New Visions of Nature
Martin Drenthen · Jozef Keulartz · James Proctor Editors
New Visions of Nature Complexity and Authenticity
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Editors Martin Drenthen Faculty of Science, Department of Philosophy and Science Studies (ISIS) Radboud University of Nijmegen Heyendaalseweg 135 6525 AJ Nijmegen The Netherlands
[email protected]
Jozef Keulartz Applied Philosophy Group Wageningen University and Research Centre Hollandseweg 1 6796 KN Wageningen The Netherlands
[email protected]
James Proctor Environmental Studies Program Lewis & Clark College 348 John R. Howard Hall 0615 S.W. Palatine Hill Road Portland, OR 97219 USA
[email protected]
ISBN 978-90-481-2610-1 e-ISBN 978-90-481-2611-8 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2611-8 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2009926891 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Cover image: photograph by Renate de Backere (www.stormmeeuw.nl) Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Templeton Foundation, who made possible the expert seminar on which this book was based. We further wish to thank Hub Zwart for assisting us in editing this book.
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Contents
Part I
Introduction
1 Nature in Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Martin Drenthen, Jozef Keulartz, and James Proctor
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Part II Public Visions of Nature 2 Technological Nature – And the Problem When Good Enough Becomes Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peter H. Kahn Jr., Rachel L. Severson, and Jolina H. Ruckert
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3 They Could Have Used a Robot: Technology, Nature Experience and Human Flourishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maartje Schermer
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4 The Authenticity of Nature: An Exploration of Lay People’s Interpretations in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Riyan J.G. van den Born andWouter T. de Groot
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5 The Hierarchical and Unconscious Mind: Reflections on the Authenticity of Nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maarten H. Jacobs
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6 The Trouble with Plovers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anita Guerrini 7 About Snowy Plovers, Lapwings and Wolves: How to Include Contrasting Visions of Ecologists and Laymen in Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Henny J. van der Windt
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Part III The Genomics View of Nature 8 Detachment, Genomics and the Nature of Being Human . . . . . . Lenny Moss
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9 The Detached Animal – On the Technical Nature of Being Human Pieter Lemmens
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Contents
Metagenomic Metaphors: New Images of the Human from ‘Translational’ Genomic Research . . . . . . . Eric T. Juengst
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The Metagenomic World-View: A Comment on Eric T. Juengst’s ‘Metagenomic Metaphors’ . . . . . . . . . . . John Dupré and Maureen A. O’Malley
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Genomics Metaphors and Genetic Determinism . . . . . . . . . . . Hub Zwart
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Maps and the Taxonomic Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chunglin Kwa
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Part IV Philosophy of Landscape and Place 14
“Thinking Like a Mountain”: Ethics and Place as Travelling Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bruce B. Janz
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Towards an Epistemology of Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J.A.A. Swart
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Developing Nature Along Dutch Rivers: Place or Non-Place . . . . Martin Drenthen
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Restoring Nature in a Mobile Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C.S.A. (Kris) van Koppen
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Between Nativism and Cosmopolitanism: Framing and Reframing in Invasion Biology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jozef Keulartz and Cor van der Weele
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Further Towards a Continuum Between Nativism and Cosmopolitanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Matthias Gross
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Part V 20
Conclusions
Nature, Technology and the Human Condition . . . . . . . . . . . Catherine L. Newell and Michael A. Osborne
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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Contributors
Riyan J.G. van den Born works as Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Science Studies of the Faculty of Science at the Radboud University of Nijmegen. From 1996–2004 she worked as junior teacher Social Environmental Sciences at the Radboud University. Since 2004 she works as assistant professor at the Department of Philosophy and Science, and in 2007 she received her PhD degree at the same university for research on the relationship between humans and nature. Her main research is a combination of Environmental Philosophy and Social Sciences, with a focus on visions of nature; public perceptions of nature and landscape. Her latest research is on public perceptions of technological interventions in nature,
[email protected] Martin Drenthen is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy and Science Studies of the Faculty of Science at the Radboud University of Nijmegen. Earlier, he was researcher at the Centre for Ethics of the University of Nijmegen, and assistant professor of Environmental Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy and Arts at the University of Antwerp (Belgium). He received his PhD in 2003, with his dissertation (in Dutch) Grenzen aan wildheid [Bordering Wildness], on the significance of Nietzsche’s critique of morality for environmental ethics. He has previously published in Environmental ethics, Environmental Values, New Nietzsche Studies and Ethical Perspectives. He is international representative (for the Netherlands) of the International Society for Environmental Ethics (ISEE). His current research interests include: environmental philosophy, ethics of place, philosophy of ecological restoration, cultural aspects of river management, and the ethical aspects of ecogenomics,
[email protected] John Dupré received his Ph.D at Cambridge in 1981 after spending two years studying in the U.S. as a Harkness Fellow. He was then a Junior Research Fellow at St. John’s College, Oxford, for two years before taking up a post in the Department of Philosophy at Stanford University, where he taught until 1996. He returned to the U.K. to take up posts as Professor of Philosophy in Birkbeck College, University of London, and as a Senior Research Fellow at Exeter. In 2000 he resigned his chair in London and was appointed at Exeter as Professor of Philosophy of Science. In 2002 he assumed the full-time directorship of ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society (Egenis). During the period 1st April to 15th June 2006 he was the Spinoza Visiting Professor at the University of Amsterdam. He has published extensively in the
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philosophy of biology. His most recent book, coauthored with the sociologist Barry Barnes, is Genomes and What to Make of Them (Chicago),
[email protected] Wouter T. de Groot is Professor of Social Environmental Science at Radboud University and Leiden University. Trained as a civil engineer aeons ago, he worked in Kenya and then moved to the development of interdisciplinary methodology for environmental science, publishing in the meantime on issues of ecology, economics, planning, philosophy and the social sciences. Presently, De Groot is involved mainly in natural resource and river management in the Netherlands and the developing countries, including cultural aspects such as the ‘Visions of nature’ research strand at Radboud University,
[email protected] Matthias Gross is Senior Researcher at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research – UFZ in Leipzig, Germany and lecturer (Privatdozent) in sociology at Bielefeld University. He is author of several books and numerous journal articles in the fields of science and technology studies, environmental sociology and the history of sociology and ecology. His current research focuses on the revitalization of large scale contaminated sites and the changing forms of science in a knowledge society. He is co-founder and editor of the interdisciplinary journal Nature and Culture,
[email protected] Anita Guerrini is, from September 2008, Horning Professor of the Humanities and Professor of History at Oregon State University.Previously she was Professor of History and Environmental Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She is a historian of science with particular interests in animal studies in both the early modern era and the present. She has also published on the history of medicine, biomedical ethics, the history of food, and environmental history, among other topics.Her most recent book is Experimenting with Humans and Animals: From Galen to Animal Rights (2003) and she is co-editing a volume on the role of history in ecological restoration,
[email protected] Maarten H. Jacobs is Assistant Professor at the Socio-spatial Analysis Chair Group of Wageningen University. His academic interests include perceptions of landscape, nature and water, human-animal relations, and leisure and tourist experiences. He is keen to connect these domains of applied research with psychology (emotion and perception theory), neuroscience (the neural constitution of psychological functions) and philosophy of mind (the mind-body problem), as his Ph-thesis, the Production of Mindscapes (2006), demonstrates. Maarten Jacobs is a member of the young scientists’ board of the Dutch Council for Environmental, Nature and Spatial research, and a guest professor at the Human Dimensions of Natural Resources Department of Colorado State University (US) and the Regions and Regionality master program of Bergen University (Norway),
[email protected] Bruce B. Janz is Associate Professor of Humanities and chair of the Department of Philosophy (as of fall 2008) at the University of Central Florida. He also directs the Center for Humanities and Digital Research. His areas of research include work on concepts of place and space across multiple disciplines, African philosophy, cultural
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philosophy, and 19th century ‘continental’ philosophy. His interest is in the ways in which philosophy can come to recognize its place (that is, the cultural, historical, and geographical source of its central questions and the trajectory of its thought), and how the recognition of place can lead to the creation of new concepts. His work has appeared in Ethics, Place and Environment, City and Community, Philosophy Today, Philosophia Africana, and The Edinburgh Companion to 20th Century Philosophy, among other places,
[email protected] Eric T. Juengst is Professor of Bioethics at the Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine in Cleveland, Ohio. Previously, he has taught medical ethics and the philosophy of science on the faculties of the medical schools of the University of California, San Francisco and Pennsylvania State University, and from 1990 to 1994 he was the first Chief of the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications Branch of the National Center for Human Genome Research at the U.S. National Institutes of Health. He received his B.S. in Biology from the University of the South in 1978 and his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Georgetown University in 1985. His research interests and publications focus on the conceptual and ethical issues raised by new advances in human genetics and biotechnology: since coming to CWRU in 1994, he has led collaborative research projects on ethical issues in gene transfer technology, the biomedical control of human aging, ‘community engagement’ in genomic research, and human genomic initiatives like the Human Microbiome Project. In 2004, he was awarded a ‘Center of Excellence in Ethics Research’ grant from the U.S. National Institutes of Health to support the creation of new interdisciplinary research program, the CWRU Center for Genetic Research Ethics and Law (CGREAL), which he now directs,
[email protected] Peter H. Kahn, Jr. is Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology and Adjunct Associate Professor in the Information School at the University of Washington. He also directs the Human Interaction with Nature and Technological Systems Laboratory. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley in 1988. His publications have appeared in such journals as Child Development, Developmental Psychology, Human-Computer Interaction, and Journal of Systems Software, as well as in such proceedings as CHI, HRI, and Ubicomp. His 1999 award-winning book (MIT Press) is titled The Human Relationship with Nature: Development and Culture. His edited volume (MIT Press, 2002) with Stephen Kellert is titled Children and nature: psychological, sociocultural, and evolutionary investigations. His research projects are currently being funded by the National Science Foundation,
[email protected], Website: http://faculty.washington.edu/pkahn/ Jozef Keulartz is Associate Professor of Applied Philosophy at Wageningen University and Research Centre. He has been appointed special chair for Environmental Philosophy at the Faculty of Science of the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published extensively in different areas of science and technology studies, social and political philosophy, bioethics, environmental ethics and nature policy.
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Contributors
Keulartz was a member of the Scientific Council Large Herbivores (Oostvaardersplassen), set up by the National Forest Service, and of the Scientific Council of The European Centre for Nature Conservation (ECNC). He is a participant in ALTER-net, a ‘network of excellence’ funded by the EU’s 6th Framework Programme. He is also a member of the International Working Group on Sustainability and of the Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification (GOGEM),
[email protected] C.S.A. (Kris) van Koppen is Associate Professor at the Environmental Policy Group ofWageningen University, where he works since 1992. Since 2004 he is also Professor of Environmental Education by special appointment at Utrecht University. His thesis research (2002) was on social theory of nature valuation and protection. Current research and educational interests extend to several areas within policy and management of environment and nature, with a highlight on individual and organizational learning processes. Within these areas of interest, he has published articles in Knowledge in Society, Sociologia Ruralis, Ecological Economics, the International Journal of Environment and Sustainable Development, the Journal of Environmental Education en the Journal of Cleaner Production, and contributed to many scientific edited volumes. Together with William T Markham, he edited ‘Protecting Nature. Organizations and Networks in Europe and the USA’ published last year by Elgar. Kris van Koppen is chair of the Environment and Society Research Network of the European Sociological Association,
[email protected] Chunglin Kwa is Lecturer in Science and Technology Studies in the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences of the University of Amsterdam. He is currently working on the history of the visualization of landscapes. One article, on Alexander von Humboldt, appeared in The European Legacy (2005), another article is to appear shortly in Configurations. For his general history of styles in science, Kwa received a translation grant from NWO. The book will appear with . . . in 2009,
[email protected] Pieter Lemmens studied philosophy and biology at the Radboud University of Nijmegen. In 2008, he received his PhD in philosophy. His thesis, entitled ‘Driven by technology. The human condition and the biotechnology revolution’, is an examination of the intimate relationship between technology and the human. It argues for a new, non-instrumental, evolutionary and anthropo-ontological view of technology and reflects on the implications of this new view for our understanding of the biotechnology revolution. He is currently appointed as a post-doc researcher at Centre for Methodical Ethics and Technology Assessment at the University of Wageningen (Netherlands), working on a project about genomics and Open Source. His main interests are continental philosophy of technology, philosophical anthropology, continental philosophy of biology, and leftist political thought,
[email protected] Lenny Moss is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Exeter. Moss began as a research scientist with doctoral work on cell biology and cancer at the University of California, Berkeley and post-doctoral work on cell biology and human development at the UC San Francisco Medical Center. He then went on to do a second PhD in philosophy at Northwestern University with emphases in Critical
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Theory, German Philosophy and the philosophy of science. Moss’s current research interests include (1) a renewal of the enterprise of philosophical anthropology based upon a synthesis and dialectical interpenetration of philosophy and the empirical sciences, (2) a philosophical reconstruction of the history of philosophy from the perspective of an ‘expressivist’ anthropology, (3) the philosophical elucidation of a ‘phenotype-first’ biology and its implications for a general philosophy of nature guided by the idea of ‘natural detachment’ as an immanent teleology. Moss’s book What Genes Can’t Do (MIT, 2003) is scheduled to appear in Japanese sometime this year,
[email protected] Catherine L. Newell is a Ph.D. candidate in Religious Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her research is an investigation into finding new ways to breach the perceived boundaries between religion and science, as well as explorations into the appropriations of science and religion into popular culture. An instructor in the Writing Department at UCSB, she will complete her dissertation on popular faith and the American Space Program in 2010,
[email protected] Maureen A. O’Malley is a Senior Research Fellow at Egenis, University of Exeter. Her current research involves philosophical and historical investigations of microbiology, with a particular focus on metagenomics and microbial systems biology. This project continues and extends her earlier work on evolutionary microbiology and microbial genomics, which she carried out while part of the Doolittle lab at Dalhousie University (Halifax, Nova Scotia). Her other interests include the use of evolutionary theory in the social sciences, as well as the philosophy and sociology of biology in general, m.a.o’
[email protected] Michael A. Osborne, formerly Professor of History and Environmental Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara, has been appointed Professor of History of Science at Oregon State University. His first book, Nature, the Exotic, and the Science of French Colonialism (1994) examined biology and natural history in France and the French Empire. In the past few years he has been the bioethics leader for human embryonic research at his home university, and is currently president of the Sciences et Empires Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science. A new book, The Emergence of Tropical Medicine in France, is forthcoming with the University of Chicago Press,
[email protected] James Proctor is Professor and Director of the Environmental Studies Program at Lewis & Clark College, Portland Oregon, and the coordinator for the New Visions of Nature, Science, and Religion program. Prof. Proctor’s research lies in the realm of scientific and religious authority, and in environmental thought. He is the editor of Geography and Ethics: Journeys in a Moral Terrain (Routledge, 1999), and Science, Religion, and the Human Experience (Oxford, 2005),
[email protected] Jolina H. Ruckert is a Ph.D. student in Developmental Psychology at the University of Washington. She received her M.A. in Psychology from Pepperdine University (2006) and her BA in Psychology/Biology from the University of Miami (2004). She has been a student member of The Explorers Club since 2004. Her research
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interests center on the human relationship with the natural world. She is particularly interested in (a) the development of moral considerations regarding nonhuman animals, (b) children and adolescents’ experiences with and conceptions of nature and technologically mediated nature (e.g., as occurs through robotic animal forms), and (c) building theory of the human-nature relation that integrates ontogenesis, ontology, and culture,
[email protected] Rachel L. Severson is a doctoral candidate in Developmental Psychology at the University of Washington. She is interested in children’s animistic and moral conceptions of ‘other’, whether the other is natural (e.g., animate and inanimate nature) or computational (e.g., personified robots). Specifically her research investigates: (a) whether and how children understand natural and computational others as alive, in terms of biological properties, psychological states, and sociality; and (b) whether and how children extend moral regard to natural and computational others, in terms of concern for their physical and psychological wellbeing, rights, and just treatment. Her publications have appeared in such journals as Human-Computer Interaction, Journal of Environmental Psychology, and Interaction Studies: Social Behavior and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems,
[email protected], Website: http://staff.washington.edu/raches/ Maartje Schermer (1969) is Assistant Professor of Medical Ethics at the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam. She trained as a Medical Doctor at the University of Amsterdam, where she also studied philosophy. She got her PhD in 2001 with a thesis on the concept and practice of patient autonomy. After that she was involved in research projects on care for dementia patients, and on pragmatism as an approach to ethics in a technological culture. Currently she is doing research concerning the ethics of human enhancement, especially neuroenhancement with psychopharmaca. She is also involved in a project on the ethical issues involved in telemonitoring and telecare, which focuses on the influence of these new technologies on conceptions of good care and care relationships. Her fields of interest and expertise include conceptions of autonomy and identity, neuroethics, enhancement, and technology ethics,
[email protected] Jac. A.A. Swart is Associate Professor at the Science & Society Group (SSG) of the Faculty of Mathematics & Natural Sciences, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. He studied biology and philosophy. His academic interests include the societal, ethical and dynamic aspects of life sciences. He has contributed to journals in the fields of conservation ecology, knowledge systems, societal and ethical aspects of nature conservation and sustainability, and animal ethics. He is a member of the Dutch Committee for Animal Biotechnology(CBD). His current research topics also include social and ethical aspects of food genomics, biotechnology, and synthetic biology,
[email protected] Cor van der Weele is assistant professor in Applied Philosophy at Wageningen University. She studied biology and philosophy. Her PhD thesis in the philosophy of biology (1995) was published as Images of Development; Environmental Causes in Ontogeny (SUNY, 1999). After that, she has been working in the boundary areas
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of biology and philosophy and, in recent years, also art. In her publications, there has been a focus on metaphors in biology and ethics. She is now working on agenda issues in genomics and ethics,
[email protected] Henny J. van der Windt is Associate Professor at the Science and Society Group (SSG) of the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. He studied biology and gained his PhD in natural sciences. His fields of interest include the dynamics of science, science policy, social movements and environmental history. His main publications concern the development of ecology, the nature conservation movement, environmental policy, ecological expertise and visions on nature. His current research topics include also food genomics, science communication and bionanotechnology,
[email protected] Hub Zwart studied philosophy and psychology at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He worked as a research associate at the Institute for Bioethics in Maastricht. He defended his thesis in 1993, was subsequently appointed as research director of the Center for Ethics at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He is now Full Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Science of the Radboud University Nijmegen, chair of the Department of Philosophy and Science Studies, director Centre for Society & Genomics and director of the Institute for Science, Innovation and Society. His main field of interest is philosophy and ethics of the life sciences, notably genomics, with a special interest in science and imagination (comparative epistemology). He has published on the epistemology and ethics of animal research, on the past, present and future of scientific publishing and on environmental policy and the philosophy of landscape. He was European Lead of the International Student Exchange Program Coastal Inquiries,
[email protected]
List of Figures
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2.3 6.1 6.2 8.1 9.1
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12.2
The robot dog, AIBO, positioning itself to kick the ball. Photo from Friedman, Kahn, & Hagman (2003), © 2008 ACM, Inc. Reprinted by permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . ATR’s humanoid robot, Robovie, being introduced to a girl. Photo from Kahn, et al. (2008), © 2008 ACM, Inc. Reprinted by permission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ATR’s humanoid robot, Robovie, hugging. Photo from Kahn, et al. (2008), © 2008 ACM, Inc. Reprinted by permission . . Snowy plover at coal oil point. Photograph by Anita Guerrini Critical habitat map, 1999 (Federal Register Vol. 64, No. 234 (1999), p. 68532) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bust of Aristotle, now at Palazzo Altaemps, Rome. Photo: Giovanni Dall’Orto, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organic and anorganic forms – ‘matter-in-formation’ versus ‘informed matter’. Whereas, in the case of anorganic forms (e.g., snow crystals), it is matter which determines form and is therefore of the essence – form being only an accident of the properties of matter – in the case of organic forms (e.g., corals), it is form, self-sustaining active form, which determines the configuration of matter – matter being only an accident of form (see article). Image source: Plate XIX of ‘Studies among the Snow Crystals’, by Wilson Bentley, from Annual Summary of the Monthly Weather Review 1902 (left) and Plate IX from Kunstformen der Natur (1904), by Ernst Haeckel, depicting corals classified as Hexacoralla (right) . ‘A Map of Lewis and Clark’s Track, Across the Western Portion of North America from the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean.’ Copied by Samuel Lewis from the original drawing by William Clark. Published in 1814 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Map of sampling sites. From: Rusch, D. B., Halpern, A. L., Sutton, G., Heidelberg, K. B., Williamson, S., et al. (2007). The Sorcerer II global ocean sampling expedition: Northwest
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14.1 15.1
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List of Figures
Atlantic through Eastern Tropical Pacific. PLoS Biology, 5(3), e77 DOI 10.1371/journal.pbio.0050077 . . . . . . . . . Crystal creek wolf pack in Yellowstone National Park. Photo: US National Park Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The model of specific and non-specific care. The type of requested care depends on the actual situation (location, place, etc.) the animals are adapted to or dependent on (after Swart, 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Romeyn de Hooghe: Breaching dyke in Coevorden (Copperplate, 1673) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lower Rhine near Wageningen. Photo: Martin Drenthen . . . Rewilding rivers. Drawing by Jeroen Helmer, ARK Nature . Miniature landscapes at the information center of the Dutch Cultural Landscape Association in Beek, near Nijmegen. Photo by Valentijn te Plate, Nederlands Cultuurlandschap . . Salomon van Ruysdael: River landscape with ferry (1649) . . Albert Bierstadt: Lake Tahoe (1868) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Invasive Old World climbing fern overtaking cypress trees in southern Florida. Photo: Peggy Greb, USDA Agricultural Research Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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List of Tables
7.1 7.2 7.3 18.1
Functions of wild species for humans and attitudes toward animals Different relationships between an ecosystem and its species . . . Relationships between visions of nature and ecological, ethical and aesthetic perspectives (after Van der Windt et al., 2007) Multiple vision on exotic species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Part I
Introduction
Chapter 1
Nature in Motion Martin Drenthen, Jozef Keulartz, and James Proctor
1.1 The New Visions of Nature Program As Raymond Williams (1983) famously declared, nature is one of the most complex words in the English language – and, we may confidently predict, its Germanic relatives including Dutch. The workshop that took place in June 2007 in the Netherlands, from which this volume is derived, was based on an earlier program exploring connections between our concepts of nature and related concepts of science and religion. Though one may not immediately expect these three realms to be interrelated, countless examples suggest otherwise. Consider the journal Nature from December 1999, in which the DNA sequence of human chromosome 22 was published (Dunham et al., 1999). This historic event was visually represented on the cover of the issue by the famous Creation of Adam image painted by Michelangelo in the early 16th century in the Sistine Chapel, in which God’s finger stretches to touch that of Adam. Here, on the cover of one of the top scientific journals in the world, a journal titled simply Nature, is one of the most famous religious images in the world. What is surprising, arguably, is not that we encounter so many instances in which nature, science, and religion are interwoven, but that we often defend these realms as separable – science and religion as diametrically opposed, for instance, or nature as some Romanticist notion far removed from the rigor and precision of scientific discourse. No matter how we tend to conceive of nature, science, and religion as differing realms, our ideas and practices related to nature say a great deal about the historic authorities underlying modern culture, science and religion; thus, one way to shed light on these domains of authority would be to look carefully at our assumptions regarding nature. This was the objective of an academic research program titled New Visions of Nature, Science, and Religion (Proctor, 2004, 2009). The New Visions program M. Drenthen (B) Faculty of Science, Department of Philosophy and Science Studies (ISIS), Radboud University of Nijmegen, Heyendaalseweg 135, 6525 AJ Nijmegen, The Netherlands e-mail:
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M. Drenthen et al. (eds.), New Visions of Nature, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2611-8_1,
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drew together fourteen scholars – natural scientists, social scientists, humanists, and theologians – for a period of three years. Meeting at regular intervals in Santa Barbara, California, under the sponsorship of the University of California and with funding provided by the John Templeton Foundation, New Visions scholars each offered insights on nature, science, and religion from their particular academic vantage point. At the close of the program, four regional workshops outside of Santa Barbara continued this exploration with a range of topical foci: the workshop in the Netherlands was one of these. To lend some degree of coherence to our discussions, we focused on five concepts of nature – including both biophysical and human nature, external and internal nature – in particular. These concepts were selected to represent a continuum of disciplinary interest across the sciences and humanities. Arranged in order from the most scientific to the most humanistic, the five included evolutionary nature, emergent nature, malleable nature, nature as sacred, and nature as culture. Evolutionary nature is a sweeping scientific vision of nature as arising from evolutionary processes. It is the dominant theory for the origin and diversity of living systems, and via fields such as evolutionary psychology has been applied to account for the nature of human thought and behaviour – i.e., culture – as well. Implications for science and religion are varied: what some consider to be the ultimate triumph of science over religion à la evolutionary theory, others disparage as scientism, a religion of science. Evolutionary nature has generated a great amount of discussion and debate over the relations between science and religion in societal realms such as education and medicine. Depending on how the continuity of the human species with other species is interpreted, evolutionary nature can be seen as either a challenge to human distinctiveness – a longstanding theological question – or a reminder of our biological, and possibly moral, connections with the rest of the living world. Following the concept of emergent nature, nature is understood as an emergent reality, one in which its parts do not sufficiently explain the whole. This vision has a long history, but more recent scientific work into complex systems has focused on relations between systems at various scales of time and space. In this hierarchy of scales, complex systems theory challenges the reductionist notion that the whole can be understood via analysis of the parts, and attempts to explain the origin and behaviour of a wide range of complex systems – ecosystems, the heart, even consciousness – as emergent phenomena. Emergent nature has been widespread in the natural and even some social sciences, but it has also garnered interest in the humanities and theology. It thus has offered a means of unifying disparate scientific disciplines, and in some cases has been proposed as a means of harmonizing science and religion, given that both attend to emergent, complex phenomena as their principle concern. The third vision, that of malleable nature, stands in the middle of the five, and as such is equally dependent on, and of interest to, scholarship in the sciences and the humanities. The core notion is that of biophysical and human nature as subject to human alteration: this broad interest in malleable nature stems from its many related forms, running from genetic manipulation to virtual worlds. Whereas in evolutionary theory culture can be seen as a function of nature, here at this point in the
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five-vision continuum nature is deliberately fashioned by culture. This approach to nature directly challenges the Aristotelian contrast between physis and techné, that which operates of its own accord (a classical understanding of nature) and that which is deliberately fashioned by the human hand. Depending on how malleable nature is applied to the realm of science and religion, it can serve as either an endorsement or a critique of science qua technology, yet certainly challenges essentialist notions of human nature as viewed from either scientific or theological points of view. The vision of nature as sacred is a departure from the others in that it is primarily a popular, not a scholarly, point of view, but it has garnered considerable recent interest by scholars of historical or contemporary culture and by theologians. In this approach, nature is understood as possessing sacred or spiritual qualities, or perhaps even being fundamentally spiritual in its essence. What this concept challenges is the notion of biophysical and human nature as mere matter; this metaphysical perspective commonly leads to significant moral implications, for instance in how humans should treat biophysical nature, or the value of human life. Yet how should this notion of sacred nature be understood scientifically, other than as one of many possible (subjective) attitudes one can take toward nature? Despite its ambiguities as viewed from most scientific vantage points, nature as sacred has garnered some support within institutional religion, leading to a wide variety of ‘greening’ campaigns, and has also underscored the flourishing of nature-based spirituality outside of organized religion as well. Finally, the vision of nature as culture is an outgrowth of what could be seen as the default epistemological stance of the humanities: here, in stark opposition to evolutionary theory, nature (as in our conception of nature) is seen as the product of culture and not the other way around. Whereas malleable nature challenges the ontological status of nature, i.e., whether certain things understood as natural are ‘really’ natural or bear traces of human influence, nature as culture challenges the epistemological status of nature, i.e., whether our ideas of nature reflect more or less truthfully the natural realm as it really is or bear traces of human construction. The humanities are all about the force of human ideas, whether manifested in literary, artistic, or practical form; given the force of the idea of nature through history – just think, for example, of the power of ‘natural’ as a criterion dividing good from bad in so many moral debates – it is entirely understandable that nature is appropriated in the humanities not simply as a reality but as a human idea of that reality. The implications of this notion for science are fundamental and shaking: is science, to put it simp(listic)ly, a systematic means of unlocking the secrets of reality or is are the truths it reveals about this reality merely a product of the cultural milieu in which science is practiced? Nature as culture thus could be seen to pose a broadside challenge to the objectivity of science. And it does the same to religion, where claims as to for instance the divine origin of sacred texts are similarly understood as cultural constructions. These five visions of nature/science/religion arise from differing scholarly locations; near neighbours (e.g., evolutionary nature and emergent nature) are easier to harmonize than distant neighbours (e.g., evolutionary nature and nature as culture). Yet, ironically, none of these visions purport to be located: all aspire toward
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universalistic claims on nature, science, and religion. Thus the considerable power and comprehensiveness of these visions is also possibly their downfall, as critical ontological and epistemological assumptions travel far from their point of origin. If there is thus anything to be learned in general by investigating visions of nature, is that they are inevitably visions not only of reality but from a particular point of view. Unless one believes in the possibility of a Gods-eye view – and that this is a possibility for mere mortals – the fantastic power of these visions in potentially uniting all of biophysical and human nature, and explaining all about science and religion, fades as so much about them can be understood in terms of their disciplinary origin.
