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Critical Success Factors for Radical Technological Innovation: A Five Case Study Pier A. Abetti We analyze the critical success factors for radical technological innovation according to four perspectives: as R&D projects, as technological innovations, as internal ventures, and as changes in corporate strategy. We apply ex-post eleven critical success factors to the pairwaise comparison of three radical innovations: GE Project EHV-UHV (success), GE non-impact printer (failure), and Xerox non-impact printer (success). We then apply ex-ante the same factors to ``predict'' the failure of Motorola's Iridium satellite communication system and the success of Nokia's cellular phones.

1. Introduction

T

Radical innovations are unique

he potential payoff of radical innovation is very high, but the project costs and the risk of failure are also very high, as witnessed by the recent bankruptcy of the $5 billion Iridium communications system. Past studies of critical factors for success (or failure) have not differentiated between incremental and radical innovations (for instance Marquis 1969, OECD 1971, Myers and Marquis 1967, Rothwell et al 1974, Utterback et al 1976). One difficulty is that, by definition, all radical innovations are unique, and therefore not comparable. In this paper, we utilize the case study method for in-depth analysis and comparison of three major projects. 1. General Electric's project EHV (Extra High Voltage) and UHV (Ultra High Voltage), the basis for 500-735 KV alternate current power transmission. 2. General Electric's failed development of the first high-speed, non-impact printer. 3. Xerox's successful development of a similar printer. Each project required ten or more years for development, with expenditures of the order of $10 million. The three projects are compared according to two congruent pairs:

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A. The same company with excellent R&D facilities and deep pockets developed project EHV-UHV and the non-impact printer. Why did the first succeed and the other fail? B. GE's and Xerox's non-impact printers targeted the same functional specifications and the same market. Both projects were carried out in their research laboratories and then transferred to strategic business units. Why did the first fail and the second succeed? These two pairs of cases are analyzed ex-post and tested for the presence or absence of critical factors that determine success or failure according to four perspectives: 1. 2. 3. 4.

as as as as

R&D projects technological innovations internal ventures changes in corporate strategy.

We then apply the results of this 3-case study to analyze ex-ante the relative probability of success of Nokia's cellular phones versus Motorola's Iridium satellite communication system. We conclude with lessons learned and guidelines that may be useful to R&D managers, business managers and strategic planners who are planning or developing radical technological innovations. # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

INNOVATION CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS

2. How Radical is a Technological Innovation? In the literature, technological innovations are usually classified as incremental or radical, according to not very clearly defined criteria. In reality, innovations are not all white or all black, but also show various shades of gray. The author has developed a method for measuring the uniqueness of a technological innovation according to a 5-level scale, as shown on Table 1 (Abetti and Stuart 1988). According to this scale, levels 1 and 2 correspond to radical innovations, levels 4 and 5 to incremental innovations, and level 3 to the ``intermediate case.'' This paper will concentrate only on projects of level one and two, that is, corresponding to highly radical or radical innovations.

3. Description of the Three Cases Following is a brief summary of the three cases under study.

3.1 GE Project EHV and UHV (1956±83) In 1956, GE's traditional heavy electrical apparatus business was becoming technologically obsolescent and unprofitable due to lack of differentiation from its competitors. GE reasserted its leadership by demonstrating to the utilities the feasibility and the economics of transmission voltages double

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the highest US voltage of 345 kV. In 1960 the world's highest operating voltage, 800 kV AC was reached. A Canadian utility then adopted the 735 kV level, and extra-high voltage transmission gradually diffused throughout the world. By 1983, the feasibility of both AC and DC 1500 kV transmission had been demonstrated (Abetti and Stuart 1985).

3.2 GE Non-Impact Magnetic Printer (1970±1983) In 1970, GE Communications Systems Division was producing mobile radios, but had only half the market share of Motorola. The General Manager elected to develop a new product, a high-speed, non-impact magnetic printer, to replace conventional mechanical printers in computer systems. In 1979, prototypes were ready. But the GE printer business was in financial trouble and did not want to take the risk of transition from mechanical to magnetic and electronic technology. After the General Manager had resigned due to health reasons, the project was abandoned, the GE printer business was sold and then closed down (Abetti and Stuart 1985).

3.3 Xerox Business Systems Non-Impact Laser Xerographic Printer (1965±1984) In 1974, Xerox abandoned the mainframe computer business and decided to discontinue the development of the non-impact, high-speed laser-xerographic printer. R&D

Table 1. Innovation uniqueness Level

Description

Type of Innovation

1

Unique original product or system, which will obsolete existing ones, based on proprietary technology beyond the state-of-the-art, highly specialized and customized, major R&D

Highly Radical

2

New product or system, with original state-of-the-art proprietary technology, that will significantly expand the capabilities of existing ones, specialized product with many adaptations, significant R&D New product with proprietary technology, but may be duplicated by others, mix of standard and special features, average R&D

Radical

Significant extension of product characteristics with original adaptations of available technology, product with standard variations, limited patent protection, minor R&D Incremental improvement over existing products, application of current technology, standardized product, no patent protection, no R&D

Significant Incremental

3 4

5

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Intermediate

Minor Incremental

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personnel and the market researchers obtained a one-year grace period, during which they developed a highly innovative market forecasting system. With this system, they demonstrated that this was a profitable market for Xerox, in spite of the announcement of IBM's competitive printer. In 1984, worldwide market shares for high-speed printers were 42% for Xerox and 44% for IBM (Oren et al 1980).

3.4 Pairwise Comparison of the Three Projects

Defining success

Table 2 presents an overview of the parallel development of the two GE cases, the EHV and UHV project (successful) and the magnetic non-impact printer (failure). Table 3 presents a comparative overview of the development of the two non-impact printers, by GE with magnetic technology (failure) and by Xerox with laser xerography (success). According to Abetti's model (Abetti 1984, 1985) there are four stages (1 to 4) separated by three milestones (I to III), as indicated in Tables 2 and 3.

4. Critical Factors for Success or Failure of Radical Innovation Projects 4.1 Measures of Success We define an innovation (radical or incremental) as successful if the resulting product, process, or system has met management's expected sales, profits, market share, return on investment, etc.1 Therefore, in order to succeed, an innovation must achieve in sequence three degrees of success: 1. technical success ± meeting specifications 2. commercial success ± acceptance by the marketplace 3. financial success ± adequate return on investment There are many examples of technically successful products that were not accepted by the marketplace, such as DuPont's artificial leather, Corfam. Although its mechanical

Table 2. Parallel chronology of GE EHV-UHV and non-impact printer projects Stage

Milestone

GE EHV - UHV

GE Non-Impact Printer

1956 ± GM of Transformer SBU 1957 - $1M for EHV apparatus; $3M for advertising

1970 ± Vice President Communications SBU 1971 ± Basic magnetics

1957 ± GM Appoints project leaderentrepreneur

1976 ± Engineering model

II. Business Plan

1958 - $10M EHV system approved 1959 ± EHV System built

1977 ± High-speed computer terminal 1979 ± Prototypes tested within GE, plans for new factory

III. Market Test

1960 ± Successful demonstration, 800kV AC reached

1980 ± Demonstration ± No orders

1961-64 ± Data obtained, technology transferred 1967 ± First 735 kV system operating 1975 ± Project UHV (1500 kV AC) 1983 ± Project UHV (DC)

(1981 ± Abandonment) (1983 ± Exit)

1. Idea Generation I. R&D Proposal 2. Incubation

3. Transition and Implementation

4. Diffusion

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Table 3. Parallel chronology of GE and Xerox non-impact printer projects Stage

Milestone

GE ± Key Events

Xerox ± Key Events

1970 ± Vice President ± Communications SBU

1965 ± White (Engineer, electro-optical laboratory)

1971 ± Basic magnetics

1970 ± Laser scanning

1976 ± Engineering model

1972 - Laser xerography

II. Business Plan

1977 ± High-speed computer terminal 1979 ± Prototypes tested within GE, plans for new factory

III. Market Test

1980 ± Demonstration ± No orders!

1972 ± ``Sold'' to business products group 1973 ± Prototypes used at R&D center 1975 ± Stop! 1976 ± Market forecast 1977 ± Introduction 1978 ± Success!

(1981 ± Abandonment) (1983 ± Exit)

1984 ± 40% Market share (IBM 42%)

1. Idea Generation I. R&D Proposal 2. Incubation

3. Transition and Implementation

4. Diffusion

properties, resistance to abrasions and to chemical stains, flexibility, etc, were superior to natural leather, it did not have the feel, the smell and the breathability of the original product. Also, 30 years ago many customers, especially women, were reluctant to wear artificial leather, psychologically connected to the ``hippie generation.'' An example of a technically and commercially successful product that did not achieve financial success is the GE pacemaker for heart patients. Although the product worked well and was recommended by doctors, GE was concerned about the risk resulting from a possible failure and death of the patient, which would tarnish the image of the entire company. Based on the economic principle ``The higher the risk, the higher the return on investment (ROI),'' GE concluded that the expected ROI was inadequate and withdrew the product.

4.2 Four perspectives for analyzing radical innovation Because of the interaction between technological, commercial and financial elements of a radical technological innovation, it is better to look at innovations in a holistic way, according to four perspectives of escalating impact and importance to the corporation: 1. as R&D projects 2. as technological innovations

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3. as internal ventures 4. as changes in corporate strategy In fact, radical technological innovations start as R&D projects, then become technological innovations, which are usually developed within internal ventures, away from ongoing businesses. Finally, radical innovations entail significant changes in the corporate strategic focus of the firm. We will now review the principal critical success factors for each perspective and apply these factors to the three innovations under study.

5. Critical Success Factors for R&D Projects According to Table 1, radical technological innovations require major or significant R&D efforts, and therefore start as R&D projects. Baker, Green and Bean (1986) have established a positive correlation between the overall (not just technical) success ratio of R&D projects and the following factors.

5.1 Progressive identification of business and technical goals, and matching of these goals In the GE EHV-UHV project, the business goals were clear: persuade the electric utilities to adopt higher transmission voltages and buy the apparatus from GE. The technical

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goals were to demonstrate the economics and reliability of these higher voltages at least five years ahead of competition. In the case of the GE non-impact printer, the technical goals of the project were set by the R&D center without consultation of the mechanical printer business unit. Later, when the business unit was consulted, the radically innovative technical goals did not match with the modest goals of the business that was looking primarily for cost reductions to match Japanese competition. In the case of the Xerox non-impact printer, the technical goal was to develop a new technology ± lasers ± and couple it with xerography, the core technical competence of the company. This goal matched well with the business goal of the operating unit, to expand the market beyond copying machines, utilizing the technological and market competencies of Xerox.

5.2 Transferability of results to an internal user with skills in production, marketing and distribution In the GE EHV-UHV project, all the GE strategic business units concerned with power transmission apparatus (transformers, circuit breakers, lightning arrestors, relays, metering and carrier communication) participated in the design of the system, designed, built and installed at their own expense the prototypes of the new apparatus, and had all the capabilities ready for marketing the new equipment. In contrast, the GE mechanical printer business lacked knowledge of magnetic and electronic technology, and did not have a single programmer to develop the enabling software. In addition, the mechanical printers were only sold to original equipment manufacturers (OEM), while the new printers would be sold directly to the final users, a new market for the sales force. The new Xerox printer was to be manufactured in the same facilities as large copiers. Although the laser technology was new, the skills and facilities of xerography were the traditional strengths of Xerox. The Business Systems sales and maintenance personnel were to be utilized to sell the new printer to their traditional customers.

5.3 General Management's involvement and function coordination The General Manager of GE Transformer Division had originated the idea of EHV transmission, and thus was an enthusiastic

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sponsor and champion (Maidique 1980). He had personally selected the project leader and made sure that all other functions (engineering, manufacturing, marketing, financial, legal and public relations) would support the project. He also protected the project leader from interference from headquarters staff, who were concerned with the increase in GE project costs from $4 million to $8 million, out of $10 million total. As we have seen, the General Manager of the GE Communications Systems division, who had originated the idea of the nonimpact printer resigned because of ill health. His successor, of financial background, had no interest in the risky project of his predecessor. Within the R&D center, this was one of 150+ ongoing projects, without higher management visibility. The R&D vice-president became involved only when the printer business decided to abandon the project, but was unable to overturn this decision. Thus the project died because there was no executive champion (Van de Ven et al 1989). In the case of the Xerox printer, the General Manager of the Business Systems group had adopted the project. His championing became vital when headquarters put the project on hold for one year, pending a credible market forecast. The general manager enlisted the support of market research specialists in operations and in the corporate staff, and created a multi-functional team of R&D and marketing persons.

6. Critical Success Factors for Radical Technological Innovations Of the many success factors discussed in the literature (for instance Marquis 1969, Kelly and Kransberg 1978, Rothwell et al 1974, von Hippel 1988, Roberts 1991, Levi 1998) the following four appear to be the most critical for radical technological innovations.

6.1 Unique advantage The GE project EHV was backed by the reputation of the world's leader in power apparatus, and by major suppliers of transmission line towers and conductors, such as Alcoa and U.S. Steel. The value of the technology had been demonstrated through five years of trouble-free operation, with an equal lead over competition. Thus GE was universally recognized as the world's leader in EHV transmission. The GE printer was based on a mature technology (magnetics) that offered highspeed, but poor, printing capability, and no

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software. The Xerox printer had equal speed, but much higher resolution with excellent software. Also, GE had no marketing contacts with potential customers, the data processing and office managers of the Fortune 500 companies, who were regular customers of Xerox.

6.2 Coupling with the marketplace As shown by Project Sappho (Rockwell, et al 1974) and by many other researchers (for instance: Maidique and Zirger 1984, Cooper 1994, von Hippel 1988), coupling with existing and potential customers is a prerequisite for success. In project EHV-UHV, it was easy to identify the potential customers: the 25+largest electric utilities in the United States and Canada. The project manager visited them all, and invited their chief engineers to sit in on an advisory board to assist in the planning, implementation and data gathering of the system. A similar advisory board was established to include the 15+major consultants and construction companies who are appointed by the utilities to plan, design, and build the EHV transmission lines and substations, including selection of the apparatus. These two boards met every two months, and gave valuable advice and feedback. Also, many of the board members became personally involved in the project, and acted as champions for promoting EHV in their companies. Technical information, including a summary of operating data, was widely distributed in handbooks published by the association of electrical utilities (Edison Electric Institute 1968, Electric Power Institute 1982). For the GE non-impact printer, no contacts were made with potential customers. The R&D center had no market analysis function, and the mechanical printer operation was marketing only to OEM's. Two outside consultants were hired by the R&D center. They made only paper studies, and did not contact a single potential customer. In contrast, it will be recalled that the Xerox project was put on hold for one year by top management, that requested a ``credible'' market forecast. A team of Xerox market researchers and project personnel developed a new forecasting model that was calibrated by field surveys and validated by in-depth interviews of major potential customers.

6.3 Technology Gatekeepers Allen (1997) has highlighted the role of technology ``gatekeepers'' who are the experts

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on specific technologies and stay abreast of new developments. Therefore, they are able to advise their colleagues on the advantages and disadvantages of selecting one or another technology for a specific application. In project EHV-UHV the project leader hired seven rather young but brilliant engineers and challenged them to become the world's experts in specific technologies related to power transmission, such as corona losses, radio noise, mechanical design of conductors, lightning-proof line design, etc. Each expert was then responsible for writing a chapter in the handbooks discussed above. For the GE non-impact printer, the R&D center had experts in the various technologies that could be utilized: magnetics, electrostatics, lasers, ink jets, etc. However, they were not consulted and magnetic technology was selected by the General Manager of the Communications Systems division because it was the core technology of his mobile radio business (which had nothing in common with printers). At Xerox, the first researcher on non-impact printers became the gatekeeper of laser technology, which he later combined with Xerox's core technology, xerography. Xerox also had experts in software development, since they had developed the first PC, the Altos, which became the basis for Apple's Macintosh.

Marketplace coupling

6.4 Free Communications Channels As shown again by Project Sappho (Rothwell et al 1974), free communication channels, inside and especially outside the firm, are a prerequisite for success. In Project EHV-UHV, communications were greatly facilitated by the fact that, at that time, electric utilities were monopolies and did not compete with each other. On the contrary, engineers competed in a friendly manner in presenting their technical achievements and in advancing the stateof-the-art. Thus, informal communications were open and frequent. More formal communications were channeled through three advisory boards ± the two mentioned above, utilities and consultants, and one of all suppliers. In the GE non-impact printer, the R&D center had a fairly strong ``Not Invented Here (NIH)'' attitude. There were good communications at high level, between the General Manager of the Communications Division and the Director of the R&D center, who were both outstanding technical people and old friends. When the former resigned, his successor, a financial manager, had no interest in working with the R&D center. Relations

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were also strained between the project personnel at the R&D center and the managers of the printer operations. The former wanted to transfer the project to operations immediately, claiming that the technology had been proven, and there was only design and production engineering work to be done. The latter pointed out some important problems, such as poor image resolution, lack of software, etc, and refused to assume responsibility for the project. In the Xerox case, there was close cooperation between the researchers, the Business Systems Group who was ready to take over the project, and the corporate market research unit.

7. Critical Success Factors for Internal Ventures The literature on the critical success factors for entrepreneurial ventures is very extensive (for instance Stuart and Abetti 1975, 1978; Timmons 1999). This area of research has been extended to corporate internal ventures (for instance Kanter 1983, Pinchot 1985, Block and MacMillan 1993). In our study we will utilize the simple formula of Timmons for new ventures (Timmons 1999) P = E6O6R where P is the potential value of the new venture, in terms of sales and profits, E is the level of entrepreneurship, the skills and the relevant experience of the lead entrepreneur and his/her team, O is the attractiveness and durability of the opportunity, and R is the commitment of the required resources. The same factors are used for an internal venture, the only modification being that the entrepreneur must have the additional skills of working within the company system, above ground and underground, to enlist support from all constituencies and to avoid being neutralized by the ever-present bureaucracy (Kanter 1973).

7.1 Level of Entrepreneurship In project EHV-UHV, the project leader was selected by the General Manager for two reasons: (1) expertise in electric power systems and (2) proven record in launching and implementing an internal venture, the first integrated electronic data-processing system in a GE factory, from heavy apparatus design to production and billing. The project leader had learned the hard way how to get things done in a segmented organization, how to create an integrated team, and how to deal

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with the ever-present GE bureaucracy in the division and at corporate headquarters. Therefore, he was ready to apply his skills to the new assignment, a $10 million project integrating ten GE business operations, twelve outside suppliers, and three advisory boards. The team of young engineers was imbued with the same entrepreneurial, indeed missionary spirit, and proclaimed the merits of EHV within and outside the company, because their personal success was inevitably linked with the success of the project. In the non-impact printer cases, initially both the GE and Xerox researchers were at first doing R&D work. Business difficulties affected both projects: at GE the unwillingness of the operating unit to accept the new technology, at Xerox the threatened discontinuance by top management. The director of the GE R&D center intervened ``in extremis,'' but was unable to save the project. At Xerox, the researchers became entrepreneurs in order to save ``their'' project, obtained the enthusiastic support of the market researchers, were able to persuade headquarters to allocate the required resources to proceed, and finally achieved a market share equal to IBM.

7.2 Attractiveness and Durability of the Opportunity The potential opportunity for EHV transmission was highly attractive, since the consumption of electric power was growing at the rate of seven percent per year, and generating stations had to be located farther away from the load centers. Rather, the challenge was to speed up the transition from 345 kV to the next step of 500 kV and the second next of 735 kV, given the conservative attitude of most utilities where top executives had financial or legal backgrounds. The opportunity would also last a very long time, since no alternative methods of distributing electric power (for instance local generation with fuel cells) appeared feasible. In fact, 735 kV is still now, 40 years after demonstration, the world's highest AC voltage. For non-impact printers, the opportunity was equally attractive and durable, given the exponential growth of computer PC's and attached printers, and the poor image, quality and noise of mechanical printers. The ``paperless office'' was emerging slowly, and its effect would not be felt for twenty years.

7.3 Commitment of Resources Both GE and Xerox were successful companies with deep pockets. Rather, the problem was

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to get headquarters' approval for large expenditures and capital investments. In Project EHV-UHV, the General Manager had high credibility because his business was profitable. In fact, he was able to increase the GE budget from $4 million to $8 million and obtain an additional $2 million from outside suppliers. For the GE non-impact printer, the general manager persuaded his friend, the director of the R&D center, to assume all the R&D expense, which did not require corporate approval. However, the project faltered when the printer operating unit was hard-hit by Japanese competition and decided to devote its limited resources to improve its obsolescent mechanical printer line. Given this poor financial situation, it would have been very difficult to obtain funds for the non-impact printer from GE headquarters. In the case of Xerox, the stock had fallen precipitously due to the closing down of the computer business, and to Japanese competition in copiers. That is why headquarters decided to discontinue the non-impact printer project, which would have required heavy manufacturing investments. However, once they were persuaded that there was a profitable market for Xerox, these investments were approved.

8. Critical Success Factors for Changes in Corporate Strategy Radical innovation projects involve changes not only in functional strategies, primarily technological and marketing strategies (Abetti 1994), but also have significant impact on corporate strategy (Abetti 1991). We will look at changes in overall corporate strategy from two viewpoints: 1. Diversification 2. Strategic Focus

8.1 Diversification in Technologies and Markets According to Roberts and Berry (1985), diversification from the present product lines can occur according to two orthogonal dimensions: technologies and markets (Figure 1). Along each axis, the diversification is measured according the three levels: A. Base, corresponding to technologies embedded in existing products and services; or to marketing to existing customers B. New Familiar, corresponding to technologies available within the company (for instance in R&D) but not yet embodied in products; or to marketing to known customers, although not yet served.

Figure 1. Evaluation of relative risk of the three projects MARKETS

~

5

8

NEW UNFAMILIAR

9

HIGH RISK

* GE PRINTER 6

3

NEW FAMILIAR

MEDIUM RISK

7 XEROX PRINTER *

BASE

1

2

LOW RISK

BASE

NEW FAMILIAR TECHNOLOGIES

4

MEDIUM RISK * GE EHV-UHV

"

NEW UNFAMILIAR

DIVERSIFICATION RISK (1 = LOWEST TO 9 = HIGHEST)

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C. New Unfamiliar, corresponding to technologies not available within the company, but accessible through consultants, licenses, etc.; or to marketing to new customers through accessible distribution channels, for instance manufacturer representatives, agents, and joint marketing agreements.

Quantifying risk

The author has quantified the risk involved in diversification, from 1=lowest to 9=highest, as shown in Table 1. This risk evaluation is based on two premises: (a) market risk is always higher than technical risk (Adams 1962) and (b) the farther away from the origin, the higher the risk (Roberts and Berry 1985). Therefore, the lowest risk is the cell close to the origin (selling existing products to served customers, which is no diversification). The highest risk corresponds to the cell in the upper right-hand corner, selling new products with unfamiliar technology to new unfamiliar markets. This is often called the ``suicide square'' because the probability of success is only 8% (Adams 1962). In fact, venture capitalists stay away from funding entrepreneurs who have no experience in the technology and in the markets targeted by their new ventures (Roberts and Meyer 1992). According to this analysis, Project EHVUHV targeted the GE base market (electric utilities) through its well-established marketing channels, with new unfamiliar technology (GE had no experience in designing and building apparatus above 345 kV and no experience in power transmission lines). This risk level was 4 (Figure 1). The GE non-impact printer was targeted to new unfamiliar markets, but the magnetic technology was available in the R&D center. As shown in Figure 1, the risk level was 8, double the risk of the EHV-UHV project. For Xerox, the targeted market was the base market of copying machines through their own distribution channels. However, Xerox's printer market risk was somewhat higher than the risk of GE EHV-UHV, because the customer's decision making unit (DMU) of GE apparatus did not change, while the DMU for Xerox now included computer experts, who normally do not participate in copier evaluations. The Xerox printer technology was new unfamiliar. As shown in Figure 1, the Xerox printer risk was 5.5, the average between 4 (new unfamiliar technology and base market) and 7 (new unfamiliar technology, familiar market).

8.2 Change of Strategic Focus Morone (1993) has shown the importance of developing and maintaining strategic focus

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for achieving leadership in high-tech markets. For radical innovations to succeed, these must be within the overall strategic focus of the business, but beyond the existing product lines, with a quantum jump in the performance/cost ratio. Project EHV-UHV was within the traditional strategic focus of GE, the world's leader in power systems apparatus. The goal was ambitious, leapfrogging 500 kV, the expected next level after the existing 345 kV, and shooting for the second next level, estimated at 750 kV. The GE non-impact magnetic printer was outside the strategic focus of the Communications Systems Strategic Business Unit (SBU), mobile radios. The mechanical printers were considered as a niche business for the SBU and GE, which was tolerated as long as it was profitable. In fact the first market for the non-impact printer was for fax machines, again outside GE's strategic focus. Here again, the specified performance parameters (speed, image quality, no copies but all originals) were an order of magnitude higher than those of mechanical printers. For Xerox, the technical parameters were the same, but the strategic focus was to expand gradually beyond the traditional business of copying machines into a ``document company,'' including printing, binding, transmission and processing. Also, as we have seen, there was synergy in production, sales, and maintenance between copiers and the new printers.

