No title

Iranian Studies Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies STATE ANd Soci ETy IN IRAN CONTRIBUTORS: ERVANdAbRAhAM...

Author: Amin Banani (Guest Editor)

40 downloads 846 Views 9MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!

Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

Iranian

Studies

Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

STATE ANd

Soci

ETy

IN

IRAN CONTRIBUTORS: ERVANdAbRAhAMiAN AMiN BANANi C.E. BOSWORTII RiChARd

W.

BUlLiET

G.R. CARThWAiTE FARIAd KAZEMi

Nikki R. KEddiE REiNhold LOEftrkR JAMES J. A. REZA

REid ShEikholIESIAMi

JOhN MASSON SMiTh, JFR.

VOlUMEXi, 1978

THE SOCIETY FOR IRANIAN STUDIES COUNCIL Ahmad Ashraf, Plan & Budget Organization and University of Tehran Amiii Baniani, University of Calilbrnia, Los Angeles Ali Ban nlazizi, Boston college Lois Gr-antBeck, (Universityo IUtal Oleg G rabair,IlharvardUniversity Eric J. Ilooglund, Bosvdoin College M.A. Jazayery, U,iiversity of Texas at Austint TlhomasM. lRicks,ex officio, GeorgetowniUniversity Marvini Zoi is, Univer-sityof Chicago EXECUTIVECOMMITTEE Gene R. Garlthiwaite, Excut tive Secretary

M. IRicks,Treaslurer Tlhomiias Ali Banuazizi, Editor

IRANIAN STUDIES Journal of the Society for Iranian Studies Editor: Ali Banuazizi Book Review Editor: Ervand Abrahamian Associate Editors: Anne Enayat Vahid F. Nowshirvani Mangol Bayat Philipp Copy Editor: Naomi Schorr Circulation Manager: Rosemary Gianino

Copyright, 1979, The Society for IranianStudies Published in the U.S.A. USISSN 002-0862 Address all communications to IRANIAN STUDIES, Box J-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts02167, U.S.A.

Journal of The Society for Iranian Studies

STATE ANd SOCIETYIN IRAN

Amin Banani Guest Editor

A joint publicationof the Gustavvon GrunebaumCenter for Near EasternStudies (Universityof California,Los Angeles) and The Society for IranianStudies.

Volume

XI

(1978)

Table

of

Contents

3 PREFACE

Amin Banani

7 THE HERITAGEOF RULERSHIPIN EARLY ISLAMICIRAN AND THE SEARCHFOR DYNASTICCONNECTIONSWITHTHE PAST

C.E. Bosworth

35 LOCALPOLITICSIN EASTERNIRAN UNDER THE GHAZNAVIDSAND SELJUKS 57 TURANIANNOMADISMAND IRANIANPOLITICS

Richard W.Bulliet John MassonSmith, Jr.

83 REFLECTIONSON THE SOCIALAND ECONOMICSTRUCTUREOF SAFAVID PERSIAAT ITS ZENITH

Amin Banani

117 THE QAJAR UYMAQIN THE SAFAVID PERIOD, 1500-1722

JamesJ. Reid

145 TRIBALORDER AND THE STATE: THE POLITICALORGANIZATIONOF BOIRAHMAD 173 PASTORALNOMADISMAND TRIBALPOWER 199 THE PATRIMONIALSTRUCTUREOF IRANIANBUREAUCRACYIN THE LATENINETEENTHCENTURY 259 THE NONREVOLUTIONARYPEASANTRY OF MODERNIRAN 305 CLASSSTRUCTUREAND POLITICAL POWERIN IRAN SINCE 1796

Reinhold Loeffler G.R. Garthwaite

A. Reza Sheikholeslami

FarhadKazemiand ErvandAbrahamian Nikki R. Keddie

IranianStudies, Volume XI, 1978.

Preface

The seed for this collection of essays has been long germinating. It grew out of a symposium on the "Structure of Power in Islamic Iran," jointly sponsored by the Society for Iranian Studies and the UCLACenter for Near Eastern Studies in 1969. But the present collection includes two generations of papers, grown as it were, from the same seed. Limitations of space dictate that those papers from the 1969 be excluded symposium which have been published elsewhere from this volume. In all, five papers from that period-albeit four of them revised--are included here. The remaining contributions (by Abrahamian and Kazemi, Keddie, Loeffler, Reid and Sheikholeslami) are new. The common concern of all the essays in this collection is the relationship of the rulers to the ruled. We are at a stage in the study of Iranian society and its political structure where bold conceptual positions are taken and ideological battle lines are formed on the basis of as and episodic Much of our work yet insufficient knowledge. orion feudalism, begins with speculations patrimonialism, ental despotism and other synthetic models. Grand gauntlets are flung and heavy halberds are wielded where a disand researcher's are needed. sector's scalpel microscope This is not to deny the added light that every analytical of the fabric of Iranian sociconcept may shed on portions ety; but only to remind ourselves that we are often victims of preconceived dogmas and inappropriate constructs.

3

are fully aware of The authors in this collection and engaged in the conceptual dilemmas of analyzing and structure of Iranian society the political characterizing But they are able to bring to context. in its historical their subjects a degree of methodological integrity and comnendable. openness that is refreshing.and philosophical Although no measure of comprehensiveness could be attempted or should be expected in this volume, the essays do treat history some major themes of Iranian social and political that are tensions certain examine They era. Islamic the in endemic in the history of Iran. Among these are tensions that exist between central and local power, between autocracy and autonomy, between imperial administration and in organization and ruling of tribal custom; variations core provinces and borderlands; tensions that pit the sedelements of the population against entary and semi-settled coexistence and coThey focus upon conflict, each other. and and pastoralists, operation between agriculturalists clash of non-military and military goals the all-important They delve into the cultural gap between and organization. into the tensions between the Percountry, the the town and sian and the non-Persian elements among the population. They examine the struggle for power and privilege between They assess and the military elites. the administrative and mothe tension between the forces of stratification which are not resolved by any change in the tradibility, tional class structure, but provide a modicum of upward and downward mobility. Interacting with these endemic tensions are certain rebetween land power; current themes: the basic relationship the inevitable precedence of military exigency, as perceived by the rulers, over the integral order of a land-based economy; the defined and conditional nature of authority; and the unlimited but precarious exercise of power; and the ever-reform. currence of both protest and reform in religious Few cultures have contributed so much to the history Even fewer display a of theory and practice of kingship. Theories wider gap between that theory and its practice. extend from a primeval pastor-monarch who is surrounded by an aura of divine confrontation and protection so long as he tends to his flock with equanimity and compassion; to IRANIAN STUDIES

the deeply enshrined and religiously sanctioned concept of The practice breaks down as the legitimation by justice. object of ruling becomes the extension of exploitation and perpetuation of privilege. In the moments of crisis when monarchical misrule is challenged by religious opposition, it is equally necessary to be aware of the chasm between the professed ideals, and the motives and class behavior of the religious leaderThere is much in Twelver Shi'i political ship. thought both to uphold absolute rule and to deny its legitimacy. What should not be forgotten is that those principles which breed pious protest and challenge tyranny were formulated in early Islamic times when the Shilis were a persecuted and powerless minority. But ever since the mid-Safavid era the Shi'i ulama as a class have been a privileged adjunct to the ruling system. The accommodation has not been easy. It has been fraught with all the conflicts of a disparate and comIt has even engendered fleeting mopeting ruling caste. ments of genuine mass support for anti-despotic movements. But ultimately the gulf between the few rulers and the many ruled has remained and widened. In the traditional pattern of Iranian society the rulers, be they grand monarchs, tribal chieftains, military lords, master bureaucrats, great mujtahids or local magnates, have only competed or cooperated to maintain and enlarge their share of power and privilege. The vast body of the ruled have merely endured their inhuman burden. They have given sullen forbearance to their immediate rulers in quiet times. In times of change they have given their enthusiastic support--and sometimes fanatical following--to those among the rulers whose oppression they felt less at thetime. In the preparation of these papers for publication I have had the able help of Teresa Joseph, the kind assistance of Nina Bertelesen and the loyal aid of George Bournoutian and Andrew Newman. In the matter of transliteration each author was left to his choice. Amin Banani Los Aigeles October, 1978 5

IranianStudies, Volume XI, 1978.

The in

Early

The

of

Heritage

Iran

Islamic Search

Connections

R ulersh

for

ip and

Dynastic With

The

Past C. E. Bosworth

The question of the continuity of rulership and governmental structures between the Sasanid and early Islamic periods merits detailed study, but has not yet received it; yet it is evident to the most superficial observer that this continuity was in many spheres a close one. Obviously, there was a violent change in the field of established religion and cult; the state church of Zoroastrianism was overthrown and the new faith of Islam introduced. Yet even here, it is not impossible to discern some elements of continuity. Islam could conceivably be viewed as a new, purified form of Zoroastrianism brought by a new prophet. Allah and Iblis could be equated with Ahiura Mazda and Ahriman; there was a commonbelief in a creation story, in a resurrection, heaven and hell, and in angels and other spirits; both religions had the practices of worship and prayer and sacred texts; and the fatalistic aspects of Zurvanism, the form that Zoroastrianism took in the later Sasanid period, was not unlike the determinist views that became influential, if not In the linguisuniversally acknowledged, in early Islam. tic and cultural sphere, the Middle Persian or Pahlavi

C. E. Bosworth is Professor of Arabic Studies in the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Manchester University, England. 7

language disappeared as a spoken tongue, and outside certain peripheral areas where Islam was late in penetrating, and outside the surviving Zoroastrian communities, it disappeared as a literary medium. Even amongst the Zoroastrian groups, knowledge of Pahlavi had sharply declined by the end of the tenth century; in 978 we have the comthe position of Kai Ka'fus b. Kai Khusrau's Zaradusht-nama, But the themes of first Zoroastrian text in New Persian. such as the heroic ones that older Persian literature, later reappeared in the numerous poetic epics of the tenth urbane, and the themes of polite, and eleventh centuries, which reappeared in Arabic literaand courtly literature, ture and in the Arab-Persian Mirrors for Princes, certainly survived to have a very marked influence on the whole course of Arabic and Islamic literature. It is, however, continuity in the governmental traditions of Islamic Iran which concerns us here. The theocratic ruler, as familiar in Persia as in the rest of the The Abbasid Ancient Near East, certainly disappeared. theocratic Caliphs came to make their regime increasingly the ulama as supin atmosphere, assiduously cultivating or ports of their throne, and adopting honorific titles alqab which expressed their dependence on God or which of their rule in His guidance. This grounded the stability leader exaltation of the Caliph into an Imamor religious seems, however, to stem purely from an inner development within the Islamic community. The Abbasids came to power supporters of the claims of the Ahl in 750 as ostensible Very soon after the Abbaal-Bait, the Prophet's family. was to be it became clear that Ahl al-Bait sid revolution, interpreted as meaning the descendants of the Prophet's uncle al-CAbbas, and not those of his cousin and son-inlaw cAll, the Shica, by an equally vigorous proclamation Professor Bernard of an Abbasid claim to divine favor. Lewis has recently pointed out the messianic implications of the later application of the honorific al-Manqur to the second Abbasid Caliph AbuiJacfar.l It is more permissible to discern Persian influence the orin some of the external trappings of Abbasid rule: a chamwith hierarchical the on lines, court ganization of IRANIAN STUDIES

8

berlain or h3jib guarding the monarch from contact with the masses; the introduction of a harem system, with eunuch attendants and with the Caliphs ceasing to contract marriages with free wives after the end of the eighth century; the formation of a regular circle or boon companions (nudama') attendant on the Caliphs in their periods of relaxation; and the requirement of the prostration or taqbfl on all those coming before the ruler's exalted presence (though as this is equally reminiscent of the Byzantine proskyn5sis of Persian models). Certain of these trends can be traced and the interest of back in part to late Umayyadpractice, such forceful UmayyadCaliphs as CAbd al-Malik and Hisham noin Persian stories and Persian practices is explicitly ted by the Islamic historians.2 Perhaps the most obvious sphere where continuity of tradition with the Persian past can be traced is that of the actual governmental institutions and the practices of The institution of the Vizierate, that their personnel. of the Caliph's chief executive officer, has been the subAn Iranian specialist like Chrisject of much discussion. tensen endeavored, in the early part of this century, to find the forerunner of the Vizier in the Sasanid chief But the subsequent reminister, the Buzurg framadh5r. searches of scholars like Goitein, Sourdel, and Bravmann have demonstrated the Vizierate to be instead a developtraditions, just ment of indigenous Arabic administrative seems to be a native Semitic one, as the word wazhr itself with the basic meaning of "helper, supporter in war" and with cognates in Hebrew, rather than a derivation from Middle Persian vi6ir "decree, judgement," which does not occur at all as the title of any known Sasanid administrative official.3 In all questions pertaining to the internal organization of the Sasanid empire, we are hampered by the paucity of contemporary Middle Persian sources, Arabic ones. and our consequent dependence on post-Islamic a Yet if the Vizier himself was not necessarily figure transported from the Sasanid court, the financial and administrative organs over which he presided had many The term for an officlear links with the Iranian past. cial register and hence for a government department, that 9

Vol.

XI, 1978

In the western of dlwin, is almost certainly Persian. lands of the Caliphate, a silver coinage on Sasanid patterns continued to be minted by the Arabs till the end of Until the naql ad-dlw5n decreed by the seventh century. CAbd al-Malik in 78/697, records of financial and adminisin Iraq and western Persia continued trative transactions to be made in the Persian language; the change was not made 124/742, in the Caliphate of Hishin. in eastern Persia till Of course, this change of language did not entail any and finanThe Persian secretaries change in personnel. cial clerks had early adopted the language of their conquerors, and continued to stay at their posts, for it was long before the Arabs themselves acquired the expertise to cope with the complexities of administration and finance.4 The organization of the state postal service, the to the first Umayyad Caliph Mucawiya, Bar1d, is attributed Such a with improvements later made by CAbd al-Malik. postal system was known to both the Byzantines and the Sasanids, and was an obvious desideratum for a ruler trying to exert some sort of control over the peripheries of an empire composed of a loose assemblage of provinces. Karl Wittfogel has seen such a network as the concomitant Although "hydraulic" societies.5 of despotic, centralizing of Late Latin-Greek origin, the the term barnd is itself technical vocabulary of the service contained several Persian terms (as is shown by the tenth century author Khwarazml's section on the terminology of the Diwan al-Barld the Mafatit) alin his encyclopaedia of the sciences, Cul5m) and the popular mind gave to the term barnd a PerThe postal service was to survive in the sian etymology.6 Caliphal lands and in those of the prov'incial dynasties ruling in Iran, until it was in the eleventh century abandoned by the Great Seljuqs, much to the disgust of their celebrated Vizier, Nizam al-Mulk; and the need for accounts was of routes and the positions on them of staging-posts an important stimulus to the development of Islamic geographical literature.

IRANIAN STUDIES

10

II By the ninth century, a symbiosis of the two culthe Arab-Muslim and the Persian ones, tural traditions, had been largely achieved. We may accept Gibb's thesis that the Shucibiyya controversies of this century had a as well as a literary aspect, and that what sociological was really at stake was the whole direction of Islamic Yet Gibb perhaps overestimated the success of culture. the pro-Arabs' defensive reaction. The partisans of the cAjamis were successful to the extent that the resultant Islamic civilization was in many regards an amalgam of the two traditions, a coming together on equal terms, and was not entirely the absorption by the Arab-Muslim tradition of just those Persian elements that it consciously close to accept, whilst rejecting the rest, as was Gibb's final conclusion. 7 Despite the bitterness of the Shuciiblyya controthe Arabs had always recognized the grandeur and versies, splendor of the ancient Persian civilization to which they had succeeded by conquest in the seventh century. The physical monuments of this culture, visible, for instance, in the Taq-i Kisra at Ctesiphon, in the ruins of Persepolis or Istakhr, in the Achaemenid and Sasanid rock reliefs and in the network of fire temples which still covered much of Persia in the first three centuries or so of Islam, were impressive enough. The Arabs of the Jahiliyya had recognized here an obvious superiority to their own degraded condition, as was likewise the case in regard to Byzantium; the external of Persian culture, manifestations such as their palaces, their weapons, their household possessions, are referred to in terms of praise by the pre-Islamic poets, and it is only the (to the Arabs) incomprehensible or tumtumaniyya) language of the Persians (their stuttering

or the mumbling (zamzama) of the Zoroastrian priests, which are referred to in derogatory terms. Only with the coming of Islam did the religious

fervor

of the Arabs create

a

feeling of hostility towards the Persians, their autocratic monarchy, their social system and their religion; the victory of the Arabs' Islamic religion over such a seemingly impregnable empire must surely have seemed a clear sign of the Arabs' superiority over the defeated nations.8 Even 11

Vol XI,

1978

so, a pure Arab of Quraish, one not blinded by religious partisanship, like the Umayyad Caliph Yaz;d b. al-Walid b. CAbd al-Malik (reigned 126/744), could boast I am the descendant of the Persian Emperor, my forefather was Marwan, and both the Emperor of Byzantium and the Khaqan of the Turks were my ancestors.9 When local, autonomous dynasties arose invarious parts of the Caliphate from the ninth century onwards, they often tried to establish a connection with the Arab-Islamic past by attaching themselves to some figure in the Prophet Mulammad's entourage, or to one of the early Muslims, or to some tribe of the Arab aristocracy. The process can be traced at both ends of the Islamic world, amongst both the Berbers and the Persians. From the early decades of the Arab conquests, the subject peoples had endeavored to acquire some of the privileges of the Arab ruling class through the institution of clientage, wala', a status which gave the maula little, if any, social standing, but which did afford some fiof registration nancial advantage, such as the possibility in the d1w5n, among the Arab muq5tila, for a pension.l1 The Tahirid family, who came to govern Khurasan during the years 205-259/821-873 and who also held for much longer lucrative offices in Iraq like the military governorship of Baghdad and the governorship of the Sawad, were originally of Herat and Puishang in eastern Persians from the district Khurasan. The first known member of the family, Ruzaiq, great-grandfather of Tahir Dhiu 1-Yaminain, was a maula of the Arab noble Tal4a b. CAbdallah, governor of Sistan from He therefore became entitled to use 62/681-2 till 64/683-4. the nisba of ''al-KhuzVci,tI from Talha's tribe of Khuzaca, a tribe considered more noble in some respects than Quraish itself.11 Although the Tahirids' claim to the designation "alKhuzclc" was in the early part of the ninth century attacked by an Arab poet like Dicbil b. CAll,himself genuinely from Khuz&ca and very proud of it, in the later years of the century the governor of Baghdad CUbaidallah b. cAbdallTh b. Thhir was known as "Shaikh of Khuzacau' and acknowledged as head T1hirid of the tribe, because of the immense prestige i the family.12 The Tahirids' connection through clientage to the Arabs was authentic enough; but the connections claimed IRANIAN STUDIES

12

by some other Persian ruling fetched.

houses were grotesque

and far-

In his panegyric on the Dailamis and his Buyid masters, the Kitab at-T3ji fl akhbar ad-daula ad-Dailamiyya,13 Abu Ishaq IbrThim a~-$bi' (d. 387/997) repeats a story that appears in other tenth century Arabic sources, such as Mascildi, Ibn Duraid, Istakhri, and Ibn Hauqal. According to this story, the Dailamis were originally from the South Arabian tribe of Dabba (Dailam and JIl being originally brothers), but had migrated as a result of tribal warfare in Arabia to northwestern Persia. In the course of time they had merged with the surrounding Persian population and so lost their Arabic language, but had retained their military qualities and the supreme Arabic virtues of hospitality and liberality.14 The Seljuq official Abil l-CAla' ibn Hassal, hostile to the Biyids and their eulogist, rightly repours scorn on this tale, that there is no historical cord of such a migration; that in the early Islamic period the Banu Dabba enjoyed the favor of the Umayyads and so had no reason to emigrate; and that Abui Ishaq Ibrahim had deliberately chosen an Arab tribe whose genealogy was noIf he had been able, Ibn Hassuil adds toriously confused. he would have attached cAdud ad-Daula to Quscathingly, raish! l The Ghiurid Sultans assembled a vast if transient empire in eastern Persia, Afghanistan, and northern India in the second half of the twelfth century and the early years It might be thought that this obscure of the thirteenth. family of mountaineers were the last Iranian dynasty to be able to forge any connection with the house of the Meccan Prophet; their homeland, Ghar, was for long an enclave of to the Islamic geopaganism, a complete terra incognita graphers, until the Ghaznavids penetrated its fastnesses in the eleventh century and introduced Islam there.16 Actually to trace a blood connection between a family from this remote corner of Afghanistan and the Arabians in their homeland was beyond the capabilities of the Ghuirids' most skillful Fakhr-i Mudabbir panegyrist and court historian, Mubarakshah, who flourished in northern India under the last Ghuirids and their epigone; Sultan Iltutmish of Delhi. 13

Vol.

Xi,

1978

He had to trace the dynasty back to the tyrant of Iranian mythology, Azhd Zahak, whose descendants were said to have entrenched themselves in Ghiir when Zahak's thousand-yearIt was not beold dominion was overthrown by Faridiln.17 conyond human ingenuity, however, to devise a historical nection between Ghuirand the early CaliphAte. The Ghiurid historian Minhaj-i Siraj Jiizjani (d. in the second half of the thirteenth century) puts forward the view, which must have been formulated as the GhQrids emerged into history and built up their empire, that the eponymous founder of the dynasty, Shansab or Shanasb (Gushnasp), was a contemporary of the Caliph CAll b. Abi Talib and received Islam He received from cAll an infrom the Caliph in person. which were a standard (iiwa'), and (Cahd) vestiture patent handed and family the Shansaban; within guarded jealously As if this were not down from generation to generation. enough, the Ghiri Amir Fiilad b. Shansab is made to take part in the Abbasid Revolution at AbuiMuslim's side, and the Shansabanls are later brought to the court in Baghdad of Hdri1n ar-Rashid to have their claim to the rulership (limrat)

of Ghftr confirmed.18

Parallel with this movement to attach native Persian dynasties somehow or other to the Arab past or the family of the Prophet, with all the social and religious prestige that accrued from this linking, we can discern a much stronger trend, that of attaching Persian families to the Iranian epic past or to the more recently historical Sasinid imperial past of their native land. The trend was stronger because it was clearly in practice much easier to Instead of the toradduce a plausible kinship connection. tuous contriving necessary to connect the distant northern and eastern fringes of the Iranian world with the Hijaz, could be made from Sasanid days to the an easy transition time of their successors of three or four centuries later Some of these later in more or less the same territory. such as the Samanids of Transoxania, Persian dynasties, sprang from the dihqgn class or landowning aristocracy in the Sasanid emand gentry, which had been influential pire as military commanders, provincial governors, and so on, and which had on occasions married into the royal house. IRANIAN STUDIES

.14

In the case of certain minor Caspian dynasties, which survived in a very isolated and socially conservative region to which Islam came only late, their origins can with fair plausibility be traced back to the late Sasanid period. The Baduspanids (45-1006/665-1599) traced their origin to Gavbara, who came from Armenia in the time of the last Sasanid Emperor, Yazdigird III (632-651), and was by him appointed Gavbara's two sons Dagovernor of the Caspian provinces. biuya and Baduspan, established lines in Gilan and Tabaristhe first the petty dynasty of Dabuiyids tan respectively, 9 The Bawandids (45-750/665-1349) traced (40-144/660-761). their line back to one Baw, who was either the Ispahbadh of Tabaristan appointed by Khusrau Aparviz (591-628) or a leading Zoroastrian of Ray. In the case of both these dynasties, the great length of their period of survival, most unusual for the Islamic world, is a measure of the political isolation of the Caspian region.20 The Afrlghid Khwarazm-Shahs were likewise a dynasty that spanned the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods, and Khwarazmwas likewise a geographically isolated province, in effect an oasis of settled land within the steppes and connected with the rest of the Iranian world only by the Oxus. According to the local author Birfini (d.ca.1050) the progeny of Siyavush b. Kai Ka'fis had ruled in Khwarazmsince their arrival there ca. 1200 B.C., and a younger line of these Siyavushids, the Afrighids, ruled from ca. A.D. 305 till their overthrow by an internal rebellion in 995. Birtini, in fact lists twenty-two rulers of the Afrighids coverning these seven hundred years. Although Qutaiba b. Muslim appeared in Khwarazmin 712 and caused much destruction to the old Khwarazmian culture, the Afrighids were left to rule as loose tributaries--a unique event in this period of the Arab conquests in Iran and Central Asia, and only explicable by the eccentric geographical position of Khwarazmand Arab fears of dangerouslyextended communication lines if a full military occupation of the province had been attempted.21 But even where dynasties arose from comparatively humble tribal backgrounds, as in the case of the Dailamis, or from downright plebian it was not too great a stretch ones, like the Saffarids, of the imagination to believe that, in the chaos of the Arab invasions of Persia and the tragedy of the downfall of the Sasanids, families having kinship connections with 15

Vol.

XI,

1978

continue quietly to exthe royal house should nevertheless of rulership should come ist, until the inherent qualities to the surface and have free play once more. plane, much of the Persian epic On the intellectual and the lore concerning the Persian emperors had, by the been absorbed into the common ninth and tenth centuries, when the Perespecially fabric of Islamic civilization, literary genre of adab and its principal exsian-inspired ponents, the secretary class, had been accepted into the Stories of cosmopolitan society of the Abbasid Caliphate. the old Persian heroes and kings had long been part of the commonNear Eastern stock of tales and romances even before was struggling to make the coming of Islam. When Mubaammad his potential message, to his listen his fellow Meccans audience kept being enticed away by the superior attractions of the story teller an-Na4r b. al-Harith; an-Nadr had been in the Lakhmid capital of Hira and had learnt there tales of the kings of Persia and of Rustam and IsSuch emperors as Khusrau Aniishirvan and Khusfandiyar.22 later date, the wise minisrau Aparviz, and at a slightly ter Buzurgmihr,23 begin to be familiar figures in Arabic magand anecdotes about their justice, adab literature; nanimity, wisdom, and so forth play an even bi'ger part in Hence to the Arab-Persian "Mirrors for Princes" genre.2 trace one's ancestry back to these rulers did not automastance. imply the adoption of an anti-Islamic tically Where feasible connection could be made, a Persian dynasty might attempt to get the best of both worlds and links with both the Arab-Islamic past and the establish with especial clariIranian one. This can be illustrated the Buyids. the and of TThirids ty from the history According to Masciidi, the TThirids claimed to be descendants of Rustam b. Ddstan.25 That they simultaneously claimed a connection on one hand with the Arab tribes of Khuzaca and Quraish, and on the other with the ancient Persian emperors, is expressly stated in some satirical verses of their opponent Dicbil b. cAll (d. 248/860), written at the death in 207/822 of Tahir Dhu 1-Yaminain:

IRANIAN STUDIES

16

Tahir has left us three marvels, which put everyone's wits into a whirl. Three wretched ones, with a commonfather and mother, but with distinguishing features to set each one apart. One group says, "My people is Quraish," but both the clients and those of pure blood refute this. Another group traces its genealogy to Khuzaca, [although this is] a clientship old and well-known. A third group inclines towards the house of Kisra, but these are considered to be vile foreigners. We have been overwhelmed with the numbers of their genealogies; whereas, in fact, all are equally spurious.26

The Tahirids found a defender against such attacks as this in the Persian Shcibi poet CAllan b. al-Hasan al-Warraq, well-known as a doughty protagonist in the cAjamil cause. Praising CAbdallah b. Tahir for his Persian antecedents, he says: [cAbdallah is] a descendant of Rustam, in the zenith of nobility, adorned with a diadem and crown, With the marks of abundant nobility and approbation upon him, because of his majesty. .....

ID .........

....0............**

....

*e

-4

@ @

Our forefathers

are of the royal stock of Persia (Kisr3wiyypt ubuwwatun), outstanding leaders, shining examples and generous souls.27

Culturally and intellectually, the Tahirids were highly arabised; they rank amongst the most munificent patrons of Arabic learning and literature of their day, and almost every member of the family was himself a competent poet or prose stylist in Arabic.28 Yet CAbdallah, established in his capital of Nishapur in Khurasan, a province where the older Persian social system, with its attendant heroic features of military prowess and hospitality long persisted, and where memories of old Persian glories were still fresh, cannot have been displeased to have been counted amongst the heroes and monarchs of ancient Iran; this ambivalent attitude towards the relative de17

Vol.

XI,

1978

sirability of Arab or Persian lineage reflects the currents of thought and the uncertainties of this century of transition, in which the Persians had already reached the highest pinnacles of political influence in the state and were now challenging the social dominance of the Arabs. The fantastic story that the Dailamis were originally Arabs of the Bang Dabba or BanuiT-amimhas been mentioned above. Since it appears in sources written before the middle of the tenth century, the story must have gone into circulation at quite an early date, when the heroic age of Dailami expansion was hardly over. Abui Ishaq Ibrahim wrote his T3j! for CA4ud ad-Daula, aiming to justify his master's imperial policy and to vaunt the claim of the Dailamis, hitherto considered as crude barbarians, to be part of the comity of Islamic nations. By the time of the second generation of rulers, the boorishness of the first Buiyids had largely gone; cAdud ad-Daula and his successors became warm patrons of Arabic literature and science, and it was at the Bilyid court in Shiraz that the greatest of Arabic poets, Mutanabbi, spent one of the happier periods of his life. The Persian genealogy of the Buiyids is given by Hamza alI?fahdn1 and Biriini in his Chronology of Ancient Nations. Biriini quotes the lost part of the Ta3ji, that the Buyids' genealogy extends back to the Sasanid Emperor Bahram Giir (420-438). He was, however, sceptical about the Dailamis' and was not disposed care for keeping correct genealogies, to accept the Buiyid one beyond the father of Buya, Fanakhusrau. Before they left Dailam to seek their fortunes as condottieri in the disturbed Persian countryside of the early tenth century, the three Bayid brothers were clearly in Ibn alof only middling status (mutawassit al-hal, Athir's words), even though Abu Ishaq IbrThim says in the extant part of the T3jl that the Buiyids belonged to the Shirdhilawand of Lahijan, noblest of the four tribes of Dailam.29 There are certain pointers that show that the Buyids had more than a passing interest in the old Iranian past. Zoroastrianism continued in the tenth century to flourish The in what had been the heart of Sasanid Persia, Firs. biography of the Sufi shaikh Abii Ishaq IbrThim Kazarani IRANIAN STUDIES

18

shows how strong the Zoroastrians were in Firs as late as the first The Zoroastriquarter of the eleventh century. ans of Kazariun prevented the shaikh from building a mosque,

having the backing of the Zoroastrian governor of the town, Khfirshid, himself high in the favor of the Biiyid Amir in Shiraz; they complained, too, about the shaikh's Islamic and had him arraigned before the proselytizing activities Amir and reprimanded.30 In the course of his antiquarian investigations, CAdud ad-Daula visited the ruins of the old Achaemenid capital of Persepolis and had an inscription carved there to commemorate his visit; he also got a local Zoroastrian mobadh to interpret for him the Pahlavi inscriptions there.31 cAdud ad-Daula was also harking back to ancient Persia when he used the imperial title Shahanshah "King of kings," already attested on a coin minted in Fars in 359/970, which depicts the Amir in a fashion resembling that of the Sasanid emperors, and has a Pahlavi inscription "May the Shahanshah's royal splendour increase!" It was only in the Arab and more strongly orthodox Islamic region of Iraq that cAdud ad-Daula's in 429/1038 grandson Jalal ad-Daula ran into criticism when he adopted the title, for the ultra pious considered that such a title belonged to God alone.3 is one of the most Mardawij b. Ziyar (d. 323/935) flamboyant, even bizarre (in Minorsky's description, "fantasque et barbare"), characters in the upsurge of the Dailamis. His conquests in northern and central Persia paved the way for the more lasting of the Buyids, and successes CAll b. Buya, the later cImad ad -Daula, began in Marddwlj's service. The historians (who are, admittedly, hostile generally witnesses) allege that Mardawlj dreamed of reviving the old Persian empire and religion, with himAt Hamadan and Dinawar, his troops self as supreme ruler. made a special point of massacring the Muslim religious classes, ulama and Sufis alike. When he had gained control of much of western Persia, including Ray and Qazwln, he had made for himself a golden throne set with jewels, donned regal clothes, and had made for himself a golden bejewelled crown, having previously enquired about the In place of the rough crowns of the ancient Persians. he and camaraderie of the Dailami soldiery, familiarity 19

Vol.

XI,

1978

would have his army drawn up in ranks before him, at a distance, as if he were a monarch distantly enthroned and out of contact with the masses; only his closest officers could address him. Fired by pseudo-prophesies and the encouragement of his advisers, he is said to have dreamed of conquering Iraq, rebuilding Ctesiphon. and the palace of the Kisras, and then assuming the title of Shahanshah. If these reports be true, it is not surprising that this apparent megalomania was cut short by his assassination at the time when he was celebrating the old Zoroastrian feast of Sadhaq.33 After the meteoric rise and fall of Mardawlj, his family, the Ziyarids, settled for a less ambitious role in northern Persia and in particular, in Gurgan and Tabaristan. Biriini wrote his Chronology of Ancient Peoples at the court of Mardawlj's nephew Qabus b. Vushmagir, but he was unable to trace Qabius' genealogy back farther than Mard5w1j's grandfather in Giln, Wardanshah, though he emphasizes the nobility of Qabiis' ascendants on the female side, the Ispahbadhiyya line of Bawandids.34 A more elaborate genealogy appears, however, in the preface to the Qabus-nama, written by Qabuls' grandson Kai Ka'us b. Iskandar. This makes Qabas the descendant of Arghush b. Farhadan, king of Gilln in the time of Kai Khusrau, whose story is discussed, so Kai Ka'uls says, in the Book ofKings Abii l-Mu'ayyad Balkhi. of one of Firdausi's predecessors, This genealogy must then have been elaborated after Biriini's time, that is, during the middle or later years of the like Hameleventh century; it appears in later historians dallah Mustaufi and Mirkhwand. Furthermore, in a titleless manuscript work by Abui l-Fida,36 Mardawlj's father Ziyar is said to have belonged to the noblest of the four tribes of Jil, the royal one called Shahanshah-wand. The Samanids of Transoxania and Khurasan succeeded to much of the Tahirid heritage in the east, and like the and aspirations Tahirids, they represented the interests of the local Iranian landed classes and also the cause of Sunni orthodoxy and obedience to the spiritual authority The degree of arabisation amongst of the Abbasid Caliphs. the Samanids was less than that of the almost completely IRANIAN STUDIES

20

It is true that Arabic literature arabised Thhirids. and the Arabic sciences flourished in the Samanid dominions, and Thacdlib-i's section in the Yat7mat ad-dahr on the poets and writers of Khurasan and Transoxania shows how brilliant this Arabic culture was. The Amirs themselves had scholarly interests, and Ahmad b. Ismacll (907-914)

is said to have been murdered by his Turkish ghulams because of his excessive of the company of the frequenting ulama.37 Nevertheless, Bukhara was very distant from Baghdad, and the Samanids lacked the direct Iraqi connections of the Tahirid family; hence the Samanids were also able to play an important part in the renaissance of New Persian language and literature which is apparent in the eastern Iranian lands from the later ninth century onwards. We know of no attempt to connect the Samanids with the Arab heritage, but it was generally accepted amongst the Samanids' contemporaries that the family was of aristocratic, if not royal, Iranian origin. Saman-Khuda, the earliest attested member of the family, was a dihqan from the Balkh area of Tukharistan, who in the eighth century was converted to Islam and served one of the last Umayyad

governors of Khurasan.38 BiruniL, followed by subsequent sources such as Ibn al-Athir, says that there is "universal agreement" that the Samanids descend from Bahram Chuibin. Bahram Chfibin, son of Bahram Gushnasp, led a revolt against the Emperor Hormizd IV in 590 and temporarily occupied the imperial throne himself as Bahram VI. His family of Mihran claimed descent from the Arsacids, hence his bid for the throne and his displacement of the Sasanids. The legitimate heir to the throne, Hormizd's son Khusrau Aparvilz, regained the throne in the next year with Byzantine and Armenian help, and Bahram Chfibln had to flee to Turkestan, where he was soon afterwards killed. His adventurous career made a deep impression on the Persian national consciousness, and gave rise to a popular romance in Pahlavi, details of which we know through mentions in Arabic and Persian sources and in Firdaus-I's Shih-nama.39 Also in the upper Oxus region, the Amirs of Khuttal were in the twelfth century still deriving their origin from a notable figure of SAsanid times, the Emperor Bahram Gir .40 21

Vol.

XI,

1978

It was obviously quite credible to contemporaries that a dynasty of dihqSn origin like the Samanids should trace their beginnings back to the Old Persian aristocracy. in considering the question of the Of equal significance need for Persian dynasties to set down roots in the past Sistan and the is the example of the Saffarids of Sistan. adjacent regions of what is now eastern Afghanistan had contributed important strands to the formation of the Persian national epic, above all, to those parts of the cycle connected with the hero Garshasp and his descendant Rustam-i shown at Zil, the stable of whose horse Rakhsh was still The Saffarid brothQarnin in Sistan in Islamic times.41 ers Yacqib and cAmr b. Laith were of indisputably plebian origin; Yacqiib had been a coppersmith and CAmra stoneThey were proud of their origin from mason or mule hirer. that the people, and claimed, with considerable justice, they had reached their position of power by their own efinfluence; forts, unassisted by noble birth or official that they justice, with again and they further claimed, against Sistan of the people of interests the represented and by Caliphal and Tahirid officials past exploitation Their implacable refusal to accept the tax-collectors. sc. practice, norms of Sunni orthodoxy and political obedience to the moral authority of the Caliphs and their exposed the $affdrids to the legitimate representatives, Yacqiib of the generality of Islamic historians; hostility and CAmron more than one occasion expressed their contempt for the Abbasids and their fraudulent seizure of The $affdrids had thus no incentives the Caliphate.42 for claiming any connection with the Arab past; the Arab in Sistan had typified everything that ruling institution Yacqfib had been fighting against, and Yacqiib openly showed his contempt f r and impatience with Arabic learning on one occasion. Moreover, it might be thought that the Saffarids' frank proclamation of their lowly origins would preclude any connection being forged between them and the Iranian past, however suitable in such a deeply traditionalist province as Sistan a connection like this might seem. Yet this is what apparently happened at an early date in of Sistan the circles around Yacqcib. The anonymous History IRANIAN STUDIES

22

gives a lengthy genealogy tracing YaCqiib back through the Sasanids Khusrau Aparviz, Kawadh and Ardashir to Faridun of and Jamshld and the first man Kayuimarth.44 The History Sistan seems substantially to date from the second half of the eleventh century, so it is possible that this genealogy was invented in say the tenth century, when the Uaffdrids had become respectable, and within their modest sphere of power in Sistan had achieved a recognized place in the Islamic states-system. Such Amirs as Ahmad b. Muhammad (310were 52/922-963) and Khalaf b. Ahmad (352-393/963-1003) being pardistinguished figures of their time, the latter ticularly famed for his scholarly interests.45 But there

incontrovertibly

is a second

piece

of evidence

which is

contemporary with Yacqib b. Laith.

In

Yaqat's biographical dictionary of scholars and writers, there is a fragment of verse, It totaling twelve lines. is quoted via the historian and is by Hamza al-Isfahan1, a poet of Isfahan, Abu Ishaq IbrThim b. Mamshadh, apparentThe poet puts in Yacqfibls ly one of Yacqtib's panegyrists. mouth these words: I am the son of the noble descendants of Jam, and the inheritance of the kings of Persia has fallen to my lot. I am reviving their glory, which had been lost and effaced by the long passage of time. I am openly seeking revenge for them; although men have closed their eyes to recognising their reI do not do so. gal rights,

With me is the banner of Kiwi (Calam al-Kabiyan), through which I hope to rule all the nations So say to all the sons of Hashim (sc. the Abbasids), before you have reason to feel "Abdicate quickly, sorry!

We have gained power lance-thrusts and Our forefathers gave have never showed benefact ions.

over you by force, with our cuts from our sharp swords, you kingly power, but you proper gratitude for our

23

Vol.

XI,

1978

Return to your country in the Hijaz, to eat lizards and graze sheep, For I shall mount the throne of the kings, with the aid of my sword blade and the point of my pen!" The poem seems to be a manifesto in verse of YaCqiib's program of conquest within the eastern lands of the Caliphate, a program that was only halted by the check to his armies at Dair al-CAqfil in 262/876, when Yacqib was within is Especially interesting fifty miles of Baghdad itself. the reference to the ancient symbol of royal authority in the "imperial banner" of the kaviyan, Iran, the dirafsh-i Sasanids, captured by the Arabs at the battle of Qadisiyya. One should note too the sharply Shucibi sentiment in the that it was the Persians and Khurasanians who allegation brought the Abbasids to power, but were only rewarded by and also in the familiar stigmatizing of the ingratitude, desert barbarians at the side of Arabs as lizard-eating It is a pity that the ancient culture of the Iranians.46 information in the History of Sistan, we have no explicit which is normally extremely detailed about the early Saffarids and their campaigns, about the conscious adoption of an imperial plan of conquest; but there seems no reason or contemporaneousness of the to doubt the authenticity to us here lies in its illustratpoem. Its significance ing the point that, at this period of Persian history, it was inevitable that a ruler who had become master of a Iranian lands should be great empire in the historically with the Iranian past and that his connected willy-nilly should be seen as the preparation for a reconvictories of that glorious past. stituting to see what happened Finally, it is instructive when a ruling family of Turkish origin became established in the Iranian world and quickly became very largely perThe Ghaznavid Sultanate sianized in culture and outlook. from the Samanid Amirate, and can in many stemmed firectly The founder, respects be regarded as its successor state. a member of the Samanid miliSebuktigin, was originally and military inand the civilian tary slave institution, of the Sultanate were to a considerable extent stitutions Obsequious genealomodeled on their Samanid forerunners. IRAIAN STUDIES

24

gists were unable to get round the fact of Sebuktigin's pagan Turkish birth. According to his testament or Pandnama, Sebluktigin came from the tribe (properly, place) of Barskhan on the shores of the Islq-K0l, where he had been captured by a neighboring tribe and sold into slavery at Nakhshab in Transoxania. The autobiographical preface of the Pand-nama states that the Barskhan tribe was so named because in ancient times, one of the rulers of Persia had settled in Turkestan and become a ruler there. He was called Parsi-khwan that is, one who is literate in Persian, and this became contracted to Barskhan, which means "powerful" in Turkish.47 The Ghiurid historian Ju:zjan1 quotes the Ta'rlkh-i mujadwal of one Aba l-Qasim CImadi (which Barthold surmised was written in the early twelfth as giving a complete genealogy century) from SebUktigin and his father Juq or Qara Bechkem through six generations to Yazdigird III; it was supposed that Yazdigird's daughter had fled to the steppes and married a Turkish chief there.48 It is possible that this genealogy was elaborated in the eleventh century, when the persianizing tenin the Ghaznavid empire had largely dencies the overlaid Turkish past. In the first years of the empire, (388-421/998-1030) had been occasionally poets for his Turkish lineage as well as nection with the Iranian past. Thus the litterateur and author of maq3mat, Badic Hamadhani, addresses Mahmuidthus:

Mahmiid of Ghazna praised by his conhis alleged famous Arabic az-Zaman al-

May God exalt whoever He wills! And may He increase me in faith! Is it Farldin [whom we see] with his crown, or a second Alexander? Or has the circle of time brought back Sulaiman once more? The sun of Mahmud has cast the stars of Saman into the shade, And the house of Bahram has become subject to the son of Khaqan. Whenever he rides out on an elephant for warfare or for ceremonial purposes, 25

Vol.

XI,

1978

on the back of a Your eyes see a ruler (sultn) demon (shai tn). Is it from the heart of India to the plains of Gurgan, From the land of Sind to the farthest limits of Khurasan, In the plenitude of his youthful power and in freshly displayed glory, That you are in the saddle, when the withers of Saturn are shrunken and emaciated? 0 Yamin ad-Daula, the successor in time to Baghdad and Ghumdan, There are not two rulers in the west who do not obey you; If you so wish, they enjoy security, prosperity, and assured faith.49 This poem must be early in date (Badic az-Zaman died in The great panegyrists of the early Ghaznavids 398/1008). and his son Mascild as much more frequently praise Mahmiud Thus we find them given such titles heirs of the Kisras. CAlam (Farrukhi), Khusrau-i Mashriq, Khusas Sh5hansh3h-i and Khudavand-i Khurasan Dunyi (cUn?url), rau Shahanshah-i va Shahanshah-i

CIraq (Maniichihri).

which aThe great dynasties of Turkish chieftains rose contemporaneously with the Ghaznavids, like the Qarakhanids, or shortly afterwards, like the Seljuqs, had not spent a formative period within the military slave institution or the cultural ambience of an indigenous Iranian dynasty, as had the first Ghaznavids. The Qarakhanids and Seljuqs were of free Turkish and not slave origin; on a mass Turkish trithey depended, at least initially, army; and bal backing and not on a deracine professional they continuously drew fresh replenishments of manpower from the Turks remaining in the Central Asian steppes. Hence it was only natural that they should seek to derive their charisma of rule from the heroic Turkish past, and of their newly-acquired not from the indigenous traditions where they for a long time felt aliIranian territories, ens, as indeed they were.

IRANIAN STUDIES

26

as "Qarakhanids" and "Ilek-KhaSuch designations nids" are, as is well known, the inventions of nineteenthOne of the names by which century Russian orientalists.50 these incoming Qarluq tribal khans let themselves be known by was Al-i Afrasiyab, that is, descendants of Afrasiyab, the king of Tfiran in Iranian epic tradition and the foe of with the Kai Ka'uis; Afrasiyab was apparently identified Turkish folk hero Alp Er Tonga.51 The Seljuqs also soon had genealogies constructed for themselves going back to Afrasiyab, and their descent from the noble Oghuz clan of Qiniq was also stressed; according to Kashgharl, this was the clan of the princes of the Oghuz.52 The various sources dealing with Seljuq origins mention that the founder of the family, Seljuq b. Duqaq, known as Temur-yal igh "ironbow," had connections with, or was in the service of, the Khaqan of the Khazars, to whom they give the Turkish title of Yabghu. The story further goes that Seljuq, the victim of envy and suspicion on the part of the Khazar king, struck the latter with his sword; this is cited to show the nobility of The historicity and daring of ToghrYl Beg's forebears. this Khazar-Seljuq link is not proven. The tale may have arisen in order to connect the Seljuq clan, part of a tribal group which was, amongst the Turks of Central Asia, at a particularly low social and cultural level, with a powerful and well-known group like the Khazars of South Russia.53 At all events, the era in which powers established in Iran on the ruins of the Abbasid Caliphate automatically tried to forge a connection with the glorious traditions of ancient Iran, draws to an end in the eleventh century. destiny in whose hands the political The Turkish dynasties, of Iran was to lie for some hundreds of years to come, were, it is true, gradually permeated by the superior culture of Persia; but this was a slow process, and the need quickly to find a place within the epic framework of the Iranian was no longer felt as pressing. national tradition, NOTES

1.

In the Dr. Zakir Husain Commemoration 1968), pp. 16-19. Delhi, 27

Volume

Vol.

(New

XI,

1978

2.

E.g., by MasCidi, Muruj adh-dhahab, ed. and trans. (Paris, Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille 1861-77).

3.

The question of the origins of the Islamic Vizierate is discussed, with an analysis of the varying views, by D. Sourdel in his Le vizirat Cabbaside de 749 a (Damascus 1959-60), pp. 936 (132 a 324 de 1'Hegire) 41-61, to which should now be added the note of M. J. Bravmann, "The Etymology of Arabic wazlr," Der Islam, XXXVII (1961), 260-3, which strongly and convincingly propounds the meaning given above of "helper, supporter in war."

4.

The process is described in detail by M. Sprengling, "From Persian to Arabic," American Journal for SemiLVI(1939), pp. 175-224, tic Languages and Literature pp. 325-336. Sprengling's account is confused, verbut has much solid informabose, and idiosyncratic, tion and has not yet been replaced.

5.

A Comparative Oriental Despotism: Power (New Haven, Conn., 1959).

6.

Ed. G. van Vloten (Leiden 1895), pp. 63-4; trans. and commentary by C. E. Bosworth, "Abii cAbdallih al-Khwarazmi on the Technical Terms of the Secretary's Art: A Contribution to the Administrative History of Mediaeval Islam," JESHO,XII/2 (1969).

7.

of the ShuH. A. R. Gibb, "The Social Significance loanni Pedersen dicata Ciibiya," in Studia orientalia (Copenhagen, 1953), pp. 105-14, also in Studies on of Islam

the Civilization

8.

1962),

pp. 62-73.

chapter on V?cArabund cAgam,v"in (Halle, 1888-89), I, 102-4, S. M. Stern (London, 1967), I, 99-100.

Cf. I. Goldziher's Muhamnedanische

trans. 9.

(London,

Study of Total

Studien

b. Habib al-Baghdadl, Kitab al-muhabbar, ed. Muhammad I. Lichtenstadter (Hyderabad, 1361/1942), p. 31; ed. AbyarI and Sairafi Thacalibi, Lata'if al-macarif,

IRANIAN STUDIES

28

(Cairo,

1379/1960),

Book of

Curious

burgh,

1968),

pp. 64-5,

trans.

p.

Bosworth,

The

Information

(Edin-

of wala', see Goldziher, I, 101 ff.

op. cit.

and Entertaining

73.

10.

On the institution trans. I, 104 ff.,

11.

KhuzaCa had ruled in Mecca after Jurhum and up to the of the Kinani adventurer Qusayy, founder of arrival in Mecca, and had then merged with Quraish fortunes the incomers, hence the eulogists of the Thhirids a point, attach their patrons could, by stretching to Quraish itself.

12.

Ibn Khallikan, Wafayat al-aCy5n, trans. de Slane (Paris, 1842-71), II, 80.

13.

No longer extant except for an abridged section surviving in the Mutawakkiliyya Library in Sanca, Ms no. 145; see M. S. Khan, "A Manuscript of an Epitome of al-Sabi's Kitab al-T3l ,'' Arabica, XII (1965), pp. 2744, who is also preparing an edition and translation of this fragment.

14.

Tajl, f. 2b. The fact that ad-Dailam is said also to be the name of a water hole in the territory of the Banu cAbs in western Arabia (cf. Yaqiit, MuCjam albuldan [Beirut, 1374-6/1955-7], II, 544, with a shahid from CAntara mentioning the hiyad ad-Dail am) may have inclined contemporaries to give some credence to an Arab origin for the Dailamis.

15.

Kitab

tafal1

al-Atrak

Ca15 sa'ir

Wim.MacGuckin

al-ajnad,

IV (1940), Arabic al-CAzzdwii, Belleten Turkish trans. by Serefeddin Yaltkaya,

text,

ed. CAbbas pp. 33-4,

16.

For the historical background here, see Bosworth, "The Asiatic JourEarly Islamic History of Ghuir," Central nal, VI (1961), pp. 116-33.

17.

Fakhr-i Mudabbir, cited from various sources in ibid. ed. pp. 125-6 (including Jiizjani's Nasirl, Tabaq3t-i 29

Vol.

XI,

1978

I, 318-19, CAbd al-Hayy HabIbi [Kabul 1342-3/1963-4], trans. H. G. Raverty [London, 1881-99], I, 300-9). It is pointed out in the article of Bosworth that Zahak, though a repugnant figure in the epic tradition of the Persian lands further west, was a much more favored and popular personage in Zdbulistln and eastern Afghanistan. 18.

I, 319-20, 324 ff., trans. I, 311JflzjRni, op. cit., Jiizjani may be depending 16, cf. Bosworth, art. cit. work, the genealogical here on Fakhr-i Mudabbir's ansab-i Mubgraksh3h!, on which see C. Shajara-yi A Bio-bibliographical Storey, Persian Literature: Survey (London, 1937- ), I/2, 1165.

19.

Cf. Encyclopedia

20.

J. Marquart, EranNahr nach der Geographie s.v.; Ibid., des Ps. Moses XorenacCi, Abh. der G5tt. Gesell, der

of Islam2,

Arts.

ss.v.

Wiss., N.F. III/2 (Berlin, 1901), pp. 127-8. Marquart thought that the latter origin suggested for Baw was the correct one, and that he came from Varznln near Ray; the line of Bawandid rulers does not become fully attested in the sources till the eighth century. 21.

Cf. E. Sachau, "Zur Geschichte Khwarazm," Sitzungsber.

und Chronologie von

der Wiener Akad. der Wiss.,

Cl., LXXIII (1873), pp. 475-506; S. P. Phil.-Hist. Kultur Tolstov, Auf den Spuren der altchoresmischen (Berlin, 1953), pp. 207 ff.; and Bosworth, Encyclopaedia "Khwqrazm" and ''KhwArazm-Shdhs .1" of Islam2, Articles 22.

Ibn Istaq, Sirat RasUl Allah, ed. F. Wustenfeld (Go3ttingen, 1859-60), I, 192, trans. A. Guillaume (Oxford, 1955), p. 136.

23.

of Islam2, It is pointed out by H. Masse (Encyclopedia that century the tenth Art. s.v.) that it is only in trafrom derived popular about Buzurgmihr anecdotes dition begin to appear in Islamic adab literature.

24.

Studien FUrstenspiegel

Cf. G. Richter, arabischen

IRANIAN STUDIES

zur Geschichte

(Leipzig, 30

der 'alteren

1932), pp. 33 ff.

25.

at-tanbih

Kitab

wa-l-ishraf.,

(Leiden, 1894), 1896), p. 446. 26.

27.

p.

347,

Diwan, ed. and trans. The Life and Writings

ington,

Ky.,

Yaqfit,

Irshad

1907-26),

1961),

trans.

ed. M. J. de Goeje Carra de Vaux (Paris,

L. Zolondek, of

pp.

an Early

74-6, ed.

al-arlb,

DiCbil b. CAll: CAbb5sid Poet (Lex-

118.

D. S. Margoliouth

(London,

V, 68.

28.

See, in considering the general question of the Tahirids' arabisation, the article of Bosworth, "The Taof Semitic and Arabic Culture," hirids Journal Studies, XIV (1969), pp. 45-79, and for an example of an Arabic work by the founder of the dynasty, idem, "An Early Arabic Mirror for Princes: Tahir Dhu 1-Yaminain's Epistle to his Son Abdallah (206/821)," JNES, XXIX (1970), pp. 25-41.

29.

f. 3a; B-irini, al-Athar al-baqiya, ed. E. Sachau (Leipzig, 1878), p. 38; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, ed. C. J. Tornberg (Leiden, 1851-76), VIII, pp. 197-8; J. in Beitr'age air Marquart, "Der Stammbaum der Bujiden," Geschichte und Sage vor Eran," ZDMG, XLIX (1895), p. 660-1. In connection with the tracing back of genealogies to Bahram Gar, it is perhaps worth noting that in certain Iranian (? ZoroBahram Gar was considered circles to be a figure of Messianic astrian) significance. The writer on South Arabian history and antiquities, Nashwan b. Sacid al-Himyarl (d. 573/1178) says that many peoples expect the return of a Messithe anic figure and amongst these, (qa'im muntazar); Magians expect the return of a descendant of Bahram Gir, who will restore the old Persian religion (adTajl,

din al-abyad (Die yaCnun dlnahum) zUglichen Angaben Nagwans im .ams

p. 30.

ed. 103).

Mahmud b.

cA;imu 'd-Din

cUthmdn,

aq-qamadiyya,

ed.

beauf SUdarabien alCuluTm gesammelt

Ahmad [London and Leiden,

Firdaus

F. Meier 31

fi

al-murshidiyya

(Leipzig,

1948), Vol.

1916],

asr3r

introd. XI,

1978

pp. 20-1, 40, text, pp. 29-30; cf. R. N. Frye, "The New Persian Renaissance in Western Iran," Arabic and Islamic

Studies

(Leiden,

in Honor of Hamilton

A. R. Gibb

1965), p. 227.

31.

Cf. idem, The Heritage

32.

See J. C. Burgel, Die Hofkorrespondenz CAqud ad-Daulas und ihr VerhHltnis zu anderen historischen Quellen der frUhen Buyiden (Wiesbaden, 1965), pp. 22, 157-8, Ibn al-Athir, op. cit., IX, 312-13.

33.

Masciidi, Muruzj adh-dhahab, IX, 19-30; Ibn al-Athir, op. cit., VIII, 144-5, 226; V. Minorsky, "La domina-

of Persia

(London, 1962), p. 251.

tion des Dailamites," in Iranica/B1st Minorsky (Tehran, 1964), pp. 17-18,

naqala-yi

24.

34.

al-Athir

35.

Trans. R. Levy, A Mirror for Princes pp. 2-3.

36.

School of Oriental 26386.

37.

V. Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion (London, 1928), p. 240. It was also under Ahmadb. IsmAcil that Arabic was once more made the language of official correspondence.

38.

Ibid.,

39.

Masciidi, Murij adh-dhahab, II, 233; Ibn an-Nadim, Fihrist, ed. G. Fliugel and J. Roediger (Leipzig, 1871), p. 305; Biriini, al-Athar al-b5qiya, p. 39; VII, 191; T. Noldeke, GesIbn al-Athtr , op. cit.,

al-b5qiya,

p. 39.

(London, 1951),

and African Studies,

London MS

pp. 209-210.

chichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sassaniden (Leiden, 1879), pp. 474-8, Excursus 6.

40.

Ibn al-Athir, op. cit., p. 234.

XI, 155, cited

op. cit.,

IRANIAN STUDIES

32

in Barthold,

41.

See Bosworth, S'stgn under the Arabs, Conquest to the Rise of the Saff5rids (Rome, 1968), pp. 2-4.

42.

" BSOAS, XXXI See idem, "The Armies of the $affarids, 535-6. The Ta'rikh-i S'st3n (1968), (on which see n. 44, below) is an exception to the hostility of the historical sources towards the Saffarids.

43.

After his victories in northern afghanistan, Yacqiib's court poets eulogized him in Arabic verses. But YacqTib angrily complained that these were incomprehensible to him, and got the head of chancery, Muhammad b. Wasif, to write some verses in Persian. Cf. G. Lazard, Les premiers poetes persans (IXe-Xe siecles) (Tehran and Paris, 1964), pp. 200-2.

44.

Ed. Malik ash-Shucaral pp. 200-2.

45.

He is said to have commissioned a grand Koran commentary, comprehending all previous ones, and running to one hundred volumes; not surprisingly, this mammoth work is no longer extant.

46.

Yaqat, Irshad al-arib , I, pp. 322-3. We owe the unearthing of these verses, and a detailed exposition of their significance in the context of the Shucibiyya controversies and the expansionist policy of the first Saffarids, to the acute mind of the late Dr. S.M. Stern, see his "Yacfib the Coppersmith and Persian National in Iran and Islam, in Memory of the Sentiment," Late Vladimir Minorsky, ed. Bosworth (Edinburgh, 1971), pp. 535-55.

47.

is given in the MajmaC al-anSebUktigin's Pand-nama sab of the fourteenth-century historian Muhammadb. CAli Shabankara'l, which has not yet been published. and translated The Pand-nama was, however, excerpted by M. Nazim, "The Pand-Namah of SubuktigTn,'' JRAS 621-3. see especially (1933), pp. 605-28, pp. 610-14, Another etymology for Barsghan is given by Kashghar1,

Bahar (Tehran,

33

from the Islamic (30-250/651-864)

1314/1935),

Vol.

XI,

1978

Diwan lughit

41), 48.

III,

Tabaq5t-i

at-Turk,

pp. 417-18, Na5irl,

trans. B. Atalay (Ankara, 1939facs. f. 625.

I, pp. 225-6, trans.

I, pp. 67-70.

49.

Cited in ThaCalibi, Yati'mat ad-dahr, ed. Muh. Muhyl IV, ad-Din cAbd al-Hamid (Cairo, 1375-7/1956-8), p. 396-7.

50.

Cf.

51.

V. Barthold, Histoire 1945), pp. 70, 84.

52.

Dlwan lugh5t

53.

See the discussions of Seljuq origins in C. Cahen, des origines seljukides," "Le Malik-Nameh et 1'histoire II (1949), 41 ff., and Bosworth, The GhaznaOriens,

Bosworth, Encyclopedia

at-Turk,

of Islam2

des Turcs d'Asie

trans.

Art. "Ilek-Khans." Centrale

I, 55.

and Eastern Their Empire in Afghanistan vids: 994-1040 (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 219 ff.

IRANIAN STUDIES

34

(Paris,

Iran

IranianStudies, Volume Xi, 1978.

Local

in

Politics

Iran

Under

and

Seljuks

The

Eastern Ghaznavids

RichardW. Bulliet of the Ghaznavid and Seljuk history The political which ruled much of Iran throughout the eleventh dynasties, well known and recentcenturies, is now fairly and twelfth of narrative in the excellent ly has been drawn together It is Bosworth in the Cambridge History of Iran. Professor however, and will probunderstood, still quite imperfectly ably remain so for a good while yet to come. The old and of the period based on the noschematization serviceable keyed to the development of madrasa tion of a Sunni revival, is still of Nizam al-Mulk, and to the personality education the facts awkwardness in fitting increasing current despite It would be premature to attempt at this time an to it. and, indeed, such a schematischematization, alternative when it eventually appears, may well be not so much zation, in which the an alternative to the old one as an expansion It of the old one have a prominent place. main features the way for a is not too soon, however, to start clearing new interpretation of this important period of Iranian of the some of the inadequacies history by illuminating emphaIn this paper, the particular old interpretation. sis will be on reorienting the customary view of the power or imperial politibetween local and central relationship cal forces.

Richard W. Bulliet Columbia University.

is Associate

35

Professor

of History

at

The eleventh and twelfth centuries are customarily presented as a period in Iranian history when relatively Turks from Central Asia conquered Iran and were, uncivilized in turn, seduced and conquered by the great Iranian imperial tradition in its Islamic form. Calling themselves Sultan and even Shahanshah, the Ghaznavid and Seljuk rulers were autocrats with unchallenged--by anyone other than their They ruled large empires from own kin, that is--authority. a central court through a staff of able Persian administraof imperial Iranian tors, embodying the ancient traditions Furthermore, they were orthodox Sunni Muslims who rule. fought to extend the domain of Islam in the East while gradually pushing back the heterodox Shicites in the West, who had encroached far on Sunni lands under the Fatimids and Buyids. The precise source of this view of the period would be hard to pin down, for it seems to be almost taken for granted in the primary sources from which the history of It may be presumed, however, the period has been written. that it corresponds fairly well to the view of the period that contemporary opinion molders at the courts in Ghazna and Isfahan either held themselves or wished others to hold. and intellectunobles, administrators, These men--sultans, wrote, and read the chronials in residence--commissioned, of the period; and it would be cles and secular literature naive to write history from these works without taking this caution alone can do little into account. Still, clientele An independent body of to right a distorted viewpoint. is called source material serving a different clientele for, and it is not obvious where it might come from. The contention of this essay is that such a body of source material does exist in the form of a local, urban but it must be admitted that there tradition, historical The differin arguing thus. is an element of circularity traposited for this independent historical ent clientele upper class, dition is the "patrician class," a restricted found in every Iranian city, made up of a small number of families sharing an education in and wealthy, interrelated concern for the further development of the Islamic reliHowever, this group includes a large numgious sciences. IRANIAN STUDIES

36

ber of people holding appointments from the central government as qadis, khatlIbs, ra'l7s's, and so forth. Thus, it is could be argued that the alleged separate clientele actually only the local extension of the court clientele, and hence shares the same viewpoint. The best evidence that this is not the case comes from the form and content of the sources under consideration. The sources pertaining to the court milieu and clientele, from which the currently available histories of the period have largely been written, are either narrations of the deeds of the rulers in loose chronicle form, books proffering advice on the techniques of ruling, poetic eulogies, or potpourris of diverting information and anecdotes. The sources pertaining to the local, urban milieu and the patrician clientele are entirely different. Ignoring purely religious works, two genres can be identified. One is the local biographical dictionary containing, in alphabetical order, brief biographies of members of the local patriciate. The other is the local history containing similar information but arranged according to chronological periods and prominent families. The latter genre gives more space to the deeds of rulers than does the former, but neither affords very much. The focus is on the lives of locally prominent men and their families. Just as the court clientele read about themselves in the works proper in to that milieu, the local patriciate read about itself tradithe works belonging to this local, urban historical tion. tradiEven after identifying this local historical tion, however, it is no simple matter to reconstruct the history of the age from it. By its very nature broken up the into the separate histories of many different cities, tradition further suffers from the disappearance of many works over the years separating the twelfth century from our own. Ibn Funduq, for example, in the introduction to his history of Baihaq, lists in a special category some of Khurasanian cities, of which only two fifteen histories survive today. Moreover, such works as survive are difficult to work with since they deal with many local percorroborative insonalities about whomthere is little 37

Vol.

XI, 1978

there are enough simiStill, formation in other sources. between events in one city and events in others larities to indicate the general outline of local history, insofar as this history was commonto Khurasanian cities in general. field, the picture that emerges is In the political strength existing in of powerful nuclei of local political with the central, imperial power. a symbiotic relationship the central power is not the From the local perspective, omnipotent authority suggested by the court literature. Rather, it is a paramount military and financial power whose patronage and support is useful in the quest for power, but which is equally, if not more, local political dependent on the support of the several local political Whereas local powers for the maintenance of its position. deprived of imperial support could retire to politicians star to ascend their estates and wait for their political of his fortisupport of the deprived Sultan the more, once fied, tax-producing cities was in a much more parlous situation. The absence in the court sources of much reference to this balance of power, and the resulting emphasis on the supreme power of the Sultan, is in large part ascribdichotomy between the able to the emphasis on a religious What is obvirtuous Sunnis and the nefarious Shicites. scured by this misplaced emphasis is the fact that the quarrels under the Ghaznavids real and meaningful religious and early Seljuks were between various factions within the of these intra-Sunni quarSunni camp. The very bitterness afford an explanation of the misplaced rerels may itself The court could ligious emphasis of the court literature. not allow local factionalism to flourish unchecked in its own precincts and may have exerted pressure to deemphasize emphasis on it and sublimate it in a somewhat artificial the is this whether But rivalry. Sunni-Shicite explanation or not, there is no question but that local religiousfactions of great importance are only dimly perpolitical ceivable through court sources. The most complete statement of this situation in Khurasan and Transoxania is that of the great geographer IRANIA

STUDIES

38

al-Maqdisi, writing the Ghaznavids:

shortly

In Khurasan there

before the coming to power of

are Caqabiyat

[factional

quar-

rels] between the western half of Nishapur in the northern part of the city called Manishak and the rest connected with Hira, wild Casabiyat not based on law schools. Only lately has it become between the Shica and the Karramiya. In Sistan there are Casabiyat between the Samakiya, who follow Abfu Blood Han1fa, and the Sadaqiya, who are Shfic'ls. is shed and power contested between them. In Sarakhs it is between the cArusiya, who follow Abii Hanilfa, and the Ahliya, being partisans of ashAt Herat there are the cAmaliya and the Shaficl. Karramiya, at Marv the city people and the people of the old market. At Nisa there is Casabiya between al-Khana and Ra's Siuq ["the head of the market"], at Ablvard between Kardarl and Ra's Balad At Balkh there are ["the head of the city"]. of law school, and likewise irrespective Casabiy3t few of in Samarqand and the rest of the cities, which are free from it. 1 The law schools of Khurasan are orthodox except that there are many Kharijites in Sistan and in In NishKarakh and Astarbiyan, towns near Herat. apur the MuCtazilis are apparent, but not dominant; Over and the Shicites and Karramis are clamorous. this entire area the followers of Abu Hanifa are of Shash [Tashdominant, except in the districts kent], Ilaq, Ths, Nisa, Ablvard, Tardz, $anghdj, the countryside of Bukhara, Sinj, Dandanqan,Isand Juyan, all of which places are Shafil'. fara'in, in these places in according to The administration their law school. They have a noisy clamor in Herat, Sistan, Sarakhs, and the two Marvs. There is no qadl who is not from one of the two factions. The khatibs of the places we have singled out and also of Nishapur are ShafiCis, as is one of the two congregational mosques at Marv, although the call 39

Vol.