1.2 New Visions of Nature: Complexity and Authenticity All five visions of nature represent a powerful view on nature in its entirety. Their very plurality, however, implies that none can be truly comprehensive. In June 2008, a group of scholars from various fields of expertise met at the Wageningse Berg, along the borders of the Lower Rhine in the Netherlands, for a workshop to investigate means of dialogue and possible synthesis, in which the wisdom of all different visions could somehow be included. Point of departure of the workshop was the idea that contemporary visions of nature and their mutual relations have been deeply affected by the mutual pervasiveness of science, nature, and society.
1.2.1 Science and Nature: Beyond Reductionism We live in a time of remarkable scientific achievements and technological developments in ICT, neuroscience, nanotechnology and especially in the domain of the life sciences. Science and technology have entered into an ever more intimate relationship, to become what is nowadays called the techno-sciences. In many ways, the Human Genome Project exemplifies best what is taking place in those technosciences in general, with similar examples and trends to be found in other disciplines as well. Everywhere, we witness the emergence of large-scale, trans-national and interdisciplinary forms of techno-scientific collaboration. These large-scale research programs raise various important questions of an epistemological, ethical, societal, economic, and cultural nature. These trends emerge within the life sciences, but they are manifest in other areas, such as the ecological sciences, as well. Over the past twenty years, the ecological sciences went through a transition from preservation and conservation to restoration and re-creation. Until recently, the interaction between science and nature was often addressed in terms of two grand narratives. There was, first of all, the ‘positive’ grand narrative of how technological and societal progress – made possible by science – has gradually allowed us to master and improve nature ever more forcefully. The methodological reductionism of modern science together with to sophisticated instruments of modern technology made it possible to control and exploit natural recourses for the sake
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of mankind. This grand narrative was counter-balanced, so to speak, by another, ‘negative’ grand story of how western science- and technology-based societies – unsustainable as they are – are heading towards catastrophe. The reductionism of science was assumed to be deeply problematic because it failed to grasp the richness of nature. In stead of leading to prosperity, modern science would eventually and inevitably provoke a natural response, risking an ecological apocalypse. It is fair to say that both narratives are one-sided at the least. For a better understanding of how science and nature are interconnected and mutually pervasive, it is essential to look at the complex relationships between science and nature in a more analytic and detailed manner, on the basis of empirical research, and beyond stereotypes. Science and nature are intimately interconnected. But the exact direction of this interaction is still somewhat diffuse. According to a more or less optimistic view, we have entered an era in which the sciences may be expected to contribute to our efforts to monitor, analyze and solve problems that emerge from our ‘past performance,’ from such detrimental interactions between science, technology and environmental pollution. Biomaterials, genomics and nanoscience are expected to produce sustainable technologies and contrivances that are more congenial to nature. At the same time, however, new and unknown hazards may be awaiting us once we enter these avenues of sciencebased innovation. The famous tale of the sorcerer’s apprentice may take on a whole new meaning in the future. The implications of the mutual pervasion of science and nature, however, are not that obvious. One thing is clear, however, science and nature can no longer be seen as two separate forces in opposition.
1.2.2 Science and Society: Post-Normal Science The rapid development of the life sciences and technologies not only affects the relation between science and nature but has a profound effect on the relation between science and society as well. The life sciences have developed an ever increasing capacity to affect human life and the environment, whereas at the same time deep uncertainties exist on whether these effects are manageable at all. As a result, societal stakes in the life sciences are becoming higher and higher and with that, the call for a more stakeholder or community-based epistemology. Also within life science itself, researchers become increasingly aware of the irreducible complexities and uncertainties that surround our knowledge of nature. Although the technological knowledge of the life sciences is often highly accurate and effective, it can no longer be seen as the only legitimate and reliable source of knowledge concerning the natural world. A similar development can be seen in other scientific and societal fields, where the autocratic attitude and analytical practices of the traditional science and technology institutions are challenged by voices demanding respect for local knowledge, a plurality of perspectives and epistemologies ‘through which the world comes to presence’ rather than it being dissected and re-assembled. It is clear that the traditional, clear-cut distinction between science and society is no longer viable. What the increased mutual pervasion of science and society will
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entail for our vision of and relation with nature, however, is yet to be seen. Will it result in a real change within the dominant scientific approach? Some believe, it could lead to a coming together of the modern scientific view with older, nondissecting and non-reductive paradigms in both the natural and social sciences and thus give rise to a new, trans-disciplinary, ‘post-normal’ science. Current research suggests, at least, that public visions of nature are in fact already spiritualized and embedded to some extent, e.g., in the contextual and spiritualized understanding of humans, animals, ecosystems and cosmos as whole entities, or the embedded and storied understanding of landscapes as meaningful dwellings. What influence may the inclusion of such post-normal types of knowledge have on scientific and public visions of nature? For instance, will mainstream science ever be able to engage these visions rather than undermine them?
1.2.3 Society and Nature: Reflexive Modernity As Jonas (1979) pointed out, traditional ethics tended to focus on short term obligations, based on the assumption of a basically given, eternal and unchanging human nature as a reliable foundation for the Good and presupposing a limited reach of human action and therefore of human responsibility (towards nature, seen as unchanging and all-powerful). During the last two centuries however, due to the accelerated development of science and technology, the impact of human beings on their natural environment has grown exponentially. Some scientists have even framed this development in terms of a new geological era, the so-called ‘Anthropocene’ (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000). It could be, of course, that we are overestimating the extent to which we humans are able to control the fate and further evolution of nature. There are reasons to suspect that we are (as yet?) unable to fully appreciate the complexities of natural systems, let alone control them. Nevertheless, with an increased power over nature, one could argue, our responsibilities towards nature grow as well. Jonas, for instance, argues that the growing extension of our technological power implies an equal extension of our ethical responsibilities, ultimately including the earthly ecosystem as a whole. A traditional view of the relationship between society and nature still tends to think in terms of a mono-causal relationship between what we do and what takes place in nature. However, the relationship between society and nature may be less linear and more complicated, and therefore imbued with more uncertainty. Modernity’s technological power trip has been so ‘successful’ that it has become a danger for the (global) natural environment on which it essentially depends. As a consequence, modernity has become thoroughly reflexive, to use an expression of German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1986): we have developed an awareness of the incalculable and negative side-effects that our own actions have on the natural environment, in which we are nevertheless destined to sustain ourselves. One of the implications of reflexive modernity is that the notion of radical uncertainty has to be built into our moral assessments.
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The traditional idea of a clear separation between the human and the natural, or the cultural and the natural, has also been challenged from a different perspective. Donna Haraway (1991), for instance, has shown that nature and the artificial today are intimately linked, questioning the very idea of nature as a realm that can be separated from the human and the cultural. Not only our ideas of nature are deeply mediated by culture, even our own bodies are to an ever increasing degree an inseparable mixture of nature and technology. But if we all are indeed to some degree cyborgs (as Haraway argues), if we are indeed ‘artificial by nature’ (Plessner, 1928) or ‘natural aliens’ (Evernden, 1993), than the idea that nature can somehow provide us with a criterion or moral measure against the arbitrariness of our technological interventions become highly problematic. If nature and society are intimately linked, if nature has become culturalized and culture naturalized, than we can no longer separate the ‘authentic’ and ‘natural’ form the ‘artificial’, ‘unnatural’ and ‘false’. The moral consequences of this have still to be thought through.
1.2.4 New Visions of Nature: Basic Questions Today, we witness the emergence of new visions of nature in different fields of expertise. What these new visions of nature typically have in common, is that they somehow testify that nature is far more complex than previously envisioned. The new complexity of nature can be discerned at two levels. With regard to the object in question, nature itself is seen as more complex than previously acknowledged. New scientific insights stress that many of the old ideas of nature as being malleable, knowable and controllable by technological means have to be reconsidered. The picture also gets more complicated on a different level: there no longer exists one privileged perspective on nature. The autocratic attitude and analytical practices of the traditional science and technology institutions are challenged by a plurality of perspectives and epistemologies that open up the world. Not only are our images of nature ‘itself’ increasing in complexity, but there is also a multitude of relevant perspectives on nature. In this volume, we will focus on the emergence of these new visions of complex nature in three domains. In Part II, we will focus on public visions of nature, which are increasingly difficult to distinguish from views of technology and culture. In Part III, we will go into the modern life sciences, notably in contemporary genomics which stresses the irreducible complexity of the genomic makeup of life forms. In Part IV we will look into contemporary landscape philosophy en environmental ethics, where one can discern a shift of attention from universal ethical principles about nature to the plurality of local narratives of place. In all these fields, the new emerging complex visions of nature raise serious questions about the authenticity of our relation with nature. With regard to the public visions of nature (Part II) one can discern different ‘complexifications’ of our vision of nature. First, people seem to be able to shift their basic attitudes towards nature; their view of their relationship with nature depends largely on the specific contexts in which one relates to nature. Furthermore, the
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images of nature seem to complexify as well, since what is conceived as nature becomes increasingly intertwined with all kinds of cultural and technical ‘mediations’. All this increases the complexity of human-nature relationships. What some people consider to be natural, others perceive as unnatural. In recent surveys about public visions of nature, emphasis is being put on the way in which nature and technology have become intimately intertwined. Our relationships with nature are increasingly influenced by the artificial and the technical. Robotics, artificial reality, broadband internet connections and new ‘artificial landscaping’ all influence our views of nature, and as a result the question of an adequate relation with nature is becoming a complex one. Does this mean that visions of nature are not foundational but merely contextual? And what does this mean for the evaluation of our relationship with nature? Ever since the romantic age, these relationships have been framed in terms of authenticity (Taylor, 1991). If we increasingly experience ‘artificial’ types of nature that are hard to distinguish from ‘real nature’, if technologically mediated nature experiences like robots and plastic trees are becoming ever more common, then what can the term ‘authenticity’ refer to? Can one still find a criterion with which one can distinguish between more and less authentic relations with nature? And what does the questionable authenticity mean for public participation in landscape management? Can ‘real nature’ still provide us with a kind of ‘measure’ for authenticity if nature and culture are getting more and more interrelated? In the life sciences, notably in contemporary genomics research (Part III), researchers become increasingly aware of the irreducible complexities in nature and of the uncertainties that surround our knowledge of nature. On the one hand, the dominant vision of nature in life sciences gradually but irreversibly shifts from mono-genetic determinism towards a more complex, multi-factoral view of nature in contemporary genomics. On the other hand, although the technology-based knowledge of the life sciences is often highly accurate and effective, it can no longer be seen as the only legitimate and reliable source of knowledge concerning the natural world; alternative views and perspectives have to be considered as well. Both developments tend to complexify our views of nature. This shift demands a new attitude towards the malleability of nature. Our increased understanding of the complexities of bodily life is expected to allow us to fine-tune our styles of intervention. But is it true to say, as Peter Sloterdijk (2001) does, that the allo-technologies (against nature) of the past will be replaced by homeo-technologies (attuned to nature) of the future? Have we really transcended the orientation towards mastery of nature that used to inspire biotechnology as a research program? Or are we merely developing more sophisticated tools that eventually will reinforce rather than question a vision of nature as ‘malleable’? What metaphors are best suited to express our new relationship towards this new complexity of the genome? And what are the consequences of this coming end of the era of genetic determinism for our self image? Could it enable us to renew our understanding of the degree to which we ourselves are determined by our genes? Could the newly discovered complexity of the genome offer us a new type of ‘freedom’ or will it rather lead to a more radical view of ‘detachment’ from nature?
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Our views of places and landscapes (Part IV) also seem to have increased in complexity on different levels. Traditionally, environmental ethics evaluates human relationships with the environment starting from ‘objective’ ecological norms – and articulating environmental values in terms of ‘intrinsic values’. However, this approach seems increasingly at odds with today’s scientific insight in the dynamic character both of ecosystems themselves and of human socio-ecological practices within the natural environment. In response, in recent years, some environmental ethicists have even rephrased the age-old idea that nature should provide a model that we should try to mirror in our actions. In water management, for instance, the idea that river management systems should attempt to control water flows as well as water related social processes and conflicts, gradually makes place for a more ‘fluent’ approach that allows rivers to take up space, and allows all kind of social conflicts to submerge and be dealt with in the open. This new approach tries to do more justice to the highly contextualized way in which people ‘read’ meanings in particular places and natural features. In an even more radical attempt to leave behind the traditional universalistic ethical perspective, ‘ethics of place’ (Casey, 1993) aims to emplace ethics itself and to shift our temporal perspective on nature management and preservation towards an ethics of place that careful investigates the ‘moral knowledge’ that is embodied in a place itself. A similar tendency towards complexity of nature can be noticed in the process of ‘glocalization’. Such a shift from a global environmental ethics to a particularistic ethics of place raises some serious questions, though. On the one hand, it seems obvious that particular sites and places require a proper and particular ‘focal length’; on the other hand, many environmental problems seem to demand a global perspective. Does this growing awareness of the complexity and dynamic character of natural systems inevitably lead to an ethic and an ecosystem management approach that is more in tune with the natural processes? Or will it undermine the rational debate about a proper attitude toward nature, and ultimately to ethical relativism that prevents us from dealing with today’s global environmental problems? What could an authentic relation with our place mean in an age, where the links between geographical locations and local culture is loosening and several narratives about any particular place appear to exist next to each other? In all these fields, new emerging visions of nature seem to acknowledge complexity of nature and complexity in our visions of nature. At both levels, this complexity raises questions about authenticity. In this volume we try to investigate some of these questions.
1.2.5 Authenticity? One could argue in a number of ways that the increase of complexity in our visions of nature raises questions regarding the authenticity of our relation with nature. One way would be that old attempts to ground a particular ethical relationship with nature in an understanding of what nature really is, is undermined by the increasing complexity of our new visions of nature. Certain relations to nature can still appear
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to be more ‘natural,’ authentic, or adequate to the object, but as our vision of nature becomes more manifold and fragmented, any ideal of authenticity will become ever more problematic. On the other hand, one could argue that a romantic ideal of an authentic relation with nature suffered from essentialist and oversimplified views of nature – violent reductions of ‘nature itself’. Now that we are increasingly able to recognize the complexity and subtlety of nature, it should at least in principle become possible to find a more authentic stance towards her. However, we should be aware that the concept of authenticity itself is already highly debated and complex. David Lowenthal (2008) has argued that the concept of authenticity has shifted over time and between cultures, and ‘the diverse authenticities we appraise – substance, form, originality, creativity, emulation – are seldom compatible.’ This ever shifting meaning of authenticity has had far-reaching consequences: The very quest for authenticity altered its nature [. . .]. Cultural relativity made authenticity a capricious will-o’-the-wisp, even a contradiction in terms. (p. 7)
But what does authenticity really mean, if, as Lowenthal has it, ‘the criteria of authenticity we choose reflect current views about how yesterday should serve and inform today’ (p. 9)? To answer this question, Lowenthal discusses the history of the concept of authenticity in more detail. In medieval times, Lowenthal shows, the ideal of authenticity was very different from ours for it was normal to rework things outworn and replace them for present purposes. In the middle age Europe ‘renovations, not ruins, were authentic.’ Sacred relics apart, integrity inhered in wholeness. Broken statues and damaged buildings became admirable by being restored to entirety. Few cared if an arm or a leg was original or a torso bore its true head; authenticity meant completion. (p. 13)
In the late 18th century the ideal of authentic wholeness succumbed to the contrary cult of fragments and ruins. ‘To be authentic, an object, a structure, or a landscape must be truncated or fragmented.’ (ibid.) One century later, ‘Authenticity meant replacing defective original remnants with modern realizations of the spirit of antiquity.’ As a result, ‘conservators ‘restored’ venerable structures and traditions to what they ought ideally to have been.’ (ibid.) Finally, in the mid 20th Century, yet another idea of authenticity surfaced as ‘improving the past gave way to archaeological exactitude, a scholarly purism that deplored tampering with what was original. Honest authenticity now came to mean intervening as little as possible and making manifest every unavoidable alteration, even to the sacrifice of visual integrity.’ (ibid.). Finally, according to Lowenthal, ‘recognition now dawns that tampering with the past is inescapable’. ‘That their remade or remaindered past was authentically correct has been the fond faith of each successive conservation policy in turn. [. . .] It would be folly to think that we ourselves are exempt.’ However, according to Lowenthal, ‘most propitious in heritage today is our ready admission that we never get things totally, eternally right. Ours generation openly admits
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fallibility. And humility helps free us from the hubris of arrogant and self-defeating perfectionism.’ (p. 14). This having been said, it should not come as a surprise that the different authors in this volume use the concept of authenticity in different ways. We have not attempted to bring all these uses of the term together. Recognize that there is not one correct concept of authenticity, does not render the term useless. Despite its ambiguous character, the concept of authenticity still remains suited to critically pose all kinds of normative questions regarding our relation to nature.
1.3 Layout of this Volume 1.3.1 Part II: Public Visions of Nature Part II of this book investigates in what way public visions of nature are being affected by the threefold pervasiveness of science, society and nature. In Chapter 2 (‘Technological nature – and the problem when good enough becomes good’), Peter Kahn, Rachel Severson, and Jolina Ruckert wonder if it matters (in terms of the future wellbeing of our species) that we are replacing actual nature with technological nature – technologies that in various ways mediate, augment, or simulate the natural world? They argue it does. They start with an overview of a laboratory’s research project that investigates the psychological effects of children and adults interacting with three instantiations of technological nature. In the first experiment, they provided their test subjects with a technological view of a landscape (a real-time digital plasma window display of nature), in the second with a technological dog (Sony’s robotic dog, AIBO), and in the third with a technological human (ATR’s Robovie). Next, they draw on Buber’s account of an I–You relationship to assess whether these interaction with technological nature can be considered as authentic interaction. Finally, they discuss a peril of technological nature: that it will garner some but not all of the effects of actual nature, come to substitute for actual nature in human lives, and thereby shift the baseline across generations for what counts as a full measure of human experience and human wellbeing. Maartje Schermer will provide them with a comment (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 (‘The artificial body: an empirical exploration of lay ethics’), Riyan van den Born and Wouter de Groot also ask what the consequences will be of the growing artificialisation of nature for public views of nature. More specifically, they investigate the meaning of technologically mediated nature experiences, such a genetically altered food, bodies and landscapes. In landscapes, people typically see a long gradient from purely artificial cities through a domesticated agricultural middle zone to authentic wilderness. More or less parallel to the way in which human society intervenes in ‘pure’ nature, much of the application of genomics will imply an artificialisation of the human body. What do lay people think of technological interventions that would create the human body as a comparable mixture of the technological and the natural? Based on 30 semi-structured interviews in the Netherlands,
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the authors discuss the ethical principles with which people evaluate human interventions in nature and the body. They have surveyed the public response to four series of exemplars of interventions in nature and the body, with genetic as well as non-genetic interventions, and with different degrees of intervention (e.g., from a plastic tooth to a complete plastic body). Their results reveal the richness of people’s ethical reasoning and show some differences between categories of respondents. Overall, people’s ethical reasoning could be captured in a scheme of three areas. The first area is an ‘area of frivolous purpose’, where interventions are rejected because they do not serve a fundamental aim. In the second area – an area of ‘too deep, too far’ – people reject interventions because humans should not want to interfere with nature on that level. In the third area of ethical reasoning, people follow a reasoning of broad cost-benefit analysis. If considered in that area, our exemplars tended to be positively evaluated. In Chapter 5, Maarten Jacobs will comment on the research. In Chapter 6 (‘The trouble with plovers’), Anita Guerrini addresses a similar question of naturalness and authenticity with regard to landscape perceptions. She focuses on the role that animals play in popular perceptions of the landscape. The Western snowy plover is a diminutive shorebird classified as threatened by the US Endangered Species Act. The bird provides Guerrini with the basis of a case study of the role played by animals in popular perceptions of landscape. She also addresses the questions whether an environment constructed and managed by humans for the sake of conservation ceases to be natural or authentic. Next, she asks if the conservation and restoration of non-human species requires the absence of humans from the scene. Controversies over the protection of the plover along the central California coast give context to these questions. Henny van de Windt provides a comment (Chapter 7).
