern narrative because narratology ultimately assumes a modern body at the base of all narrative acts. Narrative and Trans-World Identity Modern possible world theory, especially as applied to narrative texts, has evolved as a result of deep problems in reconciling our everyday thinking about hypothetical entities with traditional metaphysics. The idea that a fictional narrative projects a “world” develops in part as a way to resolve apparent contradictions in how we speak about fictional entities. After all, there is no such person as “Sherlock Holmes”—to take the overused example from fictional world philosophy. Thus references to this person within the novel, casual conversation, or literary criticism would seem consequently to be lies. And yet this is quite obviously not the case. As Michael Riffaterre notes, whereas “fictitious truth” is an oxymoron, most of us believe that “fictional truth” is not.6 It is truer to say that Sherlock Holmes lives in London than to say that he lives in New York. Early philosophies of fictional reference saw an irreconcilable problem in a sentence like “Sherlock Holmes lives in London” since no such person—other than someone who happens to own the same name
20 / narrative bodies
by accident but who has no relationship to the events depicted in the novels—exists in the real world. Bertrand Russell is usually associated with the strict “segregationist” argument that fictional entities simply do not exist and consequently that no truth claim can be made about fiction.7 In spite of this, of course, we all want to be able to have robust discussions not only about the interpretation of a narrative, but about its basic facts—something quite difficult if we accept the impossibility of making truthful claims about it. A number of ways to account for the truth of this apparent falsehood have consequently developed in the wake of Russell’s argument. One fruitful and commonsensical response to these metaphysical problems draws on possible-world theory. When applied to the question of fictional reference, possible-world theory simply states that a sentence referring to a fictional character such as “Sherlock Holmes lives in London” has an implicit contextualizing operator. We make truthful claims about nonactual states of being everyday when we say “I hope that it stops raining this afternoon.” The phrase “I hope that” brackets the untruthful statement “it stops raining” in a way that allows it nonetheless to be part of a truthful claim. Likewise, possible world theory suggests that when we make a claim about the facts of a fictional text, we are implicitly saying “In the world of Conan Doyle’s novel” before we say “Holmes lives in London.” Although some critics associate each text with an individual world, it is probably more accurate to say that each text refers to a range of possible worlds, since fictional entities are necessarily incomplete—that is, many elements of these entities are undetermined.8 Thus, although in the real world a character must have been born either on a particular day or not born on that day, a fictional text may well be silent on this character’s birthday and thus be compatible with both possible worlds.9 One traditional complaint about possible world theory is that it implies that writers do not create fictional characters so much as discover the possible worlds in which they exist. The distinction between the ontologically incomplete fictional text and the many possible worlds to which it may refer, however, seems to alleviate this problem somewhat, since it suggests that a fictional text is not so much a possible world in and of itself, but rather a means by which various possible worlds are recognized and brought into relationship with each other. The key to possible-world thinking is the idea that we can imagine another world that departs in specific ways from our real world. This is true of narrative fiction, but is especially clear when we construct alternative narratives in everyday thinking. When I say, “I could bake a cake
conceiving modern narrative / 21
if I’d stopped at the grocery” I am making reference to an alternative world—one defined as the same as the actual world except for the fact that in this alternative world rather than coming directly home from campus I stopped at the store. The logic of possible world thinking depends on the idea that all conditions other than those intentionally revised remain the same. The majority of objects in this possible world have, in other words, trans-world identity—they are the same in both real and possible worlds. Thus, permanent entities like the store and the route home, as well as more transient conditions like the amount of traffic and weather for that day, remain the same when I speculate about stopping for groceries. Is the “I” of the actual world and the “I” of the alternative world the same? Certainly it is, unless I am imagining some sort of spiritual experience that occurred in the course of my shopping trip that utterly transforms my psychology, disposition, beliefs, and so on. Stopping or not stopping at the store except in this extraordinary instance is an inessential fact about my life, and consequently we will normally say that I am the same person regardless of whether I inhabit this actual or the alternative possible world. Possible world thinking depends on the belief in this identity—that we can change one condition in a way that illuminates all other conditions. Although the relation between fictional and real world is obviously more complex in the genre of narrative fiction—in a novel, for example—we nonetheless generally assume that the “facts” of the real world are left unaltered in this alternative world except insofar as the story itself directly touches on those facts. Thus, when King Richard appears in Ivanhoe, we assume that the general historical facts of his reign are left unchanged except where those changes become an explicit part of the story, and that we can bring any historical information that is common knowledge in Scott’s time to bear on the novel. We assume, in other words, a general trans-world identity between large parts of the real world and a novel. The problems of defining trans-world identity reveal a great deal about the assumptions in this kind of everyday hypothetical or fictional narrative. In his highly influential Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke addresses these problems by turning to the traditional difficulty of defining the meaning of a proper name. Naming is part of the problem of trans-world identity because in asking whether a thing in one “world” is the same thing in another we are asking to what extent a similarity of name can be equated with a similarity of identity. Linking name and identity is a long-running problem in theories of reference. When we refer to Aristotle, to take Kripke’s example, what do we mean by this name? One traditional answer is to say that the “meaning” of a name can
22 / narrative bodies
be defined by substituting a “definite description” for it—that is, a description that is true of one and only one person, place, or thing.10 So when we refer to Aristotle, we can implicitly substitute, for example, “the teacher of Alexander the Great” to give the name meaning. Kripke notes a number of problems with this theory, among which is the fact that eventually we may all turn out to be wrong about some seemingly essential fact in a person’s life. Thus, if Shakespeare can be glossed as “the writer of Hamlet” but it is later discovered that Marlowe actually wrote this play, it is wrong to suggest that Marlowe has become Shakespeare. In this context, Kripke distinguishes between necessary and contingent properties. A contingent property (such as “stopped at the store for milk on June 25”) can vary between possible worlds without raising questions about the identity of the person. Necessary properties cannot, however. Kripke gives the example of the number nine: “does it have the property of necessary oddness? Has that number got to be odd in all possible worlds? Certainly it’s true in all possible worlds, let’s say, it couldn’t have been otherwise, that nine is odd. Of course, 9 could also be equally well picked out as the number of planets. It is not necessary, not true in all possible worlds, that the number of planets is odd.”11 Although we might initially hope to use necessary properties to define trans-world identity, we quickly realize that individuals possess far too few necessary qualities to define them definitely.12 Kripke argues that the kind of description that we can use to define about whom we are speaking is not a permanent part of most names. If a friend points out his mother across the room to me by describing her as wearing the “blue wool sweater” and then I discover later that the sweater is in largely composed of a synthetic material, I will not then begin to wonder who his real mother is. This definition need only enable me to pick this woman out of a room. Kripke suggests that any description used to explain who we are talking about has some kind of incomplete, contingent quality. When we try to explain the meaning of “Einstein” we might well answer “the man who discovered relativity theory” (82). But many people may not know enough about this theory to distinguish it from other related scientific claims. Instead, Kripke suggests, what we mean by a name is what some other person means by the name. Shifting his example to Gödel, Kripke notes, “I may then say, ‘Look, by “Gödel” I shall mean the man Joe thinks proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.’ Joe may then pass the thing over to Harry” (90). Kripke goes on to describe a “chain” of such references that may or may not actually “get back to the man by referring to such a chain in that way, borrowing the references one by one” (90). Although this means of
conceiving modern narrative / 23
“fixing a reference” of a name to a particular person may strike us as problematic, Kripke argues that precisely this is the means by which names are usually attached to people in everyday life: Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Richard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman even though he can’t remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman. He knows that Feynman is a famous physicist. A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman even though he can’t identify him uniquely. (91)
According to Kripke, all names are defined by this type of referential linking. As Kripke suggests, it is not the actual ability to reconstruct such a series of links, but rather the feeling within a whole community that one could do so if necessary that grounds the referentiality of names. The communal belief in such a chain gives meaning to the name because it allows us, hypothetically, to fix it to an actual person. Although much of the debate about fictional entities is likely to seem abstract and divorced from everyday storytelling, Kripke’s theory about the importance of birth to trans-world identity reveals assumptions at work unrecognized within all of our modern ways of thinking about narrative. One important implication of this theory of character identity is that thinking about narrative as creating “possible worlds” is necessarily anti-essentialist and emphasizes the open-endedness of human activity. It is easy to see how deeply anti-essentialism is ingrained in possible world thinking when this open-endedness is violated, as it is in Ursula LeGuin’s fantasy novel, The Lathe of Heaven. This novel in many ways seems concerned with possibility, but violates the basic rules of possibleworld thinking. LeGuin tells the story of George Orr, whose dreams cause the world to change; they do not merely predict the future, but fundamentally rearrange the world (including the past) to account for the dreamed event seamlessly as part of the natural order. When Orr finally manages to convince his psychiatrist William Haber of his power, Haber begins to use it to reshape the world to eliminate various sources of human suffering. These changes are always accomplished, however, through unexpectedly horrific means. Commanded to dream a less overpopulated world, Orr dreams a plague that kills 5 billion people;13 asked to imagine peace on earth, Orr imagines an alien invasion that unites
24 / narrative bodies
humans in desperate struggle against immanent attack (85). Orr confronts Haber with his genuine inability to improve the condition of the world: “Look, it’s not that I want to block you, to frustrate your plans. Ending the war was a good idea, I agree with it totally. . . . But I guess I can’t, or my subconscious can’t, even imagine a warless world. The best I can do is substitute one kind of war for another” (86). LeGuin develops a narrative, in other words, precisely by denying genuinely open-ended possible worlds. This is what gives her story its coherence and allows the many realities that Orr produces to have shape, since the same characters and the same conflicts reappear throughout the many worlds that he creates. Indeed, it is easy to see why LeGuin has to violate the principles of possible-world thinking in this novel. Lacking the anchoring point of the baptismal moment—which like everything else is subject to change in Orr’s dreams—LeGuin needs some other method to create coherence in her narrative. Without such a method, each of Orr’s realities would create the world anew, and no narrative of the progression of one to the next would be possible. The repeated patterns that seem inescapable accomplish this, but only at the cost of discarding the anti-essentialist futurity that is characteristic of possible-world thinking. Possible-world theory, then, assumes that human thought and action are unlimited. Orr’s distinctly limited futurity means that the alternative worlds that he dreams fail to coincide with the principle of possibleworld theory—that certain conditions of the present world can be varied intentionally and in a controlled way without changing any other conditions. In the context of a strongly deterministic understanding of human nature—where, for example, God is constantly at work directing the most minute human actions—such possible-world thinking would be largely absurd. When Leibniz formulates possible-world thinking in part to explain how God has chosen the best of all possible worlds for us to inhabit, he certainly is proposing a certain kind of personal “substance” that includes “everything that has happened to him and marks of everything that will happen to him.”14 But that essence can only be recognized through God’s omniscience, and Leibniz is quick to distinguish between logically “necessary” and mere divinely foreseen “certain” facts—facts that are certain “accidentally” (45). In this possibleworld account of divine foreknowledge, God is not an active force manipulating the world directly, but rather an abstract representation of the ideal “vision” or understanding of the universe (38) according to which its logic and principles are obvious. Leibniz aside, we can say that the belief that things might have been otherwise works against the
conceiving modern narrative / 25
assurance that the deity has laid down some plan according to which events occurred.15 In possible-world thinking taken to its logical end, we must believe that humans are composed of few if any unchanging qualities and that we are free to imagine a wide range of variations from the real world. Because there is so little that is essential to our identity, human choice becomes paramount and the consideration of many possible worlds that flower out from the present moment becomes a useful way to consider the choices before us. Starting Points As this discussion of possible-world theory suggests, the tradeoff for the radical openendedness of possible-world theory is that a certain moment in the naming process becomes essential for determining the organization of all consequent possible worlds that will surround this individual. Possible-world theory and this fiction share something—an emphasis on character individuality and human potential in which narrative motivation is articulated through character choice and action. Even when character actions appear to be determined by outside forces, as in some varieties of naturalist narrative, those forces are usually treated as emerging at particular moments. A naturalist work like Theodore Dreiser’s An American Tragedy, for example, unfolds precisely by placing its central character in a situation where he is prompted “you must choose— choose! And then act. You must!”16 even though we are to recognize how much that choice is a product of social and economic factors. The necessity of such a starting point has not been given any sustained attention from narrative theorists. Such a starting point, however, is precisely the way that the concept of narrative worlds comes to depend on a particular image of human corporeality. This essential starting point is birth—or, more precisely, the baptism or other naming ceremony that follows the birth. We can see why this moment is necessary for Kripke’s theory, of course; without such a protected moment, we would have no way of being sure that the person that we call “Holmes,” for example, is really the detective that we know from other stories. It is precisely because she dispensed with fixed starting points and allowed Orr to rewrite the past that LeGuin’s novel could not imagine open-ended futures and thus defied possible-world thinking. The continuity of the name, the simple fact that the naming itself will not become part of the possible-world variation that will be explored in the narrative, becomes the precondition for being able to imagine other futures and pasts. Many of us have been led to wonder,
26 / narrative bodies
when confronted by the inexplicable acts of our parents, whether we might not have been adopted. Such possible-world thinking seems much more radical by apparently rejecting the basis upon which my discussion of Kripke has suggested possible-world narratives must be constructed. And yet, this radical contemplation of rebirthing is played out over and over again in classic realist narrative. A long-maligned hero or heroine suffers from cruel parents or lack of social standing only to discover in the resolution to the story that his or her birth has been shrouded and that secretly he or she really possesses precisely the parents and status he or she seems so lacking throughout the story. It is a story at the heart of fairy tales like “Cinderella” and novels like Evelina, and common enough by the middle of the nineteenth century to become the subject of parody in narratives like Great Expectations. While these narratives of discovered birth seem to suggest that the baptismal moment described by Kripke as the basis of possible-world thinking is not sacrosanct, a more complex drama is being played out in these stories. It is essential to narratives like Evelina and even Great Expectations that the issue of the child’s birth is resolved in the end to provide a teleology for the whole narrative, no matter how potentially confusing to possible-world thinking it might seem along the way. Great Expectations begins, of course, with the question of naming and baptism in the graveyard, where Pip muses on his family name and studies the tombstone inscriptions for clues about his parents. Pip’s attempt to define his identity at this outset of this narrative must be traced back to a moment of naming that is curiously without external, parental authority, “So, I called myself Pip, and came to be called Pip.”17 Pip’s attempt to understand his identity in the light of this very tenuous baptismal moment is connected throughout the novel to the “expectations” that he develops and the mysterious benefactor that he seems to have. This benefactor and the social status that is promised to Pip seems to repeat a traditional story of hidden birth; the revelation of this benefactor’s identity at the end of the novel would seem to complete the naming that is noted but left unclear at the outset of the novel. Of course, exactly the opposite happens, and we see in retrospect that this moment of naming at the outset of the novel is not the sign of some hidden identity later to be divulged, but the actual moment at which Pip is given his name and narrative trajectory by his encounter with Magwich. Regardless of the ending of the story—the conventional one of social (re)discovery or the ironic one of Pip’s false expectations—the narrative functions in essentially the same way. The novel seems to question the identity of the characters, their foundational moment in the baptism of parental naming,
conceiving modern narrative / 27
only to reveal in the end the name and circumstances of baptizing that grant an identity and confirm the whole narrative. The baptismal moment is not lessened in these narratives, but rather confirmed in its significance. What we see in narratives that suspend the moment of naming the character only ultimately to resolve that name in a way that gives meaning and shape to the whole story is a rudimentary element of the artistic shaping of narrative. It is the difference between the fundamentally troubling question, “what if I’m really not who I think I am?” and the ultimately reassuring story, “How I Discovered my True Identity.” The former seems to mark a point without a baptismal moment, a narrative that is “meaningless” because the possibilities are organized around a character who may or may not be the same person in each of the various story worlds. The latter takes this confusion and makes an aesthetically satisfying narrative out of it, using and controlling the naming confusion for the sake of suspense. The narrative ordering achieved through an understanding of birth and baptism is what links realist fiction and possible-world theory.18 A good example of the absolute importance of birth as a reference point for possible-world thinking—the inability for a narrative to posit such worlds without a starting point—is the popular 1983 movie Back to the Future. In this film, young Marty (Michael J. Fox) unwittingly travels into the past and finds himself inadvertently disrupting the romance between his future mother (Lea Thompson) and father (Crispin Glover). As the two drift further and further apart, the likelihood of their marriage and consequently of Marty’s eventual birth grows dimmer. Glancing at a picture of his family, Marty sees himself and his siblings gradually fading from the picture as he races to undo this damage and sidestep this version of the grandfather paradox. Steven Spielberg’s decision to treat this impending paradox by gradually erasing Marty is narratively inevitable, perhaps, although philosophically problematic. Had Marty somehow been the instrument of his parents’ death, for example, this erasure would make sense; this is, after all, the classic concern of the grandfather paradox. In Back to the Future, however, Marty merely works to separate his parents. Both, we might assume, will likely go on to marry someone else and, equally likely, produce children. The film suggests a fundamental narrative gap between those children and Marty; there is no sense in which his identity could be traced back to these other children of his parents, no way in which his place within the narrative can be rescued from obliteration. At first, this is likely to strike most viewers as perfectly reasonable: we all assume that we have different identities than our siblings, despite sharing the same parentage
28 / narrative bodies
and, thus, quite similar baptismal circumstances. And yet the primary narrative trajectory of the film is to rewrite everything about those circumstances except the basic genetic fact of Marty’s parentage. When the film opens, Marty’s father George is unsuccessful, unhappy, and entirely under the thumb of his dim-witted boss, Biff (Tom Wilson). By the end of the film, young George’s experiences with Marty fundamentally change his self-confidence, leading him to become a successful writer in the original “present” of the film and to employ Biff to do menial labor. Within the film’s logic, this transformation of the circumstances of Marty’s birth and childhood is irrelevant to his identity and his place within the possible worlds of the film; any genetic change in Marty’s parentage, however, makes cross-world identification impossible and fundamentally severs the worlds of the old and new present. Although, in part, Back to the Future simply reflects contemporary American attitudes toward the importance of genetics and embryonic development,19 modern assumptions about narrative and possibleworld logic are very clearly revealed here. The moment of birth—with its reference to the apparently unique combination of genes from which an individual develops—is the starting point for narrative identity. Such a claim is certainly a departure from Kripke, for whom the moment of naming rather than some genetic essentialism is the basis of cross-world identity. But even in Back to the Future one would be hard-pressed to show a strong acceptance of genetics as the basis of identity. After all, the mature personalities of Marty’s parents are profoundly influenced by their psychological experiences as young adults and their economic conditions. Spielberg is not suggesting that genetics is the cause of his characters’ identities in this film—just as Kripke does not believe that genetics can somehow be used to mark individuals in their travels across worlds. Kripke and Spielberg both imagine this baptismal moment that defines the cross-world identity of individuals in similar ways. Both imagine what we could call an accidental moment, a point at which a new person is granted identity without connection to the past. Kripke is quite explicit about suggesting that this moment may well be mythical and imagined, since for him our ability to reference an individual depends not on our actually being able to trace a name back to a baptism, but our belief that we can. Likewise, in Back to the Future Marty disappears as a character when his parents temporarily drift apart despite the fact that genetically similar offspring will be born to one or the other of his parents. Individuals’ cross-world identities in this sense are unique products of the circumstances of parentage and birth exclusively. Genetic identity is one common justification for this uniqueness,
