National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe (Euricur Series (European Institute for Comparative Urban Research))

NATIONAL POLICY RESPONSES TO URBAN CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

The European Institute for Comparative Urban Research, EURICUR, was founded in 1988 and has its seat with Erasmus University Rotterdam. EURICUR is the heart and pulse of an extensive network of European cities and universities. EURICUR’s principal objective is to stimulate fundamental international comparative research into matters that are of interest to cities. To that end, EURICUR coordinates, initiates and carries out studies of subjects of strategic value for urban management today and in the future. Through its network EURICUR has privileged access to crucial information regarding urban development in Europe and North America and to key persons at all levels, working in different public and private organizations active in metropolitan areas. EURICUR closely cooperates with the Eurocities Association, representing more than 100 large European cities. As a scientific institution, one of EURICUR’s core activities is to respond to the increasing need for information that broadens and deepens the insight into the complex process of urban development, among others by disseminating the results of its investigations by international book publications. These publications are especially valuable for city governments, supranational, national and regional authorities, chambers of commerce, real estate developers and investors, academics and students, and others with an interest in urban affairs.

This book is one of a series to be published by Ashgate under the auspices of EURICUR, the European Institute for Comparative Urban Research, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Titles in the series are: The European High-Speed Train and Urban Development Leo van den Berg and Peter M.J. Pol Growth Clusters in European Metropolitan Cities Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Willem van Winden Information and Communications Technology as Potential Catalyst for Sustainable Urban Development Leo van den Berg and Willem van Winden Sports and City Marketing in European Cities Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Alexander H.J. Otgaar Social Challenges and Organising Capacity in Cities Leo van den Berg, Jan van der Meer and Peter M.J. Pol City and Enterprise Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Alexander H.J. Otgaar The Student City Leo van den Berg and Antonio P. Russo European Cities in the Knowledge Economy Leo van den Berg, Peter M.J. Pol, Willem van Winden and Paulus Woets The Safe City Leo van den Berg, Peter M.J. Pol, Guiliano Mingardo and Carolien J.M. Spellier

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Edited by LEO VAN DEN BERG ERIK BRAUN JAN VAN DER MEER

European Institute for Comparative Urban Research Erasmus University Rotterdam The Netherlands www.euricur.nl

© Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Jan van der Meer 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Jan van der Meer have asserted their moral rights under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England

Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA

Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data National policy responses to urban challenges in Europe. (EURICUR series) 1.Urban policy - European Union countries I.Berg, Leo van den II.Braun, Erik III.Meer, J. van der 307.1'216'094 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data National policy responses to urban challenges in Europe / edited by Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Jan van der Meer. p. cm. -- (EURICUR series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978-0-7546-4846-8 1. Urban policy--European Union countries. 2. City and town life--European Union countries. I. Berg, Leo van den. II. Braun, Erik. III. Meer, J. van der. IV. European Institute for Comparative Urban Research. V. Series HT131.N367 2006 307.76094--dc22 2006000104 ISBN: 978-0-7546-4846-8

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall.

Contents List of Tables List of Figures Abbreviations Preface

vii ix x xi

1

Introduction and Research Framework

2

National Urban Policies: The Situation in the Mid-1990s

15

3

The Urban Dimension in European Policy: History, Actors and Programmes

39

4

Austria: No National Urban Policies Friedrich Schindegger

5

Urban Policies in Belgium: A Puff-pastry with a Bittersweet Aftertaste? Maarten Loopmans, Sarah Luyten and Christian Kesteloot

6

Denmark’s National Urban Showcase: The Öresund Area Regional Development Christian Wichmann Matthiessen

7

Finland: Towards Urban Innovation Policy Eero Holstila

8

France: Metropolitan Areas as New ‘Reference Territories’ for Public Policies Christian Lefèvre

9

Urban Germany: The Future Will Be Different Klaus R. Kunzmann

10 National Urban Policy in Greece Dimitris Economou, George Petrakos and Yannis Psycharis 11 Ireland: Metropolitan Dominance – the Challenge in Achieving Balanced Territorial Development Michael J. Bannon

1

63

79

105

125

145

169

193

217

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vi

12 Italy: Towards the Recognition of the Strategic Relevance of Metropolitan Cities Ilaria Bramezza 13 Luxembourg: National Local Partnerships Ariane Chouly and Jan van der Meer 14 The Netherlands: Empowering Large Cities to Meet Their Challenges Erik Braun, Ariane Chouly and Jan van der Meer 15 Portugal: Urban Policies or Policies with an Urban Incidence? Álvaro Domingues, Nuno Portas and Teresa Sá Marques 16 Spain: Changing Century, Changing Cycle? Large Spanish Cities on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century Oriol Nel.lo 17 Sweden: The Emergence of a National Urban Policy Jan-Evert Nilsson

245

271

279

311

333

361

18 United Kingdom: The Changing Landscape of English Urban Policy Michael Parkinson

379

19 Synthesis

399

Annexes 1

The Basics of EU Regional Policy

433

2

List of National Government Representatives

437

Index

439

List of Tables 2.1 2.2

Population concentration in major urban regions Urbanisation, spatial patterns, social problem concentration, large cities and national populations in EU-countries (1990–1997) 3.1 Summary of the stages of EU Regional Policy and its urban dimension 3.2 EU programmes specifically directed at cities 3.3 Comparison of the two phases of URBAN 4.1 Cities and urban regions with more than 100,000 inhabitants in 1996 5.1 Primary government expenditures (debt redemption excluded) 5.2 Economic distribution of municipal revenues (as % of total revenues) 5.3 Some socioeconomic indicators for Belgium’s five large cities (2004) A5.1 Municipalities and agglomerations of over 100,000 inhabitants in 2003 6.1 Urban and rural population 6.2 Population in large cities* A6.1 Cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in core 7.1 City regions of over 100,000 inhabitants in 2002 8.1 Population of the 14 largest urban areas in France in 1999 8.2 Structure of local revenues in 1999 (%) 8.3 Evolution of main inter-municipal structures: 1972–2000 8.4 Importance of automobiles in some of the largest urban areas (per cent mechanised modes) (various years between 1985–2002) 8.5 The new institutional structures established by the Chevènement Act 8.6 Evolution of inter-municipal structures with their own fiscality (1992–2002) 9.1 Population dynamics in selected cities in Germany from the 1990s and until 2020 9.2 Municipalities and urban population in Germany in the year 2000 10.1 Number of cities with population over 10,000 people by size class 10.2 Distribution of urban population by size class 10.3 Urban population growth 10.4 Population of the largest cities in Greece, 1961–2001 11.1 Population change 1996–2002 classified by settlement size groupings

17 34 45 46 53 71 81 82 84 104 109 110 124 126 146 149 150 153 156 160 173 174 194 195 195 203 219

viii

11.2 11.3 11.4

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Population change by Functional Areas, 1996–2002 Large urban areas and centres, 1996–2002 Level of investment in urban renewal schemes by stage of development, €m 11.5 The five spatial elements of the NSS and their future roles 11.6 Possible population growth of existing Gateways, 000s 12.1 Population in 2001, demographic density and number of inhabitants 1991–2001 (%) 12.2 Unemployment rates in provinces in 1995 and 2001 and rates’ difference 1995 and 2001 (%) 12.3 The performance in quality of life in the 14 largest cities in Italy (1 = best performance) 12.5 Number breakdown for immigrants destination (2001) A12.1 Inhabitants (thousands) large cities 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 13.1 Population estimates for the largest cities of Luxembourg 14.1 Municipalities of over 100,000 inhabitants and urban regions 14.2 Role of ministries with respect to urban policy (GSB-II involvement) 14.3 Total indicative budget (€) and ministries involved in GSB-III 15.1 Demographic trends, 1991 and 2001 15.2 IORU, public expenditure 1994–1999 (€ million) 15.3 Operational Programme, NUTS II Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region 1994–1999 16.1 Urban 2 Programme: budget for Spain, period 2000–2006 17.1 Major urban regions and their economic performance, 1990– 2002 18.1 Population change since 1981 for England’s main conurbations and principal cities

221 222 231 235 236 248 249 250 258 269 271 281 285 301 313 319 324 353 362 381

List of Figures 1.1 1.2 1.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 7.3 12.1 18.1 18.2 18.3

Research framework for national urban policies from 1997 Interaction concerning policy-making between different layers of government National urban policies 2003 The proposed objectives and financial instruments for the Cohesion Policy in the programming period 2007–2013 The European cities involved in the different networks created by URBACT Eligible regions for Objectives 1 and 2 in the programming period 2000–2006 Map of Austria and surrounding area The Belgian institutional context Four large cities (urban area). Labour market regions indicated Structural map with urban system indicators The Öresund area 2003. The map shows the area most engaged in the new regional development process The population growth in Helsinki region Regional centre programmes Urban policy programme for the Helsinki region Italy and the 14 largest cities and metropolitan areas GDP of sample of European non-capital cities European Innovation Scoreboard Urban educational standards

10 11 13 44 55 57 64 80 114 118 120 131 136 139 247 386 387 388

Abbreviations CCRs CCDRs

Comissões de Coordenação Regional Comissões de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional (ex-CCRs) FEDER Fondos Europeos de Desarrollo Regional (European Regional Funds) IGAPHE Instituto de Gestão e Alienação do Património Habitacional do Estado INTEGRAR (1994) Programa para a Integração Económica e Social de Grupos Vulneráveis IORU Intervenção Operacional de Revitalização Urbana MAOT Ministério do Ambiente e do Ordenamento do Território MEPAT Ministerio do Equipamento, do Planeamento e da Administração do Território PDM Plano Director Municipal PDR Plano de Desenvolvimento Regional PER Programa Especial de Realojamento PIDDAC Plano de Investimentos e Despesas de Desenvolvimento da Administração Central PMOTs Planos Municipais de Ordenamento do Território PNDES Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social PNPOT Programa Nacional de Planeamento e de Ordenamento do Território POLIS Programa Nacional de Reabilitação Urbana e Requalificação Ambiental POR-LVT Programa Operacional da Região de Lisboa e Vale do Tejo PP Plano de Pormenor PRAUD Programa de Recuperação de Áreas Urbanas Degradadas PROCOM Programa de Modernização do Comércio PROSIURB Programa de Consolidação do Sistema Urbano Nacional e de Apoio à Execução dos Planos Directores Municipais PROT Plano Regional de Ordenamento do Território PU Plano de Urbanização RECRIA (1999) Programa de Reabilitação de Habitação Degradada REHABITA (1996) Programa de Reabilitação de Habitações Degradadas (áreas críticas e centros históricos)

Preface On the occasion of the Dutch EU Presidency (during the second half of 2004), the Ministry of The Interior and Kingdom Relations of the Netherlands invited the European Institute for Comparative Urban Research (EURICUR) of Erasmus University Rotterdam to carry out a follow up investigation concerning urban policy conducted by national authorities in the 15 ‘old’ member-states of the European Union. A first investigation into the state of art of national urban policy, also carried out by EURICUR on the invitation of the Dutch Ministry, was completed in 1997. This second report, focusing on the changes in national urban policies since then and furthermore taking into account the European influence on national policy-making is a background document and source of information for the ministers of the member states of the European Union responsible for urban matters. These ministers met in November 2004 in Rotterdam. Thanks to EURICUR’s international network of universities and cities and also thanks to the national government representatives (for details see Annex 2) who were willing to comment on the draft versions of the national reports, we were able to produce this report. We would like to thank all those persons across Europe that have contributed by writing a national report or by giving their professional comments and advice. The 15 national reports, together with the introduction of the framework for the comparative analysis, a recapitulation of the findings of the first study from 1997, an overview of European urban policies and the overall synthesis of the new findings make up this report. We appreciate the valuable contributions of Friedrich Schindegger (Austria), Maarten Loopmans, Sarah Luyten and Christian Kesteloot (Belgium), Christian Wichmann Matthiessen (Denmark), Eero Holstila (Finland), Christian Lefèvre (France), Klaus R. Kunzmann (Germany), Dimitris Economou, George Petrakos and Yannis Psycharis (Greece), Michael J. Bannon (Ireland), Ilaria Bramezza (Italy), Àlvaro Domingues, Nuno Portas and Teresa Sá Marques (Portugal), Oriol Nel.lo (Spain), Jan-Evert Nilsson (Sweden) and Michael Parkinson (United Kingdom). The investigation was carried out under the supervision of a committee composed of drs. H.J. Meijer (mayor of Zwolle), mr. L.J. Verhulst (alderman in Utrecht), mr.drs. G.A.A. Verkerk (alderman in The Hague), Prof.dr. P.E.W.M.Tops (University Tilburg), drs. I.W.D. Veenkamp (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Head of the department GSB), drs. W. Bringmann (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, GSB). We would like to thank the supervisors and advisors, including Mr Lewis Dijkstra (DG Regional Policy of the European Commission), for their valuable remarks and pleasant cooperation. Naturally, the views expressed in the report are those of the authors and editors only. Furthermore, we would like to thank Ariane Chouly as co-author of the national reports on the Netherlands and Luxembourg and

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Giuliano Mingardo as co-author of Chapter 3 on European urban policy. Finally, we would like to thank Paulus Woets, Alexander Otgaar, Laura Capel Tatjer and Ankimon Vernède for their support. Leo van den Berg Erik Braun Jan van der Meer Rotterdam

Chapter 1

Introduction and Research Framework 1.1

Introduction

European urban development is progressively challenged by ongoing processes of globalisation, the shift towards a knowledge-based and technology-driven economy, increasing mobility of production factors, demographic change, European integration, accumulation of social and environmental problems and traffic congestion. Cities have to operate in an increasingly complex and competitive environment. Urban competition seems to have become the leading principle to determine the future urban system in Europe (Brotchie et al., 1995; Kresl, 1995; Cheshire and Gordon, 1995; and many others). Cities need to anticipate and respond efficiently and effectively to opportunities and threats that influence their competitiveness structurally. City governments develop policies to try to meet these challenges, but at the same time higher layers of government pursue policies that influence the position of the cities. National governments – and regional governments in federal states – draw up financial and policy frameworks that establish the social, economic and political conditions for cities to design their own policies. Apart from the influence of national governments, EU cities are increasingly affected by supranational policy, notably regional, social, transport and environmental policy. Research Questions This publication aims to present the state of the art concerning explicit national urban policies in the member states of the European Union. ‘National urban policy’ refers to policies that affect the cities knowingly and directly. However, the scope is not limited to explicit national urban policy alone; it also stretches to European and national policy, as far as it makes a substantial impact on the development of the larger cities. The investigation is guided by the following questions: 1 What do national and regional authorities consider to be major issues for a desired development of ‘their’ larger cities? 2 What important changes have recently taken place in national policy responses to cope with these major issues? 3 What role is attributed to European policy with respect to urban development and urban policy-making?

2

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

The experiences in the 15 member states serve as input for a comparative analysis. What are the differences, similarities, challenges and trends in national urban policies? And what is the perceived role of ‘Europe’ in this respect? Perceived role, because the scope of this investigation is predominantly a comparison of national approaches and not an investigation into the impact of the European policies on cities. This would require a different, urban audit-like approach. In this study the emphasis is on recent changes in national policies. That is to say, changes that took place since the mid-1990s. A more or less similar study into national urban policies by the same editors and most of the same contributors took place in 1997 and was published as a book in 1998 (van den Berg, Braun and van der Meer, 1998). Given changing global, national and local circumstances and increasing national and European interest in seizing urban (economic) opportunities and combating urban (social and environmental) problems, an update of the 1997 study is required. The 1997 study presented a structured overview of national urban development patterns, administrative and financial frameworks, urban policy issues and challenges, as seen from a national perspective (and partly from a regional perspective in the federal states). This update serves both as a supplement to the first publication and as an individual exercise. Some topics dealt with in the first volume will now be treated only marginally (such as spatial patterns, administrative and financial structures), unless important changes have taking place in these domains. Moreover, in this update, recent national policy-making, its organisation and the influence of ‘Europe’ on cities and on national urban policy-making will be emphasised. Taken together, this results in an overview for national and local authorities to learn from mutual experiences and for European institutions to learn how the influence of European policies is perceived in the member states. Position of the New Member States The 1997 study provides a firm basis for an update for the 15 member states. Regrettably this is missing for the 10 new member states. In addition, the differences between existing and new members will be quite substantial, with regard to both urban development and urban policy formulation and implementation. Given the complexity of problems, the new member states demand a special approach. Therefore this update will be devoted to the Europe of the 15 existing member states only. Research Approach In this first chapter some features of urban dynamics in Europe will be referred to and a framework for national policy responses to urban issues will be presented. The second chapter contains a general overview of the national urban policy in the European Union during the mid-1990s. This overview is based on the 1997

Introduction and Research Framework

3

investigation. This overview is considered the starting point for this volume, aiming to highlight changes since then in national urban policy directions. Chapter 3 is devoted to European urban policy. The majority of European policies have effects on urban issues. The European Commission wants the various programmes in urban areas to support a sustainable urban development approach with as main objectives to enhance economic prosperity and employment, to promote equality of opportunity, social integration and urban renovation, to protect and improve the urban environment, and to contribute to good urban government, including boosting the local community’s ability to take action. This perspective – to take more account of the urban dimension – has resulted in the implementation of some experimental European programmes, the inclusion of urban issues in regional programmes and the production of various policy documents concerning sustainable urban development. In the national chapters the way in which EU policy and EU ruling contribute to the design of national urban policy will be investigated. Chapter 3 presents an overview of European urban policies and actions and the role European institutions play with respect to urban issues. Chapter 4 contains the summaries of the expert reports for the 15 ‘old’ member states. National academic experts in urban development or closely related issues have written national reports. The reports all deal with the following topics: 1 Introduction, including a concise ‘national urban profile’ with attention to the national urban pattern, the economic and social position and past performance of major cities and the most significant features of the national administrative and financial framework. 2 A summary of national urban policy development until the mid-1990s, with an emphasis on major developments in this policy and the driving forces behind it. 3 Description of the current situation of the larger cities in the specific country: what are major problems? What are major opportunities? What can be said about the effects/influence of national policy (as described in 2 above) on these problems and opportunities? 4 This section highlights national policy changes since the mid-1990s and discusses the intensions/plans/proposals for changes in national policies towards cities in the future. 5 This section deals with the effects of European policies and subsidies on cities and the effect of ‘Europe’ on urban development and on national urban policy-making as perceived by national authorities. 6 Summary and conclusions. The full national reports comprise Chapters 4 to 18 of this report. Finally, Chapter 19 synthesises the main findings. The outcomes of the national chapters are compared, leading to a description of emerging trends in national and European urban policy and the motives behind this policy. In addition, the

4

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

current and possible future role of Europe with respect to urban policy will be highlighted. Clarification of Some Notions Some notions that are essential to this study, like ‘explicit’ urban policy, ‘major’ or ‘larger’ cities and European policy ‘impact’, will now be clarified. The objective of this study is to investigate how national governments ‘treat’ their major cities. So in principle it is about policies that have been explicitly formulated to affect the development of cities. In general terms, urban policy can be described as the whole set of government measures at different administrative levels – European, national, regional or local – that is directed to cities. In theory, all layers of government could pursue urban policy. However, the higher layers of government also formulate policies that are not specifically designed for cities but could have a major impact on them. These policies are not targeted on cities, but they are to some extent ‘urban’ through their impact on cities. Concerning national policy responses, it is important to make a distinction between policy explicitly directed at cities and policy that is not, but that is ‘urban’ in the sense that it has substantial impact on cities, such as housing policy, transportation policy, spatial planning policy, etc. Another, equally important distinction is that between partial (sector-specific) and integral (sector-exceeding) policy. Such urban issues as accessibility, quality of living and economic revitalisation are so strongly connected that a more comprehensive approach can be far more effective. The notion ‘major’ or ‘larger’ city needs clarification too. ‘Major’ and ‘larger’ are relative notions that will be used in quite a different way depending on the issue. In this study they refer in the first place to the size of the urban population. We do not intend to define a population threshold that makes a city a ‘major’ or ‘large’ city (if such a definition existed …). We only suggest having cities in mind with a certain critical mass that makes them important as economic, social and transport centres within a nation state. We prefer to follow the proposal by Eurostat to the European Commission for the update of the Urban Audit. This proposal covers about 20 per cent of the population in each of the member states. This leads to a tentative list of about 100 ‘large-sized cities’ (Eurostat, 2001). These cities can be addressed as ‘major’ or ‘large’ in their respective countries. In this way cities are considered from a national point of view. The tentative Eurostat list contains cities ranging from 6.7 million inhabitants (London) to 52,000 inhabitants (Limerick, the third Irish city) (Eurostat, 2001). The number of major cities per country ranges from 20 in Germany to one in Luxembourg. Although it cannot be neglected, size alone is not a strong indicator. Cities will primarily be considered as major for their economic importance. Some cities are far more important from an economic point of view than their size implies. In an updated version of the well-known DATAR ranking of European urban regions (published in 1989), special attention is devoted to the gap between the city ranking according to the

Introduction and Research Framework

5

indicators used and population size (Brunett, 1989; Rozenblat and Cicille, 2003). Some cities which are ranked high relative to their size are Amsterdam, Geneva, Granada, Luxembourg and Montpellier. In constrast to these are cities that score low in view of their size like Essen, Belfast, Liverpool, Naples and Sheffield. To conclude, major cities in this study are those cities which, in a national or regional context, are large or economically important enough to function as market centres, centres for work, transport, etc. In this study the starting point is national urban policy, rather than the large city status. This might imply that other than the suggested large cities are included in the country reports. European policies have become increasingly important to cities – so important that several cities or groups of cities have established an office in Brussels to promote their interests. Although it seems that most attention is devoted to the financial sources, there is also the impact of European rules and regulations and the stimulation of exchange of experience. In this study we will deal with the effects of European policies and subsidies on cities, as perceived by national authorities and the effect of ‘Europe’ on national urban policies. We realise that perception is not the same as fact. However, to analyse the impact of Europe on city development and urban policy-making would require another approach. In this study we will present an overview of European policies targeted to large cities and the way these policies seem to influence national urban policy-making. 1.2

European Urban Dynamics

The European Union of the 15 member states is one of the world’s most urbanised areas. Close to 40 per cent of the Europeans live and work in the more than 350 cities with 100,000 or more inhabitants (Eurostat, 2001; van den Berg, Braun and van der Meer, 1998). Clearly, the cities – or more accurately the functional urban regions – are the vital economic, cultural, transport and innovative centres of Europe. They function as the motors of the regional, national and European economy. However, many of these motors face problems such as heavy traffic congestion, relatively high unemployment rates, increasing social exclusion and spatial segregation, high crime rates, feelings of insecurity and heavy pressure on environmental quality. The rising socio-economic disparities within urban regions seem to sharpen in the near future. They are a threat to a balanced and sustainable urban development and are therefore an impediment on the social and economic cohesion within the member states. Competition In the end, inhabitants, local businesses, local investors and visitors determine whether a city is attractive or not. These (existing or potential) ‘customers’ of cities put high demands on the quality of the business and living environment. Businesses consider factors like the quality of the (potential) labour force, the

6

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

economic structure, the local knowledge base, the fiscal climate, local tax rates, telecommunications, (international) accessibility of import and export markets, and the availability of financial resources highly relevant to their location behaviour. In addition, the quality of the living environment has become a necessary condition for economic development as well. Attributes such as urban services, housing conditions, the availability of green areas, the cultural climate, the quality of public space, urban safety and leisure facilities have become important location factors for those growth industries that prefer locations in or near large population concentrations. The weights that are attributed to these location factors have changed considerably under the influence of processes of globalisation, economic restructuring, informationalisation and European integration. Many economic activities have a global scope, with major consequences for urban regions, while national borders seem to play an ever-decreasing role (Ohmae, 1995). Such developments have intensified competition among cities both within countries as well as on a European scale. European unification and the establishment of a monetary union, facilitating access to cities and regions and their services, labour markets, and input and export markets have increased the mobility of European businesses and citizens and are as such inducements to competition between cities too. Competition should be understood here in its original meaning, derived from the Latin cum petere, which means ‘doing things together, to participate’. In this sense the objective of competition is not confrontation but rather keeping with others, not lagging behind. The Impact of Information and Communication Technology Globalisation has become possible through information and communication technology. The consequences of the rising information society for the economic functioning of cities cannot be defined univocally. Some scholars have pointed out that the emergence of new high-grade communication means can be a threat to the economic functioning of cities. They warn of the ‘death of distance’. However, according to others (Hall, 1995; Sassen, 1991) major cities will go on attracting high-tech sectors (such as finance, media, education, art and culture, design, private and public services) through massive location inertia, since these are the locations where information has traditionally been generated and exchanged. Increasingly, innovative activities rely on information, and they need to be accessible for and have access to information at both ends of their production process. The impression is that the transition to an information society has considerably strengthened the position of cities as nerve centres of the ‘new economics’. Cities provide the daily context for the increasingly global and peripatetic interactions within the economic, social and cultural spheres. Cities become parts of networks of information exchanges that in turn make high demands on the telecommunication facilities and the education and skills of their workforce. Because the need for face-to-face communication seems hardly

Introduction and Research Framework

7

affected, it is expected that, in Europe, the large cities – and within them the city centres – will retain this role. Changing Urban Economic Structures Along with globalisation, the economic structure of cities in the European Union has changed considerably in recent decades. The expansion of world trade and investments both results from and contributes to the global mobility of production factors such as labour, capital, landownership and technology. This alters the structure and location of employment, use of technologies, patterns of trade and investment and economic opportunities in and among cities (Rondinelli, Johnson and Kasarda, 1998). Heavy manufacturing industries no longer dominate the urban economy: whole arrays of knowledge-based industries and service activities (such as trade, financial services, commercial services, cultural activities, etc.) have taken their place. Technologically advanced industries are thriving on the intense networks of small and medium-sized firms. Competitiveness in these sectors is still to some extent dependent on a city or region, but the initial advantages might have been developed just as well at other locations. Moreover, such highly dynamic markets are subject to rapid changes. The initial chances of cities have become somewhat more equal and it is up to them to make capital out of these opportunities. A consequence of globalisation and informationalisation is the re-orientation in business life, like the growing importance of economic clustering. The strategic re-orientation in business life has expressed itself through new organisational structures, the forming of networks, etc. Businesses concentrate on their core competency and outsource their non-strategic activities to specialists. Although communication technology facilitates the worldwide formation of clusters, these clusters are often spatially determined; people want to be close to each other. This means downsizing in the large corporations and growth in small and medium-sized enterprises. This in turn creates clusters within which there is interdependence. Such local and regional business networks – embedded within the local institutional, political and cultural borders and often locally cooperative but globally competitive – are the anchors of a powerful (albeit often fragile and vulnerable) urban economy (Amin and Thrift, 1994). Many cities are seeking to identify clusters within their economic structure and, where possible, to create conditions under which the clusters can develop successfully, for instance by setting up knowledge centres or offering specialised infrastructures. The Advancement of Urban Networks Competition implies that cities will concentrate more on their core competencies, which will induce a process of further spatial specialisation in Europe. Cities are also becoming more interdependent. In effect, one can expect competition to induce the ‘competitive’ city but at the same time to give rise to the

8

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

‘complementary’ city. Growing interdependency among cities implies the advancement of urban networks. Cities that are situated relatively close to each other are becoming aware that cooperation instead of competition on strategic issues will produce mutual benefits. Moreover, creating critical mass seems to be helpful to attract, to establish or to retain high-grade functions that would not have been possible to attract or to establish by a city alone. If formal and decisive regional structures are missing this could lead to the formation of strategic urban networks. Another expectation is that the scope and importance of (inter)national urban networks linking cities with similar economic functions, for instance logistic nodes or financial centres, will increase. In addition, cities get together to apply for European funding or for exchange of experiences and ‘best practices’ in specific areas such as networks for sustainable cities, car-free cities, telecities, etc. Urban Attractiveness and Quality of Place as Emerging Location Factors In the consumer area there is an increase in leisure activities and tourism. Tourism is one of the most important growth sectors. It is also a sector which contributes to broadening the economy and creating job opportunities in the lower-skilled sectors of the job market, particularly in those areas where many cities have to fight unemployment. That is why many cities try to improve their image as a tourist destination. International leisure tourism competition is fierce in ‘city breaks’ in particular. Moreover, we can observe a growth of business meetings (trade fairs, conferences, expositions and other business meetings). Business meetings are lucrative for the urban economy because they deliver considerable multiplier effects, thanks to the spending in the local economy. Art and culture, too, are increasingly being seen as attractive to urban economies. Some industrial cities (among them Glasgow, Bilbao and some English and German cities) have tried to change their less attractive tourism image to that of a city of culture. Event tourism is also highly valued. Cities are preparing to organise large, attractive events that function as a catalyst for the city’s economic performance – Barcelona is a successful example. There is also the benefit of (free) publicity around big events that influences the city’s image (mostly but not always) in a positive manner. Directly connected to tourist attractiveness is the increasing attention on quality of living in functional (personal services, education, nightlife) as well as in physical ways (quality of residential and working areas, shopping centres, outdoor/green-belt areas, quality of the natural environment). This has a lot to do with the desires of well-educated employees. They make demands regarding the quality and accessibility of their working, living and residential environment. The concept of an attractive work environment as part of a mixture of functions (shopping, restaurants, nightlife, recreation and residence) seems to have been handled successfully in many cities (van den Berg, van der Meer and Otgaar, 2000). There is a great deal of investment in revitalisation, particularly in central

Introduction and Research Framework

9

city parts, so that city centres appear to continue to function as the beating hearts of their regions. Accumulation of Unemployment, Poverty and Deprivation Social problems such as unemployment, poverty, crime, youth delinquency, lack of education, drug abuse, homelessness and other social deprivation accumulate in areas of cities. In many of the larger European cities a polarisation is defining itself between the dynamic, well-educated segments of the population who share in the economic and social progress, and another segment that cannot share and, as a result, falls into economic and social exclusion. Such a concentration of distressed groups is especially manifest in cities that have been hit by economic decline. However, it also occurs in cities that have managed to reverse a downward economic trend and in cities that have been prosperous for a longer time. The heterogeneous groups of the less privileged tend to be located in specific areas within major cities. The accumulation of social problems in cities poses a clear threat to a balanced urban development and may hamper the cities in their functioning as engines of the economy. Combatting social polarisation seems to be one of the most important, but at the same time one of the most difficult, challenges. Transition in Central and Eastern Europe The entry of former ‘Eastern Bloc’ countries into the EU invites new competitors into the cities of the Union. The low wages in these countries will induce labourintensive companies to migrate from existing EU countries to the new member states. The difference in the standards of living between the West and the East may induce people from Eastern Europe to come to the West in search of better living conditions. The majority of them will settle in those larger cities that already face major integration problems with communities of foreign descent such as Turkish and North African people, people from former colonies and asylum seekers. Increasing Attention on Sustainable Development Closely bound up with the rise of welfare and the changing aspiration levels of European citizens is the rising importance that is attributed to the environment. The rising environmental awareness has promoted the idea of sustainable urban development, a development that provides for the needs of the present generation without jeopardising the possibilities for future generations (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Sustainable urban development is a broad notion incorporating the environment, quality of life, economics and social justice (Aalborg Charter, 1994).

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Need for New Urban Development Strategies Cities find themselves challenged. They have to adapt themselves to the new logic of competition (Bramezza, 1996) and at the same time find their place in various urban networks. They compete on a widening international scale in search of mobile investment and trade but at the same time are threatened by the cumulating social and environmental problems. To be able to deal with the complex of potential opportunities and problems cities have to organise themselves properly. The ability of cities to develop and implement strategies to anticipate, respond to and cope with internal and external changes and to create, in close cooperation with relevant public and private partners, conditions for sustainable development, depends on the organising capacity within the urban region (van den Berg, Braun and van der Meer, 1997). A central element of organising capacity is the need for a joint effort of different layers of government as well as other public institutions and private actors to meet the challenges posed to cities. An important challenge for organising capacity is to create or maintain sustainable urban development. Such a development seems to be dependent on knowledge creation, entrepreneurial and technological capacities, leadership and community support, a modern urban infrastructure, new forms of metropolitan cooperation and integration of the urban poor into the urban economy (Rondinelli, Johnson and Kasarda, 1998).

Figure 1.1 Research framework for national urban policies from 1997

Introduction and Research Framework

1.3

11

Research Framework

In the previous study we developed a research framework for understanding the development of national urban policies in the member states. From the outset we have indicated that the development cannot be separated from the national context. In that research framework we included the following factors that explain the development of national urban policies: • • •

the pattern of spatial and economic development; the administrative and financial framework (setting the margins for the development of national urban policies); the (national) political debate and political priorities.

The 1997 study demonstrated that these three factors are helpful to understand some of the differences between urban policy-making in the member states on the one hand and that these factors offer an explanation for the similarities on the other hand. The 1997 study was a first inventory of national and local policies in the member states. In this follow-up study we aim to present an update on national urban policies and to include some issues more explicitly.

Figure 1.2 Interaction concerning policy-making between different layers of government

12

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Interaction between Levels of Policy-making One of the key issues in this follow-up study which will receive specific attention is the interaction between policy-making on different levels. One of the assumptions is that the interaction between the local (urban), regional (if there is one), national and European levels is becoming more important. We emphasise that interaction refers to the influence on policy-making among different levels of government. Hence, it is not just concerned with the classical top-down policy-making process but also includes local policy initiatives that effect policy-making of higher layers of government (bottom-up). The European Level versus the Local Level One example of interaction is that between the European level and the local level. Despite the fact that the word ‘urban’ cannot be found in the Maastricht Treaty, European policies and programmes have a significant impact on policy-making in cities. The impact of ‘Europe’ on cities has to do not just with European law and regulations but also with European regional policy and special programmes such as the ‘urban programme’. In Chapter 3 we present an outline of the European policies relevant to the development of cities. In most cases the national government is an intermediary between the local and European level because of the principle of subsidiarity. In this research we include not only the perceived effect of European policies on cities but also the effect of local initiatives on European policy-making. Individual cities and city organisations (for instance Eurocities) try to influence decision-making at the European level. The National Level versus the Local Level Another example of interaction is the interaction between the national and local level of policy-making. In the 1997 study we have already indicated that in some countries both a top-down and bottom-up approach to explicit national urban policies have been developed. We also included the degree of freedom for local authorities to pursue their own policies. For this follow-up study we would like to include the influence on the policy agenda as well. It is obvious that changes in national urban policies will have an effect on local urban policies and political priorities. At the same time, new or different policy developments at the local level could have an effect on the national agenda as well. The European Level versus the National Level The third aspect of interaction between levels of policy-making is the interaction between the European and national levels. We have already touched upon the role of national governments as intermediary between the European and local levels. Interaction between the European level and the national level could be concerned

Introduction and Research Framework

13

Figure 1.3 National urban policies 2003 with the European policies and programmes that effect national policies towards cities, and vice versa, successful policies on the national level might be adopted on the European level. Apart from the more explicit attention on the interaction between levels of policy-making, we also include factors that were included in the previous studies as well as some of the issues raised in the previous pages. Figure 1.3 shows some of the features included in the research. References Aalborg Charter of European Cities amd Towns Towards Sustainability (1994), Aalborg. Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (eds) (1994), Globalization, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bramezza, I. (1996), The Competitiveness of the European City and the Role of Urban Management in Improving the City’s Performance, Tinbergen Institute Research Series No. 109, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Brotchie, J., Batty, M., Blakely, E., Hall, P. and Newton, P. (1995), Cities in Competition, Melbourne: Longman. Brunett, R. (1989), Les villes européennes, DATAR/RECLUS, La Documentation Française. Castells, M. (1991), The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Cheshire, P, and Gordon, I. (eds), 1995, Territorial Competition in an Integrating Europe: Local Impact and Public Policy, Aldershot: Avebury. Eurostat, document E4/URBAN/2001/7. Hall, P. (1995), ‘Towards a General Urban Theory’, in J. Brotchie, M. Batty, E. Blakely, P. Hall and P. Newton (eds), Cities in Competition, Melbourne: Longman.

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Kresl, P. (1995), ‘The Determinants of Urban Competition: A Survey’, in P. Kresl and G. Gappert (eds), North American Cities and the Global Economy, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 45–68. Ohmae, K. (1995), The End of the Nation State; The Rise of Regional Economies, New York: The Free Press. Rondinelli, A.R., Johnson Jr, J.H. and Kasarda, J.D. (1998), ‘The Changing Forces of Urban Economic Development: Globalization and City Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century’, Cityscape 3 (3), US Department of Housing and Urban Development. Rozenblat, C. and Cicille, P. (2003), Les villes européennes, DATAR/CNRS. Sassen, S. (1991), The Global City, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Van den Berg, L., Braun, E. and van der Meer, J. (1997), Metropolitan Organising Capacity, Aldershot: Ashgate. Van den Berg, L., Braun, E. and van der Meer, J. (1998), National Urban Policies in the European Union. Responses to Urban Issues in the Fifteen Member States, Aldershot: Ashgate. Van den Berg, L., van der Meer, J. and Otgaar, A.H.J. (2000), The Attractive City, Rotterdam: Euricur, Erasmus University. World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), Our Common Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 2

National Urban Policies: The Situation in the Mid-1990s1

2.1

Introduction

This chapter recapitulates the main findings of the comparative investigation into national urban policy in the European Union undertaken early in 1997 and published in 1998. As such it serves as a state-of-the-art description of the stitution of about seven years ago and as a starting and orientation point for the current exercise, which is focused on analysing changes since then. This recapitulation is based on 15 national reports, in each of which the national urban policies were discussed in the context of the national spatial pattern, the administrative framework, the financial framework and the urban issues and challenges as perceived at the national level. This chapter is first concerned with the national spatial development patterns and the national administrative and financial structures according to the 1997 situation. These issues, which are important as preconditions for urban development and policy-making, will not be dealt with in depth in this volume, unless important changes have taken place during the last seven years or can be expected to happen soon. After that, the attention is shifted to what national governments considered to be urban issues and challenges in the mid-1990s, followed by an overview of the main features of national urban policy in the member states of the European Union in that period. 2.2

National Spatial Development Patterns

Wide differences as well as striking similarities among the regions of a country and among the regions of different countries were found when comparing urban dynamics and spatial patterns internationally. A first conclusion, supported by international literature on this subject, was that the evolving urban systems and spatial patterns are largely nationally determined. National frontiers still form important dividing lines between sometimes far divergent spatial patterns, 1 This chapter is a slightly revised version of Chapter 17, ‘Synthesis’ (by Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Jan van der Meer) of Leo van den Berg, Erik Braun and Jan van der Meer (eds), National Urban Policies in the European Union (1998).

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

although their influence is diminishing. Some significant differences among the member states have to do with their degree of urbanisation, the balance in their urban system, the phase of urbanisation in which their larger cities find themselves, the social-economic position and performance of the large cities and the way that position has found its spatial expression. Differences as well as similarities in spatial structures, with special reference to the position of cities, will now be recapitulated briefly. Degree of Urbanisation A straightforward comparison of the degree of urbanisation is hardly possible, for almost all countries define ‘urbanised’ in their own way. Definitions vary from more than 200 inhabitants in Sweden to 10,000 and more in Germany, Greece and The Netherlands. If the degree of urbanisation is judged by the proportion of population living in (large) cities, the – hardly surprising – conclusion is that Europe counts some strongly urbanised countries (such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark) and some slightly urbanised ones (Sweden, Finland, Austria, Portugal and Ireland), as well as a number of countries occupying a position in-between (Italy, France, Spain, Greece and Luxembourg). In spite of wide differences a common trend can be observed, namely a continuous concentration of people and economic activities in major urban regions, which therefore go on expanding their sphere of influence: ‘metropolisation’ appears to have become a common development. In the 1980s and early 1990s in particular, even the least urbanised countries registered a strong expansion of both the largest cities and the regional centres. Increasing numbers of Europeans have come to live in an urban environment and this process seems to have been intensified. In some still less urbanised countries (like Spain, Portugal, Austria, Greece, Finland) the ongoing concentration is confining some rural areas to the periphery. National Urban Systems In most countries a balanced urban system, in which the various levels of the urban hierarchy are adequately filled, is lacking. Often one major city (always the capital city) dominates the urban system. London, Paris, Dublin, Lisbon, Copenhagen, Vienna, Stockholm, Helsinki, Athens and Luxembourg are such distinct principal cities. In Spain, Madrid and Barcelona are almost on an equal level, while Germany (after Berlin), Belgium (after Brussels), Italy (after Rome), and The Netherlands have some equivalent cities and/or a more balanced urban system. In several countries, the intermediate level between the principal city and other cities is largely or completely missing. That is notably true of France, Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Finland. Sometimes the intermediate level includes only one or a few cities (like Porto in Portugal, Gothenburg and Malmö in Sweden, and Thessalonica in Greece). Belgium, Italy, Spain, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom do enjoy a relatively balanced hierarchy in which the

National Urban Policies: The Situation in the Mid-1990s

17

various urban size classes are reasonably represented. In most countries a relatively large proportion of the national population is spatially concentrated in a few urban regions (Table 2.1) Table 2.1 Population concentration in major urban regions Luxembourg Denmark Ireland Austria Finland Portugal Greece Sweden Belgium France United Kingdom Spain Netherlands

55% in 1 34% in 1 28% in 1 25% in 1 22% in 1 39% in 2 37% in 2 35% in 3 37% in 2 16% in 1 12% in 1 22% in 2 25% in 4

1995 1995 1996 1991 1996 1994 1991 1996 1995 1990 1991 1995 1996

Source: van den Berg Braun and van der Meer, 1998.

Urban concentration seems to proceed fastest in those countries that came relatively late to urbanisation, mostly countries that are peripheral to the European heartland, such as Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy (the south part), Greece and Austria. Dominance in size coincides often, but not always, with economic dominance. In most countries the principal city is also economically dominant. Italy and Germany are exceptions with Milan vying with Rome for economic supremacy and Berlin is economically dominated by several other German cities like Frankfurt and Munich. Stages of Urbanisation The stage of urbanisation in which the cities in a country find themselves determines what kinds of problem confront these cities and also what is the policy to cope with them. The problems of old industrial and seaport cities at a stage of decline are hardly comparable with those of fast-growing cities in countries that until recently were largely agrarian. Europe encompasses the full range of urban development phases. The Finnish cities are at the urbanisation stage: Helsinki is one of the fastest growing major cities in the EU. Urbanisation also marks many (but not the largest) cities in Southern Europe. Suburbanisation – the stage at which the urban region is growing, mostly thanks to suburban growth in ‘ring towns’ – was the commonest trend in the

18

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

early 1990s, although it was not equally advanced everywhere. Some countries have already been suburbanising for a long time (especially such old industrial countries as the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands and Luxembourg), and some have recently joined in. Suburbanisation is a relatively new phenomenon (since the 1970s) in the cities in northern Italy, France, Austria, Spain, Denmark, and even newer (since the 1980s) in Portugal, Ireland, southern Italy, Greece (Athens especially), Sweden and Finland. From from this list it is clear that the part of Europe that was in the vanguard of industrialisation and was the first to attain prosperity is at a more advanced stage of urbanisation than the areas that industrialised later. A number of European cities suffer from disurbanisation (or de-urbanisation), that is, the decline of the entire urban region substantially brought about by the decline of the core city, a development often attended by problems of social and economic structure. The affected cities are mostly old industrial and port cities, characterised by one or a few dominating traditional manufacturing sectors; examples can be found in United Kingdom (most large urban regions), the Walloon region, the Ruhr Area, the new German states, Italy (the north), Spain (among others, the region of Bilbao), France (Marseilles) and some Austrian cities. With the exception of the new German states, these cities have often achieved considerable industrial growth in the past but face difficulties in compensating for the decline in basic manufacturing or other dominating (port) activities by attracting new business activities. Various large European cities suffer from the phenomenon of disurbanisation and the related social-economic problems (notably unemployment and its social aftermath). Finally, some places have entered the stage of reurbanisation, the stage in which cities begin to pick up (after a period of decline) thanks to new chances offered by new growth industries which prefer a metropolitan environment and/or effective revitalisation policy. Reurbanisation has been recorded in Vienna (urban renewal), Stockholm (economic growth), Milan, some major Dutch and German cities, among other places. Social Exclusion and Spatial Segregation: Core versus Ring Growth and decline are the results of a complexity of mutually reinforcing or opposing forces. Theories on the subject, which seem to be largely confirmed by the national reports, suggest that economic growth and the resulting prosperity are inseparable from urban development. However, that hypothesis does not seem to apply to some areas such as the south of Italy and some old industrial zones in the European heartland and in eastern Germany. In those areas the cities either cannot develop under their own steam or are required to make intensive efforts to do so and the private sector is very cautious with investment. Another observation is that a period of urban prosperity is often followed by a period in which negative aspects disturb or jeopardise urban development and economic growth. The negative aspects can take various forms, depending among other things on the

National Urban Policies: The Situation in the Mid-1990s

19

phase of urbanisation, the excess supply of workers, the qualitatively trailing supply of labour, the disintegration of the economic basis, congestion, a less attractive living environment, etc. The situations can increase social discrepancies among the demographic categories in an urban region. Such discrepancies often find expression in the spatial pattern. A feature of most urban regions is that the problem categories are left in the least attractive parts of the core city, while the intermediate classes move to suburban municipalities. That situation is typical of, among other countries, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Austria and Sweden (the ‘second cities’ only). In other urban regions, the socially weak are, on the contrary, found mostly in the suburbs (France, Finland, Stockholm). Finally, there are countries where the social discrepancies manifest themselves in the core cities as well as in the suburbs (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Greece). In most national reports it was stated that social segregation puts the economic function of cities in jeopardy. The tenor is that urban regions in particular are increasingly beset with serious social problems, mostly through extensive unemployment. That tendency was recently (the early 1990s) observed even in such newly urbanised countries as Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Austria. Administrative and Financial Frameworks The member states also differ widely in administrative structure. Two main types can be distinguished: unitary states (12) and federal states (three), but these main types show great diversity, for instance in the number of administrative levels. Moreover, the roles, functions, competencies, services, budgets, income sources, expenditures, etc. tend to be differently divided between the administrative levels of a country. As a detailed overview of administrative and financial aspects would stretch beyond the framework of this inventory, only a bird’s eye view of aspects, which may help to compare and interpret national urban policy, is presented here. Once again, this overview dates from 1997, so changes may have taken place in since. Administrative Structures Of the 12 unitary states, France, Italy and Spain have four levels of administration. In the 1970s the regional level in these countries was considerably empowered, primarily to decentralise certain competencies. In 1978 Spain reinforced the position of the 17 ‘autonomous communities’ to such an extent that a ‘quasifederal constitutional setting’ can be said to have ensued (Pola, 1996). Three-tier structures are found in the three northern countries and The Netherlands. In the 1990s Ireland and Greece followed thanks to the creation of an intermediate, regional level. In most of these countries the regional level counts for less than the local level in task load, budget and influence. That is specifically true of the three northern countries, where local autonomy is rather strong. Finally as

20

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

far as the unitary states are concerned, there are the two-tier states: the United Kingdom, Portugal and Luxembourg. The United Kingdom was not fully twotier, however. Above the diversity of local administrative units (London boroughs, metropolitan districts, unitary councils and districts), in the non-metropolitan parts of England there is an intermediate level, the counties. The intermediate level in the metropolitan regions (in the shape of metropolitan counties and regional councils) was abolished in the 1980s. In addition, the United Kingdom is the only member state where the central authority has retrieved responsibilities from the local administrative levels. In Portugal the creation of regions has been under discussion since the 1970s, so far without concrete results. In the federal states of Germany, Austria and Belgium the intermediate level (Länder in the German-speaking countries) has responsibilities that compare to those of national governments in the unitary states. Austria has three administrative levels. Germany has two levels in the city states of Hamburg and Bremen, three levels in the larger cities in the remaining Länder, and a second local level in the non-urban areas to coordinate the smaller municipalities. Belgium has four administrative levels. It has the most complicated administrative structure within Europe, with not only three regional units (Flanders, Walloon and the Brussels region) but also three cultural units (Dutch-, French- and Germanspeaking communities), which do not fully coincide. Centralisation versus Decentralisation: Urban Autonomy The increasing decentralisation of responsibilities in some countries has already been referred to. However, decentralisation affects the positions of the cities differently. The opportunities for local authorities to develop an autonomous policy are still relatively limited in France and Italy (although increasing in both countries), and very constrained in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal and Greece. The northern countries and Luxembourg, where local autonomy is in fact the foundation of the administrative system, represent the other extreme (although in Denmark the national government is increasingly assuming control). Relatively much autonomy for the local authorities is also a characteristic of the three federal states and Spain. Where municipalities enjoy a high degree of autonomy the adjustment among municipalities in the same urban region tends to be more difficult, especially in matters of economics or transport. Fragmentation of local policy (reported for Spain, for instance) and intra-regional competition (in most countries) work counter-productively on the development of functional urban regions. Urban Finance The degree of local autonomy is largely tied up with financial relations. This topic appeared to be extremely complex and to deal with it in more detail was beyond the scope of the 1997 exercise. Therefore, some indicative results only will

National Urban Policies: The Situation in the Mid-1990s

21

be presented. There seems to be an almost unlimited variety of ways to acquire local revenue. Local taxation is an important source, but not always the most important, as is evident from the situation in six member states. In Swedish and Spanish cities, local tax returns account for over three-fifths of the total municipal budget. Austria, Denmark, Finland and France follow closely (about half). Income from taxation is relatively low (about one-tenth) in The Netherlands, Greece, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom (Pola, 1996; Committee of the Regions, 1996). However, high tax returns do not always mean more autonomy, for often the levy of taxes is merely the execution of a task imposed by a higher layer of government. Among the purely local taxes, property tax is the most common, albeit in very divergent forms. Income taxes exclusively for local use occur in the Scandinavian countries and Belgium. Local business tax is usual in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Its application is very diverse, for instance on value added, jobs, ‘fiscal potential’, profits, etc. Finally, local authorities can levy taxes on specific items of consumption as well as on specific transactions. Other important sources of income are grants and subsidies allotted by higher administrative levels. Their share in municipal income varies from very low in Sweden, Austria, Spain and Germany (about one-fifth) to very high in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and The Netherlands (between three- and fourfifths). In many countries, block grants have gradually been replaced by specific grants. In Germany, the United Kingdom and The Netherlands a considerable proportion is still paid in the shape of specific grants. The third, ‘non-tax-non-grant’, source of income consists of charges for services and profits from commercial transactions. Especially in Luxembourg, Germany and Austria, this category contributes considerbly to municipal income (over three-tenths). In several countries such revenues are needed to compensate for the loss of income from the state which attends the decentralisation of tasks. Furthermore, the private sector is increasingly involved in the implementation of policy, for instance through public–private partnerships (in many countries) and the privatisation of public services (in particular in the United Kingdom). Finally, borrowing is an accepted way to find funds for investment in most (but not all) member states. From various national reports, the existing national financial frameworks can lead to biased relations because insufficient account is taken of the measure in which the spending of ‘impoverished’ local units is covered by revenue. Core cities in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and The Netherlands in particular appear to encounter difficulties of that kind, which can frustrate their policy actions. In The Netherlands, France, Austria, Finland, Belgium, Sweden and Luxembourg methods of equalisation or compensation have been adopted to relieve or solve such problems.

22

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

The Emergence of Metropolitan Authorities In most countries the existing administrative framework is considered as a complicating factor for the adjustment of supra-local tasks on the metropolitan level. The counter-productive effects of intra-regional competition (for companies and people, or by means of tax facilities) are also pointed out. Some form of administration and management on the level of the functional urban region seems an attractive proposition in that context. European practice, however, displays very few successful examples. Admittedly, in some countries efforts were made in the 1980s or 1990s to stimulate the creation of metropolitan bodies. The legal foundations for it have been provided in Italy (for the 10 largest metropolises) and Portugal (for Lisbon and Porto), but not much actual progress was reported. In The Netherlands plans to form ‘city provinces’ (with regional as well as local tasks to avoid a new tier) for the largest urban regions were cancelled because of a complete lack of community support in the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In Spain (in Barcelona and Valencia) and Germany (in the Ruhr area, Frankfurt, Hanover, Mittlerer Neckar and Berlin/Brandenburg) voluntary public–public partnerships have been concluded, but with rather narrow taskloads and responsibilities. In some cities the functional metropolitan region coincides more or less with a regional administrative unit, which presumably should favour internal adjustment (among others in Madrid, Bilbao, Stockholm, Vienna, Brussels, Hamburg and Bremen). For the Brussels region that is no more than theory since the competency for cultural policies is lacking. The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Denmark and Spain have experimented with forms of metropolitan administration since the 1960s. However, these regional authorities were all abolished in the 1980s for various reasons (political arguments, lack of success, confusion of tasks and responsibilities). In the United Kingdom an authority on the level of the former Greater London Region was proposed (and meanwhile established as Greater London Authority). France is the exception with its Urban Communities. These regional bodies exist alongside the municipal authorities (communes) and have assumed a significant proportion of the metropolitan tasks without encroaching upon the formal autonomy of the communes. Founded in the 1960s – and not abolished as elsewhere – that formula now seems to be successful (in Lille and Lyon, for example). However, not every city can take advantage of this situation (for example, Marseilles). In most other countries the gap in supra-municipal administration is filled by (obligatory or voluntary) cooperation, for instance for the purpose of joint exploitation of public services, or stimulated by European policy, which is primarily addressed to regions.

National Urban Policies: The Situation in the Mid-1990s

2.3

23

Urban Issues and Challenges in National Perspectives

The general conclusion of the 1997 investigation was that in more and more member states attention was being paid to the position and the role of the cities in regional and national development. Of course, the measure of attention is bound up with the degree of urbanisation and the administrative structure. In the federal states of Germany and Belgium many competencies with respect to urban development are vested in the Länder (Germany) or the regions (Belgium), so that the national government looks at the cities from a certain distance. In the other countries of advancing and advanced urbanisation, the importance of a growing number of urban potentials and challenges has been recognised for some time at the national level. In some of the less urbanised countries the debate about the position of cities in national development is underway. At first, attention tended to focus on the growing social-economic problems, but increasingly member states also stress the potential of cities for stimulating the (regional and national) economy. Cumulating Social Problems in Medium-sized and Large Cities Social-economic problems of cities were and still are of important national concern. The investigation confirmed that a growing number of cities were confronted with such fundamental social problems as unemployment, poverty, (youth) crime, arrears in education, drugs consumption and the integration of minorities and persons claiming asylum. The fight against unemployment in particular had a high priority in almost all countries and persistent unemployment was one of the problems that were increasingly concentrated in urban areas. In the early-industrialised north European countries and in the metropolitan regions in Italy and Spain, concentration of unemployment is a well-known phenomenon, but in the other member states, too, it appears to be increasingly an urban concern. In Greece, for instance, unemployment and poverty used to occur mainly in rural areas, but progressive urbanisation has clearly caused a shift to the urban regions. In Finland and Ireland as well, the unemployment problem is shifting from the periphery to the cities. In short, whatever the degree of urbanisation that the member states of the European Union had reached, unemployment notably scourged the cities in the whole of Europe. Besides unemployment, the integration of minorities and asylum-seekers into the urban society claimed much attention from national and local governors. These social groups appear to live mostly in the cities, and their intensive congretation in cities and spatial concentration within cities obstructs the integration. The traditional inflow in many member states from other parts of the world had greatly increased under the influence of the war in former Yugoslavia, especially in the cities of south Germany, north Italy and Austria, which were already very attractive to former Eastern Bloc countries.

24

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

In a growing number of member states, urban safety was becoming increasingly important, and in its wake so were the problems of drug consumption and (youth) crime. Evidently, citizens in the larger cities felt increasingly insecure. The nature and intensity of other social problems besetting the cities, such as the concentration of educational arrears, appeared to be consistent with the degree of urbanisation. That all these social worries were to be found notably in the cities was an interesting finding. But what caused the typically metropolitan problems, explicitly recognised by national governments of the member states, was their mutual reinforcement and their accumulation in certain neighbourhoods of the core cities or in the suburbs. The danger of social-economic and spatial segregation, a situation in which exclusion from the labour market, educational level, ethnic descent and social origin raise barriers to a certain group within the urban community, was recognised in all (to some degree) urbanised member states. Balanced National Urban System In some countries the national authorities attach great value to a balanced development of the national urban system. Their interest springs on the one hand from the desire to limit regional discrepancies in economic and social development, and on the other from the growing recognition of urban centres as potential engines of (peripheral) backward areas. France particularly looks upon the biased relation between Paris and the other major cities as an obstacle to the latter’s development and as a threat to the national competitive position. The Finns regard a more balanced spread of urbanisation as a comparative advantage. Germany, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and more recently Belgium are all to some extent striving for a balanced national urban development. Infrastructure and National Housing In Spain, Portugal and Greece urbanisation has only gained momentum in the last few decades. Their governments have had little hold on the urbanisation process, and there was no question of coordinated spatial development. Through the lack of coordination and the speed of the urbanisation process, the pressure on the existing urban infrastructure (road network, public transport) has risen to unprecedented levels, despite significant investments in the late 1980s and 1990s. With the access to urban centres and hence their economic potential in danger – even more so because most of the population travels by car – the national governments in those countries naturally very much want to raise the level of the infrastructure provisions. Despite a long-standing planning tradition, the rapid urbanisation in Spain (in, for example, Barcelona) has also created a restricted housing market, the metropolitan areas having a great shortage of adequate and reasonably priced housing. In Portugal, too, housing was high among the government’s priorities. However, other countries also stressed the developments in

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25

the housing market: for instance, the federal government of Germany mentioned the availability of affordable housing as a priority. Urbanisation, Accessibility and the Environment: Growing Awareness of Sustainability The advanced urbanisation in the Union makes sustainable development extremely important, especially in the urban regions. In such regions accessibility, quality of the environment and economic development are closely interwoven. In all member states these aspects are perceived as important urban issues and at the same time give direction to some of the policy responses. In Spain, Portugal and Greece the accent was mainly on infrastructure and accessibility, which does not detract from the growing importance of the environment. In more urbanised countries like The Netherlands and Germany, and also in Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the value attached to the environment rises all the time, which, however, does not make accessibility less important. It does mean that high standards were set for new infrastructure and that much attention was also owed to excellent access by public transport, especially in urban centres. Cultural Heritage In many of the member states cities are regarded as elements of the national cultural heritage. Some cities represent a unique and increasingly valued combination of history, tradition and characteristic buildings and conservation of historical and cultural values is a major concern. But the conservation and maintenance of such carriers of cultural heritage can also contribute to the attractiveness of cities and the appeal of the residential and living environment. In short, cultural heritage has acquired economic value as well as value as a location condition and in the shape of urban tourism. 2.4

National Policy Responses in the 1997 Investigation

In Chapter 1 the distinction between explicitly city-oriented policy and policy measures that, while having a great impact on cities, are not explicitly tailored to them was explained. These policies are themes of sector policy or specific groups in society. Some countries try to pursue an explicit urban policy. The vision underlying that policy and the instruments that were put in for its implementation are dealt with below.

26

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

The United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands: Examples of Explicit National Urban Policy The United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands had advanced most in substantiating the (heightened) interest for cities into explicitly city-oriented policy. In the United Kingdom such a policy had been conducted since the late 1960s, but the approach, the priorities and the financing have altered in the course of years. The policy in force in 1997 (City Challenge, initiated in 1992 and in 1994 combined with the Single Regeneration Budget) emphasised the economic revitalisation of urban regions. As in the United Kingdom, in France the foundation for explicit national urban policy was laid in the 1960s with the policy of Métropoles d’Équilibre, continued since 1990 in the form of the Chartres d’objectifs (large cities charters), which came under the Ministry of Public Works and the national physical planning office (DATAR). The latter body is also responsible for the policy of Réseaux de Villes (urban networks). In addition, the socially-oriented measures of national urban policy have been combined in the Contrats de Villes (urban contracts policy), often jointly with the Programmes d’Aménagement Concerté du Territoire (Integrated Territorial Planning Programmes). In The Netherlands, policy-makers had already shown early interest in explicit urban development, in particular in physical planning. In the late 1980s this explicit attention on urban issues was broadened to other policy sectors as well, mainly because of the aggravating social-economic problems of the cities. On the initiative of the four largest cities the so-called Grotestedenbeleid (major city policy) was launched, in 1994. This policy can be considered the first comprehensive explicit national urban policy in The Netherlands. Visions and Objectives Underlying Explicit National Urban Policy In the 1980s in the United Kingdom the focus of national urban policy was on the economic performance of the cities, economic and physical regeneration being key concepts of policy. The adjustment to the City Challenge policy did not shake the foundations of that vision, but served to give investment in, and preservation of, social and human capital its proper place. In France most efforts and resources have been directed towards combatting social discrepancies amongst and within cities. The Contrats de Villes focus on fighting the concentration of arrears and spatial and social segregation, whereas the policy pursued to reinforce the position of medium-sized cities (Large City Charter), is economic in nature: its main objective is to restore balance to the national urban system. The Dutch major-city policy is concerned not only with the problems of the major cities but also with their economic potential. The government regards cities as the engines of the national economic, cultural and social development, and

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27

has woken up to the fact that this motor function is impeded by social problems. The major-city policy is supposed to change that situation. National Urban Policy: Top-down and Bottom-up? The relation between the national government and the local authorities determines to a high degree the principles and implementation of policy. The choice of a policy directly addressing cities is inspired by (among other considerations) the belief that an area-based policy can deal with the specific problems of cities better than other types of policy, and thus increase its effectiveness. On the whole, the position of the national government in the United Kingdom towards the cities was reinforced in the 1980s, giving it more control over local policy. Nevertheless the government’s intention is to have its explicit national urban policy given substance on the local or regional level, the initiative being not by definition with the local government but with local and regional partners, often a coalition of public, semi-public and private parties. These development corporations are required to define a wider vision for their area and to link programmes, projects, resources and mechanisms to that vision in a strategic way. On that basis, the cities have to vie for payments from the available funds. In France, the local authorities were given more room to maneouvre in the 1980s. However, the influence of the national government is still large, one explanation for which is the traditional centralist structure of the French public administration. Representatives of the national government exert substantial influence on regional and local development, inter alia through the allocation of resources, specifically in the Chartres d’objectifs but also in the Contrats de Villes. The Dutch national government hopes that the major-city policy will create the right conditions to enable local authorities to tackle the problems themselves. The national government has reserved to itself a coordinating, and in some areas a controlling, part but the cities have to give substance to the policy. The Integrality of Explicit National Urban Policy In the United Kingdom the principle was that integrality should be encouraged at the national and local level. The four ministries most involved in the national urban policy (Environment, Employment, Training and Industry) worked together in the newly-created Government Offices in the Regions. To stimulate cooperation on the local level, only qualitatively good and comprehensive plans were accepted for financing. The philosophy underlying that strategy is that competition between local plans will push up their quality. In France, integrality is an aspect of the Contrats de Villes, which are put up for discussion among the parties involved, who then try to reach agreement on a joint approach. However, integration referred only to social questions, for integration with economic policy was not guaranteed. The Chartres d’objectifs do not aim at

28

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

integral policy on the local level, but great store is set by an integral development of the national urban system. The medium-sized cities involved are committed to choosing an economic specialisation for the sake of proper national spread. One spearhead of the Dutch major-city policy is to make policy more comprehensive, not only at the national level in terms of input from the (11!) ministries involved, but also at the local level, where bottlenecks in the approach to metropolitan problems are just as likely to develop when one-sector initiatives are not properly adjusted. A comprehensive approach implies a restyling of administrative culture at the national as well as the local level. Explicit National Urban Policy and the Channelling of Financial Flows The explicit policy in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands is supported in the two countries by different methods of financing. In the United Kingdom, the City Challenge programme has been completed with the Single Regeneration Budget, in which all urban regeneration funds of the above-mentioned ministries have been combined. Moreover, the funding of local initiatives was not a matter of course. Several local plans competed for the available resources (31 out of 57 proposals were accepted). In The Netherlands, too, the idea of a fund coupled to the major-city policy was considered, but in the end the decision was to channel the financial flows within each department concerned and give the municipalities more freedom of expenditure, thus widening their scope for independent policymaking. In The Netherlands as well the quality of the local plans is tested by the national government. In France, local authorities are less free to dispose of their means. The state furnishes the money needed and also monitors its spending. Spatial Scope: City or Urban Region? The spatial scale of the Dutch major-city policy is in certain respects an impediment. The policy focuses on municipalities rather than on urban regions. Within the city borders there is room for spatial flexibility. In the United Kingdom, the explicit national urban policy is not tied to administrative borders: the national government deals with ‘urban areas’. In France, too, the spatial scope is wider, because the state bargains with the regional bodies and allocates its resources through the regions. That spatial flexibility is indeed necessary, since certain problems cannot always be solved within the borders of an administrative spatial unit, but the solution might be found in a neighbouring commune. Ireland: Urban Renewal Act The national policy in Ireland was not comparable to the explicit policies conducted in the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and France. Most Irish national policy affecting cities was sector-based policy, but Ireland also pursued explicit urban policy of a kind in the shape of the Urban Renewal Programme

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29

ensuing from the Urban Renewal Acts of 1986 and 1987. These Acts focus first and foremost on the redevelopment of urban areas, in particular the Irish inner cities. The first emphasis is on physical regeneration, but schooling opportunities and the quality of the living environment also figure in the programme, although the financial structure of the policy has stimulated mostly commercial development (offices). At first, the policy addressed only a few zones in five cities, but in 1997 100 programmes were operative in 35 urban centres. In contrast to, for instance, Dutch urban renewal, which addressed not only the cities but all local units. Irish renovation is mainly directed to the inner city areas. This policy was co-funded from the European Union. Spatial Planning and Sector Policies Alongside explicit urban policy responses, in 1997 we found that the United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands pursued a broad range of other national policies that have a major impact on cities. These policy responses still took up a great part of the policies that influence urban development. In the other member states (with the exception of Ireland mentioned above) national responses to urban issues and challenges had not yet been shaped into explicit national urban policy. In these countries the national policy responses were to be found in the spatial planning policy and other sector policy measures. Italy and Portugal: Cities in Discussion In Italy, until the 1990s there had been very little interest in the problems of cities. Since 1990 a different course has been taken: a law has been passed to open the way for administration on the level of the metropolitan region, though no final decision was taken in any of the selected urban areas. The remaining sector policy also takes the cities into account. The government aimed at more integration in land management, urban planning and environmental policies, to achieve the sustainable development of urban areas. Explicit national urban policy had become a Portuguese concern in the 1990s. The possibility of a more explicit national urban policy was being considered, in particular the coordination of such a policy on the national level, among the ministries most involved. The Ministry of Equipment, Planning and Territorial Administration (MEPAT) coordinates a programme initiated in 1994, a programme explicitly oriented to the development of urban centres outside the metropolitan regions of Lisbon and Porto. In a sense, the EXPO ’98 project was an exponent of national urban policy, because it was an initiative of the national government, which was also the leading partner in the firm EXPO ’98 which carried out the project. The government considered national urban policy a matter of growing importance, because it perceived a distinct role for the larger cities in the internationalisation of the Portuguese economy. Such a policy can be implemented only if, in the eyes of the government, certain conditions are fulfilled.

30

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

The Special Position of the Federal States and Spain As a result of the administrative organisation in the federal states of Germany, Belgium and Austria, as well the administrative organisation in Spain, the national governments in these states are not in a position to pursue explicit urban policy to the same extent as the United Kingdom, France or The Netherlands. The intermediary level of government comprises most of the competences for urban policy. In fact, some of these ‘regional’ authorities can be considered ‘urban regions’: Hamburg and Bremen are Länder, Brussels is one of the three Belgian regions, the Madrid region is an autonomous community and the Vienna region is one of the Austrian states. In Germany, most competencies are on the level of the 16 states and on the local level. At the national level there is some influence on urban development, more particularly by formulating the guidelines and principles for spatial development. The most important task of the federal government is to create the marginal conditions for the lower authorities, and notably to put certain matters of urban interest on the agenda, such as the importance of sustainable urban development. The German government tries to give increasing substance to that task in view of the intensifying international competition between cities and the necessary spatial integration of the ‘new German cities’. In Belgium many of the responsibilities concerned with urban development are vested in the regional authorities. Under the physical planning policy of the Belgian state, relatively much has been invested in the infrastructure needed for cities (among other things, the connection to the European high-speed rail network). Before Belgium became a federal state there was not really a national vision on urban development, nor has federalisation changed that. This is changing now on the regional level. Concern for the situation of cities has increased and a vision for urban development is being developed as a first step to a more comprehensive approach. The measures carried through in the early 1990s were mostly sector bounded, and few efforts were made to harmonise policy initiatives. In the fight against urban poverty the Flemish government integrated a number of individual measures into the Social Impulse Fund (SIF). The regional government allocated funding to the cities with the largest problems on the basis of locally-formulated comprehensive plans. In Austria urban development became a concern during the 1990s, when suburbanisation increasingly encroached on the scarce space and increased the need for infrastructure. The national government drew up a framework for spatial development and gathered and distributed information, but the cities remained highly autonomous in their policy-making. Given the progressive suburbanisation and the fact that houses tended to be built on generous plots of land, the expectation was that the national government would place coordinated spatial development higher on the political agenda. In Spain, where the responsibilities are highly decentralised to the autonomous communities, there was no explicit national urban policy either. But sector policy

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in Spain is very relevant to urban development. In the National Infrastructure Plan, the connections between cities and also internal urban transport are important aspects. The consideration is that external and internal accessibility is a necessary condition for economic development. In addition, national housing policy – intended to relieve the tension on the housing market – expressly addresses the cities. The national environmental policy, too, was clearly concerned with the position of the larger cities. However, all policy measures sprang from sector policy and, as in other countries, the (seven) major cities have pointed out the drawbacks for the quality of urban development. They argued for an approach in which the major cities themselves can take decisions and thus stimulate a more comprehensive urban development. Nordic Countries: Explicit Regional Policies with Increasing Attention to Cities In Denmark, Sweden and Finland, until the 1990s urban development had given less rise to explicit urban policy. In these counties the main focus was on explicit regional policies. The functioning of cities is becoming an increasingly important part in these policies. More and more, cities are seen as stimulators of regional development. In Sweden a high degree of local autonomy is laid down in the Constitution and, moreover, Sweden is not yet very urbanised: the national government has thus felt no urge to conduct an explicit urban policy. Nevertheless, in the context of regional policy, a study was made of the problems of the major metropolitan regions of Sweden, the conclusion of which was that a favourable development of the cities could also benefit the development of the regions and the nation as a whole. In Finland the role of cities is placed in the context of regional policy as well: however, some informal research was carried out into the aspects of a more explicit urban policy. One point made in that research is that the cities are in potential the engines of future economic growth. The government appointed a working group, consisting of representatives of the ministries and the cities, which will study urban questions. One important task of the working group was to exchange experiences and best practices, and another was to draw up a document in preparation for a more explicit urban policy. In Denmark, Copenhagen is by far the largest city: with one-third of the population living in the Greater Copenhagen area, a policy explicitly addressing cities is a delicate matter. Internationalisation and increasing awareness of the environment are important aspects of Danish physical planning and regional policy. Against that background, the government encouraged the creation of strategic networks between cities (exchange of knowledge, check on unhealthy competition) and the planning of urban and regional development from a national point of view.

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

The Impulse of European Programmes: The Greek Experience In Greece, an explicit national urban policy did not yet figure on the national agenda in the 1990s, although Athens has benefited from national decisionmaking. The reorganisation of the administrative system in the 1990s implied that it has become possible to make a first step towards explicit national urban policy. The Greek cities have been given more attention within sector policies such as transport policy. Moreover, extensive support from the European Union put urban development higher up on the national political agenda and policy measures with a clear urban dimension were initiated in the framework of European programmes. Bilateral Consultation in Luxembourg It is understandable that Luxembourg did (and does) not pursue explicit national urban policy. Policies with regard to the Luxembourg City were mainly formulated at the local level. National sector policies, in particular housing and physical planning, are coordinated through bilateral consultation between the national and local levels. Increasing Attention to Intercity Links: Urban Networks In a growing number of member states the physical and ‘material’ connections among the cities in the national urban system have received high priority. A large part of the national infrastructure investment in Spain goes to cities’ external and internal accessibility. In Germany the links between cities play an important role in the integration process of cities in the former German Democratic Republic. Moreover, in most of the countries the focus is not only on national links between cities, but increasingly on the links with other cities in Europe as well. The Trans European Networks policy has been integrated into the national policy framework of many countries. In France, the national government pays special attention to cities situated on main European corridors and to those with an important logistic function. The Dutch physical planning policy and transport and infrastructure policy attributes considerable weight to the accessibility and the national and international connections of the major cities. The Danish, German and Italian national governments promote the starting-up of strategic networks between cities. The Öresund link between Copenhagen and Malmö is another example of a new – physical – link.

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2.5

33

National Urban Policy in Perspective

Ring Zones around Major Cities Show Strongest Growth In spite of wide differences in the degree of urbanisation, the structure of the national urban systems and the development phase at which the various urban regions found themselves during the mid-1990s, there were some similarities among the member states (see also Table 2.2). Urbanisation was advancing most rapidly in those countries that were until then hardly urbanised. Urban growth manifested itself more in the ring zones around the major cities than in the core cities themselves. In all instances, the ring zones of the largest cities were the fastest growers. The result is a progressive concentration of activity in the largest urban regions. That process was especially striking in the countries with relatively late urbanisation. Exclusion and Segregation as Major Urban Problems Social exclusion and spatial segregation in urban regions are major problems in quite a number of countries. The highest concentrations of problems such as unemployment, low residential quality, crime, vandalism, health concern were found in urban regions, often in the central cores, sometimes in the suburbs and sometimes in both (see Table 2.2). There are sizable differences in the degree to which major cities are threatened by social, living-climate and safety problems. The typically urban problems seemed to develop fast in those countries that until recently had remained unaffected. Increasing Policy Decentralisation Differences in administrative and financial structure within Europe appeared to be exceptionally wide. These differences affect urban development and the nature and form of the national policy with respect to the cities. On the other hand, the administrative and financial structures are highly dynamic. The 1980s and 1990s have shown drastic administrative changes in at least seven of the 15 member states. With the exception of the federalisation of Belgium, almost all changes have given shape to a wish for more decentralisation of competencies in those countries which in the past had a strictly centralist government system. Another exception is the United Kingdom where, conversely, the central authority had assumed more power at the expense of the competencies of local authorities. There are wide discrepancies in the degree of autonomy between the cities of Europe. Autonomy ranges from all-but-none in Greece to all-but-complete in Sweden. Although the tendency towards decentralisation is manifest, that does not invariably mean that the formal responsibilities and opportunities to conduct an autonomous and integral policy on the municipal or metropolitan level have been much extended.

Table 2.2 Urbanisation, spatial patterns, social problem concentration, large cities and national populations in EU-countries (1990–1997)

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom

Degree of urbanisation

Balanced system

Principal city

Problem concentration

Cities >100,000

low high high low average high average low average high high low average low high

no yes no no no yes no no yes yes no yes no yes

yes no yes yes yes no yes yes no yes no yes no yes yes

Inner cities Inner cities Inner cities Inner cities Suburbs Inner cities Both Both Both Suburbs Inner cities Both Both Both Inner cities

6 8 4 6 46 83 6 3 45 0 23 5 48 11 57

1 2 1 1 3 8 1 1 4 0 2 1 3 1 7

7.8 10.0 5.2 5.0 58.0 81.3 10.3 3.6 57.9 0.4 15.5 9.3 39.3 8.9 58.1

351

36

370.6

EU total Source: van den Berg, Braun and van der Meer, 1998.

Urban regions >1 million

National population

Year

1991 1995 1995 1996 1990 1997 1991 1996 1991 1996 1996 1991 1995 1996 1991

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Decentralisation and Local Budget Cuts Concerning municipal finance, no clear trends were perceivable although the observation was warranted that, as decentralisation proceeds, the grants allocated by the state are reduced. On the other hand, specific grants have been gradually supplanted by generic grants. The cities have been forced to compensate the reduction by raising or introducing new charges, levying local taxes or involving the private sector (public–private partnership and the privatisation of public services). Although in some countries the national government tried to adjust the means given to cities in proportion to their real needs by financial equalisation, in many countries the largest central cities find themselves in worse financial straits, and thus seriously hampered in the pursuit of their policy. Little Progress for Metropolitan Government Metropolitan authorities were few and far between in the EU. In 1997 we counted 25 of them, of which 10 were Communautées Urbaines (urban communities) in France. Of the others, some coincide with a higher administrative level and the remainder were created on a voluntary basis, with hardly any authority. In Italy and Portugal the law provides for the formation of metropolitan administrations, but no great progress was made with implementation. In The Netherlands, plans for creating ‘city provinces’ (combining regional and local tasks and responsibilities) have been cancelled due to lack of social support for administrative reorganisation in the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In the other countries, ‘urban management on the right level’ did not seem to have political priority. National Frameworks and Degree of Urbanisation Influence National Policy Response It is difficult to separate the national perception of and priority given to urban issues and challenges from the similarities and differences in the national spatialdevelopment pattern and the administrative and financial framework. In countries where much authority is vested in the local government, the national government will intervene less explicitly in the debate and give less attention to details. But in all those countries where urbanisation began early, the typical metropolitan problems have been high on the agenda for quite some time. Increasingly, the same problems have started to confront countries that were late urbanisers. In the strongly-urbanised Netherlands, for instance, the predicaments of cities were receiving full attention, but in countries where the urbanisation degree is still below the European average too (such as Portugal and Finland) the way things are developing was seen as a threat. Sustainable urban development has become a primary concern wherever a balance has to be struck between the economy, transport and the environment. The accents varied among the member states:

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

while Portugal and Greece and to a lesser degree Spain and Italy gave priority to the adjustment and expansion of urban infrastructure in response to their poorly coordinated urbanisation, Germany, The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries were more inclined to relate accessibility to the environment. The approach to urban problems, dependent as it is on the spatial development but also – and especially– on the administrative and financial organisation, has increasingly become a matter of public concern. In the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and France, urbanisation and the related social problems have given rise to an area-oriented, more-or-less comprehensive policy, targeted explicitly on cities. In Ireland too, an explicit national urban renewal policy has been adopted. In some countries where the urbanisation pattern might also have given rise to such an explicit national urban policy, the lack of it can be explained by the specific administrative situation (in the federal states Germany, Belgium, Austria and, albeit less so, Spain) or the spatial conditions (the relation between Copenhagen and the rest of Denmark, and the position of Luxembourg City within the Grand Duchy). In some less-urbanised, non-federal states (notably Portugal, Italy, Sweden, Greece and Finland) policy attention on urban development was increasing. The observation, however, was that in all member states, even those practising explicit national urban policy, most of the national policy that affects the cities was spatial-planning policy and sector policy. Within those policies, the relevance of the cities was increasingly recognized. But the adjustment of the policy efforts deserved more attention, for urbanisation is progressing in the European Union. The logical consequence is that national urban development appears increasingly on the political agendas of the national governments of the member states. Nevertheless, during the mid1990s the majority of EU-countries had not yet proceeded to a genuine, explicit, national urban policy. Vision, Strategy and Cooperation as Ingredients for a Balanced Urban Development The development of an explicit national urban policy seems highly relevant to the future prosperity of the member states. That position is strongly supported not only by the arguments offered above, but also by the fact that cities are increasingly functionally related. To achieve a balanced urban development, national governments need a clear vision of the preferable evolution of the cities. Naturally, that vision should do justice to the development potentialities of the cities and their important role in stimulating wider regional and national development. One of the conclusions of the 1997 investigation into national urban policies was that the voice of the cities should be heard in the development of a national urban policy. Cities themselves also need a clear vision and strategy as a basis for their own policy, to increase their own competitiveness and to deal adequately with their social problems. An indispensable element of such a strategy is good

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cooperation with the higher authorities, based on a jointly-evolved vision of urban development that is advisable at the local, regional and national levels. Such cooperation is conducive to the most efficient use of resources available for urban development. In that context it should be kept in mind that strategic cooperation between cities and the higher authorities cannot remain confined to one country, since united Europe is diligently striving to strengthen its own competitiveness. From the European point of view as well, and with the cities’ function as economic engines in mind, making the most of their economic potential is of the essence. What has Changed since 1997? The information and expectations in this chapter date from about seven years ago. Meanwhile, important changes may have taken place and the need is felt to discover what has happened since. Have national urban policies that do justice to the potentials as well as to the need to support the European cities in their efforts to prevent and solve the grave social problems which are confronting them been designed? In what way has the European Commission continued to show its concern with urban development? These and other questions will be answered in the chapters devoted to the national urban policy of the 15 ‘old’ member states. References Committee of the Regions (1996), Regional and Local Government in the European Union, Brussels. Pola, G. (1996), ‘Summary of Comparative Study’, in Local Public Finance in Europe (Seminar proceedings), Siena, Italy: European Commission DG XXI and Ministerio delle Finanze. Van den Berg, L., Braun, E. and van der Meer, J. (1998), National Urban Policies in the European Union. Responses to Urban Issues in the Fifteen Member States, Aldershot: Ashgate.

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Chapter 3

The Urban Dimension in European Policy: History, Actors and Programmes1 3.1

Introduction

Inside the European Commission (EC) there are different points of view on urban policy. Despite the fact that many Directorates General (DGs) produce policies that have an impact on cities, the only Directorate General involved practically in the development of an urban policy is the DG Regional Policy. Nevertheless, the focus of this DG is on regions and not on cities; regional policy clearly has priority over urban policy. Moreover, the fact that every six months a different member state has the Presidency of the European Union (EU) has a huge influence on the urban agenda of the Union, as urban policy’s position in the priority list changes continuously. Finally it should also be noticed that in each DG the role and importance of the city is quite different and this, of course, makes the possibility of discussing a common EU urban policy more difficult. In section 3.3 the role of some DGs and other institutional actors most involved in urban policy will be discussed. Despite the fact that in the last few years it has been realised that the development of an urban policy at the European level is necessary, most member states have never fully supported the strategy of the Commission simply because they were of the opinion that urban policy is a national matter. In the last 20 years, according to the principle of subsidiarity, there has been a tendency inside the EU towards decentralisation. Although the majority of member states like the idea of Brussels decentralising, it appears that most of them do not want this decentralisation to reduce their competences in favour of the regions. There is a lack of a common consensus among member states on the development of a European urban agenda. The next section will describe how the influence of the EU on cities has evolved in the last 10 years. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will briefly review the present urban dimension of the different policies promoted by the EU, focusing on the DGs and other institutional actors (section 3.3) and on the programmes (section 3.4) specifically meant for cities. Section 3.5 will conclude the chapter. 1

This chapter was co-authored by Dr G. Mingardo.

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3.2

Development of the Urban Dimension in EU Policy

The Treaty gives the EU plenty of scope for the development of a regional policy but it gives no competence to develop an urban policy. Regional policy is one of the tools the Community uses to pursue the ‘reduction of disparities between the levels of development of the various regions’ as quoted in art. 158 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The European Union’s Regional Policy is based on financial solidarity among member states: this means that part of the Community budget goes to less prosperous regions. On the other hand, the text of the Treaty does not consider the concept of city and, therefore, does not authorise the EC to develop a specific urban policy. A review of the most important steps made by the EC towards an urban policy can be made only in the wider context of the development of the EU Regional Policy.22 Concerning the urban dimension of the EU policy, five stages can be identified according to the Community programming periods. Stage 1 (1975–1988) From its beginning the European Community aimed to achieve political integration through economic integration. At the end of the 1960s it was clear that this economic integration could be achieved only if the gap between the poorest and richest regions was reduced. In 1975 the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created with the aim of redistributing part of the Community budget to the poorest regions. The creation of the ERDF officially set the beginning of the EU Regional Policy that in its first stage could count on less than 5 per cent of the European Community budget (Tofarides, 2003). In 1986 the Single European Act set the basis for a genuine cohesion policy designed to offset the burden of the single market for the less favoured regions. It involved an increase in resources allocated to EU Regional Policy. In 1987, when the Single European Act came into force, the Regional Policy could count on 7 billion ECU, equal to 19 per cent of the Community budget. Even if in the 1980s the focus at EU level shifted from the development between regions to the development inside regions, we can argue that at this stage there is no evidence of an urban dimension of the EU policy. Stage 2 (1989–1993) Indeed, it was only in the 1990s that the EU realised that cities were the places where most of the problems and of the opportunities of regional development were concentrated. Therefore it was recognised that more attention to the functioning of cities was needed as a stimulus to economic integration in Europe. 2

A brief review of the EU Regional Policy for the actual programming period 2000–2006 can be found in Annex 1.

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In February 1988 the European Council in Brussels boosted the EU Regional Policy with a drastic reform of the Solidarity Funds (nowadays known as Structural Funds) allocating 68 billion ECU to them (at 1997 prices). In 1992 the Treaty on European Union, which came into force in 1993, set cohesion as one of the main objectives of the Union, alongside economic and monetary union and the single market. The same Treaty created the Cohesion Fund to support projects mainly in the field of environment and transport in the least prosperous member states. There were three main reasons for this first reform: the entry in 1986 of Spain and Portugal into the Community (representing the less developed countries of the Union); the fundamental importance of economic and social cohesion for further integration set by the approval of the Single European Act; and the urgent need felt to make these structural measures more effective. The increased attention by the EU on the urban issue at this stage was influenced by the Cheshire Report (1988), which highlighted the fact that many cities were in a period of decline. In 1991 this led the EC to make a proposal to modify the Treaty in order to grant the Commission a formal competence in urban policy but member states rejected this proposal. Following this failure to acquire a Treaty basis for action, EU Urban Policy developed through a number of instruments within the existing framework of Regional Policy (Tofarides, 2003). In 1992 the Parkinson Report – suggesting that the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s could have considered as a demographic and economic renaissance of many (large) European cities – gave a further stimulus to the EC to pursue the urban issue (de Lange, 1999). The Urban Pilot Projects (UPP) set up by Art. 10 of the ERDF represented the first attempts of the EC to come up with an (explicit) urban dimension to its Regional Policy. In practice this programme was restricted to some specific themes, because of the Structural Funds regulations. In any case, in spite of these restrictions, the UPP was a successful experience and had the opportunity to show the EC the potential of an (explicit) urban-related programme. Stage 3 (1994–1999) In December 1993 in Edinburgh the European Council operated a second reform of the Structural Funds (formerly known as Solidarity Funds): it almost doubled the financial allocation to them compared to the previous period (177 million ECU at 1999 prices). This means that one-third of the Community budget was allocated to the EU’s Regional Policy. In 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam confirmed the importance of cohesion and stressed the need to work together to reduce unemployment. In May 1997 European Commissioner Monika Wulf-Mathies presented the discussion paper ‘Towards an Urban Agenda in the European Union’, which gave an analysis of problems and opportunities of European cities. This discussion paper provided the groundwork for the Urban Audit I, a pilot project where data

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on strengths and weaknesses of European cities would be statistically inventoried. In June of the same year, during the Dutch EU Presidency, an informal meeting of EU ministers for spatial development took place where one of the topics on the agenda was the urban dimension of the EU policy. Both events seemed to increase the EU’s attention on the problems of cities, but no concrete decisions on the institutionalisation of EU urban policy were taken. In October 1998 the EC published ‘Sustainable Urban Development in the European Union: A Framework For Action’, where the main pillars for an urban policy were set. The Urban Forum which took place one month later in Vienna represented an important step in the development of the urban dimension of EU policy since, for the first time, both the member states (with the Informal Meeting of Ministries) and the EC showed their willingness to pursue the development of a common urban policy. The experience and lessons of the first phase of the Urban Pilot Projects, launched in stage 2, led to the adoption of two programmes specifically targeted on cities. In 1994 the EC launched the Community Initiative URBAN, aimed at tackling issues of urban regeneration and cohesion. In 1997 the second phase of the Urban Pilot Projects was launched, covering 26 new (pilot) projects in urban areas with a total budget of 163.2 million ECU (at 1998 prices). URBAN I was the first Community Initiative entirely dedicated to the problems of cities to be approved by the member states. Stage 4 (2000–2006) The European Council held in Berlin in December 1999 decided a third reform of the Structural Funds and adjusted the operation of the Cohesion Fund. In the seven-year period 2000–2006 the two funds received €213 billion. The guiding principle in this third reform of the EU Regional Policy has been to focus further on assistance to regions whose development is lagging behind. The Structural Funds have the effect of enabling the least wealthy member states to achieve higher levels of investment in human and physical capital in developmentally more backward regions than would otherwise be the case, so helping to improve their long-term competitiveness. In 2000–2006 transfers are estimated to amount to around 9 per cent of total investment in Portugal, 8 per cent in Greece, 7 per cent in the Italian Mezzogiorno, 4 per cent in the German new Länder and 3 per cent in Spain (European Commission, 2004). In the present programming period more attention is being paid to cities that have been recognised as the engines of regional development. Moreover, the implementation of the Regional Policy has been simplified by reducing the range of assistance measures: this mainly involves the Structural Funds whose priorities – named objectives – have been reduced from seven to three. Besides the Community Initiative URBAN II – which continued the positive experience of URBAN I aiming at promoting sustainable development in troubled urban districts – the launch of URBACT – whose aim is to develop

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transnational exchange of experiences and good practices – and the launch of the second phase of the Urban Audit, a large part of the financial resources of Objectives 1 and 2 of the Structural Funds is directly or indirectly aimed at urban-related measures. Indeed, it has been estimated that more than €15 billion (approximately 7.7 per cent of the Structural Funds) are provided under the mainstream programmes of Objectives 1 and 2 aimed mainly at regenerating city centres (European Commission, 2004). Objective 2, whose general aim is to revitalise areas facing structural difficulties, makes specific mention of urban areas in a crisis situation. Stage 5 (2007–2013) For the Stage 5 programming period the EC seems to be more committed to the development of the urban dimension of its policy. Building on the success and the strength of the URBAN Initiative, the Commission intends to reinforce the place of urban issues by fully integrated actions in this field into the programmes (European Commission, 2004). A further simplification of the functioning of the Cohesion Policy, which also includes the regional and urban dimension of the EU policy, has been proposed. From the present nine objectives (not to be confused with the Objectives 1, 2 and 3 of the present Structural Funds: see Figure 3.1) and six financial instruments the future Cohesion Policy will be based on three objectives implemented through three financial instruments. The proposed three new objectives are: 1) convergence and competitiveness; 2) regional competitiveness and employment; and 3) European territorial cooperation. The three financial instruments that will remain are the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund (see Figure 3.1). It is still unclear where the new urban-related programmes will be positioned in the new proposed structure. More commitment towards the urban issue will be also asked of member states. This means that at the beginning of the 2007–2013 programming period each member state will propose a list of urban areas that could benefit from a specific action within the regional programmes. This will be part of the new initiative named URBAN+ that will probably cover a larger number of cities than the 70 today covered by the URBAN II initiative in the EU-15. According to the EC, a critical factor in the success of urban actions is the involvement of city authorities both in the design and management of programmes: therefore it has been recognised that a sub-delegation of responsibilities from member states to city authorities is necessary within the regional programmes. Table 3.1 offers a brief summary of the different stages that characterise the development of the urban and regional dimension of the EU policy. A comparison of the main statistics of the different programmes directly meant for urban areas can be found in Table 3.2.

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Figure 3.1 The proposed objectives and financial instruments for the Cohesion Policy in the programming period 2007–2013 Source: European Commission, 2004.

3.3

Urban Dimension in the EU Policy: The Actors

The object of this section is to present a brief description of the urban dimension of the policies carried out by the EU. We will start with a review of the main actors whose activities have influence on cities. In section 3.4, the programmes that shape the urban dimension of the EU policy will be analysed. The actors who are directly or indirectly related to the promotion of the urban dimension inside the EU policy can be classified into two groups: the Directorates General of the EC and the other institutional actors relevant to European cities.

Table 3.1 Summary of the stages of EU Regional Policy and its urban dimension EU Regional Policy

Urban dimension in the EU policy

Stage 1 1975–1988

Creation of the ERDF. The Regional Policy starts to be considered as a tool to reach economic integration.

Not yet existing, not even implicitly as part of the Regional Policy.

Stage 2 1989–1993

First reform of the Solidarity Funds (nowadays known as Structural Funds). The Regional Policy is considered one of the most important ways to achieve economic integration inside the EU. The creation of the Cohesion Fund is especially meant for the poorest countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece).

The EC starts to realise the need to focus on the urban dimension of its policy. UPP represents the first attempt of the EC to have an explicit urban policy.

Stage 3 1994–1999

Stage 4 2000–2006

Stage 5 2007–2013 ( policy)

Second reform of the Structural Funds: the European Council doubled the financial allocations for them. Now one third of the Community budget is booked for Regional Policy. The Treaty of Amsterdam stresses the importance of cohesion.

The EC pushes towards the development of an urban policy. At the same time some member states consider the necessity of it (first Informal Meeting of Ministers focused on the urban issue). The divergence existing between the actors still prevented the institutionalisation of the EU urban policy. The Structural Funds finance two programmes specifically targeted to cities: UPP II and the Community Initiative URBAN.

Third reform of the Structural Funds: they receive 35 per cent of the Community budget. The implementation of the Regional Policy has been simplified: the priorities of the Structural Funds, named objectives, have been reduced from seven to three.

Cities get their official positioning inside the Regional Policy: besides the URBAN II Initiative and the Urban Audit II, also a relevant part of the Objectives 1 and 2 of the Structural Funds is meant, directly or indirectly, for cities. In particular a part of Objective 2 is dedicated to ‘urban areas facing structural difficulties’.

The priorities and financial instruments of the Cohesion Policy will be further simplified. There will be three main priorities: 1) Convergence and competitiveness; 2) regional competitiveness and employment; 3) European Territorial Cooperation. And three financial instruments: the Cohesion Fund, the ERDF and the ESF.

The EC shows more commitment towards the urban issue and proposes to involve city authorities from member states on urban-related issues. The URBAN+ Initiative will represent the main expression of the urban dimension of the EU policy.

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Table 3.2 EU programmes specifically directed at cities Programming period

Programme /cities

1989–93 1994-–99 ECU163.2m 1994–99 1994–99 2000–06 2000–06 2000–06

UPP 1 UPP 2

2007–13

URBAN I Urban Audit I URBAN II Urban Audit II OB 2 – Urban areas in difficulty URBAN+

No. of projects

33 26 118 58 70 258 Data not available >70

Budget investment

Total

ECU 102m ECU63.6m

ECU 204m

€900m €2.2m €728m €1.6m** Data not available

€1.8b €2.2m* €1.6b €2.0m** Data not available

10% Cohesion Policy budget

* The first phase of the Urban Audit did not involve co-financing. ** Regarding the EU 15.

DGs Relevant to the Urban Issue Several DGs are directly or indirectly involved in urban-related issues. DGs who can be considered to have a substantial impact on urban problems are those for Regional Policy, Employment and Social Affairs, Transport and Environment. While the DG for Regional Policy is the DG with the largest and most visible impact on cities, the DGs for Transport and for Employment and Social Affairs have less urban-related programmes but their impact on the functioning of European cities cannot be considered as less important, but just focused on another scale (respectively TENs and employment). The DG Environment has scarce financial resources but can issue directives that can affect quality of life in urban areas. The policy of these DGs is the subject of this section. DG for Regional Policy According to articles 158 and 160 of the Treaty, the DG for Regional Policy is the Directorate of the EC responsible for the measures implemented by European Union to assist the economic and social development of the less-favoured regions. The mission of the DG for Regional Policy is to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion by reducing disparities between the levels of development of regions and countries of the European Union. By cofinancing infrastructure projects, developing the information society, accelerating the transfer of know-how, supporting investments in people and stimulating cross-border cooperation, the DG helps regions that are less prosperous or are suffering from structural problems to improve competitiveness

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and to achieve a faster rate of economic development in a sustainable way (European Commission – DG for Regional Policy, 2004). The DG for Regional Policy is in charge of the administration of three major funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund and the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA). Despite the fact that the DG for Regional Policy focuses on regions, it promotes several programmes that have an influence on the socio-economic functioning of cities. It can be considered as the DG with the highest influence on the urban dimension of the EU policy. Since the programming period 1989–1993 the main programmes focused on urban-related issues carried out by the DG for Regional Policy were the Urban Pilot Projects 1 and 2 (1989–1999), the URBAN I initiative (1994–1999), the Urban Audit I and II and the URBAN II (2000–2006) (see section 3.4). The DG for Regional Policy also plays an important role in managing the resources of Objective 2 of the Structural Funds dedicated to urban areas facing structural difficulties. DG for Employment and Social Affairs The two main social goals of the EU are stated in the Treaty: 1) the promotion of high level of employment and social protection; and 2) the raising of the standard of living and quality of life and solidarity among member states. The White Paper on Social Policy issued in 1994 clearly says that, besides efficient and innovative economic activities, preconditions for improving competitiveness are a good quality of life and socio-economic cohesion within and among regions. Following the introduction of a new title on employment by the Amsterdam Treaty in November 1997, member states – recognising the need to act collectively to prevent and tackle unemployment at EU level – launched the European Employment Strategy (EES). Many European Councils provided fundamental orientations for the EES but surely the most important was the Lisbon European Council (March 2000) where the EU set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (Directorate General Employment and Social Affairs, 2004). From the beginning the EES supported the development of a territorial dimension of employment policies based on the belief that success in the fight against unemployment and social exclusion in Europe requires the mobilisation and support of all resources available, especially at regional and local levels. The main financial tool to implement the EU employment policy is the European Social Fund (ESF). Created in 1957, the ESF aims to promote a high level of employment, equality between men and women, sustainable development and economic and social cohesion in Europe. In the present programming period the ESF contributes to finance part of the programmes under Objectives 1 and 2, all programmes under Objective 3 and the EQUAL Community Initiative.

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The DG for Employment and Social Affairs’ main aim is to develop a sustainable European Social Model that leads to a society with more and better jobs based on equal opportunities. It has a key role in the interaction of economic, social and employment policies of the EU. Most of the problems with which the DG is concerned are concentrated in urban areas. Therefore the programmes supported by the DG have substantial influence on the socioeconomic functioning of European cities. DG Transport The main lines of the EU transport policy are presented in the White Paper ‘European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide’ (European Commission, 2001). It proposes some 60 specific measures to be taken at Community level under the transport policy in order to pursue the long-term strategy towards a sustainable transport system. Some of these measures are: turning intermodality into reality, building the Trans-European Networks (TENs), adopting a policy on effective charging for transport and developing high quality urban transport. Inside the EU transport policy the development of the TENs has the highest priority. Initiated by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the TENs can be considered as the first attempt since Roman era that Europe thinks about transport systems going beyond national boarders (European Commission, 2002a). The Barcelona Council in 2002 revised the guidelines of the TENs by strengthening the priority given to the first series of projects and by selecting six new priority projects among which the development of the Galileo satellite system and the crossing of the Pyrenees by rail. Because the TENs are often intended to connect urban regions with one another, they will have a strong impact on the development of cities. Moreover, the DG Transport, in cooperation with the DG Energy, has developed a new strategy on Clean Urban Transport. Among the different initiatives there is the CIVITAS initiative, launched by the EC in 2000, where €50 million has been earmarked from the budget of the 5th Framework Programme. The aim is to support cities in introducing innovative measures to radically improve urban transport in order to achieve a significant change in the modal split towards sustainable transport modes. Finally the importance of the DG Transport for urban-related measures can be observed from the two explicit references that the EU White Paper makes to cities. Recalling that the common transport policy alone will not provide all the answers, the White Paper highlights that the transport policy should be part of an overall strategy integrating sustainable development that includes land use policy and in particular town planning (in order to avoid unnecessary increase in mobility) and urban transport policy in large cities. DG Environment The DG Environment’s main role is to initiate and define new environmental legislation and to ensure that measures that have been agreed are actually put into practice in the member states. Even if the DG does not have substantial (financial) resources to control developments through subsidies, it can

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exert considerable influence on urban regions by issuing directives concerning, among other things, emissions from vehicles and industries, quality of air, quality of swimming and drinking water. Efforts to influence developments through directives take a lot of time (sometimes 10 years may go by before a directive becomes effective at the local level). Therefore the DG Environment tries to use pilot projects and the stimulation of urban networks to that effect. One of these networks, the Sustainable Cities Campaign, seems to be particularly relevant at the urban level. At the end of the first European Conference on Sustainable Cities and Towns, which took place in Aalborg (Denmark) in 1994, the European Sustainable Cities and Towns campaign was launched with the adoption of the Aalborg Charter by nearly 2,000 local authorities in Europe. The Charter provided a framework for the delivery of local sustainable development that could help cities to engage in Local Agenda 21 processes and clearly stated that cities are the places where problems could be turned into opportunities for development. A group of 10 networks of cities and towns active in different aspects of sustainable development have joined together to form the campaign and to support local authorities in their work on local sustainable development. Another important project at urban level is the European Common Indicators initiative, which is focused on monitoring environmental sustainability at local level. The European Common Indicators are a set of indicators that can help a town or city interested in the quality of its urban environment to begin to monitor progress. The focus of the initiative is on helping towns and cities monitor their own progress. Other DGs In view of the fact that most of the EU Regulations could affect the functioning of cities, other DGs with urban-related projects worth mentioning are the DG Research and the DG Education and Culture where we find, among other things, programmes such as ‘Cultural Heritage and City of Tomorrow’, ‘European Cities of Culture’ and ‘Town Twinning’. Other Institutional Actors Relevant to the Urban Issue With respect to the influence of the EU on the socio-economic functioning of cities there are various relevant actors involved. Their interests and their actions regarding the development of the urban dimension of the EU policy differ; therefore in this section a brief overview of the interests, opinions and actions with respect to some of the institutional actors relevant to urban-related issues will be given. The European Parliament In the last 15 years the European Parliament has been active in promoting the interest of cities, especially through its Committee on Regional Policy, Transport and Tourism. Among its other responsibilities, this Committee is responsible for the development of a European regional planning

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policy, including an urban policy. During the 1990s the Committee on Regional Policy has been the main inspiration for the Community Initiative URBAN. The Committee of the Regions The Committee of the Regions was created by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty as an advisory body to the European Parliament and serves as the representative voice of local and regional authorities. Its members are elected regionally or locally. There were two main reasons for setting up the Committee of the Regions. Firstly, most EU legislation has been implemented at local or regional level and thus it makes sense to have regional and local representatives involved in the development of new EU laws. Secondly, there was concern that the citizens were left behind as the EU developed as political entity. The Treaty forces the EC and Council to consult the Committee of the Regions whenever new proposals are made in areas with repercussions at regional or local level. These areas are economic and social cohesion, employment policy, social policy, TENs, environment, health, education, culture, vocational training and transport. In 1996, in preparation for the Intergovernmental Conference, Commission Four of the Committee of the Regions, the Commission for Urban Policy, drew up a paper on urban policy postulating that, until that moment, the urban policies conducted by the EU lacked of cohesion. The final suggestion of Commission Four was to institutionalise the urban policy by giving the EU the power to develop an explicit policy for cities. European Investment Bank The European Investment Bank’s (EIB) mission is ‘to further the objectives of the EU by making long-term finance available for sound investment’ (www.eib.org). Created by the Treaty of Rome and with the member states as stakeholders, the EIB raises funds on the capital markets in order to help the finance of investment projects promoting the development of the Union, especially in less developed regions. The lending activity of the EIB focuses on five operational priorities among which is ‘regional development and economic and social cohesion within the Union’, which serves to co-finance the projects financed by the Structural Funds, some of which have a substantial influence on urban level. Finally, the EIB has an important part to play especially in the financing of the TENs. Eurostat Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Community. Its main mission is to provide the EU with a high-quality statistical information service that enables comparisons between countries and regions. Eurostat plays a key role in the supply of statistics to DGs, the Commission and other European institutions in order to allow them to define, implement and analyse Community policies. Eurostat has a special working party on ‘Urban Statistics’ which plays an important role in the development of the Urban Audit Database, whose main purpose is to better understand the challenges of the urban development. Moreover, the statistics provided by Eurostat are useful for the EPSON research

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projects of spatial planning and for the URBAN II project targeted at urban regeneration. Eurocities Eurocities is a network of local governments that represents more than 118 major cities in some 31 European countries. It works with the European institutions on behalf of the cities on a wide range of issues affecting local authorities, and enables the exchange of best practices in local governance among its members. The main aims of Eurocities are to ensure that urban affairs are placed high on the European Union’s policy agenda, to promote transnational cooperation projects among its member cities across Europe and to foster a networking spirit amongst Europe’s large cities. Among the institutional actors analysed in this section, Eurocities is the only one not established directly by the EU. 3.4

Urban Dimension in the EU Policy: The Programmes

This section will continue the analysis of the urban dimension of the EU policies started in section 3.3 by focusing on those programmes that are specifically meant for urban areas. As well as the URBAN Community Initiative, probably the most city-oriented programme of the EC, Objective 2 of the Structural Funds will also be discussed in this section since it formally includes a section dedicated to urban areas facing structural difficulties. A brief report on the proposed urbanrelated programmes for the next programming period (2007–2013) will conclude the section. The URBAN Community Initiative URBAN is one of the Community Initiatives financed by the Structural Funds and launched by the EC with the aim ‘to find common solutions to problems affecting the whole European Union’. This Community Initiative is focused on the promotion of innovative strategies to regenerate cities and declining urban areas and represents an example of the urban dimension of the EU policy. In the last two programming periods two phases of this Community Initiative have developed: URBAN I (1994–1999) and URBAN II (2000–2006). Its follow up for the next programming period (2007–2013) will be called URBAN+. URBAN I Following the (positive) pioneering experience of the Urban Pilot Projects, in 1994 the EC decided to launch the Community Initiative URBAN with the aim of tackling issues of urban regeneration and cohesion. URBAN I targeted neighbourhoods in extreme deprivation addressing the problems of isolation, poverty and exclusion of their inhabitants through interventions aimed at a better physical and social environment. Neighbourhood deprivation aggravates an individual’s problems; in turn, social exclusion and lack of economic opportunity

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make the individual hostile to his/her environment. URBAN I introduced a new integrated approach to fight this vicious circle aiming at revalorising the individual through his/her environment and not in spite of it (Directorate General for Regional Policy, 2004b). In other words it tried to solve the problems of urban deprivation at grassroots level. Under the URBAN I initiative 118 programmes were funded, covering approximately 3 million people; 86 per cent of these programmes were located in cities with a population of more than 100,000 inhabitants (GHK, 2003). The areas covered by URBAN I were areas suffering from high unemployment (average rate 22 per cent), poor housing conditions, declining urban fabric and a lack of social amenities. URBAN I introduced a spatially-focused approach that maximises the impact of the interventions; each programme covered around 5.8km2, mainly a single neighbourhood or administrative district. The programme was targeted mainly at peripheral urban areas (38 per cent of programmes) and inner city areas (32 per cent). Historic city centres accounted for 19 per cent of programme areas and 12 per cent were focused on neighbourhoods with ‘mixed’ characteristics. A total of 82 per cent of programmes were located within Objectives 1 and 2 areas. Of these, 75 per cent foresaw a strategic link between the mainstream Structural Funds programmes and URBAN. These links were often facilitated by a common management structure at city level. This helped ensure coordination and complementarity between EU programmes (GHK, 2003). URBAN I programmes, whose total allocated EU funding was €900 million, have been co-financed by two Structural Funds: 83 per cent by the European Regional Development Fund and 17 per cent by the European Social Fund. The estimated total eligible investment for the 118 programmes was approximately €1.8 billion: other sources of finance were represented by national, regional and local authorities as well as by the private sector (GHK, 2003). URBAN I can be considered as a consolidation of the positive experience gained through the Urban Pilot Project and as a fundamental step in the development of the urban dimension of the EU policy. The combination of URBAN with existing regeneration projects, the synergies among the different selected URBAN projects and the active participation of local communities in the management and implementation of programme can be considered as the main factors supporting the success of an URBAN project. Some problems arose regarding the lack of support from the private sector and the difficulty in understanding EU documents and procedure by those involved in the programmes. URBAN II URBAN II builds on the positive experience of URBAN I and represents the Community Initiative for Sustainable Development in the troubled urban districts of the European Union for the actual programming period 2000–2006. It is based on the guidelines drawn up by the Commission, whose aims are to finance projects that can improve living conditions, create

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jobs, integrate the social excluded, develop environmental friendly public transport and facilitate the use of information technologies. In order to assist urban areas in crisis URBAN II focuses on three main actions: 1) physical and environmental regeneration; 2) social inclusion; and 3) entrepreneurship and employment. Some very important features of the URBAN II programmes are: targeting small (deprived) areas, focusing on social inclusion and integration of minorities, the formation of local partnerships and the exchange of experience and best practices. URBAN II involves 70 programmes covering approximately 2.2 million inhabitants. The contribution of the European Regional Development Fund is €728 million, generating a total investment of approximately €1.6 billion. The Structural Fund can contribute up to 75 per cent of the total costs of the programme for urban areas included in Objective 1 and up to 50 per cent elsewhere. Highest priority is given to programmes including physical and environmental regeneration (40 per cent of the total). The other two axes – social inclusion and entrepreneurship/employment – account for a further 42 per cent. The rest is for transport- and IT-related programmes. Of the 70 programmes there are 31 inner city areas, 27 peripheral areas, four mixed areas and eight entire cities (European Commission, 2002b). Table 3.3 summaries the main statistics concerning the two phases of the URBAN Community Initiative. Table 3.3 Comparison of the two phases of URBAN

URBAN I URBAN II

Number of projects

Population covered

Allocated EU budget

Estimated total investment

118 70

3.0m 2.2m

€900m €728m

€1.8b €1.6b

A particular feature of URBAN II is the provision for exchange of good practices across Europe. In order to get this aim a specific programme, named URBACT, has been created. URBACT The URBACT programme is part of the URBAN II Community Initiative. It aims to develop transnational exchange of experience between actors, whether cities or other partners, URBAN programmes or URBAN pilot projects, and to capitalise on these projects, drawing lessons from the results, successes and weaknesses noted (European Commission, 2002c). The URBACT programme, proposed by the French Ministry of Urban Policy in accordance with the other

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member states, has a budget of almost €25 million: approximately €16 million is provided by the European Community and the rest by the member states. In the setting up of the URBAN Community Initiative, the EC indicated that each programme should also provide assistance in the exchange and dissemination of experience and good practice. This exchange of information should lead to a knowledge base whose aim is to generate a reflection on the EU urban policy and the relative urban dimension of the Structural Funds for the next programming period (2007–2013). While the URBAN programmes already include technical assistance for their own implementation, URBACT is meant to develop other types of action as the creation of transnational networks for exchange of experience, for the capitalisation of the urban-related measures undertaken by the EC and for the discussion on the future urban dimension of the EU policy. At the moment several network proposals have been approved or are in the process of approval regarding different topics such as social inclusion, physical regeneration of urban areas, employment, urban crime prevention, youth, citizens’ participation, transport and environment, training and the inclusion of ethnic minorities. Urban Audit In June 1997 the EC decided to launch the Urban Audit project, whose pilot phase began in May 1998. This project was undertaken under the aegis of Article 10 of the ERDF Regulation which enables the support of innovative measures by the EC (source: DG for Regional Policy website). The Urban Audit’s main aim is to enable an assessment of the state of individual European cities and to facilitate the exchange of comparative information among them. The management of the Urban Audit is jointly carried out by the DG for Regional Policy and Eurostat. The indicators of the Urban Audit can be classified in five categories: socio-economic aspects, participation in civic life, education and training, environment, culture and leisure. Even if it can still be considered as a ‘work in progress’, the Urban Audit has had a rapid development: from the 58 cities invited to participate in the pilot phase, it can now count on the involvement of 258 European cities. The success of the second phase of the programme is highlighted by the fact that all central statistic bureaus of the member states are now involved in the Urban Audit II. Trying to solve some of the problems that occurred with the UPP, especially the problem connected to the lack of comparable data among European cities, the Urban Audit has the potential to become an important and powerful advisory tool for cities. Objective 2 of the Structural Funds Almost all the financial resources of the Structural Funds for the programming period 2000–2006 was used on three clearly-defined priorities, known as Objectives: Objectives 1 and 2 are territorially-oriented while Objective 3 is

The Urban Dimension in European Policy: History, Actors and Programmes

Figure 3.2 The European cities involved in the different networks created by URBACT Source: URBACT webpage.

