No title

HYPA SPECIAL

ISSUE

The Historyof Womenin Philosophy

SPRING1989

A Journalof FeministPhilosophy

HYPATI SPECIAL ISSUE The Historyof Womenin Philosophy

edited by Linda LopezMcAlister

This specialissueis dedicated to the memoryof VedaCobb-Stevens(1948-1989), founderof the Societyfor the Studyof WomenPhilosophers.

VOL. 4, NO. 1 SPRING1989

A Journalof FeministPhilosophy

Hypatia

Hypatia (Hy-pay-sha)was an Egyptianwoman philosopher,mathematician, and astronomerwho lived in Alexandriafrom her birth in about 370 A.D. until her death in 415. She was the leaderof the NeoplatonicSchool in Alexandria and was famous as an eloquent and inspiring teacher. The journal Hypatiais namedin honorof this foresister.Hername remindsus that although many of us are the firstwomen philosophersin our schools, we are not, after all, the first in history. Hypatiahas its roots in the Society for Women in Philosophy,manyof whose membershave for yearsenvisioned a regularpublicationdevoted to feminist philosophy.Hypatiais the realizationof that vision;it is intendedto encourage and communicatemany differentkinds of feminist philosophy.

Hypatia(ISSN 0887-5367) is owned by Hypatia, Inc., a tax exempt corporation, and publishedby IndianaUniversity Press,which assumeno responsibility for statementsexpressedby authors.Hypatiais publishedthree times a year. Subscriptionrates for 1988-89 are: Institutions$40/year; Individuals, $20/year.Foreignorderadd postage:$5/yearto Canada,Mexico, and overseas surface;$10/yearto oversearsairmail.Single copies are$20 (institutions)and $10 (individuals).A 40 percent discount is availableon bulk orderfor classroom use or bookstore sales. Life-time subscriptionsare available to donor subscribersfor $400. to the Jourals Manager, and businesscorrespondence Addressall subscriptions IndianaUniversity Press, 10th and MortonStreets, Bloomington,IN 47405. Notice of nonreceiptof an issue must be sent within four weeks afterreceipt of subsequentissue. Pleasenotify the Pressof any change in address;the Post Office does not forwardthird class mail. Manuscriptsand other editorialcorrespondence should be addressed to: Editor, Hypatia, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville,Edwardsville,IL 62026-1437. Hypatiais indexed in the AlternativePressIndex,Women'sStudiesAbstracts, Indexdatabase,file 57 of DIALOG. and in The Philosopher's Copyright? 1989 by Hypatia, Inc. All rights reserved. Hypatiawas published in 1983, 1984, and 1985 as special annual issues of Forum. Women'sStudiesInternational

Hypatia

EDITOR MargaretA. Simons, SouthernIllinoisUniversityat Edwardsville ASSISTANT EDITOR Kim Bishop MaryEllen Blackston Xiufen Lu Aimin Shen GUEST EDITORFOR SPECIALISSUE Linda LopezMcAlister, Universityof SouthFlorida MANUSCRIPT EDITOR Faye Love COPY EDITOR Toni Oplt BOOK REVIEWEDITOR JeffnerAllen, State Universityof New York,Binghamton ASSOCIATE EDITORS Azizah al-Hibri (Editor 1982-84), New York SandraBartky, Universityof Illinois,Chicago Ann Garry,CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles SandraHarding, Universityof Delaware Helen Longino, MillsCollege Donna Semiak-Catudal,Randolph-Macon College Joyce Trebilcot, WashingtonUniversity ADVISORY BOARD ElizabethBeardsley,TempleUniversity GertrudeEzorsky,BrooklynCollegeof City Universityof New York ElizabethFlower, Universityof Pennsylvania Virginia Held, GraduateCenterof City Universityof New York Graciella Hierro, MexicoCity Instituteof Technology JudithJarvisThompson, Massachusetts MaryMothersill, BarnardCollege MerrileeSalmon, Universityof Pittsburgh Anita Silvers, San FranciscoState University EDITORIALBOARD KathrynPyne Addelson, SmithCollege

Hypatia

JacquelineAnderson, Olive HarveyCollege,Chicago Asoka Bandarage,BrandeisUniversity Sharon Bishop, CaliforniaState University,Los Angeles LorraineCode, YorkUniversity Blanche Curry, ShawCollege ElizabethEames, SouthernIllinoisUniversityat Carbondale Ann Ferguson,Universityof Massachusetts,Amherst Jane Flax, HowardUniversity Nancy Fraser,NorthwesternUniversity Carol Gould, Steven'sInstituteof Technology Susan Griffin, Berkeley,California Donna Haraway,Universityof California,SantaCruz Nancy Hartsock, Universityof Washington Hilda Hein, Collegeof the Holy Cross Sarah Lucia Hoagland, NortheasternIllinoisUniversity Helen BequaertHolmes, Universityof Massachusetts Alison Jaggar,Universityof Cincinnati ElizabethJaneway,New York Evelyn Fox Keller, NortheasternUniversity Carolyn Korsmeyer,State Universityof New York,Buffalo Rhoda Kotzin, MichiganState University LyndaLange, Universityof Alberta Linda LopezMcAlister, Universityof SouthFlorida MariaLugones, CarletonCollege PatriciaMann, City Collegeof New York KathrynMorgan, Universityof Toronto Janice Moulton, SmithCollege Andree Nichola-McLaughlin,MedgarEvarsCollege LindaNicholson, State Universityof New York,Albany Susan Ray Peterson, New York Connie Crank Price, TuskegeeInstitute LauraPurdy,HamiltonCollege Sara Ruddick,New Schoolof SocialResearch Betty Safford,CaliforniaState University,Fullerton Naomi Scheman, Universityof Minnesota Ofelia Schutte, Universityof Flordia,Gainesville Ruth Schwarz, Universityof Pennsylvania ElizabethV. Spelman, SmithCollege JacquelineM. Thomason, Los Angeles Nancy Tuana, Universityof Texas at Dallas KarenWarren, MacalesterCollege Instituteof Technology Caroline Whitbeck, Massachusetts Iris Young, WorcesterPolytechnicInstitute JacquelineZita, Universityof Minnesota

Contents

vii Preface 1 Linda LopezMcAlister SomeRemarkson Exploringthe Historyof Womenin Philosophy 6 Ursule Molinaro A ChristianMartyrin Reverse Hypatia:370-415 A.D. 9 Joan Gibson Educatingfor Silence:RenaissanceWomenand the LanguageArts 28 BeatriceH. Zedler The ThreePrincesses 64 Jane Duran Anne ViscountessConway:A SeventeenthCenturyRationalist 80 Lois Frankel DamarisCudworthMasham:A SeventeenthCenturyFeministPhilosopher 91 MargaretMcFadden Anna Doyle Wheeler:Philosopher, Socialist,Feminist 102 MaureenL. Egan EvolutionaryTheoryin the SocialPhilosophy of CharlottePerkinsGilman 120 MaryCatharine Baseheart EdithStein'sPhilosophyof Womanand of Women'sEducation 132 MaryEllen Waithe On Not Teachingthe Historyof Philosophy 139 Linda A. Bell Does MarriageRequirea Head? SomeHistoricalArguments

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Review Symposium 155 MaryAnne Warren FeministArcheology:Uncovering Women'sPhilosophical History 160 R.M. Dancy On A Historyof Women Philosophers,Vol. I Book Reviews 171 Linda Damico The Concept of Woman by Sr. PrudenceAllen 175 JudithOchshom Sarah Grimke:Letterson the Equalityof the Sexes and Other Essays, editedby ElizabethAnn Bartlett 181 Notes on Contributors 184 Announcements 191 SubmissionGuidelines

Preface

It has been a pleasureto work with Linda Lopez McAlister, one of the foundersof Hypatia,and the guest editorof this special issueon the historyof women in philosophy.As Lindanotes in her Introduction,philosophershave been slow to addressthe problemsinvolved in rediscoveringthe history of women in philosophy. But, inspiredby MaryEllen Waithe's Projecton the History of Women in Philosophy, work has finally begun in earnest. We hope that the articles assembledhere contributeto that effort. In additionto the articlesand reviewsfocusingon the historyof women in philosophy, we have decided to include another paper in this issue. Linda Bell's, "Doesmarriagerequirea head?Some historicalarguments,"examines an issueof contemporaryrelevancethat is prominentin the historyof philosophicaldiscussionsabout women, and thus of interestto readersof this special issue. The Hypatiaboardhas decided to devote a futurespecial issueto the topic of EcologicalFeminism,underthe guesteditorshipof KarenWarren.Readers who wouldlike to contributeto this issueare invited to respondto the call for papersincluded in the SubmissionGuidelines later in this issue. This issueon the historyof women in philosophyis dedicatedto the memory of Veda Alison Cobb-Stevens,the founderof the Society for the Studyof Women in Philosophy,who died on January13, of this year. Her colleague, Cecile T. Tougas has written the following about her life: Veda Alison Cobb-Stevenswas bor on May 16, 1948 and grewup in Lily, Kentucky,when turtlesstill lived there. She often readbig books in the barn, legs danglingfrom hay rafters. She attendedthe Universityof Kentuckyat Lexington, doublemajoringin philosophyand French, and graduatingas a memberof the Phi Beta Kappa Society. In 1970 she came to Boston College as a WoodrowWilson scholar. Her doctoraldissertationin 1975, Aristotle'sCategories,showedshe was truly at that time a daughterof Aristotle. She loved Europe.In 1981 she studiedat the Sorbonneand in 1985 quarried meaning and joy from Florence and Venice. Besides her fluency in Frenchand Italian, she knew classicalGreekand Latin. Ancient philosophy, Nietzsche and Sartrewere among her favorites. Veda was Professorof Philosophyat the University of Lowell, Massachusetts, and had served as Chair. She co-authoreda National Endowmentfor the HumanitiesGrant which establishedthe WesternCulturalHeritageProgramwithin the University. She was leaderin the Women'sStudies Program

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as well, developing the "Womenand the BiblicalTradition"seminarfor undergraduates.Her pictures- rangingfromJudithto Sojourer Truth- still grace the women's seminar room. She initiated a monthly lecture series where thoughtfulwomen's voices were heard. She studiedin detail the workof Catherineof Siena, comparingthe mystic to Descartes. Her researchhas been published in AnalectaHusserliana.Inspiredby The Bookof theCity of Ladiesof Christinede Pizan,she foundedthe Society for the Studyof Women Philosophersin 1987 at the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation in New York, to create and sustaina "Republicof Letters" in which women are both citizens and sovereigns. Engagingtexts of women philosopherspast and presentin a dialogueis partlythe Society'spurpose. But since it is possiblethat philosophicalunderstandingcan be reached in a varietyof ways, the Society aims to enlargethe resourcesof anyone concered with the most basic questions of human life, be they biographers, diarists,novelists, mystics or poets. Veda'sown philosophicalunderstandingand sensitivityareevident also in many poems she wrote but hid. "Aftera Death"was a publishedprizewinner in Bitterootin the springof 1988 under the pseudonym,Gillian Grant. Her fire and intellect shine in hundredsof poems, smallhouseswhich she has left. Meeting Veda was a dynamic, intense and challenging experience:"How deeply she has touched my existence in a short time" quoth several loving friends at once. Her wit knew phenomenology, Plato's Theaetetus,Gary Larsonhumor, rocks from the beach, eyes from the soul. Her death on January13, 1989 ended a courageous,painfulfight to endure despite cancer. What she became is infinitely precious. AFTERA DEATH

There are orange segmentson the table: wedges of sun, burnished. All the furnishingsof this small house are polished to a hard sheen. Morning light gracesthe windowpanes and falls on old objects an alphabetblock worn with hundreds of dumb handlings, a carved angel with one chipped wing, a flat slice of marble from a florentine quarry,a cut glass bowl, a comfortablechair in which no one rests, empty in its corner, waiting for the presence that shall not return. It is quiet in this house. The wind fluttersbriefly through the screen, and then passeson. M.A.S.

INTRODUCTION

Some Remarkson Exploringthe History of Women in Philosophy LINDA LOPEZMcALISTER

andan A discussionof thestatusof workon thehistoryof womenin philosophy to thespecialissueof HYPATIA on thehistoryof womenin philosointroduction phy. As a woman who completed her Ph.D. in philosophyin the late 1960's I believe that my experience concerning the studyof women in the historyof philosophyis prettycommon, at least for my generation.Throughoutmy enand graduatestudyof philosophyI don't remembera single tire undergraduate instance in which the name of a woman philosopherwas mentioned, with the exception of a very few contemporarywomen philosophers.But women in the history of philosophy?There wasn't a hint that there had ever been any. I rememberbeing vaguelyawareof this absence and, when the Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Edwards1967) came out, I sat down eagerlywith the Index to discover what that eight volume, presumablycomprehensive, compendium of all that was worth mentioning in philosophyhad to say aboutwomen philosophers.Nothing. There was not a single articleabouta femalephilosopher to be found, although as an encyclopediait aboundswith short articles aboutexceedinglyobscuremale figures.The only mention of a femalephilosopher I could find anywherein the eight volumes was a single passingreference to Hildegardeof Bingen buriedin an articleon "Macrocosmand Microcosm." That experienceseemed to settle the question of why we never studied any women in the historyof philosophy:clearlythere hadn'tbeen any! At least not any worthstudyingor worth includingin TheEncyclopedia of Philosophy. In the course of editing this special issue I was struckby the remarkof a feministhistorianwho commentedon how farbehind we are in the historyof women in philosophyas comparedto the study of other aspectsof women's history. The reasonsfor this are pretty clear it seems to me. Even though women have been left out of the generalstudyof historyfor all these centuHypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring1989) ? by LindaLopezMcAlister

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ries, when feminist historians came along there was never any doubt that women had existed throughout history and were there to be studied. However, we didn't think there had been any women philosophers.It stands to reasonthat people aregoing to be slowerto embarkon the studyof the history of groupsthey have been led to believe never existed. In the last decade or so, as more philosophersare feministsand approach both philosophy and history of philosophy with a feminist sensibility, the women philosophersof past eras have begun to emerge in a varietyof ways. Forone thing, we beganto see and pay attention to some of those figureswho had been there in the shadowsall along. "Oh yes, they did mention in History of Philosophy 101 that there were women as well as men in the Pythagoreancults." "And what about all those Princesseswho seemedto surround Descartesand Leibniz, could they be of any significance?""Couldshe be a philosopher, I thought she was a novelist." Secondly, we have rediscoveredearlierattemptsto look at women in the historyof philosophy, as in Gilles Menage'sHistoriaMulierumPhilosopharum (1690), which have providedclues and a startingpoint for furtherresearch. Thirdly, feminismhas expandedthe boundsof what we have consideredto be philosophyboth in termsof subjectmatterand the formsthat it may take. There is no longer any denying that women who theorize, e.g., about the rights or liberationof women, whether in the eighteenth century or today, are engaged in a philosophical pursuit. Furthermore,while this and other philosophicalquestionscan be addressedin formalessays,books and articles, they can also be addressedin letters, in diaries, in poetryand dramaand fiction. And these realizationshave led us to discoverthe philosophicalcontributionsof other women perhapsnot traditionallythought of as philosophers. Fourthly, as it becomes clear that there have been women philosophers throughoutthe historyof westerncivilization, and probablyin other cultures as well, historiansof philosophybegin to look for those women who perhaps never made it into the historiesof philosophy, or whose philosophicalwork never got published,or if publishedwas ignored,but who are there to be discoveredand studied. We no longerassumethat lack of approbationor attention from the philosophical establishmentis automaticallya sign of lack of philosophicalmerit. Several significant steps have been made in the study of the history of women in philosophyin recent years.In 1981 MaryEllen Waithe announced the foundingof The Projecton the Historyof Women in Philosophyin the APA Bulletinand the SWIPNewsletterand called for volunteersto participate in researching,translatingand writingabout the lives and workof women in the history of philosophy. Approximatelyforty philosophersfrom several countriesrespondedand workedfor six years to producematerialfor a four the first volume of volume work entitled A Historyof WomenPhilosophers, which has appearedto date. The Canadian feminist journal Resourcesfor

Linda LopezMacAlister

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sur la Recherche Feministepublisheda special FeministResearch/Documentation issue, September 1987, "Women and Philosophy/Femmeset philosophie," which includes articles on the history of women in philosophy as well as a verysubstantialbibliography.In December, 1987 a new organization,the Society for the Study of Women Philosophers,was establishedas an affiliateof the American PhilosophicalAssociation. Its statement of purposeis a clear reflection of the conviction that the work of women philosophers,now and throughouthistory, has taken a much broaderrangeof formsand dealt with a broaderrange of topics than traditionalviews of the discipline have recognized. The decision of the editorsof HYPATIAto plan a special issueon the history of women in philosophy is another such step. This decision has raisedan interestingeditorialpolicy issue. It is not the case that all women in the historyof philosophyare feminists, nor is it the case that everyonedoing the historyof women in philosophyemploysexplicitly feminist analyses. Yet HYPATIAis "a journalof feminist philosophy." The question immediatelyarosewhetherwe shouldthen restrictourselvesin this issueto acceptingonly articlesaboutfeministsand/orwhich were explicitly feministanalyses.Forthe purposesof this special issuethe answerto that question is, "No." The call for paperswas framedin the most generaland inclusive terms;we were seekingpaperson any aspectof the life and/orworkof women in the historyof philosophy. The thinking behind this decision was that the need for informationconcerningthe women in the historyof philosophy is so great, and we are to such a largeextent still at the very beginning stages, the stagesof hearingtheir names and findingout who they were, that to subject papersto a litmus test of feminist political correctnesswould be traditionalaccount of some counterproductive.And even a straightforward aspect of a woman'sphilosophicalwork may inspiresomeone else to undertake a feminist analysis.Of course, some of the papersdo deal with explicitly feminist philosophersand some employ explicitly feminist analyses. The issue begins with Ursule Molinaro'svivid poetic word portraitof our journal'snamesakeHypatia. I, for one, have long felt that the information abouther on the journal'smastheadis too briefand dry. It seemed appropriate to start this issue by giving readersa more passionateversion of the life, career and death of the woman whose memorywe honor and preserveby naming our journalafter her. Moving in chronologicalorderwe come to JoanGibson'spaper"Educating for Silence: RenaissanceWomen and the LanguageArts"which arguesthat the restrictedcurriculumthat was allowedfor educatedwomen in the Renaissance was such as to preparethem not for philosophizingor any other activity which was in the public sphere, but at best to be listenersand appreciative audiencesfor males. Gibson'swork providesa good backgroundfor developing an understanding of why, in the seventeenth century, despite their obvious gifts, the three

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royalwomen to whom BeatriceH. Zedlerintroducesus in "The Three Princesses"remainedessentiallyreactiveratherthan active in their philosophical endeavors, but importantto the history of philosophynonetheless. That other women in the seventeenth century, however, did take an active role in philosophical life and author full-blown philosophicaltreatises, even in some cases with feminist content, is clear fromJane Duran'sarticle on "Anne Viscountess Conway: A Seventeenth Century Rationalist"and Lois Frankel'spaper, "DamarisCudworthMasham:A Seventeenth Century FeministPhilosopher." MargaretMcFaddenemploysthe topologicalmodel for the developmentof feminist consciousnessproposedby contemporaryfeminist theoristsMichele Riot-Sarceyand Eleni Varikasin her examinationof the earlynineteenthcenturylife and workof "Anna Doyle Wheeler:Philosopher,Socialist,Feminist," And, moving on to the latter part of the nineteenth century. Maureen Eganlooks at Charlotte PerkinsGilman'sReformDarwinistideasand her vision of human social evolution as leading ultimately to the equality of the sexes. Finally,MaryCatharineBaseheartprovidesan accountof the phenomenologist Edith Stein's philosophyof womanand women'seducation. The material on which this essay is basedare essaysand speeches that Stein wrote during the 1920'sand early 1930's, while she was teachingat a girls'school, unable, as a woman, to get a universityteaching position despite having been one of Husserl'smost brilliantstudents. Her account providesan exampleof an essentialistview of women'snature which is nonetheless a feminist one. The idea for doing a special issueon HYPATIAon the historyof women in philosophywas,in a sense, inspiredby the work of the The Project on the Historyof Women in Philosophy, which was foundedby MaryEllen Waithe in 1981. We invited MaryEllen to sharesome of her thoughtsaboutstudying and teaching the historyof women in philosophy,which she has done in her discussionentitled, "On Not Teaching the Historyof Philosophy." One of the fruitsof the workof the Projectis the publicationof a fourvolIt appearsthat this is the ume workentitled, A Historyof WomenPhilosophers. firstbook on this subjectsince Gilles Menage'sbook was published299 years ago. This is obviously an occasion of great interest to feminists, but if the studyof women in the historyof philosophyis done, this workmustbe made known to "mainstream"scholars in history of philosophy as well. For that reason we invited two separatereviews of this book-one by a well-known feministphilosopherand the other by a traditionalspecialistin the historyof ancient philosophy-and both are publishedhere. The Book Review Section also contains a reviewby LindaD'Amico of Prudence Allen's The Conceptof Womanand a review by Judith Ochshor of SarahGrimke:Letterson the Equalityof the Sexesand OtherEssays,edited by ElizabethAnn Bartlett.

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I would like to thank MargaretA. Simons and the Associate Editorsof HYPATIAfor giving me the opportunityto work on this special issue, and thank all those who submittedpapers.I would like to offer a special wordof thanks to all those who were willing to give of their time to providedetailed reviews and very helpful critiquesof the paperssubmitted. Finally, I would like to acknowledgethe supportI received from the Women's Studies Programand fromDean JuliaDavis of the College of Social and BehavioralSciences, Universityof South Florida,which allowedme to undertakethe editorial duties of this issue.

REFERENCES Edwards,Paul, ed. 1967. Encyclopedia of philosophy.New York:Macmillan. BeatriceH. Menage, Gilles. [1690] 1984. The historyof womenphilosophers. Zedler, trans. New York:University Pressof America. (Original work publishedas HistoriamulierumPhilosopharum)

A Christian Martyrin Reverse Hypatia:370 - 415 A.D. A vivid portraitof the life and death of Hypatiaas seen throughthe eyes of a feministpoet and novelist.

URSULE MOLINARO

The torturekillingof thenotedphilosopher Hypatiabya mobof Christiansin Alexandriain 415 AD markstheendof a timewhenwomenwerestillappreciated for the brainundertheirhair.

The screamsof a 45-year-oldGreek philosopherbeing dismembered'by early-5th-century Christians, in their early-5th-century church of Caesareum,in Alexandria, center of early-5th-centurycivilization, reverberated between the moon gate & the sun gate of that civilized Egyptiancity. Before the philosopher's broken body was thrown into the civilized Alexandriangutter, for public burning. & smoke signals rose from the disorderlychunks of her charringflesh, warning future centuries of reformers& healers that they must hush their knowledge if they wished to avoid burning as heretics, or witches. If they wished to stay alive. In a worldrun by a new brandof Christians,politiciansof faith, who outlawed independent thought. Especially when thought by women. Whom they offereda new role model of depleasurizedsubmissionas they converted the great & lusty earthmothergoddess into a chaste mother of a martyred god. Whose teachings they converted into an orthodox church. Which convertedheresy- a wordthat used to mean: choice; of a view of life other than the norm - into the crime of otherness. Punishableby torture. -The sudden heresy of astrology. Which St. Augustine repudiated together with the suddenly heretic Christianityof the Manichees, & the paganphilosophyof the Greeks after the repudiatedstarswarnedhim of the suddenheresyof all his formerbeliefs. & sourcesof knowledge. Hypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring1989) ? by UrsuleMolinaro

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As they warnedTheron, Alexandria'sforemostGreek astrologer& mathematician, of the impendingmartyrdomof his only daughter.The 45-year-old Greek philosopherHypatia. Whose chart Theron had cast at the moment of her birth. Takingpridein her strongMercurythat promisedeloquent intelligence in fortunateaspectto her Jupiter.That gave her earlyrecognition;a renowngreaterthan his own. Rejoicing at her Moon exalted in the sign of the Bull, that made her clear strongvoice turn logic into music. Shakinghis head at her Venus in the sign of the Ram, which made her willful in mattersof emotion & aesthetics. Although he had to smile when he recognizedthat willful Venus in his 4year-olddaughter'srequestto wear golden sandalson her feet. & when the 12-year-oldstartedto bind her thick red hair in golden nets. He was still smiling though with thinner lips when the already renowned young philosopherstartedto have lovers. Whose charts he also cast. & when she marriedthe philosopherIsidore.Whose chartedphilosophical acquiescence to his willful wife's many amorousfriendshipsmade Theron shake his head. & wonder if his brilliant daughterwas perhapsabusingthe power over men seeminglygrantedto her by the stars. Which seemed to turn againsther, suddenly,as she approachedher 45th year. When the lined-up planets foreshadowedan event of such horrorthat Theron'scivilized early-5th-centurymind refusedto believe what he saw in her progressions. Which he recast& recast, until belief in his science outweighedhis belief in civilized early-5th-centuryhumanity. & he warnedhis daughter.Urging her to slip out of the city. To travel to Sicily, perhaps,where earlierGreek philosophershad lived out disgracedlives in quiet meditation, & discreet teaching. But Hypatiarefusedto listen to her father. Or perhapsshe did listen, but refusedto leave a city that used to sit at her feet, listeningto her learning.That seemedto be the only city in her civilized world. Where her currentlover lived also. Or perhapsHypatiawas sensing the end of an era, beyond which she had no desire to live. Her era, that had allowedher to be learned.Morelearnedthan her leared astrologer/mathematicianfather Theron. Than her philosopher husband Isidore. & to shareher learning.With studentsas illustriousas Synesiusof Cyrene. The only Christianshe knew to laugh a heartylaugh. Who had just recently become Bishopof Ptolomais.Who was writingher manyaffectionate,admiring letters. An era that had alloweda womanto think. & to become knownbecauseof her thoughts.

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That allowed the known thinking woman to have lovers, besideshaving a philosophicalphilosopherhusband. Powerful lovers, like Orestes, the pagan prefect of Egypt. Her current lover, whom she refusedto leave behind in Alexandria. Whom the Christiangossipof that city had takingordersfrom his known philosopher-mistress.Whom gossipsuspectedof being behind the paganprefect's opposition to Alexandria'sChristianpatriarchSt. Cyril. Who denied having expressed the unchristian wish to see the accursed woman dead. To his readerPeter. Who denied having repeated the Christian patriarch'sunexpressedunchristianwish casually, after a mass to a groupof lingeringclergy. Who denied having mentioned the known 45-year-old philosopher by name, in variousexhortations -about the adulterousconduct of paganwives the insidiousinfluenceof adulteroussex on the minds of pagan politicians;which had led to the martyrdomof earlierChristiansin the pastaddressedto variousgatheringsof their faithful. Who stopped the unmentioned known 45-year-oldphilosopher'scarriage on its way to her lecture hall. & forced it to go instead to their Christian church of Caesareum. Where the gatheredfaithful pulled the philosopherfrom her carriage. By the long red hair. In its habitualnet of fine gold, that instantlydisappearedbeneath a faithful cloak. & by the feet with their polished toe nails in their habitual golden leather sandals. That instantly disappeared. & by her tunic. Which tore. & left her nude. Standingfor another instant staringwide-eyedacrossa sea of bodies that were pausingbriefly, getting readyto charge into the new Christianera in which she had no desire to live. Until she realizedhow long it took a healthy 45-year-oldwoman'sbody to be tom fingersfrom hands from wristsfrom elbows from shoulderstoes from feet from ankles from knees from thighs. For the 45-year-oldheart to stop beating. For her brain to lose its exceptional consciousness. NOTE * According to The Women'sEncyclopedia of Mythsand Secrets(1983): the martyringChristians scrapedthe flesh off Hypatia'sbones with oyster shells.

REFERENCES

Walker, Barbara.1983. The woman'sencyclopedia of mythsand secrets.New York:Harper& Row.

EducatingFor Silence: RenaissanceWomen and the LanguageArts* JOANGIBSON

witheducating was integrated In theRenaissance,educating for an for philosophy the educational theoactiverolein society,and bothwereconditioned by prevailing riesbasedon humanistrevisionsof the trivium.I arguethatwomen'seducationin theRenaissanceremainedtiedto grammarwhiletheeducationof menwas directed towardactionthrougheloquence.This is botha resultof and a conditionfor the for women. greaterrestrictionon the socialopportunities

Dazzledby the seeming abundanceof brilliant women, early students of lead in extolling Renaissancewomen'seducationfollowedJacobBurckhardt's the completenessof their intellectual libertyand equality: Everywherethe intellectual arena was open to them on the same termsas to men. Incapacityand not sex was the only bar to entrance . . . never were their effortsmore highly appreciated or more generouslyrewarded.(Mozans 1913, 63) Recent scholarshave increasinglycalled attention to waysin which such improvementwas more apparentthan real, noting the generaldecline in opportunity for women as comparedto men (Kelly 1977), the greatereffect of family, class, and city on women'seducation, and the quite restrictednumberof women who actually received education along humanist lines (Wamicke 1983, King and Rabil 1981), as well as the special obstaclesencounteredby learned women (King 1976, 1980). Explanationsfor the increasedcircumscription of women's education despite its apparent promotion include changingpolitical and familypatterns(Stone 1977), lack of grammarschools for girls, conditionsof the marriagemarketfor upperclassfamiliesand the influence of reformedreligion (Waricke 1983), or the non-vocational, ornamental nature of humanist education (Jardine 1983, Grafton and Jardine

1986). An examinationof humanisteducationaltheoryand curriculumoffersstill anotherwayof understandingrestrictionson educatedwomen. The following Hypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989) ? by Joan Gibson

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discussionattemptsto explore the limitationsimposedon the intellectualdevelopment of Renaissancewomen, with particularreferenceto philosophy, by focussingon how women were affectedby curricularshifts occurringduring this period. Specifically, I consider the way in which the humanist remodeling of the triviumdiminishededucationalopportunitiesfor women as comparedto men and underminedthe utility of their education both in the context of the Italian Renaissanceof the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and particularlyin the EnglishRenaissanceof the sixteenth century.1 As curriculumreformwas a majorconcern of many leadinghumanistswho often dealt expresslywith the education of girls as well as boys, Renaissance educationtreatisesprovidea usefulbarometerof advancedviews on women.2 In spite of individualvariations,the central themes of those who considered the education of girls are remarkablyconsistent throughseveralgenerations and acrosswide geographicalareas.The treatisesshow a stronglygender-related understandingof all educationand attemptto reconcilewomen'seducation with conventional norms of sex-stereotyped behaviour, emphasizing chastity, silence, and obedience for women, courageousand active virtuefor men. While most authorsagreedabout the innate inferiorityof girl'sminds, they usuallyconcludedthat at least some girlswere as capableas any boy; but gender bias still occured in almost every aspect of Renaissanceeducation, even for the most talented women.3A commonreservationwas the view that women requirededucationespeciallyto strengthenand stabilizetheir characters. In orderto form an appropriatefemale character,the rangeof authors recommendedfor girlswas narrower,usuallyexcludingsubstantialportionsof the pagan classics-a particularlysignificant restrictionfor humanists. All educatorsedited their chosen authorsmore stronglyfor girls than for boys, ommiting whole topics and genres from the list of suitable studies for girls, with amorouspoetry and prose romancesbeing the most frequent targets. The effect of such education as they did receive was drasticallyalteredby the widespreadview that girls need not, ought not, study all three arts of the trivium. Beginning in the classical period, it had become customaryto divide the disciplines of the seven liberal arts into those paths to knowledge through number-the quadrivium- and those which led to wisdom through language-the trivium. Comprisinggrammar,dialectic, and rhetoric, the languageartsremainedsynonymouswith the requirementsfor educationfor over twentycenturies.Their rudimentswere the beginningof a child'sseriouseducation; so basic was this introductionto the world of learning through languagethat it gave to Englishthe term "trivial"to designatethe slight or trifling. Yet so central were the arts of the triviumto advancededucation that they gave their name to the "arts"course at medieval and Renaissanceuniversities.Within the trivium, classicaleducationhad placed the greatestemphasison rhetoric, the art of persuasiveand declamatoryspeech, in the con-

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text of trainingfor public service in legal and political debate. In turn, each of the three great educationalreformsbetween the eleventh and sixteenth centuries had altered that emphasis. Medieval monastic education had stressedgrammaras the most necessarypreparationfor a life devoted to religious meditationbasedon scriptureand liturgy.But beginningin the twelfth century, logic had increasedin importancewhen the rising universitiesenshrinedit as necessarypreparationfor theological speculationor for the professionsof medicine and law and laterfor refutingheresy.When Renaissance humanismagainplacedrhetoricat the center of educationaltheoryit marked a renewedbelief in the importanceof public eloquence for individualcareers and for instituting social reform(Gray 1963; Bouwsma1973). A pervasivefaith in the simultaneousreformof letters, individuallife, and society underlaythe stated aim of humanist education, which was to form minds and charactersin accordwith antique virtues. Students thus prepared by the studyof paganand Christianclassicscould contributeto a renewedsociety. While recent studies (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 1-57) have questionedhumanists'assumptionsthat their educationalprogramwould indeed lead male studentsto personalvirtue and an active careerof moraland civic reform,the situationfor women presentsadditional,specialparadoxes. The education accordedto women in the Renaissancecan be better understood if we recognizehow closely it remainedtied to grammar,while men's education encompassedas well dialectics and rhetoric. Forall students, the studyof the triviumbegan with the elementarystudy of grammar,which served as the introductionto language,especiallyLatin and Greek. At more advancedlevels, grammarlead to stylisticsand literary criticismthroughstudyof the best authorsof the past, includingpoets, orators, and historians.Girls, however, were generallyadvisedto pay greaterattention to scriptureand patristics.This close readingof sourcetexts was designed to producefluency, accuracyin speech and composition, and an appreciationof the finer points of Latin and Greek. In this sense grammarencompassed all literary studies, including areas sometimes also assigned to rhetoricor poetics. Rhetoricwas a two-foldart. On one hand it was directed to the advancedstudyof compositionand oral expression,often in combination poetics. On the other hand it was also the disciplinedstudy of persuasion, in conjunction with a dialectic which aimed at discoveringbroadprinciples of argumentation,especiallythose for probableor persuasiveargument, and at guidingclear thinking in ordinarysituations.Able thus to lead in different directions, rhetoricaltrainingwas a dividingpoint between men's and women'seducation. Both sexes pursueda generalstudy of literatureencompassing a continuum of grammar,rhetoric, and poetics, but the systematic conflation of the persuasiveaspects of logic and rhetoric served to separate the morespecializedpartsof rhetoricfromgrammarand was usuallyavailable only to male students.

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Although rhetoricin both its aspectswas the pre-eminentRenaissanceart, humanist curricularreformsalso led to a renewed importancefor grammar. Whether attemptingto reinstitutea more classicalLatin, revive Greek studies, masterHebrew, beginning to edit ancient texts or discussingthe state of the vernacularlanguages,humanistswere in the forefrontof grammarstudies. However, their literaryand philologicalemphasisalteredthe role assignedto technical grammarstudiesin medievalphilosophyand underminedthe philosophical methodology based on logical analysis of language (Heath 1971; Ashworth 1982, 1988;Jardine1982, 1988; Percival1982). Further,by cultivating new sources,and a new philosophicalstyle, and by placinggrammarin an historical and social context, the philological and literarystudy of grammar laid a basis for developments in Renaissancephilosophyclosely associated with rhetoricand dialectic (Kristeller1988, 135-37;Jardine1988, 18889). It is widely recognized that humanist education writers emphasised education for women and correspondinglydownplayed grammatical-literary or prohibitedthe study of logic and rhetoric. LeonardoBruni'swell-known text makesthe limitation explicit and its rationaleobvious. He must bear in mind above all ... who it is that I am addressinghere. Forwhy exhaust a womanwith the . .. thousanddifficultiesof rhetorical art, when she will never see the forum?And indeed that artificial performance . . . which we call pronuntiatio(which Demosthenesmaintainedto rankfirst, second and third, such was its importance),as it is essentialto performers,so it ought not to be pursuedby women at all. For if a woman throwsher armsaroundwhile speaking,or if she increasesthe volume of her speech with greater forcefulness, she will appear threatinglyinsane and requiringrestraint.These mattersbelong to men; as war, or battles, and also contests and public controversies.A woman will not, therefore,studyany further what to speak either for or against witnesses, either for or againsttorture,either for or againsthearsayevidence, nor will she busyherselfwith locicommunes,or devote her attention to dilemmaticquestionsor to cunning answers;she will leave, finally, all public severity to men (Trans. Grafton and Jardine 1986, 32-33). Juan LuisVives (1972, 34, 54-55) similarlydeclaresthat becausewomen do not participatein public affairs,they need less educationand that of a different nature, omitting logic and rhetoric,while Agrippad'Aubigneadmitsthat such studiesas logic may have utility, but only for women of the highest rank since for others it is both uselessand dangerous,perhapsleadingto contempt for domestic duties or argumentswith husbandsand companions.The temp-

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tationto pridecan be overlookedonlyfor ". . . princesses,obligedby their rankto assumethe responsibilities, knowledge,competence,administration, andauthorityof men"(O'FaolainandMartines1973, 186).4 Humanistsdevelopedthe closelinkagebetweenpublicactivity,dialectic, and rhetoricon the modelof Greekand Romanoratoricalpractices,and basedit on a newlyperceivedneed forrationalexchangebetweenfreeand view, it wasnot merelyrationality relativelyequalmen. In the Renaissance whichdistinguished the humanfromthe brute,butalsospeech.5TheCiceroniantraditionreveredby the humanistsheld thatlogicwithoutrhetoricwas if it wereto be usefulforthe useless,andrhetoricwithoutlogicdangerous; whichwasto reshapesociety,thoughtmustbe expressed. moralpursuasion Thus the integratedspeech art was not a functionof intellect alone, of knowledgeor acumenin reasoning,butof intellectandwill, knowledgeand moralactioncombined.The markof the fullyhumanwaseffective,intellionly suchspeechrevealedhumannatureas at once gent, moralpersuasion; ethical and social rational, (Gray1963,Siegal1968).The competingclaims of the activeandcontemplative livesfelt in the earlyRenaissance hadsoon beenresolvedby the idealof a mixedlife combiningintellectualandsocial pursuits.In the evolutionof an educationforsuchan ideal,all the artsof the triviumwererecast.Humanistsassertedthe importance of grammar training forthe activelife andplacedrhetoricat the centerof theirprogram to producethe virtuousmanof wordsanddeeds.Theyalsoscorfully rejectedthe technicallogicof the medievalschoolmenwhichtheyfelt highlyformalized, wasisolatedalikefromordinarylanguageandordinaryexperience. LorenzoValla,forexample,debatedwhetherscholasticlogicianswereto be accusedof "ignorance, on vanityor malice,or all at once."Commenting thispassage,Bochnski(1970, 254) remarks thatthe onlyreasonthe humanists"didnot ... rejectlogicentirelyis dueto theirsuperstitious reverencefor all ancient thinkers,Aristotle included.. . . everythingmediaevalwas lookedon assheerbarbarism, especiallyif connectedwithformallogic."Historiansof logichavelongcharacterized the rejectionof medievalformallogic asa resultbothof aestheticrevulsionandof the increasedinterestin rhetoric the closecon(KnealeandKneale1962).6Butotherstudieshaveemphasized nectionsin the Renaissance betweendialecticandrhetoric.Whilethe ususal viewhas been that rhetoricall but swallowedup the simplifiedlogicof the period,Jardineshowsthatat the universitylevelhumanistlogicincorporates muchof rhetoric.As a result,even the dialecticcourses,whichcontinuedto formthe coreof the universitycurriculum, reflecteda muchmorehumanist of role of the dialectic understanding (Jardine1974, 1976, 1988). Howell(1961,3-4) earlycharacterized bothhumanistlogicandrhetoricas a scientific of attempting analysis statements,with logicconcerning"scholand . .. the theoryof communication scientific discourse in the worldof arly Its to task was assist of learned treatises and to helpthe learing." explication

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student "masterlearnedcommunicationas part of his entrance to the scientific and philosophicworld. .. . Rhetoricwas regardedas the theoryof communication between the learnedand lay world."The combined speech arts are partof the same largertheoryof communication;their integrationcan be seen in the continuing debates about the properorder of the artessermocinales, especiallyfor their first introduction.Whether rhetoricwas taught before dialectic, as containing a milderformof the art of conviction, or dialectic was taughtfirst to help studentsrecognizeand understandthe hidden and subtle argumentsof the poets, the two arts were entwined in educational practice and in the majorityof Renaissancetextbooks with examples from Virgil or Cicero alongsidethose fromAristotle. Humanistsadoptedthe term "dialectic" rather than "logic" for the study of forms of argumentation (Jardine1988, 176), underscoringthe theory of an integratedart of discourse in which the distinctionbetweendialecticand rhetoricremainsveryimprecise. The social world within which the learnedspoke with each other or to a lay audience incorporatedseveralfeatureswhich W. J. Ong (1971, 113-41; 1977, 24-35) arguesare genderspecific. In his studyof Renaissancelanguage education, Ong contends that there were two differentuniversesof discourses and in general,two differentlanguagesfor Renaissancemen and women. The languagesthemselvescan be characterizedas the vernacularand Latin, or alternatively, as the mother and father tongues. Everyone had a mother tongue; it was the languageof women and children, of nursesand baby talk. But educated male children were encouraged,even forced, to abandon the mother tongue along with the nurseryand the world of women at an early age; they would become men speaking and writing the father tongue. As against the accessible, largelyoral, infantalizedworld of women's language, the father tongue was learned, written, action-orientedand exclusive. So clear was the scorn for women's languagethat even Latin was loweredfrom the pinnacle of respectabilitywhen it was regardedas the languageof mothers and nurses among the ancients (Montaigne 1967, 183). The connection between women'sspeech and the vernacularworriedeven the manyhumanistswho felt that the elevation and regularizationof the vernacularwas part of their mandate. The veracular, especiallyas spoken by women, was felt to be inadequatewhen comparedto classicallanguages.The subjectsdiscussedin the veracular were clearlyset off againstthose studied in Latin: the vernacularwas suitable for domestic topics, the simple, the practical,the immediate,and the frivolous.In spite of the translationof classical authorsinto vernacularlanguages,attemptsto educate in the veraculars, and even to use them to unravelthe mysteriesof logic and rhetoric,vernacular languageswere often thought to need improvementon every level. Comparedto classical languages,they were not yet sufficientlyelegant, abstract, scientific or exact, not yet universalin either time or place, and above all, not yet sufficientlymoral. In particular,vernacularchivalric romances

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were thought to be so deficient on both aesthetic and moral groundsthat Vives, who was a particularchampionof vernacularlanguages,recommended no secularvernacularliteratureat all for women (Vives 1912, 58-62, 203-08). It was arguedthat since women'sprimarytaskwas to be the firstinstructors of children, educationwasnecessaryto enable them betterto fill their crucial but limited role of teaching simple, clear speech, and appropriatemanners and giving the first instructionin virtue and religion. Although the ultimate responsibilityfor ensuringthat mothersand nursesspoke the vernacularwell enough to educate children in properspeech devolved upon the father, the vernacularworld of the nurserywas seen as so exclusively a woman'sworld that Thomas Elyot (1962, 19) wished to forbid entry to any man except a doctor. It was further hoped that the nurserywould be the realm of the motherherself, as she alone was accountedthe propernurseby most humanists for reasonsrelatingboth to nurtureand to speech training. Erasmuswas among the many to make the connection and arguefrom it for the need to educate women (Woodward 1964, 80, 86-87). Although educatorssometimes urgedmothersor nursesto teach rudimentaryLatinvocabularythrough play, few believed this was reallypracticaland usuallycalled upon the father to take a hand in such early education. The humanist ideal of the Latinspeaking household seems almost never to have been fully realized (Ong 1971, 121-22); a young boy left off "speakingas a child"only throughinitiation into the world of men and into the languagein which educated, privileged men carriedout their work. After the transitionto formalschooling, which for most boysoccuredbetween the agesof five and seven, they wereremoved from the companyof women and generallyforbiddento speak in the vernacularwhile being schooled (Woodward1921, 192-95; 198). Ong has noted that the role of formalizedlanguagetrainingin Renaissance education bearsespeciallystrong resemblancesto pubertyrites in other cultures. Characterizedas providinga "systematicceremonialinductionof adolescent youths into full participationin tribal, as opposedto familyand clan, life"the function of pubertyrites becomes"essentiallydidactic, 'the chief vehicle to link generationsin the transmissionof the culturecomplex'.The climax is reachedin the inculcationof lessons in triballaw, moralityand tradition" (1971, 105-06). Such rites provide a special marginalenvironment in which the initiate makesa decisive breakwith his past, often achievedby undergoingan ordeal or through accomplishingdifficult tasks. Special taboos might be in force at this time while other kindsof excess wouldbe tolerated; within an atmosphereof heightened emotionalism, the candidatebecomes especiallysensitive to the lessonsof the period.Ong believes these conditions were met by the sex-segregrated,linguistically-segregrated schools in which the Renaissanceboy was brought into a society and a traditionoutside the family. The child thus formedcame to adult statureseeing himselfas a member of an elite linguistic, intellectualand social communitydedicatedto pre-

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servingthe heritageof antiquity, guardingit from corruptionand entrusting it to the future. School-boy pranksand espritde corpsformedbonds between the initiates which were strengthenedby the linkage between learning and physicalpunishment, with the result that learningwas regardedas an arduous, even dangerous,trial to be undergone.Use of the rod to inculcateLatin was itself necessitated in part by the increasingseparationbetween correct (classical) Latin and extra-curricularlife. Renaissancetheories of education were overtly moral, enshriningat their center an idea of virtue which was frequentlyetymologizedas denoting the properqualitiesfor a man (vir). Learningitself was defendedon the grounds that-far fromrenderinga boy effeminateand soft-it toughenedand madea man of him, strongboth in moraland physicalfibre. The resemblanceto militarytrainingwas not unnoticed. It was a commonplaceof the periodthat the decline of Rome was simultaneousin languageand militarymight, and the hope was often expressedthat a returnto linguisticpuritywouldsignal an age of renewed military, or at least political, glory. Thus learning the classical languagesand literatureswas tied to developinga courageousand manlycharacter in the youngboy; the poets assignedfor studywere those who wroteepic tales of physicalprowessand heroic glory and the selection of moralistswas influencedby the desire to reinforcethe manly virtues. Still other masculinizingelements of Renaissancelanguageeducationarose frompedagogicalpractices.LearningcorrectLatinentailed learningnot only the appropriatesentimentsand the most apt expressionsof them, but also entailed a particular method of thought and expression. Ong (1981) and Grafton and Jardine (1986, 83-98) have shown the importance of the agonistic mode of instruction which gives a typical shape to Renaissance thoughtand speech, lending itself both to seriousdiscussionand to the verbal displaysof mock combat so frequentlyseen in Renaissancedebate. Having routinely learned material through rhetorical, argumentativerole-playing, hoping to attractthe notice of a patronby competitivedisplay,the studentor scholar easily chose sides on every question or arguedagainst all sides. He could win renown for his skill, perhapsvanquish others, even persuade.A high regardfor such duels of wordsand wits colouredall discourse,eventually affecting the shape of Reformationpolemic. While many Renaissanceauthorsexpressedhorrorat the aggressivewranglingof youngmale students,the combativenesspromotedby such educationalpracticeswas thought still less appropriatefor women (Vives 1912, 204). Even in the absenceof rhetorical or dialectical debate, learned women were often pictured as fierce, armed maidensand addressedas honorarymales.7Thus while even the verycontent and style of humanist education for men were often incompatible with women'ssocial roles and requiredmodification,the attemptto find a suitable use for a woman's humanist learning requireda still greaterdifferentiation and restriction.

