Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies
Volume 1 (1968)
Ali Banuazizi, Editor Roy Mottahedeh, Associate Editor
Published by The Society for Iranian Studies, P. 0. Box 89, Village Station, New York, New York 10014, U.S.A.
The Society for Iranian Studies COUNCIL Ervand Abrahamian Ali Banuazizi, Executive Secretary Hormoz Hekmat Abbas Heydari-Darafshian Farhad Kazemi, Treasurer Manoucher Parvin, President Majid Tehranian
IRANIAN STUJDIES Journal of 7he Society for Iranian Studies Contents: Volume 1 (1968) ARTICLES Al-i
Ahmad, Jalal. Someone Else's Child (translated by Theodore S. Gochenour). . . . . . .155-162
Bausani, Bulliet,
Alessandro.
Theism and Pantheism
Richard W. City Histories Iran . . . . . . .
in Rumi.
8-24
in Medieval .104-109
Chubak, Sadeq. Two Short Stories (translated by John Limbert). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113-121 Cottam,
Richard in Iran.
W. Political Party Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farrokhzad, Forough. Anita Spertus)
Three Poems (translated by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82-95
54-75
Fatemi,
Ali M. S. Economic Development of Petroleum Exporting Countries . . . . . . . . . .110-112
Limbert,
John. The Origin Kurds in Pre-Islamic
Mintz,
Sidney W. Social Science Research by North Americans Abroad: Some Reflections.
Mottahedeh, Parvin,
and Appearance of the Iran. . . . . . . . . .
Roy.
Manoucher. A Forgotten
Sources
for
the Study of Iran
Military Expenditure in Iran: Question . . . . . . . . . ..
iii
.
41-51
.
34-40
.
4-7
.149-154
.
.
96-103
in Iran
.
132-148
A ColThe Lifted Veil: Farmanfarmaian, Tanya. of Poems, 1966-67 (reviewed by lection Majid Tehranian) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
166-167
Savory, Zonis,
Notes
Roger.
on the Safavid
Educational
Marvin.
State.
Ambivalence
.
BOOKREVIEWS
Russia Kazemzadeh, Firuz. 1864-1914 (reviewed
in Persia and Britain by Nikki R. Keddie).
.
163-165
in Iran: and Rebellion Keddie Nikke R. Religion of 1891-1982 (reviewed The Tobacco Protest by Farhad Kazemi). . . . . . . . . . . . .
31-32
OPEC Oil (reviewed by Majid Teh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
168-175
Lutfi,
Ashraf. ranian).
The Foreign Policy of Iran: Ramazani, Rouhollah. 1500A Developing Nation in World Affairs: 1914 (reviewed by Shaul Bakhash) .122-125 on Oil
(reviewed
76-79
by Majid Tehranian).
Recent
Studies
Wulff,
Crafts of Persia: Hans E. The Traditional Technology and Influence Their Development, (reon Eastern and Western Civilizations viewed by Nikki R. Keddie) . . . . . . . .
165
MISCELLANEOUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Acknowledgment. of Current Research on Iran. Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . By Way of Introduction. The Bitter Loss, M.T.. Forough Farrokhzad: Recent Books on Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . Second Annual Business Report of the Society's Meeting, Majid Tehranian . . . . . . .
iv
. . .27-30, . . . . . .
121 80 2-3 52-53 25-26
128-131
Bulletin
rheSocCleu
oF anutn
Uolunwe Ir, lUtnWr I
nlt
Socdl Stube
Wlonter 1965
I RA
N IAN
ST
UD
IE
S
BULLETINOF THE SOCIETYFOR IRANIANCULTURAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES
COUNCIL Ervand Abrahamian All Banuaziz'i, Secretary Hormoz Hekmat Abbas Heydari-Darafshian Farhad Kazemi, Treasurer Manoucher Parvin, Pres'ident Maj id Tehraniian
IRANIANSTUDIES Ali Banuazizi, Editor Roy Mottahedeh, Associate
Editor
IRANIANSTUDIES is published quarterly by The Society for Iranian Cultural and Social Studies. to members of the It is distributed copies Society as a part of their membership. The price of single for non-members is $1.00 per issue. by the The opinions expressed contributors are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the editors of IRANIANSTUDIES. Articles may be submitted in English or Persian to the Editor for publication, All communications concerning IRANIANSTUDIES or the Society's affairs should be addressed to: The Society for Iranian Cultural and Social Studies New Haven, (SICSS), P.O. Box 3384, Yale Station, Connecticut 06520, U.S.A. cover
design
by Tina Kazemi
ST
I R A NIAN
UD
IE
S
BULLETINOF THE SOCIETY AND SOCIALSTUDIES FOR IRANIANCULTURAL Volume I
Winter 1968
Number 1
CONTENTS 2
BY WAYOF INTRODUCTION
l
SOURCESFOR THE STUDYOF IRAN Roy Mottahedeh
8
THEISMAND PANTHEISMIN RUMI Alessandro Bausani
25
RECENTBOOKSON IRAN
27
ON IRAN (I) BIBLIGRAPHYOF CURRENTRESEARCH
31
BOOKREVIEW in Iran: Reli_gion and Rebellion The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892, Reviewed by Farhad Kazemi
by Nikki
Keddie
BY
WAY
OF
INTRODUCTION
The main objective of The Society for Iranian Cultural and Social Studies, as set forth by its Constitution, Is "to encourage the study of Iranian culture and society, social, economic Including history, language, literature, problems of Iran." The need for a forum and political that could bring all students of Iranian society and of social science culture, dispersed in various disciplines and humanities, together had been felt for sometime. In a meeting held at Yale University on September 2nd, 1967, prelimInary plans for the formal establishment of the Soclet? finally came to fruition. The purposes of the Society, as its main objective, are manifold; to provide academic forums for current research in Iranian studies, to encourage further research In the field, to focus the attention of the researchers on the gaps; to po+nt out some of the fundamental problems that contemporary Iran faces, to enhance a better conmunication and understandIng between Iranian and non-Iranian scholars and students, and finally to generate greater Interest in Iranian studies In the academi'c conununiti'es. The present members of the Society are mostly young Iranian students and scholars who have been educated at home in social sciences and humanities. and foreign universities and social life to relate The need In their own intellectual to the study of Iranian the findings of their disciplines society and culture has been an important motivating factor We believe, however, that Persian In brInging them together. culture, particularly in its mystical philosophic and poetic has also something to contribute to the view of literature, It is the hope agent. man as a free and self-transending of this Society, therefore, to help to bring the analytic Insights of western social science and the integrating powers of the Persian cultural tradition to a conmon meeting ground. But to provide such a forum for cross-cultural tion, the Society needs the participation of all 2
comnunicathose non-
Iranians who are also engaged in the study of Iranian culture and society. We would welcome their membership and contributions. The Society hopes to provide in its meetiungs and publications a forum, free of all restraints of commitment to any particular political group, publitc policy or ideological position, for the discussion and analysis of the cultural and social problems facing Iran. The safeguard of freedom of inquiry and expression for its members will be, therefore, the Society's sole commitment. And the maintenance of high standards of scholarship and intellectual integrity will be its sole criterion In selection of materials to be presented to its public. To achieve its purpose, the Society hopes to sponsor seminars on Iranian studies to be held at least once a year, to encourage, and whenever possible, publish research conducted on all facets of Iranian life and history. In these activities, we would welcome the participation and contributions of institutions and individuals who share our objectives. The present journal, Iranian Studies, will be published on a quarterly basis as the bulletin of Tne Society for It is designed to serve Iranian Cultural and Social Stvlies. as a medium for the publication of scholarly articles on Iranian culture and society, literature, language, and history, as well as the social, economic and political problems of Iran. It will also report on current research on Iran and the Society's activities, and would enable Its members to communicate their views to each other on matters of conmnoninterest.
STUDIES IRANIAN
3
Sources
for
the
Study
of
Iran ROY MOTTAHEDEH Oliver Wendell Holmes when he taught anatomy at the Harvard Medical School in the 19th century used to begin his lecture on the skull by picking up each bone and des"The frontal bone borders on the cribing its position: parietal bone, the parietal bone borders on the occipital bone," and so on, until he came to the sphenoid bone, a bone composed of many pieces that seem to border on everything and assume all shapes. He is supposed to have picked up the sphenoid and said in annoyance, "Gentlemen, curse the sphenoid bone!" No such uncharitable words would come from the student of Iran, but how often the primitive state of his science, like the anatomy of an earlier century, makes Iran seem the most complex and indefinable of all the bones in the greater body politic of the world. Ethnically composed of every variety of mankind, a corridor open to the movement of many peoples, the home of seemingly endless numbers of languages (Pahlavi, Kurdish, Soghdian, Avestan, etc., etc.), a great cultural influence on its neighbors yet always ready to receive outside influences, It is hard to say one can describe the borders of Iran or where historically needed to be how one can master all the separate disciplines able to describe Iran with any accuracy. Fortunately, the student now has several guides through Walter B. Henning's list, the labyrinth of Iranian Studies. Bibl'iography of important studies on old Ijranian Subjects in Its (Tehran: 950), is extremely broad yet selective choice of books, and names many classics which students now A Guide to Iranian Area Study by L.P. Elwell-Sutton overlook. lists and describes several hundred useful books and articles.
Roy Mottahedeh is a Junior Fellow in History at Harvard University. 4
The old Grundrics der Iranischen Philologie is still the nearest thing we have to an encyclopaedia on Iran, and its useful articles and bibliographies can now be supplemented by the new two-volume encyclopedia in Persian, Iranshahr. Articles on Iran in Western languages are listed in Index Islamicus 1906-1955 (and supplements) by J.D. Pearson who is also the author of a very valuable general guide, Oriental and Asian Bibliography (1966). Persian articles are similarly (Teheran: 1961) by Iraj brought together in Index Iranicus Iranian biblioAfshar, an extremely industrious and intelligent especially those prepared for grapher whose other publications, the Iranian Bibliographical Society are essential to all students. Persian books, whether in manuscript or In print, are listed in C.A. Storey's masterful (but incomplete) Persian Literature: A Bio-Blbliographical Surevey. For Arabic manuscript sources on Iran the fundamental survey is Carl Brockelmann's Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur (five volumes). The exciting archeological discoveries in Iran in the last few years make it all the more tragic that one of the archeologically richest countries in the world cannot enforce Its Louis antiquity laws and thereby prevent amateur excavation. vanden Berghe's Archeo.logie de 'Iran (1939) does make it excavations easy to find the reporttfor most oF7'he scientific of Iran, and summarizes what we know about each period. Articles by Russian archeologists who work in neighbouring areas are listed in the footnotes and bibliography of R.N. Frye's indispensible survey of pre-Islamic and early Islamic Iran, The Heritage of Persia (1963), as well as in the occasional survey articles on Iranian studies in the Soviet Union found in Kratkije Soobshchenja Instituta Vostokovedenja. The surveys of stratigraphy by T. Cuyler Young, Jr. and of pre-Islamic are by Edith Paroda are examples of the very high quality of scholarship on Iranian archaeology in this country. Three new journals give a central place to Iranian archaeology: Iranica Antigua (1961 on), Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies7T963 on), and Teheraner Forschunen 71961 on). The geography of Iran, fundamental to archaeologists, etc. is te subject df the historians, anthropologists, recently released volume Persia (1945) by the Navy IntelliThe numerous Persian books gence Division of Great Britain. on geography are listed in D. Wilber's useful article in Archaeolo Orientalia (1952) edited by G.C. Miles. The masterful survey of the medieval geographers of Iran by Paul Schwarz, Iran im Mittelalter, still has not been used Both geographical and anthropolog"isufficiently by scholars. cal books on Iran can be followed in some detail through the reviews in The Geographical Journal. IRANIANSTUDIES
5
The study of Iranian languages, one of the most complex studies, is perhaps the strongest field of all philological Amongthe many able scholars in this of Iranian studies. field are P.J. de Menasce and J. Duchesne-Guillemi n in France, H.K. Nyberg and G. Widergren in Scnadinavia, W. Brandenstein and 0. Hansen in Germany, M. Boyce and I. Gerschevitch in England, V.A. Livshyts and l.A. Rubinchik in Russia, and R.N. Frye and M. Dresden in America. G. Lazard's books have given a new basis to the study of modern Persian. G. Doerfer's many-volumed Tuerkische und Mongolische Elemente would be able Im Neepersischen is a feat which few specialists to undertake. The important study of the many dialects of Iran, long the specialty of G. Morgenstierne, has now attracted like D.N. MacKenzie. Incidentally, we are still phililogists far from having a Persian dictionary on historical principles; like the dictionaries but in addition to the many classical five-volume Farhan2-e Nafisi, we now have a solidly based dictionary by M. Mo'in. A good survey of the whole field of Iranian language with ample bibliography is provided by volume Iranistik (1958) in the series Handbuchder Oriental istik. J. Rypka's literary history of Persia will probably Its continue to be the most widely read book in this field. Persian and Russian counterparts by Dr. Safa and E.E. Bertels A in this subject. are also widely admired by specialists different approach, in which literature is discussed as literature rather than cultural history, makes Alessandro Bausani's Storia della Letteratura Persiana outstanding, espand perceptive discussion of ecially in its very intelligent the structure and techniques of Persian peotry. F. Meier, H. Ritter, and Parviz Khanlari's studies are other examples of what could be done in the study of Persian literature if a more careful and painstaking approach were adapted. Texts continue to be published at an even faster rate, in series l ike the series of the Bonuah-e.Nashr especially va Tar h the Soviet "Pamiatniki Literatur Norodov Vostoka," and so on. Catalogues of manusqripts translations, the UNESCO including the Iranian catalogues by Afshar and Daneshpajuh provide the student of Persian literature and history with Contemporary Iran seems an unexpected wealth of materials. to have an ever_.growing number of magazines with useful bookreview sections, and one in particular, Rahnama-ye Ketab, makes Hopefully, a special effort to review newly publishes texts. the study of classical Arabic will not decline in modern Iran, for it is no accident that the best editors of Persian texts, men like Qazvini and Eqbal, were excellent Arabists. 6
The study of Iranian history is still in its primitive stages. The Greek and Romansources, though studied for generations and conveniently summarized in many works are still far from being used fully; and even those which have been used are not well known to Iranians. Few general works on the pre-Islam4c period have been produced in recent years, and most of these, like the works of F. Altheim, and controve,rsial. Western students should not overlook the interesting Russian books on the Sassanian period by V.G. Lukonin and N.V. Pigulevskaja. A very helpful guide to sources for the Islamic period is Jean Sauvaget and Claude Cahen's Introduction to the History of the Muslim East (1965). The section "Abstracta Islamica" in Revue des Etudes Islamigues provides abstracts of relevant articles and books as they appear. A good introduction to the important work done on this period in Iran itself are the excellent books of Zarrinkub. Safavid history has attracted many talented scholars like I.P. Petrushevsky in the Soviet Union and Martin P. Dickson in America; but it is a great hardship for the rest of us that none of them have ever written a general history of the Safavid period. Safavid documents are being published in many countries, and H. Busse's Utersuchungen zum Islamischen Kanzleiwesen is a model of what good use can be made of such materials. The amazingly full studies of A.K.S. Lambtonset a high standard for work on more recent Persian history. In this field we are fortunate to have several scholars in American universities: R.K. Ramazani, Nikki Keddie, Firuz Kazemzadeh, Richard Cottam, Amin Banani and others. Two interesting and different approaches to recent Iranian history are found in the works of M.S. Ivanov in Russian and of Peter Avery in English. The student of contemporary Iranian studies has at his disposal ever-growing bodies of statistics issued by the General Department of Statistics, the Plan Organization, the many branches of the Ministry of Finances, the Iranian Petroleum Institute, the many banks and so on. No subject are t.1. Paljukaitis's Ekonomicheskoe Razvitije Irana (Moscow, 1963), Hans Bobek's Probleme eines unterentwickelten Landes, alter kultur (Frankfurt, 1962) and J.P. Gittinger, Planning for Agricultural Development: The Iranian Experience (Washington, 1965). The most important publication on Iranian studies will hopefully appear in the near future: The many-volumed Cambridge History of Iran. This will include volumes on geography and history of all kinds, and will contain articles by scholars of all nationalities. STUDIES IRANIAN 7
Theism and Pantheism in Rumi ALESSANDROBAUSANI defined as "all, is God and God Pantheism is generally is al l (I) but it can therotical ly assume two different forms. First, it is said that the finite and temporal world is nothing in front of God, and it is swallowed up by the sole absolute Reality of God, or in the second instance, God is considered as dissolved in the world, poetically sung or scientifically demonstrated as a Whole, in which an immanent Life-Energy acts. In both cases, however, what most sharply distinguishes pantheism from non-pantheism (or theism) is the fact that God-is always considered by pantheists as something impersonal; pantheof their view on theaffirm the superiority ists generally istic "inferior" forms of religion pointing out that (a) calling God a "person" restricts and diminishes His greatness, as it necessarily implies a body and a limitation, (b) of devotion of an Ego to pantheistic piety is not a feeling a Thou, but rather the sensation of being a part belonging to a Whole, a wave in the immense sea of Being. It is also well-known that the original and fundamental of the three great monotheistic religious experience religions of the world, i.e. Judaism, Christianity and Islam is between man and God radically antipantheistic. The relation is always felt in both the Bible and the Qur'an just as one between an Ego and a Thou, or, to put it better, between an Ego and a He, only that one of them (the He-God) has a much more powerful and free life than the more limited Ego of Man. It would be quite useless to quote examples of this way of feeling the contact between God and Man from the Holy Books; I only bring to the mind of my readers three passages of the three Holy Books, which I consider particularly significant for this subject. One is the fight of Jacob with God (Gen. A primitive XXXII, 25 ff.) yet splendid symbol of the idea of Persian and Alessandro Bausani is Professor of Rome and the University Islamic Studies at the University of Naples. He is the author of a history of Persian litea history of the rature, Storia della Letteratura Persiana, as well as a history of Iran, Persia Religiosa, religion of the literatures of Pakistan, a chrestomathy of Malay, and many other publications. 8
of God-Person; the second is the famous passage in St. John's Gospel: (111, 16) "For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting Life". The third is the passage so often quoted by Iqbal (and also by Rumi himself) "Every day He is engaged in some new affair" (Qur. LV, 29) though the entire Qur'an bears perhaps even stronger witness idea of God than other of a personal'istic and activistic It can be added that one of the oldest names for Scriptures. "God" among the Semites, el, has been etymologically connected by some scholars with the Hebrew demonstrative root el, "that", "'He'', '"You"; (2) one of the most ancient ideas of God has been, according to this theory, that of a vague yet most powerful presence of Sombebody in some sacred place. Then, among the pantheon of various local Person-Gods one, more powerful, destroyed the others and reigned above all in undisputed and so we arrived at monotheism. Or might and sovereignty: else the Person-Gods were, in the course of Time, and this only in mature minds, felt as participating by philosophically some impersonal divine force, of which they were themselves no more than ephemeral (though longer aged than man) manifestations, and so we reached pantheism. Thus pantheism is see for instance Hinduism) theoretically (and also practically, or connected with polytheism and with a manifestantionist emotionist point of view concerning the problem of emergence of being (s). The Perfect Manof pantheism is the Saint, often the Ascetic, in which the God-head shines more clearly and who points to the way to redemption from this world, and Theism is on the other hand re-absorption into the Absolute. connected with a militant and sometimes even violent and revolutionary struggle against "other gods" in the name of God of the other (which however retains some characteristics weaker companion gods oF before, specially personality and and also with a creationist point of view living activity) God is for theism-an concerning the emergence of beings. Artist-God, and things are created, "made", "wrought" by Him according to His independent and arbitrary will, not emanated The Perfect Man from HIimthrough a sort of blind necessity. of theism is the Prophet, soinething like a Commander-in-Chief of God's armies on earth, struggling hard in order that the only true God (3) may reign on earth as He reigns in Heaven. A Prophet is not necessarily a Saint, but only a person God only by an act of free election has chosen, and made infallible on His part, not by inherent divine qualities.
IRANIANSTUDIES
9
RUMI'SCONCEPTION OF GODHEAD Facing. the problem in this way, let us now study which of these two conceptions of the Deity is more strongly emphasized in Runti's master-work, the Masnavi-i-Ma'navi'. (4) In 1923 Prof. R.A. Nicholson of Cambridge, the best European authority on Rumi, wrote: "Neigher the theologian nor the poet is a pantheist... I am aware that as regards Jalalud-Din this judgment may appear questionable to those who have read certain passages in the Diwan-i-Shams-i-Tabriz where he describes his oneness with God in terms which look pantheistic at first sight and which I myself understood in a pantheistic sense at a time when I knew less about the history of Sufism than I do now. (5) i hope to show to my readers that Rumi too, as many great mystic personalities of both Islam and Christianity, felt and sang God as a creative personality, giving to the word haqiqat a meaning that is for instar,ce found in the well-known rubal of Jami: < - J,>,
Jf~~~..ij6/
j8>g>^J
That same sense of "active personality" let Mr. Whinfield to the happy though not too exact translation. OF REASON PHILOSOPHERS DEVOID FINDTHIS WORLD A MERE FAIL TO IDEAOF THEMIND: 'TIS AN IDEA- BUTTHEY. BEHIND(6) SEE THEGREATIDEALISTWHOLOOMS The active creativeness of God is by Rumi clearly kept distinct from the created thing. This is best expressed in a rather seldom quoted passage of the Masnavi (11, 1360 ff.) which I consider fundamental for my thesis: "I am in love with Thy making (sun') both in the hour of Thanksgiving and in the hour of patience; how should I be in love like an infidel with that thou hast made (masnu)? He that loves God's making is glorious, he that loves what God hath made is an unbeliever!
. . .
therefore
distinguish,s$re,
the
ordainment from the thing ordained, so that thy difficulty may be removed at once. . . Infidelity is Ignorance and the ordainment of infidel'ity is knowledge ... the ugliness of the script is not the ugliness of the artist; nay 'tis an exhibition of the ugly by-him, the skill of the artist is that he can make both the ugly and the beautiful."
10
What has already been made by God is something crystallized, stony, senseless. No feeling then in Rumi, of a divineness of Nature: things are residual tracks of God's ever rapidly evolving and artistically original act of creation. To love that would mean to adore and love created things would mean idolatry, shirk. This idea of God as a is something radically differnaggash, a painter, an artist, ent from any conceptior, of God as an Impersonal principle -from which everything necessarily emanates. In order to point out this utter independence of God from this world Rumi often pleases himself to call the regions where this inaccessible and yet ever originally working Ego abides "Nothing", "non-existence" (adam). Non-existence Is called by Rumi the kargah-l-Khuda, the workshop of God. Nonexistence is the house and workshop of God, not, it must be remarked, God himself. Since God's workshop is non-existence, workshop there
Is only worthlessness
outside of the
. . . Inasmuch as the
Work has woven a veil on the Worker, you cannot see Hlm outside of that work. Since the workshop is the dwelling-place of the Worker, he that is outside is unaware of Him. Come then Into the workshop, that is to say into non-existence, that you may see the Work and the Worker together." (Masnavi 11, 689-90 and 760-62; on the metaphysical Importance of nonexistence also cf. Masnavi IV 2341 - 83). And even when the pure soul, the ego of man is, after death, or in ecstasy, extremely near God, this nearness is never felt by Rumi as a real absorption in God without any residual. The metaphors He uses to express fana In an interesting passage of the Masnavi (IIi, 3669 ff.T are for instance the following: the flame of the candle In the presence of the sun (but yet the candle exists and "if you put cotton upon it, the cotton will be consumed by the sparks") or a deer in the presence of lion, or elsewhere, as redhot iron In the fire, when Iron takes the properties of fire without entirely losing its own individual essence. In that state it can claim to be fire as wall as iron. The soul near God becomes then one "according to whose desire the torrents and rivers flow and the stars move in such wise as he wills, and life and death are his officers going to an fro according to his desire" In another passage, which I quote rather In (III, 1885 ff.). full as it Is a good specimen of Rumi's ideas about fana and baga, Rumi tells of a lov,r who, as he reached the presence of his Beloved, died, and "the bird, his spirit flow out of IRANIAN STUDIES
11
his body" for "God is such that when He comes, there is not a single hair of thee remaining" (111, 4616, 4621). But Rumi, not What an encouraging idea for a pantheist! unlike a modern novel-writer is always ready to surprise us with some coup de scene. So the real end of the story is told some lines further, under the heading: "Howthe Beloved caressed the senseless lover that he might return to his senses" (l , 4677 ff.) and He (the Sadr-i Jahan, the Beloved) "took the lover's hand saying: This man whose breath has departed will only then come to life when I give him spiritual breath. . . . He said: "O spirit that We have opened the door to hast fled from tribulation, and union with Us. Welcome! 0 thou whose selflessness intoxication is caused by Our Self, 0 thou whose being incessantly derived from Our Being, now, without lip, I tell
thee
the old mysteries
anew:
. . . At this
hearken!
momentopen the ear of earlessness for the sake of hearing Whenhe began the mystery of "God doeth what He willeth"! to hear the call of Union little by little the dead man began to stir. The lover of God is not lass than an earth which at the zaphyr's blandishments puts on a garment of green and lifts up its head from death; he is not less than the seminal water from which at the devine bidding there are born Josephs with faces like the sun; he is not less than a wind from which, at the conmand "Be!" peacocks and sweet-voiced birds come to being in the bird's womb; he is not less than the mountain of rock which by parturition brought forth the she-camel (7). So after
the annihilation
of everything which is not
God, as the Qur'an says
,
J
(quoted by Rumi just some lines before the anecdote of Sadr-i-Jahan) the mystery of the perpetually active personality of God,i.e. the mystery of "God doeth what he willeth" is revealed, inasmuch as God gives life to a new creation, a new world of deified, but not evanescent and This will be Paradise: but Rumi goes annihilated beings. so far along this way as to admit, In a certain sense, the presence of an element of Time in the otherworldly plane. This is the deepest meaning or his idea that the highest degree in the life of the spirit "is not attainment but infinite aspiration after having attained" (8). The verse of his Diwan ,-
r
^
-
4
st_
v
12
"
;
w
i
s
is well-known. (III, 1957 ff.):
In the Masnavi he repeats it in other words
"The greed of true men is by the forward way but greed
in the effeminate
goes backward .
.
.
. Ah,
there is a very occult mystery here in the fact that Moses sets out to run towards a Khizr. nyGod, do not tarry in anything that thou hast gained, but crave more like one suffering from dropsy who is never sated with water. This Divine Court is the Infinite Plane, Leave the seat of honour behind: the way is thy seat of honour' (9). Infinity is; then, conceived not as spatial, not as extensive, but rather intensive infinity, not as a billowing sea in which the Soul-Drop is submerged, but rather as a Way towards the far away limi't of God: ;o (Qur. LIII, 42). A sort of intensive Time (" appreciative time " lqbal would say) is present in this eternal striving. But a Way involves also two hedges limiting it, otherwise it is no longer a Way but a dipersive Desert: limitation and form are then spirtually productive. This is something quite different from what pa'ntheism has always asserted. So for Rumi, external acts of worship such as namaz and saum etc. have a real formative value. If the Spirit should not express itself through matter, if the batin were not to be expressed through zahir why would God have created the material world? Rumi asks himself in this passage of the Masnav7 (I, 2625 ff.): "If the spiritual explanation were sufficient, the creation of the world would have been vain and idle (whereas the QtJr'an repeatedly asserts that God did not create the world joking, He did it seriously. The material world is therefore a serious thing.) If love were only spiritual thought and reality, the form of your fasting and prayer would be non-existent. The gifts of lovers to one another are, in respect of Love, naught but forms; but the purpose is that the giftsr may have borne testimony to feelings of love which are concealed 'in secrecy." It is rather surprising to find so clear an assertion of the spiritual productiveness of ritual worship in an alleged pantheist like Rumi. For him acts of worship are one of the forms in which love, the communionbetween God and Manexpresses itself: and we have just seen that this dialogue will eternally continue in the world, or worlds, IRANIAN STUDIES
13
disclosed to our purified phys Ical body.
sight after
the death of the
Also the relationship between God and the world is, according to Rumi, rather a relationship of creation than of emanation. God, the "divine artist who depicts thoughts" (VT, 2 1 8 1) creates thing, In a way which reminds the ash'arite, and sharply anti-pantheistic and anti-necessitarian Idea of successive creations of the Universe In atoms of Time: "Every instant
...thou
art dying and returning:
Mustafa
declared that this world is but a moment...... Every moment the world is renewed and we are unaware of its being renewed whilst it remains the same in appearance. Life Is ever arriving anew like the stream, though in the body it has the semblance of continuity. From its swiftness It appears continuous, li-ke the spark which thou whir1est rapidly with thy hand. If thou whirl a firebrand with dexterity it appears to the sight as a very long line of fire. The swiftmotion produced by the action of God presents this length of duration (10) as a phenomenonarising from the rapidity of divine action" (Masnavi 1, 1142 ff.).