conceiving modern narrative / 29
but neither filmmaker nor philosopher is willing to take genetics as a predictor of action or as a limit on the future. Rather, what drives the presentation of these possible worlds and what limits Spielberg’s ability to describe a Marty born to different parents is precisely the narrative limitations of our modern way of thinking about trans-world identity. Contextualizing Kripke Once we recognize that possible-world thinking depends on the moment of birth or naming as a reference point around which these worlds can be organized, a number of implications become obvious. As my brief discussion of Back to the Future suggests, there will be types of events and stories that will be difficult to imagine and to describe using such narrative models. We will examine these limitations of narrative later in this chapter. More fundamental to an understanding of narratology is recognizing that this image of the “starting point” for human identity in birth or naming is a relatively recent construction, depending in large part on a particular understanding of human biology. It is my contention that despite the apparently logical necessity of much of what Kripke claims, his theory rests on assumptions marked by particular historical conditions, the most interesting of which are those that concern the body and reproduction. By way of contrast to the kind of identity that Kripke imagines, let us consider for a moment how this issue is treated in a contemporary Native American novel like Louise Erdrich’s The Antelope Wife. Late in the novel Erdrich notes, “Family stories repeat themselves in patterns and waves of generation to generation, across bloods and time. Once the pattern is set we go on replicating it. Here on the handle the vines and leaves of infidelities. There, a suicidal tendency, a fatal wish. On this side drinking. On the other a repression of guilt that finally explodes.”20 While Erdrich may seem merely to be suggesting some notion of genetic predisposition toward depression and alcoholism, it is clear in the novel that she has in mind a more complex process by which identities themselves are handed down with the traditional names that get reused. As one of her characters remarks not long after this passage, “Our spirit names, they are like hand-me-downs which have once fit other owners. They still bear the marks and puckers. The shape of the other life” (217). The identities of Erdrich’s characters are defined by their resonance with traditional, mythic types and familial patterns. Certainly this way of defining identity breaks from the European philosophical tradition in which Kripke works. Although in a good deal of modern fiction we find mythic,
30 / narrative bodies
psychological, and thematic patterns and resonances between characters, modern ideology suggests that identity is first and foremost an individual concern. Although it has been complicated by more recent histories, Ian Watt’s claim that the European novel begins with the birth of modern individualism describes why Erdrich’s narrative seems so foreign to mainstream ways of defining character identity and narrating a life. Traditionally, as Watt remarks, “the novel requires a world view which is centered on the social relations between individual persons”; Erdrich’s characters are defined by much more complex resonances with past identities.21 Erdrich makes clear that character identity can be defined in many different ways. Scholes and Kellogg are right to distinguish between typical and archetypical forms of characterization in their classic study, The Nature of Narrative. As they suggest, “Don Quixote is not a character as Isabel Archer is, or as George Eliot’s Dr. Lydgate is. He is alive but he is not real. There is more of myth and of fiction in Don Quixote than in Isabel Archer. There is more of mimesis in her. She may be quixotic, but he is Quixote. She may be typical, but he is archetypical.”22 Theories of narrative character, influenced either by reader-response theories or by semotics, usually treat such characters in terms of their qualities and place them within the overall work, rather than attending to their literary sources. Scholes and Kellogg suggest that Quixote does not arise, we can say, from Cervantes’s attempt to describe a particular person; rather, he is an attempt to embody a certain philosophical and psychological confusion. More generally, we can say, Scholes and Kellogg remind us that narrative frequently finds the inspiration for its characters elsewhere than in the real world. Indeed, narrative theory in general has failed to take sufficient account of practices in a great many periods, cultures, and genres in which the construction of unique and independent characters is not the goal of the writer. Although it is obvious to even casual readers that medieval romances like Le Morte D’Arthur and Troilus and Criseyde are rewritings of earlier tales, narrative theory frequently lets this essential fact pass in attending to other aspects of characterization. C.S. Lewis remarked in 1966, The truth is that these Middle English texts have come into existence by a process which is quite foreign to modern literature. The scholar’s ideal of accuracy in translation, the historian’s ideal of fidelity to a document, and the artist’s ideal of originally, are all alike absent from the minds of Laamon and Johan. In one way they seem enslaved to their originals; it never occurs to them to break these up and melt the slivers down and forge out of them an essentially new work. But in another way their
conceiving modern narrative / 31 treatment of them is very cavalier. They do not hesitate to supplement them from their own knowledge and, still more, from their own imagination—touching them up, bringing them more fully to life.23
Lewis suggests that some authors find their characters not in the “real world” or simply in their imagination, but also in other written or oral works. The identity of these characters is defined, at least in part, by their relationship to previous literatures and texts. In a sharp break from modern ideas about originality, it is in earlier narratives that these characters are born. We can say more generally that such premodern narratives have a fundamentally different notion of mimesis, and that this notion leads them to treat characters differently as well. As we know, authorship in the Middle Ages implied a very different notion of personal authority. Albert Russell Ascoli summarizes the traditional understanding of the etymology of the term author: [T]here was a long medieval tradition for defining the word auctor in relation, conceptual and etymological, to two other words: actor and autor. Actor comes from agere, “to do,” and refers to the one who makes a work, without reference to the authority or veracity of that work. Auctor comes from augere, “to augment or make grow,” and refers to one who is at once the originator of and the authenticating witness to an act (for instance, of composition).24
While modern definitions of mimesis tend to equate these two concepts—assuming that the artist or writer who makes a work is responsible for making it lifelike and believable—this is not necessarily the case in medieval writing. Ascoli notes this distinction: “medieval concepts of auctoritas shift away from the rhetorical notion of authority as the persuasive appearance of truth and toward the theological idea of an original, essential, and transcendent truth and power behind appearances from which all circumscribed human authority ultimately derives” (27). Evelyn Birge Vitz states this contrast even more strongly when she suggests that medieval narrative resists modern ways of thinking about authorship precisely because of the belief that the authenticating power behind the narrative is beyond the control or even understanding of the writer. Vitz writes, “to the medieval way of seeing things, one did not need human artistic intervention in order to have a story. God was the fundamental artist whom all other artists merely imitated. The dividing line between reality and art was very different for the Middle Ages than for the modern period.”25 Because of the belief that God has created
32 / narrative bodies
reality as a kind of artistic pattern that humans only barely grasp, Vitz goes on to note “the medieval conviction that every sequence of events which occurs is a ‘story,’ that all events have causality, meaning, finality: that every living creature has a function, though often known only to God” (112). According to such a way of thinking, reality and art are deeply interwoven, and the artist’s goal is not to create a narrative but merely to help reveal a pattern that already preexists the writing. It is because of this belief that narrative ultimately originates beyond the mind of the author that medieval narrative so frequently draws on traditional source stories and reworks older materials. Vitz notes, for example, that “it is often narrative in what one might call the ‘second degree’: it is not the telling of a story, but the retelling. And this is not that kind of collective commemoration of past events that one finds in epics, but rather a corrective retelling” (32). Indeed, many scholars writing about medieval narrative structure have noted that the cyclical and repetitive structure can be traced back in large part to the very different notion of origin operating within these texts. Jane H.M. Taylor, for example, notes the key role of cyclicity in medieval narrative, “by which I mean the construction of a pseudo-historical prose narrative against a conception of history as an organic process of birth, growth, apogee, decay and death, death triggering in turn the next rebirth and thus the next cycle.”26 Such “cyclicity” clearly emphasizes broader historical patterns that are not embodied uniquely in a single event nor invented by a writer, but rather revealed repetitiously through many historical and literary instances. The crucial point in the transition from an older method of imagining characters to what we can describe as modern possible-world thinking is most often located at some point in the Renaissance. William Ryding conveniently locates this moment in 1548, when the concept of narrative structure began to come under an Aristotelian critique that called for a movement away from cyclical histories to a formal understanding of beginning, middle, and end: “In the latter half of the sixteenth century there occurred in Italy what might be described as a crisis in the concept of narrative structure. The controversy raged in literary circles from 1548 until the end of the century. When it was over a revolution of sorts had been accomplished. The authority of Aristotle in matters of narrative form was firmly established as it was to remain down to our own times.”27 As my very brief discussion of mimesis and authorship has suggested, narrative structure clearly reflects an understanding of how a text comes into the world and claims authority for itself. Thus the transformation in structure described by Ryding
conceiving modern narrative / 33
necessitates a change in understanding how narratives are conceived and claim authority for themselves. A concise summary of this transformation is suggested by Carla Freccero’s discussion of the opening passages in Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel. Since such opening passages traditionally do the work of establishing the authority of the text and the origin of the characters, these two passages tell us a great deal about how authority is being imagined in the 1530s. Freccero notes that while Gargantua is narratively prior to Pantagruel and consequently that the two works are usually printed together in this order, the two works were in fact composed in the opposite order: Pantagruel appeared in 1532 and Gargantua in 1534. This small difference in date is important, since Freccero notes a very different approach to establishing the genealogy of the two figures. The earlier figure of Pantagruel is defined by reference to textual authority: Here the metaphor of a return toward origins, genealogical investigation, explicitly creates the text—it is the pretext by which the narrator achieves presence. The discourse, however, is metacritical: the narrator, not Pantagruel the hero or protagonist, is on a parental quest. Whereas classical and medieval traditions provide the foundation for the hero’s genealogical exploration, notably the search for the father, Rabelais transposes the discourse, from the start, to the level of the narrative itself, to the level of writing.28
Already, Freccero suggests, Rabelais is borrowing from the medieval notion of authority in an ironic way, integrating the very search for authority into the story itself. Still, even such an ironic treatment bears homage to the continuing presence of medieval notions of textual authority and narrative mimesis in this first book. When Freccero turns to Gargantua, published only two years later, she notes a far more direct focus on biological rather than textual ancestry, since Rabelais “situates Pantagruel in a line of descent and provides it (him) with a history in the form of a father whose authority determines the outcome of the son” (61). Biological genealogy here is used to suggest the problems of defining these characters’ identities much in the same way that literary genealogy fails Pantagruel: “The lineage claimed for the book (the retelling of a well-known tale) in one passage is denied in the next by the assertion that genealogies may disguise rather than reveal origins” (59). Rabelais’s book is, again, broadly ironic and satirizes much of the tradition that it draws from. Nonetheless, we can take the shift in the objects of Rabelais’s satire as a concise summary of the change in how narratives will define the identity of their characters.
34 / narrative bodies
As this example of Rabelais suggests, there is a quite close relationship between how characters are conceived, and how the narrative is seen to define its mimetic authority. In describing this as a matter of conception I am in one sense speaking metaphorically. Especially in medieval narrative I am referring to the way that characters are born out of a textual tradition that grants them an authority to reveal patterns within history and the world. At the same time, however, this notion of conception needs to be taken more and more literally as we move into the Renaissance. Rabelais certainly suggests this when the literal conception of Pantagruel becomes the basis for defining the authority of Gargantua. We can say that the transition from medieval textual “conception” (in a metaphorical sense) to modern biological conception (in a literal sense) is precisely what inaugurates the tradition of possibleworld thinking in modern narrative, and that creates an image of openended character futurity. Hans Vaihinger notes precisely this “transition to fictions” in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as philosophy and science increasingly comes to depend on hypothetical situations—possible worlds—as a means of reaching conclusions.29 This is certainly not yet the case in Rabelais, nor will it really be the case well into the period of the early novel in Europe, where many characters are still assigned traditional identities or destinies that foreclose their future in a variety of ways. Nonetheless, we can see the beginnings of the modern novelistic tradition here, and the preconditions for thinking about narratives as future-oriented possible worlds being defined in this equation of narrative authority and character conception. By jumping ahead a few hundred years, we can see this transformation of narrative into a discourse of possible worlds being completed in a work like Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), a novel that combines older ideas of human generation with a distinctly modern style of writing. A number of critics have noted that Shelley’s treatment of the Frankenstein monster as the product of her eponymous scientist’s imagination draws on an eighteenth-century understanding of how imagination influences the fetus.30 It was commonly believed in midcentury Britain that what a woman thought about during conception and pregnancy—and to a much lesser extent, what a man imagined during intercourse—could have a fundamental influence on the characteristics and even nature of the child that she produced. This culture’s willingness to give such formative power to the imagination comes out of a number of sources, but certainly one of the most important is the simple confusion that results from rapidly changing ideas about reproduction, which I will discuss in more detail in the following.
conceiving modern narrative / 35
Dennis Todd has recently argued that imagination’s influence on a human embryo was particularly the site in which the period played out anxieties about the nature of human identity. Standing somewhere between the rational, spiritual mind and the animal body, imagination’s ability to shape a human child suggested the frightening prospect that human identity likewise has a physical rather than rational basis: “If humans had no immaterial substance, they had no identities at all. . . . To be an individual, to have an identity, meant that one had to possess a selfhood that was a unitary thing persisting through time, and therefore individual identity had to be grounded in a substance that was itself indivisible and unchanging.”31 Todd goes on to show that the power of the imagination reappears in the satire of the time constantly as a danger by encouraging an “enthusiasm” in which bodily excitement overwhelms reason and judgment. Swift’s Gulliver, for example, travels from one monstrous vision to the next, constantly being excited by the image but failing to profit by understanding it (150). Precisely this emotional but irrational “enthusiastic” response is what critics of the time feared that fictional narrative would encourage. Frankenstein is remarkable for taking this eighteenth-century concern about the power of the imagination and making it the basis for a new type of narrative. Critics have long recognized that this might well be the first Science Fiction novel, since it speculates on the implications of a hypothetical scientific discovery—the power to reanimate dead flesh. Science Fiction’s interest in the possibilities opened up by a particular speculative donnée makes it the prototypical modern narrative in its explicit and fundamental reliance of possible-world thinking. This type of novel emerges precisely by transforming the previous concerns about the power of imagination into the basis for telling the story. Like the social critics who worried about the power of the imagination to affect the fetus, in Frankenstein imagination is fundamentally linked to birth. Frankenstein’s imagination is, however, no longer a matter of literally influencing the gestation of a child, but rather a matter of metaphorically “birthing” a new world. Dr. Frankenstein, like Shelley herself, creates a new world out of his imagination precisely by creating a new creature. Picking up on the novel’s concern with authorship in both writing and birth, Barbara Johnson remarks, “Frankenstein . . . can be read as the story of the experience of writing Frankenstein. What is at stake in Mary’s introduction as well as in the novel is the description of a primal scene of creation. Frankenstein combines a monstrous answer to two of the most fundamental questions one can ask: where do babies come from? and where do stories come from?”32 We could say that
36 / narrative bodies
modern narrative makes precisely the same equation when it links the creation of a narrative “world” with the birthing of its character. Shelley, we could say, responds to problems and ambiguities in thinking about reproduction and in turn develops a different style of writing that takes birth as the beginning of a new, speculative style of writing. Mimesis and Sexual Generation I have suggested, then, that how we understand modern narrative mimesis comes to depend more and more on possible worlds as a model, and that this change occurs because of a shift in the way that we understand human identity. I would like to argue now for what I have hinted at throughout this chapter, that this understanding of narrative futurity can be traced back to a modern way of thinking about conception and fetal development. In jumping the nearly three hundred years that separate Gargantua and Pantagruel from Frankenstein, I have obviously played fast and loose with any kind of historical causality that might link specific scientific discoveries to these changes in narrative. Although a complete history of thinking about conception and fetal development is obviously beyond the scope of a project like this, I would like to outline the debate that occurred within embryology and to suggest its links to the way that thinking about human identity as an “accidental” combination of circumstance developed during the last part of the seventeenth and first part of the eighteenth centuries. It would be wrong to suggest that there is a single trajectory from ancient theories of generation to early scientific discoveries of conception and inheritance. Indeed, what is remarkable about the history of embryology is how frequently one catches glimpses of modern ideas about conception in much older texts, and how ideas are proposed, die out, and become resurrected in later generations. It is impossible to discuss theories of sexual generation without providing a preliminary explanation of the issue of how the fetus develops human form. Indeed, although a tremendous number of issues circulate through the history of embryology, the most consistent problem posed to philosophers and, later, to scientists is to understand how human shape develops from a bodily material (either male or female semen) that initially appears to have no such form. Early Greek theories start from the problem of how the apparently different elements of the body are generated from a seemingly undifferentiated seminal fluid. “How can hair come from not-hair, and flesh from not-flesh?” asks Anaxagoras in the fifth century B.C.33 Aristotle, of course, solves this problem by attributing to women the
conceiving modern narrative / 37
seminal material out of which a fetus is produced, and to the man the shaping of that material: Now of course the female, qua female, is passive, and the male, qua male, is active—it is that whence the principle of movement comes. Taking, then, the widest formulation of each of these two opposites, viz., regarding the male qua active and causing movement, and the female qua passive and being set in movement, we see that the one thing which is formed is formed from them only in the sense in which a bedstead is formed from the carpenter and the wood, or a ball from the wax and the form. It is plain, then, that there is no necessity for any substance to pass from the male; and if any does pass, this does not mean that the offspring is formed from it as from something situated within itself during the process, but as from that which has imparted movement to it, or that which is its “form.”34
What is noteworthy here is not so much the solution that Aristotle provides, since his theory will be embraced and rejected in a variety of ways through Galen during the Middle Ages and well into the Renaissance, but the theoretical problem that will haunt embryology: how is the bodily material out of which the fetus develops (whatever its source) given shape and developed into a child?35 This issue frequently coalesces into the debate between “preformationism” and “epigenesis” as the two models for fetal development that dominated early modern thinking about sexual generation. This debate has attracted a great deal of attention recently by cultural critics because of what it says about the period, but I will keep my remarks to a few observations. Epigenesis describes what contemporary science has come to accept as the gradual development of the fetus through many different forms. Conversely, preformation theory argues that whatever material the embryo develops from, embryonic growth is merely a process of unfolding a form that is already complete within that material. This form can reside either in the female egg—a popular theory with the “discovery” of the egg by William Harvey in 1651—or in the male sperm, as was increasingly believed after the invention of the microscope in the 1670s. The result is a kind of running debate between which of the two parents provides the “form” of the future child.36 It should be easy to see why this theory is so attractive, since it does away with the issue of how “hair can come from non-hair”—that is, how elements of a fetus can develop from an undifferentiated seminal material. If such material already contains the form of the child, then fetal development is merely a process of allowing this form to manifest itself. Obviously,
38 / narrative bodies
however, this theory raises a number of very significant problems. Probably the most striking is the difficulty of explaining the fact that the child inherits qualities from both parents, a difficulty that did not keep philosophers and scientists from embracing some version of preformation. Other philosophical problems are more abstract but also more absurd. Probably the most obvious is the doctrine of emboîtement or encasement—the idea that if an embryo is already complete inside the egg or sperm, then that preformed embryo must in turn contain within itself the egg or sperm that itself contains an embryo, and so on, recursively. In his history of theories of sexual generation, F.J. Cole locates the first full articulation of the emboîtement doctrine to Jan Swammerdam in 1669. In summarizing the implications of this theory, Cole notes that Swammerdam’s later work in 1672 concludes that the whole human race was comprehended in the loins of Adam and Eve, and consequently the race will be faced with extinction when this original supply of germs is exhausted. Thus death, the penalty of sin, is implicit in the human race. It is evident that Swammerdam does not allow his mind to be disturbed by any considerations of consistency. Reasoning from his own observations he should be an ovist—the foetus is preformed in the egg, and the male parent has no direct share in it. And yet, he finds a use for Adam in generation. . . .37