XI,

1978

to prayer there and in Nishapur is double. The Karramiya make a racket in Herat and Gharj ashShar, and they have convents in Farghana, Khuttal and Ju-zjanan as well as Marv ar-Radh and Samarqand.2 This maze of names and places is not terribly enlightening without interpretation. What al-Maqdisi is saying is that on the eve of the Ghaznavid accession to power there existed in every city in Khurasan and Transoxania factions contesting for local power and struggling for control of key posts in the city. On occasion the ShiCites participate as a faction, but the dominant polarity is between the Hanafts and the Shaficis, two of the several "law schools" (madhhab) then accepted within Sunni Islam. The most recurrent third party is the Karramiya, a popular sect commonly accused of anthropomorphism and heterodoxy. In addition, there are some places where the religious affiliation, if any, of a faction is hidden beneath a neutral name, as well as places where a religious basis for factional fighting is specifically excluded. All that al-Maqdisi can report, of course, is what was immediately apparent to him as he passed briefly through these places and talked, perhaps, with local informants. Any suggestion of social forces underlying this urban unrest cannot be expected to show up in his account, although the existence of some such underlying forces is strongly implied by his observations on religious cleavages in reless facgions further west, where he found substantially tional violence. Elsewhere I have argued that factional development was rooted in differences in date of conversion to Islam with the descendants of early converts forming one faction and the descendants of later converts an opposing faction.3 could vary Doctrinal positions, by this interpretation, from place to place, but the underlying causes would remain the same. This assessment of the cause of factionalism does not fully explain, however, the peculiar intensity of violence that was reached in the cities of eastern Iran. IRANIAN STUDIES

40

For this it may be necessary to look back upon the history of the area prior to the coming of Islam and the Arabs. Transoxania was neither a part of the Sassanian empire nor of any other contemporary empire. Its oasis cities were ruled by local dynasties some of which, like the Bukhar Khudat of Bukhara, continued to be influential well into the Islamic period. Nor was the situation in Sassanian Khurasan much different, despite the fact that it was a part of the empire. As a frontier area, it did not enjoy the stable, centralized government found in Fars or Iraq. Here, too, the titles of local city lords have been preserved. Direct connections between this pre-Islamic situation of localized power and that of Khurasanian and Transoxanian cities under the Ghaznavids and Seljuks are difficult to trace, but such things as the astonishing preference for debased local coins over good silver caliphal coins in the Transoxanian cities4 strongly suggest that the sense of local autonomy and patriotic identification with a locale did not disappear from this area after the Arab conquest but continued for several centuries. Still, if the eastern Iranian tradition of independent local powers helps explain the geographical concentration of urban factional violence in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it does not necessarily explain the violence itself; for only rarely does conflict take an interurban rather than an intraurban form. At most, it emphasizes the fact that power was looked upon as something worth fighting for at a local level and not just at the imperial level.

This would not be the case unless the cities felt themselves to be independent and not merely population centers under the complete dominance of the imperial center. An analogy might be drawn to Italy under the Holy RomanEnpire. The parties of the Guelfs and the Ghibbelines were found competing throughout the empire, ostensibly for control of the empire. But in individual localities, these were simply the names for local political forces competing for local power without too much regard for the imperial arena. The counterparts of the Guelfs and Ghibbelines under the Ghaznavids and Seljuks would be the Hanafi and Shafici law schools. They may not have been competing at all on an 41

Vol.

XI,

1978

imperial scale, but in almost every city they appear as competitors, concealing under.their rubrics various other conflicts. or political social, religious, beAt question here, however, is the relationship tween central power and local powers, not just the constitution of the local powers. Earl'ier, it was proposed that Since the nature of the two forces existed symbiotically. against itself militates the sources and of the relationship a general or comprehensive exposition of what is meant by cases symbiotic in this context, a number of illustrative will be presented instead in order to show at least the of what is presumed here to have been a general outlines phenomenon. for which there is First there are three incidents At the very beginning of the Ghaznanumismatic evidence. in the year 994, the Turkish general Sabuktakin vid period, as Mahmud of Ghazna, and his son Mahmud, known to history They their Samanid overlord.5 against put down a rebellion in several ways, Mahmudbewere rewarded for this service ing appointed governor of Nishapur in the place of the who had been a governor from the Slmjiirid family, previous in Mahmud promptly of office, the Once rebellion. leader under the who had held office dismissed local officials thus winning the support of the local party out Slmjiirids, of the of power. Since the Slmjfirids had been supporters law school, and in particular of the proponents of Shafici

Ashcarite theology in that law school, Mahmudnaturally found his allies among the Hanafis, in particular the Muand the Karramis. ctazill-Hanafis, This situation continued until 997, when both SabukMahmudwas in a touchy takin and his Samanid overlord died. It was clear that he would have to take his army position. east in order to wrest succession rights from his brother, who also claimed them. Yet, at the same time, this would means abandoning Nishapur, a far richer and more important city than Ghazna, just at the moment when another succession dispute in Bukhara was making his continuing governorHaving no choice but to go off and fight ship doubtful. forces in his brother, he looked to the local political IRANIAN STUDIES

42

He did this by Nishapur to safeguard his position there. issuing a distinctive, large dirhem bearing a Qur'anic verse (III/17) which was recognized as supporting the Muctazili theology. is recognized Since coinage, along with the khutba, in Islam as an official indicator of political rule, and since the Qur'anic quotation on Islamic coins was almost invariable, the importance of this act cannot be mistook. It amounted to a promise on Mahmud's part that he would officially support the Hanafl-MuctazilU faction on his return to power if that faction would apply itself to ensuring that return. The enemy he was obviously guarding against was the Slmj urid family, supporters of the Shafici-Ashcari faction, who were awaiting their opportunity to reclaim the governorship of the city. As it turned out, however, it was a Turkish general named Bektuzun who was appointed to the post by the new Samanid ruler; and since he had no support within the city, Mahmudhad no trouble ousting him when he returned. Mahmud,however, was not the only ruler to make use of political-religious coin inscriptions to seek the allegiance of local factions. In 1092 the third Seljuk sultan, Malikshah, died leaving the succession to the throne unclear. His brother, Arslan Arghun, seized power in Khurasan and the Balkh area, but he did not enjoy the support of the cities of the area. Consequently, his hold on power was not very firm. His frustration at being locked out of the cities in the western parts of his territory prompted him to order the destruction of the fortifications at Nishapur, Sabzavar, Marv, and Sarakhs. But in the eastern city of Balkh he tried another strategy to win local support and had issued in 1095 a coin with the famous "Throne Verse" of the Qur'an (II/256) as its inscription.6 Although the doctrinal interpretation of this verse at that time and place cannot be ascertained, Arslan Arghun's action in choosing an aberrant coin legend is quite probably similar to that of Mahmudof Ghazna a century earlier. Possible confirmation of this interpretation is to be found in the issue of a coin with 43

Vol.

XI,

1978

by Arslan Arghun's brother, Barkyaruq. the same inscription but since The date and mint of this coin are obliterated, it came from the same horde as its mate, it may be assumed to have originated at roughly the same time and place. This means that it must have been issued at the time of Barkyaruq's Khurasanian expedition against his brother in imagination to see it as a bit of 1096. It takes little counterpropaganda directed at the same faction in Balkh that Arslan Arghun had been trying to woo. One other coin with this inscription was issued in b. Malikshah in 1116.7 Little informaSarakhs by Muhammad situation inside Sarakhs, tion is available on the political but Maqdisi's mention of strong factional division in that city and the fact that Muhammad'sdomain is usually thought of as being farther to the west suggests that he may have been trying to win local support in Sanjar's domain and thus encroach upon him. These examples of imperial rulers trading official positions for local support via recognition of religious between coinage show only one aspect of the relationship imperial and local power, however. While in most places the sultans had two or more factions in whose politics one local power would gain they could meddle, occasionally such supremacy that they became genuine city lords, like those of pre-Islamic days. The only difference is that their temporal power, rising from a welter of religious veneer. politics, had a religious The best example of this phenomenon is the dynasty known as the Al-i Burhan which ruled Bukhara from the late This family eleventh century until the early thirteenth.8 title held the title of qadr, which was not an official granted by the central power; but it also held the offices of ra'ls and khatl,b, which were. The fact that the rulers of the period dealt with these city lords on a basis of near equality shows, however, that these important offices were only nominally under the control of the central government.

IRMNIAN STUDIES

44

dyAlthough the Al-i Burhan is the only successful nasty of this sort thus far identified, it was not the only itself as city lords. The pafamily to try to establish avid in seeking to of Samarqand was particularly triciate and extend the autonomy of the city against the preserve in confrontations, earlier Qarakhanids. After several 1089 a Shaficite leader appealed to the Seljuk Sultan Malikthe ruling Khan. With the active shah for support against of the city and the apparent covert help of the citizens Malikaid of a patrician helping to defend the citadel, The Khan was restored by the Seljuk shah took the city. some time later, but he was charged with heresy by the paand court, found guilty, tricians, tried before a religious with a bow string in 1095. Barthold believes strangled of the that "this event must be regarded as the greatest with the in alliance successes gained by the priesthood military classes over the government and the mass of citizens." of interpretation Whether one agrees with Barthold's the conflict versus the government as army and priesthood and the masses or not, one must concur with his identificaStill, tion of this event as the high point in a movement. this need not have been the case had a power play by anof The man was a descendant other patrician not misfired. and CAli named Abu ar-Rida al-Athar al-Husaini al-Baghdadi, what the Burhan famwhat he attempted to do was precisely He attempted to make ily succeeded in doing in Bukhara. himself the city lord of Samarqand. Although he is not mentioned in the court sources, dictionaries his story is preserved in local biographical of Nishapur and Samarqand. His father came from Baghdad and settled in Samarqand where he accumulated so much wealth in both real and movable property as to become the he was a diligent standard of comparison. Nevertheless, student of the traditions of the Prophet; and when he came to Nishapur, he was widely sought out as a teacher.10 Al-Athar himself may have been born in Samarqand, He studied or he may have settled there with his father. 45

Vol.

XI,

1978

some in Nishapur, probably at the time of his father's stay After his return to Samarqand according to his biothere. graphy: He did not cease to raise and elevate his status He until his rank reached that of king [malik]. demon the and the Khan, up against himself raised of sovereign rule laid an egg in his head and In his soul was a delusion of granhatched it. deur which made it manifest that his soul would I except by dominion [mulk]. not be satisfied even heard that he ordered coins struck in his own name. He exercised the powers of government "he drew together and split apart"] until [lit., his time was ended and the measure of his days was filled. 11 Al-Athar was overthrown and executed in 1098, but more than that is not known, although he was in all probability involved in the deposition and execution of Khan Ahmadin 1095 and in the taking of Samarqand in 1097 by that parallel to the Seljuk Barkyaruq. It is interesting this hostile biography, quoted from a biographical dictionary of Nishapur, there is another, less complete, biography in a compilation from Samarqand in which al-Athar's execution is referred to as a martyrdom.12 A similar episode took place in Herat in 1098.13 Sultan Bakyaruq put in charge of the city's defense and who are reported by administration a group of officials In rea hostile local chronicle to have been Shicites. leadership the under sponse, the local population revolted of CAbd al-Hadi b. cAbd Allah al-Ansari, who was not only figure but althe son of the city's most famous religious so held his father's position of Shaikh al-Islam, a nongovernmental post similar to that of 5adr in Bukhara. The revolt, in which the city factions were deeply involved, was put down the following year, but here again the tendency toward urban independence under patrician leadership is clearly in evidence.

IRANIAN STUDIES

46

Perhaps other religious notables with ambitions to become city lords will be discovered, and perhaps more coins will be turned up bearing inscriptions alluding to imperial bids for local support; but these will always be simply the most graphic illustrations of a state of affairs which, in a less pronounced way, was exceedingly common. The central government never had firm control of the local factions. Patents of appointment issued for local posts, such as qadi, khatjb, and ra'ls, usually reflected not the choice of the central government but the choice, through election, heredity, or force, of the local factions, which choice they merely ratified. Sanj'ar's diploma investing Abu al-Barakat Muhammad as-Sacidi with the post of chief q5di of Nishapur,14 for example, makes it quite plain that that post was hereditary in the Sacidi family, which, in fact, is reputed to have produced no fewer than seventy q5dls.15 Another judge was called al-Qadi al-Mukhtar because he was elected to his post by the patriciate,16 apparently without even being a nominal appointee of the Sultan. In still another example, the office of khatlb was held at one point in Nishapur by a committee of the Hanafi faction among which it rotated.17 In short, the Sultan's government could do little but watch the bloody course of local politics and try to use it to their advantage whenever possible. This dilemma of the central government was particularly well recognized by the great vizier Nizam al-Mulk, as is shown by his own words. His remarks are contained whom in a letter he wrote in 1078 to Abu Ishaq ash-Shirazi, he had appointed to head the Niamiya madrasa in Baghdad. Writing on the subject of the disputes in that city be"There is tween the Hanbalis and the Ashcaris, he says: no imperative either by the policy of the sultan or the judgment of equity to the effect that we should prefer in the matter of law schools one side rather than another."18 From this it is quite clear that Nizam al-Mulk realized the impossibility of being inflexibly partisan and intervening in the factional quarrels that wracked every city.

47

Vol.

XI, 1978

This point is further illustrated by an incident that took place during the reign of Sanjar. Sanjar was encamped near Nishapur when a riot broke out between the Hanafis and the Shaficis. After seventy deaths had been counted on the Hanaft side, he became incensed and decided that things had gone far enough. Accordingly, he ordered his chamberlain to ride into town and say to the ShaficI leader Abu Sacd Muhammad b. Yahya, the director of the "Is this city yours or mine? If it's mine, get Ni';miya: out! If it's yours, get ready to fight me for it!" The tactful chamberlain was not unaware of the broader political implications of what he was being asked to do, however; so in delivering the message, he so modified it that it sounded very much like praise for Abu Sacd Muhammad. Then he rode back to the Sultan's camp where he discovered, as he had anticipated, that Sanjar had repented his impolitic words uttered in anger. Needless to say, when he related to Sanjar the words he had actually spoken to the Shafici leader, the grateful Sultan showered him with new honors.19 As insuperable as this standoff between central and local power appears to have been, however, it would be wrong to assume that the central government did not look for ways of getting around it. During the period under consideration here, a workable solution was never found. The mere existence of a central authority with a superior army doubtless served in times of strength to prevent each city from going its own way entirely, but it could not prevent severe and recurrent intraurban, and occasionally interurban, rioting, or such things as the destruction of the city of Nishapur by its own factions in 1154, following the defeat of Sultan Sanjar by Ghuzz tribesmen and their subsequent sack of the city. Ravandi gives a graphic capsule account of this event, which demonstrates the heights that factional fighting could attain. After the Ghuzz had departed, there were among the people of the city old hatreds born of the difference between the factions. Every night a faction IRANIAN STTUDIES

48

from one quarter would assemble and would set fires in the quarter of their rivals until the ruins that remained from the Ghuzz became mere traces. Famine and cholera joined with the factions so that whoever had escaped the sword and A group of cAlids the rack necessarily died. and the leaders of the rabble occupied the inner and placing mangonels city [and] the fortress; on the battlements, they gave refuge to the surviving remnant of the common people.20 Nishapur

was subsequently

rebuilt

on a different

site.

The solution to the factional problem further west, where it was not so much tied to feelings of local autonomy, was worked out under the Mamliuksand the Ottomans and is outside the scope of the present discussion. But the attempts at a solution made under the Ghaznavids and Selas unsuccessful juks are interesting steps toward a genuine solution. One of these attempts has already been noted, namely the strictly local endorsement of one particular faction by means of the coinage of that particular mint. Yet this could not be applied in any general way because political situations in different cities would lead to inconsistent official endorsements. Another attempt that was made by Mahmudof Ghazna was an alliance with the lower class faction, the Karramiya. 21 Sometime around 1010 he appointed the head of the Karrmlls in Nishapur to the office of ra 'Is. What he seems to have been trying to do is circumvent patrician politics altogether and find his supporters among a group that he had more hope of controlling. His plan miscarried, however, when his appointee initiated a witch hunt of alleged Shicis which got out of hand. Mahmudhad to depose him and return the office to the patricians. were more great duri

Of more importance than these efforts, however, two other attempts of a much broader and potentially These were devised by the two productive nature. viziers of the early Seljuks, cAmid al-Mulk al-Kunand Nizam al-Mulk. 49

Vol.

XI,

1978

The policy of al-Kunduri had the advantage of simcondemning and anatheIt consisted of officially plicity. matizing throughout Khurasan one of the two major factions. The one he chose, for rather involved reasons of personal was the Sh&fici-Ashcarl faction; but under difpolitics, ferent circumstances he might just as well have chosen the There is no reason to believe that his choice Uanafis. was determined by the personal religious preference of Tughril Beg. Around 1048 he put his policy into effect by orderFriday ing the condemnation of the AshCarns in the official and educaprayer and by barring them from all religious In Nishapur, which is the only place in tional functions. which the history of the persecution is known in detail, he followed this up several years later by ordering the arrest One of the of the four leaders of the condemned fact'ion. eluded capfour, the famous Imamal-Haramain al-Juvaini, ture and joined a host of Khurasanian Ashcaris in exile. Another also escaped arrest and withdrew to his estates where he gathered a private force strong enough to free Then these three also went the remaining two from prison. Thus, in Nishapur the policy was fairly sucinto exile. and it probably was in lesser cities as well. Recessful, ligious offices that had been in dispute for decades now A strong imperial hand had deall fell to the Hanafis. creed victory for one of the turbulent local factions and appeared willing and able to enforce its decree. Whether time would eventually have sanctioned and given permanence to al-Kunduri's autocratic solution is impossible to say. Al-Kunduri did not have much time left. In 1059, scarcely a decade later, Tughril Beg's brother Chaghri Beg died, and his son, Alp Arslan, who was to be the second great Seljuk sultan, became governor of NishaWhereas Chaghri Beg had never displayed pur in his stead. and had let al-Kunduri dictate much interest in politics More his son was different. policy in his territories, If Nizam al-Mulk. still was his son's vizier, different to time themselves, had prove never al-Kunduri's policies of it is because they were not in accord with the policies Nizam al-Mulk. IRANIAN STUDIES

50

Little is known about the early career of Nizam alMulk. He came from the Khurasanian city of Tiis, entered Seljuk service in Balkh, and rose entirely within the court hierarchy. Unlike al-Kunduri, he does not seem to have been involved in local factional politics, although as a native of Khurasan and an intelligent man, he doubtless knew what it was all about. He must have come up at the very beginning of his period of power with the device that was to become the hallmark of his policy vis-a-vis local factions, the Nizamiya madrasa. Alp Arslan became governor of Nishapur in 1059, and the Nishapur Nizamiya was founded either that same year or the next year, five or six years before the famous establishment of the same name in Baghdad. As its first director, Nizam al-Mulk appointed Imamal-Haramain al-Juvaini, one of the exiled Shafici-Ashcarl leaders. His return marked the end of the persecution of the Ashcaris and the end of al-Kunduri's effort to make one branch of Sunnism orthodox through imperial patronage. To deduce from this that Nizam al-Mulk was simply attempting to substitute a Shaficl-Ashcari orthodoxy for a Hanafi one is unwarranted, however, just as it is equally unwarranted to assume that his design in establishing for the central Ni;dmiyas everywhere was to train officials government hierarchy and thus foil the Shicite menace. There is no evidence that under the later Seljuks the bureaucracy was staffed by Nizamiya graduates, and specific instances of Shicites reaching the top rungs of the hierarchy can be cited. it can be shown that Similarly, whenever the factions built toward the boiling point during Nizam al-Mulk's administration, he specifically did not act in the interest of the Shafici-Ashcarl faction despite the fact that the Nizamiyas were all established for its benefit. His letter of 1078, written in reaction to AshcarlHanball rioting in Baghdad, in which he affirms the equality of the various law schools, has been quoted earlier. On another occasion, in 1067, when a Shafic1 leader tried to discredit the popular and tumultuous leader of the Herat 51

Vol.

XI, 1978

Hanbalis, Shaikh al-Islam CAbdAllah al-Ansari, Nizam alMulk made a point of defusing the situation and placating One final example, after restoring the Shaal-Ansari.22 fiCl-Ashcart faction in Nishapur, Nizam al-Mulk did not exact vengeance from the Hanafis who had been al-Kunduri's Instead, he saw to it that accomplices in the persecution. they retained a modicum of power and prestige in the city. committed to If Nizam al-Mulk was not sufficiently did he spend why then, it, for fight his chosen faction to of string whole a building on effort and money much so Nizamiyas? A definite answer to this question is not posis that there were a number of sible, and the probability including, perhaps, the desire to overlapping motivations, build an independent power base from which to make a bid for even greater authority in the empire. From the point of view of imperial policy toward local factional politics, however, the answer is probably this: While al-Kunduri wanted to declare the opinions of a single faction orthodox everywhere, Nizam al-Mulk was and the govto the tenor of local politics too sensitive ernment's need for local support to believe that such a policy would work. Instead, he bent before local sentiment Yet and tried not to exacerbate already violent conflicts. at the same time he tried to solve the entire problem inOne standardized instrument of religious stitutionally. patronage with outlets in every city in the empire would, bring the entire patrician class under some degree ideally, This was the purpose of the Nizamiyas, of central control. and within the Shafici law school they performed this funcThey were not designed to recruit tion quite adequately. bureaucrats for the central government; they were designed to exert imperial influence on local religious politicians. of course, was that only one faction The difficulty, controlled in this way. Conceivably, other was effectively imperial patrons might eventually have established parallel into line. That madrasa systems to bring the other factions this did not happen, however, is not a fault that can be cannot simply laid at Nizam al-Mulk's door. An institution be created in a vacuum. It has to fit into the instituIRANIAN STUDIES

52

Unfortunatetional patterns already extant in the society. society of the eleventh century, ly, in the faction-ridden patterns that were not part of there were no institutional system. There were mosques, which were thethe factional oretically open to all; but by this time they had become the property of one or another faction, as Maqdisi noted a in Marv. In fact, Nizam al-Mulk did sponsor indirectly Shafici congregational mosque in Nishapur to parallel the old Hanafi one. And then there were madrasas, which were The only advantage to the madalso factional property. rasa was that its functions were much less fixed than those of a mosque, and hence it could be molded more easily to Sufism, The third alternative, fit Nizam al-Mulk's needs. at that developed organizationally was not sufficiently time to afford much promise. To declare the Ni;dmiya system a failure because it under the Seldid not bring an end to factional politics juks, however, is to ignore the longer term perspective. By 1227 when the caliph al-Mustansir built his madrasa in Baghdad, it was possible to give all four current law In general, the state-sponschools room to teach in it. in the gradusored madrasa developed as a key institution establishment into the al absorption of the religious central government hierarchy despite the fact that in its earliest days it had been too burdened by factional cleavThe end result arrived at ages to function as planned. by alunder the Ottomans was the same as that visualized Kunduri, dominance of a single law school under imperial auspices; but the means was gradual absorption through change rather than autocratic fiat. institutional This later evolution is far beyond the scope of this paper; and in terms of the subject under immediate discusThe end result was sion, it is misleading to dwell on it. never realized in Khurasan and Transoxania. The original premise that there is something special about the cities of that area, a feeling of autonomy with roots going back into the pre-Islamic period, is not belied by the later development of the madrasa and the law schools; for that cities further west. development took place in different The particular importance of Khurasan and Transoxania was 53

Vol.

XI, 1978

to set the problem of central power versus local politicalreligious factions in the clearest possible way. The Ghaznavid and Seljuk sultans who ruled the area and, more important, their Khurasanian administrators knew this problem at firsthand. The fact that the solutions to it that they attempted loom large in the development of Sunni Islam as a whole in later centuries is not germane to Khurasan and Transoxania. The turbulent years of the Mongols and Timurids followed by the emergence of Shicism as the Iranian state religion put the area outside the mainstream of Sunni solutions of Islamic development. The political-religious later Sunni Islam were never tested in the crucible of Khurasanian local politics that brought them into being. NOTES

1.

Al-Maqdisi, Ahsan at-taq5ll"m fE macrifat 1906), p. 336. ed. M. de Goeje (Leiden,

2.

Ibid.,

3.

in Conversion See chapter by R. W. Bulliet ed. N. Levtzion (New York, 1978).

4.

Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion W. Barthold, (London, 1969), pp. 204-207.

5.

p. 323.

R. W. Bulliet,

"A MuCtazilite

Ghazna," American Vol.

al-aq5l1m,

XV (1969),

Numismatic

pp.

to Islam,

Coin of Mahmiid of Society

Musem Notes,

119-129.

6.

"Un tresor de dinars gaznawides et salD. Sourdel, d'Etudes Bulletin en Afghanistan," decouvert tuqides pp. 218-219. Vol. XVIII (1963/64), Orientales,

7.

N. Naqshabandi, (1949), p. 103.

8.

discussed by Barthold, This family has been thoroughly "Al-i pp. 326-27, 353-55; and 0. Pritsak. Turkestan, Burhan," Der Islam, Vol. III (1952), pp. 81-96.

IRANIAN STUDIES

"Al-Dinar

54

al-IslTml,"

Sumer, Vol.

1

9. 10.

Barthold,

Turkestan,

cAbd al-Ghafir

pp.

310-322.

al-Farisi, Naisa"As-Siyaq li ta'rikh ed. R. N. Frye (The of Nishapur, 14b-15a. second MS, fol.

buir," The Histories Hague,

1965),

11.

Ibid.,

fol.

12.

Untitled, anonymous MS, Bibliotheque 18a. 6284, fol.

13.

Mucin ad-Din Zamchi Esfezari, Rawdat al-Jannat Kazim Imam (Tehran, Madina Harat, ed. M. Awqaf 39/1959-60), Vol. II, pp. 53-55.

48a-b.

ed.

Ebbas Eghbal

Nationale

(Tehran,

No.

fL

1338-

1329/

14.

CAtabat al-Kataba, 1950), p. 10.

15.

Ibn Abi al-Wafa', 1332/1914), Vol.

16.

Al-Farisl, fol. 45a;

17.

Ibid.,

18.

Ibn al-Jauzi, Al-Muntazam Vol. VIII, p. 312.

19.

Al-Husaini, Akhbar ad-daulat as-Salfjuqiya, Iqbal (Lahore, 1933), pp. 125-126.

20.

Being Ar-Ravandi, Rahat as-sudiur wa ayat as-surur: a History of the Sel jugs, ed. M. Iqbal (London, 1921), p. 182.

21.

The following discussion of events in Nishapur is based on my book The Patricians of Nishapur (Cambridge, 1972), "The Political-Religious part I; and on my article, History of Nishapur in the Eleventh Century," in D. S.

Al-Jawahir I, p. 262.

al-muciya

"As-Siyaq li ta'rikh second MS, fol. 92b.

first

MS, fol.

(Hyderabad,

Naisabiir,"

first

MS,

68a-b.

55

(Hyderabad,

1359/1940),

ed. M.

Vol.

XI,

1978

Richards, 1973),

22.

pp.

ed.,

Islamic 71-91.

Civilisation,

S. de Laugier de Beaurecueil, (Beirut, 1965), pp. 109-110.

IRANIAN STUDIES

56

Khwadja

950-1150

(Oxford,

CAbdull1h Ans3ri

IranianStudies, Volume Xl, 1978.

Turanian and

Iranian

Nomadism Politics

John MassonSmith, Jr.

The last millenium of Iranian history has been what might best be called the "Turanian period," a time of Turkish and Mongol rule and nomad domination. It is a period viewed by Iranians and most students of Iranian history with mixed, largely negative, feelings that reflect the experience and writings of the conquered peoples. The experience of the Turanians tends to be disregarded, only in part because they wrote very little about it. This essay considers the nature and some of the experience of the conquering Turanian nomad society. In discussing nomadism it is important to dispose of some perhaps tacit assumptions of cultural bias. The nomad should not be viewed as a mere vagabond or vagrant. He moves purposefully and he is far from lacking means of support, although they may be hidden over the hill or around the bend in the road. His economy is not a primitive, pre- and subagricultural method, as some (especially Soviet) scholars would still have it, nor as simple a one as Owen Lattimore once suggested: "Nomadism.. . in adversity. .. could shrink back to its roots--a few sheep, a few horses--[and] could grow back to full vigor at the

John Masson Smith, Jr. is Professor University of California, Berkeley. 57

of History at the

at which animals breed.11 geometrical rate of multiplication The typical nomad family owns a considerable number of animals and obtains its subsistence by direct consumption and by exchange of the animals themselves or of their animal Barth reports that the Basseri of Iran consider products. a herd of sixty sheep and goats about the minimumnecessary for the support of a family of five to six persons, and there is coincident information concerning Mongol pastoShould the herd be reduced below this approximate ralism.2 pressures size, human consumptive and natural attritional on the herd tend inexorably to waste it away. And as his herd dwindles, the nomad loses his capacity for nomadism, with the loss of his mobile stock of food and his transThe average herd among the Basseri at the time of port. Barth's study was just under a hundred sheep and goats, and nomads in Inner Asia and the Middle East seem to have considered a hundred head the minimumnormal herd, since they made it the minimumtaxable herd when their chiefs, rather than sedentary governments, set the tax rates.3 Nomadism thus requires considerable capitalization. For the Basseri in the late 1950s, "The market value of a 80 Tomans, so the average mature female sheep was...c. flock represented a capital asset of c. 7,000 T. (roughly The productivity of this capital is I350 or $1,000)."4 about 75 lambs net per 100 head flock, plus considerable: perhaps 7,500 liters of milk surplus to the needs of the lambs and therefore available as food or for sale, plus, wool, butter, and lambskins for the Basseri,marketable worth about 5,000 T./$667 annually.5 Nomadismhas These profits are largely net profits. had the great economic advantages both of the availability facfor the most part without cost of one of the essential tors of production, land, or rather pasture, and of lowNomads chiefs. cost government by largely self-sufficient Even Sopay no rents, for the most part, and few taxes. viet scholars intent on demonstrating the existence of "nomadic feudalism" have been unable convincingly to discover pastoral landlordism, or to point to taxation rates If nomadism must have its more onerous than 10 percent!6 other contexts, let us call is "middledescription from IRANIAN STUDIES

58

class." This description will appear apt, I think, when the ordinary nomad with a hundred sheep and goats is compared with his ordinary counterpart in sedentary society, the peasant. Among students of Iran in particular, among scholars dealing with Asia in general, it should be possible confidently to assert that the peasant condition is, and usually has been, a difficult one. And it is generally much worse than that of the nomad. At about the time that the Basseri had an average family income of some $600, average peasant income in three Iranian provinces was about $500 (in Gilan, Mazandaran, and Azerbaijan, the richest agricultural regions of Iran), and in the rest of Iran only $47.7 Barth, like other observers, had an "overwhelming subjective impression of a high standard of living among the Basseri nomads relative to most populations in the Middle East.".8 This comparison between nomads and peasants is important for the assessment of the "assimilation" of nomads by "higher" cultures, and of programs of sedentarization. Assimilation and sedentarization, to the nomad, usually mean becoming a peasant--and the nomad usually wants nothing to do with it. Many nomads do settle, of course, but most of them of necessity rather than choice. The "middle-class" society of nomads (like others) has its difficulties as well as, indeed because of, its advantages. The nomads' income is not only sizeable in their direct consumption quantity but high in quality: includes milk and meat, and their marketed products, including luxuries such as carpets and horses, are exchanged for grain, fruit, and the other commodities that the nomads do not or cannot produce themselves. Their diet, is good. So also are their sanitary condiconsequently, tions, since they live in small groups and move frequently, as required by their large herds and sparse pastures. This wealth and health can produce a tendency to large families and overpopulation. The Basseri provide an especially striking (and perhaps exceptional) case in which two-thirds of the population in every generation becomes 59

Vol.

XI,

1978

sedentary.9 turbulence,

can cause great political

Such instability as we shall see.

The reluctance of nomads to sedentarize is not only the product of their understanding of the comparative reIt enterprise. turns on pastoral as against agricultural Sedentarized nomads in is also a matter of opportunity. modern Iran are among the most miserable of all the peasantry partly because they have consumed their animal capibut in larger part betal while trying to avoid settling, lands and jobs are already cause the available agricultural sedentary society, taken by members of the long-established which relegates the former nomad to casual labor.10 Note, however, that the "poor nomad" is a contradiction in terms. Some connection to an adequate herd, through ownership, hired employment, or owner's charity, is necessary for the practice of nomadism. A nomad's herd and means of subsistence and equipment may be marginal, at between sixty and a hundred sheep, but it cannot be less. Nomadic society is "middle-class" in part because the impoverished are denomadized and disappear to become sedentary or starve. The sedentarized nomad also loses important politiHerodotus1l and William Ironsl have pointed cal assets. Overout the protection given the nomad by his mobility. can be evaded powerful enemies and overbearing authorities by the nomad with his portable housing and movable means The peasant, on the contrary, is essenof subsistence. and with his landtially stuck in his fields and villages, He may flee in despair, but cannot lords and governors. do so with hope, as can the nomad. An equally important loss for the sedentarizing nomad in premodern times (that is to say, until very reThe greatest virtue of cently in Iran) was his horse. Exnomadism then was its capacity to produce cavalry. tensive pastoralism makes it possible to raise horses cheaply, with limited labor, free grass, and water, and And the limited labor requirements of without shelter. nomadism have also enabled a division of labor whereby IRANIAN STUDIES

60

women and children handle routine subsistence chores, and the men, in the words of Marco Polo, "do not bother themselves about anything but hunting and warfare and falconry.",13 Polo may somewhat have underestimated male contributions to subsistence in peacetime, but his main point is correct. Nomadism accordingly made every man a knight, as long as cavalry was the dominant arm. The importance of nomadism for the nomad, and its significance for the historian, now become clearer. In failure, the nomad loses not just his sheep, but his horse; he not only becomes a peasant but loses his knighthood. And in success, the nomad is not only a shepherd but also a cavalryman, and his society is both pastoral and military. Here again a comparison with sedentary society will be useful. The same economies that favor nomads over sedentary stock raisers--little labor, free grass and water, no barns--apply to horses. The disadvantage of the sedentaries is if anything increased because warhorses must be well cared for, whereas subsistence stock can tolerate a good deal of neglect, and because horses are not as useful or economical as other animals except as cavalry mounts: oxen provide more (and on bad roads, better) traction, camels carry larger loads, and donkeys are cheaper to ride. Riders, likewise, are harder to come by in sedentary societies. Agriculture is labor-intensive by comparison with nomadism, and leaves a much smaller proportion of manpower available for military service, although, because settled populations are denser than nomad, this smaller proportion may nevertheless yield large numbers. But conscripted peasants are not cavalry. They have no weapons, no horses, and are probably not accustomed to riding. Sedentary societies desiring cavalry armies have usually had to develcp a professional soldiery maintained by landed wealth or state salaries, and have found it socially and politically costly, as well as economically expensive.14 The Turanian nomads have taken only limited advanbetween their own and tage of the "military differential" The Mongols demonstrated what could sedentary societies. be done, but otherwise their martial and political capa61

Vol.

XI,

1978

cities have not been fully used. This limitation is produced in part by the nomadic economy, which satisfies its successful practitioners, and disarms, by depriving of horses, the unsuccessful. The economy works best with supplements and complements from sedentary production, but these can usually be obtained by private initiatives, commercial or predatory. Social attenuation is another limitation. The nomadic ecology involves extensive pastoralism, in which the subsistence animals are widely dispersed and constantly moving. A sheep requires something like 10 acres of steppe pasture, a horse perhaps 50; a hundred sheep and ten horses--an adequate family herd when horses had military value--need some 1,500. The large acreage requirements for grazing mean that only a limited number of animals can be grazed from a single camp; taken together with the animal capital requirements of nomadic subsistence, this means that only a few families can live together. The Mongols studied by Vreeland camped in groups of from two to six households because the individuallyowned herds averaged between 150 and 200 sheep, while the optimum size of herd-group for purposes of control and aca shepherd can handle up cess to grass was about 1,000: to 1,500, but in a group larger than 1,000 the sheep moving behind will not be left enough grass by those grazing in front.15 Basseri camps have between two and five households in winter and ten to forty in summer,16 and most ordinary nomad communities are not, and cannot be, larger than this.17 The regular concerns of these tiny communities is only with the practices and politics of herding: moving, grazing, watering, milking, and deciding whether to move and where, whether to continue camping together or not, and the like. Nomads become involved in larger politics only in The apportionment of pascertain special circumstances. tures among a number of would-be users, or the coordination of a crowded migration on routes cramped by geographic obstacles or the settlements and forts of sedentary peoples may require development of a public authority. Impoverishment is not usually a matter of public concern; since nomadic wealth and animal property are the private assets of individual families, their loss is a private IRANIAN STUDIES

62

apportionment or coordinaproblem. And when an initial tion has been achieved, it can often be maintained by traIt is predadition without further need for authority. that is most apt to genertion, rather than pastoralism, organization among nomads. ate large political cavalry out of the horses and To make effective horsemen provided so lavishly by nomadism, requires miliand command. But as the discipline, tary organization, grazing requirements of the nomads' animals attenuate so also they limit their military involvetheir society, adult male nomads--are supported ments. The soldiers--the and the horses by exby their dispersed nomadic families, The nomads can and do occupy themselves tensive grazing. most of the time with the subsistence and social activities of herd and camp, or with the sporting life Marco But they must be ready rapidly to mobiPolo describes. attempts to lize to cope with hostile pressures--with rustle their animals, encroach on their pastures, impede to profit their migration or destroy their society--or and aggression of their pasture-grabbing, from rustling, own. Nomadic military organization is geared to the seizure of special opportunities and facing of sudden emergencies.

among its soldiassociation This requires political The disery and between its soldiery and their leaders. capacity to persed and isolated nomads have no collective discern emergencies or opportunities and determine a timestrategy. They must therely mobilization and effective fore accept an authority that can do so for them, and acand obedience that this authoquiesce in the discipline This acceptance rity must obtain to operate effectively. and acquiescence is political: the nomad soldier must become the tribesman of a chief to obtain his services as a general. 18 The functions of a chief, consequently, are Each military tially ad hoc, and largely military. tion, pasture reassignment, migration arrangement, a usual work of chiefs--is dispute settlement--the Since such cases recur, and often crucial matter. 63

Vol.

essenoperaand special a chief

XI,

1978

since each case may be crucial, should always be available; To satisfy these dethe chief should always be competent. needs, nomads attempt, on the manding and even conflicting one hand, to obtain permanence in chieftaincy by viewing it or office that will always be manned, and as an institution to the only permanent entity in nomad life--by --resorting On the other hand, compacting with a family for leadership. nomads must carefully assess the competence of their chiefs at every turn, since their authority is for use in potentially catastrophic circumstances, and is so strong as to be dangerous if misused. Chieftaincy is thus at once incapable of indefinite dynastic, potentially stitutional, and temporally), yet intensely extension (geographically character, and the ability personal, dependent on skill, often become inconThese peculiarities to win followers. is a limited absolutism, making reguchieftaincy gruities: lar provision for coping with emergencies.

Turning from the general to the particular, look at cases from Iranian history.

let us

The Seljuks, who opened Iran to the Turanians, exemand the military purplify both the "military differential" The military aptitudes of hiis tribesmen pose of chieftaincy. enabled Seljuk himself to sell their services as frontier guards and his own as general to the Samanids and Karakhanids, an arrangement continued into later generations until troubles among the Karakhanids and unsuccessful fighting against the Oghuz forced Seljuk's grandsons and their and new employment in followers to seek new territories It is important for a proper appreciathe Middle East. to notice that the tion of the "military differential" Seljuks' entry into Iran was a retreating invasion by denomads who and marginally-stocked feated, poorly-equipped, had only some 10 thousand horsemen with which to face the Ghaznavids, who disposed of an army of permilitaristic haps 30 to 40 thousand well-equipped and practiced regulars, and who fielded some 18 thousand of them against the The Seljuks won this and Seljuks for the first encounter. the subsequent battles because of the greater mobility of IRANIAN STUDIES

64

their light cavalry by comparison with the heavily-armed Ghaznavids, and because their mobile herding camps gave them better logistic support than did the slow transport columns that connected the Ghaznavid forces with their sedentary sources of supply. The nomads, furthermore, were fighting for survival and did not require payment or persuasion to fight. Their victory at Dandankan in 1040 opened Iran to them and to other Turkish nomads; subsequent successes in Byzantine Anatolia, before and after Manzikert (1071), began its transformation into Turkey.19 Once in Iran, however, the Seljuk leaders tried to dismiss or transform their nomad followers as they attempted to convert chieftaincy into monarchy, and turned from the opportunistic nomad militia to a regular, salaried army much like that of the Ghaznavids. Such an army, it was hoped, would be more responsive to, and supportive of, the rulers, less troublesome to the sedentary economy and population, and logistically more suitable for the Seljuks' projected campaigns into the Levant and Arabia.20 The nomads were to be attracted into regular service, moved to remote areas, or at need suppressed by the regular army. The Seljuk rulers and Nizam al-Mulk knew from personal and past experience that nomad warriors can be attracted from nomadism into professional military careers, and they at least considered a program to this end:21 Although there has arisen a certain amount of aversion to the Turkmans, and they are very numerous, still they have a longstanding claim upon this dynasty, because at its inception they served well and suffered much, and also they are attached by ties of kinship. So it is fitting that about a thousand of their sons should be enrolled and maintained in the same way as [ghulams] of the When they are in continuous employment palace. they will learn the use of arms and become trained in service. Then they will settle down with other people and with growing devotion serve as [ghulams], and the dislike which is generally felt for them on account of their nature will disappear; 65

Vol.

XI,

1978

and whenever the need arises 5,000 or 10,000 of them, organized and equipped like [ghulams], will mount to perform the task for which they are deIn this way the empire will not leave tailed. the king will acquire glory, them portionless, and they will be contented. Such "assimilation" might have been advantageous and attractive to nomads, since, unlike ordinary assimilation to the peasantry, it appeared to offer a good subsistence But nothing seems and improved military opportunities. The cumbersome iktac and exiguous to have come of it. monetary system probably made Seliuk salaries look less than flocks of sheep.2 substantial The Seljuks tried with more success to divert their nomad followers and their energies in directions and into harmless to the Seljuks and their sedentary activities subjects, sending them away from western Iran and Mesopotamia to Azerbaijan and Fars to attack Byzantium and AraWhen the nomads did attempt to intervene in Iranian bia. as during the Seljuk succession crises, the Selaffairs, army managed for a time to overpower juks' professional them. But this army could not be held together in the confusion that followed on and administrative political the deaths of the Nizam al-Mulk and Mlalikshah in 1092. The army was no longer nomadic, but it was in a sense tribal in its attachment to the Seljuk dynasty, and now that the dynasty provided not one but several possible rulers, the army broke up into factions and the state into regional These could not cope with the nomads. In subdivisions. 1153 some fearful and hesitant Oghuz Turkish nomads in armies, captured Tokharistan destroyed two professional Sultan Sanjar, and brought down Seljuk empire in the same way they had set it up. Although Seljuk history prefigures much later Irania period an experience with Turanian nomads, it was still late It was still looking to the past in many respects. and in practice, Abbasid in principle and, where possible, its nomads were only one problem among many, and not a maNizam al-Mulk considerjor one by contemporary estimate. IRANIAN STUDIES

66

ed the Turkomans in only one brief chapter of the Siyasetquoted above in its entirety. The Seljuks had brought rather small numbers of nomads into Iran--some tens of thousands according to most estimates24--and had let most of them move on into Anatolia. The problem seemed manageable by relocation or suppression. With the coming of the Mongols everything changed, and the "nomad problem" became one of using rather than getting rid of nomads.

name,

The Mongols illustrate aspects of the "military differential" beyond those of the efficiency of nomadic society and economy in producing cavalry. They reveal the capacity of tribalism to attract and order the whole nomadic population of Inner Asia, regardless of linguistic or religious differences and divergent political experience, into the political following of Chingis Khan. Chingis could obtain loyalty from such a diverse population and organize such huge numbers because of the great project of conquest that he had undertaken:25 [Chingis Khan] made many laws and statutes, which are observed inviolably by the Tartars. We will give only two of these. One is that if anyone, puffed up by pride, wishes to be Emperor on his own authority without an election by the princes, he shall be put to death without any mercy....Another decree is that they are to bring the whole world into subjection to them, nor are they to make peace with any nation unless they first submit to them.... The accomplishments of the Mongols using this remarkable organization are famous--or infamous: feelings still run strong. What is not known so well as the ruin of cities and canals, and the massacres and flights of popis that the Mongols sponsored a great immigraulations, tion into the Middle East, causing a considerable and novel demographic development. Two-tenths of the Inner Asian nomad population was detailed for the conquest and occupation of the Middle East: some 170,000 men, accompanied by perhaps (multiplying by 4) 680,000 women and children, and (multiplying by 100) perhaps the equivalent of 17 million sheep in their accompanying camps and herds. Of these, 67

Vol.

XI,

1978

some one-fifth to one-fourth were stationed in Anatolia, and the rest were based in Iran, although some of these would winter in the lowlands of Iraq. This immigration greatly enlarged the nomad population of Iran, and, taken together with the depopulation caused by the invasion, increased the proportion of nomads in the population as a whole. Since most of the new nomads were Turks, while most of the sedentary population was Iranian, it altered the ethnic composition of Iran as well.26 arriving as conquerors and These nomad soldiers, remaining as rulers, also established the ideal and necessity of the nomadic army in Iran. From the Mongol period until recent times, governments in Iran have been ways of especially concerned to find the most effective maintaining and commanding such an army, and of amelioThe presence of nomads rating the problems caused by it. does make for trouble, as has been evident from antiquity. The Seljuks had had to reassure the people of Nishapur on this score: "Do not be downcast, for the plundering and unlawful behaviotur which has taken place up to now happened inevitably because of the rabble who were at that time carrying on warfare. Today things are different."*27 And the Seljuks had followed up by relocating their nomad The Mongols tribesmen away from their subject cities. could not do this. Nomadpredation continued to be a problem in Mongol and later times, and indeed became a much greater one beIran with about as many nomads as cause the Mongols filled it could accommodate, which made relocation of troublemakers difficult, and then these nomads seem to have reproduced in such numbers as could no longer be accommodated. Many nomads were faced with failure and sedentarization, and struggled to avoid it by engaging in outright robbery and in quasi-legal theft, demanding from peasants the dues customarily and appropriately provided by nomads: hosand help for travelers, supplies and support for pitality Since the peasants envoys and couriers, occasional taxes. were already paying "regular" taxes at about the limit of these demands were disastrous.28 their ability, Ways had to be found to curb or obviate them. IRANIAN STUDIES

68

Like the Seljuks, the Mongols and their successors had some resort to fortification, and built or repaired walls and constructed networks of caravansarays to protect cities and commerce. Sheltering the peasantry was more difficult, and depended especially on arrangements that benefited nomads as well as farmers and thus acted as an incentive against predation. A commondevice was to assign revenues derived from regular agricultural taxes to nomads to supplement their pastoral incomes. The Mongols seem to have done this collectively, granting iktaCs to their nomad tUmens, the military units of 10,000 men (with their families and herds).29 The successful working of such arrangements required population stability, growth matched by economic development, or control by state-aided nomads of nomads lacking such aid--requirements frequently unmet. Mongol Azerbaijan, where iktaCs were provided for the tumens, seems to have experienced rapid population

growth among the nomads and considerable sedentarization, and finally, during the succession struggles after the death of Abu Said, it was ravaged by nomads who boasted of their destruction and taunted the Persians and orderinclined Mongols by elevating a puppet-sovereign they called "Anushirvan. "30 The Mongols, like various later dynasties, eventually failed to cope with this problem because its containment called for the exercise in support of the status quo of chieftaincy effective over all the nomads of Iran, to require that the established and successful nomads let their failing friends and relatives go under, and repress their predatory But the efforts to maintain themselves. whereas effective problem was chronic, and comprehensive was intermittent. chieftaincy Only membership in the dy-

nastic family produced implicit comprehensive legitimacy, and yet family membership could not guarantee effectiveness or uncontestable recognition. Indeed, the family as might even fail to provide an heir to the chieftaincy, finally happened in the case of the Mongols. Parochial tribalism, seeking to solve the problems of one group at the expense of others, then asserted itself in the absence of effective comprehensive chieftaincy, replacing the general tribal loyalty to the vanished house of Hiulegiuand 69

Vol.

XI,

1978

fragmenting the Mongol organization

and power in Iran.

The fragments, the nomads who had been the soldiers and supporters of the Mongol army, survived the fall of their government to await reorganization under others. During the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they participated in several orders, including the intermittent chieftaincies of Tamerlane and the Barani/Karakoyunlu and Bayindir/Akkoyunlu dynasties. But not until the Safavis was a durable leadership again obtained. The background of the Safavis was an unlikely one for leaders of nomads. The Safavis had no original connections with nomads and little with government, but were a Persian family claiming Arab origin and providing leadership, from the early fourteenth century, for a sufi order centered at Ardabil. Tradition has it that Tamerlane bestowed some Anatolian Turkish tribal prisoners upon the its later tribal connections. order, and thus initiated The involvement of the Safavi family with nomads, and of their order with tribal politics, seems however to be largely the work of Junayd and his son Haydar, starting in the second half of the fifteenth century. Junayd visited the Warsak tribe in Cilicia, met the Akkoyunlu chief and organized ghazas against Treand married his sister, bizond and Georgia (and was killed during the latter, in inappropriate fighting against the Muslim Shirvanshah).31 Since the mid-thirteenth century, ghazi warfare against the Christian states on the periphery of Anatolia in which the particihad been a commonTurkish activity, to have been marginal nomads or pants seem especially former nomads, the surplus population of the large nomadic society established by the Mongols.32 The Ottomans in western Anatolia, for instance, were at first Turkish nomads awkwardly situated on the Byzantine-Seljuk/Mongol frontier, who took up and attracted others into ghazi warfare against the Byzantines. Their forces, ca. 1330, as described by al-UJmari, consisted of numerous, poor-quality cavalry and almost innumerable infantry.33 This was an army in considerable part of marginal or failed nomads. IRANIAN STUDIES

70

There were nomads in similar circumstances in eastSince ern Anatolia and Iran in the late fifteenth century. the Akkoyunlu, like other nomad powers, counted and (when possible) used the whole adult male nomad population in the of their musters and mobilizations army, the descriptions Davani -described show the condition of their nomad society. the troops of Fars as being composed of about 70 percent properly-armed soldiers and 30 percent "servants" (kull ughchi); Barbaro described several forces, one of which had 20,000 good, and over 5,000 poor horsemen, and another of which had 16,000 fully equipped men and 9,000 poorly armed with a variety of weapons.3 Poorly equipped men thus made up some 20 to 36 percent of the nomad-based Akkoyunlu forces, which suggests that the nomadic society as a whole had similar proportions of nomads with only marginal animal capitalization, between 60 and 100 sheep and goats or their equivalent, not enough to provide the subsistence and equipment needed for normal nomadic life.35 Such men were interested in warfare that might improve their precarious condition, and the Safavis now offered it to them. Haydar, Junayd's son by his Akkoyunlu wife, offered a larger ghaza than his father had done, and under better management. Would-be ghazis in eastern Anatolia were hampered by a lack of suitable enemies, since the only nearby non-Muslims were the rather inaccessible Georgians and Trapezuntines. Haydar provided more enemies--or prepared to do so--by adopting the Shia and the attitude that (in the words of Ismail) "Those who do not recognize cAli as Truth are absolute unbelievers. They have no creed, no faith, and are not Muslims."*36 This made targets of most of the Muslim Middle Eastern population, since most of it, including the Iranian, was not Shii at this time. Haydar The Shii also used the Shia to promise a new leadership. ghazis were to form the army of the ImamMahdi--and the shaykh of the Safavi order was to be his, and their, guide. Haydar began to use the personnel of his order to spread the word of the Coming among the Turkish nomads of Anatolia, as we see in the stories about Hasan Khalifa Tekelu and Dede Muhammad Rumlu,37 and began to recruit among these nomads sufis and potential ghazis, members of the Safavi order and future soldiers in its army. Haydar 71

Vol.

XI, 1978

in fact began the creation of a new tribe, of which he would be chief, marking his tribesmen and linking them to himself with the distinctive red cap he invented, the taj-i Haydari or kizilbash.38 Haydar died before he could mobilize his whole tribe. Like his father, he prepared a ghaza against Georgia and led it against the Shirvanshah--and the Akkoyunlu intervened, rescued the Shirvanshah, and killed Haydar and his men. The campaign is of interest because it suggests what sort of men followed Haydar. It was prepared in the spring, launched in early summer, and lost on July 9, 1488.39 This means that the ghazis were operating in the lowlands of northern Azerbaijan in the summer, and implies that their force had few horses and did not rely on nomadic logistics. Nomads use these lowlands, but only in winter, when they are well watered and give protection from the snow; they are hot and dry in the summer and must be avoided. The Mongols occupied the region only from October to April, even though it was their frontier with, and defense zone against, the Golden Horde.40 The Akkoyunlu cavalry that pursued and destroyed Haydar lost many horses there because of the heat. Haydar's men were thus probably former nomads with few horses and living off the land. The Akkoyunlu chronicler called them the "awbash-i kizilbash" and although he was biased, he was not wrong.41 Ismail, Haydar's son by marriage with an AkkoyunluTrapezuntine princess, presided over the mobilization of the Kizilbash tribesmen which began in the spring and summer of 1500. "The Guiding Imamhas come! Seize his hand, show him the way....The heroic ghazis have come forth with 'crowns of happiness' on their heads. The Mahdi's period has begun."42 Men responded from among the Ustajlu, Shamlu, Rumlu, Tekelu, Dulghadir, Afshar, Kajar, and Warsak tribes, and met Ismail and his sponsors at Erzinjan.43 Most of the Afshar were Whole tribes were not involved. aligned with the Akkoyunlu,44 and the Tekelu retained enough manpower to take on, subsequently, an Ottoman army of 50,000 cavalry and 8,000 janissaries.45 Ismail's mobilization produced only 7,000 cavalry, "the greater part IRANIAN STUDIES

72

without armor"46--drawn, no doubt, from the marginal nomad element that otherwise provided Akkoyunlu "servants" and Ottoman akinjis. Their enemies were very numerous. The Akkoyunlu had a nominal 300,000 troops47 and the Ottomans could probably field 150,000. Ismail told his followers of the dangers, and assured them that they could meet the challenge. "Let Yaz1d's host be one hundred thousand, one man from the host of Sanctity is enough [to defeat them]."48 Ismail was right. The Kizilbash overthrew the disunited Akkoyunlu and conscripted some of their large numbers into their own forces, seized Iran and held it against Uzbek and Ottoman while Shah Ismail forced the Shia upon the Persians. Iran would not be Shii today save for the efforts of these Turkish nomads. This military accomplishment, like those of the Seljuks and Mongols earlier, was so remarkable as to possess an epic quality that confirmed the heroic self-estimate of these (and all) nomad warThe Kizilbash soldiers appreciated the leadership riors. that had provided this opportunity for achievement and fulfillment, and gave Ismail and his descendants the same permanent loyalty that earlier generations had given to the dynasty of Hiulegiuand, to some extent, the Seljuks. The Safavis, however, proved more adept at using this loyalty than had their predecessors. The assets of the Safavi dynasty in their relations with the nomads that Haydar and Ismail had created, continued to be of value to their successors, and especially to Abbas "the Great." At the end of Tahmasp's long reign, half a century after the death of Ismail, effective authority had apparently been lost by the dynasty to the leaders of the Kizilbash tribes, who had begun to manipulate the succession and engage in faction and strife in the each of his own tribe and chieftainparticular interests cy. Abbas, however, was able to redevelop the authority of his house and the chieftaincy of the Safavis because these continued to seem to the nomads more comprehensive, less partisan (in that the dynasty was not derived from nomad clans with particular tribal links), and, historiin meeting the nomads' military cally, more efficacious In much the same needs and socioeconomic requirements. 73

Vol.

XI,

1978

manner that Haydar and Ismail had drawn earlier generations of nomads away from their Akkoyunlu chiefs and the Ottoman sultans, Abbas now retribalized the Kizilbash in his own favor. He appealed to "those who love the Shah" (shahseven) to join him against his rivals and disobedient subjects-that is, against the chiefs of their own tribes. The appeal met with a wide response, perhaps (although this requires further study) from among the same disadvantaged element that had provided the original Kizilbash, since that element would have been less dedicated to the status quo of local tribe and chieftaincy and more receptive to the change proposed by Abbas. In any case, large numbers rejected the authority of their Kizilbash chiefs and became Shahseven tribesmen of Abbas, who provided them with equipment, pastures, and routes, and used them to subordinate to his will their former chiefs and their residual followers .49 These imaginative exercises in the application of chiefly authority and leadership by Haydar, Ismail, and Abbas, plus a lucky longevity in the Safavi family (Safavi reigns average 25 years, those of the Mongols of Iran only 9), gave Iran its most durable and perhaps most effective government of the "Turanian period." But even the Safavis eventually succumbed and gave way to Afghans and Afshars. Established order in a nomadic society persists only by dint of frequent reestablishment against, or accommodating,the constant change generated by the productiand precariousness of nomadism. vity, power, attractiveness, The problem is nicely illustrated by contrasting the historical accomplishments of Abbas with his role in In the Shahseven episode just deTurkish epic in Iran. scribed, Abbas evokes the loyalty of Turkish nomads to In the authority his family had created and possessed. the Koroghlu epic cycle of the Shii Turkish nomads of Iran, however, Abbas is the monarch whose authority the hero, Koroghlu, could neither be forced nor induced permanently Abbas commandeda remarkable loyto obey. In actuality, alty from, and achieved immense authority among nomads, IRANIAN STUDIES

74

because of these very accomplishments, but in tradition, he became the archetype of authority, and thus the embodiment of authority as a permanent and constant force.50 of nomadic self-reliance, Koroghlu, the personification heroism, and ambivalence toward authority, could not accommodate himself to Abbas in this guise of shah rather than chief.51 and KorIf we notice that Abbas is an historical, oghlu an epic, figure, the first exceptional and the secin ond typical, I think the dilemma of Iranian politics it has taken excepthe "Turanian period" becomes clear: and well, given the tional rulers to govern effectively typical nomad attitude that authority is properly only ad hoc. NOTES

1.

Mongol

2.

Fredrik Barth, Nomads of South Persia (London, 1961), p. 16; H. H. Vreeland, Mongol Community and Kinship Structure (New Haven, 1954), p. 31.

3.

J. M. Smith,

Jr.,

vard

of

Journeys (New York, 1941), p. 253. Lattimore had in mind some three to five sheep per family, albeit augmented by "a few handfuls of millet and a bit of cheese" (p. 252).

Journal

"Mongol and Nomadic Taxation," Har30 (1970), pp. 46Studies,

Asiatic

85. 4.

Barth,

S.

Ibid. For milk production, see Daniel Bates, Nomads and Farmers (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Muse-

um of 1973), works would could

Nomads of

South

Anthropology pp. 8 (fig. out to about if the S to be scheduled

Persia,

p.

17.

Anthropological Papers No. 52, The 7,500 liters 3), 12-20, 156. 22 quarts per family per day--or 7 month lactations of the sheep to provide a year-round supply.

75

Vol.

XI,

1978

6.

Their evidence is re-presented and criticized by C. R. Bawden in The Modern History of Mongolia (New York and Washington, 1968), pp. 88-90, 150; he also considers the tax rate excessive, although the problem is not one of rates but of collection from inadequate herds. See also the History of the Mongolian People's Republic, ed. A. A. Guber, et al. (Moscow, 1973), pp. 147149.

7.

N. R. Keddie, "The Iranian Village before and after Land Reform," Journal of Contemporary History, 3 (1968), pp. 69-91.

8.

Barth, Nomads of South Persia,

9.

Ibid.,

p.

17.

pp. 115-116.

10.

Keddie, "Iranian Village

11.

Persian

12.

William Irons, The Yomut Turkmen (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Museumof Anthropology Anthropological Papers No. 58, 1975), pp. 2, 71-73.

13.

Lattimore noted these advantages in Mongol Journeys, pp. 133-134; I have discussed the division of labor of the whole adult male nomad and the militarization population in "Mongol Manpower and Persian Population," Journal Orient,

before and after

Land Reform."

Wars, IV, 46.

of the Economic and Social

History

of the

18 (1975), pp. 271-99; the quotation from Marco Polo is from the Penguin edition of The Travels (1958), p. 98. 14.

The social and political cost of knights in Western Europe is well known. Cavalry was originally provided by the wealthier classes in ancient Greece and Rome, and "horseman" remained an upper-class title even after the arm became obsolete, as also in the West later.

15.

Vreeland, Mongol Community, pp. 34-35.

IRANIAN STUDIES

76

16.

Barth,

17.

The nomads studied by Bates camped in groups of from 2 to 20 families (Nomads and Farmers, p. 121); Irons' Turkmen 2 to 10 (Yomut Turkmen, p. 46); the Kalmuk Mongols of the Volga, who have one of the highest population densities recorded for a nomad people, 7 per sq. km. (compare 48.3/sq. km. for the sedentary Ferghana region in Central Asia), camp in groups of from 3 to 12 families (L. Krader, "Ecology of Central Asian Pastoralism," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 11 [1955], pp. 301-326 and idem, Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads [The Hague, 1963], pp. 133-134, 148).

18.

Barth (Nomads of South Persia) provides the very useful definition of a tribe as a political association centered on a chief, and differentiates this kind of organization clearly from the other sort, the patrilineal descent group, commonly used by nomads. Without an understanding of these organizational principles and the differentiation between them it is difficult to understand (among other things) the elasticity and ethnic heterogeneity of tribalism that produced Mongol armies composed of Mongols, Turks, and Tunguses, Akkoyunlu forces of Turks and Kurds, or, for that matter, the Persian-Turkish-Arab Basseri.

19.

C. E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 126-128, 219-226, 241-251. See also The Cambridge History of Iran, V, The Saljug and Mongol Periods (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 15-22.

20.

The difficulty of campaigning in the Levant with forces relying on nomadic logistics is reflected in the awkward and unsuccessful forced by strategy these logistics upon the Mongols in their many campaigns against Syria; see Cambridge History, pp. 3503522, 361-364, 387-395, 403.

21.

Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government, (London, 1960), p. 105.

Nomads of South Persia,

77

p.

25.

H. Darke,

Vol.

XI,

trans.

1978

22.

23.

Seljuk money consisted mostly of gold pieces that were not standardized by weight: the Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum, Vols. III (1877) and IX (1889) lists 28 gold, 2 silver, and no copper coins o the Great Seljuks. On the lack of weight standard see F. Plunkett and J. M. Smith, Jr., "Gold Money in Mongol Iran," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 11 (1968), pp. 275-297. Succession History, 153.

struggles are described pp. 58, 88-89; the defeat

in The Cambridge of Sanjar, pp. 152-

24.

C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey (London, 1968), p. 33. A. K. S. Lambton, "Iran," Encyclopaedia of Islam2.

25.

John of Plano Carpini, History of the Mongols, in C. Dawson, ed., Mission to Asia (New York, 1966), p. 25. John's information was collected during 1246, nineteen years after the death of Chingis.

26.

Smith, "Mongol Manpower,"

27.

Quoted from Baihaki by Bosworth in Ghaznavids,

28.

I have discussed the overpopulation problem in "Mongol Manpower"and taxes in "Mongol and Nomadic Taxation." See Cambridge History, pp. 522-537.

29.

The Mongols based six tUmens in Azerbaijan, according to Georgian sources (M. F. Brosset, Histoire de la Georgie, Vol. I [St. Petersburg, 1849], pp. 511, 539), and of these one would have belonged to the sovereign, who would have provided supplementary supplies out of his own resources. The other five probably benefited from the "military fief-holds'/iktacs in the Pishkin region of Azerbaijan mentioned by Hamdullah Mustawfi Qazwini in The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat al-Qulub, G. Le Strange, ed. and trans., Vol. I, text (Leiden and London, 1915), pp. 82-83; and Vol. II, trans. (Leiden and London, 1919), p. 85.

IRANIAN STUDIES

78

p. 254.

30.

Tarikh-i Smith, "Mongol Manpower"; Abu Bakr al-Ahri, (S'GraShaikh Uwais, J. B. Van Loon, ed. and trans. venhage, 1954), text, pp. 171-173; trans.., pp. 71-73.

31.

R. M. Savory,

32.

R. P. Lindner, "Ottoman Government and Nomad Society, Ph.D. University of California 1261-1501" (Berkeley: dissertation, 1976), pp. 43-45.

33.

in Notices et exAl-Umari, E. Quatremere trans., traits des manuscrits du Roil, 13 de la Bibliotheque (1838), p. 364.

34.

Review in Firs in V. Minorsky, "A Civil and Military and Afri881/1476," Bulletin of the School of Oriental can Studies, One often won10:1 (1939), pp. 141-178. in units ders, when dealing with nomad armies organized and nominally of ten thousands (tumen), one thousand, so on, just how closely theory approachorganizational es the actuality of manpower. Under the Akkoyunlu it the "ration strength" approached it quite closely: of the Fars corps was just over 30,000, and the corps counted by Barbaro with Uzun Hasan during 1474-75, with his beans, just under 30,000; these corps each had three t'umens, in principle; see J. E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu (Minneapolis and Chicago, 1976), pp. 122 and 131, n. 122.

35.

Comparable proportions are found in a modern Mongol of wealth distribunomad population. The analysis tion in the Narobanchin district by Vreeland (Mongol in Community, p. 31) shows that of the 400 families the district, about 86 (taking half of groups 6 and 7 in Vreeland's or just over 20 percent, owntable) ed between 50 and 100 sheep.

36.

V. Minorsky, "The Poetry of Shah Ismacil, " Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,, 10: 4 (1942), poem no. 194.

37.

E. Denison

"Djunayd,"

Ross,

En.cyclopedia

"The Early 79

of Islam2.

Years of Shah IsmaCil," Vol.

XI,

1978

Journal

of the Royal Asiatic

Society

(1896),

pp. 329-330. 2

38.

R. M. Savory, "Haydar," Encyclopedia

39.

Woods, Aqquyunlu,

40.

Rashiduddin, passim, has information on the time of year the lowlands of Azerbaijan were occupied by the by the sovereign and his entourage Mongols--especially The campaigns against the Golden --as winter quarters. pp. 353Horde are discussed in The Cambridge History, be a to appears 412-413; what 354, 356, 370, 408, and summer campaign in 1265 (p. 356) was probably in fact an expedition like that of 1335 (pp. 412-413) which began to move through the highlands in summer, in reports of the intentions response to intelligence or preparations of the Golden Horde, and reached the lowlands in the fall.

41.

Details of the campaign are given by Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji, in V. Minorsky, trans., Persia in 1478-1490 (London, 1957), pp. 71-81.

42.

Minorsky, "Poetry," poem no. 249.

43.

Hasan Rumlu, A Chronicle Seddon, trans., (Baroda, 1934),

p.

of Islam

155.

C. N. of the Early Safawis, Series No. 69:2 Gaekwad's Oriental pp. 15, 18. pp.

197-198.

44.

Woods, Aqquyunlu,

45.

Rumlu, Chronicle of the Early Safawis, p. 57; S. J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,

Vol.

1976),

p. 78.

of the Early

Safawis,

I (Cambridge,

pp. 18, 26.

46.

Rumlu, Chronicle

47.

bearing on has information Woods (Aqquyunlu) of the Akkoyunlu army as a whole on pp. 113, I work out of this that the and 131, n. 122. lu forces were divided between the sovereign and their appanage/provinces governor-generals

IRANIAN STUDIES

80

the size 122, 130, Akkoyunand 9 in

corps of 3 tumens each, which would give a total of 300,000; Zeno gave this figure, but mistakenly applied it to the army that fought at Terjan/Bashkent/Otluk Beli in 1473, which included only 5 corps (p. 132). 48.