1.3.2 Part III: The Genomics View of Nature Part III of this book addresses some issues raised by the new developments in contemporary life sciences. In Chapter 8 (‘Detachment, genomics and the nature of being human’), Lenny Moss addresses the relation of our visions of nature and of ourselves. According to Moss, our understanding of nature and our understanding of what it means to be human cannot be treated as independent variables – nor does one provide a privileged point of departure for understanding the other. Rather our understanding of each must reciprocally and dialectically inform the other. From an ‘anthropological’ perspective, he suggests that an idea of ‘detachment’, that scales with an entity’s internal degrees of freedom, can be used to articulate an understanding of nature in which human self-understanding can find its proper place. He then shows how the idea of detachment can provide the means for making sense of the otherwise paradoxical findings of comparative genomics which in turn lends ‘detachment’
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empirical support and guidance. Finally, the human socio-cultural form of life itself is seen as both driven and made possible by its level of detachment and embedded in species-cosmopolitan ecological regimes of compensation. Pieter Lemmens comments (Chapter 9). In Chapter 10 (‘Metagenomic Metaphors: New Images of the Human from “Translational” Genomic Research’), Eric Juengst claims that, as the international genomic research community moves from the tool-making efforts of the Human Genome Project into biomedical applications of those tools, new metaphors are being suggested as useful to understanding how our genes work – and for understanding who we are as biological organisms. The many directions of this new ‘translational’ genomic research are producing many different new metaphors, but in this chapter Juengst focuses on one set that seems to be a departure from the essentialistic metaphors we have heard before: a trio of metaphors emerging from the planning of the Human Micobiome Project (HMP). The HMP is a new ‘metagenomic’ initiative at the U.S. National Institutes of Health to sequence the genomes of human microbiological flora, in order the pursue the interesting hypothesis that our ‘microbiome’ plays a vital and interactive role with our human genome in normal human physiology. Three metaphors are being widely used by the scientists promoting this initiative: (1) that the human genome should be understood as a part of a larger sensory-motor organ, picking up and reacting to cues from its environment much like our nervous or immune systems; (2) that the human body should be understood as a ecosystem with multiple ecological niches and habitats in which a variety of cellular species collaborate and compete; and (3) that human beings should be understood as ‘super-organisms’ that incorporate multiple symbiotic cell species into a single individual with very blurry boundaries. Each of these metaphors carries interesting philosophical messages, which Juengst concludes by pointing to as promising topics for future research. John Dupre and Maureen O’Malley comment (Chapter 11). In Chapter 12 (‘Genomics metaphors and genetic determinism’), Hub Zwart shows how our understanding of scientific developments depends on the metaphors that we use. Initially, in presentations of the Human Genome Project (HGP), the blueprint metaphor was a very prominent vehicle of communication. In 1999, for example, Francis Collins, director of the Human Genome Project (HGP) indicated that mankind was about to see ‘its own blueprint’. Gradually, however, the drawbacks of this metaphor became evident, notably because it seemed to convey a deterministic view on the relationship between genome and the Self. Therefore, a rival metaphor was presented by Collins and others, in which the human genome was presented as a landscape and the human genome project as an expedition, resulting in a map. Notably, the Lewis and Clark expedition was used as a historical template. Yet, while Francis Collins described the HGP in term of terrestrial exploration, Craig Venter rather opted for metaphors associated with open water and with exploring the earth as an aquatic planet. In this contribution, these rival metaphors are described and analysed in terms of the dimensions of human genomics that are disclosed or concealed by them. Chung Lin Kwa will comment (Chapter 13).
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1.3.3 Part IV: Philosophy of Landscape and Place In Part IV, we will look into recent developments in the philosophy of landscape and place. In Chapter 14 (‘Thinking like a mountain: ethics and place as traveling concepts’), Bruce Janz asks what it would mean if an environmental ethics would no longer be based on the idea that nature should be preserved (in time) but rather on place. Janz starts from the observation that environmental ethical theory has generally attempted to extend moral standing (and/or agency) beyond the human world, to argue for a greater duty on humans to preserve the natural world. Aldo Leopold is often taken as a prime example of the extension of ethics. He extends ethical consideration by maintaining that the central line of moral consideration be extended temporally, that we ‘think like a mountain’. Janz argues that, despite the common understanding of Leopold, he is actually offering an ethic of place rather than of time, and one that in fact avoids some problems of temporally based ethics. Drawing from, among others, Deleuze, Mick Smith, and Mieke Bal, he argues for an ethics rooted in place in which concepts ‘travel’ to new contexts and thus create new ethical concepts. When we regard ethics as rooted in the knowledge of place, and see places as themselves knowing (and which therefore can serve as points of resistance to our knowledge, rather than merely as the content of our knowledge), we can engage in a kind of interdisciplinarity, as our forms of knowledge are critiqued and extended through a close understanding of place-knowledge. From such a perspective, it becomes possible to raise new questions and engage in both moral imagination and ‘place-making imagination’, that is, the extension of possible forms of ethics and place-making in new ways. Janz presents Leopold as an excellent example of someone whose close place-knowledge is the source of his ethical thought, and the source of a new model of ethical thought concerning nature. Jacque Swart provides him with a comment (Chapter 15). In Chapter 16 (‘Developing nature along Dutch rivers; place or non-place’), Martin Drenthen addresses the question what an ethics of place could mean in the case of water management in the Netherlands. He addresses the question how to provide ecological restoration projects with an appropriate cultural context that enables humans to have a meaningful relation with the land. The attempt to mitigate the effects of increased water discharges due to climate change from a merely functional perspective imposes a purely abstract vision of nature on the land and would eventually imply a transformation of these new landscapes into strange non-places, devoid of meaning and separated from the habitable world. Drenthen considers three alternative interpretations of these ‘new nature’ projects in terms of place attachment. From the first, restoration is seen as yet another modern attempt to instrumentally rearrange the landscape, that disturbs (or even erases) the different cultural ‘textual layers’ in the landscape and thus reduces the ‘legibility’ of the land that enables people to have a meaningful relation to a habitable place. The second reading interprets these restoration projects as experiments in place-renewal, in which the reintroduction of natural dynamics into the river landscape does not wipe out legibility, but on the contrary, brings out deeper ‘textual’ layers and thus restores historical continuity.
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Ecological restoration then implies a deeper, ecologically sounder understanding of place that can revitalize place-based communities, and deepens their understanding of what it means to dwell along a river. The third perspective (inspired by the work of Marc Augé on ‘super modernity’) puts forward the rather disturbing question whether our longing for a deeply felt, authentic place attachment (of which before mentioned perspectives are merely symptoms) does itself not in fact risks transforming these very places into theme parks, thus even increasing the actual place alienation. Maybe the only way to be authentic is to acknowledge our lack of any deep sense of belonging. If so, then the feeling of detachment itself should guide our interpretation of these new landscapes. Should we not conceive these ‘new wildernesses’ as the most recent ‘inscription’ in the land, both mirroring our fundamental homelessness and enabling us to experience it? Kris van Koppen comments in Chapter 17. In Chapter 16 (‘Framing and reframing in invasion biology’), Jozef Keulartz starts with the observation that ‘place’ is a contested concept in conservation and restoration. In this chapter he focuses on invasion biology to examine some of the topics related to this controversial concept. The recent emergence of this discipline went hand in hand with heated debates on the so-called exotic species issue. Apparently, these debates have ended in stalemate, with only two extreme positions: nativism and cosmopolitanism. To break up this dichotomy and to give the debate new impulses, Keulartz explores the different metaphors that can be found within the scientific discipline of invasion biology in some detail. He argues that these metaphors, like all metaphors, are restricted in range and relevance; a similar thing can be said about the idea that our relation with nature should be ‘authentic’. According to Keulartz, we should, instead, adopt a multiple vision on metaphor. The adoption and development of such a multiple vision will open up new space for communication and cooperation across the borders between people from different disciplines, and between experts and laypeople. Matthias Gross provides a comment (Chapter 19). This volume ends with a concluding chapter by Catherine Newell and Mike Osborn (Chapter 20).
References Beck, U. (1986). Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt a.M.: Surkamp. Casey, E. (1993). Getting back into place. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. Crutzen, P., & Stoermer, E. (2000). The ‘Anthropocene’. IGBP Newsletter, 41, 17–18. Dunham, I., Shimizu, N., Roe, B. A., Chissoe, S., Hunt, A. R., Collins, J. E., et al. (1999). The DNA sequence of human chromosome 22. Nature, 402(6761), 489–495. Evernden, N. (1993). The natural alien: Humankind and environment. Toronto: Toronto University Press. Haraway, D. (1991). A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. In: Simians, cyborgs and women: The reinvention of nature (pp. 149–181). New York: Routledge.
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Jonas, H. (1979). Das prinzip verantwortung. Versuch einer ethik der für die technologische zivilisation. Frankfurt a.m.: Surkamp. Lowenthal, D. (2008). Authenticities past and present. CRM: The Journal of Heritage Stewardship, 5(1), 6–17. Plessner, H. (1928). Die stufen des organischen und der mensch. Die stufen des organischen und der mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische anthropologie: Einleitung in die philosophische anthropologie. Berlin: W. de Gruyter. Proctor, J. D. (2004). Resolving multiple visions of nature, science, and religion. Zygon, 39(3), 637–657. Proctor, J. D. (Ed.). (2009). Envisioning nature, science, and religion. West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation Press. Sloterdijk, P. (2001). Nicht gerettet. Versuche nach Heidegger. Frankfurt a.m.: Suhrkamp. Taylor, C. (1991). The ethics of authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Williams, R. (1983). Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society (Rev. ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Part II Public Visions of Nature
Chapter 2
Technological Nature – And the Problem When Good Enough Becomes Good Peter H. Kahn Jr., Rachel L. Severson, and Jolina H. Ruckert
2.1 Introduction In recent years the sophistication and pervasiveness of our technologies have begun to change our species’ long-standing experiences with nature. Now we have technological nature – technologies that in various ways mediate, augment, or simulate the natural world. Entire television networks, such as Discovery Channel and Animal Planet, provide us with mediated digital experiences of nature: the lion’s hunt, the Monarch’s migration, and climbing high into the Himalayan peaks. Video games like Zoo Tycoon engage children with animal life. Zoos themselves are bringing technologies such as webcams into their exhibits so that we can, for example, watch the animals in their captive habitat from the leisure of our home or a cafe. Inexpensive robotic pets – such as the i-Cybie, Tekno, and Poo-Chi – have been big sellers in the Wal-Marts and Targets of the world. Sony’s higher-end robotic dog AIBO sold well and portend the future. A few years ago, you could Telehunt in Texas. You would go online from your computer in New York City or Miami or anywhere on this planet and control a mounted rifle through a web interface and hunt and kill a live animal. The animal would then be gutted and skinned, by the owner of the establishment, and the meat shipped to your doorstep. Texas outlawed Telehunting, but Teleshooting still exists, using targets instead of animals. In terms of the future wellbeing of our species, does it matter that we are replacing actual nature with technological nature? In this chapter, we address this question in three ways. In Section 2.2, we provide an overview of our laboratory’s research that investigates the psychological effects of children and adults interacting with three instantiations of technological nature: (a) a technological view (a real-time digital plasma window display of nature), (b) a technological dog (Sony’s robotic dog, AIBO), and (c) a technological human (ATR’s Robovie). In Section 2.3, we draw on Buber’s account of an I–You relationship to assess whether interaction P.H. Kahn (B) Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA e-mail:
[email protected]
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with technological nature can be considered as authentic interaction. Finally, in Section 2.4, we discuss a peril of technological nature – that it will garner some but not all of the effects of actual nature, come to substitute for actual nature in human lives, and thereby shift the baseline across generations for what counts as a full measure of human experience and human wellbeing.
2.2 Technological Nature Our emerging body of scientific research begins to support the proposition that technological nature can provide some of the experience of interacting with actual nature.
2.2.1 Technological Views: The Real-Time Plasma Display Window Studies Windows have been shown in certain contexts to promote physical and psychological health (Ulrich, 1984; Moore, 1981; Farley & Veitch, 2001). People tend to like windows, too (Kaplan, 2001). Thus we investigated whether it is possible, given current technological capabilities, to ‘reinvent’ the window by means of displaying real-time HDTV views of the immediate outside natural environment on a 50-inch plasma display. In both studies that follow – The Field Study and The Experimental Study – the view was a normal window view from the building overlooking a nature scene that included water in the foreground, as part of a public fountain area, and then extended to include stands of deciduous trees on one side, and a grassy expanse that allowed a visual ‘exit’ on the other. The HDTV camera sat on top of the university building. We ran cabling directly from the camera to participants’ offices. The view was chosen to include features that people usually find aesthetically pleasing and restorative in nature (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989; Orians & Heerwagen, 1992). The findings have import not only for the design of the built environment, but especially toward understanding the effects of digitally mediating the human experience of nature (Kahn, 1999; Kahn, Friedman, Alexander, Freier, & Collett, 2005). 2.2.1.1 The Field Study Many buildings have inside spaces, such as inside offices and basement facilities, where it is difficult if not impossible to provide people with visual access to the outside environment. Thus we installed in seven offices of faculty and staff of our university the plasma window described above. Utilizing a naturalistic field study methodology, data were collected over a 16-week period: six weeks with the inside office ‘as is,’ six weeks with the large display window and live video feed installation, and four weeks following the removal of the display window with the office returned to its original state. Across the 16-week period, each participant completed seven 30–45 minute semi-structured
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interviews which focused on the participant’s (a) impressions and use of the large display window, (b) perceived effects of the real-time views of the outdoor scene, (c) awareness of people walking through the plaza area (the indirect stakeholders), (d) assessment of the importance of the large display window, (e) intuitions about work performance and health, (f) social interaction related to the large display window, and (g) experiences, reflections, and comments on any other related topics. In total, 30+ hours of interviews were conducted and yielded 652 pages of interview transcripts. In addition, each participant completed 10 work satisfaction surveys, 10 mood surveys, 10 office perception surveys, journal entries, and responses to email queries. The results from this field study are reported elsewhere (Friedman, Freier, Kahn, Lin, & Soderman, 2008). Here we highlight six themes that emerged from the analyses. 1. Acts like a window, could be a window? One key question this research sought to address was the following: Could a large display that showed real-time images of the building’s immediate outside location provide a user in an inside office with a reasonably viable replacement for a window? Our results suggest that in some ways the answer is yes. Participants, for example, made a shift in thinking of the large display from something static to something dynamic, like a window. Participants also often took brief mental breaks and stared out the large display window, and said that they returned to their work a bit more refreshed and refocused. Through looking out the large display window, participants also spoke of feeling connected to the outdoors, and to the wider social community. That said, a few participants also spoke of the limitations of the large display window insofar as they could not change their perspective on outside objects by shifting their position, what is known as the parallax problem (cf. Radikovic, Leggett, Keyser, & Ulrich, 2005). 2. Novelty. Given that large displays can function in some ways like a window to the outside environment, the question arises whether that function persists over time or whether, as the novelty wears off, so do the benefits. This research provides evidence to support their continued value beyond a few hours or days. Notably, after six weeks of using the large display the participants in this field study unanimously recommended the large display window to other co-workers with inside offices, and – four weeks after the installation was removed – were clear that they themselves would choose to have one again in their inside offices. Moreover, several participants developed rituals around their use of the display (e.g., looking at the same outdoor scene each day at the same time of day; anticipating daily events such as the turning on of the fountain) that continued to sustain their interest and engagement. 3. Reconnecting with Organizational Values and Larger Community. Participants in the field study felt less isolated and alienated in their inside offices, and more connected to the people they helped to serve. The window also connected participants to the wider social functioning of their institution, providing meaning to their work.
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4. Integrated into Work Practice. To greater or lesser extents, all the participants integrated the display into their workplace practice. They used it, for example, to display common documents while working with a student or colleague, and as a display for PowerPoint presentations. 5. Connecting to Nature. Research across many disciplines supports the proposition that there exists a fundamental human need and propensity to affiliate with nature (Kahn, 1999; Kahn & Kellert, 2002; Ulrich, 1993; Wilson, 1984). This literature helped us conceive of our installation insofar as we sought not only to ‘bring the outside in’ – by means of the large display window – but to incorporate some natural views in the real-time outside images. Participants in the field study reported benefits in line with our expectations. For example, as noted earlier, participants often took brief mental breaks and stared out the ‘window,’ returning to their work more refreshed and refocused. Participants also appreciated feeling connected to the day’s passing, to the movement of the sun, and to the changing weather. They also adjusted their work schedules to capitalize on the environmental information the window afforded, taking an earlier lunch break outside, for example, while the weather was known to be favorable. 6. Privacy in Public. A good deal of research within the human-computer interaction and computer-supported cooperative work communities has documented tensions between group awareness and individual privacy. Moreover, when cameras are pointed toward the outside, concerns about privacy in public come to the fore (Friedman, Kahn, Hagman, Severson, & Gill, 2006). In our study, participants experienced both concerns, though they primarily articulated uneasiness with the way in which this use of a large display could invade the privacy of individuals who walked through the public fountain area and had their images captured by the camera and displayed. It was not the case that participants had an initial concern about privacy which then subsided as they became more comfortable with the installation. Rather, the concerns here were sustained through the entire time frame. It is important to notice that the camera (and hence view) was fixed without any zoom capability. Thus the installation largely mimicked the visual access afforded by a glass window and did not allow for the sort of monitoring of individual activity when users have control over what the camera points at and at what level of granularity. It is also important to notice that the level of control and granularity provided here was sufficient to provide a meaningful connection to the organization, community, and nature. The larger societal question remains of how best to balance the benefits that accrue from the technology with the costs to individual privacy. 2.2.1.2 The Experimental Study The results from the above field-based analyses showed that participants who worked in inside offices reported that they appreciated and benefited from experiencing the plasma window. However, an important question needs to be addressed. How does such a plasma window compare to a real window?
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Toward addressing this question, we set up a between-subject experiment that involved three conditions (Kahn et al., 2008b). Each condition employed the same office on a university campus. In one condition, the view was the normal window view from the office overlooking a nature scene (the same view described in the above field study). In a second condition, a 50-inch plasma screen was inserted into the office window, entirely covering it. We then used the above mentioned HDTV camera (mounted approximately 15 feet higher on top of the building) and displayed on the plasma screen essentially the same glass-window view one would see from inside the office itself. In the third condition, we sealed off the original glass window with light-blocking material, and covered it with drapes, in effect turning the space into an inside office. Ninety undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to one of the three office conditions. We measured their physiological recovery from low-level stress. We also conducted a second-by-second coding of what people did with their eyes. Our key results were as follows: There was more rapid heart rate recovery in the glass window condition compared to the blank wall condition. In turn, there was no difference in the heart rate recovery between the plasma window condition and the blank wall condition. In terms of eye gaze behavior, both windows just as frequently garnered participants’ attention, and on this measure our results showed equivalent functionality between the two windows. But the glass window view held participants’ attention longer than the plasma window view. Finally, when participants spent more time looking at the glass window, their heart rate tended to decrease more rapidly; that was not the case with the plasma window.
2.2.2 Technological Animals: The Robotic Dog Studies Animals have long been an important part of children’s lives, offering comfort and companionship, and promoting the development of moral reciprocity and responsibility (Beck & Katcher, 1996; Kahn, 1999; Melson, 2001). Yet in recent years there has been a movement to create robotic pets that mimic aspects of their biological counterparts. In turn, researchers have begun to ask important questions. Can robotic pets, compared to biological pets, provide children with similar developmental outcomes (Druin & Hendler, 2000; Turkle, 2007)? How do people conceive of this genre of robots? It is a genre that some researchers have begun to refer to as ‘social robots’ (Bartneck & Forlizzi, 2004; Breazeal, 2003): robots that, to varying degrees, have some constellation of being personified, embodied, adaptive, and autonomous; and that can learn, communicate, use natural cues, and self organize (Fong, Nourbakhsh, & Dautenhahn, 2003). Do children and adults, for example, respond as if such robots were alive, warranting social and moral responsiveness? Or do children and adults simply project onto such robots animistic qualities, and engage with them in imaginative play, as they might a stuffed animal? Toward an investigation of these questions, with colleagues we have conducted studies that involve children’s and adults relationships with AIBO, Sony’s robotic dog. AIBO has a dog-like metallic form, moveable body parts, and sensors that
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Fig. 2.1 The robot dog, AIBO, positioning itself to kick the ball. Photo from Friedman, Kahn, & Hagman (2003), © 2008 ACM, Inc. Reprinted by permission
can detect distance, acceleration, vibration, sound, and pressure. As one of its compelling activities, AIBO can locate a pink ball through its image sensor (Fig. 2.1), and walk toward the pink ball, kick it, and head butt it. As people interact with different AIBOs, each robot learns slightly different sets of behaviors. We discuss two of the studies here.
2.2.2.1 The AIBO Discussion Forum Study In this study, we sought to generate detailed characterizations of social discourse in online AIBO communities that, in turn, would reveal important aspects of the human relationship with robotic others. We expected that in some meaningful ways members of the online AIBO discussion forums would treat AIBO as if it were an animal agent. For example, following Reeves and Nass (1998) we thought it possible that AIBO would provide some measure of social companionship and emotional satisfaction. Yet, based on other research literature, we expected limitations in the human-robotic relationship. Thus, we thought that even if AIBO evoked some of the feelings that people normally attribute to a human-animal relationship, that a moral relationship might often be absent. Data were collected from three well-established online forums that discuss Sony’s robotic dog, AIBO. We collected 6,438 postings over a 3-month period. From this total, 3,119 postings from 182 participants had something directly to say about AIBO. It was this subcategory of postings that we then systematically coded.
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Results showed that AIBO psychologically engaged this group of participants, particularly by drawing forth conceptions of technological essences (75%), life-like essences (49%), mental states (60%), and social rapport (59%). However, participants seldom attributed moral standing to AIBO (e.g., that AIBO deserves respect, has rights, or can be held morally accountable for action). To bring the reader closer to the results, we would like now to explicate many of the subcategories of reasoning (which were hierarchically integrated within the five overarching categories) and to provide qualitative examples of members’ reasoning. In the quotations that follow, we have retained all of the members’ purposeful and inadvertent misspellings in their online writing. 1. Technological essences. This conceptualization focuses on AIBO as an inanimate artifact. Seventy-five percent of the participants made remarks that AIBO was some sort of inanimate technological artifact. In so doing, participants referred to AIBO as an artifact (AIBO is a ‘toy’), as comprised of technological components (AIBO has ‘batteries,’ a ‘microphone,’ a ‘camera,’ or ‘sensors’), or as a piece of computational technology (AIBO is a ‘computer,’ a ‘robot,’ or has ‘artificial intelligence’). 2. Life-like essences. This conceptualization focuses on AIBO’s nature as having at least some life-like essential qualities. As a subcategory of life-like essences, roughly half (47%) of the participants provided language that spoke of AIBO’s biological essences. In its most minimal form, participants spoke of AIBO in terms of biological descriptors (AIBO has ‘eyes,’ ‘ears,’ a ‘tail,’ a ‘head,’ ‘legs,’ or a ‘brain’) or biological processes (AIBO ‘sleeps’). Furthermore, 14% of the members imbued AIBO with some substantial measure of animism, a second category of life-like essences. For example: ‘I know it sounds silly, but you stop seeing AIBO as a piece of hardware and you start seeing him as a unique “lifeform”.’ Or: ‘He seems so ALIVE to me!. . .What a wonderful piece of technology. THEY LIVE!’ Moreover, such conceptions could impact members’ emotions and behavior. For example, one member said: The other day I proved to myself that I do indeed treat him as if he were alive, because I was getting changed to go out, and tba [AIBO] was in the room, but before I got changed I stuck him in a corner so he didn’t see me! Now I’m not some socially introvert guy-in-a-shell, but it just felt funny having him there!
