Nations of Immigrants: Australia and the USA Compared (Monash Studies in Global Movements)

Nations of Immigrants

MONASH STUDIES IN GLOBAL MOVEMENTS Series Editor: John Nieuwenhuysen, Director, Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements, Monash University, Australia This series is an important forum for the publication of new research on global movements sponsored by Monash University. It presents a multidisciplinary perspective on global movements of people, resources and ideas in their diverse economic, social, political and cultural dimensions. The series makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of some of the most important trends and challenges arising in an increasingly globalised world. Titles in the series include: Privatization and Market Development Global Movements in Public Policy Ideas Edited by Graeme Hodge Globalisation of Accounting Standards Edited by Jayne M. Godfrey and Keryn Chalmers Counter-Terrorism and the Post-Democratic State Edited by Jenny Hocking and Colleen Lewis New Global Frontiers in Regulation The Age of Nanotechnology Edited by Graeme Hodge, Diana Bowman and Karinne Ludlow Nations of Immigrants Australia and the USA Compared Edited by John Higley and John Nieuwenhuysen with Stine Neerup

Nations of Immigrants Australia and the USA Compared

Edited by

John Higley Director, Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies, University of Texas at Austin, USA

John Nieuwenhuysen Director, Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements, Monash University, Australia with Stine Neerup Research Associate, Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements, Monash University, Australia

MONASH STUDIES IN GLOBAL MOVEMENTS

Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© John Higley and John Nieuwenhuysen 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2009936233

ISBN 978 1 84844 636 6 Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK

Contents List of figures, tables and boxes List of contributors Preface and acknowledgements 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10

11

vi vii xi

Introduction John Higley and John Nieuwenhuysen Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia Graeme Hugo Trends in US immigration Susan K. Brown, James Bachmeier and Frank D. Bean From disordered expansion to disordered stalemate: immigration politics in the United States Gary P. Freeman Immigration policy in Australia Bob Birrell Immigration and the labour market in Australia Santina Bertone Immigration and the United States labour market Brian Duncan and Stephen J. Trejo New groups and social cohesion in Australia Andrew Jakubowicz Latinos, immigration and social cohesion in the United States David L. Leal Immigrant settlement, ethnic relations and multiculturalism in Australia James Jupp Who belongs? Assimilation, integration and multiculturalism in the United States Cara Wong

Bibliography Index

1 22 42

56 70 86 100 115 132

147

160

176 195

v

Figures, tables and boxes FIGURES 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 7.1

Growth and components of Australia’s population change, 1986–2007 5 Settler arrivals in Australia by eligibility category, 1986–2007 6 Australia: settler arrivals by state, according to whether or not they are SSRM scheme migrants, 2006-07 29 Australia: temporary migration by category, 1986–2007 31 Australia: settler arrivals by region of last residence, 1947–2006 34 Australia: permanent and long-term departures of residents, 1959–60 to 2007–08 35 US: unauthorized stocks and flows of population, 1980–2008 50 Immigrant and temporary non-immigrant employment visas issued by the US State Department, 1988–2007 52 US: dropout rates of first- and second-generation men 108

TABLES 1.1 4.1

5.1

Approximate annual immigration to the US, 2002–06 Restrictive immigration proposals in the US Congress that died, were defeated or were weakened by amendment, 1995–2001 Migration programme outcomes, 2000–01 to 2006–07 and planned, 2007–08

6

62 82

BOXES 4.1 8.1 8.2

Main provisions of IIRIRA, 1996 Dr Peter Shergold, Foundation Director, Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1987–90 Professor Stephen FitzGerald Chair, Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies (CAAIP), 1987–88

vi

64 121 122

Contributors James Bachmeier is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology and a Research Associate in the Center for Research on Immigration, Population and Public Policy at the University of California, Irvine. His research focuses on the migration and labour market incorporation of Mexican immigrants to the US, as well as on the implications of largescale immigration for patterns of US racial and ethnic stratification. Frank D. Bean is the Director of the Center for Research on Immigration, Population and Public Policy at the University of California, Irvine (UCI). Prior to joining the UCI faculty, Bean served as Ashbel Smith Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs, Director of the Population Research Center and Chair of the Department of Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin. He was also the Founding Director of both the Program for Research on Immigration Policy and the Population Studies Center at the Urban Institute in Washington, DC. His current research focuses on the estimation of the size and type of immigrant flows, racial/ethnic relations in the US, and the interconnections among cultural repertoires, citizenship and immigrant group incorporation among US Mexican immigrants and their descendants. Santina Bertone is an Associate Dean (Research and Research Training) in the Faculty of Business and Law at Victoria University. She has been actively researching in the area of immigration and work since the 1990s. She led the Workplace Studies Centre for over a decade, winning a wide range of grants and publishing books and articles on immigrant women, industrial restructuring, migrants and trade unions, productive diversity and equal employment opportunity. She also spent many years representing migrants as part of the Ethnic Communities Council of Victoria, and has had a range of other community and government board roles. Bertone recently participated in the Australia 2020 Summit and retains a keen interest in policy issues. Bob Birrell is Reader in Sociology at Monash University. He has a degree in economics from Melbourne University, in history from the University of London and a PhD in sociology from Princeton University. He has vii

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acted as an adviser on immigration issues to both Labor and Coalition governments in Australia. He is joint editor (with Katharine Betts) of the quarterly demographic journal People and Place, published by Centre for Population and Urban Research (CPUR). The CPUR consults on demographic issues with industry and government partners. It is currently preparing the background analysis on the demand and supply for university graduates for the Review of Higher Education in Australia. Susan K. Brown is Associate Professor of sociology and an affiliate of the Center for Research in Immigration, Population and Public Policy at the University of California, Irvine. She is the author of Beyond the Immigrant Enclave: Network Change and Assimilation (2004). Her research focuses on the incorporation of immigrants to the US, residential segregation and inequality of access to higher education. Brian Duncan is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Colorado, Denver. His research focuses on the economics of generosity, specifically examining the often conflicting motives individuals have for contributing to charitable causes. Duncan has also written on the economic incentives of foster care and adoption, and on the intergenerational progress of the descendants of Mexican immigrants. He holds a PhD in economics from the University of California, Santa Barbara. Gary P. Freeman is Chair of the Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin. He specializes in the politics of immigration, comparative social policy and politics in Western democracies. His most recent writing has been directed at understanding the form of immigration politics in different countries and explaining the integration strategies employed by countries as they grapple with immigrant populations. He is currently working on the question of the linkage between immigration and the welfare state, especially the impact of ethnic and other forms of diversity on the solidaristic foundations of social policies. John Higley’s interests are comparative politics and political sociology, especially the comparative study of political elites and political regimes. As Director of the Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, he also works on various policy issues in those countries and on their trade and other relations with the US. He has written extensively about elites and elite theory in contemporary social science, including a book titled Elites in Australia (1979). Since 2001 he has served as Chair of the Research Committee on Political Elites of the International Political Science Association. His most recent book is Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (2006).

Contributors

ix

Graeme Hugo is University Professorial Research Fellow, Professor of the Department of Geographical and Environmental Studies and Director of the National Centre for Social Applications of Geographic Information Systems at the University of Adelaide. His research interests are population issues in Australia and South-East Asia, especially migration. He is the author of over 300 books, articles in scholarly journals and chapters in books, as well as a large number of conference papers and reports. In 2002 he secured an Australian Research Council Federation Fellowship over five years for his research project, ‘The new paradigm of international migration to and from Australia: dimensions, causes and implications’. He has recently completed reports on migration and development for the Australian government and for the Asian Development Bank. Andrew Jakubowicz is Professor of Sociology at the University of Technology, Sydney, Director of the Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Research Centre and Head of the Social and Political Change Academic Group. His research interests cover globalization and intercultural relations, new media and cultural interaction. He was the Foundation Director of the Centre for Multicultural Studies at the University of Wollongong and historical adviser to a number of exhibitions, including the Jewish communities of Shanghai at the Sydney Jewish Museum (2001–02), the National Maritime Museum (2001–03) and the national travelling exhibition, ‘Crossroads: Shanghai and the Jews of China’ (2002–03). James Jupp is the Director of the Centre for Immigration and Multicultural Studies in the Australian Demographic and Social Research Institute at the Australian National University. He was general editor of the Bicentennial Encyclopedia of the Australian People from 1984 until its publication as The Australian People in September 1988, and of the second edition published for the Centenary of Federation in 2001. He has published widely on immigration and multicultural affairs, including From White Australia to Woomera (2002), The English in Australia (2004) and Social Cohesion in Australia (2007). David L. Leal is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin and holds a PhD from Harvard University. He is a Faculty Associate of the Center for Mexican-American Studies and Director of the Public Policy Institute. His primary academic interest is Latino politics, and his work explores a variety of questions involving public opinion, public policy and political behaviour. He has published over 40 journal articles and book chapters on these and other topics.

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Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

Stine Neerup is a Research Fellow at the Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements and a PhD fellow at the Centre for the Study of Equality and Multiculturalism at Copenhagen University. Her research focuses on the relation between immigration policy making and integration, and the impact of temporary labour migration on paths to citizenship, migrant participation and inclusion in the welfare state. John Nieuwenhuysen is the Founding Director of the Monash Institute for the Study of Global Movements. In 2003 he received an award (AM) in the Order of Australia for service to the community through contributions to independent academic, public and private sector research, to debate on immigration, cultural diversity, equity, economic development, taxation, indigenous, labour and industry issues, and to reform of the liquor laws of Victoria. Stephen J. Trejo is a labour economist at the University of Texas at Austin. He received his PhD in economics from the University of Chicago in 1988. His research focuses on public policy issues, including overtime pay regulation, the labour market experiences of immigrants and obstacles to the economic progress of minority groups. He joined the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) as a Research Fellow in August 2000 and has been a member of the American Economic Association Committee on the Status of Minority Groups in the Economics Profession (1998–2003) and a member of the National Academy of Sciences Panel to Study US Hispanics (2003–05). He is the author of numerous articles concerning the status and mobility of Mexican Americans in the US labour market. Cara Wong is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. She holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Her research interests include American government and politics, political psychology, race, ethnicity and politics. She has published numerous articles on racial and ethnic politics, voting behaviour, citizenship, social capital and multiculturalism.

Preface and acknowledgements Much has happened in the immigration policies and programmes of Australia and the US since 1992, when Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United States and International Immigration, edited by Gary P. Freeman and James Jupp, was published by Oxford University Press. That volume, a joint venture between the former Australian Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research in Melbourne and the Edward A. Clark Center for Australian and New Zealand Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, deserves a companion that takes stock of changes that have occurred since 1992. The Clark Center and Monash University’s Institute for the Study of Global Movements have joined forces to provide this. The present volume commences with an introduction by the editors, who canvas immigration trends in the two countries and issues they pose: sustaining social cohesion; relying on skill-based immigration; resorting to guest worker programmes; allowing international students to enter domestic labour markets; cherry picking able and educated workers from developing countries; dispersing immigrants to sub-national regions and localities; coping with urban sprawl and pressures on the environment; dealing with asylum seekers and undocumented migrants; and reconciling large-scale immigration with spiralling energy costs. Following this introduction, pairs of parallel chapters by leading Australian and American scholars consider for Australia and the US five broad topics: compositions and contours of recent immigration flows; policy convergences and divergences between the two countries; immigration’s effects on their labour markets; policies aimed at integrating new groups of immigrants; and changing shapes of ethnic relations and multiculturalism in Australia and the US. The chapters in this book were composed initially as papers for a two-day workshop at Monash University’s Centre in Prato, Italy. During November and December 2008 the papers were revised in light of the Prato discussions. We thank all of the authors for their informative exchanges at the workshop and for the professional and prompt way in which they revised their chapters. This volume and the project from which it issues benefited greatly from assistance in both Melbourne and Austin. Sahar Sana at the Monash xi

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Institute for the Study of Global Movements handled complex administrative arrangements with dexterity. Irene Thavarajah at the Monash Events Management Centre in Prato organized much of the workshop with her characteristic good humour. Kate Latimer at Mediagiants in Melbourne skillfully conceived the Prato workshop programme and helped ensure its smooth unfolding. In Austin Mary Clements, in the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin, carefully processed complex travel itineraries and their costs, while Frances Cushing, the Clark Center’s administrative associate, kept her eye on the Center’s budget and encouraged the project throughout. We hope that this volume contributes useful insights into alternative approaches to immigration today and demonstrates, once again, the value of joint Australian and American research efforts. John Higley

John Nieuwenhuysen

Stine Neerup February 2009

1.

Introduction John Higley and John Nieuwenhuysen

During the years since Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the United States and International Immigration (edited by Gary P. Freeman and James Jupp) appeared in 1992, Australia and the US have experienced similar economic and immigration needs, but their responses have differed substantially. Australia has fine-tuned its immigration programme in reaction to strong economic growth and resulting labour shortages up to the end of 2008. The US has made no comparable adjustments in its programme, despite a spectacular high-tech boom in the late 1990s and an equally unbridled ‘housing bubble’ during most of the 2000s. This book picks up where Nations of Immigrants left off, by comparing and contrasting Australian and American immigration programmes since the mid-1990s. Immigration policies in Australia and the US necessarily reflect important historical and institutional similarities and differences between the two countries. Both originated as British settler colonies and societies, with independence in the US dating from the late eighteenth century and in Australia from 1901. Both have long been liberal democracies, albeit with quite different political institutions. The US is a presidential republic with a marked separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. Australia is technically a constitutional monarchy (the British monarch is head of state) with a Westminster parliamentary system that has, however, important ‘American’ features, such as a bicameral parliament with more or less co-equal chambers, a written constitution and a High Court with powers of judicial review. Both countries are federal political systems in which states (50 in the US, six in Australia) have important power, but Australia’s states are generally less powerful than their US counterparts. Australia has a highly professional and well-staffed federal public service; the US civil service is poorly paid, understaffed and weighed down by a thick layer of political appointees who often have little substantive knowledge of their portfolios. Geographically, the two countries have land masses nearly equal in size, but the US population is 305 million and Australia’s is 21 million. Important for effective immigration policy, Australia is an island continent whose territorial borders can quite readily be protected; the US has northern and southern land borders that extend thousands of kilometres 1

2

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

and are protected only with great difficulty. Both are multicultural societies made up of immigrants who have come from virtually every corner of the world, but racial divisions and tensions are substantially greater in the US, where 13 per cent of the population is African American, than in Australia, where indigenous Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders comprise only 2 per cent of the population. After the Labor Party’s victory in Australia’s November 2007 federal election, the new Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the Hon. Chris Evans, identified in a public statement the main aspects of the country’s immigration policy: Successful immigration programs need several ingredients. They must be open to anyone regardless of religion, race or nationality, providing they meet fair and objective criteria. They must be seen to deliver real economic, social or humanitarian benefits. They need to be well managed, with a high degree of integrity, transparency and accountability. Those who meet our eligibility criteria should be confident that their application will be processed professionally and efficiently. Those who seek to subvert our programs should face strong and effective border protection and compliance measures. (Evans 2008)

While Australia’s major parties, Labor and the Liberal-National coalition, disagree about some details of immigration policy, there is substantial bipartisanship, and Australia’s immigration programme is recognized internationally as one of the most successful practised by any country. On nearly every aspect of immigration policy listed by Minister Evans, the US situation is fraught: immigration’s economic and social effects are subjects of acrimonious debate; integrity, transparency and accountability in managing immigration are at best weak; immigration applications suffer from long queues and delays; border protection is porous; and compliance measures are quixotic and virtually non-existent in the country’s interior until very recently. Chapters in this book, by leading Australian and American immigration specialists, analyse the two countries’ recent immigration intakes and their effects on labour markets, government policies, social cohesion and citizenship. Our opening chapter sets the stage by providing an overview of trends in immigration to Australia and the US during the past 15 years and flagging some of the issues these trends pose.

RECENT IMMIGRATION TRENDS During the years immediately following the publication of Nations of Immigrants Australia suffered a relatively mild economic recession that

Introduction

3

resulted in an immigration intake much reduced from its record level of 170 000 in 1987. The intake dropped from 122 000 in 1991 to less than 70 000 in 1994, though by 1996 the intake had climbed back to 92 000. The decline in numbers during the first half of the 1990s reflected both economic circumstances and reduced refugee flows from Asian countries. Before 1996, when Prime Minister John Howard’s Liberal-National Party coalition government took office, two special features of Australia’s immigration intake had been relatively high humanitarian and family reunion admissions. But during the Howard government’s long life (March 1996 to November 2007) immigration increasingly displayed these features: ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

●

Rising aggregate intakes. Skill-based immigration at the relative expense of family reunion and other admissions criteria. Changed sources of immigrants, with China and India becoming the most important. Stabilization of the humanitarian intake. Strong measures to deter unauthorized asylum seekers and refugees. Rising numbers of international students that swelled the ranks of temporary long-term residents. Reduced public opposition to high immigration intakes, as unemployment fell to record lows during a dramatic commodities boom that began in the mid-1990s. Unprecedented numbers of emigrants but also of temporary longterm entrants.

By the time of the Howard government’s election defeat in late 2007, the international circumstances surrounding Australia’s immigration programme were much changed from the early 1990s. Not only had China and India become the most important sources of skilled immigrants, but international competition to attract such immigrants had increased and return migration, especially to China and India, had also increased. In order to meet continuing labour shortages, the Labor government that took office at the end of 2007, headed by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, began to consider a Pacific Islander guest worker scheme that had been strenuously resisted during the Howard years, together with changes in the contentious ‘457’ temporary visa programme, which is discussed below. Meanwhile, after the early 1990s immigration to the US displayed these features:

4

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared ● ● ●

●

●

●

●

●

Large intakes of legal immigrants and flows of unauthorized and undocumented migrants. Legal intakes based preponderantly on family reunion instead of skills. Humanitarian intakes (asylum seekers and refugees) that declined sharply from 140 000 in the early 1990s to an annual average of about 50 000 (11 per cent of the total legal intake) during the 2000s. Post-9/11 and tightened visa procedures, declining numbers of international students between 2004 and 2006 but rebounding to a record high in 2008. Sharply increased public opposition to unauthorized and undocumented migration amid worsening economic conditions during the mid-2000s. Federal government policy focused, with debatable effectiveness, on border controls against the entry of unauthorized and undocumented migrants. A patchwork of dubiously legal enforcement measures constructed by many state and local governments to blunt the costs of servicing unauthorized and undocumented migrants arriving on their doorsteps. Increasing emigration by foreign-born residents, albeit at a declining rate, while emigration by native-born US citizens remained negligible.

IMMIGRATION’S SURGE AND COMPOSITION In 2007 the Australian population grew by 1.6 per cent (331 000 people) to a total of 21.3 million. This was the fastest population growth among the world’s richer countries and it was composed of 44.5 per cent (147 434) natural increase and 55.5 per cent (184 438) net immigration. Clearly in the absence of immigration Australia’s population would be in net decline. In 2006 the US population passed 300 million and has been growing at about 1 per cent (three million people) annually. As in Australia and all European countries, the birth rate among native-born white Americans is below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman, and immigration is consequently responsible for a significant part of the US population increase. Between 1980 and 2005 legal immigration accounted for 58 per cent of the 68 million people added to the total US population, and 82 per cent of further population growth to 2050 is projected to consist of new immigrants and their US-born descendants (Passel and Cohn 2008, pp. 2, 12). In Figure 1.1 the components of Australia’s population growth,

Introduction

5

Natural Increase Net Overseas Migration (*) Total Growth

240 160 80

Persons (in thousands)

320

0 1987

Note: Source:

1991

1995 1999 Year ended 30 June

2003

2007

* Contains a break in time series from 2006–07. DIAC, Settler Arrivals (various issues), www.immi.gov.au.

Figure 1.1

Growth and components of Australia’s population change, 1986–2007

1986–2007, are shown, with the dramatic (almost quadruple) rise in net overseas immigration between 1993 and 2007 apparent. Figure 1.2 records the trend in arriving immigrants by eligibility category between 1986 and 2007. It shows a more than doubling of the skill category, a halving of the family reunion share and the humanitarian intake’s relative constancy. Immigration to the US had a quite different composition in this period. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in which the principal agencies for administering immigration have been located since March 2003, reports an annual average of one million immigrants (that is, lawful permanent residents (LPRs) with ‘green cards’) between financial years (FY) 2002 and 2006. But it is estimated that in reality the annual level of immigration and migration in this period averaged about 1.8 million, close to double the DHS figure. The difference arises from the nature of some temporary immigration and, more sweepingly, from the number of unauthorized and undocumented immigrants entering the US. Table 1.1 displays the approximate composition of actual average immigration to the US annually between 2002–06. Compared with the Australian trends shown in Figure 1.2, what stands out in Table 1.1 is the much larger proportion of family-sponsored (‘family reunion’) legal immigrants to the US: 63 per cent versus about 28 per cent

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared Family Skill Humanitarian Non-programme

60 50 40 30 20 10

Percentage of persons

6

0 1987

1992

1997

2002

2007

Year ended 30 June Source:

DIAC, Settler Arrivals (various issues), www.immi.gov.au.

Figure 1.2 Table 1.1

Settler arrivals in Australia by eligibility category, 1986–2007 Approximate annual immigration to the US, 2002–06

Immigration Category All new lawful permanent residents (DHS) Employer sponsored Family sponsored Temporary workers and dependants* H1B business visa H2B business visa Dependants of H1B, H2B and O visas O1, K, S, T, U visas (special entrants) V visa (spouses/children of pending ‘green card’ holders) Unauthorized, undocumented migrants Total average entrants per year

Annual Average Number 1 021 844 163 366 648 944 320 686 74 884 45 227 123 983 51 616 24 976 500 000 1 842 530

Note: * Estimated number of workers who entered each year on temporary visas but were likely to stay permanently. Source:

Migration Policy Institute (2007).

of Australia’s intake in the same period; and, correspondingly, the much less emphasis placed by the US on skill-based (‘employer-sponsored’) permanent immigrants: 16 per cent versus Australia’s 44 per cent. Even when the proportion of temporary business visa holders (and dependants)

Introduction

7

likely to stay permanently in the US is added to employer-sponsored immigrants, the proportion of entrants who could be thought of as skill based has been less than half of all legal entrants annually in recent years. What also stands out, of course, is the gross number of unauthorized and undocumented migrants, who accounted for nearly a third of annual US arrivals and now total roughly 12 million people residing illegally in the US, 78 per cent of them from Mexico and other Latin American countries (Passel 2006). During the 2000s permanent arrivals in Australia increased steadily, from 93 910 in FY 2002–03 to 190 000 in FY 2007–08. In the US, by contrast, permanent arrivals hovered around 400 000 annually, with no significant year-on-year change. However, there was a marked jump upwards in the number of persons in the US who adjusted their status from temporary to permanent residents. From about 300 000 persons who made this adjustment in 2003, the number jumped to 700 000 in 2006, with steady increases during each intervening year. It is obvious that acquisition of permanent US resident status is becoming less a matter of applying from abroad for permission to immigrate and more a matter of arriving legally on some temporary visa and then petitioning for an adjustment of status or, indeed, of arriving illegally and hoping that some form of ‘amnesty’ will open the way to permanent status. Annual immigration admissions to Australia represent targets that the government tries to meet, whereas in the US annual admissions have caps beyond which admissions are not allowed, except in special circumstances. Applications to immigrate to the US are invariably more numerous than the slots allocated for immigration; in Australia slots established by the government tend to be more numerous than applications to fill them. In FY 2006–07 the permanent additions to Australia’s population were located in four eligibility categories: family, skills, humanitarian, and New Zealand citizens and others. Albeit in significantly different proportions, permanent additions to the US population were in the same general categories, though the US has no provision for the unrestricted entry of an adjacent country’s citizens as Australia does for New Zealanders. Australia’s skill category is its largest and provides flexibility because adjustments can be made according to changing economic and labour market needs. A points system for education and occupational experience of applicants has been augmented by occupational shortage criteria. Skilled and other immigrants and accompanying family members can also gain admission under provisions for specific and regional migration visas that involve immigrants committing to work in specific occupations or living in specific geographic areas. Of key importance is that some 40 per cent of permanent residents in the skill category derive from

8

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

onshore applications, concentrated among those arriving initially as international students or temporary business entrants (Class 457 visas). After Australia’s shift to a skills-oriented and points-based system in the mid1990s, its family reunion stream was effectively ended. Nevertheless, as international labour mobility has increased, spousal migration has grown, and since 2004 skill-based immigrants have been allowed to bring parents from abroad, subject to paying a government charge to cover possible welfare and health costs. A points system modelled on Australia’s has recently been adopted by some European Union member states and a similar one was part of a comprehensive immigration reform bill that died in the US Senate in June 2007. Critics of the provision claimed that inefficient US immigration agencies could not manage such a system and that it would take discretion away from employers. For now, the bulk of immigrants to the US arrive on the basis of family sponsorship, and skill-based immigration relies on requests that employers, including universities, lodge for the admission of high-skilled individuals and students. Although US immigration policy responds in this way to changing labour market needs, unlike Australia, it does not do so in a centrally directed and targeted way that derives from a national strategy for attracting skilled immigrants. Moreover, understaffing of relevant administrative agencies, together with close scrutiny of applicants for security risks, make the US method of admitting skilled immigrants exceedingly slow, sometimes requiring as much as five years before a visa for permanent residence is finally issued. Australia’s humanitarian intake has remained relatively constant at about 12 000 annually, varying upwards in 2004–06, mainly because of an increase in onshore visa grants in this category. The US humanitarian intake has likewise been relatively constant at about 50 000 annually, though it was much greater during the early 1990s (nearly 140 000 in 1992, for example) following the Soviet Union’s demise, the sudden opening of East European countries to emigration and the plight of refugees from countries such as Somalia.

TEMPORARY RESIDENTS, EMIGRANTS AND RETURN MIGRANTS Important additions to Australian and US labour markets now come from permission granted to temporary residents, especially international students, to stay and work indefinitely. In Australia it is possible for those on temporary visas to apply onshore for visa extensions or permanent residence. The earlier and strict US prohibition against onshore changes

Introduction

9

of resident status has loosened, but persons in many temporary resident categories must still return home before lodging applications for permanent resident status. It is important to distinguish between the two major categories of legal immigration – permanent and temporary – because the relative importance of the two has changed substantially in both countries during the past 15 years. In Australia ‘long-term movement’ (LTM), that is, temporary immigration, has been the major component of net overseas immigration since 1999. In FY 2006–07 there were 373 000 LTM arrivals and 203 000 LTM departures. The net LTM rise of 170 000 was an increase of 25 per cent from the year before. In the US ‘legal permanent residents’ (LPRs or ‘green card’ recipients) number about 12 million and constitute roughly a third of the foreign-born population if unauthorized and undocumented migrants are included. LPR status typically entitles the holder to apply for US citizenship after five years. In 2005, for example, there were 11.5 million naturalized citizens who had formerly been LPRs. Of the 980 000 persons granted LPR status on average annually in FY 2001–05, 61 per cent were already in the country and had succeeded in shifting from temporary visas to LPR status. Not surprisingly, therefore, the demand for US temporary visas has skyrocketed. The number of such visas and of intra-company transfer visas tripled from 136 000 in FY 1992 to 440 000 in FY 2005. As the Migration Policy Institute observes, ‘Demand for H-1B visas, the primary path for high-skilled workers, is so high that the annual cap has typically been met before the fiscal year even begins’ (Meissner et al. 2006, p. 21). At 72 000 in FY 2006–07, emigration from Australia was at its highest level ever. Permanent departures by the Australia-born, at 36 882 or 51.2 per cent of the total, were also at the highest level ever. Emigrants from Australia now total more than one million, with the young and skilled being conspicuous among them. In addition, return migration, especially to Hong Kong, New Zealand and Japan, accounts for a growing proportion of those leaving Australia. The magnitudes of emigration and return migration from the US are more uncertain, in large part because the US government does not collect systematic data on departures. However, emigration appears to be concentrated among the country’s foreign-born population. Between 1995 and 2005 about 2.9 million former immigrants left the US, approximately 4.5 per cent of the total foreign-born in the country. Compared with the 1960s, this constituted a decline in the rate at which former immigrants left the US (Passel and Cohn 2008, p. 43). Compared with Australia, the emigration of US citizens is proportionately much smaller, though the number of US citizens residing and/or working abroad (not counting

10

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

military personnel) is estimated at nine million. There is, however, no indication that most of these citizens will not at some point return to the US. Uncertainty about return migration from the US is considerable because it is essentially unknown how many unauthorized and undocumented migrants return seasonally or permanently to the countries, primarily Mexico, from whence they came. Before US border controls were beefed up during the mid-2000s, the magnitude of return migration was thought to be large. But it is speculated that the now more stringent border controls ‘wall in’ undocumented migrants just as they ‘wall out’ an unknowable number of migrants who would enter the US illegally if they could more easily or safely do so.

IMMIGRATION POLICY ISSUES The patterns of Australian and US immigration and other movements of people to and from both countries pose a number of important issues. The following chapters discuss such issues, but let us flag some of them here. Immigration and Social Cohesion The rising numbers of permanent and temporary arrivals of people from an increasingly diverse set of countries tests the social cohesion of Australian and American societies. In Australia a survey study titled Mapping Social Cohesion, by A. Markus and A. Dharmalingam (2008), has found high levels of positive responses to questions relevant to social cohesion. As regards identifying with Australia and its way of life, the survey found that: ● ● ●

●

96 per cent express a strong sense of belonging to Australia. 94 per cent take great pride in the Australian way of life and believe that maintaining Australian culture is important. ‘Taking all things into consideration’, 89 per cent indicate that they are happy with their lives, while 85 per cent expect their lives to be the same or improved in three to four years time. 75 per cent express satisfaction with their present financial situation.

These and similarly ‘cohesive’ attitudes of Australians must of course be qualified because they are affected by variables such as age, gender, urban/rural location and so on. For example, on immigration intakes and government programmes for settling immigrants, the survey found

Introduction

11

that lowest levels of public support are among ‘people with trade level qualifications; people born in Australia to Australia-born parents [and] people aged over 54 years’ (Markus and Dharmalingam 2008, p. vii). Moreover, public attitudes about immigration have fluctuated historically with swings in the economy, particularly levels of unemployment. When the unemployment rate has been high, public support for immigration has been low (McDonald and Withers 2008, p. 3). During 2008 Australia’s extended period of strong economic growth and spreading affluence was sharply attenuated by international petroleum price spikes and ramifications of the US-based mortgage and financial credit crunch. It is plausible to believe that immigration intakes and settlement programmes will be substantially greater bones of public contention during the next several years. Other than in war times, social cohesion in the US has always been fragile. The bloody civil war between north and south showed this in spades. Wide and deep economic inequalities and racial tensions, to mention but two longstanding features of American society, have stood in the way of a social cohesion comparable to Australia’s. Thus, recent public opinion research on social trust among Americans finds half agreeing that ‘you can’t be too careful in dealing with people’, only 45 per cent believing that ‘most people can be trusted’ and two-fifths believing that people ‘try to take advantage of you’ and are ‘just looking out for themselves’ (Pew Research Report 2007). Another survey, conducted in 2006, found only 49 per cent of Americans (down from 61 per cent in 2002) expecting the quality of their lives to improve during the next five years, with the detailed analysis of attitudes showing that Americans in 2006 were on average about one-third less optimistic about their lives’ trajectories than earlier in the decade. ‘Nativist’ hostility toward immigration and immigrants, though fluctuating in intensity according to good and bad economic times, international wars and perceived foreign threats to national security, is never far below the surface of American society and it periodically erupts in harsh attacks on immigration policy and on immigrants themselves. In general the country’s vastly larger population, its innumerable ethnic and racial enclaves, its weak national state and a host of other circumstances make the US social cohesion fragile. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that recent survey studies of Americans’ attitudes about immigration show greater division than the Scanlon surveys find in Australia. A CBS/New York Times poll in July 2008 revealed that 32 per cent thought the existing level of immigration should be decreased and 38 per cent thought it should not be allowed to increase. An opinion poll by CBS News in January 2007 showed that 56 per cent thought the issue of illegal immigration ‘very serious’ and another 29 per cent thought

12

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

it ‘somewhat serious’. In June 2008 a survey by the Cable News Network indicated that a small majority (52 per cent) favoured building a fence along 700 miles of the US border with Mexico. At least two issues are raised. First, can Australia and the US continue their recent, extraordinarily high and diverse immigration intakes without suffering real losses in social cohesion? Second, if the economic downturn experienced during 2008 proves long lasting, will Australian and American publics turn against these intakes and make sustaining them too politically costly? Skills-based Immigration Both countries have shifted toward an emphasis on skilled immigrants during recent years, Australia explicitly via its points system and the US implicitly via a large increase in the number of temporary residence visas issued to persons with needed skills. The shift in Australia’s immigration programme to an increased proportion of skilled immigrants is generally counted a success. Employers have more easily been able to obtain the workers they need and the immigration points system has been responsive to changing market demand for various skill categories. It should be noted, however, that immigrants entering under the old family reunion category have not performed much worse as regards employability and economic integration than those who have entered via the new skilled category. For that matter, when achievements of second and third generations are taken into account the humanitarian stream’s outcomes, judged by educational attainments, exceed those of both the family reunion and skilled components. The US has no coherent national strategy for recruiting skilled immigrants, and the bulk of those entering legally continue to be sponsored by close relatives already in the country. Though there may be something to the shibboleth that anyone who migrates from their country of birth to another country possesses above average ambition and self-discipline and thus contributes to the receiving country’s social capital, the presence or absence of needed work skills among family-sponsored immigrants is more or less random. As for the half-million unauthorized and undocumented migrants who have entered the US in each recent year, they are overwhelmingly unskilled or low-skilled agricultural, construction and menial service workers. But they are not inconsequential for the US economy’s health because it is widely and credibly believed that without these migrant workers whole sectors of the economy would dwindle and become more costly to sustain. This is why most large and influential agricultural and industrial corporations strongly supported the Senate’s aborted effort in

Introduction

13

2007 to regularize the status of unauthorized and undocumented migrants and enable them to obtain permanent resident status eventually. The issue posed by the search for skilled immigrants is that of balance and how to achieve it. Obviously, large intakes of both skilled and unskilled immigrants are needed in the post-industrial, service-based economies of Australia and the US. It is a fact of life that large proportions of native-born Australians and Americans, growing up in conditions of affluence and leisure, shun menial service work, just as they shun dirty and tiresomely repetitive agricultural and manual industrial jobs. Large numbers of unskilled or low-skilled immigrants are presumably essential to the performance of these jobs. The trick for immigration policy is to provide a sufficient supply of them while at the same time recruiting highskilled entrants to sustain cutting-edge sectors of the economy. Guest Workers During the post-Second World War period guest worker schemes were not part of Australia’s immigration programme. Its emphases were on settlement and citizenship and on government and other services necessary to secure the successful integration of immigrants arriving on a permanent basis. But during 2008 the Labor government initiated a very limited trial guest worker scheme for Pacific Islanders, whose labour can be used in seasonal horticulture. The government has tried to ensure that charges of exploitation cannot be levelled. Award wage conditions (which are determined in a centralized and quasi-judicial way in Australia), health and other services, as well as travel payments and the provision of acceptable recruitment and training facilities, are part of the requirements necessary before employers are allowed to engage guest workers. Partners but not families are allowed to accompany workers, who are permitted to work in Australia for periods of five to six months in successive years. In addition, the Labor government reviewed the Visa Class 457 for temporary business entrants, and a law against employer practices that undermine work conditions of 457 visa holders was enacted. The law aims at preventing employers from paying substandard wage rates and imposing work or other conditions below those generally required in Australia. In the US there has been considerable discussion about reviving some variant of the Bracero Program, in which agricultural workers from Mexico were allowed entry for seasonal work between 1942 and 1964. Seasonal workers are currently admissible under the H2A visa programme and in FY 2007 the DHS issued 50 791 H2A visas for seasonal agricultural labour (DHS 2008). After his election in 2000, President George W. Bush proposed a large-scale guest worker programme in which an unlimited

14

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

number of ‘willing workers’ would be given temporary work permits to join ‘willing employers’. A version of this proposal was included in the Senate’s aborted 2007 comprehensive immigration reform bill, which would have created an unlimited number of new H2C temporary work visas good for three years and renewable for another three-year term. Of course, the millions of unauthorized and undocumented aliens in the US already constitute a population of guest workers de facto, but without being vetted and with no provisions for return migration other than arrest and deportation. Guest worker programmes are inherently controversial because of their suspected downward pressures on general wage levels and because they carry a taint of exploitation. They are a politically sensitive second-best option to high legal intakes of unskilled immigrants. The issue posed is whether Australia and the US can institute effective guest worker programmes at bearable political and wage-level costs. International Students Australia and the US give large numbers of international students ready access to their universities and these students increasingly enter the two countries’ workforces upon completing their studies. Australia has greatly expanded its international student visa programme during recent years and it has focused on students from Asian countries. With seven categories of visas, numbers in the international student visa programme exceeded 250 000 in June 2007, an increase of about 20 per cent over the previous year. Of these, more than 110 000 were in the higher education category. A substantial and growing part of the immigration programme now stems from permanent resident visas issued onshore in the general skilled migration (GSM) categories. (Previously, as in the US, students applying for permanent residence were required to do so offshore.) In the programme year 2006–07 there were 22 858 visa grants to overseas students (including dependants), of which 20 288 were in the GSM’s independent overseas student category. The sourcing of new immigrants from the international student programme has proved to be an effective way of accessing new skills for the Australian economy. It has the advantage that graduating international students not only have English language skill but are already acclimatized to Australia. As McDonald and Withers (2008, p. 15) observe: Immigration policy has been shifting more towards a ‘funnelling’ process where immigrants enter Australia on a range of temporary long-stay visas but are able to convert to permanent residence after a period. The temporary period

Introduction

15

operates as a trial period for both sides: to enable temporary immigrants to assess whether they want to stay permanently and for the Australian authorities to better assess the person’s suitability for permanent residence. In the meantime, many labour shortages are met while the immigrant works on a temporary basis in Australia. This assists settlement.

Following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, the US government tightened student visa procedures and a noticeable decline in the number of students entering the country ensued. For the 2003–04 academic year the number of enrolled international undergraduates dropped by 4.6 per cent. The enrolment of international graduate students dropped by 3.6 per cent in 2004–05. In both categories of students the rate of decline slowed in 2005–06 and then reversed, so that by 2008 the total number of enrolled international students was 6 per cent above its pre-9/11 level. However, there is still no clearly demarcated route that international students can follow to gain permanent resident status in the US. Students who complete their studies and who play vital roles in high priority research teams and projects can apply for such a change in status and other graduate students are eligible for a one-year work visa for purposes of practical training. But the great bulk of international students are required not only to seek visa renewals annually, but return to their country of origin immediately upon finishing their studies. Relying on international students to meet part of the need for highskilled workers is problematic. One reason is that competition for these students is increasing between OECD and middle-income developing countries. In Latin America, for example, Venezuela, Argentina and Chile now actively recruit and welcome quality students from neighbouring countries. An increasing number of South Korean students enrol in Chinese instead of American universities. Universities in Western and East Central Europe regularly seek to attract able tertiary-level students from ex-Soviet countries such as Ukraine. As sources of international students, China and India are of special importance for Australia. The same can be said about the US, for which five Asian countries – India, China, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan – accounted for almost half (47.8 per cent) of all international students enrolled in American higher education during 2006–07. Much now depends on changing social and cultural patterns in Asia, such as the role of women, generational changes, the rise of new chain-migration networks and the pattern of immigration cooperation between Asian countries themselves. Another reason why a reliance on international students is problematic is the growing dependence of Australian and US tertiary education institutions on tuition fees paid by students from abroad. It is noteworthy that

16

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

during the ten years to 2007 Australia’s public outlays on tertiary education fell by 4 per cent, relative to the OECD average increase of 48 per cent, while in US universities international students now account for 50 per cent of all science researchers, 40 per cent of science engineering PhDs and 65 per cent of PhDs in computer science. It was not surprising, then, that when the economic downturn took hold globally toward the end of 2008, Australian and US universities and other tertiary institutions feared that international student enrolments would taper off and lead to gaping budget deficits. It is also worth bearing in mind that international students who are given permanent residence status are among those most inclined to return to their home countries and cultures after a few years – a reverse brain drain. Overall, the issue is whether large intakes of international students who can be ‘funnelled’ into high-skilled workforce components, and who buttress the fiscal solvency of Australian and US educational institutions, are in reality a frail reed on which to rely. Cherry Picking Australia, followed by Canada and the US, was the world’s leading ‘net brain drainer’ in 2007, that is, it ranked first among nations that, as proportions of their working populations, import more people, many of them skilled, than they export. In 2007 the foreign-born amounted to 23 per cent of Australia’s population, compared with 13 per cent of the US population. As Robert Rowthorn has noted, ‘The countries that have been most affected by brain drain are the small island economies of the Caribbean and the Pacific where on average more than 40 per cent of skilled workers have left’ (2006, p. 19). A recent analysis of worldwide immigration by The Economist (5 January 2008, pp. 3–4) states the issue graphically: Most, perhaps all, poor and middle-income countries face chronic shortages of skilled workers. In South Africa, although universities churn out graduates at a fast clip, many well-qualified people promptly depart for Britain or Australia, leaving tens of thousands of jobs unfilled at home. In Morocco those with science and engineering degrees, computer skills and languages go to France, the Netherlands, and Canada . . . Hospitals and clinics in southern Africa struggle to cope with huge public-health problems as doctors and nurses pack their bags for jobs in the Gulf, Europe and elsewhere. It is a similar story for schools.

After reviewing the costs and benefits to receiving (rich) and sending (poor) countries, Rowthorn concluded that it would be preferable if the countries seeking to attract large numbers of skilled immigrants educated their own people and exported skilled workers to balance their inflows.

Introduction

17

Where this is impractical, Rowthorn (2006, p. 23) proposes that receiving countries ‘should compensate the countries from which the skilled immigrants come, either permanently or in some other way’. But it seems unlikely that immigrant-receiving rich countries such as Australia and the US will do much in either respect. There is substantial evidence, nevertheless, that immigrants’ remittances to sending countries contribute importantly, often crucially, to the latter’s economies. For the foreseeable future this will probably be the only substantial immigration-related economic sustenance that rich countries provide to poor ones. It is clear, however, that magnitudes of remittances vary directly with employment conditions in the rich countries. Thus, as unemployment increased in the US during 2008, remittances to Mexico and countries in Central America and the Caribbean fell, reducing or erasing the principal incomes of an apparently large number of families and villages in those countries. Moreover, intensifying US efforts to ‘wall out’ unauthorized and undocumented migrants implies that the US economy will decreasingly supply the poorer countries to its south with new flows of remittances. There is, in sum, a significant issue of ‘international morality’ encompassing Australian and US immigration policies. Sub-national Immigrant Dispersion As part of the 12th International Metropolis Conference in Melbourne in October 2007, comparative studies of policies that encourage immigrant settlement in specified sub-national regions were presented (Wulff et al. 2008). In particular, Australia’s smaller cities and towns encounter many barriers to successfully attracting and retaining immigrants. Wulff’s study assessed a number of Australian policies and programmes that seek to disperse immigrants to sub-national regions and smaller centres by: ●

●

● ● ●

Providing a bonus in the points system for immigrants who have received employment offers from outside major metropolitan centres or are prepared to locate in smaller communities. Giving applications by such potential immigrants faster and more flexible approvals so that employers can more quickly obtain the skilled labour they require. Tilting skilled migrant and family sponsorship schemes to favour specific locales. Instituting state- and municipality-specific schemes to attract immigrants to centres and regions suffering labour shortages. Allowing international students to work during their education.

18

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

But it is still the case that newly arrived immigrants to Australia settle predominantly in the major cities, and this is unlikely to change. Neither the US government nor state and local governments make any attempt to disperse immigrants. On the contrary, a plethora of state and local measures have been adopted to deter immigrant settlement. Yet states and localities bid feverishly for business investment and corporate location, and this competition often has the unintended consequence of bringing large numbers of immigrants to states and localities that have been successful in it. Historically, urban labour markets have unquestionably attracted the lion’s share of immigrants. Recently, however, the needs of employers for relatively cheap and unskilled labour in states where ‘right to work’ laws inhibit trade unions have propelled migrants to the south-east – Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama and Arkansas – but also Nevada and Arizona in the west and south-west, all of which experienced growth in their foreign-born populations, exceeding 35 per cent between 2000–06. Only two northern states, Indiana and Delaware, had comparable foreign-born growth rates. Not surprisingly, the large and rapid influx of immigrants to states and localities where there were few new immigrants previously has ignited anti-immigrant backlashes. In the absence of a federal government strategy that induces a more even regional dispersion of immigrants, hot spots of hostility toward them will continue to flare. Environmental Issues and City Growth The impact of population growth on the environment and the inexorable expansions of Australian and US cities feature prominently in debates about the two countries’ immigration programmes. With climate change a widely acknowledged reality and with the difficulties of living in illplanned and ever-spreading metropolises experienced daily by majorities of Australians and Americans, the connection between immigration and environment becomes increasingly important. In Australia, however, the connection has not caused federal governments of either party complexion to dampen their enthusiasm for immigration. In New South Wales former Premier Bob Carr’s warning cries about Sydney’s inability to sustain further population growth made a mark. But for the most part federal and state governments, especially those of high-growth Western Australia and Queensland, actively seek additional immigrant labour. In the US there is certainly worry about how the unending expansion of urban areas damages the environment, but alliances of real estate developers and politicians – ‘urban growth machines’ – that compete to attract investment, increased populations and the tax revenues that flow from them, clearly hold sway.