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thematic. Objective 2 aims to revitalise areas facing structural difficulties, whether industrial, rural, urban or dependent on fisheries. Despite being situated in regions whose development level is close to the Community average, such areas are faced with different types of socio-economic difficulties that are often the source of high unemployment (Directorate General for Regional Policy, 2004a). Objective 2 receives €22.5 billion, which is 11.5 per cent of the Structural Funds budget for the programming period 2000–2006. Regions included in Objective 2 host 18 per cent of the EU population. The kind of difficulties faced by Objective 2 areas also include declining urban areas where long-term unemployment is above the Community average and where there are high levels of poverty and crime couple with a low level of education and acute environmental problems. The 18 per cent of the European population covered by Objective 2 comprises 8.5 per cent in industrial areas, 5.2 per cent in rural areas, 1.9 per cent in urban areas, 0.3 per cent in areas dependent on fisheries and 2.1 per cent in mixed areas (Directorate General for Regional Policy, 2004a). From these figures it seems that the urban issue is under-represented; in reality many urban areas are represented in the category ‘declining industrial areas’. This also means that it is quite difficult to quantify the precise amount of financial resources that, under the mainstream programmes of Objective 2, are specifically dedicated to urban-related issues. It has been estimated that more than 10 per cent of the Objectives 1 and 2 budget is aimed, directly or indirectly, at regenerating urban areas (European Commission, 2004). Compared to the programmes for areas eligible for Objective 2 and 5b funding in the programming period 1994–1999, the programmes under the present Objective 2 are less focused on infrastructure and more on the stimulation and creation of (alternative) activities that can help declining urban areas to overcome their problems. Even if there is a clear package of measures for urban areas in Objective 2, the impact on cities still cannot be considered as successful as the impact generated by the URBAN Initiative. Firstly, the Objective 2 measures are still characterised by a ‘top-down’ approach: there has been very little decentralisation of management and the member states still have most of the power to decide how these programmes should be carried out. This leads inevitably to a lower degree of partnership at regional and local level. Moreover, the priority of Objective 2 actions is still focused on the economic rather than on a social aspect. Finally, the programmes aimed at urban regeneration under Objective 2 still do not represent as clear a brand as programmes specifically meant for the urban issue do: among city authorities especially the urban-related programmes of Objective 2 do not have the same image as the URBAN Initiative Programmes.

The Urban Dimension in European Policy: History, Actors and Programmes

Figure 3.3 Eligible regions for Objectives 1 and 2 in the programming period 2000–2006 Source: DG for Regional Policy webpage.

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The Future Programmes (2007–2013) As reported in section 3.2, for the next programming period (2007–2013) the EC seems to be more committed towards the development of the urban dimension of its policy. The present proposals, not yet approved by the member states, focus both on the new phase of the URBAN Initiative and on a more clear urban dimension inside the Cohesion Policy. The proposal for the continuation of the Community Initiative URBAN, whose name will be URBAN+, represents a very ambitious programme, whose aim is to get 10 per cent of the financial resources of the three new objectives of the future Cohesion Policy. This relatively high financial request – compared to the preceding periods – has the final aim of creating a stronger brand for the URBAN Community Initiative: in other words, they want to make it clear that URBAN+ represents financial resources that the EU wants to dedicate to the cities. The proposed URBAN+ Initiative should differ from the actual URBAN II in a number of ways. First of all, it has been proposed to abandon the ‘micro-zone’ approach typical of URBAN (in the first phase of this Initiative, for example, the average area covered by each programme was 5.8km2 – usually one single neighbourhood) in favour of a more region-wide approach. A second important difference should be a shift in the focus: the new URBAN+ will use not only a problem-solving approach but also an opportunity-based approach, meaning that the new Community Initiative will focus not only on the solution of existing problems but also on the stimulation of (potential) opportunities in depressed urban areas. Moreover, in the proposed URBAN+ more commitment towards the urban issue is also asked from member states; each member state should propose a list of urban areas that could benefit from the URBAN+ Initiative and in which the Member State itself is willing to co-invest to integrate the financial resources of the Initiative (European Commission, 2004). Finally URBAN+ should have a bigger budget compared to the present URBAN II and, therefore, cover a greater number of cities than the 70 covered in the present programming period. The proposed simplification of the Cohesion Policy functioning for the programming period 2007–2013 will also affect the urban dimension of the EU policy. As we have seen in section 3.2, the new Cohesion Policy will be based on three new objectives implemented through three financial instruments. At the moment it is still unclear where the new urban-related programmes will be positioned in the new proposed structure: while the URBACT will probably become part of the new Objective 3 (European Territorial Cooperation), it is still not clear where the URBAN+ Initiative will be allocated.

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Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to make an analysis of the development of the urban dimension of the EU policy. This section is a summary of the that development. The EU Treaty gives the EC plenty of room for the development of a common regional policy but, since there is no mention of the concept of city, there is no competence to develop a common urban policy. As a consequence of this the urban dimension of the EU policy has to be found mainly within the framework of the EU Regional Policy and is somewhat fragmented within some other fields of interest (represented by various DGs). Different stages can be identified in the development of the urban and regional dimension of the EU policy. With the creation of the European Regional Development Fund in 1975 the EU officially started its Regional Policy, considering it as a tool to pursue the economic integration among its member states. In this first stage, which lasted till 1988, there was no focus on the urban issue. It was only in the programming period 1989–1993 (stage 2) that the EC started to realise the importance of an urban dimension to its policy and launched the Urban Pilot Projects as a first official attempt to focus on cities. In the third stage, programming period 1994–1999, both the EC and the member states seemed to be more committed to the institutionalisation of an EU Urban Policy, but no concrete decisions were taken. In this stage there were two urbanrelated programmes financed by the Structural Funds: the second phase of the Urban Pilot Projects and the Community Initiative URBAN. Finally, it can be argued that in stage 4, the actual programming period (2000–2006), the urban issue has found its official positioning inside the EU Regional Policy: indeed, as well as the second phase of the Community Initiative URBAN, a relevant part of Objectives 1 and 2 of the Structural Funds is meant, directly or indirectly, for cities. In particular Objective 2 has a specific part dedicated to urban areas facing structural difficulties. It can be stated that the attention to cities over the years has considerably increased, but always under the umbrella of regional policy. The proposals for the next programming period (2007–2013) see an increased focus on urban issues both from the EC and from the member states. In any case, the urban dimension of EU policy will remain in the framework of the regional policy. Several actors are directly or indirectly related to the promotion of the urban dimension of the EU policy. On the one hand, there are some Directorates General that are involved in urban-related issues, such as the DG for Regional Policy (with the largest and most visible impact on cities), the DG Employment and Social Affairs, the DG Transport and the DG Environment. On the other hand, there are other institutional actors, such as the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, the European Investment Bank and Eurostat, that have, at different levels, an influence on the functioning of urban areas.

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Finally, this chapter has given an overview of the most important EU programmes specifically developed for cities. The most explicit city-oriented programme undertaken by the EC is the Community Initiative URBAN whose focus is on the promotion of innovative strategies to regenerate cities and declining urban areas. Built on the (positive) pioneering experience of the Urban Pilot Projects, the URBAN I and II Initiatives have targeted more than 180 urban areas and neighbourhoods in extreme deprivation, addressing the problems of poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and environment. The proposed continuation and expansion of this Community Initiative in the programming period 2007–2013 will take the name of URBAN+. In the present programming period (2000–2006) also Objective 2 of the Structural Funds has a specific part dedicated to urban areas facing structural difficulties. It has been estimated that more than 10 per cent of the Objectives 1 and 2 budgets of the Structural Funds aims, directly or indirectly, at regenerating urban areas. References De Lange, C. (1999), ‘Naar een stedelijk beleid in de Europese Unie’, in F. Evers, B. Waterhout and W. Zonneveld (eds), Europa in stad en land, The Hague: NIROV, pp. 105–15. Directorate General for Regional Policy (2004a), Objective 2. Revitalizing Areas Facing Structural Difficulties. Directorate General for Regional Policy (2004b), Urban Community Initiative 1994– 1999. Directorate General Employment and Social Affairs (2004), The EES: A Key Component of the Lisbon Strategy. European Commission (2001), ‘White Paper – European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide’, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. European Commission (2002a), Trans-European Transport Network – TEN-T Priority Projects, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. European Commission (2002b), ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – The Programming of the Structural Funds 2000–2006: An Initial Assessment of the Urban Initiative’, Brussels, COM (2002) 308 final. European Commission (2002c), ‘The Urbact Programme 2002–2006 – URBAN II Community Initiative’, report, Brussels: European Commission. European Commission (2004), A New Partnership for Cohesion Convergence Competitiveness Cooperation, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. European Commission – DG for Regional Policy (2004), Annual Management Plan 2004, Brussels. GHK (2003), ‘Ex-post Evaluation Urban Community Initiative (1994–1999) – Final Report’, Brussels.

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Tofarides, M. (2003), Urban Policy in the European Union – A Multi-level Gatekeeper System, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Web References http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/objective2/index_en.htm, accessed 13 April 2004. http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/urban2/urban/initiative/src/frame1.htm, accessed 8 April 2004. http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/index_en.htm, accessed 13 April 2004.

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Chapter 4

Austria: No National Urban Policies Friedrich Schindegger1

4.1

Introduction

Austria is a federation of nine states (Länder). The capitals of eight states are centres of metropolitan regions. The most significant is the city of Vienna, which is at the same time one of the states and the federal capital. As an urban area Vienna has a population roughly equal to that of the seven other (Länder) capitals and their catchment areas. While Vienna could be considered a large city by international standards, the others are only medium-sized cities. This strong imbalance between Vienna and the other cities of the urban network in Austria has historical roots – Vienna was capital of the Danube monarchy up to 1918. In addition to the prime city of Vienna, the following city size classes can be discerned: • •

•

four large state capitals are monocentric city regions: Linz, Graz, Salzburg and Innsbruck; two smaller state capitals; Klagenfurt in sort of a twin-city relation with neighbouring Villach and Bregenz as part of the polycentric Rhine ValleyLake Constance area; St Pölten is a special case: it became the state capital of Lower Austria only in the 1980s and is a relatively small city region.

These cities may be considered the main regional centres of Austria, containing about half of the population and gaining about two-thirds of the GDP of the country. Looking at the Austrian city system in the context of the distribution of cities in central Europe it becomes clear that the spatial distribution of the Austrian cities usually is perceived from an island perspective, focusing only on the Austrian territory. However, the full integration with the neighboured candidate countries to be expected within the next years needs a borderless perspective in order to observe and assess spatial conditions and their changes. This perspective shows some potential for polycentric development. In particular, this applies to the case of the Greater Vienna Region. Around a core with the two major 1

Austrian Institute for Regional Studies and Spatial Planning.

Figure 4.1 Map of Austria and surrounding area

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cities (and national capitals) Vienna and Bratislava there is a circle of small and medium-sized cities in a distance of 60–80km maximum. In an even wider European perspective this ‘twin-city metropolitan area’ may be considered the core area of Central Europe likely to become a new ‘global economic integration zone’ (see European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), 1999). The pattern of the spatial distribution of cities in Austria has been rather stable during many decades. The changes of population did not cause major changes in the settlement structures. An exception is the suburbanisation that is progressing dramatically and – by increased mobility and growing commuting distances – is going ‘to jump into a second circle’. It is driven by: • •

• • • 4.2

a strong increase in the number of households as compared to population trends; a societal preference for a very low-density style of residential areas (detached single-family houses) throughout attractive landscapes surrounding the cities; the strong efforts to improve the rail and road networks in the urban agglomeration areas; the ‘outmigration’ of logistic, manufacturing and service enterprises following the labour force and households to the suburban areas; an increase in the demand for land utilised per workplace. No National Urban Policy At All

There is nothing that could be called urban policy in Austria, either on a national or regional level. The most recent report on spatial planning from the Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning (ÖROK, 2002, p. 132)2 describes the situation as follows: On behalf of the federal government no measures concerning only urban development were pursued because this is an objective belonging to the competence of the states and municipalities. Of course, on the other hand, the urban regions are not excluded from the federal government’s activities. Among the measures relevant to the urban areas, the report names the science and technology park ‘Tech Gate Vienna’ and several transport infrastructure developments (motorways, high-speed rail, Vienna urban rail system, inter-modal transport nodes).

In additiont, it has to be mentioned that in fact the state governments do not take up the issue of urban policy either, although they could have influence over urban development, especially regarding their competence for comprehensive spatial planning. However, it is common to the general political strategy of all 2 The ÖROK is a platform for spatial planning at national level based on a voluntary political agreement between the partners – federal government, state governments and (associations of cities and) municipalities.

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the state governments that they prefer to focus their development policies on their respective (‘weak’) peripheries rather than their (‘strong’) central areas. Thus, urban policy may be considered being only carried out by the cities themselves. However, this hardly corresponds with the term used internationally. This lack of objective ‘urban policy’ is not because there are no social, economic and environmental issues that occur mainly in cities and urban areas in Austria too, as well as in other European countries. The difference in the way other countries have made these issues a topic of a paricular policy may be derived from the framework of constitution and from the financial endowment of the municipalities. First of all, the Austrian constitution does not mention urban policy as a field of activity and competence of the federation (Bund); it does not even provide a competence for spatial planning for the national government. Therefore, there is no federal ministry for spatial planning that could deal with matters such as urban politics. Initially it seems appropriate to give an explanation of the concept of spatial planning (Raumordnung) as used here. Spatial planning is understood to mean the entirety of measures by public territorial authorities of both sovereign territorial administrative and public business administrative character (see below), which are aimed at forming the common territory according to certain political goals. This refers in particular to economic, social, cultural and environmental conditions. Spatial planning thus comprises not only the planning of land use but also the execution all those measures with territorial and spatial impact that influence the nature of the spatial development of a territory. This applies to the concept as it is used in the official literature. In other words: it may be considered being the intention of authorities responsible for spatial planning. However, in real politics the understanding of spatial planning is mainly related to land-use planning. Austria is a federation of nine states (including Vienna) and has roughly 2,300 municipalities. Political representation and policy-making take place on three levels: federation (Bund), state (Land) and municipality (Gemeinde), which also applies to spatial planning. In practice, this is understood to be a national task which is performed by the federal government, state governments and municipalities in coordination, although this is not explicitly regulated by the constitution (of 1929). According to a decision of the Constitutional Court, comprehensive spatial planning in legislation and execution is the autonomous responsibility of the states, albeit with the significant restriction that the named powers of the federal government regarding important sectoral measures and planning activities with territorial reference remain intact. Among the latter are, for example, railways, the inter-regional road network, forestry and laws relating to water. The consequence in practice is that the federal government and state governments both carry out parallel activities related to spatial development.

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The states have influence over urban development, especially regarding their competence for comprehensive spatial planning based on spatial planning laws. The state governments implement these laws by state development plans (Landesraumordnungsprogramme), sectoral state plans (Landesfachplanungen) and regional development plans ( Regionale Raumordnungsprogramme) in varying numbers and of differing natures. These plans contain objectives and the determination of specific locations; they function as the supralocal framework for the local spatial planning of the municipalities. The spatial planning laws also determine the planning instruments of the municipalities. In addition, states have the duty to supervise municipal planning and to assist municipalities in their work. However, spatial planning at the local level is mentioned in the constitution (since 1962) under the tasks that are the autonomous sphere of competence of (all) the municipalities, i.e. there is no difference between cities and other municipalities. Responsibility for spatial planning at regional level (spatial development issues between state and municipality level) lies with the states. Based on the constitutional right to self-governance of municipalities these enjoy a relatively high degree of independence in administrative matters from the states and the federation. Especially in the light of the autonomy of the municipalities concerning local spatial planning and their competence for the issuance of building permits, one can say that decisions on the development of settlements in Austria are reached mainly on the lower tiers of the planning system. Since the city regions in Austria cover several municipalities, the situation might occur in which municipalities independently, and sometimes even competing with one another, pursue their own spatial development goals. A city region in Austria does not usually act as a uniform planning institution that pursues a common planning goal (there have been no successful new attempts since tye previous report on urban policies in Austria in 1997). Attempts to coordinate action for common goals in a city region exist in the area of Vienna through the Planungsgemeinschaft-Ost (planning partnership East) formed jointly by the states of Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland, which coordinates spatial planning activities that affect the entire region. However, it could not really successfully tackle the problem of competition among municipalities so far. For the urban region of Salzburg, the state resolved a supra-local sectoral plan on the regional level which coordinates settlement development and the location of enterprises between the core city of Salzburg and its hinterland. Another attempt was begun in the urban region of Graz (1999) with the establishment of a regional management focusing mainly on issues related to cooperation between the city area and the surrounding districts and also on development issues in the surrounding area. The regional management – rather successful in several rural regions – is an innovative approach for an urban region in Austria, but it is suffering from resource constraints with only

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2.5 staff financed by public means. Within the urban area there is no governance structure of relevance beside regional management. Beyond the scope of legislative competence, all territorial authorities have the power to implement measures in the sphere of public business administration for which there are no competence limits and which cover economic activities within the scope of private law (e.g. land purchases, investment incentives). Every state has an economic promotion agency that, for example, sets up business parks. Municipalities as well as the federal government and the state governments may own, acquire and dispose of assets of all types as business entities. They may operate business enterprises, administer their own budgets and write off expenses. Thus they may apply completely independent measures from the sphere of private business administration in order to achieve their spatial planning and urban development goals. The amounts available from the funds, which are important for the political distribution of power, illustrate the situation: of total public expenditures roughly 70 per cent comes from the federation, 15 per cent from the states and 15 per cent from the municipalities. The share of municipalities (including Vienna) in expenditure for activities with strong spatial reference (ÖIR, 1992)3 is much higher, though, (federal 50 per cent, state 20 per cent, municipality 30 per cent). This reflects the significant role played by municipalities as strong factors of influence on spatial impact trends. The main financial sources of all the municipalities come from the tax revenues and duties. The taxation system responsible for the income funds consists basically of federal taxes (roughly 25 per cent), so-called mutual federal taxes (roughly 70 per cent) and municipal taxes (roughly 5 per cent of total tax revenue). Municipalities receive roughly 15 per cent of the mutual federal taxes. The allocation of the mutual federal taxes to the municipalities according to the Revenue Equalisation Law is determined by the number of inhabitants in line with a progressive population scale. This progressive population scale is grouped into four levels of multiples of the population of municipalities. The population number of municipalities with no more than 10,000 inhabitants is calculated using a factor of 1.33; with 10,001 to 20,000 inhabitants, 1.66; with 20,001 to 50,000 inhabitants, 2.0; and with more than 50,000 inhabitants, 3.33. The allocation of mutual federal taxes, therefore, takes into account that larger cities need to fulfil central place functions for their hinterland and must therefore provide more infrastructural services. Thus, the Revenue Equalisation Law forms one of the most important federal regulations that take the special position of big cities into account. It is negotiated between federal government, 3 Expenditures with strong spatial reference are those spent by the public sector that can clearly be traced spatially (all municipal expenditures, measures of regional economic policy) or on that take spatially relevant aspects into account (transportation policy, agricultural policy) or that have the effect of generating varying spatial distribution patterns (educational, housing or health policy) (ÖIR, 1992).

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the union of cities and the union of municipalities4 every three years. Since consensus between the three partners mentioned (and, moreover, with the Länder) is necessary for political reasons, at the end of difficult negotiations marginal changes are usually the outcome. Thus, the rules remain quite stable over a long time. The most important municipal tax is the communal tax of 3 per cent on payrolls of employed persons. It basically determines the financial power of a municipality and for this reason those municipalities with more industry and tourism are financially better off. Horizontal revenue equalisation between municipalities does not exist in Austria. Fees for the use of municipal services (canalisation, water supply, waste disposal, etc.) also contribute considerably to the municipalities’ income. However, these funds are allocated to specific uses and for operating the corresponding infrastructure. Moreover, municipalities are supported in the financing of infrastructure investments in several ways. The most important is the Environment (former Water Management) Fund (at the federal level) followed by state funds and by a separate fund for municipalities, which is administrated by the state (granted according to need). A special kind of support for the bigger cities and their respective urban agglomeration area may be considered the financing of the Integrated Transport Service and Tariff Systems (Verkehrsverbünde). Whereas, for example, in the urban agglomerations of the state capitals the split of total budget (1993) is one third for each partner federation, state and city, the federal capital is in a better situation: the federation receives 50 per cent, the city of Vienna 34 per cent and the surrounding states Lower Austria 15 per cent and Burgenland 1 per cent for rail services (for the bus services the split is 5 0 per cent, 8.5 per cent, 34.5 per cent, 7 per cent, due to the varying geography of commuter flows) (Draxler, 1994). In addition, Vienna gains 50 per cent participation from the federation for underground network development costs. This kind of tailored financial support from the federal level to some cities may be interpreted as kind of an urban policy. However, in Austria it has never been interpreted this way. EU subsidies to cities are granted primarily within the scope of Community Initiatives. Since these are used to fund single projects, they do not really play a substantial role in financing. The cities of Vienna and Graz receive funds from URBAN (see below). Regarding the contents of the overall development policy pursued, the municipalities have a relatively strong position, especially if their finances are also strong due to high tax revenues. Municipalities may apply completely independent measures from the sphere of private business administration (investments, 4

This may be due to the fact that the union of cities (Österreichischer Städtebund) as well as the union of the (smaller) municipalities (Österreichischer Gemeindebund) focuses its activities on negotiating the Revenue Equalisation Law with the federal government every three years. There is no Austrian network of the bigger cities.

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investment incentives) in order to achieve their spatial planning goals. In summary, the basis for spatial development policy in general and urban policy in particular, may be characterised as competences in competition. The municipalities are also in a relatively independent position in ‘horizontal’ relation to each other. Since inter-communal cooperation between the core municipalities and their hinterland municipalities is lacking, competition between the municipalities of a city region for the location of enterprises, jobs, inhabitants, etc. exists. The more jobs there are, the higher is the revenue from the communal tax, and more inhabitants also means a higher share of the funds from the common state taxes. The reason for this is to be found in tax legislation and revenue equalisation between the territorial authorities, which makes the municipalities highly dependent on their own income. This competitive situation is aggravated by the fact that state administrative bodies often see themselves as representatives of the interests of the hinterland municipalities, which are weaker in terms of inhabitants and financially, as opposed to the economically more dominant core cities. The problem is especially acute in the region of Vienna, because Vienna is at the same time state and municipality, while the hinterland municipalities belong to another state (Lower Austria). This rivalry makes a development policy of integration for metropolitan areas much more difficult. In summary, the facts described above may be considered as reasons why no comprehensive urban policy exists on the federal level in Austria. 4.3

The State of the Cities

Due to the total absence of urban policy at the national and the regional level mentioned above (see note to Table 4.1), there are no statistics about urban issues at national level. There is not even any common delimitation of urban areas or regions. Also, there is no monitoring of policy measures relevant for spatial development beyond the regulations of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for the objective areas (until 2000 no major urban areas were part of objective areas). The description of the major urban issues in the previous report (on National Urban Policies in Austria, 1997) with the headlines: • • • • • • •

suburbanisation and land consumption; inefficient utilisation of the infrastructure; environmental problems from individual short distance traffic; declining significance of city centres; social segregation caused by speculative renovation of buildings; integration of migrants; internationalisation;

Table 4.1 Cities and urban regions with more than 100,000 inhabitants in 1996

Note: the ‘regions’ are represented by the surrounding NUTS 3 units due to a lack of common delimitation of urban regions. Sources: Statistik Austria; EUROSTAT, Regio Datenbank; ÖIR: GDP of Bezirke 1995.

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

72

•

the role and function of large cities with regard to the opening of the borders with Eastern Europe may still be considered topical. However, looking to the near future, the accession of the neighbouring countries to the European Union in May 2004 was expected to bring about a dynamisation of the current trends of spatial changes in general and the competition between neighbouring cities in particular.

There is no programme or concept in Austria that explicitly illustrates the national perspective of urban issues and challenges from the standpoint of the federal government. However, Austrian Spatial Development Concept 2001 (ÖROK, 2002) includes a chapter on ‘Urban Regions – Dynamic and Calling for Order’.5 The problems and goals mentioned in that concept may be represented by the headlines from the chapter mentioned above as follows: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

global and international economic competition of urban regions; growing suburbs; change of the functions of core cities; urban regions are agglomerations of traffic; built up or open areas; polycentric and appealing urban regions; decentralised concentration in suburbia; to maintain and promote urban regions as economic centres; urban regions need attractive core cities; sophisticated development of residential areas; controlled change of grown spatial structures; urban regions favoured for public transport; space saving development; to make urban regions capable of acting as a whole – coordination and cooperation as instruments of a pro-active urban region’s policy; to maintain and promote edificial appeal of the core cities; prospective and supra-local coordination of development of building land in suburbia; to achieve multifunctional structures in suburbia; to develop consensual strategies and cooperative instruments, differentiated application of legal instruments; to consider the territorial impacts of fiscal instruments and aids; make urban regions capable of acting – coordination and cooperation as tools of an active urban (region’s) policy.

Within this context one may raise the key question of how the spatial structure of Austria, which has been quite stable for decades, will change under the influence

5

See footnote 2.

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of developing the Trans-European transport networks. The author’s speculation is: •

•

•

upgrading the location of the urban regions of Vienna, Graz and Linz (TTEN), stagnating locations of other medium-sized cities and their regions, in particular in the south of Austria; a future for the cities of Linz and Salzburg as well as Graz and Klagenfurt in the way of functional division of labour (with future daily commuting distances as basis for common development potentials); intra-regional: ongoing suburbanisation at the fringes of major and mediumsized cities.

Such scenarios could serve the opinion-shaping on probable developments and a new discussion about whether and how they can be governed. 4.4

Two Exceptional Cases of Urban Policy: The New State Capital St Pölten and the Initiative for the ‘Vienna – Bratislava Region6

In 1996 the state parliament, state government and the office of the state government of Lower Austria, which had had their seats in Vienna since 1921, moved to roughly 60km to the west of Vienna. The city of St Pölten had been declared the new state capital by a state law issued in 1986. It was preceded by an extensive impact analysis carried out by the Austrian Institute for Regional Studies and Spatial Planning (ÖIR) and a referendum with a positive outcome. The necessary administrative buildings and a culture district had to be built; they are intended to serve as the main centre of cultural activities for the state of Lower Austria. The new government district in St Pölten is a new part of the city close to the old historic city centre. The core of the building complex is the parliament building directly on the river bank, the culture district lies between the historic part of the city and the parliament district. The culture district consists essentially of the State Museum of Lower Austria with the Lower Austrian Art Gallery, a hall for special exhibitions, a festivities hall especially for concerts, the Lower Austrian State Library, galleries, ateliers and restaurants. On the edge of the culture district is the ORF (Austrian Broadcasting Company) headquarters for Lower Austria. The expansion of the city of St Pölten into state capital pursues several spatial planning goals at the same time. The project of the state capital will serve as: • • •

a focus of development for the commuting zones of Vienna and Linz; a bastion of development for the state’s weak areas; relief for Vienna’s urban hinterlands from settlement pressure; 6

According to an agreement with EURICUR instead of ‘National Urban Policies from the mid-1990s up to now’.

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• •

a ‘motor’ of decentralisation; a centre for the endogenous development of the state.

The impact on the spatial structure is related to significant economic effects for the entire state. The predictions of an ex-ante analysis on the investment effects were more than confirmed by an ex-post analysis showing that the total volume of public and private investments of more than €1 billion resulted in an added value for the Austrian economy of more than €0.8 billion and fiscal effects of €0.37 billion (75 per cent of which was additional tax revenue). The specific geographic, social, economic and political situation of a future Cross-Border Metropolitan Region of Vienna-Bratislava with its twin city7 metropolitan area provides a unique setting in the European landscape of cities with a considerable potential intensity for a future cross-border cooperation. There is no official common vision for the Vienna–Bratislava Region, but there are cross-border initiatives that are trying to develop strategies. An important step in this direction was the signing of the ‘Kittsee Declaration’ in the autumn of 2003. The Governors of Burgenland, Lower Austria and Vienna and the mayors of the cities Bratislava, Trnava, Sopron, Györ, Brno, Eisenstadt and St Pölten thus declared their will to establish a close cooperation within theViennaBratislava Region. The aims are: • • • •

rapid social integration within the region; common use and advancement of existing innovation potentials; sustainable increase of economic prosperity and competitiveness; conscious insertion of the cultural and linguistic variety.

This initiative is continuing the cross-border activities in the area, where several INTERREG IIIA – PHARE CBC Programmes with the neighbouring countries Slovak Republic, Hungary and Czech Republic have been put in place for the period 2000 to 2006. The most recent one (still running) is the INTERREG IIIA/Phare CBC project JORDES+ (Joint Regional Development Strategy for the Vienna-Bratislava-Györ-Region) pursuing the objective to establish a regional strategy of planning and project development, which is coordinated and accepted by the regional partners. The implementation of this strategy enables a determined and optimized development into an internationally positioned growing region. These cooperation initiatives are important first steps for the region, but with regard to future developments (consolidation into one metropolitan region) we have to recognise that there are no common binding governance mechanisms. Therefore it seems necessary to establish a cross-border institution that could jointly develop policies and implement these in an effective and coordinated way. 7

Distance between Vienna and Bratislava: 60km.

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What is the Impact of European Policies?

There is no empirical evidence on the impact of European policies on the Austrian cities and urban areas in general. What can be said under this heading concerns the cities’ participation in EU ERDF programmes addressing urban areas. The following describes one Objective 2 programme (Vienna), Community Initiatives (CIs), Urban and INTERREG programmes and Vienna’s involvement in international city networking activities. Parts of the city of Vienna (parts of the 2nd and 20th districts) belong to the Austrian Objective 2 area (since 2001). It concerns about 60,000 inhabitants (with a percentage of immigrants above the average) and an area of 440 ha. The programme area comprises high-density residential areas with bad sanitary equipment and old building fabric, an urban railway area to be redeveloped and a valuable city park area. The total financial volume is about €47 million (about €18 million of which comes from ERDF). The cities of Vienna and Graz were already taking part in the CI Urban in the prevous period of the Structural Funds. The URBAN I applications are considered successful in both cities. Improvements of the urban milieu visible for everybody have been attracting some public attention to the EU policy (comparable with the impacts of the CI Leader to the public mind in some rural areas). Vienna and Graz are also participating in the topical URBAN II Programme. The elected programme area of Vienna for the period 2000 to 2006, Erdberg, in the southeast of the city comprises almost 23,000 inhabitants. The area of 160 ha. is divided by an urban expressway and despite its good accessibility it may be considered a disadvantaged quarter for several reasons: high unemployment and high poverty rates and a high percentage of immigrants. The total budget is almost €16 million (including about €4 million from ERDF). The 2000–2006 programme area of Graz (Graz-West) is an old industrial and manufacturing area close to the city comprising almost 32,000 inhabitants and an area of about 740 ha. It is now on the way to changing its functions to urban development. The total budget is about €20 million (more than €4 million from ERDF). Concerning involvement in international city networking activities only Vienna can be addressed here, because there is no proper reviewing source for the corresponding cities’ activities.8 Vienna is participating among others in the city network of EUROCITIES, the Union of the European Capitals (UCUE), the ‘Conference of European Capitals for EU Enlargement’, the Union of Central and South-Eastern European Capitals and the Urban Technology Network II (UTN II). In addition the city is involved in several projects under INTERREG IIIA and IIIB. The total budget within IIIA is about € 15 million (of which 50 per cent comes from ERDF). About the involvement in INTERREG IIIB there is no review available showing the projects concerned and their budget quotas. 8 See footnote 3.

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Perception and opinion of the national government on the impact of EU policies on cities (as mentioned in the guideline for this report) cannot be presented because of reasons given above. 4.6

Summary and Conclusions

As we have seen, there is nothing that could be called urban policy in Austria, either at national or regional level. Thus, urban policy may be considered to be carried out only by the cities themselves. But this does not really correspond with the term ‘urban policy’ as it is used internationally. Of course, there are some policy areas of which urban regions benefit, e.g. the national co-financing of Integrated Transport Service and Tariff Systems for the public transport systems of urban agglomerations. On the other hand, there is the exceptional single case of the upgrading of a regional centre to the state capital of Lower Austria (St Pölten). However, it is common to both of the cases that they are never considered to be part of urban policy. This lack of an objective ‘urban policy’ is not because there are no social, economic and environmental issues that appear mainly in cities and urban areas in Austria as they do in other European countries. The difference is that other countries make these issues a topic of a specific policy area: this may be derived from the framework of constitution and from the financial endowment of the municipalities. The Austrian constitution does not mention urban policy as a field of activity and competence of the federation (Bund), it does not even provide a competence for spatial planning to the national government. Therefore, there is no federal ministry appointed to deal with matters like urban politics. In addition, the states do not apply their actual competence for comprehensive spatial planning to steer urban development. It can be observed that all the state governments tend to prefer to focus their development policy efforts on their respective (‘weak’) peripheries rather than their (‘strong’) central areas. Based on the constitutional right to self-governance the municipalities enjoy a relatively high degree of independence in administrative matters from the states and the federation. The second main reason for the relatively strong position of cities (and municipalities at the whole) is the system of distribution of tax revenues to all levels of territorial authorities laid down in the Revenue Equalisation Law. This implies for the majority of the municipalities considerable financial independence from the higher tiers of policy-making in general. That independence is at the same time the grounds for intensive competition between the municipalities concerning development policies. In addition, it is significantly fuelled by the fact that, over and above the scope of legislative competence, all the territorial authorities have the power to implement measures in the sphere of public business administration for which there are no competence limits and which cover economic activities within the scope of private law (e.g. land purchases,

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investment incentives). Within the urban regions, neither state governments nor federal government are used to intervene in this fierce territorial competition. The pattern of the spatial distribution of cities in Austria has been fairly stable during many decades. This fact, however, cannot be underpinned by statistical data since there is no statistical standard information available for urban regions; so far a common delimitation for urban regions does not even exist. The population changes did not cause major changes in large-scale settlement patterns (on the intra-regional scale suburbanisation is topical, of course). This stability may disappear in the context of the full integration of the neighbouring candidate EU countries (with several cities close to the border) in spring 2004 and due to the development of the Trans-European transport networks. However, there are no signs of a fundamental change of federal or state politics aimed at changing urban policy. References Austrian Institute for Regional Studies and Spatial Planning (ÖIR) (1992), Regionale Verteilungswirkungen öffentlicher Haushalte; Gutachten des Österreichischen Instituts für Raumplanung, No. 97, Vienna. European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (1999), European Commission. Draxler, H. (1994), Neuordnung der Finanzierung und Planung des ÖPNV mit Hilfe von Verkehrverbünden. In Wer bezahlt den öffentlichen Verkehr?, Vienna: AKStandpunkte. Österreichische Raumordnungskonferenz (ÖROK) (2002), Zehnter Raumordnungsbericht, ÖROK Schriftenreihe 160, Vienna.

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Chapter 5

Urban Policies in Belgium: A Puff-pastry with a Bittersweet Aftertaste? Maarten Loopmans, Sarah Luyten and Christian Kesteloot1

5.1

Introduction: Belgium as a Cityscape

With an average population density of 339 inhabitants per km2, Belgium is one of the most urbanised countries in Europe. Most Belgian cities, although dating back from the Middle Ages, experienced a major growth period under the influence of nineteenth-century industrialisation. Belgium, and especially Flanders, has a dense network of small cities and towns and only 23 per cent of the population does not live in the commuter zone of one of the 17 urban regions with more than 80,000 inhabitants. These 17 urban regions occupy 26 per cent of the total surface area of Belgium, but they comprise 57 per cent of the population, 65 per cent of the employment and 73 per cent of the executive positions (Merenne et al., 1997, p. 14, 1991 statistics). Moreover, suburbanisation has had an important effect on the Belgian landscape. Suburbanisation occupied a central place in the Fordist regulation of consumption, enabling the large-scale consumption of durables through the continuous expansion of the size of housing. Post-war housing and spatial policies largely encouraged this movement, as much through the massive financial support for self-built detached housing as through the construction of a dense network of rail- and motorways and public utilities and the absence of restrictive physical planning until the late 1970s. In Flanders, suburbanisation has accrued the dominant cities (Brussels, Ghent, Antwerp and Leuven) together in one densely built zone with an average population density of more than 600 inhabitants per km2. The communities of this zone show increasing urban characteristics, both morphologically and economically (Kesteloot, 2003, p. 15), causing a tendency to speak of the ‘Flemish Diamond’ as one vast ‘nebular city’ (de Meulder et al., 1999). A similar urban accretion, though mainly resulting from nineteenth and early twentieth century industrialisation, is found in the Sambre-Meuse valley, linking up the Walloon cities of Mons, La Louvière, Charleroi, Namur and Liège. 1

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.

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5.2

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

A Puff-pastry of Government Tiers

The Federal Kingdom of Belgium has indisputably the most complex institutional framework of all European countries, a reflection of several rounds of constitutional reform of the originally unitary Belgian state since 1970 (de Clerq et al., 2000). Since 1989 there have been four directly-elected decision levels (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 The Belgian institutional context The first one is the federal level, whose main competencies are finance, social security, defence, police, justice and foreign policy. The second level of competencies is divided between (language) communities (responsible for personal matters, such as education, culture, health, and social policies) and territorial regions (responsible for space-related matters, such as economy, employment, agriculture, environmental policy, transport, housing, spatial planning, etc.). On this level, both communities and regions have their own parliamentary assembly (called the Council) and government (called the Executive), although in Flanders, while legally not merged, the region and the community are organised and managed as one entity – renamed the Flemish Parliament and Government – because of the spatial quasi-coincidence of

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community and region. The two other regions (the Brussels Capital Region and the Walloon Region) are shared by two language communities, respectively French and Flemish and French and German, which has precluded the merger of community and regional responsibilities into the hands of one government. In Brussels, the French Community Commission and the Flemish Community Commission represent both language communities. Since both language communities share the same territory and the introduction of sub-nationalities was rejected, an additional Common Community Commission cares for the institutions open to both groups of residents. Although a provincial level exists in Belgium, it has only limited responsibilities in relation to urban policies, as municipalities directly relate to the federal or regional level for these matters. The provincial impact has so far been limited to supportive measures such as offering training and information to local professionals, and in the coming years their responsibilities are expected to be even more limited.2 Table 5.1 Primary government expenditures (debt redemption excluded)

Federal government Regional governments Local governments (provinces and municipalities) Social security

Amount of € (in billions)

Percentage (social security not included)

59.6 35.1

53.4 31.5

16.9 49.2

15.1 –

Source: Dexia, 2003.

The municipalities constitute the last elected decision-making level and take care of the most immediate and local public matters. There is a long tradition of municipal autonomy and although municipalities operate within legal frameworks set up by the upper levels of the state, they have a relatively high degree of independence, which is sometimes used to hinder regional or federal decisions. On the other hand, both federalisation and new policies addressing new societal needs (among which urban policy) resulted in new tasks devolved to the municipalities by upper levels. Since 2002, municipalities are under control of the Regions. However, thanks to the holding of dual mandates, the municipalities exert strong influence on upper tiers of government. This is detrimental to larger cities, who make up only a small minority of the 589 municipalities and whose 2

The Brussels Capital Region is not included in a province since the splitting of the Brabant province into a Flemish and a Walloon Brabant province in 1995.

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representatives are thus often shouted down in parliament. In 2002, local authorities (municipalities and provinces) accounted for only 15 per cent of total public expenditure at all levels, with the important budget for social security (managed at the federal level) not included. The federal government retains the main responsibilities with 53 per cent of all expenditures, while the regional level counts for 32 per cent of all expenditures (Dexia, 2003). The local level has changed significantly since the 1970s. Firstly, a large-scale merger of municipalities in 1977, meant to increase governmental efficiency, reduced their number from 2,359 to 589, but none of the 17 urban regions has merged into one single municipality. The 19 municipalities that make up the Brussels Capital Region did not merge until very recently, and the city of Antwerp only merged with 11 of its neighbouring municipalities in 1983 (Ackaert and Dekien, 1989). Secondly, a 1997 revision of the federal Municipal Law made it possible for municipalities of more than 100,000 inhabitants to create intra-municipal districts. So far, Antwerp is the only municipality to have taken this opportunity, changing the former independent municipalities into districts with limited responsibilities, mainly in the fields of cultural matters and local public space. Table 5.2 Economic distribution of municipal revenues (as % of total revenues)

Belgium Flanders Brussels Capital Region Wallonia

Local taxes

General funds

Specific subsidies

Services

Loans

44.9 47.5 45.5 40.5

20.2 19.5 19.1 21.8

20.8 16.4 24.0 26.9

4.5 4.3 5.2 3.8

9.6 12.3 6.2 7.0

Source: Dexia, 2003.

Local revenues stem from three important sources: local taxes, specific subsidies and general funds (Table 5.2).3 Among them, local taxes are increasingly dominant. On average, they account for 45 per cent of the local revenues in 2002 (an increase with about 10 per cent since 1990 and an all-time high). Yet differences among the regions exist, with local taxes in Flanders and Brussels providing respectively 48 and 46 per cent of the total local revenue, while in the Walloon region they account for only 41 per cent of local revenues (Dexia, 2003). Although a wide variety of specific local taxes exists, only two are crucial for the financial situation of the municipalities, providing on average 80 per cent of the local tax revenue: the additional tax on the federal income tax (Aanvullende Belasting op de Personenbelasting: APB) and the additional tax on the federal property 3

A small part are incomes generated from paid services and goods and loans (e.g. dividends collected from participation in public-private enterprises).

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tax (Opcentiemen op de Onroerende Voorheffing: OOV). APB is levied by the municipality where the taxpayer lives, OOV where his/her property is located. The APB poses problems for the larger cities and peripheral rural communities, who experienced a loss of higher-income inhabitants as a consequence of suburbanisation and emigration: to some extent, cities compensate for this loss by higher revenues through the OOV on their extensive building stock. Yet again, suburbanisation of businesses and a devaluation of the housing stock threaten the urban tax base. Overall, the dominance of local taxes in local revenues has created considerable discrepancies in fiscal power among municipalities. The richest municipality gains 3.7 times more per capita on APB than the poorest and for OOV the ratio is even higher at 9.8. Larger cities in particular suffer from low tax revenues and high expenditures due to selective suburbanisation and the failure of urban regions to merge under one local government. Most larger cities experienced a period of financial hardship in the late 1970s and 1980s, requiring the intervention of higher-level authorities to lighten the increasing burden of debts. With the emphasis being put on additional taxes, municipalities also suffer from a loss of income whenever federal taxes are lowered, as happened in 2001. The prime instruments for mitigating intermunicipal income inequality are a number of funds, the largest one being the Municipality Fund (Gemeentefonds). Since 1989, most funds have been coordinated at the regional level and their history shows important variations among the regions. In Flanders, 20 per cent of local revenues were provided for by regional funds in 2002; the Flemish Municipality Fund accounting for about 18 per cent (19.5 per cent in 1990). This Fund aims mainly at compensating for the financial problems of larger cities, guaranteeing especially Antwerp and Ghent a large share of the total budget. Recently, the Fund has increased considerably in importance: in 2002 it was increased by about 7.5 per cent to €1,220 million, but for 2003 the budget rose even more, by nearly €1,545 million, through a merger with other existing funds. At the same time its distributive criteria have been reviewed. The reorientation of the Municipality Fund has had an overall redistributing effect, decreasing the share rich suburban municipalities get from the fund in favour of poorer rural municipalities in the Flemish periphery. Some large cities (notably Ghent and Bruges) face a decrease of the share they receive from the Fund (Cabus, 2002). In 1990, the Walloon Municipality Fund provided on average 27 per cent of the municipal budgets. By 2002, however, the importance of the Fund had declined to more or less the same level as the Flemish one (accounting for 21 per cent of local revenues). The distribution philosophy of the Walloon Municipality Fund resembles the Flemish one to a large extent. The two largest cities, Charleroi and Liège, receive nearly one third of the fund, while the rest goes to the other municipalities, the largest 22 of which have a privileged position. As in Flanders, recent measures have aimed at reinforcing the role of the Municipality Fund. Since 1997 the fund has again been adapted to the consumption index, more or less stabilising its relative importance in the municipal budget. In 2001 and 2002, Walloon municipalities enjoyed a 6.5 per cent rise of revenues through the

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‘Plan Tonus’, an additional Fund created by the regional government in order to relieve the burden of local fiscal taxation. The Plan has two axes: Tonus I provides temporal financial aid between 2001 and 2004 to all eligible municipalities except for the four largest cities Liège, Charleroi, Mons and Namur (€36.5 million in 2003); Tonus II provides structural, but conditional aid through loans (€43.4 million in 2003) to those municipalities willing to participate in a programme for local administrative reorganisation, aimed at a greater efficiency of the local government. In 2003, 60 municipalities applied for aid from Tonus II (Union des villes et communes de Wallonie, 2002). In the Brussels Capital Region, only 19 per cent of the municipal budgets were gained from Funds in 2002; the Brussels Municipality Fund provides no more than 13 per cent. Another 20 per cent of the municipal revenue were provided for by specific subsidies of both the federal and regional authorities for, among others, the municipal school system and the local police. The city of Brussels, one of the 19 municipalities of the Brussels Capital Region, received a special donation from the federal government for its functions as the Capital of Belgium and Europe, amounting to €84.9 million in 2003 (Dexia, 2003). Something Global, Something Local: Economic and Social Conditions of the Five Main Cities Within the Belgian urban system, five cities are classified as large cities, the next level being that of regional cities. These five cities are distinct from each other both in the socio-economic and political field (Table 5.3). Table 5.3 Some socio-economic indicators for Belgium’s five large cities (2004) City

Population

Brussels Capital Region 1,000,000 Antwerp 455,000 Liège 185,000 Ghent 229,000 Charleroi 201,000

Employment Unemployment Av. household Foreigners level income (% of (% of (% of national city workforce) av., 2000) population)

599,000 241,000 74,000 134,000 79,000

15 31 14 32

97 90 90 94 80

26 11 16 6 15

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Brussels4 clearly dominates the Belgian urban hierarchy, in terms of population and employment, as well as GDP. Hosting major international institutions of both NATO and the European Union, the city is well embedded in global networks of power and attracts the bulk of foreign investment in Belgium (Elmhorn, 2001). Brussels specifically dominates tertiary sector investments, concentrating about 33 per cent of employment in foreign tertiary sector businesses within the Brussels Capital Region. National tertiary sector employment is equally concentrated in Brussels. Furthermore, the bulk of federal, Flemish, French Community and of course Brussels government officials are employed within the city’s borders. Secondary sector employment has steadily decreased since the 1960s and is now of minor importance for the Brussels economy, providing only 8 per cent of all employment. Yet it is equally strongly internationalised, with foreign firms providing about 39 per cent of all secondary sector employment in Brussels, compared to a national average of 27 per cent (Vanneste et al., 2003). Overall, the importance of Brussels for the national economy is great: the Brussels Capital Region on its own produces 15 per cent of the country’s GDP (on 0.5 per cent of its area and with less than 10 per cent of its population). At the same time, Brussels faces serious socio-economic problems. Statistics for 2004 show that the unemployment rate was 22 per cent, and even reached 32 per cent in its worst-off municipalities. Furthermore, the average household income5 of the BCR had dropped from 160 per cent of the national average in 1963 to 97 per cent of the national average (€23,887) in 2000. This figure hides relatively strong disparities between a poor inner city and wealthy suburbs. Segregation and unemployment, but also large net wage disparities, combined to cause this contrast. Highly-skilled workers earn between two and three times the net wage of a low-skilled worker. Wage disparities in Brussels are higher than in most other major northwestern European cities, except for Paris, Luxembourg and Berlin (UBS, 2003). This social polarisation has been accompanied by an increasing spatial polarisation, mainly as a consequence of massive suburbanisation of the affluent population, as well as secondary and tertiary jobs (Kesteloot, 2000; see also Colard and Vandermotten, 1996 and Moyart, 2000 for suburbanisation of employment). The result of this process is a sharp distinction between an affluent suburban population of professional service workers and an increasingly poor population of low-skilled former industrial or service workers, overwhelmingly from immigrant origin, in the city centre. Consequently, the Brussels urban region contains the municipalities with both the highest and the lowest average household income of the country (the last having an average income per capita of only 44 per cent of the first in 2000). The internationalisation of the Brussels economy is also reflected in the ethnic composition of its population. During the 1990s foreigners accounted for 30 per 4 Further references to Brussels are to the Brussels Capital Region and not the municipality of Brussels, which is only one of the 19 municipalities of the Region. 5 This is measured by the average net taxable income per tax payer.

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cent of the population. However, successive laws (effective in 1985, 1992 and 2000) have enabled foreigners to obtain Belgian nationality. As a result, the share of foreign nationals has dropped to 26 per cent in 2004. Moreover, the Brussels foreign population shows a high degree of socio-economic heterogeneity, including descendants from Mediterranean ‘guest workers’, newcomers from these countries through marriage and family reunification immigration, Third World refugees and undocumented immigrants, as well as an important number of highly-skilled immigrants from industrialised countries, particularly the so-called ‘Eurocrats’ working in the extensive European administration (Kesteloot, 2000). Belgium’s second largest city, Antwerp, is the only one after Brussels that also attracts significant international investment, mostly through its port (second only in Europe to Rotterdam) and its position as a world centre of the diamond trade and petrochemical industry (Vanneste et al., 2003). The Antwerp district hosts about 12 per cent of all employment in international tertiary sector businesses, but most of all Antwerp dominates international investment in the secondary sector (14 per cent of investments in the sector, compared to only 11 per cent for the Brussels Capital Region). Like Brussels, Antwerp experienced important suburbanisation from the 1950s onwards. Yet unlike Brussels, the city merged in 1983 with its surrounding municipalities, thus including most of its agglomeration and even parts of its suburban area within its administrative borders. Today, the city of Antwerp counts about half of the more than 900,000 inhabitants in the urban region. In 1999, administrative decentralisation returned some of the responsibilities to the original municipalities, now designated ‘districts’ within the city of Antwerp. The average household income in Antwerp is lower than in Brussels (it reaches only 90 per cent of the national average), but the unemployment rate remains below 15 per cent (2004 data) and socio-spatial differences are less obvious. The average household income of the poorest district of the city equals 55 per cent of the one in the richest municipality within the urban region. Antwerp is also ethnically more homogeneous than Brussels, with 11 per cent of its population holding a foreign nationality, a little more than 7 per cent of them coming from outside the European Union. The largest ethnic minorities are the Jewish (dominating the diamond trade in the city) and the Moroccan (who originally came to Antwerp as guest workers). Liège, with an urban region of 625,000 inhabitants, occupies the third position in the Belgian urban hierarchy (in 1977, only a few municipalities accepted a merger with Liège and this explains the city’s relatively low population figure). As a relic of its nineteenth-century industrial expansion, its economic structure is characterised by the dominance of heavy industry, relying to a large extent on metallurgic activities since the closure or the coal mines. Internationally, Liège cannot compete with the two larger urban regions of Brussels and Antwerp, but as the major city in Wallonia it does host the bulk of this region’s service sector employment.

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More so than Antwerp and Brussels, Liège has retained part of its bourgeois population in the city centre, early suburbanisation being hampered by the steep slopes of the River Meuse, which significantly reduced accessibility to the city centre. Instead, heavy industry and worker suburbs developed around the bourgeois core. Suburbanisation has colonised the southern periphery of the city only in more recent times (Kesteloot et al., 2001). Hence, while unemployment levels in Liège are notably higher (31 per cent in 2004), the average income is nonetheless comparable to that of Antwerp. The foreign population of Liège represents 16 per cent of the total. Again, this is a reflection of its industrial past: Italian and to a lesser extent French and Moroccan nationals dominate the foreign population. Most of them were attracted to work in the coal mines and the steel industry. Ghent and Charleroi, both with an urban region of about 400,000 inhabitants rank fourth and fifth in the Belgian urban hierarchy. The nineteenth-century Ghent economy was dominated by textile manufacturing, but nowadays its port is the main site for secondary sector employment, hosting a mix of traditional industries (car manufacturing and steelworks), as well as more recent smallscale innovative industries (bioengineering). Secondary sector employment has showed a significant decline over the last decade, but this has been more than compensated by employment growth in the tertiary sector, although the relative importance of the latter (providing now almost three-quarters of employment) is still somewhat lower than in the other large Belgian cities. Only 13.6 per cent of its working force is unemployed (2004 statistics). As a substantially smaller city, Ghent succeeded in incorporating a relatively high share of its suburban ring during the 1977 merger of municipalities. As a consequence, the average household income in the city of Ghent (94 per cent of the national average) is notably higher than in Antwerp or Liège, but it remains below that of the Brussels Capital Region. Only a little more than 6 per cent of the city’s population holds a foreign nationality: almost one third of them are Turkish nationals. Charleroi is the largest urban centre in the ‘Black Country’, the Hainaut coalfield conurbation, ranging (west to east) from Mons over La Louvière to Charleroi. As in Liège, heavy industry dating from the nineteenth century has been in decline for several decades, but has not been offset by a considerable increase in employment in other sectors. Unemployment has soared to a level of 32 per cent (in 2004). Charleroi has the lowest average household income of the 17 larger cities in Belgium – just above 80 per cent of the Belgian average. Moreover, the city does not encompass many significantly richer suburban municipalities; the entire region is more or less dominated by working class neighbourhoods. Like Liège, Charleroi has a larger foreign population than Flemish cities. About 15 per cent of the Charleroi population does not have the Belgian nationality; the majority being Italian nationals, as well as (to a lesser extent) Turks, Moroccans and Algerians.

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From Anti-Urbanism to Willy-Nilly Urban Policies Until recently, upper governmental tiers in Belgium had not paid much attention to urban problems. Even by 1989, Cheshire and Hay concluded in their study on urban problems in Europe that ‘there does not exist in Belgium at either the national or regional level any real policy designed to combat urban decline’ (Cheshire and Hay, 1989, p. 181). This lack of attention to urban problems was explained by the specific power relations in Belgian politics. Since 1884 the Catholic Church and bourgeoisie have occupied a hegemonic position in the Belgian political landscape. From the late nineteenth century onwards, spatial policies – involving housing and mobility measures – were applied next to an associational and political compartmentalisation along socio-economic lines (called ‘pillarisation’) to conserve this dominance and to hamper the rise of secularisation and the socialist movement by countering the spatial concentration of workers in the cities (Kesteloot and de Maesschalck, 2001). The development of a dense network of public transport connecting the cities with the surrounding villages facilitated commuting and kept the workers’ families outside the cities. The stimulation of home ownership and individual housing promotion as an answer to the housing problem equally drew skilled workers away from the central working-class neighbourhoods to the urban fringe where land prices where cheaper. However, the bottom of the housing market was left untouched and unskilled workers and the ‘lumpenproletariat’ remained concentrated in inner city slums (Knops, 1981). After the First World War the Socialist Party gained power and stimulated social housing. They promoted collective living and supported the idea of the garden city. These initiatives were soon bypassed by a new Catholic law promoting individual housing, and did not have much effect on inner city problems. The few garden cities that were realised were developed on the urban fringe where land prices were low. The housing cost, together with the cost for commuting, was too high for the lower income groups in inner city neighbourhoods (Kesteloot, 1990). After the Second World War, the promotion of individual housing and home ownership on the periphery continued to dominate housing policy and led to a suburbanisation boom in the 1960s. Home ownership became an important element of the Fordist consumption-driven economic growth. New laws brought in after the Second World War stimulated massive but still socially selective suburbanisation. At the same time, inner city neighbourhoods faced a decline in their residential function: the development of a central business district together with massive suburbanisation and the generalisation of car-ownership increased demand for more inner city space for offices and access roads. During the zenith of the Fordist welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s, the slum clearance law of 1953 paved the way for large-scale levelling of old inner city neighbourhoods in favour of high-rise social housing, but the result was more often an increase in office buildings and commercial functions. A series of inner-city neighbourhoods

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were demolished for the construction of roads and office buildings in Brussels North, where the most extreme example is the eviction of about 10,000 inhabitants (Lievens et al., 1975). However, in the 1960s and 1970s in Belgium, as elsewhere in Europe, residents of deprived neighbourhoods who were under threat from urban restructuring started to mobilise against the ‘neglect’ of their interests in urban policy initiatives, without great success. Because of their weakening financial position, urban or industrialised municipalities were more receptive to the demands of speculators and investors than of their own, mostly low-income population (with a growing share of non-voting foreigners) and urban citizens did not receive much attention on the national level either. The Minister of Public Works did not launch its five pilot projects for urban renewal, focusing on the physical restructuring of working-class urban neighbourhoods, until 1975. Meanwhile, the federalisation process had taken off and responsibilities for urban renewal and planning at the regional level were devolved in 1974. However, federalisation was not complete, and the regional governments could operate independently of the federal level, until 1989. Hence, while the first concrete steps towards urban renewal in Belgium were taken by the regions, they showed remarkable similarities in Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels as they were practically run ‘under custody’ of the federal level. During the 1970s and 1980s, all three regions developed a spin-off of the 1973 urban renewal experiment. In Wallonia, urban renewal started as early as 1975, in Brussels in 1977 and in Flanders it took until 1983 before, in the aftermath of the European campaign for social urban renewal, a fund was raised to support local urban renewal projects (Knops and Vlaeminck, 1983; Heughebaert, 1988). These measures were aimed at the ‘social’ urban renewal of delimited areas, involving participation of inhabitants, maintaining the functional mix of the area and paying attention to local needs in terms of facilities and public space (Noel et al., 2001). However, an evaluation of the social urban renewal policies in the three regions shows poor results. In Flanders for instance, only 44 of the 151 selected areas reached the operational stage, while the most deprived areas had not even been selected. Moreover, largescale participation of inhabitants in projects that were soon left to their fate created a lot of frustrations (de Decker, 1994). The results of urban renewal in Brussels were equally meagre (Noël, 1998). Procedures went very slow and there was not so much enthusiasm among the municipalities who had to take initiative and submit renewal projects to the government. In 1993, of the 200,000 that had been considered in need of renovation in the 1970s, only 2,163 houses had been renovated. Moreover, when an individual subsidy for dwelling renewal was established in 1983, it became clear that only middle-class inhabitants took advantage of renewal funds and that lower-income groups were displaced (Becker et al. 1989). At the end of the 1980s a new approach was developed in Flanders and Brussels, based on solid contracts between the higher and local authorities, limited in time and focusing more on socio-economic problems of deprived

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neighbourhoods. The reason for this development can be found not only in the negative evaluation of earlier approaches, but also in the breakthrough of extremeright parties in the municipal elections of 1988 in both regions. In particular, the Vlaams Blok, a Flemish party with an extreme nationalist and racist ideology, grew considerably (de Decker et al., 2004). In the 1988 elections they grew from almost nothing to 17 per cent in the city of Antwerp and also drew a considerable share of the Flemish votes in several Brussels municipalities. The Socialist Party in particular seemed to have lost votes to the extreme right. The Vlaams Blok quickly rose to become a regional, if not national, threat to political stability. The party received 24 per cent of all Flemish votes in the last regional elections (2004). It particularly dominates in the larger cities Brussels,6 Antwerp and Ghent, where it seems to draw its main support from the ‘urban poor’ (Swyngedouw, 1992; Bijttebier et al., 1992). This political earthquake has drawn attention to the problems of inhabitants of deprived neighbourhoods in cities, most notably deteriorating living environments, poverty, employment shortage, increasing feelings of insecurity and the difficulties related to the cohabitation of native Belgians and young immigrants’ offspring in the inner-city neighbourhoods (Loopmans et al., 2003). Concurrently, an extension of regional competencies in the wake of a new round of federalisation offered the opportunity to transform urban policy from a mere physical restructuring of the building stock into a more ‘integrated’ approach. From 1989 onwards, several initiatives were set up focusing on urban social problems and/or insisting on the necessity of ‘narrowing the gap’ between politicians and the people (Vranken and Geldof, 1991; p. 102). In Flanders, the first more or less coordinated and structured attempt to address the problems of underprivileged inner-city dwellers was the Flemish Fund for the Integration of the Underprivileged (Vlaams Fonds voor de Integratie van Kansarmen: VFIK), initiated in 1991. This Fund received 1,218 million BEF (€30 million) to combat exclusion in 15 municipalities (mainly larger cities and former mining towns in the provence of Limburg) with the largest concentration of poor and immigrant communities. Yet the VFIK received heavy critiques. A central objection was the lack of a ‘structural’ and ‘integrated’ approach. The means were dispersed among too many, unrelated and often temporary projects. The VFIK was also largely oriented towards the social sector, and did not succeed in addressing related issues, such as job creation and housing (Baert and Fauconnier, 1995). Moreover it did not seem to reach any electoral effect: in 1995, the Vlaams Blok again achieved spectacular results. However, the VFIK-approach in Antwerp did command respect. Under the European pilot project URBAN I, a neighbourhood development corporation (BuurtOntwikkelingsMaatschappij: BOM) was set up as an independent umbrella organisation, merging funds from several origins (EU, VFIK and others) into one integral ‘neighbourhood development project’, not restricted to the welfare 6

That is among the voters for the Flemish members of the Council of the Brussels Capital Region and the Flemish Community Commission.

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sector, but including housing, economy and urban planning as well (Hobin, 1995; van Hove and Nieuwinckel, 1996). This would be one of the main sources of inspiration when the first explicitly ‘urban’ policy saw the light in Flanders in 1995. In 1989, the newly-established Brussels government decided to create its own urban renewal policy. However, the first initiatives were not taken until 1994, when the so-called ‘neighbourhood contracts’ between the BCR and the municipalities came into existence. The neighbourhood contracts are limited to the perimeter of the ‘Zone for the Development of the Residential Function and Renewal’ (Ruimte voor Versterkte Ontwikkeling van de Huisvesting en de Stadsvernieuwing: RVOHS) defined in the Regional Development Plan of 1995. The delimitation basis is the bad environmental and housing quality, but the whole area is also characterised by an accumulation of social deprivation characteristics such as high youth unemployment, high crime rates and poverty. The neighbourhood contracts were a way to circumvent the municipal level, deemed incapable of coordinating urban redevelopment after the poor result of the 1977 policy: the BCR took the leading role and compelled the municipalities to develop projects for the designated areas. Each year the government selects four neighbourhoods: the contracts run for four years. Their focus is on the redevelopment of housing and public space and they are co-financed by the region, the municipality and (tentatively) the private sector. Nevertheless, although the BCR has no power on social matters, the contracts have a social component aimed at enhancing social integration (Luyten and Kesteloot, 2003). Wallonia has not been affected by the electoral rise of extreme-right parties (see Swyngedouw, 1998) but due to the collapse of its economic base of heavy industry and mining, the Region has faced much more severe problems of unemployment, poverty and a deteriorating housing stock. Hence, in Wallonia too, poverty and worsening living conditions in poor neighbourhoods have started to attract attention. A territorial approach to these problems was initiated in 1991 and officially installed in 1994 with the delimitation of ‘priority zones for intervention’ (ZIPs) (Moriau, 1996). Their delimitation was based upon quantitative measures of poverty and housing conditions. So far, four types of ZIPs have been introduced. ZIP1 zones are areas where the housing market is under strong pressure and where affordable good quality housing is scarce; ZIP2 focuses on the rehabilitation of the built environment, and in ZIP3 the above-mentioned approaches are combined with a focus on social problems such as poverty, high unemployment, drug abuse, crime and the living together of different ethnic communities. ZIP4 zones face similar problems as ZIP3 areas, but are located in social housing estates. The ZIP initiative does not replace the ‘urban renewal’ subsidies, but subsidies are more considerable when applied to a ZIP. Moreover, since 1995 the Region has increased its influence and control, by compelling the municipalities to write an action plan when applying for subsidies. Although the regional government has no power on social matters and limits subsidies to interventions in the built environment, the action plan

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needs to contain anticipated social and economic measures such as training, social economy, etc. In 1992, after yet another electoral victory by extreme right, the situation of the Belgian inner cities once again attracted the attention of the federal level. In the light of its responsibility for the police forces (together with the municipalities), the government focused on crime prevention. It started ‘safety contracts’ in collaboration with 12 cities. The contracts go beyond the regular activities of police forces as they intend to tackle the causes, not the symptoms. As well as measures intended to enhance police efficiency, there are preventive measures including training and employment, targeted at specific groups, such as youth delinquents, drug users, prostitutes, hooligans, etc. After the inclusion of urban renewal in the preventive measures in 1996, the initiative was renamed ‘safety and society contracts’ because of the broader approach (Vranken et al., 2001). In 2002, the contracts became bi-annual and they were renamed ‘safety and prevention contracts’. Seventy-three municipalities are involved in such contracts. Visions for an Urban Future The above-mentioned regional and federal instruments for urban policy were all developed on a more-or-less ad-hoc basis, as a reaction to problems that were often not even exclusively faced by urban municipalities. However, in the 1990s Flanders and Wallonia started to develop a vision of the state and future of their cities in relation to the spatial, social and economic development of the region. The Brussels Capital Region got its first own regional parliament and government in 1989 and started the same process of defining a project for the future. The problems and opportunities of the cities in Flanders and Wallonia and those of Brussels all figure in the so-called strategic plans that the regions adopted in the second half of the 1990s (de Brabander, 1998). The central goals of the already-mentioned Regional Development Plan for Brussels (1995) are formulated in terms of inhabitants and employment. The plan stresses the problems attached to the loss of population to the surrounding suburban municipalities situated in Wallonia and Flanders and the employment mismatch (nearly half of the workforce are commuters while unemployment is concentrated in the region). The region wants to increase its population and to promote employment in the next decade not only by taking advantage of the developing service sector, but also by drastically curbing ongoing deindustrialisation. The Spatial Structure Plan for Flanders (RSV) was adopted in 1997. The plan stresses the importance of the central urban network Antwerp-Leuven-BrusselsGhent (the so-called ‘Flemish Diamond’) for economic development but at the same time acknowledges the problematic nature of the spatial claims made by suburbanisation and the resulting fiscal problems in the cities. Since 1997, the official Flemish spatial policy has implied the concentration of housing as well

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as economic development in existing centres. Brussels and as Antwerp are to be supported to integrate into a European network of international cities. In Wallonia, the Regional Plan for Spatial Planning (PRATW) equally focuses on the urban network, forming a triangle between Brussels and the urban axis along the rivers Sambre and Meuse between Charleroi and Liège. The plan anticipates a further integration and development of the international regions at the borders, being Charleroi-Lille (Belgium-France), Liège-AachenMaastricht (Belgium-Germany-Netherlands) and Arlon-Luxembourg (BelgiumLuxembourg). The PRATW is aware of existing tendencies that could thwart this development, namely large-scale suburbanisation of the Walloon urban regions (even more intense than that in Flanders) on the one hand, and massive deindustrialisation and spatial fragmentation resulting from early industrialisation and subsequent brown fields on the other. The main aim of urban policy is to curb these tendencies. 5.3

On the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century: The Age of the City?

In 1995 the Flemish government was the first to appoint a Minister for Urban Policy. The means of the VFIK were merged with other existing funds and with new means into a new Social Impulse Fund (SIF). While its forerunner the VFIK had flavoured social policy with a territorial touch, focusing on cities with high rates of poverty, the new fund would become the spearhead of what was meant to be the first multidisciplinary and multifaceted urban policy in Flanders (see Peeters, 1996; de Decker, 1999b). By merging different funds into one SIF and adding new means, the budget for urban policy increased to a large extent. Starting with 4.5 billion BEF (about €110 million) in 1996, it would increase with 1 billion BEF (€25 million) per year up to 7.5 billion BEF (€186 million) in 1999. Inspired by the social urban renewal policy of the 1980s and its follow-up in Antwerp under the wings of the BOM, as well as the ‘integral approach’ of the Dutch Large Cities Policy (Grotestedenbeleid), the SIF would put more stress on territorial and integral measures than its VFIK-forerunner. The goals of the SIF were threefold: the improvement of the quality of life in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and cities, the tackling of poverty (‘the war on poverty’) and the promotion of well-being (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1996). The SIF aimed to advance a physical, social and economic restructuring of cities (de Decker et al., 1996). Yet at the same time, under the electoral pressure of the Vlaams Blok, poverty and deprivation stayed at the heart of the analysis (Loopmans, 2002). Concerned municipalities were not always keen to address these questions (among other reasons because the immigrant population concerned had no political rights and such a policy would not generate any electoral advantage), but the Flemish government succeeded in securing this attention at the local level also by applying a relatively firm top-down approach. First of all, this involved strong selectivity in funding. Like the VFIK, the SIF used poverty criteria to

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select municipalities for funding and to decide on the level of funding for each municipality (de Coninck and Vandenberghe, 1996). Secondly, a special SIFadministration was set up in order to control local expenditures. Every selected municipality was required to draw up a detailed long-term (three years) SIF-policy plan that had to be confirmed by the Flemish government in a written agreement with the municipality. The plan had to depart from an explicit analysis of the ‘needs concerning poverty, employment and unemployment, housing and social deprivation in the municipality’ and had to define clearly the expected results, in order to enable monitoring (Belgisch Staatsblad, 1996). The SIF received positive comments (Kesteloot et al., 2000; Vlaams Parlement, 2000), but it did not survive the next elections in 1999. Two events led to this policy turn. Firstly, another electoral victory of the Vlaams Blok made clear that the ‘war on poverty’ had not driven back the extreme right. On the contrary, the extreme-right party succeeded in gaining an increasing number of votes in the well-to-do and in suburban districts (de Maesschalck, 2000). Secondly, the liberal (rightist) party VLD re-entered the government after ten years in opposition. In its inaugural speech, the new government announced a different urban policy approach, paying more attention to urban competitiveness, security and quality of life instead of poverty and exclusion (Vlaamse Regering, 1999). Partly motivated by the need to bring urban policy more into line with the formulations of the RSV, the main goal in urban policy was reformulated as ‘countering the depopulation of urban areas by enhancing the quality of life’, more specifically for young families, middle- and high-income groups and ‘active’ seniors (van Grembergen, 2001). This policy shift was warmly welcomed by many cities. Because they were facing a fiscal crisis due to selective suburbanisation, they much preferred this ‘urban’ definition of the policy to the ‘social’ assignments of SIF (Boudry et al., 1999). Some smaller initiatives saw the light immediately afterwards, such as the conception of the first Flemish ‘White Paper on Urban Policy’ by an academic Task Force (which however appeared in 2003, one year after all reforms were settled) and a small-scale (€25 million) competitive bidding programme for urban development projects in public–private partnership (Vlaamse Regering, 2001a). The most influential policy change was the replacement of the SIF by the ‘City Fund’ (Stedenfonds) in 2003. This City Fund has been left with only half of the SIF budget (the other half was diverted to the ‘Municipality Fund’) yet has remained the main instrument for urban policy. Its main goals are the attraction of middle- and high-income groups to the city and a ‘strengthening of the social basis for democracy’ (Vlaams Parlement, 2002). The City Fund will have to reach these aims by enhancing the quality of life and improving the municipal management in cities, and by countering ‘dualisation’. The Flemish government stresses the need to shift emphasis from problems to potentials, which is reflected in the new distribution criteria of the Fund: municipalities are no longer selected on the basis of needs but on their position in the Flemish urban hierarchy (the 13 largest cities and Brussels are concerned; see Loopmans, 2003a). Moreover, municipalities are encouraged to abandon the restriction of neighbourhood

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development to the most needy areas and to favour the prevention of future downgrading in other neighbourhoods (Vlaams Parlement, 2002). The City Fund also leaves more autonomy to the local authorities. Like the SIF, it demands a written agreement between the regional and local authorities, but this agreement is valid for six years instead of three and does not require a very detailed spelling out of results. While this will probably make policy monitoring more difficult, the regional government does expect a more efficient policy because the municipalities will have less reason to thwart a policy measure they designed autonomously. While it is too early to judge the City Fund, it has already received fierce criticism, mainly because it seems to have diverted attention from urban poverty and social exclusion (de Decker and Loopmans, 2003; Loopmans, 2002; van Menxel, 2002). With its renewed emphasis on the economic development of cities and the attraction of high-income groups (to balance the loss by suburbanisation), attention on deprived neighbourhoods and poor people now mainly boils down to issues of social control (Uitermark, 2003; Loopmans, 2003b). In Brussels, the neighbourhood contract initiative began in six neighbourhoods in 1994 and has so far reached 27 neighbourhoods in total. In 1997, after a number of riots with inner city youngsters, the Brussels regional government decided that a swifter renovation of public space, provision of neighbourhood facilities and employment measures in some neighbourhoods were appropriate as a complement to the neighbourhood contract. Originally, these ‘Initiative Neighbourhood Programmes’ were meant to last for 18 months each. In 2001, the Initiative Neighbourhood approach was absorbed within the neighbourhood contracts as a means of simplifying collaboration between the Region and the municipalities involved. The 13 initiative neighbourhoods nonetheless functioned as inspiring experiments and generated new approaches, more specifically to the social component of the neighbourhood contracts. To strengthen the involvement of local actors, a Local Initiative Committee must be set up, composed of delegates from several official and non-official organisations plus inhabitants of the neighbourhood. However, the efficiency of this Committee depends on the goodwill of the municipality to integrate ‘the voice of the inhabitant’ and the dynamism of the Local Committee itself (Luyten and Kesteloot, 2003). As in Flanders, the Liberals won the 1999 elections and the overall policy in Brussels has also shifted towards the attraction of higher-income groups and business investments (Baeten, 2001a; Decroly et al., 2001).7 The Walloon approach had stayed relatively stable and unchanged throughout the 1990s, continuing the work with the instruments of the ZIP and the urban renewal subsidies (Noël et al., 2001). At the time of writing, the Walloon region is considering a reform of all positive discrimination measures but will probably continue the ZIP initiative.

7

The 2004 electoral victory of the socialists is expected to redress the balance.

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Since the end of the 1990s, Brussels, the main Flemish and, less obviously, the Walloon urban cores have all experienced renewed population growth, although this is mainly due to a stronger influx from abroad (e.g. Henau, 2002). The migration balance within suburban communities remains negative, but this is compensated for by foreign immigration and the regularisation of undocumented immigrants. Hence, suburbanisation is not being countered; on the contrary, this trend remains the dominant mode of urban growth today (Mérenne et al., 1997; Dubois, 2001). Nonetheless, a moderate gentrification process has been demonstrated, at least in Brussels and Antwerp. It has strong negative effects on the lives of poorer inner-city inhabitants, who are being displaced and experience increasing constraints in searching for new housing (van Criekingen, 2002; van Criekingen and Decroly, 2003; de Maesschalck and Loopmans, 2003). Apart from the Flemish policy changes, the most striking developments took place at the federal level. In 1999 the newly-installed government appointed a Federal Minister of Big Cities Policy,8 his task being ‘the improvement of the quality of life in cities’. The tasks set forward in the 2003 Government Agreement to reach this aim are fourfold, namely; i) a further concentration of the means for urban regeneration in a limited number of urban neighbourhoods; ii) improving safety; iii) addressing poverty and exclusion; and iv) offering affordable and good quality housing. Although the minister’s own means are limited because most crucial competences are in the hands of the Regions and the Communities, the Big Cities Policy is a task for the whole government and hence some striking legal measures have been taken, such as lowering of the tax on the transaction of houses in inner cities. However, the main instrument remains the minister’s own Big Cities Policy, inspired both by the ‘French politique de la ville’ and the European URBAN programme. The Big Cities Policy aims at a partnership with urban municipalities in order to realise a ‘sustainable and visible revitalisation of the urban environment and revaluation of public space’. As with the regional initiatives and the federal ‘security contracts’, local authorities enter into a result-oriented contract with the federal authorities and receive financial support for specific urban development projects. An annual update of the local plans is demanded, but from 2005 on, the project will only be evaluated on a three-year basis. The programme was initiated in 2000 and prolonged in 2003 under the new federal government. In 2003, the budget amounted to more than €40 million, spent on 152 projects in Antwerp, Ghent, Liège, Charleroi, and the seven Brussels municipalities qualifying under Structural Funds Objective 2: Anderlecht, Brussels, Vorst, Molenbeek, SintGillis, Sint-Joost and Schaarbeek. Since 2001, the four smaller cities of Seraing, La Louvière, Mons and Oostende have joined the programme (de Decker et al., 2002). The majority of the projects concern measures to promote ‘social cohesion’ (about one-third of all programmes). Another fifth of the projects aims 8

He was Government Commissioner the first year and became the Minister of Economy in charge of the Big Cities Policy in 2000.

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at safety enhancement in cities. A smaller amount of projects, but still about 20 per cent of the budget, goes to physical urban renewal. Economic development and employment projects, maintenance and management of public space and coordination are less important as far as the numbers of projects and financial means are concerned (Picqué, 2002). 5.4

The Ephemeral Impact of European Initiatives

The EU is more notorious than renowned for its impact on urban policies in Belgium. While the majority of its administrative functions are situated right in the heart of Belgium’s largest and capital city, it has never even had a policy towards its impact on the urban scene, resulting in one of Europe’s most scandalous examples of unplanned urban development (Baeten, 2001b; Swyngedouw and Baeten, 2001). This might be an explanation for the relative scarcity of traces left by the EU urban policies on national and regional urban policy schemes. Moreover, national and regional urban policy schemes are to a large extent influenced by political and managerial considerations operating at the federal and/or regional level (the case of Flemish urban policies’ battle against the extreme-right Vlaams Blok is a striking example in this respect) and attempts to connect with EU policies can be considered as mere ‘symbolism’ or ‘window dressing’ (receiving moderate airing on the occasion of the Belgian EU presidency, but then retreating into the background again). Nonetheless, Belgian, and more particular Flemish, urban policy history has witnessed two particular moments where EU examples have had some impact. Unsurprisingly, this occurred at moments when important discussions over the redefinition of urban policy were taking place, preparing significant policy shift at the regional level (Loopmans et al., 2003). This first happened with the European campaign for urban renewal in the early 1980s, which inspired the thenrevolutionary introduction of ‘social urban renewal’ in Flanders. A second phase of strong EU influence was seen when the first Flemish minister of urban policy was appointed in 1995. Facing the task of drawing up a completely new urban policy scheme, he found inspiration in the first URBAN pilot programme, which had generated a number of new policy concepts in Antwerp. Antwerp policymakers were able to play out these new ideas at the Flemish level because of the good impression left by the European experiment in Antwerp (Hobin, 1995). At the local level, influences of EU urban policies have apparently been more penetrating. Through URBAN and Objective 2 structural funds (30 per cent of Objective 2 funds in Belgium or about €130 million over the period of 2000–2006 were directed towards urban development), the municipalities involved are compelled to play the game ‘the EU way’. As such, Antwerp, Brussels and Liege took part in the first phase of the URBAN pilot programme. Several cities that are currently receiving Objective 2 money are URBAN II grantholders. Moreover, the Objective 1 funding for the heavily deindustrialised Hainaut province (with

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the urban regions of Mons, Charleroi and La Louvière) did have some impact on local urban policy formulation as well. The larger cities (in particular Antwerp and Brussels) are highly active in various European-wide learning and lobbying networks of cities (such as URBACT and Eurocities) focused on governance, urban development, picking ‘good practices’ from various cities (Loopmans, 2003b). 5.5

Urban Policies in Belgium: Multiple Initiatives at a Multitude of Scales, but with Variable Effects

Belgium can be considered one of the most urbanised countries of the world, with a dense network of small- and medium-sized cities and about 80 per cent of the population living in an urban region. Nonetheless, interest in urban policies only grew in the 1990s, after decades of ‘urban neglect’ at the national and regional levels. Several developments lie at the basis of this urban renaissance. Most influential has been the threat of political disturbances in inner cities; urban rioting and the spectacular rise of extreme-right voting in inner city areas threatened to disturb the balance of political forces up to the national level and spurred renewed interest in the deteriorating faith of disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the inner city. Belgium’s particular federal structure has also had its impact. Regionalisation of most urban policy competences and regional differences in urban problems have led to a divergence of urban policy approaches in the three regions and at the federal level, with an emphasis on the physical environment dominant in Wallonia, on safety and poverty in Flanders and an in-between situation in Brussels. Local governance modernisation is a secondary goal of Flemish urban policies and federal policies have mainly focused on the broad area of crime prevention and more recently on economic development (using its fiscal competence). Overall, urban policy has merely reflected national and regional political considerations, even though Belgium’s largest cities – Brussels and Antwerp – are firmly inserted in international business and political networks and are considered the key poles of development for Belgium’s open economy. Even more surprisingly, while Brussels is hosting the main EU institutions, EU urban policy initiatives seem to have only marginal and indirect effects upon national and regional policy formulations. The Walloon urban policy initiatives had stayed remarkably consistent throughout the 1990s. Conversely, Brussels and certainly Flanders experienced significant policy shifts. In both regions, emphasis has recently drifted away from poverty reduction towards social control measures and the attraction of higherincome inhabitants and business investments by increasing the ‘quality of life’. At the federal level, urban policies have only recently begun to gain attention. All in all, making something out of urban policy is no easy task to perform for a municipality in Belgium. The fluctuation of new urban policy initiatives that

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have seen the light at the two tiers of supra-local government and at the EU level is hard to deal with. Increasingly, cities are required to tune various programmes developed from different viewpoints and with different requirements, making the puff pastry of Belgian urban policy sometimes hard to swallow. Some more harmony at higher levels of government would seriously reduce the workload of coordination. At the same time, however, this variety of approaches does provide local authorities with opportunities and a significant level of autonomy that some of them are able to turn to profit. Nonetheless, what has commonly been agreed upon as the core problem of Belgian cities (strong suburbanisation of high income groups and employment, as well as deteriorating living conditions for the inner city poor) has not been counteracted by the many ambitious urban policy initiatives that have seen the light during the past decade. References Ackaert, J. and Dekien, C. (1989), ‘Samenvoeging van gemeenten: verandering in de gemeentelijke organisatie en beleidsvoering’, unpublished research report, Leuven: KULeuven. Baert, H. and Fauconnier, E. (1995), ‘De doelbepaling en doelgroepkeuze in enkele VFIKgemeenten’, unpublished research report, Leuven: LUCAS. Baeten, G. (2001a), ‘Clichés of Urban Doom: The Dystopian Politics of Metaphors for the Unequal City – a View from Brussels’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 25, pp. 55–69. Baeten, G. (2001b), ‘The Europeanization of Brussels and the Urbanization of “Europe” – Hybridizing the City. Empowerment and Disempowerment in the EU District’, European Urban and Regional Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 117–30. Becker, I., Godard, M. and Roelandts, M. (1989), ‘Distribution spatiale des primes à la rénovation (1983-1988), premières réflexions sur la politique de rénovation urbaine à Bruxelles’, Revue Belge de Géographie, 3–4, pp. 175–91. Belgisch Staatsblad (1996), Decreet tot vaststelling van de regelen inzake de werking en de verdeling van het Sociaal Impuls Fonds, Brussel: Belgisch Staatsblad. Bijttebier, J., Butenaerts, H., Deschouwer, K., Elchardus, M., Gaus, H., Houttekier, G., Huyse, L., Neels, S., Swyngedouw, M. and Vanderkindere, M. (1992), 24 november 1991, de betekenis van een verkiezingsuitslag, Leuven: Kritak. Boudry, L., de Coninck, M., Fret, L., Geldof, D., Goossens, J., Notredame, L., Salmon, P., Seys, P., van Belleghem, S., Vandenberghe, J., Vandenbussche, J. and Ysebie, P. (1999), ‘Sociale, stedelijke en bestuurlijke ontwikkeling? Een tussentijdse SIF-balans, verslag van een rondetafelgesprek over de SIF-effecten 1997–1999’, Alert, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 21–48. Cabus, P. (2002), ‘Ruimtelijke verschuiving in de verdeling van het toekomstig gemeentefonds’, Ruimte en Planning, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 57–64. Cheshire, P.C. and Hay, D.G. (1989), Urban Problems in Western Europe: An Economic Analysis, London: Unwin Hyman. Colard, A. and Vandermotten, C. (1996), ‘La périurbanisation de l’emploi dans les zones métropolitaines belges’, Revue Belge de Géographie, Vol. 120, No. 1, pp. 33–40.

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De Brabander, G. (1998), ‘Belgium’, in van den Berg L., Braun, E. and van der Meer, J. (eds), National Urban Policies in the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate. De Clerq, E., Guldentops, F., Kesteloot, C., Mistiaen, P., van Nieuwenhuyze, I. and Vranken, J. (2000), Comparative Analysis at National Metropolitan, Local and Neighbourhood Level: Belgium: Brussels and Antwerp, URBEX Series No. 2, Amsterdam: Amsterdam Study Centre for the Metropolitan Environment. Decroly, J.M., van Criekinghem, M. and Crahay, A. (2000), ‘Les consequences sociospatiales des politiques urbaines ‘entrepreneuriales’, Ruimte en Planning, Vol. 20, No. 1. Decroly, J.M., van Criekingen, M. and Crahay, A. (2001), ‘Les quartiers en crise face aux nouvelles politiques urbaines’, in Devuyst, D., Hens, L. and Impens, R. (eds) Neighbourhoods in Crisis and Sustainable Urban Development, Brussels: VUB University Press, pp. 39–62. De Coninck, M. and Vandenberghe, J. (1996), Het Sociaal Impulsfonds: een instrument voor het stedelijk beleid. Brussel: Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap. De Decker, P. (1994), ‘Het herwaarderingsbesluit geherwaardeerd?’, Ruimtelijke planning, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 85–92. De Decker, P. (1999a), ‘De stadsmus raakt zelfs zijn bomen kwijt’, in Wiesbauer N. (ed.), Gazet van Babel. Een docudrama in 6 brieven en 5 seizoenen, Antwerpen: vzw de Kersentuin, pp. 39–46. De Decker, P. (1999b), ‘On the Genesis of an Urban Policy in Flanders, Belgium’, Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 183–90. De Decker, P. and Loopmans, M. (2003), ‘Nieuw Vlaams stedenbeleid verergert de armoede’, Agora, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 27–30. De Decker, P., Hubeau, B. and Nieuwinckel, S. (1996), ‘Stedelijke vernieuwing: eindelijk de retoriek voorbij?’, in de Decker, P., Hubeau, B. and Nieuwinckel, S. (eds), In de ban van stad en wijk, Berchem: EPO. De Decker, P., van Nieuwenhuyze, I. and Vranken, J. (2004), ‘Urban Development Programmes in Flanders: Ghent and Antwerp. A Preliminary Assessment’, working paper for UGIS (Urban Development Programmes, Urban Governance, Social Inclusion and Sustainability) (EVK4–CT–1999–00012 UGIS), Leuven: Acco. De Decker, P., Vranken, J. and Beaumont, J. (2003), On the Origins of Urban Development Programme in Nine European Countries, Antwerpen: Garant (UGIS: Urban Development Programmes, Urban Governance, Social Inclusion and Sustainability). De Decker, P., Kesteloot C., De Maeschalck F. and Vranken, J. (2004), ‘Revitalising the City in an Anti-urban Context: Extreme Right and the Rise of Urban Policies in FlandersBelgium’, International Journal for Urban and Regional Studies (forthcoming). De Maesschalck, F. (2000), ‘Electorale geografie van het Vlaams Blok, de ruimtelijke evolutie van de verkiezingsuitslagen van 1981 tot en met 1995’, De Aardrijkskunde, Vol. 24, No. 1–2, pp. 21–36. De Maesschalck, F. and Loopmans, M. (2002), ‘Herverdeling van middelen en mensen’, Rooilijn, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 120–25. De Meulder, B., Schreurs, J., Cock, A. and Notteboom, B. (1999), ‘Patching up the Belgian Urban Landscape’, OASE, No. 52, pp. 78–112. Dexia (2003), De financiën van de locale overheden in 2002, Brussels: Dienst Research Dexia Bank.

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Dubois, O. (2001), ‘La construction résidentielle en Wallonie: analyse spatiale multiscalaire et logiques socio-économiques de localisation’, unpublished PhD thesis, Université Libre de Bruxelles. Elmhorn, C. (2001), Brussels: A Reflexive World City, Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International. Henau, A. (2002), De recente demografie van het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest/la démographie récente de la région de Bruxelles-Capitale, Brussels: IRIS editions. Heughebaert, M. (1988), ‘Inspraak van bewoners in het nieuwe stadsontwikkelingsbesluit, toespraak op de studiedag stadsontwikkeling’, Congrespaleis Ghent, 23 September. Hobin, V. (1995), ‘Wijkontwikkeling: in de ban van de wijk’, in Vranken, J., Geldof, D. and van Menxel, G. (eds), Armoede en sociale uitsluiting, jaarboek 1995, Leuven: Acco. Kesteloot, C. (1990), De economische determinanten van de stedelijke structuren, Ruimtelijke Planning, Afl. 25, II.D.2.d., 42 p. Kesteloot, C. (2000), ‘Brussels: Postfordist Polarization in a Fordist Spatial Canvas’, in Marcuse, P. and van Kempen, R. (eds), Globalizing Cities: A New Urban Spatial Order?, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 186–210. Kesteloot, C. (2003), ‘Verstedelijking in Vlaanderen: problemen, kansen en uitdagingen voor het beleid in de 21e eeuw’, in Boudry, L., Cabus, P., Loeckx, A., Kesteloot, C., Corijn, E. and de Rynck, F. (eds), De eeuw van de stad: voorstudies, Brugge: Die Keure, pp. 15–39. Kesteloot, C. and de Maesschalck, F. (2001), ‘Anti-Urbanism in Flanders: The Political and Social Consequences of a Spatial Class Struggle Strategy’, Belgeo, Vol. 2, No. 1–2, pp. 41–62. Kesteloot, C., de Turck, A., Vandermotten, C., Marissal, P. and van Hamme, G. (2001), Structures sociales et quartiers en difficultés dans les régions urbains belges/sociale structuren en buurten in moeilijkheden in de Belgische stadsgewesten, Brussels: Ministerie voor Grootstedenbeleid. Kesteloot, C., Saey, P., de Maesschalck, F., Loopmans, M., Uitermark, J., Denayer, W., Mistiaen, P. and Guldentops, F. (2002), ‘Achtergestelde buurten, economische integratie en stedelijk beleid’, unpublished report, Leuven: KULeuven. Knops, G. (1981), ‘Stadsvernieuwing in België tussen het midden van de negentiende eeuw en 1953’, Ruimtelijke planning, 1981–1, pp. 1–18. Knops, G. and Vlaeminck, S. (1983), ‘Sociale stads- en dorpsvernieuwingsoperaties’, Ruimtelijke planning, afl. 6, II.A.1.e., pp. kno–kno19. Lievens, J., Brasseur, N. and Martens, A. (1975), De grote stad een geplande chaos?, Leuven: Davidsfonds. Loopmans, M. (2002), ‘From Hero to Zero. Armen en stedelijk beleid in Vlaanderen’, Ruimte en Planning, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 39–49. Loopmans, M. (2003a), ‘Het Stedenfonds: interview met Linda Boudry’, Ruimte en Planning, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 124–31. Loopmans, M. (2003b), ‘“Opsinjoren” in Antwerpen: een geavanceerde vorm van governance’, Agora, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 17-20. Loopmans, M. , Uitermark, J. and de Maesschalck, F. (2003), ‘Against All Odds: Poor People Jumping Scales and the Development of an Urban Policy in Flanders, Belgium’, Belgeo, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 243–58. Luyten, S. and Kesteloot, C. (2003), ‘The Brussels Case’, unpublished working paper for the seminar ‘Measuring Neighbourhood Trajectories in Understanding Processes of Social Exclusion’, October, Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

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Merenne, B., van der Haegen, H. and van Hecke, E. (1997), ‘La Belgique, diversité territoriale’, Bulletin du crédit communal, 202, Bruxelles: Crédit Communal. Moriau, J. (1996), ‘Naar een duurzame ontwikkeling in de stedelijke prioritaire zones. Wijkontwikkeling in Wallonië’, in de Decker, P., Nieuwinckel, S. and Hubeau, B. (eds), In de ban van stad en wijk, Antwerpen: EPO, pp. 219–27. Moyart, L. (2000), ‘Croissance des services aux entreprises comme source de nouvelles inégalités spatiales: applications aux régions urbaines en Belgique’, Bulletin de la Société Géographique de Liège, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 41–52. Neirinckx, P. (1995), ‘Het Algemeen Verslag over de Armoede: betekenis en opvolging’, in Vranken, J., Geldof, D. and van Menxel, G. (eds), Armoede en sociale uitsluiting, jaarboek 1995, Leuven: Acco. Noël, F. (1998), La ville rapiécée. Les stratégies de la réhabilitation à Bruxelles, Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles. Noël, F. , Rodriguez, D. and Degraef, V. (2001), Les programmes d’action locale intégrée de revitalisation des quartiers: comparaison inter-régionale Bruxelles-Flandre-Wallonie, Bruxelles: Centre de Recherche Urbaine (Université Libre de Bruxelles). Peeters, L. (1996), Voor Steden en Mensen: beleidsbrief 1995, Brussel: Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap. Picque, C. (2002), Evaluatierapport van het Federaal Grootstedenbeleid 2000–2002, Brussel: Federaal Grootstedenbeleid. Swyngedouw, E. and Baeten, G. (2001), ‘Scaling the City: The Political Economy of “Glocal” Development – Brussels’ Conundrum’, European Planning Studies, Vol. 9, No. 7, pp. 827–49. Swyngedouw, M. (1990), Verkiezingen in Antwerpen: Het Vlaams Blok, Islamitische minderheden en kansarmoede, pp. 401–29. Swyngedouw, M. (1998), ‘The Extreme Right in Belgium: Of a Non-existent Front National and an Omnipresent Vlaams Blok’, in Betz, H.-G. and Immerfall, S. (eds), The New Politics of the Right. Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, London, Macmillan Houndmills, pp. 59–75. Swyngedouw, M. (1992), Waar voor je waarden: de opkomst van het Vlaams Blok en Agalev in de jaren tachtig, Leuven: ISPO. UBS (2003), Prices and Earnings: A Comparison of Purchasing Power Around the Globe, Zurich: UBS. Uitermark, J. (2003), De sociale controle van achterstandswijken: een beleidsgenetisch perspectief, Nederlandse Geografische Studies 322, Utrecht/Amsterdam: Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijkskundig Genootschap. Union des Villes et Communes de Wallonie (2002), Rapport d’activités, Bruxelles: UVCW. Van Criekingen, M. (2002), ‘Les Impacts sociaux de la rénovation urbaine à Bruxelles: analyse des migrations intra-urbains’, Belgeo, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 355–76. Van Criekingen, M. and Decroly, J.M. (2003), ‘Revisiting the Diversity of Gentrification: Neighbourhood Renewal Processes in Brussels and Montreal’, Urban Studies, Vol. 40, No. 12, pp. 2451–68. Vandenberghe, J. (1997), ‘Bestuurlijke dialoog in een verantwoordelijke samenleving’, Alert, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 43–47. Van Grembergen, P. (2001), Beleidsbrief binnenlandse aangelegenheden en stedenbeleid 2001–2002, Brussel: Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap.

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Van Hove, E. and Nieuwinckel, S. (1996), Het Bomboek: het verhaal van de buurtontwikkelingsmaatschappij Noordoost-Antwerpen, Brussel: Koning Boudewijnstichting. Van Menxel, G. (2002), ‘Is er nog plaats voor armoedebestrijding in het lokaal sociaal beleid?’, in Vranken, J., de Boyser, K., Geldof, D. and van Menxel, G. (eds), Armoede en sociale uitsluiting, jaarboek 2002, Leuven: Acco, pp. 263–76. Vanneste, D., Cabus, P., Leemans, E. and de Rijck, T. (2003), ‘Ruimtelijke differentiatie van buitenlandse werkgelegenheid en territoriale dynamiek’, in Vanneste, D., Abraham, F., Cabus, P. and Sleuwaegen, L. (eds), Belgische werkgelegenheid in een mondialiserende economie, Ghent: Academia Press, pp. 89–211. Vlaams Parlement (2002), Plenaire vergadering, decreet tot vaststelling van de regels inzake werking en verdeling van het Vlaams Stedenfonds, vergadering van 4 december 2002, Brussels: Vlaams Parlement. Vlaamse Regering (1999), Regeerakkoord voor Vlaanderen: Een nieuw project voor Vlaanderen, Brussels: Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap. Vlaamse Regering (2001a), Ontwerp van decreet houdende de ondersteuning van stadsvernieuwingsprojecten, Brussels: Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap. Vranken, J. and Geldof, D. (1991), Armoede en sociale uitsluiting, jaarboek 1991, Leuven: Acco. Vranken, J. and Geldof, D. (1993), Armoede en sociale uitsluiting, jaarboek 1992–93, Leuven: Acco. Vranken, J., de Decker P. and van Nieuwenhuyze, I. (2001), ‘The Flemish (Belgian) Background Report’, working paper for UGIS (Urban Development Programmes, Urban Governance, Social Inclusion and Sustainability) (EVK4–CT–1999–00012 UGIS), Antwerp: OASeS. Vranken, J., Geldof, D. and van Menxel, G. (1995), Armoede en sociale uitsluiting, jaarboek 1995, Leuven: Acco.

Annex Table A5.1 Municipalities and agglomerations of over 100,000 inhabitants in 2003 Population in 1000s 1970 core Brussels Antwerpen Liège Ghent Charleroi Hasselt-Genk Mons Leuven Brugge Kortrijk Namur La Louvière Mechelen

1075136 549356 242983 255877 236813 117141 93902 86354 116868 77263 95771 78522 80351

1980 region

1675095 891375 649027 393325 413392 193948 237763 145932 154587 139639 118735 132018 107499

core 1008715 512806 220183 241695 221911 125951 96784 85632 118243 76424 100712 76892 77667

1990 region

1695704 899624 644452 395237 404385 215774 237719 154068 160533 143344 126869 130629 107144

core 964385 470349 196825 230543 206779 127437 91867 85193 117460 76081 103466 76138 75622

2003 region

1697633 896833 625334 389857 390293 226208 230462 162352 162943 144833 132163 129837 106419

core 992041 452474 184303 228016 200460 132128 91078 90406 116811 74340 105705 76592 76485

region 1787777 911293 624588 397910 385805 240981 226736 176324 165522 144222 138282 131229 109971

Chapter 6

Denmark’s National Urban Showcase: The Öresund Area Regional Development Christian Wichmann Matthiessen1

6.1

Introduction

Denmark is a small country of 43,098km2 with 5,349,212 inhabitants.2 With only one large city and three regional capital type cities, national policy for the large cities is not very explicit in light of the fact that the metropolitan area of Copenhagen houses 35 per cent of the national population. Any massive policy in favour of this clearly identifiable unit would create a minor revolution among the 65 per cent of the population which lives outside Copenhagen. Large city policy has mainly been formulated on the national level expressed in an obligatory national planning report that the Minister for the Environment submits to the parliament at intervals. The latest version was presented in 2003 (Miljøministeriet, 2003). Urban policy includes several fields of urban growth and development, and several ministries are responsible for different aspects. In the period 1998–2001 the government established a Ministry of Urban Affairs, which was active on a range of issues. The most important ministries before and after this intermezzo were and are the Ministry of the Environment (planning, spatial issues) and the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (regional development, housing), but other ministries are active too, especially the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. The Danish government is organised in a three-level hierarchy: national, regional and local government (Matthiessen, 1998). Outside Greater Copenhagen, the system of local and regional government was established in 1970 and consisted until 2001 of 225 large municipalities (towns with local hinterland) and 12 regions (regional centres with hinterland). Within the Greater Copenhagen Area the almost century-old pattern of administrative units is still partly in effect, with 50 municipalities and five regional units. An indirectly-elected council governed Greater Copenhagen in the period 1974–1989. The capital area was 1 2

University of Copenhagen. In 2001.

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without regional government in 1990–2000 and a new unit was established for the metropolitan area in 2001. This Greater Copenhagen Development Council receives its legitimacy from five county governments who finance the activities and select and instruct the council members. The council holds responsibility for public transport and for planning and coordinating issues. Another new type of regional/municipality government was set up in 2001 on the rather isolated Baltic Sea-island of Bornholm, which had previously consisted of one very small county divided into six municipalities, together counting 44,126 inhabitants. County and municipalities were amalgamated into one unit, which holds responsibility for both levels. Municipal governments cover all parts of Denmark and regional governments cover all municipalities. The rights and duties of the different local governments are almost equal,3 and the same applies to the regional level of government.4 The different levels of government are each financed by local, regional and national taxes. The responsible local, regional or national unit pays for expenditures. In addition there is a ‘downward’ flow of money from the national level to regional and local levels according to a set of rules and to political decisions. Of the total GNP, 50 per cent is privately used, 20 per cent is used on the national level, 10 per cent on the regional and 20 per cent on the municipal level. The spatial planning system is simple and decentralised. Municipalities are responsible for comprehensive municipal and local planning, counties are responsible for regional planning and the Minister for the Environment can influence this planning by directives, call in procedures and veto rights, but usually exercises national interests by negotiations. The planning process is controlled politically and public participation is an important part of the procedure. 6.2

Summary of the National Urban Policies until the Mid-1990s

The years around 1990 presented a shift in focus on the large cities from being looked upon as problematic concentrations to be perceived as decisive economic powerhouses in the global competition. Pre-1992 urban policy was linked to the construction and implementation of the welfare state. Spatial allocation principles should ensure an equal spatial development of the entire country. Irrespective of geography, the aims were to guarantee citizens living conditions of equal levels. This policy terminated in 1989–1992. The shift was a consequence of the fall of the Iron Curtain combined with the ongoing internationalisation of the economy, which in 1989–1991 expressed itself first and foremost through the establishment of the European Inner Market. The shift was quite sudden and was given very

3 Exceptions are the municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, and the island of Bornholm, which combine municipal status with county status. 4 With the Greater Copenhagen Area as an exception.

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little attention, although it represented transformations from politics to economics, from welfare orientation to market orientation and from spatial equalisation policy to a focus on metropolitan competition. Post-1992 urban policy has mostly had its impact on infrastructure investment in favour of Greater Copenhagen, highlighting also a future metropolitan reality in the Öresund area realised by the coming of the Danish-Swedish bridge. In addition, renewed attention on the regional capitals was on the agenda and an increasinlgy European view on growth issues was promoted as marketing (demand) orientation and strategic planning was introduced during the late 1980s. Regional issues with the main goal of increasing the international competitiveness of the region or city in question have been added to traditional urban marketing. Although this chapter is about national urban policy, it must be mentioned that the decentralised government system implies that the regional level of government influences urban system policy much more than the national government does. It must also be mentioned that local government policies on taxation of land and income, service level and housing play important roles in urban policy in setting the local scenes. When it comes to housing, for example, the local mixture of owner/tenant/co-op homes reflects political priorities and thus indicates the business climate for the city in question. The spatial planning policies of the Danish government are mainly expressed in an obligatory national planning report submitted to parliament by the Minister for the Environment after each national election. National planning includes topics and projects in spatial planning that are considered of national significance. It comprises a framework and a supplement to the regional planning carried out by the counties and to the municipality and local planning carried out by the municipalities. With some exceptions, detailed management and detailed approval of regional or local planning are not the purposes as, for example, development in coastal areas and the maximum size of retail business units. In addition, national interest sometimes requires intervention in decisions that the local authorities cannot or will not make on the location of socially important projects. National planning can stop or change local projects that are inappropriate from an overall perspective. Specific trends can also be promoted. A committee of state civil servants assesses all regional plan proposals during the public comment period to determine the need for national involvment and the Ministry of Environment produces documents stating national interests in the regional planning. National authority can veto local plan proposals and, if no agreement is reached, the Minister for the Environment has the final decision. Urban system policy differs from region to region, although the nationally formulated terminology is in general use. In the mid-1990s five major cities (Copenhagen plus four provincial centres) constituted the upper level with a national government-defined weak status. Outside Copenhagen each of the 13 regional governments exercised their own policies and each gave the status of regional centre to a small number of cities, where the location and development of county activities (for example, hospitals) were favoured. The next planned level

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of the urban system was the municipal centre, where each municipality generally favoured one city. Although revised every fourth year, planning for the urban system has maintained the pattern as it was formulated in the 1970s when the initial planning laws were implemented. Concentration versus deconcentration on the regional level has been a subject of politics, but the overall picture is of a very stable urban system policy. In its policy, the government established a commission of ministers with the objective of finding solutions to problems in newer social housing areas. This high-level commission was named the Urban Commission and its remit was to initiate a common problem-solving effort on social problems, criminality in social housing areas and take actions to decrease concentrations of the social underclass, immigrants and refugees in certain quarters. Actions taken included lowering rents, renovating the residential areas, hiring consultants for the residents and starting up social activities. The results of the policy actions were evaluated in 1999 by the national Danish Building and Urban Research Institute (Statens Byggeforskningsinstitut, 1999) under the headings ‘neighbourhood strategy’ and ‘competitive strategy’. The two types of strategy reflected the contemporary shift in urban policy from welfare to growth. The main conclusion of the evaluation was that negative trends had been halted so that problems did not worsen and that some problems had been diminished, but none solved. The positive evaluation of the results of actions taken by the Urban Commission has proved to be too optimistic. 6.3

The State of the Cities

National urban policy is based on issues that are certainly recognised elsewhere in Europe: concentration in the highly accessible centres, especially Greater Copenhagen and the regional capitals; segregation processes within the larger cities; immigrant integration and rising problems between native population and immigrants from Third World countries; safety issues; network development and increasing international accessibility; decreasing densities in urban areas; urban sprawl (including recreation versus landscape conservation); regional disadvantages and periphery problems of sparsely populated areas with low accessibility; environmental problems, especially those associated with increasing use of automobiles. Sustainability is a key word and defines a society in which economic growth and development of the cultural landscape take place without threatening fundamental conditions for the coming generations. Another key aspect is the advancement of democratic processes and the balance of top-down and bottom-up political processes. Moreover, an important aspect is regional balance and cooperation between small towns and cities in growth regions. Finally, there is a growing interest in urban and regional marketing and strategic planning and the European perspective plays an increasingly important role. The post-bridge bi-national Öresund Area (Greater Copenhagen plus Greater Malmö-

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Lund) represents a new urban development regime of European attention and is presented later in this chapter. Denmark is a highly urbanised nation and no municipality can any longer be considered rural. Using the outdated United Nations definition5 of ‘urban’ 85 per cent of the population lived in urban areas in 2001. The balance between urban and rural population has been stable since 1980. Table 6.1 Urban and rural population 1960 Denmark 4,585,256 Urban areas 74% Rural districts 26%

1970

1980

1990

2001

4,937,579 80% 20%

5,123,989 84% 16%

5,135,409 85% 15%

5,349,212 85% 15%

The national urban pattern is dominated by Copenhagen, with a population in the core area that comprises 26 per cent of the national total (2001) and the Greater Copenhagen region, inclusive of the commuting hinterland, counts for 35 per cent of the Danish population. Copenhagen is the undisputed national leader and capital. Its position is secure, as the second city, Århus, counts only 5 per cent when core population is measured and 8 per cent when the ring area is included. Copenhagen is in the class of large European metropolitan units and urban competition with cities like Stockholm, Hamburg and Berlin is clear. The next level of cities comprises Århus (286,668 inhabitants in the core and 429,811 in the Greater Århus area), Odense (183,691 and 409,920) and Aalborg (161,661 and 357,774). These cities play roles as regional capitals for large areas of the country as does Copenhagen. The 1980 distribution of population in different sized groups of cities has been fairly stable and it is, rather, location within labour markets of urban units, which determines urban growth. From 1990 it has been cities within labour markets around the four largest towns that have grown more than average whereas cities within labour markets outside towns of at least 20,000 inhabitants have declined (Nielsen, 2003). Concentration reflects the use of advanced knowledge as a prominent factor of production and the subsequent demand for a labour force with higher education. The knowledge economy forces through a more concentrated geography than the industrial economy did. The emerging new urban system pattern is also influenced by global competition and by reductions in national protection of industries. During the last few decades the number of 5

The traditional United Nations concept of urban areas is strictly based on psychical features. An urban area is continuously built-up which means that the distance between houses does not exceed 200 meters, except owing to public parks, churchyards, athletic grounds, industrial plants, etc. The lower limit of population is 200 inhabitants.

Table 6.2 Population in large cities*

*

The total urban areas are delimited as labour market hinterlands since 1992 (Miljøministeriet, 2003). Core areas: Copenhagen comprises County of Copenhagen plus municipalities of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, Allerød, Birkerød, Farum, Fredensborg-Humlebæk, Hørsholm, Karlebo, Greve and Solrød. This area forms the traditional urban area according to the United Nations definition. The three other core areas are the municipalities of Århus, Odense and Aalborg respectively. They are somewhat over-bounded compared to the core area of Copenhagen because of differences in municipal areas in Greater Copenhagen (small municipalities) and the rest of Denmark (large municipalities). Ring areas: Copenhagen comprises Greater Copenhagen Area plus municipalities of Ringsted, Haslev, Fakse, Rønnede and Stevns minus core area. Århus ring: Municipalities of Ebeltoft, Midtdjurs, Rønde, Rosenholm, Hadsten, Hinnerup, Hammel, Galten, Ry, Hørning, Skanderborg and Odder. Odense ring: County of Funen minus municipalities of Odense, Middelfart, Nørre Åby, Egebjerg, Gudme, Tranekær, Rudkøbing, Svendborg, Sydlangeland, Marstal and Ærøskøbing. Aalborg ring: Municipalities of Pandrup, Brønderslev, Dronninglund, Åbybro, Hals, Nibe, Støvring, Skørping and Sejlflod.