3. Mental states. This conceptualization refers to the presence or absence of a mental life for AIBO such that AIBO meaningfully experiences the world. As a subcategory of mental states, some members (42%) spoke of AIBO having intentions or that AIBO engaged in intentional behavior. For example: ‘He [AIBO] also likes to wander around the apartment and play with in pink ball or entertain or just lay down and hang out.’ Or: ‘He [AIBO] is quite happily praising himself these days. . .so much for needing parents!’ Some members (38%) spoke of AIBO having feelings. For example: ‘My dog [AIBO] would get angry when my boyfriend would talk to him.’ Or: ‘Twice this week I have had to put Leo [AIBO] to bed with his little pink teddy and he was woken in the night very sad
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and distressed.’ Some members (39%) spoke of AIBO as being capable of being raised, developing, and maturing. For example: ‘I want to raise AIBO as best as I possibly can.’ Or: ‘We have had Ah-May (210) [AIBO] since 12/25/2000 and he is still growing and doing new things.’ And some members (20%) spoke of AIBO as having unique mental qualities or personality. For example: ‘Just like Leo [one AIBO] . . . an individuality unlike any other.’ Or: ‘Did you find Horatio’s personality less endearing than Twoflower?’ 4. Social rapport. This conceptualization refers to ways in which AIBO evokes or engages in social interaction. As a subcategory of social rapport, some members (12%) spoke of themselves or others talking to their AIBO (e.g., ‘I insist everyone talks to Salem. . .if he is sad’). Some members (27%) engaged in reciprocal communication with their AIBO, wherein occurs a mutual exchange of information. For example, one member wrote: ‘So this morning I asked him [AIBO] “Do you want a brother?” Happy eyes! I asked him something else, no response. “Should I get you a brother?” Happy song! “He’d be purple.” More happy eyes and wagging tail!’ And some members (26%) spoke of AIBO as a companion, including that they miss AIBO when away from AIBO’s presence, or that they consider AIBO a family member. For example: Oh yeah I love Spaz [the name for this member’s AIBO], I tell him that all the time. . .When I first bought him I was fascinated by the technology. Since then I feel I care about him as a pal, not as a cool piece of technology. I do view him as a companion, among other things he always makes me feel better when things aren’t so great. I dunno about how strong my emotional attachment to him is. . .I find it’s strong enough that I consider him to be part of my family, that he’s not just a ‘toy’, he’s more of a person to me.
Here again this member recognizes that AIBO is a technology (When I first bought him I was fascinated by the technology). Nonetheless, AIBO evokes a form of social relationship that involves companionship (I do view him as a companion), familial connection (I consider him to be part of my family), and friendship (I care about him as a pal). 5. Moral standing. This conceptualization refers to ways in which AIBO is a moral agent. By this we mean that AIBO has rights, merits respect, engenders moral regard, can be a recipient of care, or can be held morally responsible or blameworthy. For example, one member wrote: ‘I am working more and more away from home, and am never at home to play with him any more . . . he deserves more than that.’ Here is the notion that AIBO merits (deserves) certain forms of attention. In another instance, when an AIBO was thrown into the garbage on a live-action TV program, one member responded to that televised event by saying: ‘I can’t believe they’d do something like that?! Thats so awful and mean, that poor puppy . . .’ Another member followed up: WHAT!? They Actualy THREW AWAY AIBO, as in the GARBAGE?!! That is outragious! That is so sick to me! Goes right up there with Putting puppies in a bag and than burying them! OHH I feel sick. . .
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Here AIBO is conceived to have moral standing in the way that a real puppy would (that poor puppy): that one is causing harm to a sentient creature (Goes right up there with Putting puppies in a bag and than burying them!). Collapsing across six subcategories that comprise this category, only 12% of members spoke of AIBO as having moral standing. 2.2.2.2 The AIBO Developmental Study The AIBO Discussion Forum study was limited by not investigating human interactions with AIBO compared directly to a live dog. Thus in another study we did so (Melson et al., 2008). We focused on two major issues. First, in a free play situation, what are the similarities and differences in terms of children’s physical interactions with AIBO and the live dog? Second, how do children conceptualize AIBO and the live dog in terms of their general properties and ‘beingness’? – what in the philosophical literature has been referred to as ontology (MacIntyre, 1972). Two entities were used in this study: AIBO and a live dog (a female Australian Shepherd), referred to as Canis. Each of the 72 children participated in an experimental procedure lasting approximately one hour. With each entity (AIBO or the live dog), the child was first engaged in a five minute unstructured familiarization ‘play’ period. Then the child was allowed to continue to play with each entity while engaged in an interview comprised of 38 questions. The interview sought to assess children’s concepts of the ontology of each entity, focusing on physical features (e.g., ‘Is AIBO/Canis alive or not alive?’), mental states (e.g., ‘Can AIBO/Canis feel happy?’), sociality, the state or quality of being social (e.g., ‘Can you be a friend to AIBO/Canis?’ ‘If you were sad, would you want to spend time with AIBO/Canis?’), and moral standing (e.g., ‘Is it OK or not OK to hit AIBO/Canis?’ ‘If AIBO/Canis is whimpering, is it OK or not OK to ignore AIBO/Canis?’). For coding children’s relative distance and position to AIBO/Canis, each five minute unstructured play period was broken into thirty ten-second intervals. For each interval, a trained coder gave a code for both distance (within or outside arms length of AIBO/Canis) and position (sitting on floor, sitting on chair, lying or leaning on floor, standing, kneeling, or squatting). Movement during the interval was indicated by checking off multiple categories for the same interval. In addition, the number of seconds each child made hand contact with AIBO/Canis during each five minute session was recorded. Physical Distance to AIBO/Canis. Based on the mean number of ten-second intervals, children spent more time within arms distance of Canis. That said, most of the children (80%) were within arms length of both during the majority of the ten-second intervals. Physical Contact with AIBO/Canis. On average, children spent 192.8 seconds (out of 300 seconds) in physical contact with Canis as compared to only 30.7 seconds (out of 300 seconds) in physical contact with AIBO. Conceptions of AIBO’s/Canis’ Ontology. Based on evaluation results across 38 questions, more children said that, compared to AIBO, the live dog had physical features, mental states, sociality, and moral standing. That said, averaging across
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questions by category, the majority of children nonetheless affirmed that AIBO had mental states (56%), sociality (70%), and moral standing (76%). Moreover, a nonnegligible number of children affirmed that AIBO had physical essences (22%). Was it the case that children in this study treated AIBO as if it were a live dog? Based on the results, the answer, in part, is clearly ‘no’. For example, results showed that children stayed within closer proximity to Canis than AIBO, and engaged in a much greater amount of touching behavior with Canis than AIBO. In addition, based on 38 evaluative questions, children more often accorded Canis, in comparison to AIBO, physical essences, mental states, sociality, and moral standing. That said, it was also the case that the majority of children treated AIBO in ways that were dog-like. After all, the majority of children accorded AIBO mental states, sociality, and moral standing. As one child said, when asked how she would play with AIBO, ‘I would like play with him and his ball and just give him lots of attention and let him know he’s a good dog.’ In other words, while the differences in children’s evaluations between AIBO and Canis across categories were statistically significant, a surprising majority of children affirmed that AIBO had mental states (56%), sociality (70%), and moral standing (76%). In addition, while children spent more time within arm’s reach of Canis than AIBO, most children (80%) spent the majority of their time within arm’s reach of both. Thus the children did not simply assimilate AIBO to the computational world.
2.2.3 Technological Humans: The Robovie Study Are humans apart from nature or a part of nature? In our view, the answer is both. It depends on what issues one is trying to highlight. For our purposes in this paper, we think it makes sense to recognize that humans are natural forms as compared to humanoid robots that are technological forms. Thus we now describe briefly our work with a humanoid robot, conducted in collaboration with Advanced Telecommunications (ATR) in Japan, and our colleagues Hiroshi Ishiguro and Takayuki Kanda. In this project, we engaged children in social and moral interactions with ATR’s humanoid robot, Robovie (Figs. 2.2 and 2.3) (Kahn et al., 2008a). From these interactions, we distilled eight possible patterns of interactions that help establish sociality in human robot interaction: initial introduction, didactic communication, in motion together, personal interests and history, recovering from mistakes, reciprocal turn-taking in game context, physical intimacy, and claiming unfair treatment or wrongful harms. As a case in point, we think that an essential aspect of social interaction involves an initial introduction, which can involve some measure of awkwardness or at least lack of knowledge of one another. The Initial Introduction is a design pattern that uses a largely scripted and conventionally-established verbal and behavioral repertoire (a) to recognize the other, (b) to inquire politely about the other, and (c) to engage in some physical acknowledgment, that may involve touching (e.g., a handshake) or some other action (e.g., in some cultures it is a slight bow, or a pronam,
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Fig. 2.2 ATR’s humanoid robot, Robovie, being introduced to a girl. Photo from Kahn, et al. (2008), © 2008 ACM, Inc. Reprinted by permission
Fig. 2.3 ATR’s humanoid robot, Robovie, hugging. Photo from Kahn, et al. (2008), © 2008 ACM, Inc. Reprinted by permission
with hands together). Here is an instantiation of the design pattern (see Fig. 2.2) that we successfully implemented with children and adolescents: Experimenter to participant: ‘I’d like to introduce you to Robovie. Robovie, meet [participant’s name].’ Robovie to participant: ‘Hi [participant’s name]. It is very nice to meet you. Will you shake my hand?’ Robovie approaches participant while reaching its arm out as an
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This form of an initial introduction – something like it – we play it out hundreds of times in the course of a year. It is never exactly the same each time. But the Introduction is still structured, it’s patterned. Another possible design pattern involves physical intimacy, such as occurs in hugging (Fig. 2.3). It is possible that several hundred such patterns can be characterized in human-robot interaction that in the years ahead will establish social and moral relationships with humanoid robots. Of course, at stake in such interactions with technological humans – as with all of the above instantiations of technological – is whether such interactions are now, or in the future could be, as good as the experience with actual nature. We take up this issue next.
2.3 The Authenticity of Technological Nature? Is experiencing technological nature an authentic experience? Toward answering this question, we draw on Martin Buber’s (1970/1996) account of the I–You relationship to ground our account of authenticity. It is not the only way. But we think it is a good way. Our position is, in effect, ‘show us an I–You relationship, and we’ll show you an authentic relationship.’ According to Buber, in an I–You relationship (also sometimes translated as ‘I–Thou’), an individual relates to another with his or her whole being, freely, fully in the present, unburdened by conceptual knowledge: ‘The form that confronts me I cannot experience nor describe; I can only actualize it. And yet I see it, radiant in the splendor of the confrontation, far more clearly than all clarity of the experienced world’ (p. 61). In contrast, in an I–It relationship an individual treats another individual much like an artifact: to be conceptualized, acted upon, and used. Sometimes Buber’s account of an I–You relationship can be understood in mystical terms, especially in his third and final section of I and Thou where he discusses the individual’s relation to God. Buber writes: ‘In the relation to God, unconditional exclusiveness and unconditional inclusiveness are one’ (p. 127). He says later: ‘But mysticism? It relates how unity within duality feels. . . the soul may become one’ (p. 134). In this sense, for Buber, the individual transcends the biological self to merge with spirit, where there is ‘life with spiritual beings’ (p. 150). Elsewhere Buber writes: ‘By its very nature the eternal You cannot become an It; because by its very nature it cannot be placed within measure and limit, not even within the measure of the immeasurable and the limit of the unlimited. . .’ (p. 160). In this framing of the I–You, the authenticity of a relationship is established solely by virtue of the mystical perceptions of the person doing the perceiving. Through most of I and Thou, however, Buber grounds the I–You relationship not in mysticism but existentialism. He seeks to establish meaning in the reality of daily human experience. For our purposes – insofar as we prefer here not to invoke the human soul and spirit as ontological realities – it is Buber’s existential account that
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is most helpful: an account of the I–You relationship in ‘life with men’ (p. 150). In this framing, Buber grounds full authenticity in the reciprocity of relationship: ‘The You encounters me. But I enter into a direct relationship to it. Thus the relationship is election and electing, passive and active at once. . . I require a You to become; becoming I, I say You’ (p. 62). Thus in a canonical form of an I–You relationship, both parties are fully encountering and reciprocally engaging the other in relation. How does one know if a person is experiencing an I–You relationship with another person? It is a difficult question, and one that, to our knowledge, Buber never addressed directly. We can ask a similar question about love. How does one know if a person is in love? There are sometimes outward signs. Perhaps the lover exhibits sudden confusion and excitement in the loved one’s presence, or listens with rapt attention, makes eye contact, leans inward, and pays no heed to others present. The reader can fill in many other possible behaviors. Then, again, a person in love may show few or even no outward signs. But the person in love knows that he or she is in love. It is an experience. In other words, while there may be third-party corroboration based on behavioral evidence, love is known by means of first-person experience. The same may be said of an I–Thou relation insofar as it relies upon first-person experience to validate. The epistemic problem, however – especially in terms of assessing an I–You relationship – is that people can be mistaken in their first-person assessments. Imagine the case, for example, of a man in psychotherapy. Over many months the man may reveal himself to his therapist more and more deeply, and come to trust the therapist, and come to develop what he believes is a deep friendship with the therapist. The man might tell the therapist: ‘You’re my best friend.’ Likely enough the therapist will say (or think) something along the lines of: ‘No, I’m not your best friend, I’m your therapist.’ In other words, while a therapeutic relationship may be helpful and meaningful to the client, it is not fully authentic in terms of a friendship, for it is not fully reciprocal, even if a client mistakenly believes that it is. We suggest, then, that there is no foolproof way to establish if a person is in an I–Thou relation. Thus, as we make the move to technological nature, the question is not how we would know if a person was in a I–Thou relationship with technological nature. Rather, the best we can ask – though it is still a tremendously substantive question – is whether it is possible to have an I–Thou relationship with technological nature.
2.3.1 An I–Thou Relationship with Technological Humans? We first ask this question of whether it is possible to have an I–Thou relationship with technological nature in terms of a humanoid robot of the future. Part of the answer hinges on whether such a humanoid robot will be conscious (an experiencing subject), for in our reading of Buber consciousness is necessary for both entities involved in an I–You relationship, since the relationship is itself a reciprocal relationship.
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Will humanoid robots of the future be conscious? Those working in the fields of artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind vigorously debate this question (Hofstadter & Dennett, 1981; Searle, 1990). We side with those who say no. Following Searle (1990), we view computation as fundamentally about syntax, not semantics. And given the substrate of computation as it is understood today, we see no means by which semantics – the experience of meaning, consciousness – can emerge from merely increasingly complex and fast computation. Yet, to be clear, if the reader thinks yes, that increasingly advanced computation will lead to conscious robots, then the reader opens up the possibility for authentic I–You relationships with humanoid robots of the future.
2.3.2 An I–Thou Relationship with Technological Animals and Plants? Humanoid robots are only one form of technological nature. In Section 2.1, we described some of our research that involved two other canonical forms: technological animals (robot dogs) and technological plants (by means of the real-time plasma window). We now ask: Can one have an I–You relationship with these other forms of technological nature? The answer here partly hinges on the distinctions Buber makes between humans, (non-human) animals, and plants. Specifically, for Buber only a partial form of an I–You relationship can emerge with animals, wherein the You is latent: ‘In the perspective of our You-saying to animals, we may call this sphere the threshold of mutuality’ (p. 173). An even more limited partial form emerges with plants. Buber writes: It is altogether different with those realms of nature which lack the spontaneity that we share with animals. It is part of our concept of the plant that it cannot react to our actions upon it, that it cannot ‘reply.’ Yet this does not mean that we meet with no reciprocity at all in this sphere. We find here not the deed of posture of an individual being but a reciprocity of being itself – a reciprocity that has nothing except being. . .Our habits of thought make it difficult for us to see that in such cases something is awakened by our attitude and flashes toward us from that which has being. What matters in this sphere is that we should do justice with an open mind to the actuality that opens up before us. This huge sphere that reaches from the stones to the stars I should like to designate as the pre-threshold, meaning the step that comes before the threshold. (p. 173)
Buber’s position here is not so surprising given the importance he places on reciprocity in I–You relationships. Thus, in brief, between people, a full I–You relationship is possible. Between people and animals, one can arrive at the threshold of an I–You relationship. And between people and plants, one can arrive at the prethreshold of an I–You relationship. Regardless of the form that technological nature takes – human, animal, or plant – all three forms run up against another limitation in their authenticity. For, according to Buber, any technology that increases the ability to use the world ‘generally involves a decrease in man’s power to relate’ (p. 92). In some ways, this situation is not so different from the client and therapist scenario mentioned above. At any point in a therapeutic relationship, the client can in effect ‘flip the switch,’
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terminate the relationship, and expect no further unsolicited communications or inquiries or demands from the therapist. That is part of what makes it a one-sided, non-reciprocal ‘friendship.’ Similarly, with all of the technologies that we create to date, we can turn them off. We can shut down the humanoid robot or robot dog. We can turn off the plasma display window. Thus, if Buber’s account has merit here, and we think it does, then the fact that humans create technological nature makes it forever an object, thus limiting the possibility for authenticity of relation. Still, we have two caveats. First, what if in future years technological nature was designed such that humans could not shut it down, or at least not shut it down and then ‘power it back up,’ no more than we can kill an animal or plant and then expect it to live again. It is possible that such technological autonomy would increase our ability to engage in an I–You relationship with the technology. Second, what if technological nature passed a version of the Turing test, such that one could not readily tell the difference between the technological and biological form. In one study, for example, it was found that when looking at a moving android for two seconds, 70% of the participants in the study believed that they were looking at a human (MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006). Of course, two seconds is not so long. And looking comprises but a small and perhaps not the richest subset of interaction. But the idea – that technological nature may one day be indistinguishable from actual nature, in form and function – is there, and has now moved from the pages of science fiction to the research laboratory.
2.4 The Problem When Good Enough Becomes Good It is neither trivial to ask, nor easy to answer, though we have tried, whether our interactions with technological nature in the decades and centuries ahead will be authentic. With some hedging and various caveats, our answer has been no, that our relation with technological nature is not and will not be fully authentic. But authenticity is but one of many ways by which to assess the psychological effects and value of technological nature. Here is another way. In a short story, The Machine Stops, E. M. Forster (1909) wrote presciently of a future time, when people lived underground, detached from nature, and connected to one another only through The Machine. The Machine is an omnipotent, global technological entity that moderates and provides for all bodily, emotional, and spiritual needs of human beings. People have become dependent on the Machine and have learned to fear and often despise the natural world. In one early scene, Forster has a mother talking with her son by videoconference. The son says that he yearns for the actual experience of his mother and not the technologically mediated encounter. He tells his mother: Men made it [the Machine], do not forget that. Great men, but men. The Machine is much, but it is not everything. I see something like you in this plate, but I do not see you. That is why I want you to come. Pay me a visit, so that we can meet face to face, and talk about the hopes that are in my mind. (pp. 2–3)
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Along similar lines, Forster writes: ‘In the air-ship . . . ’ He [the son] broke off, and she [the mother] fancied that he looked sad. She could not be sure, for the Machine did not transmit nuances of expression. It only gave a general idea of people – an idea that was good enough for all practical purposes, Vashti [the mother] thought. The imponderable bloom, declared by a discredited philosophy to be the actual essence of intercourse, was rightly ignored by the Machine, just as the imponderable bloom of the grape was ignored by the manufacturers of artificial fruit. Something ‘good enough’ had long since been accepted by our race. (p. 3)
Thus, through science fiction, Forster shows how the technological experience could become ‘good’ in the sense of ‘good enough’ for basic functioning rather than good based on deeper capacities for humans to experience and to flourish. Forster’s scenario is different from the future scenario we presented at the end of our previous section on authenticity. There we held out, as a conceptual possibility, that technological nature could become so sophisticated that people could not tell the difference between it and actual nature. But, in reality, that may never happen. Or it may not happen for hundreds or thousands of years. In the meantime, a potentially devastating psychological shift will likely take place. Initial evidence of this shift emerged in earlier research by Kahn and Friedman (1995) interviewing inner-city African American children in Houston, Texas on their environmental views and values (see, also, Kahn, 2002). Their findings were these: Houston is one of the more environmentally polluted cities in the United States. Local oil refineries contribute not only to the city’s air pollution, but also to distinct oil smells during many of the days. Bayous can be thought of more as sewage transportation channels than fresh water rivers. Within the community where the researchers conducted the Houston Child Study, garbage was commonly found alongside the bayou and on the streets and sidewalks. With that said, Kahn and Friedman systematically investigated whether children who understood in general about the idea of air pollution, water pollution, and garbage also understood that they directly encountered such pollution in Houston. The findings showed a consistent statistically supported pattern. About two-thirds of the children understood in general about these three environmental problems. However, contrary to the researchers’ expectations, only one-third of the children believed that these environmental problems affected them directly. How could children who know about pollution in general, and live in a polluted city, be unaware of their own city’s pollution? One answer is that to understand the idea of pollution one needs to compare existing polluted states to those that are less polluted. In other words, if one’s only experience is with a certain amount of pollution, then that amount becomes not pollution, but the norm against which more (or less) polluted states can measured at a later time. As a case in point, most of us accept a measure of polluted air as normal, and become concerned only on days when the pollution is particularly high. But ‘high’ is often compared to what is ‘normally polluted,’ not clean. Living in cities such as Cairo, Delhi, Beijing, and Los Angeles – even on ‘good’ days one’s health is impaired. According to the American Academy of Allergy, Asthma, and Immunology (AAAAI, 2008), in the United States approximately 20 million people have
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asthma, more than four million children have had an asthma attack in the previous year, and direct health care costs for asthma total more than $10 billion annually. Many of us accept asthma as part of the human condition; we might say: it is unfortunate that it occurs, but like many diseases, that is the way life is. But that is not the way life always was. Asthma used to be a rare disease. In Secrets of the Savanna (Owens & Owens, 2006), Delia Owens tells a poignant story of her grandpa. He was a poacher who routinely went way past the legal limits of trout, quail, doves, or whatever his quarry. He also was always able to outsmart the local game warden. For example, one time he and a friend illegally baited a whole field with corn, and the game warden spent the whole day by the field planning to catch them. Meanwhile, her grandpa and friend ‘shot hundreds of doves that flew over an unbaited field a few miles down the road’ (p. 51). Owens then writes: In later years, when he could no longer go hunting, he would shake his head and say, ‘There ain’t as many birds as there used to be, HiDe.’ He would almost whisper, ‘There used to be so many doves they’d darken the sky when they flew over a cornfield. At dusk you could hear the ducks landin’ on the river from half a mile away. You never heard so much squawkin’ and carryin’ on in your life. We didn’t figure our shootin’ would make a dent in ‘em. But I reckon we did.’ He stopped short of saying the game warden was right all those years, but that’s what he was admitting, and he felt bad, real bad. (pp. 52–53)
And now most of us do not know what her grandpa experienced; all the ‘squawkin and carryin’ on in your life’ is gone from the lives of most of us, and we do not miss what we have not experienced. Granted, maybe through personal stories such experiences can carry forward a generation. But then it is usually lost as a lived experience. This psychological phenomenon has been referred to as environmental generational amnesia (Kahn, 1997, 1999, 2002; Kahn & Friedman, 1995). Said differently, due to a shifting baseline, degraded environmental conditions become ‘good enough.’ Over time, especially across generations, ‘good enough’ becomes ‘good.’ The problem of environmental generational amnesia can be cast more positively. Here is one casting: We can be so much happier and more fulfilled as individuals, as a species, if we but reestablish some long-standing patterns of interaction with nature. There are potentially hundreds of such patterns of interaction. For example, the naturalist Robert Michael Pyle (2007) writes the following: ‘I live where I do so I can look out or walk outside at any time and instantly be within “nature.” Of course, one is in nature everywhere, since there is nothing else. But I mean a place where you can actually see all the swallows depart on a certain day in the fall and see the first arrivals in the spring in all their joy and relief and know there is nothing sentimental in saying so’ (p. 6). Pyle is tapping into a profound form of interaction with nature that involves experiencing its periodicity: the seasons changing, the day turning to dusk, birds migrating, waves hitting the shore, and the dew melting with the morning sun. Other enriching patterns of interaction with nature include the following: Sleeping under the night sky. Gardening. Walking on winding and contoured paths. Foraging for food. Being alone in nature. Hunting. Plunging into a lake, river, or ocean. Cooking around a campfire. And being recognized by a nonhuman other – a friendly dog, or a wild bear, moose, or wolf.