9. Luck! The above critical factors are all under management control and managers are held justifiably responsible for results. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that luck may play an important, often a decisive role, in the success or failure of radical technological innovations. GE Project EHV-UHV was originally targeted to United States electric utilities, the most accessible market for GE, but these were not in a hurry to move to 500 kV. The ``lucky break'' came when a Canadian company, Hydro Quebec, developed a very large hydroelectric plant in Labrador. There was no local market, the Canadian market was 2000 miles (3200 km) away, and the most lucrative market, New York and New England, was even farther away. Economic studies showed that this hydro power had to be delivered to U.S. utilities at lower cost than power produced locally from oil or gas. At 500 kV the transmission costs would have been excessive. Therefore, Hydro Quebec's only

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choice was to leapfrog to 735 kV, and this is what they did, utilizing project EHV-UHV's technology and operating experience. The GE non-impact printer had two strikes against it. The first strike was when the General Manager left because of ill health, and his successor had neither the knowledge nor the interest to continue the project. The second strike was when the printer business started losing money and was not able to attract corporate funding. The case of the Xerox printer is apparently a paradox. The project also had two strikes against it, the discontinuance of the computer business with one billion dollar loss, and later, the announcement of the IBM laser non-impact printer. However, the researchers became entrepreneurs by necessity, fought the decision by headquarters to cancel the project, developed a creative market forecasting model, convinced top management, and marched on to success.

10. Quantitative Evaluation of Critical Success Factors In the above analysis, we have listed 11 critical factors that affect the success or failure of radical technological innovations. For the innovations studied, we now assign a score from 0 to 5 corresponding to the degree by which the innovation satisfied the requirements of each factor. For instance, for the level of entrepreneurship we assign the score of 4 to Project EHV-UHV, of 1 to the GE printer, and 5 to the Xerox printer. The relative weight of each factor will depend on the specific environment, internal and external, of the project. For simplicity, we will assign here the same weight to each factor. Since these factors are relative, not absolute measures, the three projects are compared pairwise in Table 4. The results clearly show the clear advantage of GE Project EHV-UHV over the GE printer (91% versus 42% of the highest possible score) and also the almost equal advantage of Xerox over GE in nonimpact printers (89% versus 42%)

11. Application to Nokia's Cellular Phones and to Motorola's Iridium Both Nokia and Motorola were well-established companies when they decided to become the world leaders in wireless communications. Yet, their history and strategic focus was quite different.

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11.1 Motorola Communications As thoroughly discussed by Morone (1993), Motorola's communications business was driven by the ``mobile and portable religion,'' that is, the imperative of communicating with people on the move at all times, wherever they might be in the world. This ``religion'' led Motorola to develop first mobile radios for government organizations (fire and police departments), industrial and business uses (trucks and taxis, etc.), and finally for consumers. Given the limitations of the radio spectrum, Motorola developed cellular telephony, which was economical only for populated areas, and targeted industrial users before consumers. However, there were two problems: (1) different parts of the world had adopted different incompatible standards, so that different instruments had to be used in Europe, U.S.A., and Japan, and (2) many areas of the world, such as deserts, high seas and the poorest countries were not covered. Driven by its ``religion,'' Motorola conceived the Iridium project, a network of 66 satellites that would cover the entire planet, receive signals from the originator of the call, transmit them to the other satellites or ground stations, and then to the receiver of the call. Thus, a customer could use the same instrument everywhere in the world, regardless of location (Wall Street Journal 1999a and 1999b). While conceptually attractive, the system had major flaws, and required seven years to raise the $5 billion investment, recruit 28 local partners in the targeted countries, sell and implement the system. By 1999 the analog technology was obsolete and could not compete with the new digital cellular technology of Nokia. The phones were brick-size and weight, as compared to Nokia's attractive pocket instruments renowned for their Finnish design. Motorola's instruments required manual dexterity for assembly before use, while Nokia's were very user-friendly. Worst of all, Motorola's had to be used in the open, while Nokia's could be used inside cars, buildings, etc. Motorola had no core competencies in satellites, so had to create an overly complex international consortium of 28 partners, similar to the United Nations, to own and operate the system, while Nokia sold its base stations to local operators and its phones to consumers. Finally, the capacity of Iridium was limited to 3,000 simultaneous calls and the cost per minute was $7.00, ten times higher than cellular phones. For all these reasons, in spite of a $180 million advertising campaign, Iridium went bankrupt, sustaining a $5 billion loss (Riezenman 2000)

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11.2 Nokia Cellular Phone Systems

Impact of the CEO

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Nokia is a 135-year old corporation headquartered in Finland, a country of 5 million with scarce national resources. Until 1992, Nokia's products were neither high-tech nor glamorous: toilet paper, diapers, tires and rubber boots, and cables for electric and telephone utilities. The major market was the Soviet Union. Now (May 2001) Nokia is the world's leader in cell phones with 35% of world market share (compared to 13% for Motorola), is second in the world in cellular network and equipment (after Ericsson), and possesses the world's fifth most valuable brand. The stock market value in May 2000 was approximately $250 billion, the second highest in Europe, and ninth in the world. In comparison, Lucent's market value was $183 billion and Motorola's only $67 billion (Business Week 2000). How did Nokia transform itself from a losing conglomerate (the CEO committed suicide in 1988) to one of the world's most envied companies? The answer is in the charismatic, charming entrepreneur, CEO Jorma Olilla, quite different from the typically shy and reserved Finns, who became CEO in 1992. Under his leadership, the evolution of Nokia followed the path we have discussed above, from R&D project to technological innovation to an internal venture that completely changed the strategic focus of the corporation. Nokia's cable works decided in 1960 to produce radio telephony and became in 1981 the leading supplier of cell phones to the Nordic cellular system. This system had adopted AT&T's Bell Labs technology and had rapidly become a second world standard. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland's main trading partner, Nokia was almost bankrupt. Major shareholders tried to sell Nokia to Ericsson, but they refused (Fox 2000). Olilla was put in charge of the mobile phone business in 1990, turned it around, and became CEO in 1992 at 41 years of age. Olilla was convinced that the Nordic countries, because of their low population density and relatively high standard of living were ahead of the rest of the world in communications, and that mobile phones would appeal to the younger generation, always on the move, and gradually replace conventional phones. While Motorola was targeting principally industrial, governmental and business users, Nokia decided to target consumers, combining high functionality and performance with superb Finnish design,2 competing on quality, fashion and brand image rather than price.

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Olilla also decided to produce phones for the 3 main digital world standards: GSH for Europe, TDMA for the U.S., and PDS for Japan (Pulkkinen 1997). The look and feel of the phone would be the same, but the electronics were different. With a softwarebased menu, a mobile phone was becoming similar to a small PC or a palmtop computer. The first phones were shipped in 1993. The goal was to sell 2000 units of the first series, but sales reached 20 million! In 1992±1993, Olilla fired or retired all vicepresidents but one, closed down all of Nokia's non-electronic businesses, and created a new five-person executive team, all in their thirties or early forties. By May 2000, the value of Noka shares, fueled by international expansion in Europe, the Americas and especially Asia, had increased by 2,300%. Thus, Nokia's internal venture of diversification into electronics took over the entire company, and changed the strategic focus to become the world leader in wireless communications, including now access to the internet.

11.3 Comparison of Critical Success Factors of Iridium and Nokia It is obviously easy to rationalize ex-post the critical factors that influenced the failure of Motorola's Iridium and the success of Nokia. Both projects were launched in 1990. Nokia was in business by 1993, while Iridium became operational in 1998, went bankrupt in 1999, and terminated service in 2000. Yet in 1990, Merill Lynch had estimated that the system would achieve five million users and generate $700 million operating income per year by 2000 (Merrill Lynch 1990) Rather, the ultimate question is whether the outcomes of these two radical technological innovations could have been predicted ex-ante in the early 1990s, utilizing the analysis advanced in this paper. A preliminary analysis is offered in Table 5, utilizing the pairwise comparison model shown in Table 4. While this approach may be justifiably dismissed as post-rationalization, we believe that the methodology is valid, and that the initial data could be verified and modified, based on a detailed analysis of Nokia's and Motorola's strategic plans and other documents in the 1990-93 period. In any case, the preliminary results show that Nokia's success factors were very high (95%) while Iridium's were considerably lower (58%), although still higher than average. That last point may explain why it was not too difficult to raise $5 billion to finance the project.

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Table 4. Ex-post pairwise comparison of critical success factors of three radical innovations Success Factor*

5. As R&D Projects 5.1 Matching of Goals 5.2 User's Skills 5.3 GM Involvement 6. As Technological Innovations 6.1 Unique Advantage 6.2 Coupling With Market 6.3 Technology Gatekeepers 7. As Internal Ventures 7.1 Level of Entrepreneurship 7.2 Attractiveness of Opportunity 7.3 Commitment of Resources 8. As Changes in Strategy 8.1 Diversification 8.2 Strategic Focus TOTAL PAIRWISE COMPARISON

Rating** GE EHV-UHV

GE Printer

Xerox Printer

5 3 5

1 2 2

5 4 5

4 5 5

3 1 2

4 5 5

4 4 5

1 5 2

5 5 4

5 5

2 2

4 3

50/55 = 91% ~

23/55 = 42% ~ ~

49/55 = 89% ~

* Refer to text, sections 5 to 8 ** Scale: 1 = lowest to 5 = highest

Table 5. Ex-ante pairwise comparison of critical success factors of Iridium and Nokia Success Factor*

Rating** Iridium

Nokia

5. As R&D Projects 5.1 Matching of Goals 5.2 User's Skills 5.3 GM Involvement

4 2 4

5 4 5

6. As Technological Innovations 6.1 Unique Advantage 6.2 Coupling With Market 6.3 Technology Gatekeepers

2 2 2

4 5 5

7. As Internal Ventures 7.1 Level of Entrepreneurship 7.2 Attractiveness of Opportunity 7.3 Commitment of Resources

3 3 3

5 5 5

8. As Changes in Strategy 8.1 Diversification 8.2 Strategic Focus

3 4

5 4

32/55 = 58% ~

52/55 = 95% ~

TOTAL PAIRWISE COMPARISON * Refer to text, sections 5 to 8 ** Scale: 1 = lowest to 5 = highest

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12. Conclusions 1. In order to evaluate the probability of success of a radical technological innovation, it is useful to visualize the evolution of the innovation in four stages, of increasing importance and impact on the corporation, and analyze the critical success factors for each stage, as shown in Tables 4 and 5. The planned radical innovation should first be analyzed from the perspective of an R&D project and its transferability to operations, second from the perspective of a technological innovation and its acceptance in the marketplace, third as an internal venture, separate from ongoing business, and finally as a change in corporate strategy in terms of diversification and strategic focus. 2. Given the major differences in technology, industries, and markets served, radical innovations should be compared in pairs which show some degree of commonality or congruence. Examples could be two innovations within the same company, such as GE's Project EHV-UHV and GE's non-impact printer, or, better, innovations targeting the same market, such as the GE and Xerox non-impact printers, or Motorola's Iridium and Nokia's cellular phones. 3. From the list of critical success factors, it will be noted that technology is definitely not the principal criterion. Instead, market, financial, organizational and strategic issues are predominant. Therefore, the evaluation should be performed by a multifunctional team of technical, production, marketing, financial, and strategy experts in an open discussion. This will avoid functional bias, ``NIH'' attitudes, and myopic vision. 4. Finally, unforeseen events, likely or unlikely, may have major influences on success and failure. In order to take advantage of the positive effects, and counteract the negative effects, it is advisable to have up-to-date contingency plans and to be alert to changes in the technological, market, financial, social, and political environment. The great radical innovator and benefactor of humanity, Louis Pasteur (Vallery-Radot 1923) admonished ``Chance favors the prepared mind.''

Notes 1. In some cases, for instance pollution control, financial results are replaced by achieving the expected improvement in quality of life. 2. In Helsinki, mobile phones are sold as highclass Finnish consumer goods, similar to

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jewelry, tableware and furniture. It is possible to customize phones by, for instance, having pictures of girl or boyfriends on the outside of the phone, and to utilise ringing tones from popular music, or even composed by the user.

References Abetti, P.A. (1984) Technology: A challenge to planners. Planning Review 45, 24±27. Reprinted in Corporate Planning. R.J. Allio and M.W. Pennington, eds., New York: AMACOM, 141±147. Abetti, P.A. (1985) Milestones for managing technological innovation. Planning Review 18±22, 45±46. Reprinted in Corporate Planning. R.J. Allio and R.W. Pennington, eds., New York: AMACOM, 141±147. Abetti, P.A. (1991) The impact of technology on corporate strategy and organization. International Journal of Technology Management, special issue on Role of Technology on Corporate Policy, 40±58. Abetti, P.A. and Stuart, R.W. (1985) Entrepreneurship and technology transfer: Key factors in the innovation process. In D.L. Sexton and R.W. Smilor, eds., The Art and Science of Entrepreneurship. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 181±210. Abetti, P.A. and Stuart R.W. (1988) Evaluating new product risk. Research Technology Management 31, May±June: 40±43. Adams, A. (1962) New product risk strategy in small firms, The Business Graduate, Spring: 64±67. Allen, T.J. (1977) Managing the Flow of Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Baker, N.R., Green, S.G., Bean, A.S. (1986) The need for strategic balance in R&D project portfolios. Research Management 29 (2):38±43. Block, Z., and MacMillan, I.C. (1993) Corporate Venturing. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Cooper, R.G. (1994) Winning at New Products. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2nd edition. BusinessWeek 2000. The World's Most Valuable Companies. July 10. Edison Electric Institute (1968) EHV Transmission Line Reference Book. New York: Edison Electric Institute. Electric Power Research Institute (1982) Transmission Line Reference Book, 345 kV and Above. Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute, 2nd ed. Fox, J. (2000) Nokia's secret code. Fortune, May 1: 161±174. Kanter, R.M. (1983) The Change Masters. New York: Simon and Schuster. Kelly, P. and Kranzberg, M. (1978) Technological Innovation: A Critical Review of Current Knowledge. San Francisco, CA: The San Francisco Press. Levi, N. (1998) Managing High Technology and Innovation. Princeton, NJ: Prentice Hall. Maidique, M.A. (1980) Entrepreneurs, champions and technological innovation. Sloan Management Review 21 (Winter):59±76. Maidique, M.A. and Zirger, B.J. (1985) The new product learning cycle. Research Policy 14(6): 299± 313.

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Marquis, D.G. (1969) The anatomy of successful innovations. Innovation (November). Reprinted in M.L. Tushman and W.L. Moore, eds., 1988. Readings in the Management of Innovation. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 2nd ed., 79±87. Merrill Lynch 1990. Motorola Inc. New Global Satellite Cellular Phone System. Report by Capital Markets, Global Securities and Economics Group. June 19. Morone, J. (1993) Winning in High-Tech Markets. Boston: Harvard Business School Press Myers, S. and Marquis, D.G. (1967) Technological Innovation: Its Environment and Management. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce. OECD (1871) The Conditions for Success in Technological Innovation. Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). Oren, S.S., Rothkopf, M.H. and Smallwood, R.D. (1980) Evaluating a new market: A forecasting system for non-impact printers. Interfaces 10(6) December:76±87. Pinchot, G. III (1985) Intrapreneuring. New York: Harper and Row. Pulkkinen, M. (1997) The Breakthrough of Nokia Mobile Phones. Helsinki: Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration, Ph.D. Thesis. Riezenman, M. (2000) Iridium: Were terrestrial cell phones really the problem? IEEE Spectrum, May:10±11. Roberts, E.B. (1991) Entrepreneurs in High Technology. New York: Oxford University Press. Roberts, E.B. and Berry C.A. (1985) Entering new businesses: selecting strategies for success. Sloan Management Review: 3±17.

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Roberts, E.B. and Meyer, M.H. (1991) Product strategy and corporate success. Engineering Management Review, Spring: 4±18. Rothwell, R. et al (1974) Sappho updated ± Project Sappho phase II. Research Policy 3:258±91. Timmons, J. (1985) New Venture Creation. Boston: Irwin 2nd Edition. Timmons, J. (1999) New Venture Creation. Boston: Irwin, 5th ed. Utterback, J.M., Allen, T.J., Hollomon, J.H., Sirbo, M.H. (1976) The process of innovation in five industries in Europe and Japan. IEEE Transactions in Engineering Management 23, February: 3±9. Vallery-Radot, R. (1923) The Life of Louis Pasteur. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday. Van de Ven, A.H., Angle, H.L. and Poole, M.S., eds., (1989) Research on the Management of Innovation: The Minnesota Studies. New York: Ballinger/Harper and Row. Von Hippel, E. (1988) The Sources of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press. Wall Street Journal (1999a) Losers in Space ± Iridium's downfall. Aug. 18:A1. Wall Street Journal (1999b) Why cell phones succeeded where Iridium failed. Aug. 23: A14.

Pier A. Abetti is Professor of Management and Entrepreneurship at the Lally School of Management and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, USA.

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The Problematic Role of Lawyers in the Creativity and Innovation Process James Tunney In the literature on creativity and innovation management, the role of law is often peripheral. There is an urgent need to inject law into creativity and innovation management discourse. However there is a deeper reflexive need. Legal systems are in urgent need of reform and repair. They urgently need input from people who genuinely understand about creativity and innovation management in relation to the operation of overall systems. This is a call for a greater dialogue between creativity management and the legal establishment.

L

The lawyerstatesman type

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aw is valuable and will make a positive contribution to human endeavour, if it involves an inclusive, independent, informed institution which can provide impartial decisions in both simple and complex contexts, to control a consensus of competing constituencies. However, the hegemony of the legal establishment needs to be constantly assaulted, so that the value of law is wrestled back for the benefit of the community and people realise that the lawyers are serving the people and not the other way around. Many lawyers may be creative and innovative in deep and permanent ways. One cannot dismiss lawyers or treat them as an homogeneous whole. The fact that many celebrated political figures, such as Churchill, O'Connell, Gandhi and Mandela were lawyers, is not a coincidence. The lawyer-statesman type is well established. In addition, the role of lawyers, and law-givers in traditional and indigenous societies always involved creative people. The mode of dispute settlement in `primitive' societies is often associated with mysticism and elaborate rituals. The Brehon law, which was the system of law in Ireland before the arrival of the common law with the Normans in 1169, had what was described as a `poetico-legal' tradition. Both poets and lawyers were powerful, professional cults in that society. Both trained for seven years. All such decision-makers needed to be creative. The `justiciarii' who developed the common law in the saddle in England were creative. The many constructors of legal principle within Roman law were creative. However the growth of colonial power seems

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to have fostered a tradition of bureaucraticadministrative-lawyers (like those found in post-colonial situations), which have led to the dominant paradigm of the lawyer we find in most liberal democracies. Still today, many lawyers are creative, although the demands on their creativity may not be a sociallyoptimal one. However, the role of lawyers is highly problematic in relation to the creative and innovative process, from a number of perspectives. To take a simple, practical example, subjects which are particularly relevant to the creativity and innovation process, such as Intellectual Property (IP), do not have a high profile in legal education. Many lawyers have often been singularly ill-prepared to advise people in regard to the relevant areas of substantive law, never mind any value-added insight or sensitivity which may be particularly appropriate to this context. Associated demand discontent may be manifested in the diversion of legal work in creative areas (such as film production) to other professions such as accountants, as was the experience in Ireland in the last decade. In addition, as will be examined here, the professional worldview is often inimical to creative forces. Thus it might be noted that the processes of legal education reveals a paradoxical and unsatisfactory role for the legal profession in relation to the creative and innovation processes. This is part of a general problem with the legal establishment. Furthermore, lawyers are at the core of the origin and operation of legal systems in general which are manifesting severe dysfunctionalities, not least as a result # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

LAWYERS AND CREATIVITY

of the failure to innovate. Thus there is a reflexive relationship (Soros, 1998) between lawyers, legal systems and the creativity and innovation process which should be adumbrated insofar as it demands academic attention and hopefully practical solutions.

The Relevance of Law to the Creativity and Innovation Process Law and creativity are fundamentally linked. As mentioned above, creativity and innovation is important from the supply-side, in relation to what, why and how lawyers do what they do and as a result, how legal systems develop. But from the demand-side, it must always be borne in mind that the fruits of creativity and innovation can be fought over and contested. It seems to be the lot of man that disputes follow creation and innovation. That is why creativity and innovation is recognised at the highest level, such as by the constitution of the United States. Those who have benefited and suffered from the legal process, become aware of its relevance, for better or worse. Bill Gates understands the significance of IP law, in the context of the software and CT industries (Gates, 1995). Trevor Baylis understands the relevance of patent and design law (Baylis, 1999). Presumably, the `Artist Formerly known as Prince,' and George Michael also are keenly aware of the law of contract, and how it can help or hinder the creative process. Legal rules may adversely affect innovators rights and presumably, as a consequence, the process of innovation. Lawyers have a potentially important role in the process of creativity and innovation. They advise clients and offer protection in relation to such things as copyright, patents, designs, confidential information, `passingoff' and unfair competition. The general area of IP law, is the most relevant to the creative and innovative function, although other questions such as contract, delict/tort and product liability are also crucial. The legal system regulates innovation principally through registration systems such as patents and designs, (with some variations between common law and civil law systems). Patents, by giving a monopoly, are seen to provide a reward for innovation, and a shelter to facilitate commercial exploitation, and likewise with designs. Copyright (which generally does not require registration) will protect artists writers, playwrights, sculptors, film makers, sound recorders, performers, mime artists, database makers, broadcasters and cable programme makers, to name but a

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few. Trade marks, although more commercial and less artistic, have spawned large, arguably, creative industries associated with branding. Other areas of law such as passing off and the protection of confidential information in the UK, will offer protection to the creator and innovator. The European Union (EU), in its attempt to establish the single market as originally contemplated by the Treaty of Rome 1957, based on the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, has had to reconcile its efforts with the existing disparities in IP protection. Thus IP has been harmonised in various ways, such as through Directives and decisions of the European Court of Justice. Competition (or antitrust law in the US) is an oft-forgotten area of law. It seeks generally to prevent abuses of market power, by limiting, for example, `attempts to monopolise' (in the US, under the Sherman Act of 1890) and preventing `abuse of a dominant position' under Article 82(ex 86) of the EC Treaty. The former is the relevant law in relation to the Microsoft case in the US (Brinkley, 2001). It has also been used to challenge the power of collecting agencies in the EU and elsewhere. It is a formidable machine, insofar as for example the European Commission can impose fines of up to 10% of the gross turnover world-wide of an undertaking found to have infringed the provisions. This will play a greater role in the re-alignment of the structural powers in the worlds in which creators and innovators work. It is both a threat and an opportunity for those involved in the world in which creators and innovators work. It is both a threat and an opportunity for those involved in the creation and innovation process, and thus there should be an awareness of it (Tunney, 1998). In the meantime, lawyers are useful, despite these limitations. They can provide advice which is critical in anticipating the interaction of relevant forces. The probable, psychological profile of the entrepreneur, creator or innovator, may not make them the best candidates for their own self-protection. In relation to creativity and innovation, lawyers provide a potential protection against others who want to exploit the potential of the creative and innovative. Their pessimism, cynicism and practical sense, might be better able to foresee the unfortunately inevitable attacks. Their experience might balance the naivety, idealism or merely benign disposition of some of the creative and innovative people. They may help secure patents, design or copyright protection, construct contracts, protect against infringers, secure application of the criminal law and generally chart a

Linking law and creativity

Potential protection of lawyers

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course through the white water of legal protection.