Introduction

19

The prevailing view in both countries is that it is not so much numbers of people as it is their attitudes to environmental care that will hasten or retard degradation. Thus, it is not seen as incongruous that the Australian federal government has been increasing immigration intakes greatly at the same time as it has been taking actions to manage and reduce the consequences of climate change. In the US, which consumes nearly a quarter of the world’s energy supply, the tightening of that supply, highlighted by a doubling of petrol prices in mid-2008, brings a dawning recognition, but as yet few relevant policies, that ever-increasing urban populations and ever more far-flung suburbs and exurbs are unsustainable. Though anti-immigration groups such as Zero Population in Australia and the US Federation of American Immigration Reform were founded by advocates of population control and environmental protection, the major environmental interest groups, such as the Australian Conservation Federation and the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club in the US, either refuse to take positions on the advisability of continued mass immigration or they support it. Asylum Seekers and Migrants The most pointed debate about Australian immigration policy has centred on the emotional issue of undocumented asylum seekers. TheTampa incident immediately before the Howard Government’s re-election in 2001 resulted in new border protection legislation and a ‘Pacific Solution’, by which Australia located most processing of undocumented asylum seekers cum ‘boat people’ beyond its territorial waters, for example on the island of Nauru. Legislation enacted by a Labor government in the early 1990s, providing for the mandatory detention of undocumented asylum seekers, was taken a large step further. The tough stance taken by the Howard government against undocumented asylum seekers was seen by some as an important reason why there was so little public opposition to the government’s steady expansion of legal immigrant intakes. Largely because of successful agreements with neighbouring SouthEast Asian governments about taking effective actions against people smugglers, rather than as a result of the Howard government’s incarceration of unauthorized asylum seekers (regarded as too draconian by many observers, including some Liberal Party parliamentarians), the number of undocumented asylum seekers fell to a trickle during the late Howard years. In July 2008 the new Rudd Labor government announced that it would end the policy of automatically consigning undocumented asylum seekers to harsh detention centres. These changes have left visa over-stayers – persons who remain in Australia unlawfully after the expiry

20

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

of their temporary visas – as the only significant body of illegal migrants. Their number was estimated to be 48 500 in June 2007, compared with 51 000 three years before. The number and proportion of illegal migrants is the most striking difference between Australia and the US. Nearly one-third of the US foreignborn population is estimated to be unauthorized and undocumented, a number and proportion unacceptable for a nation of immigrants that is also a nation of laws. The growth of this population segment, despite unprecedented resources allocated to border control, has led to a sense that the US government lacks the ability and will to secure its borders and control illegal migration. The result is that illegal migration meets low-skilled demands, while temporary work visas meet demands for most high-skilled labour. Both ways of meeting the country’s labour needs circumvent established immigration policy. Yet proposed changes to the policy are subject to immediate political fights and deadlocks. Immigration and Energy Mass immigration to Australia, the US, other English-speaking countries and virtually all countries in Europe, as well as growing immigration to middle-income countries outside the West, is one of the most important aspects of globalization. But this immigration and the globalization it manifests rest on relatively cheap and readily available energy, first and foremost petroleum. On the assumption that, as many experts forecast, petroleum will never again be as inexpensively available as it has been during recent decades, it is worth speculating whether globalization and the mass immigration associated with it will attenuate. Because of much higher energy costs, especially in air and ground transport, outsourcing of jobs to far-flung countries with cheap labour may shrink. Just-in-time procurement of materials for producing many goods may become riskier and standing inventories of those materials may again become necessary. The automobile and other industries based on cheap energy are likely to contract, and many of the jobs that immigrants now perform will either disappear or be performed by native-born persons who insist on their ‘right’ to these jobs. The ease with which immigrants return on frequent visits or longer periods of work to their homelands will reduce. The indulged and indulgent lives of a great many people in the rich countries will become more pinched, and with this pinching their acceptance of mass immigration may dry up. In short, a greater scarcity of energy resources on which much immigration and return migration have depended may portend alterations in the labour markets and immigration policies of Australia and the US well beyond anything contemplated at present.

Introduction

21

CONCLUSION At the time of writing (January 2009), Australia has become prey to economic events beyond its borders, in particular the mortgage credit crunch emanating from the US. Though protected by the minerals boom that Chinese demand for coal, iron, gas and other resources induces, the Australian economy is nonetheless vulnerable. Should unemployment start to rise, there can be little doubt that, in the country’s longstanding tradition, enthusiasm for high immigration intakes will dissipate. This does not prevent a conclusion that Australian immigration policy must be counted an outstanding overall success. It has provided for immigration that is controlled, predictable, transparent and supported publicly. It has provided essential skills from diverse countries for a growing economy without detracting from the basic social cohesion of a vibrant society. A conclusion about US immigration policy must be less positive: ‘The US immigration system is overwhelmed, outdated, and no longer serves the nation’s needs’ (Meissner et al. 2006, pp. xiii and xv). There is a widespread sense, heightened by the election of a new and seemingly more progressive president in November 2008, that major changes in government postures and policies are unavoidable and that some kind of turning point is at hand. Probably the battle over US immigration policy reform will resume, with Australia’s generally admirable programme gaining study and perhaps some American emulation.

2.

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia Graeme Hugo

The massive change in Australian immigration since the early 1990s has partly been a response to pervasive globalization processes, but also the result of internal pressures and proactive, evidence-based policy making within Australia. Tracking changes in Australia’s migration patterns is facilitated by the country being an island continent but also having one of the world’s most comprehensive data collections with respect to both international migration flow and stocks (Hugo 2004a). This chapter begins with a consideration of the shifts that have occurred in the scale and composition of immigration, beginning with an examination of patterns of permanent settlement. While settlement migration was the overwhelmingly dominant element in Australian international migration in the half-century following the Second World War, there have been some major shifts in the last decade. Hence the growth of temporary migration is examined here. The chapter concludes with a brief assessment of some of the major contemporary and evolving issues relating to migration in Australia.

RECENT TRENDS IN SETTLER MIGRATION IN AUSTRALIA Australia has an organized programme for permanent settlement of immigrants. However, people who enter Australia under its migration programme are only one component of the contribution made by international migration to Australia’s population growth. The other elements are: ● ● ● ●

New Zealand migration, which refers to the arrival of New Zealanders under the Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement. Long-term visitors to the country. Emigration of residents. Category jumping from temporary to permanent residence. 22

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia

23

The migration programme operates within levels set by the federal government and is made up of humanitarian and non-humanitarian programmes. The Humanitarian Programme The last decade has seen some major, and at times controversial, developments in the Australian humanitarian migration programme. The programme was developed in 1981 to include the United Nations Convention on refugees and those who do not fit the strict United Nations definition but suffer from deprivation of human rights. Hence it is a mix of refugee and special humanitarian entrants and over the period the total intake has varied from a high of 15 050 in 1995–96 to a low of 9960 in 1999– 2000 (when in fact there were an additional 5900 temporary safe haven entrants). Of particular significance is the increased importance of onshore refugee/humanitarian settlers. Traditionally the bulk of the intake in this category has been of entrants selected by an orderly process offshore. However, there was an increase in unauthorized arrivals of asylum seekers after 1997, mostly from Iraq and Afghanistan, reaching 3800 in 2000. Prior to 1991 asylum seekers were processed in Australia and lodged in former migrant hostels, but in 1990 a system of detention was introduced while cases for refugee status were assessed. With the increased numbers of asylum seekers, the detention system was put under strain and there was heavy criticism of their mandatory detention for long periods in communities such as Woomera, located in the arid interior of the continent. Moreover, those whose claim for asylum was deemed valid were only given a temporary protection visa (TPV), whereas all offshore refugee/ humanitarian arrivals received permanent residency. Although released from detention, TPV holders did not have access to all the support and services enjoyed by other refugee/humanitarian settlers. Then in 2001 the government introduced ‘The Pacific Solution’, whereby boats with asylum seekers were interdicted before they entered Australian waters and directed to Pacific countries, where their claim would be considered (Jupp 2002, ch. 10). There has been considerable criticism of Australia’s policies toward asylum seekers arriving in Australia unlawfully – detaining them in centres while their claims are determined and diverting their boats to selected Pacific islands for determination. Moreover, until 2005 there was a policy of granting only a TPV to people who arrived unlawfully but then were found to meet the mandated United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) refugee requirements, while a

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Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

permanent prv visa (PPV) was given to those who arrived in Australia lawfully. In recent years, however, most of the TPVs have been converted to PPVs. The origins of the Australian refugee/humanitarian immigrants have varied considerably over time. A major change occurred in the late 1990s when Australia began to take substantial numbers of refugee/ humanitarian immigrants from East Africa, especially from Sudan but also Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. This was a significant change, since hitherto Australia’s immigration from Africa had been mainly from South Africa and Zimbabwe and was predominantly of European ethnic origin. This has added a new layer of heterogeneity to the Australian population and the new groups have faced many challenges in adjusting to life in a quite different cultural context (Perrin and Dunn 2007). However, it was announced in 2007 that Australia had adjusted the ‘regional priorities’ of its refugee/humanitarian programme for 2007–08 (DIAC 2007). The intake was to be maintained at 13 000 places but the African intake was reduced from 55.7 per cent (70.2 per cent in 2004–05) to 30 per cent, while those from Asia (mainly Burmese in Thailand and Bhutanese in Nepal) were increased from 10 to 35 per cent. The then Minister for Immigration came under criticism when he said this change was in response to ‘concerns raised over the problem of African refugees settling in Australia: race based gangs, reports of altercations between African groups in night clubs out at community functions and disagreements among prominent African community organisations over accusations that some are receiving favoured treatment in accessing community services’ (Asian Migration News, 1-15 October 2007). The Skill Migration Programme The ‘non-humanitarian’ part of the migration programme in 2006–07 resulted in 148 200 immigrants settling in Australia.1 This was the largest intake for two decades and 3.7 per cent larger than in 2005–06 (142 200). Moreover, the planning levels for 2007–08 and 2008–09 were 158 800 and 190 300, respectively, indicating the upward trajectory of immigration. There are three components of the non-humanitarian part of the programme. The two main components are skill and family. The skill stream is capped at a level decided each year by the federal government in consultation with the main stakeholders (unions, employers, state and local government and so on). Most applicants for skill visas are assessed against a points test with an adjustable ‘pass’ level. The test involves assessing points for skills, age, work experience, English language ability and so on. Family migration, on the other hand, is designed to facilitate reunion of close family members

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia

25

like spouses, children, parents and a few other family members. There has been a growing emphasis in the programme on the skill component. Indeed in 2007–08 the number of skilled immigrants coming to Australia reached a record 108 500 people – 10.8 per cent more than in 2006–07. Prior to the global economic meltdown in late 2008 there was considerable discourse in Australia about skill shortages, with the unemployment level being at its lowest for many decades. Accordingly a major increase in skilled migration to 133 500 was planned for 2008-09. The switch from a predominance of family migrants in the non-humanitarian programme up to the mid-1990s to one dominated by skilled settlers is one of the major elements of change. The percentage of settlers in the skill categories increased from 29.1 per cent in 1993–94 to 69.6 per cent in 2005–06. This has been driven by a number of reports (for example, Birrell et al. 2006; Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2004) and a strong imperative within government for immigration to contribute to the increasing skill profile of the national population and improving productivity. A Productivity Commission report (2006), however, concluded that the impact of immigration on productivity was positive but relatively small and would only increase income per capita over 21 years by less than A$400. Family Migration The trajectory of family migration peaked in the late 1980s and reached a low of 31 300 in 1997–98. Thereafter there was a slow increase in numbers to 41 740 in 2004–05. In recent years, however, there has been a more substantial growth in numbers to 45 290 in 2005–06 and 50 050 in 2006–07. It is especially noticeable that over time the category has been increasingly dominated by the spouse/fiancé component. Over 2000–07 there was a 51.7 per cent increase in the number of partner immigrants admitted in this category. The significance of this form of migration is seen in the fact that in 2006–07 there were 40 340 foreign spouse/partner/fiancé visa entries but there were only a total of 114 222 marriages celebrated in Australia. It reflects the fact that more and more Australians, especially young Australians, are travelling overseas on extended holidays and to work. Inevitably this is resulting in increasing international marriage. However, there has also been a tightening of the regulations regarding immigration of other family members, especially aged parents. The increasing skilling of Australia’s migrant intake is reflected in an increase in the gap between the proportion of Australia-born and overseas-born adults who have degree qualifications. In 1981 5.2 per cent of the overseas born had a degree qualification compared to 4.5 per cent of the Australia born, but by 2006 the percentages were 14.7 and

26

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

21.3, respectively. It has been shown elsewhere (Hugo 2008b) that the Australian community of researchers, scientists and academics is increasingly overseas born. Trans-Tasman Migration Although there have been changes over the years, there has been more or less unrestricted movement of Australians and New Zealanders across the Tasman (Bedford et al. 2003; Carmichael 1993). New Zealanders are granted a special category visa upon arrival and this remains valid as long as they wish to stay in Australia. The stock of New Zealanders in Australia was 504 000 in mid-2007, an increase from around 471 000 from the previous year (DIAC 2008a, p. 77). In 2006–07 there were 28 307 New Zealand citizens who entered Australia on a permanent2 basis, but the numbers of New Zealand citizens moving permanently to Australia is substantially larger than the number of New Zealand-born immigrants (23 906 in 2006– 07). This has resulted in some suspicion in the Australian government that New Zealand was being intentionally used as a less difficult way to enter Australia, since for many years New Zealand’s points assessment test pass score was not as high as Australia’s. This resulted in Australia amending its regulations so that New Zealanders were not automatically eligible for social security payments in Australia (Bedford et al. 2003). The high level of New Zealand migration to Australia has meant that in mid-2007 there were 504 430 New Zealand residents in Australia – equivalent to 12 per cent of the population of New Zealand. Of these, 363 127 (72 per cent) were New Zealand born. However, it is apparent that one of the distinctive characteristics of New Zealander migration to Australia is a substantial return migration. In 2006–07 there were 14 772 permanent and long-term departures of New Zealanders from Australia. Once New Zealander migration to Australia is controlled for age there is little difference between the New Zealand citizen population in Australia and the Australia born (Hugo 2004b). This differentiates New Zealanders from all other immigrant groups in the country. The New Zealand-born in Australia have a higher level of workforce participation (76.3 per cent) compared with the Australia born (68.2 per cent) and a similar unemployment rate (4.7 per cent) (DIMIA 2006, p. 51). Indeed international migration between Australia and New Zealand has more similarities with migration patterns within Australia (Bell and Hugo 2000) than it does with other international migration flows. This reflects the fact that despite Australia and New Zealand being separate nation states, they largely form a single labour market.

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia

27

Increased ‘Onshore’ Migration Another of the key shifts in Australian immigration over the last decade has been the increasing proportion of foreigners granted permanent residence in Australia who are ‘onshore’ migrants in the sense that they are already in the country with some other form of visa. This part of the migration programme has increased each year and in 2007–08 there were 56 575 ‘onshore additions’ to the population – 27.5 per cent of the intake. Asians made up a higher proportion of onshore migrants (54.9 per cent) than of offshore arrivals (42.3 per cent). Over the seven years to mid-2007, 25.0 per cent of all permanent additions to the Australian population were onshore settlers (31.8 per cent of those from Asia). The increasing significance of ‘onshore’ migration is a corollary of the increasing scale of non-permanent worker migration to Australia. However, it also reflects a change in Australian migration policy making, which sees considerable benefit in increasing the balance of onshore migrants, since they are more likely to adjust to Australian conditions, especially the labour market, than their offshore counterparts. This is a function of the fact that they are more likely to have Australian qualifications and have a greater knowledge of, and experience in, the Australian labour market, and conditions in Australia generally. Hence, since 1999 a number of changes in regulations have favoured temporary migrants changing their status to permanent residence. This has included regulations that have made it possible for some foreigners on student visas to gain permanent residence without returning to their origin country. Hence, in 2006–07 some 22 858 students in Australia changed their status to permanent residence; 89.6 per cent were from Asia. This represented an increase of 27.7 per cent over the previous year. The nexus between student migration and eventual permanent settlement is becoming an increasingly important process in skilled migration, not only in Australia but throughout the OECD region. The link between studying in Australia and eventually permanent settlement is not confined to students seeking permanent residence immediately after completing their studies. The Australian points assessment scheme for selection of skilled settlers now gives extra points for having an Australian qualification, so large numbers of people who studied in Australia and then returned to their origin country have subsequently come back to Australia as settlers. In 2004–05 some 15 719 new arrivals had an Australian qualification and among this group Asians were again dominant, accounting for 88.9 per cent. This increasing group has been called ‘designer migrants’ by Simmons (1999), since the Australian government is effectively shaping the training of its future immigrants

28

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

to increase the chances that they will adjust effectively to the Australian labour market. State-specific and Regional Migration Schemes The last few years have seen a more concerted effort by the Australian government to influence where immigrants settle than at any time since the immediate post-Second World War period, when ‘displaced persons’ were obliged to live their first two years in areas designated by the government. A range of mechanisms have been introduced in the last decade to attract migrants to settle away from the major metropolitan destinations on the east coast and in south-west Australia (Hugo 2004c). There has been an increase in the number of visas granted under the state-specific and regional migration (SSRM) schemes from 1753 (2–3 per cent of the total non-humanitarian intake) in 1997–98 to 27 488 (20.9 per cent) in 2005–06. The programme has gathered particular momentum since 2003, with state governments, especially South Australia’s, mounting substantial independent immigration, recruitment and settlement activities. This marks two particular shifts from previous Australian immigration policy (Hugo 2005a): ●

●

The Australian states and territories are becoming increasingly involved in immigration and recruitment of immigrants, which has in the past been almost totally a national government responsibility. Many of the SSRM migrants enter Australia as temporary residents, then after a period (around two years) in which they demonstrate that they have successfully adjusted to the labour market and Australia more generally, they are granted permanent residence.

The essence of the SSRM scheme was to enable employers, state and local governments and families in designated ‘lagging economic regions’ to sponsor immigrants without the immigrants having to fully meet the stringent requirements of the points assessment system. There is an array of visa categories available under the SSRM scheme. The object of the scheme is to influence where immigrants settle in Australia. Figure 2.1 shows the difference between the states and territories in the mix of SSRM and non-SSRM migrants in where they settled in 2006–07. The state of South Australia has been lagging economically over a long period and has been especially active in the SSRM programme (Hugo 2008c). On the other hand, New South Wales, the major destination of international migrants, has very few SSRM migrants. Indeed the overall proportion of recent migrants settling in New South Wales has

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia

29

3084

290 553 NT 3025

Qld WA

2903

16758

25556 1900

7158 SA

NSW 41935 NUMBER OF MIGRANTS

45000 30000

Vic 9178

ACT

25520

661

15000 456

650

512 Tas

1000 other

Source:

SSRM

DIAC (2008a, 2000b).

Figure 2.1

Australia: settler arrivals by state, according to whether or not they are SSRM scheme migrants, 2006–07

declined over the last decade, while that in South Australia has increased. It remains to be seen whether the SSRM migrants remain in the designated areas after the initial qualification period has elapsed. One dimension of the SSRM scheme is that there is an increasing level of immigrant settlement outside of Australian metropolitan areas (Hugo 2008e). While the SSRM scheme is confined to the ‘non-humanitarian’ part of the immigration programme, there has also been an increasing tendency to settle humanitarian immigrants outside of major centres of immigrant settlement. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship is influenced by the availability of support services and networks in which it directs

30

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

humanitarian settlers. South Australia has been especially active in attracting refugee/humanitarian settlers (Hugo 2008c, 2000e).

INCREASING NON-PERMANENT MIGRATION Australia has long had an emphasis on attracting permanent settlers to the country and a strongly expressed opposition to attracting temporary and contract workers. During the labour shortage years of the 1950s and 1960s, Australia’s migration solution to the problem contrasted sharply with that of European nations like Germany and France when it opted to concentrate on attracting permanent migrants to meet worker shortages, rather than contract workers. However, since the mid-1990s attitudes have changed in Australia and it has been recognized that in the context of globalized labour markets it is essential to have mechanisms to allow non-permanent entry of workers in certain groups. Nevertheless, this form of entry has not been extended to unskilled and low-skilled areas and, until very recently, has only been open to people with particular skills and entrepreneurs. The trends in the numbers of the main visa categories of temporary migrants with the right to work are shown in Figure 2.2. The working holiday maker (WHM) programme reached record levels of 134 612 arrivals in 2006–07, doubling in the last ten years and increasing by 20.5 per cent over the last year. The WHM programme is a reciprocal one that allows young people (aged 18–30 years) from 19 nations to have working holidays in Australia for periods of up to a year. The fact that WHMs fill some important niches in the labour market, such as in harvesting, tourist activity, restaurants, and so on, has been recognized by recent legislation allowing WHMs to extend their stay in Australia if they work in particular areas of labour shortage. The WHM programme takes up the equivalent of 69 000 full-year jobs, but about 82 000 jobs are created by the WHMs’ presence in Australia (DIAC 2008a, p. 51). The countries with reciprocal agreements are mainly European, but also include Canada, Japan, Korea and Hong Kong. In 2008 a new, somewhat similar ‘Work and Holiday’ visa programme was introduced. It is also based on reciprocal agreements with selected countries and confined to 18- to 30-year-olds. However, it is restricted only to professionals and tertiary educated people. So far agreements have been signed with the US, Chile, Turkey, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. One of the most important changes in Australian immigration policy was the introduction of skilled temporary residence visas. This has resulted in substantial flow of long-term and short-term skilled entrants to work in Australia. Long-term visas (up to four years) reached a record 87 310 in 2006–07 (a 22.7 per cent increase over the previous year). Short-stay (less

Source:

Figure 2.2 1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07

2000–01

2001–02

2002–03

2003–04

2004–05

2005–06

2006–07

1997–98

1996–97

1995–96

1999–2000

Total 1998–99

Year

1998–99

Year

1997–98

900 000 800 000 700 000 600 000 500 000 400 000 300 000 200 000 100 000 0

1996–97

1995–96

1994–95 Year

1998–99

1997–98

1996–97

1995–96

1994–95

1993–94

1992–93

2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07

2005–06 2006–07

0 2004–05

20 000 2002–03

40 000

2003–04

60 000 2001–02

80 000

2002–03

100 000 2000–01

Working Holiday Makers

2001–02

120 000

2000–01

1999–2000

Year

1999–2000

1998–99

1997–98

1996–97

1995–96

1994–95

1993–94

1991–92

1990–91

1989–90

1988–89

1987–88

1986–87

Number 180000 160 000 140 000 120 000 100 000 80 000 60 000 40 000 20 000 0

1994–95

1993–94

1992–93

1991–92

1990–91

1989–90

1988–89

1987–88

1986–87

Number 140 000

1993–94

1992–93

1991–92

1990–91

1989–90

1988–89

1987–88

1986–87

Number 600 000

1992–93

1991–92

1990–91

1989–90

1988–89

1987–88

1986–87

Number

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia 31

Overseas Students

500 000 Temporary Business Entrants

400 000

300 000

200 000

100 000

0

DIAC, Population Flows: Immigration Aspects (various issues).

Australia: temporary migration by category, 1986–2007

32

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

than one year) business visitors numbered 404 795 in 2006–07 (a 9.9 per cent increase). In 2007–08 the number of long-term visa holders climbed another 24 per cent to 110 570. The temporary business entry visa (457) is similar to the H1B visa in the US and is initiated by employers, although is not capped. It is even more focused on skill than the permanent migration programme, being confined to the managerial, professional, paraprofessional and trades occupation categories, and research has shown it has been generally quite successful (Khoo et al. 2007). However, the 457 programme has come under intense scrutiny in recent times, with some employers being accused of misusing the scheme to displace Australian workers, especially in some regional areas. The union movement (Australian Manufacturing Workers Union 2006) has raised issues of migrant workers being ready to settle for lower wages, as well as occupational health and safety issues created by a lack of ability to speak English. A parliamentary inquiry (Joint Standing Committee on Migration 2007, p. 2) has made a number of recommendations to improve procedures associated with the programme. Concerns have been expressed about the use of 457s in the meat processing industry and close monitoring that local workers are not being displaced has been instituted. In 2006–07 the major occupations of 457 holders were computing professionals (7.6 per cent), nurses (6.4 per cent), general medical practitioners (3.5 per cent), business and information professionals (3.3 per cent) and medical practitioners in training (2.8 per cent). The main origin countries of 457 holders in 2006–07 were the UK (23 per cent), India (14 per cent), Philippines (9 per cent), US (6 per cent), China (6 per cent), South Africa (5 per cent), and Ireland, Canada, Germany and Japan (all 3 per cent). It is interesting that the origins of nonpermanent migrants (minus students) are strongly concentrated in the highincome countries of North America, Europe and Japan-Korea. One of the largest categories of temporary residents with the right to work is foreign students, and there has been a rapid increase in the number of foreigners moving to Australia to study; Asians have made up around three-quarters of them. On 30 June 2007 there were 250 589 people on student visas in Australia and in the year 2006–07, 228 592 visas were issued to overseas students – both record levels (DIAC 2008a, p. 53). Of the largest six countries of origin, five are Asian – China (15 per cent), Korea (8 per cent), India (12 per cent), Thailand and Malaysia (4 per cent each). In mid-2007 there was a stock of 721 656 persons present in Australia on temporary visas (ibid., p. 43), an increase of 14.3 per cent over the previous year; over half of them were from Asia. Hugo (2006a) has shown that temporarily resident workers now make up around 4 per cent of the national workforce and are strongly concentrated in particular niches of the labour market. At present the temporary worker visa categories are restricted to

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia

33

the four most skilled occupational categories, but there is pressure from some groups to allow semi-skilled and unskilled workers to be included in the programme; this has hitherto been resisted by the government. A major initiative of the new Rudd government was the announcement in September 2008 of a new visa (subclass 416) which is a pilot to run over three years and allow 2500 seasonal workers from Kiribati, Papua-New Guinea, Tonga and Vanuatu to work in the horticultural industry in regional Australia for up to seven months each year. This follows considerable pressure from regional horticultural employers and from Pacific countries to provide employment for their burgeoning workforce age populations (Maclellan and Mares 2006; World Bank 2006). The World Bank (2006) has argued that greater labour mobility would expand the employment options available to those living in the Pacific, particularly in Melanesia. Currently such mobility is limited and favours skilled workers. Bedford (2007) has suggested that ‘the most contentious demographic issue confronting Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific during the next half-century will be how to cope with pressure for an emigration outlet from Melanesia’. He suggests that long-term development in Melanesia will depend heavily on opportunities for young people to travel overseas for training and employment. New Zealand has entered into special migration relationships with the Pacific more than Australia has, albeit in a limited way. New Zealand has a ‘Pacific Access Category’ which provides limited migration from Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Fiji and a Western Samoa quota scheme. Moreover, the Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme was introduced in October 2006 to assist employers in the horticultural and viticultural industries in planting, maintaining, harvesting and packing crops where there are no New Zealanders available. Some 5000 workers have been deployed under the scheme, which is being carefully monitored; the results will be watched very closely in Australia.

CHANGES IN COMPOSITION OF MIGRATION There has been a substantial change in the origins of permanent settlers to Australia over the post-Second World War period, as Figure 2.3 shows. This indicates that the proportion of settlers coming from Europe has undergone a significant decline and the share from Asia, New Zealand and Africa has increased. In 2002–03 visas were granted to persons from 186 different nationalities (Rizvi 2003, p. 23) and, of the leading 16 birthplace groups in 2006–07, 12 are Asian countries. In recent years China and India have become the dominant countries of origin of immigrants from Asia.

34

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared UK and Ireland NZ and Pacific

300 000

Other Europe Middle East

Africa Asia

Americas

Number

250 000 200 000 150 000 100 000 50 000 2003–04

2000–01

1997–98

1994–95

1991–92

1988–89

1985–86

1982–83

1979–80

1976–77

1973–74

1970–71

1967–68

1964–65

1961–62

1958–59

1955–56

1952–53

1949–50

*1945–47

0

Year

Source: DIMIA, Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics; DIAC, Immigration Update (various issues).

Figure 2.3

Australia: settler arrivals by region of last residence, 1947–2006

This represents a substantial change, as at various times over the last three decades, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines and Hong Kong have made the largest contribution (Hugo 2003). One of the distinctive patterns in recent years has been the increased immigration of people from north (especially Sudan) and sub-Saharan (especially Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia) Africa. There has been a permanent settler migration of 496 993 Asians to Australia over the 1994–2007 period, comprising 37.6 per cent of the total 1.32 million settler arrivals over those 13 years. The numbers fluctuated between 25 339 in 1997–98 and 57 457 in 2006–07, but a general upward trajectory is evident in the last couple of years. The relative significance of the four Asian sub-regions has fluctuated, with South Asians recording the most rapid increase in recent years. Asian countries account for seven of the ten top sources of migrant settlers over the 1994–2007 period, with the largest numbers being from China (104 599), India (79 804), Philippines (47 361), Vietnam (33 917), Indonesia (31 146) and Hong Kong SAR (26 795).

EMIGRATION There is a tendency for Australia to be categorized as a purely immigration country but, in fact, it is also a country of significant emigration. Over recent years departures on a permanent or long-term basis have been very significant. Figure 2.4 shows that there has been a substantial upturn

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia

35

Permanent Departures of Residents from Australia 90000

Australia born

Overseas born

80000 70000

Number

60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 1959–60 1961–62 1963–64 1965–66 1967–68 1969–70 1971–72 1973–74 1975–76 1977–78 1979–80 1981–82 1983–84 1985–86 1987–88 1989–90 1991–92 1993–94 1995–96 1997–98 1999–2000 2001–02 2003–04 2005–06 2007–08

0

Year

Australian Resident Long-term Departures from Australia 120000

100000

Number

80000

60 000

40000

20000

2007–08

2004–05

2001–02

1998–99

1995–96

1992–93

1989–90

1986–87

1983–84

1980–81

1977–78

1974–75

1971–72

1968–69

1965–66

1962–63

1959–60

0

Year

Source: DIMIA, Australian Immigration Consolidated Statistics (various issues); DIAC, Immigration Update (various issues), DIAC (2008d).

Figure 2.4

Australia: permanent and long-term departures of residents, 1959–60 to 2007–08

36

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

in both permanent and long-term movement of Australian residents out of the country in the period under review here. In 2007–08 there was a record number of permanent departures of Australian residents (76 923), of whom 50.8 per cent were born in Australia. The numbers of Australia born leaving permanently has more than doubled, from 17 264 in 1997–98 to 39 144 in 2007–08. Over the same period the number of long-term departures of residents increased from 79 422 to 102 066. The rate of return migration of former settlers varies considerably among particular birthplace categories (Hugo et al. 2003), with especially high rates among those born in New Zealand, the UK, Japan and the US. There are some interesting patterns of difference among Asia-born groups, with those from North-East Asia having relatively high rates of return and those from South Asia quite low rates (Hugo 2008e). The emigration outflow is highly skilled – more so than the immigration intake – although the difference is converging. In 2006–07 there was a total of 35 196 permanent emigrants employed in skilled occupations, compared with 49 523 skilled permanent arrivals. This means in that year there was a net gain by migration of only 14 327 skilled migrants. It may be that the downturn in economies of several major destinations of Australians in North America and Europe in 2008–09 has had an impact on the rate of return of Australians and on the rate of departure, but at this stage the evidence is only anecdotal. Australian emigration data can provide a perspective on the totality of international migration that is not possible in countries like the US and it demonstrates the necessity of viewing international migration in some wealthier countries as a system rather than a South–North inflow (Hugo 2008g). The Australian data rely on persons leaving the country indicating their intentions as to whether they would return and when. There are problems associated with the reference to ‘intentions’ as the key element in the definition of emigration, because there are no guarantees that intentions will become reality. Indeed, research into migration intentions indicates that often they do not. For example, a study by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship of residents leaving Australia ‘permanently’ in 1998–99 found that by mid-2003 24 per cent had returned (Osborne 2004). Of course this is counterbalanced to some extent by those who indicate they are leaving Australia on a long-term basis but in fact never return. The dominant destinations of permanent departures include the following: ●

The largest flow is to New Zealand, with which Australia has a special arrangement that allows more or less free mobility between the nations (Bedford et al. 2003).

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia ●

●

●

●

37

The second largest flow is to the UK, which partly reflects longstanding linkages having their origins in colonial times, as well as the new role of London as a global city attracting highly skilled Australians (Hugo 2005b). The third largest flow is to the US and this is the fastest growing emigrant stream, associated with the central role of the destination in the global economy, especially the cities of New York and Los Angeles. There is a substantial movement to continental European nations. This is partly return migration of former settlers but is increasingly involving the Australia born – especially the children of former settlers, many of whom have become dual citizens. Again the movement is overwhelmingly to large cities in Europe. There is a substantial flow to Asia, but it is overwhelmingly directed toward the high-income, rapid growth city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore, but increasingly also to China. The Asian movement is almost totally to the megacities of the region.

It is apparent that global cities are a key component in the Australian diaspora; indeed virtually all emigrants move to major cities. To take the example of the UK, the 2001 census detected 107 866 Australia-born residents and of these 41 486 (38.5 per cent) lived in the London region. It has been argued (Hugo 2008d) that there is a form of the escalator effect occurring (Chapman 2004; Fielding 1992), involving a combination of internal and international migration. As Australia’s world city (Hugo 2008d), Sydney attracts selectively young, highly educated, highly skilled migrants from elsewhere in Australia. Indeed there is a net internal migration loss of other age categories. There is some evidence that Sydney has become a launching point of these young people, who spend some years gaining experience and developing networks in Sydney, then emigrate to higher order world cities, either on transfer in multinational companies or by successfully applying for jobs within increasingly international labour markets. The key point is that the growing Australian expatriate community is an overwhelmingly urban-based one and it tends to concentrate in the global (Sassen [1991] 2001) and world cities (Friedmann 1986) of Europe and North America.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN AUSTRALIAN IMMIGRATION Population issues are presently widely debated in Australia, but not on a partisan basis. Nationally there have been a number of reports (for

38

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

example, Costello 2002, 2004; Department of Treasury 2007; Productivity Commission 2006) that have defined the outlook for ageing of the Australian population. A baby bonus of A$3000 (A$4000 after 1 July 2006, now A$5000) was introduced and a raft of policy interventions has been made to encourage baby boomers to stay in, and hitherto disengaged groups to participate in, the workforce. Moreover, several states (Government of South Australia 2004; State of Victoria 2004) have introduced comprehensive population policies. In all of this discussion immigration issues have loomed large and these are briefly mentioned below: ●

●

●

●

With the tightening of the labour market, especially for skilled workers, there is pressure from employers to increase the immigration quota (Birrell et al. 2006). Others have argued that there is a need to invest more in training and education to meet the skill needs and Australia has underinvested in education, especially post-school education. Gaining a judicious short-term or medium- to long-term solution to the skills shortage is a constant issue. Australia has hitherto been able to compete effectively with other OECD countries (and increasingly more developed, non-OECD countries like Singapore) with respect to skilled migrants. Asia has been the most significant source of skilled migrants (Hugo 2006b), increasingly China and India. However, it has been suggested that increasing competition from within Asia as well as other OECD countries means that Australia’s competitive edge is not assured indefinitely (ibid.). In recent times there has been some concern about workers being brought to Australia under the 457 (long-term temporary business) visa programme at the expense of Australian workers. The 457 programme is restricted to the four highest skilled ASCO categories and has a minimum wage to ensure that it is confined to skilled workers. The 457 process is a very quick, labour-market driven migration programme, as opposed to the slower government quota settlement programme and is increasingly being used by employers to get workers (Khoo et al. 2003). However, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and others are voicing concerns that such workers are being used as an alternative to available Australian workers. Some groups (for example, Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee 2005) have argued that Australia should relax its policy on allowing temporary immigration of unskilled groups, especially from the Pacific. Protagonists here are mainly employers in sectors suffering unskilled labour shortages, especially in regional areas, but also include lobby groups who point

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia

●

●

●

●

●

39

to the beneficial effects of remittances on the migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy (MIRAB) economies of the Pacific. The government has hitherto resisted this pressure and maintains that there is still a significant amount of Australian labour to be soaked up and that there is a need to improve the wages and conditions being offered in such labour-short sectors as harvesting, abattoir workers and so on. However, the introduction of the pilot Pacific Island Seasonal Worker Scheme in 2009 will be closely monitored. The reduction in significance of family migration and the restrictions placed on family reunion, especially of parents, have been criticized in some places. Indeed the presence of the family reunion programme in the past has been a factor in skilled immigrants coming to Australia and then assisting relatives to come. Refugee policy is constantly being discussed. The major issue has been over Australia’s policies of offshore processing of asylum seekers (‘The Pacific Solution’) and detention of onshore asylum seekers. The proposal for all asylum seekers to be processed offshore was intensively debated in 2006, but thus far the Rudd government has continued to process ‘unauthorized’ boat arrivals at Christmas Island. However, they abolished the TPV in May 2008. The growing nexus between foreign student migration and permanent settlement of skilled migrants has a number of dimensions that are under scrutiny. Australia is second only to Switzerland in the proportion of its university students who are fee-paying foreigners (Abella 2006) and those fees make up an increasing part of the budgets of Australian universities. One major report (Birrell et al. 2006) indicated that foreign students granted permanent Australian residence on completion of their studies were experiencing difficulty in the labour market. Hence language requirements have been increased and an initial probationary period has been introduced before permanent residence is granted. Issues of social cohesion have waxed and waned in Australian discourse. The Sydney riots between youths of Lebanese appearance and Anglo-Australians are the most recent demonstration that such tensions still exist (Barclay and West 2006; Betts and Healy 2006). The Department of Immigration and Citizenship is constantly finetuning the immigration system in order to place greater emphasis on skills and attributes such as ability to speak English and having an Australian qualification, which are associated with labour market success. The changing selection criteria and pass level of the points assessment system and the proliferation of visa categories are testament to this. This has meant that the labour market performance

40

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

●

●

●

of Australian migrants has been improving while that in countries like Canada (Ruddick 2003) and the US (Martin 2004) has declined. However, some commentators have been critical of the ‘micro management’ of migrant selection. Withers (2006) points out that no current Australian federal parliamentarian would pass the points assessment test for immigration. In 2005 the Australian Senate (2005) released its report on Australian expatriates, recommending a range of policy developments to engage the Australian diaspora. There is no doubt that Australia’s intake of skilled immigrants considerably outweighs the exodus of young skilled Australians. However, some argue that Australia could benefit from engaging that diaspora in a range of ways, as well as encouraging return migration (Hugo et al. 2003). Some states (for example, South Australia) are constantly lobbying the national government to develop new strategies to direct immigrants to settling in ‘regional’ areas, away from the major centres of immigrant settlement on the east coast and in Perth. There have been claims from some states (notably Western Australia and Queensland) that South Australia has an unfair advantage in attracting migrants through the SSRM scheme. Nevertheless, it is apparent that states are likely to play an increasing role in Australian immigration and settlement. After many decades of increasing concentration in the nation’s major cities, especially the global city of Sydney, there are strong indications of increasing immigrant settlement outside of major cities. This is driven partly by economic growth in these areas associated with mining, tourism, retirement and other development, but also ageing. These communities often have not been as influenced in the past by immigration as the rest of the country, so the new immigration raises a number of issues. While there have been incidents of culture clash, it has generally been the case that non-metropolitan communities have been very welcoming to the newcomers (Hugo 2008f). Nevertheless, challenges of lack of settlement services in such areas remain.

CONCLUSION Australian post-war immigration has wrought a profound impact on the national economy, society and demography. Moreover, this massive change has produced little conflict and must be judged as highly successful. One of the intrinsic features of post-war migration has been its dynamic nature, with levels, types, composition and countries of origin of migration

Flows of immigrants 1993–2008: Australia

41

shifting readily in response to forces both within and outside of Australia. The last decade has seen as much change as any during the post-war period. Moreover, the rapidly changing global situation and Australia’s demography ensure that international migration will remain of crucial, perhaps even increasing, significance over the next quarter-century. There have been a number of elements in the success of Australia’s post-war immigration programme. The doyen of immigration research in Australia, Professor Charles Price, attributed the success to the fact that Australian post-war immigration was similar to a python feeding – groups of migrants were introduced and then allowed to digest and adjust before a new group was introduced. The result has been an increasing level of public acceptance that immigration is on balance a positive force in Australia. Whereas in 1993, 67 per cent of Australians considered that ‘the number of migrants has gone much too far’, by 2004 the proportion giving this response had fallen to 29.7 per cent, although by 2007 it had increased again (Betts 2008, p. 20). A recent study of 6088 South Australians in metropolitan and rural areas found 87.7 per cent believed cultural diversity was a positive influence on the community (Government of South Australia 2008). Nevertheless, a key element has been related to policy development and governance. For most of the post-war period Australia has had a separate ministry of immigration and encouraged the development of a cadre of professional immigration civil servants, which fostered the development of a substantial capacity in policy making and administration in migration and settlement. Australian immigration policy has been flexible and, with some notable relatively recent exceptions, strongly evidence driven, drawing on an excellent migration data collection system and a vibrant body of immigration research. However, Australia faces many immigration challenges in its near future, as the drivers of international migration, both external and internal, are rapidly changing. Australia has not had a comprehensive review of its migration programme since the Fitzgerald (CAIIP 1988) enquiry. There have been massive changes since then and more are imminent. It is timely for the Rudd government to initiate a comprehensive enquiry into Australian international migration, its drivers and impacts.

NOTES 1. This excludes New Zealanders (28 307 compared with 23 781 in 2005–06), who have special access. 2. That is, they indicated that they intended to stay in Australia permanently.

3.

Trends in US immigration Susan K. Brown, James Bachmeier and Frank D. Bean

Demographic and economic changes in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have made immigrant labour seemingly ever more necessary in more developed, post-industrial economies (Meissner et al. 2006). Demographically fertility declines have diminished the unskilled labour supply. Also the growth of a knowledge-based economy, large gains in longevity among the elderly and greater affluence in the highest reaches of the income distribution have helped to swell demand for service workers. At least in the US remedying such imbalances through immigration has involved policies that implicitly tolerate unauthorized labour and explicitly seek temporary workers. Such policies reflect concessions to harsher, less generous approaches toward newcomers and entail growing tendencies not to see immigrants as potential future citizens but merely as labourers. More broadly, these shifts suggest the emergence of a current immigration dynamic that is more exclusionary than those of earlier eras. To show how this dynamic has emerged and to assess its importance, it is necessary to compare earlier waves of immigration with today’s. The policy rationales and national meaning attached to previous flows help clarify the shift in logic behind contemporary trends. In general, past US immigration has often been summarized in shorthand, even cryptic, terms as exemplified in the description of the US as a ‘nation of immigrants’ (Handlin 1973). Sometimes this usage has simply meant that the US is one of only a handful of countries that historically built their populations through immigration. Indeed, although some nations accept more immigrants on a per capita basis, no other country has taken in more newcomers – nearly 75 million new legal residents since record keeping began in 1820 (Brown and Bean 2005; US Department of Homeland Security 2007). But the deeper significance of yesterday’s and today’s immigration trends cannot be grasped by numbers alone. For this we must examine the logic behind current immigration in relation to those of earlier periods, noting that the latter, in retrospect, are often remembered as symbolizing 42

Trends in US immigration

43

ideals of economic opportunity, social mobility and national unity, even when it is recognized that earlier newcomers often faced discrimination and opposition at the time they arrived. Several factors support a positive mythology about previous immigrants. First, much of US immigration took place for the purpose of nation building (Fuchs 1990). Settlers were for the most part actively sought, if not always warmly welcomed. Second, after its founding the country adopted a model of small land grants as a way of attracting settlers to its western frontier, thus providing economic opportunity to family farmers rather than large landholders (Zolberg 2006). Third, much of the country’s non-agricultural immigration occurred at the same time that the industrial revolution in the Western world was raising living standards several times over (Friedman 2006), a coincidence that helped create the idea that immigration and prosperity were connected. Fourth, US immigration uniquely involved newcomers from multiple source countries, thus contributing to the notion that America offered a form of government that could embrace diversity and transcend difference (Gabaccia 2002). These themes manifested themselves in various ways in four major waves of entrants over nearly four centuries, with the forced migration of slaves constituting a fifth wave. During each of these surges of voluntary migration, citizens usually disagreed with one another over how to define the newcomers. Many saw immigrants in positive or functional terms (Crèvecoeur [1782] 1912; Handlin 1973). Others almost inevitably cast immigrants as labour competition or as ethnic or religious threats and advocated the restriction of admissions as a consequence (Higham 2002). Despite their outcries, only occasionally have nativists been able to impose limitations at a national level, although their voices have frequently exerted profound influence. Instead, immigration has continued, never entirely subsiding, with each new stream of immigrants coming to be seen as serving a distinctive economic or nation-building purpose. It is thus not an exaggeration to connect immigration trends with national economic development and self-definition. In fact, that most self-defining of documents, the Declaration of Independence, included among its grievances that King George III was trying to prevent the population growth of the states by failing to promote migration and hindering naturalization (Joppke 2005; Zolberg 2006, p. 24). Now, however, the US, in contrast to most of its history, appears to be taking steps to discourage legal, permanent immigration and naturalization. Viewing them in the context of earlier waves of immigration, this chapter examines the recent contours of and reasons for this reversal.