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commuters crossing an administrative boundary in particular has increased (1986: 947,219 or 35.6 per cent and 2000: 1,180,609 or 42.9 per cent) as has the average distance of commuting (1986: 18.3 million km and 2000; 25.8 million km). The labour regions have been enlarged, commuting to and from central urban units has been more balanced and local labour markets have increasingly opened up (Landsplanafdelingen, 2001). 6.4

National Urban Policies from the Mid-1990s: Urban Policy Reorientation at the Turn of the Century

In the late 1990s the focus on urban and regional development shifted to areas outside the Copenhagen region, since the city’s vibrant economy seemed to need little help. During the second part of the 1990s economic concentration was on major high-quality service centres with attractive environments of knowledge, research and development and with first-class locations in the dominant network of transport especially of air transport. This profile matches Copenhagen perfectly, and the city was – and is – a success. A reorientation of urban policy was launched around the turn of the century based on further analysis of the specialisation profiles of the cities (Miljø and Energi Ministeriet, 2000). Local strengths are historically anchored in the built environment, natural resources, the environment and the form of local knowledge and identity. The labour force varies regarding qualifications and the business structure is different from region to region. Each town was advised to strengthen its local role in cooperation with the rural surroundings, which must be looked upon as interactive suburbs closely related to the urban area – socially, culturally and economically – but which nevertheless also present their rural characteristics and environmental problems and potentials. Local growth potentials were to be enforced and clearly incorporated into the planning of municipalities and regions. Clusters of competence and advanced knowledge would be the new basis for differential development. The municipalities had to work out a strategy plan every fourth year following elections. Local clusters of competence and knowledge as the basis for development of growth strategies should also: point out relations to more regionally-based clusters; look at their position within networks of traffic and cooperation; discuss marketing of the urban unit; and relate to the European level. What was to be achieved with the reorientation of national urban and regional policy in 2000 was a closer relationship between public planning strategies and private business spanning from manufacturing to tourism. Also relations between ministries responsible for transport and infrastructure, economy and planning were to be improved. Sustainability on all levels would be the object. As an addition to the main objectives of the 2000 document on national spatial planning, two urban clusters were given the status of provincial centre, which they

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had been applying for for many years, indicating national attention for a location for upper level activities. The cluster of four cities (Herning, Ikast, Holstebro and Struer) in the mid-western are of Jutland – named Mid-West6 – and the cluster of three cities with neighbours in east Jutland-west Funen (Kolding, Vejle and Fredericia) – named the Triangle City7 – had already been mentioned in 1997 (Miljø og Energiministeriet, 1997) as candidates for this apparently attractive status carrying little national obligation. In 2000 the two clusters were given the official nomenclature and thus joined Copenhagen, Århus, Odense, Aalborg and the slightly smaller city of Esbjerg, which had had this status for decades. The discussion on defining an overall urban policy was initiated by the government urban commission 1993–1997 (Statens Byggeforskningsinstitut, 1999); a new Ministry of Urban Affairs was established in 1998. The ministry displayed its action plan in 1999 (By- og Boligministeriet, 1999), which undertook four aims. First, cities should be supported as centres for growth and development, urban growth should be coherent and the policy should diminsh inequalities. Second, the objective should be to create positive spirals in degraded quarters, development of attractive and sustainable cities with good conditions for business, with active participation, and research support should be established for these efforts. Third, the basics were considered to be coordination, cooperation and local basis. As the fourth field of policy, the government listed the instruments partly as a continuation of the Urban Commission actions (see above) with urban renewal and municipality planning, and partly developed new instruments on public–private partnerships, ‘flagship’ projects, urban governance and free zones. Shortly after the presentation of the action plan the government established another commission on urban policy. It presented its advice in 2001 and aimed at a new policy focused on diversity and sustainability (Erhvervs- og Bypolitisk Udvalg, 2001). The urban environment should be of high quality, a mixture of land uses is preferred, revitalisation of old urban districts should be given priority, accessibility should be improved, transport delimited and densities raised to prevent new zoning for urban purposes. The advice has yet to be implemented, but tools were provided in 2003 with a change of planning and urban renewal laws inclusive of national economic support to upgrading and changing problematic neighbourhoods and old industrial and harbour areas into contemporary use. The Minister of Urban Affairs published her statement on Urban Policy in 2001 (By- og Boligministeriet, 2001) based on laying down traditional sector policy in favour of comprehensive and integral policy. Urban policy aimed at two dimensions. One was residential area-based and comprised social policy of welfare improvement and problem solutions; the other was on growth issues. The 6

Formally, the Mid-West provincial centre consists of the four municipalities mentioned. 7 Formally, the Triangle City consists of eight municipalities: Kolding, Fredericia, Vejle, Børkop, Middelfart, Vamdrup, Lunderskov and Vejen.

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policies must be sustainable in respect of the environment, public participation is considered highly important, and the political actions must not further marginalise weak population groups. According to the urban policy formulated in a series of reports and statements related to the Ministry of Urban Affairs, a major field of action has been the neighbourhood improvement programmes. The objective was to address increasing social problems and the concentration of immigrants and refugees in a number of suburban social housing areas. The programme was launched in 1994 and around 500 social housing estates were given some kind of support. In 1996 the Urban Committee launched a new programme and selected seven major urban areas for improvement. The projects were based on coordinated and integrated efforts of different public sectors on different cooperating levels of government. They were also based on analysis of the neighbourhoods potentials, problems, and on participation and strength of local actors. It combined social actions inclusive of integration programmes with urban renewal and local economic change policy. The dimensions of culture and sustainability were also comprehended. The programme was allocated almost €200 million and was in 2003 evaluated by the national Danish Building and Urban Research Institute (By og Byg, 2003), which found that as a whole the efforts had succeeded in making changes that made the neighbourhoods more attractive and the residents more positive towards them. Mobility hadbeen reduced but no increasingly mixed composition of residents was visible. The Ministry of Urban Affairs only existed in the period 1998–2001. The most important ministries before and after this intermezzo were and are the Ministry of the Environment (planning, spatial issues) and the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (regional development, housing), but other ministries are also active, especially the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs. Based on the fact that growth in, for example, population, number of jobs and income is higher in regions with large urban units than in other regions, the Danish government published its annual document presenting intentions on urban and regional policy (Miljøministeriet, 2003). The central notion is, on balance but with clearly expressed ambitions, to strengthen growth differing from region to region. The report states that the nation consists of three different types of labour market regions: four regions with more than 100,000 inhabitants in the central city, 18 regions with between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants in the central urban unit, and 24 regions with smaller cities (see Figure 6.1). It is stated that growth in town and hinterland varies with the size of the largest city, and political effort is therefore directed towards growth in the regions without cities of considerable size. The report considers it important to think in large regional entities and to adopt flexible strategies in the planning of urban and regional growth, and it points out that flexibility should be an issue also between different administrative levels and sectors.

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Figure 6.1 Four large cities (urban area). Labour market regions indicated Source: Based on commuting data 1992, Landsplanafdelingen, 1994.

The growing number of immigrants and refugees presents a specific location pattern, which implies concentration in larger cities, often in the least attractive parts of these cities or in social housing areas. The actual visibility of ethnic minorities in specific parts of the cities is considered a political problem in need of a solution. So is the increasing social and ethnic polarisation, which in part reflects

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that it is only the strong groups (high income, surplus of social capital), which have the freedom of choice and can choose to leave unattractive quarters and select areas of urban and social quality. This kind of problem is given priority and a series of policy issues are discussed: for example, integration versus assimilation, participation in the labour market, strengthening of the immigrants’ social capital, and focused urban renewal. The contradictions between the goals of equalising and integration to human behaviour are demonstrated by an unwanted effect of urban renewal. Upgrading of residential quarters implies new polarisation for weak groups of people who by necessity concentrate in the shrinking residual of public or non-profit housing. Housing policy is an influential part of urban policy although it is often considered an independent political field. Recently there has clearly been a reduction in public financial engagement in the housing sector. Policy is in favour of private ownership, which implies privatising public housing and converting rented housing into co-ops or condos. The Municipality of Copenhagen has, for example, solved its budget deficit problems by selling the 55,000 municipallyowned apartments first and foremost to new co-ops of former residents. The government stated its policy on sustainable development in a publication signed by the prime minister (Regeringen, 2002). On urban policy, the government will promote the sustainable development of cities, homes and constructions. Residents and users must participate and the cities must provide conditions for further growth and present attractive locations for new business. They must be lively and diverse and must secure equal integration possibility for all members of Danish society. Old industrial and harbour areas will be transformed to provide attractive urban quarters for residents and industries. Accessibility issues should overrule mobility issues and collective transport should be favoured. In the residential market everyone should have a real choice between ownership and tenancy. Urban renewal should be given priority especially in social problematic areas. The actual Danish national planning report focuses on balanced development, but presents strong ties to another report released simultaneously on regional growth strategies (Regeringen, 2003). In the latter, the government presents its general ambition with regard to administrative efficiency and the creation of a business climate in favour of private sector demands as the main issues of regional policy. It is stated that regional competitiveness improvement is needed in order to secure future development and living conditions. In addition, the government wants all ministries to present the regional consequences of any laws and proposals as an integral part of the decision-making process. The objective of balanced regional development takes the aim of improving the general conditions of growth (Regeringen, 2003) and combines the general growth policy with improvement policy of peripheral regions. The government also raised the question of specific improvement of conditions for growth in the peripheral regions and has set aside a modest amount of financing (€8 million

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per year) for actions to improve these types of area, which are characterised by small cities. Between 2001 and 2003, a governmental commission worked on the structure of local and regional governments and new assignment of tasks. High expectations concerning advice on the number of administrative levels and on the number of units and their financing were presented in the actual debate. Expectations were partly based on the fact that the five municipalities in the smallest Danish region, the island of Bornholm had been combined with the regional authority to form one unit after a local referendum and that some other municipalities were in the same process, backed by local wishes. The governmental structural commission delivered its report in January 2004 and proposed several models, which were discussed until summer 2004, when the government took a decision on the number of administrative levels and size and number of municipalities and regional units. In summary, the state of the art when it comes to urban and regional policy focuses on regional entities and solutions to obtain the end goal of balanced development. The contrast between dynamics in the regions with large urban units and peripheral regions is deepening as competitiveness more and more is related to high and comprehensive levels of knowledge and education in combination with strong international accessibility. It is a political objective to strengthen regions without these qualities and at the same time support competitiveness in strong regions. Consequently the government wants to focus its own policy and to advocate that the region and cities themselves focus on their own growth potential. 6.5

What is the Impact of European Policies?

Danish towns are becoming increasingly dependent on international developments as international barriers for movements are breaking down. Cooperation across national borders is expanding. The geographical mobility of companies is enhanced, the exchange of goods and services increases and international competition becomes fiercer. As a consequence, it is expected that future international competition in Europe will be more between urban regions than between nations. Denmark is often considered to be a single region when observed from an international standpoint and regional differences in standards of living are certainly small. Denmark does, however, consist of different labour markets or urban regions, which in many ways are relatively independent of each other. The globalisation process leads to increased specialisation and division of labour among the urban regions. Each individual urban region will thus have its own unique role to play in the international division of labour determined by the strengths and weaknesses of the regions. The Örestadsplan of Copenhagen (initiated in 1993) is the first example of a comprehensive development plan for a new urban area subordinated to strategic

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objectives. The strategic objective was formulated as advancement of regional productivity in order to give Copenhagen a better platform in international competition with other metropoles. To that end, a large area of highly accessible open land close to both the city centre and Copenhagen Airport is in the process of being developed. Large investments in infrastructure, including a new metro rail system, are in progress and a mixture of metropolitan functions is in the construction phase or already in use. Denmark’s main transport structure (see Figure 6.2) includes two north–south and one east–west international axes for railroad and motorway. The east–west axis from Sweden via the Öresund Bridge crosses Sealand and, via the Storebelt Bridge, continues to Funen and further on to Jutland then across this peninsula to Esbjerg from where ferries connect to England. The eastern north–south corridor also connects via south Sweden to Greater Copenhagen and onwards to the Baltic Sea crossing ferries with Hamburg as the entry point to the German networks. Ferries from Norwegian harbours and from Gothenburg in Sweden link to the western transport corridor at harbours in the northern part of Jutland via Aalborg, Århus and the Triangle City – where this axis crosses the east–west corridor – and on to Germany at Flensburg and further on to Hamburg. The two major crossing points are the Triangle City and Greater Copenhagen, the latter also being the location of the major Danish airport, which is the largest and most important international airport in the Baltic Sea Area with traffic that includes around 20 intercontinental routes. Apart from ferry traffic no Danish harbours can be considered of European importance. The Ministry of Environment presented the perspective on the spatial structure of Denmark in the future Europe as a new item at the national planning level in 1994 (Ministry of the Environment, 1994). The new decisive angle was to focus strategically on the themes that are also in focus in the European Union. Denmark’s future urban system was presented in the publication. It will consist of many centres and it will be hierarchically based on one city of European significance, Greater Copenhagen or the Öresund Region, four cities with substantial international relations (Århus, Aalborg, Odense and Esbjerg) and numerous cities and towns with international specialties. The 1997 Noordwijk decision underscored the objective of cohesion and cooperation between different areas and centres, focused on sustainable development and natural and cultural heritage, and formulated the idea of balanced competitiveness between European cities and regions. The crucial objective is to create a polycentric system of cities with new urban-rural relations. Further concentration on the European centre (‘the blue banana’) should be counteracted and development should be more dispersed with the intention of establishing equal access to infrastructure and knowledge. The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP: European Communities, 1999) was incorporated into the national planning institution with a series of hearings and analyses in the late 1990s. The issues of urban system, accessibility and natural and cultural heritage were discussed in the national planning report in 1997 (Miljø and Energiministeriet,

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Figure 6.2 Structural map with urban system indicators Source: Based on vision-maps presented by Miljø- og Energiministeriet (2000).

1997). Implementation took the form of new attention to international urban competition. Leaders of cities and regions discussed and formulated their position in a European perspective. Business clusters of international importance were identified and emphasised as focal points for improvement of infrastructure and framework for competition. European Union programmes and subsidies formed concrete foundations for activities. INTERREG programmes provided for initiating transnational cooperation in border zones first and foremost in the Öresund Area but also between border regions at the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. INTERREG IIIA and IIIB subsidies to Danish projects amounted

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to €48 million in 2001–2006 and new funds are constantly provided. Other funds (in particular structural funds) provided means for physical or functional projects as for example more than €200 million from the European Union for the Öresund Bridge. European Union subsidies to Denmark, which imply support to specific regions and towns, are summarised for 2000–2006 by MandagMorgen (2003). FIG comprises €205 million for fishing towns, Objective 2 directs €190 million to less favoured regions, INTERREG III sends €34 million to border regions, LEADER+ provides rural districts with €17 million for innovative activities and URBAN II gives small cities €5 million for working out sustainable strategies. The South Scandinavian scene has experienced dramatic changes of internal geography with the opening of the bridge in the year 2000 between Denmark and Sweden linking two concentrations of population and production by reducing the barrier of time and eliminating the land-sea bottleneck between them (the Danish capital region of Copenhagen with 1.9 million inhabitants and the Swedish urban region of Malmö Lund with 0.5 million inhabitants). The Öresund area is by far the largest concentration of activity of the Nordic countries; it is the primary cross point of Scandinavia and the most important gateway to the Baltic Sea Area. Development of a cross-border region in this area is favoured by European Union policy on elimination of barriers for trade and communication. The area is a model for European integration (see Figure 6.3). The Öresund Area is the first cross-border region to be analysed by the OECD (2003) in one of the organisation’s Territorial Development Reviews. The integration is considered as a slow and problematic project in progress. The national and international high profile of the strategy of integration in the area is a goal which must be obtained. In the analysis two matters are important: metropolitan competition and political governance. The report described potential increase in metropolitan competitiveness as a fact, as international investors direct their Nordic focus to the region, which is by far the largest concentration of people and activity in the Nordic countries. The researchers found that the Öresund Area was the Scandinavian cross point and the gateway to the Baltic Sea Area. They recommended that the cost for crossing the bridge is reduced by reduction in toll or by tax incentives, that differences in regulation and hindrances for shifts on the labour markets are eliminated, that social systems are equalised, and that asymmetric taxation systems are harmonised. OECD also recommends that some kind of improved cross-border organising capacity must be initiated with more democratic legitimacy and some lightweight authority. 6.6

Summary and Conclusions

National urban policy in the 1970s and 1980s focused on Denmark outside Greater Copenhagen. A shift in policy in favour of the Danish capital and only

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Figure 6.3 The Öresund area 2003. The map shows the area most engaged in the new regional development process metropolitan unit occurred in the beginning of the 1990s, when the focus changed from considering large cities as problematic concentrations, to perceive them as decisive economic powerhouses in the global competition. This policy has been active and dynamic until 2003, when a reorientation of policy in favour of what is named balanced development was introduced. Regions and cities are more and more parts of the globalisation process and their leaders focus increasingly on their strengths in the international competition in the context of commercial development. At the same time, international organisations and national governments stress the importance of regions and cities to realise sustainable strategies. Competitiveness and sustainability must interact in a new way as the superior success criteria for urban change. National urban policy recognises series of major urban problems concerned with the qualities of the urban environment. In 2003 the government promoted sustainable development of cities, homes and constructions. Residents and users must participate and the cities must provide conditions for further growth and present attractive locations for new business. Cities must be lively and diverse. Social and ethnic segregation processes and immigrant integration policies also

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play a role in urban politics, as do safety issues. Old industrial districts and harbour areas will be transformed to provide attractive urban quarters for residents and industries. The renewal and use intensification is, as always, problematic but must go hand-in-hand with restraints on the zoning of new land for urban growth. Changing the focus of transport planning from mobility to accessibility has been set in motion because of the negative impacts associated with increasing use of automobiles, and collective transport should be favoured. On the residential market everybody should have a real choice between ownership and tenancy. Urban renewal should be given priority, especially in socially problematic areas. Many problems call for integral solutions. Economic dynamics since the mid-1990s has been in favour of major highquality service centres with attractive environments of knowledge, research and development and with first-class locations in the dominant network of transport, especially of air transport. The strengthening of economic activity and the corresponding population growth in the large centres, especially in Greater Copenhagen, does have its contrast in fringe areas of small and medium-sized towns with a corresponding low level of activity due to limited development opportunities. The contrast between dynamics in the regions with large urban units and peripheral regions is increasing. It is a political objective to strengthen regions that lack dynamic qualities and at the same time support competitiveness in strong regions. The government wants to focus its own policy and to advocate that the region and cities themselves focus on their own growth potentials. The discussion on defining an overall urban policy was initiated by the Government Urban Commission in 1993–1997 and a new Ministry of Urban Affairs was established in 1998. The Ministry displayed its action plan in 1999, which was directed towards four fields of effort. First, cities should be supported as centres for growth and development, urban growth should be coherent and the policy should decrease inequalities. Second, the objectives should be to create positive spirals in degraded quarters, development of attractive and sustainable cities with good conditions for business, with active participation, and research support should be established to support these efforts. Third, the premises were considered to be coordination, cooperation and local basis. As the fourth field of policy, the government pointed out new instruments on public–private partnerships, ‘flagship’ projects, urban governance and free zones. Since it was presented in 1997 and adopted in 1999, the European Spatial Development Perspective has been of central importance for Danish attitudes and policies related to urban issues. Danish planning authorities have clearly adopted the philosophy of strengthening polycentric urban and regional development and ensuring balanced and sustainable development in the European Union. Each Danish city and region has its own competencies and growth potential. National urban policy aims to identify, support and develop these regional entities and solutions to obtain the goal of balanced and sustainable development and to create broad regional, national and international networks.

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The South Scandinavian scene has experienced dramatic changes of internal geography with the opening of the bridge between Denmark and Sweden in 2000, linking two concentrations of population and production. The Öresund Area is by far the largest concentration of activity in the Nordic countries; it is the major crossing point for Scandinavia and the most important gateway to the Baltic Sea area. Development of a cross-border region in this area is favoured by the combined forces of European Union policy on eliminating barriers for trade and communication and the reduction of the strong local barrier of distance. The area is a model for European integration. References By- og Boligministeriet (1999), Fremtidens by. Bypolitisk perspektiv- og handlingsplan. By- og Boligministeriet (2001), Betænkning fra Erhvervs- og Bypolitisk Udvalg, Betænkning nr. 1397. By- og Byg (2003), De syv første kvarterløft. Sammenfattende evaluering af udviklingen 1997–2002, Resultater 028. Ehlers, N. (2001), ‘The Utopia of the Binational City’, GeoJournal 54, pp. 21–32. Ehlers, N., Buursink, J. and Boekema, F. (2001), ‘Binational Cities and their Regions: From Diverging Cases to a Common Research Agenda’, GeoJournal 54, pp. 1–5. Erhvervs- og bypolitisk udvalg (2001), Betænkning fra Erhvervs- og Bypolitisk Udvalg, Betænkning nr. 1397. Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen (2001), Kompetenceklynger i dansk erhvervsliv – en ny brik i erhvervspolitikken. European Communities (1999), European Spatial Development Perspective, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Landsplanafdelingen (1994), ‘Pendlingen i Danmark’, Working Document. Landsplanafdelingen (2001), ‘Pendlingen i Danmark år 2000 og udviklingen i 1990erne’, Working Document. MandagMorgen (2003), Regeringen: Nej til EU-milliarder, MandagMorgen, vol. 31. Matthiessen, C.W. (1998), ‘Denmark’, in L. Van den Berg, E. Braun and J. van der Meer (eds), National Urban Policies in the European Union. Responses to Urban Issues in the Fifteen Member States, Aldershot: Ashgate. Miljøministeriet (1992), Danmarks byregioner. Miljøministeriet (2003), Et Danmark i balance. Hvad skal der gøres?, Landsplanredegørels. Miljø and Energiministeriet (1997), Danmark og Europæisk planpolitik, Landsplanredegørelse. Miljø and Energiministeriet (2000), Landsplanredegørelse 2000. Lokal identitet og nye udfordringer. Ministry of the Environment (1992), Denmark Towards the Year 2018. Ministry of the Environment (1994), Spatial Planning in Denmark. Nielsen, B. (2003), ‘Det danske bysystem 1960–2000’, Working Document. Copenhagen. OECD (2003), The Metropolitan Review of Öresund. Regeringen (2001), Regional Erhvervspolitisk Redegørelse, Reg21. Regeringen (2003), Den regionale vækststrategi.

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Statens Byggeforskningsinstitut (1999), Byudvalgets indsats 1993–98. Sammenfattende evaluering, SBI-rapport 32.

Annex Table A6.1 Cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in core

Chapter 7

Finland: Towards Urban Innovation Policy Eero Holstila1

7.1

Introduction

After World War II Finland was a very agrarian country with only 26 per cent of the population living in urban communities. After 1950 the country experienced a rapid urbanisation which has continued up to now. However, according to Eurostat, Finland is still today one of the least urbanised countries in the EU. The Urban Structure of Finland According to the latest population statistics (2002), Finland has eight urban regions with more than 100,000 inhabitants. In total, these regions account for a little more than 2.5 million inhabitants, which makes almost half of the country’s population. The Helsinki Region is by far the largest urban region in Finland with 1.2 million inhabitants. It consists of 12 municipalities, among which the biggest are Helsinki (560,000 inhabitants) and its immediate neighbours Espoo (220,000) and Vantaa (180,000). The Helsinki Region is the economic and administrative centre of Finland. It contains one fifth of the population, one fourth of the employed persons, and one third of the GDP of the whole country. Especially during the latter part of the 1990s the economic performance of the city region was impressive. During the years 1995–2001 Helsinki was ranked number two among European cities in terms of dynamism of economic growth (Helsinki Urban Facts 2003). As Table 7.1 shows, major cities in Finland are growing rapidly. Particularly the regions of Helsinki, Oulu and Jyväskylä. Tampere and Kuopio have grown fast too, while Turku’s growth has been modest. During the late 1990s growth based on innovations and on knowledge industries was most rapid in Oulu and Tampere. All cities mentioned have actively cooperated with local universities and the business community. The population growth figures of cities dominated by traditional industries are modest or negative. Among the large cities, Lahti and Pori belong to this category, neither of which has a university.

1

Culminatum Ltd Oy, Helsinki Region Centre of Expertise.

Table 7.1 City regions of over 100,000 inhabitants in 2002

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Threat of Segregation Long-term unemployment, in particular, became a problem in big cities in the 1990s. Later on, the economic boom in cities was based mainly on ICT-related and high-tech industries. Unemployed people with low education could not be integrated in the new kind of working life. So the unemployment rate also remained high in dynamic cities like Oulu and Tampere. Local concentration of such unemployment in certain residential areas is now, for the first time, posing a threat of social segregation in Finnish society. Social differentiation has locally been very mild in Finland so far. In Helsinki, the situation has also changed because of the inflow of immigrants, another new phenomenon in the Finland of the 1990s. Since 1990, the number of immigrants has increased by some 500 per cent in Helsinki, where the proportion of foreigners, however, is not greater than 6 per cent even today. Unemployment is an especially severe problem among immigrants. Local Self-governing The basic unit of Finnish local administration is the municipality. Local selfgovernance of municipalities is granted by the Finnish constitution. Every four years, the local council is elected by the residents of each municipality. Finland is divided into 444 municipalities of various sizes. In terms of population the largest is the city of Helsinki, with more than 550,000 inhabitants. The smallest municipality has fewer than 200 people. According to Statistics Finland there are 40 functional urban regions in the country having urban centres with more than 25,000 inhabitants. The expenditure of local authorities makes up to two-thirds of all public expenditure in Finland because the scope of municipal activities is wider than in most other EU countries. The most important services provided by municipalities are education, children’s day care, social welfare, health care and maintenance of technical infrastructure. Urban Income Sources Finland’s strong local self-governance is derived from independent taxation rights. Municipalities finance nearly half of their costs with municipal tax revenue. In large cities, this proportion is even higher. Because tax revenue is dependent on the local economic activity, all the municipalities – and especially big cities – are active in the field of economic policy. The most important form of local tax is municipal income tax, the rate of which is determined annually by the municipal council. The rate varies from 16 to 20 per cent of the incomes of citizens, the variation being between 17.5 and 18.5 in large cities. Compared to income tax, the significance of real estate tax is marginal in Finland. But that is not the case with corporate tax. Municipalities receive a

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certain proportion of the corporate tax paid by companies. This proportion has decreased significantly during the last 10 years and is about 20 per cent in 2004. After a political debate, in 2003 the national government decided to maintain this system. The alternative would have been to replace corporate tax revenues with added government grants. Differences in tax revenue between the ‘richer’ and the ‘poorer’ municipalities are balanced by the system of government grants. Many small rural are extremely dependent on these grants, as are some urban municipalities. On the other hand, some large urban municipalities like Helsinki and Espoo have in recent years been contributing to those ‘poorer’ municipalities. Because of the complicated system these big cities have, so to speak, received negative grants from the government. Administration on the Regional Level In many fields, such as health care or education, it is usual for municipalities to cooperate with each other to provide services, for example, hospitals or schools. Joint municipal boards are formed to manage these services. There are 19 counties in Finland, in addition to the autonomous province of Åland. They are governed by regional councils, which are inter-municipal joint authorities. Regional councils bear statutory responsibility for regional development and planning. There are no regional elections in Finland. Members of regional councils are elected by the municipal councils. Funding for the regional councils comes from the government and from member municipalities. There is no regional taxation in Finland. During the last few years the role of regional councils has become stronger in regional development policy. From the beginning of 2003 a new legislation gave regional councils an enlarged mandate to coordinate regional policy action. Some cities have seen this as running the risk of decreased political influence. Finland is divided into six provinces, each having a Provincial State Office representing the government. Their significance to large cities like Helsinki has become minor after their responsibilities in the field of regional policy were shifted over to the regional councils in 1993. 7.2

Summary of the National Urban Policy Up Until the Mid-1990s

In the mid-1990s Finland experienced a deep economic recession. At the same time the national government chose investing in research and development as its priority. The most important task of urban policy was felt to be the strengthening of economic growth potential in cities. This thought is expressed in the title of a 1996 report of the national working group on urban development, ‘Cities as Generators of Growth’. According to the view expressed in the report, knowledge and innovations are the engines which generate new business enterprises and maintain the success of existing companies. The report maintained that conditions

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for innovation are particularly favourable in big cities and that favourable economic growth in these cities would have widespread regional effects. The most significant project of urban policy has been the Centre of Expertise Programme launched by the Ministry of the Interior in 1994. It was started in eight city regions, for example, in the regions of Helsinki, Tampere, Turku, Oulu, Jyväskylä and Kuopio. The objective of these programmes is to improve the local conditions enabling the location and development of internationally competitive knowledge-intensive business enterprises. At the city level, the most important cooperation organisations are the universities, research institutes, private firms, regional authorities and cities. The projects have been funded by ESF (European Social Fund). Urban policy became a matter of discussion during the years before Finland joined the EU in 1995. It became obvious that local activity and a state sectoral policy were no longer powerful enough to solve the new urban problems and to prevent new threats developing. New cooperation across the sectoral boundaries of the ministries and within the urban regions became necessary. The new concept of urban policy was welcomed by the government and by mayors of large cities as offering a framework for partnership-based actions. In all, national urban policy in Finland was still at a very early stage in the mid-1990s. 7.3

The State of the Cities

Background A period of economic growth in the 1980s had been based on extensive exports to the Soviet Union and on local demand, both isolated from international competition. The beginning of the 1990s saw a banking crisis and the collapse of many large companies in both the manufacturing and the service sectors. Finnish GNP decreased by more than 10 per cent during the years 1991–1993. The unemployment rate rose to more than 15 per cent, which led to a deep consciousness of crisis at all levels of Finnish society. The bad times gave the opportunity to all actors of the Finnish society to reshape strategies and make a new start, free from old restrictive structures. Productivity rose very rapidly in many industries. At the same time the national government – cutting budgets in the welfare sector – continued to invest in research and development: the large companies did the same. As a result, the share of R&D investment of GNP increased from 2 to over 3 per cent by the year 2000, thus reaching the target level of the EU for 2010. During the latter part of the 1990s, the economy of Finland grew by 4 per cent annually. This growth was based on expansion in the knowledge-intensive hightech sector. The share of the high-tech sector in Finnish exports increased from 6 to 23 per cent between 1990 and 2000. Information-related industries became a third pillar of the Finnish national economy along with the traditional sectors

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of metal industries and forestry. The ICT cluster, led by Nokia, managed to meet the challenges of the global information economy very successfully. It is possible that the shock of the deep recession forced the Finnish economy to adapt itself to the hard global competition better than many other EU countries. The analysis on challenges included in this chapter is based on the report by a working group for major city policy (Suomi tarvitsee suurkaupunkipolitikkaa, Finland needs a major city policy (Ministry of Interior, 2003). Challenge 1: The Role of Cities as Accelerators of Wealth ICT-driven growth of knowledge-based industries occurred mainly in three major city regions, namely Helsinki, Tampere and Oulu. The consequence was that service industries also started growing faster in these urban regions, where overall employment growth exceeded 20 per cent between 1994 and 2000. At the same time, migration to these city regions grew – at the expense of small cities and rural communities. The 1990s showed that university cities in Finland were capable of providing a good innovative environment for knowledge-intensive industries to grow and thereby for the whole national economy to prosper. At the same time, the significance of the big cities grew even more. Since 2001, however, the Nokia-led cluster’s growth has been slower, which has resulted in halted employment growth and in decreasing migration to major cities. In 2003, a working group for major city policy issued a memorandum estimating that in the future too the innovation potential of Finland’s biggest cities will remain a crucial driving force for the Finnish national economy. To compensate for Finland’s peripheral location, the main challenge of urban policy is to ensure that the Helsinki Region can go on evolving as a world-class innovation centre capable of attracting talented people from other parts of the world. Fostering the knowledge potential of Finland’s other university cities as well, is very important to Finland – not least in order to maintain regional balance. Challenge 2: Urbanisation, Housing Policy and a Sustainable Urban Structure About half of Finland’s population lives in eight major city regions. Urbanisation is still going on in Finland where, as Table 7.1 shows, the largest cities have grown very rapidly during the last few decades. According to population projections published by Statistics Finland, there will be 250,000 inhabitants more than today in the Helsinki Region by the year 2030. During the same period population growth will reach 30,000–60,000 in the urban regions of Tampere, Turku and Oulu each. These figures imply a huge challenge in providing housing for major Finnish cities today. Unfortunately – and for historical reasons – the housing standard (space per person) in Finnish cities is rather modest in European comparisons. The demand based on striving for a better housing standard has to be added to the

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Figure 7.1 The population growth in Helsinki region housing needs caused by migration flows. It was calculated that the annual number of dwellings to be constructed should be about 13,000 in the Helsinki Region only. The last decade saw annual completion of less than 10,000 dwellings in the region. The magnitude of the challenge is underlined by the fact that aggregate housing planned by the municipalities of the region is clearly below such numbers. This is due partly to the shortage of construction ground, partly to a will of the municipalities to limit population growth in order to be able to cope with the costs for building basic services like schools and kindergartens. Also, the rapid growth of cities raises a threat of urban sprawl. Finnish cities are sparsely constructed with population density only a quarter of European averages. For this reason, it is expensive and sometimes complicated to provide public transport coverage. Today Finland is facing the risk that additional construction in the future will make urban communities even more scattered. A recent OECD report noted the same thing (OECD Territorial Reviews, 2003) The importance of housing and living environment for attracting skilled labour is growing. Increasing mobility across national borders is putting the focus on living environment as a criterion for location. The dwelling stock in most Finnish cities predominantly consists of flats, for which reason a big challenge is going to be building detached, semi-detached and terraced houses at a larger scale. Challenges mentioned above imply that housing policy should be the main focus of Finnish urban policy in the future. As Michael Parkinson has pointed

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out, housing policy may become the most important element of urban policy in Europe. Urban housing policy might provide the missing link between competitiveness, social cohesion and sustainable urban structure (Parkinson, 1999). To date, however, housing policy has not been given high priority on the agenda of government in Finland, or even as a special issue in urban policy. Challenge 3: Social Inclusion The recession in the Finnish economy in the early 1990s implied great structural change that left many employees of the old manufacturing industries unemployed – often on a long-term basis. At the same time, Finland received a considerable number of refugees (Somali being the largest group) and ethnic Finns from nearby regions in Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union. A great proportion of these people have had problems integrating into Finnish working life owing to, for example, inadequate language skills. These factors – that is, unemployment and the lack of integration among immigrants – imply a threat of social exclusion in major cities. The end of the 1990s saw a considerable growth of income and wealth among those Finnish citizens who were involved in the boom of the ICT cluster. This led to increasing income differences in a country that had had the smallest income differences among OECD countries. In fact, in the big cities and in the Helsinki Region, especially, signs of looming social segregation may be seen (Vaattovaara and Kortteinen, 2003). By international standards, Finnish urban regions still have a balanced socioeconomic structure, and there have been no serious examples of accumulating deprivation. Yet in the late 1990s, the trend took a new course and social differences started to grow. This was partly explained by the fact that only part of the population benefited from the ICT boom. However, accumulation of deprivation in some blocks, sharpening ethnic conflicts and increasing criminality threaten to add a new ingredient to Finnish cities: the sort of social insecurity known to so many big cities in the world. Preventing this threat coming to pass is seen as the primary challenge for Finnish major city policy. According to the OECD territorial review on Helsinki (2003), there is a trend of growing income and employment disparities in the Greater Helsinki Region. Projected social outcomes based on the emerging socio-economic differences suggest that the city of Helsinki would end up with a disproportionately large share of the region’s poor and needy households. Espoo and some other western parts of the region would become progressively wealthier and more entrenched enclaves for the affluent high-paid workers in the knowledge economy (OECD, 2003).

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Challenge 4: Governance and Financing in Cities As briefly described in section 7.1, local administration in Finland is based on strong local autonomy. The municipalities play an important role particularly in the production of welfare services such as education, health care, children ‘sday care, income benefit, child protection and care for the elderly. To be able to perform their extensive duties, municipalities enjoy the right to levy tax among their inhabitants. The most important form of local tax is municipal income tax, the rate of which is determined annually by the municipal council. The rate varies between 15 and 20 per cent. In addition, municipalities receive a certain proportion of the corporate tax paid by companies. This proportion, on the size of which the state decides annually, has decreased significantly and is today less than 20 per cent. Municipalities receive real estate tax, too, but its significance is marginal. The deep recession in the early 1990s reduced corporate tax revenue to almost nothing. The strong city-generated economic growth that started in 1994 increased tax revenue in the big city regions of Finland very significantly. Oulu, in northern Finland, and Espoo (housing Nokia headquarters), in the Helsinki Region, benefited particularly from this growth. In 2001 the national government made significant changes in the criteria for allocating corporate tax revenue. In practice, they amounted to strong reductions in tax revenue for Helsinki and Espoo in particular. Matched with slowing economic growth this has implied budget cuts in the cities, cuts that according to the city leaders jeopardise their possibilities to respond to the challenges mentioned here. The cities have even seen these state decisions as a sort of negative major city policy that clearly has outweighted the state’s constructive urban policy measures. All the large city regions in Finland consist of the core city and several surrounding municipalities, but the future challenges of the cities do not obey municipal boundaries. Because of the strong tradition of local autonomy there is very little interests towards formal municipal mergers within city regions. According to most political leaders both at regional and national level, a stronger system of regional governance could be achieved through incentives and voluntary cooperation. It is not only a question of cooperation between municipalities, but also public private partnership and ‘triple helix’ with local universities will be important elements in improving models and practices of metropolitan organising capacity. 7.4

National Urban Policies from the Mid-1990s to 2003

The key idea of Finnish urban policy is that the task of the state is to ensure that cities themselves can solve their own problems and respond to challenges that they face. The best urban policy would thus be to increase the economic leeway of urban municipalities and consolidate their autonomy.

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On the other hand, the Finnish welfare state is based on a state-coordinated production of welfare services, where municipalities mainly play the role of implementers. However, the uniform policies for the whole country have not been able to respond to those new challenges of big cities described in Chapter 3, and this is one of the reasons why special urban policy measures are needed. Urban Programmes 1997–2000 For this purpose the Finnish national government, represented by the Ministry of the Interior, launched an urban programme policy in 1997. The purpose of the various urban programmes carried out between 1997 and 2000 was to encourage cooperation within urban regions and to give support to development measures based on the conditions of the cities themselves. The idea was to promote urban development that was economically, socially and ecologically sustainable. The main emphasis, however, lay on the vitality and competitiveness of urban regions. The urban programmes were chosen on the basis of two open application rounds, during which a total of 27 programmes were selected for programme financing. The most important criteria were innovation, regional cooperation, wide-scope partnership and a cross-sector approach. In terms of their goals, the urban programmes implemented between 1997 and 2000 can be divided into four main groups: 1) promotion of expertise and internationalisation (10 programmes); 2) urban environment, urban structure, housing and traffic (nine programmes); 3) social well-being in cities and city culture (five programmes); and 4) interaction between the urban and the rural (three programmes). Technology- and information-based programmes aimed at stimulating the vitality of cities formed the largest group, although at the same time there was a centre of expertise programme going on including almost all university cities. In the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 various ministries, mainly the Ministry of the Interior, provided around €2 million for urban programmes. The share of urban regions themselves was at least 50 per cent – and often more than that. And in many cases the projects received finance also from various EU programmes and other state finance channels. In all, ministry finance for the first generation of urban programmes could best be characterised as seed funding. The first generation of urban programmes was evaluated by the School of Public Management of Tampere University. The assessment says that the lack of a clear vision and well-defined goals of urban policy was a problem. For this reason the programmes had included large unspecified and partly unrealistic projects. Insufficient funds often caused projects that initially had started off well to end prematurely. Another problem was that cooperation between sectors faltered. On the other hand, the assessment also pointed out that the urban programme policy had given urban policy in general a boost. The programmes had clearly had catalytic effects on strategic fields of urban regions. They had given many

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urban regions a new arena for cooperation in the interest of the region’s competitiveness. Regional Centre Programme (2001–2006) In 2000, the national working group on urban policy appointed by the Finnish government suggested that a new and more efficient urban programme policy should be set up. The government decided to launch a new programme, but gave up the concept of urban policy and called the programme the Regional Centre Programme. At the same time, the Helsinki Region was excluded from the programme due to Helsinki’s special challenges. The Regional Centre Programme is an integral part of the national regional policy for balanced and polycentric regional development. The continuation of the programme was confirmed by the new government in 2003. National regional policy bases its objectives and actions on the distinctive qualities of the regions and on the recognition of their individual strengths. The aim is to develop cities of different sizes into strong regional or local centres. The authority responsible for the national coordination of the programme is the Ministry of the Interior. The programme is based on partnership and cooperation between various ministries, government bodies responsible for regional administration, regional councils and municipalities. In 2003 the programme was being implemented in 34 regions. On the basis of an agreement between municipalities, responsibility for the programme lies with the urban centres or the joint regional organisations of the municipalities, such as regional business development companies. Funding of the programme by the Ministry of the Interior amounted to €17.3 million during the years 2001–2003. The Regional Centre Programmes can be seen as the next step after the period 1997–2000 in the implementation of urban policy. The same criteria have been applied on the choice of projects. A crucial principle of the programme is to see urban regions as functional entities, for the development of which the core city and the peripheral municipalities must cooperate closely. The last few years have seen much debate in Finland on the need for a municipal reform: should the number of municipalities (450 at the time of writing) be made closer to the number of functional regions (around 90). The Regional Centre Programme contributes to implementing the government’s strategy, which aims at increased voluntary cooperation between municipalities within functional urban regions. The Regional Centre Programme is one of the government’s most important tools for regional policy. It includes practically all the urban regions except the Helsinki Region and the smallest cities. The regions included house 63 per cent of all Finns. Knowing that the Helsinki region has 22 per cent of the country’s population, practically the whole of Finland (85 per cent of inhabitants) is covered by ‘urban’ policy. Therefore, the question has been asked whether the Regional Centre Programme can still be called urban policy.

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Figure 7.2 Regional centre programmes An evaluation by NetEffect Ltd of the Regional Centre Programme was published in 2004, which maintained that the programme has been successful in catalysing partners within city regions to cooperate in order to improve the competitiveness of the region. On the other hand, the evaluators reported serious problems concerning the involvement of the ministries in the implementation of the programme. Continuation of the Centre of Expertise Programme in 1999–2006 The Centre of Expertise (CoE) Programme is a special policy tool aiming to take advantage of international top level knowledge and excellence as a resource for prosperous business enterprise and regional development. The programme was launched in 1994 in eight cities, including all the large urban regions in Finland.

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The programmes were implemented by local development companies that usually were organised according to the Triple Helix model (with the university, the city and business enterprises as co-owners). Referring to the good experiences that the programme gave, the national government has twice (in 1998 and 2002) decided to extend the programme to new regions and fields so that by the end of 2006, no less than 22 centres of expertise operating in 45 branches will be included. The programmes are carried out within regions in cooperation with the local business community, the city, university science parks, research institutes and other public administrations. It is essential that the partners involved commit themselves and their actions to the goals formulated in the programme. The responsibility for the management of the centres of expertise is often assumed by the local science and technology park company. The projects included in the programmes are born from the specific needs of the business community and innovation system of each urban region. A crucial point is to increase and consolidate cooperation between companies and research institutes, that is, to make local research, education and enterprise meet and cooperate closely. This way local innovation is developed while growth potential for companies is created and start-up enterprises are born. The Centre of Expertise (CoE) Programme is based on competition. Only the best local programmes have been awarded the centre of expertise status. The centres of expertise have to compete for basic state funds annually. In 2003, the Ministry’s basic funds for centre of expertise programmes amounted to €8 million. A condition for receiving the state’s basic funding is that local actors also invest in the programme. The cities are the most important local providers of finance. They have often invested in the science parks and the infrastructure of technology centres too. The profile of the CoE programme is to be an organising tool for the city regions, not a funding instrument. In this respect the programme was successful. For example in 2003 the total funding of the CoE projects amounted to about €40 million coming from various sources like the EU, private companies and national innovation organisations. The policy of the national government which came power in spring 2003 has been to continue the centre of expertise programmes and consolidate them. A special goal is to improve the knowledge and technology basis of mediumsized city regions. The national government seems to have adopted a two-tier strategy: it backs the spread of centres of expertise to all parts of the country and at the same time stresses the role of big cities as innovation centres of world class. From the angle of major city policy it is essential that the government intends to upgrade cooperation between the centres of expertise in the biggest cities. The goal is to make these urban regions even more inviting in order to attract more international talents to study, teach, research and do business in Finnish regions. According to the national evaluation published in 2002, the Centre of Expertise Programme has been a success story of the new regional policy based on the

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regions’ own strengths. With modest public financing an effective mobilisation of private resources has been achieved in most of the city regions involved. From the beginning of 1994, the way of managing and coordinating the programme on the national level has been based on the Triple Helix model, that is, on partnership between universities, business sector and public administration. From the beginning the chairman of the coordination group has been Professor Yrjö Neuvo, Senior Vice President of Nokia Corporation. The 2002–2004 Urban Programme of the Helsinki Region When in 2000 the Finnish government decided to launch the Regional Centre Programme, it also decided that Helsinki Region be excluded from it. Furthermore, it decided that a special policy for the Helsinki Region was needed to improve its international appeal and capacities. When the mayors of the four central municipalities – Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen (together forming the Helsinki Metropolitan Area) – discovered that the new urban programme policy had omitted Helsinki Region, they decided to draw up an initiative for a common urban policy. Representatives of the four cities were included in the formulation, as well as a large group of stakeholders from universities, the business community and civic organisations. During this work in 2001, a thorough inventory of the challenges facing Helsinki Region in the future was made. Discussions between stakeholders identified those challenges in particular that called for partnership-based (between private and public actors) urban policy measures across sectors and administrative borders. Figure 7.3 maps these challenges. The main priorities formulated by the mayors in their urban policy initiative included the strengthening of the region’s international competitiveness and the safeguarding of social cohesion within the region. A third priority included in the proposal was the theme ‘A learning metropolitan region’, which was also felt to combine the other two priorities headlined ‘Strengthening of high-tech competence and multidimensional knowledge base’ and ‘Increasing social inclusion’. The housing challenge caused by rapid population growth was left outside this new urban policy programme, because simultaneously a joint project between the government’s ministerial group and the mayors of the Helsinki Region was working on a ‘document for cooperation’. This resolution completed in 2001 aims at increased housing production in the Helsinki Region, and it is clearly a part of the national urban policy. In 2002, the mayors launched an urban policy initiative ’A competent and cohesive city – urban policy programme for Helsinki metropolitan area 2002–2004’. The programme consists of the three priorities mentioned above divided into 18 pilot projects to be implemented jointly by cities, government authorities and the third sector. After the adoption of the mayors’ initiative, the implementation of the programme was supported and partly funded by the Ministry of the Interior. Governmental seed funding for this programme does not

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Figure 7.3 Urban policy programme for the Helsinki region exceed €1 million during the period 2002–2004. The key idea of the Ministry is to catalyse local funding based on good experiences from the Centre of Expertise Programme. Urban Policy Prospects for the Helsinki Region In a programme declaration, the government in power since summer 2003 announced that it would adopt a policy that aims at social and regional balance and that reduces regional differences in opportunities to develop. The government thus continues the programmes already in process, among which the most important are the Regional Centre Programme and the Centre of Expertise Programme. A new emphasis is to extend the effects of these programmes so that the regions surrounding regional centres get their fair share of development and that centres of expertise are born in all parts of the country. According to the government programme, urban policy is applied to safeguard the competitiveness of urban regions and the opportunities for socially balanced development. The urban network is developed comprehensively whilst heeding the needs of urban regions of various sizes. Mutually supportive cooperation between urban and rural policy is increased. Cooperation procedures between the municipalities of the Helsinki Region and the state are developed further. In 2003, the government appointed a commission for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area affairs, including representatives of relevant

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ministries, the mayors of the four municipalities of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and leaders of the regional councils of Uusimaa and Itä-Uusimaa. The role of this commission chaired by the minister responsible for regional policy is advisory discussing urban policy challenges facing the region. In 2004 an investigator appointed by the government made proposals on how to develop the governance of the Helsinki Region. According to the proposal, a government for the Helsinki Region should be established inside the Uusimaa Regional Council. The government would consists of regional council members representing the Helsinki Region. It was also proposed that the regional councils of Uusimaa and East Uusimaa should be merged. In order to create outlines for ‘national metropolitan policy’ a new commission should be appointed by the government. The commission would consist of five key ministers and the same number of high-level political leaders representing the Helsinki region. The Role of Local Authorities and Cities in Finnish National Urban Policy In 1997, the Finnish government set up an urban policy work group, with representatives from various ministries, research institutes, enterprises and cities. This broad-based work group, which functioned until the end of 2002, included representatives of the big cities of Helsinki, Tampere, Turku and Oulu plus a number of smaller cities and the regional councils. This is an example of how the principle of partnering between state and municipalities has been applied to the preparation of urban policy. The Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for urban policy at the national level, mobilised the expertise of cities, for example, in the development of urban indicators and general outlines for major city policy. In both of these sectors representatives of the cities have carried the main responsibility during the preparation work. The role of Helsinki City Urban Facts, for example, has been crucial. Preparation work has been carried out in an atmosphere of good cooperation between the experts of the ministries and the cities. But the cities have been less pleased with the contents of the urban policy. The mayors of the big cities have found the funds allocated totally insufficient and criticised the focus of this urban policy which, since 2000 especially, has amounted to moderating the trend of centralised urbanisation and to supporting small and medium-sized urban regions. According to the mayors, the big cities have had to solve their challenges and problems on their own. This is the case for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area, in particular, from which the state cut a major part of corporate tax revenue and gave it to other parts of the country instead. Matched with slower economic growth in the last few years, this ‘negative urban policy’ forced the cities of Helsinki and Espoo to make budget cuts in 2003 and 2004. In 2001, the mayors of the six biggest cities in Finland – Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, Tampere, Turku and Oulu – began intensified cooperation to make the state also focus on major city policy. A working group by the name of ‘SixPack’

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has produced information on the importance of these big cities for the national economy, emphasising especially that over half of the Finnish GNP is generated in these urban regions. The mayors have endeavoured to influence the policy outlines of the national government – but not very successfully. They have intensified their cooperation also in the framework of the Eurocities organisation and have made the Centre of Expertise Programme – the flagship of Finnish urban policy – known within the EU. The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, too, has of late become more active in urban policy lobbying in ministries. In 2003, the association set up an urban policy work group including the mayors of the 15 biggest cities in Finland. 7.5

Impact of European Policies

Impact of EU Policies/Subsidies on Cities in Finland In Finland, the declared aim of policies relying on the EU’s structural fund programmes has not been to help develop cities. Some minor URBAN funds have been exceptions. The situation has, rather, been the opposite: political argumentation has mostly concerned the development of less developed areas. Regional programmes have primarily been initiated and coordinated by the Regional Councils. This, of course, influences the argumentation: regional programmes are supposed to promote the whole region. The development strategies of the programmes are strongly focused on strengthening the conditions for business enterprise, particularly so in the knowledge-intensive industries. Thus the central actors of structural funds have often been found in the cities – even when the goal has been to promote the whole region. The evaluators of the Objective 6 programmes point at the fact that internal differentiation in the province had been going on during the implementation of the programme. Yet the interests of the core city and those of the rest of the region or the Regional Council may diverge clearly. One example of this is the Pohjois-Savo region, where a considerable part of large development projects have been born around the University of Kuopio, and where the peripheral areas have demanded a fairer allocation of funds within the region. In this dispute, the Regional Council has been the spokesman of the smaller municipalities. We must notice that in Finland those regions that enjoy the first level of support include only a few middle-sized cities, among which Kuopio is the biggest. The Objective 2 programme and the horizontal Objective 3 have, to a considerable extent, been implemented in terms of projects in cities – however, without setting up any goals – except the URBAN measures taken within the framework of the Objective 2 programme.

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Impact of European Policies on National Urban Policy-making The EU policy of the government of Finland has had no significant direct effects on Finnish urban policy. In Finland no such urban policy has been applied that would have been based directly on EU outlines. The exception would be the URBAN programmes, which have probably been more influential than their financial dimension would suggest while implanting a project-based working model in the promotion of social well-being in housing estates. The urban policy outlines of the EU have, nevertheless, had indirect effects in Finland: they have provided useful references for analysing various phenomena in urban development. Many Finnish analyses have applied the classification found in EU documents of knowledge-based competitiveness, social cohesion and sustainable environmental development. Polycentrism, a familiar principle on the EU agenda, has been welcomed in Finland, because it has provided justification for the implementation of, for example, the Regional Centre Programme. 7.6

Summary and Conclusions

To be able to understand Finnish urban policy, we need to recognise certain special features of the country. For one thing, urbanisation started relatively late in Finland, in fact only after World War II, and it is still in progress. Throughout the twentieth century, an emphasised national goal was to keep the geographically large country evenly populated. Finnish cities on average have a very young building stock, and no slum developments have been seen even in the largest cities. Secondly, municipal autonomy is exceptionally strong in Finland. The fact that municipalities have the right to levy tax, that is, between 15 and 20 per cent of people’s personal income, makes municipalities – and cities especially – considerable economic actors. In this sense, Finnish municipalities are probably stronger than municipalities anywhere else in Europe. On the other hand, Regional Councils have no rights to levy tax, and in line with this, the members of Regional Councils are elected by the municipalities. So, municipalities are strong politically, too. Thirdly, Finland is a centrally governed welfare state where all cities and municipalities obey the same laws and procedures. Balanced regional development has been one of the main concerns of all the governments during the last decades. Against this background it is understandable that the national government did not put much emphasis on urban policy. On the other hand, there has been no great need for urban policy either, since problems in cities have not differed very much from problems in the country at large, and since cities have been able to solve their own problems financially.

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In the 1990s, however, this picture changed. The deep recession in the Finnish economy in the early years of the decade crumbled the old basis of manufacturing and brought mass unemployment to many big cities. The idea of ‘cities as engines of growth’ became a guiding principle in urban policy. Combined with consistent technology policy by the national government, the Centre of Expertise Programme launched in 1994 has turned out to be a success. In the latter half of the 1990s, the major city regions of Finland (Helsinki, Tampere and Oulu especially) experienced strong growth in the knowledge-intensive industries, which brought an employment growth of over 20 per cent in these cities. The big cities became winners in the new global economy and pulled the rest of the Finnish national economy into a rate of growth nearly unmatched in the EU. It is paradoxical that this success story was to contribute to a reorientation of urban policy in the early 2000s. In 2000, the national government launched a Regional Centre Programme, the main goal of which was to achieve a polycentric urban structure. With the programme, the state sought to encourage, above all, common strategic work among various actors in urban regions, and to promote key projects that mostly aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of the local business community. In 2003, the Regional Centre Programme included 34 urban regions, that is, almost all Finnish cities. Yet, the funds that the programme receives from the Ministry of the Interior are minor, eight million euros in 2003, so its effects threaten to become minor, too, especially in larger urban regions. The regional policy orientation of the Regional Centre Programme is clearly shown by the fact that the overwhelmingly largest urban region, the Helsinki Region, has been left out. Yet in 2002, the Ministry of the Interior included into its funding the urban policy programme Competence and Cohesion, which concerns the years 2002 to 2004. In 2004, the national government appointed a Helsinki Region Commission led by the Minister of Regional Development. The commission is going to deal with urban policy challenges and measures in the Helsinki Region. Furthermore, the ministry appointed an investigator to make suggestions for how to develop administrations in the Helsinki Region. The Centre of Expertise Programme – the flagship of Finnish urban policy – is going to be extended at least up until the end of 2006. The programme has been broadened and covers more than 20 urban regions today, and its goals, too, have been revised in the name of regional policy so as to give better support to a polycentric urban development. In Finland, EU structural funding has been used for supporting nation-wide regional policy, where urban policy has played a minor role. The Objective 1 area includes only one urban region with more than 100,000 inhabitants, that is, Kuopio, where EU funding has played an important role in the construction of the local technology centre. Objective 2 funding has been used in the cities of Turku, Oulu, Jyväskylä and Pori, for example. In the Helsinki Region, one URBAN project is underway. The 1998 urban policy document of the EU has been of great importance to the formulation of the contents of urban policy in Finland.

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In all, urban policy in Finland is still in its early stages. There is no comprehensive urban agenda adopted by the government but urban policy actions are constituted of a series of minor programmes. The main focus of these programmes may not be on city development but on promoting polycentric and balanced regional development. From a European perspective the profile of Finnish urban policy could be described as ‘opportunity oriented’, focusing on science and innovations in cities as the engine of competitiveness. In this sense the results have been impressive. City regions like Oulu, Tampere and Helsinki have been motors of the national economy for the last 10 years. According to several international indicators Helsinki is one of the most dynamic city regions in Europe (European Competitiveness Index, 2004). References Castells, M. and Himanen, P. (2002), The Information Society and the Welfare State. the Finnish Model, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Helsinki Urban Facts (2003), The Regional Economy of Helsinki from an International Perspective. Ministry of Interior (2003), Suomi tarvitsee suurkaupunkipolitiikkaa [Major City policy needed in Finland]. OECD (2003), OECD Territorial Reviews, Helsinki, Finland. Parkinson, M. (1999), ‘The European Commission and European Cities – Towards a New Urban Policy?’, Helsinki Quarterly, 2. Robert Huggins Associates (2004), European Competitiveness Index. Vaattovaara, M. and Kortteinen, M. (2003), ‘Beyond Polarisation versus Professionalisation? A Case Study of the Development of the Helsinki Region, Finland’, Urban Studies, 40 (11), pp. 2127–45. Van der Meer, A., van Winden, W. and Woets, P. (eds) (2003), ICT Clusters in European Cities during the 1990s: Development Patterns and Policy Lessons, Rotterdam: EURICUR.

Chapter 8

France: Metropolitan Areas as New ‘Reference Territories’ for Public Policies Christian Lefèvre1

8.1

Introduction

In France, 75.4 per cent of the population lived in urban areas in 19992 (last national census) which means a relative stability since the previous 1990 census and only a 5 per cent increase since 1968. In 1999, according to the new statistical definition (see box below), there were 354 ‘urban areas’ (aires urbaines) ranging from 12,000 to about 11 million inhabitants. Urban Areas, Urban Poles, Suburban Rings and Urban Units In 1997, the National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) established new statistical units to better measure the evolution of French cities. Four new concepts were created: urban area (aire urbaine), urban pole (pole urbain), suburban ring (couronne péri-urbaine) and urban unit (unité urbaine). An urban unit is a community of 2,000 living units or more based on urban continuity (no more than 200m between buildings). An urban pole is an urban unit which groups 5,000 jobs or more. Municipalities sending 40 per cent or more of their work force to the urban pole compose the suburban ring. An urban area is the combination of an urban pole and a suburban ring. The 1999 population census reveals a growing trend towards the concentration of people in large cities. In fact, 50 per cent of the population growth in the nineties has taken place in 11 urban areas representing only 34 per cent of the total population. To the exception of Lille, they are the first 11 urban areas in 1

University of Paris VIII. The overseas areas (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane, Réunion) are not included in these data. 2

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the population hierarchy (see Table 8.1). Generally speaking, population growth means urban sprawl: today 176,000km2 are occupied by urban areas compared to 132,000 in 1990. Urban population concerns 13,908 municipalities compared to 10,687 a decade earlier (INSEE, 2001). 8.2

National Urban Patterns

Fourteen urban areas dominate the national territory. Among these urban areas, four are have 1 million inhabitants (Paris-Ile de France, Lille, Lyon and Marseilles), 10 over 500,000 (Toulouse, Nice, Bordeaux, Nantes, Strasbourg, Toulon, DouaiLens, Rennes, Rouen and Grenoble) and 38 over 150,000 inhabitants. Table 8.1 Population of the 14 largest urban areas in France in 1999 Urban areas Paris-Ile de France Lyon Marseilles-Aix en Provence Lille Toulouse Nice Bordeaux Nantes Strasbourg Toulon Douai-Lens Rennes Rouen Grenoble

Population (in 000) 11,175 1,648 1,516 1,143 964 933 925 711 612 565 553 521 518 514

Source: INSEE.

These data illustrate the well known fact that the Ile-de-France area is by far the largest urban area and largely distances the second cities of Lyon and Marseilles. According to the recent DATAR comparative analysis3 (DATAR, 2002), while Paris is in class 1 with London (world cities), Lyon, Marseilles and Toulouse are only in class 4 (large cities of European importance) with 12 other 3

The DATAR study compares the 180 largest urban areas (over 200,000 inhabitants) of Europe. Ranking was established from a very complex set of 15 criteria including population, evolution of population (1950–90), airport traffic, European accessibility, number of headquarters, banking activities, number of students, research centres, etc.

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European urban areas and the seven following French cities in class 5 (large areas with European potential). France has no cities in class 2 (major European areas) or class 3 (European metropolises) which contrasts with Germany, Italy and Spain. The over-domination of the Paris area is not only in demographic terms. Paris contains ‘only’ 18.6 per cent of the national population, but 21.4 per cent of the labour force, 39 per cent of the foreign population, 21.9 per cent of employment, 29 per cent of the GNP, 33 per cent of the national income revenue, has 25 per cent of the student population and 45 per cent of researchers (IAURIF, 2001). In comparison with the previous decade, the over-domination of Paris has been growing (the central city of Paris has even gained population in the 1990 decade) which indicates a failure of most national policies directing towards reduction of the gap between Paris and other large cities. This exceptional situation explains why the Ile-de-France area has always been treated separately by the state in relation to national public policies and decentralisation processes. The 13 other large cities show nevertheless demographic dynamics with the exception of Lille. This demographic dynamic is largely due to their dynamics in terms of economic and cultural influence. Most of them are regional capitals and have benefited from the national policy of ‘métropoles d’équilibre’ of the 1960s and 1970s which gave them significant equipment and infrastructure. Some of them like Lille or Lyon have developed efficient strategies at the European and international levels to compensate for their poor competitive situation with respect to the capital. Some of them like Toulouse and Rennes are very dynamic economic poles meanwhile others such as Douai-Lens and Saint Etienne have gone through a serious economic crisis and are continuing their population decline, notably Saint Etienne (321,000 inhabitants in 1999) which lost more than 21,000 inhabitants between 1990 and 1999. Administrative and Financial Framework There are four levels of government in France. At the top is the state, then the 26 regions, the 100 départements and about 36,700 municipalities. All these governmental tiers are guaranteed by the national constitution, the region being the last following its inclusion in 2002. There is no hierarchy between subnational levels, in contrast for instance with federal countries or regional states like Italy and Spain. This is important to note because the question of hierarchy between different levels is gaining momentum today. Because France is a unitary state, every government tier of the same level is organised in the same way. For instance, the Paris municipality is governed with the same legal framework as any other small town. The same is true for départements and regions. The French administrative system follows the so-called Napoleonic model according to which the territorial division of the state apparatus matches the local government structure. Thus there is a regional division of the state headed by a Regional Prefect, there is a départemental division of the state headed by a

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Prefect and the Mayor is at the same time the head of the municipality and the representative of the state at the municipal level. The municipalities are the oldest government tiers. Their origin goes back at least to the French Revolution (because they correspond more or less to the parishes of the Ancien Régime). Most of them are small (70 per cent have fewer than 700 inhabitants while only 2.3 per cent have more than 10,000: 36 municipalities have more than 100,000 inhabitants). They are managed by a council led by a Mayor elected by the council. The mandate of the council is six years, as is that of the Mayor. The départements have been established in 1789. They are administered by a council elected for six years which appoints a President from among the councillors. The regions are the most recent tier: although they were created in 1982 but really came into power as democratic governmental unit only in 1986, after the first regional elections. They are directed by a regional council elected for a six-year mandate which appoints a President. There is a second assembly, the Regional Economic and Social Council, which represents the civil society and which has only a consultative role. The Decentralisation Acts of 1982 and 1983 transferred state responsibilities to the three subnational tiers according to the principle of the ‘block of competences’, that is, each level was to be exclusively responsible for specific allocated functions. Municipalities received responsibilities for land use, public transport and lowerlevel education.4 Départements are responsible for social affairs and regions were given the competence for economic development, professional training, culture and rail transport. In practice, the ‘block of competences’ principle has never functioned and instead has left the floor open to an ‘intertwining of competences’, each tier getting involved in the competence of the other. The state has more or less transferred corresponding personnel and financial resources, although this remains a conflictual issue between the state and local governments. Generally speaking every level of local government has its own fiscal resources. In addition, they receive grants from the state. The majority of local government revenues comes from their own taxes as it is shown in Table 8.2. State transfers come from the Decentralisation block grant scheme. The DGF (Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement) is the main subsidy. It is concerned with current expenses. The DGF amounts to about €19 billion in 2003 (DGCL, 2003). The DGE (Dotation Globale d’Equipement) is reserved for investments for small municipalities and amounts to €0.9 billion in 2003. The DGD (Dotation Globale de Décentralisation) acts as compensation for the functions transferred to municipalities by the Decentralisation Acts. In 2003, it amounted to €6.1 billion.

4

state.

Very partially, since the educational system remains largely in the hands of the

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Table 8.2 Structure of local revenues in 1999 (%)

Own tax revenues State transfers Other local resources Loans Total

Municipalities

Départements

Regions

52 29 12 7 100

63 21 12 4 100

49 44 3 4 100

Source: Dexia, 2002

In addition to this political and administrative framework, two essential elements regarding the management of urban areas must be mentioned. First, the multi-holding mandate system (cumul des mandats), through which a politician may hold several local and national elected positions (for example, being Mayor, member of the département and/or regional councils, or even deputy in the National Assembly or Euro-Deputy). In addition to these, (s)he may also hold nominated positions such as minister (except for the deputies). This is common practice and almost an obligation for those who wish to have a political career. Although the cumul des mandats has been severely criticised over the last decade and as a consequence has been restricted by law (it is no longer possible to hold more than two local elected mandates), this system is still very much in use because it is a way to control a functional territory through the control of the executives of the various local governments covering it. This is even more the case when a mayor of a central city is at the same time the President of the various joint authorities of the urban area and of the many semi-public bodies to which his or her city belongs. The second essential element is the so-called ‘intermunicipal’ system. Traditionally, area-wide management has been addressed through intercommunal structures: joint authorities gathering several municipalities and sometimes départements. At the end of the 1990s, there were about 20,000 of them, which makes them significant government bodies at the urban area level. Such structures are public bodies, a form of quango (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation), having responsibility for more and more policy sectors. In the largest urban areas, they take care of public transport, planning, environment, waste management, sewer systems, economic development, culture and so on. They are today completely controlled by local governments. Although they are grouped under the same heading – Etablissements Publics de Coopération Intercommunale ( EPCI) – they are of various sorts and various names: communautés urbaines, communautés d’agglomération, communautés de communes, syndicats de communes, and so on, depending on their statutory responsibilities and the population size of their jurisdictions. In the last decade, the nature of

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these structures has evolved significantly. While their responsibilities used to be mainly focused on the management of infrastructures and public services (directly, through mixed economy bodies, or by contracting out to private firms), they are now more and more involved in strategic issues such as strategic planning, economic development, social issues such as social cohesion and environment. The ‘intermunicipal’ system will be analysed in depth in the fifth section of this report because it is in this domain that the most important and relevant changes in urban area administration have occurred in the last few years. Table 8.3 Evolution of main inter-municipal structures: 1972–2000 1972 Communautés urbaines 9 Communautés d’agglomération Communautés de communes Districts 95 SIVU 9,289 SIVOM 1,243 Syndicats mixtes Total 10,636 *

1988

1992

1996

9

9

9

153 11,967 2,076

214 14,596 2,478

14,205

17,297

894 318 14,614 2,221 1,216 19,272

2000 12 50 1,493 281 14,885 * 2,165 * 1,454 * 20,340

in 1999

Source: DGCL.

8.3

Summary of the National Urban Policies Until the Mid-1990s

Up to the mid-1990s, national urban policies have to be understood within the paradigm of the Paris–province debate. In that paradigm, national policies were conceived to reduce the economic importance of Paris in relation to other French urban areas, and notably the largest ones. In the 1960s, the state launched the ‘métropoles d’équilibre’ policy, aiming at developing eight regional capitals (more or less the largest urban areas). It did so by investing largely in infrastructure and equipment (highways, high-speed trains, airports, public transport, etc.) in order to attract firms and jobs. It also started a policy of ‘délocalisation’, that is moving jobs of the national public sector away from Paris to regional capitals. This policy did not work out well since it did not prevent Paris and its area from continuing to grow and attract firms, jobs and people. At the same time, the state continued to develop Paris because it was the capital of France: it thus developed the public transport system, the airports, the highway network, created ‘La Defense’ (one of the largest urban redevelopment areas of Europe)

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and invested significantly in cultural infrastructure with the so-called ‘Grands Chantiers du Président’ (the President’s Great Public Works) such as the National Library of France, the renovation of the Louvre, the Bastille Opera, etc. Thus the state’s attitude towards Paris has been ambiguous. Economic development and urban competitiveness were not decisive priorities of the state in that period, at least not in its urban dimension.5 The focus was on social problems, notably after the first urban riots of the 1980s. Gradually the state has intervened in urban areas with several policies: first the so-called Developpement Social des Quartiers (DSQ) (Social Development of Neighbourhoods) Policy in the mid-1980s, then the Loi d’orientation pour la Ville (LOV) (Urban Area Policy Act) in 1991 and finally the Pacte de relance pour la Ville (A New Pact for Urban areas) in 1996. These policies established various programs and instruments to solve the ‘Urban Question’, such as the Grands Projets Urbains (GPU) (Large Urban Projects), the Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS) (Sensible Urban Zones) and the Zones Franches Urbaines (tax free areas with specific fiscal measures to attract jobs in distressed neighbourhoods). To implement these policies the state signed urban contracts (contrats de ville) with local governments which were agreements aiming at the funding of urgent actions over a five year period in the most deprived municipalities (all together, 214 contracts were signed between 1993 and 1998 and concerned more than 1,200 deprived areas) (Jacquier, 2001). To elaborate these policies, the state constituted a political, administrative and technical apparatus: a National Interministerial Agency for the City, the DIV (Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville) in 1988, a Ministry for Cities in 1990 and created specific national funds for cities such as the Urban Solidarity Fund (FSU). By and large these policies were not a success. They were accused of being piecemeal, badly integrated and overall insufficient in their financial contribution, which was severely criticised in a widely diffused and discussed national report ‘Tomorrow the City’ (called the Sueur Report) in 1998.6 In fact, the national urban policies of the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated that the state was no longer capable of taking urban problems in charge. It was no longer able to elaborate and implement policies alone. Gradually, the system of actors has started to open up to the private sector and to the civil society. This opening up started in fact in a few large urban areas like Lille and Nantes which

5 However, several important measures to foster economic growth were taken in the domain of economic and fiscal policies but they were not focused on urban areas. 6 The ‘Sueur Report’, ‘Demain la Ville’, written by the mayor of Orleans, National Deputy and President of the Association of French largest urban areas, Jean Pierre Sueur, notably called for a long-term, stable and larger funding programme for cities (at least double what the state gave at that time), making urban areas a national priority for the new socialist government. It was not implemented.

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were pioneers in that domain, although this opening up was modest and cannot be compared by all means to the British situation in the same period. The Conservative government which came into power in 1995 was not really urban oriented. This is clearly illustrated by the 1995 Act on the Planning and Sustainable Development of the Territory (Loi d’Orientation sur l’Aménagement et le Développement Durable du Territoire – LOADDT). Elaborated by the Ministry of Interior, the politically most powerful ministry of that government, the LOADDT focused on the national territory, considering that the major problem of France was the desertifying of rural areas. As such, it proposes various instruments to remedy this problem. It was severely criticised by urban interests concentrated in the Association of the Mayors of the Largest French Cities (Association des Maires des Grandes Villes de France – AMGVF), saying that urban areas were the ‘forgotten territories’ of the Law and that urban problems were the most important national problems, which was clearly stated in their slogan: ‘Mon Pays c’est la Ville’ (My Country is the City). Nevertheless, this government approved an important law regarding urban transport and the environment which came out after many amendments: the LAURE (Loi sur l’Air et l’Utilisation Rationnelle de l’Energie – Air and Rational Use of Energy Act) which importance for urban areas is the obligation for large cities to elaborate and implement a Plan de Déplacements Urbains – PDU (Urban Travel Plans). A PDU must give priority to public transport and soft modes to take care of people’ mobility. By the end of 2002 about 50 PDU had been approved (GART, 2002). The Conservative government lost power in 1997 and was replaced by a greensocialist-communist coalition (until 2002) whose supports came principally from urban voters and urban interests. National policies since then have been much more in favour of urban areas as we will see in the next sections. 8.4

The State of the Cities

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, French urban areas continue to be plagued by serious economic and social problems. In the economic sector, the 1990s confirmed the ‘de-industrialisation’ of most French cities. For instance, the Ile-de-France lost about 400,000 industrial jobs between 1985 and 2000 (IAURIF, 2001). This has had a double impact. First, on the spatial side, de-industrialisation has left significant brown-fields areas which need to be regenerated. Second, local unemployment has increased, the local population having problems finding jobs because of the mismatch between the qualification required and what the local population could offer. As a result, social conditions have been worsening. Social polarisation has increased in cities with many deprived areas becoming more deprived. Between 1990 and 1999, unemployment increased by 25 per cent in the 750 ZUS (INSEE Première, 2002) which had a population of 4.7 million. This situation has been

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so serious that it has become one of the top priorities of every government, be it progressive or conservative. In political terms, this issue has been approached as that of social cohesion, that is the capacity of society and cities to maintain a sort of social pacific co-existence in their territories. Urban violence and urban safety has been the most significant issue of the last national elections in 2002 and has remained a top priority for the population and its representatives, at the national and local levels, although no clear comprehensive data can be given.7 Other, more ‘classical’ problems continue to haunt French cities, namely mobility problems and environment degradation. Social and economic polarisation, along with urban sprawl, have led to a situation where people live further and further from their jobs. Commuting distances have therefore significantly increased, although commuting times have not grown in a similar way due to the development of transport infrastructure. Light rail and heavy rail systems have been built and extended in most major French cities like Grenoble, Rennes, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Rouen, Lyon and Paris, and highway construction has been pursued. However, traffic congestion is significantly increasing, at least in its spatial (the congestion area is growing) and temporal (the time period of congestion is spreading over the day) forms, due to the mismatch between public transport networks configuration and mobility patterns which makes the automobile the even more important transport mode in urban areas (see Table 8.3 below). Table 8.4 Importance of automobiles in some of the largest urban areas (per cent mechanised modes) (various years between 1985–2002) Bordeaux 1990 1998

Grenoble

79 1992 84 2002

Lille

74 1987 83 1998

Lyon 82 1985 86 1998

Marseilles 74 1988 77 1997

Paris

77 1991 81 1998

66 68

Source: CERTU, 2003.

In the most recent years, the various policies and policy-making structures aimed at solving the ‘urban question’ have been strongly criticised by researchers (Donzelot and Estebe, 1994; Behar and Méjean, 2001), but most importantly by policy-makers and elected officials. In 1998, the Sueur Report, ‘Demain la Ville’ (Tomorrow the City), as we saw, denounced the inconsistency of the Policy for Cities. It was soon followed by other reports like the Cavallier Report (1998) on the same lines. The criticisms addressed the territorial irrelevance of these policies

7

There is a large debate regarding the official figures given by the Ministry of Interior, although they show a constant increase over the years.

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which focus mainly on neighbourhoods and municipalities instead of considering the urban area as a whole; the policy inconsistency was also severely denounced on the ground that it was sectorially based instead of issue oriented, in spite of the political rhetoric. The multiplicity of procedures and programmes was also blamed because it contributed to the fragmentation of public action and negatively stigmatised the concerned areas, notwithstanding the fact that it added to the already significant administrative complexity. Also criticised were the insufficiency and the instability of funding for such programmes on the ground that social cohesion was a long term problem and consequently a long-term target which needed a strong and stable commitment from the state. 8.5

Current National Urban Policies

After almost two decades of decentralisation, the state has launched some interesting initiatives in the governance of urban areas and in policy-making, with the support of several local government associations like the AMGVF (Association des Maires des Grandes Villes de France, Association of Mayors of the Largest French Cities). Three national Acts have been approved in 1999 and 2000 which establish a new framework for dealing with urban issues: The ‘Chevènement Act’ which addresses the institutional question, the ‘Voynet Act’ which addresses the policy-making process and the ‘SRU Act’ which addresses the planning process and some specific content of policies. 8.5.1 The Renewal of the Juridical, Institutional and Financial Framework The Institutional Question: The 1999 Chevènement Act8 Considering that urban areas were not administered by relevant joint authorities (territorial discrepancies between the functional and the administrative territories, financial and fiscal inadequacies, responsibilities inconsistency of the existing inter-municipal structures) and that the present institutional system was far too complex to be understood by citizens, the Chevènement Act has introduced several significant changes to address these issues. First it has established three new types of joint authority which will gradually replace the present complex system: the communautés de communes for areas under 50,000 inhabitants, the communautés d’agglomération for urban areas of over 50,000 people and the communautés urbaines for urban areas of more than 500,000 inhabitants. As mentioned above, urban areas refer to the new statistical functional definition of the National Institute for Statistics (INSEE), thus indicating that

8

The exact appellation of the Chevènement Act is ‘Enhancement and Simplification of Inter-municipal Cooperation’ (Loi sur le renforcement et la simplification de la coopération intercommunale), Chevènement being the name of the Minister of Internal Affairs at that time.

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France is composed of about 140 urban areas of more than 50,000 inhabitants. These new joint authorities, whose territories should match the functional urban areas, have statutory powers in the following fields: economic, cultural and social development, territorial planning, social housing, urban policies for deprived areas, environment preservation, public networks (such as public transport), etc. The communauté urbaine has more statutory powers than the communauté d’agglomération. These newly established joint authorities are governed by a board which comprises the representatives of all member municipalities, generally on a population basis. Second, the Act has established an area-wide business tax in order to eliminate the competition between municipalities to attract firms. The business tax is the most important local tax. It is levied on firms located in the municipal territory. The lower the tax, the more attractive the municipality for enterprises. As a consequence, municipalities which are rich enough (because of their residents’ wealth or because they can already levy significant revenues) can offer low business tax rates and attract more firms, while the poorest ones may have to maintain higher business tax rates to levy enough revenues and thus may lose firms. In the last decade, this situation has constantly been denounced by some national associations of municipalities like the AMGVF and central government bodies like the DATAR. To reduce this phenomenon, that is, to favour territorial solidarity, the Chevènement Act established an area-wide business tax (Taxe Professionnelle Unique or TPU) which is to be levied by the new joint authorities. This area wide business tax represents the whole of the municipal business taxes (i.e. it replaces all municipal business taxes) and is to be used for area-wide purposes or for projects jointly decided by the joint authorities. In addition, in order to facilitate or to speed up the establishment of joint authorities, the state has increased the amount of the block grant (DGF) it allocates to newly created joint authorities which agree to set up an area-wide business tax. The Voynet Act The Chevènement Act is supplemented by the Voynet Act9 (Ministry of Environment and Regional Planning) which also replaces the 1995 LOADDT. The new Act addresses the question of the process of policymaking and the content of policies at the area-wide level. The interpretative slogan of the Voynet Act is ‘a territory, a project, a contract’. For cities, the territory is the statistical urban area, the project is an agglomeration project and the contract is an agglomeration contract. The Voynet Act aims at giving the joint authorities established by the Chevènement Act the capacity to achieve

9

The juridical name of the Voynet Act is ‘General Act on Regional Planning and the Sustainal Development of the National Territory’ (Loi d’Orientation sur l’Aménagenemt et le Développement Durable du Territoire), Voynet being the name of the Minister for Environment at that time.

Table 8.5 The new institutional structures established by the Chevènement Act Type of intermunicipal structure Population threshold

Mandatory responsibilities

Area-wide tax

Communauté urbaine

500,000

Economic, cultural and social development Spatial planning Social housing Urban policies for deprived areas Public utilites and public services Environment

Statutory TPU

Communauté d’agglomération

50,000 with a centre grouping more than 15,000 people

Economic, cultural and social development Spatial planning Social housing Urban policies for deprived areas

Statutory TPU

Communauté de communes

3,500

Economic development Spatial planning

TPU on a voluntary basis

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the balanced development of their area by setting up the modalities for such an achievement. The state is willing to help the joint authorities but under certain conditions. In order to receive subsidies from the state, the Voynet Act establishes several conditions. First, the joint authority must produce an ‘agglomeration project’, that is a jointly elaborated document whose aim is ‘to define the orientations of the urban area in the fields of economic development, social cohesion, territorial planning, transport, housing, policy for cities, environmental policy according to Agenda 21’. Once the urban areas have established communautés d’agglomération or communautés urbaines and when these joint authorities have approved an ‘agglomeration project’, they will be able to receive specific state grants. Central government subsidies are not piecemeal: they come in a package to fund the various actions approved in the ‘agglomeration project’. This package will be given through an ‘agglomeration contract’ signed between the state and the joint authority. In order to give consistency to the whole of public funding and to increase its efficiency, the ‘agglomeration contract’ will be inserted in the Contrat de Plan Etat-region10 (CPER) (Planning Agreement between the state and the Region) and will consequently be signed by the regional council. Another important innovation of the Voynet Act is the establishment of socalled ‘development councils’. These councils are consultative bodies, gathering the major social and economic actors of the urban area. Their establishment is a requirement of the Voynet Act and one of their main activities is the approval of the ‘agglomeration project’. They have been introduced as a tool to develop the involvement of civil society (economic actors, unions and the voluntary sector) in policy-making at the area-wide level and are thus becoming a body in the same vein of the Economic and Social Councils established in the regions by the decentralisation Acts of 1982 and 1983. The SRU Act The SRU Act which stands for ‘Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain’ (Solidarity and Urban Renewal) was enacted in December 2000. It is the last of a long series of actions and laws enacted in the last decade (such as the 1991 Act on cities (LOV), the 1996 Urban Pact (Pacte de Relance pour la Ville). It has two main objectives: i) to enhance social mixture in housing and to reduce social exclusion; and ii) to create a new more consistent system of territorial planning from the municipal to the area-wide level. The first objective is to be achieved by giving municipalities the goal of reaching a 20 per cent social housing proportion in their housing stock, with a financial system to force municipalities using money for this goal. In order to create high-density housing which is considered to be a better context for social integration than urban sprawl, the SRU Act seeks to promote a model of a more compact city by 10 Contrat de Plan Etat Region are agreements through which the state and the Region decide to jointly fund actions and Projects for a six year duration period. The state has thus such an agreement with all the 26 regions.

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developing collective housing through fiscal disadvantages on single housing. In addition, priority is to be given to public transport on the ground that a better accessibility within the urban area by cheap modes of transport will enhance social inclusion. The second objective is to be fulfilled by transforming the whole urban planning system. First, Master Plans (Schémas Directeurs) are to be replaced by Territorial Consistency Plans (Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale – SCOT), that are strategic documents, area-wide based, which aggregate previous sectoral plans such as urban travel plan, master plan, environmental plan, housing plan, etc. At the municipal level, a new planning document, the Urban Local Plan (Plan Local d’Urbanisme) replaces the land-use plan (Plan d’Occupation des Sols – POS) and must be consistent with the SCOT. In addition to the previous three laws, a new act was approved in early 2002: the Neighbourhood Act (Loi Démocratie de Proximité). It aims at giving more consultative power to the citizens. The most significant element of the new law is the establishment of consultative neighbourhood councils (conseils de quartier) in all municipalities of over 20,000 inhabitants. The creation of such councils is mandatory for the largest towns, those of more than 80,000 people. These councils are composed of municipal councillors and representatives of the civil society. They are mostly concerned with the Politique de la Ville. They have been conceived as the necessary institutional compensation for the structuring of political life at the area-wide level. 8.5.2 Tentative Assessment of the New Framework It is too soon to assess the impacts of the various institutional and economic instruments established by these four acts because time is important for these arrangements to show impacts which, if any, are more likely to be seen on a medium or long range. Second, and more important, there is a general belief that an area-wide institution associated with a pluri-sectoral approach and in concertation with ‘local living forces’ is the solution to produce better policies. As a consequence, the question of the likely impacts of these arrangements is not an issue for policy-makers, elected officials and the business community because this impact is given. Before giving a short presentation of the state of implementation of these four Acts, one remark must be made. Although presented as a chef d’œuvre of state coherence in policy-making, the first three Acts must first and foremost be considered as the products of single administrations within the Central Government: the Ministry of Interior for the Chevènement Act, the Ministry of Environment and the DATAR for the Voynet Act, the Ministry of Equipment and Public Works for the SRU Act. Cooperation between state administrations has been problematic during the elaboration of these laws. It is now up to the local level to aggregate these governance arrangements.

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The Chevènement Act The Chevènement Act is presented as an enormous success by the state as well as several associations of municipalities (AMGVF, ADCF (Association des Communautés de France). The ground for the success largely lies on quantitative data. Although the previous 1992 Local Government Act (ATR Act)11 had initiated similar joint authorities along with the possibility of establishing an area-wide business tax, the 1999 Act has shown a speeding up in the institutional creation of such joint authorities. As of January 2003, there were 14 communautés urbaines representing about 4.6 million people and 143 communautés d’agglomération grouping about 18.2 million inhabitants (compared to 5.1 in December 2000), that is all the urban areas as defined by the Insee. All these joint authorities have their own area-wide business tax since it is mandatory (DGCL, 2003). Quantitatively speaking, the 1999 Act can be considered a success. However, some important less optimistic remarks must be made. First, the Chevènement Act transfers significant powers from the municipalities to the newly established joint authorities in a domain called ‘community (area-wide) interest’ (intérêt communautaire). However this ‘community interest’ is not defined in the Act and is now the focus of debate between municipalities and joint authorities since it can either be defined in a larger sense (giving more powers to the joint authority) or on the contrary in a restrictive sense (keeping more powers at the municipal level). Second, several of the newly created communautés d’agglomération or even communautés urbaines have been established on a defensive position: they have been set up to protect themselves from their political, economic and social environment. This is clear in cases like Marseilles where the communauté urbaine does not cover the urban area and has instead been created to protect the political stronghold of the Mayor of Marseilles. Today, the Marseilles urban area is divided into several communautés d’agglomération and one communauté urbaine with little or no political relationships although they belong to the same functional territory. Similar situations can be seen in other large urban areas like Bordeaux where the communauté urbaine is surrounded by newly established communautés d’agglomération, built up to prevent an extension of the communauté urbaine in their very areas. The same can also be said about the Paris-Ile-de-France area where no less than 12 communautés d’agglomération (and several more in project) have been established which contributes to the already important fragmentation of the whole urban area.

11 ATR stands for Administration Territoriale de la République. It was approved in 1992. It established new EPCI like communautés de communes and communautés de villes and for the first time the possibility to create an area-wide business tax. Although a great success in rural areas, it was a failure in urban areas since only five communautés de villes were established and only in minor cities.

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Table 8.6 Evolution of inter-municipal structures with their own fiscality (1992–2002) 1992 Communautés urbaines Communautés d’agglomération Communautés de communes Districts * **

9 193 ** 214

1996

2000

12 50 894 318

12 143 * 1493 281

2002 14 2 032 0

in 2003 in 1993

Source: DGCL.

The Voynet Act Up to January 2003 15 agglomeration contracts had been signed. In the largest areas, the first one was signed in Bordeaux in December 2000, in Lille in May 2003, in Nancy and Rennes in June 2003. This means that most large urban areas are still in the process of elaborating and approval of their ‘agglomeration project’. The content of these contracts varies greatly from one city to the other. According to the first DATAR report (2003) which ‘assesses’ the 15 first agglomeration contracts, actions to foster the attractivity of the area are present (large infrastructure and equipment, R&D, culture), urban regeneration projects are mentioned as well as actions regarding the Policy for Cities. Sustainable development is mentioned because it is a requirement of the Voynet Act, but no concrete actions in that domain are indicated. The cost of these agglomeration contracts is also diverse, ranging from €1.2 billion for the Bordeaux area to €33 million to the Elbeuf area in Normandy. But this is also due to the diversity of the French urban areas. Funding comes from the metropolitan authority (between 19 per cent and 32 per cent depending on the area), the state (between 16 per cent and 40 per cent), the Region (between 7 and 24 per cent), the département (between 3 per cent and 19 per cent), the municipalities (between 1.5 per cent and 23 per cent) and the European Union (between 3 and 24 per cent). The SRU Act It is too soon to elaborate on the impact of the SRU Act on the economic and social situation of the French urban areas. It seems that the rules about social mixture have lead to a rather good production of social housing in the municipalities where it was missing. The elaboration and implementation of SCOTs are statutory powers of communautés d’agglomération and communautés urbaines. SCOTs are now in their very first phase of elaboration. However, some problems can already be seen such as the relations between SCOT and PLU when

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PLUs will soon be approved in some cities, although the SCOTs will not be ready on time, thus posing the question of the consistency of PLU with the SCOT. 8.5.3 The Future When the new conservative government came to power in June 2002, it made clear its intention to relaunch decentralisation by a second decentralisation step. Already the various acts approved and implemented by the previous government had established some progress in that domain, notably regarding the Ile-de-France where public transport and planning had not been transferred to local authorities and notably the region in 1982. According to the SRU Act, the elaboration of the SCOT has already started. In addition the SRU Act opened the board of the public transport authority, the STIF (Syndicat des Transports d’Ile-de-France) to the regional council, although the state remains in charge. This move was justified by the fact that the regional council has always contributed to the funding of the Ile-de-France public transport network while not being allowed to participate in the decision making. However, the idea was for the regional council to substitute the state in the medium range and thus to chair the STIF, which is part of the new decentralisation bill to be discussed in late 2003 (see below). The ‘Acte Deux’ has already started. The present government proposed and the Parliament approved a constitutional revision and two new acts regarding local referendum and the ‘right of experimentation’ (August 2003). The constitutional revision indicates that from now on, the French Republic is a decentralised country, which is highly symbolic. It also declares that the Republic is composed of the Regions, which is a constitutional guarantee given to this government tier which previously had no constitutional existence. The first act on local referendum establishes the rules for such a process. For the first time, it states that a local referendum, once approved by the voters, is adopted. Before, it was up to the mayor and the municipal council to decide whether to adopt it or not. The second act is concerned with the so-called ‘right of experimentation’ which gives local governments the possibility to be exempted of some laws and rules in order to experiment policies or any action of general interest. This would be for instance the case of the European structural funds, should a region decide to administer them. The most important move, however, concerned the government proposals presented in November to Parliament which concern new transfers of responsibilities to local governments. According to the government’s proposals, the state will transfer to the départements most national highways. The départements will also receive additional administrative responsibilities in the management of social affairs and social housing (as well as agglomerations in the matter of social housing), as well as in the education sector. The regions will be in charge of the economic development policies, notably the aid to SMEs. They will also be responsible for the whole of professional training. The municipalities will be

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mainly in charge of the policies of vicinity (politiques de proximité). The bill, once approved, will be implemented from January 2005. The AMGVF, the ADCF ( Association des Communautés de France: Association of the French Communities), the FNAU (Fédération Nationale des Agences d’Urbanisme: National Federation of Urban Development Agencies) and the newly created ACUF (Association des Communautés Urbaines de France: Association of the French Urban Communities) have strongly reacted to the government bill. The AMGVF declared that ‘cities and their agglomerations do not have the place they deserve in the new decentralisation process. They are very worried because of their absence in the bill’. These associations have presented an Urban Manifesto (Manifeste pour l’Urbain) to the Prime Minister in March 2003 to call the government on that matter. 8.6

European Policies

European policies presented in this section relate mainly to the Structural Funds, that is to Objectives 1, 2 and 3 funding and to the PIC ‘Urban’. It is important to note that from 2000, Objective 2 funds have included urban distressed areas. The impact of European policies and funding on urban national policies and more generally on cities is difficult to assess. As is known, the European Commission is not very comfortable dealing with urban issues. First, urban issues are generally the responsibility of national and local governments because of the subsidiarity principle. Second, European urban policies continue to balance between two objectives, economic competitiveness of urban areas and social solidarity, two objectives which, in practice, have some difficulty going handin-hand. First and foremost, as noted in a recent report (2002) of the Prospective Group on the future of the European Cohesion Policy, structural funds only represent 0.17 per cent of the national GNP and as such cannot pretend to have a significant impact on the economy and employment, even less regarding urban areas. In addition, it is difficult to assess the impact of Objective 3 funding since there is no clearly identified urban dimension in it. Regarding the URBAN Programme of the first period (1994–99), 13 areas were identified, involving 350,000 inhabitants: two in Ile-de-France with the rest being well distributed over the country. European funding amounted to €82 million for a total public intervention of €218 million. The European part of Urban II program (2000–2006) funding amounts to €102 million. It is concentrated on nine areas: four in the Ile-de-France with the remainer being in Bastia (Corsica), Bordeaux, Grenoble, Le Havre, and Strasbourg. The Ile-deFrance areas receive half of the national total. It is difficult to assess the URBAN programme, notably because it is integrated with other projects and actions of the Policy for Cities, such as GPU or contrats de ville. Second, the situations are very diverse and it is therefore difficult to make

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generalisations. However, a few general remarks can be made. First, the URBAN programmes have allowed for a better search for a link between social integration of these neighbourhoods and their economic development project (DIV, 2000). Second, URBAN has been an additional incentive for the involvement of the local population. Finally, it has permitted exchanges of ideas and dissemination of experiences between the various cities. More important is the funding from Objectives 1 and 2. Funding for urban areas goes mainly through the procedure of the CPER. In the current CPER generation (2000–2006), European Structural Funds account for about 20 per cent of the total €10.2 billion while the state give €17.5 billion, the regions €17.7 billion and other local governments about €5.7 billion. Once again, it is impossible to assess the impact of these structural funds on the state of the urban areas. However, some important remarks can be made. First, the impact of European funding and European policies is to be seen in ‘qualitative’ terms more than in ‘quantitative terms’. As such, the ‘European added value’ has been more on the methodology, on the modalities of policymaking than in the specific content of urban national policies. Very often noted are for instance the strategic approach and the pluri-annual funding carried out by European policies which has had an impact on national and local projects. Also the requirement of an evaluation of European policies has likely played a role in such requirements in the CPER for instance. Finally, the emphasis on partnership and citizen participation in European policies has had a role in the same emphasis in various French policies and projects like territorial projects and many instruments of the Policy for Cities. Two additional elements must be mentioned. First, starting from 2000, the time period of national territorial policies has been changed to take into consideration the European timing of structural funds. For instance, up to 1999, the CPER programming was based on a five year period. The growing importance of European structural funds has required a slight time adjustment. Today, the CPER lasts six years, thus matching the period of European programmes. Second, and much more important, is the emerging change of behaviour of the state with respect to the Ile-de-France. True, this cannot be only due to European policies but they have played a role by forcing the state to make decisions. Until the end of the 1990s, national urban policies tended to be inserted in the Paris–province paradigm that has been mentioned in the third section of this report. Two elements can be pointed out to show that this paradigm is not anymore accepted. First, the national government agreed to locate the project ‘Soleil’ (Sun), the construction of a giant nuclear particle accelerator, in the Ilede-France instead of in the area of Lille. Second, in 2000, the Ile-de-France area has started to benefit from Objective 2 funding for the first time. This can be explained by the change of attitude of the state, considering now that, although the Ile-de-France region is the richest region of France, it nevertheless contains

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pockets of poverty so important that Objective 2 money must be called for. This is also true for the Program Urban where the Ile-de-France had only four sites out of 13 in the first period (1994–99) and four sites out of nine and the half of the European funding in Urban II. Second, the Ile-de-France needs to increase its economic competitiveness with respect to other European and world cities and this must be done by concentrating infrastructure like infrastructure research (project Soleil) in its territory. 8.7

Conclusion

Regarading urban policies, France has been very innovative in the last decade but in a very specific way which obviously relates to the national history and the role of the state in policy-making. Although the country has embarked on a significant decentralisation process since the last 20 years, innovation has mainly been produced by the state and as such has concerned the whole territory. First and foremost, innovation means institutional innovation. Indeed, to address urban problems and issues throughout institutional structures is a definite French attribute, at least in the state apparatus. The innovation here is to create institutional structures at the area-wide level. Thus, new communautés urbaines and communautés d’agglomération have been established in order to address the specificities of large urban areas. The second innovation is a procedural one. Considering that institutional building was not sufficient to address urban problems, that is to produce adequate policies at the urban level, the state has proposed new modalities and instruments such as the various types of agreements (contrats de ville, contrat d’agglomération, contrat de plan Etat-Region) and the production of territorial projects like the projets d’agglomération. The third innovation is the involvement of the urban population or at least the establishment of structures aiming at involving the population such as the conseils de développement and the conseils de quartier. These three institutional and procedural innovations should permit, in the state view, the elaboration and implementation of adequate policies (in their content and their territorial relevance) to address the most serious urban problems which are economic development and the lack of social cohesion. It is now up to the local actors and leaders to use these new arrangements and it is too soon to pronounce any judgement in that domain. Another element must be stressed which is the changing attitude of the state regarding the status of the Paris area. Indeed, it can be said that the paradigm of regional planning policies (Aménagement du Territoire), that is the permanent search for a national territorial balance between Paris and the province is over. This seems to be largely due to the ongoing European integration and internationalisation process which has entailed this paradigm shift by which, in the state view, Paris is no longer considered only with respect to the national

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territory but also as an international urban area in competition with other cities and which as such must be aided. The consequence of these significant changes is that large urban areas are on the verge of becoming new political territories: a move that the direct election of their intermunicipal structures would confirm. It is a proposal that is being largely discussed and which has the support of the leaders of the largest urban areas. This would mean the end of the ‘Jardin à la française’, the end of this Cartesian and Napoleonic political and territorial model, a move that many wish and as many others fear and which is at the heart of the debate regarding the second decentralisation step. References AMGVF (Association des Maires des Grandes Villes de France) (1994), Mon Pays c’est la Ville, Manifeste des Maires de Grandes Villes de France, Paris: Grasset. Ampe, F. and Neuschwander, C. (2002), La République des Villes, Editions de l’Aube, Paris: DATAR, Series ‘Bibliothèque des Territoires’. Behar, D. and Méjean, P. (2001), ‘Contrats d’agglomération: l’obligation d’innover’, rapport de synthèse de l’opération ‘sites témoins’ des contrats d’agglomération, DATAR-AMGVF, June. Cavallier, G. (1998), ‘Rapport du groupe de travail interministériel et interpartenaires sur la définition des contrats de ville du XIIè plan’, Paris: La documentation Française. CERTU (2003), Annuaire Statistique – Transports Collectifs Urbains, Ministère de l’Equipement. DATAR (Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale) (2002), Les villes européennes, analyse comparative, Documentation Française, Paris. DATAR (2003), ‘Analyse critique des contrats d’agglomération signés’, DATAR, July. Dexia (2002), Les finances locales dans les quinze pays de l’Union Européenne, Paris: Dexia. DGCL (Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales) (2003), Les collectivités locales en chiffres, Paris: DGCL. DIV (Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville) (2000), L’initiative communautaire Urban I (1994–1999): les 13 programmes français, Paris: DIV. Donzelot, J. and Estèbe, P. (1994), L’Etat animateur: essai sur la politique de la ville, Paris: Esprit. Estèbe, P. (2001), ‘La politique de la ville: de la discrimination positive à la cohésion territoriale’, Les Cahiers du CR-DSU, 29–30, June. GART (2002), Etat d’avancement des PDU en juin 2002, Paris: GART. Groupe de Prospective Opérationnelle sur l’avenir de la politique de Cohésion (2002), Note d’Orientation, Paris: DATAR-SGCI. IAURIF (2001), ‘40 ans en Ile de France: rétrospective 1960–2000’, Etudes et Développement, Paris: IAURIF. INSEE Première (2002), No. 835, March. INSEE Première (2001), ‘Les grandes villes étendent leur influence’, No. 765, April.

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Jacquier, C. (2001), ‘Urban Fragmentation and Revitalization Policies in France’, in T. Andersen, and R. van Kempen (eds), Governing European Cities: Social Fragmentation, Social Exclusion and Urban Governance, Aldershot: Ashgate. Sueur, J.P. (1998), Demain la ville, Paris: Documentation Française.

Annex

Source: INSEE. Note: 1990 and 1999 census data for ‘urban areas’ (aires urbaines) have been made comparable by Insee (National Institute for Statistics). 1982 data refer to the ‘agglomeration’ which is smaller than the urban area.

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Chapter 9

Urban Germany: The Future Will Be Different Klaus R. Kunzmann1

9.1

Introduction

Four things are essential to understand urban policies in Germany at the beginning of the twenty-first century. First, in 2004, 15 years after reunification, Germany was still a divided country. Despite all political promises and considerable annual transfer payments, urban problems in the Länder of West Germany differ from those in the East. While most cities in the West are still growing economically and demographically, cities in the East suffer from considerable population decline, with all its implications for housing, urban infrastructure and local economic development. Cities in the east (with the exception of cities such as Potsdam or Ludwigsfelde in the immediate hinterland of Berlin) are struggling with the spatial consequences of shrinking, and those in the west are forced to adapt to less favourable and prosperous conditions. Even in what was West Germany, however, inequalities between prospering city regions in the south (for example, Munich or Stuttgart) and stagnating cities in west or north of Germany (for example, Essen or Bremerhaven) are growing Second, as a consequence of federal policies, industrial decline and deregulation, German cities are increasingly confronted with the dwindling of their local budgets. This, in turn, has significant negative impacts on the ability of cities to sustain their physical, social and cultural infrastructure. This is also true for Berlin, the new federal capital. The financial base of the reunited city state is disastrous, as the dreams of regaining pre-war importance as a European metropolis have not yet come true. Consequently urban conditions still vary considerably between urban districts in the east and those in the west of the capital city, while a more prosperous suburban belt is slowly emerging.

1 University of Dortmund. The author would like to thank Simon Guentner, Matthias Sauter, and Wendelin Strubelt for their valuable comments to an earlier version of this chapter.

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Third, in the early twenty-first century, as in other European countries, the political debate in Germany centres around a fundamental reform of the welfare state. Urban policy issues such as the prolongation of traditional subsidies for housing, education or mobility, are clearly linked to this debate. In addition, immigration policies in times of demographic decline, high unemployment rates and minimum wage disputes are still under review. The ministry responsible at the federal level, which, after the last elections in 2002 was renamed Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau- und Wohnungswesen (Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing) is clearly focusing on transport rather than on urban or spatial policies. One more policy arena affecting urban development, is controversial: the Federal Government and the Deutsche Staedtetag (an association of larger German cities), differ in their view about the appropriate reform of local taxes for improving the local tax system. A compromise solution, however, seems to be in the pipeline. Fourth, in contrast to other European countries (United Kingdom, Italy, France) urban policy at the national level is comparably weak in Germany. Constrained by the constitutional framework the federal tier has little urban policy power over the Länder and local governments further down the hierarchy. The Federal Government can set the legal rules for urban development mainly through the Bundesbaugesetz (Federal Building Code), which includes the Bundesraumordnungsgesetz (Federal Spatial Planning Act) as well as the Federal Baunutzungsverordnung (Land Use Ordinance), and it can monitor urban and spatial development. This is effectively done via the Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung (Federal Office for Building and Planning). In addition, the Federal Government can launch pilot urban programmes, so-called ExWoSt programmes (experimental housing and urban development programmes) to explore and demonstrate how urban problems can be approached. Increasingly important, however, is the federal government’s function at the European tier, where it acts as the trustee of the interests of the nation and the Länder (BBR, 2000a; BBR, 2000b). All German Länder, particularly the larger ones such as North RhineWestphalia, Bavaria or Baden-Württemberg, have their own urban policies and programmes. They complement federal policies or promote innovative approaches to address region-specific problems. Benefiting from constitutional statute, the local governments have considerable power to govern their own affairs though, given the regulatory financial system in the country, their independence is constrained. Given all these controversial policy arenas within the country, the European dimension of urban policies finds little interest among urban policy-makers. Even the accession of the Eastern European states to the European Union does not raise much concern for their likely impact on cities in the country. Nevertheless, many cities – comforted by EU regional and urban policy and used to receiving financial support from the respective EU programmes – are not enthusiastic about prospects that, after 2006, such support may be given primarily to cities in

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the accession countries of Eastern Europe. Such concerns reflect the expectation that the EU is mainly a source of additional income to local governments for infrastructure and local economic development projects. 9.2

National Urban Policies until the Mid-1990s: A Summary

Until the mid-1990s, urban policies in Germany, at Federal, Länder and local tiers of planning and decision-making were focused on the following action areas: •

•

•

•

The implications of German reunification on urban development in East Germany clearly dominated the political arena after 1989. Cities and regions in East Germany had to be modernised and West German instruments of urban development be introduced and locally applied. All this has been done with considerable transfer payments (around €100 billion annually) from West to East Germany. Private land-ownership had to be secured and a functioning property market had to be re-installed. Supported by an armada of planning consultants from all over the country, as well as by knowledge transfer in the form of partnerships of West and East German local and regional governments, local planning machineries had to be established and staffed. Investments in urban development were encouraged by generous tax incentives to private developers and investors to conserve and modernise the run-down housing stock in East German cities. Obviously, the reinstatement of Berlin as the capital city of Germany has been a key concern of the federal and Berlin governments after the political decision was made in 1991 to move the capital function to Berlin. Reuniting the divided territory, housing the comprehensive machinery of the Federal Government in the city and developing land to attract national and international investors have been the challenges since. In addition, some policy attention had to be given to Bonn, to compensate for the loss of the capital function, though half of the ministries had still remained in Bonn. Reacting to policy efforts at the European level, the Federal Government launched two national spatial development documents, the Raumordnungspolitische Orientierungsrahmen (Principles for Federal Spatial Development) and subsequently the Raumordnungspolitische Handlungsrahmen (Federal Action Plan for National Spatial Development). Although both documents did not receive much political weight and popular and media attention – and were not linked to any financial funds for application or even implementation – they became general guidelines for planners and policy advisors in federal and Länder institutions. The late 1980s and early 1990s were periods during which the environmental dimensions of urban development had a high profile. Urban containment, brownfield redevelopment, energy conservation or mobility reduction were the objectives formulated and applied wherever it was appropriate, feasible

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and politically acceptable. Very much encouraged by a committed and supportive minister at the federal level, most urban development policies at federal, Länder and local levels of planning and decision-making had a clear focus on environmental concerns. Consequently, most policy instruments and documents were screened and formulated to incorporate environmental principles and targets. As a contribution to the HABITAT Conference in Istanbul 1996, a national Plan of Action for Sustainable Development had been produced (BMBau, 1996). Emerging social problems in cities, caused by growing unemployment and large flows of migrants form Southeast Europe and the former Soviet Union, had caused the Federal Government, albeit rather belatedly, to explore ways and means to address urban problems of polarisation and fragmentation (Programm Stadtteile mit besonderem Erneuerungsbedarf: die Soziale Stadt). First community development projects were piloted in selected cities to raise awareness and to test approaches to integrated approaches. Thereby the federal initiative benefited much from earlier efforts and experience in the State of North Rhine-Westphalia (1993) and Hamburg (1994 to 1998), as well as from the Community Initiative URBAN, which the European Commission had launched in the early 1990s (Sauter 2001). During the 1990s the urban policy of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia, just to refer to one of the 16 Länder, had focused much on urban policies centred around the Internationale Bauausstellung Emscher Park (IBA), an innovative approach to revitalise an industrial landscape. The project received much political and financial support from the Land (with additional funding from EU programmes. It pioneered incremental and grassroots approaches of creative brownfield redevelopment, saved the industrial heritage from demolition, promoted affordable housing, demonstrated how to regenerate a polluted urban industrial environment, and contributed much to the reimaging of a tedious urban landscape.

The political environment in Germany prior to the mid-1990s was in a mood of economic optimism and normative policies. Though first attempts to deregulation and to the slimming down of the public sector were initiated, urban development was still very much a public sector domain. 9.3

The Present State of the Cities

By the end of 1999, nine years after reunification, Germany had a population of 82.19 million: 64.83 million lived in the former West and 17.33 million in the former East Germany (BBR, 2003). This was a slight increase of 2.41 per cent from 79.75 million as against 1990. However, already from 1990 to 1999 (end of the year) there were differences. While the population in the West grew by 5.3 per cent, the five Eastern states suffered from a decline of 4.6 per cent. This trend will

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continue. Forecasts by the BBR for the year 2020, based on past demographic trends, show that a slight decline of the overall population to 81.5 million has to be anticipated, with unequal developments in West (–0.2 per cent) and East Germany (–0.4 per cent). Speculative forecasts for the decades after 2020 anticipate a further decline to about 70 million, unless proactive migration policies stop the decline. Obviously, such trends have different implications for spatial categories. The population of most city regions in West Germany will grow further, though at the cost of core cities and more remote rural areas, while the population in the East will decline in both urban and in rural areas. The percentage of the German population living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants (at the time of writing the figure is around 80 per cent), will grow further. In the year 2000 there were 14,196 municipalities in Germany, including 5686 in the East. Eighty-two municipalities had a population of more than 100,000, though only 12 such municipalities were in the East (BBR, 2000a). The population forecast for 2020 shows that most core cities in German agglomerations will loose population until 2010, while their suburban belts will still attract households, the exceptions being Hamburg, Berlin and Cologne (Table 9.1). However, traditional city boundaries matter. The city of Essen, for example, is loosing population to the neighbouring communities due to shortage of unbuilt land for new development, while other cities, such as Dortmund have still land reserves for new suburban residencies. Table 9.1 Population dynamics in selected cities in Germany from the 1990s and until 2020 1990 Berlin Hamburg Munich Cologne Frankfurt Essen Dortmund Stuttgart Düsseldorf Bremen Duisburg Hanover

3,433,700 1,652,400 1,229,000 953,600 644,900 627,000 599,100 580,000 575,800 551,200 535,400 513,000

2000

2010

2020

3,382,100 1,703,500 1,199,400 965,000 644,300 5,959,00 588,200 580,700 568,100 537,300 515,700 512,900

3,440,400 1,698,000 1,219,700 984,100 641,100 558,800 551,800 565,300 558,700 512,700 477,700 497,300

3,498,500 1,681,200 1,228,300 990,300 638,100 524,200 514,900 554,800 546,600 491,400 445,100 483,100

Sources: BBR, 2003: INKAR Pro CD-ROM.

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Table 9.2 Municipalities and urban population in Germany in the year 2000 Population

<5,000

5,000 <20,000

20,000 <100,000

>100,000

West Germany East Germany Germany

6,161 5,257 11,418

1,785 322 2,107

494 98 589

70 12 82

8,510 5,698 14,196

<5,000 (%)

5 000 <20,000 (%)

20,000 <100,000 (%)

>100,000

Total

17,652 (27) 2,976 (17) 20,628 (25)

18,421 (29) 3,399 (20) 21,820 (27)

Population (in 1000)

West Germany East Germany Germany

9,287 (14) 5,122 (29) 14,410 (18)

Total

(%) 19,261 (30) 5,918 (34) 25,179 (31)

64,622 (100) 17,415 (100) 82,037 (100)

Source: After BBR, 2000.