Minorsky, "Poetry," poem no. 7.

49.

V. Minorsky, "Shah-sewan," Encyclopedia

of Islaml.

SO. "If one asks an ordinary Persian who had built an unknown, ancient, ruined mosque or other structure in some locality, the chances are great that he would reply it was Shah cAbbas. . ." (R. N. Frye, The Heri[New York and Toronto, 1963], p. 253). tage of Persia 51.

A. B. Chodzko, Specimens of the Popular Poetry of Chodzko Persia (London, 1842), pp. 29, 35, 334-344. the epic, or his informant, trying to historicize makes the Shah into Abbas II, when, properly to match Koroghlu, he must be Abbas the Great. Chodzko also repeats (p. 335n) "the notorious boasting of Turkmans, that they never reposed under the shade of a tree or a king."

81

Vol.

XI,

1978

Iranian Stuidies. VolumneXI. 1978.

Reflections and Safavid

on

Economic Persia

The

Social

Structure at

Its

of Zenith Amin Banani

It is generally agreed that the rise of the Safavids in the sixteenth centurx marks a new period in the histor) of Persia. Hegemony of one dynasty over nearly all the Persian-speaking world, accompanied by the sw.ift forced conversion of the overwhelming majority of the Persians into Twvelver Shilism, resulted in the emergence of the first Persian state in the modern era. Such a signal event could not but invest the Persian state and society with major, fundamental institutions. The same institutions have continued to characterize and to influence Persia down to the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1905-1911. It is these institutions that constitute the "traditional" features of the society against which the forces of "modernization" have been operating since the adoption of the Constitution and the Supplementary Fundamental Lawvof 1907. The perspective of the Safavid period as a turning point in Persian history and as a watershed of ruling institutions in the Persian society has been established sufficiently to serve as a useful analytical approach to the problems of tradition and change in the Middle East. a Nevertheless, closer of the economic and social structure scrutin) of Safavid Persia reveals a greater degree of fundamental con-

Amin Banani is Professor of Persian History and Literature at the University of California, Los Angeles. 83

Critical literachanges. tinuity than basic institutional ture on the subject is of recent origin and small in volume. by Professor V. Minorsky, in the inBold generalizations troduction, commentary and annexes to his facsimile edition of the Tadhkirat al-Muluk have been followand translation ed by a presentation of analyzed data by A. K. S. Lambton, and R. Savory.1 The burden of J. Aubin, I. Petrushevskii, appeared in the these studies is that new configurations economic and social structure of Persia in the sixteenth but that these new configurations and seventeenth centuries, of basic social tensions and conwere the manifestations forces that had characterized Persian history for trolling a long time, and continued to do so down to the twentieth century. the context of tradition and change For an historian, (1) and temporal dimensions: has at least four essential that die out; (3) that live on; (2) traditions traditions the focus of their social that are changed (i.e., traditions control is changed); and (4) changes that engender new traIf we view the socioeconomic structure of the Saditions. favid empire in the light of these dimensions, the question This ideoof "religion" belongs to the fourth dimension. logical factor was, in many forms, in constant interaction In some instances of Safavid Persia. with other institutions led to fundamental changes, which in rethese interactions trospect are the most decisive legacy of that period to later times. WVhatapparently was fundamentally new from the bechange ginning--but in fact began to bring about essential at the midpoint, and became the paramount sociohistorical phenomenon of the latter half of the Safavid period--was the conversion to Twelver Shi'ism, which can be regarded as one of the best examples of interaction between ideas and events in the history of the Middle East. The question A. K. S. Lambton's has received scant attention so far. IV, 1956), "Quis custodiet custodes" (in Studia Islamica, treats the subject as it impinges on the evolution of the It is based on objective theory of government in Persia. historical methodology, although lack of amplitude gives H. Corbin's "Les orientation. it an overly theoretical IRANIAN STUDIES

84

confessions

de Mir Damad" (in Melanges extatiques Louis I, 19S6) is a tour de force of Jungian projection which enthralls the historian but leaves him searching for footprints of the archetypes in the historical arena. N. D. Mliklukho-Maklai's "Shiizm i ego sotsial'noe v Irane na rubezhe XV - XVI vv.," litso (in Pamyati Akademika ... .Krachkovskogo, Leningrad, 1958) is a general contribution in the proper direction despite its rigid conceptual frame. Given the paucity of critical literature, one must fill in the picture and posit some tentative generalizations on the basis of a perusal of available primary sources.

Massignon,

It would appear that the Safavid state was born when the interaction of beliefs and facts had already advanced through the following stages: (1) a spiritual orientation leading to political alienation; (2) a period of becoming the magnet of a potential anti-establishment, pietistic grouping; (3) the development of affinities with elements distant from, and hostile to, the political power surrounding the "spiritual" center; (4) utilization of the military and political potentials of this following for the creation of a territorial base of power; (5) interlocking into the main power struggle for the domination of northwestern Persia; and (6) the dramatic use of ideological motivation for achieving success. These general features are responsible for the genesis of Safavid power. The gestation period extended over five generations, and spanned nearly the entire XV century. But the fanatical messianism that gave Ismacl the edge over his enemies, could not and did (1501-1524) not become a viable system of beliefs that created or modified basic institutions of the new state. The devotional zeal of the sufi qizilbash was dissipated after the defeat of Chaldiran (1514). The attitude of absolute autocracy, however, remained wvith the Safavid rulers as a legacy of their role as the murshid-i k3mil. In the reign of cAbbas I, when the actual Sufi contingent was reduced to 200 palace guards, and even further demeaned into janitorial service, there were still some curious invocations to the Shah's role as the murshid-i kamil.2

85

Vol.

XI,

1978

The confessional upheavals which followed in the wake of IsmaCill's domination of Persia, are often interpreted as his conscious design for creating a "national spirit" to withstand aggressive neighbors in the West and East. While this may be partly true, at the outset we must discount any ethnic connotation in this "national spirit" and await further evidence in support of the general contention. Even at the time of cAbbas I (1587-1629), when systematic efforts were being made to reduce the power of the Turkoman tribes and to discredit the Qizilbash, popular reflections of the Ottoman-Safavid conflicts were in terms of Rumi versus Qizilbash who appeared as hero archetypes in the popular literature and the folklore of the Safavid era--and incidentally, retained their popularity into the twentieth century. It seems more likely, however, that the forced conversion of Persians to Twelver Shi'ism was the natural reflex of the intense propaganda of the Safavids among their Turkoman supporters. It represented a fulfillment of the promises given in the course of decisive and formative wars. Petrushevskii substantiates the dimension of concrete reality for this supposition by presenting evidence of large-scale confiscations of properties of recalcitrant sunnis--with the uymaq as the chief beneficiaries.3 It took longer than a century for Twelver Shi'ism to of Persia and her rulpenetrate the socioeconomic structure The sudden rise in owqaf ing institutions sufficiently. during the reign of CAbbas I was but a prelude to the rise

of the shIll ulama as a power-sharing class. The vaunted reverence of cAbbas I for the mujtahids was a front calculated to surround that power with an that he needed the Shi'ite theories of

conduct of his rule.

his absolute power and his abuses of It is questionable aura of legitimacy. sanction of the ambivalent and arcane absolutism as a motive in the essential

And he could hardly foresee

the po-

tential to royal absolutism from the mujtahids-challenge The true powwhose bases of power were laid in his reign. er of the mujtahids began to be felt in the reign of cAbbas II (1642-1667) and reached its zenith during the reign of Shah Sultan Husayn (1694-1722). To this period in the Safavid era we owe most of the major Shi'ite doctrinal, jurIRANIAN STUDIES

86

works by CAjmilj, Mir Damad, Mir idical, and speculative Findiriski, Majlis1, Mulla Sadra and Fayz-i Kashani. Equalin the relevant ly stressed parts of these works are the Shi'ite formulations of the divine right of kings based on the concept of zill-allah (the shadow of God), and on the detailed affirmations of absolute property rights. No better evidence of the symbiotic relationship between the ruler and the religious institutions may be adduced. The anonyal-Mul uk (1725?) devotes his mous author of the Tadhkirat first chapter to the sharica authorities, i.e., the reliin the Safavid administration. gious institutions But altheoretical to royal absolutism ready the first challenge had come from Shi'ite sources before the fall of the Safavid empire. There is even some suggestions of a direct religious rule through a concourse of mujtahids above the monarch. From the preceding series of generalizations we may conclude that the conversion for to Shilism was responsible the single farthest-reaching transformation in the Safavid Empire. NMoreover, the interactions of this change with other historical forces and institutions resulted in one of the most distinctive of the Safavids legacies to the subof Persia. sequent history This transformation continued to develop from the beginning to the end of the empire; its historically effective and traditionally controlling instiand attitudes tutions germinated at the zenith and emerged in the latter half of the life of that empire. For the sake it must be added, that as important of proper perspective, as the growing power of the mujtahids and their potential for social could control happened to be, seldom did they--or the actual power of the political-military they--challenge establishment. Ample evidence supports that the mujtahids exercised a powerful influence over "public opinion" from the time of cAbbas I onward. In this they were greatly aidOften the ed by the pious poses of the shahs themselves. were the focus of popular sentiment and even ocmujtahids the governmental power. of pious protest casionally, against The continuity ligious power and its establishment plagued

of this late Safavid tradition of reto the political potential challenge the Qajars throughout the nineteenth 87

Vol.

XI,

1978

century. This "popularity" of the religious elements, however, meant little more than an occasional nuisance for the traditional political system. Nor was the government above the expedient of stirring up latent popular anti-clericalism by exposing corrupt religious leaders from time to time. The tradition of religious power reached its culmination when the mujtahids combined their power of controlling the popular opinion with other forces in the Constitutionalist Revolution of 1905-1911, thereby dealing a fatal blow to the traditional royal autocracy. Paradoxically, however, growth of the very same forces of change which enabled the mujtahids to translate their traditional ability to control public opinion into modern political action, has continued to assail the foundations of the power of the religious institutions.4 An examination of the underlying social and economic structure of a political as the Safavid empire entity--such --at its zenith, may be a convenient and sociologically illuminating approach, but it imposes severe strictures upon historical analysis. Assuming an acceptable definition of the nature of zenith and a scale for determining its period and duration, there still remains the implication that there is a direct, and even synchronous causal relation between the state of the socioeconomic structure (presumed to be dynamic), and the condition of zenith in the political This relation may be only entity at large. If moreover we assume also a positive degree partly true. of social equilibrium resulting from harmonious reciprocity between the "system of beliefs" and the institutions of a to the concept of zenith, given society as being essential we are confronted by considerable comparative historical evidence that rules out complementarity and contemporaneity of "dynamism" and "social equilibrium." Furthermore, in the case of the Safavid empire, the question of "dynamism" is extremely probof the social and economic institutions lematic and should be redefined. "Social equilibrium" is hardly ever achieved.5 From the objectives and values of the political system itself, the zenith of the empire can easily be recognized. The objectives and values of the Safavids were these: IRANIAN STUDIES

88

(1) the exercise of absolute royal power with all its effective internal controls and external manifestations of wealth, pomp, ostentatious public buildings, etc.; (2) military might, integrity, and supremacy vis-a-vis the Ottomans and the Uzbek; (3) territorial security, and if possible, expansion, at the expense of the two peren-nial enemies; (4) a quasi-mercantilistic economic policy which measured wealth in hoarded bullion and encouraged exports; (5) relative domestic tranquility and prosperity; and (6) an imposing "image" abroad. On all these counts the reign of CAbbds I (1587-1629) constitutes the high mark of the Safavid empire. A review of the major social and economic institutions during the reign of cAbbas I would be intelligible only if placed--albeit briefly--in the context of certain tensions endemic to the history of Persia (although not entirely peculiar to Persia), and related to the Safavid period as a whole.6 First is a tension between central and local power, seen at various levels as autocracy versus autonomy; imperial administration versus tribal law; variations in the mode of governing between core provinces and borderlands, etc., which has left a deep impact on the practice and theory of government in Persia. Second is a tension between the settled and unsettled elements of the population: cultivators versus shepherds, or villagers versus nomads, with the strong implication of non-military versus military social organization and goals. An important analogous tension is that between town and country. Third is a tension between the Persian and non-Persian elements among the population--"Tajiks" versus "Turks." This represents essentially a struggle for power and privithat of the civil administrative lege--traditionally, elite versus the military elite, and that of the courtly, urban cultural values versus tribal customs and values. Notions of ethnic "nationalism" or even religious millets are out of place here. 89

Vol.

XI,

1978

Fourth is a tension between forces of social stratiThe result of this tension fication and social mobility. class structure, is not a disturbance of the traditional but avenues of upward mobility are opened. The kings, actnobility, ing against the excessive power of the traditional often the decisive third factor in the process constitute cultural and ideologiof upward mobility; but significant conducive th such mobility should not be cal traditions overlooked.7 Apart from these tensions there are also some elements of continuity and certain recurrent themes in Persian beThe most basic of these is the relationship history. is subjected to tween land and power, which periodically attempts at structural reorganization by the central government, but which invariably runs the same gamut from assignment of revenue in return for military service, to outright There is always a usurpation of total proprietory rights. precedence of military exigency over the integral order of the economy based on the land. there is the recurrent tradition that And, finally, form. Minorsky both protest and reform appear in religious magnetism of Ardebil was resuggests that the spiritual for the eastward movement of the cattle-breeding sponsible It is more likely from eastern Anatolia. Turkoman tribes created in the Ottoman empire conditions that the internal in the West caused of the gh3z! conquests by the termination As the earlier among the Turkoman tribes. this restiveness so westward move had been accompanied by the ghazi spirit, coloration-took on a ghizl now this eastward backlapping an "unorthodox" one.8 and quite naturally, force under Isfighting The size of the effective cenmacil, in the formative wars at the turn of sixteenth at approximately the Aq Quinlii is estimated tury against 60,000 men for the cavalry who fought as qufl qizilb5sh The devotees under their charismatic murshid-i kimll. force were: (1) the Shamlu, chief clans in this tribal

(2) the Riimliu, (3) the Ustajlii, (4) the Takkalui, (5) the Dhul-Ghadr, (6) the Afshar, and (7) the Qajar. Minorsky IRANIAN STUDIES

90

is quite justified in describing the actual mechanics of the formation of Safavid power as being merely the third stage of Turkoman tribal But the hegemony over Persia. hegemony of this tribal-military state underwent a rapid in a new Persian empire-state. transformation that resulted

9

A three-way struggle for power ensued among the d udman (the royal family of the Safavids the at that time), and the tajik uymaq (the Turkoman tribes), (the Persian urban, administrative nobility) even before the Chaldiran In this complex struggle, (1514). the lines of basic interests were crossed more than once. The contemporary sources do not present a clear account of this struggle. Aubin provides positive evidence for the Persian influx; and Petrushevskii supplies proof for systematic land acquisitions by the duidman. It appears that the royal family and the Persian element cooperated to the detriment of the uymaq. The all-important office of the vakl1, with its Sufi connotations of being second-in-command, was occupied successively by three Persians until the death of Ismacll. The second of these, Najm-i Thani, was an astute gentleman of Isfahan, who flooded the administration with fellow-Isof Chaldiran, fahanis. After the battle Ismcil1 gradually withdrew from active participation in administrative affairs, leaving all non-military power in the hands of the Persian element. Tahmasp I (1524-1576) came to the throne at the age of ten-and-a-half. His Turkoman lala (mentor-guardian) emerged as the viceroy and the true center of power during the ten years of the Qizilbash interregnum described by of amir al-umara Savory. By using the office (chief military post) in an assertive the office manner, by restoring of the vakil to the Qizilbash, as well as by rendering the vakil and the sadr (chief religious to post) subservient the amir al-umara, the Turkoman viceroy was in a position to bring about the fall of the Safavid dynasty. Instead, interclan and intrigue turned the ten years of the rivalry Turkoman ascendancy into a period of anarchy. When Tahmasp I was able to assume real power in 1534 by adroitly manithe feuding clans, pulating his determination to check the power of these tribes exceeded that of his father. At the 91

Vol.

XI,

1978

An end of his reign there were more Qizilbash disorders. estimate of Tahmasp I's measure of success in reducing the actual power of Turkoman tribes and in increasing autocratic power, may be gained by comparing the QizilbAsh disorWhereders at the beginning and at the end of his reign. as in the beginning the Qizilbash amirs were fighting as independent chiefs for prospects of greater autonomy, at the end they were squabbling as partisans of rival aspirants of the d5dm5n to the throne, in expectation of relaMoreover, in these factional quarrels tive royal favors. the Qizilbash had to contend with for the royal succession, with the of the Safavid state: other powerful institutions inthe harem, the religious elite, Persian administrative of the Iranian tribes, and most significant stitutions, all--with the new Caucasian "slaves."111 According to an eyewitness report (cited in the HJazln) of the Afghan sack of Isfahan in 1723, during three consecutive days, books of the various divans In a review of were being dumped into the Zalanda-RUd.12 during the reign the chief social and economic institutions of CAbbas I (1587-1629) it must be kept in mind that comprehensive, continuous archival materials and basic demodata are not available to the hisgraphic and statistical it is very likely that of the materiNonetheless, torian. al of this time more has survived than we are now aware. of what is known has been organized, only While very little Most of this a fraction of that material has been studied. we owe to recent Soviet scholarship, meagre literature with the which in the main, does not deal specifically reign of CAbbas I. Among the primary sources, invaluable despite being written nearly a century after cAbbas I, is the Tadhkirat al-Muluk, with its exemplary commentary by Minorsky. Access to information from contemporary chronicles is hampered by an involuted and turgid style, impreMoreover, on material cise methods, and frequent biases. these chroniof value to economic and social historians, cles are annoyingly vague and ambiguous. But with critical handling, they can yield a great amount of data, as Minorsky, Lambton, Aubin, Savory and Petrushevskii have Aside from containing much unique inably demonstrated. Tarlkh-i

IRANIAN STUDIES

92

formation, accounts of European travelers offer a valuable adjunct to the critical examination of Persian sources. Despite their unequal merits and inherent disadvantages, they belong to our primary sources on the Safavid socioTo some extent, economic structure. we owe our knowledge and information of Safavid diplomatics, of a similar nature, to the authors of these travel accounts.13 Finally, potential mines of information--as yet barely tapped--are the archives and the library of the Armenian Vank in New in addition to the numerous family archives Julfa, of the Armenian merchant houses of I?fahan. During the reign of cAbbas I, many basic institutions of the Safavid empire underwent some changes which referred have been customarily In the to as reforms. lexical as well as in terms of the conscious strict, sense, and active of the Shah in instituting initiative these changes in accordance with his objectives, "reform" is an appropriate designation. on the baUpon closer scrutiny, sis of comparative studies of historical developments, most of cAbbas I's reforms may be regarded as structural maniputo enhance his immediate power and wealth. lations calculated Compared with contemporary economic changes in Western Europe, CAbbas' reforms of the Persian economic structure lacked altogether the dynamic element of capital investment necessary for greater production. As a matter of fact- they the Persian economic institutions propelled in the opposite direction. By the royal monopoloy of virtually all capital investment and manufacturing, (1) opportunities to invest were denied to other potential capital investors, (2) the royal capital enterprises were primarily directed toward the production of luxury items for court consumption, and (3) the revenues from salable and exportable products of the royal enterprises were partly wasted by the cumbersome bureaucratic management and partly hoarded in the royal Evidence supporting treasury. the "repressive" impact of is provided by the Armenian merchant houses of this policy New Julfa. Grown rich on the export of Persian silk, they were among the pioneers of capital investment in Russia, Poland and the Baltic region; in Persia, however, whatever they did not pay in high royal tribute for strictly conmanufacture and export of silk, trolled they could not in93

Vol.

XI,

1978

In the end, they either vest in other productions. ed the capital or bought land.l4

hoard-

The consent and even the encouragement extended to various Dutch, English, French, and Portuguese investors establishing "factories" in Persia must also be vieded in this adverse light. These enterprises placed Persia into a passive "colonial" relationship in the first phase of Western capital "imperialism," at a time when the westEuropean nations were not in a position to enforce such a role upon Persia. Their enterprises were permitted for the sake of immediate cash revenue. The manipulations of the social structure in the reign of cAbbas I were primarily intended to remove potential threats to his absolute power, and to create new bases of support for his regime. (It must be remembered that CAbbas I's succession to the throne had been irregular. His deposed father was the focus of dissident intrigues, and his brothers were suspected of treachery.) None of the manipulations were original, and none were outside of or against the traditional structure. Consequently, they were seldom effective beyond one generation, since the continuing tradition transformed the values and interests of new elements that were grafted upon it. A discussion of the economic structure in the reign of cAbbas I must focus primarily on an examination of land The Ghaznavid practices, tenure. perfected by the SeljQqs, established the basic traditions of land tenure in Persia which were in effect until 1906. The support for the tribal military establishment of ruling powers--with traditions of the central Asian steppe--was provided by the asThe cycle began with the assignment of signment of iqtFl. revenue from the land, proceeded to direct control of the land, and resulted in outright usurpation of full propriIn the Safavid era the gamut was run once etory rights. more. Lambton believes that under the Safavids, the Shi'ite theory was more accommodating of the steppe traditions of land tenure. By sanctioning the more autocratic and arbitrary power of the king, Shi'ism allowed the concept of Be the ruler as the sole landowner to emerge more fully. IRANIAN STUDIES

94

this as it may, the problems of the Safavid rulers in meetthe demands of and satisfying ing military obligations from those their supporters were not appreciably different too, of the previous rulers; consequently, their practices, tended to fall short of the Shi'ite theories.15 By the time of CAbbas I, the earlier reliance on the Turkoman tribal forces for military support, had given way to recruiting new regiments from non-tribal "slaves," mostly Caucasian converts to Islam. They were to be paid directly by the shah, who gave them tuyul (the Safavid equiThis valent for iqt5C from the kh5ssa (the crown lands). of for was the process the reason of primary payment type reducing the mamrlik (Safavid equivalent of dlv5n7 or "state lands") and adding to the khassa, which began under cAbbas I. Since hereditary rights were attached to the new military from whose male heirs military service was expected, the door was left open for the rapid alienation of the property rights of the crown. Countermeasures of later rulers the encroachment of the consisted of simply accelerating Minorsky considers this practice upon the mamalik. kha,a to be one of the main causes of the Safavid decline.16 Apart from lands held as tuy3l by the military classes, the other main category of land was the waqf. Here Major changes-again the reign of CAbbas I was decisive. of owof quantity and of kind--occurred in the institution in of vow for a In a fulfillment 1607--ostensibly qaf. victorious campaign against the Uzbeks--the Shah constituted his entire private estate (amlak, not to be confused with kh3sqa) into owqaf for the "Fourteen Innocents" (the He vested the towlitwelve imams, Muhammad,and Fatima). ya (office of the administrator of the owqAf) in himself, and thereafter in the reigning monarchs. The value of these estates, scattered in various parts of Persia, was estimated at 100,000 tumans, and their annual net revenue at an average of 7000 tumans. While the motives for his is conthe action itself action are open to speculation, (Contemporary sources sistent with his conspicuous piety. refer to him as "the vicar of the dog of the threshold of CAll,j

as he signed

It is

himself.)

suggested

so in an attempt to salve his conscience 95

that

he did

for the illegitiVol.

XI, 1978

mate manner in which he had acquired most of his estate, and moreover, for the unlawful uses for which its revenue was spent. In any event, the deed specified that the revenues from this waqf, after the deduction of the dues of the mutawall! (the administrator of waqf), were to be spent at the discretion of the mutawalll, the Shah himself. i.e., This single action not only increased directly the area of waqf lands by a sizable amount, but it served also as the signal for many private landowners to follow suit. By vesting the towllya in themselves and their families, they continued to have the use of the waqf revenues, after Thus, they gainto charities. making token contributions as well as from ed a measure of immunity from confiscation, This is one area for which ample documendues and taxes. tary evidence has been preserved, but we must await systematic regional studies of these documents in order to assess the statistical aspects in addition to the actual dynamics of the development.17 members of the religious class--partiIncreasingly, the mujtahids and siyyids--were appointed as mutanotably those of Nacin, wallis. Certain local histories, Ardistan, Natanz, and Kashan, shed light on the growing They began as economic power of some siyyid families. mutawallis of owqaf endowed by others, continued to amass extensive private estates of their own, and emerged as the esquires of their region with paramount local socioeconomic powers.18 and political cularly

CAbbas I further enhanced the economic position of the religious class by presenting to them a large number of suyUrghals

(outright

grants

of any kind,

but usually

of

Through this policy land), and exemptions from taxation. he gave the religious elements a vested interest in his regime. He benefited not only from the aura of pious approval, but he created a new, powerful, and supportive disand potentially class, arraigned against traditional Lambton concludes that the sident claimants to his favors. class into the ranks of entry of members of the religious great landlords was the most notable change in the composition of the land-owning class in Safavid times.19 IRANIAN STUDIES

96

For information on modes of administrating various categories of lands and levying land revenues, we are at althis time almost entirely dependent on the Tadhkirat Muluk, and the account given by Chardin. Since neither source covers the reign of cAbb&s I, we must base our surmises on analogies that may prove helpful.20 Renting of land, particularly of waqf, and khaqa, was common. The wazlr of Iafahan was responsible for the directly administered khassa. Local administration rested with kadkhudas, who apparently were responsible for colBut the all-important lecting taxes. question of taxation is far from being settled. It may safely be said, however, that no uniform taxation system existed throughout the coluntry; and moreover, that the extent of land taxation and the rates varied widely in relation to the types and terms of land tenure, the geographic and climatic peculiarities of the land, and methods of irrigation used. In some areas, peasants paid their land tax with one-quarter of their produce. For the assignees and owners, the taxation figures deduced by Lambton from the Tadhkirat al-Muluk range from a low of 3.5% for the holders of hereditary military tuyul, to 10.6% for the holders of annual grants, to 16.42% for the holders of non-military tuyul, to a high of 23.58% for the holders of suyuirghal.21 But the last figure may repreIt cannot be assumed, sent a first-year-only assessment. however, that these rates were uniformly applied, nor that they represent the only dues exacted. On the modes of production and the conditions of the peasants we have scant information. Again a variety of conditions prevailed. Sharing of crops as well as cash payIt appears that in the ments were used in various ratios. of Iafahdn, the Shah did not overlook any possible vicinity source of revenue, but collected even 2% in cash of the value of the crops brought into town. Chardin comments that the peasant received vile treatment from officials and was subjected to frequent corvee, but that his lot was easier than that of peasants in western Europe.22 Compared to the land-based economy, other economic in Safavid Persia were small and of secondary activities 97

Vol.

XI,

1978

importance. All sources mention a scarcity of money. The silver coins of the Safavids were worth less by weight than their face value indicated; they found few takers. Gold coins were struck only for special and infrequent occasions, and then only in small quantities. Naturally, they were hoarded. The most desirable coin was the Venetian gold ducat. The royal mint impressed a mark on them, and occasionally the court made cash disbursements in these ducats. Is it necessary to mention that they never remained in circulation? The volume of commerce was small. Since the Safavids coveted cash, and since silk was Persia's most important source of cash, a great deal of attention was paid to the silk trade. The forced migration of 3000 Armenian families from Julfa to Isfahln in 1612 paid off very well by increasing the volume of the silk export. Chardin reports the annual production of silk as 1,672,000 pounds. Onethird of this produce was collected by the Shah as his duty, and then distributed through the Armenian merchant houses. The implications of the European commercial establishments in Safavid Persia have been discussed before?3 We have already referred to the Shah's role as the sole "capitalist" in the empire. This "capitalism" is to inbe understood in a negative sense. While his policies hibited the accumulation and the investment of capital on the part of others, his own "capitalism" was devoid of any entrepreneurial spirit. Out of the thirty-three workshops of the buy0t3t, only a small fraction, namely the textile weavers, the carpet makers, the dyers, and possibly the These smiths, had potentials for productive expansion. were the very workshops that were disbanded later, when their functions were delegated to the asnaf (the guilds).24 The aqn5f exhibited the usual hostile attitude to new modes of production and to the expansion of manufactheir long-standing connections turing. Nevertheless, with urban "fraternal" and "protective" associations--with sufi tendencies and secretive procedures--posed the danger of possible "proletarian" dissent and unruliness. cAbbas I was apparently cognizant of this danger, since by means IRANIAN STUDIES

98

of the urban police he kept a close watch over the activities of the asnaf. Externally, his relations with them were only minimal. Occasionally he accepted their homage and the fees symbolic of their loyalty, as well as the quotas of free labor. In return he gave them some protective regulations to forestall malcontent and actual dissent. CAbbas I was openly contemptuous of the remnants of the Sufi guards, and weary of other Sufi circles.25 The Sufi orientation of the asnaf was matched by a growing affinity between the mujtahids and the merchants. The "liberal" spirit of Shi'ite commercial law which raised the sanction of "movable property" to the same absolute level of "immovable property" (i.e., land), was without doubt a major reason for this development. For evidence of it, we may look to the increasing number of marriages between the ulama and the merchant families. As in the case of owqaf, sufficient documentary evidence exists to permit positive studies. This Cb5z5r-Culam5 alliance reached the stage of political action in 1905. The declining prestige of the Sufis in the reign of cAbbas I, and the commensurate rise of the power and the "popularity" of the orthodox mujtahids resulted in the growing influence of the latter over the aqn5f, and did this to such an extent, that the asn3f participated in concert with the mujtahids and the merchants in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, without realizing their basic conflict of interest with the merchants. For nearly a century the rising flood of goods manufactured in the West had assailed the foundations of the socioeconomic position of the traditions. aqn3f, and had all but ended their historic After having suffered disasterous dislocations of their traditional trade patterns at the outset of the inundation of the Persian market by European imports, the merchant class had adjusted itself, with few exceptions, to the colonial role of exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods, and had directed its interests to curbing the arbitrary and erratic interference of the autocratic regime (e.g., surtax on sugar) with its profitable imports.26 99

Vol.

XI, 1978

The financial administration of the Safavid state falls outside the scope of this study, but Safavid finances are an important yardstick for the economic structure of the empire. The Safavid monarchs were reputed to be among the richest men of their time, but most accounts of their Their habits of secrecy in this wealth are exaggerated. of arriving at a clear picarea increase the difficulty In 1607, at the time of the grand ture of their wealth. the declared value of the private estates waqf investiture, of cAbbas I was 100,000 tumans. But this figure represents and contributions that he neither the vast fees, royalties, received, nor the hoard of the royal treasury. A better picture of the state revenue, although not for the period of CAbbas I, is provided by the Tadhkirat revenue According to Minorsky's tabulations, al-Muluk. apart from that collected by the kh3sSa, amounted approximately to 800,000 tymans per annum. Nearly 22%of this sum To the state revenue, went apparently also into the kh3ssa. land-taxes (keeping in mind all the ambiguity inherent in this phrase) contributed 61%; levies coming under the heading of dabita 14.5%; the revenue from mines 2%; and the goods remitted to the keepers contributed 1.5%. The provinces ranked by the revenue produced, were (1) CIraq (the center, including I?fahan with 213,816 tumians, (2) Azarb&ljan with 161,597 tuimans, (3) Fars with 159,032 tumans, (4) Khfizistan with 98,451 tumnans, (5) Gilln with 19,116 tuimzns. (6) Shirvan with 63,784 tEmans, and (7) Kirman with 17,713 tumans. From the revenue, the total expenditure was 625,273 all of which was devoted to salaries, tiimans, virtually was expended for grants, payments, etc., while very little purposes. productive comparison with the Minorsky makes an instructive French budget of the same era, when, with a population double that of Persia, the tax figure alone amounted to ten times the total annual state revenue of the Safavids.27 The class structure of Safavid Persia evinces the of social stratificaremarkable continuity of traditions The tion in Persia that date back to the Avestan period. IRANIAN STUDIES

100

basic theory of the four social strata represented by (1) the monarchy, (2) the military aristocracy, (3) the the continued to and religious nobility, (4) "peasantry," be considered the norm in the Safavid period. Important transformations took place not in the structure of the soin the composition of the social.classciety, but first, es, and second, in the relative positions of the second and the third classes. Again, the critical period for the purposeful and actual accomplishment of the first, and for laying the foundations for the second--however unintended-was the reign of cAbbas I. During the same period, the monarchy itself underwent also a certain amount of change, but not in an unexpected direction. A similarity exists in the manner in which the Achamenid and Safavid monarchies were established: one family (dudman) supported by other related families (tribes) arose in one corner, subjugated its neighbors, created an empire, and shared the rule of that empire with the families (tribes) who had supported it. The ideological formulations of khwarna/zill-allah were instrumental in elevating the monarch to a position of absolute patrimonial power. In the Safavid empire, Shah cAbbas I was responsible for the final and complete suppression of Qizilbash power, and for the achievement of patrimonial absolutism. Sophisticated institutional analysis should not blind us to the decisive force of his personality. The chief instrument by means of which he accomplished his purpose, was a familiar one in the history of the Near East: the large-scale employment of royal "slave" troops which ended his reliance on the unruly original military support of the empire, and crushed both further threats of anarchy and challenges In this context the to his authority from that source. paramount role of military considerations is obvious. From the functional point of view, a military solution was applied to an essentially military problem. Viewed in terms of the social structure, the composition of the military aristocracy was hereby altered. As we note the nature and the extent of these alwe must keep in mind that from the perspective terations, 101

Vol.

XI,

1978

of five centuries of Persian history, the formation of the Safavid empire was a continuation of the tradition of political power, based on tribal military force. The requirements of this power base determined the economic and social structure of the land. The identity, composition, and historical role of the traditional Safavid military aristocracy have already been noted. The tendency to curb the power of the Qizilbash, and the initial employment of Georgian and Armenian converts before the reign of CAbbas I, have also been indicated. What distinguished the efforts of CAbbas I from those of his predecessors was the planned nature of the recomposition of the military establishment. As an example, the devastating campaign of 1616 in Kakhetia was fought It netted expressly for the mass import of captives. 130,000 Georgians--men, women and children. cAbbas I wished to assure a continuous supply of these Georgians by breeding them at home. The wholesale conversion to Islam was followed by liberal rewards and privileges. The actual military organization of Shah cAbbas' troops need not be treated here in detail; however, its salient features that indicate modifications of the social and economic structure of the empire are: a basic and categoric dichotomy of (1) old "state" forces and (2) "new" troops. The old "state" forces were paid by tuyul of land supervised by the provincial governors in the dlvan-i mamalik. This "old" category comprised two kinds of troops: (a) mul5ziman (regular militia of the provinces) who were with their partly mounted and numbered 58,289; (b) q5rchls, distinctive red headgear (Qizilbash) who were the old tribal cavalry, armed heavily with pre-firearm weapons. In 1586 possibly as many as 60,000 qurchis could be mobilized. Chardin states that Shah CAbbas reduced their number from 60-80 thousand to 30,000. The "new" troops created by the Shah were paid by him from khasa revenue. This "new" category was composed of three divisions: (a) tufangchl (musketeers) constituted in the main of sturdy peasants--the Persian element in the army--who were originally organized as an infantry, but IRANIAN STUDIES

102

were later mounted by Shah CAbbas--they numbered about 12,000; (b) Qullar (the royal slave corps) who were armas the quirchl's but carried a musket in place ed as heavily numbered 10,000 Armenian and Georgian of the lance--they whom Shah CAbbas was fond of calling, "my janisconverts, and (c) the artillery (which, contrary to sary cavalry"; into the Safavid armies bewas introduced general belief, fore the reign of cAbbas I, and not by Antony Sherley) that the SafaIt is believed which numbered about 12,000. as it was an vid forces were not fond of the artillery, of swift cavaldoctrine impediment to the basic military is supported by the fact that This belief ry tactics. disbanded the artillery. CAbbas II actually the total military force of Shah cAbbds All in all, men, fighting of 100,000 pay-drawing, I was in the vicinity twice as large. adjunct possibly with a retainer of the Shah's "new" army The modern reorganization Hajl Baba, Antony Sherley, was claimed by that Elizabethan and is generally credited to him. The entire reorganizaconverts, tion, however, from its concept of using Christian of its financial, and procedural to details administrative, The Persian chronthe Ottoman model. suggests organization, but new evisilent on this issue, icles are understandably dence in its support is coming to light. The Caucasian element was used not only in the crewith royal army furnished ation of the new, well-organized modern equipment, but Shah cAbbas I went so far as to apand to grant contingents, point them as amirs of tribal them the ulka (the territorial concept of tuyul with strictof the deposed Turkoman amirs. connotations) ly military and idenIf we add to this blatant affront to the integrity policy of fragthe Shah's systematic tity of the tribes of the tribes, we gain relocation mentation and territorial of his two-pronged assault a fuller on the Qizilpicture bash. A growing number of Georgians and Armenians were also appointed to the high offices which had been traditionally occupied by the Turkoman amirs in the Safavid state. 103

Vol.

XI, 1978

holders during the reigns of A comparison of high-office Tahmasp I and CAbbas I, recorded in the CAlam-Ara, shows To be sure, the numerical preponderance of this trend. the Turkomans continues, and "slaves" account only for 20% of the posts in the latter reign--but these 20% include For the reign of positions. some of the most influential Shah Safi, the grandson of CAbbas I, the Khuld-i BarTn they probably fails to mention tribes altogether--although it shows that Armajority--while still had a statistical menians and Georgians held all the high posts, including of Iafathat of the darugha (the chief security officer) han.28

deof the military aristocracy, The restructuring should not blind us to spite its paramount significance, element in the social structure: the other aristocratic nobility). the Persian administrative the tajik (i.e., The pre-Islamic quadruple division of the society was themodified as early as the Selj'uq peri-od, by dioretically shamnobility into the arbab-i viding the non-religious qalam (masters of sh7r (masters of the sword) and arbab-i The historical the civil administration. the pen), i.e., pattern for the Turkish origin of the former and the Persian identity of the latter was established in early Seltension In the Safavid period this traditional juq times. was infused with a new dynamism. Perhaps as a consequence of Shi'ite ideology which tended to strengthen the central authority at the expense of "feudal" autonomy and to aid the development of a Persian national state, the tajik element in the Safavid social structure found the circumstances more favorable for acquiring power and position than ever It did so to such an extent, that we notice a before. separation of the growing discord between the theoretical and and the "masters-of-the-sword," "masters-of-the-pen" The two elements covof Safavid history. the actualities of course, eted each other's respective functions--without, being willing to relinquish their own. The cultural and of both classes were so strong, traditions institutional however, that the Turkoman amirs who held high administrative offices at the capital were thoroughly Persianized, while the non-Turkomans--be they Persians, Georgians, or Armenians--who were given ulkas and the commandof miliIRANIAN STUDIES

104

in the course of two to three tary clans, were tribalized generations. Another development favoring the rising fortunes of the Persian administrative aristocracy in the Safavid period, was the growth and the importance of the rewith whom it was closely allied. ligious classes, To speak of a Safavid middle class and of a working class is somewhat irrelevant. The traditional quadruplestrata concept of the society was essentially a division of the society in terms of rulers and the ruled--the first category comprising three classes, and the second, one The same notion of khas and c5nu (the elite and class. the masses) prevails in Safavid times. From this general discussion of the social and economic structure of the Safavid empire at its zenith, the following conclusions may be drawn: 1. The element of continuity in the actual ture was stronger than the process of change.

struc-

2. Complex and varied implications of the conversion to Shi'ism account for most of the significant changes. 3. A model of absolutism limitations.

was created with inherent

4. A traditional Turkoman tribal-military state was transformed, but the socioeconomic substructure was left intact. essentially This transformation resulted in the short life span of "reforms," the eventual assimilation of new instruments of control into the traditional structure, and led ultimately to the dissipation of military power and to the degeneration of the other ruling institutions. A NOrE ON SOURCES AND METHOD

In addition to the sources and bibliography cited in Minorsky's introduction and annex VI of the Tadhkirat al Mullik, GMS, NS XVI, London, 1943 and in Jean Sauvaget, 105

Vol.

XI., 1978

to the History of the Muslim East (based on the second edition as recast by Claude Cahen, University of California Press, 1965, pp. 184-187); the following cat(1) regisegories of available materials must be noted: ters on Iran and Azarbalj an in the Ottoman Defter-i-Khaand described by Bernard Lewis in the g3nl, as identified Melanges Henri Masse, Tehran, 1963, pp. 259-263; (These infor parts of Persia variously clude cadastral registers under Ottoman occupation in periods from 1597-1598 and 1733. Their value for economic and social history of northwestern identified (2) uncatalogued collection Persia is obvious.) Dlvan-i Mamalik, dating from the reign of CAbas Dafatir-i bas I and later, in the archives of the Mlinistry of Finance, of Safavid farmans in the Milli Tehran; (3) collection of Safavid corresponlibrary in Tehran; (4) collections and munsha'at) in the Majlis and Mill2 lidence (rasa'il braries in Tehran, of which Z. Sabitiyan, Asnad va namihaTehran, 1343 dowra-yi qafaviyeh, va ijtim3cl-yi yi tarlkhi the customary (5) is a token published compendium; s./1964, rules and regulations Safavid mode of promulgating official was to inscribe them on a stone in the walls and doorways Introduction

A large number of these of mosques and other public places. These are throughout Persia. are preserved inscriptions of social and economic rich in information particularly yet corpus of Safavid inscriptions No systematic nature. exists. A significant number of Safavid farmans, deeds, letdocuments are in private hands in and miscellaneous ters, of coming to light of chronAlso, the likelihood Persia. documents in and other historical local histories icles, and in institutions attached to religious small libraries In short, the is not yet exhausted. collections private

of identification basic tasks of archival organization, preparation of source materials have sources, and critical sources, a varibarely begun. Beyond bona fide historical materials are capable of yielding ety of "non-historical" valuable information on the socioeconomic structure of Saof the In view of the special significance favid Persia. question in this period, doctrinal and juridical religious of the religious works, as well as biographical literature folk litLiterature, are first in this category. classes, IRANIAN STUDIES

106

erature, folklore and history of arts, logy are other fruitful grounds.

crafts

and techno-

Modern critical scholarship on the Safavid era comprises a small group of works. The pioneers are: W. Hinz, V. Minorsky, H. Braun, A. K. S. Lambton, J. Aubin,. R. Savory, I. Petrushevskii, L. Lockhart, M. Dickson, A. Kasravi and N. Falsafl. Of these, only Hinz and Minorsky have put forth bold generalizations, which, by and large, serve as points of departure, revision, or elucidation for active scholars today. Working more specifically on economic structure is I. Petrushevskii and on the social structure, J. Aubin. It should not be surprising that the severest methodological difficulty encountered in this study is implicit in the task of making schematic generalizations on the basis of insufficiently analyzed data. Needless to say, the time for confident generalizations is not at hand. NOTES

1.

A. K. S. Lambton, "Quis custodiet custodees? Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government," Studia V (1956), Islamica, 125-128; VI (1956), 125146; Jean Aubin, "Etudes Safavides, I. Shah Isma'il et les notables de l'Iraq persan," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, II (1959), 37-81 (Aubin, Notables); I. P. Petrushevskii, Ocherki Po istorii feodal'nyke Armenii V, XVI-nochale

otnoshenii

v Azerbaidzhane;

XIX CC, Leningrad,

1949.

2.

V. Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Muliuk, Gibb Memorial Series, new series, XVI (London, 1943), pp. 16-18 (TM); R. M. Savory, "The Office of Khalifat al-Khulafa under the Safavids," Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXXV, 4 (1965), 497ff. (KK).

3.

I. P. Petrushevskii,

Ocherki....

107

Vol.

XI,

1978

4. 5.

V (1956),

125-128;

in Persia," Peoples Louise Sweet (ed.), (Garden City: Natural History Press, 1970), I, pp.74101 (Lambton, Islamic Society).

A. K4.S. Lambton, "Islamic and Cultures

6.

custodes,"

Lambton, "Quis custodiet VI (1956), 123-146.

Tadhkirat

Society

of the Middle East,

(TM), pp. 12-24.

al-Muluk

A. K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 1-177. (LP). 8.

TM, pp.

189-190.

9.

TAM,pp.

14-18.

10.

R. MI. Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Isma' il I (907-30/301-24)," Bulletin

of the School

XXIII, 1 (1960),

of Oriental

and African

Studies,

91-103 (PO-1); Aubin, "Notables."

11.

Offices of the Safaxid State R. M. Savory, "Principal of the School during the Reign of Tahmasp I," Bulletin XXIV, 1 (1961), 65and African Studies, of Oriental 85; IM4.

12.

MahammadcAli

13.

L. Lockhart, The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Cambridge UniAfghan Occupation of Persia (London: use Press, 1938) (London 1938 made extensive versity de CharChevalier Pierre, literature; of such traxel de Lorme. Jean-Louis din, Voyages en Perse (Amsterdam: InACcount of East New A 3 John Fryer, vols.); 1711; W. Crooke (ed.) (London: dia and Persia, 1672-1681, 2); Hakluyt Society, 1912; nos. 19, 20, 39 of series W. Fos1627-1629, Thomas Herbert, Travels in Persia, McBride and ter (ed.) (New York: Argonaut Series, Co., 1929).

IRANIAN STUDIES

Hazin,

T5rlkh-i

108

Haz7n (Isfahan,

1933).

14.

Fernand Braudel, ranean

World

The Mediterranean the Age of Philip

in

per and Row, Publishers, 15.

LP, pp.

105-106.

16.

TM, pp.

17-19.

17.

B. G. Martin,

1972),

and the MediterII (New York: Har-

pp. 50-51,

110,

193.

"Seven Safavid

Documents from AzarbayChanceries (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1965), pp. 171ff.; Heribert Busse, zum islamischen Untersuchungen Kanzleiwesen (Cairo: Sirovic Bookshop, 1959), pp. 97-147, 169-220.

jan,"

Documents

from

Islamic

18.

LP, pp.

112ff.

19.

LP, pp.

114-116;

20.

TM, pp.

85-109;

21.

LP, pp.

124-128.

22.

Chardin,

Voyages,

II,

pp. 310ff.

23.

Chardin,

Voyages,

II,

p. 298.

24.

TM, pp.

29-30,

25.

TM, pp.

85-109.

26.

Lambton, "Islamic

27.

TM, pp.

28.

MuhammadYusuf Valih, Khuld-i Barin, Suhayli sari (ed.), in Dhail-i T5rlkh-i CAlam Ara-yi (Tihran: Iskandar Beg Munshi, 1317/1939).

26-28.

TM, pp. Chardin,

Voyages,

II,

pp. 285-290.

70ff.

Society,"

pp.

74ff.

30-36.

109

Vol.

KhwanCAbbgsi

XI,

1978

SELECTEDBIBLIOGRAPHY

I. A.

Materials

Source

Aubin,

Note preliminaire du Tchiraa-Rud, Archives

NI.

1955.

Persidskie

B.

A. 1956.

i

Firmany

ukazy

Muzeja

Gruzii,

1949.

Tbilisi, Papazyan,

due takya archive 2, commentees

sur les Persanes

Jean.

Tehran,

Chubua,

Sources

Primary

Persidskie

D.

Erevan,

Matenadarana,

documenty

Chronicles

Bidlisi,

Fumanl,

cAbd /1936.

Iskandar

NMunshi. ed. 1897;

Khurshah

ibn Add.

RQmlui,

V. Veljaminov1930; trans. armenians

Sharaf-nameh, ed. al-Din. Sharaf Cairo, 1860-62; or NI. Awni, Zervov, d'historiens NI. Brosset in Collection 1874-76. Tarikh

al-Fattah.

I.

T5r7 kh-i Afshar,

Qubad. 23, 513,

Hasan.

Ahsan

Gilan,

cAbb5s1,

cAlam-.ra-yi

hlchl-yi

al-Tav5rikh,

Tehran,

1955.

Tehran,

T3r7kh-i f. 464b.

s.

1314-15

Rasht,

I

Vol.

Nizam

XI,

BI MIS

Shah,

MIS BN,

Paris,

1350. Qazvini

Tadhkirat

, Nluhammad lection at al-MulEuk. Series,

IRANIAN STUDIES

N.S.

Khuld-i

Yusuf.

the

University trans. XVI,

V. London,

110

NIS S. Nafisi Barln, of Tehran Library, Mlinorsky, 1943.

Gibb

MIemorial

ColTehran.

Tunukabuni,

C.

Muhammad. Qisas

Accounts

of Travelers,

A True Report 1600.

A Chronicle sion Della

trans.

The Voyages,

J.

Ambassadors

Journey,

de Vicqfort, Paris,

1304/1885.

and Others

of Sir Anthony Sherley's

Ambassade en Perse, Chardin,

Tehran,

al-CUlarn3',

Paris,

London, 1667.

1686.

of the Carmelites in Persia, and the Papal Misof the XVII and XVIII Centuries, London, 1932.

Valle,

P.

Viaggi,

Rome, 1650-53.

de Gonvea, Antonio. Relation des grans guerres et victoires obtenues par le roi de Perse Chah Abbas, contre les empreurs de Turquie Mohamet et Achmet, son fils, Rouen, 1646. de Mans, R. 1890.

Estat

de la Perse

Figueroa, Garcias di Silva Antwerp, 1620. Perry,

W.

y.

en 1660,

ed.

De rebus

Persarum Epistola,

A New and Large Discourse,

Kaempfer, E.

Amoenitatum exoticarum.. German trans. W. Hinz, 1940.

Sanson, A.

Estat

present

Scheffer,

London, 1601. V, 1712;

.fasciculi

du royaume de Perse,

Paris,

Tavernier,

J. B. Les six voyages de Jean Baptiste er en Turquie en Perse et aux Indes, Paris,

Zakaria,

Memoires historiques sur les Brosset, St. Petersbourg, 1876.

11

Paris,

Sophis,

Vol.

1660.

Taverni-

1692.

trans.

XI,

M. F.

1978

II.

SECONDARYSOURCES (BOOKS AND ARTICLES)

C. H. "A Persian-Dutch Treaty Century." Indian Yearbook of (1958), pp. 201-206. Affairs

Alexanderowicz-Alexander, in the Seventeenth International

Arunova, Mi. R. "Firman Nadir-Shakha." 29, pp. 116-120. Aubin, J. Deux sayyids 1956.

Soviet

de Bam au XVe siecle,

Vost.

(1958),

Wiesbadan,

I, Sah IsmaCll et les no. "Etudes Safavides. Journal of Economic and tables de 1'Iraq persan." 2 (1959), pp. 37-81. Social History of the Orient, "Les sunnites

_

due Larestan

et la chute

Revue des Etudes Islamique, favides."' pp. 151-171.

des Sa-

XXXIII (1965),

Babinger, F. "Marino Santuto's Tagebucher als Quelle zur Browne Festschrift Geschichte der Safawijja." (1922), pp. 28-50. "Zur Geschichte

_

der Sefewijje."

Islam,

12 (1922),

pp. 231-233. Bellan,

L. L.

Chah Abbas I,

Braun, Hellmut, darstellung

Gbttingen,

1932.

Eine unerschlossene Ahval-e gah Ism5cl1. Sapawidenschahs, des Lebens des erstens

1947.

Browne, E. G. A Literary bridge, 1928. .

Paris,

History

"Note on an Apparently

of Persia,

Vol. 4, Cam-

Unique Mlanuscript History

Journal of the of the Safawi Dynasty of Persia." (1921), pp. 395-418. Society Royal Asiatic

IRANIAN STUDIES

.112

of Shah Abbas the Great, of PerEdwards, C. C. "Relations sia with the Mogul Emperors, Akbar and Jahangir,"

Falsafl, Hinz,

Journal

of

1917),

pp.

the

American

N. Zindigani-yi Tehran, 1334-1342

Society,

35

Avval,

4 vols.,

Shah CAbb5s-i s./1953-1963.

W. "Eine neuentdeckte in 16. jahrhundert."1 pp. 315-328. __

Oriental

(1915-

247-268.

Quelle

zur Geschichte Irans 14 (89, 1935),

ZDMGN.F.

zum Nationalstaat Irans Aufstieg Jahrhundert, Berlin-Leipzig, 1936.

im funfzehnten

"Schah EsmaCil II. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Safaviden." MSOS, 36 (1933), pp. 19-100.

______.

"Zur Frage der Denkwurdigkeiten des Schah Tahmasp I. von Persien. " ZDMGN.F. 13 (88, 1934), pp. 46-54.

________

Horst,

H. "Ein Immunitats-diplom Schah MuhammadHudabandas vom Jahr 989/1581." ZDMG 105 N.F. 30 (1955), pp. 289-297. "Zwei Erlasse Sah Tahmasps I." 65 (1961), pp. 301-309.

ZDMG110 N.F.

V. A. "Naselenie Khachaturian, armianskoi kolonii v Astrakhan vo vtoroi polovine XVIII veka." Izvestia (Teghekagir), Erevan, 1965, No. 7, pp. 77-87. Kasravi,

Kazi,

Ahmad. 1944.

M. I. Iranica

Shaykh

4afl

va Tabarash,

Tehran,

"Sam Mirza and his Tuhfa i Sami." 13 i (1960), pp. 18-39.

1323 s.!

Indo-

Kukanova, N. G. "Iz istorii russko-iranskikh torgoviuikh svyazei v XVII veke" (po dannuim TsGADA i drugikh arkhivov), KSIV, 26 (1958), pp. 41-53. 113

Vol.

XI,

1978

Lambton, A. K. S. 1953.

and Peasant

Landlord

"

custodes.

"Quis custodiet

_

in Persia,

Studia

London,

Islamica,

IV

(1956). Bulletin "Two Safavid Soyurghals." uf the School and African Studies of Oriental (BSOAS), 14 (1952),

pp. 44-54. "The Office

_

AfshArs. " 218.

and of Kalantar under the $afavids Masse, Tehran (1963), pp. 206-

Melanges

Lang, D. M. "Georgia and the Fall of the Safavi dynasty." BSOAS, 14 (1952), pp. 523-539. Lockhart, L.

The Fall of the Safavi Occupation of Persia "The Persian

24 (1959), Malcolm, John.

Dynasty

army in the $afav!

and the Afghan

Islam,

period."

pp. 89-98.

History

of Persia,

London, 1815.

Mamedov, A. "Pis'mo shakha Ismaila na azerbaydzhanskom Dokl. AN Azerb. SSR, 16 (1960), pp. 1007yazuike." 1015.

Miklukho-Maklai, N. D. "K voprosu o nalogovoi Irane pri Shakhe Abbase I (1587-1629)." 6 (1949), pp. 348-355. Minorsky, V. "Shaykh B&ll-efendi 20 (1957), pp. 437-450. .

"The Poetry

(1940-1942),

politike Sov.

on the $afavids. "

of shah Ismacll

I."

IRANIAN STUDIES

BSOAS,

BSOAS, 10

pp. 1007-1053a.

B. "Essai d'analyse du Safvat-u~-~afd." Nikitine, 245 (1957), pp. 385-394.

114

v

Vost.,

JA,

Petrov,

P. I. "Ferman Shakha Sultan-Khuseina Vakhtangu VI." Sov. Vost. (1957), 4, pp. 127-128; English summary, p. 128. "Ob odnom redkom istochnike

_

vidov. " Petrushevskii, shenii

cc,

sv (1956),

I. P. Ocherki v Azerbaidzhane

Sefe-

po istorii i Armenii

feodal'nyke otnov XVI-nachale XIX

Leningrad, 1949.

"Narodnoc vosstanie Uch. Zap. Inst. Vost.,

_

po istorii

1, pp. 111-120.

v Gilyane v 1629 godu. " 3 (1951), pp. 225-256.

Roemer, H. R. "Die Safawiden. BundesEin orientalischer genosse des Abendlandes im Turkenkampf." Saeculum, 4 (1953), pp. 27-44. Savory, R. M. "The Struggle for the Supremacy in Persia after the Death of Timur. " Der Islam, 40 (1964), pp. 35-65. "Some Notes

on the Provincial

of the Early Safavld Empire." (1964), pp. 114-128. _.

"The Principal

Offices

Administration

BSOAS, XXVII-1

of the $afavld

State

during the Reign of IsmaCll I (907-30/1501-24)." BSOAS, 23 (1960), pp. 91-105. "The Principal

Offices

of the Safavid

State

during the Reign of Tahmasp I (930-84/1524-76)." BSOAS, XXIV, I (1961), pp. 65-85. The Three Brothers,

Togan, Z. V.

London, 1825.

"Sur l'origine des ~afavldes. " III (1957), pp. 345-57.

Melange L.

Massignon,

Voskanian, V. "Hay Rusakan Haraberutiunner XVII Darum" (Armenian-Russian Relations in the XVII Century), Teghekagir (1948), 1, pp. 59-62. 115

Vol.

XI,

1978

Weir, T. H. "The Revolution in Persia at the Beginning of the 18th Century (from a Turkish MS in the University of Glasgow)." Browne Festschrift (1922), pp. 480-490.

Note:

Abbreviations Islamicus

IRANIAN STUDIES

are the same as used in Index

.

116

IranianStudies, Volume Xl, 1978.

The Safavid

in

Uymaq

Qajar

Period,

The

1500-1722

JamesJ. Reid dynasThe Qajar uyma-q provided Iran with a central has been attention of deal A great 1924. ty from 1795 until emphawith uymaq, of Qajar the the aspect to dynastic paid sis being placed on the founders of the dynasty (Agha MuhamThe almad Khan and Fath cAli Shah and their successors.2 with the family that established most total preoccupation of the amazing complexity the dynasty has underestimated of the organism out of which it developed and the origins that organism in the even more complex Safavid uymaq syscharacteristics In order to understand the specific tem. to of Qajar Iran, it is necessary system(s) of the social the development of the uymaq system in Iran and study first social of the Qajar within that newly developing the origins context.

The Joint

Economic and Social 1000-1500 Iran,

Systems

of

into uymaqBy 1500, most of Iran had been organized type economic systems in which the three major forms of to were commanded by (and contributed economic production Iran, the In eastern the support of) groups of families.

James J. Reid is Lecturer in the Department Los Angeles. the University of California, 117

of History

at

BirlRs and MIiranshihi had held on to Khurasan and Transoxania since the time of Timur-i Lang, and even when the Safavids pushed them out of Khurasan, manv of the subtribes that had supported them (like the Jalayir and Qara BayAt) entered the Safavid uymaq system (notably into the Ustajlu uymaq). In the north, a rapidly-developing Safavid uymaq structure had entrenched itself in the mountains surrounding the Caspian Sea (being led by the Talish and Ustajlui). The Aq QuyGinluuymaqs, which later contributed to the Safavid uym5q system heavilv, existed in western Iran

(along

the Zagros),

'in FArs and Kirmln,

DiyArbakr,

Arabian Iraq, northern Syria, and parts of Anatolia.3 These groups did not appear suddenly as invaders from Central Asia, but were descendents of groups that migrated into Iran over four centuries and which embarked upon the sometimes painful process of assimilating themselves to the local cultural, social, and economic systems. The basis of the conflict between Iranians and the Turkmen centered upon the extreme diversity of the socioeconomic patterns of life held by each. Before 1000 A.D., the Iranians had generally organized themselves into agrocentral economies in the Iranian plateau.4 Their agrocentral

economies

were based

on the primacy

of agriculture

over pastoralism, and involved a distinct arrangement of property. Crops, unlike animals, must be raised in one continuous place until they are harvested (saplings or The crop requirement orchard crops can be an exception). to remain in one necessitated the Iranian agriculturalists location the year round, and around these settlements, arose. Even as land definitive economic relationships passed more and more into the hands of great landlords in the Sassanian period, the territorial organization of centers continued to retain disvillage and agricultural tinctixe traits originated gradually in earlier periods. Plots of land were reserved for distinctive purposes, the most fertile land being sowed in crops on a distinctive and the less fertile lands being repattern of rotation, The arrangement of fields served for pastoral activities. but in each and pastures varied from village to village, area there was a distinctive pattern of usage during the Islamic period over generations, exen centuries.5 IRANIAN STUDIES

118

In societies where pastoralism was the main economic a different pattern of land usage predominated. activity, forced to alThe agrocentral community was traditionally (even if lot specific plots of land for certain activities the fields were owned communally). In pastoral societies, Land were less specific. patterns of land utilization where fodder existed one year might not have any vegetadid not Since the pastoralist tion to speak of the next. fodder (only to mainconsider it a major duty to cultivate tain the animals under his family's care), it became necesThere sary to establish a system of movement or migration. In were two variations in this method of organization. areas where pastures failed altogether or were overcrowded, pastoral systems had to be thinned out. Those groups that could not compete successfully were forced to move away, and while in the state of being dispossessed, they developed an extremely general pattern of migration. Although the animals remained the primary concern, other economic moved alternatives were sought out as the pastoralists through region after region seeking out a new homeland. Multiple economic variables replaced the more patterned had previously economic contacts that the pastoralists maintained in their homeland. Multiple variables of eco(on a temporary basis), nomic activity included agriculture provision of labor or guard services for towns that were passed during the course of unpatterned migration, collection of fuel, ores, animal hides and the like for sale to urban markets, and raiding. The Oghfiz invasions of the early eleventh century, the Oghuz invasions of 1185-1187, the Mongol invasions, and the conquests of Timiir-i Lang all involved the movements of pastoral groups possessing economies into Iran.6 multivariate The continual movement of pastoral groups into Iran kept the region in an unsettled condition from the first quarter of the eleventh century down to the middle of the sixteenth century. Gradually, though, the pastoral groups ceased their unpatterned movements and set up more speciThe first to appear fic, precipitated regions of control. was the Afshar establishment in Khiuzistan, in competition with the Aq Bayat in Diyarbakr and the Inalliu (in the These groups were the residue Zagros and northern Syria). 119

Vol.

XI,

1978

Other groups sub-sequentOghiz invasions. of the earliest 1y filled the other ecological niches in Iran favorable to pastoral production, and like the earl'ier groups, developed more patterned systems of migration and pasturage. Both principal that pastoral types possessed an organizational The passystem. from an agrocentral was quite different the upon depended and toral economy was not stationarv, system from one region movement of the main productive to another where the fodder where the fodder was depleted systems found less and was plentiful. As the multivariate

less space to expand in unpatterned movements in Iran, the began to settle more and more into distinct pastoralists and by adopting distinct spheres of their settlements, routes of semiannual migration to summer and winter quargradually came to terms with the ters, the pastoralists The ultimate resolution in the conIranian population. and the agrocentral societies flict between pastoralists of Iran was the formation of the uymaa system, the highest expression of which was the Safaxvid uyymaqsystem. The Safavid

uya

system

An uym5a in Safaxvid times was an extremely complex that had an official, goxsocial and economic institution ernmental existence as well as equally formal and impresUntil the 1390s, each of sive social and economic roles. the great uymaqs was the channel through which most economic production was organi:ed and exploited by the ruling elite of Iran. While the ugm3qs haxe continually been portraved as solely pastoral communities, in reality they were in one or a had residences The great chiefs much more. All of them also built number of cities or towns in Iran. in the centers of their terrigreat compounds or citadels tories where they could store their wealth and maintain a Gania last defense if the- lost favor at the roval court. had been such a place of last resort for the Qajar chiefs since 1346, while the Qajar of the :Ivd -oglu lineage also maintained chiefs large household compounds in Qaz-vn, cities, in the capital and then I?fahdn. These households citadels were more than mere resilike the provincial and centers of political bazars, dences, but fortresses, IRANIAN STUDIES

120

organization.7 The patrimonv of the khan complex that contained more than but agricultural and mercantile Tadhkirat al-Muluk records some

paid to the qizilbash

chiefs

rested atop an economic just pastoral economies, systems as well. The of the dues that were

in their

provincial

holdings.8

These payments were made by agriculturalists who supported the household of the khan, and the households of his familv and subordinates. There is no means of ascertaining whether these figures represented increases obtained as a result of the weakening of Safavid authority, or deas a result of the reforms of cAbbas I and Safi I, creases

since no archival records remain intact for comparison. No records remain of the mercantile interests of the qiziluntil the eightbash or qizilbash-successor principalities eenth centurv, when some chiefs began to make commercial contracts with the British and Dutch. In any event, after the 1590s, the qizilbash chiefs were singularly erafrom taking anv part in a majoritv of business dicated ventures, which were reserved for the special supervision of groups that were directly dependent upon the Safavid shah. Their forcible separation from the majoritv of commercial ventures left the qizilbash and their successors in a weak position until the end of the seventeenth century, when they began to assume the links with the British that cAbbas I had initiated. In its heydav,

the qizilbash system was supported by multiple economic buttresses, not just pastoralism. It was this molding of economic systems that signaled the zenith of the fusion between the steppe economic system imported from Central Asia with the indigenous, agrocentral svstem of Iran. The fusion of pastoral and agrocentral economies into a single organization was also marked by the formation of a dual administrative system serving the great The extent of any single household khans of each uymaq. is not knoi'n%,and the best documented example of any qihousehold was the cAbdillf Shamlu located in zilbash Hirat. At the head of an entire uymaq or portion of an "white beard," or uymaq was the rish sifid (literally, 121

Vol.

XI, 1978

"elder"). He was ostensibly the head of the uymaq, though there were frequently two or three chiefs of more or less equal stature in any given uymaq at anx time. Early in his reign, Mu1Aammad Khudabanda attempted to establish a single rlsh sifid in each uymaq, but his plan failed utter1v. The r'sh sif ld could be both the head of a household complex or the leader of an alliance of several households.9 Officers of the uymaq household were both Iranian and Turkish. Turks, generally from the family of the rlsh sifid or from among his retainers, held offices such as these: Ish2k-Aq5sL-B3sh1 (commander of the 4aram guard),10 hakim (governor of a provincial post),11 kutv3l (warden of a sufrachl fortress),12 (keeper of the table), yLuzbashi-on(commanders of garrison troops levied generally b3shi-gaq from pastoral to the kh3n),l3 communities owing obeisance in the bazar darugha (administrator of the khan's affairs

of each town in his chief's

legal official),14 (master of court cerequ4bat monies in the greatest of the uymaq households, the best example was in the royal court, but there were also examples of uyma-qhouses having such masters of ceremony), and beneath all of these officials, of the the a4 sa5ls pastoral camp groups, who were responsible for enforcing the khan's will in their communities, and forwarding the rexenues in kind from their followers and dependents. Miost of these positions could be held interchangeable with Iranian chiefs as well. elchl

(herald),15

control,

yasavul-i

In Gilan, there was a long tradition of Iranian in the upper levels of the government.16 participation Only after the disastrous 1390s did the offices of rlsh sif id open up to Iranian, Kurdish, and Lurl chieftains, who had always remained at a station below the qizilbash. There were special positions for Tajiks in the uymaq structure as well. In fact, the uymaqs controlled most of the provincial administrative system, and, through strenuous exertion, attempted to take hold of the administrative Varisystem belonging to the central government as well. ous offices attached to the uymaq were: vazlr (chief administrator, held by either a Turk or a Tajik),17 khazinedar (treasurer), librarian, munshl and mustauf!,18 kalantar,19 and the office of kadkhuda or village headman in IRANIAN STUDIES

122

the regions subject to the khan's power. WThilethe combination proved to be less than perfect in the end, and the tensions between Tajlk and Turkish chieftains erupted with volcanic violence after the accession of Ismacll II in 1576,

notably

in Gilan,

the joint

system

continued

down through the era of cAbbas I and his successors,

even

even

being strengthened in some areas, where qizilb3sh chiefs were forced to accept Kurds and Lurs as their equals.