44

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

WAVES OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES The First Wave: Colonial Pioneers In the United States’ earliest immigration period, the colonial era, fragmented streams of north-western Europeans, speaking mostly English but also Dutch, German and Celtic languages, served to populate an eastern seaboard that had plentiful land but scarce agricultural labour. A mercantilist, trade-oriented Britain sought to establish large plantations to reap the bounties of the Southern colonies’ natural resources, but to do that it had to promote settlement by the British and keep out the Spanish, Dutch and French. Early settlers partly were pushed out of England or the Continent by poverty and partly pulled unto the ‘New World’ by promoters claiming vast opportunities in the colonies. In the early seventeenth century England in particular was afflicted with conditions ripe for encouraging emigration: a dense population, wage decline and privatization of public lands that forced many rural people to migrate to cities, where they were underemployed. A considerable migration wave from England to what is now the US thus resulted during the seventeenth century. With neither seed money for passage nor provisions for starting over, the earliest English labourers could not easily go to the colonies. However, the Virginia Company offered them a way out as indentured servants to Southern colonial plantations. As the seventeenth century progressed, however, real wages rose in England, and England sought to fill the demand for plantation labour with the poor, convicts and potential rebels. The majority of such migrants were male, and early on their mortality was high. By the eighteenth century Britain routinely shipped felons and paupers to the colonies, a practice that provoked strong opposition from the colonies and eventually made it necessary for Britain to find an alternative dumping ground (Fischer 1989; Zolberg 2006). Thus, even early US migration policy sought to promote the immigration of ‘desirables’ – those with skills and good English – at the same time as it sought to deter immigrants who were poor. The populating of the Northern colonies presented an entirely different scenario from that of the Southern ones. Northern settlers were often religious dissenters seeking the opportunity to establish family farms. The Northern colonies attracted trained craftsmen, tradesmen and farmers, together with their families and some servants. New England, settled first notably by Puritans, beginning in the 1620s, remained the most English and hostile to outsiders. In the late seventeenth century Quakers and German speakers located in the Middle Atlantic. In the half-century between those

Trends in US immigration

45

two waves of settlement England had undergone a civil war and Restoration and had to confront the question of how people of different religions could get along (Fischer 1989; Zolberg 2006). Both the ideal of the family farm and the question of accommodating religious diversity would become critical to sustaining immigration to the US. The family homestead provided a chance at upward mobility for migrants and the basis for the development of a large and strong middle class. Neither the plantation model of the South nor the Spanish land grants in early California offered similar mass opportunities. Migrants of different religions faced discrimination and sometimes violence, but they were relatively free to practice their faiths. Around 1717 the last colonial stream of migration began among the northern English and Scots-Irish. Unlike the nuclear families that had migrated earlier to the North, these settlers ultimately brought over entire clans that had been hard pressed by rents and centuries of poverty and sectarian warfare but still had enough means to afford passage. Many of the Scots were Presbyterian; the English tended to be Anglican. This stream settled mostly in Appalachia and the back country of the South. These clans fiercely upheld their liberty and proved suspicious of both British authorities and later the federal system – and especially federal taxes (Fischer 1989). The Second Wave: Slaves Involuntary migration of African slaves constituted a second immigration wave and helped develop the economies of both Northern and Southern colonies, as well as Britain, during the latter part of the seventeenth and all of the eighteenth centuries. While plantations in early Virginia used both the British poor and some Africans as indentured servants, the Africans endured longer periods of servitude, which made them more valuable as labourers; some slipped into lifetime servitude. Meanwhile, once the British servants were freed, they expected to be able to own land and grew hostile when thwarted by elites. Seemingly to reduce the possibility of rebellion, Virginia’s elites began to import more Africans as slaves in the 1660s, and slavery spread throughout the South. Newly won British control of the seas and the slave trade ensured a ready supply of slave labour (Takaki 1993; Zolberg 2006). Triangular trading sustained the slave economy, with slaves shipped from Africa to the West Indies for sugar plantations, molasses from sugar refining shipped to New England for the manufacture of rum and rum shipped to Africa in partial exchange for slaves. Relatively few slaves were delivered directly to the US – probably little more than 4 per cent of roughly ten million kidnapped in Africa over several centuries – but their harvesting of cotton in the South permitted the development of

46

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

the textile industry in New England (Daniels 1990). Legal importation of slaves ended in 1808 (Berlin 1998). The Third Wave: Agrarian Settlers The US enjoyed the good fortune to be consolidating its federal power at the same time the industrial revolution was beginning. The rise of railroads provided access to raw land that needed to be settled, and the rise of industries demanded labour. Immigration in the mid-nineteenth century fuelled the settlement of the Midwest and Plains. A third wave of immigration began to rise in the 1820s, although it did not take off until the 1840s, when the Irish famine brought to the north-east hundreds of thousands of destitute Catholics, the war of 1848 uprooted many Germans and, in Asia, the Chinese responded to the gold rush. The year 1854 set a record for immigration at the time, increasing the total population by 1.6 per cent, or roughly three times the equivalent of today’s annual increase from both legal and unauthorized immigrants (Zolberg 2006). Thereafter, the Crimean War, a brief economic recession and the US Civil War reduced European immigration, even as industry clamoured for labour. Partly in response, in 1862 Congress authorized the Homestead Act to give settlers 160 acres (53.5 hectares) in return for five years of working the land; those eligible included foreign residents who had filed a declaration of intention to naturalize. US consuls and Western states in particular promoted this law in Europe. Germans had already been coming to the Midwest and Scandinavians to the upper Midwest, and these flows increased (Tichenor 2002; Zolberg 2006). The Fourth Wave: Industrial Labourers The fourth great wave of immigration to the US accompanied the unprecedented industrialization in the decades following the end of the Civil War and the completion of the transcontinental railroad. By the end of the nineteenth century the US had become the world’s leading industrial power (Gabaccia 2002). A huge need for an industrial workforce ensued, and record numbers of newcomers came. But this time they came not from English- or German-speaking countries, but from southern and eastern Europe. Immigration in the first decade of the twentieth century surpassed all previous decade totals and the percentage of foreign-born persons in the population was higher than at any time since. From 1900 to 1914 nearly 13.4 million immigrants arrived. The newcomers were mostly Catholic or Jewish and overwhelmingly working class, starkly different in social class, language, ethnicity and religion from newly prospering native Protestants of English and German origin.

Trends in US immigration

47

The resulting backlash against the new immigrants ultimately led to the restriction of immigration. The first people to face exclusion were the Chinese, through a series of laws that culminated in 1882. The growth of the immigration bureaucracy in the 1890s provided a mechanism for further exclusion of immigrants at risk of becoming public charges. But despite a stream of restrictionist bills, the first general restriction on immigration did not pass until 1917, in the xenophobic prejudices of the First World War, and even then over the veto of President Woodrow Wilson. That law required that adult immigrants be literate in some language. But calls for further restriction mounted in the face of a brief post-war recession and the ‘Red Scare’ from the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. In 1921 the US established its first immigration limitations (in the form of quotas by national origin) and in 1924 it tightened them even more, thereby mostly cutting off immigration from southern and eastern Europe. However, while successful in introducing quotas, the restrictions did not target the curtailment of immigration from North America. The Fifth Wave: Reunited Families and Refugees Beginning in the Second World War, US policies acknowledged implicitly that exclusion by national origin could involve racial discrimination and that this was unacceptable. Explicitly, policy makers called for immigration laws to reflect humanitarian concerns as well as national security and strategic interests (Joppke 2005; Tichenor 2002). Thus, the Chinese exclusion laws were abolished in 1943 and, following the war, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 allowed in war-related refugees. Also the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 ended racial restrictions for naturalization. But not until 1965 were the national origins quotas lifted, to be replaced with much higher limits for both the eastern and western hemispheres. This legislation, called the Hart-Celler Act after its sponsors, gave privilege to family reunification by exempting spouses, parents and minor children of US citizens from newly established limits on permanent residency visas. Other family members could also be admitted, but on a lower priority basis. The unanticipated result was not an inflow of family members from Europe, where the economy was strong and families had been apart for nearly two generations. Rather, Asian students and professionals and GI war brides helped to start an enormous increase in new family-related immigration from Asia (Reimers 2005). To a considerable degree, the change represented a break with the country’s past emphasis on economic and nation-building rationales for immigration, although specific measures were included in HartCeller for admitting a few entrants solely on the basis of occupation. At the same time, labour shortages, particularly in nursing and home

48

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

care, began to attract skilled and unskilled women from the Philippines and the Caribbean, and eventually their families came too. Political and economic upheaval in Cuba, Haiti and Latin America resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees, though many were not officially given refugee status. But the single largest flow of legal immigrants came from Mexico, where the US had been recruiting farm workers under the Bracero Program from 1942 to 1964. When the programme ended, the need for farm workers as well as other unskilled labour continued uninterrupted, but Hart-Celler contained minimal provision for admitting such workers. As a result, as we elaborate below, more and more unauthorized migrants from Mexico began to come to the US.

THE NATURE OF EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY IMMIGRATION While today’s immigration is still mostly family based, about one-sixth of the legal permanent admissions since 1990 have been allocated for employment, both of the high-skilled and unskilled. Since 1965 this proportion has risen to its highest ever, reflecting the considerable weight still attached to matters of economic need in US immigration policy. In the last 15 years, however, the annual number of legal permanent residents overall has not increased appreciably, although the yearly totals have fluctuated considerably. In recent years the US has averaged about one million legal permanent immigrants a year, roughly equalling the number of immigrants arriving annually in the early twentieth century. From 2000 to 2006 this flow was augmented by a net increase annually of as many as 500 000 unauthorized immigrants (Hoefer et al. 2007). In addition, large numbers of temporary so-called non-immigrants (tourists, temporary workers, students and others) also increasingly arrived in record numbers, with the result that the texture of overall international migration, if not the volume of legal immigration per se, has changed considerably. This pattern bears more detailed examination. Overall International Migration One way to assess total contemporary international migration to the US is to look at the size of the foreign-born population as enumerated in the US Census (and now between censuses in American Community Surveys). While these surveys do not contain information about the kinds of migrants who have come (that is, we cannot discern who is a legal permanent resident, refugee, unauthorized migrant or non-immigrant), at least four-fifths

Trends in US immigration

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of unauthorized migrants (beginning with the 1980 Census) and many nonimmigrants (beginning with the 1990 Census) have ended up being included in such data, both in part because their numbers have risen dramatically and in part because outreach campaigns have encouraged the participation of the unauthorized (Bean et al. 1998). Census data thus provide a useful overall picture of changes in the size and texture (at least with regard to national origin composition) of recent migration to the country. The tremendous increases since 1965 are evident in trends in the relative numbers of foreign-born persons in the US over the past 35 years, when the percentage of the US population that is foreign born rose to 13.0 per cent in 2007 from 4.6 per cent in 1970 (US Bureau of the Census 2007). Clearly the Hart-Celler Act of 1965, passed after a four-decade hiatus in immigration, modified the social logic of immigrant admissions through its abolition of national origin quotas. It thus led to both largely non-European entrants, as well as major changes in the racial and ethnic mix of post-1965 immigrant flows (Bean and Stevens 2003). As a result, by 2007 almost 40 million foreign-born persons were living in the US, a number that exceeded the country’s 34 million native-born African Americans (US Bureau of the Census 2007). To be sure, as noted above, some of these are students or visitors, but a substantial majority consists of immigrants. Moreover, if the children of the foreign born are included in the total, the figure would exceed 68 million, more than twice the number of native blacks. Further, about two-thirds of those arriving since 1965 come from Asian, African or Latino countries (US Department of Homeland Security 2007). Unauthorized Migrants Another change in the pattern of international migration to the US involves a substantial increase in unauthorized migration over the past four decades, but accelerating since the mid-1990s (Passel 2005). The rapidity of this growth is reflected in a sharp rise in US Border Patrol apprehensions at the land borders, almost all of which are at the US-Mexico border. These numbers proxy gross trends in unauthorized ‘flows’ (Figure 3.1). But such entrants involve only one of broadly two kinds of persons. They reflect flows only of those who simply cross the border without authorization (so-called ‘entrants without inspection’, or EWIs in the government’s parlance). They do not reflect those who enter legally but then overstay the time of their visa (so-called visa overstays) (Bean et al. 1989). Good information on the numbers of overstays has not existed since the 1980s, but such persons are thought to constitute close to the same percentage of the total unauthorized as they did during the 1970s and 1980s, or about two-fifths (Warren 1990). Their origins are diverse

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared 2000

14

1800

12 Estimate of unauthorized stock, in millions

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1400 1200

8

1000 6

800 600

4

Border apprehensions, in thousands

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400 Unauthorized stock Border apprehensions

2 0 1980

200 0

1985

1990

1995 Year

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Source: Passel (2005), Passel and Cohn (2008) and US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics (2007).

Figure 3.1

US: unauthorized stocks and flows of population, 1980–2008

and they stay relatively short periods of time (a few months or years rather than much longer) (Woodrow and Passel 1990). In short, most of them are temporary migrants. About three-fifths of the unauthorized population, however, involves EWIs, almost all of whom are Mexicans (Espenshade 1994). This population generally comes as labour migrants and many as sojourners expecting to stay only temporarily (Bean and Stevens 2003). However, this temporary migration has been changing over the past two decades, for two main reasons. First, changes in Mexico’s economy, some induced by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have resulted in less need for small farmers and other low-skilled workers (Bean and Lowell 2004). Second, more intensive border enforcement by the US has increased the difficulty of land crossings, thus inducing circular migrants to stay longer and to settle in the US (Massey et al. 2002). The overall ‘stock’ of unauthorized persons in the country thus reached its highest level ever by 2006: around 12 million persons (Passel 2006) (Figure 3.1), contributing to public anxiety on the part of about one-quarter of the US public (Jacoby 2006). Mexicans, whether legal or unauthorized, are by far the largest of the recent immigrant groups. In 2005 alone, 161 445 persons from Mexico

Trends in US immigration

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became ‘legal permanent residents’ (14.4 per cent of the total) (US Department of Homeland Security 2006a). That same year about 300 000 unauthorized Mexicans also established de facto residency, bringing the total number of unauthorized Mexicans to 6.2 million (or 56 per cent of all unauthorized persons) (Passel 2006). These numbers dwarf those from any other country. The second largest number of legal entrants in 2005 came from India (84 681 persons or 7.5 per cent of all legal permanent residents), while the second largest number of unauthorized persons living in the US originated in Latin American countries other than Mexico (2.5 million or 22 per cent of the total unauthorized). Non-immigrant Entrants and Temporary Legal Workers In addition to dramatic growth in unauthorized Mexican workers, substantial growth has also occurred in two other kinds of flows, both of which involve temporary flows. The first of these consists of non-immigrants in general (including students, tourists, those on various kinds of temporary work and other visas). The steep rise in overall non-immigrants has involved a jump from about five million such admissions in 1975 to about 35 million in 2007 (US Department of Homeland Security 2007). To be sure, this includes growth in tourist flows, but it also includes considerable increases in temporary workers. Figure 3.2 compares the magnitude of the rise in H-class visas (the category for temporary workers, most of whom are high skilled, and their families) since the late 1980s with the relatively flat line for employment-based immigrant visas in the same period. The latter have generally been less than 50 000 annually over the entire period. Of course, these do not reflect other legal workers who are already here and adjust their status, but the numbers of these do not add much to the totals and themselves reflect a flat pattern during this time. The reason is that the US has not increased the availability of legal low- or high-skilled immigrant slots since 1990. In the case of high-skilled slots, the limit is 140 000 per year, which must include spouses and children, meaning that about half go to non-principals in any given year. Without an increase in legal permanent migration, needed workers must come to the country under alternative auspices. The new kind of international migration that has resulted is temporary and unauthorized. Much of the phenomenal growth shown in Figure 3.2 results from increases in H1B visas for high-skilled temporary workers, the impetus for which has come from the large expansion of the hightechnology industry in the US starting in the 1990s. But an often unrecognized feature of current US immigration policy is the set of linkages among the policies about establishing legal permanent residency status

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

Employment-based immigrant visas*

400

Ratio of H-Class to employmentbased immigration visas

350 300

* Both non-immigrant

250 200

25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0

150 100

5.0

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Ratio of non-immigrant to immigrant visas

All H-class non-immigrant visas*

450

0.0

19 8 19 8 8 19 9 9 19 0 91 19 9 19 2 9 19 3 9 19 4 9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 00 20 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 04 20 0 20 5 0 20 6 07

Number of visas issued, in thousands

52

Note: Source:

*Both non-immigrant. US Department of State 1992–2007.

Figure 3.2

Immigrant and temporary non-immigrant employment visas issued by the US State Department, 1988–2007

and various non-immigrant temporary flows. For example, the country has long prided itself on being a global leader in science and engineering education, the quality of its system attracting large flows of students from around the world (Brown and Bean 2009; Goldin and Katz 2008). Part of the attractiveness of coming to the US to study has also been the prospect of staying as a legal permanent resident. But the number of residency slots has remained constant. The alternative has been to stay temporarily as an H1B entrant for three years, renewable for another three years. Large increases in H1B visas became available in the 1990s. For the past few years those initially holding these have encountered time limits as their six years in the country elapsed. Rather than leave the US, recent evidence indicates many remain as unauthorized high-skilled workers, especially those from India and China (Bean et al. 2007).

A NEW REGIME OF EXCLUSION THROUGH RELIANCE ON TEMPORARY AND UNAUTHORIZED GUEST WORKERS? The important point to emphasize about recent international migration to the US is thus not its volume, even though quantity is a theme reiterated

Trends in US immigration

53

endlessly, especially by those concerned about global population growth (Krikorian 2008). While indeed overall immigration is now as high as or higher than (depending on how it is measured) it has ever been, to fixate on this is to overlook today’s supposedly temporary migration and its significance. Nor is the most important fact about today’s flows that they substantially involve non-Europeans (that is, Latinos and Asians), although this too has been ceaselessly noted, often amid nativist overtones about growing racial/ethnic diversity threatening national identity and social cohesion (Chavez 2008 documents this trend in regard to Latinos). Certainly these concerns must be considered as factors that may be contributing to the country’s apparent unwillingness to increase legal permanent immigration. But as we note below, fear of racial/ethnic diversity does not by itself account for the current configuration of US immigration policies. What then is distinctive about the current situation? It is not simply that the US needs immigrants as much or more than ever. While the country has long sought immigrants to supply labour or settle the frontier, the US now needs immigrants for new kinds of workforce reasons and is filling these needs with new (that is, temporary or unauthorized) kinds of migrants. The new reasons include help in fostering innovation and enhancing hightechnology competitiveness in a global economy and in fulfilling rising demands for social service workers of myriad kinds. Moreover, given the country’s low fertility rate and underfunded educational system, it is not now supplying enough natives who can meet these workforce needs. Thus, to the extent that such needs are being addressed, they are being met in piecemeal, ad hoc ways that involve bringing people to the country whose connection to the society is marginal and ephemeral rather than those who are welcomed because they fulfil labour market demands and are thus accepted as incipient members of the society. Stated more concretely, the defining features of today’s immigration in comparison to earlier waves are reflected in two trends, one of which only infrequently gets mentioned. The first, which does get emphasized, is that a much higher fraction of newcomers than ever before are unauthorized, in part of course because the very idea of ‘illegality’ did not particularly apply to informal pre-twentieth century migration (Ngai 2005), but mostly because unauthorized migration has been rising for 40 years. This increase has even led to some backlash against legal immigrants; so much so that some claim it ‘has become commonplace to talk about lawful immigrants as if they were no different from noncitizens who are not lawful immigrants . . . the line that really matters is becoming the line that divides all citizens from all noncitizens’ (Motomura 2006, p. 142). Second, in the ensuing absence of a public or legislative willingness to

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Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

increase legal permanent migration, the US is increasingly relying on ‘temporary’ migration to meet its workforce needs. This is evident both in outcries for more temporary visas for high-skilled entrants often dominating the legislative debate and in the apparent bipartisan consensus that proposals for immigration reform should include ‘guest worker’ programmes for unskilled workers. In short, in a political context where an apparent minority vociferously opposes any increase in legal immigration and a somewhat disinterested majority supports immigration, generally only for narrow workforce reasons, the US for 30 years has increasingly relied on irregular, temporary non-immigrants as workers, even as the need for such workers has risen because of changes in demography and economic structure. While the US initially needed workers to settle the land and to enhance nation building (and later to work the factories), it now needs immigrant labour more than ever. This primal need for workers and the demographic reason behind it tend to get lost in longstanding complaints about the fiscal costs of immigration, the social service burdens imposed by immigrant families and the need to find jobs for laid-off native-born workers (Bean and Stevens 2003). While the need for labour may fluctuate with the economy, the long-term demographic trend is not changing and will continue to dictate a need for more workers. People in the US now have fewer children than before, get more education (especially women, who are more likely to be in the labour force) and, at the top part of the income ladder, are more affluent. They tend to live longer, much longer. The average 65-year-old man can now expect to live to 82 and the average woman to 85 (Heron et al. 2008). Immigrants are thus now required more than ever for the growing numbers of jobs in caring for children and the elderly, not to mention many other kinds of jobs that provide service support (domestic, restaurant, hotel and construction workers) for a high-technology, busy, affluent labour force. Indeed, such patterns are emerging in almost all advanced post-industrial countries. But such needs are often not explicitly acknowledged or covered under immigration policy. Rather such workers are obtained, increasingly, through temporary or unauthorized migration. In Italy, for example, a burgeoning unauthorized workforce from Romania and Ecuador supplies in-home caregivers for an increasingly elderly population (Povoledo 2008). And it is not just care giving that is increasingly in short supply, as the most economically developed societies around the world experience ever lower fertility rates and increased economic competition with one another as a result of rising globalization (Friedman 2005). High-skilled workers are also becoming scarce, especially relative to demand. The US will need more college and advanced degree graduates

Trends in US immigration

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over the next couple of decades than it can provide through either the educational system or immigration (Meissner et al. 2006, p. 9). In short, because people are living longer and economies are based more on knowledge and technology, ageing societies become ever more dependent on immigration for both skilled and unskilled workers. This issue has been partially grasped for some time, perhaps for a couple of decades, although it has generally been framed in terms of potential funding shortfalls in pension systems. As the number of retirees drawing pensions has grown, countries have emphasized the importance of finding more workers to pay into their pension plans to keep inflows and outflows in balance. However, the difficulty is that many developed countries are ‘greying’ not only because of rising longevity, but also because of dropping birth rates (Harris 2006; Shorto 2008). Below-replacement fertility, which is nearly universal in the developed world, ensures that replacement workers will become ever fewer. Thus, pressures build to find immigration solutions because neither conventional economic growth rate nor birth rate remedies seem workable. Up to now, such challenges have been dealt with by resorting to unauthorized migrants, usually without acknowledging that this is the case (Cornelius et al. 2004). But this is an unsatisfactory arrangement in a democratic society because it is mostly hidden. In large part because the contributions of such labour migrants remain invisible to many citizens, whereas the costs of such migrants do not, many countries are experiencing backlashes against ‘illegal’ immigration. These backlashes are exacerbated by rising insecurities of one kind or another (economic, cultural, political and so on), but also because current policy is often de facto operating ‘under the table’. Such circumstances threaten to generate political reactions that will disrupt the flows of labour on which the populations of the most developed economies have grown dependent. At a minimum, it has become imperative that post-industrial nations explicitly formulate immigration and economic policies that cope with both the greater need for immigrant workers and rising economic inequality and insecurity.

4.

From disordered expansion to disordered stalemate: immigration politics in the United States Gary P. Freeman

In 1992 when Nations of Immigrants was first published, the US Congress had just passed the 1990 Immigration Act. Very much in the spirit of liberal immigration policy, it increased overall legal admissions for permanent residency by one-third and sought to increase the ethnic diversity of immigrant flows to the US via a new class of visas. These visas were distributed by lottery to nationals of under-represented countries. Katharine Betts and I (Freeman and Betts 1992) drew a portrait of US immigration politics that noted the dominant narrative’s stress on the country’s positive history and identity as an immigrant nation. There was reluctance to employ arguments about economic benefits as a justification for immigration. Instead, proponents of immigration referenced its connections to the civil rights movement and often spoke in terms of individual rights. International issues typically took a back seat, with the exception of refugee policy. National security was all but absent in discussions of immigration. Writing in 1992, we identified Congress as the focal point of policy making, but observed that decision making within that body was decentralized so that committees and subcommittees played the main roles. An incompetent Immigration and Naturalization Service was weak, fragmented and underfunded. Regulation of immigrants, refugees and citizenship was shared by seven separate agencies. The Border Patrol exhibited its traditional pattern of being poorly funded and often neglected. Immigration policy displayed longstanding conflicts between the President and Congress, with the former typically taking the more liberal line for reasons of foreign policy. The federal courts, when they intervened in immigration disputes, typically reduced the capacity of the national government to manage and control immigration. In 1992 public opinion was marginally opposed to admitting larger numbers of immigrants and was concerned about illegal entries, but opinion was unorganized and poorly mobilized so that, we argued, 56

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Congress, and especially its committees and subcommittees, paid attention to organized groups, yielding a pattern of client politics, as I later labelled it (Freeman 1995). The political parties did not develop coherent and consistent positions on immigration; nor were they able to impose discipline on their members; policies typically were approved by cross-party coalitions. Three broad categories of interests were active in immigration policy discussions: economic, ethnic and ideological (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, p. 53). Immigration politics in 1992 was, therefore, disorderly. Out of this disorder, however, emerged a largely consistent if incremental policy that was distinctly expansive both in its tolerance of large-scale undocumented migration and in its continuation and enlargement of the legal immigration programme in place since the elimination of the national origins quota system in 1965.

WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE 1992? It is tempting to claim a sea change in US immigration politics during the past decade and a half. This would exaggerate the undeniably important changes that have taken place, however. The significant differences one sees today have not fundamentally changed US policy but have pushed it from disordered, incremental expansionism to disordered stalemate. There is at present a policy impasse that, if broken, may result in a return to incremental expansionism, a breakthrough to comprehensive reform that by definition would contain elements of both expansion and restriction, or a move to incremental restriction. In contrast to the early 1990s, the economic benefits of immigration have emerged as a much more important criterion with which to evaluate the programme. Today advocates more often tout the contribution skilled immigrant workers can make to economic dynamism. By the same token critics worry about unskilled migrants helping to preserve inefficient, labour-intensive industries. Political controversy now focuses principally on temporary migration programmes that displace green cards as a route to permanent residency. Since 9/11 national security has become a major concern for the first time. Illegal migration, always a source of contention, has become even more controversial because of swelling numbers. Huge new enforcement resources are now concentrated on the US border with Mexico. Cultural fears that the country is becoming de facto bilingual proliferate (for example, Huntington 2004). Groups opposing large-scale immigration and migration are much better organized, while the political parties, still divided internally, have become more polarized. Presidential initiatives now run afoul of Congressional resistance. In the wake of 9/11

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the Immigration and Naturalization Service has been reorganized into the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), both housed in the Department of Homeland Security. Numbers of annual entrants, legal and illegal, have been at historical highs since the century’s start. Episodically, immigration features as a leading issue in Presidential and Congressional elections.

END OF THE EXPANSIONIST CONSENSUS Already evident in the late 1980s, certain trends accelerated and novel developments emerged after 1992 to create a new politics of immigration policy that ended the 30 years of unbroken expansionism after 1965. The sources of these changes were, first, the massive scale of unauthorized migration, its domination by Latinos and Asians, the wider spatial distribution of migrant settlement and the expanding size of the undocumented population; second, the emergence of grass-roots anti-immigration movements; third, turnover in the partisan control of national government institutions; and fourth, singular events and crises. As is recounted in Chapter 1, migration to the US at the start of the twenty-first century matched or exceeded the massive entries experienced at the start of the previous century. Immigration in that earlier period took place in an era without passports and visas, in the absence of comprehensive national immigration policies or administrative agencies, with a receiving society having a relatively small population and vast expanses of territory yet to be fully settled, and an industrial economy hungry for unskilled labour. None of these conditions existed any longer as the twentieth century wound down, and this makes the very large numbers of immigrants, legal and otherwise, that have been accepted during recent decades all the more striking. It would be surprising if the recent unprecedented flows of immigrants and migrants did not provoke some kind of political and policy response. A brief summary of the politically relevant data is conveniently provided in a recent report from the Center for Immigration Studies (Camarota 2007, pp. 1–2): ● ● ●

The US immigrant population (legal and illegal) reached a record 37.9 million in 2007. Immigrants account for one in eight US residents, the highest level in 80 years. In 1970 it was one in 21; in 1980 one in 16; in 1990 one in 13. Overall, nearly one in three immigrants is an illegal alien. Half of Mexican and Central American immigrants and one-third of South American immigrants are illegal.

Immigration politics in the United States ●

●

● ●

●

●

● ●

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Since 2000 10.3 million immigrants have arrived – the highest sevenyear period of immigration in US history. More than half of post2000 arrivals (5.6 million) are estimated to be illegal aliens. The largest increases in immigrants were in California, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, Arizona, Virginia, Maryland, Washington, Georgia, North Carolina and Pennsylvania. Of adult immigrants, 31 per cent have not completed high school, compared to 8 per cent of natives. The share of immigrants and natives who are college graduates is about the same. Immigrants were once much more likely than natives to be college graduates. The poverty rate for immigrants and their US-born children (under 18) is 17 per cent, nearly 50 per cent higher than the rate for natives and their children. Immigrants make significant progress over time. But even those who have been in the US for 20 years are more likely to be in poverty, lack health and other insurance or use welfare than natives. Immigration accounts for virtually all of the national increase in public school enrolment over the last two decades. Recent immigration has had no significant impact on the nation’s age structure. Without the 10.3 million post-2000 immigrants, the average age in the US would be virtually unchanged at 36.5 years.

These extraordinary figures at minimum raise the possibility that something might be wrong with US immigration policy. The status quo of client politics has been, accordingly, challenged by an increasingly agitated grass-roots movement. The opening volley occurred in California in 1994 when a group labelled the Save our State Coalition took advantage of the state’s constitutional mechanism of popular initiative and placed a proposition on the ballot that denied almost all public services to undocumented immigrants. Proposition 187 passed overwhelmingly (although, to be sure, most of its provisions were eventually negated by the federal courts as unconstitutional). Anti-immigration activities accelerated after 1994. Because the fiscal burdens of illegal immigration fall disproportionately on state budgets, a number of heavily impacted states petitioned Congress for financial relief. When their pleas went unanswered, five states sued the federal government for compensation. These suits went nowhere. The premise of the states’ pleas was that immigration regulation was one of Congress’s plenary powers and when regulation failed the states were its innocent victims. When the national government brushed off these complaints, dozens of states and localities took matters into their own hands, passing

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laws and local ordinances seeking to deny publicly funded benefits to undocumented immigrants and to restrict their ability to rent accommodation, obtain driver’s licences and acquire legal identification documents (Rodriguez et al. 2007). Private citizens have also joined the effort. In 2004 the Minuteman Project was founded by a retired California accountant for the purpose of organizing thousands of volunteers to assist the Border Patrol in apprehending illegal immigrants crossing the Mexican-US border (www. minutemanproject.com/). In the meantime, more well-established mainstream organizations such as the American Federation for Immigration Reform (FAIR), Numbers US and others intensified their activities as they took advantage of heightened public interest and anger. Restive popular movements found a much more receptive national political environment after 1994, when the Republican Party captured both the House and Senate in the mid-term Congressional elections. Although major immigration bills have normally won at least some crossparty support, Republicans have been less reliably supportive of liberal reforms than Democrats. Gimpel and Edwards (1999, p. 298) conclude that ‘the recorded votes on immigration policy have become more partisan over time, even after controlling for alternative influences on congressional decision making such as region and constituency characteristics. Divisions between Republicans and Democrats have been on a steady upward climb since the 96th Congress (1979–1980)’. After 1994 there was a sharp increase in the number of immigration bills introduced in Congress and most of them were restrictive in intent. Apart from these major trends in immigrant and migrant flows, grassroots agitation and partisan transformation, immigration politics in the US have been shaken since 1992 by singular events great and small. The cumulative impact of the flotillas of Cuban and Haitian boat people in 1992; the outbreak of widespread rioting and looting in Los Angeles in the same year, prompting the arrest of large numbers of undocumented migrants; the bombing of the World Trade Center by Islamic radicals in 1993; the beaching in the same year of the freighter Golden Venture in Long Island Sound, filled with hundreds of Chinese being smuggled into the US; and multiple sweatshop scandals involving immigrants being held in virtual slavery all contributed to increasing the salience of the question of porous borders. All of these events were, of course, minor disturbances compared to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 (Freeman et al. 2008). The confluence of these developments fuelled critical public opinion about US immigration policy. An October 2006 survey commissioned by the Center for Immigration Studies (2006) presented respondents with

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facts about immigration to the US and also posed plausible alternatives with which they could agree or disagree. The survey was taken just one month before the mid-term elections and was limited to ‘likely voters’. The survey indicates that 68 per cent of likely voters, when presented with figures of the number of legal and illegal immigrants entering each year, thought they were too high, 21 per cent thought they were about right and only 2 per cent thought they were too low. Respondents strongly favoured an attrition strategy for discouraging illegal migration (that is, making it difficult to find work) as opposed either to an amnesty solution or mass deportations. Seventy per cent agreed that there are ‘plenty of Americans to do low-wage jobs that require relatively little education’. Seventy-five per cent thought the illegal population is so large because past enforcement efforts were ‘grossly inadequate’. Republicans were most likely to think immigration was too high and to favour enforcement. Even among Democrats, however, majorities thought immigration was too high and preferred either large-scale deportations or an attrition strategy over earned legalization.

REVOLT AND STALEMATE, PHASE ONE: 1992–2000 The last decade of the twentieth century produced a plethora of bills targeted at various aspects of the immigration dilemma. Most were restrictive in intent. On the surface the period from 1992 to 2000 appears to have brought about a fundamental shift in the normal politics of immigration. Pointing to the trends and events listed in the previous section, as well as to the surprising early support in 1996 for anti-immigration presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan, one can be excused for concluding that a populist uprising was being waged against one of the world’s most liberal immigration regimes. The reality did not quite support such an interpretation, however. As I have argued (Freeman 2001), if one distinguished between legislative proposals, bills passed in one house of Congress but not the other, laws actually implemented and laws struck down by the courts, the picture was much more mixed. Some of these matters are summarized in Table 4.1. Of course, some important restrictive legislation was passed. Box 4.1 details the main provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Furthermore, major welfare reform legislation (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996) had significant implications for immigrants. Beginning in August 1997, most immigrants were to be excluded from receipt of means-tested old-age

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Table 4.1 Restrictive immigration proposals in the US Congress that died, were defeated or were weakened by amendment, 1995–2001 Legislative Proposals 1. Reduce legal immigration from 535 000 for family-sponsored entries to 350 000 (1995 Smith bill) or 450 000 (1995 Simpson bill); reduce skilled migration from 140 000 to 135 000 (Smith) or 90 000 (Simpson). Cap legal immigration at 480 000 per year (Feinstein amendment) 2. Impose a $3 border crossing fee to be used to fund patrolling efforts 3. Double employer sanctions fine if employer is guilty of violating other laws as well 4. Impose fines of $50–$250 on aliens entering the country illegally 5. Eliminate several preferences allowing naturalized citizens to sponsor extended family members 6. Create a national registry of persons authorized to work in the US

7. Require employers of foreign workers to pay 10% above the prevailing wage, and put 30% of first year’s salary into a fund for training US workers 8. Eliminate visas for unskilled workers 9. Establish a balance-of-family rule requiring parents of US citizens wishing to join their children have half of their children in the US 10. Simpson bill providing that a sponsor’s income could be deemed available to the sponsored immigrant for ten years and affidavits of support would be legally binding

11. Simpson bill would permit the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to conduct open field searches for illegal immigrants

Outcomes 1. Did not pass. Comprehensive legislation was defeated by splitting the bills into separate components. Only the bills dealing with illegal migration survived

2. Did not pass 3. Did not pass

4. Did not pass 5. Did not pass

6. Final version reduced plan to a pilot programme in five states, to end 1 October 1999, and could be expanded nationally only by vote of Congress 7. Did not pass

8. Did not pass 9. Did not pass

10. The Senate reduced the provision for deeming from ten years to five. Sponsors would have been required to have income equal to 200% of the national poverty level under the House bill. In its final form IIRIRIA* required only 125% of the poverty level, but affidavits would be legally binding 11. Failed in the Senate 79–20

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Table 4.1

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(continued)

Legislative Proposals

Outcomes

12. Simpson bill would permit INS agents to exclude asylum seekers with false or no documents 13. To reduce legal immigration by 10% a year for five years (amendment to IIRIRA offered by Senator Simpson) 14. Prohibit illegal alien parents from applying for welfare benefits for their US citizen children (Smith bill) 15. Permit states to deny free public education to illegal alien children (Gallegly amendment to House bill)

12. IIRIRA followed the Senate’s lead in giving the Attorney General discretion in this matter 13. Defeated 80–20

16. Deny automatic citizenship to children born to illegal alien parents (Citizenship Reform Act of 1995) 17. Create 350 new labour inspectors to enforce employer sanctions 18. Legal immigrants who receive means-tested benefits for more than 12 months during their first seven years in the US would be subject to deportation 19. Deny legal immigrants access to food stamps and Social Security Income (SSI)

14. Did not pass

15. Passed House 257–163; later weakened by amendment several times; passed House again in September 1995, but deleted from final bill by Senate/White House before passage 16. Hearings held in House but bill died

17. Dropped from the final version of IIRIRA 18. Dropped during negotiations with the White House. These negotiations also preserved the right of states to provide Medicaid to non-citizens 19. Adopted as part of IIRIRA, the ban was lifted subsequently for elderly recipients of SSI and Medicaid if they were on the rolls before 22 August 1996 or if they were in the country at that time and subsequently became disabled

Note: * IIRIRA refers to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Source:

Adapted from Freeman (2001, appendix 3.1, pp. 89–91).

pensions, food stamps, public welfare, Medicaid and other federally funded means-tested benefits until they became US citizens. In addition, states were given the option to ban both current residents and new immigrants from non-emergency Medicaid, welfare and other entirely statefunded benefit programmes. These provisions represented a major reversal in policy: under prior law states had been prohibited from discriminating against legal immigrants in the provision of assistance. During 1997 and 1998 many of the restrictive provisions enacted in 1996

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BOX 4.1

MAIN PROVISIONS OF IIRIRA, 1996

Border Enforcement: Added 1000 Border Patrol agents per year for five years. Required the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to build a 14-mile triple fence on the border south of San Diego and increased penalties for smuggling aliens and for using false documents to obtain US jobs or welfare assistance. Added 1200 INS investigators to inspect workplaces for unauthorized workers and to apprehend and deport criminal aliens. Foreigners convicted of entering the US illegally, or overstaying a previous visa, to be denied new visas for from three to ten years. Verification: Established a pilot telephone verification programme to enable employers and social service agencies to verify status of applicants. Employer participation is voluntary and a national worker eligibility verification system that mandates employer participation cannot be established without new legislation. Access to benefits: Expanded and reinforced restrictions on the access of legal immigrants to welfare benefits. President Clinton’s last-minute negotiations preserved the right of states to offer Medicaid to non-citizens. Sponsors of immigrants must have incomes that are 125 per cent of the poverty line, which was $19 461 for a family of four in 1996. Asylum: An INS officer will decide whether a person who seeks asylum at the US border is granted asylum. A negative decision must be appealed to an immigration judge within seven days, with further appeals impossible. Note: IIRIRA refers to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Source:

Adapted from Freeman (2001, appendix 3.2, p. 92).

were delayed, watered down or rescinded by Congress, the President or federal courts, or their effects were weakened by compensatory actions taken by the states. Eventually the ban on receipt of pensions, Medicaid and food stamps was lifted for those already on the rolls before 22 August 1996. In addition, most state governments stepped in to make up at least a substantial portion of the benefits the welfare legislation had denied to legal immigrants. Finally, the federal courts intervened on a number of fronts to prevent officials from pursuing deportations under the new provisions.

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By the late 1990s an element that had been marginal moved to the centre of the immigration policy agenda – skilled labour recruitment. At issue was the controversy over whether the US was suffering a skilled labour shortage and, if so, how to address it. Because efforts to alter the massive legal immigration system had been stymied by 1996, the skilled labour debate in that period mostly ignored the employment-based portion of the legal programme that distributed up to 140 000 visas annually for permanent residency. The debate focused instead and almost exclusively on the H1B temporary worker programme for specialty workers possessing at least a university bachelor’s degree or equivalent work experience. H1B visas are for three years and are renewable only once. The majority of these visas went to workers in the high-technology sector. Created in its present form in 1990, the law originally set the annual cap at 65 000 visas, a limit that was not reached until 1997. In 1998 the cap was raised to 115 000 for 1999 and 2000 and 107 000 in 2001, whence it was to revert to 65 000. Due to high demand, the ceiling was raised in 2000 to 195 000 for three years. But a bursting of the high-tech bubble during 2000 meant that the higher ceiling was not reached in 2001 and in October 2003 reverted to its original 65 000. As the economy bounced back this ceiling was reached in February for financial year 2004 and again on the very first day of financial year 2005.

REVOLT AND STALEMATE, PHASE 2: 2001–08 Shortly after his inauguration in January 2001 President George W. Bush met with the President of Mexico and promised comprehensive immigration reform that would include a large guest worker system and a path to legalization for the undocumented population in the US. Before concrete progress could be achieved, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 intervened. In January 2004, at the outset of his second term, Bush again outlined a broad immigration reform agenda that would allow approximately eight million unauthorized immigrants to obtain legal status as temporary workers (though they would be provided with financial incentives to return to their home countries and faced with various hurdles), increase the number of green cards issued under a Department of Homeland Security/Department of Labor programme and create a large, openended, new temporary worker programme. President Bush couched his proposals as a matter of national security in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. He argued that they would secure the country’s borders while remaining true to America’s humane immigration traditions and not squandering economic opportunities. These ideas launched the most recent round of

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immigration policy debates. Disagreement centred on the relative merits of enhanced investment in border controls, the question of how to deal with the large unauthorized population, and the wisdom and feasibility of the proposed temporary worker programme. The White House never drafted its own legislation, but the combination of the security-conscious post-9/11 climate and the record number of immigrants, both legal and illegal, spawned a raft of bills dealing with various aspects of immigration. In November 2005 President Bush resuscitated his immigration reform agenda, which had failed to gain traction in Congress. He delivered speeches in Arizona and Texas in which he indicated his continuing support for both a temporary worker programme and enhanced border security/enforcement. Furthermore, the Bush administration’s general preferences on immigration policy were clarified in October 2005 testimony before the Senate by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and Secretary of Labor Elaine Chow. Immigration reform proposals emerging in Congress after 2004 increasingly included an innovative feature – a merit-based points system for selecting legal permanent resident aliens. Debate over the proposed points system was nested within broader public debates over comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) and bipartisan legislative efforts embodied in a series of Senate bills designed to address legal and illegal immigration to the US. While issues such as border security, the need for a temporary worker programme and the numerical limitation of visas (for example, H1B) for temporary workers garnered national attention, the points system itself emerged as a key component of ‘comprehensive’ bipartisan proposals and generated significant controversy in its own right. Public debate over points system proposals did not merely reflect cleavages between advocates and opponents of CIR. The more expansive CIR debate pitted a loose coalition of Congressional Democratic and Republican moderates, the US Chamber of Commerce, pro-immigrant advocacy groups, civil/human/minority rights organizations and certain neoliberal business groups and labour unions against Congressional partisans on the left and right, protectionist business and labour interests, and politically active nationalist anti-immigration organizations. Each side employed simple but effective rhetorical framing to brand the opposing bloc as either ‘proenforcement/anti-amnesty’ or ‘pro-employment/pro-amnesty’. Such tactics tended to polarize the debate and led many to conflate issues of legal immigration reform with those of illegal immigration. The debate placed both Democratic and Republican parties in a tenuous position. For Democrats, labour unions and protectionist elements of the anti-immigrant wing limited their ability to compromise by opposing temporary worker programme expansions in order to protect US jobs and

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wages. In the Republican Party the difficulty of balancing business interests with a powerful and mobilized ‘anti-amnesty’ grass-roots base limited the ability of party moderates to conduct bipartisan negotiations in good faith. An explicit merit-based points system for managing legal immigration and selecting permanent resident aliens was a component of a major bipartisan legislative effort during the spring of 2007. A ‘grand bargain’ between the Bush administration and leading Congressional moderates produced a succession of three very similar comprehensive bills that built on the core provisions in S. 2611/S. 2612 from the previous year, with the addition of a points system to replace the existing preference/green card system for legal immigration. Following President Bush’s placement of comprehensive reform on the legislative agenda in his January 2007 State of the Union address (during which he also restated his advocacy of a temporary worker plan and a path to legalization for illegal immigrants), Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) began jointly formulating a revised CIR proposal. Their efforts were spurred in March by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid’s (D-NV) public declaration of his intention to introduce a major CIR bill prior to the Congressional recess in August. Later in March a number of key Democratic and Republican senators met with high-ranking Bush administration officials behind closed doors, with the goal of rallying supporters of the CIR agenda around a workable piece of bipartisan legislation. The Democratic and Republican senators sought to project a united partisan front vis-à-vis each other in order to maximize leverage in any compromise, while the Bush administration forwarded a set of organized immigration reform ‘principles’, which happened to leak to the media while negotiations were ongoing. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joel Kaplan were Bush’s chief surrogates during the prolonged negotiations, which continued through April and until the 14 May deadline set by Senator Reid for debate to begin on the legislative product. A merit-based points system became a component of the compromise bill when the Bush administration formally added it to deliberations very late in the game, after undertaking studies of similar Australian and Canadian points systems. Republican negotiators perceived the points system as a means of ending ‘chain migration’ and undue reliance on family preference categories for immigrant admission. This caused a rift with Democratic senators sympathetic to the extension of family-oriented entries. Cross-party cleavages emerged around the issue of whether the points system would be weighted in favour of high-skilled or low-skilled workers. Despite the continuous haggling, Senator Specter announced on 8 May that a ‘grand bargain’ had been reached among the principals,

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resulting in the outline of a multi-faceted bipartisan comprehensive proposal. The nascent bill was to buttress immigration law-enforcement measures (both at the borders and through mandatory verification by employers of the legal status of their employees), create a new temporary worker programme, eliminate family immigration backlogs, institute the points system and allow for a path to legalization for the majority of the country’s 11 to 12 million unauthorized immigrants. In spite of this ostensible settlement, the details of the points system remained highly controversial and were one of several hindrances to a formal bill. The sticking point was how to factor family relations into the points system for future worker visas. Also unresolved was the methodology for implementing the points system: one plan called for a points threshold for determining qualification, while another would rank applicants by their respective scores. Republicans wanted to limit family visas to spouses and young children, while Democrats were sensitive to the concerns of their constituents in organized labour and opposed such a restricted weighting of family relations. Eventually, Republicans secured their preferred version of the points system in the draft legislation, ostensibly by yielding to Democratic pressures for less restrictive border/internal enforcement measures for combating unauthorized immigration. On 9 May Senator Reid officially introduced S. 1348 in the Senate. Eight days later a group of lawmakers led by Senators Kennedy and Kyl reached an adjusted compromise version of S. 1348 – the supplemental amendment S.A. 1150 – that was approved by President Bush. After the Senate invoked cloture on the motion to proceed to debate on the bill and agreed by unanimous consent to consider it on 21 May, Senator Reid that same day introduced the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S.A. 1150) for debate. From 22 to 24 May, and again after the May recess on 6-7 June, the Senate voted on a series of amendments to S.A. 1150 emanating from both Republican and Democratic ranks. Many of these amendments threatened to upset the fragile consensus holding the bipartisan compromise together. However, after the consideration of over 40 amendments, the bill failed to move forward when Republicans blocked Democratic efforts to end debate on 7 June. This opposition induced Senator Reid to scrap the bill shortly thereafter. President Bush subsequently began to make concerted efforts to revive the proposal, making public statements, engaging in private contacts with lawmakers and even making a rare visit to Capitol Hill to speak with Republican leaders about it. Eventually the bill was resurrected as S. 1639 in mid-June, after Bush successfully wooed conservative opposition elements by adding $4.4 billion in border security appropriations. Senators Reid and McConnell then negotiated an agreement allowing for

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27 additional amendments (which were protected from extended debate) to be considered before putting the new bill to a vote. Amendments offered by the Democrats largely tried to appease constituency groups such as organized labour and Hispanics by altering the merit-based visa system to moderate its favouring of skills, education and occupations over family ties. Republican amendments, on the other hand, mostly attempted to amplify border/internal enforcement measures. But in the end efforts to move the bill to a final vote failed when a 28 June cloture motion was defeated in the Senate 46–53. A critical factor in the bill’s final failure was the massive mobilization of public opposition to its perceived amnesty provisions. This put overwhelming pressure on Congressional moderates to support increasingly partisan amendments and, ultimately, resulted in the compromise’s collapse.

