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Editorial: Tariq Ali, ‘Afghanistan: Mirage of the Good War’
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CONTENTS Tariq Ali: Afghanistan: Mirage of the Good War Reasons for the West’s stalemate in Afghanistan sought neither in lack of troops and imperial treasure, nor in Pakistani obstruction, but in the very nature of the occupation regime. Tariq Ali on the actual results of ‘state-building’ in the Hindu Kush, as a broken country is subjected to the combined predations of NGOs and NATO.
Benedict Anderson: Exit Suharto What explains the extraordinary longevity of Indonesia’s ‘New Order’, and what are the legacies of three decades of dictatorship? Benedict Anderson details Suharto’s career, from colonial army to crony capitalism, and explores the consequences of his rule—political, social,
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tariq ali Editorial
A F G H A N I S TA N : MIRAGE OF THE GOOD WAR
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arely has there been such an enthusiastic display of international unity as that which greeted the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Support for the war was universal in the chanceries of the West, even before its aims and parameters had been declared. nato governments rushed to assert themselves ‘all for one’. Blair jetted round the world, proselytizing the ‘doctrine of the international community’ and the opportunities for peace-keeping and nation-building in the Hindu Kush. Putin welcomed the extension of American bases along Russia’s southern borders. Every mainstream Western party endorsed the war; every media network—with bbc World and cnn in the lead—became its megaphone. For the German Greens, as for Laura Bush and Cherie Blair, it was a war for the liberation of the women of Afghanistan.1 For the White House, a fight for civilization. For Iran, the impending defeat of the Wahhabi enemy. Three years later, as the chaos in Iraq deepened, Afghanistan became the ‘good war’ by comparison. It had been legitimized by the un—even if the resolution was not passed until after the bombs had finished falling—and backed by nato. If tactical differences had sharpened over Iraq, they could be resolved in Afghanistan. First Zapatero, then Prodi, then Rudd, compensated for pulling troops out of Iraq by dispatching them to Kabul.2 France and Germany could extol their peace-keeping or civilizing roles there. As suicide bombings increased in Baghdad, Afghanistan was now—for American Democrats keen to prove their new left review 50 mar apr 2008
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‘security’ credentials—the ‘real front’ of the war on terror, supported by every us presidential candidate in the run-up to the 2008 elections, with Senator Obama pressuring the White House to violate Pakistani sovereignty whenever necessary. With varying degrees of firmness, the occupation of Afghanistan was also supported by China, Iran and Russia; though in the case of the latter, there was always a strong element of Schadenfreude. Soviet veterans of the Afghan war were amazed to see their mistakes now being repeated by the United States in a war even more inhumane than its predecessor. Meanwhile, the number of Afghan civilians killed has exceeded many tens of times over the 2,746 who died in Manhattan. Unemployment is around 60 per cent and maternal, infant and child mortality levels are now among the highest in the world. Opium harvests have soared, and the ‘Neo-Taliban’ is growing stronger year by year. By common consent, Karzai’s government does not even control its own capital, let alone provide an example of ‘good governance’. Reconstruction funds vanish into cronies’ pockets or go to pay short-contract Western consultants. Police are predators rather than protectors. The social crisis is deepening. Increasingly, Western commentators have evoked the spectre of failure—usually in order to spur encore un effort. A Guardian leader summarizes: ‘Defeat looks possible, with all the terrible consequences that will bring.’3 Two principal arguments, often overlapping, are put forward as to ‘what went wrong’ in Afghanistan. For liberal imperialists, the answer can In fact, the only period in Afghan history where women were granted equal rights and educated was from 1979–89, the decade it was ruled by the pdpa, backed by Soviet troops. Repressive in many ways, on the health and education fronts real progress was achieved, as in Iraq under Saddam. Hence the nostalgia for the past amongst poorer sections of society in both countries. 2 Visiting Madrid after Zapatero’s election triumph of March 2008, I was informed by a senior government official that they had considered a total withdrawal from Afghanistan a few months before the polls but had been outmanoeuvred by the us promising Spain that the head of its military would be proposed for commander of the nato forces, and a withdrawal from Kabul would disrupt this possibility. Spain drew back, only to discover it had been tricked. 3 ‘Failing State’, Guardian, 1 February 2008; see also ‘The Good War, Still to Be Won’ and ‘Gates, Truth and Afghanistan’, New York Times, 20 August 2007 and 12 February 2008; ‘Must they be wars without end?’, Economist, 13 December 2007; International Crisis Group, ‘Combating Afghanistan’s Insurgency’, 2 November 2006. 1
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be summarized in two words: ‘not enough’. The invasion organized by Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld was done on the cheap. The ‘light footprint’ demanded by the Pentagon meant that there were too few troops on the ground in 2001–02. Financial commitment to ‘state-building’ was insufficient. Though it may now be too late, the answer is to pour in more troops, more money—‘multiple billions’ over ‘multiple years’, according to the us Ambassador in Kabul.4 The second answer—advanced by Karzai and the White House, but propagated by the Western media generally—can be summed up in one word: Pakistan. Neither of these arguments holds water.
Political failures True, there was a sense of relief in Kabul when the Taliban’s Wahhabite Emirate was overthrown. Though rape and heroin production had been curtailed under their rule, warlords kept at bay and order largely restored in a country that had been racked by foreign and civil wars since 1979, the end result had been a ruthless social dictatorship with a level of control over the everyday lives of ordinary people that made the clerical regime in Iran appear an island of enlightenment. The Taliban government fell without a serious struggle. Islamabad, officially committed to the us cause, forbade any frontal confrontation.5 Some Taliban zealots crossed the border into Pakistan, while a more independent faction loyal to Mullah Omar decamped to the mountains to fight another day. Kabul was undefended; the bbc war correspondent entered the capital before the Northern Alliance. What many Afghans now expected from a successor government was a similar level of order, minus the repression and social restrictions, and a freeing of the country’s spirit. What they were instead presented with was a melancholy spectacle that blasted all their hopes. The problem was not lack of funds but the Western state-building project itself, by its nature an exogenous process—aiming to construct an army able to suppress its own population but incapable of defending New York Times, 5 November 2006. Pakistan’s key role in securing this ‘victory’ was underplayed in the Western media at the time. The public was told that it was elite Special Forces units and cia ‘specialists’ that had liberated Afghanistan; having triumphed here they could now be sent on to Iraq. 4 5
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the nation from outside powers; a civil administration with no control over planning or social infrastructure, which are in the hands of Western ngos; and a government whose foreign policy marches in step with Washington’s. It bore no relation to the realities on the ground. After the fall of the Taliban government, four major armed groups re-emerged as strong regional players. In the gas-rich and more industrialized north, bordering the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum was in charge with his capital in Mazari-Sharif. Allied first to the Communists, later the Taliban and most recently nato, General Dostum had demonstrated his latest loyalty by massacring 2–3,000 Taliban and Arab prisoners under the approving gaze of us intelligence personnel in December 2001. Not too far from Dostum, in the mountainous north-east of the country, a region rich in emeralds, lapis lazuli and opium, the late Ahmed Shah Masoud had built a fighting organization of Tajiks, who regularly ambushed troops on the Salang Highway that linked Kabul to Tashkent during the Soviet occupation. Masoud had been the leader of the armed wing of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamaat-i-Islami, which operated in tandem with an allied Islamist leader, Abd al-Rabb Sayyaf (both men were lecturers in sharia at the law faculty of Kabul University in 1973, where these movements were incubated). Until 1993 they were funded by Saudi Arabia, after which the latter gradually shifted its support to the Taliban. Masoud maintained a semi-independence during the Taliban period, up to his death on 9 September 2001.6 Masoud’s supporters are currently in the government, but are not considered one hundred per cent reliable as far as nato is concerned. To the west, sheltered by neighbouring Iran, lies the ancient city of Herat, once a centre of learning and culture where poets, artists and scholars flourished. Among the important works illustrated here over the course of three centuries was a 15th-century version of the classic Miraj-nameh, an early medieval account of the Prophet’s ascent to heaven from the Dome 6 Masoud had been a favourite pin-up in Paris during the Soviet–Afghan war, usually portrayed as a ruggedly romantic, anti-Communist Che Guevara. His membership of Rabbani’s Islamist group and reactionary views on most social issues were barely mentioned. But if he had presented an image of incorruptible masculinity to his supporters in the West, it was not the same at home. Rape and the heroin trade were not uncommon in areas under his control.
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of the Rock and the punishments he observed as he passed through hell.7 In modern Herat, the Shia warlord Ismail Khan holds sway. A former army captain inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ismail achieved instant fame by leading a garrison revolt against the pro-Moscow regime in 1979. Backed by Teheran he built up a strong force that united all the Shia groups and were to trouble the Russians throughout their stay. Tens of thousands of refugees from this region (where a Persian dialect is the spoken language) were given work, shelter and training in Iran. From 1992–95, the province was run on authoritarian lines. It was a harsh regime: Ismail Khan’s half-witted effrontery soon began to alienate his allies, while his high-tax and forced conscription policies angered peasant families. By the time the Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996, support had already drained away from the warlord. Herat fell without a struggle, The stunning illustrations were exquisitely calligraphed by Malik Bakshi in the Uighur script. There are 61 paintings in all, created with great love for the Prophet of Islam. He is depicted with Central Asian features and seen flying to heaven on a magical steed with a woman’s head. There are also illustrations of a meeting with Gabriel and Adam, a sighting of houris at the gates of Paradise, and of winebibbers being punished in hell. European scholars have suggested that an early Latin translation of the poem may have been a source of inspiration for Dante. 7
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and Ismail was imprisoned by the Taliban, only escaping in March 2000. His supporters meanwhile crossed the border to Iran where they bided their time, to return in October 2001 under nato cover. The south was another story again. The Pashtun villages bore the brunt of the fighting during the 1980s and 90s.8 Rapid population growth, coupled with the disruptions of war and the resulting loss of livestock, hastened the collapse of the subsistence economy. In many districts this was replaced by poppy cultivation and the rule of local bandits and strongmen. By the early 1990s, three militant Sunni groups had acquired dominance in the region: the Taliban, the group led by Ahmed Shah Masoud from the Panjsher province, and the followers of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, once Pakistan’s favourite, who had been groomed by the Saudis as the new leader. The jihad was long over, and now the jihadis were at each other’s throats, with control of the drug trade the major stake in a brutal power struggle. Under Benazir Bhutto’s second premiership, Pakistan’s military backing for the Taliban proved decisive. But the overthrow of the Mullah Omar government in the winter of 2001 saw the re-emergence of many of the local gangsters whose predations it had partly checked.
Anointment of Karzai Washington assigned the task of assembling a new government to Zalmay Khalilzad, its Afghan-American pro-consul in Kabul. The capital was occupied by competing militias, united only by opposition to the toppled Taliban, and their representatives had to be accommodated on every level. The Northern Alliance candidate for president, Abdul Haq of Jalalabad, had conveniently been captured and executed in October 2001 by the Taliban when he entered the country with a small group from Pakistan. (His supporters alleged betrayal by the cia and the isi, who were unhappy about his links to Russia and Iran, and tipped off Mullah Omar.) Another obvious anti-Taliban candidate was Ahmed Shah Masoud; but he had Afghanistan’s ethnography has generated a highly politicized statistical debate. The 6-year survey carried out by a Norwegian foundation is probably the most accurate. This suggests that Pashtuns make up an estimated 63 per cent of the population, along with the mainly Persian-speaking Tajiks (12 per cent), Uzbeks (9 per cent) and the mainly Shia Hazaras (6 per cent): wak Foundation, Norway 1999. The cia Factbook, by contrast, gives 42, 27, 9 and 9 per cent respectively. The tiny nonMuslim minority of Hindus and Sikhs, mainly shopkeepers and traders in Kabul, were displaced by the Taliban; some were killed, and thousands fled to India. 8
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also been killed—by a suicide bomber of unknown provenance—two days before 9.11. Masoud would no doubt have been the eu choice for Afghan president, had he lived; the French government issued a postage stamp with his portrait, and Kabul airport bears his name. Whether he would have proved as reliable a client as Khalilzad’s transplanted protégé, Hamid Karzai, must now remain an open question. Aware that the us could not run the country without the Northern Alliance and its backers in Teheran and Moscow, Khalilzad toned down the emancipatory rhetoric and concentrated on the serious business of occupation. The coalition he constructed resembled a blind octopus, with mainly Tajik limbs and Karzai as its unseeing eye. The Afghan president comes from the Durrani tribe of Pashtuns from Kandahar. His father had served in a junior capacity in Zahir Shah’s government. Young Karzai backed the mujaheddin against Russia and later supported the Taliban, though he turned down their offer to become Afghanistan’s Ambassador to the un, preferring to relocate and work for unocal. Here he backed up Khalilzad, who was then representing CentGas in their bid to construct a pipeline that would take gas from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan and India.9 After his appointment as interim president, the Saudi daily Al-Watan published a revealing profile of Karzai, stating that he had been a cia pawn since the 80s, with his status on the Afghan chessboard enhanced every few years: Since then, Karzai’s ties with the Americans have not been interrupted. At the same time, he established ties with the British and other European and The CentGas consortium, incorporated in 1997, included unocal, Gazprom, Hyundai and oil companies from Saudi Arabia, Japan and Pakistan. In late 1997 a Taliban delegation received full honours when they visited unocal hq, hoping to sign the £2bn pipeline contract. According to the Sunday Telegraph (‘Oil Barons Court Taliban in Texas’, 14 December 1997): ‘the Islamic warriors appear to have been persuaded to close the deal, not through delicate negotiation but by old-fashioned Texan hospitality. Dressed in traditional shalwar kameez, Afghan waistcoats and loose, black turbans, the high-ranking delegation was given vip treatment during the four-day stay.’ The project was suspended in 1998, as the Taliban were split on whom to award the pipeline project to: Mullah Rabbani preferred the offer from the Argentine company Bridas, while Mullah Omar was strongly in favour of the American-led deal. But us–Taliban contacts continued till mid-2001 both in Islamabad and New York, where the Taliban maintained a ‘diplomatic office’ headed by Abdul Hakim Mojahed. 9
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international sides, especially after he became deputy foreign minister in 1992 in the wake of the Afghan mujaheddin’s assumption of power and the overthrow of the pro-Moscow Najibullah regime. Karzai found no contradiction between his ties with the Americans and his support for the Taliban movement as of 1994, when the Americans had—secretly and through the Pakistanis—supported the Taliban’s assumption of power to put an end to the civil war and the actual partition of Afghanistan due to the failure of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s experience in ruling the country.10
Karzai was duly installed in December 2001, but intimacy with us intelligence networks failed to translate into authority or legitimacy at home. Karzai harboured no illusions about his popularity in the country. He knew his biological and political life was heavily dependent on the occupation and demanded a bodyguard of us Marines or American mercenaries, rather than a security detail from his own ethnic Pashtun base.11 There were at least three coup attempts against him in 2002–03 by his Northern Alliance allies; these were fought off by the isaf, which was largely tied down in assuring Karzai’s security—while also providing a vivid illustration of where his support lay.12 A quick-fix presidential contest organized at great expense by Western pr firms in October 2004—just in time for the us elections—failed to bolster support for the puppet president inside the country. Karzai’s habit of parachuting his relatives and protégés into provincial governor or police chief jobs has driven many local communities into alliance with the Taliban, as the main anti-government force. In Zabul, Helmand and elsewhere, all the insurgents had to do was ‘approach the victims of the pro-Karzai strongmen and promise them protection and support. Attempts by local elders to seek protection in Kabul routinely ended nowhere, as the wrongdoers enjoyed either direct us support or Karzai’s sympathy.’13 Nor is it any secret that Karzai’s younger brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, has now become one of the richest drug barons in the country. At a meeting with Pakistan’s president in 2005, when Karzai was bleating bbc Monitoring Service, 15 December 2001. The late Benazir Bhutto made the same request for American protection on her return to Pakistan, but in her case it was vetoed by Islamabad. 12 Barry McCaffrey, ‘Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan’, us Military Academy Memorandum, West Point, ny 2006, p. 8. 13 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: the Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, London 2007, p. 60. The corruption and brutality of the newly established Afghan National Police is also widely credited with turning the population against the Karzai government. 10 11
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about Pakistan’s inability to stop cross-border smuggling, Musharraf suggested that perhaps Karzai should set an example by bringing his sibling under control. (The hatred for each other of these two close allies of Washington is well known in the region.)
New inequalities Also feeding the resentment is the behaviour of a new elite clustered around Karzai and the occupying forces, which has specialized in creaming off foreign aid to create its own criminal networks of graft and patronage. The corruptions of this layer grow each month like an untreated tumour. Western funds are siphoned off to build fancy homes for the native enforcers. Housing scandals erupted as early as 2002, when cabinet ministers awarded themselves and favoured cronies prime real estate in Kabul where land prices were rocketing, since the occupiers and their camp followers had to live in the style to which they were accustomed. Karzai’s colleagues, protected by isaf troops, built their large villas in full view of the mud-brick hovels of the poor. The burgeoning slum settlements of Kabul, where the population has now swollen to an estimated 3 million, are a measure of the social crisis that has engulfed the country. The ancient city has suffered cruelly over the past thirty years. Jade Maiwand, the modernized ‘Oxford Street’ cut through the centre in the 1970s, was reduced to rubble during the warfare of 1992–96. An American-Afghan architect describes how Kabul has been relentlessly transformed: from a modern capital, to the military and political headquarters of an invading army, to the besieged seat of power of a puppet regime, to the front lines of factional conflict resulting in the destruction of two-thirds of its urban mass, to the testing fields of religious fanaticism which erased from the city the final layers of urban life, to the target of an international war on terrorism.14
Yet never have such gaping inequalities featured on this scale before. Little of the supposed $19 billion ‘aid and reconstruction’ money has reached the majority of Afghans. The mains electricity supply is worse now than five years ago, and while the rich can use private generators to power their air conditioners, hot-water heaters, computers and satellite 14
Ajmal Maiwandi, ‘Re-Doing Kabul’, presented at lse, 11 July 2002.
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tvs, average Kabulis ‘suffered a summer without fans and face a winter without heaters.’15 As a result, hundreds of shelterless Afghans are literally freezing to death each winter. Then there are the ngos who descended on the country like locusts after the occupation. As one observer reports: A reputed 10,000 ngo staff have turned Kabul into the Klondike during the gold rush, building office blocks, driving up rents, cruising about in armoured jeeps and spending stupefying sums of other people’s money, essentially on themselves. They take orders only from some distant agency, but then the same goes for the American army, nato, the un, the eu and the supposedly sovereign Afghan government.16
Even supporters of the occupation have lost patience with these bodies, and some of the most successful candidates in the 2005 National Assembly elections made an attack on them a centre-piece of their campaigns. Worse, according to one us specialist, ‘their well-funded activities highlighted the poverty and ineffectiveness of the civil administration and discredited its local representatives in the eyes of the local populace.’17 Unsurprisingly, ngo employees began to be targeted by the insurgents, including in the north, and had to hire mercenary protection. In sum: even in the estimate of the West’s own specialists and institutions, ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan has been flawed in its very conception. It has so far produced a puppet president dependent for his survival on foreign mercenaries, a corrupt and abusive police force, a ‘non-functioning’ judiciary, a thriving criminal layer and a deepening social and economic crisis. It beggars belief to argue that ‘more of this’ will be the answer to Afghanistan’s problems.
An Afghan surge? The argument that more nato troops are the solution is equally unsustainable. All the evidence suggests that the brutality of the occupying forces has been one of the main sources of recruits for the Taliban. Barnett Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, January–February 2007. Simon Jenkins, ‘It takes inane optimism to see victory in Afghanistan’, Guardian, 8 August 2007. 17 S. Frederick Starr, ‘Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-Building’, in Fukuyama, ed., Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Baltimore 2006, p. 117. 15
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American air power, lovingly referred to as ‘Big Daddy’ by frightened us soldiers on unwelcome terrain, is far from paternal when it comes to targeting Pashtun villages. There is widespread fury among Afghans at the number of civilian casualties, many of them children. There have been numerous incidents of rape and rough treatment of women by isaf soldiers, as well as indiscriminate bombing of villages and houseto-house search-and-arrest missions. The behaviour of the foreign mercenaries backing up the nato forces is just as bad. Even sympathetic observers admit that ‘their alcohol consumption and patronage of a growing number of brothels in Kabul . . . is arousing public anger and resentment.’18 To this could be added the deaths by torture at the us-run Bagram prison and the resuscitation of a Soviet-era security law under which detainees are being sentenced to 20-year jail terms on the basis of summary allegations by us military authorities. All this creates a thirst for dignity that can only be assuaged by genuine independence. Talk of ‘victory’ sounds increasingly hollow to Afghan ears. Many who detest the Taliban are so angered by the failures of nato and the behaviour of its troops that they are pleased there is some opposition. What was initially viewed by some locals as a necessary police action against al-Qaeda following the 9.11 attacks is now perceived by a growing majority in the region as a fully fledged imperial occupation. Successive recent reports have suggested that the unpopularity of the government and the ‘disrespectful’ behaviour of the occupying troops have had the effect of creating nostalgia for the time when the Taliban were in power. The repression leaves people with no option but to back those trying to resist, especially in a part of the world where the culture of revenge is strong. When a whole community feels threatened it reinforces solidarity, regardless of the character or weakness of those who fight back. This does not just apply to the countryside. The mass protests in Kabul, when civilians were killed by an American military vehicle, signalled the obvious targets: Rioters chanted slogans against the United States and President Karzai and attacked the Parliament building, the offices of media outlets and nongovernmental organizations, diplomatic residences, brothels, and hotels and restaurants that purportedly served alcohol. The police, many of whom disappeared, proved incompetent, and the vulnerability of the government to mass violence became clear.19 18 Barnett Rubin, ‘Proposals for Improved Stability in Afghanistan’, in Ivo Daalder et al, eds, Crescent of Crisis: us–European Strategy for the Greater Middle East, Washington, dc 2006, p. 149. 19 Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’.
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As the British and Russians discovered to their cost in the preceding two centuries, Afghans do not like being occupied. If a second-generation Taliban is now growing and creating new alliances it is not because its sectarian religious practices have become popular, but because it is the only available umbrella for national liberation. Initially, the middlecadre Taliban who fled across the border in November 2001 and started low-level guerrilla activity the following year attracted only a trickle of new recruits from madrasas and refugee camps. From 2004 onwards, increasing numbers of young Waziris were radicalized by Pakistani military and police incursions in the tribal areas, as well as devastating attacks on villages by unmanned us ‘drones’. At the same time, the movement was starting to win active support from village mullahs in Zabul, Helmand, Ghazni, Paktika and Kandahar provinces, and then in the towns. By 2006 there were reports of Kabul mullahs who had previously supported Karzai’s allies but were now railing against the foreigners and the government; calls for jihad against the occupiers were heard in the north-east border provinces of Takhar and Badakhshan. The largest pool for new Taliban recruits, according to a well-informed recent estimate, has been ‘communities antagonized by the local authorities and security forces’. In Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan, Karzai’s cronies—district and provincial governors, security bosses, police chiefs—are quite prepared to tip off us troops against their local rivals, as well as subjecting the latter to harassment and extortion. In these circumstances, the Taliban are the only available defence. (According to the same report, the Taliban themselves have claimed that families driven into refugee camps by indiscriminate us airpower attacks on their villages have been their major source of recruits.) By 2006 the movement was winning the support of traders and businessmen in Kandahar, and led a mini ‘Tet offensive’ there that year. One reason suggested for their increasing support in towns is that the new-model Taliban have relaxed their religious strictures, for males at least—no longer demanding beards or banning music—and improved their propaganda: producing cassette tapes and cds of popular singers, and dvds of us and Israeli atrocities in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.20 The re-emergence of the Taliban cannot therefore simply be blamed on Islamabad’s failure to police the border, or cut ‘command and control’ links, as the Americans claim. While the isi played a crucial role 20
Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, pp. 42, 69.