The ever active God recites spells arld incantations over the spirits and (Masnavi 1, 1448 ff.) " ...... they begin to stir; because of His spells the non-existences at that very momentare dancing joyously Into existence. Whenagain He recited a spell over the existent, at this word the existent marched back post-haste into non-existence. He spake Into the ear of the rose and made It laughing: He spake to the stone and made it a cornellan of mine. He spake to the body a message, so that It became spirit, he spake to the sun so that it became radiant. Again He puts into Its ear a fearful saying, and upon the face of the sun fall a hundred eclipses. Consider what the Speaker chanted Into the ear of the cloud so that it poured tears from Its eyes, like a waterskin; consider what God has chanted Into the ear of the earth, so that it became regardful and has ever since remained silent." Owing to that contact witm the creating God, things, tokens of H's power, are beautiful. Rumi likes Nature, he does not fly away from the world like the Buddhist who consider things ugly and despicable (11). Rumi's fl-ight from the world is the flight of one, who, though considering this world beautiful (Laysa fi'l-imkan ahsan mim-makan)yet thinks 14
that God, the ever active Worker working In the workshop of has prepared or Is preparing there worlds non-existence, even richer and more Intense than this world of ours. He Is preparing "speaking worlds" to use Rumi's original expression: "The prophets abandoned this delight because they were steeped In the divine light; since their spirit had experienced tha delight these delights seemed to them mere play.... since every atom of that world Is living and able to understand discourse, and eloquent, they have no rest in this dead world" (Masnavi V, 3588). Speaking Worlds: Another aspect, together with that of the eternal striving after God, of that dialoguing duality, which Rumi sees, after fana of that element of intensity-time even in the Plane of Eternal Life. But Rumi Is also deeply aware that, If no practical and visible wall be raised against the too easy mergingconception, words and thoughts in-God and identifying-with-God So the idea of the indispensable would remain insufficient. life of man role of the Prophet-Saint in the spiritual In the spiritual emerges in Rumi's religious philosophy. path, if the direct dialogue of man with God is too premature, a danger is felt: the danger of losing sight of the proporimperfect tions, the danger of assimilating one's own still self into the Ego of God, the danger of Pride. Even angelical natures suffer this temptation, the supreme temptation of the perfect soul (12). "Harut and Marut were intoxicated with the spectacle of God and with the marvels of the King's gradual temptation of them. Such intoxication arises even from God's gradual temptation, so that you may judge what intoxicatlons are wrought by the ascension to God. . . The Divine trial was turning them rapidly down, but how should one that is drunken have consciousness of these things? (13) ...Be cut off...fron the intoxication
of lust
. . . but know again
that
this
world is to be deemedIntoxication of lust in the terrestrial of small account beside the Intoxication of the angels ... a single drop of the wine of Heaven causes the soul to be rapt away from the wine and cupbearers of this world - so that you may imagine what intoxications befall the angels and the spirits
purified
by the Divine
Glory
. . . Therefore,
Harut
and Marut because of their feelings of Intoxication said: Alas, we would rain upon the earth like clouds; we would IRANIAN STUDIES
15
spread in this place of injustice a carpet of justice and equity and devotions and faithfulness". (mii, 801, ff). They were superb; they wanted to take themselves the tntltiattve of changing the world, of teaching justice and doing good. But the supreme and most freely acting Personality, God, punished them for their fault and they fell into the pit of Babylon where they teach no more than a poor substitute of Divine Lore, a counterfeited form of the Science of Heaven, magics, the theology of pantheism. Rumi sees a powerful means against falling Into magics and pantheism in the faith In a Prophet: the personality of the Prophet becomes in this way like a symbol of the personality of God, and a remedy against any subtle temptation of pride and envy. Man Is always ready to say, like Ibils: "Yes, I love and adore God, and none but Hin"'. And this he does often in the lbilsian sense, I.e. with the satanic arriere-pensee. To love and adore the Invisible and impersonal God Is easy, Is an easy pretext for me not to curb my neck to true and perfectly humble adoration". This Iblisian tauhid (T4Tmust be broken so that the purified soul may understnad the divine tauhid. Prophets and veneration for them are the weapon to destroy this extremely subtle temptation, which mounts, in ultimate aialysis, to a temptation towards pantheism. So Rumi says (Masnavi, 11, 811 ff.): "God made the Prophets the mediumbetween Him and His creatures In order that feelings of envy should be displayed In the agitation of the mind, inasmuch as no one was disgraced by inferiority to God, no one was ever envious of God; but the person whomhe deemed like himself (15) he would bear envy against him for that reason". This gradual temptation could seem rather cruel on the part of God but (1) the Islamic God is not a petty-god. of some pantheistic pseudo-religion and (2) evil is always ready to conceal itself i.n the innermost chambers of human heart and a cruel physician is necessary to eradicate It. But God's surgical lancet goes even deeper than this: ". . . Now, as the grandeur of the Prophet (in this case MuhammadT1Nas none feels envy of become established, him, since he is accepted by all the faithful; theref6re, In every epoch after Muhammada Saint arises: the probation of the people lasts until the Resurrection. Whosoever has a good disposition is saved; whosoever has a glass-heart Is broken. 16
Two points have to be remarked In this connection: (1) the psychological acuteness of Rumi's religious analysis (2) the activistic trend in his spiritual attitude. Mancan never repose at his ease in a given religion, In taqlId, God is always near him to urge him, to stimulate him through new "temptations". So the Path becomes also extremely dangerous (16); man is always In danger of losing himself and not many are there who reach that degree of hardness enabling them to see God face to face, that hardness so beautifully expressed in the Persian verse Iqbal liked so much (17)
Man, once he has overcome all the temptations of God in a fascinating struggle that reminds one of Jacob transposed into a spiritual plane, can stare Into God's eyes: this indescribable and ever new dialogue with God Is the supreme goal of the lover, killed by the Beloved and then caressed by Him again to Life. Through fixing his eyes In God's eyes man acquires an Immensepower. He acquires a power which is no more the fruit of pantheistic magics, but of theistic taslIm, islam (in the etymological sense) accepting the amanat of God: "Do you bear His burden? He will cause you to be borne aloft. Do you recieve His commands? He will cause If you accept His comyou to be received into His favour. mand you will become the spokesman therof; If you seek union Free will is with Him, thereafter you will become united. the endeavour to thank God for His beneficence: your Thanksnecessitarianism Is the denial of that beneficence. giving for the power of acting freely increases your power; Thanksnecessitarianism Is the denial of that beneficence. giving for the power of acting freely increases your power; necessitarianism takes the Divine gift of free will out of -your hand". (18) (Masnavi I, 936 ff.) and: "He (the man who broke his foot on the path of exertion) . . . was an accepter of the Divine Command,and he became accepted. Until now, he was receiving commandsfrom the King: henceforth he delivers the King's commandsto the oeople. Until now the stars were influencing him: henceforth he Is the ruler of the stars!" (1,1074-77). Here, as everybody clearly sees, we are very far from Nirvana''(19). IRANIANSTUDIES
17
Sunrning up the results of these short remarks on Rumi's pantheism, which are far from exhaustive but only intended as a stimulus for ITt and others to deeper"study, we see that Rumi's ideas are in the following several points quite distinct from those of a pantheist: (1) God in not All: He is working outside "all" in his workshop situated in the plane of non-existence (adam). (2) The sensible world, though ephemeral, is not, so to say, ephemeral by nature because of any inner Principle, but it is made such by God. It is not a joke, but it has (see for instance also Masnavi, IV to be taken seriously, So material acts of worship too have to be taken 3659-60). The material world too has its positive Importanct seriously. (3) If free activity and a sort of intensive Time are of Personality, then the God of Rumi the characteristics could also be called a person, though Rumi never states this in explicit words. But he makes Him always act ac totally free and even sometimes strangely and cruelly, original Ego-Power, fighting with Man so that he may become Man. (20). (4) The sensible world and even the thoughts of man emerge as a result not of necessary emanation or manifestation, but of free creation. (5) Devotion is here on earth submission to the will of God, and in the hereafter it will be an eternal and indescribable running after God or a dialogue with God. (6) Every temptation of mixing up the humanand the divine planes must be overcome by the faith in the Prophet and, after him, in the Saint of the epoch, which form an insuperable barrier against too simple a form of monism. Perhaps the only point in which Rumi remains rather near the ideal of pantheistic ethics is the accentuated character of liberation and redemption of the individual from the cage of the world in his religious preaching, and his Saint-ethics of moksha (though expressed in quite different forms than the Brahmanic ideal of iioksha) which is not the prophetic ethics a militant and socially organized faith, that ethics of the spiritual conquest of the world of God. It is also a duty of elementary honesty to state that in Rumi's Masnavi many lines and passages also can be read, which at first sight point to something like a pantheistic I shall quote two examples, one pointing to an initial view. unity of Being, the second to a final stage indifferentiate of unity with God. 18
(1) "Simple we were and all one substance; we were all without head and without foot yonder. We were one substance like the Sun: we were knottess and pure like water. Whenthat Godly light took form, it became many in number like the shadows of a battlement. Raise ye the battlement with the mangonell(manjanig), that difference may vanish from amidst this company of shadows" (Masnavi 1, 686-89). (2) The story, too well known to be reproduced here at length "of the person who knocked at a friend's door": his friend from within asked who he was: he said: 'tis 1: and the friend answered "Since thou art thou, I will not open the door: I know not any friend that is "I", and he opened the door only when the hover answered again, after long purifying suffering and pains, "tis Thou! (I, 3056 ff.) But I think that it would be immature to interpret right away such passages as pointing to a pantheistic view of immersion and complete annihilation of the self in the Deity. People (20) who quote such anecdotes and stories of the Masnavi generally - indulging in that adulterated pantheism in which too many Europeans try to find relief from too mechanized a life - forget to read deeper and to read further. For instance this same anecdote of the Lover who finally said "tis Thou", is accompanied by some considerations, among the clearest ones in Rumi's Masnavi, about the free and personal working of God (vv. 3068 ff.): "For that, 0 reader, the hand of God is necessary, for it is the "Be! and it was" the bringer into existence of every impossible thing. By His hand every Impossible thing is made possible: by fear of Him every unruly one is made quiet
.
.
Even the dead are made living
by the spell
of the Almighty, and that non-existence which is more dead than the dead - non-existence Is compelled to obey when He calls It into being. Recite the text: "Every day He Is engaged in some affair. Do not deem Him idle and inactive. Ilis least act, every day is that He despatches three armies: One army from the loins of the fathers towards the mothers in order that the plant may grow in the womb. One army from the wombs to the earth, that the world may be filled with male and female. One army from the earth to what Is beyond death that every one may behold the beauty of good works". IRANIAN STUDIES
19
Therefore, even to be annihilated in and with such an ever active God can in no wise mean a real and complete and As Rumi says in this same anecdote, nirvanic annihilation. God kills and gives Life: even the dead are made living by the spell of the Almighty (as we just saw in the story of Sadr-i-Jahan quoted above). So the mystery of what the lover and the beloved will say to each other in the chamber finally unlocked, remains a mystery, but is not final annihilation. Death and effacement of the Ego is for Rumi only a pieparatory degree to a more splendid rebirth and revival of which he Generally he uses in such can give only dim and vague hints. cases expressions like "this discourse hath no end . ." As for initial somebody who wants to avoid useless talking. unity it was - it seems clear to me - unity of all things in non-existence, from which they emerged by a free creative act of God, it does not mean unity in some etheral matter to which they will return. The first 'adam is quite different from the 'adan of fana. No doubt then that the mistake of many of Rumil's interpreters is due chiefly to four reasons: (1) They failed to understand that Persian lyrics are expressed in terms a.id metaphors of a panthetraditionally istic or seemingly pantheistic character, and that the pantheism of many Persian poets is a question allegorical So rather of form and emotion than matter and intellect.. we clearly see, for instance, that those poems of Rumi which follow the lyrical pattern of the hazal (22) more strictly (the odes of his Diwan) are generally more pantheist- ooking than the verses of hTs Masnavi. (2) They failed to perceive that for Rumi "annihilation" and unity are rather a preparatory stage to a metaphysical personal life, impossible to express in words and therefore only continuously hinted at. (3) They failed to grasp the great religious importance Rumi attributes to the obedience and faith In a Prophet, as a pomrful barrier against confusion of values and vahdat1-vujud.
(4) Psychologically they were themselves inclined to consider a monotheistic and personal istic religion like Islam and orthodox Christianity something "old" and superated by were led modern monistic views,so that they instinctively to attribute their ideas to Rumi too. 20
IN THETEXT NOTESTO REFERENCES Encyclopaedia of ReuI12ionand Ethics,
1.
Hasting's
2.
R. Otto. Das Heilige, and 213
3.
I.e. the only God really worth serving adoring, workinq loving, for he is the most artistically J Cf. the Quranic and the often reiterated challenges of the Holy to other "Gods" to do what God has been capable
IX,.609.
Munchen, 1947, XXVIII ed. p. 142 and of all. Quran of doing.
I follow Prof. R.A. Nichol-
4.
In the following quotations son's translation.
5.
The Ideal of personality In Sufism, 1923, Quoted in Syed Abdul Vahid's lqbal: His Art and Thought. Lahore 11 ed. 1948 p. 95-96.
6.
Lawa'ih. A treatise on Sufism by Nur-ud-Din Abd-urJami=...wth a translation by E.H. Whinfield and Rahman Mirza MuhamnadKazvini ... London, 1906 p. 44. The entire treatise of Jami is imbued with pantheistic ideas, and also in the quoted quatrain it would be to give haqiqat the meaning of a personal difficult God. AnyhowMr. Whinfield's perhaps involuntary confronted with the original, translatlon of idealist, it very apt to convey to the mind of the reader the difference between pantheistic and theistic conception of haqiqat.
7.
8.
About this idea of second birth of Personality, see also the words Iqbal attributes to RumIat the beginning of Javednama. See Nicholson's
note III daftar,
p. 109.
So his famous
misra
could easily 9.
be reversed in
It is unnecessary to explain to Muslim readers who Khizr was. I would only like to point out the deeply and obscure passage modern way in which that difficult of the Holy Quran is explained by Rumi. About the infinite progress of man even in the other World sometimes this Quranic verse has also been quoted (LXVI, 8).
IRANIANSTUDIES
21
The conception that not only In this world but even In the Paradisiacal plane there always remains a Mystery, and then, an element of striving to solve It, is also to be seen in Dante's Divine Comedy (Paradise XXI, 91-96) question from when S. Pier Damiani answering a difficult Dante about predestination and free will says to Him: Ma quell'alma nel ciel che plu si schiara Quel serafin che In Dio plu l'occhlo ha fisso alla domanda tua non satisfara nell'abisso Pero che si s'inoltra dell'eterno statuto quel che chiedi che da ognt creata vista e scisso It "serial
time".
10.
In his Six Lectures Iqbal calls
11.
In some Buddhist texts for Instance the human body Is described, in powerful Imagery but more powerful pessimism as a mass of blood, excrements and bones, trying to eradicate from the feelings of man any slightest trace of admiration for beauty in Nature.
12.
The famous Russian philosopher and mystic V.S. Soloviov has some deep considerations on the supreme temptations In his SD ritual Fundamentals of Life (DuQovnvia Osnovy Zhizni, 1884). Italian ed. Bologna 1922. p. 46 ff.
13.
Note here again the original way In which God Is Introduced as a personal living power who almost Jokes with men and angels like the cat with the mouse.
14.
The character of Iblis Is described In a very original way In the Masnavi, which in this too Is the chief Particularly Intersource of Iqbal's Ideas on lblis. esting is the story of Iblis and Mu'awlya and the wonderful yet deceitful words put Into the mouth of Iblis about his longing for his former state, his nostalgia for Heaven (Masnavi 11, 2617 ff.)
15.
Cf.
16.
God is even so "cruel" as to act with man In the manner Rumi describes In the words (Masn. 111, 4462 ff.) "In the course of events your resolutions and purposes In order now and then come right and are fulfilled, that through hope of that fulfilment your heart may form an Intention and that he may once more destroy For if He were to keep you wholly your Intention. unsuccessful, your heart would despair: how would tt
the Quranic assertion
22
sow the seed of expectatior.? And unless It seed of expectation how from 4 ts barrenness subjection to the Divine become apparent to their failures the lovers are made aware of I-n success Is the guide to Paradise"'
sowed the woul its it? By their Lord.
17.
See Lectures,
18.
A study of Rumi's attitude towards the problem of free-willl would be extremely Interesting but It Is rather out of pisce here. The verses quoted are Intended only to show how a personalistic view of Religion could brilliantly solve the problem.
Lahore ed.,
1930 P. 163.
19.
About the exterior similitude and real differences between the conceptions of fana and nirvana, see the penetratIng- and Interesting article of the Itallan orientalist, M.M. Moreno. Mistica Musulmana-eMistica Indiana. (MuslIm and Hindu Mystics) In Annali LateromensI, X., 1946. Rome.
20.
In order to understand what I mean by Intensive Time In God a re-reading of Iqbal'4 wonderful discussion on Time In His Lectures would be necessary. Iqbal, with Bergson, considers apprecIative Time, or duree, as a fundamental element of consciousness, and personality. Thus, an element of Time Is Introduced even ILto the deepest and innermost receptacles of Personality; more, over, personality means life In real Time, unadulterated by spatial Imaginations. But to exist In real time qens to create. Free creation Is the living symbol of appreciative Time. So if God creates,there must be present In Him an element of Tlme. But Iqbal, criticizing Bergson's keeping too sharp a distinction between elan vital and spatialising thought, finds, In the Idea of a teleological plan created by a GodPerson a brillian solution to the dilemma between purely Intellectualistic teleokog(denying reality tt, Time) and chaotic elan vital.
21.
for Instance, It is a pity that such an insufficient study,asthat of Carra de Vaux In the Encyclopaedia of be dedicated to so great and Important a perIsl s-oa ity In Islamic thought as Rumi.
IRANIANSTUDIES
23
22.
A very clear Jefinitlon of ghazal Is to be found in the extremely interesting qFtTc7e by H.H. Schaeder In Zei tschrift der Dentschen Moroen1and'ischen Gesel1schaft, on Insanu-i-KamiI (1925, pp. 192 ff .) (Die islamische Lehre vom vol IkonmmenenMenschen, ihre Herkunft und ihre dichterische Uestaltung i,e. the Islamic doctrine on Perfect Man, its origin and its poetical elaboration. pp. 255-61 are dedicated to Rumi).
24
Recent
Books
on
Iran
BOOKS PUBLISHED ON IRANIN ENGLISH(1962-1967) Arasteh, R., Education and Social Awakening in Iran 18501961 (Brill, 1962) Arasteh, R. Manand Society
in Iran (Brill,
1964)
General Arfa, Under Five Shahs (Murray, 1964) Avery, P., Modern Iran (Ernst Benn, 1965) Bayne E., Four Ways of Politics: State and Nation In Italy, Somala,israel,and Iran (Daynamics of Political Particpation, 1965) Benedick, R.,industrial
Finance in Iran (Harvard, 1964)
Binder, L., Iran (Univ. of California,
1962)
Cottam, R., Nationalism in Iran (Pittsbur4Univ.
Press, 1964)
CuiIcan, W., The Medes and the Persians (Pra.ger,
1965)
Davar, F., Iran and India through the Ages (Asia Publication, 1963) Eagtton, W., The Kurdis h Republic of 19946 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1963) English,
P., City and Village in Iran: Settlement and Economy inthe KermanBasin (Univ. of Wisconsin, 1966) ~
Eskdund, K., Behind the Peacock Throne: Travels in Persia (Redman. 1I965) Esfandiary,
F, Identity Card (Grove Press, 1966)
Eskdund, K., Behind the Peacock Throne: Travels in Persia (Redinn,1965)Forbes, D., The Heart of Iran (Hale, 1966) Frye, R. The Heritage of Persia (World Publishers, IRANIAN STUDIES
25
1963)
Gittinger,
J., Planninq for Agrcultural Plan. Assoc., 1967)
Harnock, C., Persian Lions,
Developent
PErsian Lambs (Holt,
Nazen, W.,. Iran: A Selected List of References 1967) Jacobs, N., Sociology of Development (Praeger, Keddle, N., Religion and Rebel,lion In Iran: Protest (Class, 1966) Marlowe J., Marlowe J.,
Iran: A Short Political
(National
1965) (Library of Congr.., 1967)
The tabacco
Gufde (New York, 1962)
The. Perslan Gulf in the Twentieth Century (Praeger, 1962)
Mehdevi, A., Persia Revisited Nahat, L.., and Kibell
(Knopf, 1965)
C., The Petroleum Industry In Iran (U.S., Dept. State, 1967)
Notlau, G., and Wiehe, H., Russia's 1963)
South Flank (Praeger,
Ramazani, J., The Foreign Policy of iran_ 1500-1941 (Univ. Press of Virginia, 1967) Skrine,
C., The World War In Iran (Constable,
1965)
Soraya, An Autoblograph (Doubleday, 1964) W1ilber, D., Contemporary Iran (Praeger, Wilber, D., Iran- Past and Present Zabih, S.,
1963)
(Princeton,
1963)
The Lommunist Movement in Iran (Univ. of California,
1967)
26
Current Research on Iran (I) A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THESESCONCERNING IRANCOMPLETED IN THE LASTFIVE YEARS,ORIN PREPARATION, IN BRITISHANDAMERICAN UNIVERS'ITIES. ECONOMI CS NowaT7B. Oil experts and economic development with special referencd to Iran and Venezuela. Oxford. Parvin, M. The role of per capita Income growth-a socioeconomic study-. Columbia. Rajaee, A. OPECand Its objectives American. Sadri,
In the Middle East.
M. Economic Planning In Iran; study of entrepreneurtal probIems during economic growth. Pennsyl vania.
Tabriztchi,
S. Location of Industry In Iran. Columbta.
Tehranien, M. The political economy of Persian oil nationalization. Harvard.
since
Zekavat, S. An analysis of the feasibility of the use of fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth In Iran. S. California isphahani,
A. Optimization of economic resources for economic for economic growth in Iran. S. California
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Arcilesi,
S. Development of U.S. pol icy in Iran (1949-1960). Florida.
Berk, H.
Persia and the European state system: From unilateralism to reciprocity in Persian diplomacy in the 19th century. Columbia.
Davand, D. Iran in the perspective American. IRA$I/WSTUDIES
27
of Soviet
political
strategy.
Ferdows, Amir Garthwaite,
G.
The Idea of constitutlonal Indiana Persia.
government In
The role of the Bakhtlarl Trlbe In the Persian revolution and their nineteenth (LA). -century background. California,
Irons, W.
A nomadic or seminomadic tribe ofiran. Michigan.
Kudsi-Zadeh, A.
Political Indlana.
McDaniel, R.
The Perslan revolution and the Shuster Mission, 1911. Illinois.
Martinez, A.
A history
Mottahedeh, R.
Iran and Iraq In the Buyld Period, Harvard.
Nezami, A.
Legislative
Noorl, H.
of the oil A study of the nationalization Industry In Iran. Colorado State College. J.
Russell,
legacy of Jamal al-Din Afghani.
Columbia.
of the I1-Xanid state.
elites
In Persia.
Chicago.
Effects of reference group identificatlon importance ascribed by on the relative Iranian and Latin American students at the University of OklahQma. Oklahoma.
Sedehi,
A.
Constitution and constitutionalism Iran. N.Y. University
Staley,
W.
The Intellectual Princeton.
in
development of Kasravi.
Spooner, B.
in Persian daluchesReligion and politics tan: a study In the confusion of temporal Oxford. authority. and spiritual
Umer, Z.
Shibli
Young, Cuyler T. Jr. Zonls,
M.
and the Islamic tradition.
Proto-Historic vania.
The style political
Western Iran.
Oxford Pennsyl-
and structure of the Iranian M.I.T. elite.
28
Entner, M.
Russia and Persia (1890-1912)
Fishburne, C. U.S. policy toward Iran (1959-63). in Iran.
Ghoreichl, A. Soviet politics
Florida.
Colorado.
with the U.S. (1856-1906)
Haddad, J.
Perslan relations
Heravi, M.
Relations between Iran and the U.S., from the beginning until the end of World War 11. American.
Hekmat, H.
Iran and the Cold War, a study of snall behaviour. Columbia.
Howell, W.
Soviet policy and the,Kurds. Virginia.
power
via-
Mirheydar, D. Geographical Factors In the political bility in Iran. Indiana. Rafat, A.
Nationalization of the private property of Indonesia, aliens in International law-Iran, Cuba, Egypt. Minnesota.
Tabari, K.
U.S. - Iranian Relations
(1941-45),
Columbia.
ANDSOCIOLOGY POLITICS.HISTORY Abrahamian, E.
The social bases of the Tudeh Party (194153). Columbia.
Alberts,
Social structure and cultural change in an Iranian Village (Davarabad). Wisconsin.
R.
Algar, G. Bill,
J.
Cuff, H.
Political and social role of the ulama In Cambridge. Qajar Persia. Iranian politics ton.
and modernization.
Prince-
Cross-cultural problems of Iranian students in the United States. Columbia.
Ferdows, Adele. The Fedayan Islam.
IRANIANSTUDIES
29
Indiana.
LI TERATURE Atai,
P.
Contrastive study question signals.
Javadi-Tabrizi,
Netzer, Nouri, Shaked, Spencer,
of English Michigan.
H. The idea of Persia and Persian literary influence in English literature, with special reference to the Nineteenth ceatury. Cambridge.
A.
Judo-Persian
literary
M.
The scholars Edinburgh.
of Nishapure,
S.
The Pahlavi
H.
and Persian
andarz
influences.
literature.
Columbia
700-1225. London.
A study of the dependence upon alGhazali's Ihya' of the introduction and the first two 'Pillars' of the Persian Kimiya-i-Sa'adat. Edinburgh.
30
book
review FARHADKAZEMI
Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: Protest of 1891-182. London: Frank Cass & Co.
The Tobacco Ltd., 1966.
The 1891-1892 protest movement against the granting of tobacco concession to an English company, points to an extremely Important and interesting chapter In the Iranian history. It was the first successful mass protest against the unscrupulous foreign concessionaires and the greedy and unpopular Qajar monarch and his hated entourage. But more important, it marks the successful formation of a peculiar phenomenon in Iranian history--the alliance of the ulama with the modernizing reformers. This phenomenonof religious-radical alliance was to recur later during the years 1905-1906 leading to the birth of the Iranian Constitution. The fascinating story of the protest against the Tabacco Monopoly is told in clear and concise language by Professor Nikki Keddie of U.C.L.A. In her well.-balanced treatnent of the subject, Professor Keddie discusses the background to the protest movement itself and then draws interesting conclusions on its eventual success. In an attempt to place the movement protesting the Tobacco Monopoly in its proper historical perspective, Professor Keddle points to the rising popular discontent with Naser-ed Din Shah's free-wheeling grants of concessions to foreign agents in the perlod prior to the tobacco incident. These concessions not only Increased the already wide influence of foreign agents in Iran, but they also made possible further exploitation of the people by the Shah and his government. The most famous of these concessions, was the one granted in 1872 to Baron Julius de Reuter giving him monopoly over much of the country's resources. The Russian opposition to Reuter, the British refusal to support him, and some internal opposition forced the Shah to cancel the concession. As Professor Keddie points out, the cancellation of the Reuter concession was significant in that it "called forth an internal protest which shook the Iranian government and forced the Shah to act In ways distastefull to himself." (p. 6). This early victory against Reuter in many ways paved the way for the later tobacco protest. Farhad Kazemi is a graduate student at Harvard University IRANIAN STUDIES
31
Professor Keddie then discusses Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani's role during the tobacco episode, giving him much credit for having begun the tactic of allying the ulama with the reformers against the government. (p.15). In less detail she discusses MalkamKhan's ag'itation through his England-based publication, Qanun. Although Professor Keddie agrees that the exact influence of neither Afghani nor MalkamKhan can be measured, she nevertheless gives a great deal of credit to their efforts (especially Afghani's) against the Shah and the Tobacco Monopoly. The organized and coordinated campaign against smoking, finally forced the frightened Shah to give in. The Russian opposition to the concession,. it should be noted, was crucial during the whole affair since it also put a great deal of pressure on the Shah. Professor Keddie concludes by saying that the tobacco protest, in spite of its victory, did not solve any of the original The concession was cancelled, but the causes of discontent. On the contrary, during the foreign influence did not subside. coming years, the country appeared to be succumbing even more Nevertheless, the tobacco movementwas a to foreign control. significant episode in the modern history of Iran in that, to put It In Professor Keddie's words, "it pointed the way to win victories from the government, it also left the ambiguous legacy reformers, and religious of peculiar coalitions of nationalists, leaders whose opposition to the government masked very different aims--a legacy which still shows strong signs of life as late as the present." (P. 133). As it has already been pointed out, this small book is a sound scholarly volume on an important period of the Iranian Professor Keddie's knowledge of many languages has history. enabled her to use source material not easily accessible to The result has been a fine analytical treatment of a others. subject which had not been treated adequately up to now. Professor Keddie deserves credit for helping to fill this lacuna.
32
The
eP
rTmnIan Cbart
UokumeI,ftumnWrt
n
S
SprInq1966
StudiFs
rranian
BULLETINOF THE SOCIETYFOR IRANIANCULTURAL AND SOCIALSTUDIES
COUNCIL Ervand Abrahamian AlI Banuazizi, Secretary Hormoz Hekmat Abbas Heydari-Darafshian Farhad Kazemi, Treasurer Manoucher Parvin, President Majid Tehranian
IRANIANSTUDIES Ali Banuazizi, Editor Roy Mottahedeh, Associate
Editor
IRANIANSTUDIES is published quarterly by The Society for Irdnian Cultural and Social Studies. It is distributed to members of the The price of single copies Society as a part of their membership. for non-members is $1.00 per issue. The opinions expressed by the contributors are those of the individual authors and lot necessarily those of the Society or the editors of IRANIANSTUDIES. Articles may be submitted in English or Persiai to the Editor for publication. All communications concerning IRANIANSTUDIES or the Society's affairs should be addressed to: The Society for Iranian Cultural and Social Studies (SICSS), P.O. Box 3384, Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520, U.S.A.
rranian
Studifs BULLETINOF
THE SOCIETYFOR IRANIANCULTURAL ANDSOCIALSTUDIES Volume I
Spring 1968
Number 2
CONTENTS 34
SOCIAL-SCIENCERESEARCH BY NORTHAMERICANS ABROAD: SOMEREFLECTIONS Sidney W. Mintz
41
THE ORIGINS ANDAPPEARANICE OF THE KURDSIN PREISLAMICIRAN John Limbert
52
FOROUGH FARROKHZAD: THE BITTER LOSS POEMS(Translated
by Anita Spertus):
54
THOSEDAYS
64
THEWINDWILL CARRYUS AA4AY
68
REBIRTH
76
BOOKREVIEW RECENTSTUDIES ON OIL Majid Tehranian
80
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT RESEARCH ON IRAN (II)
SOCIAL-SCIENCE RESEARCH BY NORTH AMERICANS ABROAD: SOME REFLECTIONS*
Sidney
W. Mintz
The break-up of colonial empires in Asia and Africa since World War II; the rise of sternly nationalistic regimes in many non-western countries; the great unpopularity of America's undertakings in Viet Nam; and persisting international tensions have all contributed to the difficulties faced by American social scientists These difficulties engaged in research abroad. have mounted so in recent years that the central problem for could soon become not what to North American social scientists study, but where to study; and one may expect the situation to grow worse, not better. In the Middle East, recent hostilities have made North American social scientists less than welcome in while "Dperation Camelot" in Latin America --when many countries; Department of Defense funds were secretly employed to support allegedly the cause of honest social science "pure" research--did much harm. toward North American research workers in foreign Hostility lands seems to spring from many sources, but I think that we North Americans should be prepared to admit that much of the responsibility is our own. Too often the North American anthroor sociologist pologist, political scientist, has treated the country in which he worked as no more than a convenient stoppingplace on his way to a doctoral degree, exploiting his hosts without any serious thoughts of intellectual Latin reciprocity. * The author wishes to express his thanks to Ali Banuazizi, Jacqueline W. Mintz and Majid Tehranian for their useful criticisms of earlier versions of this paper. The responsibility for the arguments advanced here and for any errors they may contain, however, rests solely with the author. The author He and his wife, research fellows in villages west
is Professor of Anthropology at Yale University. a linguist, spent a year in Iran as Fulbright during 1966-67. Their investigations were made of Shiraz, in' the Province of Fars.