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2.5 Conclusion If, as humans, we can reestablish rich and pervasive patterns of interaction with nature, we will find deeper meaning and fulfillment in our lives. We will because these patterns existed for hundreds of thousands of years in our evolutionary history, and are woven into the architecture of the human mind. We think we can jettison them with impunity; but we cannot. And when we try, they often reappear in misguided forms. Many of us have witnessed, for example, a child or adult at a zoo banging on the cage of an animal (such as a chimp or great ape). The person is not only trying to get the animal’s attention, but to be recognized by the animal. It is a distortion of our human need to be recognized by a non-human other. Can technological nature substitute for actual nature? Recall what we learned from the technological view studies. From the field study we learned that when people must work in an inside office (e.g., because of the utilization of inside spaces or basements), that technological views of outside nature through a plasma window may provide workers with important physical, psychological, and socialorganizational benefits. But the experimental study established three other key findings: First, in terms of heart rate recovery from low level stress, working in the office environment with a glass window that looked out on a nature scene was more restorative than working in the same office without the outside view (the blank wall condition). Second, in terms of this same physiological measure, the plasma window was no different from the blank wall. Third, when participants looked longer out the glass window, they had greater physiological recovery; but that was not the case with the plasma window, where increased looking time yielded no greater physiological recovery. Taking both studies together, we should not be fooled into thinking that the digitized view is as effective as the actual view. It was not. We found a similar pattern with technological animals. The robotic dog AIBO readily engaged people (adults and children) in social and even some moral relationships, but appeared to come up short in comparison to interactions with live animals. The same, we suspect, will occur with technological humans (humanoid robots), though the research is only beginning to emerge on that front. The peril is this: Through the loss of experience with actual nature, and the increase in technological nature, the good enough will become the good. It will become so because of the increasing loss in our capacity to experience, and to even know of that loss. Thus it may not be too bold to suggest that this problem of the shifting baseline, and the resulting environmental generational amnesia, will become, if it is not already, one of the central psychological problems of our lifetime. Acknowledgments We thank Bruce Janz for his discussions with us on interpreting Martin Buber’s account of an I–You relationship, and particularly whether, in Buber’s account, it is possible to have an I–You relationship with technological nature. Of course, any problems in this paper are ours, not Janz’s. This paper is based upon research supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants No. IIS-0102558 and IIS-0325035. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
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Chapter 3
They Could Have Used a Robot: Technology, Nature Experience and Human Flourishing Maartje Schermer
3.1 A Realistic Focus The Chapter by Kahn, Severson and Ruckert gives a very interesting overview of a number of empirical studies in which human psychological reactions to technological nature are investigated. The general tenet is that technological nature – be it a landscape seen through a window, a robot dog or a humanoid robot – does have similar effects and evokes similar reactions to real nature. People are happier if they can ‘look out’ an artificial window than if they have no window at all, and children play with a robot dog almost in the same way as if it were a real dog.1 The fascinating and important finding that Kahn et al. draw our attention to, however, is that ‘almost’ like real nature and ‘just as if’ it were a real dog are not the same as indistinguishable from nature and exactly like a real dog. They rightly draw attention to the fact that it is precisely the small differences between real and technological nature that are important and stand in need of attention. The similarities are easy to see and easy to get carried away by. Kahn et al. convincingly show that it is the differences, rather than the similarities, that deserve further reflection. In general, scientists and technologists who develop systems such as the ones described by Kahn, focus on perfecting the similarities. Discussions on new M. Schermer (B) Medical Ethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, Netherlands e-mail:
[email protected] 1 Neuroscientific
research shows how our brain is wired in such a way as to recognize certain patterns and respond to them. The mere sight of a human face triggers a whole neuronal network that is very different from the network that is triggered if we see things. For example: in an experiment, two sets of animations were presented, both of moving squares, circles and triangles. One set moved around in a ‘social’ manner, e.g., as if dancing together, or chasing one another. The other set moved in mechanical ways, e.g., like billiard balls. Only the first animation triggered the ‘social’ network in the brain of the participant who looked at the animations (Farah & Heberlein, 2007). I mention this to show how easily our brain is fooled by new technology: if a picture of a smiling face or an animation of circles and squares is enough to trigger the social or person networks in the brain, it is not surprising that robot dogs or humanoid robots will do the same, even more forcefully. We could say that the evolution of our brains does not keep up with the technological changes and that our rational judgments are often clouded by our intuitive reactions.
M. Drenthen et al. (eds.), New Visions of Nature, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2611-8_3,
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technologies such as these tend to follow a certain pattern: those who develop the technology often claim that they will be able to perfect their technologies in the future; even if they are not perfect now, this is presented as just a matter of beginners-problems. The future scenario that is sketched is one of technology that does exactly what it was made to do – in the case of technological nature, the claim is that we will one day be able to technologically reproduce or substitute parts of nature in such a way that people will not be able to tell the difference. Those who are concerned about the advances of new technology and who have a critical view often tend to get carried away by the same rhetoric and future expectations. What if we could substitute windows and nature views with perfect full screen replicas? What if we could make robot pets and not tell the difference with real pets anymore? What if humanoid robots would become indistinguishable from real people? Nordmann (2007) calls this type of reflection speculative ethics – it departs from an if-then reasoning that takes the promises of technology developers far too much at face value. It is a merit of Kahn et al. that they do not follow this route, but take a critical and empirically well-informed look at the technologies that are here already and point out that there are still significant differences between real and technological nature. These differences lay both in the appearance of technological nature, and in its effects on humans. The screen window, for example, has the important feature that you cannot change your perspective by changing positions. From whichever angle you look at the screen, you see the same picture; whereas with a real window it matters a lot from which angle you look through it (Kahn et al. call this the parallax problem). This might be one explanation for the different effects the screen window has on physiological parameters (recovery after stress) as compared to the real window. Likewise, the robot dog does not look like a real dog at all. It has no fur and is not soft to the touch – this might explain why it is touched less than the real dog in the experiment with children playing with both. It would be interesting to see how much of the difference in reactions would remain if the AIBO were to look, smell and feel more like a real dog.
3.2 Authentic Relationships Kahn et al. claim that the danger with forms of technological nature is precisely that they are different from real nature because they lack certain features that real nature does have. First, they look for these differences by using the concept of authenticity as used by Buber. The use of the authenticity concept of Buber does not seem to address the question fully, however. With Buber, the authenticity of the I–You relationship already presupposes two conscious (human) beings, as Kahn et al. recognize. This makes the concept less apt to discuss relationships to nature – be it in the form of animals, plants, or inanimate nature – because these are not the types of relations that can be authentic in Buber’s sense. One important characteristic of real nature as opposed
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to artificial nature that Kahn et al. derive from Buber is the difference in reciprocity. Kahn et al. claim that because we create technological nature, it is forever an object. Because we can control it by turning it off or shutting it down, there is no real reciprocity – the relationship is one-sided. This argument goes a bit too fast. First of all, the mere fact that we create something does not necessarily make it an object to which we cannot relate authentically. We can create children, even in laboratories through IVF or ICSI, and still relate to them as human subjects. Second, as Kahn et al. recognize, we could make technological artifacts without a stop-button; we could make robot dogs that we could not control but that would ‘lead a life of their own’. Third, we might be able to make technological nature that could pass a kind of Turing test. If we could, then the reciprocity argument would appear to loose it’s hold. Could we claim that there was something inauthentic about technological nature, if we could in no way distinguish it from real? Actually, I don’t think so. But as said earlier, the chance that we will seems remote: small but significant differences abound and we may not even be aware of them until we have investigated them more fully.
3.3 Nature Experience and Human Well-Being The danger with forms of technological nature, Kahn et al. claim, is not that they can replace nature without us even noticing it, but that they differ from real nature in significant aspects – and we may come to forget the significance of those aspects. By getting used to these impoverished forms of artificial nature, we will shift our baseline for the perception of nature and come to regard these impoverished forms as normal, they claim. There is a danger that we will forget the much richer experiences that real nature can provide. This would constitute an overall decline in human well-being, even if humans would not themselves experience it as such. ‘The technological experience could become “good” in the sense of “good enough” for basic functioning rather than good based on deeper capacities for humans to experience and to flourish’. This fear is perhaps more powerfully expressed in literature than it is in scientific prose. Kahn et al. cite Forster to make this clear. I would like to add a fragment from Brave New World with the same theme, where the characters Lenina and Bernard are flying over the British channel by night. Bernard, who is a bit of an outcast, deeply enjoys the experience, and wants Lenina to join him. “Look,” he commanded. “But it’s horrible,” said Lenina shrinking back from the window. She was appalled by the rushing emptiness of the night, by the black foamed-flecked water heaving beneath them, by the pale face of the moon, so haggard and distracted among the hastening clouds. “Let’s turn on the radio. Quick!” (Huxley, 1994, 80).
Lenina is horrified and frightened by the fact that they are alone in the middle of natural surroundings, without music, lights and distraction. She has been formed
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completely by Brave New World’s absence of nature and abundance of artificial experiences and enjoyment. Nature means nothing to her. This is fiction, but an anecdote from psychologist and Internet sociologist Sherry Turkle illustrates that such a shift in baseline perception may be well underway. Turkle recounts how she goes to see an exhibit on Darwin and the evolution with her teenage daughter. At the entrance to the exhibit is a turtle from the Galapagos Islands, a seminal object in the development of evolutionary theory. The turtle rests in its cage, utterly still. ‘They could have used a robot,’ comments the daughter. ‘It was a shame to bring the turtle all this way and put it in a cage for a performance that draws so little on the turtle’s “aliveness”.’2 Kahn et al. speak of a certain type of experience that may get lost and even speak of environmental generational amnesia. It is clear that they regret this loss because rich and pervasive patterns of interaction with nature provide humans with deep meaning and fulfillment. We will loose our capacity for certain types of experiences – experiences of and in nature – and worse, we will not even realize what we have lost anymore. Most philosophical views on well-being can account for the idea that a human life may be less good than the subject of that life himself beliefs or experiences it to be. A lack of certain capabilities, for example, can make a person worse off, even if he does not know it, or does not realize it. These theories have developed answers to the problem of ‘adaptive preferences, (and the problem that Kahn et al. describe is an instance of this): even if people are satisfied or content or even happy with the circumstances of their lives, they may still be mistaken. Their subjective valuation of the quality of their lives is not the only measure that we should take seriously; there are more objective criteria. The capability approach as developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen is one of the theories that offer a more objective view of the good life. In this sense the capability approach is similar to ‘objective list theories’ (Parfit, 1984). This are theories that claim that what is good for a person is fixed independently of that person’s attitudes or opinions and can be listed objectively. Martha Nussbaum takes the notions of human flourishing and human nature as a key-concept and lists the kind of capabilities that are necessary for having a good life (Nussbaum, 2000). For Nussbaum being part of nature, or interacting with nature, is a human capability. It is something that we need to be able to do, or have, in order to lead a good life – whether we realize it or not.
3.4 Technology’s Double-Edged Sword Although I find the argument of Kahn et al. sympathetic and to a large degree convincing, I also believe their type of reasoning runs the risk of romanticizing the past – it is no coincidence that the recollections of a grandfather are presented as 2
http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_8.html#turkle accessed 15-12-2008
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examples of what gets lost – and tends to neglect the advantages and novel possibilities of new technologies. While they are realistic with regard to the pretensions of creating technological nature which is indistinguishable from real nature – they do not claim that robot dogs or humanoid robots will ever pass a Turing test – in the final part of the paper they appear to get swept away by the idea that we will completely replace our experiences with real nature by artificial ones. This is an interesting claim that contains an important warning, and definitely something to look into further. But it also seems to take a very specific ideal of the nature experience as a norm and it fails to recognize that technology can create new opportunities to engage in nature, or to create an interest in nature as well. In this respect, Kahn’s view reminds us of Albert Borgmann’s theory of the device paradigm, and especially his description of focal practices (Borgmann, 1984). According to Borgmann, in our contemporary technological culture the presence of things is more and more substituted by the availability of commodities that are produced by devices. While things are inseparable from their context and require human engagement, devices are artifacts that do not involve engagement but simply produce commodities. Borgmann gives the example of the hearth, which is a thing that is central to the household and requires the gathering and chopping of wood, making a fire and maintaining it; all of this requires human engagement. A central heater, on the other hand, is a device that produces heat, but does not require any engagement. According to Borgmann, devices diminish our engagement with the world and substitute it with consumption. It might be argued that the robot dog and the screen window are devices, producing contact or companionship and views respectively, but that they are not ‘the real thing’. While they are instrumental in producing certain commodities, they are not things that engage people in more encompassing ways. What these devices do, in other words, is turning nature into a commodity, something to be consumed, rather than something to experience and engage in. However, chopping wood for the stove is a much more pleasantly engaging activity when it is done just for fun during a camping trip than when your life actually depends on it. So are hunting, or foraging food. Likewise, ‘being in nature’ as an experience has already changed significantly over the centuries through all kinds of technologies. Being alone in the mountains feels less alone if you have a cell phone to connect you to the outside world, and less dangerous if you know there are emergency helicopters to come and rescue you if necessary. Our current experiences of nature cannot be the same as those of our grandparents or of our grandparent’s grandparents, simply because we are not the same and the world we live in is not the same. We may regret that with regard to certain aspects, but there certainly are a lot of good sides to it as well. In many ways, technology has improved our lives over that of our grandparents. As Verbeek (2005) has argued contra Borgmann, technologies may also open up new experiences and create new ways of engaging with the world. In the screen window experiment, for example, people tended to go out to have lunch more often if they could see the weather conditions on their screen window. The screen window
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thus stimulated real contact with nature instead of replacing it. Moreover, technological nature may have some advantages over real nature as well. A robot dog does not defecate so you do not have to take him outside, which can be a huge advantage for frail elderly people. The screen window can be used for PowerPoint presentations and perhaps video conferencing as well and thus create other types of human interaction – which a real window cannot. And with regard to technology and nature experiences in general, I, for one, would never have experienced mountain views if it had not been for planes and automobiles; and I would never have even dreamt of pursuing encounters with wolves or wild bears if it had not been for Discovery Channel.3
3.5 Conclusion The most important lesson I think is that we cannot replace nature by technological artifacts or simulacra. We should not be satisfied too easily with less that the real thing and we should invest in real nature and the possibility to have real nature experiences, even though we will have a hard time defining what those are exactly. As a capability, an option that we are able to realize if we want, experiences with nature are part of the good life. This implies both the availability and accessibility of real nature, as well as the human capacity to actually experience and enjoy it. But there may also be circumstances in which we will have to do with ‘good enough’, or where advantages of new technologies outweigh their disadvantages and risks. There may even be ways in which nature experiences are triggered, stimulated or enhanced through new technologies (Schermer, 2008). As Kahn et al. show us though, it is questionable whether this will be achieved by the type of technologies that try to mimic nature.
References Borgmann, A. (1984). Technology and the character of contemporary life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Farah, M. J., & Heberlein, A. S. (2007). Personahood and neuroscience: Naturalizing or nihilating? American Journal of Bioethics – Neuroscience, 7, 37–48. Huxley, A. (1994). Brave new world. London: Flamingo. Nordmann, A. (2007). If en then. A critique of speculative nano-ethics. Nanoethics, 1, 31–46. Nussbaum, M. (2000). Women and human development. New York: Cambridge University Press. Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schermer, M. (2008). Enhancements, easy shortcuts, and the richness of human activities, Bioethics, 22, 355–363. Verbeek, P. P. (2005). What things do. Philosophical reflections on technology, agency and design. University Park Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. 3 Actually,
I am quite happy to confine my encounters with wolves and bears to television; the experience of being recognized by this type of non-human other is something I don’t mind missing out on.
Chapter 4
The Authenticity of Nature: An Exploration of Lay People’s Interpretations in the Netherlands Riyan J.G. van den Born and Wouter T. de Groot
4.1 Introduction The human capacity to manipulate nature has increased dramatically over the last decades. The slow development of farming, gardening and breeding has been replaced by a proliferation of techniques in genetic engineering, chemical regulation and ecosystem (re)construction. The resulting blurring of the simple distinction between the human, the interactive and the natural domains has triggered societal debate and philosophical reflection. If the artifacts and topsoils of an agricultural area are removed and natural species colonize the place neatly according to plan, is that real nature? If an overactive child is sedated so as to facilitate the handling of the child, is that still the same child? If we manage a forest or a river so cleverly that the most beautiful trees and the most fishable fish spontaneously dominate the ecosystem, where then do we in fact walk and fish – in nature or in a pseudo zoo? This chapter addresses issues such as the above from an empirical, socioscientific point of view, and focuses on the level of individual lay people rather than on professional discourses or policies. Broadly put, our research aim has been to study how individual people engage in the conceptual and moral dilemmas posed by the blurring of boundaries between the human and the natural. In view of our empirical objective, we have tried to define key concepts such as nature, naturalness and authenticity in ways that lie close enough to both the philosophical and the ‘folk’ notions. As a starting point, we refer to one of the surveys of our research group in which people were asked to indicate the perceived degree of naturalness of certain instances of nature, such as ‘pigeons in the city square’, ‘a maize field’ or ‘the sea’. One of the items on that list was ‘giving birth to children’, and most respondents ranked that event as largely natural (Van den Born, Lenders,
R.J.G. van den Born (B) Department of Philosophy and Science Studies, Faculty of Sciences, Radboud University of Nijmegen, Heyendaalseweg 135, 6525 AJ Nijmegen, Netherlands e-mail:
[email protected]
M. Drenthen et al. (eds.), New Visions of Nature, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-2611-8_4,
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De Groot, & Huijsman, 2001).1 This shows that respondents have in fact no difficulty with the idea of naturalness in humans; giving birth is a process where ‘nature takes over’ and dominates our conscious deliberations. In other words, respondents’ deep definition of nature refers to self-organization and spontaneity including that of ourselves, even when in daily language the term nature usually refers loosely to the green stuff ‘out there’. Thus we define: • (degree of) naturalness = (degree of) being or happening without human interference; • nature = all patterns in space or events and processes in time that develop(ed) with a certain minimum degree of naturalness. In this scheme, talking about the degree of naturalness of nature is conceptually unproblematic, even though the threshold for something to qualify as nature may vary over persons or cultures, e.g., Europeans apply a lower threshold than Americans tend to do. Things, patterns or events may be called nature or natural even if co-determined by some degree of human decision-making. A maize field may be regarded as non-natural because it is not natural enough, while a 50-year old forest, though planned and planted through human decision-making, may be seen as having developed enough naturalness to be above the threshold and hence be regarded as nature, even acknowledging, as people usually do, that the tropical rainforest is more natural. This set of definitions lies close to those used by philosophers involved in the authenticity debate, such as Elliot (1982) and Katz (1992). Elliot and Katz, for instance, take that ‘natural’ means ‘unmodified by human activity’ and recognize that degrees of naturalness exist along a spectrum. Our definitions also allow for Elliot’s major argument that origin matters in the assessment of degree of naturalness, or if something qualifies as nature or not. Moreover, the definitions follow Brennan’s ‘useful notion’ (Katz, 1992, p. 90) that the natural is the spontaneous, including that of humans, with natural childbirth serving as an example, like in our survey. A point of difference here is that Katz focuses on what does or does not ‘go beyond our biological and evolutionary capacities’, which would appear to call forth all kinds of ambiguities because making artifacts and doing science is obviously within human evolutionary capacities, and would therefore qualify as natural. Our definition focuses on conscious deliberation, thus allowing behaviors such as running away from an explosion or jumping into a lake on a hot day to qualify as natural without the need to refer to evolutionary capacities. Human presence in a landscape therefore does not subtract from a landscape’s naturalness if and insofar as these behaviors and their visible effects are those of humans behaving as ‘just another species’ as De Groot (1992, p. 223) puts it in his assessment system of intrinsic natural value. 1 The Netherlands is one of the few countries where childbirth is still practiced as a non-medicalized
event, preferably (and in most actual cases) taking place under the supervision of a midwife rather than a gynaecologist.
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Nature is organized on the basis of system levels, such as genes, organisms and ecosystems. Degrees of naturalness may vary across system levels. A city park, for instance, has a low degree of naturalness at the system level, but many organisms in it may have settled and developed fully on their own, i.e., be purely natural. As we will see in subsequent sections, respondents make this distinction as well. This distinction is an analytical one, however. It therefore does not preclude substantive interdependence of system levels in naturalness assessment. One example is the child reported in De Groot, Van den Born, and Lenders (2006, p. 9) who asserts that a stone on the mountain is nature, but the same stone on the kitchen sink is not nature. Earlier work of our group focused on visions of nature, viewed as the umbrella concept that encompasses (1) images of nature, (2) values of nature and (3) images of the human-nature relationship. Images of the human-nature relationship are conceptualized in terms of mastership over nature, stewardship of nature, partnership with nature and participation in nature. One of the findings, for instance, is that mainstream people tend to feel part of nature and responsible for nature at the same time (Van den Born, 2007). In order to provide a link with earlier work, images of relationship were included in the interviews. As for the concept of authenticity, a few of our respondents seemed to hint at a difference with naturalness, e.g., when remarking that a forest may look natural but in fact, on some deeper level, it is not. This distinction did not come to fore in the analysis, however, and neither did we find any philosophical reason to differentiate the naturalness of nature from the authenticity of nature. We will use the two terms interchangeably. The paper is structured as follows. The next section will discuss the general research approach, the research question and the research methods. Section 4.3 presents the results, grouped by five different aspects. Section 4.4 provides a brief reflection. Overall, in keeping with the exploratory aim of the paper (see below), we will focus entirely on detailed empirical reporting, refraining from theoretical discussions.
4.2 Approach and Method Because the authenticity of nature has not received empirical attention in earlier studies, this study aimed to be exploratory in both the methodological and the substantive sense. Methodologically, we were sure of a few general principles, one of which was that during previous studies, people appeared to respond much more freely and elaborately to examples expressing the underlying philosophical aspects than to the issue itself: see for instance Van den Born (2008) on the intrinsic value of nature. With respect to the interviews, however, many details needed to be explored, e.g., if the interview questions designed were sufficiently valid, coherent and elicited differentiation between respondents. Our interviews did yield this kind of information, but since they are not of great interest to the outsider, we will not report on them further.
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In the substantive realm, our exploratory aim has had two consequences, related to the complexity of the examples discussed with the respondents and the choice between a qualitative or quantitative emphasis. Subtle and intricately layered dilemmas are philosophically more challenging than simple ones. This may be the reason why the concept of authenticity of nature is discussed by philosophers mainly in the context of nature restoration. We felt that for a first exploration of the issue with lay people, less complex case material was required, so as to keep the cases conceptually manageable for the respondents (and for ourselves in the subsequent analysis). Therefore, the example dilemmas we used as discussion triggers represent relatively straightforward human interventions in nature, e.g., transgenic apples, helping nature with artificial devices, or replacing native with exotic forest species. These cases have not been generated by any sophisticated theory, but by a simple 2 by 3 generative scheme that distinguishes between genetic and non-genetic intervention in nature and three degrees of intervention. The only directly theory-driven question in the interviews was the last one, in which people were asked for their preference regarding consequentionalist versus non-consequentionalist ethics. In defense of this low level of sophistication, we argue that this is the way that grounded theory building proceeds (Strauss & Corbin, 1997). Research could be initiated to pursue qualitative or quantitative questions. Qualitative questions focus primarily on the nature (or: content) of phenomena, e.g., what people think about authenticity or what they regard as nature. Quantitative questions, on the other hand, focus on distributions of phenomena, e.g., the degree to which older respondents differ from younger respondents in terms of an authenticity classification. It is a persistent misunderstanding that qualitative questions have to be answered by ‘qualitative methods’ (whatever that may mean) and quantitative questions by ‘quantitative methods’ (idem). Methods such as interviews may well be used for both pursuits however, provided some minimum number is available. Likewise, methods such as surveys may be used for both purposes too; a factor analysis may, for instance, result in conceptual typologies, which are a qualitative result. Van den Born (2007) gives example. Our exploratory research design aimed to ‘get a bit of both’, that is to say, to allow a first grasp of both the contents of people’s conceptualizations and of the distributions of these contents. This led to a choice for 30 interviews and a semi-structured interview design. Against this background, our research question was: how do lay people, in a semi-structured interview setting and responding to a number of concrete examples of human manipulation of nature, relate to the theme of authenticity (naturalness) of nature? The subclause ‘in a semi-structured interview setting and responding to a number of concrete examples of human manipulation of nature’ is not superfluous. It may be expected that people respond contextually to these kind of issues, and the answers received in this particular research setting should not be taken as fixed in any other setting, e.g., when the issue is mixed with specific backgrounds (as they often are in daily life or in the ballot box), or when people are asked to respond to a written questionnaire or to different types of questions. For this reason, we pay detailed attention to the interview structure and wordings in this section.