The Qajar chiefs

of Qarabagh, and later

in the Al-

burz, certainly possessed such a dual administration. Their power was not so extensive as that of the Ustajlu/ Qara Bavat or the CAbdillu Shamlu at any period in the Safavid era. The Qajar administrative svstem was therefore much less elaborate than that of the greater uymaqs. This was especiallv the case in the svstem at the command of the Qarabagh Qajar (Zlvyd-oglfi), where the chiefs tottered precariously upon the fine diplomatic balance between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid state. The Qajar chiefs in this region were marcher lords, who had to content themselves with the eternal possibility of war and the loss of their possessions. The History

of the Qajar uymag in Safavid

Times

The Qajar uymaq originated onlyr in a misty and vague past. The earliest mention of anv uymaq with that name was in 897/1492, in the Lubb al-Tav3rikh, wvhere it mentions that a Qajar army supported Dana Khalil Bavandur.20 The identification with the Qajar was probably made on the basis of subsequent events, not upon current political affiliations. Most of the familv credited with being Qajar in the sources--that is, the descendents of Dana Khalil b. Kir Nuhammad b. Qara CUsman Bdvandur--actually considered themselves to be part of the Bayandur ruling house that produced the Aq Quydnlii dynasty, since thev were in fact descended from the founder, Qara cUsman. The rule of Dand Khalil's family over the Aq Bayvt tribe mav be commemorated

in the stories

of Dede Korkut, which continuallv

the Oghuz chieftain tween Dede Korkut,

refer

to

Bdvandur Khan. The relationship bethe Bavdt minstrel, and Bayandur Khan, 123

Vol.

XI, 1978

continually pops up through the entire the chieftain, length of the narrative cycle, indicating further that between Bayandur and Aq Bayat was rethe relationship Other than this corded in the popular oral tradition.21 else is known of the orilittle vague set of references, gin of the Qajar or the name Qajar. Legends that trace the name back to a Mongol chieftain named Qajar Noyan are as spurious as the genuine tradition is vague.22 There doubt, though, that the Qajar uymaq origican be little nated from the household of Dana Khalil and his descendThe uymaq, ents and his son Ibrahim or Avba Sultdn.23 newly-formed under the auspices of Dana Khalil, included of the Aq Bayft and Bavandur subtribes. representatives The term Qajar may actually have been an epithet applied to Ayba Sultan in his capacitv as a military commander, or to the unit he or his brothers and sons commanded, since Qajar or "kajar" meant "marching quickly."v24 The ethnic origins of the Qajar are equally difficult to pinpoint. A certain number of the Qajar, that is, But, after the Bavyt subtribe, did have Oghuizorigins. the Qajar were separated from the Aq Bayat by the Safavid and then the Ottoman conquests, the Qajar began to rule over other tribes, retaining only a small group of Aq There are Bayat under themselves at Hamadaninitially. still Aq Bavat tribes located between Baghdad and Hamadan to the present day, but they call themselves Bavyti, not Qajar. The Qajar uym3q, like other uym5qs that had their was drastically' alroots in the Aq Quyuinliuruling elite, tered bv the Safavid expansion and the breakup of the older Aq QuyuInl uymaqs. Those chiefs like the 'MausillZi, Purnak, Qajar, Arashlii, and Indllui who dared oppose the force of Shah Ismacll I were shaken to pieces. irresistable The elements that fell in scattered remnants about Iran were all alienated from the former organizations they headed except for the Arashliu khans of Kiih-Glliiya, whose ancestors had survi'ved in the same region for nearly four centuries almost untouched, and who would continue to rule All of KiurMluhamin southwestern Iran for ninety years. madb. Qara CUsman's descendents opposed Safavid domination and fled, died fighting in the Aq Quvinl5 civil wars, or Some of their fell resisting the Safavid onslaught.25 IRANIAN STUDIES

124

descendents either chose to remain in Iran and serve the Safavids, or returned to Iran later in the mid-sixteenth Zaman Sultan and his sister Jan century such as Muhammad By and large, the Agha Khan bint Murad b. Dana Khalli.26 retainers of the Bdyandur1 family remained, but they were rooted out of their holdings by the Safavids and sent off to regions where they did or could not gain a great deal of power. There was no chieftain among the remaining Qaor rapidly into a position jar who could move skillfully of power like the Aq Quyuanluchief Amir Beg Mausillu, who eventually became Keeper of the Seal for Shah Ismdcll I and beglarbegi of Khurasan. Most of the surviving Qajar chiefs may have belonged to the Bayandur tribe as well, though they were of much more an inferior status than an Ayba Sultan Qajar or an Amir Khan Mau,sillu, and were unThis category able to commandgreat power or resources. of lower level chieftains included the descendents of Qajar families (or their Bayandur or Aq Bayat antecedents) who had served the ancestors of Ismacil I. The most important of the officers from this uymraq serving Haidar Safavi was an Aq Bayat chief named Qara Plrn Beg, who was variously called an Ustijlu and a QaThe reason for the double identifijar in the sources. cation is that the Aq Bayat were later ruled by Khin MuhammadUstajlu and then his brother Qara Khan before DiHis yarbakr was taken from the Ustaj lu and the Safavids. descendents including Ilyas Beg Halvachi-ogl1 remained in Safavid service. in Ismacil I's service who bore the Other officers of Qajar included a chief named Malmiid Beg, another named Naznln or Ndrin Beg, and Acha Sultan who was also variously called Qudirmish Sultln or Qaracha Sultan.27 in The subtribes of these individuals are not identified the sources. The most important was Acha Sultan, who was an officer of Khan Muhammad Ustajlii, and probably an Aq Bay&t.28 The tribal organization of the early Qajar is not too well known, except that many of the chiefs supporting the early Safavi were Aq Baydti, and they were probably agitating against their Bayandur masters by competing against them for their wealth and accepting the

nisba

125

Vol.

XI, 1978

Safavid message as preached in the poetry of Shah IsmaCi1l. On the whole, the early Qajar uyznaq lacked cohesion, and the histories of its members in the period of IsmiCil I have no identifiable pattern in common. It was only about from the families the 1530s and 1540s that the chieftains that later formed the Qajar uymnaqachieved high status within the qizilb5sh system at all, and partook of any share in administering the wealth of the Iranian Empire. The Formation

of the Qajar uymaq

The Qajar began to grow in importance in the Safavid state on two counts during the reign of Tahmasp I (15241576). First of all, Qajar chiefs began to obtain holdings in the joint qizilb3sh system established by Tahmasp I. The joint rule of qizilbgsh chieftains and joint participation of chieftains in administration and military affairs was the goal that Tahmasp seems to have strived for throughThe coalitions of chiefs in the ofout his entire reign. fice of imperial vakil at the beginning of Tahmasp's reign were indicative of the entire direction of the Safavid system under Ismc-l1 I's son. Through the development of extensive intisab or protege organizations, some qizilb3sh famil'ies became powerful enough to gain the highest administrative positions in the Safavid state, but not strong enough to hold the position alone. At first, Kopek (Kiipk) Sultan Ustajlu shared power with D;v Sultan Riumluas coregents and vakils of Tahmasp. But through a series of depositions new co-regents continually held office. These combinations, though ending in violent disruption at first, eventually settled down into a more peaceful pattern of alliances as Tahmgsp came to maturity and developed into a capable ruler. The shah formulated a system of cooperaon his observations tion and joint alliance based partially As he of the co-regent method of rule early in his reign. came to control the situation more and more during the 1530s, he eradicated some of the negative elements, and extended the system throughout the provincial administration. The development of family domains, though not officially discouraged, was halted temporarily by allocatin regions throughing administrative parcels to chieftains IRANIAN STUDIES

126

out Iran. Members of each uym5q who achieved the status of 'imarat (the right to administer a provincial holding or ulka as an amir) were given properties away from their appeared in family domains. Numerous Qajar chieftains scattered holdings throughout Iran (as did chiefs from this helped to increase their other uymaqs) and ironically power. The only uymaq that was capable of expanding its power over a cohesive bloc of territory at this time was the Ustajlu, the subtribes of which moved east from G;lan into the Alburz range and from thence into Khurasan. This joint system of rule was, in a sense, the consolidation of a pastoral social system ruling over an agrocentral base economy within Iran, since many of the units of administration were considered movable parts capable of beBut, the theory of ing sent off to different regions. The from the practice. management was quite different family domains remained, and, in the case of the Qajar, a sphere of uymaq control was founded if not actually established. It was the establishment of a Qajar household from the Zlyad-oglui family in the Armenia/Georgia region after 1545 that was the second element in the increasing power of the Qajar. Like the other uymaqs, the Qajar now had a distinctive hold over a region its chiefs considered to be their patrimony. They rose to power in their new domain partly on soil conquered from the Georgian kings and partly on the remnants of power left by the uymaq of Div Sultan, the Ay-Riumlii, which was still under Qajar dominion in 1829 at the Russian conquest of the khanate of Erevan.29 Even though they could now begin to establish themselves on a more competitive footing with the other uymaqs, it was some time before they could even think of challenging the power of the greater uymgqs. It was only when some Qajar amirs transferred to locations in the Alburz range, a more secure position in which to develop their power, that they began to develop a more menacing pose in the affairs of Iran. Like the Ustajlii, whomthey replaced in this zone during and after the reign of CAbbas I, they were in possession of the geographical center of the Iranian Empire, and could control the other parts of Iran more handily than the other dispersed or isolated 127

Vol.

XI, 1978

uymaqs. They eventually were far more successful in this endeavor than the Ustdjlii had been under the aegis of the Safavid shahs. Their precarious situation on the border, and the loss of Ganja to the Ottomans between 1583 and 1606 made the Qajar move to the Alburz possible, but also, since the Qajar were so terribly weakened by the loss of their family domain, they were kept out of serious contention for power during the catastrophic civil wars between 1576 and the early seventeenth century, when the whirlwinds of vitiating and violent internecine strife uprooted and totally emasculated the ability of the other uymaqs to resist the reform. In the second phase of Qajar growth under the Safavids, chieftains who participated in the joint administrative system were able to develop power for themselves, despite the fact that they possessed no family domain. Some of them even obtained high positions in government service, such as Mirzd CAll Beg Qajar who was dlv3n-begi in 1576. Since the joint system of Tahmasp provided for the helter-skelter assignment of amirs to widely scattered posts, it is difficult to determine the exact genealogical relationships of most of the chiefs to be discussed. It is rare indeed to see a case where the amir's genealogy is cited in the text of a chronicle, and the full identitv of many of the Qajar chiefs is irretrievably lost. Nonetheless, there was an apparent increase in the number of Qajar chieftains holding positions. This increase in ulka-holders is demonstrated in the chart following. The chart clearly demonstrates that a larger number of Qajar chieftains were assimilated into the Safavid system after 1510, and rose to the position of 'imarat. The majority of these received posts in the late 1530s and the early 1540s. The chiefs holding positions in the early Safavid system were located mainly in the traditional territory of the Aq Bayat in Dlyarbakr, but it is not clear where they held their ulkas, or from whomthey held them. None of the holdings can be studied in depth until greater scrutiny is given to the surviving archival materials in Iran and possibly Iraq.

IRANIAN STUDIES

128

CHART:

Holders

of

ulkas,

Qara Pirl Beg Acha Sult.n "Qud5rmish" Mahmud Beg Narin or Naznin Beg Holders

of

ulkas,

EARLY CHIEFTAINS

1495-1510 ?Iraq ?.Iraq ?

References AT, pp. 26, 58 AT, pp. 72, 75-76

1510-1576

References

Budaq Khan

Qandahar Sabzavar

AT, pp. 118, 180; IM, pp. 66, 69, 91, 92, 99, 512

YaCq5b Sultan

an ulka in Khurasan

AT, pp.

103,

Kukja Sultan, kinsman of Shahvirdi

lala

or tutor of Bahram Mirza Sharvan

AT, pp. IM, pp. 108

133, 143; 70-73, 81,

Taviqfin Beg and Badr Beg yuzb-ash

clients of Kuikja ulka in Shak;

AT, pp.

158,

Shdhvirdi Sultdn Zlyad-ogl

conquest of Georgia after 1546

see text

Suilagh Husain! and Erdoghdui Khallfa (Beg)

in Gil1n ulkas under Ustojlg patronage

Aqcha Siqal

CAll

130

161,

163

AT, p. 179; IM, p. 140; KhT, pp. 18, 67

a royal elch__l

Mirza cAll

Beg

an amTr in the direct service of the shah who rose to the office of dhvan-beg 129

AT, pp. 191, 202205; IM, pp. 112, 140, 193; TG, pp. 34-35 , Vol.

XI,

1978

The founder of the early Qajar power structure was Shahvirdi Sultan, whose descendents were designated Zly&doglii or Z;yadliu. His family ruled in Ganja, Qarabagh, and Erevan down to 1829. He, his brother Ibrahim, and his kinsman Kakja Sultan contributed in no small measure to efforts by the Safavid shah to consolidate the northwestern marches facing the Sharvan-shah, the king of Georgia, and the Ottomans. In a series of campaigns between 1547 and 1555, ShThvirdi and his relatives pushed the Georgians out of Qarabagh, and he became governor of the region after the last campaign in 1555. During his campaigns in Georgia, he had captured 30,000 prisoners, some of whomhe sold into slavery. He kept many of these Georgians as his own slaves, however, and built the power of his dynasty by forcing them into his service. From the start, the rule of his family in Georgia and Armenian Erevan was marked by excessive exploitation of the local population. It was not long before Shahvirdi Sultan was faced by massive rebellions of the Georgian populace, and he crushed attack after attack by the rebels. More important from the standpoint of Safavid history, he formed the right flank of the Safavid defense system facing the Ottomans, and his position in Georgia ensured that the Ottomans would never go very far into Iran as long as he and his retainers and descendents maintained a military force there.30 His death some time in the 1570s provoked a crisis within the Qajar uymaq that erupted just at the same time as the greater crises developed elsewhere in the Iranian Empire. This crisis will be examined in the greater context of the problems besetting the rest of the Safavid Empire between 1576 and the early part of the seventeenth century. The number of Qajar amirs floating about the debris of the qizilbash system after the death of Tahmasp I remained unusually high by comparison with other uymaqs, which began to place members of their own uymaiqs into regions held as part of the patrimony of the ruling families. Although attempting to square off against each other in their own corners of Iran, none of the uymaqs was able to place all of its qualified male members into positions of IRANIAN STUDIES

130

administration

due to the drastic

rise

in the population

of chieftains over seventy years of Safavid rule. The high number of amIrs already awaiting assignment to ulkas was made even greater by the loss of Chukhur-i Sacd and Erevan to the Ottomans, who even conquered Tabriz after 1583. The crisis of the qizilbash system in general was accentuated to an even greater degree by the flooding of its ranks with unassigned These Qajar and Ustajlii amirs. further in the next section. problems will be discussed

The Crisis

of the Qajar uymaq

At the death of Tahmasp I, Safavid society asunder by a struggle of magnificent proportions.

was rent Even

though Shah Tahmasp had been able to stabilize the qizilbash system to some extent, he could not prevent the processes of normal social and economic change. Tahmasp's institutions were little more than temporary breakwaters in the path of a rampaging torrent. He did not foresee the need to institute a regular means of succession to in the provincial positions administration, leaving the tangled patchwork of Islamic law and Turco-Mongol tradition to determine the issue. To make matters worse, he was unable to erect a social and administrative structure that would resolve the many problems nagging away at Safavid society. First and foremost, there were still groups like the Qajar that had no distinct place in the Safavid provincial system, while there were others, like the Iranian chiefly of Gillan and the Caspian littoral, who families were being coerced into rebellion and then denied their masters. Above all, holdings by qizilbash every chief to some share in the administrative who was entitled syswith a growing sense of despair and tem began to perceive of the for full exploitation alarm that the possibilities wealth of Iran were becoming slimmer each year.31 The and those who had no holdings problem not only confronted desired to gain ulkas, but those who held provincial posts themselves since they were becoming more and more frequentof attacks by chiefs in their own uymaqs as ly the targets hit well as "enemy chiefs" from other uymaqs. The crisis the Qajar uymaq in two ways: (a) the unresolved problem 131

Vol.

XI, 1978

of lack of space for placing Qajar amirs was heightened in 1576, (b) a civil war broke out within the Z;yfd-oglu family controlling Ganja. The problem of obtaining supportive revenues in a society where the number of the people being supported increased beyond the capacity of local economies to support them turned the uyrngqs inward against themselves. Chief fought against chief, and the subtribes were divided and redivided again and again to the point where they lost their commonidentity. This was the case with the Qajar in Ganja. Two colateral chieftains (agnatic) lineage groups vied with one another for control of the uymaq patrimony. One party claimed the right of the eldest male member to succeed the deceased chief, Shahvirdi, while another sought after the right of the eldest son to succeed his father. The first method of succession was based on Turkish custom, while the second was more consistent with Iranian bureaucratic practices. At first, Shahvirdi Sultun's brother ruled in his stead, but then, when he died, Yiisuf Khallfa b. Shdhvirdi tried to claim the right to rule in his father's place. He held power only a few months in 984/1576, when he was assassinated by his cousin, Paikar b. Ibrahlm. Paikar Beg was the chieftain of the Otuz-Iki, a Qajar affiliate tribe that supported him in his bid for power. Shortly thereafter he attacked Sharvan with hopes of adding this province on to the Qajar patrimony, but his plan was frustrated by an attack of the Crimean Tatars, who had established a foothold in the Caucasus.32 The sons of Shlhvirdt were soon faced by other rivals as well. Paikar Beg had to contend with a new rival--Imam Qull Khan b. Qubad Khan Ylva Qajar, who replaced him as the beglarbegi of Qarabagh in 1578. His father, Qubad Khan Yiva, had been hakim of Sabzavar, but could find no place for his son. Finally, he exerted his influence, and obtained Ganja for his son. These individuals from the Ytva tribe, though Qajar, were not members of the patrimonial organization in Qarabagh, yet through contacts in the central government, they managed to displace the family that laid claim to the region. Upon the Ottoman conquest of Qarabagh in the early 1580s, Imam Qull was deposed and after Ganja was regained for a short time in 1588-1589, Muhammad IRANIAN STUDIES

132

Khan b. Khalil Khan b. ShThvird1 Sultan became the governor of Qarabagh. By this time, Imam Qull Khan had become the hakim of Sabzavar in his father's place. MuhammadKhan was left alone to fight for Ganja, which remained in Ottoman hands from 1589 to 1605-1606. During this entire period, he remained titular governor of the province, and headed a campaign with his kinsman Amir Giina Khan to regain Ganja.33 The problems that affected the establishment of a Qajar patrimony in Qarabagh were merely part of a larger complex of problems confronting the Qajar uymaq as a whole. The vast majority of Qajar chieftains had no patrimony to speak of and did not belong to any specific inprovincial stitution. Only Qubad Khan and his son Imam Qull were able to hold on to Sabzavar in Khurasan for a short time, but this lasted only for one decade during the 1580s. Other chiefs were scattered throughout Iran. The Aq Bayat remaining in Safavid service were established in possession of the government of Hamadan, and were given control of the region up to the Ottoman border in 1592, but by then their rule had been independent of the Qajar chiefs. The family of Sultan cAll Beg Bayat had retained some links with the Qajar, but by the 1570s they seem to have abandoned the Qajar chiefs, who had been the superiors of their ancestors. Uruch Beg b. Sultan CAll Beg, commonly known as Don Juan in the West, seems to have been among the discontented members of the Aq Bayat, who suffered because them from the excessthey had no great patron to protect in this respect were es of their enemies. His experiences in the many stories reflected he related about the hardwars of the ships suffered by his family in the civil The narrative of Don Juan, combined with the 1580s. separate treatment given the Bayat tribe in the other sources, gives quite an impressive of the dire picture of the Qajar uymaq in the period before definicondition tive establishment of the uymaq in Ganja, Astarabad, and Chukhur-i Sacd.34 The Aq Bayat may be considered a body without a head during most of the sixteenth century, while conversely the Qajar chieftains could be seen as a head that was grafted onto a poorly conditioned body that continually 133

Vol.

XI,

1978

rejected patches of skin in one area and then another. Qajar and Aq Bayat chiefs were assigned to holdings all over Iran, but they consistently failed to establish a This was true hold in any area where they were assigned. even of the domain in Ganja, which was the apple of contention among all the Qajar amirs, and which additionall had fallen to the Ottomans. The result was that the Qajar disembodied unit in Safauym3q remained a dysfunctional, vid society, that was always dependent upon the largesse of greater uymgqs in Safavid service like the Mausilliu or later, the Ustajlii. Even when the greater uymaqs were wiped from the scene by the disastrous civil wars of the 1580s, the Qajar still remained dependent upon Shah CAbbas I, and their previous dependent status made them in fact attractive to the shah who sought to elevate weaker groups at the expense of the more powerful uymaqs. The Qajar remained in a disembodied state until the early seventeenth century, however. The story of a detached and ailing uymaq is best illustrated in the movements of the Zlydd-ogl5 chief named Husain (or Hasan) Beg. He was the original founder of the patrimonial estate in and around Rayy and Tihran that became the cornerstone of the Qajar dynastic system in Iran in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is certain that his descendents were not the founders of the Qajar dynasty itself, though he established the power bases in Rayy that lead to the formation of dynastic power. Husain Beg was first mentioned in 1590 as the )2kim of Shiraz, replacing the Ilyas-oglu Dhu'l-Qadr family that had ruled there for nearly ninety years. He governed there for about seven years, when he was transferred to Rayy in 1597 or 1598. In 1605, he was moved again to the huku-rnat of Arsbar, and again two years later, to a region in Qarabagh, from whence he conducted a campaign that aided in the reconquest of the His role in establishing province. the Qajar at Rayy cannot be doubted and from that time, the Qajar held control of the region.AS Other chiefs were shuffled from post to post like H.usain Beg. The snarled and tangled history of their movements is ample evidence of the confused state of the uymaq in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Allah IRANIAN S TUDIES

134

Qull Beg Qapana-ogli Qajar was the most important of these displaced chiefs. His power was based upon the fact that he was a qurchl at the beginning of CAbbas I's reign and received his sustenance and support almost totally from the royal court, not from an independent provincial post. In ca. 1587-1588, he was promoted to the office of yuz bishl of the Qajar qurchils, and in 1592, he rose to the position of qurchi-b3shl, displacing an entrenched Arashli (Afshar) family that had held a monopoly on the office since the attainment of the position by Sivindik Beg Arashactive lu Afshar. Between 1592 and 1613, he was especially in campaigns against the Ottomans, driving them out of former Qajar holdings in the region of Erevan.36 Numerous other Qajar chiefs served directly in the royal retinue including Mehdi Quli who was a qurchi and then a qurchiand Chelebi Beg, another qurchl; and Aqcha Siqal cAll, who served as a royal elch7.37 A number of independent chiefs ruled in scattered holdings throughout the

bash7;

provinces. The dispersal of the Qajar chiefs throughout northern Iran attested to the fact that they were unable to coalesce their forces and powers into a consistent family

holding

during

the lifetime

of CAbbas I. Murshid

Qull Beg b. Muhammad Khan b. Khalil b. ShThvirdi ruled at Tiflis in 1616, while his kinsman Latif Khan Beg-i Qajar ruled nearby in Qarabagh, and Latif Khan's brothers Sharif Khan and Mihrab Khan governed regions in Khurdsan.38 Qajar chiefs from the Aqcha Quyfnlf sept (that is, descended from the family of Ibrahim "Ayba" Sultan b. Dina KhaIran. Ill Bayandur) ruled in scattered locations throughout CAli Khalifa Aqcha Quyuinlu was the hakim of Damghan and Both Husain Bistam in the reign of Ismc-l1 II and later. Qull Beg and Alyan (Alpan) Beg (sons of Kulabt Beg Aqcha Quyunl1) held positions in the royal government. The former was in charge of a cannon corps and the latter was yasavul-i suhbat and as such as in command of some tufangchls .

Amir Guna Khan, their Chukhur-i

Sacd.39

brother,

The dispersed

was the gover or of

condition

of the Qajar

continued to plague their efforts down to the local level with the many new Iranian, Afghdni, and Lurl chiefs who were gradually taking over the pastoral systems of Iran, 135

Vol.

XI, 1978

Various replacing many of the Turkish-speaking leaders. Afshar groups, plus an assortment of "shah-savan" Turkish tribes (formed during the era of CAbbas I and later) remained the only other Turkish-speaking groups that controlled the pastoral economies of Iran. There were also the Yaka, Yomut, and Jalayir in Khurasan. Even when the descendents of Husain Khan Zlyad-oglu were able to establish a long-lived provincial dynasty at Ganja in Qarabagh, they were unable to claim a broad base of support in the tribes residing under their control. To the twenty-one Turkish lineages recorded in the Russian survey of 1829 (some of which had been only recently founded) must be added the three Qajar subtribes--the Otuz- Ik;, the Igirm;d5rt, and the Shams al-Dinlu, which had originally been Dhu'l-Qadr. Kurdish pastoralists had steadily grown in numbers since the seventeenth century, and by 1829, there were nineteen lineage groups of Kurds engaging in pastoralism. The most important of these was the group named Jalali, which was evidently formed from among the descendents of Jalali (Celali) rebels who fled into Safavid service in 1610. The Jalal; were probably never very submissive to the rule of the Turkish uymzq chieftains, against whomtheir ancestors had revolted in the Ottoman Empire and later, in Safavid service.40 This particularism hampered the consistent functioning of the Qajar governor, and eventually permitted the Russians to conquer the region in 1827. The situation was no better in the Qajar center at Rayy in the eighteenth century. The Qajar subtribes were organized into two basic factions, each consisting of six autonomous or semiautonomous tribal groups. The most powerful tribe of the Ashaqabash faction was the Quyuinlii from which the Qajar dynasty itself originated, being descended from a kinsman of Amir GiunaKhan b. Kula? b. Shah Qull b. ?Kuldbi?.41 bi named Shah Qult b. The opposing Yukharibashi faction was headed by the DevehHi tribe, and occupied a different geographical position from the Quyiinlii faction altogether in the region of Rayy.2 Taking into consideration the total dysfunction of the Iranian uymqg system after the civil wars of the 1580s if impossible, to classify the and 1590s, it is difficult, resurrection of a new tribal system in Iran later as a "reIRANIAN STUDIES

136

surgence" of tribal power. The tribes were merely the strongest of many weak elements that were competing for of any particular dynasty to mainpower. The inability tain itself in power until the end of the eighteenth century was indicative of the fact that there was no surging or unified impulse to grab all the loose ends together as there had been in the rise and conquests of the early SaThe dismantling of the power of the uymaqs favid family. under cAbbas I clearly remained a factor in the eighteenth century, but since Safavid royal authority was unable to it marshall the forces of disunity to its own benefit, was unable to be anything more than one of a number of competing elements.43 It was this dismantled and disrupted tribal society that was the legacy of Shah CAbbas I to Islamic Iran, who capitalized upon the debilitation of the qizilbash tribes in the civil wars of the 1580s and 1590s to establish a system of tribal rule in Iran that would be totally and permanently incapable of establishing unified control over Iran or any part of the Iranian Empire. The only problem was that CAbbast successors were incapable of carrying on with his activities, and in fact weakened the position of the Safavid dynasty, so that at its collapse, only an extremely divided and poorly organized tribal system remained that paled by comparison with the magnificant powers of the qizilb7sh uymaqs in the reign of Tahmasp I. Only under Fath cAll Shah Qajar would uymaq power again reach a new height of temporary splendor. ABBREVIATIONS

Amini - Fadlullah

b. Ruzbihan Khunji, Tarikh-i CAlam V. Minorsky, Persia in A.D. Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, Luzac and Co., Ltd., London, 1957.

tr. Ara-yi Amini, 1478-1490, Royal

AQ - John E. Woods, The Aqquyunluu: Clan, Confederation, Empire, Bibliotheca Islamica, Minneapolis, 1976. AT - Hasan-i Rumlu, Ahsan al-Tavarikh, A Chronicle of the Oriental Institute of Baroda, BaroEarly Safawis, da, 1931. 137

Vol.

XI,

1978

DJ - Don Juan (Uruch Beg Bayat),

Don Juan of Persia,

trans. Routledge and Sons, London, 1926.

Shicah

Catholic,

1560-1604,

DK - Geoffrey Lewis, ed., The Book of Dede Korkut, Books, Inc., Baltimore, 1975. EI (second edition)

- Encyclopedia

of Islam

-

Penguin

(second edition).

IM - Iskandar Beg-i Munshi, Tarikh-i cAlam Ara-yi Amir Kabir, Tihran, 1350, 2 volumes. ISP

A

G. Le Strange,

CAbbasi,

A.K. S. Lambton, "Islamic Society

in Persia," Peoples and ed. Louise Sweet, Natural History Press, Garden City, N.Y. , 1970, I, pp. 74-101. Cultures

of the Middle East,

KhT - Qazi AhmadQumi, Khulasat

Hans Muller, al-Tavarikh,ed. Die Chronik Khulasat at-Tawarikh, DerAbschnitt uber Schah 'Abbas I, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1964.

PZP - Klaus Michael Rohrborn, Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persiens im 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, Walter de Gruy1966. ter, Berlin, Sarwar - Ghulam Sarwar, History of Shah IsmaCil Safawi, AMS Press, New York, 1975, reprint of edition published at Muslim University, 1939. Aligarh, Manuchihr Sutuda, Tarikh-i Gilan, Intisharat-i Farhang-i Iran, Tihran, 1349.

Bunyad-i

TM - Anonymous, Tadhkirat al-Muluk, A Manual of Safavid ed. V. Minorsky, Gibb Memorial Administration, new series, vol. 16, London, 1943. Series, NOTES

1.

Uymaq is generally translated as tribe, but in the Safavid system, the uymaq was considerably more than just a kinship association. It was an administrative unit as well as an economic institution which controlled the three major forms of economic activity--

IRANIAN STUDIES

138

and various craft agriculture, pastoralism, located in the towns and cities.

industries

2.

387 ff.; A. K. S. Lambton, "Kadjar," EI (2nd edition), idem. "The Tribal Resurgence and the Decline of the Bureaucracy in Eighteenth Century Persia," Studies in Southern Illinois Century Islamic History, Eighteenth University Press, Carbondale, 1977, pp. 108 ff., the argument here overlooks the fact that the uymaqs were also administrative units, and that the bureaucracy was in league with them at a certain level of society.

3.

A full listing of Aq Quyuinlii uym5qs can be found in John Woods, AQ, pp. 197-214. The most important in terms of Safavid history were the Aq Bayat, Afshar, Inallu, Purnak, Mauil1 lu, and the various Kurdish groups.

4.

Iranians who had lived in the Eurasian steppe on the This inother hand were nearly all pastoralists. cluded the Scyths (Saka?), Sarmatians, Ossetes, and Alans.

5.

Kent V. Flannery, "The Ecology of Early Food Production in Mesopotamia," Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, ed. L. Sweet, Natural History Press, Garden City, 1970, I, 29-52.

6.

Speros Vryonis, Jr., The Decline of Medieval Hellenism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1970 gives the best description of the effect of such movements through an area that was organized on an agrocentral basis.

7.

Numerous examples may be cited throughout the chronicles of the Safavid era of such compounds. KhT, p. 39, for instance, mentions the network of houses that Khan Ustajlii maintained around Qazvin Pira Muhammad and environs, showing the houses were important cenFor the Qajar citadel at ters of commerce and trade. Ganja see George Bournoutian, Eastern Armenia on the Eve of the Russian

Conquest, 139

The Khanate of Erevan Vol.

XI,

1978

under the Governorship

of Hoseyn Qoli Khan Qajar,

1807-1827, PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1976; and W. Barthold/J. A. Boyle, "Gandja," EI (second edition), pp. 975-976. 8.

TM, pp.

100-105.

9.

KhT, p.

32; IM, p. 233 and numerous other

citations.

10.

KhT, pp. 90-91 (Mehdi Quli Sultan Shamlii at Hirat).

11.

DJ, pp. 45-46.

12.

IM, p. 500.

13.

p. 80; DJ, p. 43; AT, p. 70 (Hasan Aqa Ustajlu, Khizr Aqa Ustajliu)--the term aqa was applied to any chieftain, usually a standard-bearer of the khan, who had no share in the patrimony of the uymaq's chiefly families.

14.

ISP, pp. 84-85; Chardin, Voyages, II, 302-303 (chef du metier); IM, p. 208 (cAbd al-Ghani Beg Ustajlii) and p. 948 (Takhta Beg Ustajla).

15.

IM, p. 416 (Shahvirdi

16.

TG, passim.;

Amini,

Beg Chulaq Qajar).

B. G. Martin, "Seven Safawi Documents

from Azarbayjan,"

Documents from Islamic

Chanceries,

Cassirer, Oxford, 1967, pp. 198-199, Amira Siyavash Khan was a member of the Iranian group subordinant to the Talish. 17.

IM, pp. 267 (Muhammad!Khan Sarii Siilagh Ustaj1l); 296 (Qasim, the Tajlk vazir of Amir Khan Mauili).

18.

TM, pp. 85-100.

19.

Chardin, Voyages, II, p. 292, "Le prevot de la ville."

20.

A. K. S. Lambton, "Wadjar," EI (second edition), pp. 387-389.

IRANIAN STUDIES

140

21.

DK, pp. 28-41 especially commemorates this relationship, while the prologue gives reference to the Kayl tribe, from which the Ottomans were supposedly descended.

22.

Mirkhand, 1351/1972,

T5rIkh-i

Rawzat

al-Safa,

Khayyam, Tihran,

IX, p. 4.

23.

A. K. S. Lambton, "Kadjar," El (second edition), pp. 387-389; AQ, p. 222; Amini, p. 26, note 3.

24.

Sulaiman p. 214.

25.

AQ, p. 222; AT, pp.

26.

IM, pp.

804,

27.

AT, pp.

33,

28.

AT, pp.

29.

Khanate of Erevan, Bournoutian, The Ayriumliu p. 63. was the second most numerous of the Tiurkmcnltribes in the khanate in 1829, testifying to the fact that lost power after the debacle of they had not totally Div Sultan. Even so, down through the centuries they maintained only a subordinate in the clearly position

Efendi,

Lughat-i

1, 27,

Chaghat5l,

Istanbul,

215; TK, p.

1298,

261.

1009. 78-79,

93.

72, 75-76; Tahmasp I Safavi, Tadhkira, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1912, p. 21; Sarwar, pp. 54, 83, 86.

region.

30.

AT, pp. 73, 76,

31.

The longevity of the Qajar uymaq may indeed be due partly to the lack of sympathy with any particular subtribe in the regions it (Turkish or otherwise) came to rule.

32.

Ibrahim Sultan: IM, pp. 94, 112, 134, 140; Yusuf Khalifa b. ShThvirdi: AT, p. 206 and IM, pp. 140, 212; Paikar Beg b. IbrThim: AT, p. 206 and IM,

143, 144, 169, 175, 180-181; IM, pp. 70, 71, 77, 86, 88, 89, 108, 140; PZP, p. 4.

141

Vol.

XI,

1978

pp. 264, 267. 33.

ImamQull Khan b. Qubad: KhT, p. 27; W, pp. 145-146, 154, 198, 202; IM, pp. 233-235, 237, 270, 293. Muhammad Khan: IM, pp. 385, 416-417.

34.

Sultan CAli Beg Bayat belonged to the Aq Bayat not the Qara Baylt, since his family had an interest in Tabriz long before the Ustajli came on the scene. Muhammad! Khan TukhmaqKirajiya Ustajlii, governor of Tabriz in 1585, may have been an Aq Bayat chief who gave his Before this, though, allegiance over to the Ustajliu. the Qara Bayat had little connection with affairs in Tabriz, so it is assumed that Sultn CAll and his relatives were Aq Bayat. DJ, pp. 158-225; the Aq Bayat patrimony at Hamadan, IM, p. 440.

35.

im, *pp. 435,

659,

436, 458, 671; KhT, p. 75.

36.

IM, pp. 439, 858-859.

37.

Mehd; Quli: 1064; Abdal

AT, p.

533,

581,

585,

604,

605,

657-

6S9,

660,

678,

698,

720,

836,

462,

53S,

Im,

p. 638.

Sultn:

iM, pp. 984, Chelebi beg: 497; Aqcha Siqal CA1:

IM, p.

179.

38.

IM, pp. 881, 1008. Murshid Qull: IM, p. 893. Latif: IM, p. 628. Sharif: Mi4rib Khan, who was h.kim of Marv: IM, pp. 490, 525-527, 576, 620-621, 628, 630, 760, 804, 830, 835, 841, 842, 845, 927, 1008.

39.

cAli Khalifa: IM, pp. 140, 203. Husain Qull and his brother Alpan or Alyin: IM, pp. 492, 499, 737, 804; TG, pp. 152-153. Amir Giina Khan: Im, p. 1041 plus numerous citations.

40.

IM,

pp. 657, 892; Bournoutian, Khanate of Erevan,

pp. 59, 41.

AT, p.

63.

168; Hasan-e Fasa'l, History of Persia under Columbia University Press, New York, 1972,

Qajar Rule,

IRANXAN STUDIES

142

pp. 1-2. 42.

A. K. S. Lambton, "t(djar," pp. 387-389.

43.

A different view is put forward in A. K. S. Lambton, "The Tribal Resurgence and the Decline of the Bureaucracy in Eighteenth Century Persia," Studies in Eighteenth

Century

Islamic

EI (second edition),

History,

and Roger Owen, Southern Illinois Carbondale, 1977, pp. 108-129.

143

ed. Thomas Naff

University

Vol.

Press,

XI,

1978

Iranian Studies, Volume Xl, 1978.

Order

Tribal

Political

The of

Boir

and

the

State:

Organization

Ahmad Reinhold Loeffler

Amongthe tribal peoples of the Middle East, from the Atlas to the Hindukush mountains, the most commontype of political organization appears to be some form of segmentary structure in which powerful sociocultural mechanisms function to contain every tendency toward the emergence of Some tribes of Iran permanent centralized power figures. characteristically deviate from this general pattern. The Boir Ahmadi is one of them. Their political organization, as it existed during the nineteenth century and up to 1963, consisted in an intrinsically centralized system, that is, a system in which its political power figures showed a vested interest in maintaining, rather than preventing, centralized In this paper I describe--as leadership. much as is possible within a limited space--the bases and the

Reinhold Loeffler is Associate Western Michigan University.

Professor

of Anthropology at

My thanks to the many people in BoirAhmad who gave me the benefit of their knowledge of the traditional political system; to the University of Chicago and the Wenner Gren Foundation for their generous support; and to E. Abrahamian, G. Beech, G. Garthwaite, R. Hahn, and T. Ricks for much and information. An earlier verappreciated discussions sion of this paper was read at the 10th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association in Los Angeles, 1976. 145

functioning of this system, trace its emergence and inner evolution, and outline its present transformation. In conclusion, to further highlight some of its features, I compare it with European feudalism. The BoirAhmadi is one of the six major tribal groups of Kohgiluye, in southern Iran, occupying roughly the area between Behbahan in the west and the Kuh-e Dena range in the east. It is comprised of a number of larger and smaller tribes (ta'ifa) each of which represents a clan or a segmentary lineage, or a set of such descent groups. Each of these tribes holds rights to a set of territories, designated warm/winter and cold/summer quarters, respectively, and migrates between these two areas in early spring and late summer. The two quarters of the various in a variety of patterns reflecting tribes are distributed both ecological adaptation and the political history and power of the tribe, the latter perhaps being even more But in all cases the members of a tribe pracimportant. tice a subsistence economy of both agriculture and animal husbandry, that is, besides tending their flocks they cultivate fields in either the summer or the winter quarters or in both. This implies that, unlike in the Qashqai area, are not divided between two farming and herding activities If a division of labor along ethnically distinct groups. these lines occurs at all, then it is between brothers on a cooperative basis. The people of BoirAhmad are thus at the same time tribesmen in terms of their descent system, in terms of their econoboth cultivators and pastoralists in terms of mic pursuits, and--as is shown below--peasants their economic, political, and cultural interrelatedness with the wider Iranian framework. The Traditional

Political

System

In the nineteenth century the area was politically divided into two units, Boir AhmadGarmsir and Boir Ahmad the dominion of one khan. Such Sardsir, each constituting a khanship, as one may call the unit, was organized as a three struccentralized political system of essentially IRANIAN STUDIES

146

tural strata, viz., the commontribesmen at the bottom, the tribal chiefs on the intermediate level, and a paramount chief, the khan, at the top. Unlike in so many other centralized systems in Bo i r Ah ma d no p r ev al en t ethnic d i st in ct io n s existed between these strata. The tribes themselves, though ultimately derived from a variety of sources, considered themselves all Lurs. Their chiefs, coming in hereditary fashion from a particular lineage segment in each tribe, were genealogically related to them. And also the khan, who was a member of a dynastic lineage which established itself in this position in the eighteenth century, was never considered anything else than a Boir Ahmadi although the exact origin of the dynasty is unclear. (Most authorities, both of literary and oral traditions, trace it back to one of the small local Boir Ahmadtribes while others postulate Bakhtiari descent.) Of the two political entities, Boir AhmadSardsir was by far the larger and clearly the dominant one. In fact, it was one of the most powerful political units in the area at large, posing a continuous threat of insubordination to the provincial government, of raids and conquest to its tribal neighbors, and of highway robbery to caravans passing through its outskirts. The following account, based mainly on oral evidence given by members of all three political strata, pertains specifically to this section of Boir Ahmad. I first outline its socioeconomic basis and then the political process as such. The Socioeconomic

Dimension

It should be emphasized that the chiefs and the khan played three analytically distinct roles in relation to the tribesmen: they functioned as tribal chiefs, as landlords, and as government officials. A recognition of this triple role is crucial for an understanding of the political dynamics of the system. The role of the chiefs as tribal leaders can be summarized as essentially consisting of three functions: providing representation to the outside, providing organization, for example, for the purpose of de147

Vol.

XI,

1978

fending the tribal territory or regulating migration and and providing maintenance of order pasture utilization, In the present context by acting as judges and arbiters. and landlords need a their roles as government officials more detailed description. The Khan and Chiefs

as Government Officials--With-

in the framework of the Iranian state the region of Kohunit under the govgiluye constituted an administrative ernorship of Behbahan which in turn was part of the proKohgiluye was again vincial government of Fars. In itself subdivided along lines of tribal groupings, and the official terminology of the administrative apparatus was applied Thus, to the khans and chiefs representing these groupings. the title ;3bit (subgovernor) was given to the khan representing the subdivision of chahar boniche, a unit comprising the Boir Ahmadi and three other tribal groups (Fasa'i, kalantar(mayor 1314:II, 271). The next lower designation, or head of district) was applied to the khans of the major And the term political units, like Boir AhmadSardsir. kadkhoda (village magistrate) was used to designate the chiefs who represented individual tribes or tribal segments. As kal1ntar and kadkhodas the khan and the chiefs of Boir Ahmadhad, as all government officials in Qajar the three functions: Iran (Curzon, 1966:438), essentially of taxes, the furnishing of military support, collection I shall briefly discuss and the administration of justice. these three functions in turn. The role of the khan and the chiefs as official collectors of the state tax (m5llygt) seems to have been the most important one both to themselves and to the government. It is amply documented in the British reports on the tribal areas (Morier, 1837:238; Rawlinson, 1839:108; In the beginning of this century all Layard, 1846:3-4). of Boir Ahmadhad an assessment of 4,000 Toman (Ranking, 1911:5; Wilson, 1916:43; my own informants gave exactly the same figure) payable to Behbahan which, again was accountable to the governor of Fars (Layard, 1846:22; Bode, This sum was further apportioned to 1845:1I, 277 and 285). IRANIAN STUDIES

148

the individual tribes and then again divided among the population in form of a head tax levied per married male. for example, the overall asIn the case of the Sisakhti, As sessment was 200 toman and the head tax around 5 rial. the khan and kadkhodas had the right to levy tax collectors a sum beyond the assessment, and in BoirAhmad they certainIt is estimated that at ly made use of this privilege. certain times the khan collected 6,000 toman in excess of the 4,000 toman assessment. The obligation of the khan to provide military support to the government is evidenced by several historical incidents (Baver, 1324:95, 108). When called upon by the with his governor of Fars, the khan had to participate These were mainly punitive army in local operations. expeditions against khans and tribes that had become "rebellious" and had refused to pay taxes or engaged in such outrageous raids and plundering that the governor felt an obligation, or saw a pretext, to subjugate them and make extractions. Finally, since executive and judicial functions were fused in Persian administrators at the time, the khan and kadkhodas were, at least nominally, also the judges of the area. Exactly what judicial powers were delegated to them is a mute question in view of the fact that they were wieldan almost total physical control over the ing, in effect, Thus, one of the powerful kadkhodas once had population. a girl burned alive at the stake after her father and uncle, incited by the rumor that she had been seduced by a young man from another tirbe, ambushed and killed the young man's brother and father. By this Draconic action the kadkhoda intended to demonstrate to the kinsmen of the slain that justice was being done, and thus prevent a revenge attack on the village. The people, however, seemed to have avoided resortThey recognized that this ing to the kadkhodas as judges. entailed presents and bribes with no security attached that if their justice would in effect be restored--especially opponent was able to bribe better or stood in higher favor. Consequently, the people made use of customary patterns of 149

Vol.

XI,

1978

arbitration through elders or religious figures. These mediators sought to achieve, for example, a compromise in the case of disputes, the restoration of property in cases of theft, and the payment of either blood money or a daughter in cases of murder. In concluding this outline of the administrative functions of the chiefs and the khan, I shall briefly examine the question of the extent of control the government had over them. Whether or not, and to what amount, the khan of Boir Ahmad factually paid taxes to the government is an open question which, perhaps, will be illumined some day by the study of archival materials. In general, he apparently tried to withhold payment as long as he felt he could get away with it. In the 1840s the Boir Ahmadis were reported to have been in open opposition to the governor of Behbahan (Layard, 1846:22; Bode, 1845:I, 279). Later in the century, however, under Nasr-ed-Din Shah, the government's power to crush flagrant insubordination seemed to have increased. The most striking example of this on the local scene was the fall of the dynasty of the Nu'i, a tribe bordering on the Boir Ahmadis. In the 1830s and 1840s its Khan was certainly the most powerful of the Kohgiluye chiefs. It is said that at his center, the castle of Pili, 1,000 cavalry men were always on the alert to strike against his enemies, and that a band consisting of a drum and an oboe, which was usually employed at feasts and warfare, performed three times a day for him (Baver, 1324:108). In 1849 the khan refused to comply with government orders and to pay taxes. And, when the governor of Fars sent an army contingent against him, he attacked the corps in a gorge and completely annihilated it. Consequently the governor summonedthe military assistance of all surrounding khans who, seeing an opportunity for expansion, readily joined forces. The coalition conquered the khan's stronghold; he himself was taken prisoner and executed in Behbahan (Baver, 1324:108).

IRANIAN STUDIES

150

At least one other indication of increased government control is presented by the fact that in the 1870s a Qajar prince acted as the political resident in the area. This is documented in a stone inscription which we discovered in one of the tribal summer quarters. Dated 1879, it says that the undersigned, a great-grandson of Fath Ali Shah, appointed to maintain good order in Kohgiluye, resided in the area for 6 years, after a first term in 1864. This suggests that in the latter part of the nineteenth century the Qajar government did effectively tighten its control over the area. This conclusion conforms with the observations by Curzon (1966:406) and the summaryby Oberling The effect of this situation on the internal (1974:63). political process will be noted below. The Khan and Chiefs as Landlords (mlik)- -This function has been generally overlooked in the British reports on the area though Ranking (1911:5, 51) comes close to recognizing it. It was, however, of crucial importance in the overall system since it provided the very foundation for the khan's and the chiefs' roles in the political arena. It was this function which furnished them with both the means and the incentives in their power play. In the course of time it even seemed to have turned into their dominant status criterion, and it still persists today as members of the dynastic and chiefly lineages claim government compensation for their lands in the framework of the land reform.

The ownership rights over the tribal lands, especially the cultivated fields, were theoretically claimed by all three actors in the play, the khan, the chiefs, and the peasants. But it was only the first two who, in any way, had the possibility of actively realizing their claims. The landholding patterns can therefore be seen as the outcome of the positions these two parties held, and of the political processes they were engaged in. Thus, for analytical purposes, one can distinguish two categories of land: (1) lands over the ownership of which the two parties, khan and chiefs, basically agreed and consequently acknowledged each other's rights; and (2) lands that 151

Vol.

XI, 1978

were basically

contested

between the two.

the khan acknowledged as As to the first category: the property of chiefs those lands which the latter had either obtained as a gift from one of the khans or had acConsequently, quired through purchase or land reclamation. the rents collected by the chiefs on such land were contheir own. The chiefs generally sidered to be exclusively acknowledged as the khan's property lands that had been conquest, maracquired by the dynasty through inheritance, by own efforts or manageriage, purchase, or cultivation ment. Either such lands were administered by the khan in the case of lands was done especially directly--this of his castles and other resisituated in the vicinities dences and amounted to only a tiny fraction of the tribal lands--or they were entrusted to loyal chiefs under the condition that they would collect the revenues, retain a 50 percertain portion of it as their fee (theoretically cent in most cases), and hand the rest over the khan. Now to the second category, the contested lands: ideas rearose over conflicting the contention basically The khan held the universalistic garding land rights. claim that, on the basis of the theory of his position as khan of Boir Ahmad, he was the owner of all tribal lands with the exception of the ones noted above. The kadkhodas, or chiefs, wanting to imitate, in a sense, this claim withcame to challenge in their own tribal confines, necessarily of the khan's pretension. the universality In such cases of contest the degree to which either party could assert its claim varied with the degree of Where the its rival. power that it could muster vis-a-vis khan was in commandthe local kadkhoda was forced to hand over at least 50 percent of the collected rents and so on lands he claimed for himself, was de facto a revenue colIn other cases, lector for the khan rather than a landlord. in the remote areas, some chiefs, willhowever, especially deny ingly supported by their tribesmen, could effectively compliance.

IRANIAN STUDIES

152

The case of Sisakht is an example. This region is situated at the fringe of Boir Ahmadterritory and at some distance from the prime power area of the khans. For over 60 years it was united under the strict leadership of a forcible, shrewd, and internally unchallenged kadkhoda who categorically and revenue claims rejected all territorial by the various khans in power, and defended the region by force of arrmsagainst their recurring attempts to gain control over it. While this struggle was costly--over the years it took the lives of many men including two sons of the kadkhoda, and once left the main village burned down and pillaged in the wake of a khan's attack--it succeeded to safeguard the region's independence. The kadkhoda never handed over to a khan any taxes or any share of the collected land rents; if he paid any taxes at all, he delivered them directly to Behbehan. In other cases again, the kadkhoda did not dispute the khan's claim in principle but controlling a large tribe was simply too powerful to be bossed by the khan. He would pay a tribute to the khan, but its amount would be nominal and at his own discretion. If the khan had tried to get more, he would have antagonized the chief and risked his secession. In such a case, then, the khan had to choose political advantage over material gain. Thus, whether or not the ownership over a given piece of land was now agreed upon between the khan and a chief, the rent on the land would be collected and kept by the one who had the power to do so. This rent (bahra malekana) varied on the basis of a number of factors between 1/5 and 2/3 of the produce. Although in practice this rent may not always have been separated from the state tax, the two should not be confused conceptually. While the tax was, at least nominally, the government's, the land rent accrued to the chiefs and the khan on the basis of their de facto position as landlords. The right and/or the power to collect and keep rents from certain lands always signified both the test and the symbol of control over an area and population. Once this control was established, the khan or the chief 153

Vol.

XI,

1978

exacted not only the land rents but a whole series of other Foremost of all, he took a levy on livelevies as well. stock, rated by heads of animals and payable in the form We have, of course, no of animal and dairy products. figures on that, but it may well be that in the nineteenth more century, when herding appears to have been relatively these levies on the flocks extensive than agriculture, Furtheramounted to greater sums than the land rents. more, the landlord levied imposts at special occasions, at the marriage especially viz., at life cycle rituals, holidays, at a person's return of a peasant, at religious from a successful hunt, at the visit of some notable guest, landlord called upon the peasants for etc. Finally,the harvesting a field of his, building a special services: house, errands, serving in his house. imposts--were levies, All these revenues--rents, used by the khan and the kadkhodas mainly for their own consumption. This included the support of servants, craftsmen, retainers and riflemen, the operation of a and the mainlarge household offering lavish hospitality, tenance of a conspicuous life style imitating urban upperIn this process,part of the collected proclass models. and part was duce was consumed or put to use directly, bazaar for towns goods and, of the adjacent in exchanged course, weapons and ammunition. But, since few cash crops were produced--opium and tobacco were not introduced until around the turn of the century and were grown only in a was never generated few areas and as a sideline--capital amount. to any significant As the visible embodiment of their power, the khan and the chiefs each maintained a personal entourage or folIn the case of the khan this was the Camala tribe lowing. a composite group created of members of the or nukarbab, kinship-based tribes for the special purvarious original, pose of service to the khan. The members of this "tribe" tended the khan's personal fields and flocks, served as his and houseretinue, bodyguard, riflemen, revenue collectors, hold servants, and in general, acted as the executive arm Another position at the khan's of his various functions. "court," and probably the highest one besides the members IRANIAN STUDIES

154

of the dynasty, was that of the khan's secretary (munshi) who came in hereditary fashion from a special lineage whose male members carried the title "Mirza" in front of their names. He functioned as penman, accountant, keeper of records, political advisor, and concluded most of the routine economic contracts with tenants. The kadkhodas maintained similar, but smaller such retinues, whose members were variously called ma'miur (agent, commissary), nukar (servant), or tofangchl (rifleman). In contrast to the khan's service corps, each of these retinues was usually recruited from one and the same tribe, that is, from among the tribesmen of the chief's own tribe. The men usually came from the stronger families and were selected for their personal robustness and prowess. What motivated them to engage in the service of their chief--and so turn against their own kin--was not so much the prospect of economic profits, obtainable through minor privileges, overof dues, and participation collection in raids and plundering, but foremost and above all the possibility of thereby protecting their own immediate relatives from inordinate extractions and transgressions at the hand of the landlord/ chief and other retainers. Nevertheless,this job was looked at evilly by all people including the retainers themselves since it entailed lending a hand in that gravest of all moral trespasses, oppression. Even today, 30 years after the last high days of the regime, men who acted as retainers at the time feel remorse about it although they claim to have had no other choice. This leads us to a final question in this section: What was the people's attitude toward the land claim of their chiefs and the khan? Quite generally, they never really accepted it. They argue--and they have historical support in that--their chiefs were originally simply tribal leaders,

primi

inter

pares,

to whom, quite

voluntarily

and

without fixed norms, a certain amount of contributions were made so as to enable them to fulfill their hospitality and functions. representative It was only later on, they say, that the chiefs in their role as tax collectors backed up by the khan and allied kadkhodas, developed the power to proclaim themselves landlords entitled to collect a rent 155

Vol.

XI, 1978

this from the tribal lands (bahra milekana) and justified claim by arguing that the former contributions had in fact always been regular dues. The peasants insist that the revenues collected by them were always extracted by force (zur, zolm) and never given by their own free consent. They acknowledged only those lands as the rightful property of the chiefs which the latter held on the basis of their positions in the kinship charter, their statuses as tribal leadnew land. ers, and their personal investments in cultivating In practice the people adjusted to the regime, like everywhere in Iran, by way of the so-called minimum investherds held were Little land was tilled, ment strategy. small, no improvements were made. The natural environment a diet based on acorns. offered an almost perfect solution: The acorns needed only to be collected in the vast oak forests covering the area, and to be processed into bread. Neither could The kadkhoda would extract nothing of it. he sell the acorns--they had almost no market value--nor would his household use much of it since wheat bread was eaten there. Another form of adaptation to the regime was escape. At present, there are several commun'ities in Fars that have settled by refugees from Boir Ahmad. Still been originally another form of reaction was a complaint at the government Boir Ahmaddid also have its share of those brave level. men noted by James Morier (1837:238) already 160 years ago a poor miserable old man, when he says: "A Rish-safid, is oppressed, to make a tribe his will not fail whenever the governor of the with remonstrate to purposely journey However, these were province, and abuse him to his face." mechanisms of adjustment only, and did not change the existing system. The Political

Process

process in t er ms I shall analyze the political of the transactions between the two main of the dialectic actors in the play, khan and tribal chiefs, and in terms strucof the patterns in which the particular centralized IRANIAN STUDIES

156

ture of the system was manipulated by them to promote their respective interests. The tribal chief perceived the central position of khanship as intrinsically functional to his own ambitions, that is, the safeguard as well as the expansion of his area of control. He saw in the khanship a rallying point, a focal point of power in its faculty to engage at any given time the simultaneous action of a number of chiefs with their respective followerships. One who could, through clever political manipulation, engage the khanship and so mobilize its potential in the service of his own cause, was thereby able to mu 1 t i pl y his p o w er manifold and so promote h i s interest much more efficiently than the neby direct transaction with other chiefs--although cessity to do this too was thereby by no means repealed. The later political developments in Sisakht illustrate this principle nicely. At the death of the powerful kadkhoda mentioned above, two of his offspring rivaled for Fisuccession, neither being able to overcome the other. nally, in 1941, when after the abdication of Reza Shah, the khan returned from his exile in Teheran,one of the two took recourse to him. He went to pay his obeisance and invited the support of the khan for a conquest of all of Sisakht. For the other chief, and the Sisakhtis at large whohad since ever fought against a dynastic hegemony, this act was a flagrant betrayal of their cause. Yet, they did not have the power to resist as the coalition mobilized by the khan invaded the region and subdued it, most of the land being divided between the khan and the Sisakhti chief who had allied with him. Thus, by working through the khan, the clhief achieved supremacy over his rival and acquired a portion of the total land, which was much larger than his regular inheritance share would have been. It was this potential of the central position which, in the political theory of the individual tribal chief, was He accepted and supported it because of its raison d'etre. the political promise it held for him. Through it, he could attempt to expand his area of control and thus increase his But also, since the other chiefs hadmuch the power and status. 157

Vol.

XI,

1978

same possibility against him too, he could, and even had to, secure the center's favor to forestall such an event a nd insure h is protection. Thus, for him the khanship was not only a convenience, but he was also intrinsically dependent on it. Shifting our view of the system to the perspective of the khan, we see an essential difference. While the tribal chiefs as a group thought to benefit from the central position of khanship, the khan, for his part, had the chiefs standing in his way to direct access to power. As has been said, only a tiny fraction of all the land stood under the direct control of the khan himself. All other parts were occupied by tribes whose chiefs had a direct hold on them and their resources. The chiefs provided a modicum of governance, could build from among their tribe a standing corps of riflemen, recruit a massive following in case of warfare, and extract the economic means to support all this. Only through them was the khan able to get possession of the revenues and, above all, obtain major military support. Thus, in a very essential way the khan was dependent on the chiefs or kadkhodas. He needed them for any attempt to defend or expand his territory, and for the consolidation of his position against rival pretenders. The contention over the position of khan was incessant and fierce. The first khan of Boir AhmadSardsir his to at least one tradition--by was killed--according This khan, in brother, who then became his successor. turn, was ousted by his own son who, before that, had killed three of his half brothers. He, in turn, was killed as a consequence of the events triggered by the intrigues of his father, who then again became khan, but was eventually killed by a grandson of the first khan under the pretext of And so on. The position of khan of Boir blood revenge. Ahmad, or any other tribe in Kohgiluye, for that matter, was not a very peaceful job. Of the 21 men in the dynasty who became khan, or were close pretenders to the position, 19 died a violent death and one, who was given the choice by his nephew, preferred to be blinded rather than killed so as to witness the eventual fate of his victor.

IRANIAN STUDIES

158

In all this the khans depended on the kadkhodas for support. So, for example, when in 1953 the last one of the khans in power killed his influential half brother, he could do so only after having first secured the allegiance of the influential warlike kadkhodas by making them major promises. Then he walked up to his half brother's castle in full daylight with a few men and shot him. The act was only the completion, as it were, of the restructuring of alliances that had happened before. in his dependence on the tribal chiefs, what were to win their support? Besides the the khan's strategies many forms of coercion, persuasion, intrigue and the rule of divide et impera, the most important seem to have been: (1) co-optation by satisfying the chiefs' desire for land, and (2) intermarriage with the chiefs. I shall briefly discuss the khan's use of these two techniques and the problems which resulted from it. 1. In his attempt to satisfy the chiefs' constant drive to expand their landholdings, the khan had essentially three possibilities: (a) conquest of outside territory, (b) land grants from his own possessions, and (c) support of internecine fights over land. The first possibility was, of course, ideal since the khan could thereby not only satisfy the chiefs but also enlarge the total territory under In effect,land his control. was being conquered in the nineteenth century from the Qashqai, the Mamasani, and neighboring Kohgiluye tribes. But, given the overall power in the area, the extent to which this strateconstellation gy could be employed was limited. The second possibility was equally finite, in addition to having the disadvantage of the khan depleting his own power base. Thus, the khan also resorted to the third option, that is, patronizing some chiefs in their strife against In his attempt to secure the support and followothers. ing of powerful chiefs, he would lend a favorable ear to their suggestions of raiding and usurping another chief's In this way he would periodically one of land. sacrifice the chiefs, usually a weaker and more isolated one, as prey to the others; in fact,he felt he had to do so in order to 159

Vol.

XI, 1978

win the latters' support. The method offered him the additional advantage of thereby expanding his own control and landholding, as the last example on Sisakht has shown. But, on a more fundamental level this method was highly problematical. It violated the very principle on which the khanship was based. As has been pointed out above, the individual kadkhoda perceived the justification for the existence of the khanship in its potential to serve his own political interest. When this promise was not fulfilled by a particular khan, he saw no reason for having him in power. Consequently, a victimized chief was not only disaffected but also became a potential opponent who waited the occasion to support a rival pretender to the khanship. Thus, in the very process of attracting the support of some chiefs, the khan simultaneously generated strong antagonistic forces against himself. But even those chiefs whose support was won did not in the long run serve the khanship well. To maintain their good will and to prevent them from swinging their support over to a rival pretender to the khanship--a threat they always held in hand against the khan--the khan had to coopt them in increasing measure by yielding to their requests, accommodating to their schemes, giving them grants of land, and making concessions, as well as by cautiously refraining from anything that might have antagonized or aliented them. Also, under the constraint of choosing sides, he tended to In the align himself with the stronger of two chiefs. long run this process bred a few dominating figures, an oligarchy of chiefs whose power tended to compromise or eclipse the autonomy of the khan. Some of these attained this position by skillfully engaging the khan to help them overcome rivals within their own tribes and thus establishing their exclusive control over a large tribe. A few others moved up to top positions by leaving their own tribes with a handful of hardy men and working themselves up by way of increasingly obliging the khan through staunch support of his cause, and by takAs their ing part in exploits and services in his favor. IRANIAN STUDIES

160

land holdings increased in the course of such often spectacular careers, they attracted men from various other tribes

and so built

is, tribes, tribes.

up groups,

also

called

pt'ifa,

that

which were comparable in size to the original

These chiefs did not, however, form a monolithic bloc but stood in complex relationships of rivalry and alliance to eachi other, relationships that were in part created in reaction to the khan's disruptive politics and his dual attempt to unite chiefs behind himself but at the same time fragment them to reduce their power. In the political game, this put the khan in a precarious So it was in the case of Sisakht. triangle of forces. After the region had been subjected to the khan, the chief who had allied h i ms e 1 f with the khan wanted to e 1 i mi n a t e his rival, his father's half brother, and thus take o v e r all remaining 1 an d. At this p o i n t, the khan h a d to r e c o n s i d e r his support, for a sister of the intended victim was married to a very powerful chief of another tribe, an indispensable ally. If the khan had tolerated the former's annihilation, he would have critically antagonized that other chief and jeopardized the continuance of his support. Consequently, he never gave a free hand to his Sisakhti ally. Thus, one chief was indirectly protected by the khan through his relation to another chief whom the khan could not risk to lose. The example also shows the khan tended to choose siding that in such situations with the stronger of his two allies. and alliances beGiven this network of rivalries tween chiefs, and the permanent fluctuations of power in it, the khan inevitably drifted in a position in which he had to decide as to which set of chiefs to put his stakes on. As he became drawn to one of the sides, alliances At this point, his posihardened into factions and blocs. tion and his hold over the total area began to slip as one bloc saw no usefulness in a khan committed to another bloc. They would rally behind a rival pretender and proclaim him khan in much the same way as counter popes were created in the Middle Ages. 161

Vol.

XI,

1978

2. Through intermarriage with the chiefs the khan could not only gratify their ambition to enhance their status, and so oblige them, but also tie them powerfully as true in the case This was especially allies to his person. in mardaughters or of his presenting one of his sisters particularthe of use made act an Such riage to a chief. in Lur cully binding force attached to marriage alliances A man receiving a woman in marriage incurs a strinture. he gent and lasting obligation towards his father-in-law; becomes, as the Lur say, the servant of his father-in-law. In many respects this obligation is considered to take precedence even over a man's obligation toward his own to the chiefs Thus, having such relationships father. was a powerful instrument in the hands of the khan for securing their commitment. And, in fact, all the major tribal chiefs of Boir Ahmadwere tied to one or the other khan in this fashion. But, as in all affairs Boir-Ahmadi style, nothing So, in the above-mentioned was really absolutely binding. of the last khan's half incidence of the assassination in brother, one of the chiefs committed to participate the killing was married to a daughter of the envisaged Consequently, he divorced her before engaging victim. in the action and married a daughter of the khan. The incident also shows that such ties were conto the received by the chiefs as applying specifically lated khan and not to the dynastic lineage as a whole. In a converse case, that is, if the khan's wife were a sister or daughter of a chief, the commitment of the latter, though also to the khan,would apply more specifically to the khan's offspring by this wife, the offspring children) by the (sister's being considered khaharzada between rivalries In this way, his lineage. chief and two of the khan's wives, once taken up by their respecbecould spill over to become rivalries tive offspring, between a tribe and a khan if tween tribes or rivalries the latter chose to take the side of the other wife. As the khan But intermarriage entails reciprocity. tied certain chiefs to himself, he himself became tied to IRANIAN STUDIES

162

them and incurred more or less engaging commitments of the case when he married This was especially support. Consequently,the oththe daughter or sister of a chief. er chiefs considered such a marriage a threat to themThey suspected that the chief would rise in staselves. tus and influence and that the khan would play into. his So, first they would try to inhands at their expense. Then, trigue against the marriage before it took place. if they failed, as they usually did, and subsequently saw t he ir suspicions come true, t he y would strive Thus, very much like the strategy of cofor secession. optation by land, in the process of winning support intermarriage entailed the problem of generating disaffected ones on the chiefs on the one side and too influential other. In sum, his dependency on the tribal chiefs presented the khan with a fundamental dilemma. On the one side, by the theory on which his position rested, he was required to demonstrate to the chiefs that his position principally On the other side, in of them all. served the interests the effort to generate support and maintain himself in that he used methods that favored some chiefs at the position, In the first principle. expense of others, thus violating this sense, the role of the khan contained a contradiction. and unbiased at the same time It had to be universalistic and biwhen, in fact, it was made to be particularistic ased. Or, in other words, the universalism on which the khan's position rested was compromised by the particumethods by which it was maintained. laristic This contradiction, finding expression in the processes mentioned- -the khangiving awayhis ownlands, the emergence of a few overpowering chiefs, the formation of blocs, the of the disadvantaged and victimized chiefs, the hostility khan incurring commitments to some chiefs and suspicions brought from others through his intermarriages--eventually an overall erosion of the power of the khanship. about The most striking indication of this was the partition of Boir AhmadSardsir occurring already in the third generation of its khans. 163

Vol.

XI,

1978

In the beginning of this century two of the politIn ical factions of Boir Ahmaddominated its politics. 1907 one faction killed the khan and then rallied around (cousin and half brother) who had been a close relative involved in the killing and was married to daughters of The other faction, the two leading chiefs in the faction. considering the late khan "their" khan since he was married to a daughter of a leading chief, first rallied around another of his cousins and then, after that cousin was around the late khan's two sons although they killed, The ensuing feuds shook the region children. were still so badly that they, as well as the daring highway robberies, caused the Boir Ahmadi to become known as "the wildest of the nomad tribes and a menace to the civilized But neither of the khans life of Far" (Wilson, 1916:17). Neither of the could permanently unite the region again. two factions felt they could entrust the other khan with ithad the means to assert and neither their allegiance the stop to attempt an in Eventually, self by force. the then governor of Sardar Jang Bakhtiari, feuding, of Boir Ahmad Sardsir by the split Behbahan, finalized each with its own into two sections, its formal division khan.