The Problem with Law

A profession in crisis

However, law and legal systems are often dysfunctional. They have shown consistently their potential to be archaic, antiquated, elitist, exclusive, slow, unfair, unjust and wrong. The legal establishment, have generally been anti-competitive, introverted, introspective and protective. That however is a failure of operations and not of purpose. That the referee makes manifestly wrong decisions, even if consistently, is not a justification for abandoning the rules. The baby must not be thrown out with the bath-water. Indeed the lack of credibility of lawyers in relation to law reform, paradoxically puts an onus on others to raise this argument. As long as law is an essential part of the hard-wiring of the global village, it remains a formidable force to be reckoned with. If everything in the legal garden were rosy, then criticism of the legal systems, the legal profession (and accordingly the nexus with the creativity and innovation process) might be more difficult to sustain. However the systemic problems in law, are alarming. Mature legal systems in western, liberal democracies are experiencing a degree of convulsion which merits the title `crisis' in relation to the legal establishment (Glendon, 1994), involving `falling ideals' (Kronman, 1993), the `collapse' of criminal justice (Rose, 1996), the persistence of redundant legal concepts (Tunney, 1998), and the lack of `common sense' (Howard, 1994). The twentieth century promise of legal systems has dwindled into disappointment. The hope that legal systems might experience an enfranchisement of the type that political systems did, has not happened. The perennial problems of legal systems persist, some of which may be noted thus. (a) Legal systems are still exclusive, elitist and dysfunctional. Civil and criminal systems are seen to be dogged by legitimate complaints of complexity, expense, inconvenience, antiquity, anachronism and delay. Lawyers often cause these problems or deny that they exist. (b) Miscarriages of justice still recur. The recurrence of miscarriages of justice in western, liberal democracies has emphasised the systemic problems in the operation of criminal law. Lawyers, by definition, were involved in all miscarriages of justice, and have often played a causative role, although they are good at projecting blame elsewhere.

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(c) Legal exclusion persists. People have always been excluded from the benefits of legal protection by religion, race, ethnic origin, disability, gender and expense or alternatively escape inappropriately from punishment. Law and lawyers have often played a crucial role in the persistence of exclusion. (d) People are unhappy with legal systems and services. Although law should be a servant of the people, it is often perceived to be otherwise, and the popular disenchantment with legal systems is manifest in folklore, jokes, newspapers, film and novels. The discontent is predominantly directed against the legal establishment. (e) There is disparate enforceability. Enforceability of law in a universal, transparent, consistent and fair way cannot be claimed. This is manifest in relation to international law, white-collar crime and towards particular groups such as indigenous people. (f ) In short, many legal systems do not work and instead perform at a sub-optimum level.

The Problem with Lawyers The contemporary legal profession has been increasingly regarded as being in crisis. The mistake is to believe that this is a contemporary phenomenon as distinct from the endemic problem that it is. In the nineteenth century in New York, the profession were not respected and indeed were vilified in some quarters. In the times of the Roman Empire, the advocates were regarded as rapacious guides. In literature, from Shakespeare to Dickens to Grisham, lawyers do not receive a lot of praise. In popular film, the role of the lawyer is questioned (Denvir, 1996). Literature and film are seen to be useful corroborative indicators of the problems with lawyers, because of their contiguity to known circumstances. This is not accidental. The evolution from the prehistoric to the contemporary illustrates and underlines a continuum of elitism, due to the unique nature of law. The forces of cohesion were re-inforced by a number of factors, such as colonial administration. While law became separated from the community, the legal profession protected itself by erecting a moat. With the evolution of modern society, the unique experience of the legal profession put them in a unique position from which to engage in anti-competitive practices. The restrictive practices, and monopolistic position of the professional bodies, bring all the attendant and usual consequences of inefficiency, most notably a lack of innovation

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(Massey and O'Hare, 1996). Ultimately, the law belongs to the community, and it might be predicted that there are certain positive forces such as liberalisation, competition law and communications technology law which will serve to return law to the community. But if innovation is a problem, due to structural reasons, then it follows that innovation should be part of the solution. The education of lawyers continues to be regressive and antiquated. They learn in a conservative, `backwards-compatible' way. The skills of creativity (and to a lesser extent critical thinking) are marginal. The nature of legal education, and the cohesive, elitist and traditional dimensions to the professions, combined with a tendency towards anti-competitive practices, has meant that the contemporary legal professions in the EU and elsewhere are predominantly constituted of an ex post, mechanistic mind frame. In addition, the training of lawyers is often calculated to see the negative side, to be aware unduly of the pitfalls and to be over-pessimistic, which probably contributes to a generally riskadverse mindset (Tunney, 2000). Having placed a high toll at the drawbridge into the castle of lucrative endeavour, the legal professions are able to turn away many who would be disposed to question the status quo by their presence. Endurance, endeavour, persistence and a degree of conformity are needed. Design and creative skills are not needed. Paradoxically, this conservative and largely uncreative profession, have a huge input into the creative and innovative process. Lawyers are heavily involved in the status quo in many countries. Indeed they are the very maintainers of the status quo and even the status quo ante. Many legal professions in western, liberal democracies seek to preserve in formaldehyde those things which should have been allowed to perish and pass. But the tendency to bind together of the profession and preserve, defeats change and dynamism. It is only those who have risen through the ranks of the legal establishment, (such as perhaps in the case of Daniel O'Connell or Mary Robinson) with the force of great personality and will, who can understand the range of equations necessary to obtain change in great leaps. Or else they may become revolutionary and see the legal system, and the skeleton of politics it houses as the essence of the evil they want to alter. The French and American revolutionaries may fit into this category. Revolutionaries in the US who became the `founding fathers' were often trained in law but did not practice it (Syndor, 1967), although they are exceptional.

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The success of the legal professions in building a citadel around themselves, has been striking in its ability to put off potential entrants into law, not least where they are creative or innovative. These people could have been able to influence the necessary correction of pervasive systems-problems in the operation of legal systems. This forms part of the problematic role of lawyers in general. Many lawyers are of a mechanistic mindset. An historical analysis illustrates that legal education was utilised as a mechanism to integrate young lawyers into the machine of State. The opportunity and need for those skilled in understanding the dynamic of creativity and innovation in a coherent and systematic way, become clear. The proximity between accountants, the accountancy profession and lawyers and the legal profession are obvious. The following observation would seem apt for both. Birkin (1996) writing from a critical accounting perspective, argues that contemporary mainstream techniques, values and ways of thinking in accountancy are unsuitable for environmental accounting and sustainable development contexts. He writes, Cartesian thought describes well a clockwork universe. Mechanical clocks occupied an eminent position in Renaissance technology and one of the greatest achievements of the age, Newton's law of motion, described planetary motion as a majestic clockwork. Concepts and functions within traditional accounting classification system are reminiscent of clockwork: ``cogs'' are the discrete and specialised parts of both an accounting classification system and the accountant isolated within an idealised, strong professional objectivity; ``motive power'' is allowed to operate only in predetermined ways subject to strong regulation; precision and cleverness are integral elements of the design (emotion, intuition and wisdom having no place); and numerical analysis provides significant and for many purposes, wholly sufficient representation of both means and ends. Such professions are arguably not calculated to be highly sympathetic or understanding of the creators and innovators in our midst and the special needs that people of such orientations and dispositions may have. Thus for example, the common lawyer is fed at university on a diet of cases which, by definition, represent a catalogue of failures, of breakdowns, and irreconcilable differences. In contrast, by their nature, creative people may be less tolerant of hierarchical structures, authority and formality. Indeed the evidence

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suggests that the lawyers may be the last people who should be involved in certain contexts involving the creative and innovation function.

Conclusion

The crucial role of law

It cannot be constructive, and in the interests of creators and innovators, that advisors who should be positioned to offer them the best protection, are performing at a sub-optimum level and do not possess relevant and appropriate skills. A profession, which glorifies, rigidity, ritual and respect above all values irrespective of competing ones, and which has not adapted with the passage of time should not play a central role in the creativity and innovation process. That should never blind one to the crucial role of law however, and the need for proper orientation through its obstacle courses. Thus there is a challenge to those involved in the theory and practice of creativity and innovation management to think about law and legal systems. There needs to be more study of lawyers and creativity, lawyers and their service in this domain, as well as studies which look at the creativity and innovation process at work (or not at work) in the evolution of legal systems in a macro sense. There should be a warning however, that lawyers and the legal establishment are as formidable a bunch of thinkers as may be found anywhere. Some of the softfocus, gentle types of creativity programs will not work with them.

References Baylis, T. (1999) Clock This: My Life as an Inventor, London: Headline.

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Birkin, A. (1996) From Cogito to Thinking Like a Mountain, Critical Perspectives in Accounting, Vol. 7, 231. Brinkley, J. and Lohr, S. U.S. v. Microsoft, New York: McGraw-Hill. Denvir, J. (ed) (1996) Legal Reelism: Movies as Legal Texts, University of Illinois Press, Chicago. Gates, B. (1995) The Road Ahead, London: Viking. Glendon, M. (1994) A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming American Society, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kronman, A. (1993) The Lost Lawyer: Falling Ideals of the Legal Profession, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Howard, P. (1996) The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating America, New York: Warner Brothers. Massey, P. and O'Hare, P. Competition Law and Policy -in Ireland, Oak Tree Press, Dublin, 287. Rose, D. (1996) In the Name of the Law: The Collapse of Criminal Justice, London: Jonathon Cape. Soros, G. (1998), The Crisis of Global Capitalism, London: Little Brown. Syndor, F. (1967) American Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in Washington's Virginia, New York: Free Press. Tunney, J. (1998) The need for strategic awareness of European Union law for HTSFs, in the 6th High Technology Small Firms Conference Proceedings, University of Twente, Netherlands, 1, 31. Tunney, J.(2000), Notes on the reflexive role of cyberspace, International Review of Law, Computers and Technology, 14, 2, 243±257.

James Tunney, Senior Lecturer in Law, Dundee Business School, University of Abertay Dundee, BA (Hons) Law, Trinity College Dublin, Barrister, Kings Inn, Dublin, LLM (Commercial law), Queen Mary College University of London.

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Call Centres: Pre-evaluation of their Usefulness in Local Government David McElhinney and Tony Proctor The development of contact-centres within those local government organisations in the UK is occurring with inadequate strategic consideration. The general themes which emerged during in-depth surveys strongly support the proposition. Thus, a significant new product development is at risk and may cost each individual organisation many millions of pounds in set-up costs representing substantial financial commitment. Yet, there is only limited knowledge of capital costs or on-going revenue costs, strong evidence of internal resistance, a lack of any shared vision, or knowledge of the level of risk. There is only limited understanding of the organisational impact of such an innovation, its potential benefits or added value that it could provide. There is also evidence to support the view that the decisionmaking process is following a path of logical incrementalism without clearly stated project objectives or formal project appraisal. There is a creeping commitment to the continuation of such projects, and often a lack of group and intragroup coherence. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of powerful product champions and compliant project teams.

Introduction

T

here is clear evidence of local government embracing the development and introduction of call-centres into the heart of their operations (Surrey County Council 1998; FITLOG, 1999a,b,c,d; Local Government Chronicle, 1999; Municipal Journal, 1999; Oakwood, 1999). For these to be effective there is a requirement for substantial organisational commitment, considerable financial resources and significant business-process reengineering. It could be argued that such strategies go against the generally risk-averse culture of local government. This poses the question as to why local government is collectively following such a strategy given the apparent absence of any (published) rigorous evaluation of its organisational costs, effectiveness, risk and overall customer value. Below we report on research undertaken which examines this question and related issues.

Research Approach Followed It is generally argued that the choice of research design imposes intellectual and practical constraints on a researcher in terms # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

of reliability, validity and generalisability (Creswell, 1994; Webb, 1995; Crouch & Housden; 1996; Silverman, 1997). This research study adopted a predominantly qualitative perspective. The authors accept the constraints, and perhaps even some contradictions that this choice may produce, particularly as recognise the benefits from presenting the study within a more positivistic structure. We note however, that although rather unusual, the application of a positivistic approach with largely qualitative data is in no way a contradiction or methodologically in error.

Research questions The set of research questions evolved from a combination of activities. They emerged during the process and were open to iterative revision and challenge. The main contributions to the questions came from a literature review of decision making processes relevant to the topic of interest; a review of previous call-centre research work and findings; and interviews with members of various relevant constituencies. The questions were comprehensive, and as we will show were addressed comprehensively within the constraints of the

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study. However, we will also indicate where our investigations failed to provide satisfactory resolution for a question. The literature review was a rich source of information and ideas covering the general areas of relevance to the research. This highlighted the areas of risk (in its broadest form), incremental decision-making, over-commitment, coherence and uncertainty. The following questions were identified for exploration: Is the policy of establishing customer contactcentres within local government being developed in a strategic vacuum?

A strategic vacuum

In this case strategic vacuum is taken to mean that a new product could be developed in isolation of any product development strategy, corporate plan or customer service strategy. The product is being developed, not because of any sound business-case, but for other reasons (to be first, to be seen as leading edge, to enhance organisational reputation, or as a consequence of creeping commitment). Has the financial cost (both in terms of capital and revenue) of delivering a customer contact-centre been quantified, or justified, in terms of a robust business±case or financial model? Is the development of customer contact-centres being driven by corporate champions at the head of organisations with only limited shared ownership throughout organisations? Does the level of commitment to the development of a customer contact-centre vary significantly within organisations amongst the key decisionmakers? It is important to assess the level of commitment, or for that matter over-commitment, amongst the key players within an organisation. If there is significantly different levels in commitment this could indicate likely levels of resistance. This resistance may be implicit or explicit. Have the cultural issues of establishing a customer contact-centre been formally identified, evaluated or formally reported upon?

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Risk is considered in its broadest sense. It is not simply financial risk. The risk associated with the development of contact-centres strikes at the heart of an organisation. These risks include the risk to the reputation of an organisation. In local government those involved in the development of contact-centres tend to be viewed by their peers as leadingedge and at the forefront of the Government's modernising agenda. The risk of failure becomes significant. However the fear of stopping can also be great, leading to levels of over-commitment. Other risks include the adverse impact on levels of customer service. The recent Passport Office experience is evidence of the potential impact on organisational reputation and level of service to the customer. The personal risk to product champions cannot be under-estimated. The risk of the technology failing or under-performing is a real possibility. There is also the risk of the culture of the organisation not fitting with the vision and demands of a contact-centre. If this fit is not achieved it can lead to reduced organisational performance, significant organisational conflict and turmoil. In the absence of any formal risk-assessment or risk register the potential for this formal evaluation and reporting levels of risk-taking increases (Staw & Ross, 1987). Is local government a risk aversive environment pursuing a high-risk strategy in developing customer contact-centres? Are local authorities are not generally aware of the concept of entrapment,(operational or strtegic rigidity) the dangers of entrapment, or the means of avoiding entrapment? Is decision-taking is taking place within the framework of logical incrementalism which is encourages a policy of creeping commitment? Is there limited post evaluation of new projects in local government to help identify failed projects, and any lessons an organisation can learn from such events? Is political composition a key determinant in selecting a procurement route for the delivery of a customer contact-centre?

Culture is taken to include issues such as levels of; risk-taking, conservativism, innovation, cautiousness, reputation, team-work, departmentalism, forms of communication, nature of decision-making, how risk is managed and employee motivation. Importantly, it also includes behaviour and the values of the organisation.

Review of Existing Call-Centre Research

Have the risks associated with the setting up of a customer contact-centre been assessed and evaluated?

A review was conducted of available quantitative and qualitative research studies related to call-centres and contact-centres activity in

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local government across the UK. This helped in establishing those organisations that are specifically involved in developing and introducing call-centres (and possibly contactcentres). This review helped to prepare an analysis of those local authorities engaged in this field of activity, and just as importantly, those who are not. Survey information was found which covered the structure of local government within England which included the thirty-three London Boroughs, thirty-four English County Councils, thirty-six Metropolitan Boroughs, forty-six Unitary Authorities, and the two hundred and thirty-eight District Councils. A survey conducted by Oakwood (1999) covered the total population of three hundred and eighty-seven English local authorities. It achieved a response rate of fifty-five `per cent'. It was completed through a closed-ended postal survey. This survey data allowed an analysis by nature of authority, political composition, stage of development, and procurement route. No other significant studies were found in relation to call-centre or contact-centre developmental activity. A range of published keynote reports were reviewed (eg. Henley, 1997, 1999; Kable, 1997; Cabinet Office, 1998a,b.c, 1999a,b,c,d, 2000; CDW & Associates, 1998; FITLOG, 1999a, e; Local Government Management Board, 1998b; Barnes & Isaac-Henry, 1999; Merchants, 1999). This provided a wealth of information on the growth of call-centres, the potential benefits of such an approach and individual organisational case studies of activity. There was a considerable focus on all issues around ICT. Contact was made with the appropriate trade associations and market specialists, including the Foundation for Information Technology in Local Government (FITLOG), Service First (Cabinet Office), and the CallCentre Association. Specialist journals were reviewed including; the International Journal of Call-centre Management, Government IT, and Government Computing. Local government publications were reviewed particularly the Municipal Journal, Local Government Chronicle and Network First. A search of marketing and general publications was undertaken. Within these areas little was found on the detailed development of contact-centres. Only very limited information was available on the impact on organisations or forms of evaluation of such developments. The focus tended to be on specific case examples, usually around good practice. Considerable coverage is given to the ICT elements of contact-centres but virtually nothing to culture, risk or affordability.

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In-depth Interviews A series of in-depth interviews involving eighteen people were conducted across seven organisations. The in-depth interviews involved a series of probing questions on a one-to-one basis. The objective was to obtain unrestricted comments (or opinions) and to gain a fuller understanding of the various dimensions of these opinions. The number of interviews was determined largely through limitations of cost and time. A standardised open-ended interview approach was employed and tailored to each set of actors in the local government and non-local government sectors. The in-depth interviews attempted to uncover, and then identify why individuals believed that an organisation followed a particular strategy. They were intended to help gain a fuller appreciation of any debate that may have taken place prior to the adoption of any strategy; to identify whether any dissent was present prior to the adoption of such a strategy and if so, how the dissent was resolved (or not). In addition the interviews were interested in whether any formal research had taken place prior to a strategy being agreed; if any evaluation had taken place during the process period; whether any analysis had been challenged; what scaling and scoping had been undertaken and reported to either employees, trade unions, customers and councillors; and whether the potential impact on its relationship with its customers had been explored or evaluated. A further area of questioning attempted to determine what level of organisational commitment had been made, whether the development of the product had been costed e.g. in terms of financial expenditure, goodwill, industrial unrest, system failures, political tensions, organisational tensions, or conflict. The research sought to explore if, and how, any of these issues had been rationalised. The question of risk was explored in some detail, along with, discussions of who championed such a strategy and whether any motives existed for such a position. Given the limitations of time and cost, the study considered a representative sample from metropolitan local authorities only. However one district council was also surveyed. In each of the metropolitan local authorities surveyed, five individual in-depth interviews were conducted. .

A representative sample

General Themes From the in-depth survey research a number

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of general themes emerged. These can be grouped collectively under the following:

formally assessed, evaluated or reported upon.

There appeared to be a general lack of understanding around the subject area of new product development. This is particularly true in the domain of the product development of contact-centres. For example, what constitutes a contact-centre? What are its benefits? What are its expected development costs?

There was an apparent lack of intragroup coherence displayed (Yang & Dougherty, 1993, p147) and in some cases a lack of group coherence displayed.

Within one organisation there was strong evidence of a lack of consensus around a number of critical issues. For example, a range of differing and contradictory responses were received from within an organisation when asked, does the organisation have a corporate plan or customer contact policy? Is there a defined set of objectives for the project? Has any formal evaluation been undertaken? There seems to be an apparent lack of ownership around the vision of what a contact-centre could achieve within specific organisations. Considerable resistance was identified within organisations. This was particularly so within senior management teams and service departments. Where conflict existed, and had been identified, little appeared to have been attempted to resolve this resistance or conflict within the organisation There appeared to be little understanding of the costs (either capital or revenue) involved in the development of the new product. Or for that matter any real appreciation of the added value that any new product could deliver within the business if applied correctly. There was evidence of creeping levels of commitment to both the concept and subsequent introduction of contact-centres. This situation appeared to be developing in the absence of any formal evaluation or formal reporting against any original project objectives. There appeared to be no real understanding, or appreciation, of the organisational issues that needed to be addressed to ensure the successful introduction of the new product e.g. professionalism, overt departmentalism, loss of power, culture.

Little financial evaluation

There was no common agreement or, for that matter, understanding of the level of political support at either the national level or at the local level. The risks involved in developing, and then introducing, a contact-centre had not been

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These general themes could all be described as signs of potential entrapment (Staw & Ross, 1987; Wilson, Gilligan & Pearson, 1992; Proctor, 1993). The themes demonstrate, individually and collectively, a lack of organisational rigour. This indicates an environment where decision-making could be taking place in the absence of available and salient facts. It is difficult to envisage rational decisionmaking in the absence of robust project objectives, any financial framework, or any analysis of risk taking. The conditions appear ripe for entrapment to develop and then occur.

The policy of establishing customer contact-centres within local government is being developed in a strategic vacuum Of the four local government organisations surveyed, only one had a corporate plan. None had a customer-contact strategy or customer service strategy. There was a lessthan-clear vision of what a contact-centre actually is. We found none in which the original project objectives were stated. The evidence suggests that the development of contactcentres is not taking place within a clear strategic framework. It is being driven perhaps more by a desire to please others than on any sound business case. There is no evidence of any formal evaluation or assessment of the risks involved taking place. On this basis the weight of evidence supports the point of view that contactcentres are indeed being developed within a strategic vacuum. The financial costs (both in terms of capital and revenue) of delivering a customer contact-centre have not been quantified, or justified, in terms of a robust business ± case or financial model. Almost no financial evaluation has taken place. The immediate capital costs of settingup a contact-centre have not been determined or budgeted for. A conservative estimate of five million pounds has been suggested as the cost of establishing such a facility.