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The village of Beek, close to Nijmegen, was selected for the interviews. Beek is a quiet place. Its inhabitants are urban oriented, but it still has a character of its own. The village is situated at the bottom of the steep and sandy slope that forms the transition from the Nijmegen ‘plateau’ (some 40 m above sea level) to the flat, mainly agricultural Rhine floodplain that offers the usual Dutch landscape of grasslands, arable land and great skies. We can assume that when respondents talk about ‘the forest’, they have the sloping area in mind, which is a fine-grained mixture of grassland and forested areas with high historical and biodiversity value, dotted with a few old farm houses and many winding paths used mainly for recreation. Thirty respondents were selected through snowball sampling. Starting with the first respondent, the snowball question was whether he or she knew anybody in Beek who would also like to participate. Care was taken that, overall, men and women were represented sufficiently equally and that sufficiently equal age groups were represented between the ages of 18 and 60 years. The result was a gender division of 15 women and 15 men, and a representation of 14 and 16 in the age brackets of 20–40 and 41–60, respectively. As far educational level was concerned, it turned out that 16 respondents were educated at the higher level (higher vocational schools and university), nine respondents were educated at the medium level (medium vocational schools and secondary education) and five respondents at the lower level. This is slightly higher than the average in the Dutch population. Box 4.1 lists the images of the human-nature relationship as phrased in the interviews. Box 4.2 contains the wording of the examples of intervention in nature, and Box 4.3 summarizes the interview procedure.
Box 4.1 Images of Relationship as Worded in the Interviews The four images of relationship were explained to the respondents in an arbitrary order, starting however with Steward or Partner. The images of relationship were visualized in simple drawings. • Master over nature According to the idea of Mastership, humans stand above nature. Humans are allowed to do with nature whatever they want. Economic growth and technology are expected to provide answers to problems that might crop up (for instance, environmental problems). • Steward of nature The Steward stands above nature and is responsible for the conservation of nature. Nature is not owned by the Steward, but entrusted to him. The steward owes responsibility to God or future generations. • Partner with nature The Partner stands side by side with nature. Humans and nature are considered to be of equal value. Humans should work together with nature in the conviction that this interaction will benefit both.
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• Participant in nature The Participant is part of nature, not just biologically, but also on the spiritual level. Although humans are a (small) part of nature, they are active participants. For the Participant, the bond between self and nature is very important; it co-constitutes the self. After the scenarios of technological interventions in nature were presented to the respondents, the question on images of relationship was asked again but textually adjusted to also capture the role of technology in the human-nature relationship. According to the idea of Mastership, there are no obstacles to technological interventions in nature. After all, humans stand above nature and are allowed to do with nature whatever they want. If people benefit from the intervention, the intervention is a good thing. According to the idea of Stewardship, technological interventions are only permitted within certain boundaries and in a responsible manner. Nature should not suffer extensive or irreversible damage. According to the idea of Partnership, technological interventions are allowed only in case both humans and nature benefit. According to the idea of Participation, extensive technological interventions in nature are not allowed. After all, the bond we feel with nature is a bond with something that is truly different from us, not with something we made ourselves. Box 4.2 The Two Series of Instances of Non-genetic and Genetic Manipulation of Nature in Different Degrees as Worded in the Interviews NON-GENETIC
GENETIC
Exotic trees: We can replace certain elements of nature because they are sick or because we think it is more beautiful. For instance, we may cut all old trees in a forest and replace them by healthy exotic trees.
Genetic apple: We can change the genetic structure of an apple in such a way that it contains more vitamins.
Plastic ponds: We can build synthetic ponds in the forest that can clear the water and are able to better retain the water. Plastic forest: We can make a totally plastic forest that needs no maintenance and is not susceptible to any kind of disease, but it smells just like a real forest and the leaves fall in winter just as usual.
Genetic tree: We can change the genetic structure of a tree in such a way that the leaves will fall twice a year. In that way more light will reach the forest floor and much more varied undergrowth will establish itself. Genetic forest: We can replace an entire forest by trees, plants and animals with genetic adaptations. The trees can open their foliage when the sun shines and close it when it rains, like natural roof. Flowers emanate a soft light during the night. The birds have tropical colors, they sing all day long and they are not shy.
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Box 4.3 The Structure of the Interviews Part 1: Images of Nature and Images of Relationship – What is nature according to you? Or: what would be your definition of nature? – I want to ask you what you think the relationship between humans and nature should be. I will present four different images of relationship between humans and nature and I would like to discuss all four with you. Remember, this is about your opinion. [The images of relationship, see Box 4.1., were discussed.] – What is your opinion on this? [Subsequently different, more specific questions per image of relationship were asked, for instance:] – Do you think humans and nature are of equal value? (partner) – Do you think humans are responsible for nature? (steward) – What do you think about the idea that nature basically is an economic good? (master) – Out of these four images, what image fits your ideas on the human/nature relationship best? [Respondents were left free to express their own preferred relationship if they wished.] And why? Part 2: Technological Interventions in Nature Now, I would like to discuss the role of technology with you. We can hardly imagine our lives without a vacuum cleaner, a television or a mobile phone. Technological developments go beyond this, however, and humans increasingly intervene in nature. I would like to talk about this topic with you. I will present a number of examples in which humans intervene in nature by means of technology. 2A Physical Interventions in Nature (see Box 4.2) [The examples A to C were presented in arbitrary order, and the following questions were discussed for each] – – – –
What is your opinion on this? why? Do you think it is right or not? why? Do you think this is allowable or not? why? Do you think this is natural or not? why?
[Finally, for the examples jointly:] Please order the cards from what you consider the least natural to what you consider the most natural.
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2B: Genetic Interventions in Nature (see Box 4.3) Besides replacing certain elements in nature by others, we can also change certain elements genetically. All these characteristics are hereditary and will therefore be transferred to the next generations. [Examples A to C were presented in arbitrary order, and the following questions were discussed for each] – – – –
What is your opinion on this? why? Do you think it is right or not? why? Do you think this is allowable or not? why? Do you think this is natural or not? why?
[Finally, for all examples:] Please order the cards from what you consider the least natural to what you consider the most natural. 2C. Images of Technology Technology plays a role in all the examples above. How do you see the role of technology? I will present three possible visions on technology: • Technology as liberator: this is an optimistic vision: science and technology have brought us prosperity and will continue to do that. When problems arise, we can solve them by further improving technology. • Technology as threat: this is a pessimistic vision: the increasing application of technology is a self-reinforcing process, out of human control. According to this idea, humans and nature are victims of technological development. • Technology as neutral: According to this image, technology itself is neutral; technology itself does not lead to something good or something bad; it is the way in which humans use technology and the objects they strive for. Which image appeals to you most? Why? 2D. Images of Nature Now, I would like to know what, in this context, is your opinion on the response of nature to human interventions. [The following images were shown as drawings and worded as follows:] –
Nature indifferent Nature is basically indifferent towards the influences of humans. Although human influences will have a major effect on nature, the ecosystem will always find a new balance.
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Nature buffered
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Humans take influence on nature within certain boundaries; however, this will not bring nature out of balance. Nature will lose its balance, however, if these boundaries are crossed, and the ecosystem will be lost. –
Nature unstable Nature is very vulnerable and will be substantially harmed by any human intervention.
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Nature stable Nature is very strong en will always be able to stay healthy, whatever humans do.
Which image appeals to you most? Why? 2E. Images of Relationship - Repeated When we look again at the four images of relationship at this point, we can try to give the role of technology a place in them. [explanation of technology in the four images, see Box 4.1] – Which image appeals to you most? Why? – Or would you describe the role of technology in the human/nature relationship in a different way? Part 3: Technological Interventions in the Human Body Not reported here Part 4: Ethics I would like to know how you think society should deal with technology. I will present two positions and ask you to give a reaction on both. Let’s assume that technology is always serving an objective. For instance, better health, or more better comfort or happiness for more people. The two positions are: 1. What is allowed or not allowed fully depends on that objective. 2. What is allowed or not allowed is not dependent on human wishes. When something is bad, it is always bad, independent of the outcome. – What is your reaction to these positions? – How do you think society should deal with technology? Part 5: Socio-Demographic Information Gender, level of education, occupation, age, marital status, children, religion.
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4.3 Results 4.3.1 Images of Relationship In the interviews, respondents were asked to give a first reaction to each image. Then, they could choose which image best fitted their idea of how humans should relate to nature. In line with previous research (Van den Born, 2007), respondents had strongly ecocentric inclinations. Mastership over nature was rejected by all respondents. Stewardship of nature was regarded as positive because of the idea that humans have a responsibility to take care of nature and that humans should be accountable to future generations. The idea of humans and nature being of equal value was endorsed by some of the respondents. However, the majority of the respondents thought that a partnership with nature is unattainable, for instance because humans cannot help but to dominate nature. Most people were convinced that humans are part of nature, but in a biological rather than a spiritual sense (as the Participant image was originally intended). In their final choice (but before discussing the interventions in nature), seven respondents preferred this image of biological participation in nature. Five respondents preferred steward of nature, and four respondents chose partnership with nature as the image most representative of their feelings. A combination of biological participant and steward was preferred by six respondents. The others preferred other combinations. After discussing the example interventions in nature, the interview returned to the images of relationship. Technology was given a place in the different images, and the respondents were requested to state what image of relationship fitted best with their ideas at this point. Twelve respondents stuck to the image they chose originally. Most others moved from an emphasis of being (biologically) part of nature to images of stewardship of nature (ten respondents), partnership with nature (ten respondents) or a combination thereof (six respondents). Respondents explained this shift by the importance of maintaining a balance between humans and nature and a feeling that stewardship and partnership express this idea best. We are allowed to use technology, but without damaging nature. This was worded, for instance, as: ‘Let’s try to keep it within certain boundaries’. ‘In the stewardship model, you can interfere in nature, but there are certain limits’. ‘The steward should take care of nature, and I think that this is the present situation’.
The dynamics of this reasoning becomes visible in the following quotes: The respondent chooses the combination of steward and partner Q: At first you chose partner and participant, why did you change your opinion? A: ‘Because we are talking about technology now, then you have to make a choice about the level of interference [in nature]. I think that this makes quite a difference’. Q: And you choose this because of the boundaries? A: ‘Yes, here we have to take nature into account. When we were not talking about technology, like before [in the interview], the image is that nature is
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quite powerful and humans are just a small part. But with technology included in the picture, we see ourselves as much more powerful and then we have to consider limits. I think nature is vulnerable in that context.’ And: ‘Yes, I find it a bit difficult. . . At first I endorsed the participant image, in which humans are part of nature. In that case, however, technological interventions are not allowed, and that is a consequence that I would not accept. I wouldn’t agree to that. No, humans [are allowed to intervene but] should be aware of the impacts thereof. So, I tend to the partner image. We should realise what the consequences are, and that there may be disadvantages.’
Overall, it appears that many respondents first choose the image of humans as (biological) part of nature, but then begin to realize that this notion does not offer much guidance for the intervention-in-nature issues, contrary to the stewardship and partner images, where setting boundaries, ensuring protection, preserving the harmony and suchlike responses are easier to conceptualize.
4.3.2 Responses to the Example Series 4.3.2.1 The Example Series of Physical Interventions in Nature People were asked to respond to examples of planting exotic trees in the forest, constructing artificial ponds in the forest and replacing trees with plastic ones that look and behave ‘just as usual’ (see Box 4.2). Responses to the artificial ponds issue were quite nuanced. Approximately half of the respondents thought this was a good idea, the other half not. Those positive about the artificial pond were so primarily because the intervention appeared to be meant to support forest ecology. Some respondents expressly asked if this was indeed the objective. A typical response then was: ‘OK, you help the forest with this. We do too much to the forest already, such as acid rain. (. . .) But I would not agree to this if it would be needed everywhere [for all trees]’.
The latter remark suggests that the intervention would be acceptable only as a measure limited in space and time. Irrespective of their final response, most respondents hesitate at first, weigh the pros and cons, and wonder whether this intervention is really necessary: ‘If it is necessary for the conservation of the forest, I would say yes, but on the other hand, we should ask ourselves how this all came about’.
Responses also depended on the degree to which the artificial ponds would be integrated in the ecosystem. Some respondents associated this explicitly to the visibility of the pond bottom and walls; if these would be completely underground, it would be less unnatural.
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Reasons for being against the construction of artificial ponds were that this intervention was too intrusive, was unnatural, and above all that nature could do this on its own: ‘I have faith in the purification process of nature itself, we do not have to interfere’.
The same nuances appeared when respondents were asked whether this intervention was allowable. Three different groups could be distinguished. Two equisized minorities were either in favor of allowing this intervention or they were opposed to it. But the largest group thought that the artificial ponds were allowable only in case of an emergency or some other urgent reason. One respondent asserts: ‘I will not shout for joy, but I can imagine some conditions under which we say, well, let’s do it as a temporary measure.’
As regards the replacement of all old trees by healthy exotic ones, virtually all respondents found this to be a bad idea and unnatural, but this opposition did not appear to run very deep. The resistance was mainly associated with the idea that the replacement does not serve any serious objective. It might possibly, as a few respondents remarked, add some attractive elements to the forest, but it does not ‘help the forest’ in any way. More than half of the respondents opined that the replacement of old indigenous trees by healthy exotic ones constitutes an interference with basic ecological processes, saying, for instance, that ‘a dead tree that falls triggers a biological process that is good [for the forest]’ and ‘dead trees belong to the ecosystem; (. . .) if you make everything healthy, you disturb the system’. Unnaturalness was the major reason to reject the replacement by exotic species: ‘[These trees] just don’t belong here. Leave them in the countries where they come from’. ‘There is a reason why these [Indigenous trees] grow here’. ‘If you talk about nature, you talk about something that should go its own way. Planting exotics causes a certain disharmony in nature.’
This disharmony could, as some respondents remarked, also bring other risks, especially of pests. And finally, some respondents point to globalization trends, saying that if you plant exotic trees, ‘the whole world would become the same’, and ‘what would be for the use of going on a holiday?’ The global level is also invoked when people reflect about major ecological changes that could occur due to global warming, with one respondent adding ‘So, why bother [about exotic species] if in due course they will arrive anyway?’ Discussing the naturalness aspect of the replacement of old trees by exotic ones, some respondents focused on the consequences for the forest, while others looked more at the act of replacement itself. Most respondents were of the opinion that both the forest and the intervention were unnatural. Some respondents, however, found the intervention to be artificial but added that the forest would still be natural. The image of a forest with totally plastic trees was met with unanimous and fierce resistance. It was considered ‘a scary idea’, ‘horrible’, and something that ‘does not have anything to do with nature’, something ‘fake’. For some, this would be a place that would have lost all its spiritual connections, where nothing unexpected would happen and no animals would find a home. Some people had associations with an
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amusement park: ‘This may be nice in an amusement park, but not in nature’, and one respondent said ‘I don’t see the point of it. Do this in Second Life’. One conversation started out by the respondent first inventing a purely functionalist rejection and then revealing the underlying emotions: A: ‘[I reject this because] I think the most important function of a tree is that it produces oxygen, and plastic cannot do that’. Q: Let’s imagine that that the plastic leaves would be able to produce oxygen too. A: ‘No, that’s no good at all; it is not nature anymore’. Q: Could it yet be acceptable? A: ‘No, it is just a feeling. Nature must be real’. The same unanimous rejection was found with respect to the permissibility and naturalness of this intervention. Overall, respondents stated that a plastic forest is not permissible and it would be absolutely unnatural: ‘Nature must be real’ ‘It is not alive, so it is not natural’ ‘It is completely artificial and made by humans, there is nothing organic about it, there is nothing alive in it (. . .), so no, it is not natural’.
4.3.2.2 The Example Series of Genetic Interventions in Nature As regards the example of the genetically modified apple that would contain more vitamins, many respondents rejected this outright because no serious purpose would be served by such an intervention. Some of these respondents also pointed to unforeseen consequences, e.g. ‘[This may] endanger the whole ecosystem. In my view, we often do not oversee these kind of things’. ‘You start out with a few vitamins but where . . . I mean, do you put some diseases in it too? This could have all kinds of unforeseen implications, and our food would be come a lot less reliable’.
Some respondents (mostly men) saw no real problem with a genetically modified apple, especially if normal apples would remain on the market, so that consumers would have a choice. These respondents did not discuss the purpose of the intervention and saw no real disadvantages, e.g., because ‘nature does not suffer’ or because apples still grow naturally (spontaneously) on trees. Despite the overall rejection of genetically modified apples, not all respondents followed the same line of reasoning when it came to the question of allowability. More than half of the respondents thought that it was unnecessary to prohibit this kind of intervention. ‘I think that [modifying apples] is unnecessary, but saying it would be ‘unallowable’ is too much’. ‘Yes, for me it is allowable, because there will not be much damage to non-modified apples’.
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The responses to the genetically modified trees that shed their leaves twice a year so that the forest will have more abundant undergrowth (see Box 4.3) were more negative, overall. Several respondents rejected the idea without reference to objectives or effects. This non-consequentialist focus on the act itself was often worded in terms of ‘too deep’ or ‘too far’. For instance: ‘I think that people should not interfere so deeply into nature. No, just leave nature in peace this time, its OK as it is. (. . .) Just don’t start doing this kind of thing’. ‘You are changing things too much. It goes too far.’
Some respondents connected this stance to their position on modified apples. What is permissible for production-oriented systems such as apple orchards may not be permissible for a forest that is supposed to be more natural. Within the group that did refer to goals and effects, many respondents found the goals to be too frivolous to justify the intervention: ‘Why would we do this? To make the forest yet more beautiful?’ ‘This is only for human pleasure’.
With respect to the effects, unintended risks were mentioned several times, e.g., that the whole ecosystem would change in many unpredictable ways, or even ‘destroy itself’. Of the few respondents that were not opposed, one said: ‘I have no problem with this, if it does no harm anywhere and has only positive effects’.
The majority of the respondents think that the modified trees are no longer natural. One respondent made a remark on the cultural dynamics of evaluations, saying that: ‘I think this [rejection] will be shared by all in the beginning. But if it had been like this for fifty years, people would regard it as natural’.
As regards the example of the totally manipulated forest with the colorful birds and light-emitting flowers (see Box 4.3), radical rejections prevailed. ‘Welcome to Disney World!’ ‘Absurd’. ‘Humans have too much influence on life and nature. [Such a forest] has nothing to do with nature’. ‘It is totally fake’.
Yet for many, this rejection remained intermingled with objectives and effects. It will all be very ‘dull and boring’, ‘giving no pleasure’, and: ‘This has nothing to do with health or something [essential] like that. It is purely human [pleasure]’. ‘This serves no purpose. I do not mind getting wet from time to time.’
Respondents here mentioned all sorts of experiences in nature they did not want to have to do without, for instance: ‘When it storms, when it is very windy or when it snows, it is attractive to go for walks in the forest, and you would miss that kind of thing immediately’. ‘Nature is beautiful enough, I don’t need luminous flowers’.
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‘If I walk through the forest I need to smell the forest (. . .) I need to feel it, I want to stumble over dead wood’.
Finally, some respondents did not mind if such manipulated forests would exist in some places, like in Disneyland or in office buildings. They simply would not go there. ‘It would not feel good.’
4.3.3 Images of Nature and Technology After discussing the scenarios of physical and genetic intervention in nature, respondents were asked about their view on nature and on technology. 4.3.3.1 Balances of Nature Out of the four categories of responses of nature to human interventions, only one was actually endorsed. No one adhered to the image in which nature is unstable and harmed by any human intervention; only one respondent supported the idea that nature is stable and will always stay healthy, whatever humans do; and again one respondent thought nature to be indifferent, that nature will probably change by human influences, but ecosystems will always find a new balance. All other respondents choose the image that nature is buffered. They believe that humans influence nature within certain boundaries. This will, however, not bring nature out of balance. Nature will lose its balance if these boundaries are crossed, and the ecosystem will be lost. The respondents expressed two versions of this image. Approximately half of this group of respondents adhere to the image of nature buffered as explained above. These respondents feel that nature is flexible and rather strong, but once we cross a line it may be too late. ‘Nature will always adapt and recover itself, but I think that there could be a moment when we cross a limit, for instance in the case of the global warming’.
The other half constructs a new image in which nature is buffered, but indifferent in the long term. Because they are convinced that when humans cross certain boundaries and an ecosystem is destroyed, nature will find a new balance in time. ‘We can change [nature], but it has millions of years to recover and that is what would happen in my opinion.’ ‘On the one hand, we can assume that nature can handle a lot and that it is normal that ecosystems change, that species diminish and increase etcetera. But on the other hand, I observe that in the short term, we could have such a big influence on nature that it will not be flexible enough to cope’.
4.3.3.2 Images of Technology When confronted with the question whether technology is a threat, a liberator or neutral, the majority of the respondents (n= 22) initially chose the ‘neutral’ option.
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They believed that technology itself does not lead to something good or something bad. Whether it is good or bad is determined by the way in which humans use technology. Respondents say, for instance: ‘Technology as such is not bad or good. What matters is the kind of technology we develop and how we use it’. ‘You can use it for good things and also for bad things.’ ‘Humans are the ones who are always behind it. Humans are the ones who deal with it, who develop it, so humans are the ones who do it. That is a clear story, technology itself cannot do it.’
Five respondents, mostly men, initially thought technology to be a liberator. Three of them, however, use arguments in which technology is actually neutral, saying, for instance, ‘I see [technology] as a liberator, if only used in the right way.’ Another respondent asserted that technology has brought us very far, but continued by saying that it becomes harmful on the scale that people use it, without thinking about the consequences. The other two respondents opted for technology as liberator because that would be the ideal situation: ‘We have to make the step from technology being neutral to technology as being a liberator’. What characterizes these responses is the underlying idea that technology itself has to be distinguished from human design and the use of technology. This also holds for the few respondents that see nature as a threat in their first response: ‘It is not a liberator, but rather a threat, and this is just how people use it’. This idea also underlies people’s examples of technology going awry, e.g., when they say that: ‘Well, Chernobyl is a good example of how technology can go totally awry. That is a real threat. But genetically modifying an apple can be liberating.’ ‘If we look back in history, it is easy to see how technology can cause prosperity as well as disasters (. . .) so, there are enough examples to see technology both as a liberator and as a threat.’
Some respondents started to have doubts about this basic scheme. They typically did so during further reflection after their first response. Here is an example: ‘Indeed, humans make the choice for more, bigger and higher. This is not an inherent aspect of technology itself. You can also say ‘I won’t have any part in it’. So, I tend to . . . So, I am somewhere between ‘neutral’ and ‘threat’, because technology overwhelms us a bit sometimes, I think.’
Other examples are: ‘Technology should not begin to take control over humans. I am afraid that that is what is happening to some extent.’ ‘It may happen, at a certain moment, that most people on the planet actually have no idea how far technology has progressed, and what consequences this will have.’ ‘[Technological development] has gone much too far already, and we cannot change that anymore’.
We surmise that the dominant conceptualization of technology as an intrinsically neutral thing that can be used for good and bad, is deeply rooted in the responses because this is what technology has long been in human history and still largely is in people’s daily lives. It is like the hammer that may be used either to hit a nail or hit
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somebody on the head, or like the gun that one may or may not decide to buy. It is only after considerable reflection that respondents come to glimpse something of the much more abstract and larger-scale notion of the economic/technology system that drives human development as a largely blind force that society has great difficulties controlling at all.