The Modern System of evolution Whatever the further internal short it was cut been, have might system ditional First, of the government. intervention military established losses, military under heavy initial in the area, exiled and later killed ment control

khans, maintained military

rule,

the traby the Riza Shah, governthe two

and created an adminis-

of resurgence Then, after an interlude center. trative system during the 1940s and 1950s, the of the traditional instilosses, great military present Shah, also suffering marks This in 1963. year control again tuted government system. political the end of the traditional

of all ment.

as well as a great portion Since then, all political governother life has been monitored by the central The important members of the dynasty of khans have

IRANIAN STUDIES

164

been killed, or exiled from Boir Ahmadterritory. The tribal chiefs have been divested of their power, their weapons confiscated, their land distributed under the land reform, their retinues dissolved, and violence checked. Kohgiluye has become a separate administrative unit (farmandari kol), governed by the usual hierarchy of civil executives and assisted by the gendarmerie which maintains well-staffed strongholds all over the area. Together with representatives from the various otlher ministries an impressive bureaucratic machinery was formed which operates from two newly built administrative centers and effects a comprehensive hold over the population and its activities. Thus, schooling, jurisdiction, medical and health care, population control, contracts for cash crops, various development projects, the organization of village councils, equity courts, women's associations, the party, even the teaching of religion and in increasing measure also the sale of consumer goods, are all administered by extensions of the central government. Above all, the government pays out an increasing amount of money through wages and salaries for teachers, officials, contractors, workers and service personnel recruited from the local population itself. This has reached such a proportion that in some areas traditional agriculture and herding have lost, or are rapidly losing, their roles as primary subsistence bases. Thus, government agencies exert their influence in practically all aspects of daily life, and increasingly integrate the area into the political, economic, and cultural context of the nation. Conclusion

The advent of national integration suggests a basic, though often ignored, fact: tribal systems in Iran are part of a whole and to fully understand their dynamics we have to view them from two perspectives, the local and the state. The sort of paradigmatic analysis I gave above satisfies the first view; it presents the system's functioning and can well account for its internal evolution. But to comprehend its emergence and demise, and 165

Vol.

XI, 1978

the ultimate force that maintained it, we have to view it From this in the wider framework of the Iranian state. system of it will appear that the political perspective interaction the of result the as being Boir Ahmadcame into between two forces, state power and tribal order. State power entered the tribal system in its attempt to establish its control over it, at least for taxation and Not commanding, however, the means nemilitary purposes. cessary to do so in a direct and comprehensive way, the state adopted the stratagem of making the tribal order part of the overall bureaucratic framework by appointing the chiefs as government agents, providing them with official and charging them with executive functions. Impertitles fectly as it may have worked for the state, internally this maneuver set in motion an evolution with its own momentum in the course of which the chiefs detached themselves from owed their power and those to whomthey had originally translated their position as tribal leaders into that of Although the backing provided to the chiefs by landlords. more than the nomithe government may have entailed little this nevertheless nal investment with authority and title, state of with the suggestion new status, linked as it was power and the threat of force as demonstrated in the conspicuous punitive expeditions of the provincial governors, seems to have given them an edge over those among whom were primi inter pares, and enabled them they originally to rise above them. Thus, in the last instance, the stimulus which led to the formation of the system emanated from the central power. Through it, the general Iranian landlord-peasant though, given the popusystem could overlay--imperfectly prelation's unwillingness to accept it in principle--the tribal system. Out of existing more or less egalitarian a fusion of these two systems emerged the specific form system I have outlined above. The design it of political embodied predicated its erosive internal evolution while at the same time evoking in increasing measure its conConsequently, as soon as the demation by the center. latter could muster up power, it did away with the system in direct control. itself and established IRANIAN STUDIES

166

Thus, the political system of Boir Ahmad was a passIt was both created, ing constellation. albeit indirectly, and eliminated by the agency of the state. It was created at and for a time when the state lacked the power of direct control, and it was eliminated when the state had eventually gained that power. Thus, its rise and fall came as a reflection of the center's long-range attempt to realize its absolutist theory. Discussion:

A Comparison

with

European

Feudalism

Further insights into the nature of the political system of Boir Ahmad can be gained by examining it in reference to the concept of feudalism. This concept is curwith at least three different rently associated meanings. (a) In its proper technical or legal sense the term refers to the political in central and part of western situation Europe during the tenth through the twelfth centuries, as described in the works of Bloch (1964), Ganshof (1964),and others. (b) In a more general sense the term is used for or anasystems which show more or less close resemblances to the European form, such as phases in the politilogies cal history of Russia, Japan, China, and the Islamic World (Asakawa, Franke, Lybyer, 1937). (c) In the Marxist sense of the word it refers to the exploitation of a weak, subject peasantry by a predominant, landholding aristocracy, that is, of serfs by their lords. In view of its general resemblance to European feudalism, as shown below, and the nature of its mode of prothe traditional duction, system of Boir Ahmad may be justitermed feudal in the two latter senses of the word, fiably and has in fact been termed so by the Soviet anthropoloand one of my informants, a gist M. S. Ivanov (1961:61) brother of the late khan. But more revealing than mere classification promises to be a comparison between the nottraditional Boir Ahmad system and European feudalism, and similarities differences. ing As early as 130 years ago, A. H. Layard (1846:4) to feudalism" in the noted the "very strong resemblance In the case of Boir of the Persian tribes. constitution 167

Vol.

XI,

1978

the selfAhmadthese resemblances are indeed striking: and subsistence economy; the subject peasantry; sufficient the public powers of khan and chiefs; the dispersal of posystem based on purely authority; the political litical khan and chiefs between exchange the personal relations; and military supof favor and protection against political in the likelihood port; the power of the khan consisting of the chiefs' following; the personal bonds between khan and chiefs buttressed by the powerful symbol of marriage; the numerous castles dotting the landscape as symbols of and protection resided an order in which power, security, on the private level, and in the immediate control of armed force; the rise of a landed, hereditary "nobility" in the tribal chiefs. fundamentally derived from the fact The differences that the Boir Ahmadsystem lacked the institution of the feudal contract binding vassal and lord to reciprocal obligaThe chiefs had never offered, however nominally, tions. their land in homage to the khan and received it back as a fief with the obligation of military service attached to it. Thus, the chief was not bound to follow the khan in his wars because he had taken an oath of fealty and had been granted alliances were a Rather, political the land in return. marriage ties, ingratiation, co-optation, force, function of and the demonstration to the othdependency relationships, Of course, these factors assets. er of one's own political in feudal Europe, but transactions also governed political there the feudal contract existed on top of all that, while it was absent in Boir Ahmad; and marriage ties, functioning pattern could not --as I have shown--in a particularistic the power of the Concomitantly, it. for fully substitute the fact that not from derived their subjects over chiefs the latter held in tenure a piece of land which was part of but bea fief and carried with it certain obligations, cause of the chiefs' dominant positions as landlords. Also, the relation of Boir Ahmadto the wider sociUnlike a dukedom in feudal ety shows basic differences. was not Ahmad part of a state whose organizaEurope, Boir tion could be termed feudal, either in its proper or its the term wider meaning; also, in Marxist categories, IRANIAN STUDIES

168

"Asiatic mode of production" or "Oriental despotism" seems to be preferable over feudalism, as has been shown recently by Abrahamian (1975). Nineteenth century Iran was a politically corporate group rather than an entity based on relations of purely personal loyalty; it was an absolutist or, better, despotic monarchy, ruling through a crude inefficient bureaucracy, whose main functions were the collection of taxes and the recruitment of military quotas, and whose officials were appointed and removed entirely at the will, or even whim, of the sovereign and paid by the right, or at least the possibility of making excess extractions from their inferiors. Consequently, between the khan and chiefs of Boir Ahmadon one side, and the sovereign on the other, there existed no such thing as a feudal contract. For the sovereign, as a despot, to bind himself as a contractual partner to a subject would have contradicted the theory of his position. Nor was there an implicit contract, a deal in the sense that the center, in its inability to assert itself directly, tacitly acknowledged the khan and chiefs in their landholdings and so obliged them to provide the in refunction of tax collection and military assistance turn. Rather, the khan and chiefs held their lands in their own rights, and never acknowledged them as fiefs enjoining on them binding obligations, in the way the duke of Normandy, who was also a tribal hereditary chief in primary control over his land, did in the high days of European feudalism. When they provided military service to the government it was not because they held a fief and had taken an oath of fealty that would have obliged them to do so, but because the center, on the basis of its absolute sovereignty, could request them to do so. By the same token, their public powers, such as tax were not objects of feudal grants, but were collection, delegated to them by the government which, realizing they were the only persons who had the requisite power to execute these functions appointed them in an economy of means in the bureauand out of necessity, to official positions cratic hierarchy. They did not have a stronghold over their had been granted to because these territories territories 169

Vol.

XI,

1978

them as fiefs by the ruler, but simply because the latter did not have the power to evict them, however desirable For the center this this may have deemed him at times. claim, a flaw in its make-up an unfulfilled constituted that was corrected as soon as it had gained the power to the end of the sysdo so. Thus, as another difference, tem of Boir Ahmaddid not come about, as in European feudalism, as a consequence of internal economic transformations, but through government intervention. difference The final and perhaps most significant The conceptions unis in their evolutionary potential. derlying European feudalism proved to be important incubators of ideas which eventually led to the constitutional movement and from there to what is called the democratic form of government. In other words, they provided intrinsic elements in the evolution of a society in which original power was no longer thought to be located in a supreme from him downward, but rather in the ruler and distributed community of the people themselves and delegated from them Boir (Ullmann, 1965). upwards to their representatives in a comparable development. Ahmaddid not participate Rather, it was part of a state whose underlying theory of emerging other forms of governrequired the stifling in evolution exclusively ment, and conceived of political of absolutist, terms of an ever more perfect realization into a position despotic rule, thereby maneuvering itself in which transformations tend to take the form of radical revolution rather than gradual transition. REFERENCES

Abrahamian, Ervand. "European Feudalism and Middle East2 (Summer ern Despotisms," Science and Society,39, 1975). Asakawa, K., 0. Franke, and A. Lybyer. Articles on "Feud6 (1937). of Social Sciences, alism," Encyclopedia Baver, M. Kuhglluyeh

IRANIAN STUDIES

va Il

t an.

170

Gachsaran, 1324.

Bloch,

Marc.

Feudal

de Bode, C. A.

Chicago,

Society.

Travels

in Luristan

1964.

London,

and Arabistan.

1845.

Curzon, George N. Fasa'l,

H. H.

Ganshof, Ivanov, Layard,

Persia Repr.:

1892.

don,

T5rlkh-i

F. L. M. S.

F3rsn5mah-i

Naair'l.

New York,

Feudalism. Plemena

Moskva,

Farsa.

James.

1314.

Shiraz,

1964. 1961.

A. H. "A Description of the Province of Journal the Royal Geographical tan,," 16 (1846), pp. 1-105.

Morier,

Lon-

and the Persian Question. New York, 1966.

of KhuzisSociety,

"Some Account

of the I'liyats, or WanderJournal of the Royal Geo7 (1837),

ing Tribes of Persia," graphical

Oberling,

Society,

Pierre.

The Qashqa' i Nomads of Fars.

The Hague,

1974.

Ranking, J.

Report

on the Kuhgalu Tribes.

Simla, 1911.

Rawlinson, H. C. "Notes on a March from Zohab, at the Foot of the Zagros, along the Mountains of Khuzistan (Susiana) and from thence through the Province of Luristan to Kirmanshah, in the Year 1836, " Journal of the Royal Geographic Society, 9 (1839), pp. 26-116.

Ullmann, Walter. Middle

Wilson,

A. T.

Ages.

A History of Political Thought: Penguin Books, 1965.

Report

on Fars.

171

Simla,

The

1916.

Vol.

XI,

1978

Iranian Studies, Volume Xi, 1978.

Pastoral Tribal

Nomadism

and

Power

G. R. Garthwaite

The nomadic tribes of Iran have long attracted interest, yet despite many descriptive accounts there have been few critical studies of them. Major obstacles to analysis have been a romanticization of nomadism, a dichotomization that emphasizes the differences between nomadism and a disregard for the historical and agriculture, setting and change. Discussions have tended to obscure important economic and social relationships between nomadic and sedentary society, and within the tribal structure itself; moreover, it has often been assumed that an organic or deterministic, link between pastoralitm and tribal political structures exists. The Bakhtiyarl are commonly associated with the central Zagros mountains. It is assumed that this rugged area in turn necessitates transhumant movement of the BakhtiyarI with their flocks of sheep and goats and a tribal organization to accomplish this end. Furthermore, this and gives the tribe autonomy vis-a-vis environment isolates the state. The name "Bakhtiyari" identifies not only nomads but a geographic area and an administrative unit of some 20,000 square miles that stretches from Chahar Mahall (an agriculG. R. Garthwaite is Associate Dartmouth College. 173

Professor

of History at

tural region west of Isfahan) to the plains of Khuzistin and south from Gulpayigan to Rim Hurmuiz(ca. 31?N to 330 50'N and 490E to 510E). Roughly, it encompasses the drainages of the Kariunand Diz rivers. The Bakhtiy&ri divide this larger territory into three major areas: winter pastures (garrnsir/qish15q) in the uplands of Khuzistan, summer pastures (sardslr/yail5q) on the eastern slope, or plateau side, of the Zagros, and the mountainous barrier between these two somewhat more hospitable areas. Vegetation, affected by elevation and seasonal precipitation in the Zagros, was a key factor in Bakhtiyar; migration. The migration began in late winter, by which time some of the flocks may already have been accompanied to pastures lower than the garmsir to take advantage of the earlier forage. In late March and early April, however, with temperatures climbing over 100?F and the resulting dessication of pastures in Khuzistan, the Bakhtiyarl as a whole--but in widely-spread groups--began their characteristic six-week journey of approximately 180 miles to higher, cooler, and better-watered pastures in the yailaq. Some remained in the garmsilr to harvest their wheat. In the yailq a more plentiful supply of grass resulted from greater precipitation, up to 40 inches per annum, much of it in the form of snow that melted more gradually in the cooler mountain temperatures, thus providing needed moisture throughout the summer. Shortly after the nomads' arrival in the yailaq, winter wheat, planted before the previous autumn's departure for the garms2r, was harvested. Then, in early September, the return to garmsir resumed; the cycle completed. between The concept of the close relationship nomadic and sedentary economies and societies--with major the in degree of flock size and mobility--in differences for moveZagros is important for it shows the possibility ment from one to the other under a variety of conditions, and the different ways in which a man has responded to and In the Zagros there have exploited the same environment. the sedentary villager who been three major responses: practiced dry or irrigated farming and who herded small IRANIAN STUDIES

174

the transflocks in pastures contiguous to his village; humant agriculturalist-pastoralist with a permanent village base who farmed and also maintained larger herds and moved them, often under the care of shepherds, to neighboring alpine pastures for the summer; and the long-range pastoral nomad who may have had a permanent residence with sown fields in both the winter and summer pastures, but most often lived in a tent and was primarily dependent upon his relatively large flocks and moved in a seasonally direction to maintain them. cyclical sequence and vertical Bakhtiyar1 were to be found in all three categories, especially in the last two, with the third group predominating. All three types relied essentially on cereals for food. The first two were more dependent on fixed sources of water, fields, and pasturage, whereas the third possessed greater freedom--but with limitations- -to move in search of it. The villager had to limit the size of his herds by the amount of available pasturage in the driest part of the year or provide for fodder storage, but the nomad could maintain larger flocks by moving them to pastures as they matured to optimum productivity. Historically pastoral nomadic and agricultural societies have been linked, for pastoral nomadism could occur only after, or concomitantly with, the "food-producing revolution" during which animal and plant domestication took place, beginning before the tenth millenium B.C. The recent archaeological investigations of Braidwood, Hole and Flannery, and Meldgaard, Mortensen, and Thranel in the Zagros, a locus for the incipient domestication of sheep and goats and of wheat, barley, and legumes, gives support to the hypothesis that pastoral nomadism--at least the vertical and transhumant types in West Asia--probably developed concurrently with agriculture. These paragraphs suggest a continuum with pastoral at nomadism at one end and the sedentary agriculturalist in degree and emphasis, as the other, with a difference they practiced some of the same pastoral and agricultural skills, and competed for the same habitat or occupied comThe agricultural like the plementary niches. villagers,

175

Vol.

XI,

1978

in community self-denomads, shared corporate interests The vilfense and sometimes in land usage and herding. organized around lagers did not have corporate interests a migration, unless they were transhumant agriculturalistwhen the migration was less complex, but they pastoralists, in regard to water usage. may have shared such interests Just as in migration, where coordination was necessary and a potential existed for hostile contact with outsiders as so did water well as within the migrating unit itself, usage require coordination and contain within it the germ for internal and external conflict. and the between the villagers Other similarities boundaries nomads were that each maintained territorial with a name and through political and identified itself Like the nomads, functions. offices and administrative some villagers structured themselves on a segmentary basis in descent groups around which a variety of socio-political alignments may have been formed. Often identical outspecialside groups--the ulema, tinkers, etc.--performed even ized tasks for both. Nomads and agriculturalists, when they might have shared the same values, were united as hostile units by mutual antagonisms that grew out of retheir competitive economic, and at times political, as a possible mechanism reinforcing group lationships, loyalties. Flock

size,

however,

with

the related

factor

of

mobility with its mechanisms for expansion, defense, and for aggresthe resulting experience that may be utilized sive action, suggest at least a major economic difference and nomad with significant between the agriculturalist There were econoand cultural ramifications. political mically marginal nomads who became sedentary or transhumant but only some of the transhumant villagers, agriculturalists, had sufand only a very few of the sedentary villagers, large flocks to maintain themselves as pastoral ficiently nomads. Barth states that the average size flock needed to maintain a Basserl household consisted of approximately 100 sheep and goats, and that it was impossible for a The iniBasser1 household to subsist on less than 60. tial herd investment would preclude most peasants from IRANIAN STUDIES

176

nomadism, for, using Barth's figures, it would cost about $1,000 (1957-1958) to obtain an adequate herd of approximately 100 sheep and goats. At that time the estimated annual median income for all peasant families in Iran, excluding casual agricultural labor and thus making the median income high, was only $112!2 Poorer nomads do maintain themselves with less than 60 animals by establishing animal and shepherding contracts, through seasonal agricultural or urban labor, with a son in wage labor, etc. Whole groups, such as tinkers and blacksmiths, of course, exist as nomads without relying on flocks. Barth's relatively recent research thus corroborates Sir James Morier's observations of the early nineteenth century. An I'liyat [nomad] of middling fortune possesses about a hundred sheep, three or four camels, three or four mares, ten asses, etc., which may yield him a revenue of forty to fifty tumans. A man who possesses a thousand sheep, thirty camels, twenty mares, etc., is reckoned a rich man.3 In "Hasanabad," a sedentary agricultural village in the Zagros near Kirmanshah, the average number of animals per household was considerably less. "Most families in Hasanabad had no more than four or five of these animals but they are important because they belong [sheep/goats], ." solely to the villagers... In this same village 7 out of 41 households had 60 or more sheep/goats, and 7 households had none. And in a village with a transhumant economy--also near Kirmanshah--there were 33 households and 10 of these had 60 or more sheep/goats, 8 had 40 or more, and 3 had none.4 In this latter village large flock owners hired shepherds and sent their sheep and goats with them to the Iran-Iraq border area for the winter; in mid-May most of these villages moved in stages up to alpine pastures high on the mountain upon which their village was located and then returned, also in stages, beginning in late August, to their permanent stone houses. In contrast, Hasanabad families possessing large flocks occasionally moved to pastures at a higher elevation for a few weeks in the summer when their local pastures became overgrazed. Except for these few families, it would appear that the 177

Vol.

XI,

1978

did not have the minisedentary and transhumant villagers mumeconomic basis to maintain themselves if they were to leave their permanent residences; unless, of course, they were able, through the accumulation of capital or contracts, (It should be noted that the fito acquire more animals. gures for Hasanabad were collected in 1959-1960 and may reflect extreme or regional variations.) The nature of nomadism--the factors of mobility and problem of accounting for the fluctuhistorical flocks--the ation in nomadic population, and the nomad's politicaldifference between nomilitary roles suggest a political and invite comparison of the two mads and agriculturalists structures and responses in terms of their socio-political Iron's work with the developments. external political to YumiutTurkman in the Gurgan plain demonstrates that an essential factor in their mobility was avoidance of governor resistance to imment with its taxes and conscription, position of dynastic control and its inherent interest in power.5 The Mongols under concentrating and centralizing Chingiz Khan and his descendants exhibit the antithesis, an offensive rather than a defensive aspect of mobility, with the imposition of their hegemony over other nomads, and even over states and emover sedentary settlements, an attempt at concentrating and centralizing pires--also, power. Herding and movement of flocks to pasture or asserhamlets may tion of power over neighboring agricultural have involved only a family, or a small group, whereas the conquest of other tribes, a city, or a state required a larger and better organized unit with leadership; a "tribe," in the case of nomads, or the state's army, which in the Iranian context would have had tribal components. and needs, villagers Despite corporate interests except in organization, did not usually have a political for of the potential state, context the of the totality conquest and expansion as did the pastoral nomads. They lacked the economic resources for arms and horses, the experience gained from defense, which was usually provided for villages by their landlord, the government, or even IRANIAN STUDIES

178

that they would be willpastoral nomads, nor was it likely and homes. ing to leave their capital investment Other major factors would have been the land system itself, which was characterized for limited by internal competition resources, and the relationship of the villagers with the landlord, characterized and autocratic by his arbitrary power. The landlord was represented in the village by his headmen and, unlike the khan, possessed no kin tie, either real or fictive, with his peasants. historGenerally--and ical and geographic factors impinge here--no peasant had "rights" to land unless he owned it, and in case of grievance against the landlord, he could have appealed to urban authorities, to the ulema, moved to vacant lands, were such available, or fled. This system worked to the peasant's advantage only when there were demands for peasant labor. Villagers appear to have lacked mechanisms to defend their own interests the landlord, against except as individual nuclear families that were powerless, since kin group membership was of little import to the landlord. Among nomads lineage principles were more apt to operate in favor of the nuclear family that formed the basis for the larger segments of pastoral nomadic society. Utilization of specific pastures, however, may have been allocated or rotated by the khan; indeed, nomads may have been expelled from them. In recent Bakhtiyari history, especially, when a khan's power was primarily dependent upon the number of his supporters and when keen competition existed between an increasingly large number of eligible candidates for such positions, a khan emphasized his relationship to them and feared their desertion to a rival. Segmentary principles functioned in favor of the family as well in migration, defense of pastures and fields, and raiding, all of which also required economic resources, a decree of military skill, organizational ability, and experience and leadership--supplied largely by the khans. These qualities and abilities are commonly assumed when the term "tribe" is used in the Iranian context; popularly, the concept relates both economically to nomadism and politically to rule by autonomous khans.

179

Vol.

XI,

1978

Confederations like the Bakhtiyarl probably owe their espeestablished, genesis to processes begun and policies earlier in the cially in terms of land and administration, This was a period of great fragmentaeighteenth century. that reinforced the autonomy of tion and decentralization The smaller units makthe tribes. many groups, especially of course, even predate that ing up the confederations, Not until the nineteenth century did the Qajars, period. invest leadwho possibly emulated a much earlier practice, ers with the title and office of ilkhdnl, which gave its holders authority and power to act on behalf of the central administrators of what were thus government as official formally created and recognized as autonomous administrative units by Tihran. This occurred in 1234/1818 for the The KhamsahconfederaQashqa'l,6 1867 for the Bakhtiyari.7 tion came into existence during Ndtir al-DIn Shah's reign;8 even though its head never held the title of ilkhani, he functioned as such. The dates for the first appointment of an ilkhin1 for the Qajar confederation (possibly early nineteenth century and of special status given its relationship to the ruling dynasty) and the ZafaranlCi of Qiichan are not as yet known. None of the other Kurdish leaders possessed the title nor did the Arab shaikhs who held like office as administrators for their respective areas. The Bakhtiyar1 confederation comprised two major One consisted of the kin strucsystems. socio-political ture of small groups, the nuclear family being the basic economic unit and the core, revolving around herding, and politipastures, and fields; migration organization; The other cal leadership dealing with these activities. superstructure consisted of the political-administrative of progressively larger units, which brought the other small units together for migration, pasture usage, expansion, defense, or for administration. The Bakhtiyar1 grouped and defined themselves by a variety of names, under many, oftentimes contradictory, Sometimes this was headings, and for different purposes. or ecoand other times on political done genealogically on a kin basis. nomic grounds, although rationalized IRANIAN STUDIES

180

The Bakhtiyar1 segmentary structure family

(kh3nivadah

or vargah

lit.

begins with the

[tent])--classification

The nuclear family, and terminology follows Digrard's.9 which owns the flocks and works together in the agriculturThe yield of al cycle, constitutes the key economic unit. for family the flocks and of the land is largely utilized Exmarketing is a family concern. consumption; similarly, tended, or related, families come together as oulad, or tash, approximating a descent group, which functions as a camp (mal) of from three to twelve tents and shares common At this level herding, migrating, and defense interests. of segmentation decisions are reached by heads of family. The tirah, roughly subtribe, forms the next level and conthe maximumgroup of related camps and functions stitutes Tirahs are represented by primarily during the migration. kadkhudas.

Tirahs

come together

to form t5yafah,

some of

appointed which number 25,000 and are headed by kalantars from the group by the khans. Pasture rights derive from membership in the t3yafah, which exists as a named group with its own identity and, probably, as an endogamous unit. Even though it may not have always acted as an entity, the provides t3yafah, indeed even the Bakhtiyari confederation, a conceptual framework for organizing people politically and attaching them to leaders. Continuing with the segmentary pyramid, all t3yafah are a component of one of eight bab; each bab has a dominant The bab are grouped lineage from which khans are chosen. in one of the two moieties (bakhsh or bulu-k) of the Haft (11) of Lang or Chahar Lang, and finally the confederation the Bakhtiyarl. Today, four bab are found in the Haft Lang-the Duraki, Babadi, Bakhtiyarvand (or Bahdarvand), Dinardn1, and Jdnikl--and four in the Chahar Lang--Mamlvand, Mamsalah, (Of these terms the written sources Mugu'!, and Kiyanursi. and 11; the last use khanivadah, oulad, tirah, tayafah, three are often used as synonyms. In addition, documents The absence of the other use chadur rather than vargah. percepa different organizational terms probably reflects tion on the part of the great khans and the central govern-

181

Vol.

XI, 1978

were most compelling and stable ment.) Corporate interests at the lowest levels in contrast to the more inclusive units inof tribe or confederation where there were conflicting terests. Tribal competition for land, as well as that with the major factor sedentary society, probably constituted in addition, migration with its potential for for strife; and the necessity for exacerbation of intergroup rivalries exchange with sedentary society, may have sharpened the This, added to the prespotential for internal conflict. with other tribes sures generated by external conflicts and the demands of the largand the defense of territory, the Iranian government, seem to er community, especially the existence of khans or like leaders have necessitated These leaders usually as mediators and intermediaries. They always had "common"ancestors with their people. of wisdom, courage, and possessed the characteristics generosity necessary for their chiefly function, which may have included coordination of the migration; assignment of pastures; appointment of headmen and agents; medidisputes; leadership for raids, deation of intertribal fense, and battle; and awarding of levies, taxes, and fines. The khans were usually selected from those born into however, Occasionally, the chiefly families of the t5yafah. a group went outside its own membership, or even outside the Bakhtiyari, to secure a khan. Khans had the greatest economic resources, and widest ties within their tribe and, outside that group, with sedentary society and other nomads. This is illustrated by the large number of marriages among In addition, inthe ruling khans outside their tayafah. heritance practices in these families seem to have concentrated family wealth in the hands of favorite and more able sons. The khans were the executives and retained the greatTheir power, though est coercive power within the tribe. seemingly absolute, was limited by the power of the various segments of the tribes to withhold their support or to throw this support to a rival within the chiefly family or another khan or even to one outside the group. IRANIAN STUDIES

182

The confederation of more recent history, Il-i Bakhtiyar1, is a further elaboration of Bakhtiyarl political could selkhan, the 7lkh5n! structure, and like the tayafah components dom count on the support of all the constituent The khans and their followers freof the confederation. and may actually have sought interests quently had different to weaken the power and ability of the ll kh5nI to intervene Within the confederation, to collect taxes. and, especially, through sons, brothers, chains of commandwere established uncles, and nephews. Although they may have assisted the khan and may have been obeyed because they were born into a continuing the chiefly lineage, they did not constitute on the contrary they could challenge the administration; khan and replace him. There was a line of communication to the from the ilkh5nl or khan down through the kal1ntars lowest and smallest segment of the tribe, the delegation of authority to those appointed by the khan to carry out his The orders; but only for the duration of a specific task. ilkh3n Is maintained a rudimentary bureaucracy with secretaries to keep records and to act as agents. was both personal The power of the khans and llkh5n! and vested in their chiefly office: it was based on the benefits they were able to dispense, the respect they may have commandedbecause of their lineage, their coercive capabilities within the tribe or confederation provided by a standing corps of loyal armed retainers, and the support given them by the central and provincial government or outside sources of power, such as the British in the nineteenth were These last associations and early twentieth centuries. beneficial only to a few, other than the most important khans and their supporters. The Duraki khans, the lineage from which the l1khni's were selected in the nineteenth century, trace their descent from early eighteenth century khans who had been major landlords in Chahar Mahall and who had functioned as civil and for the ruling dynasties, but who also military officials derived power and wealth from their position as tribal 'adderived Possibly their power was initially ministrators. from land and appointments, like the Qavam al-Mulks of Fars, and only secondarily from the Bakhtiyari. With office came 183

Vol.

XI,

1978

land, exemptions, greater wealth with protection for it, and power. These factors were to elevate those few families or their counterparts, were drawn from which the likh5n7s, far above those of potential rival leaders, and reinforced Other major the prevailing dominance of such families. whose members were also known as khan, Haft Lang lineages, even though they may have lacked the formal award of the menby farman, were to be found in the previously title the D-inaran-, and the tioned bab of the Bakhtiyarvand, BabAdd, and the dominant Chahar Lang bab of the Klyanur-

Accession to leadership of these bab was based on linesi. age, primacy of age or often mother's rank (daughter of a khan or not, and, in the case of the former, addressed by or honored lady), wealth, internal (includthe title blbl, and tUrah) and external support, and perceived ing family the virtues of courage, asespecially fitness for office, sertiveness,

knowledge,

sagacity,

and generosity.

Although one khan was regarded as paramount by his, competed for candidates multiple or even other, tayafah, sons), brother's (father's cousins that position--brothers, Late in the nineteenth brothers). (father's and uncles it would appear that as well, earlier and possibly century, blbis, were favored the of the sons usually sons, eldest although by their fathers, as successors and were designated The two dominant rithis was no guarantee of accession.

(same valries consisted of brother versus half-brother brother); father) and nephew opposed to uncle (son-father's these particular antagonisms should not be surprising given polygyny and the notion of the equality of all sons.12 The a striking contrast to the Qashqa'l -ruling khans constitute and fewer disputes monogamy their of because Bakhtiyarl over

succession.13

and to The khans had to be able both to inspire To provide maintenance for their immediate supporters. act, lead, and live like a khan required a degree of wealth, dues in the form of regular incomes from tribal especially

and land, and to maintain or to increase power--even cessitated

holdings

required

often neposition to retain one's leadership the blb and even ou tsupport from outside

IRANIAN STUDIES

184

side the Bakhtiyarl, where marriage alliances could play a key role. Khans sought wealth, less for its own sake than for the power and prestige of it helped to buy. Positions power in the Bakhtiyarl were insecure, for there were always rival claimants who acted as an important check against the potential for despotism by allowing and t7rah to tayafah In summary, power in the transfer support and allegiance. nineteenth century Bakhtiyart was wielded by those born into ruling lineages who had the necessary to inspire ability family and tayafah support and the resources to maintain themselves as khans. to greater power required Aspirations outside and this usually meant the central assistance, government, but also other tribal leaders or even the British. The khans had little over the pastoral control base of the Bakhtiyarl, which was controlled by family or extended family units. Flocks were owned by the nuclear family, but camping, herding, migrating, and defense required and resulted in increasingly larger groupings that superficially appear to have been formed on a kin basis. Such associations had access to the traditional pastures of their particular Apparently the khans could tayafah. or reassign assign, pasture land as reward or punishment, but seldom did so. Produce was largely utilized for family consumption and the marketing of surpluses was an individual or family concern. (The Bakhtiyar; khans depended little on flocks for their own incomes, and with one exception the record fails to note the size of the khans' flocks;14 even so, given the nature of pastoralism and its attendant problems, 15 no individual, or group of leaders, could successfully exploit this single factor of flocks to personal advantage.) In terms, however, of the Khans' juridical-political role, their relationship to their tribes is more evident. After the mid-nineteenth as a whole, but in earlier century for the Bakhtiyarl times for the two great divisions or even smaller units, the khans mediated within the Bakhtiyari, between them and the central sedentary society, especially and government, integrated the Bakhtiyari into the larger social fabric. Their functions included the collection of tribal taxes and dues, maintenance of order, providing of cavalry forof disputes, and coordination of the ces, adjudication 185

Vol.

XI, 1978

migration. ideology the role of the ruling In terms of tribal yet crucial, symbolic, khans and descent groups is largely world view and hierarchical as it completes the Bakhtiyart and legitimizes the linebut justifies not only reinforces internal relationships. Bakhtiyari age principles underlying would appear to share in The Bakhtiyar1 folk-model the Ima.ms world view--God, hierarchical an Islamic-Iranian In addithe shah, the khans, and themselves. and saints, not concretely, were perceived tion power and authority in specias wielded by individuals abstractly, conceived or Thus power was seen when its holder, fic situations. His, or even at times her,16 his agent or writ, was present. obedience, was acknowledged through submission, authority but The khan was regarded as accessible and deference. rich but hospitable remote, powerful but one of the people, and and omniscient magnanimous and helpful, and generous, in the ruler's Participation but responsible. judicious was by his grace, or khan's bounty of wealth and authority as emanating from were perceived as all power and benefits In all manner of things the khan, him in his position. as the 11khanY, acted within the Bakhtiyarl, especially did the Qaj ar shahs in their realm, and was treated as within and held fast to such. The khans also functioned ethos of their urban counterIslamic-Iranian the greater so that when they came to power, they accepted the parts, concept of no alternate and offered traditions prevailing if they achieved power--as a BakhtiFurthermore, power. and even as a great landlord-as a governor, yari leader, power in the same way. they utilized khans of the the leading Bakhtiyari Significantly Husain Quli centuries, late nineteenth and early twentieth 1kh5ni and always known by that title), Khan (the first and their progeny, do not appear to have his brothers, ethos aside from idenBakhtiyarl developed a distinctive Nor were they above tification with their own leadership. the manner of sense71 7-in using "Lur" in its pejorative to one of their reference their sedentary counterparts--in own tribesmen, even though they took pride in their lineage IRANIAN STUDIES

186

and in being BakhtiyriL. Nor does the historical record reveal the intensity of the Qashqa'l-tat dichotomyl8 within the Bakhtiydrl--that is between the BakhtiyarL nomad and the sedentary world, although Bakhtiyaris looked down upon members who settled in villages. The reasons are several: the Qashq'li constitute a Turkic-speaking minority enclave surrounded primarily by Persian speakers, Qashqa'l migration routes take them through a heavily populated agricultural region in proximity to urban areas, and they practiced less agriculture than the Bakhtiyari. Furthermore the Qashqa'i confederation was probably far more homogenous than the Bakhtiyari which, in the late nineteenth century at least, included the Gunduzlii, a major Turkic-speaking dependency, smaller Arabic-speaking tirahs, and the Janiki Sardsir and the Janikl Girmsir, both of which were made up of sedentary agriculturalists--not to mention Qashqa'i elements. The great confederations in Iran came about as the result of three processes. One would involve designation by the central government, possibly in attempts at centralization or in limiting tribal autonomy, when it would select a leader, not necessarily from within the group, as the one responsible for order, taxes, and conscripts. The Khamsah, formed by order of the Qajars and led by the Qavams, a Shiraz merchant and landlord family, are an example of this type. Confederations also emerged through a process of amalgamation, when a leader forged successively larger and more effective units, relying on a variety of leadership skills and symbols and manipulating the basic kin structures to achieve goals beyond those associated with the smaller groups. Over a period of time corporate interests would be identified with the confederation, but would be weaker in comparison with the corporate interests of the basic units. The Qashqa' provide but one successful illustration for this variation, partly because they exemplify enclosed nomadism--they constitute a Turkic-speaking minority and their migration takes them through thicklysettled agricultural regions in close proximity to urban areas. Although this second model was commonly attempted in Iranian history, given the difficulty of obtaining out187

Vol.

XI,

1978

side support without threatening the central government, most tribal leaders failed because of internal and external in times of a strong especially rivalry and opposition, central government. Even within the Qashqa'i the Qajars attempts to in ineffective elevated and deposed 1kh3nis Examples of failure are comcontrol that confederation. mon in Bakhtiyari history up to the time of Ilkhani, who examplified the third process, a combination of designation and amalgamation, in which the central government capitalizand by ased on a khan who was gathering a confederation, sisting him with resources and thus retaining a degree of control over him, turned a potential threat to its own adto the Government action probably meant little vantage. people who continued to respond to their own chosen leadIlkhani and his Significantly ers of the smaller unit. progenitors possessed large land holdings and held government offices that provided them with incomes and political support for the amalgamating process in sharp contrast to Taq1 Khan, who Ilkhani's immediate predecessor, Muhammad did not, and therefore failed to unite the Bakhtiyari. reference in the fourteenth historical The earliest century19 to the Bakhtiyari is probably to a small group in It remains unknown whether the the amalgamating process. two moieties of the Haft Lang and Chahar Lang were formed in the late Safavid era as a result of a split or represent in effect two categories of amalgamation and designation, sharing the commonregional name separate confederations of Bakhtiyari, which were only brought together into a single confederation by Uusain Qull Khan Ilkhani in the has nevertheless, That division, mid-nineteenth century. Bakhtiyari existed since at least the eighteenth century. myths, centered on the theme of fraternal rivalry, refer to a variety of origins for the Bakhtiyari as a whole, as and to the major segments well as for the two divisions, and segments of them. Earlier in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Shah and his government had designated individuals to collect taxes, provide troops, and maintain order for a part of the Bakhtiyari; but only with the creation of the of the Bakhtiyari in 1867, posactual office of llkhinl IRANIAN STUDIES

188

sibly beginning with the earlier office of nazim in 1862,20 did the government commit its support to an individual khan of the Bakhtiyari as a whole. Imfor the responsibility plicit, too, was the government's long-range support for him in that office. Examples of the earlier decentralized administration of the Bakhtiyari are to be found in documents issued to Haft Lang khans, and one assumes that Chahar Lang, or other khans, had been awarded similar documents for like assignments. Although the various imperial this term can be used for the eighteenth governments--if century--may have regarded the Bakhtiyari as a single administration, or one divided between the governorships of Isfahan, 'Arabistan, and possibly Fars; they held no single khan responsible for it. Under the Safavids, when there had been governors of the Bakhtiyar1 as a whole, these offices may have been held by Bakhtiyar1, although there is little evidence to suggest this. The khans themselves began the amalgamating process with a core, most likely consisting of close kin, and built upon their leadership qualities of sagacity, courage, and generosity; their greater economic resources, coercive powers, and marriage ties that allowed them to impose their will on others. Also, they attracted support with the promise of booty, land, and exemption from dues. In addition they may have appealed to a vague BakhtiyarL identity and defined this quality through their leadership and in terms of rivals. Most such groups were ephemeral and lacked cohesion beyond immediate objectives, hence the many names for similar, or even the same, units; names that in many cases were derived from individual leaders. In the last half of the nineteenth century these processes are readily observable; moreover, the emergence of new moieties, the result of a split in the ruling family of the recently unified Bakhtiyaril, may shed light on earlier developments, especially the formation of the Haft Lang and the Chahar Lang divisions. Briefly, Husain Quli Khan Ilkhan;'s long tenure in that office assured Haft When Lang--especially his own family's--preeminence. Nasir al-Din Shah had Ilkhani assassinated in 1882, he imprisoned only two of his sons and continued to rule 189

Vol.

XI,

1978

through Ilkhanl's family because he had been intimidated divisions, by its power.21 The most important political to emerge were the Ilkhan;, Ilkactually family factions, hani's sons and then grandsons, and the ajjji Tlkhani, Tlkhani's full brother, whose given name was Ima-mQuli Khan, The third family faction, the and his sons and grandsons. power by the other two and one excluded from effective known as the Ilbig;, was composed of Riza Quli Khan Ilhalflieutenant to the tlkhAnI), i.e., bigi ("l1bigri," brother to Ilkhani and Haj'jl Ilkhanl, and his sons and Possibly the Haft Lang and Chahdr Lang divigrandsons. sions were the result of similar uncle-nephew (brotherbrother's son) and then cousin (father's brother's sons) rivalry, but a division whose function in terms of political leadership and alignments of the Bakhtiyari had been Ilkreplaced by the Ilkh-ani-Hjji lost and was essentially which monopolized offices and incomes after hanl factions, the 1880s, when the various tayafah and tirah of the BakhThey, howgrouped themselves along these lines. tiyari ever, also continued to identify themselves as either Haft or Chahar Lang. The Iranian government's demands were comparatively and submission characterized by payment simple--recognition and observance of royal of taxes, conscription of recruits, The Qajar government in nineteenth- and early suzerainty. Iran maintained its position through its twentieth-century military superiority and through its greater prestige and authority, access to Anglo-Russian support, and its ability inter- and intra-tribal to reward and divide by utilizing rivalries. in naThe more the Bakhtiyarl khans participated during and after the Persian Revolution, tional politics the closer they were to greater personal rewards. Conversely, as they moved away from problems of immediate they were also subject to the greater tribel interest, danger of loss of their power base and tribal support, diminishing their ability to compel obedience. system differIn summary, the Bakhtiyari political ed from the classic segmentary lineage systems by having a IRANIAN STUDIES

190

hierarchy of khans. The Bakhtiyaril, despite this major difference, did share division into segmented levels, with and responsibilities ascertain relationships, activities, sociated with each segment, instability and change in these and diffusion of military power. This inrelationships, in relations and diffusion of military power was stability of the Bakhtiy5ri but of the Iraninot only characteristic an political system as a whole. The Bakhtiyar1 used military force directly against one of the other tribes or settled areas despite the basic idea that they were all subjects of the Shah, and during the Persian Revolution the BakhtiydrL used force against the Shah himself. The various tribes and subtribes within the Bakhtiyarl used force against each other, against their khans, and against their Ilkhani. Significantly, the highest authority at even the lowest level can, in effect, negotiate treaties, form alliances, and conclude peace independently of higher levels of authority. Thus, like a segmentary lineage system, intergroup and even intragroup relations are based on a balance

national. may unite

of power at each level--tayafah,

il,

or even

Groups that oppose each other on one occasion on another in opposition to some third group.

The balance of power in the model segmentary system was between territorial groups, all of whose members were politically equal and who acted on the basis of internal consensus. In the Bakhtiyari system, however, the balance of power was between the various members of the chiefly hierarchy who competed for the support of both their superiors and their subordinates, and at the same time concluded alliances with members of other tribes to strengthen their position. Thus, the llkh5nl of the Bakhtiyar1 competed with rival claimants--especially with half-brothers, nephews, and brothers; occasionally there was even competition between father and son--by seeking the support of tayafah khans, by concluding agreements with a Qashqal' khan or an Arab shaikh, and by gaining support of a superior authority, such as the Shah's government or the British. The tayafah khans maintained themselves in the same manner. Like model were not segmentary systems, moreover, Bakhtiyari alliances based primarily on a theory of commondescent, unless it suited the immediate purpose, but were extensivley modified 191

Vol.

XI,

1978

by contractual alliances based on negotiation and mutual agreement. Since these alliances derived from considerathey loyalties, tions of expediency rather than categorical Korans sealed and daughters of Exchange brief. tended to be however, helped to at the conclusion of these alliances, strengthen them. The Bakhtiyarl system was thus characterized by continual internal shifts in the balance of power frequentof the posily leading to a show of force and renegotiation or confederacies involved. tions of the khans, t5yafahs, levels were continually mobilizing That groups at different for military purposes and redefining their position by violence or threats of violence reinforces Bakhtiyari classification as a segmentary lineage system--but one in which alignments instead of geneology played the most political structure in than as a political important role--rather monopolized the use which a central authority effectively of military force and invariably imposed its will on subOnly under the most effective ordinate local authiorities. khan, such as Ilkhani, or under the most extraordinary circumstances, for example, the Persian Revolution, could unification of the segments be brought about to form an efThe Duraki fective confederation of all the Bakhtiyari. manipulated the own lineage, effectively khans, Ilkhnil's their incomes from land and tribal structure and utilized government appointments to consolidate their position as Just as the economic base of the BakhBakhtiydri leaders. so did tiyari encompasses both pastoralism and agriculture, and social structures the highest level of tribal politics incorporate tribe and landlordism. the great ones who Iranian landlords, especially provincial and maintained armies and played significant national roles, unlike tribal khans, exercised power autoTheir and independently of their peasants. cratically authority and power stemmed from the incomes of their land holdings, and ties to the government allowed them to mainBy the last quarter of the eighttain and arm retainers. eenth century--but possibly earlier as well--some of the Ilkhani's ancestors--had beBakhtiyar1 khans--significantly Indeed, they come landlords and government administrators. IRANIAN STUDIES

192

may havebeen such even before they emerged as tribal

leaders!

Comparatively speaking the khans and landlords functionthey both may have determined the use of the ed similarly: land, regulated disputes, mediated relations with the outside world, and integrated their tribe or peasants into the wider social and political fabric of Iran. Moreover, they bothwere usually members of the local elite in provincial centers and The central government used them to often in Tehran as well. The khans, howcollect taxes, maintain order, and conscript. ever were regarded as kin by their tribesmen and were expected to be responsive to them. Incomes from land and appointthe triments gave khans a degree of independence vis-a-vis bal segmentary system by allowing them to reinforce the kinincome to go outside the tie with an economic one, to utilize and to maintain and equip them with kin group for retainers, Following Hubetter arms and for longer periods of time. sain Quli Khan Ilkhani's death, tribal segments could once again limit the khan's independence that came from their dual roles, because of the increased competition among a large number of eligible khans for the office and its greater rewards. NOTES

1.

Communities Village Robert J. Braidwood, "The Earliest Atti del VI ConAsian Reconsidered," of Southwestern a Progresso Internazionale delle Scienze Preistoriche tostoriche, Vol. I (Rome, 1962), p. 122. Jorgen Meldgaard, at Tepe Peder Mortensen, and Henrik Thrane, Excavations Guran, Luristan (Copenhagen, 1964), p . 111, note 15 . Kent V. Flannery, "The Ecology of Early Food Production in Mesopotamia," Science, Vol. CXLVII, No. 3663 (12 March 1965), p. 1255.

2.

Fredrik Barth., Nomads of South pp. 16-17.

3.

or Sir James Morier, "Some Accounts of the I'liyats, obtained in the Years 1814 Wandering Tribes of Persia, Society, or 1815, " Journal of the Royal Geographical Vol. VII (1837), p. 23.

4.

Patty

Jo Watson,

"Clues 193

Persia

to Iranian

(New York,

in Modern

Prehistory Vol.

1964),

XI,

1978

Vol. VIII, No. 3 (Spring Expedition, communication. And personal

Life," Village 1966), p. 11. 5.

Adaptation: William Irons, "Nomadism as a Political The Case of the Yomut Turkmen," American Ethnologist, Vol. I, No. 4 (November 1974), p. 635.

6.

Fasa'X

records:

In that year (1234) [1818], by mediation of of Fars, vizier Haji Mirza Reza Qoli Nava'i, "Ilkhani" was bestowed upon Jan; the title His son of Fars. ilbegi Khan-e Qashqa'i, Up to Mohammad 'Ali he appointed ilbegi. that year nobody in Fars had been called by "Ilkhani. " The head of the tribes the title in Korasan used to be called "Ilkhani." Hasan Fasa'i, (Farsnama-ye

York,

1972),

of

History

Na5eri), p. 160.

Persia

trans.

under

Qajar

by Herbert

"Farman" (Tehran:

Rule

Busse

(New

Sha'ban

1284/

7.

Nasir al-Din Shah, December 1867).

8.

Fasa'i,

9.

et des inconveniDigard, "De la necessite Jean-Pierre Utilisation Baxtyari, d'etre ents, pour un Baxtyari, des chez pasteurs et polititique puvoir de l'espace et Production pastorale nomade d'Iran" (forthcoming, Cambridge). societe,

p. 399.

communication.

10.

Lois Beck, personal

11.

Encyclopaedia Ann K. S. Lambton, "Kalantar," 1974), pp. 474-476. Vol. IV (Leiden,

12.

"Two Persian Wills of Hajj 'AlU Quli G. R. Garthwaite, Khan Sardar As'ad," Journal of the American Oriental 1975), Vol. CIXV, No. 4 (October-December Society, pp. 645-650.

IRANIAN STUDIES

194

of Islam,

13.

Oliver Garrod, "The Qashqa'i Tribe of Fars," Journal of

the

Royal

Central

Asian

3 and 4 (July-October 14.

Layard, describing

Society,

1946), p.

Vol.

XXXIII, pts.

301.

Muhammad Taqi Khan's wealth,

writes:

His wealth, like that of other chiefs of these nomade [sic] tribes, consisted principally in flocks and herds; actual specie they very seldom possess, and the enormous sum that the Mo'tamid had represented to be in Mohammed Taki's possession was such a ridiculous exaggeration as a Persian alone could credit. MohammedTaki's actual property might have consisted of 1500 buffaloes, 50 excellent Arab mares, some of which were valued at very high prices, and could have been sold for 500 tomans (250L) in Khuzistan; the same number 500 broodmares, and of good Cha'b stallions, 500 horses of Lur and mixed breeds, and about 10,000 sheep and goats. This I consider as having been about the whole amount of his property. MohammedTaki, a despotic chief, had of course a certain power over the property of those who lived under his authority. Layard, "A Description-.. totals

constitute

,"

rather than his personal 15.

p. 15.

the property

Possibly

of his

holdings.

these

t3yafah/tlrah

(Cf fn. 19 below.)

Barth writes: ...It is a characteristic feature of wealth in herds that its net productivity rate for the owner declines as the size of the herds increases. No effective means have been developed among the Basseri to protect the rights of the big herdowner--the less the flocks are under the owner's constant supervision, the more he will be cheated out of his profits while made to carry real or fictitious losses.... 195

Vol.

XI,

1978

the What is more, the capital asset itself, fluctuto subject unpredictable flock, is... ations and severe losses from natural causes, averaging as much as 50% in some years.... As a herd-owner's wealth grows, there are thus growing economic incentives for him to transfer a part of his capital to another typical patform than wealth in herds....The tern for wealthy nomads is therefore to convert a fraction of their wealth in flocks into landed property. Barth, pp. 103-104. and notes: ...one

Hole reached similar

conclusions

seldom sees a rich nomad.

The reason is that the potential for increase of herds is subject to great variation as a and result of environmental, pathological, economic factors. Frank Hole, "Ethnoarcheology of Nomadic Pastoralism: A Case Study" (November 1975), p. 42. Land

16.

Elizabeth Ross, A Lady Doctor in Bakhtiari (London, 1921), pp. 97-108.

17.

Sardar Ashja', Ilkhani's nephew, exclaimed to Dr. M.Y. life Young, of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, "...the of nomads is no longer a life for us and to rule the Lurs our children are good enough." Dr. M. Y. Young, "Memorandum: The Governorship of Bakhtiaristan," Vol. 5 (August 1912).

18.

Thomas R. Stauffer, "The Qashqai Nomads: A Contemporary Appraisal," The Harvard Review, Vol. I, No. 3 (Spring 1967), p. 33. Personal communication, Beck.

19.

ed. Guzidah, Hamdallah Mustaufi-yi Qazvini, Tarikh-i by 'Abd al-Husain Nava'i (Tehran, 1339/1961), p. 540.

IRANIAN STUDIES

196

20.

21.

Nasir al-Din Shah, "Farman" (Tehran, 1862). 1279/September-October

Rabi'

al-Sani,

Sipahsalar-Bar Guztdah as: Asnad-i (Tehran, 1350), pp. 49al-Mulk al-Sul1tn--Dabir

Ibrahim Safa'i, Zill

52.

197

Vol.

XI,

1978

Iranian Studies, Volume Xl, 1978.

The of

Patrimonial Iranian

The

Late

Structure

Bureaucracy Nineteenth

in

Century A. Reza Sheikholeslami

Introduction

A major characteristic of traditional is polities that their policy-implementing and policy-formulating roles deare less differentiated than those in more politically veloped societies. Consequently, the bureaucracy in a traditional setting plays a crucial role in system-maintenance, not only through its recruitment function and socialization of the new recruits,,but by reinforcing the system's goals and mores. Without the development of an effective bureauthe traditional cracy as an agent of political integration, or breaks apart.1 The system either remains traditional that the bureaucracy would be able to perform possibility its herculean task is further reduced by the fact that as a subsystem within the larger traditional political system it mostly symbolizes the general systemic patterns. For norms are prevalent in the soexample, if the ascriptive ciety, one may expect to see inheritance of offices and level. Political nepotism on the institutional developis a painfully slow process which more ment, therefore, often than not may never come about.

A. Reza Sheikholeslami is Assistant Professor Science at the University of Washington.

199

of Political

in Iran during the unusually The Qajar bureaucracy is a case in long reign of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896) Under the Western impact and the Shah's attempts point. the need for rapid institution the country, to centralize of At the same time, the prerequisites was felt. building relaof interpersonal separation as such a modern state, differentiation, tions from work, economic and societal ensuring the legal procedures established and, finally, The economy was too were absent.2 of contracts, efficacy holders, to office meager to allow for payment of salaries and the working force was not mobile enough to allow for the bureaucracy by any method other than the asstaffing ones. criptive that the beginning therefore, It is not surprising, should mark the transformacentralization administrative of the Shah's household into major offices of first, tion, presome of bureaucratization the second, and state, the of traThe formalization structures. traditional existing the process of institution structures accelerated ditional with traBut it also imbued the new structures building. at this time tradition The Persian political ditionalism. The into sacred and secular. differentiated was clearly The sacred were were mostly absorbed. secular institutions It did to the government. It did not deny legitimacy not. have was to grave it assimilated, Not not offer it either. traditionalisof the new, albeit on the stability effects institutions.3 tic, during Nasir al-Din Shah's The Qajar bureaucracy in the Wethe most important criteria reign fulfilled (a) offices bureaucracy:4 berian model of a primitive differentiated. and functionally were not structurally was neither functions official of (b) The organization was not The official rules. (c) bound by nor continuous to carry out the functions always provided with authority to him, nor were the means of rule enforcement assigned establishfor compulsion clearly defined, or the conditions there was no specialized ed. (d) With some exceptions, or knowledge required from those who held office. training were thought of in terms of revenue, thus they (e) Offices between the There was no separation could be farmed out. IRANIAN STUDIES

200

officer and the ownership of the administrative means, nor was there a separation between the office and the official's residence. (f) To the extent that an officer was obeyed by his subordinates or the community, it was due to his person rather than to his office. The bureaucratic structure, therefore, was closely related to the general systemic norms. One can observe that a "Weberian" primitive bureaucracy operated in a soeither ciety where legal norms could not be established by coercion or by agreement. The only general laws were Quranic.

Not only was sovereignty

contested

between

the

Shah and the ulama, but the society was fragmented into and linguistic tribes, isolated villages, and religious groupings which surfaced more obviously whenever government authority faded away. Thus, the authority patterns in the Shah's dominion cannot be expressed in a consistent system of abstract rules. Where the Shah's authority was felt, as it was in the central bureaucracy, one faces a totally different problem. Here the bureaucracy was indeed an extension of the monarch's household. He chose the officers on the basis of his personal trust, and without establishing any consistent limitations on their authority or obligation. Nor was his choice limited by the officer's degree of technical competence. It was a case of patriarchy. "Patriarchalism," as Weber observed, is based "on the official's commitment [not] to an impersonal purpose and not on obedience to abstract norms, but on strictly personal loyalty."5 The official's power was an extension of the Shah's power and the manifestation of the Shah's personal trust in the official. Consequently, the areas that the officials had jurisdiction over were not defined, nor was there much relationship between the bewildering and pomtitles and any definite administrative aupous official thority. Weber's characterization that "Whenthe ruler's political operations are appended to his purely economic concerns they appear as auxiliary resources which are used merely according to need and opportunity,",6 accurately describes Qajar Iran. Within such a system where the bu-

201

Vol.

XI.

1978

operate as household servants whose duties and reaucrats dechange according to their master's responsibilities deto reach an objectively it is very difficult sires, between the The relationship function. fined official followed the same pattern and his subordinates official and the Shah: the offias the one between the official to his authority and delegated cial made ad hoc decisions on the basis of purely personal considerasubordinates of "inviolable a juxtaposition Weber identifies tions. making decision and "arbitrary prescription" traditional as a typical feature of the patrimoni(kabinettsjustiz)" al state.7 between such sees some similarity Weber, in fact, bureaucratic oriented and impersonally authority personal and domination in the sense that they both enjoy stability he In the final analysis, have an "everyday character."8 of domination find their support holds that both patterns between The difference in the compliance of the subjects. the two patterns of domination is in the manner in which the norms of domination are established. in Iran, however, did not conThe official classes in the modern sense, as the officials stitute a bureaucracy whose of ascribed positions formed a hierarchy basically A change can be were diffuse. and functions authorities discerned early in Nasir al-Din Shah's reign when six were formed by the Shah formally autonomous ministries differentiated aspects of the Shah's authority. to exercise went so far in the The process of institutionalization that in the middle of Nasir Affairs Foreign of Ministry inal-Din's reign it had already become a differentiated In some with functionally departments. specific stitution and know lsome training such as War or Finance, ministries, But in each and every edge were required of the officials. from the Shah derived his legitimation official case,the at the Shah's pleasure. his office and retained to give an account of it is possible At this point, bodies in Qajar Iran with awareness of the administrative milieu in which they operated. Any the noninstitutional in terms of the informal study of the Qajar bureaucracy IRANIAN STUDIES

202

of which it was comprised,rather than in terms stitutions of functions that it actually played and relying on the yearbooks, sal-namahs, which listed the variety of governmental departments, will of necessity miss the informality of the structure of power while drawing up an ideal-typical model of the administration which would bear no resemblance to the actual diffusion and lack of institutionalization. As Aristotle pointed out at the beginning of his treatise on ethics,

there

is nothing

achieve a greater precision subject matter will allow.9

to be gained

from trying

in an investigation

to

than the

The Persian government was basically organized around monopolies. Each officer's sphere of j'urisdiction was defined by the extent of the area that he was authorized by the Shah to exploit fiscally. The ministries, as in the country, were also basicalthe highest institutions ly monopolies. Ideally, there were fifteen ministries in Iran headed by the Grand Vizier. They consisted of War, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Treasury, Court, Commerce, Justice, Pensions and Endowments, Post, Press, Science, Telegraphs,

Mines,

Public

Works, and Customs.10

Some of these ministries were lumped together under one minister. Such groupings of the ministries indicate the prevailing conception of them. The portfolios of Justice and Commerce were often held by the same man, as the criminal litigations were handled by the governors and most civil cases by the ulama. The procedure for commercial cases was most consistent and was handled by the local chambers of commerce. Since the administration

of commercial cases was the most organized,and since the Ministry of Justice could have no other consistent area of authority at the time, it was natural that both offices should be held by the same man. In the same vein, the Ministries of Science, Telegraph, and Mines were headed by the same minister as were Pensions and Endowments. Interestingly enough, the portfolios of Treasury and Finance were consistently held by

two different men. The power of the Minister of War, which could have been significant, was also divided up 203

Vol.

XI, 1978

among the Minister notables,

and a host of other governors,

army chiefs,

The Ministry

of

Pensions

local

heads.

and battalion

and Endowments

was not in full control of of the The trustees from mostly in the form of lands, were generally estates, tumans, which was Of 4,000,000 the ranks of the ulama. the revenues from endowments, the Ministry conreportedly among the This was distributed 500,000 tumans.11 trolled as well as the ulama and many students, theology tullab, The local governorates other members of the ruling class. indevaza'if, for pensions, funds allocated distributed va Awqaf. The adminpendent of the Ministry of Vaza'if of Imam Riza's shrine endowments was under the istration as the regent, of the Shah and his appointee control direct that almost all Considering known as na'ib al-tawliyah. the by individuals, other endowments were administered by the Ministry seems figure of 500,000 tumans distributed too large. The Persian

the charitable

government

endowments, awqaf.

The Ministry

of

the

Post

system was one of the of the postal The organization into of government which had fallen functions traditional EuroWhen Nasir al-Din Shah,during his first utter decay. a functioning an Austrian to establish pean trip,employed of govconception Ministry of Post, given the prevailing it was natural that the ernment as a system of monopolies, should be granted as a monopoly old but revived function secreIt was the Shah's personal servant. to a trusted who assumed the new tary, Mirza cAli Khan Amin al-Dawlah, minisIn his memoirs, the supposedly reformist monopoly. manner that "By the royal ter writes in a matter-of-fact the Ministry of Post which was created at the rescript cost and labor of Amin al-Mulk [Aminfinancial personal to himself forever and the probwas entrusted al-Dawlah] were to go to him."*12 The Shah able and expected profits did not request Mirza CAli Khan to render an account of IRANIAN STUDIES

204

mainthe revenues under his trust, so long as the latter tained his monopoly in a state of reasonable efficiency. staThe old subsidies paid to the chapar-khanahs, postal tions, however, continued to be paid to the newly formed ministry. 13

The Ministry

of

the

Telegraph

An area where the conflict between personal goaland the general systemic gratification of the officeholder needs were in an obvious contradiction was in the Ministry of Telegraph. The minister regularly blocked the construction of new lines as they reduced his monetary exploitations. The minister was expected to pay 19,000 tumans annually into the Shah's treasury to pay for his monopoly. Thanks to the deductions he made for the expenses of the new lines, instruments, and some of the salaries, he paid no money to the government.14 The salaries of nearly all the staff was paid out of the Treasury, since the Ministry was in fact a web of espionage systems in the country, its local offices being

headed by military officers or the Chief Minister. The Ministries

reporting

directly

to the Shah

of Commerce and Justice

The Minister theoretically depended on special ato adjudicate the commercial litigagents in provinces The commercial cases were,however,decided tions. by the notable merchants of each locality according to the cusThe minister's tomary law, Curf.15 agent at best could hope to give an official insignia to the decision for some The local governors, remunerative rewards. however, barred the special agents from the provinces under their authorities. The Ministry of Justice, often united with Commerce, was almost a non-existing The adjudication institution. was carried out by the peripheral bodies. function 205

Vol.

XI,

1978

The

Ministry

of

Public

Works

The Justice was not the only nonexisting ministry. sole employee of the Ministry of Public Works was the MinAmir Nizam, who filled the portfolio for ister himself. so long that the name of his ministry became actually his name, Vazir-i Fava'id-i cAmmah,was normally away from Tehran. Every now and then somebody would remember the ministry and write an elaborate job description for it. Mushir al-Dawlah describes it as a "bureau within the Ministry of Interior, responsible for constructions of public structures such as bridges, roads, karvansarais, ports, docks, and their repairs and unkeep. "17 Whenthe Shah appointed Mirza Qahriman Amin Lashkar to the ministry, not only did he elevate the bureau to a ministry, but he also added a few more functions to the already long list of the MinisThe minister was also entrusted try's responsibilities. drying up the marshlands, with building water reservoirs, of water of the and making decisions on the distribution rivers. 18 source refers to a certain JaAn autobiographical although other hangir Khan as the Minister of Industries, sources that list other nonexisting ministries do not mention this one.19 The Ministry

of

the

Press

There were ministries that actually performed cerOne was the Ministry of the tain specific functions. He put Press under the authority of Ictimad al-Saltanah. together a cadre of scholars who generated a renaissance They edited, wrote, of literary and scholarly interest. and translated a large number of books. They also reguand Iran among them. larly published newspapers, IttilaC The important ministers were those concerned with The latter two asthe army, and taxes. foreign affairs, pects of the government require a more detailed study.

IRANIAN

STUDIES

206

The Ministry

of

Foreign

Affairs

The authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs dewith the Chief Minispended very much on his relationship ter. During the absence or weakness of the Chief Minister, his the minister in charge of foreign affairs fulfilled ministry's functions with the authority that was expected Mirza Sacid Khan, although under of such a high office. the thumb of the Shah, was often in a position to make as indeed did Mirza Husain Khan. authoritative decisions, The Ministry consisted of four departments dealing with the British, Russian, Ottoman, and the nonneighboring commercial affairs, powers. There were also five offices: and decipherment, and acprotocol, records, translation in the major counting. The Ministry had representatives capitals and towns where Persians congregated to work or in regard to foreign trade. To handle its responsibilities the Ministry had merchants, minorities, and border affairs, offices in the major Persian cities as well.20 The important ambassadorships were sold by the Shah as were the most important consular positions. The possithrough passport fees, disbilities of fiscal exploitation and the use of tribution of medals to foreign nationals, diplomatic mail for trade purposes were so great that the eager candidates were willing to offer large sums of purchase price. The posts in Istanbul and Tiflis were especially popular on account of the large Persian population residing in Turkey and Caucasia, and the judicial authority of the Persian representative in deciding on conflicts among the Persians as well as supporting their cases to the host government.21 The Ministry

of

War

The Persian Army was not an autonomous institution, functions, and differentifulfilling technically specific ated from other traditional processes of the institutional 207

Vol.

XI,

1978

country. The army was closely financing, and administration, social and economic structure.

tied, in its recruitment, with the country's diffused

On the surface, the Ministry of War consisted of nine functionally specific departments. These departments included a blue-ribbon committee which was supposed to deliberate on military affairs down to the secretariat, which was in charge of clerical matters.22 In a rescript by the Shah to Kamran Mirza, the Shah's son and Minister of War, the Shah distributed the functions of the ministry among seven departments. The new organization was more rational, as overlapping had been avoided. New departments dealing with military instruction and the corps of the army engineers were at least indicative of the Shah's ambitions,though not of the reality of the situation. The Shah foresaw two offices of deputy to the minister. One was of administrative and clerical nature, but the second one, which he called ajudan-bashi, was infused with enough power to rival and control the minister. The ajudanbashi was put in charge of "the instructions, maneuvers, transfer of battalions, appointment of military officers and the construction of foranywhere across the country, tifications."*23 a gap Colonel Picot's report, however, indicated between the ideal-typical model of the Ministry of War and the actual organization of that office. Picot reported "that the Minister of War unites in his own person several separate and distinct such as those of the Minisoffices, ter of War, Financial Secretary, the Commander-in-Chief, and Paymaster-General."24 In a manner similar to other powerful Qajar officials, Kamran Mirza had monopolized a of offices in his variety and personalized these offices his authority could not be subject person. Consequently, checks. "As Minister of War and Fito any institutional nancial Secretary," Picot wrote, "he prepares the Army Estimates, provides the war material, equipment, clothing, and checks the meets all pay disbursements, tents, etc., In sum, Picot accounts of expenditure."25 observes that, he accepts the material "As the Commander-in-Chief and IRANIAN STUDIES

208

equipment provided by himself as Minister of War."26 On KamranMirza, in Picot's words, "devolves the whole reand executive."27 financial, administrative, sponsibility, Decentralization

of

the

Army

Picot's report on the concentration of the authority of the Ministry of War in the person of KamranMirza may give an erroneous impression of the Minister's power. While of the Minthe Minister was, in fact, the personification istry, not all military powers were within the authority of his office. Formally, he was the commander of the whole issued in 1882-1883, the Shah catearmy. In a rescript, gorically wrote, "The three branches of the armed forces of the state, consisting of the gunners, the cavalry and the infantry are under the direct authority of the Minister that were [of War]."2 Yet in the same year the battalions under the authority of the Court Minister, cAla' al-Dawlah, were given marched in front of the Shah and their officers robes of honor and medals by the Shah.29 Seven yearslater military power reached such magnitude that Zill al-Sultan's the Shah sent General Wagner to investi'ate the extent of the threat to his sovereign authority.3 There was a host of other military leaders,who unand not combine administrative like Zill al-Sultan,did sumilitary power but were independent of the minister's Such an example was Sulaiman Khan Sahib-Ikhtipervision. yar who led the Khurasan army and was responsible to the Shah directly.31 In addition to the military leaders who enjoyed their positions thanks to the Shah's favor,there was a trihost of local notables who commandedtheir basically bal forces and felt their allegiance was due only to the Shah. Some of these local lords,such as Mir cAlam Khan military ranks and Hishmat al-Mulk,were granted official they hardly came to functions in the Ministry,although Tehran and commandedforces which were loyal to them on the basis of their patriarchal allegiance.32

209

Vol.