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in bringing the Taliban to power in 1996 and in the retreat of 2001, they no longer have the same degree of control over a more diffuse and widespread movement, for which the occupation itself has been the main recruiting sergeant. It is a traditional colonial ploy to blame ‘outsiders’ for internal problems: Karzai specializes in this approach. If anything, the destabilization functions in the other direction: the war in Afghanistan has created a critical situation in two Pakistani frontier provinces, and the use of the Pakistan army by Centcom has resulted in suicide terrorism in Lahore, where the Federal Investigation Agency and the Naval War College have been targeted by supporters of the Afghan insurgents. The Pashtun majority in Afghanistan has always had close links to its fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan. The present border was an imposition by the British Empire, but it has always remained porous. It is virtually impossible to build a Texan fence or an Israeli wall across the mountainous and largely unmarked 1,500-mile frontier that separates the two countries.
Older models The current occupation of Afghanistan naturally recalls colonial operations in the region, not just to Afghans but to some Western myth-makers—usually British, but with a few Subcontinental mimics— who try to draw lessons from the older model; the implication being that the British were ‘good imperialists’ who have a great deal to teach the brutish, impatient Americans. The British administrators were, for the most part, racist to the core, and their self-proclaimed ‘competence’ involved the efficient imposition of social apartheid in every colony they controlled. They could be equally brutal in Africa, the Middle East and India. Though a promise of civilizational uplift was required as ideological justification, then as now, the facts of the colonial legacy speak for themselves. In 1947, the year the British left India, the overwhelming majority of midnight’s children were illiterate, and 85 per cent of the economy was rural.21 21 ‘Per capita income was about one-twentieth of the level then attained in developed countries . . . Illiteracy was a high 84 per cent and the majority (60 per cent) of children in the 6 to 11 age-group did not attend school; mass communicable diseases (malaria, smallpox and cholera) were widespread and, in the absence of a good public health service and sanitation, mortality rates (27 per 1,000) were very high.’ Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai, eds, Cambridge Economic History of India, vol. II: c.1757–c.1970, Cambridge 1983, p. 23.
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Not bad intentions or botched initiatives, but the imperial presence itself was the problem. Kipling is much quoted today by editorialists urging a bigger Western ‘footprint’ in Afghanistan, but even he was fully aware of the hatred felt by the Pashtuns for the British, and wrote as much in one of his last despatches from Peshawar in April 1885 to the Civil and Military Gazette in Lahore: Pathans, Afridis, Logas, Kohistanis, Turcomans and a hundred other varieties of the turbulent Afghan race, are gathered in the vast human menagerie between the Edwardes Gate and the Ghor Khutri. As an Englishman passes, they will turn to scowl on him, and in many cases to spit fluently on the ground after he has passed. One burly, big-paunched ruffian, with shaven head and a neck creased and dimpled with rolls of fat, is specially zealous in this religious rite—contenting himself with no perfunctory performance, but with a whole-souled expectoration, that must be as refreshing to his comrades as it is disgusting to the European.
One reason among many for the Pashtuns’ historic resentment was the torching of the famous bazaar in Kabul, a triumph of Mughal architecture. Ali Mardan Khan, a renowned governor, architect and engineer, had built the chahr-chatta (four-sided) roofed and arcaded central market in the 17th century on the model of those in old Euro-Arabian Muslim cities—Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Palermo or Córdoba. It was regarded as unique in the region; nothing on the same scale was built in Lahore or Delhi. The bazaar was deliberately destroyed in 1842 by General Pollock’s ‘Army of Retribution’, remembered as amongst the worst killers, looters and marauders ever to arrive in Afghanistan, a contest in which competition remains strong. Defeated in a number of cities and forced to evacuate Kabul, the British punished its citizens by removing the market from the map. What will remain of Kabul when the current occupiers finally withdraw is yet to be seen, but its spreading mass of deeply impoverished squatter settlements suggest that it is set to be one of the major new capitals of the ‘planet of slums’.22 The Western occupation of Afghanistan is now confronted with five seemingly intractable, interrelated problems. The systemic failures of its nation-building strategy, the corruption of its local agents, the growing alienation of large sectors of the population and the strengthening of armed resistance are all compounded by the distortions wrought by 22
Mike Davis, ‘Planet of Slums’, nlr 26, March–April 2004, p. 13.
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the opium-heroin industry on the country’s economy. According to un estimates, narcotics account for 53 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product, and the poppy fields continue to spread. Some 90 per cent of the world opium supply emanates from Afghanistan. Since 2003 the nato mission has made no serious attempt to bring about a reduction in this lucrative trade. Karzai’s own supporters would rapidly desert if their activities in this sphere were disrupted, and the amount of state help needed over many years to boost agriculture and cottage industries and reduce dependence on poppy farming would require an entirely different set of priorities. Only a surreal utopian could expect nato countries, busy privatizing and deregulating their own economies, to embark upon full-scale national-development projects abroad.
NATO’s goals It need hardly be added that the bombardment and occupation of Afghanistan has been a disastrous—and predictable—failure in capturing the perpetrators of 9.11. This could only have been the result of effective police work; not of international war and military occupation. Everything that has happened in Afghanistan since 2001—not to mention Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon—has had the opposite effect, as the West’s own intelligence reports have repeatedly confirmed. According to the official 9.11 Commission report, Mullah Omar’s initial response to Washington’s demands that Osama Bin Laden be handed over and al-Qaeda deprived of a safe haven was ‘not negative’; he himself had opposed any al-Qaeda attack on us targets.23 But while the Mullah was playing for time, the White House closed down negotiations. It required a swift war of revenge. Afghanistan had been denominated the first port of call in the ‘global war on terror’, with Iraq already the Administration’s main target. The shock-and-awe six-week aerial onslaught that followed was merely a drumroll for the forthcoming intervention in Iraq, with no military rationale in Afghanistan. Predictably, it only gave al-Qaeda leaders the chance to vanish into the hills. To portray the invasion as a ‘war of self-defence’ for nato makes a mockery of international law, which was perverted to twist a flukishly successful attack by a tiny, terrorist Arab groupuscule into an excuse for an open-ended American military thrust into the Middle East and Central Eurasia. 23
The 9.11 Commission Report, New York 2004, pp. 333–4; 251–2.
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Herein lie the reasons for the near-unanimity among Western opinionmakers that the occupation must not only continue but expand—‘many billions over many years’. They are to be sought not in the mountain fastnesses of Afghanistan, but in Washington and Brussels. As the Economist summarizes, ‘Defeat would be a body blow not only to the Afghans, but’—and more importantly, of course—‘to the nato alliance’.24 As ever, geopolitics prevails over Afghan interests in the calculus of the big powers. The basing agreement signed by the us with its appointee in Kabul in May 2005 gives the Pentagon the right to maintain a massive military presence in Afghanistan in perpetuity, potentially including nuclear missiles. That Washington is not seeking permanent bases in this fraught and inhospitable terrain simply for the sake of ‘democratization and good governance’ was made clear by nato’s Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Brookings Institution in February this year: a permanent nato presence in a country that borders the ex-Soviet republics, China, Iran and Pakistan was too good to miss.25 More strategically, Afghanistan has become a central theatre for reconstituting, and extending, the West’s power-political grip on the world order. It provides, first, an opportunity for the us to shrug off problems in persuading its allies to play a broader role in Iraq. As Obama and Clinton have stressed, America and its allies ‘have greater unity of purpose in Afghanistan. The ultimate outcome of nato’s effort to stabilize Afghanistan and us leadership of that effort may well affect the cohesiveness of the alliance and Washington’s ability to shape nato’s future.’26 Beyond this, it is the rise of China that has prompted nato strategists to propose a vastly expanded role for the Western military alliance. Once focused on the Euro-Atlantic area, a recent essay in nato Review suggests, ‘in the 21st century nato must become an alliance founded on the Euro-Atlantic area, designed to project systemic stability beyond its borders’: The centre of gravity of power on this planet is moving inexorably eastward . . . The Asia-Pacific region brings much that is dynamic and positive to this world, but as yet the rapid change therein is neither stable nor embedded in stable institutions. Until this is achieved, it is the strategic responsibility of Europeans and North Americans, and the institutions they ‘Must they be wars without end?’. ‘Afghanistan and nato: Forging the 21st Century Alliance’, 29 February 2008; available on Brookings website. 26 Paul Gallis, ‘nato in Afghanistan’, crs Report for Congress, 23 October 2007. 24 25
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have built, to lead the way . . . security effectiveness in such a world is impossible without both legitimacy and capability.27
The only way to protect the international system the West has built, the author continues, is to ‘re-energize’ the transatlantic relationship: ‘There can be no systemic security without Asian security, and there will be no Asian security without a strong role for the West therein.’ These ambitions have yet to be realized. In Afghanistan there were angry street demonstrations against Karzai’s signing of the us bases agreement—a clear indication, if one was still needed, that nato will have to take Karzai with them if they withdraw. Uzbekistan responded by asking the United States to withdraw its base and personnel from their country. The Russians and Chinese are reported to have protested strongly in private, and subsequently conducted joint military operations on each other’s territory for the first time: ‘concern over apparent us plans for permanent bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia’ was an important cause of their rapprochement.28 More limply, Iran responded by increasing export duties, bringing construction in Herat to a halt.29 There are at least two routes out of the Khyber impasse. The first and worst would be to Balkanize the country. This appears to be the dominant pattern of imperial hegemony at the moment, but whereas the Kurds in Iraq and the Kosovars and others in the former Yugoslavia were willing client-nationalists, the likelihood of Tajiks or Hazaras playing this role effectively is more remote in Afghanistan. Some us intelligence officers have been informally discussing the creation of a Pashtun state that unites the tribes and dissolves the Durand Line, but this would destabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan to such a degree that the consequences would be unpredictable. In any event there appear to be no takers in either country at the moment. The alternative would require a withdrawal of all us forces, either preceded or followed by a regional pact to guarantee Afghan stability for the Julian Lindley-French, ‘Big World, Big Future, Big nato’, nato Review, Winter 2005. 28 Rubin, ‘Proposals for Improved Stability in Afghanistan’. 29 In response to Karzai’s pleas, Teheran proposed a treaty that would prohibit foreign intelligence operations in each country against the other; hard to see how Karzai could have signed this with a straight face. 27
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next ten years. Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia and, possibly, China could guarantee and support a functioning national government, pledged to preserve the ethnic and religious diversity of Afghanistan and create a space in which all its citizens can breathe, think and eat every day. It would need a serious social and economic plan to rebuild the country and provide the basic necessities for its people. This would not only be in the interests of Afghanistan, it would be seen as such by its people— physically, politically and morally exhausted by decades of war and two occupations. Violence, arbitrary or deliberate, has been their fate for too long. They want the nightmare to end and not be replaced with horrors of a different kind. Religious extremists would get short shrift from the people if they disrupted an agreed peace and began a jihad to recreate the Taliban Emirate of Mullah Omar. The us occupation has not made this task easy. Its predictable failures have revived the Taliban, and increasingly the Pashtuns are uniting behind them. But though the Taliban have been entirely conflated with al-Qaeda in the Western media, most of their supporters are driven by local concerns; their political evolution would be more likely to parallel that of Pakistan’s domesticated Islamists if the invaders were to leave. A nato withdrawal could facilitate a serious peace process. It might also benefit Pakistan, provided its military leaders abandoned foolish notions of ‘strategic depth’ and viewed India not as an enemy but as a possible partner in creating a cohesive regional framework within which many contentious issues could be resolved. Are Pakistan’s military leaders and politicians capable of grasping the nettle and moving their country forward? Will Washington let them? The solution is political, not military. And it lies in the region, not in Washington or Brussels.
benedict anderson
EXIT SUHARTO Obituary for a Mediocre Tyrant
I
n 1971, the indonesian presidential machine informed the public that Suharto and his wife were planning a mausoleum for themselves on a spur of Mount Lawu, the dormant, 3,000m sacred volcano that lies to the east of the ci-devant royal Javanese city of Surakarta.1 The site had been carefully chosen, respectfully situated some metres below the early tombs of the Mangkunegaran dynasty—the second most insignificant of the four small Central Java principalities instituted by colonial authority in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Mrs Tien Suharto—by then already quietly mocked as Tientje (Ten Per Cent)—claimed some connection with the little dynasty which had barely survived the revolution of 1945–49. For Suharto, who always insisted that he was of simple peasant stock, but was rumoured to be the illegitimate son of a Chinese tycoon, the site represented a social step up; and a normal one, since hypergamy was common among the army officer corps in the 1940s and after, and families were traditionally uxorilocal. Still, the construction of this expensive, unprecedented mausoleum for the future dead had something creepy about it, since Suharto himself was a healthy 50-year-old at the time. I visited Surakarta in the spring of 1972, after the Suharto government had discovered that I had entered the country by roundabout methods and had informed me that I would be deported. After some negotiations, I was allowed two weeks to wind up my affairs and say farewell to friends. I took to the road with my Vespa and stopped briefly in Surakarta for a meal in the city’s pleasant amusement park. In those days, young ‘white’ men on Vespas who could also speak Indonesian fluently were a real curiosity, so my table was quickly surrounded by locals. When the topic new left review 50 mar apr 2008
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of the mausoleum came up, I asked my new acquaintances what they thought of it. After an awkward silence, a skinny, intelligent old man replied, in Javanese: ‘It’s like a Chinese tomb.’ Everyone tittered. He had two things in mind: first, that in contrast to Muslim tombs, even those of grandees, which are very simple, Chinese tombs are or were as elaborate and expensive as the socially competitive bereaved could afford. Second, in the post-colony, many Chinese cemeteries had been flattened by bulldozers to make way for ‘high-end’ construction projects by the state and by private realtors, speculators and developers. During the long noontide of the Suharto dictatorship, from the 1970s to the early 90s, three things happened to the mausoleum. It was gradually filled, almost to bursting, with the remains of Tientje’s para-aristocratic relations, but none of Suharto’s; it was heavily guarded by a unit of the Red Beret paratroopers who had organized the vast massacres of the Left in 1965–66; and it became a tourist attraction, especially for busloads of schoolchildren, so that it was always crowded with village women selling T-shirts, baseball caps, snacks, drinks and plaited bamboo fans. One thing did not happen: even after Tientje joined her relations not long before the Crash of 1997, the mausoleum never became sacred or magically powerful. After I was finally allowed back into the country in 1999, I often went to observe the site. No paratroopers, no busloads of children, only a desperate handful of vendors, a melancholy caretaker and the smell of a decaying building that had already endured a quarter of a century of annual monsoons. It remains to be seen what will happen to the place now that Suharto has finally joined his wife. To paraphrase Walter Abish: how Chinese is it? If the mausoleum marked an early version of Suharto’s ‘death foretold’, I caught a later variation in Jakarta a few years ago. I had been interviewing an elderly Javanese Communist, who had once held a high position at the party newspaper Harian Rakjat (People’s Daily) and spent many years in Suharto’s grim gulag. At the end of the interview, to cheer him up, I asked casually whether he thought Suharto would soon be dead. It worked, but not in the way I expected. With a big smile he said: ‘Not at all! It will take a long time, and will involve much suffering.’ How could he be so sure? He replied that the secret of Suharto’s enormous power, vast wealth and remarkable political longevity was that, early in his adult life, a renowned shaman had inserted a number of susuk under the skin I would like to record my gratitude to my friends Ben Abel and Joss Wibisono for very helpful comments and criticisms. 1
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in various crucial places. ‘But the shaman died quite a while ago’, he said cheerfully as he went on his way. There is an old belief that such susuk—tiny slivers of pure gold impregnated with magic spells—bring the bearer wealth, power and a long life. But there is a catch: for a man to die peacefully and speedily, the susuk have to be withdrawn, and this can only be done by the shaman who inserted them in the first place. Otherwise death will be a drawn-out agony.
1. life and times What sort of man was he? How did he manage to rule his country without much serious opposition for more than three decades? Suharto’s start was humble enough. Born in June 1921 in a village near Jogjakarta in Central Java, he joined the Dutch colonial military (knil) at the age of 19; just about the time when the Wehrmacht overran the Netherlands, and Queen Wilhelmina and her cabinet scuttled off to London. The knil, like its sisters in other European colonies, was trained to suppress internal rebellion rather than to combat external enemies, and was organized racially: mostly Dutch and Eurasian officers, and native ncos and foot-soldiers with very limited education. Suharto himself had never finished his private Muslim high school. In less than two years, however, he had risen to the rank of sergeant, as far as it was usually possible to go. At that point, Hirohito’s armies invaded the Dutch Indies and the knil surrendered virtually without a fight (except for its small air arm). But in October 1943, when he was just 22, the Japanese military in Java, fearing an Allied assault, formed a small auxiliary military force called the Peta to support a planned guerrilla resistance.2 Suharto immediately joined this force, and by 1945 had achieved the second highest rank available—company commander. After the Japanese surrender to MacArthur, and the hurried proclamation of Indonesia’s independence by the seasoned nationalist politicians Sukarno and Hatta, a national army was established. It was composed of former knil, former Peta and former members of various Japanese-armed youth groups, but with Peta officers in the dominant position. There was, naturally, a huge inflation of ranks: a An acronym for Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Motherland), the name expressed the Japanese plan to hitch local nationalism to the defence of the Empire. There is a clear parallel with the almost contemporaneous Japanese creation of the Burma Independence Army to help fight against the British.
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swarm of generals and colonels with immediate backgrounds as lieutenants and sergeants. Suharto joined the rush and, by the spring of 1946, was a Lieutenant-Colonel. More importantly, he was posted just outside Jogjakarta which became the infant Republic’s capital city when the British and Dutch seized Batavia-Jakarta early in 1946. There were not many people in the new Army who had served both the Dutch and Japanese regimes within the space of just six years, but Suharto was one of them, and profited by the experience. In 1946, at the age of 25, he was already a relatively senior military man. It was at this point that he can be said to have started his political career. On the night of June 27, 1946, a group of armed militiamen, attached indirectly to the political ‘opposition’ (a mix of pre-war nationalists, most of whom had collaborated with the Japanese), kidnapped the civilian Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, charging him with weakness in dealing with the returning Dutch. Sukarno took direct control of the government and demanded Sjahrir’s immediate release, which was eventually forthcoming. But the conspirators—backed openly by the Jogjakarta military commander and less openly by the 31-year-old Commander-in-Chief General Sudirman—retired to Suharto’s command-post. From there they attempted a coup d’état on July 3 which was, however, easily broken up. The civilians involved went (briefly) to jail, as did the Jogjakarta military commander, but Sudirman made sure that no other officers were affected. Still, the coup might have ended Suharto’s military career, and he was very careful thereafter.
Rise to power From the autumn of 1945 up to January 1948, the core leadership of the ruling multi-party coalition in Indonesia consisted of a variety of socialists and communists, including some returnees from Holland who had taken part in the anti-Nazi underground. They were not ‘contaminated’ by collaboration with the Japanese, a strong card domestically and internationally. It was also believed that since the first post-liberation government in Holland was led by socialists, there was a chance of a diplomatic route to independence. By 1947, however, the Dutch cabinet had shifted to the right, and in July of that year a large and successful military attack caused the new Republic a considerable loss both of territory and of access to the outside world. The socialists and communists were forced to accept a highly disadvantageous interim agreement in January 1948, and so fell
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from power, replaced by a coalition of Muslims and ‘secular (bourgeois and petty aristocratic) nationalists’. Meantime the Cold War was setting in and the left was radicalized all over Southeast Asia, abandoning parliamentary for military means to come (back) to power. In the summer of 1948, a civil war was looming in Indonesia between the left and its various adversaries, with both sides backed by military units and armed militias. Sudirman tried to overcome the crisis by appointing two men to mediate: Wikana, the then Communist civilian governor of Central Java, and Suharto. In 1963 I interviewed Wikana in Jogjakarta, where he had retired after being sidelined by the Party’s younger leadership. The gentle elderly man told me that Suharto had been excellent, taken no sides, and done everything he could to prevent warfare between the armed backers of the cabinet and the opposition—to no avail. The civil war (which took place only in Republican-held areas in Java) was brief but bloody, and the left was completely crushed. A good number of the leaders were killed in action or executed after surrendering. After the formal transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949 the new member of the United Nations faced an enormously difficult situation. The colonial economy had been devastated by wartime Japanese rule and the military struggle with the returning Dutch. The huge popular mobilizations that began against the Japanese and continued during the ‘revolution’ created a large body of people who expected to be rewarded for their sacrifices. But the lightly populated eastern part of the archipelago had been successively occupied after the war first by Australia and then by the Dutch, so that Republican activism there was difficult. Furthermore, the Dutch–Indonesian agreement, supervised by the us, required the Republic to return all pre-war properties of Dutch capitalists. Finally, no political party had even come close to monopolizing the revolutionary upsurge. Hence, a multi-party constitutional democracy came into being, which even permitted the surviving Communists to rebuild their strength. One could also say that there was no alternative, given the country’s geography; the military was powerful, but it had no air force and not much in the way of a navy. In this environment Suharto started to make his mark, by a successful amphibious attack on pro-Dutch and other dissidents in Celebes. This in turn led to him being appointed in 1957 (aged 36) the Military Commander of Central Java, a key position in the army hierarchy. Then he made
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another serious mistake, not so much political (he was very careful) but financial. He and his trusted staff became involved with certain dubious Chinese tycoons in extensive smuggling operations and other businesses. This resulted in his being dismissed by the High Command. (Two of these Chinese friends later became key cronies under the dictatorship.) But armies usually take care of their own, and Suharto was sent off to the staff and command school in Bandung, where he did well, and after that was appointed Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, planned as the High Command’s strike force against provincial dissidents and other ‘national enemies’. In the early 1960s he commanded the joint operations designed to liberate ‘West Papua’ from residual Dutch colonialism. There was no military victory, since the Americans intervened diplomatically against the Dutch, but Suharto was treated by the press as a kind of national hero. When Sukarno decided, in 1963–64, on a military confrontation with the London-arranged Malaysian Federation, Suharto was named Deputy Commander, and secretly (fearing the growing power of the Communist Party in Java) opened contacts with the ‘enemy’. By then he was so senior that he was the automatic replacement for the Army Commander General Yani, when the latter was overseas. Meantime, political polarization between right and left was increasing rapidly as hyperinflation embedded a sauve qui peut mentality which persists to this day. It is an indication of Suharto’s penchant for secrecy and manoeuvre that he was by then a trusted army leader (his secret contacts with Malaysian intelligence and, indirectly, with the cia were well hidden even from Yani) and an apparent Sukarno loyalist.