CONCLUSION From 1965 until 1990 major US immigration legislation was broadly expansive in form, intent or outcome. The decade of the 1990s produced significant changes in this pattern. Measures seeking to curtail illegal immigration and immigrant access to public benefits were adopted and literally dozens of other restrictive proposals were mooted, though most of the latter were not enacted. More liberal proposals also continued to be made, not least by the Republican President after the 2000 election, and by a cross-party coalition of House and Senate members. Patched together as comprehensive bills, these measures – sandwiched in various combinations – increased enforcement, a guest worker scheme and a path to legalization. The premise was that legislation on any of these matters would need the support of people who opposed one or more provisions but would sign on in order to obtain support for the aspect they preferred. This grand bargain failed. Conservative Republicans in the House killed amnesty and liberal Democrats objected to more extensive enforcement arrangements. Comprehensive immigration reform seems unlikely to succeed any time soon, given the partisan divisions between and within the two parties, the sharply critical stance of a large part of the populace and the tortuous path along which any comprehensive legislation must travel. The US appears to be in for an extended period of incremental restriction, though the decisive victory of Democrats in the November 2008 election could put the country back on the road to immigration expansion.

5.

Immigration policy in Australia Bob Birrell

The headline story on immigration levels in Australia is that after a period of stringent reform and relatively low permanent entry programme numbers in the 1990s, there has since been a dramatic expansion. By 2008–09 the programme had reached the record level of just over 200 000. There are some Australian commentators who see this outcome as an inevitable consequence of economic globalization and consequent increased cross-national movement of people. For example, Castles and his American colleague Miller argue: ‘Barriers to mobility contradict the powerful forces which are leading towards greater economic and cultural interchange. In an increasingly international economy, it is difficult to open borders for movements of information, commodities and capital and yet close them to people’ (Castles and Miller 1998, p. 290). There is no doubt that the increased exposure of national economies to the international marketplace brings in its train pressures for more international movement of personnel. In particular, if firms are to compete in the global marketplace they may have to look outside their country’s borders to recruit the required skills. The logic of globalization, as summarized, may seem convincing. However, the removal of barriers to population movement across national borders is far more contentious than the movement of goods and money.

WHY IMMIGRATION IS DIFFERENT To understand why immigration is contentious requires a brief foray into the history of the nation state in the post-Second World War era. In post-war Europe politics largely revolved around class accommodation. The Second World War brought ordinary people into the service of their nation. After peace was established these same people expected to be treated as full citizens, free from the social and economic divide that previously characterized relationships between upper and lower classes. The British Labour Party won a landslide victory in 1945 on an explicit socialist platform. Its subsequent implementation of the foundations of the 70

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welfare state (including the establishment of the national health system) was an expression of these citizenship claims. In Britain, as in much of the rest of Western Europe, the state took responsibility for its citizens’ wellbeing through policies of full employment and the creation of a welfare net for those outside the employed workforce. The moral base for these policies was the ideal that each nation consisted of a national community in which the state’s task was to provide for the wellbeing of each citizen. Citizens, for their part, owed a duty of loyalty and commitment to their national community. Nationalist ideology flourished in these circumstances. The growing role of state agencies was legitimized by their part in enhancing the wellbeing of the national community. States also had an interest in encouraging national solidarity because the stronger this solidarity, the greater was the justification for parliaments and public instrumentalities to expand their functions in the service of the people. It was in the interests of elites to promote the idea that each national community was composed of a distinctive ‘people’. There was ‘us’ and there were others – ‘them’. Ordinary people responded strongly to the invitation to become one of ‘us’ because it implied that government policy would give priority to their interests. Most people embraced the idea that they belonged to a community sharing a common national identity and that their national identity was a core part of their sense of self. Why wouldn’t they? The nation state was their advocate and guardian. They had much to gain by being a part of their national community. These developments implied strong borders. The greater the benefits allocated to citizens, the greater the motivation outsiders from less blessed societies have in joining the community in question. If in-movement is not controlled, employment conditions for residents may be jeopardized, along with the financial base of the welfare state if it is stretched by new claimants. In addition, the flourishing of the welfare state and accompanying nationalism encouraged a personal identification with the nation involving an intertwining of self and national identity. To the extent that notions of peoplehood flourish in this context, the more sensitive the public is likely to be about the influx of people who are ‘different’. Such outsiders may be perceived as a threat to the insiders’ conceptions of their community. The challenge to community will be all the greater if any influx is accompanied by the propagation of cosmopolitan or multicultural ideas. This is because such ideas tend to be seen as contrary to the ideal of a national community sharing common characteristics. The shared perception that citizens belong to a community whose first priorities are to the wellbeing of residents also had powerful implications for domestic policies, including education. The state in nationalistic

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societies invariably accepts the responsibility to provide schooling and training so as to maximize the opportunities of residents. It follows that when filling the nation’s skill needs the focus will be on training ‘our own’, rather than importing skilled migrants. An inflow of foreign capital can be justified in nationalistic terms as helping to promote job opportunities or exports if the capital is invested in productive enterprises. This may not be the case with an influx of foreign workers, even if they do not need to be paid as much as domestic workers and/or their education has already been paid for overseas. They may be portrayed as competitors of domestic workers, an outcome quite contrary to the expectation that national governments allocate top priority to the interests of domestic workers. These circumstances make immigration very different from other aspects of globalization. Money and goods can cross borders without much obvious impact. Immigration, especially of visible minorities, presents an in-your-face direct challenge, at least to some.

THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE Through the 1950s and 1960s migration was central to Australian nationbuilding objectives. These included a larger population base for defence purposes and, by the 1960s, the contribution migration was making to Australia’s manufacturing industries. Migrants provided much of the workforce growth and also added to market growth – a crucial factor, given that most of the industries in question were dependent on tariff protection and thus on expansion of the domestic market. During this era there was bipartisan political support for a high migration policy and little public disquiet about the programme. Migrants were expected to assimilate on Australians’ terms and in this sense posed no direct challenge to popular conceptions of Australia’s identity. During the 1970s the former consensus in favour of high migration was breached in the face of ideas about the need for Australia to develop a more internationally competitive economy. The boom in mineral and energy industries in the late 1970s helped consolidate such views. Immigration no longer seemed relevant to Australia’s future, because it was linked with domestic market growth tied to protective tariffs. Critics argued that if Australia were to sell its mineral and agricultural products to Japan and elsewhere it had to accept a reciprocal obligation to open its markets to Japanese goods. Since migrants were heavily involved in tariff-dependent manufacturing industries this undermined one of the key earlier justifications for a strong migration programme. The 1980s saw the emergence of a new, widely shared set of ideas

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linking economic progress and high migration. In the aftermath of the deep recession in the early 1980s there had been a profound rethink in policy circles about Australia’s economic destiny. The resources boom of the late 1970s had proved to be short-lived. It seemed that Australia had to find a new economic direction. The consensus within the policy elite was that Australia must restructure its economy around high-technology goods and services. The fact that by 1985 and 1986 Australia’s terms of trade had reached their lowest ebb since the mid-1970s (and as it turned out, the lowest point in the entire period since 1975) lent credibility to this diagnosis. Policy makers saw high immigration as part of the solution because it would serve to expand the domestic market base for new high-technology industries, deliver entrepreneurs and skilled managers and professionals who would help create these industries and sell the product into the booming Asian market. These beliefs fuelled enthusiasm for opening up the business migration programme at the time and for the recruitment of young Asian professionals. As the Prime Minister’s economic advisor Ross Garnaut put it in 1989: ‘There is an opportunity now for Australia to recruit to citizenship young, well-educated and professionally accomplished people from Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea . . . There is a strong case for making good use of this opportunity while it lasts’ (Garnaut 1989, p. 292). During the 1980s there was also a distinct change in the ethnic makeup of the migrant intake, partly because the increasing flow of skilled migrants was being drawn primarily from Asian source countries. In addition, the family reunion intake also expanded rapidly. The Hawke government allowed permanent residents in Australia to sponsor their siblings and their parents, provided that the sponsor was a permanent resident who had been in Australia for at least two years. All parents were eligible, regardless of their age or the location of other children. Most of those taking advantage of their generous arrangements were Asian. Even though the Asian-origin community in Australia was small at the time, these residents showed a very high propensity to sponsor their relatives. The humanitarian programme at the time was also dominated by refugees from Indochina. Both political parties supported some form of active multicultural policy, because of its appeal to the growing non-English-speaking background (NESB) community (which both parties were anxious to cultivate) and because advocates had succeeded in convincing politicians that such a policy offered the best prospects for successful settlement of migrants from non-Western countries. The Hawke government, in effect, laid out the ‘welcome mat’ for migrants. In doing so the government built on initiatives of the preceding

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Fraser government. The latter was strong on symbols, like the establishment of the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) and the proliferation of various advisory bodies that incorporated ethnic representatives. The Hawke government extended English language services for migrants. Migrants also benefited from generous settlement arrangements, including immediate access on the part of the newly arrived to many of the privileges of Australian citizenship, including welfare and health benefits, as well as access to schools and universities on the same terms as locals. Though there were waiting periods for some pensions (ten years in the case of the age pension), in practice the government provided a special benefit paid at the same level as the age pension to recently arrived migrants who could prove they were in financial hardship (Birrell 1997, p. 5). This bipartisanism fell apart in the late 1980s when the undertow of public restiveness about both high migration and multiculturalism policies was mobilized by prominent critics. They insisted that migration was undermining the solidarity of the Australian community. Professor Geoffrey Blainey, one of Australia’s best known historians, played a key role, in part because of his ability to propagate phrases such as Australia ‘is becoming a nation of tribes’ and ‘a giant rooming house for the world’, which encapsulated public concerns. In 1987 the Hawke government appointed a blue-ribbon inquiry entitled the Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies (CAAIP), headed by the respected China scholar, Stephen FitzGerald, to review the situation. The government hoped that the inquiry would help lay a firmer foundation for its migration policies. Instead, CAAIP undermined these foundations by declaring that policies of high migration (which they favoured) could not succeed unless ordinary people were assured that these policies were relevant to them. CAAIP concluded that most people did not believe that this was the case. It declared that ‘the program is not identified in the public mind with the national interest, and must be given a convincing rationale’ (CAAIP 1988, p. xi). CAAIP saw its task as laying the ground work that would make high migration acceptable to a sceptical public. Migration Policy Since CAAIP The controversy about migration in the aftermath of the CAAIP report helped ensure the opposite outcome to that sought by the committee. John Howard, then leader of the Liberal Opposition, began to question the policy of multiculturalism, though he supported a higher immigration intake at the time. On 1 August 1988 Howard stated in the course of a radio interview that in order to promote social cohesion it would help if

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‘Asian migration was slowed down a little’ (Betts 1999, p. 290). Opinion polls showed many electors were concerned. One poll, published in The Australian in August 1988, showed that 77 per cent of voters strongly agreed or partly agreed with John Howard’s statement that Asian immigration to Australia should be slowed down (ibid., p. 293). Howard’s controversial statements contributed to his subsequent downfall as Opposition leader. The new leader, Andrew Peacock, took a much softer stance. However, by the early 1990s, when the Australian economy had sunk into a deep recession, the next Liberal leader, John Hewson, began arguing for a reduction in the size of the immigration programme. In August 1992 John Howard also called for a cut in migration (ibid., p. 309). This controversy, as well as the early 1990s recession, dampened the Labor government’s support for migration. After Hawke lost the leadership in December 1991 the new Keating government slashed the migration intake. The number of settlers fell from 124 700 in 1990–91 to 81 800 in 1992–93. The Keating government also began the long process of rolling back the Hawke era welcome mat, including establishing a six-months moratorium on the access of some recently arrived migrants to welfare benefits. By the time the respective parties began campaigning for the 1996 election, the era of bipartisanism on immigration issues was over. The Coalition did not campaign directly on immigration issues, but rather signalled that it opposed Labor’s alleged objective to turn Australia into a more internationalist society in which diverse minority interests could flourish. The appeal was to voters attached to a conception of Australia rooted in a local sense of place and tradition and fearful of the breakdown of ‘their’ national community in the face of the challenges that immigration and multiculturalism appeared to present. This approach seemed to work. The Coalition won with a large majority, in part because it made significant inroads into Labor’s traditional constituency – the blue- and lower white-collar classes. For the first time in the history of Australia as a nation, the Coalition won a higher share of blue-collar first-preference votes than did Labor (ibid., p. 39).

IMMIGRATION POLICY UNDER THE COALITION Once in power (from March 1996) the Coalition focused on appeasing public concerns about the immigration programme. It implemented a series of reforms to migration selection and settlement policies. In effect it did what the CAAIP report recommended: it sought to erode

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the popular conception that immigration policy was about appeasing sectional interests. The objective, repeated many times by the Minister for Immigration, Philip Ruddock, was that the programme was to serve Australian national interests; it was not there for the benefit of migrants themselves or of the ethnic communities. Whether these policies reflected a longer term strategy to lay the ground work for a subsequent expansion in the programme – as many of its business supporters may have hoped and as actually occurred in the early twenty-first century – will be explored later. The welcome mat of the 1980s was removed. Throughout the period of these reforms the Coalition did not have control of the Senate. Its proposals were often defeated. If all the proposed rule changes put to the Parliament had got through, the revolution in policy would have been even more thoroughgoing (Birrell 1997). Nevertheless, as the legislation affecting family reunion and skill selection procedures detailed below show, the reforms represented a profound change from the Hawke era. Family Reunion Rules and Access to Welfare Benefits Family reunion rules were comprehensively tightened. In the case of the largest component, that of spouses and fiancé(s), except where longstanding marriage relationships were involved, the sponsored person was initially only granted a two-year temporary resident visa. This precluded access to Australian welfare benefits and entry to Australian schools and universities on local terms during the two years. In addition, the spouse had to prove that the relationship was ‘genuine and continuing’ before a permanent residence visa was issued. Spouse sponsors in de facto relationships had to prove a pre-existing one-year couple relationship before they could apply. In the case of parents, the Senate rejected legislation to limit sponsorship of parents. However, access to parent visas was sharply reduced, mainly by capping the number of visas that could be issued in any one year (which the government could do without new legislation). In the late 1990s fewer than 3000 parent visas were issued each year. By contrast, in the early 1990s around 7000 parent visas were granted per annum and in the 1980s at least 10 000 per annum. The welfare benefits accessible to newly arrived migrants, including spouses and other family members sponsored by Australian permanent residents, were sharply curtailed. A two-year moratorium (supported by Labor) was put in place for all incoming permanent residents with the exception of those entering under the humanitarian programme. Even the previous backstop of Special Benefits (for persons who could prove they had no financial means of support) was restricted.

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To be eligible claimants had to show that their circumstances had changed after arriving in Australia (for example, where a wife separated from her sponsor husband). Inability to find a job did not render a newly arrived migrant eligible for Special Benefits. Immigration Selection On the other side of the coin, the Coalition government sought to sharpen the skill selection system in an effort to maximize the fit between migrant skills and Australian employer needs. The Concessional Family category was virtually abolished. In the 1980s some 30 000 visas a year were issued to siblings and other extended family members sponsored by Australian residents. The size of the Concessional Family programme was reduced in the early 1990s to around 7000 a year by the Keating government. By mid-1997, despite opposition in the Senate, the Coalition had succeeded in implementing a compulsory English test for all Concessional Family applicants (ibid., pp, 25–6). Subsequently the Concessional Family category was effectively abolished when it was incorporated within the General Skilled Migration programme. Those sponsored continue to receive concessionary points on account of the family sponsorship, but they had to meet all the threshold requirements applicable to skilled applicants who were not sponsored and, as well, achieve the required pass mark on the points test. In addition, the rules governing selection for skilled migrants were tightened, following an external review initiated in May 1997 (DIMA 1999). The review’s recommendations focused on better targeting those selected for the needs of the skilled end of the Australian labour market. In the aftermath of the inquiry a new skills selection system was implemented from mid-1999. The previous selection system had favoured skilled occupations but did not differentiate within the spectrum of such occupations. The new system introduced an element of targeting by creating a list of occupations eligible for selection (the Skilled Occupation List – SOL). Any occupation not on the list, such as doctors and university teachers (when the first list was released), meant that an applicant with this occupation could not apply. The SOL also categorized occupations into 60-, 50- and 40-point groupings. Applicants holding 60-point occupations were advantaged in gaining selection and thus given priority relative to other occupations. Sixty-point occupations were restricted to skilled occupations where employment depended on the possession of prescribed technical skills or knowledge, such as engineering, computing, accounting and nursing in the case of professionals, and metal working in the case of the trades. To be eligible for selection applicants had to first submit their credentials to the relevant

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Australian accrediting authority for the profession or trade in question and to pass a formal English language test. In a major concession to business interests the Coalition liberalized the rules governing skilled persons coming to Australia to work on temporary entry visas. Australia has long allowed employers to sponsor skilled persons for employment on a temporary entry basis. However, until the mid-1990s such sponsorship was only permitted under restrictive conditions that included a requirement that the sponsor first establish that no local was available who could do the work. Since 1996 the recruitment of skilled persons (at trade level or above) on a temporary entry basis has effectively been deregulated. Australia-based businesses can sponsor as many skilled persons under the long-stay business visa class as they wish, for periods of up to four years, without any requirement to assess the availability of locals to do the work or any assessment of the qualifications of the sponsored person (as with the permanent entry programme). Employers have responded strongly. The number of principal applicants visaed under the 457 visa category increased from 8000–9000 per annum in the mid-1990s to 24 316 in 2003–04. There has been a further recent surge to 46 680 in 2006–07 and 58 050 in 2007–08. This reform was distinctive in that it liberalized employer access to migrant skills, yet did so with limited impact on the size of the migrant population in Australia. The expectation, at least in the 1990s, was that those recruited would return home. The migrants sponsored, or their employers, were required to pay for all the settlement costs while in Australia, including health care and the education of their children if enrolled in government schools.

IMMIGRATION AND THE RECENT ECONOMIC BOOM The reforms enacted in the 1990s were implemented in the context of a tight migration programme. During this time, the Coalition government showed little interest in any rapid expansion of the intake. This stance began to change after 2000. The change coincided with a concerted campaign on the part of Australian business for a much enlarged programme. The Business Campaign Fairfax journalist Michelle Grattan claims to have uncovered a network of business leaders keen to promote migration as early as late 1997. She refers to a luncheon meeting of some of Australia’s biggest business names,

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including Tony Berg of Boral, Frank Lowy of Westfield, Fred Hilmer (subsequently head of the Fairfax group) and Reg Clairs of Woolworths. The reason for the meeting was that they ‘were worried the migration debate was slipping away by default and believed the pro-migration arguments should be put more strongly’ (Grattan 1998). Whether this luncheon was the catalyst to increased business engagement with the immigration issue or not is a matter of conjecture. However, business leaders did enter the public arena on the issue after the meeting. In November 1999 Richard Pratt (head of Visy Industries) launched APop (the Australian Population Institute), which has since lobbied for a population policy directed at greatly increasing Australia’s population. Its efforts culminated in the organization of a major population summit in 2002, which was supported by the Victorian Labor government. Richard Pratt restated his vision, not just for the year 2050 but for 2020, of a ‘democratic, secure, prosperous, fair and pluralistic Australia with a population of 50 million’ (Pratt 2003, p. 35). In the late 1990s (and subsequently) most of Australia’s peak business bodies and leaders did speak in favour of high migration. For example, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry attacked the Coalition’s immigration policy in February 1999. According to a report in The Age on 8 February 1999, the Chamber said the relatively low programme levels of the mid-1990s have ‘had an adverse effect across most of commerce and industry, with only the degree of negative impact varying by sector . . . amongst the hardest hit are likely to be construction, mining, finance, insurance and general manufacturing’. The business campaign had little to do with workforce shortages. Through 1997, 1998 and 1999 the Australian economy was still in recovery mode and the unemployment rate was around 8 per cent. Some business leaders, as is evident from the previous quotation, wanted a lift in the immigration intake in order to provide an immediate impetus to the economic recovery process. But most of the corporate leaders involved articulated a larger long-term vision, in which rapid population growth would provide the basis for sustained economic growth in Australia. They received strong support from the leading Australian media. The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian all regularly editorialized in favour of a larger immigration programme. From the point of view of those advocating a population building agenda, the Coalition’s focus on a migration policy structured around labour market shortages was a restrictive cage. Advocates wanted a population policy that would give priority to the attainment of growth targets. The stance of the influential Business Council of Australia illustrates the point. In April 2004 the council published a position paper on Australia’s

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population future, prepared by Professor Glen Withers (Withers 2004). The paper recommends setting a population growth target of 1.25 per cent per annum, which would deliver a population of around 35 million in 2050 (about ten million more than would have been the case if the net migration level recorded in the year 2000 had been sustained). As regards selection criteria for permanent residents, the paper recommended a focus on skill, but asserted that the population targets it wanted should not be constrained by skill shortages (ibid., p. 43). Opening up the Skilled Migration Programme Since 2000–01 The Coalition government did initiate an expansion in the migration programme after the year 2000. Though the increase coincided with the business advocacy just described, there were also pressures stemming from the emergence of skilled labour shortages linked to the dot.com boom of the late 1990s. Employers argued that an enhancement of the supply of such workers was essential if enterprises located in Australia were to compete in the ‘new economy’. Industry leaders pointed the finger at the Howard government, and the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) in particular, for not doing enough to attract those with the scarce skills in question to Australia, or to hold on to those already trained in Australia. Critics noted that there had been rapid growth in the numbers of overseas students training in Australia, particularly in accounting and computing. Yet the immigration rules in place at the time stipulated that such students had to leave Australia and then, if they wanted to apply for permanent residence, they had to do so from an overseas address. In response, DIMIA introduced (from mid-2001) an onshore visa subclass designed to encourage overseas students to take out permanent residence on the completion of their courses in Australia. If they did not apply within six months of completing their course, the right to apply onshore was removed. To be eligible, former overseas students had to possess the required credentials for one of the 60-point occupations listed on the SOL. Unlike applicants applying from overseas, former students applying from within Australia did not need to have any work experience in the relevant occupation. The response to these onshore opportunities has been enthusiastic. In the first year of this programme (2001–02) some 5480 visas were issued to principal applicants in the new onshore overseas student visa subclass. The numbers subsequently increased to 7700 in 2003–04, 14 441 in 2004–05, 19 352 in 2006–07 and 17 552 in 2007–08. Most of the successful applicants held Australian credentials in accounting and computing. By 2006–07 the number of principal applicants visaed under these subclasses accounted

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for about half of all visas issued under the Skilled Independent category, as specified in Table 5.1. Note that the numbers in Table 5.1 are for principal applicants and dependents. As Table 5.1 shows, the Coalition government has augmented the permanent immigration programme in all years since 2000–01. Most of this expansion has been within the skill stream, though there has also been a sharp increase in the family stream. Most of the latter growth has been driven by former migrants or the children of such migrants who have sponsored a spouse from their country of origin (such as China, India and Vietnam). In other words, it is a form of chain migration. In the case of the skill stream, the Coalition government has pointed to the emergence of serious skill shortages, especially in the construction and health areas, as justification for the increase in the skilled intake. Since 2005 this has prompted a greater focus on employer nominations. The DIMIA media release accompanying the announcement of the 2005–06 programme puts this priority succinctly: ‘A primary aim will be to increase the number of skilled migrants entering under the employer sponsored categories, as it is employers who are best placed to identify the skilled migrants we need’ (Vanstone 2005). In a parallel move, in 2005 the Coalition government made it easier for those holding temporary permits to convert their status to permanent residence. This was done by liberalizing the English language and skill requirements under the permanent entry employment nomination programme for persons with employment experience in Australia. By 2007–08 most of those so sponsored consisted of persons already in Australia on temporary entry 457 visas. One of the reasons for the focus on employer nominations was concern among some Coalition cabinet members that the points-tested visa categories were not delivering migrants with skills genuinely in shortage. Reflecting this concern, the government decided to establish an inquiry into the general skilled migration (GSM) categories. These categories cover most of the skilled migration categories except for the business migration and employer nomination programmes. The author was a member of the inquiry panel. The panel delivered its report in March 2006. It recommended that the minimum English language requirement be lifted from five to six on the four modules tested under the International English Language Testing System (IELTS). The four modules covered reading, writing, listening and speaking. The panel also recommended that former overseas students should initially only be granted a temporary transitional visa, pending evidence that they had completed a year’s experience in their occupation in Australia, or undertaken a professional year in an accredited course focusing on their particular occupation or that they could achieve seven on the IELTS scale

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38 090 – 9 560 29 880 – 6 250 7 590 230 53 520 1 480 93 080 12 350 105 430

2001–02 40 790 – 10 540 38 120 – 10 470 6 740 200 66 050 1 230 108 070 12 530 120 600

2002–03 42 230 – 10 400 38 720 1 630 14 590 5 670 240 71 240 890 114 360 13 850 128 210

2003–04 41 740 – 13 020 41 180 4 140 14 530 4 820 90 77 880 450 120 070 13 178 133 248

2004–05 45 290 – 15 230 49 860 8 020 19 060 5 060 110 97 340 310 142 940 14 144 157 084

2005–06 50 080 – 16 580 54 180 6 930 14 170 5 840 220 97 920 200 148 200 13 017 161 217

2006–07

50 000 – 22 800 55 600 8 000 15 900 6 000 200 108 500 300 158 800 13 000 171 800

2007–08

Source: DIMIA (2001), Migration Program Planning Levels Fact Sheet 05 and Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Programme Fact Sheet 60 (2005).

Notes: Totals may not be the exact sum of the components because of rounding. Employer sponsored includes Employer nomination scheme, labour agreements and regional sponsored migration scheme. State/regional sponsored includes state/territory nominated independent and skilled independent regional. Others include Distinguished Talent and a few 1 November Onshore.

33 470 – 7 510 22 380 – 7 200 7 360 290 44 730 2 420 80 610 13 730 94 340

2000–01

Migration programme outcomes, 2000–01 to 2006–07 and planned, 2007–08

Family stream Skill stream Employer nominations Skilled independent State/regional sponsored Skilled Australian sponsored Business skills Others Total skill Special eligibility Total non-humanitarian Humanitarian Total programme

Table 5.1

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(Birrell et al. 2006, pp. 170–2). The Coalition government implemented these reforms in September 2007. Since relatively few students from NESB countries can achieve seven on the IELTS test, the reforms amounted to a significant toughening of the rules governing former overseas student access to permanent residence visas in Australia.

IMMIGRATION POLICY UNDER THE RUDD LABOR GOVERNMENT Since the new Labor government came to power in late 2007 it has not challenged the migration selection and welfare arrangements introduced by the Coalition. Nor has there been any hint of a return to the policies enacted during the Hawke era, which sought to accommodate ethnic community concerns. Instead there has been a renewed focus on the contribution of migrants to the labour force. In May 2008 the Labor government announced that the permanent migration programme would be increased by 37 500 visas in 2008–09, 31 000 of which would come under the skilled visa subclasses. The result was an overall programme (including the humanitarian category) of over 200 000. Both the size of increase and the overall programme number were unprecedented. The announcement occurred without any preliminary notice or discussion about the possible consequences. These include the impact on metropolitan housing markets, the infrastructure implications for the cities that still accommodate more than half of all new settlers (Sydney and Melbourne) or the environmental ramifications. Yet during the 2007 election campaign these were all issues on which Labor had criticized the Coalition record. My inquiries indicate that the impetus for the 2008–09 programme increase came from the Treasury via the Prime Minister’s Department. These agencies shared a common concern with business interests about the risk of a wages breakout flowing from the mineral industry-led economic boom. By early 2008 such concerns were well founded. Job vacancy numbers, especially in the construction industry, were very high, unemployment was at its lowest level in decades and the pipeline of business investment and public infrastructure projects was enormous. The Rudd government instructed each federal department to contribute to avoiding a wages outbreak. The Department of Immigration’s role was to recruit more migrant labour, thus the expansion in the 2008–09 programme. Clearly, the short-term economic priority trumped urban and environment issues, as well as the trade unions’ interest in higher wages for their members.

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DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY The Rudd government’s migration announcement generated no public debate. This lack of interest appears to be mirrored within the Australian electorate. By the time of the 2001 and 2004 federal elections the proportion of electors believing that the programme should be reduced a little or a lot had fallen from well over 50 per cent in the 1990s to 36 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively. However, following the 2007 federal election, and perhaps reflecting the increase in the migration intake by this time, 46 per cent stated that they thought the number of immigrants should be ‘reduced a little or a lot’ (Betts 2008, p. 21). Could it be that the populist concerns about migration so evident in Australia during the 1980s and 1990s have abated? There is still a minority drawn primarily from the blue- and lower white-collar classes who worry about the challenges that migration represents to the ideal of ‘one Australia’, as well as threats to their more traditional image of what Australia represents. But this minority appears to have shrunk relative to earlier years. Since the implosion of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation movement after the 1998 federal election (when the One Nation party received nearly 9 per cent of the Senate vote) there has been no organized political basis for opposition to high migration. The boom in job opportunities since 2000 partly explains this situation. However, it also probably reflects the Coalition government’s tough line on reforming the migration programme and its ‘fortress’ stance on border protection. As former Minister for Immigration Amanda Vanstone put it, when interviewed in 2005, ‘we can take so many precisely because we control the borders’ (quoted in The Economist, 7 May 2005, p. 14). Also, the recent surge in migration has occurred in the absence of any vocal multicultural movement. The political influence of Australia’s ethnic community is a shadow of what it was in the 1980s. To the extent that there is any advocacy for multiculturalism it is of the soft variety, in which diversity is celebrated, but not in a way that most patriotic Australians would regard as a challenge to their identity. Another major change relative to the Coalition years is that the Labor leaders, including the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, tend to see migration as a part of (rather than a challenge to) their vision for Australia. Most want Australia to be more progressive in social justice terms, more open to international influences and more accommodating towards cultural diversity and minority interests. Surveys show that Labor politicians are far more likely to support high migration than their Coalition counterparts or voters for either party (Betts 2004, p. 71).

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Prime Minister Rudd has since indicated that he favours a continuing high migration programme, on a number of grounds. These include the impending ageing of Australia’s population and the consequent need for more people to provide for retirees. Another is that the rate of growth of the Australian workforce will slow sharply over the next decade as the current large baby boomer cohort enters the retirement ages. Rudd appears to be comfortable with Australia reaching 33.9 million people by 2050. This is the outlook if the present level of fertility and net overseas intake of 180 000 per year continues. Whether coincidence or not, this number is close to that floated by Withers for the Business Council of Australia in 2004. One might conclude that Australia is set on a new high migration pathway free from the populist challenges of the past. However, I doubt that this will be the case. Australian patriotism remains strong. As shown above, large numbers can be mobilized around immigration issues. A likely focus in the immediate future is the challenge high migration will present to Australian workers should the late 2008 economic downturn persist. As argued at the outset, for ordinary people patriotism involves an implicit contract with the nation state in which citizens give their loyalty in return for state protection of their interests relative to those of foreigners. If the Rudd, or any other future government, seeks to sustain a high migration programme in the face of limited employment opportunities for Australians it will expose itself to the danger of opposition politicians mobilizing public concerns about this situation against the incumbent government. At the time of writing, the Rudd government was already in retreat from its 2008–09 programme objectives. On 17 December 2008 it announced that henceforth it would give priority to migrants sponsored by employers and those with occupations on a limited critical skills list (CSL). This was to be focused on ‘medical and key IT professionals, engineers and construction trades’ (Evans 2008, p. 6). This announcement represents a significant change in policy, since it implies that the large numbers gaining permanent residence visas with occupations not on this CSL (like cooks and hairdressers) may not be eligible for permanent residence in future. If so, it means the size of the skilled programme will diminish because of their exclusion. At the time that policy changes were announced, the unemployment level in Australia was still very low. The implication is that strategists within the Rudd government were acting to nip in the bud the potential political dangers their migration programme might present if not modified.

6.

Immigration and the labour market in Australia Santina Bertone*

In Australia the recruitment of skilled migrants has been a central feature of the migration programme since at least the late 1980s. A detailed points test, modelled broadly on the Canadian version in the 1970s, gives priority to applicants who are young, well educated, English literate and qualified for high-demand jobs in which local skills are in short supply. The points test was considerably tightened in 1997 after the election of the conservative Coalition government (Hawthorne 2005). Not only principal applicants, but also concessional family applicants (distant relatives) were required to meet the test. In the ensuing decade the implementation of mandatory English language testing and rigorous overseas qualifications screening effectively ‘closed the gate’ on applicants who were thought to be ‘at risk’ of unemployment or poor integration within the Australian labour market. The figures for permanent settlers bear out this increased focus on skilled migration. By 2002 the majority (or 58 per cent) of permanent migrants entering the country were skilled, with this figure rising to 70 per cent (out of a total intake of 190 000) in 2008 (Kelly 2008). Skilled migration has also been the dominant feature of Australia’s relatively recent temporary migration programme. Introduced in 1996, a 457 (long stay) subclass temporary visa, similar to the U H1B in the US, has allowed increasing numbers of skilled migrants (defined as ranging from trades qualified up to tertiary educated) to enter and work for a sponsoring employer for up to four years. The visa is renewable, migrants can bring their families and visa holders can apply for permanent residence (Khoo et al. 2008). The growth of this scheme has been rapid. By 2008 the number of temporary migrants arriving in Australia had increased to 100 000 (compared to 40 000 five years earlier) (Kelly 2008). At the same time we have seen a marked rise in the number of overseas students studying in Australia, the majority from China, India and other parts of Asia. In 2008 there were 170 000 overseas students in the university sector alone, and these comprised 26 per cent of the total university student population (Rowbotham 2008). Changes to immigration rules allowed students 86

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to apply for residence while still onshore, with the result that, by 2002, half of all skilled migrant applicants were students (Hawthorne 2005). Approximately one-third of onshore students have been accepted as permanent residents (Birrell 2008). Taken together, these three changes – tightening of the points test for permanent migrants, introduction and rapid expansion of the 457 visa entry system and the large-scale entry of overseas students who are now eligible to settle – have resulted in a major and quite historic shift in the Australian migration programme. The shift has been away from family migration and general labour recruitment to an expansive, but highly focused, system of ‘cherry picking’ for the best available talent on the global market. In its quest for skilled talent from abroad Australia is not alone (Antecol et al., 2003a; Cobb-Clark and Connolly 1997; Iredale 2001). However, what is unusual is the highly orchestrated manner in which this quest is conducted and the crowding out of other migration categories – family, humanitarian – through the almost singular focus on skilled migrants who can readily assimilate to an English-speaking society and make an immediate economic contribution. The US, in contrast, allows most of its migrants to enter through family sponsorship, with only 10 per cent being selected for skills. There is also a very large component of illegal immigration, mostly comprised of low-skilled workers from Latin America. While the US has a thriving subprogramme of skilled migration much like Australia’s, in most other respects the two immigration programmes could not be more different (as Chapter 1 observes in some detail). This chapter asks a number of searching questions that are of increasing policy significance to the Australian public and to the migrants themselves. Answers to these questions reveal a number of contradictions and issues that are of potential importance for policy makers in both Australia and the US. Essentially this chapter questions the efficacy of the Australian transformation in immigration policy, how well it has served national needs for skilled labour, how the skilled migrants and their children have fared, who benefits, who loses and what each country can learn from the other about labour market policies in the context of further immigration.

IS SKILLED MIGRATION WORKING? The short answer to this question is: it depends how we define ‘working’. If filling skilled vacancies is the goal, apparently yes. If broader labour market and equity considerations are applied, the answer is more qualified. Certainly the number of skilled vacancies has shown a downward trend,

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with figures in September 2008 showing decreases for all skilled occupational groups. In annual terms, the skilled vacancy index (SVI) is now 17.1 per cent lower than in September 2007. The falls in vacancies were ‘widespread’, with ‘decreases evident in 16 of the 18 occupations listed’ from science, building and engineering professionals, accountants and auditors, through to health and social professionals, and to various trades such as automotive, electrical, food, printing, wood and hairdressing (Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations 2008). The data indicate that post-1997, when stricter points testing was introduced, vacancies in professional jobs rose and then began to fall by 2001 and have consistently fallen since then. Vacancies in trade occupations initially rose in the 1997–2000 period, then fell for a year and began to climb again in 2001, but started falling again by 2004, with the current rate at a level similar to that in 2000. These falls do not appear to be the outcome of factors such as the increasing supply of skilled native workers or contracting labour demand. For example, the numbers of domestic students in science, engineering and technology (SET) disciplines remained static or declined in the 1996–2006 decade (DEST 2006), reducing the pool of graduates in this field. Yet the economy and labour market were expanding during the 2000–07 period, increasing demand for skilled workers in SET occupations. In the health sector the workforce has been growing at a faster rate than the population, but demand for health services has grown faster (ABS 2006b). Overseasborn people have consistently been recruited to address shortfalls; they now make up very high proportions of the health professions – 50 per cent of general practitioners, 42 per cent of specialists, 47 per cent of dentists and 27 per cent of nurses being overseas born in 2006 (ibid.). Close analysis of supply and demand figures in each industry sector over the 1997–2008 period is needed to determine whether skilled migration has been a major factor in reducing skilled vacancies. However, the prima facie evidence suggests that in key sectors (SET, health services) skilled migration has been an important mechanism for filling immediate gaps. Some researchers are sceptical about the actual extent of skill gaps in the Australian economy. Mitchell and Quirk (2005) argue that the skills shortage in Australia is illusory. If a more expansive definition of unemployment were used (as in Germany), they argue we would see a labour underutilization rate of 9.63 per cent (or 1.7 million Australians without adequate work). Another indicator, the unemployed-vacancy rate, was 3.9 in 2004, suggesting there were nearly four people unemployed for every vacancy advertised. Australia has one of the highest rates of casual and non-standard or short-hours work in the OECD, currently estimated at 25 per cent. As

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such, being in employment (or working for a minimum of one hour a week, as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics), is no guarantee that one is fully or properly ‘employed’. In short, many Australians find there is insufficient work to go around (Mitchell and Quirk 2005). At a more global level, some commentators are critical of Western government policies that pursue skilled migration, often at the expense of less developed nations (Mitchell and Quirk 2005; Rowthorn 2008). They view this practice as a form of ‘poaching’ of workers who have been trained abroad, with little or no compensation to the ‘losing’ country (ibid.). The reality is that Australia has become heavily dependent on overseastrained professionals across a range of occupations, such as engineers, computer professionals, doctors, nurses and accountants (Hawthorne 2001). To the extent that skilled visa migrants are reducing skilled vacancies, and perform better in the labour market than other categories, such as family migrants and refugees, it could be said that this policy is working and contributing to the development of a ‘knowledge economy’. But there are well-documented problems of skill wastage and non-recognition of skills among the migrants, as the following sections will discuss. Another potential problem concerns the skill mix of migrants being recruited. The largest numbers of advertised vacancies in September 2008 were for labourers, factory and machine workers (16 298), followed a long way behind by accounting, finance and management (9100) and food, hospitality and tourism (8200). The first and third of these categories are generally not skilled work categories (ibid.). Some employers, such as those in the tourism sector, are now voicing concerns about emerging gaps in the supply of unskilled and semi-skilled labour (Visa Subclass 457 External Reference Group 2008). Recently the federal government announced a programme to allow 2500 agricultural workers from the Pacific Islands to be admitted on temporary visas. These developments suggest that the current migration programme is too heavily slanted towards skills. Rising prosperity fuels demand for tertiary services, such as cleaning, hairdressing, child minding and cooking (DEST 2006; Froud et al., 1998, cited in Masterman and Pocock 2008). An over-reliance on skilled migration may therefore be counterproductive in a growing economy. Finally, it is worth noting that Australia is increasing its skilled migrant intake at the same time as the USA and Canada (Cobb-Clark and Connolly 1997). Skilled Australian workers are also being increasingly lured by opportunities overseas, with 77 000 departing permanently from Australia in 2008 (DEST 2006; Hugo 2008, Chapter 2, this volume). People have choices about the countries they apply to work or settle in (ibid.) and, increasingly, they are not staying in any one country ‘for good’ but often move on, in a circular fashion, between countries.

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HOW WELL ARE IMMIGRANTS MATCHED TO JOBS? There are major problems in terms of matching skilled migrants to suitable jobs in the receiving country. The international evidence indicates that the problem of over-education (having excess qualifications for the job one is doing) is greater for members of ethnic minorities than the core population. This suggests that recruiting skilled migrants may not be an efficient method of plugging workforce gaps, as the translation of foreignearned qualifications and experience into the host country’s labour market is often problematic. At best, skilled migration may be seen as a rather crude tool for feeding human capital into the labour market, with considerable leakage and waste. For example, in Britain over-education has been found to be much higher among non-whites (more than 30 per cent being over-educated) than whites (Kler 2006). In Greece in 1997 the percentage of overeducated workers with foreign tertiary qualifications was 27 per cent. In Australia past studies found that non-English-speaking background (NESB) migrants were almost three times more likely to suffer from over-education than ESB (English-speaking background) migrants, who had rates of over-education typical of those for the Australia-born (Flatau 1995, cited in Kler 2006). Similarly, Green et al. (2004, cited in Kler 2006), using longitudinal data from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA), found that rates of over-education were lower among ESB migrants (22 per cent) than for NESB immigrants. There were variations among the NESB category; for example, Asians had an over-education rate of 36 per cent whereas other NESB migrants’ over-education stood at 31 per cent. Kler (2006) revisited the LSIA in his study of over-education among migrants arriving in Australia between 1993 and 1995. His data were based on three waves of interviews conducted five months, 17 months and 41 months after arrival. Again, he found that those who were best matched to their jobs were ESB migrants (just under 16 per cent over-educated), followed by other NESB (mainly European) migrants at 39 per cent and Asians (49 per cent of them being over-educated). These results were achieved by using Kler’s objective measure of over-education based on comparing educational requirements contained in Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) codes with qualifications held by the migrants. Kler also found significant earnings differences between the groups. Again, ESB migrants fared most favourably, with Asians and other migrants earning 70 per cent and 78 per cent, respectively of the average ESB immigrants’ weekly wage (Kler 2006). Kler concludes that the greater incidence of

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concessional family and non-skilled visas among NESB migrants played a part in these differences, but beyond this ‘it appears that qualifications held by Asian graduate immigrants are simply not as highly regarded as those of ESB and other NESB immigrants’ (ibid., p. 110). Why is over-education a problem? Economically, it means we have underutilized labour capacity and thus a waste of productive resources, leading to lost productivity. On the personal level, research and anecdotal data have revealed the psychological distress caused by a person’s sense that their full professional capacities are not acknowledged and rewarded (see Bertone 2008). This distress can lead to skilled migrants leaving the country, or they may stay but suffer psychologically or socially, with correspondingly negative impacts on them and their families. The incidence of unemployment is another indicator that is often examined to gauge the successful integration of skilled migrants. Studies in this area date back to the 1980s (see, for example, Beggs and Chapman 1990). Using 1981 census data, Beggs and Chapman found that ESB migrants have lower probabilities of unemployment than NESB migrants, for all levels of schooling and pre-migration experience. The gap reduces with a longer period of residence, but there is no crossover, although the gap is narrower for high-skill migrants (ibid., 1990). More recently Hawthorne (using 1991 census data) found that one to five years after arrival only 30 per cent of degree-qualified migrants were employed and diploma holders were even more disadvantaged (Hawthorne 2001). Non-European professionals were particularly disadvantaged, with Iredale (1987, quoted in ibid., 2001) blaming this on credentialism and protection of standards by professional bodies. By 2005 Hawthorne had changed her view of the position of skilled migrants in Australia. Reviewing the data on skilled migrant outcomes since the 1997 immigration policy changes, she argued that the Australian policy of ‘picking winners’ had paid off for the country and the migrants (Hawthorne 2005). Using data from LSIA 2 (migrants arriving between 1999 and 2000) and the 2001 census, Hawthorne found that unemployment among migrants had halved and that higher job satisfaction was being reported by the migrants who were interviewed for LSIA. She particularly noted that skilled Asian migrants from Commonwealth countries were faring better than those from other non-European sources. Thapa (2004) comes to a less sanguine set of conclusions than Hawthorne, using Household Income and Labour Dynamics (HILDA) 2001 data and comparative data from the 1990 income distribution survey. Thapa concludes that ‘there is a clear disadvantage in the probability of finding employment for migrants with similar characteristics of a native born Australian in both time periods. The disadvantage has not diminished in

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spite of the emphasis on skilled migration in recent years’ (Thapa 2004, p. 199). Thapa finds that the probability of unemployment for male migrants remains consistently higher than for an average native-born Australian. English language ability leads to a dramatic difference in the employment prospects of migrants and the higher relative disadvantage of NESB migrants is relieved over a longer period of residence. However, over a 25-year period of residence the relative risk of unemployment of NESB migrants does not match that of native-born Australians. Overall the majority of studies in Australia point to consistently inferior employment outcomes for non-Europeans, and Asians in particular, even when objective human capital attributes are controlled for. Some scholars suggest that ‘ethnic or racial profiling’ (discrimination) by workplaces cannot be discounted as a factor in these outcomes. Such discrimination may be similar to that highlighted for many years by studies into the differential treatment of black minority workers in the US (see Jain et al. 2003).

WHAT IS THE EMPLOYMENT LEVEL AND STATUS OF IMMIGRANTS COMPARED TO THE REST OF THE POPULATION? A recent OECD bulletin explains that the integration of migrants into the labour market is becoming more problematic in a number of countries (OECD 2006). In a qualitative discussion that accurately reflects the situation for many migrants in Australia, the bulletin catalogues a range of barriers in the labour market. Migrants are rarely able to compete on an even footing with local job seekers due to lack of references and contacts, language barriers and problems having their qualifications recognized in the host country (ibid., 2006). Employment services are often not well equipped to help the migrants or give appropriate advice. Financial pressures may lead migrants to compromise and take any work available, leading to skills atrophy and downward mobility. In Australia the 1997 immigration reforms went beyond making the selection of migrants more restrictive and exacting. They were also accompanied by the abolition of income support for the first two years after arrival and of most federally funded employment assistance and professional bridging programmes. This forced migrants to rely on their own initiative to find jobs. Junankar (Junankar and Mahuteau 2005) investigates the ease with which recent immigrants to Australia from different countries and with different visa categories enter employment at an appropriate level to their prior education and experience in the source country. Using two definitions of a good job – objective and subjective – he too draws on LSIA data

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from two cohorts: 1993–95 (LSIA 1) and 1999–2000 (LSIA 2). He notes that changes in these periods included extension of the social security waiting period (for income assistance) and labour market changes, as well as tighter immigration selection procedures. LSIA 1 had better qualifications in general than LSIA 2 interviewees. Nevertheless, after controlling for education, visa type and so on, the second cohort was significantly less likely to be holding a good job. This is important, as we would expect the second cohort to do better, given they were selected on the basis of stricter criteria. The greater difficulties experienced by the second cohort, despite a strong economy and declining official rates of unemployment at that time, suggest that the lack of income support and labour market programmes may have contributed to the problems. Another recent study by Borooah and Mangan (2007) used a large sample of 2001 census data and categorized groups by primary ancestry: indigenous Australians, East Asian, Other Asian (South Asian and SubSaharan Africa), Middle East (Lebanon and North Africa), Whites (North, South and East Europe and the Americas) and Other Whites (Australia, New Zealand, Britain and Ireland). The study examined the probabilities of members of these groups having professional or managerial employment and/or earning upper-quartile incomes. It found that being born abroad appeared to be a significant handicap in entering professional/managerial jobs, but was mitigated by being born in English-speaking countries or living in Australia five years or more. Speaking English at home greatly increased the chances of being in professional/managerial employment. Returns to education were lower for East Asians and Other Asians than for other groups. However, for those Asians in professional or managerial employment the chances of earning high (top-quartile) incomes were very good: 60 per cent for Asian men compared to 42 per cent for East Asian men, 27 per cent for White men (from North, South and East Europe and the Americas) and 51 per cent for Other White men (from Australia, New Zealand, Britain and Ireland) (Borooah and Mangan 2007, p. 839). Having a higher education improved the chances of both men and women being in the top quartile of income, a degree in science or commerce being more rewarding than the arts. Working in the public sector increased the chances of earning a higher income, as did English language ability.