XI,

1978

Size

of the Army

The Army was divided into nine tumans, regiments, and each tuman included five to nine afvag, battalions.33 The infantry battalions were supposed to consist of 800 men.34 A contemporary source, however, points out that each battalion included 100 musicians and officers and another 200 were either sick or claimed to be. Thus, the active men of the battalion were not more than 500.35 numbered 64,000 but officially The army, therefore, The sal-namahs conits fighting force was about 40,000. sistently give the size of the standing army as well over Even Mirza Husain of the irregulars. 100,000,exclusive Khan,in a letter to the Shah,writes that "the army is over 100,000 men," and the Shah writes his comment on the same 20,000 be stationed in barracks as reserves, letter that,"if then 80,000 soldiers can be mobilized."36 Colonel Baker, an English officer who traveled to Central Asia in the 1870s, reported that the army consistSo objective ed of 35,000 infantry and 25,000 cavalry.37 reports on the Persian Army puts the strength of it between 40,000 and 60,000 men. The difference between the two reports is mainly that the latter does not exclude musicians, and the from the list the number of officers, sick. To have his commands obeyed, the Shah did not have on the social fragmentation of his to depend exclusively realm. Rather than just being a manipulator he could count on the strength of an army that was about 60,000army given the preindustrial men strong--a substantial nature of the state and the size of the general population.38 The army was, of course, not large enough to mainIn Khuzistan, tain strong presence in the whole country. for example, the "Persian army is represented only by a skeleton

garrison

at Shushtar...and

by a qurkhanah-chi

men... at Muor captain of ordinance and a few artillery hammarah [today's Khurram-Shahr]."39 A report by a PerIRANIAN STUDIES

210

sian agent supports the contention that the army's presece in Khuzistan was nominal. The report indicates, however, that there were generally two battalions in Khuzistan. This report also indicates that the battalions were being replaced with fresh ones very rapidly.40 Both reports, however, overlooked the fact that southern Khuzistan was not under direct control of the government, and the Bakhtiari cavalry could be resorted to in order to maintain peace in northern Khuzistan. The Shah always succeeded in mobilizing enough forces to suppress the several in Iran, the most revolts important of which was that of Shaikh cUbaid Allah. The government defeated the rebels with relative ease even before the arrival of Mirza Husain Khan, who was appointed to command the Army of Azarbayjan and given extraordinary powers in 1880.41 At the same time, Zill al-Sultan dispatched seven battalions to quell the tribal rebellions of the Hamavand-i Chalabi, Kalhur, and Karandi while he moved at the head of a 12,000-man army to Burujird. This large force was in addition to the local lords, who joined the government forces in sizeable number.42 In fact, although the Shah attempted not to entangle himself in areas over which his jurisdiction was not clear, when it became necessary to extend his sovereign authority he often had enough military power at his disposal to do so forcefully. In the case of Sistan, for example, he wrote to Vakil al-Mulk, governor-general of Kirman, that "at first thoughtlessly they stationed some government forces in Sistan. Now we have no alternative but its complete annexation [tasahub]. Muzzaffar al-Dawlah should move to Sistan at the head of three battalions ... .A strong fort shouid be built in Zahidan to house the government forces. "4 The power of the army during the reign of Nasir alDin Shah has often been underestimated. Yet the account given here should not give the impression of a well-maintained, disciplined engine of violence. Some of the infantry were organized along tribal,"feudalistic" lines, and apparently all the cavalry was raised and maintained 211

Vol.

XI,

1978

by the local lords.44 The situation at times was so chaotic that a British officer reported that "no one knows how many privates are in a regiment or what their expenses in pay and rations and other sources allowed by the government for sundry expenses."45 A report read to the Dar al-Shura on the structure of the army throws light on the degree of disorganization, complications, and varieties of the modes in which the army was recruited, and the extent to which the raising and maintaining o f the army was associated with the country's social and economic structure. Because of the information it provides, parts of the report deserve to be quoted at length: Persian army consists of different types of soldiers. like the First, there are the volunteers, Azarbayjan army. Of course the soldier who joins the army of his own volition will leave the army when he wishes also....Second, there are the taqsimi ones whose induction into the army is part of the taxes paid by localities in lots ... .which are of several types. Places like CAli Abad, which is khalisah [government lands], and Tajrish, which is owned by many persons, have to provide the government with 100 men each as part of their taxes. So every 5 families of the 500 families have to get together and send a soldier....Wherever they find a shepherd or a washer in the public bath who can be persuaded for little money to join the army, they pay him 30 to 50 tumans and the five It families present him to the draft officer.... is obvious that such a soldier is entirely useless. When the whole village is owned by one person the The landowner is situation is again different. either working in the government and is powerful, and just a subor he is a petty merchant (kasib), ject

(raciyat).

No officer,

of course,

dares

to

demand any soldiers from the man who works in the government and is powerful... .As far as the kasib and the raciyat are concerned, they do not want to If he is wealthy lose good hardworking peasants. IRANIAN STUDIES

212

he recruits useless peasants from other villages or pays some hooligans from the city and turns them in. He also passes some money to the draft If the owner of the village is poor officer.... the draft officer does as he pleases.. .takes away whatever and whomever he wants... .Finally, there is a type of draft that is entirely in the hands of the regional officers. They can take whoever they want. Often they collect the money from the landowners for the pay of the soldiers, but they do not recruit the soldiers. This system operates in Kurdistan, Fars, Khurasan, Kirman, and Kirmanshah....None of these systems are conit is obvious that under sistently applied..,and such conditions, no effective army can be raised nor can the subject enjoy any peace.... 46 The report also indicates that while the subjects were supposed to contribute 10 tumans toward the pay of the solwere often forced to pay 100 tumans to pay nondiers,they existing recruits.47 Financing

the Army

Not only was the recruitment of the soldiers based on the village system, but so was the manner in which the Amir Kabir, in his attempt to estabarmy was financed. lish a standing army to replace the irregulars, tied the military draft to the tax structure, which was basically tax. agricultural Each agricultural unit, bunah, had to send a certain number of soldiers, pay them a maintenance fee, and pay for the upkeep of their families in the vilThus developed a standing army comprised of sollage.48 diers drawn from and paid by the villages, which came to be known as sarbaz-i bunichah. The bunichah system remained in force,although the expansion of the army necessitated the search for new sources of money. Thus,by the 1870s,it was only one of the three sources for the payment of the army's expenses. The Shah makes this clear in his answer to a letter from 213

Vol.

XI, 1978

the then Minister of War, Mirza Husain Khan, in which the latter, in the name of cordiality between himself and Mirza Yusuf, the Minister of Finance and Mirza Husein's rival, had requested that the sources of the money allotted to the army be identified and thus be under his own control. The Shah wrote to Mirza Husain Khan that the army's budget depends on different sources. First, there is the six-month maintenance costs of the soldiers, payable by the provinces. You can use your own judgment to ensure its efficient collection and receipt. Second, there is the money for the upkeep of the army [throughout the year]. That comes from the Customs. They should collect that every month and deliver it. Third, there are the other costs. The money for them comes from the Treasury.49 In 1886, the bunichah, or the six-month maintenance allowance, amounted to b519,214,"8.50 The other two sources also seem to have contributed heavily toward paying the army, as some battalions remained in service all year long and had to be paid not only for six months of service, but for the whole year. The Shah and ammunition had to pay for clothing, foreign officers, out of the Treasury. There was also a large class of civilians in the Ministry of War doing scribal duties, lashkar nivis, who were not paid by the bunichah taxes.51 The financing of the army was as irregular as its recruitment. Soldiers did not receive the same salaries, nor did the central government know what they received. In fact, the Grand Vizier, MirzaYusuf, asked Asif al-Dawlah, the of Khurasan, governor-general Khurasani soldiers were paid.

as to the manner in which the Asif al-Dawlah's answer in-

dicates that some soldiers were completely on the government's payroll. The pay of other soldiers depended on or whether they were drawn from privately owned villages, Some soldiers whether they came from the government lands. received their bunichah salaries in kind and others in cash. As far as the two battalions of Qa'in were concerned, even IRANIAN STUDIES

214

the governor-general was not informed, as the amir of Qa'in, Hishmat al-Mulk, commandedthem independently and deducted the costs from the taxes he owed to the governmentS2 Given the erratic nature of the payments to the army, it is not surprising that the battalions repeatedly rioted as their salaries were in arrears. Even the battalion charged with the protection of the capital was so ill paid and so tardy that in 1890 they took bast in the royal stable, 3 an act which for the army, amounted to insurrection. Troop riots in other parts of the country because of delayed payments were common, as they were farther from the capital. They had more grievances and more freedom to express those grievances.5 In Bushihr,the soldiers became so desperate that they turned to looting in order to feed The situation became so dangerous that the themselves. government had to move troops against them. The riotous troops faced with a superior force took bast under the flagstaff of a foreign power at the Ottoman consulate.55 During emergencies,the government took extra care to deliver the troops' pay on time. When Shaikh cUbaid Allah rebelled,the government tried to meet the soldiers' pay. In a letter to the Shah, Mirza Husain wrote: I have written to CAzad al-Dawlah to use any means to ensure that the tribal cavalries which are called up receive their pay for the period between now and the end of the year. They are supposed to reI know, however, that ceive this in installments. they are shameless and undisciplined. They can find this [tardy payments] an excuse and not respond to the call-up. 56 Attempts

at Reforming

the Army

Some of the officials whose interests lay with the chaotic system prevailing in Iran, blatantly lied to the Shah on the needs for reform. Firuz Mirza Nusrat al-Dawlah,who ran the Ministry of War in KamranMirza's name in 215

Vol.

XI, 1978

1870-71,wrote to the Shah, "I swear upon the 'revengeful salt'57 of the Shahanshah, may we all be sacrificed to him, that there is no better army anywhere in the world than yours."*58 The Shah, however, had experienced a quick defeat at the hands of a small Anglo-Indian army in 1856-57 and even a more ignominious one at the hands of bands of Turkomans in 1861. There were also officials,who either altruistically or because they opposed the clique in power, informed the Shah about the prevalent conditions in the country. One such official wrote to the Shah: the army is so hopelessly weak that it cannot withstand the onslaught of an enemy for an hour, if that much. I do not think we have two combat-ready battalions. The causes of this are, of course, obvious, after the Marvand Astar-Abad episode particularly when the commander of the [the Turkoman fiasco] troops sold the provisions and left his soldiers hungry. What can one expect of the troops [so badThat is why so many battalions ly treated]. in this last year became so rebellious.5 to reform the army had already begun unThe efforts der Amir Kabir. The financial system that he set up still funded the army and patterned its recruitment practices. The college that Amir Kabir founded, Dar al-Funun, was a and remained so. Its curriculum was closemilitary college as well ly tied to the needs of the army and its teachers as students had army ranks.60

lis-i

In 1867, the Shah formed the Military Tahqiq Divan-i Nizam]. It was expected

Council rMajto see that

the military code, that had just been prepared,was executed.1 In a rescript, the Shah discussed the Council's authority He still in more detail. held on to a traditional view in that the Western progress was inspired by Islam, insisting and thus Europeanization was not a change for Iran, but a return to the old Islamic ways. In the usual signified vague and general style of thinking, he gave the Council authority to oversee all affairs of the army but in effect The document, however, if any authority. granted it little still

indicated

IRANIAN STUDIES

relatively

significant 216

intentions

for re-

form.

The Shah wrote:

the worldly affairs, particularly the matters regarding the state and kingship and more specifically those that concern the army cannot be attended to properly in the absence of consultation and the solicitation of the ideas of the wise. In fact, at the time of the Prophet... in most affairs the wise were consulted. This was particularly so in military matters. This was an Islamic practice until the end of caliphate. This custom gradually died out in the Islamic lands while the Europeans picked it up and adhered to it firmly... the authority of this Council extends to all the military matters. They should present their opinions on all these All military farmans after Jinab-i areas. Aqa's and Sardar-i [Mustawfi al-Mamalik] Kull's [cAziz Khan-i Mukri, the Minister of War] should be presented to the Council. Only if the Council accepts [the proposals] do they become the law of the land, [hukm-i qanuni]. We will execute the decisions.... However, if we object to some of their decisions and prove to them that they have made a mistake, to their mistake and give a new they should confess opinion.62 in effect, The council, had no authority. It was the forof the Shah's will in a more bureaucratic malization manner. a step forward for a government that It was still had few routinized established ways of conducting its afA further step toward rationalization of the army fairs. the time, administration was taken when the Shah specified the days, and the place where the council had to meet.63 This was an important measure toward conceptualization of it from the individuin abstract terms, separating office and conducted his administrative al who held the office at home and in erratic functions style. that a certain There are other indications of regularization had set in before the advent of reformers. were sent to the ernizing Inspectors and to take account of the ammunition, soldiers, 217

Vol.

degree the Westbattalions the genXI, 1978

Many such reports can eral conditions of the battalion. of Majlis Library.64 be located in the manuscript collection The Shah's first two trips to Europe, in 1873 and 1878, impressed upon him the need for the reform of the arThe emptiness of the treasury coumy along Western lines. did not allow any meanpled with the Shah's irresolution Certain armed forces. ingful modernization of the paraphernalia of Western technology and appearances were structure of the Persian Army. grafted upon the traditional Amin al-Dawlah sums up the result of the first trip as simply "the purchase of several thousand rifles bought in Germany. Some bullets for these guns were bought from Austria and two Austrian advisors were hired for the Post Office and the Mint House."65 During his second trip,the Shah seems to have showed more interest in the reinforcement of his army. He purchased large amounts of ammunition from He also hired a number of Austrian officers to Austria. reorganize and instruct the Persian Army.66 The Austrians chosen as Austria could play the role of were particularly the third interested power to balance the pressures of Russia and Britain on Iran. According to Amin al-Dawlah,the Shah had resolved to reconstruct his army completely on European models.67 He could not afford, however, to alienate the Russians. He also employed a Russian officer to organize a cavalry on the Cossack model. In 1879,the officer formed a Cossack brigade which became an effective tool of oppression, and an aid for the execution of Russian policies .68 Even before the Shah's second European trip, one may of the miliobserve some indications of rationalization tary system. Many officers who drew salaries but performed no functions were invited to retire without pay and not to make claims for back payments.69 The Persian soldiers, in contrast with their Ottoman counterparts, did not resent In fact, they seemed to show a the new Austrian uniforms. degree of eagerness for the new weaponry and organization70 There At best, the reforms remained half-hearted. was neither money nor resolution behind the reforms. The under Mirza Husain Khan. Ministry of War changed little IRANIAN STUDIES

218

Specialized departit was differentiated. Structurally, were to perform specific ments existed which theoretically The army, however, was staffed by the s am e functions. The very few who came to hold important posiold faces. tions for the first time, such as Vajih Mirza, owed their success not to their ability but to their close relationship with Mirza Husain Khan.71 It is, therefore, not surprising that upon Mirza Husain's departure from the Ministry of War no profound changes of the staff took place either, as Mirza Husain had not brought new officers or structural change which could have threatened the interests elite. of the traditional of Persia that it was in the interests Ironically, the reformers failed to modernize the army. Their success would have meant a burdensome structure over a traditional society which would have had its finances sapped to pay for a modern army. The army in turn would have become an agent The early and uneven modernization of the of oppression. armed forces would have turned Iran into a praetorian without stability state, robbing it of its traditional Invariably, the bringing advantages of the modern world. reformers assumed that the problem of modernizing the armed Malkam wrote that "The fo r c es was merely financial. army will never become modernized unless taxes are inMirza Husain in a letter to the Shah saw "All creased."72 result of the progress of the European armies...[as]...the pays and purchase of of regular delivery of the soldiers' ammunition."73 The reformers showed no awareness of the social structure of between the traditional relationship Iran and the modern superstructure they hoped to impose Nor did they realize that the strength of the upon it. European armed forces had more to do with the structure than the purchase of the arms. of the European societies than the The new reformers were much more short-sighted like Amir Kabir, who saw the need earlier personalities, to train a cadre to lead for an educational institution the army.74

219

Vol.

XI,

1978

Finance

Nowhere was the burden of traditionalism felt as much as in the financial offices of Nasir al-Din Shah's state. Early in his reign, during Amir Kabir's sidarat [chief ministry], the financial sphere was brought under control. Large numbers of pensions were either cut off or reduced, and the taxes came to be more effectively collected.75 What Amir Kabir succeeded in doing, however, was mainly to make the old system work. Reforms were partial and structural changes nonexistent. Mirza Husain, during his sidarat, failed to bring any measure of change into the financial departments.76 The difficulty of financial reform was rooted in a multiplicity of problems. First, the Shah viewed the economic sphere as a main extension of his authority. In a variety of ways he exercised this power. He imposed taxes and tariffs, granted monopolies and concessions, and even sold land when the city walls of Tehran expanded to encompass a larger area.77 Thus any reform, of necessity,would have touched upon the Shah's interests, as the Shah considered the wealth of his realm as his personal prerogative. Second, the economic structure was amorphous. The currency used in various parts of Iran differed. For example, coins minted in Tehran were not worth the same amount in Khuzistan. Siyah-pul, a copper coin, was worth 1/54th of a qiran in Shushtar, 1/56th in Dizful, and 1/64th in Ahvaz. There were also Persian coins used in some parts of Persia and not in others. Copper money was generally worth less than its nominal value, whereas silver and gold were generally worth twice theirs. To complicate the matter further, various kinds of European, Indian, and Ottoman currencies were freely used in transactions.78 The tax structure was no less confusing. Different localities paid different taxes. Most taxes were collected by indigenous local hierarchies. To change the system would have required the creation of an effective organization to collect the taxes on a systematized and universal basis. Not only was the creation of such a body difficult, but had it been established it would have had to face the opposition IRANIAN STUDIES

220

of the local notables. The political enough to face such opposition.

system was not strong

Third, the Department of Finance, Vizarat-i Maliyah, had turned into the bailiwick of a closely tied group from the city of Ashtian. The department's officials, known as mustawfis,

in the manner of other

Qajar officials,

conduct-

ed their affairs in an informal manner. Few records were kept and only the initiated could find out about the nature of the taxation system. To change the system,the cooperation of mustawfis was needed, and as occurred during Mirza Husain Khan's sidarat, the mustawfis were too jealous of their monopoly to allow for any change. The problem was further compounded by the absence of credit. viewed a full treasury as The Shah, therefore, a necessary of his royal power. ingredient Increasingly, he came to view the problem in the short run, as the overhaul of the system could have momentarily cost him finanThe Shah was often in need of quick cash. cially. In

1870, when the great famine had already started to have an impact, he instructed the deputy of the youthful princegovernor of Fars, Zill al-Sultan, to send him 70,000 tumans immediately to pay for his trip to Iraq. The crop situation was so bad that the local notables no longer wanted the position of tax collector. The local notables were finally persuaded to provide the money th em selv es on condition that their positions be guaranteed for three years and that the central government give them more autonomy.79 in Moreover, there were no functioning tribunals to deal properly with the problem of recovering existence sums due individuals or the government. Consequently, there was an ever-present in finansense of uncertainty cial affairs. To compound the problem

further,

each item of ex-

penditure was related to some particular revenue. Thus, the expendituresand revenues were related not only in their total sums but in parts of them. Malayir and Tuysirkan the Minister of were entrusted to Ictizad al-Saltanah, 221

Vol.

XI, 1978

Science, so that he would spend the revenues of these two o f Tehran, Dar al-Funun.80 provinces on the polytechnic The taxes from The same was true for other expenditures. the town of Abhar and two of its villages were allocated to the stable of the gunnery.81 Certain parts of the taxes of Gilan were allocated to the military budget.82 Each time a certain General Nasir Allah Khan was promoted, his salary increase was to be paid through a new opening, that or he had to await such is, the death of another officer, an outcome.83 Consequently, the whole financial structure was fragmented. Reforms, when contemplated, were conceived piecemeal. Even then,each expenditure had a strong vocal supporter. Financial

Departments

The functions of assessing the taxes, of collecting septhem, and of maintaining the treasury were distinctly arate. The Ministry of Finance, Vizarat-i Maliyab:, assessThe local notables such as tribal chiefs, ed the taxes. town zabits, and heads of corporations collected the taxes. Khazanah, received the taxes. And the Treasury, vizarat-i among three The division of financial responsibility autonomous structures may exaggerate the powerlessness of the Minister of Finance. Haji Sayyah, for example, condescribes the minister as "someone pessimistic, sistently [The who has paid some money and has purchased a title. is only an honor and carries no function, except position] of that he may get a chance and look at the tax registers The taxes are collected by the governors Tehran environs. and put them in charge who sell the positions of mustawfis, Mirza Jacfar Khan Mushir of taxes."84 of the collection al-Dawlah who, owing to his Western education and high could assess the situation better, government position, lists the functions of the ministry as "preparing the budget and overseeing the financial sections of all government bureaus."85 A rescript by the Shah places even more The minister was distinctly authority in the ministry. IRANIAN STUDIES

222

placed over all ministries as he had to approve all their expenditures, not just oversee them. He was also put in charge of all government concessions, monopolies, and banks. Once a year he was expected to submit a written report on the budget to Shura-i Dawlati, Government Consultative Assembly.86 Some less important ministries were completely under the authority of Mirza Yusuf,who held the portfolio of the Minister of Finance before Nasir al-Din Shah's ascension to the throne and retained it through most of Nasir al-Din Shah's reign, until the Ministry that he had inherited from his father,and had passed on to his six-year-old son,became totally identified with his person. As the Minister of Finance, Mirza Yusuf had direct authority over the Ministers of Pensions and Endowments, Customs, Telegraph, and Post. Many branches of the royal household also fell under his authority.87 The title of minister was, far from an empty one. He was in a position to therefore, distribute with the patronage, and his close association royal household enabled him to retain his authority for an inordinately long period. The minister, assisted by his mustawfis drew up a al-amal, local budget, for each province. In general, he decided how much each province had to send to the reasury after allowing for local expenditures. By increasing the amount that had to be sent to Tehran or by not accepting some local expenditures as appropriate, the minister could punish any governor he chose. Similarly, he could reward them. The mustawfis decided where those who received salaries and pensions from the government could draw them from. They could assign one's salary to a source that was not recoverable or to one that was reliable.88 The ministry had control over anybody who had anything to do with the government. The minister had agents in the provinces who oversaw the general tax structure; they were independent of the governors but dependent on the minister's support.89

dastur

The position of the mustawfi was one of the few positions in Iran which required some technical training. In a traditional society where public education was limited to a the positions that entailed expertise military college, 223

Vol.

XI, 1978

naturally went from father to son as the sons could privately receive the education needed to become public servants. As Picot pointed out, "These Mustawfis are recruited from Irak [Arak], where certain families have provided Accountants [mustawfis] for generations. "90 Even though the special training required for the office of a mustawfi gave to certain families a form of monopoly, it brought a certain degree of predictability and order to the Ministry of Finance not commonin other government departments. For instance, when Anis al-Dawlah, the Shah's favorite wife, requested Mirza Yusuf to appoint a certain person as a mustawfi, Mirza Yusuf wrote to the Shah in a self-assured tone, unparalleled by other officials, that "Her Exalted Highness Anis al-Dawlah has recommended Mirza Husain's son be appointed as a mustawfi. He is an able young man. He should, however, not become a mustawfi at this point."'91 The Ministry of Finance consisted basically of one important department concerned with the major function of the ministry,

the Idarah-i

Istlifa.

It was in charge

of

In addition drawing up tax registers for each province. to the central office in Tehran, the Idarah-i Istifa had agents, mubashirs, in all of the provinces who theoreticalof the taxes. He sent a report ly oversaw the collection on the anticipated local income and expenditure at the beginning of each fiscal year which was ratified after being the Minister of Fisigned by the director of the Istiffa, nance, the Grand Vizier, and the Shah.92 Normally, however, the financial report was made by the financial agent of the local governor and then signed by the aforementioned officials. In fact, the sources indicate that each governor in Tehran, known as had his own personal representative vakil, who was supposed to present the list of the expenditures and income for the previous year to the central government for ratification.93 In major provinces such as Fars, Isphahan, Khurasan, Kirman, and Kirmanshahan, the ministry had special agents, ma'murin-i vilayat. Many of these agents were people with local roots such as Mushir al-Mulk in Fars. There were individual mustawfis in Tehran, however, with specific assignments for specific provinces. IRANIAN STUDIES

224

The accounts had to be ratified by yet another ofknown as the Baqaya. The officer in charge of the Baqaya department was in charge of all accounts including the buyutat, the royal properties. At the end of each fiscal year he would investigate the documents regarding the actual expenditure and income and collect the difference. Thus Vazir-i Baqaya, the officer in charge of the collecting function of the Ministry of Finance could summonany erring governor or his agent to Tehran. It is notable that this officer was always a court functionary. fice,

The Treasury was associated even more closely with the royal court. It was in fact only a department within the Court Ministry.95 It was authorized to receive "all the taxes and what was due to the government and the payment for government expenditures."96 The Collection

of Revenues

Nowhere was the symbiotic relationship between the center and the periphery more pronounced than in the collection of taxes. In the absence of an efficient bureaucracy, the central government depended on local notables in its most basic and important relationship with its subjects--its fiscal relationships. The local notables also enjoyed the legitimacy that recognition by the government brought them. This insured their rights against other possible local rivals. In a socially fragmented society where even the small social units such as the tribes and towns were factionalized into hostile sections and quarters, the recognition by the central government of a local family's political authority meant more than formal recognition of an authority that was already there. The local magnates eagerly sought the recognition of their authority by the government. Often they paid large sums to sanctify their in the central administration.97 positions Haji AhmadKhan Minabi, a local magnate in Bandar-i cAbbas, strengthened and institutionalized his position by succeeding in getting a farman from the Shah confirming his function of tax collection and putting him under the authority of the governor of Fars . 8 Others, not yet fully established, mobi225

Vol.

XI, 1978

lized the support of the notables in their respective as to prove they could effectively and with the least gree of conflict collect the taxes.99

arede-

At times the government's authorized agent was forcefully ejected by a powerful local leader who hoped to usurp power. In 1880, for example, the governor of Ram-Hurmuz, appointed by the Persian government, was forced to escape from the city because of a popular rebellion led by a local shaikh. The rebellious shaikh agreed to pay the governor of Khuzistan, Nizam al-Saltanah, even more than he did his predecessor, in order to be confirmed in his position. 100 The performance of official functions by notables came about mainly because of their local roots rather than by assignment from the central government. This duality of authority structure created an axis of conflict between the center and the periphery. The center demanded more money as the costs of the government soared,and the periphery tried to retain as much of the taxes as possible. At the same time,the center expanded its direct rule, particularly over the customhouses. In spite of the sometimes tense relationship between the two poles of power, the existence of a dual administration, local and central, brought about an element of stability. Law and order, in its traditional sense, were maintained, cases were adjudicated, and, above all, taxes were collected. Such important governmental functions were carried out in the context of a government with few institutions worthy of the name and with an almost annual change of governors sent by the central government. In Rasht, where the governorship was a revolving door, a local notable by the name of Haji Nasir ran the government of the city to the extent that he became nicknamed Haji Hakim, Haji the Governor.101 The family of Amin Divan ran the affairs of Lahigan for more than 150 years.102 And CAbdal-Husain Khan and his family did the same for Fuman.103 In Bihbihan, by the time of the revolt of Mirza Qavamal-Din in 1851 against the central government,104 his family, which had achieved the chieftancy of the city through military force, had ruled the city and collected IRANIAN STUDIES

226

its taxes for over 200 years.105 During this period, the central government often had its governors in Bihbihan, but the government functions were carried out by the local structure of power. It is important to note that as far as the collection of taxes was concerned,the areas of jurisdiction were based on personal rather than territorial law. Therefore, as Weber pointed out, "The individual carried his professio juris with him wherever he went. Law was not a lex terrae...but rather the privilege of the person as a member of a particular group...the result was the coexistence of numerous 'law communities' the autonomous jurisdiction of which overlapped."*106 When the government extended its authority to Hindijan in Khuzistan, empowering a Mirza CAbdAllah Khan to collect the taxes, he turned to the two traditional leaders of Hindijan who had traditionally divided up the city between themselves to collect its taxes. Mirza CAbdAllah, however, farmed out his taxation authority to the two leaders, locally known as qa'ids, for 12,000 tumans.107 The structure of the tax collection changed only to the extent that Mirza CAbdAllah's appointment marked the beginning of the development of a second bureaucracy, namely that of the central government. The ambitions of the central government were not paralleled by the existence of an able administration. The duality of the structure of power, therefore, is the most commoncharacteristic of Nasir alDin Shah's Iran. The local structures of power had preserved and allowed for the continuation of organized life during the period of chaos between the fall of the Safavids in 1722 and the advent of the Qajars in 1798. They formed an underpinning of social life that at the time of Nasir alDin Shah's reign had more history behind it than did the Qajar rule. Locally it was more legitimized than the Qajar government. Even a court historian accedes in a revealing passage that "None of these tribes [of Mamasani] follow anybody's commands other than those of their own kalantars [subtribal leaders]. Nor will they ever accept the author227

Vol.

XI,

1978

ity of any outsider." This source emphasizes that the position of the kalantar has remained in certain families, passed from father to son, since time immemorial.108 By granting authority to the local chiefs to collect taxes,the government helped to tighten the control of many The process, local chiefs over the local inhabitants. though useful as far as it bridged the gap between the ethnically Turkish central government and the non-Turkish process, proved subjects, thus easing the tax-collection the tradidysfunctional in the long run as it intensified tional, localistic, and primordial structures of power. As the taxes were paid by whole tribes, guilds, and city quarters, the local leaders in charge of tax collection retained and this power was now supportp o w e r over the localities ed by the central government which above all was interested in the prompt receipt of revenues. The tribal chiefs paid their taxes as they moved from Collectheir summer pastures to their winter quarters.l09 tion of the taxes from the tribes often resembled preparations for a military campaign. If the tribe managed to surprise the government and arrived at their winter quarters before the government agents could stop them and coltask lect the taxes due, the government had a difficult The Luristan tribes, for finding them to exact the taxes. example, went to Khuzistan in winter and the governor of Khuzistan had little authority and interest in collecting At that point, having migrated taxes from the tribes.110 in small groups, the tribes were scattered all over Khuzistan. The local notables, the kalantars , khans, zabits, and the shaikhs not only gained prestige and political power through their fiscal functions, but they accumulated a great The two shaikhs of Bani Taraf, deal of wealth, as well. be heading the two sections of the tribe, collected tween 25 and 30 percent of the produce of the peasants. This amounted to 60,000 tumans of which they turned over only

18,000

tumans

IRANIAN STUDIES

to the government.111

228

The local structures of power and wealth were often supported by the central government. It was through the pyramidal structure of power that the government could reach its subjects. When Prince Rukn al-Dawlah, the governor-general of Khurasan, decided to move to Bujnurd at the head of an army,to discipline the hereditary governor of Bujnurd, Siham al-Mulk, who had become rebellious and would not pay the taxes he had collected, the Grand Vizier,Amin al-Sultan, sent strict telegrams to Rukn al-Dawlah, instructing him to "treat him [Siham al-Mulk] and his dependents with maximum respect and do all within your power to cooperate with him and help him so that he will return to Bujnurd willingly. Then again you should strengthen him, treat him kindly, cooperate with him and his dependents, lest he become unhappy and disappointed. 112 The government treated these local structures, entrusted with the collection of taxes, very cautiously. When Sultan MuhammadKhan, the kalantar of Bihbihan, allegedly, "gathered a large entourage of rebels around himself, spent the government taxes on them, paid no attention to the decrees of the royal government, and treated the "113 agents of the government with disdain and unjustly... the provinonly then was he carefully summoned to Shiraz, cial capital. His exile was very carefully arranged and gently applied, however, "so that the taxes of Bihbihan could remain recoverable."t114 to several The taxes in Fars were contracted important local notables. The governor of Fars, Prince Mu'ayyid al-Dawlah, complained to the Shah that he had no power to demand the taxes from the local magnates.115 In a letof Fars complained ter to the Shah, another prince-governor "The problem of Fars is that there are no peasants [directAll authority rests in ly under the government authority]. The landowners are the ones the hands of the landowners. And they are all notawho are supposed to pay the taxes. And All respectable bles, ulama, and sayyids. people. their custom has always been to misbehave and not pay their dues.",116 Zill al-Sultan, A much more powerful governor, when he became the governor of Fars for found it necessary the third time to humble himself before Mushir, a notable 229

Vol.

XI,

1978

who was the chief tax collector of Fars.117 Presumably he had learned his lesson during his first two assignments to Fars. In Khuzistan the local structure of tax collection was even more independent of Tehran. The Shah's envoy reported that "no one knows how much taxes the local governor of the In Dizful,the collection of Huwaizah collects.",118 taxes was entirely in the hands of the local notables and "the governor is stationed in the city simply to maintain law and order but does not interfere in the taxes at all"111 Some of the shaikhs were so powerful that "even if they the subjects will plunder all of the subjects' possessions, So far there is no record that any not dare to protest. subject [raciyat] has ever shown that he is aware of the existence of the governor-general or protested to any government agency." 0 The taxes were collected in Kirman under a similar situation. The local notable, as zabit, collected all that from the cenwas due the government with no interference tral government.121 The system was therefore far from being integrated. owing to Local officers exercised fiscal responsibilities they were part of the Functionally, their local roots. they were independent. Ministry of Finance, institutionally Without them the fiscal system could not have worked at all. With them it worked through conflict and compromise. Varieties

of

Taxation

Systems

It has been pointed out that dependence on the local bestructures of power to collect taxes was necessitated organization and the comcause of lack of administrative The plexity of the mosaic of different customs and taxes. It remains to discuss former has already been discussed. the extent that the taxes varied from one locality to the next.

IRANIAN STUDIES

230

Edward Stack,who visited Iran in 1880 and traveled extensively throughout the country points out that the tax base changed from village to village. From year to year within each village it changed for each peasant, depending on whether he depended on irrigation or rain to produce his crop. Yet within these small units, the villages, obligations were well defined and customs so well rooted that there was little room for disagreement. In the absence of records of who was responsible for what amount of taxes, the centralization of tax structure would not have been feasible.122 Basically, the taxes were collected in cash and in kind. To this category should be added military taxes such as providing the government with soldiers and providing them with provisions and some pay. Taxes in kind depended on the locality and what it produced. Taxes for Tehran and its environs amounted to 141,633 tumans annually in cash. The area also had to provide the government with 250 kharvars123 of wheat, 7,523 kharvars of corn, 67.5 kharvars of barley, 2,727 kharvars of rice, and 18,727 kharvars of hay.124 Azarbayjan was responsible for paying the central government 786,142 tumans in cash, 54,873 kharvars of grain, 7,020 kharvars of rice, and 4,958 kharvars of hay.125 Kirman, on the other hand, paid only 221,534 tumans and 2,075 dinars in cash.126 Not all these taxes due the central government reached Tehran, a s the local expenditures authorized by the government, such as payments to the army or pensions of the ulama were subtracted from the total amount. In Khuzistan, where the government extracted L47,428.13.3 which was equal to 142,285 tumans and 993 dinars in cash, L4,555.13.8 was spent on pensions and salaries and L4,783.17.10 on the army locally. The central government's receipts from Khuzistan came to L38,089.1.7.A17 What was taxed in each province changed from place to place. The Persian Gulf district is representative of the whole mosaic of the tax structure. Dashti, ruled by a hereditary khan, paid three different kinds of taxes. First, there was an agrarian tax of 50 qirans per gav128 231

Vol.

XI, 1978

The date palms were taxed anywhere between of cultivation. half a qiran to 2 qirans according to the trees' productiFinally there was a poll tax which was between 5 and vity. The khan actually sent agents to Bushihr to 20 qirans. collect it from the native Dashtis who worked and lived in In Langah,- a port Bushihr. They paid 8 qirans each.129 not far from Dashti, the taxation system was different. The date trees paid a quarter of a qiran and a tenth of their produce. Sea captains paid 12 rupees and sailors The shops were also taxed between 4 and 8 paid 4 rupees. colrupees each. In Langah,the taxes were theoretically lected by the governor as the chief agent of the central government, but he regularly farmed it to the local kalanthe taxes through the hereditar, who in turn collected In and villages.130 tary kad-khudas of city districts ruled by local khans, the only Hayat Davud, a district It was between 50 and 70 qirans on each tax was land tax. Liravi, There were no other taxes.131 gav of cultivation. also ruled by hereditary khans, paid only a land tax which amounted to from 20 to 60 qirans per gav of cultivation.132 It seems that areas which were ruled by the local notables and were subject only to formal control by the central government paid less tax than areas over which the government Where the government could send its exerted more authority. relied on the local structure own official, the official As a result, the subjects had to to collect the taxes. support not only the local notable but the Tehran official Hindijan, for example, was ruled by local notaas well. bles known as qa'id . Then the government included HindiHe delegated his jan in Mirza CAbdAllah's governorate. for 12,000 authority to collect taxes to the local qa'id tumans annually.133 The rate of taxation, however, was universally high. In Khuzistan,where "only the peasantry pay taxes and other classes of subjects, no matter how rich, do not pay a penny in taxes,"'134 the peasantry paid a third of its produce to the government. The tax agents,known as musaddiqs, asand often overestimated sessed the produce upon cultivation the produce.135

IRANIAN STUDIES

232

to the burdensome regular taxes there In addition and equally of irregular a series was also in operation tax a special at least, In Azarbayjan, burdensome taxes. Tabriz was collected. sultaniyah known as iCanahyah-i The total amount of alone paid 10,000 tumans annually.136 it for Azarbayjan must have been enormous, as Vazir Nizam that he had persuaded the notables boasted to Azarbayjani In Tehran there Shah to reduce it by 50,000 tumans.137 And it was only was even a tax on the nightingales.138 the that the Shah abolished just before his assassination tax on bread and meat.139 special

The Ministry

of the Customs

on exports and imports the govtariffs To collect the tariffs were not uniernment faced the same problem: would have thwarted even an effiform. Their complexity in Iran. existed cient bureaucracy, and no such bureaucracy So until late in Nasir al-Din Shah's reign the customhouses Tariff was uniform were farmed to local or other magnates. In the manner of other tax farmers, only for foreigners. a great fortune, litreceived the farmers of customhouses of the governtle of which found its way into the coffers aware of its ment.140 The central government was acutely for Mirza Jacfar Khan Mushir al-Dawlah, own limitations. example, wrote that "If the Persian government would dethe farming of the customhouses and admincide to abolish government agents [nawkar-i ister them through central then it would need a number of honest and compedivani], available.",141 who are not presently tent administrators The expansion of foreign trade made the customs even more profitable during the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah for The revenues from Azarbayjan, than they were before. at such a rate that the government beexample, increased in putting the Azarbayjan customhouse uncame interested control. Ictimad al-Saltanah, government's der the central in 1877, records that "Sixty to seventy years ago writing Now the customs of Tabriz was worth only 12,000 tumans. because of the expansion of trade its revenues exceed 300,000 tumans.",142 233

Vol.

XI,, 1978

Azarbayjan's customs was the first of a series of Before customs to come under direct government control. the Shah went to Europe for the first time in 1872, he bea ministry of customs and came interested in establishing Gumrukat, he appointed Suhrab Khan Gurgi as the Vazir-i the state He was a courtier,as the Minister of Customs.143 was conceived as the Shah's property and thus the exploitation of its wealth fell under the household functions. in the Shah's trusted official The elder Amin al-Sultan, was functions of the household, charge of the financial of Customs.144 Appointed in 1879,he the seventh Minister managed to bring most of the customhouses under direct died in When the elder Amin al-Sultan royal authority. government from 1882, the revenues reaching the central The office of the customs had reached 300,000 tumans.145 by his son,who in 1892 Ministry of Customs was inherited agreed to pay 900,000 tumans annually to the Shah alone.146 tumans.147 to pay as much as 1,200,000 Others were willing in the revenues of the Ministry This tremendous increase its rapidly increasing of Customs indicated importance,as trade--and the authority government--expandof the central ed. In ten years the Shah's income from customs had triexistence decade of the ministry's pled. During the first

it was at least ity.

equally

The duality

successful

in expanding its

of the bureaucracy,

author-

however, continued

the Grand Vizier, farmed out the to exist. Amin al-Sultan, the customs on internal trade,rahincluding customhouses, after gayments and reportedly dari, to the local notables

The to the Shah secured 200,000 tumans for himself.14 customs on goods exported and imported from Persia remained f i x e d at 5 percent in accordance with the Treaty of Turkamanchay between Iran and Russia signed in 1828. This was true for foreign traders, while a Persian trader's tariff depended on the power and cupidity of the farmer of the customhouse. The structure of the Ministry of Customs, was marked by informality like other Qajar institutions, The impact of the West had expanded and unpredictability. the population,and another avenue to fleece again the perand the systemic needs were at sonal goals of the officers variance. IRANIAN STUDIES

234

The Structure

of

Governorships

like that of other ofof a governor, The authority depended on his person rather than on his office. ficials, for a governor was much shorter than The tenure of office as the former, away from Tehran, had more for a minister, as a center of power. himself of establishing possibilities as the Nasiri documents indicate, The duties of a governor, of the taxes and mainteto prompt dispatch were limited formula, commending the govThe routinized nanceof order. govshows that the central ernors who had performed well, ernment did not expect the governors to go beyond their their duNor did they conceive tasks.149 two traditional ties to the Shah in any other way.l50 Most governors did not perform these two tasks well, not only absence Their reports to Tehran indicate either. Kiyumarth Mirza, the but personal mediocrity. of authority of Kirman, reported proudly to Mirza Khuamprince-governor that he had sucthe chief minister, mad Khan Sipah-Salar, arrested.151 cessfully managed to have two petty thieves Nor were the reports of other governors much different. the leaders, religious Where there were no outstanding governor disposed of legal cases before him capriciously to any code of justice other than and without reference of the govThe capriciousness his own pecuniary needs.152 ernor often caused his escape from the city upon dismissal, as the rival of the new governor, but before the arrival to the new governor saw to themselves attaching factions begovernor paid for his erratic it that the dismissed for example, was replaced by Fakhr When Sipahdar, havior. al-Mulk as the governor of Qum,he sought refuge in the shrine of Qum as his house was plundered by groups who had joined forces with the new governor.153 was of the governor's authority The main insignia In what came to be known officially as tafafinancial. more money from the vut-i camal,the governor collected Hamzah Mirza tax farmers than he paid the government. the governor of Khuzistan in 1869 and Hishmat al-Dawlah, 137 000 tumans in taxes and 1870, for example, collected That amount seems reakept a fourth of it for himself.i54 235

Vol.

XI, 1978

sonable considering that a petty governor, that of Bagh-i Tun, collected four times more from the tax farmers than he paid the central government.155 Extra-exaction of taxes was so much a part of the system that Fakhr al-Mulk, the new governor of Qum, was advised that the taxes of the first two months of the year belong to the former governor, Sipahdar, as part of his tafavut-i Zill al-Sultan gives a descriptive Camal.l56 account of the tafavut-i "Iranian governors," he Camal. wrote, "collect two kinds of taxes. The first is asl, the tax which is sent to the central government. The other kind of tax is

tafavut-i

Camal.

The amount of the latter

depends on the size and prosperity of each area.",157 Then Zill al-Sultan points out that part of this additional tax finds its way to Tehran in the form of presents to the bearers of-the robes of honor (the government agents residing in the province) and payments to the mustawfis of the army and to the civilian bureaucracy to settle the accounts of the governor. Taxes from some areas were not recoverable. So the tafavut-i

Camal was to cover

such deficits

as well.158

In a system where governors received no salary, it is not surprising that they supported themselves through extra taxes. The basic flaw in the system was its unpredictability.

FarC or tafavut-i

Camal in some areas

was

three times the amount of asl according to Picot who had carefully studied this matter.159 While Mirza Yahya Khan Mushir al-Dawlah could not even collect the asl of the taxes of Fars, Farhad Mirza collected the asl plus a huge farC for his own expenditures.160 One contemporary source pointed out that the origin of the tafavut-i Camals went back to fines exacted from certain individuals some time in the The money was recorded as part of the revenue of past. that particular area where the victim of the fine resided. So year after year it was added to the normal taxes of that area.161 Some governors, by saving the salaries and pensions of the dead and the absent, added to their farC.16 Sultan Hamid Riza Farman-Farma, for example, increased his farC by reducing the amount of money the pensioners were IRANIAN STUDIES

236

to receive.163 On the surface, however, the governor seemed to have little flexibility. Tehran issued a kitabchah-i dastur alCamal, or local budget, for each governorate. The revenues and the expenditures were clearly specified.164 The central government, however, paying no salary to its governors, expected them to live on the farC they managed to collect. Important governors had major figures in Tehran as their special channel of communication with the Shah. During his lifetime,Mirza Yusuf was Zill al-Sultan's channel to the Shah as well as his main supporter in Tehran. Zill al-Sultan's deputy governor, during the former's minority, bitterly complained of the flow of telegrams from court to Fars, Zill al-Sultan's governorate, as Mirza Yusuf was empowered as the special representation to handle all of his affairs with Tehran.165 Those representations often became formalized. In addition to his ministries,the list of Mirza Yusuf's offices included the direction of the affairs of Fars, Khuzistan, ruled Isphahan, and other governorates by Zill al-Sultan.166 While the governor needed a powerful supporter to him against protect in Tehran, he also needed intrigues an agent to present his tax accounts to the central government and settle Zill alany problems of discrepancies. Sultan was fortunate to have Saraj al-Mulk as his financial agent, pish-kar in Tehran. 167 The later decline of Zill al-Sultan's authority is partly related to his worwith his pish-kar. sening relationship Some governors had no authority. All power was exercised This was particularly so in by their deputies. case of the younger princes, who as members of the Shah's household were expected to govern the Shah's realm but were either too young or too incompetent. A letter from of Kirman to Mirza Kiyumarth Mirza, the governor-general MuhammedKhan Sipah-Salar, this point: illustrates surrender My total Ismacil Khan Vakil

and obedience to... [Muhammad al-Mulk, the deputy-governor], 237

Vo.Z. XI, 1978

I is much more than you can possibly imagine. I have followed have done whatever he has ordered. I ha v e not participated whatever h e has said. I have tried in any affair of the governorship.... to please him to the extent that when upon arrival he asked me to give him my stamp so that he would not have to disturb me by asking for my approvals, I stay away from I gave it to him immediately. I do not let anybody come to see me, the public. so that I do not be tempted to interfere in the administration. 168 Kiyumarth Mirza was not the only prince-governor The crown prince was also just a nomwith no authority. In June 1879,when the prince inal governor in Azarbayjan. returned to Azarbayjan and it seemed that he was officially given permission to rule, his deputy-governor issued a manifesto making it quite clear that he did consider himHe declared in his self independent of the crown prince. manifesto that "I therefore accepted the present appointment from His Highness [Mirza Husain Khan] the Sepeh Salar and by his advice."'169 Even Zill al-Sultan who was more shrewd than other had his power severely cut by Mirza Huprince-governors sain, who distrusted him. Mirza Husain appointed Zahir aldeputy, entrusting full authorDawlah as Zill al-Sultan's ity on the former and being well aware of the mutual animosity between the prince and Zahir al-Dawlah.170 The Decline

of the Governor's

Authority

sowed the powerful governors Ironically, Farhad Mirza was successful their own seeds of decline. in ruthlessly putting down the centers of rebellion in the western part of Iran, bringing the tribes under closer Between 1869 and 1872 he exgovernmental supervision. tended the authority of the government where before there was nothing but local autonomy.171 He further encouraged the Shah to dispossess the previous governor's family, CImad al-Dawlah, who had bought most of Kirmanshah's vilIRANIAN STUDIES

238

lages through dubious means and thus had established a claim to exercise of authority in Kirmanshah.172 It was finally decided that no governor was allowed to purchase lands within his governorate.173 The military authority was carefully separated from the governor's authority. The Shah sent chiefs of military Divan-Khanah-i Ra'is Nizami, councils, to major provinces. These officers were independent of the governors.174 It was this dichotomy of authority that made it possible to order four hundred Khurasani soldiers to storm Hisam alSaltanah's residence and easily arrest the governor of Khurasan, the celebrated conqueror of Harat and the Shah's uncle, and send him to Tehran.175 The extension of telegraphic lines capped the authority of the central government over the governors. Most governors became as close to Tehran as the telegraph office. The heads of the local telegraph offices performed espionage work on the governors. 176 The telegraphic lines effectively limited the discretion of governors in regard to financial matters. They had to give adequate and immediate answers. Often they were summoned to the office for interrogation.177 telegraph Even a powerful came to be at the beck and governor like Zill al-Sultan call of the vizier in Tehran.

Concl usion

The reign of Nasir al-Din Shah marks the beginning of the development of the Persian bureaucracy. It develthe king's household and the nooped from two sources: of rule application. tables' structures The notables, in Nasir al-Din Shah's reign,began starting to lose ground to the royal realm. The religious atavistic in classes, in the embryonic bureaurefused to participate outlook, institutions cratic and failed to bar their development as well. The bureaucracy was consequently bound to be or to enjoy little It did not constipassive autonomy. tute an aristocracy. Nor could it become such a social the absolutist and discretionary force, considering poli239

Vol.

XI,

1978

cies of Nasir al-Din Shah. Many offices, departments, and ministries existed in name only. Others duplicated each other's tasks, vied for favor from the Shah, and intrigued against each other. Often important functions were distributed among opposing poles as to make its fulfillment improbable and its potential danger to the system minimized. The lower classes participated in Nasir al-Din Shah's bureaucracy as individuals, co-opted into the system through the household structures, representing not the class they came from but the group they had joined. As they gradually replaced the notables, the bureaucratic system became less sensitive to the wishes of the people since the former received their legitimation from the agreement of the people in their locality and the latter were gradually forming a modern bureaucracy, deriving their authority from offices bestowed them. In short, Nasir al-Din Shah's bureaucracy, up on although manifesting traditional patterns, developed to become more independent of the country's social classes. The incongruity between the society and the government made mounting oppression a norm of government. NOTES

For administration

cieties

in traditional

and transitional soin Developirq

see Fred W. Riggs, Administration

Countries:

The Theory

of

Prismatic

Society

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964); see also his "Bureaucrats and Political A Paradoxical Development: View," in Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed. by Joseph La Palombara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 120-168. For a theoretical analysis of the relationship between bureaucracy and political development see Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Development," in ibid., pp. 62-95. To some,the concept of bureaucracy is necessarily a legal-rational one. In this paper it is utilized as an operational concept. It is the set of positions organized to make legal/ or charismatic rational, traditional, dominations possible. IRANIAN STUDIES

240

2.

For a discussion of the prerequisites of a modern bureaucracy see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production: A Comparative Study," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. IV (1959), pp. 168-187; S. N. Eisenstadt, Essays on Comparative Institutions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 177-215; Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "'Bureaucracy' and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organization Theory," American Sociological Vol. Review, XXIV, No. 6 (1959), pp. 791-795.

3.

In much of Europe and definitely in England,many of were recruited the new bureaucrats from the ranks of the clergy and thus the term "clerk" for the bureauthe clergy provided the state with crat. Childless, manpower with little in appropriation of interest their offices. Consequently, they were instrumental in establishing a modern centralized state,which at the same time through their participation, the state received legitimacy from the religious sector. See

T. F. Tout, The English

Civil

Service

in

the

Four-

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1916), Vol. III, pp. 194-195. In Iran, while the monarchy was maintained as a conservative inteinstitution grative during the transitional period giving support and legitimacy to the new institutions, remained either of politics outside or hosreligion to the new organizational tile arrangements. Depending only on the secular aspect of the tradition, the new institutions had problems of legitimacy and thus On the question of stability. of the importance of conservative, yet adaptable, integrative institutions in the context of political stability see Seymour MarMan: The Social Bases of Politin Lipset, Political tics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1963), pp. 64-86.

teenth

4.

Century

model of the primitive The ideal-typical "Weberian" has been arrived at here by way of conbureaucracy of an ideal-typical ratrast with Weber's definition tional See Max Weber, From Max Weber: bureaucracy. Essays

in

Sociology,

ed. and trans. 241

by H. H. Gerth Vol.

XI,

1978

and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 196-244; and idem, The Theory of Social

and Economic Organization,

ed. by Talcott

Par-

sons, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1946), pp. 329-340. The construction of the model of a primitive bureaucracy also depends on Parsons' "pattern variables," which again are influenced by Weber. "Pattern variables," Parsons holds, are five dichotomies,"one side of which must be chosen by an actor before the meaning of a situation is determinant for him, and thus before he can act with respect to that situation." Parsons suggests five pattern variables: (1) affectivity-affective neutrality, (2) ascription-achievement, (3) universalism-particularism, (4) collectivity-orientationself-orientation, and (5) specificity-diffuseness. See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 77-84. 5.

Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of InterSociology, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans. by Ephraim Fischoff, et al. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), Vol. III, p. 1006.

pretive

6.

Ibid.,

pp. 1029-1030.

7.

Ibid.,

p.

8.

Ibid.,

p. 1006.

9.

Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, Book I, Chapter 3, trans. by W. D. Ross in Richard MCKeon,ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: RandomHouse, 1941), p. 936.

10.

1041.

Muhammad Hasan Khan Sanic al-Dawlah (the later al-Saltanah)

Tarikh-i

Muntazam-i Nasiri

(3 vols.;

Ictimad Teh-

ran: Government Press, 1877-1882), Vol. III (supplementary), pp. 5-52 (hereafter referred to as MN). 11.

Appendix I in Memorandumby Lt. Col. P ic ot in Memorandum by Sir M. Durand on the Situation in Persia pre-

IRANIAN STUDIES

242

December pared for the use of the Foreign Office, folios 21-22 F.O. 60/581, (6704), 1895, Confidential There is a Persian referred to as Picot). (hereafter but it presents study of the government institutions version of the government organia highly idealized TarzSee Mirza Jacfar Khan Mushir al-Dawlah, zation. i Hukumat-i Iran, Persian Foreign Office Archives (PFOA), MS, No. 974. 12.

Mirza cAli

Khatirat-i Khan Amin al-Dawlah, Siyasied. by Hafez Farman-Farmian (TehPersian Book Company, 1962), p. 59.

i Amin al-Dawlah,

ran: 13.

Picot,

p. 23.

14.

Ibid.,

p. 24.

15.

Six Months in Persia, (2 vols.; Edward Stacks, and Rivington), Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, Vol. I, pp. 247-282.

16.

cAbbas Mirza Mulk Ara, Sharh-i ed. by Ahmad Nava'i Chap, 1946), p. 24.

Mulk Ara,

Hal-i

London: 1882,

CAbbas Mirza

(Tehran:

Shirkat-i

no folio

no.

17.

Mushir al-Dawlah,

18.

to Amin Lashkar, SavadNasir al-Din Shah's Rescript i Layihah-i Fava id-i CAmmah, 1299-1300/ Vizarat-i (hereafter Persian Foreign Office Archives 1882-1883, referred to as PFOA), M5116, no folio number.

19.

Mirza Qahriman Khan Amin Lashkar, Ruz-Namah-i TavaqTehran University), Tabriz Tehran: (4 vols.; quf-i 319. Microfilm No. 2929, Vol. 1, folio

20.

of the Ministry of Foreign For the internal structure see MN, Vol. III, "Supplement," pp. 25-33, Affairs, alMir'rat and MuhammadHasan Khan Sanic al-Dawlah, Tehran: Government Press, Buldan-i Nasiri (4 vols.; Vol. II, "Supplement," pp. 20-26 (here1877-1882), to as MB). after referred

Tarz-i

Hukumat-i

243

Iran,

Vol.

XI,

1978

21.

See ICtimad al-Saltanah's account of MuCin al-Mulk, the Persian ambassador to Istanbul with the Shah in al-MaCi, Kurrasah-i al-MaCi (4 vols.; Tehran: Majlis Library), Ms, No. 1516, Vol. II, folio 732.

22.

MB,

23.

Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript to KamranMirza, 18821883, PFOA, MS, No. 116, no folio number. Kamran Mirza wrote in a statement on the Shah's rescript that he would comply with the Shah's instructions.

24.

Picot,

25.

Ibid.

26.

Ibid.

27.

Ibid.,

28.

Nasir al-Din Shah's Rescript, folio numbers, 1882-1883.

29.

mL, Vol.

30.

"Isphahan," Farhang, 1887, pp. 277-278.

31.

MN,

Vol. III,

32.

MB,

Vol. IV ("Supplement"), p. 24.

33.

Anonymous, Kitab-Chah-i Tuman-Bandi-i Afvaj (Tehran: The National Library, n.d.), MS, No. 589, no folio number.

34.

The list of the battalions which had marched in front of the Shah's portrait in Isphahan are all officially listed as consisting of 800 men. The cavalry, however, was supposed to consist of 100-men groups. See "Akhbar-i Dakhilah-i Rasmiyah," Farhang, May 6, 1880, Vol. II, No. 45, p. 2.

Vol. II ("Supplement"), pp. 6-7.

folio

26.

p. 27.

III,

IRANIAN STUDIES

PFOA, MS, No. 116, no

p. 363. Vol. 10, No. 420, January 13,

p. 356.

244

35.

36.

Anonymous, Juzvah National Library, Mirza Husain's Ibrahim Safa'i, 1971), p. 35.

dar

n.d.),

letter ed.,

Nazm-i Afvaj (Tehran: MS, No. 338, folios

The 3-4.

to the Shah, dated 1875-76 in Tarikh (Tehran: Sharq,

Barg-ha-i

37.

Al-Maci, Kurrasah-i al-MaCi, Vol. IV, folios 27352837. The article, which is not titled, is a Persian translation of Colonel Baker's report. It is not written. clear for whom the report was originally

38.

For the view that regards the Qajar political authority as an outgrowth of social fragmentation and in spite of its weak structure of power, see Ervand Abrahamian, "Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran," International Vol. V, Journal of Middle East Studies, No. 1 (January 1974), pp. 3-31.

39.

J.

G. Lorimer,

Gazetteer of Arabia (4 vols.;

and Central

dent, Government Printing, p. 149.

the

Persian

Calcutta: 1915), Vol.

Gulf,

Oman,

SuperintenII, part 1,

40.

The report bears no title or signature. Its content indicates that it was composed in 1888-1889 (PFOA, MS, No. 6285, folios 33, 37-49).

41.

MN, Vol.

42.

Sultan

III,

pp. 364-365.

Mascud Mirza Qajar (Zill al-Sultan), SarguMascudi, lithograph (no place of publication: When Jahan-Shah no publisher, 1907), pp. 296-297. in 1886-1887 the government had Khan Afshar rebelled a strong enough force to put no trouble mobilizing alNasir down the tribal See Namah-ha-i uprising. LiNational Din Shah bi Na'ib al-Saltanah (Tehran: 110 and 112. No. 1316, folios brary, n.d.), zasht'i

43.

Vakil alAhkami ki bi Jinab-i "Khulasah-i Baqiyah-i Mulk bi Tarikh-i Mah-i Safar bar Hasb-i Amr Qadar Quirat-i Humayuni Sadir Mishavad," June 15-July 15, 245

Vol.

XI,

1978

1863, PFOA, MS, No. 42, folio 96. The Shah has certified the summary of the decrees that are in Dabir alMulk' s handwriting. no folio

44.

Anonymous, Kitabchah-i number.

45.

Report on Persian Army, 1877, General Fran[cl?]in's Enclosure in W. T. Thomson to Derby F.O. 60/379, No. 197, December 17, 1877.

46.

"Surat-i Faqarati ki dar Bab-i Macayib-i Giriftan-i Sarbaz-i Haliyah Nivashtah Shudah Bud va dar Dar alShura Khandah Shud," PFOA, MS, No. 71, folio 71, 1866-

Tuman-Bandi Afvaj,

In did not provide any soldiers. Some villages 1867. tax to cover the stead they paid an extra military had to prothat they would have otherwise soldiers telegram, to Amin al-Sultan, vide. See Zill al-Sultan (Tehran: July 10, 1890, in Majmu Cah-i Tiligraphat MS, No. 3365, folio 40. Majlis Library, n.d.), 47.

Ibid.

48.

Man, ya CAbd Allah Mustawfi, Sharh-i Zindigani-i Iran dar Dawrah-i QajarTarikh-i Idari va Ijtimaci-i Tehran: Tehran Musavvar Press, 1943), iyah (3 vols.;

Vol. I, p. 69. 49.

Mirza Husain Khan to Nasir al-Din Shah. The letter is in the possession of Farhad Muctamid. Although not dated, the content indicates that it was written when Mirza Husain assumed the Ministry of War in 1874. The Shah's comments are written on Mirza Husain Khan's letter.

50.

Returns

of Revenue and Expenditure prepared by Arthur Herbert, Encl., in Nicolson to Rosebery, F.O. 60/479, No. 47, April 7, 1886. An account book of a battalion also supports the figure given by Herbert. The six-month maintenance of the Mahallati battalion came See Daftarto just over 5,300 tumans in 1892-1893. i JamC va Kharj (Tehran: Majlis Library, 1891-92),

IRANIAN STUDIES

246

One pound was about three 133. MS, No. 3210, folio This would report). tumans in 1886 (see Herbert's of 60,000 men as it indicate that the army consisted was proposed before. 51.

Mirza Husain Khan to Nasir al-Din Shah, probably written 1874-78 (PFOA, MS, No. 6238, no folio number).

52.

Asif al-Dawlah to Mirza Yusuf, September 27, 1884, File No. 13, Khurasan, PFOA, MS, No. 111, no folio number.

53.

Amin Laskar,

54.

of Gulpaigan Battalion See for example the incident in Shiraz over nonpayment of their salaries. rioting to Muctamid al-Dawlah, July telegram, Amin al-Sultan

Tavaqquf-i

Tabriz,

14, 1890, Tehran in MajmuCah-i

Vol.

IV, folio

268.

folios

Tiligraphat,

Nasr Amin al-Mulk to Muctamid al-Sultan 141-142. head of the riotous Allah Khan Sartip (battalion Telegram, July 14, 1890, Tehran, in MajmuCahtroops), 143-144. i Tiligraphat, folios 55.

of the Persian Gulf, Oznan, Gazetteer Calcutta: Superinten(4 vols.; 1915), Vol. I, part 3, ent Government Printing, p. 2058.

J.

G. Lorimer.,

and Central

Arabia

56.

Mirza Husain Khan to Nasir al-Din Shah, probably The letter is in Farhad September 1880, Qazvin. in Tehran. Muctamid's collection

57.

the minisindicates The word "salt" in the evocation for favors already shown to ter's sense of gratitude Lack of gratitude is thought to him by the Shah. is interthe evocation cause God's anger. Finally, in the context of the household in which the esting by the master. members are fed and protected

58.

Firuz Mirza Nusrat al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, July 27, 1870, PFOA, MS, No. 6139, no folio number.

247

Vol.

XI,

1978

59.

Anonymous to Nasir al-Din Shah, July 21, 1866, PFOA, MS, No. 1, Section 24, folio 154. The author of the to letter,who must have been a high official,suggests the Shah that to reform the army he should leave more authority in the hands of amir tumans, field marshals, and make them responsible to a War Council, Majlis-i Vizarat-i

Jang.

60.

MN, Vol.

III,

p. 381.

61.

MB, Vol.

III,

p. 45.

62.

"Mukhtasar Hukm va Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript, Majlis-i TahAst ki Baray-i Inciqad-i Dast-Khatti Mishavad," May 18, 1869, PFOA, qiq-i Nizam Nivishtah MS, No. 173, no folio numbers.

63.

Ibid.

64.

See, for example, Majlis

(Tehran: 65.

Amin al-Dawlah,

66.

Ibid.,

67.

Ibid.

68.

Daftar-i Library, Khatirat-i

Amar-i Qur-Khanah-i MS, No. 3206. n.d.), Siyasi,

Tabriz

pp. 57-58.

p. 63.

Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia 1914: versity

in Persia, 1864and Britain A Study in Imperialism (New Haven: Yale UniPress, 1968), pp. 166-168.

69.

to Nasir al-Din Shah, NovemZain al-cAbidin, et al., ber 21-December 21, 1873, PFOA, MS, No. 6238, no folio et al., to Nasir al-Din Shah, number; CAbd al-Qadir, October 21-November 21, 1873, PFOA, MS, No. 6238, no folio number.

70.

Zill

71.

MB, Vol.

al-Sultan, II

IRANIAN STUDIES

Sarguzasht,

p. 301. pp. 6-7.

(Appendix),

248

72.

Mlirza Malkam Khan, Tanzim-i

Lashkar va Majlis-i Idarah, ya Intizam-i Lashkar va Majlis-i Tanzimat in MajmuCah-i Athar-i Malkam, ed. by Muhammad Muhit-i

Tabatabai (Tehran: 73.

The letter Sipah-Salar-i

Danish Press,

1948), p. 100.

is reproduced in MahmudFarhad MuCtamid, ACzam (Tehran: Ilmi, 1946), p. 63.

74.

MN, Vol.

75.

CAbd Allah Mustawfi, Sharh-i Zindigani, Vol. III, p. 68. See also John H. Lorentz, Modernization and

III., p. 381.

Political Change in Nineteenth-Century Iran: The Role of Amir Kabir (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,

Princeton

University,

1974), pp. 152-172.

76.

Mustawfi, Sharh-i

77.

For the theoretical discussion concerning the patrimonial ruler's financial authoritv see Richard Bendix's discussion based on lWeber in Max Weber, An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1962), p. 335.

78.

Lorimer, Gazetteer,

79.

Muhammad Quli Asif al-Dawlah, the Vizier of Zill alSultan to Mirza Yusuf Mustawfi al-Mamalik}, Shiraz, October-November 1870, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, no folio

Zindigani,

Vol. III,

p. 118.

Vol. II, part 1, pp. 134-135.

number. 80.

MB, Vol.

81.

Anonymous to Nasir al-Din Shah, Tehran, October 8, 1873, PFOA, MS, No. 6300, no folio number.

82.

MIirza Yahva Khan Muctamid al-Mulk, the later Mushir al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, MajmuCah-i Faramin va Namah-ha-i Nasir al-Din Shah (Tehran: Majlis Library, 1875-1876), M4s, No. 5121.

83.

See Nasir

III,

p.

al-Din

12.

Shah's

three 249

farmans promoting Vol.

XI,

Nasir 1978

Allah

Khan in Asnad-i

Juda-Juda,

dated

1865-1866,

1874-1875, and 1885-1886 (Tehran: Tehran University, The Central Library),. MS, No. 8255, no folio numbers. 84.

85.

Haji Sayyah, CAli Sayyah, Khatirat-i Hajj Muhammad ed. by HumayunSayyah (Tehran: Offset Press, 1967), p. 485.