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Formen, the properend of educatedintelligence-speechleadingto action-is well illustrated of whetherrhetoricis partof diaby the discussions lecticsor of politics-an artof reasonor an artof action(Vickers1988,71519, 726-29.The tendencyto regardlogicandrhetoricas correlativeartsof communicationhas been noted, as has the generaldebasementof logic. Whenrhetoricwasassociatedwith logicas merelysugar-coated dialecticfor boys,it sharedto someextentthe lackof status.8Butwherebothwereplaced at the serviceof publicvirtue,a morepositiveview of the assimilationof rhetoricand logicresulted.The transferof dialecticsto the realmof active servicewasaccomplished in partthroughthe doctrinesof the places(topics) andof invention,eachof whichwastreatedby bothlogicandrhetoric,and in partby the expansionof the kindsof reasoningconsidered byRenaissance dialectic.The new focuson inductivearguments,enthymemes,persuasion and probabilitybroughtlogic closerto the practicalconcernsof rhetoric, whileobviatingthe need to considermedievaltreatiseson the properties of termsor the conditionsforcertaintyin demonstrative proof(Jardine1982, 1974, 60-62). Renewedattentionto inventionandthe placeswascorrelated closelywith in interest more diverse forms of and the need for a practical rising argument and for Formal was grounding application argumentation. validity now less than for debatable or focusrequired strategies arguments using propositions on circumstances. Invention sing particular providedstartingpointsand or marshalled whatcouldbe said typesof approachto debatablepropositions foror againstthem. The need to supplyevidenceor reasonsfor arguments wasmet usuallyby recourseto the commonplaces when "theauthorfound wisdomof hisrace subjectmatterbyconnectinghis mindwiththe traditional andby allowingthatcontactto inducea flowof ideasfromthe generalstore into himself"(Howell1961, 25). Reflectionson definition,genus,species, property,time,place,whole,parts,etc. allowedhimto tapthe logicalplaces of collectedwisdom,whilethe rhetoricalplacesprovidedaccessto the generalwisdomrelatingto political,legal,andmoralissues.It wasnot uncombetweenlogicand mon, even forthosemostkeenlyawareof the differences to render invention a of rhetoric, logical species rhetoricalinvention,andto themchieflyon the groundsof the greaterplainnessandbrevityof distinguish logicalinvention. ThusRenaissance theoryneverreallydivorcedrationalspeechandlogicitselffrompracticalconsiderations of politicsandthe professions. The Ciceronianidealof the orator-the goodmanspeakingwell-combinedin himself dutiesto logic,rhetoricandthe moralconcernsof civilscience;hisoratorical wereto be directedalwaystowardsocialvirtue. teach,delight,andpersuade Byhis words,he conveyedtruth,by his life, he gaveauthorityto his words, andby theircombination,he led othersto the goodlife.9

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But such speech, authorityand persuasionwere systematicallydenied even to educatedwomen by the obsessivedemandsof a constrainingdecorum.Numerousstudiesattest to the tensions felt in the Renaissancebetween expanding educationalopportunitiesfor women and the lack of an acceptablesocial role for the educatedwoman. Women whose educationneverthelessseemed to bestow authority rendered the tensions especially accute.l? There were severalstandardapproachesto resolvingthe impliedcontradictions:one denied the identity of the educatedpersonand the woman (she didn't write it; she has the mind and heartof a man; she belongsto a mythic type). An alternate strategyacceptedthe educatedwoman, but denied that she had become a good person-the properoutcome of humanisteducation(she is not chaste; she is proudof her learning, she defends immoralopinions) and a third version acknowledgeda virtuouseducatedwoman but only indirectly(she is too modest to make her knowledge public).11Each of these strategiesrevealed the incompatibilityof requirementsof chastity, silence, and obedience-the omnipresentfemale virtues-with the requirementsof receiving and using a complete education in Renaissance grammar,dialectic, and rhetoric, and each fails to resolve the paradoxof a linguisticallyoriented education for silence. The attempted resolution in the Renaissancewas an intensive education for women which remainedbased in literarygrammaticalstudies. While the study of languages,both classical and vernacular,could foster the positive values of education for women, the prohibition of dialectic and rhetoric would simultaneously reinforce the traditional restricted social roles for women. If grammareducation for boys preparedthem for more specialized studies in the trivium and the professions,for girls, the modified grammar curriculumneed provideonly a generalisteducationacquiredin a familysetting, directed towardfamily duties and private pleasure(Friedman1985).12 As a student, a girl would be occupied and would disciplineher characterto docility.13She would read exhortationsto chastity, silence, and obedience from the best and most persuasiveauthorswith the greatestauthority;she wouldamassexamplesof virtuefromthe orators,historians,poets, and scripture, rememberingboth the phrasesand the deeds.14 The fruit of her efforts would be an intense awarenessof decorumand virtue, expressedwith grace and facility in conversation, Latin composition, and vernaculartranslation, together with knowledgeableappreciationof the fine points of men's more professionalspeech and writing. The utility of their intellectualtrainingremainedlimitedeven within a domestic sphere:women were encouragedto teach only the membersof their own householdswho were still uninstructedand unformed.A womanteacher was not generallyrecommendedfor advancedfemale students, in spite of the dangerpresentedto a girl'schastity by male tutors.15 A woman was still less likely to be consideredas a teacher of boys "lestwhen she hath taken a false

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opinion . . . she spreadit into the hearers, by the authorityof mastership .. ." (Vives 1912, 56). Knowledgeof languagesor of reveredauthorssignified only a woman's charming accomplishments, not her authority.16Althoughoutstandinglearningmight give her the statusof a prodigy,a myth, or a muse it did not entail any scholarlyprospects.Of the three oratoricalduties assignedthe good man, the humanistwomanof the Renaissancewas allowed two-to teach in a highly attenuatedformand to delight, but to persuadeno one. It is just this persuasionand argumentationwhich was the object of dialectic and rhetoricand which makestheir omissionso important.If the purpose of grammarwas an understandingof canonicalauthorsand readycommandof fluent expression,it did not differsignificantlyfromthose aspectsof rhetoric which examined advanced composition (Grafton and Jardine 1986, 20) or from those aspects of poetics which sharedwith grammarand rhetoric the study of figures of speech and tropes, the so-called "colours"of rhetoric (Howell 1974, 155-61; Vickers 1988): all these were available to educated women. But such featuresof rhetoricas impliedequalityor authority,those which markeda professionalrhetoric, or a dialecticalstance with direct and daily applicationin a public forum, these fell outside grammar. In additionto argumentation,those aspectsof rhetoricpertainingto deliveryor to an active life were exactly the ones forbiddento women;women are to form an audience, not to seek one. 17 Unlike either dialectic or rhetoric, grammartrainingplaced its firstemphasison the role of studentsas audience, strivingto understandtheir authorsand teacherseven in the studyof composition. Significantly, the education treatisesfor women includedno discussion of an intendedaudiencefor theirwordsbeyondthe domesticor conversational sphere. Issuesof polite conversation,however, were raisedin courtesy books, not in rhetoricaltheorywhich adressedadaptingargumentsto particularaudiences. 8 Women'sspeech is thus assignedonly to the context of courtesy-being pleasing,knowingone's place in the social order-leaving unexplored the possibilitythat they might participateeven informallyin the reformof life, letters, and society.19Some of the singulardifficultywomen humanistshad in finding and holding a learnedaudience may derive from the confusion of their intended audience about whether to respondsocially or professionally.20Even when speakingpublicly women had severely limited opportunitiesfor persuasion;they most typicallygave orationsof praise,with very few women who were not rulersessayingpolitical or legal oratory-and then only on behalf of family. The fashionableoratoricalperformancesof the earlygenerationof Italian humanistwomen illustratevividly that the reluctanceto educate women in dialectic and rhetoricdid not springsolely fromreservationsabout the public naturetheir displaysof accomplishmentsbut even more stronglyfrombeliefs that women shouldnot influencepublic affairs.21GraftonandJardine(1986,

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45) concluded that all oratoricalperformancesof humanistwomen were occasionalratherthan professional,necessarilyso since there was no social role to supportit. Like their literaryrhetoric, women'soral performancesserved only to announce their presenceand their accomplishmentsto an audienceof charmedspectators.The tamenessof these performances-suitable for ceremonial occasions-reinforces Jardine'sobservations(1983, 39) on the humanist tendency to see education as "safe"for those women who understood their assignedplace. While public displaysof women'seducation both fascinated and disturbedmale humanists,they did not open doorsto professional status, which would have requiredsocial autonomy,or to philosophicalspeculation, which would have requiredintellectual autonomy. Public recognition of women'saccomplishmentswhile denyingwomen real participationin the public spheremaskeda similarlack of freedomin the privatesphere.22 In either situation, women's independenceof thought and authorityto make or urgerationalchoices were effectivelycurtailedby the prohibitionson dialectic and rhetoric. An education based in grammaris particularlysuitablefor one destined to a life of retirementor obedience, in which she was to listen, but not to speak until spoken to, in which she would ordinarilywield no authorityexcept as patronor discriminatingaudience. Almost none of the extant publicationsof humanistwomen requiredmore than an advancedgrammareducation;even the Latin works-correspondence, occasionalpieces and presentationcopies of school exercises-are often distinguishedfor their virtuoso literaryqualities though not memorablefor their content (King and Rabil 1983, 26-28). In turn, their most typical kinds of literaryproduction- veracular translations of devotional or imaginative works (Hannay 1985, 5-9)-are exactly those which most closely resemblethe set pieces of grammarinstruction.Although these worksderive from familiaritywith classicalauthors, they were not addressedprimarilyto a learnedaudience, but to other women and to less educatedmen. While such worksmake a claim for the learningof the author, they makeno claim that she speakson her own behalf, thus solving the problems of authorityand audience by serving as conduits for the wordsof others.23 The historical importanceof women'sliteraryactivities in the Renaissance as well as their interest and originality, has obscuredthe full implications of omitting dialectic and rhetoricfromwomen'seducation.24Given the importanceof languagetrainingfor all humanists, and the rarityof women educatedin the classicallanguages,scholarsmay treat knowledgeof Latin as sufficientevidence of a woman'shumanisteducation, althoughit is surelynot sufficientto denote a humanist programfor men.25 The majorimportanceof humanismfor intellectualhistoryprobablylies in the diffusionof a particularset of attitudes and in the educationalprogram which came to dominate secondaryeducation. Concentratedin the humanities-grammar, rhetoric, poetics, history and moral philosophy-humanism

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did not touch directly on many other aspects of the intellectual life of the Renaissance(Kristeller1988, 113-14). However, from the middle of the fifteenth century, men'searlyeducationin humanismwasfollowedby a university and professionaleducation which now combined elements of humanism with scholasticism,thus reinforcingand extending the effects of humanism. The change was especially pronouncedfor dialectic, which was introduced seriouslyonly at the universitylevel and which continued to hold the central place in the artsprogramboth for its own sake and as essentialpreparationfor more specializedstudyand careers.The implicationsfor women and philosophy are considerable.The expansion of women's education in the Renaissance came almost exclusively through increasedaccess to humanisteducation, albeit of a truncated,still more intensely literarykind than that offered to men. Thus women educatedalong humanistlines have been notable especially for literary achievements, most particularlyvernaculartranslations, vernacularpoetryand tales, and Latinorationsand correspondence.But they were ill preparedfor philosophy;as humanists,they authoredno philological theory, wrote no textbooks, translatedno technical philosophicaltreatises, and scarcelyparticipatedin editing-activities which made importantcontributions to reshapingRenaissancephilosophy and for which their grammar trainingmight have preparedthem. Further,rationaland naturalphilosophy were largelyinaccessableto humanistwomen since they lacked the training in dialecticstypicalof such non-humanistareasand of more advancededucation and careerssuch as medicine and law throughwhich men made other kinds of philosphicalcontributions(Jardine82, 805-06).26 It was often claimed that women had the study of morality as a special province, but even here humanism, by its educationalprogramor its attitudes, scarcelyfreed women to pursuetheir full development. Discouraged from the study of scholastic speculative ethics as unfashionable,barbarous, and clerical, as well as foundedon a systemof logic they did not understand, equallydissuadedfrom the fashional interest in sceptical and epicureanphilosophyas probablyimmoraland certainlyinappropriatefor chaste, obedient women, female scholarswere left with a philosophyconsistinglargelyof religious doctrine, moral fables and the platitudesof christianizedstoicism or a literaryattitudeof neoplatonism.27In both, the emphasiswas on privatevirtues, with Christianand paganalike makingchastityparamountfor women, followed closely by docility and endurance. Moral issues deriving from the governanceof the household or the state did not arise;there is no sign that even princesseswere instructedin political philosophyor the exerciseof public virtues such as liberality.Without access to worldlyaffairsor the professions, offereda self-developmentwhich could be fulfilledonly in the isolation of secularretreator religiousretirement, it is small wonder that women did not seek virtueeither in autonomousaction or in makingcommoncausewith other women.28

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The samenessof humanist education for women throughoutthe Renaissance and the repetitiouscharacterizationof women'smoraland intellectual agencycontrastsstronglywith the new historicalappreciationwhich continually alteredphilosophicalunderstandingof the place of man in the universe or men in the state and which led Renaissancephilosophersto a questioning and sceptical attitude (Vasoli 1988, 61-62).29 The static humanist educational theories for women provided a diminished intellectual field, a restricted community of discourse, and no authority within it. By denying women access to the combined artsof logic and rhetoric, the curriculumexcluded them from the revived classical ideal of human nature embodied in "the speakerof wordsand doer of deeds."If neverthelessexceptionalwomen managedto studyphilosophy, a humanisteducation had providedat most a few of the tools but very little of the rationaleor support.30

NOTES * An earlier version of this paper was first presented at Canadian Society for Women in Philosphy, 1978. I would like to acknowledgea generousgrant from Atkinson College for researchand to thank Leslie Sanders,Sr. FrancesNims and the readersat Hypatiafor helpfulcomments on earlierdrafts. 1. Graftonand Jardine(1986, 122-57) discussrelevantdifferencesbetween Italianand northern humanisteducation. 2. Among those who wrote on the educationof girls, some may have had femalepupilsat the court schools (Vittorino da Feltre, JuanLuisVives), throughtutoringin privatefamilies (Roger Ascham, Richard Hyrde), or through dischargingtheir parentalobligations (Thomas More). The educationof girls was also a topic among humanistswho taughtonly male studentsat universities (Erasmus)and those who did not teach at all (Leon BattistaAlberti). 3. With depressingregularity,the achievementsof women are routinelyused by the humanists as a shamefulincentive to less diligent male students. 4. Mulcaster(1971, 133-35; 140-43), generallyregardedas a liberaladvocatefor women'seducation, takes a position very similarto Aubigne. A populartranslationof a conservativehumanist plan for women'seducation is describedin Holm (1987, 200-05). 5. See for example, CassandraFidele, in King and Rabil (1983, 72). 6. On the complex continuing historyof traditionallogic in the period, see Ashworth (1982, 1988). 7. Among others, Jardine(1983, Grafton and Jardine, 1986) has noted the differentunderstandingof virtueassignedto learnedmen and women and the readinessto interpretaccomplishment in women as a sign of masculinityor of vice. 8. When rhetoric is assimilatedto logic, insteadof vice versa, it can be accountedfor by the prior standing of dialectic as a professionalizedactivity within the university (Jardine1974, 1976). 9. GraftonandJardine(1986, 1-57) argueforcefullythat humanisteducationalpracticeswere inadequate,perhapseven misdirected,for realizingthis elevated ideal. 10. As Wilson so correctlypoints out, birth or position ratherthan educationformthe basis on which learnedwomen take an active role in the world (1987, xxii-xxiii). 11.It is ironic that public advertisementsof learningwereunambiguouslypositive when assosiciated with only one professionfor women-that of courtesan(Warke 1987, 3-5). 12. CassandraFidele'soration in praiseof the liberalartsassertsthat they offerwomen no rewardsor dignity. They are usefulfor men, pleasureablefor women (Kingand Rabil 1983, 74-77). See also LauroQuirini'sletter to Isotta Nogarola, indicatingthat without furthereducation in

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dialectic and philosophy, she remainsonly semi-learned,however eloquent (King and Rabil 1983, 112-16). Note the assessmentof this letter in Grafton and Jardine(1986, 29-32). 13. Graftonand Jardine(1986, 24) stressthe passivity,obedience, and docility attendenton grammarstudy even for boys. 14 She would also be constantly remindedthat studyshould not interferewith domestic duties or the properdomestic attitudes. 15. Vives (1912, 54-56) mentions the possibility and Mulcaster (1971, 143) allows for women teachers of girls, but prefersmen. Warike has difficultyestablishingthat women humanists generallyeducatedeven their daughters. 16. Watson's comment on the passagefrom Vives cited in the previousnote confirmsthis reading as does Jardine'sremarkthat "Greek was much encouragedfor women, whilst it remaineduselessfor civic affairs,which were conductedin Latin"(1983, 52). A similarassessment applies to poetry, in which women are especiallynotable, as comparedwith prose (Woodward 1921, 234). 17. LauraCereta retired shortly after she was attacked preciselyon her oratoricalstance, (Rabil 1981, 16-20) and Isotta Nogarola undertookthe study of dialectic and philosophyonly aftershe had retiredfrompublic view (Jardine,1983, 242). See also Angelo Poliziano'sreportof AlessandraScala'sperformanceof the role of Electra.His view that it wascompletelynon-theatrical because it reflectedher real maidenlymodesty, with eyes firmlyfixed on the groundat all times, undermineshis praiseof her gesturesand oral delivery (cited Graftonand Jardine1986, 53-54). 18. The importanceof conversation in the Renaissanceideal of the cultivated and learned person should not be underestimated,although its influence is particularlyhard to document. See the comments by Valerie Wayne (1985, 21-25) on the audience for women'swriting;also Novy, 1985. 19. In additionto other constraints,distinctionsof rankand authoritywerecarefullyobserved with the resultthat in the absenceof genuine social equality,there could be little competitionor persuasion.The high honorificrankaccordedwomen combinedwith their actuallack of authority renderssuch equality especially problematic.The suitable tone when addressinga superior was flattering;for an inferior,one of command.Neither gives women a usablevoice in debate. No workthat I know allowswomen a publicrole throughparticipationin a social setting comparable to that routinelygiven to the courtier. 20. It is worth noting that audiences for ceremonial occasions are "captive"even if captivated. The role of the audiencewas as onlooker, not engagedparticipant;similarconsiderations applyto the correspondenceof women humanistswhich seems seldomto have been sustainedor engaged(GraftonandJardine1986, 51-52, n.69). ThomasMoresuggeststhat his daughterMargaret would have to be content with an audience of her father and her husband (More 1947, 302). 21. Renaissanceemphasison modestyand seclusionfor women blursthe distinctionbetween being in public and having a public role. Courtperformances,with elements of both the domestic and public realms, also occur in Tudor England;note the staged debate of two girls from More'shousehold (cited McCutcheon 1987, 453). 22. King (1980, 78) suggeststhat the desire for psychic freedomis an importantmotivation for choosing a celibate life, and Jardine(1983, 24-25; 38-40) arguesthat in the Renaissance, women's sexuality is glossed as dependency and vice versa; thus any learning which places a woman 'beyondher sex' would then automaticallyraise questionsabout independence. 23. Chamberlain(1988) explores the complex metaphoricfeminizationof translation.Although Renaissancewomen may have been able to voice their perspectivesthroughtranslation, they do not therebygain authority. 24. Not surprisingly,literaryscholarshipon learnedwomen has been particularlyabundant. The difficultiesof using literarysourcesfor social and intellectualhistoryhave also attractedconsiderableattention. See for example, Woodbridge(1984). 25. Knowledgeof a classicallanguagebecomes an all-but-defining traitof women humanists for Waricke (1983, 5; 134-36) and presentsdifficultiesfor placing learnedwomen who do not know classicallanguagesor Latinistswho do not sharehumanistgoals. Although many scholars have noted the importanceof the ommitting dialectic and rhetoricfrom girls'education, only Friedman(1985) has explored it at much length.

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26. Thus, althoughLouisaOliva Sabucode Nantes developeda medicalphilosophy,she owes more to medieval and Arabic traditionsthan to humanism.The most interestingexample of a woman philosopher influenced by humanism is Marie le Jarsde Goumay. Neither woman reflects the Italian or English environment I am most concerned with. 27. On the literarystatusof neoplatonic ethics, see Kraye(1988, 349) and for the emphasis on public virtuefor male humanists,Vasoli (1988, 63). Rabil (1981, 7) confirmsthat moralphilosophyfor women often means moralizingliteraturewhile Kraye(1988, 325) and Vasoli(1988, 69-71) assertthat the professionalacademicstudyof ethics wasAristotelianthroughoutthe Renaissance. 28. Women'swritingson the importanceof educationfor women seem to be the most important step in this direction as well as a step towarddeveloping a philosophywhich gives value to women'srationality. 29. The majordifferencebetween writingson the topic fromthe earlyand late periods, Italy and England, lies in the more domestic goal of education for English women. 30. Although MargaretMore Roper and MargaretGigs Clement studiedlogic and medicine, this was never partof the humanistcanon and probablyowed more to late medievalattitudesto medicine. Similarly, when MaryWard instituted the study of logic for girls so that as Catholic women they might become teachersand apologists,she envisageda role no humanistendorsed. REFERENCES

Ashworth, E. J. 1982. The eclipse of medievallogic. In TheCambridge history of latermedievalphilosophy.N. Kretzman,A. Kenny and J. Pinborg,eds. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Ashworth, E. J. 1988. Traditionallogic. In The Cambridge historyof Renaissancephilosophy.C. B. Schmitt and Q. Skinner, eds. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Bochenski, I. M. 1970. A historyof formallogic. I. Thomas, trans. and ed. New York:Chelsea PublishingCo. Bouwsma,W. J. 1973. The cultureof Renaissancehumanism.AHA Pamphlet 401. Washington, D. C.: American HistoricalAssociation. Chamberlain,L. 1988. Gender and the metaphoricsof translation.Signs:13 (3):454-72. Elyot, T. 1962. The bokenamedthegovernour.New York:E. P. Dutton. Friedman,A. T. 1985. The influenceof humanismon the educationof girls and boys in Tudor England. The Historyof EducationQuarterly25 (12) :57-70. Education Grafton,A. and R. Jardine.1986. Fromhumanismto thehumanities: and the liberalarts in fifteenth-and sixteenth-century Europe.Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press. Gray, H. 1963. Renaissancehumanism:The pursuitof eloquence. Journalof the Historyof Ideas24:497-514. Heath, T. 1971. Logicalgrammar,grammaticallogic and humanismin three German universities. Studiesin the Renaissance18:9-64. Holm, J. B. 1987. The myth of a feminist humanism:Thomas Salter'sThe mirrhorof modestie.In Ambiguousrealities:Womenin theMiddleAges and Renaissance.C. Levin and J. Watson, eds. Detroit:Wayne State University Press.

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Howell, W. S. 1961. Logicand rhetoricin England,1500-1700. New York: Russell & Russell. Jardine,L. 1974. The place of dialectic teaching in sixteenth-centuryCambridge. Studiesin the Renaissance21:31-62. Jardine, L. 1975. Humanism and the sixteenth-century Cambridge arts course. Historyof Education4:16-31. Jardine,L. 1976. Humanismand dialecticin sixteenth-centuryCambridge:A preliminaryinvestigation.In Classicalinfluenceson Europeanculture,AD 1500-1700.R. R. Bolgar,ed. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Jardine,L. 1977. LorenzoValla and the intellectualoriginsof humanistdialectic. Journalof the Historyof Philosophy15:143-64. hisJardine,L. 1982. Humanismand the teachingof logic. In TheCambridge toryof latermedievalphilosophy.N. Kretzman,A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, eds. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Jardine, L. 1983. Still harpingon daughters:Womenand dramain the age of N. J.: Barnesand Noble Books. Shakespeare. Jardine, L. 1988. Humanistic logic. In The Cambridgehistoryof Renaissance philosophy..C. B. Schmitt and Q. Skinner, eds. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Jordan, C. 1986. Feminism and the humanists:The case for Sir Thomas Thediscourses Elyot'sDefenseof goodwomen.In RewritingtheRenaissance: in sexual modern Ed. M. W. Europe. of difference early Ferguson, M. N. and Vickers. The of Quilligan, J. University Chicago Press. Chicago: Did women have a Renaissance?In Women, 1984. Kelly (Gadol), J. [1977] and The history, theory: essaysof Joan Kelly.Chicago: The University of Press. Chicago King, M. L. 1976. Thwarted ambitions:Six learned women of the Italian Renaissance. Soundings:An Interdisciplinary Journal59 (Fall):280-304. L. M. The of retreat Isotta 1978. King, religious Nogarola(1418-1466): Sexism and its consequences in the fifteenth century. Signs:Journalof Womenin Cultureand Society3 (4):807-822. King, M. L. 1980. Book-linedcells: Women and humanismin the earlyItalian Renaissance.In Beyondtheirsex: Learnedwomenof theEuropeanpast. P. H. Labalme,ed. N. Y.: New YorkUniversity. hand:Selectedworks King, M. L. and A. Rabil. Jr., eds. 1981. Her immaculate by andaboutthewomenhumanistsof quattrocento Italy.Medieval& Renaissancetexts& studies.(vol. 20). Binghamton,N. Y.: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, State University of New York at Binghamton. Kneale, W. and M. Kneale. 1962. The development of logic.Oxford:Oxford University Press. Kraye,J. 1988. Moralphilosophy.In TheCambridge historyof Renaissance philosophy.C. B. Schmitt and Q. Skinner, eds. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

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Kristeller,P. 1988. Humanism.In TheCambridge historyof Renaissance philosophy.C. B. Schmitt and Q. Skinner, eds. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. McCutcheon, E. 1987. MargaretMore Roper:The learnedwoman in Tudor England. In Womenwritersof the Renaissanceand Reformation.K. M. Wilson, ed. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Montaigne, M. 1967. Completeworksof Montaigne.D. M. Frame, trans. Stanford,Cal.: StanfordUniversity Press. More, T. 1947. The correspondence of Sir ThomasMore. E. F. Rogers, ed. Princeton:Princeton University Press. Mozans, H. J. (J. A. Zahm). 1913. Womenin science.N. Y.: D. Appleton and Co. Mulcaster,R. 1971. Positions.Abridgedand ed. R. L. DeMolen. Classics in Education44. N. Y.: Teachers College Press, ColumbiaUniversity. Novy, M. 1983. Shakespeare'sfemale charactersas actors and audience. In The woman'spart: Feministcriticismof Shakespeare.C. R. S. Lanz, G. Greene, C. T. Neely, eds. Urbana:University of Illinois Press. O'Faolin,J. and L. Martines,eds. 1973. Not in God'simage.N. Y.: Harper& Row. Studiesin theinteraction of Ong, W. J. 1971. Rhetoric,romanceand technology: expressionand culture.Ithaca:Cornell University Press. Ong, W. J. 1981. Agonistic structuresin academia:Past to present. In Fightingfor life: Contest,sexuality,and consciousness.Ithaca:Cornell University Press. Percival, W. K. 1982. Changes in the approachto language. In The Cambridgehistoryof latermedievalphilosophy.N. Kretzman,A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, eds. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Rabil, A. Jr. 1981. LauraCereta:Quattrocentohumanist.Medieval& Renaissancetexts& studies.(vol. 3). Binghamton,N. Y.: Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Studies, State University of New York at Binghamton. in Renaissance humanism:Ciceronian Seigal, J. E. 1968. Rhetoricandphilosophy elementsin earlyquattrocento thoughtand theirhistoricalsetting.Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stone, L. 1977. The family, sex and marriagein England,1500-1800. N. Y.: Harperand Row. Vasoli, C. 1988. The Renaissanceconcept of philosophy. In The Cambridge historyof Renaissancephilosophy.C. B. Schmitt and Q. Skinner, eds. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Vickers, B. 1988. Rhetoric and poetics. In The Cambridgehistoryof Renaissancephilosophy.C. B. Schmitt and Q. Skinner, eds. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Vives, J. L. 1912. Vivesand the Renascenceeducationof women.F. Watson, ed. N. Y.: EdwardArnold.

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F. WatVives, J. L. [1913] 1971. Vives:On education.(De tradendis disciplinis) son, trans. Totowa, N. J.: Rowmanand Littlefield. Wamicke, R. M. 1983. Womenof the EnglishRenaissanceand Reformation. Contributionsin Women's Studies, no. 38. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. Wamke, F. J. 1987. Aphrodite'spriestess,love's martyr.In Womenwritersof theRenaissance andReformation. K. M. Wilson, ed. Athens: Universityof Press. Georgia Wayne, V. 1985. Some sad sentence: Vives' instruction of a Christian woman. In Silentbutfor theword:Tudorwomenas patrons,translators and writersof religiousworks.M. P. Hannay, ed. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. andReforWilson, K. 1987. Introduction.In Womenwritersof theRenaissance mation.K. M. Wilson, ed. Athens: University of Georgia Press. and the Woodbridge,L. 1984. Womenand the EnglishRenaissance:Literature natureof women1540-1620. Urbanaand Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press. Woodward,W. H. [1897] 1921. Vittorinoda Feltreand otherhumanisteducators:Essays& versions.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Woodward,W. H. [1904] 1964. DesideriusErasmusconcerningthe aim and methodof education.Classics in Education, No. 19, Bureauof Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York: Columbia University Press. Woodward,W. H. [1906] 1965. Studiesin educationduringtheAge of theRenaissance:1400-1600. New York:Russell & Russell.

The Three Princesses BEATRICEH. ZEDLER

This articleintroducesthreeprincesses:PrincessElizabethof Bohemia(16181680); her sister, PrincessSophiewho becamethe Electressof Hanover(16301714); and Sophie'sdaughter,SophieCharlotte,who becamethefirst Queen of theircommonfamilybackground, Prussia(1668-1705). Aftersummarizing thearticlepresents,for eachin turn,herbiography anda discussionof herrelationto phiinvolvementstemsfrom theirfriendships losophy.In each case theirphilosophical with the leadingphilosophers of theirday; PrincessElizabethwas a friendof DescarteswhiletheElectressSophieand SophieCharlottewerefriendsof Leibniz.The articleconcludesthatanyonewhohasmadetheacquaintance of thethreeprincesses willalwayssee them andhas studiedtheirinteractionwiththeirphilosopher-friends as partof the historyof modernphilosophy.

Histories of modem philosophy devote whole chapters to Descartesand Leibniz,but they seldom include any majordiscussionof the women who influenced, and were influencedby, these men. This article introducesthree of those women who shareda common bond by being membersof the samefamily and by having a seriousinterest in the philosophersof their time. It presents the story of three princesses: Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (16181680); her sister, PrincessSophie, who became Electressof Hanover (16301714); and Sophie'sdaughter,Sophie Charlotte, who becamethe firstQueen of Prussia(1668-1705). Princess Elizabethwas a friend of Descartes. The ElectressSophie and her daughter,Sophie Charlotte, werefriendsof Leibniz. To understand both the personal and philosophical interests of these women, we must first look at their family background. FAMILYBACKGROUND

Elizabethand Sophie were daughtersof the Elector Palatine and King of Bohemia,FrederickV, and ElizabethStuart,daughterof KingJamesI of England. After living in Frederick'sfamilycastle at Heidelbergduringthe firstsix years of their marriage, Frederickand Elizabethmoved in 1619 to Prague when Frederick,as a leadingProtestantprince, acceptedan invitation to become king of Bohemia. A prophecythat Frederickwould be "but a winter King and go with the melting snows" proved to be true (Chapman 1966, 98). 1 In November 1620, at the battle of White Mountainnear Prague,his Hypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring1989) ? by BeatriceH. Zedler

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forces were defeatedby the armyof FerdinandII, the-Austrianwho was the Holy Roman Emperor.And even worsethan Frederick'sloss of the throne of Bohemiawas the loss of the Palatinate, his own land, which was overrunby Spanish troops. After their own capital of Heidelbergwas taken, Frederick and Elizabethsought refuge first in Germanyand then in Holland. Prince Mauriceand laterPrinceFrederick-Henry,head of the familyof Orange-Nassau, providedthem with a largehouse in The Hague and a countryhouse at Rhenen. In the hope of improvinghis family'sfortunes,Fredericklaterjoined King GustavusAdolphus of Sweden when he was fighting in Germany,but the Swedish king was killed in the battle of Lutzenon November 16, 1632, and less than two weeks later, Frederickhimself died of an illness at Mainz. Elizabeth,"the winter queen," stayedon at The Hague, supportedfor the next seventeen yearsby pensions from the Englishand Dutch governments, but alwaysin debt. In Mayof 1661, she left The Haguefor Englandwhereher nephew, King CharlesII, eventuallygrantedher a pension. She died in Februaryof 1662 and was buried in WestminsterAbbey. She and Frederickhad thirteen children. In addition to two children who died in infancyand a boy who died at the age of nine, there were:Frederick Henry, who drownedin 1629; Charles Louis, the Elector Palatine, who recovered part of his father's lands after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648; Rupertand Maurice,who fought for the cause of their uncle, CharlesI; Edward,who marriedAnne of Gonzaga;Philip, who fled fromHolland afterattacking a Frenchmanwho had made advancesto his mother; Louise, a talented painter, who became a Catholic abbessat the Abbey of Maubuisson; Henrietta Marie, who married a Hungarian prince, but died about three months afterher wedding;Elizabeth,who was the oldest of the girls;and Sophie, who was the youngestof the girls. As we look more closely first at Elizabethand then at Sophie, we shall see how the fortunesand misfortunesof their familyaffectedtheir lives and their thought. I. PRINCESSELIZABETH A. BIOGRAPHY

Elizabethwas the third child of Frederickand Elizabeth.She was born at Heidelbergon December26, 1618, the yearbeforeher fatherbecameking of Bohemia. Beforeher second birthdayhe had lost the throne and his Palatine lands and possessions,and the family was dependent on others for support. In her earlyyearsshe lived in Silesia with her grandmotherand her father's sister, Elizabeth-Charlotte,who was marriedto the Electorof Brandenburg, George-William.At about the age of nine she rejoinedher parentsin Holland, and with the other childrenshe was tutoredat the Prinsenhofin Leiden

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in court etiquette, Scripture, mathematics, history, the sciences, jurisprudence, French, English, German, Dutch, Latin, and Greek. Elizabethwas nicknamed"LaGrecque"for her impressiveknowledgeof classicallanguages (Kroll 1973, 28-29). Her sisterSophie was to say of Elizabeththat she knew every languageand science (Gorst-Williams1977, 124). In 1642, Elizabethread in Latin the Meditations on FirstPhilosophy by Rene Descartes.When a friend of her family, Alphonse de Pollot (or Palotti), informedDescartesof this fact, the philosopher,who was then living in Holland, said that he had alreadyheard of the marvelsof the excellent mind of the princessof Bohemia and that he had a higher opinion of her judgment than he had of that of the doctorswho take as the rule of truth the opinions of Aristotle ratherthan the evidence of reason. He expresseda desireto meet her. They probablyfirst met at her mother'scourt. When on another trip to The Haguehe was unable to see her, Elizabethwrote on May 6, 1643, to express her regret and to raise a philosophical question (Petit 1969, 57-58). This was the beginningof a correspondencethat wouldlast until the death of Descartesin 1650. Though they met many times, more often they wrote to each other. In her letters Elizabeth tells him about her family problems, health problems,and philosophicalproblems,and he did his best to help her. Though Elizabethwas more interestedin the intellectual life than in what seemed to her to be the empty diversionsof court life, as a princessshe had dutiesthat she could not avoid. She complainsin one letter to Descartesthat she was interruptedmore than seven times by inconvenient visits (Sep. 30, 1645, Adam and Milhaud 1956, 6: 311). 2 On other occasionsher answerto him had to be postponed while she cared for sick membersof her family (Aug. 16, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 284; Feb. 21, 1647, Adam 1960, 7: 268). There were the inevitableeffortson the partof her familyto find her a husband. The Catholic king of Poland, WladislavV, had wanted to marryher, but she was unwillingto become a Catholic and his people would not accept a Protestantqueen. As a Protestantand a poor Palatine princesswithout a countryof her own, her prospectsfor a suitablemarriagewere not good, and by the age of eighteen she had given up all thought of marrying.This did not distressher since she was more interestedin the life of studythan in marriage. The troublesof her familydid distressher. Her oldest brotherhad drowned when she was eleven; her fatherhad died when she was thirteen. Her brother Edwardhad shocked the familyin 1645 by renouncinghis Protestantfaith to become a Catholic and marryAnne of Gonzaga. In her letter of November 30, 1645 (Adam 1956, 6: 384-385) Elizabethis so upsetthat she momentarily forgetsthat Descartesis himself Catholic. In his reply, he tries to give her a more objective view by pointing out that some might find her brother'saction a good step and that God uses differentmeans to drawsouls to himself (Jan. 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 1-2).

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Another family problemled to Elizabeth'sdeparturefrom The Hague. In 1646, her brotherPhilip in broaddaylight and in a public marketplacehad stabbedto death a MonsieurL'Espinay,who had been boastingaboutflirting with Philip'smother, the queen, and his sister, Louise. Philip had to flee the country at once. He joined the Spanish armyand was killed in battle four years later. Elizabeth, while not condoning murder, was sympathetic to Philip's intention of upholding the family honor, but her mother was displeasedby Elizabeth'sdefense of Philip and decided that it would be best for Elizabethto leave The Haguefor at least severalmonths and go to Germany to stay at the home of her aunt, the wife of the Electorof Brandenburg.Descarteshad visited Elizabethin Holland afterthe latest familymisfortune,and it was arrangedthat while she was in Germanyher sister, Sophie, then sixteen, would forwardhis letters to Elizabethand Elizabeth'sletters to him. Some of these letters concernedanotherfamilymisfortune:the beheading of King Charles I, who was Elizabeth'suncle. Descartestried to console her by saying (in a letter of February22, 1649, Adam 1963, 8: 142-143) that her uncle'ssufferingwas short, and that death froma long, lingeringillnessmight be worse than death from the swift blow of an axe. Despiteher familytroublesshe was happyin Berlinand felt she was among loving relatives. She tutoredher young cousin, Hedwig. She tried to interest the Duke of Brunswickand some Germanprofessorsin Descartes'works.She also triedto arrangeto visit Sweden. At that time Queen Christina'smother, Marie-Eleanoreof Brandenburg,was in Germany,and Elizabethhoped to accompanyher to Sweden to ask the queen to supporther brother'sclaim to the Palatinatelands. Queen Christinachose not to invite Elizabethto come, but she did invite Descartes. One of the reasonswhy Descartesacceptedthe queen'sinvitation to come to what he called "the land of bears between rocks and ice" was to see whether he could obtain some help for Elizabeth'sfamily (Mar. 31, 1649, Adam 1963, 8: 196-197; Foucherde Careil 1909, 104).3 Since he seldom saw the queen duringthe few months in Sweden beforehis untimelydeath in Februaryof 1650, he was not able to accomplish that goal. But after the Peace of Westphalia, he did try to help Elizabethview her family'ssituation realistically. Elizabeth was unhappy because her oldest living brother, CharlesLouis,was not given back all of his country,but Descartestells her to be glad that under the circumstanceseven some of the Palatinate was returned. He adds that even the smallestpart of the Palatinateis worth more than all the empireof the Tartarsor Muscovites(Feb. 22, 1649, Adam 1963, 8: 144-145). In the summerof 1651 Elizabethvisited her brotherCharles Louis, but stayed with his first wife, Charlotte, at Cassel rather than at Heidelberg where CharlesLouis lived with his second wife, Louisevon Degenfeld. This was the firsttime that some of her relativeshad seen Elizabethsince the death

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of her friend, Descartes. Sophie reportsthat their brotherEdwardthought Elizabethhad lost her liveliness of spirit (Petit 1969, 234). Some years later, in 1667, Elizabeth entered a Protestant convent at Herford in Westphalia. She served first as coadjutrix, assisting the abbess with administration;then as abbess,with the title, "Princessand Prelatessof the Holy RomanEmpire."She not only ruledover a largehouseholdof noble ladiesbut had jurisdictionover a territoryof some seven thousandpeople and had to transact business concerning farms, vineyards, mills, and factories (Godfrey 1909, 301-302). She also had to supervisegood worksamong the poor and serve as a judge, hearing and determiningcases that the people of her principalitybroughtbeforeher. Though she had been a princesswithout a countryfor most of her life, she now, as a friendsaid, "hada small territory which she governedso well that she showed herselffit for a greater"(Penn, quoted in Godfrey 1909, 331). Among her good deeds as abbesswas her offerof refugeto some whose religious beliefs were quite different from the Calvinism she had learned as a child. Anne Marie Schurmann, the learned "Dutch Minerva"whom Elizabeth had known in Holland, had become a followerof Jean de LaBadie,a religious reformerwho first left the Catholic Church for the reformedreligion and then left the reformedreligion to lead a new reformwhich stressedan interiorregeneration.When he and his followerswere banishedfrom Amsterdam, Elizabeth,in 1670, invited Anne Marieand the Labadistcommunityto come to Herford.This was a generousgestureconsideringthat LaBadiewas an enemy of Cartesianphilosophyand MademoiselleSchurmannherselfnot only had dislikedDescartesbut, in 1644 had written to Elizabethto war her againstthis "newphilosophy"(Foucher1862, 11; Foucher1909, 150-153).4 Despite Elizabeth'sassurancesthat the Labadistssaid they subscribedto the Institutesof Calvin and the HeidelbergCatechism, the people of Herforddisliked them. After two years, the Labadistsleft and settled in Altona. Later she welcomed into her abbey William Penn, Robert Barclay, and other Quakers.After Penn's visits in 1676 and 1677, they exchanged some letters with a religiouscontent. At this stage in her life she had a deepened interest in religiousexperience. Her last illness was long and painful. Her brotherCharles Louis sent his physician, but nothing helped her. Her sisterSophie, who came to visit her, describedher in this way:"Mysisterwas in bed, all her body, legs, arms,and throat like a skeleton, only her stomach frightfullyswollen with dropsy" (Quoted in Godfrey 1909, 344). Yet Elizabethcalmly orderedher coffin, made her will, and wrote a letter to her sisterLouise, Abbess at Maubuisson, in which she said: I am still living, my dear sister, but it is to preparemyselffor death. .... Adieu, my dear sister, I hope that we shall see

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each other again in the next world, and that God will prepare us so well in this transitorylife that we shall eternallysee his face in the future. (Oct. 31, 1679, in Foucher1879 and 1909, 213-214; Neel 1946, 132-133) She died on February8, 1680. B. ELIZABETH AMDPHILOSOPHY

As we turn our attention to Elizabeth'srelation to philosophywe shall be relying mainly on her correspondencewith Descartes.This correspondence began when she was 24 and he was 47 and continued for seven years, until Descartes'death in Februaryof 1650. Chanut, Descartes'friend, entrusted Descartes'papers to Clerselier for publication, but could not obtain Elizabeth's permissionto have her letters publishedwith those of Descartes.Her side of the correspondenceremainedunpublisheduntil morethan two hundred yearslater when, in 1879, Foucherde Careil edited and publishedcopies of her letters which had been discovered in the library of a chateau (Rosendal)near Amheim, Holland. Fromher 26 extant letters to Descartes and his 33 letters to her we shall considerthe main philosophicalquestions that they discussed, that is: the soul-bodyproblemand the sovereign good and how to attain it. In the firstletter she wrote to him (May6, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 287-288) she raisesthe crucialquestion of how the soul which in his context is only a thinking substance,can determinethe body to do voluntaryactions. Forone thing to move another implies contact and extension. How then, she wondered, can a non-extended immaterialsoul move the body? In replyto her requestfor a more particulardefinition of soul than the one he has given, Descartesre-stateshis notion of body as extended and of soul with its attributeof thought and refersto an argumentgiven in an earlier work (May 21, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 289-291). But this did not answerher question, and she saysthat it would be easierfor her to allow matterand extension to soul than to concede to an immaterialbeing the capacityof moving and being moved by a body (June 10, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 316). Descartes (June 28, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 322-323) then distinguishes three simplenotions: soul, which can be conceived only throughpureunderstanding;body, resextensa,which can be known by pureunderstandingaided by imagination;and the union of soul and body, which is known only obscurelyby understanding,but very clearlyby the senses. To those who do not philosophizebut relyon sense experience, the union of soul and body is clear. Descartestells the princess,perhapswith some exaggeration,that he himself has alwaysspent just a few hoursa yearon thoughtsthat occupyonly the understandingand that he has devoted the rest of his time to relaxationof the

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senses and reposeof the mind (Adam 1951, 5: 323-324). This was his way of advising Elizabethto spend less time meditatingon the abstractproblemof how soul and body can be really distinct and yet at the same time substantially united. He seems to concede that in his context this problemcannot be solved on a metaphysicalplane when he says:"It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of conceiving very distinctly, and at the same time, both the distinction between the soul and body, and also their union; becauseto do so it is necessaryto conceive them as just one thing, and at the same time to conceive them as two, which is self-contradictory"(June 28, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 324). Since he can't reallyanswerthe questionshe had asked, he advisesher instead to rely on "somethingthat each one alwaysexperienceswithin himselfwithout philosophizing"(Adam 1951, 5: 324), that is, the union of soul and body. He recommendsthat in this mattershe trust the experience of her senses. In her answerof July 1, 1643, (Adam 1956, 6: 1) Elizabethacknowledges that she, too, finds that the senses show her that the soul moves the body, but neither they nor the understandingshow just howthe soul does this. She wonderswhether there might not be some propertiesof the soul that are unknown to us that could perhapsupset what Descartes'metaphysicalmeditations have persuadedher with good reasonsconcerningthe non-extension of the soul. She added:"I would despairof findingcertitudein the things of the world, if you did not give it to me, you who alone have preventedme from being a sceptic, to which my firstreasoninginclined me" (Adam 1956, 6:2). The next letter of Descartesto Elizabeth,datedNovember 1643, makesno mention of her question and treatsof mathematics(Adam 1956, 6: 70-73). Perhapssome letters are lost, but he laterdealt with some of her questionsin the Treatiseon thePassionsof theSoul, which he wrote for her, showedher in manuscriptform in 1646, and published in 1649. This was the treatise in which he said that the body moves the soul and the soul moves the body throughthe intermediaryof the pineal glandwhich is found in the middle of the brain. Through this gland the soul "exercisesits functions more particularlythan in the other partsof the body"(Haldaneand Rosstr. 1955, 1: 345350). He suggested(Collins 1954, 188) that when an object impingesupon a sense organ, it arousesan impulsethat is carriedby the nerves to the animal spirits, the minute partsof the blood, thus affectingthe cavity in which the pineal gland is situated.Since differentobjectsagitatethe pineal gland in different ways, the mind will have differentperceptions. And when the soul wills something, its commandis communicatedto the animalspiritsand from them to nerves and muscles. As one writerhas appropriatelyremarked,"Descartesshifted the problem of the human composite from the metaphysicalto the physicalplane" (Collins 1954, 189). Though the princess did not comment explicitly on the pineal gland, she did say, after seeing the manuscriptof the Treatiseon the

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Passions:"I do not see how one can know the differentmovements of the blood that cause the five primitivepassions"(April 25, 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 55), and she probablyalso found it hardto see how providinga physicalpoint of contact between body and soul answeredher originalquestion on how the immaterialthinking substancecould touch or move the body.5 But though Descartesdid not really explain man's unity, he assertedthat man is "a single whole," and that throughfeelings, imagesand passionshe knows he has a body to which he is closely united (Meditations1941, 6.94). Moreover,Descartes'letters to Elizabethassumethat unity as an underlying premise.This is particularlyevident in the letters in which he is giving her some medical advice. When Elizabethtells him about some stomach trouble, he answersthat though he approvesof a specialdiet and exercise, he thinks the best remedies are "those of the soul, which doubtless has great force over the body, as shown by the largechanges that anger, fear, and the other passionsexcite in it" (July1647, Blom 1978, 226). He does not mean that the soul can directly will the body to be well, but ratherthat it can help by thinking morebeneficial thoughts. An especially suitable thought for conserving health is the strongpersuasionand firmbelief that the structureof our body is so good that once one is healthy one cannot easily fall sick. In a previousletter (May 18, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 225) he had suggested that the cause of Elizabeth'sfever and cough might be sadness. She admits that Descartesfrom a distance gave a better diagnosisthan her doctors (May 24, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 230). Foranotherillnessfor which the doctorshad recommendedthe watersof the Spa, he advisedher to also deliver her mind entirely from all sortsof sad thoughts, and even from all seriousmeditations regardingthe sciences. He suggested that she look at the greenness of a woods, the colors of a flower, the flight of a bird. "To do so," he said, "isnot to waste time but to employ it well; for in the meantimeone can satisfyoneself by the hope that by this means one will recoverperfecthealth, which is the foundationof all the other goods one can have in this life" (Mayor June 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 238). He is suggestingto her a remedythat he himself had found helpful. He said that he had inherited a dry cough from his mother, who died of lung disease a few days after his birth. All the medical doctorswho saw him when he was young condemnedhim to an earlydeath. He adds: But I believe the inclination I have alwayshad to regardwhatever happened from the point of view that could render it moreagreeable,and to arrangeit so that my principalcontentment dependedon me alone, explainswhy this indisposition, which was natural to me, has little by little entirely passed. (May or June 1645, Adam 6: 239) If cheerful, optimistic thoughts can have a beneficial effect on one's health, soul and body mustbe intimatelyunited. In his attemptsto help Eliz-

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abeth with her health problemsDescartesrepeatedlyacceptsas a fact of experience what he cannot explain metaphysically.The rationalistwho had mistrustedexperience and relied on clear and distinct ideas, now has modified his p6sition or at least shifted his emphasisin his letters to the princess. Though Elizabeth'sfirstquestionswere occasionedby theoreticalproblems that arosefromhis writings, many subsequentquestionscame fromthe practical problemof coping with troublesin her life. She had once called Descartesthe best doctorfor her soul (May6, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 288) and had told him later not only that his letters always served her "as an antidote againstmelancholy"but that he was the person to whose counsel she could commit the conduct of her life (June22, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 248). He replied that he wished to see her happyand content and that he would discuss with her "the means concerningwhich philosophyinstructsus for acquiring that sovereignhappiness, which common souls await in vain from fortune, but which we shall be able to have only from ourselves" (July 21, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 267-268). The discussionsin their letters on "the sovereign good"were thereforenot motivatedby the love of abstracttheorizingbut by Elizabeth'spersonalneed to find happiness. Descartes suggests they begin by examining what the ancients, like Seneca, have written about happinessand then add what is needed to make that teaching their own. He gives a chapter by chapter account of what Seneca actually treats in the De vita beata (July 21, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 268). But of greater interest for understandingDescartes'and Elizabeth's views is Descartes'account of how the blessedlife oughtto have been treated by a philosopherlike Seneca "who, not having been illuminatedby faith, had only natural reason as a guide" (Aug. 4, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 279). Descartes had not written the systematictreatiseon ethics that he intended as the crown of his philosophy, but here in his effort to help Elizabethhe presents a sketch of a naturalethics that she can use for the conduct of her life. After acknowledgingthat Seneca begins well when he saysthat "everyone wants to live blessedly,"Descartesexplainsthat blessednessconsists in a perfect contentment of the mind and in interior satisfaction. The things that bringaboutthis contentment of the mind areof two kinds:those that depend on us, like virtue and wisdom, and those that do not depend on us (at least not entirely), like honors, riches, and health. Descarteswill consider only the kind of contentment that is within our power (Aug. 4, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 279-280). To achieve this contentment one should, he tells Elizabeth,observe the three rules that he had given in his Discourseon Method.These rules stress "the right use of reason"(Adam 1956, 6: 282). The first (in which Descartes substitutesknowledge for the provisional maxim of the Discourse)is that one should alwaystry to make the best possi-

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ble use of one's mind to knowwhat one ought or ought not to do in all the occurrencesof life. The second is that one should have a firmand constant resolutionto carry out all that reasoncounselsone to do, without letting one's passionsor appetites turn one asidefromthis, and it is in this firmnessof resolutionthat Descartes thinks virtue consists. The third is that while so conductingoneself as much as one can according to reason,one shouldconsiderthat all the goodsthat one does not possessare entirelyoutsideone's power, and in this wayone accustomsoneself to not desire them (Aug. 4, 1645, Adams 1956, 6: 280-281). According to Descartes,knowing the good and willing to adhereto it are the keys to achieving the happinessthat lies within our power. He said: .. to have a contentment that is solid, it is necessaryto follow virtue, that is to say, to have a will that is firm and constant in carryingout all the things we judgeto be the best, employing the entire force of our understandingto judge them well. (Aug. 18, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 289) Elizabethasks Descartesto instruct her "aboutthe means of strengthening the understandingso that it will judge what is best in all the actions of life" (Aug. 18, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 291). Descartesanswersthat there are "two things requiredfor anyone alwaysto be disposedto judgewell: knowledgeof the truth and the habit of remembering and acquiescingin this knowledge every time the occasion requiresit" (Sep. 15, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 300). Since, unlike God, we cannot know everything, Descarteslists the truths that he regardsas most importantfor a theory of morality: the existence of an infinitely perfect God of immense powerand infallibledecrees;the immortalityof the humansoul; the vast extent of the universe;and the recognition that as part of a family, state, and society, each of us should, though with discretion,preferthe interestsof the whole to the interestsof his own person (Adam 1956, 6: 300-303). In replyElizabethsaysshe would like Descartesto explain the usefulnessof knowing the truths he has proposed.She has problemswith each of them. Descartes'reflections on the fact that we are part of a whole raisesquestions for her about how we can have enough accurateand impartialknowledge to determinewhen it is better to preferthe public good to our private good (Sep. 30, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 310). Descartesadmitsthat it is difficult to measureexactly how farreasonordersus to interestourselvesin the public good, but sayswe shouldsatisfyour conscience (Oct. 6, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 319-320). Descartes'view of the vast extent of the universeseems to Elizabethto be incompatiblewith the doctrineof a particularprovidence,which is the foundation of theology (Adam 1956, 6: 310). Descartes responds that God's

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poweris not like a finite powerwhich can be exhausted.Since God'spoweris infinite, it extends not only to greateffectsbut to all the particularactions of men (Adam 1956, 6: 319). As for the immortalityof the soul, that doctrine, Elizabeththinks, could make us seek death to escape the illnesses and passionsof the body. She is astonishedthat those who say they accept this doctrinewouldprefera painful life to an advantageousdeath (Adam 1956, 6: 309-310). Descartesreplies that naturalreason can give probableargumentsfor immortalityand happiness in an afterlife, but not any assurance(Adams 1956, 6: 318-319). He adds that the same naturalreason teaches us that we have more goods than evils in this life (though this is something that Elizabeth,with all her troubles, was not alwaysconvinced of). He advisesus not to leave the certain for the uncertain. Though we should not fear death, we ought never to seek it (Nov. 3, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 332). The truthregardingthe existence of God and his attributesraisedthe most difficultyfor Elizabeth. Descartesseemed to be saying:If I know there is a God of immensepowerand infallibledecrees, I can accept all that happensto me since it is expresslysent by God. Elizabethconcedes that this consoles us for evils causedby nature, but she thinks it does not console us for evils imposed by men who seem to have free wills, since only faith could persuadeus that God regulateswills (Sep. 30, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 309). While granting the role of faith, Descartestries to show Elizabethfrom naturalphilosophy alone that God's omnipotence is compatiblewith man's free choice. He sees God as "the first and immutablecause"of all the effects that dependon men'sfree choice as well as the causeof the effectsthat do not depend on it. It would be contradictoryto say that God createda being that does not depend on him (Oct. 6, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 318; Nov. 3, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 331). Neither the inclinations of our will nor the least thought that enters our mind would be there unless God willed it, but Descartesthinks that our dependenceon God does not depriveus of our willing. Though Elizabethis convinced that we have free will "since we feel we have it" (Oct. 28, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 323), it seems contradictoryto her to believe that free choice is dependentupon God. She thinks it is impossible for the will to be at the same time free and also attached to the decrees of providence(Nov. 30, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 335). Descartes'best effortsdid not really resolve her problemson this topic. Descarteshimself had already that this was one of the "greatdifficulties," said in the Principlesof Philosophy but he maintainedthat it is evident that we possessfree will and also certain that God has fore-ordainedall things. We know each of these truths separately. Even if our limited understandingcannot reconcile them, he thought we still ought to affirmwhat we do not comprehend(Principles1941, 149151).