IRANIAN STUDIES
34
America, for instance--and it strikes this writer as stunningly disingenuous to deny that the relationship of this vast area to the United States is quasi-colonial in character--used to be called "our back yard"; and many of us have treated its countries and peoples in just this way. We may think nothing of "doing research" in a Latin American country without paying respects to our foreign colleagues, without lecturing (if invited) at their institutions, without learning the national Even language. fundamental courtesies--letters of thanks, farewel l visits. sending back reprints, When these slights etc.--may be forgotten. can be interpreted as reveal ing an "imperial istic" attitude toward the host country on the part of the foreign researcher, they are doubly damaging. Some aspects of the hostility of the host, however, are probably not attributable to North American sins. The social scientist abroad must realize that he is moving into a pre-existing structure of intellectual and academic life, one in which the host scholars, validating their statuses and playing their roles appropriately at home, have vested interests of their own in dealing with visitors. The social scientist abroad, to put it another way, is but a special kind of tourist; his host-colleagues must look ahead to their own security long after he is gone. The writer has discovered the implications of this during nearly two decades of research experience in Latin America. The local anthrothe local museum director, pologist, the local professor of social has much to defend in his dealings with his visiting science, North American colleagues. He must assure himself that the North American is not trying to take his job away from him; such things, after all, have probably happened. If he has not completed his doctoral training, he may feel somewhat insecure in the company of the visitor, and anxious to establish his own credentials of competence, even if these do not include a higher degree. If his library is poor, or if his administrative obligations are heavy, he may feel out of touch with developments in his own speciality, and concerned not to expose his anxiety in this regard. No doubt it sometimes happens that the visitor wishes to study precisely what his host has been wanting to do for years but could not, for lack of funds and time. And above all, perhaps, the host must be careful to guard against the criticisms of his fellow-nationals-the harshest of which may be that he is excessively deferential to foreigners. For these and other reasons, American social scientists abroad may be subject to a certain amount of tension or inhospitality that is not precisely their fault--even though I would continue to argue that we sometimes deserve what we get. Since
I spent
less
than a year in Iran,
35
I am not equipped
SPRING 1968
to
deal profoundly or at length with so sensitive and subtle a topic in discussing that country. And prefatory to any other remarks I may make, I would like to stress that my reception in Iran by colleagues in the social sciences was for the most part warm and reassuring. But perhaps a few points may be made in connection with this general theme. The first is that North American social scientists in Iran do well to take note of the historical relationto western lands, and of the ship of that ancient civilizaiion effects of that relationship on the intellectual ambiance. I think it would be fair to say --in spite of the absence of any reliable sociological evidence-that Iranian intellectual attitudes toward the West have been shaped in good part by the educational experiences of that nation's middle and upper classes. An older generation of Iranian intellectuals, trained in the great universities of France, or in Iranian schools which followed an essenFrench system of education, tially is far more favorably disposed to French culture and to the French language, for example, than toward any comparable western intellectual tradition. French culture was surely that segment of western learning most admired by the Iranian intellectual community of half a century ago, and France still the stands very high--if not at the pinnacle--in of Iranian view of western cultural achievements. The stereotype "the French people," I suspect, The work is similarly favorable. of English scholars is also highly regarded--as, indeed, it deserves to be--even though I believe that the popular stereotype of "the English" is far less favorable than that of "the French." in attitudes Differences toward Frenchmen and Englishmen--assuming that this argument has any merit--may hinge in part on the differing historical roles of their respective nations in Iranian affairs. At the present time, the French international posture probably the favor with which French cultural reinforces achievements are regarded: French recognition of the national aspirations of other peoples, for instance, symbolized by the disengagement in Algeria and the momentous earlier withdrawal from Viet Nam, and French for national pride and independence from the United struggles to require States, symbolized by events too recent and too telling here. repetition When one turns from what may be inferred about attitudes toward Frenchmen and Englishmen to what may be inferred about attitudes toward the North Americans, a different image emerges. Of course, as more Iranians receive their educations in the it is United States and become familiar with American culture, that this society, conceivable too, will receive some credit for of the United States in conits achievements. But the position to some extent against temporary world affairs may militate fuller recognition of its intellectual accomplishments at this claim no more for it than that--that time. One has the feeling--l
IRANIAN STUDIES
36
the current Iranian stereotype of "the Americans" takes into account America's great economic and military might; the gaucherie and apparent "openness" of the North American abroad; (often North American wealth; and that curious informality as deliberate that typifies impoliteness) misread, unfortunately, by-no means many of us. It is often assumed by many foreigners, limited to Iranians, that our accomplishments are all of a charge technical order, and that we are lacking in "culture"--a not usefully countered by losing our tempers. into the unprovable is called for This momentary digression need rationales in and anti-that because people who are pro-this advancing their arguments. It is hardly enough to be anti-English one has to be able to say why. In or anti-French or anti-Russian; to the case of us North Americans, it may be useful superficially the roles vis-a-vis reflect upon America's role in Iranian life, of other foreign powers there. Though Iran shares a long border its recovery of celebrates with the Soviet Union (and still Azerbaijan after World War II), Iranian foreign policy is sensibly relations. China committed to an improvement in Irano-Soviet in any public foreign policy statements. hardly figures Englandi at times as the arch-imperialthough conjured up retrospectively force in Iranian and world ist power, is now seen as a declining The attitude toward the at least by many Iranians. affairs, is as much one of Arab states, though rarely stated publicly, and positions of amusement as anything else, though the policies the U.A.R. are cause for some nervousness. toward the United States is something else But the attitude in Middle Eastern oil and politics; again. American interests both governmental and private; American developmental undertakings, the Peace Corps; military advisers and military equipment--while new, nor by any means altothese undertakings are not altogether validate the American pregethernecessarily bad, they certainly sence and the show of American authority in Iran. And the corres(quite ponding attitude toward the United States often carries appropriately, it seemed to me) a sense of being subjected to an over-arching power, heavily engaged in defining and consolidating its interests everywhere. Hence contexts are provided in Iran in and the obviousness of which it is popular to be anti-American; American power gives play to great imaginativreness in intellectual circles. I am reminded of a Saul Bellow character on a fellowship in Europe, who is lectured accusingly by everyone about "You and impelled to empty his pockets to your atom bomb," and who feels that he is not carrying one. Well, none of us is; establish but it is nonetheless for us as individuals to difficult convince others of our bona fides in today's world.
37
SPRING 1968
I suppose I am suggesting that the creative anti-American is automatically provided with good field position when confronted by the visiting North American social scientist. Some examples may illuminate this suggestion. Since my personal view of the American adventure in Viet Nam is extremely negative, and since I make no to conceal my opinions, special effort i was amused while in Iran to have been invited to give a public lecture on "The role of the in American life"--hardly a topic on which I can claim military any professional competence. Since the invitation came from an Iranian social scientist who knew I was an anthropologist rather than a sociologist or political scientist, I was led to speculate whether I was seeing imaginative anti-Americanism in action. Again, on two separate occasions, I respectfully declined invitations to take to the field with me young Iranian social science students as assistants. I explained in each case that I cannot carry out my field research through an interpreter, and that, given the brevity of my stay, I could not take the necessary time to accommodate, introduce, and properly train a fledgling assistant in the field. In one such case, my refusal was matter-of-factly accepted, but in another, it was apparently interpreted as disdainful and chauvinistic on my part, and I was indirectly taken to task accordingly. In this same connection, it may be worth remarking that both invitations came from scholars who had received their graduate social-science educations abroad, and hence might be expected to understand that one of the most difficult and demanding teaching assignments in social science is in-the-field training. One scholar did understand this; the other either did not--or would I was also urged in one instance to give a full semester not. of lectures in anthropology, even after having made clear well in advance, and by mail, that the terms of my grant and of my sabbatical leave forbade this. When, after refusing, I was accused of "academic imperialism," I was made to wonder whether possibly my refusal was nearly as useful as my acceptance would have been. can be a double-edged sword. But programmed anti-Americanism Planners have been discovering in recent years that social science research really does have relevance to planning design; that census statistics do not provide all of the answers; that basic information from sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists., etc., really can have practical Such data, of course, utility. who are social scientists, may be gathered by local nationals and the like. Additional working through universities, institutes, data may be gathered through the research of scientists employed by International bodies, as in the case of Fredrik Barth's brilliant work on the Basseri of Iran for UNESCO. But whether or by foreigners, data will be gathered by local nationals collected primarily by scholars who choose to work in Iran because in Iran, and enjoy doing their research there. they are interested
IRANI"
STUDIES
38
take on their This is not the least bit mysterious. Scientists due to a variety of causes, some of them research directions research without a genuine fortuitous. But no one does first-rate in his subject, interest however obscure (or ludicrous) this may And the only way to expedite the research of seem to others. the completion of their scientific scholars and to accelerate is to make the prerequisites undertakings when they are foreigners here visas, work permits, for research opportunities--including etc.--more rather than less so. To impose too many available, the initiation conditions to delay tipon research opportunities, of research, to attach a quid pro quo to every permission granted, could lead eventually to a widely-held understanding that unfetsocial science research by foreigners tered, impartial, is no in Iran--with possibly unfortunate consequences. longer feasible scientific One keeps in mind that the international community is really a very small one; the word, that is, "gets around." One reason for the brain drain, other than higher salaries, is that value so highly their freedom to carry on research. scientists Social science research at its best is a creative undertaking. It cannot be forced. The production of monographs and books is but the production of significant easy enough for the facile; research cannot be computerized. Nor can scholars be told what to investigate, As Hogben once suggested, an entire desert may have to be surveyed in order best to determine where to run a railroad line across it. When the survey is completed, only a trivial percentage of the data will be employed in the actual but those data'can be made to "emerge" only by a engineering; patient, thorough--and initially, seemingly wasteful--investigation beforehand. Moreover, many of the most significant findings in social science have emerged as by-products of research freely undertaken, with no particular practical goal in mind. this case, North American--social So far as the foreign--in scientist the host country and to is concerned, his obligationsto his colleagues are clear. there, whether in Iran or elsewhere, To assist--consonant with the requirements of his research plan and the terms of his grant--with the planning of courses, the preparation of bibliographies, and the integration of his intellectual hosts with the wider scientific community; to give lectures on his research and on his discipline; to play the host in turn, when his foreign colleagues the United States; to maintain visit communication, once he has returned to his own institution. It seems to me that, just as social scientists would like to feel as welcome and unfettered as possible in their research abroad, so must they also be prepared to welcome such research by outsiders in their homelands. One of the more promising aspects
39
SPRING 1968
of the North American picture in this regard is the constantly and carrying on increasing number of foreign scholars visiting Two decades ago, the Latin American research in our universities. engaged in teaching and research in our academic social scientists few; now, institutions community, for example, were pitifully such as Yale, Harvard, Chicago and Berkeley proudly count many The "brain Latin American academicians among their faculties. drain" danger is real; but many of these scholars come to give us the benefit of their knowledge for a semester or a year, and then The hope is, of course, that return to their parent institutions. too--that will be reciprocated, cordiality such international abroad will be judged more and North American social scientists rather than in terms of their more on their individual merits, pursued by their government. or the policies national origins, For when one comes back to the fundamentals, good will matters community scientific The international perhaps more than all else. and of national politics at its best rises above considerations It should matter not at all to fellow-biodifferences. cultural that their cultural backgrounds or fellow-anthropologists logists from of their homelands--make them different --or the policies each other, as long as they can communicate honestly and cooperin the pursuit of the truth. atively Since this is commonly accepted to be the case among scientists, we were very moved to discover that "ordinary" Iranians understood so well what we were doing among them, and were so happy to help. Though we have been back in the United States for half a year now, a receive (and answer) perhaps as many as six letters we still with whom we lived and worked. We were month from the villagers in getting to know many kind and warm Iranian very fortunate people in all walks of life; but we remember best the folk we saw or sitting of "our" villages, each day, along the muddy streets As we remember rme saebzi. together over a tasty abgoosht or them, we think that they remember us. Of them we asked more than they take us in, and teach us how they of any other Iranians--that They had plenty of time, it is they gave most freely. lived--and and we hope they true, to make up their minds about us personally, If we have only to too much of what they saw. did not dislike count upon them to permit us to work in Iran again, we will have no worries.
IRANIAN STUDIES
40
THE ORIGINS AND APPEARANCE PRE-ISLAMIC IRAN
OF THE KURDS IN
John Limbert At present the Kurds occupy parts of Turkey, I ran, I raq, Syria and the USSR. As the map shows, the area in which the Kurds predominate is a long arc extending roughly northwest to southeast in a band of varyi ng width from cent ra I Turkey to In these western Iran in the Kermanshahand Shahabad regions. last areas, the historic road from Baghdad to Hamadanand beyond divides the Kurds from their Iranian cousins, the Lurs. Within this extensive, mountainous area the Kurds speak an Iranian language divided into two groups of dialects--northern Kurdish, or Kurmandji, and southern Kurdish, called Kurdi. The dividing line between these two groups of dialects run roughly from the southwest corner of Lake Rezaiyeh to the town of Rowanduz in northern Iraq. Linguists consider Kurdish to be a northwestern Iranian language and therefore quite distinct from Persian, a southwestern language. Within the Kurdish areas there are linguistic minorities such as the Gurani of Iran and the Zaza of Turkey who consider themselves Kurdish, but whomlinguists insist speak a non-Kurdish Iranian language. The basic question concerning the origin of the Kurds is this: are they the descendants of the original inhabitants of all or a part of this extensive area or did they come to this area at an undetermined date from an undetermined place? Furthermore, what, if anything, can be found about the situation of the Kurds in pre-Islamic Iran? We must be careful to distinguish between the history of the Kurds and the history of Kurdestan. We are concerned with the history of the Kurdish people, wherever they appear. The name "Kurdestan" did not appear until the time of the Seljuqs. Our evidence about the history of the Kurds is very scarce, and what does exist is often of little value. One English traveller asked John Limbert is a Ph.D. candidate in History and Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University. 41
SPRING 1968
The peasant answered, a peasant the name of a nearby village. dutifully The traveller Nazanom (Kurdish for 'I don't knov'). recorded that he had passed the village of Nazanom. Some in spite of the Kurds' obvious links with the Iranian scholars, peoples, have even claimed that they have found a Kurdish nose that looks like the nose in the relief of the Assyrian king Others have felt Thus the Kurds are the Assyrians. Ashurbanipal. like that, since the Kurdish women are tall and attractive UnforGeorgian women, the Kurds are a branch of the Georgians. evidence because of the complete lack of anthropological tunately, What evidence we concerning the Kurds, such things can be written. common language in no and geographical--but do have is linguistic The Kurds speak a mutually intelligible way implies a common race. language (although sometimes just barely so) over a wide area but within a single tribe there may be a wide variety of racial types. from their Furthermore, the Kurds have absorbed characteristics Arab, Persian, Turkish, and Armenian neighbors. The Origin of the Kurds The Shahnameh of Ferdowsi relates the popular Iranian version The tyrant Zahh5k had two snakes growing of the Kurds' origin. Thus to which had to be fed fresh brains. out of his shoulders, protect the tyrant two young people were killed every day. To for human save some of the youths, sheeps' brains were substituted brains and about four hundred young people thus saved fled to the Kurds. mountains and became the original Some Kurdish tribes have given themselves Arab origins--Arab and tribes would go to the mountains, mingle with foreigners, may have a These Arab geneologies forget their mother tongue. factual basis when we consider that the Kurds are apparently not Minorsky homeogeneous, but an amalgam of various ethnic elements. writes, of the Kurds among The classification the Iranian nations is based mainly on data and does and historical linguistic not prejudice the fact there is a complexity of ethnical elements incorporated in them.1 At present there are Iranians other than Kurds living in Kurdish areas, and there may wel1 have been non-Iranians who also became Mahabad, and At Soleimaniyeh, part of the Kurdish population. based on Qotur, there has been observed a social stratification in a feudal relationship. newcomers dominating older inhabitants IRANIAN STUDIES
42
~
:
43
The "Kurdishness" of this entire area may actually diverse peoples. imposed on ancient,
be a unity
The word of the word Kurd is not certain. The derivation is Iranian and appears in the Sassanian epic Karnamak-eitself It also appears among the Arabs at the time Ardashir-e-Papakan. of the conquests of the seventh century A.D. with its Arabic Some scholars have suggested that the word comes plural akr5d. from the name of the Guti, a people mentioned in Sumerian tablets century B.C., or in Kar-da-ka (or as early as the twenty-fourth of about 2000 B.C. Xenophon Qar-da-ka) in Sumerian inscriptions uses the name Kardukhoi. for the people l iving in present-day Iraqi Kurdestan whom his army fought on its retreat in 401 B.C. According to Xeonophon, these Kardukhoi lived as far north as The kh ending of their name is (Bohtan) River. the Centrites apparently an Armenian plural ending of Kardu, for Xenophon writes In later that he learned the name of the tribe from an Armenian. and Livy mention them sources the name Kyrtiae appears--Polybius first for an enemy of Rome around 190 B.C., fighting as mercenaries, the Seleucid Antiochus I I I, and later for an al ly of Rome around 170 B.C., Eumenes of Pergamum. Strabo mentions Kyrtiae in Media He also uses the Atropatane (Azarbaijan) and in Persis (Fars). name Corduene or Gordiaea for the area that is now Turkish Kurdestan. between the words Kurd In spite of the apparent similarity feel that the and Kardu, Kyrtiae, and Corduene, philologists from Kurd by reason of the final short older terms are distinct Kardu vowel which is part of the root of these words, i.e., The initial K or Kardu may actually (kardu-karduw) and Kyrti. represent I, in which case there is a connection with the Semitic Furthermore, Kardu may be root QRD*, meaning brave or strong. The the indigenous name for the Georgians. related to Kart'veli, name Kurd probably comes from the Persian Gord, meaning "hero", of the local name, Kardu which would be an Iranian interpretation or Qardu.2 believed that the modern Kurds were direct Older scholarship This view was based on the similardescendants of the Kard5khoi. and the relationship, ity of the names, the obvious geographical of the Kardukhoi as wild mountain fact that Xenophon's description tribesmen not recognizing outside authority matches in many feature! the habits of the Kurds as recorded in later histories. However, this view has been widely disputed since the beginnFor it has been recognized that any ing of the twentieth century. that affiliations, people, regardless of its racial and linguistic lives in the mountains bordering Mesopotamia will have about the
IRANIAN STUDIES
44
same manner of life. Furthermnore, the older view confuses the Kurdish people with Kurdestan, assuming that the area presently inhabited by Kurds has always been so occupied and ignores the migrations and other shifts of populations that occurred in We know, for example, that displacement of pre-Islamic times. peoples was an important part of Achemenian policy. The Kurds themselves ciaim to be descendants of the Medes (Persian Mad), who, as Herodotus describes, overthrew eventually the Assyrians in 612 B.C. and who later were absorbed by Cyrus the Achemenian into his empire of the "Medes and the Persians." We have very little information about the Medes. The first mention of them in the sources is in 844 B.C. in an inscription of the Assyrian king Salemnasr, who made war on a tribe called the Amada, which lived east of the Assyrians both in the mountains of present-day Iranian Kurdestan and on the plateau further to the east. Although some scholars have dismissed the Kurds' claim of Median descent, and geographical linguistic evidence supports these claims. All Kurdish dialects have maintained the-basic characteristics of Kurdish despite the wide -dispersion of the tribes. This fact suggests that there was an ancient and powerful language from which the dialects evolved. Kurdish could well be descended from the Median language or languages which spread into Asia Minor after the fall of the Assyrian empire in 612 B.C. Geographically, this is very interesting, since according to Herodotus the western frontier of the Median empire was the Halys River (Kizil Irmak), which is just about as far west as Kurds are found today. An Armenian manuscript of the fifteenth century, probably copied from a much older work, contains a monophysite liturgical prayer in seven languages, one of which is called "the language of the Medians." This language is a North Iranian dialect which affinities to North Kurdish (Kurmandii).3 The Median language, cf which we have very few traces, apparently stood in the same relation to old Persian as Kurdish does to modern Persian, that is, northwest to southwest Iranian. The Kurds could have been formed by amalgamations among Iranian and non-Iranian indigenous tribes as the former moved west from the Persian plateau into the Zagros mountains and the anti-Taurus ranges of Turkey. In this shadowy period the Iranian Medes may have absorbed the settled Manneans of Iranian Kurdestan. The 'ranian scholar Rashid Yasami (himself a Kurd) says that Deio-es, who, according to Herodotus, organized the Median kingdom, was the same as "Dia'aku" who is reported to be a chief of the Manneans in Assyrian courses at the time of Sargon I (c. 715 B.C.).4
45
SPRING 1968
In central Kurdestan there of different nationalities Minorsky says,
could have been an Iranization of tribes but bearing a similar name (Kardu).
It is very possible that the Kurdish nation is formed from the union of two tribes, the Mardi Zescendants of the Manneansff and the Kyrtiae ?f the Bohtan areg7 who spoke Median dialects very close to each other. It is certain that in their expansion to the west the Kurds incorporated many indigenous elements.5 that Kurmandj, the present word for Minorsky also speculates North Kurdish, represents the union of Kurd with Mede and Mannean. The theory of Kurdish east-to-west migration is an attractive one, especially as the Median capital of Ekbatan (Hamadan) was located east of present Kurdish areas. But there is no way we can establjsh how or when the Kurds spread west of the Median portion of tie Iranian plateau. We can only guess that at the time of Xenophon, what is now Iraqi Kurdestan was not yet Kurdish. It is very interesting that Livy separates the Kyrtiae from the Medes when both are fighting against Rome in the army of Antiochus At that time (190 B.C.) the Kyrtiae are mercenaries, III. used as infantry, and auxiliaries, but the Medes are picked men in the cavalry. The "Kurds" of Fars The Arab and Persian historians who wrote during the early centuries of Islam frequently mentioned Kurds living outside of in Fars. Kurdestan, especially According to these histories, the Kurds had lived in many places outside of Kurdestan in Sassanian times. The historians Mas'udi and Istakhri, writing in the middle of the tenth century A. D., tell of Kurds living in Kerman, Sistan, Khorasan, and Fars as well as in Kurdestan proper. Rashid Yasami believes that the Kurds' original home was Fars. He cites as evidence the Persian historian Beihaqi (c. 1000 A.D.). Each reason and area associated with it: Greece, the painters the Kurds (akrad) of
has something the wise men of of Ch,na...and Fars.
According to Yasami, not only were the Kurds of Fars a major support of Sassanian power, but Ardashir I, the founder of
IRANIAN STUDIES
46
the empire, was himself a Kurd. He says that Sasan, Ardashir's grandfather, married Ram Behesht of the Bazanjan Kurds, who, were one of the five Kurdish tribes of Fars. according to istakhri, and Their son Pgpak took advantage of his Kurdish connections sent his son Ardashir as governor to Darabgerd (Darab), which was the center of the Chupanan, or Shab5nk5reh, the large federation of tribes to which the Banzanjan belonged and who had been Sasan's These same Kurds of Fars now became Ardashir's original protectors. supporters in his revolt against Ardavan V, the Arsacid ruler. After Ardashir had proclaimed himself king of kings, Ardavan wrote an insulting letter to him which called attention to Ardashir's Kurdish ancestry. You've bitten off more than you can chew and you have brought death to yourself. 0 son of a Kurd, raised in the tents of the Kurds, who gave you permission to put a crown on your head?7 However, not all Kurds supported Ardashir. Both the Shahnameh and the Karnamak-e-Ardashir tell of Ardashir's defeat by and eventual conquest of the Kurds. In the Shahnameh account Ardashir wars with the Kurds before subduing the neighboring areas of the reference is probably to the Kerman and S.istan--therefore Kurds of Fars. But in the Karnamak account Ardashir makes war on the Kurds of the land of Masi, which the translator and editor, as Madi, an area in Kurdestan. Sadeq Hedayat, interprets Although it is possible that the Kurds of Fars are related to the tribes of Kurdestan, it is more likely that the groups are and that the tribes of Fars are not true Kurds, but distinct Iranian tribes speaking southwest Iranian dialects, perhaps related to mDdern Luri. Such southwest dialects as Luri and Bakhtiari are much more closely related to Persian than to Kurdish. If we reconstruct the ancient linguistic division, then the Kurds of the north spoke a language related to Median--that is, northwest Iranian, and the "Kurds" of the south spoke a language related to Persian, or southwest Iranian. Of course it is impossible to prove that the tribes of Fars were not true Kurds; they might have been. But before the beginning of the twentieth century, no basic distinction was recognized between Kurdish and Luri.8 Only recently h&ve these two languages been found to follow the N.W.-S.W. or Mede-Persian division. Furthermore, there is simply no trace of Kurdish One of speakers at presetn either in Fars or on its borders. five Kurdish tribes of Fars is the Jiloya; at present istakhri's there is a Lur tribe in the same area with the name Kuh-Giluyeh, 47
SPRING 1968
whose origin
and whose time of coming to Fars are unknown.
of all is the fact that Kurd in the older Most conclusive Persian or Arab sense meant simply nomad with no particular In this case, Ardavan V's letter becomes ethnic connotations. he is calling Ardashir an ignorant since in effect more insulting, to Iranian nomads--accordnomad. The term was not even restricted ing to a tenth century work, the Persians called the Mesopotamian Thus it is reasonable (but hardly Arabs the "Kurds of Suristan." Kurds of Fars of Sassanian times were certain) that the so-called not true Kurds at all , but were Iranian nomads speaking dialects related to Persian. From what has been said, it should be clear that the early with any certainty. history of the Kurds cannot be reconstructed of evidence and the romanticizing of the scarcity Unfortunately, the Kurds by Americans and Europeans (they are seen as straighin opposition to the connivforward, outgoing, jolly-good-fellows cowardly Persians) has resulted in an outing, double-dealing, nonsense, propounding wild theories pouring of pseudo-scholarly But we can draw two that can never be conclusively disproved. conclusions: 1)
2)
The Kurds were formed by an amalgamation of Northwest Iranians, migrating from the east, who absorbed various elements from the indigenous population of the Zagros unity upon them. mountains and imposed a linguistic there is no basis for and geographically Linguistically between Kurds and Medes. making a distinction The Kurds that the Islamic historians mention as living in South and Southwest Persia were probably not true Kurds, but were nomadic tribes speaking Southwest Iranian dialect related to-modern Luri and Persian.
IRANIAN STUDIES
48
FOOTNOTES V. Minorsky, "Kurds", Encyclopedia
of Islam,
p. 1132.
2-To follow the derivation of the name in more detail, Minorsky, Nikitine, and Driver. 3 MacKenzie, D.N., 4 Yasami, Rashid,
"The Language of the Medians",
7 Ibid., 8
354-5.
Kurds, 70.
5 Cited by B. Nikitine, 6 Y5sami, op. cit.,
see
Les Kurdes,
12.
172-3.
171.
The Sharafnameh, a sixteenth century history cal ls the Lurs a branch of the Kurds.
49
of the Kurds,
SPRING 196&
BIBLIOGRAPHY I.
Literary A.
Sources
Sources Classical Library)
by the Loeb Classical
(published
Herodotus, The Persian Wars Livy, History of Rome Polybius, Histories Strabo, Geography Xenophon, Anabas i s B.
Pahlavi
Sources
Karnamak-eHedayat, Sadeq, editor and translator, (Book of the deeds of Ardashir, Ardashir-e-Papakin. from Pahlavi into modern son of P3pak), translated 3rd edition, Teheran, 1963. Persian. I1.
Other Sources Arfa,
Hassan, The Kurds.
London:
Oxford Press,
1966.
Vol. 7.. Fars Army of Iran, Farhang-e-Geographia-ye-Iran, (Dictionary of Iranian Geography) Teheran: Army In Persian. 1951. Geographical Division, Tarikh-e-MofassalAmir Sharaf Khan, Sharafnameh. Bidlisi, ( Complete History of Kurdestan). Teheran: e-Kurdestan. Elmi, n.d. Driver, G.R., "Dispersion of the Kurds in Ancient Times." Journal of the Oct., 1921, yal Asiatic Society. pp. 563-572. , "The Name Kurd and
Its
Associations."
Philological
JRAS, 1923, pp. 393-403. in Kurdish
J "Studies
School of Oriental pp. 491-513. Edmonds, C.J.,
History."
and African
Studies,
Kurds, Turks, and Arabs.
IRANIAN STUDIES
50
Bulletin
Xi,
of
the
3 (T92275
London: OUP, 1957.
Scene." 195)
of the Kurds in the Middle Eastern Royal Central Asian Society Journal XLV (Apri , 53. PP. 1p41
Lane, D. Tribes lation April,
on the Nomad Austin "Hajji Mirza Hasan-e-Shirazi (A transof Fars in the Fars-Nameh-e-Nasiri ." JRAS of the Farsnameh, lith. Teheran, 1895-6). 1923, pp. 209-231.
, "The Place
LeStrange, G. Lands of the Eastern Caliphate. (First published, Press, 1930. University
Cambridge: 1905.)
of the Province of "Description , G., translator. Fars in Persia at the Beginning of the 12th Century A.D." JRAS. Translated from a manuscript of Ibn-al-Balkhi. 1912. pp. 1-30; 311-340; 865-90. MacKenzie, D.N. "The Language of the Medians." XXII (1959), pp. 354-5. Minorsky, V., "The Guran." pp. 75-103.
BSOAS, I I, pt.
_, "Kurds" in The Encyclopedia account. but excellent
BSOAS,
1 (1943),
of Islam.
A concise,
_
Journal of the Royal "Tribes of Western Iran." pp. 73-80. LXXV(1945). Institute, Anthropological
Nikitine,
Basil.
Les Kurdes.
Paris,
1956.
Kurds and Kurdistan. London, 1948. Saf rastian, Arshak. The author holds the theory that the Kurds were the inhabitants of modern Kurdestan and as such original and others. the direct descents of the Guti, the Kassites, UNESCO, Iranshahr (The Land of Iran). In Persian. 1963. Vi lchevski, Sciences,
2 volumes.
0. Kurdi (Kurds). Leningrad: In Russian. 1961. U.S.S.R.,
Teheran,
Academy of
va Tarikhi-ye-u. Yasami, Rashid, Kord. Peivastegi-ye-Nezhadi and Racial Connections) Teheran, (Kurds. Their Historical This book, written by an Iranian Kurd, In Persian. n.d. account of Kurdish origins well-reasoned is a fascinating, and history.
51
SPRING 1968
FOROUGH FARROKHZAD: THE BITTER LOSS
Among leading contemporary Iranian poets, Forough Farrokhzad, 1934-1967, stood out in at least two regards: her womanhood, and her daring modernism. Attractive, exuberant, and, above all, an she was as sensitive, iconoclast, uninhibited, and warm in her as in her poetry, according to those who knew her well. friendships Her untimely death in an automobile accident a year ago shocked attended by thousands of people the whole of Tehran. Her funeral, from all walks of life, was one of the city's greatest public displays of genuine grief in recent years. Farrokhzad's place in modern Persian poetry is still a matter of critical examination. She was one of a group of young modernist lead in breaking away from the poets who followed Nima Youshij's mold of Iran's powerful classical tradition in poetry by writing in 1 blank verse and dealing with the live problems of their age. Farrokhzad's contribution was, however, the more significant be-. cause she also spoke as a woman. With raw and powerful imagery, her poetry gives an unabashed expression to desires and perceptions that have been long hidden in Iranian women because of their oppressive social conditions. But Forough Farrokhzad avoids the of parochialism; pitfalls she goes far beyond the quaintness of an outspoken poetess breaking traditional taboos by lustily celebrating her sensuality; sexual fetters were broken by her only to set her forth on further adventures of the mind and the spirit. She also has social and philosophical concerns. She exposes the social injustices, mocks the bureauunmasks the social hypocrisies, cratic imbecilities. She deals with the problems of alienation, both her own.and those of her generation, the despair and anguish of human separation, expressing her own yearnings for a world to come
1 The leading figures among these modernist poets include: Mehdi Akhavan-Sales (Omid), Ahmad Shamlu (imdid), Siavash Kasrai, Fereydoun Taval lol i, Mgder N5derpour, Mehdi Tehrani ( Azad), Yadol l ah Royai (Roy-i), Houshang Ebtehaj (Sayeh), Atashi, Tamimi, and Sepehri.
IRANIAN STUDIES
52
shall reign. And ail this she where freedom, love, and simplicity does with utter honesty and a great sense of personal immediacy. Despite the universality of her themes, she is, perhaps, the least and the most Persian of the Persian modernist poets. affected, Her imageries arise from the pulse of ordinary life in Iran. Although she did write some poetry of despair, in the end, life asserts itself. of life is exuberant, visceral, Her affirmation and earthly; here again, her unique perception of life as a woman asof the alienaserts itself. She is, perhaps, the least alienated in her ten years as a ted modern Persian poets. And above all, poet, she grows by leaps and bounds in craftsmanship, in the elevation of her themes, and in the depth of her understanding. She even made a successful excursion into another artistic medium of expression, directing a documentary film on a leprosarium which won her considerable 2 critical acclaim. The following poems are drawn from Farrokhzad's last collection of poatry published under the title of one of her better-known digar (Rebirth). poems, tavallodi These poems, along with a numnber of others, have been sensitively translated into English-by Miss Anita Spertus, a gradiate of Radcliffe College, and a student of Persian art and literature. While the present poems cannot show the whole of Farrokhzad's poetic range, they are representative of some of her major thematic concerns in her maturest stage of development. M.T,
2 For an anthology of Farrokhzad's own self-evaluation as well as her friends' elegies on the occasion of her death, see Arash, Vol. 2, No. 13, Esfand 1345.
53
SPRING 1968
THOSE DAYS
Those days have passed those
fine
those
full,
days peaceful
those skies
full
of glitter
those
groves
full
those
houses
leaning
Those roofs
days
of cherries on one another over green ivy fences
of playful
those streets
kites
giddy with the perfume of locust trees
Those days have passed those
days when, from the slit
my songs,
like
bubbles
My eye drank up all like
fresh
filled
that
of my eyelids, wrth air,
it fell
rushed out
upon
milk---
it was as if,
between the pupils
there was a restless
rabbit
of my eyes,
of joy:
each daybreak it would go out with the aged sun seeking and at night
new fields,
it would go down into the dark forests
IRANIAN STUIES
54
jT ubiv
0o 51,
;
L'
s; o4
L~jtJac~ ~Lbu.,)"
};
5
s
A56 e sLa t 5
T
o5
&T W9,j
55
Ass(1O
Those days have passed those
days
snowy silent
when, from behind the window pane in a warm room, I would gaze out endlessly: My pure snow, like
soft
fluff,
would come down softly on the old wooden ladder rope
on the thin clothes-line on the tresses
of the aged pines
And I would think of tomorrow, ah, tomorrow a white
form
slippery
It would begin with the rustle with the appearance
veil;
in the door frame of an indistinct shadow
which suddenly would set
her free
and with the wandering pattern on the colored
of my grandmother's
in the coldness of light; doves
of flying
panes of glass---
tomorrow The warmth of the korsi
brought drowsiness
Quickly and fearlessly, far from my mother's I would erase
sight,
the lines
IRANIAN STUDIES
that cancelled
56
my old exercises
&44o; -; Uy
)).