ARE IMMIGRANTS MARGINALIZED BY HARSH LABOUR LAWS? Australia had a centralized wage system for most of the twentieth century, but by the 1990s a major transformation was underway. For most of the

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century the Australian award system provided for near-universal and comprehensive coverage of minimum wages and entitlements. On arriving in the country, even where they entered low-paid factory work, migrants were entitled to the same employment minima as other workers, though they might be allocated the least congenial and hazardous jobs (Bertone 2008). Trade unions, while often indifferent to the specific needs of migrant workers, were sufficiently organized through most of this time to enforce these entitlements in the workplace. However, the advent of enterprise bargaining (a form of collective bargaining supervised by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission) in the early 1990s, together with globalization and major economic restructuring, began to change this system in fundamental ways. An increasing diversity of employment forms and entitlements began to emerge. A large section of the workforce (both skilled and less skilled) came to fall outside the award safety net through casual, contract-based or informal employment. The wage gap between people who relied solely on awards (now a very minimal safety net) and those covered by union-negotiated enterprise bargaining agreements began to widen. Union density continued its marked decline, from a high of 57 per cent in the 1950s to 20 per cent in 2006 (Bertone 2008; ABS 2006a). In this environment migrants entering the Australian labour market have faced a bewildering array of different and quite conflicting employment options (ibid.), but no workplace union structures to provide support and advice. The conservative federal government of 1996–2007 had an ideological zeal for spreading more individualistic and competitive labour arrangements. In keeping with this ideolology, the WorkChoices legislation was introduced in early 2007, but subsequently repealed by the Rudd Labor government. Despite numerous studies conducted into the impact of the short-lived WorkChoices legislation, none has focused specifically on the experiences of migrant workers. However, research on the impact of decentralized employment rules during the enterprise bargaining period (1991 to the present) suggest that migrant workers are vulnerable. Under enterprise bargaining, some migrant workers benefited but many lost their jobs or faced increased work intensification and loss of conditions (Bertone 2008). The multiskilling or functional flexibility during this period posed a major challenge for migrants, many of whom lacked training and had worked for many years in repetitive, single-task jobs with no autonomy. However, for some migrants the work content became more interesting and a measure of dignity was finally gained. The problem was that these benefits were largely restricted to younger, more English literate and adaptable migrants more characteristic of the later period of migration than the earlier (ibid.). Casualization and shorter working hours introduced during this period

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also affected migrants in the same way as most workers, by depriving them of job security and security of income. WorkChoices, on the other hand, seemed to have no benign effect. The research conducted to date (both quantitative and qualitative) presents a consensus in showing the deleterious consequences of the individualization of work contracts for workers’ pay, working conditions and dignity (Bertone et al., 2008). Compared to the US, the Australian industrial relations system has traditionally offered more protections and a more comprehensive set of entitlements for most workers, including the non-unionized. However, in recent years enforcement mechanisms have become weak and formal entitlements are not always applied, particularly as the influence and coverage of unions has waned. Real wages have fallen for low-skill workers in both countries, but the falls have been much sharper in the US than in Australia (Antecol et al. 2003a). It remains to be seen how the Rudd Labor government’s Fair Work Bill will impact on workers’ wages and conditions generally. Even with the boost it will give to collective bargaining and union recognition, many skilled and higher paid workers, including recent migrants, may be covered by individual agreements of some form, such as common law agreements or enterprise flexibility agreements (Norington 2008). A final word needs to be said about the recent controversy surrounding 457 (temporary migration) visas, aimed primarily at skilled migrants. Some serious cases of exploitation and occupational safety problems have been aired. A recent federal government review of the 457 visa has concluded, with new rules being introduced, such as higher penalties for abuse and a requirement for companies to consult with unions regarding the use of these visas. There are claims that 457 wages and salaries are undercutting market rates, since only minimum salaries are required to be paid and these are often well below the rates paid to local workers (Centre for Policy Development 2008). This is an area that requires ongoing scrutiny.

WHAT IS THE LABOUR MARKET STATUS OF SECOND AND LATER GENERATION MIGRANTS? It is too early to say whether the children of skilled immigrants recruited to Australia in the past decade are performing better or worse than other second-generation immigrants from a less selective immigration programme. However, we have good data from Khoo et al. (2002) on the second generation in Australia, based on 1996 census data. They review the outcomes for second-generation migrants of all ages,

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but perhaps the 25–44 age group is the most informative in terms of labour market outcomes. Despite their less advantaged backgrounds, Khoo et al. found that children of Southern or Eastern European origin have better educational and occupational outcomes than those of UK or Western European origins. Importantly, the second generation of Malaysian or Chinese parents have the highest proportion of university qualifications and professional jobs. Indeed, the second generation as a group are doing better than their third-generation peers. While there are pockets of disadvantage such as second-generation youth in the 15–24 age group of Turkish or Lebanese origins, who had higher unemployment rates, the picture overall is surprisingly positive. The story of first-generation migrant disadvantage, particularly for Asians, seems to have been turned on its head for the second generation. Such results are not as surprising when we consider the overseas literature on the performance of the second generation in the US, and occupational mobility of non-whites in Britain. While in these countries the picture is mixed – for example, Mexicans and their children fare very poorly in the US – for many groups the positive story of upward mobility for later generations is widespread. In Britain, for example, people of Caribbean and South Asian origins have been successful in gaining employment in whitecollar jobs, mainly due to the equal employment opportunity policies of the 1980s and union support for opening up of opportunities, particularly in London (Virdee 2006). Some Indian and African Asians have also succeeded in entrepreneurial businesses, whereas Pakistani men, displaced by industrial restructuring in the north and west of England, have resorted to self-employment through taxi driving, opening grocery shops, off-licences and the like (ibid.). Perlmann and Waldinger (1997) observe that in the US the second generation have also done well and have now caught up to or surpassed their White Anglo-Saxon Protestant ‘betters’, but tackle the debate about whether the outlook will be so positive for future cohorts, given the restructuring of the US economy and the loss of well-paid blue-collar jobs. A similar question arises for Australia, which has also seen the hollowing out of middle-income jobs, with increased polarization between high- and low-income jobs. The latter are still the preserve of less-skilled migrants or those failing to achieve employment suited to their qualifications.

POLICY DISCUSSION AND LESSONS This chapter has focused on skilled migration in Australia and drawn some comparisons with migration policy and experiences in the US. What

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has emerged is an overriding concern in Australia for selecting migrants who are considered best equipped to succeed in the Australian labour market, and a corresponding shift away from family migration. This shift towards skills has occurred within the context of a highly expansionist programme. The concern of policy makers to ensure that migrants are not a drain on public finances and can rapidly contribute to the emerging knowledge economy has been paramount. This has led to the exclusion of skilled migrants from social welfare access and income support, leaving them to rely very much on their own resources as they negotiate the new country and its labour market. Yet at the same time we have seen a reduction in public spending on education and other policy levers that might promote greater participation by Australians in the knowledge economy. And while employers have lobbied for increases in skilled migration, and particularly the capacity to recruit temporary skilled migrants, there is considerable evidence that they are less disposed to employ skilled migrants arriving from countries outside their own familiar sphere of experience, that is, Western Europe, some former Commonwealth countries and the English-speaking world. A review of recent literature in this area shows an increasing sophistication in focusing on subgroups within the NESB category, highlighting the heterogeneous experiences within this category and the particular challenges faced by some newer skilled migrant groups, such as Asians and nonEuropeans. The majority of recent studies point to continuing problems of job mismatch, poorer mobility and higher probability of unemployment even for the more recent, elite migrants recruited under the skilled migration programme. It is clear that ‘selecting for success’ is not enough. Employer discrimination on the basis of national, ethnic or religious characteristics needs to be recognized as a potentially real problem, undermining the chances of skilled migrants to make a smooth and successful transition into the Australian economy and society. There is enough known about the basis of such discrimination to cast doubt on the proposition that differential outcomes merely reflect differences in quality of education among overseas source countries (Jain et al. 2003). The loss of most publicly funded labour market programmes for skilled migrants is to be deplored in this context. Past research has shown the efficacy of those programmes in accelerating acculturation, providing work experience and breaking down employer and employee attitudes. Publicly funded programmes are needed for a range of underemployed Australians seeking a successful transition back to work, such as women returning to work after childbearing and older workers. Looming labour shortages in lower skilled occupations and sectors

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should lead us to question whether the focus of immigration policy needs to be so heavily slanted towards skills. While the need for better regulation of low pay occupations is an emerging policy issue for Australia (Masterman-Smith and Pocock 2008), this is not an argument for restricting unskilled immigration, but rather calls for upgrading standards and labour law enforcement for such jobs. In the US Duncan and Trejo (Chapter 7, this volume) find that lowskilled immigrants with less than 12 years schooling have little trouble finding employment and indeed have an employment rate similar to that of US natives. This suggests that in a growing knowledge-based economy there will be a corresponding demand for lower skill jobs of various kinds, a finding that Australia could well take note of. Immigrants to the US are on average less skilled than those coming to Australia. However, in the skilled component, despite some differences such as countries of origin and English fluency, employment outcomes such as relative wages are remarkably similar across the two countries (Antecol et al., 2003). There was more comparability with the US in the first 40 years of the mass migration programme in Australia (late 1940s to late 1980s), when large numbers of poorly educated migrants arrived from Southern and Eastern Europe and later from the Middle East and Indochina. However, as Duncan and Trejo indicate in Chapter 7, migrant wage growth in Australia was not as great as in the US, due to the equalizing influences of centralized wage fixing. Skilled migrants in Australia are increasingly covered by individual employment arrangements, not dissimilar to those in the US, so once again it is not surprising that there are few differences. Finally, it is worth noting that in the US, as in Australia, the negative impacts of migration (such as lower earnings) are experienced by the migrants rather than the native workforce. In Australia this involves a higher risk of unemployment, underemployment and over-education. The point is made in Chapter 7 that Australian migration policy, in terms of skill selection, is much less haphazard than that of the US, and this is true. However, settlement support for skilled migrants in Australia (such as income support, bridging programmes and so on) is barely existent in the first two years after arrival. To that extent Australian policy is more laissez-faire than it was in the past, with support programmes now being more targeted to newly arrived refugees. It would be interesting to learn (both quantitatively and qualitatively) how skilled migrants from different source countries and ethnicities fare in the US with respect to skill recognition and career advancement, as this has been a troubling issue in Australia and a number of other countries. Global warming is an issue that will inevitably impinge on policy considerations in the migration area, across all countries of immigration.

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Recent commentators have noted the alarming speed of developments – rapid loss of polar ice sheets, increased incidence and severity of ‘wild weather’, food shortages and droughts. The speed of global warming has alarmed scientists around the world and confirmed fears that ‘runaway’ climate change may be only a decade or two away unless drastic measures to reduce and claw back carbon emissions, in particular, are taken (Spratt and Sutton 2008). It is likely that Australia will see increasing misery and environmental pressures within its immediate region (in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, China and the Pacific Islands). While Australia faces its own problems with climate change (water shortages and declining food production among them), as a developed country with high GDP (and a major long-term contributor to greenhouse gases) it is likely to face growing pressures, both political and moral, to take climate refugees from this region. How long, in this context, can the overriding focus on skilled migration continue? On a more positive note, if sufficient political will can be generated to make large investments in alternative energy sources and climate change adaptations, this will greatly boost the need for labour in those emerging industries. As such, we could see continuing expansion of immigration as we seek to import the capital, skills and labour to tackle the immense climate challenge. The Australian employment relations system has undergone major transformations and is no longer as fair and equitable as it was for most of the twentieth century. Competition for market share has permeated all industries and migrants must operate in a highly competitive labour market. The problems of adjustment to a new country have always been visited primarily on the first generation of migrants, whether skilled or unskilled, since the second generation seems to fare far better in this respect. But in a country where a quarter of the workforce is made up of first-generation migrants, and every available human resource will be required to tackle the immense problems of the twenty-first century, it is vital that barriers and blockages to the full utilization and retention of our human talents be addressed, and urgently.

NOTE *

I would like to thank Dr Devaki Monani for her invaluable assistance in collecting literature for this chapter.

7.

Immigration and the United States labour market Brian Duncan and Stephen J. Trejo

Over the last several decades two of the most significant developments in the US labour market have been rising inequality and growth in both the size and the diversity of immigration flows. Because a large share of new immigrants arrive with very low levels of schooling, English proficiency and other skills that have become increasingly important determinants of success in the labour market, an obvious concern is that such immigrants are a poor fit for the restructured US economy. In this chapter we evaluate this concern by discussing evidence for the US on two relevant topics: the labour market integration of immigrants and the impact of immigration on the wages and employment opportunities of native workers. To set the stage regarding immigrant skills we calculated the educational distributions of native and immigrant men from US Census microdata for the year 2000.1 Fully a third of foreign-born men have less than 12 years of schooling, compared to only 9 per cent of native-born men. The contrast is even more striking for men with less than nine years of schooling; this group represents 24 per cent of the immigrant population and less than 3 per cent of the native population. Looking at this same phenomenon from a slightly different perspective, immigrants comprise only about 13 per cent of the overall sample of men, but they make up 35 per cent of the men with less than 12 years of schooling and almost 60 per cent of the men with less than nine years of schooling. Education levels are particularly low for immigrants from Mexico (by far the largest national origin group of US immigrants), with two-thirds of these men possessing less than 12 years of schooling. Clearly, immigrants are disproportionately concentrated among US workers with the lowest education levels. At the same time, however, immigrants are well represented among US workers with the highest education levels. Completion of a bachelor’s degree is about equally common for foreign-born men (27 per cent) as for native-born men (28 per cent), whereas a higher fraction of foreign-born earn postgraduate degrees (13 per cent versus 10 per cent). Immigrants are over-represented at the bottom and top of the US educational distribution 100

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and they are under-represented in the middle (with 40 per cent of immigrants, compared to 63 per cent of natives, completing 12 to 15 years of schooling). The backdrop for resurgent US immigration has been an economy in which earnings inequality and the labour market rewards to education and other indicators of worker skill have increased dramatically (Autor and Katz 1999; Levy and Murnane 1992). How have US immigrants fared in the last few turbulent decades? In particular, how have recent shifts in the wage structure and other ongoing changes in the US economy affected the large group of immigrants who arrive with little schooling or skills? In effect, these immigrants are swimming upstream against the predominant economic currents that have heightened the importance of education and cognitive ability. In the restructured US labour market what is the role of immigrants in general and of unskilled immigrants in particular?

LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS Let us consider five key aspects of immigrant economic integration: (1) the availability of jobs; (2) the extent to which the earnings of immigrants grow as they gain experience in the labour market; (3) the unique circumstances faced by illegal immigrants; (4) the potential for selective admissions policies to raise the skill content of immigration flows; and (5) the intergenerational mobility of immigrant families. Employment How well has the US labour market been able to absorb the large inflows of immigrants? An important part of the answer is the ease or difficulty with which immigrants find gainful employment. Therefore we first compare the employment rates of foreign-born and native-born men, focusing in particular on how comparisons vary by education and by the amount of time immigrants have had to adjust to their new country of residence.2 For the same sample of men from the 2000 US Census described previously (note 1), we calculated employment rates for US natives, all immigrants and Mexican immigrants. Employment rates are the percentage of men who were employed at any time during the calendar year preceding the census. For each native group, employment rates are calculated separately by education level, as well as separately for recent immigrant arrivals (who had been in the US for at most five years) and earlier immigrants (who had lived in the US for six or more years).

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Overall, male employment rates are similar for natives (91 per cent) and immigrants (89 per cent), but immigrant-native employment differences vary enormously by education level. Among high school dropouts the employment rate of foreign-born men exceeds that of native-born men by 12 percentage points, whereas employment rates are nearly identical (at around 88 per cent) for immigrants and natives with 12 years of schooling. For those with more than a high school education, employment rates are three to four percentage points higher for natives than for immigrants. Immigrant men display high employment propensities, relative to native men, among those in the lowest education group, and the magnitude of this immigrant employment advantage is striking. This pattern becomes even sharper when immigrants are disaggregated by their year of arrival in the US. Immigrant employment rates are seven to ten percentage points lower for recent arrivals – men who have been in the country for five years or less at the time of the census – than for earlier arrivals. The single cross-section of census data analysed here is incapable of distinguishing assimilation and cohort effects (Borjas 1985, 1995a), but other studies that follow immigrant arrival cohorts across censuses show that the depressed labour force activity of recent arrivals primarily represents an adjustment process that all immigrant cohorts experience during their first few years in the US.3 In the 2000 Census data the employment rate of immigrant men shoots up by almost 20 percentage points during the first few years following arrival, and thereafter employment rises more slowly with further time in the US until, after about 13 years, the immigrant employment rate converges to the 91 per cent rate of US-born men. For our purposes we focus on employment rates of immigrants who have been in the US long enough to be past the initial period of adjusting to the labour market. Overall the employment rate for men who have been in the US for more than six years exceeds 90 per cent, and it is just half a percentage point below the corresponding rate for natives. In the lowest education group these immigrants hold a 14 per cent employment rate advantage over native-born men (87 per cent compared with 73 per cent). In all of the other education groups employment rates do not differ much by nativity for immigrants who have had time to adjust to their new surroundings. Despite ongoing structural changes in the labour market – including the widening of earnings inequality and a steep rise in the reward associated with additional years of formal schooling – employer demand for low-skill immigrant workers has remained high. Employment rates even for Mexican immigrants are similar to those for immigrants as a whole, notwithstanding the very low educational attainment of most Mexican immigrants.

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Earnings Growth Analysing data from the 1970 Census, Chiswick (1978) concluded that the earnings of immigrants grow rapidly as they adjust to the labour market, enabling them, on average, to erase their initial earnings deficit relative to natives within ten or 15 years, and immigrants then go on to earn more than natives in the later stages of their work lives. During the last half of the twentieth century, however, dramatic changes occurred in the national origin and skill composition of immigrant flows to the US. The proportion originating in Europe and Canada fell sharply, with the slack taken up by surging immigration from Asia and Latin America. A substantial body of research subsequently shows that more recent immigrant arrival cohorts are less skilled and have been less successful in the labour market than earlier cohorts, and that there are important links between the shifts in national origins and declining immigrant skills (Borjas 1992, 1994a, 1999; Card 2005).4 Revisionist studies predict that most foreign-born workers who entered the US in recent years will earn substantially less during their work lives than native workers (Borjas 1995a). Darren Lubotsky (2007) provides the most convincing estimates of post-migration earnings growth for foreign-born workers in the US. By employing longitudinal data from the social security earnings histories of individual workers, Lubotsky not only addresses unobserved heterogeneity across immigrant arrival cohorts, but accounts for selective emigration. Although correcting for these factors lowers estimates of immigrant earnings growth, Lubotsky still finds evidence of substantial labour market assimilation for immigrants: ‘[O]ver their first 20 years in the United States, immigrant earnings grow by 10–15 per cent relative to the earnings of native-born workers’ (Lubotsky 2007, p. 864). Consistent with other research (Blau and Kahn 2007; Borjas 1995a; Borjas and Katz 2007; Trejo 2003), Lubotsky also finds that earnings assimilation is considerably slower for Hispanic (predominantly Mexican) immigrants than for others. Antecol et al. (2006) broaden this analysis by distinguishing the separate impacts of assimilation on the employment opportunities of immigrants. The percentage growth in total earnings arising from assimilation is equal to the sum of assimilation’s impacts on immigrant employment rates and on the weekly wages that immigrants earn when employed. Second, the writers provide a comparative analysis of immigrant earnings assimilation in Australia, Canada and the US. Analysing census data for the 1980s for each country, Antecol et al. (2006) find large differences across countries in both the total amount and the form (that is, the relative importance of employment versus wage adjustments) of immigrant earnings growth. They show that earnings assimilation is greatest

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in the US and least in Australia. Furthermore, employment assimilation explains all of the earnings progress experienced by Australian immigrants, whereas wage assimilation plays the dominant role in the US, with Canada in between. They argue that these patterns reflect the impact of host country labour market institutions on the assimilation process, with relatively inflexible wages and generous unemployment insurance in Australia causing assimilation to occur along the ‘quantity’ (that is, employment) rather than the ‘price’ (that is, wage) dimension. In addition, Australia’s relatively compressed wage distribution reduces the scope for immigrant wage growth and might reduce incentives to make post-arrival investments in human capital. Illegal Immigration How does legal status, by itself, affect the labour market opportunities of immigrants? Most data sources cannot identify illegal immigrants, so perhaps the best evidence on the labour market impact of legal status comes from a survey that tracked the experiences of initially undocumented immigrants before and after they were granted permanent legal resident status through the amnesty provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Despite using somewhat different approaches to analysing these data, Rivera-Batiz (1999) and Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) reach similar conclusions. First, after controlling for observable skills, the estimates suggest that legalization raised the wages of such workers by about 5–10 per cent relative to what their wages would have been had the workers remained undocumented. Second, by increasing the incentives for such workers to invest in human capital, legalization also may have induced greater skill acquisition and thereby boosted wages through this indirect channel. Although data limitations preclude strong conclusions on this topic, available research suggests that labour market skills play a much bigger role than legal status in determining economic outcomes for US immigrants. For example, the low wages earned by recent immigrants from Mexico and Central America, are primarily due to their low levels of education and English proficiency, not their illegal status (Duncan et al., 2006). Unskilled immigrants, whether legal or illegal, tend to be treated similarly by the US labour market. However, an open question is whether legal status has important intergenerational effects. We currently know very little about this issue. Raising Immigrant Skills Through Selective Admissions Policies For several decades immigrant admissions policies in Australia and Canada have incorporated some variant of a points system that screens for

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workers with special skills or high levels of education (Boyd 1976; Green and Green 1995; Price 1979). These tests weight characteristics such as age, education, language ability and occupation, which runs counter to the family reunification emphasis of US immigration policy. For several reasons it is not a foregone conclusion that the Australian and Canadian systems lead to an immigrant flow that is highly selective in terms of characteristics associated with labour market success. First, both systems admit many immigrants who are not screened by a points test, such as applicants with immediate family who are citizens of the destination country, and refugees and family members who accompany those admitted by a points test. Second, both systems award a significant number of points based on a ‘personal assessment’ of the applicant by an immigration official who conducts a face-to-face interview. Finally, Jeffrey Reitz (1998) argues that the Australian and Canadian points tests can be passed by applicants with quite modest skill levels and therefore may provide only very weak filters for immigrant labour market skills. In an attempt to discern the effects of US and Canadian immigration policy on outcomes, Duleep and Regets (1992) compare immigrants originating from the same world region. Although Canadian immigrants are more language proficient, they possess neither an education nor an earnings advantage relative to their US counterparts. Duleep and Regets conclude that the Canadian points system has little effect on immigrant education and earnings. Pooling immigrants across all source countries, Borjas (1993) finds an earnings advantage for Canadian immigrants – resulting from their having more education on average – that to a large extent disappears once immigrants from the same source country are compared. Borjas concludes that the Canadian immigration system produces a favourable effect on immigrant outcomes by altering the mix of source countries. Using more recent data and extending the analysis to Australia, Antecol et al. (2003a) re-examine the consequences of skill-based immigration policies on outcomes. They do so by comparing the observable skills – language fluency, education and income – of immigrants to all three countries. Census data indicate that Australian and Canadian immigrants have higher levels of English fluency, education and income (relative to natives) than do US immigrants. The skill deficit for US immigrants arises primarily because the US receives a much larger share of immigrants from Latin America than do Australia and Canada. For each destination country, Antecol et al. (2003a) show the region of birth distribution for the immigrants in their samples who arrived within ten years of the relevant census.5 The most striking difference in the national origin composition of immigrants to the three countries involves

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Latin America. Almost half of post-1980 immigrants to the US hail from Central or South America, whereas only 14 per cent of Canadian immigrants and 2 per cent of Australian immigrants come from this region.6 In addition, the US receives relatively fewer immigrants from the UK and Europe than the other two countries. Another difference is that Asians make up a somewhat larger share of the immigrant flow to Australia (36 per cent) and Canada (40 per cent) than to the US (28 per cent). Lastly, Australia receives a sizeable number of immigrants from New Zealand. For immigrant arrivals after 1980–81, Antecol et al. (2003a) then compare educational attainment by region of birth and destination country. Among immigrants from a particular source region, the education level of US immigrants typically matches or exceeds that of Australian and Canadian immigrants, yet on the whole US immigrants average about a year and a half less schooling than immigrants in the other two destination countries. The explanation for this difference is the large immigration flow from Latin America to the US. US immigrants from Central and South America average less than ten years of schooling, and excluding this group from the calculations causes the mean education level of US immigrants to shoot up from 11.7 years to 13.9 years. Considering only those who originate from outside Latin America, US immigrants average half a year more schooling than do immigrants to Australia or Canada. The preceding discussion pertains to average schooling levels. Antecol et al. (2003a) demonstrate that the patterns evident at low education levels are similar to those just described for average levels. For example, among immigrants arriving after 1980–81 the proportion with ten or fewer years of schooling is 15.8 per cent in Australia, 15.7 per cent in Canada and 29.9 per cent in the US. Excluding immigrants from Latin America drops the proportion for US immigrants to 13.8 per cent! In his analysis of earlier census data for Canada and the US, Borjas reports a similar finding. The large US immigration flow from Latin America plays a leading role in this story, although not quite as dominant a role in Borjas’s version as it does in that of Antecol et al. (2003a).7 From his analysis, Borjas (1993, p. 40) concludes that the Canadian ‘point system works because it alters the national-origin mix of immigrant flows’. Antecol et al. (2003a) strongly doubt that the Australian and Canadian points systems are the primary reason why both countries receive few Latin American immigrants relative to the US. First, the US shares a wide border and a long history with Mexico, and these factors undoubtedly contribute to the large presence of Latin American immigrants. Second, Australia and Canada never received many immigrants from Latin America, even before immigration points systems were adopted (see Reitz 1998, table 1.1, pp. 10–12). Third, much US immigration from

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Latin America is undocumented (Passel 2004; Passel et al., 2004; Warren and Passel 1987) and subject to limited official control (Bean et al., 1990; Donato et al., 1992; Hanson 2006; Kossoudji 1992). Finally, Antecol et al. (2003a, 2003b) note that the general patterns they find for men also emerge for women, even though female immigrants are much more likely to enter as dependent family members not subject to any particular selection criteria. Intergenerational Mobility Historically, much of the socioeconomic mobility achieved by US immigrant families has taken place across rather than within generations. For example, previous waves of predominantly unskilled immigrants, such as the Italians and Irish, enjoyed substantial intergenerational progress that enabled their descendants to join the economic mainstream of American society (Alba and Nee 2003; Borjas 1994b; Chiswick 1977; Farley 1990; Lieberson and Waters 1988; Neidert and Farley 1985; Perlmann 2005; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997). There is considerable scepticism, however, that the processes of assimilation and adaptation will operate similarly for the predominantly non-white immigrants who have entered the US during the past several decades (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut 1994). Samuel Huntington (2004) voices an especially strong version of this scepticism with regard to Hispanic immigration. For a large number of national origin groups, Figure 7.1 shows one dimension of educational progress between immigrants and their US-born children. Using 1994–2006 data from the Current Population Survey, we calculated high school dropout rates (that is, the percentage of individuals with less than 12 years of schooling) for first- and second-generation men from the 51 source countries with reasonable sample sizes (at least 30 observations) for both generations. The first-generation men are immigrants aged 45–59 and the second-generation men are aged 25–39. The regression line plotted in Figure 7.1 shows the central tendency of the relationship between the dropout rate of the second-generation men from a particular source country and that of their immigrant ancestors. Figure 7.1 illustrates several important points regarding the intergenerational mobility of immigrant families in the US. First, six of the seven countries with immigrant dropout rates above 45 per cent are Spanish speaking (with Portugal being the lone exception), as are nine of the 11 countries with immigrant dropout rates exceeding 25 per cent (Haiti being the other exception). Second, the relatively high dropout rates of Hispanics persist into the second generation, particularly for the two most populous Hispanic groups (Mexicans and Puerto Ricans) and for two of the fastest growing groups

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Percentage dropout rate of second-generation men (aged 25–39)

20 Mexico

Puerto Rico

15

Turkey

El Salvador

Argentina

10

Portugal Panama France

5

Peru

Dominican Republic Honduras

Canada Brazil Jamaica Cuba

Ecuador Guatemala

China

Nicaragua

Ireland Israel

0 0

5

10

15

Haiti

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

Percentage dropout rate of first-generation men (aged 45–59)

Source:

Authors’ calculations from 1997–2006 Current Population Survey data.

Figure 7.1

US: dropout rates of first- and second-generation men

(Salvadorans and Dominicans). Indeed, the dropout rates of secondgeneration Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are well above the regression line, suggesting that the large educational deficit of these US-born Hispanics is not due simply to their having poorly educated immigrant parents. As a frame of reference, consider the comparable dropout rates for young (aged 25–39), non-Hispanic white and black men who are third generation or beyond (that is, these men and both of their parents were all born in the US). These dropout rates are 7 per cent for whites and 10 per cent for blacks. Therefore, by the second generation young men from the vast majority of immigrant source countries already have lower dropout rates than the average American (see also Card 2005; Card et al., 2000). The primary exceptions are second-generation men from some of the largest Hispanic groups. Finally, there exists considerable diversity across Hispanic national origin groups in the educational attainment of both immigrants and their US-born children. Among second-generation men, for example, Cubans, Ecuadorians, Guatemalans and Nicaraguans have low dropout rates (below 5 per cent). This contrasts sharply with the very high dropout rates of second-generation Mexicans and Puerto Ricans (above 17 per cent). The dropout rates of second-generation Salvadorans, Dominicans and Hondurans fall between these two extremes (rates of 7–11 per cent).

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As a result, Hispanics assume a central role in current discussions of immigrant intergenerational progress and the outlook for the so-called ‘new second generation’. Most indications of relative socioeconomic disadvantage among the children of US immigrants vanish when Hispanics are excluded from the sample (Perlmann and Waldinger 1996, 1997). To a great extent, therefore, concern about the long-term economic trajectory of immigrant families in the US is a concern about Hispanic-American families.8

IMPACT ON NATIVE WORKERS In recent years many studies have attempted to estimate the impact of immigration on the wages and employment opportunities of US-born workers. Useful surveys of the academic literature on this topic include Borjas (1994a, 1999), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Smith and Edmonston (1997, chs 4–5) and Card (2005). Lowenstein (2006) provides a non-technical and nuanced discussion of the key issues. For the most part the method used to estimate the impact of immigration on native workers has been to compare labour market outcomes (such as wages, employment rates or unemployment rates) for natives in US metropolitan areas that did and did not receive large inflows of immigrants. During this period how have earnings and employment opportunities changed for native workers who might be competing for jobs with unskilled immigrants? If labour market competition with immigrants has harmed unskilled native workers, then we would expect the wages and employment rates of unskilled natives in high-immigration cities like Los Angeles and Houston to have deteriorated relative to their counterparts in low-immigration cities such as Cleveland and Pittsburgh. This type of analysis suggests that, on average, immigration has only very modest effects on the labour market opportunities of native workers. Statistical correlations are weak across US metropolitan areas between measures of immigrant penetration and native labour market outcomes. This remains true even after controlling for observable differences across cities (in, for example, demographics or industrial composition), and even when comparing intertemporal changes in immigrant inflows and native outcomes (in order to control for unobservable differences between cities that persist over time). A National Academy of Sciences panel assembled to evaluate the impacts of US immigration concluded that the ‘weight of the empirical evidence suggests that the impact of immigration on the wages of competing native-born workers is small – possibly reducing them by only 1 or 2 per cent’ (Smith and Edmonston 1997, p. 220). An important potential problem with the empirical methodology used

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in much of the literature is that immigrants may be choosing to locate in metropolitan areas with the most dynamic local economies. If sunbelt cities like Los Angeles and Houston are booming, then even with a large influx of immigrants, wage and employment growth for native workers may match or exceed the corresponding growth for native workers in less prosperous cities like Cleveland and Pittsburgh. What we really want to know, however, is whether labour market outcomes for natives in Los Angeles and Houston would have been even more favourable in the absence of the immigrant influx. Card (1990) studied an immigrant inflow that plausibly satisfies these conditions. In April 1980 Fidel Castro unexpectedly announced that Cubans wishing to emigrate to the US were free to leave from the port of Mariel. From May to September 1980 some 125 000 Cuban immigrants arrived in Miami on boats and rafts. Half of these so-called Mariel immigrants settled permanently in Miami, increasing the city’s labour force by 7 per cent and its Cuban workforce by 20 per cent. The influx of Mariel immigrants thus produced a large and unexpected increase in the supply of unskilled labour in Miami. Card estimates the impacts of this surge by tracking labour market outcomes for native workers in Miami during the years before and after the Mariel boatlift. In order to control for overall labour market trends, Card also compares the experiences of native workers in Miami with those of native workers in four other metropolitan areas chosen for being similar to Miami demographically and economically. Card’s analysis finds no evidence that the Mariel immigrants adversely affected the wages, employment rates or unemployment rates of native workers in Miami. The textbook model of supply and demand predicts that when a large influx of immigrants shifts out the supply of labour in a market, the equilibrium wage should fall as a consequence of movement along the downward sloping demand for labour curve. It was therefore surprising that spatial correlations (across US metropolitan areas) between immigrant inflows and native worker outcomes suggested that immigrants do not significantly affect the wages or employment opportunities of natives. One explanation for this is that the location decisions of native workers help to mitigate the local labour market effects of immigration. In response to any decline in labour market opportunities, natives might leave a city or alter plans they had to move to that city. Indeed, Card (1990, p. 257) finds some evidence that ‘the net migration rate of natives and earlier immigrants into the Miami area slowed considerably after the Boatlift. To some extent the Mariels may have displaced other migrants from within the United States who could have been expected to move to Miami’. There is disagreement, however, over the ultimate importance of this factor. Looking later at data for a large number of cities in the late 1980s, Card (2001, p. 47) concludes

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that ‘mobility flows of natives and older immigrants are not very sensitive to inflows of new immigrants’. On the other hand, using a somewhat different methodology applied to data for the 1960–2000 period, Borjas (2006) finds a bigger impact of immigration on native internal migration. Capital is also potentially mobile, so if immigration were to lower the wages of unskilled workers in particular cities, businesses that intensively employ unskilled labour might move to or expand in these cities in order to take advantage of the lowered wages. But contrary to this possibility, Lewis (2003) and Card and Lewis (2007) show that when metropolitan areas receive an influx of unskilled immigrants only a small portion of the influx is absorbed through an expansion of industries that intensively employ unskilled workers. Instead, most of the adjustment takes place within industries. In other words, cities that receive large inflows of unskilled immigrants tend to use unskilled labour more intensively – in all industries – than do cities that receive fewer unskilled immigrants. Lewis (2006) provides evidence that in metropolitan areas where unskilled workers are plentiful due to immigration, industries are less likely to adopt technologies such as automation that could substitute for unskilled labour. Because of the possibility that equilibrating reallocations of labour and capital within the US might make it difficult to detect the effects of immigration by comparing cities or regions, Borjas (2003) argues that it is best to analyse US immigration at the national level. Instead of using the geographic clustering of immigrants to identify their impact, Borjas exploits the fact that new immigrant arrivals are concentrated in particular age groups and education levels and that the extent and nature of this concentration has changed over time. Workers are sorted into cells defined according to age (as a proxy for work experience) and education, with each cell meant to represent workers with similar labour market ‘skills’. Because education remains fixed for most workers after they enter the workforce full time as adults, Borjas argues that native workers are unlikely to move across these skill categories in response to immigration. He therefore estimates the effects of immigration by examining how the earnings and employment of natives in a particular skill group respond to immigration-induced changes in the supply of labour in that same skill group. Contrary to most of the previous literature, Borjas’s approach produces estimates implying that immigrants significantly depress the labour market opportunities of competing native workers. Using his estimates to simulate the impact of the large and relatively unskilled influx of immigrants that the US received between 1980 and 2000, Borjas concludes that the adverse effects of immigrants on wages fell most heavily on younger native workers who failed to complete high school – the least skilled native workers.

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Because no consensus has been reached, summarizing the findings of academic research about immigration’s impact on native workers is not a straightforward matter. An important conclusion is, however, that immigrants and natives must be distinguished according to their respective labour market skills. As noted by Borjas (1995b) and Card (2001, 2005), immigration will alter the wage structure – that is, the relative earnings of different skill groups – only to the extent that the skill composition of immigrants differs from that of natives. Therefore, when estimating the impact of immigration it is imperative that the overall influx of immigrants be disaggregated into labour inflows of various skill levels, and it is also imperative that these immigrant inflows be allowed to differentially affect native workers of different skill levels. A distinguishing feature of US immigration over the past few decades is that, compared to natives, immigrants are disproportionately concentrated in the lowest education groups. Using broad occupation categories to approximate skill groups, Card (2001) exploits cross-city variation in the size and skill content of immigration inflows in 1985–90, and he finds evidence that immigration did reduce the wages and employment rates of competing native workers (particularly low-skilled natives living in high-immigration cities), although the estimated effects are relatively modest. Using age and education to approximate skill groups, Borjas (2003) exploits national-level variation in the timing and skill content of immigration over the period 1960–2000, and he produces impacts of immigration that are roughly two to three times as large as those estimated by Card (2001). Overall, earlier assessments (Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Smith and Edmonston 1997) that immigration’s impact on native workers is minimal, even for low-skilled natives, are probably unduly optimistic, because this conclusion is based on studies that for the most part did not adequately account for the skill composition of immigrant flows and the differential effects of these flows on natives in disparate skill groups. Subsequent studies (Borjas 2003; Card 2001) that are careful to make these distinctions tend to find more negative impacts of immigration on low-skilled native workers, but we would still characterize the estimated effects as fairly modest. The most adverse labour market consequences of immigration fall on workers without a high school diploma, a group that has become increasingly small among US natives.

CONCLUSION As other chapters in this volume make clear, there are many reasons to expect US immigrants to be less successful in the host country labour

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market than Australian immigrants. Unlike Australia, the US makes little or no effort to regulate either the volume or the skill content of immigration flows to fit with current labour market needs. Moreover, a large share of US immigration is illegal and the government appears to have almost no control over this predominantly unskilled flow. Finally, inequality and the returns to skill in the US labour market have been rising over the last few decades as large numbers of unskilled immigrants have entered the country. Both in terms of design and implementation, US immigration policy seems haphazard when compared with its Australian counterpart. Despite these warning signs, the labour market performance of US immigrants looks quite good, even when compared head to head with Australian immigrants. US immigrants have little trouble finding jobs, and this is particularly true of unskilled immigrants. Most immigrants experience substantial earnings growth as they adapt to the US labour market. For most immigrant groups the US-born second generation has achieved socioeconomic parity with mainstream society, though for some Hispanic groups this is not the case. On the whole, immigration to the US has not had large adverse consequences for the labour market opportunities of native workers. With regard to the economic integration and labour market impacts of immigration, it is not obvious that the seemingly haphazard character of US immigration policy has led to unfavourable outcomes.

NOTES 1. Though not described here, the educational distributions of women are similar. Our calculations are for men aged 25–59 who do not reside in institutions. We choose this age range so as to focus on men in their prime working years who likely have completed their formal schooling. Persons born abroad of American parents are excluded because the distinction between immigrant and native is fuzzy for such individuals. Also excluded are foreign-born individuals who may have been younger than age 16 when they arrived in the US, in order to avoid complications that arise with immigrants who arrived as children. The sample sizes are 2 747 433 for natives, 374 893 for all immigrants and 121 340 for Mexican immigrants. Sampling weights were used in the calculations. 2. The labour supply decisions of women are often more sensitive than those of men to competing responsibilities within the household. As a result, we view male employment rates as primarily reflecting labour demand and the market opportunities available to specific groups of workers, whereas this view is less tenable for female employment rates. For this reason we report results only for men. The general patterns, however, are similar for women. 3. See, for example, Chiswick et al. (1997), Funkhouser and Trejo (1998), Schoeni (1998), Funkhouser (2000) and Antecol et al. (2006). 4. In particular, immigrant earnings in the US are strongly correlated with per capita gross national product in the source country (Borjas 1987; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986), presumably because workers from industrialized countries are better trained than workers

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5. 6. 7. 8.

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared from developing countries and their skills transfer more readily to the US labour market. The data are from the 1991 Australian and Canadian Censuses and the 1990 US Census. The samples include foreign-born men aged 25–59 who immigrated in 1981–91 in the Australian and Canadian data or in 1980–90 in the US data. The Australian and Canadian census data do not identify particular countries or subregions within Latin America, so this region of birth cannot be disaggregated further. See footnote 10 in Borjas (1993). See Smith (2006), however, for a more optimistic assessment of the intergenerational schooling gains made by Hispanics.

8.

New groups and social cohesion in Australia Andrew Jakubowicz

Immigration presents every society with issues about the nature of its social relations, its changing or resistant hierarchies of power and status, and the degree of openness of its economic, social and cultural institutions. Immigration is thus both a project within the political economy of the nation state and a dynamic process within the cultural politics of the society. This chapter discusses new groups in Australia and their effect on and absorption into contemporary society. ‘New groups’ refers in this chapter to communities created in Australia after the break-up of the Soviet Union, composed of immigrants or refugees from countries that had hitherto had a small or non-existent presence. In the main these communities come from Africa, parts of the Middle East and parts of the Pacific. As economic, ecological and political crises of global scale impose their consequences on small states and economies such as Australia, they foreground the multidirectional flows of power and resources between the global and the local, and the tenuous hold of the local political apparatus over international forces. Although the concept of social cohesion emerges from the social sciences, it has been fully politicized and normalized in policy and public discourse. Alexander Vladychenko, Director General of Social Cohesion for the Council of Europe, noted in 2007 that ‘a question which is currently fuelling political debate in all our societies [is] “How can we achieve social cohesion in a multicultural Europe?”’ (Council of Europe 2006). The Europeans are aware that there is an emergent paradox of social cohesion potentially present as a consequence of an alleged ‘excessive level of diversity’. Furthermore the Europeans may see migrant diversity itself as a problem for social cohesion, the Council of Europe proposing that governments should be calling on strategic interventions geared towards human rights, participation and active citizenship. The problem, then, is not incompatibility of cultures, but rather the incapacity of the receiving societies to recognize and modify their own structures of exclusion. 115

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Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

In Australia ‘cohesion’ has a particular set of connotations, as during the late 1980s social cohesion stood as a proxy for cultural uniformity in reference to reducing Asian immigration. As Opposition Leader in 1988, John Howard used ‘social cohesion’ to articulate his and his party’s increasing opposition to multiculturalism as public policy, and to demand a major reduction in Asian immigration. He argued that multicultural readings of Australian society represented the antithesis of social cohesion, so much so that in 1988 the Liberal and National parties formally abandoned any commitment to multiculturalism. Howard (1988) said, ‘Multiculturalism cannot be a cement for all Australians’. While the use of multiculturalism was somewhat recovered for the 1996 federal election, it was never to find a firm base again. The resurgence of an interest in social cohesion in the late 2000s came from a different direction. The European Community had been increasingly debating three distinct though ultimately related problems. First, there was the question of European identity and how it should be articulated, in relation to the national identities of the member states, in ways that accorded with the widespread desire to see Europe as a secular federation based on common values. Second, the issue of social marginalization and alienation characterized parts of Europe, typically accompanied by economic distress and occupational disadvantage. This added a geographical dimension to the political economy of European social inequality. Finally, the consequences of generations of immigration from outside Europe – for example, of Turkish guest workers, ex-Commonwealth citizens from the sub-continent and Africa, and Africans and Asians with some former colonial relation with the European powers, overlaid by the movement west of citizens of former Soviet bloc nations – generated further concerns about the porosity of borders and the perceived social distance of immigrant cultures from the assumed European heartland. The European model argued that economic integration and citizenship offered the most secure foundations on which to underpin social cohesion, and that employment and education would serve as the drivers for intergenerational mobility and a longer term social order. As Australia has actively sought the citizenship of settlers, the citizenship question in the European form does not really exist in this country. In the Australian context the language of social cohesion has been further complicated, again by using European discourses around social inclusion. However, where social cohesion foregrounds cultural difference as a central problem in both thought and action, to be dealt with through some form of accommodation between the host and the immigrant communities, social inclusion effectively ignores the issue. Whereas ‘cohesion’ implies a set of negotiating relationships between disparate but interacting

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parties (albeit of unequal power), ‘inclusion’ reinforces a hierarchy of power where dominant groups essentially set the parameters under which minorities will be expected to behave. Minorities only gain access to the benefits associated with inclusion if they do so without disrupting unduly the benefits already taken for granted by the host majorities (Jakubowicz 2006). Nor is it necessarily the case that intolerance has been greatest against the most recent arrivals (especially not, given the resentment experienced by Indigenous Australians); rather intolerance is expressed publicly against those most seen in whatever way to be a threat to the cultural economy of the society (true of Indigenous and non-Anglo groups). The novelty and social distance of an immigrant group can contribute to the ‘mainstream’ sense of apprehension, particularly where the rate of inflow and the concentration of newcomers are both unexpected and overwhelming. For instance, early groups of African settlers in the 1990s reported generally welcoming responses from Australian neighbours. However, where Africans have settled in denser communities and, in particular, in areas where youth unemployment is high and other urban gangs already control the turf, then antagonism tends to be more publicly expressed and occasional violence more pronounced and reported. Yet where equally recent Polynesian communities have settled in the same or similar areas, social reactions have been more muted, possibly because of some important shared cultural mores (especially in sports such as Rugby League football, where Islanders are well represented and Africans almost nonexistent). The events of recent history are therefore quite comprehensible when set against the longer history of racialized discourses of inclusion and exclusion. This chapter addresses the context for government and societal responses to key ‘new waves’ of immigration, which are popularly understood as being from Africa and the Islamic countries of the Middle East. It will also make some reference to the resurgence of Chinese communities within Australia, with their economic, social and political consequences.