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Though Elizabethhad problemswith each of the four "truths"that Descartesregardedas usefulfor morality,she agreedwith his view of the place of the passionsin the morallife. Descartesregardedthe topic of the passionsof the soul as a particularquestionof moraltheory (June 15, 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 83), since he thought one must know the passionsto obtain the sovereign good he described(Nov. 20, 1647, Adam 1960, 7: 366). Elizabethhad asked him to define the passions (Sep. 13, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 298), to explain how they are formedand how they affect reasoning(Oct. 28, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 323). He definedthe passionsas "allthe thoughtsexcited in the soul without the concurrenceof the will" (Oct. 6, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 316), but noted that "ordinarilyone restrictsthe name to thoughtscausedby some particularagitation of the spirits."6To answerElizabeth'squestions more fully he wrote the Treatiseon thePassionsof theSoul, which, as we have seen, acknowledges the influenceof soul on bodyand of bodyon soul that Elizabethhad accepted as a fact of experience. Though Elizabeththought the physiologicalexplanations in the treatisecould be clearer, she praised"the order, definition and distinctions"Descartesgave to the passionsand "all of the moralpartof the treatise."These parts,she said, "surpasseverythingthat has ever been saidon the subject"(April 25, 1646, Adam 1960 7: 55). In his letters, Descarteshad maintainedthat while one ought not to scorn the passions,they should be subjectto reason (Sep. 1, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 296). 7 He reiteratesthis theme in the moralpart of the Treatiseon the Passions,where he saysthat even those with the feeblestsoulscan acquirean absolute dominion over their passions,and that the principaluse of prudenceor self-controlis that it teaches us to be mastersof ourpassions.Since control of the passionsis requiredto judge the best courseof action and effectivelywill to follow that judgment, it is an indispensablemeans to the sovereigngood (Haldane and Ross tr. 1955, 1: 356, 427). Elizabeththen shifts the discussionfromthe topic of personalethics to the ethics of civil society, saying:"Since you have alreadysaid what the principles are as regardsprivatelife, I would be satisfiedto know also yourmaxims regarding civil life" (Apr. 25, 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 56-57). She adds, however, that so far she has found herself doing better by using experience ratherthan reason in such matters. Descartesanswersby saying that it would be impertinentof him to write the maximsone ought to observe in civil life since he leads so retireda life, remote from the managementof affairs.He agreeswith Elizabeththat it is betterto regulateoneself in such mattersby experienceratherthan by reason (May 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 61-62). But he does granther requestto discuss ThePrinceby Machiavelli. Without going into the detailsof the discussionof The Prince,we might note that Elizabethagreeswith Machiavellithat a private person is in a good position to teach princes how they should govern,

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whereasDescartesthinks that a prince is in a better position to understand the office of a prince (Sep. 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 167-168; Oct. 10, 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 189). Elizabethconcludesher commentsby sayingshe hopes never to be put in the position of following Machiavelli'spreceptssince violence and suspicionare things contraryto her nature (Nov. 29, 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 230). As we look back at the correspondencebetween Descartesand Elizabeth we might brieflyconsiderwhat Elizabethdid for Descartesand what Descartes did for Elizabeth.We have mentionedsome of the doubtsand difficultiesthat Elizabethraised,but even when the questionswere sharplycritical, Descartes could accept them. He took them seriouslybecausehe knew they came from one who had readand understoodand reflectedon what he had written. AddressingElizabeth,he had said: ... I have never yet met anyone who understoodso generally and so well as yourselfall that is contained in my writings.For there are several,even amongmen of the highest intellect and learning, who find them very obscure. (Principles1941, 128129) Her questions led him to try to clarifyand develop what he had left unclear and incomplete, for example, his position on the relation of soul and body, and his view of the sovereigngood and the theoryof the passions.Though he was later to comment furtheron these last two topics for Queen Christina, the work he had done on them for Elizabethserved as the basis for his remarks. In respondingto Elizabeth'squestionshe knew he was not confrontingan adversarywho wanted to prove him wrong, but a friendwho was franklytelling him-whereshe needed help to understandand accept what he said. Her letters reflectedher respectand appreciationof his work. She introducedhis workto others, for example, to the Germanscholarsshe met when she lived in Berlin. She was gratefulto him for correctingflaws in her own reasoning and for sheddingmorelight on the subjectof beatitudethan anythingshe had ever read (June 10, 1643, Adam 1951, 5: 314; August 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 290). Her lettersalwaysclosed with the phrase:"Yourveryaffectionatefriend to serve you." Descartes,in turn, servedElizabeth.He gave public evidence of his appreciation by dedicating to her his Principlesof Philosophy.This dedication, in the formof a letter addressedto the princess,was not a conventional expression of flatteryto a royalpatron,but an honest statementof his judgment.He says that usuallythose who are good metaphysiciansare not geometricians, and usuallythe cultivatorsof geometryhave no abilityfor the investigations of FirstPhilosophy, but he adds: I can say with truth that I have encounteredbut one mind, and that is your own, to which both studies are equallyeasy,

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and as a result, I have good reasonfor esteemingit as incomparable. But what most of all enhances my admirationis that so accurateand variedan acquaintancewith the whole circle of the sciences is not found in some aged doctor who has spent manyyearsin contemplation,but in a princessstill young, and whose countenance and yearswould more fitly representone of the Graces than a Muse or the sage Minerva. (Principles 1941, 129) Descartessigns himself: "Of your most Serene Highness, the most devoted servant, Descartes." Though Elizabethwas modest about her learningand sometimesspoke of her "ignorance" and "stupidity"when she had trouble in understanding something, it must have been gratifyingto her that the eminent Monsieur Descartes always treated her as a serious thinker and praised her "clear thoughts"and "firmreasonings"(June 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 251; Nov. 3, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 330). His intellectual companionshipwas a welcome relieffromthe social dutiesof her life as a princess.She complains"ofthe distractionsof those who do not know what to do with themselves"and of being "constrained. . . to accede to impertinentlaws of civility" (Sep. 30, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 310), but she saysthat the truthsthat Descartes'lettersteach her will always contribute to the contentment of her life (Oct. 10, 1646, Adam 1960, 7: 187). Descarteswas the age that her fatherwouldhave been if he had lived. Whether or not he played the role of a "father-figure," he was the personto whom she confided her health problems,familyproblems,and her philosophicalproblems.What Descartesdid for her is perhapsbest summarizedin this remarkin one of her letters: I have alwaysbeen in a condition that renderedmy life very useless to persons I love; but I seek to conserve it with very much more care since I have had the happinessof knowing you, because you have showed me the means of living more happily than I did. (Oct. 28, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 325) If we ask: "Whatwas Elizabeth'sown philosophy?"there is no one text to which we can turn for an answer. She has been called "the first Cartesian" but as we have seen, this does not mean that she was a passive, unquestioning, uncritical disciple of Descartes. She had read and understoodhis works,had difficultywith his physicaltheories, was not satisfiedwith his answer to the problem of God's foreknowledgeand man's free will or to the problem of how an immaterialsoul and extended body could be two substances and yet act as one. She accepted from experienceboth the union of soul and body and man's free will, and she also accepted the existence of a perfect infinite God and a doctrine of a particularprovidence. She agreed

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with Descartesthat to achieve the sovereigngood one must both know what is rightand have a firmand constantresolutionto do what is right. Her steadfast adherenceto her duties as a princessand later as an abbesssuggestthat she lived in accordancewith her convictions. Elizabeth'sseven-yearcorrespondencewith Descarteswas certainlyone of the most importantexperiencesof her life, and it is that for which she is best remembered.But she lived for thirty more yearsafterthe death of Descartes and duringthat time she encounteredother thinkersand other ideas. Some scholars have wondered whether Elizabethabandonedphilosophy for mysticism in her later years. It is true that she offered a refugefor the Labadistsand Quakers.She could sympathizewith those who had no permanent home and she respectedthose who had sincerereligiousbeliefs. She was interestedin hearingof the doctrineof the "innerlight." We aretold that she withdrewher favorfromJeande LaBadieand his followerssince "theydid not walk accordingto their pretenses"(Penn 1881, 1: 440). She preferredthe Quakers, welcomed William Penn and his friends to Herford,and allowed them to talk to her and her communityfor manyhours each day of their visit (Neel 1946, 131-132; Penn 1981, 440-445, 485-488). She was deeplymoved by some of the things Penn said and invited him to retur for another visit, but neither he nor his Scottish friendRobert Barclay convertedher to Quakerism.Barclayhas reproachedher for being too occupied with the dutiesof her calling and urgedher to the practiceof "quietism," but Elizabethreplied: The silent waiting is no more in my powerthan flying through the air since my calling gives me some diversions. I scarce have one hour of the day to myself;the night is my best time, in which I endeavorto practiseyourlessonsbut cannot bragof much progress.(Oct. 6, 1676, in Godfrey 1909, 324) And later she added:"I must not do anythingupon persuasionof others, nor out of my own opinion until I have the light of faith for my conduct"(Quoted in Godfrey 1909, 325). Just as her admirationfor Descarteshad not led her to surrenderher own critical judgment, so her admirationfor Penn and the Quakersdid not turn her aside from the coursethat seemedright to her: fulfillingher duties as abbess. The tone and content of her letters to Penn and Barclaysuggestsa greaterconcentration on religiousexperience than in her earlieryears, but this does not mean she had rejectedphilosophy. During her last few years, she still kept in touch with philosophers.She wroteto Malebrancheby wayof her sisterLouise,Abbessof Maubuisson,saying she was so pleased with Malebranche'sRecherchede la veritethat she would like to know the author. Her enthusiasmdiminishedwhen she realized

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that Malebranchehoped to convert her to Catholicism.She told him politely that though she agreedwith him in essential things and was obliged to him for his concern for her soul, she could not hope to live long enough to examine all the controversiesand would continue to hold to what she believed (Malebranche1961, 18: 130-133). This firmresponseto Malebranchedid not, however, preventher fromliking his next workso much that she provideda copy for Leibniz.Leibnizsays, in a letter to Malebranche: Through the favor of her highness, the Princess Elizabeth, who is as famousfor her learningas for her birth, I have been able to see yourChristianConversations.Her judgmenton it is very favorable. . .. (Malebranche1961, 18: 142-143)8 In a letter to Elizabeth'ssister Sophie, Leibnizlater refersto Jacob Boehme, who was "quite esteemed by Madamethe PrincessElizabethduringher last years"(Klopp 1874, 3: 426-427). Fromwhat we know of Elizabeth'syearsas Abbessof Herfordand fromthe hints we can glean fromLeibniz'sstatements,it seemsreasonableto conclude that Elizabethdid not abandonthe intellectual life. Rather, while retaining her balancedand criticalspirit, in her lateryearsshe gave greaterattention to religious philosophy, whether tinged with the inner light doctrine of the Quakers, the speculative mysticism of Boehme, or the Christian Cartesianism of Malebranche. The inscriptionon Elizabeth'stomb correctlydescribesthis "MostSerene Princessand Abbess of Herford,born of PalatineElectorsand Kingsof Great Britain"as unconqueredin all fortune, constant, prudent,virtuous,of admirable learning, celebrated beyond the condition of her sex, and friend of learnedmen (Godfrey 1909, 350). II. PRINCESSSOPHIE A. BIOGRAPHY

Sophie, the youngestsisterof PrincessElizabeth,was born on October 14, 1630, at The Hague. As the twelfth child of KingFrederickand Queen Elizabeth of Bohemia, she says, "I can well believe that my birth causedthem but little satisfaction."At the age of three months she was taken to Leidenwhere the queen had her children broughtup by others, "preferring,"says Sophie, "the sight of her monkeysand dogs to that of her children"(Sophie 1879, 3334). After being taught by her father'sgovernessat Leiden, she returnedto her mother'scourt at The Hague at the age of 9 or 10. Becauseshe had a cheerful disposition, she was able to say, "Our family misfortuneshad no

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power to depressmy spirits, though we ... often had nothing at our court but pearlsand diamondsto eat." But she adds, "The merchantsfurnishedall that I required,and the care of payment I left to Providence"(Sophie 1879, 43). As a youngwoman Sophie moved to Heidelbergto live at the home of her brother Charles Louis, the Elector Palatine. Though she was fond of her brotherwho was almost like a fatherto her, his quarrelswith his wife, Charlotte of Hesse-Cassel, and subsequentmorganatic marriageto Louise von Degenfeldmade her feel the need of having a householdof her own. Among the proposalsof marriagethat she received, that of Duke George William of seemed best, but when George William suddenlydeBrunswick-Luneburg cided that he did not want to marryat all and suggestedthat his younger brother Ernst August marrySophie instead, she agreed. As part of the arrangementGeorge William promisedto increasehis youngerbrother'sallowance and never to marry,so as to give ErnstAugust'schildrenthe right to inherit the family estates (Sophie 1879, 44-61).9 Taking a very practical, unsentimentalattitude towardsthe substitutionof bridegrooms,Sophie said to her brother,"Icare only for a good establishment,and if I find it with the youngerbrother, then I shall have no difficultyin relinquishingthe one for the other" (Sophie 1879, 59). Wearing a dress of white silver brocade and a crown of the family diamonds, Sophie was marriedto Duke ErnstAugust at Heidelbergin September of 1658 and later was welcomed to her new home at Hanoverwith additional festivities (Sophie 1879, 61-64). Her husband, Erst August, became the secularbishop of Osnabruckin 1661, Duke of Hanover in 1679, and Elector of Hanover in 1692. Though Sophie was correspondinglyaddressedas Madamed'Osnabruck,Duchess of Hanover, and Electressof Hanover, she is most often referredto by the last title. She and ErnstAugust had seven children:six boys and one girl. Three of her sons, FrederickAugust, Charles Philip, and Christiandied in battle. Her two most famouschildrenwere the oldest son, GeorgeLouis, who was to succeed his father as Electorof Hanover and become King George I of England, and her daughter,Sophie Charlotte, who was to become the firstqueen of Prussia.' As Electressof Hanover Sophie had a busy life. She was in charge of a court employing hundredsof people. She planned entertainmentfor many festivities. She servedas hostessfor all the visiting foreigndignitaries,including Peter the Great on his first trip to the West (Kroll 1973, 191-194). One of the tasksthat occupiedmuch of her time, especiallyafterthe death of her husbandin 1698, was the project of the English succession. Though Sophie was content to remain the Electressof Hanover, Leibnizhad urged her to pursuea claim to the Englishcrown on behalf of her family. Because the British Parliament had passed a bill which limited succession to the

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throne to Protestantsand because Queen Anne had no survivingchildren, Sophie, as the granddaughterof KingJamesI of England,had a good chance of being designatedas Anne's successor.But after much delicate diplomatic maneuvering,just when the successionhad supposedlybeen securedfor Sophie and her descendants, the arrangementseemed in dangerof collapsing. Queen Anne suddenlyfelt that her own rightsas sovereignwere threatened and wrote a harsh letter to Sophie on May 19, 1714, which, some say, may have led to Sophie's death (Klopp 1874, 3: 454-455). 1 On June 8, 1714, as Sophie was takingher usuallate afternoonwalk in the gardensof her countrypalace of Herrenhausen,she suddenlybecame very ill and within severalminutes was dead. She was 83 yearsold. She died as she had wished to die, with neither parsonnor physicianto attend her. Her funeral was held at Hanover, and she was laid to rest in the royal chapel at Hanover. Queen Anne died a few weekslateron August 1, 1714. Though Sophie did not live quite long enough to become Queen of England,she earneda place in Englishhistory. The workshe had done on the projectof the Englishsuccession was not in vain afterall, since her son, George Louis, the Electorof Hanover, succeededQueen Anne and became George I of Great Britain.12 Sophie was eulogized by many of her contemporaries,and a medal was struckto honor her memory(Baily 1936, 247-253). Leibnizpraisedher virtues and her achievementsin a poem, and he also wrote in a letter to the wife of her grandson: It is not she, it is Hanover, it is England, it is the world, it is myselfwho has lost. .. . But let us not think too much about her death; let us rather think of her happy and gloriouslife. (July 7, 1714, in Klopp 1874, 3: 462-465) B. SOPHIEAND PHILOSOPHY

One aspect of that "gloriouslife" was Sophie'srelationto Leibnizand philosophy, as is evident in the three hundredlettersthat Sophie and Leibnizexchanged between 1684 and 1714. Trained as a philosopher, mathematician, and lawyer, Leibnizhad first workedfor the Elector of Mainz and then entered the service of Duke John Frederickof Brunswick-Luneburgin 1673. This markedthe beginning of what was to be more than fortyyearsof service to the Brunswickfamily. One of his main taskswas to researchand write the historyof that family. Though he often traveled, his official residence was at Hanover, where he was in chargeof the library.When Duke John Frederickdied in 1680, and Sophie's husband, Ernst August, became Duke of Hanover, Leibniz continued his

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serviceunderthe new duke and becamean almostindispensablefriendof Sophie, the Duchess and later the Electressof Hanover. In additionto the workhe did for her and her familyto help establishtheir right to the British crown, he performed many smaller services as well. Whenever he traveled, he made a point of reportingto her any political or personalnews that would interest her. He often gave her an eye-witnessaccount of any weddingcelebrationsor operasor playsshe could not attend. He discussednew medicaltreatmentshe had heardof. His royalfriendwas interested in almost everythingand he responded,as promptlyand as thoroughly as he could, to every question she asked. Of special importancefor her intellectual life was the fact that he kept her informedabout the books and ideas of the principalthinkersof their time. The letters of Leibnizand Sophie are thereforeon a wide range of topics, including religion and philosophy. On the subject of religion it is interestingto note that one of the special concerns of both Leibniz and Sophie was the reunion of the churches. Though Sophie had been raisedas a Calvinist, she was undogmaticin her religious belief. Regardedas "loose in her religiousopinions" by some of her more orthodox contemporaries,she enjoyed hearingdiscussionsbetween exponents of opposing beliefs (Chapman 1966, 171). She approvedand encouragedLeibniz'sworkfor the reunionof Catholic and Protestantchurches, and said in one of her letters to him, "As Christianitycame into the world through a woman, I should be proud if its unification were due to me" (Quoted in Kroll 1973, 156). Sophie'srelianceon reasonprovideda philosophicalbasisfor this earlyecumenicalproject. She had said in a letter to her brother:"Thereare so many things in religion contraryto good sense that it needs much faith to submit One can only judge by the reason one has received from nature" to .... (Quoted in Godfrey 1909, 335). She agreedwith Leibnizthat reasonshould be the guide and norm of religion, and he praisedher religion as being "very sound"(May 6, 1713, Klopp 1874, 3: 301-302; Apr. 30, 1709, Klopp 1874, 3: 308).

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Sophie'sphilosophicalquestionsoften arosefromher readingof books and lettersor fromconversationsshe had with learnedmen who visited her court. She wouldask Leibniz'sopinion aboutthem and then sometimessend his letters on to her niece Liselotte, the Duchess of Orleans, or her sister Louise, the Abbessof Maubuisson.Among the philosophersmentioned in the letters are, in addition to Leibnizhimself: Molanus, Van Helmont, John Toland, John Locke, Pierre Bayle, Anthony Collins, Bossuet. 14 Many topics are mentioned, but the main philosophicaltopic discussedin the lettersis, as one might expect, Leibniz'stheory of monads. Let us first see how Leibnizpresented his philosophyto Sophie in his letters and then note her reactionsto his views.

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He began with the notion of substanceas a unit of force, a dynamiccenter of activity (Sep. 3, 1694, Klopp 1874, 1: 303; Nov. 4, 1696, Klopp 1874, 2: 15). He distinguishedbetween indivisiblesimple substances,which are true unities or souls, and aggregatesor multitudes,which are bodies. Since a multitude can be dissolvedinto the partsof which it is composed,bodiescan perish, but souls are imperishable(Oct. 31, 1705, Klopp 1874, 3: 145-146, 154155). He describedeach unity or monad as having not only activity or force but also perception(June 12, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 174), that is, as representing the things outside itself, as though mirroringthe universefrom its own point of view. But since not all monadsmirrorthe universewith equal clarityand distinctness,there is a hierarchyof monads.Some monadshave only a minimumof perception;some monadsor souls have a confusedrepresentation,as in sense perceptions;but some, the spiritsor rationalsouls, have acts of selfreflection and a knowledgeof necessarytruthsand immaterialthings (Nov. 4, 1696, Klopp 1874, 2: 15-16, 18). To help Sophie see that each substanceis unique, Leibnizremindedher, in his letter of October 31, 1705 (Klopp 1874, 3: 152), that in her gardenat Herrenhausenshe had never seen two leaves that perfectlyresembledeach other. He statedfurtherthat each substanceis independentof everythingelse except God. One substancenever acts on anothernor is acted upon by another, but changesand develops in accordancewith principlesimmanentin its own being (Mar. 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 173), yet each mirrorsthe whole worldand functions as though interactingwith others. To account for the appearanceof interaction of these independent substances Leibnizofferedhis doctrine of pre-establishedharmony. By that he meant a divine arrangementby virtue of which monadshave fromthe beginning been so adaptedto one another that changes of one monad, although immanent,correspondto the changes in everyother monad. He gave the example (with referenceto the relation of spirit and matter) of the "excellent workmanwho made two clocks of differentconstruction, which, however, were in perfect agreementwith each other, each by virtue of its own laws" (Mar. 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 174). He had no doubt that it lies within the power and wisdom of the Author of all things to establish the harmonious workingof all substances. He wassureof the existence of such a supremeBeing. Relyingon one of his favorite principles, that nothing happens without a sufficient reason, he asked:"Why is there something?[That is, why does anything exist?] There wouldbe no reasonfor the existence of anythingif there werenot a final Reason who needs nothing but has the reasonfor existence in itself." This same God who "causessomething to exist ratherthan nothing, also causes many ratherthan few things to exist" (Mar. 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 172-173). In-

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deed, one could say that in creatingthe universe, God has chosen the best possibleplan, in which there is the greatestvarietytogetherwith the greatest order. Leibnizoften referredto the wisdom and goodness of the Author of things (Sep. 3, 1694, Klopp 1874, 1: 305; Feb. 7, 1706, in Foucher 1876, 161-162). Leibniz'slettersto Sophie, therefore,presentedto her his main philosophical themes. She was interestedin all that he said, but she did not have the time to write long commentson all of these themes. Her writtenresponsewas in the formof briefremarks,mainlyon two points that she foundhardto understand:the multiplicityof the monadsand the immaterialityof thought of the rational soul or spirit-monad. Sophie wonderedhow there could be manymonads. Leibnizsuggestedshe wouldfind them intelligible if she wouldconsiderthat all that is corporealis a multitude, and that every multitudeis composedof an assemblageof unities, as a flock is composedof individualsheep and a pond of dropsof water and fish (Nov. 19, 1701, Klopp 1874, 2: 310; Sep. 1696, Klopp 1874, 2: 9). But, still puzzledby the notion that there are manyones or monads, she said: One can give whatever name one wishes to things, but in a languagewhich is not that of philosophers,it seemsto me that one is not plural, and that one ought not to call them unities when there are several of them. ... I have little comprehended what these unities are. (Nov. 21, 1701, Klopp 1874, 2: 313) She seemedto think that one could applyproperlyjust to God or perhapsto a universalsoul. Leibnizrepliedthat she had "allthe reasonsin the worldfor sayingthat the one is not several." But he again pointed out that multitudesexist, and a multitudeis composedof unities. He addedthat if there were only one unity, that is God, there would be no multitudein nature and God would be alone (Nov. 30, 1701, Klopp 1874, 2: 314-315). 15 On one occasion, when Sophie attributedto him a belief he did not hold, namely that the one is worth more than a thousand (June 16, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 178), he concluded his letter to her with this uncharacteristically impatientremark: The apparentobscurityoccurs only when one scarcelytakes the troubleto reason about abstractthings with the attention that they require. (June 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 181-182)16 Sophie also raiseda questionaboutthe immaterialityof thought and of the soul. She told Leibnizthat her son the Elector(GeorgeLouis)had engagedin a disputewith Molanus,the Abbot of Loccum,on the natureof thought. Her son held that thought is material,"inasmuchas it is composedof things that

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enter into us by the senses, and . .. one cannot think of anything without makingfor oneself an idea of things that one has seen, heard, or tasted, like a blind man who, when askedhow he imaginedGod, said, 'Likesugar.'" She askedLeibnizto meditate on the disputebut warnedhim: "I am of the opinion of my son" (June 2, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 163-164). Molanuswrote Leibnizto give his own side of the story. He said that the Duchess (that is, Sophie) had provokedhim to a dispute, askedhim to send her his thoughts in writing, but then attackedhis papernot by respondingto his arguments"butby multiplying,as is the habit of people who are strangers to these matters, questions which have no relation to the subject."He said that she ended by sayingshe would send the paperto Leibnizand have Leibniz serveas the arbiterof their differences.He hoped that Leibnizwouldagree with him that the soul is a thinking thing and really distinct from an extended thing (Foucher 1876, 53). Leibnizagreedwith Molanusthat thought and the soul are immaterial,but since he had long found some difficultiesin the Cartesianposition, he chose to take a differentroute to establishthe point. He saysthat we think not only of what comes fromsense, but also of what does not come fromsense. There are ideas that accompanyour notions of materialthings that are not corporeal, as for examplethe notions of force, of action, change, time, and even of the one, the true, the good. And as to the materialthat enters the brainby the sense, this is not the samematerialthat enters into the soul, but ratherits idea or representationwhich is not a body (June 12, 1700, Klopp, 1874, 2: 173-174). Thus Leibniztried to show Sophie that thought and souls cannot be material, but Sophie will later say that she does not understandwhat is meant by "thought"and by "immaterial,"adding, "I confess that surpasses me, perhapsbecause I do not comprehendthe termswell enough ... to be able to penetrate to the truth" (Nov. 27, 1702, Klopp 1874, 2: 402).17 Unlike her sisterElizabethwho carefullystudiedDescartes'position before askingquestions, Sophie sometimeswrote criticalcommentswithout making a seriousstudyof Leibniz'sviews. Though as a workingadministratorshe was busy with other concerns, she still enjoyed conversationand letters on the philosophicaltopics that Leibnizdiscussed. As we look at the correspondencebetween Sophie and Leibniz,we might summarizewhat Sophie did for Leibnizand what Leibnizdid for Sophie. She providedsome intellectual companionshipfor Leibnizat Hanover. By questioning his theory of monadsand by askinghis opinion on every new notion she met, she encouragedhim to clarifyboth his own views and his reactions to the ideasof his contemporaries.By sendinghis lettersto her influentialrelatives in France, her sister, the Abbess of Maubuisson and her niece Liselotte, the Duchessof Orleans, she helped to fosterhis internationalreputation. She repeatedlyprotectedhim fromher son George Louis, the Elector of Hanover, who was angrywhen Leibniz,though usuallyon businessfor the

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House of Hanover, wouldset off on a tripto Italyor Franceor Vienna or Berlin without askingpermission.The Electorcomplained:"At least he ought to tell me wherehe's going when he goes away. I never know whereto find him" (Quoted in Foucher1876, 118; Mar. 25, 1711, Klopp 1874, 3: 328). She was a steadfastfriendto Leibnizfor morethan thirtyyears,interestedin all his activities, concerned about his health, and alwayshappy to have him at her palace at Herrenhausen. In her many letters to him she consistently expressedher esteem for him. Forexample, in a letter of May 12, 1688 (Klopp 1874, 1: 14) she said, "I hope to see you again ... and find occasionsof giving you proofs of my esteem and my friendship,"and on April 27, 1713 (Klopp 1874, 3: 39): "I am alwaysan admirerof your merit."18 Leibnizappreciatedher friendshipand often concluded his letters, "I am with devotion, Leibniz."Needless to say, he in turn did much for his royal friend. We have alreadynoted the varietyof practicalserviceshe performed for her, not the least of which was helping to securethe rightof successionto the Englishthrone for Sophie and her heirs. In addition, he answeredall her questionson a wide rangeof subjects.Whether at home or abroad,he served as her eyes and ears, reportinganythingthat would interestor amuseher. He kept her informedof the workand ideasof scholarsof the time, includingtwo women philosopherswho were defendersof Locke: Lady DamarisMasham and Catherine Trotter Cockbum (May 26, 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 218-219; July 6, 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 223-224).19 It was in part due to Leibnizthat throughouther long life Sophie was alwaysin touch with currentphilosophical thought. What can be said of Sophie as a philosopher?She acknowledgedthe existence of a God who is knowablethroughreason, but as a busyprincesswith a strong commitment to the duties of her state of life, she had little time for prolongedspeculation.Moreover,abstractsystemsof thought were of less interestto her than practicalphilosophy.Her everydayworkingphilosophywas reflectedin a calm acceptanceof change20and a firmresolutionnot to worry aboutaccidentsthat could, but might not happensince such worrycould ruin one's health (Nov. 21, 1701, Klopp 1874, 2: 314). She did admit:"I am not so much a philosopher at heart as I am in words"(Nov. 10, 1701, Klopp 1874, 2: 306). But later, at the age of 82, in speakingof the loss of fourof her seven children, she wrote: "I believe that I remainso long in this worldbecause I keep my spiritcalm"(April 27, 1713, Klopp 1874, 3: 394). In a letter of April 7, 1714, Leibnizwrote: YourRoyal Highnessand I ... regardthings as a spectacle. It is the meansof being alwaysin good humor, as much as possible, for example in consideringthe greatestprinces and their ministersas people engaged in giving us an opera. That preserves health. As your Electoral Highness practices this

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method marvelously,I predict for her still very many years. (Klopp 1874, 3: 438) Since Sophie died two months later, Leibniz'spredictionwas mistaken, but no doubt her calm and cheerful dispositionhelped her to surviveas long as she did. Lookingat Sophie as a philosopherin the formal,as distinguishedfromthe popularsense of the term, Leibnizthought she just did not take the time or make the effortto reasonabout abstractthings. She wouldnot, for example, have wanted him to go into detailed prooffrom physicsand mathematicsof the wisdomof God in nature (Feb. 27, 1702, Klopp 1874, 2: 333). But referring to Descartes'praiseof her sisterElizabethfor being the only personwho understoodboth his metaphysicalmeditationsand his geometry,Leibnizsaid that if her Serene Highness, Sophie, wouldhave judgedit appropriateto take the troubleof understandingDescartes'treatises,she would have understood them just as well, though (like Leibnizhimself) she might not have approved them (1691, Klopp 1874 1: 158). He impliedthat she could be a fine philosopher if she wanted to, particularlybecause she is "entirelyfor reason."21 The letters imply that Sophie did not fully develop her potential as a philosopher.They might furthersuggestthat her principalrole in the historyof modem philosophywas that of a learnedfriendand protectorof Leibniz.But to complete the picture of Sophie, we should also note the reaction of an Irishmanwho had spent severalweeks at her court. John Toland praisedSophie not only for her knowledgeof languagesand history,for her vast reading of many books, for her deep insight into affairsof state, and for her wise and witty sayings,but also for her knowledgeof the principalcontroversiesin religion and philosophyand for having a mind that was "irradiatedby philosophy."22 III. PRINCESSSOPHIECHARLOTTE A. BIOGRAPHY

Sophie Charlotteor "Figuelotte"was the fourthchild and only daughterof Sophie and Erst August, the Electressand Electorof Hanover. She wasborn on October 29, 1668, at the castle of Iburg.She studiedundera governess, and her curriculumincluded Latin, French, Italian, English, the sciences, and music (Foucher1876, 74).23 At the age of eleven, she traveledwith her mother to Francewhere she met her Aunt Louise, Abbess of Maubuisson, visited with her cousin Liselotte, who by then was Duchess of Orleans, and was introducedto King LouisXIV, who thought she was a beautifulchild. A few yearslaterSophie and ErnstAugustarrangedfor her to marryFrederickof Brandenburg,a widowerwho had a spinaldeformityas the resultof a fall and

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was fond of elaborateclothing, pomp, and ceremony. But Sophie said that her daughterdid not look to externals(Quoted in Baily 1936, 242) and Emst August, for political reasons,sought a closer relationshipwith Brandenburg. The weddingwas held in Octoberof 1684, when Figuelottewas 16 and Frederick was 27. Followinga week of ballets, plays, operas,and fireworks,and a quiet stay at Herrenhausenfor the brideand groom, Sophie Charlottemoved to Berlin. She and Frederickhad three sons, but the firsttwo died in infancy. Only FrederickWilliam survived. He was born in 1688, the year that his father became Elector of Brandenburg. On January18, 1701, Frederickbecame the first king and Sophie Charlotte the first queen of Prussia.An elaboratecoronation ceremonywas held at Konigsberg.Frederickwas dressed in scarlet embroideredwith gold and wore a crimsonmantle with ermine lining. Sophie Charlotte was dressedin gold brocadeand adored with pearlsand diamonds (Frey 1984, 60-62). Sophie Charlotte disliked the intrigue at her husband'scourt.24She also disliked the pomp and formalityof court life at Berlin, but she found two means of escape: visiting her mother at Hanover and spending time at her own palace of Lutzenburg.Lutzenburgwas for her what Herrenhausenhad been to her mother Sophie. It was situatednear the town of Lutzen,between Berlin and Spandau, landscapedwith trees, small lakes, and gardensin the Frenchstyle. Sophie loved to visit her daughterthere and in one of her letters suggestedre-naming it "Lustenburg,"that is, palace of pleasures(Aug. 4, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 204). Here Sophie Charlottecould pursueher own interests. She played the clavichord and composedsome music. Here ballets, plays, and operaswere performed.Formanyyearsthe musicwas underthe direction of a gifted Italianmusician,Attilio. At Lutzenburgmusicians,artists, and scholarswere alwayswelcome. Sophie Charlotteenjoyed long conversations with her learned visitors, but sometimesthey found life at Lutzenburg ratherstrenuous.Leibniz, a frequentvisitor who in 1700 spent four months there, gently complained in his letters to Sophie of feeling tired since he sometimes could not get to bed before one or two o'clock in the morning (May 22, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 152). King Frederick,a hard-workingadministrator,often startedhis day before his wife went to bed, yet she helped his regimein her own way. Though Sophie Charlotte had little interest in politics, she agreedwith Leibnizthat a closer relationshipbetween her husband'shouse of Brandenburgand her parents' house of Hanover would benefit both houses. She was happy to have Leibnizserve as a diplomatic liaison between the two houses. But her main contributionsto her husband'shouse were culturaland intellectual. She had the reputationof being one of the most learnedwomen in Europeand, like her mother, was alwaysinterestedin hearing the ideas of the scholarsof her time. It was she who made it possiblefor Leibnizto fulfill his dreamof establishing an Academyof Sciences, which was to be devoted to scientific inquiry

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and equippedwith an observatoryand a laboratory.Sophie convinced her husbandthat such an academy, a society of the learnedsimilarto those alreadyestablishedin Franceand England, would enhance his reign. On July 11, 1700, the Berlin Academy of Sciences was founded, with Leibnizas its first president.25 The Queen loved philosophical and theological controversyand at one time had a Catholic theologianbattlingsuccessivelyagainstthree other theologians (Foucher 1876, 143). John Toland, a freethinker, who later dedicated a book to her, was also a visitor at her court. Conversationson the views of another unorthodox thinker were to prompt Leibnizto write his Theodicy.She especiallyenjoyed conversingwith Leibnizand wrote in a letter to him (Quoted in Foucher 1876, 80): "Do not believe that I preferthe grandeursand crownsof which people makeso much here to the charmof the philosophicalconversationsthat we have had at Lutzenburg."26 In Januaryof 1705, Sophie Charlotte suddenlybecame critically ill with pneumonia. When she realizedthat she could not recover, she assuredthe preacherthat she was on good terms with her Makerand said that she was giving her husbanda new opportunityto show his magnificenceby providing a fine funeral(Kroll 1973, 212). She died on February1, 1705, at the age of 36. She was indeedgiven a magnificentfuneraland was interredin a splendid sculpturedsarcophagusin the cathedralat Berlin. Lutzenburg,which she had loved, was renamedCharlottenburgin her honor (Frey 1984, 69, 107). Leibnizwrote a eulogy in which he praisedher beauty, virtue, and intellect, and tried to achieve a philosophical perspectiveon the sad event by thinkingof his monads.He recalledthat each soul is a perpetualliving mirror of the universeand that rationalsouls or spiritsare assuredof eternalcitizenship in the City of God (Hankins 1973, 83-100; Aiton 1985, 264-265). He laterfoundconsolation in the thought that she died with a serenespirit,tranquillity of soul, and resignationto the ordersof supremeprovidence (Mar. 18, 1705, Klopp 1874, 3: 117). B. SOPHIECHARLOTTE AND PHILOSOPHY

Sophie Charlotte'sphilosophicallife, like that of her mother, owed much to their mutualfriend, Leibniz. Like her mother, she was curiousabout the thought of her contemporaries,especiallyJohn Toland, John Locke, Pierre Bayle, and, of course, Leibnizhimself. But unlike her mothershe had a keen interest in abstractmetaphysicaltopics. Leibnizsharedwith her, as he had with her mother, an account of his own philosophicalsystem.27She not only understoodwhat he said, but wanted deeperexplanationsthan he gave. She wrote to a good friend: My dearPoellnitz, here is a letter fromLeibnizthat I am sending you. I love this man, but I am inclined to get angrybecause he treats everything so superficiallywith me . . . he

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rarelyanswersme with precisionon subjectsI raisefor discussion. (Quoted in Foucher 1876, 16) It may well be that at one time Leibnizunderestimatedthe capabilitiesof Sophie Charlotte. Speakingof the taste of the "Electresses,"that is, Sophie Charlotte and her mother, he once wrote: They need somethingwhich might be at the same time spiritual and diverting, . . . curiousand pleasingstories, beautiful productions, writings on matters of religion which are not prejudiced.... Formyselfwho am more accustomedto what gives me the task of deepeningmatters,I preferwhat gives me new opportunitiesto advance in knowledgeand make others advance in it. (Quoted in Foucher 1876, 78-79) In spite of what he said here, Leibnizdid help his royalpatronsto advancein knowledge and understanding,especially of philosophical and theological ideas. Sophie Charlotte had readLocke (Dec. 4, 1703, Foucher1876, 127); she knew both John Toland and Pierre Bayle, and she was eager to have Leibniz'scomments on their views. In 1702, she sent to Leibnizan anonymousletter on which she askedhim to comment. Some of Leibniz'sreply (Loemker1969, 547-553) is believed to have been aimed at Locke, whose essay he was criticizing, and at John Toland, the English Deist and freethinker,who had come to Hanover with the delegation of the Englishambassadorand who often talked with Sophie and Sophie Charlotte. The letter, accordingto Leibniz, had raised two questions: (1) whether there is somethingin our thoughtswhich does not come fromsenses;and (2) whether there is something in naturewhich is not material.Leibnizgives an affirmativeanswerto both questions. On the firsthe saysthat we use our externalsenses as a blind man uses a stick;they help us to know their particular objects, which are colors, sounds, odors, tastes, and tactual qualities, but they do not help us to know what these sensiblequalitiesare, nor do they account for objects of understandingalone, such as the thought of oneself, of substancein general, of being, of truth, of necessarytruths (Loemker1969, 547-550). Such objects we know by a naturallight and not by sense experiences. Leibnizdistinguishedhis position from that of Locke in this famous line: ". . . there is nothing in the understandingwhich has not come from the senses, except the understandingitself, or the one who understands" (Loemker1969, 549).28 On the second question, he reaffirmshis position that there is something immaterialin all createdbeings and, further,that God, "the universaldetermining cause which makes things be, and makes them be as they are rather than otherwise, must of necessity be free of matter"(Loemker1969, 552).

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Sophie Charlotte showed Leibniz'sletter to Toland (Aiton 1985, 262), who then tried to prove againstLeibnizwhat he never denied, that is, that we need sense organsto have thought. But Leibnizwent on to re-emphasize that there are necessary truths that are prior to experience (Quoted in Foucher 1876, 91-98). Toland'ssympathyfor a materialistposition had been evident on a previous occasion when he read to the Queen a discourseon the soul which was close to the teaching of Lucretius. On that occasion, Leibniz criticized Toland for not explaining why matterhad motion and order(Sep. 9, 1702, Klopp 1874, 2: 362-363). Though not sharingToland'sviews, Sophie Charlottefound it interesting to talk to him. He was later to write three letterswhich he claimedwere answersto questionswhich she had askedabout the origin of prejudice,about the originof idolatry,and aboutthe historyof the doctrineof the immortality of the soul among the heathens. These letters were included in a book he dedicatedto her entitled Lettersto Serena.Though Toland had respondedto her intellectual interests, she continued to turn to Leibnizfor help in understanding theological and philosophical issues. Her questions about Bayle's philosophy were to provide the occasion for the writing of the only philosophical book that Leibnizpublishedduringhis lifetime, his Theodicy. PierreBayle, who had been a Calvinist beforegainingthe reputationof beet critique.In ing a sceptic, was the authorof the famousDictionnaire historique both the firstand second editions of that workhe had included, in the article "Rorarius,"some objections to Leibniz'sphilosophy, and both times Leibniz published replies to those objections (Loemker 1969, 492-497; 574-585). Since Sophie Charlotte had heard much about Bayle, had met him in Holland in Octoberof 1700, and had discussedwith Leibnizthe questionsBayle raised, she askedLeibnizto put his answersin writingfor furtherreflection. In a letter to Thomas Burnet of October 30, 1710 (Jalabert 1962, 10), Leibnizdescribedthe origin of the book in this way: The largest part of the work was composed piece by piece, when I was at the late Queen of Prussia'swhere these matters were often discussed, on the occasion of the Dictionaryand other works of Bayle which were being widely read. In our conversationsI usuallyansweredthe objectionsraisedby Bayle and made the Queen see that they were not so strong as certain people who are not well disposedto religion would have us believe. Her Majestyfrequentlycommandedme to put my answersin writing, so that one could consider them with attention. After the death of this great princessI gatheredthe pieces together, at the urgingof friendswho had heard about

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them, and with some additions,producedthe book of which I have just spoken. In the prefaceto the book Leibnizalso saysthat the book originatedin the conversationsabout Bayle'sviews with "one of the greatestand most accomplishedof princesses,"who exhortedand urgedhim to publishhis reflections on these matters.Though "the incomparableQueen"died beforehe could do so, he was now carryingout her wish (Theodicy,Huggardtr. 1952, 62-63). Sophie Charlotte has left no philosophical treatise, but we can become awareof what was on her mind if we brieflysummarizethe main content of the Theodicy,which presentsthe substanceof Leibniz'sdiscussionswith her and was written at her command. The title of the workrefersto the justificationof God, that is, to the problem: If a good God exists, how can one account for evil? The subtitle, Essays on theGoodnessof God, theFreedomof Man, and theOriginof Evil, revealsthe scope of the work. The main discussionis precededby an essayon the conformityof faith with reason in which, contraryto Bayle, Leibnizheld that truths of revealed religion and truths reached by reason cannot contradict each other. "The light of reason,"he said, "is no less a gift of God than that of revelation"(Theodicy,Huggardtr. 1952, 91). Mysteries,like the Trinity, are beyond, but not against reason. In PartOne, he consideredwhat the light of reasonand the light of revelation teach us of God and of man in relation to evil. After recallingthe proof for the existence of God fromthe contingency of the world, he re-statedone of his favorite themes: that God chose to create the best of possibleworlds. But the best possible world involved permittingsome evil. Leibniz distinguishedthree kinds of evil: metaphysicalevil, which simplyrefersto the privation or limitations that all creatureshave; physical evil or suffering;and moral evil or sin (Theodicy,Huggardtr. 1952, 127-130, 140-141).29 The possibility of doing a morally evil act presumesthat we have free choice, but this does not mean that our will has "the indifferenceof equipoise," as though it were equally inclined to two differentcoursesof action. Whether we are awareof it or not, there is alwayssome cause or reason inclining us towardsthe course taken, but the will is never bound by necessity to adopt it (Theodicy,Huggardtr. 1952, 143; 147-148). To the question of how our choices can really be free if God has certain foreknowledgeof them, Leibnizansweredthat the certaintyof God's knowledge does not predeterminethose choices. While God can foreseeall future contingent events, they occur only by a hypothetical or conditional necessity. They do not happen by absolutenecessity (that is, that whose opposite would implya contradiction). We have the two conditionswhich, according to Aristotle, are requiredfor freedom:intelligence and spontaneity.That is, we can know what we are doing, and the source of the act is within us

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(Theodicy,Huggardtr. 1952, 143-150, 153, 309-310, 382). To deny ourfreedom and take refuge in fatalismwould be what he called a "lazysophism." In PartTwo, Leibnizexaminednineteen philosophicalmaximsthat Bayle had opposed to his views (Theodicy,Huggardtr. 1952, 187-207). Bayle had especiallycriticizedthe view that God had to create the best possible world since he thought this would implythat God is not free. LeibnizassuredBayle that God's decree to create is free and that there are no bounds to God's power or goodness, but that unless God had chosen the best of the possible worlds, there would have been no sufficientreasonfor his choice (Theodicy, Huggardtr., 1952, 267-270, 386-388). In PartThree, the last part, Leibnizreturnedto some topics he had previously mentioned, among them physical evil. Again he maintainedthat sufferings,monstrosities,and other apparentdefectsarea partof the orderof the world consideredas a whole (Theodicy,Huggardtr. 1952, 276-281). Loosely structuredto answerthe long list of Bayle'sobjections, the book reflectsthe discussionsthat Leibnizand the Queen had at Lutzenburg.Had it not been for the Queen, it is quite likely that Leibnizwouldnever have written or publishedhis Theodicy. We should note, however, that the Theodicywas not Leibniz'sfirst response to Sophie Charlotte'sinterest in the problemof evil. When she was still Electressof Brandenburg,he had writtento tell her that he was sendinga new printing of the German version of Boethius'Consolationof Philosophy. After summarizingBoethius'view on the perfectionof orderin the universe, which was similarto his own view, he tried to suggesthow such perfection was compatiblewith evil by giving an example. He remindedSophie Charlotte, a musician, that musical chords sometimes sound unpleasant if one hearsthem alone, but when they arejoined with other chords,they makethe whole harmonymorebeautiful.He concludedhis letter by saying,"Butthere is no need to speakfurtherof these things that Boethiusexplainsmuch better and that yournoble mind conceives still better than Boethiuscould express" (May 9, 1697, Klopp 1874, 2: 29-30). Sophie Charlotte had first known Leibnizas the friendof her mother, but lie also became her friendand teacher. In a letter of September1, 1699, she told him that he could henceforth regardher as his disciple and as one who appreciatedhis merit (Cited in Aiton 1985, 255). In summarizingwhat she did for him and what he did for her, we might mention firstthe achievement that was of benefit to both: the foundingof the BerlinAcademyof Sciences. The establishment of this scholarly society that was conceived by Leibniz broughtprestige to the court of Queen Sophie Charlotte and her husband, King FrederickI, but it was throughthe Queen's influence that Leibnizwas able to realizehis dream and become the founderand first presidentof the Academy. The historiographerof Brandenburg,addressingthe Academy in

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1795 and in 1799, refersto both Leibnizand Sophie Charlotteas foundersof the Royal Academy (Erman1801, 3, 193). Sophie Charlotte also helped him by stimulatinghis philosophicalthinking. Like her mother, she habituallyaskedhis reactionto the many ideasshe encounteredin letters, books, and conversationswith scholars.She was seriously interested in questions relating to theory of knowledge, metaphysics, naturaltheology, and religion. She will alwaysbe rememberedas the person who motivated Leibnizto write his Theodicy. Like her mother, she, too, was a steadfastfriend to Leibniz. Many years later, her grandson,known to historyas Frederickthe Great, was to say, after praisingher genius and knowledge: She believed that it was not unworthyof a queen to esteem a philosopher ... .this philosopher ... was Leibniz; and as those who have received privilegedsouls from heaven are the equalsof kings, she bestowedher friendshipon Leibniz(Frederick 1859, 230). Though Leibniz sometimes found life at her palace exhausting as he grew older, he was alwayswelcome at Lutzenburg.Her unexpected death at the age of 36 was a heavy blow to him, and when her mother died nine years later, he lost his influence at court. George Louis, Sophie's son and Sophie Charlotte'sbrother, who became King George I of Great Britain, continued to employ him as the family historian, but he did not allow Leibnizto come to Englandnor did he send a representativeto his funeral. In reviewing what Leibnizdid for Sophie Charlotte, we might note first that politically he tried to achieve a closer relationshipbetween her husband'scourt at Berlin and her mother'sand brother'scourt at Hanover, but his efforts were not always appreciated.George Louis of Hanover resented Leibniz'stripsto Berlin and the courtiersat Berlinsometimesthought of him as a spy. Leibniz also served as a kind of unofficial culturalminister at the courtof Berlin, a supervisorof artsand sciences. But his greatestcontribution to Sophie Charlotte was to foster her intellectual life. He kept her informed of new books and ideas. He participatedin discussionswith other scholarsin her presence. He provideda reasonedand balancedresponseto the views of the free thinkersof the time. He tried to answerall the questionsshe raisedin theology and philosophy. He was her philosophyteacher and friend. What can be said of Sophie Charlotteas a philosopher?Her contemporaries were impressedby her wide rangeof interests.John Toland, for example, describedher as "one of the most curiouspersonsyou ever knew, and mistress of a vast compassof knowledge"(Lettersto Serena1964 reprintof 1704 ed., preface#9). Leibniz,too, speaksof "hercuriosityand her eagernessto be instructed"(Quoted in Erman1801, 194). Her grandsontells us that her curiosity led her to desire to graspthe first principlesof things (Frederick1859,

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112). Since she chose Leibnizas her teacher, she often encounteredhis main ideas as they were expressedin his letters to her or in essayswritten at her command. Among these ideas are the following:that there is something in our mind that does not come from the senses; that there is a Creator-God; that the truthsof reasonand the truthsof revelationcannot contradicteach other; that though God is omniscient, we do have free choice; and that despite evil and sufferingin the world, everythingis orderedfor the best. But at times she wanteda deeperexplanationof things than Leibnizwas able to provide. It was said that she wanted to know the why of the why (pourquoide pourquoi)(Frederick1859, 112). Sophie Charlotte'slast wordswere of Leibnizand philosophy. To one of her weeping ladiesof honor, she said:"Do not feel sorryfor me, for now I am going to satisfymy curiosityabout the principlesof things that Leibnizhas never been able to explain to me: aboutspace, the infinite, being, and nothingness"(Frederick1859, 112). One who has made the acquaintanceof Sophie Charlotte, her motherSophie, and her Aunt Elizabeth,and has studied their interaction with their philosopher-friends,will alwayssee these three princessesas part of the history of modem philosophy. NOTES Notes on Introduction and PartI 1. In additionto Chapman,sourceson the familybackgroundincludeGorst-Williams1977, Hatton 1978, and the Bakered. of The lettersof Elizabeth,queenof Bohemia1953. 2. This book will hereafterbe referredto as Adam. 3. This reference is to Foucherde Careil'sbook, Descartes,la princesseElisabethet la reine Christine.Other worksby this author have also been used in this paper. 4. The firstreferenceis to Foucherde Careil'sDescarteset la princessepalatine;the second reference is to his Descartes,la princesseElisabethet la reineChristine. 5. In May 1647 (Adam 1960, 7: 343) afterhaving reada discussionon how soul is united to body that was written by Descartes'friend Hogelande, Elizabethsaid it still did not satisfyher. 6. In a letter to Chanut (Feb. 1, 1647, Adam 1960, 7: 255) he defined passionas "a confused thought excited in the soul by some movement of the nerves." 7. See also lettersof May 18, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 225, and Sep. 15, 1645, Adam 1956, 6: 303. 8. Severalyearslater, in writingto Hessen-Rheinfels,Leibnizsaid:"The late MadamePrincess Elizabeth,Abbess of Herford,has in the past given evidence to me that she had a high reof this Father[i.e. Malebranche],but it was at a time that she gardfor the ChristianConversations was beginningnot to scorn the writingsof Jacob Boehme."Malebranche, Robinet ed. 1961, 18: 373. Notes on PartII 9. GeorgeWilliam laterbrokethis promiseand marriedhis mistress,Eleonored'Olbreuse,to legitimizethe birth of their daughter,Sophie Dorothea. In response, ErnstAugust and Sophie arrangedfor their oldest son, GeorgeLouisto marrySophie Dorotheato insurethat GeorgeWilliam'sdukedomof Celle would be united with their lands, as originallypromised.Though this

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marriageof convenience resultedin the birthof two children, it was an unhappymarriagewhich ended in divorce when Sophie Dorothea'saffairwith Count Philip von Konigsmarck(who was mysteriouslyassassinated)was discovered. (Sophie 1879, 89-94, 101-111; Kroll 1973, 109-112, 128-131, 180-188) 10. A niece, Elizabeth Charlotte, known as "Liselotte,"the daughterof Sophie's brother CharlesLouisof Heidelberg,lived in Sophie'shouseholdforfouryearsand was like a daughterto her. The many letters that Liselottewrote to Sophie afterher marriageto Philip the Duke of Orleans, brotherof King LouisXIV, are a lively recordof the social historyof the time. See Letters fromLiselotte,tr. Kroll 1971. On Sophie's life, in addition to her memoirs,see Chapman 1966, Kroll 1973, Baily 1936. 11. On the cause of Sophie's death, see letter from Schulenbergto Leibniz(June 13, 1714, Klopp 1874, 3: 483). Moredetails about Sophie'sdeath aregiven in the letter of the Countessof Buckebourgto Louise, the daughterof Sophie'sbrotherCharlesLouisand Louisevon Degenfeld. (July 12, 1714, Klopp 1874, 3: 457-462) 12. To see what Sophie started, it is interestingto note that for 123 years, from the time of George I throughthe reignof William IV, the rulerof Hanoverwas also the king of England,but becauseby the law of Hanover a woman could not be the sovereignof Hanover, the crownsof Britainand Hanoverwere separatedwhen Victoria becameQueen of Englandin 1837. Victoria was, however, a greatgreat great grand-daughterof Sophie, and the presentqueen of England, Elizabeth II (a great great grand-daughterof Victoria) also ultimately owes her crown to her Britannica1929, 14th ed., 11: 160) ancestress,Sophie of Hanover. (Encyclopedia 13. In lettersto Sophie, Leibnizhad written:"I am persuadedthat religionshouldhave nothing that is contraryto reason,"and "God ... has engravedthe religionof reasonin our hearts." (April 1709, Klopp 1874, 3: 300-302) 14. Bossuet, the French orator and writer, had discussed with Fenelon the question of whether love is egoistic or altruistic.Leibniz in one of his letters to Sophie tries to resolve the oppositionbetween self-centeredlove and disinterestedlove by saying:"To love is to find pleasure in the good, the perfection, the happinessof another." (Klopp 1874, 2: 60) Anthony Collins was an EnglishDeist whose workon religion Sophie called to the attention of Leibniz. (Klopp 1874, 3: 395) Baron FrancoisMercurevan Helmont, metaphysicianand author of two books that Sophie had sent to Leibniz,spent severalmonths in Hanoverat Sophie'srequestand discussedhis views, especiallyon the transmigrationof souls, with both of them. LaterLeibnizwrote a reportof the conversationswhich Sophie sent to her niece, Liselotte, the Duchessof Orleans. (Aiton 1985, 201-202; Klopp 1874, 2: 8-11) 15. In another letter (Mar. 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 174) Leibnizgrantsthat God is incomparably more a unity than we are and that he alone is unity in every way. This does not, however, mean that God is the only unity. 16. In a letter of Oct. 31, 1705 (Klopp 1874, 3: 145-148), in what sounds like an effort to answerSophie's question about the multiplicityof monadsby appealingto a distinguishedperson, Leibnizinformedher that the Duke of Bourgogne,a friendof her niece, the Duchessof Orleans, had come to accept the existence of unities. 17. Sophie also forwardedto Leibnizan objection raisedby her sister Louise, the Abbess of Maubuisson.Leibniz'stheory of monadshad implied that animal souls are immortaland Louise found this a dangerousidea. But Leibnizin a letter to Sophie asks:"Whatevil would there be if the soulsof beastswere alwaysto subsist?"Since accordingto his philosophysouls aresimplesubstanceswith force and perception, they cannot be subjectto dissolution.The doctrine might be dangerousonly if one did not distinguishanimal souls fromhumansouls. But Leibnizholds that animal souls lack the power of reason, self-reflection,and self-memorythat human souls have. Our souls will not lose their knowledgethroughdeath. They will continue to be citizens of the city of God. (Nov. 29, 1707, Klopp 1874, 3: 287-288). Sophie left no written comment on this letter, but she probablysent it on to her sister Louise. 18. See also letters of June 17, 1688 (Klopp 1:38); Sep. 9, 1695 (Klopp2: 3); Nov. 5, 1701 (Klopp 2: 295). 19. George Bumet of Kemnayin a letter to CatherineTrotterCockbum said (aftera visit to Sophie's court): "I find the Electoresslikes ratherthose points of wit, lively thoughts, and odd storiesthan subjectsof much thought, and deep reasoning.One mustconcenter much sense into

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a point, or say all in a word(which is very hardto do) otherwiseshe will not considerit." But in her reply, Catherine TrotterCockbum defendedSophie, saying:"The accountsyou give me of the Electoress'taste in conversationshew me that she verywell understandsthe natureof it ... The most solid subjectsshould not, in my opinion, be treatedof in conversation,as one would writeof them. There is a certain short and lively mannerof speakingon them, which is not only more agreeableand insinuating, but often detects error, and finds out truth better than a long train of reasonings. . ." (The Worksof CatherineCockbum1751, 185, 188) I am indebtedto Dr. MaryEllen Waithe for a photocopy of part of this book. 20. (May4, 1691, Klopp 1874, 1: 109). Speakingof people dying, Sophie wrote:"Ifsome did not replaceothers, the world would be too crowded .... Everythingpasses, and there is only God who subsistsalways, and we endure less well than inanimate things." 21. In a context in which he was explaining her political views to an Englishman,Leibniz said: "Madamethe Electressis entirely for reason, and consequentlyall the measureswhich can serve to cause kings and peoples to follow reason, will be to her taste." (July 1701, Klopp 1874, 2: 267) 22. John Toland, "The Elogyand Characterof the late PrincessSophia,"in Baily 1936, 247250; and Lettersto Serena, 1964 reprintof 1704 ed., preface #7. Notes to Part III 23. In addition to Foucher 1876, sourceson the life of Sophie Charlotte include Frey 1984, Kroll 1973, and Sophie's Mnmoires,Kocher ed. 1879. 24. Sophie Charlotte had some differencesof opinion with EberhardDanckelman,the influential adviserwho also had been her husband'stutor. He thought she favoredHanoverianinterests over those of Prussia.Eventuallyhe was dismissed. 25. Referenceson the foundingof the BerlinAcademyof Sciences includeFoucherde Careil Leibnizet lesacademiesin Leibniz,oeuvres1969 reprintof 1875 ed., 7; Leibniz'slettersto Sophie of Nov. 1697, Klopp 1874, 2: 48, and June 19, 1700, Klopp 1874, 2: 188-190; Aiton 1985; Frey 1984. Leibnizalso had plans to establishsimilaracademiesin Dresden, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. 26. On a later occasion in 1704, when Leibnizsought the post of chancellorto GeorgeLouis the Elector of Hanover, Sophie Charlotte'sbrother,Leibnizasked Sophie Charlotte to write a letter of recommendationfor him. In doing so she was acting againsther own interestsince she did not want to lose him, but she added:"I believe, as a good friend, I ought to put yourinterest beforemy own" (Aug. 31, 1704, Klopp 1874, 3: 95-96). Fortunatelyfor her, Leibnizdid not get the position and from that time on he tried to spend more time in Berlin. 27. Leibnizhad sent to Sophie Charlottea revisionof an exposition of his philosophythat he had written for LadyMasham. See his letter to Sophie Charlotte of May 8, 1704, included in Foucher 1876, 130-135. 28. See his comment in a letter to Thomas Bumet (May 26, 1706, Klopp 1874, 3: 219): "Lockehas not sufficientlywell probedthe origin of necessarytruthswhich do not depend on senses or experiencesor facts, but on the considerationof the nature of our soul ... ." 29. Accordingto Leibniz,God never wills physicalevil or sufferingabsolutely,but he permits it to prevent greaterevils or to obtain greatergood. Moral evil or sin God never wills at all, thoughhe sometimespermitsit if it is for the best. Leibnizcites the example, fromthe EasterEve liturgy,of referringto the fall of Adam asfelixculpa,a happyfault, since it led to the incarnation of Christ (Theodicy,Huggardtr. 1952, 129, 137-138, 378).