Feint, massacre, coup The crisis finally exploded on the morning of October 1, 1965, when a small group of mostly middle-ranking army officers kidnapped and later killed six senior generals on the grounds that they were planning Sukarno’s overthrow. Most of these disaffected officers had long personal associations with Suharto, and it is virtually certain that they informed him of their plans. They made no attempt to seize him, though he had operational command of all seasoned military units in the capital. Nor did Suharto make the slightest effort to warn Yani and his comrades of what was afoot. Instead he crushed the conspirators with ease and proclaimed that they were tools of the Communist Party.
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Almost all the military officers involved in what was then called ‘the coup’—though the actors themselves claimed that they were protecting Sukarno from a military coup steered by the cia—were executed, via death sentences in kangaroo courts, or outside any legality. Only one (barely) survived the dictatorship. Colonel Abdul Latief, who was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment, probably avoided execution because of his long and close association with the Suharto family; perhaps Tientje intervened. After enduring 32 years in prison and unimaginable suffering (the wounds he received when arrested were allowed to fester to the point that half his body was riddled with maggots), Latief was released by Suharto’s successor, Habibie, but suffered a crippling stroke. When I interviewed him not long before he died, much of what he said was unintelligible. But when I asked him how he felt on the evening of October 1, when Suharto had crushed the ‘coup’, he said, brokenly, but clearly: ‘I felt betrayed.’ With the mass media closed down except for the mouthpieces of the military, the Suharto group published photographs of the decayed bodies of the dead generals and announced that their eyeballs had been gouged out, and their testicles slashed off with razors, by sex-crazed members of the Communists’ Women’s Organization. (Some years later, by accident, I discovered the text of the doctors’ post-mortem, which stated that the generals suffered only wounds from bullets and rifle-butts, with eyes and genitals all intact.) Within a few days all Communist offices in Jakarta had been occupied or destroyed. On October 17, the elite Red Berets arrived in Central Java and began the mass killing of men and women of the left. The same killings started in East Java with the arrival of the paratroopers in mid-November, and in Bali when they landed there in mid-December.3 3 The massacres were mainly aimed at the Communists’ mass bases, easily identified since the Party had been legal since independence, and actively participated in electoral politics. These bases were, numerically speaking, concentrated in the rural areas of Central and East Java and Bali, and in the plantation belt of North Sumatra. The cities were less severely hit, probably because they were more easily controlled, and also more visible to prying foreign eyes. The rural areas mentioned above had become zones of turbulence in the early 1960s when so-called ‘unilateral actions’ were carried out by the Communist Peasant League and the People’s Youth, to try to enforce the progressive agrarian reform legislation of 1960, which had largely been sabotaged by influential landowners, Muslim and ‘secular nationalist’. It also has to be said that in the early 1960s the Party often made the mistake of ‘talking loudly, while carrying a chopstick’.
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In every case, the military enlisted the panicked and murderous help of the ‘mass organizations’ of the Party’s many enemies. The strategy of involving large numbers of civilians in the massacres achieved two goals. First it allowed the military to announce, and a good number of foreign reporters to believe, that the citizens had ‘run amok’ on a vast scale. Second, it ensured that there would never be any investigation of the killings, since blood was on too many civilian hands. No one really knows how many people were killed—the figures offered run from half a million to two. On his deathbed, the by-then marginalized General Sarwo Edhie, who led the Red Berets in 1965–66, even said he had been responsible for the death of three million people.4 Nor does anyone really know how many were imprisoned for years without trial in the grimmest conditions, but certainly the number exceeded half a million. The intelligence apparatus was also cunning enough to enlist the help of a number of captured Communists, some quite senior, who betrayed their comrades and even participated in their torture. By the end of the year, the Party had been completely destroyed—for good, as they say. President Sukarno struggled vainly to stop the killings and rally his supporters, but he no longer had access to the mass media. In early March 1966, paratroopers in mufti surrounded the palace where an emergency cabinet meeting was being held, broke up the meeting and arrested fifteen ministers while Sukarno fled to his ‘summer palace’ in Bogor. On the evening of March 11, three generals visited him there and demanded that he sign a document transferring all executive power to Suharto. Feeling himself at gunpoint Sukarno signed the authorization letter, which gave the General, who had often sworn loyalty to his President, the opportunity to replace him the following year, and keep him under house arrest till his death in 1970. Curiously enough the original of this famous letter has never been seen by the public, and was said to have been lost. Many years later, after Suharto’s fall, a young aide of Sukarno who was with him that night told the press that the signed document had carelessly been typed on Army Headquarters stationery. By this time Suharto had achieved full power in ‘legal terms’, but he continued to deepen it in the years immediately following. All state 50 Tahun Merdeka dan Problema Tapol/Napol (50 Years of Independence and the Problem of Political Prisoners), published by Masyarakat Indonesia untuk Kemanusiaan, Jakarta 1995, p. 591.
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institutions, including the Armed Forces, were massively purged of ‘Communists’, ‘Communist sympathizers’, Sukarnoists and other subversives. No ruler in the archipelago had ever had such a chance to pack the bureaucracy, the legislature, the judiciary and parastatal agencies with supporters, sincere or opportunist. This initial packing was later systematically continued: by the early 1990s, the number of bureaucrats was triple what it had been in 1970. Mindful of the niceties of protocol in the ‘international community’, Suharto did not eliminate the party system altogether. But all the conflicting Muslim parties were forced into a single United Development Party, led by a sly opportunist recruited by Suharto’s personal political intelligence agency, financed (modestly) by the regime, and forbidden to use religious symbols when campaigning. The same thing happened to the rest of the tolerated surviving parties, variously Protestant, Catholic and conservative secular nationalist, which were compressed into an Indonesian Democratic Party, also funded by the regime and led by intelligence nominees. The regime had no trouble winning two-thirds majorities in every ‘election’ held till the dictator fell, thanks to a state party (but it was not called a ‘party’) which included all members of the civilian bureaucracy, the military, the police, assorted ‘technocrats’ and mercenary journalists and academics.
Development? Suharto’s difficulties lay elsewhere. By the end of Sukarno’s soi-disant revolutionary regime, Guided Democracy (1959–65), the economy was in ruins, and the rate of inflation staggeringly high. But fortune and Washington were with the General. At a moment when the Vietnam War was ‘going very badly’, and huge numbers of American troops were poised to cross the Pacific, Suharto had completely destroyed the largest Communist Party in the world outside the ussr and China. For this the American political elite was naturally grateful. Furthermore, Indonesia was strategically located and had vast mineral and timber resources; new oil fields were just beginning to be productive. Suharto understood what he had to do: the legal system was promptly revamped to open most of the doors to Western capital that Sukarno had tried to close. The Americans accordingly rounded up the Western Europeans and the Japanese to create the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia, which for many years thereafter essentially paid for Indonesia’s
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development budget.5 The formation of opec and the huge rise in oil prices in 1973 gave Suharto riches undreamed of hitherto. In the late 1960s, the government began the systematic destruction of the country’s primary forests by favoured cronies and military men, as well as foreign corporations. The main beneficiary of all this was the dictator himself, who is generally thought to have had something like $73 billion in various accounts by the mid-1990s.6 To say nothing of his greedy children and assorted close relations and cronies. During the 1970s and 80s, Suharto had many admirers in the West for what they saw as his sincere campaign to modernize the Indonesian economy, to promote rapid growth, to institute the Green Revolution in the countryside, to bring rapid population increase to a halt and to expand that ‘middle class’ so commonly believed to be the harbinger of real democracy. These claims are by no means entirely mistaken, but they need to be looked at comparatively, especially if one remembers the vast subsidies provided over two decades by the iggi. The most obvious comparisons are with Indonesia’s neighbours, Malaysia and the Philippines. If one considers health first, by the beginning of the 21st century, all three countries had about the same life expectancies (males in the late 60s, females in the lower 70s). But the statistics on infant mortality look quite different: Indonesia shows 33 deaths per 1,000 live births, the Philippines close to 23 and Malaysia 17. On the other hand, thanks to extremely invasive and coercive policies, the natural rate of population increase was 1.38 per cent for Indonesia, 1.78 per cent for Suharto was soon treated like royalty by the uk, whose arms dealers profited mightily from trade with Indonesia. Australia followed suit, with its eyes on the huge underwater oil fields spotted off the island of Timor. 6 The psychology behind this astounding accumulation is an interesting puzzle. Suharto’s personal tastes were quite simple, and he did not keep an expensive stable of mistresses. He was visibly uncomfortable in foreign countries, and one cannot imagine him settling down with the loot in Los Angeles or the Riviera. He seems to have thought of himself as a good paterfamilias, spoiling his children, especially his eldest daughter and his youngest son ‘Tommy’, who did luxury time in prison (after his father’s fall) for arranging the assassination of a Supreme Court judge who annoyed him. In the liberal 1950s, the maverick Sumatran politician Muhammad Yamin cheerfully explained why, as a cabinet minister, he had ordered the purchase of pianos for every school in the country: he wanted comfortable lives for his descendants ‘to the seventh generation’. There is a general belief in Indonesia that even the canny Chinese can rarely stay rich for three generations. Children and grandchildren, used to luxury, and the usual vices, quickly fritter away the family fortune. It is possible that Suharto was thinking how much money would have to be accumulated to fund his own brood’s frittering over seven generations. 5
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Malaysia and 1.95 per cent for the Philippines. (Literacy in all three states was around 90 per cent.) The economies show much greater differences. If one divides the labour force between the agrarian, industrial and service sectors, the comparison looks like this: Malaysia, agriculture 14.5 per cent, industry 36 per cent and services 49.5 per cent; the Philippines, 36 per cent, 16 per cent and 48 per cent; Indonesia, 46.5 per cent, 11.8 per cent and 41.7 per cent. Per capita gdp in the three countries was about $12,100 in Malaysia, $5,100 in the Philippines and $3,600 in Indonesia. In fact, given the enormous inequality prevailing especially in the Philippines and Indonesia, the real annual ‘product’ for the mass of people is substantially lower than these figures suggest. Most strikingly of all, in a larger context, almost all the countries whose currencies were severely damaged in the Asian Crisis of 1997–98 have today more or less retrieved their old position vis-à-vis the dollar. The biggest exception is Indonesia, where the ‘collapse’ exchange rate has remained largely unchanged.
East Timor’s torment There were other fronts on which Suharto’s grip was slipping. Of these the most important was ‘internal security’, with East Timor as the exemplary case. When the Portuguese dictatorship finally fell in April 1974, he was persuaded that his intelligence agencies’ ‘black’ operatives could manipulate the internal politics of the decolonizing entity to prevent the ‘communist’ Fretilin party from taking power. But the gamble failed. After a brief, bloody and Indonesia-instigated civil war, Fretilin did take power, and hastened to forestall Jakarta by declaring the ex-colony an independent state. After some initial hesitation, Suharto, basking in a sea of oil money, decided on military invasion, followed by annexation. All the messages from the us were positive. Ford and Kissinger arrived in Jakarta on the eve of the expedition, and the latter is said to have told Suharto: ‘Just do it quickly.’ Virtually all the armaments used for the invasion were American, but Washington winked at what was a clear violation of the existing arms agreement between the two countries, which specified that they could not be used externally. The Americans had another reason to be complaisant: in a secret agreement Suharto had permitted (against international law) us nuclear submarines to pass through the Timor Strait without surfacing, thus evading Soviet monitoring from the heavens. A few weeks before the invasion, a high-level team of military and civilian intelligence
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operatives, on a propaganda tour in the us, dropped by Cornell University. When I asked one of them about plans for East Timor, the cheerful reply was: ‘Don’t worry, it will be over in a few weeks.’ The initial invasion was a disaster, with Indonesian planes bombing their own ground troops in several places. Two years later, Fretilin still controlled more than half of the demi-island’s territory. Jimmy Carter, the ‘human rights’ president, then secretly sent Suharto some of the ov-10 Broncos that had had so much to answer for in Vietnam. They turned the tide. Thousands upon thousands of Timorese fled to the Indonesian-controlled lowlands. There they were herded into ‘resettlement camps’, and large numbers died of hunger and disease. But the resistance never gave up, gradually regained strength, and started a steady underground penetration of the lowlands. Suharto tried everything he could think of, but nothing really worked. The land of East Timor, famously arid, had no mineral resources and scarcely any forests; its people were desperately poor and largely illiterate. Teachers hated being assigned there, as did bureaucrats. Attempts to settle migrants from other islands failed in the face of popular hostility and intermittent sabotage. The territory’s one high-class export, coffee, became a military monopoly. The deeper problem was that in East Timor, Indonesians, often half-realizing it, were in the position of colonialists. Hence the regular colonial complaint that the East Timorese were ‘so ungrateful’, language that would have been taboo anywhere in Indonesia itself. Furthermore, East Timor could not be accommodated in the standard ‘our centuries-long struggle against the Dutch’ narrative of nationalist ideology and school textbooks. Worse still, they were Catholic in a 90 per cent Muslim national population. Irritatingly, the Vatican refused to merge East Timor’s priests into the pliant and often cowardly Indonesian Catholic hierarchy. But there was still another factor which has not generally been much noticed. Virtually all the soldiers at the time of the 1945–49 Indonesian revolution were in their twenties. So large and so young was this force that a military academy was not opened until 1957. The first class graduated in 1960, with only childhood memories of the struggle against the Dutch. They had been green lieutenants, with no important role to play, during the massacres of the Left in the mid-60s. East Timor, their first experience of war, came ten years later when they were in their thirties.
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Since the invasion was justified to them as a campaign against communism, the model they were given was 1965–66: no mercy, torture, burning of villages, rapes, crude intelligence operations and, most notoriously, in the spirit of 65, the organization and financing of lumpen pro-military militias among the local population, who got accustomed to using methods from which even the army officers occasionally shrank. Characteristically, Army hq prepared a secret manual on effective torture techniques and how to avoid being caught trying them. One of the best-known younger commanders, who had successfully ambushed and killed Fretilin’s first military chief, Nicolau Lobato, had himself camcorded with his triumphant booted feet on his enemy’s corpse. He would tell occasional reporters that he fought off boredom of an evening by replaying the videotape. In November 1991, increasingly bold demonstrations by youngsters in Dili, the small capital city, were answered by a characteristically brutal and stupid outburst of killing. Unfortunately for Suharto, a brave young English journalist called Max Stahl managed to film the bloodshed and smuggle the videotape out of the country. The film’s international circulation destroyed overnight the Suharto regime’s constant assurances to the ‘international community’ that the East Timor problem was ‘over’, and enormously encouraged the resistance. The capture of Xanana Gusmão, the heroic successor to Lobato, could not be handled any more by a quick execution. Jailed in Jakarta, his prestige undamaged, he became a hero even to some Indonesian youngsters in the opposition, who would joke, ‘If only we had Xanana as our president.’ The same methods and the same lack of success marked the regime’s military suppression campaigns in Acheh and West Papua. Acheh had been a quiet and prosperous province in the 1970s and early 1980s, but the discovery of a vast field of natural gas led to the creation of exploitation enclaves, heavily guarded and filled with workers and managers brought in from other parts of Indonesia. Military rule set in; armed resistance followed, responded to by East Timorian methods. The end was a terribly costly stalemate in which neither the military nor the resistance had the power to come out on top. It turned out that some of the Acheh resistance commanders had earlier had some Red Beret training. More or less the same was true in West Papua, where timber-mad cronies and Western mining conglomerates worked in a vast forbidding terrain where a small armed resistance continued right through the era of the dictatorship.
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In the long run, all these adventures undermined the prestige and selfconfidence of younger-generation military leaders, not one of whom ever emerged as a hero in the mould of some of the veterans of the older generation. The Asian Crisis of 1997 gave striking evidence of how the institution had been hollowed out. The military newspapers, which no one but military people willingly read, and which depended on large subsidies, were forced to close down and never re-emerged. After Suharto fell, newspapers reported that the head of military intelligence was being investigated for forging large amounts of currency. When reporters questioned the general about this, he engagingly replied: ‘Look, what could I do? Our budget had been cut to nothing, and the high command couldn’t give me any more money, but there were all these militias in East Timor who hadn’t been paid for a long time and were getting really upset.’ So he went on to become, briefly, the Army Commander.
Father of bankruptcy The secrets of the ultra-secretive President—security failure, industrialization failure, financial failure, moral failure, parental failure (all his children either monsters or nonentities), even political failure—came oozing out bit by bit. For the irony of Suharto’s story is that he was finally undone by the forces that had made his long dictatorship possible. In the early 1990s, he had been persuaded by Washington to ‘open up’ his country more widely to global financial capital. A lot of fast money flowed into a plethora of shady new banks created to take advantage of this sudden bonanza. By then Suharto was living on borrowed time. Indonesia had become a net importer of oil, and the forests were largely gone. Local industrial development was weak, and the education system had been decaying for years. When the ‘Asian Crisis’ broke out, Indonesia was hit harder than any other country. Within a few weeks the rupiah lost fourfifths of its exchange value. Dozens of banks went bankrupt. Millions of people lost their jobs. The national debt climbed dizzyingly. His toadies had long flattered him with the title of Bapak Pembangunan (Father of Development) but by the beginning of 1998, bitter local wits had turned it into Bapak Pembangkrutan (Father of Bankruptcy). Nothing more cruelly demonstrated this Waterloo than the photos of the haggard dictator at his desk while the capo of the imf, arms akimbo, stands behind him, ultimatum symbolically in hand.
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What was he to do? The thinking that led to Suharto’s stepping aside in 1998 could be formulated in two quite separate ways. The first is cultural. Suharto had no oratorical gifts whatsoever—almost always he scrupulously droned his way through tedious, statistic-filled, clichéridden speeches written for him, in bureaucratic Indonesian, by the State Secretariat. As John Roosa has pointed out, no one remembers a single phrase Suharto coined in thirty-three years in power. (Siad Barre? Franco?) Probably he did not even think in Indonesian, which he had had to acquire in his late teens. Occasionally, however, he would let his guard down, especially when he was furious. A few braver souls would mock his Indonesian for its Javanese accent, imported Javanese grammar and Javanese moral clichés. Once, enraged by student criticisms of one of his wife’s more extravagant ‘projects’, he blurted out that he would gebuk anyone who dared to criticize her. Gebuk is Javanese for ‘beat the hell out of someone’. On another occasion, privately addressing the group of ambitious toadies who ran his National Youth League, many of them non-Javanese, he astounded his listeners with a long digression about the mystical meanings of the names for the letters in the Javanese alphabet (the State Secretariat made sure this curious rant was never published). Late on in his dictatorship Suharto was seduced into helping an experienced journalist ghost-write his autobiography. What blazes out from the pages is burning resentment—resentment of all those who thought he was stupid, uneducated, a mystical novice, manipulated by his aides, and so on. The central motif is ‘I, and only I, decided everything’. But rancune led him uncharacteristically to claim—correctly—that in 1983 he had personally ordered the execution of several thousand small-time thugs.7 The book was barely out when Suharto had second thoughts and ordered its recall, a rare case of a dictator banning his own book. In fact he was Javanese to the bone, secretly consulting shamans and astrologers, and visiting magically powerful caves, tombs and so on. In late 1997, shaken to his core by the financial collapse, Suharto let it be known to the press that he was prepared to lèngsèr kaprabon and become a pandito. The Javanese words are a kind of cliché drawn from the old The regime had officially insisted that these clearly military-style murders were the result of turf wars between gangs. The popular on dit had it that most of these small gangsters were election-enforcers in the pay of General Ali Murtopo, Suharto’s longtime personal political spy-chief, who was getting too big for his boots, and was soon exiled as Ambassador to Kuala Lumpur where he died of a stroke. 7
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chronicles of Javanese kings and from the even older shadow-play repertoire, based on the Mahabharata and Ramayana. Lèngsèr kaprabon can be translated as ‘abdicate the throne’, while pandito means Great (Mystical) Sage. In effect, the Great King, in old age, passes the kingdom to his successor and ends his days as a Revered Sage and Counsellor. This utterance was received with bitter mirth among his many young enemies, who believed not a word of it. In fact, he probably meant it, at least at that moment. For Suharto here let slip what many had long suspected, that in some moods he thought of himself as a monarch, and maybe really expected to play a key further role as the Wise Man of whatever-next.
Calculating the succession The second reason for Suharto’s decision to retire was straightforwardly political, seasoned with several tablespoons of rancune-concentrate. Stalwart to the last, he would show ‘them’ what would happen without him. Re-elected president for the last time—unanimously, as always—in March 1998, he had picked as his running mate the aeronautical engineer Habibie.8 This was something new and remarkable, since over the past two decades the vice-president had always been an (unthreatening) retired general. Habibie, who came from Celebes, was often regarded as an amiable, lightweight gasbag, who had persuaded the dictator to spend untold sums of money on building an export aviation industry along the lines of the German company Messerschmitt, where the engineer had worked for many years. The us (in the person of Boeing) made sure that these planes would never meet ‘international’ standards, and in any case the Crash of 1997 had ended the whole enterprise. But Habibie’s candidacy also served another purpose. In the late 1980s and 1990s, Suharto increasingly felt that the armed forces might be slipping out of his control. So he started to manipulate high-level promotions in the military: in the first instance Tientje’s nonentity brother, and later a visibly unbalanced and fascist-minded son-in-law; and in the second instance former personal aides, whom military wits joked about 8 Under the constitution, such as it was, the presidents of Indonesia were not chosen by popular vote, but by the Supreme People’s Consultative Assembly, composed of all members of Parliament, plus a phalanx of representatives of various regions and functional groups, selected by . . . the president. This was handy for Suharto, who had no talent on the stump. The system was only changed five years ago. The current president, (retired) General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is the first to be directly elected by the Indonesian voters.