4q?
4.
sAA .z ,.,
zr-,X
?)s*))r
.
L?+
'U1
)y)T* 1y9 45j4L*jS
57~~~~_
5
When the snow slept I would walk saddened in the little
garden
At the base of the pots of withered
jasmine
I would bury my dead sparrows Those days have passed those days of enchantment and wonder those
days of sleep
and wakefulness
those days when every shadow held a secret and every closed
box concealed
Every corner of a closet
a treasure
in the silence
of noon
was a world unto itself Anyone not afraid
of the dark
was a hero in my eyes Those days have passed those
festive
days
that waiting
for sun and flowers
that trembling in the silent
at a scent, modest company of the wild narcissus
that would visit on the last The calls
the city
morning of winter
of pedlars
IRANIAN STUDIES
in the long streets
58
were splashes of green
W3Jt9j5LIA,-
.sg1_J1
)
Q,
t
59
tbj~) O
s) A&
)a1,(5Jl
C,
0T
a63l37
in wafting smells,
The bazaar was afloat
in the pervading odor of coffee and fish The bazaar would unroll under one's feet, would stretch out and fuse with all the momentsalong the way, and it would turn round in the eyes of the dolls The bazaar---Mother would go swiftly toward the colored fluid forms and would return with gift packages, with baskets full The bazaar was rain that would fall and fall and fall Those days have passed those days of wonder at the secrets of the body those days of cautious acquaintance---the
beauty of a
blue-veined hand that, with a flower, would call another hand from behind a wall; and little
spots of ink on this trembling quivering fearful hand,
and love repeated in a greeting full of shyness On warmsmoke-filled
afternoons
we would sing our love in the dust of the street Wewere acquainted with the simple language of floral messengers Wewould bring our hearts to a garden of innocent friendliness IRANIAN STUDIES
60
cL-G .
s
~
9jI2j *,
. :SseAS.
~
45DA
,,j
L
Fj
.4
s
sJxolG61vj
and would be grateful and a ball It was love,
to the trees,
with messages of kisses that quivering
would pass among us
feeling which, in the darkness of a corridor,
suddenly would surround us and we would be enraptured with the burning quickness of our breaths and our beating hearts and stolen smi les Those days have passed those days like
plants
which decay in the sun
decayed with the rays of the sun And lost
are those streets
giddy with the perfume of locust trees
in the noisy
crowds of the one-way streets
And the girl
who used to color
with geranium petals, Now is a lonely
alas,
woman,
Now is a lonely
IRANIAN STUDIES
woman.
62
her cheeks
oLrL
L;)
Lo
;
MJ
t
>;;i)
5
L
bj)o
Lr,
63
THE WIND WILL CARRY US AWAY
In my small night, alas the wind has a rendezvous with the leaves of trees In my small night rests the fear of ruin Listen... Do you hear the blowing of the darkness? I look at this good luck like a stranger I am accustomed to my hopelessness Listen... Do you hear the blowing of the darkness? In the night now something is happening: the moon is red and disturbed and above this roof, which at any momentmight fall, the clouds like the crowds of mourners seem to await the momentof rain A moment and after that---nothIng. Behind this window the night is trembling,
IRANIAN STUDIES
64
ir
l
> _A
5 vl
) 5 *A
,
S
3o
K ;lt) ) r? ? hr
4SbAr ~~~~s)- - ,?,
?5 )o
65
01a-Y'
l j
and the earth stands still
in its course
Vague things lie behind this window, you and 1, uneasy
Oyou are green all over, put your hands like a burning memoryin my loving hands and entrust your lips like a warmsense of life to the caresses of loving lips The wind will carry.us away with it The wind will carry us away.
IRANIAN STUDIES
66
13L
67
3 1,t.3
REBIRTH
My whole being repeating that
in itself carry you to the dawn of eternal
it will
Ah, I sighed in this
is a dark verse
to you in this
blossoming and growth
verse;
verse
I grafted
you to tree
and water and fire
Perhaps life is a long road on which a woman with a basket passes every day Perhaps life is a rope with which a man hangs himself Perhaps life
is a child,
Perhaps life
is a cigarette,
returning
Perhaps it is the absent who tips
lit
from a branch
from school in an interval of rest while making love
look of a passer-by
his hat
and, with a meaningless
Or perhaps
life
smile,
is that clozed
says "good morning to another passe r-by moment
when my glance
meets ruin in the pupils
a feeling
I shall
that
with my visions
of your eyes:
mingle
of the moon and the darkness.
IRANIAN STUDIES
68
o'41A
5
,1@i
4t li4)@.I)
Z?.T j4J.I
LoT\~~.T fjX Jj
&?
)L
ab
wjI 6ii.
L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~U
=LA.L AlpLiy
69
Z
In a room as big as loneliness my heart as big as love looks at its excuses
drooping
the beautiful
in the flower pot
flowers
that you plaited
the sapling the voice
for simple happiness:
in the garden of our house
of the canaries,
songs as bi-g as the window
their
Ah... this
is my lot,
this
is my lot:
My lot is the sky that a hanging curtain My lot
takes from me
is to step down from a deserted
stair
and find something worn out and nostalgic My lot
is to walk sorrowfully
to relinquish
my soul
in a garden of memories,
in the sadness
of a voice
"I love your hands"
I plant I will
my hands in the garden: become green---l
And the sparrows will in the holes
know, I know, I know lay eggs
between my inky fingers
IRANIAN STUDIES
70
that says
~?J3 t 3a
3j
O\= L; I
5 Lli
. j;X
al jt J13j -L
1~ LA.&-
j?, .
Lo-a4)L4)l;
I
)t~~~~~~ ijT
,e
>yA
P Xf .71 y )
b
1
4?
;L o jl>AJ s @SL
') ,
71
4
e
&h
I hang earrings
on my ears,
a pair of twin red cherries, and to my nails
I facten
There is a street
dahlia
petals
where
the boys who once loved me still,
with the same toussled
think of the innocent
the wind carried
of the poor girl whom, one night
away.
There Is a street has stolen
smiles
hair and lean legs and slender necks,
that my heart
from the quarters
of my childhood
The journey of a mass along the line of time and the mass making pregnant
the dry line of time,
a mass aware of an image which a mirror brings In this
back.from
a party
way
someone dies and someone remains No fisher
would hunt pearls
in a shallow disappears
IRANIAN STUDIES
72
stream that underground.
0f)'Y
4"
&.j(l
,R4a.2tr X. s
\,,\yT
@)19
.9r
S ' *- Jh S,c .>
sJ@hj B4A X o4j
73
&Bd4)
~
know a sad little
fairy
who lives
In an ocean
and plays
to her heart on a wood-tipped
softly,
softly
A sad little
fairy
who dies
at night
and will
from a kiss
flute:
from a kiss,
IRANIAN STUDIES
be reborn in the world at dawn
74
75
book
review RECENT STUDIES IN OIL Jaid Tehranian
Financing Economic Development in Iraq: The Role of Oil in a Middle Eastern Economy, by Abbas Alnasrawi. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. The Evolution of Oil Concessions in the Middle East and North Africa, by Henry Cattan. New York: Oceana Publications, 1967. Ydrk:
Crude Oil Prices in the Middle East, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.
Mattei: Oil and Power Politics, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.
by Hulmut J. Frank.
by Paul H. Frankel.
Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.
New
New York:
by David Hirst.
The Economics of Transporting Oil to and Within Europe, by Michael Hubbard. London: MacLaren & Sons Ltd., 1967. Economic Aspects of Oil Conservation F. Lovejoy and Paul T. Homan. Saltimore: 1967. Our Gift,
Our Oil,
Regulation, by Wallace The Johns Hopkins Press,
by Anibal R. Martinez.
Vienna,
1966.
A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil Concessions: 1901-65, by Zuhayr Mikdashi. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Permanent Sovereignty Over Oil Resources: A Study of Middle East Oil Concessions and Legal Change, by Muhamad-A. Mughraby. Beirut: The Middle East Research and Publishing Center, 1966.
Majid Tehranian Lesley Col lege.
is Assistant
IRANIAN STUDIES
Professor
76
of Political
Economy at
The past two years' vintage of studies on oil has been lush and promising. We have listed here only ten of the most important of those recently published in English on different aspects of this most complex of world industries. Since it is difficult to deal critically with all of them in a single review, the aim of this note is simply to provide brief summaries while pointing out some of their common and divergent features. One striking aspect of these studies is the fact that four of This is not them are by writers who come from the producing countries. of the increasingly purely accidental; it is suggestive serious interest that the producing countries have taken in the affairs of an industry vital to their future development. For a long time the industry was the exclusive domain of eight major international oil companies which exhibited an altogether natural jealousy over their knowledge of its operations. With little access to the vital sources of information in the industry, few scholars could conduct serious research on oil. But as the dominant position of the seven AngloAmerican-Dutch sisters (British Petroleum, Standard of New Jersey, Gulf, Mobil, Shell, Standard of California, and Texaco) with their French half-sister (Compagnie Francaise des Pe"troles) has been somewhat weakened in the recent decade, so has their exclusive control of the sources of information. There are now many independent private and national oil companies competing in the international markets. Furthermore, governments of the producing countries and also of some of the consuming countries, have more or less come to the conclusion that oil is too important a matter to be left entirely to the oilmen. The trade journals, which still remain an excellent source in the thinking of the representatives of private interests, are now supplemented by publications such as those of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Middle East Research and Publishing Center, which reflect the point of view of the producing countries. A whole generation of independent observers and scholars of the oil scene, including some of the present writers, have also emerged to fill some of the gaps. We have now, notably in the works of Professor M.A. Adelman of M.I.T., even the beginnings of some theoretical into insights the economics of the industry.*
*See especially, "The World Oil Outlook", in Marion Clawson (ed.) Natural Resources and International Development (Baltimore, 1964); "Oil Prices in the Long-Run (1963-65)," University of Chicago Journal of Business (April, 1964); The Supply and Price of Natural Gas (London 1962); "Crude Oil Production Costs in Four Areas",(A.I.M.E. Feb.-Mar., 1966); "Oil Prices 1957-67: An Interim Report (Unpublished Mss, Dec., 1967); "Security of Eastern Hemisphere Fuel Supply (MIT Dept. of Economics Working Paper, December, 1967.
77
SPEING 1968
Another common feature to note among these studies is that, with the exception of one, Economic Aspects of Oil Conservation all are primarily concerned with petroleum in the Regulations, This, again, is symptomatic of international Eastern Hemisphere. only Although Eastern Hemisphere oil constitutes market conditions. its share of inabout 56 percent of the world's total production, This is a posttrade in petroleum exceeds 85 percent. ternational in the last two decades of war phenomenon; and the availability cheap Middi.e East and North African oil on a massive scale to the consuming countries of Western Europe, has motivated the latter to domestic coal to lowshift their demand for fuel from high-cost more Oil exports constitute cost imported petroleum products. trade, and of this, an inthan 50 percent of all international The movement creasing share comes from the Eastern Hemisphere. of millions of barrels of crude oil and crude oil products across involves a highly complex network of inter-relationships continents among an increasing number of producing and consuming countries as intermediaries, the oil companies. well as among their everpresent with The chief concern of these studies is, quite appropriately, and legal framework of these rethe changing ecomonics, politics, lationships. The studies under review are on the whole impressive contriMikdashi's study ventures into a butions to our understanding. brief, and presents a good, though necessarily virgin territory It is a comparative analysis of the Middle East oil concessions. welcome beginning of a study that will have to be later carried out in order to provide a basis for the comparison in greater detail Frank's study of crude oil prices presents of the new concessions. development of a very cona very lucid account of the historical Alnasrawi's work is a case study of fusing system of pricing. economic development, or lack thereof, with abundant resources in It shows what money capital and foreigh exchange earnings from oil. can and cannot do in the underdeveloped oil producing countries. Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East is a study of an important The author argues western bias. infused with a distinct subject, ignoring the fact that the subject of oil should be depoliticized, that a country which depends on a single commodity for more than cannot be policical80-90 percent of its foreigh exchange earnings, the oil Henry Cattan's study reflects to its fate. ly indifferent system in companies' views on the evolution of the concessionary Mughraby's study rethe Middle East; it is somewhat apologetic. piece of research into the legal notions that presents an extensive system and its serve as the under pinnings of the concessionary Martinez's book is an anthology of the author's reevolution. accounts of the changing scene in the industry. levent and irrelevant Frankel's book on Mattei is a study, by a-close advisor and an astute observer of the oil scene, of a remarkable oilman, who chaloil companies on their own grounds. lenged the major international
IRANIAN STUDIES
78
Hubbard's is a study of the changing transport scene, which is now of more of super-tankers being revolutionized by the introduction And, finally, Lovejoy and Homan's exthan 100,000 dwt capacity. system in the United States pretensive study of the prorationing sents an excellent case study in microcosm, of the problems and Despite conprospects of production programming on a worldscale. in the United States siderable governmental and private cooperation to maintain prices high by keeping supply commensurate with demand, the industry continues to be plagued with excess producing capacity. towards prorationing among the exporting countries OPEC's efforts can profit greatly from the lessons of the American experience as analyzed in this work. All in all, these are good years for the students of the New sources of information are international petroleum industry. Just as with the market bursting forth with each passing day. as the problem is no longer as much one of scarcity conditions, abundance. absorption of the available
79
SPRING 1968
CURRENT RESEARCH ON IRAN (E)
IRANCOMPLETED OF THESESCONCERNING THESECONDPARTOF A BIBLIGRAPHY IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, OR IN PREPARATION,IN BRITISH ANDAMERICAN UNIVERS ITIES.
of Nishapur in the Eleventh
history
Bulliet,
R.
The social Harvard.
Daftary,
F.
Economic development
Kazemian, Gh.
Zonis,
M. Studies
in the texts
M. The life
(Berkeley)
U. Calif.
on the
Princeton.
of Hafiz.
criticism
E. Contemporary Persian
Loraine,
in Iran.
The impact of the U.S. technical and financial rural development of I'ran. American.
Rehder, R. Modern Persian Schwartz,
planning
century.
of Sogdian Christians.
art and music.
Berkeley.
Chicago.
and works Maleku-sh-Shuara
Bahar.
Cambridge.
Radwan, S. A comparative study of Persian and Arabic poetical developA.D. Cambridge. ments in Eighth and Ninth centuries, Ovanessian,
0.
JaIalu-Din
Rumi and Sufism.
and economic life
Emerson, J. The trade relations Cambridge. A.S.
Husaini,
Husain, M. Perry,
J.
Underground religious Cambridge. The Safavids.
The Zands.
IRANIAN STUDIES
Cambridge.
80
Iran.
movements in Timurid Iran.
Cambridge.
Cambridge.
of Safavid
Iraia Sllt
tuUiEs
Eulketin of The Sodet!j PorIrantin Ctu4al an) ;s.d1 Sbt 4a
rmtn:er3 Uolumr, S,etwtor
1968
COUNCIL Ervand Abrahamian Secretary Ali Banuazizi, Hormoz Hekmat Abbas Heydari-Darafshian Farhad Kazemi, Treasurer President Manoucher Parvin, Maj id Tehranian
IRANIAN STUDIES Ali Banuazizi, Roy Mottahedeh,
Editor Associate
Editor
for Iranian quarterly by The Soceity IRANIAN STUDIES is published to members of the It is distributed and Social Cultrual Studi-es. of single copies The price membership. as a part of their Society by the expressed The opinions is $1.00 per issue. for non-members authors and not necessarily are those of the individual contributors may Articles of IRANIAN STUDIES. or the editors those of the Society for publication. to the Editor be submitted or Persian in English IRANIAN STUDIES or the Soceity's All communications concerning Cultural and for Iranian The Soceity should be addressed to: affairs New Haven, Studies (SICSS), P. 0. Box 3384, Yale Station, Social U.S.A. 06520, Connecticut
Cover
design
by Tina
Kazemi
TIt
'et
to
"S .4 Apr xBunlIetin of
Tht Socety IerIrantn Volume I
Culuwa nb$ocda &ubt
Summer 1968
Number 3
CONTENTS
82
POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENTIN IRAN Richard W. Cottam
96
NOTES ON THE SAFAVID STATE Roger Savory
]04
CITY HISTORIES IN MEDIEVAL IRAN Richard W. Bulliet
110
ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUMEXPORTING COUNTRIES Ali M. S. Fatemi
113
TWO SHORT STORIES BY SADEQ CHUBAK by John Limbert Translated JUSTI CE THE FLOWERSOF FLESH
121
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
122
BOOK REVIEW "RATIONALITY" ANTD"IRRATIONALITY" IN IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY Shaul Bakhash
POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN'
Richard
W. Cottam
political party free and vigorous of reasonably The period in Iran was remarkably brief when viewed in the peractivity Beginning land. of that ancient of the very long history spective of Reza Shah in 1941, party activity the abdication slowly after August 1953 when it was suduntil more intense became steadily But as brief as this period was, these twelve denly suppressed. which party development of political patterns years witnessed states. of other developing comparison with the experience deserve the posthas been in vogue throughout The term "developing" But for all that the term remains a vague one. World War II era. of over twenty five hundred history Why Iran with its recorded the United States while as "developing" years should be classified than two hundred years should be classified with a history of less Indeed the very use of obvious. as "developed" is not immediately subconand more journalists so vague a term leads some analysts connotawith its perjorative "primitive" to substitute sciously tions for "developing".2 differThere are qualitative Yet the term is a fair one. which are of those societies processes ences in the political and as "modern". as "developing", as "traditional", classified of analysis in the political school the predominant But, oddly, the structural-functional approach, following states, developing than the differences rather the similarities tends to stress to Fred Riggs has made a major effort among the three systems. to the to focus on the unique by pointing failure remedy this as a major indicator of differentiation factor of functional out, his the stage of development.3 But, as Riggs points or develsystem is not a synonym for the transitional prismatic as traditional which are classified Some societies oping system. The factor of differentiation. have a great deal of functional as a can be useful differentiation the degree of functional but of development of the stage valid indicator frequently
Richard W. Cottam is Professor of Pittsburgh. University
IRANIAN STUDIES
of
82
Political
Science
at
the
it cannot serve as the primary analytbecause of the exceptions ical device for pointing to the unique aspects of the political process in the three systems. The contention here is that the most obvious and at the same time analytically distinction useful political among the three is the degree of political awareness and political participation. By political awareness is meant ail at least vague awareness of An individual the state as a unit and of the society of states. as politically classified unaware is not necessarily apolitical. in village, He may understand and participate clan, and tribal politics and yet not be conscious of the state. Therefore the awareness as the tea is used simplest indicator of political which has or here is a comprehension of membership in a cosunity seeks a state organization and of the existence of a society of states. Between the individual who barely understands he is a member of such a community and the individual who comprehends the subtleties and nuances of the political process of the state there is a vast range in degree. Seen in these terms, the developing process is the growth in the percentage of the population that is politically aware and of the percentage of the population which has a sophisticated understanding of the political process of the state. The purpose of this study is to test the analytical utility of this focus by correlating types of political parties in Iran with three different levels of political awareness and political participation. Unfortunately levels of political awareness in Iran can only be estimated. Voting in elections, which would seem to be a logical indicator of basic political participation, is in fact of little utility. Uncomprehending peasants were herded to the polls in parliamentary elections while politically sophisticated urbanites remained at home rather than participate in a meaningless ritual. The urban vote for the 17th Majlis in 1952 was something of an exception, however, since the politically aware populace considered it relatively free and meaningful. in Around 40% of the adult male population of Tehran participated that vote. Nor is a survey such as Almond and Verba's Five nation in study likely to yield valid results in Iran. In a dictatorship which much of the most active population is engaged in underground politics, honest answers to questions designed to test political awareness are hardly to be expected. The three periods to be looked at are: 1906-1921, the generic period for Iranian political parties in which certainly as less than three percent of the population could be classified politically aware; 1941-1950 during which the level of awareness is assumed to be five to ten percent; and 1950-1953 during which
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the level of awareness is assumed to be over ten percent and during increased rapidly. participants which the percentage of political The typology to be used for the parties will be based on the 1) dependence on or independence of a following five criteria: would the party collapse were the i.e., individual, particular 2) base of recruitment for activity; to cease political individual is the party leadership drawn largely from the old i.e., leaders, oligarchy or from some other source; 3) base of recruitment for to which popular elements is the party i.e., party rank and file, likely to turn for support; 4) breadth of the ideology appeal is it i.e., toward party competition, made; and 5) attitude or non-authoritarian. authoritarian parties does not begin with The history of Iranian political to their political Iranians have been referring the year 1941. revolution of 1906. parties since shortly after the constitutional groups, the Democrats and Moderates, can lay And two political of party A definition "party". some claim to the appellation which is abstracted from the great, broadly-based parties of the United States or Western Europe would, of course, exclude both the These groups were composed of only a few Democrats and Moderates. in communicating with the who found difficulty dozen individuals more than parliaIndeed they amounted to little Iranian mass. But their failure to organize extensively mentary groupings. of their lacking any purpose outside parliament is not indicative of individual members. There beyond advancing the self-interest homogeneity in each of the groups although the was ideological and ideological, and consciously Democrats were the more intensely the ideology was a compound of the French Enlightenment and nationalism. Their failure to organize outside is merely awareness. symptomatic of the narrow base of political Whether the Moderates and Democrats are described as politiWhat is important is to consequence. cal parties is of little groups emerged naturally from the recognize that these political of the dowreh or circle and that they institution traditional parties more of political constituted a major step in the direction Furthermore, they were very natural in accord with the Western model. awareness. groupings for this stage of political political The institution of the dowreh consisted of a group of who met regularly or men of similar interests relatives friends, As awareness of Western or for socializing. for discussions some ideas and institutions penetrated the oligarchy, political sons of the oligarchy became enamored of these ideas and deterparallel A salon constitutionalism mined to put them into effect. expanded to that of 19th Century Russia followed and some circles The Democrat party in particular when into societies (anlumans).
IRANIANSTUDIES
84
it was formed, had close ties to and drew its leadership from a number of these societies. A dominant section of the leadership in this stage was recruited from sons of the oligarchy. This was not the group within leader was which a charismatic likely to appear. Dominant personalities were expected features of the dowreh, the anjuman and the new party. But they were too well known, too much part of the group to elicit the type of unquestioning support characteristic of that of the charismatic leader. The statement often heard that parties in this period were little more than personal is misleading. instruments Strong personalities were to be found in both parties, but neither could be classified as personality dependent. Such a type would appear in a later stage of political awareness when an effort would be fruitful for reaching barely aware voters through a highly personal appeal. These early parties, if they can be called classified as personality independent; leadership the oligarchy; rank and file recruited from the base; rather broad ideology; and non-authoritarian.
such, can be recruited from narrow literate
came to a standstill Party activity during the 1920's and under the authoritarisn 1930's rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi; but in terms of a growth in political development awareness proceeded when Reza Shah abdicated in 1941 and free rapidly. Therefore, was again possible a much larger party activity existed public which had at least potential for the appeal of receptivity political For would-be party leaders. party leaders this development offered new opportunities and new types of political parties to appear. were certain The type of party that appeared almost immediately was the glorified dowreh-type described above. This should come as no surprise. Habits, values, and norms of behavior that were characteristic of the traditional will society persist throughout the transitional or developing stage. Only as Iran has moved into an increasingly in the 1960's has the totalitarian control Nor are these glorified dowreh-type party begun to disappear. behavioral confined to the most conservative traditional patterns The behavior members of society. of even those leaders who their will continue to include basically alter style nevertheless some traditional which often add not at all to political patterns the glorified dowreh party was modal only effectiveness. However, in the early stage of growth in political In the 1941awareness. 1950 period a new modal type appeared.
85
SUMMER1968
By 1941 approximately five per cent of the population was and probably somewhere between five and ten percent had literate, process. Awareness and parsome awareness of the modern political are not the same thing, however, and a major effort ticipation figures to communicate from rival political could be anticipated with and then to mobilize the support of this group. Included also aware during the Reza in the public which had become politically and had achieved a Shah period was a group which was well-educated In absolute sophistication. high degree of political relatively numbers this group, to be referred to henceforth as the "new inteBut when it is remembered that the vast was not large. llectuals," unaware, the group was majority of Iranians remained politically Emerging from families of moderate very influential. potentially the members of means, often small merchants or minor bureaucrats, this group were frequently restive and anxious to see fundamental change. In the period from 1941 to 1946 two new party types appeared. The first, represented by the Tudeh Party, focused its appeal on Along with an the more radical members of the new intellectuals. compelling ideology came a promise of fundamental intellectually The fact that this party openly proclaimed its adherence change. with the Soviet Union was less of to communism and its association Though most an obstacle to recruitment than might be imagined. including many members of the Tudeh, of the new intellectuals, in Iran had foreign intervention nationalistic, were intensely foreign with any particular been so common that an association as long as the power could be thought of as not unpatriotic welfare of the Iranian people was foremost in mind; and many saw far less reason to look with favor on Iranian nationalists the British than on the Soviets. as personality The Tudeh Party type can be classified independent; leadership recruited mainly from the new intellectuals; rank and file recruited also largely from the new although a major but at this time, generally unsucintellectuals cessful effort was made to attract members from other elements of and authoritarian. society; narrowly and rigidly ideological; The other party type was represented by the National Will These people resembled each Party and the Democrat Iran Party. One major of the typology. other closely in each of the criteria sophistiIn politically existed however. perceptual difference the National Will Party was perceived to be at cated circles least as close to the British as the Tudeh Party was to the The party's leader, Sayyid Zia al-Din Tabatabai, had Soviets. become premier in 1921 after a coup d'etat perceived to have been When he fell from power he went into exile in the British-backed.
IRANIANSTUDIES
86
British mandate of Palestine and was believed to have been brought back to Iran during the British and Soviet wartime occupation as part of a British effort to counter the Soviet challenge implicit in the Tudeh Party. That a man with such a reputation could seriously hope to gain popular support is testimony to the Iranian acceptance of foreign interference astonishing as a fact of life that must be lived with. AhmadQavam, the leader of the Democrat Iran Party, was believed to be "close" to the British as were most aristocratic politicians; but there was a substantial in degree of perceived attachment. difference Each of these parties sought to attract support from the the new intellectuals, and the by-now substantial old oligarchy, inert. The mode of appeal to each group of aware but politically of the three groups had to be different and Sayyid Zia and Ahmad understood this. Qavam intuitively Support from the old oligarchy was gained essentially by an appeal to the power and spoils interest of prominent personalities, and here both parties were The new intellectuals successful. were appealed to through an advocacy of economic and social reform and real national independence. Here the Democrat Iran Party had some success, but the National Will Party with its British reputation attracted very few The appeal to the third group was primarily intellectuals. personal and here neither party was successful. For a brief period in 1946 the Democrat Iran Party was able to enlist the support of a surprisingly leaders and large number of political the party was extraordinarily successful in the elections for the 15th Majlis. But following this electoral victory the party collapsed with a suddenness that amply demonstrated the tenuousness of party attachments. This party type can be described as personality dependent; leadership recruited from the oligarchy; rank and file recruited from the oligarchy with a generally Unsuccessful appeal to the new intellectuals and to the aware mass; an ideological appeal narrower than that of the dowreh-type party but broad when compared with the Tudeh; and non-authoritarian. The failure of the National Will and Democrat Iran parties and the limited success of the Tudeh demonstrate two major points. First, even though a by-now significant section of the Iranian public was to some extent politically aware, mobilizing was extremely difficult. them politically Second, a narrowly ideological appeal was necessary to attract recruits from among the new intellectuals. The elements of the successful ideological appeal were also becoming clear. They included as an essential feature an intense devotion to the goal of a truly independent Iran with a dignity consonant with Iran's great past. They included also an acceptance of modernizing, achievement values which called for rapid social and economic change. But within these areas of general agreement there was a wide range of 87
1968 SUMMER
One group of new intellectuals viewpoints. felt Iran's national independence and dignity were in no sense compromised by a close association with the Soviet Union. However, Soviet support for a puppet communist government of Iranian Azerbaijan in the latter part of this period did lead to disillusionment and many defections. Polar to this, another group made of nationalism its primary focus and proclaimed that Iran's dignity could only be restored by a restitution of lost territories now included in the Soviet Union, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The majority of the new intellectuals rejected any close association with a foreign power but accepted Iran's boundaries as essentially unalterable. On the point of economic and social change, one group accepted the comunist formula. Another combined what it believed was doctrinaire Marxist socialism with an insistence that a peculiarly Iranian road to socialism must be followed. A third group was less doctrinaire, resembling rather closely the British Fabians. A fourth called for a statism which in many ways resembled the corporate focus of fascist Italy. A major area of disagreement concerned the applicability of the liberal democratic frame. There were among the new intellectuals, and even more so among the old intellectuals who had in the early constitutional participated for whom revolution,many the goal of liberal democracy haa a clear priority. For others liberal democracy was at most a very distant goal. A mere recounting of the range in intellectual attitude spells out the dilemma for the Iranian political leader in this To attract the new intellectual period. he must make a narrowly ideological appeal. But such an appeal would attract only one section of the intellectual community and would have virtually no appeal beyond that small group. Therefore the possibility of building a broadly based party was remote and the established pattern for the 1946-1950 period was the development of a number of narrowly ideological parties with a restricted popular appeal. Of the successful parties in this and the Mardom Iran Party, made little the new intellectuals as the recruting Both parties had rather narrowly file. the
substance
of
their
appeals
was very
period two, the Iran Party real effort to go beyond base for their rank and ideological appeals and similar.