REFERENCES

Adam, Charles. 1917. Descartes,ses amitiesfeminines.Paris:Boivin. Aiton, E.J. 1985. Leibniz:A biography.Bristoland Boston: Adam Hilger. Baily, F.E. 1936. Sophiaof Hanoverandhertimes.London:Hutchinson& Co.

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Baker, L.M., ed. 1953. The lettersof Elizabeth,queenof Bohemia.London: Bodley Head. Blom, John J., trans. 1978. Descartes:His moralphilosophyand psychology. New YorkUniversity Press. persons:FourseventeenthcenturyporChapman, Hester W., 1966. Privileged traits.New York:Reynal and Company. Cockbum, Catherine Trotter. 1751. The worksof CatherineCockbum.London: Knapston.Micropublished1975 In Historyof women.New Haven, Conn.: ResearchPublicationsInc. Collins, James. 1954. A historyof modernEuropeanphilosophy.Milwaukee: Bruce PublishingCo. vol. 5,6,7,8. Charles Descartes,R. 1951, 1956, 1960, 1963. Correspondance, Adam and GerardMilhaud, eds. Paris:PressesUniversitairesde France. . 1941. Meditationsand selectionsfrom the principlesof philosophy.John Veitch, trans. Illinois: Open Court PublishingCo. . 1955 reprintof 1931 ed. Philosophical works.ElizabethS. Haldaneand New York: Dover Publications. G.R.T. Ross, trans. Erman,Jean Pierre. 1801. Memoirespourservird l'histoirede SophieCharlotte reinede Prusse.Berlin: G.F. Starcke. Foucherde Careil, Louis A. 1909. Descartes,la princesseElisabethet la reine Christine.Paris:Felix Alcan. . 1862. Descarteset la princessepalatine.Paris:Auguste DurandLibraire. . 1876. Leibnizet les deux Sophies.Paris:Germer-Bailliere. . ed. 1969 reprintof 1875 ed. Leibnizet les academies.In Leibnizoeuvres. (vol. 7). Hildesheim & New York:George Olms. and Des moeurset des Frederickthe Great. 1859. Memoiresde Brandebourg coutumes.In Oeuvresde Fredericle Grand. (vol. 1). Berlin:Koniglichen Geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei. I: The manandhistimes.New York: Frey,Lindaand Marsha. 1984. Frederick ColumbiaUniversity Press. Godfrey, Elizabeth. 1909. A sisterof PrinceRupert:Elizabethprincesspalatine and abbessof Herford.New York:John Lane Co. Gorst-Williams,Jessica. 1977. Elizabeth:Thewinterqueen.London:Abelard. Hankins, Olan Brent, 1973. Leibnizas baroquepoet: An interpretation of his Germanepicediumon thedeathof Queen SophieCharlotte.Bern & Frankfurt:HerbertLang. Hatton, Ragnhild. 1978. GeorgeI: Electorand king.Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard University Press. de Leibnizavec l'electriceSophiede Klopp, Onno, ed. 1874. Correspondance Hanover: Klindworth. (3 vols.). Brunswick-Lunebourg. Letters Liselotte: Elisabeth ed. 1971. Charlotte,princesspalaKroll, Maria, from tine and duchessof Orleans, 1652-1722. New York:McCall Publishing Co.

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. 1973. Sophie:Electressof Hanover:A personalportrait.London:Victor Gollancz. Leibniz,G. W. 1961. Philosophische 1702-1716, In Die philosophAbhandlungen schenschriftenvon GottfriedWilhelmLeibniz.(vol 6). C. I. Gerhardt,ed. Hildesheim:Georg Olms. --. 1969. Philosophicalpapers and letters. Leroy E. Loemker, trans. Dordrecht,Holland: D. Reidel PublishingCompany. -- . 1962. Essaisde Theodicee.JacquesJalabert,ed. Paris:Aubier. -- -. 1952. Theodicy.E. M. Huggard,trans. New Haven: Yale University Press. Mackie, John M. 1845. Lifeof GodfreyWilliamvon Leibnitz.Boston:Gould, Kendall and Lincoln. acteset documents1638-1689. (vol. Malebranche,N. 1961. Correspondance, A. ed. Vrin. Paris:J. Robinet, 18). Mates, Benson. 1986. Thephilosophy of Leibniz.New York& Oxford:Oxford University Press. NMel, Marguerite. 1946. Descarteset la princesseElisabeth.Paris:Editions Elzevir. Penn, William. 1981. Papersof WilliamPenn. (vol. 1). MaryM. Dunn and RichardS. Dunn, eds. Philadelphia:University of PennsylvaniaPress. Petit, Leon. 1969. Descarteset la princesseElisabeth.Paris:A. G. Nizet. Ranke, Leopold. 1968 reprintof 1849 ed. Memoirsof thehouseof Brandenburg and historyof Prussia.New York:GreenwoodPress. Sophie. 1927. Briefwechselder kurfiirstinSophievon Hanover. Berlin and Leipzig:K. J. Koehler. . 1879. Memoirender herzoginSophie,nachmalskurfiirstinvon Hanover. Adolf Kocher, ed. Leipzig:S. Hirzel. -- . 1888. Memoirsof Sophia,electressof Hanover1630-1680. H. Forester, trans. London:RichardBentley. Toland, John. 1964 reprint of 1704 ed. Lettersto Serena. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:FriedrichFromann.

Anne ViscountessConway: A Seventeenth Century Rationalist JANE DURAN

The workof Spinoza,Descartesand Leibnizis citedin an attemptto develop, both expositorilyand critically, the philosophyof Anne ViscountessConway. and accountof Broadly,it is contendedthatConway'smetaphysics,epistemology the passionsnot only bearintriguingcomparisonwith the workof the otherwellknownrationalists,butsupersedethemin someways,particularly insofaras thenosubstance and are concerned. tionsof Citingthecommentary ontologicalhierarchy on theCamof LoptsonandCarolynMerchant,andalludingto othercommentary bridgePlatonistswhoseworkwas donein tandemwithConway's,it is contended thatConway'sconceptionof the "monad"precededand influencedLeibniz's,and to theCartethathermonisticvitalismwas in manyrespectsa superiormetaphysics sian system.It is concludedthatwe owe Conwaymoreattentionand celebration thanshe has thusfar received.

Anne Viscountess Conway (1631-1679) was a 17th century philosopher and author in the tradition of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Until recently, her workwas almost lost to us, since becauseof the difficultyof translation and semi-anonymous manuscriptattribution. In her longest piece, Principlesof the Most Ancientand ModemPhilosophy,was erroneouslyattributed to her friendand collaboratorF. M. van Helmont. Within the past decade, however, there has been a surge of interest in Lady Anne Conway's work. It has been recognizedby manythat some of the moresalient and original strandsof thought in the PrinciplesanticipatedLeibniz, and that indeed his usageof the term "monad"was probablydue to his originallyhaving seen it in her Principles,shown to him by the peripateticperson of letters, van Helmont (Merchant, 1979, 265-266). 1 Several recent commentatorshave remarkednot only on the originality and profundity of the Viscountess Conway'sphilosophy-she tackles many difficult and perplexingquestions having to do with de re modality, the natureof time, essence vs. accidents, and so forth-but on her having servedas a sourcefor other thinkers(among them, again, preeminentlyLeibniz) in a particularlyhelpful and fructifying way (Merchant, 1979, passim). Hypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989) ? by Jane Duran

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Since a spate of recent journalarticlesand bookshave either touched upon Conway'slife or gone into it in some depth (and since there remains, in any case, the superbConwayLetters,by MarjorieHope Nicolson, publishedduring the '30's), I will devote most of this piece to a discussionof some of the majorpoints in the Conwayrationalism,and the respectsin which her Principles differsfrom the work of other rationalists. Anne Conway's work is most easily compared to that of Spinoza and Leibniz, since she is from the start a monist, and far from being a Cartesian dualist. She was, we are informedby all sources,extremelywell-readin both Latinand Greek-she had readPlato and Plotinusin Latinand possiblyPlato in Greek as well. She had also readDescartesand Spinoza,and it was the former, apparently,who became in some sense the indirectcatalystfor her own philosophicalwork, since she found so much of the Cartesiansystemerroneous (Conway 1982, 15). She was also in pronounceddisagreementwith Thomas Hobbes. In any case, our purposehere will be to achieve a commentary on specificportionsof the Principleswhere intersectionbetween Conwayand Descartes, or to some extent between Conway and Leibniz is most pronounced. Up to this point the workon Conway has been more biographical than philosophical,and save for the meticulouscommentsby Loptsonon her Principles,more along the lines of intellectual history than rigorousphilosophy itself. But if it is the case that, as Loptsonand CarolynMerchantboth argue, Conway'sphilosophical views are sufficientlysophisticatedthat they merit study in their own right, surelya naturalpoint of departurefor such a task is the Principles,specific portionsof which may easilybe contrastedwith the work of the other rationalists. I A largepartof the opening section of the Principleshas to do with the natureof God. Standingwithin the frameworkof the Christiantradition,and a close friend and intellectual confidante of the CambridgePlatonist theologian and philosopherHenry More,2 Conway wrote in such a way that some of her workseems more theological than philosophical.It is an intriguingaspect of her treatisethat, as the commentatorshave noted, she had taken into account worksof Judaicaonly recently availableat the time, especiallycertain portions of the Kabbala.Such work emphasizedviews of the nature of God, both fromthe standpointof substanceand fromthe standpointof God's relation to a divine offspring,not in accordancewith Christian belief and hence somewhatheretical. We will not be concernedwith those views here, but Conway'sdescriptionof God as substanceis noteworthybecause it leads directly into her monadic view of substancein general. Briefly,Conway holds that God is a being of infinite spirit, the attributes or particularsof which are infinite in numberand necessarilypartof God'ses-

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sence. Specifically, Conway writes: God is a Spirit, Light, and Life, infinitely Wise, Good, Just, Mighty, Omniscient, Omnipresent,Omnipotent, Creatorand Makerof all things visible and invisible .... In God there is neither Time nor Change, nor Composition, nor Division of Parts:He is wholly and universallyone in himself, and of himself, without any mannerof varietyor Mixture ... (Conway 1982, 149) In Conway'sontology, God is one sort of substance(as God will become one sort of Monad for Leibniz). All of the rest of creation is anothersort of substance, save for Christ, who is a thirdsort of substancestandingmidway,ontologically,between God and the restof createdthings. This somewhatpared and terse account may help us bear in mind the Conway ontological hierarchy, as it has importantramificationsfor the rest of her philosophy.Her notion of Christ, peculiar(in English, at any rate) to her philosophy, is derived partiallyfromthe Kabbalaand its traditionalnotion of a being metaphysically halfwaybetween God and the createdworld, Adam Kadmon, in Kabbalistic terminology.As Conwaywrites, "And for the samereasonhe is called of Paul . . the First Begotten of all Creatures;wherein is signifiedthe relation he hath to Creation. . . . That the Ancient Cabbalistsacknowledgedsuch a FirstBegotten Son of God, whom they called the HeavenlyAdam"(Conway 1982, 149). More importantly,however, these two ontologicallysuperiorentities have an interestingand complicatedrelationshipto the restof creation, which is itself metaphysicallycomplex and ontologically intriguing.Both of the ontologically prior entities are in a sense eternally co-presentwith the rest of creation, since God is by naturea creatorde re. (This is a sophisticated point, on which Loptsonhas extensive commentary.)3But more interesting for ourpurposesis the relationshipof the restof creation-animal, vegetable, humankindand so forth-to itself. Conway is, as Merchant is at pains to point out, a vitalist. Hence she is a monist;she sees matterand spiritas intermingled and inseparable (Merchant 1979, 258).4 All of creation can be brokendown into infinitelymanysmallparts,called monads,which have the capacity to penetrate and intermingle-hence the interaction one sees among the creatures.She writes of this substance,of which all except God and Adam Kadmonconsist: .Infinite . Divisibility... how all creaturesfromthe highest to the lowest are inseparablyunited with one another, by means of Subtiler Parts interceding or coming in between, which are the Emanationsof one creatureinto another, by which also they act one upon anotherat the greatestdistance;

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and this is the Foundation of all Sympathy and Antipathy which happens in creatures.(Conway 1982, 164) This original and strikingmetaphysicsattempts to account for the internally felt "action"of one being upon another, what Descarteswouldhave labeled a "passion"(Descartes1969, 353-368), by the "Emanationof one creature into another",achieved by "SubtilerPartsintercedingor coming in between." Whateverthe lack of clarityhere, (Conwayholds that this substance has the capacityto be "lessgross"and "lesscorporeal"in some entities, "more gross"and "morecorporeal"in others), it is worth contrastingthis point specifically with Leibniz'scelebratedaccount of the purelyspiritualmonads in TheMonadologie(Leibniz1951, 533-551). One of the chief difficultiesof the Leibnizianaccount of the monadsis, of course,the natureof their effect upon one another, since, as he held, they mirroreach other without directlyinteracting with one another (1951, 534-536). Leibnizwrites of the monads, to the puzzlementand chagrin of futurecommentators: 7. ... The monads have no windows through which anything can enter or depart. The accidents cannot detach themselvesnor go about outside of substances,as did formerly the sensible species of the Schoolmen. Thus neither substancenor accident can enter a monad from the outside .... 13. ... For since every natural change takes place by degrees, . . . 14. ... the passing state . . . is nothing else than what is called perception. . . 17. It must be confessed, moreover,that perceptionand that which depends upon it are inexplicableby mechanical causes. (1951, 534-536) The commentaryon Conway and Leibniz (Merchant 1979, passim)is at this point fairly well developed, so we will simply note that a difficulty in Leibnizianmetaphysics-not to say the Cartesiansystem, with its conundrum of interaction between the two substances, a source of dismayfrom Amauld on down-is handled by Conway in her own systemin such a manner that any questions which are raisedabout the nature of the interaction are at a differentlevel of gravityand at a metaphysicallyless crucial point. Conway also held de re notions of God's essence which enable her to forestall to some extent the sorts of problemsinherent in Leibniz'saccount of God's creation of Judas.5 Leibniznotoriouslyhad held that everythingexists for a reason, and the reasonfor the existence of any one given particularor entity is that the overall plan is such as to yield the most perfect set of compossibles(Couturat1972, 28). Here is Leibnizon the creationof Judas(a

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problematicarea, of course, for Christian theorizingand for the notions of good and evil): For God foreseesfrom all time that there will be a certain Judas, and in the concept or idea of him which God has, is contained this future free act. The only question therefore, which remains is why this certain Judas, the betrayerwho is possible only because of the idea of God, actually exists. To this question, however, we can expect no answer here on earth excepting that it is becauseGod has found it good that he should exist notwithstandingthe sin he foresaw.This will be more than overbalanced.God will derive a greatergood from it, and it will finally turn out that this seriesof events in which is includedthe existence of this sinner, is the most perfect among all the possible series of events. (1951, 333). Leibniz'sview of the deity includesthe difficultythat the deity is supposed to have engaged in ratiocinationwith regardto the set of all compossibles, yet other accountsof the natureof God by rationalistshave held that it is inconsistent with the nature of God and the divine attributesto supposethat God engages in ratiocinaton at all. Conway'sview has the virtue of being moreappealingin the sense that she has a temporalview tied into her overall descriptionof God which saves her from having to give us the notion of a God who weighs and calculates, however ultimately beneficial such weighingsand calculations. Loptsonaids us in coming to gripswith this portion or Conway'sview on God's de re essentialityand its relationshipboth to temporalityand to the notion of God's being a creator: That which does not change is outside time. Change is evidently to be understoodinternally, and not relatively:when God creates a new substance,which from its first appearance undergoeschange, this involves change only in the creature, not in its creator. God in short is immutableand changeless, and therefore outside time. .... Conway'sconclusion-that time is infinite and has always contained created substances-will follow in any case from her view of the essence of God. Forher God is essentially,not merelycreator,but creative, and ubiquitouslyso. .. . Hence there have never not been-according to Conway-created substances. (Conway, Loptson (commentary), 1982, 30-32) As I have assertedat an earlierpoint, Conwayis remarkablein her treatise (which is comparativelyshort in length-approximately 100 printed pages) for the numberof philosophicalpositions to which she makesreferenceand

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in some cases actuallyattemptsto refute. To reiterate,Conwaycites (among major thinkers), Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza and makes some effort (greaterin the case of Hobbes, who, of course, wrote in English)to refuteall three. We have already adumbrated some of the respects in which the Conway metaphysics anticipates that of Leibniz, and we have emphasized Conway'suse of the term "monad"and the fact that Merchant, among others, believes that Leibnizprobablyderivedthis termfrommaterialby Conway which was presentedto him by van Helmont (Merchant 1979, 264-265). In the remainderof the paperI will attempt to show in what waysConwaydiffers from-and intersectsinterestinglywith-Descartes. It is worth mentioning in passing, however, that Loptson, among others, cites as particularly noteworthyConway'sallusionto Spinoza,since his workwasnot well known in Englandat the time and since much of it (the Ethics,for example)was actually published after Conway's death. Loptson hypothesizesthat Conway was familiarwith Spinoza'sTractatusTheologico-Politicus fromher discussions with Henry More. Much of More'sown work was either dedicatedto Anne Conway, or, accordingto some, such a direct outgrowthof his discussions with her that she might be thought to be the authorof majorcomponentsof it (Mackinnon 1969, xiv). II Along with Hobbes, the other chief object of Conway's interest in the Principlesis Descartes.Crudelyspeaking,the largepartof her rebuttalagainst Descartesis apparentfrom the start of her treatise:she is a monist, and Descartes is a dualist. Her idea of matter, as we have alreadyseen, is a form of vitalismwhich encompassesboth spiritand rawmattersimpliciter in the same ontological compound. Descartes,of course, was known for having "clearly and distinctly"perceivedthat mind and matterwere separate,and for having come to the conclusion that his essence was thinking (Descartes1969, 165179). As Merchantand Loptsonboth assert, it is a virtue of Conway'smetaphysics that she has achieved a view which allows for a continuity between humankindand other living creatures(even, to be sure, between living creatures and non-living creatures). There is no clear line of demarcationfor Conway between the human and nonhuman or the living and non-living; rather, ". .. .all Kinds of Creatures may be changed into another . . ." (Conway 1982, 222-224). Thus, although she has a de re view of individual essence (Paul, for example, to employ a personshe utilizesfor such purposes, cannot be changed into another individual.), she-unlike some contemporarythinkers-does not have a de re view of naturalkinds or speciesessence. She holds that, by gradations,a human might be transformedinto a mayfly. Cursorily, she holds that such transformations would be related to the

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amountof grosscorporealityin the individualperson-in other words, some might more readilybe transformedinto mayfliesthan others. Insofaras the Cartesianview is concerned, however, there are other noteworthy points of contrast which might be developed above and beyond the obvious juxtapositionof the two views on the natureof substance. It might proveworthwhileto attemptto constructan epistemologyfor Conway, a feat which is somewhatdifficultto performadequatelybecauseepistemologymust be pulledout of her writings-she is not particularlyexplicit on any epistemic point. But her metaphysicswouldseem to indicate-as it does for most of the rationalists-that there is a naturaland patent linkagebetween her ontology and epistemology,and it does not seem to be strainingunnecessarilyto try to articulatesuch a linkage. In addition, and perhapsmore intrinsicallyinteresting because it is not addressedas fully in much of the secondaryliterature, there seems to be an account of the passionsembeddedin the Principles,and here the comparisonbetween Conwayand Descartesmight be somewhateasier to construct, since Descartes'views on the passionsis spelled out in full, and Conway'sview is at least more developed than her epistemology. To proceedwith mattersepistemological,Descartesheld a view on knowledge and the knowable that tied his epistemologyand metaphysicstogether somewhat more neatly then did Spinoza's,for example. The processionof ideas for Descartes, from "confused"to "adventitious"to "factitious" to "clearand distinct", moves carefullyalong a line from ideasof purelysensory originto ideasacquiredat least partlythroughthe sensesbut which generalize over data and hence are somewhatscientific, to ideaswhich have no sensory admixtureand hence are "clearand distinct" (Descartes1969, passim.)6 In the Meditations,Descartes'systematicdoubt is the method by which he paves the way for a new intellectual perspectivewhich is ultimatelyto yield epistemiccriteria.His two principalcriteriafor knowledgewill come to clarity and distinctness.But it becomes evident by the Third Meditation, if not sooner, that the Cartesiannotions of clear and distinct are related in an interestingmannerto the Cartesianmetaphysics.In a briefpassagein the middle of his attempt to prove the existence of God, Descarteswrites: This idea [the idea of God] is also veryclearand distinct;since all that I conceive clearly and distinctly of the real and true, and of what conveys some perfection, is in its entirety contained in this idea. . . . [and] I should judge that all things which I clearly perceive and in which I know that there is some perfection, and possiblylikewisean infinitudeof properties of which I am ignorant,are in God formallyor eminently; so that the idea which I have of him may become the most true, most clear and most distinct of all the ideas that are in

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my mind. (Descartes 1969, 188-189) Now becauseof God's infinitenessand the emphasisthat Descartesplaces at other points on the notion of a "simple"as related to clarity and distinctness, the precedingpassageand passageslike it have posed some difficulty for Descartesscholars. But we are concerned here with their relationshipto Conway'smetaphysics,and here it is plain that the passagesare helpful and even instructive.ForConway'sontologicalhierarchyis such that, as we have seen, God is the only substancein her hierarchywhich is purelyspiritual,the Adam Kadmon substance having an interesting mixture of spiritual and nonspiritualqualities,and the restof createdbeing containinga much greater admixture of the corporeal.7 As the admixtureof the corporealbecomes greater, and as the beings descend down the ontological hierarchy, it becomes moredifficultto construetheir constituentsand to articulatewhat proportion of which being is corporeal,what spiritual,etc. It is in this sense, I believe, that Conway has given us a beginning epistemology,and nascent epistemicprinciples.For it is clear, althoughConway does not explicitly say so, that for her, too, the idea of God is the most clearlyheld and most articulable idea we possess.The ontological descriptionsof God at the opening of the Principlesare straightforwardand unproblematic;descriptionsof other creaturesat a laterpoint aremuch less so. To quote again, here is the opening of the Principleswith its descriptionof God: 1. God is a Spirit, Light, and Life, infinitely Wise, Good, Just, Mighty, Omniscient, Omnipresent, Omnipotent, Creatorand Makerof all things visible and invisible. (1982, 149) Forpurposesof contrast,here are some passagesfroma much laterpoint in the Principleswhich attempt to contrastanimalsand humankind: And First, let us take an Horse, which is a Creatureindued with divers degreesof perfection by his Creator, as not only strengthof body, but ... a certainkind of knowledge,how he ought to serve his Master, and moreover also Love, Fear, Courage, Memory and divers other Qualities which are in Man: which also we may observe in a Dog, and many other animals. ... Now I demand,unto what higherperfectionand degreeof Goodness, the Being or Essenceof an Horsedoth or may attain afterhe hath done good servicefor his Master,and so performedhis Duty, and what is properfor such a Creature? Is a Horse a mere Fabrickor dead Matter?or hath he a Spirit in him, having Knowledge,Sence and Love, and diversother Facultiesand Propertiesof a Spirit? (1982, 180-181)

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The obvious difficultyConway has here is in articulatingpreciselywhat the proportionsof the vitalist mixturewhich the horsecomprisesactuallyare. Not, of course, that this could be done, even in theory, but this passageand others similarto it supportour notion that Conway'simplicit epistemologyis hierarchical,somewhat like Descartes',but without dependingon his dualism. For Conway, obviously, any ideas we possess of God are among our clearest ideas. Additionally, as we have noted at an earlierpoint, Conway'sphilosophyis remarkablein its account of the effectsof motion or action fromone individual substance-a dog, horse, or person-on another. We had cited this material with regard to the distinction between Leibniz's monadology and Conway's,since it is clear that a problemfor Leibnizis his accountof how the monads"mirror"one another, given that he does not posit direct interaction. Conway, as we have seen, holds that . . . all creatures from the highest to the lowest are inseparablyunited with one another, by means of Subtiler Partsintercedingor coming in between, which arethe Emanations of one creature into another, by which also they act upon one another at the greatest distance; and this is the Foundationof all Sympathyand Antipathy which happens in creatures.(1982, 164) Now Descartes has, of course, an entire work, The Passionsof the Soul, which attempts to account for passionate interactionsbetween individuals. Briefly, Descartesaccounts for the fear we feel when we see a Bengal tiger ahead of us in the grassin Northern India as a movement of animal spirits conveyed throughoutdifferentpartsof the body by the imageor figureof the animal which is imprintedon a portion of the eye. The difficultywith the Passionsis not really a difficultywith Descartes'physiology,for we can certainly make allowancesfor the very little that wasknown aboutthe functioning of the humanbody at that time. Rather, the difficultythat we face in the Passionsis that the question of how the interactionof mind and mattertakes place is never fully resolved (nor, of course, is it ever resolvedelsewhere in Descartes'work, at least accordingto many of the commentators,beginning as earlyas ObjectionsandReplies).Here is Descarteson what takesplace when we see a ferociousanimal: Thus, for example, if we see some animal approachus, the light fromits body reflectstwo imagesof it, one in each of our eyes, and these two imagesform two others, by means of the optic nerves, in the interiorsurfaceof the brainwhich faces its cavities; then from there, by means of the animal spiritswith

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which its cavities are filled, these imagesso radiate..... And, besidesthat, if this figureis verystrangeand frightful-that is, if it has a close relationshipwith the things which have been formerlyhurtfulto the body, that excites the passionof apprehension in the soul and then that of courage.. .. (1969, 363364) It is not that Descartes'account, again, is not in some sense morefully developed than Conway's. It is ratherthat it leaves more difficultsortsof questions open. To try to arguefor at least the partialsuperiorityof Conway'saccount is to offer the following construalof the material:On Descartes'account, everythinghinges on the body/mindinteraction,which is the least developed and most infamouslydifficultportionof his metaphysics.One moves from the optic nerves, for example, to some formof thinking-to utilization of the mind to recognizethe tiger-and also to the "passionof apprehension . . . and then that of courage."It is not clear how this interactionproceeds, and, as I have indicated earlier, this was one of the chief sticking points in Objectionsof both Gassendiand Amauld. On Conway'saccount there is direct action between me and the tiger, (". . . Subtiler parts intercedingor coming in between . . "), and it is not necessaryto wonderhow my mind could interactwith my animalspirits(themselvesaffectedby the imageof the tiger, ex hypothesi),as it is on the Cartesianview. To return once more to the notion of God, both in Descartes and in Conway, there is still anothercomparisonwhich can usefullybe made. To recapitulatebriefly, accordingto Conway we know God innately (1982, 149150). According to her doctrine, the idea of God is the clearestidea we possess. More importantly,perhaps,since we alreadyhave a conception of God which includes his essence and subessences,as Loptsonterms them, we can deduce most of the rest of what we know about being/creationfrom them. We know of Adam Kadmon (as Conway, following the Kabbala,terms Christ) becausehis existence and characteristicsfollow necessarilyboth from the existence of God and the existence of visible creation. We know of the substanceof visible creation-it being, as we have said, both "Corporeal" and "Spiritual," and "inseparably united with one another"-from our knowledgeof Adam Kadmon (Conway 1982, 164). But it is interestingand valuableto compareDescartesand Conway both on the notion of the idea of God and on what can be derivedfromit. In order to performsuch a comparison,we must go into Descartesat greaterlength, delineating the problematicareas, and then utilize Conway'swork for purposes of comparison. We alludedat an earlierpoint to the difficultiescausedfor commentators by Descartes'statementthat ". . . so that the idea that I have of him maybecome the most true, most clear and most distinct of all the ideas that are in

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my mind"(Descartes1969, 188-189). Fromthe Cartesianpoint of view, one wonderswhether or not it is the case that, if Descartes'idea of God is such that "nothing in the world could be more clear or intelligible" (Descartes 1967, 107), it could in some way be said to be the simplestand least complex idea. Preliminarily,one wants to answerwith a solid sort of "no." Descartes describesGod in the Meditationsas the Being in which there is an infinitude of propertiesof which we are ignorant. Certainly, insofaras sheer numbers are concerned, the infinitude of God's propertiesoutweighs any degree of complexitywhich might adhere to a lesserbeing. It is here that the crux of the problematicarea arises:Is God (insofaras he can be known or comprehended at all by the humanmind) most easilydescribedas a concatenationof properties,each of which may be perceivedor apprehendedclearly and distinctly?And can these propertiesthemselvesbe describedas simples?If all of this is the case, it does lend some credenceto the notion that the idea of God as a whole is the most clear and distinct of Descartes'ideas, particularlysince it mustbe rememberedthat it is at least in partthe concept of the greatestdegree of perfection'snecessarilyexisting that makes any idea of God so distinct. But to develop the difficultieswith the Cartesianmaterialalong the lines of merelyone commentatorwhose work is well-known (Kenny), just because I have a clear and distinct idea of x, a clear and distinct idea of y, and a clear and distinct idea of z, it does not follow that I have a clearand distinct idea of x + y + z. It is entirely possiblethat my idea of the concatenationof these three may be less clear and distinct than my idea of any one of them alone (Kenny 1968, 137). Worse still, the idea under considerationhere (that of God) is the idea of a being with an infinite numberof properties.If there is any clarityat all in the concept of infinity, it can only be becausethe concept of infinity is a mathematicalconcept. The idea is clear insofaras the fact that even the mathematicallyunsophisticatedcan graspthat infinity proceedsarithmeticallyis concerned;it is clear that, for every whole numberof which I can think, there is alwaysthat number + 1. But surely, one is tempted to say, this is not what Descartesoriginallymeant. Somehow one senses that the antecedentspiritof "clarityand distinctness"has been violated or not adhered to. To repeat Conway's definition of God one more time, she writes: God is a Spirit, Light, and Life, infinitely Wise, Good, Just, Mighty, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Creatorand Makerof all things visible and invisible. ... In God there is neither Time nor Change, nor Composition, nor Division of Parts:He is

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wholly and universallyone in himself, and of himself, without any manner of variety or Mixture .. . (1982, 149) Now whereas Descartesseems to be at pains to emphasizeGod's properties-and it is this emphasiswhich creates some of the difficultieswith the notion of "clarity"and "distinctness"of the idea of God-Conway prefersto emphasizeGod's unity. It mayperhapsbe the case that, were she philosophically pressed,Conway'saccount of God wouldbecome somewhatmore simito go on, and we can larto Descartes'.But, again, we have only the Principles there some small extrapolashe has written and what perform only analyze tion. To be fair, Descartesno doubtdelineatesGod'spropertiescarefullyso as to be in a better position to bolsterother argumentswhich he makeson the nature of humankind, for example. (In the Sixth Meditation,for instance, one needs to be assuredof God's goodnessso that one can have more confidence in the informationimpartedto the senses.) But this merelyunderscores our overallpoint. BecauseConwaydoes not emphasizeGod'spropertiesin an enumerativesense (although, as I have indicated, it might be possiblefor her to do this, since goodnessand wisdom, amongothers, are listed), difficulties with the innatenessof a complex idea, or with the clarityof such an idea, do not occur. In its metaphysicalsimplicity, Conway'sconception of God more closely resemblesPlato'sFormof the Good than it does the Cartesianconception of God, particularlysince she specifiesthat He is ". . . wholly and universallyone in himself, and of himself, without any manner or variety or Mixture ... .." Thus, although the epistemologicalquestion of what, precisely, constitutes the knowledgeof God is certainlyclearerand less fraught with difficultyin Conway'saccount of God, it is again along the lines of the sortsof difficultywe have with Plato'snotion of the Good-we would like to know more about it. The second majorpoint of comparisonbetween Descartes'alembicatedaccount of God and Conway'sis with regardto what one can derivefromit. On this score Conway'smetaphysicsseems at once clearerand more consistent, although it is not, of course, nearly as thoroughlydeveloped as Descartes'. One must, of course,be just and repeatthe caveat implicitat an earlierpoint: the body of Descartes'work (or, for that matter, Leibniz'or Spinoza's)is so much greaterthat it seems, on the one hand, unfairto makethe comparison. But comparisoncan and shouldbe made, since to slight Conwaywith the excuse that the Principlesis not fully developed enough to be comparedto, for example, the Meditations,is to simply repeat the injuryhistoricallydone to women philosophers.We must utilize the availablematerialand try to infer what else, consistent with the availablematerial, springsfrom it. From Descartes'account of God alone, little can be derived. The metaphysicalproblemsinherent in trying to squarehis account of God with the rest of creationare more analogousto those we cited with regardto Leibnizat

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an earlier point. Although he does not go into the problem in any depth, Descartesimplicitlyseems to be saying (a la Leibniz)that God possessesthe capacity for decision-making,ratiocination, and so forth, and that He decided to create the world as it is, so to speak, because it affordsthe greatest amount of good (Fifth Meditation).Nor can we derive any notion of what, necessarily,God creates from Descartes'account, since there is a complete ontological break between the substance that is God and any other substance. Stating the mattercrudely, Descartesseems to be given to complete breaks,as it were, since the breakor split between matterand spirit is itself another instance of this same sort of theorizing.Conway solves the problem of the ontological relation between God and the rest of creation by gradations, as we have seen at an earlierpoint with the brief contrastto the work of Leibniz.All the rest of creation proceedsby gradations,which mimic the gradationbetween God, Adam Kadmon, and rest of created things. If this still leaves the natureof the relationshipproblematic-as it does-it leaves us with what we might be inclined to dub a more holistic account, since there is at least a hierarchicalrelationshipimplicit in what she postulates. In Descartes'ontology one senses no such line of interactionor gradationbetween postulated entities. More importantly, one can derive in Conway, deductively, the restof creationfromthe existence of God, since (as Loptsonso admirablysummarizes) God in short is immutableand changeless, and thereforeoutside time .... Conway's conclusion-that time is infinite and has always contained created substances-will follow in any case from her view of the essence of God. Forher God is essentially, not merelycreator,but creative, and ubiquitously so. ... Hence there have never not been-according to Conway-created substances. (Conway, commentary, 1982, 30-32) To arguebrieflyfor Conway, this might be thought, in a preliminaryfashion, to have bettered Descartes'account in the followingsense: since God is de re creator, creation flows from Him with no necessity for ratiocination. Thus one metaphysicalproblemis disposedof. And since there is the obvious hierarchyfromGod to Adam Kadmonand the restof createdthings, the separatenessand splitting that plague the Cartesiansystemare, at least on first view, eliminated. In sum, then, points of contrastbetween Conwayand Descartes,for example, are not nearlyas preciselystated fromher perspectiveas one would like, and hence the contemporarycommentatormust extrapolate. But there are manyfruitfulpoints of comparison,both between Conwayand Descartesand Conway and other rationalists,if one is willing to grant that certain sorts of views seem to follow naturallyfrom the explicitly stated Conway ontology.

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That Conway anticipatedLeibnizis now acknowledgedin the literatureand has received fairlyextensive comment. What should be acknowledged,I argue, are the varioussortsof waysin which Conwaycan usefullybe contrasted with the other majorseventeenth century rationalists. III Throughoutthis paperI have endeavoredto develop a view of the philosophy of Anne Conway which would enable us to see her as a philosopher workingwithin a certain traditionof her own time, a traditionwhich we acknowledge to have two strands,broadlyspeaking. The first is its Christian heritage, which neverthelessis much less orthodox in Conwaythan in some other thinkers, at least partially,one hypothesizes,becauseof her extensive use of the Kabbalaas a source (Merchant, 1979, passim;Coudert, 1975, passim). The second is, of course, the tradition of rationalism, of which Conway is a very worthy proponent. I have chosen to contrast Conway largelywith Descartessince there is alreadyan extensive commentaryon his workand since Conway has specificallycited him as a thinkerwhom she attemptsto refutein the Principles.Somewhatheretically,I have triedto go beyond the obvious sort of contrastbetween Conway and Descarteson the notion of substance (which is well developed, in any case, by Loptson) to a broaderset of contrasts, includingelements of epistemologyand an account of what was then referredto as the "passions."Necessarily, one goes somewhat beyond the text here, but Conway'stext implicitlyasks us to do that. In any case, it is clear that Conway was an originaland incisive philosopher of her time, whose work, as has alreadybeen acknowledged,influenced Henry More, anticipatedLeibniz, and was in stated disagreementwith that other English-languagephilosopher, Hobbes.8 MerchantdescribesConway as a woman whose " ... ideas, praisedand respectedin her own day, have been almostforgottenin ours".(1979, 255). In ourendeavorto celebrateand rememberwomen philosophers,we can do no better than to take specialnote of Anne Conway, whose erudition and knowledge were so great that they were even acknowledgedby seventeenth centurymen. NOTES 1. In additionto Merchant,see Fraserand Coudert. Fraseris superbat placingConway in intellectual context, and Coudertprovidesan illuminatingcommentaryon the Judaicsourcesutilized by Conway. 2. All of the commentatorsand literaturecited attest to this fact, and to the rarenatureof their friendship.See Powicke (1926), Lichtenstein (1962) and Mackinnon (1969). 3. See Conway, (1982, 30-31). Loptson is especially careful with the technically difficult points of modalityin Conway, many of which bearcomparisonwith today'sworkon modal topics.

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4. Cf. Fraser(1985, 352-353), points out Conway'sgoal of unifyingChristianbeliefsand the new science. Cf. also Conway, (1982, 164 and 43-46 of commentary). 5. This particularpassagefrom the "Discourseon Metaphysics"is frequentlycited as a paradigm elucidationof the problemof the existence of evil. These aspectsof Leibniz'sworkare the very aspectswhich gave rise to the Voltaireansatire. (Leibniz(1951, 333) 6. Descartes'epistemologycan be developed using the Meditationsand Discoursealone, although there are also hints of it in the Rules. 7. See Conway (1982, passim).Loptsonfeels that she would insist that angels, etc., arepurely spiritual,but she does not discusssuch beings in any detail. 8. Moreis said to have remarkedthat he " . . turnedto her, as naturallyas the needle tumes North." (Lichtenstein 1962, 15) * I wouldliketo acknowledge thegenerosityof the Universityof California,SantaBarbaraGraduate Schoolof Education,whereworkon therationalists,particularly Leibniz,was donein connectionwith DOE (OSERS) Grant G0083/03651. Additionalthanksare due to Noel Fleming,membersof his Spring1985 seminaron Leibniz,and to offshootsof EasternSWIP,wherefruitfuldiscussionof thedoctrinesof Spinozaand Descartes,in particular,was hadfor a periodof manyyears.We al owe a debtof gratitudeto AntoniaFraserand CarolynMerchantfor bringingAnne Conwayto thefore again.

REFERENCES

Conway, Anne. 1982. Principlesof themostancientandmodemphilosophy,Peter Loptson, ed. The Hague: MartinusNijhoff. Coudert,Allison. 1975. A cambridgeplatonist'skabbalistnightmare.Journal of the historyof ideas36 (4): 634-652. Couturat, Louis. 1972. On Leibniz'smetaphysics.In Leibniz:a collectionof criticalessays, HarryG. Frankfurt,ed. Garden City, NY: Anchor. Descartes, Rene. 1967. The philosophicalworksof Descartes, Elizabeth S. Haldaneand G.R.T. Ross, eds. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Descartes,Rene. 1969. The essentialDescartes,MargaretD. Wilson, ed. New York:New American Library. Fraser,Antonia. 1985. The weakervessel.New York:Vintage Books. Kenny, Anthony. 1968. Descartes:a studyof hisphilosophy.New York:Random House. Leibniz, Wilhelm Gottfried. 1951. Leibniz:selections,Philip P. Wiener, ed. New York:Charles Scribner'sSons. Lichtenstein, Aharon. 1962. HenryMore:therationaltheologyof a Cambridge Platonist.Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press. Mackinnon, FloraIsabel, ed. 1969. Philosophical writingsof HenryMore.New York:AMS Press. Merchant, Carolyn. 1979. The vitalism of Anne Conway: Its impact on Leibniz'sconcept of the monad. In Journalof the historyof philosophy27 (3): 255-270. Nicolson, MarjorieHope. 1930. The Conway letters:The correspondence of Anne ViscountessConway,HenryMoreandtheirfriends,1642-1684. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.

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Parkinson,G.H.R. 1954. Spinoza'stheoryof knowledge.Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press. Powicke, F.J. 1926. The CambridgePlatonists.London:F.M. Dent & Son. de Spinoza, Benedict. 1955. On theimprovement R.H.M. of theunderstanding, Elwes, ed. New York:Dover.

DamarisCudworthMasham: A Seventeenth Century Feminist Philosopher LOIS FRANKEL

The daughterof RalphCudworth,andfriendof JohnLocke,DamarisMasham in herown right.Shepublishedtwo, philosophical was also a philosopher books,A and the of Love God Occasional Thoughts In Discourse Concerning Referenceto a Virtuousand ChristianLife. Her primarypurposewas to refute doctrinethatwe oughtto loveonly God becauseonly JohnNorris'Malebranchian God can give us pleasure,and his criticismof Locke.In addition,she arguesfor for women,and an end to thedoublestandardin greatereducationalopportunities sexualmorality.Recentfeministliteraturehassuggestedthatwomenandmenmay standsbasedon differences betweenthe 'fetakedifferentethicalandepistemological maleexperience',and the 'maleexperience'.Whileleavingasidequestionspertaining to theaccuracyof thesesuggestions,thispaperdiscussessomeaspectsof Masham's thoughtwhichmightbe consideredrepresentative of the 'femaleexperience.' DamarisCudworthlived fromJanuary18, 1659 to April 20, 1708. She was the daughterof RalphCudworth,a prominentmemberof the CambridgePlatonist school, who authoreda lengthy but unfinishedtreatise,The TrueIntellectualSystemof theUniverse,a criticismof atheistic determinism.He had intended, but never accomplished, the addition of a criticism of Calvinism. This opposition to Calvinism, combined with opposition to Hobbes, were central features of Cambridge Platonist philosophy. In addition, the Cambridge Platonists held that God is essentially rational and that true Christiansought to emulate that rationality.They held also (as did Leibniz) that God should be adjudgedgood based on its works, rather than God's works being considered good just because God performedthem. Many of these views, as we shall see, play important roles in Damaris Cudworth Masham'swork. Though denied access to higher education, as were all women of her time, Damaris Cudworth grew up accustomed to philosophical discourse. She sharedmany philosophicalviews with her father and many with Locke (indeed, often the two men'sviews were compatible)and frequentlywrotein defense of both their views (Passmore,91).1 Her relationshipwith Locke was Hypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring1989)? by LoisFrankel

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close, and was personalas well as philosophical.They had enjoyed a romantic attachmentpriorto her marriageto Sir FrancisMashamin 1685, and continued a close friendshipthereafter.It was at the Mashamhome, Oates, that Lockeended his days in 1704, having been a residentbeginning 1691. Locke wrote admiringlyof Masham: The lady herself is so well versed in theological and philosophical studies, and of such an original mind, that you will not find many men to whom she is not superiorin wealth of knowledge and ability to profit by it. Her judgmentis excellent, and I know few who can bring such clearnessof thought to bear upon the most abstrusesubjects, or such capacityfor searchingthroughand solving the difficultiesof questionsbeyond the range, I do not say of most women, but even of most learnedmen. Fromreading,to which she once devoted herself with much assiduity,she is now to a greatextent debarredby the weaknessof her eyes, but this defect is abundantlysupplied by the keenness of her intellect (Boure II, 213).2 During Locke's residency, the household was visited by Isaac Newton (Bourne II, 219), with whom Mashamand Locke discussedthe Bible, and FrancisMercuryVan Helmont (Cranston, 374), the latter a close friendof Anne Conway, authorof ThePrinciples of theMostAncientandModemPhilosophy, and a strong influence on Leibniz.3Although there is no direct evidence that Conway'sworkwas discussedin Van Helmont'svisit, it is not unlikely that it was. Mashamhad at least a passingacquaintancewith Conway's workthroughLeibniz,who mentions Conway in passingto Mashamin a letter of December 14/25 1703 (Gerhardt III, 337). Additionally, Ralph Cudworth'sfellow CambridgePlatonist Henry More was a close friend of Conway's.4 1. FAITHAND REASON

Masham'sworks include A DiscourseConcerningthe Loveof God (1696, a replyto John Norris'PracticalDiscourses),OccasionalThoughtsin referenceto a Virtuous or Christian Life (1705), and correspondence with Locke and Leibniz. Mashamwrote to Locke on April 7, 1688 in praiseof an abridgement of Locke'sEssay,which he had recentlypublishedin orderto elicit criticism and interestin the full work. Mashamapologizedfor her limited knowledge of philosophy, mentioning her poor eyesight and that she had been discouragedfromreadingphilosophicalbooks. It is unclearwhetherthis discouragementwas solely on the groundsof her failing sight, or becausethose who discouragedher consideredsuch readingunsuitablefor her. Nevertheless, in agreementwith her father'sposition on the issue, she challengedLocke'sde-

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nial of innate ideas, suggestingthat his differencewith those who believed in such ideas was not 'reallyso great as it seems,' becausethe proponentsof innate ideashad not claimedthat specificideaswere innate, but only that there was 'an active sagacityin the soul' (Cranston, 300).5 Masham'scorrespondencewith Leibnizprimarilyaddressedmetaphysical subjects, including Leibniz'sPre-EstablishedHarmony, the relationshipbetween mind and body, freewill, Cudworth'saccountof "plasticnatures."She also mentioned frequentlyher friendshipwith Locke, whose "direction"she credited for the successfulupbringingof her son (GerhardtIII, 365).6 She had sent Leibniza copy of her father'sThe TrueIntellectualSystemof the Universe, writing that "The esteem you expressfor that work pleases me very much . . . and . .. it is a new confirmationto me of the worth of that performance"(GerhardtIII, 337).7 While Masham had some interest in metaphysics, as we have noted above,8her writingsemphasizedChristiantheology, epistemology,and moral philosophy. On this score, her interests included the relationshipbetween faith and reasonand the question of the moralityof worldlypursuits.In particular, Masham wished in OccasionalThoughtsto support Locke against Stillingfleet9on the relative meritsof reasonand revelation. Stillingfleethad claimed that Locke upheld reason at the expense of revelation: Your answer is, That your Method of Certainty by Ideas, shakes not at all, nor in the least concerns the Assuranceof Faith. Against this I have pleaded. 1. That your Method of Certaintyshakesthe Beliefof Revelation in general.2. That it shakes the Belief of Particular Propositions or Articles of Faith, which depend upon the Sense of Words contained in Scripture.10 In his chapter "Of Enthusiasm"(EssayIV.xix, added in the fourth edition), Locke decries "enthusiasm,"the rejectionof reasonin favorof revelation, as an attitude which takes away both reason and revelation, and substitutesin the room of them the ungroundedfancies of a man's own brain, and assumesthem for a foundationboth of opinion and conduct. (EssayVI. xix. 3) Locke adds that reason and revelation are not so opposedas the enthusiasts believe, but are insteadclosely related, reasonbeing "naturalrevelation"and revelation"naturalreasonenlargedby a new set of discoveriescommunicated by God immediately"(EssayIV. xix. 4). While genuine revelation is absolutely true and certain, he continues, we must first be certain of having received a revelation, and such certaintymust be more than "ungroundedpersuasion"of our own minds (EssayIV. xix. 11). It mustat least "beconforma-

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ble to the principlesof reason"or be attendedwith some outwardsign of revelation, such as a miracle (EssayIV. xix. 14). Writing in supportof Locke, Mashamreiterateshis claims that revelation may provide rationalgroundsfor belief (1705, 34), but that reason must be employed in order to determine whether a revelation has indeed occurred. Absurditiesmustbe denied the statusof revelation,forno revelationcould be contrary to reason (1705, 35). In this position, she is in accord with the CambridgePlatonist view that God is essentially rational and that good Christiansought to emulate that rationality. Mashamarguesfurtherthat a preferencefor revelation alone over revelation scrutinizedby reason would lead people to consider Christianityto be unreasonable,resultingeither in the rejectionof reasonin favorof faith ("enthusiasm")or in the rejection of faith in favorof reason:skepticism.Nevertheless, she arguesin OccasionalThoughtsthat religionprovidesthe only sufficient supportfor virtue, basedon anticipationof divine rewardand fearof divine punishment(1705, 14-5). Although manyof the Christianrulesof morality are, she thinks, derivablefrom reason and the "light of nature,"our passionswill tend to overwhelmus without the steadyinginfluenceof religion and a "rationalfearof God," "experienceshowingus that naturallight, unassisted by revelation, is insufficientto the ends of naturalreligion"(1705, 55-

6). Religion has, I think, been rightlydefined to be theknowledge howto pleaseGod, and thus taken, does necessarilyincludevira farther tue, that is to say MoralRectitude(1705, 84).... to men's the law of nature, by virtue of obeying impediment the mere light of nature;which is, that they cannot, in all circumstances, without revelation, make alwaysa just estimate in referenceto their happiness. (1705, 103) However, in orderto believe that a deity can guide our actions and influence their consequences, we must have solid evidence for religiousbeliefs (1705, 16). Therefore, Mashamobjects, (perhapsfollowing her father'sopposition to dogmatismll) to mere rote teaching of catechism (1705, 18ff). If studiedonly by rote, she argues,the pronouncementsof religion often seem contraryto commonsense (1705, 20). But Christianityshouldnot seem to be teaching doctrines contraryto reason, for the discoveryof its (seeming) absurdityleadspeople to doubt the reasonabilityof religion. Mashamaddsthat women are especiallysusceptibleto this doubt, not having the advantageof education to overcome the "ignoranceor errorsof their childhood" (1705, 21).

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ANDREASON 2. WOMEN,EDUCATION, When examining the worksof long-ignoredwomen philosophers,particularly those women who lived duringtimes when philosophywas considered an inappropriateoccupationfor women, one is moved to look for evidence of feminist attitudes. One first looks for such fairlyobvious indicationsas protests about women'slot in life. These aboundin Masham'swork, as we shall see in this section. In addition, we might seek more subtle manifestationsof feminism, dependingon what we count as feminism:Is it meaningful,for example, to speakof epistemology,ethics, theology, or metaphysicsas capable of being informedby feminism?Much contemporarywork in feministphilosophy suggeststhat it is indeed meaningfulto speak in such terms. Without addressing that issue directly, we will consider in Section 3 how such a broaderinterpretationof feminism might shed light on Masham'swork. Explicitly feminist claims are found in several of Masham'sarguments: First,she objects to the inferioreducationaccordedwomen, but primarilyon the grounds that such inferior education (a) makes them unfit to educate their children properly and (b) conduces to impiety in women and their children. Impietyoccursbecause those not properlyeducatedwill believe in Christianityout of habit, or rote, ratherthan out of understandingand therefore will be unable to defend their faith againstany doubtswith which they may be confronted. For if Christianitybe a religion from God, and women have souls to be saved as well as men; to know what this religion consists in, and to understandthe groundson which it is to be received, can be no more than necessary knowledge to a woman, as well as to a man: Which necessaryknowledge is sufficientto enable any one so farto answerto the opposersor corruptersof Christianity. . . (1705, 166) Although by late 20th century standardsMasham'sbrandof feminism is weak indeed, we must considerthe extreme antifeministtimes in which she lived. Masham laments the fact that women of her time were discouraged fromintellectualendeavors.Being barredfromformalhighereducationwas a majorimpedimentwhich she herselfmust have felt deeply. Youngwomen of the upperclasses were kept busy with social diversions,so that they had no time to spend on the improvement of their understanding (1705, 151). About women of other classes, Mashamunfortunatelyhas nothing to say. However they were obviously barredfrom intellectual activity also. Even though Mashamherselfwas encouragedin her studiesby Locke, Leibniz,and her father, it appearsto have been the sortof indulgent,patemalisticencouragement given by leamed men to exceptional women of leisure. In general, however, she notes that women are dependenton the good opinions of men,

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andblamesthe attitudesof menwho,forthe mostpart,werenot overfondof learningthemselves,andthusthreatenedby educatedwomen,forthis sorry stateof affairs: of reason,howeverrequisiteto ladiesfor The improvements their accomplishment,as rationalcreatures;and however needfulto themfor the well educatingof theirchildren,and to theirbeingusefulin theirfamilies,yet arerarelyanyrecommendationof them to men; who foolishly thinking, that moneywill answerto all things,do, forthe mostpart,regard nothingelse in the womanthey wouldmarry:andnot often findingwhatthey do not look for, it wouldbe no wonderif theiroffspringshouldinheritno moresensethan themselves ... .girls, betwixtsillyfathersandignorantmothers,aregenerallyso broughtup, that traditionary opinionsareto them, all theirlives long, insteadof reason.(1705, 162) Thus wretchedlydestituteof all that knowledgewhichthey ought to have, are (generallyspeaking)our Englishgentlemen:And beingso, whatwondercan it be, if they like not thatwomenshouldhaveknowledge; forthis is a qualitythat willgivesomesortof superiority evento thosewhocarenot to have it? (1705, 174) As forotherscience,it is believedso improper for, andis indeedso littleallowedthem,thatit is not to be expectedfrom them: but the cause of this is only the ignoranceof men. (1705, 169) In addition,Mashamobjectsto the doublestandardof moralityimposed on womenandmen,andespeciallyto the claimthatwomen's'virtue'consists in chastity(1705, 21). Mashamobjectsto thisas insufficient,seeprimarily ing chastityas a low-levelnecessarycondition,withoutwhich a woman wouldbe "contemptible" (1705, 22), andopposesits beingconsidered"the chiefmerit[women]arecapableof having"(1705, 22). To regardchastityin thisway,she argues,lowerswomen'sself-esteemor (justifiably) makesthem thinkmenunjust.Shealsopointsoutthatbeingover-proud of one'schastity, whileignoringothervirtues,leadsto conceit.Chastityshouldnot be consideredsolelya woman'svirtue,but a sacreddutyforbothsexes: Chastity(forexample)is, accordingto the Gospel,a dutyto bothsexes,yet a transgression herein,evenwiththe aggravation of wronginganotherman, and possiblya whole family talkedas lightlyof, as if it wasbuta pecthereby,is ordinarily

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cadillo in a young man, although a far less criminal offense againstduty in a maidshall in the opinion of the samepersons brandher with perpetualinfamy:The nearestrelationsoften times are hardly brought to look upon her after such a dishonor done by her to their family;whilst the fault of her more guilty brother finds but a very moderatereprooffrom them; and in a little while, it may be, becomes the subjectof their mirth and raillery.And why still is this wrongplaced distinction made, but becausethere aremeasuresof living established by men themselves according to a conformity, or disconformity with which, and not with the preceptsof Jesus Christ, their actions are measured,and judgedof? (1705, 155) Here Mashamhas remindedthe readerthat conventional moraland religious teaching is not alwaysin accordwith rationalChristianity.True virtue is action in accordwith "rightreason"and the Gospel, which are "one and the same, differentlypromulged"(1705, 97-8), not the exact observanceof custom or civil institutions (1705, 96). Virtue is not just following the rules, as religion is not just reciting the catechism. Both requirethe properemployment of the understanding. AND MORALPHILOSOPHY 3. EPISTEMOLOGY, FEMINISM,

It has been arguedrecentlyby Nancy Chodorow(1978) and CarolGilligan (1982) that the 'maleexperience'resultingfromchild-rearingpracticesin our society encouragesmales to define their masculinityin terms of separation and detachment, while the same practices result in a 'female experience' which encouragesfemalesto define themselves in termsof relation and connection. These self-definitions,Gilligan argues,shapeour morallife, females tending to make decisions in terms of relationships,males in terms of rules and abstractions.12Nancy Holland (1986) has extended these theories to epistemology,pointing out the atomistic structureof Locke'sepistemology, where simple ideas are combined to form all other ideas, including ideas of substanceand of relations, and abstractgeneralideas. Hollandsees this as exemplifying the "repressionof relation and connection that Chodorow describesas characteristicof male experience"(1986, 4). While I am not entirelyconvinced of the Chodorow/Gilliganthesis (the claim of a universal'female experience' and 'male experience' is supportedprimarilyby anecdotal evidence and psychoanalytic theory), it nevertheless suggests criteria for identifyingfeminine,' if not necessarilyfeminist approachesto philosophy. Accordingly, we can now look for examplesof appealto relation and rejection of atomism;and we do indeed find some in Masham'swork.