Although the spatial implications of such population trends will differ from region to region, the strong polycentric spatial system of Germany will not change. Not surprisingly in times of globalisation and European urban competition, the larger metropolitan city regions of Berlin, Leipzig/Halle/ Dresden, Hamburg, RheinRuhr (Bonn, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Duisburg, Essen and Dortmund), Frankfurt (RheinMain), Stuttgart (RheinNeckar) and Munich, will gain even more population. Small and medium-sized communities in particular will benefit from the economic and cultural attractiveness of core cities, improvements of metropolitan transport systems, as well as from the lack of affordable housing. What are the issues of urban development in Germany in the early twenty-first century? The Deutsche Institut fuer Urbanistik (DIFU), the official think tank of German cities, publishes annually the results of a survey among its member cities to learn about their concerns. The 2002 survey showed the following results, ranked according to their political importance (DIFU, 2002): 1 2 3 4 5 6

budget consolidation and public management; structural change and employment; suburbanisation and population decline; inner city development; local transport management; affordable housing and social segregation;

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7 city region cooperation and governance; 8 urban development and marketing. This list gives a good insight into the most pressing problems of cities in East and West Germany. It shows that East German local governments are more concerned about dealing with an oversized and unattractive social housing stock, while West German cites stress the urban region governance issue. It shows as well that population decline through suburbanisation and demographic factors is increasingly becoming an issue of local concern. The ranking list also indicates that the tight financial situation of local governments increasingly overshadows most other concerns. The eight most pressing problems of German cities areas are, briefly: •

•

Budget consolidation and public management. Budget deficits as a consequence of an eroding tax base are the key concern of German cities. Burdened by the infrastructural legacies of affluent decades in the last century and new tasks assigned to them by federal policies and regulation in the field of social welfare (for example, accommodation of migrants and asylum seekers, provision of kindergartens) the municipalities have lost much of their former capability to influence and guide city development processes by public investment. Budgets for culture and leisure facilities are curtailed and the maintenance of public infrastructure (schools, roads, bridges, sewage system, etc.) is postponed. Some cities have even sold their loss-making public utilities to US groups, who use loopholes in the US tax system to reduce their income tax through losses made in Germany (Rügemer, 2004). In order to promote local flagship projects, seen to be essential for their image and attractiveness for investors and tourists, the municipalities undertake considerable efforts to lobby for support from EU, federal and state programmes and organise public–private partnerships. Given the budget constraints, the local governments tend to favour reactive than proactive public management styles. Simultaneously, local governments rationalise and streamline their administration by privatising functions and slimming down their planning and management departments following the paradigm of the ‘Neues Steuerungsmodell’ (NSM) which, in turn, has borrowed much from the international new public management model. The harsh urban competition in the country does not allow them to raise local taxes, such as property or business tax. However, reacting to the high long-distance mobility of employees in Germany, some cities have introduced second home taxes (for example, Potsdam and Witten) to tax dual job households (Kost, 2003). Structural change and employment. Structural change and the implications for employment and the local economy dominate political urban agendas. Unemployment figures are extremely high, particularly in cities where the industrial base is linked to traditional technologies, such as steel and chemical production. Local economic development agencies, supported by a large

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•

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number of European, federal and state programmes, aim at modernising the eroding local industrial base and developing new local knowledge and service economies. This is done with a spectrum of measures and initiatives to attract investment and to support local firms and enterprises, and to encourage local citizens to start their own businesses. In public–private partnerships, the cities develop technology parks linked to local universities, promote cluster formation in new technological fields (for example, IT, bio-technology), initiate start-up programmes or establish one stop agencies to make it easier for foreign investors to locate. In addition, the cities present their investment opportunities at international real estate fairs. Suburbanisation and population deline. Traditionally, more than 80 per cent of all Germans wish to have their own single detached house. Such aspirations have been generously supported by Federal German policies for more than half a century. Given the limits of affordable land within city boundaries, and pushed by high property values, social tensions in neighbourhoods and schools, families are prepared to move to the nearer or wider suburbs, depending on their ability to pay for land and mobility. Suburbanisation and population decline are the consequence with considerable implications for local taxes and for sustaining the provision of local social infrastructure. Small firms and back offices, supermarkets and shopping malls follow and locate at the edge of the core city. Although rather effective regional physical plans limit the development of agricultural land for new out-of-town residential developments, the suburban local governments do not hesitate to promote their own communal interests. The more households they attract, the more they consolidate their local budgets and the more they can maintain and improve their local facilities. The core cities, however, feel the negative implications for their local economy (Brake et al., 2001; Hutter et al., 2003). Inner city and retail development. Increasingly inner city retail outlets loose their traditional clientele to out-of-town shopping malls, factory outlets, e-shopping and an eroding purchasing power of the lower urban middle class. This is supported by changing values, the demise of traditional family businesses and the location strategies of a few international corporations dominating the market. Shop closures are the ultimate consequence. A vicious circle starts. Shopping streets in less attractive locations lose their appeal to residents and visitors. German cities try to steer against the tide with a plethora of actions such as mixed land use zoning, city managers, public–private contracts, cultural policies, design enhancement or with events aiming at attracting different target groups. The range of efforts, however, is limited by financial constraints, regulatory frameworks and changing life styles. Successful improvements in one centre soon have negative effects for others. For the municipalities there is no easy way out of this dilemma between globalisation and localisation. With city management, public space improvement, events, and considerable concessions to investors they try to stem against the erosion process and the vicious circle of urban decline.

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•

•

177

Local transport. There is a wide array of problems linked to mobility that worries all German cities at the beginning of the twenty-first century. They range from maintaining and improving the quality of public transport to the maintenance or even the extension of the urban road system in times of budget constraints. Other issues are policies to increase the use of public transport and bicycles in cities, the steadily growing urban freight transport, the politically desired privatisation of transport authorities, and measures to protect neighbourhoods and the natural environment from traffic caused noise and air pollution. Affordable housing and social segregation. For some time local governments in West Germany have been reducing their once central role in the local market for affordable housing. To some extent their housing associations have been successful in reducing the existing housing stock by selling apartments to middle-class tenants. However, the bulk of social housing is still under their management. They are facing considerable problems in the housing estates built in the 1960s and 1970s at the fringe of the cities. Mainly used to accommodate newly arriving migrants and asylum seekers from Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the Middle East and Northern Africa, these aesthetically unpleasing high rise housing estates have become neighbourhoods characterised by social disadvantage, pockets of unemployment, urban poverty and discrimination, with considerable implications for the quality of local schools and shops. As the number of German households on such estates is dramatically declining, this adds more burdens to housing management and to neighbourhood schools and kindergartens. Efforts to promote grassroots participation in managing and sustaining the neighbourhoods have only partially brought the expected results. In eastern Germany the housing situation is even worse. The cities – particularly small and medium-sized industrial cities such as Eisenhüttenstadt, Brandenburg or Schwedt – suffer from lack of local employment, population decline and unattractive prefabricated social housing estates. Citizens migrate to western Germany, to larger cities or strive to live in their own little suburban houses. As a consequence, whole housing blocks are falling empty: more than once they have had to be torn down to save the neighbourhood from further environmental deterioration. Even cities like Leipzig or Görlitz, where post-reunification programmes encouraged investors to buy and modernise attractive pre-war housing, search desperately for tenants. The total figure is alarming. There are estimates that up to a million apartments will have to be demolished in East Germany in the years to come. Now efforts are being undertaken to find appropriate and affordable solutions for the challenges ahead. City region cooperation and governance in city regions. All over Germany the tensions between the larger core cities and suburban communities are growing. Among the issues local governments in city regions debate are sharing costs for the provision of cultural facilities, out-of-town shopping malls, airport

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extensions and public transport management. On the hidden agenda, however, are the financial consequences of the fierce intra-regional competition for households and firms among local governments in the city region. Efforts to deal with compromise over such issues and develop new rules for cooperation. They are bottom-up in character, as there is no politically legitimised tier of planning and decision-making between local governments and the Land (although subregional spatial planning has a long and quite successful tradition in Germany). Some city regions (for example, Hanover, Stuttgart) have piloted in establishing new forms of cooperation within the city region. The Ruhr will soon follow with a new regional authority ‘Regionalverband Ruhr’ (RVR). Other city regions (Frankfurt, the city states of Hamburg and Bremen) are still searching for political compromises. Their problem is that the hinterland of the core cities reaches out to local governments in other federal states, rendering any constitutional change much more difficult. This is similarly true for cit state of Berlin, where a political project to merge the city state with its hinterland, the State of Brandenburg, has not found popular support. Urban development and marketing. Image and identity have become key concerns of German city managers and urban planners in times of globalisation and growing personal mobility. In an increasingly competitive environment, it has become essential to bind local residents and firms to a place emotionally, and to attract outside interest in the place by whatever measures, such as generous offers for investors, attractive media covered events or praising the better local quality of life. In their struggle to improve local image and to be on the mental map of opinion leaders and investors, more and more cities in Germany rely on urban marketing. They commission the task to marketing professionals, hoping that they can identify the strengths and weaknesses, as well as the opportunities and risks, of the city. On the basis of such research they develop strategies to strengthen local identity and to market the city to the outside world. The growing economic role of urban tourism supports such efforts.

There are a few other prominent local policy concerns, not explicity mentioned, which receive much media attention and concern planners as well as local politicians. They are added to this list of problem pressures as they round out the above picture: •

Social polarisation and spatial fragmentation. It is somewhat surprising that growing social disparities in cities and the resulting spatial fragmentation have not been articulated and included in the above list of major urban concerns. The local consequences of the overall demise of the welfare state and equity concerns, neglected system reforms and new social values in Germany are immense. The city regions are increasingly disintegrating into a patchwork of functional urban units, such as upper-class enclaves with high property values

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•

•

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and gentrified inner-city neighbourhoods and economically-deprived districts with a high immigrant population, above average unemployment rates, poorly performing schools and high criminality. While in the past such problems were usually addressed and countered by generously funded support policies, the cities and their social institutions are no longer able to cushion all the spatial implications of growing urban disparities (Sautter, 2001). However, compared to many other cities in western and southern Europe such as Paris, London, Rome or Naples, German cities are doing much better in this respect. Aging population. Low birth rates in Germany and strict immigration controls are causing a gradual aging of the society, with all its implications for urban infrastructure and housing policies. In many inner cities and smaller country towns schools have to be closed due to dwindling numbers of school-age children. The emerging four generation society poses new challenges to the cities. Brownfield redevelopment in old industrial regions. Once the engines of economic development, cities in old industrial regions such as Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen and Oberhausen in the Ruhr, or Hombruch in the Saar are still struggling with the territorial implications of technological and structural change. In these regions an abundance of centrally located brownfields is waiting for new investment. However, the absence of booming real estate markets, unattractive locations, high costs of site development and complex regulatory processes are serious constraints on their re-use. The cities focus all their policy efforts on such sites, develop new creative concepts, offer support from European, federal or state programmes and market the sites at property fairs in Nice, Barcelona or Munich. However, given the stagnating German economy and the unexpected strength of the European currency, there is little demand for new spaces for production and services at such comparatively less attractive locations. Efforts to use such brownfields for leisure and entertainment projects have had only limited success. Railway stations. In the 1990s the redevelopment of aging central railways stations, in public–private partnership, into modern inner-city logistic hubs with attractive shopping and entertainment functions (reflecting recreational shopping and ‘delaytainment’ paradigms) has received much interest from politicians and developers. A few such projects been implemented since (for example, Düsseldorf and Leipzig), others (for example, Stuttgart or Dortmund) have turned out to be too costly, or could not attract the interest and commitment of investors and bankers. Airport extension. As is the case all over Europe airport extension schemes in densely populated city regions meet considerable opposition from residents and environmental action groups. On one side, the international airports have become the biggest employers in the respective city regions and engines of economic development; on the other side, their impact on the environment and on transport infrastructure is considerable. While the new airport in the city region of Munich, now the second largest airport and international hub

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in Germany, seems to be less controversial, the airport extension schemes at Frankfurt, Düsseldorf or Berlin are faced with massive opposition, with many consequences for timely approval procedures and public investment. In all debates about city region cooperation, the controversial airport issues belong to the key issues. Sustainable development. Sustainability – a major concern of local governments in the last decade of the twenty-first century – has lost much of its appeal for citizens, since cities are being forced by budgetary constraints to confine themselves to those tasks which they are obliged to carry out by law. Since 1992 more than 2,000 municipalities in Germany have initiated Agenda 21 processes to raise awareness for sustainable development (DIFU, 1/2003, p. 16). These processes have involved many local citizen groups, educational institutions and charity organisations. In many cities they have led to the formulation of local environmental action plans and programmes for incremental implementation. The high degree of environmental awareness in Germany can certainly be traced back to the enthusiasm of the participants in such local agenda processes. With shrinking potentials of local governments to promote and implement resource conserving environmental measures, and the gradual disappearance of a generation of professional activists, citizen commitment seems to vanish.

Obviously, national urban policy has little direct influence on such local projects. However, as a regulatory institution, a key stakeholder for infrastructure development (for example, for railways and motorways) and the main provider of public funds for infrastructure, the Federal Government maintains a dominant role (Kunzmann, 1998). One brief account of the Berlin situation follows. In both West and East Germany, the city benefited from generous political and financial support. With the transfer of the capital function from Bonn to Berlin in 1993, both parts of the cities lost their exceptional status, on the assumption that the reunified city would flourish economically. However, such speculation was idle. Industrial production declined, banks and insurance companies did not move from their locations in Düsseldorf, Munich or Hamburg. Headquarters have not returned, local innovative entrepreneurialism remains weak. The property market stagnates. An oversized public administration absorbs most of the local budget. Now the city has and enormous financial problems. Obviously, the process to reunite the city physically, economically and mentally takes more time than expected (Kunzmann, 2004). 9.4

National (and State) Urban Policies from the Mid-1990s

Given the constitutional structure of Germany, there is no articulated single comprehensive urban policy of the Federal Government in Berlin. However,

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there have been various elements of such a national policy with very clear aims addressing significant problems of urban development in the country. The most significant policies and programmes are briefly described hereafter. In 1996 the concern about growing intra-urban disparities caused the Federal Government, in close cooperation with the 16 Länder, to launch a programme ‘Die Soziale Stadt’ (‘The Socially Integrative City’). The programme aimed at introducing an innovative approach to urban renewal policy. It was designed to pool resources (policies in the field of employment, economy, ecology, social affairs, youth, culture and urban development) to foster cooperation among all the institutions and stakeholders concerned and to mobilise the residents and shopowners of such neighbourhoods. The ambitious and challenging programme, officially launched in 1999, follows conceptual ideas of strengthening the civil society and the integration of migrants and socially disadvantaged groups of the society. The idea was to provide a new impetus for self-sustained community development and to demonstrate that a new, less formalistic, perception of policy and administration for decentralised district management is required to cope with the problems encountered in socially disadvantaged communities (DIFU, 2002). Originally, a total of 161 urban districts in 123 larger and smaller municipalities were nominated by the Länder to receive financial support under this four year (1999–2003) programme. During 2001 an additional 88 urban districts in then altogether 184 municipalities were selected. €300 million were provided annually (€100 million by the Federal Government) to support the cities in their efforts to socially stabilise neighbourhoods and to improve the living conditions of their multi-ethnic residents. In addition, each Land had chosen one model district to get particular on-site support for integrated and more comprehensive action. The German Institute of Urban Affairs (DIFU) coordinated the programme, linked the participating municipalities, furnished ideas and inspiration and disseminated information among the participants and to the general public. The funds were mainly used for physical improvements, for the provision of social infrastructure, to boost civic awareness, and to contract planners and social workers to assist the municipalities. The aims of the programme were to: • •

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develop comprehensive spatial strategies for such neighbourhoods with reference to city wide development perspectives; motivate residents, shop owners and other local residents and institutions to take an active role in neighbourhood development and foster self-sustaining community structures; support the municipalities in their efforts to establish sustainable local organisation and management structures; design the programme as open processes and mutual learning experience; learn how to integrate various budget lines for spatially integrated action.

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Mainly three types of urban districts qualified for the programme: i) huge densely populated (and usually badly managed) housing estates of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s on the outskirts of the city with a concentration of low income households, migrants as well as a high degree of unemployment and vandalism; ii) run-down late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century urban quarters on the fringe of the inner city; and iii) former military barracks and compounds in city regions abandoned as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. The main spatial targets and beneficiaries of this programme were urban agglomerations with a concentration of ‘disadvantaged urban districts with special development needs’, such as Berlin, Bremen, as well as the RhineRuhr, RhineMain and Saar conurbations. The programme had found much political attention and media interest. It has unquestionably raised public awareness of disadvantaged communities. More importantly, however, local governments have gained considerable experience from all the projects supported under the programme. They have learnt how to address the problems in such urban quarters more effectively. The innovative approaches of the city state of Berlin to strengthen neighbourhood participation by assigning limited budgets to designated areas have found particular interest and are already copied elsewhere. Some criticism has been articulated concerning the negative branding of the selected neighbourhoods, which unavoidably comes along with increased media coverage in local newspapers. In 2003 the first phase of the successful programme came to an end. At present the second phase is under implementation, complemented by a new twin programme, ‘Umbau Ost’ und ‘Umbau West’. The eight year Programme Umbau Ost (Urban Renewal East) started in 2002. It aims at promoting sustainable urban development and attaining a balanced housing market in East German cities. The starting point for the programme is the fact that economic and demographic decline in East Germany is causing considerable problems to regional housing markets. Due to the lack of local demand, more and more rental apartments in East German housing estates are unoccupied, Cottbus, for example, will lose 16,000 of its 102,000 inhabitants in the period to 2015. It is estmated that around 1.1 million apartments in East German cities are unoccupied. The ambitious and comprehensive programme Umbau Ost now aims at promoting private house-ownership, modernising the existing housing stock, where location and housing quality render it feasible, and at demolishing a considerable number of prefabricated socialist apartment blocks, where the housing market is not any longer functioning properly. The revitalisation of inner cities is the focus and the development of new housing at the city fringe is being discouraged. Various calculations about the over-supply of housing in East Germany varied from between 250,000 to over a million up to the year 2030. Under the programme, and benefiting from experience of the programme ‘Soziale Stadt’, a bundle of measures will be financed, reaching from contributions to credit schemes, to strategic plans for slimming down whole towns or urban districts. Beneficiaries of the programme are local governments and

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public or private housing corporations. €2.7 billion will be provided by the federal and state governments during 2002 and 2008, 46 per cent for demolition, and 54 per cent for renovation and neighbourhood improvement measures. Insiders argue that the calculated costs are insufficient, as they neglect the immense costs for adapting the respective local physical and social infrastructure (BBR, 2003a, 2003b, 2003d). The programme Umbau West (Urban Renewal West) was initiated in the same year to address the spatial consequences of demographic and economic decline in selected West German cities. So far, 11 cities have been selected as pilot schemes under this programme, with among others Bremen, Wilhelmshaven, Pirmasens, Völklingen, Salzgitter or Oer-Erkenschwick. The participating cities show similar symptoms of urban economic decline caused by the gradual erosion of the local economic base (steel production, ship-building, coal mining, etc.). Consequently, the programme encourages cities to develop ideas and pragmatic approaches for slimming down ‘with grace’, to explore how this could be done in a proactive way and how it could be communicated to politicians, local stakeholders, residents and the media. Slimming-down is thereby seen as a chance for the future, not as an unavoidable burden. The terms for the 11 cities include deliberations to adapt and alter the legal framework of urban planning and the nature of promotional instruments. It is all about changing the rationale of urban planning from guiding investment under growth conditions, to conditions where built-up urban territories have to be adapted to gradual decline. The measures foreseen in the programme, called Impulsprojekte (impulse projects) include the demolition of un-occupied housing estates built in the 1960s, the improvement of open space in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the re-use of derelict industrial buildings and measures to support the reinforcement of retail activities in inner cities. On its hidden political agenda, the initiative also aims at ‘pacifying’ envious local governments in West Germany clearly suffering from the immense transfer payments to the East (MSWKS, 2004). During the 1990s a few other new urban policy initiatives under the traditional ExWoSt Forschungsfelder (research arenas of a clear exploratory and illustrative nature) and urban com-petitions were initiated by the Federal Government. They aim to demonstrate how local governments could cope with anticipated urban development problems. Given the constitutional context in Germany, it is their demonstrative character which allows the Federal Government to launch such policy initiatives. Seven such research arenas were still ongoing in 2004, 19 other arenas initiated during the 1990s had already ended. The more significant programmes are briefly described hereafter. One set of such programmes is labelled ‘Demonstration Projects of Spatial Planning’. These programmes at promoting and strengthening the urban region as an action platform for efficient spatial development. The programme Städtenetze (City Networks) was one of these initiatives. It encouraged local governments in an urban region to cooperate and to join forces for more efficient urban development. Thereby the participating cities in the network had to agree on intercommunal

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projects and measures. The action areas of the urban network programme were marketing and public relations, economic support, education, town expansion and land management, and transportation and tourism. Twelve such networks were supported during 1997 and 2000, among others MAI (München Augsburg Ingolstadt), ANKE at the German-Dutch Border or the EXPO Region Hanover. The urban network EXPO Region was particularly successful. It was established in 1995 by cities in a second ‘ring’ around Hanover, the city hosting the World Exhibition 2000, to concert their local policies towards a common urban region development strategy. The programme had met the expectations of its founding fathers. It introduced the concept of city networks. And, as the participating networks have felt the need for follow-up activities even after the federal funding under the programme has come to an end, they organised a Forum Urban Networks to serve as a permanent agent of communication and information exchange (BBR, 2000b). A second initiative with a similar mission is Regionen der Zukunft (Regions of the Future), a competition launched in 1997. The regions participating in the competition were requested to devise innovate approaches for future-oriented sustainable spatial development. They differed considerably in size and ambition. A few large metropolitan regions such as Hamburg, Stuttgart and RheinMain (Frankfurt) were selected for this competition, as well as smaller rural regions in the states of Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Brandenburg. The projects which served as exemplary catalysts to ‘learn’ intraregional cooperation were in the field of land use-transport relationship, energy flows, the promotion of environmentally friendly businesses or the protection of open space. First measures under the regional cooperation programme were implemented in the year 2000. At the occasion of the URBAN 21 Conference in Berlin, the best regions were selected and presented. A small follow-up project during 2001/2003 supported eight so-called ‘Modellregionen’ (model regions), to develop replicable strategies for sustainable development. These regions were coached in their efforts by academic advisors. Städte der Zukunft (Cities of the Future) was an ExWoSt Programme (1996– 2003) to elaborate and test a set of practice oriented quantitative and qualitative indicators for measuring the success of sustainable urban development. So-called Impulsprojekte (impulse projects) were initiated in four cities (Heidelberg and Münster in West, and Dessau and Güstrow in East Germany). A comprehensive catalogue of urban development strategies, such as ‘re-use of derelict urban land’, ‘improvement of attractiveness for pedestrians’ and ‘promotion of selfhelp activities in urban neighbourhoods’ were the basis for the identification and application of 24 indicators in the selected model cities. As a result of this exercise, all cities in Germany have been advised to base the assessment of their urban development policies on these 24 indicators. A few other, still ongoing, thematic ExWoSt arenas should be mentioned:

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3stadt2 is a small ExWoSt programme, which explores new forms of cooperation between citizens, investors and the public sector. Following the paradigm of public–private partnership, the programme, launched in 2001, supports quite different projects in five German cities, which aim to increase the efficiency of cooperation among the three partners. Öffentlicher Raum (public space) was a programme (2002–2005), which aimed at the promotion of public space in cities as an essential element of urban quality. The participating seven cities focus on integrated management of public spaces. Stadtentwicklung und Verkehr (urban development and transport). A number of cities experimented during 2000–2003 with replicable mobility management concepts to better integrate land use and (public) transport development. The ExWoSt arena Gender Mainstreaming und Städtebau (gender mainstreaming and urban development) is under implementation. It aims at exploring how gender issues can be better dealt with in urban development. The first pilot projects were selected at the beginning of 2004. The cities of Pulheim, Dessau and Bremen have been selected as model cities.

All these policy arenas are being launched to raise awareness of already felt or anticipated urban issues in Germany. Given the federal system in the country and the suspicious monitoring of the Länder governments, these policy arenas are predominantly persuasive policies. City governments participate with much enthusiasm and local commitment in the programmes. It gives them a chance to test new approaches, communicate their experience with others, raise awareness among residents, local stakeholders and the media and demonstrate to local politicians that more future-oriented approaches to address local problems make sense. Another argument, of course, is that they get some financial support for paying the extra costs of such experimental approaches and external advisory services. One more urban policy programme should be mentioned, although it was not initiated by the Bundesministerium for Verkehr, Bauen und Wohnen (Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing). Under a special budget line of the Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft (Federal Ministry of Education and Research Government) the programme Stadt 2030 (City 2030) was supported from 2001 until 2003. It aimed at envisioning future city development by encouraging local governments to invest in positive city visions for the year 2030. Out of more than 100 applications, 21 cities or city networks were finally selected to participate in this very short, though intensive and generously funded, applied research programme. Local governments were required to cooperate with advisory groups from university planning schools to develop replicable approaches for preparing cities for future challenges. The promotion of a permanent dialogue between practice and scientific community was one of the key goals of the ambitious initiative. Three categories of projects emerged under this programme: first, the need for approaches to better intercommunal cooperation in city regions

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was the concern of municipalities which are located in densely populated urban regions; second, social polarisation and spatial fragmentation was the theme of a second set of municipalities. A third set of municipalities focused their activities on strengthening image and local identity in times of globalisation and structural change. One of the projects addressed problems of inter-city cooperation in the Ruhr. During the two year programme, eight municipalities developed a multitude of ideas to join forces for more efficient land-use development, involving local governments, citizens and universities. The programme is by far the largest urban policy research initiative in the history of post-war Germany. It came to an end in the autumn of 2003. The DIFU (German Institute for Urban Affairs) published a concluding assessment report of the programme with recommendations for future urban development in Germany. The longer-term effects of this programme have still to be seen. In addition to the programmes launched at the national level, most states in Germany have their own urban policy agenda. Traditionally, North RhineWestphalia – the largest and most densely populated state in Germany, with a population of 18 million – pursues a broad range of policies to assist local governments in urban development and redevelopment. One programme, an initiative to promote inner city development colloquially labelled Ab in die Mitte (Off to the City) was particularly successful in encouraging local governments to participate (MSWKS, 2003). This programme – a joint effort of the Ministry of Planning and Housing, the participating municipalities and two large private department stores – was launched in 1999 first as a pilot programme in 10 cities in the state. Subsequently, the programme was carried out on an annual basis. Municipalities affected by economic decline and the competition of out-of-town malls, that wished to revitalise their city centres or subcentres by strengthening local identities or/and cultural profiling, could submit their proposals to the annual competition. If successful, they received support for the activities they had proposed. Between 1999 and 2003 112 projects were selected from 296 applications. As a matter of principle, the proposed local initiates had to demonstrate public–private partnerships by combining physical, cultural and economic elements of urban regeneration. The programme was very successful both in terms of raising matching funds from the private sector, mobilising local stakeholders and in attracting popular and media interest. Most cities reported positive local impacts. Meanwhile, the concept has engaged the interest of other German states. The states of Hesse and Lower Saxony launched quite similar programmes. Given the dense urban system of the state, it is not surprising that the state of Baden-Württemberg is running successful programmes to support urban development in small and medium-sized cities. Two other projects are worth mentioning. In 2001 the parliament of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia established a Kommission Zukunft der Stadt (Commission Future of the City) to explore the future of the city in the state. The comprehensive outcome of this initiative was published. It contains a long list of recommendations for future urban development in the state responding

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to all the problems identified during the three years exercise (Landtag NRW, 2004). StadtBauKultur is another programme, initiated by the state government together with a wide array of public, semi-public and private institutions such as the Chambers of Architects and Engineers, the Chambers of Trade and Industry, the Local Governments Association, various Housing Associations and the Association of Artists. One of their successful projects explored the future of shopping centres in the city (StadtBauKultur NRW, 2003). Three state-regulated financial instruments, however, must be added to this list of significant urban programmes to give a full picture of urban policies in Germany. These are financial instruments with considerable impact on urban development in the country, the Eigenheimzulage, the Pendlerpauschale and the Gewerbesteuer. The Eigenheimzulage (property benefit), a generous ideology-laden subsidy for home-owners, aims at promoting home ownership, which, by international standards, is still low. Some argue that this subsidy, which encourages middle-class households to build a single detached house or to buy a new apartment rather than renting one, has considerable influence on suburbanisation, urban sprawl and land consumption. The Pendlerpauschale (a commuter flat rate per km) is given to households to reach their work from their home. It compensates commuters for the additional costs they have to bear when working outside their local neighbourhood. The rate (which can be deducted from the income tax) favours the use of the car as against the use of public transport and tends to promote suburbanisation. The longer the commuting distance, the more additional costs a household can deduct from their tax demands. The Gewerbesteuer (industrial tax) is a major source of income for local governments. The tax has to be paid by local firms in the production sector and, since 2004, even by service sector firms and liberal professions such as architects and law firms, depending on the approval of the Bundesrat. The local government is free to set the rate, which has become a much disputed factor in intercommunal competition. The tax is mainly paid by small and medium-sized firms, while many larger international corporations (for example, BMW in Munich), facilitated by international accounting regulations, manage to evade paying this local tax. Understandaby, all three instruments are very sensitive political issues. Whenever the federal government tries to change or even to abolish them, as has frequently been the case in recent years, interest groups and potential beneficiaries oppose any change at their costs. 9.5

Impact of European Policies on German Cities

Obviously, in one way or the other all European policies have considerable direct and indirect impacts on German cities. Competitiveness as against North America

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and Asia has been the overriding goal of the European project over the last few decades. The creation of a single European market, as well as the extension of the European Union to the East, were therefore considered to be the two most significant policy components to achieving this goal. Consequently, most European sector as well as regional, and to certain extent urban policies, aim to strengthen Europe’s economy by promoting the competitiveness of cities and city regions. Due to the fact that the majority of target groups and beneficiaries of European policies (with the exception of agricultural policies) are concentrated in densely-populated territories, this clearly further supports the concentration of innovative and future-oriented activities in metropolitan regions all over Europe, a trend which is caused anyway by globalisation and structural change. The Federal Government is very much aware of such consequences and implications. Therefore, in 1996, it agreed early with the German Länder to define a small number of Europäische Metropolregionen (European metropolitan regions). With the exception of the city regions of Hanover and Nuremberg all larger German city regions have got the new label (MURL, 1997). However, apart from communicating this new label, not much has happened since, though the policy of creating equal living conditions in Germany, as postulated in the German Raumordnungsgesetz (spatial planning law), is gradually losing policy support. German municipalities benefit in different ways from European policies. Due to the designation of all five East German states as Objective 1 regions, the cities in that part of Germany can and do apply for considerable financial support under the respective EU programmes (URBAN, INTERREG, etc). Cities in the Ruhr and in the Saar, in turn, benefit much from the Objective 2 status of their regions. They received considerable support in their efforts to revitalise the industrial region. A number of projects of the Internationale Bauausstellung Emscher Park, the very innovative 10 year initiative (1989–99) in the Ruhr was supported by contributions from the European Regional Fund. Similarly, the conservation of the World Heritage Foundry in Völklingen, Saar, was made possible by considerable EU contributions. A number of German cities applied successfully for support from the EU EFRE and ESF Funds under the URBAN I and II initiatives. During 1994–1999 12 cities (including nine from East Germany) used the EU cofinancing (€110 million) for neighbourhood improvement projects. 12 other cities (including seven in West Germany) were selected under the second programme 2000 to 2006 to receive a total of €148.7 million. The terms of the EU required the cities to develop integrated innovative approaches to urban improvement (such as the promotion of entrepreneurial spirit, creation of jobs, design of public space, improvement of cultural, tourist, social and leisure facilities, as well as measures of social integration and interethnic communication). Hence the projects developed high profiles and public attendance at their respective locations. Clearly, without the EU ‘stick and carrot’ approach, most projects would not have taken off, or at least they would not have attracted so much political approval. Even

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after the funding periods come to an end, a private sector supported DeutschOesterreichisches URBAN Netzwerk will continue to link the participating cities and disseminate replicable experience to other German cities, and thus perfectly meet the communication of best practice criteria of the EU Programme. Similarly many municipalities, mainly those in border regions, benefited from the INTERREG programmes. Twenty-seven such border regions are formally institutionalised in Germany. During 1996–99, INTERREG II A and C supported joint development initiatives in border regions and transnational cooperation. Under the III A and B programmes which were launched by the European Commission for 2000 to 2006, Germany qualified for four of the five cross-border regional development programmes, two were targeted to German–Polish development projects, one each to a German-Dutch border and a German–Austrian–Swiss border region, and one to the larger Alpine region. Under the programme, Germany received €737 million. The financial contributions of the INTERREG programmes were additional to the funds already made available under the established Regional and Social Funds of the European Union. Finally, the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) has to be mentioned in this context. In contrast to other countries of the European Union, the ESDP received comparatively little praise in Germany. This is partially due to the fact that German regional and spatial plans and development programmes already pursued most of the principles laid down in the ESDP, such as polycentric development or sustainable transport. It also reflects the low political support spatial planning receives in Germany in times of economic stagnation. Nevertheless, the ESDP is used as a supportive reference in documents targeting spatial development issues in the country. In addition, though more indirectly, the ESDP is challenging planners at federal and regional tiers to think about less routine-based approaches to spatial development strategies. 9.6

Overall Assessment

Over the last decade, following mainstream economic and social developments in the country and forced by a significant decline of public sector finance, the nature and the emphasis of urban policies in Germany have gradually changed. What are the main changes and how do they affect the municipalities? First, the emphasis on environmental aspects of urban development has gradually been shifted to social concerns. This reflects both the increase of social problems in German cities caused by structural employment and the erosion of the welfare state. However, though environmental concerns are no longer the dominant local policy field, they are still pertinent in day-to-day planning and development decisions. Second, local development and the management of public facilities and utilities relies increasingly on local public–private partnerships, focusing on economically

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profitable or culturally important flagship projects. Though such partnership usually speed up planning and decision-making processes, they tend to neglect social and environmental concerns. Third, the erosion of public budgets, force the Federal Government to change from nationwide to competitive promotional programmes. Even those cities in the east of Germany no longer automatically qualify for financial support under federal programmes, but have to compete with other cities for selection under a particular programme. Cities which manage to forward qualified innovative proposals in particular are benefiting from the new policy environment. To a certain extent, it is a policy environment for winners than for losers, though the losers can still reckon with political sympathy and cushioning support. Fourth, social dimensions of urban development increasingly burden local governments in Germany. While in the past social disparities in German cities were often cushioned and hidden from view by a comparatively generous and well balanced federal welfare programme, there is much evidence that the future will be different. Urban disparities have started to grow and will be visible. Consequently, social segregation and social tensions will grow in cities. The face of the much acclaimed cosmopolitan European city will remain an asset of architecturally attractive gentrified inner cities and knowledge districts, while the losing districts of German cities will experience growing social tensions. Fifth, though embedded in the established institutional multi-tier system, with its traditional counter-current principle of planning and decision-making, more and more municipalities initiate their own intercommunal cooperation within the urban region. This is done to overcome the gridlocked constitutional and administrative conditions in the undefined realm between established local and state legitimacy. Sitting together and negotiating contracts to address selected city region problems has become a more common routine among local governments. For some time in the future Germany will have to cope with the spatial, economic and social implications of reunification. Models of how to address the problems are available: their application, however, is made difficult by constitutional insufficiencies, the lack of locally available funds and qualified and committed personnel, changing values of the society and a media-dominated political environment. The extension of the European Union to the East will not make easier for Germany to cope with its growing problems in both metropolitan regions and peripheral municipalities. Even the entry of the Eastern European states to the European Union does not raise much concern for their likely impact on cities in the country. However, given all the fundamental debates about the need for a new definition of the German welfare state, the European dimension of urban policies does not (yet) raise much interest in the country. The likely consequences of the ongoing reform of the post-war welfare state for cities and city regions in Germany are still underrated. The future will be different.

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References BBR (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) (eds) (2000a), Raumordnungsbericht 2000, Berichte, Band 7, Bonn. BBR (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) (eds) (2000b), Regionen der ZukunftAufgaben der Zukunft, Werkstatt: Praxis No. 3/2001, Bonn. BBR (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung/Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning) (eds) (2001), Spatial Development and Spatial Planning in Germany, Bonn. BBR (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) (eds) (2000), Urban Development and Urban Policy in Germany, An Overview, Berichte Band 6, Bonn. BBR (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) (eds) (2000), Stadtentwicklung und Städtebau in Deutschland. Ein Überblick, Bonn. BBR (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) (eds) (2003a), Stadtumbau Ost. Dokumenation, Bonn. BBR (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) (eds) (2003b), Stadtumbau West. Programm und Pilotststädte, Bonn. BBR (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) (eds) (2003c), Stadtumbau. Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, Heft 10/11.2003, Bonn. BBR (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) (eds) (2003d), 3satdt2, ExWostInformationen 24/, Bonn. BMBau (Bundesministerium für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau) (1996), Human Settlements Development and Policy. National Report Germany, HABITAT II, Bonn. Brake, K., Dangschat, J.S. and Herfert, G. (eds) (2001), Suburbanisierung in Deutschland: Aktuelle Tendenzen, Leske+ Budrich: Opladen. Das Parlament (2003), Zukunft der Städte, No. 37, 8 September. Der Spiegel (2004), ‘1250 Milliarden Euro Wofür? Wie aus dem Aufbau Ost der Absturz West wurde’, No. 15/05, May. DIFU (Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik) (2002), The Federal-Länder Programme ‘The Socially Integrative City’– Integrated Urban Renewal Policy, . DIFU (2002b), ‘Probleme der Stadtentwicklung und Kommunalpolitik’, Berichte 02/2002, 28. DIFU (2003), ‘Lokale Agenda und nachhaltige Kommunalentwicklungh’, Berichte 01/03, 16. Hutter, G., Iwanow, I. and Müller, B. (eds) (2003), ‘Demographischer Wandel und Strategien der Bestandsentwicklung in Städten und Regionen’, IÖR Schriften, Band 41, Dresden. Kost, A. and Wehling, H.-G. (eds) (2003), Kommunalpolitik in den deutschen Ländern, Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag. Kunzmann, K.R. (1998), ‘Germany’, in L. van den Berg, E. Braun and J. van der Meer (eds), National Urban Policies in the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 132–59. Kunzmann, K.R. (2004), Und der Sieger heißt (noch), Bonn: DISP 156, pp. 88–97. Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen (eds) (2004), ‘Zukunft der Städte’, Bericht der Enquetekommission des Landtags von Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf. MSWKS (Ministerium für Städtebau und Wohnen, Kultur und Sport des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen) (eds) (2000), Ab in die Mitte! Die City Offensive NRW, Düsseldorf.

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MSWKS (Ministerium für Städtebau und Wohnen, Kultur und Sport des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen) (eds) (2004), Stadtumbau West. Intelligentes Schrumpfen, Düsseldorf. MURL (Ministerium für Umwelt, Raumordnung und Landwiretschaft des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen) (eds) (1997), European Metropolitan Areas in Germany. Rügemer, W. (2004), Cross Border Leasing. Ein Lehrstück zur globaölen Enteignung, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot. Sauter, M. (2001), ‘Verstetigung aber wie? Integrierte Stadtteilentwicklung zwischen Sonderprojekt und Regelaufgabe der kommunalen Verwaltungen’, in Arbeitskreis Stadterneuerung (eds), Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung 2001, Berlin, pp. 109–19.

Chapter 10

National Urban Policy in Greece Dimitris Economou, George Petrakos and Yannis Psycharis1

10.1

The Urban System in Greece

Greece is characterised by significant spatial peculiarities and initial conditions that have affected its urban structure and make it a rather untypical case of an EU country. First, being at the southeastern end of the European economic space, Greece faces all the constraints and limitations arising by its peripheral position and the limited accessibility to major European economic agglomerations and markets. Second, it is characterised by unique ‘border conditions’, as it has no common borders with any other EU country. In addition, although the country has common borders with four non-EU members (Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria and Turkey), a number of historical and geopolitical factors prevented the development of economic (or any other) relations with these neighbours until recently. As a result, for a significant period in its modern history, the country has been without the most natural type of economic relations (with neighbouring countries of similar development level), being restricted to relations with distant and usually more advanced partners only. This ‘missing neighbours’ effect has certainly had adverse effects on the structure and the orientation of the economy (Petrakos and Pitelis, 2001) and to a certain extent on its spatial regularities. Third, Greece is characterised by a highly fragmented physical and economic space, due to the existence of hundreds of inhabited islands and the limitations imposed by its mountainous territory. This fragmentation increases transportation and accessibility costs, requires huge investments in infrastructure that for many decades were not available and inhibit the internal integration of the economy. Limited accessibility to internal and significant external markets has generated over time a productive structure dominated by small inward looking firms serving local markets and having limited capacity to adapt in size and technology in order to compete in national or international markets. Greece has the highest share of self-employed in the economy, the highest ratio of small and micro firms and perhaps the larger informal sector among all EU-15 countries. As a result, a 1

University of Thessaly.

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relatively low level of development in the EU-15 context and a weak production structure characterise the economy. Greece is the country with the lowest GDP per capita, a continuously declining industrial share in GDP (the lowest in the EU-15) and a productive base characterised by traditional sectors and low capital and technology intensity. These conditions have facilitated the development of a large and highly centralised public sector, which in the last decades has had a central task to absorb labour force, often through a clientele system, in order to reduce the employment deficit of the private sector. External and internal economic asymmetries are closely coupled by internal ones at the urban and regional level, as the country has one of the most concentrated urban structures in Europe. As it can be seen in Tables 10.1 and 10.2, the metropolitan region of Athens is the only urban area with a population of over a million, which constitutes about 50 per cent of the urban population of the country. The metropolitan region of Thessaloniki is the only urban area in the second size class, hosting about 12 per cent of the urban population. There are no cities in the third size class (200,000–500,000), while there are only four cities with population in the fourth size class (100,000–200,000), making up about 9 per cent of the urban population. There are five more cities with population in the fifth size class (50,000–100,000), while the rest of the cities considered as urban areas (72 in total) have a small or very small size and account for about 20 per cent of the urban population. As a result, in 2001 the two largest cities accounted for about 60 per cent of the urban population in Greece, while the 11 largest cities account for about 80 per cent of the urban population. Over time, this distribution has become more concentrated, favouring the larger cities. Table 10.1 Number of cities with population over 10,000 people by size class Cities Over 1,000,000 500,000–1,000,000 200,000–500,000 100,000–200,000 50,000–100,000 20,000–50,000 10,000–20,000 Total

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

1 0 1 1 3 25 25 56

1 1 0 1 4 27 23 57

1 1 0 4 2 32 23 63

1 1 0 4 7 29 29 71

1 1 0 4 11 35 37 83

The size of the two metropolitan regions has been shaped by strong internal migration flows in the post-war period that transferred population from the rural areas and the small cities primarily to Athens, but also to Thessaloniki. As Table 10.3 shows, Athens increased its population by 37 per cent in the 1960s

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195

Table 10.2 Distribution of urban population by size class Cities Over 1,000,000 500,000–1,000,000 200,000–500,000 100,000–200,000 50,000–100,000 20,000–50,000 10,000–20,000 Total

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

50.6 0.0 10.4 2.84 5.65 20.51 10.0 100.0

54.27 11.9 0.0 2.58 6.39 17.59 7.27 100.0

53.29 12.43 0.0 8.37 2.09 18.09 5.73 100.0

50.73 12.37 0.0 8.69 6.56 15.03 6.62 100.0

47.66 11.93 0.0 8.82 10.24 13.56 7.79 100.0

and 19 per cent in the 1970s, to slow down in the 1980s and the 1990s, as urban area growth rates have been lower than both the urban areas average and the national average. However, this reduction in growth rates was not an indication of deconcentration, but rather an indication of internal structural change that transformed Athens to a multi-polar metropolis through urban sprawl (Petrakos et al., 2003). This can be verified by the high rate of population growth around the metropolitan area limits (second line in Table 10.3), which was about or more than 30 per cent in the 1980s and the 1990s. Similar trends are also observed in the growth of Thessaloniki and its surrounding areas. Table 10.3 Urban population growth Cities Athens metropolitan area Rest of Attica Region Thessaloniki metropolitan area Rest of Thessaloniki Region Urban population (over 10,000) Total population of Gr eece

1961–71

1971–81

37.11 28.98 46.42 5.55 27.42 4.53

19.17 24.75 26.7 – 0.92 19.9 11.08

1981–91 1991–2001 1.51 34.88 6.07 26.7 5.04 5.33

3.22 30.18 6.05 36.47 7.5 6.86

As a result, the Greek system of urban places is characterised by a high and persistent degree of concentration and a serious deficit in medium sized cities (Petrakos et al 1999). Official statistics on the population of the metropolitan areas are considered to be an underestimation of the actual population for reasons related to the large numbers of largely unregistered and illegal immigrants from the Balkan and Eastern Europe (estimated to be close to 1 million in total) and to inherent deficiencies of the census methods (see below).

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196

Turning to welfare indicators, we must say that, unfortunately, there are no GDP or income statistics at the urban level in Greece. Therefore, the assessment of the degree of economic inequality along the urban hierarchy can only be done indirectly with the use of regional (NUTS III) statistics. Regional GDP per capita data indicate that inequalities in Greece are limited compared to other EU countries. However, there are fundamental problems with these statistics that systematically undervalue the position of Athens (Petrakos and Saratsis, 2000). First, we should keep in mind that GDP per capita should be used with caution as a measure of inequality in Greece, as a large number of activities located in one region produce incomes for another. This is the case with Attica (the Athens region), which has exported a significant part of its industrial activities to neighbouring regions in an effort to cope with restrictions based on environmental considerations or to take advantage of investment incentives that are not available in Attica. As a result, while there is no doubt that Attica is the most developed region in the country: regional GDP per capita statistics rank it in the fifth place. If one uses more advanced measures of inequality based on a combination of income, welfare and development indicators, inequalities are much more serious and show no sign of decline in the last 20 years (Petrakos and Psycharis, 2003). Overall, we could claim that asymmetries have been consolidated if not increased in the last decade under the influence of agglomeration economies, structural change and tertiarisation of the economy, a minimum critical scale (threshold) of activities acquired only by the metropolitan regions of Athens and Thessaloniki and the lack of basic infrastructure in the periphery. All these factors operate in a rather cumulative way, largely offsetting local initiatives or the impact of regional policies. 10.2

Summary of the National Urban Policies until the Mid-1990s

Over the whole post-war period there has been in Greece an essentially identical urban policy model. With its roots in the pre-war period, this model was already crystallised in the mid 1960s in Athens, diffused over the rest of the country in the following decades and, for the most part, it still prevails nowadays, despite some new developments. The main features of this policy are: • • • •

the consistent support for small land property; the high plot coefficients2 and the small minimum size of plots allowed to be built, both inside and outside town boundaries; the role of illegal construction as the basic mechanism of urban development; the negligible public expenditure for urban infrastructure; 2

Ratio of the total permitted floor area of the building to the site area.

Greece

• •

197

the subordination of urban policy to the priorities of other policies; the weakness of urban planning.

Comprehension of the intricacies of Greek urban policy is difficult without taking into account the structural characteristics of landed property. First, the very pronounced fragmentation of the land, with an average size of urban plots of around 180m2 in Athens and even less in other cities (Antonopoulou, 1994). Second, its diffusion: not only is the rate of owner occupation around 70 per cent – one of the highest in Europe – but it also concerns the whole of the social spectrum. In addition, more than 80 per cent of the households are owners of at least one and usually more plots of land (Maloutas, 2000; Economou, 1993a). These characteristics, which seet Greece apart from other European countries, are the result of a long-standing land policy, formulated in the nineteenth century. In the post-war period this pattern of landownership structure imposed, through electoral pressure and the clientelistic character of Greek political system, the unfailing support for the small landed property, which became the more crucial element of urban policy (Economou, 1993a). From a technical point of view this support took the form of the continuous, up to the 1980s, rise of the plot coefficients (with increases by a factor of 4 or 5 not being unusual) as well as the setting of very small minimum acceptable sizes of plots where building is permitted (often below 50m2). Taken together, these regulations made possible the building or reconstruction of a great percentage of the urban plots, after the demolition, if necessary, of the pre-existing smaller older edifices (with a collateral damage being the destruction of most of the historical centres of the Greek cities). In the same time, the state consistently refrained from appropriating – for instance, through fiscal policy or betterment levies – a part of the land surplus values created by the intense post-war urbanisation and urban growth (as a matter of fact, land values increased during this period much more than the consumer prices). Moreover, the state deliberately discouraged the concentration of capital in the construction industry (for instance, through the severe limitation of housing credits). As a consequence, the construction capital remained small, and this led to a symbiotic relationship with the small landed property, exemplified in the form of ‘antiparochi’. This is a specifically Greek scheme of informal (and not-taxable) partnership between landowners and builders, through which the majority of the post-war constructions were created (Economou, 1990). The second fundamental feature of the post-war urban policy is the central role of illegal construction. Unauthorised construction is not, to be sure, an exclusively Greek phenomenon.3 However, its scope in Greece is substantially greater than in other South-European countries, both from a quantitative point of view and because unauthorised construction represents a vital component of 3

Besides the well-known Third World Cases, it is present in many Mediterranean regions (Leontidou, 1994).

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the urbanisation process. The proportion of unauthorised construction in the total dwelling output was between 25–35 per cent in the post-war period up to the end of 1990s. The state either tolerated or indirectly encouraged this phenomenon, with successive legalisations of the unauthorised buildings. Moreover, the almost exclusive criterion for the (substantial) extensions of the town boundaries in the post-war period was the inclusion in the town plan of already built-up illegal settlements in the peri-urban areas (MEPPW, 1995, p. 12). These two practices together resulted in the conversion of the sequence ‘illegal construction A expost legalisation of the buildings A incorporation of the area in the town plan’ into the major mechanism of determination of the pace of the urban growth (Economou, 1997). The above feature, in common with that previously mentioned, had deeprooted social causes. On the one hand, it was a means of privileged treatment of the small landed properties, in this case those outside the town boundaries, which were not allowed to be built according to planning by-laws (those under 2,000 or 750m2, depending on their location). At the same time it gave a boost to the (illegal) subdivision of the bigger plots, often a preliminary step in an illegal construction operation. As a result, some three quarters of the buildings outside the cities are the product of some form of illegal construction (Economou, 1999). On the other hand, this practice led to the reduction of the cost of land both for residential uses and for activities as manufacturing industry and tourism. Since illegal construction outside the cities is the worse kind of urban sprawl and has very negative impact on the environment (degradation of the landscape, pollution due to the lack of necessary technical infrastructure, etc.), it becomes obvious that the model of growth of these activities was based upon the non-payment of their external environmental cost – a practice maybe effective from a purely private-economic point of view for several decades, but whose limits have become increasingly obvious since the end of the 1980s . The latter point is related to a more general feature of the spatial (not only urban) policies in Greece: their submission to the priorities of other policies. This fact has several of aspects. To the ones above one should also consider the role of the building industry, for many decades one of the more vibrant economic sectors in Greece, as a source of multiplication effects for quite a lot of manufacturing activities, as well as an instrument of anti-cyclical policy. In addition, the extent of illegal construction made possible the avoidance of a classical housing policy based upon public financing (as a fact, the public part of the housing stock in Greece never exceeded 1–3 per cent) and/or a subsidised housing credit, which in Greece was insignificant. This was achieved without problems of inadequate supply or of poor housing conditions; on the contrary, the housing conditions in post-war Greece presented a steady amelioration and were superior to that of the growth level of the country in general. This outcome is attributable to the role played by the omnipresent (and profitable) small landed property which, through the mechanisms described above, permitted households to satisfy their residential needs by themselves. Indeed the small landed property, both as an

Greece

199

income generator and as a fixed financial asset, functioned more generally in Greece as a substitute for the Western European welfare state. Housing was just a component of this function, which also included the role of landed property as an insurance factor or as a means of dealing with needs in the spheres of health or of education fields where state intervention is clearly inadequate (Economou, 1993a). Equally ‘inexpensive’ from a public finance point of view were urbanisation and urban growth. As already mentioned, these processes were based on the intensification of the use of the existing urban space on the one hand and, on the other hand, on the successive extension of the town boundaries and the inclusion of the illegal settlements. A common denominator of both practices was the minimisation of public investment in technical and social infrastructure. The consequences for the urban conditions and the quality of life in the cities were negative, but this was realised gradually and cumulatively (Economou, 1993b, 1997). During the first post-war decades there was an impression that this policy could be continued forever without contradictions or undesirable side-effects, and adverse approaches only began to appear from the beginning of the 1970s. The last major feature of the post-war urban policy was the extreme weakness of urban planning in Greece. Officially, there was (and still is) a whole series of urban plans and programmes that theoretically covered almost every possible situation – sometimes twice or more. Up to the beginning of the 1980s there was a two-tier system of urban plans, according to the Decree of 1992, the first major planning law in Greece: the Town Plan Study and the Plan Implementation Study.4 In 1983 a third tier was added above them, the General Urban Plan. Moreover, there used to be (and still is) a multitude of other types of plans covering several specific cases, from small rural settlements to organised developments.5 This rising number of plans was coupled by a marked ‘blueprint’ bias of the planning system. Planning tools necessary for the effective application of the plans or of proactive character were absent. For example, there was nothing in Greece equivalent to the Certificat d`Urbanisme in France or planning permission in Britain. Changes of existing land use not associated with the creation of a new building were not, with a few exceptions, controlled. Building permission was necessary only in case of a construction project, and its scope was limited to the building regulations, mainly the plot coefficient. The use of the land was not a part of the permission.

4 A kind of plan usually inexistent in other European countries, made necessary because of the lack of cadastre, a unique attribute of Greece among European countries − including most of Eastern Europe. 5 Almost exclusively in the form of cooperatives with the purpose of the collective purchasing of land and its successive subdivision in individual plots. The actual construction of dwellings remains a private operation, since organised land developments weren almost nonexistent before the 1990s.

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With minor exceptions, the whole range of urban plans is the responsibility of the central administration (Ministry of the Environment, Planning and Public Works). This is partly due to the excessive fragmentation of both the urban system and the local authorities in Greece, but it reflects even more the traditional overcentralisation of the administration. As for the timing, at least six and usually eight, 10 or even more years elapse between the beginning of the preparation of a General Plan and the completion of the corresponding Implementation Studies. The effectiveness of this complicated, over-centralised and very timeconsuming system was limited (Economou, 1997). The General Plan, a rather outdated version of rational-comprehensive planning, had very little influence on urban reality. With the exception of the definition of boundaries for the future extensions of the towns (which become statutory only after a Town Plan Study is approved), the provisions of this plan were not compulsory either for the public agencies or the landowners. Besides, these extensions mostly ‘legalise’ the out-of-town areas already built-up through unauthorised construction, as mentioned above. So even in this case, the role of the General Plan remained passive. On the other hand, the Town Plan Studies and the Plan Implementation Studies were binding, but this only concerned the street and plot layout and the building regulations. These issues are relevant only in new expansions of town plans; instruments for intervention in the already urbanised area (through, for example, urban renewal schemes, land use zoning and controls, land policy, urban infrastructure programmes, etc.) hardly exist. In fact, the whole town planning machinery essentially serves a sole purpose: the maximisation of the small land property gains through the incorporation of new areas in the town plan and the resulting rise in land prices, and the legalisation of the unauthorised buildings (Getimis, 1992). To the above, which refer to the urban plans in the narrow sense, should be added the weakness or lack of planning concerning other geographical levels. Countryside remained practically unregulated, since urban plans covered, with minor exceptions, only the area inside town boundaries. As a matter of fact, up to the time of writing less than 6 per cent of the areas outside these boundaries have been dotted by some kind of land-use plan (Economou, 2003), and practically one can build legally wherever one likes. This situation has been clearly related to the policy options of not containing unauthorised construction and of keeping low the cost of land for manufacture and tourism, and has also been directly connected with the acuteness of the problem of urban sprawl. In additionn, spatial policy on the larger scale (national/regional) of strategic character – analogous, for instance, to the French aménagement du territoire, the German Raumordnung, or the emerging spatial development/planning in the EU – was almost completely nonexistent. Plans, programmes or guidance of this type – for instance, of regional level or concerning the urban system as a whole – were never enacted in Greece. As a consequence, plans at town and city level were never guided or coordinated by more general goals or policy frameworks. The only

Greece

201

exceptions to this were the Regulatory Plans of Athens and Thessaloniki, which were approved in the mid-1980s. These plans covered more or less the whole of the respective wider metropolitan area and were of strategic character. They were purely indicative and their impact was marginal (Economou, 1999). The lack of strategic spatial policy contributed to the aggravation of problems of spatial imbalance, the more conspicuous one being the hydrocephalic overgrowing of Athens. Before completing this presentation of urban policy in this period, we must note that the only serious attempt to reform was made in the decade 1975–85. This attempt was centred upon institutional and organisational issues, with its major steps being two acts for urban planning; Law 1337/83 and its precursor Law 947/97 established the three-tier system described above, while Law 365/76 provided strategic (national/regional) spatial planning (but never implemented), the two metropolitan Regulatory plans, as well as the creation of a dedicated ministry for planning (Ministry of the Planning and the Environment – later Ministry of the Environment, Planning and Public Works – MEPPW) (Giannakourou, 1999). These efforts gave to the institutional landscape of urban policy its definitive form up to now. However, in the end they were not able to alter the essence and the basic options of this policy, as they were described above, and from the mid1980s the limits of the reform were made apparent. 10.3

The State of the Cities: Current Situation of Larger Cities

In Table 10.4 we provide the population of the urban areas and the surrounding regions for the cities with population over 100,000 people in the census years 1961 and 2001. We observe that the metropolitan area of Athens has increased in this period by 71 per cent to a size close to 3.2 million. The population of the Athens (Attica) NUTS III region has increased over the same period by 82 per cent to a reported size close to 3.8 million. Similarly, the population of Thessaloniki, the second city (in size), has increased by 108 per cent to a reported size of nearly 800,000, while the populations of the four other cities have increased by similarly high rates. The city of Patras has increased by about 80 per cent to a reported size of 187,000, the city of Heraklio has increased by about 114 per cent to a reported size of 150,000, the city of Volos has grown by about 55 per cent to a reported size of 124,000, while the city of Larissa has grown by 125 per cent to a reported size of 124,000. However, these figures should be used with extreme caution, as census statistics in Greece tend to be biased and present an underestimation of actual population size in the large urban areas. The reason is that many residents that are first or even second generation immigrants of rural origin prefer to travel to their villages and register there during the census period. This is a deliberate effort to artificially keep the size of the village, where they maintain property, artificially large, as local public funding from national sources primarily depends

202

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

on population size. This peculiar type of urban exodus during the census period leads to a gross underestimation of the population of the large cities and especially Athens. A recent independent study for Athens (Attico Metro, 1998) has found the population of the Athens metropolitan area to be around 3.8 million and the population of Attica around 4.2 million people. Similarly, most unofficial estimates of the Thessaloniki metropolitan area population are around a million, while the next four cities in the urban hierarchy are often reported (unofficially) with populations greater than the official ones by a margin of 30,000 to 50,000 people. With this reservation in mind, by comparing columns 3 and we observe that the urban areas, in all cases except Athens,6 take a larger share of the regional population over time, indicating that concentration forces are also in operation at the local level. An interesting feature of the two metropolitan areas and (to a lesser extent) the larger cities is the changes that have occurred in the internal spatial allocation of residential and other activities. Significant trends of suburbanisation in housing but also services have coexisted with the expansion of the tertiary sector in the centres of the cities and significant construction activities, but also projects of urban renewal and aesthetic improvement. At the same time, certain ‘inner’ areas of low quality housing have experienced high mobility, as on the one hand they have been attracting immigrants by large numbers and on the other they have been losing a significant part of their original population in seek of better housing and neighbourhood conditions in the suburbs or outside the metropolis in the satellite cities. In a parallel manner, large industrial activities have been established or relocated almost entirely outside the cities. This spatial reorganisation has been facilitated by policies, but also by the process of industrial decline that hit Greece and especially the largest cities in the 1980s and the 1990s (Petrakos and Saratsis, 2000). During this period, a number of industrial firms historically located in residential areas, or even the centre of the cities, were not able to stand international competition and were shut down. This type of industrial estate has in many cases been used in urban renewal projects, giving them new functions in the tertiary or the new tertiary sector. On the other hand, small-scale industrial activity like repair, handicraft, sweat shops, etc, are still located in the urban tissue, but they tend to concentrate in the entrance or the less affluent neighbourhoods of the cities. As it has been explained in section 10.2, the metropolitan areas and (to a lesser extent) the larger cities of the country have grown in the last three or four decades in a spontaneous and anarchic way, with lack of urban planning and insufficient public infrastructure. The long-standing, constitutionally based, 6 The Athens metropolitan region has gradually been transformed to a multi-centric system of urban settlements with indistinct boundaries, so the urban/regional ratio is not a very relevant index.

Table 10.4 Population of the largest cities in Greece, 1961–2001 Urban areas

Athens Thessaloniki Patras Heraklio Volos Larissa Source: Census data.

City

1961 Region (NUTS III)

(1)/(2)

City

2001 Region (NUTS III)

(4)/(5)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1,852,709 380,654 103,941 69,983 80,846 55,858

2,057,974 544,394 239,206 208,374 162,285 237,776

0.90 0.70 0.43 0.33 0.49 0.23

3,172,006 794,330 187,391 150,253 124,956 124,786

3,761,810 1,057,825 322,789 292,489 206,995 279,305

0.84 0.75 0.58 0.51 0.60 0.45

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sanctification of private property and its protection have undermined urban planning in Greece. Private property has a very high degree of protection from a legal point of view, clearly stated in the Constitution, while at the same time it offers consistently a secure type of investment, not affected by the ups and downs of the exchange rate (in the past, before the introduction of the euro) or the Stock Exchange. Therefore, societal support to regulations on development is at a basic level. Planning has rarely driven decisions but instead comes frequently after development has taken place to coordinate public infrastructure. Both the low level of implementation of local (urban and countryside) plans, and the failure (until recently) to establish national–regional level strategic spatial plans, are a testimony to the reluctance at the local level to adopt priorities and rules and at the national level to make decisions. The implications of the specific choice of urban policy (or the lack of urban policy) have been both positive and negative, although overall they were clearly negative. One positive side effect has been the improvement of housing conditions. Most housing indicators (people per room, houses per 1,000 people) have improved dramatically during the last decades and are already close or even above the EU average. Another implication of the following the market type of urban planning has been the lack of social segregation in the cities, which is a by-product of the mix of activities resulting from the absence of zoning in land uses and planning in general. With the exception of the above, all other implications were and continue to be negative. One can mention here the low level and the low quality of urban infrastructure (transportation networks, urban transport, public space, etc.), the high cost of providing urban infrastructure in already (illegally) built areas around the city and the low quality of this infrastructure, the destruction – demolition of traditional housing and the historical character of cities, the friction over spontaneously arising incompatible land uses inside and outside the cities, intense construction activity (legal or illegal outside the city limits, especially in tourist and seaside areas that destroy the environment and transplant urban problems (pollution, congestion) to many areas in the countryside). The situation that has resulted has all the disadvantages mentioned before, but perhaps the biggest problem is that it practically reduced the costs of internal migration and allowed a large numbers of people to concentrate in a relatively small period of time in Athens, leading to excess concentration and unbalanced urban development. It is now interesting to examine key characteristics and trends of the largest cities of the Greek urban system, in order to assess their potential in the new economic environment. Starting from Athens, the advantages and opportunities of the city are related to its function as the political, administrative and financial centre of the country, the new tertiary sector providing producer and consumer services, its significantly restructured industrial base (spread in its largest part outside the city and in neighbouring regions), a number of new infrastructure projects (new airport,

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metro, ring roads) and the opportunities created from hosting the 2004 Olympic Games. On the positive side one has to count a number of urban renewal projects that are currently in progress, as well major interventions related with its heritage (Museum of Acropolis, Unification of Archeological sites, etc). The economy has also benefited from the influx of immigrants (about 400,000 are estimated to live in Athens), who have allowed for cost related advantages. Disadvantages are mainly associated with the lack of planning in the development of the city, missing transportation infrastructure, poor social infrastructure, congestion, pollution and social degradation in a number of neighbourhoods. Although social segregation in Athens is not as serious as in other European cities (for example, there are practically no homeless people among the poor), it has nevertheless increased in recent years and has taken a clearer spatial dimension. On balance, problems, disadvantages and threats seem to be offset by advantages, opportunities and central government interventions at the urban scale, in such a way that the prospects of the city now look better than ever. While Athens is mainly a service economy, Thessaloniki bases its strength on its export-oriented industrial base, its scientific base (the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki is the largest in the country), its proximity to the Balkan region and its role as a regional capital in certain markets. Thessaloniki also benefits from certain national and EU administrative functions (Ministry of Macedonia-Thrace and the Headquarters of the EU Centre for Vocational Training) and Egnatia, a new East–West highway connecting the city with a large number of regions in Northern Greece, as well as the neighbouring countries. Also, successful urban renewal projects at the centre of the city have transformed abandoned inner-city areas to leisure and recreation centre. On the negative side, despite the construction of a ring road a few years ago, the city still suffers from serious congestion problems. The much-needed transportation infrastructure at the centre of the city has been delayed. Overall, the city has a dynamism stemming from its economic base and the opportunities related with the new realities in the northern borders of the country. Patras, the third city in the urban hierarchy, is considerably smaller than the first two. It is a major regional centre and the most important city in western Greece. It is a gateway to the west, connecting Greece with Italy by speedboats and hosts an important regional university with a significant value added in the local economy. The city suffered in the 1990s from serious industrial decline and has lost a large part of its industrial base. Although it is currently in a phase of structural change in search of a new role, it is certain that its future prospects will be substantially improved by the construction of the Rio-Antirio bridge (6 km long), which connects the Peloponnesus with western Greece and gives Patras a leading role in the western part of the country. Heraklio is the fourth Greek city and the largest one on Crete. It is a dynamic seaside city (although unlike Patras or Volos, the centre of the city is not on the seafront), basing its strength on a combination of factors ranging from

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tourism in the surrounding region, noticeable industrial activity (especially in the processing of agricultural products) well connected with the tourist industry and its science base including dynamic universities and research centres. One of the most serious problems of the city is its poor aesthetic and the illegal use of land in the surrounding areas. Larissa, which has an actual population of about 180,000 and is larger than Volos, is a dynamic regional centre at the centre of Greece. It takes advantage of its location on the main north–south highway connecting Athens and Thessaloniki and its location at the centre of a highly productive valley. Larissa operates mainly as a trade and service centre serving a large rural hinterland and the surrounding small urban centres. Although it mainly attracts large department stores and outlets, it has also developed a noticeable and growing industrial base, part of which is in the processing of agricultural products. Despite its poor aesthetic, the city has managed to transform the city centre to a lively marketplace through a series of projects. Volos is a seaside city, 60 km away from Larissa, at the centre of the country. The quality of the natural environment of the surrounding mountain Pelion and the nearby Sporades islands give the city a strong potential in tourismrelated activities. Historically, Volos has been one of the most important regional industrial centres, hosting large (by Greek standards) capital-intensive industrial firms. The city was hit by a sharp industrial decline in the 1990s and lost thousands of employment positions and important local firms. The city also has an important port, serving the (seasonal) tourist activity of the region with speedboats and ferries, and the industrial base of the region with cargo carriers. Overtime, the passenger-tourist activities have become more important than cargo-related ones. One of the assets of the city is its (relatively new) university, while one of the biggest and still unsolved problems is traffic congestion at the centre. The city is currently undergoing major changes in its structure and is searching for a new identity. Overall, the Greek system is dominated by the six largest cities described above. Despite the highly polarised environment and the dominance of Athens and Thessaloniki, which has been consolidated and perhaps increasing, the four smaller cities have managed to maintain positive prospects for growth and development. Some of them are in search of an identity and some will have to make difficult choices in the near future. All of them are poorly funded and have administrations with limited authority and even less resources to implement restructuring or development policies. Despite that, they have passed a critical size threshold and can operate as regional centres, becoming the recipients of regional scale rural–urban migration.

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207

National Urban Policies from the Mid-1990s

The analysis of the main features of urban policy in Chapter 2 remains in essence valid for the current period. Its core options, as the support of small land property, the central role of illegal construction and the weakness of planning have not been seriously challenged, despite some developments in the case of the latter one. However, some new elements have appeared over the last 10 years that are not without significance. First, there has been a considerable rise of public expenditure in urban infrastructure. It is estimated that since 1990 this expenditure has tripled on an annual basis, in fixed prices, in comparison with the period before 1990, while as a percentage of total public spending it has been increased by about 50 per cent (Economou, 1999). This development is important because it represents a change for urban policy, which up to this period was of especially low financial cost and orientated towards normative and institutional measures. However, it is a change directly attributable to the aid from the EU structural funds, chiefly through the three successive Community Support Frameworks (1989–1993, 1994–1999 and 2000–2006). Furthermore, a boost to public urban expenditure was given by the 2004 Olympic Games. The deficiency of urban infrastructure imposed, beyond the construction of athletic facilities, the implementation of a massive programme of urban public works, mainly in transport and secondary in urban renewal; this programme was centred upon Athens but was gradually extended, for reasons of both political and technical character, to a number of cities in the periphery (Economou and Coccossis, 2002). On the whole, therefore, the financing and the initiative for the increase of urban public investment have been either exogenous or attributable to exceptional circumstances. As a consequence, it cannot be claimed that it indicates a permanent shift of the previous orientation of urban policy, and what will happen after 2006, when the European funding will be reduced and the 2004 Olympic Games will be history, remains an open question. Second, the increase of urban public investment was channelled into five fields (Economou and Petrakos, 1999; Coccossis, 1999): •

•

The first one consists of transport, with a substantial part of the funding concerning the road network but also an important part being absorbed by public transport infrastructure, especially in Athens (Athens subway and a tramway network). At best, however, this investment reduced but did not stop a long-standing trend of worsening traffic conditions in the cities, while it did not affect the ever-rising problem of car parking, both problems having deep roots in the way post-war urbanisation and urban policy were carried out. The second field of urban public spending concerns environmental infrastructure, which has been presenting critical shortage not only because both of many decades of under-investment, but also due to a model of urban expansion based on the legalisation of illegal settlements. This investment had

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•

•

•

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various results, with a definite amelioration in the case of air and (less) water pollution but not so regarding waste management, problems of inundation of urban areas or the percentage of green spaces (NCESD, 2003). Urban renewal schemes (the most well-known case being that of the ‘Unification of the Archaeological Sites’ of Athens) are another field of urban public spending. These schemes are limited in scope, mainly consisting of the creation of pedestrian roads and in the beautification of open spaces,7 and with contradictory and often controversial results. Among them are the near-impossibility of securing the pedestrian areas from illegal circulation and parking, the uncontrolled changes of land uses (especially the proliferation of recreation and leisure activities), and, sometimes, gentrification (Economou, 2000). However, these interventions are noteworthy, either from a quantitative aspect (in view of the fact that they have been propagated in quite a few cities and towns in the whole range of the urban system) or because they represent a kind of civic investment almost inexistent before the mid-1990s. A fourth field of urban investment is the construction of large-scale cultural infrastructure. More celebrated cases are the New Acropolis Museum and the Concert Halls in Athens and Salonika, but smaller projects of the same type can also be found in some medium-sized cities. In fact, it is a reflection in Greece of an international trend: the increasing importance of leisure and city-marketing strategies (Deffner, 2000). The last new field of public investment regarding (also) the cities is the beginning of the creation of a national cadastre, obviously a very important kind of infrastructure. This project progresses with a still very slow pace (mainly because of difficulties related to the small landed property).

Third, programmes focusing not on physical planning but on dealing with social and economic problems related to urban space did not exist in Greece before the mid-1990s. The first step in this direction were six projects of the URBAN Community Initiative, implemented in the 1994–1999 period, which comprised a mixture of physical planning and socio-economic measures (for instance, grants for the creation of new SMEs, training programmes, schemes for counteracting social exclusion and so on). In the current programming period, projects of this type have been multiplied considerably, and apart from the URBAN projects of the new generation, some 100 analogous interventions have been included in the Third CSF for Greece, located in settlements of all ranks, from metropolises to small provincial towns. It is clear that this development is EU dependent. Greek authorities considered the advent of the first URBAN projects as just another opportunity of increasing their share in Community resources, with 7 Hardly covering the whole spectrum of issues include in the notion of ‘urban regeneration’ as this is understood today in most European countries (Roberts and Sykes, 2000).

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the obligation to include socio-economic measures being an undesirable sideeffect. This point of view remains widespread, and the incorporation of the aforementioned 100 projects in the Third CSF is mainly due to the pressure from the European Committee regarding the insertion of the ‘urban dimension’ in the Operational Programmes of the CSF (EC, 1998). This unwillingness partly reflects the inefficiency and the ‘physical’ bias of planning system in Greece, but is also related to the fact that the socio-economic problems in Greek cities are not, in general, concentrated in particular areas and neighbourhoods (as in many European cities) but are rather diffused over the urban space. Thus, projects in the ‘URBAN’ line, which are restricted by definition in small parts of the city, are not well adapted to the Greek situation. However, evolution following the massive entry of foreign economic migrants and the deindustrialisation crisis of the 1990s altered the social geography of the cities in Greece and resulted in the appearance of localised social problems (unemployment, criminality, increasing ethnic and social division of space) (Allen et al., 2004). These developments indicate that a socio-economic urban policy strand becomes more necessary, while an understanding of this fact also begins to reach Greek administration and local authorities. Fourth, up to the beginning of the 1990s, the relationship between the public and private sector in urban policy matters had consisted of the officially exclusive responsibility of the state for urban planning and expansion, on the one hand, and the informal, but in reality equally exclusive, assumption of this role by the private sector in the form of the small landed property and the agents of illegal construction, on the other hand. This state of affairs is still in effect, but some new elements have emerged as well: •

•

A new law has made it possible, for the first time, that larger investors (with more capital) can start planned land development. This opportunity has attracted some interest by banks and (specifically created) building societies. It has become obvious, however, that the so-called ‘private development’ cannot compete with the traditional (and equally private) model of housing supply (dominated by small firms and small land-owners) and of town expansion (through the legalisation of illegal structures/settlements), described in section 10.2. At best, it will create a housing sub-market oriented to the new upper-middle-class stratum, which is seeking a new ‘life-style’ and has also the necessary income to pay for it (Economou and Petrakos, 1999). The deregulation of the credit system which made possible the provision of housing credit without restrictions could also support such a development. Nevertheless this will remain an option for the future, as the actual number of projects of this kind has been very low up to now. A new phenomenon, albeit limited, is the undertaking by private companies of the co-financing and operation of large transport infrastructure projects. A few really important projects of this sort have indeed been implemented (the new International Athens Airport and the first free-way ring-road of Athens

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•

are among them) but their number remains very small, and the optimism of the second half of the 1990s for this kind of public–private partnership has not been verified so far. A fairly new element is the increasing interest of bigger capital, especially the banks, for a more efficient management of their landed property as well as for a more active intervention in the land market. It must be noted that for many decades the relationship between big capital and real estate has been less than indifferent. The reasons of this change are numerous, and include the pressure from international competition in the context of globalisation to the emergence of new opportunities for large-scale land surplus values (connected to the big projects mentioned above) to the (ambivalent) change of the position of the Greek state regarding these issues. Nevertheless, once more this development remains tentative and limited.

The final category of new elements in urban policy relates to the legal and administrative framework. They include: •

•

a quantitatively important legislative output, comprising new major laws for urban planning, Law 2508/97, and strategic spatial planning, Law 2742/99.8 These acts often reproduce older styles of planning and tend to result in the further multiplication of the levels of urban plans, by the introduction of a fourth tier for the large and medium-sized cities, Master Plan, on top of General Urban Plan. They also comprise, however, some innovative themes, such as the authorisation of corporative land development and an institutional framework for integrated urban renewal of a ‘regeneration’ type. However, these innovations have not be utilised appropriately: the amount of new ‘private’ development stills remains very moderate, while both the urban renewal projects and the URBAN-type socio-economic urban interventions mentioned above do not make use of the new framework but of informal procedures; the effort to reduce the centralisation of planning system by the transfer of some responsibilities to local authorities (which has also been strengthened by the reform of local government through a programme of compulsory unification of the smaller municipal units, ‘Kapodistrias’). However, the outcome of this attempt was not successful, for two different reasons. On the one hand, this transfer of responsibilities has been cancelled eventually by the supreme administrative court (Council of State) on grounds of unconstitutionality. On the other hand, the performance of local authorities, during the period in which they carried out these responsibilities, was very disappointing, due partly to technical shortcomings but mainly to the utter subservience of the self-government politicians to the local landed interests; 8

The last one being partly attributable to the influence of ESDP process (Coccossis et al., 2004).

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since the beginning of 2003, a number of strategic spatial plans, containing among else guidance for urban planning, have been officially ratified. They include seven regional plans (Regional Frameworks of Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development) and two national sectoral plans (Special Frameworks of Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development). In view of the fact that these are the first strategic spatial plans ever to obtain legal status in Greece, this represents an important step. However, the actual influence that these indicative plans will have upon urban reality remains uncertain.

As a conclusion, it seems that over the last 10 years some new developments in urban policy have effectively appeared. However, most of them have not attained a level of maturity. Moreover, these developments have been relatively peripheral, in relation to the core of the urban policy model, which had prevailed over the previous post-war decades. In consequence, this model remains powerful with some minor modifications, and in the best case the new elements have been incorporated in it without altering its key characteristics. This long-standing vitality of the post-war urban policy model may seem inexplicable, in view of its mostly negative effects upon urban reality. In order to understand this apparent contradiction, one has to take into account the fact that this model has deep roots into the very fabric of Greek society, and its rationality is tested in the level of its socio-economic, rather than spatial, impact. 10.5

The Impact of European Policies

The impact of European policies on urban policy in Greece has been channelled primarily through the ESDP, the URBAN Initiative, the projects of the Cohesion Fund and the imposition of an urban dimension in the Operational Programmes of the 3rd CSF. ESDP objectives provide a challenge to Greek planning by stimulating a ‘Europeanised’ national planning agenda. It also puts multi-polar development back in the agenda of discussion. In Greece in the early 1960s and actually in the late 1970s there had been a lot of political debate on regional growth poles. In the end, the issue was scrapped from the political agenda, but later on it re-emerged as an issue in view of globalisation, regional development, etc. The dominance of Athens, due to the size and concentration of economic activities, has been a major concern of national policy for a long time. In this direction, the National General Spatial Planning Framework, which has been adopted by the government as a guide for future policy, includes a clear reference to the spatial structure of national poles and axes of development in relation to nodes of trans-European significance. In general, it can be claimed that ESDP has strengthened to some extent the role of spatial planning within the national planning system, in the sense that it has strengthened the arguments for spatial planning in the form of a strategic

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long-term perspective at national level. In bringing forward the need to link to European-wide concerns, the ESDP highlights the need for a national spatial policy, a discussion for long mostly restricted to planners (Economou et al., 2004). The next major factor influencing urban policies is related to the Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund interventions (CSF, Community Initiatives …). The first two CSFs for Greece (1989–1993 and 1994–1999) did not provide for any direct urban policy measures. Policies in this period were implemented in the absence of any short of spatial planning. The lack of planning as a guiding mechanism is further attenuated by the short-/medium-term character of CSF interventions which, until quite recently, were mostly ad hoc selections of infrastructure projects out of a menu of local ‘wishes’, mostly based on vested interests or local myths. Such a non-planning culture permeates public policy supported widely by the strong party politics and clientelism of the local and national level representatives. While the current 3rd CSF (2000–2006) started on the Greek side without a spatial reference – like the two previous ones – along the way, and following EU suggestions, it acquired a spatial frame of reference as three themes were finally included with a clearly spatial character: mountain areas (representing a substantial part of the national territory), urban development (urban centres and metropolitan centres) and island areas (Konsolas et al., 2002, pp. 191–214; MNE, 2000, pp. 3/303–3/377). Both were included following suggestions by the European Commission, reflecting the rationale and options of the ESDP but also the increasing interest of the Commission in urban problems. Urban development policy is also implemented through the regional operational programs in which urban development projects at the regional and local level are financed under the priority axis ‘upgrading urban and semi-urban centres’. The third channel of influence is the increasing number of environmental projects that have been financed through the Cohesion Funds and are related to solid and fluid waste disposal projects in the urban areas. The fourth channel of influence of European urban policies on national ones concerns the implementation of the Urban Initiative, which was a significant effort to integrate urban policies into EU structural policies. As it was mentioned above, these programmes paid in practice more attention to the creation of new infrastructure and to urban renewal projects, and kept to a minimum all actions related to the socio-economic base of the cities. Nevertheless, the Urban Initiative has generated significant pressures for change in domestic urban policy as designed at the central level or implemented at the local levels. These pressures include the need for cooperation among the Ministries of National Economy and the Ministry of Planning, the need for a policy shift from the regulatory or legislative level to the level of economic incentives for the creation of employment and the modernisation of the economic base of cities and the need for adjustment of the

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institutional apparatus at the local level in order to facilitate bottom-up policies (Koutalakis, 2003). Although there is certainly a ‘learning’ process through the implementation of various projects and in that sense a value added of the Initiative to urban policies, the overall impact on the policy setting (not to mention urban conditions) has been limited. 10.6

Conclusions

The Greek system of urban places is characterised by a high and persistent degree of concentration – with the dominance of Athens over the national population – and a serious deficit in medium-sized cities. Over the post-war period there has been in Greece an essentially identical urban policy model. The main features of this policy were the consistent support of the small land property, the intensive use of small land and its eligibility for construction both inside and outside town boundaries, the role of illegal construction as the basic mechanism of urban development, the negligible public expenditure for urban infrastructure, the subordination of urban policy to the priorities of social policies and the weakness of urban planning. The long-standing, constitutionally based, sanctification of private property and its protection have undermined urban planning in Greece, while societal support to regulations on development has been at a low level. Planning has rarely driven decisions but instead has come frequently after development had taken place to coordinate public infrastructure. The implications of the specific choice of urban policy (or the lack of urban policy) have been the low level and the low quality of urban infrastructure (transportation networks, urban transport, public space, etc.), the high costs of providing urban infrastructure in already (illegally) built areas around the city and the low quality of this infrastructure, the demolition of traditional housing and the loss of the historical character of cities, the friction of spontaneously arising incompatible land uses inside and outside the cities, and intense construction activity (legal or illegal) outside the city limits, especially in tourist and seaside areas, that destroy the environment and transplant urban problems (pollution, congestion) to many areas in the countryside. Despite the highly polarised environment and the dominance of Athens and Thessaloniki, which has been consolidated and perhaps increasing, the other four cities with population over 100,000 have managed to maintain positive prospects for growth and development. Some of them are in search of a new identity and some will have to make difficult choices in the near future. All of them are poorly funded and have administrations with limited authority and even less resources to implement restructuring or development policies. Over the last 10 years, some new developments in urban policy have effectively appeared, some of them being the direct effect of EU policies. However, most of them have not attained a level of maturity. Moreover, these developments have

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been relatively peripheral, in relation to the core of the urban policy model, which had prevailed over the previous post-war decades. In consequence, this model remains powerful with some minor modifications, and in the best case the new elements are incorporated in it without altering its key characteristics. References Allen, G., Barlow, G., Leal, G., Maloutas, Th. and Padovani, L. (2004), Housing and Welfare in Southern Europe, Oxford: Blackwell. Antonopoulou, S. (1994), ‘The Consequences of the Construction Industry and the Land Tenure in Post-war Greece’, in Sakis Karagiorgas Institution, Greek Society in the First Post-war Period, Athens, pp. 583–92 (in Greek). Coccossis, H. (1999), ‘Urban Environmental Policies’, in D. Economou and G. Petrakos (eds), The Development of Greek Cities, Volos: University of Thessaly Press – Gutenberg, pp. 48–90 (in Greek). Coccossis, H., Economou, D. and Petrakos, G. (2004), ‘The ESDP Relevance to a Distant Partner: Greece’, in U.J. Rivolin and A. Faludi (eds), Southern Perspectives on European Spatial Planning, Special issue of European Planning Studies 12 (7). Deffner, A. (2000), ‘Cultural Industries in Athens: Spatial Transformations during the Nineties’, Papers of the 6th World Leisure Congress Leisure and Human Development, Deusto University, Bilbao, 2000, CD-ROM. Economou, D. (1990), ‘La politique du logement en Grèce et sa rationalité sociale’, Conference Internationale de Recherche: Les Enjeux Urbains de l’Habitat, Association Internationale de Sociologie-Ministère de l’Equipement, du Logement, des Transports et de la Mer, 6/1990, Paris. Economou, D. (1993a), ‘Housing Policy, in the EC and in Greece’, in P. Getimis and D. Gravaris (eds), Social State and Social Policy, Athens: Themelio Editions (in Greek). Economou, D. (1993b), ‘New Forms of Geographical Inequalities and Spatial Problems in Greece’, Society and Space (Environment and Planning D) 11 (5), pp. 583–98. Economou, D. (1997), ‘The Planning System and Rural Land Use Control in Greece. A European Perspective’, European Planning Studies 5 (4), pp. 461–76. Economou, D. (1999), ‘The Evolution of Urban and Regional Policy over the Twentieth Century’, in SADAS, Proceedings of the 10th Greek Architects Association Congress, Athens: TEE (in Greek). Economou, D. (2000), ‘The Environmental Dimension of Urban Policy in Post-war Greece’, in Modinos M. and Efthimiopoulos I. (eds), The Sustainable City, Athens: Stochastis/DIPE, pp. 4–70 (in Greek). Economou, D. (2002), ‘Countryside Building and Spatial Planning’, in Proceedings of the Conference Countryside Construction: Legal and Urban-planning Dimensions, Athens: Greek Society of Environmental Law (in Greek). Economou, D. and Coccossis, H. (2002), Athens Metropolitan Regional Review. Background report for the elaboration of ‘Athens Metropolitan Regional Review’ by OECD, Volos: University of Thessaly-Laboratory of Urban and Regional Planning.

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Economou, D. and Petrakos, G. (1999), ‘Policies of Urban Development and Urban Planning in Greece’, in Economou D. and Petrakos G. (eds), The Development of Greek Cities, Volos: University of Thessaly Press – Gutenberg, pp. 413–46 (in Greek). Getimis, P. (1992), ‘Social Conflicts and the Limits of Urban Policies in Greece’, in M. Dunford and G. Kafkalas (eds), Cities and Regions in the New Europe, London: Belhaven Press, pp. 239–54. Giannakourou, G. (1999), ‘The Institutional Framework of Urban Planning in Greece’, in D. Economou and G. Petrakos (eds), The Development of Greek Cities, Volos: University of Thessaly Press – Gutenberg, pp. 457–80 (in Greek). Giannakourou, G. (2004), ‘Transforming Spatial Planning Policy in Mediterranean Countries: Europeanization and Domestic Change’, in U.J. Rivolin and A. Faludi (eds), Southern Perspectives on European Spatial Planning, Special issue for European Planning Studies, 12 (7). Konsolas, N., Papadaskalopoulos A. and Plaskovitis I. (2002), Regional Development in Greece, New York: Springer. Koutalakis, Ch. (2003), Cities and the Structural Funds: The Domestic Impact of EU Initiatives for Urban Development, Athens: Sakkoulas. Leontidou, L. (1994), ‘Mediterranean Cities: Divergent Trends in a United Europe’, in M. Blacksell amd A.M. Williams (eds), The European Challenge. Geography and Development in the European Community, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 127–48. Maloutas, Th. (1990), Athens, Housing, Family, Athens: EKKE-Exactas (in Greek). Maloutas, Th. (ed.) (2000), The Cities. Social and Economic Atlas of Greece, Athens-Volos: National Centre of Social Research−École Française d’ Athènes (in Greek). MEPPW (Ministry of the Environment, Planning and Public Works) (1995), HABITAT II. National Report for Greece, Athens: DEPOS, YPEHODE (in Greek). MNE [Ministry of National Economy] (2000), Development Plan for the Period 2000–2006: Special Areas, Athens (in Greek). NCESD (National Centre for the Environment and Sustainable Development) (2003), Environmental Signals. A Draft Report of Sustainability Indicators. GREECE 2003, Athens (in Greek). Petrakos, G. (1999), ‘La Grèce et les Balkans: Une Géographie perdue et retrouvée’, Revue d’ Études Comparatives Est-Quest 30 (4), pp. 177–99. Petrakos, G. (2000), ‘The Spatial Impact of East-West Integration in Europe’, in M. Petrakos and G. Gorzelak (eds), Integration and Transition in Europe: The Economic Geography of Interaction, London: Routledge, pp. 38–68. Petrakos, G., Pavlea, S. and Anagnostou, A. (2003), ‘The Greek Urban System: Concentration or Deconcentration?’, paper given at the Third EuroConference on The European City in Transition: The City and the Region, 14–15 November, BauhausUniversitat, Weimar. Petrakos, G. and Psycharis, Y. (2003), Regional Development in Greece, Athens: Kritiki (in Greek). Petrakos, G. and Saratsis, Y. (2000), ‘Regional Inequalities in Greece’, Papers in Regional Science 79, pp. 57–74. Petrakos, G. and Pitelis, Ch. (2001), ‘Peripherality and Integration: The Experience of Greece as a Member of the EU and its Implications for the Balkan Economies in Transition’, in G. Petrakos and S. Totev (eds), The Development of the Balkan Region, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 283–316.

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Petrakos, G., Karaveli, E. and Mardakis, P. (1999), ‘Recent Developments in the Greek System of Urban Centers’, Environment and Planning: B 26, pp. 2–13. Roberts, P. and Sykes, H. (2000), Urban Regeneration, London: Sage Publications.

Chapter 11

Ireland: Metropolitan Dominance – the Challenge in Achieving Balanced Territorial Development Michael J. Bannon1

11.1

Introduction

Since the early 1990s the Republic of Ireland (henceforth Ireland) has undergone a major transformation. Between 1993 and 2001 the annual real growth of the economy at 8.0 per cent per annum was more than double the average recorded over the previous three decades. The population of the state increased by 8 per cent in the six years between 1996 and 2002, as the country prospered and as inmigration replaced emigration. The 2002 population of 3,917,336 was the highest recorded for the country since 1871. Employment estimates indicate that between 1995 and early 2003 the number of people at work increased by 43.6 per cent and the number employed in early 2003 at 1,772,000 was significantly above levels ever recorded in the history of the state. Many policy developments contributed to this unprecedented period of growth, most especially the success of Ireland in attracting foreign direct investment (OECD, 1999). Much of the growth during the 1990s, and especially since 1996, has been an urban or an urban focused phenomenon. Between 1996 and 2002 the population of the state increased by 291,000 persons, of whom some 77.7 per cent resided in aggregate urban areas, that is, urban settlements of 1,500 persons or over. In contrast, the aggregate rural population has remained almost static and its share of total population has declined to 40.4 per cent of total population, inclusive of a large and increasing number of urban-based workers who have opted to live in the countryside. Table 11.1 provides a succinct overview of the settlement

1 Emeritus professor, University College Dublin. The author acknowledges the assistance provided in the preparation of this paper by Oonagh Buckley, Niall Cussen, David McLoughlin, John Martin and Carmel Sherry of the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and by Ruairi MacUnfraidh of the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, as well as by Paula Russell and Declan Redmond of the Department of Regional and Urban Planning, University College Dublin. The usual disclaimer applies.

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structure and the performance of its various components in the six year period 1996–2002. The built-up area of Dublin, as defined in Table 11.1, accounted for just over one quarter of the population of the state in 2002. The overwhelming dominance of Dublin within the Irish settlement system is shown by the fact that its population in 2002 was almost as large as that of all other cities and towns of 5,000 population or over within the state. While the total share of population resident in Dublin and the four other cities declined slightly between 1996 and 2002, there was an increase in the share of population living in the smaller and medium-sized towns, particularly in towns of 5,000 to 10,000 population whose combined growth of almost 105,000 exceeded the total growth in the built-up areas of the five cities including Dublin. Table 11.1 also shows that one third of the population resided outside towns and villages in 2002. While the rural share of total population had declined slightly, there had been a significant increase in the total number of rural residents between 1996 and 2002. It is important to note that there have been significant changes in the composition of the Irish rural population over time, with recent decades witnessing a decline of farming occupations and a growth of ‘urban generated’ households and second or holiday home residents. The issue of urban generated housing in rural areas remains a contentious planning and a vibrant political issue. Rural values remain very important within Irish society and there has been an increased emphasis on rural policies in recent years (Kenny, 2003; DOEHLG, 2004). This report is focused on the performance of the Irish urban system with a particular focus on the continuing and increasing dominance of Dublin and its region at a time when key components of the recently published National Spatial Strategy, 2002–2020 (henceforth NSS) await implementation (DOELG, 2002). Metropolitan Dominance Since the establishment of an independent Irish state in 1922, there have been numerous reports and recommendations aimed at limiting the relative size and role of Dublin or attempting to strengthen the national effectiveness of centres and places relative to the capital city. One of the most important was the 1969 report on Regional Studies in Ireland, which recommended a national urban strategy based on a hierarchical network of ‘development centres’. Those recommendations, together with others dealing with aspects of development policy and administrative reform, went largely unimplemented (for an overview see Bannon and Greer, 1998). As a consequence, the role of Dublin was strengthened over time, both in respect of domestic and international affairs (Bannon, Rhys Thomas and Cassidy, 2000). In the absence of counter magnets, it is widely accepted that Dublin ‘continues to perform at the international level as a driver of national development’ (NSS, 2002, p. 78). In the absence of some effective spatial strategy for the balanced development of the country, Dublin and the

Table 11.1 Population change 1996–2002 classified by settlement size groupings Size categories

Dublin city and suburbs Other major cities and suburbs Towns 10,000 and over Towns 5,000 to 9,999 Towns 3,000 to 4,999 Towns 1,500 to 2,999 Towns 1,000 to 1,499 Towns 500 to 999 Villages under 500 Remainder of country Total:

Population 1996

2002

1996

2002

Percentage share of total population 1996 2000

952,692 360,609 423,356 201,967 82,294 101,277 71,878 96,749 82,919 1,252,346 3,626,087

1,004,614 386,136 496,163 233,939 99,473 113,957 79,462 104,602 98,126 1,300,731 3,917,203

+51,922 +25,527 +72,807 +31,972 +17,179 +12,680 +7,584 +7,853 +15,207 +48,385 +291,116

+5.5 +7.1 +17.2 +15.8 +20.9 +12.5 +10.6 +8.1 +18.3 +3.9 +8.0

26.3 10.0 11.6 5.6 2.3 2.7 2.0 2.7 2.3 34.5 100.0

Source: Census of Population, 2002, Table 7.

Population change

25.6 9.9 12.7 6.0 2.5 2.9 2.0 2.7 2.5 33.2 100.0

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Greater Dublin Area (henceforth GDA) has come to increasingly dominate the urban landscape of the state. While Table 11.1 above examined the overall settlement structure of the state in respect of ‘Census’ cities and towns, Table 11.2 redistributes the population in terms of Functional Areas as defined in the National Spatial Strategy. The concept of Functional Areas is meaningful in the case of Dublin, Cork, Limerick and Galway and it is especially useful in determining the true extent and importance of Dublin and its functional region within the Irish economy and society. In Table 11. 2 the NSS data have been brought forward to 2002 to highlight the changes throughout the state during the period of rapid growth from 1996 to 2002. The Dublin Functional Area contained a population of 1,657,330 or 42.3 per cent of the total population of the state in 2002. More significantly, the Dublin Functional Area accounted for 49.2 per cent of the total increase in population between 1996 and 2002. Dublin was the only Functional Area to significantly increase its share of total population. The strong growth of Dublin is a reflection of the region’s role both within Ireland and as a European capital city and its position as a prime location for Foreign Direct Investment during a period of unusually rapid economic growth. The share of population resident in all other 11 Functional Areas either remained almost constant or suffered small relative declines. There is evidence from the Census data that at least some of the growth of population in areas contiguous to the Dublin Functional Area has arisen as consequence of long-distance commuting to Dublin, as workers seek more affordable housing at ever increasing distances from their place of work in Dublin. Taking Tables 11.2 and 11.3 together, one of the important causes of concern has been the very poor performance of the intermediate sized cities – Cork, Limerick, Galway and Waterford – which together accounted for a small share of the total population growth between 1996 and 2000. In fact the collective share of total population in these four cities actually declined marginally even during this period of national expansion, despite their designation as Gateways in the National Development Plan, 2000–2006 (henceforth NDP). Of these cities, Galway, a strong educational, tourism and shopping centre, is something of an exception, with its share of the population of Connacht-Ulster increasing consistently from 25.0 per cent in 1971 to 29.4 per cent in 2002. None of the cities has achieved the critical mass to challenge the dominance of Dublin nationally or even within their own regions in many respects. Table 11.3 further details the growth performance of the five Irish cities and the 11 largest towns in the state between 1996 and 2002. This table shows that the Dublin NUTS II region, the core of the Dublin Functional Area and the Greater Dublin Area, increased by 6.1 per cent or by 64,557 persons. While some of the other urban centres shown in Table 11.3 had higher growth rates than the Dublin region’s figure, the total increase in the other four cities together with the 11 towns of over 17,000 population in 2002 was 61,932 or just 95.9 per cent of the Dublin Region’s population increase. Significantly, five of

Table 11.2 Population change by Functional Areas, 1996–2002 Functional Area 1996

Population 2002

Dublin 1,514,016 Cork 420,510 Limerick/Ennis/MW 296,920 Galway 188,854 Waterford/Tipp South/Wexford 236,835 Donegal/Derry 129,994 Sligo/Leitrim 87,458 Mayo Triangle 111,524 Kerry 126,130 North Midlands 238,699 Border Areas 103, 095 South Midlands 172,052 Total 3,626,087

1,657,330 448,181 319,032 208,826 254,851 137,383 90,549 117,428 132,424 260,151 107,982 183,199 3,917,336

Population increase No. % 143,314 27,671 22,112 19,972 18,016 7,389 3,091 5,904 6,294 21,452 4,887 11,147 291,249

9.5 6.6 7.4 10.6 7.6 5.7 3.5 5.3 5.0 9.0 4.7 6.5 8.0

Share of total population 1996 2002 41.8 11.6 8.2 5.2 6.5 3.6 2.4 3.1 3.5 6.6 2.8 4.7 100.0

42.3 11.4 8.1 5.3 6.5 3.7 2.3 3.0 3.4 6.6 2.8 4.6 100.0

Source: Functional areas as defined in the NSS Public Consultation Paper ‘Indications for the Way Ahead’: data for 1996 taken from the NSS and for 2002 from Census of Population, 2002.

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Table 11.3 Large urban areas and centres, 1996–2002 City/town

1996

Dublin Region* 1,058,264 Cork + suburbs 179,954 Limerick + suburbs 79,137 Galway City 57,363 Waterford 44,155 Dundalk 30,195 Drogheda 25,282 Bray 27,923 Ennis 17,726 Tralee 19,950 Kilkenny 18,696 Sligo 18,509 Navan 12,810 Carlow 14,979 Naas 14,074 Wexford 15,862 *

2002

1,122,821 186,239 86,998 66,163 46,736 32,505 31,020 30,951 22,051 21,987 20,735 19,735 19,417 18,487 18,288 17,235

Population increase No. % 64,557 6,285 7,861 8,800 2,581 2,310 5,738 3,028 4,325 2,037 2,039 1,226 6,607 3,508 4,214 1,373

6.10 3.49 9.93 15.3 5.85 7.65 22.69 10.84 44 10.21 10.91 6.6 51.58 23.42 29.94 8.66

Dublin is defined as the NUTS III Dublin Region including the City and the counties of Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown, Fingal and South Dublin. Towns are inclusive of their suburbs.

Source: Census of Population 1996 and 2002, Tables 4 and 7.

these 11 towns are located within the Dublin Functional Area discussed above. Dublin continues to dominate the urban pattern of Ireland and to overwhelm the settlement structure of its region to a quite extraordinary degree, in terms of demography, employment and enterprise (BSM et al., 1999). While there is much that could be done to regulate the growth of Dublin, with possible benefit to its international role, policy-makers equate growth with development and are reluctant to put any restraints on the growth of the city and its region (Bannon, Cassidy and Rhys Thomas, 2000). Issues such as diseconomies of metropolitan growth or relative overcentralisation have not been reasonably researched nor properly addressed. While Dublin is a relatively small city by European or international standards, its dominance within the state lies at the heart of debates on settlement strategy and regional policy. Given the primate-style dominance of Dublin and its region, there is little attention given to the themes of the European Spatial Development Perspective, such as interurban, urban–rural or rural–urban cooperation or collaboration. While Dublin has been successfully promoted as a location for

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foreign investment, there has been attention given to the necessity to invest in the development of the critical mass of counter magnets, notably the other Gateways set out in the NDP. 11.2

The Administrative Context for Urban Policy

Reference has been made to the centralised nature of Irish administration, one of the reasons for the dominance and sustained growth of the capital city region. Commercial, financial, political and administrative power is vested in a large number of Dublin-located or Dublin-controlled institutions. The principal tier of administration in Ireland is that of the national government, which is the locus of policy development and financial control. The 15 departments of central government administer funds in accordance with their respective responsibilities. The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (henceforth DOEHLG) has overall responsibility for environmental and spatial planning matters, excluding transport. A number of sections within the DOEHLG deal with aspects of urban policy – urban renewal, planning and the National Spatial Strategy – but there is no over-arching urban policy unit or focus within the Department. Likewise, there is no Minister with exclusive responsibility for urban policy. The central tier of government is supported by a large number of unifunctional State Boards and Regulatory Authorities whose remit is usually statewide, transcending both urban and rural boundaries. A total of eight statutory Regional Authorities perform a coordinating role in respect of their constituent local authorities. They also advise on and have a role in monitoring EU funding within their regions and they have also been given a role in the implementation of the National Spatial Strategy at regional level through their Regional Planning Guidelines, now in draft form. Since 2000 these eight regions (NUTS III) have been complemented by the division of the state into two NUTS II Regional Assembly Areas – a Border, Midland and Western region which retains Objective I status under EU regulations and a Southern and Eastern region which has the status of Objective I in Transition. The major function of the Regional Assemblies is to oversee the implementation of the Regional Operational Programmes of the National Development Plan, 2000–2006. The Dublin Functional Area dominated one NUTS II region and impinges on the other. A separate NUTS II region for Dublin would give a great deal more meaning to the other two regions. The principal unit of local government is the 34 County and City Councils – the mainline local authorities. The County and City Councils generally operate through a number of broad functional headings, including housing and building, roads, water supply and sewerage, development incentives and controls, environmental protection and recreation and amenities. The White Paper on Better Local Government (DOE, 1996) has begun a process of reforming the local

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government system with the establishment of ‘strategic policy groups’ and the creation of a network of County and City Development Boards. While County and City Councils remain heavily dependent on central government for much of their funding, there is now an accelerating trend towards having local authorities charge for services and a new system of development levies is likely to generate significant local funds. Below the County and City councils, there exists a network of urban district and town councils whose operations now generally nest within the 34 mainline local authorities. Dublin City Council, the largest local authority, frequently is sometimes aggrieved that it has to operate and run the capital city within the same framework and with the same powers as the smaller councils. Given that central government is based within Dublin, there is sometimes a desire by Ministers to involve themselves in the affairs of the city. The Irish local government system is based on a series of historical divisions of the territory, many of which transcend modern urban or regional realities. As has been stated above, Ireland is characterised by its very high level of centralised administrative control, with limited institutional development at the regional level, and an extensive network of local authorities which have a limited range of functions, lack adequate local resources and are strictly controlled by central government (Bannon and Greer, 1998; Callanan and Keogan, 2003). Subnational units of government are strictly controlled and closely monitored by the relevant central government or agency. During the mid-1990s there was evidence pointing to the emergence of a period of strong economic growth (Bannon and Greer, 1998). These early shoots of growth flowered into a phase of unprecedented expansion, commonly referred to as the Celtic Tiger phenomenon. The scale of growth was such as to create a discontinuity with much of Ireland’s previous experience. A change of government in mid-1997 led to changes in political ideologies and to different economic and social priorities. While many of the initiatives operating in 1997 have continued, emphasis may often have changed, while implementation procedures and delivery mechanisms may have been refocused. Economic development has been substantially driven by foreign direct investment, with a relatively weak performance by the indigenous sector, despite efforts to promote local development, including those set out in the Better Local Government White Paper (DOE, 1996). Policy developments relating to urbanisation during most of the 1990s were strongly influenced by the EU funded Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development, 1994–1999, implemented in tandem with a range of other EU programmes and initiatives (Bannon and Greer, 1998). In contrast, the Irish National Development Plan, 2000–2006 relies heavily on national resources to fund its proposed €51.5 billion development programme. Under the Community Support Framework, 2000–2006, the contribution from ‘Community Participation’ has been set at €3.172 million, with a further €567 million earmarked for Ireland from the Cohesion Fund between 2000 and 2004. Domestic policy has an increasing reliant on its own resources, with an emphasis on privatisation

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and market approaches to economic development and social provision. These include the adoption of public–private partnership approaches for a wide range of major projects. Strictly speaking, Ireland does not have an urban policy per se. Rather, in respect of the physical environment, the approach is essentially national, with the regional, urban and rural policy components being viewed as part of an integrated whole and each adopting an appropriate emphasis. Responsibility for environmental, planning and urban policy rests primarily with the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government whose mission is to promote sustainable development and improve the quality of life through protection of the environment and heritage, infrastructure provision, balanced regional development and good local government. Other departments of government also play a role in relation to urban policy, notably the Departments of Finance, Transport, Enterprise, Trade and Employment and Arts, Sport and Tourism, together with their operational agencies. While planners and those involved in urban development activity might have wished for such a strong coherent urban focus to have been continued and built upon in the National Development Plan, 2000–2006, the government chose to thread support for urban themes through a range of programmes operating from a number of government departments. At the same time, there have been many continuities of relevance to urban issues, most notably, the continuing work of the Dublin Transportation Office, the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Roads Authority. Major statements relating to planning and having a relevance to urban policy include the White Paper on local government reform (DOE, 1996), the national strategy for sustainability (DOE, 1997), the Planning and Development Act, 2000 and the National Spatial Strategy (DOELG, 2002). All these policy documents apply to the state as appropriate, while policy documents such as guidelines for retail planning (DOELG, 2000) or increasing densities (DOELG, 1999; DEGW, 2000) apply particularly to urban regions. The single most important action programme relating to urban policy for much of the last 10 years has been the focus on urban renewal. The initial emphasis was on EU and Exchequer funding of urban renewal projects, most notably the Urban and Village Renewal Sub-Programme of the OP LURD programme from 1994 up to 2000. Under the Sub-Programme, payments totalling €145 million had been made, including payments in respect of the Temple Bar Cultural Project. In the six years of operation that programme supported ‘major initiatives’ in run down areas of the five cities, as well as improvements to the physical environment of 105 towns across the state. The Sub-Programme, with the aid of funding from FEOGA, enabled improvements to be made to 684 villages to underpin their future and involved ‘general amenity improvements (and) the development of focal points/meeting places’. Some 157 conservation projects or phases of projects were assisted and the development of the Temple Bar Cultural Quarter was completed.

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The enactment of the Urban Renewal Act, 1986 and the associated Finance legislation to the establishment of the Customs House Docks Development Authority in Dublin and to the introduction of tax-based incentives to promote urban renewal in designated parts of the five cities, later extended ‘to cover over 100 designated areas in 35 urban centres’ (Bannon and Greer, 1988, p. 203). From a rather slow and somewhat confused start, the tax-led approach has become the leading component of urban renewal policy. In 1986 the Department of the Environment commissioned a major review of the operation of the urban renewal process. That review recommended that for the future the designation of areas for renewal should be undertaken with the context of carefully prepared Integrated Area Plans which would provide the framework for the renewal process (KPMG, 1996). Such Integrated Area Plans should reflect the specific needs of areas, be cross-sectoral in approach integrating the developing of ‘a diverse range of sectors and groups’, involve local communities and set measurable targets upon which to base monitoring and evaluation (KPMG, 1996, p. 141). The concept of IAPs embraced the physical, economic and social aspects of renewal within an integrated framework. The tax-led approach was strengthened by the introduction of the Urban Renewal Act, 1998 and the Town Renewal Act, 2000. For the most part, urban renewal investment has been in residential developments, affecting a wide range of urban places throughout the state. The largest urban renewal undertaking in the state is the rejuvenation of the 526 ha. area of the designated Dublin Docklands. This project includes the former Custom House Docks Development site and is being carried out by the Dublin Docklands Development Authority. Section 11.4 of this chapter will examine the urban renewal programme in some detail and it will also outline details of a number of other complementary renewal activities. The various urban regeneration programmes have transformed the image of Irish cities and towns. Tax-led incentives have resulted in a huge inflow of investment into all significant urban centres. However there are limitations to tax-led programmes which on their own lead to property rather than societal or community renewal. There are also questions as to the desirable or practical balance to achieve between redevelopment and refurbishment or conservation. While there was a substantative review of the urban renewal programme in 1996 (KPMG, 1996), no formal reassessment of the programme has been undertaken since that date, despite its expanding influence and importance. Of equal concern is the absence of an over- arching urban policy within which the role of tax-led urban renewal could be contextualised and evaluated. 11.3

The State of the Cities

The very rapid economic growth experienced by Ireland, and especially in its cities, has meant that cities have become prosperous and have been in a position

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to fulfil long-standing development objectives. At a time of prosperity, the availability and expansion of tax-based urban renewal incentives has led to a quite massive property boom in the cities and in most significant towns. This has been especially true in Dublin where the new development has served to rid the city of its sizeable legacy of obsolescent buildings and derelict sites. Both cities and towns have witnessed the emergence of a buoyant market in apartment construction, a demand fuelled by the growth of new households, particularly one- and twoperson households, in what has become an increasingly secular society. The economic prosperity has also driven a demand for rapid growth in both the office and industrial property markets, notably in and around Dublin. While growth has been widespread across the urban system, Dublin has been the principal beneficiary of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ growth. Dublin has developed and is promoted as the Irish location where ‘the global economy comes down to earth’. The cities, most especially Dublin, find themselves in a somewhat invidious position. On the one hand, in the absence of a strong local financial base, they have been heavily dependent on a grant from central government to cover much of the expenditure. They are part of the national network of local authorities even though their role and importance may greatly differ from that of the average local authority. At the same time, they must play an international role for which they have much less autonomy than most of their counterparts across the EU. In Dublin and other cities, the scale of rapid growth and its consequences had been largely unforeseen. Decades of economic stagnation had resulted in a lack of adequate investment in infrastructure and the failure to proceed with many worthy and essential projects. The arrival of a largely unexpected economic boom was to give rise to critical capacity problems, particularly in the case of Dublin and most notably in the fields of housing supply, road capacity and the inadequacy of public transport infrastructures. Rising house prices have forced people to locate further and further away from city centres, thereby compounding the transportation challenge. As will be seen below, many significant infrastructure projects are now coming on stream, but the supply-led approach to housing policy together with an unregulated land market continues to give rise to problems, especially for first-time buyers. A tax-driven and property-led renewal programme can be expected to generate ‘place prosperity’ rather than ‘people prosperity.’ There is also a good deal of evidence that some renewal initiatives have led to social displacement and to community fragmentation. In relation to property-led renewal, Punch argues that this kind of renewal tends to encourage speculative activity, producing a high proportion of large-scale buildings for high-grade uses. Although this may well engender rapid physical development and prove lucrative for well-placed landowners and developers, the outcome for poorer inner city communities and the local infrastructure of small businesses, services, facilities and amenities that sustain them may not be so favourable (Punch, 2001, p. 49).