Despite its logical problems, Cole notes that “from about 1674 the Preformation Doctrine was generally accepted, and it was only a question whether the miniature was in the egg or in the sperm (Ovism and Animalculism)” (53). It is not until the 1740s with the work of P.L.M. de Maupertuis that we have a theory that tries to account for what we would describe today as the genetic inheritance of traits from both parents, and theories that try to locate the form of the child in seminal material of one or the other parent recede.38 Modern readers of this debate are probably first struck by the abstract and scholastic nature of much of the inquiry into the development of the embryo. Howard Adelmann summarizes the writing about sexual generation precisely as a lack of scientific investigation and observation: In embryology, as in other fields, the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth were a period of transition. Some who worked during it were almost completely unable to free themselves from the old forms and were largely content to weigh the statements of their authorities one against the other when they were at variance, perhaps adding new “reasons” of their own in support of one or the other or, possibly, advancing an original hypothesis, but not systematically observing or
conceiving modern narrative / 39 experimenting to ascertain what their own senses might find to be the truth.39
As my summary of the early preformation doctrine has suggested, there is a great deal of validity in Adelmann’s characterization. Without doubt much of the writing of this period is marked by concern for inherited theories and philosophical abstractions at the expense of more direct observation of human development and anatomy. But Adelmann does a disservice to the writing on embryology of this period when he fails to recognize how fundamental a change in thinking about the body he is demanding of these writers. Jonathan Sawday has recently written about dissection in early modern medicine, and has suggested that the shift from taking the body as an emblem of the larger cosmos to seeing it as an object to be taken apart and studied has radical implications.40 Sawday writes Guiding the followers of Vesalius was the belief that the human body expressed in miniature the divine workmanship of God, and that its form corresponded to the greater form of the macrocosm. Such ideas did not vanish overnight, to be replaced by the clear light of Cartesian rationality. Indeed, William Harvey himself leaned on a system of beliefs inherited from Aristotle, which held that the universe and the human body—the interior and exterior worlds—were united in the common bond of correspondence. Within this system, features observed within the body were held to replicate features to be seen in the world at large.41
In contrast, Sawday notes, early modern scientists began to speak about the body as a space to be explored, equating the interior of the body with the dark “interior of the continent of the newly ‘found’ americas” (25). Modern scientific study of the body, then, marks a fundamental transition in the way that the body is made meaningful, and especially implies that we must give up the symbolic qualities attributed to the surface of the human form. Because the human form provides explicit analogies for the world, it is natural that early scientists would want to find those forms embedded in whatever materials the child develops from. To think otherwise is to imagine a fundamentally different starting point for human identity. In describing the early modern transition from a cosmological to a genetic understanding of the “starting point” for human identity, we are obviously returning to the concerns that I have associated with possibleworld theory. Earlier I suggested that an “accidental” quality to human genetic combination is deeply interwoven in contemporary ideas about
40 / narrative bodies
sex, birth, and identity upon which possible-world thinking depends. Consider for a moment Robert Silverberg’s comment on the somewhat unlikely subject of the representation of interspecies sex in Science Fiction: The essential thing to keep in mind about sex is that its inherent purpose is to bring two alien beings together to create a third being different from them both. I’m talking strict biology here, of course, taking things right down to the teleological nitty-gritty. Whatever sex may happen to mean to you or you or you or me, the inarguable fact remains that the whole sexual thing was programmed into most living organisms above the level of viruses and bacteria for the primary sake of bringing about an exchange of genetic material between two individuals who belong to the same species but otherwise may have very little in common. . . .42
Silverberg is eager to emphasize the “alienness” of these potential parents, but he describes sex and reproduction in terms that reflect our prevailing assumptions about human reproduction in general. Reproduction is a moment at which two significantly different creatures come together to conceive a new one that is “different from both.” An individual in this way of thinking about reproduction is an “accident” in some general sense: he or she is a product of two very different sets of genetic material that produce a new, unique creature. Early modern embryology quite explicitly struggles with the transition from a cosmological to what I am calling this accidental starting point for human identity. The resistance to this transition reflects a whole network of social and cultural ideologies,43 but the struggle at its most fundamental and far-reaching level is narrative in nature. Indeed, Sawday’s observation that the transition from older cosmological models is worked out in part through metaphors of geographical travel suggest how older metaphorical uses of the body are giving way to narratives of search and discovery. Ultimately this modern narrative style is most clearly embodied in Darwinian narrative, where the balance between a search for origins and the unlimited futurity of accidental starting points seems to me most clearly exemplified. Gillian Beer’s influential study of Darwin and narrative suggests that precisely this interest in futurity is what substitutes for the older assumption of some type of preformation. Noting that “[e]volutionary theory emphasised extinction and annihilation equally with transformation,” Beer suggests that this “disturbing” balance marks a change in narrative: “The all-inclusiveness of its explanation, stretching through the differing orders of the natural world,
conceiving modern narrative / 41
seemed to offer a means of understanding without recourse to godhead. It created a system in which there was no need to invoke a source of authority outside the natural order: in which instead of a foreknown design, there was inherent purposiveness.”44 Futurity, the urge toward “difference, plentitude, multifariousness,” substitutes for older models of development that presupposed some form that gradually manifested itself. It is clear, then, that transformations in thinking about conception affected narrative in two ways. At the most general level, they mark a shift from belief in inherent, divinely inspired forms that manifest themselves over time—both in everyday life and in narrative. At a more specific level, these changes produce a new way of thinking about character identity as the basis for narrative. No longer are characters subordinated to some larger form; instead, they are the basic metaphysical building blocks of whatever story, whatever “world,” is described. Rethinking Accessibility Possible-world theory, then, poses special problems for critics, since it both claims a universal logical application and at the same time seems to arise as a mode of thinking only at a specific historical moment. The very idea of trans-world identity assumes the need to define a continuity between two separate but similar “worlds.”45 This seems true of most modern narrative. Although early European novels often tried to claim that individual works of fiction were actually found documents or collections of real letters, modern fictional narratives treat real and textual worlds as fundamentally distinct. It is only because of this distinction that the issue of fictionality itself arises. If a novel produces another, obviously untrue world that readers are invited to enter, writers are challenged to defend the value of such a flirtation with lies. This gap is precisely the one that Kendall Walton has in mind when he argues that artworks are a form of “make-believe,” a kind of imaginative acting out based on childhood play in which participants (readers, viewers, the audience) are aware of two realities. A child might imagine that a tree stump is a bear in order to develop a game with her friends and straddle the real world of the tree stump and the imagined world of the beargame, using the former to “prompt” additional play and “broaden our imaginative horizons”: “They induce us to imagine what otherwise we might not be imaginative enough to think of. It might not occur to me to imagine a monster sitting atop a mountain were it not for the influence of certain suggestive rock formations.”46 Likewise, in artworks we
42 / narrative bodies
move back and forth between the fictional world of the text and our real world, treating the characters, events, and other qualities of the artwork as the prompts for further imaginative play. But in the end, such play can only work if we remain firmly aware of the distinction between real and imaginative worlds. We have seen, however, that narrative before the eighteenth century by no means always relies on this distinction between two separate worlds. Is it really fair to say that Dante’s mixture of religious, historical, and literary figures creates a new, fictional world that is self-contained and that is entered when a reader picks up The Divine Comedy? Auerbach suggests something of the complexity of reference in Dante’s characterization when he notes the way that earthly existence “figures” eternal, divine designs: “The world beyond . . . is God’s design in active fulfillment. In relation to it, earthly phenomena are on the whole merely figural, potential, and requiring fulfillment. This also applies to the individual souls of the dead: it is only here, in the beyond, that they attain fulfillment and the true reality of their being. Their career on earth was only the figure of this fulfillment. In the fulfillment of their being they find punishment, penance, or reward.”47 Although in one sense Dante has invented most of the events of his narrative and thus created a “fictional world” in which historical events are represented and reshaped, in another sense Dante is merely revealing the “fulfillment” evident in these earthly events. In such narratives, the text does not create a fictional world distinct from the real world and mediated through relations of trans-world identity. Rather, both narrative text and earthly existence are partial revelations of a divine order. At the other end of the spectrum, folktales integrate with the everyday world in a variety of ways that modern fictional narrative traditionally does not. Folktales are usually communal and frequently purport to explain some natural phenomenon or historical mystery. When, for example, Rabelais describes Gargantua’s adventures in Paris, he makes a point of linking these events to specific historical questions that his narrative claims to explain: The people so pestered him, in fact, that he was compelled to take a rest on the towers of Notre-Dame; and when from there he saw so many, pressing all around him, he said in a clear voice: “I think these clodhoppers want me to pay for my kind reception and offer them a solatium. They are quite justified, and I am going to give them some wine, to buy my welcom. But only in sport, par ris.”48
With this, Gargantua urinates upon the crowd so generously, “they began to swear and curse, some in a fury and others in sport (par ris).”
conceiving modern narrative / 43
Rabelais concludes the episode by using it to account for a historical mystery: “Hence it was that the city was ever afterwards called Paris” (75). Once we recognize that not all narratives will presuppose a distinction between two worlds, the way that much narratology characterizes the reader’s relation to the text must be questioned. Already Walton’s theory seems historically very suspect, since the belief that the world of the artwork is ontologically discontinuous with that of the real world does not apply to folktales and the kind of religiously inspired writing that Auerbach describes in Dante. An especially good example of this twoworld model is Nelson Goodman’s aesthetic theory. Goodman concludes his influential study, Ways of Worldmaking, with the characterization of artworks as “samples from the sea.” Goodman models aesthetic analysis on attempts to extrapolate general patterns from instances, to take a work as a sign of how the world in general functions. Goodman notes that scientific inquiry into the world depends on “fair samples” of natural phenomena or materials, such a sample being “one that may be rightly projected to the pattern or mixture or other relevant feature of the whole or of further samples.”49 Goodman then contrasts the analysis of the artwork to this scientific extrapolation: Works of art are not specimens from bolts or barrels but samples from the sea. They literally or metaphorically exemplify forms, feelings, affinities, contrasts, to be sought in or built into a world. The features of the whole are undetermined; and fairness of sample is no matter of shaking a barrel thoroughly or taking water from scattered places but rather of coordination of samples. In other words, rightness of design, color, harmonics— fairness of a work as a sample of such features—is tested by our success in discovering and applying what is exemplified. (137)
The aesthetic model here is clearly attuned to modernist art, with its emphasis on abstract and obscure patterns that need to be analyzed before meaning can appear. And yet Goodman’s aesthetics describe how we often treat literary works in general, especially narrative ones. Narratologists frequently ask about the “world” that a text projects, and frequently treat that world as an artifact whose rules need to be discovered. It is in his sense that Lubomír Dolezˇel describes a possible world within a narrative text as “not a random assemblage of entities; it is constructed in accordance with certain postulated global principles.”50 For him, narrative semantics seeks to “recover and to formulate the intrinsic meaning of narrative texts” (193). Precisely this idea that narrative is a puzzle, a “sample” from which rules must be postulated, is at the
44 / narrative bodies
heart of possible-world analysis of narrative; this in turn depends on the strict distinction between the real and fictional worlds, a distinction that this chapter has drawn into question. This distinction between two possible worlds is perhaps most clearly embodied when these theories discuss how possible worlds are “accessed.” Marie-Laure Ryan offers the following definition of how fictional worlds can be accessed: Since a text projects a complete universe, not just an isolated planet, two domains of transworld relations should be distinguished: (1) the transuniverse domain of the relations linking AW [Actual World] to TAW [Textual Actual World], and (2) the intraunivese domain of the relations linking TAW to its own alternatives (TAPW [Textual Actual Possible Worlds]). The relations of the first domain determine the degree of resemblance between the textual system and our own system of reality, while the relations of the second determine the internal configuration of the textual universe. Or to put it another way: transuniverse relations function as the airline through which the participants in the fictional game reach the world at the center of the textual universe, while intrauniverse relations make it possible for the members of TAW to travel mentally within their own system of reality.51
Ryan’s concluding description of the relation between real and textual worlds in terms of travel neatly summarizes the tendency within narratology to treat texts as creating separate worlds. For Ryan, as for all narratologists working on the issue of worlds, access is a matter of logical compatibility: are the rules of this textual world more or less the same as those of the real world? Precisely the same question is at work in Goodman’s broader aesthetic theory, where analysis of an artwork involves treating it as a “sample” and understanding the rules according to which it functions. In both Goodman’s and Ryan’s discussions, it is clear that a great deal of the challenge and fun of reading a narrative according to this possible-world theory is in exploring these relations, in deciding which rules from the real world apply, and which do not. As Walton describes it, narrative worlds here are a kind of game. As this example of accessibility makes clear, questioning possibleworld thinking means challenging both our conventional theories of mimesis—the relation between work and world—as well as the very principle upon which we experience these narratives. Earlier in this chapter narrative theorists like Vitz have suggested that entirely different ways of thinking about authorship and the reception of the work are at play within medieval narratives. In these older narratives the relation between the reader and the text is not a puzzle in the way that is
conceiving modern narrative / 45
described by Goodman; there is no a priori problem of accessibility. This suggests, I think, a broader conclusion, that hermeneutics undergoes a fundamental transformation as we move into the modern period and accept possible-world thinking about narrative. The fundamental hermeneutic question about how we are to interpret a foreign text or artifact arises precisely because world and text are taken to be fundamentally separate. As Sawday has suggested, older cosmologies organized around the human body backgrounded hermeneutic questions by suggesting a fundamental homology between world, text, and self. Once scientists take the body as an artifact to be dissected and studied scientifically, these natural links begin to break down, and the hermeneutics of the text becomes a fundamental issue around which narrative theory will circle. Critics have seen similar interpretive problems appear when world/body links are severed in culture in general. John O’Neill has recently argued for the need for more anthropomorphism in contemporary culture “in order to resist the drift toward a mechano-morphic or prosthetic society in which the ordinary intelligence and sensibility of persons are rendered docile and passive.”52 I will argue in later chapters that the body constantly reappears when we try to speak about textual hermeneutics, and that such older models of corporeality continue to haunt narrative and narrative theory. For now, however, we should recognize that narratology’s broad belief that a text projects a separate world with specific accessibility relations ultimately applies only to modern narrative. We will see that narrative itself reflects the hermeneutic problems raised by the body and the way that it defines the relation between text and world. Limitations in Traditional Narrative As my discussion to this point has argued, possible-world thinking achieved cultural prominence only recently and partially as the result of changes in our thinking about human generation. Because of this recent origin of possible-world thinking, it is inappropriate to apply the concept to the analysis of earlier literatures except in very circumspect ways. To speak of a narrative “world” in Dante or Chaucer, I have suggested, is a misapplication of the term. While we may want to continue to use the term to refer to the ways in which the cultural, political, and philosophical mores of the time influence the work, the suggestion that these works conceive of the relationship between text and outside world like a modern narrative is, I have suggested, a mistake.
46 / narrative bodies
My comments about the body’s place within modern narrative worlds also have implications for contemporary narrative practices. In arguing that modern narrative typically begins from a moment of “accidental” birth at which an individual is given as a starting point for the construction of the text’s world, I am also suggesting that there may be topics and narrative situations that this modern style of narrative may have difficulty addressing. Let us return, again, to the problems faced by a writer who wishes to imagine that he or she has different parents. This goal of reimagining the circumstances of one’s birth—or rethinking the foundational moment for most narrative worlds—has its clearest expression in narratives concerned with racial identity. It is not difficult to think of narratives in which one imagines “What would it be like if I’d been born a man instead of a woman.” This, after all, is the subject of Woolf ’s Orlando as well as Science Fiction narratives like Samuel Delaney’s Trouble on Triton. That such examples come to mind rather easily is not surprising, since such counterfactuals do not fundamentally change the conditions of one’s birth—the circumstances of baptism are retained, even if one is likely to be given a different name. It is more difficult to imagine narratives in which one imagines a different race. We can certainly think of fantastic examples like Kafka’s “The Metamorphosis,” in which a person is suddenly changed into a new creature. But in this situation, one’s identity is not really changed— rather, Gregor Samsa is treated primarily as a man trapped within a bug’s body, rather than as a person who must reimagine his identity as a bug.53 Exactly the opposite is the case in narratives in which characters imagine belonging to a different race. In fact, such narratives are quite rare—surprisingly rare, we might think, if we did not now recognize how much of modern narrative practice works against reconceiving a character’s birth. The first work of African American fiction, James Weldon Johnson’s The Autobiography of an Ex-Coloured Man (1912), is usually considered a “passing” narrative. Johnson tells the story of a very light-skinned black man who as a child believes himself to be white, only to discover later in school that he is considered African American. For most of the novel this character identities himself as black, but late in his life begins treating himself as white. In the end, this character seems disappointed in his choice, closing the novel with the observation that “I have sold my birthright for a mess of pottage.”54 In this context it is clear that, although this character questions the way that he should define himself, Johnson sees himself him as black and uses that definition as the ground for the story as a whole—it is this character’s “birthright.” Although the narrative itself raises social and psychological questions about the way that this character should think about his life
conceiving modern narrative / 47
story, the narrative problems raised by these questions are not allowed to enter into and upset the main narrative. These social and psychological questions have fascinated recent critics, who have largely failed to recognize how difficult it is to reconcile them to traditional narrative structure. Recent critics writing about such “passing” narratives see them as implicitly challenging the culture’s belief in fixed identities and conventional mores. Elaine Ginsberg summarizes well this current treatment of passing narratives in her introduction to a recent collection of essays on the subject: “the process and the discourse of passing interrogate the ontology of identity categories and their construction. For the possibility of passing challenges a number of problematic and even antithetical assumptions about identities, the first of which is that some identity categories are inherit and unalterable essences: presumably one cannot pass for something one is not unless there is some other, pre-passing, identity that one is.”55 Although Judith Butler’s work on the radical potential of different kinds of identity “performance” has made critics especially sensitive to the possibilities contained in passing narratives, Ginsberg’s reading of these narratives seems largely to miss the narrative limitations that shape such identity transformations. At the outset of this chapter I suggested that seemingly challenging subject matter (Evelina discovers who her father is) could be used to create a teleology that suppresses those challenges and instead insists that the character’s identity has always been implicit in the narrative. Likewise such philosophically challenging questions can be used to tell an ultimately reifying narrative. If, as I have suggested, modern narrative seems to create identities by pointing back to some baptismal moment, we are on considerably shakier ground if we seek to modify that moment and redefine the conditions of one’s birth.56 Valerie Rohy, writing in the same collection on passing narratives, captures some of these problems in her essay on Baldwin’s Giovanni’s Room in which she finds an essential theme of misrecognition as the precondition for narratives about such subjects.57 According to Rohy, Baldwin continually emphasizes nostalgia and the desire to return to an origin: “If passing . . . invokes origins only to displace origins, the passing of the law itself is manifest in its nostalgia for a point of origin that, in fact, it has never known” (228). In other words, such passing narratives will express their anxiety about the origins that are necessary for their own textual construction. Giovanni’s Room expresses this anxiety by continually circling around the issue of nostalgia and by emphasizing the way in which its central character, David, seeks to recognize and misrecognize himself in others. Other narratives will express this anxiety in different ways.