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The Discourseon theLoveof God, Masham'sother publishedbook, is a reof sponseto John Norris'PracticalDiscourses,the latterbasedon the Principles Malebranche.Mashamparticularlyobjectsto Norris'claim that we ought not to love creaturesat all, because doing so is incompatiblewith loving God. She arguesthat love of creaturesis a necessarypre-requisiteto the love of God, that Norris'and Malebranche'sargumentsare insufficientand even injuriousto piety, and that one can love creaturesand God without any incompatibility. In this passage,Mashamrespondsto Norris'claims (indicated by Masham'sitalics): But another reason, besides the narrownessof our capacities, Why we cannotdivideour love between God and the creature, is, becausewe cannotloveeitherof them,butuponsucha principle as mustutterlyexcludetheloveof theother;which is thus offered to be made out: We mustnot loveany thingbutwhatis our true Good: Therecan be but one thingthatis so: And thatmustbe eitherGod, or the creature, What is our True Good, he tells us is that which can both deserveand rewardour love. But certainlywhatever is a good to us, is a truegood;once whateverpleasesus, pleasesus:And our love, which he says is to be deservedand rewarded,is nothing else but that dispositionof mind, which we find in our selves towardsany thing with which we are pleased. So that to tell us, that we must not love any thing but what is our True [Good];Is as much as to say, that we must not be pleasedwith anything but what pleases us; which it is likely we are not in dangerof. (1696, 89-90) Here we see Mashampoking fun at Norris and objecting to his dualistic and atomistic thinking with regardto the sharingof love between God and creatures.The love of God and of creaturesis not so separableas Norrishad claimed;indeed, she argues,the love of God is basedon the love of creatures. Masham'sposition could, by the criteriadiscussedabove, be consideredfeminist because it rejects separationin favor of connection. Male philosophershave traditionallyassociatedwomen with nature, the earth, the body, and everydayor 'worldly'things in general,while associating men with God, the spirit, and 'otherworldly'things. One formof feministresponse (and my own preference)is to reject such dualistic stereotypes;another, which Mashamembracesto a limited extent, without identifyingit as a feministmove, is to rehabilitatethe so-calledfemaleside of the dichotomy, rejecting some of the more austerevalues embeddedin patriarchalsystems. Mashamobjects to any strongproscriptionsagainst loving 'the world,' arguing that only' inordinate'love of the worldconflicts with our duty to God.

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Here she is in accordwith her father'semphasison the virtuesof "the good of the system"and "public-spiritedness"-thesocial life, as opposedto the contemplative life advocatedby Norris (Passmore1951, 79). [S]uch declamationsas are sometimes made against pleasure absolutely(not the irregularpursuitof it) as if pleasurewas in its own nature, a false, and deceitful, not a realand solid good, have produced this ill effect, that many from the absurdity hereof are confirmedin an evil indulgenceof their appetites, as if to gratifythese was indeed the truestwisdomof a rational creature. . . (Masham 1705, 79) That happiness consisting in pleasure, we are so much the happier as we enjoy more pleasure must unquestionablybe found true;but that the gratificationof men's desiresand appetites cannot thereforebe that which should always,as they arerationalagents, determine,or regulatetheir actions in pursuit of happiness, is no less evident; in that we perceive our selves, and the things to which we have relation, to be so framed, and constituted in respect one of another, that the gratificationof our present desires and appetites, does sometimes for a short, or smallpleasure,procureto us a greaterand more durablepain. (1705, 75) . . . the love of pleasureimplantedin us (if we faithfullypursue it in preferringalwaysthat which will, on the whole, procure to us the most pleasure)can never misleadus fromthe observanceof the law of reason:and that this law enjoins only a right regulationof our naturaldesireof pleasure,to the end of our obtaining the greatesthappinessthat we are capableof: so that there is an inseparableconnection, or relation of moral good and evil, with our naturalgood, and evil. (1705, 77-8) Finally, rejectingthe patriarchalpreferencefor purepower (activity is preferredto passivity, existence to nonexistence, strengthto weakness, rigidity to flexibility), Mashamarguesthat God is not to be loved simplybecauseit is our creator, and more powerfulthan we, but because God is good and the source of our happiness. Mere existence is not necessarilya good thing, for the damnedand many unhappypeople in this worlddo not considerit so. It is more reasonable,therefore, to worshipthe author of our happinessthan the author of our mere existence (1696, 62-3). Thus, things in this world must be worthyof love in orderthat their creator,which must be more perfect than its creations,13may be worthy of our greatestlove (1696, 64). In

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other words,worshipand love are due to a creatoronly if it uses its powerfor our benefit, not simply on the groundsthat it has power over us: ForGod as powerful(which is all we shouldknow of him, consideredbarelyas a creator)is no morean object of love than of hate, or fear; and is truly an object only of admiration. It seems thereforeplain, that if any could be without the love of the creatures,they would be without the love of God also:For as by the existence of the creatures,we come to know there is a creator;so by their loveliness it is that we come to know that of their author, and to love him. (1696, 64-5) Any assessmentof the claim that the positions discussedin this section constitute a feminist approachto the issuesinvolved, or representa particularly'feminine'perspective,dependson the assessmentof somethinglike the Chodorow/Gilliganthesis, i.e. that Masham'spositions represent 'female' value-systemsin oppositionto those of the male establishment.That task requires more discussion than is possible here. Nevertheless, it is clear that Masham'scalls for improvededucationfor women and an end to the double standardregardingchastity representat least a limited feminist orientation. And perhapsthat is the most that we can expect froma womanof the seventeenth century.

NOTES 1. Passmore comments in a footnote that Masham wrote to Bayle to defend her father againstthe claim that his views led to atheism. Passmoreaddsthat the belief that Mashamabandoned her father'stheories to take up those of Locke is a resultof ignoranceof Cudworth'sunpublishedwork. 2. Citing MSS in the Remonstrants'Library:Locke to Limborch,March 13, 1690-1. 3. See my chapteron Conway in MaryEllen Waithe (ed), A Historyof WomenPhilosophers, Vol. II; Forthcoming,MartinusNijhoff. 4. She employedwith their son some of Locke'seducationalmethods, apparentlywith great success. Replying to Molyneux, who wrote in praise of Locke's educational methods on Molyneux'sson, Locke writes: [Masham'sson], but nine yearsold in June last, has learntto readand write verywell is now readingQuintus Curtiuswith his mother, understandsgeographyand chronology very well and the Coperican systemof our vortex, is able to multiplywell and divide a little, and all this without ever having had one blow for his book. (BourneII 267, citing 'FamiliarLetters,'p. 57, Locke to William Molyneux, August 28, 1693) 5. Citing B.L. MSS. Locke, c.17, f. 154. 6. To Leibniz, November 24, 1704. 7. To Leibniz, March 29, 1704. 8. See her correspondencewith Leibniz, GerhardtIII, 333-375. 9. See Christophersen,41-2. 10. Answerto Mr. Locke'ssecond Letter;whereinhis Notion of Ideasis prov'dto be Inconsistent with it self, and with the Articles of the ChristianFaith. London, printedbyJ.H. for Henry Mortlock, etc. MDCXCVIII,pp. 178 in 8vo, p. 65; quoted in Christophersen,41-2.

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11. Passmore,81. 12. Gilligan, 100, cited by Nancy Holland, "Genderand the Generic in Locke",presentedat the Pacific Division meeting of the American PhilosophicalAssociation, March, 1986 13. Mashamshares this principle with the Platonists.

REFERENCES

de Beer, E. S. 1976. The correspondence of John Locke. (vol. 2). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bourne, Henry RichardFox. 1969. The lifeof JohnLocke.(2 vols.). London: Scientia Verlag Aalen. Chodorow,Nancy. 1978. The reproduction of mothering.Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress. to thestudyof John introduction Christophersen,H. 0. 1968. A bibliographical Locke.New York:Burt Franklin. Cranston, Maurice. 1957. JohnLocke:A biography.New York:MacMillan. Gerhardt, C. I., ed. 1875-90. Die philosophischen Schriftenvon Leibniz. (7 vols.). Berlin. Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a differentvoice. Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press. Holland, Nancy. 1986, March. Genderand the genericin Locke.Paperpresented at the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Los Angeles, CA. of RalphCudworth:A studyof thetrue Lowrey,CharlesE. 1894. Thephilosophy intellectualsystemof the universe.New York:Phillips and Hunt. Locke, John. 1959. An essay concerninghumanunderstanding.Alexander CampbellFraser,ed. (2 vols.). New York:Dover. Masham,Damaris. 1696. A discourseconcerningthe loveof God. London:A. and J. Churchil at the Black-Swanin Paternoster-Row. Masham,Damaris.1705. Occasionalthoughtsin referenceto a virtuousor christianLife. London:A. and J. Churchilat the Black-Swanin PaterosterRow. Passmore, John A. 1951. RalphCudworth:An interpretation.Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Anna

Doyle

Wheeler

(1785-1848):

Philosopher,Socialist, Feminist* MARGARET McFADDEN

This essay examinesthe life and workof early socialistthinkerAnna Doyle Wheeler,who, with the OwenitetheoristWilliamThompson,was authorof The Appeal of One Half the Human Race, Women, Against the Pretentionsof the Other Half, Men . . . (1825). In analyzingherthought,I employa typoloproposedby Michele of a feministconsciousness gicalmodelfor the development andEleniVarikas(1986). Theseauthorspositthreetypesof a feminist Riot-Sarcey "pariah" consciousness: 1) exceptional woman feminism 2) subversive feminism, and 3) collective feminism. WithinthisframeworkAnna Wheeler falls betweenpositionsone and two; she was an exceptionalor tokenwomanwho neverthelessadvocatedsubversivefeministdoctrinesof radicalchange,including didnot participate).The callsfor collectivefemaleaction(in whichshenonetheless to WilliamThompsonas ends with a discussion Wheeler's relationship essay of to traditional that woman's access is, througha male philosophy, exampleof mentor.

I. INTRODUCTION Michele Riot-Sarceyand Eleni Varikashave recently developed a very intriguingmodel of the processby which feministconsciousnesscomes to exist. Taking as examples France in the period of the 1848 Revolution and late nineteenth centuryGreece, they arguethat, over a periodof time, a growing awarenessof exclusion develops among women. This is broughton by 1) a disintegrationof traditionalsocio-economicstructuresand a relative absence of women in powerpositions in the new society;2) a post-revolutionarysociety supposedly based on universal ideals; 3) a decline in the position of women, relative to the evolution of the rightsof men; and 4) a growthin ed* An earlierversion of this paperwas presentedat the Third InternationalInterdisciplinary

Congresson Women, TrinityCollege, Dublin, Ireland,July6-10, 1987. The beginningresearch was carriedout and presentedin a National Endowmentfor the HumanitiesSummerSeminar, "The Woman Question in Western Thought," Departmentof History, StanfordUniversity, 1986. I would like to thank the following for their helpful suggestionsthroughoutthe writing process:KarenOffen (SeminarDirector), Catherine Boyd, BudGerber,Gail Savage, and Eleni Varikas.

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ucation, writing and public speech possibilitiesfor women. The consciousness that develops is that of the pariah. This is exactly what FloraTristan called herself, whereasVirginiaWoolf uses the term "ConsciousOutsider." Riot-Sarceyand Varikasidentify three formsof this pariahconsciousness: 1) exceptionalwomanfeminism-this is a tokenism which leads to assimilation, confirmsthe rule of inferiority,and denies the systematiccharacterof the exclusion of women as a social category;2) subversive feminism-present social structuresand institutionsaredenied or destroyed,leadingto social disorder;Claire Demar, the most radicalof the Saint-Simonianwomen, is the examplehere, with her advocacyof the abolition of even the "lawof blood" to free women from maternity;3) feminismas theartof thepossible-this form alwaysdevelops from a collective movement and stresseswomen'sotherness and difference (Riot-Sarceyand Varikas1986). In what follows, I wish to test this hypothesisby consideringthe case of an importantearlysocialistthinker, Anna Doyle Wheeler (1785-1848). While I generallyfind the Riot-Sarcey/Varikasmodel to be enormouslyusefuland illuminating, there may be some room for refinement. Wheeler seems to be both a subversiveand a convention-bound"exceptionalwoman,"depending on which aspect of her thought and life one chooses. In any case, this typology allows us an intriguingentree into both Wheeler's philosophical ideas and the issue of her somewhat ambiguoushistorical location. A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH II. ANNA WHEELER:

Anna Doyle Wheeler was bor to an Anglican familyof Clonbeg Parishin County Tipperary,Ireland. She was the beautifuland headstrongyoungest daughterof a middle-levelChurch of Irelandcleric, who died when she was not yet two yearsold. Even though her godfatherwas the greatIrishnationalist Henry Grattan, she was brought up mostly by her mother'speople, the Doyle's. This familyheld importantposts in the militaryand civil service for British colonial government, not only in Irelandbut also in the American colonies, on the continent, on the Isle of Guernsey, and in India (Doyle 1911). In 1800, when only fifteen, she was noticed at the racesby nineteen-yearold FrancesMasseyWheeler, a young inheritorof his family'sestate at Ballywire. Wheeler proposedto her at a ball. Her familyopposedthe match and tried to divert Anna by an invitation to London from her uncle, Sir John Doyle. Anna would have none of this and marriedWheeler the sameyear. In twelve yearsshe bore six children, the first four being girls (Galgano 1979). Rosina, the second daughter,remembersbeing told about the wrath of her drunkenfather on learningthat Anna had given birth to anothergirl. Later she had a son, but only Henrietta and Rosina survivedinfancy. Anna took refugefrom her abusivehusbandin reading. Rosina recallsher mother read-

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ing the French philosophesand Wollstonecraft on one couch while her mother'smaiden sister, Bessie Doyle, read the sentimentalnovels of the Minerva Presson the other. Rosina tried to learn to drawand not bother them. Both her aunt and her father, Rosina says, would take her (Rosina's) part against her mother, who favoredolder sister Henrietta. But, she adds wistfully, "I did long for a little of my mother'slove" (Devey 1887).1 The marriage finally became completely unbearable. In a daring and desparatemove, Anna was able to arrangean escape. In Augustof 1812, she fled with her children, her sister, and her brother,John, to the Isle of Guernsey where her uncle Sir John Doyle was Governor. Francismade no attempt to persuadeher to returnand refusedher any allowancefor the rest of his life; predictably,he left her no maintenance in his will (he died in 1820). 2 In high society on Guernsey, Anna Wheeler was lionized by the aristocratic and wealthy. The aging Duc de Bouillon courtedher for 12 years, according to Rosina. Four years after Anna arrived, however, Sir John was forced to resign his office because of his debts. Anna and her family left for Londonat the sametime, beginningthe peripateticlife which she was to lead for the next two decades. London, Dublin, Caen, and Paris-these were her principalstops. At Caen she became part of an early Saint-Simoniangroup and was known, perhapswhimsically, as the "Goddessof Reason." She returnedto Irelandafterher husband'sdeath, but was back in France by 1823; in Parisshe met CharlesFourier.She alwaysclaimed that Fourier's systemwas essentiallythe same as that of RobertOwen and Saint-Simon. In all three, she said, co-operation is central; men and women are entitled to both equal education and employmentopportunities;and marriageand divorce law changes eliminate the double standard and give women equal rights. For the rest of her life she attemptedto bring these three versionsof socialism into union. To that end she arrangedfor Fourierto meet Robert Owen, introduced Saint-Simonian missionaries to Owenites in England, translatedFourieristand Saint-Simonianarticlesfor the Owenite press, sent young people to France with letters of introduction to Fourier,persuaded Owenites in Englandthat Saint-Simonian doctrines were similarto theirs, etc. (see Gans 1964). ThroughJeanne-DesireeVeret (who lived for a time with Anna in Englandand later marriedthe Owenite Jules Gay), Wheeler was connected to the Saint-Simonianwomen'sjournal,TribunedesFemmes, and translatedarticlesfor The Crisis(Wheeler 1833b).3 She became a wellknown lecturerat a time when women were not often allowed to speak to mixed-sex groups. Anna Wheeler also associatedwith the Utilitarians. Indeed, throughher friendshipwith JeremyBentham (begun in Paris)she met William Thompson, whose socialisteconomic theoryso impressedRobertOwen. Thompson, also Anglo-Irish (a large landownerfrom Cork), formeda close relationship with Wheeler. Together they wrote TheAppealof One Half theHumanRace,

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Women,AgainstthePretensionsof theOtherHalf, Men, to RestrainThemin PoliticalandThencein CivilandDomesticSlavery(1825) as a replyto JamesMill's Britannica.Mill, in less than a senessayon governmentin the Encyclopedia had women's as dismissed tence, rights unnecessary,since their interestswere their or "covered" husbandsor fathers. by represented All the while she continued her networking for co-operative socialism. She was a major influence on the views of James Smith, the editor of the Owenite journal The Crisis. When Flora Tristan visited London in 1839, Wheeler helped to guide her around. The chapter on Bethlem Hospital in Tristan'sLondonJournalrelates an incident in which a French inmate, M. Chabrier,attacks Anna Wheeler as an atheist who had killed God (Tristan 1982). When Thompson died in 1833, he assignedan annual annuity of ?100 to Wheeler;most of the rest of his estate he willed to the Owenite co-operative movement for the buildingof an intentional community.The will, however, was contested in courtby his relativeson the groundsthat Thompsonwas insane; the processdraggedon for a generation, so that she never received the money. Wheeler was an invalid in her last years,but lived to hear of the beginning of the 1848 Revolution in Paris. ARGUMENTATION III. WHEELER'S

A. TheAppeal.As mentioned earlier,Wheeler and Thompsonproduceda long, closely-reasoned,and well-organizedbook, The Appealof One Half the HumanRace, Women.... While it bears only his name, the introductory letter makesthe fact of co-authorshipclear. The essaybeginswith the proposition that a social system cannot provide for the greatesthappinessfor the greatestnumberif one-half that numberis removedfromconsideration.Part I examines James Mill's general argumentthat women's interests are "covered" by husbands, fathers, or brothers. In Part II, the first question asks whether there is indeed an identity of interest between women and men. Varioussections then focus on the partsof this question:single women without fathers,adultdaughtersliving in fathers'houses, and wives. As one might expect, the essay especially critiquesmarriage: All women, and particularlywomen living with men in marriage . . . having been reduced... to a state of helplessness, slavery . . . and privations, . . . are morein needof political rights than any other portion of human beings. (Thompson [1825] 107) Following eighty pages of philosophicalargumentation,the second question in PartII is taken up. Whether a sufficientcause to depriveeither group of civil or political rightscan be demonstrated,even if an identityof interests

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could be shown to exist-this is the issue. The argumentproceedsby supposing that "the interestsof men and women are so involved in each other, that political powerpossessedby the one mustbe impartiallyusedfor the benefit of both" (126, emphasis added). The question of whether one sex should be given exclusive political rightsstill remains.In a bold and unprecedentedreversal, Thompson and Wheeler set forth reasonsin favorof giving exclusive political rightsto women.One of the reasonsis, they maintain, that women, being the "weakerparty,"would never be able to overlook the interestsof men since men would never submitto injusticeat the hands of women. The most important qualification for those making public regulationsfor others-i.e., "sympathy with those to be affected . . . or moral aptitude" (114)-is, they assert, to be found more often in women. Finally, however, they find that no sufficient cause for excluding either partyexists, if human improvementis the object. Authentic progressrequires that a negative and a positive step be taken: "the negative consisting in the removalof restraints;the positive in the voluntaryestablishmentof co-operative associations"(151). The third and final question is, "Isthere any way to securehappinessto a groupbut bymeansof equalcivil and political rights?"Arguedfirstis the matter of whether women can enjoy happinesswithout equal civil and criminal laws. The authorspoint out the evil and degradationthat women sufferunder present (1825) unequal laws. The second section takes up the question of whetherwomen have any guaranteeof equalciviland criminallaw other than their possession of politicalrights. As it stands now, say Thompson and Wheeler, it could often happenthat "one fourthplusone" of the adultsof the human race, would control "threefourthsless one" (174). In other words, a simple majority of men could dictate to the rest of the men and all the women. (This of course takes no account of the fact that not even all men had the vote at that time.) The essayas a whole is an unequivocalappealfor votes forwomen, the first to be cogently argued(Wollstonecrafthad only hinted at it). In the long, concluding"Addressto Women," Thompsonand Wheeler exhort women to awakento their degradedstate and join with a systemof Co-operationin intentional communitysuch as that espousedby RobertOwen's followers. Interestingly,in an extended footnote, the similaritiesand differencesbetween Fourier'ssystem and Owen's are discussed.Even here Wheeler tries to unify the disparatestrandsof socialism. The main difference,she says, lies in the Fourieristsystem of distribution, one of inequality,whereasOwen's goal is equalityof distribution.Both systemsprovidefor equal educationof all children as well as equal rights in marriageand employmentfor both women and men (Thompson, 204-5). B. TheFinsburySquarelectureandotherstatements.Anna Wheelersoon became a well-known lectureron women'srights and the variousformsof the

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co-operativemovement. A famousaddressin 1829 at FinsburySquarelecture chapel was directedparticularlyto women. Entitling it "Rightsof Women," she sets out to demolish the main argumentsgiven by men to justify their claim of superiorityover women. After a long apologyin which she mentions her "depressedhealth" and "a deep domestic sorrow"(probablyRosina'simpending divorce), she says she will be speaking"in my capacityas slave and woman"(Wheeler 1830, 13). As a good utilitarian,she notes that when men refuseto treat women as anythingother than as an object of animal passion, men too aredegraded:" ... in refusingto cultivate women'sintellectualfaculties, men are caught in their own snares; and the ignorance, that they would exclusivelyconfine to women, soon becomesgeneral"(14). "Prejudice becomesfixedprinciple" and, like Pandora'sbox, spillsevils throughoutall society. Our institutions, she continues, ostensiblyestablishedfor "the perfection of humanreason"areonly caricaturesof reason. If we say that nothing can be good that producespermanentlyevil effects, then our institutions are evil, since they do not recognizethe generalinterestof all mankind-which must include women. The problemis, she avers, that individual,personalinterest is often set up instead of generalinterest. She then critiquesthe two main argumentsfor male superiority.The first, that men have superiormuscularstrength, is refutedby evidence fromvarious ancient and primitive societies. She concludes that women'sweaknessis "a civilized disease,"not part of female biology at all. Wheeler challenges the second argument-the alleged moral incapacityof women-also by looking at studies of primitive groups. Here she finds "civilized"behavior wanting. There is no differencein brain capacity, only differencesin education. Her argumentis buttressedby consideringuneducatedmen. A final partof the argumentcites examplesof greatand heroic women, both noble and common: women during the Terror in France, MadameRoland in prison, and Lady Russell, beheadedfor conspiringagainstCharles II. Concluding in classic liberal fashion that education will make women equal, she supportsthis claim by showinghow "the greatestvices of women" are all vices of the slave and, as such, can be pedagogicallyremoved. We then fearlesslyask for education; equal right to acquire and possessproperty;equal morals;women themselvesresponsible for their conduct as membersof society; equal civil and political rights.(35) Politicalrights for women are necessary,she asserts;otherwise, other rights cannot be guaranteed.Wheeler then invokes the name of FrancesWright, advocate of general education for both women and men, who understood, says Wheeler, that only through the system of Co-operation, sustained by democraticeducation, could the wrongs to women be righted.

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Finally, she calls on women to pressfor "a soundand liberaleducation"for their daughters,not being content to wait for others. Women must, she says, form groupsof like-mindedpeople, "the ultimate object of which will be to obtain, by all legal means, the removalof the disabilitiesof women, and the introductionof a national system of equaleducationfor the Infantsof both of women, demandingequal educasexes" (36). This call for an organization tion and equalpropertyand political rights, marksWheeler as one of the earliest and most radicalof feminists. Under the pen name "Vlasta,"Wheeler publishedother pieces, continuing to discussequal education and equal civil and political rightsfor women and claimingthat these were in men'sself-interest.Becauseof her knowledge of various societies, she had an important comparative perspective; her strongestcriticismswere usuallyreservedfor Englishwomen. In an 1832 letter, for example, she causticallycommentson women's inabilityto see their own oppression: Fortunatelythere was not a word about justice to women in the Reform Bill. Else, these poor creatureswould have opposed it with more animositythan they did, and most satisfactory it is for us to know that the principleof 'Cannot I do what I like with my own' will sufferonly as it relatesto men. (Burke 1976, 22) This criticismof her own sex was not unusualin Wheeler'swriting;in this, she is similarto Wollstonecraft. IV. FROMTYPOLOGY TO CONTINUUM:WHEELER'S AMBIGUOUSSTATUS

Returningto the frameworkof Riot-Sarceyand Varikas (1986), we can now see that Anna Wheeler falls between positions one and two: she generally advocatedsubversivefeminist doctrinesbut was often cast in the exceptional woman'srole; indeed, she often saw herselfthat way (her belittling remarks about women are explicable in these terms, for example). As the Wheeler example shows, it might be better to imagine "exceptionalwoman feminism"as possessingan inner continuum which moves from the pole of conventionality to the pole of subversion.Dependingon which phase of her career and which aspect(s) of her thought one chooses, Wheeler is both a subversiveand a convention-bound "exceptionalwoman." In a more recent study on the concept of exceptionality, Riot-Sarceyand Varikashave used a notion similarto my idea of a continuum. They discuss two sorts of exceptionality, vecue (lived or authentic) and assumee(assumed or taken on) and suggesta kind of dialectic between them. They conclude with a helpful metaphor: "The exceptional woman of the 19th century situates herself at the crossingof the feminist consciousnesswith the world

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view of the satisfiedparvenu"(Riot-Sarceyand Varikas1987, 11). Wheeler fits this graphicdescriptionperfectly.Satisfiedwith her position as a unique female intellectual, she still calls for a break-upof patriarchalstructuresand leans towardan attempt at collective work with other women. Duringher lifetime most of the antagonismevidencedtowardWheelerhad more to do with her political beliefs than with her personallife. Curiously, there is no evidence of scandalabout her personalsexual life such as plagued both Frances Wright and Mary Wollstonecraft. Given her views and her friendshipwith William Thompson, had there been any cause for gossip, it certainlywould have been used againstboth her and her daughter,Rosina. Anna Wheeler was on the outskirtsof respectablesociety, but she was never ostracizedas she would have been were she seen as a sex-radical. Becauseshe never workedwithin a collective, her feminismwas not of the thirdtype, "the art of the possible."Her pariahconsciousnesswas alwaysthat of the lone outsider,often disparagingof other women. Indeed, althoughshe never broke the bonds of feminine respectability to become a so-called like George Sand or Daniel Stern, she was still more at "homme-femme" home with men than with women. She called for a separateorganizationof women, but she did not join other women in formingsuch a group.A mature internationalsisterhoodwould have to wait for a largernumber of women with fully-developedfeminist consciousnesses,a criticalmasslargeenough to overcome the exceptional woman syndrome. WHEELER AND THELE DOEUFFTHESIS V. A CONCLUDINGPOSTSCRIPT:

Michele Le Doeuff'svery suggestivearticle, "Womenand Philosophy,"describesthe way that most women philosophersin historyhave had access to philosophy, that is, through their passionaterelationshipwith a particular male philosopher.This has been true, she says, fromthe time of Hipparchia and Crates the Cynic, through Heloise and Abelard, Descartesand Elisabeth, up to Sartreand Simone de Beauvoir.Women's access to philosophy has not been throughthe (phallocentric)institutionsof philosophictraining (from which women have historicallybeen barred),but through their relationship with a mentor. This "erotico-theoreticaltransference"(Le Doeuff 1987, 185) has meant that women have had accessnot to philosophy,per se, but to a particularphilosophy. If we look at the work of Anna Doyle Wheeler in this context, she becomes anotherin that line of women playingdiscipleto a male master,in this case, William Thompson. The way out of the impasse,suggestsLe Doeuff, is to try to create in philosophya "non-hegemonicrationalism,"an acceptance of its "intrinsicincompleteness,"an ongoing philosophicdiscourse(206). At the sametime, she says, the enterpriseof "doingphilosophy"shouldbe transformedinto a collective enterprise,so that the philosopheras subjectdisap-

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pears.Only thus can philosophybecome trulyaccessibleto women. Here, in work groups and other collectivities, one may find "a new rationality, in which a relationshipto the unknown and to the unthought is at every moment reintroduced"(209). Anna Doyle Wheeler not only had no access to institutional philosophy, she had no concept of doing philosophy collectively. Thus, although she was at the center of many networkingactivities and advocatedan organizationof like-mindedwomen, her projectwas never truly cooperativeor non-hegemonic.

NOTES 1. The available biographical sources on Anna Wheeler are all dependent on two early sources,written in the wakeof the scandalsurroundingthe divorcebetween Wheeler'sdaughter Rosina and the Britishnovelist Bulwer-Lyttonin 1836. As might be expected, these sourcesare not entirelydependable,contain severalerrors,and contradicteach other. LouisaDevey'sLifeof Rosina,LadyLytton(1887) takes Rosina'sside, while Michael Sadleir'sBulwerandHis Wife:A Panorama1803-1836 (1931) puts all the blame on Rosina. The followingquotation (describing the family'sdeparturefrom Guernseyand their uncle Sir John Doyle) is typicalof the tone and attitude of the Lytton side of the controversytowardRosina and her family: [Sir John] chose resignationand quick departure,because by this means at least he would be rid of women who had only sought him out for what they could get. . . . Apprised of his immediate retirement to London, Mrs. Wheeler gave way to one final burstof rageand, late in 1816 or earlyin 1817, sailed for France. In a few months she had become "Goddessof Reason"to a small group of embittered cranks in Caen. Her unhappy children played acolyte on either side her altar. (Sadleir 1931, 76) The most sympatheticview of Rosinawas that she was the "product"of a terribleupbringing,her mother having abdicated her maternal responsibilities. Anna, therefore, is seen as moneygrubbingand, worse, as a radicalintellectual, even in the sourcessympatheticto Rosina. This view is partof the reasonthat Anna has been erasedfromhistory. Like MaryWollstonecraftand FrancesWrightbeforeher, her political views and personallife were seen as anathemato respectable women, and thereforeher life and workssimplywere omitted from later accountsof early feminism and socialism. Two examplesshould suffice to suggestthe inaccuraciesof these sources.Ballywireis located in CountyTipperary;in Devey'saccount, Rosinasaysnot only that it is in CountyLimerick(and it is on the border of the two counties), but that it is on the western coast of Ireland. She describesin great detail the house at Ballywire,and in most respectsshe is correct. The house does indeed have a stone turret, marble fireplaces, and carved ceilings. But the memoryimaginationof the 8-year-oldRosinaalso imbuedthe surroundingswith a high cliff over crashing waves and a view of the sea to the west (Devey 1887, 10-11). This is purefantasy;the view is to the relatively tame Glen of Aherlow in the southwesternpart of County Tipperary. Anna Wheeler'sfather is said to be an archbishopin severalof the sources;he was in fact an archdeaconand a prebendary,entirelydifferentoffices (Leslie 1958, I: 326). There was a Catholic archbishopDoyle (JamesWarrenDoyle, bishopof Kildareand Leighlin) at this time in Ireland, so one can see how the errorhas crept in. 2. Again, earliersourcesdisagreeas to FrancisMasseyWheeler'sdeath date. Galgano (1979) and Pankhurst(1954) follow Devey and use 1820, but Sadleirsays 1823. I have been unable to locate a death certificateor grave markerin any availablerecordsin Clonbeg Parishor at the Diocesan Libraryin Cashel. Records for Clonbeg and Galbally Parisheswere among those destroyedin the fire at the Public RecordsOffice in Dublin in 1922.

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3. I am indebted to KarenOffen, Center for Researchon Women, StanfordUniversity, for her perusalof and notes on this letter, and for calling it to my attention. See Wheeler'stranslation of "Appel aux femmes"(Wheeler 1833a).

REFERENCES Bell, Susan Groag, and Karen Offen, eds. 1983. Women, the family, and Freedom:The debatein documents.(2 vols.). Stanford:StanfordUniv. Press. Burke, Stephen. 1976. Letter from a pioneer feminist-Anna Wheeler. Studiesin LaborHistory1: 19-23. Devey, Louisa. 1887. Life of Rosina,LadyLytton.London: Swan, Sonnenschein, Lowren. Doyle, Arthur. 1911. A hundredyears of conflict:Beingsome recordsof the servicesof sixgeneralsof theDoylefamily, 1756-1856. London:Longmans, Green. dictionaryof Galgano, Michael. 1979. Anna Doyle Wheeler. In Biographical modern British radicals. (vol. 1). Joseph O. Baylen and Norbert J. Gossman, eds. Sussex: HarvesterPress, 519-524. Gans, J. 1964. Les relations entre socialistes de France et d'Angleterreau debut du XIXe siecle. Le MouvementSocial46: 105-118. Le Doeuff, Michele. 1987. Women and philosophy. In Frenchfeminist thought.Toril Moi, ed. London: Basil Blackwell, 181-209. indexof theclergyof theChurchof Leslie, Rev. Canon J.B. 1958. Biographical Ireland.Typescript.RepresentativeChurch Body Library,Dublin. Pankhurst, Richard K.P. 1954. Anna Wheeler: A pioneer socialist and feminist. The PoliticalQuarterly25: 132-143. Riot-Sarcey,Michele and Eleni Varikas.1986. Feministconsciousnessin the 5: 443nineteenth century:A pariahconsciousness?PraxisInternational 465. Riot-Sarcey, Michele and Eleni Varikas. 1987. Reflexions sur la notion d'exceptionalite.Typescriptin preparationfor Les Cahiersdu GRIF. My translation. Sadleir,Michael. 1931. Bulwerandhiswife:A panorama1803-1836. London: Constable. Thompson, William. [1825]1983. Appealof one halfthe humanrace, women, againstthepretensionsof theotherhalf, men, to restrainthemin politicaland thencein civil and domesticslavery. Intro. Richard Pankhurst.London: Virago. Tristan, Flora. 1982. TheLondonjournalof FloraTristan,1842. Jean Hawkes, ed. and trans. London: Virago. Wheeler, Anna Doyle. 1830. Rights of women. The BritishCo-operator1: 1, 2, 12-15, 33-36.

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Wheeler, Anna Doyle, trans. 1833a. Appel aux femmes, by Jeanne-Victoire [pseud.]. The Crisis, 15 June; reprintedin Bell and Offen 1983, I:146147. Wheeler, Anna Doyle. 1833b. Letter to Charles Fourier, 28 May 1833. Archives Nationales (Paris), Archives societaires, 10 AS25, doss. 3.

EvolutionaryTheory in the Social Philosophy of Charlotte PerkinsGilman MAUREEN L. EGAN

ThispaperexaminesCharlottePerkinsGilman'sconnectionwiththeevolutionist ideasof late nineteenthcenturyReformDarwinism.It focuseson theassumptions thatherlanguageand use of metaphorreveal,and uponhervisionof humansocial evolutionas a melioristic processthroughwhichtheequalityof thesexesmustfinally emerge.

Charlotte PerkinsGilman has been recognizedby recent scholarsas one of the majorfeminist theorists of the period which spans the late nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries. Dale SpenderplacesGilman'sworkas being at the forefrontof feminist theory even today and regardsher as the earlyfeminist most closely embodyingthe assumptionsand aims of the contemporary women'smovement. For BarbaraEhrenreichand DierdreEnglish, Gilman's first major work, Women and Economics,provided "the theoretical breakthroughfor a whole generationof feminists, [for it] appealednot to right or moralitybut to evolutionarytheory"(Ehrenreich1978, 67 Emphasistheirs). Gilman's biographer,Mary C. Hill, calls her life "the making of a radical feminist,"becauseof the extensive and disciplinedcritiqueof sexual inequality which she carriedout. Regrettably,Gilman'sworkhas yet to be recognizedadequatelyfor its contribution to American philosophy. Mary Mahowald has pointed out that "feministelements are generallylacking in the canon of American philosophy" (Mahowald 1987, 411), defining feminist elements as those that challenge the subordinationof women's intereststo those of men. I believe that the exclusion of Gilman-whether intended or inadvertent-is a case in point. A further characteristicof the recognizedAmerican philosopher is that, ironically,while their workis markedby emphasison the importanceof experience, "none had an experience common to half the human race, that of being female"(Mahowald1987, 410). Taking a lead fromMahowald'sargument for a "majorityperspective,"I will try in this paperto advance the needed recognitionof Gilman'scontribution,by situatingher philosophically ia vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring1989) ? by MaureenL. Egan

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in the intellectual history of the United States as one of several influential proponentsof reformDarwinism.I will indicate the main ideas which she held in common with both the Spenceriansand the reformDarwinists.I will then providea generaloverview of her use of the methodologyof evolutionarytheoryfor analyzinghumansocial developmentand show how this methodologyeventuallymade her arriveat conclusionsboth very modem and distinctly nineteenth century. Lastly, I will give some attention to what I call her "theoryof the two natures"and to the role of the two sexes in social evolution. Although these points are far from a thoroug prsentation ofGilman's writingswhich she producedover a periodof forty yearsand which account for the greaterportion of some twenty-fivevolumes of publishedwork, they are representativeof her work as a whole, and they give some indication of the profoundand original thinking of one of the major intellectualsof the centuryjust past. Moreover,some attention to them is greatlyneeded. While the meritsof her psychologicalshort story "The Yellow Wallpaper"and her utopian novels Herlandand WithHer in Ourlandhave recently received long overdue attention, her nonfiction production-in which we may see reflected the majorintellectual movementsof her time-has received far less. So completelydid Gilman'sworkdisappearfor some five decades, until Carl Deglerrepublishedher seminalWomenandEconomicsin 1966, that it is difficult for us today to grasp the influence and wide acquaintancewhich this work once enjoyed among an enormousaudience in the United States. A case can be made for Charlotte Perkins Gilman's inclusion in the "canon"of American philosophersdefined by Max Fisch (1951). She belonged to the "classicperiod"which Fischdefined as beginningjust afterthe Civil War and extending to just before World War II (Fisch 1951, 1), and her writingsexhibit several of the assumptionsand interestssharedby the "canonical"authors,especiallythe ideasthat wouldcome to be understoodas pragmatist,the searchfor a scientific explanationof cultureand thought, and an evolutionarystartingpoint for philosophy.To develop the case fully is beyond the scope of this paper. However, an analysisof Gilman'sconnection with the evolutionist ideas of the late nineteenth centurywill go some way toward placing her in the mainstreamof American thought. It should be noted that one featureof her biographywhich accounts significantlyfor her exclusion from previouslydefined canons is the fact that she had no direct connection with Philosophy in the academy. As Fisch'swork ably demonstrates, a trng ntwork of university connections united the "canonical" American philosophersof the classic period. Gilman was a self-taughteconomic theorist with a good commandof the basic ideas of capitalismand a general understandingof Marxistprinciples. That she was also a Bellamyiteis evident in, amongother things, her utopian vision of the kitchenless home as the beneficiaryof many technological ad-

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vances. Everyaspectof her social philosophyalso showsthe influenceof Darwinian science, both in method and in substance.But perhapsabove all, she was an effective popularizerof the ideas of early sociologist Lester Ward, whom she greatlyadmired.In her work she carriedout highly suggestiverefinements and developmentsof Ward'stheory of an earlymatriarchicperiod in human history. While, therefore, the major influences on her thought overall were Ward'ssociology, reformDarwinism,EdwardBellamy'ssocialism, and Deweyan instrumentalism,for the purposesof this paperI will concentrate primarilyon reformDarwinismas it shows itself in her work. THESOCIAL DARWINIST TRADITION It wouldbe difficultto overestimatethe effects of Darwin'sprincipleof evolution by naturalselection upon virtuallyall areasof intellectual endeavor. The ideasof natural,gradualchange over a long period;of adaptationfor survival in a competitive environment;and, in humans, of the implicationsof "sexualselection" for the developmentof the species all had a profoundimpact upon the nineteenth century United States. As scientific thinking began to change significantlyunder the influence of Darwinismthe resulting conflict between science and religionemerged.All of this occurredjust as the social sciences were developing and opening up a fruitfulavenue for application of the new science to human behavior. Those who sought to applythe principlesof Darwinismto the understanding of the human species tended to move in one of two opposite directions: some, like William GrahamSumner, who was a discipleof HerbertSpencer, looked upon human social development as a positive progressionexplicable by the same scientific principlesas the development of other species. They disapproved of social reform movements, regarding them as artificial interferenceswith a naturalprocess.Others, like LesterWard, moved in exactly the oppositedirection. They supportedsocial reformmovementson the groundsthat human beings should use their intelligence and the ethical development that has resulted from their evolutionary progress, in order to modify their conditions. It is the latter direction that Charlotte Perkins Gilman took. RichardHofstadterhas observed, "Although its influence far outstrippedits merits, the Spenceriansystemservesstudentsof the American mind as a fossil specimenfromwhich the intellectualbody of the periodmay be reconstructed"(Hofstadter 1955, 32). While Gilman and other critics chose not to follow Spencer to the logical conclusionsof his hard determinism, it is possible-as Hofstadter'scomment indicates-to traceseveralintellectual trends of the nineteenth century by their relationshipto Spencerianism, even through their sometimesvisceralopposition to it. ReformDarwinism was one such trend.

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Spencerhad wished to create a unified science which would bringthe natural and human worldstogether, in the traditionof the eighteenth century philosophers.He found that evolutionarytheory did this by showing the development from homogeneity to-within species limits-heterogeneity. It was Spencerwho used the phrase"survivalof the fittest,"which he appliedto economics, labor, business,and law. He was a strongproponentof conservatism and envisioned only a negative role for governmentin the processof social evolution: its purposewas to ensure that people did not overstep their naturalrights. Although Spencer believed that privatecharityaided the inevitable evolution from egoism to altruismon the part of almsgivers,he denounced public charity, chargingit with holding back progressby aiding the continuedsurvivalof the unfit. "Natural"-that is, unimpeded-growthof society was to be preferred.Carnegie,Rockefellerand othersfound in Spencer's ideasintellectualjustificationfor the strongpositionof individualism. William Graham Sumner's social philosophy, conservative in nature, rested upon Spencerianprinciples, especiallythose set forth in The Studyof Sociology,and upon the ideas of Thomas Malthus. Sumnerbelieved that the basisof society is "the man-landratio."We cannot blame othersfor our tribulations, since these are but partof the strugglein nature. Unrestrictedcompetition shouldbe encouraged,for it promotesthe selection process,which in turn leads to progressfor civilization. Sumnerwas skepticalof democracyand tended to regardit as a transient stage in social evolution. Leadersin industry,he felt, are entitled to amass their fortuneson the groundsof their usefulfunction in promotingthe economic progressof society. Inequalitywas to be valuedas the resultof true liberty, in which all personsare free to engagein the strugglefor existence. The successfulcome out on top. Sumner believed in social determinism,a concept borrowedfromSpencer:that is, that society is the productof gradualevolution and cannot easilybe alteredby legislation. He was, therefore,against reformism. Fromthese social DarwinistsGilman leared to see human social progress as an evolutionaryprocess which follows the same scientificallyobservable patternsand principlesas does animal evolution. However, she did not agree that humansare caught in a strugglefor the survivalof the fittest. Moreradically, she questionedthe criteriaused by Spencer and his disciplesfor determining fitness. Gilman rejected the deterministicassumptionof the social Darwiniststhat the strugglefor survivalcould not have occurredotherwise than it did. To her mind, one half of the humanrace had for many centuries been held at an inferiorstage of evolution by the other half, with the effect that the evolutionaryprogressof bothwas jopardized.Wishing to incorporate potentialityfor change and choice into scientific explanation, she found a more satisfactoryaccount of human development in the critics of pure social Darwinism, the so-called "reformDarwinists."In them she found her

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reason for optimism for the future:the modification, if not complete rejection, of social determinism. GILMAN'SDEBTTO REFORMDARWINISM

One of the most outspokenof the reformDarwinistswas LesterWard. Although influencedmethodologicallyby Spencer, Wardwas opposedto what he saw as a monistic trend in sociology; namely, the practice of using the principlesand laws of the naturalworld to explain the social. He adopteda dualisticphilosophy that reflecteda pragmaticbias, makinga sharpdistinction between physical evolution and mental evolution. Physical evolution explainedthe originsof the variousanimal species. It was purposelessin nature. Mental evolution, on the contrary,explainedthe purposivecharacterof specificallyhuman development. No other explanation, he felt, could better account for the facts of human social interaction. His physical evolution/ mental evolution distinction had the furtheradvantagethat it providedtheoreticalsupportfor the reformmovementshe advocated.Democraticsensibilities are everywherepresent in Ward'swritingsand lectures. In an important speech to the AnthropologySociety of Washington in 1881, he spoke in favor of the trend towardgovernmentintervention in social affairs,which opposed the then-currentlaissez-fairesocial theory. Perhapsmost significantlyforGilman, Wardidentifiedtwo typesof economics: animal economics of life and human economics of mind. Accordingto the latter, humans transformtheir environment throughwhat he called the "telic" application of intelligence: that is, through purposivebehavior for both individualand social ends. Although other animals interactwith their environment to more or less complex degrees, they do not alter their environmentas humansdo by the applicationof intentionality.The effect of this differenceis that humans can be properlysaid to create their environment. For Ward there exists also a social mind, an aggregateof individualhuman minds. In orderto explain the melioratingpowerof educationon generations of people, he believed-as had Lamarcke, Darwin, and Spencer-in the transmissionof acquiredcharacteristics.Gilman found this a suggestiveidea, which could serve as the foundation of a new social order to correct the wrongsof the past. One had only to breed into the human race the nobler sentiments and virtueswhich would ensure an improvedsociety. Although Gilman'sworkwas most stronglyinfluencedby the ideasof Lester Ward,elements drawnfromother social Darwinistsare also evident in her writings.She agreedwith John Fiskeon the durationof infancyas the distinguishingfeatureof humans, enablingand necessitatingthe developmentand passingon of cultureand increasingthe rangeof behaviorlater. Maternalaffection and care are prolongedby long infancy and result in a deeper bond

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amongall the familymembers.This idea laterassumeda central significance in Gilman's analysisof sexual relationships. With T.H. Huxley, Gilman believed that a distinctionshouldbe madebetween "the fittest" and "the best," and between the social processand the cosmic process. "The fittest" should never be reductionisticallyidentified with the physicallystrongest,while social process-being amenableto direction by the telic applicationof human intelligence-is thereforein some degree distinct fromcosmic processes.Advanced societies free themselvesfrom the strugglefor existence and move towarda "strugglefor the meansof enjoyment" (Hofstadter1955, 96). Like Henry Drummond,she saw a strugglefor thelifeof othersas emergingfromhuman evolution, out of the need for nutrition and reproduction.Drummondhad assertedthat this phenomenonmakes the familythe basisof human sympathy.His worksuggeststhat this "higher" strugglebringsspiritualperfection, and idea with which Gilman was strongly in agreement,althoughshe sought to extricatethe concept of familyfromits definition as an economic unit. Prince Peter Kropotkinhad proposedmutual aid among animals of the same species (including humans) as both a sign and a significantfactor in their evolutionarydevelopmentand recommendedthe eliminationof competition as an indicatorof a high degree of evolution. Gilman, too, believed that the samesocial processeswhich advancedthe humanracewouldeventually make competition obsolete. While she found elements to agree with in the social Darwinists,it was with the "dissenters,"therefore, that she most clearly aligned herself, especially with the movements inspiredby Henry George and EdwardBellamy. These opponents of social Darwinismdetested and fearedthe free competitive system, even though they were strongly influenced by individualism. George, in his Progressand Poverty,set out to disproveMalthusand to argue that Spencer'sideaswere not only not radical,but on the contraryabsolutely conservative in their fatalism. Gilman found George's concept of an unearned increment-that is, the value that accruesto the owner whose land increasesin value by reasonof the growthof society aroundthe land, as distinct from that which occursfrom the owner'swork-helpful in understanding the oppressionof women. The "unearnedincrement"which women receive in the form of "gifts"from men is theirs by reason of their powerlessness. Women are prevented from producing economic goods, but by the providenceof men they are enabled to consume them. Ward, George, Bellamy, and other "dissenters"approvedof the efforts then being madeto alterbusinesspracticesthroughprotectivelegislation,but were never fully satisfiedby them. Bellamy, in LookingBackward,sharplyattacked the fundamentalprinciplesof the competitive system and of private property.Gilman found much to admirein his vision of a society that could

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embodystronglycommunalfeaturescoexisting with a high degreeof individual freedomfor each of its members. THE LANGUAGEOF EVOLUTION

The influence of Darwinian science is everywhereevident in the social philosophy of Charlotte PerkinsGilman. Like other evolutionists, she frequently made use of nature and of the variousanimal species as illustrations and examplesfor points she wished to make regardinghuman development. The gypsymoth, for instance, providedher with a model of the "absolutely stationaryfemale"never permittedto leave the home: She has abortedwings, and cannot fly. She waits humblyfor the winged male, lays her myriadeggs, and dies,-a fine instance of modificationto sex. (Gilman 1898, 65) Cirripeds, bees, and spiders, on the other hand, whose males are very nearly useless and are easily discarded,offeredproof that female, not male, dominancehad been the patternof naturethroughoutmost periodsof evolution. If the beehive producedliterature,she suggestedmore than once that, the bee's fiction would be rich and broad,full of the complex tasksof comb-buildingand filling, the care and feeding of the young, the guardian-serviceof the queen; and far beyond that it would spreadto the blue gloryof the summersky, the fresh winds, the endless beauty and sweetness of a thousandthousand flowers. It would treat of the vast fecundity of motherhood, the educative and selective processes of the groupmothers, and the passion of loyalty, of social service, which holds the hive together. But if the drones wrote fiction, it would have no subject matter save the feasting, of many; and the nuptial flight, of one. (Gilman 1911, 99) The lesson is not difficultto draw:human relationships,underthe influence of male domination, have followed the opposite pattern to that which unimpedednaturalevolution would have impelledthem. Since feastingand nuptial fights abound in human literature,apparentlythe droneshave written nearly all that we possessof it! Gilman likened the social life of humansto the biologicallife of individual organisms.She believed that just as there is a naturalprocesswhich controls the growthof individualphysicalfeaturessuch as armsand legs, so too a natural processwould control relationshipsamong individualsin the social body of the human species were women'sgrowthnot grotesquelydistortedby eco-

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nomic dependency-like tumorsgrowingwithout limit and without proportion (Gilman 1910, 196-7). Gilman often noted lawlike behavior when she observed it in humans, therebysupportingher generalbelief that humanevolution takesplace in the same way as all other evolution occurs. There are "laws of brain-action" which operateto producethe effectsthat we experienceas our ideas, feelings, and personalprejudices.One of these, the law of adaptation,bringsit about that as we fit ourselvesto our environment, we cease to notice the things we have become accustomedto-for example, the economic, social, and sexual domination of women by men. The things to which people are accustomed eventually appearnaturaland right, since they permeatethe social environment. A second "lawof brain-action"tends to make it easierfor humansto "personalize"than to "generalize."This tendency makes it difficultfor us to see our individualcondition as partof a social pattern-a difficultywhich has so far kept us, as a species, from abolishingthe practiceof male domination. There are also sociological laws which operatelike laws of physics:for example, "the strengthof a currentof social force is increasedby the sacrificeof individualswho are willing to die in the effortto promoteit" (Gilman 1898, 80). This makessocial behavior among humansmeasurableand its underlying principles potentially discoverable by science. It is easy to see why Gilman placed great confidence in the emerging science of sociology, of which she identified herself as a practitioner.She could see its potential for discoveringthe principlesof human social behavior. Sociologicalanalysiswould also reveal that the law of inertia, too, "applies to the psychic as well as to the physicalworld:any idea, if sufficientlyforced into the mindsof a people, will keep going unlessand until met by a sufficient opposing force, or by friction with its gradualeffect" (Gilman 1911, 163). Justsuch an idea is the one which limits women'sparticipationin "society"to "societypage"events while extending men's participationto all areasof social life. Either slow friction over a long periodof time or a strongopposing idea (such as that of women'seconomic freedom)would be requiredin order to halt this long held idea. Social evolution, while it is affectedby human telic intelligence, is every bit as naturalas physical, or individual, evolution (Gilman 1898, 95). It is, however, the "fourthpower"of a naturalprocess. In the descriptionof increasinglycomplex naturalentities, the first power is the formationof cells; the second power of the process occurs when cells form organs;the third power is the combination of organsto form organisms;and the fourthpower is the association of organismsto form society. At the level of the fourth power organic relations among individualsare no longer based primarilyon biological or sexual functions, but are instead based on "purelyeconomic grounds;"that is, upon specializationof labor and exchange of product.