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as prawira piningit. Prawira is Javanese for officer, while piningit refers to the old aristocratic tradition of putting daughters, after their first menstruation, into seclusion until they were successfully married off. In effect, ‘virgin officers’. But Suharto was also thinking about how to create a political counterweight to the active senior officer corps, a generation younger than his own. The solution was remarkable. Throughout much of his dictatorship Suharto had been visibly hostile to political Islam. In the 1970s, his political spymaster Ali Murtopo had created a Komando Jihad, partly formed by released and desperate prisoners from the failed Islamic-state rebel movement of the 1950s and early 60s. Some of these sad mercenaries had carried out an amateurish bombing of part of Borobudur, the famous 9th-century Buddhist stupa in Central Java. It suited the regime’s book to have ‘Islamic terrorists’ secretly on its payroll. Then, suddenly, in his old age, Suharto took his family on a highly publicized, deluxe pilgrimage to Mecca, from which he returned not only as a ‘Haji’ but with an entirely fictitious, new first name—Muhammad! Habibie was now instructed to create what was briefly known as the League of Muslim Indonesian Intellectuals (icmi). The engineer learned fast. He had previously astonished pious Indonesian Muslims in the us by telling them that the Prophet was akin to a television set, faithfully transmitting Allah’s programmes to serious viewers. But Muslim intellectuals, excluded from power for decades, rushed to join the icmi, also with Machiavellian intentions. Suharto might wish to use them, but they would also use him—and they were much younger. As it turned out icmi, which had no social or religious base, disappeared in a puff of smoke when the dictatorship collapsed. But Suharto’s calculation had been that, although Habibie would have general Muslim support in counterpoise to the army, he would be too weak not to need to turn to the Great Sage for instructions and help. In this the ex-dictator would be gravely disappointed. Habibie, an affable, garrulous figure, quite aware of the enormous public hostility to Suharto after his fall, struck out on his own—and Suharto is said never to have spoken to him again. He released almost all surviving political prisoners (including Col. Abdul Latief) and ended virtually all mass media censorship. Out of this came a torrent of abuse for the Great Sage, demands that he be tried for his crimes, and a strong push for ‘total
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reform’ of the political system. Habibie also made a start at organizing the first free elections that Indonesia had experienced since 1955. More strikingly still, he agreed that the East Timorese should be allowed a referendum on their future, monitored by the un. The military were at first furious about this; but then told Habibie that, with the help of their notoriously violent militias, they could guarantee that the natives would opt for Indonesian citizenship. Unfortunately for them, they had not reckoned with Xanana’s guile. Against vehement opposition within the resistance, he had sent word from jail that all East Timorese should massively support the ex-dictator’s electoral machine in the national ballot held in June 1999. So huge was this machine’s success in the territory that military intelligence let down its guard; they were livid and bewildered when the great majority of the population voted for independence in the referendum two months later. In retrospect Habibie’s brief presidency had many good moments. Unluckily, he believed that these earned him a full term as a real president, at which point his stock plummeted and he felt compelled to return to his second patria, a Kohl-created united Reich. From this moment on, Suharto disappeared from public view, successfully fending off demands that he be put on trial thanks to faithful doctors’ reports that he was too ill or too senile to face the courts. Nor was the political elite he had created eager to go after him—he knew all their miserable secrets.
ii. some legacies From the later 1980s on, I used regularly to ask young Indonesian visitors and new students arriving on the Cornell University campus: ‘Who is the living Indonesian that you most admire?’ Almost invariably, the reaction was merely a puzzled scratching of the head, as if the question were ridiculous. Sometimes a youngster would hesitantly name a popular folk-singer whose lyrics were mildly critical of the way things were. One or two would mention Pramoedya Ananta Toer, the country’s greatest writer, whose oeuvre was banned throughout Suharto’s New Order. If the same question had been posed in the 1950s, the answers would have been completely different: many ‘heroes’ of the colonial-era nationalist and Islamic movements and the revolution were still alive and publicly active. The contrast points to a central legacy of the long
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dictatorship—the production of an overwhelmingly timid, corrupt and mediocre political class. Resentful, suspicious and cunning, the dictator made sure that no potential rivals, military or civilian, could develop any independent social or political base. Even his abject cabinet ministers believed they were under surveillance. The amiable, intelligent son of one of these ministers studiously avoided me during his first three years at Cornell—on parental orders. But in his last year, now socialized to American campus norms, he suddenly became very friendly. His father, he reported, had forbidden him ever to mention anything political when he telephoned home, since he was sure his lines were tapped. Well-educated in some ways, the boy turned out to know almost nothing about his country’s history and had never read the many important books about Indonesia’s politics. Suharto terrified people, not only on the basis of his blood-stained record, but by his demeanour—chilly, silent, masked, except for occasional eruptions of real or staged rage. But with international backing he also acquired the resources to buy people on a massive scale. In the early years of the regime, it was his fellow-generals who were the main beneficiaries of his largesse, but after 1973 and opec it was increasingly the so-called technocrats, economists and engineers of many different types who became the richest (non-Chinese) people in the country, as they were given control of the ministries of oil and gas, basic and light industry, finance, foreign trade, employment and so on. They had no political base and were reliably loyal and compliant. In his final years, however, it was Muslims (often of Arab descent), especially Muslim technocrats and intellectuals, on whom the cornucopia fell. A whole generation and a half of politicians grew up within and absorbed the authoritarian, corrupt and clientelist political culture that Suharto created. He liked to play them off against each other, but would tolerate no substantial or inflammatory rhetoric. Deliberately or not, he created over time the Indonesian national oligarchy of today: quarrelsome, but intermarried; competitive, but avoiding any serious internal conflict; without ideas, but determined to hang on to what they have, at all costs. This is the main reason why Suharto remained above the law after his fall, and why his children, except for the murderer Tommy, continue to control many of the country’s television stations, tollways and other strategic assets. The crucial thing is that this national oligarchy and its hangers-on are largely incapable of thinking outside the old regime’s
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box. Cynics joke that there used to be one big Suharto; now there are hundreds of little ones. How did the oligarchy survive the popular demands for reform after the mass protests that erupted as a result of the 1997 financial crisis? One reason was the deep-seated fragmentation of the electorate, reminiscent of the elections of 1955. The biggest winner in 1999 was the ‘secular nationalist’ party led by Megawati, a lazy and overweight daughter of Sukarno. But it failed to get even one third of the votes, and lost support in succeeding elections. All governments since then have had to be coalitions. Second, under the constitutional rules inherited from the Suharto era, the president was not popularly elected (until 2004), but rather selected by the party-dominated Supreme People’s Consultative Assembly. After the national elections of 1999, when the reform tide was still high, this body elevated Abdurrahman Wahid, whose party won 10 per cent of the vote—partly because of his popularity with the reformers, but mainly because he was too weak to prevent his cabinet being packed by nominees from all the other political parties and the military, with Megawati as his vice-president. Rather full of himself (‘I got a message from Allah summoning me to be President’), Wahid felt humiliated by his position, and tried to extract himself by conspicuous interventions into internal army affairs, a drastic reshuffling of his cabinet and various other manoeuvres. He lasted only a year and a half, at which point all the parties except his own agreed to impeach him and remove him from office. When Megawati succeeded him, she promised and delivered a ‘rainbow’ cabinet, in which all the parties (if one includes a renegade from Wahid’s who became Defence Minister) had their quotas. The target of the oligarchy had been achieved: a parliament without an opposition, and every party clique sharing in the perquisites of power. Sukarno’s daughter was not an energetic figure in any case, but the absolute lack of any creative initiatives during the three years of her presidency was also due to what Dan Slater has nicely termed the cartelization of the political system.9 A third factor was the general outlook of the oligarchy, which feared popular mobilizations outside their control, fully accepted the neo-liberal Slater has written a theoretically sophisticated and often very amusing account of top-level politics in Indonesia since Suharto: ‘Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition’, Indonesia, 78, October 2004. 9
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international order, and had no interest in anything that smelled of the left. The army leaders not only accepted the cartel but were important players within it. Nonetheless, as the popularity of the parties visibly declined, the oligarchy felt forced to change the method of electing the president, by opening the office to the sentiments of the national electorate. This is how, in 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, an unassuming but intelligent Javanese (retired) general, a key behind-the-scenes member of the oligarchy and Megawati’s Senior Minister for Security and Defence, became Indonesia’s first popularly elected president. But the party he created for himself did not do well, and he has largely succumbed to the logic of cartelization: passivity, systematic incorporation of any possible parliamentary opposition, and catholic division of the emoluments in his gift. It is not very likely that he will be re-elected in 2009, but his replacement will not be very different, barring some popular upheaval which seems for now over the horizon. Characteristically, when Suharto finally died on 27 January 2008, the President presided tearfully over the funeral, worked things out with Suharto’s children, who own many tv stations, so that no ‘negative’ reports on the dead man would be aired, and ordered flags all over the country to be half-masted for a week. Luckily, in many places this order was scornfully rejected.
Cloaks of faith A second major legacy relates to the political parties and their competitors. Like many military men, Suharto despised such parties and, as we have seen, corrupted and castrated those that he tolerated. Other than that, he paid them no attention. Since the legal parties were completely marginalized and had no influence on policy, they bore their impotence without attracting much in the way of political support or funnelling social protest. Under these conditions, people soon realized that the only institutions which Suharto was usually cautious about suborning or directly suppressing were those based on religion. After all, one of the ideological banners under which the slaughter of the Communists had been organized was the primordial battle against atheism. Suharto’s religion was a characteristic Javanese syncretism of Islam, Hindu-Buddhist mysticism and shamanistic animism—but this was usually concealed from the public.
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Christians, though a small minority, had high educational qualifications— a heritage of colonial-era state favouritism and missionary energy. Generally sycophantic, eager for protection against phantom Muslim fanaticism, they were useful to Suharto’s cynical ideological campaign for national ‘unity’. But they also had crucial support in Rome, Western Europe and, above all, the us. Catholics were not a real problem, since their power was largely based in Java, and their hierarchical leadership was easily bought off or cowed. Protestantism was a very different story. In the colonial period, Protestant evangelism had its main successes with minority groups in remote or upland regions, which were divvied up among different sects with different overseas sponsors. Hence even in the colonial period Protestantism became closely associated with Outer Island ethnicities, creating separate ethno-cultural ‘churches’ for the Toba Bataks, the Karo Bataks, the Ambonese, the Toradjans and so on. It is telling that the largest-circulation newspapers in Jakarta under the Suharto regime were controlled by Catholics and Protestants: the most easily intimidated and therefore the most tolerated. It was not long before the obsequious Catholic Kompas was quietly mocked as Kempes (flat, like a tyre), and the Protestant Sinar Harapan (Light of Hope) as Sirna Harapan (All Hope is Gone). As for the vast Muslim majority, Suharto closely followed the advice of the panjandrum of Dutch colonial Islamic studies, C. Snouck Hurgronje (who had had the courage to go to Mecca disguised as a pilgrim): give them everything they want that is not political. Hence, until the 1990s, Suharto donated enormous sums for the building of high-tech mosques in the bourgeois neo-Arab style, schools, charities and subventions for airplane pilgrims to the Holy City, while brutally repressing any manifestations of political Islam. Today, any serious visitor to Indonesia should visit the beautiful old mosque in Surabaya dedicated to Sunan Ampel, said to be one of the nine founders of Islam in the country. It is located in the centre of the old town, next to the traditional Arab and Chinese quarters. Visitors will find a civilized warning posted against disturbing the peace of many tired and hardworking neighbours. This mosque is, to my knowledge, the only significant one in the country that still uses the beautiful unmediated human voice for calling the faithful to prayer. Everywhere else, and this is another Suharto legacy, the calls to prayer are made fortissimo with the help of high-amp loudspeakers, and often lazily taken from tapes.
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The relative immunity of religious institutions from Suharto’s increasing insistence on his own form of Gleichschaltung had consequences that he failed to predict. All kinds of political, economic, ethnic and even criminal interests which, under other circumstances, would have gravitated to political parties clustered round different religious denominations. The late Suharto period thus saw the emergence of something unimaginable before he came to power: Protestant street-thugs, Catholic extortionists, Muslim mercenaries. After his fall, the consequences became bloodily evident. Protestant Ambonese hoodlums who had long controlled part of Jakarta’s brothels, bars and gambling dens were evicted by Muslim gangsters loudly proclaiming Muslim morality.10 Forced to return to Ambon, the defeated Protestant hoods convinced almost all the local Protestants that they had been victims of Muslim aggression. Meantime, the corrupt, but quietist, colonial-era local Protestant Church was being undermined by fanatical American and German evangelical missionaries, who provided much-needed social services but insisted that Islam was the work of Satan. The outbreak of cruel religious conflict in the Moluccas, which had never experienced anything of the kind before, was initiated by a Protestant massacre of an entire Muslim village—no surprise that this was not reported in the Western press. No surprise either that the alliance of gangsters with fanatical Protestants led sizeable numbers of other gangsters and fanatics to ‘come to the rescue’ of their fellow-Muslims. The police and military, who should have prevented the bloodshed that followed, often broke up along religious lines. The result was a savage local civil war in the Moluccas, from which no one but gangsters profited.
Arms and assets Suharto rightly believed till the very end that the one Indonesian institution capable of felling him was the Army. After the massive purges of 1966–67 he could be sure of the loyal support of a now completely anti-communist officer corps, composed mainly of people of his own generation—‘veterans of the Revolution’. Still, he took extra precautions. The most striking of these was a budgetary allocation policy which in no way sufficed for a modern military, especially one in power. (At various Their boss, explaining a later visit to the Great Satan at state expense, averred he was only going to see his children, comfortably ensconced in lesser Californian universities. It is also characteristic of these Muslim thugs that they never showed the slightest interest in the plight of the famously devout Achehnese.
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points in the 1980s and 90s, senior military officials would even say in public that the budget covered only about one third of their needs.) This also provided plausible evidence to foreign reporters, scholars and, of course, officials that democracy was up ahead, somewhere along the yellow-brick road. The financial solution was ingenious and had its roots in the short period after 1949 when Indonesia was a constitutional democracy. The country was desperately poor after the ravages of the Depression, the Japanese Occupation and the revolution, and the demands on a series of weak governments were substantial. Some provincial military commanders, headed towards warlord status, began to create their own hidden budgets by protecting smugglers, controlling local export revenues and practising extortion, especially of Chinese entrepreneurs who nonetheless found these commanders useful at the price. We have earlier observed Suharto getting into this game in the mid-1950s. The big change, however, came in the year 1957. The very free elections held in 1955 had shown that no political party was able to win more than one quarter of the electorate, but about 77 per cent of the vote went to four large parties, three of them based on the heavily populated island of Java. These three were a so-called secular nationalist party, a ‘traditionalist’ Muslim party and the Communist Party, while the fourth, a ‘modernist Islamic’ party, was strong above all in non-Javanese areas. That the two (usually) mutually hostile Islamic parties could not together win even a small majority in a country which is nominally 90 per cent Muslim points to the real peculiarity of Indonesia in today’s Islamic world. Prior to the generally peaceable political arrival of Islam in the mid15th century—eight hundred years after the Prophet and his immediate successors had achieved astounding military successes in the Near East and on the Mediterranean littoral—Old Java for centuries had been culturally dominated by an eclectic mix of Hinduism, Mahayana Buddhism and local animism. Virtually all of the grand monuments which earn Indonesia a substantial tourist income are pre-Islamic. The arrival of the Dutch at the beginning of the 17th century helped block any thoroughgoing Arab-Muslim transformation. Thus even today the Javanese are divided between (mostly urban) ‘modernist’ Muslims who have no patience with syncretism and superstition, ‘traditionalist’ Muslims (mostly rural) whose outlook is both nationalist and syncretic, and ‘statistical’ Muslims who are circumcized, married and buried according to Muslim rites, but
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whose real faith still shows strong traces of Old Java’s religious outlook. In 1955, the secular nationalists and the Communists competed for the votes of the ‘statistical’ Muslims, while active Muslim voters were divided between traditionalists and modernists. The post-election cabinet was necessarily unstable, weak and incapable of halting the spread of Outer Island warlordism which increasingly took on local ethno-linguistic features. Behind the scenes, the cia, alarmed by the Communists’ surprising electoral strength, and by President Sukarno’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, was looking towards a major rebellion which would get rid of Sukarno and bring about an Army-backed right-wing regime. In March 1957, the country was put under martial law. In the autumn negotiations between the centre and the Outer Island opposition broke down. At the same time, Sukarno, increasingly enraged by Dutch obstinacy in hanging on to West New Guinea, with American support, decreed the nationalization of all Dutch enterprises and the eviction of almost all Dutch citizens. The High Command, using its martial-law powers, took over the huge welter of Dutch factories, banks, export–import firms, mines, shipping and plantations, and promptly moved to immobilize the Communist-dominated trade unions attached. In one blow, the Army thus seized almost the entire ‘advanced’ sector of the economy, and made use of these resources to win the civil war that broke out at the start of 1958, despite heavy cia assistance to the rebels. Most of these enterprises were parcelled out, and either mismanaged or effectively looted, making a major contribution to the economic crisis that undid Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. As noted above, Suharto had far more resources to dispense than his predecessor, while the Army’s overwhelming political power helped it to build a huge, ramshackle economic empire independent of the national budget, often with the cooperation of favourite Chinese tycoons. It was, however, not an effectively centralized empire, since the Army was organized territorially, right down to the village level, and each predatory level created its own sources of funds. Furthermore, most sizeable private enterprises were forced to accept ‘security units’, ostensibly to protect them from scarcely existing labour unrest, but actually as agents of systematic, hierarchical extortion.
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But this was by no means all. For the first two decades of Suharto’s rule, military officers were ‘parachuted’ into all the state ministries and parastatals, and most important positions in the territorial civil bureaucracy were occupied by generals and colonels. The armed forces had a large, Suharto-selected bloc in Parliament, and dominated the electoral machine, Golkar, which always won elections without difficulty. Perhaps most important of all, the officer corps was essentially above the law. Not a single senior officer was ever put on trial for corruption or abuse of power, let alone for murder. Yet, as we have also seen, by the mid-1980s the last of the revolution’s veterans had retired, replaced by former cadets from the Military Academy. They had adapted fully to the regime, but failed to produce a single moment of ‘glory’, and not one of the new generation of generals enjoyed any independent public prestige. After Suharto’s fall, and Habibie’s ending of the old order’s strict censorship, the mass media began to be filled with devastating stories of military malfeasance and brutality. The popular anti-military movement was briefly strong enough to get rid of the appointed military bloc in Parliament, and restore much of the bureaucracy to civilian hands.11 But other legacies of Suharto have remained. The officer corps is still largely above the law, the territorial organization of the Army has not been undone and, after enormous losses in the 1997 financial crisis, the soldiers have clung still more fiercely to their extra-budgetary enterprises. But the drastic decline in the Army’s prestige and the mediocre quality of its leadership appear to rule out for the foreseeable future any return to military rule.
National amnesia Since the cultural legacy of Suharto is a vast and complicated matter, it makes practical sense to focus here on just two crucial policy initiatives. The first and most important was the introduction of a new spelling system for the national language, inaugurated in 1972–73. Officially, this policy was justified as a way to open up a common print market with Malaysia. But the real motive behind it was to mark a decisive break between what was written under the dictatorship and everything written before it. One had only to read the title of a book or pamphlet This success was possible in part because of the support of the political parties, eager to fill the parliamentary seats vacated by the soldiers.
11
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to know whether it was splendidly modern, or a derisory residue of Sukarnoism, constitutionalism, the revolution, or the colonial period. Any interest in old-orthography materials was automatically suspicious. The change was sufficiently great that youngsters could easily be persuaded that ‘old’ printed materials were too hard to decipher, and so not to be bothered with.12 The effective result was a sort of historical erasure, such that the younger generation’s knowledge of their country’s history came largely from the regime’s own publications, especially textbooks. Needless to say, the decades of anti-colonial activity against the Dutch largely disappeared. The revolution was renamed the War of Independence, in which only soldiers played significant roles. The post-revolutionary period of constitutional democracy was abruptly dismissed as the creation of civilian politicians, aping Western rather than Indonesian ways. All this had some comical aspects. For example, the brave but hopeless Communist rebellion against the Dutch colonial regime in 1926–27 was described as the first of a series of treasonable Communist conspiracies culminating in October 1, 1965. In the decade after Suharto’s fall, some tentative rewriting of textbooks has occurred, but in general inertia prevails. Many once-banned books have been republished (anachronistically, in the Suharto spelling), but the market for these books is basically limited to students and intellectuals. The general ignorance of the past is probably greater than at any time in the last century. The second, related, policy concerns Indonesia’s Chinese minority. Very soon after October 1, the regime’s media claimed that the masterminds of the failed ‘Communist coup’ had received a large clandestine shipment of arms from the prc, and that Party chairman D. N. Aidit had acted at the behest of Peking. There followed the sacking of the Chinese Embassy and the suspension of diplomatic relations until 1990. Under Sukarno, the only substantial political organization for the Chinese minority, known as Baperki, had been a strong supporter of the From the end of the 19th century the colonial regime had tried with mixed success to create a standard orthography for Malay/Indonesian based on Dutch orthographic rules. The Revolutionary government adopted a simplified form of this colonial spelling system by substituting, quite sensibly, ‘u’ for the odd Dutch ‘oe’. A simple example will show what Suharto’s New Improved Spelling achieved: ‘I am looking for a special jacket’, once saja tjari djas chusus, became saya cari jas khusus. 12
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President, who enjoyed excellent relations with Peking. Baperki had also allied itself with the Communist Party and leftwing secular nationalists. This body was now prohibited, many of its leaders were imprisoned, and a significant number of ordinary Chinese killed. Suharto followed this up by banning Chinese schools, any use of Chinese calligraphy, and the near-compulsory changing of Chinese personal names to more Indonesian-sounding appellations. Needless to say, the rationale for all this was that the Chinese had to be better assimilated and become like other Indonesian citizens. But in reality the Chinese were almost completely excluded from political power. Discrimination was rampant and systematic in the universities, the civil service and the armed forces. Over the 32 years of the dictatorship, only one Chinese ever became a cabinet minister, and this figure, appointed only two months before Suharto fell, was a notorious crony. On the other hand, on the economic–financial side, Suharto surrounded himself with a small group of Chinese tycoons who, in addition to acting as his bagmen, built huge and successful business empires. (Some of these people, sniffing the wind, began transferring their assets to Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia and elsewhere several years before the Crash of 1997.) The policy suited the dictator’s book, since he both respected Chinese acumen and knew that Chinese wealth could not be converted into dangerous political power. ‘Native’ Indonesians were another story. Below the level of the cronies, the Chinese, facing exclusion from most other options beyond private medical and legal practice, concentrated energetically on commerce and swelled the ranks of an already timid middle class. The concentration became so great that the old stigma of being ‘economic animals’ became partly internalized. Yet there were a few impressive exceptions: Soe Hok Gie, a prominent student opponent of the Communist Party and of Sukarno’s authoritarian populist rule, was the one and only person in the late 1960s to denounce in public the massacres of 1965–66; the Protestant lawyer Yap Thiam Hien was so courageous in defence of human rights that he ultimately became a national icon. Dede Oetomo, on returning from graduate study in America, was brave enough to announce that he was ‘gay’, and over two decades tirelessly worked to help hiv/aids victims and to enhance the civic rights of gays, lesbians and transsexuals. The playwright Riantiarno dared to
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compose and stage politically coloured plays and musicals, though these were soon shut down. Nonetheless Suharto’s policies made the Chinese more vulnerable than ever to popular envy and hatred, and Suharto’s fall was marked by savage anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta and the old royal city of Surakarta. After Suharto? Politically the Chinese have no vehicle of their own, though they are financially important to all the large parties today. Only two Chinese, to my knowledge, have become cabinet ministers. The more important of the pair, Kwik Kian Gie, was quickly dismissed because of his personal honesty and blunt attacks on corruption, in general, and the activities of the tenacious Chinese cronies in particular. Discrimination is still rife. Young Chinese know even less about Indonesian history than their ‘native’ counterparts, and that goes for the history of the Chinese in Indonesia as well. Many parents, still traumatized by their experiences under the Suharto regime, try to send their youngsters overseas to study, often with the dream of following them into permanent emigration. One remarkable development, however, is that there has been no significant anti-Chinese riot over the past ten years, which have otherwise seen a great deal of inter-ethnic and inter-religious bloodshed. I think that the ironic explanation is that the Chinese minority, maybe 1 per cent of the population and scattered around the archipelago, is too small to matter in the open electoral politics where these larger conflicts are involved; under Suharto, with his tight control over the public sphere, the Chinese were regarded as the least dangerous targets for social anger and resentment.