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There is also a view that the expected ‘community gain’ from the Integrated Area Plan procedure for the urban renewal schemes, as discussed above, has not materialised locally nor has it impacted on the people most directly affected by the new developments, as had been anticipated. Communities complain that projects are sometimes over-scaled and that community involvement in the implementation processes has been very limited. All too often, new development and redevelopment tend to take place at the expense of the heritage and the traditional urban character. There is increasing evidence of concern that the entrepreneurial approach to urban renewal is in conflict with the needs of communities and the weaker sections of urban society McQuick and MacLaran (2001) argue that the potential of the entrepreneurial approach to enable planners to implement the social dimensions of planning schemes is compromised by a pro-development local authority corporate vision at the managerial level. Significant pockets of relative poverty are to be found within the cities and in many of the towns across the country. While good work has been underway in refurbishing some of the public housing stock, especially older blocks of flats, much remains to be done especially in regard to older local authority estates. All the cities are experiencing serious problems with drug-related crime and abuse, problems compounded by the financial restraints on social programmes. While much of the urban renewal is to be commended in itself, it is not impacting on the social problems within the cities. Problems of homelessness are increasing and, while the nature of homelessness has changed over the time, the numbers on the housing waiting lists have been increasing steadily (Threshold, 2002). In 2001 the government established a programme aimed at revitalising areas by planning, investment and development: RAPID. The RAPID programme has been designed to bring about better coordination and closer integration in the delivery of services in some 45 city and town areas of disadvantage. Communitybased Area Implementation Teams were established and plans have been drawn up and submitted to address the needs of each of the areas. The costs and the implementation of these plans were to be borne by the various government departments and agencies and front-loaded under the National Development Plan. In the absence of an over-all evaluation of the programme, it is difficult to say what has been achieved or how actions under the programme have related to the various local plans. In the case of the Traveller community, Ireland’s most visible minority, only 22 per cent of the estimated housing need has been met and in the case of the four Dublin local authorities only 194 units have been provided out of an estimated need for 1,057 residential units.

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Recent National Urban Policy Initiatives

The period since 1997 has been an exciting one in terms of policy developments relating to national, regional and local development, planning and the environment. The drivers of these policy advances included the needs arising from the rapid growth of the economy, the culmination of initiatives commenced earlier and the impact of EU directives and influences, notably the report of the Potsdam 1999 meeting of the European Spatial Development Perspective. As was stated in section 11.1 above, while most policy changes are national in scope, their impact is greatest in respect of cities and towns since this is where most people live; these are the locale for almost all major developments and it is in and around cities and towns that problems of land use change and competition are most intense and complex. This section looks in some depth at four categories of policy advances of relevance to contemporary urban conditions. These include new and comprehensive planning and development legislation, an extensive array of urban renewal activity and supports, the formulation of a national spatial strategy and a range of urban infrastructural projects now coming on stream. Each of these four elements is dealt with below. The Planning and Development Act, 2000 The Planning and Development Act, 2000 can be seen as an updating of the original 1963 act and a consolidation of that and subsequent legislation relating to planning. But the act is also a major deepening and strengthening of the role and potential of the planning system for Irish society. There is a strong emphasis on the principles of sustainable development and best practice in relation to the wide canvas of planning as adopted in the act. Some of the many changes introduced through this act include statutory provisions for the making and implementation of Ministerial Guidelines and Directives, Regional Planning Guidelines and Local Area Plans, for all types of areas be they urban or rural areas or rural–urban localities. Part IV of the act deals extensively with the protection and enhancement of the architectural heritage, including the making of Architectural Conservation Areas and Areas of Special Planning Control. In conjunction with the recently published National Spatial Strategy, 2002–2020, the act lays the frame work for a hierarchy of plans from local to national and affecting all parts of the state. Perhaps the most significant innovation within the legislation is contained in Part V of the act dealing with Housing Supply. Under this section local authorities have been required to prepare, implement and review housing strategies to meet the housing needs of their administrative areas. In turn, the housing strategy becomes an integral part of the development plan, where provision has to be provided for the implementation of the housing requirements. It may be that the requirement to properly calculate the housing need of an area will in turn bring an intellectual rigour to many of the development plans.

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In an effort to counter social segregation and the development of large oneclass housing estates, Section 96 of the act made provision for a percentage of the lands in housing and mixed use developments to be made available for ‘social and affordable’ housing. In many of the housing strategies this allocation was set at, or near, 20 per cent of the site area, the maximum allowable. This provision has been relaxed in the Planning and Development Act, 2002, whereby a local authority Manager may agree to accept a cash payment, based on the existing use value of the site, or a land transfer off-site in the same jurisdiction in lieu of the social and affordable requirement in specific sites or cases. While the 2002 act requires that a number of factors should be taken into account, including the need to counteract undue segregation, the net effect of the amending legislation may be to reduce the level of social integration envisaged in Part V of the 2000 act (Grist, 2003). Significantly, Dublin city council, which has exhausted its housing land supply, is insisting on the Part V mechanism to meet the requirements of its Housing Strategy. Implementation of Part V of the act, together with improved supports for voluntary housing societies and associations, should improve conditions for the homeless and the very poor in society. Other provisions of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 deal with enforcement, planning and other appeals, environmental impact assessment, the acquisition of land, amenities and compensation issues. The act also makes provision for Strategic Development Zones, which can be used to facilitate commercial and industrial development or to provide for major residential development, notably at Adamstown in west Dublin. Overall, the act has modernised the Irish planning system and, together with the related Statutory Instruments and Regulations, it facilitates higher standards of development and it expands the social purpose of planning for urban areas. Urban Regeneration Initiatives Provisions under the Urban Renewal Acts, 1986 and 1998 and the Town Renewal Act, 2000, together with the related financial legislation, permit the granting of tax incentives to promote urban and town renewal in specific approved circumstances. In some cases these incentives operated in parallel with EU and Exchequer grant assistance in centre city renewal programmes, but since the late 1990s taxbased renewal schemes have become operational in the cities and in many towns throughout the state. As stated above, a review of the workings of the urban renewal schemes was undertaken in 1996. This review recommended that areas to be designated for future renewal should be based on Integrated Area Plans (KPMG, 1996). Integrated Area Plans have been prepared to identify those areas within cities and towns in need of urban regeneration and to define the physical, economic and social needs of these areas within their wider urban context. In February 1999, the minister responsible for urban renewal announced that areas within the five cities and 38 large towns had been approved for inclusion under the 1999 Urban Renewal Scheme. Approvals were in the context of their

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Integrated Area Plans and developments had to conform to the Departmental Guidelines, with owner-occupiers and investors eligible to avail of significant tax allowances. Incentives apply to both residential and commercial developments within approved renewal schemes. A broadly similar Town Renewal Scheme was introduced in July 2000, under which a further 100 towns became eligible for tax-led incentives on the basis of their approved Town Renewal Plans. A third scheme of tax-based urban renewal incentives was introduced in April 2001. The Living Over the Shop Scheme designated 13,000 m of streets in parts of the five cities where tax incentives could be taken advantage of in an effort to stimulate renewal and an intensification of use. In the case of residential developments, the scheme allowed owner-occupiers and investors or lessors to claim 100 per cent of the eligible refurbishment or necessary new-build costs against tax on total income. The Living Over the Shop Scheme also allowed some additional incentives for ‘associated commercial development’. Civic authorities, especially in the major cities, have played a crucial role in the implementation of renewal schemes and the opportunities to develop important civic improvements, as at Smithfield in Dublin, Patrick Street in Cork and the riverside treatment in Limerick. It is projected that the three tax-based renewal schemes, which are to run until the end of June 2006, subject to certain conditions, could generate a total investment of the order of €4.0 billion during their lifetime, see Table 11.4. Table 11.4 Level of investment in urban renewal schemes by stage of development, €m Type of scheme Completed

Urban Renewal Town Renewal Living Over the Shop Total

481 63 7 551

Stage of development Work in Planning progress stage 1,611 80 27 1,718

2,804 334 32 3,170

Total

4,896 477 66 5,439

Source: Data as of 31 December 2003 for the Urban and Town Renewal Schemes and 30 June 2003 for the LOTS scheme. Information supplied by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government.

By the end of December 2003 the level of investment in projects completed or in progress was €2.269 million. The three components of the scheme involve a total of 1,734 projects, of which 489 (28.2 per cent) have been completed and a further 415 (23.9 per cent) were under construction. While both the Urban and the Town Renewal schemes have attracted large scale investment, take-up under the Living Over the Shop initiative has been disappointing, due to a large

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number of complex issues, including patterns of ownership rights, problems with obtaining clear title, security, building regulation requirements and lack of an adequate level of income to avail of tax benefits. In Bannon and Greer (1998) it was stated that the Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural Development 1994–1999 has had the greatest impact on the development and, in some cases the redevelopment, of the larger urban centres. Expenditure on urban and village renewal projects under this programme amounted to some €146.7 million. Drawing on this success, subsequent policy initiatives have focused strongly on urban regeneration and renewal initiatives. In general, these initiatives are now diffused across a wide range of programmes and the emphasis has shifted strongly away from grant supports in favour of tax-based incentives. The remainder of this section outlines the principal urban renewal schemes now in operation, as well as reference to a number of other initiatives where assistance to urban or village renewal may be considered in special circumstances. As part of the two Regional Operational Programmes under the National Development Plan 2000–2006, an Urban and Village Measure was included as part of the Local Infrastructure Sub-Programmes. This Measure is administered by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and implemented by the local authorities in each region. As part of the implementation procedures, the local authorities were required, with the involvement of local communities, to draw up framework action plans to be implemented during the currency of the National Development Plan. It was envisaged that investment of the order of €158 million would be made under this Measure between 2000 and 2006, with the contribution from the ERDF being just in excess of €68 million. The programme is being implemented in both Regional Assembly regions by the local authorities in accordance with Guidelines issued by the Department of the Environment and Local Government (DOELG, 2001). While the initiatives discussed above constitute the major urban regeneration approaches currently in operation, a number of other programmes contain measures which directly or indirectly assist urban and village renewal. The EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland, 2000–2004 contains a number of community and tourism related measures where town or village renewal schemes throughout the six Border counties may receive assistance as part of wider development objectives. Under the URBAN Community Initiative, 2000–2006 the Dublin working–class suburb of Ballyfermot and including the older neighbourhood of Ballyfermot and the newer area of Cherry Orchard, is to receive an investment of €11.4 million aimed at the physical, economic and social improvement of the area and its facilities. The Dublin Docklands Development Authority, which is responsible for the rejuvenation of some 526 ha. of the former docks area has a sophisticated mix of policies for the renewal of their area, including development incentives,

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infrastructure supports, conservation and social housing initiatives (Drudy, 1999; Bartley and Treadwell Shine, 2003). The scale of this mixed-use development on a ‘brown-field’ inner city site is unparalleled in the state, and the quality of the urban design is setting new standards. The Department of Finance has in place a blanket Rural Renewal Scheme which provides tax-based incentives for approved residential and commercial development in the designated Upper Shannon area and inclusive of the towns and villages throughout the area. Likewise, both the LEADER Community Initiative and the CLAR Programme for Revitalising Rural Areas allow for funding support for village enhancement schemes and local authority housing estate enhancement schemes as part of an overall improvement of rural environment and quality of life considerations. A range of Community Development initiatives operated by the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs can also transcend the rural/urban divide, while the RAPID programme which aims at revitalising areas by planning, investment and development has targeted 25 urban areas and 20 provincial towns where Area Implementation Teams have been put in place to draw up plans to address the needs of the area. While the interdepartmental and inter-agency coordinating groups have been established, and Dublin has set up a social inclusion task-force, it is difficult to assess the overall impact of RAPID in the absence of a formal evaluation. An examination of the ‘progress reports’ of the various local RAPID groups suggests that progress towards implementation has been varied and the impact to date often limited. On 2 February 2004, the minister responsible announced that ‘a dedicated fund of €4.5 million has been set aside for capital expenditure for the RAPID programme to support such small-scale projects’ (Dail Debates, 2 February 2004). It is proposed that such investments will also be co-funded by the relevant national agency. Research by Coogan questions the extent of additional investment provided under the programme or the degree to which it has facilitated community participation or local ownership of the programme (Coogan, 2003). Urban renewal has become a key component of many strands of Irish development policy. It had long been evident that virtually all cities and towns contained an important heritage of buildings and areas that were in urgent need of new investment. Such investment was also necessary if the towns were to modernise and to become attractive for enterprise investment and tourism development. Initiatives commenced under the Urban Renewal Act, 1986 have increased momentum during the economic boom of the later half of the 1990s, although concern arises as to the emphasis on new-build rather than renovation and rehabilitation, while tax-led initiatives do not readily lend themselves to dealing with issues such as social and community integration. It is a cause of concern that, with the exception of Cork city, the take up of the Living Over the Shop Scheme has been disappointing. From a planning perspective, there is concern that the various urban regeneration incentives do not place a higher emphasis on the conservation and that the widespread emphasis on ‘new build’

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is radically altering the traditional character, the individuality of Irish towns and cities and their social and community mix. The National Spatial Strategy 2002–2020 The European Spatial Development Perspective (EU, 1999) had called for member states to produce national spatial development reports, and in Dublin, the ESRI in its early 1999 review of national investment priorities called for the implementation of a ‘nodal strategy which will have the best chance of promoting balanced and sustainable regional development’ (Fitz Gerald, 1999). This call was further taken up in the Government’s National Development Plan, 2000–2006 in which it argued for the ‘promotion over the period of the Plan of a small number of additional regional Gateways (urban growth centres) to complement the existing Gateways and to drive development throughout both Regions’ (Government of Ireland, 1999). The NDP also called for a National Spatial Strategy is to be completed within two years. In November 1999 the government mandated the DOELG to prepare a National Spatial Strategy having regard to the context set out in the National Development Plan, 2000–2006. A Spatial Planning Unit was established within the Department to undertake the work, assisted by a Technical Working Group and an Expert Advisory Group. Cross-departmental involvement was secured through a Steering Group representative of the relevant government departments and the use of a consultative process across a wide spectrum involving the social partners, local and regional authorities and many different interest groups both North and South. In addition, a team of consultants was appointed to assist with a total of approximately 30 research tasks and covering topics such as population, household formation and the Irish urban and rural systems (Spatial Planning Unit, 2000). The National Spatial Strategy 2002–2020 (henceforth the NSS), was released on 28 November 2002 (DEOLG, 2002). Having reviewed the key development trends within Ireland and their spatial consequences, the NSS report addressed the likely future trends under a number of alternative scenarios. Thus the population of the state could increase from 3,787,000 in 2000 to between 4,391,000 and 5,013,000 in 2020. On the basis of recent trends, up to four-fifths of the population growth in the state could take place in or in areas adjoining the Greater Dublin Area over the next 20 years (NSS, 2002). The number of cars on the Irish roads could double between 1996 and 2016. The number of households could increase from a 1996 baseline of 1.123 million to a 2020 estimate of 1.889 to 2.083 million. Such a level of household growth would represent an increase of between 68.2 and 85.5 per cent over the period, with the share of the national housing stock located in the Greater Dublin Area increasing from 38.8 per cent in 1996 up to 44.4 per cent of total in 2020 were current trends to continue. Having regard to the need for balanced regional development in the interests of economic efficiency, improved quality of life and to secure proper planning

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for settlement development, the NSS proposed a major modification of current development trends. The aim of the strategy is to secure a better and more rational future spatial pattern based on the following five elements of spatial structure and their policy roles as set out in Table 11.5: Table 11.5 The five spatial elements of the NSS and their future roles Spatial element

Future roles

A more efficient Greater Dublin Area

The Greater Dublin Area’s vital national role is secured in terms of improved mobility, urban design quality, social mix, international and regional connections. Balanced national growth and development are secured with the support of a small number of nationally significant centres, whose location and scale support the achievement of the type of critical mass necessary to sustain strong levels of job growth in the regions. Balanced patterns of growth are supported by towns that link the capabilities of the gateways to other areas. Balanced patterns of growth are supported by towns that capitalise on local and regional roles and are also linked to the roles of the gateways and development hubs. Rural areas benefit from enhanced employment options and from development of their local resource potential.

Strong Gateways in other Regions

Hubs

County and other town structure

Vibrant and diversified rural areas

The Strategy designated a total of nine Gateways, including Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Galway and Waterford which had been designated in the National Development Plan, 2000–2006; these are described in the Strategy as ‘existing Gateways’ while a further four new Gateways have been designated including Dundalk, Sligo, Letterkenny and the ‘linked Gateway’ of Athlone/Mullingar/ Tullamore in the midlands. It is envisaged that the Dundalk and Letterkenny Gateways would have close cooperation with border towns within Northern Ireland. A total of 11 towns received designation as Hubs, most of these being located in the relatively underdeveloped areas of the country and designed to stimulate growth in these regions. While the NSS does not provide precise future populations for the ‘new Gateways’ or for the proposed Hubs, the given characteristics of gateways include populations of the order of 100,000, wide ranges of primary

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and secondary education as well as a third level facility, large clusters of modern industry, a regional hospital, theatres and a focal point for transport and communications etc. Hubs are described as having a population within the range of 20,000–40,000, a good mix of medium and larger businesses, a local and/or regional hospital, good amenities and an effective transportation system. Table 11.6 provides indicative figures of the scale of change envisaged in the NSS for the five existing Gateways – a scale necessary if the current national patterns of population, housing and employment are to be significantly changed in the years ahead. Such a scale of future growth and its redistribution could bring about a very different future geography of the country. Table 11.6 Possible population growth of existing Gateways, 000s Gateways and catchments.

Population 2002

Greater Dublin Area Cork Limerick Galway Waterford Total

1,535 350 236 146 119 2,386

2020 population: current trends 1,938 360 260 181 138 2,877

2020 population: economic growth 2,200 454 284 192 164 3,294

Source: Data is for the Gateways and their surrounding catchment areas. See NSS p. 49.

In launching the strategy, the Taoiseach/Prime Minister stated that the strategy marks a new stage in our maturity and development as a nation, as we plan for the future development of our country … The Strategy will act in three ways: It will bring a better spread of job opportunities … It will bring a better quality of life … It will bring better places to live in.

As for the future of the NSS, much depends on the continued commitment to implementation and the effectiveness of the policies to deliver it over the period up to 2020. The implementation of the National Development Plan, 2000–2006 is considered as a first step in the development of the original Gateways, as is the implementation of land-use/transportation frameworks for Cork (Atkins, 2001), Limerick (Colin Buchanan and Partners, 2001) and the other cities. However, the growth performance of these cities between 1996 and 2002, as seen in Table11.1 above, is hardly reassuring. The NSS report places an emphasis on various forms of partnership and cooperation, both public and private. There is also an emphasis on central/ regional/local coordination and collaboration. Regional planning guidelines are being prepared for the regions, and revised in the case of the Greater Dublin

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Area to translate the overall national approach of the NSS into policies at regional and local levels. The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government places particular attention on the widespread adoption of the processes of the NSS. According to the NSS report all relevant public sector policies and programmes will have to be consistent with the NSS and will be required to demonstrate that consistency. A Cabinet Sub-Committee on Housing, Infrastructure and Public Private Partnerships has been charged with monitoring the implementation of the strategy, while government departments and agencies were to put structures and mechanisms in place to support the NSS and ensure that it is embedded in their policies and programmes. The DOEHLG stresses the importance of the interdepartmental committee and the necessity of having all relevant agencies of government committed to and actively supporting the strategy. It had been anticipated that any future programme of government office relocation would be tailored to support the rapid development of the designated Gateways as key nodes in the regional development strategies. In the event a government announcement of December 2003 stated that over 10,000 public service jobs would be relocated to a total of 53 locations in 25 counties. Approximately 50 per cent of these posts are scheduled to relocate to towns within the Greater Dublin area and the immediately adjacent counties, with few jobs earmarked for the Gateways apart from the ‘linked Gateway’ of Athlone/ Mullingar/Tullamore in the Midlands region. While the government has stated that the proposed relocations are consistent with the NSS strategy, it remains unclear as to how this could be so. While the government appears determined to implement this ‘decentralisation’ initiative, there has been strong opposition to the proposed relocations, particularly from senior staff, on a range of efficiency, economic and social grounds. If this programme proves successful, it is likely to further enhance the dominance of Dublin and the east of the country as a business and enterprise location. Since the publication of the National Spatial Strategy much of the media attention and commentary has focused on the question of Gateways and Hubs. Were too many nominated? Can they be delivered? What policies will be enacted to support these designations? In particular, will industrial location policies follow the strategy? What of service industry location policies? Can the designated Gateways achieve their growth targets and expanded role without the injection of public sector decentralisation? Will the essential hard strategic choices be made or will populism and localism win out? Regional Planning Guidelines have now been drafted for each of the eight Regional Authority areas inter-alia to give effect to the National Spatial Strategy at regional level, but to date few concrete or significant investment steps have been taken to give effect to the NSS designations.

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Major Urban Infrastructural Projects Reference has been made to the problems generated by rapid growth in circumstances where the physical infrastructure was inadequate to service the increased demand. This was especially the case in relation to almost all facets of transportation infrastructure by the mid-1990s. A number of major projects are now nearing completion which should alleviate many of the current difficulties in Dublin as well as in other cities, after years of discussion, financial and legal difficulties and political indecision and delays. The construction of a 41 km C-ring motorway around Dublin is nearing completion. This motorway was recommended in the Dublin Transportation Study of 1972 and the first completed section was opened in 1991. Following the completion of the Dublin Transportation Initiative and the publication of its final report in 1995, the government established, the Dublin Transportation Office to coordinate transport policy for the Dublin city region and to produce a practicable set of recommendations for new transportation infrastructure and complementary measures to manage projected growth (DTO, 2001). The DTO is working to a vision of Dublin as a civilised, vibrant city, a place where people live, work and relax and enjoy their leisure time, accessible to all. In addition to its traffic management role, the DTO is responsible for the implementation of the Dublin light rail project, the LUAS, the introduction of bus lanes and Quality Bus Corridors (QBCs), cycleways and pedestrian routes. The two LUAS light rail lines from the southern suburbs were due to be completed by mid-2004. To date, some nine QBCs are in operation. The DTO strategy document A Platform for Change sets out the plans for bus, light rail, metro and traffic management between 2001 and 2016. Initially the DTO operated under the aegis of the Department of the Environment, but now operates under the Ministry of Transport. In an effort to remove heavy goods traffic from the streets of Dublin, a 5.6 km. Dublin Port Tunnel is under construction at an estimated cost of €685 million. The tunnel, which extends from the Dublin port to the MI motorway and C-ring near to the airport, was due for completion in late 2004. When fully in operation, these developments should facilitate easier movement within and around Dublin and they should contribute to an enhancement of the city and the quality of life of the citizens and visitors alike. The 2001 Cork Area Strategic Plan (Atkins, 2001) proposes an investment programme of €2,015 billion in infrastructure development, the creation of an integrated transport system and environmental improvements for the development and expansion of the metropolitan area between 2001 and 2021. Broadly similar long-term strategies are being developed for the Limerick area (Colin Buchanan and Partners, 2001) and for other cities and major towns. Another crucial infrastructural investment programme essential for quality of life and expansion has been large scale modernisation of the wastewater treatment facilities provided in all the cities and major towns in recent years.

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Many of the programmes discussed above were significantly assisted by various EU funding contributions. Whether many or all of these investments would have proceeded at all without EU support is debatable. What is without doubt is that they would not have been put in place in anything like the same timeframe. 11.5

The Impact of EU Policies

There can be little doubt that the overwhelming majority of Irish people would regard the impact of EU membership as being positive and beneficial in many respects. EU membership, its policies, its influences and its support have all assisted in Ireland’s modernisation and transformation since joining the EEC in 1973. However, there are relatively few reliable quantifiable indicators to measure the full impact of EU membership or the influence of many of its policies. In the Irish case there is coordination between the National Development Plan and the Community Support Framework for Ireland. Thus, the CSF may be seen as an agreed subset of the wider programme of investment and development as set out in the National Development Plan. Both are implemented through Operational Programmes which deal with Economic and Social Infrastructure, the Productive Sector, Human Resources and Regional Development which transcend exclusively urban or rural or even regional concerns in many instances. It can be argued that there are four means by which European policy impacts on Ireland, including the cities. The first way in which policy affects Ireland is through the transposition of EU Directives into Irish law, especially Directives dealing with issues of social policy, environment and health and safety. Of particular relevance to urban planning are the Directives on Environmental Impact Assessment, Habitats and Strategic Environmental Assessment. These EU Directives are not place specific; however they can have a very important impact in metropolitan and urban areas, since it is there that population and employment are concentrated and that environments may be both precious and under particular pressure. It is estimated by Clinch (2001) that a total of €18.256 million has been proposed under the National Development Plan, 2000–2006 to cover the costs of some key environmental elements, including many to meet the requirements of EU Directives. A second strand of EU influence comes through direct action on the ground in Ireland. Examples relevant to this chapter include Urban Pilot projects notably in Cork city and the work of URBAN I Community Initiative which involved a €28 million contribution from the ERDF and ESF funds towards the improvement of two disadvantaged areas in Dublin and the north-side of Cork city. The Irish designated area for URBAN II, 2000–2006 is the Ballyfermot-Cherry Orchard area of Dublin, where a planned investment of €11.420 million is 50.0 per cent co-funded through the ERDF. Even the EAGGF fund in 1994–99 contributed just over €16 million to village renewal as part of the Structural Funds. Other Community Initiatives, such as LEADER, INTERREG and PEACE deal with

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a range of largely non-urban issues, but can have a variety of urban and village applications. Looking forward, the EU proposal to establish a Thematic Strategy on the Urban Environment, with its emphasis on sustainable urban transport, design and construction and the creation of management systems for urban sustainability, may prove a catalyst to strengthen urban policy and to further improve urban conditions. The EU Structural Funds are undoubtedly the most visible and the best known form of EU policy influence throughout Ireland, including the cities and towns. Since Ireland constituted a single NUTS II, Objective I region up to the end of 1999, Dublin and the other cities could all benefit from co-financed investment. The Community Support Framework, 1994–1999 approved a CSF investment programme of €14.576 million of which €5,620 was to be contributed from the Structural Funds, principally the ERDF. While the Irish National Development Plan, 2000–2006 has set out an investment programme of €51.536 million over the seven years of the programme, the Community Support Programme, 2000–2006 relates only to €7.002 million of the NDP with EU ‘transitional support’ being set at €3.172 million and diminishing in the years up to 2006. One directly relevant component of the CSF 1994–1999 was the Local Urban and Rural Priority and the Urban and Village Renewal Sub-Programme which invested €146.7 million in a wide array of city, town and village projects. Structural funding has contributed significantly to Ireland and it is estimated that the cumulative effect of the CSF is to raise GNP by between 2.5 per cent and 3 per cent by 1998–99 (Fitz Gerald, 1998). The structural funds have enabled rapid progress to be made in respect of urban transport and infrastructures, as well as assisting in the skilling and re-skilling of the labour force and enabling the unemployed to avail of the opportunities offered by the boom of the late 1990s. In addition, State Aid payments to industry made between 1995 and 2002 amounted to €2.444 million, of which a total of €1.137 million, or 46.5 per cent, was invested in the Greater Dublin Area. Another important source of productive funding for Ireland has been the Cohesion Fund which between 1993 and 2002 contributed €1.997 million towards the costs of various infrastructural projects. These have included major waste water treatment works for the cities of Dublin, Cork and Limerick, as well as port improvement works at Dublin, Cork and Waterford. The Cohesion Fund has also been used in the construction costs of the Dublin C-ring motorway and it has contributed to the funding of numerous urban by-passes throughout the country. The Cohesion Funding expires in 2004 with a scheduled expenditure of €263 million for the years 2003–2004. Without this scale of capital expenditure many of these important infrastructural projects would not have been possible. Finally, the impact of the EU and its policies on Ireland and on its urban residents is positively influenced by a vast array of networks, information flows, exchanges and research funding initiatives.

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241

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has examined the processes of urban change in Ireland since the mid1990s, a period of rapid growth and unprecedented social and economic change. This growth has fuelled the continued expansion of Dublin and the increasing dominance of Dublin in terms of population, economic activity and the urban system. Even those Gateways outside Dublin, and designated in the National Development Plan, 2000–2006, have performed modestly at best. Developments relevant to urban policy include the enactment of a comprehensive and up-to-date Planning and Development Act, 2000 which makes provision for a hierarchy of planning structures and which attempts to develop the economic and social roles of planning. The principal component of urban policy operating in recent years has been the various urban renewal programmes, including the urban and village renewal supports provided through the regional Operational Programmes of the NDP and a wide array of tax-led renewal incentives, principally the urban and town renewal schemes operated by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government and which may generate an investment of around €4 billion during their life time. But there is evidence of a policy polarisation, particularly in the case of Dublin, between the entrepreneurial approaches to renewal and more community and locally based collaborative models of urban regeneration. City programmes and plans include a large number of strategic infrastructure projects, which will do much to facilitate intra urban movement and improve the quality of life. The EU has played a significant and multifaceted role in these and many other strategic policies, which have helped to develop and to modernise the country. Strictly speaking, Ireland does not have an urban policy per se at present; rather, urban policy is threaded through a wide range of national programmes and implemented by a confusion of routes and agencies. For the future, Ireland needs a much more explicit and coherent overarching and proactive urban policy. Such an urban policy should give priority to better defining the roles of different levels of urban places and to ensure that these roles are supported and enhanced with efficiency and effectively. The role of cities outside Dublin, as well as other designated Gateways, must be discussed and implemented with regard to issues of critical mass and the generation of both urban and agglomeration economies. Urban policy needs to come to terms with the thorny issues of urban land provision, the costs of such land and the recapture and social investment of the windfall profits from land transactions, inclusive of meeting the costs of servicing the land and the provision of infrastructure. An urban policy should provide the framework for the rational implementation, monitoring and evaluation of urban renewal, particularly after 2006. An Irish urban policy should be based on the principles of the European Spatial Development Perspective, a programme to which Ireland has already signed up. Within such a context, the focus should be on enlightened urbanism and the efficient use of space, including intensification where appropriate. Issues of

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importance in the physical domain include sustainable development, conservation, heritage protection, rehabilitation and urban containment. Sprawl and unplanned urban encroachment needs to be replaced by the development of interurban and urban–rural relationships and networking. But urban policy is not just physical; an enlightened urban policy must be inclusive, reflecting a set of values ‘with the benefits of growth being reinvested to help the economically disadvantaged’ in terms of housing for the disadvantaged and the support of empowerment of individuals and communities. But Irish policy-makers must also see the economic role of cities in society as the centres of culture, innovation, education, research and the arts. Cities and towns are the bedrock upon which the Irish economy has been built. Good, enlightened planning of cities and towns is central to national competitiveness now and in the future. The National Spatial Strategy, 2002–2020 is a major initiative which provides a route map for the long-term development of Ireland, its cities, towns, villages and rural areas. Since the year 2000 rural policy has been coherently enunciated under the auspices of a number of government ministries. There is an urgent need for a clear well developed over-arching urban policy to deal with the physical, economic, social and environment problems of cities and major towns, where half of the population live and where the vast majority of people actually work. The challenge of implementing the National Spatial Strategy is just beginning; it calls for clear, well researched thinking on urban policy within the framework of the NSS. References Atkins, W.S. (2001), ‘Cork Area Strategic Plan’, prepared for Cork City and County Councils. Bannon, M.J. (1999), ‘The Greater Dublin Region: Planning for its Transformation a and Development’, in J. Killen and A. MacLaran (eds), Dublin: Contemporary Trends and Issues for the Twenty-First Century, Dublin: Geographical Society of Ireland, pp. 1–19. Bannon, M.J. and Greer, M. (1998), ‘Ireland’, in L. van den Berg, E. Braun and J. van der Meer (eds), National Urban Policies in the European Union. Responses to Urban Issues in the Fifteen Member States, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 181–223. Bannon, M.J., Cassidy, A. and Rhys Thomas, S. (2000), ‘Development Restraint and Urban Growth Management’, research report prepared for the National Spatial Strategy Team, Department of the Environment and Local Government, Dublin. Bannon, M.J., Rhys Thomas, S. and Cassidy, A. (2000), ‘The Role of Dublin in Europe’, research paper prepared for the National Spatial Strategy Team, DOELG, Dublin. Bartley, B. and Treadwell Shine, K. (2003), ‘Competitive City: Governance and the Changing Dynamics of Urban Regeneration in Dublin’, in F. Moulaert, A. Rodriguez and E. Swyngedouw (eds), The Globalized City, Economic Restructuring And Polarization in European Cities, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 145–66.

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Brady Shipman Martin, with NUI Maynooth, and Fitzpatrick Associates (2000), ‘The Irish Urban System and its Dynamics’, report prepared for the National Spatial Strategy Team, Department of the Environment and Local Government. Brady Shipman Martin, Kirk McClure Morton, Fitzpatrick Associates and Colin Buchanan and Partners (1999), Strategic Planning Guidelines for the Greater Dublin Area, Dublin: Dublin Corporation. Callanan, M. and Keogan, J.F. (eds) (2003), Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out, Dublin: IPA. Clinch, P. (2001), ‘Reconciling Rapid Economic Growth and Environmental Sustainability in Ireland’, Environmental Studies Research series, W.P. ESRS 01/01,UCD. Colin Buchanan and Partners (1969), Regional Studies in Ireland, Dublin: An Foras Forbartha. Colin Buchanan and Partners and Ryle Hanley, with Brady Shipman Martin (2001), ‘Limerick Planning, Land Use and Transportation Study’, draft prepared for Limerick City and County Councils. Coogan, W. (2003), ‘Local Development and Communities: An Examination of RAPID’, MRUP thesis, Dublin, University College. DEGW (2000), Managing Intensification and Change: A Strategy for Dublin Building Height, Dublin: Dublin Corporation. Department of the Environment (1996), Better Local Government: A Programme for Change, Dublin: Stationery Office. Department of the Environment (1997), Sustainable Development: A Strategy for Ireland, Dublin: Stationery Office. Department of the Environment and Local Government (1999), Residential Density: Guidelines for Planning Authorities, Dublin: Stationery Office. Department of the Environment and Local Government (2000), Retail Planning Guidelines for Planning Authorities, Dublin: Stationery Office. Department of the Environment and Local Government (2001), Implementation Guidelines for the Urban and Village Renewal Measure of the Regional Operational Programmes 2000–2006, Dublin: Stationery Office. Department of the Environment and Local Government (2002), The National Spatial Strategy 2002–2020, Dublin: DOELG. Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (2004), Sustainable Rural Housing: Consultation Draft of Guidelines for Planning Authorities, Dublin: DOEHLG. Department of Public Enterprise (2001), New Institutional Arrangements for Land Use and Transportation in the Greater Dublin Area, Dublin: DPE. Drudy, P.J. (1999), ‘Dublin Docklands: The Way Forward’, in J. Killen and A. MacLaran (eds), Dublin: Contemporary Trends and Issues for the Twenty-First Century, Dublin: Geographical Society of Ireland. Dublin Transportation Office (2001), A Platform for Change, Dublin: Stationery Office. Environmental Protection Agency (2002), Environment in Focus: Key Environmental Indicators for Ireland, Wexford: EPA Publications. European Commission (1999), The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (Ireland), Brussels. Fitz Gerald, J. (1998), ‘An Irish Perspective on the Structural Funds’, European Planning Studies 6, pp. 677–94.

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Fitz Gerald, J., Kearney, I., Morgenroth, E. and. Smyth, D. (eds) (1999), National Investment Priorities for the Period 2000–2006, Dublin: ESRI. Government of Ireland (1993), National Development Plan 1994–1999, Dublin: Stationery Office. Government of Ireland (1999), National Development Plan 2000–2006, Dublin: Stationery Office. Grist, B. (2003), ‘Planning’, in M. Callanan and J.F. Keogan (eds), Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out, Dublin: IPA, pp. 221–52. Kenny, L. (2003), ‘Local Government and Politics’, in M. Callanan and J.F. Keogan (eds), Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out, Dublin: IPA, pp. 103–22. KPMG (1996), Study on the Urban Renewal Schemes, Dublin: Stationery Office. McGuirk, P. and MacLaran, A. (2001), ‘Changing Approaches to Planning in an Entrepreneurial City: The Case of Dublin’, European Planning Studies 9 (4), pp. 437–57. OECD (1999), Economic Surveys: Ireland: Origins of the Boom, Sustaining High Growth, Paris: OECD. Punch, M. (2001), ‘Inner-City Transformation and Renewal: the View from the Grassroots’, Dublin: Economic and Social Trends 3, pp. 38–51. Spatial Planning Unit (2000), The Scope and Delivery of the National Spatial Strategy, Dublin: Department of Environment and Local Government. Spatial Policy Unit (2003), Regional Planning Guidelines, DOELG: SP 1/03. Threshold (2002), Housing Access for All, Dublin: Threshold. Williams, B. and Shiels, P. (2000), ‘Acceleration into Sprawl: Causes and Potential Policy Responses’, Quarterly Economic Commentary, June 2000, ESRI, Dublin.

Chapter 12

Italy: Towards the Recognition of the Strategic Relevance of Metropolitan Cities Ilaria Bramezza1

12.1

Introduction

Since the mid-1990s in Italy there has been no urban policy focused on the development of larger cities. Financial resources have mostly been directed to improving urban accessibility and upgrading degraded areas. Urban policy aimed to limit further urbanisation and to improve the quality of urban life by eliminating the conditions that had determined urban degradation and overcoming the lack of infrastructures and services. Today, after desurbanisation, signs of a clear process of gentrification can be seen almost everywhere. During the second half of the 1990s, quality of life in larger urban areas had worsened, as effect of the lack of an effective urban policy. It is only since 2000 that Italian have authorities moved towards a more defined urban policy with respect to larger cities, to fight against the deleterious effects of urban development. This case study starts with an overview of the pattern of spatial development in Italy. This section is a general introduction, including a brief national urban profile. Section 12.2 illustrates the national urban policies until the mid-1990s. Section 12.3 illustrates the current situation for the larger cities in Italy: major problems and opportunities and the influence of the national policy on the development of large cities. Section 12.4 is focused on national urban policies from the mid-1990s up to now, their influence and effects with respect to the urban problems and challenges analysed in the previous section. Section 12.5 illustrates the impact of European policies on Italian cities. Last, section 12.6 draws some conclusions.

1 City Management of Venice. This chapter is an updated version of the national report published in 1997 and commissioned by the Dutch government. The author would like to thank the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport for the valuable information given. Also, the author thanks Giuseppina Di Monte, Stefania Bragato and Fabrizio D’Orte for their valuable contributions.

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Like most cities in industrialised countries, Italian cities were confronted with strong centralisation until the 1970s. With respect to metropolitan areas, the development pattern was characterised by stagnation and even a population decrease in the centres and moderate growth in the ring. The causes of this development are to be found in the differences between housing costs and in the people’s search for better quality of their living environment. Up to the time of writing, cities have maintained the most important functions internally, affecting the following developments. In recent years, clear signs of gentrification have occurred: citizens have returned to the city centres and historical centres have been re-occupied, especially those areas that had been rehabilitated and restored. High-income earners have become the new inhabitants of the cities’ cores, who appreciate the historical heritage and cultural and architectural peculiarities of Italian cities’ centres. Their demand is at a high level while their migration causes a rise of housing costs and increasingly results in a situation in which low-income inhabitants and traditional economic activities are no longer compatible with the new social environment. In Italy, more than 8,000 municipalities are spread over the territory. In 2001 only six had more than 500,000 inhabitants, while the vast majority of municipalities had no more than 5,000 inhabitants (about 6,000 municipalities). Trends in the last two decades show a slowing down of demographic growth, due to the phenomena of decreasing internal migration and decreasing birth rates. These phenomena also concern the smallest centres in the whole territory, except for some areas in southern regions. Urban growth still occurs in small urban centres characterised by relative good accessibility to larger centres. First, these areas begin to have a residential function, but later on industrial activities, especially small and medium-sized activities, also tend to take place, according to a decentralisation pattern of production. Italy has 103 administrative chief-towns (provinces), among which 12 can be considered as large cities. The nine largest cities recognised by the legislation as metropolitan cities are Turin, Milan, Genoa, Venice, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples and Bari. Three other cities located in the two largest islands (Sicily and Sardinia, which are regions with a special status) are also considered large cities: Palermo, Catania and Cagliari (see Figure 12.1). Two other cities, Trieste and Messina, have been added too. Tables 12.1–12.3 give an overview of the characteristics of large cities in Italy, according to some social and economic indicators. Table 12.1 shows the number of inhabitants by municipality, province and total figures in 2001 in comparison with 1991 and the density of population in 2001. In the last decade, all metropolitan cities have lost population (with the only exception of Messina), while the opposite occurs in their hinterland. The province of Rome has gained more than 12 per cent inhabitants in one decade, while the city has lost almost 7 per cent of population. The demographic decline, which occurred in large cities of northern Italy, determined the negative demographic trend of the whole areas; in southern Italy, demographic trends of the larger areas including

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Figure 12.1 Italy and the 14 largest cities and metropolitan areas metropolitan cities have all been positive. This means that since the beginning of the 1980s until now, large cities have been confronted with demographic decline and small- and medium-sized cities have gained population. The next two tables give an overview of some of the characteristics of lager urban areas, referring to some social and economic indicators. Table 12.2 shows the unemployment rates of the larger areas in years 1995 and 2001 and the differences in that period. Table 12.3 shows the rank of the 14 largest cities looking at other indicators related to quality of life in three different years:2 1996, 1999 and 2002. Indicators are the general mood, business and work, public services

2

The rank is based on the elaboration made by Il Sole-24 ore. One might argue about the choice of indicators and the methodology (described in the dossier). However, in this context, the aim is to give a general idea about the situation in the largest cities in Italy.

Table 12.1 Population in 2001, demographic density and number of inhabitants 1991–2001 (%)

Source: Instituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), Census, 1991 and 2001.

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Table 12.2 Unemployment rates in provinces in 1995 and 2001 and rates’ difference 1995 and 2001 (%) Large areas

Turin Milan Genoa Venice Trieste Bologna Florence Rome Naples Bari Palermo Catania Messina Cagliari

1995

Unemployment (%) 2001

10.7 8.2 13.0 8.1 n.a. 5.1 8.1 12.8 28.8 14.3 24.7 19.8 n.a. 25.2

6.2 4.6 7.2 5.3 5.3 3.3 4.2 10.0 26.4 12.1 25.1 23.1 23.0 22.9

Difference 1995/2001 –4.5 –3.6 –5.8 –2.8 n.a. –1.8 –3.9 –2.8 –2.4 –2.2 0.4 3.3 n.a. –2.3

Source: ISTAT Quarterly Survey. 1995 and 2001.

and environment, criminality, population, and leisure. Quality of life is calculated as a synthesis of those six indicators. Likewise, in Table 12.2 the last figures show that a clear dichotomy exists between north and south of Italy. The larger northern cities had better performances with respect to unemployment rates, with a positive trend; southern cities show unemployment rates even higher than 20 per cent and two cities, Palermo and Catania, show a negative trend. However, looking at quality of life, Italian metropolitan areas have lost many positions in the last decade, bringing them to an intermediate position in the final rank of Italian cities. Comparing the performances of cities with respect to the single indicators and the general indicator of quality of life in the years 1996, 1999 and 2002, clearly the heavy negative trend emerges. Medium-sized cities have gained position in the final rank, and this phenomenon is related to the whole Italian territory. Only Florence and Milan compete for the first positions in the rank, followed by Trieste and Bologna. High quality of life is difficult to reach in large cities. The biggest problems relate to criminality (Rome, Turin, Bologna and Genoa score rather badly) and demography (Genoa, Trieste, Turin and Milan). However, large cities score relatively well in tenor of life (Milan is the first) and leisure (Trieste, Bologna and Florence compete for the first position).

Table 12.3 The performance in quality of life in the 14 largest cities in Italy (1 = best performance)

Sources: Il Sole 24 Ore, December 1996, 1999, 2002.

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251

National Urban Policies Until the Mid-1990s

Administrative Organisation, National and Regional Authorities, Influence on Cities and Metropolitan Authorities Until recently, the tiered administrative system in Italy included the national government, the regions, the provinces and the municipalities. In 1990 the first important changes at institutional level were set by the government, in line with the general European trend of decentralisation of tasks and competencies. The national law 142/90 was the first attempt to adapt the situation to the developments occurring all over Europe. It cancelled the entire normative structure that was regulating the life of local systems (dated 1915 and 1934) and it introduced innovations, setting the transition from centralisation to decentralisation. For the first time, the local administrative institution received statutory power and regulated itself with wide autonomy. According to the law, each local institution (municipality or province) would have its own administrative structure and organisation, flexible in time and adapted to its own dimension and context. Innovation had been introduced in several aspects of the reform. Besides the statute autonomy, other important points of innovation concerning municipalities, provinces and regions foresaw: • • • • • •

active participation of citizens in local administration; greater transparency of the actions and activities concerning the citizens; the possibility of fusion of more municipalities and constitution of new municipalities; the institution of metropolitan areas and metropolitan cities; the direct election of the mayor and the president of the province; and financial and fiscal autonomy.

Further, the local administrative reform evolved in 1999 with the national law 265/99 and in 2000 with the Testo Unico sull’ordinamento degli Enti Locali (D.Lgs 267/2000). The tasks of the various administrative levels, according to the reform, can be summarised as follows: • •

municipality – all those functions related to the population and the relevant territory; province – programming, managing of administrative functions in sectors like environment, culture, transport, information systems and technicaladministrative assistance for the local entities;

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•

•

•

metropolitan areas (Turin, Milan, Venice, Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples, Bari and Cagliari3) – they will substitute the provinces from the administrative point of view (not as territory). The respective regions decide their delimitation. The metropolitan cities, besides the tasks carried out by the province, will also have other functions, like spatial planning of the metropolitan area, traffic, protection of cultural assets, protecting of hydrogeology assets, gathering and distribution of water and energy, services for the economic development and large retail, urban services generally defined of metropolitan level; regions – discipline of functions, procedure of programming, forms of association and collaboration, metropolitan areas, controls and partial distribution of financial sources; central government – it maintains its role of controller (Ministry of Internal Affairs) over the various institutions through institutional figures like the civil governor, and manager and supporter of decisions concerning metropolitan areas (ministry of public works with delegation for urban areas).

According to law 142/90, the regions have to determine the territorial extension of their respective metropolitan areas. Problems related to this matter have delayed the full implementation of the law. They arose because the law established that the metropolitan area can also not coincide with the territory of the province, disagreeing with the article 114 of the Italian constitution that says that the republic is divided into regions, provinces and municipalities. An active debate began and lasted the entire decade among those supporting the delimitation of large areas and those who were in favour of more restricted areas. The debate did not result in any outcome. Only in three cases – namely Bologna, Genoa and Venice – have regions made a law about the delimitation of the respective metropolitan areas. However, these laws did not have any consequences and no metropolitan city was formally instituted. Until the end of the 1990s, the implementation of law 142/90 had occurred as voluntary forms of associations among municipalities in anticipation or as alternative solution to the formal institution of the metropolitan areas. Much changed in 2001, when the reform of part V of the Italian constitutional law took place (L.C. 3/2001). The new article 114 affirms that the Italian republic is made up of municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities, regions and the state. Metropolitan cities finally assume their institutional dignity and their constitution has now become compelling. Since 1999, the mayors of the 14 metropolitan cities have met regularly to promote initiatives to define institutional, economic and organisational matters, in order to accelerate the creation and definition of the administrative functions

3

status.

Palermo and Catania have not been included because Sicily is a region with a special

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and competencies of the new metropolitan areas. This work has produced the expected results. Urban Policy at the Level of the Ministries Urban policy in Italy has n for a long time been a non-priority for the central government been. Until the end of the 1980s, urban laws had neither permitted any programming of the phenomena related to urbanisation on the national territory, nor a correct definition of such phenomena with respect to the economic and social aspects, and, consequently, they had not even permitted any valid control system over such phenomena. In the 1970s, the methodologies of interventions changed: instead of focusing on the large movements of population and economy, attention moved towards the best possible use of existing sources and more moderate interventions. For the first time in urban legislation, the notion of programming appeared. In the 1980s and 1990s a new perspective began to emerge. Instead of looking for balanced development by means of centralised control of localisation and flows of population and economic activities, attention was focused on the endogenous components of those processes, that is, on the answers that each local system can give to global changes. The logic of requalification replaced the old logic of re-equilibrium, and the notion of competitive advantages substituted that of comparative advantages. This evolution started from the recognition of the impact of the fundamental changes at social, technological and economic levels that had been affecting urban development. Quality of the living environment and quality of life, on the one hand, and specificity of local context on the other hand, assumed strategic value and became the main factors in determining competitiveness. The above-mentioned weaknesses with respect to urban policy are also reflected at the administrative and institutional levels. Until the end of the 1990s, the role of the Ministry of Urban Areas had been delegated to the Ministry of Public Works. Other ministries also had indirectly dealt with urban matters. For example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with the Ministry of Public Function and regional Affairs and the Ministry of Treasury and Budget were all involved in law 142/90 dealing with the administrative reorganisation of some Italian regions into metropolitan areas. Also the Ministries of Transport, Environment, Culture and Social Affairs often had a role in decision-making on matters concerning urban affairs. For instance, in 1995 the Ministry of Transport, together with the Ministries of Public Works, Treasury and Budget, and Environment, began a reform of urban transport (law 549/95), setting three main goals: to transfer the financial and management powers to decentralised administrations (the regions); to overcome the current situation that sees the state responsible for local rail services and the regions responsible for road and urban services; to allow regional and urban governments to modify the share of financial resources assigned to local transport, that is, to include these resources

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in the regional budget and let the regional government decide about the use of funds.4 The Ministry of Public Works with Delegation for Urban Areas (henceforward the Ministry of Urban Areas), besides the tasks of coordination, outlining, promotion of initiatives of monitoring, verification and control, was delegated to deal with the management of urban areas, the management of public services (also in cooperation with private actors), the operational management of interventions for 1970s and of the problems related to the 2000 Jubilee. In particular, the Ministry of Urban Areas had the following main tasks: 1 programmes of completion and enlargement of parking and integrated systems of transport in urban areas; 2 interventions for the decentralisation of administrative and production activities, re-use of abandoned areas, limitation of noise and pollution; 3 financial assistance; 4 predisposition of all interventions related to the definition, assessment and management of metropolitan areas; 5 promotion of programmes finalised to the optimisation of public services in urban areas. At the end of the 1990s, with the reform of the government organization set up by the law 300/99, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport was created, absorbing the competencies of the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Transportation. The new ministry is made up of a number of departments (Regolamento di organizzazione del Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei trasporti, D.P.R. 177/2001). National urban policies are developed and implemented by the Department of coordination of the development of the territory (Dipartimento per il Coordinamento dello sviluppo del territorio). Among its competencies are: •

• •

identification of main trends of territorial development, especially concerning infrastructure networks and national public works, cities and metropolitan cities; national infrastructure planning; coordination and relationships with international institutions and the European Union with respect to urban policy and territorial planning and programming.

Another department of the same Ministry (Dipartimento per le opere pubbliche e l’edilizia residenziale) deals with programming and regulation of

4 So far, only the first issue has been tackled. No action has been undertaken to implement the other two goals.

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public works, the national road and highway networks, residential policy and Interventions for 1970s. The largest role in urban policy implementation is played by the first department, as it deals with: 1 national infrastructures; 2 programmes of urban requalification and territorial sustainable development (PRUSST); 3 programs for the development of urban restoration interventions; 4 management of public and private urban transformation companies (STU); 5 prevention of urbanisation in high risk level and sensitive areas; 6 elaboration of the European URBAN programme; 7 promotion of agreements between the state and regions for intermodal exchange infrastructure. The Urban Income Sources Before law 142/90, the financial situation of local administrations had undergone through disordered and not coordinated evolution. In particular, the fiscal reform of the 1970s (DPR 616/1977), in the name of the unity of public finance, had eliminated almost every form of autonomous taxation by the local administrations. As a consequence, local administrations became almost exclusively dependent on the central government. Before this reform, municipalities and provinces used to have a certain degree of fiscal autonomy, local taxes being the largest part of their income. Autonomy and self-sufficiency of finance disappeared with the fiscal reform. Currently, the situation is still marked by a centralised fiscal system, as it was established in 1977: fiscal drawing is carried out by the central government that redistributes the resources to regions and municipalities. The redistribution of funds favours medium-sized cities and neglects the bigger cities despite their greater need for financial resources (Presidency of the Council of Ministries, 1996). Article 54 of law 142/90 has only laid down some general principles that the expected reform of the government is supposed to respect when legislating on local finance. The following laws confirmed the general statements of local finance established in 1990. The main role is played by autonomous financing as the major source of urban income: each city is supposed to have its own duties, taxes, rights, tariffs on competent services, and its own income from its properties. Public transfers are assumed to guarantee the services of first necessity, while local income are destined to the financing of public services that are considered necessary for the development of the community. In other words, local financing is expected to have a propelling role ensuring the citizens new services, but also higher quality of the services of first necessity.

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Yet the law specifies that public transfers from the central administration occur according to objective criteria that consider the population, the territory, and the social and economic situation; the government can also distribute specific contributions in case of exceptional situations of need. A national ordinary fund contributes to local finance for the realisation of public works of relevant social and economic interest, while a special national fund finances public works in areas or situations defined by law. Shares are defined by the government according to parameters that are fixed during the period of the government’s budget (three years), so that local administrations have more certainty about the consistency of the funds that they will receive during that period. Regions co-finance the local administrations for the implementation of the regional plan of development and the programme of investments. Moreover, on the basis of regional programmes, the resources for investments established by the central government are distributed to municipalities and provinces. Since 1990 several decrees have been emanated to start the process of decentralisation of the fiscal system. The most relevant decrees are those that have instituted the property tax (ICI) (decree no. 504, 1992), the municipal tariffs on advertisement and on occupation of public areas (COSAP) (no. 507, 1993), and the tariff for disposal of solid urban waste. However, fiscal reform has not taken place yet and some measures could work against the desired decentralisation of some fiscal responsibilities from central government to local authorities. Local authorities keep asking for more fiscal autonomy or, to be more precise, for a coordinated development of new local financial instruments. The most recent budgetary laws presented by the central government refer to a very strongly centralised fiscal model that sets up strong restrictions to the fiscal autonomy of municipalities. The fiscal policy adopted by the central government in the last two years should be considered as a step backwards. Some cities have also taken advantage of EU financial contributions. About 135 million ECU were invested for the rehabilitation and recovery of decayed areas in 16 cities under the first URBAN programme; €23 million was given to 10 Italian cities under the second URBAN programme. At national level a new initiative has been launched, called Urban Italia, with financed actions for €5 million; Urban Italia includes economic and social actions in some Italian cities not included in the second URBAN programme. Specific National Preconditions Hampering Integrated Urban Policies at the Local Level The high political instability of the Italian governments and the national debt constraint are two specific national circumstances that have hampered the development of integral policies at the local level. Indeed, the political instability has had strong influence on the problem of competencies and coordination of actions and interventions. In addition, the national debt constraint has affected

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the amount of investments dedicated to infrastructure and resources that are necessary for the development and implementation of policies also at local level. And also, this problem focuses attention on ways to decrease public deficit at the expense of effective integral socio-economic policies. The law 142/90 about the reform of local autonomies, and the following updates, hardly changed the administrative culture, as today planning and programming are still quite sectoral and there is still little coordination among the various sectors and levels of government. Yet there is no governmental organisation able to gather and organise knowledge about territorial plans and programmes. The preliminary conditions to implement effective procedures of coordination and discussion among the various sectors and levels of spatial government are still missing. The main problem concerning territorial planning is to define rules and procedures able: •

• •

to express a system of guidelines about spatial development at the national level, consistent with the guidelines of spatial development given by the EU and by other European countries; to ensure coherence to territorial plans defined at different levels of local government; to ensure an effective coordination between the programming of large national infrastructure and the spatial planning at different levels of competence.

12.3

The State of the Cities

Major National Urban Issues Until the 1990s in Italy had not had an explicit urban policy, for reasons that have already been mentioned. With law 142/90, the concept of metropolitan cities was introduced for the first time. Recently the national government has started an administrative reform linked to the urban context, although this reform cannot be considered completed yet. Even so, the lack of a ministry dedicated exclusively to urban areas confirms that Italy is far from having an explicit policy concerning cities. Unemployment, poverty, traffic congestion, crime, and inadequacy of infrastructure are major concerns of the (implicit) national urban policy, as the consequences of these phenomena seriously affect quality of life especially of the largest cities (see also Tables 12.2 and 12.3). Unemployment is a phenomenon that especially manifests itself in the largest cities in the south of Italy, while northern cities show relatively better figures. This phenomenon needs to be faced by prompt interventions of economic policy. Recently, central government has introduced elements for a reform of the labour market that should become more flexible. Recent figures show that the reform is

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starting show some results. There is a slow rise of employment, especially in the north and centre Italy (+1.4 per cent), while in the south the figure is only +0.4 per cent; the employment rate in 2003 was 56.4 per cent, 0.6 per cent more than the year before. The unemployment rate in 2003 was 8.3 per cent, 0.4 per cent less than in 2002; modest figures, however, that show that there is the need to adopt a sound policy to regulate the restructuring processes and to restrain the increasing gap between the north-central areas and the southern Italy. Recently, the attention has moved towards the development of forms of cooperation between the different levels of administration in order to define intervening measures and projects for slums in large cities. Other interventions concerned the promotion of tourism, which in Italy represents an extremely important economic and employment resource. The idea is to promote projects that use cultural and environmental assets for tourism, submitted by private operators. Among the evaluation criteria there is the capacity of creating new productive jobs. The growing flows of immigrants have contributed to make the problems of crime and poverty bigger. The problem of immigration and its impact on cities is becoming serious. A high percentage of immigrants in Italy is illegal and in search for employment. Obviously, the difficulties in finding a job are legion, but they tend to remain in Italy any way. Many problems related to immigration derive from the incapability of the competent institutions to manage the phenomenon efficiently, although the Italian government has made some interventions and laws to control and regulate the immigrations flows (Legge Bossi-Fini). The impact of immigration on cities is relevant: there are problems of social integration and usually immigrants are relegated in degraded areas. The last figures of the ministry for internal affairs show that in the last decade the number of legal immigrants have doubled (in 1992 they were 648,935, in 2001 1,362,630). Table 12.5 shows their geographic distribution. Almost 50 per cent of them are female, and more than 80 per cent come from developing countries. Table 12.5 Number breakdown for immigrants destination (2001) Geographic area North-western Italy (Val d’Aosta, Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria) North-eastern Italy (Trentino, Veneto, Friuli, Emilia Romegna) Central Italy (Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio) Southern Italy (Abruzzo, Campania, Molise, Basilicata, Puglia, Calabria) Islands (Sicilia, Sardegna) Total number of legal immigrants Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, 31 December 2001.

No. 444,876 328,488 396,834 133,263 59,169 1,362,630

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Immigrants come to Italy mainly for the following reasons: • • •

59 per cent looking for a job; 29 per cent for family reasons; 7 per cent for religious and political reasons.

The phenomenon is becoming more and more structural with respect to the past, as immigrants come for family reasons and because the areas of origin are rather polycentric, as they come from all over the world: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Morocco Albania Romenia The Philippines China 14 other nations Six other nations

158,094 144,120 75,377 64,215 56,566 46,000–20,000 18,000–15,000

National Priorities with Regard to Territorial Management A document by the Italian government (1998), after deep analyses about their performance, stresses the need to consider cities on the basis of two main indicators: their dimension (metropolitan cities, medium and small cities) and their geographic position in the country (northwest, northeast, centre, south, islands). This approach puts in evidence the following factors: a) in the Italian urban system, metropolitan areas are the focal points of territorial development, in terms of economic and social innovation, but also the places where decline is evident more than elsewhere (crime, decreasing employment rates, economic instability, lack of adequate infrastructure and high pollution); b) weaknesses occur when we consider the division of the country between centre-north and south: all the negative trends described above are much more evident in southern metropolitan areas; c) in comparison with Europe, metropolitan areas suffer from relatively heavy mobility problems in particular because of the objective lack of infrastructure; d) small and medium-sized cities have a totally different performance, with positive trends of welfare improvement, and must be guided in their development to better exploit existing strengths. Four different geographic systems of regional and transregional networks have been delineated:

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•

•

•

•

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

medium-sized and small-to-medium-sized cities located within large metropolitan areas (northwestern Italy), where infrastructure network – roads, highways, railways, water plants, etc. – is well developed (index of infrastructure = 118.2), could foster the development of new cross-border networks and peripheral mountain areas; small- and medium-sized city networks that form diffuse cross-regional urbanization phenomena (northeast Italy); in these contexts, small and medium enterprises have given origin to a very highly productive economic system, although the infrastructure network is just sufficient for supporting that development, but not developed enough to establish connections with the big communication axes (96.6); coastal cities and networks of small and medium-sized cities (centre-south and islands) where the presence of seven metropolitan areas out of 14 does not go along with the development of solid and articulated urban systems (infrastructure index = 102.9 in central Italy, but only 77 in the southern areas); small and medium-sized city networks to be built, especially in the less populated and internal areas of the centre-south Italy and in the islands: these urban systems do not gravitate around large metropolitan areas, show little endogenous development forces, lack of internal mobility systems and strategic connections with the big communication axes.

A clear dichotomy between north and south Italy emerges. Therefore, since the second half of the 1990s, much effort has been dedicated to developing urban policy measures in the south. Structural funds for the years 2000–2006 for southern Italian cities have been directed of priority actions related to: • • •

actions for the improvement of quality of life in urban areas; requalification and restoration of historic centres and residential areas; development of urban marketing strategies, improvement of urban mobility systems, inside and outside urban centres.

These actions have been carried out paying much attention to the aspects concerning the involvement of all public and private actors insisting on the territory, models of sustainable urban development and development of adequate instruments. The final aim is to improve competitiveness and to reach social and economic cohesion. The urban policy’s instruments used all over the territory that have been adopted are: • • •

PRU, requalification urban programmes (art. 2 law 179/92); PPI, integrated intervention programmes (art. 16 law 179/92); urban restoration programmes (art. 11 law 493/93)’

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• • • • • •

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global finance for local development programmes (CIPE 16/3/1994 and 8/8/1995), Contratti d’area and Patti territoriali (law 662/96), programmes to foster local development; Contratti di quartiere (20/10/1997), actions dedicated to peripheral urban areas; PRUSST (8/10/1998), actions for urban and sustainable requalification; Bersani law (art. 14 law 266/97) for economic development in urban areas; actions for requalification of the health system in large urban centres (law 448/98).

Specific Threats and Opportunities for Cities as Perceived at the National Level The problems that cities still have to face are related to four matters: •

•

•

•

the slow move towards a more complex decision-making process that imposes complementarity and subsidiarity of competencies and the necessity of a wide harmonisation of choices, especially with respect to the relationship between central administration and local autonomies and between local interventions and national and community development programmes; the need to overcome the logic of management of financial transfers and to think in terms of management of local taxes, management of the processes of exploitation of existing assets and involvement of private actors; there is a growing need for investment in reorganisation, infrastructuring and requalification of housing and premises, but the scarce availability of funds pushes to look for greater effectiveness of the public expenditure on social, economic and employment fields; the lack of infrastructure has also generated the need to change the logic of development based on the simple addition of housing into the logic of development focused on the reorganisation and requalification of housing and premises and large infrastructures.

Generally, there has been the tendency to move from quantitative towards qualitative aspects of urban development, respecting the general condition for sustainable development. This trend implies a reorganisation of the institutions, especially with respect to the relationship between local autonomies and central government and the quality of juridical, planning, evaluation and managerial tools. The key problems are: 1 the new relationship between national programming and local planning, after the new legislation; 2 the effectiveness of the process of infrastructuring; 3 effectiveness of territorial policies.

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In Italy, as all over Europe, cities are confronted with specific urban challenges. The process of globalisation of the economy has been translated into growing competition at national and international levels. The effects of competition occur very rapidly. However, economic growth is not directly and automatically linked to growth of employment, improvement of quality of life, social progress and improvement of the quality of the living environment. The fact that cities are very much exposed to the effects of the global economy constitutes a stimulus to innovation and enhancement of the level of competitiveness, but it also implies that cities must be able to manage this process. Likewise, problems arise on the one hand, from the scarcity of production factors, with the exception of labour which remains heavily unemployed and, on the other hand, from the availability of new information technologies that allow the composition and integration of production factors which are located in other regions and countries. In this respect, changes occur very rapidly: innovation processes permit rapid improvements in level of competitiveness and quality of life, but also create problems of continuous adjustments to innovation. Last, as far as the need for maintaining high levels of efficiency is concerned, the preliminary factors that are preconditions for the competitiveness and economic development of cities (infrastructure, production sites, strategic centres, and research and development centres) require large investments and a clear definition of priorities. The need for cooperation among cities and the need to anticipate relations of cooperation at the European level and with countries that will probably take part in the EU in the future are felt as challenges. Furthermore, cooperation is also necessary at the local level, especially in those areas made up by many local administrations. The general reduction of public sources for interventions on infrastructures and services has favoured the development of public–private partnerships. Further development of this measure of project financing must be developed. Among the conditions that favour the creation of public–private partnerships to a large extent are opportuneness, transparency and certainty about the actions of the public administrations that manage the territory. Globalisation and increasing competition often force policy- and decisionmakers to privilege objectives of effectiveness, rather than of equity. Policies of social and economic cohesion, solidarity, social and cultural development and, in general, the furthering of the well-being of citizens must be privileged as much as economic policies for sustainable development. In that respect, sustainable development requires the implementation of long-term integral policies that consider at the same time economic development, social cohesion and environmental improvement. Policies of territorial reorganisation should also be considered as part of an integral policy for sustainable urban development. Urban areas are also concentrated zones of unemployment. To face this challenge, the conditions for the favourable development of new economic activities and the support of those already existing is needed, in addition to the

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exploitation of economic potential to enlarge the supply of labour compatibly with the characteristics of demand. Finally, there is the tendency to develop privileged areas within cities, where the level and quality of services and infrastructure is higher than in other parts of the cities. This tendency stresses the problem of social segregation. Projects of urban requalification and interventions on infrastructure should start a process of redistribution of the values and qualities of the city (in the form of better services, infrastructure, conditions of mobility, architecture and quality of the living environment) that guarantees homogeneous and balanced development. 12.4

National Urban Policies from the Mid-1990s

National Policy Based on National Vision on Cities and Urbanisation Process Urban renewal and regeneration are important matters for national authorities, due to the urbanisation effects that have provoked great demand for housing, and the need to manage urban growth. Concern has moved towards the need for urban quality and the consequent necessity to regenerate existing quarters. New tools have been recently introduced with legislative dispositions. Urban renewal plans, regeneration plans and integrated programs aim at reorganising the cities with innovative forms of project-financing that foster the active intervention of private actors and consider the use of intersector resources. Urban renewal programmes move the attention from housing to infrastructure. They focus more on infrastructure and aim at increasing and improving the accessibility and quality of the living environment of residential areas. They include initiatives of primary and secondary urbanisation, urban design and completion and integration of urban programs. These programmes stimulate the active intervention of private actors. Public and private actors make proposals, often together, to the municipalities. The latter evaluate the proposals according to the existing and future priorities and select those ones, which also respect the procedural form of the so-called ‘programme agreement’. Urban regeneration programmes are the complementary tools to the two just mentioned. Regeneration concerns maintenance and urban restructuring, rehabilitation of buildings and urban design, urbanisation and environmental reordering. It depends on the specific context and revitalisation and reorganisation needs. These programmes take also into account the effects that they can generate over the whole urban area. They concentrate their action on specifically identified urban areas and intervene with programmes of primary and secondary urbanisation, non-residential and residential buildings. In this case also, project financing and the degree of integrity are criteria used in the selection of programmes, which are presented to the competent central agency Direzione per le trasformazioni territoriali of the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport which

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performs the selection and also has the task of monitoring the proceedings of the projects and controlling their implementation. Integrated programmes (art. 16 law 179/92 and law 493/93), as well as Contratti di quartiere and Programmi di riqualificazione urbana e di Sviluppo sostenibile del Territorio (PRUSST), introduced in 1997 and 1998, are tools for regenerating the whole urban, housing and environmental structure in consolidated cities. Indeed, they consider a plurality of functions which have effects on sustainable urban redevelopment, involve different actors and make use of various financial sources. The impact of these also is determinant and the level of efficiency in their management is relevant too, thanks to the direct relationship existing between the national authority and cities that avoid the mediation of intermediate actors (regions). However, integrated programmes are valid tools as far as the coordination of actors and financial sources is concerned, for coordination is only ex-post: the programmes do not arise from an ex-ante evaluation and definition of prior objectives. Many cities are experimenting with new ways to initiate processes of revitalisation and redevelopment using these innovative tools. Therefore, they are considered important. Innovation stands especially on the plurality of actors, functions and uses involved in the programmes, on transparency and new forms of public and private cooperation, according to the logic of integrated urban planning. However, these innovative tools are not yet fully considered usual forms of intervention, as they need some technical and procedural adjustments. For instance, the economic aspects concerning public–private partnerships, local governments’ experience in activating project financing and the incompatibility with some existing regulatory systems are aspects that need to be better defined to transform these tool into ordinary forms of intervention. However, cities have also started to change their way of planning, so as to improve the way they face complexity. Planning is becoming more flexible, starting aiming at complex goals involving all interested actors, public and private. Strategic planning has become a must for any local authority, looking for a balance between government and governance and facing the competitiveness with other cities. Evaluation and monitoring actions have become usual and essential activities in city’s government life. Nevertheless, strategic planning in Italy is not an obligatory instrument but is strongly characterised by the voluntary nature of its promoters (Camagni, 2003). Experiences in strategic planning in Italy are recent and still rare and contain only some of the methodological elements of a strategic approach, such as: • •

definition of a comprehensive strategy, notably in terms of response to a tricky transitional situation; citizen participation in defining the strategic vision and certain urban projects;

Italy

•

• • •

265

the search for new strategies, together with improved integration in different administrative fields where management of major urban projects is concerned; rationalisation of public-sector action; public–private partnerships for urban projects; greater flexibility for urban planning.

Sectoral Policies for the Sustainability of Cities’ Growth Quality of life of larger cities in Italy has been seriously affected in the last decade for the heavy environmental and social pressure due to economic restructuring. Problems of lack of sustainability arose and plans for interventions have been developed. Italian cities must face various challenges because of the peculiarity of the urban system: environmental aspects, importance of historic and cultural assets, industrial activities and tourism. The coexistence of several strategic elements that contribute to urban development makes it clear that an integrated approach that considers them all is the only answer. Land management, urban planning and environmental policies are proposed by the government integrally, equally to the international experiences. The sectors of interventions still remain those of mid-1990s: however, new topics are emerging: • • • • • • • • • • • •

actions for decreasing motor vehicle traffic and air pollution; actions against noise pollution; waste management; water resources management; urban green parks development; industrial risk areas; areas at risk of an environmental disaster; environmental education; migration flow management; integration policies for migrants; criminality and citizens' safety programme; public services management.

Urban safety, migration flow management and cultural and social integration of immigrants are indeed new sectors of interventions for today urban policy, with respect to the 1990s. These themes are also included in the political program of the current national government’s mandate. Criminality is the worst-performing social indicator in Italian larger cities, affecting the level of quality of life: Rome, for instance, is the fourth city for general mood, but it is number 101 for criminality (see Table 12.2).

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The Impact of European Policies

Collaboration with the EU has already been consolidated and new initiatives continue to be taken to develop further cooperation with European countries concerning the definition of guidelines about large-scale planning and the development of innovative planning and knowledge-development tools. Italian agencies have presented a frame of development of the European territory (SDEC) and the necessary tools for the exchange of knowledge and the analysis of phenomena of spatial change. SDEC should provide the framework to evaluate the effects on the territory of environmental, social and economic phenomena at the European level that will probably occur in the near future within the EU and in the neighbouring countries. The aim is to build a range of operational tools that provide indications, support, tools, codes of behaviour to the national, regional and local administrations of the EU and ensure conditions for sustainable development based on complementarity of the different structures. More specifically, at the European level, the idea is that the EU should promote wide sensibility on the requisites of urban quality to be guaranteed to all citizens; on the most effective planning, economic and administrative instruments to start structural processes of urban requalification; on the type of actions that favour an equal redistribution of the economic results and benefits that originate from the interventions of urban requalification. In other words, the main role that the EU should assume is the favouring of the transition from strategies of support for marginal urban areas towards strategies that are based on a balanced economic and social development. URBAN has been a very successful programme for three main reasons. First of all, it has decreased the cultural gap between European policies and European citizens, giving them the right visibility and increasing the charisma of local authorities promoting such policies. Secondly, URBAN has developed project management capacity of cities, that have learned how many advantages come from cooperation with different institutional levels and involvement of other actors, in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and innovation; southern Italian cities have had successful experiences, especially Siracusa, Cosenza, Salerno and Bari. Thirdly, URBAN helped Italian cities to overcome the sectoral vision in favour of a more integral and strategic vision of urban planning. Nowadays, programmes like URBAN have been promoted also from the national government, that is, PRU and PRUSST (Camagni, 2003). 12.6

Conclusions

Until the 1990s there was no explicit urban policy in Italy. With law 142/90 the concept of metropolitan cities has been introduced for the first time. Although the national government has started a discussion about administrative reform linked to the urban context, an explicit urban policy was missing in terms of contents.

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The main reason behind the lack of a clear urban policy is that, for a long time, urban policy in Italy has been a non-priority for central government. Since 1942 Italian urban legislation has been based on art. 1 of urban law no. 1159, which favours desurbanisation, rather than managing the process of urbanisation. Therefore, at least until the end of the 1980s, urban laws did permit any programming of the phenomena of urbanisation, and not even offer a correct definition of such phenomena with respect to the economic and social aspects. During the 1990s the national government started thinking in terms of urban planning and programming. The instruments for the development of an integrated urban policy have been set. Although Italy did start thinking about contents, the development of an explicit national urban policy is still unclear and too slow, as the reform dated 1990 (law 142/90) has not been fully completed: indeed, metropolitan cities still do not exist. This implies self-made urban policy, also due to the scarce coordination and cooperation between the several departments and institutions at the national, regional and local levels of government. The lack of coordination and cooperation is the main obstacle to the development of a clear national urban policy that favours the sustainable growth of Italian cities. As result of this, the performance of larger cities has worsened. Moreover, the dichotomy between northern and southern cities is still too marked, although many investment and resources have been directed to that purpose. Problems in larger cities in Italy and in the southern area are becoming more complex every day. References Archivio di Studi Urbani e Regionali (1999), art. XXX – no. 66, FrancoAngeli. Archivio di Studi Urbani e Regionali (2001), art. XXXII – no. 70, FrancoAngeli. Bramezza, I. (1996), The Competitiveness of the European City, Amsterdam: Thesis Publisher. Bramezza, I. (1997), National Urban Policy in Italy, Aldershot: Ashgate. Camagni, R. (2002), ‘Le politiche urbane e territoriali europee: accelerazione o decelerazione?’, Ciclo di seminari di economia del territorio, 30 April, Venice. Camagni, R. (2003), ‘Strategic Planning in Italy’, Interact Newsletter 4: , April. Caritas and Migrantes (2002), ‘Immigrazione – Dossier Statistico 2002 XII Rapporto sull’immigrazione’, Edizioni Nuovo Anterem, Rome, October. Cempella, F. (1996), ‘Territorio, infrastrutture e ruolo dell’amministrazione centrale’, in A. Clementi, G. Dematteis and P.C. Palermo (eds), Le forme del territorio italiano. Temi e immagini del mutamento, vol. 1, Bari: Laterza. Clementi A., Dematteis, G. and Palermo, P.C. (eds) (1996), Le forme del territorio italiano. Temi e immagini del mutamento, vol. 1, Bari: Laterza. Cori, B. (1991), Città, spazio urbano e territorio in Italia, Milan: Franco Angeli. ENEA (1996), ‘L’osservatorio delle trasformazioni territoriali’, in A. Clementi, G. Dematteis and P.C. Palermo (eds), Le forme del territorio italiano. Temi e immagini del mutamento, vol. 1, Bari: Laterza.

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Fubini, A. and Corsico, F. (1994), Aree metropolitane in Italia, Milan: Franco Angeli. Il Sole-24 Ore (1996, 1999, 2002), Dossiers on quality of life. IRES (1991), Le aree metropolitane tra specificità e complementarietà, Turin: Dibattiti IRES. Ministry of Public Works and ANCI (2000), ‘Per una centralità delle periferie: linee di orientamento e modalità operative’, Conferenza nazionale sulle periferie urbane, 15–16 December, Turin. Ministry of Public Works (1998), Di.Co.Ter, Programmazione Fondi Strutturali 2000–2006, Tavolo settore ‘Città’, Deliberazione CIPE 22 December, no. 140. Pierotti, P. (1991), ‘La politica delle città in Italia’, in B. Cori (ed.), Città, spazio urbano e territorio in Italia, Milan: Franco Angeli. Presidency of the Council of Ministries (1996), ‘Piano nazionale di azione’, Report for the world conference on human settlements Habitat II. Presidency of the Council of Ministries, Dipartimento per le Aree urbane (1996), ‘Competenze, finalità, aspetti organizzativi ed operativi. Quadro normativo di riferimento e linee di azione’. SEC, Social and Economic Committee (1996), ‘Advice on the Role of the European Union about Urban Matters’, Brussels, 25/26 September 1996. Sichera, C. (1995), L’ordinamento delle autonomie locali, 4th edn, Milan: Pirola. Vandelli, L. and Mastragostino, F. (1996), ‘I comuni e le province’, Le autonomie territoriali 2, Il Mulino, Bologna.

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Annex Table A12.1 Inhabitants (thousands) large cities 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 1971

1981

1991

2001

Cities

Core

Region

Core

Region

Core

Region

Core

Region

Rome Milan Naples Turin Palermo Genoa Bologna Florence Bari Catania Venice Verona Messina Trieste Cagliari

2.782 1.582 1.183 1.168 588 784 445 437 312 364 347 221 255 273 184

708 1.574 1.238 1.119 523 247 397 576 951 530 402 446 431 26 571

2.838 1.603 1.212 1.115 702 762 458 448 371 381 345 265 260 252 234

856 2.413 1.759 1.228 497 282 471 753 1.094 625 493 510 409 31 497

2.734 1.369 1.067 963 699 679 404 403 342 333 299 256 232 231 184

1.027 2.369 1.949 1.274 526 272 502 564 1.188 703 522 533 415 31 580

2.547 1.256 1.005 865 687 610 371 356 317 313 271 253 252 211 164

1.154 2.451 2.055 1.300 549 268 544 578 1.243 742 539 573 410 31 596

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Chapter 13

Luxembourg: National Local Partnerships Ariane Chouly and Jan van der Meer1

13.1

Introduction

About 450,000 persons live in this smallest among the EU member states, one third of them being foreign residents (Eurostat, 2003). In the capital city of Luxembourg-Ville reside almost 25 per cent of the inhabitants. Foreign residents make up about 60 per cent of the population of the capital city. Next to the capital city, there are some secondary towns, most of them located close to LuxembourgVille. The population of the four largest towns is presented in Table 13.1. Table 13.1 Population estimates for the largest cities of Luxembourg City Luxembourg-Ville Esch-sur-Alzette Differdange Dudelange

Population 78,000 28,000 19,000 17,500

Source: Statec, 2004.

The neighbouring cantons of Luxembourg-Ville and Esch-sur-Alzette together constitute what can be indicated as the ‘functional urban region’ of LuxembourgVille. The urban area thus defined occupies about half of the Luxembourg territory and counts 230,000 inhabitants. The average annual growth of the urban population was 0.4 per cent during the decade 1990–2000. The financial services industry is the mainstay of the country’s economy. Luxembourg is the headquarters of the European Investment Bank as well as over 200 banks and 1,500 investment funds. This represents the greatest concentration of financial institutions in the European Community. In addition, 90 major insurance 1 European Institute for Comparative Urban Research, Erasmus University Rotterdam.

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companies and over 250 reinsurance companies have a presence in the country. Ten per cent of employees in Luxembourg work in the financial sector. A number of EU institutions are based in Luxembourg-Ville. These include the the Court of Justice of the European Communities, the European Court of Auditors, the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities and the Secretariat General of the European Union. Almost 8,000 EU officials work in Luxembourg, the majority in the Kirchberg area of Luxembourg-Ville. Luxembourg is also an audiovisual and communications centre, thanks to the presence of Europe’s premier commercial radio and television broadcaster, RTL. Despite a small rise since 2002, Luxembourg’s unemployment rate is, at 3.7 per cent, the lowest of the EU-15 (Eurostat, 2003), whilst the GDP per inhabitant is about twice as high as the EU-15 average (Statec, 2001). However, the international economic downturn since 2001 has affected the GDP. The country is divided into three districts, 12 cantons and 118 municipalities. A commissioner appointed by the central government heads each district. This official has no executive powers, his or her main function being to serve as a liaison between central government and the municipalities. In general, decisions which can effectively be taken at the municipal level will be taken at this level. This holds true for urban policies as well. Local authorities are rather independent. To avoid municipalities taking decisions that have a national impact, the Minister of the Interior has the authority to interfere in decisions taken at the municipal level. In addition, she/he has to formally approve municipal plans. Due to the size of the country there is generally a close relationship between the central and the local level of government, especially within the city of Luxembourg. This relationship is strengthened by the fact that several members of the national parliament also are mayors or members of municipal councils. Various public institutions cooperate continuously. On the basis of projects, teams with participants from the ministries and municipalities involved are formed to handle a specific issue, thus creating effective partnerships. Advice committees are also set up to handle specific subjects. These advice groups constitute a formalised method of cooperation between ministries, as they have members from different ministries and/or municipalities. Some of these advice committees have a permanent existence, such as those responsible for planning matters, housing matters and sites and monuments. The national government pursues nationwide policies for different kinds of subjects. There are no policies specifically directed towards cities. As well as national and municipal plans, plans on a regional level are also made. These regional plans strive to integrate the national and the municipal and are therefore made by working groups consisting of representatives of the different ministries and the involved municipalities. The national government has set up some funds (under their own control) to help to overcome specific urban problems, some of them directly targeted to Luxembourg-Ville, such as a fund for affordable living facilities (aiming to facilitate building cheap houses, for rent and for sale), a fund for the urbanisation

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and planning of the Kirchberg plateau (to facilitate the planning, acquisition and building of a new district of Luxembourg-Ville) and a fund for the renovation of the ancient city. 13.2

Summary of the National Urban Policies until the Mid-1990s

As indicated in the previous section, no national urban policies specifically directed to large cities have been developed. This is no surprise given the size and the rather direct relations between state and city. As everywhere, there are nationwide policies on specific subjects that have an implicit effect on the development of Luxembourg-Ville. In the early 1990s the following subjects were considered especially relevant in this respect: •

•

•

• •

Housing: the focus was on the renovation of ancient buildings. A substantial rise in the demand for housing in Luxembourg-Ville was expected. Measures were taken in order to accommodate this growth. These housing projects are developed in close cooperation between ministries, such as the Ministries of Physical Planning, the Environment and Transport. However, rather than focusing on housing alone, the vision was that the rise in prices due to the rise of the tertiary sector in the city centre poses a problem. Urban planning: the policy objective was to spread economic and social functions. This relates to the problem as identified above. Policy measures are the development of regional business parks. The expansion of LuxembourgVille results in high infrastructure costs, pollution and other negative effects. For this reason, national government is striving to spread economic activity (away form the capital city). Public services: the government is aiming to reduce the number of government offices in the city centre, by relocating these offices elsewhere. This will generate space for new activities in the city centre. Transport: the policy objective is to increase the public transport system in the urban agglomerations. Environment: the policy objective in this respect is to ensure durable economic development.

An important national government instrument to interfere in municipal planning and policies is the national planning vision, the ‘Programme Directeur d’Aménagement du Territoire’. This is a long-term vision developed by the Direction of Spatial Planning and Urbanism (DATUR2) of the Ministry of the Interior, which strives for a coherent use of specific policies, in order to avoid unbalanced development.

2

Direction de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de l’Urbanisme.

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During the 1990s the national government felt the need to develop a more effective land-use policy. To this end a new national vision on spatial planning was formulated. Some specific objectives of the spatial policy are the consolidation of the industrial structure in the south, to stop the rural exodus in the north, to spread new economic activities, to relocate public services away from the crowded city centre and to improve public transport. This new vision on spatial planning will be described in section 13.4, where changes in national urban policies since the mid-1990s are highlighted. 13.3

The State of the Cities

The towns in the former industrial area have experienced problems due to the decline in the metal industry. They account for about one third of Luxembourg’s unemployment. These areas house many immigrants, who have to cope with low incomes and low quality housing, which has led to social segregation in some districts. The conditions for improvement are present – for instance, the availability of former industrial sites, which can be used now to locate other economic activities. New businesses are willing to locate at these sites due to excellent accessibility and communication connections. Besides the former industrial areas, Luxembourg-Ville and its agglomerations experience some problems resulting from the affluent economic development in the 1990s. Luxembourg-Ville experiences some traffic congestion, suburbanisation and pressure on land for commercial activities, leading to a considerable increase in land prices. However, the city does not suffer seriously from these typical city problems. To prevent high infrastructural costs, pollution and other negative effects, spatial planning policies are directed to spread economic activities by developing business parks outside the city (polycentric city). The Minister of Interior Affairs and the mayor of the city have the intention to intensify their cooperation especially with regard to the future development of a plan for the central/southern region. 13.4

National Urban Policies from the Mid-1990s

In this section three developments in national urban policies are discussed: the project of law no. 4486 concerning urban development and municipal planning; the new national vision on spatial planning; and the development of an integrated transport and spatial planning vision (‘Integratives Verkehrs- und Landesentwicklungskonzept’, IVL). Project of Law No.448; Modernisation of Spatial Planning This project, initiated by the Ministry of the Interior in 1996, aims to modernise the municipal planning process, until now governed by the law of 12 June 1937,

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and to adapt the law to the requirements of a sustainable urban development. The proposed adoptions and innovations can be categorised into four points (DATUR, 2004): 1 a sustainable spatial planning process: the urban planning process has to take into account environmental and social objectives; 2 hierarchy of municipal planning instruments: general and special spatial plans; 3 simplification, harmonisation and specification of procedures; 4 instruments for executing the spatial plans, for example the establishment of development zones and restructuring zones. The renewal of the law has been finalised in 1998. Since then it has been evaluation by a number of advisory bodies, which has led to various revisions. Parallel to the renewal of this law, a new national spatial planning vision has been developed, the so-called ‘Programme Directeur de l’Aménagement du Territoire’. New National Spatial Planning Vision The Ministry of Interior Affairs is responsible for a leading national policy instrument, the ‘Programme Directeur de l’Aménagement du Territoire’. The first Programme was established in 1978. The new Programme has been developed in the same timeframe as the project of the renewal of the law concerning spatial planning (IVL, see above). It was adopted in 2003 by Parliament. This new spatial policy instrument presents a vision on the spatial development of Luxembourg for the coming 10 years and is leading for other national (sectoral), regional and municipal plans. The programme defines objectives in three fields: • • •

urban and rural development; transport and telecommunication; environment and natural resources.

The objectives of the urban development include: •

• •

to promote a system of ‘centres of development and attraction’ (Centres de Dévelopment et d’Attraction, CDA) through an active decentralisation policy (polycentric city embedded in functional regions); Luxembourg-Ville has been appointed as the superior centre of development and attraction; next, two medium centres and 11 regional centres have been appointed; to create dynamic, attractive and competitive urban regions; to develop sustainable urban structures, amongst others through diversification and increasing density of use in urban areas;

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• • •

to develop socially balanced cities offering a high quality of life; these policies aim at preventing and/or reducing social segregation; to invest in the development of partnerships between cities and rural areas; to stimulate cooperation among municipalities (regional cooperation), amongst others through financial incentives, to develop complementarities.

Integrated Transport and Spatial Planning Concept The Government of Luxembourg decided in 2003 to develop an integrated transport and spatial planning concept (‘Integratives Verkehrs- und Landesentwicklungskonzept’, IVL). This concept concretises and transposes the aims of the Programme Directeur and integrates various sector plans. Six ministries are involved in the development of the IVL: the Ministry of Interior Affairs (DATUR), the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Public (road) Building, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Public Housing. The IVL integrates the developments concerning the settlement structure, the commuter structure and the transport infrastructure into one comprehensive plan. The aims are: 1) to increase the share of public transport use from 12 per cent to 25 per cent in 2020; 2) to develop the settlement structure in such a way that it leads to traffic reduction; and 3) to decrease the use of the natural landscape. 13.5

Impact of European Urban Policies

As indicated earlier, Luxembourg is one of the most prosperous EU member states. This implies that only limited European grants in the framework of the Structural Funds have been granted to cities and regions. Luxembourg participates in various INTERREG III initiatives, because the whole country is more or less a borderregion. Furthermore, Luxembourg receives (limited) funds in the framework of the Objective 2 programme. Within this framework, €40 million (1999 prices) have been allocated for the period 2000–2006 (Ministry of Economics, 2001). The eligible areas consist of two rural areas and one urban area (canton Eschsur-Alzette). The urban area was selected because of its damaged environment caused by industrial decline. So far, many measures for industrial diversification have been taken, like business innovation, economic conversion of industrial sites and boosting endogenous potential. The limited grants that Luxembourg receives from the European Union indicate that European urban policies do not have a substantial impact on national urban policy-making in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

Luxembourg

13.6

277

Conclusions

From the point of view of population size, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is considerably smaller than many European cities. Hence, it is no surprise that national urban policies specifically directed to large cities have not been developed here. The capital Luxembourg-Ville has 78,000 inhabitants; the urban region comprising the capital and the old industrial belt has about 230,000 inhabitants. Despite the decline in the iron and steel industry, the Luxembourg economy ranks among the most affluent in the world, with among others a very low unemployment figure and a high GDP per inhabitant. Luxembourg-Ville is an important commercial and administrative centre specialised in financial services, and home base for EU and other international institutions. The municipalities are (financially and politically) rather independent. Most decisions regarding municipal issues are taken at the local level, however the Ministry of the Interior has the authority to interfere in municipal decisionmaking. The national ministries did not formulate policies specifically directed towards cities. Integration between national and local plans takes place at the regional level. Working groups consisting of representatives of the different ministries and the involved municipalities therefore makes regional plans. This proves to be an effective way of national–local cooperation. Besides some problems (like low quality housing and some social segregation) in the former industrial areas, Luxembourg-Ville experiences some (quality of life) problems resulting from the strong economic growth in the 1990s. From the mid-1990s three major developments in national policies took place that considerably affect the cities, especially Luxembourg-Ville. First, urban planning has been modernised and adapted to the requirements of a sustainable urban development. Second, a new vision on spatial planning has been adopted. In this vision an active decentralisation policy is promoted by appointing ‘centres of development and attraction’. Although the capital city is the superior centre, activities are spread away from the city, mainly to strive for sustainability by preventing sprawl, congestion, land pressure in the capital and to promote the – economic – development of medium and regional centres. Third, an integrated transport and spatial planning concept (IVL) has been developed by a working group with representatives of six ministries. The major objectives are to increase the share of public transport, to develop a settlement structure that leads to traffic reduction and to decrease the use of the natural environment. Given its strong economic performance, only limited European grants in the framework of regional and urban policy have been granted to cities and regions in Luxembourg.

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References Committee of the Regions (1996), Regional and Local Government in the European Union, Brussels. Eurostat (2003), Europe in Figures – Eurostat Yearbook 2002, Brussels: European Commission. Ministry of Economics, Direction Industry and Technology (DIT) (2001), Objective 2 Programme for the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Ministry of Interior Affairs, DATUR (2004), Ein Integratives Verkehrs- und Landesentwicklungskonzept für Luxemburg. Ministry of Interior Affairs, DATUR (2003), Programme Directeur d’Aménagement du territoire. STATEC (2004), Etat de la population. Communes les plus peuplées, 2004. Van den Berg, L., Braun, E. and van der Meer, J. (1998), National Urban Policies in the European Union. Responses to Urban Issues in the Fifteen Member States, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Websites http://www.statec.lu. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat. http://www.europa.eu.int/regional_policy. http://www.etat.lu. http://www.ivl.public.lu.

Chapter 14

The Netherlands: Empowering Large Cities to Meet Their Challenges Erik Braun, Ariane Chouly and Jan van der Meer1

14.1

Introduction

With 16.3 million inhabitants (1 January 2004) The Netherlands is the ‘largest of the smaller’ countries of the European Union. This position has not changed with the EU enlargement with 10 countries. Only Poland, with 39 million, is considerably larger. The other new countries are smaller. In the last 10 years the Dutch population has grown by 0.9 million. Ethnic minorities (allochtonen2) accounted for two thirds of this population growth. With 3 million non-native Dutch residents (half of them non-Western), The Netherlands can be considered an immigration country. The largest cities in particular have experienced a change in the composition of their population. In the three largest cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague (with 1.8 million inhabitants together), one in every three citizens belongs to a non-Western ethnic minority group (CBS, Statline, 2004). The differences between the three cities are small, although Rotterdam has the largest share, with 34 per cent. Within the cities the differences are enormous, with some city districts where around 80 per cent of the inhabitants is of nonWestern origin against other districts with less then 5 per cent. This population composition and its consequences for the development of the cities (especially the integration problem) have dominated a great deal of the political and societal debate in The Netherlands during the last few years. It also influences the socalled Grotestedenbeleid (Dutch urban policy; GSB for short), a national policy, explicitly concerned with typical large city problems. The GSB was initiated in 1994. Between 1994 and 2004 Dutch cities experienced two terms of this policy. The third term (GSB-III) began in 2005. In section 14.2 the pioneering phase of the GSB – and other explicit national urban policies – is recapitulated. Section 14.3 focuses on the major challenges for the Dutch cities. In section 14.4 the actual policy (GSB-II) and the intended policies (GSB-III) are dealt with. Apart from the GSB policies, section 14.4 also discusses a selection of other policies highly 1

European Institute for Comparative Urban Research, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 2 Definition: at least one parent was born abroad.

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relevant for the development of the major cities. Section 14.5 pays attention to impact of European policies. In this first section some relevant features and developments with regard to the larger Dutch cities are presented. Urban System By world standards, The Netherlands cannot boast any genuine major city. However, if we look at metropolitan regions, then The Netherlands counts two regions with more than one million inhabitants (Amsterdam and Rotterdam regions), and three with between half a million and one million inhabitants (the regions of The Hague, Arnhem/Nijmegen and Utrecht). In 2004, 25 municipalities had more than 100,000 citizens and 37 had between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. In 1990 the corresponding figures were 17 and 27 municipalities. After a long period of population decline that started in the 1960s, the four largest cities have shown a moderate population growth since the mid1980s (‘reurbanisation’). Most of the medium-sized cities kept growing steadily at a slow pace. An exception is Almere, the new town near Amsterdam in the province of Flevoland (the former IJsselmeer), which did not exist at all in 1970 and now has become the country’s eighth largest city, with 165,000 inhabitants. Other reasonably strong growers are situated in the southern province of North Brabant (Tilburg, Breda, ’s-Hertogenbosch). The number of of municipalities has been reduced from 636 to 483 over the last 10 years as smaller communities had to merge as port of an administrative reform that intended to increase the scale and effectiveness of local government. As a result the average population size of Dutch municipalities has grown from 26,000 to 34,000. The heart of the relatively stable Dutch urban system is in the western part of the country, where the ‘big four’, together with their suburbs and some towns of medium size,3 form the Randstad or Delta Metropolis, as it is sometimes called. Physically as well as economically, the Randstad conurbation constitutes the core of The Netherlands. Six and a half million people live and work there. The population density in this part of The Netherlands amounts to some 1,000 persons per km2. The Randstad stretches over three of the 12 provinces. It does not have a legal or administrative status; it is primarily a planning unit in the framework of national spatial planning. In the new national planning policy the Randstad is considered an urban network that possesses potential to compete with the major European economic centres.

3

Among which are the municipalities of Almere, Dordrecht, Haarlem, Haarlemmermeer, Leiden, Zaanstad and Zoetermeer, all with more than 100,000 inhabitants in 2003.

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Table 14.1 Municipalities of over 100,000 inhabitants and urban regions 1980

1990

2000

2003

City Region City Region City Region City Region (old) (old) (new) (new) Amsterdam Rotterdam ’s-Gravenhage Utrecht Eindhoven Tilburg Groningen Almere1 Breda Nijmegen Apeldoorn Enschede Haarlem Arnhem Zaanstad ’s-Hertogenbosch Amersfoort Haarlemmermeer2 Maastricht Dordrecht Leiden Zoetermeer3 Zwolle Emmen Ede

717 586 457 237 195 152 161 12 117 148 138 143 158 128 130 88 88 78 109 107 103 64 82 90 90

958 1,018 675 482 369 217 200 – 151 218 – 244 225 287 141 184 – – 145 196 173 – –

695 579 442 230 191 157 168 71 123 145 148 146 149 130 130 91 99 96 117 109 110 96 94 93 93

1,045 1,044 685 530 384 229 207 – 159 243 – 251 214 301 142 196 – – 162 206 187 – –

731 593 441 234 202 193 173 143 161 152 153 150 148 138 136 129 126 111 122 120 117 110 106 106 102

1,379 1,174 860 536 383 280 333 – 297 268 210 305 390 322 – 182 255 – 186 280 328 – 169 – –

737 600 464 265 206 198 177 165 164 156 156 152 147 142 139 133 131 123 122 120 118 113 110 108 105

1,428 1,193 884 558 391 286 340 – 304 274 213 308 405 351 – 186 262 185 287 331 166 – –

Notes In bold: 20 of the 30 municipalities participating in the GSB policy. The other 10 are Almelo, Deventer, Heerlen, Helmond, Hengelo, Leeuwarden, Schiedam, Venlo, Alkmaar en Lelystad. ‘Region’ for the years 1980 and 1990 refers to 17 urban areas (‘stadsgewesten’) composed in 1960 on the basis of commuter flows. In 2000 this definition was updated for new circumstances. The number of urban regions increased to 22. 1 2 3

Suburban municipality in the Amsterdam region (not, however not included in the region notion as applied here). Suburban municipality in the Amsterdam region. Suburban municipality in the region of The Hague.

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Urban Dynamics In the 1960s processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, reflected in the growth of the largest cities, came to an end. The increased prosperity, reflected in higher disposable incomes, greater mobility and a demand for more comfortable housing and living, determined the transition to suburbanisation in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1970s brought an exodus from the largest cities, supported by the then prevailing national policy of allocating housing schemes to a limited number of formally designated growth towns in the vicinity of the core cities, a policy meant to curb unbridled population dispersion. This policy has greatly influenced the development of the largest cities. Generally speaking, it weakened the position of the largest cities. The resulting migration process was highly selective: the well to do left the cities and predominantly low income people, including ethnic minority groups, stayed there or moved in. This selective migration reinforced the social and economic degeneration of, in particular, the older districts surrounding the city centres. However, most city centres remained the economic centres of their region. In the late 1970s and 1980s large scale urban-renewal, a change in national spatial policy in favour of building houses in or near the cities and policies to revitalise the largest cities, together with ‘big-city-friendly’ trends as ‘the rise of the information society’ and internationalisation, restored the position of the major cities, or rather, of the metropolitan areas. City centres gained popularity as residential areas among specific groups in society, especially young two-income households and well-to-do seniors. Urban Economics From an economic perspective, the Randstad is made up by two distinctive parts, usually addressed as the northern wing (comprising the metropolitan regions of Amsterdam and Utrecht) and the southern wing (the metropolitan regions of Rotterdam and The Hague). These two wings have developed at different speeds: a strong economic performance in the northern wing, while the southern wing is economically trailing behind (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2003). The international service region of Amsterdam and the national service and knowledge centre Utrecht are better placed in the knowledge economy compared to the Rotterdam region (port and logistics) and the administrative centre The Hague. Outside the Randstad, the regions of Eindhoven (high technology) and ’s-Hertogenbosch (logistic centre along a major national transport connection) have shown considerable economic growth. In the second half of the 1990s, the conditions for urban economic development were very good. Between 1995 and 2001 the Dutch economy grew by an average of 4 per cent per year. Unemployment gradually dropped from 7 per cent in 1995 to 2 per cent in 2001, one of the lowest figures in the EU. The increased prosperity resulted among others in a huge demand in the higher segments of the housing market. Economic growth in the Randstad – especially

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in the northern wing – and most other urban regions was well above the national growth average. The pessimistic outlook for the future of the largest cities in the early 1990s was replaced by optimism as far as economic development was concerned. A positive revaluation among company managers of the city as a business location and among specific higher income groups as an attractive residential location was clearly visible (SCP, 2001). Despite these positive trends, the social gap between those who had been able to benefit from the economic upswing and those who had not, such non-native Dutch, lower educated people and low-income elderly people, remained the same or even widened. Since 2002 the high growth rate of the Dutch economy has rapidly dissipated. National economic growth was around zero in 2002 and (for the first time since 1983) and even negative in 2003. Unemployment has risen rapidly from 2 per cent in 2001 to 6 per cent in the first quarter of 2004. The economic performance is one of the poorest in the EU-15. This development affects the cities in several ways. For instance, the Amsterdam office market has recorded the highest vacancy rates ever. Unemployment is rising again, especially among young people entering the labour market and among people with no or inadequate qualifications. Unprecedented budget cuts by the Cabinet hit the cities too, because national grants, including the GSB grants, have been reduced considerably. The public sector in general has taken a step back, leaving former public tasks to the private sector. The traditional Dutch ‘welfare state’ model seems to be gradually being replaced by a model in which people have to accept more responsibility for themselves. Financial and Administrative Framework Financially, Dutch municipalities are highly dependent (more than 80 per cent) on state payments (both earmarked and block grants). In 1997 the system of municipal financing was revised so as to put municipalities back on an equal level of services. Until then, general payment (one third of local income coming from the so-called Municipal Fund) used to be for the most part allocated on the basis of population size. The disadvantage of the system was that the distribution did not really weigh the expenses of the municipalities. One reason for the revision, apart from the need for a more cost-oriented allocation of resources, was the greatly increased political and social concern with the problems of large cities. In the new system, half of the resources are dependent on the social structure (38 per cent) and the functioning as a regional centre (13 per cent). At the same time the new structure allows for adjustment of the distribution code, thus permitting a transfer from relatively rich to relatively poor municipalities (the large ones among them). Notwithstanding the financial dependence on the national government, the role of municipalities has never been marginalised, the reason being that the national government needs the local authorities for the execution of their tasks and policies. It is a matter of participatory rule (Derksen, 1996). In 1994 the national government started the preparation to arrive at democratically chosen metropolitan authorities with strategic competencies

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in the seven largest urban regions.4 The first step was the introduction of new (temporary) legislation (kaderwet) that enforced local cooperation in urban regions. In due course, this legislation should lead to the creation of ‘city provinces’. Within these public bodies, municipalities remain powerful, but they are compelled to reach agreement about the planning and execution of specific ‘regional’ tasks, like the planning of new housing schemes and traffic and transport. For these two spatial functions the ‘city provinces’ have become the obvious negotiation partners for the state and they also distribute the financial means. However, the second, strategically most important step, to arrive at powerful metropolitan authorities, was never made, the reason being the negative outcomes of referendums held on the subject by the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Most public parties involved as well as the business community were in favour, but there was very little societal support. What was left was the temporary law to provide for state-imposed local cooperation within ‘city-regions’ on a limited number of issues. Nevertheless, this system has improved regional cooperation: core and suburbs can no longer restrict their view to their own local borders (Derksen and Sietsma, 1999). This temporary law, which expired in 2003, has been prolonged without much political debate. To conclude this section, Table 14.2 presents the ministries involved in the GSB. 14.2

Summary of National Urban Policies Until the Mid-1990s

It is only since the late 1980s that explicit attention has been given to the role of cities, at first notably in spatial policy, later also through measures directed towards residential renewal, economic revitalisation and social innovation. However, most policies were not explicitly focused on cities, despite the fact that the worst societal problems could be found in cities, particularly in the largest ones. In 1994 for the first time in history a coalition came into power including the social democrats, liberals and neoliberals. This ‘purple coalition’5 made the problems of the large cities a priority on the national policy agenda, not the least because of an urgent plea from the four largest cities themselves. Before the 1980s most (territorial) policies were in fact ‘anti-urban’ because cities were expected to be economically strong enough. Most public attention was given to economically lagging peripheral regions, following the ‘principle of equity’ approach. When the national economy was hit by a severe recession in the early 1980s things changed. It was realised that in a globalising world the large cities were more than before the engines of the regional and national economy. It should be prevented that they 4 The regions of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, Eindhoven/Helmond, Arnhem/Nijmegen, and Enschede/Hengelo. 5 The coalition was presented as a purple coalition because it was the first time that social democrats (red) and liberals (blue) decided to work together in the Cabinet.

Table 14.2 Role of ministries with respect to urban policy (GSB-II involvement) Ministries involved in national urban policy

Responsibilities, involvement

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Public administration, funding municipalities,1 urban policy: social integration and safety, liveability Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Housing schemes, urban renewal, improving physical the Environment structure, major public–private metropolitan revitalisation projects Ministry of Economic Affairs Condition-creating activities (quality business parks), urban economy (physical and non-physical), coordinating Structural Funds for The Netherlands. Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment Job creating and reintegration for unemployed persons (until 2004), day and after school care, teenager care Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Accessibility, infrastructure, public transport, transport Water Management nodes, mainports Ministry of Justice Crime prevention, integration (inburgering) Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport Social work, social care, community improvement Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences Catching up learning arrears, language education Ministry of Agriculture Improvement physical structure (green areas) Ministry of Finance Co-responsible funding municipalities, budget safeguarding The Ministry of General Affairs3 Supervision of Cabinet policy Notes 1 2 3

Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Minister of Government Reform and Kingdom Relations. Office of the Prime Minister.

GSB involvement Coordinator GSB2 Involved in GSB

Involved in GSB

Involved in GSB (until 2004) Involved in GSB Involved in GSB Involved in GSB Involved in GSB Involved in GSB Passively involved in GSB Passively involved in GSB

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turned into new problem areas. The national policy approach therefore changed into a more balanced ‘equity plus efficiency’ approach, paying more attention to the conditions for economic growth. We will now briefly summarise those aspects of national policy that most affected the functioning of the cities during the period until the mid-1990s. This description includes a short impression of the pioneering phase of the Dutch urban policy (GSB) that was started by the first ‘purple’ coalition in 1994. Spatial Policy The national spatial policy of the 1960s and 1970s, designed to control unbridled suburbanisation, was primarily a policy of spatial concentration to preserve sufficient open space in the strongly urbanised Randstad region. The so-called ‘growth towns policy’ proved very effective, for in the 1980s, 95 per cent of population growth in the three largest urban regions took place in the seven formally designated growth towns. However, that suburban growth was attended by a strong and selective reduction of the population in the major cities, where practically no adequate new housing schemes were planned. When it become clear in the late 1980s that this policy, intended to relieve the expected population pressure in the largest cities, was effectively an ‘anti-city’ policy, the focus was shifted to the major cities and their immediate vicinity. The shift in priorities led to the ‘compact-city policy’ that was to prevent further population decline in the largest cities since the mid-1980s. The objectives of this concentration policy were to foster a positive economic development of cities, limit the growth of mobility, encourage the use of bicycles and public transport, and protect rural territory serving as ‘green buffer’ between urban areas. The foundation for the present spatial policy was laid in the 1980s, when the national economy was cautiously recovering from a serious recession. The present national spatial plan,6 which was succeeded by a new national spatial plan in 2004, emphasises the need for economic growth and the role of the market sector. This emphasis on economic growth, international competition, accessibility of economic centres (in particular the main ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam) and the quality of the environment, very explicitly put the larger cities (as engines of economic growth) in the spotlight. The need for urban revitalisation was emphasised, to be effected by outward expansion as well as by restructuring inner-city locations that had lost their functions. One exponent of national urban policy was the designation, in 1989, of 13 socalled stedelijke knooppunten (‘urban nodes’). These cities would get priority in the allocation of specific national funds and services. An evaluation after seven years of urban-junctions policy revealed some positive developments, like the realisation of some large revitalisation projects (like the Kop-van-Zuid project in Rotterdam), 6 Fourth Memorandum on Physical Planning (VINO) and Fourth Memorandum on Physical Planning Extra (VINEX).

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but also criticism with respect to the limited set of financial instruments and the lack of selectiveness (van der Meer and Pol, 2000). Meanwhile, this policy has come to an end. Another explicit urban spatial policy that has been abolished meanwhile is the ‘ABC-location policy’, meant to curb intra-city car traffic. The underlying motive of the policy was to put ‘the right business in the right place’. To that end, types of location were distinguished according to their accessibility profile by public transport and/or motorcar. Ideally, only companies with a corresponding mobility profile should establish at each type of location. The rigid top-down approach, the resistance of municipalities, who were no longer free to develop new business parks and the meagre results as far as the impact on location decisions were concerned have led to the termination of this policy. Housing Policy: ‘VINEX-locations’ Within national spatial planning, the allocation of housing schemes is a main national instrument with direct influence on the spatial structure. Financial support from central government to municipalities for the construction of houses depends on this allocation. Although housing policy is not explicitly urban, the greatest challenges with respect to housing do occur in and around the largest cities. Municipalities are committed explicitly to enlist the private sector (real estate investors and developers) in their spatial policy. City regions were invited by the central government to propose large-scale locations (‘Vinex-locations’), where a minimum number of houses had to be realised.7 Agreements between the state and city regions about funding, housing, infrastructure, soil cleansing, and so on, have resulted in covenants. The integral implementation and financial responsibility rest mostly with the municipalities. The objective is to build 635,000 dwellings by 2015, of which 300,000 will be in the seven largest city regions (100,000 in the cities themselves and 200,000 in the expansion zones) and 160,000 in other urban areas. Although the national government takes responsibility only for the lower income groups, here too, the desired development is dependent on market participation. For the construction of new dwellings at inner-city locations, a link exists with the urban-renewal policy (to be discussed next). Urban Renewal Policy Urban renewal, which started in the 1970s, was primarily meant to improve the poor housing conditions in the old inner-city districts of mostly the largest cities, where low incomes and unemployment are concentrated. As with housing, the national government is deeply involved in the large-scale and intensive urban renewal policy. The expectation was that the catch-up operation would be 7

At least 2,000 dwellings at expansion locations and 1,000 at inner-city locations.