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There is no evidence of any financial evaluation of the future revenue costs of a contactcentre taking place across any of the four local government organisations surveyed. No cost/ benefit analysis has been completed or formal business case developed. Within the non-local government organisations surveyed the responses to the estimated future costs of a contact-centre varied from `nil' to the `cost equation remains unclear'. It is difficult to envisage such a large scale new product development project taking place without any sound business-case being developed, evaluated and subsequently monitored against. The evidence supports the argument that the future costs of delivering a contact-centre have not been quantified or justified within any business case or financial model. The development of customer contact-centres are being driven by corporate champions at the head of organisations with only limited shared ownership throughout organisations. In each of the organisations surveyed, either the Chief Executive or the Director of Finance was mentioned as the product champion. On only one occasion was political leadership even mentioned. Within this latter organisation six different people were identified as the product champion. Resistance to the proposals was generally identified as strong. The groups opposed to the project included trade unions, service departments, professions, directors, and councillors. This evidence indicates a lack of shared ownership within these local government organisations. Leadership is evidently coming from the top of the organisation, then delivered through small and tight project teams who are deeply committed to the new product development. It is argued that the evidence supports the view that there exists only limited shared ownership of the vision within these organisations. The level of commitment amongst the key decision-makers to the development of a customer contact-centre varies significantly within organisations. The level of commitment varied considerably within each organisation. However it is difficult to establish the degree of these different levels of commitment and thus levels of overcommitment. Within the sample surveyed, it was clear that only subjective statements were being made by the individuals surveyed. This subjectivity was made relative to an individual's own perspective of his/her level of

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commitment when compared to his/her perspective of another individual's commitment. The research study did not establish a base-line of commitment. It therefore could not compare individual levels of commitment. The area of levels of commitment within an organisation, in the context of entrapment, would indeed lend itself to further research. The cultural issues of establishing a customer contact-centre have not been formally identified, evaluated or formally reported upon. A contact-centre requires significant business process reengineering of systems, transactions and processors. This must be combined with a substantial change management agenda and the transformation of structures. The product allows organisations to work in different ways. To be more effective, it is not simply about a product which allows organisation to do things more effectively. The success or failure of any new product of this nature depends upon addressing these fundamental organisational issues. The research study found that within four local government organisations some of these cultural issues had indeed been identified. This view was reflected in the non-local government organisations surveyed. However it was also clear that no formal evaluation, or formal reporting of these fundamental issues had been undertaken. There was almost a complete absence of work in this area. When considering the complexity of the issues and the potential impact on an organisation this is a startling outcome. The evidence supports the view that the cultural issues around the development of a contact-centre have not yet been formally identified, evaluated or reported upon. The risks associated with the setting up of a customer contact-centre have not been assessed or evaluated. In the field of new product development, risk is a critical part of informing the decisionmaking processes. Without a full risk evaluation and assessment then there is always a danger of serious decision-making biases. Within the non-local government organisations surveyed the issue of risk was generally viewed around the softer issues of departmentalism, management buy-in, under-estimating the complexity of the product being developed, unclear corporate objectives, raised customer expectations, amount of management capacity available, and the costs of doing nothing. Interestingly in the local government organisations surveyed, the issue

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Informal decision making

of risk was generally viewed around the harder issues of organisational restructuring, financial savings, and the failure of ICT. The available evidence supports the view that the risks associated with the setting up a contact-centre remain unknown. Local Government is a risk aversive environment and is pursuing a high-risk strategy of developing customer contact-centres It is evident that introducing a contact-centre is a high-risk strategy. The scale, scope, and complexity of the product supports this position. Local government is witnessing a period of great change. The introduction of the cabinet system, directly elected mayors, and regional government supports this view. It is perhaps too early to say whether local government remains risk averse, or will continue to be so in the future. On this basis there is insufficient evidence to support the view that local government is following a high risk strategy in a low risk environment. Local authorities are not generally aware of the concept of entrapment, the dangers of entrapment, or the means of avoiding entrapment. The overall level of understanding within local government of new product development is generally low. There is also a general lack of understanding around risk, project management , and issues of product costs and benefits. The concept of entrapment (or its outcomes) are not generally known. The dangers of entrapment (eg. over-commitment), groupthink , managing risk and fear of failure are perhaps understood in theoretical terms but perhaps not grasped at the implementation level. It is difficult to see how the local government organisations could avoid entrapment if they were not conscious of its potential, or in reality, its existence. There is an absence of any new product development framework or models illustrating the low level of awareness within this field of business activity. The evidence supports the view that local government has limited understanding of potential new product development failure or an understanding of how to prevent it from occurring in the future. Decision-making is taking place within the framework of logical incrementalism which is encouraging a policy of creeping commitment. There was only limited evidence of any formal decision-taking around new product

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development. Informal decision-taking was in evidence. This was usually led by the product champion, in the absence of any real financial evaluation or cost/benefit analysis, risk evaluation or assessment, or continuous project appraisal, then there is strong supporting evidence of an incrementalist approach to decision-taking. The evidence suggests that the majority of elected members are at best passive towards the development of this new product, combined with the strong level of commitment from very influential product champions, there is strong evidence of creeping commitment. The local government organisations surveyed challenged this assumption. However all were committed to proceeding with the product development in the absence of any formal evaluation, clear product objectives, risk assessment, and in the face of resistance from within each organisations. On this basis it is argued that the evidence supports the view that an incrementalist approach is contributing to a situation of creeping commitment to the development of a new product. There is limited post evaluation of new projects in local government to help identify failed projects, and any lessons an organisation can learn from such events. It is clear that only limited post-evaluation of new product development takes place in local government, or a recognition of what constitutes a failed new product. The research study did not explore sufficiently this area and it offers an area for further research. Clearly new products do fail in local government. It would appear these failures are not then identified and lessons learnt. Failed products are either quietly funded, fundamentally changed to become a new product, or quietly stopped. Perhaps a logical incrementalist approach to decisionmaking contributes to this situation. Political composition is a key determinant in selecting a procurement route for the delivery of a customer contact-centre. It is a weakness of the in-depth interviews that the issue of procurement strategies was not explored. However to overcome this weakness an attempt was made to overlay against the Oakwood (1999) findings the political composition of local authorities. The findings highlighted how outsourcing a call-centre or contact-centre was the preferred procurement route for those planning a facility. Sixty-six organisations from a total population of seventy-five favoured this

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route. Political composition however was found not to be a significant factor. Of those local authorities undecided about developing such a new product all would consider outsourcing . Again political composition was not a significant factor. On the available data, the evidence does not support the view that political composition is a determining factor in selecting a procurement route. Is Entrapment occurring? It is the proposition of the authors that there is strong evidence to support the view that entrapment (Proctor, 1993) is occurring in the context of the development of contact-centres within those local government organisations surveyed. The general themes which emerged during the in-depth surveys strongly support this proposition. This is a significant new product development which will cost each individual organisation many millions of pounds in set-up costs which will represent a substantial on-going financial commitment. Yet, there is only limited knowledge of capital costs or on-going revenue costs, strong evidence of internal resistance, a lack of any shared vision, or knowledge of the level of risk. There is only limited understanding of the products organisational impact, its potential benefits or the added value that it could represent. There is also evidence to support the view that the decision-making process is following a path of logical incrementalism. There is an absence of any stated project objectives or formal project appraisal. There is a creeping commitment to the projects continuation. There is some evidence of powerful product champions and compliant project teams. There is evidence of a lack of group and intragroup coherence (Yang & Dougherty, 1993, p141). Other influences, other than rational economic objectives, are displayed. There is a desire to be first. To be seen to be at the leading edge of technology and its application in the field of customer service. A desire to embrace the Government's modernising agenda (Cabinet Office, 1999d) and its vision of e-government. These objectives seem to be a strong influence on the decision-making process.

References Barnes, C. & Issac-Henry, K. (1999) Local government on the line: new technologies and public access. December. Birmingham. University of Central England.

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Cabinet Office. (1998a) The six service standards for central government. A Report for The Cabinet Office. September. @ http://www.servic first/gov/uk/1998/six-standards.htm Cabinet Office. (1998b) Electronic government: the view from the queue. London. BMRB Interational. Cabinet Office. (1998c) `People's panel-a quick summary'. @ http://www.servicefirst. gov.uk/ 1998/panel/ppsummary/htm Cabinet Office. (1999a) `Central local information age government concordat'. Central Information Technology Unit @ http://www.citu.gov.uk/cl_iag/concordat/htm Cabinet Office. (1999b) `Peoples panel: answer the phone!.' Report No 3. July. London. ServiceFirst Publication. Cabinet Office. (1999c) Public service: we will value public service, not denigrate it'. London. HMSO. Cabinet Office. (1999d) The six service standards for central government: modernising government. London. Modernising Public Services Group. Cabinet Office. (2000) E-government: a strategic framework for public services in the information age. April. @ http://www.citu.gov.uk. CDW & Associates. (1998) Towards electronic local government. Management Report for Oracle Corporation, Sun Micro-Systems, Post Office Counters. 5 November. CDW & Associates Ltd. Creswell, J, W. (1994) Research design: qualitative and quantitative approaches. London. SAGE Publications Ltd. Crouch, S. & Housden, M. (1996) Marketing research: for managers. (eds). Oxford. Butterworth-Heinemann. Foundation for Information Technology in Local Government. (1999a) `Developing a call-centre approach in newham. @ http://www.fitlog.com/call/newham.htm. Foundation for Information Technology in Local Government. (1999b). `Brent council's one-stopshops and call-centre'. @ http://www. Fitlog.com/call/brent.htm. Foundation for Information Technology in Local Government. (1999c) `A call centre at Westminister city council'. @ http://www.fitlog.com/call/westminister.htm Foundation for Information Technology in Local Government. (1999d) `Three-Rivers dc combined call centre and one stop shop'. @ http://www.fitlog.com/call/threerivers.htm Foundation for Information Technology in Local Government Foundation for Information Technology in Local Government. (1999e) The connected council: leading the community in the information age. Calne. Foundation for Information Technology in Local Government Henley Centre. (1997) Teleculture: the citizen speaks. London. Henley Centre. Henley Centre. (1999) Rhetoric and reality: obstacles to change in government teleculture. London. Henley Centre. Kable. (1997) Call-centres in the public-sector: the Kable guide. No 2. July. London. Kable Ltd.

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Local Government Management Board. (1998) Local government spending and the macro economy. London. Merchants. (1999) `Call-centre benchmarking report 1998. London. Internal Report. Municipal Journal. (1999) `Council call-centre to speed-up service'. 10±16 September. (Page 9). Oakwood. (1999) Local authority call-centre database. September. Buckinghamshire. Oakwood Consulting And Research Ltd. Proctor, T. (1993) `Product innovation: the pitfalls of entrapment'. Journal of Creativity and Innovation Management, 2, 4. 165±260. Silverman, D. (1997) Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analysing talk, text and interaction. London;. Sage Publications Ltd. Staw, B, M. & Ross, J. (1987) `Knowing when to pull the pull'. in Harvard Business Review. March± April. (Pages 68±74). Surrey County Council. (1998) Public access to information and services strategy: public con-

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sultation document. Issue One. Surrey County Council. Webb, K. (1995) An introduction to problems in the philosophy of social sciences. London. Pinter. Wilson, R. M. S. & Gilligan, C. & Pearson, D. (1992) Strategic marketing management: planning, implementation and control. Oxford. ButterworthHeinemann. Yang, E. A. & Dougherty, D. (1993) `Product innovation: more than just making a new product'. in Journal of Creativity and Innovation Management. 2, 3. September. (Pages 137±155).

David McElhinney is an Executive Director of Liverpool City Council, and Tony Proctor is Visiting Professor in Marketing at Chester Business School, University College, Chester, UK.

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The Benefits of a Coherent Strategy for Innovation and Corporate Change: A Study Applying Miles and Snow's Model in the Context of Small Firms Fernando A. P. Gimenez The literature on strategy has focused a great deal of attention in the quest for a taxonomy of generic strategies (Hatten & Schendel, 1977; Herbert & Deresky, 1987; and Miller & Dess, 1993). A generic strategy can be seen as a broad categorisation of strategic choices with ample applicability across industries and organisational forms (Herbert & Deresky, 1987). On this study, the model proposed by Miles and Snow (1978) was adopted to describe small firms' competitive strategies. Miles and Snow have produced a typology of competitive strategies. Miles and Snow proposed that firms in general develop relatively stable patterns of strategic behaviour in order to accomplish a good alignment with perceived environmental conditions. Their typology involves four strategic types: defenders, prospectors, analysers and reactors. Data were collected with a sample of 150 Brazilian small firms' owner-managers using a questionnaire adapted from Conant, Mokwa and Varadarajan (1990). Competitive strategies identified in this study gave additional evidence in support of Miles and Snow's model of existence of four types of generic strategies in a competitive environment composed mainly of small firms.

1. Introduction

T

he literature focusing on small firms has increased substantially in the last three decades. Most reported research has dealt with problems and difficulties faced by owners of small businesses, as well as with the advantages and positive traits linked with this type of organisation (Scase & Goffee, 1989; Stanworth & Gray, 1991). Strategy formulation and strategic planning in small enterprises has been a topic of quite a large number of studies. Robinson and Pearce (1984), for instance, presented a classification including four research thrusts on small firm strategic planning, namely: (i) Strategic Planning Practices which included papers focusing on the nature of the strategic planning process in small firms, and the decision making approaches adopted by the entrepreneurs; (ii) Value of Planning which considered how strategic planning and performance of small businesses were related; (iii) Specific Features of the Planning Process that focused on specific # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

aspects of strategic planning, such as the search for external information and the use of consultants; and (iv) Content of Strategy that dealt with types of strategy adopted by entrepreneurs in different environment settings. As the classification proposed by Robinson and Pearce suggests, most of the papers in small firms strategic management have dealt with issues related to the strategic process. Only one of their four research thrusts indicated a concern with issues related to strategy content. Nevertheless, the analysis of the type of strategies followed in different conditions by small firms adds considerable knowledge to the field because it goes beyond the level of general description of the strategy formation process. On the other hand, if significant positive relationships between strategies, context, and small firm performance can be found this may have profound implications in terms of managerial practice. Thus, this paper discusses the results of a study dealing with competitive strategies

Small enterprise strategy

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adopted by owner-managers of small firms. The model proposed by Miles and Snow (1978) was adopted as a theoretical background to describe small firms' competitive strategies. Results gave additional evidence in support of Miles and Snow's model of existence of four types of generic strategies in a competitive environment composed mainly of small firms.

2. Research on small firm strategic management

Arguing against Porter

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When Robinson and Pearce (1984) published their review on research thrusts in small firms' strategic planning very little was reported on the strategy content thrust. In my literature survey, a reasonable number of studies were found to be dedicated to different aspects of strategy content on small firms. This seems to indicate a great awareness among researchers of the importance of content analysis to a better understanding of strategic behaviour in small firms. This thrust deals mainly with types of strategy adopted by entrepreneurs in different environmental settings and their potential association with firm's performance. I will comment upon a number of these studies to indicate the prevailing concern in this research thrust. Dilts and Prough (1989) conducted a comparative study to check the differences on the strategic orientation of small and large American travel agencies. Their findings showed that: ``managers of small and large firms were found to perceive the effectiveness of various strategies differently'' (Dilts & Prough, 1989, pp. 34). The larger travel agencies favoured differentiating offerings aggressively, establishing closer relationships with preferred suppliers and de-emphasising unattractive services or markets. The smaller ones, however, put more emphasis on joint political action with trade associations in order to create a more favourable business climate (Dilts & Prough, 1989). Chaganti (1987) designed a comparative study of strategies adopted by 192 small firms in different industry growth environments. This study allowed Chaganti to conclude that the environment has a contingent role on strategy formulation. In growth industries the most profitable strategies were: low cost production; low product innovation frequency; less use of patents; and a higher percentage of sales in local markets. Mature industries indicated only competitive pricing as an appropriate strategy. Finally, in declining industries, the most profitable strategies focused on broader product lines, higher firm

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image, and higher expenses with sales and management. Davig (1986) studied successful and unsuccessful strategies adopted by small firms in maturing industries. His approach to identifying the strategy was based on paragraph descriptions of the four Miles and Snow's generic strategies which were presented to the CEO of each firm, i.e., a selftyping approach that had been previously adopted by Snow and Hrebiniak (1980). Data were obtained from a sample of 60 firms from the apparel, foundry, and fabricated metal products. Results indicated that firms following the prospector and defender strategies achieved the best performance with respect to growth in profits, while reactors were the lowest performers. Analyzers' performance results were between those for reactors and the other two types. Differences on sales growth, although in the same direction, were not statistically significant for this sample. Contrary to the conclusions of Smith, Guthrie & Chen (1986), firm size did not appear to have any relation to performance, but the larger companies tended to be either analyzers or prospectors (Davig, 1986). This study showed that the four different strategic types could be found among a sample of small firms, and thus, in a way, dismisses the speculation advanced by Smith, Guthrie and Chen (1986) that Miles and Snow's typology could be seen as sequential stages of strategy development, i.e., defender strategies would be linked to small firms, and prospector strategies to larger firms. Rugman and Verbeke (1987) argued against the use of Porter's (1980) model of competitive strategy in the context of small firms and advocated the adoption of Miles and Snow's one. For them, small firms can only adopt a focus strategy and so, the choice between overall cost leadership, overall differentiation, and focus as proposed by Porter is not an issue in a small enterprise. They exemplify the application of Miles and Snow's framework to the Canadian electrical distribution industry. A sample of firms (the authors do not indicate the exact number) in this industry were studied and the most dominant strategy in the industry was found to be the prospector type. Many firms were identified as reactors, and a few as defenders. Contrary to what would be expected, no analyzers were identified (Rugman & Verbeke, 1987). Lyles, Baird, Orris and Kuratko (1993) describe a more comprehensive study dealing with the relationship between planning formality, strategic decision making process, and content of strategies and performance. A sample of 188 firms from a diverse range of

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industries located in the Midwestern United States provided data that allowed for the testing of the expected relationships. The results indicated that formal planners differed from non-formal planners in the degree of emphasis put on dimensions of strategic decision making and strategic choices. A wider range of strategies was adopted by formal planners. They also put greater emphasis on improving the quality of the strategic decision making. Formal planners, specifically, were more interested in cooperative strategies than non-formal planners (Lyles, Baird, Orris & Kuratko, 1993). Slevin and Covin (1987) reported a comparison of competitive tactics adopted by entrepreneurial firms in high-tech and lowtech industries. Interested in investigating whether the content of strategies adopted by high-tech and low-tech entrepreneurial firms would be significantly different, the authors collected data from 79 recently created entrepreneurial firms in the western Pennsylvania area. They investigated as well, if there were any differences regarding to competitive tactics adopted by low and high performing firms in both kinds of industries. The findings indicated that: entrepreneurial firms in high-tech industries tend to attack their environments, adopting a proactive, aggressive, innovative, focused and future-oriented strategic posture. On the other hand, entrepreneurial firms in low-tech industries adopt a more mechanistic, structured, and standardised approach to their environments (Slevin & Covin, 1987, pp. 93). No significant differences were found in terms of competitive tactics adopted by high and low performing firms in both industries (Slevin & Covin, 1987). These studies reveal a fragmented approach to the study of strategy formation in the realm of small firms. Most of them have dealt with narrowly defined aspects of strategy content (Chaganti, 1987; Stoner, 1987; Dilts & Prough, 1989). The integration of their findings is not easy. More integrative frameworks were adopted by Rugman and Verbeke (1987) and Davig (1986). These studies have adopted Miles and Snow's (1978) framework and have showed the possibility of studying strategic behaviour in small firms based on wellestablished theoretical models.

3. Miles & Snow typology of strategies The quest for a taxonomy of generic strategies is a characteristic of much of the literature on

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strategic management (Hatten & Schendel, 1977; Herbert & Deresky, 1987; and Miller & Dess, 1993). A taxonomy of generic strategies that has attracted attention is that due to Miles and Snow (1978). In a literature survey, I have identified over 50 papers that have applied Miles and Snow's model in the period between 1987 and 1994 A strength of this taxonomy is that it specifies relationships among strategy, structure and process in a manner that allows the identification of organisations as integrated wholes in interaction with their environments. Furthermore, I was not able to find a single reference in my literature search that presented any major conceptual criticism of Miles and Snow's proposed taxonomy. It is a well-researched taxonomy and can be selected with less need to explore its operationalization status. The diverse empirical studies that have applied Miles and Snow's model have contributed to identifying it as one having good codification and prediction strengths (Shortell & Zajac, 1990; James & Hatten, 1994). Organisations can be classified into one of the four theoretical categories easily, and their behaviour can be predicted on basis of their classification as a defender, prospector, analyzer or reactor organisation. Finally, Miles and Snow's model has been proposed as specially relevant for the analysis of small firms' strategic behaviour (Davig, 1986; Rugman & Verbeke, 1987; Olson & Currie, 1992). Miles and Snow have produced a typology of business-level strategies. As opposed to corporate-level strategy, i.e., decisions related to what businesses should the firm be in, business-level strategy is related to how the organisation competes in a given business (Hambrick, 1983). Miles and Snow proposed that firms in general develop relatively stable patterns of strategic behaviour in order to accomplish a good alignment with the perceived environmental conditions. Their typology involves four strategic types: defenders, prospectors, analyzers and reactors. The authors have described them as follows: 1. Defenders are organisations which have narrow product-market domains. Top managers in this type of organisation are highly expert in their organisation's limited area of operation but do not tend to search outside of their domains for new opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organisations seldom need to make major adjustments in their technology, structure, or methods of operation. Instead they devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing operations.

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2. Prospectors are organisations that almost continually search for market opportunities, and they regularly experiment with potential responses to emerging environmental trends. Thus, these organisations often are the creators of change and uncertainty to which their competitors must respond. However, because of their strong concern for product and market innovation, these organisations usually are not completely efficient. 3. Analyzers are organisations that operate in two types of product-market domains, one relatively stable, the other changing. In their stable areas, these organisations operate routinely and efficiently through use of formalised structures and processes. In their more turbulent areas, top managers watch their competitors closely for new ideas, and then they rapidly adopt those that appear to be the most promising. 4. Reactors are organisations in which top managers frequently perceive change and uncertainty occurring in their organisational environments but are unable to respond effectively. Because this type of organisation lacks a consistent strategy-structure relationship, it seldom makes adjustment of any sort until forced to do so by environmental pressures. (Miles & Snow, 1978, pp. 29). Miles & Snow have also proposed that the four different types of strategy would differ in three basic dimensions of what they have called the adaptive cycle. Strategy differentiation is based on distinct approaches to: a) entrepreneurial problems: definition of a market-product domain; b) engineering problems: choice of technical systems; c) administrative problems: related to organisational structure and processes. Central to Miles and Snow's model is the specific relationship between the four strategic types and environment. Coherent with the environment enactment process, defenders will carve a niche in the market where stability can be found even in more dynamic industries, whereas prospectors will be the source of instability in an industry by constantly producing innovations. Hambrick (1983) found that, as predicted by Miles and Snow's model, prospectors tend to thrive in innovative, dynamic environments, capitalising on growth opportunities, whereas defender type firms were most prevalent in stable, mature, and non-innovative industries. Miles and Snow argue that three of these strategic types are stable forms of organisation, namely, defender, analyzer and prospector firms. If there is an alignment between chosen strategy and organisational structure and processes, than any of these strategies may lead the organisation to be an effective

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competitor in a particular industry. However, a non-alignment between strategy and structure, will result in the firm being an ineffective competitor in the industry, characterising unstable forms of organisation which Miles and Snow have termed Reactors. The inconsistency of reactor strategies may stem from at least three sources: (1) management fails to articulate a viable organizational strategy; (2) a strategy is articulated but technology, structure and process are not linked to it in an appropriate manner; or (3) management adheres to a particular strategystructure relationship even though it is no longer relevant to environmental conditions (Miles & Snow, 1978, pp. 82). However, at least one study has found that reactors could outperform the other three types (Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980), leading some scholars to suggest that this type of strategy may be suitable to environments characterised by a low degree of movement or change among their components and by the lack of connection among these components (Zahra & Pearce, 1990). Another possibility is that reactors may also include in their classification firms that show a capacity to change rapidly ± i.e. to show flexibility ± presumably a positive characteristic (Kanter, 1989). Finally, Miles and Snow have proposed the analyzer strategy as a unique combination of the prospector and defender types. They have put these two types of organisation at opposite ends of a continuum of adjustment strategies, with the analyzer being somewhere in the middle of this continuum as a viable alternative strategy.