Children of 1965 The Communist Party, as we have observed, was completely destroyed— physically, politically and morally. Among the elderly survivors of years of imprisonment there is no agreement on what actually happened in 1965 or who should be held responsible. No one, not even overseas, has attempted to write a serious account of post-revolutionary Party history. Up till today, former members of any Communist-controlled organization and their families have to carry id marking this stigma. Most are very poor, having lost all their property after 1965. They are barred from many significant occupations, educational institutions, the bureaucracy and parliament.
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To the very end of the Suharto regime, its military and intelligence services continued to warn, in menacing terms, of a ‘latent Communist Party’, and more idiosyncratically, of a dangerous ‘organization without organization’. Seemingly oblivious, even today, of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and of the delirious success of the ‘capitalist-roaders’ in China, right-wing generals and ‘modernist’ Muslim organizations continue to rant about Communist conspiracies. When this interminable Hetze will end no one knows. But there are some interesting things occurring, nonetheless. During his brief presidency at the beginning of our century, Abdurrahman Wahid, the maverick and charismatic leader of ‘traditionalist’ Muslims, spoke out strongly for reconciliation à la Mandela and the end of stigmatization. He even asked Parliament to remove the constitutional ban on Marxism and Marxist writings. His many enemies made sure that this request was rejected, but the ban is no longer seriously enforced. One can find in bookshops today many texts about Marxism, and by dead Communists, including D. N. Aidit who was summarily executed forty-three years ago. Suharto’s fall has opened the way for a good many publications claiming—sometimes with evidence, sometimes on the basis of rumour and mystical signs—that the real mastermind of October 1, 1965 was Suharto himself. These circulate quite freely. The most surprising development has emerged in an unlikely place— among young intellectuals and social activists from ‘traditional Islam’, who in many ways are showing themselves to be far more modern than the ‘modernists’. Taking a cue from Wahid, they can be found, even in remote rural areas, visiting and helping impoverished old Communists and their families. They say they are doing this work as a kind of atonement for the conspicuous and ferocious role that their elders played in the 1965 massacres. Not long ago, a friendly meeting was held in the old Republican capital of Jogjakarta between women from the traditionalist Islamic sector and female survivors from the Communist side. Muslims listened sympathetically to the elderly Communists talk about their sufferings in 1965 and after. All went well till one of the victims started to describe in detail how and where she was raped and tortured. At this point one of the younger Muslim women stood up ashen-faced, stuttered a few unintelligible words, and fainted. It turned out later that from the account she could identify the sadist—he was her father.
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It is possible, indeed likely, that Wahid, a very shrewd politician, took his initiatives with the idea of getting votes from ex-Communist families.13 He knew that the modernist Muslims and the residual electoral machine of Suharto have no interest—to say the least—in this constituency. He also believed that the reborn secular nationalist party, assuming that the victims had nowhere else to go, felt they needed to make no appeals or concessions. Their party leader, Megawati (the wags call her Miniwati), Sukarno’s daughter, has repudiated her father’s ideological legacy and displays a thoroughly petty-bourgeois conservative outlook. All this means is that there is no serious political party representing anything remotely left. Nor is there any immediate chance that this situation will change, especially given today’s international environment. The old social base of the Communist Party has changed greatly over the past forty years. The factory-based work-force has become—for well-known reasons—heavily feminized and based on short-term employment contracts. Organizing is very limited, and the old social divide along quasi-religious lines remains. Corporatist mentalities are still dominant in the bureaucracy. It is probably telling that the workforce’s one modern hero has been a heroine, a brave East Javanese trade unionist who was raped and murdered by the local military for her persistent and vocal opposition to her employers and their ‘security units’. The peasants are still there, but population pressure, landgrabbing and the alluring suggestions of the mass media have brought huge numbers, especially of the young and active, into the cities. Peasant organizations are small and weak. In the late Suharto era and in the first years after the dictator’s fall, there were many enthusiastic and idealistic ngos—tolerated, up to a point, by the authorities because of their small size. But the return of political parties to power, and the Probably, a comparable calculation lay behind his spectacular decree (when still President) that the Chinese New Year, locally known as Imlek, would henceforth be a national holiday. For most of the Suharto period, public celebrations of Imlek were prohibited. It may have surprised Wahid that this decree was hugely successful, not only among the Chinese but especially among young non-Chinese Indonesians. One cannot doubt that here the influence of films from Hong Kong, Taiwan and more recently the prc, and of advertising, soaps and travelogues on television, has played a big role. What in the 1950s was seen as the cultural expression of an often disliked local ethnic group is now seen as part of a general culture of the spectacle and of tourism. It was common in the old days for wealthy Chinese to hire young and poor non-Chinese to dance the famous lion-dance. The practice has been revived, but in a ‘Mardi Gras’ spirit of festive fun. 13
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successful holding of a series of free elections since 1999, has lured many ngo staffers into mainstream party-political careers. Others are too dependent on ignorant and trend-happy ‘sponsors’ in the North to be capable of much creative work.
Quiescence? It says something that, in 2007, Indonesia was often cited as Southeast Asia’s most open and democratic society. The competition was not heavy: Thailand under military rule, interminable authoritarian regimes in Burma, Laos, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore; and the appallingly corrupt and violent regime of Gloria Arroyo-Macapagal in the Philippines. With the melancholy help of the tsunami, peace has come to Acheh, and an intelligent, peaceable former rebel is now its governor. Perhaps exhausted by the bloodshed of previous years, the Moluccas are fairly calm. Concessions have been made to the Papuans. The important decentralization law, passed by Parliament at the height of the short wave of ‘reform’ that followed Suharto’s fall, has shifted power and money to the regional elites whom cynics dub mini-Suhartos. Islamic extremism is a spent force. The press is pretty free, though mostly conservative. Yet there is one other phenomenon that needs to be noted. Indonesia’s educational system today is mostly a dreary swamp. Up until perhaps the early 1960s, primary and secondary schoolteachers were, even if miserably paid, respected local figures, partly for their energetic role in overcoming widespread illiteracy, and partly for the contributions many had made to the colonial-era nationalist movement. The everyday word for ‘teacher’, guru, still had an impressive traditional aura. During the 1965–66 massacres, the occupational group that was proportionately hardest hit consisted of just such primary and secondary schoolteachers. Their emergency replacements were a mass of uninterested, unqualified placemen and placewomen who wanted a civil service job at all costs, and, of course, were completely loyal to the regime that hired them. It was this phalanx that really brought the pervasive miasma of civil servant-style corruption into schools—bribery, ‘tea-money’, embezzlement of school budgets and so on. This generation has finally retired, but they are responsible for recruiting their successors. (I have often asked young people which of their high-school teachers they remember with either affection or admiration.
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Typically, the reaction is incredulity at my naïveté.) Suharto had no time for students, but he encouraged the spread of hundreds of diploma mills to sop up unemployment. Even in the better universities, teacher absenteeism has long passed the time when it was remarked on: sidelines, real-estate speculation, boondoggling state-financed ‘research projects’ are the usual lures. There is no better evidence of Suharto’s educational legacy than that the political elite sends even its stupidest and most anti-social children to be tamed and tutored overseas. This does not mean that the country lacks a lot of very intelligent youngsters, but many of them are part autodidacts, more dependent on each other and the internet than on their teachers. One of Winston Churchill’s more acerbic bons mots was ‘While there is death there is hope’. Every year, the number of young people who only remember dimly or not at all what Suharto’s Neues Ordnung was like grows apace. It is nice that, after half a century, Pramoedya Ananta Toer has found a successor. The young Sundanese Eka Kurniawan has published two astonishing novels in the past half-decade.14 If one considers their often nightmarish plots and characters, one could say there is no hope. But the sheer beauty and elegance of their language, and the exuberance of their imagining, give one the exhilaration of watching the first snowdrops poke their little heads up towards a wintry sky.
Eka, a great admirer of Pramoedya, wrote a first-class academic thesis, since published, on the older writer’s complex relationship with ‘socialist realism’. The two novels are Cantik Itu Luka [‘Beautiful’, a Wound] (2002) and Lelaki Harimau [Man Tiger] (2004). The first is a huge, rather unwieldy, surreal recapitulation of the past century of Indonesian history set in a sort of isolated Macondo somewhere on the south coast of Java. The second is a brilliant, tight-knit and frightening village tragedy, also set somewhere on that barren littoral. I understand that both novels are starting to be translated into other languages. 14
robin blackburn
THE SUBPRIME CRISIS
I
n the summer of 2007 many leading banks in the us and Europe were hit by a collapse in the value of mortgage-backed securities which they had themselves been responsible for packaging.* To the surprise of many, the poisonous securities turned out to constitute a major portion of their ultimate asset base. The defaults fostered a credit crunch as all financial institutions hoarded cash and required ever widening premiums before lending to one another. The Wall Street investment banks and brokerages haemorrhaged $175 billion of capital in the period July 2007 to March 2008, and Bear Stearns, the fifth largest, was ‘rescued’ in March, at a fire-sale price, by JP Morgan Chase with the help of $29 billion of guarantees from the Federal Reserve. Many of the rest only survived by selling huge chunks of preferred stock, with guaranteed premium rates of return, to a string of ‘sovereign funds’, owned by the governments of Abu Dhabi, Singapore, South Korea and China, among others. By the end of January 2008, $75 billion of new capital had been injected into the banks, but it was not enough. In the uk the sharply rising cost of liquidity destroyed the business model of a large mortgage house, leading to the first bank run in the uk for 150 years and obliging the British Chancellor first to extend nearly £60 billion in loans and guarantees to its depositors and then to take the concern, Northern Rock, into public ownership. In late January Société Générale, famous for its skill at financial engineering—indeed the winner that month of the coveted ‘Derivatives Bank of the Year Award’ from Risk magazine—reported that a 31-year-old rogue trader had lost the bank over $7 billion. The SocGen management began unwinding the terrible positions taken by this trader on 21 January, contributing to a share rout on the exchanges and, it seems, to an emergency decision by the Federal Reserve the next day to drop its interest rate by 75 basis points.
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The management of risk—especially systemic risk—in the financial world was evidently deeply flawed. An important part of the problem was that core financial institutions had used a shadowy secondary banking system to hide much of their exposure. Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, hsbc, Barclays Capital and Deutsche Bank had taken on a lot of debt and lent other people’s money against desperately poor collateral. Prior to the us deregulation and uk privatizations of the 1990s, us investment banks would have been barred by the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 from dabbling in retail finance, and Northern Rock would have remained a solid, and very boring, building society. The trigger for the credit crunch was rising defaults among us holders of subprime mortgages in the last quarter of 2006 and early 2007, as interest rates were inched up to protect the falling dollar. This led to the failure of several large mortgage brokers in February–March 2007, but the true scope of the problem only began to register in the late summer. Interestingly, the first bank to report a problem was Deutsche Bank, which was forced to bail out two property-based funds in July. In October the us Treasury encouraged three of Wall Street’s largest banks—Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Bank of America—to set up a $70 billion fund to establish a clear value for threatened assets. This did not work. Analysts complained: ‘The path they have taken of skimming off the cream from the top doesn’t resolve the fact that there is poison at the bottom’.1 At the end of 2007, with the credit crisis still as bad as ever, the world’s central banks tried to pump vast amounts of liquidity into the global financial system, but the impact was temporary, and the banks remained unwilling to lend to one another. Lawrence Summers, the former us Treasury Secretary, warned of a looming ‘major credit crunch’—as if six months’ paralysis had been a mere bagatelle; this danger stemmed from the ‘impaired’ asset base of major banks if more capital was not injected.2 The subprime debacle and the drying up of credit, themselves the consequences of deteriorating conditions, were hastening * This article in dedicated to the memory of Andrew Glyn (1943–2007) whose wisdom, generosity and criticism are sorely missed. I would like to thank Yally Avrahampour, Jane D’Arista, Duncan Foley, Max Gasner, John Grahl, Geoffrey Ingham and Julia Ott for helpful comments and suggestions. 1 ‘Some Wonder if Stabilization Fund Will Work’, New York Times, 12 November 2007. 2 Lawrence Summers, ‘Beyond Fiscal Stimulus’, Financial Times, 28 January 2008.
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the slide to recession in the us and global economy. On 10 February us Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson confirmed that credit problems were still ‘serious and persisting’, with more expected.3 On 29 February two senior investment bankers—David Greenlaw (Morgan Stanley) and Jan Hatzius (Goldman Sachs)—and two economists—Anil K. Kashyap (Chicago) and Hyun Song Shin (Princeton)—published a study entitled ‘Leveraged Losses’ which cautiously estimated that losses from the subprime crisis were likely to total around $400 billion and cause a drop in gdp of between 1 and 1.5 per cent.4 You might think the title mainly referred to the plight of millions of mortgaged homeowners but, as we will see, the destructive logic of over-leveraged assets was also at work in scores of financial concerns. The us President and Congress swiftly agreed a stimulus package of $150 billion, and on 11 March the world’s central banks clubbed together to offer the banks $200 billion on easy conditions. But these supposed masters of the universe seemed caught in celestial machinery they did not control. On 16 March the us Federal Reserve intervened to avert the collapse of Bear Stearns and arrange for its purchase by JP Morgan Chase at a small fraction of its earlier price. The remaining investment banks were offered, for the first time, direct loans at low rates, against the flimsiest collateral and in confidence. The credit crunch came as the climax of a long period of gravity-defying global imbalances and asset bubbles. Fear of recession had prompted the us Federal Reserve to keep interest rates low in 2001–06, and this in turn set the scene for cheap and easy loans. The world’s financiers and business leaders looked to us householders, the ‘consumers of last resort’, to keep the global boom going. Robert Brenner gave an arresting account of the structural flaws and systemic turbulence in the global economy in nlr in 1998. In a substantial Afterword to The Economics of Global Turbulence in 2006, he stressed that a contrived ‘consumptionled’ boom in 2002–06 had failed to overcome weak profitability and investment. While labour productivity rose in these years, real employee Michael Phillips and Yuka Hayashi, ‘Markets at Risk for Additional Shocks’, Wall Street Journal, 11 February 2008. 4 David Greenlaw, Jan Hatzius, Anil K. Kashyap and Hyun Song Shin, ‘Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown’, presented at us Monetary Policy Forum, 29 February 2008. 3
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compensation did not. The maintenance of the boom was made a little easier by cheap Chinese imports, but the vital ingredient in consumer buoyancy was a build-up of personal debt. Brenner characterized the demand-stimulating policies of the Fed and us Treasury as ‘market Keynesianism’.5 While Andrew Glyn and Giovanni Arrighi offered extra considerations, they too recognized that the bubble economics of 1995– 2007 was not under control and that finance had escaped the reach of the regulators.6 According to the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data, total debt in the
us economy rose from 255.3 per cent of gdp in 1997 to 352.6 per cent of gdp in 2007. Debt growth was strongest in the household and financial sectors. Household debt grew from 66.1 per cent of gdp to 99.9 per cent of gdp over the decade to 2007. But the most rapid growth was in the debt taken on by banks and other financial entities which grew from 63.8 per cent of gdp in 1997 to 113.8 per cent of gdp in 2007.7 A succession of asset bubbles fuelled this growth in debt. Notwithstanding his famous remark about ‘irrational exuberance’ in 1996, Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve Chairman, took no stern measures to dampen the share bubble of the late 1990s. Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers at the Treasury did even less, with Summers insisting that ballooning share prices should be viewed as an increase in us saving.8 In the early 2000s Washington found compelling reasons to pursue a cheaper money policy—it wished both to devise a ‘soft landing’ from the share bubble and to demonstrate that the us powerhouse was unscathed by terrorism. It became a national security priority to inflate the purchasing power of us consumers. In the aftermath of 9/11 Americans had a patriotic duty to take on more debt Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence: the Advanced Capitalist Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945–2005, London and New York 2006. For rising personal and corporate indebtedness see pp. 157–9, 276–8. 6 Andrew Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed, Oxford 2006, and Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing, London and New York 2007. 7 Federal Reserve Bank, Flow of Funds, Washington, dc 2008. The significance of these figures is explored in a fundamental paper by Jane D’Arista, ‘Broken Systems: Agendas for Financial and Monetary Reform’, presented at 17th Annual Hyman Minsky Conference, 17 April 2008. 8 See Robin Blackburn, Banking on Death or Investing in Life: the History and Future of Pensions, London and New York 2002, p. 218. 5
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in order to keep consumption rising, and banks and regulators to make this possible. Banks were drawn to consumer debt because of a decline in their traditional role as custodians of savings and deposits, as this was increasingly assumed by pension funds and mutual funds, and also by a drop in the share of their earnings coming from traditional corporate finance. Between 1997 and 2007, the share of total financial sector assets accounted for by the assets of depository institutions plummeted from 56.3 per cent to just 23.7 per cent, while the share of pension funds and mutual funds rose from 21 per cent to 37.8 per cent. Freed by deregulation, the banks found new business by converting consumer debt into tradeable securities and then selling those securities to the funds (or other banks). In order to finance this operation the banks themselves took on more debt, blithely assuming that the return on the securities would be comfortably above their cost of borrowing, and that they would anyway soon sell on the securities to someone else, in what was known as the ‘originate and distribute’ model. It was difficult for anybody to know what was going on, or how justified these assumptions might be, because much of the action was registered only on the banks’ ‘invisible balance sheet’ in a ‘shadow banking system’.9 Jane D’Arista argues that these trends also conspired to undermine traditional policy tools, since the latter, especially interest rate changes and great dollops of extra liquidity, work in and through their impact on banks as depository institutions.10 In what follows I interpret the credit crunch as a crisis of financialization—otherwise put, as a crisis of that venturesome ‘new world’ of leverage, deregulation and ‘financial innovation’ which Alan Greenspan celebrates in his recent memoir. I show how the pursuit of a market in almost everything led to a banker’s nightmare in which key assets could not be valued. I urge that attention be paid to the ideas of Fischer Black, the improbable inventor of structured finance, who warned against ‘loading up on risk’ when declining to become The nature of the ‘invisible balance sheet’ will be explored below, but the concept is taken from Salih N. Neftci, ‘fx Short Positions, Balance Sheets, and Financial Turbulence’, in John Eatwell and Lance Taylor, eds, International Capital Markets: Systems in Transition, Oxford 2002, pp. 277–96. 10 D’Arista, ‘Broken Systems’, pp. 8–10. 9
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a founder member of Long Term Capital Management. I evoke both the New Deal response to financial failure and the rise of consumer finance in the postwar world, before considering, in conclusion, what can be done today.
i. inside the shadow banking system The very low us interest rates of 2001–06 were hugely lucrative to the banks, allowing them to take on more debt, improve the terms of their business and expand its volume. They sponsored hedge funds and private equity buyouts, packaged their own mortgage-related financial instruments, arranged bond insurance, and furnished lines of credit to their own structured investment vehicles (sivs) and ‘conduits’. These bets were usually leveraged by extra helpings of debt, with some institutions—the investment banks and hedge funds—borrowing to buy assets worth as much as thirty times their capital. This is how the protagonists of the 2007–08 crisis became heavily leveraged concerns—often, as we will see, indebted to one another. The banks’ embarrassment in changed conditions has at least one element in common with the plight of the heavily mortgaged house buyers. In both cases borrowers were squeezed by rising costs and weakened revenue to sell the underlying assets in a falling market. First the home buyers faced higher interest rates in 2006–07, then the banks and their special conduits ran into an even sharper jump in their borrowing costs in August 2007. Sophisticated and lavishly paid financial professionals should at least have spotted the problem, but they seem to have been deceived by their own legerdemain. As a Financial Times report put it at the close of 2007: While investors are scrutinizing some of the industry’s best-known names, a spectre will be silently haunting events: the state of the little known, so-called ‘shadow’ banking system. A plethora of opaque institutions and vehicles have sprung up in American and European markets this decade, and they have come to play an important role in providing credit across the system.11
This ‘hidden’ system had expanded rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s as a consequence of deregulation, which allowed many financial institutions Gillian Tett and Paul Davies, ‘Out of the Shadows: How Banking’s Secret System Broke Down’, Financial Times, 17 December 2007.
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to take on banking functions and loosened the rules that govern borrowing and lending. Following the collapse of Enron it was revealed that several leading banks had helped the company fool investors and regulators by devising a multitude of off-balance sheet special purpose entities. To the surprise of many, the subsequent legislation did not introduce an outright ban but allowed, under rule 46-R of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, the holding of vehicles off-balance sheet so long as the bulk of the rewards and risks lie with others.12 While other investors had some exposure, the banks, as owners of the sivs, have learnt the hard way that structured finance products can generate less controllable losses than simple assets, whose value can never dip below zero.