They were
highly
nationalistic, with a foreign opposed to any close association power, non-doctrinaire and liberal democratic. Mardom socialist, Iran in addition stressed spiritual values. Both were independent of particular leaders, although the Iran Party came to be closely identified with Allahyar Saleh. Their resemblance was close
IRANIAN STUDIES
88
enough that the two parties sometimes merged. But there was one The which persistently drove them apart. difference typological who had Iran Party leaders were by and large old intellectuals emerged from the oligarchy whereas the Mardom Iran leaders were new intellectuals of middle class origin. The Iran Party can be seen therefore as a party which evolved naturally from the glorified dowreh type. Leadership was recruited from the same oligarchic base; but the ideological appeal had been narrowed which permitted recruiting from the new intellectuals. All of the other significant parties made serious efforts to attract support outside the narrow community of the new intellectuals. Two of these, however, found their greatest recruitment successes within the new intellectual community. The Tudeh Party though outlawed, stepped up its appeal to virtually every recognizable group within the newly awakened publtic. But its successes outside the intellectual community were few and largely confined to the labor area although there were beginnings of progress in near Tehran and in the Caspian province of Gilan. villages The second of these parties, the Toilers Party, was a most interesting transitional type. It targeted two specific groups and hoped to be able, through the personal appeal of its leader Dr. Mozaffar Baqai, to reach deeply into the non-participant politically aware. By far the greatest success for the Toilers Party resulted from the alliance of Dr. Baqai and some doctrinaire the brilliant, Marxist but anti-Stalinist intellectuals, especially one-time communist theoretician, Khalil Maleki. With the newspaper Shahed as its mouthpiece this wing of the Toilers Party was able to attract the support of a large number of new intellectuals. Dr. Baqai also included in his entourage men who were able to exercise some control over a number of labor unions and who had excellent circles. A contacts within the guilds and religious third group of close associates of Dr. Baqai were men with easy the British access to the Court, the army and, cynics believed, with Embassy. This latter group had had a dowreh-type association itself with the Dr. Baqai prior to 1946 and then had associated Democrat Iran Party. The Toilers Party in fact deserves close study. Rarely will a political such a broad combingroup be found which incorporates ation of traditional Furthermore and modern behavioral patterns. the Toilers Party just might have become Iran's dominant party. which might Dr. Baqai seems to have had a charismatic potential eventually have enabled him to reach many of the non-participant politically aware. But in this regard he could not compete with Dr. Mohamad Mossadeq and,by making an effort to do so,Dr. Baqai
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his party and his own reputation was to destroy as a leading nationalist politician. The Toilers Party was clearly personit recruited its leaders ality dependent; from the new intellectuals, from labor and guilds; it attracted its rank and file also from these three groups; it was narrowly and rigidly ideological; and it was non-authoritarian. Two other parties of some significance had relatively far success greater outside the community of the new intellectuals. Both can be classified as personality dependent although in each case had the leaders died in the period either a successor would have been found or a new party with a substantially similar appeal would have appeared. In fact minor parties competing for the same rank and file were already in existence. The more noteworthy of those two parties, the Warriors of Islam, was ostensibly headed by the turbaned but spectacularly on the opportunistic Shams Qanatabadi. But it was dependent leadership of the most successful of the politician-priests, AbolQassem Kashani. This party recruited its leaders from three groups, Shiah religious leaders, guild leaders, and street leaders. Rank and file support was attracted from the deeply religious lowermiddle class. Since the great bulk of the aware but as yet nonparticipating public could be classified as lower-middle class, and since the Warriors of Islam was the most successful of the parties in reaching this group, especially in the provincial centers, Kashani could reasonably believe that his political potential was next only to that of Mossadeq. However he was dependent for success on a loose alliance with some independent-minded politicalin Tehran and in the provincial religious and leaders centers, the tenuousness of this alliance in 1953. was to be demonstrated Kashani's No real ideological appeal was broad and loose. in an effort was made to reconcile the inherent contradictions His appeal which had a dual center in Islam and Nationalism. economic and social attitudes were conservative to reactionary, but there is little were very reason to believe his rank and file much aware of them. of Iran They were attracted to grand slogans and Islam. This was not the kind of appeal to attract, and Kashani did not reach, The party of the religious intellectual. course claimed to oppose authoritarianism but liberal democracy was clearly of little interest to Kashani personally. The other of these two parties, Pan Iran, was more narrowly targeted. It directed its appeal to lower middle class youth, particularly high school students. At this stage of Iran's political development this was a highly significant target group,
IRANIAN STUDIES
90
and a number of parties or would-be parties competed for preeminence in the high schools. Since the young students were volatile and easily mobilized, force of some they were a political in a chaotic situation. potential particularly All of the groups targeting them used essentially the same ideological appeal, an intense nationalism which called not only for the ouster of the imperial West but also for the return of lost Iranian territories now located within the boundaries of each of Iran's neighbors including the Soviet Union. The appeal was statist but anti-capitalist, anti-communist, and often anti-Semitic. The leader of the most successful of these groups was Dariush Foruhar, and leaders were recruited from young men of the lower middle class and the fringes of the new intellectuals. The party called for free party competition but the sincerity of its call for tolerance could be questioned Finally there was the Fedayan Islam about which little is known. This party recruited fundamentalist-activists from the urban lower middle and lower classes. In ideology it called for a return to the fundamental principles of Islam and viewed secular and nationalist parties as blasphemous. Premier Ali Razmara was assassinated by a member of this group in 1951, an act which led to the premiership of Dr. Mossadeq. Partly for this reason the party is sometimes mistakenly placed in the Mossadeqist National Front.5 In fact Mossadeq soon became a prime target of Fedayan assassins, and a leading Mossadeq lieutenant, Hossein Fatemi, was gravely wounded by a Fedayan gunman. The party had virtually no appeal among the new intellectuals and Nevab Safavi and other Fedayan leaders were generally regarded as insincere and for sale to the highest bidder. The Shah had Safavi and the entire Fedayan leadership executed in a later period,but the assassins of Premier Mansur in 1965 were possibly Fedayan members. Unlike the previous period, the parties of this period must be classified as successful. Virtually every element of the population which was mobilizable was reached by one or another of them. But only the Tudeh and Toilers parties had any real success in attracting significant support from both within and without the new intellectual groups. And none of the parties could be classified as a mass party. In order to achieve this end what was called for was a means to surmount the ideological parochialism that characterized these parties and at the same time to attract the attention and support of the politically aware but non-participant section of the population.
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In the final period of relative freedom, 1950-1953, there did finally emerge a political party or political movement which met both of these requirements. This was the National Front which formed around the leadership of Dr. MohammadMossadeq. Prior to 1951 the National Front was indeed a front or coalition. Of the parties described above only the Tudeh and the Fedayan Islam were not included. In addition the National Front incorporated a number of glorified dowrehs which were formed around some of Iran's leading political personalities, and also incorporated entire guilds. Whether the National Front after 1951 is defined as a party, a movement or a front is of little The individual significance. parties maintained their identities within the National Front but lost much of their freedom of action. This loss of freedom was best demonstrated when in 1953 both Dr. Baqai and Ayatollah Kashani sought to take their parties out of the National Front. Both were confronted immediately with massive defections. The intellectual wing of Toilers split off to form the Third Force Party. Almost all of the loosely aligned religious leaders who had cooperated with Kashani broke away from any association with the Warriors of Islam as did guild leaders. In both cases only those individuals personally beholden to Baqai or Kashani remained. In the eyes of most of the National Front Baqai and Kashani had committed treason. The National Front continued to be regarded as a coalition by its leaders but it had demonstrated an ability to discipline even its most outstanding lieutenants. The National Front succeeded in surmounting the ideological parochialism of the previous period by focusing the attention of all participants on the one task regarding which there was general consensus, i.e., the destruction of the British-Iranian oligarchy alliance which was perceived to be denying Iran independence and progress. But even more than this, the National Front had in Dr. Mossadeq a charismatic leader who quickly came to personify and symbolize the Iranian search for national dignity. Very quickly a general consensus developed around the conclusion that Dr. Mossadeq was a leader who could be trusted. Those who broke with him soon found their very patriotism questioned. Dr. Mossadeq also proved to be the answer to the problem of transforming the politically aware but inert mass into active participants. Other political leaders had understood that in the early stages of political awareness a people is particularly prone to indentify with and to seek satisfaction for its frustrations in the leadership of a great personality. Qavam, Baqai, and Kashani each offered himself for this role. But only
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The 1950-1953 period magic appeal. Dr. Mossadeq had the requisite was one in which there was a rapid extension downward into the awareness and an even more rapid expansion population of political Dr. Mossadeq and the of the percentage of political participants. National Front thus can be seen as primary agents of political and the norms that those moving into the political socialization, democratic norms. It is no stream accepted included liberal accident that the man who gave leadership to the National Front and who became Iran's first really popular leader should have In 1951 a potentially popular national democracy. espoused liberal leader needed the support first of all of the new intellectuals,and leader could at that time have it is doubtful that an authoritarian attracted broad support from that group. Obviously a great many an acceptance more than three years would be required to inculcate governmental process in a people which of the liberal-democratic But in this three-year had long acquiesced in authoritarianism. period a great many uncomprehending people accepted the liberaldemocratic process simply because it was part of the political elite they believed normative system of a leader and a political from in. It is one of the ironies of this age that intervention West cut short this experiment. the liberal-democratic depenas personality The National Front can be classified the new intellecdent; leadership recruited from the oligarchy, from the rank and file recruited tuals and the middle-class; broad; and aware; ideologically entire spectrum of politically (until the summer of 1953,when confronted with non-authoritarian a serious challenge from the right, it turned sharply in the authoritarian direction). party development can be viewed in Thus Iranian political three stages, each related to the percentage of politically which the percentage of politically aware. In the first stage,in aware was very low, parties were mere outgrowths of traditional more structured and with an slightly oligarchical patterns, and liberal ideology focusing broadly on nationalism explicit in a power position, although briefly These parties, democracy. process than political of the traditional were more disruptive They did, process. a modern political capable of substituting serve in the 1906-1908 and again in 1919-1921 periods, especially But they did not as agents of rapid political mobilization. produce the kind of leadership capable of performing a tutelary role. When a tutelary leader did appear in Reza Shah, he operated outside the party structure. revived. With Reza Shah's abdication in 1941 party activity aware was At this stage, in which the percentage of politically
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probably approachiag the ten percent mark, the outstanding of the duccessful parties was the narrow ideochaLacteristic to attract the support of the mobilizable logical appeal utilized element. new intellectual The third stage, lasting only from 1950-1953, was one in the participation of was able to enlist which party activity Evidence such aware population. the entire politically virtually inert as the continued memory of Dr. Mossadeq among politically peasants suggests that this period was indeed one of rapid mobilization.6 political for There is no thought here of suggesting an inevitability Iran's developmental process has these stages of development. alone been a unique one. The variable of foreign intervention was in part responsible Foreign intervention makes this obvious. revolution of 1906 and of for the success of the constitutional its failure in 1912, for the coup d'etat of 1921 which was the first step in Reza Shah's rise to power, for the abdication of Reza Shah, and for the overthrow of Dr. Mossadeq. Furthermore the success of the National Front was dependent on the single national the entire around which virtually issue of anti-imperialism But at the same time each aware populace could rally. politically of these stages mirrored the extent and profile of political awareness in the country. has been conducted Since 1953 Iranian political party activity There was an effort on two levels, and semi-clandestine. official loyal to the regime, in the late 1950's to superimpose two parties, Now an official, frankly on the polity; but the attempt failed. party But the really significant exists. authoritarian,party is underground. Should the present regime be replaced by activity there is little one permitting once again free party activity, of much resemblance to the party activity reason to anticipate Since that time a great many more Iranians have become 1953. The modal participants. aware and are potential politically party type of the future would surely be one capable of recruiting rank and file support from this very large newly awakened population.
IRANIANSTUDIES
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Footnotes and more condensed version of this 1An earlier presented at a Seminar on "Problems of Contemporary sponsored by the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, and the Iranian Students Association in University, States, April 16-17, 1965.
paper was Iran," Harvard the United
for Iran than in the This point has no better illustration that the sophisticated and complex suggestion of Thomas Schelling Thomas Dr. MohammadMossadeq might respond to child psychology. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York, 1963) p. 13. in Developing 3Fred W. Riggs, Administration The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston, 1964).
Countries:
4It is one of the ironies of American social science studies of developing states that this very common phenomenon is so Since the perceptual frame of the frequently understressed. color to some extent the view of another analyst will inevitably of liberal political culture, an exaggeration of the attraction Instead, the democratic values might reasonably be expected. But this underestimation of liberalopposite appears to be true. democratic attachments may well best be explained as a consequence from a determining perception of perceptual distortion resulting the Even with optimal success, of American national interest. liberal-democratic elite in the early stages of development can And the avoidance of instability achieve only tenuous stability. in developing states which have the misfortune of being on the Sino-Soviet littoral is generally assumed to be in the American interest. American policy makers seem to prefer an authoritarian regime which can maintain at least a comforting surface stability in such areas to the democratic regime whose surface appearance The downgrading of liberal democratic will frequently be chaotic. of a attachments may therefore be in large part a rationalizing In Iran it amounted to a self-fulfilling national policy stance. prophecy. 5See N. Marbery Efimenco, "An Experiment with Civilian Dictatorship in Iran: The Case of MohammadMossadeq, "Journal of Politics, August 1955, p. 396. 6This point was made at the Harvard Conference on Iran, of his paper April 1965 by Hossein Mahdavy during the discussion He reported that in the course of "Iran's Agrarian Problems". the Iranian survey team had making a survey of thirty villages found universal withl the name of Dr. Mossadeq. familiarity SUMMER1968
NOTES ON THE SAFAVID STATE
Roger
Savory
if a language does not have a word It is axiomatic that, does not exist for a given concept, that particular concept for the people who speak that language. We must therefore begin consideration of the evolution of the Safavid state by making the of the state the concept negative statement that, for the 5afavids in any Western sense did not exist. As Minorsky has said: "it is a moot question how the idea of the State, if ever distinctly was expressed in Safavid realized, The term dawlat, terminology." used in an abstract was sometimes meaning "bliss, felicity", way to denote the aura of beneficence which surrounded ruler the just and sheltered his subjects. of the Thus the principal officers Safavid state were termed arkan-i that is, the pillars dawlat, which supported this So too, especially from the regal canopy. time of shSh cAbbas I onwards, the vazIlr was entitled ictimad that is, its trusty or prop. al-dawla, support During the
Roger Savory is Associate Studies at the University *This is article State."
a brief by the
IA
Chairman of of Toronto.
the
Department
version of a more comprehensAve, author entitled "The Development
96
of
Islamic
unpublished of the Safavid
in the nearest equivalent state, of the Safavid period formative the "divinely-protected mahrusa, sense was mamalik-i a concrete towards the end of the that, There is some evidence dominions." into a was crystallizing the idea of 'the State' period, Safavid a chronicle for example, The namici Mifidi, form. more concrete during the reign of Shah Sulayman uses in 1090/1679-80 completed mamllkat-i Tran and Mansab-i as: such phrases !adnrat-i man*ab-i that the It is more likely Tran. Caztm al-sha'n-i sadarat-i along Ithna cAsharT Shicism, religion, of the national evolution in the period and the emergence lines, doctrinal more ridigly or of mujtahids, class following CAbb5s the Great of a poweful for responsible were largely theologians, ShIci high-ranking as they interesting allusions, Such stray this development. the Although picture. the overall alter are, do not materially they were very of the state, concept had no very clear Uafavids therebegin, of the ruler. certain about the position JI shall of the shah, and by examining the position by considering fere, and with the people. with his officials his relations structure. The shah was the apex of the whole administrative of the godemanation He was the living His rule was absolute. and men were consequently head, the Shadow of God upon earth, or unjust. his commands be just to obey him whether required by God was in appointed The idea that the ruler was directly of absolutism, to give his rule the character sufficient itself that namely, theory, by another reinforced but it was powerfully of the Hidden Imam, the the Uafavid shah was the representative The basis in 260/873-4. from the earth Mahd1, who disappeared to be directly theory was the claim of the Uafavids of this As the descended from the 7th ShicT Imam, Miisa al-Ka;im. to the shah was closer of the Mahdt, the Safavid representative Truth than were other men, and consequently source of absolute to the led inevitably This theory to him was a sin. opposition of the Since the conduct of kingly infallibility. assumption with the conduct which proved to be incompatible shAh frequently of the representative one might expect from a pure and immaculate this particular to resist Culama attempted Hidden Imam, certain the throne that ideally and asserted rulers, claim of the Safavid (mujtahid-i mujtahid' should be in the hands of an 'immaculate the view and certainly The prevalent view, however, macsUm). was that the imperfections themselves, by the Safavids fostered his authority as the lieutenant did not invalidate of the ruler the successor of the Imams, of the Prophet, of God, the vicar As of the Hidden Imam during his absence. and the representative of the to the Ehah the universal government there belonged such, and temporal. both spiritual world,
97
SUMMER1968
the absolute All Western observers are unanimous in asserting nature of the $afavid monarchy, and it is worth while to dwell on this because the other side of the coin presents an appearance I refer, of course, to which is, at first sight, paradoxical. freedom and personal security the high degree of individual It may be well at this point to obtaining under aafavid rule. insert a caveat against applying ideas derived from the study of It might be of $afavid Iran. European history to the complexities given the absolute nature of the power of supposed, for instance, the Safavid rulers, that the position of the Persian peasant was analagous to that of the French peasant under the majority of the Bourbons, or of the Russian muzhik under the Romanovs. Nothing could be further from the truth, and any such superficial to take into account the social, comparison would fail entirely or Iran. As William and ethnic diversity geographic, political H. Hallman has shrewdly remarked, prior to the nineteenth century government in Persia consisted of "unlimited power balanced by or of "fleeing" from right of rebellion", the unrestricted of these It was precisely because of the existence authority. system of government checks and balances that the traditional worked in Safavid times. insight The Huguenot jeweller Chardin, to whose penetrating we owe much of our understanding of the Uafavid administrative system, considered that the power of the Safavid shlhs was even "le He writes: more absolute than that of the Ottoman sultans. Gouvernement de Perse est monarchique, despotique et absolu, etant tout entier dans la main d'un seul homme, qui est le chef il n'y que pour le temporel.. souverain, tant pour le spirituel, a assurement aucun souverain au monde si absolu que le roi de This opinion carries the greater weight because it was Perse." held by a contermporary of Louis XIV, to whom it was said: "Sire, the place where Your Majesty is seated represents for us the throne of the living God." The judgement of Malcolm, who wrote his History nearly a century after the fall of the Uafavids, is also of the greatest value, because, like Chardin, he attempted to view the Safavid system of government as a whole., and "to see "The word He says: and explain how all things worked together." of the King of Persia has ever been deemed a law; and he has imposed upon the free probably never had any further restraint exercise of his vast authority than what has arisen from his his respect for established usages, his regard for religion, and his fear of exciting an opposition that desire of reputation, might be dangerous to his power or to his life."
IRANIANSTUDIES
98
If the apex of the pyramid of power was the shfh, its base was the commonpeople - the peasants in the rural areas, and the shopkeepers and small merchants in the cities. Yet artisans, as we have already hinted, the absolute nature of paradoxically, shih's authority was not a threat to, but rather a guarantee of, the individual freedmon and security of the lower classes of In the same way, Louis XIV was very conscious that he society. was the one man who could protect the ordinary peasant or householder from oppression and injustice. who Marxist historians deplore the existence of despotic power in Persia per se thus miss the fundamental point, namely, that the arbitrary use of this power was rarely, if ever, directed at the lower classes of society. In a recent work, one writer for instance deprecates the existence of a society in which the ruler could execute a subject "merely to test the keenness of his sword." Admittedly he is talking about the 12th century, a period not noted for its political stability. In Uafavid times, however, the victim of such arbitrary action on the part of the shlh always belonged to a class the elimination of which should surely be applauded by a Marxist historian; he would also certainly be a member of the nobility, an official guilty of oppressing the people, or a court functionary. The only occasions on which ordinary persons were executed in the presence of the shAh were those on which cases which had already been tried in the lower courts were submitted to the shah as the highest magistrate in the land and the ultimate court of appeal in cases governed by Curf or common law. As Malcolm justly observes: "this summary the execution of those whose appeal to the shAi proceeding (i.e., was rejected), added to the mode of execution, which is generally in his presence, and is always inflicted by executioners who attend his person, often give a character of barbarous tyranny to acts of the most exemplary justice." It was the persons who stood between the shah and the mass of his people - the nobility, the court fuctionaries, and the serried ranks of officials, both civil and military, lay and ecclesiastic, who made up the complex Safavid administrative system, on whom the shah's anger might be vented without warning, and who stood in constant fear of their lives. Anyone who held office in the state was considered to be the slave of the shah; his property, his life, and the lives of his children, were at the disposal of the shah, who held the absolute power of loosing and binding. Malcolm states the advantage of this system succinctly: if the shah is not feared, he says, "the nation suffers a great increase of misery under a multitude of tyrants." Louis XIV expresses the sentiment in his Memoirs: "nothing can so securely establish the happiness and tranquility of a country as the prefect combination of all authority in the single person of the Sovereign;" otherwise, he says, 99
1968 SUMNER
the country groans "under the oppressive tyrants."
lash of a thousand
Chardin declares emphatically that outside the court, there was no arbitrary exercise of power by the shih. Both Chardin and Malcolm assert that the awe in which the shlh was held by the Court and the nobility was the primary reason for the relative security and freedom from oppression enjoyed by the lower classes. "C'est autant en Perse, qu'en aucun autre pays du monde, que la condition des Grands eat la plus exposee, et celle dont le sort est le plus incertain, et souvent le plus funeste; comme au contraire, la condition du Peuple y est beaucoup plus assuree, et plus douce, qu'en divers Etats Chretiens." Chardin's words are echoed by Malcolm: "No small proportion of that security which the rest of the community enjoy, may be referred to the danger in which those near to the king continually stand; for, unless he be very weak or very unjust, it is hazardous for any of his ministers, or courtiers, to commit violence of injustice in his name." Malcolm goes on: "What we reflect on the which the habits of the Persian monarch afford to his facility subjects of preferring complaints, and that policy which directs to them, we must be satisfied attention that, in a rude and half-civilized community, the exercise of the absolute power of the sovereign over those to whom he delegates his authority, is essential to preserve the people, at large, from the oppression and rapacity of petty rulers. Though a great proportion of the Kings of Persia may be deemed capricious, cruel and unjust, we find very few examples in the history of that country of their exercising their absolute prerogative, except over those whom usage, and the condition of the state they govern, have placed at their disposal" (my italics). In the above passage Malcolm has exposed, with his usual astuteness, one of the bases of the Persian system of government, namely the subject's traditional right of appeal to the shAh This ancient right was at once a without let or hindrance. source of strength to the monarchy and a safeguard for the people As Malcolm says: against bureaucratic oppression. "The principal check upon the conduct of subordinate governors is an appeal to the throne, which those whom they oppress can always in Persia from make, as no person can prevent an individual and when he reaches court, he is certain of seeking that relief; attention". This tradition was still followed in Qijir times. Malcolm tells the story of a British sergeant, in the employ of the Persian government, whose pay was withheld by a certain from the official official. Failing to obtain satisfaction
IRANIANSTUDIES
100
to the shhi. The shah's concerned, the sergeant appealed directly comments Malcolm considered this to be a perfectly ministers, normal and proper procedure. This jealously guarded right of appeal to the sovereign was one of the reasons why, in a despotic system, the ordinary individual enjoyed a surprising degree of freedom from tyranny. Another important reason was the zeal of the rulers to keep themWe selves informed of the condition of their meanest subjects. are all familiar with the stories of how the cAbbasid Caliph, used to disguise himself and tour the streets Harun al-Rashid, and markets of Baghdad with his faithful vaztr, JaCfar the Barmecide, in order to assure himself of the well-being of the people and to detect instances of oppression on the part of his In much the same way, we are told, the Uafavid shahs officials. used to frequent, incoxnito, the coffee-houses and tea-houses of The Persian kings took their administrative Isfahan. duties and did not hold themselves aloof from their subjects. seriously, Malcolm asserts that, "there is no country in which the monarch has more personal duties than in Persia... When in camp, his habits of occupation are the same as in the capital: and we may pronounce, that he is from six to seven hours every day in public, during which time he is not only seen by, but accessible to, a It is impossible that a great number of persons of all ranks. monarch, whom custom requires to mix so much with his subjects, can be ignorant of their condition: and this knowledge must, unless his character be very perverse1 tend to promote their happiness" (my italics). This custom was one of the factors which militated against the development of anything analagous to the Japanese cult of emperor-worship, although the first Safavid shahs were worshipped as quasi-divine persons. The Venetian ambassador Vincentio d'Allessandri noted in 1571 that "the reverence and love of the people for the king... .are incredible, as they worship him not as a king, but as a god."
101
SUMMR1968
Bibliography
Books
and monographs:
Bellan,
L.L.,
Chah CAbbas I,
Paris
1932.
Busse,
H., UIntersuchungen Cario 1959.
Hinz,
W., Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im funfzehnten Jahrhundert, Berlin and Leipzig 1936.
zum Islamischen
Kanzleiwesen,
Lockhart, L., The Fall of the Safavi Dnasty Afghan OccuRation of Persia, Cambridge Malcolm,
Sir
J.,
History
of Persia,
London 1815.
Minorsky, V., Tadhkirat al-Mululk, translated London 1943. explained by V. Minorsky, Savory, of Savory,
and the 1958.
and
in Cambridge R.M., The Safavids in Persia, Islam, Part VI, Chapter 2 9in press).
History
in R.M., The Safavid Administrative System, of Iran, Vol. VI (in press). Cambridge History
Articles: Roemer, H.R., "Die Safawiden. Ein orientalisher Bundesgenosse des Abendlandes im Turkenkampf", in Saeculum 4 (1953), pp. 27-44. Savory, R.M., "The Principal Offices of the Safawid State during the reign of Ismacil I (907-30/ 1501-24)", in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. XXIII, Part I, 1960, pp. Savory,
91-105.
of the Safawid Offices R.M., "The Principal during the reign of Tahm1sp I (930-84/1524-76)t" in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Vol. XXIV, part 1, 1961, pp. 65-85. Studies,
IRANIAN STUDIES
102
Bibliography
2
Savory,
R.M., "The Significance of the Political Murder of MIrza Salmin", in Islamic Studies, Journal of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi, Vol. III, no. 2, 1964, pp. 181-191.
Savory,
R.M., "The Office of KhalIfat al-Khulafi under Safawids", in Journal of the American Oriental Vol. 85, no. 4, October-December 1965, Society, pp. 497-502.
des Safavides", in Melan,ges Togan, Z.V., "Sur l'Origine Louis Massiknon, Vol. III, Damascus 1957, pp. 345-357. L.
Travel Literature The European travel literature relating to the Safavid period is immensely rich and important. For particulars of the most valuable works, see Minorsky, V., Tadhkirat al-Muluik, pp. 6-9. See also the following: Travels to Tana and Persia, and A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia in the 15th and 16th Centuries, published by the Hakluyt Society, London 1873.
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SUMKER1968
CITY HISTORIES IN MEDIEVAL IRAN
Richard W. Bulliet
The object of this article is to open up to speculation a historiographical problem which the serious student of Iranian urban history necessarily encounters. This is the problem of the motivation of the authors of medieval urban histories. In studying any single work or city, it may be possible to work around the problem; but as soon as a broader approach is and numerous works, it attempted, encompassing several cities looms as a major obstacle. The root of the problem is essentially the very richness and volum of medieval urban historical writing itself, for that is what makes the comparative study of Iranian cities potentially so rewarding. There is hardly a single major city in the Persian speaking world that has not been the subject of at least one local history. Many of these works are extant, published or unpublished; but many, many more that at one time existed have disappeared. A complete list of these local histories has not, to my knowledge, been compiled; but if it were to be, it would be very long indeed. Given the richness of this genre of literature. it is not lies. That is beimmediately apparent wherein the difficulty cause the impression one gets at first glance is that of a genuine "genre" of historical writing, comparable to the chronicle In fact, this is not the case at all. or the biography. Neither is it the case, however, that each of these works follows its own pattern and is totally unlike any other. Actually, there seem to be at least two distinct genres of local history; and these two are often to varying degrees interwoven or linked to other genres of historical writing. These two genres are the local biographical dictionary or tabapit and what might be considered local political history. Richard W. Bulliet
IRANIANSTUDIES
is Instructor
in History
104
at Harvard University.
The first genre, the local biographical is dictionary, seen as a subdivision of the larger genre of conventionally dictionaires biographical This larger genre has been per se. penetratingly discussed by H.A.R. Gibb. He states that: Thus it is clear that the conception that underlies the oldest biographical dictionaries is that the history of the Islamic Community is essentially the contribution of individual men and women to the building up and transmission of its specific culture; that it is these persons (rather than the political governors) who represent or reflect the active forces in Muslim society in their respective spheres; and that their individual contributions are worthy of being recorded for future generations.
And he elaborates
1
further:
Since the earliest organized disciplines in Islam were the religious and legal disciplines of hadIthstudy, the earliest works are oriented biographical towards meeting their requirements both in general works and in the 'histories' of particular cities and provinces .2 This is an excellent analysis of the philosophy of history underlying the general approach of the compiler of biographical dictionaires, but it does not adequately explain the phenomenon of strictly local biographical dictionaries. There are too many aspects of these works which do not really fit into this analysis. The first seeming inconsistency is the regular appearance in these works of an introduction containing usually a few phrases in praise of the city attributed to Muhammad,Ali, or other eminent earlyl4uslims; one or more accounts of the origin of the city; an accoumt of its conquest by the Muslims; and a more or less extensive list of its mosques, shrines, waterways, quarters, and so forth. This sort of introduction can be found in such biographical dictionaries as the histories of Nishapur, Jurjan, Balkh, and Isfahan. It is also noteworthy that in cases where there have been later biographical compilations written as continuations of the original work, these continuations do not include separate introductions but only the biographical entries.
105
SUMMER 1968
A second inconsistency, which reflects certain of the interests implied by the contents of the introduction, is the regular appearance in the individual biographies of place-names in contexts which would surely be of little interest to the student of iadith. Nor are these place-names easily explained by other reasons. Some of them, to be sure, elucidate the nisba of the person being discussed. For example, a man named al-Utri will be described as living in the quarter of UTra in Nishapur. Also, one might desire to know what cemetery a man is buried in for purposes of making a pilgrimage to his tomb; and for purposes of verifying chains of authority of badith one might find it useful to know what particular institution the man taught in. But it is difficult indeed to determine why in normally spare biographies the compiler chooses to record where the subject's funeral took place or where his house or shop was located in relation to other localities. And it is even more difficult to explain why, within the framework outlined by Gibb, an epitomiser such as the man who condensed the original multivolume history of Nishapur by al-Vikim al-NaisibUri to some one hundred and fifty pages should choose to retain virtually nothing of the original te-xt in addition to the man's name except where he lived. Even the dates of death, which are of such vital importance to the student of badith, are deleted from the vast majority of the biographies. One final inconsistency, although others might be added to is the not infrequent the list, inclusion of biographies of people who appear to have no scholarly standing and who seem to be extremely One unlikely of hadith. sources for the transmission cannot be absolutely did not transmit certain that any individual badith, of course, but in such cases as a postmaster noted for drunkeness and lascivious conduct it seem unlikely. In short, it seems that although the tabaglt format was very widely used by local historians, the impetus for writing these biographical dictionaries handbooks was not primarily to provide for badIth scholars. No more was it to record the contributions of individual men and women to the history of the Islamic Community. The emphasis on genuinely local interests and places is unmistakable. The question is not why the writers of biographical dictionaries them confined to small areas chose to call - a question histories implied by Gibb's use of quotation marks but rather why the writers chose to cast them histories of local in this format which seems to Western readers to be so uncongenial to the purposes of the local historian.
IRANIANSTUDIES
106
The second genre of local historical writing is represented in extant works by such works as Ta'rlkh-i Baihaq_, Raudit fl Aweif Mandinat Harat, Ta'rtkh-i Qum, and Ta'rlkh-i al-Jannlt Ruyln. To Western readers, works in this category seem to merit the title "history" much more than the biographical dictionaries. They share many characteristics with the biographical dictionnumber of naries, including in mary cases a substantial is quite different. biographical notices; but the overall effect these Like the introductions to the biographical dictionaires, works typically contain more or less lengthy discussions of geographical features and points of interest. But in addition they include accounts of the various dynasties that have ruled the city and of the various important families in the city. The chronological historical which with the tabaqit introinterest, ductions
generally
stops
with
the
Muslim
conquest,
is
continued
in these works up to the time of the author. Furthermore, the entire structure of the biographical portions of these works is different. Where the biographical dictionaries may have several thousand biographies simply listed in alphabetical order and subdivided, if at all, into rather broad chronological groups; these works typically group the biographies by family. Complete genealogies of the important families of the city are given along with various anecdotes and mention of any intermarriage with other important families. Precisely the same information can be retrieved from the biographical dictionaries; genealogical tables can be reconstructed that are sometimes more complete and accurate than those that are virtually ready-made in these political histories. But this can be done only at the expense of a tremendous amount of time and effort. There is no need to go further into the various differences between these two genres of local history, because the variations on these two themes are many, and the borderline between them sometimes become rather thin. In the Fadi'il Balkh, for example, the entire structure of the work is along the lines of the biographical dictionary format, but only seventy or so biographies are included in the entire work, which is of sufficient length to include over a thousand of the usual cursory biographies expected in this format. The important point here is simply that these two distinct genres of historical literature existed side by side for several centuries and that the difference between them is not so much in the categories of information deemed worthy of recording but rather in the entire approach to the notion of local history.