Mlirza JaCfar Khan Mushir al-Dawlah, PFOA, MS, No. 974, folio 17.

Tarz-i

Hukamat-i

Iran,

86.

Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript to Mirza Yusuf, 18811882, PFOA, MS, No. 116, no folio number.

87.

MB, Vol.

88.

Zill

89.

Majd al-Mulk, Rasalah-i Majdiah (Tehran, Sultani's Private Library), MS, No. 467, folio 24.

90.

Picot,

91.

Mirza Yusuf to Nasir al-Din Shah, December 20, 1873January 20, 1874, PFOA, MS, No. 6320, folio 231.

92.

Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript to Amin Huzur defining the authority of Vizarat-i Baqaya, 1881-1882, PFOA, MS, No. 116, no folio number; see also Mushir alDawlah, Tarz-i Hukumat, no folio number.

93.

Mushir al-Dawlah,

94.

Nasir al-Din Shah's rescript to Amin Huzur, 18811882, PFOA, MS, No. 116, no folio number.

95.

MB, Vol. 2 ("Supplement"),

96.

Mushir al-Dawlah,

97.

See the example of a local personage who pays 600 tumans to the governor of Shahrud and receives the

p. 12.

IV (Supplement),

al-Sultan,

p. 233.

Sarguzasht,

p. 18. "MIemorandum,"

IRANIAN STUDIES

Tarz-i

Tarz-i

250

Hukumat, no folio

number.

p. 19.

Hukumat, no folio

number.

It is to collect the taxes of the city. authority taxes of the interesting to note that the official The actual taxes city only amounted to 600 tumans. must have been more than twice the nominal sum. See Khurasan," pp. 348-349. "Ruz-Namah-i Safar-i 98.

CAbbas

ran: 99.

in 1869 in

of the farman issued See the reproduction Haji Ahmad Khan Minabi, Sadid al-Saltanah, va Khalij-i

Ibn-i

Sina,

Bandar-i

(Teh-

ed. by Ahmad Iqtidari

Fars,

p. 5.

1963),

a certain See the farman by Zill al-Sultan appointing of Jarquyah in the IsMuhammadas the tax collector The farman is in the Mtinasian Collecphahan area. no MS of California, Los Angeles, University tion, number, no date, no folio number. I, part

100.

Lorimer,

101.

Mtirza Husain Farahani, Safar

Gazetteer,

ed. ran University

Farahani,

Vol.

3 , p.

Namah-i

1680.

Mirza

by Hafiz Farman-Farmaian 1963), p. 42. Press,

Husain

Teh-

(Tehran:

102.

Ibid.

103.

For more examples of local notables Ibid., pp. 42-43. see pp. 42-45. functions, performing executive

104.

MuhammadHasan Khan Ictimad al-Saltanah, va al-Athar Government Press, (Tehran: p. 39.

al-Mu 'athir

1880-1881),

105.

Fars-NamahTarikh-i Hajj Mlirza Hasan Husaini Fasa'i, i Nasiri no place of publication: (2 vols; lithograph; Vol. II, pp. 267-269. n.d.), Sana'i,

106.

Max Weber, Law in Economy and Society (Cambridge: 1957), p. 143. Press, Harvard University

107.

cAbd Allah Clumat-i

6285,

Ibn-i

Ictimad

folio

163.

Ictimad

al-Saltanah,

al-Saltanahl,

This

is 251

a report

Ma-

Kitabchah-i

1890-1891,

PFOA, MS,, No.

to Nasir Vol.

al-Din XI,

1978

Shah on Khuzistan affairs

and routes.

108.

Fasa'i,

109.

"Kirman-Shahan," Farhang, Vol. X, No. 414 (December 23, 1886), pp. 253-255. Luristan taxes were paid by tribal chiefs. See "Burujird," Farhang, Vol. VI, No. 260 (June 19, 1884), p. 1.

110.

cAbd Allah Ibn-i Ictimad al-Saltanah, folio 23.

111.

Ibid.,

112.

Amin al-Sultan to Rukn al-Dawlah, Telegram, Tehran, PFOA, MS, No. 6256, March 14, 1888, no folio number.

113.

Mu'ayyid al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, Shiraz, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, 1858-1859, no folio number.

114.

Ibid.

115.

Mu'ayyid al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, Shiraz, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, 1858-1859, no folio number.

116.

Zahir al-Dawlah to Nasir al-Din Shah, Shiraz, 18621863, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, no folio number. In the same letter the Shah wrote that he planned to go to Fars next year to settle the problem. He obviously found it necessary to use his own royal charisma to settle the conflict between the center and the notables.

117.

Zill

118.

Fars-Namah,

folio

al-Sultan,

Vol. II, pp. 303-305.

Kitabchah,

65.

Sarguzasht,

p. 214.

Hajj CAbdal-Ghaffar Najm al-Mulk, Safar-Namah-i ed. by MluhammadDabir Siyaqi (Tehran: CIlmi, 1962), p. 67.

Khuzistan,

119.

Kitabchah-i CAbdAllah Ibn-i Ictimad al-Saltanah, folio 87. See the similar situation Bandar-i Mlacshur, folios 164-165.

MaClumat-i,

IRANIAN STUDIES

252

in

folios

35-36.

120.

Ibid.,

121.

Mlurtiza Quli Khan Vakil al-Mulk Shah, Kirman, December 9, 1873, no folio number.

122.

Vol. II, pp. 247Edward Stack, Six Months in Persia, in Bandar-i a district Khamir, for instance, 282. The had its own local tax rates. CAbbas province, tax which included paid a complicated inhabitants and poll tax. land, animals, taxes on agricultural The amount of tax was fixed rather minutely for each The system wvas applied to an area kind of animal. This that paid only 200 tumans of taxes a year. the degree to which the tax strucindicates clearly See MuhammadcAli Sadid al-Salture wvas fragmented. In Bandar-i cAbbas tanah, Bandar-i CAbbas, pp. 4-5. taxes: the following itself the governor collected fixed at 7 1/2 (1) taxes on shops, called izafiyyah, dues, tazkarah, tumans for each shop; (2) passport (3) tax on commer14 1/2 qirans for each passport; fixed at 2 1/2 known as dallal, cial transactions, (4) from each buyer and seller; percent collected known tax on goods about to be loaded on animals, duty at 1/2 qiran (S) a kind of octroi as sar-rigi; according to size, each package to two qirans on or pierage at 2 1/2 (6) iskilliyah called maidani; (7) rah-dari qirans to 5 qirans for each package; Yet, the customs of Bandar-i CAbbas or road tolls. See Loriauthority. were not under the governor's Where Vol. II, part I, pp. 13-14. mer, Gazetteer, rates of taxation were large, different minorities In Urumiyah,the Mluswere applied to non-Mluslims. for each house lims paid S qirans equal to 4s.2d. paid 8 qirans or they owned while the Christians Tax rates on live animals were the same how6s.8d. The Christians ever for Mtuslims and non-Mluslims. service,which paid poll tax instead of military see, for example, the report amounted to 5 qirans; Secby William G. Abbott to Her Mlajesty's Principal Tabriz, November 11, retary for Foreign Affairs, 1. No. 26, Inclosure 1880, F.O. 60/431, 253

to Nasir al-Din PFOA, MS, No. 101,

Vol.

XI,

1978

is

equal

to 300 kilograms.

123.

Each kharvar

124.

Muhanmad Ibn-i Riza Quli Tarikh-Nivis, Library), National Mahdiyah (Tehran: 397-398. folios

125.

Ibid.,

folios

126.

Ibid.,

folio

127.

Arthur Herbert, Returns of Revenue and Expenditure, in Nicolson to Rosebery, Encl. No. 47, F.0. 60/479, April 17, 1886.

128.

Gav is

129.

Lorimer,

130.

Ibid.,

Vol.

II,

131.

Ibid..,

Vol.

132.

Ibid.,

Vol.

133.

CAbd Allah Ibn-i Ictimad 163. Maclumat, folio

134.

Ibid.,

folios

31,

135.

Ibid.,

folios

55-56.

136.

ed. DafiC al-Ghurur, Adib al-Mamalik, CAbd al-cAli Khawrazmi), pp. 33-34. by Iraj Afshar (Tehran:

137.

Ibid.,

138.

Ruz-Namah, p. 313.

139.

in ''Iclan-ha See the photocopy of the proclamation Dawrah-i Qajar," ed. by Muhammad va Iclamiyah-ha-i No. 26 (JuneBar-Rasi-ha-i Tarikhi, Ismacil Rizvani, July 1960), p. 265.

416-417. 627.

of measurement

a unit

IRANIAN STUDIES

to an acre.

equal

I, p. 371.

Vol.

II,

part

part

II,

pp.

1089-1090.

II,

part

I, pp. 698-699.

II,

part

II,

Gazetteer,

pp.

Mu'athir-i MS, No. 969 ,

p.

1102.

al-Saltanah,

Kitabchah-i

56.

154,155.

254

Vol.

1, part

3, p. 2595.

140.

Lorimer,

141.

Mushir al-Dawlah,

142.

MB, Vol.

143.

ICtimad al-Saltanah,

144.

Ibid.

145.

Picot,

146.

Ruz-Namah,

147.

Ibid.,

p. 991.

148.

Picot,

folio

149.

by Nasir al-Din Shah to See, for example, a letter "Surat-i Parpublished in Farhang. Zill al-Sultan Humayuni," Farhang, Nishanah-i vanah-i Mulatifat Vol. X, No. 414 (December 23, 1886), p. 253.

150.

See the many letters Dawlah to the Shah ing that this able that his functions taxes from the tax

151.

Kiyumarth Mirza to Mirza MuhammadKhan Sipah-Salar, number. PFOA, MS, No. 66, no folio Kirman, n.d.,

152.

Lorimer,

153.

to Fakhr al-Mulk, telegram. Amin al-Sultan Majlis Library), April 30, 1890 (Tehran:

Gazetteer,

Tarz-i

Hukmat-i

Iran,

no folio

no.

I, p. 348.

folio

Mu'athir

p.

va al-Athar,

21.

20. pp. 991,

995.

20.

of Farhad Mirza MuCtamid aland to Mirza Husain Khan indicatand scholarly prince did not think of the went beyond the collection order. farmers and maintaining PFOA, MS, No. 63. Kurdistan, Daftar-i Nivishtigat-i letters of the documents includes The collection See also Farhad Mirwritten between 1871 and 1873. written beza's letters to Mirza cAli Divan-Baigi Farhad Mirza tween 1870 and 1874 in Namah-ha-i Sultani's MS, No. 422. Library), Private (Tehran:

Gazetteer,

Vol.

255

II,

part

1, p. 348.

Vol.

Tehran, MajmuCah-i XI,

1978

Tiligraphat,

MS, No. 3365, folios

3-4.

154.

Lorimer, Gazetteer,

155.

MuhammadIbrahim Khuda-Bandahlu, "Ruz-Namah-i Safari Khurasan va Sistan," ed. by Iraj Afshar, Farhangi Iran-Zamin, Vol. XII, Nos. 1-4 (1965), pp. 127-128. The governor of Sultaniyah, a traveler recorded, retained one-third of the tax he collected. The rate of extra-taxes for the benefit of the governor varied from place to place; see also CAbdal-CAli Adib alMamalik, DafiC al-Ghurur, p. 58.

156.

Amin al-Sultan to Fakr al-Mulk, telegram, May 6, 1890, MajmuCah-i Tiligrafat, MS, folios 4-5.

157.

Zill

158.

Ibid.

159.

Picot,

160.

Zill

161.

Majd al-Mulk Sinaki,

162.

Ibid.,

163.

Hajj Shaikh Yahya Ahmadi, "Fihrist-i Asami-i Farmandihan-i Mamlikat-i Kirman," ed. by Muhammad Ibrahim Bastani Parizi, Farhang-i Iran Zamin, Vol. XII, Nos. 1-4 (1964), pp. 64-65.

164.

See for example the following local budgets: Asl-i Kitabchah-i Jamrc va Kharj-i Sanah-i Maziyah-i Qui Du I1, Dar al-CIbad-i Yazd Savad-i Kitabchah-i Salah-i Yunit I1 va Qui Il-i Ru-Saqi va Jarnal-Abad va Fasaruq (Tehran: Tehran University, The Central Library), MS, No. 8358.

165.

Muhammad Quli Asif al-Dawlah to Mirza Yusuf, Shiraz, March-April 1870, PFOA, MS, No. 6210, no folio number.

al-Sultan,

Vol. I, part 2, p. 1677.

Sarguzasht,

p. 87.

pp. 17-18. al-Sultafi,

folio

IRANIAN STUDIES

Sarguzasht, Rasalah,

p. 87. folios

11-12.

12.

256

For another example see Murtiza Quli Khan Vakil alMulk to Nasir al-Din Shah, Kirman, March 11, 1873, PFOA, MS, No. 101, no folio number. 166.

mM, Vol.

I ("Supplement"),

167.

Akhbar-i Dakhilah, 1886), p. 2.

168.

Kiyumarth Mirza to Mirza Muhwamad Khan Sipah-Salar, Kirman, n.d., PFOA, MS, No. 66, no folio number.

169.

Translation of Manifesto issued by the Deputy-Governor of Tabreez. Enclosure in the Consul-General Abbott's Despatch, No. 13, Confidential, July 5, 1879, F.O. 60/425.

170.

Benam al-Mulk, "Memorandum," Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to Marquis Salisbury, Gulahek, September 3, 1890, Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Library, MS, No. 5991, p. 3.

171.

Mirza cAli Vaqayi-Nigar, Hadiqah-i Nasiri (Tehran: The National No. 625, folios 209-215. Library),

172.

Farhad Mirza to Nasir al-Din Shah, Kirmanshah, November 31, 1870, PFOA, MS, No. 6139, no folio number.

173.

Mirza Yusuf to Zia al-Dawlah (governor of Simnan), Tehran, Telegram No. 45, January 27, 1884, PFOA, MS, No. 111, no folio number.

174.

Anonymous report to Nasir al-Din Shah, November 23, 1863, PFOA, MS, No. 114, no folio number.

175.

Anonymous report to Nasir 1872, PFOA, MS, No. 6320,

176.

See for example CAbbas Mirza to Amin al-Sultan, telegram, Qum, October 8, 1890, in MajmuCah-i Tiligra20-21. fat, folios

Farhang,

257

p.

18.

Vol.

IX, No. 360 (May 27,

al-Din Shah, March-April 6. folio

Vol.

XI,

1978

177.

Amin al-Sultan to MuCtamidal-Dawlah, telegram, July 22, 1890, folio 145, and Amin al-Sultan to telegram, October 20, 1890, folio Zill al-Sultan, 46, and Zill al-Sultan to Amin al-Sultan, telegram, October 22, 1890, folio 47, in MajmuCah-i Tiligrafat.

IRANIAN STUDIES

258

Stuidies,Volume Xl 1978. Iratniatn

Nonrevolutionary

The Peasan

try

of

Modern

Iran Farhad Kazemi and Ervand Abrahamian

of tradition needs explanation The persistence as much as change. It may be that people cleave but to ancestral ways through general inertia, it is more likely that there are good and suffimuch as cient reasons behind such persistence, reasons for change.1 there are good and sufficient Lack of

Peasant

Rebellions

studying the modern world is The social scientist struck by the importance of peasant rebellions. inevitably as Russia, Yugoslavia, Albania, In some countries--such have helped China, Cuba, and Vietnam--peasant rebellions as In others--such bring about communist revolutions. Mexico, Algeria, Kenya, and recently Angola--they have revolutions. contributed toward the success of nationalist Spain, Greece, Peru, InIn yet other countries--including have helped Malaya, and Indonesia--they dia, Phillippines,

Farhad Kazemi is Associate Professor in the Department of Ervand Abrahamian is at New York University. Politics Associate Professor of History at Baruch College of the City University of New York. This is a joint enterprise and the order of the authors' Earlier names does not imply seniority of authorship. versions of this paper were presented at the Tenth Annual-+. 259

shake, even though they have not destroyed, the foundations studying Iran, howof the old order. The social scientist ever, is struck not by the importance but by the conspicuin the peasant rebellions ous absence of any large-scale modern era. As one British diplomat correctly predicted in 1943 on the eve of the Fourteenth Majlis elections and in the ciat a time of increasing revolutionary activity confident that, in "The landlords are justifiably ties: spite of radicalism in the towns, the majority of the peasantry will continue to follow their lead on election day!'2 surprising This lack of major uprisings is particularly not only because all observers agree that the peasantry lived in "abject poverty,"3 but also because some scholars have argued the rural standard of living declined substantially during the second half of the nineteenth century.4 Insofar as the history of many modern states cannot be understood without an analysis of why they experienced rural the failthe history of modern Iran--especially rebellions, ure of its urban radical movements--cannot be understood without an analysis of why the country did not experience any serious peasant upheavals. does not mean that The absence of peasant rebellions accepted the established order. On the peasants willingly who studied villages before the contrary, anthropologists the land reform of 1962 often noted that the outward bein no way reflected their inward havior of the villages attitudes and that peasants publicly submitted to but priJavad vately questioned the authority of their landlords. and authSafinezhad, one of Iran's leading anthropologists or of a classic study of the village of Talebabad, writes

Los Angeles, Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, November 1976, and at the University of Chicago, February 1977. We would like to thank Shahen Abrahamian, Ali Banuazizi, James A. Bill, Dale Eickelman, Grace Goodell, Eric Hooglund, Nikki R. Keddie, Joseph Upton, and Marvin Zonis on earlier drafts of this paper. for commenting extensively Of course, they are not responsible for any errors and opinions found in the paper. IRANIAN STUDIES

260

that the local population, old and young, sharecropper and day laborer alike, expressed intense hatred for the landlord in private (even though he was a comparatively lenient taskmaster), although in public they rushed to obey his orders as if they were commands from the Almighty.5 Paul Vieille, a French sociologist who has studied in depth the Caspian region, has also drawn a sharp contrast between the peasant's internal thinking and his outward "humility, docility, and apparent acceptance of feudal authority."6 This discrepancy between outward submissiveness and inward rebelliousness is vividly illustrated by Reverend Perkins, an early nineteenth-century missionary working among the Assyrians (Nestorians) of western Azerbaijan: I was once forcibly reminded of the depth of this hatred (of peasants for landlords), by its development at the funeral of an aged khan, who like others of his rank, had grievously oppressed his serfs. The villagers--all Nestorians--came to the city, as is the custom, and assembled before the door of the deceased, to make lamentations and tender their condolences to the widow and family. One of our native helpers, who happened to be passing the dwelling at the time, halted a few moments to listen to their grief, some of which he retained and related to me--such for instance as the following, "The wicked old oppressor is dead, and we are glad of it, he is receiving the reward of his iniquity; may his whole household soon follow him." The bereaved Muhammedanfamily did not understand the Nestorian thus gave utterance language in which the villagers to their sorrow, but were little disposed to question their sincerity, since the exclamations were accompanied with violent beatings of the breast as well as pious sobs and wailings.7 Moreover, the absence of major upheavals did not mean the existence of social harmony. Invariably during the annual division of the crop, peasants tried to cheat landlords by concealing as much of the harvest as possible. This can be viewed as a form of "passive resistance." Frequently after devastating plagues, villages fled en masse 261

Vol.

XI,

1978

from more oppressive to less oppressive landowners. The extensive epidemics and famines of the early nineteenth century depopulated the countryside and thus encouraged Octhe traditional method of "voting with one's feet."8 casionally peasants fed, hid, and protected outlaws fightThis type of "soing local landlords and state officials. cial banditry" can be described as a mode of "primitive rebellion."9 Sometimes peasants refused to pay taxes, held onto rents, and even took sanctuary in town mosques. This latter form of public protest was the accepted method of "collective bargaining."?10 Finally on one notable occasion, peasants actively supported radical fighters, known as the Jangalis (Men of the Jungle), who waged a guerrilla war in the forests of Gilan against foreign invaders, large This Jangali landowners, and government tax collectors.11 movement, which reached its height between 1917 and 1921, is analyzed in the last section of the paper. Nevertheless, and regional none of these village riots, local protests, proupheavals developed into statewide peasant rebellions, tracted jaqueries, or civil wars. The intention of the present paper is to offer some exploratory hypotheses as to why modern Iran--beginning with the 1860s and ending with the land reform of the 1960s peasant rebellions; --has not experienced any large-scale why occasional protests have not developed into protracted revolts; why urban radicals have failed to ignite rural revolutions; why peasants have appeared to be "fatalistic," rather than "aggressive,," "passive," and "conservative," The paper will address and "revolutionary." "assertive," works the problem first by examining the main theoretical on peasant revolutions and identifying the major sociopolitical factors that explain the emergence of peasant rebellions. It will than analyze which of these factors have been absent in modern Iran. It will finally discuss the Jangali movement and contrast the revolutionary peasantry in Gilan with the nonrevolutionary peasantry in the rest of Iran. Previous writers that have been intrigued by the in modern Iran have usually put lack of peasant rebellions One interpretation--faforward one of two explanations. IRANIAN STUDIES

262

vored by historians who believe that religion molds popular the that Islam has effectively instilled culture--claims doctrine of "passive obedience" among the "uneducated masses." Another--espoused by New Left critics of the Old Left unlike those of China, fail--argues that Iranian radicals, ed to ignite peasant revolution because they overlooked the interests, grievances, and aspirations of the peasantry. As one contemporary guerrilla group has stated in a detailed study of the rural social structure: "The countryside has not risen in revolt because previous radical organizations, especially the Tudeh Party and the National Front, failed to articulate rural interests, develop a coherent agricultural policy, and mobilize the peasant masses into a disciplined political movement.",12 These two explanations, however, are not very convincing. The first fails to take into account that Islam, like all major religions, contains contradictory themes. On one hand, it preaches passive obedience; on the other hand, it exhorts active resistance against social injustice, political oppression, and economic exploitation. Since the radical theme often inspired riots, demonstrations, and rebellions in the cities, there is no theological reason why it could not have done the same in the countryside. The second explanation, meanwhile, overestimates the importance of political organizations and underestimates the historical role of social forces. It overlooks the fact that the Tudeh Party showed considerable interest in the peasant issue, developing a coherent agricultural program, demanding land reform, and sending cadres into the villages to organize the rural masses. The party failure came not from want of trying but from the lack of peasant response. Moreover, the explanation distorts the course of those peasant revolutions that succeeded. In the Chinese case, for example, the peasant rebels initially had no ties to the urban-based communist organizations. As Mao Tse-Tung admitted in his famous Report of the Peasant Movement (1927), the rebellious had developed their own secret sovillages their own demands, and even their own liberated recities, gions, long before the Chinese Communist Party took the interest in their existence.13 slightest Mao Tse-Tung did not launch the peasant rebellions. He merged the urban 263

Vol.

XI,

1978

radicals with the peasant rebellions cessful comnunist revolution. Theories

of Peasant

to bring about a suc-

Rebellions

The main analytical works on modern peasant rebellions--such as Eric Wolf's Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century, Hamza Alavi's "Peasants and Revolution," Joel Migdal's Peasants, Politics, and Revolution,Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship, Jeffrey Paige 's Agrarian Revolutions, and Donald Zagoria's "Ecology of Peasant Communismin India"--show that the following three sociopolitical factors have been present in countries that have experienced major peasant rebellions:14 1. 2. 3. 1.

A discontented middle peasantry An unstable market-economy A weak central state

Middle Peasantry

For soTo townsmen, villagers may all look alike. ciologists, however, villagers may be divided into three its distinct a "rich peasantry" that cultivates classes: lands with the hired help of landless laborers; a "middle peasantry" that farms its independent small holdings with its own family labor; and a "poor peasantry" formed of impoverished sharecroppers, landless laborers, and near-landsoless cultivators. True, over a number of generations, cial mobility, both upward and downward, often complicates the village structure,l5 but at any particular time, inin way of come differences, differences and, consequently, Of divide the villages into three major classes. life, the three, the middle peasantry has played the most promi-

nent role in rural rebellions. For, as Eric Wolf has documented, the rich peasant is often an employer of labor, a and consequentof the state, a representative money lender, order: "His power domain ly, a supporter of the established it depends on the mainwithin the village is derivative;

tenance of his domains outside IRANIAN STUDIES

264

the village.",16

The poor

peasant, in turn, is so completely dependent on others for that he is unable to wages, food, land, and subsistence, action even though he has initiate independent political no interest in preserving the social order: "He has no tactical power; he is completely within the power domain resources of his own of his employer, without sufficient to serve him as resources in the power struggle."'l7 The middle peasant, on the other hand, has both the ability to revolt. For he does not own enough and the inclination land to be a large-scale employer, and, thus, a preserver of the status quo; but he does own enough land to be economically and socially independent of both the local magnates and the central government. Owning land, the middle peasantry, unlike the poor peasantry, has enough economic security to be able to act against the major landlords and the government officials. "He enjoys," as Eric Wolf has "the minimum tactical stressed, freedom required to challenge the landlords."18 In other words, economic independence laid the foundations for possible social and political independence. As Hamza Alavi has summarized: From the examination of the actual experience of the Russian and Chinese revolutions it was found that, contrary to expectations, the "rural proletariat" and the "poor peasants" were, initially the least militant classes of the peasantry whereas the small-holding independent proprietors, the "middle peasants," were, initially, the most militant.19

2.

Market-economy

For a variety of reasons, the formation of a marketeconomy can generate discontent among the middle peasantry. into national and interOn one hand, it integrates villages national commerce, dissolves self-sufficient regional units, to the drastic fluctuand, consequently, exposes villagers ations of the world market. On the other hand, it inflates land prices, and thereby subjects the middle peasantry to unfair competition from rich peasants, absentee landlords, and land-hungry city merchants. As Eric Wolf has stressed, 265

Vol.

XI,

1978

the middle peasantry finds itself threatened by unstable prices and unfavorable markets, by encroachments from urban entrepreneurs, by foreclosures and high interest payments, by enclosures of communal properties, and, eventually, by the destruction of their village societies.20 Moreover, the market economy, by stimulating agricultural trade, creates direct links between peasants and local towns, and, thus, weakens the economic power of large landowners. In the words of Joel Migdal, commercialization undermines the large landowners by introducing economic ties between rural producers and town consumer, by ending the landlord's monopolistic control over the peasant's transactions with the outside world, and by transforming the traditional "inward-looking" villa es into modern potentially "outward-looking" villages.H 3.

Weak State

Almost all the major peasant rebellions, especially those that have led to successful revolutions, have occurred in times when the central government has been shaken by As Donald Zagoria has stresscatastrophic foreign defeats. the Rused, many of the successful revolutions, especially have sian, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Yugoslav revolutions, not only by internal social forces, such been precipitated as the middle peasantry, but also by foreign military incrises vasions.22 For defeats in war create institutional in the state. in turn, produce power Institutional crises, vacuums in the provinces. And power vacuums encourage urban radicals to reach out into the countryside to establish ties with the discontented middle peasantry and to mobilize the poor peasantry who are no longer cowed by the "means of compulsion" previously provided by the central government to the provincial landowners. As Frances Ferguson has noted in an article on "Rural/Urban Relations and Peasant cannot grow into successful Radicalism," rural rebellions revolutions unless urban radicals mobilize the geographically dispersed peasantry into coherent, cohesive, and collective political organizations.23

IRANIAN STUDIES

266

The Iranian

1.

Middle

distinct

Situation

Peasantry

The agrarian structure of Iran was divided into five classes. The first consisted of absentee land-

lords: the crown (saltanat); the the state (khaleqeh); the large landholders religious foundations (Cumdeh (vaqf); malek), such as provincial magnates, tribal chiefs, and high court officials, who owned numerous whole villages; and the smaller absentee landholders (khurdeh malek), such as merwho owned scatchants, civil servants, and army officers, tered but often substantial vilof many different portions lages. The second class was formed of rich peasants tied to the absentee landlords: the bailiffs (mubisher) adminthe landowner's the oxen-owners istering estates; (gavband) who obtained from the large landholders the right to lease plough animals; and the village headmen (kadkhuda)

who were nominated by the large landowners and confirmed The bailiffs, in office by the provincial governors. oxenowners, and village headmen often hired landless laborers to work on their small estates. The third class corresponded to the middle peasantry which owned just enough property to be independent of the large landlords but not enough to require the hired labor of the poor peasantry. The fourth contained sharecroppers (z3reC or barzegar) who owned no property but enjoyed the right to cultivate (nasaq) the landlord's property. As holders of cultivating rights (nasag-dar), they could j oin production teams of four to sixteen men known in many regions as bonehs.24 As boneh members, they had access not only to village wells., woods, and pastures, but also and more imto the landlord's fields, and the landlord's irportantly, rigation water. And as tillers of the land, they shared the annual crop with their landlords. In general, the

267

Vol.

XI, 1978

water, suppliers of the five factors of production--land, labor, seeds, and plough animals--each received one-fifth of the annual crop. In some areas, however, more weight It should be noted was given to land and less to water. that the division was not between the landlord and the individual sharecropper--as many observers have claimed--but between the landlord and the boneh as a group. Moreover, from its share the boneh paid for the various services that had been provided during the year by the village blacksmith, carpenter, miller, shepherd, barber, and bath attendant. the boneh was also responsible for payIn some districts, ing the village water regulator (mlr5b), the field watchand even the kadkhuda appointed by the landman (dashtb3n), the sharecropper who had contributed only labor lord. Thus, ended up receiving far less than one-fifth of the annual harvest. The fifth class consisted of peasants who had neither Having no such rights, they rights. land nor cultivating could neither use village pastures nor receive a share of the annual crop. And having no land, they could subsist only by working for either rich peasants or absentee landThey survived as seasonal laborers, grazing cattle, lords. threshing corn, picking cotton, digging weeding fields, ditches, and, at peak periods, helping the sharecroppers In many regions, the sharecroppers used with the harvest. (happy squatter) to describe the ironic term khushneshin landless laborers and the comparativeboth the destitute such as the local shoply well-off nonfarming villagers, keeper, bath owner, oxen renter, carpenter, miller, and The term originates from the days when the blacksmith. village artisans and the rural "bourgeoisie" outnumbered But the rapid growth of the agricultural "proletariat." rural population had grown from seven milpopulation--the lion in 1900 to nearly fifteen million in 196025--had expanded the ranks of the landless laborers to the point where they far outnumbered the other nonsharecropping villagers. clear, class,

Although the lines between the agrarian classes are size and actual importance of each the relative the middle peasantry, remains unclear. especially

IRANIAN STUDIES

268

Iran in 1957 conAccording to the Ministry of Agriculture, Each village was traditionally tained 39,406 villages.2 Of these 39,406 villages, divided into six parts (dang). the crown held 812 (2 percent); the state 1,444 (3.6 perfoundations 713 (1.8 percent); private cent); the religious landlords, each with at least one dang, owned 4,330 (11 perfoundations, and private cent; the state, crown, religious landlords jointly controlled 6,005 (15.2 percent); large landlords (cumdeh malek), each with at least all six dangs held 9,239 (23.5 percent); and smaller landof one village, lords (khurdeh malek), each with less than one dang in any The term together owned 16,522 (42 percent). one village, khurdeh malek, however, is deceptive since it includes not including kadkhudas, but also only peasant proprietors, minor absentee landlords, such as merchants, clergymen, and civil servants, as well as major absentee landlords Consequently, who owned small parts of numerous villages. are ambiguous and confusing. these statistics Another survey carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1960 is equally inadequate and ambiguous. Categorizing landholdings as sharecropped (mazraCi), rented it estimated that 54 and owner-operated (melkl), (ej5r!), land was sharecropped, 7 percent percent of the cultivated The last was rented, and 26 percent was owner-operated.27 category, however, included not only peasant holdings, but also

large

sentee

estates

landlords.

farmed by landless

These figures

laborers

for the ab-

led Hossein Mahdavi, a

to conclude that former adviser to the Plan Organization, were small peasant holdings very few of the sharecropped

farms.28 on landownership are vague, Although the statistics on Iranian agriculture agree that peasant the specialists if any, part in the village econoholdings played little, my. Ann Lambton, in her major study entitled Landlord and Peasant in Persia, estimates that "peasant proprietorship is not, insofar as its extent is concerned, an important She also stresses that form of landholding in Persia."29 peasant holdings did not provide adequate income since they were often

proprietors

too small,

too barren,

and too remote:

were on the whole confined 269

"Peasant

to remote areas in Vol.

XI, 1978

which agriculture offered a low return, as, for example, mountain areas or the edge of the central desert.",30 Khosrow Khosravi, an Iranian sociologist, argues that although there were a considerable number of small holdings, almost KazemVadici, anall belonged to absentee landlords.31 other Iranian sociologist, details in his Rural Sociology of Iran the main agrarian classes but considers the peasant cultivator to be too insignificant to deserve examination.32 Jamshid Behnam and Shapour Rasekh, authors of The Sociology of Iran, estimate that 50 percent of the cultivated land belonged to large proprietors, 25 percent to small absentee landlords, 20 percent to religious foundations, and only 5 percent to peasant cultivators.33 Benno Sternberg-Savel, a European specialist, reckons that less than 5 percent of the peasants owned the land they tilled.34 Eric Hooglund, in a detailed dissertation on the land reform, argues that peasant proprietors were too poor, too few, and too isolated to be considered a significant social force.35 The Tudeh Party calculates that in the 1950s thirty-seven families owned 20,000 villages while 60 percent of the peasantry remained landless.?6 The same source shows that 23 percent of the peasantry owned less than 1 hectare, 10 percent between 1 and 3 hectares, and only 7 percent more than 3 hectares--the minimumrequired for an adequate small holding. Finally, Nikki Keddie, in an analytical study of rural stratification before land reform has written:37 Direct peasant proprietorship was rare, and found Even peasant owners were mainly on marginal lands. under the thumb of the local landlord, and their methods were economic position and agricultural Middle propriquite similar to those of tenants. etors owning "only" one village were usually descendants of headmen and other rich peasants and nomads. Even when they lived in the village, these proprietors put only 5 to 10 percent of their land under with hired help and improved direct cultivation tools. The majority of the land of middle and large proprietors was sharecropped by tenants. These estimates are supported by a sample survey completed on the eve of land reform.38 Surveying 154 vilIRANIAN STUDIES

270

lages in the seven rural districts of Birijand, Qasr-i Shirin , Hamadan, Sanandaj, Garmsar, Golpayegan, and Sari , a research group from Tehran University found that 54 villages belonged to large landlords, 33 to small absentee landlords, 16 to the state, 16 to religious foundations, and only 4 to peasant cultivators. The remaining 31 were co-owned by absentee landlords, religious foundations, and the state. The small size of the middle peasantry is accounted by a number of factors. First, the lack of adequate rainfall, and, consequently, the importance of expensive irrigation systems tended to squeeze the small farmer out of the land market. According to one source, over one-half of the cultivated land relied on the intricate underground canals known as qanits.39 According to another source, nearly 50 percent of the. annual crop grew on irrigated and over 66 percent of these fields were watered fields, by some 40,000 qan5ts.40 It has been estimated that the construction of a medium length qanat would now cost well over $213,000 .41 Second, the social importance of landownership, and the precariousness of alternate methods for investing capital, encouraged merchants, civil servants, and other well-to-do urban families to channel their wealth into agriculture. Thus the peasant in Iran was subject to unequal competition from urban investors even before the commercialization of agriculture. Third, the Islamic law of inheritance, dividing property among all direct descendants, fragmented holdings, and thereby lowered middle peasants into the ranks of poor peasants. In some regions, heirs tried to keep family holdings intact by jointly owning farms and marrying cousins as much as possible. Finally, the few middle peasants who succeeded in reaching the small circle of rich peasants frequently gave up working on the land. As Lyle Hayden has observed: "Whena villager becomes a gavband, he wears a hat, coat, carries a cane, and quits manual work.",42 Western observers have often explained this phenomenon in terms of Middle Eastern cultural disdain for physical labor. In fact, it can be explained more easily in economic terms since the returns from nonmanual work were far above those from manual work. For example, the owner of ten oxen obtained the same por271

Vol.

XI, 1978

tion of the harvest as ten individual sharecroppers who had The degree of exploitation, contributed only their labor.43 rather than the mode of perception, explains why the peasdrudgery for clerical or gave up agricultural ant willingly pursuits. entrepreneurial lfhereas the middle peasantry hardly existed, the tenant sharecroppers and the landless laborers formed over In larger villages, 90 percent of the rural population.44 the landless laborers tended to outnumber the sharecroppers. For example, the reverse was true. In smaller villages, Talebabad, totaling 88 households, had 59 family heads who were sharecroppers and only 15 family heads who were landless laborers. 5 On the other hand, Shishdangi, with 684 Ismail households studied by the Iranian anthropologist Ajami, contained 75 families whose heads were landless laborers and only 47 families whose heads were sharecroppers.46 But whether tenant sharecropper or landless laborer, the peasant was economically and socially dominated by the The landless laborers landlord and his representatives. could not reside in a village for any length of time withThey could not out the permission of the local kadkhuda. obtain employment on the landlord's estates without the And they could not gain access goodwill of the mubasher. to communal pastures, wells, and woods without the special In short, the landlord dispensation of the village elders. totally controlled the economic existence of the landless laborer. were equally dependent on The tenant sharecroppers the "right of culeven though they possessed the landlord, words in Paul Vieille's The landlord, tivation" (nasaq). control" over the sharecroppers.4t "monopolistic exercised He could deny them emergency loans and could persuade local of a Before the creation money lenders to do the same.48 state in the 1930s, he could use the village centralized and even corporal punishments, fines, headman to inflict the taxes from the high taxes since the kadkhuda collected of each household. the contribution and assessed locality

After the creation IRANIAN STUDIES

of a centralized 272

state,

the landlord

lost these traditional powers but gained new levers of control. He could now use the kadkhudi to handpick conscripts for the army, the gendarmerie to trump up criminal charges, of the Justice Ministry to arrest and the local officials and convict troublesome tenants. Moreover, in some regions he extracted labor services (bigril), demanding sharecroppers to transport his share of the crop, to graze cattle, to build houses, and to repair roads, bridges, and irrigation canals. In other regions, he exacted dues in kind, requiring firewood, eggs, hens, butter, and other agricultural products. In yet other regions, he levied such "seasonal" dues as for new year celebrations, weddings of tenAs Ann ants, and entertainment of visiting dignitaries. Lambton has stated: "In many cases the actual amount of these dues is not heavy, but they reflect the continuance of a medieval attitude of mind and of the survival of the medieval type of social organization."49 Furthermore, the landlord could often circumvent and undermine the sharecroppers' cultivating rights since these rights--unlike manorial contracts in medieval Europe--were usually unwritten and therefore precarious. For example, the landowner could allot the sharecroppers the worst land, for the cultivating rights did not specify the piece of land. He could deny them seed, water, and, through the gavbands, plough animals. He could exert pressure on the boneh leaders--who were appointed by the mubasher--to exclude specific peasants from the production teams. He could refuse to have the cultivation rights passed onto heirs. He could even deny the legality of these rights unless the tenants owned houses and gardens. Ann Lambton writes that landlords "discouraged" the cultivation of gardens since the ownership of gardens and houses gave the peasants a limited degree of "security": "Whenthe landlord wishes to evict them, he has to buy the trees, vines, etc., and any building the peasant may have put up."50 Finally, the landlord could always threaten to recruit landless laborers and thus to weaken the bargaining position of the As Eric Hooglund observes, the presence sharecroppers. of a large number of landless laborers strengthened the hand of the landlords: "Challenges to the inequalities of crop distribution of authority and the arbitrariness 273

Vol.

XI,

1978

were futile and economically disastrous since landlords could always transfer the nasaq rights of unruly peasants laborers."151 Robert Alto more submissive agricultural study of a village near Tehberts, in an anthropological ran, summarizes the pervasive power of the landlord. keeps the tenant in line is rilWhatprincipally giditx of the system which for him means lack of peasant may be The recalcitrant alternatives. penalized by economic sanction, since the local to whom he is surely merchant or money-lender, is typically the landlord in another indebted, to another area-He may be transferred guise. rotate tenants periodically and many landlords

as a purely prophylactic means of frustrating He mav also be assigned inclique alignment. ferior land. The peasant who proves overly trouIt is the blesome may be permanentlv ejected. threat of this--a fate worse than usury, penury, abject status or hard labor--which seems to acThe outcast tenant count for resigned servilitv. indigent soul with a unskilled, is an illiterate, It is no family to support and nowhere to turn. accident that a high percentage of beggars, petty criminals, and social misfits in the cities as village have rural background and histories troublemakers .5Z of the landlord's implications The sociopolitical surin the Tehran University economic pow.er is illustrated of Birjand, Qasr-i, Shirin, vev of the seven rural districts Asked Hamadan, Sanandaj, Garmsar, Golpayegan, and Sari.53 64 percent of exactions," why they "endured the landlord's 8 per19 percent "respect," cited "fear," 1,418 respondents and 8 percent "respect for the law." Of cent "attachment,"

the respondents percent said lord because

who cited

"respect" and "attachment,"

17

supported their landthat the) had willingly he had backed them against other sharecroppers

in local disputes; 17 percent said he had given them emergency loans and free advice; and 10 percent said he had Of the respondents who cited mediated village quarrels. "fear," almost all mentioned the dread that the landlord IRANIAN STUDIES

274

would take away their right of cultivation, deny them irrigated water, fabricate criminal charges, and sow dissension between themselves and their neighbors. To borrow Eric Wolf's words, the sharecropper in Iran, like the poor peasant in other countries, was "completely within the power redomain of his employer," and, thus, lacked "sufficient insources" to assert even a minimum degree of political dependence. 2.

Market Economy

The villages of early nineteenth-century Iran were, as leading authorities have often stressed, "economically "55 "predominantautonomous, "54 "virtually self-contained, ly self-governing,"56 and "practically self-sufficient."57 Travelers from Europe frequently noted not only that villages were geographically isolated by long distances, difficult terrain, rugged mountains, inhospitable deserts, nonexistent roads, and bandit-infested routes, but also that many villages preferred to remain as far as possible isolated economically, socially, and politically from the rest of the country. De Bode noted in the 1840s that the establishment of security on the Tehran-Tabriz highway had encouraged a number of villages to forsake their homes for more distant regions inaccessible to outsiders, especial"In Persia the richest villages ly tax collectors: are generally in some retired valley in the mountains or far from the highroads."58 a report to the British Similarly, Foreign Office observed that few villages "prospered" near main roads since peasants were more than eager to resettle in areas inaccessible to "pestering" tax collectors.59 Consequently, villages--unless located near large towns--tended to produce much of their manufactured goods as well as agricultural commodities. They not only grew and produced dairy foods, but staple crops, raised cattle, As also manufactured house and agricultural implements. Eric Hooglund has commented: "Traditionally, village arall the non-food products utilized tisans made virtually by the peasant; shoes, copper utensils, earthenware, cutand agricultural tools.",60 lery, wooden furniture, More275

Vol.

XI, 1978

over, many rural communities also made their own clothing. found that large villages James Fraser, English visitor, and cotton to produce coarse in Khurasan grew mulberries for local consumption.61 silk and rough cotton clothes observed through Baluchestan, traveling Henry Pottinger,

that "village

women attend to household affairs--milking,

and ghee, and they also weave felts cheese, making butter, Sir Percy Sykes, touring the and coarse white cloth."62 found century, country in the early part of the twentieth continued to produce their that villages to his surprise

own food and clothing, even though many had started to grow commercial crops, such as opium, to pay their taxes in trade that did exist was limited to cash.63 The little foreign goods in transit through Iran and to luxury proBut ducts en route from one city to another major city. as Arthur Arnold, an Englishman, discovered in the 1870s of improving communithe profitability when investigating cations, the volume of trade within Iran was too small to justify the construction of modern means of transport.64 The growth of trade with Europe in the second half the nineteenth century gradually eroded the self-suffiof As foreign products-villages. ciency of the traditional glasswares, and mass-manufactured textiles, particularly metal goods--flooded the country, and as native goods--escommodities such as opium, tobacco, pecially agricultural customers abroad, raw cotton, hides and dried fruits--found the regional economies merged into the national economy and the national economy merged with the international economy. By the beginning of the twentieth century, many peasants went to market towns to sell their crops and to buy in return not only manufactured commodities but also goods as tea, sugar, spices, and tobacsuch agricultural co. Production for sale had augmented production for consumption. The commercial economy had supplemented the precommercial economy.65 The formation of the market-economy, however, failed to enlarge the horizons of the "inward-looking" communities. This failure can be explained by a number of socioFirst, the problems of communication economic factors. terrain continued well into the contemthrough difficult IRANIAN STUDIES

276

porary era. For example, the important road between the southern port of Khorramshahr and Tehran was so slow even at the beginning of the twentieth century that it was quicker to travel from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea by boat, from Erzerum to the Caspian by land, from Baku to Enzeli (Pahlavi) by boat again, and finally from Enzeli to Tehran by land. Many villages remained isolated until the construction of rural roads in the 1950s, the introduction of transistor radios in the 1960s, and the rapid extension of government agencies in the 1970s. Second, the birth of the market-economy did not mean the automatic death of the traditional subsistence economics. For the peasant, with his extremely low standard of living, had little surplus to sell, and, consequently, little income to consume. Investigating the development of capitalism in rural Iran, Farhad Khamsi has found that even as late as the 1960s subsistence farming dominated over coammercial farming: Regional specialization based on commodity exchange had developed on only a very limited scale and then in only a few areas. Approximately 87.2 percent of the area under temporary and fodder crops was devoted to subsistence crops. It is clear that exchange between the various provinces, and therefore between the peasant masses, was still at a minimum, and that, consequently, the peasants consumed a good part of their produce themselves.66 Third, the need for irrigation perpetuated the need for village organizations. As Khosrow Khosravi has stressed, the reliance on irrigation works necessitated communal solidarity and village cooperation.67 Peasants continued to farm in production teams; to depend on communal pastures, wells, and woods; to appoint village shepherds, water regulators, and field watchmen; to settle disputes through the mediation of local headmen and elders; and to work jointly in the repair of village mosques, bridges, ditches, and irrigation streams. According to Ann Lambton, these communal organizations were survivals from the ancient past

277

Vol.

XI,

1978

were entirely when villages outside landlords.68

self-regulating

and free of

Fourth, the village structures were reinforced in Although observers many regions by tribal organizations. often consider tribesmen to be synonymous with nomads and Kurds, distinct from peasants, yet many tribesmen--especially Lurs, Baluchis, Afshars, Arabs, and Turkomans--lived not as And although nomads but as permanently settled villagers. do not reveal figures for tribal statistics the official (the peasants, one can subtract the nontribal villagers Azeri, Gilaki, and Mazandarani peasants) Persian-speaking, on this measure, the from the total number of villagers; tribal peasantry formed as much as 30 percent of the setwith These tribal organizations, tled rural population. and social ethos, their kinship ties, mythical histories, not only reinforced the communal village organizations, but also connected the tribal peasant to his kadkhuda, regional tribal chief (khan), and, among some chief (kalantar), Thus, tribal ties groups, supreme tribal chief (illkhan). helped to bridge the wide class divisions between landlords and peasants. and ethnic differences religious, Fifth, linguistic, and tribal difeconomic, at times compounded geographical, As observers have often commented, Iran is a ferences. mosaic of diverse languages, tribes, ethnic groups, and reIn the central plateau, for example, some ligious sects. spoke Persian, Bakhtiyari, or various dialects of villages of or the Qashqayi dialect Luri; others Arabic, Baluchi, Turkish; yet others Armenian, Georgian, or the Azeri diaof Khurasan inlect of Turkish. The peasant population cluded Persians, Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs, Afshars, Azeris, and Shahsavens. Baluchis, Timurs, Jamshids, Afghans, Tajiks, Even when a region appeared to be homogeneous ethically, affiliain terms of religious it was often heterogeneous for example, some In the western Kurdish regions, tions. others Sunni; some orthodox Twelver were Shi'ite, villages some All-Allihis; others unortlhodox extremist Shilites,

These differences, Qaderi Sunnis, others Naqshbandi Sufis. within on one hand, strengthened the communal solidarity the village,

and, on the other

IRANIAN STUDIES

278

hand, widened

the social

distance

between the village

and the surrounding population.

Sixth, periodic attacks by nomadic tribesmen instilled among the peasantry the feeling that their village was an isolated oasis in a desert of social chaos. For whenever bad weather or high taxes reduced the nomadic tribes to desperation, they usually tried to plunder either the main roads or the available local villages. In describing the province of Fars during World War II, the British Consul in Shiraz vividly summedup the rural fears, tensions, and conflicts: Of diverse origins, brave traditions, and mixed tongues, the inhabitants live in an unstable equilibrium whose balance once more is determined one way or the other by force of arms. Old blood-feuds and half-buried quarrels are apt to erupt with destructive fury; whilst the strength of the weaker tribes is ever provoked and their patience sorely tried by the raids, incursions or exactions of their more powerful neighbours. Those who are settled in rich lands have little to gain and everything to lose from lawlessness; and from having been rich feeding ground for Government officials they are now the tempting prey of irresponsible nomadic tribes. Whether villager or nomad, man must bear arms and be brave to survive.69 To survive, villages built fortifications, high walls, narrow gates, and winding alleyways;70 paid "protection money" to local nomads;71 and, most important of all, sought the assistance of their landlords who normally enjoyed considerable influence both among the local tribal chiefs and among the provincial government administrators.72 In the words of Ann Lambton, the peasants needed the landlord to ward off new hardships, even though no "spirit of cooperation" existed between the two and the latter viewed the former as "drudges" whose primary function was to provide him with his profit.73 For many a peasant, exploitation by the landlord was a grievous burden, but a bearable one compared with the destruction that the nomads could inflict. In the eyes of the modern viewer, landlords were exploiters, 279

Vol.

XI,

1978

rulers, and oppressors; peasants But in the eyes and oppressed. ditional viewer, landlords were and "patriarchs"; peasants were

were exploited, ruled, of the conservative tra"patrons," "protectors," "proteges," "clients,"

and "vassals. "74 In the words of Barrington Moore, the and peasants helped to direct "links" between landlords rather than "radinto "conservative" solidarity" "village ical" channels.75 did their very best to perthe landlords Finally, They discouraged of the villages. petuate the insularity to by denying rights of cultivation mobility geographical In fact, nasaq rights were conabsentee sharecroppers. They restricted privileges."76 sidered to be "residential the sharepeasant contact with the market by controlling found that Safinezhad towns. local the in sales croppers' even in the early 1960s some bonehs could not trade their perbazaars without the special surplus in the regional They limited peasant dealings mission of the mubasher.77 as the by opposing such projects even with state officials Ismail Ajami writes that schools. of village construction would not even let government agents "some big landlords Moreover, they narrowed peasant into their villages."78 conworld by making the kadkhuda the official relations communities. the and neighboring the village tact between study of the Boir in an anthropological Reinhold Loffler, tried to hinder horizontal Ahmadi argues that landlords mediation between peasants and instead channeled all reor their representathrough themselves verticallv lations the landlord had "In order to secure their control, tives: which could the peasant from all contacts to try to isolate forms other to or access give them influence potentially "inward-looking" remained villages Thus, of mediators."79

as late as the mid-twentieth ket-economy had started century. nineteenth

3.

century,

even though the mar-

to expand as early

as the mid-

Weak State

While Iran lacked and an "outward-oriented" IRANIAN STUDIES

"middle peasantry" a significant it was cerpopulation, village 280

Before the establishment tainly not without a weak state. of a modern state in the 1930s, the army was but a haphazard collection of tribal contingents led by their own kh.Ins, local militiae headed by regional magnates, and a small palace guard named the Cossack Brigade. As one Qajar Shah complained to his chief minister, "I have neither an army nor the ammunition to supply an army."80 And as a British visitor remarked in 1906 when urban demonstrations forced the Shah to grant the country a written constitution: "The Shah with his unarmed, unpaid, ragged, starving soldiers, what can he do in face of the menace of a general strike and riots?" .81 Moreover, the state bureaucracy--if it can be called that--was nothing more than ministers without administrative staffs, without provincial departments, and, sometimes, without even central ministries. The central government could not have crushed a large-scale peasant rebellion with its administration and army. But even though the central state was weak, the country did not experience any major peasant upheavals during the second half of the nineteenth century. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Reza Shah successfully created a modern autocratic state. Increasing the military budget and instituting mass conscription, he built a standing army of 18 divisions and over 100,000 men. Expanding and rationalizing the central administration, he established a state bureaucracy of 11 ministries and over 90,000 full-time government personnel. By 1940, the arm of the state reached out from the capital into every provincial town--although still not into every tribe and village community. This new state, however, was dramatically weakened by the Anglo-Soviet invasion of August 1941. As the army retreated in face of the better-equipped foreign forces, Reza Shah abdicated, peasant conscripts deserted, and the state lost its control over the countryThe British Consul at Shiraz, in describing the side. troubles of Fars, summedup the general situation in many rural regions: With the fall of Reza Shah, his much-prided infantry and armies lost morale and were overthrown by the tribes or quick to escape from the narrow val281

Vol.

XI,

1978

leys where they were quartered, fearful of the awakening wrath of those they had been obliged to oppress. The nomads rejoiced in a reaccession of freedom, and buried arms saw light again and were carefully cleaned. New rifles were bought, some sold by the army or arms traffickers, others seized in daring raids on outposts of the army and gendarmerie. Added to these were the many rifles of the deserters, some of whom had been conscripted from the tribes and were quick to return to their tents. The rearmament race had begun.82 Meanwhile, in the cities, members of the intelligentsia formed numerous radical organizations to mobilize the urban masses. Of these, the most successful was the Tudeh Party. Founded by young Marxist intellectuals, the Tudeh Party soon attracted veteran labor organizers--many of whomhad been jailed by Reza Shah--and gradually created a powerful trade union movement. By 1945, the Tudeh Party and its labor affiliates, the Central Council of United Trade Unions, coordinated 186 different occupational associations claiming over 400,000 members--including 75 percent of the country's industrial labor force, and had branches in all the 80 towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The strength of the Tudeh Party can be gauged by the size of its rallies which took place simultaneously on May Day 1946 in 20 major towns: its rally in Tehran drew 50,000 participants; in Isfahan, 40,000; and in Abadan, 80,000. Impressed by the demonstrations, the NewYork Times estimated that the Tudeh Party could obtain in a free election as much as 40 percent of the vote.83 While successfully organizing the urban workers, the Tudeh Party also tried to appeal to the rural masses. Its official program called for the immediate distribution of state and crown lands among the peasants; the gradual buying of large private estates by the state and their sale at low interest rates to the landless peasantry; the retention of a larger share of the harvest by the sharecroppers; the election of the kadkhuda by the community; the formation of an agricultural bank and village cooperatives IRANIAN STUDIES

282

village to help farmers; and the building of rural clinics, projects.84 Moreover, the party schools, and irrigation formed a Peasant Union along the lines of the Central Council of Trade Unions and sent workers and students into the Furthermore, the countryside to organize the villagers. to party used the Peasant Union and its mass publications "awaken" the peasantry from "the dark sleep of the Middle Ages." The party proclamations continually argued along these, 1ines: Your landlords are determined to keep you peasants ignorant and backward. For they know well that men who are aware of their rights will actively resist while men who are unaware of their exploitation Unforturights will meekly accept exploitation. nately, they have succeeded in keeping you ignorant, This backward and thereby, passive. illiterate, situation will not improve until you wake up from the sleep of ignorance.85 and If you think that exploitation Peasants! are misyou and permanent, are natural oppression In other parts of the world, peasants have taken. aroused themselves, formed organizations, overthrown the rule of the landlords, and, thus, raised their It is time the peasants of Iran standard-of-living. did the same.86 The Tudeh was unable to atThese appeals failed. As tract any significant following among the peasantry. a party leader admitted, villagers formed less than 2 perThe Peasant rank and file.87 cent of the organization's Union took root in only a few regions, mainly in Gilan and in villages near large industrial centers. But these rural unions, unlike the urban unions, were easily crushed in 1946-1948 when the government struck to destroy the Tudeh. Moreover, the contingents sent into the countryside invariably returned empty-handed. In trying to explain these one party leader years later argued that the failures, Tudeh had lacked cadres with rural backgrounds able to speak the same languages and dialects as the peasants, to understand their needs, to voice their demands, and, theretask of mobilizing them into by, accomplish the difficult 283

Vol.

XI,

1978

Another party leader argued that viable organizations.88 too the peasantrv had been "too passive, too illiterate, ignorant, and too fearful of change to be able to even perof a social transformation."89 ceive the possibility Although these explanations contain more than a grain They of truth, they ignore the main reason for the failure. lacked a social ignore the fact that almost all villages group, namely a middle peasantrv, that was able and willThis is iling to challenge the power of the landlords. lustrated by a minor but indicative incident which occurred in August 1945 in the v'illage of Liqvan twenty-five As the vear's harvest season ended, miles outside Tabriz.90 a vigorous campaign against landthe Tudeh Party initiated lords, sending cadres into select villages to encourage peasants not to give up any portion of the crop. Liqvan owrner, was specially chosen because its eighty-year-old the against fought having for notorious was Haji Ehtesham, movement and for being, in the words of the constitutional The TuBritish consul, "a feudal lord of the old school." not by enthusiasdeh cadres were received in the village, tic peasants eager to throw off the yoke of their master, but bv the landlord himself with his extended familv, his and his sharecroppers, who, according to armed retainers, the British consul, "stood solidly behind their lord." In Haji Ehtesham's men fired, the subsequent confrontation, two, and forcing the wsounding members, Tudeh four killing the Tueffectively, Unable to retaliate others to flee. choice but to hold mass funerals in deh Party had little Tabriz and send letters to the central government demandThe ing action against "local reactionary feudalists." Tudeh Partv, thus, failed not for the want of trying nor for the absence of a weak state, but for the lack of an adequate peasant response. Jangali

Movement

in

Gilan91

While the peasantrv in modern Iran is noted for its during the the peasantry in Gilan, especially "passivity," This Jangali movement, is famous for its rebelliousness. and in Gilan general of an analvsis exception necessitates IRANIAN STUDIES

284

of the in the troops started Khan.

The Jangali movement began Jangalis in particular. early years of World War I as Russian and British occupied the main cities of Iran. The movement was by a dynamic preacher from Rasht named Mirza Kuchek An armed volunteer in the constitutional revolution,

Mirza Kuchek Khan in 1909 had joined the proclerical Moderate Party in opposition to the secular Democratic Party. At the outbreak of the war, he established contact with of-

ficials of the Ottoman Empire, formed a Committee of Islamic Unity, and, with weapons obtained from German and Turkish agents, led an armed band into the forests of Gilan to wage guerrilla war against the Russians. He was soon joined by two other bands. The first, headed by a minor Kurdish chief named Khalu Qorban, consisted of Kurds who had been forced out of Kermanshah after an unsuccessful military campaign against the British. The second, formed of Democrats from Tehran, was led by Ehsanollah Khan, a young intellectual who had been influenced by revolutionary political thought, especially anarchism, while studying law in Paris. These three groups, despite their differences, managed to work together against the occupying armies. They harassed the Russian and British troops, published in Rasht a clandestine paper called Jangal, and arrested government officials suspected of collaborating with the foreigners. Moreover, they consciously tried to build a popular base among the rural population. They increased the sharecropper's portion of the harvest, lightened labor services, abolished dues in kind, investigated complaints against landowners, recruited peasants into their bands, paid for the food they obtained in the villages, and even forced wealthy collaborators to distribute some of their estates among the peasantry. A member of the British expeditionary army sent to northern Iran described Kuchek Khan as the "Robin Hood of the Caspian marshes" who "robbed the rich to feed the poor."'92 The Jangalis were strengthened further by the collapse of the Tsarist Regime. As the Russian armies disthe rebels assumed control over much of Gilan, integrated, including Rasht and Enzeli, obtained additional weapons, 285

Vol.

XI,

1978

Moreover, as the Red and recruited more local volunteers. Army chased the remnants of the White Armies into the Caspian provinces, the rebels found new allies in the recent1y formed Communist Party of Iran. Transferring its headquarters from Baku to Gilan, the Communist Party reinforced the Jangalis with its own armed volunteers, most of whom and oil were Azeri-speaking Iranians, both intellectuals workers, residing in the Caucasus. The party was headed enelectrical by Heydar Khan cAmuUghlu, a Tiflis-educated gineer who had ioined the Russian Social Democratic Party, revolution in Iran, and helpfought in the constitutional ed organize the Democrat Party in Tehran. Allying with the Communists, the Janglalis in June 1920 declared the formation

of the Soxiet

Socialist

Republic

of Iran.

The new

cabinet of Democrats, republic was headed by a coalition Meanwhile, its armv Communists, and local Muslim leaders. was commandedby Mirza Kuchek Khan, of some 1,500 guerrillas Ehsanollah Khan, khalu Qorban, and Communist representatives. soon broke the united front Internal contradictions lWfhilethe Communists and the more radical Democrats apart. of land among the called for the imnediate distribution supporters talked peasantry, Kuchek Khan and his religious While the Comof the Islamic sanctity of private property. campaign and championed an anticlerical munists initiated "Principles, not the rights of women, Kuchek Khan declared: movements. In the past, the weapons, generate political that haxe generated the most meaningful politiprinciples cal movements in Iran haxe been those of Sacred Islam."93 came to a head after February 1921, when These differences Colonel Reza Khan of the Cossack Brigade, the future Reza Shah of Iran, ov-erthrew the government in Tehran, denounced former agreements with Britain, signed a pact with the Russian Bolsheviks, negotiated the evacuation of the Red Army, and and extended the hand of friendship to all patriotic progressive groups in Iran. The Communists and many of the Treaty, were Democrats, convinced by the Soviet-Iranian But KuchekKhan, hand of friendship. willing to accept this and foreign intentions, of Cossack officers, distrustful refused to negotiate with the new gov'Tehran politicians, Kuchek Khan murdered ernment. Suspecting double-dealing, Haydar Khan, tried to murder Khalu Qorban, and forced EhIRANIAN STUDIES

286

sanollah Khan to evacuate with the Red Arm'. Left without allies and confronted with an expeditionary force from Tehran, Kuchek Khan retreated to the snow-covered mountains of Gilan where he froze to death during the bitter winter of 1921. B- December 1921, Kuchek Than's head was on public display in Rasht to prove to all that the Jangali movement had ended and to preempt future rebels from taking on the guise of the dead hero. Although Kuchek Khans failed to appear, the Jangali mo-ement rexviv-ed brieflv during World War II. WViththe weakening of the central government, survivors from the earlier movement regrouped under the name of the Jangali Party. They demanded the convening of provincial assemblies, elimination of court influence in politics, and distribution of crown and state lands among the peasantry.94 Moreover, they formed a Farmer's Association and allied with the Tudeh Party and its Peasant Union. Bv 1943, the local branch of the Tudeh, together with the Jangali Party, controlled much of Gilan and the adiacent districts of Mazandaran. While their trade unions dominated the tow.ns, their peasant organizations and armed militiae controlled the countryside, setting up roadblocks, imposing fines on landlords, and successfully' encouraging sharecroppers not The British Anbasto give up any share of the harvest.95 sador wrote in alarm that the control of affairs in Gilan was rapidly passing out of the hands of the central government into that of local committees and soxviets dominated by the Tudeh Party'.96 This situation continued until after the end of World War II, when the Soviet troops evacuated the region, allowing the Iranian army to reassert central A foreign Xvisitor to Gilan in 1947 reported authoritv-. that although "few now dared to even whisper the name of the Tudeh Party-," many-peasants were deeply influenced by the demands of the party, especially- the demand to increase and schools, the sharecropper's clinics portion, open village and eliminate the "hated" gendarmerie. 9 One peasant implied to avisitor that the local landow%ner, "who was celebrated in the province," as one of the most benevolent kept a car

and frequently- repaired could

make a quick

the road to his village

getaway' in the event

287

so that he

of a new uprising.98

Vol.

XI,

1978

The existence of a radical peasantry in Gilan can be explained bv a number of geographical and socioeconomic The Caspian provinces, unlike many other regions factors. Wheresoil and abundant rainfall. of Iran, enjoy fertile as much of the countrx receives less than ten inches of rain a year and the central plateau no more than five inches, the Caspian region obtains as much as thirtv inches.99 together with rich soil, permits high High precipitation, yields, which, in turn, permits high populaagricultural According to the 1956 census, the density tion density. of population for the whole of Iran was 11.5 persons per square kilometer; for Baluchestan, 2.4; for Fars, 8.9; but for Gilan, it was as high as 33.5 persons per square kilometer.100 The same census shows that the mean population of a villlage in Iran was 265 persons; in Fars, 277; in Kerman, 135; in West Azerbaijan 215; but in Gilan, 425 perin Gilan Moreover, manx of the 3,076 villages sons.101 are separated from each other not by long distances and terrain, as in many other parts of Iran, but by difficult Furthermore, the rice paddies, wood, and grazing lands. and the easy comRussia to Gilan of proximity geographical munications over the Caspian Sea led to the early introducEven as early as the 1870s, tion of commercial agriculture. in Gilan Russian traders were encouraging the cultivation of silk, cotton, rice, tea, jute tobacco, and other cash As Khamsi has observed, geography helps explain crops. why Gilan was the first province in Iran to develop rural capitalism. 102 These geographical factors had far-reaching consequences that produced both "outward-looking" villages and The densitv of populaa discontented "middle peasantry." and the higher of the villages, tion, the accessibility productivity encouraged the early growth of local trade. Even in the first half of the nineteenth century when communities in other parts of Iran were predominantly selfGilan was famous for its rural fairs, festivals, sufficient, The development of foreign commerce in the and bazaars.103 second half of the century not only stimulated local commerce, but also introduced modern communications. For example, the Russians modernized the port of Enzeli, laid a railwaxv line between Enzeli and Rasht, and paved the road IRANIAN STUDIES

288

between Enzeli and Tehran. Consequently, manv villages by 1900 enj oed easy access to local market towns. A number of other socioeconomic factors encouraged in Gilan. First the development of outward-looking villages homogeneity of the rural population, 95 perthe linguistic cent of whomspeak the Gilaki dialect of Iranian, faciliSecond, the tated social intercourse among the villages. complete absence of settled tribes meant that villages Third, the abunlacked tightly; knit tribal organizations. dance of rain diminished the importance of water distribution, and, thereby, lessened the crucial role of village Gilan was one of the few areas in Iran that organizations. had neither bonehs nor continual rotation of land among the Fourth, Gilan's higher standard of living compeasants. pared to other rural regions of the country left the peasConsequently, vilantry with a larger surplus to sell. lages formed direct and constant ties with the modern marFinally, the literacy rate was slightly highket-economy. er in rural Gilan compared with other rural regions of Iran. The 1956 census estimated that of the nonurban population in Gilan, over the age of eight, 6 percent was literate 4.9 percent in Wsest Azerbaijan, 4.2 percent in East AZerbaijan, 3.5 percent in Kurdestan, and 3.2 percent in Baluchestan. 104 Whereas the villages were more outward looking than most rural communities in Iran, the large landlords tended to be less dominant. Thev did not wield omnipotent control over the means of production, since agriculture relied not on expensixve qanats but on small streams and natural rainThey had been unable to intimidate the peasantry bv fall. rights; for, before threatening to withdraw cultivation the growth of population, the sharecroppers had been able new fertile lands; nor to cut dowinforests and cultivate since the could they use kinship ties with the villagers, funcThey served no protective peasantry was not tribal. did not have to contend with tion, for the local villages a nomadic danger and did not even bother to fortifv themselves with high walls. Moreover, the landlords did not own as large estates as they did in many other parts of founIran. In Gilan, the crownl, the state, the religious 289

Vol.