Fantasy valuations Martin Wolf has compared the high bank profits of 2006 with long-run equity returns. While the latter run at about 7 per cent, the return earned by us, German, French and Italian banks in 2006 was around 12 per cent, and uk banks returned 20 per cent.13 These high rates of return reflect leverage, ‘thin’ capitalization and risk-taking. The miracle of banking has always lain in the fact that bankers’ liquid assets are much less than their outstanding loans. This stems from the credit-creating function of banks. The central banks, as lenders of last resort, are there to insure against bank runs, as the Bank of England reluctantly proved when, with help from the uk Treasury, it bailed out Northern Rock, and as the us Federal Reserve showed when it subsidized the sale of Bear Stearns. The central banks supposedly control their risks by establishing strict asset qualifications and capital/loan ratios. Level 1 capital for uk banks was only 4 per cent of total outstanding liabilities at the close of 2007. The us banks claim to be better capitalized, with 8 to 9 per cent of Level 1 capital, though Citigroup had dropped to 7.3 per cent at that time—they are meant to stay above 8 per cent. These are not generous levels of capitalization but were still deceptive in that they hid problems created by the lending spree off-balance sheet—with leverage rendered invisible and liabilities rated as assets. This became apparent as the banks were forced to recognize the collapse of the secondary, ‘hidden’, banking system Floyd Norris, ‘Why Surprises Still Lurk After Enron’, New York Times, 29 February 2008. 13 Martin Wolf, ‘Why Banking Remains an Accident Waiting to Happen’, Financial Times, 28 November 2007. 12
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constituted by off-balance sheet sivs, conduits and bank-sponsored hedge funds. The ‘slow motion’ collapse reflected reporting periods and rules of disclosure. The sivs held scores of billions of dollars of credit derivatives, at model prices, reflecting great optimism or even sheer fantasy. Within specified time limits, however, the banks’ accountants are obliged to ‘mark to market’, that is, set a market price on them. The best assets—‘Level 1’ assets—are those which can be valued simply by consulting a Bloomberg screen, where their price at a given moment will appear. ‘Level 2’ asset values are based on a model which relates them to an index of similar traded assets. ‘Level 3’ asset values are based simply on models, with no directly traded element—a form of guesswork, or, in troubled conditions, a wish and a prayer. By August 2007, mortgage-based securities were difficult to sell and those based on subprime mortgages could scarcely be given away. They had never qualified for Level 1, but now they did not make Level 2 either. On 8 November The Economist noted: ‘Among Wall Street firms, the soaring amounts of Level 3 securities now exceed their shareholder equity.’14 In the case of Citigroup, its collateralized debt obligations (cdos) alone were worth more than the equity value of the bank, forcing it, in subsequent weeks, not just to search for new investors, but to offer the latter preferred shares or ‘convertibles’ that greatly diluted the holdings of their existing shareholders—a convertible is a bond in so far as it has a prior claim on the company’s revenues but converts to a share above a given strike price.15 By April 2008 the imf was estimating that total losses were likely to come to $945 billion: ‘Global banks are likely to shoulder roughly half of aggregate potential losses, totalling from $440 billion to $510 billion, with insurance companies, pension funds, moneymarket funds, hedge funds and other institutional investors accounting for the balance.’16 However these funds, especially insurance and pension funds, also have large shareholding stakes in the banks, so will suffer heavy indirect losses. Indeed, most of their losses are ‘collateral damage’ since their direct holdings of subprime cdos were minimal. ‘cdoh no!’, Economist, 8 November 2007. ‘Breaking Views: To Raise More Capital, Citigroup Is Shoving Aside its Shareholders’, Wall Street Journal, 16 January 2008. 16 imf, Global Financial Stability Report: Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness, Washington dc, April 2008, p. 12. The imf estimate of losses is almost twice that of Greenlaw et al’s ‘Leveraged Losses’ mainly because its coverage is more global and comprehensive. 14 15
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Low interest rates tempted many homeowners to go deeper into hock by re-mortgaging. As Robert Brenner showed, the asset bubbles—first technology shares and then houses—helped to maintain the mirage of a buoyant economy and consumption growth, but only at the cost of growing personal and corporate indebtedness.17 Non-financial corporations— especially the auto companies—had long offered consumer credit since this was the only way to maintain sales volume; now homeowners were encouraged to treat their houses like atms. By 2003, some 18 per cent of the disposable income of us consumers was required to service debt; yet neither the Federal Reserve nor the Securities and Exchange Commission (sec) moved to crack down on the securitized mortgage bonanza. Those who felt wealthy could build a McMansion while the majority, with their flat earnings, still aspired to the comfortable lifestyle portrayed in tv and magazine ads. Low teaser rates led millions of the poor to believe they could own a home. By 2007, weak housing and consumer debt were both hovering around the $1 trillion mark. For some time finance houses had teamed up with retailers to shower so-called gold and platinum cards on all and sundry, with the hope of ratcheting up consumer debt and subsequently charging an annual 18 or 20 per cent on money for which the banks themselves were paying 3 or 4 per cent. These high rates of return whetted the banks’ appetite for dubious lending. By February 2008, after more than a year of wilting prices, the number of us homeowners with negative equity rose to 8.8 million or one-tenth of the total.18 Because houses seem such good collateral, the total home mortgage debt was around $11 trillion, of which a little over a tenth was either ‘subprime’ or almost equally doubtful ‘Alt A’. Credit-card debt rose to just short of $1,000 billion, with automobile debt a little lower at around $700 billion. In these cases the asset backing the loan is really the earnings capacity of the borrower, not the refrigerator or the car.
Contagion? How bad could it get? Very bad, some believe. Nouriel Roubini of the Stern School of Business (nyu) has come up with a total of possible losses for the us economy that runs to several trillion dollars. Martin Wolf describes it as a recipe for ‘the mother of all meltdowns’: the bursting of Robert Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble, London and New York 2002, pp. 146–52. Edmund Andrews and Louis Uchitelle, ‘Rescues for Homeowners in Debt Weighed’, New York Times, 22 February 2008. 17
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the housing bubble could wipe out between $4 trillion and $6 trillion in household wealth; subprime mortgage losses he puts at $250–300 billion; then there will be consumer credit defaults, the downgrading of bond insurers, a meltdown in the commercial property market, the bankruptcy of a large bank, the collapse of several leveraged buy-outs, a wave of corporate defaults (‘a “fat tail” of companies has low profitability and heavy debt’), the crumbling of the ‘shadow financial system’, a collapse of stock prices, a cascade of hedge-fund failures, and a severe credit crunch. After all this one scarcely needs to add ‘a vicious circle of losses . . . contraction . . . and fire sales’.19 Wolf insists that this is a possible scenario—indeed, the ‘bankruptcy of a large bank’ prediction came true within less than a month—and that global linkage will be quite strong: Wall Street sneezes, a debilitated us economy catches a nasty virus, and the world comes down with flu. Of course some of these disasters may be milder than feared, and the authorities would try to prevent each element in the catastrophe; but according to Roubini the regulators do not have the right instruments to avert much of the damage. Indeed some of the problems of today stem from past attempts to put off the inevitable recognition of losses. If losses are not recognized and subordinated shareholdings expropriated, then it will remain unclear where new capital injections need to be made and stagnation may ensue, as it did in Japan in the 1990s.20
Chain of irresponsibility How on earth could such risks build up? The source of the problems which surfaced in 2007—though some had warned about them years earlier—did not lie only in the us deficits or the Fed’s easy money policy. It also lay in an institutional complex and a string of disastrous incentives and agency problems riddling an over-extended system of financial intermediation. To start with, take the incentives relating to those notorious ‘subprime’ cdos. New subprime mortgages rose from $160 billion in 2001 to $600 billion in 2006—by which time they constituted 19 Martin Wolf, ‘America’s Economy Risks the Mother of All Meltdowns’, Financial Times, 20 February 2008. 20 The reluctance of political and financial authorities to recognize losses and carry out expropriations is stressed by Jean-Charles Rochet, Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation, Princeton 2008, pp. 4–5, 28–33, 284.
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one-fifth of mortgage originations. The salesmen responsible for this surge received a generous commission for each new loan, paid upfront but expressed as a proportion of the redemption payments to be made over several years. Brokers happily signed up ‘ninjas’—no income, no job and no assets—by the hundred thousand. This behaviour was directly encouraged by their incentive structure, while legislation dating back to the 1960s had relaxed credit standards for the low paid and jobless without reckoning with the likely consequences. The Bush administration’s vision of the ‘ownership society’ somehow latched onto codicils of Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ to encourage the poor to take on housing debt at the pinnacle of a property bubble. The quality of the arrangements made for poorer mortgagees was manifestly inadequate—they had no insurance provision—and also avoided the real problem, which is the true extent of poverty in the United States and the folly of imagining that it can be banished by waving the magic wand of debt creation.21 Indeed the subprime borrowers were lured into inherently bad deals by those low ‘teaser rates’ that bore no relation to the large payments required of them down the line. The bad mortgage bets were to be hugely compounded by the investment banks that purchased the mortgage debt for resale, supposedly according to the ‘originate and distribute’ model—take on debt, repackage it, and sell it on. As a report in the Wall Street Journal explained: Upfront commissions and fees are well established on Wall Street. Investment banks get paid when billion-dollar mergers are signed. Firms that create complex new securities are paid a percentage off the top. Rating services assess the risk of a new bond in return for fees off the front end.22
Just to complete the picture, one should add that such fees are not only garnered by those in investment banks who construct and sell assetbacked securities. On the day his employer announced a write-down of over $8 billion, a managing director at an investment bank explained that the bank’s own senior risk-assessment officer had received a Louis Hyman, ‘The Original Subprime Crisis’, New York Times, 26 December 2007. Charles Forelle and Jeanne Whalen, ‘us Financiers’ Pay Spurs Financial Crunch’, Wall Street Journal, 17 January 2008. This is part of a structural incentive problem evident in earlier bubbles. In a prescient 1993 article two financial economists, Franklin Allen and Gary Gorton, warned of the design flaw in incentive schemes, encouraging financiers to join a speculative bandwagon even if they know it will eventually run into a ditch. ‘Churning Bubbles’, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 60, no. 4, 1993, pp. 813–36. 21
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bonus of $21 million in the previous year for his part in the great cdo bonanza. What was more, this executive still did not report directly to the board.
Returns on risk The subprime mortgage meltdown perfectly illustrates the perils of financialization and what I have called ‘grey capital’—great clouds of institutionalized savings, including private pension money, entrusted to financial industry insiders. I have previously explained how the growth machine of the 1990s and 2003–06 widened inequalities and was based on unsustainable mountains of debt.23 At a certain point the burden of debt repayment would extinguish the prospects of more credit. Lulled by success, the banks faced a ‘Minsky moment’, in which the new risks and instabilities of a financialized capitalism would storm through the markets.24 The banks themselves borrowed to buy up subprime lenders, some even with convictions for ‘predatory lending’, because this gave them access to just what they craved—rubbishy assets. They had supposedly discovered how to limit their own exposure, while raking in the charges, by repackaging poor debts as cdos and selling them on to their clients. Risky debt was potentially far more profitable than good debt because the latter is expensive to acquire and can never be worth more than par, while the value of the former was heavily discounted, and optimism about repayment prospects and the ingenuity of ‘structured finance’ led to high resale prices.25 See Robin Blackburn, ‘Finance and the Fourth Dimension’, nlr 39, May–June 2006 and Age Shock: How Finance Is Failing Us, London and New York 2006, especially pp. 175–81. 24 Hyman Minsky argued that capitalist financial markets had a tendency to become steadily more fragile in the course of a boom. Among other reasons, this is because banks become accustomed to low defaults and skimpy margins of safety, and because such booms tend to secrete Ponzi-effects—after Charles Ponzi, author of a pyramid scheme. See Minsky’s essay ‘The Financial Instability Hypothesis’, in Charles Kindleberger and Jean-Paul Laffargue, eds, Financial Crises: Theory, History and Policy, Cambridge 1982, pp. 1–39. For a helpful discussion of Minsky see Geoffrey Ingham’s valuable recent book, The Nature of Money, Cambridge 2004, pp. 159–62. 25 Tony Jackson, ‘Crazy Crisis May Herald the End of New Derivative Folly’, Financial Times, 24 December 2007. 23
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With direct access to subprime mortgages, the banks and hedge funds had enlarged scope for bundling them together as cdos, in ways that supposedly spread and insured the risk. Thousands of mortgages would be consolidated into one instrument and the resulting pool of debt subdivided into ten tranches, each representing a claim on the income accruing to the underlying mortgages; the lowest tranche represented the first to default, the second the next poorest-paying assets and so on up to the senior levels which were least likely to default. The bottom tranche of the cdo, designated the ‘equity’, was both vulnerable and valuable, and the mezzanine portion also attracted a good return. The senior ones—the top 70–75 per cent—were more difficult to sell because the reward and (it was thought) risk were quite low. The different tranches’ vulnerability to default was hedged by taking out insurance, at rates varying according to the perceived level of default risk. Note that a feature of the securitizing and tranching process is that the holders of a tranche would not know which specific mortgages they held until the default rate within a specified period became clear. Depending on the precise wording of the bundled security, the different classes of holder could also find themselves, if there was a default spike, bundled together in awkward and unexpected ways. The generally buoyant conditions of 2003–06, with low default rates and low interest rates, meant that cdo insurance was cheap. The purchaser was assured by those assembling the cdo that it came with a secure hedge and that the whole package had a ‘triple A’ grade from the ratings agencies. The complexity of the cdo with its accompanying insurance made the entire credit-derivative product difficult to value. Unsold portions could be ‘sold’ at model prices to sivs or conduits, set up with the bank’s own credit. These prices reflected trust in the banks and the ratings agencies that had produced and evaluated the products. At the height of the cdo boom the ratings agencies were deriving half their income from such fees.26 The sivs were off-balance sheet, so that the bank’s stake in them was an asset, while the liabilities stowed away did not show up. Institutional investors could be persuaded to buy the sivs’ supposedly high-quality, short-term commercial paper, allowing the vehicles to acquire longer-term, lower-quality assets, and generating a profit on the spread between the two. The latter included large amounts of mortgages, credit-card debt, student loans and other receivables. Like 26
‘The Moody’s Blues’ (editorial), Wall Street Journal, 15 February 2008.
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cdos, the sivs are tranched with the bank holding the equity. For about five years those dealing in sivs and conduits did very well by exploiting the spread between the return from the commercial paper they sold to investors and that from the sivs’ asset base of securitized receivables, but this disappeared in August 2007, and the banks were left holding a very distressed baby.27
Market ignorance? While the party lasted the big banks could not get enough mortgages to feed their cdo assembly lines. The banks’ frenzy to acquire subprime mortgages became so intense that they encouraged brokers to skimp on the credit checks required by standard ‘due diligence’. In return for immunity from prosecution, Clayton Holdings, a company that ‘vetted home loans for many investment banks’, is reported to have delivered documents to Andrew Cuomo, New York’s attorney general, showing that its clients—the banks—had allowed it to wave through many ‘exceptions’ to the normal lending conditions and then conceal the high number involved. The report itemizes serial irresponsibility.28 The complexity of the cdos and cdss—credit default swaps, the financial instruments which insure bond holders—generates new risks: documentation risk, operational risk, ratings risk, counter-party risk, liquidity risk and linkage risk among them. At the height of the cdo/ cds surge thousands of mortgage bonds were being packaged and rated every week. Sometimes the back-office paperwork lagged, skipped stages or was out of sequence, leading to unexpected complications. On 15 November 2007 it was reported that an Ohio judge had dismissed fourteen foreclosures brought on behalf of investors in pooled mortgages, on the grounds that they had failed to prove their ownership of the properties they were trying to seize.29 Traditional subprime lenders had tended to cover particular localities about which they built up detailed information. They also had teams who would assess potential borrowers according to quite complex criteria, and 27 For an account of how sivs work, see bca Research, Special Report: A Vicious Circle of Credit Retention, Montreal, 12 February 2008, p. 8. 28 Jenny Anderson and Vikas Bajaj, ‘Loan Reviewer Aiding Enquiry into Big Banks’, New York Times, 27 January 2008. 29 Gretchen Morgenson, ‘Foreclosures Hit a Snag for Lenders’, New York Times, 15 November 2007.
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collection agents who would retain contact with the mortgage holder. But the large mortgage brokers and investment banks had a different modus operandi. In the days of J. P. Morgan, the banks rated ‘trust’ even more highly than collateral. But then they were dealing with a relatively restricted number of wealthy individuals and businesses. The ballooning of individual debt offered a vast market but with little scope for personal knowledge and judgment. Fair Isaac and other personal credit-rating agencies believed that the creditworthiness of any customer could be distilled into a single three-digit number, reflecting the statistical probability of default.30 Borrowers and brokers learnt how to manipulate the scores. As the growth of negative equity raised defaults, this algorithm became quite unreliable. In normal times those who hold a mortgage on their house will be greatly concerned to maintain payments, but for the almost 9 million or more with negative equity, the attraction of simply walking away is great. As soon as they believe that the property is worth less than their debt, they have an inducement to put the keys in the post, surrendering the asset and escaping the debt.31 The mortgage issuers should have ignored the Fair Isaac scores and taken due note of market risk. After all, default rates correlate more strongly with the trade cycle than anything else. But this factor was ignored, as were the signs from deteriorating credit tests. In a market that had been rising for years there was still money to be made by assuming it would last a little while longer—long enough to ‘distribute’. And many believed that business cycles were becoming so mild, and counter-cyclical action by the monetary authorities so strong and effective, that consumer defaults were dwindling. The investment banks were playing a fast-moving game of ‘pass the parcel’. According to breathless ‘flat world’ accounts of globalization, loans could be bought one day, packaged overnight in India, and sold on to institutional investors the next day. The sooner the sale, the better the risk profile. But by 2006 the supply of cdos exceeded demand. Many public-sector and ‘defined benefit’ pension funds declined to buy the Jan Kregel, ‘Minsky’s Cushions of Safety: Systemic Risk and the Crisis in the us Subprime Mortgage Market’, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Policy Brief no. 93, January 2008, p. 11. 31 Dean Foust and Aaron Pressman, ‘Credit Scores: Not-So-Magic Numbers’, Business Week, 7 February 2008; Nicole Gelinas, ‘The Rise of the “Mortgage Walkers”’, Wall Street Journal, 8 February 2008. 30
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cdos, because they suspected them or were not sure how they worked. But those with mutual funds and ‘401(k)’ retirement plans were often less well served by their fund managers. There was also demand from other financial institutions—especially hedge funds—who liked the fact that the cdos came with impressive credit ratings and could indirectly be used to bolster their asset base. Several of the major banks themselves developed a taste for the decorative qualities of their fool’s gold. Even if they knew defaults must be in prospect, they believed they could hedge against them or invest only in well-protected tranches. Furthermore, the money-management arms of the banks had some scope for palming off the well-rated derivatives on the less wary of their institutional clients. Thus in January 2008 the secretary of the municipality of Springfield, ma, complained that Merrill Lynch, manager of the authority’s fund, had sold it cdos for a total price of $13.9 million on the understanding that they were safe assets. By November 2007 they were only worth $1.2 million. Fearful of the consequences for its reputation, Merrill Lynch repurchased the assets at the sale price.32
Tremors A protracted sequence of reporting periods attached to the various financial services and products delayed the impact of the subprime crisis. The earthquake did not bring down everything at once. The default rate jumped in the second half of 2006. By February 2007 it became clear that defaults were running at a level that was likely to take down Countrywide, one of the largest mortgage brokers in the us; in a move prompted by the Fed, Bank of America offered to rescue Countrywide and guarantee its business, but the deal dragged on for months. In early March 2007 the New York Stock Exchange suspended New Century Financial, a company which had taken on insurance obligations for submerged tranches of mortgage debt for most of the big banks. The cdo tranches in the sivs and conduits were now dubbed ‘toxic waste’ by insiders. In the context of a credit crunch and mortgage-default rise this colourful phrase had a very exact meaning. The cdo tranches turned from being steady earners into a source of loss as their return fell below the interest that had been promised to investors in the conduits’ commercial paper. As beneficial owners of the sivs and conduits, the Craig Karmin, ‘Merrill Faces Fraud Allegations’, Wall Street Journal, 1–2 February 2008. 32
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banks had to find a way of meeting their obligations to the holders of the commercial paper which had been issued in their name. Sale of the securitized mortgages and other receivables was imperative, but no one wanted to buy them. ‘Leveraged assets’ become a curse when the asset value turns negative. In the epoch of financialization households have been encouraged to comport themselves as businesses—for example taking out a second mortgage because their home has risen in value. But many householders remain cautious as they realize that they want to go on living in their home. Financial intermediaries, to a far greater extent than households, actively adjust their balance sheets in response to changes in asset prices. Exception made of their flashy headquarters, the banks get no use-value from the assets on their balance sheet and are obliged to chase a monetary return. Greenlaw, Hatzius and their co-authors contrast the pattern of response from households and financial concerns: financial intermediaries react in a very different way to the fluctuations in net worth as compared to households or non-financial firms . . . households tend not to adjust their balance sheets drastically to changes in asset prices. In general, leverage falls when total assets rise . . . However, the picture for financial intermediaries is very different. There is a positive relationship between changes in leverage and changes in balancesheet size. Far from being passive, financial intermediaries adjust their balance sheets actively.33
This behaviour by financial intermediaries, the authors believe, made a critical contribution to the mortgage bubble: ‘With regard to the subprime mortgage market in the United States . . . when balance sheets are expanding fast enough, even borrowers who do not have the means to repay are granted credit—so intense is the urge to employ surplus capital. The seeds of the subsequent downturn in the credit cycle are thus sown.’ But once contraction sets in, balance-sheet pressure runs powerfully in the opposite direction and the banks are obliged to hoard cash. The super-leveraged conduits and sivs aggravated the pattern, as they had been set up with access to automatic lines of credit from the parent institution. Greenlaw and co explain: As credit lines were tapped, the balance-sheet constraint at the banks must have begun to bind, making them reluctant to lend . . . The fact that bank 33
Greenlaw et al, ‘Leveraged Losses’, pp. 25–6.
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balance sheets did not contract is indicative of this involuntary expansion of credit. One of the consequences . . . was that banks sought other ways to curtail lending. Their natural response was to cut off, or curtail, lending that was discretionary. The seizing up of the interbank credit market can be seen as the conjunction of the desired contraction of the balance sheets and the ‘involuntary’ lending due to the tapping of credit lines by distressed entities.34
Balance-sheet pressures were ramped up as accounting deadlines kicked in. The banks’ auditors wanted their clients to accept large writedowns on these assets. But to do so was to make deep inroads on their capital base, and, for the weaker, this raised the spectre of collapse. While grappling with conduit-related balance-sheet pressure they also had to keep a weather eye out for other threats, notably those arising from flaky insurance.
Bond insurance A string of bankruptcies among the heavily leveraged would test the market for credit default swaps (cdss). Municipal bond insurers, known as ‘monolines’, enjoyed ‘triple A’ rating because of this conservative specialization. Pension funds and other institutions were heavily invested in the monolines, with holdings amounting to $800 billion at the close of 2007. However, some years back the monolines diversified and took on insurance for corporate as well as municipal bonds, still claiming that their ‘bond only’ insurance remit was of limited risk.35 The meagre capitalization of the large bond insurers weakened their credibility, notwithstanding their past ratings. The search for more exciting returns had drawn them into branches of corporate and financial insurance that overstretched their capital base. An institutional investor complained that Ambac, a monoline with equity capital of less than $5 billion, insured the debt of California, the world’s sixth largest economy.36 If the monolines lost their coveted triple A ratings, this would sharply raise their cost of capital. They escaped downgrades by means of discreet capital injections arranged by several of their clients, including the banks. Shareholders suffered dilution but the prospect of collapse was staved off. It is possible Greenlaw et al, ‘Leveraged Losses’, pp. 30, 32–3. Saskia Scholtes and Gillian Tett, ‘“Casualties and Shipwrecks” Warning for Credit Markets’, Financial Times, 11 January 2008. 36 William Gross, ‘Rescuing Monolines Is Not a Long-Term Solution’, Financial Times, 8 February 2008. 34 35
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that the Federal Reserve helped to promote this outcome, as it undoubtedly did with the buy-out of Bear Stearns. The saving of Bear Stearns and Countrywide by means of takeovers was a win both for their bondholders and for those concerns that had insured their bonds.37 Indeed, when a company teeters towards bankruptcy, bondholders and shareholders can have quite different interests; a ‘rescue’ at fire-sale prices can punish shareholders but leave bondholders relatively unscathed. We have seen that the securitization boom helped to make up for a stagnation or decline in the banks’ fees from corporate lending and underwriting—ipos, rights issues etc.—in 2001 and after. Indeed, the banks, helped by their role in packaging and selling all manner of ‘credit derivatives’ including mortgage-backed cdos, achieved remarkably good profits right up to the actual outbreak of the credit crisis. This was true of both the historic investment banks and the commercial banks, albeit that, in the aftermath of deregulation, this distinction was breaking down. A residual contrast was that the investment banks are ‘prime brokers’ and engage in large amounts of proprietary trading, risking their own money but in ways that are often difficult to fathom. Where commercial banking operations loom large in a financial group, as they do at JP Morgan Chase, the balance sheet tends to be stronger—hence its ability to absorb Bear Stearns. However, credit derivatives had appeal to both types of financial concern, helping to blur the distinctions between them.