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SUMMER 1968
in this to the problem posed initially Thus, we return article, that of the motivation of the authors of Iranian urban of the two discussion of the nature histories. The preceding way of however, suggests a plausible genres of local history, the problem. As the problem now stands, the essential approaching to write question is no longer what prompted any individual local a local history to write history, but what prompted any individual This may seem than of the secoAd type. of the first type rather see, that to be evading question, but, as we shall the initial is not entirely the case. it would be best question however, Before going into this to deal with the first and most obvious answer that comes to mind, that the were so distinct namely, that the two traditions aware of the alternative individual authors were not completely of this works. The best rebuttal approach when they began their argument is the case of Ibn Funduq, the author of Ta'rlkh-i of that work, which is of the Baihag. For in the introduction the he says that he used as a source political history genre, which is a prime example of the Ta'rlkh-i of al-4lakim, Naisabur he himself composed genre. Furthermore, biographical dictionary a biographical which demonstrates of philosophers, dictionary that he was fully of working in the other format. capable The answer to the question posed above that we are authors chose one or the other suggesting here is that individual own status and depending on what their genre of local history in what is reflected was within the city. Basically, allegiance but is a phenomenon which runs throughout this Islamic history, which was in many ways particularly in Iran during accentuated times the medieval of Sasanid structure period when the social in the was still This is the cleavage strongly influential. and notability between the religious power structure of society the secular and the 'umara'. between the Culaml, notability, The emphasis and dynastic on political in Western scholarship binding history, combined with the theory of the caliphate, the together, led to underestimating religion and the state of units But looking at the history importance of this cleavage. this viewto revise or states, one is forced smaller than empires This is not to say that the company of educated religious point. and officials is always or necessarily antagonistic scholars and trading toward and divorced from the great landholding links are This is far from being the case. Marriage families. not infrequent between Moreover, cooperation the two groups. often when the city as a between the two groups occurred quite the medium of religious or through parties, whole was threatened
IRANIAN STUDIES
108
in which one often called by the names of the law schools, of religious and secular notables would vie for power coalition with an opposing coalition. Yet, it seems clear that each identified or the individual primarily with either the religious secular group and not simply with the upper class as a whole. For present purposes, the importance of this cleavage is that it was felt to be a dynamic and competitive one, if not an each group believed that the antagnoistic one. Essentially, and there history of the city was the same as its own history; was enough distribution of real power in the community to lend substance to both beliefs. Thus, when any individual undertook the writing of a local history, his choice of format was to the religious governed primarily by his allegiance notability or the secular notability. If the former, then he felt that the the history of the history of the community was basically scholars and their patrons who had been born, studied, religious or visited in the city; political history was of interest only up to the advent of Islam in that locality. Thus, taking his cue from the religious discussed ultimately biographical dictionaries by Gibb, he composed a labaqjt of these men. If, on the other hand, his allegiance was to the secular notability, he felt that the history of his community was the history of the great families that ruled it, from the ruling dynasties on top to the local landholding families on the botton. His emphasis was on blood lines and signs of power rather than on education and signs of religious Instead of taking a family and discussing its individual prestige. members as he ran across them in alphabetical order, he emphasized the blood line and continuity of family tradition by treating them all in one place. Thus, he chose the second genre of local history. Whether this explanation of the nature of the two genres is valid can only be ascertained by specific examination of the of a number of authors of local histories biographies in terms of the social cleavage discussed above. Even if it is not the entire answer, however, it is at least suggestive of a line of approach to be taken toward this type of historical document. It suggests that local histories must always be read with the thought in mind that the author of the history had a very definite conception of what history was and that his work is therefore biased in very specific ways. And for the person attempting to deal with these works on a comparative basis, this is a very important consideration to keep in mind. FOOTNOTES 1. 2.
H.A.R. Gibb, "Islamic Biographical Literature," the Middle East, ed. B. Lewis and P.M. Holt, p. 54. Ibid., p. 55. 109
Historians of London, 1962, SUMMER1968
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM-EXPORTING COUNTRIES
All
M.S.
Fatemi
In this study the contribution of petroleum revenues, as a source of capital formation, for the economic development of the exporting countries is considered. the question of Initally, of capital significance as a necessary factor for economic is investigated. The overall is development rate of development affected and limited of productive greatly by shortage factors, and among the scarce with underdevelopment factors associated capital is a very important one. However, the effectiveness of capital itself is limited by the absorptive capacity of the The availability of noncapital factors and their given economy. relative elasticities not only determine the rate of development but generally in the short run set a limit to the amount of capital which can efficiently be invested. For the purpose of this study the assumption is that absorptive in some capacity of the petroleum exporting countries is not the limiting factor to economic development. In an underdeveloped economy due to a very low level of income both average and marginal propensity to consume are very high. Domestic capital formation can hardly take place under such conditions. Even if domestic could be secured an underdeveloped still faces savings country another major problem in its development effort. Since lack of most underof capital goods industries is a common feature and equipment developed countries, they need to import machinery is a and for this foreign (and technical know-how), exchange necessity. Most petroleum-exporting countries have been spared this problem. This is due to the fact that their substantial the . oil revenues are paid in hard currencies. However, not in itself of capital and foreign availability exchange will of lead to economic An examination of the question development. how these can place the economy of these nations on a revenues Ali M.S. University
Fatemi is Associate of Akron, Ohio.
Professor
of
Eqonomics
at the
*This is a summary of a study originally undertaken as a doctoral dissertation. It has been subsequently expanded to be published as a book. The empirical of the study are based on aspects and financial economic data from Iran and Venezuela. IRANIAN STUDIES
110
self-sustained growth path in the long run is investigated through further analysis of two specific questions: 1.
How can the producing or exporting countries best optimize and stabilize their export proceeds? Is the ultimate answer? nationalization
2.
Since sustained or self-perpetuating growth requires a high level of domestic savings, in what manner can these temporary revenues from a wasting-asset facilitate structural changes necessary to raise the domestic savings coefficient?
The first question is considered in the light of the oligopolistic nature of the international petroleum market and its significance for the exporting countries. Prices of crude oil in the Middle East are "posted" or published by the major oil companies. However, not much trade with independent compaines is conducted at these posted prices. There is for the most part a discount either in cash or in more favorable tanker rates. But posted prices are used in intra-company and inter-company transactions --dealing with affiliates. Since 90 percent of the trade is done with the affiliates posted prices become important. The exporting countries of the Middle East feel that posted prices are too low, making it possible for the oil companies to benefit from high profits in transport, refining and marketing which all take place outside of the exporting country and thus are not subject to its income tax. The oil companies and some of the consuming nations have held the opposite view. Profits in the Middle East crude production are very high and costs are remarkably low. As far as the sharing of the economic rent is concerned there seems to be no special economic rationale for 50/50 profit-sharing agreements. Therefore, it seems possible for the exporting countries to demand and receive a higher share of profits when it is economically justified. Also since the exporting countries have been constantly faced with deteriorating terms of trade, it should be possible for them to bring about some price stability through internationally joint production policies. Through international agreements such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) such joint actions are made possible. As far as nationalization is concerned, though as a long run solution it does have certain advantages, but as an immediate solution to the problem of exporting countries it poses many problems.
111
SUMMER 1968
The second major question raised in this study is concerned with the effect of oil revenues on the domestic savings coefficient. Revenues from petroleum exports must facilitate an increase in the coefficient of domestic savings to such a level that self-sustained growth becomes possible. Petroleum export. revenues make such a progressive rise in the savings coefficient possible without the necessity and hardship of further reductions of current consumption. However, it will be necessary to restrict the marginal propensity to consume. This will allow both additional consumption and additional savings and will raise the savings coefficient. If this is not accomplished and the propensity to save remains at the same level. the flow of petroleum export receipts must continue indefinitely in order to maintain the desired rate of growth. In relation to this question an aggregate theoretical model is postulated and some of the computer results of various simulations have followed the analytical solution of the model. listed
In brief the main conclusions reached in this in the following paragraphs.
study can be
Revenues from petroleum exports can contribute to the long-run development of the exporting countries only if they succeed in modifying one of the most important structural parameters - the savings coefficient. In that sense these revenues
can serve
as the necessary
low-income equilibrium exporting
feature
shock
for
altering
of the underdeveloped
the
petroleum
countries.
Stability of petroleum prices and the volume of revenues are necessary prerequisites and major contributions to raising the low savings coefficient. Determination and enforcement of a relatively high marginal savings ratio is dependent upon these factors. Commoninterest of the exporting countries will be best served if they maintain a common front. Through joint action in an organization such as OPECthey are better able to safeguard their interests. Nationalization as a short run solution may not serve the purpose of exporting countries mainly because international markets are controlled by the major oil companies. Therefore even after nationalization the exporting countries will still have to deal with the major international oil companies as oligopsonists. If nationalization is envisaged as a long run solution, the exporting countries must concentrate on finding their own independent routes to the market. IRANIANSTUDIES
112
TWO SHORT STORIES BY SADEQ CHUBAK
JUSTICE Translated
by John
Limbert
A carriage into a broad ditch horse had fallen and its foreIt was absolutely obvious leg and kneecap were smashed. that the where blood oozed long bone of one of Its legs had been dislocated from under the reddish-brown skin. The kneecap of another leg was torn completely loose from its cartilege and was joined only to a few strands and sinews that had not given up their faith at the last. The hoof of one leg--the one with the broken long bone--had turned out, and one could see the polished shoe The water in the ditch was frozen--only attached by three nails. the horse's own body heat melted the Ice around it. Its whole body had fallen into dirty, bloody water. It took short breaths one after the other; the wings of its nostrils opened and shut. It had stuck half its tongue out from betweeni its locked teeth. Bloody foam appeared around its mouth. Its mane had fallen sadly over its forehead. Two street cleaners and an itinerant workman, wearing fatigues without any insignia and a service cap without a sun visor, were trying to get it out of the dltch. One of the with henna, said: a leg and we'll stand the can't spring up all at and I'll let go legs That leg's on two legs and
street cleaners, whose hand was dyed bright red "I'll get his tail and each one of you'll get him up together. hoist Then when the beast pain and can't put his legs on the ground, he'll once. Then you let go of his legs real quick his tail. He should be able to stand on three not broken very much. hIow can a chi cken stand this not stand on three?"
A gentlemen wearing case under his arm said, animal this way? You've whole body and put I t on
and with colored sunglasses to "So it's really possible lift got to get some people, the sidewalk."
John Limbert Is a P'hi.D). candidate Studies at liar-var(d University.
In hlistory
113
a leather out life out its
and Middle
Eastern
SlUMMER1968
an
who was holding a little One of the on-lookers, child's hand, complained: "Enough of this kind of talk! It's not worth a thing Then he to its owner. Should get rid of it with a bullet." turned and said to a seedy, half-dead looking policeman who was at the edge of the sidewalk munching some beet root: "Officer, you have a pistol, why don't you put it out of its misery? The poor beast is really suffering." The policeman, one side of his maw still puffed up with beet-root, answered sarcastically, "Not a chance, honored sir! First of all, the bullet is for thieves, not for horses. Besides, even if we came and just as you commandput it out of its misery--even supposing we forget judgement day and the questions and answers of that world--but tomorrow what do I answer the government? Look, aren't they going to ask a poor bastard like me what he did with the bullet?" A turbaned seyyedl with a worn-out sheepskin on his shoulders "Eh friend, there's nothing wrong with the beast. said: God won't like it if they kill it. Tomorrow it'll be all right. Just give it a little mumiya'i2 . A bystander did it happen?"
with a newspaper who had just
arrived
asked,
"How
A man with a long pipe answered: "By God, I'm not from around here--I'm just passing through. A beet-root seller, his head tilted, answered while peeling beets with a handleless knife for a customer, "Damit, it's nothing' A car hit him and he died. Since this morning he's been in the water and the poor thing's been dying without a sound. No one thinks of it. This Then he shut off his talking and said to a customer, "One " ' rial." Then he yelled, got sugar without coupons! One sir, one rial!"'3 That same man with the newspaper asked, have an owner?"
"Now doesn't
it
A man wearing a chauffeur's leather coat and gloves and with a green scarf wrapped around his neck answered, "How couldn't he have an owner! Is it possible not have an owner? Just his skin is worth fifteen tomans at least. The carriage-man has been 1Seyyed: A descendent of'the prophet Mohamad through his daughter Fatemeh and his son-in-law Ali. A green turban is the 2 sign of their status. Mumiya'i: A kind of mineral asphalt which is placed on broken 3 bones to aid healing. During World War II sugar was rationed in Iran--thus this man is selling black market sugar. A sir is about 75 grams. IRANIANSTUDIES
114
here he'll
just till be right
now and he's back."
gone
to put
the
carriage
away--then
boy whose hand was held by that man raised The little take his What did the driver "Daddy dear: head and asked, his horse die?" Didn't away with? carriage A well-dressed inj ured?"
man with
glasses
asked,
"Are only
its
his
legs
with a green like a chauffeur The same big man dressed said its ribs are "The driver around his neck answered, scarf smashed too." Irregular Steam horse. ribs under the on its rump. and there the shook violently. free of face, without eyes,
of the of steam came out of the nostrils puffs You could see the body. rose from its entire of mud had dried thickness Five fingers skin. Here were also muddy. Its neck and other places Its whole frame of its body throbbed. flesh but had a peaceful at all, complain It didn't With open horse. face of a healthy pleading--the it watched the people. tears,
THE FLOWERS OF FLESH
Morad stood in the middle of the crowded street; he pulled off his coat and handed it to the old clothes peddlar. By it he had taken off his shoulders both the wright selling of a mass of wool and cotton and the false restraints of society. He felt He moved a kind of freedom he had never known before. his arms a little and they seemed lighter and freer--so he could live a coat. just as well without But the thought of having ten tomans in cash in his watch pocket--the proceeds of the sale--stirred up his anxieties and cravings--anxieties and cravings for filling up on vodka and Neither had touched his lips opium. since yesterday; and how his nerrves were like dried sticks from a day without these He pictured how it would be to stick two doses of delights. 115
SUMMER1968
here he'll
just till be right
now and he's back."
gone
to put
the
carriage
away--then
boy whose hand was held by that man raised The little take his What did the driver "Daddy dear: head and asked, his horse die?" Didn't away with? carriage A well-dressed inj ured?"
man with
glasses
asked,
"Are only
its
his
legs
with a green like a chauffeur The same big man dressed said its ribs are "The driver around his neck answered, scarf smashed too." Irregular Steam horse. ribs under the on its rump. and there the shook violently. free of face, without eyes,
of the of steam came out of the nostrils puffs You could see the body. rose from its entire of mud had dried thickness Five fingers skin. Here were also muddy. Its neck and other places Its whole frame of its body throbbed. flesh but had a peaceful at all, complain It didn't With open horse. face of a healthy pleading--the it watched the people. tears,
THE FLOWERS OF FLESH
Morad stood in the middle of the crowded street; he pulled off his coat and handed it to the old clothes peddlar. By it he had taken off his shoulders both the wright selling of a mass of wool and cotton and the false restraints of society. He felt He moved a kind of freedom he had never known before. his arms a little and they seemed lighter and freer--so he could live a coat. just as well without But the thought of having ten tomans in cash in his watch pocket--the proceeds of the sale--stirred up his anxieties and cravings--anxieties and cravings for filling up on vodka and Neither had touched his lips opium. since yesterday; and how his nerrves were like dried sticks from a day without these He pictured how it would be to stick two doses of delights. 115
SUMMER1968
opium together in the bowl of his first pipe and then to smoke Just from this image he felt a the whole thing at one time. Then he let forth pleasure that soothed his nerves a little. a noisy yawn and his eyes filled with tears; the sound of his the fresh yawn mixed with the street noises and was lost--but remained in and delight of the imaginary opium still softness his system. His existence was made up of Morad had nothing to live for. a handful of moveable bones, a quick mind mixed with a grim pessimism, and an encrusted course of studies that even he himHe changed his mind a thousand times a second, self could not use. his thoughts, ignoring both their order rejoining and alternating This man was a wrong-colored patch stuck on the and conclusions. pants; underneath the seams he had his stinking seat of society's He He didn't live at all like a human being. own existence. enjoyed his own misery as though it was happiness and at the same He time considered torments an inseparable part of his life. He had made himself tiny babies. hated all people--even so that now he felt himself alone even accustomed to loneliness He completely ignored everyone in the most crowded places. around him. Anyone could be who he wanted or do what he wanted; He had built a skin Morad would not see and did not want to. around himself like an egg shell and inside it he twitched. Do But sometimes strong convulsions did touch his spirit. you know when? He noticed his surroundings in spite of himself when he felt a craving and would see that everyone had everything-But suiddenly he would ridicule his own even extra things. move his head from side to indifferently thoughts and listlessly, side like a snake that has just woken up, and would forget everyTo Morad both his own words and those of others were thing. truth, lies and shame, honor, religion, meaningless--disgrace, propriety were all the same for him and, like his breathing, had He was tied to nothing except his own no place in his thoughts. addictions and even these were just temporary--they seemed pointthem. But when less and stupid to him after he had satisfied they appeared he was their slave and he indulged them again and again with fresh greed, appeasing his cravings without considering his previous regret. But right now what could he do to escape the claws of this Jew creditor whose store was on the other side of the street? From a distance he watched the store and saw the Jew perched like All at once an eagle on a four-legged stool in front of it. "What's it to me if this Jew Morad shook and said to himself: collars me int front of these people and wants his son-of-a-bitch
IRANIANSTUDIES
116
two tomans? As if he hadn't already raised hell about it more So if I think a bunch of fools is important than a hundred times. what's the difference between them and me? They don't know there's a man among them just like them--he's got a stomch like them, he wants a woman like them, and he wants about a thousand other things--and they make like they don't notice but every one of them's stored up a harem of wives and sighehsl for themselves and their buddies. Anyhow, whose dogs are they that I'm so scared of them? What'll happen? When we argue these people'll all come around. The women'll all say, 'A good-looker--not bad for bed:' But do you figure any one of them'll come up and say, 'Let's go to my house.' She won't' I don't have a coat on, I haven't had a bath in months, I can't get along with people, I don't have any money, nobody knows my mother and father--who's going to pay any attention to me. People'll say, 'Just another street bum with nothing.' There'll be some cussing and swearing-then they'll go one way and I'll go another. But I know this much, I need my money, I want to live with it, so why should I give it up when my life and death depend on this piece of paper? I'll go and fill up on vodka and opium and sleep at Mahin's house. To hell with it! I'll mix with the people and sneak away. Where could his weak, nasty little eyes see me in this dusk?"
A young woman--shapely, provacative and aloof--quickly passed Morad and spread the soft morphine scent of her perfume behind her. She was one of those who in his whole life Morad would never touch--not even, for example, at the laundry would he touch the cloth of her clothes. He breathed in as much of the perfume smell as his lungs could hold and wouldn't release it. He had held it so long that he finally started coughing. This smell, like morphine, was immediately absorbed by his whole system. You see, it smelled like roasted opium mixed with iodine. He felt as if he had taken a deep draw on his opium pipe. His head reeled. Just then an intense desire arose in him--he didn't know where it came from or what it wanted--a desire made from envy, poverty and lust, but not inclining to any of these alone. She had been so skillfully put together--the clear, lovely indentation of the waist, the delicate breadth of her shoulders, and the prominence of her prefectly-proportioned, statue-like buttocks--that a human being could have been fashioned so well only in clay. Its sculptor would have lived without women for ____heh:
An Iranian
Moslem or Jew may make a legal
temporary
marriage with a woman called a sigheh. The contract will will specify the period of the marriage which may vary from hours to years. 117 SUMMER 1968
years in some remote place and would have wanted to create am ideal female for his own pleasure. The poppy flowers on her tight, thin dress stuck to her body as though they had been shook with life exactly pressed on her flesh with decals--they in time to the movements of her shapely, naked legs. Each one of the flowers had its own set of separate exciting and tempting movements that spoke to a man, sneered at him, and drew him after them. It seemed she was naked and on her skin they had tattooed these blood-red poppies and their dark brown branches. A man wanted to follow her a while, to inhale the smell of her morphine perfume, and to watch those sneering, living flowers of flesh-flowers of life, warm, sweet-smelling flesh. The orderly, animate shaking of her buttocks drew the flowers up and down like In one place more, in one the measured valves of an automobile. place less, but everywhere luring and speaking. Waves trembled in the indentation of her waist and one imagined she was walking a tightrope and sometimes swung her buttocks instinctively to keep her balance and not fall. But amrous looks and desires that made the heart pound rose from these same undulations. A pair of lovely, well-formed calves-covered with tiny golden hairs, like a wheat field in mid-August with the evening sun shining on it--supported her mysterious body and controlled And this entire its movements, so full of life. and desired from head to foot, strode gracefully form, enticing along on two pieces of buffalo skin--dried skin of an animal that once had lived but that now was trampled on as he walked the asphalt of the street. Morad's life collapsed in the drunkenness of this enervating He thought, opium and his stomach gnawed at her inaccessibility. "It's a nice piece--yeah--who I don't know what they've screws it? got that's better than me. If I ever get hold of the god they say gave that piece to them I know what I'll do to him. Aren't I a part of this world too?" He was completely absorbed in watching the poppy flowers. He spoke stupidly to himself with a pleasure as though he had never seen poppies before: "Opium's flower is nice too . . . such a pretty color. But that's a real good thing. And those poppies sure make it nice." He again felt a desparate need for his opium pipe. For an instant his gaze turned away from the flesh flowers. But suddenly it seemed to him that the flesh of that woman's body had collapsed in the patterns of shade and light thrown by the trees along the street. The flowers of flesh were scattered and the form of that body he had desired changed into a broad, ridiculous frame full of holes, that took huge, staggering strides.
IRANIANSTUDIES
118
Now in this confusion the Jew creditor saw Morad's shape from a distance, made him out, and bellowed his name several times from After he saw Morad stop, he threw himthe bottom of his lungs. But several self in one motion off his stool toward the street. couldn't move off his seconds passed and the Jew creditor still side of the street. A speeding Chevrolet had blocked him and he A few more seconds passed and the-creditor's had to wait. patience gave out--he fidgeted every instant he stood in his place But his gaze was fixed on waiting for the Chevrolet to pass. eyes off him. Morad stood Horad; he never took his tiny, bat-like on the sidewalk on the other side of the street, his whole being A moment awaiting the encounter with the stubborn shopkeeper. went by before he could forget the morphine-perfume, the irritating redness of the poppies, the animate, provocative movements of the flesh flowers, and he could remind himself of giving up the red two-toman note. He felt contempt for himself and muttered at a whore--if you went up to heaven and came the Jew: "Your sister's wouldn't give you half a dinar--come on over and back down I still see . , ,18 The Chevrolet passed quickly. The creditor kept watching hunter who marks out where his prey has Morad, and like a skillful fallen in the thick grass, his eyes picked out Morad in the crowd. "DamnMoslem, you should die in the gutter, He thought to himself: If I catch you this time I won't let you go free from my claws. So I'll take the pants off you right in front of the people. you'll know you can't eat what belongs to Yaqub . . .t had not reached the middle of the But the creditor still street when a ten-wheeled truck loaded with flour hit him and ran him over. The truck dragged his body along the ground between the grinding wheels for a few meters until it stopped with a horrifying of brakes. Yaqub's torso was smashed and mangled, while the rest of his body had collapsed like burnt wool. touched mixed with concealed indifference Lightheartedness Morad. He put his hands in his pockets and did not move from his place. He breathed easily and for a moment made sure that the head was ground and pulverized like a spider squashed creditor's a debt under a camel's foot--and there was no one else to collect from him. Before Morad could even blink, a large crowd had gathered around the truck, just like ants gathering around the corpse of a The fear of viewing death changed their huge, stinking cockroach. their faces without disturbances, in normal life, faces--obviously From the fear of death and of lonewere completely different. liness these people had deserted their homes to seek refuge in the 119
SUMMER 1968
ebbing and flowing crowds of society; and now there was nothing in their hearts except the grip of terror. Morad thought to himself: "Why is it when they kill a chicken and throw out its guts, the living chickens argue over the warm stuff until finally one of them pecks it, takes it somewhere quiet and eats it, but these people are afraid of their own dead, who had money and are champagne and caviar when they were alive . . . ?" Gradually Morad, his hands still in his pockets, mixed with the crowd. By this time the truck had rocked back and forth and had passed over Yaqub's body. A mass of blood and bone from the skull spilled on the ground, though tiny bits still stuck to the truck's tires. Black coagulated blood spread over the pavement of the street and sank in wherever there were crevices in the stones. While, blood-soaked matter, like a soft-boiled egg-white with a blood spot, and a mass of smashed bones formed a foul mixture with the sinking blood and with the dung of the street. He yawned and realized he was Suddenly Morad was nauseated. late for his opium. He very slowly pulled himself out of the crowd and took the road to his remote, underground coffee-house. He had no more endurance. His feet had grown heavy. He felt an annoying wakefulness and sensitivity in his nerves. He leaned against a wall for a minute until his feeling of nausea passed and then started walking again. self:
His eyes were fixed to the ground and he thought to him"Brother of a whore, it's like they're pulling out all
my veins." Then he spat a thick blob like soapsuds on the and continued his thoughts: "It was a nice one: asphalt There'd be a good time if a fellow it." He kicked at a pack of stripped in the street that had fallen and when its top Gorgan cigarettes did not open he bent over and picked it up. It was emipty. He threw it angrily into the dirty water that had drawn itself up like a wounded snake in the ditch alongside the street. He muttered under his breath, "Son of a whore: If we had a chance in the world . . . our luck would be better than this:" As he kept his face toward the ditch and watched the floating cigarette pacK, he banged his head into the trunk of a plane tree. He swore at the tree: "I screwed your sister:" Morad changed direction and lost himself in the crowd. He shoved bodies and bodies shoved him. But he didn't care. There was freedom and abandon in his heart. He felt lighter. Alone For him all these people passing again. nearby had no existence. They were for themselves; he was for himself. Neither the sound of car horns nor the noise of the people reached his ears. IRANIAN STUDIES
120
But suddenly he shook and turned his head. He saw the same beautiful woman coming out of a hat shop. She still shook her exciting, living rump regularly up and down the same way; and the flowers of flwsh tattooed on her body sneered just as before. As she passed she spread the smell of the same morphine perfume behind her. Only this time her perfume smelled of dung, a crushed skull, squashed brains, and a mass of black, coagulated human blood.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT The editors would like to thank Mr. Manouchehr Mohandessi, lecturer in Persian literature at Harvard University, for his permission to Iranian Studies to publish three of Forough Farrokhzad's poems out of an anthology translated, under his supervision, by Miss Anita Spertus. These poems appeared in our last issue.
121
SUMMER 1968
book
review
I?RATIONALITY"AND " RRATIONALITYt IN IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY Shaul Bakhash The Foreiwn Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs: University 1500-1914, by Rouhollah Ramazani. Charlottesville: of Virginia Press, 1966. Mr. Rouhollah Ramazani has not made use, in his current book, of the extensive materials for 19th century Persian diplomatic in the British Foreign Office archives or history now available important documents in the but nevertheless the less substantial such as Iranian, French and Russian archieves that historians for Firuz Kazemzadeh and Nikkie Keddie have made the basis use of available by intelligent Nevertheless, studies. recent survey a very adequate he has put together materials published half of the in the 19th and the first policy foreign of Persian 30 pages of the book deal with (Only the first 20th centuries. the 1500-1800 period). is endowed with with great lucidity, Mr. Ramazani writes a nice balance and has struck powers of summarization impressive is not moreover, His account, and analysis. between exposition book, and more detailed more recent by Kazemzadeh's superseded since a good two-thirds 1864-1914, in Persia and Britain Russia where period, to the post-1914 book is devoted of Mr. Ramazani's in the Much of the material his study. Mr. Kazemzadeh terminates In addition, time. for the first in English book thus appears than the rather policy foreign focus is on Iranian Ramazani's
And he brings to his foreign policy of the great powers in Iran. analysis a schematic framework and terms of reference which are of in themselves. interest First, he Mr. Ramazani has two basic points of reference. attempts to examine the degree to which the makers of Iranian foreign policy succeeded in the period with which he is concerned Mr. Shaul Bakhash, an Iranian journalist, graduate work at Harvard University. IRANIANSTUDSIES
122
is presently
doing
in matching means with ends--the hallmark, in his view, of a "trational" foreign policy. Secondly, he seeks to identify some of the basic persistent characteristics of Iranian foreign policy. This simple and straightforward scheme both aids and hinders the task of analysis that Mr. Ramazani has set for himself. Mr. Ramazani is able to show, quite convincingly, that Iranian foreign policy has been dominated by a number of identifiable constants: the predominant role of the shah as foreign policy-maker; long periods of unrealism when ends far outran the available means to secure them; irresponsible irredentism in the first half of the nineteenth century and an equally over-ambitious nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; and internal weaknesses which rendered ineffective many diplomatic efforts. Thus he demonstrates how, under the Qajars and also Reza Shah, the over-riding influence of the shah linked foreign policy too closely with the abilities, weaknesses, whims and over-all personality of the monarch. Again, he analyzes the manner in which the Qajars, ignorant of the real military power of Britain and a rising Russia, fought war after war with inadequate military force and organization to suffer defeat after defeat. He traces in illuminating fashion the ways in which the rise of Iranian nationalism began to influence the course of foreign policy. All this is very useful and enlightening. But the same thing cannot be said of Mr. Ramazani's attempt to test Iranian foreign policy in different periods against the yardstick of "rationality." He adopts from Morgenthau the arguement that holds "a rational foreign policy to be a good foreign policy." But the concept is far too vague to give much insight into the workings of Iranian foreign policy, or of any other nation's foreign policy for that matter. (What does "rational" mean, anyway?) Mr. Ramazani is on slightly firmer ground when he bases his judgment of "rationality" on the degree to which means and ends coincide in the fashioning of foreign policy. But even here, the yardstick, when applied to different cases, too often turns out to be an a posteriori justification of the accomplished fact. His analysis too often degenerates into a mere labelling as "rational" those foreign policies that work; and as "irrational' those foreign policies that do not. All this takes place in a kind of international vacuum with inadequate consideration of the degree to which the changing international picture affected Iranian freedom of maneuver.
123
SUMMER 1968
For example, in Mr. Ramazani's account, as long as things go well with Reza Shah, he is deemed to be following a "rational" foreign policy. As soon as things go badly and the allied invasion takes place in 1941, Reza Shah's foreign policy is described as having turned "irrational." The fact is, of course, that the international situation had changed. Russia, after a long period of involvement in internal consolidation, had emerged as a factor in international politics again; war was looming and Iran's area of maneuver had grown much more constricted. Again, in the confused internal and international situation of the 1914-21 period, when Iranian governments rose and fell with clocklike regularity, Mr. Ramazani's scheme forces him into an awkward ticking off of governments as "rational" and "irrational", until he is able to point to a "rational" government, which signs the favorable 1921 agreement with Russia and deals more adequately with British pressures on Iran. But here again, the operative factor is not a sudden maturing of Iranian foreign policy makers. The new Soviet government's desire to win friends in a period of weakness and idealism; the effect of this change in Russian policy on Britain which now had to worry less about Russian penetration of Iran; and Britain's own war weariness immensely increase Iran's bargaining power. It is not, of course, that Mr. Ramazani totally ignores the changing international situation. On the contrary, in each chapter a section is devoted to this subject. But when it comes to judging the "rationality" or "irrationality" of Iranian foreign policy, these changes do not enter the picture or receive far too little weight. A second objection, to Mr. Ramazani's
approach
related is
that
to the first, it
implies
that must be taken that
there
is
always a "rational" (i.e. effective) foreign policy which a given country might follow. The fact is that for small nations caught in the crunch between two great powers, there often are no options open. What conceivable "rational" foreign policy might Czechoslovakia have followed to stave off the Nazi onslaught once she was abondoned by Western Europe? For Iran, throughout the 19th century, much the same was true. For a while there was at least the possibility of playing off Russia against Britain. But after the conclusion of the 1907 agreement, under which Russia and Britain divided Iran into spheres of influence, the door on even this possibility was shut. Iran's means for fashioning an effective foreign policy after this date were far narrower than Mr. Ramazani suggests. For example, he roundly blames Iranian nationalists for attempting to IRANIANSTUDIES
124
in World War I; the sin, of stick to an uncertain neutrality The "realistic" alternative which course, is again "unrealism." Mr. Ramazani suggests would have been to ally with Britain and Russia against Germany. Yet, at this very time, the Russians and the British were redrawing their spheres of influence in Iran and, by giving Russia complete freedom of action in her sphere, Britain was virtually abandoning the northern half of In fact, the going the country to outright Russian annexation. jingle in Russia at the time was that Iran was not a foreign country just as a hen was not really a bird. Mr. Ramazani's concept of rationality Finally, appears at times to imply abject surrender. He thus disapproves of the Iranian parliament's rejection of the Russian ultimatum of which brought Russian troops marching from the 1911--a rejection Caucasus onto Tehran--as another sign of "unrealism." It is true that the parliament had no power to make good its brave challenge to Russia. But it is also true that there are moments--and this was surely one--when men and nations do have nothing left but their sense of dignity, and Mr. Ramazani's emphasis on common sense and rationality in this instance sounds too much like the old adage that "when rape is inevitable, relax and enjoy it." For Turkey in 1919, defeated and gripped by internal chaos , the "'rational" course would have been to accept the inevitable. Mustapha Kemal's "irrationality" paid its own dividends, however. And Iranian statesmen, fumbling, often corrupt, inept and bewildered succeeded by tactics that appear illogical, uncertain and procrastinating and by what at times was nothing but empty bravado in at least preserving the fiction of independence until international circumstances permitted its reassertion.