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Specializationand organizationare marksof evolutionaryadvances on a social scale (or the "fourthpower"of the naturalprocess)just as they are on an individualscale (or the "thirdpower").Evolutionarydevelopmentin any "power"tends to increase specializationand therefore to increase interdependence. This is as true among personsin a society as among the partsof a complex physical organism. The need for competitive individual struggle, therefore,is diminishedover time in an advancingsociety, since competition has value in inverse proportionto the degree of evolutionarydevelopment. Interdependencesupplantsthe original competition between individuals. One can compareand contrastindividualand societal existence on a number of counts. As has been indicatedabove, specializationoccursin both: on the individuallevel a specializationof functionsis exhibitedby organs;on the social level it takes the form of specializationof laboron the part of organisms. Individualsexperienceexchange of function amongtheir organs;societies depend upon exchange of productamong the individualsthat compose them. The sex relation, whetherfor purposesof reproductionor pleasure,is a function of the individual(that is of the "thirdpower"of naturalprocesses), while economic relations are social functions by their nature (that is, of the "fourthpower");the two types of relation are irreconcilable(Gilman 1898, 106). One of Gilman'smost powerfuland fruitfulinsights, unfortunatelybeyond the scope of this paperto explore, was that the institution of marriage conflates these two essentially separaterelations:women are obliged to obtain their best economic advantageby exchangingtheir sexualservicesfor financial securitythrough marriage. Whether we are talking about ants or humans, distinctions can be made between characteristicswhich belong to them as individualsand those which belong to them as membersof a society. In like manner, whether they are ants or humans, social animalshave two differenttypes of functions among their kind. In the firstplace are those which are distinctlysocial-like teaching their young-in which individualsare small elements within a vast integrated social system. In the second place are functions-notably reproduction-which they carryout as individualsin a relationshipwith anotherindividual. Any animalwhich exists in a social relationwith its kind will exhibit both sortsof functions. Science had disproventhe ancient idea that humans are a "special"species separatedby a wide gulf from the "lower"species;on the contrary,as Gilman recognized,there are no such gaps. OF HUMAN SOCIALEVOLUTION THE PROCESSES

ForGilman all the civilizedStates createdby humansexist in organicrelation with one another. This characteristicthey sharewith all formsof animal life. The relations of human societies are industrialrelations, comprisedof "individualanimal processes":nourishment,reproduction,socialization,mu-

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tual protection, and the like. Thus cooperativesocial arrangementsare created, wherebythe work ("industry"is the wordGilman often prefers)of one contributesto the sustenanceof another. An elaboratestructureof economic exchanges is built aroundthese industrialrelations. Seen in this perspective the differencesamongsocial species-birds, bears,or humans-are not differences in kind but are simplydifferencesin the degreeof complexityof the industrialrelationscreated. The most perfecthumancivilizationwouldbe markedby three characteristics: it wouldexhibit the highest degreeof freedom,subtlety, and differentiation of labor. These characteristics,in turn, would give rise to the development of a "socialspirit."The social spirit(Gilman 1898, 107), that is a sense of social duty and service, is a very advancedformof evolution. It promotes the growthof society, just as an organof the body promotesthat of the individual:"Socialorganizedhumanbeingstend to produce,as a glandto secrete; it is the essential nature of the relation" (Gilman 1898, 116). Gilman was not referringto biological reproduction,but to industry,the human process by which human energy is transformedinto economic production. She observed with caustic humor: The most casual survey of social evolution shows it to be a processof growthand change, not along lines of reproductive activity, in which the rabbitis easily our leader, but in racial functions, in the tradesand crafts, in art, in science, in government, in education, in religion. These are not functionsof sex, nor in any way attributableto it. (Gilman 1923, 169) While she had rejected many of the conclusions of the social Darwinists, Gilman was in agreementwith them that some human behavior is instinctive. She added the refinement, however, that male and female rlaturesexplain the source of human instinctive behavior. (Fuller discussion of Gilman'stheories regardingmale, female, and human natureswill be found later in this paper.) Among instincts which humanshave developedas a race but which derive from male nature she identifieda hunting and chasing instinct, which she acknowledgedis present in the young of both sexes but which continues to develop in the male long afterthe youngfemale has outgrownit and a "protectiveinstinct"which servesto ensurecare for wife and children. In women, two instinctsremainwhich derivefromtheir femalenature: a maternalinstinct (the result of their long "overspecializationto sex" by men) and a protective instinct, which they share with male nature, to guaranteethe care and safety of their children (Gilman 1898, 56). However, Gilman believed that these instincts emerge in women at adolescence. She felt that it was harmfulto forceyounggirlsto overdeveloptheir instinctsby having to playwith dolls. "Beyondthe continuousdolls and their continuousdressing,"she wrote, "we providefor our little girls tea sets and

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kitchen sets, doll's houses, little workboxes-the imitation tools of their narrow trade"(Gilman 1911, 111). By such dangerousand limiting practiceswe thus contributeto the overspecializationof the female to her "lower"activities (those, like housecleaning,cooking, mending and laundering,that society has erroneouslyidentifiedwith her sexualnature)just at a time in her life when she should be exploringthe many and variedfeaturesof her humannature. Moreover, it is clear that these efforts to overspecializethe female in this direction have not proven very advantageousto the race, since the "maternal instinct"has so far not preventedthe existence of many sickly, undernourishedchildren or significantlyreducedthe high rate of infant mortality. Indeed, "the recordof untrainedinstinct as a maternalfaculty in the human race is to be readon the rows and rowsof little gravestoneswhich crowdour cemeteries"(Gilman 1898, 198). In the end, instincts arefar less valuableto complex, higherorganismsand societies than they are to simplerspecies. What the human speciesrequiresis more effective education of each generation, since the human is the species which creates its environment. The environment which we create is a far more significantfactor in our social evolution than are the instincts which derive fromour sexual nature. While instincts help to ensuresurvivalon the individuallevel, it is the environmentwhich will bringaboutprogresson the social, or highest, level. In all her works Gilman made certain evolutionist assumptions,some of which she articulatedmost fully and explicitly in her introductionto His ReligionandHers, one of her last works.As is alreadyevident fromthe above, she took humanityto be an organicrelationshipamongindividualsin a processof social evolution. Natural law, which can be either promotedor hinderedby our consciousbehavior, she took to be the basisof this evolutionaryprocess. Gilman also believed that ideas can influence human behaviorand that human behavior and social conditions determine the moralityof actions. A change in moralvaluation, for example, comes aboutwith a change in social conditions, (Gilman 1923, 119), since ethics is human conduct. The role of conscious human behavior is significant because we are the only species which is able to create its own environment(in our case a physical and a mental environment) and thereforethe only species able to create itself by makinguse of the environment. We have the power to develop an advancedrace, but we are held back by ideassuch as those that religionoften promotes, including and especially the idea that more emphasisshould be placedon a supposedafterlifethan on the presentnaturallife of which we are part. We are also held back by the nonparticipationof the female in society generallyand by the excessive influence of the male upon social evolution. Even one generationof educatedwomen could make a significantadvance in social evolution, Gilman believed, if all would join in the effort:

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In some thirty years these arousedwomen could send forth a new kind of people to help the world; better born; better trained;able to discriminateand reason, to judge wisely, and strong to carryout their decisions. All this was opened to us by the perception of evolution, the law of growth. (Gilman 1923, 92) BeforeconsideringGilman'stheory of social developmentand sexual relations in some detail, a summarywordabouther evolutionarythought in general is in order. There is much to be rejected in it. A good deal of her "science" is now outmoded, reflectingas it did the thinkingof her times. Moreover, she seems to have fallen victim to a rathernaive meliorismas regardsthe processesof biologicaland social evolution. Likesome other social Darwinists of the period she seems to have believed that improvements in physical health and stature, as well as intellectual and moraladvancement,could be literally "bred"into the human species in the space of a few generations. Lastly, in the implicit racismwhich pervadesher culturalcomparisonsand her assessmentof what she, along with her contemporaries,calls "savage"periods and peoples, she echoes the prejudicesof her culture and class. On the other hand, there is much in her social philosophywhich is valid today. The explanationof human behaviorby appealto scientific principles, of which Gilman was an earlyand ardentproponent,has been vindicated. It is now the receivedwisdomof social scientistsand philosophersof the generations which succeededhers. Her insight that previoushistorieshad createda skewed understandingof human nature by excessive reliance upon the descriptionof male experience as normativeis one which feministstoday continue to affirm.Her confidence in the power of ideology to influence scientific "truths"could not have been more accuratelyplaced, as the spectreof some contemporarysociobiologycontinues to make clear. As both the shortcomingsand the meritsof Gilman'sphilosophyare evident in her theory of human social and sexual development, a closer look at this central piece of her evolutionarythought is now necessary. AND THE TWO NATURES STAGESOF SOCIALEVOLUTION

According to the "GynaecocentricTheory," which Gilman learnedfrom LesterWard, the earliest stage of human developmentwas a stage of female superiority. The male at that stage representeda scattering ("katabolic") forcewhose function was fightingto wardoff enemies and to obtain food, and the female representeda conservingforce whose function was nurturing.It was maternalenergythat was transformedinto productiveindustryon behalf of the survivalof the race. According to the theory, responsibilityfor improvementof the human race fell to women, chiefly throughtheir selection

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of the best possible-in this case, the strongest and healthiest-mate. As Gilman was quick to note, the function of mate selection was in a laterstage usurpedby men, thus "reversingnature's order." Following upon the first stage came the androcentricstage, a periodof temporary(if long) subversion of women'spowers. It is the stage in which we still find ourselvesas a race. According to Gilman, the second stage has had a most deleterious effect upon humansocial evolution, retardingthe progressof the speciesas a whole, because in it the earlierand powerfulfemale energyhas been suppressed.A futurethird stage, she believed, will eventuallybringabout equalitybetween the sexes, which will effectivelyrestorethe humanrace to its rightfulpattern of evolutionaryprogress. According to the GynaecocentricTheory the male was little more than a "reproductiveagent"duringthe first stage of social evolution. Necessaryfor conception, he was not involved in gestation, birth, parturition, or childrearing.Laterthe female graduallyinvolved him in the rearingof the child, so that he came to have an active role in two out of the five "stages"of reproduction (conception, gestation, birth, parturition, and childrearing)-the first and the last. The familyas the basic economic unit of society only came aboutduringthe second periodof humansocial evolution, the stage of man's dominationof woman. Gilman looked upon the modem family, therefore,as a "relicof the patriarchalage" (Gilman 1898, 145). It is, she argued,wholly out of place on the thresholdof the era of sexual equalityand is presentlyin processof extinction (Gilman 1898, 155). The developmentof the human race throughstagesexhibits three laws of evolution at work. The law of self-preservationbringsaboutrace characteristics, such as industry.The law of race-preservation,or reproduction,which often takesprecedenceover self-preservation,bringsaboutsome race characteristics and some sex characteristics.The law of progresstowardimprovement of one's kind also bringsabout race and sex characteristics,including our intellectual characteristicsand the external manufacturedworld that we produce(Gilman 1923, 61). In humans the third law of evolution has been carriedout by the male (Gilman 1910, 88-9), who has been almost exclusively responsiblefor whateverculturaland social developmentsthe human race has enjoyed, becausehe has so severelyrestrictedthe female'ssphereof influence. Gilman restedher versionof the GynaecologicalTheoryon what I will call here "the theory of the two natures."In it she arguedthat every personhas two natures, a human nature and either a female or a male nature (Gilman 1911, 165). The two naturesoften promptto differentactions and provide differingmotivations.A woman, for example, mayrebel in her humannature againsta constraintwhich society imposeson her by reasonof her female nature.

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The most complete account she providedof her theoryof the two natures occurs in The Man-MadeWorld. "Let us begin inoffensively," she wrote, "withsheep" (Gilman 1911, 9). Gilman'saim was to identifythe sex characteristicsof animals, includinghumans, in orderto distinguishthem fromspecies characteristics.Citing the principlethat "functioncomes beforeorgan," she hypothesizedthat rams,being belligerent,growhorns;while ewes, being nurturanttowardtheir young, develop the meansto feed them with milk and to guardthem with their protective care. It is a sex characteristic,she suggested-here belligerency or nurturance-which brings about the physical feature.The same patterncan be observedthroughoutthe animalkingdom. "Masculine"or "feminine,"then, is that which belongs to the male or female, irrespectiveof species. All other characteristicsare those of the animal as a memberof its species:bovine, feline, canine, equine-or human-characteristics. Unfortunatelyfor their evolutionaryprogress,humans have become obsessedwith masculinityand femininity and very nearly ignoredthe common humanityof the two sexes. Furthermore,the "androcentric"culture of the patriarchalstage of social evolution has usurpedqualitieswhich are in reality human qualities and identified them falsely as male qualitiesor characteristics. We live, Gilman concluded, in a "masculized"world. An individual'shumannatureaffectssocial life and social development.A personcan exhibit a vast arrayof "humanprocesses":education, art, literature, history, and so on, quite apart from the individual'ssex. Specifically sex-identifiedprocessesarefarfewerin number.Gilman regardedfatherhood as the sole purposeof the male nature, motherhoodand the early education of the child as the sole purposesof the female nature. All the other myriad purposesfor which human beings are "suited,"she asserted,are human purposes. According to Gilman's analysis, male and female naturesare irreducibly distinct in several particulars.Male nature is characterizedby three distinguishingfeatures:Desire (for sexual activity and for other formsof self-interest), Combat (which is the origin of competition of all sorts), and Self-expression(the sourceof all ostentation, all the wayup to that remarkablearray which characterizesmilitarytrappings).Male natureexpressesthe centrifugal force of the universe and disposesits possessortowardthe use of force. The impulse to scatter, to disseminate, and to destroy is evident in the use of many projectilesby the male at play and in sports. Destructionhas, interestingly,one constructivefunction in evolutionary progress:it is the male processfor eliminatingthe unfit. Likewise, in evolutionaryterms, combat, or the destructiveimpulse,servestwo functions. It is a "subsidiaryprocess"(like destruction)for eliminatingthe unfit, and it aids in the transmissionof physicalsuperiority-although it does nothing to transmit psychic and social qualities. Gilman condemned excessive destruction

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and combativeness, in light of the ever diminishingneed for force as social development advances. Acerbically she once noted that men turned even modem forms of industryinto predatorywarfare.One need hardly wonder what she might think about "hostiletakeovers,""forcedbuyouts,"and other similarphenomena on the corporatebattlegroundtoday. Femalenature, in evolutionaryterms, expressesthe centripetalforceof the universe. It is the impulseto gather, to put together, and to construct. The humanmother is also the firstadministratorand executive of the race, by reason of her authorityover her children. If the male uses the destructiveenergy of his sexual nature to eliminate the unfit, the female uses her constructive and conservativeenergiesto select the fit. The female bringsabout race-improvementthroughheredity, of which she is the main agent, by selection of the best possible mate and by healthy childbirth. Gilman believed that the highest process in physical evolution is motherhood. Over all is the highest humanprocess,the processthroughhumannatureto develop physical, intellectual, and moral "fitness." While the differencesbetween the sexes serve the evolution of the human race up to a point, they pale in significanceto the importanceof the shared humanqualitiesthat all personspossess.It is in their common humannature that men and women ought to bring about race improvementthrough culture. The improvementof humansas a society is no morenor less than an extension of their physical improvementthroughheredity. The noble task of bringing this about belongs by nature to both sexes, although throughout modem history women have been prevented from making contributionsto the creation of culture. Gilman utterlyrejectedany suggestionthat male dominanceis natural.As alwaysshe looked to evolutionaryscience to buttressher argument,taking as her evidence the fact that the "instinctof dominance"did not appearduring the millions-of-times-longerperiodof naturalevolution that precededthe period of human male dominance. The human species is, afterall, a relatively recent evolutionarydevelopment, and-as she knew from the Gynaecological Theory-even within humanhistorynot all ageshad been characterized by patriarchalstructures.She found male dominanceto have emergedonly in the "moremodem and arbitrary"relation (Gilman 1923, 180). The theory of the two natureshas implicationsfor morallife as well as for physicaland economic development. The virtues most associatedwith men arecourage,justice, truth, loyaltyto one another, generosity,'patriotism,and honor. Those associatedwith women are the virtuesof a subjectclass:obedience, patience, industry,kindness, cheerfulness,modesty, gratitude,thrift, and unselfishness.However, all of these, both "male"and "female"qualities, are in realityhuman virtues,potentiallyattainablein a just society by persons of both sexes. Gilman assigned to modem women the task of developing

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"men's"virtues and to men the task of assistingtheir human sisters, whose moral growth had been stunted, in their efforts. Humans, like other living organisms,evolve in a progressivedevelopment, and it is important to recognize that their progressis vulnerable to being checked by forces in their environment. They themselvescan be such forces for one another, as the oppressionof women had demonstrated.To Gilman it seemed only good common sense that a healthier environmentwould generate a healthierpopulation,while an unhealthyone would impederacialprogress. Creating an environment in which individualsare excessively specialized to one function-for example, reproduction-is unhealthy. Thus women, who have been "modified"(that is, adaptedor specialized)down through many centuries to the service of sex functions as well as to other functions incorrectlyattributedto their sexualnature, while being prevented fromparticipationin the manyhumanfunctionsof culture, inhibit the development of the entire species through their own thwartedhuman development. An encouragingexception to the modificationof women to sex, Gilman noted with pride, is the "increasingarmyof women wage-earners,who are changing the face of the worldby their steadyadvance towardeconomic independence"(Gilman 1898, 63). These women were becomingsocial forces, and Gilman saw in them greatcausefor optimismthat social evolution would benefit from their active participationin economic relations. In her eyes the woman'sclub movement also had enormoussignificance, as the focus of the "first timid steps toward social organization" on the part of previously "unsocialized"membersof the race (Gilman 1898, 164) and of moraldevelopment on the part of the morallystunted. The ultimategoal of social evolution is a HumanWorld:an economic democracyresting on a free womanhood. Pointing to the unfortunatewillingness of earliersocieties to take life as a changelessfact, Gilman took encouragementfrom modem society'srecognitionof the evolutionarynatureof human relationships: All this is giving way fast in our new knowledgeof the laws of life. We find that Growth is the eternal law, and that even rocksareslowlychanging. Humanlife is seen to be as dynamic as any other form;and the most certainthing aboutit is that it will change. (Gilman 1911, 258) Our problem is that there has never been a true democracy, but only an to be ideal either, "androcracy."Gilman does not considera "gynaecocracy" a point she made in her utopian novel Herlandwhen she allowed the main charactersto leave the society of women for a society of men and women governed by scientificallyjustifiedlaws. Both sexes, she felt, need to share the ruling of their world.

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CONCLUSION

The new age with its movements for social change (especially the labor movement and the women's movement) indicated to Charlotte Perkins Gilman that the human race is eager to exercise its naturalfunction of production and not to be content with reproduction.This, she argued,was a measureof its social progress.The criterionshe offeredfor assessingour degree of advancement was: How much has the progressof individualsbeen madeavailableto all? It was easyfor her to see that measuredby this criterion only men had advanced,for all of women'senergieshad been spent in service of their immediatefamilies. Men's energies, expended in the creationof culture, had turnedindividualprogressinto progressof the whole. On the other hand, women had producedpeople, but they were not themselves society, any more than food is a social factorjust becausesociety cannot exist without it. A cogent analogy! Directly assertingthat "life means progress"(Gilman 1898, 208), she arguedthat all human relations-whether sexual (individual) or economic (social)-should be measuredby their effects upon the progressof social evolution. The health, happiness,and increasedorganicdevelopment of society will testify to our success or failure. In a single paper it has been possible only to present a small piece of Gilman'sprolificwork. My goalshere have been modest:to place her analysis of sex roles in its context, that of the evolutionarytheoriesof her day and, by implication, to suggestthat her philosophyshould be the focus of continued scholarly interest. To examine further her economic interpretationof the Gynaecocentric Theory would be a logical next step. The concept of the sexuo-economic relation between men and women-whereby women are obligedto seek their economic good throughthe exchangeof their sexualservices-is a separateprojectin itself, albeit one which would more than repay the effort. A more extensive survey,which examinesthe influenceof pragmatismon Gilman, is also needed in orderto place her accuratelywithin the historyof American philosophy. The instrumentalismof John Dewey would be a suggestive place to begin. Her views on the function of human intelligence are strikinglysimilarto his, and she sharedhis belief in the originaryimportance of evolutionarytheory to modem philosophy. She "verylikely"met Dewey personallyduring the time in which both were involved in Jane Addams' Hull House reformcampaigns(Hill 1980, 247n.), and she was in strongaccord with "his demand that learningserve as a reformer'stool" (Hill 1980, 247). It is clear that there is much in her work to disagreewith a centuryor so later, but it is also clear that Gilman's applicationof the majorintellectual discoveriesof her day to the problemof woman'scondition made a contribution that was originaland powerful.Alice Rossihas noted that "thereareany

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numberof ideas in Gilman'swritingsthat were the beginningsof an intellectually innovative view of sex differencesand their origins, yet they remained undevelopedand have not yet been seizedupon as significantproblemsin an intellectual history of human conceptions of basic sex differences"(Rossi 1973, 571). Today'ssocialist feministsdo "seizeupon" some of these ideas, especiallythat of the interdependenceof economic and sexualoppressionsin human history. The debt of Second Wave feminism to Charlotte Perkins Gilman is a profoundone, one which we slowlyrepayas we continue to build upon her radicalcontributionsto the FirstWave.

REFERENCES

Berkin, Carol Ruth. 1979. Private woman, public woman: The contradictions of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. In Womenof America:A history. Carol Ruth Berkin and Mary Beth Norton, eds. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Ehrenreich,Barbaraand DeirdreEnglish. 1978. Forherowngood:150 yearsof the experts'adviceto women.GardenCity, NY: Doubleday. New York:AppletonFisch, Max. H. 1951. ClassicAmericanphilosophers. Century-Crofts. Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. 1979. Herland.NY: RandomHouse. .1923. His religionandhers:A studyof thefaithof ourfathersandthework of our mothers.NY: The Century Company. . 1903. The home:Its workand influence.NY: The CharltonCompany. . 1911. The man-madeworld or, our androcentricculture. NY: The Charlton Company. ~- . [1898.] 1966. Womenandeconomics:A studyof theeconomicrelationbetween women and men as a factor in social evolution.Reprint, Carl N. Degler. NY: Harper& Row. Hill, MaryA. 1980. CharlottePerkinsGilman:Themakingof a radicalfeminist, 1860-1896. Philadelphia:Temple University Press. Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. SocialDarwinismin Americanthought.(Revised ed.) Boston, MA: The Beacon Press. Lane, Ann J., ed. 1980. The CharlottePerkinsGilmanreader:"The yellow wallpaper"and otherfiction. NY: RandomHouse. Mahowald,MaryB. 1987. A majorityperspective:Feminineand feministelements in American philosophy. Crosscurrents36 4: 410-417. Spender, Dale. 1982. Womenof ideasand whatmen havedone to themfrom AphraBehnto AdrienneRich. Boston: Routledge& Kegan Paul. Vanderpool,Harold, ed. 1973. Darwinand Darwinism:Revolutionary insights man, nature,religionandsociety.Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath concerning and Company.

Edith Stein's Philosophy of Woman and of Women's Education MARY CATHARINE BASEHEART

EdithStein,Husserl'sbrilliantstudentandassistant,devotedtenyearsof herlife to teachingin a girls'secondaryschool,duringwhichtimeshegavea seriesof lectureson educationalreformand the appropriate educationto be providedto girls. accountof thenatureof Shegroundsheranswerto thesequestionsin a philosophical woman.Shearguesthatmenandwomensharesomeuniversallyhumancharacteristics,butthattheyhaveseparateanddistinctnatures.Herawarenessof therichvaallows amongindividuals rietyof differentpersonalitytypesand specificdifferences herto holdan essentialistview of the natureof womanwithouteitherstereotyping individual womenorassumingthatwoman'snatureis in any wayinferiorto man's.

EdithStein (1891-1942) was a prominentGerman-Jewishphilosopher,educator, lecturer, and feminist in Germany in the period between the two World Wars, at the time when Hitler was coming to power. After 1932, her public activity was halted, and she died at Auschwitzin August 1942, a victim of the Holocaust. Her student days at the universitiesof Breslau,Gottingen, and Freiburgim-Breisgauwere characterizedby disciplinedstudyof phenomenologyunder EdmundHusserl, in companywith the famousscholarswho engagedhim in discussionand dialogue:Max Scheler, Adolf Reinach, FritzKaufmann,Roman Ingarden, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Alexandre Koyre, and Martin Heidegger,to name only a few. For severalyears, after achieving the Ph.D. summacum laudeat Freiburgin 1917, she was Husserl'sassistant,transcribing and editing his voluminousworks. She remaineda phenomenologist,but in her effortsto constructher own body of theory, there is evidence of a strong impulsetowardsynthesisof phenomenologywith what she found acceptable in the philosophyof other times and other schools. Ten volumes of her workshave been publishedby Nauwelaerts(Louvain) and Herder(Freiburg)posthumously.They could not be publishedin her lifetime becauseof the ban on worksby non-Aryanwriters;however, beforethe ban, a numberof Stein's lengthy articleshad appearedin Husserl'sJahrbuch Forschung.Her works deal with a wide fur Philosophieand phdnomenlogische but of running through all her work is the range philosophical subjects, Hypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989) ? by MaryCatharine Baseheart

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threadof the investigationof the natureand structureof the human person, from her first full-length book on Einfihlung(Empathy)to the largework of her maturity,EndlichesundEwigesSein(FiniteandEternalBeing).The circumstances that arousedher feminist interestsin theory and practicewill be apparentin the body of the paperthat follows. Fora more complete account in Englishof her life, see WaltraudHerbstrith,EdithStein,A Biography (Harper & Row, 1985). When you readthe views of EdithStein on womanand woman'seducation which she expressedfrom the lectureplatformsof Europeancities more than fifty yearsago, you get the impressionthat here is a womanwho could speak calmly and brilliantlyon the subject today. Stein mediatesthe polaritiesof the extreme-feminismand the eternal-feminismpositions in a way that is highly flexible in theory and practice, since it encompasseswoman ih all her dimensions:her humanity,her femininityand her individuality.Her concept of woman is rich and open, not a stereotype. By virtue of her openness to change and her active desire to stir up a revolution in education, she is a woman to turn to for furtherquestions and insights in the presentperiod of reform. The question of why Edith Stein, whose workhad been predominantlyin speculativephilosophy,spoke and wrote aboutthe philosophyof womanand of educationcan be answeredonly in the light of conditions in Germansociety at the time and of her own personalexperiencesin the role of philosopher and educator.In one of her firstlectureson the subject,1 it is evident that she was responding to the current desperate situation of German education, which she describedas a shambles, calling for complete demolition and reconstructionfromthe groundup. She sawthe problemsplaguingwomen'seducation as part and parcel of the general crisis. Her analysisfound one root of the crisis in the fact that the educational systemwas essentiallya child of the Enlightenment,with its ideal of encyclopedic knowledgeand its conception of mind as a tabularasaon which should be imprinted as much factual and intellectual material as possible (Stein 1959, 73-4). The second basic difficulty, in her opinion, was the male-orientedand male-dominatededucationalsystem. Stein definitelybelieved that education is too importantto be left to men only, that educationwas sufferingfromthe lack of women'sinput of ideas, and that it needed their contributionsin the areasof teaching, research,and administration. Changesin educationhad not kept pace with the reformseffectedin political and economic life afterWorld War I; for example, the 1919 Constitution of the Reich had grantedequality and full citizenshiprights to women and opened the way for them to assumepositions in governmentand professional life, but adequate programsof preparationwere lacking at all educational levels.

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Earlyin hercareer,EdithSteindoesnot appearto havebeen concered withtheseproblems. Thedescription of herownschoolingwhichshegivesin her autobiography is verypositive.Her rigorousand demandingeducation wasquitein accordwithherowninterestsanddesires.Sheheldherownwith herfellow-students of bothsexesandwasheldin respectbythemandbyher Shewasusuallyin teachers,bothin the lowerschoolsandin the universities. the companyof spirited,intellectual,interestingcompanionsin her social life as well as in the schools.It has alreadybeen notedabovethat she was the Ph. D. degreeat theUniversityof Freiburg awarded summacumlaudeand becameHusserPsassistantsoon after,transcribing and editinghis writings andgivingnewstdents preliminary forhis classes.Herlettersto instruction her friendRomanIngarde in 1917and 1918revealthe frustrations of this workwhichledto herresignation in 1918:Husserlwouldnot rereadherwork andtell her whethershe hadmadea correctrenderingof his texts, nordid shehaveanytimeleftforherownoriginalwork.Husserlprovednot to be inwithheras a colleagu-nor withanyotherscholterestedin collaborating for The that matter. next stepwouldnaturally havebeenforherto "haars, a at the university,but that to become full-scale member bilitate," is, faculty of a womanwouldhavebeena mathiswasrefusedbecausethe appointment jor breakwith tradition.3 In the fallof 1919,whensheagainattemptedto habilitate,thistimeat the Universityof Gttingen, the attemptmet with failur for the samereason. At thispointEdithwroteanappealto the Prussian MinistryforScience,Art, on andEducation,and February 21, 1921,MinisterBeckerissueda milestone rulingin responseto herappeal,declaringforthe firsttimethat"membership in German in the femalesex maynot be seenas an obstacleto habilitation" cauniversities.Heractionclearedthe wayforwomenseekinga professorial butit wasanotherthirtyyearsbeforethe reerin fieldsotherthanphilosophy; firstGermanwomanactuallyhabilitatedandtookup teachingdutiesin philosophyat a Germanuniversity.Steinherselfmadea finalattemptto habiliand Breslauin 1931;but, in spiteof her of Freiburg tate at the universities she did not succeed.This timenot only sexismbut eminentqualifications, alsoanti-Semitism blockedthe way. In spring1932,sheacceptedthe offerto jointhefacultyof the GermanInstituteof ScientificPedagogyin Miinster,whereher lectures,particularly thoseon the philosophyof the person,attractedstudentsfromthe university as wellas herown studentsin educationat the institute. If Steinhadsucceededin herhabilitationattemptsandhadcontinuedher careerin the ranksof the philosophyfacultyat Freiburg,Gottingenor Breslau,it seemsdoubtfulthat she wouldhave probedthe practical,pragmaticissuespertainingto educationto the extentthatappearsin DieFrau.It is naturalto suppose,however,that, givenher persistentpursuance of the in the femithemeof the personin herphilosophizing andherparticipation

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nist movement in Germany,she might have undertakena phenomenological inquiryinto the nature and destiny of woman. Her nine yearsof teaching girlsat St. Magdalena'sin Speyer,as well as her briefstint in Minster, and her involvement in associationsintent on educational reformof both public and privateschools, made it inevitable that she wouldfollow her characteristicbent of seekingsolutionsby analysesof underlying philosophicalfoundations.The lecturetoursset up for her in Germany, Switzerland,and Austria between 1928 and 1932 by Eric Przywarawere an additionalincentive. These lectures, assembledfrom subsequentpublication in periodicalsand frommanuscripts,and edited by LucyGelberand Romaeus Leuven, form BandV of EdithSteinsWerke,entitled Die Frau.This volume, publishedin 1959, is the principalsourceof knowledgeof her philosophyof woman and of education.4 In approachingthe subjectof woman'snatureand role, Stein does not ignore the importanceof the empiricalsciences of anatomy and physiology, psychology,and sociology. She outlines a total configurationalapproachthat makesuse of their methods and content, especiallythat of a psychologythat passesbeyond itself to anthropological,sociological, and cosmologicalconsiderations,thus treatingwomanas she exists in the life world.5 Her analysis, however, culminatesin the philosophicalmethod, whose propernoetic function is to explorewhat is necessaryand possibleto beings (in this case, to the being of woman), accordingto their nature, and in the theological, which brings divine Revelation to bear on the question (Stein 1959, 125-130). Only the philosophicalwill be treated in this paper. The philosophical method which she employs is, she maintains, distinct fromthat of the positive sciences and gives their necessaryfounding. In phe"intuition," which nomenological terminology it is the Wesensanschauung, effectsthe cognitive graspof concreteobjectsin their universalstructure.She comparesthis intuitionwith the noetic function termedabstractionin traditional philosophy (Stein 1959, 126). Stein insistson reliablemethod in probingthe essence of woman, although she grantssome value to pre-scientificexperience. All of us know women by experience and think we know what a woman is, she says. But if we drawa generalimagefromthese experiences,we cannot be surewhetheror not this is a faultygeneralization,whetherwhat has actuallybeen observedin certain cases does not fail to be truefor others. Individualexperiencehas to be critically examined. Has even individualwoman been properlyunderstood?Experiencesare subjectto errorand deception, and here the dangeris, perhaps, greaterthan elsewhere. Or, perhaps,we are presentedwith an ideal image which serves as a standardby which to ascertainwhether others are genuine women. She notes the necessity of askingthe sourceof the ideal image and what value it has to increaseour knowledge(Stein 1959, 126-127). Stein is cognizant of the difficulties of demonstrating the cognitive universality

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sought, of organizingthe data, and of making it truly scientific.6 In the of woman, of "bringingthe essence processof effecting the Wesensanchauung to givenness,"Stein proceedsto considerwoman in the context of ontology, that is, of the science of the basic forms of being (Sein) and of beings (Seienden).In the gradationof finite being, all lowergrades(inorganic,plant, animal) are, in a sense, contained in the human structureof rationalbeing, which occupies a unique, superiorposition. The structureof human being which she presentshere repeatsthat enlargedupon in her earlierworks, beginning with her dissertationon Empathy:materialbody, living body, soul, spirit,all of which belong to the humanspeciesas such. There is anothersimple differentiation,she adds, that cuts throughthe differentiationof humanity into a boundless multiplicity of individualsof unrepeatablesingularity: this is the sexual differentiation (geschlechtliche Differenzierung).Since her in human have included woman at every step, and of being general analyses since philosophy, as such, does not analyzethe individualas individual,her analysisin Die Frauis directedtowardwoman as woman, althoughit encompasses her totality: her humanity, her womanhood, and her individuality (Stein 1959, 131-132). The central question in the investigationis whether woman and man are distinct species, each having an ontologically differentessence or nature.7 Do the differences observed between man and woman involve the whole structureof the personor only the body and those psychicfunctionsnecessarily related to physical organs (Stein 1951, 133)? Scientific investigationsin Germanyat this time, she says, presumethe differencebetween the sexes to be a universalfact. They try to establishthe uniquenessof each throughdistinguishingcharacteristicswhich appearon an averageor throughquantitative measuresof their frequencyof occurrence;but she does not think they succeed in presentinga complete imageof the uniqueness,and they have not yet distinguishedwhether the uniquenessis to be consideredas variabletype or stable species(Stein 1959, 122-123).8 In the practicalorderof the women'smovement, there are significantimplications in the questionof whetherwoman is presentedas a distinct species fromman within the human species. If she is, then there are special characteristicsof woman which can contributeto every areaof human life and endeavorand which can complementmale characteristicsand service in home, school, state, and church. Edith Stein sincerelybelieves that this is the case. In order to understandthe question properly,Stein holds that one must understandthe relationshipamong gender, species, type, and individual.By speciesshe understandssomethingfixed, which does not change. Within the hylomorphictheory she holds that the innerformdeterminesthe structureof the being, its nature, which we seek to graspin its essential features,actual and potential. The fact that the potential can become actual indicates that when Stein defines species as that which does not change, she is not using

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the term changein an absolute sense. She distinguishestypeby stating that typeis not unchangeablein the same sense that speciesis. In the courseof development, a person may exhibit change of type and individualcharacteristics, but these changes take place within the limits set by the inner form or species (Stein 1959, 109, 119-121). The basic question is, then, whetheror not the differenttypessharea uniformand unchangeablecore which can be regardedas characterizingwoman as a species. If there are no such species as woman and man, but only types, then the transformationof one type to anotherought to be able to take place in varyingconditions. If each is a species, it cannot be changed by environmental, cultural, or professionalfactors (Stein 1959, 109 119-121).9 The positive sciences, in her opinion, can signifyonly that a thing is conditioned in one way or anotherunderthis or that circumstancethat it mayact, or possibly must act in one way or another. It remainsfor philosophyto reach the inner form, the ontological structure. After a lengthy, methodical considerationof the subject, Stein arrivesat the image (Bild) of woman. She calls it a sketching (Skizzerung)and uses broadstrokesto present an outline, which, she says, is open to enrichment and modification. It representsprogresstowardgiving the essence of woman its logical place in philosophicalanthropology,as she expressesit. A translation of her own words may best convey her thinking about the nature of woman: . . . the specieshumanbeingis actualizedas a doublespeciesof man and woman;the essence of humanbeing, in which no essential feature can be lacking in either one, is stamped in a binate way, and the entire essence-structuredisplaysthe specific stamp. It is not only the materialbody (K6rper)that is structureddifferently:not only are there differentphysiological functions, but the entire living-body (Leib) life is something else; the relationshipof soul and living-bodyis different, and within what pertainsto the soul, the relation of spirit to sense faculty as well as the relation of spiritualpowersto one another is different. The female species answersto unity and wholenessof the body-soulpersonalityas a holistic, harmonious unfoldingof the powers;the male species, to the perfecting of individual powers to the highest degree (Stein 1959, 138). Thus Stein believes that sexual differentiationextends beyond the somatic and psycho-somaticfunctions connected with the physicalto the total structureand that woman'sformmustbe specificallydifferentfromman's.She recognizesalso that the whole problemof the body-mindrelationshipas it enters

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into sex differenceneeds furtherresearch,with the aid of whateverlight genetics can give (Stein 1959, 133-134).10 Although she discovers in the nature of woman a central, unchangeable core (Kern),she states that there are manyfeminine types accordingto natural endowments.She describes,for example, the typesgiven by the psychologist Else Croner:the maternal,the erotic(stronglysexual), the romantic,the sedate(sensible), and the intellectualtypes (Stein 1959, 136-137). l Anyone who has taught girls, she adds, recognizesstudentsof one or other of these types, as well as of mixed typesor of still other types. The types, as well as the individuals,she points out, are definitely influencedby the times and by the particularenvironmentalcircumstancesof the women's lives. In her generalizationsregardingthe natureof woman, she does not hesitate to make reservations,e.g., when she writes that femininity is expresseddifferentlyin differentindividuals.They realizethe speciesmoreor less perfectly and show the various characteristicsmore or less pronouncedly.Man and woman have the same basic human characteristics,some of which predominate not only in one or other sex but also in individuals;therefore, some women may closely approximatethe masculine nature and some men, the feminine nature (Stein 1959, 139). In explaining further the sameness and difference of men and women, Stein begins with woman'srole as parallelingman'sin showingforth the image of God. Here, although it may seem that she is in the realm of religion ratherthan that of philosophy, her ideas may be interpretedwithin a philosophic theism. To be God's imageboth man and woman must develop their powersof knowing,of enjoying,and of creativemakingin orderto imageGod's wisdom, goodness, and power. Woman mirrorsthe divine perfections in characteristicways. Her primaryrole of being companionand mother (this, fulfillednot just in a physicalsense) and her waysof knowing, enjoying, and creatingare particularlyadaptedto this role as well as to her role in national and professionallife. Her strength, she thinks, is in the intuitive graspof the living, inner world of others, of entering into their aims and ways of work. Feeling (Gemiit)is her specialgift. The principleof the womanlysoul is serving love. Her specialfunction is to nourish, shelter, and cherish (Stein 1959, 3-4, 32-34, 138-139, 171). Stein's statement that woman'sways of knowing are characterizedby the intuitive graspof the living, the concrete, the personaldoes not imply a negation of her capacityfor graspingthe abstract.It does signifythat characteristicallywomen are not content to remainon the level of the abstract.They want the ideological, the conceptual, to be related to the world of persons and things. They want psychology, for example, to have something to do with human beings, sociologyto have somethingto do with the concrete human situation, and physics to be related to the real world of experience.12

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In her emphasison the active characterof woman, Stein opposesthe view that predicatespassivityas a characteristicdisposition, either innate or acquired, in woman. Activity is the key concept in her schema for all education. If a woman is to become what she is by nature and by her calling, she should not forgetherselfbut bringher gifts and powersto perfection. Passivity wouldbe incompatiblewith the roles which Stein describesfor women in marriageand motherhood,in religiouslife, in the professions,and in political and cultural life. "There is no profession that cannot be practiced by a woman,"accordingto Stein. Professionswhich she lists as dependingon special feminine gifts (though, of course, not exclusively so) include those of doctor and nurse, social worker,and scholar, especiallyin the sciences pertaining to the human person;but some women have the capacityfor service in professionsthat have been regardedas typicallymasculine,such as those in businessand industry,government,administration,law, science, and mathematics. To these, women may bring a special dimension that will benefit both men and women (Stein 1959, 7-9). Stein's philosophyof education flows from her conviction that education should lead women to affirmand develop not only the powerswhich they possessin common with men but also their properfeminine natureand their individuality. Education should preparethem to fulfill their destiny to be companions and mothers, a destiny which can be fulfilled on the spiritual level in single life as well as in marriedlife. Serving love has been given above as her idea of a characteristicof the womanlysoul; however, this serving love, she says, shouldnot find expressionin a falsemystiqueof sacrificeor in a mystiqueof sex. Their educationshouldbe both liberaland professional to preparethem for the work-world,whether they actually enter it or not (Stein 1959, 73-88). Edith Stein's concept of education is simplyexpressed:It is the formation of human personality.It is not an external possessionof knowledgebut the process by which human personality takes form under various influences within and without the person. The "material"which is to be formedis the psycho-physical-spiritual predispositionswhich each person has at birth, as well as the raw materialswhich are constantly taken from the environment and built into the living being. The body drawson the materialworld;the soul, on the world of personsand values. The fundamentalformationhappens from within. In each human being there is a unique inner form which all education from outside must respect and aid in its movement towardthe determinedform, the mature,fully developed personality(Stein 1959, 73-88). Although in every individualthere can be distinguishedthe tripartitecomplexusof being human, being woman or man, and being this individualperson, only in the abstractare these consideredseparately:the single form is the principleof all the person'spowers and characteristics,human, feminine or masculine, and individual.

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Much of what she says and writesabout education is in the context of the educationof women and followsfromher theoryof woman'snatureand role. Education,she holds, should preparewomen in such a way that they will be able to make free and wise choices of life roles. Becauseof the wide rangeof individualdifferences,women should not have to conformto a pattern. Human and femalepersonalityin some is adaptedto the one choice of being wife and mother; in others, to the choice of a single life and a career;others may choose marriageandworkoutsidethe home. The doublerole had become increasinglycommon in Germany in Stein's day, as it has in contemporary America. She was awareof the tensions and problemsinvolved, and the solutions she offershave much in common with those of today. She remindshusbandsof their obligationnot to let their wives' intellectualand spirituallives atrophythroughlack of time and opportunityfor development. "Continuing education"and "life-long learning"were not phrasesin her vocabulary,but the ideas are unquestionablyin her educationalphilosophy. It is obvious that the feminismwhich emergesin Edith Stein's wordsand actions is of a positive, non-competitive, non-combative kind, calling women to the fullness of the vocation which they share with men, but also takingcognizanceof the special gifts which each sex possesses.If women are to fulfill their highest function of developing the humanity of others, she says, they mustbecome fully-developedhumanbeingsthemselves. Education is the key to women'sfulfillment,just as it is for men. Eachwomanshouldbe educated to her full potential, and women's specific gifts and bents should find expressionin national and culturallife as well as in the home. Thus education should preparewomen not only for homemakingbut also for professional proficiencyand for political and social responsibility.In summary,it may be observedthat Stein's penchant for unity and synthesis is evident in her endorsement of activity and receptivity in women of abstractnessand concretenessin feminine ways of knowing;of stimulationand development of head andheart in the formationof personality,which is the function of education. Forboth men and women, "the intellect is the key to the kingdomof the The intellect must be pressed into activity. It cannot become spirit .... brightand sharpenough," but purelyintellectualknowing does not result in real formationof the person unless the knowledgeis interiorized.The training of the intellect shouldnot be extended at the expense of the schooling of the heart. The mean should be the target (Stein 1959, 80-83). The educatormust rememberthat there is not merelya speculativeintellect but a practicalintellect as well. It is importantto trainthe latterproportionately throughconcrete tasks. Educationcomprisesalso a schooling of the will, acts of which are continuallyrequired.The abstractactivityof the intellect and the concrete applicationshould go hand in hand (Stein 1959, 171172).

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The basic curriculumin schools at all levels should include generaleducation and should be adaptedto the natureand vocational/professionalgoalsof the student. The college curriculum,she says;should include a strongstrain of liberal-artssubjects"crownedby the integratingdisciplinesof philosophy and theology."The liberal-artscomponent, she understandsas includingthe humanities, the naturalsciences and mathematics,and the social sciences; and she againemphasizedthat for the total educationof the person,the disciplines should not be taught in a purelyabstractway, but shouldbe relatedto the concrete and the personalas far as possible (Stein 1959, 171-172). In consideringthe "schoolingof the will," referredto above, one may ask how values enter into Stein's educationalschemata. In this regard,her basic principlesare revealed in her philosophyof person, which comprisesextensive analysesof affective acts and their relation to cognition and to the valuing activity of the person. On the groundof cognition there can and mayoccur the cognizingof value or non-value without affectivepositing of accompanying feeling towardor away from the object; but for valuing to be completely filled, the value-intuitionand response-reactionmustbe filled. When the lively interestof the ego is lacking, there is no felt value. Since the egodata are alwayspresentin valuingand since each individualis unique, if education is to function in bringingthe student to effective valuing activity and affectiveresponse,the teachermust take into account the uniquenessof each student as well as the universalmeaning-coredetachablefromthe individual mental coloring. This involves the total structureof the personand contact with the value worldin which he/she lives, the attitudes,drives, and motives which undergirdthe values and guide the actions. In assistingthe student to change faulty values and to rise to higher values, Stein appearsto hold the position that the approachis indirect, by way of appealto reason in orderto lead the student to clarifyhis/her valuesand applythe law of reasonto arrive at feeling-forming,choice, and decision. Feeling-formingis very important, since feeling (Gemut) holds a central position in changingpersonalattitudesand actions, but it cannot carryout its taskwithout the cooperationof intellect and will. Feeling, or emotion, needs the light of the intellect and the discipline of the will. If these are lacking, emotional life becomes a compulsionwithout direction. The teacher'svery being and actions give tremendousimpetusin the processof students'forming feelings, valuing, and choosing (Stein 1959, 55). In all education, Stein states realistically,naturalpredispositionsand the subject'sfreedomset limits to what can be accomplishedby external educational efforts, which only provide subject matter and make it appealing. These can show the way but cannot force acceptance and imitation (Stein 1959, 57). Stein's ultimategroundingof value education, as of her total theoryof education, is to be found in religiouseducation. Her ideason religiouseducation

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are beyond the scope of this paperon her philosophy.The fact that she considersthe subject accordingto "natureand grace"makes it possibleto separate the two and to treatonly nature. It shouldbe said, though, that her ideas yield their full significance when reviewed in the context of her unified ChristianWeltanschauung,which was enriched by her Jewish heritage. Although this paper is focused on Stein's philosophy, it should be noted that the conceptual structureis often concertizedand illuminatedby literary allusions.An example in point is her comparativeanalysisof three women in literature: Ingunn Steinfinnsdatter from Sigrid Undset's The Master of Hestviken;Ibsen'sNora from A Doll's House; and Goethe's Iphigenia(Stein 1959, 46-52). 13 The differencesamong them are great, but in Stein's analysesthey are shown to shareone common characteristic;the desireto give love and receive love, and, in this respect, a longing to be lifted out of the narrownessof their actual, factualexistence to higherbeing and acting (Stein 1959, 51-52). In anothercontext, she gives a descriptionof the idealwomansoul that is chargedwith poetic and emotional intensity (Stein 1959, 77-80). These passageshighlight woman'sspecial nature and role. Stein's phenomenologyof woman is a good example of the way in which she takes Husserlianmethodologyof seeking knowledgeof essence of an entity under investigation and adaptsit to the complexities of the entity as it exists and operatesin the world of experience. Thus she attemptsto implement Husserl'sidea of "concrete essence" and avoids the tendency toward over-abstraction that can plague a philosophy of essence. Stein looks at woman'shumanity, femininity, and individualityfrom all sides as it is encountered in real life experiencesand in the vicariousexperiencesof literature. Her view invites further exploration of its implications in present searchings into strengths and potentialities, sameness and difference of woman as woman and of each individualwoman. NOTES 1. Referencesin this paperare made to the 1959 Germanedition. Translationsand paraphrasesare the author'sown. 2. Her remarkshave a touch of good-naturedhumor;e.g., in the letter of January18, 1917, she wrote:"I muststay with him [Husserl]until I marry;then I musttake only a husbandwho will likewise be his assistant, and the children too ...." And in a letter to FritzKaufmann,dated January12 of the same year, she had written that she could not get him to look at the whole finishedtreatisewhich she made of the old materialthat he had lost, and so she had resolvedto bringit to accessibleformwith him or without him. Then it could not be lost. It shouldbe noted that she and Husserlremaineddevoted friendsto the end of his life. 3. The followingare the sourcesof data concerningStein's resignationand effortsfor habilitation: in Briefen,EdithSteinsWerke.8: 15-48. Louvain:Nauwelaerts Stein, Edith. 1976. Selbstibildnis and Freiburg:Herder. McAlister, LindaLopez, with WaltroutStein. The forthcomingaccount of Edith Stein's life to 4. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster:MartinusNijhoff. appearin A historyof womenphilosophers. Volume I appearedin 1987. Herbstrith,Waltraud. 1985. EdithStein,a biography.28, 55-57. New Yorkand London:Harper and Row.

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4. The other eight lecturesor essaysin Die Frau,all on subjectspertainingto womanand to education, were deliveredor composedbetween 1928 and 1932, and were presentedbeforevarious associationsof academicwomen in cities such as Salzburg,Munster,Ludwigshafen,Zurich, Augsburg,etc. 5. For discussionof her method, see Die Frau, 122-137. 6. In Note 17, p. 127 of Die Frau,Stein selects one of manyGermanworkson the natureof woman to discuss:The rhythmof being:A studyon thefoundationof a metaphysics of the sexes,by Thoma Angelica Walter (Freiburg,1932). She terms it a scientific, pioneering achievement which treatsthe questionof the sexes in an ontologicalcontext. Her criticalanalysisof this work indicates both its strengthsand weaknesses.In Note 21, p. 132, after an extensive analysisof Walter'sschema of being, Stein questionswhether male and female are really to be understood only as "rhythmsof being"or whethera distinctionof substantialformis the groundfordifferent rhythmsof being. 7. In her use of the termsnatureand essence,Stein seemsto employthem interchangeablyat times, but at others to allow for the emphasison function in the word nature. 8. In the courseof her analyses,she refersto investigationsof Mausbach,O. Lipman,Rudolf Allers, and others. 9. See also pp. 133-134, in which Stein raises questions pertaining to genetic problems which seem to relate to evolution, which she would like to investigate at another time. She raises,also, the question (which remindsone of Jungiantheory)whetherthe natureof each individualmight contain both masculineand feminineelements, with one of these predominatingin each person. 10. See also M.C. Baseheart.1966. On educatingwomen:The relevanceof Stein, in Continuum, (vol. 4) Illinois. 11. The work of Croner which Stein cites is Die Psycheder weilbichen Jugend(Langensalza, 1930). 12. Cf. Riesman(1965) would like to see morewomen in science not only for the sakeof talented women but also for the sakeof science. To his mind, prevalent"masculine"modelsof academic performanceare inclined to favor abstractionto the point that the academicdisciplines are not relatedto the worldoutside, nor to the concrete, but to each other and to their own intemal development. Grantedthat there have been changessince Riesmanexpressedthese ideas, they may still have some validity. 13. Stein refersalso to women charactersin Schiller's Glocke, Chamissos'Frauenliebeundleben,and others which Zola, Strindberg,and Wedekind delineate. REFERENCES

Boedeker,Elizabethand MariaMeyer-Plath. 1987. 50 JahreHabilitationvon Frauenin Deutschland.Boston: MartinusNijhoff. Riesman, David. 1965. Some Dilemmasof women'seducation, in theEducationalRecord46:423-427. Stein, Edith. 1987. Essayson woman.F.M. Oben, trans. Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications. Stein, Edith. 1959. Die Frau, EdithStein'sWerke.L. Gelber and R. Leuven, eds. Louvain:Nauwelaertsand Freiburg:Herder. Stein, Edith. 1986. Life in a Jewishfamily, 1981-1916. J. Koeppel, trans. Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications.

On Not Teaching the History of Philosophy MARY ELLENWAITHE

whichexcludecontributions Coursesin thehistoryof philosophy madeby women cannotlegitimately claimto teachthishistory.Thisis true,not merelybecausethose historiesare incomplete,butratherbecausetheygivea biasedaccount.I sketchthe a less for developing difficultiesthusposedfor theprofession,and offersuggestions biased,moreaccurateunderstanding of the historyof philosophy.