48 / narrative bodies
A good example of the difficulty of fully coming to terms with the narrative problems raised by the radical reconception of character birth is Toni Morrison’s Bluest Eye. Morrison’s well-known novel tells the story of Pecola, a young African American girl who desperately wants the blond hair and blue eyes that she has been taught to associate with beauty. In wishing for this physical change, Pecola is essentially asking to change her race. Within this simplistic summary of the novel’s plot, Morrison’s task is essentially similar to the kinds of passing and transformation narratives that I have been discussing. She must describe a character’s rebirth, rebaptism into new circumstances and a new identity that raises fundamental questions about trans-world identity. But Morrison does nothing of the sort—at least not directly. Although the novel closes with Pecola’s apparently delusional belief that she has been given her new eyes and that everyone at school now envies her, the issue of rebirth is handled not by literally granting Pecola a new identity. Indeed, the novel ends with the suggestion that Pecola has failed to escape from her world, and that her belief that she has been given new eyes has made her an object of mockery and fear rather than envy— “Grown people looked away; children, those who were not frightened by her, laughed outright.”58 Morrison handles this issue of rebirth by having Pecola become pregnant by her father. Thematically this incestuous pregnancy is important and helps to account for the way that Pecola is treated when she returns to school, and becomes a way for Pecola’s friends to think about the hope and ultimate impossibility of Pecola’s dream of being reborn into new circumstances, of “chang[ing] the course of events and alter[ing] a human life” (150). As the narrator remarks, “More strongly than my fondness for Pecola, I felt a need for someone to want the black baby to live—just to counteract the universal love of white baby dolls, Shirley Temples, and Maureen Peals” (149). That Morrison chooses to write about this rebirth rather than attempting to accomplish the birth itself suggests how difficult it is to escape the narrative logic that defines characters by their birth. Narrative after Baptism We can observe, then, some instances in which modern narrative methods, which rely on a particular image of the human body to ground their negotiation of narrative worlds, encounter fundamental limitations in how they can think about alternative biologies. It is also clear, however, that our beliefs about the body and its genetic inheritance have changed radically in the last half century. When I have spoken about the “modern
conceiving modern narrative / 49
body,” my model has primarily been an evolutionist one of simple parental genetic inheritance—a model that was available by the latter part of the nineteenth century. Certainly recent work on genetics, especially the Human Genome Project’s attempt to catalogue all human genes, has begun to replace this model. If we are beginning to develop a biology after the classical evolutionist model of accidental combination that I have suggested underlines realist narrative, should we not then begin to see a new type of narrative that negotiates the relationship between text and world in a new way? I am certainly not the first person to raise this possibility. Donna Haraway is the critic best known for asking how recent discoveries in human biology will affect the way that we tell stories. Haraway’s well-known suggestion about cyborg body becomes more meaningful in the context of my discussion of narrative worlds: “By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centres structuring any possibility of historical transformation.”59 In this well-known passage, Haraway points to the cyborg as a “myth” with the potential to change how we look at historical reality and how we approach the task of changing our political and material conditions. The core of this transformation, according to Haraway, is a creature (the cyborg) that is more explicitly the product of myth and imagination. The cyborg is a creature that has been assembled—that has, in other words, a different sort of baptism. It is not an evolutionary body that is accidental, new, and distinct. Rather, it is a product assembled of many different parts. It is for this reason that Haraway describes cyborgian life as a means “through which we engage in the play of writing and reading the world” (152)—cyborg narrative entities remind us of how they are being placed within a narrative, how they are being created as entities rather than dropping fully formed into our laps as biological accidents. When Haraway asks “Why should our bodies end at the skin, or include at best other beings encapsulated by our skin?” (178), she is asking precisely this question about where the body has come from, what relationships and qualities have been suppressed to form it. The cyborg is not merely a new “origin myth” but rather an image of origins as themselves constructed in the process of narration, a process that Haraway rightly recognizes runs directly counter to all of our biological assumptions about physical identity and human reproduction.
50 / narrative bodies
In William Burroughs’s writing—frequently described as “cyborgian” by critics—we can see how this post-evolutionary body fundamentally changes our ideas about narrative and fictional worlds. Among the many frustrating qualities of Burroughsian prose, one of the most striking is the repetition of scenes with slight variations. Within a given Burroughs novel, the same actions may be performed again and again—sometimes by the same characters, sometimes by different characters, other times by characters with the same name who may or may not be the same character that appeared under that name earlier in the novel. Burroughs’s later novel Cities of the Red Night (1981) uses this technique in a direct way, repeating the same stories in traditional narration, play acting, sexand drug-inspired hallucination, and the writing of a book called “Cities of the Red Night.” The result is a nexus of characters and events that reappear throughout the novel with slight variations but that seem, in the process, to be struggling to tell a single story. There are many reasons behind Burroughs’s use of this repetition, but surely one cause is the radically different idea of narrative identity that Burroughs is using. These characters are not born to live out one life by making choices and seeing the results. Nor do they even follow many different, possible lines of choice. This latter technique is used at times in contemporary fiction, probably most successfully in Robert Coover’s short story “The Babysitter,” where a number of mutually exclusive narrative lines surround the story’s donnée of a young girl babysitting children while their parents attend a cocktail party.60 In Burroughs’s fiction, however, we are not given characters who maintain their identity across these various possible futures. The characters themselves are changed by the narrative circumstances in which they appear. The post-evolutionary logic behind Burroughs’s radical narrative style is clear in his association of human life and the virus or parasite. The image of the virus occurs frequently in Burrroughs’s writing, most notably in its association with language. In Cities of the Red Night, Burroughs suggests that human life itself is “viral”: “we are all tainted with viral origins. The whole quality of human consciousness, as expressed in male and female, is basically a virus mechanism.”61 Most relevant for this discussion is the way that this viral definition of human life challenges our ideas about reproduction. Steven Shaviro untangles some of the implications of Burroughs’s viral metaphor: [Viruses] aren’t self-sufficient, or even fully alive; they always need to commandeer the cells of an already-existing host in order to reproduce. A virus is nothing but DNA or RNA encased in a protective sheath; that is to say, it is a message—encoded in nucleic acid—whose only content
conceiving modern narrative / 51 is an order to repeat itself. When a living cell is invaded by a virus, it is compelled to obey this order. Here the medium really is the message: for the virus doesn’t enunciate any command, so much as the virus is itself the command. It is a machine for reproduction, but without any external or referential content to be reproduced.62
Although this characterization of the virus in some ways emphasizes its autonomy, what is most significant is the way that it makes the body that carries it point back to this viral “cause” for reproduction. Even if the virus itself contains no content, no real message, it itself directs and drives the body that carries it. The virus, in other words, is the mechanical process that produces the body almost as an afterthought. This, it seems to me, is what Burroughs’s repetitious narrative style is getting at—an understanding of how the narrative body, the starting point for the fictional world, is itself the product of some far more important and fundamental process that has created and shaped this entity. Burroughs’s fiction exemplifies, I think, a post-evolutionary narrative form. Here the individual character body is no simple accident, no individual from which a myriad of possible worlds unfold. Instead it is a body that has been constructed according to some viral code. As we begin to think of the body as a particular combination of genetic material with its own logic and meaning, we may well begin to see more fiction in which the characters are not taken as independent but rather as the product of other forces that are themselves the “starting point” for the narrative. More significantly, in such a type of narrative can we speak about worlds at all? Are the narrative possibilities created by these codes themselves worlds? We have seen throughout that the concept of a narrative world depends on a certain notion of accident, a combination of human characteristics that creates a person who will serve as the unique reference point for linking possible worlds. Once we move beyond this starting accidental point, can we speak of worlds at all? Perhaps, then, the concept of the fictional world describes merely a theoretical presupposition of a two-hundred-year period of narrative that is already coming to an end. Narratology in this sense treats an object (narrative) defined by a particular although broad timeframe. This frame, in turn, is defined by the modern body that it represents.
This page intentionally left blank
CHAPTER 2 Sorted and General Character Bodies
Chapter 1 has argued that the way in which we think about human bodies is inherent to what we can take as the most basic and abstract element of narrative—the way that it conceives of mimesis, the relationship between text and world. Although narratologists have treated narrative as a more or less timeless form of discourse, we have seen that much of how we think about narrative depends on a particular set of ideas about human potential and identity. We have seen, further, that these ideas in turn depend on an understanding of human conception and generation that becomes recognizable only in the eighteenth century. In a broad way, our very understanding of the idea of narrative depends on a particular way of conceiving the human body. Narratology in this sense is a form of discourse that is deeply entwined with the modern body. In this chapter I would like to turn from these abstract concerns toward more typically concrete narratological issues. In particular, I would like to focus on the role of the human body in characterization. When we imagine a corporeal narratology, we are most likely to think about a theory of character bodies, since it is through characters that our ways of thinking about the human body will most obviously influence narrative. This chapter considers, then, how bodies help to make characters significant. Turning to characterization is especially informative because these theories reflect a more typical narratological interest in concrete textual choices and possibilities. In particular, many people think of narratology as primarily a taxonomic discipline, categorizing textual features and providing schema for organizing those features. As we begin to develop a theory of the body in narrative character, we will construct a schema of the possible forms of narrative bodies. Along the way, this inquiry into bodies in narrative characterization will lead us into interpretive issues as well. In chapter 1, I suggested that the emergence of the human body as an object to be dissected and interpreted
54 / narrative bodies
should be read against the older tradition of symbolic links between the body and the world. While developing a theory of narrative bodies in characterization we will find that narratology has again relied on a historically limited understanding of the body as an object of analysis. We saw in chapter 1 that these historical reflections lead us to find general hermeneutic issues that a corporeal narratology raised. We will see the same thing when we consider narrative characters, where interpretive problems raised by the taxonomy of characters will ultimately be resolved only by broadening our understanding of the human body in narrative and by considering how these character bodies mediate between text and reader. Theories of Character To understand the place of the human body within theories of narrative character, we must first define what we can call the normal science of narrative character. That is, how have narratologists usually approached characterization, and what are their primary assumptions about character? We learn a great deal about the presentation and use of character traits in a narrative in W.J. Harvey’s classic study, Character and the Novel (1965). Although Harvey’s study seems dated in places—his principle polemic is against New Criticism’s lack of interest in character—it provides us with a rare effort at theorizing precisely those ideas about character that we take for granted in most interpretive work. Harvey’s overall definition of character uses the commonplace image of a “web” of human relationships: By far the most important of contexts [for viewing characters] is the web of human relationships in which any single character must be enmeshed. So much of what we are can only be defined in terms of our relations with other people; indeed, if we wish to be rigorous, we can say with the philosophers that other people must exist if only to show us what we ourselves are not.1
As Harvey suggests, usually we think about literary characters in terms of their contrasts to each other. This is true of theories of literary characters from very different critical schools and perspectives. David Lodge, for example, argues that we should subordinate traditional questions of character morality and thematic coherence to the language of the narrative itself, suggesting that when we read any novel “we enter a unique linguistic universe; we learn a new language designed to carry a particular view of experience.”2 Other critics have gone to the opposite extreme, suggesting
sorted and general character bodies / 55
that narrative characters be read essentially like individuals. Seymour Chatman is a defender of the equation between characters and persons, arguing that “[t]he same principle [by which we respond to narrative characters] operates with new acquaintances: we read between their lines, so to speak; we form hypotheses on the basis of what we know and see; we try to figure them out, predict their actions, and so on.”3 Clearly Lodge and Chatman have very different attitudes toward the role that character plays in narrative, and even toward the nature of narrative itself. Nonetheless, both agree that literary characters function primarily by contrast with each other. For Lodge, this contrast is seen primarily in patterns of language; he writes of “a linguistic thread or threads—a cluster of images, or value-words, or grammatical constructions” (79).4 For Chatman, characters embody an ordered and limited set of traits that are worked out through the course of the narrative, implying that individual characters are meaningful because of the contrast between their various combinations of these traits. Chatman defines his “open” concept of character as a “paradigm of traits; ‘trait’ in the sense of a ‘relatively stable or abiding personal quality’ ” (126). He characterizes this paradigm as follows: “The paradigmatic view of character sees the set of traits, metaphorically, as a vertical assemblage intersecting the syntagmatic chain of events that comprise the plot” (127). The contrast between characters has been used to explain narrative meaning in many different ways by critics. Intuitively we recognize that characters must contrast on some grounds; that is, the juxtaposition of several characters within a single work is structured on some thematic, psychological, metaphysical, ethical, or social ground. When we reflect on a work, we consider which qualities of these characters might be significant for the work. This theory of literary characters depends, of course, on a whole formalist belief in the importance of internal, usually binary, contrasts between elements of a literary text. Mieke Bal offers, somewhat apologetically, a structuralist theory of semantic axes in order to explain how “we decide which we consider provisionally to be a character’s relevant characteristics and which are of secondary importance.”5 Echoing Chatman’s language of paradigms and selection, Bal tentatively describes characters through systems of “semantic axes,” pairs of contrary meanings that reveal themselves to operate within a significant number of characters: Characteristics like “large” and “small” could be a relevant semantic axis; or rich–poor, or man–woman, kind–unkind, reactionary–progressive. The selection of the relevant semantic axes involves focusing, out of all the characteristics mentioned—usually an unmanageably large number—only
56 / narrative bodies on those axes that determine the image of the largest possible number of characters, positively or negatively. Of the axes which involve only a few or even one character, only those are analysed which are “strong” (striking or exceptional) or which are related to an important event. (126)
Bal notes a number of limitations with this model, among which is the simplification of the degree of contrast and the problems with the binary model of semantics in general. Still, Bal describes directly a model of character contrast that we find implicitly used by so many writers discussing in narrative theory. James Phelan’s influential recent study of character, Reading People, Reading Plots, repeats this emphasis on thematic contrasts while at the same time striving to state our common understanding of characters in the simplest way possible. Phelan distinguishes three components of fictional character: the synthetic (the fact that the character is fictional and hence constructed of language), the mimetic (the way that a character describes a “possible person”), and the thematic. Phelan describes the thematic component of an example character drawn from David Lodge’s criticism as follows: this character “is taken as a representative figure, as standing for a class—the individual in modern society, men, the ordinary human, respectively—and his representativeness then supports some proposition or assertion allegedly made by Lodge through his text.”6 As Bal and Phelan suggest, character becomes meaningful because it instances a larger textual system; the contrasts between characters allow us to glimpse the complexity of that system and to recognize the various forms that it can take. As Bal’s hesitant use of the model implies, contemporary critics have found it very difficult to escape from the structuralist logic that underlies the theory of contrasting character qualities. Bal’s reticent theory of semantic contrasts in narrative character summarizes the state of normal narratological criticism as applied to character. While critics seem to recognize that a model of simple logical contrasts is problematic, narratology’s way of approaching these texts does not seem to allow for an alternative. This model of semantic contrasts describes both the strengths and weaknesses of narratology’s treatment of characterization, and suggests where a corporeal narratology will need to adapt itself and to challenge its assumptions. To develop a narratology of the body in characterization is first to define the body as an object that enters into a system of semantic contrasts. We need to recognize eventually that something important seems to escape from this definition of character, and we will need to broaden our definition of corporeality to recover what that is.
sorted and general character bodies / 57
The Body as a Narratological Object Before the body can contribute to the semantics of narrative, it must be defined as a meaningful object. It is because we see the body as a distinct entity that we are able to place it within the whole schematic of contrasts that Bal describes. Mary Douglas titled her influential work on the body in society Natural Symbols, a title suggesting a paradox in the way that the body becomes meaningful: “The title of this book would seem to hold a contradiction. Nature must be expressed in symbols; nature is known through symbols which are themselves a construction upon experience, a product of mind, an artifice or conventional product, therefore the reverse of natural.”7 Douglas goes on to argue that the body is “capable of furnishing a natural system of symbols” (xxxii), since the body provides the first and simplest analogy for thinking about “the social relation of men [that] provide[s] the prototype for the logical relations between things” (xxxi). Despite cultures’ universal access to the body as a model, and despite the frequency with which the body is used as a prototype for these relations, the body must be instilled with a specific set of meanings before it can take on a role in culture. Douglas’s observation about the body in culture applies, I think, to narratology as well. Although we recognize that it is impossible to tell a story without drawing on human bodies and thus entangling corporeality within the narrative, those bodies must always be shaped into meaningful textual objects by specific choices made by the text. Concern for how the body is endowed with meaning within a narrative will usually touch on systems of meaning that extend far beyond the text itself. As Bal notes, “everything that can be said about the structure of fabulas [story ‘elements’] also bears to some degree on extra-literary facts. Various investigators in this area even refer to themselves as anthropologists or sociologists, and work not only on literary narratives but quite often on folk tales, rituals, and common cultural practices such as table manners, recipes, and political programs” (177–78). We must first ask, then, how a narrative gives meaning to the human body, while realizing that this method will depend on the larger culture out of which this narrative arises. The body is shaped not merely by thematic or cultural influences, but also by the specifically narrative terms in which the writer is representing the body. That is, authors’ choices in the representation of body are delimited by typically narrative concerns like the need to present a narrator, to describe a setting, and to make action meaningful. These concerns will appear again at various points throughout this book, and will inevitably influence a discussion of characterization to some extent. In this chapter, however, I would like to focus as tightly as possible on
58 / narrative bodies
the specific question of the way that bodies are shaped to be part of a system of meaningful contrasts for semantic and thematic purposes.8 If character bodies become meaningful by being individuated into meaningfully distinct objects, then we can describe four types of relations that must be defined. Distinguishing Bodies from Other Objects It may seem obvious, but for bodies to be made meaningful by a narrative, they must be distinguished systematically from those things that are not bodies. This initial, non-semantic distinction underlies all narrative choices that follow. In the case of realistically presented humans, the narrative process by which bodies are sorted from nonbodies will usually be invisible. But when we begin to consider narratives with less traditional narrative entities, we realize that this invisible system is at work within all narratives. Marge Piercy’s science fiction novel He, She and It makes this point well. At the heart of this novel is a fairly simple dramatic donnée: a young woman, Shira, falls in love with a very human-like robot named Yod. The relationship not only becomes the basis for thinking about gender relations, since Yod him/itself is significantly the product of both male and female designers, but about what a body is. Shira, wonders, for example, “what did it mean to speak of a machine as having sex at all? Surely it did not urinate through its penis, and what would it want to have sex with, presuming a machine could want, which she was not about to assume. . . . ‘[W]ant’ was a word based in biology, in the need for food, water, sleep, the reproductive drive, the desire for sexual pleasure.”9 Pondering her body’s reactions leads Shira to question what should count as a body; she wonders at one point if the house she inhabits should not be considered in some sense a body (48). Piercy’s novel clearly stands on the boundary between several different definitions of the human body—as the seat of human sensation, as the material support for consciousness, as the object of human passion.10 Our difficulty in knowing how to read the novel comes from our inability to decide whether Yod’s body counts as a human body. Is this the story of an illicit but emotionally valid human relationship? Is this a cautionary tale about the human dependence on technology and our loss of understanding of our own bodies? As this example suggests, one of the essential conditions for meaningful narrative is to sort bodies from nonbodies. The way a narrative chooses to make this distinction will depend largely on the historical and cultural context out of which it comes. Narratives frequently distinguish bodies from nonbodies in terms of
sorted and general character bodies / 59
animation—a body is different from objects like tables and chairs because it acts on and responds to the environment. Likewise, narratives commonly define bodies as the seat of consciousness. Stephen Dedalus’s childhood body, for example, leaves impressions on his mind that will shape his later ways of thinking, so that the water images from childhood of wetting the bed or of being pushed into a ditch later produce an antipathy toward bathing. How narratives develop this distinction between bodies and nonbodies will depend not only on the culture out of which they arise but also on the role bodies will play in a narrative. In contrast to the importance given a dead body in a play like Sophocles’s Antigone—where a dead body continues to be a body endowed with cultural and familial significance—we might note the complete lack of interest in such bodies in most contemporary popular action films and adventure stories, where the bodies of the dead antagonists are rarely accorded significant attention. In these narratives bodies are meaningful primarily because they participate in the drama of danger and chase. Once the characters are dead, their bodies are inanimate and thus, narratively at least, no longer bodies at all. The contrast between bodies and nonbodies is an especially rich but relatively unexplored area of narrative poetics. Narratives seem to be interested not merely in the gray areas between the two, but in categories beyond both. In Mason and Dixon Thomas Pynchon describes Mason’s experience of traveling on a meat ship, and the thinking about the dead body that results: “Here were the Representatives of ev’ry sheep he had ever spoken ill of,—and now he was at their Mercy. But they are dead, he told himself. Aye, but not only dead. Here was a category beyond Dead, in its pointless Humiliation, its superfluous Defeat,— stripp’d, the naked faces bruis’d and cut by the repeated battering of the others in this, their final Flock, they slither’d lethally ’round him.”11 Pynchon’s narratives are regularly populated by figures that straddle the line between life and death, body and nonbody—ghosts, angels, robots, and institutions. It may be that this fascination with the line between body and nonbody is a particularly postmodern concern.12 It may also be that narratives so often concern themselves with such problematic cases because they are anxious to police the borders upon which their storytelling depends. Indeed, Peter Schwenger has recently argued that reading means experiencing a kind of ghostly fantasm, and that such complex corporeality is therefore inherent to reading.13 And, certainly, it is true that one of our most basic types of narrative is the ghost story, where a problematically corporeal body is the organizing principle for plot. The ghostly body in Hamlet quite literally prompts the narrative.