3.1 Empirical applications of Miles & Snow's generic strategies As I have indicated earlier, a great deal of attention to Miles and Snow's taxonomy has been paid by strategy scholars. I will first comment on a thorough analysis of research evidence related to Miles and Snow model made by Zahra and Pearce (1990). I will then proceed to describe in more detail the results of a number of empirical works which I judge representative of the concerns that have attracted attention of researchers. These works include: Hambrick (1983), Smith, Guthrie and Chen (1986), Conant, Mokwa and Varadarajan (1990), Parnell and Wright (1993), Beekun and Gin (1993), and Schenk (1994). Zahra and Pearce (1990) carried out a comprehensive study aiming to evaluate the research evidence for the Miles-Snow typology based on an analysis of 17 empirical

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studies. According to Zahra and Pearce (1990), results from a high number of studies have strongly supported Miles & Snow's propositions that four types of different strategies exist in different environments. The hypothesis that reactors will be outperformed by the other three types seem to have been strongly supported albeit the moderate coverage it has received in the studies analysed. Other dimensions such as differences in domain definition, production technology choice, environmental analysis, functional importance, and top management team characteristics among the four strategic types have received low to moderate attention and, thus, have resulted in weak or mixed support (Zahra & Pearce , 1990). Most of the studies analysed by Zahra and Pearce (1990) have concentrated heavily on classifying the firms under analysis into different groups based solely on the entrepreneurial problem, paying little attention to the other two dimensions, i.e., the administrative and engineering problems. However, Miles & Snow (1978) have posited that the performance of the firms will be dependent on the alignment among the solutions adopted for each type of problem. Although the entrepreneurial dimension is believed to be the key dimension underlying the typology (Hambrick, 1983), this reliance on a partial measure may be leading to an incorrect classification of firms' strategies by researchers who consider only this dimension of Miles & Snow's model. Miles and Snow's model proposes that when the solutions to the three problems are not aligned, the firm's strategy is characterised as a Reactor one. Bearing, this in mind, researchers who have adopted only the entrepreneurial dimension to classify their respondents' strategies, may be getting at best an incomplete picture, and thus, their research results are open to question. Hambrick (1983) studied how industry environment affected the effectiveness of different strategies based on Miles and Snow's taxonomy. Applying an objective data approach (data of an economic and financial nature). Hambrick studied 1452 different businesses from the PIMS database. Concentrating on defenders and prospectors, Hambrick designed a measure of strategy based on the percent of sales derived from new products for the business minus the percent of sales derived from new products for the three largest competitors. Defenders were considered those firms whose score in this measure was less than or equal to 75, and prospectors were firms whose score was more than or equal to +5. Businesses were matched

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against their competitors along 4-digit SIC codes. Contrary to what Miles & Snow proposed the results indicated that defenders so defined outperformed prospectors in stable, mature and non-innovative industries, while prospectors performed better in innovative and dynamic environments. Prospectors presented higher product R&D expenses and marketing expenses as would be expected, while defenders produced high capital intensity, high employee productivity and low direct costs. Hambrick's study, in spite of bringing new light to Miles & Snow's typology, failed to address the behaviour of two strategic types: analyzers and reactors. Smith, Guthrie and Chen (1986) applied a multidimensional (cluster analysis) approach, gathering data on a number of dimensions to verify the extent to which four clusters resembling Miles & Snow's typology would emerge. Secondly, they tested the relationship between organisational performance and strategic type, as well as the relationship of these two variables with organisational size. A sample of 47 electronic manufacturing firms provided data for this study collected through structured interviews with CEOs and other top-level managers. The results indicated a support for the typology. Thus, firms identified as having prospector strategies presented the following characteristics:

Classification of firms

an unstable customer base, a changing product mix, a competitive edge in innovation, a ``creating change'' approach to their customer base and an aggressive attitude toward growth. Furthermore, this group is managed primarily by research and development personnel who are relatively young, less tenured and who have been recruited from outside of the organisation. On most measures this cluster of firms appears to be following a prospector strategy (Smith, Guthrie & Chen, 1986, pp. 46) The cluster of companies identified as analyzer had traits that resemble Miles & Snow's model demonstrating a balanced blend of product variety and diversity; top level managers equally divided among marketing, research and development; and combinations of high and low scores on other dimensions. Defender firms were identified in a cluster whose characteristics involved a stable product base, an aggressive approach to maintaining their customer base, a low price competitive edge, and a product design approach that is based on production capability. Furthermore, the top management team was composed of managers with general management backgrounds. Finally, the reactors firms were identified by the majority of firms in this group indicating a lack of

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Strategies neglected

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consistent approach to the entrepreneurial, engineering, and administrative problems. The data supported Miles and Snow's contention that analyzers, prospectors and defenders outperform reactors. An interesting result was obtained on the relationship among strategy, size and organisational performance. Small defenders outperformed analyzers and prospectors, prospectors performed better as medium to large firms, and analyzers performed better as large ones. This, could indicate, according to the authors, that Miles & Snow might have captured different stages of strategy development rather than a typology of alternate strategic behaviours ( Smith, Guthrie, and Chen, 1986). In view of the small sample size, the results have to be treated as exploratory. However, the evidence suggests that the effectiveness of a specific strategy may be partially associated with organisational structures. Thus, taken together, the results (Hambrick, 1983; Smith, Guthrie & Chen, 1986) support the existence of stable patterns of strategic behaviours, and groupings of firms according to strategies hypothesised by Miles and Snow (1978). However, the relationship between strategy and performance is less clear-cut. We have to reject any simple relationship on the evidence of these studies. Further work is required to explore intervening variables ± internal to the organisation and in the environment. This is a point also raised by Zahra and Pearce (1990). Conant, Mokwa & Varadarajan (1990) designed and tested a multi-item scale for operationalizing Miles & Snow's generic strategies. This questionnaire addresses the eleven dimensions contained in the three different problems faced by each organisation's management team when choosing a strategy, i.e., the entrepreneurial, administrative and engineering problems as proposed in Miles & Snow's model. The instrument was originally tested in a single industry study of Health Maintenance Organisations (N = 150). The results indicated that defenders, prospectors and analyzers performed equally well in terms of profitability and outperformed reactors. The most significant contribution of Conant, Mokwa and Varadarajan's work was in the thorough development of a multi-dimensional measure of Miles and Snow's typology of generic strategies. Their instrument was used in another paper that is described next. Their study gave also additional evidence of the existence of four generic strategies as hypothesised by Miles and Snow (1978). Parnell and Wright (1993) addressed the relationship between strategy and perform-

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ance in a volatile, dynamic and growing industry - catalogue and mail-order houses. Their approach was based on the self-typing questionnaire developed by Conant, Mokwa & Varadarajan (1990). The final sample included 104 respondents (CEOs) and results supported the expected relationships, i.e., reactors were outperformed by the three other types, and prospectors were the best performing companies in terms of sales growth in the sample. Analyzers, on the other hand, produced higher return on assets than the other strategic types. However, this was a one-industry study and the expected relationships may differ for other industries. Beekun and Ginn (1993) sought an extension of Miles and Snow's model. The authors tried to complement the intraorganizational configurations proposed by Miles & Snow studying how firms align themselves with the environment by developing both tight and loose interorganizational linkages. The expected relationships tried to link resource and information exchange patterns with the choice of a defender, analyzer, prospector, or reactor strategy. Data from a sample of 86 Acute Care Hospitals in America provided support for the idea that certain strategic types are dominant in environments with different levels of turbulence. As in the study by Ginn (1990) prospectors were more frequent in a high turbulent environment and defenders in a less turbulent one. Partial support was gained to the expected relationships and results indicated that: when the environment was placid defenders were the most tightly coupled with other actors; prospectors, analyzers, and reactors were loosely coupled and did not actively search information. In response to environmental turbulence, both prospectors and analyzers acted as the defenders did by stressing information gathering. By contrast, reactors loosened external linkages (Beekun & Ginn, 1993: pp. 1310). Miles and Snow's model proposes that defenders, prospectors, and analyzers will outperform reactors assuming that their strategies are well implemented. However, the implementation of strategies is one area that has not been extensively researched as Zahra & Pearce (1990) have rightly noted in their review of empirical evidence related to Miles & Snow's typology. The studies described above, for instance, have not dealt with strategic implementation issues and have, implicitly assumed, that the comparisons were being made among companies whose strategies were adequately implemented. Schenk (1994) tried to extend Miles & Snow's typology to cover technology strategy.

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The information collected with 18 German and 23 British biotechnology companies allowed for the identification of three clusters which resembled defender, prospector and analyzer strategies. These groups differed on two basic dimensions: new product development and research orientation. The so-called defenders were low on basic research, high on making use of contract research, pursued process improvements and were lowest on new product development. The prospectors, on the other hand, were higher in basic research, and lower on applications engineering. The third group were in-between these two. An interesting result was that the groups were related to the differing nationalities: defenders were German companies; prospectors British ones; and analysers composed a mixed group. This seems not so much a case of extending Miles & Snow's typology to cover technology strategy, as an investigation of the processes adopted by companies to solve what Miles & Snow have called the engineering problem. It is an example of how to investigate the implementation processes adopted by companies adopting each of the different strategic types indicated as important by Zahra & Pearce (1990). But in this case the examination was restricted to the engineering problem, and did not address the entrepreneurial and administrative domains. In summary, the review of empirical evidence related to Miles and Snow's taxonomy of generic strategies provides a strong support for the proposition that four different generic strategies exist in a variety of environmental settings. Furthermore, dynamic environments will have a higher proposition of prospectors, while defender type firms will be predominant in more stable industries. Conflicting evidence has been reported in relation to performance differences among the four strategic types. It seems that variables of both an internal and external nature may influence this relationship, such as, firm size or environmental turbulence.

4. Research method Data were collected with two samples of small firms' owners running their businesses in two Brazilian cities, comprising 150 respondents. Their owner-managers were asked to fill in a short questionnaire adapted and translated to Portuguese from Conant, Mokwa and Varadarajan (1990) which aimed at establishing the preferred generic strategies according to the Miles and Snow (1978) taxonomy of strategic types.

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Sample one, with 108 respondents, came from eight different business sectors (computer services; food industry; supermarkets; chemical industry; clothing industry; clothes retailers; tourist agencies; and metallurgy industry) located in a large city in the south of Brazil. Sample two, with 42 respondents, is represented by two business sectors, lumber extraction and furniture industry, located in a less developed city in the North of Brazil. The questionnaire had eleven questions with four alternative answers for each of the two environmental conditions. These questions represented the eleven dimensions identified by Miles and Snow as being part of what they called adaptive problems: entrepreneurial, administrative and engineering. Each alternative answer for the questions was related to one of the four strategic types: analyzer, defender, prospector and reactor. The majority of answers in one of these four categories was used to indicate the preferred generic strategy for each firm. In case of numeric ties the respondent was classified as having an analyzer style. In the instance of a tie between reactor choices and any of the other three types, the choice was for the reactor strategy. These rules, as Conant, Mokwa and Varadarajan (1990) have explained, are in accordance with Miles and Snow's model. Conant, Mokwa and Varadarajan (1990) reported reliability coefficients for the 11 questions ranging from .56 to .82, with a mean reliability of .69. Validity checks were made via assessment by a panel of organisation theory and strategy researchers, in an iterative manner, until complete agreement by all judges on the appropriate correspondence of each question and response options to Miles and Snow's strategic dimensions (Conant et al, 1990, pp. 372). For the Portuguese version of the questionnaire, a content validity check of questions was performed using a cluster analysis approach. Binary variables corresponding to the presence or absence of choice for each of the four alternative options in each of the eleven questions were created. The same was done for the overall classification of the firm as a defender, analyser, prospector or reactor strategy. Cluster analyses were run using the Ward method for one of the samples (Norusis, 1990). The forced choice of four clusters was adopted in accordance with the number of strategic types in Miles & Snow's model. Results of the cluster analysis indicated that 79,2% of prospector cases were present in the same cluster, while 78,9% of reactors clustered together with one case of analytical strategy. Overall, the four clusters

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Table 1. Competitive strategies Strategy Defender Prospector Analyser Reactor Total

Sample 1 (n)

Sample 2 (n)

Total (N)

%

16 24 48 20

6 11 13 12

22 35 61 32

14.7 23.3 40.7 21.3

108

42

150

100.0

allowed for the correct classification of 59,2% of the cases. Although very positive, this result indicates the need for further refinements in the Portuguese version of the questionnaire. Respondents in one of the samples provided also their perceptions about turnover growth in the last five years and number of employees. These data were used as surrogate measures of firm performance.

5. Results As can be seen in table 1, and in accordance with Miles and Snow's model, small firms' owner-managers in both regions adopted four types of competitive strategies. The most common strategy, in both samples was the analyzer one (40.7%). The least frequent strategy, again for both regions, was the defender type (14.7%).

If the samples are looked at separately, one can notice that for sample one, located in a more developed region of Brazil, the number of reactors was relatively lower than those of sample two. Sample two is located in a region less developed and composed of two business sectors which are relatively more stable. In table 2, figures indicate the number for each strategic types present in each of the business sectors investigated. On the other hand, two business sectors in sample one, presented only three strategic types. In the supermarket sector no prospector companies were found, while in the computer services no defender companies were found. Additional data collected with sample one indicated that reactor firms produced the worst performance, i.e., 35% of them presented a decrease in their turnover in the last five years. The other presented a better performance, since less than 10% of them had diminishing turnover in the last five years.

Table 2. Competitive strategies by business sector Strategy Business Sector Computer services Food industry Supermarket Chemical industry Clothing industry Clothes retailers Tourist agency Mettalurgy industry Furniture industry Lumber extraction Total

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Defender

Prospector

Analyzer

Reactor

0 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 3 3

6 6 0 3 4 1 2 2 2 5

6 11 8 6 7 4 5 1 6 10

1 4 3 3 4 1 2 2 5 8

22

31

64

33

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Table 3. Strategy and performance Turnover behaviour in last 5 years Strategy

Growth

Stability

Decrease

Defender Analyzer Prospector Reactor

9 33 18 9

6 12 5 4

1 3 1 7

Total

69

27

12

These results give additional evidence in support of Miles and Snow's contention that defenders, analyzers and prospectors are more effective strategies in any business environment. Figures are shown in table 3. The medium number of employees, taken as a measure of performance (growth) indicated as well the best results for prospectors, defender and analysers. Prospectors produced the largest average number of employees (9.5). On the other hand, reactors produced the lowest average (4.9), while defenders and analysers produced averages of 5.8 e 7.3, respectively. This can also be seen looking at the highest number of employees for each type of strategy. For reactors this was 12, while for prospectors it was 58, defenders 23 and analysers 27. Finally, the overall majority of the companies were more than two years old (95,3%) and 66.7% of them had passed the 5 year barrier and can be considered mature companies. Thus, the results indicate that in a small business context one can find all four strategic types proposed in the Miles and Snow's model.

6. Conclusion This paper gave additional evidence in favour of the application of Miles and Snow's model of strategic choices in research with small firms in a varied set of industries. As evidenced in the model discussion, any business environment presents organisations competing in similar ways allowing for their classification as defenders, analysers, prospectors and reactors. In this sense, it has brought additional arguments to dismiss Smith, Guthrie and Chen's (1986) speculation that Miles and Snow's typology could be seen as sequential

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stages of strategy development, i.e., defender strategies would be linked to small firms, and prospector strategies to larger firms. Considering that size and age of the company may be associated, the figure of 66.7% of the companies being older than 5 years indicates that all strategic types in Miles and Snow's model are options for this business size Another proposition of the model confirmed in this study deals with the lower effectiveness of reactor strategies in comparison with the others. As shown by two criteria, firms that adopted defender, analyser and prospector strategies produced a better performance, especially in terms of turnover growth, than reactor ones. Finally, although the small numbers of respondents in each business sector prevent any strong assertion, results seem to indicate that the proportion of strategic types may vary with environment dynamism. No measure of such variable was used in this study. Nevertheless, the fact that in the supermarket sector no prospector companies were found, and in the computer services industry no defender companies were identified, seems to indicate that results in this study are in the same direction of other studies that have dealt with environment dynamism (Hambrick, 1983). Finally, a couple of limitations must be mentioned in this paper. First, data on company performance are based solely on owner-managers perceptions, and have not been checked against more objective data. Nevertheless, the number of employees taken as a performance measure attenuates this limitation. On the other hand, the questionnaire adopted and translated from Conant, Mokwa and Varadarajan, presented a validity check of almost 60%, an acceptable degree, but one that deserves to be bettered.

Owner-managers perceptions

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7. References Beekun, R. I.. and Ginn, G. O. (1993) Business strategy and interorganizational linkages within the acute care hospital industry: an expansion of the Miles and Snow typology, Human Relations, 46, 11, 1291±1318. Chaganti, R. (1987) Small business strategies in different industry growth environments, Journal of Small Business Management, 25, 3, 61±68. Conant, J. S., Mokwa, M. P. and Varadarajan, P. R. (1990) Strategic types, distinctive marketing competencies and organisational performance: a multiple measures-based study, Strategic Management Journal, 11, 365±383. Davig, W., (1986) Business strategies in smaller manufacturing firms, Journal of Small Business Management, 24, 1, 38±46. Dilts, J. C. and Prough, G. E. (1989) Strategic options for environmental management: a comparative study of small vs. large enterprises, Journal of Small Business Management, 27, 3, 31±38. Ginn, G. O. (1990) Strategic adaptation in the hospital industry, Health Services Research, 25, 565±591. Hambrick, D. C. (1983) Some tests of the effectiveness and functional attributes of Miles and Snow's strategic types, Academy of Management Journal, 26, 1, 5±26. Hatten, K. J. and Schendel, D. E. (1977) Heterogeneity within an industry: firm conduct in the U.S. brewing industry, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 26, 2, 97±113. Herbert, T. T. and Deresky, H. (1987) Generic strategies: an empirical investigation of typology validity and strategy content, Strategic Management Journal, 8, 135±147. James, W. L. and Hatten, K. J. (1994) Further evidence on the validity of the self typing paragraph approach: Miles and Snow Strategic archetypes in banking, Strategic Management Journal, 16, 2, 161±168. Kanter, R. M. (1989) When Giants Learn to Dance, London, Simon & Schuster Lyles, M. A., Baird, I. S., Orris, J. B. and Kuratko, D. F. (1993) Formalised planning in small business: increasing strategic choices. Journal of Small Business Management, 31, 2, 38±50. Miles, R.E. and Snow, C.C. (1978) Organizational strategy, structure and process, New York, McGrawHill. Miller, A. and Dess, G. G. (1993) Assessing Porter's (1980) model in terms of its generalizability, accuracy and simplicity, Journal of Management Studies, 30, 4, 553±585. Norusis, M. J. (1990), SPSS/PC+ Statistics 4.0 for the IBM PC/XT/AT and PS2. Chicago, SPSS. Olson, S. F. and Currie, H. M. (1992) Female entrepreneurs: personal value systems and busi-

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ness strategies in a male-dominated industry, Journal of Small Business Management, 30, 1, 49±57. Parnell, J. A. and Wright, P. (1993) Generic strategy and performance: an empirical test of the Miles and Snow typology, British Journal of Management, 4, 1, 29±36. Porter, M. E. (1980) Competitive strategy, New York, Free Press. Robinson JR, R. B. and Pearce II, J. A. (1984) Research thrusts in small firm strategic planning, Academy of Management Review, 9, 1, 128±137. Rugman, A. M. and Verbeke, A. (1987) Does competitive strategy work for small business?, Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 5, 3, 45±50. Scase, R. and Goffee, R. (1989) The Real World of the Small Business Owner, 2nd edition, London, Routledge. Schenk, U. W. (1994) Technology strategies and the Miles & Snow typology: a study of the biotechnology industries, R&D Management, 24, 1, 57±64. Shortell, S. M. and Zajac, E. J. (1990), Perceptual and archival measures of Miles and Snow's strategic types: a comprehensive assessment of reliability and validity, Academy of Management Journal, 33, 4, 817±832. Slevin, D. P. and Covin, J. G. (1987) The competitive tactics of entrepreneurial firms in high- and low-technology industries, In Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research (Ed. by N. C. Churchill, J. R. Hornaday, B. A. Kirchoff, O. J. Krasner and K. H. Vesper), Wellesley, Centre for Entrepreneurship Studies, 87±99. Smith, K. G., Guthrie, J. P. and Chen, M-J. (1986) Miles and Snow's typology of strategy, organisational size and organisational performance, Academy of Management Proceedings, 45±49. Snow, C. C. and Hrebiniak, L. G. (1980) Strategy, distinctive competence, and organisational performance, Administrative Science Quarterly, 25, 317±335. Stanworth, J. and Gray, C. (Eds.) (1991) Bolton 20 Years On - The Small Firm in the 1990s, London, Paul Chapman. Zahra, S. A. and Pearce II, J. A. (1990) Research evidence on the Miles-Snow typology, Journal of Management, 16, 4, 751±768.

Fernando Gimenez, Associate Professor of Strategic Management at Departamento de AdministracËaÄo, Universidade Estadual de MaringaÂ.

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Increasing Understanding of Technology Management through Challenge Mapping Min Basadur, J. Andre Potworowski, Nicholas Pollice and Jan Fedorowicz The authors seek to clarify what is understood by the management of technology by involving a group of managers in a workshop to identify specifically what they believe to be their critical difficulties and challenges in managing technology. The approach is shown to be a means of enhancing creativity, designed not so much for creating good answers and solutions, but rather for discovering good questions and challenges and for conceptualizing complex issues. Virtually all of the challenges selected as most important had much more to do with leading people to think more innovatively and collaboratively than with new technology itself.

Introduction

M

anagement of Technology (MOT) has become an increasingly prevalent expression. MOT conferences attract both academics and practitioners; universities have introduced curricula; and consulting services in technology management abound. However, a perusal of the relevant literature indicates it may remain relatively ill-defined. MOT literature has grown considerably and can be divided into about six categories. Some writers describe MOT by explaining to whom the term applies. Others explain what is required to make it work, or what the benefits are, or what the goals and aims are. Still others explain it by convincing the reader that it is an important issue. Finally, some writers explain it by linking it in broad terms to other subjects such as change management and knowledge management. Some examples follow. According to Berk (1989), technology management applies not just to manufacturers or high-tech companies but to every organization that develops, markets or uses technology. Frohman (1982) warned that companies using technology as a competitive weapon should not do so at the expense of other areas. Instead, they should create organizational structures that ensure close and consistent connections # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

between business decisions and technological decisions. They should decide to support projects based on whether or not the project supports the business goal; protects or establishes technological leadership; solves customer problems; opens up new technology opportunities; and pursues technological advancement. Badawy (1989) equated managing technology to managing change and argued that: . senior management must become more

adept at managing change while continuing to manage other corporate functions that promote stability and conformity; . managing technology requires organizations to develop and embrace new ways of doing things, new products, new processes, new markets and new competitors thus quickly moving ideas and technology from research and development through manufacturing to marketing; . effective strategic management involves close interaction between the technology side (R&D, engineering and manufacturing) and the business side (finance, human resources and marketing).

Categories of literature

Noori (1990) also positioned the management of technology as a change process and

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summarized its importance in the following manner: . MOT seems to be a process by which an

organization can manage change in processes and people. By this process, organizations strive to improve product quality and become the lowest-cost producer; set measurable goals for ongoing improvement; develop the necessary organization skills to train and educate employees; and create an environment that encourages employers and employees to actively seek out opportunities for valuable change.

The above examples indicate that while the general philosophy and aims of MOT appear fairly well agreed, there is no clear or widely accepted definition of the term ± what this change process is and why a process is needed. For example, what are the specific issues and problems that require a MOT ``process''? What prevents organizations from achieving their MOT aims, from turning MOT philosophy into practice? The objective of the applied research reported in this article is to better identify these specific issues and problems and thereby increase understanding of what MOT actually means. The authors decided to try to clarify what MOT means by involving a group of managers in a Simplex Challenge Mapping1 workshop to try to identify specifically what they believe to be their critical difficulties and challenges in ``managing technology'' Challenge Mapping is a deliberate process of creative thinking designed not so much for creating good answers and solutions, but rather for discovering good questions and challenges and for conceptualizing complex issues. Many applications of Challenge Mapping have been documented, including managing conflict and new product development (Basadur, Speranzini, Pringle & Bacot, 2000), and involving employees in manufacturing cost improvement (Basadur & Paton, 1993).

Solving Process (Basadur, 1994a, 1994b) of which Challenge Mapping is a part. A few of the participants had had prior experience with Simplex, and the brief interactive handson familiarization served to bring the others up to speed. The process is briefly described below.

The Simplex Creative Problem Solving Process The four-stage problem-solving framework in Figure 1 systematically relates problem generating, problem formulating, problem solving and solution implementing, and constitutes a ``complete process'' of creative thinking. What is meant by a complete process is that (i) not only are there multiple stages but also (ii) within each stage, judgment is deferred to permit sequenced divergent and convergent thinking (Rickards, 1994). In Figure 1, there

Method Twenty senior managers from diverse functional groups in thirteen large North American companies were invited to participate in a day-long workshop entitled ``exploring issues in the management of technology''. They knew that the objective of the workshop was for them to engage in creative thinking and ``tease out'', clarify and define their most significant difficulties (challenges) in the management of technology. A facilitator used the first 45 minutes of the workshop to familiarize the group with the Simplex Creative Problem

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Figure 1. Problem solving as a 4-stage process emphasizing deferral of judgment, divergent thinking and convergent thinking in each stage # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000

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Table 1. Specific skills for deferring judgment (formulation stage) . Avoid making premature, negative judgments of fledgling thoughts . Visibly value, appreciate, and welcome other points of view . Patiently maintain an awareness that some facts are more difficult to perceive (more invisible)

than others

. Question assumptions for validity; search out hidden, unconscious assumptions . Tackle problems with an optimistic `can do' attitude rather than prematurely concluding that

it `cannot be done' because `I can't see how'

. Tend not to jump prematurely to a conclusion as to what the `real problem is' . Avoid attaching negative connotations to problems; such prejudgment may bias fact finding

efforts

. Visibly stay open-minded to others' versions of the facts . Pause to deliberately try an unusual approach to defining a problem . React positively to new radical thoughts and build upon them

are feedback loops among all stages to permit a return to earlier stages. These loops also permit leapfrogging to later stages as environmental changes occur, new insights are revealed, and the process and events unfold. The focal points for the purpose of this paper are the first and second stages of the model in Figure 1, problem generation and formulation. The specific deferral of judgment, active divergence and active convergence thinking skills required to execute these two stages are documented in past research (eg. Basadur et al, 1994) and a few examples are identified in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Deferral of judgment is the skill of separating active divergence from active convergence.

Problem Generation Problem generation means a continuous process of proactively sensing and anticipating problems, and fact finding. Skills in these areas include actively diverging to collect potentially relevant problems, changes, trends and opportunities, then to actively converge upon a secondary number for further exploration. Each is accepted as an ambiguous ``fuzzy'' situation (ill-defined) but represents a ``tip of the iceberg''. Getzels (1975) showed that tolerating such fuzzy situations often leads to inventive solutions. In fact finding, one first actively diverges and gathers information potentially related

Skill in deferring judgment

Table 2. Specific skills for active divergence (formulation stage) . Search out many different facts and points of view before attempting to define a problem . Define problems in multiple and novel ways to obtain a variety of insights . Clarify problems by breaking them down into smaller, more specific subproblems and also

by opening them up into broader, less limiting challenges

. Deliberately extend effort to create additional thought provoking ways of defining a problem . Give credit for divergent thinking by others; praise others for alternative viewpoints and

build upon them to increase variety of choice

. Turn premature, negative evaluations into positive challenges to keep the creative process

flowing

. Share information freely with others to build understanding . Encourage teams to formulate problems in ways which transcend individual or departmental

biases

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Table 3. Specific skills for active convergence (formulation stage) . Take the time to select and clarify the most significant facts prior to defining a problem . Open-mindedly develop and apply unbiased criteria for selecting from among problem

formulation options

. Recognize the critical few best problem definition options . Take the risk of being criticized for selecting more novel, imaginative problem definition

options

. Participate in and accept consensus decisions; move forward into the problem solving and

solution implementation stages

. Avoid rejecting imaginative problem statements to which you cannot foresee a solution ±

trust that the rest of the process will produce a solution

. Accept that the `perfect' option is unlikely to surface - take the risk of moving forward

to the situation while deferring judgment. Evaluation and analysis are suspended; all points of view and versions of the facts are accepted. Establishing what is not known is as important as what is known or is thought to be known. Only during convergence are the most relevant and worthwhile facts identified. A skilled fact finder avoids unwarranted assumptions and examines a given situation from a wide variety of viewpoints; listens well and accepts other versions; extends effort to dig out further information when it seems that all facts have already been unearthed; and asks fact-finding questions in the simplest manner, never being too embarrassed to ask questions to increase understanding. After gathering such information, this person can converge upon a small number of facts believed to be especially relevant.