Cassandras and others Warren Buffett warned in 2002 that derivatives were ‘financial weapons of mass destruction’. In a letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, he conceded that Berkshire’s main business, re-insurance, was itself conceptually close to the use of derivatives, the latter being calibrated bets on a pattern of future events not unlike those made by an insurer. He pointed out that there are widely shared risks in the derivatives world and that ‘there is no central bank assigned to the job of preventing the dominoes from toppling in insurance or derivatives’. He also observed: Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that participants who can’t bear certain risks are able to transfer them to stronger Gretchen Morgenson, ‘In the Fed’s Cross-Hairs: Exotic Game’, New York Times, 23 March 2008. 37
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hands . . . on a micro level, what they say is often true. Indeed at Berkshire, I sometimes engage in large-scale derivatives transactions in order to facilitate certain investment strategies. Charlie [Munger] and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one another. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties . . . are linked in ways that could cause them contemporaneously to run into a problem because of a single event . . . Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems.38
Buffett complained that the way banks account for their holdings of derivatives was completely impenetrable and made a mockery of the disclosure requirements placed on them. The derivatives revolution, on this reading, was the most decisive step towards deregulation. Buffett was also clear that the banks were riddled with principal–agent problems: I can assure you that the marking errors [i.e. the errors made in ‘marking to market’] in the derivatives business have not been symmetrical. Almost invariably, they have favoured either the trader who was eyeing a multi-million dollar bonus or the ceo who wanted to report impressive ‘earnings’ (or both).
Alan Greenspan, whose job it was to monitor such problems, preferred to remain a cheer-leader for the financial services industry. Addressing the Futures Industry Association in March 1999, he insisted that any new regulations on derivative products ‘would be a major mistake’: ‘Regulatory risk-measurement schemes’, he added, ‘are simpler and much less accurate than banks’ [own] risk-measurement models.’39 His view chimed well with the repeal of Glass–Steagall that year and the passage of the Futures Modernization Act, sponsored by Congressmen Gramm, Leach and Bliley and signed into law by President Clinton in 2000. When Greenspan came to write his memoirs he explained: ‘I was aware that the loosening of mortgage credit terms for subprime borrowers increased financial risk . . . But I believed then, as now, that the benefits of broadened home ownership are worth the risk.’40 By the time Warren Buffett, ‘Letter to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway’, 2002, p. 14; available on Berkshire Hathaway website. 39 Nelson D. Schwartz and Julie Creswell, ‘What Created This Monster?’, New York Times, 23 March 2008. 40 Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World, New York 2007, p. 233. 38
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this was published the mirage of ‘broader home ownership’ was beginning to melt away, menacing his ‘brave new world’ of rising productivity and low unemployment and inflation. Some of Greenspan’s colleagues, however, were alarmed by his cavalier approach to swelling debt. Ned Gramlich, a Federal Reserve governor, queried the chairman’s approach in 2000 and later drew up a detailed indictment asking why super-sophisticated mortgage products were being foisted on the poor.41 Others in touch with the Federal Reserve system were also concerned. In 2004 the Fed published a paper by Michael Gibson outlining how vulnerable cdos were to the business climate; they could come unstuck very quickly if a recessionary breeze unsettled the interlinked flow of payments.42 The us regulators seemed to ignore the broad issues of linkage and correlation risk. No doubt they were loath publicly to draw attention to the risks courted by the banks, their sivs and their insurers, or the linkage between them. Investors large and small had no viable way of tackling linkage or default correlation risk—insurance costing 400 basis points would wipe out any profit in holding these assets. As we have seen, many public-sector pension funds did shun the cdos and cdss, which is one reason why the investment banks were caught with so much inventory on their hands. The managers of these funds are inclined to be cautious and to pay attention to the warnings of informed commentators. Two men were well placed to anticipate these problems, yet failed to do so: Robert Rubin and Henry Paulson. Rubin was a respected director at Citi and could have ensured a much smaller exposure to the risky instruments. He was at the forefront of the financial revolution in the 1980s, when he recruited the ace risk-evaluators to Goldman Sachs, where he then worked. Henry Paulson as Goldman chief ensured that the bank would emerge almost unscathed from the subprime debacle. Yet at the Treasury he took no public or effective steps to avert the catastrophe. Were there aspects of the problem that simply eluded these super-intelligent and deeply informed financiers? Or were they blinded Edmund Andrews, ‘Fed and Regulators Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread’, New York Times, 18 December 2007. Ned Gramlich’s last warning came in a contribution to the Fed’s Jackson Hole conference in August 2007, shortly before his death. 42 Michael S. Gibson, ‘Understanding the Risk of Synthetic cdos’, Federal Reserve Working Paper No. 36, Washington, dc 2004. 41
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by faith in the market, or in the ability of the financial community to regulate itself?
ii. the fog of financialization The subprime debacle and its sequels train a spotlight on financialization. When properly embedded in structures of social control, finance can help to allocate capital, facilitate investment and smooth demand. But if it is unaccountable and unregulated it becomes sovereign in the re-allocation process, and can grab the lion’s share of the gains it makes possible, including anticipated gains before they have been realized. The problem is aggravated as financial intermediaries proliferate and take advantage of asymmetries in access to information and power imbalances. Such distortions multiply as ‘financialization’ takes hold. It is boosted as the logic of finance becomes ubiquitous, feeding on a commodification of every aspect of life and the life-course—student loans, baby bonds, mortgages, home equity release, credit-card debt, health insurance, individualized pension funds.43 Financialization also encourages corporations to privilege financial functions and to see themselves as chance collections of assets which, as circumstances change, must be continually broken up and reconfigured. While the individual is encouraged to think of him or herself as a two-legged cost and profit centre, the corporation is simply an accidental assemblage to be continually shuffled in response to fleeting market signals. Resort to ‘leverage’ in the financialized world supposedly enables individuals and corporations to get rid of ‘unrewarded risk’ and maximize outcomes. While the word ‘debt’ has a negative ring to it, the word ‘leverage’ is positive; indeed it is now often used as a verb, as we leverage our assets in order to reach for the stars. Forgetting that Archimedes’ lever had a purchase point, the financial engineers aspire to move the world without securing the land on which they stand. In their philosophy, all that is fixed melts into air. This gives them some insight into capitalist motion but no sense of its limits. In contemporary capitalist conditions, especially a grey capitalism riddled with defective links between principals and agents, financialization becomes hugely destructive. Randy Martin, The Financialization of Daily Life, Philadelphia 2002, and Blackburn, Age Shock, pp. 29–74.
43
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Two processes that took hold in the 1950s and 1960s nourished financialization—new principles of consumer credit, and the rise of institutional finance and fund management. In the postwar period, American retailers and manufacturers constructed a new world of revolving credit and ‘option accounts’, eventually culminating in the credit card.44 Fostering consumer credit soon became critical to the success of a wide range of businesses. The Commercial Credit Corporation (ccc) offered its services to retailers who lacked sufficient expertise—or capital—to set up their own lending operation. General Electric offered finance to purchasers of its wide range of consumer durables, laying the basis for the emergence of the mighty ge Capital, responsible for 42 per cent of group profits in 2000. General Motors expanded the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (gmac) as of the late 1960s, a finance arm which accounted for nearly all group profits by the close of the century. Louis Hyman concludes: ‘Rather than forced down on consumers and retailers by banks, credit practices trickled up to financial institutions as retailers responded to the limits on their capital.’45 Diners Club, American Express and Visa picked up and developed such already established lending practices. The powerful trend towards financialization was also evident in the rise of institutional investment—pension funds, insurance, mutual funds and college endowments. Indeed it was often they who supplied the capital needed to finance the new credit arrangements, with different financial intermediaries taking generous fees as both fund managers and lenders. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, cooperatives, housing associations and insurance companies organized on a genuinely ‘mutual’ basis—i.e. owned by their members, not private shareholders—managed to bring down the costs of intermediation by cutting out the commercial middlemen. But the consumer revolution of the 1950s and 1960s was driven by large-scale commercial retailers and their banks. In later decades many genuine mutuals were 44 See Louis Hyman, ‘Debtor Nation: How Consumer Credit Built Postwar America’, Harvard University PhD 2007, Ch. 6. The phenomenon was charted with foreboding by Monthly Review, whose early focus on personal debt reflected an analysis to be found in the classic work by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, New York 1966, arguing that us capitalism was dogged by overproduction. For a more recent reprise see John Bellamy Foster, ‘The Household Debt Bubble’, Monthly Review, vol. 58, no. 1, May 2006. 45 Hyman, ‘Debtor Nation’, Ch. 6, p. 3.
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marginalized or broken up, with members receiving a modest pay-off in the event of privatization.
Theoretical models The financial surge was accompanied by a revolution in finance theory that was pioneered as much by those advising institutional investors as by economics departments, since most of the latter took no interest in the world of everyday finance. The global turmoil and computing advances of the mid-1970s gave great scope to a new theory of financial economics and a practice of financial engineering. Its principles and methods were incubated by economists and financial professionals, who were both intrigued by the novel credit conditions and ideologically hostile to the well-ordered world of the postwar boom, with its government regulation, managerialism, hierarchy of leading corporations and increasingly influential fund managers. Fischer Black (1938–95), who straddled the world of finance and academia, was the most theoretically fertile and ambitious member of the emerging school. On the one hand Black was co-inventor of one of the financial world’s most intensively used instruments—the Black–Scholes options-pricing formula—and on the other he sought to arrive at a new equilibrium model. In the mid-1960s Fischer Black was asked by the Investment Company Institute (ici), a fund managers’ consortium, to prepare evidence which it could submit to forthcoming Congressional hearings, showing that fund managers were doing a good job for their clients—pension funds, college endowments and investors in mutual funds. In conjunction with two academics also working on the problem, Michael Jensen at Chicago and William Sharpe at Seattle, Black commenced a collaboration that was to redefine the ‘capital asset pricing model’, underlie the Black– Scholes options-pricing mechanism, and earn his other collaborators, Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton, the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1997.46 However, to the disappointment of his commercial sponsors, Black and his associates, after analysing decades of share price movements, found no evidence that fund managers added anything to the For the gestation and significance of Black–Scholes, see Donald MacKenzie, ‘An Equation and its Worlds’, Social Studies of Science, vol. 33, no. 6, December 2003, pp. 831–68. 46
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value of their assets. (The ici omitted this embarrassing conclusion from the published report.)47 The ‘financial engineers’ pinpointed the contribution to share performance made by a particular management by separating it from share price movements which simply reflected overall shifts in the stock market or industrial sector. On average, they found, half of share-price movement is not company- or sector-specific but reflects overall market trends; sector trends accounted for 10 per cent of price changes. The logic of this approach led to a host of share indices, such that investors could bet on their movements to screen out risk and secure reward. This was the origin of risk arbitrage, or the exploitation of asset mis-pricing in the wake of such market events as a hostile take-over bid.48 Black urged that the prudent investor should be thoroughly diversified and intolerant of ‘unrewarded risk’. These watchwords of financialized investment have unexpected dimensions. For Black, diversification should extend through time as well as within the universe of assets currently available. The same nominal asset in three days, or three years, was not, in fact, the same asset because, as the Greek philosopher pointed out long ago, you cannot step in the same river twice. But Black’s stress on longitudinal diversification also supported ‘dynamic hedging’, in which the portfolio is continually reassessed and recomposed. Aversion to unrewarded risk can prompt either a reasonable attempt to remove this—e.g. currency, inflation or interest-rate risk, which can be done by hedging—or a continuous search for risks that carry a reward. This idea often informs the ‘leverage with everything’ approach. Leveraging the assets in a portfolio allows greater diversification; while remaining invested in one set of assets, the investor can mortgage them and establish a claim over another set, perhaps by buying an option or taking out a short position. Such procedures may also minimize tax. Perry Mehrling, Fischer Black and the Revolutionary Idea of Finance, Hoboken, nj 2005, pp. 60–4. 48 An example being John Paulson—no relation to Henry—a maestro of risk arbitrage. While risk arbitrage usually focuses on just one event, Paulson took a further step in 2005, seeing house prices, mortgages and cdos as a gigantic bubble; he set up two very bearish hedge funds whose value increased from some $30 million in 2006 to over $4 billion by the beginning of 2008. (George Soros also did well backing Paulson in 2007.) Gregory Zuckerman, ‘House Money: How Trader Made Billions on Subprime Downturn’, Wall Street Journal, 16 January 2008. 47
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Black’s respect for ‘strong economic forces’ working themselves out through an inescapable overall equilibrium made him a critic of both monetarists and Keynesians. Monetary policy was always impotent in the face of changes in what people want. Black favoured ‘uncontrolled banking’—including the waiving of all deposit ratios. In ‘Banking and Interest Rates in a World Without Money’ he invoked the advantages of a passive banking system—quoting James Tobin to the effect that in such a world, ‘the real economy would call the tune for the financial sector, with no feedback in the other direction.’49 Black expressed various views concerning the ‘efficient market hypothesis’, according to which market prices reflect all available information at a given point in time. He did, however, formulate a version he could accept in the following terms: We might define an efficient market as one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value, i.e. the price is more than half of value and less than twice value . . . By this definition, I think almost all markets are efficient almost all of the time. ‘Almost all’ means at least 90 per cent.50
Many would regard such wide parameters as a very loose concept of efficiency. But Black liked approximations—the Black–Scholes model itself does not aim at great exactness. For Black the market price oscillated around the efficient price, just as Marxist economists hold that market price oscillates around value. Indeed the idea that price and value reflect ‘socially necessary labour time’ itself implies a remarkable approximation to efficiency.51 Black remains a contradictory and enigmatic figure. He took further than anyone else a model of equilibrium that treats human beings as bearers of ‘human capital’ who must maximize their returns. Perry Mehrling explains how he experimented with diet, sex and drugs in pursuit of this idea. He was the prophet of leverage because he believed that only the endebted had the single-minded focus on performance that equilibrium demanded (disconcertingly, this concept functions rather 49 Fischer Black, ‘Banking and Interest Rates in a World Without Money: The Effects of Uncontrolled Banking’, in Black, Business Cycles and Equilibrium, Oxford 1987, pp. 1–19. 50 Fischer Black, ‘Noise’, The Journal of Finance, vol. 41, no. 3, 1986, pp. 539–43, 533. 51 See Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Parallax View’, nlr 25, January–February 2004.
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like accumulation in a Marxist account). In the pursuit of diversification he alternated spells in academia with work on Wall Street. But when approached by the Chicago Board with the idea of basing the derivatives market on his option-pricing formula he declined to become involved and observed: ‘Options are an exciting way to gamble, and the Chicago Board Options Exchange wants to act as the gambling house, and take its cut. There’s nothing wrong with that; but if we are to permit this form of gambling, it seems logical to tax it as heavily as the government taxes betting on horse races.’52
Risks and uncertainties The quantitative finance pioneered by Black always wanted to know the worst-case scenario—how much would be lost in the case of a protracted collapse of the market? The banks that were knocked for six by the credit crunch all used elaborate measures for their Value at Risk (VaR). These have proved to be beset by flaws—they do not cope with the unexpected, and prompt replication or reinforcement of untoward events. Years of low volatility led to reduced VaR scores. Feeding bad news into these systems prompted sell signals that aggravated the dangers which the measure had initially highlighted.53 The 1987 crash had revealed a similar problem with computerized programme trades. The afflicted patient is often not the best judge. Regulators with access to a better-constructed VaR could act more rationally than those gripped by a tidal cash ebb. It would not be difficult to bring the visible balance sheet closer to the real balance sheet by requiring published, board-approved levels of VaR and proper disclosure of all liabilities pertaining to associated enterprises. sec filings show that the VaR implied by trading activity at the major investment banks doubled between May 2006 and November 2007.54 In recent years, as we have seen, Wall Street banks Quoted in Mehrling, Fischer Black, p. 138. See Gillian Tett, ‘Volatility Wrecks Financial World’s Value at Risk Models’, Financial Times, 12 October 2007. See also Boris Holzer and Yuval Millo, ‘From Risks to Second-Order Dangers in Financial Markets: Unintended Consequences of Risk-Management Systems’, New Political Economy, vol. 10, no. 2, 2005. The authors give the examples of the 1987 crash and the collapse of ltcm. Jérôme Kerviel, the sadly miscast ‘Che Guevara of finance’, made a similar point when he claimed that the huge SocGen losses revealed on 24 January reflected the over-hasty liquidation of his positions. 54 Greenlaw et al, ‘Leveraged Losses’, p. 32. 52 53
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have felt obliged to take greater risks with their own resources because of a contraction in their revenues from corporate finance—itself a reflection of low investment in the us economy. They not only sponsor hedge funds but increasingly come to resemble them as they use their position as prime brokers to leverage up their bets and pursue arbitrage. The Austrian free-market critique of socialism had insisted on the irrationality of ‘administered prices’, as administrators could never know the host of local possibilities that might unsettle any given set of comparative prices. The practitioners of quantitative finance believed that the Black–Scholes–Merton options valuation model had established a new path to valuation, enabling financial products to be assigned valid prices. The prestige of this device set a precedent for pricing ‘over the counter’—direct, institution to institution—sales of derivative products. As MacKenzie explains: Many of the instruments traded in this market are highly specialized, and sometimes no liquid market, or easily observable market price, exists for them. However, both the vendors of them (most usually investment banks) and at least the more sophisticated purchasers of them can often calculate theoretical prices, and thus have a benchmark ‘fair’ price.55
The theoretical model persuaded the purchasers of cdos that they had paid the right price, notwithstanding the absence of a market, just as it seemingly reassured the banks that they had no skin in the game. In ‘grey’ capitalist conditions, the concepts and techniques of the financial engineers begin to undermine and corrupt the market mechanism. Part of the problem is that these techniques are often used to game less wellinformed players, escape tax or promote a constant reshuffling of assets. As the current crisis shows, they can even deceive the deceivers. To some extent the fault lies in the abuse of financial techniques, rather than in the techniques themselves. The finance houses’ short-term horizon, their lack of commitment to working collectives, and their susceptibility to insider abuse, are all typical of actually existing capitalism. More broadly, today’s institutional investment—‘grey capitalism’—has tolerated or spawned financial malpractice often dressed up in the latest jargon of the ‘quants’ and engineers. 55
MacKenzie, ‘An Equation and its Worlds’, p. 855.
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Derivatives and deception A well-regulated stock exchange is a phenomenal source of information for all market participants. It generates second-by-second data concerning the volume and price of trades, and its settlement system registers the identity of buyers and sellers. The analytic feats of the financial economists were themselves based on such data. Yet the advent of structured finance generated a gigantic volume of direct trades between institutions whose details were only known to the participants. These ‘over-the-counter’ transactions exceeded stock-exchange transactions by the turn of the millennium, and led the exchanges to skimp on procedure in order to remain competitive. Here we have both the cause of the credit crunch and the ultimate irony of the Western crusade to marketize the globe. A great wave of securitization aimed to turn even the most unpromising cash prospect, or intimate personal ambition, into a tradeable. It succeeded in submerging the world’s main capital markets in a deluge of non-performing and unpriced securities. The fog of grey capital descended on the financial districts, shrouding the great banks and clouding the view of investors and regulators alike. In order to grasp today’s capitalism we need financial analysis, but the phenomenon of financialization sucks oxygen from the atmosphere. It privatizes information that should be public, just as it commercializes everyday life and promotes a pattern of ‘uncreative destruction’ in which enterprises and work teams are continually broken up and re-assembled to take advantage of transient arbitrage gains. In addition to helping financial institutions game their own customers, the techniques of financialization allow big capital—large corporations and wealthy individuals—to escape tax and skim the holdings of small shareholders. Note that most pension funds and charitable endowments, but not us mutual funds, are limited by fiduciary rules from much exposure to hedge funds or exotic derivatives. A further corollary of proliferating financialization is that the regulations governing credit creation were first loosened and then almost entirely ignored. Reckless credit expansion has long been the primrose path to financial crisis and collapse.56 The role of derivatives in generating excess credit and financial failure was well explained by Salih Neftci, ‘fx Short Positions, Balance Sheets and Financial Turbulence’. Note however that Neftci holds that, if properly regulated, derivatives would still have a part to play in a healthy financial system. 56
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The post-1972 take-off of financialization coincided with advances in computing capacity and the discovery of new mathematical techniques for valuing options and constructing derivatives. To begin with, these techniques were used mainly to reduce uncertainty and hedge currency risk. But before long it became clear that derivative swaps could be used to bamboozle tax authorities and shareholders. Financial engineering could convert one type of income stream into another, or an asset into income or the other way round—reducing or avoiding tax. Derivatives could also be used to refine the techniques of fund management and strategies for merger and acquisition. The more responsible pension funds avoid hyper-trading programmes and stick with long-term investment strategies. But they do use derivates to hedge their positions. While several financial products serve no useful purpose, we should not expect a generalized rejection of all options and derivatives. Instead it will be necessary to distinguish, as the irs already tries to do, between derivative contracts that really do seek to hedge risks and those whose only rationale is to cheat the tax authority and confuse the unwitting shareholder. There are already calls for proper regulation and registration of these instruments and of the ‘shadow banking system’ as a whole. More and better regulation is indeed needed, but will regulation be enough? It is worth recalling that financialization was born in a quite heavily regulated world, with some of its techniques designed to frustrate and defeat the regulators, just as others aimed at releasing ‘value’.
Lessons of the 1930s The 1920s share bubble, and the bank runs of 1929 and after, prompted a wave of regulation, including the passage of Glass–Steagall in 1933— repealed by Clinton in 1999. For a long period, roughly 1929 to 1972, the scope for financialization was limited, first because of the sharp financial contraction of the Great Depression and then because of the extensive coordination of the Bretton Woods system and postwar economy more generally.57 The centrality of banks, and the role of property bonds in the current crisis, bear an eerie resemblance to the onset of the Great Crash. Joseph Schumpeter stressed how the tumbling of property prices in Florida precipitated the collapse of a speculative bubble centred on property 57 Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, ‘La Finance capitaliste’, in Suzanne de Brunhoff et al, La Finance capitaliste, Paris 2006, pp. 131–80.