60 / narrative bodies
By violating the rules of body and action—by providing information that Hamlet should not know and that Claudius thought safely hidden—the ghost creates a dramatic tension that must be resolved during the course of the play. This distinction between bodies and nonbodies not only underlies the organization of many conventional plots, but also has a crucial role in a narrative’s system of action and knowledge. Only by sorting bodies from nonbodies are narratives able to create a variegated structure of public and private spaces, organize moments of reflection and secrecy, and so on. John Bender’s study of the relationship between early British novels and the penal system suggests something of this relationship: The old prisons socially inscribed the principle that the true order of things had to be discovered through discord (discordia concors), and that final causes lay hidden beneath appearances. Romance narratives—by their magical strategies and implicit causes—bore this cultural fiction in literary form. The novel bears another fantasy entirely, that of a reality constituted from material causes. It articulates reality within a fine network of visible, observationally discoverable causes which are the motor factors of the narrative itself, for example, the internal forces of psychological motivation, the details of perceptual experience, the “natural” requirements of physical survival, the social demands of law and decorum.14
Bender goes on to suggest that the modern British novel depends on both the isolation of individuals from others for the purpose of selfreflection, and the ability to observe characters even in these isolated spaces. As Bender writes, “in confinement, the internal forces of psychological motivation fuse dynamically with the physical details of perceptual experience” (43). Crucial to the development of this narrative style is an inanimate space in which individuals are free from exterior influences. Other narrative styles—we might think of children’s stories in which animals are free to travel to and from prison cells or in which inanimate objects might spring to life—obviously do not construct such isolated spaces. Before a body can be given meaning, then, it must be contrasted to all other objects that are not to be considered bodies. Although this distinction is usually invisible—except in the kind of contemporary fiction that I have made frequent reference to here—the implications of particular ways of individuating bodies resonate within the whole narrative structure of the story. We can say that this preliminary stage of individuation in many ways has far more profound effects on the narrative
sorted and general character bodies / 61
than the more visible and obvious ways in which it is invested explicitly with semantic meaning. Sorting Body Types In addition to deciding what will count as a body, every narrative implicitly or explicitly defines a certain range of body types. It is at this point that character bodies primarily enter into semantic relations, since by sorting bodies into types a narrative defines the contrasts that underlie thematic, symbolic, and psychological patterns. We are usually most aware of bodies being sorted into types in racist narratives, where skin color directly relates to such qualities as intelligence and strength of character. Aphra Behn’s Oroonoko, for example, tells a story of a “royal slave” primarily by distinguishing the body of the admirable Oroonoko from those of other black characters in the novel. In particular, Oroonoko is associated with white body characteristics in every way except his skin color: “His Nose was rising, and Roman, instead of African and flat. His Mouth the finest shaped that could be seen; far from those great turn’d Lips, which are so natural to the rest of the Negroes. The whole Proportion and Air of his Face was so nobly and exactly form’d, that bating his Colour, there could be nothing in Nature more beautiful, agreeable and handsome.”15 Behn distinguishes Oroonoko from all other Africans precisely because he shares the best qualities of the European body type. The sorting of characters into such body types is one way the body enters into the semantics of the narrative and helps to support the process of characterization. Body sorting demands some overall principle for distinguishing between types of bodies. In many cases, the principle is a political schematic explicitly racist—as in the notion that lighter skins imply intelligence and greater degrees of civilization. It may also be more implicitly racist or classist by defining a set of social norms against which physical deviations become meaningful, as in Lombroso’s anthropometric search for signs of latent criminality. Equally political is sorting bodies by some notion of health, where particular body flaws are taken to signify moral or psychological lack—as, for example, Shakespeare’s Richard III, who is “Deformed, unfinished, sent before my time / Into this breathing world scarce half made up.”16 Behind such distinctions there is always, of course, an implied understanding of what makes a body healthy and by what means illness or deformity come into the world—means that can include everything from Divine messages to failures of hygiene.17 Even within the context of illness, the way that disease is imagined varies
62 / narrative bodies
a great deal by culture and by narrative usage. Susan Sontag has recently noted the different metaphors that tuberculosis and cancer give rise to, commenting that “[w]hile TB takes on qualities assigned to the lungs, which are part of the upper, spiritualized body, cancer is notorious for attacking parts of the body (colon, bladder, rectum, breast, cervix, prostrate, testicles) that are embarrassing to acknowledge.”18 Sontag implies that particular illnesses will not only have certain thematic and moralistic inflections but that different ways of thinking about illness will lead to specific narrative uses. Thomas Mann, for example, is able to use tuberculosis in The Magic Mountain not just to characterize particular people in the story—in fact, we meet a wide range of characters in the story all suffering from similar diseases—but rather to create a certain kind of isolated setting and a plot devoid of involvement in everyday political concerns. Body sorting, however, may also obey less politically charged semantic patterns. One broad cultural model of body types deployed in many Renaissance narratives is the division of personalities into those influenced by one of the four humours said to circulate through every human body. It is in this way that the humours are described in Ben Jonson’s Every Man Out of His Humor: So in euery humane body The choller, melancholy, flegme, and bloud, By reason that they flow continually In some one part, and are not continent, Receiue the name of Humours. Now thus farre It may, by Metaphore, apply it selfe Vnto the generall disposition: As when some one peculiar quality Doth so possesse a man, that it doth draw All his affects, his spirits, and his powers In their confluctions, all to runne one way This may be truly said to be a Humour. But that a rooke, in wearing a pyed feather, The cable hat-band, or the three-pild ruffe, A yard of shooetye, or the Switzers knot On this French garters, should affect a Humour! O, ’tis more then most ridiculous.19
As this passage makes clear, the language of humours can describe either inborn biological qualities—which here “may be truly said to be a Humour”—or to social pretension or self-indulgence. For Jonson, these humours function most effectively, then, as a catalogue of contemporary vice: “my strict hand / Was made to ceaze on vice, and with a gripe /
sorted and general character bodies / 63
Squeeze out the humour of such spongie natures, / As licke vp euvry idle vanitie” (p. 433; ll. 143–46). While such a model has social and political implications, the sorting of bodies by these individual humours is not itself a matter of sorting into political groups. The most pervasive way in which bodies are sorted is of course by gender. It is a critical commonplace today that in the nineteenth-century novel, women are marked as frail, private, and interior in order to define men as public and active. The semantic use of this kind of gender distinction is nicely exemplified at the end of Barchester Towers, where Trollope describes the relationship between wife and husband using the metaphor of ivy clinging to a wall: “When the ivy has found its tower, when the delicate creeper has found its strong wall, we know how the parasite plants grow and prosper. They were not created to stretch forth their branches alone, and endure without protection the summer’s sun and the winter’s storm. Alone they but spread themselves on the ground and cower unseen in the dingy shade. But when they have found their firm supporters, how wonderful is their beauty; how all-pervading and victorious!”20 Here an image of physical frailty becomes an essential part of the semantics of this novel—the contrast between weak but beautiful women and supporting men—which in turn provides the basis for the plot’s movement from tribulation to resolution and stability. Obviously, gender differences can be endowed with semantic meaning within individual narratives in many other ways. The Body and the Outside World Not only must a narrative decide what counts as a body and what kinds of bodies are possible within that narrative world; it must also determine how the body interacts with what is outside of it. This includes other human bodies as well as the surrounding environment—narrative space, objects, and natural forces. This body/world relationship is important because it affects how distinctly individual character bodies are imagined. If, as I have suggested so far, bodies must be distinguished from other types of objects and integrated into a semantic scheme, the ways in which those bodies participate within larger systems can vary a great deal from narrative to narrative. Nonetheless, the question of how separate bodies are from the outside world will affect the way that these semantics are interpreted. Like other aspects of the body in narrative, the system relating body and environment is usually invisible, taken for granted by readers and critics as part of the cultural background for the story. Historians and anthropologists have frequently noted that social space is modeled on
64 / narrative bodies
the human body, and it should be no surprise that all narratives implicitly or explicitly describe the “fit” between individual body and the larger space in which it operates. A good example of this modeling of extra-bodily objects and spaces using the human body is provided by Richard Sennett in his discussion of the history of the European city. Sennett notes for example the scientific revolution that William Harvey’s De motu cordis (1628) sparked with the discovery of blood circulation and the function of the heart. Such scientific discoveries were brought to bear on personal and public space in the rapidly developing urban environment. Doctors began to council the importance of the circulation of blood and allowing the skin to “breath,” ushering in a movement toward looser clothing and lighter fabrics.21 Likewise, cities were designed with circulation and movement in mind as the fundamental conditions of civic health. Narratives obviously face a similar choice in how closely they link world and body. We might think, for example, of the difference between narratives in which characters are strongly influenced physically by their environment and those in which a character is defined largely apart from physical interaction. As an example of this distinction we might contrast those modernist narratives that emphasize solipsistic character psychology at odds with the world around it—one thinks here of James or Conrad more than Joyce or Lawrence—with a naturalist novel whose characters conform physically to the fabric of the society in which they live. We can certainly think of narratives in which the body is used to speak about the relations between characters idiosyncratically rather than through schema popular within the culture as a whole,22 but all narratives would seem to need some understanding of the interaction of bodies and a larger space.23 These world/body relations affect the narratives that deploy them by placing the semantic contrasts between characters into an essential interpretive context. To return to the example above, the meaning of a character within a naturalist novel will be quite different from one within a modernist novel, precisely because of differences in the way that each type of work imagines the relationship between world and body. Virginia Woolf ’s To the Lighthouse treats men and women in fundamentally different ways precisely by separating them spatially, frequently noting the gaps between their perspectives on a given object or situation. To interpret the differences between Mrs. and Mr. Ramsay, for example, is in part to think about the different types of bodies they occupy. Mrs. Ramsey is described at various points as a kind of blank reference point: There was freedom, there was peace, there was, most welcome of all, a summoning together, a resting on a platform of stability. Not as oneself
sorted and general character bodies / 65 did one find rest ever, in her experience (she accomplished here something dexterous with her needles) but as a wedge of darkness. Losing personality, one lost the fret, the hurry, the stir; and there rose to her lips always some exclamation of triumph over life when things came together in this peace, this rest, this eternity.24
In contrast, Mr. Ramsay is described by how strongly he physically occupies space. The novel remarks at the very outset “the extremes of emotion that Mr. Ramsay excited in his children’s breasts by his mere presence” (10), and returns at many points to the kind of force that his body exerts upon social situations.25 Here bodily contrast is pronounced because Woolf assumes that the characters themselves are radically separated; our interpretation of these contrasts follows from the way in which space literally separates the characters much like Lily Briscoe composes the distinct elements of her painting. Something quite different occurs when we interpret naturalist novels like those of Frank Norris. Norris’s short story “Fantaisie Printaniere,” which became the basis for his well-known novel McTeague, is especially explicit about the corporeal logic of his writing. The two main characters of the story are introduced in very physical terms: [Ryer] was a small, lean, pinkish creature, like a split carrot, his mouth a mere long slit beneath his nose. When he was angry his narrow eyes glistened like streaks of bitumen. McTeague was a huge blonde giant, carrying his enormous fell of yellow hair, six feet and more above his ponderous, slow-moving feet. His hands, hard as wooden mallets, dangled from arms that suggested twisted cables. His jaw was that of the carnivora.26
Norris goes on to describe how both men physically abuse their wives, “McTeague on the days when he was drunk, which were many, Ryer on the days when he was sober, which were few” (64). The intertwined but contrasting bodies of the two men run throughout the story, which describes how they argue and then are reconciled at the expense of their wives: “Heretofore it had been the men who were enemies and their wives who were friends. Now the two men are fast friends, while the two women maintain perpetual feud. The ‘block’ has come to recognize their quarrel as part of the existing order of things” (75–76). Bodies in this story contrast much like those in Woolf’s novel, but they are deeply entwined with each other and with the outside world. The corporeal contrasts of Norris’s characters form part of the “existing order of things” in a way that the bodies of Woolf’s characters do not. To insist on the strict contrasts between characters is then a mistake, because the corporeal contrasts
66 / narrative bodies
that we notice here must be seen against a larger pattern at work within the novel. Degree of Embodiment One final way that narratives must define character bodies is according to the degree to which individuals are embodied. I have just suggested that character bodies must not only be sorted into semantic patterns, but must be defined in terms of how deeply individuated they are. The degree of embodiment within narrative character is in many ways a corollary to this issue, since it describes how closely we should associate characters with these bodies. The potential distance between body and character is an element of the interpretation of a narrative just like the potential distance between the viewpoint of a narrator and that of the author. It is frequently noted that women and ethnic minorities are more typically associated with their bodies than are men in the ethnic majority. Lindon Barnett summarizes how this contrast plays out in African American slave narratives: “Whereas the black body is understood in the redundant terms of its own materiality, the white body is understood as referential, in other words as significant and meaningful.”27 Likewise, feminist critics have long been aware that women are more routinely associated with their bodies than men are. Men are allowed to occupy an abstract and unmarked body because, as Beauvoir noted long ago, “A man never begins by presenting himself as an individual of a certain sex; it goes without saying that he is a man.”28 As Beauvoir argues, cultures have always recognized some of its members as the norm—as “Self ”— and some as its Others, and marked those Others as embodied in a way that need constantly to be explained. “Man superbly ignores the fact,” writes Beauvoir, “that his anatomy also includes glands, such as the testicles, and that they secrete hormones. He thinks of his body as a direct and normal connection with the world, which he believes he apprehends objectively, whereas he regards the body of woman as a hindrance, a prison, weighed down by everything peculiar to it” (xv–xvi). While some of these differences arise because of assumptions within the culture out of which the narrative is produced, there are important ways in which the issue of embodiment reflects particularly narrative concerns. In chapter 5, I will discuss how what I will call “differential embodiment” functions to create narrative authority. Even within the context of the semantics of character, we should recognize that the degree of embodiment will play an important role. Consider the way that we are led to interpret two cosmetically similar stories—the slave narratives
sorted and general character bodies / 67
of Frederick Douglass and Harriet Ann Jacobs. Both authors occupy bodies that white culture sees as heavily embodied, and both tell stories in which these bodies provide the essential narrative situation of the characters—the need to escape an area of the United States where they are enslaved because of the color of their skin. Critics, however, have long noted that embodiment plays a very different role in these two stories. Douglass describes slavery as a condition violating a freedom that is essential and universal. As Douglass remarks famously to the ships at dock in Chesapeake Bay, “Alas! betwixt me and you, the turbid waters roll. Go on, go on. O that I could also go! Could I but swim! If I could fly! O, why was I born a man, of whom to make a brute!”29 Douglas tells a story of a natural progression “upward” in which growth toward manhood is treated as naturally inheriting freedom: “I began, with the commencement of the year, to prepare myself for a final struggle, which should decide my fate one way or the other. My tendency was upward. I was fast approaching manhood, and year after year had passed, and I was still a slave” (91). Jacobs’s narrative, in contrast, far more resolutely embodies her heroine Linda Brent. Brent cannot achieve the simple freedom that Douglass strives toward because she has links and responsibilities to her children, which she cannot leave behind as part of a natural maturation. As Jean Fegan Yellin remarks in her introduction to the novel, “Linda Brent dramatizes her flight for freedom within the context of her family’s active support. Despite terrible danger, grandmother, uncle, aunt, brother, even (she later learns) son and daughter—aid and abet her concealment and escape. Further, she presents her own efforts and those of her family within the larger configuration of an ongoing struggle for freedom by an entire black community.”30 The degree of embodiment as represented in these two novels must be interpreted in fundamentally different ways. While Douglass encourages us to adopt a disembodied perspective in evaluating the way that his skin color leads him to be treated, Jacobs handles embodiment in no such ironic way. Although she certainly accepts the idea of universal freedoms, her characters do not achieve this by transcending their bodies. In this way, interpretation of both these novels depends not just upon contrasts of how embodied various characters are but also upon how we are encouraged to think about embodiment itself. Character and Exteriority The discussion that I have developed in this chapter follows what I have described as the normal science of narratology. That is, it obeys the
68 / narrative bodies
general assumptions of narratology’s treatment of character, following its emphasis on semantic contrasts and accepting its treatment of characters as distinct objects to be given meaning within a text. And in doing so, I hope, this discussion has raised a number of issues that can improve these traditional theories. Although narratologists have frequently treated claims about the impact of social and cultural assumptions on the semantics of the text with suspicion, my discussion makes clear, I hope, that the basic ways in which textual objects emerge depends on a whole host of cultural as well as aesthetic concerns. We cannot talk about a textual object without talking about how objects are defined according to the cultural and aesthetic logic of particular texts. I would like now to consider the assumptions about the human body at work even within this rather abstract definition of character. As I argued about fictional worlds, I believe that this normal science of the narratology of character depends on a particular and limited image of human corporeality. In chapter 1, I showed how possible-world thinking depended on a particular way of understanding human conception as the “accidental” originary basis upon which the future-oriented structure of these worlds could be organized. I think that there is a separate but related concept of the human body at work in narratology’s treatment of character. Theories of character depart from theories of fictional world because they are not organized around origins in any significant way. Indeed, we have seen almost no interest in the historical development of characters in the theories that I have cited,31 and no particular interest in the referential identity of the characters; instead, identity here comprises semantic or thematic meaning. I will try to show that theories of character and fictional world are similar, however, because both assume a modern European way of thinking about the body. Let us return again to Harvey’s very traditional discussion of literary characters, which suggests a great deal about the corporeality implicit in narratological theories of character. Harvey begins his discussion of literary character, somewhat surprisingly, with a comparison to objects. Specifically, he begins with R.H. Horne’s discussion of Dickens, which focuses on the importance of inanimate objects. Harvey describes this concern for objects as a quality of his imagination since this dense world of things is also alive; it has a comic or malign energy of its own. Dickens’s imagination is primitive, animistic. I think we misread him slightly if we take his quickening power as merely conceit or metaphor or symbol; I believe this inanimate world was, for him, literally alive. There is nothing very odd in this; when a pencil breaks or we stub our toe in the dark we often have, in a
sorted and general character bodies / 69 transient way, this primitive sense of objects stubbornly leading a mysterious life of their own, a life which sometimes thwarts or obtrudes into ours. (37)