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completed around the year 2010. The renewal policy was not exclusively addressing the major cities, where the problems were most severe; also ‘village renewal’ is part of the activities. Before 1990, the policy was focused at housing rehabilitation, often at the expense of small businesses in the same quarters. Since the 1990s the attention shifted from a physical (‘bricks and mortar’) to a more comprehensive approach, taking into account social affairs, employment, health, education, economic affairs, safety, etc. Since the late 1990s urban renewal activities have been integrated in the GSB. Traffic and Transport Policy The accessibility of economic centres, especially the two main ports of Schiphol and Rotterdam, are central to the traffic and transport policy, because in areas with a great (potential) demand for transport, investments in road infrastructure and public transport yield the highest social and economic returns. Because the quality of living is more under pressure in dense traffic areas, the policy was first and foremost directed at cultivating public transport. Investments in high-grade regional public-transport networks were supposed to keep the pressure on the road network within acceptable limits. For the south wing of the Randstad a light-railway network has been planned and the expansion of the Amsterdam Underground is underway now. The high-speed train Paris-Brussels-Amsterdam, that has to be in operation in 2007, gives Amsterdam and Rotterdam a better connection to the European rail network. Finally a dedicated freight railway (Betuwelijn) is under construction connecting the seaport of Rotterdam with Germany. The idea is to offer an environmental friendly alternative for the explosively growing freight transport by truck. Moreover, all kind of private car mobility reduction measures were proposed (like road pricing) and sometimes implemented (strict parking policy, ‘park and ride’ (P+R)), but not with great success. Meanwhile, the fight against mobility growth is relaxed. The high priority for easy access to economic centres and main ports implies priority to hinterland connections of the main ports and the main transport axes – in particular the connections among urban regions – over other projects. Social Renewal Policy In the early 1990s, ‘social renewal’ was launched, not as an explicit policy for the major cities, although they were most in discussion. The idea had been hatched in the city of Rotterdam and subsequently adopted on the national level. The principal objective is to fight persistent social disadvantages by an integrated and sector-crossing approach. The policy of social renewal aimed at integrating various measures to fight disadvantages by a new administrative approach. The administrative reform was to be given shape in covenants between municipal authorities and the central government, in which directions were given how to set about social renewal. Some state payments to municipalities were combined

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in the Social Renewal Fund. Moreover, in the distribution of funds much more account was taken of the accumulation of problems. The social renewal has been effective, but could not meet all its ambitions because of the way it was set up and for lack of time. Meanwhile the GSB offers a new, comprehensive approach of social problems in cities. GSB: Pioneering Phase 1994–1998 The initiative for the GSB was taken by the ‘major four’ cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) in 1994. The recognition that social problems were getting worse, in particular as far as safety, living climate and lack of jobs were concerned, prompted the four largest cities to submit a rescue plan for the metropolitan regions to the new Cabinet. The problems of the major cities, especially with respect to the living climate and safety, were indeed made a priority concern of national policy. The result was the announcement of a comprehensive policy for major cities, integrating all kinds of (already existing) state payments. Within the Ministry of the Interior, a Secretary of State was appointed to coordinate this GSB. This policy was not the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior alone; it was Cabinet policy involving 11 ministries to a greater or lesser extent.8 Between 1994 and 1998 an annual sum of about 3.7 billion guilders (€1.68 billion) was made available for the GSB, found mostly by combining and/or earmarking already existing funds of the participating departments. During this first GSB period, the national government made performance agreements (covenants), first with the major four cities and later with 21 additionally selected cities9 on five issues: 1) work and economy; 2) youth and safety; 3) (health) care; 4) quality of social and physical living environment; 5) education. On the basis of these agreements, the cities had to produce action plans, which formed the ‘face’ of the policy in the pioneering phase. Because of the relative large unemployment numbers in the larger cities at the beginning of the 1990s and the possibility to use state-subsidised so-called ‘Melkert-jobs’10 as a new policy instrument, the ‘work issue’ got most of the

8 Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of National Health, Welfare and Sports, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences and the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of General Affairs. 9 In 1995 15 cities joined the major four cities: Almelo, Arnhem, Breda, ’sHertogenbosch, Deventer, Eindhoven, Enschede, Groningen, Helmond, Hengelo, Leeuwarden, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Tilburg, Zwolle. In 1997 this group of cities was expanded by another six cities: Dordrecht, Haarlem, Heerlen, Leiden, Schiedam and Venlo. 10 Named after the responsible Minister of Social Affairs and Employment.

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attention. The main aim of the GSB at that moment was to raise employment growth in cities to the national average and to help the long-term unemployed to find jobs. The first target was to provide 40,000 new jobs in the public sector, of which some 35 per cent would be in municipal services in large and medium-sized cities. A second target was to provide 20,000 jobs in the market sector between 1994 and 1998. Employers received an initial subsidy; in time, the job would have to be financed completely from the market. 14.3

State of the Cities

In the 1997 study on national urban policies in The Netherlands, the accumulation of (economic, social, environmental, youth, safety) problems in the four major cities started the debate for the GSB. What is the state of the Dutch cities in 2004? The Cities as Engines of Growth in the Knowledge Economy To fully understand the position of the Dutch cities we need to go back to the mid nineties. In the period from the mid 1990s until 2000 the Dutch economy was one of the fastest growing economies in Europe. The positive economic development resulted in a substantial increase of wealth of both people and companies in The Netherlands. The country attracted international attention with the so-called Dutch ‘polder model’11 that was seen as the basis for the success. The spectacular growth on the stock market, the sharp rise in wages and the drastic increase of prices in the housing market, are all indicators of the economic boom of that period. The Dutch cities did also benefit from this strong period of economic growth. Compared to the first half of the nineties, the number of unemployed people in the cities has decreased considerably. Moreover, cities did not only benefit from the economic upswing, but were the main engines behind economic growth – especially cities such as Amsterdam and Utrecht. It was no surprise that the pressure on the housing market was particularly great in those cities. The confidence of investors, companies and people in the future of cities was restored (see also section 14.1). Many observers argued that the major Dutch cities have strengthened their position in ‘the knowledge economy’. Economic growth is above all caused by knowledge intensive services. However, growth was not evenly distributed. There was a strong concentration of economic activity in the Amsterdam region, while Rotterdam and The Hague were economically trailing behind.

11 The polder model refers to the frequent consultation between the government, employers’ organisations and trade unions concerning the economic development.

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The Dual City At the same time the economic boom of the late 1990s demonstrated very clearly that people without appropriate qualifications did not find their way in the knowledge economy. The socio-economic gap in cities widened despite the favourable economic tide. Unemployment rates in cities decreased considerably, but were still well above the national average. The most important explanation for the higher unemployment rates especially in the largest cities is that the population composition is out of balance. Generally speaking, the share of lowincome groups and of people with no or little education is much higher than the national average whereas the share of the middle-income groups is far below the national average. There are too few employment opportunities for this relatively large group of underprivileged people in an urban economy where knowledge and skills are vital. The Quality of the Housing Stock The decades of selective migration (see section 14.1) have also left a mark on the housing stock of the four major cities as well as that of some medium-sized cities. The large-scale revitalisation of the housing stock has been tailored too much to the needs of these low-educated and low-income groups, again reinforcing the imbalance in the largest cities. The quality of housing is therefore insufficient to meet today’s potential demand for good quality housing in the major cities. This problem cannot be solved in the short term, making the spatial-economic mismatch (most jobs in the city being in the hands of people living elsewhere) still a problem. Major Cities are Still Magnets for the Underprivileged The major cities need to cope with a continuous flow of underprivileged people (‘kansarmen’). A lot of people with no or little education – the majority belonging to ethnic minority groups – moved to the major cities for all sorts of reasons (family, ethnicity, cheap housing, job opportunities, etc.). Moreover, the birth rate of these groups is much higher than among the native Dutch living in the cities. These people have come from all over the country but also come from abroad since The Netherlands has clearly developed into an immigration country over the years. Not only asylum-seekers and immigrants who marry people from their country of origin but also illegal immigrants looking for a better future have settled down in the country (see section 14.1). One of the main concerns for the major cities (especially the larger ones) is that they are still the main magnets for these immigrant groups. Most of the immigrants coming to the cities have few if any qualifications.

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Immigration, Integration and Safety In the 1990s the levels of societal support for these immigration flows had already been gradually eroded. At the turn of the century the climate in The Netherlands changed dramatically. The relatively large flow of immigrants, the integration of ethnic minorities and (the lack of) safety have become top political priorities.12 These issues are strongly associated with the situation of the largest cities. The largest problem as perceived by the public is insecurity. People in cities are concerned about the actual crime rates but also feelings of insecurity among the population are a serious problem. Many people consider lack of safety or feelings of insecurity as a by-product of the weak integration of some ethnic minorities. Difference Between the Largest and the Medium-sized Cities The social problems are most manifest in the four largest cities. The cities of medium size are on the whole less affected, although a few of them are also falling victim to typically metropolitan worries. Most of the medium-sized cities have a better balanced population composition. Other Issues Of course, the well-known issues for cities such as accessibility and congestion, environmental quality, preservation of cultural heritage, etc. are still relevant for the state of the cities in 2004. 14.4

National Urban Policies from the Mid-1990s

In this section most attention will be given to the continuation of the GSB. In the GSB three phases can be distinguished. The first ‘pioneering’ phase concerns the period 1994–1998 as summarised briefly in section 2. The second phase of the GSB – the development phase – is addressed as ‘GSB-II’ and covers the period 1998–2004. The third phase, GSB-III, concerns the period 2005–2009. The most important decisions for that period have been taken very recently. In addition to the GSB, some other national policies that are highly relevant for cities and that are not included in GSB, will be discussed. The section concludes with a new proposal of the Cabinet for special legislation tailor-made to the problems of the four largest cities.

12 These were high on the agenda of the controversial politician Pim Fortuyn (see section 14.4).

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GSB-II: Objectives and Policy Framework After the 1998 elections the second ‘purple’ coalition continued the GSB. A major change was the appointment of a Minister of Major Cities and Integration to stress the importance of the GSB on the national level and to increase the effectiveness of the policy. The cities got their ‘own’ minister and a ‘vote’ in the Council of Ministers. In this second phase, the GSB has been developed further, based on the experiences of the first phase. One could say that the GSB has grown up or at least that it has expanded. In that period the number of cities involved, the budgets linked to the GSB framework, the number of policy instruments and objectives increased compared to the first phase of the GSB. GSB-II focuses on 30 large and medium-sized cities13 with nine objectives: • • • • • • • • •

reducing (structural) unemployment and promoting job opportunities; strengthening the competitive position of cities; improving the match between education and labour market; strengthening the position of urban living areas on the regional housing market; improving of the (physical) living environment; improving accessibility of economic activities; strengthening the social infrastructure; improving safety; sustainable regeneration of deprived neighbourhoods.

As well as these nine general objectives,14 three objectives15 with regard to the implementation process of GSB have been formulated: • • •

regional coordination: the selected municipalities should try to coordinate their urban objectives with neighbouring municipalities; active participation of citizens, companies and institutes in policy development and execution (burgerparticipatie); integrated area-oriented approach for deprived neighbourhoods.16

In comparison to the first period, the minister has tried to streamline the GSB. The policy rests on three so-called ‘pillars’: an economic, a physical and a social 13

In 1999 Alkmaar, Amersfoort, Emmen, Lelystad and Zaanstad were also included in the GSB. They are not full members of the GSB programme as their involvement is limited to a number of objectives. 14 These objectives should indicate the expected societal impact of the GSB-II and are called outcome-doelstellingen . 15 These objectives are called procesdoelstellingen and are necessary conditions for the implementation process of GSB-II. 16 Referred to as wijkaanpak.

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pillar. The ‘work and economy’ pillar focuses on strengthening the economic vitality in cities. This pillar includes specific grants of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The physical pillar makes arrangements to improve the quality of the living and working environment in cities and is mainly covered by the ISV-budget17 of the Ministries of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture. The ISV-budget is a broad target grant aiming at making the cities more attractive for residents, companies and visitors by investing in the physical environment of cities (housing, public spaces, cultural facilities, etc.). The social pillar covers a wide variety of issues like the social living environment (health) care, education and safety and includes a large number of specific grants, provided by five ministries.18 In 1999, the cities eligible for GSB support, developed a ten-year period vision on their cities, which they translated into so-called ‘long-term development programmes’. In these programmes the cities indicated their social, physical and economical goals19 that contribute to the general GSB objectives and how they were going to obtain these goals. The national government reviewed these programmes after which covenants were negotiated with the cities for the period 1999–2003,20 including the expected performance of the cities. Financial Framework On the basis of the city covenants, the national government assigned €10.3 billion to the execution of the urban programmes up to 2004. A large difference between the first and the second GSB period is the funding system. In the first GSB period, the national government allocated resources to projects. It is no surprise that this funding system does not stimulate an integrated approach but on the contrary, it induces a fragmentation of resources over numerous projects. To stimulate cities to work in a more integrated way, the national government decided to finance long-term programmes, which also gave the cities long-term financial certainty. Another difference concerning the first and second GSB period is the division of the GSB budget over the different policy fields. In the second period less money is invested in work and labour issues and more money is invested in improving the quality of the social and physical living environment of cities. Some observers claim that this shift in policy attention was caused by the fact that the ‘Melkertjobs’ (subsidised jobs) have had a positive effect on the employment in the larger towns and therefore have attained their goal. Others claim that at the end of the 17

Investeringsbudget Stedelijke Vernieuwing (investment budgets for urban renewal). Ministry of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of National Health, Welfare and Sports, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. 19 Referred to as Outputdoelstellingen. 20 In 2003 it was decided to extend the covenant period with one year to 2004. 18

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1990s the cities benefited from the upward trend in the economy reducing the urge to invest in employment growth. Again others point out that the complaints of inhabitants of most of the GSB cities about the quality of the social and physical living environment induced the policy makers to change their priorities. Dutch Urban Expert Centre An interesting initiative in the second phase of the GSB is the establishment of the Dutch Urban Expert Centre (‘Kenniscentrum Grote Steden’). Both the cities and various government departments felt the need to share knowledge on urban policies. In March 2001 the Dutch Urban Expert Centre was established by 25 of the country’s largest cities and nine ministries. The aim of this centre is to stimulate cities to exchange knowledge and best practices of urban policies in The Netherlands as well as the in the wider European context. The Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is represented on the Programme Council as well as in the Board of the Dutch Urban Expert Centre. Up to now, the cities and the government departments appreciate the supporting role of The Dutch Urban Expert Centre. It will be continued in GSB-III. Political Changes since 2002 In 2002 The Netherlands experienced a political earthquake as an ‘outsider’ entered the political arena. The controversial politician Pim Fortuyn21 (without support from the traditional political parties) gained serious support as he put immigration, integration of ethnic minorities and (un)safety firmly on the political agenda. To the surprise of many political experts, he won 33 per cent of the votes in the local elections in Rotterdam as the leader of a new local political group (Leefbaar Rotterdam, liveable Rotterdam) in February 2002. He established his own national political party for the national elections in May 2002 called Lijst Pim Fortuyn, in short LPF. His ideas and his party were the centre of an unprecedented political debate in The Netherlands. The murder of Pim Fortuyn just two weeks before the national elections caused a serious political crisis. His party won 26 seats (out of 150) in the parliament and became the second largest political party after the Christian Democrats (CDA). The rise of the LPF has undoubtedly influenced the political priorities of the traditional political parties. There are different points of view concerning the impact of Fortuyn’s short political career. There is consensus that the rise of LPF changed the tone in the political debate about the integration of ethnic minorities (more obligations), immigration (tougher immigration policies) and safety (more

21

Pim Fortuyn was a member of the Social Democrats until he decided to start his own political party. He gained societal support with his tough ideas about the need for strict immigration policies and compulsory integration of ethnic minorities.

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attention for law and order and less tolerance). Naturally, these changes have had their effect on the GSB. First, the new coalition of Christian democrats, conservatives (LPF) and liberals, which started in 2002, did not mention the GSB in its coalition agreement and did not continue the position of a special Minister of Major Cities and Integration. The GSB is now the responsibility of the Minister of Government Reform and Kingdom Relations. Some claim that this has had a considerable impact on the effectiveness of the GSB, because the problems of the major cities are only one of the issues the Minister of Government Reform and Kingdom Relations is responsible for. Others say that this was a logical change, because the GSB should be seen as a process of government reform. One evaluation of GSB22 indicated that the GSB did not bring direct relief to the cities with large problems. The merit of the GSB is in the changing behaviour of government – stimulating a different approach – to meet the challenges of cities. (RMO, 2001). GSB is considered to be a pilot for a new modus operandi of the government in which decentralisation, results and business-like are key concepts. Second, the change in government had an effect on the political priorities of the GSB. During the two ‘purple’ Cabinets, the GSB mainly focused on creating new jobs and improving the (social) quality of living. The coalition of Christian democrats, conservatives (LPF) and liberals paid much more attention to safety, integration and immigration issues in the major cities. At the end of 2002, this Cabinet resigned, because of continuous conflicts within the LPF.23 New elections were held in the spring of 2003 and the LPF lost many of its votes. However, the current coalition Cabinet of Christian Democrats, liberals and neoliberals continues to stress the importance of safety and integration issues. To indicate the national importance of safety, the Cabinet even proposed to introduce a separate ‘safety pillar’ in the GSB framework, but this created a lot of resistance, especially among the ministries involved in the social pillar.24 Therefore, in December 2003, the Ministry of the Interior decided to abandon the pillar structure model and choose for another policy framework.

22

An evaluation by the ‘Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling’ In the months after the murder of their leader, the LPF was out of control and had fallen victim to a series of internal conflicts. 24 The introduction of a separate safety pillar induced more ministries to claim their own pillar, encouraging fragmentation instead of the so needed integrated approach working. 23

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Lessons Learned from GSB-II and Starting Points for GSB-III At the request of the Minister of Major Cities and Integration a large number of advisory bodies25 have evaluated the GSB. In March 2002, the Ministry of the Interior published an interim evaluation of the GSB,26 summarising all the points of improvement mentioned by the advisory bodies. A division is made between policy results and process results. Policy Results The GSB Monitor 2002 shows that during the last two GSB periods the socialeconomical position of the GSB cities has improved. In particular, unemployment rates have fallen. Many consider the economic upswing the major reason and doubt that this positive trend can be continued because of the change in the economic circumstances. At the moment the unemployment rate in cities is rising again and the number of start-up firms is declining. The monitor also indicated an increase of crime figures as well as growing feelings of insecurity in the largest cities. Therefore, the Cabinet decided that safety would receive top priority in the new covenant period (GSB-III). Process results •

Integrality The GSB aims at an integral use of state money to enable cities to tackle the multiple problems of cities in an integral way. ‘Broad Special Purpose Grants’ (BSPG) should give the cities more flexibility and responsibility to allocate the national resources for the most urgent local problems. The idea is that city governments have better insights into the local problems than national government officials. However, during the first and second period of the GSB this goal has not been obtained. Only one BSPG has been created, the so-called ISV-budget covering the physical pillar. GSB-II has not been able to break down the barriers between the different policy sectors, because the participating ministries are reluctant to bundle their own special grants into broad purpose grants. Also the monitoring-system is still separate for policy sectors, meaning that each ministry has its own monitoring system. In the new covenant period, the financial resources will be provided through a limited number of BSPGs. This should enable cities to allocate the resources at their own discretion in order to achieve the agreements linked to the relevant BSPG.

25 Amongst others evaluations and advices of the ‘Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling’, ‘VROM-raad’, ‘Raad voor Openbaar Bestuur’, ‘Raad voor financiële verhoudingen’, ‘Sociaal Economische Raad’. 26 Ministry of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations (2002), Steden op stoom: tussenstand grotestedenbeleid 1994–2002.

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•

•

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Furthermore, one integrated monitor has been developed including all the indicators stated in the covenants. Result-oriented working In the so-called long-term development programmes the cities translated their ambitions into output-objectives. However, the defined output-objectives in the covenants show a large uniformity and are difficult to measure (very general aims). This was (partly) caused by the short time available for the preparation of the programmes. Because of time pressure almost no intermediaries (community work, youth work, etc.) and inhabitants have been consulted. Moreover, no time was available to measure the situation at the beginning of the covenant period, which makes it impossible to evaluate the progress made. Furthermore no clear agreements have been made on the accountability of the policy. It was unclear what would happen if the cities do not reach their objectives. In the new covenant period, cities will be confronted with much less, but concrete (output) objectives and indicators and they will be held accountable for their results. Tailor-made approach (‘maatwerk’) In the GSB-II period one of the main criticisms concerns the development of the 10-year development programmes (Meerjarige Ontwikkelingsplanning, MOP for short) for each of the GSB cities. Research concluded (CPB, 2001) that the majority of cities have handed in similar plans with a very general analysis of their situation. For the new planning period, the cities and the national government will put more effort to carry out a serious and tailormade SWOT-analysis. The idea is to make that a compulsory element of the development process. The ministries develop their own city visions and they will use that information in the discussion with the cities to jointly formulate the city’s ambitions. Again cities will be freer to select their priorities then they have been in the previous periods. Cities can add their own specific objectives to the general ones formulated by the national government. For these national government objectives again cities can choose their priorities and can for instance be more ambitious with regard to reducing youth delinquency and less ambitious in job creation. Partnership First, the various evaluations of the GSB-II show that there has not been enough cooperation between the selected cities and the participating ministries, which has made it difficult for the ministries to evaluate the performanceagreements, included in the long-term development programmes of the cities. Second, the cities themselves have not been successful in stimulating stronger involvement of local stakeholders (one of the three process objectives of the GSB-II). Residents and professionals working in the cities (youth work, community work, etc.) are still not enough involved in the development and execution of the urban policy, while the demands of citizens and the problems

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in the neighbourhoods should be the starting point of the GSB. Therefore, in the new covenant period, local governments will have to create more partnerships with citizens and societal organisations. Regional coordination Another lesson from the GSB-II period is that cities still do not –(or do not enough) take the regional scale of many of their problems (like the housingand labour market and accessibility) into account. For the new period it is vital that municipalities are stimulated to tackle their urban problems on a regional scale. Regional cooperation will be compulsory for a limited number of output objectives in the new covenant period (in the field of the housing stock, economic accessibility and the restructuring of industrial areas).

The Future: GSB-III: 2005–2009 Objectives and policy framework As said earlier the Minister of Government Reform and Kingdom Relations dropped the pillar structure of GSB-II. Instead the policy framework ‘Working together on the strength of the city’ of GSB-III consists of three ‘domains’: an economical, a physical and a social domain. The economic domain is about improving the urban entrepreneurial climate by developing new and restructuring old industrial zones, decreasing crime against companies/entrepreneurs, increasing broadband Internet deployment and increasing service provision for entrepreneurs. The physical domain has three major objectives concerning: 1) housing (better balance in supply and demand of housing accommodation); 2) quality of the environment (public space, green zones, soil sanitation, noise reduction, air quality and culture); and 3) efficient land-use. It has been difficult to join the different issues of the social domain because of the variety and complexity of these issues. The general objectives for the social domain are: 1) settling down of newcomers and integration of ethnic minorities; 2) youth and education; 3) reception centres and other social facilities; 4) better physical health; and 5) safety. Three coordinating ministries have been appointed to coordinate the policy within the three domains: the Minister of Economic Affairs for the economic domain, the Minister of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment for the physical domain and the Minister of Government Reform and Kingdom Relations for the social domain. The responsibility of these coordinating ministries is just that: coordination. The coordinating activities do not replace the standard practice of the political responsibility and power of each individual minister of the Cabinet. The real decision power is still with those ministers. The Minister of Government Reform and Kingdom Relations is also the overall coordinator of the GSB-III. As discussed in the preceding section, the GSB-II had nine objectives. In the GSB-III the number of objectives will be reduced to the five:

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1 Improving objective and subjective27 safety. This is a basic condition for the effective functioning of the urban society as a whole. 2 Improving quality of the living area. These improvements are needed to keep the city attractive as a city to live, work and enjoy recreation. 3 Improving ‘societal quality’. This is a condition for a stable society in which the government enables (groups of) people to accept their own responsibility as much as possible. 4 Attracting medium and high-income groups to the city. This is seen as a vital condition for sustainable urban development. 5 Stimulating economic growth. Because cities are the engines of the Dutch economy, it is important to increase economic growth in cities. At the same time economic growth makes it easier to fight social, physical and safety problems. These five new general objectives cover most of the issues that were incorporated in the nine objectives of GSB-II as well. What has changed is the setting of political priorities. Safety has moved up the political charts to become the undisputed number one. As mentioned earlier, the national government intends to enter into tailormade agreements with the cities at the beginning of GSB-III. There are two sides of the coin: on the one hand, cities will enjoy more freedom to fight specific local problems, but on the other hand, the government will hold cities accountable for their results, including the possibility that cities might have to pay back some of the special GSB funds. In the GSB-II period the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment was the only one with concrete sanctions for cities that would not live up to their part of the agreement concerning the financial support from ISV funds. GSB-III will hold cities accountable on the five objectives.28 GSB-III involves the same 30 cities as GSB-II, although the five cities that joined in 1999 will become full members of the programmes as well. Each city has been asked to produce new development programmes for the years to come and to include the expected results of the GSB. These programmes are the basis for the agreement with the national government (‘stadsconvenanten’). The national government stages one intermediate and one final evaluation of the results. There are no checks and balances concerning the implementation process. This is a major break with GSB-II and generally welcomed by the cities. The local democratic process must guarantee that the city incorporates the contribution of citizens, companies, institutes and other public authorities.

27

‘Subjective safety’ is the perceived safety. This is how it will work: the five general objectives have been translated into fifteen concrete goals. These 15 goals are evaluated on the basis of 39 (measurable) indicators. Besides these 15 goals, the cities can work with another five goals added to deal with their specific situation. 28

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Financial Framework The financial framework of the GSB-III corresponds with the three defined domains and will consist of three Broad Special Purpose Grants (BSPG): an economic, a physical and a combined BSPG for social issues, integration and safety.29 The three financial coordinators are the same as the policy coordinators. The bundling of specific grants into three BSPGs is the most important change compared to the previous GSB period where cities were confronted with 42 specific grants. The new financial system with these three BSPGs replaces the complex regulations of GSB-II. The bundling of 42 separate grants into three broadly defined grants is a necessary condition for more flexibility and the development of tailor-made solutions on the local level. Both the national government and the cities prefer this decentralisation. Additionally, the government has promised to reduce the complexity of the current system(s) of financial reporting concerning the GSB funds. The following table shows the total indicative budget and ministries involved in GSB-III (Ministry of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations, 2004). Table 14.3 Total indicative budget (€) and ministries involved in GSB-III BSPG

Budget

Ministries

Physical

1.1 billion

Economical SIV (social issues, integration and safety)

163 million 2.4 billion*

Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Economic Affairs Ministry of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations Ministry of Justice Ministry of Education, Culture and Sciences Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport

*

It is to be expected that the national government will add another €20 million for safety. Since the government is in the process of developing a new scheme for the obliged settling down of newcomers, the financial means for that purpose are not included in the table. The planning is that the financial means will be integrated into the SIV BSPG starting from 2006.

29

The BSPG ‘Sociaal, Integratie en Veiligheid’.

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The ministries involved are the same as those involved in the second GSB period, except for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. As from the 1 January 2005, this ministry no longer participates in the GSB. This is remarkable, as the role of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment was considerable during the first and second GSB period (for more information see section 14.2). Table 14.3 indicates that the cities will receive less money compared to the previous GSB period. This is a consequence of the unprecedented budget cuts launched by the Cabinet. It is no surprise that the cities were unhappy with the first proposals of the Cabinet. However, it is difficult to compare the two periods since the resources of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment are no longer in the GSB financial figures. Other National Policies Directed to Cities This subsection discusses some national policies that are not part of the GSB but are highly relevant for the functioning of the major cities from the mid 1990s up till now. We conclude this subsection with a new initiative of the Dutch government to develop a special law for the four largest cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Spatial Policy The Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment is responsible for a leading national policy instrument, the National Memorandum on Physical Planning (see also section 14.2). In April 2004 – considerably delayed owing to dramatic political changes described before – the draft Fifth National Report on Physical Planning was presented to Parliament. The new draft document (‘Nota Ruimte’) can be considered as a structural change in Dutch spatial planning. Local stakeholders30 get more freedom to decide on use of land. Top-down policies like the ‘urban nodes’ policy and the ‘ABC-location’ policy (see section 14.2) have been abolished. The basic idea is that the development of the country’s networks of cities is vital for its competitiveness. This does not imply that cities can grow as they please: the government strives for powerful cities and a vital countryside. Economic activity is promoted within six urban networks: Randstad Holland (including the four largest cities), de Brabantse stedenrij (including Eindhoven, Tilburg, Breda en ’s-Hertogenbosch), Maastricht-Heerlen, Twente (Enschede and surroundings), Arnhem-Nijmegen en Groningen-Assen. Reliable connections between these networks are a priority, as well as the development of the so-called mainports Schiphol (airport) and Rotterdam (port).

30

Municipalities, provinces and private developers.

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The aim to combine the development of powerful cities and a vital countryside is promoted through the Beleidsregeling Subsidies Budget Investeringen Ruimtelijke Kwaliteit (BIRK) of the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment. The subsidies from the BIRK go to projects that fit in the new national planning framework.31 In a later stage, the BIRK will be linked explicitly to the GSB system through the accountability and the evaluation of the results. Another instrument to contribute to the development of urban networks is the New Key Projects. The advent of the European high-speed railway network will create great opportunities for the stations on the nodes of the network. Therefore, the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management have reserved €1 billion for six ‘New Key Projects’ in 1997. The projects concern six high-speed railway stations.32 With these projects the national government aims to improve the quality of life in the cities and to attract large businesses to the cities. The Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment assists in planning the station areas and provide funds if private participants do so too. The Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management is primarily responsible for optimising the railway stations’ transport function. Economic Policy The most important policy instrument outside the GSB of the Ministry of Economic Affairs is the TIPP-policy (‘Tender Investeringsprogramma’s Provincies’). This policy will be succeeded by a new action plan for the restructuring and redevelopment of business locations (2004–2008) to be published after the acceptance of the ‘Nota Ruimte’. The vast majority of the 60 projects33 in the plan (70 per cent) are to be found in the 30 GSB cities. Again a link with the GSB agreement (stadsconvenant) is foreseen. The business parks outside the GSB cities will be supported through the ‘Financieel Instrumentarium Bedrijventerreinen’ (FIB). Social Policy The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment will not be part of the third phase of the GSB. The ministry decided to make specific arrangements with the

31 Up to the time of writing six projects in medium-sized and small cities had been approved. The budget of BIRK is €90 million. 32 Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, Arnhem and Breda. 33 These so-called ‘Topprojecten’ are selected by value added, supra-regional importance, lack of similar business parks in the area, need for restructuring, size of the business park.

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cities through the new law on work and social security (‘Wet Werk en Bijstand’).34 This new law is in force from January 2004 and combines the funds for social security with the money for a better match between supply and demand on the labour market (‘reintegration’). In the old system municipalities would get financial compensation for each person that needed social security. Now the cities can keep part of the state money35 if they succeed in getting people out of the social security system within 12 months (through education, work placement or a real job etc.). The financial stimulus for the municipalities makes other monitoring systems redundant.36 The new policy is the most prominent example of decentralisation of responsibilities to cities and is actually one step further in that respect than the GSB-III. In combination with the new law, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has made explicit agreements with the four largest cities as well as the other 26 GSB cities concerning the fight against long-term unemployment. The special subsidies for the reintegration of people into the labour market are linked to specific targets (number of people that are helped to find a proper job, the number of people to be helped). The ambition is that each long-term unemployed individual gets an offer from the municipality to improve his or her situation. This is based on a (voluntary) European agreement between the Ministers for Social Affairs and Employment entitled ‘A Joint Agenda for the Future’.37 The Dutch government is really trying hard to include both existing and new longterm unemployed in their agreements with the cities. Cities Setting the Political Agenda: The Dutch Government Prepares Special Legislation for the Four Largest Cities The four largest cities (referred to as the G4) have pointed successive Cabinets to the disproportionate problems of these four cities. The city of Rotterdam in particular has been very active in bringing its agenda under the attention of the national politicians. In December 2003 the city of Rotterdam presented its action programme ‘Rotterdam zet door. Op weg naar een stad in balans’.38 The action programme is based on a frank analysis of the city’s main problems. Rotterdam is unable to cope with the continuous flow of underprivileged people to the city. The city’s social and economic system, as well as the capacity of its residents to support the large groups of underprivileged people entering Rotterdam (and for 34

Replacing the Algemene Bijstandswet en de Wet Inschakeling Werkzoekenden (WIW). 35 The ministry calculates this state contribution every year. 36 This decentralisation could also imply a financial risk for municipalities if they do not succeed in keeping people out of the social security system quickly enough or if the number of applicants for social security increases drastically during a year. 37 This declaration was signed on 25 October 2000. 38 ‘Rotterdam Carries On. Towards a Balanced City’.

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some specific neighbourhoods in particular) is limited. For many years, the flow of underprivileged people exceeds the city’s capacity to absorb these groups properly. Most of these people belong to ethnic minorities. However, ethnicity is not the key problem; the key problem concerns the weak social-economic position of these new inhabitants. This can be caused by various reasons but the lack of adequate education and insufficient language skills are important. The action programme proposes controversial measures such as a minimum income for newcomers39 and obligatory integration of ethnic minorities. The Rotterdam action programme includes an ‘agenda for discussion with the national government’ in which Rotterdam asks for special support of the national government. The agenda does include a plea for a fair allocation of the national governments’ resources with an eye to the big problems of the second biggest city. The allocation (including the GSB) should be based on the size and accumulation of problems as well as the robustness of the plans to fight these problems. The main focus of the agenda is not on financial support but on more local power and administrative and legal instruments to fight some of the most persistent problems in the city. The Dutch government has responded to the signals of the G4 and Rotterdam’s ‘agenda for discussion with the national government’ in particular. Many of the issues raised by Rotterdam and the G4 were already priorities at the start of the coalition Cabinet of Christian democrats, liberals and neoliberals in the spring of 2003. The Cabinet takes the matter seriously and is preparing special legislation (Verzamel- en uitzonderingswet) to better deal with the problems of the G4. The city of Rotterdam will be the pilot city. Already the initiative is referred to in the press as the ‘Rotterdam wet’ (Rotterdam law). Of course this legal initiative needs some refinement before it will be send to parliament and it is not yet clear if the law gets enough political support. However, the reaction of the Cabinet is an important signal to the G4 and Rotterdam in particular. The Cabinet recognises the disproportionate problems of Rotterdam and the other three cities. If the parliament approves of the Cabinet’s proposal pilot city Rotterdam will have more power to fight its problems. The city can demand a minimum income for newcomers in deprived neighbourhoods (not for the entire city), the law enables the city to dispossess property owners that are structurally disrespecting the law (drugs, violence, noise, illegal hostels etc.), it enables the city to link the (legal) status of immigrants to the degree of integration, it opens up the ability for establishing entrepreneurial zones to kick start the economy in deprived neighbourhoods, etc. Of course, the proposal still needs approval of the parliament but the message of the Cabinet is clear: empower the city administration of the four largest cities to fight its problems.

39

The income should be at least 120 per cent of the minimum wage.

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14.5

Impact of European ‘Urban’ Policies

The Netherlands has a tradition to uphold in regional and urban policy at the national level. Besides, The Netherlands is not considered as one of the weaker economic countries. This implies that only limited European grants in the framework of regional and urban policy have been granted to Dutch cities and regions. For the period 2000–2006 there is one Objective 2 programme explicitly focusing on ‘Urban Areas in Difficulty’. This programme covers 11 zones in nine cities. The total budget of the programme amounts to €588 million of which the Structural Funds provide €200 million. This programme, the single Objective 2 city programme in the EU, fits very well in the objectives and methods of the GSB. The European Funds support the GSB programme budgets. In this way the ‘urban’ dimension of the Objective 2 programme finds its way into the national urban policies. More or the less the same holds for URBAN projects. The Netherlands has been allotted three URBAN II projects. Together these projects (in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Heerlen) receive €30 million over six years. These projects are also coordinated with the GSB and managed by the local GSB management. As such, they form an important and welcome addition to public and private investments, but they do not have a significant influence on policy development. The basic idea of URBAN – to arrive at a comprehensive regeneration approach – has been a basic element of GSB from its start in 1994. Almost two thirds of the Dutch part of the Structural Funds is for Objective 3. Remarkably, Dutch municipalities appear to be hesitant to make use of these budgets, the reason being that the administrative procedures are considered as extremely complicated. Cities fear that they will face more problems (like paying back or penalties) than benefits from ESF-applications. The fact that the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs had to pay back considerable amounts of ESFmoney has made some cities cautious in applying for funds, despite increasing unemployment. This could imply that a considerable part of the relative limited Dutch EU grants will not be used. The Netherlands receives €2.6 billion EUsupport over the 2000–2006 period. This is 1.4 per cent of the total SF-budget, while the Dutch population counts for 4.2 per cent of the EU-15 population. With regard to EU policy there are several aspects that influence urban development. A few examples that were mentioned during interviews with representatives of ministries: •

•

The use of (local and national) public resources should not go against European competition law and regulations. The implications are sometimes serious. For example it is not clear that a revitalisation project of a business park, can compensate the companies that have to be relocated financially. Competing firms could file a complaint. The (re)introduction of fiscal zones in troubled urban districts could be against European rules.

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The margins for the policies concerning the immigration of ethnic minorities (a prominent national political issue) are set by European rules.

Next to funds and regulations, considerable value is attributed to the international exchange of knowledge and experience. The European institutions stimulate this exchange. It is clear that the relatively small budgets of the EU’s ‘urban policies’ limit the impact on national urban policy-making in The Netherlands. On the whole European ‘urban’ policies did not have a substantial impact on national urban policy-making in The Netherlands as it might have had in some other Member States (as an example and stimulus of new policy initiatives). The impact of European regulation on local urban policy-making should not be underestimated but more data are not available to substantiate this observation. Besides, the exchange of experiences is much appreciated. Meanwhile, the four largest Dutch cities are convinced that the European institutions are important enough to establish a joint lobby office in Brussels in order to look after their common interests. This again shows that the cities want to play their own part on the European level, notwithstanding the efforts from the national government on their behalf. 14.6

Conclusions

What have been the most important changes since the mid-1990s with regard to national urban policy-making in The Netherlands? What is the state-of-the art in the middle of the decade? How do cities influence the national urban agenda? What is the impact of European policies on urban policy-making in The Netherlands? One of the main observations concerning the GSB is that the policy has ‘matured’ since the start in 1994. At that time, the four largest cities presented a rescue plan to the Dutch government that was to be translated into the GSB. Looking back at the first years of the GSB, this period (1994–1998) is now considered as the pioneering phase. After that start-up phase the GSB really ‘took off’ in the period 1998–2004. In that period the budget and the number of cities involved has increased, the number of policy instruments has been expanded, the GSB accounting system has been adjusted and the country has welcomed its first ever minister for the cities, giving the cities a vote in the in the Council of Ministers (1998–2002). At first sight one might get the impression that the coming GSB-III period (2005–2009) does not bring spectacular changes compared to the introduction of the policy in 1994. If we look closer this is not entirely accurate. In the first place the government has prepared measures to reduce the GSB red tape through the setting up a simplified GSB administration system and the government has decided to combine the 42 special grants into three broadly based grants.

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In the second place, the proposed policies for the third GSB period take into account the unprecedented shift in the Dutch political climate of 2002. Urban safety and integration of ethnic minorities are on the top GSB list now. In the third place, the GSB will reflect the political (and societal) desire to decentralise more responsibilities to the cities. The cities welcome the higher degree of policy freedom to find tailor-made solutions at the local level. At the same time, more decentralisation implies that cities will be held accountable for the results of their efforts. It is clear that at the start of GSB-III, the national government and the cities together will lay down their ambitions towards (a reduced) number of welldefined (measurable) objectives. In the fourth place, we need to point out that the GSB-III budget will be considerably lower compared to the previous period. Dramatic budget cuts, a consequence of the downturn of the Dutch economy since 2002, are an important reason for the smaller GSB budgets. Consequently, cities get more power ‘to do it themselves’ but with less financial support from the State. In the fifth place, the special position of the ‘minister for the cities’ has been abolished. The GSB is now the responsibility of the Minister of Administrative Reform and Kingdom Relations. This change can be interpreted in different ways: it can be seen as an attempt to better integrate the GSB with other policies but it can also lead to the conclusion that the political visibility of the GSB is lower. Also, it is a fact that all participating ministries within GSB keep their own (financial) responsibility despite the ambitions to stimulate an integrated approach. Most of the cities were in a better (economic) position than at the start of the GSB in 1994 but many of the typical urban problems are still there, especially in the four largest cities. In addition, the first signals indicate that the economic downturn might hurt the cities considerably. In some ways the sense of urgency of 1994 was back in 2004. Again the four largest cities jointly raised their voice to the government about the state of the cities. On top of that, the city of Rotterdam presented its action plan to fight the city’s most persistent problems as well as to make the most of the opportunities of the port city. The plan included an ‘agenda for discussion with the national government’. At the time of writing the Dutch government has responded with the proposal to develop a special law for the four largest cities with the city of Rotterdam as the pilot city. The new legislation should empower the city administrations of the G4 to better deal with their disproportionate problems. The cities have welcomed this new initiative but the ‘proof of the pudding is in the eating’ as the law needs to be send to and accepted by parliament first. The last issue is the impact of European ‘urban’ policies. The impact is not as important as it might be in other countries because of the GSB experience and the many other national policies in which cities play an important role. In that sense, European policy is not a role model for Dutch urban policy-making, but the European support clearly strengthens the special programmes of the Dutch government. Just as the cities, the government values the exchange of urban experiences among member states. Finally, the impact of European regulation on developments in cities must not be underestimated.

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References College van B&W (2003), Rotterdam zet door: op weg naar een stad in balans. Derksen, W. en H. Sietsma (1999), ‘Succesvolle stadsregio’s kunnen nog lang niet worden gemist’, Binnenlands Bestuur 6, 12 December. Derksen, W. (1996), Lokaal Bestuur, ’s-Gravenhage: VUGA. ECORYS Nederland BV (2003), Jaarboek Grotestedenbeleid 2002, Rotterdam. Kempen, R. van (2000), ‘Big Cities Policy in The Netherlands’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 91(2), pp. 197–203. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2002a), Steden op stoom: tussenstand grotestedenbeleid 1994–2002, Den Haag. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2002b), Samenwerken aan de kracht van de stad: actieplan grotestedenbeleid 2002–2009. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2004), Samenwerken aan de krachtige stad: uitwerking van het stelsel Grotestedenbeleid 2005–2009 (GSB-III), Den Haag (bestuurlijk overleg 8 April). Ministerie van Economische Zaken (2003), De economische hittekaart van Nederland, Den Haag. Ministerie van Economische Zaken (2004a), (deel-) Beleidskader Pijler Economie: GSB convenantsperiode 2005 t/m 2009, Den Haag. Ministerie van Economische Zaken (2004b), (deel-) Beleidskader Pijler Economie: GSB convenantsperiode 2005 t/m 2009, Den Haag. Ministeries van VROM, LNV en OCW (2004), Beleidskader ISV-2, Den Haag. Ministerie van VWS, OCW, BZK en Justitie (2004), Werken aan samenhang, samenwerken voor resultaat: landelijk beleidskader voor het sociale domein in GSB-III 2005–2009 (eindversie maart 2004), Den Haag. Raad voor Maatschappelijke ontwikkeling (2001), Van uitzondering naar regel: maatwerk in het grotestedenbeleid, Den Haag: RMO. SCP (2001), De stad in de omtrek, Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau Den Haag. van der Meer, J. and Pol, P.M.J. (2001), ‘Het stedelijk knooppuntenbeleid en het stedelijk vestigingsmilieu in Nederland’, in Notie van ruimte, Parlementaire werkgroep Vijfde Nota ruimtelijke ordening, ’s-Gravehage.

Websites http://www.minbzk.nl. http://www.grotestedenbeleid.nl. http://www.hetkenniscentrum.nl.

Discussion Partners Mr J.H. Broersma, Head Antiracism, Accommodation and Participation, Ministry of Justice. Mr G.J.J. Cremers, Senior Policy Advisor, Ministry of Economic Affairs. Mr J. ten Doeschate, Project Leader GSBIII, Ministry of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations. Ms J.J.M. Hoogendam, Coordinator GSB, Ministry of Justice.

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Ms M.J. Jongman-de Jong, Policy Advisor, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Mr R. Levels, Policy Advisor, Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environment Mr P.L. Meijer, Coordinator GSB, Ministry of National Health, Welfare and Sports. Ms M.G.A. Nijhof, Senior Policy Advisor, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. Mr O.J.P. Overbeke, Policy Advisor, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Mr P.F. van Velzen, Policy Advisor, Ministry of Finance.

Chapter 15

Portugal: Urban Policies or Policies with an Urban Incidence? Álvaro Domingues, Nuno Portas and Teresa Sá Marques1

15.1

Introduction – General Issues on Recent Portugal Urban System Evolution

During the 1990s, when there was a low demographic growth of about 5 per cent, the Portuguese urban system demonstrated distinct dynamics, even though the urbanisation process intensified and vast areas of the territory suffered continuous population drain, affecting about 69 per cent of Portugal’s total area. Schematically, we can group the patterns of urbanisation into three types: the Metropolitan Conurbations of Lisbon and Porto; the non-Metropolitan Conurbations (diffuse urbanised areas with a polycentric urban structure in the northwest, on the western seaboard and in the Algarve), and the small and medium-sized cities located in regions marked by strongly regressive economic and demographic trends. The urban tendencies of the 1990s reinforced this pattern, maintaining a strong imbalance in the Portuguese ‘urban condition’, in which we can highlight the following: •

•

•

the predominant weight of the two metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto, which register growth of 5.6 per cent (Lisbon Metropolitan Area – LMA) and 4.6 per cent (Porto Metropolitan Area – PMA), especially as a result of the dynamism of their peripheral municipalities; the intensification of diffuse urbanisation in the non-metropolitan conurbations (the largest, the northwest seaboard which includes the PMA, registered a population growth of about 11 per cent); the intensification of processes of ‘urban centrifugation’ particularly around the PMA, where the administratively considered metropolitan area stretches along the whole of the northwest seaboard, without any perceptible boundaries. This area represents about 2.4 million people (3 million, if other measurement criteria of the urbanised continuum are used) which, added to that of the LMA, corresponds to a concentration of 53 per cent of the total Portuguese population in the two metropolitan regions;

1

University of Porto.

312

•

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the fragility of the medium-sized city system (only three cities with about 100,000 inhabitants: Braga, Coimbra, and Funchal in the Autonomous Region of Madeira) and the unequal dynamics of the small-sized city network. For example, Guarda and Leiria register growth between 30 per cent and 35 per cent; Coimbra and Beja only about 6 per cent to 7 per cent; Portalegre registers negative change. This unequal behaviour was observed in very distinct contexts of urban dimension and geographic situation, due to their more or less favourable location in terms of proximity or inclusion in large urbanised sprawls (metropolitan conurbations or not), or of strategic location in the main mobility corridors. In the vast territories marked by population drain, the urban network remains fragile and diffuse, if we exclude Viseu and Évora with about 40,000 to 50,000 inhabitants each.

Taking into account the main ‘engines’ of urban transformation, a strong duality persists between the LMA and the PMA. Considering the inertia of political and administrative decentralisation policies (regionalisation was not approved in a 1998 referendum), the LMA reinforced its leadership capacity, heightened by positive discrimination in the globalisation process (public administrative sector, large facilities, R&D resources and institutions, financial sector, foreign investment, etc). The PMA continued to experience difficulties in modernising and stabilising its sector of advanced services, and in asserting its economic fabric (metropolitan and regional). For this reason, despite its quantitative importance and being a major exporting region, it is currently suffering a problematic loss in competitiveness and has difficulty modernising its most characteristic industrial sectors (textiles and clothing, footwear, timber and furniture). Positive signs are found in higher education, the health sector and cultural dynamics, despite recent restrictions on public funding. The three cities in the 100,000 inhabitant bracket, Braga, Coimbra and Funchal, remain excessively dependent on public sector employment, and no appreciable dynamics have been registered in terms of private investment in the manufacturing industry and producer services. Also in terms of urban policy, the administrative and financial framework remains excessively polarised between local institutions that are fragile from an organisational and financial viewpoint, and the top-heaviness of central administration. The MAs themselves, created in 1991 by decree, are associations of municipalities without resources and proper powers. The Administrative Regions of Madeira and the Azores have not developed significant initiatives in terms of urban policy. A paradoxical framework thus exists, in which initiatives with greater urban incidence are a result of the central government’s sectoral policies or of special programmes and projects, which are limited in scope and articulation. The proportion of the state budget attributed to the municipalities represents about 10 per cent of the total. During the execution of the 2nd Community Support Framework, CSF II 1994–1999, only 18.5 per cent of the total investment corresponded to programmes managed by the Committees

Table 15.1 Demographic trends, 1991 and 2001

Metropolitan Region of Lisbon Metropolitan Area of Lisbon Municipality of Lisbon Other municipalities in the LMA Other municipalities in the MRL Metropolitan Region of Porto Metropolitan Area of Porto Municipality of Porto Other municipalities in the PMA Other municipalities in the MRP Cities with over 100,000 inhabitants Coimbra Braga Funchal Other municipalities in Continental Portugal municipalities with medium-sized cities municipalities with urban centres with >10,000 inhab.*) Other municipalities Total for Continental Portugal Total for the country

Area (km2)

Resident population 1991

Resident population 2001

Weight in the country (%)

Variation in resident population 1991/2001 (%)

8,757.6 2,956.9 84.6 2,872.3 5,800.7 4,168.4 812.8 40.1 772.6 3,355.6 575.4 318.8 183.4 731 75,609.3 13,726.2 34,760.9 27,122.3 89,037.6 92,151.8

2,897,316 2,520,708 663,394 1,857,314 376,608 2 215 734 1,167,800 302,472 865,328 1,047,934 395,711 139,052 141,256 115,403 3,982,568 1,444,950 1,899,204 638,414 9,375,926 9,867,147

3,062,482 2,661,850 564,657 2,097,193 400,632 2,413,262 1,221,339 263,131 958,208 1,191,923 416,596 148,443 164,192 103,961 4,080,964 1,545,253 1,952,244 583,467 9,869,343 10,356,117

29.6 25.7 5.5 20.3 3.9 23.3 11.8 2.5 9.3 11.5 4.0 1.4 1.6 1.0 39.4 14.9 18.9 5.6 95.3 100

5.7 5.6 –14.9 12.9 6.4 8.9 4.6 –13.0 10.7 13.7 5.3 6.8 16.2 –9.9 2.5 6.9 2.8 –8.6 5.3 5.0

Notes The Metropolitan Regions of Lisbon and Porto include the respective Metropolitan Areas and surrounding territory with contiguous urbanisation. In the case of the Metropolitan Region of Porto, the Population count in 2001 could reach 3 million inhabitants, if we consider other mapping criteria. * Excluding medium-sized cities.

Source: INE, Censuses 1991 and 2001.

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for Regional Coordination and Development (CCDRs) and the Autonomous Regions of Madeira and the Azores (DPP, 2002a). The main urban policies were managed by central government, which also retains a large part of the jurisdiction in matters of transport and housing infrastructures, and in decisions involving the location of public health facilities, middle and higher education, administration, culture, etc.). 15.2

Summary of National Urban Policies Until the Mid-1990s

Due to decades of cumulative underdevelopment, urban growth in Portugal has generally taken place against a background of a severe deficiency in infrastructures – mobility, water supply systems, public facilities. The 40 years of dictatorship before the revolution of April 1974 correspond to a long period in which the country remained poor, rurally illiterate and politically and economically isolated. The absence of democracy and the construction of a Welfare State indelibly marked underdevelopment in Portugal, from which the country has yet to recover despite the impetus given by entry into the EEC in 1986. This sociopolitical context also explains the high rate of emigration registered after the end of the war, largely responsible for rural desertification and also for the lack of urbanisation (it was frequently said that the second Portuguese city was Paris!). If we exclude the plans for larger cities (1940s), Portugal enters the 1990s with an unbalanced, top-heavy urban system, lacking urban policy guidelines. From 1990, the first physical plans for the zoning and regulation of land use (Municipal Master Plans – PDMs) are approved during a phase in which previous urbanisation had been taking place chaotically, with intensive construction that was not accompanied either by planning or the production of urban infrastructures. Thus, and with a highly significant financial contribution from the EU, urban policies until the middle of the 1990s are characterised by: •

•

consolidation of a Planning System, with special emphasis on the PROTs, (Regional Physical Plans, 1988) and the PMOTs (Municipal Plans), mainly PDMs, PU (Urbanisation Plans), and PP (Detailed Plans); under the CCDRs, (Regional Coordination Committees, RCCs), the Operational Regional Programmes were put into execution or initiated. These Programmes were instruments of regional coordination through which EU funds and programmes and investments from central government were applied. In 1992, with the Lisbon Strategic Plan and immediately afterwards, with that of Évora, the execution of this type of plan was initiated in Portugal. The results proved to be extremely limited due to a lack of institutional coordination and operability: In 1994, PROSIURB was created, a programme with the explicit objective of developing the urban centres which have a strategic role in the organisation

Portugal

•

•

•

•

315

of the national territory. Although only limited funding was available, the programme’s objective was to serve as a fundamental instrument in urban system policies for small and medium-sized cities, and obliged those involved to implement Strategic Plans and coordinate investments and public and private agents. Massive investment in mobility infrastructures. The prime objective of the National Road Plan was to link all the district capitals, the large logistic infrastructures and cross-border connections. In the new areas of urban expansion, investment in roads was largely translated into the construction of ring-roads and accesses to the main road network. If we exclude the LMA, railway investment did not have a structuring role in the design of the urban form. Some interventions in critical areas: rehousing, PER (Special Rehousing Programme – 1993, for the MAs), combating poverty, regeneration of degraded areas, PRAUD (Programme for the Recovery of Degraded Urban Areas – 1988), including historical zones and funding for social housing. These policies resulted from state initiatives, from contract programmes with municipalities and cooperatives, and from the URBAN I and II programmes, centred on the two MAs. PRU (Urban Rehabilitation Programme) ran between 1995–2004 with a framework similar to URBAN. In some programmes significant intersection between social and employment policies and housing policies was achieved. As a consequence of the state’s sectoral policies (education, health, social welfare, etc), there was an intensive programme to construct new facilities (universities, polytechnics, middle-level education schools, hospitals, cultural and sports structures, etc). Despite a lack of coordination at the local-urban level, these investments had a significant impact on modernisation and boosted the polarisation of some cities in the national urban system. The PROCOM/ URBCOM programme (Ministry of Economy) is the most important initiative for commercial urban planning in historic city centres. The project for EXPO’98 in a derelict area of the Tagus waterfront (300 ha.) on the Lisbon municipality. This was to be the first great Urban Project in Portugal, similar to other international waterfront renewals. Thus a practice of urban intervention was introduced, justified by the holding of big events and operable through Urban Projects with proper regulations, funding and management institutions;

The principal driving force behind these policies was the state, either directly or through contracts with the municipalities, and strong support provided by the EU through the CSF I, 1989–1993, and the CSF II, 1994–1999. Public–private partnerships were few in number (with the exception of non-governmental organisations in the social initiatives). Private investment in the cities, apart from the real estate sector, was mostly focused on hypermarkets and shopping centres. Office real estate was highly polarised in Lisbon, where foreign investment

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combined with the re-composition of economic groups, after the privatisation of the state enterprise sector (nationalised in the post-revolutionary period of 1974). In terms of the administrative and financial framework, there were no developments in relation to that which has already been mentioned. Most of the budget is channelled by the central government, through public investment boosted by EU funds (annual or pluriannual, managed directly by ministries or by de-concentrated regional bodies, the Regional Coordination Committees at the NUT II level). The weight of direct transfers from the central government to the municipalities is only around 10 per cent per year. 15.3

The State of the Cities

Problems •

•

•

•

•

Infrastructures and mobility Despite the high funding registered, by the middle of the 1990s strong infrastructural deficiencies persisted (sanitation, roads and railways, public transport), in part due to the existing extremely high deficit. Lack of control over peripheral urbanisation The absence of plans (approval of PDMs occurring above all from 1993–1995) and strong real estate growth, inherited from the past, explain the chaotic character of the ‘urban explosion’. Thus a type of duality was produced, between the ‘historic’ city and the peripheral, discontinuous and fragmentary urbanisation (high environmental and infrastructural deficits, which posed great access difficulties to public transport). Degradation of old centres Old centres are faced with several problems, despite the rehabilitation policies: a freeze on rents (since the 1950s), which explains lack of investment on the part of landlords; the physical degradation of older social neighbourhoods; difficulties in adapting to the growing use of the automobile; the appearance of new central areas connected to the new road network; difficulties in modernising collective transports, etc. Persistence in processes of social polarisation Despite the fact that the 1990s were fertile in experimental policies of social reintegration, combating poverty, the guaranteed minimum income, rehousing of shanty towns (especially in the LMA), compulsory nine years of schooling, etc., the social problems that are specific to large cities persist. Immigration, the growing inflation of land prices, scarcity of public resources, polarises ‘old poorness’ and ‘new richness’ in the central municipalities of the MAs. Excessive asymmetry between central government and the municipalities The emancipation of local power (municipal) after 1974 took place unequally: insufficient municipal financial resources for increasing responsibilities. The

Portugal

•

317

absence of regionalisation (except for the islands of Madeira and the Azores) and the fragility of intermunicipal institutions, notably in the two MAs, created obstacles to the sectoral cooperation of central government policies and, in their turn, their integration with local policies. The growing gap between the MAs and the unequal dynamics in the three larger cities, Coimbra, Braga and Funchal The asymmetrical shock of EU integration, globalisation, and the persistence of a centralist government, favoured competitiveness in Lisbon and the LMA (EXPO’98, R&D parks, concentration of directional services, etc.). Coimbra and Braga, meanwhile, are excessively dependent on large public investments in the university and hospitals, and were penalised by a process of deindustrialisation without the emergence of a modern tertiary sector, despite a clear economic upsurge in real estate, and in the commercial and consumer services sectors. Funchal relies essentially on tourism, its status as a regional capital and its logistic infrastructures (port, airport and free-trade zone).

Opportunities •

•

•

Public investment The great infusion of public investments supported by the CSF I (1990–1994) generically favoured the urban centres. The new universities and polytechnic institutes, hospitals, the extension of compulsory education, the cultural, sports and social welfare facilities, have brought new opportunities for skilled employment and income, mainly in medium-sized cities. The investments in road networks and in the Lisbon-Porto railway have drastically reduced the problems of interurban connections that had been worsening since the 1960s. In terms of environmental infrastructures (water supply and sanitation) important steps were taken, even though the process was far from concluded by the mid-1990s (2006 is seen as the deadline for resolving these problems). General improvement in standards of living Despite the drawbacks of a fragile national economy, the improvement in standards of living accompanied the urbanisation process and caused great transformations in daily habits. This fact is very clear in the dynamics of private investment in residential real estate and large shopping centres. At the same time, public investment in infrastructures and functions democratised access to essential services. However, problems with schooling persist, as does a deficit in professional qualifications, bearing in mind the challenges of the economic restructuring and strong competitiveness posed by the new countries entering the EU. Boosting the modern tertiary industry The period 1985–1990, particularly in the two MAs and especially in the LMA, corresponded to clear tertiarisation dynamics, despite its tardiness in comparison with other European countries. Public investment contributed to this, especially in the sectors of education, health and administration, as well

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•

as private investment in information economy, producer services, commerce and personal services. International integration Although Portugal has had difficulty in ending its twin peripheral status (within the context of the Iberian Peninsula and the EU), the 1990s were a fairly positive period. The LMA was, as we have said, the prime beneficiary of this situation, in terms of both quantity and quality. In the PMA and in other cities there was a lack of stable specialisation with self-reproductive capacity and there was also a lack of a critical mass capable of creating truly ‘innovative resources’.

In summary, we can state that the impact of urban policies, or more specifically, sectoral policies with a strong urban incidence, in the 1990s, does not by any means point to a consistent and lasting strategy. If we exclude the exceptional character of EXPO’98, taken as an opportunity to project Lisbon internationally, everything else can be summed up as sectoral investments commanded by the central government, responding to basic priorities providing infrastructures and expanding the coverage of social policies (new facilities, rehousing programmes, combating poverty and intervention in critical areas). The consolidation of the planning system at a regional and urban level (PROTs and PMOTs) took off slowly and with very modest results in terms of the definition of a strategy for the consolidation and competitiveness of the national urban system. Municipal initiatives were rapidly used up on the basic needs of infrastructure and facilities; responsibilities delegated by the central government were accumulated, but there was a great deficit in experience, qualified human capital and appropriate financial resources. 15.4

National Urban Policies from the Mid-1990s

The second half of the 1990s practically coincided with the implementation of the CSF II. The availability of public investment allowed for some innovations in Urban Policy and the sectoral policies of urban incidence, especially in terms of infrastructures, facilities (particularly education and health) and housing. Strictly in terms of national urban policies in this period, we draw attention to the EXPO’98 project (about €2,500 million invested directly in the event’s area); the PROSIURB – Programme for the Consolidation of the National Urban System and Support for the Execution of Municipal Master Plans (€150 million in supported investment); the POLIS programme – National Programme for Urban Renewal and Environmental Enhancement of Cities (with a budget of €800 million between 2000 and 2006); the IORU – Operational Intervention Urban Renewal initiative (about €485 million); the EU initiative URBAN (€70.6 million); Porto 2001 – European Capital of Culture (about €250 million); and PROCOM – Reviving Traditional Small Commerce in Old Centres (€173.5 million).

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CSF II (including the Cohesion Fund) Between 1994 and 1999, the CSF II (including the Cohesion Fund) supported total investments of about €38.8 million, representing an average of 8.5 per cent of the national GDP. Of this total in public expenditure, the EU contribution was about 38.5 per cent (cf DPP, 2002a). Basic infrastructures were highly relevant (53.2 per cent) and had a strong urban incidence, explaining the enormous changes observed at that level, particularly in the construction of high capacity road networks (31.5 per cent); Telecommunications, Energy, Water/Environment, and Health infrastructures (21.7 per cent). At the end of 1999, expenditure included in the Urban Renewal policies reached a total expenditure volume of €2613.7 million, applied chiefly to the EXPO’98 project. Operational Intervention Urban Renewal – CSF II, IORU The Operational Intervention Urban Renewal – CSF II, IORU, corresponded to an initiative of the 13th Government aimed at boosting the implementation of a housing policy, namely the PER (Special Rehousing Programme) (Decree Law no. 163/93). The IORU thus appears as complementary to housing and social policies, especially in the Metropolitan Areas of Lisbon and Porto, financing initiatives by the central government, municipalities and Private Social Solidarity Institutions (PSSI). In this way, the better integration of rehousing policies was the objective. The IORU was structured by several measures, presented in Table 15.2. Table 15.2 IORU, public expenditure 1994–1999 (€ million) Measures 1 – Renewal of Zones Occupied by Shanties 2 – Rehabilitation of Depressed Zones 3 – EXPO’98 4 – Technical Assistance Total *

€ million

%

140.43 78.31 261.85 4.39

29.0 16.1 54.0 0.9

484.97 100.0

ERDF contribution rate of 62.5%.

Source: TC, 2001, p. 55.

Measure 1 financed above all the PERs in the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (111,600 people rehoused, of whom 37,322 in the municipality of Lisbon) and of Porto (50,917 people, of whom 5,000 in the Porto municipality). Of the total of 27 municipalities in both MAs, seven concentrated about 71 per cent of the total

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number of shanties registered, and about 70 per cent of the rehoused population. Measure 2 was aimed at actions in deprived zones. The beneficiary was the IGAPHE (Institute for the Management and Transfer of State Housing Stock). Measure 2 covered about 45,600 people, 67.4 per cent of the LMA. Measure 3, which by itself represented 54 per cent of the total expenditure of IORU, was exclusively aimed at financing urban and environmental renewal programmes related to EXPO’98. At the level of social and rehousing policy, the IORU was combined with some complementary programmes.2 The Community Initiative URBAN mobilised about €70.56 million distributed through six measures, 4 in the LMA and 2 in the PMA (DGDR, 2002). In terms of total public expenditure, the URBAN interventions in the LMA corresponded to about 63.6 per cent of the total. Together, the IORU and URBAN channelled investments largely directed at the LMA. PROSIURB PROSIURB (1994–1999) was particularly aimed at rebalancing the national urban system (excluding the Metropolitan Areas). PROSIURB sums investments from regional and sectoral programmes, from central and local administration, also involving partnerships with other institutions and agents represented in City Offices which, together with the Municipal Assemblies were responsible for preparing and ratifying Strategic Plans. For the first time, the ‘medium-sized cities’ were an objective concern of urban policies (MEPAT, January 1994). Subprogramme 1 of PROSIURB, ‘Enhancement of Medium-sized Cities’ covered 40 medium-sized cities, either individually or as part of city networks. The main areas of intervention were: basic infrastructures (38.9 per cent of co-financed investment); urban rehabilitation and renewal (36 per cent); public facilities (14.7 per cent); economic infrastructures and support facilities (8.3 per cent); and detailed plans (2.1 per cent).

2 URBAN (1995) – Community Initiative Programme aimed at supporting the revival and restoration of deprived urban areas, by improving housing, infrastructures and facilities, and by supporting measures to combat poverty. PER (1993) – Special Rehousing Programme for the Lisbon and Porto MAs, particularly aimed at eradicating shanties. PRU (1995) Urban Rehabilitation Programme similar to URBAN. INTEGRAR (1994) – Programme for the economic and social integration of vulnerable groups, especially the long-term unemployed, the handicapped and other disadvantaged groups. REHABITA (1996) – Programme aimed at housing recovery in old urban areas, applied exclusively to historic urban centres declared critical areas. RECRIA (1999) – Programme providing financial support to improve housing in run-down real estate. Programme to Combat Poverty (1990) – several measures to support underprivileged households and individuals. Minimum Wage (1996) – Creation of the Guaranteed Minimum Wage as a measure to combat poverty and social exclusion.

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In terms of the overall assessment of the programme (cf. MAOT, 2000), the contracts concluded numbered 70, that corresponded to €150 million in the volume of investment supported. In terms of funding sources, PROSIURB corresponded with about 25 per cent (42 per cent from municipalities; 30 per cent from Community Funds; 3 per cent from Central Administration). Despite these positive aspects, the inadequacy of the financial resources involved and the interruption of the programme, cut off processes and methodologies with a medium- long- term time-frame, and devalued the dynamics generated by strategic planning and by partnership solutions. However, there remained a more or less embedded experiment, and a series of synthesisdocuments on an integrated and prospective approach to urban policies. As for harmonisation mechanisms – the City Offices – the results were more modest, as was the contribution of non-public funds. The POLIS Programme The Regional Development Plan 2000–2006 chose urban restoration and environmental enhancement of cities as one of its strategically important objectives. Thus, in November 1999, a working group was created, directly dependent on the Ministry of Environment and Territorial Planning. POLIS has its own management under the jurisdiction of the present-day MCOTA (Ministry of Cities, Territorial Planning and Environment), and is executed in partnerships involving municipalities and private entities. Detailed plans have to be approved for the intervention areas. It was expected about €800 million of total investment (57.5 per cent from EU Funds including CSF III, 16.3 per cent from Central Administration, 16.3 per cent from municipalities, and 10 per cent from self-financing). The POLIS programmes, inspired by EXPO’98, correspond to intensive and multipurpose interventions in restricted areas, in accordance with objectives of urban requalification that include a significant environmental enhancement component. At the beginning of 2004 there were long delays in the programme’s execution, in part due to budgetary restrictions, in part due to the complexity of the public–private partnerships necessary for the approval of Detailed Plans. Urban Project EXPO’98 The Urban Project EXPO’98 involved the direct investment (coordinated by the company PARQUE EXPO) of €2,500 million (TC, 2000). The opportunity to hold the World Exhibition of 1998 in Lisbon justified wide-ranging national consensus and strong investment in a highly depressed riverside area. The infrastructural needs (pollution clearing of the Trancão River and land previously occupied by a rubbish dump and abandoned industrial plots; the construction of an urban household refuse processing plant; the construction of a new Tagus River crossing and road accesses; the expansion of the metro; the new intermodal railway station;

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etc.) represented an important enhancement of this area of the LMA. After the event was concluded, important facilities remained (among others fair and exhibition pavilion, multi-purpose pavilion, the Oceanarium, the Living Science Centre, the Camões Theatre, the Pavilion of Portugal), as did high-quality public spaces. Furthermore, private investment was concentrated in the PARQUE EXPO land sites, particularly in residential real estate and hotel facilities. There are as yet no important effects in terms of urban ‘catalysis’ on the surrounding area. Porto 2001: European Capital of Culture The project Porto 2001 – European Capital of Culture (about €250 million), apart from the cultural events programme, also resulted in urban regeneration interventions in the areas surrounding the historic centre (public space, tramway network, underground parking lots, etc). The project included the restoration and new construction of a number of cultural facilities: among others the Portuguese Photography Centre, Soares dos Réis Museum, Library and Auditorium, S. João and Carlos Alberto Theatres and the Music Hall. Managed by a public funds Society, the Porto 2001 SA, this intervention represented a sort of closure of the large-scale construction works of urban renewal in Porto, continued by the construction of the metro network (project of the Metropolitan Council, financed by the central government) and the Antas Plan (intervention involving the new football stadium for the European Championship in 2004). PROCOM The PROCOM, about €173.475 million, is a programme aimed at reviving traditional small commerce in old centres (42.4 per cent co-financed by ERDF within the scope of the CSF II 1994–1999). Of the total actions financed, about 18.5 per cent of the funding was directed at interventions in public spaces and projects of environmental qualification. The remaining quota was directed at entrepreneurial investment (companies and Trade Associations). The PROCOM projects, led by the Ministry of Economy, are bottom-up in character, involving traders and their associations, and the municipalities. It is also an example of implementation of a sectoral policy that is well articulated with a policy of economic and physical rehabilitation of old urban areas in crisis (DGDR, 2002). In brief, these were the main initiatives in urban policy funded mostly by the central government and Community Funds. Apart from these, we should also consider the urban impact of the PIDDAC (Central Administration Investment Plans), the Regional Operational Programmes (coordinated by CCDRs within the scope of the CSFs), and the municipalities.

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PIDDAC (Annual Plan of Investments of the Central Administration) Between 1994 and 2000, the weight of the PIDDAC in GDP was 3.7 per cent. The sectoral impact of the PIDDAC was particularly directed at construction and public works, 14.8 per cent of the average (annual) GVA in the period 1994–2000. In the same time period, growth at real expenditure prices was 3.6 per cent, with strong fluctuations: 14.3 per cent in 94/95, and –15.4 per cent in 1999/2000. Of the total amount – €20,711 million – 33.5 per cent corresponded to EU funding (DPP, 2001). By expenditure sector, the 1994–1999 PIDDAC was particularly concentrated in three types of investments: transport and communications (32.1 per cent); agriculture (15.5 per cent) and industry and energy (11.4 per cent). The NUT II Lisbon and Tagus Valley absorbed about 31.3 per cent of the expenditure, and the NUT II North 22.3 per cent (DPP, 2001; DPP, 2002b). The values per capita (€464.6 million, national average for the 1995–2000 period) for the LMA were €167.8 million, and 166.6 for the PMA; for the municipalities of Lisbon and Porto, the values were 860 and 759 respectively; for Coimbra and Braga 317 and 168 respectively (DPP, 2001). In conclusion, the PIDDAC was particularly important for the cities in the construction of infrastructures in transport and communication, education, environment and urban revival, health and public administration, although there were significant regional fluctuations. POR-LVT In terms of the Regional Operational Programmes, we will give the example of the POR-LVT 1994–1999 (Operational Programme of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region). During its lifespan, the POR-LVT approved a total of 789 projects, amounting to about €570.8 million in investment, of which 71.5 per cent were cofinanced by EFRD and 27.3 per cent by the national government. This operational intervention was divided into three programmes with the following objectives: •

•

•

Subprogramme A: Reinforcement of Regional Territorial Cohesion and Improvement of Standards of Living (favouring small and medium-sized urban centres). Subprogramme B: Actions for the Development of Regional Strategic Value (favouring the intermunicipal level in matters concerned with accessibility, environment and socio-economic facilities). Subprogramme C: Regional Dynamisation (boosting the competitiveness of productive and innovative systems).

The POR-LVT was mostly executed by the municipalities (87 per cent of the eligible investment in the total NUTS II Region – Lisbon and Tagus Valley, and 90 per cent in the case of the LMA). The environmental sector, including the

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Table 15.3 Operational Programme, NUTS II Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region 1994–1999 Eligible investment No. of € projects million Subprogramme A NUTS III LMA West Tagus Valley Subprogramme B Accessibilities Environment Facilities Subprogramme C Economic Support Technical Support Total

359 85 113 161 177 35 78 64 253 125 128 789

246,371 101,444 60,405 84,521 287,718 97,94 149,401 40,376 36,657 21,659 14,997 570,746

%

43.2 17.8 10.6 14.8 50.4 17.2 26.2 7.1 6.4 3.8 2.6 100.0

LMA/LTVR %

€ million

% AML

17.8

101,356

43.3

19.8 12.2 5.6 2.0 3.4 1.8 1.6 41.0

113,060 69,755 31,835 11,236 19,663 10,534 9,129 234,078

48.3 29.8 13.6 4.8 8.4 4.5 3.9 100.0

Source: CCDR-LVT, 2001a.

construction of three integrated waste treatment systems, is the favoured domain, corresponding to about 36.8 per cent of the total investment (subprogrammes A and B). The sector of accessibility infrastructures, 32 per cent of total investment, allowed for the construction of the Multi-modal Terminal of the Tagus Valley and a number of roads in the LMA arterial road system. LMA received a 41 per cent quota of the programme (77 per cent of the inhabitants of the Lisbon and Tagus Valley region); Lisbon’s largest urban project, EXPO’98 did not have a direct expression in POR-LVT. However, in terms of urban refuse processing, the installation of a composting plant and an incinerator were important contributions to closing down the rubbish dump formerly located on EXPO’98 grounds. This intersection was also the case of the arterial road axes in the LMA that would, normally, be the responsibility of the central government. Local Finances For the purposes of comparison, we will use the example of the LMA local/ municipal finances. Although the used figures refer only to 2000 (CCDR, 2003), we can estimate the total investments for the 1994–1999 period at about €2,235 million. As to the structure of the revenue, the largest slice goes into direct taxes, 61 per cent of current revenue. Capital transfers correspond to about 18.6 per

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cent (namely, 3 per cent of EU funds and 14.1 per cent of transfers from central administration). Housing and urbanisation correspond to the majority proportion of the investments, 34.8 per cent, especially due to municipal contribution in the respective national programmes (see IORU). Infrastructure provision works comes next with 33.5 per cent. The remaining portions are particularly aimed at the construction of local social facilities (education, sport, leisure, culture, social support). 15.5

Urban Policies – Prospective

In terms of defining a structured strategy for urban policy, Portugal is at a crossroads. In general terms this can be identified as the pressing need to define a more flexible administrative architecture for the conception and operability of more sectorally and territorially integrated urban policies, in accordance with the general directives contained in EU documents (EDEC; Green Book on Urban Environment, Europe 2000+, etc). In the absence of strong local institutions (municipalities and inter-municipal associations), or administrative regions, the sectoral policies of greatest urban incidence (infrastructures and public facilities, for example) are dependent on ministerial or Council of Ministers decisions. This decision-making structure, fragmented and mostly top-down, is not coherent with the need to appropriately integrate the challenges of structuring the urban system and policies. Let us look at some of the major issues at several government and public administration levels. 1 Central Level 1 After dividing responsibilities between the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Environment, the present government created the Ministry of Cities, Territorial Planning and Environment, MCOTA. This reorganisation, apparently more efficient for integrating urban policies, has come to prove highly inadequate, in part because resources are scarce (budgetary restrictions and compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact), in part because institutional cultures create difficulties in coordinating inter-institutional projects and resources. 2 Jurisdiction as important as road infrastructures, and other decision areas of strong urban incidence (health facilities, education and vocational training, R&D, housing, etc.) remain in other ministries and are organised according to sectoral logics that are not integrated at an urban and territorial level. 3 This lack of collaboration is reproduced in the institutions that are hierarchically dependent on the ministries and is worsening because of privatisations. In the recent past, two programmes aimed at urban regeneration, PROSIURB and POLIS were separate initiatives run by two ministries, the first within the

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scope of the CSF II 1994–1999, and the second under the CSF III. The two programmes, however, do not intersect in any way. Meanwhile, the contents of the PNDES (National Plan of Economic and Social Development) and, later, the third, PDR (Regional Development Plan) (MEPAT 1998, 1999), are aimed at boosting the role of cities in development, environment and territorial planning, without there having been, however, any appreciable changes in terms of Urban Policy. The special operations like EXPO’98, Porto 2001 – European Capital of Culture, or EURO 2004, resulted from opportunities, involving specific interventions and urban projects, whose urban impact is very distinct and which have ended up being seen as very high endowments if compared with the rest of the country. 4 A recent resolution from the Council of Ministers No. 76/2002 on the definition of the PNPOT (National Programme of Territory Planning), is highly expressive of the need to integrate sectoral policies with territorial policies, including the urban policies. The main strategic options also emphasised the need to harmonise options, policies and territorial management instruments, including the sectoral one, so as to promote the vertical coherence between the national, regional and local levels, and the horizontal coherence between distinct sectors with spatial incidence.

The guidelines proposed for structuring the urban system specifically mention the affirmation of the metropolitan areas as hubs of strategic resources with national and international influence… and the consolidation of the regional urban subsystems.

2 Regional Level The CCDRs – bodies decentralised from MCOTA by NUTS II – suffer from a deficit in decision-making capacity, autonomy and resources. With institutions mediating between the municipal and central levels, very close to the former but very dependent of the latter, the CCDRs are, above all, techno-structures that manage regionalised community funds and accompany the PDMs. As a consequence of the Strategic Plan for the Lisbon and Tagus Valley Region (CCDR-LVT, 1999), the PROT for the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, PROT-AML, is a pioneering, strategic document, ‘systematizing the norms that should guide the decisions and plans of Central and Local Administration and constitute a reference framework for the elaboration of Territorial Management Instruments’ (CCDR-LVT, 2001b, p. 7). The essential priorities of the PROT-AML are: environmental sustainability (metropolitan structure for environmental protection and the enhancement and management of water resources), metropolitan improvement (planning, new centralities, accessibility network, logistics), socioterritorial cohesion (regeneration of depressed residential areas and suburban

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zones, improvement of access to facilities and services), and organisation of the metropolitan transport system (creation of the Metropolitan Transport Authority). The PROT-AML also contains clear guidelines in terms of urban policy. The future will show if this document finds the appropriate political conditions for better cooperation between central, regional, metropolitan and local administration, based on the principle of subsidiarity. The PMA and the metropolitan region in which it is included have not so far been an object of strategic planning similar to the PROT-AML. 3 Local Level: Municipal and Inter-municipal The municipal and inter-municipal levels, despite the fact that the average size of the municipalities is far superior to those in countries in the south of the EU, and the positive evolution of the legal framework of local finances, are marked by great fragility. The municipal level possesses strong visibility and political legitimacy, although with limited powers (direct transfers from the general state budget to municipalities correspond to about 10 per cent of the revenue). The municipalities retain strong jurisdiction in terms of land management and use (Municipal Master Plans), but they have a highly limited investment capacity. Of the about €573 million of municipal investment in the 19 municipalities of the LMA in 2000, about 35 per cent corresponded to rehousing accommodation (funding contributions from national funds and programmes and the EU); 33.5 per cent, to road infrastructures and basic sanitation; and about 20 per cent to the construction of local facilities, especially schools, sports, cultural, leisure and social amenities. This precarious financial situation (aggravated by the levels of indebtedness) hinders the prosecution of activity plans in the medium term, even if we do not include the upheavals caused by electoral cycles (four years). Even after the Strategic Plans were approved (a prerequisite for admission to PROSIURB 1994–1999), the investment priorities and the action and programme schedules ended up particularly dependent on the availability of other sources of funding, in other words, those coming from the Regional Operational Programmes (CCDRs), the central government Sectoral Programmes and applications to the EU’s Structural Funds and Community Initiatives (CSFs). This situation strongly compromises the coherence of Urban Policies, if we take into account the fact that, especially in the metropolitan areas and the larger cities, the main structuring public investments are the responsibility of the central government (high-capacity transport infrastructure, middle and higher education, hospitals, courts, etc), subject to a sectoral logic and possessing a weak level of territorial/ urban cooperation. At the inter-municipal level, there are only the two Metropolitan Areas of Lisbon and Porto, in existence since 1991, and in the rest of the country, voluntary municipal associations. As we have mentioned before, these inter-municipal associations do not have their own resources, and are limited to coordinating

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inter-municipal projects with co-financing from State and Community Funds. The experiences of the LMA and the PMA practically only involved projects related to water, sanitation and the collection and treatment of urban waste, and in the case of Porto, the metro project (directly financed by the central government). In February 2004, a new administrative map was under discussion, which foresaw the formation of Metropolitan Areas (minimum of nine contiguous municipalities and 350,000 inhabitants), Urban Communities (minimum of three municipalities and 150,000 inhabitants) and Municipal Communities (Law No. 10/2003). The new Metropolitan Areas and the Urban Communities will both result from the free decision of the municipal bodies (according to information in the media, Braga and Coimbra, among others, will be integrated in new Metropolitan Areas). The executive body – the Metropolitan Council – and assembly are to be elected indirectly by the municipalities, as direct elections are not envisaged. Apart from powers in terms of the coordination of public transport – creation of the Metropolitan Transport Authorities – Law No. 10/2003 foresees a series of general competences, namely the promotion and elaboration of regional territorial planning schemes (currently part of the CCDRs’ functions). There are, therefore, still many doubts about the final format of these administrative bodies. In terms of the vast set of powers the law admits, the new Metropolitan Areas do not as yet possess a stable financial framework, nor are transfers from municipalities or Central Administration clear. In public debates minimalist theses are defended on some occasions – the new entities will be little more than Municipal Associations – while on others there are those who argue that the Metropolitan Areas and Urban Communities will be the bases for regional decentralisation. 15.6

Relevance of European Policies for Portuguese National Urban Policymaking

In the strict sense, the only European Urban policies are URBAN and UPP –Urban Pilot Projects. Given the success of those programmes it is hoped they will be continued, having in mind trans-sectoral incidence and the targeted objectives and goals. Even so, direct European policies and subsidies for cities are scarce. In accordance with EU policies it will be necessary to have stronger (decision oriented) initiatives to reduce the strong imbalances, which characterise the Portuguese urban system. This implies the adoption of more explicit national urban policies, namely policy integration and decentralised implementation evolving contractual arrangements between ministries or/and different levels of government. The effects of EU policies on cities are above all the indirect consequences of the application of Structural Funds with a significant urban impact mainly in the

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areas of transport, sewage and waste disposal. A more directed policy is necessary, supporting ‘immaterial’ investments on economic urban competitiveness, as well as on the enhancement of social cohesion and development of human capital. The EU should contribute to a more integrated trans-sectoral response to urban problems according with the principle of subsidiarity and governance practices. Given the strong trends in urban sprawling, an urban policy that enables municipal associations to propose multisectoral actions comprised in Strategic Plans should be strengthened and made explicit at the EU level. Strategic urban planning should become more emphasised under Structural Funds. The most urgent domains are, among others: qualification of environment and landscape resources, public transportation and mobility, and structuring the enlarged urban territory (urban axes and polarities). Larger MAs and medium-sized cities are the hubs of social, economic and territorial organisation. Given the fragility of Welfare State system, it’s necessary to design innovative policies on public–private task forces to promote social accessibility to the network of collective facilities and equipment. The ‘Welfare City’ side of governance must be the strategic arena for coordinating sectoral and central government policies. 15.7 •

•

Summary and Conclusions

The problems found in evaluating the impact of the national/central urban policies (directly or indirectly supported by EU funds) are explained by the chronic difficulty that the Central Administration has in implementing and financing coherent programs at a local level, and in programming national priorities in accordance with a more articulate local framework. As a consequence of successive ministerial reorganisations, the jurisdiction of the de-centralised regional bodies also varies, even though they should perform the essential role of regional coordination between the central level and the municipalities. The most recent novelty in creating a Ministry of Cities (Ministry of Cities, Territorial Planning and Environment) does not seem to have strengthened this coordination, since it only covers the departments of Regional Planning and Environment. However CSF III (2000–2006) supports €410 million (ERDF and ESF) for city and metropolitan qualification measures in the scope of CCDRs Regional Programmes. In addition, the Urban Environment Improvement programme (MCOTA), the Digital City Projects, URBCOM, URBAN II and Urban Rehabilitation Programme PRU, hold for more €418 million of public expenses with a strong urban incidence. In terms of the organisation of public administration and the government, there is excessive asymmetry in jurisdiction and resources between the central and local levels, with large gaps and deficiencies in matters concerning the

330

•

•

•

•

•

•

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

horizontal coordination of the national sectoral plans. The inter-municipal level, particularly in the Metropolitan Areas, is very fragile in terms of powers and resources. These powers depend exclusively on municipal finances and contract programmes with the central administration. Due to Portugal’s delayed development, the priorities of the CSF are centred on the construction of infrastructures and facilities (transports, environment, health, education, etc) with a sectoral and national logic. Urban policies dependent on EU initiatives have little expression, being excessively matter-specific and directed only at the urban rehabilitation of critical areas (URBAN). Urban policies have taken on a discontinuous character, with the exception of housing policies, directed especially at rehousing, renewal of historic centres, and the rehabilitation of deprived areas (with support, among others, from the Community Initiative URBAN). CSFs Regional Operational Programmes, PIDDAC and urban EU initiatives along whit local authorities programmes, plans and projects include a significant number of strategic investments in infrastructures and facilities, urban renewal, as well as incentives for the location of industry and services. From the accomplishments of this period, exceptional projects justified by the holding of events stand out. The case of EXPO’98, an acknowledged organisational success, does not camouflage some negative side effects on other programmes in other cities, which consequently suffered the diversion of resources they desperately needed. An inability on the part of central administration to consolidate practices of strategic urban planning. The excessively isolated character and problematic execution of special programmes aimed at urban regeneration and environmental enhancement. However, the exceptional nature of these programmes, in relation to current projects, has meant overcoming difficulties in bringing together sectoral measures, in accordance with already-developed strategies and projects, in order to obtain more robust results within the established deadlines. Incidence on historic centres and the older city, to the detriment of interventions in the extensive suburbs of those cities, where most of the population lives and where we (still) find the greatest deficits in terms of transport infrastructure (especially public transport) and protection of the environment and landscape. The studies developed about the national urban system have an important contribution to make to a more clearly urban policy. These documents – including separate studies on the dynamics and role of medium-sized cities, metropolitan regions and the small cities and towns, as well as an integrated forward-looking synthesis – provide a basis for better defining roles of the different components of the national urban system. Those roles can be supported and enhanced through an adequate and efficient integrated urban policy. The approval of the National Spatial Planning and Urbanism Act

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in 1998, which laid down a number of fundamental principles and goals for spatial planning and urban development, is an important issue pointing to more integration of social and economic development and environment protection and establishing a comprehensive, coordinated multi-layer territorial management system. References CCDR-LVT (1999), Plano Estratégico da Região de Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Lisboa: CCDRLVT. CCDR-LVT (2001a), Plano Regional de Ordenamento do Território da Área Metropolitana de Lisboa, PROT-AML (versão para discussão pública), Lisboa: CCDR-LVT. CCDR-LVT (2001b), Programa Operacional da Região de Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 1994–1999, Lisboa: CCDR-LVT. CCDR-LVT (2003), Os Municípios na Região de Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Lisboa: CCDRLVT. CEDRU (2003), Dimensões Urbano-Metropolitanas do Emprego, Observatório do Emprego e da Formação Profissional, Lisboa: IEFP. DGDR (2002), Relatório Final de Execução do QCA II, Lisboa: Direcção Geral do Desenvolvimento Regional. DGOT/DU (1999), Relatório do Estado do Ordenamento do Território, Lisboa: Direcção Geral do Desenvolvimento Regional. DPP (1999), Portugal – Indicadores Económicos e Sociais, Lisboa: Ministério do Planeamento. DPP (2002a), QCA II Relatório da Verificação Ex-Post do Princípio da Adicionalidade 1994–1999, Lisboa: Ministério do Planeamento. DPP (2002b), Avaliação do Impacto Macroeconómico e Sectorial do PIDDAC 1994–2002, Lisboa: Ministério do Planeamento. DPP (2003), Portugal, Litoral e Globalização, Departamento de Prospectiva e Planeamento, Lisboa: Ministério da Economia. Ferrão, J. (1997), ‘Rede Urbana, Instrumento de Equidade, Coesão e Desenvolvimento’ in A Política das Cidades, série Estudos e Documentos, Lisboa: Conselho Económico e Social. Ferrão, J. and Marques, T. (2002), Sistema urbano Nacional-Síntese, Lisboa: DGODDU. Marques, T. (ed.) (1997), Sistema Urbano Nacional: Cidades Médias e Dinâmicas Territoriais, vols I and II, Lisboa: Direcção Geral do Ordenamento do Território e do Desenvolvimento Urbano. Matias Ferreira, V. and Indovina, F. (eds) (1999), A Cidade da Expo’98, Lisboa: Editorial Bizâncio, Colecção Documentos. Mendes Baptista, A.J. and Martinho, M.A. (1996), Programas Urban e Reabilitação Urbana – revitalização de áreas urbanas em crise, Lisboa: Direcção Geral do Desenvolvimento Regional. MAOT – Gabinete Coordenador do PROSIURB (2000), Avaliação Global do PROSIURB, Lisboa: Ministério do Ambiente e do Ordenamento do Território. MCOTA (2002), Programa POLIS, Lisboa: Ministério das Cidades, do Ordenamento do Território e do Ambiente: .

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Portas, N., Domingues, A. and Cabral, J. (2004), Políticas Urbanas, Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. TC – Tribunal de Contas (2000), Auditoria ao Projecto EXPO’98, Vol. I, Lisboa. TC – Tribunal de Contas (2001), Avaliação Global dos Impactos da Intervenção Operacional Renovação Urbana – QCA II, Lisboa.

Chapter 16

Spain: Changing Century, Changing Cycle? Large Spanish Cities on the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century Oriol Nel.lo1

16.1

Introduction

During the second half of the twentieth century the large Spanish cities underwent the most decisive transformations in their history, characterised by a first stage (1959–1975) of concentration of population and activities in main urban areas and followed by a second stage (1975–1996) of more moderate demographic growth and certain dispersal of urbanisation. The growth and opening of economy, the general modernisation of the society, the democratisation and convergence with the rest of Europe are the main causes of these transformations. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it appears that the large Spanish cities could be moving into a new phase characterised by certain symptoms of recentralisation, although dispersal trends are far from having disappeared. This imposes new requirements to public policies affecting the cities and, in particular, those related to the functionality of urban areas (mobility, transport, telecommunications), to their environmental sustainability (energy and resources) and to their social cohesion (housing, town planning and immigration). The substantial inflection in the Spanish political scene, with the electoral victory of the conservative Partido Popular in two consecutive legislatures had important consequences in the policies concerning the cities. However, the new victory of the social democrats for the 2004–2008 period might modify some of the policies that will be described here. The present chapter is dedicated to analysing the characteristics and magnitude that the listed transformations are having on the large Spanish cities. Thus, after the introduction, the text reviews studies changes in urban dynamics, paying particular attention to how large cities fit into the Spanish urban system as well as to the modifications of the metropolitan morphology; next, national public 1

Autonomous University of Barcelona.

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policies especially relevant to the cities are analysed, particularly those related to housing, infrastructures, environment and governance; the text finishes with a summing up and some conclusions. It is a follow-up to the chapter regarding Spain contained in the first edition of National Urban Policies in the European Union (Nel·lo, 1998). Consultation of this antecedent may be useful for any reader interested in the general aspects of the urbanisation process in Spain, which are not reiterated here.2 16.2

Urban Dynamics: Social Change, Demographic Transformations and Metropolitan Cycle until 1996: From Concentration (1960–1975) to Dispersal (1975–1996)

The changes that started taking place in 1996 seem to indicate that the large cities are stepping into a new stage in which features of both previous phases go hand in hand: the persistence of the dispersal dynamic is combined with a renewed growth of the main cities. This section will briefly review the antecedents in the evolution of the urban cycle. As is well known, the modern process of urbanisation took place in Spain very late compared with other European countries. The difficulties that confronted industrialisation – the lack of agricultural modernisation, the belated transformation of the social structure and the troubled configuration of the modern state – combined in such a way that by the end of the 1950s nearly half the Spanish population still lived in towns with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants (Reher, 1994). From 1959 onwards, the main urban areas grew in an accelerated way, which can be explained, above all, because of the crisis of traditional agriculture, the great interregional migrations and the shift of active population from the primary sector to industry and services (Nel·lo, 1998, 2001; Terán, 1999). Municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants went from hosting 8.5 million to 14.5 million inhabitants in only 15 years (1960–1975), while simultaneously the population plummeted in communities with less than 20,000 inhabitants. The polarised character of the economic growth in this period contributed to establishing what have been the three fundamental features of the Spanish urban system in the last 50 years: the creation of a series of large metropolitan areas that boast a clear pre-eminence over the whole of the system; the consolidation of some territorial axes where the population and the activities tend to be concentrated; and the conservation of the urban network’s bipolar character.

2

We would like to thank Joan López Redondo, geographer of the Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, for providing the statistical support for the present chapter.

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The main seven Spanish cities and their surroundings underwent an extraordinary growth period between 1960 and 1975,3 reaching a population of 12 million. In this way the Spanish urban system was defined as follows: at the top, two large metropolises of international rank – Madrid and Barcelona – followed by five urban areas of national and regional importance, creating a configuration of territorial axes where the population, jobs, resources and services tend to concentrate. In fact, these axes confirmed the trend of the population and activities to settle in the peninsular periphery: along the Mediterranean coast, from Catalonia to Murcia, with potential expansion towards Andalusia, and in the Ebro Axis, between the Basque Country, Navarra, Aragón and Catalonia (Perpiña Grau, 1954; MOPTMA, 1994; European Commission, 1994; Nel·lo, 1999; Salom, 2000). This caused an increase of population in all coastal provinces and the Ebro Axis (24.7 per cent between 1960 and 1975), while the interior provinces (except for Madrid) decreased and lost 1.4 million inhabitants, 15.4 per cent of their total population. The clear exception was Madrid, the administrative capital, situated in the centre of the peninsula, which experienced a remarkable growth surrounded by territories that tended to depopulate to a great extent. The third feature of the Spanish urban system that manifested itself in this period of growth, is its bipolar character, due to the nearly equal parity in demographic terms between Barcelona and Madrid, causing the pre-eminence over the Spanish urban network as a whole shared between the administrative capital and the Mediterranean metropolis (Díez Nicolas, 1972; Racionero, 1986; Precedo, 1988; Reher, 1994; Nel·lo, 1997). As a result of this polarised and accelerated urbanisation, in 1975 the seven largest metropolitan areas were already home to more than a third of the population of the country, on a meagre 2 per cent of the Spanish territory. From this moment on, coinciding with the socio-economic and political transformations 3 In the present chapter we will use the most common administrative definitions to delimitate the metropolitan territory of each city: in the case of Madrid, we will use as reference the central municipality (605.8 km2) and the metropolitan area composed of the 27 municipalities of the former COPLACO (1,942 km2); in the case of Barcelona, the central municipality (97.6 km2) and the 163 municipalities for which the Plan Territorial Metropolitano (Metropolitan Territorial Plan) (3,235.6 km2) must be drawn upon; in the case of Bilbao, the central municipality (41.3 km2) and the 25 municipalities from the metropolitan district of Bajo Nervión (404.8 km2); in the case of Valencia, the central municipality and the 44 municipalities of the metropolitan district of Horta (628.2 km2); in the case of Seville, the central municipality (141.3 km2) and the 22 municipalities from the delimitation established by the Junta de Andalucía (Andalusian Government) (1,501.9 km2); finally, in the case of Málaga, the central municipality (393 km2) and the 10 municipalities in its area (961.7 km2). The case of Zaragoza, which, due to the vast surface of its central municipality, (1,063.1 km2) carries within the metropolitan dynamics, we will distinguish between the city and the whole of the province. For comparability purposes, we must point out that we are dealing with the same delimitations used in the previous edition of National Urban Policies in the European Union (Nel·lo, 1998).

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mentioned before, the demographic growth of large cities tended to slow down and the concentration dynamic began, up to a certain point, to revert. Thus, while in the 15 years after 1975, the weight of large cities remained practically stable, in the following five years (1991–1996) the seven cities saw their growth nearly come to a halt and even lost some relative weight with respect to the whole of Spain. Furthermore, this stagnation on the whole came with very vigorous dynamics regarding the population changes inside the metropolitan areas. Dynamics through which the central areas gradually lost relative weight (and even population in absolute terms), while the population growth concentrated in the metropolitan belts. This trend confirmed itself and deepened in the following five years and thus in 20 years (1975–1996) the municipality of Madrid suffered a population loss of 334,384 inhabitants (10.4 per cent), Barcelona 242,331 (–13.8 per cent), Bilbao 72,427 (–16.8 per cent). However, the losses in the central municipalities were compensated by the gains in their respective territorial surroundings and the total population in these metropolitan areas remained relatively stable compared to the previous period. The other metropolitan areas – Valencia, Málaga and Zaragoza – experienced the same phenomenon of deconcentration, although with a slight delay and less intensity. In any case, in all these areas a real sprawl of urbanisation over the territory took place and in the last five years of the period (1991–1996) a more equitable distribution of population over the metropolitan territory can be noticed. This is not the place to tackle the causes for such outstanding asymmetries in the demographic evolution inside the metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, these have been explained especially by the existence of intra-metropolitan migrations, from the central city to the belts. There are two main factors among the reasons for these migrations: the existence of very significant price differentials between the metropolitan centres and the rest of their respective urban areas, together with the varied housing offer and greater accessibility of the territory (Nel·lo, 2002). The consequences of such dynamics of expansion and deconcentration over the structure of the metropolis have been hotly debated. With their corresponding nuances, the experts (Naredo, 1994; Monclús, 1998; Font, 1999; Rueda, 2002; Nel·lo, 2001, 2002) agree that the expansion has given the large Spanish cities a critical mass that situates them in a better position when it comes to litigating in order to attract economical activity and investments. Likewise, deconcentration is claimed to have brought about better accessibility to jobs and services in the ensemble of the metropolitan territory, and an improvement of life conditions. However, urban dispersal and a growing social and functional specialisation in the use of the territory, can carry significant problems: of environmental character (due to accelerated consumption of land, water and energy); of functional character (due to an overload of the transport networks resulting from exacerbation of mobility); of social character (due to segregation of social groups over the territory); and of administrative character (due to an increase of the expenses in managing the networks and the provision of services).

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1996–2003: Beginning of a New Recentralising Cycle?

So far we have described the transformation of the large Spanish cities in the second half of the twentieth century. The data we have at our disposal regarding the last few years of the twentieth and the first years of the twenty-first century lead us to think, however, that deep changes are taking place. Is the change of century coinciding with the beginning of a substantial modification in the urban cycle in Spain? We are not it a position to give a definitive answer to this question, but there is evidence pointing in this direction. In the first place, it must be said that the population stagnation that the large Spanish metropolitan areas had known has disappeared. Between 1996 and 2001 their population increased by 457,068 persons, a growth slightly larger than the average of the 1975–1991 period, and significant enough to stop and even revert the loss of relative weight of the whole of metropolitan areas over the Spanish total that had taken place between 1991 and 1996. Still, it must be noted that, in absolute terms, this inflexion is due particularly to the change in trend of the Madrid and Barcelona metropolitan areas. Both metropolises add up to a growth of 430,619 inhabitants (94.2 per cent of the growth of the seven cities altogether). But it is the Madrid urban area which surpasses by far the growth of the rest of metropolitan areas together, accompanied by a marked increase in economic activity (particularly in services and construction sectors) in the capital, its GDP contributing almost 17 per cent to the total of Spain. The second largest Spanish city, Barcelona, grew by only 26.9 per cent and its contribution to the national total decreased from 14.3 per cent to 14 per cent. The decentralisation trend seems to show symptoms of exhaustion and in the largest areas even tends to reverse itself. The areas where the central cities started to lose population first are growing again (Madrid) or have slowed down their losses considerably (Barcelona and Bilbao). The rest of Spanish large cities have seen their central municipalities drained of labour in the period 1991–1996. This evolution could lead us to think that the evolution of the large Spanish cities in the last 50 years faithfully matches the classical statistical models of metropolitan dynamics (Hall and Hay, 1980; Van den Berg et al. 1982; Cheshire and Hay, 1989; Cheshire, 1995).4 Therefore, Seville, Málaga and Valencia would now find themselves in the absolute deconcentration stage; Bilbao and, above all, Barcelona, would be about to enter the recentralisation stage. Finally, Madrid would have covered the whole cycle and would already be decidedly going into a new recentralising stage. Several clues – such as the housing market’s type of 4

These models explain that the evolution of European metropolises sticks to a determined cycle or common pattern, which includes several successive stages of evolution: absolute concentration, relative concentration, relative deconcentration and absolute deconcentration. And they predict that, after the absolute deconcentration stage, recentralisation might start.