SETTING A CONTEXT Globalization has generated pressures and opportunities for international movement of people, opening new pathways for peoples whose past histories had been more local and constrained. In the post-Second World War period Australia began to be caught up in these globalizing processes, turning to the international pool of labour to feed its industrial development and responding to the emerging international discourses on human

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rights by accepting refugees from war and terror. Broadly speaking, Australia has sought to respond to three major sets of problems in managing migration – attracting high-value human capital in competition with other labour-importing countries; solidifying the long-term settlement intentions of desirable new arrivals by providing for family reunion; and managing the demands for refugee and humanitarian intake. We can characterize ‘new groups’ as those whose numbers have substantially increased in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the nature of the global political economy changed significantly. It is therefore valuable to understand what the pattern of population and immigration looked like in Australia at the end of the 1980s. As the year 1988 marked the bicentennial of the settlement or occupation of Australia by a First Fleet of British military forces and convicted felons, it had major ideological importance as a moment in which narratives of the nation could be mobilized and calls to social cohesion could be given firmer traction. During the mid-1980s Australia had been in the midst of a major public debate about the importance of ‘social cohesion’ and the implications of the term for public policy. The debate had two broad origins – one was the end of the ‘White Australia policy’ in the mid-1970s and the consequent but unexpected arrival of many tens of thousands of Indochinese refugees. By 1988 their numbers had reached 100 000 and some areas of the larger cities had become points of concentration for arrivals from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. There they joined the growing inflow of immigrants from other parts of Asia drawn by the new, non-discriminatory regulations and the industrial need for new workers. The second element was essentially political – throughout the postWhite Australia period there had been an informal pact between the leading political parties in the national parliament that they would not be the first to play ‘the race card’. That is, they would not seek to gain political advantage by playing on the racial fears of Australians who had so recently been hunkered down behind the defensive barrier of White Australia. With the defeat of the conservative government led by Malcolm Fraser in 1983, internal changes in his Liberal Party brought in a growing group of ultraconservatives who replaced the more liberal politicians associated with Fraser. By 1990 the social milieu had been further affected by new waves of immigrants, many of them de facto refugees from the Middle East, especially Lebanon. While there had been Muslim settlers in Australia since the mid-nineteenth century, the most significant inflow had been Turks arriving in the post-1968 period, with most settling in Melbourne. The majority of Muslim Lebanese a generation later settled in Sydney, in a tight area

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to the west of the inner city, where they established a raft of institutions – mosques, schools, prayer halls, sports clubs – reflecting the diversity (and at times the antipathies) of their places of origin. The suburbs around the Villawood Immigration Reception and later Detention Centre provided cheap housing and drew in the cluster of Arabic-speaking groups whose presence has since allowed the area to be characterized as the ‘Green Crescent’. With the first Gulf War in 1990 Australia was presented with a rather new phenomenon, the presence of potentially a significant number of people with cultural and emotional links to the ‘enemy’. In the major world wars Australia had incarcerated those who were possible enemy sympathizers – including, for instance, Australia-born Italians and the Indigenous wives of Japanese pearl divers in the Second World War. This could not be easily done in the 1990s, if only because it was hard to discern who might be a civilian with Baathist sympathies. Nevertheless the Australian media made much of testing the loyalty of Arab Australians and thus, for the first time in two generations, introduced the possibility of ‘enemies within’ into the wider Australian consciousness. During the early 1990s a significant change in immigration was that occasioned by the break-up of the Soviet Union and the de-Sovietization of Eastern Europe. This transformation created turmoil, most tragically in the former Yugoslavia. Australia became the temporary refuge for over 4000 Bosnians and a permanent refuge once more for people from throughout the Balkans. However, the critical shift in Australia, while not as large as that produced through the intake of Indochinese that followed the lifting of White Australia in the 1970s, was created by the decision to give refuge to black Africans fleeing various civil wars and hostilities in countries such as Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, the Congo DR, Sudan and Somalia. In many cases the refugees came from generations of fragmented families, surviving without education and exposed to sustained atrocious violence.

THE BUILDING BLOCS From the initial establishment of the post-war immigration programme, the question of how the newcomers would settle into Australian society was a cause for government concern. On the one hand, the programme’s necessity for the nation’s economic development could be undermined by anger and hostility evoked among the host population – that is, the effect on Australians of the newcomers. But the domestic reaction was also problematic, as a hostile response could too easily turn potential settlers

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into temporary sojourners. This tension has continued throughout the 60 years or more of the programme and provides one of the underlying though varying imperatives within which policy is contained. Given the earlier racialization of immigration and deeply embedded fears in particular of Asian population inflows, the end of White Australia was not a unanimously welcomed move. When assimilation was replaced by multiculturalism as a policy parameter for managing settlement, there was significant scepticism and indeed opposition to the moves. However, by the late 1980s a shaky political consensus among policy elites supported a non-racial immigration policy and a national narrative that could incorporate cultural diversity, albeit within a hierarchy of preferred cultures. Furthermore, government institutions at both national and state levels began to redirect their management practices towards access and equity. Many states and the Commonwealth developed charters of cultural diversity, which recognized the complexity of the social world and validated cultural retention and intergenerational cultural transmission. The debate was well embedded within the policy environment, as key policy players in 1987–88 indicate in their differing orientation to multicultural policy. Peter Shergold (an English immigrant) was then head of Prime Minister Hawke’s Office of Multicultural Affairs, and later head of Prime Minister Howard’s Department until 2008. Stephen FitzGerald was a former ambassador to China who led a review of immigration and settlement policies. Here their views on the essence of the debate reveal both the political and policy issues at stake. The deeply embedded societal disagreements were thus well in place as the ‘new groups’ began to feature as emerging ‘problems’ in the media and in government discussions. The election of Howard (a strong supporter of the FitzGerald recommendation to abandon multiculturalism) in 1996 occurred in a wider environment of rising alarm about immigration. Pauline Hanson, a Queensland Liberal candidate in 1996, had her endorsement as a candidate withdrawn just prior to the election, her statements on Aboriginal welfare having been deemed unacceptable in the election atmosphere. She was subsequently elected as an Independent and launched a campaign to stop Asian and non-European immigration. Her rhetoric played an important part in foregrounding the unnerving politics of race, and the race card was played over and over. Nevertheless, while immigration did decline after 1996 under Howard, it began to rise after 2001, though the proportion of immigrants who left Australia was also on the rise. The Hanson rhetoric and the government’s implementation of policies that could be said to reflect her ideas drove the decline, and in particular stimulated earlier immigrants to leave the country. The changing makeup of the migrant inflow pointed to the closing down of European

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DR PETER SHERGOLD FOUNDATION DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS, 1987–90

‘The FitzGerald Report was of course positively hostile to the concept of multiculturalism, and [had] an underlying distrust of the power that was being wielded by ethnic communities and a strong emphasis on an economic approach to our immigration policy. The Office of Multicultural Affairs and myself had strong concerns about drafts of the FitzGerald Report, and when the FitzGerald Report appeared, and very crudely – and this is very crudely – the Prime Minister was persuaded of our position. And therefore, although the FitzGerald Review on Immigration had a significant impact, many of its key elements were not to have the role on government policy that they otherwise would have had . . . The FitzGerald Report was, I suppose, a real litmus test of whether the Office of Multicultural Affairs was going to exert a real influence on government, because there is no doubt that both Clyde Holding and then, in particular Robert Ray, were sympathetic to the directions that FitzGerald was moving in. Apart from that, FitzGerald very much had the ear of influential ministers, in particular John Dawkins, who was very attracted to the Asian push. Alan Matheson, who had been the ACTU representative on that Committee, at least from the outside, seemed to not exert much influence. There was Helen Hughes, who was always running an economic rationalist agenda through the FitzGerald Inquiry. And FitzGerald simply assumed that he had the weight, in Cabinet, to push his agenda forward. And although the Report is very articulate, in some ways brilliantly written, and quite helpful in terms of immigration policy, it was in my view extremely dangerous in terms of the way it would be seen as signalling the end of multiculturalism . . . I have no doubt at all that FitzGerald and the Minister at the time, Clyde Holding, just thought there would be no problem with this. And therefore when the Office of Multicultural Affairs briefed the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister called in the Minister for Immigration and said: no, this was simply not going to be acceptable in its draft form – then changes were made. It came as a real shock in a very real way. Clyde Holding lost his ministerial position as a result of it and Robert Ray was pretty outraged by it . . .

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The Prime Minister decided to get involved in this and got involved in a way where he, in general, supported the policy positions put to him by the Office of Multicultural Affairs, which meant not only was he then, in effect, rejecting the policy advice provided by the Department of Immigration, but which the Ministers for Immigration were picking up. And there was a lot of tension and hostility that resulted from that.’ Source: www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/library/media/Audio/id/589 (accessed 26 January 2009).

BOX 8.2

PROFESSOR STEPHEN FITZGERALD CHAIR, COMMITTEE TO ADVISE ON AUSTRALIA’S IMMIGRATION POLICIES (CAAIP), 1987–88

‘We [CAAIP] had to look at things like the numbers. You had to look at the mix, the categories, the selection process. We also were asked to look at the legislation. And that was a major, but probably less publicised aspect, of the work of the Committee at the time. [John] Dawkins was a strong supporter [of the Committee’s views], a very strong supporter. [Kim] Beazley was a supporter. [Bill] Hayden was certainly supportive. Who stood on the other side? I think that [Prime Minister Bob] Hawke was the main person. I think Hawke was a kind of . . . as we all know he was a populist, he was a lowest common denominator person – highly intelligent, but not intellectual. I don’t think that Hawke’s view really was infused too much by a kind of intellectual vision about what it all meant. But he was a kind of soft sentimental touch for the multicultural idea. A paper was distributed and its thrust was how to manage the CAAIP Report when it appeared. And it was subsequently denied by all members of the Advisory Council on Multicultural Affairs that I spoke to, that such a paper had ever existed, and the reason for that is that the copies were pulled back – but it existed, I know that.

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The actual authorship appeared to have been the Office of Multicultural Affairs. But I can’t vouch for that. There is some doubt about that. But it would be consistent with something that happened subsequently. The idea that multiculturalism might have run its course was deeply offensive to vested interests of the kind which represent in my view the “ism”, the dogma – their vested interest in the sense that it was developing as an industry, it provided their employment, their rationale, their “raison d’etre”. And a lot of people, I might add, in this category were people who were themselves immigrants from Britain . . . There was no doubt that there were people who were working to head off any suggestion that multiculturalism might come to be seen as a phase in the evolution of Australian society and ultimately replaced by something which in my conception would be bigger, broader, all-encompassing and so on. And there were several things that happened then, towards the end of the CAAIP Report. One was the concoction of a Report which went to the Prime Minister which was not, of course, shown to me and was never supposed to have been seen by me. It was prepared by the Office, by OMA, and I think I have to say, it is the most mendacious document that I have ever come across in public life in Australia.’ Source:

www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/library/media/Audio/id/416.

immigration and the expansion of Asian, African, Middle East and Pacific sources. Meanwhile in inner-western Sydney the media were identifying the rise of Middle Eastern crime gangs. The activity of these gangs had been brought to public attention by a number of disgruntled police who were concerned that criminal acts were not being prosecuted, and a reign of terror had begun to emerge. Events reached their first break-out in 1998, when a drive-by shooting sprayed the police station in Lakemba, the heart of the Green Crescent, with 9 millimetre bullets. Media interviews with local Arabs reported their frustration at what they claimed to experience as thuggish police harassment. The media reported increasing incidences of other shootings, while the then state premier, Bob Carr, called on the Lebanese Muslim community to put its own house in order. (It should be noted that a number of people convicted of other gun crimes were Lebanese Christians.) Both these communities were closely associated with factions inside the Labor Party.

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Over the next few years media attention intensified as lurid cases of aggravated rape, abductions and sexual violence were associated with Muslim young men. In parallel the police carried out a series of raids on jihadist suspects, some of whom were released after police evidence failed, some of whom were convicted and gaoled for terrorism offences. The range of these offences grew as new legislation was enacted at the state and federal levels through 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 (see legislation listed in the Appendix). A number of explanatory models, based on opposing sets of assumptions, have been postulated in relation to the behaviour of the people involved. They broadly split along lines that either support or oppose the policy settings of multiculturalism as they are commonly represented in public debate. On the one hand, those who oppose multiculturalism tend to argue that young Australian Muslims, especially men, are socialized in a culture of gynophobic, sexist and misogynistic violence, where atavistic pre-modern feudal values of masculine hegemony are imposed in authoritarian familial environments on women and children. As one former police commissioner described it, they are the children of the people who blew Beirut to pieces (his comments applied to both Muslims and Christians). Furthermore, to paraphrase the Commissioner’s position, their culture of misogyny is amplified by a rising volume of imported jihadist rhetoric, which justifies violence and separatist fantasies, extols hyper-masculinity and is fuelled by a criminal subculture of drugs (including ice, cocaine, heroin and hashish), car-rebirthing and standover extortion. It is driven by its own anti-Semitic, anti- American and anti-Australian/White racism. Multiculturalism, it is said, has condoned the separatist rhetoric and thereby inflamed the conditions under which a ghettoized world of unAustralian horrors is allowed to flourish and from which non-Muslims are intimidated into leaving. The Cronulla riots in the southern summer of 2005, understandable in relation to the frustration and revulsion felt by young non-Muslim Australians, and totally foreseeable in the disgustingly brutal street rampages enacted by Muslim youth in retaliation, were just an explosive example of the poison that had been contained previously to the Green Crescent (for example, Windschuttle 2005). On the other hand, those who support multiculturalism and see its more effective implementation as a solution to these problems tend to argue that deep-seated racism in Australian society and popular culture has pervaded relations between young Australian Muslims and their society, squeezing them into internally focused communities. Most share the core values of Australia and simply want the same freedom to be themselves and to follow their beliefs that other Australians take for granted. However,

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stereotyping in the media, expectations of their failure projected on to them by the public education system, experiencing regular harassment by police and hostility to them in the employment market together build significant barriers to full participation. Well-publicized but failed legal cases against Muslims accused of terrorism offences contribute to their sense of being the targets of state marginalization and social exclusion. While many are religious, many are also effectively secular while retaining a basic Muslim identity – as is the case with most Christians and many Jews. Only a small minority are drawn to crime and fewer still to jihadist political positions. However, in a situation where they feel scapegoated and marginalized by the wider society, they may find comfort and support in smaller extremist communities where they can bond with people of like-mind and experience. Cronulla was an example of the hostility they experience on a more diffuse but sustained level in their everyday lives, and the retaliation attacks were an uncontrolled outburst of frustration and anger. As later events were to show, many of the participants in the Cronulla retaliation attacks showed sincere remorse for their uncharacteristic actions (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2006). These two discourses cannot easily sit together, though the national action plan on Muslim communities adopted by the federal government in 2006 sought to do so. By 2008 this plan had been reconceptualized as a ‘de-radicalization’ strategy, designed to target young Muslim men, now the bullseye for concerted attention by governments. Government representatives expressed increasing unease about ‘home grown terrorism’, with senior security officials mentioning dozens of cases under investigation in their rare media reports.

SECURITY OR ALARM? In the lead-up to the second Gulf War/invasion/liberation of Iraq in 2003, the Australian government implemented a major public information campaign it called ‘Alert but not alarmed’. The campaign, ridiculed by some of its opponents, had a public face of fridge magnets and television advertisements (Making Multicultural Australia (MMA) 2005), but a much deeper background of increased surveillance and expenditure on domestic intelligence. While it has been argued that the campaign was as much about creating the conditions of cognitive dissonance necessary to allow the government to thwart public opposition to the Iraq war as it was about internal security concerns, one clear and ongoing effect was to heighten intercommunal suspicions about Muslims and to intensify Muslims’ apprehension about their place in Australian society. The campaign followed on from

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the passage of a raft of legislation that targeted terrorism, but seemed to be mainly concerned to deter or apprehend jihadists. While there is one organization listed by the Australian government that is not Islamist (the Kurdish Workers’ Party), the remainder are all Muslim in countries from Uzbekistan to the Mahgreb, from the Middle East through Indonesia and the Philippines (www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf). Unlike other countries, Australia has not proscribed any other non Muslim organizations, a factor that has been well noted by Muslim community leaders. Indeed throughout the period that the legislation was being drafted Muslim leaders sought to have the government reduce the severity of the penalties and modify the language and associated campaign images. In combination these laws produced a draconian web of constraints within which freedom of speech would turn out to be heavily restricted and executive authority dramatically extended. The case of Dr Mohamed Haneef in 2007, accused of terrorism offences and then exonerated, intensified Muslim communities’ sense of harassment and intimidation. The Australian Labor Party government returned at the November 2007 election argued that the failure of previous government’s initiatives reflected the selection of ‘easier’ targets by programme proposers, too much of a concentration on inter-faith dialogue among those who were willing to engage (that is, not those who were perceived as a threat), and the impossibility of resolving the leadership quagmire that characterized the Islamic organizations. Moreover, there were constantly expressed concerns that previous policy had given too much power to religious and extremist Islamic leaders, mostly foreign born and unconnected with Australian society, whose utterances promoted a scandalized public perception of Islam and Muslims, magnified by a populist and sensationhungry media. What was now needed, it was proposed, was the discovery of more secular, younger leaders, who were effectively integrated and shared Australian core values. Government policy shifted to targeting ‘young men’ and organizing their integration, while the Federal Police established community engagement units to facilitate surveillance and intelligence gathering in Sydney and Melbourne.

A NATION OF TRIBES? Historic studies of Australian settlement patterns (for example, Burnley et al., 1997) have pointed to a staging process for immigrant settlement, especially in cities. When non-Anglo (and even Anglo) immigrants arrive, they either settle initially near migrant hostels, if that is where they were first located, or seek out compatriots in areas of employment opportunity and

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cheaper housing. Over time the relative strength of language groups has changed, a process that will accelerate far more dramatically in the next decade as the leading European groups begin to decline due to the death of the elderly cohort that made up the 1950s and 1960s mass immigration. Over time communities develop, centred on religious, communal and educational facilities. This was a typical pattern for the Chinese in nineteenth-century Sydney and Melbourne, for Mediterraneans in the inter-war period and Europeans in the post-Second World War period. Within a generation or less the more successful and affluent families would relocate to more salubrious neighbourhoods, often creating a secondary concentration. By the third generation the grandchildren of the immigrants would have widely intermarried into other communities and dispersed through the society, reflecting economic rather than ethnic preferences. For the first two generations after the Second World War this model generally applied. However, the large refugee communities that were rapidly formed in the wake of the Indochinese, Middle East and African conflagrations are now in their first generation of settlement, with some reaching into the second. The more affluent and educated Asian immigrants (from Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and parts of India) have tended to leap-frog the areas of first settlement and move into areas where there is an ageing Anglo or earlier immigrant population who are leaving ‘empty-nest’ family homes for smaller apartments or retirement villages, or new developments on the edge of the metropolitan areas. However, within areas of first settlement, or more particularly economically stressed working-class areas where many different generations of immigrants live, pockets of quite intense concentration continue. Here two or even three generations of particular groups may live, marrying within the group and finding their emotional and economic needs met quite locally. Where communities focus around religious rituals they create large institutions that both draw people to them and hold them locally. This process intensifies in cities where public transport is poor and women for the most part do not drive or are otherwise restricted in their public movement. By 2006 a new discourse had surfaced in relation to African settlement. Extremist white power groups had targeted African refugee communities in Brisbane and Ipswich (once the heartland of Pauline Hanson’s political support), leafleting housing estates to raise the ire of white residents. In Melbourne, where the majority of African refugees were located, urban gangs began to emerge, drawing on US black power mottos and gangland culture. A study by the Sydney Centre for Refugee Research argued that these were not African problems, but rather issues generated by protracted displacement (Thorell 2007).

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However, Liberal Immigration Minister Kevin Andrews announced in October 2007 that African refugee intakes were to be cut, beginning with a total cessation of movement for those on the current accepted waiting list in camps in Africa. He argued that their failure to assimilate resulted in urban violence and that the inflow should be reduced until those already in Australia demonstrated their capacity to integrate. There was already a fairly large-scale settlement of refugee families in rural areas, where there were large government grants to help local bodies assist in their settlement, and regional employment programmes seeking their labour. In addition, many refugee families, especially those from the Sudan, had begun to move themselves out of the inner-city housing estates and resettle in rural agricultural districts, seeking thereby to distance themselves from the turmoil of inner-city drug cultures, and provide opportunities for their children in safer locales with more appropriate occupational demand. Andrews’s comments were seen as highly provocative (Melbourne Protests 2007) and some commentators saw them as an unsophisticated attempt to wedge the opposition Labor Party in the lead-up to the November 2007 federal election. Concerns about the settlement experiences of Africans – especially young men – were not so easily resolved. In November 2008 two Sudanese men were stabbed to death in a street brawl between African gangs in Adelaide.

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND SOCIAL DIVISION Ethno-religious conflict has a strong pedigree in Australia. Tension between the Anglican English, the Scots Protestants and Irish Catholics intertwines with the national narrative and flavours the most celebrated moments of national formation, such as the struggles over conscription in the First World War (an opposition led by a Catholic bishop). However, in recent years with inter-Christian tensions subdued, it has been the presence of other ethno-religious tendencies that has generated intense if sporadic tension. In the 1986–2006 period, while the major Christian denominations remained relatively stable in their proportions, new religious groups (especially evangelicals) had a greater rate of growth, while the irreligious have also increased. Non-Christian groups are dominated by Buddhists, with rapidly rising numbers of Muslims and Hindus and a static Jewish population. The debates over the position of women, the nature of modesty and the control of women’s sexuality have dominated public controversies over the place of Islam in secular Australia (Jakubowicz 2007a). Australia is a society that recognizes and facilitates religious belief, its secularity

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demonstrated in the separation of church and state. Even so, Australian governments work closely with religious institutions, using their services to provide education, health and welfare services and investing public funds in their sites of religious importance and rituals of religious celebration. In general, Australian governments have taken the view, in the last generation or so, that religious organizations provide a significant contribution to social cohesion and offer contexts for the elaboration of moral codes in a society that is increasingly commercialized and individualistic. For the most part Islamic institutions fit this model; they provide welfare and educational services and have benefited greatly from the privatization of health and welfare provision promoted by neoliberal governments of both political persuasions. The rage about the Muslim presence is most intense when proposals emerge for new Muslim institutions such as mosques or schools in previously non-Muslim neighbourhoods. Social geographer Kevin Dunn has documented this process, where local government has continually blocked such developments, giving planning grounds (usually traffic) as the rationale. Dunn concludes from his studies that such activities by local councils reflect widespread prejudices in the local community. Councils reframe the opposition, using professional criteria in order to deflect accusations of racism (and the potential for legal action under human rights legislation) (for example, Dunn 2005). In her study of what she calls the ‘Jihad Seminar’, Hanifa Deen (2008) examines the conflict between the Islamic Council of Victoria and Catch the Fire Ministries, an evangelical Christian group whose leadership came from South Asia (Jakubowicz 2007b). Ultimately the case slowed to a halt, both sides exhausted, angry, but unable to push forward an outcome that would allow further peace. In the end both sides agreed to apologize for any unintentional hurt, to pursue their beliefs in a civil manner, but not resile from their deepest beliefs. Deen argues that this was a victory for the sensibility of secularism.

CONCLUSION There is a curious ambiguity about inter-ethnic relations in Australia (Jakubowicz 2006). We can witness the emergence of a multicultural globalizing professional class espousing values of recognition and acceptance of difference. Close by there is a series of often fragmented communities created yet bypassed by globalization, turning inward and antagonistic to strangers. The global period since the end of the Soviet bloc reflects fragmentation as well; societies fragmented through war and genocide, lives bent and twisted by conflict and terror. These features rather than the

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cultural attributes of particular peoples underlie the current inter-group tensions in Australia. Government policy can do something about such tensions. Australian history demonstrates how easily government policies can exacerbate them and feed anger and hostility on all sides; in different Australian states similar tensions have had very different outcomes. Victoria, for instance, has had a lower level of tension (though not without violent incidents) than New South Wales. The presence of proactive government policies can alleviate anxieties and create opportunities for collaborative and creative solutions of problems. Their absence can intensify hostility and deepen social cleavages. In its first year in office the national Labor government spoke often of social inclusion, arguing from within the language of European social democracy for the participation of ‘all Australians’. The question that this rhetoric would pose but not answer would be fundamental for a society whose government had pledged to increase immigration and open itself up to the people of its region; would those on the edges be invited in to share the power at the centre? Would they be permitted to work equally with others in rewriting the script for the nation’s future? Or would they be expected, coerced and intimidated into falling into line in a narrative that they could not hope to affect.

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LEGISLATION

Anti-terrorism Act 2004 Anti-terrorism Act (No. 2) 2004 Anti-terrorism Act (No. 2) 2005 (includes sedition provisions) ASIO Legislation Amendment Act 2003 Australian Federal Police and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2004 Australian Protective Service Amendment Act 2003 Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 Border Security Legislation Amendment Act 2002 Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002 Criminal Code Amendment (Offences Against Australians) Act 2002 Criminal Code Amendment (Espionage and Related Matters) Act 2002 Criminal Code Amendment (Anti-hoax and Other Measures) Act 2002 Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Constitutional Reference of Power) Firearms and Crimes Legislation Amendment (Public Safety) Act 2003 (NSW) Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (Public Safety) Bill 2005 (NSW) Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 – allowed indefinite detention of unauthorized arrivals Migration Legislation Amendment (Application of Criminal Code) Act 2001 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002 Surveillance Devices Act 2004 Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act 2002

9.

Latinos, immigration and social cohesion in the United States David L. Leal1

The central focus of any discussion of immigration and social cohesion in the US today is the Latino population, which numbered 44.3 million people in 2006. This population is a diverse mix of families who have lived in the formerly Mexican territories of the US Southwest for many generations and larger numbers of more recent arrivals from Mexico, Central and South America and the Caribbean. Although immigration to the US has diversified considerably since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the public imagination and political debate tend to conflate Latinos with immigrants in general. Immigrants from Asia, Africa and other non-Western regions receive less attention, are the object of less concern, and are often contrasted positively with Latinos. When the INA was enacted in 1965 the official rhetoric was that it did not herald a dramatic shift in immigration policy. At the Act’s signing ceremony President Lyndon Johnson stated that ‘This bill . . . is not a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions. It will not reshape the structure of our daily lives’. Stemming in part from a desire to abolish the internationally embarrassing racial restrictions of the 1920s, and in part from the fact that immigration from Europe had declined far below its allotments, the INA instituted a preference system that prioritized family reunification and to some degree work-related skills. Whether Johnson’s statement was an innocent mistake or a deliberate effort at obfuscation, the reality was a renewal of immigration that would transform the US demographically. In 1970, for example, Mexican immigrants numbered about 200 000 less than immigrants from all of Europe. During the 1980s, however, the number of immigrants from Europe dropped dramatically while the number from Mexico increased by about 40 per cent. Over the four decades since the INA, only 14.3 per cent of immigrants have come from Europe. Currently, the largest share of immigrants (46.6 per cent) originates in the Americas,2 and a large share is now from Asia (32.8 per cent). Migration from Africa, which totalled about 132

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71 000 people in the 1970s, grew to over half a million in the first seven years of the twenty-first century, and migration from the Middle East has also increased steadily. These figures do not count the large number of unauthorized migrants living in the US which the Department of Homeland Security estimated at 11.8 million in 2007.3 During the 2000s this figure increased by 3.3 million individuals, an average annual increase of almost half a million. Of the total number of unauthorized migrants in the US, approximately seven million (59 per cent) are from Mexico. Of the top ten countries from which both legal immigrants and unauthorized migrants come, six are in the Western Hemisphere: Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Brazil and Ecuador. The total number of Latino immigrants and migrants from nine Latin American sending countries, not including Mexico, is almost 1.7 million. Given the growing and increasingly diverse US immigrant population, issues of integration and social cohesion have much immediacy. As Gary Freeman (1995) pointed out, immigration politics are complex and crosscutting, with interest groups and elites playing prominent roles. This helps to explain why, according to most public opinion surveys, the citizens of Western countries do not obtain the immigration policies they want. Since 1965, US laws and policies have greatly changed both the total flow of immigrants and their ethnic makeup. Recent laws have made life more difficult for unauthorized migrants and even legal immigrants. Forced removals (not including voluntary departures) of unauthorized migrants have increased considerably – from 30 039 in 1990 to 208 521 in 2005 (Terrazas 2008; Terrazas et al. 2008). It is not clear, however, that the American public favours this response to unauthorized migration. When asked to choose in the 2006 election exit poll between deportation and a path to legalization for ‘illegal’ migrants, 57 per cent chose the latter (Leal et al. 2008). This chapter focuses on the place of Latinos in American society today. It assesses the extent of their integration, as well as their continuing ethnic distinctiveness and identity. Although the degree to which other immigrant communities, such as Muslims and Asians, are becoming integrated is an important dimension of American society’s cohesion, the situation of Latinos is its overriding aspect.

THE TREATMENT OF LATINOS The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican-American War in 1848 and ceded Arizona, New Mexico, California and other parts

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of northern Mexico to the US. Since then, prejudice against Mexican ancestry and other Latino peoples has been an unfortunate reality in the southwestern US. Individuals who had formerly been Mexicans faced economic, social and political discrimination in the war’s wake, but the border with Mexico remained virtually unregulated and people continued to move between the two countries unhindered. In 1917 the US began to require immigration documents at border crossings, a practice that created ‘illegal’ migration (Portes and Bach 1985). In 1924 Congress created the Border Patrol. More generally, legislation during the 1920s instituted a racially based system for immigration, although certain exceptions were made for immigrants from the Americas because of their importance to US agriculture and other business. The US approach to Mexican and broader Latino immigration has been multifaceted and it has varied with the economic climate. Congress has repeatedly been forced to mediate between business needs for labour and public qualms about the immigrant population growing too rapidly. When the economic depression of the 1930s was impending, the US State Department used its discretionary authority to bar Mexican entry, and laws enacted during 1929 led to the deportation, imprisonment or fining of persons who crossed the border without documentation, criminalizing such crossings for the first time (Lorey 1999; Massey et al., 2002; Portes and Bach 1985). As many as two million people of Mexican ancestry were deported or strongly ‘encouraged’ to leave the US during the Depression years. Significant numbers of them were US citizens, including many US-born children of Mexican immigrants (Guskin and Wilson 2007). During the next 50 years, however, the US and Mexican governments tolerated unauthorized Mexican entry and sometimes actively recruited Mexican workers to meet the needs of south-western agriculture and railroads across the country for inexpensive labour (Andreas 2000; Portes and Bach 1985). During the Second World War this need for labour resulted in the Bracero program – officially, the 1943 Emergency Farm Labor Program – which provided workplace and wage guarantees and temporary residence for Mexican workers. The programme continued until 1964, although in 1954 ‘Operation Wetback’ entailed immigration sweeps throughout the south-west that resulted in the deportation of perhaps a million Mexican-origin people. By the early 1980s anti-immigrant sentiment had again become conspicuous. In 1986 the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was crafted as a compromise between pro- and anti-immigration groups (Massey et al., 2002). It created a process through which unauthorized migrants continuously living in the US since 1982 could become legal residents. About three million such persons were ‘regularized’

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under IRCA provisions, more than anticipated. The Act simultaneously enhanced border controls and instituted sanctions against employers who hired undocumented workers (although the latter were not vigorously enforced). Today, when legal immigrants and unauthorized migrants are readily visible in large cities and many small communities, a significant part of the American public feels threatened by the social and cultural changes immigration is believed to bring. Official efforts to control immigration often feature rhetorical and symbolic gestures aimed at reassuring a nervous public, even though these gestures rarely accomplish their stated goals (Andreas 2000) and may have reached a point of diminishing political returns. The relationship between the US and Mexico has become closer but also more fraught during the past two decades. In 1994, the year in which the two countries, along with Canada, inaugurated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), California passed Proposition 187, which was designed to deny social services, health care and public education to unauthorized migrants, although it was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. In addition, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act – known by the public as ‘welfare reform’ – reduced eligibility for federal public benefits for legal permanent residents as well as unauthorized immigrants. Also in 1996 Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which contained provisions that increased border control enforcement, mandated increased penalties for illegal entry and the overstaying of visas, and imposed more rigorous criteria for confirming the eligibility of persons applying for employment. Beyond these federal efforts, legislation at state and local levels created a patchwork of immigrant restrictions that has addressed everything from eligibility for social services to eligibility for renting apartments.

RACE AND IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES Focusing solely on immigrants and immigration ignores a fundamental and longstanding factor in US group relations, namely, African Americans and the politics of race. America has seen longstanding discrimination against African Americans intermixed with suspicions of recent immigrants. American conceptions of racial identification are important in this context. The US has a long history of insisting that individuals either are or are not white. Even ‘one drop of blood’ could lead historically to classifying a person as black, and this was important in a society where political and social rights were for centuries apportioned by race.

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This US racial ‘black-white paradigm’ means that many immigrants face the reality of being identified as white or non-white. During the nineteenth century Anglo-Saxon was a more exclusive category than the contemporary ‘Anglo’ term implies. For example, the Irish were initially racialized as non-white by Anglo-Saxons and they were clearly viewed as inferior people. Irish immigrants responded with a variety of tactics for acculturating and securing political and economic power. In addition to labour unions and the Roman Catholic Church, one of the instruments for Irish social mobility was anti-black prejudice. By drawing a distinction between themselves and African Americans – sometimes violently – Irish immigrants and their descendants were able to ‘become white’. As Noel Ignatiev (1995, p. 1) observed, ‘an oppressed race in Ireland . . . became part of an oppressing race in America’. Other Central, Southern and Eastern European immigrants also had to strive to become recognized as ‘white’. While it is clearly possible to see US race relations as improving over time – from slavery to Jim Crow to civil rights to Barack Obama4 – the need to navigate the USA’s racial shoals is still a reality for Latino immigrants. Many commentators ask if Latinos will ultimately become an assimilating immigrant group similar to the ‘ethnic’ migrants of the past, or a ‘racialized’ minority group similar to African Americans. One controversial exploration of this question is Skerry (1993, p. 9), who argued that ‘the critical, overriding question regarding MexicanAmerican politics does concern race. Will Mexican Americans define themselves as traditional ethnic immigrants or as victims of racial discrimination?’ He argues they cannot decide and are therefore ‘ambivalent’ (the subtitle of his book is ‘The Ambivalent Minority’). He blames Latino leaders and government institutions for urging Mexican Americans to claim a minority, victim status in order to benefit from policies such as affirmative action. Others note that while many Mexicans and Latinos may be relatively recent immigrants, they ‘entered an environment where Mexicans were already a subordinated enemy’ (de la Garza 1994, p. 461) and that ‘Mexican immigrants were not allowed to develop their own identity as were European immigrants’ (de la Garza 1994, p. 461). Montejano (1994, p. 357) finds it ironic to see Mexicans as immigrants in cities like San Antonio and Los Angeles. More generally, some have taken issue with the claim that Mexican Americans (and Latinos more generally) must somehow choose between two identities. Responding to Skerry, Montejano (1994, p. 357) argued that ‘this book may reflect the poverty of American political science theory, unable to go beyond its East Coast paradigm of assimilating European immigrants, unable to recognize that

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in the West there is something different’. Nevertheless, Skerry raised important questions and illustrated the identification issues that immigrants face, and have long faced, almost from the moment they cross the border.

MARKERS OF LATINO INTEGRATION The belief that Latinos are decidedly different from previous, mainly European immigrant communities is a strong rallying cry for Americans who oppose their presence and a further increase in their numbers. It is argued that earlier waves of immigrants, such as Italian, Irish and Polish, travelled great distances and were largely cut off from their home countries. European immigrants are seen in hindsight to have made a clean break with their homelands and to have acculturated to the US in a ‘sink or swim’ manner, while shedding their cultural identities as quickly as possible. This of course greatly simplifies the earlier immigration experience. Up to a third of immigrants from some European countries eventually returned home, and it is doubtful that first-generation European migrants learned English and other aspects of American life as effortlessly as many imagine today. Foreign-language newspapers were common throughout the US and bilingual, even monolingual, foreign-language instruction was common in schools attended by immigrants from Germany and other Central European countries during the nineteenth century. Immigrant enclaves and ‘political machines’ rooted in them were conspicuous in urban areas. It is important to keep in mind the reality, not the romantic image, of past immigration in order to make useful comparisons with the present. It is often said that a difference between the past and present is that immigration to the US today, especially from Mexico and Latin America, is more or less continuous. By contrast, the third wave of immigration from Europe that began in the nineteenth century had a clear ending point – the commencement of the First World War, which closed borders and made trans-Atlantic travel highly dangerous. Recalling this sudden ending of the third immigration wave, we might question the widespread assumption that recent and current high levels of Latin American immigration to the US will continue indefinitely. Indeed, there is some evidence that Latin American immigration has slowed because of the severe US economic downturn that took hold in 2007–08. Similar caution is warranted when discussing the question of whether recent Latino immigrants are more reluctant to learn English than were

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earlier immigrants. As of 2006, 26 states in the US had adopted laws making English their ‘official’ language, and some local governments have also done this. This does not negate federal legislation and court rulings on the subject, so bilingual ballots and other language protections stemming from the Voting Rights Act amendments are not endangered. However, such state and local measures are a clear indication that significant elements of the voting public are disturbed by the presence of nonEnglish speakers and believe that the status of English must somehow be protected. Survey research suggests that the public largely favours adding an ‘official English’ amendment to the US Constitution, albeit this differs somewhat according to race and ethnicity, but efforts to do this have failed. Census data indicate that the US is becoming more diverse linguistically. Not only has Spanish long been the language most frequently spoken besides English, but Spanish speakers more than doubled, as a proportion of the total US population, between 1980 and 2005 – from 5.3 per cent to 12 per cent. During those 25 years no other non-English language was spoken by more than 1 per cent of the American population, though a large increase in the use of Chinese and other Asian languages has taken place. For many Americans the widespread use of languages other than English is not a potential national resource but an indication that immigrants do not want to assimilate and wish to remain outside the society’s mainstream. There was, for example, a public uproar when the National Anthem was translated into Spanish. In fact, the majority of Latinos say that they face discrimination based on language more than on the bases of skin colour, income, education or legal status (Hakimzadeh and Cohn 2007). Recent immigrants clearly understand the benefits of learning English, however. Farkas et al. (2003) found that the vast majority of all recent immigrants (85 per cent) believe it is ‘hard to get a good job or do well in this country without learning English’, and 90 per cent agreed strongly or somewhat with the proposition that ‘Immigrants who speak good English have a much easier time in the US’. The 1989–90 Latino National Political Survey found that 90.1 per cent of Latinos agreed or strongly agreed with the statement ‘All citizens of the United States should learn English’. It is important to note the generational dimension in English-language acquisition. First-generation and language-minority immigrants of any nationality in any of the historical waves of immigration to the US lived predominantly in ethnic enclaves and struggled to learn English (Lacy 2007). But English has always been less of a barrier for second and subsequent generations. Although less than one in four (23 per cent) firstgeneration adult Latino immigrants self-report that they speak English

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‘very well’, by the second generation 88 per cent of Latino adults are fluent in English and by the third generation 94 per cent speak it ‘very well’ (Hakimzadeh and Cohn 2007). Virtually all Americans consider learning English to be important, with little difference between races and ethnic groups. A 2002 Kaiser/Pew national survey asked: ‘Do you think adult (Hispanic/Latino) immigrants need to learn to speak English to succeed in the US or can they succeed even if they only speak Spanish?’ Latinos and Anglos answered at similar rates that English is important for success – 89.0 and 88.9 per cent, respectively, while African Americans answered affirmatively at a slightly higher rate – 92.6 per cent. What about Latino views of the US and American values? The most comprehensive research shows very high levels of patriotism and support for basic American political and economic values. Even recent immigrants who primarily speak Spanish hold such views (De la Garza et al. 1996). In addition, research indicates that while Latino voting patterns and opinions differ from those of Anglos, they do not do so in any fundamental way. Leal et al. (2005) have found that while Latinos are more likely than Anglos to vote for Democrats, the votes of both electoral segments track in parallel ways. Candidates who are generally popular do better among both segments of voters, while candidates who are generally less popular do less well among both. In terms of public opinion, Latinos generally express more liberal policy preferences (Leal 2007), but Latinos and Anglos generally prioritize the same set of issues – education, the economy, jobs, the Iraq war and terrorism – although their respective solutions to policy problems differ somewhat. Another marker of integration is the relatively high rate at which Latinos enlist in the US armed forces, even in recent years when the Pentagon has experienced difficulty meeting some of its enlistment targets. The US military will probably become increasingly Latino in its composition, albeit with some variation by service branch (for example, Latinos appear to favour the Marine Corps). Still another indicator of integration is marriage across ethnic and racial lines. According to the census, 14 per cent of married Latinos have a nonLatino spouse. A Pew survey asked respondents if an immediate member of their family was in an interracial marriage.5 Twenty-seven per cent of Latinos answered that this was so, compared with 37 per cent of African Americans and 17 per cent of whites. On the other hand, there are obstacles – some of them potentially quite serious – to Latino integration. A 2008 national survey of Latinos by the Pew Hispanic Center found growing Latino insecurity in the political climate.6 Among the specific findings:

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‘Half of all Latinos say that the situation of Latinos in this country is worse now than it was a year ago’ and this perception is especially common among Latino immigrants (63 per cent). Almost 10 per cent of Latino adults – including both citizens (8 per cent) and immigrants (11 per cent) – reported that they were asked by the police or other officials about their immigration status. About 15 per cent of Latinos reported difficulties during the previous year in finding or keeping a job because of their ethnicity. One of every ten reported similar difficulties in finding or keeping housing.

There is also evidence of growing Latino residential and educational segregation. According to an analysis of census data by the Lewis Mumford Center: Hispanics and Asians are considerably less segregated than African Americans. But as their numbers grew rapidly in the last twenty years, there has been no change in their level of segregation. As a result, these groups now live in more isolated settings than they did in 1980, with a smaller proportion of white residents in their neighborhoods. This trend is the same in both cities and suburbs. (Lewis Mumford Center 2001)

As regards education, the Harvard Civil Rights Project found an increase in the segregation of Latino students during the last 30 years (Frankenberg et al., 2003). During the 2000–01 academic year, for example, only 23 per cent of Latinos’ classmates were not Latinos.7

A NATION OF TRIBES? It is difficult to statistically compare the isolation of today’s immigrants with that of immigrants of 100 years ago. In recent years the above-noted data regarding school and neighbourhood segregation show that both indicators of isolation appear to be increasing for Latinos. In addition, a study of the ‘Dissimilarity Index’ found that while Latinos became much more widely dispersed across the US counties during the 1990s, their segregation increased at the neighbourhood level (Kandel and Cromartie 2003). It is not easy to hold, however, that Latinos see themselves as more isolated than earlier immigrants did, because Latino influence in American popular culture and politics is readily observable. In a country where salsa has long outsold ketchup, it is difficult to argue that Latino migrants feel more isolated than did Irish or Polish immigrants a century ago. In

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addition, the presence of well-established Latino communities and place names mitigates at least some feelings of isolation. However, despite the long Latino presence in the US, especially in states that were once part of Mexico, one recent development is that a growing number of Latino immigrants live today in places that have been inhabited historically by few Latinos. Such locations may create feelings of isolation among the Latinos who live in them, most notably physical isolation in their housing locations. Many Latino immigrants arrive in these ‘new destination’ areas either as a first stop or after an initial stop in one of the more traditional Latino locales. There is evidence of this in the 2000 Census, which shows the Latino population to have increased fastest in states such as North Carolina, Tennessee, and Iowa. It is also the case that Latinos are increasingly an urban and suburban population. Although many view Latinos as agricultural workers who follow the harvest, this is an accurate perception of a rapidly decreasing proportion of Latinos. While Latino immigrants may be regarded as a revitalizing force in some locales, the receptions they receive in others are less positive. Although many ‘farming dependent’ counties in the US are losing population, a recent report by the US Department of Agriculture shows that Latinos constituted 25 per cent of rural population growth in the 1990s, and many ‘heartland’ counties would have experienced net population declines without Latino influxes (ibid. 2003). The report also noted that Latino migration to rural areas can have positive economic effects, although the immigrants may tax local services such as schools and social services, and depress wages in these localities.

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND SOCIAL DIVISION Latinos are overwhelmingly Christian and mostly Roman Catholic. About 70 per cent are Catholic, and the figure is higher still for immigrants from Latin America. Some conversions to Protestantism are occurring, particularly among second- and third-generation Latinos. These conversions are typically to Pentecostal and evangelical faiths, often practised in storefront churches. Such conversions may serve to lower social divisions because they bring Latinos into a wider range of religious space. New Latino immigrants enter a country with a Latino population that has been connected to the Catholic Church for centuries and is increasingly central to the Church’s mission. By some estimates, the American Catholic Church will be almost 60 per cent Latino by 2030. This means that a church traditionally anchored by European third wave immigrants and their descendants will be quantitatively and qualitatively transformed

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by the growing Latino population. As the Catholic Church became more interested in social justice and immigration issues during the twentieth century, it was an increasingly important resource for Latinos (Leal 2008). The church is now one of the few institutional voices in American political life arguing in favour of humane treatment of immigrants and criticizing enforcement-only approaches. Latino immigrants therefore now benefit from arriving in a country with an established and salient religious faith that has significant institutional influence and power. Accordingly, immigration advocates often call attention to the religiosity of Latinos when countering claims that they are somehow different or alien. Are not family-oriented and church-attending immigrants, they ask, the epitome of American values? While intolerance based on religion, especially in the immigration realm, had decreased significantly by the end of the twentieth century, some renewed, if relatively short-lived, intolerance towards immigrants and long-time residents based on religion appeared to surface after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the first month after 9/11 the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee gathered more than 700 reports of discrimination and the Council on American-Islamic Relations received 785 reports of hate crimes against Muslims and Arabs. By 2003, six lawsuits that alleged discrimination because of an employee’s ‘Islamic beliefs and . . . Arabic appearance’ had been filed with the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2003). However, US public opinion has not turned against the Islamic religion or Middle Eastern immigrants in the manner of some other western nations.

LATINO IMMIGRATION AFTER 9/11 Although one might have expected that the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington would increase restrictions on immigrants from the Middle East, this did not generally happen. For instance, Salehyan (2008) examined asylum and refugee admissions from Muslim nations and found no evidence of backlash or bias. In fact, one can argue that the practical effects of the reaction to 9/11 have been felt mainly by Latinos and persons at the US-Mexico border. Some US government officials and parts of the public regard unauthorized migration across the border as a security threat, and this has embroiled Latino immigration issues in security concerns. But to date the only reported post-9/11 cross-border terrorist plot occurred at the US-Canada border, with the crossing of a ‘millennium bomber’ who was allegedly planning to attack Los Angeles Airport.