125
SUMMER 1968
Jarm.of
s
Jaaino
tu4i>
1~~~~~~~~~~~`
Qtdazm*t t968 Vow?4~
I
'1
The Society for IranianStudies COUNCIL Ali Banuazizi Richard W. Cottam Hormoz Hekmat Abbas Heydari-Darafshian Farhad Kazemi, Treasurer Manoucher Parvin Majid Tehranian, Secretary IRANIAN
STUDIES
Ali Banuazizi, Editor Jacqueline W. Mintz,
Associate
Editor
IRANIAN STUDIES is published quarterly by The Society for Iranian Studies. It is distributed to members of the Society as a part of their membership. The price of single copies for non-members is $1.00 per issue. The opinions expressed by the contribu-
tors are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the Society or the Editors of IRANIANSTUDIES. Articles may be submitted in English or Persian to the Editor for publication. All communications concerning IRANIANSTUDIES or the Society's affairs should be addressed to: The Society for Iranian Studies, P.O. Box 3384, Yale
Station,
New Haven,
Connecticut Cover
Second Printing, Current Address: Chestnut Hill,
design
06520,U.S.A. by Tina
January 1973 Box E-154, Boston College, Massachusetts 02167, U.S.A.
Kazemi
JrtaZatv &tudi >CCekii
of kSojcforJroWatiSt S
Volume I
Fall
1968
udZs Number 4
ARTICLES 128
REPORTOF THE SOCIETY'S SECONDANNUAL B3USINESSMEETING
133
IN EDUCATIONAL AMBIVALENCE IRAN
154
Manoucher Parvin IN MILITARYEXPENDITURE IRAN: A FORGOTTEN QUESTION
161
Jalal Al-i-Ahmad SOMEONE ELSE'S CHILD Translated by Theodore S. Gochenour
Marvin Zonis
BOOKREVIEWS 170
FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH: Russia
Persia,
and Britain
Nikki R. Keddie
in
1864-1914
172
HANSE. WULFF: The Traditional Crafts of Persia
Nikki R. Keddie
173
The TANYAFARMANFARMAIAN: Lifted Veil
Majid Tehranian
175
ASHRAPLUTFI: OPECOIL
Majid Tehranian
REPORT OF THE SOCIETY'S SECOND ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING
The Second Annual Business Meeting of the Society was held on August 24th, 1968, in to review the Society's New Haven, Connecticut, during the first year of its existactivities and to make plans ence, to elect new officers Mr. Manoucher Parvin, for the coming year. welcomed the members President of the Society, His opening and their guests to the meeting. remarks were followed by a full report on the presented by Dr. Ali Banuayear's activities, the Society's Secretary. zizi, "The Society for Iranian Cultural and Social Studies," Dr. Banuazizi reported, "was on September 2, 1967, in formally established a meeting at Yale University. The main objective of the Society was set forth by its Con'to encourage the study of Iranian stitution: lanincluding history, culture and society, economic, and social, guage, literature, political problems of Iran.' "The need for a forum that could bring together students of Iranian society and culture had been felt for some time, manifesting in the appearance of several rather itself and the organization short-lived periodicals IRANIANSTUDIES
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Moreover, since of several seminars on Iran. there was a reasonable doubt that, given the in Iran, such an organizacurrent conditions it was tion could function independently, the Society to establish considered desirable There was, however, a shared convicabroad. in the creation among all those instrumental tion of the Society that it should have an as character, independent and non-partisan for the effective this was deemed essential of the Society as a and continued functioning devoted to the preorganization professional of scholarly research on Iran's insentation and social life. tellectual "The work of the Society during the past in four main areas: year concentrated "1 .
Recruitment
of Members.
Starting
with 9 members at the time of its inception, increased membership has steadily the Society's 40 over we have Today during the past year. in involved members, most of whom are actively Soof the to the objectives relevant research we have been able to secure In addition, ciety. journal. to the Society's many subscriptions of our members and subscribers The combined list of like a Who's Who in the field reads literally for the at least (unfortunately, studies Iranian to North Amnerica'). limited present, Journal. of a Scholarly Publication "2. StuIranian bulletin, quarterly The Society's with three published, has been regularly dies, and having reached the readers, already issues Both with regard a fourth under preparation.
129
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to the articles and the printing, there has been a noticeable improvement in the quality of the journal. "3. Cultural Activities. The Society sponsored a reception last spring for members and friends in Cambridge, Massachusetts at which Mr. F. M. Esfandiary gave a talk on 'Iranian Intellectuals Abroad.' More than 50 persons attended that meeting. The Society also sponsored a two-hour radio program on Iranian music in the Cambridge-Boston area. "4. The Sponsorship of a Seminar on Iranian Studies. are under way Preparations for a seminar, to be sponsored jointly by the on some Society and an American university, well-defined theme in Iranian Studies. It is expected that this seminar will be held in the spring of 1969." Dr. Banuazizi's report was followed by some questions, after which he was warmly applauded for his vigorous and effective leaderThe ship of the Society during the past year. Treasurer's report was then presented to the members. Mr. Kazemi reported that the Society's revenues from membership fees, subscriptions and contributions during the past year had were totaled $621.00, while its expenditures $568.91, leaving a balance of $53.09 in the Both reports were unanimously adopTreasury. officers ted by the meeting and the respective were thanked for their valuable contributions to the Society's progress.
IRANIAN STUDIES
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The meeting then moved to the next item on the agenda, and the following amendments to the Constitution were enacted. 1. The privilege of Full Membership in to "any person the Society was made available of this Society and ensharing the objectives gaged in research or study in social sciences of nationality. and humanities," regardless Prior to this amendment, only Iranians were for Full Membership while non-Iranian eligible students and scholars could apply for the Society's Associate Membership. The category of Associate Member was thus eliminated altogether, opening the way for the internationalization of the Society's membership. As a scientific and professional society, the meeting felt there of nationality should be no distinctions in the membership requirements. 2. Dues were standardized for all members, with dues for Full Membership reduced from $12 to $10, and dues for Family Members remaining at $2. name of the Society was 3. The official changed from the "Society for Iranian Cultural and Social Studies" to the less cumbersome "Society for Iranian Studies." The meeting then moved to the election of a new Council, and the following seven were elected to serve for the coming year: Ali Banuazizi, Psychology,
Professor Assistant Connecticut College. 131
of
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Richard W. Bulliet, Instructor Harvard University. Hormoz Hekmat, Instructor Science, Utica College.
in History,
in Political
Abbas Heydari-Darafshian, Lecturer Economics, Hunter College.
in
Farhad Kazemi, Lecturer in Political of Michigan. Science, University Manoucher Parvin, Lecturer Columbia University.
in Economics,
Professor Majid Tehranian, Assistant Political Economy, Lesley College. its
The new Council elected Executive Committee:
of
the following
Majid Tehranian, Secretary Farhad Kazemi, Treasurer Ali Banuazizi, Editor, Iranian
as
Studies
It also appointed Mrs. Jacqueline Mintz as Associate Editor of Iranian Studies. The Second Annual Business Meeting of the Society came thus to an end amid hopes for the expansion of the Society's activities during the coming year. Majid Tehranian Secretary of the Society
IRANIAN STUDIES
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EDUCATIONAL AMBIVALENCE IN IRAN MARVIN ZONIS Iran is rare among developing societies, in the intensity of its dilemma resulting from efforts to effect a symbiosis between two divergent traditions-cultural continuity and Marvin Zonis is Assistant Professor of Political & Social Sciences, and Assistant Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Center, at the University of Chicago. The research on which this paper is based was carried out in Iran by the author from 1963 to 1965 and was supported by a Research Training Fellowship of the Social Science Research Council. Data analyzed and reported here were derived from interviews with 167 members of the Iranian political elite identified through a two-stage reputational analysis. I wish to thank those Iranians who so generously gave of their time, their knowledge, and their opinions, as well as Professor Frederick W. Frey, Department of Political Science, MIT; Mr. Frank Bamberger of the Computation Center, Department of The University Sociology, of Chicago, for their assistance in every phase of this work. 133
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technological, i.e., Western, innovation. As the Shah himself sees it, "we are both adjusting the technology to our culture and our culture to the technology. "1 But the "adjustment" proceeds, at best, haltingly with the result that neither of the traditions is especially vital, nor entirely relevant to Iran's political goals. In no area of contemporary Iranian life can this be more tellingly demonstrated than that of education. Where the political leadership has made a firm commitment to social, political, and economic change, the educational sector is frequently among the first to reflect this commitment. But the ambiguities, contradictions, and ambivalences of Iran's political elite is reflected in the course of Iran's educational system. It is to each of these areas --the attitudes of the political leaders and the education system to which we turn to demonstrate Iran's dilemma. Situated at the highest command posts both within and without the government, the political elite translate the wishes of the monarch into political action through the prisms of their own attitudes and values.2 In a political system such as Iran's, where the traditions of public administration are weak and where the political process is relatively less structured than is the case in by formal organizations more developed countries, the role of indiviis correspondthe elite, duals, and especially But this group is an interesting ingly greater. These men subject for study on other grounds. IRANIANSTUDIES
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Iran's progress in the blending of personify her cultural heritage with the technological contributions of Europe and the United States. For in the final analysis, this melange of traditions-so essential for modernization-must be done in the minds of individuals. The members of Iran's political elite have had numerous first-hand to opportunities learn the "new knowledge" directly. Of the 167 members of the political elite who were interviewed, some 18% (N=30) attended high schools outside Iran; 36% (N=60) received undergraduate degrees
from European
or American
universities;
and nearly one-half (N=78) of the elite received graduate degrees from such universities. (on the whole, the elite are remarkably well-educated. Fifty-one have received bachelors degrees or their equivalents while eightyeight have received graduate degrees. In a land in which at least 4/5 of the population are illiterate these are no slight achievements.) But there have been other opportunities for becoming personally acquainted with Western culture. Foreign travel is one such means. All but two of the elites have traveled outside their own country. In fact, the common pattern is for elites to enjoy frequent and far-ranging foreign travel. Some sixty percent of them have traveled abroad more than a dozen times while forty percent have done so two dozen or more times. Their travel has not only been it has also tended to be lengthy. frequent, of the elite have lived outside their Sixty-five own lands for a minimum of ten years (onemember 135
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having lived abroad for nearly of the elite of while two-thirds sixty years of his life) leaders have lived abroad a these political Moreover, this foreign minimum of four years. of technology. travel has been to the capitals have not been to Only three of the 167 elites Europe or the United States. There is yet another way of facilitating of contemporary technological the transmission i.e., knowledge of foreign languages. culture, to confront modern knowledge in its The ability original language can be a profound source of On this count, also, the elite information. are well-equipped. All but one of these political claims fluency in a language influentials percent other than Persian while forty-five (N=75) know three or more other languages. Moreover, these languages are the ones best able to transmit the culture which buttresses percent of the Eighty-seven modernization. elite (Nu146) know French; eighty percent (N=135) (N=56) know German. know English; and one-third only nine members of the elite (Surprisingly, [5.4%] claimed to know Russian and these were who had been born or primarily older elites educated in Czarist Russia.) We have noted then, that the Persian for elite have enjoyed personal opportunities into Western culture and technosocialization in logy. High levels of education (frequently the knowledge of Europe or the United States), French and English) foreign languages (especially and travel to the centers of this contemporary culture have all been as much a part of their IRAY.'.ANSTUDIES
136
and emotional maturation processes intellectual as has been their contact with the more tradiBut to what tional elements of Persian culture. extent is their exposure to these two streams, in these two sources of weltansicht, reflected their behavior and attitudes? It is the former-what the elites actually do, rather than is ultimately how they feel-which of interest to us. How they act to introduce, through of political their positions power, the cultural and ideological basis of Western progress while invigorating their indigenous culture is the issue, after all. But such measures of political behavior are extremely hard to aoqize in a political system where the most meaningful and decisive actions are made outside the scruNo record of cabinet or tiny of the public. parliamentary roll call votes is available. No bitter political appeals to the public are in enacting desired made to aid a politician parts of a program. And information on how political measures were proposed, accepted, and enforced is simply unobtainable because of the of the members of the system and sensitivity the precariousness of their positions within it. But although information on elite behavior is not obtainable, elite can be attitudes The elite can be probed through interviews. asked to express their views on a variety of salient issues and to ruminate over a number of projective questions. One can then hope that while their attitudes will undoubtedly not determine their subsequent behaviors, they will coninfluence those behaviors in directions sonant with their attitudes.3 137
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Among the self-proclaimed attitudes of the political elite, those concerning education and technology present a fascinating and seemingly contradictory amalgam of the traditional and the modern. We asked the elite, for example, the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the notion that "Iranian culture is so unique that it has always subverted would-be conquerors and 'Iranized' them." TABLE1 ATTITUDESTOWARDS UNIQUENESSAND EFFICACYOF IRANIANCULTURE Attitude Strong agreement Moderate agreement Slight agreement Slight disagreement Moderate disagreement Strong disagreement Don't know, no answer TOTAL
31.7 27.5 13.8 5.4 6.6 5.4 9.6 100.0% (167)
of the elites Nearly three-quarters agreed with the notion-a common one-that Iran has consistently absorbed and ultimately conquered its conquerors through the strength of its culture. Simultaneously, however, when asked to assess the roots of Iran's past greatness, onlythirteen IRANIAN STUDIES
138
percent of the responses pertained to culture, knowledge, or learned men. The overlearning, whelming percentage of responses attributed Iran's past greatness to "great and wise kings," etc. The elite alternately 'strong leaders," then, Iran's historical attributed greatness, leaders and to education and culto individual a projecWhile this may partly reflect ture. to the realities tion of contemporary political past, it is also symbolic of the deep-seated towards education. ambivalence of the elite This ambivalence may also be noted by comparing responses to another pair of questions. When asked to assess the factors which would to a renewal of Iran's greatness most contribute only in the future, elite respondents stressed development and spread of modern one factor-the serMore than improving the civil education. reforms, or speeding political vice, effecting economic development, the elite perceived Iran's rooted on the dissemisolidly future greatness nation and mastery of contemporary culture and technology. lies And yet, while national greatness felt that personal happiness the elite therein, Nearly sixty percent of the elites does not. his know(N=97) agreed that "he who increases more Slightly sorrow." his ledge increases be "we would that than sixty percent agreed development far better off with less scientific reflect These attitudes and more simple faith." an ambience
which
was consistently
expressed
A past, untraminterviews. throughout elite of Western learning, meled by the challenges 139
FALL 1968
was nostalgically remembered. extreme respondents urged:
One of the more
We must revitalize Persian culture, for science is the bane of the contemporary world. That learning which makes men nearer to each other is good. But modern knowledge brings rancor and hatred. In a fundamental way, then, many of the elites approach technological culture with a deep ambivalence. Iran was great in the past on the strength of its political leadership. Yet on the numerous occasions that those leaders failed to preserve Iran's political integrity, a superior culture led to the eventual defeat of her conquerors. For the future, the is not bleak. situation Renewed greatness can be found through raising the cultural level of the population by the spread of education. But while national greatness may be forthcoming, personal disquiet and malaise will result. And political unrest and personal unhappiness go The central dilemma is the appahand-in-hand. betwen rent zero-sum nature of the relationship personal and national goals. The Iranian elites of man to his society as in view the relation if national developsome way inimical, i.e., which education is ment is to be achieved-for essential-then personal happiness needs be sacrificed. In many ways this vision of national dewith notions commonly velopment is consistent held by Western and certain Communist observers. but nonetheless "cherished The stereotyped IRANIAN STUDIES
140
noble nomads, images of the passive peasantry, brave Bedouin" hold that development can only destroy this idyl and lead to social and personal disintegration.4 Daneil Lerner, however, has demonstrated the empirical untenability of "...a very powerful finding of this belief: our study is that Middle Easterners who are modernizing consider themselves happier than do those who remain within traditional lifeways.1"5 Whether personal satisfaction and national development are, in fact, incompatible in the Iranian context is not an issue here. What is for us is that this ambivalence asignificant mong the political leaders of Iran appears to be reflected in the development of Iran's educational Whether from altruistic institutions. motives which seek to isolate the more traditional segments of society from the personal which is the concomitant of education disquiet or from less selfless motives which detect in a threat to the continuation such disquiet of their own privileged political the stature, political elite has acted to place educational development in Iran under two severe limitations. at the Firstly, education, especially to the scions higher levels, remains restricted of the narrow, upper strata of Iran. Secondly, the content of that education which is offered tends to be relatively less oriented towards the most modern aspects of contemporary Western culture-the social and natural sciences and more oriented to studies comengineering--and patible with Iran's traditional culture--the liberal Let us arts, humanities, law, etc. 141
FALL 1968
examine each of these of her est in spends cation
in turn.
Iran's school population as a percentage eligible young persons is among the lowthe Middle East. Furthermore, Iran a lower percentage of her wealth on eduthan do most of her neighbors. TABLE2
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION ANDSCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATIOSFOR SELECTEDCOUNTRIESOF THE MIDDLEEASTO
Country
Public Expenditure School Enrollment on Education as % Ratios of National Income 1st Level 2nd Level
Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Lebanon Morocco Saudi Arabia Syria Turkey U.A.R.
3.1% 6.4 8.4 2.9 2.0 4.7 N.A. 5.2 2.9 3.8
37 45 70 60 70 34 11 48 48 44
19 26 55 43 32 9 4 29 20 25
The unadjusted school enrollment ratio in Table 2 for the first level of education is a percentage ratio based on the enrollment at this level IRANIANSTUDIES
142
related to the estimated population five to fourteen years; the second level is a percentin relation age ratio of all school population6 to total population aged 5 to 19. Despite the decades-long concern for developing her school system, Iran's overall quantitative level of education remains below other Middle Eastern nations save the least developed. Moreover, the slope of the educational pyramid the difficulties indicates confronting Iran in to alter these ratios. its efforts An extremely high drop-out rate throughout the school system marks this dilemna.7 TABLE3 NUMBER OF STUDENTSIN PRIMARYAND SECONDARY SCHOOLSIN IRAN AT THE BEGINNINGOF THE 1965-66 ACADEMIC YEAR?
Grade First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth
TOTAL
Primary Schools
Secondary Schools
524,514 438,637 386,108 335,518 272,419 2241437
160,490 106,852 85,611 58,232 43,750 38,800
2,181,633
493,735
143
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We note that from an initial input of more than one-half million students, less than half enter the final year of primary schools. A recently established but distinct system of formal primary education is the Literacy or Education Corps. Secondary school and university graduates who are conscripted into the Armed Forces may serve their tenure in rural areas, establishing village schools and teaching basic literacy skills. The drop-out rate for students of this Corps is even greater than for the regular school system. During the 1965-66 school year, 365,813 pupils were receiving training. They were distributed by grades as follows: TABLE4 PERCENTAGE OF LITERACYCORPSSTUDENTS, BY GRADE,1965-1966 ACADEMIC YEARO Grade of Primary School
Percent of Total Pupils
1 2 3
52.8% 26.6 14.0
4.8 1.8
4 5 &6
100.0%
IRANIAN STUDIES
144
It would seem clear that the many drop-outs from the formal educational system, who had received only a year or two of primary school training would be able to retain their primifor only a short time. skills tive literacy purposes, they must be countFor all practical illiterates. ed as functional we note Turning to the secondary level, that only thirty percent of the boys and girls who enter the first grade of primary school enOnly ter the first grade of secondary school. seven percent enter the final year of secondary thousand Of these 7% or thirty-eight school. thousand actuonly about twenty-eight students, ally obtain that degree which is so essential for finding white-collar jobs in the bureaucracy. But the major rewards in Iranian society being reserved for university are increasingly for vocational Educational criteria graduates. in Iran as in success having been as inflated the more developed West. This has even been list formalized by the Ministry of Education's for Iranian secondary schools, of objectives " ...to give further general knowledge to these students and prepare them for admission to uniis tremendous presversity.... "110 The result few places in Iran's unisure on the relatively 15,000 appliIn 1963, approximately versities. cants sat for the entrance examinations to the of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, and Universities had Meshed. In 1964 the number of applicants increased to 18,042. Only one year later the number had risen to 29,335; climbing in 1966 to 35,000 candidates. 145
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And these pressures for entrance to faof higher education within Iran mount cilities for the number of secondary school annually, students is growing faster than the number of For and colleges. places in the universities and university example, the number of college students in Iran in the 1965-1966 academic year an increase of sixteen percent over represented But for the number the school year 1962-1963. of students in the final year of secondary school the increase in the same period was thirty-two Thus not only does the unbalance percent. continue to exist but it continues to widen. degree is a requiBut if a university site for mobility to the higher levels of the and such a debureaucracies civil and military to acquire, Iranian students gree is so difficult stanare induced to compromise their educational One is that applidards in a number of ways. cants tend to seek admission to any faculty of whose entrance examination they the University or of their intellectual can pass, irrespective Thus in 1965, the twentycareer interests. adseeking university nine thousand applicants mission received more than 60,000 passes to take the examinations being offered by various faculties. the number of therefore, Frequently, students in a given faculty is a poor guide to graduates who will the number of that faculty's work to its subject matter. devote their life's Science and technology students will frequently receive their Bachelor of Science or Engineerto the employing degrees and proceed directly where bureaucracies of government ment offices IRANIANSTUDIES
146
they compete with their classmates boasting Bachelor of Arts or law degrees. Their special lost. is effectively training Failing to be accepted at any faculty of of Tehran, applicants the University will frequently bide their time for a year (or several years) and annually retake the entrance examinations, hoping to do better, eventually. Of the 29,000 who took the university entrance exams in 1965, 12,000 had only recently graduated from secondary schools while 17,000 of the hopefuls had graduated in previous years. Failing yet again, these students will turn to the less prestigious and academically inferior provincial universities, more understaffed and overburdened than the University of Tehran. But of the 29,000 students in institutions of higher learning in the 1965-1966 year, only 7,300 are enrolled at the six major and numerous minor provincial universities. The remainder and vast majority are enrolled in the of gaining a capital. Thus, the likelihood place at these provincial universities is not particularly great either. of these Equipped with the prescience and noting the higher status of their statistics compatriots bearing degrees from European and American universities, many high school graduates seek an escape to foreign study. And many On a per capita basis, Iran is in the succeed. first rank, with India, Japan, and Canada, of countries But the penalty "exporting" students. for Iran's maintaining this community of fledgling scholars outside its boundaries--now said 147
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A enormous. to number some 30,000 persons-is lost to their majority of them are irreparably It has been estimated that a minimum homeland. of sixty percent of these students abroad never in Iran, a figure approaching return to settle 80-90% in certain disciplines.1 Iran is well aware of this loss and underresoures. of its youth's intellectual utilization In the summer of 1967, a new law passed the Parstudy abroad, after mid-1967, liament restricting to only those who had completed their military As the loopholes in this legislation, service. and which the Iranians are so adept at locating pressures on the internal using, are closed, system of higher education will mount. While the government appears to be making overtures whose end result would be the satisfaction of these demands for more education for the overall proggreater numbers of students, As a member of nosis must be a negative one. in educalong influential elite, the political put it, "I have been instructed tional affairs for higher education opportunities to restrict to those who have the most at stake in our system." It was clear that he referred to the those young people whose scions of the elite, bound up with the present intimately future is of power. political distribution There is no doubt, then, that the demand and will continue for higher education exists of the ability to to expand out of proportion demand. that meet to system the educational This is true, at least in part, because of the
IRANIANSTUDIES
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lagging commitments to meet those deelite's mands and in the process to train young persons culture necin the contemporary technological essary for modernization. This lagging commitment is only one maniof conof the ambivalent perceptions festation There elite carry. the which education temporary imthe most are others, of course, and one of for the more traportant is their predilection That is, aspects of Iranian culture. ditional all too often, commitment to higher education dishas meant the expansion of non-technical expense of science and at the relative ciplines in this area are diffiStatistics technology. cult to obtain, but it appears that traditional areas of the curriculum are more than holding their own, while medicine and the natural and One stunted. remain relatively social sciences study of education in Iran revealed that earlier of Tehran half of the students at the University and Letwere enrolled at three faculties-Arts While the establishters, Law, and Theology.13 has ment of an "Arya-Mehr Technical Institute" distant. is still been announced, its fruition It is doubtful that enrollment ratios between subjects will be and non-technical technical for the distant future. markedly affected These two major problems of educational and archaic currienrollments reform-limited cula-are by no means peculiar to Iran alone. however, is that the What we are suggesting, ambivalence towards education which characterand values of the political izes the attitudes Imperial Majesty amongst them--exelite-His Here situation. acerbates an already difficult 149
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is an instance where social and psychological The economic factors are mutually reinforcing. underdevelopment of Iran and its social strucof the ture combined with the deep reservations towards contemporary education serve to elite educated impede the development of a technically modernizing cadre. any radical improvement Unfortunately, for the near seems unlikely of this situation mentioned above are When the attitudes future. power, analyzed in terms of the reputed political such holding elites the age, or education of differsignificant no statistically attitudes, The most powerful and the least ences appear. and the powerful; the oldest of the elites youngest; the holders of Ph.D. and Doctorate degrees and those with secondary school educations alone, all report similar perspectives There is no reason to expect, on these issues. influence of the that the increasing therefore, less powerful of the poliyounger and currently (and also the better educated ones) tical elite shift in will result in any marked attitudinal Those who must make and the governing group. which will affect the implement future decisions system in general and its Iranian political are as likely educational system in particular of their be to elites prisoners the present as ambiguities. own attitudinal
1H. I. M. MohammedReza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for Mt Country (New York: McGrawHill Book Company, Inc., 1961 ), p. 132. IRANIANSTUDIES
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2To translate this rather facile coninto operational ceptualization criteria and then into the actual names of individuals proved a laborious task. First, some thirty categories of professions, social roles, and government positions (doctors, tribal leaders, members of the Royal Family, Cabinet Ministers, etc.) were detailed. All the occupants of these categories (for periods going back to 1941 depending on the category) were identified, and with the elimination of overlaps and those who had passed away, a general elite of 3000 individuals was established. A panel of ten Iranians-reputed to be knowledgeable and honest--was formed. The members of the panel individually ranked the 3000 on the basis of their reputed political power. Arbitrarily, I set 10% or the top 300 of this list as the cutoff point to delineate the political elite from the general elite. This group of the 300 reportedly politically most powerful individuals then became the subject for intensive investigation. 3In this sense, of course, present attitudes may well be a better indicator of future behavior than are present behaviors. A further complication is presented when the possibility is admitted that what one does at present may and alter how one will feel in well influence the future. Vide Milton J. Rosenberg, Carl I. Hovland, William J. McGruse, Robert P. Abelson, and Jack Brehm, Attitude Organization and Chan. An Analysis of Consistency Among Attitude ComPress, ponents (New Haven: Yale University and A. Bauer and p. 213; Alice Raymond 1960), H. Bauer, "America, Mass Society and Mass Media' Vol. 16 (1960), 30-31. -Journal of Social Issues," 151
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4Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society. Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 73. 5Ibid. on expenditures from UNESCO 6Statistics Yearbook, 1964, Table 21. For enStatistical Yearbook, rollment ratios see UNESCOStatistical 1965, Table 9, pp. 117-129. by the 7This statement must be qualified that one reason for the progressively realization class size is that the number of pudiminishing pils entering the first grade of primary school has increased annually as the school system has we assume that a Nonetheless, been expanded. large proportion of the decline is attributable to the "dropout" problem. tion, Iran,
Ministry of Educa8Bureau of Statistics, in Iran (Tehran, Educational Statistics 1967), Table 9, p. 37. 9Ibid.,
p. 3.
and 10Ministry of Education, Objectives Resources of the Education Ministry of Iran (Tehran, 1965), p. 27. One concomitant has been education at neglect of vocational the virtual a condition which is changthe secondary level, from the U.S. Agenassistance ing with technical Development and the U.S. cy for International in the 1965-1966 academic year, Army. Still, only 16,293 (3%) of a total of 510,028 secondary school students were enrolled in vocational, or teacher-training commercial, agricultural, schoolsi.