At the Seventh BerkshireConference on the History of Women (June 1987), KarenWarren(MacalesterCollege, St. Paul, MN) challengedphilosophy departmentsto integratethe historyof philosophycurriculumand teach the worksof women philosophers.ProfessorWarrenwarnedthat the likeliest method of integrationwouldbe to "addwomen and stir."In this paper,I will firstsuggestwhy "addingwomen and stirring"is a recipe for not teaching the historyof philosophy. I will then explain why a modifiedversionof the "add women and stir"model could, however, be a temporarilyacceptablemodel. Finally, I will describesome projectswhich may contributetowardsdeveloping a literaturewhich offersa reasonablyaccuratehistoryof our discipline, a literaturewhich can form the foundationnot only for a historyof philosophy curriculum,but for teaching within the discipline generally. Accounts of the two millennia history of our discipline are astonishingly incompleteand incorrect.Those accountstypicallyomit any mention of contributionsmade to philosophyby women. The historiesI am referringto include those multi-volume series created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the standardEnglish-languageanthologiesand introductorytexts which are the mainstaysof philosophylibrariesand curricula. Throughthem, philosophyis effectively, but not explicitly, portrayedas an essentiallymale enterprise. Hypatia of Alexandria and Hildegardof Bingen were consideredby their contemporariesto be philosophers,but later historiansreferto Hypatiaas a "mathematician/astronomer,"and to Hildegard as a "theologian/medical theorist."Yet what Hypatia and Hildegardwrote fit descriptionsof philosophy in their respectiveeras. We must remindourselvesthat the definition of the discipline philosophyhas undergonesignificantmetamorphosisover the Hypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989) ? by MaryEllen Waithe

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millennia. If we accept descriptionsof philosophyin use at particularperiods, we find woman-authoredworksfitting those descriptions.Women have been philosopherssince at least the time of Theano I. The fragmentarywritingsof Aesaraof Lucaniaand those by other ancient women philosophers,show that with the possible exception of those centuries appropriatelyreferredto as "the darkages,"there is an unbrokenhistoryof women philosophersfromancient times until the present day. I is undertandablethat our students and our colleaguesbelieve that women did not make substantialcontributionsto philosophy.The opinion that for two millennia there wereno women philosophers has achieved the status of received (and unspoken) doctrine in our profession.When scholarsof the historyof women philosophersfind or analyzeor translatethe worksof a womanphilosopher,we have a sense of having contributedsomethingto the understandingof the historyof women philosophers. And we have. We are tempted to correct the omission of the worksof women philosophersfromour historyof philosophycoursesby "addingwomen and stirring" them into the curriculum.If we resistthis temptation, and say nothing about women philosophersof the past, we leave studentsof our discipline to conclude that our foremothershad neither abilities nor interestsin philosophy. This is false. What is immediatelydesirableis adding women and stirring them into the curriculum either through separate courses to examine women'scontributionsto a particularhistoricalperiod, or to a particularsubspecialty within philosophy or through incorporatingthe study of women philosophersin existing history of philosophycoursesand in existing topics courses.The breakdownsand combinationswouldbe tediousto list here, and anythingfromminor changes to existing coursesto complete curricularoverhaul would be an improvementover the present situation in most universities. Some examplesof course-tinkeringto includeEnglish-languageworksor translationsof works by women philosophersspring to mind. Metaphysics should include Anne ViscountessConway and MargaretCavendish;epistemology should include Julian of Norwich and Catherine Trotter Cockbum. Philosophyof mathematicsand logic merits inclusion of Sophie Bryantand Christine Ladd-Franklin; moral philosophy should include Aesara of Lucania, Perictione I, Phintys, Theano II, and HarrietTaylor Mill. These are only a few examples. Nonetheless, just as the omissionof women philosophersfromthe philosophy curriculumperpetuatesone untruth, addingwomen and stirringperpetuates another. If we succumbto temptation and add a dropperfulof women philosophersto our courserequirements-perhapsby assigninga term paper about a nineteenth century woman philosopher-we invite our students to infer that such women were both prodigiesand oddities. That, also, is false. Both the omission of women and the inclusion of a few women perpetuates untruthsabout women and about philosophy. What we need to teach is not

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only the historyof women philosophers,but the historyof philosophyitself. We cannot now do this because we ourselves are barely acquainted with worksof women philosophers.What then, can we do? We can modify the "addwomen and stir"models. It wouldbe difficultto adequatelymodifythe "addwomen and stir"models for departmentswhich remainunreceptiveto integratingthe worksof women throughout the philosophy curriculum.But even conservative curriculum committeeswill permitsome token tinkering. In such cases there would be a riskof creatingthe impressionthat writingphilosophywas an affectationof a handfulof Englishwomen and Greek women (whose workshave been translated). To avoid this tendency it might be wise to join forceswith colleagues in the languagedepartmentsand crosslist coursesin, e.g., Frenchor German or Italian philosophyso that language-limitedphilosophystudentscan form learningteamswith advancedlanguagestudentswho are interestedin philosophy. This would be a naturalfor a team-taughtcourse. Until Englishtranslations are available or unless students have good foreign-languageskills, courses covering contributions made by non-English-writingphilosophers could either be team-taughtusing untranslatedtexts, or could use the previously-mentioned works in conjunction with materialson women philosophers which are now beginning to appear. Graduateas well as undergraduatestudentsshouldlearnthe researchmethods and tools for unearthingmaterialby and aboutwomen philosophers.Students in doctoralprogramsshouldbe encouragedto undertakedissertationresearchaboutwomen philosophers.In topics courses,ratherthan merelysummarizingthe worksof women, we can show how philosopherswho were each others' contemporariesbenefitted from their mutual exchange of ideas. An introduction to philosophy of the seventeenth century would include the summative and commentary literature on Hobbes, MargaretCavendish, Anne Viscountess Conway, Anna Maria van Schurman, Leibniz, Bathsua Makin, Descartes,Elizabethof Bohemia, Locke and DamarisMasham.Most of these names are omitted from the men-only history of philosophy texts. This modified "addwomen and stir"model would call for supplementinga women-only history of philosophy text (or the originalworks) with a menonly text (or the originalworks)and stirringin an overviewof some basic research questions. The teacher will want to pose questions (and maybe provide some answers)concerning authenticationof documents, the establishment and transmissionof texts, historicalmaterialsand methods, criteriafor good translations,etc. Such questionscan help today'sstudentsrealizethat the introductoryhistory of philosophycoursesbuilt on this "addmore than women, then stir"model are meant only to whet their appetitesfor further inquiryinto truths about women and about philosophy. Women philosophersdid not exist in a vacuum. Most were trained,just as we were, by their male and female predecessors. The educational back-

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groundsof women philosophersare diverse. Some, like MurasakiShikibu, Julianof Norwich, Anne Finch (ViscountessConway), and MargaretCavendish (Dutchess of Newcastle) were self-taught. Makrina of Neocaesaria, Christine of Pisan, and DamarisCudworthMashamare among those educated by their parents. Some, like Beatrijsof Tienen and Herradof Hohenbourg, were trained in the monastery,usuallyby other women. LauraBassi, Antoinette BrownBlackwell,Julie Favre, and other women were trainedin the academy.Some, like Julia Domna, Birgittaof Sweden, Kristinaof Sweden, and Elizabethof Bohemiawere royaltyor aristocratsof had wealthypatrons. BathsuaMakin, Catherine Trotter Cockbur, MaryWollstonecraft, HarrietMartineau,and ClarisseCoignet were among those who were selfsupporting.Most were known, just as we are, to their contemporaries.Some ancient women, like Arete of Cyrene, Asclepigeniaof Athens, and Hypatia of Alexandria were known to direct or co-direct schools of philosophy. A few, including Hypatia, Hildegardof Bingen and Catherine of Siena had largefollowings.With a few exceptions, such asJulianof Norwich, SorJuana Ines de la Cruzand Oliva Sabucode Nantes Barerra,all werepartof largerintellectual circles which included other philosophersand learnedpersons. In my view, the modified"addwomen and stir"model is temporarilyan acceptable substitutefor teaching the historyof philosophy. This is so for two reasons.First,we do know that what has heretoforepassedas a reasonablyaccurate history of philosophy is not reasonablyaccurate. We never claim to teach the entire historyof philosophybecausehistoriesare by their very natureselective and limited, and courseworkeven moreso. The incompleteness of the historyof philosophyas we have learnedit is not in itself a significant partof the argumentthat presenthistorycoursesareunreasonablyinaccurate. The unreasonablenessclaim arisesbecausewe now have good evidence that the historyof philosophythat we thought was a representativeaccountof the developmentof philosophicalthought maywell be a biasedaccount. It is the likelihoodof bias that makesit unreasonableto continue teachingthe history of philosophyas it has usuallybeen taught. The traditionalhistoryof philosophy curriculumis likely to be biasedbecauseit is an accountthat excludesthe contributionsof a whole classof philosopherswhom we can now demonstrate to have been part of the development of philosophicalthought. A second reasonwhy the modified"addwomen and stir"model is temporarilyan acceptablesubstitutefor teaching a reasonablyaccurateand less biased historyof philosophyis because it is the best we can now manage. Furthermore,the widespreadadoptionof the modifiedmodel is likely to contribute towardthe developmentof the literatureneeded to implementa reasonably accurate,less biasedphilosophycurriculum.Studentswhose undergraduate and graduatephilosophyeducation incorporatesthe modifiedmodel are more likely to pursuedoctoraland post-doctoralresearchon women philosophers of the past than students whose education omits mention or serious

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studyof women philosophers.As these studentsmaturephilosophicallyand begin to contributeto the literature,women'scontributionsto the historyof philosophywill become better understood.As our graduatestudentsbecome our colleagues, their studentswill begin to have opportunitiesto studya reasonablyaccurate, integratedhistory of philosophy. Although addingwomen and stirringis a necessaryfirstcondition for making an informedinquiryinto the historyof philosophy, it is not sufficientfor understandingit. We will need to know how the received doctrine evolved. We need to know in greaterdetail how the matrilineageof our disciplinegot lost. We can piece togethersome of those details. We do know, for example, that MarsilioFicino (in the 15 century)was the first to suggestthat Diotima was a fictitious character. We know that the Suda incorrectly reported Hypatia'sworksas lost and that later scholarsinferredthat the loss occurred when the libraryof Alexandria was burned. What no one counted on was that some workseither had been removedby the arsonists,or had been out on loan, for example, to copyists.Yet a few centurieslater, at least two of the three "lost"worksturned up in Turkey. We will need to know both as a generalphenomenon, and with respectto specific philosophers, how women's biographiesand texts came to be excluded from the histories of philosophy. This is particularlytrue respecting philosophers such as Hypatia, Hildegard, Conway, Cavendish, and Cockbum. These and numerousother philosopherswere well known among their contemporariesand/or immediatesuccessorsin philosophic and wider intellectualcircles. Their philosophiccorpusis substantiallylargerthan mere fragmentsor scatteredpamphletsand correspondence.How did it all get misplaced?If we do not find out, it will most certainlyhappenagain. These materials are part of our rich heritage. Findingthem or identifyingtheir philosophical significance creates something of a moral obligation to preserve them. Ideasand theoriesare preservedby criticallyexaminingthem, utilizing them, comparingthem, and improvingupon them without destroyingthe content or denying the authorshipof the original. If we are to attempt to understandan integratedhistoryof philosophy,we will need to examine Gilliganesquequestionsaboutwhetherwomen philosophersspoke in "a differentvoice" than their male counterparts.The case can some of the Pythagorean be made that some women philosophers .... in wrote "a differentvoice." The women, MurasakiShikibu and Heloise, preservationof harmonious,loving interpersonalrelationshipswas the focus of their moral philosophy, (although this "differentvoice" is also found in Aristotle and in Cicero, as well as in other males who have written on love and friendship.So perhapsthe voice is not differentat all.) Most women philosopherswere literate, but some dictatedtheir works.The writingstake a variety of literaryforms including dialogue, poetry, prose essay, correspondence, and epic novel. Some survive as brief fragmentsof largerworks, but

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many full-length works survive, often in several editions. The illuminated miniaturesof a groupof medievalwomen philosopherssurpassin sheer artistic qualitythat of any known writingsby male philosophers.This is one distinctive featureof women'sphilosophicalwritingfor which there is no equivalent in the worksof male philosophers.These worksarenot only interesting philosophically,but an aesthetic delight as well. On the whole, it does not appearthat women philosopherswere terriblydistinctive in their selection of philosophictopics. For the most part, they sharedthe same interestsas their male contemporaries,although as is true of some men of any given period, there are notable exceptions. This is not to say that women imitated men; rather, both were part of an intellectual communitywhich shaped and responded to scientific, religiousand political developmentsof their times. Ironically, with two minor exceptions, Christine de Pisan and Bathsua Makin, women philosophershave not included mention of earlier women philosophersin their own writings.Although women arerepresentedin every subspecialtyof philosophy-metaphysics, cosmology,moral,social and political philosophy, philosophies of mathematics, medicine, and everything else-I know of no women historiansof philosophypriorto this century.We can only speculate to what extent the absence of women philosopherswho were historiansof philosophy accounts for the omission of women from the histories of philosophy. In this century, Mary Ritter Beard's intriguing Woman as a Force in History is maddening for its errorsand exaggerated claims, conspicuousfor its absenceof footnotes. Nevertheless, it is an important startingpoint for researchabout women philosophers.Two important contemporarysources, Beatrice Zedler'stranslationof Gilles Menage'sThe History of Women Philosophers,and Sr. Prudence Allen's The Concept of Woman, are valuable for different reasons. Zedler'stranslationprovides an excellent opportunityto identifythe sourcesavailableto seventeenth century historiansof philosophyfor researchingthe history of ancient and medieval women philosophers.Allen's workhas an entirelydifferentpurpose,but is an equally valuable researchtool, containing analysesof women philosophers' views of women. Works like Zedler's,Allen's, and the work which has resulted from the Projecton the Historyof Women in Philosophy(e.g. A HisVol. 1, 600 B.C. - 500 A.D. and A Historyof tory of WomenPhilosophers WomenPhilosophers, Vol. 2, A.D. 600-1600, forthcoming)contain information about sources and glimpsesof the lives and works of women philosophers. If we want to learn about women's contributionsto the dialogueswhich engaged the philosophic community, several processescan be undertaken. We can teach one anotherhow to use the researchtools and methodswhich yield the rich literatureour foremothershave left us. We can teach our students how to think criticallyabout and how to researchthe historyof philosophy. We can be willing to risk publishingthe incomplete resultsof our re-

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searchbecauseit is throughsharingeach other'simperfectworkproductsthat we can benefit fromthe collaborativereconstructionof our heritage.We can take pride in knowledgeof that heritage, without assumingproprietaryattitudes towardsthose snippetsof it we have personallyuncovered.When criticism is warranted,it can be supportiveratherthan destructive. In addition to makingthese commitments, we can commit ourselvesto a variety of projectswhich will contributeto the developmentof the primary and secondaryliteraturewhich in turn will facilitate curricularchange. Editing projectscan make cumbersomeworkssuitablefor classroomuse. Projects to microfilm works by women philosophers can preserve and disseminate those originalswhich are too fragileor too rareto share. We will need to establish and fund projectsto find the worksof the women philosophers,projects to authenticate, establishand translatetexts, projectsto criticallyassess women's identification of and inquiryinto philosophic questions, and projects to trace the mutual interchange of ideas among women and between women and men philosophers.And then, there is TheEncyclopedia of Philosowill reexamine to revise. we need to the of Finally, history philosophyitphy self in light of the outcomesof those projects.As these projectsaredeveloped and bearfruit, we will continue to find waysto revisethe philosophycurriculum so that its contents more accuratelyreflect the historyof our discipline, particularly,the contributionsmade to it by women. We alreadyhave materialswith which to begin this revision. Worksby Allen, Zedlerand Waithe are augmentedby this special issueof Hypatia,and by sur the issueon women philosophersof the Canadianjournal,Documentation la Recherche FeministeDRF/RFR.These journalshave createda forumfor secondaryliteratureabout the historyof women philosophers.If we are ever to understandthe extent to which we arenot prodigies,if we areever to identify ourselvesas a part of a rich traditionof women philosophers,and if we are ever to understandthat the historyof philosophywas a symposiumin which women took an active and influentialpart, and not a courseto which women were added and stirred,we must continue the dialogue and engage our students in it. Doing so in a reasonablyaccurateway ultimatelywill requirethe kinds of long-term projects described above. Antoinette Brown Blackwell lived into her nineties and fulfilledher dreamof voting in a presidentialelection. The workwe have beforeus might likewisecontributeto our longevity.

Does MarriageRequirea Head? Some HistoricalArguments* LINDA A. BELL

Are hierarchies Thisissueis a centralonefor necessaryin humanrelationships? feministtheory, and thereis a continuingneed to rethinkrelationshipsand to envisionwhattheymightbe likewithoutany sortof dominanceof someoverothers. To aid thisprocessof envisioning alternatives,thispaperexaminesmorecloselythe - marriage- has beenarguedand way one of the most intimateof hierarchies envisionedhistorically.

Not until 1983 did the Georgialegislaturevote to repeala "headof household" law which had been in effect for 130 years. This law recognizedthe husbandas "headof the family"and the wife as "subject"to him and merged her legal civil existence into his, "except insofaras the law recognizesher separately,for her own protection, for her benefit, or for the preservationof public order."Although it had been claimed that variousstatutes enacted over the yearshad in effect repealedthe "headof household"law, the Georgia legislature was inundated with protests against the repeal. Protestors claimed that reformwould destroy the family. Many of the protestorstied their concerns to what they regardas biblical injunctions concerning the structuringof the family. Even those who regardthis particularlaw as antiquatedmay, nonetheless, have some reservationswhen reformersgo so far as to reject the claim that a marriageshould have a head. A friend of mine, for example, expressedhis view that a leader would always emerge in a society-even a society of two-since someone has to assume the responsibilityfor making the neces sar decisions and giving orderswhen concerted action requirescarefullyorganizedand orchestratedactivity amongor between the membersof the society. Given these examples, the question of this paperhas a relevance today, and answersto it may have a generalapplicationwhich goes far beyond the traditionalpatriarchalconception of marriage.But be that as it may, I am concerned here primarilywith argumentsfor and against that traditional Forhis perceptivereadingsof an earlierdraftof this paperand for his many helpfulsuggestions and comments, I am gratefulto Albert C. Skaggs.

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patriarchalview of marriagein which the husband'sdominanceover the wife is seen as legitimate. The argumentswhich I explore are ones I discoveredwhile doing research on what philosophershave said about women.1 When I completed that research, I realizedthat I had unearthedquite a variety of argumentsfor and againstthe traditionalhierarchicalmarriage.I believe that examining these argumentsin a paperwill informreadersof a long standingphilosophicaldiscussionof which relativelyfew have been or areawareand will makepossible a critical examination of these arguments. Before I begin my analysis, though, I owe the readera bit of a warning. The views and argumentsI discuss are frequentlynot part of a larger,well workedout philosophical treatmentof the issue. Many of the philosophers whom I cite had relativelylittle to say on women, and often these references were madeas an aside. Their discussionof women is parentheticalto the issue being given seriousconsideration, and whatever is said is not seen as problematic and hence as warrantingthe carefulprobingdue genuine philosophical problems.Thus, I ask the reader'sindulgenceas I weave togetherthreads suggestedby variousthinkers in orderto fill out argumentsonly partiallydeveloped by any given thinker. MARRIAGENEEDSA HEAD

One argumentthat seems to underlie some of the earliest philosophical views of marriageis that hierarchicalarrangementsin marriageand beyond are ordainedby natureor by God. This argument,or set of arguments,is frequently ensconced comfortablyin metaphysicalschemes like those common in the middle ages where all reality is hierarchicallyarrangedand where the inherent superiorityof one type of being is said to give it the right as well as the power to control those inferiorto it. Fromthis hierarchicalperspective,the main questionconcerningmarriage is who shouldrulewhom, and this questionis decidedon the basisof physical and/or mental superiority.Thus, Aristotle arguesthat the female is a "deformed"male and concludesthat "the male is fitter to commandthan the female" (1946, 1259b2; VW, 66). His views of superiorityand inferiorityand of the right of the formerto control the latter lead him quite consistentlyto approvethe institution of slavery. The alleged physical inferiorityof women to men is often the basisfor the conclusionthat men mustrule in marriage.Agreeingthat the superiorshould rule, Montesquieuarguesthat women's "naturalweakness does not permit them to have the pre-eminence"in families, although it may in fact make them good administratorsof empiresby giving them "morelenity and moderation" (1899, 108; VW, 165). ForRousseau,a woman'sreproductivecapacity-her physical weakness and consequent "intervals of inaction"-are

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enough to tip the scales, howeverotherwiseevenly balanced, in favorof the man (1950, 286-87; VW, 196). On the other hand, Comte arguesfor the woman'ssubordinationto the man on the basisof the "intrinsicweaknessof her reason"("unfitas she is, in comparison,for the requisitecontinuousnessand intensity of mental labor") (1975, 268; VW, 281). But like Montesquieuwho never explainedwhy family rule requiredphysicalstrengthwhereasthe rule of empiresdid not, Comte never shows that rule of either familiesor societies requiresparticularlycontinuous and intense mental labor, much less that women are incapableof it. The allegedweaknessof women is either physicalor mental. In the casesof Aristotle and Schopenhauer,it is both. Thus, Schopenhauersees the weakness of women as a weaknessof both body and mind: "Youneed only look at the way in which she is formedto see that woman is not meant to undergo great labor, whether of the mind or of the body" (1951, 62; VW, 270). When such appealsto "nature"are examined, their weaknessbecomesapparentin a numberof ways. First,the varietyof these appealsto naturemust make us suspicious.Too often, it seems, nature is examined in such a way that it, like a mirror,simplyreflectsaspectsof the observer,in this case, his opinions. Thus, Diderotwas convinced fromwhat he observedthat the husband should generallyhave the determiningvoice "since ordinarilymen are more capable than women to decide mattersof detail" (VW, 182) while his contemporaryand fellow countrymanRousseauwas equally as certain that women shouldbe subordinateto men even though, or partlybecause,women have better heads for detail (1911, 349; VW, 206). Second, such attemptsto deciphernatureraisea questionaboutwhat is really being examined. It is at least clear that such appealsshould be treated warily.John Stuart Mill and others have questionedhow we know which of the actualmental and physicaldifferencesbetween men and women arenatural and which are the result of education and circumstance(1869, 98-99; VW, 293-94). Whateverthe answer,it cannot be Rousseau'ssimplisticproclamationthat "whereman and woman are alike we have to do with the characteristicsof the species;where they are unlike, we have to do with the characteristicsof sex" (1911, 321; VW, 197). Third, the adequacyof the sample on which these claims about men and women are based can also be questioned. Mill makes an observationthat surely applies to generalizationsproposed by many philosophers, unaccustomed as they are to applyinganything resemblingadequatesamplingtechniques. Mill observed, "the most favorablecase which a man can generally have for studyingthe characterof a woman is that of his own wife:for the opportunities are greater, and the cases of complete sympathy not so unspeakablyrare."Since few men have had occasion to studyso closely more than one woman, Mill concluded, "one can, to an almost laughabledegree, infer what a man's wife is like, from his opinions about women in general"

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(1869, 43-44; VW, 291). This may, in fact, help to explain the diversity found in these appeals. Fourth,the allegedweaknessesto which these thinkerspoint do not justify any subordinationof women to men and certainlynot the unlimitedsubordination generallyrecognizedby the lawsof the societies in which these thinkers lived. What is needed to justifyacross-the-boarddominationof women by men in marriageis a markeddifferenceuniversallyand unfailinglyholding between women and men. A comparativeweaknesssuch as these thinkers "observe,"whether of body or of mind, will not do, partlybecause it is not sufficientlymarkedand partlybecause it will be a differencethat will hold among men themselves and frequently will not hold between individual women and individualmen. If men and women are examined as they are, without raising questions aboutwhat is or is not natural,we find, accordingto Condorcet, "that with the exceptions of a limited numberof exceptionallyenlightenedmen, equality is absolutebetween women and the remainderof the men" (1912, 6; VW, 210). Mill, too, recognizeda roughequalitybetween women and the majority of men: The utmost that can be said is that there are many things which none of them [women]have succeededin doing as well as they have been done by some men-many in which they have not reached the very highest rank. But there are extremelyfew, dependentonly on mentalfacultiesin which they have not attainedthe ranknext to the highest ... (1869, 9394; VW, 203). Even Hobbes (1841, 104; VW, 147) and Diderot (VW, 182), although believing the husbandwill generallybe the superior,nonetheless acknowledged exceptions and proposedthat in any case the fitter of the two shouldrule, be it the husbandor the wife. This seems to be the most that could be established by the appealto nature. Once it is grantedthat the superiorought to rule, any individual exceptions to whatever the rule happens to be require special treatment. Otherwise, there will be marriagesin which the inferior rules the superior. In fact, if weaknessjustifiesthe masteryof one human being by another, then slaverylike that condonedby Aristotle is easierto supportthan the universal domination of women by men. Mill recognizedthe inconsistency of maintainingthe virtuallyabsolutemasteryof women by men in an age which has rejected the legitimacyof slavery: The law of servitudein marriageis a monstrouscontradiction to all the principlesof the modem world, and to all the experiences through which those principleshave been slowly and

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painfullyworkedout. It is the sole case, now that negro slavery has been abolished, in which a human being in the plenitude of every faculty is delivered up to the tender merciesof anotherhumanbeing, in the hope forsooththat this other will use the powersolely for the good of the personsubjectedto it. Marriageis the only actual bondageknown to our law. There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house (1869, 147; VW, 295). Some thinkers supplementor replace appealsto nature with religiousappeals. Forexample, Jerome,a medievalRoman Doctor of the Latin Church, cited Paul'sadmonitionthat a woman is not "to have dominion over a man" and pointed to the Old Testament account of the consequence of the first sin, "after displeasing God she [Eve] was immediatelysubjected the man . .." (1893, 366; VW, 85). Similarly,Aquinas addsto the woman'ssubordination to the man as her natural superiorthe "subjection"which follows Eve'ssin. This subjectionis her punishmentand involves "herhaving now to obey her husband'swill even againsther own" (1922, 270-71; VW, 112). Such an appealhas certain advantagesover the appealto nature. First, it reliesneither on the highly dubiousclaim that women areby naturegenerally inferiorto men nor on the false claim that each and everywoman is mentally and/orphysicallyweakerthan each and every man. Second, by acknowledging women'ssubjectionto men as a punishmentinflictedby God, such thinkers need not concern themselves with cases where superiorwomen are subjected to inferiormen. Although Aquinas seems obliviousto such a possibility, he could accept even brutal subjection as the woman'sproperpunishment for Eve'ssin. Thus, a contemporaryAquinas would not be troubledby Mill's claim that the wife'sservitudeis a "monstrouscontradictionto all the principlesof the modernworld"(1869, 147; VW, 295). Although the religiousappealhas some advantagesover the appealto nature, it nonetheless faces some similarproblems.First, like nature, religious scripturesmay act as a mirrorand reflect the opinions of those who allegedly look therein for divine will. Lucretia Mott, a nineteenth-century Quaker minister, makes this point when she maintains that were these Scriptures "readintelligently . . . the solemn covenant of marriagemaybe entered into without these lordlyassumptionsand humiliatingconcessionsand promises." Not only do these Scripturesnot justifythe "assumedsuperiority,on the part of the husband,and the admittedinferiority,with a promiseof obedience, on the partof the wife," but also, accordingto Mott, there is no good reasonto suspendthe wife's legal existence and to surrenderher propertyto her husband, actions with cruel consequencesfor many wives (1884, 490-91; VW, 327). Like Mott, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, a twentieth-century North American thinker, rejects such readings of "God's will" and indignantly

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chargesthat "the guilelesshabit of blamingwomen for the sin and troubleof the world"just shows what a mess an overly-masculineapproachcan make even of a religion of life and love such as Christianity(1963, 43; VW, 404). Second, the religious appeal presumesthe authorityof scripture.Even if the scripturescited were clear and unequivocal, which they obviously are not, such religiousappealsare singularlyunconvincing to those who do not accept the particularscriptureas evidence of divine will. If appealsto nature and to divine will are problematic,what else can be said in behalf of the claim that marriageneeds a head?Few modem thinkers are readyto suggestthat a differencein capabilityalone justifiesthe rule of the superiorover the inferior.This aristocraticpresumptionhas come under too much attack in the historyof philosophysince the time of Plato and Aristotle. Instead, the modem supportfor a head of the family is more likely to resembleHobbes'sargumentthat the durabilityof a society requiresthat "one of them govern and disposeof all that is common to them both .. " (1841, 104; VW, 147). Lockespelledout the problemin moredetail in the following passage: But the husbandand wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having differentunderstandings,will unavoidably sometimeshave differentwills too; it thereforebeing necessary that the last determination, i.e., the rule, should be placed somewhere;it naturallyfalls to the man'sshare, as the abler and stronger(1824, 385; VW, 152). Where there is no head, a seriousdisagreementbetween husbandand wife will lead, accordingto Kant, to "nothing but wrangling"(1974, 167; VW, 247) or, accordingto C.S. Lewis, to the dissolutionof the marriage(1974, 87; VW, 438). Thus, in the interestsof harmonyand permanence,marriage must have a head. Those who challenge this argumentoften point to other human relationshipswhich clearlydo not need a head. Gilmandid this by pointing to friendship and love: "If it [marriage]needs 'a head' it will elect a chairmanpro tem. Friendshipdoes not need 'a head.' Love does not need 'a head.' Why shoulda family?"(1971, 43; VW, 398). Unfortunately,just becausemarriageis to be an enduringrelation with a common life and common property,Gilman's analogywill not do. At most, her analogychallenges the presumptionthat there can be no human relationshipwithout a ruler. Mill, too, pointed to other voluntaryformsof association: It is not true that in all voluntary association between two people, one of them mustbe absolutemaster:still less that the law must determinewhich of them it shall be. The most frequent case of voluntaryassociation,next to marriage,is partnershipin business:and it is not found or thought necessaryto

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enact that in every partnership,one partnershall have entire control over the concern, and the others shall be bound to obey his orders(1869, 71; VW, 293). Mill's analogy is far better than Gilman'ssince businesspartnershipsusually involve at least some common property,are grantedlegal recognition, and frequentlyarequite enduring.I suspect,though, that Lewiswouldobject that they arenot quite enduringenough. If businesspartnerscome to a seriousdisagreement,they can dissolvetheir partnershipand go their own ways.This is preciselywhat Lewis does not want to see happen in a marriage. Some way to resolvedifferencesseems to be in order,given the concern to make marriageas harmoniousand enduringas possible. But why should it be the rule of one over the other?Though agreeingthat there needs to be a determiningvoice in cases of disagreement-in "situationsthat do not permit the interactionof separatewills," Condorcet noted that such situationswill be few in number. He went on to say, It is, however, rather difficult to suppose that this deciding voice should, for the totality of these exceptional cases, belong necessarilyto one of the two sexes. It would seem more natural for this prerogativeto be shared, and to give, sometimes to the man, sometimesto the woman, the decidingvote in those cases where it is most probablethat one of the two will conform his will more closely to reason (VW, 215). Such a division of responsibilityseems more consistent with the expressed concern that the superiorshould have the final say in cases of conflict which requirea joint decision. Justas it seems impossibleto maintainthat each and everyman is superiorto all women, so it is ludicrousto assumethat a particularman is superiorin everyway to a particularwoman. Surelya union is more likely to be more harmoniousand enduringif the more expert has the determining voice each time a seriousconflict of wills otherwisepreventsa decision from being reached. Condorcet'sresolution to the problemof conflicting wills has the advantage of not taking us back to the previously-examinedissue of establishing which of the two is superior.To insurethat the partybest able to judge has the final say in disputesbetween the two, society and philosopherswould do well to leave the actualestablishmentof such principlesof governanceto the two who are formingtheir own society-within-societysince they are likely to be, by far, in the best position for assessingtheir relative expertise vis-a-vis each other. Moreover, this resolves other problemswhich have been raised as challenges to the claim that marriageneeds a head. First,the discordarisingfrom the abuseof authoritywould no doubt be greatlyreducedeven without going

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so faras to grantHume'swish that "therewere no pretensionsto authorityon either side; but that everythingwas carriedon with perfect equality, as between two equal membersof the same body" (1875, 385; VW, 157). Certainly it would diminish the extreme crueltyrecognizedby Mott of allowing the wife to be "robbed"by her husbandof her earningswith no redressby law (1884, 503; VW, 327). And it seems likely to lessen to some degreethe incidence of wife and child abuse, a problemour society is belatedlybeginningto recognizeas a seriousone. By establishinga greaterequalitybetween the partners,such maritaldistribution of authority in decision-makingwould allow also for friendshipbetween the two, which many recognizeas impossiblein marriageswith a hierarchicalstructure.Admittedlythis is not a problemto some, like Santayana, who find friendshipbetween men and women precludedby their intellectual disparity,"an intellectual alienation as profoundas that which separatesus fromthe dumbanimals... " (1932, 149; VW, 406). Thinkerslike Gilman, though, deplore the subservient wife and dominant husband of the traditional home and look toward"a nobler type of family"which combines the tendernessand permanenceof love with "the broaddeep-rootedfriendliness and comradeshipof equals . . " (1971, 42-43; VW, 397-98). Even Nietzsche recognizedthat slaves cannot be friendsand that tyrantscannot have friends.(1923, 64-65; VW, 341). Condorcet'sdivision of responsibilityanswersan objection raisedby several thinkersconcerningthe social effectsof the hierarchicaltraditionalfamily. Mill held this "presentconstitution of the relation between men and women"to blame for "[all]the selfish propensities,the self-worship,the unjust self-preference,which exist among mankind . . " (1869, 148; VW, 296). Gilman, too, believed the traditionalhome develops unnecessaryselfishness,but, even worse, that it is counter-productivein a democraticformof government.As she says, "Foreach man to have one whole woman to cook for and wait upon him is a poor educationfor democracy.The boy with a servile mother, the man with a servile wife, cannot reach the sense of equal rights we need today" (1971, 42; VW, 397). Thus, Condorcet'ssuggestionof a division of responsibilitymeets the concerns of those who arguethat marriageneeds a head to resolve differences. Moreover,it meets those concerns in such a way that it resolvesmany of the difficultiesand problematicor harmfulconsequencesof the hierarchicaltraditional marriage. MARRIAGE MEN AND/ORWOMENWANT A HIERARCHICAL

Some thinkers argue, not that marriageneeds a head, but that a head is necessaryif men and/orwomen are to achieve what they want in marriage.It is not practical considerations like decision-making proceduresthat lead

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these thinkers to the conclusion that the husbandmust rule the wife. It is ratherdemandsissuingfrom the perceivedneeds, wishes, sexuality,or moral requirementsof at least one and possiblyboth of the two parties. Some of the wants and wishes to which thinkers in this groupappealare not particularlypraiseworthyor even healthy ones. For example, Nietzsche saw subordinationas something women have used to the greatestadvantage to gain the upperhand as they have connived "to get themselvessupported, like drones in a beehive . . . "(1909, 303; VW, 334). Kierkegaardsaw submissionas the form alwaystaken by woman'sdevotion to man, "perhapsbecause woman has a bad conscience about [the egotism of her devotion]" (1975, 577; VW, 315). These claimsmayremindone of an observationmade by Simone de Beauvoir-that many women preferto "take shelter in the shadowof man" to avoid the demandsand responsibilitiesof adult freedom (1948, 37; VW, 439). These all seem good reasonsto change fromthe traditional approachto marriagealthough, of the three cited, only de Beauvoir drew this conclusion. Nietzsche made a more convincing case for hierarchywhen he proposed that subordinationand domination are precisely what the two sexes want from each other in love: What woman understandsby love is clear enough: complete surrender(not merelydevotion) of soul and body, without any motive, without any reservations,ratherwith shame and terrorat the thought of a devotion restrictedby clausesor associated with conditions .... Man, when he loves a woman, wants preciselythis love fromher .... A man who wants to be loved like a woman becomes thereby a slave; a woman, however, who loves like a woman becomes thereby a more perfectwoman .... Woman wants to be taken and accepted as a possession(1910, 321-22; VW, 340). More recently Ortegaclaimed virtuallythe same thing but with more flourishes when he said, the essence of femininity exists in the fact that an individual feels her destiny totally fulfilledwhen she surrendersherselfto another individual.Everythingelse that the womandoes or is has an adjectival and derivative character. In opposition to this marvelousphenomenon, masculinitypresents the deeprooted instinct which impels it to take possessionof another person (1957, 160; VW, 457). Ortega went on to extol this wonderful"pre-establishedharmony." Many of the same responses can be made to this claim about the way women and men love as were made previouslyto the appealsto nature. Does

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observingthe loves of men and women really indicate anything very clearly about their differences?Can observationtell us anythingabout the essentials of feminine and masculineloves or only the way these have been formedby social'expectations?Are not men's reportsconcerningsuch loves more likely to reflect primarilytheir own preferencesand their own limited relationships with their wives and/or, at best, a few other women?Finally, even if general differencesare found, what, if anythingdoes that say concerningthe mutual love of a particularman and a particularwoman? This last question is by far the most important.As BertrandRussellnoted, there are many women who do not desireto subjectthemselvesto their husbands. Even Ortega admitted that it is an error to assume that particular women and men will conformperfectlyto the essencesof femininityand masculinitysince "the classificationof humanbeings into men and women is, obviously, inexact" (1957, 160; VW, 458). It will not do simplyto dismissindividualswho do not fit the "patterns"as "slaves"or "not reallywomen"or to instructthem to accept, even though it does not meet their needs, the institution of marriageestablishedfor those who better fit the patterns. On the other hand, if those who do not fit the patternsare entitled to set up differently organizedmarriagesand other relationshipsthat do meet their needs, then, farfromshowing that in marriagewives shouldbe subordinateand husbands dominant, the most these argumentsshow is that some people prefer such marriages.And we should be most waryabout accepting philosophers' claims that these people are in the majority. William Jamespresenteda one-sided variationof this argumentwhen he arguedthat the "representativeAmerican"reallywants a wife who is dependent. He wants, accordingto James, a "tranquilspot"where he does not constantly have to fight to secure his position but where he shall be valid absolutely and once for all; where, having been accepted, he is securefromfurthercriticism, and where his good aspirationsmay be respectedno less than if they were accomplishedrealities (1869, 562-63; VW, 362). As Jamesrecognized,the securityand repose essential to his ideal are not easily attainable without some feeling of dependence on the woman'sside-without her relyingon him to be her mediator with the externalworld-without his activityoverlappinghers and surroundingit on almostevery side, so that he makesas it were the atmospherein which she lives . . . (1869, 562-63; VW, 362). SurelyJames is correct that the securityand repose desiredby his "representative"and obviouslymale Americanarenot "easilyattainable"without a considerableamount of dependence on the wife'spart. As Russellobserved,

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in what many today would take to be a classic understatement,"Women's emancipationhas in variouswaysmade marriagemore difficult"(1929, 139; VW, 420). We might ask how easily attainablethese goals are even with the woman's dependence, but it is more crucialto note the ease with which Jamesjustifies women'sdependence for men's comfort and happiness.We have seen Mott decrythe crueltythat such dependencehas broughtin its wakeand Mill challenge the injusticein such treatmentof women. We have seen others express chagrinover the consequenceson men and boys of this dependencyof their wives and mothersand, morebroadly,the consequenceson democracyitself. Certainlyeven if men's goals of securityand repose were "easilyattainable" with women'sdependence, the consequencesof this dependenceon women themselves as well as on men and society must be evaluated as an unwarranted expense for men's comfort. It is also importantto ask whetherwomen, if their wisheswere considered, would want exactly the same thing, namely, their own securityand repose even if it requiresthe dependence of men. Why should their wishes not be granted the same consideration that James accorded to those of men? Of course, if women and men want incompatiblethings and either group'sgetting what it wants means the other cannot get what it wants, then both sets of wishescannot be grantedthe sameconsiderationJamesaccordedto men's. Men and women may have to compromiseand make do with their next-best choices. Moreover, we need to ask whether men-and possibly women, too-should try to secure such absolute justificationin the eyes of another human being. Admittedly, few would choose to go from one battlefield-their work-to another-their homes. James,however, only replaced one dilemmawith anotherthat is just as faulty. He wouldhave done betterto examine whether it is healthy for humanbeings to set up workas a battlefield and whether it is any more advisableto try to set up home as a haven of perfect acceptance. Acceptance secured at the cost of the freedomof the one who accepts is bought at a high price. Moreover,inasmuchas the acceptance is coerced by virtue of the dependence of one party, it is problematicas acceptance. Surelywhat is desiredis uncoercedacceptance;coercedacceptance can never be quite the same. In addition, those who are free seldom respect to any great degree the opinions, or the acceptances, of those who are dependent on them. A final argumentfor "the most unlimited subjectionof the woman to the will of her husband"comes from Fichte (1889, 417; VW, 258). For Fichte, the surrenderof the woman's very personality to her lover has a moral ground.Fichte'sargumentproceedslike this. Even though the sexual impulse is natural, men and women must experience it differently.This impulseappears"in its trueform"to men who seek the satisfactionof this impulse"asan

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end in itself, since it can be satisfiedthroughactivity"(1889, 394, 397; VW, 254). If women were similarlyto seek satisfactionof this impulseas an end, they would, accordingto Fichte, make a "purepassivity"their end. This, he believed, is irrational:"The characterof reasonis absoluteself-activity;pure passivityfor the sake of passivitycontradictsreason, and utterlycancels it." Thus, a woman, inasmuchas she is rational, can only give herselfup to her sexual impulseif it assumesa differentcharacter:"the characterof an impulse to satisfythe man"(394, 398; VW, 253, 255). She thus maintainsthe dignity of reasonby "voluntarilymak[ing]. . . herself [a] means in virtue of a noble natural impulse-love!" In this moral form of love, "[h]erown dignity requiresthat she shouldgive herselfup entirelyas she is, ... and shouldutterly lose herself in him" (398, 402; VW, 255). It follows, for Fichte, that "[t]he least consequenceis, that she shouldrenounceto him all her propertyand all her rights"(402; VW, 255). Fichte'sargumentgoes far beyond any other in supportingthe subordination of the wife to the husband.Forhim, it is not a practicalmatterof resolving disagreementsthat requiressuch subordination.Nor is such subordination merely a means to satisfymen's and/orwomen'swishes, not even such important"needs"as that of the man to be assuredthat the children he is obliged to acknowledgeand maintain are really his own-a "need"which Rousseauarguescan only be satisfiedif he is able to "superintend"his wife's conduct (1950, 287; VW, 196). On the contrary,for Fichte, a wife must voluntarilysurrender"all"her propertyand "all"her rightsto her husband;otherwise, she is acting immorallyand contraryto her very existence as a rational being. How compelling is Fichte'sargument?First,we must ask why women cannot seek the satisfactionof the sexual impulseas an end in itselfwithout making "purepassivity"their end. Fichte apparentlythought this to be sufficiently obvious that it requiredno furthercomment. Perhapsthat is because he was being delicate here, believing that it is the natureof sexual activity itself that leadsto this result. If he was assumingthat the male is necessarilyactive and the female is necessarilypassive in the sex act, then his claim is based on arbitraryand unwarrantedviews of the roles of the participantsin the sex act. At most, a womanseekingsexualsatisfactionin a way that maintains her dignity as a rationalcreatureshouldconclude fromFichte'sanalysis that she, too, must be an active participantduringthe sex act. If Fichte'sclaim was not based on this active-male/passive-female view of the sex act, then, I confess, it is difficultto conceive what it might be based on. De Beauvoir'sanalysis of the way woman has been systematicallyrendered"the Other"(1971, xvi; VW, 442) suggestsone other possibleinterpretation. He could, I suppose,have been sayingthat if men activelypursuesexual satisfactionas a goal, then women, insofaras they are not men, cannot pursuethis goal in the same way. Their pursuitmust, then, make them pas-

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sive, and, since rationalbeings cannot rationallymakepassivitytheir end, it followsthat women mustnot pursuesexualsatisfactionas their goal. If this is Fichte'sargument,then it is even weakerthan it wouldbe if basedon the active-male/passive-femaleview of sexual activity. It simply cannot be maintained that becausewomen are differentfrom men they must alwayspursue goals differently:ludicrousresultsfollow when we imaginethis claim applied to basic life-sustainingactivities like eating and drinking.In addition, if this were Fichte's argument, it would be arbitrarywhether he begins with the male or the female pursuitof sexual satisfactionand the conclusion concerning who is to give up rights, property,and personalityto the other would differ accordingto which genderis allowed to stake out for itself the active pursuit of this satisfaction. Finally, even if Fichte's claim that women and men must experience the sexual impulsedifferently,with women expriencingit as love, were granted, his conclusion aboutthe unlimitedsurrenderof the woman'sproperty,rights, and personality(symbolizedby her surrenderof her name) does not follow. At best, the sexual impulseis only one of many impulsesseekingsatisfaction in an individual'slife. Foran individualto surrenderherselfbody and soul in the pursuit of any one of these seems nothing short of an extreme overreaction. Why, indeed, could she not experience the sexual impulse as love-the desireto satisfythe man-during the sexual activity itself without allowing this desire to rule each and every aspect of her life and possibly impedeher satisfactionof her other impulses?Fora personto go to such great lengths to avoid the contradictionof willing momentarypassivityseemsto be irrationalindeed. Fichte's argument,then, no more supportsthe traditionaldominance of the husbandthan do the other appealsto wants and needs. That men want an absoluteacceptanceof themselvesor need an assurancethat their children are trulytheir own does not justifytheir keepingtheir wives dependent. Even if women were to want such dependence, this would not justify the traditional dominanceof the husband,particularlyas long as education and laws and mores work together to limit women's opportunitiesand expectations and thereby to ensure as far as possible their acceptance of their subordination. The claim that subordinationis "for their own good" has been challenged too vigorously, too frequently, and too compellingly to retain any plausibility today. Moreover, the desire for one's own or another's dependence is, on other grounds,morallyproblematicor objectionable. CONCLUSION

The appealsto men's and/orwomen'swants, wishes, and needs seem to offer no supportto the claim that marriageshould have a head and, in fact, raise some seriousquestions about whether the demandsof moralitywould

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permitthe traditionaldominance/submissionrelationof husbandand wife. In fact, to be consistent, many of these thinkerscannot even apply to women what they themselves elsewhere say of moralityand of what it means to be human. Consequently, they either construct a double set of standards,one for males and one for females, or they simplypassover in silence the dubious moralityof one who is totally subjectedto the will of another. On the other hand, neither do the argumentsthat marriageneeds a head prove that there should be a single head, much less that that head should be the husband. The only compelling argumenthere is that the desired permanence of marriagerequiresthat there be some way of resolvingdisagreements when common action is required.However, this argumentdoes not establish that there must be a single head in a marriage.At most, it indicates that stable unions need some recognizeddivision of responsibilitysuch that disagreementscan be resolved with joint action following the lead of the party who is likely to have the cooler and wiser head on the matter under dispute.

NOTES 1. These views are included in my anthology Visionsof Women(Clifton, NJ: The Humana Press, 1983), hereafterreferredto as VW. In the followingcitations, except where the material was translatedfor my anthology, I shall cite the sourceof the materialas well as indicatewhere it can be found in my anthology.

REFERENCES

Aquinas, Thomas. 1922. Summatheologica.Fathersof the EnglishDominican Province, trans. New York:BenzigerBrothers. Aristotle. 1946. Politics,I. BenjaminJowett, trans. Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press. Beauvoir, Simone de. 1948. The ethics of ambiguity.BernardFrechtman, trans. New York:PhilosophicalLibrary. . 1971. The secondsex. H. M. Parshley, trans. New York:Alfred A. Knopf. Comte, Auguste. 1975. The positivephilosophy.GertrudLenzer, trans. New York:Harper& Row. Condorcet, Marquisde, Marie-JeanAntoine-Nicolas. 1983. Lettersfrom a dwellerin New Heavento a citizenof Virginia,on theuselessnessof sharing legislativepoweramongseveralbodies.R. BartonPalmer, trans. Visionsof Women.LindaA. Bell, ed. Clifton, NJ: The Humana Press. . 1912. On theadmissionof womento therightsof citizenship.Alice Drysdale Vickery, trans. Letchworth:Garden City PressLimited.

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Diderot, Denis. 1983. Women. Encyclopediaof Diderotand d'Alembert.R. Barton Palmer and Irene B. Seay, trans. Visionsof Women. Linda A. Bell, ed. Clifton, NJ: The Humana Press. Fichte, J. B. 1889. The scienceof rights.A. E. Kroeger,trans. London:Trubner and Co. Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. 1963. His religionand hers.. Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, Inc. . 1971. The man-madeworld.New York:Johnson ReprintCorporation. Hobbes, Thomas. 1841. Philosophicalelements of a true citizen. In Philosophicalrudimentsconcerninggovernmentand society.The Englishworksof ThomasHobbes. (vol. 2). Sir William Molesworth, ed. London:John Bohn. Hume, David. 1875. Of love and marriage.In Essays,moral,political,and literary.T. H. Greena and T. H. Grose, eds. London:Longsman,Green, and Company. James, William. 1869. A review [of] 1. Women'ssuffrageand reformagainst nature,by HoraceBushnell, New York,Scribner,1869. [and]2. Thesubjectionof women,by John Stuart Mill, New York. Appleton, 1869. The NorthAmericanReview(October). Jerome. 1893. AgainstJovinianus.In Theprincipleworksof St. Jerome.W. H. Fremantle,G. Lewis, and W. B. Martley,trans. In A selectlibraryof NiceneandPost-Nicenefathersof theChristianChurch.(vol. 2). Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, eds. Kant, Immanuel. 1974. Anthropology froma pragmaticpointof view. MaryJ. trans. The Martinus Gregor, Hague: Nijhoff. Kierkegaard,S0ren. 1975. Journalsandpapers.HowardV. Hong and EdnaH. Hong., eds. (Vol. 4, S-Z). Bloomington:IndianaUniversity Press. Lewis, C. S. 1974. Merechristianity.New York:MacmillanPublishingCo. Locke, John. 1824. Essayconcerning the true original, extent, and end of civil government. In Two treatiesof government.In The worksof John Locke. (vol 4). London:C. Baldwin. Mill, John Stuart. 1869. The subjectionof women.New York:D. Appleton and Company. Montesquieu,Baronde, Charles-Louisde Secondat. 1899. The spiritof laws. Thomas Nugent, trans. New York:The Colonial Press. Mott, Lucretia. 1884. Discourseon Woman. In Lifeand letters.Alice Davis Hallowell, ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Company. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1909. Human, all-too-human,part I. In The complete worksof FriedrichNietzsche. (vol. 6). Helen Zimmerman,trans. Oscar Levy, ed. London:T. N. Foulis. . 1910. The joyfulwisdom.In The completeworksof FriedrichNietzsche. (vol. 10). Thomas Common, trans. Oscar Levy, ed. London: T. N. Foulis.

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. 1923. ThusspakeZarathustra. ThomasCommon, trans.New York:The MacmillanCompany. Ortegay Gasset, Jose. 1957. On love. Toby Talbot, trans. New York:World Publishing. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1911. Emile. BarbaraFoxley, trans. New York: Dutton. . 1950. A discourseon politicaleconomy,and the socialcontractand discourses.G. D. H. Cole, trans. New York:E. P. Dutton & Co. Russell, Bertrand.1929. Marriageand morals.New York:Horace Liveright. Santayana, George. 1932. The life of reason, Book II. New York:Charles Scribner'sSons. Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1951. "On women," Essays. T. Bailey Saunders, trans. London:George Allen & Unwin LTD.