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Nevertheless, a study of the Congressional Record for 2004 found that members of Congress associated Mexico with terrorist threats via immigration six times more often than they perceived such threats coming from Canada (Espino and Jimeno 2005). Some claim that anti-immigration advocates are using 9/11 as a pretext for advancing long-standing items on their wish list of tighter immigration controls. It is now commonly claimed that important changes have taken place in American immigration policy, particularly involving Mexican migration and the US-Mexico border. These include a growing fortification of the border in terms of barriers and personnel; a growing number of forcible deportations; greater interior enforcement; growing state and local enforcement of federal immigration laws; and restrictions on identification documents. Waslin (2008, p. 48) argued that such changes have ‘had an extremely harmful effect on the country’s Latino population’. She also noted that ‘the US moved from the brink of comprehensive immigration reform to enacting immigration policies based on national security concerns’ (Waslin 2008, p. 30). It is important not to mistake policy inputs with outcomes, however. As noted previously, Andreas (2000) found a symbolic effort at border control that emphasizes dollars spent and programmatic activities, though the reality of large-scale migration has been little changed. But even symbolic efforts to assure the public that the border is under control can have negative consequences for some migrants, exemplified by the deaths of hundreds of migrants who have attempted to enter the US by crossing the Arizona desert. All in all, continuity, not change, is the most conspicuous feature of US immigration policy post-9/11. Labour is still needed, migrants are still waved across the border by the invisible hand of Adam Smith, and those primarily willing to take the risk of crossing are the young, able-bodied men and women that the US economy needs.

COMPARISONS WITH AUSTRALIA Several key factors distinguish the Australian case, as discussed by Andrew Jakubowicz, this volume, from the US case. First, Australia’s official policy of multiculturalism sounds odd to American ears. Although there has been much discussion about multiculturalism in the US, it remains a vague and undefined concept for the public and for US governments alike. American proponents and opponents of multiculturalism often construe it in quite different ways. In fact, the term ‘diversity’ appears to be superseding ‘multiculturalism’, though ‘diversity’ is not precisely or commonly construed either.

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Second, and unlike in Australia, only a small minority of Americans seem greatly concerned about Muslim or Middle East immigrants. Despite 9/11, the focus of anti-immigrant concerns among Americans is Latinos and the US-Mexico border. While the ‘War on Terror’ is an important political issue, it is largely regarded as something that takes place overseas. According to a recent Pew survey, 58 per cent of the American public reports knowing either ‘not much’ or ‘nothing’ about Islam.8 About 15 per cent express positive impressions, with 30 per cent holding negative views. The public is also more positive towards ‘Muslim Americans’ (53 per cent) than ‘Muslims’ (43 per cent).9 About Muslim Americans themselves, another Pew study10 has found that ‘Muslim Americans reject Islamic extremism by larger margins than do Muslim minorities in Western European countries’ (although there are some variations). However, just over half (53 per cent) believe that ‘it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the United States since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks’ and most see increased government surveillance measures that single out Muslims. Nevertheless, they ‘express generally positive views of American society’ and only 18 per cent claim to have experienced discrimination. Muslim immigrants also report attitudes toward the US that are very similar to those of the overall American population, and when compared to Muslims in Europe they are more socioeconomically embedded in the society’s mainstream. It must be kept in mind, however, that the Muslim population in the US is quite small. The Pew report ‘Muslim Americans: middle class and mostly mainstream’ estimated it at 2.35 million individuals, which is less than 1 per cent of the American population.11 Views of Muslim Americans are further complicated by the fact that they are of two types: Muslims of Middle Eastern nativity and native-born Americans, some of whom are AfricanAmerican converts to Islam. The Pew report found that about two-thirds of Muslims were born abroad and about 20 per cent of the native born are African Americans. In its American usage, therefore, ‘Islam’ is as likely to connote the Nation of Islam as immigrants from the Middle East.

CONCLUSION Latinos are the fastest growing major demographic group in the US. Due both to immigration and childbirth, they constitute a growing share of the US population and are responsible for much of its population growth. But while the foreign-born proportion of the population is increasing markedly, it has not yet reached record levels. In the 2000 Census the foreignborn share (not including children born overseas to American parents)

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was 11.1 per cent. This was an increase over the proportions recorded in the 1990 Census (7.9 per cent), 1980 (6.2 per cent) and 1970 (4.7 per cent). The record high (after the mid-nineteenth century) was 14.7 per cent in 1910, reflecting the third wave of immigration. While the 1965 immigration reforms created much more diverse flows of immigrants to the US, public and political concerns about immigration have focused predominantly on Latinos. Almost all policy making and political rhetoric centres on Latino immigration and the Latino population more generally. Anti-immigration concerns often appear to be thinly veiled anti-Latino sentiments. ‘Nativists’ have long made negative claims and assumptions about immigrants, regardless of their countries of origin, and anti-immigrant views tend to be quite similar across time and groups. In the early American Republic, Benjamin Franklin believed that Germans ‘will never adopt our language or customs’ and would ‘Germanize’ the US (Fraga and Segura 2006, p. 280). Subsequent US history proved Franklin’s fears unwarranted, but similar fears continue and are now applied to Latinos. It is sometimes noted, for example, that Mexican nationals living legally in the US have a low rate of naturalization, and this is used to suggest that they are disinclined for cultural or political reasons to become Americans. However, it is rarely noted that Canadians living in the US have comparably low naturalization rates. This suggests that geographic proximity to one’s home country, not more abstract explanations, is the underlying cause. In contrast to Australia, the US has never adopted national multicultural policies to address immigrant integration issues, leaving this instead to a wide variety of private and public institutions and individuals. While Latino segregation in the US is increasing according to some measures that suggest problems for social cohesion, Latino populations are now found in many locales that previously had few if any Latinos. From the deep South to the rural Midwest, Latino communities are putting down roots across the US. While this creates some tensions between Latinos, Anglos, and African Americans in the short run, in the longer term Latinos will increasingly be part of everyday American life and society. In addition, a growing body of evidence indicates that Latino political and cultural values do not differ significantly from those of most other Americans. While continual immigration can draw attention away from the achievements of earlier generations, Latinos are successfully acculturating and pose no threat to American values and institutions. Although nativist sentiments will no doubt surface sporadically, the growing Latino electorate – and a more tolerant overall electorate than many politicians have foreseen – may preclude the effective use of immigration as a wedge issue in political contests. At present there is early

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evidence that the recent national immigration fever is breaking. The 2006 and 2008 elections recorded no gains for anti-immigrant politicians and, in fact, several of the most prominent ones were defeated. Following the 2008 elections, large Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress, together with Barack Obama’s presidency, suggest that immigration policy reforms focusing on enforcement-only provisions are off the table. While comprehensive immigrant reform may or may not move forward in Congress, a plausible future is one with declining public interest in immigration issues, especially if unauthorized immigration declines because of the recession. This might work to ‘lower the temperature’ of immigration politics and thereby promote social cohesion and help America transition to its inevitable future – a society with a declining Anglo share and growing Latino cultural and political presence.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Thanks to Jill Strube for research assistance with this chapter. Less than 3 per cent are from Canada and Newfoundland. Note that this figure is based on an estimate of the undercount of the unauthorized. Doubling this rate from 10 to 20 per cent would increase the total unauthorized figure to 13.3 million. Although see Klinkner and Smith (1999), who find that progress is episodic and sometimes reversed. http://pewresearch.org/pubs/304/guess-whos-coming-to-dinner, accessed 1 December 2008. http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=93, accessed 1 December 2008. For African American students the corresponding figures are 32 per cent in 1970, 36 per cent in 1980 and 31 per cent in 2000. http://pewforum.org/surveys/religionviews07/, accessed 1 December 2008. This is not to deny the impact on the Muslim-American community by changes in security laws and procedures in the post-9/11 era. See Jamal (2008) for additional discussion of the Pew survey and Muslim-American politics more generally. http://pewforum.org/surveys/muslim-american/, accessed 1 December 2008. http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf, accessed 1 January 2009.

10.

Immigrant settlement, ethnic relations and multiculturalism in Australia James Jupp

Immigration policy is developed on two different dimensions. One is rational and pragmatic, responding to labour market needs and to population trends. Immigrants are treated essentially as factors of production, with desired skills and capacities, and as younger and healthier additions for static or slowing population. Larger markets need larger labour forces, as do improved services and infrastructure. This economically rational dimension of policy has been increasingly stressed by Australia and Canada in recent years. Immigrants are chosen for their skills and employment potential. This approach denies the validity of distinctions based on ‘race, colour or creed’, as the old formula has it. The discriminatory factors are age, health, education and language facility. Economists usually have the greatest input into this aspect of policy, followed by demographers. The greatest pressure from outside the policy-making professions comes from employers. In the recent past Australia has markedly increased its intake based on these factors to a level of about 190 000 a year and is aiming to increase its temporary resident intake still further, with a special emphasis on skilled labour and students. The current world economic crisis threatens this policy. However, immigration also introduces new elements into society who may well be different in terms of ‘race, colour or creed’ or simply, like Catholics or Southern Europeans, be regarded popularly as different. In the Australian colonial days, when the labour force was predominantly manual and relatively unskilled, popular prejudices were vitally important in determining selection policy. Analysing these politically controversial and potentially disruptive aspects requires a comparative understanding of race relations, human behaviour and sociology. Unlike the economic approach, outcomes are less predictable and depend on imponderables such as political leadership, media impact, historical traditions and unforeseen consequences. Certainly in Australia this aspect of immigration has 147

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been unevenly studied and has had most impact on popular prejudices and opinions rather than social science analysis. In any case many politicians and public servants have no training in the necessary disciplines, being more likely to be educated as lawyers, teachers, journalists or economists and very sceptical of sociology, history or even political science. The greatest pressures on this dimension come from the general public and the media and can be negative. A well-developed inheritance of the social sciences is not necessarily the answer to developing rational and evidence-based policy and practice. Comparing the US and Australia is instructive. US immigration policy is far more muddled and troubled than that of Australia, often through no fault of its own. The US is among the most multicultural societies on earth and also the goal of a larger and more varied immigrant intake than anywhere else. Australia is a remote and often unknown quantity, has no land borders and is unlikely to suffer the ‘opening of the flood gates’ so popular in public discourse over the past century. The comparison is between a world power with 15 times the population of Australia and at least 20 times the economic strength, and a consciously restrictive Western outpost determined to exercise detailed control over ‘who comes to Australia and under what circumstances’, as former prime minister John Howard memorably expressed it.

SIMILAR BUT NOT THE SAME The ethnic, political and social situation in the US and Australia differs considerably. Unfortunately American experience often colours and even corrupts public debate in Australia, especially around the concepts of multiculturalism, assimilation and integration. Australian popular culture and intellectual life are heavily influenced from the US – the converse is scarcely true! At the popular level, however, the US and Britain were frequently held up as horrible examples of what might happen in Australia if strict control over immigration were to be relaxed. These arguments can be traced back well into the nineteenth century for America and since the 1950s for Britain. American race relations were not dominated by immigration but by a slave population numbering a majority in several southern states which made its experience quite different from that of Australia. Britain freely allowed subjects of the British Empire to settle without restriction until the 1960s was irrelevant to White Australia, where strict physical criteria and total exclusion had been applied since 1901. In other words, Australia, Britain and the US had quite different ethnic histories (Bouchard 2008; MacLeod 2006). Arguments from one to another were

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illegitimate, however popular, because all three societies were superficially similar but were not the same. The US has whole areas and even cities which are not dominated by citizens of British origin, such as Hawaii, New Mexico, Mississippi, Louisiana and, increasingly, California. Australia does not. While Sydney and Melbourne are now cosmopolitan cities – which they were not before the 1950s – they are scarcely in the same league of ethnic variety as New York, Chicago or Los Angeles. Australia does not have an ‘English only’ movement (and indeed offers official translations in 16 languages) because English is not under numerical threat anywhere. Australia does not have one-ethnicity ghettoes but multicultural suburbs, in all but a handful of which English is the majority language and where living conditions are far better and violence far less than in many US counterparts. What both countries do have are small indigenous communities (Aborigines and Native Americans) which have some similar problems but which Australians agonise over to a much greater extent than do Americans. But these communities in the US and Canada normally have some treaty status and rights, which indigenous Australians lack.

MAINTAINING THE FOUNDING CULTURE Race relations were combustible in the US as a result of long-term relationships, which is not true in Australia except in Aboriginal affairs. Lynching, Jim Crow laws, rioting leading to deaths, denial of the franchise and the KKK were not part of the Australian scene. Radical academics have tried to make it so and there are elements in Aboriginal history that certainly justify the term ‘genocide’. Rioting against Chinese miners took place between 1850 and 1890 but, as far as research can show, few deaths occurred and the army and police were called in to restore order with considerable success. What Australia did have was an exclusive immigration policy that preserved British and Irish hegemony to a much greater extent than was possible in the US. Indeed this White Australia policy (1880s–1960s) was justified precisely on the grounds that it prevented the regrettable tensions of the US. There was limited repression and violent hostility against the Chinese, but they were few and widely scattered. Jewish communities were also much smaller than in the US, being treated with ‘neither toleration nor favour’ as Israel Getzler put it. Jews were active in party politics, with four in the first Commonwealth parliament in 1901 but only two today in a larger assembly. Australia has historically been a more peaceful and ordered society than the US in many ways, and ethnic relationships have been correspondingly muted. However, being

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of recent British origins, most Australians shared with other Englishspeaking peoples a number of engrained prejudices. The English and Irish were strongly prejudiced against each other for over a century. In both countries about 27 per cent of the population are Catholics and in both they are now comparably represented in elected legislatures from both major parties – having historically been attached to the US Democratic Party and the Australian Labor Party. Prejudices remained into the 1950s, when a major rift in the Australian Labor Party drove many Catholics in a more conservative direction. Today Catholics are as likely to be in a Liberal as in a Labor cabinet. Catholics and Jews have lived in Australia and the US for many generations and this has tended to modify prejudice. What Australia and the US faced in the twentieth century was an influx, real and potential, of new and different ethnicities, which aroused new prejudices with each wave. Governments have had to respond to public opinion by reconsidering immigration policy towards these new elements, which often arrive in large numbers over short periods unless prevented. Long-term policies of exclusion included the ‘national quota’ system of the US between 1924 and 1965 and the White Australia policy between 1901 and 1973. Both Australia and the US had already instituted legislation to exclude the Chinese in the 1880s. Australia was to follow this up in 1901 with the deportation of Pacific Islanders who had been recruited to the Queensland sugar-cane fields. Between 1831 and 1983 Australia, but not the US, provided free or assisted passages to immigrants from the UK. These were limited to British subjects (excluding ‘coloured’) until the post-war admission of Displaced Persons between 1947 and 1953 and the signing of agreements with European states between 1951 and 1970. Essentially this maintained a ‘British’ society, if one strained by Protestant/Catholic tensions, just as White Australia preserved a British society by keeping others out. Both countries adopted policy favouring people like themselves – or at least like the dominant ethnicities, which were British and Irish. Over a long period this consolidated their societies around the ‘founding nations’, who might otherwise have been swamped by ‘aliens’. The US had the larger problem, as for almost a century it had freely admitted very large numbers of immigrants from impoverished rural societies in Southern and Eastern Europe. The expectation that assimilation would change the character of these ‘backward people’ over time was less realistic than in Australia, where they formed very small and isolated groups in a predominantly British society. Consequently the US has adopted a more vigorous approach to the ‘melting pot’, emphasizing national history and symbols, consciously using the public school system to instil Americanism, and publicly subscribing to the notion that God favoured the US among

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nations and that the US had a mission to spread its influence and ideals as widely as possible. Australians, in contrast, remained British subjects until the middle of the twentieth century. They have rather modest national aspirations except in the field of competitive sport.

IMMIGRATION AND THE NATION STATE Having created a multicultural society through slavery, an open Mexican and Canadian border and mass immigration from anywhere in Europe, the US then set about the massive task of turning its varied peoples into Americans, with equal rights, a common language, common loyalties and a uniform culture. Many Americans believe these aims have been achieved; others remain sceptical. Australians were just emerging from a self-description as ‘overseas Britons’ when they began to change their society though immigration policies that became increasingly universalized in ethnic terms after 1973. In practice Australia continued to favour the British for another decade and had become so alarmed at growing arrivals from Europe that a ‘Bring out a Briton’ campaign was begun in 1957. After a brief boom, British migration kept sinking to an all-time low of less than 10 per cent of the total by 1999. New Zealanders continued to arrive free of restrictions, but even this intake included large numbers of Maori and Samoans. As in the US, by the 1980s immigrants no longer came from European sources but from what was still called the ‘Third World’. Australia was certainly not the ‘most multicultural country in the world’ as its politicians frequently claimed. But it had rapidly become more so, just as the US had 50 years before. Both Australia and the US have, at various times and in various ways, faced a central dilemma of the nation state (Joppke 1999). This relatively modern form of statehood assumed a uniform culture as the basis for uniform laws and common allegiance. Full uniformity was rarely achieved. Only modernized states aspired to it. The perceived dilemma remained that if languages, religions and cultures remained distinct and were free to do so in liberal democracies, this might undermine the cohesion of the nation state and threaten its disintegration into what Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey called ‘a nation of warring tribes’. This dilemma becomes even more acute when public policy not only allows, but encourages, the arrival through immigration of an ever more varied population (Kymlicka and Norman 2000). As immigration control is characteristic of the nation state, governments must bear full responsibility for this dilemma. The US had avoided the issue by allowing relatively free entry while it built its economy and military power between

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1790 and 1925. The entry of slaves and then of Chinese was prohibited, but others were free to settle until 1920. Britain similarly allowed free entry for British subjects, who constituted one-quarter of the world under the British Empire, and this principle was not abandoned until 1962. Most others could enter freely until the Aliens Act of 1905 was introduced in the face of large Jewish immigration from the Russian empire. The economic expansion of Britain and the US was based on a rapidly growing immigrant population. While the early stages of industrialization depended on rural labour moving into towns, mines and factories, the later stages depended on movement from other states altogether. In the US there was the added factor of the movement of African Americans from rural to urban situations once slavery was abolished. This rural reserve was not available in Australia, where the indigenous population was rapidly declining and inner Australia was virtually uninhabitable and empty. Immigrants had to be assisted from public funds or they would have gone to North America.

MANAGING THE ‘PROBLEM’ OF ETHNIC DIVERSITY As nation states consolidated their hold on their subjects and centralized their governments, they tended to see ethnic diversity as a problem that challenged the hegemony of the majority. The development of a national education system was crucial in teaching national loyalties and in suppressing minority languages and cultures. This was characteristic of the great European empires, but also of the UK, the US and Australia. In Australia this pressure was partly modified by the strength of the Catholic school system, from which public subsidies were withdrawn in the nineteenth century and not restored for a century. This reduced the impact of the notion common to Britain and Australia that Protestantism was one of the bulwarks of the democratic nation state. Languages other than English were not taught, which affected the Celtic languages of Britain and the Aboriginal languages of Australia. Loyalty to Australia was combined with loyalty to the British Empire – a dichotomy not relevant to the US. Military glory was not as important as in Britain and the US. Until Vietnam Australian wars were always fought in alliance with the rest of the British Empire. In some respects sporting achievement took their place. The success of the public education system was considerable and replaced the much cruder cultural suppression of many European states, whose examples were often and regrettably followed when Asian and African states emerged from the empires. But unless overtly genocidal policies were followed, minority cultures persisted, especially in remote

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and rural areas. Minority languages were slowly accepted and in some states, such as Ireland, were revived by deliberate state action. Local cultures were incorporated into the tourist trade, as with the small German settlements of South Australia and the Chinatowns found everywhere from San Francisco to Sydney. Long-resident minorities (which often predated the majority) were accepted as legitimate elements in the nation state and conservatives often appealed to them, as in Germany, Scotland or Quebec. They only became problematic when they challenged existing arrangements, as with the rise of Black Power in the US in the 1960s and of the Aboriginal land rights movement in Australia a decade later.

THE ARRIVAL OF NEWCOMERS However, the immigration of new ethnic cultures raised the problem of the cohesion of the nation state once again. While Jews had been grudgingly accepted in the past, sudden influxes as in London from 1881 to 1905 or Melbourne in the 1920s and 1950s, revived resentment. An important element in heightened racial tension is frequently influxes of ‘foreigners’, especially those the Canadians term ‘visible immigrants’. In Australia these included Jewish refugees from Hitler in the late 1930s, Slav and Baltic refugees from communism between 1947 and 1953, Italians in the 1950s, Greeks in the 1960s, Vietnamese and Lebanese in the 1970s, Arabs and Muslims in the 1990s and Africans in the new century. As most of these did not wish to return home, the numbers accumulated and were joined by their children and eventually grandchildren. All of these waves led to heightened though modest racist activity, most notably through the One Nation Party in the 1990s, which was hostile to Asians and Aborigines. One unpleasant feature of these Australian reactions has been hostility to refugees, which reached its height under the conservative government of 1996–2007 (Jupp 2007). When there is widespread anxiety and hostility to newcomers, even if only expressed in opinion polls, politicians see a problem, which they pass on for solution to their public servants. One obvious solution, favoured by One Nation, is total exclusion. This was the basis for the White Australia policy and it worked effectively for 60 years. However, towards the end of that period public opinion began to change and newly independent states began to complain about discrimination against their subjects. In the 1960s Canada, the US, New Zealand and Australia all began to remove racially based exclusion policies. Britain, in contrast, began to restrict the right of entry for British Commonwealth subjects, the majority of whom were Asians and Africans, but without making a specifically

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racist argument for this. Exclusion broke down in the major countries of immigration to the point where the majority of legal immigrants are now from the very nations that former policy had been designed to restrict or exclude. Canada, Australia and New Zealand generally reacted less incoherently than Britain, having already planned immigration programmes many years before, based on economic criteria. The rapid change in sources of immigrants for Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain and the US was also reflected in the European Union. Apart from the brief rise of One Nation and the longer life of the British National Party, the English-speaking destinations did not favour total exclusion and repatriation. Instead they invested considerable research, legislation and administration into ‘managing’ ethnic diversity, as did the Scandinavian democracies and the Netherlands. In the 60 years since the end of the Second World War, three major strategies have been followed. The earliest was assimilation, followed by integration and then by multiculturalism. Recently political controversy (outlined below) has revived ‘integration’ and added the notion of ‘acceptance’. All these terms suffer from indistinct meanings that vary from one country to another. In general, assimilation is the solution of conservatives and multiculturalism of liberals, while integration and acceptance have been taken up by minority ethnic organizations to some extent. ‘Tolerance’ has fallen into disuse. It is seen as acknowledging that there is a real problem that must be accepted gracefully. All these terms have become fashionable or rejected since 2001 in the turmoil caused to ethnic relations by Islamic terrorism.

FROM ASSIMILATION TO MULTICULTURALISM Seeing themselves as nation states, both Australia and the US expected their citizens to assimilate to a common culture and to adopt common loyalties, languages and values. As already suggested, this was more difficult for the US, but was tackled more resolutely. American patriotism depended on continuing expansion to the west and then into the Pacific, where the ‘white man’s burden’ was taken up in Hawaii and the Philippines by the end of the nineteenth century. The US has a longer history of military victories and conquests than Australia, where patriotism has depended on praising a way of life rather than imperial glory (which remained the British achievement). Thus assimilation in Australia depended on maintaining an essentially monocultural immigration programme that promised a better way of life and, hopefully, higher incomes rather than the potential of great individual wealth. While religious uniformity could not be imposed, cultural uniformity depended on the

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English language, continuing cultural and economic links with the UK, the protection of the British Navy and public and private reiteration of the notion that Australia was a British society with some local variations. This did not prevent some hostility towards the English, but it was officially repeated at least until the 1960s, by which time Britain was turning its face reluctantly towards Europe. By the 1960s Australia had significant ethnic minorities in its larger cities and in a handful of mining and industrial settlements elsewhere. These were all of ‘European’ origin but were linguistically varied and came from different political and social situations. Official policy was ambivalent between 1947 and 1972. Naturalization as citizens was urged, but was more difficult than for the British. English was taught at public expense, but in the hope that other languages would die out with disuse. Political and religious allegiances from Europe were expected to fade away and the formation of ethnic-specific clubs was not encouraged. Immigrants were called ‘New Australians’ officially but ‘Balts’ and ‘Dagos’ in popular parlance. Folk dancing, national costumes and ethnic cuisine were all welcomed as brightening influences, but other national manifestations were discouraged, including the use of other languages in public or the preservation of homeland political allegiances. As is frequently the case, many immigrants paid little attention to what governments expected. Ethnic media and organizations flourished and communities were replenished through a generous family reunion programme. The official settlement agencies, the Good Neighbour Councils, were strongly assimilative and would not allow the affiliation of ethnic-specific organizations, which greatly reduced their appeal. The whole assimilative effort began to collapse with the arrival between 1955 and 1970 of large numbers of Italians and Greeks who had no intention of giving up their well-defined practices and attitudes. Assimilation was abandoned as official policy by the 1960s. One consequence is the paucity of assimilation studies when compared with the US (for example, Vigdor 2008).

MULTICULTURALISM After a brief period of advocating ‘integration’, a change of government in 1972 led to the adoption of multiculturalism while finally ending the White Australia policy. Much of the work of defining this concept was undertaken in Melbourne by supporters of the newly elected Whitlam Labor government. This followed a period of cultivating the new Southern European intake, who were becoming naturalized voters, in contrast to the previous East European settlers who had been cultivated by the Liberal Party and

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the Democratic Labor Party as opponents of communism in their home countries and in Australia. A major input into the new policy came from Greek organizations, but there was also support from some Poles, Jews and Maltese. As the definitive study of this policy formulation suggests, the whole operation was political and for the benefit of the Labor government (Lopez 2000). However, it was continued with enthusiasm by the succeeding Liberal government of Malcolm Fraser. Between 1973 and 1996 all Australian governments, national and state, developed policies they described as multiculturalism. Australia joined Canada as one of the very few states at this stage that were officially multicultural, although the policy and the word gradually spread to New Zealand, the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands. However, it did not appeal to more conservative elements in Australian politics, was strongly opposed by their US and British counterparts, and underwent a consistent attack from the early 1980s that eventually led to a cautious rundown under the Howard Liberal government between 1996 and 2007. This did not prevent the majority of state governments, which were Labor controlled, from carrying on regardless of federal approval. The main departures from previous policy were developed in the 1970s and consolidated in the Galbally report, Migrant Programs and Services, of 1978. In the same year the New South Wales government issued Participation, which outlined services within the control of the state. In 1983 the newly elected Victorian government issued Access and Equity. In due course all state and federal governments had issued substantial policy documents, including a federal ‘agenda’ in 1989 and a follow-up review in 1995. Despite the reluctance of the Howard Liberal government to use the word, a multicultural agenda was issued by them after consultations in 1999. It is often claimed that Australian multiculturalism has not been defined or is a conceptual muddle. However, there is a substantial documented literature, including a Review of Migrant and Multicultural Programs and Services in 1986 (Jupp 1986). It is these documents that provide a definition, not usages from elsewhere. Frequently critics of Australian multiculturalism make no reference to them, but echo debates in the US and Britain. Debate and redefinition would have been more productive had the Howard government not abolished the two relevant research agencies in 1996. Multicultural policy has remained within the Immigration Department since 1973, except for a brief period between 1987 and 1996 when an Office of Multicultural Affairs was located in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Consequently much of the national policy has been concerned with the settlement of immigrants, with the implicit suggestion that many programmes would be temporary and would not apply to subsequent generations. This distinguishes policy from the Canadian model and from that adopted by most Australian states. The essential difference from

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assimilation is the belief that different cultures, languages and religions do not represent a threat to the cohesion of Australian society and are bound by Australian law. English will remain as the sole official language, but translation and interpreting services will be available, ethnic media will not be subject to restrictions, community language schools will be subsidized, ethnic organizations will also be subsidized to provide welfare service and ethnic representatives will be involved in policy consultations. Language education was at the centre of the new policies and its beneficiaries were officially designated as of Non-English-Speaking Background until this was changed to Culturally and Linguistically Diverse, presumably to cope with the growing number of Asians fluent in English. As the policy developed into the 1990s, it was argued that ethnic diversity was an advantage rather than a problem, as many had previously believed. A number of laws and supervisory agencies were developed to combat racial discrimination, although positive discrimination in the American sense was much less popular. Multiculturalism was defined as extending to the indigenous minority in 1989, but in practice Aboriginal affairs have remained distinct and of greater public and official concern.

MULTICULTURALISM AND SOCIAL BONDING Multiculturalism has developed as public policy for over 30 years and a range of institutions have been created at national and state levels. Panethnic organizations, the Ethnic Communities’ Councils, have affiliated to a national body whose expenses are met by the Immigration Department. This has meant that ethnic-specific organizations have worked with each other as well as with government. This is particularly helpful for the growing number of smaller groups coming into Australia, especially as refugees. The larger communities – Greeks, Italians, Chinese, Vietnamese – and the variety of religious organizations, do not need this mutual support to the same extent. Their networks are well developed and their assets considerable. While most of this has developed in the seven major cities, there has been a recent trend to create ethnic linkages in smaller provincial areas, which governments have encouraged. After 30 years there is a wide network of organizations, media and collaboration that is directed towards and controlled by ‘culturally and linguistically diverse’ Australians, which did not exist in the more distant past. This provides a solid base for bonding and civic action, rather than being disruptive. Indeed the ‘ethnic movement’ is far from radical, without subscribing to the assimilationist nationalism that its critics favour. Criticism of multiculturalism, which strongly influenced the conservative

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parties in the 1990s, usually subscribes to the notion that a uniform culture is the basis for a stable society; that immigrants should abandon their homeland cultures and loyalties and give single-minded allegiance to Australia; that ethnic-based services are a misuse of public funds that should be devoted to creating unity; that there are alien elements that cannot be tolerated (and especially militant Islam); that language and religion should be a strictly private matter within the home and family; that policies favouring ethnic minorities are illegitimate vote catching; that dual loyalties are confusing and detract from loyalty to Australia, especially for the Australia born. These are all familiar criticisms, found everywhere and used effectively for a while by One Nation in the 1990s. They are not racist (unlike One Nation) but concentrate on cultural uniformity and national obligations. Racism in its classic form dominated Australian immigration policy for a century, but it has little popular appeal now and racist organizations like Australia First have no electoral support. There remains an underlying sense that some immigrants are preferable to others because of their greater ability to fit into a peaceful, democratic society. While multicultural policy aims to reduce the salience of these engrained suspicions, it has also avoided the charge of ‘cultural relativity’ by stressing the need to accept liberal democratic values, equality of the sexes, peaceful resolution of disputes, dominance of the English language and mutual tolerance. Indeed right at the end of its term of office the Howard Liberal government introduced a citizenship test that required undertakings on and understandings of these issues. This is currently being revised (but not abolished) by the Rudd Labor government. An underground river of assimilation still runs beneath the multicultural structures, constantly threatening them with erosion. This is particularly true at present for the Muslim communities, who number less than 2 per cent of the population.

WHAT FUTURE FOR MULTICULTURALISM? After 11 years of a national government openly hostile to multiculturalism, and with the threat of Islamic terrorism seldom off the news pages, the earlier official enthusiasm for the policies of the 1970s and 1980s has waned. There is currently little evidence that the new Australian Labor government is planning anything as radical as the policies adopted under both major parties between 1972 and 1996. As in Europe, the militant Islamists have achieved a decline in popularity for ethnic variety in general and their own religion in particular. It may be that official multiculturalism made little difference to the assimilation or integration of immigrant communities, as a provocative Canadian study argued over 20 years ago:

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‘our comparison of the Canadian mosaic and the American melting pot reveals that the differences between them are not overwhelming’ (Reitz and Breton 1994, p. 125). The same might be true for Australia as well. But this opinion was expressed before the rise of Islamist militancy and does not fully account for Quebec either. It may be, as the chairman of the British Commission for Racial Equality argued more recently, that the ‘celebration’ of ethnic differences should be replaced by asserting common rights and citizenship. However, against this it can be argued that between 70 per cent and 96 per cent of immigrants become naturalized Australians, with the highest levels being for former refugees. The two religions with the highest naturalization levels in 2006 were the Greek and Macedonian Orthodox, both sustaining a very different kind of Christianity from the traditional majority. Buddhists and Muslims had a naturalization level of 77 per cent. Of all indicators of ethnicity, religion usually lasts the longest. While Australian research in this area is weak and defective, it seems probable that most immigrants want to become Australians, while still retaining their distinctive religions, languages and beliefs. This can only become more likely with the rapid increase of intakes from China and India. For the future a relatively new element is likely to develop in Australian ethnic affairs. Immigrants in the past were popularly and often officially regarded as disadvantaged because of their manual working-class origins and lowly social position. Selection policy and the growth of well-educated post-migration generations are rapidly changing this picture. Recent immigrants, who are predominantly well educated and often fluent in English, tend to settle in middle-class suburbs, in contrast to their predecessors. They are moving into the professions, with all the implications that has for future social and political influence. They are well able to look after their own interests and to organize and lobby accordingly. This leaves the refugee intake of about 10 per cent of the immigration total as the core of disadvantage, but because refugees are selected for their settlement potential (at least in theory), they are often also capable of moving back into the middle classes from which many have originated. The effect of this is that multiculturalism is likely to emphasize cultural maintenance (including religious and linguistic variety) rather than social disadvantage. This is already changing the face of ethnic politics and must eventually change the character of national politics, at least in the major cities. However, as most of the current settler and refugee intakes are ‘visible’ non-Europeans, issues of racial and religious prejudice will also remain important (Parekh 2006).

11.

Who belongs? Assimilation, integration and multiculturalism in the United States Cara Wong1

The myth and truth of the US is that it is a land welcoming of immigrants. In 2000, 11 per cent of the population was foreign born, up from 8 per cent in 1990. The numbers fluctuate over time, as does the salience of immigration in the news, depending on economic and social factors. In 2006 and 2007 immigration was often front-page news as a result of the visible immigrant marches and boycotts organized in response to legislation proposed in Congress, which ultimately failed. During 2008, however, immigration slid under the radar screen as pundits, politicians and the public focused on the presidential election. Throughout a period of intense public debate and even after immigration ceded centre stage to other issues, there were two strands of concern: do immigrants have a positive or negative impact on the country, and are immigrants members of the national community? These questions persist because their answers affect how the US views its responsibilities to its immigrants – present and future – and what it expects in return. More generally, the way immigrant-receiving countries address these questions affects how they manage (and embrace) the growing diversity of their populations. Membership of a society can be defined in many different ways, and in this chapter I present five definitions that pertain to immigrants in the US. The most straightforward and simple definition equates membership with citizenship: the rules that govern citizenship and naturalization make clear the important features of membership in the eyes of the state. However, not even the US government treats membership and citizenship as synonymous; therefore, one can also think of membership as defined by those who have what are considered the rights and responsibilities of membership. A third way to define membership is to be guided by public opinion. The American people have a unique view of who is ‘truly American’ and their view does not necessarily coincide with governmental definitions or practice. A fourth mode of defining membership is to be guided by the views of 160

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immigrants themselves; do they consider themselves members of the US national community and does this include or exclude their membership of other national communities? Finally, one can look at the behaviours of immigrants as indicators of membership: do they behave in ways that are largely indistinguishable from the behaviours of native-born Americans? Why do these different definitions matter? Understanding the variety of views about who belongs in the national community is more than an academic exercise; beliefs about who is part of Us (and not Them) have a big impact on how the US tries to unify its incredibly heterogeneous population into a cohesive nation via a range of public policies. Depending on how one conceptualizes membership, very different policies can come to mind as possible avenues for bringing together a wide range of peoples. While I focus on the US, my analysis can be applied to any number of countries around the world that are dealing with growing demographic heterogeneity, largely due to immigration. In other words, questions of membership matter not only for traditional immigrant-receiving countries like Australia and Canada, but also for countries like the Netherlands and France, where concerns about integration and social cohesion are much more recent, and where riots have sparked debates about how to balance multiculturalism and assimilation. In these early years of the twenty-first century the US is steadily becoming more diverse in terms of ethnicity and race. According to the US Census Bureau, about one of every five persons living in the US today is either an immigrant or the child of an immigrant. Racial and ethnic minorities make up about a third of the population and, collectively, are projected to become a majority in 2042. By 2050, the Hispanic population is expected to double, from 15 per cent to 30 per cent, and Blacks and Asians are estimated to compose 15 and 9 per cent of the population, respectively. By 2032, less than half of all children will be non-Hispanic whites, and around that time almost 20 per cent of US residents will be 65 and older. Race and age will interact so that a majority of the working-age population that will provide benefits to senior citizens will not be of the same race or ethnicity as the majority of the beneficiaries. Sheer demographics portend multiculturalism in fact, if not in policies. Which multicultural or assimilation policies are implemented to cope with this diversity rests, to a certain extent, on views of who belongs in the national community.

CITIZENSHIP AS MEMBERSHIP American citizenship is normally granted at birth or via naturalization. Both jus soli and jus sanguinis are guiding principles of American

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citizenship, which means that individuals born on US soil or of parents who are American citizens are considered citizens.2 In general, legal immigrants are allowed to naturalize after residing in the US for a required period of time and after passing a naturalization examination that requires knowledge of English and of American history, values and government. The residency and examination requirements can vary, depending on whether an applicant is a spouse of an American citizen, is serving in the US military, or is a child or an elderly immigrant. What is required of all applicants, however, is that they exhibit all of the following: a good moral character, attachment to the principles of the Constitution, and a favourable disposition to the US. For the bulk of applicants, if one has not committed criminal acts and swears the Citizenship Oath, these requirements are met. Whether or not native-born Americans feel that immigrants sufficiently meet the criteria is a separate issue. By satisfying these requirements, about a third of the foreign-born population in the US has naturalized. In 2007, 660 477 immigrants became new American citizens, most of them from Mexico, India, the Philippines, China and Vietnam (Rytina and Caldera 2008). The more time immigrants spend in the US, the more likely they are to become citizens: 82 per cent who entered prior to 1970 have been naturalized, while only 13 per cent of those who entered in 1990 or later have been naturalized. While the legal residence requirement is generally five years, most immigrants do not naturalize in that time period, whether for personal or bureaucratic reasons.3 The country’s rules guiding citizenship are assimilationist in nature, emphasizing the ability of all immigrants to transform fully into American citizens with time. These rules both structure and follow one of the distinctive characteristics of the American national community, which is that membership is defined normatively (at least in theory, if not always in practice): Americans are united not by bloodlines but by shared beliefs about ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ (Gleason 1980). In the government’s eyes, at least, anyone can become an American, given enough time for socialization. If one conceives of membership as being the same as citizenship, then certain policies suggest themselves as solutions to problems of social cohesion. For example, one can readily think of ways to ease naturalization requirements so that more non-citizens become citizens. If more nonmembers were allowed to become members, they would presumably have a greater attachment to and investment in the national community. Or, one could propose that requirements for citizenship be made more stringent because naturalization is currently too easy. By making citizenship more exclusive, citizens would presumably constitute a more homogeneous and

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unified group, at least with respect to whatever qualifications are needed for citizenship. However, it is hard to see how this second policy option would be appropriate for an increasingly diverse country, because it could lead to a large body of permanent and disgruntled second-class citizens. During the last decade Germany moved away from precisely this policy when it decided to ease naturalization requirements so that, for example, third-generation Turks born in Berlin could feel a greater sense of attachment to their country of residence via German citizenship. Other policy options are implied by other definitions of membership, and the fact that particular conceptions encourage us to ignore certain solutions to problems of social cohesion at the expense of others will be more evident as these other definitions are elaborated. I hope to make it clear that no healthy immigrant-receiving polity can afford to focus excessively on any single definition of membership.

MEMBERSHIP DEFINED BY RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Citizenship status, however important, does not mean that everyone without this legal designation is outside the national community. The US Constitution extends many rights and responsibilities to ‘persons’ rather than ‘citizens’, and all residents are counted in the census, regardless of citizenship status (Aleinikoff 2002). Because the census enumeration is used to determine congressional districts, all residents therefore ostensibly enjoy political representation. Non-citizens are entitled to a number of other rights from the nation state, including public education for undocumented immigrant children. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (known popularly as ‘welfare reform’) terminated a range of social welfare benefits to legal residents, although some were later reinstated either by the federal government or local governments. When it comes to political participation, aside from voting, serving on juries and making campaign contributions, the doors are relatively open. Until the 1920s, non-citizens were even allowed to vote in many local and state elections across the US (Hayduk 2006). The concept of ‘post-national citizenship’ has been developed in some European countries to account for extending a range of social welfare benefits and rights to non-citizens (Soysal 1995) because, it is argued, the meaning of citizenship has been eroded by separating welfare benefits and rights from citizenship. While the argument has not been made that American citizenship is losing its meaning, rights distinct from citizenship are certainly present in the US.

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Responsibilities are also not limited to citizens. All young men – regardless of their status as citizens, legal permanent residents or undocumented immigrants – are required to register for selective service in the military. While there is little to no likelihood of military conscription being reintroduced, Selective Service is a system to provide manpower to the US Armed Forces in case of an emergency (see www.sss.gov for more information). The burden of defending the national community – symbolically or not – does not therefore fall only to citizens. All non-citizens also have to pay a range of taxes and in this way they help pay for social services and public institutions in their communities. Defining membership by rights and responsibilities focuses attention on certain questions about remedies for a ‘Balkanization’ of the US. Would adding or withdrawing rights or responsibilities from non-citizens affect social cohesion in the nation? If rights were added, one could imagine approaching Soysal’s (1995) post-national citizenship, by which migrants enjoy a range of social, economic and even political benefits regardless of citizenship. While this might make non-citizens happier and foster a sense of gratitude, past literature on welfare in the US does not suggest that rights and benefits alone will necessarily lead to greater social cohesion. It is also difficult to imagine how adding responsibilities to or taking away rights and responsibilities from non-citizens would increase attachment to the US as a whole.

MEMBERSHIP DEFINED BY AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION The examples provided above of extending rights and responsibilities to non-citizens are legal measures taken by the government. However, ordinary Americans’ views of the boundaries of their national community may diverge from the boundaries drawn by government laws and policies. In fact, the official boundaries may not be the most important politically. Notions of assimilation and incorporation – of becoming American, above and beyond what is required by the naturalization examination – are intertwined with popular definitions of what it means to belong to the American community. While the idea of a melting pot has been present in Americans’ minds since the eighteenth century, what sits at the bottom of this ‘pot’ has never been altogether clear (Glazer 1997). Who is considered a quintessential member of the national community today? To answer this question, I examine public opinion about the importance of traits that make someone a ‘true American’ (Citrin et al. 1990).4 The 1996 and 2004 General

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Social Surveys (GSS) are face-to-face national surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, which asked respondents the following questions: Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is . . . 1. To have been born in America 2. To have lived in America for most of one’s life 3. To be a Christian 4. To be able to speak English 5. To have American citizenship 6. To feel American 7. To respect America’s political institutions and laws 8. To have American ancestry [asked only in 2004].

The response options were ‘very important’, ‘fairly important’, ‘not very important’ and ‘not important at all’. About one in five Americans surveyed thought that all of these characteristics are ‘very important’ in making someone ‘truly American’ and less than 1 per cent said that none of them is important. Furthermore, the fact that a quarter of the 1996 respondents (and over a third of those in 2004) believe that native-born Christians who have lived in the country all their lives are the prototypical ‘true American’ belies the myth of the melting pot. No level of assimilation by immigrants could transform them into ‘true Americans’ in the minds of this sizeable proportion of the population. Native-born, non-Hispanic whites were not the only persons with this conception of true Americans. For example, over 40 per cent of the Hispanic respondents in the 2004 GSS said that being born in the US is necessary for being a ‘true American’. A majority of whites, blacks and Hispanics agreed that being Christian, living most of one’s life in the US, speaking English, feeling American and having citizenship are all traits necessary for being a ‘true American’.5 These quite specific conceptions of a ‘true American’ do not preclude immigrants from being considered patriotic Americans, however. As part of a national survey about immigration conducted by National Public Radio, Kaiser Family Foundation Harvard University in 2004 (Immigration Survey), when native-born Americans were asked if they think most immigrants love America more or less than most other Americans, 60 per cent said there was no difference or immigrants loved America even more. Obviously, how one defines a ‘true’ member may not determine the limits of who is considered an average or typical member, and a new member may be considered just as loyal to the community as an old one. But, visions of the ‘true American’ nevertheless influence attitudes

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about what immigrants need to do in order to become better, if not ideal, members of the national community. If membership is defined by public attitudes, how is the weaving together of disparate strands in the American community affected? Views of membership determined by images of a ‘true American’ have a strong influence on popular support for assimilation, rather than multicultural policies. At the same time, the non-immigrant public needs to be persuaded to develop a more inclusive sense of what it means to be American, so that newcomers feel welcome to become members. A definition of membership guided by public opinion suggests, then, a campaign to change ‘hearts and minds’ is more necessary for social cohesion than a campaign to alter the legal distinction between non-members and citizens. Of course, the US has long experience with inter-group conflict and it has learned the importance of institutions that regulate civil rights, above and beyond pleas for brotherly feelings. Simple media campaigns would not have helped desegregate schools, voting booths or workplaces without the force of the federal government and its laws. Thus, although ‘hearts and minds’ cannot be ignored, they cannot be the sole basis of cohesion.