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bonds. For Schumpeter the stock-market falls were secondary to the impact on the banks, which in turn reflected the bursting of a credit bubble. He pointed out that the 1929 crash exhibited the classic features of the onset of a ‘Juglar cycle’. Named for the economic historian Clément Juglar, this cycle began with a devastating financial crisis and credit famine, which then took its dreadful toll on industry and agriculture. Schumpeter was already aware of the particular role of housing investment in economic turbulence: ‘Nothing is so likely to produce cumulative depressive processes as such commitments made by a vast number of households to an overhead financed to a considerable extent by commercial banks.’58 This time around, speculative financial instruments based on property mortgages have also collapsed—with Florida again an epicentre. Despite many unknowns it is reasonable to suppose that us gdp will stagnate rather than suffer anything like the crushing decline of the 1930s. Nevertheless, the loss in potential output could be large: Greenlaw and his colleagues estimate a conservative 1–1.5 per cent of gdp, as we have seen. So far both politicians and regulators have sought to tackle the crisis by prompting the banks to come up with their own solutions, rather than by devising new instruments of regulation. The Brown government havered for six months before taking Northern Rock into public ownership. In the United States neither the Fed nor the Treasury have shown a clear determination to expose losses and recapitalize the affected institutions. Even Herbert Hoover established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a public agency designed to resuscitate threatened assets, which eventually made a huge contribution to reviving the us economy. The New Deal response to the crisis also comprised, in addition to Glass– Steagall, the setting up of the Home-Owners Loan Corporation (holc) in 1933, the introduction of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934, the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, and the establishment of a Federal National Mortgage Association, now more familiarly known as Fannie Mae, in 1938. While the holc was supposed to head off mounting foreclosures, Fannie Mae was designed to secure and subsidize prime residential mortgages. The holc bought mortgages in default from the banks and offered the borrowers lower repayment terms. Within 58 J. A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles [1939], Philadelphia 1982, Vol. 2, pp. 747–8. Schumpeter attempted to explain the severity of the 1929 crash as the conjunction of Juglar, Kitchen and Kondratiev cycles.
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two years the holc had received 1.9 million applications from distressed homeowners and successfully re-negotiated one million mortgages. It closed in 1951 after the last 1936 mortgage was paid off.59 While the holc was dealing with subprime borrowers, Fannie Mae made it easier and cheaper for prime borrowers to get a mortgage, using its Federal guarantee and tax-free status to organize a secondary mortgage market that underwrote any residential mortgage up to a certain value. The guarantee and tax exemption enabled Fannie Mae to borrow at cheap rates which were passed on to the individual borrowers. This partial decommodification of the residential mortgage market subsequently proved a great success. In 1968 Fannie Mae was semi-privatized and allowed to raise capital from investors, but kept its Federal guarantee and remained exempt from taxation. These subsidies enabled it to finance the process whereby, over the subsequent forty years, over 50 million householders acquired ownership of their homes. However the semi-privatization can now be seen as a huge mistake, since it allowed the two government-sponsored enterprises to take on inordinate amounts of debt in a bid to promote securitization and boost earnings.60 The more general problem here—also seen in the privatization of so many British building societies—is the hostility to even partially decommodified social forms and an infatuation with the corporate model.
iii. meltdown By August 2007 the malaise caused by the collapse of mortgage-backed instruments had spread to the whole cdo section, and it was this that created the ‘credit crunch’. The penny now dropped that these amazingly complex financial instruments constituted an important part of the assets of a whole string of financial institutions. Hedge funds had also fancied them, being neither squeamish about their quality, nor quizziAlan Blinder, ‘From the New Deal, a Way Out of a Mess’, New York Times, 24 February 2008. Such an approach is a bailout for the banks who are culpable for mis-selling, and should be made to pay a price—on which more below. 60 Ronald Utt, ‘Time to Reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’, Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder 1861, June 2005. Utt proposed withdrawing the Federal guarantee and tax exemption to allow Fannie and Freddie to ‘concentrate . . . on securitizing residential mortgages in free and open competition with the private sector’. See also Manuel Aalbers, ‘The Financialization of the Home and Mortgage Crisis’, Competition and Change, vol. 12, no. 2, June 2008. 59
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cal about structured finance. They knew there was no active market in derivatives, but believed in their model value and in the insurance they carried. In some cases, including those worst hit, the hedge funds were themselves spin-offs from an investment bank, which would extend them credit to make margin calls. Part of the problem with cdos is that the salaries paid to bank employees and financial lawyers match a wholesale operation dealing with thousands of mortgages, but not retail inspection of each lowly mortgage.61 Shortage of deliverable items and practical restrictions on settling cds contracts, meanwhile, has in some cases led to so-called protocols and cash payments worth less than the hedged amount. In another paper for the Federal Reserve, dated October 2007, Michael Gibson first stressed the benefits of credit derivatives of all types, and then itemized the multiple risks stemming from their complex or intricate sequencing and coordination.62 The collapse of cdo valuations, and the doubts about cds coverage, reflected mutual distrust among those holding the securities rather than simple incomprehension. The credit crunch was a product of the banks’ justified doubts concerning one another, as well as the quality of the underlying assets. The banks knew how to assess the problems of the cdos, because they had helped package them. Their in-house Finance PhDs had enough information to know—whatever the complexity—just how dubious these assets were, despite their aaa grades. They were aware that fear of contamination would take its toll on securities, including some that, in the fullness of time, might be okay; likewise that the insurance wrappers around these products might disintegrate just when really needed. The credit crunch has taken a toll on all mortgage securities and on the very concept of the cdo and cds. It will prompt great caution. But it will not wipe out all derivative trades since these are too useful to the financial system, and too widely diffused within it, to be simply abandoned. The nominal total of cdss is no less than $48 trillion, or three times the size of us gdp (though many overlap and cancel one another out, making the real total much smaller). cdo issuance over Satyajit Das, ‘How Supposed Risk Hedgers Could Become Risk Creators’, Financial Times, 6 February 2008. See also Robert Cookson and Gillian Tett, ‘Pressure Builds Over cds Settlements’, Financial Times, 21 February 2008. 62 Michael S. Gibson, ‘Credit Derivatives and Risk Management’, feds Working Paper No. 47, Washington, dc 2007. 61
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the last five years was $1.6 trillion, while outstanding financial securities total $10.8 trillion. The Federal Reserve has offered greater liquidity to the banks but it is very likely that their problem is solvency not liquidity. The paper by Greenlaw and his co-authors explains: Liquidity injections by the central bank are an invitation to the financial intermediaries to expand their balance sheets by borrowing from the central bank for on-lending to other parties. However a leveraged institution suffering a shortage of capital will be unwilling to take up such an invitation. Recognition of this reluctance is the key to understanding the protracted turmoil we have witnessed in the inter-bank market.63
These authors admit that us-style low interest rates help the banks by allowing them to roll over their existing loans at more favourable rates, but they do not lead to new loans. If the major banks are forced to reduce the book value of their cdos by 50 cents on the dollar, this will wipe out the equity value of their businesses and make them technically bankrupt. Banks which face this danger include Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley, but there are likely to be surprises too. Of course no major bank will be allowed to fail. Instead the authorities will devise rescues, buyouts and mergers. Rather than the stern treatment meted out to Enron and Worldcom, we shall see ‘socialism for bankers’ as public money is mobilized to prop up finance houses that are too big to fail. The Bear Stearns rescue was hard on shareholders but not bondholders or counterparties. JP Morgan, the purchaser, is the beneficiary of a Federal Reserve guarantee covering $29 billion of assets held by Bear. In the weeks following this rescue the Fed lent a broadly similar sum, in confidence, to several other banks, with Level 3 securities as collateral. The main alternative to the injection of public funds would be further input from sovereign wealth funds. Altogether, at the beginning of 2008, there was as much as $900 billion in vulnerable cdo bundles including quantities of subprime, Alt A and better debt. These assets do have value but it is difficult to know exactly what this is, because they can only be sold at an absurd discount. Some will make a killing by acquiring undervalued ‘distressed assets’, 63
Greenlaw et al, ‘Leveraged Losses’, p. 43.
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but how to tell good bets from dead losses? In an attempt to rebalance portfolios some banks have resorted to barter, swapping credit derivatives to achieve a supposedly more advantageous mix. The losses chalked up by the banks hit their shareholders and some juniors in the stricken sector. Financial stocks have dropped on average by a quarter or more, with some doing much worse. However the senior executives who brought these great losses on their shareholders have still been awarded handsome pay-offs by tame boards of directors. The ceos of two Wall Street banks left their jobs in 2007 clutching lavish rewards for failure: $160 million for Stanley O’Neal at Merrill and $90 million for Charles Prince at Citigroup. At Bear Stearns the rescue left shareholders with $10 a share compared with $170 a year earlier. Onethird of the bank’s shares were held by its employees, many of whom will also lose their jobs. Board members lost heavily on their holdings, but will remain very rich men since during the great cdo bonanza—in which their bank was a lead player—they had earned fees and bonuses of tens, or even hundreds, of millions. Senior- and medium-level bankers continued to receive lavish compensation despite the dire results. Morgan Stanley announced a $9.4 billion loss in the last quarter of 2007 but still increased the size of its bonus pool by 18 per cent, arguing that the losses had been concentrated in structured finance and should not blight the rewards of those who continued to be profitable. Employee compensation generally runs at 50 per cent of an investment bank’s revenue. In 2007 this rose sharply and in some cases came close to 100 per cent.64 The banks’ shareholders have undergone severe losses. The largest shareholder in Citigroup is the Saudi investor Prince Alwaleed, whose booming oil assets offset his banking losses. But there are certainly swathes of pension funds and small investors who will feel the pain. They may not have held much in cdos but, since they have to invest in the whole market in the interests of diversification, they do have stakes in many financial 64 Raghuram Rajan, ‘Bankers’ Pay Is Deeply Flawed’, Financial Times, 9 January 2008. For ceo and fund manager ‘agency problems’ see Blackburn, Age Shock, pp. 164–5; Michael Useem, Investor Capitalism, New York 1996; John Bogle, The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism, New Haven 2005; Nomi Prins, Other People’s Money, New York 2004 and Yally Avrahampour, ‘Agency, Networks and Professional Rivalry: the Valuation and Investment of uk Pension Funds (1948–2006)’, PhD University of Essex, 2007.
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corporations. One report claimed that pension funds lost $110 billion in the first month of 2008 alone.65 In 2007 116 funds filed lawsuits against their managers, for losses ranging from 28 to 84 per cent on supposedly safe investments. State Street, with $2 trillion of pension funds under management, has already put aside $618 million to cover legal claims.66 The most direct victims of the crisis have been two to three million us mortgage holders—or their tenants—who have lost, or will lose, their homes. Younger women, African Americans and other minorities were over-represented. The credit crunch deepens a recession which shrinks wages and the job market, and will make student loans more difficult and expensive to obtain. It is holding up countless municipal improvements—including the building of social housing. In the longer run there may be some benefit, since it has exposed how insurers and ratings agencies combined to overcharge municipalities for their bond insurance. And the crisis afflicts many outside the us, with the highly financialized uk economy already taking a heavy hit.67 The looming danger is some mixture of a protracted recession, like Japan in the 1990s, until bank losses are purged from the system, and a wider dislocation like that of the 1997–98 Asian crisis. Because this is a convulsion brought on by ‘Anglo-Saxon’ finance-driven capitalism it will have a character of its own. Japan did not have hollowed-out industries, a negative savings rate, or an infestation of untested, unpriceable structured finance.
Treasury gambits Henry Paulson has, from the inception of the crisis, put the main emphasis on urging the banks, bond insurers and other financial concerns to come up with their own solutions. But this has had little impact. Thus the super-siv, which he endorsed in September 2007, had to be abandoned in January 2008. On 28 January Hugo Dixon enquired in the Wall Street Journal, ‘Is Anybody in Charge?’68 Within days Paulson was assuring Andrew Sheen, ‘Funds Lose $110 billion in a Month’, Global Pensions, 1 February 2008. Vikas Bajaj, ‘State Street Corp is Sued Over Pension Fund Losses’, New York Times, 4 January 2008. 67 Alex Frangos, ‘Credit Losses Stall Affordable-Housing Projects’, Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2008; Julie Creswell and Vikas Bajaj, ‘States and Cities Start Rebelling on Bond Ratings’, New York Times, 3 March 2008; Alistair MacDonald and Mark Whitehouse, ‘London Fog: Credit Crunch Pounds uk Economy’, Wall Street Journal, 7 February 2008. 68 Wall Street Journal, 28 January 2008. 65
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Charlie Rose, the tv interviewer, that he was working on a new and comprehensive regulatory template, to cover mortgage origination, securitization, bank asset ratios, off-balance-sheet entities, disclosure and the construction and sale of derivatives. When it was published in March it became clear that he had not abandoned his faith that the financial community should regulate itself—or at least appear to do so. The plan laid some disclosure requirements on the investment banks and hedge funds, but there were to be no regulatory powers. The credit crunch has created emergencies in which the Treasury and Fed have had to intervene, but so far as possible this has been dressed up as self-help and auto-regulation. Hence even the takeover of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan only proceeded, as we have seen, because the Fed assumed $29 billion of risk from the former, an arrangement cleared with the Treasury Secretary. The fire sale of Bear Stearns dealt harshly with an outriding and unloved bank, which had itself declined to join the rescue of ltcm in 1998. It left unanswered the capital-adequacy doubts that dogged other Wall Street concerns. The Federal Reserve has cut short-term interest rates sharply, supposedly as a way to stimulate the us economy. But its overriding concern is with the well-being, or even survival, of core financial institutions. The banks are always slow to pass on lower rates to customers.69 With banks able to borrow on the flimsiest collateral at 2.25 per cent interest, they continued to charge over 6 per cent for even the most solid mortgage prospect. That there is much in life beyond the ken of quantitative finance is no revelation, but that its practitioners so badly miscalled the odds is strange. Thus Matthew Rothman, a Chicago PhD and head of quantitative equity strategies at Lehman Brothers Holdings, declared after a few bad days in August 2007: ‘Wednesday is the type of day people will remember in Quant Land for a very long time. Events that models only predicted would happen once in 10,000 years happened every day for three days.’70 In fact Benoît Mandelbrot had long been sceptical, while Nassim Nicholas Taleb, himself a trader, warned that quantitative finance has a blind spot when it comes to ‘fat tails’ and ‘black swan events’.71 Fischer Floyd Norris, ‘An Effort to Stem Losses at Citigroup Produces a Renewed Focus on Risk’, New York Times, 16 January 2008. 70 Kaja Whitehouse, ‘“Quant” Expert Sees a Shakeout for the Ages’, Wall Street Journal, 14 August 2007. 71 See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Fooled by Randomness, New York 2004, and The Black Swan, New York 2007. 69
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Black wrote an article on ‘The Holes in Black–Scholes’ and another on how to exploit them.72 One hole in Black–Scholes is that it assumes a normal distribution and will be wrong-footed by a fat tail. With financial data there is often a problem of a sample size that is not large enough to capture their variance over a significant time period. In a long-term perspective the information available to someone basing themselves on today’s financial data is very limited; by excluding the future, it is impossible to estimate whether the tail is fat or not. While Fischer Black knew that time could play havoc with the theorems of finance theory, the general run of quantitative economists naively believe in a simple numerical discount rate which can be used to calculate the net present value of a future stream of income or payments. This flattening process—also brought on by ‘mark to market’ and ‘fair value’ accounting—robs the future of its most unsettling characteristics: it is at once unpredictable and carries the past within it. Financialization encourages households to behave like businesses, businesses to behave like banks, and banks to behave like hedge funds. But what, then, is the fate of the hedge funds? How can we know when they are successful? The relative frequency of ‘Taleb distributions’ in financial markets makes it very difficult for even expert institutional or individual investors to assess the performance of hedge funds. In such markets there is, in any one year, a high probability of making a good return and a low probability of huge losses. But over twenty years the low probability rises to levels where perhaps one in ten, or even one in five, such funds will be wiped out. The hedge-fund manager is paid 2 per cent of fund value each year and 20 per cent of the annual capital gain. Even managers of funds that are wiped out after twenty years will walk away very rich. The credit crunch has already taken down several famous hedge funds and inspired radical doubts concerning the hedge-fund formula. Martin Wolf cites a study which shows how difficult it is to devise incentives that are truly aligned with the interests of investors: Obvious possibilities include rewarding managers on the basis of final returns, forcing them to hold a sizeable equity stake, or levying penalties for under-performance. None of these solutions solves the problem of distinguishing luck from skill. The first also encourages managers to take sizeable risks when they are close to the return at which payouts begin. Managers can evade the effects of the second alternative by taking 72
Fischer Black, ‘The Holes in Black–Scholes’, Risk, no. 1, March 1988.
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positions in derivatives, which may be hard to police. Finally, even under the apparently attractive final alternative it appears that any claw-back contract harsh enough to keep unskilled managers away will also discourage skilled ones.73
There remains the question: when—and to what extent—will the financial crisis become a crisis for the real economy? After six months of financial near-paralysis, the us economy was still growing and the New York Stock Exchange was seemingly in denial. There were signs of a slackening pace but these were aggravated, rather than caused, by the credit crunch. After all it was the housing bust which prompted the crunch, not the other way round. A leitmotif of writing about the us economy in 2001 and after was the low level of domestic investment and the decline in loans made to non-financial concerns by banks. Instead financial institutions lent to, and traded with, one another. Greenlaw, Hatzius and their colleagues have explained how the balance-sheet-levered ‘financial accelerator’ communicates shocks from one interconnected financial sector to another, intensifying the losses.74 For a while, what was left of the real economy could limp along since it was not dependent on financial credit, but what of the ‘fat tail’ of heavily leveraged corporations? They might only comprise 5 per cent of the total, but their failure could still set off a new round of write-downs. The April 2008 imf report politely raised the issue of bankruptcy when it stated that its estimate of $945 billion of losses ‘suggests potential added stress on bank capital and further write downs . . . combined with losses to non-bank financial institutions . . . the danger is that there may be further reverberations back to the banking system as the de-leveraging continues’.75
iv. tackling the credit crunch The collapse of the mortgage bubble and the damage it has done to both the financial system and real economy reveal the failure of Anglo-Saxon capitalism with its deregulation, privatization and belief in the alchemy of financialization. While parts of the shadow banking system serve no Martin Wolf, ‘Why Today’s Hedge Fund Industry May Not Survive’, Financial Times, 19 March 2008. See also Dean Foster and Peyton Young, ‘Hedge Fund Wizards’, The Economists’ Voice, vol. 5, no. 2, 2008, and ‘The Hedge Fund Game’, Oxford University Economics Department Discussion Paper No. 378, January 2008. 74 Greenlaw et al, ‘Leveraged Losses’. 75 imf, Global Stability Report, p. x. 73
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useful purpose and could simply be suppressed, other functions are potentially useful and could be discharged by a responsible public body. The banks are closing their sivs, but the law which allows them to hide liabilities off-balance sheet remains. The us and British authorities have both mobilized huge resources to rescue the banks from their own folly, and the bailout may be far from over. For both households and financial concerns, the burden of debt remains, and can bring them down. The banks will need support if they are to ‘de-leverage’ by reorganizing their business and restoring solvency. The use of public resources to achieve this should carry a price if it is not to encourage a repetition of such behaviour—‘moral hazard’, as the economists call it. Financial corporations that benefit from public intervention—as did JP Morgan—could also be obliged to issue preferred stock to a public holding fund. In the us this might be the state-level Social Security trust fund network. Alternatively a new social fund regional network could be established in this way. Since all have benefited from the low interest rates, all could be required to contribute. The power to impose a capital levy could also be deployed to prevent new bubbles. If the proceeds were redistributed from those who spend their dividends to a future-oriented fund that re-invested its income, it would help to contain inflationary pressures. Another area that requires reform is accountancy, dominated by just four large companies, and accounting standards, where the ‘mark-to-market’ approach has been ‘pro-cyclical’—encouraging the boom–bust cycle. A public audit agency, and a diversified set of accounting standards, could tackle the problems of an industry where auditors are too often in cahoots with the auditee.76 There is likewise a case for only allowing expert publicly owned bodies to function as hedge funds, and converting ‘private equity’ into ‘public equity’ concerns. Another model that might be considered is the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a public body that operated in the years 1932 to 1946. It invested a total of some $39.5 billion—in contemporary terms nearly $4 trillion—to combat recession and, after 1940, to organize war production. It created a swathe of new productive facilities, acquiring an equity stake in return. This enterprise was hastily liquidated in 1946 because it had succeeded too well. It was 76
I have more on these approaches in Age Shock, pp. 285–92.
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portrayed as an un-American institution and several of its best managers were hounded as Soviet spies.77 A further example of a bailout mechanism is the Resolution Trust Corporation set up by the us Congress in 1989. This body used Federal money to rescue the stricken Savings and Loan concerns. The rtc assumed ownership of all assets, selling these off once the market had recovered. In this way the rtc accomplished a huge Federal injection of funds but was eventually self-liquidating—the rtc worked, but its successes became an opaque way of subsidizing the banking sector.78 It would have been better if both rfc and rtc had remained as public bodies helping to diversify the economic landscape and maintain levels of investment and security. Recapitalization expenditures should be seen as part of the capital budget, not as current expenditures. Jean-Charles Rochet points to the success of the Norwegian approach to its banking crisis in 1988–92. Three of the country’s largest banks were taken into public ownership and their shareholders expropriated. The banks were so successfully rehabilitated that when they were eventually sold back to the private sector the government made a significant profit.79 At least some of this was channelled to the country’s two public pension funds, one of which is dedicated to investment in the local economy. More generally, the old Anglo-American formula of the National Debt is inappropriate in a world beset not by individual ‘risk’ but by large-scale ‘common shocks’ like climate change, ageing and market turmoil, as has been recognized even by some of the most conservative and cautious states as they build up ‘future funds’ and sovereign wealth funds. The incoming Labour government in Australia has announced that it will continue to build the country’s ‘future fund’. Norway, Singapore, South Korea and China are other examples. The Norwegian finance minister insists that his country’s government pension fund, with assets of $350 billion, pursues an ‘ethical’ agenda and a ‘high degree of transparency in all aspects of its operation’. It has ‘long-term investment horizons’, James Olson, Saving Capitalism: the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the New Deal, 1933–1940, Princeton 1988. 78 Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald, Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics, Cambridge 2003. 79 Rochet, Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?, pp. 29–30. 77
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avoids ‘leverage’ and adds liquidity to the market. The fund rigorously eschews ‘political posturing or politicized investment decisions’: We promote the ethical foundation by exercising ownership rights and excluding companies from the fund. In cases where it is possible to encourage a company to put in place systems that reduce the risk of ethical infringements, the use of ownership rights is the preferred option.80
Nowadays many public-sector and social funds prefer ‘engagement’— putting down motions at agms on such issues as dangerous industrial processes, denial of worker rights and exorbitant executive pay—rather than simply boycotting the stock. One should be careful not to exaggerate what is achievable by such means, still less pose them as an alternative to popular campaigns, legislation and trade-union action. This is still state capitalism, and is usually far removed from real accountability. But in the shifting and treacherous sands of financialized capital markets, the sovereign wealth funds have been a factor of stability. Given this potential there is every reason to argue that they should be financed by regular capital levies, with the added advantage that such levies can, as Schumpeter pointed out, counteract bubble economics.81 The national scale of regulation that