XI,

1978

dations, and the Cumdeh milek together owned only 28 percent of the villages; but the khurdeh milek and other small holders owned as much as 50 percent of the villages.105 The weak position of the landlords vis-a-vis the peasants had discouraged sharecropping and encouraged land leasing on fixed rents. Khamsi shows that rented holdings were "prevalent" in the two Caspian provinces and 66 percent of all small holdings (less than 10 hectares) were found in Gilan and Mazandaran.106 Even in the 1870s the British consul in Rasht recognized the relatively more secure position of the local peasantry: In Ghilan, one of the richest and most productive districts of Persia, where, on account of its rich vegetation, almost every plant or tree wvill grow, the lower classes have no reason to be unhappy. Few of them, it is true possess land, but the arrangements they make with the landowners are all to their If they engage to clear a piece of jungle, advantage. they divide the produce of the land with the owmer of the ground ....As little supervision can be at all times exercised over the villlager, he naturally contrives to secure for himself a good portion of the crop. The advantages the peasant derives from his He vocation are not inconsiderable. agricultural can cut downm wood in the jungle--that is, the nesell glected part of his landowner's estates--and it on his ownm account. His cows and sheep can browse freely in those parts that are not under cultivation; he can make charcoal without let or hindrance; he can produce vegetables around his hut, and reap all the benefits arising therefrom; he can rear poultry and sell it on his own account; and last, but not least of all, he can dispose of the fruit which grows in abundance on the estate without consulting the owner of the land.107 Thus by the beginning of the twentieth century, Gilan conTrue this peastained a special type of middle peasantry. antry did not own land, yet its relatively higher standard of living compared with other parts of the country, its IRANIAN STUDIES

290

long land leases (often gaining position against from labor services and all combined to give it ence and social status.

at fixed rents), its favorable barthe landlords, and its freedom fear of losing cultivation rights, a considerable degree of independ-

The gradual growth of population during the twentiin the mareth century, together with sudden fluctuations in the Russian trade, created disket-economy, especially content among the middle peasantry. It is estimated that the population of Gilan doubled during the second half of the nineteenth century. This placed heavy pressures on the available land, decreasing the size of holdings, increasing the numbers of landless, and, inevitably, producing land hunger. A research group from Tehran University found that of the total holdings in Gilan and Mazandaran in 1960, 15 percent were less than 0.5 hectares, 14 percent between 0.5 and 1 hectares, 33 percent between 1 and 2 hectares, and 21 percent between 2 and 3 hectares.108 While the population pressures on land increased, the few major landlords retained their large estates, especially lucrative tea and tobacco plantations, and the small absentee landlords continued to collect rents from the hard-squeezed peasantry. Since these landowners performed no useful function, such as protecting villagers from nomads, finanfrom ficing irrigation works, and protecting cultivators nancial disasters, the peasants viewed them not as "patrons" but as "parasites." To borrow the words of Barrington Moore, there were no "natural bases of respect" between the landlords and the peasants in Gilan.10B Thus Gilan, unlike the rest of Iran, produced a radical peasantry for much the same reasons as Russia, China, Vietnam, Mexico, and many other countries. It contained a middle peasantry that was independent of the large landlords and the state, was equipped with the minimum leverage required to challenge the establ'ishment, and was hit hard by the impact of commercial agriculture. Its villages were outward looking, relati'vely free of landlord and directly domination, closely tied to other villages, integrated into the market-economy. Consequently, the vilbut also aware of the lages were not only discontented, 291

Vol.

XI,

1978

discontent of other villages. Moreover, the discontented peasantry in Gilan, as in the rest of Iran, did not have to fear a strong central state during much of the modern era, especially between 1914 and 1921, and again between 1941 and 1946. Conclusion

Russia, China, Yugoslavia, and many others, experienced peasant rebellions because they contained three explosive ingredients: a weak state, a discontented middle peasantry, and a rural population formed of "outward looking" villages. Modern Iran, on the other hand, did not experience any large-scale peasant upheavals mainly because it lacked the latter two of these three essential ingredients. For although its state was weak until the late 1920s and again in the 1940s, its countryside contained neither a middle peasantry nor a network of "outward looking" villages. The absence of a middle peasantry can be attributed to a variety of geographical, economic, and social presLack of adequate rainfall, sures. high cost of irrigation and predominance canals, competition from urban investors, of large absentee landlords united to limit the number of medium-sized independent farmers. The rural population, thus, was formed not of landed peasants but of tenant sharelaborers. croppers and agricultural The survival of the traditional "inward-looking" villages into the modern era can be explained partly by the predominance of subsistence agriculture which weakened the dissolving effects of the market economy, and partly by a combination of geographical, ethnic, and organizaRural distances, tional factors. transport difficulties, linguistic differences, religious diversities, regional and rivalries, kinship networks, communal organizations, tribal antagonisms, together helped to perpetuate the "inward looking" villages. villages

The lack of middle peasants had far-reaching political

IRANIAN STUDIES

292

and "outward looking" The abconsequences.

sence of the former meant that the countryside developed no class with the minimum degree of economic security and social independence needed for challenging the authority of the central government and local landowners. On the contrary, the countryside was formed of tenant sharecroppers depended totally and landless laborers whose livelihoods Although unupon the "good-will" of the large landlords. der extraordinary circumstances the landless peasantry could be mobilized by outsiders into radical movements, under normal circumstances they were too dependent upon the actheir own political landowners to be able to initiate tion. They were the subjects, not the objects, of politics. helped the Finally, the lack of "outward looking" villages landlords keep the peasants isolated not only from other but also from urban radicals and even government villages, on one hand, developed loofficials. Village insularity, calism; and, on the other hand, prevented the development of cross-regional class consciousness. NOTES 1.

Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars in the Twentieth (New York, 1969), p. xxiii.

2.

British Consul in Tabriz to the Foreign Office, Tabriz Diaries (9 July 1943), British Foreign Office (F.O.) 371, Persia 1943, 80-35093.

3.

A. Lambton, The Persian p. 30.

4.

N. Keddie, "Stratification, Social Control, and CapiRural Politics and Social talism in Iranian Villages," Change in the Middle East, ed. R. Antoun and I. Harik (Bloomington, Ind., 1972), pp. 365-372. Describing Iranian villages in the 1850s, Lady Sheil commented: "There is considerable air of substantial comfort, which I often envied for our countrymen." Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia (London, 1856), p. 100.

5.

J.

Safinezhad,

Century

Land Reform (Oxford,

Talebabad 293

(Tehran,

1966),

pp. Vol.

1962),

136, XI,

336.

1978

6.

P. Vieille, 1975),

7.

J. Perkins, p.

8.

La feodalite pp. 51-56. Eight

et 1l'6tat

Years

in

Persia

en Iran

(Paris,

(New York, 1843),

284.

James Fraser, an early nineteenth-century traveler, found that whole villages often fled to escape high exactions: "In Persia, the seduction of peasantry from one district to another is held to be a deadly such attempts therefore are put down, crime....All where possible, by force, and bitter quarrels are often the consequence" of a Journey (Narrative into Khorasan [London, 1825], pp. 115-116, and A Winter's Journey from Constantinople to Tehran [London, 1838],

II, 289). This geographical mobility substantially decreased by the second half of the century partly because debts tied peasants to their landlords and partly because plagues no longer devastated whole regions. For a general discussion of peasants fleeing from landowners in Iranian history see I. Petroshevsky, Keshavarzi

va mun3sebat-i

arzi

dar

Iran:

CAhd-i

Mughul

[Agricultural and Agrarian Relations in Iran: The Mioghul Era], trans. from the Russian by K. Keshavarz (Tehran, 1965), II, pp. 156-190. 9.

10.

For example, Dad Shah, a notorious brigand who killed two American employees of the Point Four Program in hid among the Baluchi peasMlarch 1957, successfully antry until he was killed in a bloody confrontation with government troops in January 1958. Similar examples of bandits successfully evading government in forces can be found in most regions, especially the period before Reza Shah. During the upheavals of the constitutional revolution, British consuls reported only three incidents of peasIn Rasht, farmers from nearby villages ant protests. took sanctuary in the town mosque to protest high taxIn the Caspian town of Talesh, peasants demones. strating against high taxes burned the governor's manAnd in Yezd, two thousand villagers marched sion.

IRANIAN STUDIES

294

through

to protest again against high taxthe Correspondence Respecting Affairs of Persia, December 1906-October 1913 (London, 1914), I, 26, 43, 122, and 144. For a general discussion of public protests in this period see E. Abrahamian, "The Crowd in Iranian Politics, Past 1905-1953," and Present, 41 (December 1968), 184-210. During the turbulent the Iranian press reperiod of 1946-1963, Of these ported only 22 incidents of peasant protests. 22, 8 consisted of peaceful demonstrations in mosques, 4 involved rival villages, and only 10 directly challenged landowners. For a general discussion of political violence in this period see F. Kazemi, "Social Mobilization and Domestic Violence in Iran: 19461968" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, of University Michigan, 1973), pp. 195-205.

es.

the streets

See Great Britain,

11.

The Babi uprisings of the mid-nineteenth century also had some rural and peasant support. There was apparently strong rural backing for the Babi movement in parts of Mazandaran, Azerbaijan, and Isfahan provinces. The Babis, however, also enjoyed substantial support in the urban areas. See Farhad Kazemi, "Some Preliminary Observations on the Early Development of Babism," Muslim World, LXIII (April 1973), 119-131; Edward G. Browne, ed., A Traveller's Narrative Written to Illustrate the Episode of the Bab (New York, reprint. 1930); Edward G. Browne., ed., Materials for the Study of the Babi Religion (Cambridge, reprint. 1918).

12.

The Organization for Freedom Fighters of Iran, Rusta va inqilab-i sefid: Barres7-yi ingil3bishar5yit-i yi rusta-ha-yi Iran [Villages and the lWhite Revolution: An Investigation into the Revolutionary Situation of the Iranian Countryside] (n.p., 1971), p. x.

13.

Mao Tse-Tung, "Report on the Peasant in Revolutions: A Reader, reprinted (New York, 1971).

14.

For analytical

E. Wolf, Peasant

Movement (1927)," ed. B. Mazlish

studies of peasant rebellions see: Wars in the Twentieth Century (New 295

Vol.

XI,

1978

"Peasants and Revolution," ed. by R. Miliband and J. Saville (New York, 1965), pp. 240-265; H. Alavi, "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," Journal of Peasant Studies, I, 1 (October 1973), 23-61; J. (Princeand Revolution Politics, Migdal, Peasants, ton, 1974); B. Moore, Social Origins of Democracy York, 1969); H. Alavi, The Socialist

Register,

Lord and Peasant in the Making and Dictatorship: of the Modern World (Boston, 1966); J. Paige, Agrarian Revolution (New York, 1975); D. Zagoria, "Ecology of Peasant Communismin India," American Political Science Review, LXV, 1 (March 1971), 144-160; D. Za-

Issue on "Peasants and Revolution," VIII, 3 (April 1976); E. Wolf, MobiliIssue on "Peasants and Political

ed.,

Special

Comparative

Politics,

goria,

ed., Special zation," Comparative Studies in Society and History, XVII, 4 (October 1975); R. Stavenhagen, Social Class(New York, 1975); M. Beqiraj, es in Agrarian Societies (Ithaca, 1966); E. Hobsbawm, Peasantry in Revolution Journal of Peasant Studies, "Peasants and Politics," I, 1 (October 1973), 3-22; A. Stinchcombe, "Agrarian Enterprise and Rural Class Relations," Class, Status, and Power, ed. R. Bendix and S. Lipset (Glencoe, 1966); Factor," Peasants T. Shanin, "Peasantry as a Political ed. T. Shanin (London, 1971), and Peasant Societies, pp. 238-263. 15.

For social mobility in rural societies see A. Chaya1966). nov, The Theory of Peasant Economy (Illinois,

16.

Wolf, Peasant

17.

Ibid.,

p. 290.

18.

Ibid.,

p. 291.

19.

Alavi, "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," p. 28. In another article analyzing the role of the Communist Party in the Chinese Revolution, Alavi has argued that Mao Tse-Tung recognized the crucial role of the middle peasantry but defined them in such a See way as to include them among the poor peasantry.

IRANIAN STUDIES

Wars in the Twentieth

296

Century,

p. 291.

"Peasants

Alavi,

Peasant

and Revolution,"

p.

257. Century,

Wars in the Twentieth

p. 292.

20.

Wolf,

21.

Migdal,

22.

Zagoria,

23.

and Peasant RadiF. Ferguson, "Rural/Urban Relations and History, in Society Comparative Studies calism," XVIII, 1 (January 1976), pp. 106-117.

24.

Boneh (Tehran, J. Safinezhad, the boneh was known as sahra, kal, pagav, or darkar.

25.

Economic Development J. Bahrier, (Oxford, 1971), p. 27.

26.

EqteD. Homayoun, "Land Reform in Iran," Tahqiaat-i sadi, II, 5, 6 (September 1963), 18-25; S. Rasekh and Iran [The Sociology of J. Behnam, Jameceh shenasl-yi Iran] (Tehran, 1969), pp. 229-232; K. Khosravi, Jameof Iran [The Rural Sociology ceh shenas7-yi rdsta-yi Iran] (Tehran, 1972), pp. 28-29.

27.

of the FarmI. Ajami, "Land Reform and Modernization and Probin Iran," The Social Sciences ing Structure 1976), pp. 191-192. lems of Development (Princeton,

28.

H. Mahdavi, "Iran's Agrarian Problems" (Unpublished Harat a Seminar on Iranian Studies, paper delivered vard University, April 1965), pp. 20-22.

29.

A. Lambton, Landlord 1953), pp. 280-281.

and Peasant

30.

Lambton, The Persian

Land Reform,

31.

Khosravi, 139.

Peasants, "Peasants

Politics,

and Revolution, pp. 3-5.

and Revolution,"

J3meceh shen5si-yi

297

pp. 61-68.

In some areas, 1972). sarkar, payharaseh,

in Iran,

1900-1970

in Persia

(Oxford,

p. 24.

rust5-yl

Iran,

Vol.

pp.

136-

XI,

1978

[Rural Sociology

32.

K. VadiCi, Rusta shinasl-yi Iran] (Tehran, 1973).

33.

Rasekh and Behnam, Jameceh shengsl-yi

Iran

Iran,

of

pp. 232,

282. 34.

"Revolution Blanche" Terre , Payed. M. Mendras and Y. Tavernier 1969), p. 471.

B. Sternberg-Savel, sans et Politique,

(Paris, 35.

E. Hooglund, "The Effects of the Land Reform Program on Rural Iran, 1962-1972" (Unpublished Ph.D. disser1975), pp. 23-24. tation, Johns Hopkins University,

36.

CA. CAyin, "The Pahlevi Dynasty, Agricultural Land, and the Peasantry," Donya, XVI (February 1976), 7273.

37.

Keddie, "Stratification, ism in Iranian Villages,"

38.

Research Group at the Institute of Tehran University, Carz.1 nat5yej-i Social Research, Barresi-yi eql51;5t-i [A Study on the Effects of Land Reform] (Unpublished manuscript [Tehran, 1963]), pp. 300-301.

39.

Social Control, p. 373.

and Capital-

H. Goblot, "Le probleme de l'eau en Iran," The Econoed. by C. Issawi of Iran, 1800-1914, (Chicago, 1971), pp. 214-219.

mic History

40.

Area Handbook for Iran (WashingAmerican University, ton, D.C., 1971), pp. 381-395.

41.

Various estimates are given by R. Dillon, "Carpet Capitalism and Craft Evolution in Kirman" (Unpublished 1976), pp. 10Columbia University, Ph.D. dissertation, 11.

42.

L. Hayden, "Living Standards in Rural Iran," Middle III, 2 (April 1949), 140-150.

East Journal, 43.

Ibid.

IRANIAN STUDIES

298

44.

Hooglund, "Effects of the Land Reform Program on Rural Iran, 1962-1972, " pp. 39-40.

45.

Safinezhad,

46.

I. Ajami, Sheshdangi pp. 24-26.

47.

Vieille,

48.

Lambton writes: "It is not surprising that debt should be one of the curses of Persian rural life. The peasant is constantly in need of money for capital requirements, to replace livestock and agricultural implements, for seed, and for other current expenses .... The rates of interest are almost always exorbitant."

Talebabad,

La feodalite

Landlord

and Peasant

49.

Ibid.,

p. 339.

50.

Ibid.,

p. 302.

51.

Hooglund,

"Effects

pp. 83-90. [Six Dings] (Tehran, 1969), et 1'etat

in Persia,

en Iran,

p. 53.

p. 380.

of the Land Reform Program on Rural

Iran, 1962-1972, " p. 62. 52.

R. Alberts, an Iranian University

"Social Structure and Cultural Change in Village" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, of Wisconsin, 1963), p. 165.

53.

Tehran University, Research Social Research, Barresl-yi pp. 60-63.

54.

V. Nowshirvani

and A. Knight,

Group at the Institute of Car4, natayej-i eql1hat-i "The Beginnings

of Com-

mercial Agriculture in Iran" (Unpublished paper delivered at a Yale University Seminar, 1975), p. 2. 55.

A. Lambton, Islamic

Society

in Persia

(Oxford, 1954),

p. 8.

56.

N. Keddie, Historical to Agrarian Obstacles in Iran (Claremont, 1950), p. 5. 299

Vol.

Change

XI,

1978

57.

I. Harik, "The Impact of the Domestic Market on RuralUrban Relations in the Middle East," in Antoun and and Social Change in the Middle Harik, Rural Politics East,

p.

340.

(London,

58.

C. deBode, Travels 1845), II, 138.

59.

Foreign Office, "Report on Bushire" (reprinted in Issawi , The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914), pp. 227-228.

60.

E. Hooglund, "The Khwushnishin Population of Iran," VI, 4 (Autumn 1973), 234. Iranian Studies,

61.

Fraser, Narrative 379, 405.

62.

H. Pottinger, p. 73.

63.

P. Sykes, "Report on the Agriculture of Khorasan," reprinted in Issawi, The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, pp. 253-255.

64.

A. Arnold, Through Persia II, 45.

65.

ReE. Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional volution in Iran," forthcoming in the International Journal

in Luristan

of a Journey

Travels

and Arabistan

into

in Belochistan

Khorasan,

pp. 378-

(London, 1816),

by Caravan (London, 1877),

of Middle East Studies.

66.

F. Khamsi, "The Development of Capitalism in Rural Iran" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1968), p. 79.

67.

K. Khosravi, "Irrigation and Rural Society in Iran," cUlum-i Ijtimaci, I, 3 (February 1970), 48-56.

68.

Lambton, Landlord

and Peasant

342. IRANIAN STUDIES

300

in Persia,

pp. 3-4,

69. 70.

British Consul in Shiraz to the Foreign Office, "Report on Tribal Areas," F.O. 371, Persia 1944, 6844-155. X. De Planhol, nales

"Les villages

de Geographie,

71.

H. Rabino, p. 99.

72.

F. Barth,

67,

en Iran," An-

fortifies

1 (January

Mazandaran and Astarabad

The Nomads of Southern

1958),

256-258.

(London,

Persia

1928),

(New York,

1959), p. 80. and Peasant

in Persia,

73.

Lambton, Landlord

74.

For an analytical study of modern and traditional class relations see: A. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure

and Organizations,"

ed. J. March (Chicago, 75.

Moore, Social

Origins

pp. 263-265.

Handbook of Organizations,

1965), pp. 143-197. of Democracy and Dictatorship,

pp. 474-483. 76.

Safinezhad,

77.

Ibid.,

78.

Ajami, "Land Reform and Modernization of the Farming Structures in Iran," p. 191.

79.

R. LOffler,

pp. 87-89.

Peasant,"

1971),

Boneh, pp. 42-43.

"The Representative American Anthropologist,

Mediator and the New 73, 5 (October

1084-1085.

80.

M. Amin al-Dawleh, Khalerat-i oirs] (Tehran, 1962), p. 77.

81.

E. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Lonof the weak Qajar don, 1909), p. 137. For discussions state see: E. Abrahamian, "European Feudalism and Middle Eastern

Despotisms,"

siyasl

Science

[Political

and Society,

Mem-

XXXIX,

2 (Summer 1975), pp. 129-156; and E. Abrahamian, "The Crowd in the Persian Revolution," Iranian Studies, II, 301

Vol.

XI,

1978

4 (Autumn 1969), pp. 128-150. 82.

British Consul in Shiraz to the Foreign Office, "Report on Tribal Areas," F.O. 371, Persia, 1944, 6844155.

83.

New York Times,

84.

The Tudeh Party, "The Program of the Peasant Union," Rahbar, June 24, 1945; The Tudeh Party, "Program for the Peasantry," Rahbar, February 2, 1943; A. Qassemi, Hezb-i

Tudeh-i

June 15, 1946.

Iran cheh mlgyad

va cheh mlkh3had

[The Aims and Demands of the Tudeh Party] (Tehran, 1944), pp. 42-59. 85.

Peasant Union, "Peasants: 24, 1945.

86.

The Tudeh Party, March 3, 1943.

87.

CA. Kambakhsh, "The Tudeh Party's Struggle to Form a United and Democratic National Front," Donya, V (Autumn 1964), 6.

88.

CA. Kambakhsh, "The History of the Tudeh Party: From its Formation to the Birth of the Azerbaijan Movement," Donya, IX (Winter 1968), 32.

89.

P. Khalacatbari, "The Tudeh Party and the Peasants," Donya, IV (Autumn 1963), 68.

90.

Descriptions

Wake Up!," Rahbar, June

"Peasants of Azerbaijan!,"

of the incident

Rahbar,

have been obtained from:

The National Assembly, Muz5ker5t-i majles-i mell [Parliamentary Debates], 14th Majlis,

shura-yi

September 13, 1945; British Consul in Tabriz to the Foreign Office, "Tabriz Diaries (15 August 1945)," F.O. 371, Persia 1945, 80-45478.

91.

For detailed A. Kasravi,

descriptions T5rlkh-i

of the Jangali movement see:

hezhdah saleh-i

Eighteen Year History of Azerbaijan] IRANIAN STUDIES

302

Azerbaijan

[An

(Tehran, 1961);

ferqeh-i demokrat [An H. Jowdat, T5rikhcheh-i ical Sketch of the Democratic Party] (Tehran, I. Fakhraci, Sardar-i jangal [The Ruler of the (Tehran, 1969); M. Taherzadeh-Behzad, Qiyim-i jan dar inqelab-i

mashrutiyyat

jan during the Constitutional

Histor-

1969); Forest] Azerbai-

of Azerbai-

[The Revolt

(Tehran,

Revolution]

Farrokh [The siyasi-yi 1953); M. Farrokh, Khaterat-i Memoirs of Farrokh] (Tehran, 1969); M. TalePolitical qani , Duktur Heshmat keh bud? [Who Was Dr. Heshmat?|

(Tehran, n.d.); cA. Kambakhsh, "The October Revolution and the Liberation Movements in Iran," Donya, VIII (Summer 1967), 34-57; A. Shamideh, "Haydar Khan," Donya, IX (Spring 1970), 113-124; M. Akhundzadeh, "The Life of Akhundzadeh, " Donya, IX (Spring 1969), 55-58; 92.

I. Ra'in,

M. Donohoe,

with

Haydar Khan (Tehran, the

Persian

Expedition

1975). (London, 1919),

p. 127. 93.

The Revolutionary Iran

munisti-yi

(n.p. 94.

Tudeh Party of Iran, Junbesh-i [The Communist Movement in Iran]

ku-

1969), p. 23.

The Jangali Party, "The Proclamation of the Party," Donya, January 7, 1945; idem, "Telegraph to Tehran," Donya, January 14, 1945; N. Najami, "The Situation in Gilan," Donya, January 31, 1945; Editorial, so... ," Gileh Mard, May 10, 1946.

"Gilan Al-

95.

"Travels in Mazandaran and Gilan," CA. cAmidi-Nuri, 15, 1947. Dad, December 29, 1946-January

96.

"Three MonthAmbassador to the Foreign Office, British 1945," F.O. 371, Persia ly Report for July-September 1945, 45452-31.

97.

M. Hindus, pp. 68-69.

98.

Ibid.,

In Search

of

a Future

(New York,

1948)

p. 61.

303

Vol.

XI,

1978

99.

M. Ganji, "Climate," The Cambridge History of Iran, ed. W. Fisher (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 212-249.

100.

Ministry of Interior, Sarshumari-yi Cumumi-yi keshvar [Sunmary of the Population Census] (Tehran, 1960), I, 100-120.

101.

Ibid.

102.

Khamsi, "The Development of Capitalism Iran," p. 71.

103.

K. Khosravi, "Rural Bazaars in Iran," Rahnema-yi Ketab, 19, 1-3 (April-June 1976), 21-29.

104.

Ministry of Interior, var,

II,

sarshum5r2l-yi

CumUml.-yi kesh-

78.

105.

VadiCi, Rusta shenasl-yi

106.

Khamsi, "The Development of Capitalism Iran," p. 62.

107.

Quoted in Issawi, 1914,

in Rural

Iran,

p. 143.

Economic History

in Rural

of Iran,

1800-

p. 225.

108.

Research Group, "A Study of Rural Economic Problems IV, in Gilan and Mazandaran," Tahqiqat-i Eqtesadi, 11 and 12 (January 1969), 135-141.

109.

Moore, Social p. 470.

IRANIAN STUDIES

Origins

of Democracy and Dictatorship,

304

Iranian Studies, Volume Xl, 1978.

Class Power

Structure in

Iran

and Since

Political 1796

Nikki R. Keddie

The transformation in the structure of classes and of power in the past two centuries in Iran, as in manyThird World countries, can be seen as: (1) a change from a relastructure of power in which several diftively decentralized ferent groups and localities shared power to one in which power is concentrated in the center and is backed by a modernized army and bureaucracy, (2) a change from primarily in which the most homogenevertical divisions in society, ous groups--tribes, communities ulama, towns, and religious --comprise both rich and poor, to a division based on more horizontal class lines. These two changes go together and form part of the transformation often referred to under

Nikki R. Keddie is Professor of California, Los Angeles.

of History at the University

written in March, 1977, reNote: This article, places the paper given at the UCLAconference on the structure of power in Islamic Iran, 1969. I chose not to reprint that article since it was already published as "The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800-1969: An Overview," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, II (1971), pp. 3-20, and since its many references to the The present article is in the present are now outdated. same general area, but its approach is different, as are the examples used; it went to press before the events of 1978.

Author's

305

or "the such rubrics as "modernization," "westernization," impact of the West," although none of these terms is fully This paper attempts to outline the basic satisfactory. changes in modern Iran lines of these two sociopolitical developments there. and also to assess recent sociopolitical In addition to the premodern features of relative and of "estates" rather than modern class decentralization Iran also divisions commonto many Third World societies, Those are either special to exhibits individual traits. of semi-arid societies Iran alone or are characteristic found mainly in certain parts of the Middle East. The peexpressed culiar nature of premodern Iranian structures, in the power and independence of nomadic tribes and in a very decentralized power structure that gave rein to nongovernmental groups such as the ulama, owes much to the topography of Iran, which is partly duplicated in some In a schematic way the other parts of the Middle East. Middle East may be said to exist as a meaningful region not only because it roughly corresponds to the earliest region of Islamic conquest and empire, but equally because it is bordered by a desert fringe going through Central Asia, parts of Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq, into Arabia and through the Sahara. This fringe is heavily nomadic in population and, because of the mobility, scattered settlement, and armed independence of nomads, has been very Much of the for central governments to control. difficult rest of the Middle East forms a second band in which noMost of Iran forms madic and settled life is intermixed. in which difficulit is a region and band, of this part ties of communication owing to high mountains and the lack of navigable rivers, plus scattered settlement, have meant governments at best, until modern highly decentralized means of overcoming the transport problem were employed. Only in small areas of the Middle East--along the Nile, parts of the Syrian coast-in Lebanon, and the fertile dominate. In such settled agriculture did well-watered, areas in the premodern era easy communication with a metropolis existed and nomads were a minor element. From one viewpoint, then, Iran may be seen as typical of a band of Middle Eastern countries or territories IRANIAN STUDIES

306

in which pastoral nomads or transhumants made up a large part of the population who played an important military and political role, but which also had enough settled agcivilriculturalists to have been a largely agricultural surplus that helped ization, providing an agricultural In the premodern period it is difsupport many cities. ficult to speak of a single ruling group or class in Iran. the Rather, several groups held some power--particularly top strata of these groups. Amongthem, the shah and his bureaucracy (which was quite rudimentary before the 1920s) were only one group, although the most powerful single one. Also powerful were tribal leaders, the ulama, landlords, and merchants. The Safavid shahs (1501-1722) commanded very variable amounts of power, depending partly on their characters and partly on their relations to other powerful groups: the Turkish-speaking tribes, the armed forces, and in particular, the ulama. The second Safavid shah, Tahmasp, lost control over the Turkish tribes who had been the main supporters of the Safavid accession to power under Ismail in 1501, and it was only with Abbas the Great (15871629) that tribal dissension was subdued and a new armed force created with heavy reliance on an infantry of Armenian and Georgian converts, modeled on the Ottoman janisYet this Ottoman-inspired system was effective saries. only briefly, probably largely because armed nomadic tribes were more numerous and independent, and hence harder to a control in Iran than in the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, bureaucracy never developed in Iran to nearly the point it did in the Ottoman Empire. Only relatively few neceswere actually appointed by the center. sary officials Both before and after the Safavid period, and even during that period, the system was subject to long intervals of breakdown in which tribal forces and smaller tribal states came to the fore. If within the Safavid period itself, as in all Iranian dynasties from the eleventh century on, one can see the power and frequent military supremacy of nomadic tribes (who led or brought to power all dynasties until the Pahlavis), this nomadic power was clear in the eighteenth century, when tribal especially dynasties such as the Afshars, Zands, and Qajars vied for It is power, and nearly all military power was tribal. 307

Vol.

XI,

1978

possible that the first widespread use of rifles in Iran favored the tribes, whose moin that century initially bility and ability on horseback made them easy masters of the rifle.1 a territory containof centralizing The difficulty ing many armed tribes is not peculiar to Iran, but has been seen throughout many centuries in such areas as Morocco, Libya, Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In Iran, as in many other Middle Eastern countries, the tribes, as indicated above, were important in bringing dynasties to power. But because tribal leaders were and largely autonoarmed and depended on a decentralized mous tribal base, they were also a force preventing effecTribes ruled notonly over nomadic tive centralization. and transhumant peoples, but also over groups of agriculthey passed or to whom through whose territories turalists Tribes could also be an unstable they were contiguous. element in society, as their raids economic and political and fights with each other or with settled people or traders might hurt the economy, although many of the tribes There became quite integrated with settled economic life. importance of tribes doubt that the political seems little exceeded their considerable economic contributions in utilizing marginal land, since it was the armed strength of for the tribes that kept them on center stage politically so many centures. An analytic study of the role of the tribes in Middle Eastern or Iranian history has yet to be made. The role of tribes in the total power structure and organization of the Middle East is too often neglected, and tribes for are treated, if at all, as something apart--material the anthropologist but not for the historian or political often reject an Middle Eastern nationalists scientist. emphasis on tribes as colonial or romantic, but there seems to be no doubt that a proper appreciation of the role of tribes involves no romantic glorifihistorical cation, and will help us to better understand the tripartribe, and city--of tite settlement structure--village, a emphasis on Middle greater Similarly the Middle East. IRANIAN STUDIES

308

Eastern geography, with its growing aridity and soil erosion over the centuries, which encouraged the spread of nomadism and the decline of agriculture and of manufactures, Such is a key to understanding Middle Eastern history. to use archeological studies involve teaching historians methods and to understand material culture much better than they do today.2 The Qajar dynasty (1796-1925), themselves tribal in origin, were able to keep somewhat better control over the tribes than were the Safavids or their eighteenth century successors. This was partly due to a relative diminution in the numbers of nomadic tribespeople, probably caused by a gradual expansion in settled agriculture that accompanied the introduction of new cash and export crops like opium and cotton. Thus Charles Issawi, in his Economic History of Iran, estimates tribes to comprise one-half of the Iranian population at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while at the end of the century he estimates their number at one-fourth--still the same absolute number if we accept estimates that the Iranian population doubled in use of this period.3 The Qajar government made effective carrot and stick policies in keeping control of the tribes --holding hostages from the leading tribal families in Tehran, while generally allowing the tribes to pick their own chiefs and often to control not only their own terriLarge territories tories but contiguous agricultural ones. were effectively alienated to the tribes in return for tribute. Tribal contingents also made up most of the effective armed forces, and were largely paid in booty. Apart from increased control over tribes, the Qajar of period also saw a gradual growth in and rationalization the governmental bureaucracy, and even of the armed forces, when compared with although these developments were pitiful such relatively centralized parts of the Middle East as the Under the Qajars the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Tunisia. virtually yearly auction of tax farms, arbitrary dismisand the relative sals, and punishment of high officials, lack of specialization in government offices were all signs that a traditional "patrimonial" bureaucracy continued. And only the Russian-trained and -officered Cossack Brigade 309

Vol.

XI,

1978

of Tehran, begun in 1879, bore comparison with the modernized forces of the central Middle East. Rather than sigtheir instruments increasing and rationalizing nificantly of power, the Qajar shahs relied mainly on traditional divide and rule, and so forth. means of balanced opposites, they support against the Russians, Lulled by British the danger of movements from within.. ed to realize

fail-

If geography and the tribes were two factors weakening the central power of the shahs, another was the autothis at length Having discussed nomous power of the ulama. that the power of the I will only say briefly elsewhere,4 (1) Shici disbased on: Iranian Shici ulama was largely

dain for temporal rulers and the belief that in the absence of the twelfth, hidden Imam, the mujtahids were best as well as in qualified to interpret his will in politics of the khums tax by the Shici (2) the collection religion; ulama--elsewhere collected by governments--which helped to create considerable economic independence; (3) the location of the leading ulama, who were in Ottoman Iraq since the eighteenth century and thus outside the Shah's control; (4) the dependence of the ulama on popular support for and also on their ties with the guilds. their position, tioning

In late Safavid times, some ulama were already questhe right of certain Safavid rulers to rule, and

century, they helped bring on the in the early nineteenth incidents. war and various antiforeign second Irano-Russian Although Egyptian and Ottoman government reformers in the control over century gained essential early nineteenth weakon relative issue others the as this their ulama, on

The Qajars on the whole ness of the Qajars is evident. catered to the ulama, and when many of the ulama joined in objections to mildly secularizing measures by the reAmir Kabir, Mirza Husain Khan, and formist prime ministers these men and the shahs stopped supporting Amin ad-Dauleh,

their measures rather than risk alienating their

allies.

Unlike the tribal direct

the ulama and

military

force,

leaders, although

sometimes caused trouble. IRANIAN STUDIES

the ulama had almost no armed religious

students

The ulama's appeal was rather 310

in the respect in which they were held by the community, their control of key institutions like the schools and courts, and in their ideological agreement with the majority of Iranians. They were far more respected than secular rulers, and when they dared point out that the Qajar rulers were selling Iran and Islam to foreign intheir appeals were paralleled by the urban popufidels, lation. A third power group of some importance which was also independent of, and often hostile to, the central government were the urban bazaar classes. These i ncluded large-scale, long-distance merchants (the elite of the bazaar), smaller-scale merchants and traditional bankers, and artisans and retailers, who might be the same persons. Hostile to Western competition and to domination of Iran by Western powers, they aligned idewith the ulama far more than with the shah. ologically Although not strong enough to lead a movement against the government on their own, when allied with the ulama and occasionally with others, this group could be an effective opposition. Another oppositional group arising out of the above classes was the Western- (or Russian- or Turkish-) influenced intellectuals. Although a very small group of varied origins and of either professional or bureaucratic occupations, they helped to arouse larger groups to combat Iran's backwardness, misgovernment, and subservience to foreign interests. Thus, among the independent groups that were potenin opposition to a weak government were found most tially of the more influential classes in the country: the tribes, the ulama, the bazaar classes, and the intellectuals. The tribes were in a special category, and tribespeople generally followed their leader on whichever side they chose, but the lack of real control over the tribes by the central government was nonetheless a factor of considerable weakness. cerned.

The remaining classes tended to be loyal or unconThose directly or indirectly in government employ, 311

Vol.

XI,

1978

whether bureaucrat or servant, tended to be loyal, as the constitutional revolution was to show. Large landlords were rarely oppositional except when pushed to it for prudential reasons. The peasantry in Iran has rarely been revolutionary, probably due largely to reasons having a geographical basis. The scattered settlements in Iran, the need for a heavier investment in irrigation than most peasants can afford, uncertain yields, and lack of water, have turned most peasants into impoverished sharecroppers with few intervillage ties, whereas peasant revolts in most parts of the world have been shown to be led by landed middle peasants.5 The late Qajar period thus saw a weak central government with almost no army ranged against these classes, particularly the ulama, the bazaar classes, and the small group of intellectuals. Their alliance brought fruit in both the movement against the British tobacco concession in 1891-1892 and in the Constitutional Revolution of 19051911. The government's lack of an effective military force (outside of the small Russian-led Cossack Brigade after 1879) meant that there could be popular revolts of a "classic" (i.e., French revolutionary) type in Iran--mass urban, This sometimes armed, struggles lasting for long periods. type of struggle was almost precluded elsewhere in the twentieth century, due to the presence of modern armed forces (except when large parts of these forces went over to the revolutionary side). The revolution did not culminate in a basic sociopolitical transformation of Iran. This was due partly to splits between liberal and conservative ulama-led forces in the revolution, partly to the power of the victorious Bakhtiari tribe in the second constitutional and especially to the Anglo-Russian accord

government, of 1907 and the

Russian intervention against the revolution, with British It did pass laws to end feudal forms of acquiescence. landownership and reform taxes, but these were applied The revolution also helped educate Iranians spottily. and created Iran's still politically existing constituIt also saw advanced thinkers in the Democrat Party tion. and elsewhere put forth ideas of land reform and other IRANIAN STUDIES

312

basic

socioeconomic

reforms.

Such advanced democratic ideas saw further expression during and after World War I, coming forth especially in the successful movement against the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919, which would have imposed a virtual British protectorate, and in the democratic revolts led by two religiously educated leaders, Khiabani in Azerbaij'an and Kuchik Khan in Gilan. Conservative bourgeois modernizers were interested in installing a strong nonrevolutionary government, and rallied to the 1921 coup d'etat led by Colonel Riza Khan and Sayyid Zia ed-Din Tabataba'i. This movement also received support from the British General Ironside, the commander of British forces in Iran, although there is as yet no proof of the widely held Persian belief that it was officially supported by the British government. (The Legation in Tehran was ignorant of it.)6 Riza Khan, at first Minister of War, soon took power into his own hands. Suppressing dissident political and tribal movements, he was also able to get rid of Sayyid Zia and to build up his own armed forces. When his campaign for a republic on the Ataturk model was successfully opposed by leading ulama, who feared that Ataturk-style secularism would follow, he had the assembly depose the Qajars and create him shah in 1925, with his coronation occurring early in 1926. The modernization program of Riza Shah 1925-1941 brought fundamental changes in the structure of power and in class relations in Iran. If he was less thoroughgoing and successful than Ataturk, the initially backward state of Iran must be kept in mind. The lack of fundamental reform, centralization, or extensive economic modernization in Iran meant that Riza Shah had to be a kind of Muhammad Ali, MahmudII, Tanzimat statesmen, and Ataturk all in one. Considering the situation, his advances were considerable, although often done at the expense of remaining autonomous groups and at economic cost to the popular classes. Below are summarized the main changes in class and governmental forces under Riza Shah and since then.

313

Vol.

XI,

1978

Riza Shah grasped the initial need to create an effective monopoly of armed power under his own control, and concurrently to strengthen his armed forces. He put down several tribal revolts or signs of recalcitrance and forcibly settled several tribes--a policy that was economically disastrous for them, but which effectively killed their military potential. Although most of these tribes resumed migrations on Riza Shah's abdication, they could only sporadically cause military and political trouble, and for the past fifteen years the political independence of the tribes has appeared to be a thing of the past. It is not to be excluded that some of the tribes that are still viable units with separate linguistic and cultural identities will again cause difficulties for the government, although these difficulties could be based more on new ideas of linguistic and cultural autonomy, and less on a return to the military-political autonomy of the past. Riza Shah was largely successful in curbing the autonomy of a major power group, the tribes, and was almost equally successful with the other major autonomous power group, the ulama. After the pyrrhic victory of forestallA ing a republic, the ulama had no more major victories. number of Riza Shah's measures that aimed mainly at introducing a modern bourgeois type of administration had the secondary effect, also positive for Riza Shah, of reducing the role and power of the ulama. Amongthese were the introduction of new law codes in most spheres, the coordinate introduction of secular courts and judges of whommodern training was increasingly required, and the introduction of a secular system of public education from As the ulama had offielementary to university levels. ciated in the traditional courts that had previously predominated and had also been the teachers in all but a few reduced the sources schools, these measures drastically of their income and influence. Religious trusts such as the shrine at Mashad and all its attached properties (which today include factories, farms, public charities, and even such an exotic item as the very modern and even semi-swinging Mashad Hyatt Hotel), were put under predominantly secular governance. Although no measures were taken by Riza Shah to change Muslim family and personal IRANIAN STUDIES

314

status laws, he did encourage girls' education and in 1936 made Iran the only country to outlaw the veil, along with its enveloping chadur. (Such moves took inspiration from a women's movement that dates largely from women's partiand the subsecipation in the constitutional revolution, The ulama quent evolution of feminist ideas and groups.) made some protests against Riza Shah's measures, especialbut they were preemptorily suppressed or punly unveiling, ished, so that no effective ulama-led or religious opposition arose under Riza Shah. The landlord group, which also traditionally had some autonomy, lost most of it under Riza Shah, as lands of enemies or simply desirable lands were widely confiscated by the shah and taken over by him or given to favorites. The shah became by far the largest single landlord in the country, largely due to arbitrary confiscations. The majlis tried to return these lands to their former owners after Riza Shah's abdication, but they were later taken back by Muhammad Riza Shah for sale to the peasants (and new favorites) on nonextortionate terms. With the threat of confiscation, the creation of a large landlord group from among loyal bureaucrats, and the support given by Riza Shah to traditional landowning practices rather than land reform, the landlord group was unlikely to display political hostility to the shah. If groups and classes formerly troublesome to the center were controlled and tamed, new groups at the center were strengthened and modernized and became the shah's instruments in his program of modernization from the top. These groups were chiefly the bureaucracy and the army, which have remained the pillars of centralized government until today. The rationalization of the bureaucracy had begun under the Qajars, but could take real effect only under a powerful centralized government with modern laws and civil service regulations, and when based on a new educational system. The bureaucracy was divided under modernized ministries increasingly and bureaus. Entrance requirements were increasingly based on education (often a foreign higher education was and is almost a require315

Vol.

XI,

1978

ment for certain high positions). The bureaucracy increasingly entered into many spheres of life, including those formerly dealt with by the ulama or informally by guilds and other local groups. Under Riza Shah and even after industry and economic life had become matters of heavy central control or regulation, families of some means who wanted economic gain or security often felt it necessary to have one or more family members near the seat of power. Educated young men, and today also women, head mainly for government posts. At the same time the fact that nearly all major decisions, even regarding the provinces, are made in Tehran has continued to bring an influx of educated people into that overcrowded city. At the same time, the popular classes stream in also in the hope of employment. Although individual bureaucrats were and are often guardedly critical of the government, it is not surprising that, flattered by the appearance or even reality of power, and increasingly well paid and promoted on merit, they form a generally loyal and increasingly well-trained base for governmental power. The army and gendarmerie, which were the first concern of Riza Khan, were built up into an effective force against internal and tribal dissension. Although the uselessness of this military force against a foreign threat was shown in the Russo-British ultimatum of 1941 that brought about the abdication of Riza Shah, this did not contradict its effective prior and subsequent internal use. This first large-scale modernized armed force also formed the basis for later expansion and further modernization, which has led to the recent purchase of the world's most sophisticated weapons in large quantities. Critics note that these recent expenditures are for weapons so complex that it may take years to train enough Iranians to use them, by which time they will be obsolete and the whole process may be repeated. In addition, the expenditure of billions of dollars on such weapons diverts money from Iran's millions of needy and contributes to inflation. However wasteful military expenditures have been, though, they have contributed to the of revolts and opposition movements (in adforestalling dition to strengthening Iran on the international scene). IRANIAN STUDIES

316

In this they have been aided by the exceptional control that both Pahlavi shahs have kept over their armed forces, so and effective intelligence, largely through privileges that there has rarely been a threat of the military coups In this control of so commonin most of the Middle East. such internal security the armed forces, as of civilians, as SAVAKhave contributed under the present organizations regime. opposition was generally muzzled The intellectual and often jailed, both under Riza Shah and again since the overthrow of Musaddiq in 1953. The working class, which began to organize in the early twentieth century, and esliberal period, 1941-53, was pecially in the relatively forbidden to organize or strike under Riza Shah. Although government controlled trade unions have been permitted in recent years, strikes have not, but they continue to break class since World War oppositional out. An increasingly II has been the students, in both modern and religious Student strikes and demonhigher and secondary schools. strations have continued to be important since 1953 deand suppress them. spite government attempts to forestall Under Riza Shah the popular classes--tribespeople, a general worsening of peasants, and workers--experienced this was In the case of tribespeople living standards. mostly due to forced settlement on generally poor land. Villagers and workers were hit by taxes to finance new The ingovernment expenditures and the armed forces. direct taxes on sugar and tea, two items of wide mass consumption, provided most of the financing for Riza Shah's Transiranian Railroad in the 1930s. Economic and social stratification also increased under Riza Shah, with more rich people created than ever before while the poor bewere incame poorer and both peasants and craftspeople class groups. This into distinct creasingly stratified has continued under trend to increased stratification Riza Shah, although in recent years oil income Muhammad and investment have been so high that even the poorer classes have been brought in on some of its benefits. however, those in cities, Even among the popular classes, in Tehran, have improved their position much especially 317

Vol.

XI,

1978

faster than those in the countryside, and the wage gap between skilled workers and the unskilled has grown. If there is broad continuity between the policies of Riza Shah and those of his son, as suggested above, there was a break in the period from 1941 to 1953, and there have been some novelties since. The period from 1941 to the present is a complex one with several phases of social and political change. In 1941, there was a RussoBritish ultimatum that culminated in the abdication of Riza Shah in favor of his son, and in the occupation of Iran for supply purposes by British, Russian, and then American troops. The three powers backed different political groups --the Russians favored both the leftist Tudeh Party and autonomist movements in Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan. After the Iranians, with U.S. backing, negotiated Russian troop withdrawal from those provinces in 1946, their local In the war and governments were crushed by the center. postwar periods parliamentary life was revived, and a fight against the poor terms offered by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Companyculminated in a movement, successful in 1951, to nationalize The National Front, led by MusadIran's oil. diq, came to power in 1951, but there followed an effective boycott on Iranian oil by the major Wcstern oil companies, backed by their governments, and the U.S. government refused Iran further aid until the oil issue was settled. Musaddiq was overthrown in August, 1953 under circumstances too well known to need recounting, and the shah returned to rule as well as reign.7 A settlement with foreign oil companies that left them considerable control followed, but even with this settlement Iran's oil revenues were far higher than they had been before nationalization. Successive moves by the shah in recent years have given the Iranian government essential control over Iran's oil production, and the shah has been a prime mover for This movement major price increases by OPECcountries. has also increased the profits of Western oil companies and some think these companies encouraged it. Even before recent price increases, oil income was the largest item in the Iranian budget and both Iran's economic boom of the past dozen years and its greatly increased military strength and budget are based largely on this income. IRANIAN STUDIES

318

These foreign policy and political developments have had an impact on social change as well. The period of parliamentary and cabinet rule, 1941-1953, like previous such revolution and during and periods during the constitutional after World War I, saw a flowering of intellectual-political life and writings as well as of numerous political parties, The Tudeh was which partly represented class interests. popular with intellectuals and with the working class, which engaged in several significant strikes, including a strike against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Parts of the Nathe tional Front represented ulama elements, especially group of ulama in parliament who followed the political mujtahid, Ayatullah Kashani until he split with Musaddiq. The bazaar elements in the National Front were generally allied with the nationalist ulama, whose antiimperialism was tinged with hostility to the infidel West and its ways. The Musaddiq period hence saw some revival in the oppositionist-leadership role of some of the ulama. More prominent among Musaddiq's supporters were more secular middle-class elements, including students and intellectuals. Bazaar and modern middle-class elements who backed Musaddiq also benefited from his rule in many cases. Despite the economic crisis brought about by the oil boycott there was a considerable development of Iranian business and industry, partly encouraged by a drop in imports resulting from a lack of foreign exchange. WhenMuhammad Riza Shah returned to take over full power in 1953, backed by U.S. aid and support, he began to similar in many ways to those of his father. adopt policies Apparently believing that parliamentarism could endanger his power he returned to controlled parties and parliaments, jailing of opponents considered dangerous, censorship, and, as a contemporary innovation, an increasingly efficient and omnipresent security police. At the same time he became convinced, with some prodding from U.S. advisers, of the need for certain reforms--reforms that, as in the time of Riza Shah, were the logical outcome of prior social and economic developments, but which also needed intelligent planning to be implemented effectively. From 1953 to 1962, planning efforts were rather piecemeal, and an early period of economic growth was followed by crisis and re319

Vol.

XI,

1978

in of opposition Following a recrudescence trenchment. the early 1960s the shah, with apparent U.S. encourageof reforms in 1962-1963 that helpment, launched a series of the country. and class structure ed alter the social

The most important of these was a land reform that transferred some of Iran's land to sharecropping peasants and

Although the reform put some others under cash rents. and excluded both the nonsharecropwas far from radical of Iran's ping laborers who made up a large percentage and mechanized farms and also plantations rural population an important step that has it is still and their laborers, been followed by some improvement in the lives of Iran's stratifiIt has also led to increased landed peasants. however, with the top peasant strata becoming a cation, peasantry while laborers have found rich and influential work with new peasant owners or on newly mechanized little farms, and have become more marginal than before--often to handle forced to migrate to towns that are ill-equipped various the include life in village reforms Other them.8 army corps that send young male, and government-sponsored as members into some villages female, conscripts recently Further and health corps. development, of the literacy, such as large governmental farm innovations agricultural take back the land rights that essentially corporations and try to farm large units, given to the peasants recently agriimmense and foreign-controlled headed by bureaucrats, many Indeed validity. dubious more of seem businesses, which often monopolize some of the best agribusinesses, land and force farmers to leave or become laborirrigated been taken over and broken up iners, have very recently for reato smaller units by the Iranian government--not reform but because they were producing so sons of social in investment lack of intelligent The relative little.9 growth recent low a very meant has Iranian agriculture This not growth. below that of population rate--well but could add to economically only hurts the peasantry to exist when Iranithat is likely situation the serious ca. 2000 if no new reserves an oil runs out (beginning Already food imports are very high and conare found). growing. stantly

IRANIAN STUDIES

320

Agrarian changes were one part of a shift toward the a capitalist rapid development of what is essentially system, however large the state-owned or subsidized component. This system has given favored treatment to large investors, both foreign and domestic. Although industry had begun under Riza Shah and had grown in spurts since World War II, the most rapid development of largely private, often largescale, industry came after the early 1960s when capital moved increasingly away from traditional landholding and the government increased incentives to domestic and foreign investors: tax holidays, low interest loans, government licenses (usually to only a small number of businesses in each field, thus creating semi-monopoly conditions), and high tariffs on competing foreign products. The result was a continuing boom in business, industry, and banking, which was further spurred by rising oil income as Iran took greater control of its oil resources and encouraged price rises by OPEC. In class terms this resulted in a growing capitalist class with very varied social backgrounds--from the of old governmental and landholding most aristocratic families to the lowest ranks of the bazaar classes. There was also a growing middle and upper management group, better educated than before, and an increasing working class, both male and female. Despite their illegality, strikes have continued to occur, nearly always outside the bounds of the government-sponsored trade unions that have recently been encouraged in some industries in the hopes of preventing strikes and finding easier solutions for disputes. Although some skilled and semiskilled workers have been able to take advantage of the spectacular growth that has occurred since the major OPECprice rise to increase their wages significantly, wages are more uneven than ever and widespread labor discontent is still manifest. Partly to the shah has launched various schemes meet this discontent, of profit sharing and sale of stock with workers getting first preference, but the former meant much less than appeared on paper, and this seems to be true of the latter too, although some foreign investors have been concerned at the idea of selling large shares in their businesses.10

321

Vol.

XI,

1978

especialIn the same period government enterprises, steel mill, projects like the Soviet-aided ly large-scale and officontinued to expand, as did government services effort was made to bring back A concerted cial positions. educated Iranians from abroad, even if they had opposed the regime, and branches of government concerned with the and intelligent, with educated, economy soon became filled with the remaining vededicated young people who contrast nal and slow-moving bureaucrats. have grown considerThe middle and upper classes has imof women in these classes ably, and the position was among the Women's suffrage proved in recent years. Law (since reforms of 1963, and in 1967 a Family Protection though not comgreater, introducing improved) was passed, Polygamy was in marriage legislation. plete, equality can divorce only for cause, circumscribed, both parties and the civil court awards child custody (by Muslim law the child goes to the father after a young age) to the but Abortion has been legalized, parent it deems fittest. exist this is not yet widely known. Unequal laws still There has been a and are a cause of feminist complaint. dramatic shift of educated women into paid work, partiin Tehran. To nurses although not exclusively, cularly, government workand teachers have been added secretaries, and a few lawyers ers at many levels, doctors, professors, women there have executives. For lower-class and business work hard in agriculture, been fewer changes; they still and in in domestic service, on carpets and embroidery, their homes, although some are now to be found in modern have the lowest paid jobs, and They generally industry. the offiare often ignorant of their rights. Recently, which earlicially supported Iranian Women's Organization, has concentrated on er emphasized legislation, literacy, and child care for lower-class women; education, vocational The this should help them and Iran's expanding economy. Mahnaz Afkhami, was named head of the Women's Organization, for Women's Affairs Minister and, using the Iran's first has presided in place of a ministry, Women's Organization action in this field. over continued governmental

IRANIAN STUDIES

322

Perhaps the largest social problem of recent years is the constantly growing gap between income strata. This increasing income distribution gap is felt between city and countryside, between the Tehran region and the provinces, While the rich, helpand between lower and upper classes. ed by the possibilities arising from Iran's huge oil income, have been getting much richer, and new people have been joining the ranks of the rich, most of the poor have been The fifth five-year plan getting only a little richer. (1973 to 1978) was to help overcome this gap, b ut although some achievements have been made in education, health, and social services, 1975 studies indicate that income gaps continue to widen. An attack on profiteers in 1975, and some controls on prices and inflation, were signs that the government was concerned, but price and rent controls are so erratic that they lead to such results as landlord harassment of rent-controlled tenants and refusals by farmers to sell food at barely profitable controlled prices. Attacks on profiteers increased the flight of capital abroad and added to the bottlenecks at Iran's ports since many businessmen refused to risk picking up underinvoiced goods. Piecemeal controls will not meet the problems caused by Iran's frenetic and largely uncontrolled growth; such problems include not only the increasing income gap noted above but also the overcrowding of cities, which encourages high rents and prices, food shortages, traffic jams, and short tempers among those living in cities that are daily becoming more and more unlivable. Planners and officials have failed to deal effectively with such problems, while some in high positions continue to believe that a wide income gap is necessary for continued investment and rapid development. If greater equality is to be achieved, not only will taxes on the rich and on corporations have to rise significantly, but government investment and indirect subsidies will have to shift away from big business towards small producers, artisans, workers, peasants, and nomads. Movements toward decentralization and local participation, to which the government pays lip service and in which some officials sincerely believe, must be more serious than they have been until now. Many Iranians in and out of govern323

Vol.

XI,

1978

ment realize what is needed, and there is some hope of steps of for greater equality, which is one of the prerequisites The problems caused a modern twentieth century society. by headlong and largely unplanned growth may prove more inbut are not in principle insoluble. tractible, The opening of this paper mentioned two major changes in the structure of classes and power: a change from dewith power in the hands of several autonocentralization and a change from primarimous classes to centralization; ly vertical to primarily horizontal group or class divisions. Both these changes have been dealt with in the course of than the second. To the paper, the first more explicitly on the first point, Iran, before Riza Shah, recapitulate, class structure with tribal leaders, had a decentralized bazaar classes and a few bureaucrats, ulama, landlords, autonomy and power. considerable possessing intellectuals The coming of the Pahlavis brought increasing modernizadevelopment which was coucapitalist tion and centralized pled with a forcible reduction in the independent power of the groups named above and the rise in the power of the The land center, backed by a new army and bureaucracy. reform and the sending of government corps in the countryside was, from one point of view, a further consolidation of direct government control, this time over the peasants. this As for the change from vertical estates to classes, can be seen in several cases; the tribes had, for example, once been unified by the economic and social needs of their As tribal chiefs increasingly became mode of production. city dwelling landlords, often with Western style educastratition, and as tribal members became increasingly fied and sedentary, the tribes were subject to increasing Similarly in the countryside, although class divisions. of more identification there was probably only a little patrimonial landlords than there peasants with traditional peasant village was was with modern ones, the traditional than in more communal in organization and less stratified This century has seen a rise in the twentieth century. the number of landless laborers on the bottom of the agscale, and in the small number of rich peasants ricultural on top. Such divisions were increased, not ended, by land IRANIAN STUDIES

324

reform, not only because landless laborers got no land, but also because richer peasants got or kept the most land. This put them in a stronger position to increase their income further through investment. In towns, the bazaar classes which had formerly had a largely common identity became increasingly stratified with many "journeymen" and apprentices reduced to the ranks of underpaid wage workers. More modern classes naturally fit into the modern horizontal class pattern, as with urban and rural wage workers and their employers. The increase in stratification among formerly homogeneous groups is felt in the contrasting life styles of upper and lower classes: the former now almost entirely Westernized in housing, dress, education, and basic beliefs, while the latter stick heavily to tradition. These differences are more noticeable among women than men, as most men have kept Riza Shah's imposed Western dress and have adopted some Western ways, while women of the popular classes, often pressured by their men, went back to the chadur after Riza Shah's abdication and lead much less free lives than upper class or bourgeois women. Such, in brief, is the outline of the major modern social changes discussed in this paper. Modernization and centralization have thus far gone hand-in-hand. It would be wrong to think, however, that centralization is an entirely one-way street toward homogeneity, or that protest has died out. Among continuing protests there are, most dramatically the few assassinations or limited guerilla movements that occasionally reach the world press. Second, there are the rather frequent (especially the considering dangers involved) student and workers' strikes, that are rarely reported either inside or outside Iran. Third, there is the quiet, behind-the-scenes, criticism often made by those in or close to the government, which sometimes appears effective (as do, on a limited scale, the strikes just mentioned). there has been a sigFinally, nificant revival of religious opposition to the government since about 1960, which will be described in greater detail as one example of an opposition class. A leading mujtahid, Ayatullah Khumaini, was arrested and deported by the government in 1963, after he attack325

Vol.

XI,

1978

ed the government for its ties to Israel and for a proposal, later approved, to exempt the U.S. military and their dependents

from Iranian

law.

Khumaini's

arrest

was follow-

In ed in June 1963 by major riots with much loss of life. subsequent years Khumaini from exile and like-minded ulama within Iran have kept up an open or muted attack on the government, with Khumaini mixing attacks on tyranny with attacks on the Family Protection Law. Some university subjects have joined the reliprofessors of nonreligious gious opposition which, for a time, centered in a small number of mosques with attached schools and clubs, since closed down. Religious students have been as oppositional as other students; the holy city of Qumhas been a center of student and ulama opposition to the government. opposition comprises While this generalized religious both fundamentalists and reformers, an even more radical group drawing inspiration both from Shicism and from Marxism has existed until its recent turn away from religion. opAlthough many members of even the nonradical religious their continued activity and position have been jailed, writings indicate that the revived religious opposition is once again, as before the Pahlavis, the oppositional group least vulnerable to destruction by the central government.11 Thus, despite the appearance of central conthere accurate, which is largely trol, control. refuse to accede to central

remain groups that

With regard to the events sketched above, the Iranitends as well as many not in the opposition, an opposition, of the to believe that most of the important developments or guided. have been foreign controlled last two centuries and Russian when both the British Forthe Qajar period, had strong inand some of their businesses, governments, in Iran and the Iranian government was weak, it terests Such into stress foreign influences. seems reasonable

but also in fluences are to be seen not only in politics, of handas the undermining such socioeconomic developments icrafts due to the competition of Western industrial goods, the crewhich forestalled helped by enforced low tariffs, were the ation of industry in Iran. Also foreign-inspired with the growth growing commercialization of agriculture, in export crops like cotton and opium, and the commercialIRANIAN STUDIES

326

ization

on the world market of one handicraft,

carpets.

The notion that the Pahlavi shahs were and are tools of Western powers is harder to sustain. Each shah got Western aid in his rise to power, and each relied on such aid But it seems more to build up military and police forces. conreasonable to talk of a frequent (and not invariable) currence of interest between the Pahlavi shahs, along with the conservative modernizers who followed them, and difthe ferent Western states (since World War II especially United States) than to strain credibility with continual stories of these shahs being told what to do on various crucial occasions by representatives of Great Britain and the United States. While the U.S. government, or parts of it, was involved in the overthrow of Musaddiq and surely had men in Iran who counseled land reform, it seems wrong to argue, as is sometimes done, that the shah launched land reform because of U.S. advice. The-reform was a logical part of a general strategy of capitalist development and of greater governmental control in the countryside. In the above the indigenous component of recent changes has been stressed, partly because the role of foreign governments and companies is often hard to prove, and partly to avoid the somewhat catastrophic conspiracy theories of Iranian history so widespread among Iranians. It is likely that foreign governments and corporations, concerned with Iranian oil, the Persian Gulf, and the especially containment of communism, played a somewhat larg.er role in events that shaped socioeconomic change in Iran than is suggested in the above internally-oriented analysis. A convincing presentation that would include both foreign and domestic developments has yet to be made, however, and might require the use of documents not yet available to the public. Many available government documents for the post1914 period have not yet been used by historians of Iran, however, and it is clear that there already exist enough to tell us much more than is now known about the impact of foreign governments and corporations on Iranian history. Compared to some other countries of the Middle East --notably Egypt, the Levant countries, and Turkey--Iran has had an unusual history of extremely slow social change un327

Vol.

XI,

1978

til 1921, followed by rapid change under the Pahlavis, who Oil inwere supported by new groups within the society. in recent years, come has sped up this change, especially Only the future can tell but was not its original cause. if the much-needed phase of social equity, popular partiand planned control over cipation in basic decisions, and growth can occur and bring about a less stratified centrally controlled society than that which characterterms as well In purely materialistic izes Iran today. urbanization, as in such indices as industrialization, and the legal staeducation, health, modern legislation, tus of women, Iran has made most impressive strides in the past 50.years, starting from a stage of great backwardness. In terms of equity, democracy at all levels, decentralizaof most aspects tion, and a reversal in the deterioration Iran still has far to go.12 of urban life, NOTES

1.

I owe this idea to a personal communication from Robert McDaniel who is doing research on the military important and underin modern Iranian history--an studied topic.

2.

For two fine works showing the new light that studies of material culture can shed on Middle Eastern History, see R. McC. Adams, Land behind Baghdad (Chicago, The Camel and the Wheel 1965), and R. W. Bulliet, 1975). Mass., (Cambridge,

3.

of tribes in Sir John Malcolm, The from the Most Early Period to the of Persia, Time, Vol. II (London, 1815), and the tribal and population estimates in C. Issawi, ed., The Eco(Chicago, 1971), p.20. nomic History of Iran 1800-1914 See the discussion

History Present

4.

N. R. Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in ModSaints, ern Iran," in N. R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972), and the and Sufis references contained therein.

IRANIAN STUDIES

328

5.

My ideas regarding the nonrevolutionary character of the Iranian peasantry were presented briefly at the end of N. R. Keddie, "Stratification, Social Control, and Capitalism in Iranian Villages: Before and after Land Reform," in I. Harik and R. Antoun, eds., Rural Politics

and Social

Change in the Middle East

(Bloomington, Ind., 1972). They have been amplified by reading "The Non-Revolutionary Peasantry of Modern Iran" by Farhad Kazemi and Ervand Abrahamian, in the present volume. 6.

discussion of this period and Ironsee R. H. Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921, Vol. III, The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton, 1972), Ch. IX.

7.

The best discussion so far of the Musaddiq period is in R. W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, 1964), now unfortunately out of print. The day is fast approaching when official U.S. and British documents on this period will be partially open to scholars.

8.

See Keddie, "Stratification," and the sources cited therein and Eric Hooglund's excellent forthcoming work on land reform.

9.

For these and other recent developments see D. Housego, "Quiet Thee Now and Rest," The Economist, Aug. 28, 1976 and Eric Rouleau, "Iran: Mythes et r6alities," Le Monde, October 3-4, 5, 6, 1976.

10.

Ann T. Schulz ("Iran's New Industrial State," Current History [January, 1977], pp. 15-18 ff.) Estimates the pay differential between skilled workers and laborers as between 3:1 and 30:1. There is no doubt that skilled workers are now a kind of elite, as are nearly all workers in large factories, and that statistics citing their wages, or wages in laborshort occupations (such as building in some areas) are not a reliable guide to average wages for the working population as a whole.

For an excellent side's key role,

329

Vol.

XI,

1978

11.

trends see H. Algar On recent political-religious in this volume, "The Oppositional Role of th e Saints Ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran," Scholars, unpubed. N. R. Keddie, and M. Fischer's and Sufis, Account An Anthropological lished "The Qum Report: I have read numerous writof Contemporary Shiism." eleand radical ings by Khumaini and by more liberal and Persian, in opposition ments of the religious at greater length in my aris treated this material en Iran," Le Monde Diploet Politique "Islam ticle

August, 1977, and in my "Religion and Society in Iran," forthcoming in a volume edited by C. Caldarola.

matique,

12.

Among the many uncited works in various languages that have contributed to this article I can mention only a few: A. Ashraf and H. Hekmat, "The State of the Traditional Bourgeoisie in Nineteenth Century Iran," forthcoming in the proceedings of the 1974 Princeton conference on the Economic History of the Middle East, of Iran: ed. A. Udovitch; J. A. Bill, The Politics (Columbus, Ohio, and Modernization Classes Groups, en Iran et 1'Etat La feodalite 1972); P. Vieille, of Elite (Paris, 1975); and M. Zonis, The Political (I have also been helped by 1971). Iran (Princeton, several articles by E. Abrahamian and by Gene Garthon Iran and the On women, see the articles waite.) introduction in L. Beck and N. Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). On the economy to 1973, see Robert E.

Looney, The Economic Development of Iran: Survey

with

Projections

to

1981

A Recent

(New York, 1973).

On reading proof in October, 1978, I am struck by how I would change in this analysis to 1977 despite little the dramatic and important events of the last year. WesternThe conflict between the "two cultures"--the popular classes-ized elite and the traditionalist could have been stressed more.

IRANIAN STUDIES

330

A NOTE OF TRANSLITERATION In manuscripts subnmittedfor publication, only those words need be transliterated which do not appear in the third edition of Webster'sNew International Dictionary. The system of transliteration used by IRANIAN STUDI/,S is the Persian Romanization developed for the Library of Congress and approved by the American Library Association and the Canadian Library Association. Copies of this table (Cataloguing Service - Bulletin 92) may be obtained by writing directly to the Editor.

IranianStudies is published by The Society for IranianStudies. It is distributed to members of the Society as part of their membershlip.Annual membership dues are $15.00 ($10.00 for students). The annualsubscriptionrate for libraries and other institutions is $15.00. A limited supply of the back volumes of the Journal (1968 to present) is available and may be ordered by writing to the Editor. The opinions expressed by the contributors are of the individualauthors and not necessarilythose of the Society or the editors of IranianStudies. Articles to be considered for publication and all other communicationsshould be sent to the Editor, Iranian Studies, Box K-154, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass. 02167, U.S.A. Communications concerning the affairs of the Society should be addressed to the Executive Secretary, The Society for Iranian Studies, c/o Department of History, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire03755, U.S.A.

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

No title

Recommend Documents