The Importance of Problem Formulation

Ill-structured problems

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Albert Einstein was once asked if he had one hour to save the world, how would he spend the hour? He is reputed to have said, ``I would spend 55 minutes defining the problem and then only five minutes solving it.'' Problem formulation consists of problem defining, conceptualizing and structuring. Skillful problem formulation yields a wide variety of insightful challenges created from a few key facts. The problem is broadened and narrowed so that both the forest and the trees become clearly and refreshingly portrayed. Large problems are broken down into smaller components and the group or individual can see the bigger picture into which the components fit. Convergence is deferred while optional ways of formulating the problem are imagined until a clearly superior angle on the problem has been developed. This angle, or

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set of angles, then becomes the target for Stage 3, solution finding. Problem formulation has been noted by many as difficult. Ackoff (1979) suggests that researchers do not usually encounter welldefined problems, rather they encounter ``messes''. Simon (1960) identified three types of problems: well-structured, semi-structured, and ill-structured. Well-structured problems come with complete information, are usually repetitive and routine, and can be solved with established solution techniques. Ill-structured problems are ``fuzzy''; there are no data, too few data or too many data available. Some of the data may also be difficult to perceive or quantify. These problems tend to be complex, non-routine and difficult to define. Semistructured problems include characteristics of the previous two types ± portions of the problem appear to be well-structured, while other aspects are quite messy and difficult to understand. In managerial work, increasing proportions of problems are ill-structured and difficult to define. For this reason, aids to assist them in defining ill-structured problems are important. However, even when systematic aids and procedures are available for problem definition, there are human behavioral deficiencies that prevent people from following them. For example, managers' propensity to spend most of their time acting in haste to correct situations rather than taking the time to think them through is well-documented by Mintzberg (1973). Elbing (1978) identified perceptual biases that interfere with problem analysis that often cause managers and other organizational members to handle problems ineffectively. Basadur (1994b) identified various attitudinal, perceptual and cognitive short-

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comings including the tendency to accept unsubstantiated assumptions as facts. Often, people are unwilling to take the time to discover the real facts, which might lead them to refreshing new ways to define the problem. They emphasize problem solutions rather than problem definitions, believing that ``I already know what the problem is.'' The methodology for problem formulation provided in this paper encourages the use of a systematic creative thinking process, Challenge Mapping, that overcomes such perceptual, attitudinal and cognitive inadequacies. When skillfully applied, this process incorporates logic, sequencing and imagination (and is fully described in Basadur, Ellspermann and Evans, 1994).

Challenge Mapping Challenge Mapping was first developed and applied as a creative thinking process in North America within Procter and Gamble, and then further developed and refined in organizations such as Ford and Frito-Lay (Basadur, 1974, 1981, 1984). The purpose of Challenge Mapping is to uncover and clarify the different problems and sub-problems lurking within a complex or ill-defined situation, and to understand how they relate to one another. The success of the Challenge Mapping process depends on the skill of the participants in the application of a special heuristic called the ``Why ± What's Stopping?'' (WWS) Analysis2. There are three important aspects to this method. First, all problem definitions are stated in a challenge form beginning with the phrase ``How Might I . . .?'' or ``How Might We . . .?'' (depending on the number of stakeholders). The word "might" signals a nonevaluative reception to all options made later in response to the challenge. The second aspect of the ``Why ± What's Stopping?'' Analysis is based on two principles: Asking `Why?' of a particular challenge helps identify broader challenges, while asking `What's stopping us?' of a particular challenge necessarily identifies narrower sub-problems. These two activities help to develop a hierarchy of the problem. It is important to note that the hierarchy becomes a two-dimensional ``map'' when the two questions are augmented with the word ``else'' (i.e. ``Why else . . .?'' and ``What else is stopping . . .?''). The third key aspect of this process is that deferral of judgment and divergent and convergent thinking skills are employed in answering the two ``Why?'' and ``What's Stopping?'' questions, then transforming each answer into imaginative problem definition

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options (all beginning with the challenging phrase, ``How might we . . .?''). These are then positioned onto a Challenge Map ± a visual representation of the ``big picture''. The WWS Analysis ``layers'' and groups problems and sub-problems from broad to narrow. In the ``Why-What's stopping?'' Analysis, it is imperative that thinking and dialogue be captured in simple, specific words and clear, complete sentences. In this way, ``hidden'' facts and challenges are uncovered, vagueness is reduced, and unconscious, unwarranted and limiting assumptions are surfaced ± often to the surprise of the participants. The result is a visual hierarchical map showing how the more strategic ``big picture'' challenges link to the more specific, tactical challenges in one easily understood array. In a group, this interactive methodology encourages different points of view to be melded into succinct challenges leading to a more complete understanding of the problem. All stakeholders' various points of view are captured, no matter how different or contrasting to those of other stakeholders, and incorporated into the challenge. The more highly skilled the individuals are in the processes of divergent thinking, deferral of judgment, and convergent thinking, the better. The resulting Challenge Map reconciles all the diverse challenges, recognizing the value of each one in describing the overall picture. Virtually always, a skilled group can create and converge upon carefully conceptualized problem definitions that are satisfactory for all stakeholders. Skill in Challenge Mapping very much depends on being able to use simple and specific words in asking questions and providing answers as clear, specifically-worded complete thoughts during the WWS Analysis. This facilitates the application of imagination to create insightful new challenges from the answers. The following heuristic demonstrates how the WWS Analysis is applied in the development of the Challenge Map: (1) Ask ``why'' and ``why else'' of a beginning problem statement (challenge) frequently to stretch knowledge and imagination to uncover broader problem statements. This will usually result in 2±5 broader problem statements. (2) Ask ``what's stopping'' and ``what else is stopping'' of the original challenge frequently to stretch knowledge and imagination to uncover sub-problems. This will usually result in 1±10 sub-problems. (3) Review the map for challenges the stakeholder(s) wish to explore further, to break sub-problems down even further or to

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explore broader ``purposes''. Do not forget to check for ``what else is stopping . . .'' or ``why else . . .''. (4) Have stakeholder(s) review the map for ``points of maximum leverage'', i.e. the problem statement(s) they believe best define their problem. If this convergence cannot be achieved, return to step 3 to explore the map further on those challenges the stakeholder(s) believes have most merit.

Results Fact Finding Beginning with the key phrase ± ``exploring issues in technology management'' ± divergent fact finding followed (as described above). The participants formed smaller subgroups and were prompted to stretch their thinking to share perspectives and divergently generate information from their own experience about MOT issues using the special prompter questions shown in Figure 2 as adapted from Basadur (1994a). Each of these subgroups listed a large quantity of responses to each question on a flip chart without judgment or analysis. (This represented active divergence in fact finding.) Afterwards, they clarified, analyzed and applied judgment to their responses and

reached consensus (active convergence in fact finding) on their most important (``key'') facts. These key facts were then used as a basis to divergently generate a large quantity of specific challenges phrased as questions beginning with the words, ``How might I . . . ?.'' Each ``How might I?'' would thus represent a personal MOT challenge. Participants were encouraged to defer judgment and build upon each other's thoughts (cross-fertilize). By discussion, clarification and consensus, the group then converged upon a small number of challenge statements that they considered to be the most important ones. This activity completed the initial divergence-convergence portion of the problem formulation stage. Following is a summary of the key facts and challenges selected. (Two groups provided a summary statement of their key facts. These summary statements are provided first.)

Key Facts . ``You are not working in a vacuum. There

must be some set of values in the organization that says `this is where we're going,' whether it has been written down and articulated or not. They are there, and you have to recognize them before you can figure out what you have to change to get to where you want to go.''

1.

What do we know or think we know about managing technology?

2.

What don't we know but wish we knew about managing technology?

3.

What makes managing technology a problem for us? Why can't we resolve it? What are the obstacles?

4.

What have we already thought of or tried?

5.

If this situation were resolved, what would we have that we don't have now? What exactly would be different?

6.

What assumptions or biases might we be bringing to the situation?

Figure 2. Divergent fact finding prompters

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. ``When we talk about the generic manage-

ment of technology, it's in the transfer process that it breaks down. You've got your smart research guys in one place, and your manufacturing guys in another, and it's the passing off between them, that's the challenge.'' . We feel that a corporate culture based on change must be somehow established. . We believe that it is vital to establish a clearly understood corporate vision, thus determine market needs and align R&D efforts to the vision and needs. . We don't know how to measure progress in the management of technology. . We don't know how to communicate technology issues well enough. . We know that management of technology demands the integration of people with different skills into the process of technological change. . We know that management of technology must include simultaneous recognition of science issues, management issues, and politics. . We do not know how to optimize the process of moving new technology through the company. . We do not have a model or checklist for selecting and targeting technology. . We would like to have a method to transfer technology successfully from research to development and then down the line. . We would like to have a way to manage a single corporate strategy across a company's multiple markets, labs, factories and locations. . We would like to have a method to facilitate interfacing among the management of technology, the management of resources, and the business strategy of a company.

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Key Challenges Of the extensive list of challenges divergently generated from the key facts above, six were converged upon as the most important. They are shown in Table 4 and form the basis for the Challenge Mapping which followed.

MOT Challenge Mapping Next, a secondary divergence-convergence was performed employing the ``Why ± What's Stopping?'' Analysis using the selected challenges in Table 4 as a starting point. Thus, the group created a Challenge Map, with broader challenges placed higher and more specific challenges placed lower. New and sometimes unexpected or hidden challenges were discovered in both directions, often filling in crucial links both vertically and diagonally up and down. Twenty-one new challenges were added using the WWS analysis. Thus a total of twenty-seven challenges ended up on this map, and they were assigned numbers from 1 to 27. The group then selected three challenges from the twenty-seven that appeared especially critical and merited further fact finding and more detailed exploration. They were numbers 8, 10 and 13 (see Table 5). The group again divided itself into three subgroups. Each subgroup was assigned one of these three especially critical challenges and worked together to identify the major impediments preventing its solution by asking the questions repeatedly: ``What's stopping us?'' and ``What else is stopping us?''. The facilitator tried to induce the participants to phrase their answers as specifically, simply and completely as possible. Some of the answers obtained were of higher quality than other answers in this respect. The three groups then reported these impediments to each other and created an additional eleven more tactical sub-challenges to add to the

Table 4. Six challenges selected as most important to begin the challenge map . How might I promote better cross-fertilization of new technology from one part of the

company to another?

. How might I move ideas faster from R&D to the customer and vice versa? . How might I pin down the right criteria to rank technology options? . How might I better relate customer needs to the technologies available to me? . How might I base the corporate culture on change? . How might I encourage different groups in the company to share the same vision of the

future of the company and common business objectives?

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Table 5. The three most critical challenges selected from the first twenty-seven challenges on the challenge map 8. How might I implement a cohesive coordinated business planning process? 10. How might I promote better cross-fertilization of new technology from one part of the company to another? 13. How might I better relate customer needs to the technologies available?

Challenge Map, numbered 28 to 38. The whole group then selected the most important challenges of these eleven. There were four of these.

Impediments to the Top Three Challenges

Impediments Uncovered to the Top Three Challenges The answers to the what's stopping questioning reported by the groups were as follows: Group 1 The major things stopping us from implementing a cohesive coordinated business planning process are: . The various groups within the unit do not

place the same importance on the objectives of the unit. People have different priorities depending on how they view the problem or what their background is. . Many individuals' priorities are not the same as the units' priorities. This leads into some personality issues in presenting a cohesive plan. . The technical and financial people do not share the same decision-making criteria. These could be any two groups in a company, but technical and financial groups are at diametric ends of the continuum. This is tied up partially in the value systems of the two groups. Without a focusing mechanism at that level, there are implementation problems. . Groups are not rewarded for making their own departmental objective secondary to the objectives of the company as a whole. Group 2 The major things stopping us from promoting better cross-fertilization of new technology from one part of the company to another are: . The physical separation of plant locations

limits the frequency of face-to-face discussion. It still means something to be able to walk to the next office and discuss something as opposed to telephoning or flying down. With physical separation, it takes a

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lot of extra effort to synchronize, and the path of least resistance often is not to bother. . Different divisions have differing business concerns, including different market/customer priorities, product life cycles and features (including P&L goals). How are the divisions being measured? What are their business concerns? For one thing, they may have different markets and customer priorities in terms of timing or whatever. They will respond to their own priorities because they are being measured by their own profits and losses. . Different divisions have differing cultures, organizational structures, and levels of technological sophistication. This could even lead to different levels of technological sophistication depending on the age of each division and what their history is. Group 3 The major things stopping us from better relating customer needs to the technologies available are: . The people who know the technologies are

not the same people who know the customer. The marketing people in a company may think they know the customer's needs and problems, but in fact, the people on the technology side may know something about where the technology is trending that negates everything the marketing people know. . We do not understand the customer's needs, problems, strategies and the market well enough. Customers may have immediate needs and problems that they want solutions to, even if these do not reflect what you know the market trend is. For example, customers want you to make buggy-whip handles so they can make buggy whips, but you know that technology is gone and there's something else coming down the road. . Decision-makers may not know either the technology or the customers well enough. The top decision-makers in a company

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may not be familiar with either the details of technology or the specific situation of the customers. . We do not devote enough time to helping customers in planning. If we did, we'd understand their needs better. You can help yourself and customers by helping them in the planning process. By doing that, you will understand their needs better. The message here is to get as close as you can to the customer and exchange your own understanding of the market and technology. The final Challenge Map is shown in Figure 3. The four most important tactical challenges selected are shown in Table 6 and are highlighted in the dashed ovals on the Challenge Map as numbers 30, 33, 35, and 36.

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Summary of results The Challenge Map The upper levels of a Challenge Map represent the more strategic challenges (the main goals). Inspection of Figure 3 reveals that the managers in this study believe that the ultimate aims of managing technology better are to gain market advantage over competition by lowering costs and introducing better product features faster (challenges # 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). The next highest levels of the Challenge Map represent somewhat more operational challenges that support the ultimate aims. The managers identified the following five challenges right beneath the top ones: selecting the right technology from options (#7);

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Table 6. The four most important additional challenges derived by probing the three most critical challenges How might I: 30. . . . ensure that the technical and financial people share the same decision-making criteria? 33. . . . ensure that different divisions share the same concerns regarding customers, products, and features? 35. . . . ensure that the people who know the technology and the people who know the customer communicate better? 36. . . . better understand the customer's needs, strategies, and markets?

getting people to put new technology into use more quickly (#9); promoting cross-fertilization of new technology from one part of the company to another (#10); moving ideas faster from R&D to the customer and vice versa (#11); and minimizing product introduction intervals (#15). Of these, promoting better cross-fertilization from one part of the company to another was selected as the most critical (#10). Seven challenges at the next level down were identified as how to: better relate customer needs to technologies available (#13); pin down the right criteria to rank technology options (#12); implement a cohesive business planning process (#8); base the corporate culture on change (#14); get different locations, divisions and functions to work together as a cohesive team (#16); get a business process in place to minimize product introduction intervals (#21); get a technical process in place to minimize product introduction intervals (#22). Of these, #13, how to better relate customer needs to technologies available, and #8, how to implement a cohesive business planning process, were selected as the most critical. The middle and lower parts of the Challenge Map include more tactical challenges which support the challenges in the upper parts. The challenges near the middle of the Challenge Map were how to: get a technology strategy established in the company (#18); increase one's knowledge of technological choices available for products (#19); know one's customers' needs better (#20); get various groups within the same unit to place the same importance on its objectives (#28); ensure that individuals' priorities are the same as their unit's priorities (#29); ensure that the technical and financial people share the same decision making criteria (#30); and encourage groups to accept sub-optimization if it contributes to company objectives (#31). Challenges just below these included how to

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get more consensus on the internal criteria for ranking technology options (#17); how to ensure that different divisions share the same concerns regarding customers, products and features (#33); and how to ensure that different divisions share the same organizational culture and level of technical sophistication (#34). Of all of these middle level challenges, the two most critical selected were: how to ensure that the technical and financial people share the same decision making criteria (#30), and how to ensure that different divisions share the same concerns regarding customers, products and features (#33). The lowest levels on the Challenge Map contain the most tactical challenges that support all of the higher level challenges. The two selected as most critical were: how to ensure that the people who know the technology and the people who know the customers communicate better (#35), and how to understand better the customers' needs and markets (#36). Six additional tactical challenges identified were how to: help key decision makers in the company to better understand both the technology and the customer (#37); participate in customers' planning processes to understand their needs better (#38); encourage different groups in the company to share the same vision of the future of the company and share common business objectives (#23); install a planning process to develop a shared vision and common business objectives (#26); get a forecast of the probable results that will be obtained from current plans (#27); and, encourage face to face contact among employees working in different locations (#32). Challenge Mapping is a powerful problemsolving tool. Just as this diverse group of senior managers was able to agree on the critical challenges among them, so too can any diverse group within a company, or even between a company and its suppliers or customers working as a team. Challenge Mapping is

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also an excellent tool for empowering people. When groups of employees create their own strategic challenge maps and plug them into the corporate challenge map, they acquire more ownership for their goals and tasks, better understand how their activities help the company meet its strategic objectives, and make more accurate or useful decisions about which challenges to tackle. In addition, this mapping process allows an organization to compress a huge amount of knowledge onto one page that can easily be copied, viewed, reviewed and updated.

Discussion of results and recommendations The most important personal challenges in the management of technology that were identified in this study were: How might I (1) implement a cohesive, co-coordinated planning process organization-wide?; (2) cross-fertilize new technology much faster and better among the various parts and divisions of the company?; and (3) better relate customers' needs to available technologies? The most important supporting challenges were: How might I (1) ensure the technical and financial people share the same decision-making criteria (about new technology)? (2) ensure that different divisions share the same concerns regarding customers, products and features? (3) ensure that people who know the technology and the people who know the customers communicate better? and (4) better understand customers' needs, strategies and markets? These seven challenges appear to be much more problems of skills in managing behavior rather than problems of technological know-how. They all have primarily to do with leading and managing people and behavior ± getting people to think differently and work together toward common goals.

The Need for New Skills for Tomorrow Learning how to think differently is not an easy task for most managers, especially those who are engineering and business graduates. Often they have learned to exercise only highly structured, solution-oriented, analytical thinking (Leavitt, 1975). When they become managers of organizations, these individuals need to be careful that they don't rely solely on programmed problem solving methods and highly structured procedures. They need to become more comfortable with innovation. They need to recognize the value of learning new processes that help people cope with uncertainty, ambiguity, poorly

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structured problems and other situations requiring non-programmed thinking skills. Because these processes are strange to them, they regard them skeptically. Leaders trying to involve colleagues in the innovation process must prepare to encounter this skepticism. It shouldn't be surprising if others are slow to support the idea of investing in learning and applying creativity and innovation processes. The literature abounds with evidence that such creative leadership skills can be deliberately learned and developed (eg. Cohen, Whitmeyer and Funk, 1960; Basadur, Graen and Green, 1982; Basadur et al, 2000). The challenge of using and applying new technology faster and better is obviously directly related to the above discussion. People confined to narrow vertical functions (with a reward system that encourages them to pursue narrow vertical goals) get little opportunity to receive helpful critique and input from their peers in other vertical functions, or to offer feedback to those people. They complete projects more slowly and with less fresh thinking, and fail to understand how their work aligns with that of others and with overall corporate goals. People also find themselves ``reinventing the wheel'', unaware that colleagues have already completed certain projects or tasks. The lack of familiarity with what people in other areas are doing is in itself enough to keep people from opening up a dialogue. The physical separation caused by different locations further reduces face-to-face contact and informal discussions which could lead to greater understanding and the sharing of similar concerns regarding customers, products, services, and technological advances and sophistications. Leaders could try creative approaches to getting people in such circumstances to work together. For example, designing a project with a stretch target requiring close cooperation, even a project outside of the workplace, could help people learn more about each others' similarities and differences.

Compression of knowledge

Moving Away From Vertical Organization A surprising number of organizations are still structured along the outdated ``scientific management'' approach. This approach, made famous by Frederick Taylor (1967), is designed to efficiently produce a stable set of products. The organization arranges work around functional specialization ± manufacturing, sales, engineering, marketing, R&D, finance, accounting. Each function pursues its own goals, and often works in a separate

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Strong vertical leadership

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building or even a separate location. Managers succeed by pursuing functional goals, not overall organizational goals. Surrounded by specialists in the same field, they regard other functions as less important, or even as competitors. This arrangement hardly fosters the teamwork required to create new products and services. Many important organizational problems fall ``between the cracks''. Some are not even addressed; others are bounced back and forth (``that's not our problem, it's engineering's problem''). Customers themselves are passed from one department to another when they phone in for information. Each function's work is often broken down into smaller and smaller tasks, with people doing the same task day after day. The theory is that this builds expertise: by doing a simple task over and over again, a person becomes very good at it. But in practice, this design causes people to view their organization as a group of separate functional entities. They pursue narrow goals that benefit their own function but that prevent the entire organization from succeeding. Innovative projects often suffer from interdepartmental squabbling. Rather than cooperate as a team, the departments soon find opportunities to quarrel over who should receive credit for a certain project or who needs more resources. Achieving vertical functional goals becomes more important than reaching overall, organizational objectives. When someone successfully leads others in meeting important functional goals, that person can be said to exercise strong vertical leadership. Vertical leadership emphasizes technical excellence in a particular field, such as accounting or marketing. When one leads others to meet interfunctional, organizational goals, one can be said to exercise strong horizontal leadership. Horizontal leadership emphasizes teamwork and long-term thinking. Some functions might have to sacrifice short-term goals for the benefit of the entire organization. Horizontal leaders use informal networking to get things done, rather than relying on hierarchical approval. They encourage people outside their own narrow domain to see the ``big picture.'' Both vertical and horizontal approaches are necessary for businesses to succeed in today's environment. Organizations need to restructure themselves in order to develop both strong vertical and horizontal leadership. Innovation cannot flourish under vertical leadership alone. Some organizations have established matrix teams that try to achieve teamwork even as they maintain functional priorities. But these efforts have failed for several reasons. Functional priorities often take precedence over

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interfunctional objectives. The organization's reward system often favors individual efforts to meet functional goals, not teamwork to meet organizational goals. As they lead their teams across functional barriers, the few skilled horizontal leaders ruffle the feathers of others who are less flexible and more used to thinking vertically. Because promotions often follow functional lines, horizontal leaders often end up low on the promotion list. Until organizations place horizontal leadership and organizational goals on the same level as vertical leadership and functional goals, matrix teams will not work.

Thinking Across Organizational Units Some of the difficulties with how people in organizations think include the following. Various groups within an organizational unit place a different level of importance on the unit's objectives. Furthermore, individuals within a unit have their own personal priorities depending on their backgrounds and their own personal thinking and problem solving styles that are not synchronized with the units' priorities. Different functional groups, such as technical and finance, use very different criteria for deciding the merits of a new idea. Moreover, there are often inadequate management skills or incentives to induce such groups to implement a common set of innovation criteria for the good of the company as a whole, long and short term. The people in most organizational sub-units: (eg. teams, groups, departments, divisions and functions) are rewarded for achieving the specific objectives of their own sub-unit. In other words, they are encouraged to live in organizational ``silos'' and to think vertically, ``up and down'', within the confines of their own sub-unit. Incentives for people to think horizontally ± across functions, departments and divisions ± are few and largely inadequate. Many decisions that are right for the company as a whole, and for its customers, require some sub-units to sub-optimize their own goal achievement for the greater good. It is perhaps somewhat amazing that our organizational leaders have not found ways to make it attractive for all individuals and sub-units to transcend such narrow, vertical thinking.

Thinking Towards Long Term Objectives In these days of short term profit pressures, many organizations have downsized so drastically to reduce costs that it is difficult for their people to advance ideas that have longer term and sometimes more risky (although

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much higher impact) paybacks. Many organizations do not know how to create meaningful strategic plans that identify and align specific short term objectives with long term goals that are understood by all individuals in the organization. Even fewer have the ability to involve all levels of the organization in strategic thinking to develop such specific, aligned objectives and integrated strategic plans. A well known definition of leadership is the process of influencing followers to agree on and work toward common goals and objectives. It appears that in today's era of rapidly accelerating change, leadership also requires the ability to change how people think, to open (closed) minds and keep them open permanently. Our findings would indicate that there is much room for improvement in leadership skills among today's managers of large corporations. A much more creative leadership style is needed, with new skills in designing organizational structure and changing how others think.