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occupancy and the structure of ages observed in Barcelona (Nel·lo, 2003; Ràfols, 1997) – invite us to think that the present and future evolution of the large Spanish cities may continue to adjust to the patterns of these descriptive models. The return movement can obviously be easier if we consider the lifecycle of those who left the central cities during the past 20 years. Now these families are returning to the central city because of the availability of jobs or studies (grown-up children) and the more accessible services and transport for their aging parents. It is possible that some of these recentralisation phenomena that especially affect the population in the middle and upper classes are indeed starting to take place. But in our opinion, we must look for the explanation to the trend changes of population growth in the main Spanish metropolitan cities in another direction: the arrival of numerous contingents of foreign immigration (Nel·lo, 2003). This is the main explicative factor for the change in the urban cycle. In the field of international migrations, Spain had characterised itself during the twentieth century by the predominance of emigration flows over immigration, the main destinations of Spaniards being Latin America (mainly for political reasons) and north and central Europe (labour-related migrations) (Cardelús and Pascual, 1979). In contrast, the presence of numerous contingents of permanently settled population of foreign origin in Spain had been relatively scarce. In 1996, foreigners residing in Spain only reached 542,314 persons (1.4 per cent of the total), the majority of whom were citizens from the European Union. However, from that year on, and coinciding with the entrance into the Spanish labour market of the relatively scanty generations born after 1975, the flow of foreign immigration began to increase, representing 3.8 per cent of the total population (1,572,017 persons) in the short space of five years (1996–2001). The partial information available at the time of writing for 2002–2003 indicates that the arrival of foreign population, far from decreasing, is tending to intensify. According to partial results of the 2003 census, the immigrant population could already surpass 2 million, but this number could be higher if non-regularised immigrants, not counted by the census as they have origins outside the European Union, are taken into consideration. Analysis of the immigrant population’s spatial distribution reveals that immigrants tend to settle predominantly in the largest urban areas. Thus, the seven provinces in which the large cities under study are found – representing 42.3 per cent of the resident population – were home to 51.3 per cent of the foreign population, in 2001. The two great metropolises of international rank are of utmost importance here: Madrid and Barcelona house, respectively, 23.3 per cent and 14.8 per cent of the total foreign population. When analysing the nature of the population in these cities, we observe that the population of Spanish nationality and the foreign population have very different evolution patterns. Between 1996 and 2001, the total population growth in these municipalities was of 459,365 persons. In short, the Spanish metropolitan areas grew again, thanks particularly to foreign migration. The arrival of immigrants affects the internal dynamics of metropolitan areas: this population concentrates

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in those districts and urban areas where prices are lower, in many cases the densest and most populated municipalities of the metropolises and in certain districts of the central cities. Therefore, it is precisely this sudden appearance of a population of foreign origin that explains, in great measure, the beginning of the demographic cycle’s change we have noticed in the heart of the large Spanish cities. Between 1996 and 2001, in each of the seven large Spanish cities the central municipality lost population of Spanish nationality while, in all the cases, the foreign population rose to a point where it compensated that loss in certain cases and even reversed the growth trend. This is the case in Madrid and Barcelona, where the foreign population has increased by 168,497 and 73,498 persons respectively. It also applies to Valencia and Zaragoza, where the foreign population has multiplied by five and six times respectively. The same can be observed in Bilbao and Málaga, although in absolute terms the immigrants do not compensate for the fall in the Spanish population, which obviously contributes to the fact that these are the cases of central cities with the highest relative losses. We have tried to show how the large Spanish cities reached a new stage at the turn of century, where the evolution of population is closely conditioned by the existence of international migrations associated, again, to the labour market. This respresents a new cycle that is and will be characterised by two side-effects: on the one hand, the progressive resumption of the large central cities’ growth and, on the other hand, by the maintenance – and even deepening – of the dynamics of dispersal of urbanisation over the metropolitan territory. 16.4

Major Challenges Regarding Large Spanish Cities: Housing, Infrastructure, Environment and Governance

In the last few years the large Spanish cities have witnessed a renewed population growth, the opening and internationalisation of the economy, the affirmation of their primacy over the whole of the Spanish urban system and an unprecedented turn of metropolitan dynamics that now combine a greater growth of the centres with the persistence of dispersal of urbanisation This evolution poses new challenges for public policies, particularly in the fields of housing, transport, environment and governance of cities. Housing: Difficulty of Access and Land Liberalisation In Spain the production of newly built houses has increased noticeably in the last decade. Therefore, the supply of dwellings has gone from 17.2 million units to 20.8 million. This increase in the number of dwellings (3.62 million) has surpassed by far the population growth (1.98 million): in the 1990s, two dwellings per new inhabitant were built in Spain, and the number of housing units per 1000 inhabitants went from 442.6 in 1991 to 509.8, well over the average in other

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European countries. On two occasions (2000 and 2002) the number of dwellings started came close to 600,000, which means that in one year the number of units started in Spain was nearly equal to that of the total housing supply in the municipality of Barcelona. Many of these dwellings have been and are being built within the range of the largest urban areas: thus, in the last year for which data are available (2002), 212,368 out of 575,546 dwellings started (36.9 per cent of the total) were built in the seven provinces where the large cities are located (MIFO, 2003). However, there is the paradox that, despite this fast building pace, access to housing is problematic for important sectors of the population (young people, immigrant population and low income sectors). The reasons for this situation are complex and have to do in the first place with two factors: the use of the built housing stock and the tenure regime. In both fields the Spanish situation presents specific peculiarities in the European context (Trilla, 2001). As for the use of the housing stock, the proportion of dwellings destined to uses other than as main residence is outstanding. In 2001 out of the 20.8 million existing housing units, only 14.3 corresponded to main residences, while 6.2 were declared second residence or recorded as empty, which means that the number of dwellings was 32 per cent higher than that of households, a fact unmatched in Western Europe. Secondly, the tenure regime shows great rigidity regarding access: 86 per cent of Spanish households own their home whereas only 14 per cent rent. In this situation, access to housing takes place in a nearly exclusive way through the purchase market and at free prices. From 1998 onwards, the situation in the stock market and the low price of money directed a large volume of financial resources towards the estate sector, causing a sharp increase of prices, while the gross annual salary hardly increased (9.2 per cent) (between 1998–2002) (FUNCAS, 2003). In the large cities, the price increase during this period was particularly sharp: with the exception of Valencia, in all cases the average increase went over 80 per cent and in that of Málaga it reached 98.6 per cent. Finally, it must be said that, on average, prices are higher in the central cities than in their respective metropolitan belts: thus, in Barcelona, for example, the price in the city is 1.5 times higher than the average price in the metropolitan region (CSPV, 2003). This increase has great consequences for the economic effort of a household to gain access to housing which, remarkably, continued to rise: in 2002 a Spanish family required the equivalent of 6.6 years of medium income to acquire a 90 m2 type dwelling. The increase in prices absorbed the beneficial effect of the reduction of interest rates; at the time of writing, the average payment of a mortgage absorbed nearly half of the gross income of families who accessed property in this way (FUNCAS, 2003,). The housing situation in Spain brings about obvious problems that have been pointed out by experts and by the Banco de España itself: difficulties in accessing housing for young people, families with low income and the immigrant population; the delay in the age of emancipation and the consequent drop in birth rate; the concentration of those population sectors of lower income in the districts and

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urban areas with lowest prices; the growing family debt, which entails a reduction of consumption and an increase in risks for the credit system. Infrastructures of Mobility and Transport: Economic Competitivity, Increase in Demand and Territorial Model Between 1996 and 2002 the Spanish economy continuted its convergence with the European average. While in 1980, five years before Spain’s entry into the European Community, the average Spanish income represented 71 per cent of European income, in 2002 it reached 83 per cent (INE, 2003). Simultaneously, the Spanish economy experienced remarkable internationalisation: the opening rate (the weighting on the GNP of exports and imports) increased from 36.1 per cent in 1985 to 62.5 per cent in 2000. Convergence is the result of a process of opening up and modernisation in which the large cities have played a key role. Thus, the GVA (gross value added) of the seven metropolitan provinces represented 48 per cent of the Spanish total in the year 2000. In addition, it is in these cities where the highest exporting capacity lies, together with the economic sectors – both in the industry and in the services – which are strategic for the advance of the Spanish economy. The evolution of the last years has meant a remarkable increase in flows of persons, goods and information in Spanish urban areas, both regarding their external connections and internal mobility. This increase in the demand for external and internal mobility has carried with it great pressure on the transport and telecommunications infrastructures which, despite the efforts made, are still one of the main problems for convergence with Europe, for putting the urban system into practice and for the functionalities of the cities. The evolution of traffic in the Spanish airports constitutes a useful signal of this situation. Passenger traffic in the main cities’ airports doubled between 1991 and 2002, from 34.4 to 71.1 million. This increase was remarkably high in Madrid, reaching 33.7 million passengers; Barcelona, from 9 million in 1991 to 21 in 2002; and Málaga, which grew from 4.9 million in 1991 to 10.3 in the same period. This rapid growth tended to accelerate in the second half of the period, during which the airports of the seven largest cities tended to grow more quickly than the rest. This evolution tended to cause congestion to the system and brought some of the airports close to saturation. Thus the enlargements of the main airports – Madrid-Barajas and Barcelona-el Prat – carried out in the first half of the 1990s, have clearly proved insufficient. The same thing happened with traffic of goods in the main ports, mainly regarding general cargo – that is, the kind of goods that, on the one hand, have a greater added value and, on the other hand, require more sophisticated handling – which increased sharply in the metropolitan ports, from 19.9 to 53.4 million tons. Valencia experienced the greatest increase – 377 per cent regarding general cargo – surpassing that of Barcelona. The evolution of maritime traffic has highlighted the need to enlarge dock infrastructures in respect of both berth

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areas and logistic activity areas on land and accesses, particularly to the ports of Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia. The growth in demand for traffic infrastructures has also been remarkable, both for interurban transport and everyday mobility in the cities. Car ownership has grown by 37.2 per cent in the whole of Spain and 35.5 per cent in the seven metropolitan provinces, which hold 43.9 per cent of the total number of automobiles. This growth has been accompanied by a substantial expansion of the road network, particularly that of high capacity, which increased its network by 6,026 km in the 1990–2001 period. However, this increase was not enough to absorb the increase of mobility in certain inter-urban itineraries and inside the largest metropolises. Moreover, the expansion of the road system has not come with a parallel increase of the railway system, which carries on, although in more moderate terms, with the decline started in the 1980s: while in that decade the total extension of the network decreased by 1,152 km, the reduction in the next was 225 km. Finally, we must point out the extraordinary increase undergone by telecommunications. Thus, the number of landline telephone lines installed went from 16.3 million in 1995 to 20.8 million in the year 2002, when there was already one line per two inhabitants. The evolution of mobile telephony was even more spectacular: in 1995 there were 929,000 users and seven years later the number had reached 18.4 million, with a progression that leads us to foresee that it will soon overtake the number of land telephone lines. Despite all these data, the International Telecommunication Union points out that the situation in Spain in respect of accessibility of communication and information technologies is still at a considerable distance from other countries of the European Union. Therefore, the synthetic index of accessibility to ICT (the so called Digital Access Index) ranks Spain 29th in the world and third from last among the countries of the Union, only before Greece and Portugal (ITU, 2003). Environmental Issues: Land Consumption, the Water Cycle Problem and Waste Management In the environment field, one of the most obvious problems for large cities derives from the fast building pace and the low density of urbanisation pointed out above. This dynamic resulted in a very sharp increase of land consumption, which meant the occupation by constructions of 102,200 ha. between 1995 and 2000 (INE, 2003a). In the autonomous community of Madrid, for example, urbanisation is estimated to have advanced at a rate of between 3,000 and 5,000 ha. a year and the situation is similar in all the metropolitan areas under study (Naredo, 2002, 2003). Land occupation affects flat areas, coastal areas and the rich lands of the fertile plains and deltas in a particularly intense way (Nel·lo, 1998, 2001). The pace of occupation, far from slowing down, had tended to speed up, supported by the processes of metropolitan expansion and urban dispersal. As we have seen, legislative interventions, far from limiting this dynamic, have tended to encourage

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it through normative deregulation. In addition, Spain finds itself, significantly, among those European countries that have not signed the Carta Europea del Paisaje (European Landscape Charter), approved by the European Council in October 2000. Together with the land consumption problem, we must also consider that of waste. In the year 2001 Spain generated 59.3 million MT of industrial waste, 1.4 of which were considered dangerous, according to the current classification (INE, 2003). With regard to urban waste, there were 26.3 million MT in 2001, at a rate of 1.7 Kg per inhabitant a day. In the same way, as the increase of the Spanish economy has been reflected in the increase of waste, it has also been reflected in the increase of atmospheric pollution. As is well known, when applying the Kyoto Protocol the European Union agreed to reduce its gas emissions, which contribute to the greenhouse effect: in the 2008–2012 period they should be 8 per cent lower than the readings of 1990. Taking into account its level of economic development, Spain was granted a 15 per cent increase with respect to 1990. However, the evolution in the last years shows that the country has by far surpassed the figure agreed on. In the last four years of the twentieth century emission of gases producing the greenhouse effect (expressed in thousands of MT equivalent of CO2) increased by 26.2 per cent with respect to the 1990 levels (INE, 2003a), while the EU in its whole reduced emissions by 3.5 per cent. The last and most difficult issue regarding environment in Spain is water management. Due to its Mediterranean climate and complex orography, Spain presents great contrasts as far as water resources are concerned: in the northern and northwestern sector of the peninsula, water is plentiful; however, the great interior river basins (Ebro, Duero, Tajo, Guadalquivir, Guadiana) are very dependent on fluvial contribution; and, finally, the Mediterranean climate and geography – scarce rainfall and with few river basins – are characterised by the irregularity and scarcity of water resources. Moreover, water consumption has traditionally been very high, 80 per cent corresponding to agricultural use, given the extension of irrigable lands in Spain, which has deep historical roots and has undergone an accelerated growth in the last years. Their growth between 1995 and 2000 was 229,800 ha., at a rate of 46,000 ha. a year (INE, 2003a). As it stands, water consumption at home represents some 4,700 Hm3 a year, which is equivalent to 165 litres per inhabitant a day. The increase in the average standard of living and the new trends of dispersed urbanisation encourage the increase of consumption (Saurí, 2003). 16.5

Public State Policies of Interest to Cities from the Mid-1990s

To understand the action taken by the Spanish government on these issues, we must remember that the Spanish Constitution of 1978 established an administrative system of decentralisation of competences; a system that greatly

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empowers autonomous communities or regional governments (17 in the whole of the state) and to which an essential part of the regulating and managing capacity in matters directly related to managing of cities has been entrusted – more specifically, town planning, public transport, environment and housing. This is, in good measure, the reason why in Spain there has neither been nor there is a now national, unique and integrated policy for cities (Nel·lo, 1998). Nevertheless, the state’s administration has impelled several pieces of legislation, plans and sectorial projects, the application of which has an important impact over the cities and the challenges they must confront. Among these, the following must be highlighted: the Plan Nacional de Vivienda (National Housing Plan), the Plan de Infraestructuras de Transporte (Transport Infrastractures Plan), the sectorial environment plans and the Ley de Grandes Ciudades (Law of Large Cities). In each of these fields there have been relevant novelties in the two last legislatures (1996–2000 and 2000–2004), during which, as already mentioned, the orientation of government policies has experienced a certain inflexion with respect to the previous period (1982–1996). The 2004–2008 legislature, governed by the Socialist Party, might bring changes in many of the policies related here, as some of them – like the Plan Hidrológico Nacional – were strongly criticised by this party during its period in opposition. This section will examine the the state administration’s response to the urban challenges in the four areas analysed in the previous section: access to housing, investment and transport management, environmental policy and governance of the cities. Housing: Fiscal and Development Policies The public administration has tried to favour housing access in three ways: firstly, with the liberalisation of the land market; secondly, with fiscal deductions and compensations aimed to facilitate access to tenancy of habitual residence; and finally, with investments aimed at promoting and rehabilitating dwellings at prices lower than those in the market. The resources budgeted for these aims are equivalent to 0.98 per cent of the GNP: 65 per cent are distributed in indirect aid (fiscal benefits) and 35 per cent in direct aid (13 per cent from the state and 22 per cent from the autonomous communities) (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2003). The will to relax the land market regulations gets its inspiration from the conviction that less regulation would result in an increase in offer, and therefore in a price reduction. Thus, in 1998 the government launched a new Ley de Régimen del Suelo y Valoraciones (Land Regime and Valuation Act) which facilitated the conversion of land into urbanisable land. This act was immediately complemented and extended by the Royal Decree – Law 4/2000 from 23 June of Medidas Urgentes de Liberalización en el Sector Inmobiliario y Transportes (Urgent Measures for Liberalisation in the Real Estate and Transport Sectors). In fact, it rigorously limited the capacity of regional and local administrations

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to constrain urbanisation, except for specifically protected spaces. However, the regional authorities resisted the law and appealed to the Constitutional Court. When the law was finally passed, its content had to be modified. Moreover, various experts have doubted the usefulness of this type of measures, adducing that, in such a demand-dominated market like the Spanish one, it is the price of housing that assigns value to the price of urbanisable land and not the opposite (Naredo, 2003). Fiscal benefits for the acquisition of housing have been the essential piece in the national housing policy: as already noted, they represent 65 per cent of the state resources aimed at housing policy and, in the year 2002, they were 11.3 per cent of the national budgeted revenue of the IRPF (single tax on individuals) and 21.1 per cent of expenditure associated to this tax. This fiscal treatment of housing (developed since the 1980s) was one of the main causes of the predominance of ownership over renting. However, more and more objections were raised against its eventual inflationary effect over prices, its impact on the pre-eminence of ownership to the detriment of renting, and its distributive effects, thought to be doubtful if not clearly regressive (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2003). Finally, in agreement and collaboration with the autonomous communities, the state executed the Plan Nacional de Vivienda 1998–2001 and launched a new Plan 2002–2005, which aims to finance production and rehabilitation of housing at lower prices than those of the market. The new Plan, the execution of which started in 2002, foresees for the whole of Spain a number of projects close to 400,000 in four years, with a loan volume of €17,192 million and a cost for the state of €3,380 million. A great deal of the projects in the Plan have taken place in the autonomous communities where the main cities are located. However, their application inside the urban areas turns out to be very problematic: since the expected aid has important limitations over the final selling price, and the price of land and production in the large cities are very high, nearly the whole of the offer is left out of the chance of receiving financial aid. Thus, the effectiveness of the Planes Nacionales in the large cities has necessarily been limited. Moreover, the present conditions of the market do not make building subsidised housing very attractive for the private initiative and despite the extraordinary boost of construction during the period of validity of the Plans, the absolute number and relative weight of this type of housing has not ceased to decline: in 1998 56,479 subsidised units were started in Spain, a 12.2 per cent of the total, while in 2002 the number had fallen to 44,014 (7.6 per cent) (Ministerio de Fomento 2003a). Infrastructure of Mobility and Transport In order to tackle the challenges and deficiencies of infrastructures, the government of the state, through the Ministerio de Fomento (Ministry of Industrial Development), launched the Plan de Infraestructuras del Transporte (PIT) (Plan for Transport Infrastructures) 2000–2007, with 2010 in mind, which

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follows up and substitutes the Plan Director de Infraestructuras (National Plan for Infrastructures) 1993–2007, produced during the period of socialist governments. The Plan, which constitutes, with no doubt, the most ambitious state policy of those directly affecting the managing of cities, foresees investments of €104,806 million (in values of 1999), about 1.4 per cent of the GNP for every year of validity of the Plan. Sixty per cent of the resources will be contributed by the Spanish administration, and the rest, in equal parts, by private financing and European funds. According to the government’s forecast, this investment would allow Spain to get closer to achieving three objectives: full real convergence with Europe regarding economy and infrastructures, integration of trans-European transport networks and territorial organisation and cohesion. In order to achieve this, the Plan foresees projects in five fields: airports, ports, roads, railways and communications (MIFO, 2003b, 2003c; Muñoz and Nel·lo, 2001). Estimated investments in the Plan regarding airports, according to 1999 values, represent a total of €11,419.2 million, 10.9 per cent of the total of the PIT. This investment should enable the modernisation and increase in capacity of the 47 Spanish airports of general interest, aiming to tackle the growing demand and the liberalisation of air transport. Particularly important are the estimated investments in the Madrid-Barajas (€2,898 million) and Barcelona-el Prat (€1,375 million investment) airports. With these investments, both airports will considerably increase the number of passengers annually, 70 million for Madrid-Barajas and 40 million for Barcelona-El Prat in real terms. However, the main objections to the airport policy are related to their management, which the government keeps centralised in the state enterprise AENA. Different areas, and the large cities in particular, have suggested that there should be greater flexibility in the ways airports are managed This would confer more autonomy on each airport and the participation of the private sector would improve the competitivity of the Spanish airports. In the chapter about ports, the PIT estimates a total investment of €9,450 million, 5,194.9 from public funds and 4,255.1 from private sources, in the 27 Spanish ports belonging to the state. This represents 9 per cent of the total investments estimated in the Plan. The most remarkable investments must take place in the port of Barcelona, amounting to €1,610 million that enables an enlargement of the port towards the south, in order to improve the logistics of the Barcelona area. Other significant investments are aimed for the ports of Valencia (876 million), Bilbao (568) and the inland water port of Seville (463). With regard to roads, the plan envisages three areas of action: high capacity roads, urban roads and preservation and exploitation. The estimated investments amount to €22,400 million, which reach 38 per cent of the total estimated investment. Their objective is to expand the network of high capacity roads (expressways and motorways), intending to pass from 6,000 km in 1996 to 13,000 km. While the expansion of the network in Andalusia, Castilla-León and Galicia has been particularly remarkable, the Plan has not broken with the traditional radial feature of the network, centred in Madrid. The Plan disregards the

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peripheral axes of economic activities, precisely the Mediterranean one and that of the Ebro, where some of the most important metropolitan areas are located. The way of executing the new projects, where opening new connections takes precedence over doubling already existing private roads with public ones, has largely kept these axes as toll corridors, while radial connections with and from Madrid are, primarily, free. The railway constitutes another long chapter of investment of the PIT. It is estimated that a total investment of €33,200 million will be devoted to this type of infrastructures, 38.6 per cent of the total investment. The main objective is to complete the high-speed network, of which only 470 km from the Madrid-Seville line were in service in 1996. The whole of the proposed network will have a total extension of 7,700 km and it will spread over five corridors, linking Madrid with the rest of Spain. Between 1996 and 2003, 757 km were put into service, although not always at full performance. Another 972 km are being built and the rest of the planned network is in different project phases. The high-speed railway programme, welcomed in general terms by public opinion, has been criticised from two areas: first, the government has been accused of delaying necessary investments in the regional and local network in their eagerness to promote high speed; secondly, the conception of the network has been highly censored because it is too radial from Madrid, largely ignoring service corridors such as Ebro or the Mediterranean and Cantábrico axes. In fact, the government’s motto regarding the conception of the network has been ‘no capital province over four hours away from Madrid’. Environmental Policies The main environmental policies implemented by the national government refer to waste and urban waste management and those related to the water problem. The issue of waste management has been dealt by the national government through several Planes Nacionales (National Plans), such as the Plan Nacional de Residuos Peligrosos (National Plan for Dangerous Waste 1995–2000), with an initial investment estimated at 45,609.1 million pesetas (€247.1 million) (MOPTMA, 1995; Nel·lo, 1998). Another important Plan is Plan Nacional de Recuperación de Suelos Contaminados (National Plan for Recovery of Contaminated Land) (1995–2000) (MOPTMA, 1995b). In both cases the assessment of the execution of the Plan as a whole is difficult because an important part of the investment and its execution depended on the various autonomous communities, and not all of them have invested as expected (MIMAM, 2000a). In the field of urban waste, a Ley de Residuos (Waste Act) was passed in 1998, which determines the objectives of forecasting production, and encouraging reuse, recycling and energetic evaluation of waste. Next, a Plan Nacional de Residuos Urbanos (National Plan for Urban Waste) 2000–2006 was drawn up, which, from the admittance of ‘the poor environmental waste management’ proposes a set of measures for the prevention of waste production and for encouragement of

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reusing, recycling and evaluating its energy. The aim is to move from a way of managing that in 1996 was widely dominated by dumping (70.4 per cent of the total) to a different way, in the year 2006, in which dumping will be only one third of the total (33.1 per cent) and where recycling (25 per cent), composting (24.2 per cent) and energetic evaluation (17.7 per cent) will become the dominant methods of waste management (MIMAM, 2000b). The total estimated investment amounts to 552,047 million pesetas (€3,317.9 million). The situation in the year 2001 (the last year with available data) shows that, despite the remarkable advance in recycling, dumping is still 64.6 per cent of the total management (INE, 2003b, 2003c). To conclude, a special reference to water management policies must be made. This is, without doubt, one of the most ambitious and controversial environmental policies of any designed in the last few years. From 1985 to 1995, during the Socialist government, the state drew up several plans to regulate water using reservoirs and the water transference between river basins, but they did not succeed and were abandoned when the Socialist Party (PSOE) lost power in 1996. In parallel, in 1995 the Plan Nacional de Saneamiento y Depuración de Aguas (National Plan for Sanitation and Treatment of Waters) 1995–2005 was approved to adapt Spanish water treatment to conform with European directives. The estimated initial investment amounted to 1.9 billion pesetas (€11,400 million). Its application has meant the participation of public administrations at all levels (state, autonomous and local) (MOPTMA, 1995). However, in the field of water policy, the project that has given rise to most controversy has been the Plan Hidrológico Nacional (PHN), approved by the Spanish Parliament in 2001 (MIFO, 2001). The elaboration of the PHN was preceded by the Libro blanco del agua en España (White Book of Water in Spain), which divides the territory according to its existing resources and lacks. The PHN suggested an ambitious programme of general regulation of river basins, the introduction of new resources (especially through desalination) and water transference between river basins. The Plan estimated a total investment of €18,843.4 million (from state, private and European funds) and was approved by the Spanish Parliament in June 2001. The most controversial aspect of the Plan is, with no doubt, the project of the Ebro water transfer, whereby 1,090 Hm3 would be extracted annually from the Ebro to be transferred to the river basins on the Mediterranean coastline from Barcelona to Almeria. The use of these resources would be intended for land irrigation (56 per cent) and home consumption (44 per cent). The project has generated an important movement of rejection from the regions which would be called upon to deliver (particularly in Aragón and the Catalan area around the Ebro), which have contested the Plan and have opposed its receiving European funds (Arrojo, 2001; Diputación General de Aragón, 2001; Saurí, 2003). Undeterred by criticism, in autumn 2003 the government opened the bidding for the first building works for the infrastructure of the water transfer. However, the new socialist government promised to stop this plan, and even the

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European Union has expressed its doubts about its convenience, refusing so far to provide the funds for its development. Governance: Administrative Fragmentation, Financing Problems and Local Regime Regulations From the point of view of governance, the most marked characteristic of the large Spanish cities is its administrative fragmentation. When the urban dynamics of the last years were analysed, we pointed out that one of the dominant features had been the growth of the territory that could be considered as part of each urban area. This expansion of the metropolitan territories resulted in the fact that the Functional Areas of the large cities do not only go considerably over the limit of the respective central municipalities, but they even go over the metropolitan delimitations established with statistic or planning aims (which, as mentioned before, have been used to produce the present chapter). The definition of the metropolitan territories confirms this by using the well-known delimitation methodology of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the US census. In this way, the studies carried out regarding labour mobility in the year 1996 (the last year with available data) indicate that, according to this criterion, the area of Barcelona would comprise 217 municipalities and 4,592 km2, Bilbao 77 and 1,780 km2, Madrid 167 km2 and 7,392 km2,5 Málaga 26 and 1,654 km2, Seville 56 and 6,672 km2 and Valencia 86 km2 and 2,831 km2 (Roca Cladera, 1998). However, this functional expansion of the metropolitan areas has not been complemented, in most cases, by the adoption of administrative measures that allow the local governments and planning to adapt to the new realities. Thus, the Spanish metropolitan areas generally lack administrative organs of metropolitan governance and coordination. The most remarkable exceptions are Barcelona where there is a Mancomunidad de Municipios del Area Metropolitana (Mancommunity of Municipalities of the Metropolitan Area) and sectoral institutions for the management of transport, waste and the water cycle, and that of Madrid, where the metropolitan area tends to coincide with that of the regional government. In the rest of the cities, the coordination organs are either very weak or have been abolished, as in the case of Valencia, where in the year 1999 the Consell Metropolità de l’Horta (Metropolitan Council of the Horta) was dissolved. This fragmentation is also reflected in the field of planning, so that effective urban planning has a mainly municipal base, while the arrangement schemes of metropolitan scope are either nonexistent or renowned for their limited executive character. The large cities have tried to obviate this lack partly through exercises of strategic planning of supralocal scope. 5

The area of Madrid probably overlaps the area of the Autonomous Community at different points. The fact that there are no data for its neighbouring regions prevents us from exactly establishing its delimitation using this methodology.

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The lack of organs of unitary management is also shown in the field of taxation and resources. Metropolitan areas do not have any tax instruments, and state transferences to the municipalities, when they exist are very scarce, due to their metropolitan condition (as in the cases of Madrid and Barcelona). We must also take into account that the enormous effort to decentralise public expenditure carried out by the Spanish administration has especially benefited the autonomous communities (which in 2001 already administered 27.6 of total expenses). However, the share of local finances in the total (despite having increased slightly from 1996 onwards) remains of modest proportions, both regarding public expenses as a whole (13.6 per cent in the year 2001) and regarding the GDP (5.2 per cent). In order to confront this situation and equip themselves with adequate governance instruments, in 1996 the mayors from the seven largest Spanish cities demanded that a Ley de Grandes Ciudades (Law of Large Cities) be elaborated (Criterios …, 1996; Nel·lo, 1998). In their proposal, the law would serve to provide the large municipalities and the communities that could be created around them with the most suitable administrative and financial management instruments. Likewise, it should include the possibility to confer on large cities specific competences and regulations in fields like urban planning, housing, environment, infrastructures, public transport, taxation, financing, social policies, municipal justice, public safety and traffic management. The law was finally approved, on 19 November 2003, with the title Ley de Medidas para la Modernización del Gobierno Local (Measures for Modernisation of Local Government Act). However, its content is quite far from what the metropolitan mayors initially aimed for. In fact, the regulation does not modify the framework of competence, nor does it introduce measures for supramunicipal coordination. Instead, it establishes that – in the municipalities with more than a certain population (those over 250,000 inhabitants, capital provinces with over 175,000 and, in special cases, municipalities with over 75,000) – specific administrative measures will be adopted to strengthen the figure of the mayor, to make municipal administration more flexible and to favour citizen participation. The municipality of Barcelona stayed out of this general regulation as it was awaiting a Municipal Charter for the city to be approved. As we can see, we are dealing, in any case, with modifications of partial regulations that do not entail deep changes in the governance of the main Spanish metropolitan areas. 16.6

Impact of European Policies on Spanish Cities

Since Spain joined the European Union in 1986, European projects have been considered a part of the national process of democratisation and development. The first 10 years of membership were characterised by a clear pro-European attitude of the social-democratic government, which supported the different initiatives coming from the supranational institution – programmes such

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as agriculture and fishing, environment and transport, and the convergence programme. Nevertheless, this encountered some opposition among the public opinion, especially with regard to issues that directly affected major economic sectors of the country, like fishery and agriculture. During the mid-1990s, in a period of deep economic crisis, the convergence programme came to be judged negatively as well, as it was reputed to place a constraint on macroeconomic policy and, specifically, on the domestic economy. The costs of Spain’s participation in Europe and the impact of some of its policies were seen as outweighing the massive, but less visible, benefits, especially through the main instruments for regional (and local) development, the Structural Funds. That is why it was commonly felt that the effort made by Spain to modernise and adapt to the new European framework should have been compensated by the Community in the form of aid, ensuring not only political but also economic integration into Europe. In 1991, the European Community created the Cohesion Fund as a way to compensate the less wealthy member states (those whose GDP is less than 90 per cent of the European average) and help them to converge with Europe. Spain’s support (both by citizens and national government) to the EU was since then highly influenced by this benefit-oriented vision (Closa, 2001). European policies and directives in areas such as transport, environment and economy helped Spain to fill the gap with other countries in the Union, and all of them had an impact on Spanish cities, either in a indirect or direct way. However, the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Funds are those that more directly contributed to the reduction of regional and urban disparities within Spain and have fostered convergence with other EU countries. Infrastructure development or improvements in transport or research and development would not have been possible without these sources of funding. The arrival of the conservative government in 1996 marked a deterioration in the relationship between Europe and Spain, especially with regard to issues as the content of the European Constitution and defence policy. However, Spain insisted on the defence of the privileges granted by the Structural Funds and fought to maintain them in the Treaty of Nice, which shows how important they were deemed by the Spanish government as a tool to support the regional and local development of the country. The Spanish government (through its Ministry of Economic Affairs) is the managing authority of all the regional programmes and initiatives that directly affect the autonomous communities. The latter only have an advisory role through their participation in working groups and advisory committees of the European Commission. During the period 1994–1999, EU aid accounted for 1.5 per cent of Spanish GDP. For the next six year period (2000–2006) decreased to 1.3 per cent of GDP, both as a result of the general reduction in structural funds over the new programming horizon of the EU, and because of the relative change in the position of Spain due to EU enlargement (Sebastián, 2001).

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At the time of writing, almost 84 per cent of the Spanish territory is covered by one of the ‘Territorial Goals’ of the Structural Funds. These funding sources mostly affect all the autonomous communities, but they also apply to cities. Spain is under Objectives 1 and 2, which on the one hand seek to diminish deficiencies in areas as basic infrastructures, productive systems (especially R&D and new technologies), human resources and environmental problems (Objective 1) and, on the other, tackle issues such as the scarcity of economic and social infrastructures, depopulation, aging and dependency on traditional agricultural sectors (Objective 2). Some of the most prosperous regions like Madrid and Barcelona are now under Objective 2b, for those regions in transition from receiving the structural funds to their withdrawal. Regarding Objective 1, most of the regions spend their budget on overcoming the lack of infrastructure, while leaving behind other actions such as promotion of innovation or training of the labour force. For instance, Andalucía spent €2,492 million on transport infrastructure and only €327,923 on human resources-related areas (Dirección General de Fondos Comunitarios y Financiación Territorial, 2003). This has somehow prevented such regions from converging with more developed ones in Spain (Pardo García, 2003). Regions under Objective 2, instead, dedicate most of the EU investment to Local and Urban Development, Catalonia being the region that has executed most of the investments in this field. The Basque Country, Madrid and Aragón are other regions where local development accounts for an important amount of funding, although transport and R&D respectively take most of the funds in Aragón and Madrid. Regarding the Social Cohesion Fund, at the time of writing Spain received 63 per cent of the total fund (€2.624 million), to be invested in environment (mainly water provison) and the creation and improvement of transport infrastructures (railway, airports and ports). The Spanish conservative government intended to use some of this funding to invest in the controversial Plan Hidrológico Nacional, but at the time of writing the EU was still debating this possibility, due to the environmental issues raised by the project. The EU’s doubts encouraged vociferous opposition to the plan, the opponents using this as a tool against the Conservative Government. This is a clear illustration that European policy can have an impact on the national politics, which pn its turn influences Spanish cities, as seen in the previous sections. Another important part of the Structural Funds that affects cities more specifically is the URBAN Programme, which is intended to help the sustainable development of cities and the regeneration of neighbourhoods in crisis through tools such as enterprise creation, professional training, improvement of infrastructures, protection of the environment, promotion of equal opportunities, creation of social infrastructure, etc. As has been explained, Spanish cities have few resources of their own, due to their limited taxation capability and to the administrative fragmentation that leaves them with only few competencies. In this context, European policy, and more particularly the URBAN Programme (as well as subsidiary programmes like Urban Pilot or Equal), is by cities seen as

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an essential addition to their development opportunities, which they often enjoy independently of the national government’s will. During the period 1994–1999, 31 Spanish cities benefited under the URBAN programme: among them are six of the seven largest cities or their metropolitan areas (except Zaragoza). In 2000–2005 period the number was reduced to 10, with a total budget of €728.3 million.6 Only one of the largest Spanish cities, Barcelona, will benefit from this programme, even if in an indirect way, as Sant Adrià del Besós, a deprived municipality of the metropolitan area, is involved in the programme. The decrease in the number of large cities participating in the URBAN programmes might in part be the result of the improvements achieved thanks to the previous participation. Most of the programmes are oriented towards regeneration of corridor areas (like the small municipality of Sant Adrià next to Barcelona) and of old historic centres (as in the case of Málaga). Table 16.1 Urban 2 Programme: budget for Spain, period 2000–2006

Source: Regional Policy European Commission.

In Málaga, the introduction of URBAN programmes was used to improve the quality of internal governance of the city, in addition to the most direct benefits derived from the execution of the projects. The action was not only oriented to the physical rehabilitation of the historical centre, but also included economic and social development actions like the modernisation of the small enterprises of the area and the assistance to homeless and deprived people. In Sant Adrià del Besós the programme puts an emphasis on the development of employment

6

http://www.guiafc.com/documentos/2002-IP-049.pdf.

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opportunities, basic services and social integration, although there is also some attention given to water pollution and physical renewal. Without the impulse of the EU, the ‘social’ character of the project would not have been developed, not only because of a lack of resources but also because the EU has given the direction and the justification to start many projects, which instead would have been prevented by internal political conflicts. Moreover, EU programmes favour the cooperation of the actors involved, the participation of citizens and the formation of an integral vision on urban development. The relevance of Europe for Spain and its cities can also be shown in relation to more indirect elements. For instance, the localisation of European agencies, like the one for Work Safety in Bilbao or the European Office for Internal Market Harmonisation in Alicante, activates relevant spin-offs in term of employment and internationalisation that can help these cities to be more dynamic and to put themselves ‘on the map’. Likewise, the candidacy of Barcelona as headquarters of the Food Safety Office, which was rejected after long negotiations, illustrates that cities see these agencies as contributions to urban development. Last, the student exchange programmes financed by the EU – Erasmus, Socrates, Leonardo – can be considered as another factor of the ‘Europeanisation’ of many medium Spanish cities like Salamanca, Murcia or Granada, and without doubt have also contributed to the choice of cities such as Barcelona as a preferred destination for work and leisure. In conclusion, the impact of European policies and funds in Spanish cities must be considered as very positive, even if more general policies have caused controversy, mostly those related to agriculture and fishery. Moreover, the ‘historic’ autonomous communities like Catalonia or the Basque Country have tried to gain a more visible role in Europe outside the control of the Spanish government, which also created some conflict. 16.7

Conclusions: Large Cities at the Crossroads

At the start of the twenty-first century, the large Spanish cities find themselves at a crucial point in their evolution. They are confirmed as engines for development, leaders of the national urban system and a link with Europe and the rest of the world. At the same time, they witness a new cycle, where the dispersal of urbanisation and the growth of the main cities combine for the first time. Their increase in size, population and activity has given them a tactical advantage, and some of them have even become metropolises of world influence, like Madrid and Barcelona. Others have settled as metropolises of European and Spanish rank, like Valencia, Bilbao, Seville, Málaga and Zaragoza. In general, all of them have witnessed a greater accessibility to services and a greater integration of the labour market in their respective regional areas. Nevertheless, together with these advantages, considerable challenges have also been described, especially those related to the environment (land consumption and

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degradation, air pollution, water and energy consumption, difficulty of managing urban and industrial waste) and problems of functional character, related to the increase of demand for internal mobility and communication. This has clearly shown the lack of communication and telecommunication infrastructures, resulting in problems of network congestion. Finally, there is also an increase in problems of social character caused by the difficulty of access to housing (which particularly affects young people, low-income families and immigrants) and by an expansion of urban segregation. Many of the policies aimed at solving these challenges are under the competency of the autonomous authorities from each region and the local governments; however, the state’s administration still holds the power in the management of housing, infrastructures, the environment and in the design of the administrative framework. With reference to housing, the state’s government has promoted initiatives of a clear liberalising character which have seen their application considerably limited because of legal contestations and the resistance to their application by regional and local authorities. More effective have been the fiscal policies of access to property, (65 per cent of the state’s resources for housing policy), meaning that 86 per cent of Spaniards belong to families who are property owners, which has resulted in a very rigid market (renting is practically residual) and has affected the increase of prices. Finally, despite the effort made, promoting subsidised housing through the National Housing Plans has not yet achieved a significant increase, even decreasing in percentage over the whole of the market. In the field of infrastructures, mobility and transport, the Plan de Infraestructuras del Transporte (Transport Infrastructures Plan) 2000–2007, with a budgeted investment of €104.806 million (1999 value), proposed investments in airports, ports, roads, railways and telecommunications of the main Spanish cities. The projected investment in dual carriageways and the high-speed train, which will allow to configure an integrated road and railway network of great capacity, with Madrid being the centre of the development, is also substantial. The capital-based organisation of the network has created criticism against the PIT and the regional governments of the Mediterranean axes (where economic and tourist activities have traditionally concentrated) have demanded a less radial design of the road and railway systems. We have also pointed out the relatively little attention that state policies give to the traditional railway network and urban public transport. Concerning environmental policies, the different administrations have been unable to slow down the accelerated rate of land occupation, driven by urbanisation dispersal, low density of construction and the proliferation of secondary residences. Regarding waste management, the various plans launched in the second half of the 1990s – dangerous waste, recovery of polluted soil and urban waste – have allowed for certain improvements, but have not achieved the original objectives, as happened with gas emissions. Finally, with respect to the water cycle, even the considerable improvements in the field of sanitation, the constant increase of consumption – for irrigated land, industrial and home use – cause tensions in

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several river basins. To confront them, the state approved the Plan Hidrológico Nacional which forecast the transference of water from the Ebro to other regions, causing widespread political, scientific and public debate. The main problem Spanish metropolitan areas must confront in the field of public policy is that of their administrative fragmentation: with very few exceptions large Spanish cities lack integrated tools for management of services, taxation and urban planning. On the other hand, the finances of the local governments in these areas show substantial problems related to sufficiency, particularly acute regarding public transport. The recent approval of the Measures for Modernisation of Local Government Act, although containing certain improvements, is far from the original aims metropolitan mayors had in mind regarding common instruments of representation, management and planning. As for Spain as a whole, the impact of the European policies in the Spanish cities can be considered very positive. Programmes such as URBAN or the Cohesion Funds have to a certain extend, helped to overcome some of the above mentioned ‘management’ problems of the large Spanish cities, by providing funding and promoting governance. To conclude: large Spanish cities find themselves at a crossroads. They are entering a change of urban cycle that confers on them significant opportunities and poses important challenges that require prompt political replies. The state policies that have been applied in these cities in the last years respond to two great lines of inspiration: on the one hand, to willingness to deregulate as far as services, land and housing are concerned; on the other, to the intention to affirm the unitary character of the state and the national cohesion. In the light of the results that have been reached, which have been thoroughly analysed in these pages, we must wonder whether these approaches are the most suitable to manage an increasingly complex, contradictory, reticular and open urban system: the Spanish urban system of the twenty-first century. The change of political colour in the Spanish government for the 2004–2008 period will probably mean the modification or even total cessation of some of the policies here described, and might result in a change in the orientation of policies towards large cities. References Ajuntament de Barcelona (2003), Polítiques públiques d’habitatge, Document 2/03, Gabinet Tècnic de Programació: Barcelona. Arrojo, P. (ed.) (2001), El Plan Hidrológico Nacional a debate, Bakeaz: Bilbao. Cardelús, J. and Pascual, À. (1979), Movimientos migratorios y organización social, Península: Barcelona. Centre de Política de Sòl i Valoracions (2003), Los precios de la vivienda en la región metropolitana de Barcelona, año 2002, CPSV: Barcelona. Closa, A. (2001), ‘The Domestic Basis of Spanish European Policy and the 2002 Presidency’, European Studies, 16.

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European Comission (1994), Europe 2000+. Schema d’ammenagement de l’espace européen, European Comission: Brussels. Cheshire, P. and Hay, D.G. (1989), Urban Problems in Western Europe. An Economic Analysis, London: Unwin Hyman. Cheshire, P. (1995), ‘A New Phase of Urban Development in Western Europe. The Evidence for the 1980s’, Urban Studies, XXXII (7). Comisiones Obreras, Secretaría Confederal de Medio Ambiente (2001), Valoración del Plan Nacional de Residuos Peligrosos, Madrid. Criterios para una Ley de Grandes Ciudades (1996), Málaga, VI Reunión de Alcaldes de las Grandes Ciudades. Díez Niclás, J. (1972), Especialización funcional y dominación en la España urbana, Fundación Juan March: Madrid. Diputación General de Aragón (2001), Alegaciones al Plan Hidrológico Nacional, Civitas: Madrid. Dirección General de Fondos Comunitarios y Financiación Territorial (2003), Informe Anual, Año 2002, Ministerio de Hacienda: Madrid. Font, A. Llop, C. and Vilanova, J.M. (1999), La construcció del territori metropolità. Morfogènesi de la regió urbana de Barcelona, Mancomunitat de Municipis de l’Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona: Barcelona. FUNCAS (2003), ‘Políticas de Vivienda: Eficiencia y Equidad’, Miguel-Ángel López García, Papeles de Economicia Española, 95. Gavira, C. (1989), Geografía humana de Madrid, Oikos-Tau: Vilassar de Mar. Giner, S. (ed.) (2002), Enquesta de la regió de Barccelona, 2000. Informe general, Institut d’esTudis Regionals i Metropolitans: Barcelona. Hall, P. and Hay, D.G. (1980), Growth Centers in the European Urban System, Heinemann: London. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2003a), España a los 25 años de la Constitución, INE: Madrid. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2003b), Encuesta sobre la recogida y tratamiento de residuos urbanos, 2001, INE: Madrid. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2003c), Encuesta sobre la recogida y tratamiento de residuos en la industria, 2001, INE: Madrid. International Telecommunication Union (2003), ITU Digital Access Index: World’s First Global ICT Tracking, ITU: Geneva. Ministerio de Fomento (2001), Plan Hidrológico Nacional, MIFO: Madrid. Ministerio de Fomento (2003a), Estadísticas de la vivienda, MIFO: Madrid. Ministerio de Fomento (2003b), El Plan de Infraestructuras del Transporte 2000–2007, MIFO: Madrid. Ministerio de Fomento (2003c), Balance de ejecución del Plan de Infraestructuras del Transporte 2000–2007, MIFO: Madrid. Ministerio de Fomento (2003d), Nuevas infraestructuras aeroportuarias, MIFO: Madrid. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente (2000a), El medio ambiente en España, 2000, MIMAM: Madrid. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente (2000b), Plan Nacional de Residuos Urbanos (2000–2006), MIMAM: Madrid. Ministerio de Medio Ambiente (2001), Estudio de impacto ambiental del Plan Hidrológico Nacional, MIMAM: Madrid.

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Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente (1994), Plan Director de Infraestructuras, 2003–2007, MOPTMA: Madrid. Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente (1995a), Plan Nacional de Residuos Peligrosos (1995–2000), MOPTMA: Madrid. Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente (1995b), Plan Nacional de Recuperación de Suelos Contaminados (1995–2000), MOPTMA: Madrid. Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Transportes y Medio Ambiente (1995c), Plan Nacional de Saneamiento y Depuración de Aguas Residuales (1995–2005), MOPTMA: Madrid. Monclús, F.J. (ed.) (1998), La ciudad dispersa. Suburbanización y nuevas periferias, CCCB: Barcelona. Muñoz, F. and Nel·lo, O. (2001), ‘La produzione di infrastrutture in Spagna e Catalogna: politiche e attori, inerzie e sfide per un territorio in transizione’, in G. Dematteis and F. Governa (eds), Contesti locali e grandi infrastrutture. Politiche e progetti in Italia e in Europa, Franco Angeli: Milano, pp. 273–305. Naredo, J.M. (1994), ‘El funcionamiento de las ciudades y su incidencia sobre el territorio’, in Ciudad y territorio. Estudios territoriales, 100–101, pp. 233–49. Naredo, J.M. (2002), ‘Naturaleza de la conurbación madrileña y sus tendencias actuales’, in Quatre ciutats a Espanya, Barcelona, COAC (multicopied). Naredo, J.M. (2003), ‘El mercado del suelo y las plusvalías en España’, La Vanguardia, 26 October. Nel·lo, O. (1997), ‘Las grandes ciudades españolas: dinámicas urbanas e incidencia de las políticas públicas’, Papers. Regió Metropolitana de Barcelona, 27, July, pp. 9–70. Nel·lo, O. (1998), ‘Spain’, in L. van den Berg, E. Braun and J. van der Meer (eds), National Urban Policies in the European Union. Responses to Urban Issues in the Fifteen Member States, Aldershot: Ashgate. Nel·lo, O. (1999), ‘El sistema urbà’, in Història social, política y econòmica dels Països Catalans, vol. 12, Enciclopèdia Catalana: Barcelona. Nel·lo, O. (2001), ‘Las áreas metropolitanas’, in A. Gil and J. Gómez Mendoza (eds), Geografía de España, Ariel: Barcelona, pp. 275–98. Nel·lo, O. (2002), Cataluña, ciudad de ciudades, Milenio: Lleida. Nel·lo, O. (2003), ‘Contra la dispersió, intensitat; Contra la segregació, ciutat’, FRC 6. Pardo García, I. (2003), ‘Spanish Regional Policy: Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Union’, International Advances in Economic Research, February, 9 (1), pp. 79–83. Perpiñà Grau, R. (1954), Corología. Teoría estrucutral y estructurante de la población de España, CSIC: Madrid. Precedo, A. (1988), La red urbana, Síntesis: Madrid. Racionero, L. (1986), Sistemas de ciudades y ordenación del territorio, Alianza: Madrid. Reher, D. S. (1994), ‘Ciudades, procesos de urbanización y sistemas urbanos en la Península Ibérica, 1550–1991’, in M. Guardia, F. Javier Monclus and J.L. Oyon (eds), Atlas histórico de las ciudades europeas, vol. 1, La Península Ibérica, CCCB.Salvat: Barcelona, pp. 1–29. Roca Cladera, J. (ed.) (1998), Estudio sobre la delimitación de áreas metropolitanas, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente – Centre de Política de Sòl i Valoracions: Barcelona. Rueda, S. (2002), ‘Els costos ambientals dels models urbans dispersos’, Papers. Regió Metropolitana de Barcelona, 36, pp. 73–104. Salom, J. (2000), ‘El arco mediterráneo’, in C. Bellet and J.M. Llop (eds), Ciudades intermedias. Urbanización y sostenibilidad, Milenio: Lleida, pp. 209–23.

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Saurí, D. (2003), ‘El transvasament de l’Ebre. Recursos hídrics, identitat y equilibri territorial’, in Oriol Nel·lo (ed.), Aquí, no! Els conflictes territorials a Catalunya, Empúries: Barcelona, pp. 252–73. Sebastian, M. (2001), ‘Spain in the EU: Fifteen Years May Not Be Enough’ Centre for European Studies, Working Paper Series 96, Harward University. Terán, F. de (1999), Historia del urbanismo en España. Siglos XIX y XX, Cátedra: Madrid. Trilla, C. (2001), La política d’habiatge en una perspectiva europea comparada, la Caixa: Barcelona. Van den Berg, L., Drewett, R., Klaassen, L.H, Rossi, A. and Vijerberg, C.H.T. (eds) (1982), Urban Europe. A Study of Growth and Decline, Oxford: Pergamon. Van den Berg, L., Braun, E. and van der Meer, J. (1998), National Urban Policies in the European Union. Responses to Urban Issues in the Fifteen Member States, Aldershot: Ashgate.

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Chapter 17

Sweden: The Emergence of a National Urban Policy Jan-Evert Nilsson1

17.1

Introduction

In Sweden by tradition more political interest has been focused on regional development in sparsely populated parts of the country than on urban development. The former role of the national regional policy was to support growth in sparsely populated regions and to restrict the expansion of the large metropolitan regions. This policy has its roots in the 1950s with its large migration from the ‘forest counties’ in the north of Sweden. The content of the new policy area, called ‘location policy’, was imported from the UK. One of the arguments used in favour of the ‘location policy’ was that it should reduce the population growth in the metropolitan regions. The growing structural problems in the 1970s following the first oil crisis and deepened by the second oil crisis some years later added part of the old manufacturing belt in the middle of Sweden to the areas designated for regional policy support. Little attention was given to urban policy, which primarily was considered as a policy concerning local problems in the three largest cities. In the very last years the focus of regional policy has changed from being a policy for designated areas to be a policy enhancing growth in all Swedish regions. The lack of a coherent national urban policy means that we have to look for elements of urban policies in different sector policy areas such as housing policy, labour market policy, regional policy and, in later years, transport policy and environmental policy. The fact that urban policy has been of minor importance in Sweden up till now can be understood in terms of the late urbanisation of the country and its combination of a small population and a large geographical area. In terms of area size Sweden is the third largest country f the European Union, while in terms of population it is one of the smallest. A population density of 21 inhabitants per square kilometre corresponds to about one-tenth of the EU’s.

1

Blekinge Institute of Technology.

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Urbanisation in Sweden emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, when a combination of the expansion of the manufacturing sector and an increased birth rate of the city dwellers made existing cities grow and new ones emerge. Natural resources like iron ore and wood were the main engines of growth in these days and resource-based production was located close to the these resources. In this way the industrialisation process gave birth to many new cities. It was not until the 1940s that the population of the urban areas exceeded that of the rural areas. Sweden has 12 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, which is two more than in 1980. Thirty per cent of the Swedish population lives in these cities. If the surrounding municipalities are included 56 per cent of the Swedish population lives in the 11 local labour markets that these 12 cities constitute. Malmö and Lund are centres in the same local labour market. Table 17.1 Major urban regions and their economic performance, 1990–2002

Based on Table 17.1, two pictures of the Swedish urban pattern can be presented. On the one hand we can conclude that 30 per cent of the Swedish population is living in the 12 largest cities of the country, a share that has increased only marginally since 1980. On the other hand, about 56 per cent of the Swedish population is living in the 11 largest urban regions, a share that has increased by 4 per cent units since 1980. Population has increased in all the largest cities and urban regions since 1980 with in total 990,000 persons, compared with the national growth of 623,000 persons. These figures express an ongoing centralisation process in the Swedish spatial pattern. Behind this national process two different patterns can be identified.

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In the three metropolitan regions – Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö – the population increase is significantly higher in the suburbs than in the three cities representing the core of the regions. Between 1980 and 2002 population increase in the suburbs was three times as high as in the cores, which has reduced the dominance of the three cities in their local labour markets. At the time of writing, almost 60 per cent of the inhabitants in the metropolitan regions live outside the cities of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. The population growth in the three metropolitan regions has to a large degree taken the form of a spatial expansion of the regions. The picture is the opposite in the other eight large urban regions. In these the population growth is concentrated in the municipalities, which represent the cores while population in the more peripheral parts of the regions is declining. The cores share of the regions’ population has increased from 64 to 71 per cent since 1980 making this group of cities the primary growth centres, in terms of population growth, in Sweden. The economic performance of the majority of the major urban regions between 1996 and 2001 is strong. In fact about 60 per cent of the total economic growth in Sweden in these years occurred in the three large metropolitan regions. Almost 40 per cent of growth was generated in the Stockholm region. Strong performance indicates that a region is among the top ten in the national growth league, which includes 81 regions in Sweden. Six of the major urban regions is on the top ten list. While the other five urban regions also are performing well and are found at places between 11 and 30. None of the major urban regions show a poor economic performance in the period 1996–2001. The situation was different in the years 1990–1996, when three of the urban regions had a poor performance. The main reason for the poor economic performance in the regions of Göteborg, Malmö and Norrköping was the weak performance of the Swedish economy in 1991–1993, when GDP in fact declined by almost 5 per cent. Manufacturing industry was struck hard by this decline. Production was reduced by 8.5 per cent and employment by 23 per cent, which had a strong impact on regions with a large industrial base. Local autonomy is one of the cornerstones of Swedish policy. Municipal autonomy is exercised locally, in municipalities, and regionally, in county council districts, which rest on a long tradition. The municipalities are responsible for public services like childcare, compulsory and upper-secondary schooling, care of the elderly and town planning. When the county council districts were introduced in the 1862 municipal ordinances, a peculiarly Swedish regional administrative pattern was created. In every county there is both a state county administration led by a county governor appointed by the national government and a county council elected directly by the inhabitants of the county. The geographical areas of the county administrations and the county councils are the same, but their areas of responsibility differ. County administrations have primary responsibility for a number of state assignments in the county – regional policy, regional planning and state sector planning – as well as coordination of

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state, county council district and municipal government services. The county councils municipalities have primary responsibility for health care services, which is their dominant activity, but they also contribute to public transportation, business sector development, culture and the field of social activities. In 1996, the Swedish parliament voted for a four-year experiment in four counties, entailing the transfer of tasks from county administrations to county councils. Representatives from Skåne and Västra Götaland took the initiative to merge some existing counties in order to create stronger counties. In the case of Skåne, with Malmö as the largest city, two counties were merged, and in the case of Västra Götaland, with Göteborg as the dominant urban region, three counties merged into one. The two new counties both had more than a million inhabitants, making them, together with Stockholm, outstanding compared to the other counties in Sweden from the point of view of size. In Skåne and Västra Götaland, directly elected county councils were established. Like traditional county councils, the new councils handled health and medical services but they have also assumed full responsibility for the county’s regional development from the county administrative board. In the other two counties the experiment took another form. In Kalmar an indirectly elected regional council was established and in Gotland, a county that consists of only one municipality, responsibility for regional development was transferred to the municipality. A Parliamentary Committee on the Regions was appointed to evaluate the experiment, so as to provide the government and parliament with basic data for decisions on future policy concerning regional organisation. The Committee concluded that three years was too short a period of time on which to draw well-founded conclusions and suggested a prolonged and extended trial period. Parliament did not follow the recommendations from the Committee and decided to only let Skåne and Västra Götaland continue the regional pilot projects up to the year 2006. However, Parliament also passed a new legislation enabling all counties to form regional development councils comprising all municipalities in a county and, on a voluntary basis, the county councils. The former pilot regions of Kalmar and Gotland were directly transformed into regional development councils. In 2003 another five counties created regional development councils and an additional one followed in 2004. The main reason for restricting the number of counties that have chosen to create regional development councils is the demand that such a council must comprise all the municipalities in the county. If one single municipality opposes against the plan to established such a council it cannot be realised. The major task of these regional development councils is to formulate and implement a regional development strategy. The regional structure in Sweden is at present diversified. Two counties have elected regional assemblies, which have taken over the tasks from the traditional county council and the responsibility for regional development from the county administrative boards. Eight counties have formed regional development councils that consist of a statutory joint authority comprising all municipalities in the county and the county council. These new councils have a weaker legal status and

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have fewer state resources at their disposal than the regional councils, but have nevertheless assumed full responsibility for the county’s regional development from the county administrative board. In 11 counties the county administrative boards, which are not part of the local self-government system but represent the state, are still responsible for the county’s regional development (Regional Development in Sweden, 2003).2 This variation in the regional institutional structure between different regions reflects that the Swedish government has not yet come to any conclusion about the regional level in the political system. This issue is about the strength of the regional self-government as well as about the future of the traditional county councils and the organisation of the public health care sector. As a step forward in this process the government has appointed a Parliamentary Commission of inquiry to investigate the division of responsibilities between central government, municipalities and county councils/regions. The starting point for the review is to maintain strong municipal self-governing within the framework and a strong national responsibility for the welfare of the citizens in the whole country. To a considerable extent, the Swedish ‘welfare state’ is local – it is therefore better to talk of ‘welfare communities’ than a welfare state. The growth of the welfare state and increased burdens on the municipalities created a pressure for larger municipalities. In the 1950s and 1960s the local structure was changed in several steps. The number of municipalities was reduced from 2500 in 1950 to 277 in 1979. Since then the number started to grow again and at present there are 290 municipalities in Sweden. For municipalities as a whole, 53 per cent of revenues come from municipal taxes, 37 per cent from fees and just 8 per cent in the form of government subsidies. However, the role of the government has a greater impact on the allocation of resources between different municipalities than these figures indicate. In addition to the financial contribution of the government, Parliament approved a policy according to which municipal tax revenues are redistributed between municipalities. In this way the government collects part of the revenues from the municipal taxes in some municipalities and transfers them to other municipalities. The general subsidy system consists of three parts. Firstly, the so-called base amount accounts for the largest part of the total subsidy. This base amount is used for equalisation of municipal taxable incomes up to a general guaranteed level. Secondly, the equalisation subsidy redistributes tax revenues from municipalities with strong tax bases in the large urban regions to small municipalities in rural areas. Thirdly, the equalisation subsidy is a means of ensuring that comparable services can be afforded in different municipalities.

2 The report is published by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and the Swedish Federation of County Councils.

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Summary of National Urban Policies until the Mid-1990s

In Sweden, national urban policy is directed at the three metropolitan regions, and this is a policy area to which little attention has been devoted for a long time. The responsibility for urban policy has been moved between ministries. In the 1970s and 1980s the Ministry of Environment was responsible for this area. In 1994 the government reintroduced the Ministry of Domestic Affairs and moved urban policy to that ministry. In 1998 urban policy was split up; part of it was moved to the Ministry of Labour and part to the Ministry of Finance. In 2002 urban policy was moved from the Ministry of Labour to the Ministry of Justice. The focus of the urban policy has changed over time. During the 1960s, housing policy was at the very centre of political interest. The housing shortage was viewed as a major problem. Parliament passed an ambitious housing programme, the socalled ‘million programme’. The objective was to build a million new apartments over a period of 10 years. When the ‘million programme’ was terminated as planned in the 1970s, focus of interest was moved to the relocation of state agencies from Stockholm to other parts of Sweden. This relocation strategy became an important element in the new national city-system policy formulated in the beginning of the 1970s. The objective of this policy was to strengthen regional urban centres. In the 1970s, 42 state agencies with in total 8,700 employees were relocated from Stockholm to 14 regional urban centres. In 1988/89 another four state agencies with 600 employees were relocated in the last wave of relocation (Nilsson, 1992). In the last few years some newly established state agencies have been placed outside the capital. In these cases the location decisions have been made without reference to a national city-system policy. In the 1990s, organisational changes became an important urban issue. Changed economic conditions for municipalities forced them to initiate thorough organisational changes. One cardinal idea, which was adapted in many municipalities, was to split municipal activities into purchaser and supplier organisations. The purchaser organisation was expected to formulate the goals and demands regarding the production for which the municipality is responsible. These ‘orders’ could then be filled either by municipal entities or by private organisations. The basic idea was to create a market where politicians were responsible for the purchaser organisation, which was in charge of demand, while public or private actors under professional management should be responsible for service production. One dilemma for this organisational model was that politics was cut off from many concrete decisions about how production should be organised. Specific changes in nurseries, schools and geriatric institutions, etc. were placed beyond the reach of politicians. This meant that local politicians could do very little when there was local dissatisfaction with the activities of an individual institution. They could only pass on complaints to those who were responsible for operating the institutions. This dilemma led many municipalities to abandon the model.

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Sweden has long been a net receiver of international migrants. Immigrants have arrived in Sweden for different reasons and their countries of origin are highly diverse. Since the early 1970s refugees and family-reunion immigrants have dominated the influx. Since 1980, 275,000 refugees and 345,500 relatives received permanent residence permits in Sweden. Today, less than one-third of all first generation immigrants have a Nordic background, about one-third are from other parts of Europe, predominantly Eastern Europe, while close to 40 per cent are of non-European origin. The labour immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s were normally well received and the integration process was considered to be fairly successful. By the 1980s there were clear signals that a growing number of immigrants faced serious problems of discrimination both in the labour market and segregation in housing. Some ‘immigrant-dense’ municipalities in the metropolitan areas started to advocate a more active strategy to spread immigrants more evenly throughout the country. The government formulated such a new strategy aimedat decentralising refugee reception both administratively and geographically (Andersson, 2002). Despite this dispersion policy, which was in full operation between 1985 and 1994, immigrant densities continued to increase in the Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö areas. In some immigrant-dense housing areas in these three regions the concentration of people with an immigrant background approached 100 per cent. Even during periods of economic boom immigrants had difficulties finding jobs. With the severe economic crisis in the beginning of the 1990s, employment rates in some immigrant-dense housing areas were below 10 per cent. This obvious failure of the integration policy made immigration a ‘hot’ political issue, discussed in the context of growing urban poverty, social marginalisation and exclusion. One outcome of this debate was that the government decided to allocate extra funds in a special assistance programme for neighbourhood development in a limited number of segregated and immigrant-dense areas in the big cities. In the first step, resources were allocated to Stockholm, Göteborg, Malmö and Botkyrka (part of the Stockholm metropolitan region) municipalities. However, other large municipalities and municipalities within metropolitan regions having similar problems could also be selected. The aim of the programme was to increase the level of competence and labour market participation rates among residents in immigrant-dense areas and to promote good social development and combat exclusion. Political attention to the situation of the metropolitan regions increased in the late 1980s. One of the warning bells signalling that something had to be done was the downturn in the participation in elections that was observed in these regions. The government response was to commission an investigation to suggest measures to change this pattern. In fact the commission choose not to investigate just political activity in metropolitan regions, but to undertake a broad analysis of challenges for these regions. The investigation published a total of 13 expert reports and a final report (SOU, 1990).

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The final report noted that the prospects for rapid economic growth in the Göteborg and Malmö regions were not particularly good, athough it found many reasons to believe that Stockholm would continue to enjoy a positive economic development in the coming years. Therefore, the investigation concluded that there were strong reasons to stimulate development in the Göteborg and Malmö regions. The major argument was that it would be advantageous for the development of Sweden if the economic potential of these two metropolitan regions could be better utilised. The investigation argued that there was no need to actively stimulate economic growth in the Stockholm region. However, it also warned the government against adopting measures designed to slow the economic growth in the Stockholm region, because such policies could create obstacles to the importation of new knowledge and to Sweden’s possibilities of keeping pace with international economic development. In order to stimulate growth in the metropolitan regions it was suggested that the government take the initiative for a programme to expand the traffic network in the three metropolitan regions. Before the investigation’s final report had been published, the government had appointed three negotiators who, at the government’s instigation, would consult with the affected municipalities to draw up proposals for investments in traffic infrastructure in these three regions. These negotiations resulted in three agreements in principle for expansions of the transport systems (SOU, 1991). 17.3

The State of the Cities

In the second half of the 1990s Sweden got through its economic crisis and economic growth took off again. In fact, in the second half of the 1990s economic growth in Sweden was higher than in the rest of the EU. Some of the urban regions that suffered from the economic crisis recovered well. Göteborg and Malmö were among these regions. Stockholm had a strong economic performance during the entire decade. However, the situation in Stockholm changed in 2002, when the regional economy started to decline due to problems in the ICT industry and financial services. Stockholm has lost its role as the engine of the Swedish economy, a fact that concerned people in the region and initiated a new debate on urban policy in Sweden. This debate reawakened the old political conflict between Stockholm and the rest of Sweden. Representatives from Stockholm underlined the national importance of the economic growth in the region. Stockholm was considered to play a unique role, as a national centre for import of new ideas, products and innovations in the Swedish city system. From this point of view, it is of vital importance for the whole country that Stockholm is able to fulfil its role in a proper manner. A dynamic capital, which performs well economically, indicates that the region fulfils its role as a national innovative centre. The stagnation in

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the last year can be interpreted as a signal that the Stockholm region is losing its dynamics. The new situation in Stockholm demands policy changes. Three issues are considered to be of special importance for stimulating growth in the Stockholm region: the general subsidy system, infrastructure and housing policy. Local Financing System The debate on the general subsidy system has become increasingly intense. The main criticism of the system is that financial resources are redistributed from the Stockholm region to other parts of Sweden. In the Stockholm region a majority of the municipalities deliver more tax revenues to the state than they receive in subsidies. Fourteen municipalities are net contributors to the general subsidy system. In a few suburban municipalities this contribution is their single largest cost, larger than their costs for care for the elderly and education. In a number of municipalities it has been necessary to increase municipal tax rates in order finance their contribution to the general subsidy system. Just two of the municipalities in the region receive a significant contribution from the general subsidy system. One of them is Botkyrka, which is a municipality characterised by low average income and a great proportion of immigrants. The net contribution from the municipalities in the Stockholm region to the general subsidy system has gradually increased. Representatives from the Stockholm region argue that the general subsidy has developed into a system which drains resources from the region and slows down the regional economic growth. The economic stagnation in the region in the last years has made this argument stronger. The general subsidy system is primarily an issue in the Stockholm region. In the other two metropolitan regions the situation is different. In the Göteborg region no municipality is a net contributor to the system, while just two municipalities in the Malmö region belong to this group. The general subsidy system is regularly revised. The government commissioned another investigation of the general subsidy system in 2001. The investigation suggested modifications in the system which would reduce the future increase of the Stockholm region’s contribution to the system (SOU, 2003). If the proposed system is introduced, the amount of money going from the municipalities in the Stockholm region to other parts of Sweden will increase by 13 per cent and by another 18 per cent in the following years. The investigation presented the proposal as an advantage for Stockholm by making a comparison with the existing system. If the present system is kept unchanged the net contribution from the Stockholm region is expected to increase by 46 per cent in the next 10 years. One way of characterising the investigation’s proposal is that all municipalities can be considered losers if the proposed system is introduced. However, the government can change this situation through allocating more state funds to the general subsidy system. According to the presented proposal municipalities in the Stockholm region will continue to deliver an increasing amount of money

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to other parts of Sweden, while the net receivers of these contributions will get less money than is the case in the present system. In municipalities in sparsely populated regions the revenues from the general subsidy system represent about 40 per cent of the total revenues. The final report of the investigation is sent on hearing to municipalities and public agencies. Based on the report and views from the hearing the government is expected to present a bill. This bill has not yet been presented to Parliament. Infrastructure Another controversial issue in the urban policy debate in Sweden is the need for investment in infrastructure. In connection with the investigation of the situation in the metropolitan regions the government took initiatives to develop proposals for investments in transport infrastructure in these regions (SOU, 1990). Negotiators were appointed to come up with an agreement with representatives from the regions. The main thrust of the agreement in the Stockholm region was on investments in the highway network. A complete six-lane ring road round the centre of Stockholm and one thoroughfare to the west of the city for through traffic would be constructed. The argument for this investment was that a growing Stockholm, where a large amount of automobile traffic passes through the city, has created a poorer environment and lower accessibility for traffic. The ring road would make it possible to lead traffic around the core of the city. Levying road toll would finance the thoroughfares. In addition a rapid streetcar system would be laid out, the capacity of the railways would be expanded and the subway system would be improved. The national government and the county councils together would finance the investments in public transport. The agreement between the government and Stockholm was subjected to much criticism both from concerned citizens and in political circles. The entire plan, specific parts of the plan and the proposed financing have all been opposed. In 1997 the Minister of Transport and Communications announced that the government no longer backed the plan. The government proposed that the eastern part of the ring road should not be built and to postpone the thoroughfare west of the city for through traffic. Since then representatives from the business community and from political circles have argued for the need for investments in order to solve the congestion problem in the traffic system. After the general elections to Parliament and municipalities in 2002 the issue again was put on the political agenda. Before the election there was a discussion about introducing toll in order to reduce the traffic in central Stockholm. All major local parties in Stockholm rejected the idea and promised not to introduce such a system if they obtained a majority in the local assembly. However, political circumstances at a higher level made that such a system was proposed after the election. This time the aim of the toll system was just to reduce the traffic in the centre of Stockholm and it was not combined with investment plans in

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infrastructure. From this point of view, the new plan represented a new strategy. The traffic congestion problems in Stockholm will be solved primarily through reducing the traffic volume. This change in strategy reflects the political circumstances, which gave rise to the proposal. After the election the social democratic government needed support from the Green Party in order to secure a majority in Parliament. The Green Party presented the introduction of a toll system in Stockholm as a prerequisite for supporting the social democratic minority government. Despite the fact that they had promised not to introduce such a system before the election, the local social democrats in Stockholm had to adjust to the new political circumstances and accepted to introduce a toll system, to be in operation in 2005. This decision met strong resistance from the citizens in the region and made cooperation between the city of Stockholm and the other municipalities in the region more difficult. Housing Shortage The third issue of major concern is the housing situation. The construction of new houses has been permanently low in the second half of the 1990s and new houses were predominantly cooperative apartments and private single-family houses. In 1998 almost 80 per cent of the new dwellings belonged to these categories, which means that the new dwellings primarily were built for better-off persons. The low building rate has increased the lack of dwellings in all the metropolitan areas. In the Stockholm region the number of new apartments in the period 1996–2001 was on average 2,300 per year. The average number of new single-family houses in the same period was 1,700 per year. In this period the average addition of dwellings was 5,000 units per year, which can be compared with an annual increase in population of 19,000 inhabitants. In the 1990s there was a severe shortage of dwellings in the Stockholm area as well as, but to a lesser extent, in the Göteborg and Malmö areas. There are many reasons for the housing shortage. At the beginning of the 1990s, during the economic crisis, Parliament abolished a major part of the interest rate subsidy and the special financial privileges for municipal housing. The major shake-up in housing policy made the cost of new rental apartments double during the 1990s, making the rental charge an increasing share of the disposable income. The private economic impact of abolishing the old housing policy was reinforced by the deep economic crisis, which reduced the disposable income for many citizens. For relatively many one-person households the rent rose to about 40 per cent of their disposable income (Lind, 1999). As a consequence a growing number of peope could no longer pay the rental charges asked for new houses. From this point of view the situation was characterised by a combination of need for new apartments and a lack of demand, due to people’s low ability to pay. Others chose to put the blame on the regulation of the market for rental apartments. According to existing rental control the maximum rents for new departments are linked to the rents of existing comparable houses. That means

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that a rent ceiling is established. If developers cannot build a new house at a cost in accordance with the rent ceiling, no house will be built. Many developers argue that they have difficulty in building at the cost indicated by existing maximum rents. Again, they say the situation is paradoxical because they are certain that there is demand for such more expensive rental apartments in attractive districts. From their point of view, abolishing the existing rental regulation system would stimulate the building of new rental apartments. A deregulation of the housing rent would also eliminate the illegal market for leases and stimulate turnover in housing. Some small steps have been taken in this direction by way of looking at the attractiveness of different apartments in the rent negotiations between representatives of the house owners and the tenants’ association. The Øresund Region In the Malmö region the agenda is quite different. The major happening in that region influencing the prospects of the region and the self-confidence of the regional policy-makers was the opening of the Øresund bridge in 2000. Policy-makers in the region see the bridge and the nascent regional integration as a unique social experiment, which is likely to have far-reaching consequences for the Malmö region as well as for the Copenhagen region. Initially the debate started from the premise that, due to various obstacles and barriers, integration in the Øresund region was held back. The Øresund bridge and the approach roads have dramatically increased physical accessibility within a geographical area comprising three million people, making it the largest metropolitan region in the Nordic countries. The Øresund region is considered to have features that make it a relatively complete urban region. In addition it is a major research metropolis in the European city landscape and the region has good communication facilities. Jointly, these should make the region attractive to advanced scientific activities and to industries dependent on research and higher education (Törnqvist, 2002). However, policy-makers are aware that the integration process will take a long time. It is easier to build a bridge than to create an institutional framework that supports integration. Institutional changes proceed slowly and perhaps even slower in a cross-border region which consists of areas in two countries with different cultures and institutional structures. National institutions may represent serious barriers. Sweden and Denmark have different laws, statutes and regulations. These regulation systems range from taxation, collective bargaining and labour law at the national level, to traffic regulations and opening hours at regional and local levels. The harmonisation process will take time but the process will be made easier by the fact that Denmark and Sweden are both members of the EU (Maskell and Törnqvist, 1999). Thus, the national governments hold the key to a successful integration process in the Øresund region. The future development of the Øresund region is also dependent on local and regional authorities on either side of Øresund, which will eventually create

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common decision-making bodies. The creation of such institutions will take a long time. There are numerous examples of conflicts between municipalities on both sides of Øresund. Since the bridge opened in 2000 an integration process has started. The number of commuters across the Øresund is increasing slowly and cooperation between universities, hospitals and corporations in the two countries has increased. this nascent integration process many barriers have become evident and initiated negotiations In between involved institutions for reducing them. To what extent the strong economic performance in the Malmö region in the last year is reflecting the ongoing integration process is an open question. 17.4

National Urban Policies from the Mid-1990s

In 1998 the Swedish government presented an integrated metropolitan policy for the first time (Goverment Bill 1997/98). The government regarded the Bill as the start of a process of cooperation between central government and the municipalities, county councils and regions concerned. In the metropolitan policy the government emphasised that increased growth in the metropolitan areas would contribute to increased growth also in the rest of Sweden. The new metropolitan policy has two main objectives. First, the policy should provide the foundations for sustainable growth in the metropolitan regions. This growth should be able to contribute to increased employment in the metropolitan regions as well as in the country at large. Included in this objective is the ambition that the metropolitan regions in Sweden are able to successfully compete with other regions in Europe for business investments. Second, the policy should stop social, ethnic and discriminating segregation in the metropolitan regions, and promote equal and comparable living conditions for people living the cities. This objective included many ambitious challenges. The government’s ambition is that the employment rates in socially disadvantaged housing areas should be raised and the citizens’ dependence on public allowances reduced. Adult persons in these areas who have not completed their upper secondary schooling or equivalent should have opportunities to do so. Public health, both as measured in the health statistics and as people’s subjective sense, should be improved and democratic participation should increase in these neighbourhoods. The responsibility for the metropolitan policy is placed on the Commission on Metropolitan Areas, which was appointed in 1999 to develop and coordinate the national metropolitan policy. The commission consists of state secretaries from seven ministries and from the Prime Minister’s office. The Commission monitors and evaluates the impact of the metropolitan policy and presents an annual report to the government on development in the metropolitan regions. In the beginning the Commission focused mainly on decreasing segregation.

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Local development agreements, which are contracts signed by the state and the involved municipalities for designated districts in the metropolitan areas, are the measure used to handle the segregation problem. These development agreements contain local objectives, an overall strategy and an action plan for the city districts covered by the programme. The local development agreements are drafted in a dialogue between the municipalities and the Commission on Metropolitan Areas before they are submitted to the government for approval. The municipalities have the overall responsibility for implementing the agreements. However, much of the work can be undertaken within the framework of local partnerships. The major argument used for this bottom-up strategy is the need to emphasise the needs, potential and wishes of the residents. With such an approach officials and other professionals are constantly reminded not to try to take control of the project from the residents. However, the government made it clear that a bottom-up perspective should not be interpreted as all initiatives having to come from the bottom. The geographical areas covered by the local agreements are much more limited than the scope of the Bill in general. At the time of writing, 24 housing districts in seven municipalities in the three metropolitans regions were designated as local agreement areas. In the Stockholm region 16 housing districts in the municipalities of Stockholm, Botkyrka, Haninge, Huddinge and Södertälje are defined as socially disadvantaged while the other eight housing districts are in the municipalities of Göteborg (four districts) and Malmö (four districts). These 24 housing districts are geographically defined according to somewhat varying principles. The common feature is that in relation to surrounding districts there is an over-representation of persons with low income, persons dependent on social assistance and immigrants. For the period 1999–2003 the government allocated more than SEK 2 billion for these development agreements. The funds are distributed among the seven municipalities concerned in accordance with the proposal of the Commission within the framework of the local development agreements. However, the Commission must, when allocating the funds, take into account the fact that more than SEK 700 million is earmarked for specific areas, in particular pre-schools, compulsory schools, culture and leisure activities. Apart from this, the funds allocated to the designated districts are to be used to finance the measures that are agreed upon by the government and the municipalities in the local development agreements. The agreements are revised annually in a dialogue between the seven municipalities and the Commission on Metropolitan Areas. The municipalities’ undertakings include that they must match the government grants for local development and make every possible effort in the areas concerned to achieve the objectives of the local development agreements. The municipalities are also obliged to conduct the local democratic dialogue in such a way that citizens in the municipality participate in local development.

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The Commission on Metropolitan Areas is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the programmes. In a fact sheet on the Swedish government’s Budget Bill for 2004 the government concluded that although metropolitan policy had involved reversing negative trends, much more progress was needed before these areas could catch up with the average levels in the rest of Sweden (Ministry of Justice, 2003). Some progress has been made. Employment in the 24 housing districts has increased, the share of population receiving social allowances has decreased and the proportion of residents in the 24 housing districts that has at least three years’ upper secondary school has risen. These changes are also associated with changes in the national economic situation as the impact of the metropolitan policy. It is unclear how important the metropolitan policy has been. The Swedish government has an ambitious evaluation programme. It has called upon a special inquiry to draw conclusions from all the evaluations that have been made since 1998. The inquiry’s general conclusion was delivered in March 2005. The metropolitan policy so far has been an area-based integration policy. One problem with the strategy is that it is unclear whether the policy is aimed at improving conditions for individuals and households or at improving the local situation in the selected 24 housing districts. Poor neighbourhoods tend to lose people who manage to improve earnings and to receive in-migrants who have a more marginal position on the labour market through migration. Therefore, the success of the Swedish metropolitan policy in getting more people in the designated areas jobs will not necessarily make noticeable improvements in these areas. It is too early to conclude whether the area-based strategy has been a success or failure. We need more research to be able to judge whether or not such strategies are helpful in combating social exclusion and segregation. Earlier experiments with area-based programmes have revealed that such strategies make the institutional relations between state–municipal, municipal– municipal, municipal–submunicipal and relations between different sub-municipal units critical and problematic. If the area-based strategy is to be successful, policymakers have to address the institutional aspects of the policy more seriously than has been the case so far (Andersson, 2002). At the present stage the two main goals of the metropolitan policy (economic growth and integration) are poorly integrated. So far focus has been on the integration issue. In 2004 the metropolitan policy entered a new phase. A growth dimension was devised and efforts to combat segregation shifted from measures financed with special grants to regular mainstream work. This change included a more strategically oriented local development work and in-depth collaboration between municipalities, the government, the business sector and local residents. The government has encouraged this work by helping to devise a model for making scenarios in the city districts. Some 10 districts have created scenarios for the future of their areas. These scenarios are considered to represent a starting point for developing measures.

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In the first phase of the metropolitan policy efforts to promote economic growth were completely ignored. In the second phase, more attention will be paid to this aspect of the metropolitan policy. Efforts to boost economic growth will include more municipalities than those that were invited to develop local development programmes. Still, the government has only in vague terms described the new growth dimension of the metropolitan policy. The government has announced that continued refinement of the metropolitan areas’ role in a national as well as an international perspective is important and that the government has the ambition to combine measures in order to boost growth and combat segregation simultaneously. Initially the growth promoting work will focus on the growth aspects of the segregation in the metropolitan areas. As an initial step the government announced that it will add a more highly developed metropolitan dimension to overall growth policy by holding regional growth conferences in the three metropolitan regions during 2004. The main purpose of the conferences is to offer a forum for discussing urban growth issues. 17.5

The Impact of European Policies

Swedish metropolitan policy has in many ways been influenced by European policy. Being a member of the EU since 1995, Sweden has a rather short history of taking part in the European collaboration. The situation as a member of the EU means that Swedish politics participate in policy formulation on the European level, which has opened the national politics for influences from other European countries. Only the fact that Sweden now, for the first time ever, has a metropolitan policy to some extent reflects this new context of Swedish policy-making. More recently, political attention has moved gradually from the sparsely populated areas in the north of Sweden to urban regions. The new regional policy which now is developed into a development policy for all parts of Sweden is one manifestation of this changing perspective (Goverment Bill 2001/02:4). The EU influence is also visible in the approach chosen by the government in the first phase of metropolitan policy. The basic approach with local development agreements, in which the municipalities present a strategy, local objectives and an action plan, is inspired by the approach used in the Structural Funds’ programmes. The significant role of partnerships in implementing the local development agreements is another tribute to European influences. 17.6

Conclusions

In 1998 Sweden for the first time developed a policy presented as a coherent metropolitan policy. The new policy aimed at providing the foundations for sustainable growth and to stop social, ethnic and discriminating segregation in the metropolitan regions.

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In the first few years the metropolitan policy was exclusively focused on the segregation issue. Local development agreements for handling the segregation in 24 housing districts in seven municipalities in the three metropolitan regions have been developed and implemented. The approach used is very similar to the approach used in EU Structural Funds’ programmes. So far the metropolitan policy has been a segregation policy focusing on the situation in very few areas of the metropolitan regions. Thus the present metropolitan policy is a rather narrow policy, focusing only on one aspect in a few housing areas in the three largest regions in Sweden. The Swedish government has announced that more attention in the next phase will be given to the economic growth dimension of the metropolitan regions. Efforts to boost economic growth will include more municipalities than those that were invited to develop local development agreements. In order to develop a metropolitan policy that responds better to the current situation for the three largest urban regions in Sweden than the existing policy a much broader approach is needed. More aspects have to be included and a greater portfolio of methods has to be used in order to attain the existing objectives of the metropolitan policy. At present there is a significant gap between the issues discussed in the section about the current situation for the large cities and the content of the new metropolitan policy. Politicians from all parties in the Stockholm region agree that the financial drainage of the region in the general subsidy system represents a serious threat to the future of the region. They hope that the government will listen to their arguments and change the system. The plan to introduce a toll system has also met strong criticism in the Stockholm region. This issue hides a conflict in several dimensions. It is a conflict between a majority of the citizens in the Stockholm region and local and national politicians, but also a conflict between the social democratic government and the social democrats governing the town district of Stockholm. How this story will end is still an open question. Concerning the housing situation there is now sign of a permanent change. An upward economic trend may stimulate the construction of new houses, but without institutional changes in the housing market it is difficult to see a solution to the housing problem in Stockholm. At present there seems to be no political pressure for such institutional changes. The picture of metropolitan regions in Sweden is contradictory. On the one hand, a new urban policy that has not addressed growth issues, low investment in infrastructure and housing and a financial drainage of the metropolitan regions. On the other hand, three metropolitan regions that show a strong economic performance in the second part of the 1990s. Obviously, urban development in Sweden is not only determined by public policy. Autonomous processes exert a decisive influence on the development pattern. In the second part of the 1990s these autonomous processes were strong enough to overcome existing barriers to metropolitan growth. So far the new metropolitan policy has not provided the promised foundations for sustainable growth in the metropolitan regions.

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References Andersson, R. (2002), ‘The Swedish Area-based Urban Strategy – Some Critical Remarks’, in Urban Futures Anthology, Stockholm: Storstadskansliet, Näringsde-partementet. Goverment Bill (1997/98), ‘Development and Justice – a Policy for the 21st Century’, 165. Goverment Bill (2001/02), ‘A Policy for Economic Growth and Vital Force in all the Country’, 4. Lind, H. (1999), ‘Ekonomiska aspekter’ (Economic Aspects), in Institutes of Housing Yearbook 1999, Stockholm. Maskell, P. and Törnqvist, G. (1999), Building a Cross-border Learning Region. Emergence of the North European Øresund Region, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press. Ministry of Justice (2003), Budget Bill 2004. Nilsson. J.-E. (1992), ‘Relocation of State Agencies as a Strategy for Urban Development: The Swedish Case’, Scandinavian Housing and Planning Research 9, pp. 113–18. SOU (1990), Stostadsliv. Rika mökligheter – hårda krav (Big City Life Rich Opportunities – Exacting Demands), 36. SOU (1991), Storstadens trafiksystem – Överenskommelser och miljö i stockholms-, göteborgs- och malmöregionerna (The traffic system in Big Cities. Agreements and environment in the Stockholm-, Göteborg- and Mamö regions), 19. SOU (2003), Gemensamt finansierad utjämning i kommunsektorn (Jointly Financed Equalisation in the Municipal Sector), 88. Swedish Association of Local Authorities and the Swedish Federation of County Councils (1993), Regional Development in Sweden. Törnqvist, G. (2002), Science at the Cutting Edge. The Future of the Øresund Region, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.

Chapter 18

United Kingdom: The Changing Landscape of English Urban Policy Michael Parkinson1

18.1

The Changing Landscape of English Urban Policy

Urban policy in England has undergone a number of important changes since the previous report was written in 1997. In that year a Labour government replaced a Conservative government and there have been major shifts in policy priorities, principles and practices. The government has abandoned many – although not all – of the key principles of the previous Conservative government’s policies. The consequences of the policy shifts are still being worked out. But they make urban policy in England rather different in 2004 than it was in 1997. The National Spatial Development Pattern The UK was the first urbanised country in the world. Half its population lived in urban areas as early as the 1850s and at the time of writing over 80 per cent of the population live there. But in the UK, as in the rest of the Union, it is not simple to define a city. In addition administrative boundaries of cities do not correspond well with economic and social realities. It is also difficult to distinguish between cities in terms of size or economic and social need. There is a hierarchy of scale, contribution and need rather than a simple division between ‘large cities’ and ‘the rest’. Urban policy has always recognised that many cities outside the largest should be the target of urban policy so resources have not been concentrated upon the largest. However, it is sensible to use the following classification: 1) London, which is the largest and most important economically; 2) the eight large Core Cities Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Sheffield, which have typically been industrial and manufacturing based cities undergoing economic restructuring; 3) the 28 other metropolitan districts; and 4) nine large non-metropolitan cities. However, the first two categories have been the largest and most important types of cities in the UK and present the greatest challenges and opportunities. They have become an increasingly important focus of policy debate under the Labour government. In particular concern with the 1

European Institute for Urban Affairs, Liverpool John Moores University.

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economic roles and relationships between the London and the eight Core Cities and their actual and potential contribution to the national economy has grown enormously. This theme is discussed at greater length in section 18.4. Key Trends Affecting Cities There are four important trends to appreciate: •

•

• •

Economic restructuring. The changing international economy means that many of the larger industrial cities, especially their inner areas lost economic activity and jobs during the 1960 to mid-1990s. With the exception of London, cities did less well economically than non-urban areas. Counter-urbanisation. The second key trend was the loss of population as people moved from large urban to suburban, smaller urban and rural areas, although this has slowed down in recent years. Social polarisation. This loss of population also skewed the social composition of cities and increased social polarisation within them. The dominance of London. London dominates the English urban system – economically, institutionally, politically and culturally, far more than any capital city in Europe including France.

These trends essentially mean that, since the 1970s, all cities have been experiencing challenges of economic decline, loss of population and growing social inequalities in comparison non-urban areas. But the larger northern industrial cities outside London and the southeast have experienced particular difficulties. However, as a later section makes clear, since the mid-1990s there has been a process of urban renaissance in which many of those cities have begun to improve their economic and social performance, even though many challenges remain. In many ways urban policy in England has reflected that renaissance and widened its focus beyond social challenges to that of maximising cities’ contribution to national economic competitiveness The scale of changes in the largest urban areas can be seen in Table 18.1. It shows that the loss of population continues until 2001 but at a slower rate in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Key Features of the Administrative and Financial Framework Powerful centre – weak periphery First central government is relatively powerful and local government is relatively weak with relatively few financial resources. Its tax base is restricted and about 85 per cent of its income comes from national government grants. Local government has probably been weakened by national policies and priorities during the past two decades.

Table 18.1 Population change since 1981 for England’s main conurbations and principal cities Area

Population

Change 1981–1991

1991–2001

1981

1991

2001

000s

000s

000s

000s

%

000s

%

18159.1

17913.9

18183.9

–245.2

–1.35

270.0

1.51

6805.6

6829.3

7307.9

23.7

0.35

478.6

7.01

11353.5 2619.1 1522.2 1317.1 1155.2 2673.1 2066.8

11084.6 2553.6 1438.0 1288.7 1123.8 2618.8 2061.7

10876.0 2512.3 1365.6 1266.5 1077.9 2570.1 2083.6

–268.9 –65.5 –84.2 –28.4 –31.4 –54.3 –5.1

–2.37 –2.50 –5.53 –2.16 –2.72 –2.03 –0.25

–208.6 –41.2 –72.4 –22.2 –45.9 –48.7 21.9

–1.88 –1.62 –5.03 –1.72 –4.08 –1.86 1.06

4229.4 1020.6 401.2 717.9 517.0 462.7 284.1 278.2 547.8

4086.2 1004.5 392.2 706.7 475.6 432.7 275.0 279.4 520.1

3989.5 985.9 383.7 715.6 442.3 418.6 261.1 269.2 513.1

–143.2 –16.1 –9.0 –11.2 –41.4 –30.0 –9.1 1.2 –27.7

–3.39 –1.58 –2.25 –1.56 –8.01 –6.48 –3.20 0.45 –5.06

–96.7 –18.6 –8.5 8.9 –33.3 –14.1 –13.9 –10.2 –7.0

–2.42 –1.85 –2.16 1.26 –7.00 –3.26 –5.05 –3.65 –1.35

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Narrow urban boundaries – no metropolitan wide government Second there are no metropolitan levels of government. The largest cities did have such governments until the Conservative government in the 1980s abolished them. It is frequently argued that this lack of wider administrative government means that cities cannot respond coherently to the economic and social changes which are taking place across the wider urban areas but which fall beyond the administrative control of relatively tightly drawn local government boundaries. Limited regional organisations There has been little regional administration let alone regional government in England. However this now changing. There are Regional Offices of Government in the nine regions of England, there are important Regional Development Agencies responsible for economic development in those regions. And there are plans to create elected Regional Assemblies if there is public demand for them through referenda in 2004. Complex urban governance The proliferation of decision-making and administrative agencies responsible for delivering urban services means that there is no longer urban government but urban governance. The precise pattern has varied during the period as different governments created or abolished special agencies to deal with aspects of education, training, transport, community development, economic development in neighbourhoods, cities and their surrounding regions. But typically in any large city there is now a proliferation of agencies involved in delivering urban policy including local government, Government Offices in the Regions, Regional Development Agencies, Local Skills Councils, Urban Regeneration Companies, Local Strategic Partnerships, Education Action Zones, New Deal for Communities, Neighbourhood Management, Housing Action Trusts, Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders. Each operates with different responsibilities and functions, different boundaries, different sources of income and have a different mix of elected and appointed members. Views differ whether this institutional complexity policy generates flexibility or confusion at the heart of policy. The Labour government has recently attempted to rationalise and limit the growth of such bodies though its Regional Coordination Unit to rationalise the position. But despite this a Parliamentary Select Committee recently argued that the costs of complexity still far outweigh the benefits and simpler patterns of policy-making in cities are desirable. It has also been argued that this pattern of overlapping responsibilities for urban affairs is replicated at the centre of government with many national government departments having responsibility for urban areas but with limited overlap in their priorities, policies and practices in cities. The key phrase of government is joined-up government. But the picture so far remains more of fragmented government.

United Kingdom

18.2

383

National Urban Policies until 1997

An explicit urban policy for England has existed since the late 1960s and has had to confront an enduring set of questions: • • • • • • •

What is the target of policy – inner city problems or wider urban challenges? Is the problem economic, social or environmental – or some combination of all three? What is the right balance of power between national and local government? What is the best mix of public, private and community intervention? Should social need or economic opportunity determine policy priorities and the flow of national resources to cities? How can government get an integrated approach to cities? Are competition and partnership mutually reinforcing or mutually exclusive ways of delivering urban policy?

Between 1979 and 1997, the Conservative government had a distinctive approach to those questions. Most significant, it was anxious to marketise state services – to reduce the role of the public sector and increase that of the private sector in relation to cities. And they reduced many of local authorities’ powers and resources. For example education, housing, social services, transport and environmental maintenance were privatised or opened up to competitive tendering. Local control over revenue and capital spending was reduced and the level of national financial support was reduced. Many new actors from the private and community sector became involved in delivering urban services and urban regeneration, perhaps most Urban Development Corporations and Housing Action Trusts. As a result, during this period there was: • • • • •

declining public expenditure for cities; highly fragmented local service provision; a reduced role for local government; an explicit national urban policy agenda which was not clearly linked to mainstream government programmes which affected cities; resources were increasingly allocated less on the basis of need and more as a result of competition between urban areas.

These principles were enshrined in many policy initiatives during the Conservative government’s period of office. Probably the two most important during the 1990s were City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget, major area-based initiatives designed to encourage regeneration in the most deprived areas of UK cities. There was some support for amongst cities for some of those principles involved. For example, cities felt that such policies had encouraged greater integration of departments and funding, a partnership and a regional

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

384

approach and a more effective use of public money. However there were specific concerns that: • • • •

the concentration of resources was being diluted by spreading money across to many small projects; the explicit urban programme was larger but expenditure on mainstream programmes for cities was actually reduced; not all departments were committed to supporting urban regeneration competition was an inappropriate way to allocate resources to cities, possible rewarding better off places, which could make good bids than areas which really needed support.

The current government has addressed some of these concerns. But they remain important themes for current policy, as we shall see in later sections. 18.3

The State of the Cities

What is the Opportunity and What is the Challenge for Cities? During the past decade there has been sea change in the perceptions of cities. After two decades of economic and demographic decline, the idea that cities are not economic basket cases – but the dynamos of the UK national economy – has seized the imagination of politicians, researchers and business. It has been an increasingly significant dimension of national policy. There is growing interest in the contribution that cities can make to the national welfare – and to economic competitiveness in particular. But how that contribution can be maximised remains a big policy challenge. Some light has been thrown on the issues by policy and research work done for the government which is working with the eight large Core Cities and the nine Regional Development Agencies to find ways of making cities drive urban renaissance and improve economic competitiveness at national and regional level. This agenda also marks a widening in national focus from issues of social exclusion or environmental decline to issues of urban economic competitiveness. This has been driven by concerns that the Core Cities: are not punching their weight economically in the national context; are falling behind London; lack the right mix of responsibilities and resources to improve their performance; are not as competitive, and do not make as great contribution to the national economic welfare, as do comparable cities in continental Europe. What does the evidence show? Fewer people are leaving and some more are moving into Core Cities. Nearly four million people live in the Core Cities. The 2001 Census showed that the Core Cities are still struggling to retain their population with all the Core Cities except Leeds experiencing a fall in total population between 1991 and 2001. However,

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the rate of population decline is slowing and in several places the trend is starting to be reversed. More people are working in the Core Cities. More than 2 million people now work in the Core Cities, a figure that has increased steadily since the mid-1990s – up by 7.5 per cent between 1995 and 2001. The Core Cities act as regional employment centres, accounting for a higher proportion of their regions’ total employment than population. People in Core Cities are earning higher wages. Full-time gross average earnings increased in the Core Cities by 15 per cent between 1997 and 2002. In all the Core Cities average earnings are now higher than their regional average. Unemployment has fallen dramatically in the past seven years. Claimant unemployment rates in the Core Cities are down – from 9.2 per cent in 1996 to 4.3 per cent in 2003. Despite this improvement the claimant count unemployment rate for the Core Cities remains 1.7 percentage points above the rate for England, a difference that has persisted for the last five years. There are fewer people in poverty. Between 1996 and 2000 the number of households in the Core Cities in receipt of poverty benefits fell by 18 per cent –107,000 fewer households were in receipt of these types of benefit. Most of the Core Cities are outperforming their regions in terms of falling numbers of poverty claimants. Rising house prices are a further sign of economic buoyancy and in the Core Cities house prices are up. Property now tends to be more expensive than the regional average. The Core Cities are becoming safer. Over the last five years reported crime has fallen in all but one of the metropolitan areas surrounding the Core Cities. And in most Core Cities the number of reported crimes has fallen faster than the English or metropolitan averages. Educational attainment is not good, but it is getting better. Historically the number of young people living in cities and attaining qualifications has been lower than the national and regional average. Since 1994 all the Core Cities have made significant improvements in their educational performance. Whilst all Core Cities experienced improvements, improvements have also been made at the national level. This means that despite the improved pass rate the Core Cities are yet to make any significant impact on the difference between their performance and the National average. But despite progress problems remain. In many spheres their performance still lags behind regional and national performance and social problems remain concentrated in urban areas. The process of urban renaissance has begun and Core Cities have come through the worst of economic restructuring. However, national policy is intended to make English cities as economically competitive as the most successful cities in Europe. What is the evidence here? The answer is English cities are lagging in terms of wealth, educational qualifications, innovation, and demographic trends and standing in the eyes of the private sector.

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

386

English Core Cities Compared with the Leaders in Europe Urban wealth Recent government research on GDP per capita shows how far English cities lag behind. Of the top 50 in Europe, capital cities tend to be at the top of the league table. Large cities tend to do well. German cities, despite the country’s current economic difficulties, perform very well with 15 out of the top 25. The Core Cities do not perform well. Bristol and Leeds, at 34 and 43 respectively, perform best. But several are at the bottom of the list. The majority of Core Cities have GDPs less than one-third of the richest cities in Europe. Figure 18.1 shows the Core Cities in comparison with some leading European cities. GDP per capita (€) 2001 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 Liverpool

Barcelona

Lille

Newcastle

Manchester

Birmingham

Turin

Toulouse

Leeds

Rotterdam

Lyon

Dortmund

Bristol

Milan

Helsinki

Stockholm

Amsterdam

Stuttgart

Copenhagen

Munich

Frankfurt

0

Figure 18.1 GDP of sample of European non-capital cities Source: Barclays plc, 2002.

Urban innovation The European Innovation Scoreboard has seven indicators: tertiary education; participation in life-long learning; employment in medium/ high-tech manufacturing; employment in high tech services; public R&D expenditure; business R&D expenditure; high-tech patent. Looking across the top 50 urban regions, even though the precise ranking varies, a familiar pattern emerges. Northern European cities and countries perform well – Sweden, Finland, The Netherlands and Germany. Few southern European cities perform well, except for Madrid. German cities as a group perform well. From the UK only London and the southeast make the top 10. Of the Core Cities, Bristol leads. But the remainder falls in the bottom 25, with innovation scores about half that of the high performing regions. Figure 18.2 compares Core City Regions with leading European regions. Urban educational standards In terms of the qualifications of the workforce of cities in their regional context, a familiar pattern emerges. Northern European

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European Innovation Scoreboard 2002: EU Regions 250 200 150 100 50

Nord-pas-de-Calais (Lille)

Northumb.T&W (Newcastle)

Yorks. and Humberside (Leeds)

Arnsberg (Dortmund)

Catalonia (Barcelona)

East Midlands (Nottingham)

Northwest (Liverpool)

Northwest (Manchester)

Noord-Holland (Amsterdam)

West Midlands (Birmingham)

Darmstadt (Frankfurt)

Zuid-Holland (Rotterdam)

Piemonte (Turin)

Lombardy (Milan)

Rhone-Alps (Lyon)

Southwest (Bristol)

Midi Pyrenees (Tolouse)

Stuttgart

Oberbayern (Munich)

Uusimaa (Helsinki)

0

Figure 18.2 European Innovation Scoreboard Source: European Innovation Scoreboard Technical Paper No 3 EU Regions (2002).

cities, especially German ones, perform well. Bristol and Leeds perform best of the Core Cities. But again the majority congregate at the bottom part of the league table, as Figure 18.3 shows. The Core Cities, which have been under-performing economically in relation to their counterparts in Europe, have also been losing people. By contrast the majority of the more economically successful cities have actually been gaining population. The big picture is clear. Continental cities are becoming more attractive to live in, as Core Cities apparently have become less so. One important dimension of cities’ competitiveness is their relative attractiveness to business and private sector investors. The Healey and Baker city survey lists the cities, which during the last decade have been seen by over 500 business people and private sector investors as the best 30 in Europe in which to locate a business. In important respects these subjective surveys confirm what our comparative quantitative data have already shown. First the global cities of London and Paris are rated the best. Second capital cities in general are the most attractive. Third, only one Core City, Manchester, made it into the top 30. The cities that we have identified as having the highest GDP, highest innovation levels, more skilled workforces, better external connections are frequently seen by the private sector as the best places in which to locate. They do not normally include English cities, except London.

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

388

Percentage of population (25–64 years) with third level education (2000) 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 Gloucestershire (Bristol)

West Midlands (Birmingham)

West Yorks. (Leeds)

Derbyshire and Notts.

Greater Manchester

Merseyside (Liverpool)

Stockholm

Northumb.T&W (Newcastle)

Zuid-Holland (Rotterdam)

Noord-Holland (Amsterdam)

Piemonte (Turin)

Lombardy (Milan)

Rhone-Alps (Lyon)

Midi Pyrenees (Tolouse)

Uusimaa (Helsinki)

Nord-pas-de-Calais (Lille)

Catalonia (Barcelona)

Amsberg (Dortmund)

Denmark (Copenhagen)

Oberbayern (Munich)

Darmstadt (Frankfurt)

Stuttgart

0

Figure 18.3 Urban educational standards Source: Eurostat, Regions, Statistical Yearbook 2002.

It is clear that, despite their relative renaissance in recent years, many English large cities lag behind their competitors in terms of GDP, innovation levels, educational levels, connectivity, social cohesion, quality of life, political capacity and connections with their wider territories. Crucially, they lag in the eyes of international investors. In contrast to their successful continental counterparts, many UK cities are a drain upon national economic competitiveness. This remains a fundamental challenge to UK cities and to national policy. 18.4

Urban Policies Under the Labour Government 1997–2004

There has been an enormous amount of activity and change in urban policy in England during the seven years between 1997–2004. There has been a large number of independent and government reports assessing the conditions and prospects of English cities. The most notable include: Lord Rogers Task Force on Urban Renaissance in 1998, which focused upon the quality of urban living in England; the Government’s own White Paper, ‘Better Towns and Cities: Delivering an Urban Renaissance’; the National Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy and the Sustainable Communities Plan. There have been White Papers and Green Papers on housing, planning, regional government and local government. A number of

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themes run through these policy documents. In particular the realisation that large cities are not economic drains but potential dynamos of the national economy has become an increasingly important thread of national policy. However, although economic competitiveness is perhaps the most visible dimension of urban policy it is not the only ambition of policy. Achieving social cohesion and encouraging livability and sustainability are also important goals. Also although crucial, the large cities are not the only focus on policy. Regions and neighbourhoods also have had particular attention and smaller and medium-sized cities are also regarded as important. Cities as Economic Drivers not Liabilities Most importantly, the Labour government sees cities as economic opportunities rather than liabilities and is committed to delivering an urban renaissance. In particular there is a growing recognition of the contribution that the larger cities could or should make to the national economic welfare. Changing the Balance of Power between Nation, Region, City and Neighbourhoods The balance of power between national, regional, local and neighbourhood governments and agencies is changing. For example, there have been efforts to improve working relationships and reduce potential conflicts between national government and cities. The level of national resources going to local authorities and cities has increased. Competition between cities for resources has been reduced. There have been attempts to reduce controls over local authorities while at the same time attempting to improve the delivery of urban mainstream services with agreed targets. There have been attempts to increase regional powers and responsibilities with new institutions like Regional Development Agencies, Regional Assemblies introduced and elected regional parliaments proposed. There has also been a sustained effort to improve the economic and social prospects for deprived neighbourhoods. There has been a growing recognition of the dilemmas of relying too heavily upon small area-based policy initiatives and of the importance of mainstream government programmes, which provide the bulk of public expenditure for cities. Reducing Sprawl, Suburbanisation and Encouraging Central City Sustainability There have been changes in planning for the provision of housing retail provision and transport to discourage suburbanisation and encourage the more concentrated use of old brownfield land in the core of urban areas rather than new greenfield areas in the suburbs and beyond. There is also greater awareness of the importance of livability in cities with awareness of the importance of architectural, environmental and the social quality of life.

390

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Managing Housing Markets There has been growing recognition of the different housing pressures in different regions of the country. The economically deprived northern regions have an oversupply of affordable housing while the overheating southeast and London have major undersupplies, which has different and difficult major economic and social consequences. A new policy for Sustainable Communities and new initiatives, Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders have been created to tackle this regional mismatch of urban housing. Improving Joined-Up Policy Delivery There have been important attempts to link the activities of different government departments by giving them joint targets for delivering improved urban performance. The Government’s Urban Targets These broad ambitions are reflected in the priorities of the government department responsible for delivering urban policy, which since 2002 has been a new department – the Office of the Deputy Prime Minster (ODPM). ODPM has responsibility for local government, housing, planning, social exclusion, neighbourhoods and regions and sustainable communities. In its own words its broad target is to encourage the achievement of ‘thriving, inclusive and sustainable communities’, which means that ‘economic prosperity and social justice go hand in hand’. That philosophy is broken into three broad objectives and seven specific agreed Public Service Agreement targets which were specified in the recent review of public spending in 2002. They give a clear indication of the range, scale and key priorities of national policy. Since they link policy ambitions to public money and specific actions, they are worth rehearsing in some detail. Objective I – to work with the full range of government departments and policies to raise the levels of social inclusion, neighbourhood renewal and regional prosperity. It has two targets. •

•

PSA 1: to promote better policy integration across all government departments and in particular to help them meet the PSA targets to achieve minimum standards floor targets for neighbourhood renewal and social inclusion. PSA 2: to make sustainable improvements in the economic performance of all English regions and over time reduce the persistent gap in growth rates between the regions. This important regional target is jointly owned with two other very powerful government departments, the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry.

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Objective II – to provide for effective devolved decision-making within a framework of national targets and policies. It has two targets. • •

PSA 3: to provide an opportunity for a referendum on regional government in regions where there is demand for it. PSA 4: to improve delivery and value for money of local services by introducing comprehensive performance assessments and action plans and securing progressive improvement in authorities scores.

Objective III – to deliver effective programmes to help raise the quality of life for all urban areas and other communities. It has three targets: •

• •

PSA 5: to achieve a better balance between housing availability and the demand for housing in all English regions while protecting valuable countryside around our towns, cities and in the green belt. PSA 6: to have all local planning authorities complete local development frameworks by 2006. PSA 7: by 2010, bring all social housing into decent conditions with most of this improvement taking place in deprived areas and increase the proportion of private housing in decent condition by vulnerable groups.

Sustainable Communities Plan The most important single statement of the policy in relation to urban areas was made at the beginning of 2003 in the Sustainable Communities Plan. Primarily the plan is designed to tackle the shortage of affordable housing in the southeast, low demand for housing primarily in the north and the quality of public spaces generally. It involved a substantial increase of resources – £22 billion over three years. The plan has several key elements. •

•

• • •

Addressing housing shortages. Government plans to do this by accelerating housing provision, ensuring that proposed housing in the southeast was delivered, accelerating growth in four areas of the southeast which deliver 300,000 extra jobs and 200,000 extra homes and ensuring construction industry has the right skills to deliver; investing £5 billion in affordable housing and tackling homelessness. Addressing low demand and abandonment in the north. Nine Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders have been given £500 million to try to restructure housing markets in the north where there are 1 million abandoned houses. Improving the quality of social housing, which will receive £2.8 billion. Specifying ways to improve the local environment of all communities, which will get £200 million. Protecting the countryside. The majority of new housing is to be built upon previously used land rather than unused land. And high densities will be encouraged to prevent sprawl and waste of virgin land.

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

How will Government Policy be Delivered? There have been some important organisational changes within government to help achieve these ambitious cross cutting targets. Four are worth mentioning. The Sustainable Communities Delivery Unit is responsible for delivering the Sustainable Communities Plan. The Regional Coordination Unit is responsible for drawing together the work of the nine Government Offices in the Regions. It has been directly involved in developing the Sustainable Communities Plan, working with the assessment of local authorities, producing regional economic performance indicators, reviewing and rationalising the number of small areabased initiatives in cities as well as in producing a White Paper on regional governance. The Neighbourhood Renewal Unit is responsible for narrowing the gap between deprived areas and the rest of the country. It works to achieve specific targeted improvements in jobs, education, health, crime – trying to mobilise long-term mainstream government resources rather than simply limits area-based indicatives. But it does also have responsibility delivering improvements in 88 of the most deprived neighbourhoods in the country through its New Deal for Communities Plans which targets special and mainstream resources on those deprived areas through its national strategy for neighbourhood renewal. The Social Exclusion Unit is meant to reduce social exclusion in England. It works on specific projects and initiatives drawing on research, external advice, good practice and the experience of the socially excluded responsible for helping key excluded groups and areas. The Urban Policy Directorate is responsible for integrating the key elements of the new urban policy. What changes have taken place? There has been much achieved in trying to modernise and improve the performance of local government. There has been a fundamental shift in planning guidance, which means that urban areas are targeted ahead of suburban areas for development. There have been efforts to simplify and speed up the planning process. There have been considerable efforts to strengthen regional organisation and performance. Nine Regional Development Agencies are responsible for economic development in their regions and they have been given increased freedom in the way they use their budgets by national government. Referenda on directly elected assemblies are planned in several regions. The dialogue between local and national government in general and between national government and large cities in particular has improved. Resources going to local authorities have substantially increased during the past seven years and are currently planned to be 25 per cent higher than when Labour took power in 1997. There has been a comprehensive package of fiscal measures designed to increase investment in cities including tax incentives and discounts to clean up contaminated land, creating houses above shops, the renovation of derelict properties. There has been some progress in introducing increased flexibilities for local authorities and cities. There has been a major focus on improving the

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performance of the most deprived neighbourhoods in England, many of which are in the large cities. Fourteen New Urban Regeneration Companies have been set up to encourage development in deprived urban areas. Seven Millennium Communities have been created to explore energy efficient sustainable mixed-use communities. The focus upon quality of urban design has been increased by the creation of the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment which has received increased funding to drive up quality standards. There has been some rationalisation of the numbers of small area-based initiatives. Local Strategic Partnerships, which involve a variety of stakeholders, have been encouraged and financially supported in all local authorities – but especially the most deprived 88 neighbourhoods – to develop local strategic plans for the use of all public resources. Such neighbourhoods have also received a raft of initiative funded by national government through New Deal for Communities, Community Chests, neighbourhood wardens and neighbourhood management. Research and evaluation The government is especially concerned with understanding the impacts of public resources on urban areas, partly because of its wider concern with what works and partly to get improved value for money. As a consequence the government has been noted for the extent of review, research and monitoring it has undertaken. Virtually all major policy initiatives have independent evaluations attached to them. This has meant that it does have a much better evidence base than previous governments. The government held a major international Urban Summit in 2002 designed to take stock of its achievements in the first five years in office. It is currently planning a major state of the cities report that will provide detailed evidence of progress, failures and policy recommendations. And there is informal evidence that research and evaluation does influence the scope of policy. However, the other side of the coin is that that cities sometimes feel that the national concerns with targets and assessment mean that cities are more constrained in their actions, and more subject to national control than they should be. What contribution do large cities make to policymaking? This issue often raises difficulties. Small and medium-sized cities, as well as non-urban areas argue that they are as important to the country as large cities. A national government feels it has to represent all areas of the country. The White Paper on Urban Policy, even-handedly tried to argue that towns are as important as cities. Nevertheless, this chapter has already argued that in recent years a change in perception of the economic potential of cities and of large cities in particular has changed their relative political status. In particular, it can be argued that although much growth and development continues to take place in the southeast of the country whereas most of the large cities are in the north, there is a growing recognition that large cities ought to be a more important part of governed policy. This can be seen in variety of ways. The government has been more involved in a dialogue with the

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Core Cities, encouraging them to work together and to develop more strategic plans for their development. There are working parties attempting to increase the contribution that the large cities can make to regional economic performance, which is the formal quantitative goal of government policy rather than improving urban performance. However, the jury on government policy is out Urban policy in England remains a moving target. While some important policy principles have emerged, there remain some tensions between them. The way in which they interact to shape the operation of the policy-making system – indeed the way they will affect the challenges and opportunities of cities – is still unclear. There is a greater willingness to help the cause of cities, but their future remains uncertain. What are the Continuing Concerns about Current Urban Policy? Many of the changes in policy have been welcomed by urban areas and by the large cities in particular. But there are still some unresolved tensions. These would include: Singing from the same hymn sheet? There is still some concern that not all major government departments are as committed to the urban renaissance as is the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. In particular the Department of Trade and Industry and the Treasury have not been as committed to the cause of cities and brownfield renewal. And there is some evidence that large cities and local authorities generally have got their policies better integrated than have government departments at the centre of power. Creativity or confusion in the regions? There is a welcome for the growing regionalisation of power in England, with responsibility for more decisions being placed away from the centre. However, there are continuing concerns that the Government Offices in the Regions which have responsibility for social policy in the cities do not connect well enough with the Regional Development Agencies, which have responsibility for economic development. More generally, there is a concern that regional policy itself is not that powerful and has less resources invested in it than it did two decades ago. Closing the regional divide Most of the largest cities are in the north. But most economic development has taken place in the southeast and London. Despite the government’s commitment to the principle of urban renaissance and its commitment to encourage slow growing regions to catch up with the fastest growing, there is still a feeling that it is not yet taking enough actions to actively reverse the flow on investment and people to the southeast and improve the economic fortunes of the largest cities in the north. There are concerns that many of the drivers of a modern economic and urban competitiveness – investment,

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transport infrastructure, innovation, research and development, universities still favour the more successful southeast. Grown-up government The relations between national government and local authorities and cities have become better under Labour. But there are still concerns that the centre is too anxious to control local government to ensure that it meets national targets for increased efficiency. There is a tension at the heart of government about how much discretion is best given to local authorities to achieve greatest effectiveness and efficiency. Cities might wish to see a more outcome driven strategy with contractual relationships between cities and the government and rather less micro control of what they do. Is bigger more beautiful? There are continuing concerns about scale and size. The larger cities argue that since they contain the majority of challenges and opportunities they should receive different treatment than other places. This is controversial with many. But the large cities still want further evidence that the national government really does have a clear strategy to promote their economic renaissance and is willing to invest the long-term resources and commitment required to achieve it. In particular, the cities argue that they are the way in which the government can achieve its target of improving regional economic performance. But there remains some difference of view on these issues. Fiscal incentives – more work needed It is admitted that the government has provided some fiscal incentives to encourage urban investment. However, there remains an important anomaly in that tax upon development in brownfield site in the core areas of cities is still taxed much more heavily than development in the greenfield sites. There remains important tension about the failure to change this anomaly, which is seen by many as an incentive for sprawl rather than central renaissance. Too many special initiatives? Equally there is some agreement that the government has begun the process of limiting or rationalising the number of different initiatives that impact upon cities. But, as under the previous Conservative administration, there is still a feeling that local authorities have lost too many powers and the provision at local level is too fragmented. Connecting economy territory and governance Related to the concern about the fragmentation of local decision-making there is a concern that the government has still not yet got the right balance between neighbourhoods, cities, subregions and regions. At present government have policies for those different spatial levels. But they do not clearly interconnect. There is a continuing debate about the best way in which city regional relationships can be encouraged. The most common

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assumption is that this should be encouraged dot take place on a voluntary basis. But this remains a continuing challenge for cities, regions and government. Europe and English Cities Until 1997, cities and national government took a different view about the value of European urban policies. In general, cities liked European programmes because they gave them an alternative sources of revenue as national spending on cities was reduced. It also gave them an alternative route to power as the national government was trying to reduce their powers and responsibilities. The Conservative national government did not welcome European intervention for similar reasons. The current Labour government has been less opposed to the principle of European intervention. However, it remains unpersuaded that Europe has a great deal to offer in the field of urban policy. What has been the impact of European policies? Many regions in England have benefited from Objective 1 and 2 status and have therefore received substantial sums of European funding. A number of cities have also benefited from the Urban Initiative in Rounds and 2. What has been the experience? There have been some perceived advantages of European policy: • • • • •

it has required local authorities and urban areas to take a more strategic view of their areas and encouraged the principles of partnership; such programmes have also encouraged community participation in urban decision-making; it has encouraged a more integrated approach to decision-making; it has encouraged a more long-term approach to decision-making; it has encouraged the modernisation of urban economies with an increasing focus upon innovation. The problems are both of principle and practice:

• • • •

the sums of money involved are relatively small, especially in urban areas. They are not large enough for the scale of challenges involved; the system is slow and bureaucratic; there is not a good enough fit between ERDF and ESF programmes; there is a feeling that England and the UK have, in any case, been in the lead in developing integrated, partnership based approaches to urban problems and that URBAN is not very innovative.