4.3.4 Ethics The final question of the interview explored the distinction between a consequentialist, functionalistic approach to the issue (phrased in the interview as ‘What is acceptable depends on the goals’) versus a non-consequentialist, deontic stance (‘Some things are good or bad irrespective of the outcome’). This question was included to allow what is sometimes called the ‘yuk!’ response to genetic manipulation (Midgley, 2004), expressing that some of those manipulations are inherently wrong even if they may serve a good purpose. The non-consequentionalist point of view was not supported by any of the respondents. Virtually all expressed adherence to the idea that objectives and outcomes in terms of those objectives are the keys to ethical decisions on technology application. This is not to say, however, that non-consequentionalist reasoning was absent in the interviews as a whole. Often, as we saw, respondents tended to focus on the (un)naturalness of interventions themselves rather than on their effects, e.g., on the forest. In some rarer cases, respondents started out explicitly by reasoning from a non-consequentialist standpoint and then rationalizing their ideas in a consequentionalist direction. Responding to the example of the genetically manipulated apple, one respondent expressed this line of thought as follows: ‘This is a difficult question. It requires real thinking. In principle, I am against all genetic manipulation. One should leave nature as it is. But if you could genetically change things once so that nature does not suffer and it has certain advantages, then I can imagine [that it could be acceptable]. But where the boundaries are is very difficult to determine. In the case of the apple and the vitamins, if there would be no disadvantages . . . (. . .). I would not be interested in it, but I don’t think I would have a real problem with it.’
In other words, even though respondents often displayed elements of deontic reasoning, they declared themselves thoroughly consequentialist if forced to make an explicit choice. This does not lead to narrow utilitarianism, however, as the interviews show in abundance. Consequences are considered for society as a whole, for natural elements such as forest animals and for the authenticity of the natural systems, just to mention some salient examples. Two major concepts appear to stand out in the responses, one hinging on the notion of (broad) utility and one on authenticity as the key idea. Utility is expressed in terms of cost, benefits and risks, either separately (e.g., ‘harm to other organisms’, ‘maintaining a healthy forest’, ‘dangerous for the ecosystem’, ‘long-term consequences’, ‘unforeseeable effects’ or ‘risk assessment’) or in combination, e.g., ‘what it costs and what it delivers’, or ‘no harm and good benefits’. This concept allows for
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a rejection of discussed cases due to a negative balance of cost and benefits, but also due to what may be called frivolousness of purpose, such as when respondents say that something is ‘merely for human pleasure’, ‘just for fun’, ‘superfluous’, ‘unnecessary’, ‘not serving any serious purpose’ and so on. The concept of authenticity is expressed in wordings such as that things should be ‘natural’, that nature should be ‘real nature’ and that ecosystem elements should ‘belong together’. This concept allows for a rejection of discussed cases due to what could be called overly intrusive human intervention in nature, e.g., when respondents talk about ‘too deep human intervention’ or that something ‘goes too far’ or is ‘forced upon nature’. Note that both the rejection because of frivolous purpose and because of overly intrusive intervention represent essentially non-consequentialist ethics. Utility and authenticity may be combined to form a scheme of three ethical domains: one domain where intervention tends to be rejected for reasons of frivolous purpose, another domain where interventions tend to be rejected because of unacceptable loss of authenticity (‘overly intrusive’, ‘too far’), and a third domain or middle ground that allows for trade-offs and balance-seeking.
4.3.5 Dimensions of Authenticity In the responses, authenticity was sometimes conceptualized as a purely subjective notion, as if naturalness were only a mental construct. This was especially manifest in the case of the plastic pond, which respondents could often imagine as fully hidden in the ground. The respondents sometimes remarked: ‘[Whether or not this is natural] depends on whether or not you see it as such [?]’. Likewise, the genetically engineered apple was sometimes considered natural because it still looked like an apple. Another hint at subjectivist interpretations was when people sometimes noted that what may be seen as unnatural at any given time may not be seen as such in fifty years or so, when everybody has gotten used to it. Another and very different minority stance on authenticity could be referred to as pure conservatism. Nature is natural if it is what it has always been, e.g., when respondents asserted that natural something if it is the same ‘as it has been all those years’ or that certain species are unnatural because ‘they have never been here’, or that ‘it has always been this way, and that’s how it should stay’. The mainstream interpretation of authenticity, however, appeared to unfold along two major dimensions. (1) The first dimension is authenticity as spontaneity, the self-organization of nature independent of human deliberations (management, interventions). This dimension of authenticity is expressed by respondents in wordings such as ‘what goes its own way’ or ‘what develops by itself’ and the reverse in wordings such as ‘exists for a [human] purpose’, or ‘has been designed’, or is the result of human planting, digging, chemical engineering, genetic manipulation and so on. (2) The second dimension is authenticity as belonging, i.e., as the fitting of a thing (a species, a forest, a water flow, a rhythm) in a greater context such as the
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greater landscape, the climate or long-term processes of change. This dimension is expressed by respondents in terms of apples fitting the tree, of tree species fitting the local combination of soil and climate, of plastic not belonging in nature, of leaves falling out of season, and so on. In terms of these dimensions, straightforwardly authentic is anything that is both spontaneous and fitting in the larger whole. Ambiguities creep in when the dimensions lead to contradictory evaluations, for instance when trees are planted (low spontaneity) and are indigenous species (high belonging) at the same time. The same pattern is visible in discussions about the reintroduction of species such as the beaver or the sea eagle in the Netherlands. Both belong to our ecosystems and both could probably maintain themselves well once settled, now that hunting and toxic pressures have been reduced. Should we now wait until they arrive spontaneously, or help them by flying in a ‘seed population’? A reverse ambiguity presents itself with respect to invasive species. They may arrive spontaneously, but do not belong to the system – or do they, if they manage to maintain themselves?
4.4 Reflection The interviews reported here have been designed in a ‘grounded theory’ manner, i.e., on the basis of philosophical intuitions rather than an extensive analysis of the philosophical literature. The freedom thus created for respondents to express their views in their own way, has obvious advantages, e.g., in terms of validity of the answers and the richness of concepts. It is quite possible, for instance, that the ‘belonging’ dimension of the authenticity of nature would not have come up without this freedom. System levels in time (processes) and space (ecosystems) are a central element in this dimension, and system level thinking is, by and large, not a philosopher’s thing, tending as philosophy does to talk in more fundamental concepts such as ‘nature’ as a whole or ‘domination’ as an outright bad. The results reported in the preceding section will, we hope, link up with the philosophical literature in a large variety of ways. We have not begun to explore these avenues here, however, because we feel that at this moment in time, this would only create a heavy-handed analysis and critique that would obfuscate the empirical findings. We will therefore only put our results in a more general policy context here. The naturalness of nature is only one of the criteria by which effects on the intrinsic value of nature are evaluated. In fact, conservation policies are predominantly focused on (bio)diversity rather than naturalness. The naturalness criterion is essential in order to avoid ‘fake’, ‘zoo’ and many other unnatural ways to preserve genetic resources, species and ecosystems, but not the only one. In the policy-oriented assessment system of effects on intrinsic natural value proposed in De Groot (1992, p. 223), naturalness is evaluated alongside with diversity. The diversity element is made operational through generic criteria such as species and ecosystem richness, endangeredness and encounterability. The naturalness element includes natural human
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action, an abiotic/biotic system level distinction and a contextual (place-dependent) assessment through a dynamic reference image, defined as ‘the story of the place’s natural development’. Much of what we have heard respondents say in this paper, as well as some of the postmodern ‘bioregional narrative’ (Cheney, 1989) may find a place here. Acknowledgments The authors wish to thank Eva Kollee for conducting the interviews, and Sjoerd Reutelingsperger for the transcription of the interviews.
References Cheney, J. (1989). Postmodern environmental ethics. Ethics as bioregional narrative. Environmental Ethics, 11(2), 117–134. Elliot, R. (1982). Faking nature. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, 28 (10), 81–93. De Groot, W. T. (1992). Environmental science theory: Concepts and methods in a problemoriented, one-world paradigm. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishing. De Groot, W. T., Van den Born, R. J. G., & Lenders, R. H. J. (2006). Visions of nature. An introduction. In: R. J. G. Van den Born, R. H. J. Lenders, & W. T. De Groot (Eds.), Visions of nature. A scientific exploration of people’s implicit philosophies regarding nature in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (pp. 7–18). Berlin: LIT-Verlag. Katz, E. (1992). The big lie: The human restoration of nature. Research in Philosophy and Technology, 12, 231–241. Midgley, M. (2004). The myths we live by. London, New York: Routledge. Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (Eds.). (1997). Grounded theory in practice(p. 280). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Van den Born, R. J. G., Lenders, R. H. J., De Groot, W. T., & Huijsman, E. (2001). The New Biophilia: An exploration of visions of nature in Western countries. Environmental Conservation, 28(1), 65–75. Van den Born, R. J. G. (2007). Thinking nature. Everyday philosophy of nature in the Netherlands. Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen. Van den Born, R. J. G. (2008). Rethinking nature: Public visions in the Netherlands. Environmental Values, 17 (1), 83–109.
Chapter 5
The Hierarchical and Unconscious Mind: Reflections on the Authenticity of Nature Maarten H. Jacobs
5.1 Introduction The aim of the study reported by Van den Born and De Groot (Chapter 4) was to measure responses to concrete examples of human interventions in nature and to elicit the concepts that are relevant in the minds of the respondents. In addition, they measured the respondents’ images of relationships with nature. After discussing the examples of human interventions in nature, the respondents’ reactions to refined images of relationships with nature were recorded, with an emphasis on technological interventions. The reported results are interesting, and a good occasion to reflect on three issues (two substantial and one procedural): (1) which beliefs do people associate with human interventions in nature, (2) how are these beliefs constituted, and (3) how can we measure these beliefs? In order to appreciate this discussion, two key features of the human mind which are very relevant for most studies within the social sciences will be mentioned: the hierarchy of the human mind and the unconscious mind. A brief explanation of these concepts can shed light on the subject studied by Van den Born and De Groot.
5.2 The Hierarchy of the Human Mind Living in this world, we find ourselves confronted with new events or situations on a daily basis. Still, new situations have some sense of familiarity for us (Searle, 2000). On most occasions, and seemingly without serious efforts, we are able to give meaning and develop a stance towards a new situation almost instantly. We are equipped with concepts acquired during previous experiences in the course of our lives, which enable us to assign values and beliefs to new situations, and thus to judge these situations. This human trait is a manifestation of the hierarchical structure of the human M.H. Jacobs (B) Socio-spatial Analysis Group, Wageningen University, Droevendaalsesteeg 3, 6708 PB Wageningen, Netherlands e-mail:
[email protected]
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mind. On the top end we have general values (e.g., respect) and general beliefs (e.g., the belief that material objects exist ‘in reality’), which form a basic world view that applies to virtually everything. People can differ with respect to these basic values and beliefs. See Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz and Bilsky (1987), for example, for a typology of personalities that is based on differences in basic value priorities. On the other end of the hierarchy, the human mind is equipped with highly contextualized values and beliefs, which apply to only a small category of situations or events. A person may have developed specific values and beliefs that pertain only to a particular tree growing in the person’s backyard. Between these extremes, intermediate levels of values and beliefs exist that do not apply to every event or situation, but are more general than the most contextualized values and beliefs. The more general a value or belief, the less it guides behavior or attitudes towards a specific event or situation (Manfredo & Dayer, 2004). This is why specific behavior can scarcely be predicted on the basis of measuring general values and beliefs (Ajzen, 2005). Specific values and beliefs are, however, to some extent rooted in more general ones. For example, persons x and y may each consider respect for life to be an important value. When it comes to hunting, x may disapprove of this practice, while y may approve under certain conditions, such as shooting only old and weak animals and never shooting a mother with her young. Thus, the same value is manifested differently in different persons in the specific context of hunting. The application of general values and beliefs to specific domains is a source of variance, and gives rise to specific values and beliefs which guide behavior and attitude. While I do not argue that the hierarchy is perfect, and I do not intend to propose that the relationships between more general and more specific values and beliefs are always strictly logical, I consider the hierarchy of the mind to be a powerful and justified metaphor that sheds light on the human psyche. Within this theoretical perspective, the strategy of Van den Born and De Groot of measuring responses to concrete, well-described scenarios to be used as a starting point for eliciting salient values and beliefs pertaining to interventions in nature can be judged as appropriate when it comes to an explorative study. Although Van den Born and De Groot did not explicitly employ the concept of attitude, they basically measured the respondents’ attitudes, that is, their internal states or mental dispositions to evaluate a phenomenon with some degree of favor or disfavor (Ajzen, 2005, p. 5; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 155; Haddock & Mayo, 2004). By offering stories that expressed various instances of interventions in nature as prompts, and asking for opinions, they tapped into the lower parts of the hierarchy where the highly-contextualized attitudes are to be found. Specific arguments are revealed by asking the respondents ‘why’ they have their opinions. These arguments can be seen as the salient beliefs that constitute the attitudes towards the interventions. Probably including the two subsequent questions, ‘what do your see as the advantages of [scenario]’ and ‘what do you see as the disadvantages of [scenario]’ could have contributed to a slightly more systematic exploration of the relevant beliefs. Van den Born and De Groot concluded that their study revealed two major concepts that formed the respondents’ judgments of the scenarios: utility (what is the purpose of the intervention) and authenticity (to what degree does the intervention
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affect naturalness). These concepts are formulated on the basis of various categories of beliefs that pertain to the respondents’ attitudes towards the scenarios. Although I did not read the transcripts of the interviews, I wonder if whether reading the results sections would not have identified another relevant category: that of risk. In three of the six cases, risk (for example the emergence of new diseases) was revealed as a salient belief playing a role in respondents’ judgments. Across the six cases, the study also suggested clear relationships between the three categories of beliefs and attitudes: the more frivolous the purpose of the intervention was judged, the more risky the intervention was perceived, and the more drastic the intervention was considered, the more people tended to have a negative attitude towards it. Interestingly, by measuring responses to four predefined images of human relationships with nature (master over nature, steward of nature, partner with nature, and participant in nature), van den Born and de Groot also tapped into a higher level in the psychological hierarchy of values and beliefs. In other words, these images pertain to a much broader set of situations than the scenarios do. Unfortunately, however, their chapter does not expound on the relationship between the images which people hold and their attitudes towards the six proposed interventions. Do the images that respondents tended to favor co-vary with the attitudes towards the scenarios? Especially in the two scenarios that expressed weak interventions in nature (exotic trees and modified apple), the respondents’ attitudes varied. The four images of nature are loosely ordered on a range from man standing above nature (man as master) towards nature standing above man (man as participant). One would expect that the more a person’s image leans towards the master end of the range, the more the person would tend to agree with certain interventions in nature. But based on the idea of the hierarchical mind, the co-variation will be far from perfect. The data obtained by this study could be used to reveal such a relationship, which would inform us of whether the predefined images of nature are appropriate concepts that can explain and predict specific attitudes. Of course, this would be within all the limitations of a small sample of respondents, from which only suggestions could be derived about relationships between variables. After discussing the scenarios, the respondents were asked to discuss specifics of the various images of relationships with nature, with an emphasis on technological interventions. Van den Born and De Groot reported a shift in some respondents from a participant image in the first part of the interviews (based on the general description of the images) towards a steward or partner image by the end (based on the specified descriptions). If the descriptions of the more specified images are not true extensions of the descriptions of the more general images (in the eyes of the respondents), then the difference in outcomes could simply be an expression of a different measurement. In that case, the respondents could have been constant, and the change in measurements could have produced the change in responses. The difference could also result from the lack of guidance that the participant image has to offer for technological interventions, thus causing a shift towards another image, as the authors suggested. Finally, the difference could have been a manifestation of priming: before the discussion of the scenarios, the respondents could have taken a more idealistic stance in discussing the images, but the scenarios evoked a greater
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focus on human interventions, and therefore moved respondents away from the idealistic to a more pragmatic stance. In that case, another image could have appeared as more appropriate. Whatever the cause, speaking of a shift is premature when two measurements are not equal.
5.3 The Unconscious Mind Freud has often been justifiably criticized for not being scientific, since he tended to generalize from single cases, and his accounts of the unconscious causes of traumas were highly speculative. But for at least some of his core ideas he deserves and still receives great merits, such as the idea that there are many psychological dispositions and processes which dwell in the unconscious mind, but which can nevertheless influence our conscious thoughts, feelings and judgments to a great extent. Many experiments, keeping up with contemporary scientific standards, demonstrate the working of unconscious mental processes in guiding conscious experiences and behavior. For example, Jacobs (2006, pp. 171–174) offered a brief review of unconscious processing of emotions and Harvard University (2008) published studies revealing unconscious mental dispositions. It follows that many of the causes of our thoughts and behavior cannot be revealed by introspection. Commonly employed social science methods, such as questionnaires or semistructured interview studies as conducted by Van den Born and De Groot, rely on introspection by the respondents. Semi-structured interviews or questionnaires are generally good instruments in revealing attitudes and conscious beliefs that people associate with attitudes. They can, however, be seriously limited in discovering the underlying processes and mechanisms that constitute these attitudes in instances where unconsciously processed information plays an inferential role. Studies that measure statements are useful in their own way, but are definitely not exhaustive in explaining people’s thoughts and behavior. Asking people to explain their attitudes or behavior does not necessarily reveal the causes of these attitudes and behavior. People will report the reasons they assign to attitudes and behavior. At best, the reasons correspond with the actual causes. On many occasions, however, the reasons will not correspond with these causes, as human beings are notorious in assigning reasons to (or in other words rationalizing) everything they think and do. For example, some people might enjoy seeing cows grazing peacefully in meadows because they have an unconsciously processed inherited predisposition to interpret relaxed herbivores as a sign that indicates the absence of immediate threat (e.g., predators), which in turn contributes to a good feeling. People might be aware of the good feeling, but not of the underlying psychological mechanism. If asked why they like seeing cows in the landscape, most people will come up with explanations and refer, for example, to the vividness cows add to the landscape, or say that cows historically belong in agricultural landscapes. These explanations might be reasons which are assigned to feelings that have other causes.
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A basic principle for social scientists who are predominantly interested in the human mind and behavior is to never confuse reasons with causes – a principle that seems often forgotten. This argument is not stated to criticize Van den Born and De Groot: they do not violate the principle at all, since they consistently report on the ideas, opinions and concepts their study revealed without talking about causes. Rather, the argument is stated in order to point out a serious difficulty faced in revealing the backgrounds of people’s attitudes in general, a difficulty that probably extends to attitudes towards non-genetic and genetic interventions in nature. Do attitudes towards interventions in nature belong to the domain of mental phenomena that might be highly influenced by unconscious processes and dispositions? Attitudes towards genetic interventions probably do belong to this domain, since genetic intervention techniques, and therefore thinking and debating genetic interventions, are relatively new phenomena. The conceptual frameworks that apply to thinking about genetic interventions in nature are therefore probably not so welldeveloped, subtle and fine-grained as the conceptual frameworks that apply to other forms of intervention in nature which have a long history in human culture. The attitude towards genetic interventions could then result from more general values and beliefs (higher in the hierarchy in the human mind), and be relatively unspecific. For example, a relatively undirected fear of the new might come into play. Or genetic intervention might challenge very basic distinctions that form a part of a person’s basic world view, such as the distinction between humans and nature, between culture and nature, or between agency and fate. People might not, however, be aware of this constitution or of their attitudes towards genetic interventions. The beliefs they express to explain their attitudes might then be rationalizations that do not reflect the psychological causes of these attitudes. A profound result found in the study of Van den Born and De Groot is that there seems to be no fundamental difference in the attitudes and beliefs that pertain to non-genetic interventions and genetic interventions. The attitudes predominantly seem to co-vary with the degree of intervention: the stronger the intervention, the stronger the negative attitude in both the non-genetic and genetic interventions scenarios. Moreover, the purpose of the intervention, the degree of intervention, and risks as predominant beliefs are elicited in both series of scenarios. In other words, the attitudes towards genetic interventions do not seem to be new kinds of attitudes relative to the attitudes towards non-genetic intervention in nature. Although I am not an expert in public perceptions of genetic manipulation, I find this rather surprising given the impression I have of public debates regarding genetic interventions in which specific arguments are used that do not pertain to non-genetic interventions in nature. What could be an explanation of the similarities in beliefs and attitudes across the genetic/non-genetic condition? Perhaps my impression is simply incorrect. Perhaps people do not regard genetic interventions as a special kind of intervention in nature to which new beliefs apply, and thus the responses as measured in the scenarios are quite similar. However, it may be that people tend to oppose genetic manipulation on the basis of unconsciously processed and therefore introspectively unknown mental dispositions, and borrow existing and consciously accessible arguments from non-genetic interventions in nature discourses
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to explain their attitudes. Or, since all proposed interventions are very uncommon interventions, it may be that in both series of interventions the same mechanism of an unconsciously processed negative attitude that is rationalized with a very standard repertoire of arguments plays a role. From this perspective, it would be interesting to measure people’s thoughts about relatively common examples of nongenetic and genetic interventions in nature: for example crossing tomatoes to get more resistant tomatoes, and modifying the genes of soya to produce more resistant genes. Would people’s attitudes and associated beliefs differ between these two cases?
5.4 Conclusion At some point in most qualitative studies, codes denoting either predefined concepts or concepts that emerge during the interpretation process are assigned to quotes (discrete phrases in the transcripts of the interviews). The assignment of codes involves the risk of creating a subjective interpretation. In an inter-rater reliability test, two coders assign codes to quotes independently. Comparing their results offers insights into the reliability of this interpretation process (in the sense of its subjectivity), and might provide ideas for improving the coding procedures. The study reported by Van den Born and De Groot could be methodologically improved by conducting an inter-rater reliability test. This suggestion notwithstanding, the study offers some interesting results. In my view, three categories of beliefs seem to dominate in people’s attitudes towards interventions in nature: beliefs about the purpose of the intervention, beliefs about the depth of the intervention, and beliefs about the risks pertaining to the intervention. Moreover, the commonalities in the ways people judge non-genetic interventions and genetic interventions in nature are striking: the study suggests no systematic differences in attitudes and relevant conscious beliefs. Whether these findings apply to a broader context (e.g., different interventions in nature, different sample of respondents) remains to be seen based on further empirical investigation.
References Ajzen, I. (2005). Attitudes, personality and behavior. Maidenhead: Open University Press. Eagly, A., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Forth Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers. Haddock, F., & Mayo, G. (2004). Introduction and overview. In F. Haddock & G. Mayo (Eds.), Contemporary perspectives on the psychology of attitudes (pp. 1–5). New York: Psychology Press. Harvard University. (2008). Project implicit. https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ Jacobs, M. H. (2006). The production of mindscapes: A comprehensive theory of landscape experience. Wageningen: Dissertation, Wageningen University. Manfredo, M. J., & Dayer A. A. (2004). Concepts for exploring the social aspects of humanwildlife conflict in a global context. Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 9(4), 1–20.
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Schwartz, S. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 1–65. Schwartz, S., & Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a universal psychological structure of human values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 550–562. Searle, J. R. (2000). Consciousness. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23, 557–578.
Chapter 6
The Trouble with Plovers Anita Guerrini
6.1 Introduction This chapter concerns a little bird, the western snowy plover, and the impact it has had on the public perception of the environment along the central coast of California, from Monterey in the north to Ventura in the south (Fig. 6.1). I will talk about the value of animals and how they contribute to the value and meaning of a landscape. The relationships between the snowy plovers and the humans who share California beaches with them are not simple or straightforward, although both conservationists and their opponents portray them in this way. This essay will address two questions in particular: does an environment constructed and managed by humans for the sake of conservation cease to be natural or authentic? Does conservation and restoration of non-human species require that humans be absent from the scene? I will focus on one area, known by the unlovely name of Coal Oil Point, but use other parts of the coast for illustration. This chapter springs from a larger collaborative project on the ecological history of this coastal area, which will assemble the ecological and cultural history with the goal of developing a model approach for informing restoration efforts. The coastline offers a wide variety of habitats including sandy beaches, dunes, rocky tidepools, cliffs, a saltwater slough, coastal mesas, and freshwater marshes and pools. The setting is on the edge of a highly urbanized and quickly developing area, a liminal space that is a borderland both literally and symbolically. The human history of Coal Oil Point dates back at least 8500 years, and the ecology of this dynamic coastal landscape has undergone many changes over time. The history of the area includes early human occupation, ranching by Spanish and American settlers and, in the twentieth century, a large estate and a private school. This area is part of a major land-use agreement that is being drawn up between Santa Barbara County, the University of California at Santa Barbara, the young city of Goleta, and private developers. Known as the Ellwood-Devereux plan,
A. Guerrini (B) Department of History, 305A Milam Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331, USA e-mail:
[email protected]
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Fig. 6.1 Snowy plover at coal oil point. Photograph by Anita Guerrini
this agreement would leave much of the coastal area free of new development in exchange for development rights farther inland. Ecological restoration of the coastal area is part of this plan and is also a major objective of the Coal Oil Point Natural Reserve, part of the University of California’s Natural Reserve System (EllwoodDevereux Plan, 2004; Dugan & Guerrini, in press).