By the end of this passage it becomes clear where Harvey is going; he will use the image of individuals confronting objects, things that are “other-than-us” (37), as the model for how characters “resist our attention, that they remain opaque, stubbornly themselves” (39).32 Harvey’s approach to human relationships feels quite dated, since his starting point is the concept of alienation and he approaches character through the context of the radical awareness of the gap between self and other. While these limitations are not irrelevant to our evaluation of Harvey’s theory, we should recognize that the way that he describes characters as “others” defines a tradition that critics will follow later despite other aspects of this theory. It is not an accident that characters are the elements of narrative most likely to elicit spatial language. Already I have quoted the metaphor of a “network” of characters in Chatman’s theory of character traits, which explicitly draws on the spatialized language of the paradigmatic axis from which individual characters are formed. Harvey uses the term “network” to describe fictional characters as well, but this spatial language of the character becomes most explicit in a more recent book on character by Baruch Hochman. Hochman speaks of character essentially as a structural device, a scheme that overarches the entire narrative: “The schematic organization of our knowledge of characters in literature differs from that of our knowledge of people in life in that the existence of characters in literature (and our perception of their existence) rests on the more or less coherent, more or less self-declaring structure of the work that generates them and that we perceive as a single thing. Even when we retrieve characters as relatively autonomous entities, we perceive them as part of an organizing structure made up of elements that are interfused with each other and that illuminate each other.”33 Hochman quite explicitly declares that character is an element of narrative that necessarily refers back to a spatializing structure that overarches the entire narrative. This spatialization of character is certainly clear in work like the actantal model of A.J. Greimas where characters are located within a four-part spatial structure in order to analyze their role within the events of the plot.34 This spatialization of character is perhaps most familiar in Fredric Jameson’s use of Greimas’s model. In The Political Unconscious, it will be recalled, Jameson uses Greimas to analyze novels like Conrad’s Lord Jim. Unlike Greimas’s original use of the semiotic
70 / narrative bodies
square to model agency, Jameson’s study is explicitly based on the contrast of character traits. He finds, for example, that the principle characters of Conrad’s Lord Jim can be arranged according to a series of semantic positions that they occupy in the novel’s overall spatial structure: between activity and non-activity, value and non-value. The penultimate diagram for Jameson’s analysis is as follows:35 “Lord” Jim ACTIVITY
VALUE
The Buccaneers (Gentleman Brown)
The Pilgrims
NOT-VALUE
NOT-ACTIVITY
The Deck-chair Sailors
Principle characters are taken to embody a combination of these logical possibilities. Jim, for example, represents activity and value in contrast to Gentleman Brown who represents activity but non-value. Although there is often resistance to the reductiveness of the type of structuralist analysis that Greimas and Jameson are doing, rarely is there resistance to the spatiality of the analysis itself. We accept the kind of analysis that Jameson develops, I think, in part because we recognize characters themselves as naturally spatially separated. Why are characters so consistently spatialized in critical literature even when the critics—like Jameson and Hochman—have radically different ideological approaches to narrative? At first we might be tempted to reply that spatialization, at least when it is used in the broad way that I have used it here, may be an inherent part of our ways of making sense of the world. This is certainly Greimas’s contention, since he sees the four-part structure as a way of breaking down any concept into a series of related ideas (opposites, contraries, contradictions) that give it a firm meaning and allow us to use it to analyze objects and situations.36 But if this is the case, surely all elements of narrative would be equally spatialized. And yet we will look long and hard before we find an instance of the spatialization of plot. Freytag’s famous but overused pyramid of rising and falling action immediately comes to mind, but this model has had little effect on the development of subsequent theories
sorted and general character bodies / 71
of plot.37 Likewise, although types of narrators and voices are sometimes described spatially because of the metaphor of the narrator’s perspective being contained “within” that of the author,38 spatial renderings of the relations between voices or types of speech within a text are extremely rare.39 It seems to me an obvious but rarely observed fact that characters are spatialized in critical discourse because we are used to thinking about people as located within space. Narratology depends on an understanding of bodies largely alien to each other and to their environment—the sort of radical spatial separation of bodies that I described in the previous section in Woolf ’s To the Lighthouse. Through this alienation they become distinct objects and enter into a thematic system of contrast. Past narratologies have largely ignored the way that characters are conceived as spatially differentiated. As this brief discussion should have already suggested, viewing characters as spatially discrete—we could say, even, spatially alienated—is the result of a very particular cultural and historical moment. A number of critics have associated this sorted, alienated body with modern culture. Even leaving aside Harvey’s own existentialist background, we can see the insistence on semantic contrasts as the basis upon which bodies become meaningful as part of the rise of modern scientific culture. Indeed, Foucault uses this process of structural sorting as the very definition of early modern culture. In The Order of Things, Foucault offers the contrast between Renaissance and early modern (or, “Classical”) ways of knowing botanical and zoological objects: To the Renaissance, the strangeness of animals was a spectacle: it was featured in fairs, in tournaments, in fictitious or real combats, in reconstitutions of legends in which the bestiary displayed its ageless fables. The natural history room and the garden, as created in the Classical period, replace the circular procession of the “show” with the arrangement of things in a “table.” What came surreptitiously into being between the age of the theatre and that of the catalogue was not the desire for knowledge, but a new way of connecting things both to the eye and to discourse.40
Narratologists, however, rarely distinguish the texts to which such classifying methods are appropriate from those to which they are inappropriate. The nature of narratology is to seek out fundamental categories that can be applied to all literatures. While narratologists are considerably less willing than they once were to reduce narrative to some fundamental and abstract “deep structure” that causes all individual textual details to appear as inessential articulation, they retain the goal of defining generally applicable terms for the study of narrative texts. Narrative
72 / narrative bodies
bodies particularly reveal, however, the bias brought to this field by narratology’s traditional emphasis on the European novel. Alternatives to the Sorted Body We can say, then, that narratology’s treatment of character bodies as distinct objects to be sorted and integrated into a system of semantic contrasts reflects a particularly modern way of thinking about the body. This does not mean that this model might not apply well to modern narratives, but it does suggest that older literatures are likely to suffer when we insist on bringing this modern understanding of character to bear. Evelyn Birge Vitz notes, for example, that medieval characterization does not proceed so much by “individuation—horizontal differentiation among individuals—but with salvation and damnation, the rise and fall of souls, their vertical movement in relation to God.”41 As a result, Vitz argues, medieval narrative “was almost exclusively concerned with the placement of characters—especially but not only heroes—on the vertical axis: with what set them above or below—but not apart from—the common run of men” (16). Other types of narrative characters from earlier literatures even more remarkably violate modern models. We might recall again Scholes and Kellogg’s discussion of archetypal characters in the Nature of Narrative, which I also noted in chapter 1. They distinguish between two different types of characterization, the “typical” and the “archetypical.”42 Scholes and Kellogg describe a quality of character that is not simply a matter of the mimetic accumulation of significant traits. There seems to be, instead, an allegorical dimension to the character that departs from the kinds of semantic contrasts that Bal and other narratologists describe. There is a quality to a Quixote, Scholes and Kellogg imply, that seems to encompass the whole work rather than functioning by contrasts within it. This discussion of corporeal assumptions within modern narratology certainly suggests that critics need far more historical sensitivity to the assumptions about corporeality before they can discuss the comparative poetics of various periods and cultures. There is, however, a larger issue of narrative poetics independent of whatever historically specific body model that critics assume. In chapter 1, I noted that an inquiry into possible worlds leads us specifically to problems in the hermeneutics of narrative texts, and suggested that these problems are inherent in the way that we have come to think about the relations between the human body and the cosmos. There is a lesson in this discussion for our approach to narrative character as well. While one of the effects of revealing the alienated modern body as the base of
sorted and general character bodies / 73
narratological theory is to suggest the need for more historically specific treatments of character, we should ask what gaps are themselves obvious in this narratology. In other words, it seems to me that even when applied exclusively to the modern narratives with which narratology’s understanding of corporeality coincides, the model of sorted character bodies fails to account for a number of aspects of our experience of narrative character. It is this failure that I would like to explore in the remainder of this chapter. Let us turn to a novel that initially seems to exemplify narratological ways of understanding the sorted body, but which also ultimately suggests the limits of this understanding. Toni Morrison’s Beloved uses both distinct bodies and also a more complex corporeality fitting uneasily within the modern, alienated body. We can see the traditional model of characters and bodies at work in the different attitudes of Sethe and Paul D toward the past. We recognize that the past has affected these two characters in different ways, and we sense that these two very different responses reveal the characters’ psychological traits (Sethe’s complexly defiant sense of guilt, Paul D’s desire to escape the past) and suggest something about the possible ways that one can think about the past. The novel reflects these thematic differences between the two characters in the types of bodies that each are assigned. Sethe’s body is literally marked by the past, her back inscribed with a “tree” of scars from a beating shortly before she escaped to the North. For this reason, Sethe’s relation to the past is dramatized externally—especially in her dealings with Beloved, the young woman who appears at Sethe’s house early in the novel and who turns out to embody this ghostly past. Conversely, occupying a body whose surface is largely unmarked, Paul D has memories of the past contained internally like a “tobacco tin buried in his chest where a red heart used to be.”43 For this reason, his understanding of the past is dramatized through the negotiation of interior spaces, as he drives the ghost from Sethe’s house to make room for himself (39) or moves to the margins of the town when Beloved forces him from that house later in the novel. In all of this, Beloved seems to deploy contrasting character bodies for thematic purposes—just as traditional narratology would lead us to expect. More problematic is the novel’s principle character, Beloved, the young woman who appears at Sethe’s house early in the novel, and who turns out to embody this ghostly past. Although Beloved may seem to be simply another character, her appearance in the story is ontologically heterogeneous—she quite literally does not inhabit the same world as Sethe and Paul D. Beloved seems to exist as a projection of Sethe’s own
74 / narrative bodies
feelings about the past. This latter function certainly fits uneasily within theories of character based on meaningful contrasts, since we cannot easily place Beloved side-by-side with the other characters for interpretation. James Phelan has recently noted the problems of interpreting the character of Beloved. Drawing on the various readings that the novel has been given in the past, Phelan writes, Beloved is a survivor of the Middle passage and of a white man found dead in his cabin around the time she shows up at 124. She is both Sethe’s murdered daughter and her murdered African mother, a specific character in a specific family and a representative of all the middle passage women, “and also all Black women in America trying to trace their ancestry back to the mother on a ship attached to them.” She is a figure filled with the psychokinetic energy of others, who then use that energy to act out their needs and desires. She is the incarnation of Sethe’s guilt. Because the novel supports—indeed, insists on—all these not entirely compatible accounts, it prevents us from resting with any one and makes the struggle to “perform” her part of Morrison’s world extraordinarily demanding.44
Morrison develops this untraditional characterization precisely by complicating Beloved’s body. Although an eighteen-year-old girl when she appears at Sethe’s house, she appears in many ways infant-like. Sethe, likewise, seems to repeat the process of birthing just before Beloved appears; her water metaphorically “breaks” just as she first glimpses Beloved sitting on her porch, for example. Although she may be a ghost, Beloved is also physically linked to Sethe in a way that makes no conventional sense within the novel. It is certainly possible to explain Beloved’s appearance literally as the working of spirits, but it is also possible to see these textual features as the result of Morrison’s own narrative purposes. Beloved, like Beloved, is clearly a text to be read, a message from the past. After all, Beloved’s own name comes from the one word that Sethe is able to have carved onto the young child’s tombstone (5). Although, as Phelan suggests, Beloved can be treated as one of the characters in any number of thematic systems of contrasts, she also raises meta-interpretive issues. She literally comes to symbolize the difficulty of interpreting the work. She is not simply an enigma, but is rather a figure that represents the many ways in which we can give significance to Morrison’s whole novel. Morrison seems to be suggesting that the relationship between Sethe/reader and Beloved/text is a physical, corporeal one. Beloved’s body is an overarching narrative body, a body more general than that of any character, which serves as our ingress to the novel and its difficult subject matter.
sorted and general character bodies / 75
In Beloved, Morrison creates a textual body that plays a different role within her narrative than the sorted bodies that we have described in the first part of this chapter. The general body that we see in this novel is a means to understanding the text as a whole, and implicitly suggests that our experience of a text is corporeally more complex than simply identifying characters and individuating them within a schematic structure. In this sense, Morrison’s novel is very much in keeping with a number of recent theories of corporeality, which have argued that the relationship between world and body has been simplified by our emphasis on sight as the model of perception. Particularly eloquent on this point is Elizabeth Grosz, who has mounted a wide-ranging critique of the modern understanding of the body. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Grosz describes the implications of sight: “The epistemological value of sight is based on the clarity and precision of the images of which it is composed. An image, traditionally, has three characteristics: it presents a manifold field or set of events in terms of simultaneity (it is the only nontemporal or synchronous sense); it functions at a distance, setting up a space or field between the seer and the seen, the physical and the psychical; and it does not imply or presume causality (because the other senses are momentary and occasioned by events, vision is ongoing and need not be focused on or caused by any object).”45 Grosz sees this pattern in thinking about the body going back to the beginnings of Greek philosophy, but locates Descartes as a key transition into modern thinking. The body/mind dualism, according to Grosz, is basis for our modern theories of knowledge: Scientific discourse aspires to impersonality, which it takes to be equivalent to objectivity. The correlation of our ideas with the world or the reality they represent is a secondary function, independent of the existence of consciousness, the primary, indubitable self-certainty of the soul. Reality can be attained by the subject only indirectly, by inference, deduction, or projection. Descartes, in short, succeeded in linking the mind/body opposition to the foundations of knowledge itself, a link which places the mind in a position of hierarchical superiority over and above nature, including the nature of the body. (6)
This observation about the modern body is especially important to a theory of narrative meaning because Grosz argues that this way of thinking makes the body amenable to being invested with meaning, since sight seems to provide “the raw elements, the data necessary for the production of knowledge” (97). We have already seen that when critics speak about the meaning of narrative characters, it is almost always by
76 / narrative bodies
imagining them spread out in space simultaneously and separated from each other. What is the alternative to the visual model of corporeality? Again following Merleau-Ponty, Grosz suggests that taking touch rather than sight as the basis for the body’s place in the world produces a very different way of thinking about the body: “Touch is regarded as a contact sense. . . . [I]t provides contiguous access to an abiding object; the surface of the toucher and the touched must partially coincide” (98). Among other things, Grosz’s interest in touch suggests those aspects of corporeality that are being incompletely represented by traditional philosophy. In particular, we have noted Grosz’s critique of the Cartesian separation of body and mind; the visual model implies that the mind treats the body at best as a place for the mind to occupy rather than as an inherent part of identity. Touch as a model for our interaction with the outside world, conversely, suggests that rather than thinking about bodies as spatially separated and distinct, we should consider the ways in which individual bodies engage in an ongoing exchange.46 Neither Grosz nor Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that the traditional, visual model for corporeal experience is entirely wrong—that we should literally or metaphorically close our eyes and experience the world entirely through touch. Rather, touch defines a more fundamental corporeal “atmosphere”—more fundamental because literally closer to the body— in which the visual experience of the world and other bodies must be contextualized. Grosz clearly has touch in mind when she describes the skin as “the ground for the articulation of orifices, erotogenic rims, cuts on the body’s surface, loci of exchange between the inside and the outside, points of conversion of the outside into the body, and of the inside out of the body” (36). For her, touch itself defines the context in which all other relations between the body and the world, and objects within the world, must be understood.47 Grosz’s call for a return to the larger corporeality of “touch” clearly has implications for the way that we think about bodies within narrative, but how we respond to this critique is not obvious. If narrative is a means of conveying knowledge about the world, there may well be something particularly appropriate about the visual model of the body. We need to ask, however, if there are elements of narrative texts that engage with corporeality in ways other than as distinct, meaningful bodies. To return to Morrison’s novel, we might note that in describing Beloved as a general body that overarches others, I am really suggesting that she is a mediating figure—both between the individual characters, and between the reader and text. She is not only a means of bringing
sorted and general character bodies / 77
other characters into contact, but also a physical embodiment of a story that the reader must confront. The last image in the book is of the disappearing traces of Beloved’s body: “Down by the stream in back of 124 her footprints come and go, come and go. They are so familiar. Should a child, an adult place his feet in them, they will fit. Take them out and they disappear again as though nobody ever walked there” (275). Morrison ends the novel by emphasizing the reader’s position in relation to this subject matter in general and to Beloved herself in particular in the refrain of the book’s last chapter: “This is not a story to pass on” (275). Beloved here seems to exemplify a kind of corporeality that does not coalesce into a distinct body given meaning by the story, but instead brings character and character, reader and text into contact. She is literally the means by which these narrative elements “touch.” In arguing that Beloved represents a type of character body outside of narratology, I am suggesting not only that narratology has adopted a historically limited frame of reference for its theories, but also that it seems unable to account for important elements of the text even in the modern narrative to which it should apply especially well. In particular, narratology has failed to theorize moments when character corporeality will exceed individual bodies and provide a general hermeneutic atmosphere for the reader’s contact with the narrative. This, I think, is the equivalent in narrative terms of Grosz’s theory of the importance of touch in our everyday experience of the world. In contrast to visual models that seek to separate characters into distinct objects that we analyze from a distance, this atmosphere quite literally implies that we interact with the text in a more complex way. Touch represents a concern for our ongoing interaction with the world and the inseparability of body and identity.48 Likewise, in narrative I am suggesting that we attend to the ongoing contact between reader and character. There are certain character bodies that represent points of contact between the reader and the text. This point of contact provides the hermeneutic atmosphere of the text. We can describe Beloved as a kind of general character body—one that stands above the individual bodies of the story and mediates between them. In describing her this way, I am suggesting a link between Morrison’s novel and a long tradition of using the human body to figure social relations, especially within political discourse. Ernst Kantorowicz’s discussion of European medieval political philosophy, The King’s Two Bodies, is one of the best-known explanations of the use of a general body to speak about social relations. Kantorowicz defines the tradition of thinking about a monarch as embodying the whole of a nation. A king
78 / narrative bodies
might be understood to have the “two bodies” of Kantorowicz’s title in the sense that the frailties and mortality of his “body natural” must be distinguished categorically from his “body politic,” which is timeless, perfect, and ultimately owned by no one—not even the king himself.49 The idea that the king embodies the whole society leads quite naturally to the best-known use of the “body politic”—as a way to speak about the unity of the whole society. One of the classic examples of the body used to symbolize the society is provided by Thomas Hobbes at the outset of Leviathan: For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE, in Latin CIVITAS, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defense it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates, and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment, by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty every joint and member is moved to perform his duty, are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural. . . .50
Hobbes here uses the parts of the body (soul, joints, nerves) to discuss the relationship between different individuals within the whole society (king, magistrate, officers). Behind Kantorowicz’s study is the recognition that societies necessarily construct general bodies to which all its individuals are taken to belong as part of the way that they think about social totalities. The body politic, then, is a concept that provides an image of the whole society, and that helps for thinking about the meaning of citizens’ social role. In other words, it helps to shape social hermeneutics. Other general bodies have appeared at different historical moments. Today we are probably more likely to think about society in terms of the “normal” body—as a kind of exemplum through which we can think about difference and social order. A particularly good example of the construction of such normal bodies is Cesare Lombroso’s now infamous anthropometric studies that attempted to define the physiological markings of criminality. David Horn has recently observed that Lombroso’s interest in statistical methods of studying society in fact arose from an increased awareness of the individuality of its members. Horn writes, “The construction of crime as a social fact and problem, and of criminology as a social science, was ironically linked to a new focus on the individuality of the offender and to new scientific practices of individuation.”51 Although today recognized as unscientific and patently racist, Lombroso’s methods can be