There are two major issues about regional and urban policy. First, there has been enormous controversy because many government grants to urban areas designed to finance regeneration projects by providing incentives for private sector investment have been outlawed by DG Competition on the grounds they are state aids. The UK government has had to abandon a whole package of

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investment programmes during the past years because of this. This has soured the view of EU policy. The second important issue concerns the future of regional policy after 2006. Essentially, the UK government takes the view that there is no rationale for the EU to be involved in urban and regional policies outside the accession countries, since it will essentially consist of recycling small sums of money between the richer states in an inefficient way. They essentially take the view that regional and urban policy should be renationalised. That notion is not popular with regions and cities, however. They still value the guarantee of European funds as well remaining committed to the principle that Europe is about more than market forces. They believe that Europe should continue to play a major part in encouraging the social cohesion as well as the economic competitiveness of cities and regions in Europe. At present it is not clear how these issues will be resolved. But is clear that whatever happens, European resources for English cities will be much reduced after 2006 and that therefore their significance is likely to decline even further. 17.5

Conclusions

This chapter has shown that the landscape of urban policy has changed significantly since the election of a Labour government in 1997. It is still to soon to see how these changes will impact upon urban areas in the longer term but important shifts are taking place. Some long-term structural trends remain the same: economic restructuring; counter-urbanisation, social polarisation and the continuing dominance of London remain. Some key institutional features have not changed: a powerful centre and weak periphery; the lack of metropolitan government; limited regional organisations and increasingly complex urban governance. However, there has been growing recognition by national government that cities – and the big cities in particular – are the drivers of national and regional economies and a growing concern to increase their economic competitiveness, especially outside the globally successful city of London. In some ways the larger cities have improved their economic and social performance during the past seven years, even if many of them have a long way to go to match London. However, despite their relative improvement, English cities do still lag behind their European counterparts in terms of wealth, levels of innovation, educational standards, connectivity and attractiveness to international investors. But there have been important policy changes since Labour took office. There is less support for the principle of competition in allocating resources. National money for cities has increased. There has been a growth in regional organisations and powers. There have been attempts to change the balance of power between national government, the regions, cities and neighbourhoods. There has been an attempt to reduce suburbanisation and sprawl, to speed up planning and to join

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up departmental policies. There has been increased investment in the evaluation of national government policies. There have been institutional changes to attempt to streamline the delivery and effectiveness of policy with a range of new policy instruments. There is growing recognition of the need to integrate more closely regional and urban policy. There has been a greater recognition of the need to close the gap in economic performance between the affluent south east of the country and the remainder and to intervene to better manage housing markets in different regions of the country. There has been growing recognition of the need for cities to form regional alliances if they are to punch their weight in a European context. Europe has made a modest contribution to the development of some policy principles – partnership, integration, and community involvement. But the principles have not been that novel in the English context, the resources not that large and the impact not that great. European funds are liable to reduce in future and so will their political significance encouraged by the government wish to renationalise European urban and regional policies. The policy signs are promising. But the jury remains out on some questions. Are all the departments of government outside the lead Department the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister committed to an urban renaissance? Is the division of powers and responsibilities between national, regional and city governments right? Do cities have enough powers, responsibilities and resources to maximise their performance. Is enough being done to close the gap in the economic performance of cities in the southeast and the rest of the country? But despite those questions, urban policy is further up the political agenda in the UK than it been for many years. The next five years will be an important test of national policy to sustain the regeneration of England’s cities.

Chapter 19

Synthesis 19.1

Introduction

This final chapter synthesises the main trends and developments with regard to national urban policies in the 15 ‘old’ member states of the EU. What is the state of the art concerning national urban policies and what has changed since 1997? The basis of this synthesis is an extensive comparison of the 15 national reports written by experts from the member states. The comparative investigation should lead to answers to the following questions: 1 What do national and regional authorities consider to be major issues for a desired development of ‘their’ larger cities? 2 What important changes have recently taken place in national policy responses to cope with these major issues? 3 What role is attributed to European policy with respect to urban development and urban policy-making? These questions have been discussed in each of the 15 national reports and determine the structure of the synthesis. The analysis in section 19.2 refers to the first question. We examine the ‘State of the European Cities’: what has changed compared with the mid-1990s and what are currently the major urban issues? Next, in sections 19.3 and 19.4, we take a closer look at question 2. Section 19.3 reviews the national urban policy responses since the mid-1990s for each member state. What are the (changes in) visions and strategies with respect to national urban policy-making? In section 19.4 we concentrate on a number of topics that appear to be of great interest in most of the member states. Key issues here are the (changing) balance of power between national and local authorities and the interaction between the national and local (or regional) level of government with regard to national urban policy-making. In addition, we discuss issues that concern the delivery of national urban policies (partnerships, civic involvement, integrated approach, area-based approach) and issues that are recurrent themes in the policies of the member states (housing and urban renewal, accessibility, integration of ethnic minorities, safety, fighting intraregional competition, opportunity based policies and other themes). The European influence on national urban policymaking and the appreciation of European urban policies is the topic of section 19.5 and refers to the third question outlined above. Finally, we summarise the major emerging trends in section 19.6.

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Before turning to section 19.2 we would like to remind the reader that this research builds upon the 1997 research. In that research we demonstrated that several factors explain the development of national urban policies in the member states, such as the degree of urbanisation, the presence of a number of large cities in a country, the administrative framework and financial system, the development phase at which countries and regions find themselves, and the emergence of typical large city problems. Consequently, some countries have more reasons to make city development a priority than others. For example in federal states, in countries where the local autonomy is very strong and in countries with a very limited number of large cities there might be few motives for a national focus on cities whereas the need for national attention to cities in highly urbanised countries might be much more likely. In this synthesis we will not recapitulate the 1997 situation. The results of the 1997 study are summarised in Chapter 2. The focus is on the developments since the mid-1990s and on the influence of EU policies. 19.2

The State of the European Cities

Section 19.2 is concerned with the position of the larger cities both nationally and in the EU. What is the state of the cities in the EU? What are the major urban issues? What are the major changes in comparison to the previous study carried out in 1997? Capital Cities are Major Contributors to Economic Growth One of the main changes since the first half of the 1990s is that the perception of cities has changed for the better as more and more member states indicate that cities are engines for their national economy. In the first half of the 1990s the role of cities as economic engines was also considered but the change in the perception gained momentum during the economic boom of the second half of the 1990 into the new millennium. In many member states, cities have been at the heart of that economic upswing. Cities have been major contributors to the higher national economic growth rates. That growth has stimulated the belief in the economic potential of cities. It is a particular group of cities that have been the drivers of growth. The national reports show that especially capital cities (for example, Amsterdam, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Lisbon, Paris, London, Helsinki and Stockholm) and other key cities well equipped for the knowledge economy (such as Munich, Milan and Barcelona) have been central in what could be called an urban renaissance.

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Economic Performance of Cities in Transition is Below the National Average At the same time the research also highlights the economic differences between cities across Europe and within the member states as well. Especially cities with an industrial past (for instance, in The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, United Kingdom and France), cities that are seen as peripheral (for example, in France, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom) or cities with a negative overall image experience difficulties and have benefited insufficiently from the favourable economic climate. The economic performance of these ‘cities in transition’ is systematically below the national average. The common denominator is the disadvantaged position of these cities in the knowledge economy (for instance concerning labour market supply) and consequently the significantly higher unemployment rates in these cities. The big question is how these cities will cope now that the economic tide has changed. Increasing Social Polarisation and Spatial Fragmentation Notwithstanding the differences in economic prosperity among cities in the member states, they all have to tackle persistent social problems. The international comparison clearly shows that this is the number one concern for cities. For decades, the issue of social exclusion has been linked to cities. Despite the economic growth of the late 1990s (some would argue because of the growth), social disparities within cities but also between city and region have widened. The prosperity in the well-to-do suburban areas or the gentrified inner city neighbourhoods is in sharp contrast with the poverty in city districts close to the centre or in suburban housing estates from the 1950s and 1960s. Immigration Puts High Demands on Cities Increasingly, the urban pockets of poverty have become the domain of immigrants and other ethic minorities (for instance in The Netherlands, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Denmark). Cities have been and are magnets to the flows of immigrants coming into the EU. The insufficient language skills and the generally poor levels of education of the majority of immigrants reduce their opportunities to fit into the labour market of the EU. In addition, the integration of immigrants and other ethnic minorities – fuelled by the developments of 9/11 – has become a major social issue as well. Given the preference of immigrants for the cities (affordable housing, bigger labour market and ethnic relations) the issue of integration of immigrants is first and foremost a concern for the cities of Europe.

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Urban Safety Urban safety has also gained priority in the aftermath of 9/11. This is not just concerned with the vulnerability of cities for terrorist activities. The events of 9/11 have heightened feelings of insecurity, which had been on the wax for some time. As a result, the public and political awareness for safety in general is greater in many member states (for instance The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy). Of course, cities have received special attention, as feelings of insecurity have been associated with cities throughout modern history. Urban safety has become a major issue both to fight the (sometimes) higher urban crime rates in some member states but also to reduce the feelings of insecurity. Suburbanisation Next to the social problems, there are a number of challenges that come with the continuous pattern of suburbanisation in most of the member states. The patterns and the magnitude of suburbanisation differ among urban areas in the member states. It is however an issue for most member states, also for those countries where central cities have shown population growth again. In most cases the suburbanisation is selective and reinforces the social polarisation and spatial fragmentation mentioned above. A central issue is that the transportation infrastructure is not designed to cope with the urban sprawl. In some countries, governments have done very little to match suburban development and transportation planning; but also member states where much has been done in this respect, find out that transportation planning cannot keep up with the pace of suburbanisation. In turn, this leads to the well-known problems with regard to congestion and related environmental (air) pollution. Another issue is sometimes the extensive and inefficient use of land that can be the result of uncontrolled suburbanisation, for instance in the metropolitan areas of Athens and Porto. However, there are some exceptions, such as Finland, where urbanisation forces are still dominant, and Eastern Germany, where the exodus of people to the Western part can hardly be called suburbanisation. Polycentric Urban Regions and City Centres It is important to understand that in many EU countries, suburbanisation in the twenty-first century is rather different from that of 1960s and 1970s. These patterns of suburbanisation fit in the rise of polycentric urban regions across the EU. People, jobs and companies leave the central city for suburban locations. These suburban locations develop into centres in their own right as nodes in an extensive urban network. The position of (former) central cities in these polycentric urban regions is changing; the rise of polycentric urban regions affect their city centres in particular as these suburban nodes compete with suburban shopping centres,

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business parks and housing developments. The role and competitiveness of city centres is a concern in several member states. Housing Another urban issue that is relevant in most of the member states is housing. In a number of countries the challenge is to sustain or increase the supply of housing in cities, in particular that of affordable housing. At the same time, the reports indicate that the context determines the particular need for housing (private versus public housing, planning, building regulations, financing, government interventions, etc.). It is also relevant where the affordable housing is needed, with the United Kingdom and Germany serving as good examples. Affordable housing is an issue in the southeast of the United Kingdom whereas restructuring is the challenge in the northern part of the country, with around a million abandoned houses. There is pressure on the housing market in successful cities in the Western part of Germany whereas vacant social housing estates in the Eastern part are abundant. It is striking that in a smaller number of countries, for example, The Netherlands and Belgium, the highest priority is to promote the development of housing for the middle and higher income groups in cities to restore the balance in the major cities. Urban Governance Changing the governance of cities – or, better, urban regions – is also an issue. Most reports show that urban challenges do not stop at the municipal border as research has repeatedly shown. A too-narrow focus on administrative borders is not very productive. In a growing number of countries, there is a debate about reforming the local and regional government structure. At the same time there seems to be a tendency towards more (voluntary) intra-regional cooperation. For some countries the complexity of urban governance is a problem (for example, the United Kingdom); for others it is the weak position of local authorities in the government system that is seen as an area for improvement (for instance, Portugal). Other Issues Most of the reports point to the continuous (economic) internationalisation and the potential consequences for cities. Finally, there are issues that feature in a smaller number of reports but that are interesting to mention: the financial situation of cities and the system of financing cities, the need for urban marketing strategies, the accession of the 10 new member states and the consequences for the neighbouring EU members.

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19.3

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

National Policy Responses to Urban Issues and Challenges: Visions and Objectives

The main conclusion of the 1997 study was that the United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands appeared to be examples of countries with explicit national urban policy-making. Among the 12 other member states, a distinction was made between the three federal states and ‘federation-like’ Spain on one side and the remaining eight unitary states on the other. In Germany and Belgium explicit urban policies were present at the regional level, but restricted to some regions. Austria and Spain were among the countries without explicit national (and regional) policy attention to cities. The reports from the three Nordic countries indicated that attention to the urban dimension in national policy-making had increased, although the regions remained the first policy focus in Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg had not developed national policies or strategies targeted to cities. However, the (physical) urban renewal policy in Ireland could be considered as a first step, while in Portugal and Italy in the early 1990s discussions started to pay more attention to the position of cities within the national policy framework. The 1997 study also concluded that although the majority of EU member states had not developed explicit and coherent national urban policies, it was to be expected that more countries would develop such kind of policy in the future. We now present an overview of the existence or non-existence of explicit national urban policies in the ‘old’ member states. A first conclusion is that the situation is not very different from that in 1997, although there are some interesting changes. In the overview we distinguish between countries with explicit national urban policies, countries where urban issues have taken a higher position on the national political agenda, and countries where the national policy attention to cities is minor or lacking (see scheme below). National policy response

Countries

Explicit urban policies

United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Belgium Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Portugal Ireland, Spain, Greece, Austria, Luxembourg

Increasing policy attention to cities No explicit urban policies

Examples of Explicit National Urban Policy United Kingdom In the United Kingdom national urban policy has undergone important changes since the government change in 1997. The current government sees cities as economic opportunities rather than liabilities. A range of reports assessing the conditions and prospects of cities has supported this vision. The

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newly established Office of the Deputy Prime Minister – responsible for urban policy since 2002 – has as broad target to encourage ‘thriving, inclusive and sustainable communities where economic prosperity and social justice go hand in hand’. The objectives are to promote better policy integration across all government departments, to provide for effective local decision-making within a national policy framework, and to deliver effective programmes to raise the quality of life for all urban areas (with a strong focus at housing policies). There is in particular a growing recognition of the contribution that London and the eight core cities could or should make to the national economic prosperity. Although economic competitiveness is a very important dimension of British urban policy it is not the only one. Achieving social cohesion and encouraging liveability and sustainability are important goals as well. France As in the United Kingdom, the political colour of the French national government affects the national policy attention to cities. According to the French chapter, the government that came into power in 1995 gave priority to the problem of the abandoning of rural areas rather then to urban problems. In 1997 a new coalition again put urban governance and urban policy-making high on the political agenda. The idea is that first and foremost institutional and procedural innovations are needed to better develop and implement policies to fight the most serious urban problems – economic stagnation and lack of social cohesion. The innovations are expressed in laws that allow for the creation of new area-based institutional bodies (depending on size: communautés urbaines, communautés d’agglomération and communautés de communes), to introduce new instruments for these new institutions such as various types of mutual agreements (contrats) and projects (like the projets d’agglomération), and the involvement of the urban population (conseils de développement and conseils de quartier). The government that came into power in 2002 launched a ‘second decentralisation step’. The decentralisation of responsibilities in this second step involves mostly the regions and the départements. The Netherlands In 1994 the Dutch government started an explicit urban policy, the Grotestedenbeleid (GSB – Large Cities Policy). The Dutch government considers cities as the motors of the national economic, cultural and social development. But many cities suffer from a typical syndrome of interrelated social problems. The vision is that only an integrated, strategic approach, combining social, physical and economic policies can be effective in meeting the challenges of the major cities. Additionally, the idea is that the funding of national urban policies should stimulate and not frustrate integrated policy-making. The main objectives gradually shifted from work and labour (1994–1998) to the quality of living environment (1998–2004) and recently, for the period 2004–2008, to safety, integration of ethnic minorities and immigration. The latest shift in priorities is greatly affected by the political earthquake of 2002. In the new urban policy period, the measures are based on contracts between the national government

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and 30 selected municipalities. From 2004 onwards, further decentralisation of responsibilities to cities – and city regions – will take place, however, in combination with reduced budget as a consequence of unprecedented national budget cuts. Belgium Since the late 1990s Belgian cities have experienced a flux of urban policy initiatives, both at the federal and at the regional level. Since the late 1990s Belgium is among the member states that have developed an explicit urban policy at the national level. Although most competencies are in the hands of the regions, the federal government decided in 1999 to make urban policy directed at large cities a task for the national level as well. A federal Minister of Big Cities Policy has been appointed and a framework for an integrated policy, inspired by the French Politique de la Ville and the Dutch Grotestedenbeleid, has been set up. The national urban policy framework supports programmes and projects aiming at ‘the improvement of the quality of life in cities’ by encouraging social cohesion (one third of all programmes), safety enhancement (one fifth) and physical renewal (one fifth). Special legislation has been passed to support the policies through tax incentives. The measures are based on partnership contracts between the federal government, the regions and the selected cities. The new federal Big Cities Policy (prolonged in 2003) matches the Flemish and Brussels urban policies. The Flemish approach changed from a social problem-oriented to a more economic opportunity-oriented approach, while the Brussels ‘neighbourhood contracts’ also appear to pay more attention to opportunities. Except for urban renewal subsidies (since the 1970s), explicit urban policy is absent in the Walloon region. Countries giving Increasing National Policy Attention to the Development of Cities Germany Constrained by the constitutional framework, urban policy at the national level is relatively weak in Germany. The federal level of government has little ‘urban policy power’ over the regions (Länder) and local authorities. All German Länder, particularly the larger ones, have their own urban policies and programmes. These policies and programmes promote innovative approaches to address region specific problems and are sometimes related to federal initiatives. For example North Rhine-Westphalia pursues a broad range of urban policies, such as a successful public–private initiative to promote inner city development (Ab in die Mitte). The concept has found the interest of other German Länder. At the federal level the responsible ministry is focusing on transport rather than on urban policies. Moreover, the special attention for environmental aspects of urban development has gradually been replaced by more attention for social concerns. Although there is no vision on national urban policy in place, various programmes aiming to address urban problems do exist. These programmes should stimulate an integrated approach of urban renewal (Die Soziale Stadt, the socially integrative city), sustainable urban development and a balanced housing market in East German cities (Umbau Ost, urban renewal east).

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Finland In Finland urbanisation started relatively late, municipal autonomy is exceptionally strong and a principal national objective is to safeguard the position of all regions both in terms of economic development and population distribution. In addition, urban problems did not differ much from problems outside cities. Therefore the Finnish government did not put a lot of effort into urban policy. That picture changed in the 1990s owing to a deep economic recession. ‘Cities as engines of growth’ became the guiding principle of urban policy. The ‘flagship’ of Finnish urban policy is the Centre of Expertise Programme. Most programmes are implemented by local development companies that are organised according on the ‘triple helix model’ (a partnership of the university, the city and business enterprise). The Regional Centre Programme, launched in 2000, encourages strategic cooperation among various actors in urban regions and promotes key projects mostly aiming at strengthening the competitiveness of local business. This regional programme covers 34 regions and includes most cities, except for the capital region. However, in 2004, a Helsinki Region Commission, led by the Minister of Regional Development, was installed to deal with urban policy challenges and measures in the Helsinki region. Sweden The immigration issue, a central political issue in Sweden, is closely related to urban social problems. The traditional integration policy of immigrants proved to be unsuccessful. This is one of the reasons for the national government to present a metropolitan policy in 1998. It was the first time that the government launched such a policy, in which seven ministries are involved. The new policy should create the conditions for sustainable (metropolitan growth) and stop social, ethnic, and discriminating segregation in the metropolitan regions. Seven cities in three metropolitan regions have been selected for the programme. The ambitions of the area-based policy are to increase local employment and reduce citizen’s dependence on state allowances. In the first phase, this policy focused exclusively on stimulating integration issues in 24 designated problem districts. The government has announced that in the next phase more attention will be given to the economic aspects of the development of the metropolitan regions. Also, the measures to enhance economic growth will include more municipalities than in the first integration policy. Denmark Denmark experienced a confusing period as far as urban policy is concerned. A Ministry of Urban Affairs was established in 1998 but abolished in 2001. The minister published a statement on urban policy saying that traditional sector policy should be replaced by a comprehensive approach. The focus of such a policy should be on diversity and sustainability. The policy has yet to be implemented even though special tools have been developed through a change in planning and urban renewal legislation. These tools support revitalisation of problematic neighbourhoods and the transformation of old industrial and harbour areas. At the moment, social and ethnic segregation and immigrant integration are among the new urban policy priorities. Although the related

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urban problems call for integrated solutions, the impression is that they are often discussed as one-sector issues. A major comprehensive national urban development plan is the Örestadsplan. The idea is to uphold and improve the competitive position of Copenhagen in relation to other European metropolises. At the same time, the national vision is to keep the balance among the different regions in the country by strengthening weaker regions that perform below the national average in terms of knowledge and international accessibility, as well as supporting the position of the strongest regions. In that framework, it is the regions and cities themselves that should focus on their growth potentials. Italy For a long time urban policy in Italy was a non-priority for the central government. Since 1942 Italian legislation favoured de-urbanisation, rather than managing the process of urbanisation. In 1990 Law 142/90 introduced the concept of metropolitan cities for the first time. Although the national government did start thinking about contents, the development of an explicit national urban policy is still unclear and slow. At the end of the 1990s the Ministry of Urban Areas (part of the Ministry of Public Works) was combined with the Ministry of Transportation into a Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport. The instruments for the development of an integrated urban policy have been prepared, but as of yet the institutional reform has not been implemented; metropolitan cities still do not exist. This implies ‘self made’ urban policy, also due to the scarce coordination and cooperation between the several departments and institutions at the national, regional and local levels of government. The Italian report considers the political instability of consecutive national governments and the lack of coordination and cooperation as main obstacles to the development of a clear national urban policy that favours the sustainable growth of Italian cities. The existing urban policies such as the urban (spatial) renewal plans, (spatial) regeneration plans and integrated programmes (mainly housing and environment) intend to reorganise cities mainly through innovative public private project financing. Portugal According to the Portuguese report, Portugal is at a crossroad to define a more flexible administrative structure for the formulation and implementation of more integrated urban policies. The powers of local government are limited; most important decisions for cities are made at the national level (top-down). Until the 1990s national urban policy and planning guidelines were missing. Through the European Community Support Frameworks (CSF) attention has been given to spatial planning, including municipal planning, and massive investments have been made in transport infrastructures and facilities. A new Ministry of Cities, Territorial Planning and Environment (set up in 1999) has been made responsible for co-financing renewal and technical works (mostly) in smaller cities and for supervision of URBAN programmes in Lisbon and Porto. The availability of public investment through the CSFs allowed for innovations in national and regional urban policy. Several examples can be mentioned. One example is the urban renewal interventions that concern integrating ‘rehousing’ and social

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policies in Lisbon and Porto and some other cities, as well as an environmental programme related to EXPO’98 (IOUR). A second example has to do with promoting a more balanced urban system by improving the position of some 40 medium-sized cities (PROSIURB). A third example is the urban regeneration and environmental enhancement of cities based on strategic plans and executed through public private partnerships, following the successful EXPO’98 example (POLIS). The ‘Porto European Capital of Culture’-year has been set up similarly. Finally, the revitalisation of small business in urban areas in crisis through physical rehabilitation and improving entrepreneurship (PROCOM) is mentioned. All these new initiatives show that the attention to cities is on the wax, however, the Portuguese report also indicates that coordination at the national level and lack of decentralisation remain major problems. Countries Without Explicit Attention to City Development at the National Level Ireland In Ireland the need to cope with the effects of unprecedented social chance and economic growth has resulted in a number of policy initiatives. While most policy changes are national in scope, their impact is greatest in cities and towns, where most people live. At present Ireland does not have an explicit national urban policy. To be more precise, urban policy is threaded through a wide range of national programmes and implemented by a confusion of routes and agencies. Recent examples of policy initiatives with a substantial impact on cities are urban regeneration initiatives. These regeneration initiatives are essentially tax incentives promoting urban renewal. Inspired by the ‘nodal strategy’, as agreed in the European Spatial Development Perspective, the government prepared a National Spatial Strategy 2002–2020, aiming to secure a better and more rational spatial development pattern. Specific attention is devoted to the position of Greater Dublin, that needs to become more efficient, and the designation of 13 ‘Gateway-towns’ and 11 ‘Hub-towns’. It is still unclear what this labelling will mean in terms of government support and concrete measures. A first step could be decentralisation of public functions, although this proposal has met with strong opposition from the public workers involved. Spain Spain does not have a national urban policy. Many of the policies that respond to urban challenges are the competence of the autonomous regional authorities and the local governments. However, the national government has the statutory power in the management of housing, infrastructure, the environment and in the design of the administrative structure. In these fields some plans and policies have been developed recently to liberalise the housing markets and to support subsidized housing. However, both measures have not been successful until now. Furthermore, the government carries out an ambitious investment plan in airports, ports, roads, railways and telecom to overcome historical legacy of inadequate infrastructure development (1.4 per cent of the Spanish GNP is made available for seven years). The success of the regional and national policies

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intended for cities depends highly on the local organising and financial capacity. The Spanish report considers these capacities as generally weak. A recently approved act for the modernisation of the local institutional framework is far from what the mayors had in mind as necessary improvements for urban management and planning. Greece The authors of the Greek report argue that the tradition of fragmented land ownership, a specific national land policy and strong centralisation has had serious drawbacks for urban planning and, as a consequence, for urban development. There is no tradition of urban policy-making. Only relatively recently has the government initiated some measures that can be considered urban policies, some of them being the direct result of EU policies. There has been a considerable increase of investment in urban infrastructures (thanks to the Structural Funds and the Olympic Games of 2004). Furthermore, substantial public investment took place in environmental urban quality (reducing water and air pollution), urban renewal schemes (mainly improving public spaces), some large-scale cultural facilities and the setting up of a proper land register. About 100 URBAN-like interventions took place under EU pressure to add an ‘urban dimension’ to the European support programmes. However, most of the new developments have not developed into mainstream policies. As a matter of fact, these policies do not match up with the prevailing Greek land policy. Austria Austria has no experience with national urban policy, either at the federal or at the level of the nine Länder. Urban policy is not considered a field of national competence or policy activity, but a matter for the cities themselves. Another reason is the relative high degree of (political and financial) independence of municipalities. Cities can receive tailored financial support from the federation or the Land, for example, for infrastructure projects, but this is not considered as ‘urban policy’. The exception is spatial planning, where the higher layers of government have some influence over urban development. More important are the Länder that do have the legal duty to supervise and assist municipalities in their (spatial) planning and functioning, but municipalities are still relatively autonomous compared to many other cities in Europe. The common denominator in the policies of all Austrian Länder is that they concentrate on supporting ‘weak’ peripheral areas rather then ‘strong’ central areas. Luxembourg It is understandable that Luxembourg does not pursue an explicit national urban policy. Bilateral consultation between the administrative levels is the basis for in particular housing and spatial planning. The national government aims to modernise the local spatial planning process by integrating environmental and social issues. Next, a new national spatial planning vision has been adopted that formally identifies Luxembourg-Ville as the superior pole and that promotes polycentric development through an active decentralisation policy. In 2003 the

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government decided to develop an integral transport- and spatial planning concept that has to integrate several sector plans. Six ministries are involved. 19.4

Major Trends in National Urban Policy-making

The previous section presented an overview of the diversity and complexity of national urban policy-making in the 15 ‘old’ member states. However, there are also a number of issues that arise in many of the national reports. Consequently, the comparative investigation enables the editors to distinguish a dozen European trends. The first five themes have to do with the organisation and the delivery of national urban policies. The other seven are devoted to the policy contents. Organisation and Delivery of National Urban Policies National urban policies to empower cities? One of the themes that become clear from this follow-up study is the interaction between policy-making on different levels. The 1997 study already showed that national urban policies are not just concerned with the classical top-down policy-making process but can also include local policy initiatives that effect policy-making of higher layers of government (bottom-up). Does the national government determine each and every aspect of the national urban policy or are the national policies meant to empower the cities to meet their challenges? Do city initiatives lead to a national follow-up? Do the national government or the cities set out the objectives in detail? Who is responsible for (developing the) implementation? The theme of empowering the cities (or the opposite) is a topic that comes back in several national reports. This international comparative study tries to establish a pattern or an emerging European trend. Is it ‘power to the cities’ or the opposite? First, we discuss the developments in the four countries with explicit national urban policies, followed by the countries with no explicit urban policies. Third, we analyse the ‘middle group’ of member states where more attention is paid to cities in policy-making. What comes out a first comparison of the situation in the three unitary states with a centralist tradition (France, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and the federal state of Belgium? In the United Kingdom the balance of power between national, regional, local and neighbourhood governments and agencies is changing. Most of the efforts have been directed to increase regional powers and responsibilities with new institutions. For example the nine Regional Development Agencies (responsible for economic development) have been given increased freedom in the way they use their national government budgets. In addition, the dialogue between local and national government in general and between national government and large cities in particular has improved and the level of national resources going to cities has increased. There have been attempts to reduce controls over local authorities

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while at the same time attempting to improve the delivery of urban mainstream services with agreed targets. However, the other side of the coin is that cities sometimes feel that the national concerns with targets and assessment mean that cities are more constrained in their actions, and more subject to national control. The overall picture for the United Kingdom is that the national urban policies intend to restore some of the powers at the regional and local level. However, cities are still concerned that the central government is too anxious to control local government. The question for the national government is how much discretion is best given to local authorities to achieve greater effectiveness and efficiency? In France, the picture is that the regional and local level get slightly more elbow room in the national urban policy system, although there are signals that show other developments as well. An important change has come from the three national Acts (approved in 1999 and 2000) that establish a new framework for dealing with urban issues. One of these Acts is the Chevènement Act that arranges for new types of joint authorities including the communautés d’agglomération for urban areas of over 50,000 people and the communautés urbaines for urban areas of more than 500,000 inhabitants. Eventually, these authorities will gradually replace the present complex governance system. The other two Acts provide the competences for these new joint authorities, whose territories should match functional urban areas. They have statutory powers in many aspects (economic, cultural, social and transportation policies). The Association of Mayors of the Largest French Cities supports these initiatives. In 2002 a new conservative government came to power and made it clear that decentralisation (Acte deux de la decentralisation) would get more priority. It is not a decentralisation in favour of the larger cities however, since most responsibilities are transferred to the regions and the départements. The Association of Mayors of the Largest French Cities declared that ‘cities and their agglomerations do not have the place they deserve in the new decentralisation process’. They are very worried because of their absence in the act. They have presented an Urban Manifesto (Manifeste pour l’Urbain) to the Prime Minister in March 2003. The overall impression from the Dutch national report is that the national government has made another step towards the empowerment of the major cities. The Dutch urban policy has matured over the past decade and is about to enter the third phase (2005–2009). The urban policy has been a pilot for a new modus operandi of the government in which decentralisation, monitoring results and a business-like approach are key concepts. However, the cities involved expressed their concerns about the additional red tape that was introduced with the policy. In the third phase the Dutch government will develop tailor-made agreements with the cities. Each city has been asked to produce new development programmes for the years to come and to include the expected results. These programmes are the basis for the agreement with the national government (stadsconvenanten). The national government will stage one intermediate and one final evaluation of the results. The major break with previous years is that there are no checks and balances concerning the implementation process. It has become clear that on the

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one hand cities will enjoy more freedom to fight specific local problems, but on the other hand the government will hold cities fully accountable for their results. A(nother) very recent development is that the four largest cities (referred to as the G4), and the city of Rotterdam in particular, have been very active in bringing their disproportionate problems to the attention of the national government. An unusual frank and outspoken action plan of the city of Rotterdam has drawn the attention of national politicians. The city’s economic and social system is unable to cope with the continuous flow of underprivileged people to the city. The Dutch government has responded to the signals of the G4 and Rotterdam’s ‘agenda for discussion with the national government’ that is included in the port city’s action plan. The government is preparing special legislation to enable the four major cities to better deal with their social problems. This unprecedented legal initiative is still in the planning phase. However the reaction of the cabinet is an important signal to the G4 and Rotterdam in particular. In the federal state of Belgium, the situation is a bit more complicated because of the complex government structure. Most of the statutory powers concerning urban policies are with the regional governments (Flanders, Brussels and the Walloon region). Nevertheless, the federal level enters in direct contracts with the major cities. These contracts provide cities with funding for projects in deprived areas to achieve targets set by the federal government. It is positive that the federal level develops an urban policy – within its limitations – but the cities are subject to national control as the contracts are renewed every year. The most interesting development is in the Flanders region. In 2003, the Flemish government has made some changes in the regional urban policy framework to give cities a higher degree of freedom. The Social Investment Fund (SIF) – a top-down approach with detailed criteria and supported by a special SIF-administration – has been replaced by the City Fund. The cities are free to select the neighbourhoods for support and the contract period has been extended from three to six years. Also the Flemish government has adopted very general objectives instead of spelling out the expected results in great detail. The Flemish government expects more efficiency from the greater local autonomy. The general picture is that the national reports for these four countries with explicit national urban policies indicate that there is more elbowroom for the cities (and sometimes regions) in the respective national urban policy frameworks compared to the situation in 1997. Also the cities themselves have come up with initiatives and in some cases exert more influence on the national urban policy agenda. The reports do not present enough evidence to really speak of a major break with the past nor that empowering cities is the leading principle in those four countries. For the group of countries with no explicit national urban policies (Austria, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain) the situation is clear. Empowerment of cities is not on the political agenda. In Austria and Spain, the state has little to say over urban issues as those issues are dealt with on the local (Austria) and regional (Spain) level. Empowerment of cities is therefore not really a national

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issue. In Greece and Ireland the national government dominates many of the policy areas relevant for cities and there are no signs of change. Luxembourg is simply too small for a special approach. As far as the middle group of countries (Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Italy and Portugal) is concerned several observations can be made. In Italy several proposals (for instance strengthening the metropolitan level) are at the table but as for now, there has not been decisive action on behalf of the government and the debate is still going on. Portugal is at a crossroad as far as defining a structured strategy for urban policy: there is a need for a more flexible administrative structure in which cities can develop into strong local institutions (municipalities and intermunicipal associations). Cities lack sufficient investment capacity and rely heavily on the state for many policy areas. In addition, the decision-making structure is of little help to cities as the national urban policy framework is fragmented and mostly top-down. A development to empower the local level more could come from the new Metropolitan Areas. However, the status of these new entities is not yet clear. In the Denmark report, there is little evidence of empowerment being a major issue at the moment. Local autonomy is one of the cornerstones of society in Sweden and Finland. To begin with Sweden, the government introduced a new metropolitan policy in the late 1990s to tackle some of the typical urban problems. At the heart of the policy are contracts between the state and the involved municipalities for designated areas in the metropolitan region. These so-called development agreements contain local objectives, a strategy and action plan for the areas involved. The local developments agreements are drafted in a dialogue between the municipalities and the Commission on Metropolitan Areas and the municipalities have the overall responsibility for implementing the agreements. This bottom-up strategy is meant to safeguard the interests of the residents, though that does not imply that the national government cannot start initiatives. A problem is that a substantial part of the funding (€200 million) is earmarked for specific areas, limiting the freedom of the municipalities to use these funds. The Finnish report states that ‘the key idea of Finnish urban policy is that the state has to ensure that cities themselves can solve their own problems and respond to challenges’. Compared to many other cities across Europe, Finnish cities are relatively autonomous. The empowerment of cities does not extend to all policy areas. The Finnish welfare state for instance is based on a state-coordinated production of welfare services, where municipalities are mainly implementers. The government has started the Regional Centre Programme as part of the national policies aiming at a balanced and polycentric regional development across the country. The mayors of the four central municipalities Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen (together forming the Helsinki Metropolitan Area) were not amused as they found out that the Helsinki Region has been left out. The mayors have drawn up an initiative for a common urban programme for the Helsinki region that was adopted nationally, though with very little funding. Generally speaking, the major cities find the funds allocated for urban policy totally

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insufficient and criticised the policy focus. From 2000 onwards the emphasis has been on strengthening the smaller towns and according to their mayors, the large cities have had to solve their challenges and problems on their own. Helsinki has been hit considerably as the state reallocated a major part of corporate tax revenue to other parts of the country. Finally, German cities lobby for support from EU, Federal and Land programmes persistently to support their projects and to safeguard their financial position. The German Länder are responsible for most urban issues and nowadays most Länder develop their regional urban policy. The federal level has initiated several policies. These urban policy initiatives under the ExWoSt Forschungsfelder (research arenas) are allowed because of their exploratory and demonstrative nature, anticipating urban issues in Germany. City governments participate in the programmes with much enthusiasm and local commitment. Sometimes cities’ innovative approaches influence the national level. An example is the city-state of Berlin’s project to strengthen neighbourhood participation by assigning limited budgets to designated areas. Other Länder and the national government have watched that project with great interest. Partnerships and Civic Involvement The growing attention on (local) partnerships and the importance of civic involvement are unmistakably repeated themes in the urban policies of the member states. The majority of national urban policies include stimuli for city authorities to engage in partnerships. The national governments see partnerships almost as a precondition for the effective delivery of national urban policies. They are part of the national urban policy framework of the countries that have developed a range of explicit urban policies and they are developed in the member states that pay more attention to cities with some special policies for cities or regions Actually, most countries embrace the partnership principle, apart from Austria, Spain and Greece, because of the lack of national urban policies or for different reasons. The partnerships could be with other municipalities, higher layers of government, other public institutions, the business community etc. In some cases local partnerships are compulsory and cities need to comply with the demands of the national government. In many cases where partnerships are not compulsory, there are incentives in place that strongly encourage cities to develop partnerships. These incentives are mostly financial. Cities receive additional financial support as a bonus for partnerships or the national government matches the private funds that cities raise for particular projects. Sometimes these partnerships do not result in extra money directly; rather, partnerships are a positive indicator in the evaluation of the local programmes and projects. Nonetheless, there is mostly a ‘stick and carrot’ for local partnerships. The incentives did result in more local partnerships. Two developments are noteworthy: the growing involvement of the private sector – and the business community in particular – since the early 1990s and the emphasis on partnerships

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among municipalities. It is not always easy to come to successful partnerships with private organisations. The Dutch government for instance has decided to give the development of partnerships with these private actors higher priority in the new Dutch urban policy framework for the coming years. One example of successful partnership including the private sector is the ‘triple helix model’ in the Finnish Centre of Expertise programme where city, university and businesses are jointly responsible for the local actions. The partnerships between municipalities are a key issue in, for instance, France, especially with the Chevènement Act which paves the way for the communauté urbaine and the communauté d’agglomération. But other countries have also introduced measures to stimulate partnership between municipalities through new legal structures or special policies. The national policy-makers also attribute more weight to the interest of (certain groups of) citizens in the delivery of national urban policies – though it is not as strong as the partnerships mentioned above. The integrated metropolitan policy in Sweden claims to take the interests of citizens as their starting point. In Germany, the national government – despite its limited statutory powers in urban affairs – explores new forms of cooperation between citizens, investors and the public sector in parts of the ExWoSt programme. In France the new Neighbourhood Act (Loi Démocratie de Proximité) aims to give more consultative power to the citizens. The law provides for the establishment of consultative neighbourhood councils (conseils de quartier) in all municipalities of over 20,000 inhabitants. These councils are composed of municipal councillors and representatives of the civil society. Comprehensive Approach Another trend in many EU member states is the attempt to come to a more integrated approach in the delivery of national urban policies. Previously, the 1997 study had already observed the efforts of a limited number of countries to develop such an approach in delivering national urban policies. Since then a growing number of member states have experimented with, developed, implemented and improved the delivery process of their national urban policies in a more integrated – or comprehensive – way. This integrated approach involves both the efforts to synchronize the one-sector policies and objectives from the various ministries at the national level as well as the efforts to fight fragmented implementation at the local level. A more integrated approach begins at the national level where the main challenge is to bring into line objectives, programmes, projects, strategies, evaluation procedures, funding, etc. Consequently, coordination at the national level is regularly mentioned in the national reports as a key challenge. In addition, we can find examples in the national reports concerning a different view on national urban policies in which the leading principle is the linkages between economic, social, educational, environmental, housing, accessibility and safety

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issues instead of the distinctions. A growing number of member states have gained experience with the positive and the negative aspects of that approach. The Netherlands sets out to make another step in their integrated approach by reducing the number of ministries involved in the coordination (not in the policy itself) and by a restructuring of 42 specific grants into three main grants. The new Office of the Deputy Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, responsible for delivering urban policies, promotes better policy integration across all government departments. Sweden’s metropolitan policy is characterised as an area-based integration policy. The Finnish Regional Centre programme is the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior aiming to stimulate cooperation between various ministries and lower levels of government. The federal government of Belgium has the ambition to include safety, mobility, employment and the strengthening of the economic and social fabric into its urban policies. The Irish Urban Renewal Scheme Approvals asks for integrated area plans and the Danish Minister of Urban Affairs (1998–2001) has stated that traditional sector policy should make way for comprehensive and integral urban policy. Sometimes coordination refers to both the national and the regional level as is the case in Germany where the federal government launched a comprehensive programme Die Soziale Stadt in cooperation with the 16 Länder. At the same time the national reports show that the criticism is never far away. The Danish Minister of Urban Affairs was only three years in power and the current government changed the policy. Independent Finnish evaluators reported serious problems concerning the involvement and cooperation of the ministries in the Regional Centre Programme. In the United Kingdom, there is still some concern that not all major government departments are as committed to the urban renaissance as is the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. In The Netherlands, the cities have made regular claims for more coordination at the national level. It merely shows that it is not easy to implement a more integrated approach and that member states can learn from each other’s experiences with more comprehensive and integrative ways of urban policy-making at the national level. More integration at the national level does not automatically lead to more integration at the local (implementation) level. The same challenge of different departments representing different policy sectors that fail to see the linkages between policy fields is also relevant at the city level. How can national urban policies induce more integration at the local level? According to an independent evaluation one of the merits of the Dutch urban policy is that it positively affected integrated policy-making at the local level. More integration at the national level is an important prerequisite for more integration at the local level. The Dutch government has recognised that it had to do more and incorporated that in their policy for the new period. Perhaps national urban policy-makers can learn from the local level as well. At least in the United Kingdom there is some evidence that large cities and local authorities have generally integrated their policies better than government departments at the centre of power.

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Area-based Approach Area-based policies have become more important in the last seven years. Some member states have a vast experience with that type of policies; others have started to develop area-based solutions, sometimes inspired by the EU’s URBAN programme. What are the trends with regard to area-based policies? Not surprisingly, these policies have in common that they are designed for a limited period (for instance three, four or six years) and that these targeted policies are considered as an extra on top of the mainstream national policies relevant for cities. One important distinction is that the spatial scope of area-based policies differs. We can distinguish between policies directed to particular (parts of) neighbourhoods, policies concerned with particular cities, policies for municipalities in functional urban agglomerations and special policies for designated administrative regions. Examples of special regional policies can be found in for instance Finland, Denmark, Sweden, France and the United Kingdom. In the Nordic countries, these policies do not favour the major cities and are sometimes even counterproductive for them. Interestingly, the Voynet Act in France is based on the statistical urban areas and supports projects for the agglomeration. Designated areas within cities and/or metropolitan regions are subject to special policies in for instance the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Sweden, Portugal and The Netherlands. The large number of area-based initiatives indicates that the national governments have faith in the effectiveness of these policies. The experiences indicate that these policies can be an effective tool, or at least more effective than general policies that do not take the specific local circumstances into account. At the same time, the research reveals that area-based policies should not be seen as a magic formula with guaranteed results. The national reports raise (at least) three questions with regard to these area-based approaches. The first question has to do with the differences in the spatial scope. What are the boundaries of the selected area? Does it stop at the administrative borders or is it possible to look for opportunities outside the chosen area? A growing number of member states are aware of the limitations of a too strict interpretation of the boundaries of the selected area in need. An interesting observation is that in some countries (notably the United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands) a strong link with the regional development and initiatives is stimulated of even compulsory. Sometimes the selection of a relatively small area does simply not fit with the pattern of urban development. An illustration is Greece where the small areas of the URBAN programme do not fit well with the Greek situation. The second question is: what are the right criteria to select a particular area? The answer is not always easy. Traditionally, the criteria are primarily indicators of (social and environmental) problems. Areas that meet these criteria get support through special policies. In several countries (Belgium, United Kingdom, France, Finland and The Netherlands) there is a debate to put more weight on the

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opportunities of these deprived areas in the selection. The regional government of Flanders for example, decided to give cities more freedom in the selection of neighbourhoods eligible for support from the City Fund. A third question is about the relation between area-based policies and the mainstream of national policies. How do the area-based policies match with other – more general – policies? It appears to be difficult to avoid inconsistencies between the two and it proves to be even more difficult to create synergies. This question comes up in countries that have comparatively more experience with area-based policies (such the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and The Netherlands). For example, the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit in the United Kingdom is expected to deliver improvement in the most deprived areas though special funding as well as to mobilise mainstream funding for their objectives. A final observation is that area-based policies focusing on one issue are a minority. Increasingly, these area-based policies aim to combine several objectives (economic, social, environmental, education, crime, etc.). Prevent Intraregional Competition Competition among municipalities in the same urban region or among core cities is a well-known phenomenon in many countries. Most parties involved are convinced that this situation is often counterproductive and as such not contributing to societal objectives. However, this kind of spatial competition is sometimes induced by specific administrative or financial structures. Tax regimes, in which (part of) business taxation and sometimes a share of personal taxation are determined and levied locally, can be a recipe for intra-regional competition as a negative sum game. Also special tax incentives for investment can induce competition. For example, Austrian municipalities are free to use investment incentives to achieve their own spatial planning goals. Generally speaking, the basis for urban policy can be characterised here as ‘competences in competition’. However, as a consequence of increasing international urban competition and the need to become or remain competitive, some member states have introduced policies designed to prevent intra-regional competition. In France the business taxation is the most important local tax. The Chevènement Act (1999) has established an area-wide business tax in order to eliminate competition between municipalities in the same area to attract firms. All over Germany the tension between core cities and suburban communities is growing as the core cities and suburban municipalities are at loggerheads because of many issues: the reluctance to share the costs for the provision of central cultural facilities, the competition from out-of-town shopping malls, the funding of airport extensions or public transport management. On the hidden agenda, however, are the financial consequences of the fierce intra-regional competition for household and firms among local governments in the city region. There are attempts to develop new rules for cooperation and competition. It is a considerable challenge to arrive at an acceptable compromise, as there is no

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legitimate political authority in between local governments and the Land that can press for a solution. The Contents of National Urban Policy Housing and urban renewal to combat social exclusion In most of the national reports reference is made to housing policies and (mostly) physical interventions (urban renewal and urban regeneration) as national urban policies designed to combat social exclusion. In a growing number of countries physical renewal schemes are now accompanied by social and/or economic policies. The European URBAN programme has definitely inspired the introduction of a more coherent approach. A remarkable trend is the discouragement of further suburbanisation to attain a stronger concentration of especially housing in core cities. Here too, promoting social inclusion is a policy objective. In the United Kingdom an important policy statement in relation to urban areas is to discourage suburbanisation and to encourage more concentrated use of old brownfield land in the core of urban areas. The plan is primarily designed to tackle the shortage of affordable housing in the southeast, the low demand for housing primarily in the north and the quality of public spaces generally. The French SRU Act (2000) is intended to reduce social exclusion by strengthening the social mix in housing higher densities (by preventing sprawl) and cheap modes of public transport. Municipalities that do not reach a 20 per cent social housing proportion in their housing stock risk financial penalties. A compact city model is promoted and priority should be given to public transport on the ground to improve the internal accessibility of urban area by cheap modes of transport. The idea is that cheap public transport will enhance social inclusion. The compact city model and the revitalisation and rehabilitation of inner cities have been part of the Dutch national policy framework since the mid-1980s. Urban housing and urban revitalisation are important issues in Germany. The ambitious and comprehensive programme Umbau Ost seeks to promote private house-ownership, modernise the existing housing stock, and demolish a considerable number of prefabricated socialist apartment blocks, where the housing market is not functioning properly. The centre of attention is revitalisation of inner cities; the development of new housing at the urban fringe is discouraged. The programme Umbau West addresses the spatial consequences of demographic and economic decline in 11 selected West German cities. The programme encourages cities to plan for decline; slimming-down is seen as a chance for the future, not as an unavoidable burden. In Ireland local authorities have been required to prepare, implement and review housing strategies to meet the housing needs of their administrative areas. In an effort to counter social segregation and large one-class housing estates, provision is made for a percentage of the lands in housing and mixed-use developments to be made available for social and affordable housing.

Synthesis

421

The promotion of subsidised housing and other initiatives in Spain to liberalise the – very rigid – housing market were not very successful. Especially their application in urban areas turns out to be disappointing. The present conditions of the housing market in cities (with relative high property values) do not make subsidised housing very attractive for the private sector. In Greece urban renewal schemes are still limited in scope and mainly involve the creation of pedestrian areas and the improvement of open spaces. The Greek authors argue that the results are often contradictory and controversial, like the nearimpossibility of securing the pedestrian areas from illegal circulation, parking and uncontrolled changes of land uses. In Portugal urban renewal interventions are predominantly the implementation of a ‘rehousing’ programme, including social policies, especially in the Metropolitan Areas of Lisbon and Porto (IORU). A programme for urban restoration and environmental improvement (POLIS) involves municipalities and private parties. This programme, inspired by the success of the national initiative of the EXPO’98, corresponds to intensive and multi-purpose interventions in a restricted number of areas with significant environmental problems. Integration of ethnic minorities In most countries the integration of ethnic minorities and immigrants is increasingly considered a major issue that is most of all a challenge to cities. Integration problems are increasingly linked to social exclusion and feelings of insecurity. Urban renewal and residential rehabilitation are among the measures to combat this kind of social exclusion. In a number of the relatively prosperous Western European countries explicit integration policies are now starting to form a considerable part of national urban policy-making. Explicit examples are mentioned in the country reports of The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, France and Germany. In 2002 an unprecedented shift in Dutch politics put urban safety, integration and immigration of ethnic minorities on the top of the national urban policy agenda. The political climate changed: compulsory instead of voluntary integration for ethnic minorities, tougher immigration policies, more emphasis on law and order and less tolerance. In 2004, the city of Rotterdam, unable to cope with the continuous flow of underprivileged people to the city, presented its plan to tackle the city’s most persistent problems. At the time of writing the government has responded with the proposal to develop a special law for the four largest cities. The new legislation should empower city administrations to better deal with their disproportionate (integration) problems. At the time of writing, the new law has not yet been send to parliament. In Denmark the concentration of ethnic minorities in specific parts of the cities is considered a political problem in search of a solution. So is the increasing social and ethnic polarisation. These kinds of problems are given priority and series of policy issues are discussed as for example, integration versus assimilation, participation in the labour market, strengthening of the immigrants’ social capital, and focused urban renewal. By the 1980s there were clear signals in Sweden that

422

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

a growing number of immigrants faced serious problems of discrimination in the labour market and segregation in housing. The government formulated a strategy aiming at decentralising refugee reception. The obvious failure of this policy made the immigrant issue a hot political item, discussed in the context of growing urban poverty, social marginalisation and exclusion. The government decided to allocate extra funds in a special assistance programme for neighbourhood development in a limited number of segregated and ‘immigrant areas’ in the large cities. In Italy urban safety, the management of migration flows and cultural and social integration of immigrants are new sectors of intervention for today’s urban policy. These themes are also included in the political programme of the current national government. In 1999 the growing intra-urban disparities caused the federal government of Germany – in close cooperation with the 16 Länder – to launch an ambitious and challenging programme that follows conceptual ideas of strengthening the civil society and the integration of migrants and socially disadvantaged groups in society. The idea was to provide a new impetus for self sustained community development and to demonstrate that a new more flexible perception of policy and administration for decentralised district management is required to cope with the problems encountered. Some criticism has been articulated concerning the negative branding of the selected neighbourhoods, which unavoidably comes along with increased media coverage in local newspapers. In 2003 the successful programme came to an end. Elements of the programme continued in two other programmes (Umbau Ost and Umbau West), which are primarily residential renewal programmes. Safety The issue of safety in cities, both concrete safety problems as well as feelings of insecurity, is among the top priorities in some of the member states. The French, Dutch and Belgian reports are unambiguous in this respect. Since the last national elections in France in 2002, urban violence and urban safety have been the most significant urban issues. These issues are still a top priority for the population and politicians at the national and local level. The French report does not discuss how these issues are worked out in specific urban policies. In The Netherlands, the government stresses the importance of safety and integration issues. The first of the five urban policy objectives is improving the (real and perceived) safety conditions. It is considered to be a precondition for the sustainable development of cities. In Belgium crime prevention has been a political priority since the electoral victory of extreme right in 1992. The government introduced ‘safety contracts’ with 12 cities. The contracts transcended the regular activities of police forces, as they intend to tackle the causes, not the symptoms. Preventive measures were introduced including training and special employment programmes for youth delinquents, drug users, prostitutes and hooligans. In 1996, the initiative was renamed ‘safety and society contracts’ because of the broader approach that was adopted. From 2002 on, the contracts have become biannual and have

Synthesis

423

been renamed ‘safety and prevention contracts’. Seventy-three municipalities are involved with these contracts. One fifth of the projects that are formulated within the framework of the national Big Cities Policy concern projects that aim at improve safety conditions in cities. In the Danish, Spanish and Italian reports the urban safety issue is referred to as a relatively new sector of government intervention in relation to urban policy. From problem-led to opportunity-led policies The national governments in several countries have shifted the emphasis of policies relevant for cities. Problem-led policies, mostly directed to social problems, make way for opportunity-led policies, focusing on economic opportunities. First and foremost the awareness of the role major cities play in the competitiveness of regions and countries is growing. This change from ‘equity’ to ‘efficiency’ policies is visible since the mid-1980s particularly in the United Kingdom. Other countries have since followed. In the United Kingdom there is a growing recognition of the contribution that the largest cities could or should make to the national economic welfare. In The Netherlands the new draft national spatial policy document (2004) considers the development of the country’s network of cities as vital for the national competitiveness. The latest Danish national planning report shows strong ties to a report on regional growth strategies, which was released simultaneously. In this report the government presents its general ambition with regard to administrative efficiency and the creation of a business climate in favour of private sector demands as the main issue of regional policy. Regional competitiveness improvement is needed in order to safeguard future development and living conditions. The Finnish government launched a programme in 1997 to promote urban development that is economically, socially and ecologically sustainable. The focal point however, is the vitality and competitiveness of urban regions. According to the programme, urban policy is expected to safeguard the competitiveness of urban regions and the opportunities for socially balanced development. In Belgium the Flemish government stresses the need to shift the emphasis from problems to potentials. This is reflected in new criteria for the distribution of the City Fund: municipalities are no longer selected on the base of needs, but on their position in the urban hierarchy. The priority of urban policy in the Brussels region has changed as well. The attraction of higher income groups and business investments has become more important, whereas the attention for social exclusion and the need of the poor has decreased. Flagships In several countries large-scale ‘flagship’ projects are considered important catalysts for urban revitalisation and economic competitiveness. These flagship projects fit in the shift to opportunity-led policies. Examples of this kind of projects are the Öresund Bridge (and Örestad) in the Copenhagen-Malmö area, the EXPO’98 area in Lisbon, the Olympic Games in Athens, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao and the Cultural Capital status of Porto (2001). In The

424

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Netherlands urban revitalisation through large-scale public–private projects is promoted and co-financed by the state. The advent of the high-speed railway network will create opportunities for the stations on the nodes of the network. Therefore, the ministries involved have reserved one billion Euros for six highspeed railway station projects. With these urban projects the national government aims to improve the quality of life in the cities and to attract businesses and investors. Spatial policies Spatial planning policies to bring more balance in the national urban system are mentioned in the reports of Ireland and Portugal. However, in France this policy seems to be passé. The new Irish National Spatial Strategy proposes a major modification of current development trends. The aim is to secure a better and more rational future spatial pattern based on a more efficient Greater Dublin and the designation of ‘Gateway’ and ‘Hub’ cities. Future population and employment growth should preferably be concentrated in these centres. All relevant public sector policies and programmes will have to be consistent with the strategy and will be required to demonstrate that consistency. In the Portuguese report attention is drawn to a programme (PROSIURB) for the consolidation of the national urban system and support for the execution of municipal master plans. For the first time medium-sized cities have received explicit attention in urban policies. The French national policy, dating from the 1960s, to strive for a spatial balance between Paris and the provinces appears to be over, largely due to the on going European integration and internationalisation. The international competitive position of Paris has become a key issue that is more important than the dominant position of Paris in the national context. The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) has influenced and strengthened spatial planning in among others Italy, Ireland, Greece, Denmark and Luxembourg. The polycentric approach adopted in the ESDP is considered a challenge for national spatial planning, especially in countries with little experience in that field. In Germany a polycentric approach was already adopted for some time in the national spatial planning framework. Access Another theme that is relevant for most of the member states is the accessibility of urban areas and urban centres in particular. Section 5.2 ‘The State of the Cities’ highlights the pressure on the transportation system caused by suburbanisation and changing relations within polycentric urban regions. The sprawl and the increase in mobility of the EU population in general, jeopardises the accessibility of many urban areas across the EU. Many countries consider these urban issues within the framework of national transportation policies or have developed special transportation policies for cities. Public transport is still important in urban transportation policies but all together the accessibility by private modes of transport features in the policies as well. The countries that are or that will be connected to the European high speed train-network (HST) have special policies in place to make optimum use of that connection. Other countries

Synthesis

425

relate major urban transportation improvement to a major event (EXPO’98 in Lisbon, Portugal, the 2004 Olympics in Athens, Greece). It is quite difficult to see a lot of similarities in the priorities and strategies of the member states. The differences among the member states concerning the density and coverage of existing transportation networks are huge. The transportation networks for Greek islands and mainland are not the same as the extensive transportation networks in The Netherlands or the United Kingdom. 19.5

European Influence

Introduction In Chapter 3 an overview of European urban policy development and the role European institutions play with respect to urban issues was presented. The effects of European policies and subsidies on cities and the perceived effect of ‘Europe’ on national urban policy-making have been discussed in the national reports. Obviously, in one way or the other, all European policies have direct and indirect impacts on cities. The general reaction is that there are clear advantages of European urban subsidies and policies, both explicit urban policies (such as URBAN) and ‘indirect’ urban policies (such as the Objectives of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund). The need for a European urban policy is not equally endorsed. The British report asserts that the national government takes the view that there is no rationale for the EU to be involved in urban matters outside the accession countries. In most of Northwestern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, except for the ‘new’ Länder) and in Austria the effects of European subsidies are considered as minor. But it appears that even in these countries the impact of European policies is to be seen in ‘qualitative’ rather than in ‘quantitative’ terms. For the cohesion countries (Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Spain) and parts of Italy and Germany, Europe is very important. The Spanish report maintains that European policies helped to bridge the gap with other countries in the Union, and all of them had an impact on cities, either in a direct or in an indirect way while the Irish report claims that the structural funds have enabled rapid progress to be made in respect of urban transport and infrastructures, as well as assisting in the skilling and reskilling of the labour force. In Greece suggestions by the European Commission have been followed to add a territorial dimension to their national policies for the 3rd Community Support Framework, including explicit attention to urban development. The approach followed in URBAN was the first occasion to consider both socioeconomic challenges in relation to spatial structures. The Portuguese country report observes that, although the Structural Funds have a significant urban impact in the domains of infrastructure, sewage and waste disposal, a more integrated response to urban problems is requested. Several countries – including

426

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

France – have adopted new national planning periods to match the timespan of the European programmes. As for the Objective 1 regions of the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, overcoming the lack of infrastructure is a prime objective. There is no full assessment of the impact on urban development, but there is no doubt about the positive contribution to the accessibility of cities. Accessibility is crucial to make the most of the potentials and chances of cities. Regions coming under Objective 2 dedicate a considerable part of the European budget to local and urban development, as is quoted from among others the Spanish report. URBAN: A Considerable Success The ‘European added value’ of the URBAN Community Initiative has been based more on its methodology than on its budgets. URBAN is generally appreciated because of its specific approach. For several countries, the introduction of integrated, area-based policies for social and economic problem districts, is considered as an important innovation in policy-making. Several benefits are listed in the national reports such as: the long-term comprehensive strategic view that is requested, the principles of partnership that have to be taken into account, budgets for several years, and the community participation in decisionmaking. The Italian report states that URBAN has reduced the cultural gap between Europe and the citizens and it has contributed to develop local project management capacity. In the United Kingdom URBAN has contributed to modernise urban management with a strong focus upon innovation. In Greece, URBAN generated significant pressures for changes in national urban policymaking as well as for the implementation at the local levels. URBAN inspired French urban policy-making as far as the introduction of evaluation is concerned. It inspired the set up of a metropolitan policy in Sweden and a ‘social urban renewal policy’ in Belgium. Apart from general appreciation, the national reports contain some criticism as well. Budgets available are not large enough for the scale of the challenges involved. For some countries URBAN was not really innovative. It could easily be incorporated in existing long term area-based programmes (United Kingdom, The Netherlands and France). In the Greek report, the learning process of URBAN is seen as positive but did not lead to a turnaround in policy-making (not to mention urban conditions). Another critical remark, not exclusively referring to URBAN but to European subsidies in general, is that the system is slow and bureaucratic (United Kingdom). Dutch cities appear to be hesitant to make use of ESF budgets, the reason being that the administrative procedures are considered as extremely complicated and time-consuming. Finally, two national reports (United Kingdom and The Netherlands) point to a controversy in European policy. Some government grants to urban areas designed to finance regeneration projects by providing incentives for private sector investment have been outlawed by DG Competition on the grounds they are state aids.

Synthesis

427

Other European Policies As already mentioned, the European Spatial Development Perspective has influenced (and relatively strengthened) spatial policy-making in most countries. The polycentric approach is considered a challenge for national spatial planning. In a few countries with a strong tradition in spatial planning, the polycentric approach has already been adopted for some time in the national spatial planning framework. Apart from the Objectives and URBAN, INTERREG was regularly mentioned as another programme that supports cross border relations without actually contributing to urban policy-making. Structural funds also provided means for specific physical or functional projects as for example, for the binational Öresund Bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö and the World Expo grounds in Lisbon. The Spanish report mentions the localisation of European Agencies as relevant for cities in terms of economic spin-off and city marketing. It helps cities to put themselves ‘on the map’. European legislation does have considerable impact on national legislation. As a consequence, it does have impact on cities and on urban policy-making, especially with respect to environmental quality and transport deregulation. In the Dutch report immigration and the integration of ethnic minorities were mentioned as an important policy issue for large cities. European legislation sets the margins for stronger Dutch immigration laws. Exchange of Practices Next to subsidies and regulations, the international exchange of knowledge and experience is considered a positive contribution of EU policies in most of the national reports. The European institutions stimulate this exchange, for instance by the URBACT programme. The European impact is positively influenced by a vast array of networks, information flows, exchanges and research funding initiatives. Some cities are active in various European wide learning networks, picking ‘good practices’ from various cities. In Germany and Austria a private sector supported Deutsch-Oesterreichisches URBAN Netzwerk will continue to link the participating cities and disseminate replicable experience to other German and Austrian cities, and thus perfectly meets the communication of best practice criteria of the EU Programme. Appreciated by Cities At the local level, influences of EU-urban policies have apparently been more penetrating then on the national level, as can be learned from the URBAN experience. Some country reports (United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Spain, France and Belgium) explicitly state that cities appreciate European programmes. There

428

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

are several reasons for that. They give them an alternative source of revenue, as national spending is low or reduced. Or they offer an alternative route to power, as the national government appears to restrict their powers and responsibilities. Cities seem to attach importance to the guarantee of European funds and that Europe should continue to play a major part in encouraging the social cohesion as well as the economic competitiveness of cities and regions in Europe. Moreover, the European title gives special status to projects. In Spain URBAN is seen by cities as an essential addition to their development opportunities, which they often enjoy independently of the national government’s will. The four largest Dutch cities – and they are not unique in this – are convinced that the European institutions are important enough to establish a joint office in Brussels to represent the four cities and to look after their common interests. This shows that the cities want to play their part on the EU level, with or without support from the national authorities. Overall Conclusion Even without a formal statement in the European treaties relating to cities or towns, Europe appears to have a great deal to offer in the field of urban policy. There are relatively few reliable quantifiable indicators to measure the full impact of EU policies and subsidies, so little can be substantiated. The perceived impact however is quite positive. URBAN particularly is appreciated by both national and local authorities. Of course the impact differs from country to country: the French report argues that structural funds only represent 0.17 per cent of the national GNP and as such cannot pretend to have a significant impact on the economy and employment, let alone the impact on urban areas. We conclude this overview by quoting from the German report: ‘Due to the fact that the majority of target groups and beneficiaries of European policies (with the exception of agricultural policies) are concentrated in densely-populated territories, this clearly further supports the concentration of innovative and future-oriented activities in metropolitan regions all over Europe …’ (Chapter 9 of this volume, p. 188). 19.6

Summary of the Main Conclusions

What is the state of the art concerning explicit national urban policies in the 15 ‘old’ member states of the European Union? What can be said about the change in national urban policy development since the mid-1990s? 1

What is the state of the European cities?

1.1 1.2

Capital cities are major contributors to economic growth. A growing number of member states see cities as engines for their national economy.

Synthesis

1.3 1.4

1.5

1.6 1.7 1.8

1.9

1.10

429

The economic performance of (former industrial) cities in transition is generally below the national average. Social disparities within cities and also between city and region have widened, leading to stronger social polarisation and spatial fragmentation. Immigration is above all a concern for the larger cities of Europe as the urban pockets of poverty have become the domain of immigrants and other ethic minorities. Urban safety and increasing feelings of insecurity have become a major issue. The continuous pattern of suburbanisation in most of the member states challenges the transportation infrastructure and planning The rise of polycentric urban regions affects core cities as their city centres have to compete with suburban shopping centres, business parks and housing developments. Affordable housing is a central urban issue in the majority of the member states; some member states identify the lack of housing for the middle and higher income groups as a challenge. Most national reports show that urban challenges do not stop at the municipal border and there is debate about changing urban and regional governance a growing number of member states.

2

What is the state of the art concerning national urban policy-making and what are important changes in the national policy responses in the member states?

2.1

A first conclusion is that the situation is not very different from that in 1997, although explicit national policy attention for the larger cities has grown somewhat since 1997. Generally speaking, the increased awareness of the (inter)national importance of urban and regional competitiveness, especially within the EU level playing field, and the pattern of social exclusion in cities, have contributed to this (modest) increase in attention. On the whole, the conclusion must be that the general picture for national urban policies in the EU-15 is still diverse, notwithstanding ongoing European integration and internationalisation. Administrative, political, economic, social, cultural, geographical and historical differences account for the great variety of national urban policies. At the same time, the international comparison identifies a number of common trends and developments for groups of member states. Four member states have formulated extensive explicit national urban policies (United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands and Belgium).

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5 2.6

430

2.7

2.8 2.9

2.10

2.11

2.12

2.13

2.14 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.18

2.19

2.20

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Six countries (Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Italy and Portugal) have put urban issues on their national agendas, although the policy responses do not have the same critical mass as in the four countries mentioned above. Five countries have not formulated explicit national urban policies (Ireland, Spain, Greece, Austria and Luxembourg). There is some evidence that empowerment of cities has become more important. There is more elbow room for the cities (and sometimes regions) in the national urban policy frameworks, at least for the four countries with explicit national urban policies. The empowerment of cities is associated with more national attention for bottom-up initiatives as to traditional top-down approaches have become less popular; the situation is different in the Nordic countries, the federal states and Luxembourg because there the local and regional level are relatively autonomous. There are several examples of cities (independently or through associations) that have come up with initiatives and in some cases have exerted more influence on the national urban policy agenda. The growing attention for (local) partnerships and the importance of civic involvement are unmistakably repeated themes in the urban policies of the member states. Most national governments see partnerships (among cities as well as between public and private parties) almost as a precondition for the effective delivery of national urban policies. Another major trend in EU member states is the attempt to come to a more integrated approach in the delivery of national urban policies. The large number of area-based initiatives indicates that the national governments have faith in the effectiveness of these policies. The selection criteria, the spatial scope and the (mis)match with mainstream policies are barriers to successful area-based policies. Several member states have developed policies to prevent intraregional competition. Social exclusion appears to be the most difficult problem to solve in most large cities across Europe. The policy responses to combat this problem differ considerably: residential and urban renewal (applied almost everywhere); more affordable housing; preventing urban sprawl and promote compact cities; supporting social mix in neighbourhoods; providing cheap public transport; integration policies of ethnic minorities; reducing dependency on state allowances. In most of the member states housing policies and (mostly) physical interventions (urban renewal and urban regeneration) are used to combat social exclusion. In some countries demolition programmes of outdated housing estates have been planned or carried in the fight against social exclusion.

Synthesis

2.21

2.22

2.23 2.24 2.25 2.26

2.27

431

In most countries the integration of ethnic minorities and immigrants is increasingly considered a major issue that is most of all a challenge to cities. Integration problems are increasingly linked to social exclusion and feelings of insecurity. In a number of the relatively prosperous Western European countries explicit integration policies are now starting to form a considerable part of national urban policy making. The issue of safety in cities, both concrete safety problems as well as feelings of insecurity, is among the top priorities in some of the member states. The national governments in several countries have shifted the emphasis from (social) problem-led policies to (economic) opportunity-led policies. In several countries large-scale ‘flagship’ projects are considered important catalysts for urban revitalisation and economic competitiveness. Some member states still see spatial planning policies as a means to maintain equilibrium in the national urban system, other member states pay more attention to the international competitive position of key urban areas. Many countries consider these urban accessibility issues within the framework of national transportation policies or have developed special transportation policies for cities.

3

What role is attributed to European policy with respect to urban development and urban policy-making?

3.1

The EU appears to have a great deal to offer in the field of urban policy. The perceived impact is quite positive. URBAN particularly is appreciated, not so much for its budget, but for its approach. Generally speaking, most cities in the member states appreciate the European programmes. They give them an alternative source of revenue and a chance to look beyond the national borders. The international exchange of knowledge and experience is considered a positive contribution of EU policies in most member states. The impact of European legislation on cities and on national urban policymaking should not be underestimated.

3.2

3.3 3.4

The national reports also make it very clear that the development of cities and regions is unmistakably closely related to two very important EU objectives. Cities and city regions are key drivers of the EU’s competitiveness, whereas the increased social polarisation within cities and regions is perhaps the biggest threat to social cohesion in the EU territory. Europe’s cities struggle to strike a balance between competitiveness and cohesion. This is a fundamental challenge for the local, regional, national and EU level of government. The subsidiarity principle makes national governments the liaison between the local and European level. It is very important that they really play this intermediary role. For one, this implies

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National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

that there should be room for bottom-up initiatives from cities within the national urban policy framework. Increasingly, (associations of) cities raise their voices looking for support and acknowledgement of higher layers of government. For another, national governments should also incorporate the European dimension in their national urban policy framework. A balanced development of cities is in the interest of local and national governments as well as the EU. Both the cities and the EU need the support from the national governments both politically and through supportive national urban policies.

Annex 1

The Basics of EU Regional Policy EU Regional Policy 2000–20061 The European Union’s Regional Policy is based on financial solidarity among Member States; this means that part of the Community budget goes to less prosperous regions. For the present programming period 2000–2006 this part of the Community budget is equal to €213 billion (approximately one third of the total Community budget), which comes mainly from the richest Member States to the least favoured regions. The solidarity approach helps not only the beneficiary countries but also the net contributors, as their enterprises profit in return from major investment opportunities since the beneficiary regions are regions where various types of economic activity have not yet really taken off. The aim of the EU Regional Policy is to make the European Union more competitive. In the present programming period the financial resources of the EU Regional Policy are divided into two main funds: the Structural Funds (SF), attracting the biggest part of these resources (€195 billions), and the Cohesion Fund (CF), attracting the rest €18 billions. The Structural Funds Almost the totality of the financial resources of the SF (93,56 per cent) is used on three main clearly defined priorities, called objectives: •

Objective 1 has the aim to help regions whose development is lagging behind; this programme involves some 50 regions, home of 22 per cent of the EU’s population. The Objective 1 can be considered as the main priority of the European Union’s cohesion policy and as the most important programme of the EU Regional Policy since it gets €135,9 billion that represent respectively 70 per cent of the SF budget and 63 per cent of the total budget for the EU Regional Policy. The regions that are ‘lagging behind’ are those regions where the gross domestic product (GDP) is below 75 per cent of the Community average and where low level of investments, higher than average unemployment rate, lack of services for businesses and poor basic infrastructure can be found.

1

All data presented in this paragraph are based on the information available on the website of the DG for Regional Policy (http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/ index_en.htm).

434

•

•

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

In this case the aim of the SF is to support the growth of economic activities in these regions. Objective 2 has the aim to assist economic and social conversion in industrial, rural, urban or fisheries-dependent areas that, though situated in regions whose development level is close to the Community average, are experiencing structural difficulties; it receives €22.5 billion, which is 11.5 per cent of the SF budget. Regions included in the Objective 2 programme host 18 per cent of the EU population. Objective 3 has the aim of promoting the modernisation of training systems and the creation of employment outside Objective 1 regions, where such measures form part of the strategies for catching up. This programme receives €24.05 billion, that is, 12.3 per cent of the SF budget. The new Objective 3 combines the former Objectives 3 and 4 of the 1994–1999 programming period and represents the reference framework for all measures that can be used to promote human resources in the Union.

The remaining financial resources of the SF are used mainly for four special programmes, called the Community Initiatives (CIs), which try to find common solutions to specific problems affecting the whole EU. The CIs for the period 2000–2006 are: • • • •

INTERREG III, which promotes cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation; URBAN II, which promotes innovative strategies to regenerate cities and declining urban areas; Leader +, which promotes new local strategies for sustainable development in rural societies; Equal, which promotes the attempt to eliminate the factors leading to inequalities and discrimination in the labour market.

Together, the four CIs absorb 5.35 per cent or €10.44 billion of the SF budget. A small part of the SF is meant for the adjustment of fisheries areas outside the Objective 1 regions (€1.11 billion or 0.51 per cent of the SF budget) and for the development of innovative actions to promote and experiment new ideas that have not been yet adequately exploited (€1 billion or 0.5 per cent of the SF budget). At the moment there are four SFs through which the EU grant financial assistance to regions: •

The European Regional Development Funds (ERDF), whose aim is to reduce the imbalances between regions or social groups and represents the main instrument to promote economic and social cohesion within the EU.

Annex 1

•

•

•

435

The ERDF finances projects of the Objective 1 and 2 and of the Community Initiatives INTERREG III and URBAN II. The European Social Fund (ESF), the main tool for the implementation of the European Union’s employment policy. It grants financial assistance on the projects of Objective 1, 2 and 3 and of the CI Equal. The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) has the main aim of supporting the restructuring of the agricultural sector and the development of rural areas. It supports programmes under Objective 1 and 2 and the CI Leader+. The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) represents the specific instrument for the structural reform of the fisheries sector.

Objective Outside Objective 1 Objective 1 2 regions ERDF ESF EAGGF FIFG

X X X X

X X X X

Objective INTERREG URBAN 3 III II

X

Leader +

Equal

X

X

X X

Source: DG for Regional Policy.

The Cohesion Fund The CF is a special solidarity fund set up in order to help the four least prosperous Member States: Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain. Absorbing €18 billions for the seven-year period 2000–2006 it helps these countries to finance major projects in the field of environment (helping these states to achieve the objectives of the Community’s environmental policy) and transport (to sustain the TEN). The Commission has chosen to split the funds 50:50 between the two categories.

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Annex 2

List of National Government Representatives Austria Belgium

Roland Arbter (Federal Chancellery) Pascale Lambin (Ministre de la Fonction publique, de l’Intégration sociale, de la Politique des Grandes Villes, de l’Egalité des chances, en chargé de l’Interculturalité) Denmark Mette Kragh, (Ministry of the Environment) and Bue Nielsen (Spatial Planning Department) Finland Valle Antti (Ministry of the Interior) France Gilles Garcia (Mission Europe et international Délégation interministérielle à la ville) and Mrs. Catherine Badie (Mission des politiques communautaires territoriales) Germany Wendelin Strubelt (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung: Raumordnung, Städtebau) Greece Christos Zambelis (Ministry of the Environment, Planning and Public Works) Ireland Liam Whelan (Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government) Italy Cinzia Zincone (Ministry for Infrastructures and Transport)* Luxembourg Myriam Bentz (Ministry of the Interior) Portugal: Maria José Festas and Albina Martinho (Ministry of the Cities, Spatial Planning and Environment) Spain Rodolfo Segura (Ministry of Housing) Sweden Beatrice Larsson (Ministry of Justice) United Kingdom Ian Hardy (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) *

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Index accessibility 4, 6, 8, 25, 31–2, 36, 75, 87, 108, 112, 116–17, 121, 146, 158, 193, 245–6, 263, 274, 286–8, 292–3, 299, 323–4, 326, 329, 336, 342, 354, 370, 372, 399, 408, 416, 420, 424, 426, 431 asylum seekers 9, 23, 175, 177, 291 Austria 16–21, 23, 30, 34, 36, 63, 64–78, 404, 410, 413, 415, 425, 427, 430 Bregenz 63 Graz 63, 67, 69, 73, 75 Innsbruck 63 Klagenfurt 63, 73 Landesfachplanungen 67 Landesraumordnungsprogramme 67 Linz 63, 73 Planungsgemeinschaft-Ost 67 Regionale Raumordnungsprogramme 67 Salzburg 63, 67, 73 St Pölten 63, 73, 74, 76 Vienna 16, 18, 22, 30, 42, 63, 65–70, 73–5 Villach 63 Belfast 5 Belgium 16–21, 23–4, 30, 33–4, 36, 79–104, 401–4, 406, 411, 413, 417–18, 422–3, 425–7, 429 Aanvullende Belasting op de Personenbelasting (APB) 82, 83 Anderlecht 96 Antwerp 79, 82–4, 86–7, 90, 92–3, 96–8 Big Cities Policy 96, 406, 423 Bruges 83 Brussels 5, 16, 20, 22, 30, 39, 41, 79, 81–2, 84–7, 89–98, 104, 288, 307, 400, 406, 413, 423, 428 BuurtOntwikkelingsMaatschappij (BOM) 90, 93 Charleroi 79, 83–4, 87, 93, 96, 98, 104 City Fund 94, 95, 413, 419, 423 Flanders 20, 79, 80, 82, 83, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 413, 419

Gemeentefonds (Municipality Fund) 83, 84, 94 Ghent 79, 83–4, 87, 90, 92, 96, 104 La Louvière 79, 87, 96, 98, 104 Leuven 79, 92, 104 Liège 79, 83–4, 86, 87, 93, 96, 104 Molenbeek 96 Mons 79, 84, 87, 96, 98, 104 Namur 79, 84, 104 Oostende 96 priority zones for intervention (ZIPs) 91, 95 Schaarbeek 96 Seraing 96 Social Impulse Fund (SIF) 30, 93, 94, 95, 413 Sint-Gillis 96 Sint-Joost 96 Vlaams Blok 90, 93, 94, 97 Vorst 96 Wallonia 82, 86, 89, 91, 92, 93, 98 Cavallier Report 153 Central and Eastern Europe 9 centralisation 20 Cheshire Report 41 competitiveness 1, 7, 36–7, 42–3, 45–7, 60, 74, 94, 107, 115–17, 119, 120–21, 132, 134–6, 138–9, 142–4, 151, 162, 164, 187–8, 242, 253, 260, 262, 264, 302, 312, 317–18, 323, 329, 380, 384, 387–9, 394, 397, 403, 405, 407, 423, 428–9, 431 conservation 25, 108, 171, 188, 225, 226, 233, 242, 334 convergence 43, 333, 341, 346, 351 core competencies 7 crime 5, 9, 23, 24, 33, 54, 56, 91, 92, 98, 228, 257, 258, 259, 292, 297, 299, 385, 392, 402, 419, 422 drug-related 9, 23, 24, 91, 92, 228, 305, 422

440

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

prevention 54, 92, 98, 422 prostitution 92, 422 vandalism 33, 182 violence 153, 305, 422 youth delinquency 9, 92, 298, 422 crime rates 5, 91, 292, 402 cultural facilities 177, 294, 322, 410, 419 cultural heritage 25, 117, 292 cultural infrastructure 151, 169, 208 DATAR 4, 26, 146, 155, 158, 160 de-urbanisation 18, 408 decentralisation 20–21, 30, 33, 35, 39, 56, 72, 74, 86, 106–7, 147–8, 154, 157, 161–2, 164–5, 181, 237, 246, 251, 253–4, 256, 275, 277, 296, 301, 304, 308, 312, 326, 328, 337, 343, 405–6, 409, 410, 412, 422 Denmark 16–22, 25, 31, 34, 36, 49, 105–24, 372, 401–2, 404, 407, 414, 418, 421, 424–5, 430 Aalborg 9, 13, 49, 109, 110, 112, 117 Århus 109, 110, 112, 117 Børkop 112 Bornholm 106, 116 Building and Urban Research Institute 108, 113 Copenhagen 16, 31, 32, 36, 105–12, 115–17, 119, 121, 372, 400, 408, 423, 427 Esbjerg 112, 117 Fredericia 112 Frederiksberg 106, 110 Funen 110, 112, 117 Herning 112 Holstebro 112 Ikast 112 Jutland 112, 117 Kolding 112 Lunderskov 112 Middelfart 110, 112 Odense 109, 110, 112, 117 Örestadsplan 116, 408 Öresund region 32, 105, 107, 108, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 423, 427 Struer 112 Urban Commission 108, 121 Vamdrup 112

Vejen 112 Vejle 112 Directorates General (DGs) 39, 44, 46, 49, 50, 59 Education and Culture 49 Energy 48 Environment 46, 48, 49, 59 Employment and Social Affairs 47, 48 Regional Policy 39, 46, 47, 54, 57, 59, 433, 435 Research 49 Transport 48, 59 disurbanisation 18 Eastern Europe 9, 72, 75, 170, 171, 190, 195, 199, 367 Czech Republic 74 Hungary 74 Slovak Republic 74 economic development and growth 6, 11, 18, 25, 31, 47, 88, 92–3, 95, 98, 108, 125, 128–9, 133, 140, 148–50, 157, 161, 163–4, 169, 171, 175, 179, 220, 224–5, 236, 252, 261–2, 273–4, 277, 282–3, 286, 290, 300–31, 343, 334, 363, 368–9, 382, 392, 394, 400–1, 407, 409, 411, 428 education 6, 8, 9, 23, 24, 29, 50, 54, 56, 68, 80, 109, 116, 127–8, 133, 137, 148, 161, 170, 180, 184, 199, 220, 236, 242, 265, 285, 288–9, 291, 293–4, 299, 304–5, 312, 314–18, 323, 325, 327, 330, 363, 369, 372–3, 382–3, 385–6, 388, 392, 397, 401, 416, 419 environmental policies 29, 214, 265, 347, 348, 355, 416 environmental problems 1, 10, 56, 70, 108, 111, 352, 421 environmental quality 5, 292, 427 European Community 39–46, 48, 50–51, 54, 58–60, 209 Eurocities 12, 51, 98, 141 European Commission 3, 4, 37, 39, 43, 44, 47, 48, 53, 56, 58, 162, 172, 189, 212, 335, 351, 353, 425 European Community 40, 50, 54, 271, 341, 351, 408 CIVITAS initiative 48

Index

441

NUTS II 220–23, 240, 323–4, 326 European integration 1, 6, 119, 122, 164, NUTS III 196, 201, 203, 222–3 424, 429 Regional Policy 39–42, 45–7, 50, 57, 59, European Investment Bank (EIB) 50, 59, 353, 433, 435 271 Structural Funds 41–3, 45, 47, 50–52, European Parliament 49, 50, 59 54, 56, 59–60, 75, 96, 162–3, 208–9, Committee of the Regions 21, 50, 59 211–12, 239–40, 276, 285, 306, 312, European unification 6 315, 317–19, 321–2, 326–30, 351–2, European Union 1–3, 5, 7, 9, 15, 17, 23, 376–7, 408, 410, 425–6, 433 29, 32, 34–6, 39–54, 56, 58–60, 69, 75– Objective 1 43, 45, 47, 52–4, 56–7, 7, 85–6, 90, 97–9, 117–19, 121, 122, 59–60, 97, 143, 162–3, 188, 352, 125, 127, 129–30, 134, 137, 141–3, 396, 426, 433–5 160, 170–72, 175, 188–90, 193–6, 200, Objective 2 43, 45, 47, 51–2, 54, 56–7, 204–5, 207–8, 212–13, 223–5, 227, 59–60, 75, 96–7, 119, 141, 143, 229–30, 232, 239–41, 254, 256–7, 262, 162–4, 188, 276, 306, 352, 426, 434 266, 271–2, 276–7, 279, 282–3, 306–7, Objective 2b 352 314–19, 321, 323, 325, 327–30, 338, Objective 3 47, 54, 58, 141, 162, 306, 342–3, 349–52, 354, 361, 368, 372, 434 376–7, 387, 397, 399, 400–404, 410, Objective 6 141 415–16, 418, 424–5, 427–35 URBACT 42, 53–5, 58, 98, 427 Cohesion Funds 41–3, 45, 47, 211–12, URBAN 13, 42–3, 45–7, 50–54, 56, 224, 240, 319, 351, 352, 356, 425–6, 58–60, 69, 75, 90, 96–7, 119, 141–3, 433, 435 162–3, 172, 184, 188–9, 208–11, Cohesion Policy 43, 44, 45, 58 232, 239, 255–6, 266, 306, 315, 318, Community Initiative for Sustainable 320, 328–30, 352–3, 356, 396, 408, Development 52 410, 418, 420, 425–8, 431, 434–5 EQUAL Community Initiative 47 URBAN+ 43, 45–6, 51, 58, 60 European Regional Development Fund URBAN I 42, 46–7, 51–3, 60, 75, 90, (ERDF) 40, 43, 41, 45, 47, 52–4, 59, 188, 239, 315 70, 75, 232, 239–40, 319, 322, 329, URBAN II 42–3, 45–7, 51–3, 58, 75, 396, 434, 435 97, 119, 239, 306, 329, 434–5 European Social Fund (ESF) 43, 45, 47, 52, 188, 239, 306, 329, 396, 426, 435 Finland 16–19, 21, 23–5, 31, 34–6, 125–44, European Spatial Development 386, 402, 404, 407, 414, 418, 425, 430 Perspective (ESDP) 65, 77, 117, Centre of Expertise Programme (CoE) 121, 189, 210–12, 222, 229, 234, 129, 136–7, 139, 141, 143, 407 241, 409, 424, 427 Espoo 125, 128, 132–3, 138, 140, 414 Eurostat 4, 5, 13, 50, 54, 59, 125, 271, 388 Helsinki 16–17, 125, 127–33, 135, INTERREG 74–5, 118–19, 188–9, 239, 138–40, 143–4, 400, 407, 414–15 276, 427, 434–5 Itä-Uusimaa 140 LEADER Community Initiative 119, Jyväskylä 125, 129, 143 233, 239 Kauniainen 138, 414 member states 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 15, 16, Kuopio 125, 129, 141, 143 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 29, 32, 33, 35, Lahti 125 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, Oulu 125, 127, 129–30, 133, 140, 143–4 48, 50, 54, 56, 58, 59, 276, 308, 351, Pori 125, 143 399–404, 406, 411, 415–19, 423–5, Regional Centre Programme 135–6, 428–31 138–9, 142–3, 407, 414, 417 new member states 2, 9

442

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Tampere 125, 127, 129–30, 140, 143–44 Turku 125, 129, 130, 140, 143 Uusimaa 140 Vantaa 125, 138, 140, 414 Yrjö Neuvo 138 Fortuyn, Pim 292, 295 frameworks 158 administrative 1, 2, 13, 11, 5, 19, 22, 35, 147, 149, 210, 283, 312, 316, 355, 380, 400 financial 1, 2, 3, 11, 15, 19, 21, 35, 147, 154, 283, 294, 301, 312, 316, 328, 380 policy 32, 296, 299, 404, 405, 406, 413, 414, 415, 416, 420, 432 political 1, 149 policy 1, 200, 413, 430 France 16–22, 24, 26–30, 32, 34–6, 93, 145–68, 170, 199, 380, 401, 404–5, 411–12, 416, 418–19, 421–2, 424, 426–7, 429 Bordeaux 146, 153, 159–60, 162 Chartres d’objectifs 26, 27 Chevènement Act 154–6, 158, 159, 412, 416, 419 communautés d’agglomération 149, 154, 156, 157, 159, 160, 164, 405, 412, 416 communautés de communes 149, 154, 156, 159, 405 communautés urbaines 149, 154, 156–7, 159, 160, 164, 405, 412, 416 Contrat de Plan Etat-region (CPER) 157, 163 contrats de ville 26–7, 151, 162, 164 cumul des mandats 149 Douai-Lens 146, 147 Grands Projets Urbains (GPU) 151, 162 Grenoble 146, 153, 162 Ile-de-France 146, 147, 152, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164 Le Havre 162 Lille 22, 93, 145–7, 151, 153, 160, 163 Lyon 22, 146, 147, 153 Marseilles 18, 22, 146, 153, 159 ‘métropoles d’équilibre’ 26, 147, 150 Nancy 160 Nantes 146, 151

National Federation of Urban Development Agencies (FNAU) 162 National Institute for Statistics (INSEE) 145, 146, 152, 154, 167 Nice 146, 179 Montpellier 5 Paris 16, 24, 85, 146–7, 150–51, 153, 159, 163–4, 179, 288, 314, 387, 400, 424 Rennes 146, 147, 153, 160 Réseaux de Villes 26 Rouen 146, 153 Saint Etienne 147 Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale (SCOT) 158, 160, 161 Strasbourg 146, 162 Toulon 146 Toulouse 146, 147, 153 Voynet Act 154, 155, 157, 158, 160, 418 freight transport 177, 288 gentrification 96, 208, 245, 246 German Democratic Republic 32 Germany 4, 16–25, 30, 32, 34, 36, 93, 117, 147, 169––92, 288, 386, 401–4, 406, 414–22, 424–5, 427, 430 Baden-Württemberg 170 Bavaria 170, 184 Berlin 16, 17, 22, 42, 85, 109, 169, 171, 173, 174, 178, 180, 182, 184, 415 Bonn 171, 174, 180 Brandenburg 22, 177, 178, 184 Bremen 20, 22, 30, 173, 178, 182, 183, 185 Cologne 173, 174 Cottbus 182 Dessau 184, 185 Die Soziale Stadt 181, 406, 417 Dortmund 173, 174, 179 Dresden 174 Duisburg 173, 174 Dusseldorf 174 Düsseldorf 173, 179, 180 Eigenheimzulage 187 Eisenhüttenstadt 177 Essen 5, 169, 173, 174 ExWoSt Forschungsfelder 170, 183, 415

Index Frankfurt 17, 22, 173–4, 178, 180, 184 Gelsenkirchen 179 Gewerbesteuer 187 Görlitz 177 Güstrow 184 Halle 174 Hamburg 20, 22, 30, 109, 117, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 184 Hannover 173 Hanover 22, 178, 184, 188 Heidelberg 184 Hombruch 179 Leipzig 174, 177, 179 Ludwigsfelde 169 Mittlerer Neckar 22 Munich 17, 169, 173–4, 179–80, 187, 400 Münster 184 North Rhine-Westphalia 170, 172, 184, 186 Nuremberg 188 Oberhausen 179 Oer-Erkenschwick 183 Pendlerpauschale 187 Pirmasens 183 Potsdam 169, 175 reunification 169, 171, 172, 177, 190 Rhine-Westphalia 406 Ruhr area 22 Salzgitter 183 Schwedt 177 Soziale Stadt 172, 181, 182, 406, 417 Stuttgart 169, 173, 174, 178, 179, 184 Umbau Ost 182, 406, 420, 422 Umbau West 182, 183, 420, 422 Völklingen 183, 188 Westphalia 172 Wilhelmshaven 183 Witten 175 globalisation 1, 6, 7, 116, 120, 174, 176, 178, 186, 188, 210, 211, 262, 312, 317 Greece 16–21, 23–5, 32–4, 36, 42, 45, 193–216, 342, 401, 404, 410, 413–15, 418, 421, 424–6, 430, 435 Athens 16, 18, 32, 194–7, 201–9, 211, 213, 402, 423, 425 Attica 195–6, 201, 202 cadastre 199, 208

443

General Urban Plan 199, 200, 210 Heraklio 201, 203, 205 Larissa 201, 203, 206 Patras 201, 203, 205 Salonika 208 Thessalonica 16 Thessaloniki 194, 195, 196, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 213 Volos 201, 203, 205, 206 health care 127, 128, 133, 364, 365 homelessness 9, 228, 391 housing 24–5, 31, 88, 83, 91, 113, 142, 157, 171–2, 174–5, 177, 182–3, 198, 209, 220, 227–8, 230, 234, 282, 290–91, 293, 299, 337, 340, 366, 371, 377, 390–91, 401, 403, 406, 416, 420–21, 430 immigration 75, 85–6, 89–90, 93, 96, 108, 113–15, 127, 130–32, 170, 173, 179, 194–5, 201–2, 204–6, 246, 258–9, 265, 274, 279, 282, 291–2, 295–6, 305, 307, 333–40, 355, 361, 367, 369, 374–5, 401, 405, 407, 421–2, 427, 429, 431 industrialisation 18, 79, 93, 152, 282, 334, 362 information and communication technology (ICT) 6, 7, 53, 127, 130, 132, 262, 342, 368 infrastructure 10, 24–5, 30–32, 36, 46, 56, 65, 69–70, 107, 111, 117–18, 127, 137, 147, 150, 153, 160, 164, 169, 171, 175–6, 179–81, 183, 193, 196, 198– 200, 202, 204–5, 207–9, 212–13, 225, 227, 232–3, 237–9, 241, 245, 254–5, 257, 259–63, 273, 276, 285, 287–8, 293, 318, 325, 327, 330, 339, 345, 348, 351–2, 368–71, 377, 395, 402, 409–10, 425, 426, 429, 433 internationalisation 29, 70, 85, 106, 134, 164, 282, 339, 341, 354, 403, 424, 429 Ireland 16–21, 23, 28–9, 34, 36, 45, 217–44, 404, 409, 413–14, 418, 420, 424–25, 430, 435 Athlone 235, 237 Bray 222 Carlow 222 Celtic Tiger 224, 227

444

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Community Support Framework 224, 239, 240, 312, 425 Cork 220–22, 231, 233, 235–36, 238–40 Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DOEHLG) 217–18, 223, 225, 231–32, 237, 241 Drogheda 222 Dublin 16, 217–28, 230–41, 400, 409, 424 Dublin Docklands Development Authority 226, 232 Dundalk 222, 235 Dun Laoghaire 222 Ennis 221, 222 Fingal 222 Functional Areas 220, 221 Galway 220, 221, 222, 235, 236 ‘Gateways’ 220, 223, 234, 235, 236, 237, 241, 409 ‘Hubs’ 235, 236, 237, 409, 424 Integrated Area Plans 226, 230, 231 Kilkenny 222 Letterkenny 235 Limerick 4, 220–22, 231, 235–6, 238, 240 Mullingar 235, 237 Naas 222 National Development Plan, 2000–2006 220, 223–5, 228, 232, 234–6, 239–41 National Spatial Strategy, 2002–2020 (NSS) 218, 220, 221, 223, 225, 229, 234–7, 242, 409, 424 Navan 222 Planning and Development Act 225, 229, 230, 241 Rathdown 222 Sligo 221, 222, 235 Tralee 222 Tullamore 235, 237 Waterford 220–22, 235–6, 240 Wexford 221–2 Italy 16–23, 29, 34–6, 147, 170, 205, 245–70, 401–2, 404, 408, 414, 421–2, 424–5, 430 Bari 246, 249, 252, 266, 269 Bologna 246, 249, 252, 269 Cagliari 246, 249, 252, 269 Catania 246, 249, 252, 269

Cosenza 266 Florence 246, 249, 252, 269 Genoa 246, 249, 252, 269 Messina 246, 249, 269 Milan 17, 18, 246, 249, 252, 269, 400 Naples 5, 179, 246, 249, 252, 269 Palermo 246, 249, 252, 269 Programmi di riqualificazione urbana e di Sviluppo sostenibile del Territorio (PRUSST) 264, 255, 261, 264, 266 Salerno 266 Sardinia 246 Sicily 246, 252 Siracusa 266 Trieste 246, 249, 269 Turin 246, 249, 252, 269 Venice 246, 249, 252, 269 knowledge economy 109, 132, 282, 290, 291, 400, 401 leisure activities 8, 208, 374 Luxembourg 4–, 16–18, 20–21, 25, 32, 34, 36, 85, 93, 271–78, 404, 410, 413–14, 424, 430 Centres de Dévelopment et d’Attraction (CDA) 275, 295 Differdange 271 Dudelange 271 Esch-sur-Alzette 271, 276 Integratives Verkehrs- und Landesentwicklungskonzept (IVL) 274, 275, 276, 277 Luxembourg-Ville 271–5, 277, 410 Maastricht Treaty 12, 48, 50 OECD 119, 131, 132, 217 Parkinson Report 41 polarisation, social and ethnic 9, 85, 114–15, 152–3, 172, 178, 186, 241, 315–16, 380, 397, 401–2, 421, 429, 431 pollution 177, 198, 204–5, 208, 213, 254, 259, 265, 273–4, 321, 343–5, 402, 410 population decline 147, 169, 174–7, 280, 286, 385

Index Portugal 16–22, 24–5, 29, 34–6, 41–2, 45, 311–32, 342, 401, 403–4, 408, 414, 418, 421, 424–5, 430, 435 Beja 312 Braga 312, 313, 317, 323, 328 Coimbra 312, 313, 317, 323, 328 Committees for Regional Coordination and Development (CCDRs) 312, 314, 322, 326–9 Évora 312, 314 EXPO’98 315, 317–21, 324, 326, 330, 409, 421, 423, 425 Funchal 312, 313, 317 Guarda 312 Leiria 312 Lisbon 16, 22, 29, 47, 311–24, 326–8, 400, 408–9, 421, 423, 425, 427 Municipal Master Plans 314, 318, 327 Operational Intervention Urban Renewal (IORU) 318, 319, 320, 325, 421 Portalegre 312 Porto 16, 22, 29, 311–13, 317–20, 322–3, 326–8, 402, 408–9, 421, 423 Porto 2001 318, 322, 326 Viseu 312 poverty 9, 23, 30, 51, 56, 60, 75, 90–91, 93, 94–6, 98, 164, 177, 228, 257, 258, 315–16, 318, 320, 367, 385, 401, 422, 429 privatisation 21, 35, 177, 224, 316 public–private partnership 21, 35, 94, 112, 121, 175–6, 179, 185–6, 189, 210, 225, 262, 264–5, 321 public–public partnerships 22 public expenditure 82, 127, 196, 207, 213, 261, 319–20, 350, 383, 389 quality of life 9, 46–7, 93–4, 96, 98, 178, 199, 225, 233–4, 236, 238, 241, 245, 247, 249–50, 253, 257, 260, 262, 265, 276–7, 303, 388–9, 391, 405–6, 424 research and development (R&D) 111, 121, 128–9, 160, 262, 312, 317, 325, 351–2, 386, 395 recentralisation 333, 337, 338 reurbanisation 18, 280 revenue and funding 3, 5–6, 8, 21, 26–8, 30, 35, 46, 48, 50, 52, 56, 68–70, 74,

445

76, 82–4, 91, 93–5, 97, 115–16, 118–19, 127–8, 133–4, 137–40, 143, 147–9, 151, 154–5, 157, 159, 161–4, 170, 172, 175, 184, 186, 189, 198, 201, 207–8, 223–5, 233, 239–40, 255–6, 262–4, 276–7, 283, 285, 287, 294, 297, 301, 303–4, 306–7, 312, 315–16, 319–4, 327–9, 345–6, 350–52, 356, 365, 369–70, 374–5, 380, 383, 393, 396, 403, 405–6, 408, 413–15, 417, 419, 425–8, 431, 435 Rome 16, 17, 179, 246, 249, 252, 265, 269 Single European Act 40, 41 social cohesion 41, 47, 50, 96, 132, 138, 142, 150, 153–4, 157, 164, 262, 329, 333, 388–9, 397, 405–6, 428, 431, 434 social exclusion 5, 9, 33, 47, 51, 60, 95, 132, 157, 208, 320, 375, 384, 390, 392, 401, 420–21, 423, 429–31 social housing 88, 91, 108, 113–14, 155, 157, 160–61, 175, 177, 233, 315, 391, 403, 420 social integration 3, 74, 91, 120, 157, 163, 188, 230, 258, 265, 285, 320, 354, 422 social segregation 18–19, 26, 33, 70, 85, 120, 127, 132, 174, 177, 190, 204–5, 230, 263, 274, 276–7, 420 social welfare 127, 175, 315, 317 Soviet Union 129, 132, 172 Spain 16–25, 30–32, 34, 36, 41–2, 45, 147, 333–60, 401–2, 404, 409, 413, 415, 421, 425, 427–8, 430, 435 Almeria 348 Andalucía 335, 352 Andalusia 335, 346 Aragón 335, 348, 352 Barcelona 8, 16, 22, 24, 179, 335–42, 344, 346, 348–50, 352–4, 400 Basque Country 335, 352, 354 Bilbao 8, 18, 22, 335–7, 339, 342, 346, 349, 354, 423 Castilla-León 346 Catalonia 335, 352, 354 Galicia 346 Granada 5, 354 Horta 335, 349 Madrid 16, 22, 30, 335–39, 341–2, 346–7, 349–50, 352, 354–5, 386

446

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

Stockholm 16, 18–19, 22, 109, 363–4, Málaga 335–7, 339, 340–41, 349, 353–4 366–71, 374, 377, 400 Murcia 335, 354 Västra Götaland 364 Navarra 335 Salamanca 354 The Netherlands 16, 18–19, 21–2, 24–6, Seville 335, 337, 346–7, 349, 354 28, 29–30, 35–6, 279–310, 386, 401–5, Valencia 22, 335–7, 339–42, 346, 349, 354 411, 417–19, 421–3, 425–7, 429 Zaragoza 335, 336, 339, 353, 354 ’s-Hertogenbosch 280, 281, 282, 289, 302 spatial and economic development 11, 15, Alkmaar 281, 293 24, 30, 36, 42, 65–7, 70, 72, 77, 106, Almelo 281, 289 117, 121–2, 170–1, 183–4, 189, 191, Almere 280 200, 222, 229, 234, 241, 245, 257, 275, Amersfoort 281, 293 379, 409, 424, 427 Amsterdam 5, 22, 35, 40, 41, 45, 47, Spatial Planning 29, 63, 65, 183, 211, 234, 279–84, 286, 288–90, 302–3, 306, 273, 274, 275, 276, 330 400 spatial planning 4, 29, 51, 65–8, 70, 73, 76, Arnhem 280, 281, 284, 289, 302, 303 80, 106–7, 111, 156, 178, 188–9, 201, Breda 280, 281, 289, 302, 303 210–12, 223, 252, 257, 274–7, 280, Deventer 281, 289 287, 302, 331, 408, 410–11, 419, 424, Dordrecht 280, 281, 289 427, 431 Eindhoven 281, 282, 284, 289, 302 suburbanisation 17–18, 30, 65, 70, 73, 77, Emmen 281, 293 79, 83, 85–8, 92–6, 99, 174–6, 187, Enschede 281, 284, 289, 302 202, 274, 282, 286, 389, 397, 402, 420, Grotestedenbeleid (GSB) 26, 93, 279, 424, 429 281, 286, 289–90, 292–4, 296–303, Sueur Report 151, 153 306–8, 405–6 sustainable development 3, 5, 9–10, 25, GSB-II 279, 285, 292–3, 297–301 29–30, 35, 42, 47–9, 108, 111–13, 115, GSB-III 279, 292, 295, 297, 299–300, 117, 120–21, 180, 182, 184, 225, 229, 301, 304, 307–8 240, 242, 255, 260–62, 265–6, 275, Haarlem 280, 281, 289 277, 300, 326, 333, 352, 389, 405–7, Haarlemmermeer 280 422, 434 Heerlen 281, 289, 302, 306 Sweden 16–19, 21, 25, 31, 33–4, 36, 117, Helmond 281, 284, 289 119, 122, 361–78, 386, 401, 404, 407, Hengelo 281, 284, 289 414, 416–19, 421, 425–6, 430 Leeuwarden 281, 289 Botkyrka 374 Leiden 280, 281, 289 Commission on Metropolitan Areas Lelystad 281, 293 373, 374, 375, 414 Lijst Pim Fortuyn 295 Göteborg 363–4, 367–9, 371, 374 Maastricht 12, 48, 50, 93, 281, 289, 302 Gothenburg 16, 117 Nijmegen 280, 281, 284, 289, 302 Haninge 374 Randstad 280, 282, 286, 288, 302 Huddinge 374 Rotterdam 22, 35, 86, 279–82, 284, 286, Kalmar 364 288–90, 295, 302–6, 308, 413, 421 Lund 109, 119, 362 Schiedam 281, 289 Malmö 16, 32, 108, 119, 362–4, 367–9, The Hague 60, 279–82, 284, 289–90, 371–4, 423, 427 302–3 Norrköping 363 Tilburg 280–281, 289, 302 Øresund 372, 373 Utrecht 102, 280–82, 284, 289–90, 302–3 Skåne 364 Venlo 281, 289 Södertälje 374

Index

447

London 4, 16, 20, 146, 179, 379, 380, 384, 386–7, 390, 394, 397, 400, 405 Manchester 379, 387 Newcastle 379 New Deal for Communities 382, 392, 393 Nottingham 379 Office of the Deputy Prime Minster (ODPM) 390, 394, 398, 405, 417 Regional Development Agencies 382, 384, 389, 392, 394, 411 Sheffield 5, 379 United Nations 109, 110 Urban Audit 4, 41, 43, 45–7, 50, 54 urban development 1–3, 5, 9–10, 15, 17–18, 23–4, 26, 29–33, 35–7, 50, 65, 67–8, 75–6, 94, 96–8, 109, 128, 134, 142–3, 170–72, 174–5, 181–7, 189–90, 196, 204, 212–13, 225, 245, 253, 260–62, 265, 274–5, 277, 300, 306, 331, 354, 361, 377, 399, 406, 408, 410, 418, 423, 425–6, 431 urban infrastructure 10, 24, 36, 169, 179, 196, 200, 204, 207, 213 urbanisation 16–19, 23–5, 33–6, 125, 130, 140, 142, 197–9, 207, 224, 245, 253, 255, 263, 267, 272, 282, 311, 313–14, 316–17, 325, 333–6, 339, 342–3, 345, 354–5, 361–2, 380, 397, 400, 402, 407–8 Urban Pilot Projects (UPP) 41–2, 45–7, 51, 52, 54, 59–60, 328 urban planning 29, 91, 158, 183, 197, 199, 201–2, 204, 209–11, 213, 239, 264–7, 273, 275, 277, 315, 329–30, 349–50, unemployment 5, 8–9, 18–19, 23, 33, 41, 356, 410 47, 52, 56, 60, 75, 84–7, 91, 92, 94, urban regeneration and renewal 3, 18, 127, 129, 132, 143, 152, 170, 172, 28–9, 36, 42, 51, 56, 89, 91–3, 95–7, 175, 177, 179, 182, 209, 247, 249, 112–13, 115, 121, 160, 181, 186, 200, 257–8, 262, 272, 274, 277, 282–3, 287, 202, 205, 207–8, 210, 212, 223, 225, 289, 291, 293, 297, 304, 306, 385, 227–33, 241, 263, 285, 287–8, 294, 401, 433 322, 330, 38–4, 399, 404, 406–10, United Kingdom 16–22, 24, 26–30, 420–21, 426, 430 33–4, 36, 170, 379–98, 40–5, 411–12, urban renewal projects 89, 202, 205, 210, 417–20, 423, 425–7, 429 212, 225 Birmingham 101, 379 urban safety 5, 6, 24, 90, 121, 132, 153, Bristol 379, 386, 387 265, 292, 297, 300, 301, 308, 350, 402, City Challenge 26, 28, 383 416, 421–3, 429, 431 Core Cities 379–80, 384–7, 394 urban sprawl 108, 131, 146, 153, 157, 187, Leeds 379, 384, 386, 387 195, 198, 200, 402, 430 Liverpool 5, 379

Zaanstad 280, 281, 293 Zoetermeer 280 Zwolle 281, 289 tourism 8, 25, 69, 111, 178, 184, 198, 200, 206, 220, 225, 232, 233, 258, 265, 317 traffic congestion 1, 5, 153, 206, 257, 274, 371 Trans-European Networks (TENs) 46, 48, 50, 77 transport air 117, 146, 150, 177, 179, 180, 204, 238, 302, 317, 341, 346, 352, 355, 409, 419 public 24–5, 53, 69, 72, 76, 88, 106, 131, 148–50, 152–3, 155, 158, 161, 177–8, 187, 207, 227, 238, 273–4, 276–7, 285–8, 316, 328, 330, 344, 350, 355–6, 370, 419–20, 430 rail 66, 75, 150, 179, 180, 260, 288, 303, 315–17, 321, 342, 346, 347, 352, 355, 370, 409, 424 road 8, 24, 65, 79, 87–9, 153, 175, 180, 187, 205, 207–8, 223, 234, 260, 287–8, 315–16, 324, 346–7, 355, 370, 372, 409 sea 18, 86, 87, 206, 232, 238, 240, 280, 282, 302, 308, 317, 341, 346, 413 transport infrastructure 65, 153, 179, 207, 209, 276, 327, 330, 352, 370, 395 transport policy 32, 48, 238, 288, 361 Treaty of Rome 50

448

National Policy Responses to Urban Challenges in Europe

waste management 149, 208, 265, 342, 347, 348, 355

welfare state 88, 106, 134, 142, 170, 178, 189, 190, 199, 283, 365, 414 Wulf-Mathies, Monika 41