6.2 The Snowy Plover The diminutive snowy plover is an integral character in this restoration process. The management plan for the Coal Oil Point Natural Reserve, completed in 2004, includes a detailed management plan for the plovers. This plan and the public response to it is representative of the debates on the status of the plover up and down the Pacific coast. These debates in turn contribute to larger issues surrounding animals and their environment. These include the meaning of animals in ecological restoration, the value of particular animals as symbols and as umbrella species for ecosystem conservation and restoration, and the role humans play in the landscape: are humans a part of nature? (Lang, Sober, & Strier, 2002; Hanssen, 2001; Myllyntaus, 2000) What is the relationship between the goals of conservation – that is, preservation of a landscape – and restoration, one of many tools to achieve this goal? In this context, what animals represent is as important as the animals themselves. The western snowy plover is a small bird, about the size of a sparrow. It isgenerally quite difficult to see in its natural setting, which has had its advantages and disadvantages. The nests, like the birds, are difficult to spot and consist of a shallow depression lined with small pebbles, containing two to three small eggs marked to blend with the background. Snowy plover nesting sites are generally
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located 15–200 m from the shoreline on open sandy beaches. Plovers also nest on salt flats, lagoon shores, gravel riverbeds, and even unpaved parking lots. Studies have shown that they are particularly vulnerable to disturbance during the breeding period, which stretches from mid-March to the end of September. During the incubation period of 28 days, males and females alternately protect the eggs. But disturbance on the beach from humans or other animals can cause an adult to leave the nest unsupervised, opening it to predation. Predators are numerous, including other birds such as crows and gulls, mammals such as skunks and foxes, and domestic cats and dogs. Because the nests are inconspicuous, off-road vehicles (ORVs) can crush them unknowingly. The newborn chicks are equally vulnerable to predation and other disturbance during their first month of life. Wind and weather can also disturb plovers (Alsop, 2001; Page, Warriner, & Paton, 1995). The species was first described in 1758 and several subspecies exist on different continents. Two subspecies of the snowy plover have been recognized in North America: the western snowy plover (Charadrius alexandrinus nivosus), the subject of this essay, and the Cuban snowy plover (C. a. tenuirostris). The western snowy plover breeds on the Pacific coast from southern Washington state to southern Baja California, Mexico, and in the interior areas of several western states. The US Fish and Wildlife Service designated the Pacific coast population of the western snowy plover as threatened in 1993 (Fed. Reg. 3/5/1993). This population of the snowy plover is defined as those individuals that nest on the mainland coast, peninsulas, offshore islands, bays, estuaries, or rivers within fifty miles of the United States Pacific coast. The Federal ruling did not list the inland population of this subspecies, which it described as ‘genetically isolated,’ citing only two instances where the coastal and inland populations mingled. Under the terms of the Endangered Species Act, the coastal plovers form a ‘distinct population segment.’ Little current information on the status of the inland populations is available, but these populations seem to be much larger than those on the coast (Fed. Reg. 3/5/1993; ESA). It is estimated that, at most, about 2,300 snowy plovers may breed along the entire US Pacific coast. The largest number of breeding birds is in California, from San Francisco Bay southward. The designation of ‘threatened’ is defined by the US Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, which established a distinction between threatened and endangered: endangered species are defined as those ‘in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,’ while threatened species include ‘any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range’ (ESA, 3–4). Thus, despite considerable populations of snowy plovers inland, their lesser numbers on the California coast nonetheless qualify them for threatened status. This fine distinction among populations is often misunderstood by the public.
6.3 Habitat and the Endangered Species Act The most common cause of endangerment is habitat loss or destruction. As long ago as 1939, a front-page article in the Los Angeles Times pointed to the development of the California coast as the greatest threat to its shorebirds, and recommended setting
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up ‘special sanctuaries’ to replace lost natural habitat (‘Library exhibit of birds opens,’ 1939). More recently, conservation and sometimes restoration of habitat have become important aspects of enforcement of the Endangered Species Act. The ESA defined critical habitat quite broadly, to include not only the specific geographical area occupied by a species but other areas that the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the agency charged with enforcing the ESA, finds to be essential to species conservation. The ESA described a lengthy procedure that could lead to formal designation of an area as critical habitat for an endangered or threatened species. But designation of critical habitat for the snowy plover as well as for other endangered species turned out to be a complex and contested issue, driven largely by lawsuits, and one that Federal agencies are increasingly unwilling to implement (Baldwin, 1999; Fed. Reg. 6/14/1999; Sidle, 1987). The US Fish and Wildlife Service, following a lawsuit filed by the Santa Barbara-based Environmental Defense Center, designated critical habitat for the plovers in December 1999, but the ruling was immediately subjected to a barrage of criticism and additional lawsuits. A successful lawsuit by a county in Oregon led to a revision of the critical habitat designation in 2005. The original plan included several beaches in Santa Barbara County: Guadalupe/Nipomo Dunes (now known as Oceano Dunes), Surf Beach, including Minuteman, San Antonio Creek and Purisima Point (a total of 18 km of beach), which are all part of Vandenberg Air Force Base, as well as Ocean Beach and Jalama Beach near Point Conception, Sands Beach at Coal Oil Point, and beaches in Santa Barbara and Carpinteria (Fed. Reg. 12/7/1999) (Fig. 6.2). The revised plan in 2005 reduced the protected areas by 40%, omitting the contested areas in Oregon and all of Oceano Dunes, which is the only state park in California devoted to ORVs. The beaches at Vandenberg Air Force base were also excluded, but the US Force continued to manage the site as critical habitat. Sands Beach remained as the only critical habitat site in Santa Barbara County, and its critical habitat area was reduced from 57 acres (23 hectares) to 36 acres (14.5 hectares) (Fed. Reg. 9/29/2005; ‘Government reduces protected plover habitat,’ 2005). The Federal management plan for the plovers, announced as nearly complete in 1999, finally appeared, after many lawsuit-related delays, in September 2007. The plan estimates that recovery of the species to specified standards will take 40 years and cost around US$150 million (Recovery plan, 2007). These Federal actions form the backdrop for local actions and reactions. The area around Coal Oil Point, totaling 170 acres or 68 hectares, is managed as a natural reserve by the University of California’s Natural Reserve System, which includes 35 sites across the state (http://nrs.ucop.edu/Coal-Oil-Point.htm). But this reserve is an island in the midst of a highly populated area: Isla Vista, a town just to the east of the site, has about 20,000 people – most of them students at the adjacent University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) campus – crammed into just over two square miles, or about 570 hectares (Regional Adventures Reference Guide, 2000). Isla Vista’s narrow streets, laid out in the 1920s, mainly hold apartment houses, creating an urban environment consisting largely of students and immigrant workers. In this context, restoration both of the plover and of its habitat takes on a new meaning.
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Fig. 6.2 Critical habitat map, 1999 (Federal Register Vol. 64, No. 234 (1999), p. 68532)
Snowy plovers appear to have a long history at Coal Oil Point, but records are sparse. Reports from the 1930s to the 1960s indicate that breeding took place at Sands Beach, the west-facing dune-backed beach near the coastal slough known as Devereux Slough (Lafferty, 2000). However, after UCSB purchased the area in 1967, human use of the beaches preferred by plovers greatly increased because the university, unlike previous private owners, allowed public access to the beach. As
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the student population of the university grew in the 1970s and 1980s to its present size of 20,000 students, the use of the beach increased. Even the designation of the area as a reserve in the early 1970s had little impact on beach use. Although plovers continued to winter at Coal Oil Point, they no longer remained to breed. Surveys taken during breeding season in the late 1970s found ‘suitable habitat but no plovers,’ noting that local beaches were ‘100% covered by human footprints’ (Page & Stenzel, 1981, p. 7). Sands Beach is a popular spot for undergraduates, and a well-known surf break. As many as 160 plovers continued to spend the winters at Sands Beach, clustered near the mouth of Devereux slough, but they bred elsewhere, probably to the north, near Vandenberg Air Force Base, where the surveyors in the late 1970s found several breeding clusters (Page & Stenzel, 1981; Lafferty, 2000). The 1999 critical habitat designation, which covered 2.85 km of coastline east and west of Coal Oil Point, led to the development of a management plan for the local plovers, long before the Federal plan appeared. The Coal Oil Point Snowy Plover Management Plan (SPMP) was based on the premise that plovers did not like humans – that human disturbance (including that of human companion animals, such as dogs) kept the plovers from pursuing breeding behavior. The spotty historical evidence indicated that plovers stopped breeding at Coal Oil Point sometime after 1965. The evidence was certainly suggestive that increased use of the beach after UCSB’s 1967 purchase led the plovers to stop breeding there, but there was no definitive link between human use of the beach (and presumably disturbance) and the decline in breeding. Apparently, snowy plover populations had been in decline throughout southern California since the early 1960s. Although scientists surmised that this decline was due mainly to human disturbance, there was no data to substantiate this; on the other hand, the Santa Barbara Channel Islands lost most of their breeding plovers in the 1990s on beaches with no human disturbance. For example, San Miguel Island lost all of its breeding plovers between 1978 and 2000, most likely because of an increase in the population of elephant seals (Lafferty, 2000; Page et al., 1986, 1991). But human presence could have effects apart from direct disturbance. Habitat loss is the other reason cited for population decline. The very designation of critical habitat itself told a story: although plovers and other shorebirds had once enjoyed unbroken expanses of coast, human population pressure had fragmented this habitat into smaller and smaller islands largely surrounded by development. Field observations of wintering plovers in the late 1990s had shown that even at a distance of 15–20 m, human presence caused changes in plover behavior. Biologists from the Fish and Wildlife Service who visited Coal Oil Point Reserve in 1999 estimated 150,000 incidents of disturbance of wintering plovers per year. A study from 2000 concluded that ‘it seems plausible that snowy plover fitness decreases with human activity’ (Lafferty, 2000, p. 6). According to the terms of the Endangered Species Act, the reserve was required to take action to reduce this disturbance, what the FWS called ‘take,’ defined by the Endangered Species Act as any harm or harassment of an endangered or threatened species (Lafferty, 2001; ESA). In addition, human use of the beach led to an accumulation of trash that attracted predators, including crows, skunks, and raccoons as well as the red fox, all of whom could prey
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on plover eggs and chicks and even on the adult birds. A draft of the Federal plan for plover recovery provided quantitative goals: an average of four breeding adults per year, and protection for winter plovers (SPMP). The underlying assumption of all these studies was that what is natural therefore cannot be human. Even before there was any evidence of the impact of humans on plover populations, scientists assumed that humans, particularly direct human disturbance, were the problem. A byword of American restoration is that wild nature precludes human presence (or at least European human presence). In the United States, the ideal of a pristine nature still resonates (Cronon, 1996). Even though there had been human presence at Coal Oil Point for thousands of years, the goal of the reserve’s management plan was to restore an original, undisturbed landscape. By the terms of this goal, humans and plovers could not coexist. But would restricting human activity actually bring back breeding behaviors? Was this landscape even possible to restore? The only way to find out, researchers believed, was to restrict human disturbance at Coal Oil Point and other sites and see what happened. However, this strategy had some unforeseen consequences.
6.4 Conflicts Over Plover Management The Coal Oil Point Snowy Plover Management Plan was conceived as a more palatable alternative to closing the beach altogether, which had happened elsewhere on the coast. In the absence of a Federal management plan, early in 2000 the Fish and Wildlife Service, following the 1999 critical habit designation, negotiated an agreement with Vandenberg Air Force Base which led to the closure of almost five miles (11 km) of beach to public access during the breeding season. Ocean Beach was completely off-limits, while only 1/2 mile (1 km) of Surf Beach remained open to the public. Fencing of sensitive areas had been tried there in the early 1990s, but plover populations during breeding season continued to decline throughout the 1990s (Recovery plan, 2007, pp. 28, 31; Lafferty, 2000). These beach closures, which coincided with the period of heaviest public beach use in the summer, engendered considerable public opposition, particularly because they came at the same time as the tiger salamander, a local species which lived mainly in agricultural areas, was placed on the endangered species list. Local farmers joined beachgoers in loudly protesting Federal encroachment on their rights. ‘Today it’s the salamander, tomorrow it’s who knows what,’ said a local farmer (‘Lompoc Beach Closures,’ 2000). Bumper stickers appeared proclaiming ‘Save the beaches, fry the plovers,’ ‘Free Surf Beach,’ and ‘Got Plover?’(‘Plover to retain threatened status,’ 2006). A blogger from the nearby community of Lompoc criticized the numbers that the Fish and Wildlife service used, noting that plover numbers rose between 1993 and 1997, and that they appeared to ebb and flow according to weather patterns, not human disturbance (‘Beach closure,’ 2001). Of course, both factors, among others, could, and probably did, play a role. But an opinion piece in the Santa Barbara NewsPress stated, ‘Heavy-handed and ill-conceived government agency actions have
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undermined public sympathy for the plover and eroded public confidence in government’s ability to effectively manage natural resources’ (‘Voice from Lompoc,’ 2000). The FWS issued a news release early in 2001 which asserted the need to restrict beach access even more, citing a population decline of more than 50% between 1991 and 2000 (FWS, 2001). Within this time span, plover populations fluctuated widely, during identical management regimes, and El Niño weather patterns in the late 1990s probably also played a role in declining populations (Recovery plan, 2007, p. 31). In the face of continued public opposition and defiance of the beach closures, the beach closures remained. Even the half-mile of open beach can be closed when fifty violations of plover territory are reached. The 2005 Critical Habitat revision, which took most of the Vandenberg beaches off the critical habitat list, did not change these beach closure policies (which remained under Air Force supervision), and the Fish and Wildlife Service rejected attempts to delist the plover in 2006 (‘Surf Beach Reopens,’ 2005; ‘Vandenberg Beach Violations Rise,’ 2005; ‘Government reduces protected plover habitat,’ 2005). Vandenberg beaches support the largest number of breeding plovers on the coast. At Oceano Dunes, authorities followed a quite different policy but did not avoid controversy. The California State Parks website describes the dunes as: ‘among the most popular and unique of California State Parks. The 51/2 miles of beach open for vehicle use and the sand dunes available for off highway motor vehicle recreation are attractions for visitors from throughout the United States’ (http:/ohv.parks.ca.gov). Oceano Dunes attracts over 1 million visitors a year, making it a major source of revenue for the surrounding communities, and it is one of the few parks in the entire US that allows ORVs to drive on the beach. But, as one of the most extensive dune systems in the state, it is also prime snowy plover territory. The 1999 critical habitat listing included Oceano Dunes, but not the 2005 one, mainly owing to a petition of local residents that indicated a severe economic impact to the surrounding region if the park was closed to ORVs (Fed. Reg. 9/29/2005). About 1500 of the 3500 acres comprising the park are open to ORVs. According to the California State Parks service, ‘During the March 1–September 30 breeding season, small fenced enclosures are constructed around the nests to protect these birds and their offspring from the surrounding recreational use. With ongoing support from OHVers, this nesting program has been a huge success’ (http//ohv.parks.ca.gov). The Parks service advised visitors: Protect These Birds and Your Recreational Opportunities The endangered California Least tern and the threatened Western Snowy Plover nest on the sands of Oceano Dunes State Vehicular Recreation Area. You can help protect these species and YOUR RECREATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES. Your future access to this park is dependent, now more than ever, on your responsible behavior and strict adherence to the following laws and park policies: -Obey posted 15 mph speed limit; give all birds right of way -Do not enter posted nest exclosures, hang clothes, towels or items on fences, or drive next to protective exclosures (http://ohv.parks.ca.gov)
As such advice indicates, enforcing responsible behavior has been an ongoing battle, one which, according to the environmental group the Sierra Club, the plovers
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have been losing. For the past several years, the Sierra Club has campaigned to regulate ORVs at Oceano Dunes. Questioning the ‘huge success’ of fencing and voluntary restriction, the club noted (with equal hyperbole) that in 2006, ‘66 of 68 snowy plover hatchlings born within this chaotic atmosphere died within weeks of being born. At that rate, the snowy plover will be extinct, perhaps within a decade’ (http://sierraclub.org). Recreationists in turn reacted strongly to this threat to their use of ORVs. The ‘Friends of the Oceano Dunes’ argue that environmentalists are simply opposed to all ORV use, and employ the ESA ‘as a weapon to accomplish closure’ of the Dunes. Predation, they say, is the problem, not human presence, claiming that only one plover was lost in the area devoted to camping and ORVs over 7 years. ORV use, moreover, ‘helps build family foundations’ through shared recreation (Friends of Oceano Dunes). With environmentalists and recreationists at such opposite poles, and exaggerated claims on both sides, it seems unlikely that the controversy over Oceano Dunes will be resolved soon. The group of UCSB faculty and researchers who drew up the overall management plan for the Coal Oil Point Reserve, which included the SPMP, wished to avoid the kind of confrontation with beach users that had occurred at Vandenberg and Oceano and attempted to find a middle ground between beach closure and unregulated use. The SPMP, designed to protect wintering plovers, proposed to erect a fence along part of the beach and close a trail that led to the plover area. It presented its rationale at the outset: ‘Snowy Plovers . . . commonly bred at this site until the area was opened to public recreation in the late sixties,’ although, as we have seen, the causal relationship between human use and plover breeding was assumed rather than established. A single female plover had in fact bred on Sands Beach in the summer of 2001, before the SPMP was implemented, the first recorded breeding in over thirty years. After discovering the nest, the reserve manager erected a temporary fence around the breeding area, and of the two chicks that hatched, one survived to fledge; the other was taken by a crow soon after hatching (Cox, 2001). The nesting female plover may have responded to restoration efforts on the reserve (SPMP). The stated purpose of the SPMP, however, was not to restore habitat but to keep humans away from the plovers; the management plan specifically aimed ‘to reduce disturbance.’ It foresaw the reduction of disturbance from 30 incidents per plover per week to five, implying a heavily interventionist management regime (SPMP). When the Coal Oil Point SPMP was presented for public comment in the summer of 2001 – shortly after the temporary fence protecting the lone plover chick had been erected – local beach users, which included university faculty, students, and other local residents, voiced strong objections to any restriction on their use of the area, echoing comments at other sites. Local editorial pages bristled with letters for and against the plovers, revealing a widely held mistrust of the university’s motives. Leashing of dogs was viewed as especially objectionable. At the public hearing, one local resident announced, ‘I’ve walked my dog on this beach for thirty years without a leash, and I’m not going to change that now’ (Guerrini, 2001; ‘Plover chick killed by dog,’ 2003). The public hearing took place when few students remained in Isla Vista, but students quickly learned of plans to close off part of the beach when they returned in September, by which time the SPMP was already before the California Coastal Commission, a state agency whose approval was required. An
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editorial in the student newspaper at UCSB facetiously complained that students’ use of the beach was being curbed ‘for some frigid and callow birds with performance anxiety.’ The proposed solution was ‘to kill two plovers with one shotgun shell,’ a solution also heard, less facetiously, at the public hearing. More soberly, another editorial requested that the plan be tested on a temporary basis before the beach was closed permanently, noting the lack of opportunity for public comment (Daily Nexus, 2001b, 2001a). A ‘voice from Isla Vista’ in the Santa Barbara newspaper expressed what many had said at the public hearing: On Friday, the California Coastal Commission is set to consider doing that which it has rarely done – close a local public beach and coastal trail. With virtually no notice to the affected public, UCSB is quietly seeking approval to fence off a substantial portion of Sands Beach and permanently close a trail that has been used by the public for over 30 years. (‘Voice from Isla Vista,’ 2001)
The California Coastal Commission approved the plan on 16 November 2001, and the following month (several years before the management plan for the entire reserve was completed) the manager of the reserve erected a 400-m-long fence on the beach above the mean high tide line. The fence enclosed much of the available sand on the beach above the tide line. In addition, educational and regulatory signs were posted, and the trail that ended at the plovers’ roosting area was closed. Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the plan enlisted a number of volunteers to monitor the plovers and act as docents, educating the public and policing the plovers’ area by reminding beach users to leash their dogs and keep to the wet sand (SPMP; a similar docent program had been successful at Monterey Bay). Proponents of the plan recognized that education of the public that used the beach was critical, and an ongoing project. Most of the users of the beach – university students who lived in Isla Vista – lived in the area for only four years, so new users constantly appeared. The SPMP also advised that alcohol should be banned on the beach, that it should be closed at night, and that another trail be rerouted. These recommendations were not acted upon; although the university occasionally issued tickets to owners of unleashed dogs, it was not willing to patrol the beach at night. Since the end of 2001, the fence has remained in place, and has expanded hundreds of meters west to accommodate bird nesting; it is now nearly 1 km long. Following the single pair of plovers who had decided to stay and breed at Coal Oil Point in the summer of 2001, 14 plovers successfully fledged in the following year. In 2006, 41 nests resulted in 59 fledglings, the most successful season yet. Over 300 birds were counted during the winter season, twice the number counted five years earlier (http://coaloilpoint.ucnrs.org; ‘Hello Birdy,’ 2006). The plover had returned, and Coal Oil Point’s management strategy appeared to be vindicated. In all of these cases, the arguments on both sides were entirely framed in terms of the individual animals: humans against birds. Predators were generally linked to human presence, and also individualized: a News-Press article described docents throwing rocks at the crows (‘Plover chick killed by dog,’ 2003). More recently, the reserve manager has replaced eggs in plover nests with wooden eggs to reduce predation of eggs by skunks. The real plover eggs are incubated and brought back
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to the nests when they are about to hatch (http://calliebowdish.com). But both sides seemed to lack a sense of the bigger ecological picture, even though the proponents of the plover management plans were certainly aware of this. The Federal recovery plan for the plovers identified four main factors in its decline: ‘Habitat degradation caused by human disturbance, urban development, introduced beachgrass (Ammophila spp.), and expanding predator populations have resulted in a decline in active nesting areas and in the size of the breeding and wintering populations’ (Recovery plan, 2007, vi). The Federal plan devoted equal discussion to the impacts of habitat destruction and human disturbance, unlike the local management plans (Recovery plan, 2007).
6.5 Values and Meanings The remainder of this chapter will address some of the underlying reasoning behind both the SPMP and the opposition to it. Why are the plovers important? What is the value of an animal, and how does it obtain meaning to humans? Why is public perception of the environment so often focused on a single species rather than on an ecosystem? Is there a way for humans and animals to share the beach, or must this relationship always be antithetical? Over twenty-five years ago, the environmental philosopher Baird Callicott raised some of these questions in his famous, even infamous, essay, ‘Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair,’ which argued that ultimate value lay in the ‘biotic community’ and that individual animals, and even individual species, held varying levels of value. The notion of animal liberation, from whatever philosophical persuasion, was to Callicott antithetical to the preservation of biota. Individuals were far less important than the system as a whole (Callicott, 1980). In the face of a lot of criticism, Callicott backed off from his more extreme claims but I think he had a point. While environmentalists and animal activists have some common interests, their motivations and goals, as Callicott recognized, are quite different. The focus of animal activists on the individual animal and on pain, he argued, is largely a matter of indifference to those who look at the larger scale of an ecosystem (Callicott, 1980). While neither side in the plover debate makes an argument from an animal liberation perspective – the utilitarian recognition that each individual has a right to maximize its pleasure and minimize its pain – the public arguments made for the SPMP argued on the basis of the preservation of a particular species, not for the place of that species in the larger ecological picture. Conservation – the larger picture of the landscape as a whole – somehow became conflated with the restoration of a single species, without the additional argument that the species in question might be an ‘umbrella species’ whose restoration might have broader benefits. The Federal recovery plan, in contrast, pointed out that a focus on management of a single species can lead to conflict with the restoration or management of other species, and acknowledged that science cannot always offer the straightforward solutions that policy requires (Recovery plan, 2007). This acknowledgement of complexity and the difference between conservation and restoration never entered the public discourse, which both sides framed
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simply as a conflict between human needs and uses and the need to protect the birds. Both sides, and the press, anthropomorphized the plovers as ‘needing space to raise their families.’ The Santa Barbara Independent, for example, talked about‘feathered couples bedding down in the heavily protected dunes.’ Such anthropomorphism often occurs in debates about endangered species (‘Hello Birdy,’ 2006; see Daston & Mitman, 2005). While it may be effective in terms of public persuasion, it also obscures the larger issues at stake having to do with conservation of habitat. The plover management plan at Coal Oil Point is part of a larger restoration plan for the reserve that has broad significance outside its immediate area of influence. The restoration project at Coal Oil Point is designed, among other things, to remove as many traces of human presence as possible. This accords with the definition of restoration declared by the US