sorted and general character bodies / 79
seen as an attempt to recreate the image of a social whole previously provided by the body politic in the light of the individuality of many members of that society—especially the seemingly inevitable tendency within a society toward unlawful acts that hurt the body politic. Like so many nineteenth-century social thinkers, Lombroso seems to be asking why the body politic seems inevitably to have elements that work against its well-being. We can say in this sense that the challenges posed by individual actions that rebel against the social body were ultimately worked back into another form of “body politic” and subordinated to a theory that placed all members of the society along an evolutionary line. Horn explains: Anthropometry promised both to make potential dangers known and manageable and to specify the social, historical, and evolutionary place of the criminal body. Lombroso argued that the criminal was linked by his abnormal anatomy and physiology to the insane person and the epileptic, as well as to those other “others” who were constituted as the objects of the social sciences: the ape, the child, woman, prehistoric man, and the contemporary savage. For Lombroso, the criminal was, in his body and conduct, and “atavism”—a reemergence of the historical and evolutionary pasts in the present. (112)
Here, bodies are organized within a single continuum of the primitive to the civilized. A criminal merely displays tendencies that are already implicit within this trans-individual body. It is not difficult to see the body that arises from Lombroso’s anthropometry as a return to the generalized body of the whole society in the body politic. Although this generalized body is quite different from the symbolic relations with which Kantorowicz associated the body politic, it nonetheless describes an image that makes the whole society meaningful. It creates a hermeneutic context through which individuals and historical events can be interpreted. In the context of such reflections on the generalized body in narrative and social thinking, we can see the modern image of sorted bodies mutually exterior to each other as one particular general body. At the outset of this chapter I quoted Harvey’s association of characters and objects, where individuals are caught within a “web of human relationships” that “show us what we ourselves are not.” Modern literary characters are, then, radically “other” to one another in a way that positions them firmly outside of each other. We have seen critics like Chatman and, more reluctantly, Bal offer this exteriority as a model for characters in general. The idea that characters form a semantic “network” through which a narrative presents and evaluates certain personal or metaphysical “traits” assumes precisely
80 / narrative bodies
this image of the character bodies as positioned externally within a preexisting literary space. Instead of either accepting this model as universal or rejecting it as historically biased toward modern literature, we should consider it as an example of how any hermeneutics must work to create a general human body. When Harvey defines characters as positioned within an alien space, he is elevating to the level of a general schematic for understanding the variety of body types within narrative one particular body type. Certainly there will be variations among the way that this general body type will be represented, variations that will account for why all of the characters in modern literature do not occupy exactly the same body. Nonetheless, we can say that this image of the alienated body is precisely the general body that becomes the basis upon which these other variations are thought. General Bodies and Narrative Hermeneutics In suggesting that narratology should attend more closely to the corporeal atmosphere of a narrative as defining the fundamental hermeneutic conditions of the reader’s interaction with the text, I may seem to be moving beyond the scope of theories of narrative character. And, indeed, this is certainly a possibility, since this type of more elusive textual corporeality has, in fact, been discussed in primarily non-narratological contexts. Hélèn Cixous’s writings on écriture féminine suggest the reader’s physical engagement with the literary text hinted at in Beloved. When Cixous describes a woman struggling to speak at a public gathering, she clearly has in mind a kind of writing experienced through the body: “She doesn’t ‘speak,’ she throws her trembling body forward; she lets go of herself, she flies; all of her passes into her voice, and it’s with her body that she vitally supports the ‘logic’ of her speech. Her flesh speaks true.”52 Here is a corporeal element of a story that is not a discrete object represented in the speech text, but rather a whole bodily “atmosphere” out of which the work is produced and through which it must be experienced. Such a general, overarching corporeal atmosphere establishing a fundamental contact between reader, writer, and text before any defined bodies appear within the work, seems to be a fair approximation in narrative theory of Grosz’s concept of touch as prior to sight. Clearly, however, Cixous’s observations about textual corporeality are far from the kind of analysis of specific textual features that we expect from narratology, and mark a distinct movement beyond theories of character in particular. Indeed, in investigating this corporeal atmosphere, we run the risk of sliding away from engagement in concerns
sorted and general character bodies / 81
specific to narrative and toward very metaphorical claims about the act of reading in general. In chapter 1, I suggested this same danger when I noted that narratives’ creation of possible worlds engaged in concepts of mimesis and projected problems of hermeneutics in general. It should be no surprise that these same hermeneutic issues appear in character theory, since we have seen that they ultimately attempt to describe the very way in which a text becomes meaningful. Although bodies will be a part of the interpretation of any representation of humans, and although hermeneutics describes interpretation in general, I think that there is a specific way in which the body will work to provide a hermeneutic atmosphere in narrative. We have already seen that Beloved creates its hermeneutic atmosphere through the figure of a particular character body. Although the type of corporeality that Cixous describes will be a part of any text, we can say, the choice to dramatize this relation specifically through a character body is inherent to narrative. Grosz’s point that bodies touch applies especially well to narrative, where we can say that what makes character description into narrative is the interaction of those characters—the fact that characters literally or figuratively “touch” in the course of the story’s events. Narrative characters become meaningful when they touch and interact. It is, of course, one of the defining qualities of narrative that descriptions of place and character are animated by events. Indeed, one of the standard definitions of narrative is change of state whose cause is explored. As E.M. Forster remarked, “We have defined a story as a narrative of events arranged in their time-sequence. A plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality. ‘The king died and then the queen died,’ is a story. ‘The king died, and then the queen died of grief ’ is a plot. The time-sequence is preserved, but the sense of causality overshadows it.”53 Critics have debated this definition of narrative at length and offered alternatives. Certainly the rhetorical manipulation of time sequence has emerged as a major element of narrative, for example. But critics generally accept the idea that narrative describes the meaningful presentation of temporal change. Didier Coste has more recently offered the following summary: “An act of communication is narrative whenever and only when imparting a transitive view of the world is the effect of the message produced.”54 Hayden White has distinguished between a more rudimentary chronicle and narrative’s ability to explain events and describe their importance.55 This emphasis on meaningful events assumes that the agents of those events—the narrative’s characters—will interact in some way. A text that describes separate characters without observing their interaction is far more likely to be classified as a prose
82 / narrative bodies
poem of some sort than a narrative. Likewise, a text that emphasizes directly the corporeal relationship between the reader and text without connecting this relationship to the interaction between character bodies will lack narrativity. Narrative characters, in other words, touch. And when they touch, they are developing a whole corporeal atmosphere for the text. We can say, then, that narratives dramatize the corporeality implicit within all interaction between text and reader in the bodies of characters. Character corporeality in this sense will always function as a way of commenting on how the text may be read. Some time ago Ross Chambers argued that narratologists have not thought enough about the “situation” of a narrative—“the social fact that narrative mediates human relationships and derives its ‘meaning’ from them.”56 For Chambers, narrative in general is interested in its impact and the way that it will be read, and frequently works to define its own interpretational context: My critique of the narratological tradition conveniently encapsulated by Seymour Chatman is not, then, that this tradition fails to explore the pragmatics of literary narrative in the sense of the empirical circumstances in which literary texts come to be written and read. It is rather that, in concerning itself with literary texts, it has neglected those features in them—those textual indices of contractual and transactional understandings— that themselves realize the narratives as communicational acts and open them, as verbal structures, onto a world of events and change. Not the actual historicity of texts, but the markers, within them, of historical situation— these are what a renewed narratology, concerned with the phenomenon of point, might take as its object. (10)
Chambers does not explore narrative’s concern for the “phenomenon of point” through character bodies, but instead through mise en abyme remarks—usually made within self-conscious early modernist texts— about how they should be read. But my discussion of general bodies and the corporeal atmosphere of interpretation suggests that Chambers’s theory might be approached through the human body. If character bodies are the basic building blocks of narrative events, and if those bodies in turn help to define the reader’s position in relation to the text, then narrative is always necessarily concerned with its own hermeneutic conditions. As I have tried to show here, to understand the semantics of narrative’s characters is to recognize and to adopt the general body that mediates all of these characters. It is not enough merely to observe that some
sorted and general character bodies / 83
characters are embodied and others disembodied, or that some are sorted according to their presence in the world or absence from it. We needed to know as well how these individual bodies fit within a larger hermeneutics. This overarching understanding of corporeality is essential to making bodies meaningful, and defines a general body through which all of the textual objects “touch.” This general body may be figured in many different ways—from the alienated space of Woolf ’s novel, to the ironic links between Norris’s characters, to the literally embodied figure of reading in Beloved. However a narrative represents this general body, it will always be our readerly ingress to the story.
This page intentionally left blank
CHAPTER 3 Plot and the Unruly Body
In chapters 1 and 2 we have seen that corporeality has a fundamental effect upon the way that we visualize and theorize the concepts of narrative world and character. We have seen not only that narratology is shaped by the particularly modern body that it imagines as the basis of storytelling, but that the body is a site where a host of hermeneutic problems arise. At the end of chapter 2, I suggested that these general hermeneutic problems had particularly narrative solutions in the way that character bodies were used to stage the interaction between different types of corporeality, and that in the process a “general” body overarched the story. This interaction occurs, I suggested, through the basic temporality of the narrative—its description of time and change. I would like to turn to the body’s place within our way of representing time in this chapter. Most people assume that our experience is shapeless and disparate until we give it form. One of the most common ways of speaking about this act of giving order to experience is as “narrating” events. Indeed, one of the reasons that narrative has had durability and continued popularity as a critical concept is because it seems to describe a concrete and ubiquitous act of meaning-making in everyday life. When people speak about narrative in this way, what they most have in mind is the ability of narrative to create plots, to organize events into a meaningful temporal and causal sequence. Although we might say that in telling such stories we create characters and settings, adopt the role of a narrator, perhaps even posit possible worlds—all those textual acts that we associate with narratology—the key to narrative’s ability to transcend literary study is how it organizes time. Narrative seems to take the disparate events of life— everything from everyday experience to broadly significant historical events—and construct a meaningful pattern. In examining the body in plot, we discover the crucial role played by what Paul Ricoeur calls narrative distention. Plot works to create gaps
86 / narrative bodies
between an overarching and an unruly body. Recognizing how plot does this will ultimately help us to understand the interplay between specific and general narrative bodies that I postulated at the end of chapter 2, and help to theorize the complex hermeneutics that narrative corporeality has revealed. Narrating as Giving Order A good deal of the credit for the expansion of narrative emplotment into a wide variety of fields and areas of experience falls to Hayden White. White’s argument that narrative is crucial to historiography has been important in shaping our current belief that narrative is inherent to any attempt to make sense of time and event. Probably the best known of White’s work is his essay on the conditions under which narrative is possible in the telling of history, “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality”—a title that clearly suggests the broad application that narrative has been given in the last twenty years. White, it will be recalled, begins by describing what he takes to be the pre-narrational understanding of history evidenced in the medieval annals. These annals, White notes, describe events that are “extreme, and the implicit criterion for selecting them for remembrance is their liminal nature.”1 Although White is anxious to avoid suggesting that this sort of writing is without a method of sorting events, he finds in the annals a very simple system of sorting recordable from unrecordable events that seems to exclude a wide range of phenomena, and that makes no distinctions between significant and insignificant events. In observing this list, White suggests that these events cannot be sorted by significance precisely because the writer inhabits a society in which what would constitute such significance is unclear. White concludes that these annals evidence an “image of reality according to which the social system, which alone could provide the diacritical markers for ranking the importance of events, is only minimally present” (10). Precisely what distinguishes narratives from these simple lists of liminal events is that the former has a more sophisticated method of identifying events and some principle—some method of emplotting—that allows them to be organized. Particularly evident in White’s discussion of narrative within historiography is the way that non-narrative experience of events lack coherence. A number of times White claims that he wants to view annals writing not simply as pre-narrative: “surely a genuinely historical interest would require that we ask not how or why the annalist failed to write a ‘narrative’ ” (6). But when he turns to consider the role of narrative
plot and the unruly body / 87
within history writing, his discussion depends on the annals’ much looser organization of discontinuous pre-narrative facts. White’s explanation of what gives narratives their ability to sort and shape events is well-known. According to White, a “social center” provides a means of organizing narrative events: What is lacking in the list of events to give it a similar regularity and fullness is a notion of a social center by which to locate them with respect to one another and to charge them with ethical or moral significance. It is the absence of any consciousness of a social center that prohibits the annalist from ranking the events he treats as elements of a historical field of occurrence. And it is the absence of such a center that precludes or undercuts any impulse he might have had to work up his discourse into the form of a narrative. (11)
The negative language in this description is quite evident. Annals’ writing is not simply an alternative to narrative, but rather a form of recording that lacks an essential organizing principle that emerges in narrative. In many ways, this way of understanding narrative as the fulfillment of discontinuous real events could be seen as inevitable. If events come to us as naturally discontinuous, as naturally lacking cohesion without some form of ordering applied after the fact, then experience before narrative will inevitably be seen as a kind of lack, a period of disorganization only resolved with the introduction of a narrative. Precisely this way of thinking about temporal experience is evident in writing that treats narrative as a more or less universal element of the human attempt to understand time. If temporal experience begins naturally in discontinuity and incoherence, then narrative will likewise be a natural response to that confusion. Temporal experience without narrative appears, then, within current philosophical, historical, and cultural thinking as naturally discontinuous—as naturally non-narrative. What creates this discontinuity? We might recall White’s comment that all of the events within the annals are liminal. Indeed, bodily needs seem to represent the alternative to narrative: “Basic need—food, security from external enemies, political and military leadership—and the threat of their not being provided are the subjects of concern” (7). It is not clear in White’s essay that these bodily needs themselves create the discontinuity of the pre-narrative annals, but they certainly keep the society from developing the social center necessary for narrative and exemplify the kinds of momentary concerns that mark the pre-narrative. Indeed, in broader philosophical treatments of the narrative organization of human experience, the body naturally
88 / narrative bodies
appears as the “other” to narrative. In his discussion of narrative in everyday life experience, Anthony Paul Kerby describes the body as the physical basis of human continuity and thus everything that narrative transcends: If, as we have seen, time is fundamentally the time of my life (between birth and death), personal identity will depend upon the continuity of meaningful experience in this life. The physical body may well be the permanent locus of my insertion in the world, and it is indeed a fairly solid basis for continuity, but it is the events that unfold from this locus that generate the meaning of my existence, both through the habitualities it embodies and the history it exhibits.2
In both Kerby’s and White’s accounts, the body represents whatever is outside of the narrative ordering of experience. In both cases, to be sure, the body remains a necessary outside—the “permanent locus” from which narrative springs, according to Kerby. But simple bodily continuity, the existence of the body in time or the continuous effort of the body to survive despite harsh physical conditions, clearly represents for both writers the opposite of a genuinely narrative understanding of temporal experience. When we consider more strongly articulated theories of narrative emplotment, a duality of the body’s relation to narrative becomes evident. Peter Brooks’s Freudian theory of narrative developed in Reading for the Plot (1984) exemplifies our common ways of thinking about plot in a particularly explicit way. In emphasizing desire as the crucial element of plot, Brooks hopes to revise traditional structuralist models of plot with a greater interest in the “dynamic” of the “motor force in human desire, its peculiar relation to beginnings and ends, its apparent claim to rescue meaning from temporal flux.”3 Desire here specifically suggests a tension between the plot as a process and the plot as an overarching structure that stands outside of time and is visible only retrospectively. For this reason, narrative desire seems to Brooks to be profoundly ambivalent about its own temporality: “The sense of a beginning . . . must in some important way be determined by the sense of an ending. We might say that we are able to read present moments— in literature and, by extension, in life—as endowed with narrative meaning only because we read them in anticipation of the structuring power of those endings that will retrospectively give them the order and significance of plot” (94). To explain this apparently contradictory temporality, Brooks turns to Beyond the Pleasure Principle and its central interest in why individuals repeat traumatic events. Repetition functions
plot and the unruly body / 89
for Freud, Brooks observes, both as a form of mastery (becoming active in a situation where one initially seems to be passive) and as an attempt to return to an earlier state of being—ultimately, to the inorganic state of death. Brooks brings these two impulses together in the following passage: What operates in the text through repetition is the death instinct, the drive toward the end. Beyond and under the domination of the pleasure principle is this baseline of plot, its basic “pulsation,” sensible or audible through the repetitions that take us back in the text. Yet repetition also retards the pleasure principle’s search for the gratification of discharge, which is another forward-moving drive of the text. We have a curious situation in which two principles of forward movement operate upon one another to create retard, a dilatory space in which pleasure can come from postponement in the knowledge that this . . . is a necessary approach to the true end. (102–03)
Plot here is a necessary delay created precisely out of the desire that would seem to drive the story toward its conclusion. Delay arises from the paradoxical dynamics implicit in a desire for an ending. Although Brooks’s theory is peculiar in focusing on the death instinct and in working so insistently within the paradoxes created by that concept, it is absolutely typical of narrative theory in general by approaching the subject of plot as a tension between end and delay. We saw White answer this tension by suggesting that life is inherently discontinuous, and that plot was the attempt to give shape to an inherently confused temporality. For Brooks, the source of this temporal discontinuity is not the inherently chaotic nature of everyday life, but rather the way that desire itself retards the eventual appearance of overarching plot. But in departing from White’s assumption that events themselves are discontinuous, Brooks ultimately confirms a deeper and more important principle in our ways of thinking about narrative plot. What Brooks’s and White’s ways of accounting for the discontinuous “other” of narrative order share is a tie to the body. I have already suggested that White sees discontinuity as best summarized by simple human, bodily need. The body exerts demands that work against the kinds of cultural and intellectual construction inherent to narrative. For Brooks, likewise, it is an inherent bodily desire to return to a prior state that ultimately ends up retarding the progress toward the end point of narrative. Brooks goes a step beyond White by suggesting that the body accounts for both parts of the act of emplotting: both the overarching meaning given the plot (the drive toward death) and the force that acts
90 / narrative bodies