Technology for Customer Needs Making technologies better suited for customer needs requires the technology developers to get to know the customers better and discover the customers' own problems and challenges. In Japan's Toshiba Corporation, scientists and engineers newly hired into R&D positions are required to spend at least the first six months of their new career working in sales (Basadur, 1992). Why? To ensure that the newly hired researchers learn that the first step in the innovation process is to learn what problems customers are having. Such customer problems are considered ``golden eggs'', and new products are considered simply as solutions to customers' problems. Getting to know customers helps one to discover and even stumble upon important problems that they are experiencing. There are many other creative ways in which organizations can deliberately increase such educational interactions and customer awareness for technology people. Providing the opportunity for participation in a customers' planning process is one example. It is important for key decision-makers on technology ideas and investments to increase their understanding of both the technology and the customer. Otherwise, truly well-informed decisions cannot be made consistently. Time must be invested in creating such opportunities. It must become an important priority. However, such initiatives often remain merely ``ideas'' ± unimplemented due to the pressure of short term day to day crises and

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activities that contribute to the next quarter's bottom line.

Conclusions and future research Managers must develop new creative leadership skills and acknowledge the fact that they are expected to manage the work environment and lead people. They must be able to use new tools which help people think differently and more strategically and which help them clearly identify and align the objectives and challenges of every part of the company. These creative skills and tools are readily available to learn, develop and apply. Furthermore, these same skills and tools must stretch down further in the organization. Individuals must learn how to align their own objectives and activities with more strategic organizational goals. Managers must learn to devise creative ways to increase face-to-face interaction among diverse parts of the organization and with customers to build understanding of customers' problems. In other words, managers must put creative thought into devising and implementing such people processes which overcome the management of technology (MOT) challenges identified in this research. Such processes must be customized for each organization. The importance of devising these processes must be accepted and not relegated to secondary priority bending to imminent crises and pressures. Similar research with representatives of small- and medium-sized enterprises should be conducted to explore differences and similarities compared to large corporations. This would likely provide valuable insights on solving the challenges uncovered in this research. Also, this research focused only on the fact finding and problem-definition portions of the Simplex method. It would be useful to conduct a longer research workshop that could work the issue through all three phases. Solutions created and implemented could be monitored and shared for other corporations to adopt and implement and for further research to build understanding.

Notes 1. Challenge MappingTM, and Simplex1 are trademarked and registered names of the Basadur Center for Research in Applied Creativity. 2. The Why What's Stopping? AnalysisTM is a trademarked name of the Basadur Center for Research in Applied Creativity.

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References Ackoff, R.L. (1979) The future of operational research is past. Journal of Operational Research Society, 30, 93±104. Badawy, M.K. (1989) Management of Technology. The Enemies are Within. Industry Week, March 20, 238, 39±43. Basadur, M.S. (1994a) Simplex: A Flight to Creativity. Buffalo, NY: Creative Education Foundation Press. Basadur, M.S. (1994b) Managing the creative process in organizations. In M.A. Runco (Ed.), Problem finding, problem solving, and creativity. Chapter 12. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Basadur, M.S. (1992) Managing creativity: A Japanese model. Academy of Management Executive, 6(2), 29±42. Basadur, M.S. (1984) Productivity case study: Offsetting costs at Frito-Lay. Productivity, 5 (4), 1±3. Basadur, M.S. (1981) Training in creative problem solving and measuring improvement. Engineering Digest, 27 (3), Toronto, Ontario. Basadur, M.S. (1974) Think or sink. The Deliberate Methods Change Bulletin, July-September, Procter & Gamble Management Systems Division, Cincinnati, Ohio. Basadur, M.S., Ellspermann, S.J., & Evans, G.W. (1994) A new methodology for formulating illstructured problems. OMEGA: The International Journal of Management Science 22 (6), 627±645. Basadur, M.S., & Paton, B.R. (1993) Creativity boosts profits in recessionary times ± broadening the playing field. Industrial Management, 35 (1), 14±19. Basadur, M.S., Pringle, P.S., Speranzini, G.W., & Bacot, M. (2000) Collaborative problem solving through creativity in problem definition: Expanding the pie. Creativity & Innovation Management, 9, No. 1, 54±76 Berk, S. (1989) Managing Technology for a Competitive Edge: An AMA Survey. Management Review, Jan-June, 78, 49±51.

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Cohen, D., Whitmeyer, J.W., & Funk, W.H. (1960) Effect of group cohesiveness and training upon creative thinking. Journal of Applied Psychology, 44(5), 319±322. Elbing, A. (1978) Behavioral Decisions in Organizations. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. Frohman, A.L. (1982) Technology as a Competitive Weapon. Harvard Business Review, JanuaryFebruary, 97±104. Getzels, J.W. (1975) Problem-finding and the inventiveness of solutions. Journal of Creative Behavior. 9, 12±18. Leavitt, H.J. (1975) Beyond the analytic manager. California Management Review, 17, No. 3, 5±12. Mintzberg, H. (1973) The Nature of Managerial Work. Harper & Row, New York. Noori, H. (1990) Managing the Dynamics of New Technology Issues in Manufacturing Management. Prentice Hall. Rickards, T.J. (1994) Creativity from a business school perspective: Past, present, and future. In S.G. Isaksen, M.C. Murdock, R.L. Firestein & D.J. Treffinger (eds.), Nurturing and Developing Creativity: The Emergence of a Discipline. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex. Simon, H.A. (1960) The New Science of Management Decision. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Taylor, F.W. (1967) Principles of Scientific Management. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1911.)

Min Basadur is Professor of Organizational Psychology and Innovation at McMaster University, Ontario, Canada. J. Andre Potworowski, Nicholas Pollice and Jan Fedorowicz are Associates of the Basadur Center for Research in Applied Creativity.

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Trust-based Leadership: Creative Lessons from Intelligent Horsemanship Tudor Rickards Mostly unsubstantiated claims have been made that non-traditional methods of horsemanship have much to offer as models for leadership. The claims include the achievement of rapid and efficient interactions in which trust is gained between the human and unridden foals, or even between human and horses with fear of human contact. A study has begun to explore the relationship between the so-called `join-up' approach, and creative leadership. The basic principles of the two approaches have been compared and contrasted in pilot studies with managers on development courses. Preliminary results suggest that creative leadership, and the join-up approach, have many features in common. A particularly significant similarity is that they are both trust-based approaches, contrasting with more traditional approaches of human and horse management, in which the goals of the leader/ trainer are achieved through reinforcement of power and through the exercise of coercive methods of maintaining dominance. The study raises deep ethical questions of how leaders deal with those over whom they have some power, and for whom they have responsibilities. We conclude that creative leadership, and trust-based methods of horsemanship achieve involvement and cooperation by psychologically healthy means.

T

his is a story of a non-traditional kind of study, even it was partly carried out in a traditional Business School classroom. It may well have claims that can be legitimized in conventional academic fashion. However, I have chosen to relate it in an informal fashion, although I will have a stab at explaining what I understand by some important terms such as creative leadership. This story begins when the methods of a Californian cowboy came to the attention of academics in a European Business School. It describes the methods, and outlines how we connected them to the principles of creative leadership with which my colleagues and I have been associated over a period of years. For some people, the dangers of drawing simple analogies between horse management and human leadership are all too clear. Let me therefore say immediately that there are both similarities and differences between the method and our work on creative leadership in business, political and social environments. The obvious differences can become a communication barrier. One colleague on hearing of our work asked if we were learning how to calm people by breathing into their nostrils! We have also needed to reassure trainees that # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

we are not working on ways of `breaking the spirit' of workers, or of belittling humans by comparing them with animals. Indeed, the work has sensitized me to the inappropriateness of a great deal of animal behaviours as models for improved human action. The behaviour of wresting the leadership of a pride by a lion, or of a troop of monkeys by the alpha male is single minded, and in human terms, merciless. The essential distinction is that the approach is based on dynamics that make for a better fit with human beliefs of ethical behaviour, converted into creative action for the well being of leader and followers alike. We must be very careful in the metaphors we choose as our thinking tools.

Dangers of simple analogies

Background Like all good stories, this one involves a chance meeting. An enthusiastic horse rider called Sylvia Arnold, learned about the approach and attended a demonstration by Kelly Marks, one of Europe's leading advocates of trust-based methods of working with horses. Kelly had worked with the original horse

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A facilitative style of leadership

whisperer, Monty Roberts, and incorporated his ideas alongside her own passion for what she calls intelligent horsemanship. Sylvia was captivated by Kelly's demonstration, and began studying with Kelly. In her enthusiasm she persuaded her husband to attend a demonstration as well. Her husband John was not at the time interested in horses. He was more interested in his job as director of the Manchester Business School. It would be fair to say that John's attendance had been through Sylvia's enthusiasm. Nevertheless, he was intrigued enough to wonder what would happen if the methods were introduced to some of his colleagues who were already interested in leadership . On his next tour of Great Britain, Monty Roberts visited the Manchester Business School at the invitation of John and Sylvia Arnold. Monty Roberts was accompanied by his wife Pat, who is now accepting her increasing status as an international celebrity. Other colleagues, included Jason, a Rodeo expert, who was the lead rider on the exhausting series of demonstrations up and down the country. There were in addition, academics at the lunch meeting, including the editors of this journal We knew little of the visitor, beyond the fact that The Horse Whisperer, was allegedly a Hollywood version of the story of Monty Roberts, and his methods dealing with horses. The film brought Monty international attention for his approach, which has since become a recognized ± and in many cases, preferred ± alternative to earlier approaches to working with horses. In complete contrast to many traditional approachs of `breaking' the horse into a condition of compliance, Monty's approach is founded on the recognition of a foal's instinctive desire to be part of the herd. From a study of such behaviours over a period of many years, he developed a method that permits him to win the trust of a horse within half an hour, so that even a previously unridden animal accepts saddling, and then a rider. Demonstrations have convinced thousands of knowledgeable spectators that this new approach works. After one such demonstration, the Queen herself endorsed the method, and has been encouraging its use for some years. TV appearances, books, and hundreds of personal demonstrations have helped communicate the method.

The links with creative leadership and trust These were the methods that Kelly Marks had also taken up so successfully. After meeting

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and talking with Kelly and Monty ± and witnessing their work with horses ± a group of us at Manchester including John and Sylvia Arnold, and co-editor Susan Moger determined to look more closely into the business relevance of the basic approach. We also met other business academics and consultants who are considering how such methods might be applied in organisational contexts. One experienced executive in particular, Ian Lawson, saw a connection with recent research results. Ian heads the leadership group at the Industrial Society, a well-respected British institution. They have been associated with socially-responsible leadership initiatives for many years. Ian produced evidence that showed that the most powerful differentiation between successful and unsuccessful leaders was a trust-based leadership style. In the autumn of 1999, we offered a workshop on non-traditional leadership approaches at the British Academy Conference. The Manchester-based group and Ian Lawson presented our embryo ideas about horsemanship and creative leadership. To some relief, we received only an expected level of challenge and cynicism. The dangers of drawing simple analogies between horse management and human leadership were made all too clear. The obvious differences can become a communication barrier. Since that time we have become tired of being asked if we are teaching leaders to control people by breathing into their nostrils. We have also reassured trainees that we are not working on ways of `breaking the spirit' of workers, or of belittling humans by comparing them with animals. Indeed, the work has sensitized us to the inappropriateness of a great deal of animal behaviours as models for improved human action. Such methods are particularly dangerous and morally repugnant if translated to a handbook for human leadership. Nevertheless, the logic we were developing ran something like this. Creative leadership has an easy-to-understand meaning as leadership that brings out the creativity inherent in others. It is a facilitative style of leadership perhaps found at its purest in the leader of a team engaged in a structured creativity technique such as brainstorming. It is not the same as the better known transformational style, which relies on inspirational features. But is possibly closer to a transformational style, which seeks insights and visionary change, than to a transactional style, which is akin to the old-fashioned `stick and carrot' style of leadership. The new methods of intelligent horsemanship we were learning about seemed close to creative leadership,

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and Ian Lawson's research on trust-based leadership.

Further reactions to our first ideas At Manchester Business School, we have become hardened to adverse reactions to novel ideas. The School is an institution with a long reputation for pioneering new and controversial ideas in management. In the 1960s the newly founded school developed `The Manchester Method', a way of learning through studying businesses and their challenges as living cases. So we were not deterred by the thought that other Business Schools might have already rejected the whole idea of joinup as irrelevant and academically trivial. More important was to satisfy ourselves that we had a legitimate and promising approach to support executive education and development. The case against using the `intelligent horsemanship' metaphor is that we risk reinforcing inappropriate leadership metaphors of dominance and dehumanization. A second line of attack is that the method is a version of the so-called theory-Y, or be-niceto-the-workers approach, which has its own problems in competitive business environments. The third objection is that the methods are not accepted yet by many in the horse breeding and managing establishment. We do not wish to make excessive claims for what we are doing, but the experiences of first trials have gone some way towards justifying our initial intuitions. Our view is that experiential learning leads to unexpected discoveries. Learning can not just be asserted in a classroom. And as they observe the way horses react to certain behaviours, participants think about how they themselves or other employees react to different management styles. The discussion afterwards often leads to one about experiences of bullying and abusive behaviours, a discussion that might not otherwise surface in a leadership course. We've found this helps the participants draw fine distinctions between being tough, being assertive, being supportive and being soft. At a more immediate level, we see the need for careful research studies into the behaviours of our executives. The discussions and demonstrations suggested that there were connections between the approach, and an on-going project on creative leadership at Manchester Business School. Could there be a link between the two bodies of work? If that turned out to be the case, then it would lead to an exciting new means of studying, and even teaching, good leadership practices.

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Looking for the links We decided to carry out a piece of detective work, `fingerprinting' the essential features of the two approaches of creative leadership and of `join-up'. Strictly speaking, we were not here conducting a search for a shared identity between two samples of fingerprints, or in its more recent counterpart, between two sequences of amino acids. Rather, we are exploring to see whether the sense we make of horse whispering has adequate connections to the sense we make of creative leadership. We took as our fingerprints the basic principles behind the practices of creative leadership that we had been studying, and the principles behind the methods of join-up. This gave us a list of over twenty attributes. We rated each attribute as a clear match, or a possible match, after a period of discussion. We were also prepared to record mismatches. We found no mismatches. The absolute number of matches is perhaps misleading, as the items on the list are not independent. The results are shown in Table 1. We subsequently asked two groups of executives (one from the UK, and the other from a set of visiting Future Leaders of Africa, including two members of parliaments in their own countries) to help in our fingerprinting. They extended the list of attributes, once again confirming the general matching. They also suggested carrying out a `negative matching' ± to show that traditional horsebreaking did not match with creative leadership. We took their advice, and produced Table 2. The results were even more straightforward. Traditional horse-breaking (at least as we understood it) is almost completely unmatched with creative leadership.

Fingerprinting essential features

Into the Round Pen. The next steps By January this year, Sylvia Arnold had conducted her own researches into the methods on trust-based horsemanship. She had successfully achieved the communication called `join-up' when a horse previously unknown to the human, signals willingness to be a partner, and acknowledging the human as a form of leader to be trusted. This step, of joinup, takes place in a special circular enclosure or round-pen, and leads to `follow-up', where the horse actively follows the human, and increasingly accepts being in close touch, until eventually the horse accepts a rider. We might have proceeded at academic pace, but for a chance remark to a journalist. (Yes, it did happen that way). John Arnold had mentioned our intentions to a reporter

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from Time magazine. An article appeared in Time in January 2001 indicating that The Manchester Business School was training executives to be better leaders, by having them tame horses. For the next few weeks, we had to learn quickly how to deal with TV and press media that had become interested in filming executives dealing with wild stallions. At this stage, we became very aware of the contagion theory of innovation. We felt in danger of losing an opportunity if we did not act quickly. Fortunately, our marketing team rose to the challenge, and we found ourselves working to create a pilot course for managers in less than six weeks. (They had shown even more prescience in persuading most of the academics involved in this project to undertake a media-training course the previous summer.) Kelly Marks agreed to take part in the demonstration. A local business woman, Dawn Gibbins, MBE, came to the rescue by making her private indoor riding school available to us. Dawn and husband Mark ( a former MBA at the School) also hosted refreshments for journalists, executives, invited members of the public, and academics. The executives did not `tame wild stallions'. But they did watch a lively bucking horse become receptive to the point of joinup. Some of the managers went into the round pen and experienced the follow-up as well. They were also talked through the techniques being applied as a resistant horse was coaxed into a horse loader. I have borrowed from that experience in refining the points shown in tables 1 and 2. The horse demonstration was the primary source of the press interest. We were also aware that we had inserted the demonstration into a course for corporate executives who had signed up for a workshop on creative leadership. Would they see as many links between the two domains as we did ourselves? Judging from the interviews that appeared in the press, some were highly

enthusiastic. Other reactions ranged from cautious support, to disappointment at failing to see relevance in working with horses. Perhaps this spectrum of reactions is unsurprising to management trainers who offer non-traditional courses. In some ways it may be taken as demonstrating that experiential learning is likely to generate a range of reactions. That is not to say that as trainers we will not become more skilled at managing expectations, and making the experience generally more valued in future programmes already in progress.

What can we conclude from the exercise? There has been a wealth of learning from the exercise. Those involved have found themselves on the inside of a whirlwind of change whipped up by an idea that captures the attention of the international media. It was easy to see the collusive pressures. The journalists wanted a certain type of story with heroes, and danger and an element of funkiness. There are other combinations, but the cocktail is explosive, and indicates some of the mechanics of a contagion theory of innovation. More directly related to our goals, we have concluded that the next steps will be to explore more deeply the principles of join-up to find out how they can apply to creative leadership. The notion of trust-based systems seems one promising conceptual start-point. More critically, `join-up' applies for the simplest kind of leader-follower transaction, the one-to-one. High-flying corporate executives are more interested in advice whereby they can develop skills in one-to-many relationships in teams or even across entire organisations. This particular detective story is far from over.

Table 1. Fingerprint analysis of `join up' and creative leadership

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Creative leadership

`Join up' and `follow up' processes

Creative leadership: The fundamental process that shifts (team) behaviours from unacceptable to acceptable to outstanding by introducing helpful (`benign') structures.

Trust-based hosemanship: The fundamental process that shifts behaviours from wild or troubled to cooperative by introducing helpful structures leading to `join-up' (condition of acceptance and trust) and `follow up' (condition of mutually beneficial leader/ follower activities).

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The process emphasizes cooperation not coercion. The leader strives for mutuality and `win-win' outcomes.

The process works by cooperation not coercion. The human strives for win-win' outcomes.

+

The leader deploys strategies and techniques that encourage team members to learn and solve its problems.

The human deploys strategies and techniques that encourage the horse to learn and solve its problems.

+

Leader tries to align individual needs, with team tasks and responsibilities (`Hips and lips in same direction').

The human sets tasks, avoids `mixed messages'.

+

The style is empowering and enabling.

The human succeeds by `making the world a better place for the horse', so that the horse learns at its own pace (`get out of its way when learning is about to take place')

+

The leader helps build a `platform of understanding' of shared needs and capabilities.

The human `listens' to what the horse is saying (or even whispering). The human learns the language `Equus'

(+)

The process tries to achieve shared or mutually accepted goals regardless of status differentials.

The process achieves results because the impact of status is managed towards mutually acceptable goals.

+

The leader establishes a warm, supportive climate.

The human establishes a non-threatening `space' and invites the horse in. No pain, no adversarial actions.

+

Teams from hell (problem teams) have failed to reach understanding of individual roles and responsibilities.

Problem horses are due to early bad experiences that trigger `bad' behaviours.

(+)

`If you always do what you've always done, you always get what you've always got'. Creative insights require discovery of alternative ways.

Within a `join-up' demonstration, the human has to find ways of dealing with the unexpected. All horse have similar needs, each horse may have had a different trauma, calling for subtle shifts in emphasis. In another sense, the rejection of the new methods by many horse trainers smacks of `If you always do what you've always done, you always get what you've always got'

+

Dream teams co-create and own their future.

Horse and human co-create their shared future.

+

Most teams stay `stuck' at a standard level of performance until triggered by creative challenges.

Our `join-up' colleague (Kelly Marks) won her most prestigious racing awards after she gave up using a whip, in the interests of a trust-based relationship with her horses

(+*)

Resilience is needed to overcome jolts and disappointments.

In `join up' the horse is never wrong. Non-cooperation calls for resilience and patience while maintained the core values of the system.

(+*)

A team needs good `network activators' bringing in extra resources not made available in the original terms of reference

The human needs to be the `network activator' on behalf of the horse. This may involve bringing in innovations, from whatever source

(+*)

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Table 1 (contd) Creative leadership

`Join up' and `follow up' processes

Match

Team learns best through doing and reflecting on doing.

Learning is through the right kind of doing.

(+)

Outstanding performance is helped by structures that help break structures.

Experts such as Monty Roberts and Kelly Marks have a range of `tips' ± innovations (like the Monty Roberts horse blanket) to overcome recurrent problems

(+*)

Leadership is `by invitation only'.

Emphasis is on freedom, not restriction.

+

Leadership `makes the familiar strange, and the strange familiar'.

The human sets up `join-up' by effectively `making the familiar (fear) strange and the strange (trust) familiar

(+)

The leader encourages the team to narrow the gap between ideas and actions. Both intellect and emotions are involved.

The human encourages `join-up' and narrows the physical and psychological gap between horse and human.

(+)

Creativity techniques `work' to simplify the real-world under learning conditions.

A special environment (round pen) helps and speeds up the process of `join-up'.

+

The leader signals that problem-solving is not about blame. Problems are for solving mutually

The horse can do no wrong. (Behaviours are natural even if unwanted!)

(+*)

Developmental learning is a form of mutual discovery

Join-up is about communicating.

(+*)

Key: + = clear match (+) = possible match (+*) = match discovered after discussions with managers and experts in intelligent horsemanship.

Table 2. Creative leadership and aggressive horse-breaking (Analysis made by executive teams January/ February 2001)

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Creative leadership

Aggressive horse-breaking and leadership

Match

The fundamental process that shifts (team) behaviours from unacceptable to acceptable to outstanding by introducing helpful (`benign') structures.

The fundamental process that shifts behaviours from wild or troubled to cooperative by introducing reinforcement through restraining/punishing stimuli.

±

The process emphasizes cooperation, not coercion. The leader strives for mutuality and `win-win' outcomes.

The process works by coercion. The human strives for compliant outcomes.

±

The leader deploys strategies and techniques that encourage team members to learn and solve its problems.

The human deploys strategies and techniques that teach the horse to avoid undesired behaviours.

±

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The team leader tries to align individual needs with team tasks and responsibilities (`Hips and lips in same direction').

The human sets tasks, and backs them up with reminders of punishments associated with undesired behaviours.

±

The style is empowering and enabling.

The style is directive and dominating.

±

The leader helps build a `platform of understanding' of shared needs and capabilities.

The human demonstrates what is required of the horse.

±

The process tries to achieve shared or mutually accepted goals regardless of status differentials.

The process achieves results because the impact of status is reinforced.

±

The leader establishes a warm supportive climate.

The human establishes a `fear zone' where the animal conditioned to comply.

±

Teams from hell (problem teams) have failed to reach understanding of individual roles and responsibilities.

Problem horses can be re-conditioned through appropriate exercise of power.

±

Creative insights require discovery of alternative ways. Otherwise, `If you always do what you've always done, you always get what you've always got'

The process is fixed and uncreative. `If you always do what you've always done, you always get what you've always got'.

±

Dream teams co-create and own their future

A minority of teams achieve high performance when challenged by aggressive threatening methods. Such teams seem intrinsically unstable, and prone to self-destruction (c.f. many pop groups).

(±*)

Most teams stay `stuck' at a standard level of performance until triggered by creative challenges.

Even high performance horses do the minimum needed to avoid punishment

±

Resilience is needed to overcome jolts and disappointments. A special feature of the creative leadership process is its mutual reinforcement and encouragement

The resilience is egocentric, and not of a kind that permits development of mutual support and encouragement, human to human, or human and horse.

(±*)

A team needs good `network activators' who bring in resources. Creative leaders offer the enhancing resources in a spirit of mutual obligation through which trust builds up over the longer-term

New resources are withheld or supplied as part of a carrot-stick regime. The new resources are of a kind known as `fungibles', and therefore only of temporary impact on team (or horse) behaviours.

(±*)

A team learns best through doing and reflecting on doing.

Learning is through avoiding error.