IRANIAN STUDIES
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are for the lThe actual statistics 29,384 and 38,800; secondary school students: 24,456 and 28,982. students: for the university handbooks of the Data gathered from statistical Ministry of Education, 1964 and 1967. The 12Habib Naficy, "The 'Brain-Drain': Society for InCase of Iranian Non-Returnees," Development, March 17, 1966, mimeo., ternational passim. Diffu13Ahmad Fattahipour,"Educational sion and the Modernization of an Ancient Civilithe zation," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, p. 72. 1963, of Chicago, University
153
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MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN IRAN: A FORGOTTEN QUESTION MANOUCHERPARVIN A high official of the Iranian government was recently visiting the United States when he offered to meet students and scholars of Iranian affairs in order to discuss questions of mutual interest related to Iran. It was hoped that such a meeting in an academic environment would bring about a greater understanding of the current government policies and thus bridge the generation and information gap existing at present. Among the questions he was asked was the following. Why should Iran spend a larger percentage of its national budget on military expenditure (in relation to portions allocated to health, eduthan most countries for which such cation, etc.) data is available? Among the twenty-seven such countries only Indonesia, Brazil, Spain, Portugal and Turkey showed a higher percentage of military expenditure for the years, 1952-1963.1 Since then, there have been military coups d'etat in three of these Brazil and Turkey, countries, viz., Indonesia, while the internal condition of Spain political and Portugal is only too well-known to warrant further comment. Manoucher Parvin is Lecturer Columbia University. IRANIANSTUDIES
154
in Economics at
Furthermore, expenditure
in Iran
the absolute has been
amount of military
increasing
steadily
and the relative percentage has shown no sign of In addition, downward movement since 1963. $600 million extra is to be used for the modernization of the military Is such a sacriestablishment. for a less developed fice necessary, especially economy in transition? Our speaker was obviously surprised that Briefly, he anyone should raise such a question. stated that only the highest government authoriand subties are responsible for such inquiries In matters of national security sequent decisions. the judgment of such authorities must be accepted without further debate. A survey of the major newspapers and periodicals published in Iran shows that in fact such mi are vigoranswer is typical and its implications There is a pronounced absence of ously sustained. any debate and a conspicuous silence concerning expenditure-especially the magnitude of military to ecothe in comparison with resources allocated or the elsewhere. Majlis nomic development-in understood it is implicitly Accordingly, of the ordinary citizen that the responsibility in this matter do not extend beand his interest yond the payment of taxes and tacit acceptance of the present mode of expenditure of a substantial portion of government income. explanaThus, in the absence of official tions and the lack of inquiry by the news media, comwe shall attempt to make several suggestive which may justify ments concerning the reason(s) 155
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such a large expenditure on the military establishment in Iran. We hope that this note will initiate detailed studies creating a demand for reasonable accountability of the public funds and will, consequently, lead to certain ameliorative adjustments or modifications of military expenditure. The major reason offered by the highest officials is the existence of a potential external threat. Let us study this justification in the broadest terms. Among Iran's neighbors, and military Turkey and Pakistan are political allies, and Afghanistan may not produce another MahmoodAfghan unless Iran produces a Sultan Hossein. Iraq cannot be considered a threat in either, since several Iraqi administrations all their in of elaborate recent years, spite military maneuvers, have failed to "pacify" the Kurds in their demands for autonomy. However, we have been warned in the past of the potential aggression of the Soviet Union, of that of Nasser's Egypt and and, more recently, But the Soviet Union has ceased to her allies. be considered a potential threat according to which are substantiarecent official statements, ted by the increase in the number and size of economic transactions, and other such manifestations of friendship. In any case, even if Iran allocated all of her national budget to military excould she even marginally increase her penditure, a superpower? The national security vis-a-vis outcome of Iran's combat with superpowers is still fresh in our minds. As for Egypt, IRANIANSTUDIES
she has amply manifested 156
her
military prowess beyond and within her boundaries in recent years. The withdrawal from Yemen and the short-lived clash with Israel supply ample evithat such a state cannot dence for the assertion in the foreseeable future present the kind of threat to Iran's national boundaries which we have been repeatedly led to believe. The threat of an internal uprising in Iran is discounted by the Iranian authorities. We are told that the success of the "White Revolution" or rethe many-sided "political and socio-economic revolutionary withforms" have left the potential out a concrete cause for revolt. Land reform and various labor laws have gone a long way to increase the vested interest of the peasantry and labor in intellectuals the present regime. In addition, are satisfactorily high pacified by the relatively positions salaries paid them and the authoritative granted them by various governmental agencies and of higher learning. Assuming such a institutions we then still must to be description objective, which such a large necessitate search for reasons military expenditure. that the present regime is, Is it possible or otherwise, looking beyond Iran's consciously Is the Iranian government inpresent boundaries? the power vacuum created by terested in filling forthe general departure of the British military of ces from the area? Is governmental tolerance Finally, the Pan-Iranist Party of any significance? is the renaming of the Ministry of Defence as the of certain expanMinistry of War an indication sionist tendencies? Again, if we accept the stated policy of the present regime, we must disregard such speculations immediately. Firstly, 157
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Iran's allegiance to the Charter of the United assured in statements Nations has been repeatedly Secondly, made by the Shah and other dignitaries. to plan rapid economic it would be impractical and in combination with development simultaneously expansion, unless the preparation for territorial are adopted in order to subexpansionist policies with conditions limate general Iranian discontent spheres. in the political and socio-economic Could we assume that it is a combination of the all the above factors which has necessitated expenditure in Iran? present level of military including India, Realizing that several countries, and Israel among others, with more unPakistan, from the security point of favorable conditions view, spend a smaller portion of their national we must also disforces,2 budget on the military regard the above hypothesis. it has been shown that the military Finally, in (especially establishment in certain countries the economically less developed ones)3 becomes, to a large degree, an autonomous expanding institution with interests of its own. Such a military mechfor the instrumental established anism originally function of national defense, gradually outgrows its former boundaries and functions no longer merely responding to the demand for security against attack but creating new demands for itself as an automotive organism bent on preserving and expanding its interests. Thus, while the cost of is forces in such countries maintaining military no the with security proupper bound, increasing Does vided is no longer improved even marginally. the case of Iran belong to this category? IRANIANSTUDIES
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In summary, in order to explain the proporof the national budget large allocation tionally one or a combination of to military expenditure, hypotheses must be acthe following alternative cepted as explanatory factors. (a) The "White Revolution" is not as successful as has been claimed by the present regime and, conforce is required to a large military sequently, Obviously, system. preserve the present political the reacceptance of this hypothesis contradicts of the present and progressiveness presentativeness by the press and spokesmen regime, as publicized of the government. it can be assumed that Iranian (b) Alternatively, purchased at a higher cost per is national security This hypothesis to other nations. relative citizen forces in Iran are unnecimplies that the military and that they are large and/or inefficient essarily of the Irathe expense at growing and flourishing This implies that either the milinian taxpayers. has become an autonomous interest tary establishment are anachronipolicies group and/or that military and changed. cist and must be restudied is that Iran's hypothesis The third alternative (c) and silently gradually changed foreign policy has is of pursuing today Iran the with the result that an expansionist
policy.
that we may have failed to con(d) It is possible including a threat of sider other relevant factors, invasion from Mars or elsewhere known to the Iranian government, but unknown to us. we have implied that it is In this article the business of the Iranian taxpayer to know what 159
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criteria have been used to spend his taxes. This does not imply a demand for the publication of military secrets but rather concrete explanations as to the reasons which have necessitated the present amount of military expenditure. It appears to us that the allocation of a larger portion of the national budget for the moof the communication and transportation dernization and systems, thus promoting economic integration, investment in human capital (education, health, etc.) which increases economic productivity and social mobility, may in the long run be more beneficial even from the viewpoint of "national security" than the yearly and automatic enlargement of the military forces and expenditures. We hereby hope to have raised a question which may be studied fUrther with the aim of stimulating changes advantageous to Iranian society. NOTES Yearbook, 1See United Nations Statistical 1963 & 1964, for absolute amounts. The percentages by M. Parvin, mentioned above have been calculated Unrest in "Quantitative Analysis of Socio-economic and Its Effect on Economic Growth," Maktab (Summer, The average percentage of the 1966), pp. 41-52. Iranian national budget spent on the armed forces around the 40% level during recent has vacillated years. pp. 48-51. 2p. cit., 3See M. Janowitz, The Military in the PoliUnitical Development of New Nations (Chicago: versity of Chicago Press, 1968). 2See M. Parvin,
IRANIANSTUDIES
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SOMEONE ELSE'S CHILD JALAL AL-I-AHMAD Translated
by Theodore
S.
Gochenour
Well, what could I do? My husband wouldn't keep me and the child both-a child who was not his own'. The boy was my former husband's who had divorced me and never come to take him. If someone else were in my place, what would she do? Well, I had to live too. If this new husband divorces me what would I do? I had to get rid of the child. A woman like me who doesn't know her way around wouldn't think of anything else. I didn't know any place or any way out of the thing. But it wasn't that I didn't know any place, really. I knew you could put the child in a nursery or stick But where would they take him in some other place. him? Where could I be sure they wouldn't keep me to me and waiting and then not pay any attention call me and the child a thousand names? Where? I couldn't have it end that way. when I had gotten it That same afternoon, over with and come back home and told my mother and the neighbors what I had done, one of them, I don't know which one, said, "Well, woman, you could have Theodore S. Gochenour is Director Training at Putney, Vermont.
of the Peace Corps
This article in the Mid East (Deappeared earlier cember, 1967). It is being reprinted here by the permission of Mr. Gochenour and the Editor of the Mid East. (Ed.) 161
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taken ried know said in?
your child and given him to a nursery or carhim to an orphan asylum, and...." I don't where else she named. But just then my mother to her, "Do you think they would have let him Ha!"
Though I had thought of that way, too, when that woman said this to me my heart pounded inside me and I said to myself, "Couldn't you have gone, woman, to see if they would let him in?" And then I said to my mother, "I wish I had done it." But I didn't have any place to start or any confidence they would let him in. And now it was A world of sorrow poured on my already too late. heart because of what that woman had said. Every precious saying of my little boy came to mind. I couldn't bear it any more, and, in front of everybody I cried bitterly. How bad it was! I heard one of them utter, "And you cry to boot! She isn't even ashamed." me. I've much three true
But my mother came to my rescue and consoled And she said some things to me which were right. so why should I pine so just begun to live, for one child? I've got plenty of time to have or four babies one after the other. But it's he was my first-and I shouldn't have done this.
What's done is done, and But, well enough. now there's no more thinking about it. Myself, I wasn't out of my mind and just got up and did this thing. It was my husband who insisted. He was right too, he didn't want to see some other man's When I talked sense to myself, brat at his table. I knew he was right. Was I ready to love my husband's children as my own and not see them as a
IRANIANSTIUDIES
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drag on my life? Didn't I think there were too many of them at my husband's table? Well, the same way for him-he had a right too, not to have to see my child-I won't say my child-the brat of some other jackass (according to him) at his dinner table. In the two days after we had been married and I'd gone to his house, he was all full of talk about the boy. The night before, we talked a long time about him-not that we conversed very much, he just talked and I listened. Finally, I said, "O.K., you say what I should do." He thought My husband didn't say anything. awhile and then said, "I don't know what you should do. Do it however you know how. I don't want to see some other man's brat at my table." He gave me no way out or any help at all. That night he didn't come beside me, as if he was not
on speaking
terms
with
me.
It
was just
the
third night we were married but he was sulky with me. I knew he wanted to provoke me so I would get on with the business with the child quicker. In the morning when he was going out the door of the house he said, "When I come home at noon, I better not see the child, huh?" And from that moment I knew what I had to do. No matter how much I think about it now I can't unBut I in my heart. derstand how I was willing didn't have any choice about it any more. I tossed hand my prayer veil on my head, took the child's and went outside behind my husband. My boy was near He walked handsomely all by himself. his third year. The bad thing was that I had given myself so much trouble over him for three years. Bad, because all 163
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the trouble with night of staying was just now that to do what I had
him had passed already. Every and it up over him was finished, having him was good. But I had to do.
Matching him step for step I went right up I had put his shoes on his feet to the bus station. blue and I had put his best suit on him-a little coat and pants-which my first husband had bought When I was dressing him a for hi. just recently. thought stopped me: "Woman, why in the world do you put new clothes on him?" But I just couldn't not do it. I wanted them on him. What would I do with them? Blind my husband! He'll just have to go and buy some new clothes if I have a baby againl I smoothed his clothes and combed his hair. How handsome he was! I took his hand and held my prayer veil around my waist with my other hand, and we started walking slowly. I wouldn't have to scold It was the last him any more again to come quicker. time I would take his hand and take him with me in the streets. In two or three places he wanted me to buy him some geegaw and I said, "First we go on Just as on the bus, then I'll buy you a lollipop." other days, I think he kept asking me over and over. A horse had gotten its feet in the hole of a drainage ditch and some people had crowded around him. Iy child kept wanting me to hold him up to I helped him up to see the see what was happening. been cut and was bleeding. horse, whose leg had When I put him back down on the ground he said, I said, "Yes, sweet"Mama, his leg been hurted." to his mama and he got hurt." heart, he didn't listen Slowly
I went up near the bus station.
IRANIANSTUDIES
164
It
morning rush hour and the busses were was still I stayed in the station for perhaps half crowded. an hour before one came I could get on. My child now and then and I was getting tired got restless He asked so many questions I lost my pamyself. Two or three times he said, "What do, tience. go buy a lolliMama? If bus isn't coming, let's pop." And I would say again it would come soon and for him when I would tell him I would buy a lollipop we got on the bus. Finally we took line seven and by the time we got off at Maidan-i-Shah, my child had asked a I think he asked me once, "Mama, hundred questions. where we go?" I don't know why I suddenly said without knowing what I was doing, "We're going to Daddy's. while and then My child looked at my face a little asked, "Mama, which Dada?" I blew up at him and said, "How you chatterl see?" Now If you talk I won't buy you a lollipop, as these hurt the Such things how my heart ached! heart this way break child's would I my Why worst. so near to the end? I had promised myself I wouldn't get angry from the time I left the house until the I wouldn't hit my child or fuss thing was finished. with him. But how my heart ached now! Why did I hush child was quiet for him up like this? My little said then something to the apfinally awhile and prentice driver who was making faces at him. But to him, or to my child I didn't pay any attention who turned his face up at me now and then, chattering and laughing. I told
the driverMaidan-i-Shah
165
and he stopped.
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laughing when we had gotten off. Ny child was still The square was crowded and there were lots of busto be done. I still dreaded to do what ses. about for awhile. I strolled Perhaps half There busses now. I were fewer passed. an hour came to the edge of the square and pulled out ten shahis from my pocket and gave them to my child. He stood there and just looked at me. He hadn't I didn't know how learned about taking money yet. At the other side of the to make him understand. square a pumpkin seed seller was shouting, and I buy something pointed to him and said, "Take it-go I want to see if you know how to do it by nice. yourself." He looked down at the money and then said to stand I said, "No, I'll me, "Xama, you come too." Go on! I want to see if you here and watch you. He just looked at the money can do it yourself." as if he wanted to take it but didn't know how you since I had never were supposed to buy things, at What a strange look me. him. stared He taught heart only just then it was! It seemed as if my and felt was close to very bad, started aching, I he had gone when it up. Even afterwards, giving or even in the run until I had or now, away, and afternoon when I cried in front of the neighbors, I was almost at my heart never ached like this. an end. What a strange look it was! He stayed with me not knowing what to do, I don't wanted to ask me something. as if he still know how I held on to myself. Once again I showed him the seed seller and said, "Go on, sweetheart, give this money to him, Say 'Give me some seeds." Go on, that's a good boy."
IRANIANSTUDIES
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and then, like He looked at the seed seller the times when he made excuses and cried, he said, I was nearly I want raisins." "Mama, no seeds. bit, if he helpless. If he had cried one little longer, I would have given had lingered a little But he didn't cry and I got mad. I up the thing. lost my patience and yelled at him, "He has raisins, Go on, buy whatever you want! Get along!" too! him over the ditch by the sidewalk and And I lifted I put put him down on the asphalt of the street. slow push my hand on his back and gave him a little and said, "Go on now, it's getting late. " From where we The street wasn't crowded. were there were no busses or horse cabs in sight to run over him. He came back from the two or three steps he had taken and said, "Mama, he have raisins Tell him to give you too?" I said, "Yes, honey. of worth raisins." ten shahis Then he went, but just as he reached the middle of the street a bus blew its horn and I shook I in terror and without knowing what I was doing. flew to the middle of the street myself and grabbed him in my arms and ran to the sidewalk and his myself among the people there. Sweat streaked down my face and my chest was He said, "What matter, Mama?" I said, heaving. You should cross the street "Nothing, darling. faster. You went slow and almost got hit by a bus." Still As I was saying this I was close to tears. under my arm, he said, "O.K., Mama, put me down. I go fast this time,." child had not said this Perhaps if my little I would have forgotten why I had come. But his words 167
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I hadn't wiped the tears out of started me again. what I had come to I remembered when yet my eyes I do--remembered my husband who would get angry. on put would I kiss last kissed him. It was the I kissed him and put him on the ground his face. cars and said in his ear, "Go fast, sweetheart, are coming." Again the street was uncrowded and this time feet He picked up his little my child went faster. quickly and I was afraid two or three times that He turned they would get tangled and he'd fall. when he had reached the other side of the street and looked over at me. I had gathered the ends of my prayer veil under my arm and had started to walk away. Just as he turned and looked in my direction, It's true that I didn't want I froze in my steps. running away. But this was was to I understand him I was like a thief caught in the not why I froze. I froze and my hands stayed just as they were act. under my bosom. Just like that time when I had been ready to dig into my husband's pockets--that first husband of mine--and he appeared at the door. Again I Exactly like that I stopped in my tracks. I ducked my head and when was drenched in sweat. I managed to lift it the boy was walking again and nothing would stop him from reaching the seed selHe had reached the other My job was done. ler. It was as if from that side of the street safely. moment I had never had a child. The last time I looked at him it was exactly child, as if I had been looking at someone else's child just exactly like looking at someone else's Just as you get learning to walk by himself. child, I was pleasure in looking at someone else's enjoying looking at him. I twisted my way quickly IRANIANSTUDIES
168
in among the crowds on the sidewalk, and suddenly I was afraid. It almost paralyzed me and nailed me to the sidewalk. I was afraid someone was following me. The hair on my skin stood on end and I went faster. Two streets down I thought of dashing into an alley and running. I forced myself near to the alley when all at once a taxi pulled up behind me in the street like someone coming just then to grab me. Even my bones trembled. I thought the policeman at the intersection I had passed had jumped into a cab and was now getting out behind me and would grab my wrist in a moment. I don't know how I turned and looked behind me. I relaxed. The passengers had just paid their fare and were leaving the cab. I gasped with relief and then I had an idea. Without thinking or seeing anything around me, I flew into the taxi and slammed the door with a bang. The driver grumbled and started off. My veil had caught in the taxi door, and when we had gone a ways and I felt and sure of myself, I opened the door a little I pulled in my veil and shut the door again. leaned back on the cushion and began to breathe easily. And that night, even after trying a long time, I couldn't get back the money for the taxi from my husband.
169
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BOOK REVIEWS Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914. Kazemzadeh. New Haven: Yale University 679pp. 1968. $15.00
By Firuz Press,
NIKKI R. KEDDIE Professor Kazemzadeh of the History Departhas produced a formidable ment at Yale University far surpasses any other work monumental that and relations. international book on modern Iranian of research job The author has done an outstanding and Persian sources, as well in Russian, British, and has presented a far as some in other languages, fuller view of his subject that has hitherto been available. Professor Kazemzadeh gives us both a comprehensive overview of British and Russian policoverage of the most imcy in Iran and a detailed in the policy of the two governportant incidents of the effects He also provides an analysis ments. on Iran. He is of British and Russian policies for avoiding the to be congratulated particularly view of many recent works in this British-centered that have often tended to analyze Brifield--works as they were analyzed by British tish policies diplomats at the time, rather than taking into acviews in arriving at an independent count non-British
Nikki R. Keddie is Associate of California the University IRANIANSTUDIES
170
Professor of History at Los Angeles.
at
Professor Kazemzadeh has taken a critianalysis. cal view of all three parties involved-Britain, his views uith identifying Iran, and Russia-without those of the policy makers of any of the three or, on the other hand, regarding any of countries the three as a special villain. Professor Kazemzadeh argues that both Russia and Great Britain were motivated more in Iran by desires for expansion and increased power than by that economic He insists any economic interest. insignifimore even were Iran regarding interests the periduring writings and cant than discussions argument, This believe. us make od he covers would is not enalthough it is put forth very cogently, one draws If convincing to this reviewer. tirely balance sheet of British or Russian ofa pre-oil regarding Iran and contrasts expenditures ficial drawn it with the rather meager private profits from Iran, the argument against even private ecobeing determining is a formidable nomic interests However, it can be shown that British subone. jects
had far
more significant
economic
interests
in India, and that the British desire to control tied to was intimately as much of Iran as possible the Russian Similarly, the need to protect India. approach toward warm water ports in the South was Fiin motivation. economic as well as strategic in the last years of the period discussed nally, by Professor Kazemzadeh, the British Government became heavily dependent on Iranian oil, as well as from its sale, and this designificantly profiting than the author gives it. serves more attention The author also seems too negative regarding Malkam Kh7an. particularly some Iranian reformers, While it is true that Malkam, as to a lesser extent, 171
FALL 1968
positions, some of the other reformers in official this does was venal and even dishonest on occasion, not mean that he is to be dismissed as a signifiModern on reform and modernization. cant influence fiIranian history is full of such contradictory to falsification gures, and if it is a nationalist heroes, make of them unblemished or barely blemished it is also a mistake to discount their reform efforts because of their sometimes impure or mixed motivations. The above points are only matters of interfrom Proon which this reviewer differs pretation fessor Kazemzadeh. These points and a few details aside, Professor Kazemzadeh's book is to be welcomto the field of modern ed as a major contribution Both relations. Iranian history and international students and scholars should put it on their must reading list.
Their DevelopCrafts of Persia: The Traditional Eastern and on Influence and ment, Technolog_, Cambridge: Wulff. E. By Hans Civilizations. Western $25.00. 1968. MIT Press, NIKKI R. KEDDIE Hans Wulff, whose untimely recent death will be mourned by all scholars of Iran, has produced a comprehensive pioneering work on the history and and industcurrent status of all the major crafts the great The book amply illustrates ries in Iran. and/or point importance of Iran as the originator and of many of the major technological of diffusion IRANIANSTUDIES
172
in human history. innovations The treatartistic however humble, is comprehensive ment of each craft, and well-illustrated, and there is an excellent glossary of terms at the end. Despite its great importance, the technological history of Iran has been shamefully neglected in the past, and it is to be hoped that others will delve more deeply into the historical aspects of technology, taking up book leaves off. The book is where this excellent of great importance for historians, anthropologists, and all scholars of Iran.
of Poems 1966-67. A Collection The Lifted Veil: Tehran, 1968. By Tanya Farmanfarmaian. Here are forty-eight pen of an Iranian
young
short
poems from the
woman, sensitive,
search-
often with innocence glittering ing, questioning, and at times with flashes of humor and wisdom. The mood, however, is one of youthful reflecprevailing and the The title tion on the wonders of life. celebrated Shelly's theme are aptly taken from sonnet: "Lift
not the painted
those
who live
call
veil
which
life."
heeds not and The poetess in this collection and she finds hypocrisy ("False the veil, lifts a Hamlettruth at every corner"), smiles...evading ian puzzle ( "My box of cookies laughs at me...But they are left untouched because of my guilt...Will I study? Or will I not?"), passion instead of love spoke of intimate words of love. ("My intentions and withered youth in His, of experience gained."), 173
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whose place sits age, "clad in the dark robes of hardened by the absence of excitement experience, In less despairing moods, she disand adventure." covers beauty in the movements and rhythms of natue ("Life is a Colored Awning," "The Caspian Shores," In one poem, "Winter," "September," and "Sunset"). "Catita," she demonstrates a talent for stinging satire: Here walks Catita, Shrouded in the immensity superficiality. In a few (The Beggar, social consciousness. hushed rebellion:
of her
War), she shows an incipient In another, she promises a
One's parents have gone out, Shattered the barrier of timelessness, And have braved a world of Treachery and indecision. Armed with cynicism, They face the comical battle of society against society; The cold war of a million timeless years... Despite some monotony of mood and a craftsin awkward infancy, Miss Farmanfarmian manship still in this colpoetic sensibility reveals considerable She is at her best when she is personal lection. rather than cosmic, immediate rather than detached medium Poetry is a difficult and philosophical. and a young poet risks for philosophic reflections, when she is seduced by the temptasentimentality tion to make prfound statements about life in general. But as a first volume of her work, this and promise. collection shows great authenticity hero, Miss Farmanfarmaian may some Just as Shelly's day become splendor of a poet among shadows. --IRANIANSTUDIES
174
M.T.
Beirut: By Ashraf Lutfi. OPECOil. Research & Publishing Center, 1968.
Middle East 120pp. S5.00.
MAJIDTEHRANIAN It is said of Samuel Gompers, the indomitable American labor leader, that when some tedious reporters prodded him on the philosophy of the labor replied in one word: MORE. movement, he tersely To the queries about the philosophy of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Established too, Gompers reply is very appropriate. of the interests in 1960 to defend the collective OPECnow includes nine of the producing countries, Venezuela, world's major exporters of crude oil: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Indonesia, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar. Unadulterated greed is probably as much operative on this side of the bargaining table as it has side of the major forbeen on the other side--the oil companies (in order of the eign concessionaire Standard Oil of New Jersey, size of their assets: Gulf, Texaco, Socony Mobil, Royal Dutch/Shell, and British Petroleum). Standard of California, But to understand the problem in purely psycholoIn perspective. gical terms is to lose historical one passage of this book, Ashraf (a former secrein Kuwait of OPECand a high official tary-general provides what may be considered petroleum affairs) claims. the moral basis of the producing countries' "might perhaps "An outside observer," he writes, that Middle East governments jump to the conclusion Majid Tehranian is Assistant Economy at Lesley College. 175
Professor
of Political
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have an insatiable appetite and that their demands will be never-ending. Yet such a conclusion would be completely unjustified. The crux of the matter is that these governments had a bad deal from the very start. What they have been striving to attain all this time is the redressment of an unfair situation; and even the situation today still requires many more improvements to bring the terms of the conventional Middle East agreements into line with normal conditions elsewhere. The Middle East governments have been at it for the past 30 years or more, but the parity they seek is still a long way off." (P. 73) Lutfi With charac Geristic forthrightness, volume proposals for represents in this little to the producing countries. As dressing justice of his previous work, Arab Oil: an amplification A Plan for the Future (Beirut, 1960), this volume is also primarily concerned with the future. It of OPEC's past but provides an excellent critique with an eye on what can be accomplished if only its members would adopt a strategy to win the initiative oil companies. from the major international and what is posBetween what is desirable sible, however, there is a wide gap. While Lutfi sentiments in the producing shares the prevailing he arguesin favor of nationalization, countries quite persuasively and in consonance with most informed opinion--that it makes no practical good sense for any individual country to go it alone. Iranian nationalization is, of course, the classic case in point. Conditions in the market have, if The companies have an even anything, worsened. greater diversity in sources of their supply of crude oil; there is an abundant and growing excess IRANIANSTUDIES
176
none of the producing countries producing capacity; and marrefining has any adequate transportation, of its own; and, perhaps above keting facilities the operative is still all, beggar-thy-neighbor countries. of the producing of the goverrunents policy abound in OPECreof solidarity While expressions no producing country is known to be ready solutions, its volume to resist the temptation of increasing of production and sales at the expense of another. The market thus continues to be a buyer's conthat by judicious market, but Lutfi believes it can duct on the part of the producing countries If there is a market. be turned into a seller's is a way. In this is a big "if"--there will--and have a poOPEC, he argues, the producing countries powerful bargaining instrument that can tentially counter the combined resources of the oil companies. But OPEChas so far played the game according to the It has approached problems piececompanies' rules. nemeal; it has wasted too much time in fruitless and fallen victim to the companies' degotiations and having failed to control prolaying tactics; it has bargained duction in the member countries, E.xcept for the mainof weakness. from a position tenance of posted prices at the August 1960 level, OPECcannot claim much that could Lutfi maintains, Straight from not have been otherwise obtained. the horse's mouth, from the pen of one of OPEC's this is a sharp rebuke. former secretary-generals, "achievenot to celebrate here is Lutfi's objective deeds. to OPEC greater ments" but to challenge proposed strategy for OPECconsists Lutfi's production controls and of a two-pronged policy, the national oil companies of forward integration The logic of both of the producing countries.
177
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is overwhelming; but so are the obstacles. policies OPEC Lutfi calculates, prorationing, With effective members would recover from the consumer an average the current of 50 cents per barrel, representing would a consumer But 63). of (p. discounts level to energy cheap a be might it as country, committed In sucker? of a role unenviable the accept policy, wilwould not consumer countries all probability, lingly submit to such a plan, and they have considto counter it. erable resources at their disposal In the absence But this is not the only obstacle. authority to plan and implement of a supranational and production quotas for the producing countries is of decisive companies, voluntary cooperation It takes only one spoiler to upset the importance. political plan, and there are enough contradictory to provide the necessary and commercial interests This is why most OPECmember countries incentives. lip service have, on the whole, paid unenthusiastic while the of production controls, to the principle oil companies have gone on record to oppose it. from the producing Lutfi asks for statesmanship on this issue, but even if we assume that, countries of remain the formidable difficulties there still a of commodil;y controls of production implementation that has so many sources, comes in a variety of crude and is put other places, types, is refined in still To solve this uses. of different to such a number a requiring Herculean task, jigsaw puzzle will be and flexibility. dexterity considerable To cite the work of the Texas Railroad Compromodel for international mission as a successful the In United is somewhat misleading. rationing government is the higher authority that acts States, as an umpire among the producers; the import quotas seal the domestic market from foreign competition;
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to have are too disorganized and consumer interests None of these condiinfluence. any countervailing But tions exist in the world market as a whole. of implementation even if we assume a successful model, on the American prorationing international it must be recognized that though production controls in the United States have maintained high and they have not solved the basic probstable prices, As Lovejoy and Homan have lem of market weakness. shown in their study of Economic Aspects of Oil 1967), prora(Baltimore, Conservation Regulation the problem of tioning has only institutionalized excess producing capacity by encouraging investment and development to capture new shares in exploration of the market or to maintain one's own, while rein support prices that make this investment sulting (p. 116) profitable. As for forSo much for production controls. road. promising more the seems this integration, ward already member countries the OPEC nine Eight out of Most of them oil companies. have their own national with foragreements have entered into partnership have their own some companies; eign concessionaire all of them But facilities. refining production and interbecome can before they to go have a long way lack all They operations. competitive nationally marand organization manpower, technical sufficient is of argument Lutfi's The burden keting outlets. oil must integrate companies that (a) the national from their control forward as rapidly as possible to the ownership of transof sources of crude oil and and marketing facilities, refining portation, such in (b) they should coordinate their activities this of But all a way as to avoid price-cutting. without effective ties in again with prorationing; national oil companies would production controls, 179
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tend to act as commercial enterprises entering a rather controlled market, by extending special conto buyers and, if need be, by price cutcessions ting. Which brings us back to where we were-the necessity for producers' solidarity. Time is on the side of the producing countries; in due course the concessions held by the major companies will expire. The first to go will be the Consortium's in Iran, which will end in 1979-.though renewable for three five-year terms-and most of those in Venezuela will terminate in 1983. Lutfi's plea is that the producing countries must prepare themselves to take over by that time at the very latest. To do this, he argues, they must have a strong bargaining position by their access to marketing outlets. In his last chapter, written after the Six-Day War of June 1967 between Israel and the that the time may be ripe for Arabs, he reflects the Arabs to take decisive steps towards collective nationalization. However, to insure success, three conditions must be met: (1) In a five to ten-year plan, the Arabs must acquire a tanker fleet capable of transporting at least 50 percent of their production of crude oil, (2) then all of the major Arab producing countries must join the plan, and oil must be enof the nationalized (3) disposal trusted to a single marketing organization. By nationalization would yield 1973, Lutfi calculates, substantially greater revenues to the Arabs than under present arrangements. This is true,he argues, even if we assume lack of cooperation by the oil companies and increased exports from non-Arab sources (pp. 85-86). tions
Without entering into Byzantine argumentaover figures, Lutfi fails to account for the
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community of interest which exists between the oil companies and the consumer countries in sabotaging any nationalization plans. So long as the oil corpanies appropriated to themselves most or part of from high prices, the profits resulting they shared a strong common interest with the producing countries in squeezing the consumer. But as additional profit margins accrue to the producing countries alone in this plan, neither the consumers nor the oil companies have any interest in seeing it succeed. Appeals to the consumers' metaphysical interest in the continuing success and prosperity of the producing countries would deter them from bargaining only as much as the oil companies' claims of indispensibility have deterred the producing to take as large a share of countries from efforts the profits as possible. in crude oil producDue to great variation tion cost in the major producing centers of the world (in declining order of their average costs: U.S., USSR, Venezuela, North Africa, and the Middle East), the international petroleum industry is characterized by the presence of very high economic rents. (For our purposes, we define rent as anyThe residuthing above cost plus normal profits.) al rent which accrues to the lower cost and more advantageously-located crudes has been for a long between the oil companies time a bone of contention and producing countries. Resulting from complications of cost and price calculations, however, rent is an unknown and possibly unknowable quantity. the bargaining power of the respectConsequently, ive parties tends to be the ultimate arbitrator. the Starting from a weaker bargaining position, have seen in OPECan instrument producing countries of collective bargaining for taking as large as 181
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Under the rent. a share of the available possible weak marand capacity producing excess prevailing to take begun has also consumer ket conditions,the of form the in share of the rent an increasing sources of discounts below prices of competitive The oil companies as well as the producenergy. share a common interest ing and consumer countries and maintenance of prices at a in the stability with other sources of energy level competitive coal, atomic energy and indigenous oil and (i.e., to the companies gas) that guarantees normal profits economic rent to and the full measure of available This is a common ground the producing countries. commodity on the basis of which an international agreement could be formulated for the rationalizamarket for crude oil. tion of the international that all Under such an agreement it is preferable measures such as the U.S. import discriminatory threats of supply quota and the producing countries' should be removed. Also, an Internationdisruption composed of the representaal Petroleum Authority, tives of the producing and consuming countries, to provide the machinery for could be established It would be wise the enforcement of the agreement. (1) the rights to guarantee for such an Authority between crude prices of nationalization, (2) parity the producing oil and manufactured goods which and (3) import from consuming countries, countries maximum freedom of trade. It seems that until such a time as foresight lead the governments of or force of circumstances to come to such producing and consuming countries of the oil inagreement, the ills an international Market instability, dustry will remain with us. threats and bluffs of continuous hard bargaining, various sorts will be the price everyone will have IRANIANSTUDIES
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to pay. There will long as there is no and comprehensively til such time, it is would act in defense consumers in search companies
questing
be no panacea to these ills so will to attack the problems in a statesmanlike manner. Unto be expected that everyone of his own immediate interests: of lowest possible oil prices,
for
profits
and diversity
of
supply sources, while the producing countries pant for "more." The latter are well-advised, under these circumstances, to strengthen their bargaining position by any and all means: collective bargainforward integration ing, production controls, of the national oil companies, progressive reform of the present concessionary agreements into partnerships and contracts, individual nationalization if feasible, and collective nationalization if at all possible. of the obstacles Despite its underestimation to production controls and collective nationalization, Lutfi's essay is a forthright contribution to a necessary dialogue in the producers' camp. Now, however, the dialogue must be broadened to include The international the consuming countries as well. petroleum industry has for too long been run almost exclusively by a small group of major oil companies. Oil is too important to be left entirely to the oilmen. Those whose vital interests are at stake-consumers and producers alike--must have the deciof the industry. sive say in regulation And in the of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) Organization and OPEC, the major importing and exporting countries are fortunate enough to have the necessary comachinery for forging such an international operation.
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