MEMBERSHIP DEFINED BY ATTITUDES OF IMMIGRANTS Immigrants themselves may define membership in terms of their attitudes about the country and how they perceive themselves to be situated in it. I noted earlier that a majority of native-born Americans thought immigrants love the country as much as, if not more than, other Americans (the 2004 Immigration Survey). When immigrants were asked the same question, 72 per cent said there was no difference or that immigrants loved America more than those who were native born. Similarly, if one compares immigrants and native-born Americans in that same survey, there is little difference in patriotism: 87 per cent of native-born citizens and 84 per cent of the immigrant citizens are extremely or very proud to be Americans. Patriotism is not a zero-sum commodity and some pundits and scholars are concerned that today’s transnationalism is having a negative effect on immigrants’ ability or desire to develop ties and loyalty to the US (Huntington 2004; Renshon 2001). However, evidence from the Immigration Survey indicates that these concerns are baseless: when dual citizens and non-citizens were asked how they identify, 36 per cent responded that they thought of themselves mostly as American and 48 per cent identified with the US and their home country equally. So, even among those with official (that is, citizenship) ties to another country, only

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a small proportion considered their non-American identity paramount. Perceptions and realities also do not match when it comes to the ties immigrants keep with their home countries. Sixty per cent of native-born Americans in the Immigration Survey thought that recent immigrants send most of the money they earn in the US back to their home country; however, 61 per cent of immigrants reported that they do not regularly send any money back. So, in terms of attitudes about and attachment to the US, immigrants are largely indistinguishable from native-born Americans. Concerns about immigrants’ attachment to the US often shifts more or less imperceptibly to a discussion of whether different racial and ethnic minorities consider themselves members of the national community. For example, in his 2004 book, Who Are We?, Samuel P. Huntington expresses much concern that Latinos in the US – immigrant or not – are not adopting the nation’s creedal Anglo-Saxon Protestant values and are thereby threatening the social fabric while perhaps even harbouring hopes that the south-western US will someday again be part of Mexico. Responding to Huntington’s thesis, Citrin et al. (2007) tested a number of its claims. In the 1995, 1999 and 2000 Los Angeles County Social Surveys (LACSS) respondents were asked: ‘When it comes to political and social matters, how do you primarily think of yourself: just as an American, both as an American and (ethnicity), or only as (ethnicity)?’ Ninety-five per cent of whites said ‘just American’ or ‘both’, as did 83 per cent of blacks, 68 per cent of Hispanics and 77 per cent of Asians. Furthermore, among Hispanics born in the US the proportion answering ‘both’ rose to 90 per cent, and for those who had been naturalized the proportion was 84 per cent. Citrin et al. also provide evidence that the majority of whites, blacks and Hispanics love America, feel pride in the American flag and are proud to be American, confirming the findings by de la Garza et al. (1996) that Mexican Americans’ patriotism is equal to that of Anglos. Therefore, whether one thinks in terms of immigrants’ or racial minorities’ membership in and love of the US, it appears that both population segments share many of the same attitudes as native-born Americans. Attitudes about the American Dream – or an idealized hope about what can be attained through membership – are also remarkably similar across groups. According to the 2004–05 National Politics Study (Jackson et al., 2004), which involved a telephone survey of whites, blacks, Latinos, Asians and black Caribbeans, conducted by the University of Michigan, the vast majority of all groups express pride in being American and support the proposition that America is a land of opportunity. In fact, Asians, Hispanics and Caribbeans are more likely than whites to believe in the American Dream. Overall, then, all Americans typically express pride in membership of the

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national community, even to the point of chauvinism. When asked about their citizenship preference, 95 per cent of whites in the 2004 GSS agreed with the statement ‘I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world’, 88 per cent of blacks also agreed, as did 84 per cent of Hispanics. The percentages were very similar in the 1996 GSS, when 83 per cent of whites, 74 per cent of blacks and 73 per cent of Hispanics agreed that ‘America is a better country than most other countries’. Perhaps because of public opinion as well as their own attitudes about what it means to be American, immigrants may feel the need to prove themselves ideal members of their new community by speaking only English at home, serving in the military or waving American flags. Given the strong patriotism they express towards their new country, perhaps one should not be surprised that since it was established many decades ago, more than 20 per cent of Congressional Medal of Honor recipients have been immigrants. This medal is the highest military decoration granted by the US and its recipients have risked their lives in actions considered to be well beyond the call of military duty. Immigrants are disproportionately represented among medal recipients, relative to native-born Americans. Clearly, one may use membership as self-defined by immigrants to craft policies that enhance social cohesion. One policy would be a public campaign to convince immigrants that they need to develop a greater sense of attachment to the US in order to achieve greater success, whether it is defined politically, economically or socially. Simultaneously, one could make the general public more aware of the similar amounts of patriotism and national attachment that immigrants and native-born Americans display. Of course, given that definitions of membership vary a great deal in the minds of non-citizens, naturalized citizens, second-generation immigrants and other native-born Americans, such campaigns of persuasion would be difficult to devise and execute. Social cohesion, according to some, demands assimilation by immigrants; for others, cohesion does not require homogeneity and a greater embrace of multiculturalism by the US is the only proper course. As one considers the different, more psychological bases of membership and the policies implied by different conceptions of it, merits of the more abstract and universal definitions implied by institutional requirements for formal citizenship acquire added weight.

MEMBERSHIP DEFINED BY SIMILARITY TO OTHER MEMBERS Waters and Jimenez (2005, pp. 105–6) describe the ongoing, steady progress of immigrant assimilation in the US in this way:

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The last comprehensive review of sociological research on immigration and assimilation [Massey 1981] . . . pointed to significant evidence in sociological research that, on balance, [Latin American and Asian] immigrants were well on their way to becoming fully integrated into American society. Although there was variation between groups, research on spatial concentration, intermarriage, and socioeconomic advancement from one generation to the next all suggested that these immigrant groups were becoming Americans in much the same way that European immigrant groups did before them. Twenty-four years after this last review, we find continued support for this position.

Still more recent research on the intergenerational nature of assimilation is consistent with what Waters and Jimenez found. For example, a comprehensive study of second-generation youth in New York City reveals great variation in educational and occupational attainment, depending on the ethnicity or nationality of the individual, but also economic mobility at the aggregate level (Kasinitz et al. 2008). On measures of socioeconomic status, 40 per cent of second-generation youth have already exceeded their immigrant parents’ status. Contrary to the predictions of segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou 1993), studies of second-generation immigrants show that few experience downward mobility resulting from overly rapid Americanization; furthermore, few experience upward mobility if they remain in an ethnic enclave (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Of course economic mobility does not guarantee cultural or political inclusion or parity. There is clear evidence, however, that immigrants are assimilating culturally. Intermarriage is one of Waters and Jimenez’s measures of cultural assimilation.6 The rates of exogamy have increased for all immigrant groups, particularly for Latinos and Asians. Almost 8 per cent of all marriages in 2006 were interracial or interethnic as defined by the census (that is, Hispanic and non-Hispanic), up from 3 per cent in 1980 (Current Population Survey). As Farley (1999, p. 124) observes: We no longer think of the Anglos and the Saxons; we think of English. We no longer speak of Ligurians, the Piedmontese, and Sicilians; we speak of the Italians. Are we not witnessing a process of assimilation as a result of increasing rates of racial exogamy in the marriage market?

In addition to intermarriage rates, language is also important, both as a major aspect of acculturation and as an important precursor of naturalization and political engagement. According to the 2002 American Community Survey, 83 per cent of the foreign-born speak a language other than English at home, with 45 per cent of them speaking Spanish (Deardorff 2003). However, by the second generation over 80 per cent of all Latinos (not living with their parents) speak only English or speak English very well (Citrin et al., 2007). According to the Census Bureau,

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fewer than 9 per cent of the foreign-born classify themselves as limited English speakers. It is clear that, given time, immigrants resemble nativeborn Americans culturally as well as economically. While politics is not a typical realm in the study of assimilation, having a voice in the government is an important factor in the incorporation of immigrants into American society. Political engagement indicates that individuals consider themselves members with a stake in what is going on and a right to be involved in politics. Both citizenship and place of birth have an effect on political action, even for types of participation that do not require citizenship or native birth. For example, in a study of Asian Americans, Wong et al. (2008) found that native-born Asians are two to three times more active politically than non-citizens, with naturalized Asians falling in between. Americans’ propensity to register and vote in elections is affected by factors like political awareness, socioeconomic status and social network resources. For immigrants, however, a number of additional factors affect whether they register and then vote; these include generational status, duration of stay in the US and political mobilizations aimed at preventing anti-immigrant legislation (Pantoja and Segura 2003; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). While there is evidence that language ability affects immigrant voting (Cho 1999), there is also research that raises doubts about the efficacy of multilingual ballots and native-language campaign ads in raising immigrants’ turnout for elections (DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2008; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Residential context matters, although the factors that most affect turnout are the overall degree of poverty and proportion of non-citizens in areas where immigrants live, rather than high concentrations of Latinos or co-ethnic mobilization (De la Garza et al., 2008; DeSipio 1996). What motivates this research is a clear difference that is observed in levels of registration and turnout between immigrants and the native-born population. In the November 1996 presidential and congressional elections, 71 per cent of the native-born citizen population were registered and 59 per cent voted; among the naturalized-citizen population, 63 per cent were registered and 53 per cent voted (Bass and Casper 1999). These gaps have not narrowed over the past decade. In 2006 naturalized citizens were 52 per cent less likely to register and 42 per cent less likely to vote than native-born citizens. Looking from 1996 to 2006, Crissey and File (2008) found that political participation by naturalized citizens did not increase over time, and there is even some evidence that it is decreasing compared to native-born citizens.7 Even if these objective indicators point to the economic, social and political assimilation of immigrants across generations, there is a question

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whether a distinct immigrant vote exists at any given time. Do their political preferences differ from those of native-born Americans? It should be noted that few pundits or scholars actually discuss whether there is a distinct immigrant vote; the assumption is that ethnicity trumps immigration status when it comes to voting. Part of the explanation for this lies in the availability of data. Below I look at immigrants’ beliefs in particular, but also whether there is a distinctive ‘ethnic’ vote. If there were marked differences of political opinion between immigrants and non-immigrants, one would imagine that these differences would be found in attitudes about immigration policy. According to the 2004 Immigration Survey, however, 52 per cent of native-born Americans and 50 per cent of immigrants think there are too many immigrants in the US today. Fifty per cent of immigrants and 54 per cent of non-immigrants also think that most recent immigrants to the US are here illegally. If one looks at broader political beliefs and predispositions like partisanship, immigrants and non-immigrants are also similar in their levels of identification with Democrats and Independents. In the Immigration Survey immigrants were slightly less likely to identify as Republican than nonimmigrants, and were more likely to give a ‘don’t know’ response. There was a similar pattern for ideology: immigrants and non-immigrants were similar in identifications as liberal or moderate, though immigrants were less likely to identify as conservative than native-born Americans. If one looks at voting, the pattern mimics party identification to a large extent, at least in recent elections. Data from the GSS show that, on average, a majority of both immigrants and non-immigrants recalled voting for the same presidential candidate between 1972 and 1996; in the 2000 and 2004 elections, however, a majority of immigrants said that they voted for the losing Democratic candidates. One caveat in interpreting these data is that the number of immigrants in each national survey sample is relatively small, fluctuating from a low of 40 to a high of 246; another caveat is that voting recall can be problematic, especially when a respondent is asked months, if not years, after an election about who they voted for. Nevertheless, it appears that immigrants have voted largely like their non-immigrant compatriots, with a slight turn toward the Democratic Party since 2000. There are greater inter-group differences if one looks at votes for presidential candidates, disaggregated according to the race and ethnicity of voters, recorded in election exit polls compiled by the New York Times. The exit polls between 1984 and 2008 show that a plurality of whites consistently voted for the Republican presidential candidate, while the majority of blacks and Hispanics voted for Democratic candidates. In elections for which data on Asians were collected, it appears that their vote preferences shifted: in 1992 and 1996 a plurality of Asians’ votes went to

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Republican candidates, while in 2000, 2004 and 2008 a majority voted for Democrats. While these data tell us that whites, blacks and Hispanics have been pretty consistent in their presidential choices, they also tell us that no single racial or ethnic group has backed the winners consistently over the last quarter-century. Despite close and heated election contests, subsequent power transitions have been unmarked by violence or major protest demonstrations on the part of those who supported losing candidates. If membership is defined by the similarity of immigrants to native-born Americans – economically, culturally and politically – then what policies might flow from this definition? Given that research has shown that immigrants are, on average, coming to resemble native-born Americans across generations, one suggestion would be to adopt policies that speed up the process more or less forcibly. However, such a practice would resemble the much-scorned ‘Americanization programme’ of yore. A more palatable and feasible suggestion would be to channel greater government monies to fund oversubscribed programmes like English as a Second Language, which enable immigrants to adapt to the US and perhaps naturalize more quickly. Alternatively, multicultural policies that do not force immigrants to make painful choices – between, for example, speaking only English or only one’s native language – may enable them to embrace the new along with the old more easily. One might also make better known to the public and political leaders what scholars have known for decades: that immigrants are similar to native-born Americans not only in attitudes, but in major aspects of their behaviour as well.

CONCLUSIONS As we ponder issues of social cohesion and whether immigrants are members of their new societies, questions about how we define membership loom large. When is someone a member? Each definition of membership implies a different set of policies to enhance social cohesion. Different definitions point to different balances of assimilation and multiculturalism. Concerns about whether immigrants can become full members of American society date back to the country’s founding. Although the Founding Fathers did not make English the official language, Benjamin Franklin worried that the German immigrants in Pennsylvania and other immigrants did not and probably would not assimilate: ‘[The immigrants] who come [to America] are generally of the most ignorant stupid sort of their own nation . . . Not being used to liberty, they know not how to make a modest use of it . . . now they come in droves . . . Few of their children in the country learn English . . . (Bigelow 1887, p. 291).

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Franklin believed that for immigrants to become members they must resemble native-born Americans. His concerns were echoed at the start of the twentieth century – by both the public and Congress – with the arrival of immigrants from Asia, who were barred outright from naturalization, and from Southern and Eastern Europe. The federal government pursued a programme of ‘Americanization’ designed to force immigrants to become ‘proper’ Americans, whether they liked it or not (Tichenor 2002). At about the same time, however, Horace Kallen (1915) made an argument in support of cultural pluralism – celebrating the diversity of cultures brought to the US by immigrants – that resonated with those opposed to Americanization. In many ways assimilation and multiculturalism have walked hand in hand throughout the country’s history, as have varying definitions of what it means to be a member of the national community. A main difficulty in assessing how American elites and ordinary citizens are currently trying to realize the motto E pluribus unum (‘Out of many, one’) is that both assimilation and multiculturalism can be defined in multiple ways (Alba and Nee 2003; Kymlicka 2001). Moreover, whereas assimilation is used specifically to discuss the integration of immigrants into society, multiculturalism’s focus includes immigrants, native-born racial and ethnic minorities, and the mainstream majority. Nevertheless, the outcomes both assimilation and multiculturalism weigh in the balance are integration and segregation (including self-government). Does assimilation entail the following? Teaching or speaking foreign languages should not be permitted; cultural/ethnic organizations, festivals and cultural celebrations should be discouraged; a whole-hearted embrace of American culture, economy and politics should be demanded. The federal government mandates none of these actions or practices. Does multiculturalism entail the following? Bilingual education, ballots and other official documents should be provided in multiple languages; electoral districts should accord at least roughly with ethnic or racial concentrations; dual citizenship should be allowed without qualification; affirmative action programmes should be extended to underprivileged immigrant communities. The federal government currently implements many of these measures, albeit in varying degree. Nevertheless, as DeSipio and De la Garza (1998, p. 202) observe, ‘The US has had few, if any, national public policies or programmes that are designed to recognize, legitimize, and encourage the maintenance of diverse cultures and languages.’ Instead, the government seeks to ‘celebrate, but not legally enshrine, diversity in the culture’, and it tries to incorporate immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities as individuals, not groups. In short, the government adheres to an assimilation ideology even while recognizing groups’ attempts to remedy the discriminations and disadvantages that they experience (Glazer 1997).

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Public opinion mirrors this institutional ambivalence to some extent. The American public clearly makes a distinction between public and private spheres, and what it thinks membership requires in the former is not necessarily what it regards as essential in the latter. As Citrin et al. (2001, p. 266) explain: The survey evidence . . . shows that a majority of the American public opposes the articulation of ethnic identities in a form that competes with, rather than complements, the older liberal ideal of a common civic identity . . . This preference for an inclusive nationalism coexists with the widespread acceptance of pluralism in cultural practices.

So, for example, even though a majority of Americans support the idea of making English the official language and believe that ethnic organizations promote separatism, a majority also support bilingual ballots, bilingual education, oppose requiring that only English be used in public schools and do not believe that ethnic histories receive too much attention in schools. Americans are pretty evenly split between those who would advocate that groups should blend into larger society, those who support the idea of racial and ethnic groups maintaining their distinctive cultures, and those somewhere between the two poles. However, even among those who support the maintenance of distinct cultures, very few believe that the government should help groups manifesting these cultures; instead, they believe that such matters should be left to the groups themselves, thus marking a line between public and private spheres. Public opinion is also the main driving force behind historical and contemporary concerns about membership and social cohesion. Debates about who is a member of the American national community have never been focused primarily on whether immigrants are meeting or eliding naturalization requirements; or about whether non-citizens should be fighting in the armed forces; or about immigrants promoting treasonous ideas or trying to establish sovereign nations within US territory. Naturalization requirements, after all, have changed very little over time. ‘Who are we?’ fears have long been driven by concerns about who is a true American, whether immigrants want to become Americans and whether immigrants are assimilating. When thinking about immigrants and social cohesion problems it is important to bear in mind that the driving impetus for all such concerns are public attitudes, not laws and not demographic facts about the extent to which immigrants approximate native-born Americans. However, merely relying on public opinion to manage the affairs of a society with strong commitments to equality and individual freedoms would risk tyrannies of the majority that have dictated racism and ethnocentrism in US immigration and immigrant policies (as well

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as many other domestic policies) in the past. Wise policy requires an understanding and acceptance of membership’s multiple definitions and judicious policies that nurture a diverse and cohesive society.

NOTES 1. I would like to thank Gary Freeman, John Higley and John Nieuwenhuysen for inviting me to participate in the Nations of Immigrants conference in Prato, and all of the members of the conference for their comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Jake Bowers, John Higley and James Jupp for providing detailed comments on this chapter. 2. Historically, there have been many violations of these principles (see, for example, King 2001). I argue elsewhere that jus meritum is also a guiding principle of American citizenship from the beginning of the country’s history: in exchange for military service to the country, non-citizens are granted citizenship (Wong 2007; Wong and Cho 2006). 3. Context may also affect naturalization rates. For example, the number of Mexican immigrants who naturalized almost doubled between 2006 and 2007 (Watanabe 2008). There were a number of factors that contributed to this rise: a steep fee increase scheduled to take effect; a highly visible national debate over immigration; a large, coordinated campaign by Spanish-language media and immigrant advocacy groups to encourage immigrants to naturalize; and a push by the Bush administration in support of assimilation. (In 2008 the numbers applying for naturalization dropped.) The context of one’s home country may also drive or delay naturalization. Jones-Correa (1998) notes that an immigrant’s desire to return to her home country reflects, to a certain extent, the relative living conditions and status of the immigrant in both countries. For example, he finds women from more rigidly patriarchal societies to be more interested in naturalization than their husbands, who often had lost status in their move to the US. 4. For a more in-depth look at how people define the boundaries of their national community and how these definitions affect their notions of duty and obligation, see Wong (2009). 5. Schildkraut extends this research by exploring more civic participation aspects of American identity, but she also asks how important being white is to being a true American. Only a very small minority agrees to this explicit question (Schildkraut 2007). However, experimental work by Devos and Banaji (2005), using an implicit association test, shows that for many Americans ‘white’ does equal ‘American’. 6. It should be noted that intermarriage and exogamy are defined as marriages between individuals of different races or ethnicities, not between immigrants and non-immigrants. In some ways intermarriage is an odd measure of immigrant assimilation today. 7. Another type of political participation that requires citizenship is running for office. The requirements vary for local elections, but to run for the US House of Representatives an immigrant must be a citizen for seven years, and to run for Senator they must be a citizen for nine years. So, when one thinks about the normative question of how many immigrants should be serving in Congress, one needs to consider this additional tenure requirement, on top of the residency requirement for naturalization. And, in order to run for President of the United States the candidate must be a ‘natural born citizen’ (that is, not an immigrant).

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Index multiculturalism in Australia; labour market and immigration in Australia; social cohesion in Australia; New Zealand and White Australia Aboriginal land rights movement 153 Aborigines/indigenous Australians 117, 149, 153, 157 Access and Equity (1983) African refugees 24 ageing population of 85 border protection legislation/Tampa incident 19 Chinese communities in 117, 149 Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, Department of 88 education system in 152‒3 emigration from 9, 34‒7 see also emigration from Australia Ethnic Communities’ Councils 157 Fitzgerald enquiry (CAIIP, 1988) 41 hostility to refugees 153 Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Department of (DIMIA) 23, 26, 80, 83 Immigration and Citizenship, Department of (DIAC) 29, 30, 32, 36, 39, 156, 157 immigration reforms (1997) 92 Jewish communities in 149‒50 long-term movement (LTM) 9 see also temporary residents loyalty to British Empire 152 Middle East Lebanese refugees 118 Migrant Programs and Services (Galbally Report, 1978) 156 One Nation party/Pauline Hanson 84, 153, 158 Pacific Island guest worker scheme 3

9/11 attacks 15, 57‒8, 65‒6, 142 and anti-immigration advocates 143 Abella, M.I. 39 Age, The 79 Alba, R.D. 107, 173 Aleinikoff, T.A. 163 American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee 142 American Dream, attitudes to 167 American‒Islamic Relations, Council on 142 Andreas, P. 134, 135, 143 Antecol, H. 87, 95, 98, 103, 105, 106, 107 anti-immigration groups/activities 19, 59‒60, 145 American Federation for Immigration Reform (FAIR) 60 Minuteman Project (USA) 60 Numbers US 60 Save Our State Coalition (USA) 59 Asian 32, 58, 169 Americans 170 immigrants 37, 73, 75 and US elections 171‒2 Asian Migration News 24 assimilation see also integration and multiculturalism in US and multiculturalism in Australia and US 154‒5, 158, 160‒61, 168‒9, 173 and intermarriage 169 asylum seekers 19‒20, 39 Australia (and) 4‒6, 22‒42, 70‒99, 115‒31, 147‒59 see also flows of immigrants (1993‒2008): Australia; immigration policy in Australia; immigration settlement, ethnic relations and 195

196

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Pacific Solution, the 23, 39 Participation 156 permanent prv visa (PPV) 24 policies towards asylum seekers 23‒4 population growth in 4‒6, 80 Productivity Commission 38 racial and religious prejudice 159 return migration 9 Review of Migrant and Multicultural Programs and Services (1986) 156 skill category for 7‒8 sporting achievements 151, 152 temporary protection visa (TPV) 23‒4 Treasury, Department of 38 working holiday maker (WHM) programme 30‒31 Zero Population group 19 Australian, The 75, 79 Australian Conservation Federation 19 Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) 38 Australian Coalition government, immigration policy under 75‒8 CAAIP report 75 family reunion rules/access to welfare benefits 76‒7 immigration selection 77‒8 Skilled Occupation List 77‒8 Australian government(s) (and) see also legislation (Australia) Andrews, K. 128 Carr, B. 18, 123 Coalition 3, 19, 75‒8 Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies (CAAIP) 74‒5 Conservative 153 Democratic Labor 156 Evans, C. (Australian Minister for Immigration and Citizenship) 2, 3, 85 Fitzgerald, S. 120, 122‒3 Fraser, M. 118, 156 Hanson, P. 120 Hawke 73‒4, 83, 120 Hewson, J. 75

Howard, J. 3, 19, 74‒5, 80, 120, 148, 156, 158 Keating 75 Labor 3, 19, 33, 39, 83, 84, 94, 123, 126, 130, 150, 155‒6, 158 Liberal 118, 155, 156, 158 Multicultural Affairs, Office of (1987‒1996) 156 One Nation Party 84, 153, 158 Parliament Joint Standing Committee on Migration (2007) inquiry 32 Peacock, A. 75 Rudd, K. 3, 19, 33, 39, 83, 84‒5, 94, 158 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee (2005) 38 Shergold, P. 120, 121‒2 Australian Industrial Relations Commission 94 Australian Manufacturing Workers Union 32 and hostility to Asians/Aborigines 153 Australian Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) 90 Autor, D. 101 Bach, R.L. 134 Barclay, R. 39 Bass, L.E. 170 Bean, F.D. 42, 49, 50, 52, 54, 107 Bedford, R.D. 26, 33, 36, 49, 52 Beggs, J.J. 91 Bell, M. 26 Berlin, I. 46 Bertone, S. 91, 94‒5 Betts, K. 39, 41, 56, 75, 84 Bigelow, J. 172 Birrell, B. 25, 38, 39, 74, 76, 83, 87 birth rates/population growth 4 black Americans 168 black minority workers in US 92 Blainey, G. 151 Blau, F.D. 103 Bliney, G. 74 borders/border controls 10, 19, 49, 56, 60, 66, 71‒2, 134‒5, 142‒3 see also US‒Mexico border

Index Borjas, G.J. 102, 103, 105, 106, 107, 109, 111, 112 Borooah, V.K. 93 Bouchard, G. 148 Boyd, M. 105 Breton, R. 159 Britain (and) see also England/English Aliens Act (1905) 152 British Labour Party 70 British National Party 154 fewer migrants to Australia 151 free entry/settlement for British subjects 148, 152 post-war welfare 71 restriction of right of entry 153‒4 Brown, S.K. 42, 52 Buchanan, P. 61 Burnley, I. 126 Bush, President G.W. 13, 65‒7, 68 Business Council of Australia 79‒80 and population growth 80 business leaders and immigration (Australia) 78‒80 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 79 Australian Population Institute (APop) 79 Camarola, S.A. 58 Canada/Canadian 30, 149 immigration admissions policy 104‒6, 147 multiculturalism policy 156 Card, D. 103, 108, 109, 110‒11, 112 Carmichael, G. 26 Casper, L.M. 170 Castles, S. 70 Castro, F. 110 census data Canada and US 106 US (1920) 103 US (2000) 100, 101, 102 Chapman, A. 37 Chapman, B.J. 91 Chavez, L.R. 53 Chertoff, M. (US Homeland Security Secretary) 66, 67

197

China 3, 15, 34, 159 and Chinese communities in Australia 117, 149 Chiswick, B.R. 103, 107 Chow, E. (US Secretary of Labor) 66 Citrin, J. 164, 167, 169, 174 Cobb-Clark, D.A. 104 Cohn, D’V. 4, 9, 138, 139 Connolly, M.D. 87, 89 Cornelius, W.A. 55 Costello, P. 38 Crèvecoeur, J. 43 Crissey, S.R. 170 Cromartie, J. 140 Daniels, R. 46 De la Garza, R.O. 136, 139, 167, 170, 173 Deardorff, K. 169 Deen, H. 129 definition(s) of refugees 23 ‘true member’ of community/ country 165‒6 US membership see US membership as defined by DeFrancesco Soto, V.M. 170 DeSipio, L. 170, 173 Dharmalingam, A. 10‒11 Dissimilarity Index 140 Donato, K.M. 107 Duleep, H.O. 105 Duncan, B. 98, 104 Dunn, K.M. 24, 129 Economist, The 84 Edmonston, B. 109, 112 education language 157 low levels of 100‒102, 106, 108 over- (of migrants) 90 Edwards, J.R. 57, 60 emigration (from Australia) 34‒7 data on 36 dominant destinations for 36‒7 Senate report (2005) on 40 to UK and US 37 emigrants 8 see also return migrants/ migration 8‒10

198

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

employment rates for immigrants 101‒2 see also labour market and immigration in Australia and labour market and immigration in the US England/English migrants to American colonies 44‒45 as official US language 174 as Second Language 172 English-speaking background (ESB) migrants 90‒91 Espenshade. T.J. 50, 170 Espino, R. 143 EU member states and immigration points system 8 Europe, Council of 115 Director-General of Social Cohesion for 115 European Community 116 European Union and immigration strategies 154 Evans, C. 2, 3, 85 family migration 25‒6 and aged parents 25 Farkas, S. 138 Farley, R. 107, 169 Fielding, A. 37 File, T. 170 Fischer, D.H. 44, 45 FitzGerald, S. 74 Flatau, P. 90 flows of immigrants (1993‒2008): Australia (and) 4‒8, 22‒42 changes in composition of migration 33‒4 contemporary issues in Australian immigration 37‒40 ageing of population 38 and baby bonus 38 comprehensive population policies 38 family reunion resistrictions 39 international students 39 refugee policy 39 settlement strategies 40 skills and attributes 39‒40 social cohesion 39 emigration 34‒7

humanitarian intake 8 increasing non-permanent migration (with) 30‒33 foreign students 32‒3, 39 seasonal worker visas (subclass 416) 33 skilled temporary residence visas 30, 32‒3 working holiday maker (WHM) programme 30 and Pacific Island Seasonal Worker Scheme (2009) 3, 39 settler migration see settler migration in Australia: recent trends Fraga, L.R. 145 Frankenberg, E. 140 Franklin, B. 145, 172‒3 Freeman, G.P. 1, 56, 57, 60, 61, 133 Friedberg, R.M. 109, 112 Friedman, B.M. 43, 54 Friedmann, J. 37 Froud, J. 89 Fuchs, L. 43 Gabaccia, D.R. 43, 46 Garnaut, R. 73 Gaus, H.J. 107 Getzler, I. 149 Gimpel, J.G. 57, 60 Glazer, N. 164, 173 Gleason, P. 162 global warming/climate change 98‒9 globalization 70‒72, 117‒18, 129‒30 and energy 20, 21 Goldin, C. 52 Grattan, M. 78‒9 Green, A.G. 105 Green, C. 90 Green, D.A. 105 Guskin, J. 134 Hakimzadeh, S. 138, 139 Handlin, O. 42, 43 Hanson, G.H. 107 Harris, F.R. 55 Hawthorne, L. 86, 87, 91 Hayduk, R. 163 Healy, E. 39 Heron, M.P. 54

Index Hispanic immigrants 103, 169 passim Hispanic population of US 161 patriotism of 167‒8 and ‘true American’ concept 165 voting in US elections 171‒2 Hoefer, M. 48 Howard, J. 116 Hugo, G.J. 22, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 89 human rights, deprivation of 23 Hunt, J. 109, 112 Huntington, S.P. 57, 107, 166, 167 Ignatiev, N. 136 illegal immigration 104 to Australia 87 to US 57, 58 immigrant, types of 103 see also international students and refugees and attachment to US 166‒8 asylum seekers 23 Chinese 47 see also US immigration trends Concessional Family 77 family-sponsored (family reunion)/ legal 5 general skilled migration (GSM) 14, 77, 81, 87‒9 illegal 57, 58, 87, 104 lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and green cards (USA) 5 Mariel (Cuban) 110‒11 Mexican 100‒104, 107‒8 onshore refugee/humanitarian settlers 23‒4, 30 overseas-born/Australia-born adults 25‒6 skill-based (employer-sponsored) permanent 6, 7 skilled Asian 91 state-specific and regional migration (SSRM) 28‒30 unauthorized/undocumented 6, 49‒51 US and Latin American 105‒7 immigrant dropout rates 107‒8 immigrant settlement, ethnic relations and multiculturalism in Australia (and) 147‒59 assimilation 154‒5

199

as differing from US 148‒9 ethnic diversity 152‒3 indigenous Australians (Aborigines) 149 maintenance of founding culture/ White Australia 149‒51 multiculturalism 155‒9 the nation state 151‒2 new ethnic cultures 153‒4 social bonding 157‒8 immigrant skills 91, 98, 100‒101, 104‒7 immigration, surge and composition of 4‒8 immigration policy in Australia (and) 70‒85, 147‒9 CAAIP report 74‒5 Coalition government 75‒8 critical skills list (CSL) 85 domestic political constraints 84‒5 economic boom 78‒83 see also business leaders and immigration (Australia) English language requirements 81 English language services 74 ethnic makeup of migrant intake 73‒4 history and background of 70‒72 link between economic progress and high migration 73 multicultural policy 73, 155‒7 nation-building 72‒5 NESB community 73 Rudd Labor government 83‒5 Skilled Migration Programme and overseas students 80‒83 Skilled Occupation List (SOL) 77‒8, 80 skilled temporary residence visas 30‒32, 78, 147 Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) 74 White Australia 118, 119‒20, 148, 149‒50 immigration policy issues 10‒20 asylum seekers and migrants 19‒20 energy resources 20 environmental issues/city growth 18‒19 guest/seasonal workers 13‒14

200

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

immigration and social cohesion 10 international students 14‒16 morality and ‘cherry picking’ 16‒17 settlement deterrents 18 skills-based immigration 12‒13 sub-national immigrant dispersion 17‒18 Immigration Studies, US Center for 58‒59 International English Language Testing System (IELTS) 81‒3 integration and multiculturalism in US 160‒75 citizenship as membership 161‒3 diversity of ethnicity/race 161 political preferences of immigrants 171 US membership see US membership as defined by international students 14‒16, 32‒3, 39, 80‒83, 86‒7 from Asia 14, 86 reliance on 15 Iredale, R. 91 Jackson, J.S. 167 Jain, H.C. 92, 97 Jakubowicz 117, 128, 129, 143 Jiminez, T.R. 168‒9 Jimeno, R. 143 Joppke, C. 47, 151 Junankar, P.N. 92 Jupp, J. 1, 153, 156 Kahn, L.M. 103 Kallen, H. 173 Kandel, W. 140 Kaplan, J. (White House Deputy Chief of Staff) 67 Kasimitz, P. 169 Katz, L.F. 52, 101, 103 Kennedy, Senator E. 67, 68 Kelly, P. 86 Khoo, S-E. 38, 86, 95‒6 Kler, P. 90‒91 Kossoudji, S.A. 104, 107 Krikorian, M. 53 Kyl, Senator 68 Kymlicka , W. 151, 173

labour market and immigration in Australia (and) 86‒99 agricultural workers/temporary visas 89 discrimination by workplaces 92 employment level/status of immigrants 92‒3 Fair Works Bill 95 global warming 98‒9 labour laws and immigrants 93‒5 match of immigrants to jobs 90‒92 policy discussion and lessons 96‒9 skill mix problems 89 skill selection policy 98 skilled migration 87‒91, 97‒8 skilled vacancy index (SVI) 88 status of second and later generation migrants 95‒6 WorkChoices legislation 94‒5 labour market and immigration in the US (and) 100‒114 earnings growth 103‒4 employment 101‒2 illegal immigration 104 immigrant skills/low levels of schooling 100‒101 impact on native workers 109‒12 integration of immigrants 101‒9 intergenerational mobility 107‒9 selective admission policies/raising skills 104‒7 Lacy, E.C. 138 Latin American immigrants 105‒7 passim Latino National Political Survey (1989‒90) 138 Latino(s) 58, 132‒6 passim; 169, 170 see also social cohesion and immigration in the US communities in US 145 and English language 138‒9 as fastest growing major demographic group in US 144‒5 as growing electorate in US 146 and immigration concerns 145 integration, markers of 137‒40 religion and social division 141‒2 residential/educational segregation of 140‒41, 145

Index in US armed forces 139 US treatment of 134‒5 Leal, D.L. 133, 139, 142 legislation (Australia) Fair Works Bill 95 list of recent 131 WorkChoices (2007) 94 legislation (US) 61‒4 abortive immigration reform bill (2007) 14 Chinese exclusion laws (1943), abolition of 47 Civil Rights Act (1954) 142 Displaced Persons Act (1948) 47 Hart-Celler Act (1965) 47, 48, 49 Homestead Act 46 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996) 61, 64, 135 Immigration Act (1990) 56 immigration bills 59, 66 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, 1986) 104, 134‒5 McCarran‒Walter Act (1952) 47 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (1996) 61, 135, 163 Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act (2007) 68 on unauthorized migrants: Proposition 187 (California, 1997) 135 Levy, F. 101 Lewis, E. 111 Lieberson, S. 107 Lopez, M. 156 Lorey, D.E. 134 Lowell, L.B. 50 Lowenstein, R. 109 Lubotsky, D. 103 McCain, Senator J. 67 McConnell, Senator 68 McDonald, P. 11, 14‒15 Maclellan, N. 33 MacLeod, C.I. 148 Mahuteau, S.E. 92 Making Multicultural Australia (MMA, 2005) 125

201

Mares, P. 33 Markus, A. 10‒11 Martin, P. 40 Massey, D.S. 50, 134, 135 Masterman-Smith, H. 89, 98 Maugan, J. 93 Meissner, D. 21, 42, 66 Melbourne Protests (2007) 128 Merolla, J.L. 170 Mexican Americans, patriotism of 167 Mexican migrants/immigrants 10, 49‒51, 100 passim; 133, 136 passim in Depression years 134 and Operation Wetback (1954) 134 unauthorized entry of 134‒5 Mexico 10, 106, 133‒4 see also US‒Mexico border associated with terrorist threats 143 President of 65 and Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848) 134 migration, remittances, aid and bureacracy (MIRAB) economies 39 migration, unauthorized 58 Migration Policy Institute 9 Miller, M. 70 Minuteman Project (www. minutemanproject.com) 60 Mitchell, W. 88, 89 Montejano 136‒7 Motomura, H. 53 multiculturalism 125 in Australia 73, 155‒9 future of 158‒9 Murnane, R.J. 101 ‘Muslim Americans: middleclass and mostly mainstream’ (Pew report) 144 Muslims/Muslim organizations 118‒19, 124‒6, 128‒9, 158 and Asian communities 133, 144 Islamic Council of Victoria 129 and Islamic militancy 154, 158‒9 Nations of Immigrants (1992) 1, 2, 56 native workers, impact of immigration on 109‒12 Nee, V. 107, 173 Neidert, L. 107

202

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

new groups in Australia see social cohesion in Australia New York Times 11 and election exit polls 171 New Zealand (and) 7, 9 Australian migrants to 36 immigrations from 106 migration 33 migration to Australia 26, 151 Pacific Access Category and limited migration 33 Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme 33 Non-English-Speaking Background (NESB) 73 changed to Culturally and Linguistically Diverse 157 countries 83 migrants 90‒91, 92, 97, 157 Norman, W. 151 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 50, 135 Obama, B. 146 OECD bulletin on migrants (2006) 92 countries 2, 15, 16, 88 Ortiz, V. 169 Osborne, D. 36 over-education of migrants 90 overseas students see international students Pacific Island Seasonal Worker Scheme (2009) 3, 39 Pacific Solution on refugee policy 39 Pantoja, A.D. 170 Parekh, B. 159 Passel, J.S. 4, 9, 49, 50, 51, 107 Perlmann, J. 96, 107, 109 Perrin, R.-L. 24 Pocock, B. 89, 98 polls on illegal immigration (CBS News, 2007) 11‒12 immigration levels (CBS/New York Times, 2008) 11 population growth/changes 4‒6, 80 population movement, removal of barriers to 70

Portes, A. 107, 137, 169 poverty rates for immigrants and US-born children 59 Povoledo, E. 54 Pratt, R. 79 Price, C. 41, 105 Puerto Rican immigrants 107‒8 Quirk, V. 88, 89 racism in Australia 158 and One Nation 84, 153, 158 Ramakrishnan, S.K. 170 reciprocal agreements 30 refugees 8, 23‒4, 30, 47‒8, 118, 119, 127‒8, 153 Jewish 153 Pacific Solution for 39 Regets, M.C. 105 Reimers, D.M. 47 Reid, Senator H. 67, 68 Reitz, J. 105, 106, 159 religion(s) 141‒2, 150 and naturalization levels 159 Renshon, S.A. 166 report(s) on Latinos and rural population growth in 1990s (US Dept of Agriculture) 141 worldwide immigration (The Economist, 2008) 16 research data from Household Income and Labour Dynamics (HH.DA, 2001) 91 Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) 90, 92‒3 research/studies/surveys (on/by) alternatives to immigration to US (Center for Immigration Studies, 2006) 60‒61 American Community Survey (2002) 169 Australia Centre for Policy Development (2008) 95 education and segregation of Latino students (Harvard Civil Rights Project) 140

Index fencing US border with Mexico (Cable News Network, 2008) 12 immigration/love for America (NPC, Kaiser Family Foundation 2004) 165, 166, 171 influence of cultural diversity on community (2008) 41 Latino immigrants and English language (Kaiser/Pew, 2002) 139 Latino residential and educational segregation (Lewis Mumford Center) 140 Latinos and interracial marriage (Pew) 139 Latinos and political climate (Pew Hispanic Center, 2008) 140 Los Angeles County Social Surveys (LACSS 1995, 1999, 2000) 167 Mapping Social Cohesion (2008) 10‒11 National Politics Study (University of Michigan 2004‒05) 167 Pew Research Report (2007) 11 Population Survey (1994‒2006) 107 professional/managerial employment of migrants (2001) 93 Scanlon (Australia) 11 second-generation immigrants (US) 169 urban gangs in Australia (Sydney Centre for Refugee Research) 127 US General Social Surveys (GSS, 1996 and 2004) 164‒5, 168 return migrants/migration 9‒10 Rivera-Batiz, F.L. 104 Rizvi, A. 33 Rodriguez, C. 60 Rowthorn, R. 16‒17, 89 Ruddick, E. 40 Rumbaut, R.G. 107 Salehyan, I. 142 Sassen, S. 37 seasonal worker visas (subclass 416) 33 Segura, G.M. 145, 170

203

settler migration in Australia: recent trends 22‒30 family migration 25‒6 humanitarian programme 23‒4 increased onshore migration 27‒8 Pacific Solution, the 23, 39 permanent prv visa (PPV) 24 skill migration programme 24‒5 state-specific and regional migration schemes (SSRM) 28‒30 temporary protection visa (TPV) 23‒4 trans-Tasman migration 26 Shorto, R. 55 Simmons, A. 27 Skerry, P. 136, 137 skill categories 7‒8 skills-based (employer-sponsored) permanent immigrants 6, 7 skills-based/skilled immigration 12‒13, 24‒5, 87‒9 and lack of US strategy 12 and over-education 90 Smith, J.P. 109, 112 social cohesion in Australia (and) 116‒31 African settlement/refugees 127‒8 ambiguities of 129‒30 building blocs for 119‒25 crime gangs 123 Cronulla riots (2005) 124, 125 domestic reaction to newcomers 119‒20 European Community model for 116 Fitzgerald Report 121‒3 history of settlement patterns 126‒8 Islamic Council of Victoria/Catch the Fire Ministries 129 legislation for 131 see also legislation (Australia) multiculturalism 121‒5, 143‒4 Muslims/Muslim organizations 118‒19, 124‒6, 128‒9 racial politics 120‒21 refugees (1990s) 119 religious conflict/social division 128‒9 security 125‒6 setting a context for 117‒19

204

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

terrorism 124, 125‒6 ‘White Australia’ 118, 119‒20, 148, 149‒50 social cohesion and immigration in the US (and) 132‒46 see also Latino(s) after 9/11 142‒3 Catholics 150 comparisons with Australia 143‒4 forced removals of unauthorized migrants 133 isolation and segregation 140‒41 Jewish communities 149‒50 markers of Latino integration 137‒40 multiculturalism and integration 150‒51 Muslim and Asian communities in 133, 144 Muslims and Arabs, reported crimes/discrimination against 142 race and immigration 135‒7 racial identification/black‒white paradigm 135‒6 religious conflict/social division 141‒2 treatment of Latinos 134‒5 Soysal, Y. 163, 164 Specter, Senator 67 Spratt, D. 99 Stevens, G. 49, 50, 54 students see international students Sutton, P. 99 Sydney Morning Herald, The 79 Takaki, R. 45 Telles, E.E. 169 temporary residents ‒ Australia and US 8‒10 Terrazas, A.M. 133 Thapa, P.J. 91‒2 Thorell, E. 127 Tichenor, D.J. 46, 47, 173 Trejo, S.J. 98, 103 United Nations Convention on refugees 23 definition of refugees 23

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 23 United States of America (US) (and) 5‒6, 42‒69, 100‒114, 132‒46, 160‒75 see also assimilation; integration and multiculturalism in the US; labour market and immigration in the US; Latinos; legislation (US); social cohesion and immigration in the US; US, immigration to; US immigration politics and US immigration trends African Americans 135‒6, 152 Black Power 153 Border Control 49, 56, 60, 134 Bracero Program/seasonal workers 13‒14, 48, 134 Bureau of the Census 49 Census Bureau 161, 169 Chamber of Commerce 66 Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 58 Civil War 46 comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) 66‒7 Constitution 163 Declaration of Independence 43 Democratic Party 150 elections, registering and voting in 170‒72 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 142 features of immigration to 3‒4 Federation of American Immigration Reform 19 HIB (temporary worker) visas 32, 65 Homeland Security, Department of (DHS) 5, 42, 49, 51, 65, 133 humanitarian intake 8 illegal immigration to 57, 58 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 58 Immigration and Naturalization Service 56 immigration policy 132 passim, 148 passim indigenous communities/Native Americans 149

Index international students 14‒15 Labor, Department of 65 as leading industrial power 46 legal permanent residents (LPRs/ green card recipients) 9 military conscription/Selective Service 164 race relations 148 racial and ethnic minorities 161 Sierra Club 19 skills-based immigration 12‒13 slavery, abolition of 152 slaves/slavery 45‒6, 148 tightening of student visa procedures 15 transcontinental railroad 46 ‘true Americans’, concept of 165‒6 undocumented/unauthorized population segment/migrants 20, 133 US membership see US membership as defined by welfare reform see legislation (US) Wilderness Society 19 US, immigration to 44‒8 agrarian settlers 46 colonial pioneers 44‒5 from England 44‒5 industrial labourers 46‒7 refugees (war-related) 47‒8 reunited families 47‒8 slaves from Africa 45‒6 US immigration policy 132 passim, 148 passim US immigration trends (and) 42‒55 see also legislation (US) abolition of Chinese exclusion laws (1943) 47 American Community Surveys 48, 169 assimilation 154‒5 non-immigrant entrants/temporary legal workers 51‒2 overall international migration 48‒9 reliance on temporary/unauthorized guest workers 52‒5 restrictions on immigration (1882 and 1917) 47 unauthorized migrants 49‒51 US Census 48‒49

205

US immigration politics (and) 56‒69 anti-immigration activities 59‒60 border enforcement (IIRIRA, 1996) 64 changes in (since 1992) 57‒8 economic benefits of immigration 57 end of expansionist consensus 58‒61 immigration reform 65‒6 merit-based points system 67‒8 report from Center for Immigration Studies 58‒9 restrictive immigration proposals 62‒4 revolt and stalemate (Phase One, 1992‒2000) 61‒5 revolt and stalemate (Phase Two, 2001‒08) 65‒9 US membership as defined by American public opinion 164‒6 immigrants’ attitudes 166‒8 rights and responsibilities 163‒4 similarity to other members 168‒72 US‒Mexico border 10, 49, 60, 134 after 9/11 142‒3 and Minuteman Project 60 new enforcement resources for 57 securing 65‒6 Vanstone, A. 81, 84 Vigdor, J.L. 155 Virdee, S. 96 Vladychenko, A. 115 Waldinger, R. 96, 107, 109 Warren, R. 49, 107 Waslin, M. 143 Waters, M.C. 107, 168‒9 welfare benefits/rights for non-citizens 163 West, P. 39 White Australia 118, 119‒20, 148, 149‒50, 155 total exclusion policy of 153 Wilson, D.L. 134 Windschuttle, K. 124 Withers, G. 11, 14‒15, 40, 80

206

Nations of immigrants: Australia and the USA compared

Who Are We? 167 Wong, J.S. 170 Woodrow, K.A. 50 working holiday maker (WHM) programme (Australia) 30‒31

World Trade Center, attacks on 60 Wulff, M. 17 Zhou, M. 107, 169 Zolberg, A.R. 43, 44, 45, 46