±

Outstanding performance is helped by structures that liberate creative potential.

Outstanding performance is achieved by structures that help break horse's will

±

Leadership is `by invitation only'.

Restriction gives limited freedom.

±

Leadership `makes the familiar strange, and the strange familiar'. Creative leadership helps unblock mindsets that reject the unfamiliar

The human achieves his or her ends by `making the familiar (fear) the standard, and the strange (trust) irrelevant'.

±

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Table 2 (contd) Creative leadership

Aggressive horse-breaking and leadership

Match

The leader encourages the team to narrow the gap between ideas and actions. Both intellect and emotions are involved.

The human clearly emphasizes the physical and psychological gap between horse and human.

±

Creativity techniques `work' to simplify the real world in learning conditions.

Leadership tries to control the environment to achieve compliance (however long it takes).

±

The leader signals that problem-solving is not about blame. Problems are for solving mutually

The human is not in the wrong. The horse alone has to change

±

Developmental learning is a form of mutual discovery

Learning is what the horse has to do; communicating is about what the human wants.

(±*)

Tudor Rickards is Professor of Creativity and Organisational Change at Manchester Business School.

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Book of the Quarter Reviewed by Paul Mc Kevitt Mark Runco and Steven Pritzker (Eds.) (1999), Encyclopedia of Creativity, Vols. 1 & 2. ISBN: 0-12-227075-4 (set), 0-12-227076 (Vol. 1), 0-12-227077 (Vol. 2). Vol. 1: Pp xvii+833, Vol. 2: Pp xiii+810; hardbound. Academic Press, San Diego, CA.

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n the hard bound library version, the set of two volumes retail at $350. At that price, one would want to be very interested in creativity to make the purchase. Volume 1 covers A±H and Volume 2, I±Z, with articles on various aspects of creativity, listed alphabetically. The complete index is located in Volume 2 with tables of contents in each volume. The Editors in Chief are Mark Runco at California State University, Fullerton, California, USA and Steven Pritzker at Luminescent Creativity, Greenbae, California, USA. The Executive Advisory Board consists of: Howard Gardener, Harvard University; Ravenna Helson, University of California, Berkeley; Ruth Richards, Saybrook Graduate School, University of California, San Francisco and Harvard Medical School; Tudor Rickards, University of Manchester; Dean Keith Simonton, University of California, Davis and Robert J. Sternberg, Yale University. In their preface, the Editors point out that since 1960 over 10,000 research articles in creativity have appeared in hundreds of journals and periodicals and over 600 books have been published in the 1990s confirming that creativity is a concern in both the arts and the sciences. The editors claim that, ``The Encyclopedia of creativity is a source book, the first of its kind, comprehensive, and written for a wide audience. Here everyone from the casual newcomer to the seasoned researcher can find a broad cross section of information and even guidance about creativity.'' (Vol. 1, preface, p. xv). However, reviewers on http://www.amazon.com claim that the book is more for academics and too dry to be readable by the casual newcomer. The encyclopedia consists of articles written by various sorts of professionals (mainly academics) providing overviews of theories and perspec# Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

tives, reviews of specific areas (e.g. the arts, acting, architecture, and dance), thought processes, programs and courses, business creativity, society, research methodology, definitions, and selected biographical studies focussing on eminent individuals in different domains (e.g. writers, scientists, psychologists, and painters). Each article consists of an outline (contents), a glossary, cross-references, and a bibliography. A feature of the encyclopedia is that the running right and left page headers both give the title of articles (e.g. ``Brain and the Creative Act'', Vol. 1, p. 216), whereas one would normally expect alternate information such as the author's name (e.g. Karl Pribram). I went immediately to the Artificial Intelligence article by Tony Proctor (Vol. 1, p. 127). I was surprised that his bibliography did not mention any of the standard Artificial Intelligence books on creativity that I would have expected to find, e.g. Boden (1990, 1996), Partridge and Rowe (1994), Dartnall (1993), nor even classic references to claims of creativity by computer programs. I also checked the article by the same author (Vol. 1, p. 301) on computer programs, and missed AM and Eurisko (Davis and Lenat, 1982; Lenat 1982, 1983). Nor were there references to good introductory books on Artificial Intelligence, e.g. Partridge (1991), Rich and Knight (1990), Russell and Norvig (1994). [To be fair, a ceiling of six key references was imposed on the contributor for each encyclopedia entry: Ed, CAIM]

What, no Nachmanovitch? In perusing the encyclopedia, I was expecting to see a reference to Nachmanovitch (1990) but found none therein. Stephen Nachmanovitch was an invited speaker at The Eighth

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International Workshop on the Cognitive Science of Natural Language Processing (CSNLP-8), Theme: language, vision & music, occurring during the solar eclipse of 1999 in Galway, Ireland, where there were oral paper sessions and a panel session on creativity (see Mc Kevitt et al. 2001). His paper on, ``Creativity: stone & lava'' focussed on creativity which Stephen said like life itself is a balancing act. We melt down structures that are too settled or habitual, and solidify intuitions that are too loose and incohate ± a flux of give-and-take between lava and stone. Stephen points out that this is why the archetype of the creative personality is often portrayed as a blacksmith or alchemist: heating, reshaping, hammering, cooling molten metal. Being too rigid makes us tyrants wrapped up in conformity and fear, and being too loose our dreams remain unrealized. Stephen draws on material from William Blake, Buddhism, Taoism, the history of Western music, and other traditions. Stephen jumped on the point of STAMPING OUT NOUNS insisting that we must become detached from symbols. Paul Mc Kevitt asked if this is what Joyce did in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, and Stephen said yes it was. Incidentally, this presentation of Stephen's was during a creativity session from 9.30 AM until 10.30 AM on Wednesday, August 11th, where the solar eclipse was already ongoing. He made reference to the eclipse a number of times showing pictures of lions eating the sun which heralded ``a new beginning''. During this, Paul Mc Kevitt noted that EuroNews TV that morning had it showed Celtic Druids in Cornwall, England performing the sun dance, and they pointed out that the significance of the solar eclipse was that it heralded ``a new beginning''. Other topics coming up frequently at that meeting were the obvious ones of metaphor and analogy being important for creativity. These are also found in the enclyclopedia as mentioned, for example, by Karl Pribram in his article on ``Brain and the creative act'' (Vol. 1, p. 216) and also other articles (analogies, ensembles of metaphor, metaphor). Hofstadter (1999), also not mentioned in the encyclopedia, comes to the same conclusion.

Zeitgeist ``Zeitgeist'' (Vol. 2, p. 737), in an article by Leonard Shlain, is given a definition as, ``A conjunction of artistic and scientific creativity can occur within a society without there being active interaction between artists and scientists. Yet, in some mysterious manner, the

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new forms of art and the innovations in science appear to be related in a non causal way. The phenomenon is known as a ZEITGEIST.'' Shlain asks, ``How do the central principles of a new style in art segue across the spectrum of culture, like ripples on a pond, eventually to resonate in the equations of visionary physicists?'' (p. 738) Shlain's article focusses on relationships between the arts and sciences and this is an area which is gaining new significance today with the advent of MultiMedia and Intelligent MultiMedia (see Mc Kevitt 1995/96, 1998a,b) and is a focus of the MIT Media Lab. (http:// www.media.mit.edu) and MediaLabEurope (http://www.medialabeurope.org). In fact, I have recommended that universities must focus on this more (Mc Kevitt, 1999) as part of a series of ideas on how to stimulate more thinking and creativity in university education.

Synesthesia Synesthesia, where people hear colours or taste shapes, is clearly linked with creativity which is also stressed in Mc Kevitt et al. (2001). I was happy to see the article ``Synesthesia'' (Vol. 2, p. 597) by George Domino concurring. Domino's laboratory has conducted experiments producing results linking synesthesia with creativity and his article is well written and covers all aspects of synesthesia in detail.

Missing personnel I was glad to see that Vygotsky gets a biographical sketch (Vol. 2, p. 691), being one of the distinguished scientists of our time, but was surprised that the most celebrated writer in the English language, arguably in the world, James Joyce, doesn't. Admittedly, the editors do say in the preface that, ``Only those individuals whose lives have already been studied by specialists in creativity were included. Hence, although there are many individuals famous for their creative pursuits, you may not find coverage of your favourite here. Inclusion is not intended to be a judgement on the impact or value of these individuals or their reactions.'' (Vol 1, p. xiii and Vol. 2, p. xvii). I know that Joyce wasn't awarded the Nobel Prize, like Shaw, Yeats, Beckett and Heaney, but I find it hard to believe that no creativity specialist has studied Joyce. Even if that were the case, maybe the editors could have taken another tack, and

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commissioned biographical sketches. Surely including great creators is more important than whether creativity. specialists have studied them or not? And what about Picasso, Kandinsky and Heaney?

Brainstorming I found Tudor Rickards' article on ``brainstorming'' (Vol. 1, p. 219) useful since it reminded me of Dennett's great book on brainstorms (Dennett 1984). I was surprised to find that there is practical evidence showing that interactive groups are less productive than nominal groups (taking the combined outputs of individuals in making the comparisons). I have found contrary evidence supporting the importance of groupwork for stimulating creativity (discussed in Mc Kevitt, 1999). However, Rickards' conclusion is that brainstorming is most effective when using a cocktail of nominal (non-interactive) and interactive groupwork techniques and applied to particular circumstances. Research in electronic support systems for brainstorming focusses on the differences between individual and group behaviours and shows that it can enhance idea generation. The article points out that the question, ``Does brainstorming stimulate creativity?'' can only be answered by empirical means, in the absence of universal agreement on what creativity is. The encyclopedia on creativity is a useful reference book for source material mainly tailored for academics, and is wondrous for dipping into, as you can see I did above. I wonder, considering the price, whether one would prefer to find it in a library or on the internet.

References Boden, M. (1990) The creative mind: myths and mechanisms, London, England: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Boden, M. (Ed.) (1996) Dimensions of creativity, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT press. Dartnall, T. (Ed.) (1993) Artificial Intelligence and creativity: an interdisciplinary approach, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers Davis, R. and Lenat, D. (1982), Knowledge based systems in artificial intelligence, New York, USA: McGraw-Hill Dennett, D. (1984) Brainstorms: philosophical essays on mind and psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press Hofstadter, D. (1999) Godel, Escher, Bach: an eternal golden braid, New York, USA: Basic Books.

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Lenat, D. (1982) The nature of heuristics, Artificial Intelligence, 19, 21. Lenat, D. (1983) Why AM and eurisko appear to work, Proceedings. of the National Conference of the American Association of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 236±240. Mc Kevitt, P. (1995/96) (Ed.) Integration of natural language and vision processing (Vols. I-IV). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer-Academic Publishers. Mc Kevitt, P. (1998a) SuperinformationhighwayS and IntelliMedia 2000+: bringing together humanities, science, and engineering, WWW and Printed Proceedings of the International Conference on The Future of the Humanities in the Digital Age: problems and perspectives for humanities education and research, de Smedt, Koenraad, and Daniel Apollon (Eds.), 157±158, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway, September. Mc Kevitt, P. (1998b) CHAMELEON and the IntelliMedia, WorkBench: integrating research from the humanities, science and engineering, Video of Software Exhibit, WWW and Printed Proceedings of the International Conference on The Future of the Humanities in the Digital Age: problems and perspectives for humanities, education and research, de Smedt, K, and Apollon, D (Eds.), 17±22 University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway, September. Mc Kevitt, P. (1999), Ideas for universities, Unpublished M.Ed Dissertation, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, England. Mc Kevitt, P., O Nuallain, S. and Mulvihill, C. (2001) Language, vision & music: Workshop Report on The Eighth International Workshop on the Cognitive Science of Natural Language Processing (CSNLP-8), In AI Review, 14(6), 591± 613. Mc Kevitt, P., O Nuallain, S. and Mulvihill, C. (2001) (Eds.), Language, vision and music, ``Advances in Consciousness Research'' US: John Benjamins. Nachmanovitch, S. (1990) Free Play: the power of improvisation in life and the arts. Los Angeles, CA: Tarcher. Partridge, D. (1991) A new guide to artificial intelligence, Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing (Now Intellect Books). Partridge, D. and Rowe, J. (1994) Computers and creativity, Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing (Now Intellect Books). Rich, E. and Knight, K. (1990) Artificial Intelligence, New York, USA: McGraw-Hill. Russell, S. and Norvig, P. (1994) Artificial Intelligence: a modern approach, Prentice Hall Series in Artificial Intelligence, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Paul Mc Kevitt is Chair in Digital Multimedia at the School of Computing and Mathematical Sciences, Faculty of Informatics, University of Ulster (Magee College) Derry (Londonderry) Northern Ireland.

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Book Review David Collins (2000) Management fads and buzzwords: critical-practical perspectives, Routledge, London/NY, 413 pp, hback, ISBN 0415206391, author and subject indexes.

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reativity and innovation are topics open to the charge of embracing fads and buzzwords, and of being over-influenced by gurus. I rather expected the topics to be discussed in Management fads and buzzwords: Critical-practical perspectives. They are not directly examined, although it is possible to extend the author's critique to include these subjects, and I will attempt to do so towards the end of this review. This book constructs an exhaustive (and at time exhausting) examination of management fads and buzzwords. But the real, real enemy, the causal agents behind fads and buzzwords, are portrayed as the management gurus, or `gurus' as the author consistently apostrophizes them. The basic story had a coherent logic to it, and one that can not be dismissed in its entirety. The logic, simply put, is that `Management's fads and fancies do not fall like rain. They do not occur naturally. They are created and disseminated by groups of people working within an apparatus, which has grown to become an industry in itself . . . whose core business lies, not in the field of management but in the fields of media and entertainment'. (p4). The analytical approach offered is stated as a critical-practical critique. I understand this to mean essentially an approach that stands in opposition to an uncritical practical approach (or approaches) typifying management behaviours. The gurus and their messages are largely accepted because their consumers/ customers/prey are uncritical and unsuspecting. The author attempts to work at a more specific level though identifying important fads and buzzwords. Nevertheless, the work tends to comment rhetorically on gurus as if they have a common set of characteristics, almost always expressed as pernicious in intent or outcome. Furthermore, the managerial targets of the gurus are portrayed are gullible, in an equivalently universalistic way. Gurus are presented as performers, to be recognized in lecture theatres, via web sites

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and TV screens, and through their numerous books. They thus share characteristics with artists engaged in the media and entertainment businesses. This seems a potentially worthwhile image of gurus in action. It might be worth considering other images or metaphors. Similarly, I am not convinced that their messages (performances?) are received by a homogeneously uncritical audience. Indeed the author recognizes some, perhaps illicit, organisational opposition to gurus and their buzzwords. He reminds us of the not-so-new game of management buzzword bingo, whose players keep track of buzzwords perpetrated during otherwise boring meetings. Might it just be that the apparent uncritical acceptance of gurus is, at least partly, acted out? In which case, we can hardly look for a rescue act by introducing critical-practical critique. I just have the slightest suspicion of the non-participant observers setting out to conduct a richer and more meaningful critique, while missing a great deal of the intentions of the actors. Shades of early anthropological interpretations come to mind. The natives were not noble savages, nor unenlightened cannibals, nor sexually liberated children. Can we risk treating managers as completely uncritical, in their dealing with what amounts to high-profile selling and influencing experiences? The author selects a wide range of fads and buzzwords, and to draw attention to the antics of gurus offering their various treatments and remedies wrapped up in the buzzwords. He identifies culture and culture change programmes; prescriptions in search of excellence (after Tom Peters); Total Quality Management; Empowerment; Business Process Reengineering, Downsizing, Globalisation, and Knowledge work, as his examples of fads and buzzwords. From a position reasonably close to managerial action, I recognize how these and other themes capture the imagination of a proportion of advocates. I agree that there is a proportion of people who appear to be unreflective believers, and who play an important part in the diffusion of a # Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000. 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

BOOK REVIEW

particular fad . The energetic cynicism in this book serves as a redress to the outpourings in what the author calls works of hagiography. His fundamental point is that the gurus succeed by sustaining the cherished beliefs of managers rather than challenging these beliefs, and then by offering as new, prescriptions that accord with the beliefs. These beliefs include what used to be called `the right to manage' ± this involves the espousal of a shared and legitimate set of organisational goals, and having authority to mobilize the efforts of others towards achieving those goals. In practice, managers find setting and achieving corporate goals to range from very difficult to impossible. Thus there remains an unfulfilled need for new ways of achieving goals, that do not threaten the core beliefs. An alternative possibility might be that managers have to become more critical/less uncritical of these fundamental beliefs. If workers face redundancies through proposed corporate changes, what rights should they have in setting the change agenda? If products are harming the environment, or killing people, there may be conflicts and lack of a shared vision of corporate means and ends. Gurus and managers collude in ignoring the possibility that the fundamental beliefs about management may themselves be in need of re-examination. This gives plenty of scope for one set of prescriptions to become discredited as a fad, leaving the door open to the next travelling guru and his or her goods. Success tends to follow the guru who can make the most convincing show or performance. The outcome is churning not changing, as Professor Andrew Pettigrew has been known to remark. Gurus are more in the spirit of onenight stands, than of permanent relationships undertaken in the spirit of `for better or worse, richer or poorer, `till death do us part'. The author is careful to approach each chapter indicating an intention to reveal the implicit beliefs behind the selected topic in order to `illuminate the potential pitfalls that await those who would blindly follow the advice of management's specialists' (p145). The topics make for interesting reading. Mostly, the critical observations have enough weight to command attention. As chapter follows chapter, the reader may will conclude that there is a consistent underpinning pattern of guru prescription, and ultimate disappointment from managers who at first were believers. Citing an earlier work by Huczynski (Management Gurus, 1993, Routledge) the author suggests that the success factors include an understanding of the world of work that

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resonates with managers. It also requires a practical appeal which `consists of a number of steps or principles, claims universal applicability, carries some authority or proof, [and] carries the promise of improvement of turnround' (p106) Another assumption that diminishes the force of the argument, is an insistence that all gurus provide a partial and unsophisticated account of organisations. There may be a tautology here ± maybe any guru instanced as offering a more critical approach would not be classed a real guru. More likely, however, the author has found it easier to write rhetorically of a mythologised class, ignoring the differences among gurus. Peter Senge, for example, has probably been described as a guru as frequently as those identified in the book. Yet Senge's most successful writing attempted to encourage a form of critical thinking as a management discipline. Conversely, the influential American Academy of Management still publishes a great deal of highly unreflective (non-critical), data-driven material. Yet, the author seems to assume that, scholars, for example, those versed in critical-practical analyses, are better able to handle the multi-layered complexities of organisational life, than are gurus or managers. Sadly, the value of the material is diminished by editorial decisions, and lack of care in the final proof reading. One extended quotation appears in two different places, each time with the same authorial comment. The decision to bestow apostrophes on important concepts such as guru seems out of character for a book from a sociological interpretive tradition. At over 400 pages it risks alienating readers. The messages would have more force if the book had been more severely edited.

Creativity and innovation fads and buzzwords Let us apply the approach to the themes of creativity and innovation. Our buzzwords are helpfully pointed out by those who are less than impressed by them. Training feedback may complain of jargon such as mindsets, paradigm switch, lateral thinking, out of the box thinking, brainstorming, whole brain thinking, imaginization, creative destruction, imagineering, gestalt, stage gate structures, super teams to name the first that came to mind. Many have been associated with a pioneering guru. There are numerous creativity gurus who have written books on unleashing the latent power of your mind. There are quite a few

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innovation gurus with their stage models facilitating the initiation and implementation of innovation. Indeed, I recall brainstorming appearing in one examination of management fads, so we are on the right track here. It is rather clear that the field does include gurus operating in ways close to the accounts in this book. There are advocates of steps to success, who promise improvements for all who care to believe and act, and who offer endorsements through authority or proof. Yet it would be a gross simplification to imply that the gurus are easily typified. The most celebrated appear to have a charismatic impact on some people, while succeeding in generating scorn, anger, and dismissive reports from managers and creativity researchers alike. In addition there are those who offer more modest support within change programmes, and yet who espouse a structure or technique for management of data, ideas, and decisions. Some indeed offer step by step prescriptions. Others do not. Some offer prescriptions within some of their writings, and refrain elsewhere. Innovation guru Rosebeth Kanter does not offer such presciptions; neither does Charles Handy, although he receives some robust, knockabout criticism in the book. Conferences on creativity tend to

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include participants holding a wide range of beliefs. There are technique freaks and technique rejectionists. There are members of what has been called Bible-belt creativity (`unleash you hidden powers NOW'). There are distinguished figures from highly reputable universities who present their ideas in subtle and critical fashion. Within these are people some regarded as gurus, or aspirant gurus. There are those with war stories of creative success; others with formal accounts as non-participant observers. In short, the conferences represent a microcosm of conferences in which academic and non-academics come together and attempt to communicate. It is this richness of experience that emerges within a given field, that points to the limits of Management fads and buzzwords. There is indeed much that is nasty and brutish about organisational life. The practices of gurus have persisted relatively unimpaired by critical treatments. Nevertheless, I am as reluctant to concede that the gurus in this field simplistically forces of evil, as I am to accept their messages with a more detailed contextual analysis. Tudor Rickards

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Index to Volume 9 (e.g. 2/79 = number 2, page 79)

1. Articles ABETTI, Pier. Critical Success Factors for Radical Technological Innovation: A Five Case Study

4/208

ANDERSEN, Jon Aarum. The Weight of History: An Exploration of Resistance to Change in Vicars/Managers

3/147

BASADUR, Min, PRINGLE, Pam, SPERANZINI, Gwen and BACOT, Marie. Collaborative Problem Solving Through Creativity in Problem Definition: Expanding the Pie

1/54

BASADUR, Min, POTWOROWSKI, J. AndreÂ, POLLICE, Nicholas and FEDOROWICZ, Jan. Increasing Understanding of Technology Management through Challenge Mapping

4/245

DAVIES, Mark A. P. Using an Analytic Hierarchy Process in Advertising Creativity

2/100

EKVALL, GoÈran. Management and Organizational Philosophies and Practices as Stimulants or Blocks to Creative Behavior: A Study of Engineers GIMENEZ, Fernando. The Benefits of a Coherent Strategy for Innovation and Corporate Change

2/94

4/235

GOLDENBERG, Jacob and MAZURSKY, David. First We Throw Dust in the Air, then We Claim We Can't See: Navigating in the Creativity Storm

2/131

GOODMAN, Malcolm R.V. The Frustration of Talent: A Study in Scarlet

1/46

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JIN, Zhongqi. How Product Newness Influences `Learning and Probing' and the Linearity of its Development Process

1/21

KODAMA, Mitsuru. Innovation through Strategic Community Management: A Case Study Involving Regional Electronic Networking Promotion in Japan

2/115

KODAMA, Mitsuru. Creating New Services Based on the Formation of a Strategic Community with Customers: A Case Study of Innovation Involving IT and Multimedia Technology in the Field of Veterinary Medicine

3/171

MCELHINNEY, David and PROCTOR, Tony. Call Centres: Pre-evaluation of Their Usefulness in Local Government

4/227

MALIK, Khaleel. Managing the Innovation of a Corporate IT-based Cable Design System

3/156

È M, Harry. The NYSTRO Postmodern Challenge ± From Economic to Creative Management

2/109

OLLILA, Susanne. Creativity and Innovativeness through Reflective Project Leadership

3/195

RADNOR, Zoe and ROBINSON, Judith. Benchmarking Innovation: A Short Report

1/3

RICKARDS, Tudor. Trust-Based Leadership: Creative Lessons from Intelligent Horsemanship RIQUELME, Hernan. How to Develop More Creative Strategic Plans: Results from an Empirical Study

4/259

1/14

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ROBERTS, Joanne. Knowledge Systems and Global Advertising Services

3/163

SWAILES, Stephen. Goals, Creativity and Achievement: Commitment in Contemporary Organizations

3/185

TUNNEY, James. The Problematic Role of Lawyers in the Creativity and Innovation Process

4/222

VON KROGH, Georg, ERAT, Pablo and MACUS, Mark. Exploring the Link between Dominant Logic and Company Performance

2/82

2. Books of the Quarter (Review Articles) ECO, Umberto. Kant and the platypus: Essays on language and cognition

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1/77

GRYSKIEWICZ, S. S. Positive Turbulence: Developing climates for creativity, innovation and renewal

3/205

RUNCO, Mark and PRITZKER, Steven (Eds) Encyclopedia of creativity

4/267

3. Book Reviews COLLINS, David. Management fads and buzzwords: critical-practical perspectives

4/270

DEETZ, S.A., TRACY, S.J. and SIMPSON, J.L. Leading organizations through transition: Corporate communication and cultural change

3/203

PAVITT, K. Technology, management and systems of innovation

3/201

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