to delay that ending (narrative repetition). Paradoxically, bodily desire describes both the plot and what resists that plot. Although Brooks’s Freudian theory of desire as producing and retarding plot seems to be a departure from traditional ways of thinking about plot, the paradoxical way that it imagines the body in narrative temporality is in fact implicit within much of our most traditional and bestknown work on narrative. One such study is Northrop Frye’s influential theory of seasonal mythoi in Anatomy of Criticism, where we can also observe the bodily paradoxes that Brooks describes at work in narrative time. Frye, of course, imagines plots on the model of yearly seasons: comedy as Spring, tragedy as Autumn, romance as Summer, and satire as Winter. Frye’s theory is quite explicitly a cyclical one, attempting to describe the circular movement between states: “The fundamental form of process is cyclical movement, the alternation of success and decline, effort and repose, life and death which is the rhythm of process.”4 Frye’s theory influenced a whole generation of critics not only because of the wide variety of works that it illuminated, but also because it suggested what we might describe as an underlying logic beneath a great deal of literary writing. Frye manages to integrate the major forms of traditional plot under a broad banner that accounts for the similarities between tragedy and comedy, while balancing social and individual elements of the unity that is created. We might say that Frye’s most important suggestion is that both individual and community can be understood within this model of birth/death/rebirth—indeed, that the individual is a representative and instrument of the community within this model. Frye makes this point as he begins to develop his theory of myths: “myth is the same world looked at as an area or field of activity, bearing in mind our principle that the meaning or pattern of poetry is a structure of imagery with conceptual implications. The world of mythical imagery is usually represented by the conception of heaven or Paradise in religion, and it is apocalyptic . . . a world of total metaphor, in which everything is potentially identical with everything else, as though it were all inside a single infinite body” (136). These mythic modes are eventually significant because they manage to show the individual’s place within the whole social framework, and to use the individual life as a model for that society. In a fairly straightforward way, Frye turns to traditional symbols of a trans-individual body to represent social health. In chapter 2 we have already noted how important such general bodies are to theories of character; Frye makes clear that the human body can be used to speak about the trajectory of a community’s development. This theory confirms the same impulse that we noted in Brooks’s Freudian theory—the attempt
plot and the unruly body / 91
to account for plot by associating the human body both with the unifying principle of plot, and with that which creates the confusion that plot itself must eventually resolve. Frye’s list of the sorts of typical plot problems in comedy make clear their bodily basis: We have noted that the cognitio of comedy is much concerned with straightening out the details of the new society, with distinguishing brides from sisters and parents from foster-parents. The fact that the son and the father are so often in conflict means that they are frequently rivals for the same girl, and the psychological alliance of the hero’s bride and the mother is often expressed or implied. The occasional “naughtiness” of comedy, as in the Restoration period, has much to do, not only with marital infidelity, but with a kind of comic Oedipus situation in which the hero replaces his father as a lover. (180–81)
Here natural social order is interrupted by the demands of desire and the confusion of bodies—male for female, father for son, and so on. Individual aspirations both seem to force human society away from its natural balance and at the same time function as an engine of the plot’s movement—the energy that drives the story from one stage to the next. Constructing the Resisting Body Frye’s model, then, somewhat surprisingly confirms the dual role of the human body that we observed within Brooks’s theory. We can say that plot stages the same interaction between general and individual bodies that we observed at the end of chapter 2 in character theory. In this sense, the fundamental temporal dimension of the text is imagined through this corporeality. Of the two, the body’s ability to represent and shape the overarching plot pattern that is evident in Frye is certainly the more obvious, although the other pole of the emplotment of time is associated with the human body for reasons that likewise seem straightforward. If, according to White, everyday experience naturally comes to us as disunified and in need of mental if not strictly discursive representation, then the body will be the best instance of that unordered brute experience. The examples of Brooks and Frye suggests, however, that more might be going on than first meets the eye. After all, both of these critics articulate the eventual shape of overarching plot precisely by linking the overall symbolic body and its natural dynamics to the individual body that resists emplotment and that thus gives rise to the need for emplotting in the first place. In these two theories, plots do not just work on the raw matter of brute human experience. Rather, the eventual shape of
92 / narrative bodies
overarching plot is already prefigured in the individual body that resists plot and that consequently makes it possible. The body that resists plot is, then, not only the precondition of that plot, but also in a curious way a mirror of the total shape that eventually arises out of time—literally a representation of the whole in reverse. This relationship between the resisting element and the overall shape leads me to question the way in which this seemingly prior condition is constructed. What I have in mind is an observation that Judith Butler makes about the ways in which materiality, conceived as the brute stuff that is outside of culture and meaning, in fact arises from within language and discourse, and is every bit as constructed as the social patterns that we seek to distinguish it from. Butler’s theory, in which “materiality [is] rethought as the effect of power, as power’s most productive effect”5 is both well-known and influential. Her discussion of Lacan’s “mirror stage” seems to me especially comparable to the reading of the plot-resisting body that I am suggesting here. Within Lacanian theory, the mirror stage describes a moment when an infant realizes the shape and wholeness of his or her body by seeing an image—either the child’s reflected image from a mirror, or another person with whom the child momentary identifies. Lacan is fairly explicit in describing the infant’s prior stage as a lack of bodily control and fragmentation, which is transformed imaginatively in the mirror image: This development is experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the individual into history. The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation—and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic—and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development.6
Lacan’s theory of the child’s transformation in the mirror stage has resonated for critics both because of its theoretical significance for speaking about subjectivity and for its ability to help readers understand particular moments within literature that offer images of bodily wholeness. No doubt another reason that the mirror stage has been for critics the most accessible and widely used aspect of Lacanian theory is because it tells a familiar story of the transition for incoherence to coherence. We have seen precisely the same story told by White in his explanation of emplotment as the transformation of incoherent natural and human
plot and the unruly body / 93
events into a plot organized around a social center and a shared sense of community significance. Like White, Lacan insists on the temporal quality of this transformation—it is a way of defining the difference between “then” and “now,” between the middle of the events and the shape that they are eventually given. To his credit, Lacan seems to recognize that this moment may well be a construction as much as an actual, observable moment, since this transformation is “experienced” as temporal and works to “project” an individual into history. Lacan, in other words, seems to recognize that the story being told uses this transitional moment to organize its narrative time. As much as Butler finds Lacan’s theory powerful for describing the formation of subjectivity out of identification, she is suspicious of the way that the time before the mirror stage is imagined. She asks, “Why should the body be given in parts before it is specularized as a totality and center of control? How did this body come to be in pieces and parts? To have a sense of a piece or a part is to have in advance a sense for the whole to which they belong” (81–82). Butler’s point is difficult to argue with—it is only in retrospect that we can understand the premirror stage as fragmented because fragmentation implies a whole from which the part is broken. That fragmentation is constructed after the fact precisely as the opposite of the coherence that is found in the mirror stage and, later, in the subject’s articulation into language. Butler is interested in this moment of imagined priority because she is concerned with the way that bodily materiality is constructed for particular social and discursive reasons as precisely that which is outside of society and discourse. For her, Lacan’s construction of the pre-mirror stage is of a piece with all attempts to use materiality to make some claim to special priority, to a bruteness that exists before society and that consequently makes possible certain appeals to theoretical priority. It seems to me that exactly the same sort of story is being told by critics like White when they describe narrative as arising from a prior moment of brute material experience. This prior moment, we can say, is a reconstruction made possible and necessary by the way that the eventual overarching plot is imagined. As we have seen in Frye’s and Brooks’s theories, plot is frequently imagined on bodily models as a kind of wholeness or dialectic of physical development. As in Lacan’s mirror stage, the time before meaning is imagined in the obverse of that eventual shape, but in the same terms—in both cases, through the body. The importance of the body to both Lacanian and narrative theory should not be surprising, since both are interested in the appearance of meaning, the dialectical shaping of experience into structure conceived in discursive and social
94 / narrative bodies
terms. Precisely that attempt to imagine the time before such meaning leads both theories to the body as the exemplum of such brute, unorganized experience. If my application of Butler’s critique of a prior materiality to theoretical stories about how narratives organize experience is correct, it suggests that the ability to narrate will depend on the ability to imagine a body that resists narrative closure. In other words, before we can have stories that move through a narrative trajectory within some overarching pattern, we must be able to think about bodies in a way that allows them to resist that pattern. According to this theory, the historical emergence of plot as a structural narrative device will depend on the development of the understanding of the body as narratively unruly. We come, then, to the somewhat surprising conclusion that our modern ideas about plot will appear only when we have an overarching image of the body and, especially, a way of thinking about bodies that resist this whole image. Certainly White’s approach to narrative in historiography is likely to make us miss this element, since it follows common sense in treating narrative as a struggle to conquer everyday, natural incoherence. I think that we can see the importance of this narrative formulation of incoherence if we turn to Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of the novel. In particular, Bakhtin’s discussion about the rise of the “chronotope” natural to the modern novel suggests precisely this struggle to define what is unruly within plot. According to Bakhtin, the chronotope describes the “intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature.”7 In practical terms, the chronotope describes the way that narrative is staged in space and time. Indeed, Bakhtin suggestively describes the chronotope as a way of “giving flesh” to narrative: “In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history” (84). In suggesting that the raw story outline of a narrative “takes on flesh,” Bakhtin rightly implies that the way that a narrative will imagine space and time is inherently linked to the way that it positions bodies within that space. The concept of the chronotope implicitly argues that all events must take place somewhere and through some notion of time, and in describing such a setting as a process of giving the narrative flesh, Bakhtin reminds us how important these spatio-temporal positions are to the body. In a very straightforward sense, bodies demand that space and time be made meaningful, since in that time/space, that chronotope, characters will choose, act, and anticipate consequences.
plot and the unruly body / 95
Bakhtin begins his discussion of the chronotope with the early Greek adventure novel. Bakhtin observes that ancient Greek novels are composed of similar events organized around parted lovers struggling to be reunited despite a series of seemingly accidental misfortunes that keep them apart. For him, the time assumed by these novels is remarkable for the fact that little seems to change. The starting point of the novel is a sudden flareup of their love for each other; the ending of the novel is their inevitable (if much delayed) union. In between, Bakhtin says, time passes, but it is a meaningless time: “in essence nothing need lie between them [the staring and ending points of the narrative]. From the very beginning, the love between the hero and heroine is not subject to doubt; this love remains absolutely unchanged throughout the entire novel” (89). Unlike a modern novel, which might function by testing and consequently deepening this love, this novel treats the events that occur merely as unfortunate but inconsequential to the love and thus to the characters’ lives. As a result, Bakhtin argues, the narrative has no “biological and maturational” duration—that is, the time of the novel does not describe the passing of the characters’ lives or their psychological growth. It also lacks any cyclic or everyday quality, “such as might have introduced into it a temporal order and indices on a human scale, tying it to the repetitive aspects of natural and human life” (91). People do not age in these narratives, nor is the time in which the events take place marked by the novel. Instead, Bakhtin concludes, we have “an extratemporal hiatus that appears between two moments of a real time sequence” (91). Bakhtin characterizes this extratemporal hiatus as “adventure time,” and suggests that it constitutes the primary chronotope of this novel. Adventure time is characterized by the discreteness of its occurrences. New events are frequently introduced by transitions like “suddenly” because these novels do not describe any overarching time that connects all the events within the novel together. Space, likewise, is unmarked; these adventures occur in an exotic “nowhere,” since they have no connection to the later lives of the characters or to historical reality. Within this chronotope space is merely the ground for such contingent events: the “logic” of this type of novel “is one of random contingency, which is to say, chance simultaneity and chance rupture, that is, a logic of random disjunctions in time as well” (92). Space here, then, is historically unmarked and given specific meaning within the narrative only to the extent that it allows for certain types of encounters based solely upon chance: did the two individuals happen to be in this place at the same time? If we return to the language that I have used above, we could say that these works have not managed to think about how individual bodies resist narrative inevitability, resist the
96 / narrative bodies
overarching plot to which they will eventually succumb. The accidental qualities of the characters’ encounters that delay their marriage appear to be in no way related to the ultimate inevitability of their union. When Bakhtin turns to the development of genuinely biographical time in Apuleius’s The Golden Ass we can see much more clearly the relation between plot and resistance that is lacking in this earlier adventure novel. This novel is marked by the mixture of the adventure time that characterized earlier narratives and the “everyday time” that will be characteristic of the evolution of the chronotope in later novels. Bakhtin makes Apuleius’s departure from the adventure novel explicit at the outset of his discussion: “The plot of The Golden Ass is in no sense an extratemporal hiatus between two adjacent moments of real-life sequence. On the contrary, it is precisely the course of the hero’s (Lucius’) life in its critical moments that makes up the plot of the novel” (111). Much of the novel seems similar to the random events of the earlier adventure novel, since Lucius in the form of an ass moves from one encounter to another with very little control over his fate or actions. What makes this novel a departure from that tradition, however, is that the time during which Lucius is transformed into an ass is not merely a hiatus from his everyday life, but rather a period during which he becomes worthy of his transformation back into a human. Bakhtin explains that Apuleius uses the metamorphosis of Lucius to signal a broader transformation of his character: “Metamorphosis serves as the basis for a method of portraying the whole of an individual’s life in its more important moments of crisis: for showing how an individual becomes other than what he was. We are offered various sharply differing images of one and the same individual, images that are united in him as various epochs and stages in the course of a life” (115). In this transformation, Bakhtin finds the rudiments of what we would normally call a plot—the temporal development of a character through stages toward eventual final identity that provides closure for the story. Bakhtin notes that plot based on metamorphosis is not strictly a personal evolution in the same sense that we would expect in a modern novel: “There is no evolution in the strict sense of the word; what we get, rather, is crisis and rebirth” (115). Nonetheless, this crisis-based plot achieves a temporal movement toward a final stage that the adventure novel lacks. What is interesting for my discussion is the way that this kind of plot emerges precisely through the development of a narrative body that resists that plot. In an exemplary way, The Golden Ass suggests that the ability to imagine personal transformation and an overarching biographical plot depends on creating a narrative device that retards that development and
plot and the unruly body / 97
pushes the character through a detour that delays narrative closure. And this retarding device is Lucius’s body. Indeed, the central story of The Golden Ass, the time when Lucius has been transformed and is futilely seeking the rose petals that will transform him back into a human, describes a character who is quite literally locked into a body that organizes and delays narrative resolution. On every occasion when Lucius thinks that he will be able to eat the rose petals that will change him back, his inarticulate corporeality keeps him from being able to accomplish his goal. His first chance to eat the roses in the stable shortly after his transformation is met with a furious bodily assault: “But by a piece of really bad luck, before I could eat any of the roses, my slave who was acting as groom happened to catch me at work. He sprang up angrily from the heap of straw on which he was lying and shouted: ‘I’ve had quite enough trouble from this damned cuddy. First he tries to rob his stablemates and now he plays the same trick on the blessed gods! If I don’t flog the sacrilegious brute until he’s too lame to stir a hoof. . . .’”8 It is precisely because Lucius is trapped in this literally resisting body that the narrative is delayed. And, of course, because of this delay Lucius is able to come to the understanding that allows him to achieve the spiritual purification that characterizes him at the end of the novel. Lucius ends by undergoing a ceremony of “voluntary death” and rebirth: “So she [the goddess Isis] usually chooses old men who feel that their end is fast approaching yet are not too senile to be capable of keeping a secret; by her grace they are, in a sense, born again and restored to new and healthy life” (277). We could say that the spiritual rebirth exemplified in the end of The Golden Ass is made possible by Lucius’s experience of the decidedly unspiritual corporeality of the ass’s body. Although I have emphasized what Bakhtin has to say about the body as creating narrative delay and resisting closure, Bakhtin also argues that the body produces an overall, whole image of narrative development and social organization. In many ways, the core of Bakhtin’s theory—the assumption that drives all of his other observations and that gives this theory its particular force—is the claim that this increasing ability to present the continuity of an individual human life (and, in his Rabelais book, the continuity of multigenerational human life in general) brings increased concreteness to the places and characters of the narrative. Once authors begin to construct narratives in which events are not simply random as they are in the Greek adventure novel, but instead connected to the characters’ larger lives, the places in which they occur must themselves become significant and concrete. Bakhtin notes that abstract social hierarchies forestall this continuity between individual parts of the whole
98 / narrative bodies
human community. In a passage later in the chronotope essay describing medieval hierarchy, the value that Bakhtin places on the articulation of such continuities is especially clear: Amid the good things of this here-and-now world are also to be found false connections that distort the authentic nature of things, false associations established and reinforced by tradition and sanction by religious and official ideology. Objects and ideas are united by false hierarchical relationships, inimical to their nature; they are sundered and separated from one another by various other-worldly and idealistic strata that do not permit these objects to touch each other in their living corporeality. (169)
Bakhtin assumes here that a whole and natural unity exists in everyday human life at the level of physical interaction, and that this unity can be sundered by abstract schema imposed mechanically on that unity. In the case of narrative, this abstract schema is the ultimately disunified (or, we might say, only weakly unified) structure of adventure time, organized around ruptures rather than continuities. Bakhtin sees the coherence provided by the body not only in individual bodies, but also in more symbolic bodies. Critics have sometimes seen Bakhtin’s writing on the human body to be contradictory, since it treats the individual body both as an object that resists order and, at the same time, as something that needs to be subordinated to larger cosmological patterns. One part of Bakhtin’s writing—the best-known part often taken unfairly to characterize his theory as a whole—valorizes the “carnivalesque” body as the site of a trans-human physical continuity that ultimately works against all social structure and stratification. Bakhtin describes the grotesque body as fusing the individual with the outside world, both because it is constantly invested with symbolic values that transcend an individual, and because this body is literally linked to the cosmos and to aspects of the physical world through these symbolic qualities: “It stresses elements common to the entire cosmos: earth, water, fire, air; it is directly related to the sun, to the stars. It contains the signs of the zodiac. It reflects the cosmic hierarchy. This body can merge with various natural phenomena, with mountains, rivers, seas, islands, and continents. It can fill the entire universe.”9 Here physical continuity within a whole community is not established by virtue of a single human biography—as it is in Bakhtin’s work on the chronotope—but rather through the superindividual grotesque body that dominates Rabelais’s writing.10 In both cases, Bakhtin articulates both the unruly and the general body together. It is for this reason that Bakhtin remarks, “The events of the grotesque sphere are always developed on the boundary dividing one body from the other and, as it were, at their points of intersection. One body offers
plot and the unruly body / 99
its death, the other its birth, but they are merged in a two-bodied image” (322). In just the way that we have noted in Brooks and Frye, the plot moves toward an overarching bodily image—for example, of the purified body of the sinner Lucius. And it makes this movement toward such a body by deploying another, unruly body that resists that overarching body. Here plot emerges at the moment that these two bodies are imagined and related to each other. The unruly body takes many different forms that in turn reflect very different ways of thinking about narrative. Bakhtin emphasizes how the unruly body is transformed into a representation of the private life that works against official hierarchy. We have already s