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REVIEW

SYMPOSIUM

FeministArcheology:Uncovering Women's PhilosophicalHistory MARY ANNE WARREN

A Historyof Women Philosophers,Volume I: Ancient Women Philoophers, 600 B.C. - 500 A.D., edited by Mary Ellen Waithe, is an importantbut somewhatfrustratingbook. It is filledwith tantalizingglimpsesinto the livesand thoughtsof some of our earliestphilosophical foremothers.Yet it lacks a clear and periodto the unifyingtheme,and the abrupttransitions fromone philosopher nextaresometimesdisconcerting. The overalleffectis not unlikethatof viewingan expansivelandscape,illuminatedonly by a few tiny spotlights. It is still commonlyassumedthat women have contributedverylittle to the development of philosophy, at least prior to the present century. Realizing that standardhistoriesof philosophy-like standardhistoriesof art-have arbitrarilyomitted the contributionsof hundredsof importantwomen, Mary Ellen Waithe has undertakento help correct the situation. This volume is the firstof a seriesthat she has launchedwith the help of a smallgroupof fellow researchers.Forthcomingvolumesare to cover Medieval,Renaissance and EnlightenmentWomen Philosophers500-1600, ModernWomen Philosophers WomenPhilosophers, 1600-1900, and Contemporary 1900-Today. Chapters 1-4 of the present volume deal with approximately a dozen Pythagorean women philosophers, of whom more will be said presently. Chapter 5 focuses on Aspasia of Miletus, a memberof the Pericleanphilosophicalcircle who taughtrhetoricto Socratesand Plato and is representedas the authorof Pericles'funeraloration in Plato'sMenexenus.Chapter6 argues for the historicityof the philosopher/priestess Diotima, whom Plato creditsas the source of certain ideas in the Symposium.Chapter 7 (by Beatrice H. Zedler)recountsthe life and times of Julia Domna, wife of the Roman EmperorSeptimusSeverus, and known as "the philosopherJulia"although she herself apparently did not write any philosophical works. Chapter 8 (by Cornelia Wolfskeel) deals with Makrina,the sisterof a 4th centurybishop, and Chapter9 with Hypatia,the 5th centuryphilosopherand mathematician afterwhom this journalis named. The final chapterbringstogetheran assortHypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring1989)? by MaryAnne Warren

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ment of other female philosophersof the ancient world, about whom relatively little is known and none of whose work has survived. The introductionposes a set of questionswhich the seriesmay help to answer. Perhapsthe most importantis whether and in what ways our understandingof the natureof philosophyitself will be alteredas a resultof a better acquaintancewith women'sthought (p. xviii). While no clear answeris provided here, some of the materialpresentedmay tend to supportthe hypothesis that women'smoralreasoningis often basedless on the formulationof abstract general principlesthan on pragmaticconsiderationof everydayrealities. This suggestionis particularlypertinent to the workof the Pythagorean women. The earlierPythagoreanwomen philosophers(6th and 5th centuryB.C.) include several members of Pythagoras'family, e.g., his wife Theano of Crotona, and their daughterMyai. Some of the later Pythagoreanwomen were roughlycontemporaneouswith Plato and one (Perictione I) may have been Plato'smother;others may be as late as the 1st centuryB.C. While the work of these women is representedonly by a few fragmentsor personalletters, it is evident that one of their primaryconcerns was the applicationof the normative principle of harmoniato the lives of women. Like the male Pythagoreans,they held that women are responsiblefor creatingjustice and harmonyin the home, while men are responsiblefor creatinga just and harmonious city. Consequently, they advise women to be temperate, modest, subservientto their husbands,and sexually faithful. For instance, in a fragment from the lost workOn theHarmonyof Women,PerictioneI advisesthe marriedwoman to obey her husband, in the unanimityof their common life, attendingupon the relatives and friends whom he extols, and thinking the same things sweet and bitter as he-lest she be out of tune in relation to the whole (34). As both Waithe and Vicki Lynn Harper point out, this conservatism is rooted in an acceptanceof the social statusquo. The Pythagoreanwomen did not ask what role women would play in an ideal society, but ratherhow they can achieve harmoniousnessin an actual society (38, Harper).Insofaras the societies they knew were highly male dominated, they evidently regardedfemale rebellion as leading only to a loss of harmony. Nevertheless, "In the Pythagoreanview, women are not peripheralto social justice, they make it possible,"(25) since justice on the largescale is impossiblewithout harmony in the individualfamily unit. While these views cannot readilybe construed as feminist, neither do they evidence the misogynyso evident in the workof many male philosophers. Becausethe authenticityof the Pythagoreanfragmentsand lettershas been questioned, Waithe providesan entire chapter on this issue. Here, as else-

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where, the scholarshipappearsto be meticulous, and the conclusionsdrawn in an appropriatelycautiousfashion. This carefulscholarshiplends weight to what is probably the most important finding of the volume-i.e., that Diotima of Manitea was almost certainly an historicalfigure, ratherthan a fictional charactercreated by Socratesor Plato. as the sourceof certain ideasaboutlove, Diotima is cited in the Symposium beauty, and immortality. Socrates says that he received these ideas from Diotima some yearspreviously,when she was called to Athens to attemptto avert a plague. Apart fromthis one dialogue, there is little direct evidence of Diotima'sexistence. Yet Waithe presentsa convincing case, basedon a number of arguments.First, Plato virtuallynever createdfictional characters,and seems never to have suggestedthat Diotima was not an actual person. Second, there are several other instances in which Plato representsSocratesas consulting a priestessfor guidance, so the event is not implausible.Third, there is relevantarcheologicalevidence. A bronzerelief that was once partof the housing for a scroll of the Symposium(dated to 340-330 B.C.) shows Socratesin conversationwith a woman who is probablyDiotima, since she is the only important female character in that dialogue. Waithe notes that, were Diotima believed to have been a fictional character,she probablywould not have been representedin such a realisticfashion. Fourth, Diotima'shistoricity appearsto have remainedunquestioneduntil the 15th century, and then to have been rejected in the absence of any new evidence. But perhapsthe most importantargumentfor Diotima'shistoricalrealityis that her philosophicalviews as recountedby Socratesare markedlydifferent fromany known to have been held by either Socratesor Plato. For instance, Plato and, on his account, Socratesbelieved in an immortalsoul that could be reincarnatedin either humanor animalform. In contrast, Diotima speaks of only a metaphoricalimmortalitywhich could be achieved by imprinting one's own personalqualitiesupon anotherperson,therebygenerating"anoffspring of the soul." Furthermore,Waithe arguesthat Diotima'sconcept of beautydoes not appearto be a Platonic Formor Idea, but rather"an idea at the level of appearances"(86). Thus, she concludes, it is highly unlikelythat either Socratesor Plato invented Diotima in orderto expressa view that he himselfheld. Nor, it shouldbe added, is it likely that she was invented to expressa view that no one held. Although none of these argumentscan prove beyond doubt that Diotima was an historicalfigure, they are certainlysufficient to shift the burdenof proof to those who doubt her existence. Makrina is another female philosopher whose ideas are preservedonly throughthe writingsof a man. Makrinawas the sisterof Gregory,a bishopof Nyssa during the 4th century A.D., and her deathbed reflections are recounted in Gregory'sOn the Soul and Resurrection. Cornelia Wolfskeel contrastsMakrina'sviews with those of the Church Fathers,and of prominent Jewishand paganthinkers. Makrina'sviews were somewhatless androcentric

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than the doctrinesthat were to prevailin most subsequentChristianthought. She held, for instance, that both women and men have immortalsoulswhich are createdin the imageof God. She also maintainedthat it is in the nature of both women and men to have a physicalbody as well as immaterialsoul. Thus, in her view humanembodimentis neither a resultof the Fallnor something for which women can be blamed, via the sins of Eve. The last majorphilosopherdealt with is Hypatia of Alexandria. Hypatia "livedduringpaganism'slast standagainstthe encroachingChristianreligion and in a sense personallyrepresentedthe conflict between paganGreek science, philosophyand mathematics,on the one hand, and the Christianreligious and political empireon the other"(170). Although the currentgovernment of Alexandriawas Christian, she was appointedto a publiclypaid position as head of the Neo-Platonic school of Plotinus. She was widelyregarded as the greatestphilosopherand mathematicianof her time; yet the story of her untimely death at the hands of a mob of Christianmonks is almost the only fact about her that has found its way into standardhistoriesof philosophy. It has long been assumedthat all of Hypatia'swritings have been lost. However, Waithe arguesthat at least two of Hypatia'sworkshave probably survived more or less intact: her commentarieson Diophantus'Arithmeticorumand on Ptolemy'sSyntaxisMathematica.In Waithe's view, the former was incorporatedinto Diophantus'originaltext, perhapsby the authorhimself, while the latter became Book III of (at least one of copies of) the commentaryon Ptolemywrittenby Theon, Hypatia'sfather.The commentaryon Ptolemy has received little attention, and indeed has never been translated into any modem language.Yet Waithe makesthe intriguingsuggestionthat it mayhave had an importantinfluenceupon westernscience, since Copernicus may have reada copy of Theon's commentarycontaining Hypatia'sBook III. In sum, this is an importantbut somewhatfrustratingbook. It is filled with tantalizingglimpsesinto the lives and thoughtsof some of our earliestphilosophical foremothers. Yet it lacks a clear unifying theme, and the abrupt transitions from one philosopher and period to the next are sometimes disconcerting.The overall effect is not unlike that of viewing an expansive landscape,illuminatedonly by a few tiny spotlights. This frustrationis in to some extent inevitable, given the scantiness of the historical record. However, it might have been somewhatamelioratedby the inclusionof more of the available backgroundinformation-e.g., about the social and legal statusof women in Greek, Roman, and earlyChristiansocieties, and some of the ways in which it changed duringthe thousand-yearperiodcovered. But this is essentiallya quibble.The gapsand distortionsin the historyof western philosophyresultingfrom millennia of suppressionof female thought cannot be overcome in a single volume or series of volumes. But Waithe and her

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fellow researchersare makinga significantcontributionto that goal. Further research and analysis will be necessary to determine the accuracyof their specificconclusionsand occasionalspeculations.If this volume leadsto such furtherwork, then it will have proved its value.

REFERENCES

vol. 1: AnWaithe, MaryEllen, ed. 1987. A Historyof womenphilosophers, cientphilosophers, 600 B.C. - 500 A.D. Boston: M. Nijhoff.

REVIEW

SYMPOSIUM

On A Historyof WomenPhilosophers, Vol. I R.M. DANCY

it fails to meet them:apart This booksets highstandardsfor itself. Regrettably and a from few displaysof thorough competentresearch,it is generallybasedon substandard scholarship.

This book sets laudablegoals for itself: to rediscoverpreviouslylost worksof women philosophersand make informationaboutthose worksavailablein a formatthat would be useful for studentsas well as scholars.We would do this in a way that reflected the highest standardsof scholarship: meticulous documentation of sources, careful translations of originalwritingsby women philosophers,and critical analysisof our findings. (Waithe x-xi) The first four chaptersare devoted to Pythagoreanwomen, and are based on materialall of which is standardlyconsideredspurious.1 Waithe believes that this condemnation is undersupported. Considerfirst Theano. The ancient sourcespresentapparentlyconflicting views about her: she is variouslylisted as the wife of Brotinus(or Brontinus) of Metapontum(or of Croton), as the daughterof Bro(n)tinus, as a student under Pythagoras,and as the wife of Pythagoras.2 Waithe says: Theano was the daughterof Brontinus,a Crotona orphic and aristocrat.She first became the pupil of Pythagorasof Samos, and later his wife. (12) Waithe does not say why she prefersthese choices over the others possible. Indeed, she does not mention the varietyin the ancient traditionor provide any referencesto it. There are writingsascribedto Theano. One purportedfragmentreads, in the translationprovidedfor this volume by Vicki Lynn Harper: I have learnedthat manyof the Greeksbelieve Pythagorassaid all things aregeneratedfromnumber.The very assertionposes Hypatiavol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1989) ? by R.M. Dancy

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a difficulty:How can things which do not exist even be conceived to generate?But he did not say that all things come to be from number;rather, in accordancewith number-on the groundsthat orderin the primarysense is in numberand it is by participationin orderthat a first and a second and the rest sequentiallyare assignedto things which arecounted. (12-13) First notice what this text says. It protests against the attributionto Pythagorasof the claim that all things come fromnumberand coupleswith the protestthe idea that numbersdo not even exist: the authorthinks this makes it absurdto say that all things come from number. It then revisesthe claim ascribedto Pythagorasto avoid the objection. The word'things'does not actually occur in the Greek: it is a perfectlylegitimatetranslator'ssupplement, but the text should be thought of as saying something like 'How can what doesn't exist (plural) even be conceived to generate?' The attributionof the claim that all [things]come fromnumbersto Pythagoreans (not to Pythagoras)we find in Aristotle, a century and more later. He is our earliest and soundest source for what little we know about early Pythagoreanism.He also finds the claim absurd,not on the groundthat numbers don't exist, but on the ground that they do not take up space, have weight, etc. The question of the existence of numberswas underheavy discussion in the Academy.3 But there is nothing in Aristotle or anywhereelse to suggestthat it was a questionfor the Pythagoreans.It is completelyalien to the fragmentsof Philolaus, and at least some of these may be genuine. It appearsto be contradictedflatly by a comment Waithe ascribesto "Pythagoras' daughter,Arignote" on the precedingpage: . . .the eternal essence of numberis the most providential cause of the whole heaven, earth and the region in between. Likewiseit is the root of the continued existence of the gods and daimones, as well as that of divine men. 'Theano'would say:how can what does not exist be the providentialcauseof heaven? Now turn to Waithe. She saysnothing directlyabout the apparentinconsistency. But she says, about the 'Theano' passage: If we read Theano's "things"to mean "corporeal,or physical objects,"as I think we must, given her use of the term "generate," she is claiming only that corporealthings do not come into existence from numberitself becausenumberis non-corporeal. (13) If this comment is to be taken seriously,it must be rewrittento speakto the text on which it is a comment: that text does not use the term 'things.' So

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Waithe wouldhave to say:Theano'sword'exist' is redefinedso that only corporealobjectsexist. Such a redefinitionbecomesstandardin Hellenistic phi4 losophy, especially among the Stoics. The claim that numbers do not exist follows, perhaps, from these Hellenistic views, together with the premiss(that not everyone would have granted)that numbersare not bodily things. So the text ascribedto Theano is most often 5 taken to be a Hellenistic responseto Aristotle'spresentationof (and criticismof) Pythagoreanviews. Waithe does not mention this orthodox view. She says: The document attributed to Theano of Crotona appearsto have been unknown to Aristotle . . . (13). But Aristotle's ignorance of this text is nearly conclusive evidence that Theano did not write it. Waithe apparentlydoes not recognizethat the burden of proof is thereforehers. Among the writings that go under the name 'Theano,' Waithe distinguishesbetween those that should be ascribedto the Theano just mentioned and those that should be ascribedto another, whom she refersto as 'Theano II.' She says "it is certain that there were at least two" Theanos, and "there are sound philologicalreasonsto distinguishat least two Theanos"(41). She does not tell us the groundsfor the certaintyor the natureof the soundphilological reasons;a referenceas to where to look to find these groundsor reasons would have helped. The writingsof 'Theano II' are presentedin a sound translationby Harper, who providesa sensitive, careful,and interestingfew pagesof commentaryon one of them (49-52). Another Pythagorean woman, Myia, is listed in ancient sources as a daughterof Pythagoras,marriedto one Milo. Ancient sourcesalso tell us that Milo'shouse in Croton was the one in which some Pythagoreansdied when a hostile faction burnedit down. There are variousaccountsof what Pythagorashimselfhad to do with this incident:Pythagorasescapedfromthe burning house;6he was awayat Delos at the time;7 he died laterat Metapontum;8 he waskilled in a battle with the Syracusans.9 All of these storiesmakePythagoras'death take place somewhereelse; in none of them is there any mention of Myia. Yet Waithe, who gives none of these references,10says of Myia: "It was in her home that Pythagoraswas bured to death" (15). What we have under the name 'Myia' is a letter to an unknown woman named'Phyllis'on the sort of nurseshe shouldget forher recentlybor children. This is presented(15-16) in anothergood translationby Harper.Its philosophicalrelevance, accordingto Waithe, is that it speaksof temperanceand moderation-the nurse selected should have these qualities. And she sees two points here:first, the letter itself is an instanceof moderation,since Myia

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ends the letter with the statementthat "theseare the things it seems useful to write to you for the present .... ." There is moderation even in the giving of advice, for she promises more later on, when it will be "fitting"to remind Phyllis of other details of harmoniouschildrearing!(16) And, second, the letter is 'task oriented':Myia and the other Pythagorean women philosopherstake it as their task as women philosophers to teach to other women that which women need to know if they are to live their lives harmoniouslyand, as Aesara of Lucaniasuggests,create justice and harmonyin their souls and in their homes. Likewise, it is the task of men philosophersto teach to other men that which men need to know if they are to live their lives harmoniously, creatingjustice and harmonyin their souls and in the state. This task orientation in part explains, and in part merelydescribesthe reasonsfor the "realistic"approachto it that men take. They take differentapproachesbecause their tasks are different. Their tasks are differentbecause the natures of men and women differ. (17) Now if 'Myia'had said this last, we shouldhave had to pay attention, even if the letter is spurious.But there is not a hint of it in the letter itself:it is just a moralizingletter of advice on how to hire a nurse, and there is no attemptat reflection on what is involved in giving such advice. 'Perictione'was the name of Plato'smother. There is no independentevidence to the effect that Plato'smotherwas a Pythagorean.But there are four texts ascribedto 'Perictione,'1 two allegedlyfroma work"On the Harmony of Women." We are again given sound translationsby Harper.The longerof the two fragmentsfrom"On the Harmonyof Women"is, as with 'Myia"sletter, given to moralizing,but this time specificallyabout how a woman must act. The advice is by and largedepressing,particularlythis: A woman must bear everythingon the part of her husband, even if he should be unfortunate,or fail on account of illness or drink, or cohabit with other women. For this erroris forgiven in the case of men; for women, never. Rather, retribution is imposed. Thereforeshe must keep the law and not be envious. She must bear anger and stinginess, fault-finding, jealousyand abuse,and any other traithe mayhave by nature. Being discreet, she must handle all of his characteristicsin a way pleasing to him. When a woman is loving towardsher husband,and acts agreeablyto him, harmonyreigns;she loves

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the entire household and makes outsiders well-disposed towardsthe house. (34) The best commentson this are quotedby Waithe froman unpublishedpaper of Harper's: This comment [aboutmarital infidelity being forgiven in the case of men but not women] . . . initially appears merely repellant. On reflection, however, it is impressiveas a cleareyed statement of the brute fact that the actual society in which the authorlives limits or restrictsthe ways in which its female members can satisfy the normative principle of harmonia.Perictione is not speculatingabout what might be the case in some hypothetical, and vastly different society. Rather, she is consideringhow a womancan be harmoniousin an actual society. (37-38) On these comments Waithe bases some questionablegeneralizationsabout the differencesbetween men and women (34 ff.). There is not space to considerthe rest of the alleged Pythagoreanwomen. But we mustface the question of the authenticityof these writings.Waithe's case for their authenticity is mainlynegative. She considerstwo alternatives: that they are forgeries,and that they are pseudonymousworksby dissident Pythagoreansafter the time of Archytas (Thesleff). 12 She thinks that these views have "ludicrousconsequences"(73), e.g.: [1]. . . that there werefamousearlyPythagoreanphilosophers of the samenames as the given authorswhose views weremore or less congruent with those presented in the texts. [2] . . . that the names and views of these early Pythagoreanwomen were rememberedfor centuries either without benefit of any written record,or despite the destructionof all recordof them and their views. (72) Ad [2]: everyone of the women dealt with in this book is mentioned in some source independentlyof the fragments,as can be confirmedby looking the names up in Thesleff's collection. 13 Ad [1]: the idea is supposedto be that a forgerwould have had to keep close to the known views of the womanwhose name she or he was using (see Waithe on p. 61). But a forgerwho wantedhis or her materialto be acceptedas authoritativepresumablywouldhave picked as his targetsomeone whose views were not widelyknown. If Perictionewere known for her views on maritalinfidelity, there would be no need to forge a document purportingto state those views in her own words. The idea is to pick some ancient figurewho survivesonly as a name.

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Such blanket considerationswould authenticate not only the letters by women, but many of those by men as well. We should then have to rewrite the historyof Greekphilosophy:the maunderingsof Ocellus, Callicratidas,14 Hippodamus,and so on would have to be includedin the standardhistories. No doubt the prospectof having to rewritethe historyof Greek philosophy does not disturbWaithe. Nor does it disturbme. But it cannot be done this way. Too much workhas been done to separateout the genuinefromthe spuriousin Pythagoreanism,15 and some account mustbe taken of this no matter how we do our rewriting.Waithe does not mention this work. This is reallyquite central:we cannotjust deal with the worksallegedto be by women and authenticate them all at once. The question of authenticity must be dealt with case by case. The fragment quoted above ascribed to Theano, for example, has no chance of being taken for genuine. The fragment quoted above which Waithe ascribesto Arignote is not so ascribedin any of the ancient literature; instead, it is said by lamblichus,who quotes it (VP 146), to be fromPythagoras' Discourseabout the Gods (A6OyosMrEPi Oeov). 16 The tenth century A.D. lexicon known as the Sudatells us, underthe name 'Arignote,'that she was a student (it does not say 'daughter')of Pythagorasand Theano, and that a SacredDiscourseis ascribedto her. That is the entire basisfor the ascription of this fragmentto "Pythagoras'daughter,Arignote." In chapter 5, Waithe takes up Aspasia, and in chapter6 Diotima. These chaptersare basedon Aspasia'sspeech in Plato'sMenexenusand Diotima'sin Plato's Symposium.In both cases the materialput into the mouths of these women by Socrates, whose wordsare put into his mouth by Plato, is ascribed to actual historicalpeople. There is no independentevidence for this procedure. 17

The case of the Symposiummust be discussed:Waithe's rehabilitationof Diotima is the centerpieceof this book. The generalpatternof her argument: what Diotima is made to say stands in conflict with the known views of Socrates and Plato; so it must be ascribedto a historical individualnamed 'Diotima.' 18

The inconsistenciesWaithe sees between Diotima'sviews and those of Plato/Socratesare three: (1) the theoryof Formsis not in the Symposium; (2) the idea of immortalityin the Symposiumconflicts with the idea of immortality elsewherein Plato; (3) in the Symposium,reason is subordinatedto eros. All three allegeddiscrepanciesare highly dubious.I confine my commentsto the first, which is worse than dubious. Waithe cites Stanley Rosen (not the text of the Symposium),and then writes:"ForDiotima, then, not only isn't the Good an Idea, but her concept of Beauty is an idea at the level of appearances,not at the level of Platonic Ideasor Forms"(86).

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In fact, in the Symposium(210e4-211b5), Diotima tells Socrates, in what is the standardlanguageof the theoryof forms, that the initiate in mattersof love will behold, at the top of a ladderof ascent awayfromthe worldof bodies and things that appear,a certainnon-relativebeautiful[thing], the beautiful; she specificallysays: nor, again, will the beautiful appearto him as some face or hands or anythingelse of which body partakes,. . . nor as being somewherein something else, e.g. in an animal, on the earth, in heaven, or in anything else, but itself by itself with itself, alwaysbeing singularin form, while all the other beautiful [things] are partakersof that [beautiful].... and undergoes nothing. (211a5-7, a8-b2) There is no question of the beautifulbeing "an idea at the level of appearances." Throughoutthe discussionof Diotima, there is no quotationfromthe text, and there is exactly one referenceto it. The discussionproceedsby quotation from a spotty19selection of secondarysources. PerhapsDiotima was a historicalperson. If so, she may have held the theory of formswe associatewith Plato; if what Plato makesSocratesmake her say in the Symposiumis true to her, she certainlydid. But we have been given no reasonwhateverfor supposingthat she musthave been a historicalperson, or that, if she was, she held the views put into her mouth in the Symposium.20 Chapter 7, on Julia Domna (170-127 A.D.; 2nd wife of the Roman emperorSeptimiusSeverus)is by BeatriceH. Zedler;chapter8, on Macrina(ca. 327-379 A.D.; a Saint, the elder sisterof St. Basilthe Great and of St. Gregory of Nyssa) is by Corelia W. Wolfskeel. Both chaptersarewell-researched and documented;both have things of interestto say. They are still a bit disappointing, and for the same reason, one which it is beyond the power of Zedleror Wolfskeel to remedy:neither JuliaDomna nor Macrinawrote anything at all. So, in discussingJulia Domna, Zedlerends up discussingwhat she might have read, and a book that she causedto be written by someone else and did not live to see in complete form:Philostratus'Lifeof Apolloniusof Tyana.The Lifeis the closest we can get to the viewsJuliamight herselfhave entertained. Unfortunately,it is difficultto see Apollonius (who had died long before, ca. 98 A.D.) as anything but a crackpot:he prayedto the sun, performedmiracles, and foresawthe death of Domitian by clairvoyance:all this accordingto Philostratus.It is not clear that Julia'sinterest in Apollonius is really to her credit, but Zedlerdiligentlyseeksout good points in Philostratus'Apollonius, and apparentlyhopes that it is these that commendedhim to Julia:e.g., his belief in immortalityand the kinship of man to God.

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We are a little better off in connection with Macrina,since, althoughshe did not write, there is a dialoguewrittenby her brotherGregoryin which she is the main speaker,purportedlyfromher deathbed.Wolfskeelpoints in this to a definition of the soul (140), an argumentfor the immortalityof the soul (141), criticismof Aristotle for not recognizingthe soundnessof this argument (145-146), and meditationon the relationof the soul to its affects, desire and anger (144-145). She adds an interestingdiscussionof early views, especiallyChristianones, on the natureof women'ssouls:a greatmanyearly Christian writers believed in the inferiority of women (147-152). But, however interestingthis discussionis, its bearingon Macrinais tangential, since: "Nothing is directlyknown of Macrina'sviews on the question of the equalityof the souls of men and women." (146) Wolfskeelquotes her brothers Basil and Gregoryas saying that they are equal and infers that Macrina must have held the same (146-147). We may finish by consideringchapter9, which shouldbe of especial interest to readersof this Journal:this chapter, by Waithe, is devoted to Hypatia. We have, on the face of it, nothing whateverby Hypatia(ca. 375-415), although she did write. But the editor of the worksof Diophantusof Alexandria (fl. ca. 250 A.D.), Paul Tannery, had a conjectureaboutwhat was preserved under Diophantus'name. 21 is on algebra;it is fairlyprimiDiophantus'survivingwork, Arithmetica, tive, althoughit can get very complex. The primitiveness,and the difficulty, have to do with Diophantus'notation: he has no notation for, or understanding of, negative numbersor zero, he still adheresto the traditionalGreek conception of numbersas collections of units, and so has very little notion of or notation for fractions, and none at all for irrationalnumbers. Tannery noted that a number of the problems solved in book ii of Diophantuslooked like repetitions, with new numericalexamples, of problems solved in book i. He conjecturedthat these new exampleswere in fact survivalsof an ancient commentaryon Diophantus. Hypatia is said to have writtena commentaryon Diophantus.Tanneryconjecturedthat the new exampleswere from that commentary. Waithe printsa translationof Diophantusii 1-7 and 17 as a fragmentfrom Hypatia'scommentary.The translation,unfortunately,is not fromthe Greek text, but from Tannery'sLatin paraphraseof the Greek. The result is a misrepresentationof the Greek, especiallyon mattersof notation. The translationbegins as follows: (materialsin [squarebrackets]supplied) Book II. Throughout, the assumedratio of largerto smaller number is assumed[sic] to be 2:1. 22 II.I To find two numberssuch that their sum is in a given ratio to the sum of their squares.Given that their sums are to

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the sum of their squaresas 1/10. Assume the smaller= x, the larger= 2x; the sum of these = 3x and the square[of the sum of] these [latter]is 5x2. Then it should be [the case that] 3x is 1/10 x 5x2. Therefore30x =5x2 making x=6. Thus the smaller=6, the larger= 12, and the problem is solved. (178) Anyone who follows the problemcan see that somethinghas gone wrong in the clause "andthe square[of the sum of] these [latter]is 5x2":we were supposed to be talking about the sum of the squaresof the numberswe are seeking, and if the numbersare x and 2x, the sum of their squaresis indeed 5x2. There is no questionof a squareof any sum. Then it maycome as a surpriseto see that Tannery'sLatin at this point reads:"et quadratorumab ipsis summa, 5x2";it does not take much Latin to decipherthis as saying:"andthe sum of the squareson them [is] 5x2". The same errorhas unaccountablycrept into the translationof the next problemas well. As they stand, these translationsare quite unintelligible. What significanceare we to see in this alleged 'commentary'by Hypatia? Waithe (176-177) revertsto a passagefrom Plato'sGorgias(451b-d), which she construes as differentiatingarithmetic from calculation on the grounds (apparently)of the greatergeneralityof the former, and says: Hypatia'sintroductionof some new problemsand of some alternative solutions to Diophantus' original problems helps clarifythe abstractness,the arithmeticnature, of Diophantus' contributionsto algebraictheory. (177) Suppose the proposition just quoted, ii 1, is from a commentary on Diophantus. It would have come from the commentaryon i 31: To find two numbersthat have to each other a given ratio, so that the sum of the squareson them has a given ratio to the two together. Let it be set up so that the greateris 3 times the lesser, and the sum of their squares5 times their sum. Let the lesser be set at x; thereforethe greaterwill be 3x. The rest is that the sum of their squaresis 5 times their sum; but the sum of their squaresis 10x2, and their sum 4x; so 10x2 is 5 times 4x. Therefore20x is equal to 10x2, and x becomes 2 units. The lesser will be 2 units, and the greater6 units. It is reallycompletelyunclearwhat the advanceof ii 1 is on i 31. It is just another case. If it comes from an actualcommentary,presumablythe commentary did more than just give another case: the commentarymay have done

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something to describethe method used in the solution. But we do not have that. Tannery'sconjecturewas that ii and the others were survivalsfroman ancient commentary;the commentary,he thought, was with the manuscriptof the text, and when some early editor tried to separate out the genuine Diophantusfrom the commentary,he slippedup occasionally.Such an early editorcould have recognizedcommentaryfor what it was;he wouldhave had trouble, perhaps,telling that an example used by the commentatorwas not one of Diophantus'own, and that is why, on this conjecture, ii 1 etc. stayed in the text. Unfortunately,our editor would have managedto excise all that was of real interest. There are egregiousomissions in the bibliographyfor this chapter:papers in English by A.W. Richeson and J.M. Rist, one in French by Etienne Evrard,Praechter'sPauly-Wissowaarticle on Hypatia. In fact, nowhere in the book is there any mention of the articles in Pauly-Wissowa,despite the fact that there are articlesin that mammothworkof referenceon virtuallyall of the women dealt with here. In sum: the chaptersby Zedlerand Wolfskeel are good, and the translations and all too infrequentcommentsby Harperarefirstrate. But the rest of the book is so froughtwith half-truths,wishfulthinking and downrightmisinformation23basedon poor or incompletescholarshipthat it utterlyfails to attain the goals it set out to achieve.

NOTES 1. It does not, for example, appearin Diels-Kranz(for which see bibliographybelow: to this book the Historymakes no referenceat all). 2. The source-materialis conveniently collected in Thesleff [19651 193-194, 54-55. 3. E.g., PosteriorAnalyticsA 1076b18-19, MetaphysicsZ 11. 1036a3-7, MN passim. 4. See, e.g., Plutarch, De communibusnotitiisadversusStoicos1073de (SVF ii 525), 1080f, viii 263 (SVF II 363), Cicero, Academicaposteriorai 39 (SVF i 90), SextusAdversusmathematicos etc. The definition derivesfromthe Academy:Plato, Sophist247de;Aristotle, TopicsE 9. 139a48, Z 7. 146a22-23. 5. E.g., Burkert[1972] 61, esp. n. 52. 6. Porphyry,Vita Pythagorae56 (ascribedby Porphyryto Dicaearchus);Diogenes Laertius viii 39. Diogenes adds that Pythagoraswas murderedby a mob after his escape. 7. Porphyry,VP55; Iamblichus,Vita Pythagorae251-252. 8. Diogenes Laertiusviii 40; Porphyry,VP 57; Iamblichus,VP 249. 9. Diogenes Laertiusviii 40. 10. Indeed, she gives no referencesat all, except to passagesin which Myia is mentioned as the daughterof Theano and Pythagoras:p. 17 n. 14. In the firstof the five referencesshe gives (Clement, Stromateisiv 19 = iv 121.4), though, Pythagorasis not mentioned:only Theano as the motherof Myia, and there Theano is not said to have been Pythagoras'wife, but his student. The second referenceshe gives ('Suda, Lexicon,s.v. "Myia"'does not exist. The third (Sudas.v. 'Theano') does say that Theano was the mother of Myia and Pythagorasthe father, but adds "somewrite that she [Theano]was the wife of Brotinus."The fourth(lamblichus,VP 30= 170) does not name Myia at all, but speaksof a daughterof Pythagoraswho marriedMeno [sic] of

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Croton; it is quite plausible to suppose that 'Meno' (Mtvovt, MENfINI) is a copyist'serror for Milo (MCoXvt,MIAINI). The fifth (Iamblichus,VP 36= 267, ed. Deubnerp. 147.1-2) tells us only that Myia was the wife of Milo of Croton. We might add:Porphyry,VP 4; Photius 438b31 (in both of these Pythagorasis made the father of Myia). 11. There is anotherthat Waithe takesto be by a differentPerictione;she calls this lattertext 'Sophias'(55), and refersalso to a treatiseascribedto Archytasin this way (65). In both cases, the Greek title is fepi aro4(Cos.We must draw from this and other indications the disturbing conclusion that Waithe knows no Greek. 12. She includesa discussionof the Greek dialects in which these fragmentsare written that is seriouslyconfused. Forexample, she sayscorrectlythat the fragmentsascribedto 'PerictioneI' are "writtenin Ionic, although they contain occasionalDoric expressions"(68, virtuallyquoted from Thesleff [1961] 17); she continues: "This suggeststhat they were written when the Attic and Koine influences were leading to the popularizationof Doric Koine as the languagethat would eventually supplantIonic's use in inscriptedprose (68)." (1) The word 'inscripted'does not, as far as I can ascertain,exist. Waithe uses it frequently, where Thesleff, whom she quotes, uses 'inscriptional,'meaning 'pertainingto inscriptions.'But Waithe appearsto mean by 'inscripted'simply'written'as opposedto 'oral':"Archytas,"she says, "is usuallycreditedwith the popularizationof inscriptedDoric"(68). But Archytashad nothing we know of to do with inscriptions.So Waithe'sphrase'inscriptedprose'mustjust mean 'prose.' Waithe means to date the fragmentsto the early4th centuryB.C. when Archytas,who wrote in Doric, was active. Thesleff [1961] supposesthat subsequentPythagoreanwriterswere influenced by Archytas to write in Doric. Waithe apparentlywants to put 'Perictione'is this group. (2) Similarly, scholars (including Thesleff) use the term 'Doric Koine' for the "officiallanguage which prevailsin the Doric inscriptionsof the last three centuriesB.C." (Palmer[1980] 190; the word 'inscriptions'here means just that: not literaryor philosophicalprose). (3) There were not 'Attic and Koine influences'(Thesleff [1961] 82, quoted by Waithe on p. 67, speaksof "Attic and Koine influence".)'Koine' is the name given to the language, mostly based on the Attic dialect, that came into vogue especially after 338 B.C. (the battle of Chaeronea, which consolidated the Greek world under Macedonia):the word 'KOLviA'means 'common,'and this languagewas 'common'in the sense that it was non-literaryand in the sense that it was widely spoken. The most prominentdocument written in Koine is the New Testament. (4) The Attic dialect is one thing, the Koine based on it another, and the Doric dialect is completelydistinct fromeither. The idea that Attic 'influences'or Koine 'influences'could 'lead to the popularizationof Doric' is as nonsensical as it sounds. (5) No varietyof Doric 'supplantedIonic'suse' in prose:the use of Doric in Pythagoreanwritings is a relativelylocal phenomenon. (Also usedby Archimedes,but that is still not Doric 'supplanting'anything.) (6) If Thesleff'sconjectureis right, the imitatorsof Archytascame much later;there is no suggestion that everybodywho readArchytasimmediatelybegan slippinginto Doric. But this is, on Waithe'shypothesisthat 'Perictione'is in fact Plato'smother, what happenedto her, presumably at least in her mid-fiftieswhen Plato first came into contact with Archytasin 388 or so. (Plato was born in 428 or 427 and had two brothersapparentlyolder than himself. If we make the assumptionthat Perictionewas at least 15 when she gave birth to Plato, she was born in 443 at the latest and was at least 55 in 388.) 13. The one Pythagoreanwoman apparentlynot mentioned except at the head of the fragment ascribedto her is Melissa, but she is nowherementioned in this book. That in itself is curious: the letter ascribedto her is no less worthy of attention than the rest. 14. He was the purportedSpartanPythagoreanphilosopherand fatherof Phintys, not necessarilythe same as the Spartanadmiralwho died in the battle of Arginusae,with whom Waithe confuseshim in discussingPhintys (71: see Thesleff [1965] 102). 15. See, in particular,Burkert[1972], a work that appearsin the bibliographyof this book but, astonishingly, is never referredto. 16. Also sometimes referredto as the SacredDiscourse('Iep6s h6yos), but pieces of three differentbooks under the latter title are ascribedto Pythagoras. 17. Waithe (102-105) cites a piece of archeologicalevidence as supportingthe actualhistorical existence of Diotima: a bas-reliefportrayingsomeone who looks like Socrateslistening to a woman talking. 18. She assumesthat other dialoguesin which Socrates is the speakerare biographical;her supportfor this is A.E. Taylor'sPlato;she shows no awarenessof the by now universalrejection

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of this, known as the 'Bumet-Taylorthesis' (see, for example, Guthrie [1969]351 ff.). Her argument in particularrequiresthat the Phaedobe biographical;she says:". . . there is little doubt that the Phaedo,Apology,and Critoarebiographical"(110). On the contrary,there is little doubt that the Phaedois philosophicalfiction. 19. There is no referenceto Bury[1932] (althoughthis appearsin the bibliography)or to Dover [1980], to name two prominentEnglish-languagecommentarieson the Greek text. There is no referenceto Guthrie [1975], althoughhe discussesall of the issuesover which Waithe detects inconsistencies. 20. ConsiderAristophanes'long and uproariousspeech in the Symposium(189a-193d). We do not have to believe that Aristophaneshimself authoredthis or anything like it. she is apparentlycon21. Repeatedlyreferredto by Waithe as "Diophantus'Arithmeticorum"; liberprimus. librisex, Arithmeticorum fused by such titles as Arithmeticorum 22. These wordsshouldbe in squarebrackets;nothing in the original, Latinor Greek, corresponds to them. And the claim they make is false: only for the first five problemsis the ratio assumedto be 2:1. 23. And, strangely, misspelled words, e.g.: 'apothegem,''Atheneus,' 'Montulca,' 'pseudoepigrapha,' 'Timeaus.' (Athenaeus' name is correctly spelled by Zedler, and 'Timaeus' by in the index. Wolfskeel.) 'Montucla'is mispelledeven in the bibliography,and 'pseudepigrapha' The title of Clement'sStromateisis correctlyspelled in the bibliography,but appearsin the text once in the Latinizedform 'Stromata'and once as 'Stromates.' REFERENCES

E.L. Minar, Burkert,Walter. 1972. Loreandsciencein ancientPythagoreanism. Jr., trans. Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press. Bury, R.G. 1932. The Symposiumof Plato. Cambridge:W. Heffer & Sons. Dover, Kenneth. 1980. Plato:Symposium.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Diels, Hermann and Walter Kranz. 1959/1960. Die FragmentederVorsokratiker(9th ed.). (3 vols.). Berlin:WeidmannscheVerlagsbuchhandlung. Guthrie, W.K.C. 1969. A historyof Greekphilosophy,vol. 3: Thefifth-century enlightenment. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. Guthrie, W.K.C. 1975. A historyof Greekphilosophy,vol. 4: Plato, the man andhisDialogues:Earlierperiod.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Palmer,LeonardR. 1980. The Greeklanguage.London:Faber& Faber. Thesleff, Holger. 1961. An introductionto the Pythagoreantexts of the Hellenisticperiod.[ActaAcademiaeAboensis,Humaniora24.1.] Abo: Abo Akademi. Thesleff, Holger. 1965. The Pythagoreantextsof the Hellenisticperiod.[Acta AcademiaeAboensis, Humaniora,Ser. A, vol. 30, no. 1.] Abo: Abo Akademi. vol. 1: AnWaithe, MaryEllen, ed. 1987. A Historyof womenphilosophers, cientwomenphilosophers, 600 B.C. - 500 A.D. Boston: M. Nijhoff.

Book Reviews

The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution 750 BC-AD 1250. By PRUDENCEALLEN R.S.M. Montrealand London:Eden Press, 1985. LindaDamico In my pre-feministdays as a student of philosophy, I never imaginedthat the inhabitantsof the philosophicalworldweregendered.I sat for hours, eyes glazedover, listening to professorstalk aboutthe etherealworldof "Being"or "HumanBeing"or "Man."This was the worldbeyondthe concrete, lived reality that was my earthlyhome. It was a safe, dreamy,abstractworldof pure thought about which I could ruminate, and speculate, and ponder to my heart'scontent. But in recent yearsI have been awakenedfrommy sex neutral slumber. Feminismcame into my life with a vengeance, and I realized that human beings do indeed come in gendersand that the male partof that genderedworldhad privilegesand political powerthat the femalepartdid not have. I realizedthat the philosophical world of "HumanBeing" or "Man" was, in truth, a world for males only. But this is a familiarstoryfor feministsin philosophy.We have all had similar experiences. We may not have realized, however, that philosophy has not alwaysignoredthe realityof gender. We also may not have realizedthat there was a ratherdefinite, if not deliberate,processthat led to the neutering of philosophy. My educationon these issuesbeganwhen I readTheConceptof Woman.In this remarkablyambitious and scholarlybook, Sr. PrudenceAllen reveals that "Philosophy,fromits beginnings,soughtto makethe distinctions, to develop explanations,and to promotetheoriesaboutthe respectiveidentitiesof women and men" (8). But, with the adoptionof the worksof Aristotle as the central curriculumof the University of Paris,a legacy of desexed philosophy was created. She says: Sex neutrality is a theory that essentially ignoresthe materiality of human existence and instead focuses its formalstructure on rationality.Aristotle provideda convenient rationale for this preferencein thinking and the victoryof the Aristotelian Revolution ensuredthat it would become the respectable way to do philosophyfor centuries to come (469). In nearly 500 pages of well documented, detailed, orderly, and carefully writtentext, Sr. Allen supportsher claims. She exploresthe sex identitythePermissionto reprinta book review from this section may be obtained only from the author.

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ories of a wide rangeof thinkers,both male and female, fromthe Presocratics to mid-thirteenthcenturymedievalists.She showshow each philosopherwas concernedwith answeringfourbasic questionsabout the concept of woman: In what way arewoman and man opposite?What are the respectivefunctions of motheringand fatheringin generation?Do women and men relate to wisdom in the same or in differentways?Do women and men have the same or differentvirtues?These questions, she says, correspondto fourtraditionalareas of philosophicalthought:metaphysics,naturalphilosophy,epistemology, and moralphilosophy. Allen then shows how the answersgiven by the philosophersto the above questionsreveal a limited numberof alternativetheories about the relation of the sexes. These theories are: sex unity (men and women are equal and not significantlydifferent), sex neutrality(ignoresthe issue of male and female differentiation),sex polarity (men and women are differentand the male is superior),reversesex polarity(men and women are different and the female is superior), and sex complementarity(men and women are differentbut equal). The primarydebate in the history of philosophy, Allen claims, has been between theories of sex unity, championedby Plato and the Neo-Platonists, and sex polarity,developedby Aristotle and institutionalizedby the earlymedieval philosophers.Not until Hildegardof Bingen do we find a securefoundation for the theory of sex complementarity,a theory which, by the way, is Allen's own preference. After Hildegard, according to Allen, there was a "movementback and forth between theories of sex unity, sex complementarity,and sex polarity, without any one theory dominatingWestern thought ... "(361). But with the discoveryof certain Aristotelian texts and their translationinto Latin, and with the decision of Thomas Aquinas to use Aristotle as the foundation for a new Christianphilosophy,the theoriesof sex unity and sex complementaritysuccumbed.By the time of the foundingof the Universityof Paris,the theories of Aristotle had become so entrenched, and women had become so devalued, that the decision was made to stop the study of the concept of woman altogether. Sex differenceswere ignoredand the theory of sex neutrality became part of the foundationof westernphilosophy. Forthose teachersof ancient and medievalphilosophyand for all those interestedin the historyof ideas, Allen's book is an invaluableresource.While other authorshave researchedand written on the concept of woman in ancient sources,Allen is the first personto undertakethis studysystematically and comprehensively. Her style is clear, well-organizedand straightforward. Eachchapterfollows a detailed outline with a summaryand evaluationat the end. Although this book is clearlyintended for scholarsand studentsof philosophy,all those interestedin the historyof ideas on woman will find this easy and stimulating reading.

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One particularlyinterestingfeatureof the book is found in the conclusion where the author engages in a honest and thorough analysis of her work, pointing out achievements, limits, and possibilitiesfor futureresearch.The value of the book, she claims, is that it offersa truthfuland balancedaccount of each philosopherunder consideration"withoutexaggeratingor distorting the passagesto supporta single interpretation"(475). Allen's assessmenton this point is correct. She is almost painfullyobjective. Ratherthan an asset, however, this could be seen by some as a limitation. In her effortto presentthe "facts,"she shies awayfromspeculationand critical analysis. Throughout the work I kept wanting her to explain why each philosopherheld the position he/she did. What were the historicalconditions that contributedto the riseof sex unity theoryin Plato?of sex polarity theoryin Aristotle?She points out the intellectualinfluencesbut rarelymentions other factors.Her one exception is that of the sex complementaritytheory of Hildegardof Bingen. This anamoly in the historyof philosophy, she claims, was created by the practical interaction of women and men in the doublemonasteriesof the middleages. "As there was a true complementarity in a long-termliving situation,"she says, "it was inevitablethat a philosophy of sex complementaritywould eventually evolve" (315). Her work would have been more interestingphilosophicallyhad she, in her summariesand evaluations, made a similarattempt to explain the long historyof the triumphof sex unity and sex polarity. Surely, the devaluation of women in patriarchalsociety playeda largerole in the successof the Aristotelian revolution. Allen never mentions the patriarchicalsocial structure underlyingthe philosophicaltheories. Ratherthan look at the social and historical influences, she treats philosophy, for the most part, as if it were a world unto itself. While the omission of historicalanalysismay be excused due to time and space limitations, some claims made by the author beg for furtherexplanation. Forinstance, on page 246 she claimsthat "femalephilosopherswerenot original thinkers in the sense that Plato, Aristotle, or Augustine developed new theories."My questionswould be: Is this true?Or has there been a historical cover up? If this is true, what is the cause?Are women philosophers innately inferior, as Aristotle claims?Or, have women philosophersmerely internalizedtheir oppression? My suspicionis that a refusalto deal with the cultural,social, and historical basisfor specific sex identity theories is itself a continuationof the tradiof Aristotelian formalism.It implies that there is a philosophicalrealm unsullied by materialreality. I suspect furtherthat Allen's uncriticalbias toward sex complementarityimplies a tacit belief that males and femalesdo have a fixed and unchangingnatureremovedfromthe exigenciesof the lived world. Allen is awareof the limitations of her work, however. She realizesthat the "classificationof theories under the categoriesof sex unity, sex polarity,

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or sex complementaritywill need to be renderedmore precise in coming years"(475). She also realizesthat a moreholistic, interdisciplinaryapproach to the studyof the concept of woman is needed. She saysthat futureresearch shouldconsiderthe personas a "unifiedexistent in the midstof intricateand creative relationships"(477). This suggests,at least to my satisfaction,that the author is not wedded to a belief in fixed "natures"and may be open to moreflexible approachesto the problemof gender, e.g. evolution or continuum theories. With this criticismaside, there is anotherproblemthat needs addressing. This is not a book about the "concept of woman," as the title suggests. Ratherthis is a book aboutthe concept of woman in relationto man. In limiting the concept of woman to this one relationship,Allen does a disservice to the richnessof the experienceof the historicalwomanwho we mayassume had relationshipswith children, other women, and natureand who also had an ontological status of her own. While it may be true that white European philosopherswroteonly aboutwomanin relationshipto man (revealinga distinctly heterosexualbias), Allen should have broughtthis to the reader'sattention, especiallygiven the fact that she is sensitive to the need for a more holistic approachto the study of human relationships.It would seem that such an approachwould have to take seriousconsiderationof the fact that women in the concreteworldcome in differentages, races,classes,sexualorientations, and with differentphysicalabilitiesand culturalbackgrounds.Any theory that tries to abstractaway these differencesis hopelessly idealistic. I do not wish to underminethe value of this stimulatingand challenging work. ProfessorAllen's book is an importantand pathbreakingstudy. She sheds light on an area of inquirythat traditionalphilosophyhas ignoredfor centuries.Her hope is that a new field of inquiry,the Philosophyof Man and Woman, will "takeits rightfulplace once again in the heartof academicphilosophy"(478). With this workand its sequel, in which she will continue her researchon the concept of woman from 1250 to the 19th century, she will have done her part in making this vision a reality. Sarah Grimke: Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and Other Essays. Edited and with an introductionby ELIZABETHANN BARTLETT.New Haven and London:Yale University Press, 1988. JudithOchshom The recent publicationin one volume of the complete feministwritingsof SarahGrimk--her Letterson the Equalityof the Sexesand brieffragmentsof perhapsfive other essays,the last probablywrittenduringthe late 1840'sand 1850'sand possiblynot intendedfor publicscrutiny-is causefor celebration. The Lettersprovidedthe first, and by now widely-acknowledged,radicalcri-

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tique of American women's secondarystatus, remarkablebecause it challenged enduringphilosophicaland theological beliefs about women'snature, embodied in an array of institutions, laws, customs, and values that demeanedand degradedthem. Grimke'sthought was enormouslyinfluential in staking out the philosophical and moral high groundof mid-nineteenthcenturyfeminism. Grimke'slife was paradigmatic,in its intellectual bravery and scant options, of the fate of brilliant,under-educatedwomen of her class and time. Most remarkableof all, SarahGrimkeclaimedequalitywith the most educated men for herselfand all women-arguing compellinglyfor women'scapacity, right and obligation to reason, make moral judgments, and act on them in the public sphere-at a time when they had just been admitted to Oberlin College, after having been denied a universityeducation in Europe and the United States for 500 years. Women were vilified for speaking in public, or violating their "private,""dependent"natures.Indeed, the Letters were a responseto an attack by the Congregationalministersof Massachusetts when she and her sisterAngelina were deliveringabolitionist speeches all over the state to "promiscuous,"i.e., mixed-sex, audiences. An excellent biography of the Grimke sisters was available by 1967 (Lerer, 1967). The Letters,firstpublishedin 1838, werereissuedin their entirety by 1970, and selections of them, with biographicalbackground,have been reprintedsince in collections of feminist documents (Schneir 35-48; Cooper & Cooper 51-89). Generous portions of two of the five remaining fragments,"Marriage"and "Sistersof Charity,"and the entire "Educationof Women" were reprintedby 1977 (Lemer 1986 87-98, 477-87). Therefore, beyondthe obviousvalue of having all of her writingscollected in one book is the question of what it offersthat is new. The editor, ElizabethAnn Bartlett, introducesGrimke'swork with a synthesis of the intellectual and social sourcesof her ideas, most of them already discussedin the literatureon the roots of nineteenth-centuryfeminism, e.g., the influences of Enlightenment ideas, radicalsectarianism,utopian socialism, moral reform movements, the relative status deprivation sufferedby middle-classwomen as a resultof industrialization,and the like. All of this is useful in locating Grimke'sposition within its historicalcontext. The sub-text consists of Bartlett'sassessmentof the specificconfigurations of Grimke's thought, what she alleges was a shift from an earlier, malecentered stance in the Letters to a female-centeredview in the later fragments, and an attemptto evaluateits implicationsfor the currentminimalistmaximalistdispute, between those feministswho try to minimizethe differences between the sexes and those who try to maximize them. Thus, Bartlett'sanalysiscuts to the heart of some of the basic philosophicalissues raisedby feminists in its focus, but is somewhatproblematicin its content.

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Bartlett maintains that Grimke'snotion of womanhood in the Lettersis male-centered, "either male-definedor a reaction against that definition," and that "She knew that women lackedwhat men had, and she soughtto obtain it for them, but she had little idea of what women lackedas women,"and that "Insteadof definingwoman'sidentityfroman inner notion of the nature of womanhood, Grimke appropriatedsociety's definition of both men's and women'sidentities (men as public;women as domestic) to define the nature of womanhood. The very notion of sisterhoodin her concept of sororityfocuseson women'scommon oppressionbymen, ratherthan the commonexperiences and unity of womanhood"(Bartlett 27). Finally, she sees Grimke moving from an attitude of hostility and resentment towardmen who had what women wantedand denied it to them, found in the Letters,to a still angry but "rebelliousaffirmationof the dignity of womanhood. As she grew, Grimke came to focus more and more on who women are and of what they are capable, ratherthan on what they lack and are denied" (Bartlett29). And since it was the Letters,and not her later unpublishedfragments,that was to help delineate feminist theory, whether or not her thinking is "male-centered"is of more than passinginterest. When Grimkewrote the Letters,to a far greaterextent than is true today, men dominated every aspect of life-politics, the economy, education, the family, the determination of normalcy and deviance, indeed what constituted knowledgeitself. Even some of the most egalitarianphilosophicaland religious ideologies then current, stemming from the Enlightenment and Quakerism,either failed to extend their libertarianthrustfully to women, or legitimizedthe emergingmiddle-classconstructionof separatespheresby a conception of female and male naturesas polarizedand complementary,and a definition and exaltation of motherhood as womanhood (Fox-Genovese 251-77; Dunn 115-36). How then, in the 1830's, could any American woman make a "female-centered"argument,contesting male definitions of female "nature,"beforeshe establishedher rightto do so? And this was precisely what Grimke did. Like MaryWollstonecraftbefore her, in the LettersGrimke appropriated the naturalrights philosophy of the Enlightenmentto include women, and underminedthe biological argumentsfor women'sinferiorityby stressingthe impactof socializationand societal expectationson personalitydevelopment. Restingher case for the equalityof the sexes on what Grimkesaw as the sexually-egalitarianintentions of God, she assertsthat women coulddiscern divine aims, or were as rational, morallyaccountableand intelligent as men, therebyjustifyingoppositionto man-made,sexist laws in deferenceto divine mandatesof equality, and fueling the nineteenth-centuryattackon the double standard.The Seneca FallsDeclarationand speechesby SojournerTruth, LucretiaMott and ElizabethCady Stanton echo Grimke'scontention that women are answerableto God ratherthan men (Schneir 77-8, 80-2, 101-2,

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113, 120-1). In claimingdivine authorityfor women'sactivities on behalf of oppressedgroups, and women's ability to judge who, including themselves, are oppressed,she stressesnot only women'sright but their obligationto fulfill God's commitment to equality even in the face of men's denials. All of this hardlyreflectsa male-centeredphilosophybut ratherrepresentsthe closest approachto a claim for female autonomypossiblein the historicalcircumstances of the 1830's. Furthermore,Grimke'saccusationthat a scripturalbasisfor sexual inequality was inaccurate, the result of "falsetranslations"(Lettersin Bartlett31); her reinterpretationof Genesisstories, so damagingto women, to illustrate the equalityof the sexes in God's creationby retelling Genesis1; her view of the culpabilityof man in the Fall, (Lettersin Bartlett32-4), and, as its first consequence, men's "lustfor dominion"(Lettersin Bartlett35); and her contention that once women were permittedto studyGreek and Hebrew, a differentpictureof the intentions of God and the behaviorof men wouldappear (Lettersin Bartlett38) all explicitlyforeshadowa rangeof workdone by feminist theologians today, none of it "male-centered." Therefore, it seems less than accurateto say that Grimkeonly knew that "womenlacked what men had"but "hadlittle idea of what women lackedas women," since what they lacked as women was access to everything in the world outside of the home, especially if they were poor or slaves. A consciousnessof their "commonoppressionby men,"and an expressionof some therapeuticanger over that, was necessarybefore any notions of "sorority," "sisterhood,"or self-definitioncould emerge. In fact, feminists'awarenessof the "commonexperiencesand unity of womanhood"proceededdirectlyfrom that consciousnessof their "commonoppression." Is it any wonderthat Grimke'searlierwritings, (and incidentallyher later ones as well), were markedby "resentmenttowardmen" (Bartlett29) who, as John Stuart Mill pointed out in his Subjectionof Women,benefitted from that subjection?Does it really make Grimke male-centeredwhen she (and others) initially appealedfor redressto the ideals of justice and compassion expressedby men? After all, the latterwere the only ones, in the 1830'sand afterward,with the power to remedyinjusticestowardwomen, and she also urgedwomen to work publiclyfor social reform(Lettersin Bartlett53, 56). On anotherissue, it is one thing for Bartlettto tracethe legacyof Grimke's thought, it is quite anotherto look for her immediaterelevanceto contemporary feminist debates such as that between minimalists and maximalists. While there are significantcontinuities between nineteenth and twentiethcenturyfeminist thought, the tasksof earlyfministswere quite differentfrom our own. They had to first establishour capacityand right to engage in debates, and to conflate American feminist theoriesover two centuriesis to ignore the meaningof historicalchanges and confuse similarities.It is as inappropriateto evaluate Grimke'sposition, say, on the unique value of mother-

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hood in light of Adrienne Rich'sposition on the uniquenessof femaleexperience as it is to project our currentvalues back on the past. In Grimke'sday, the realitywas that it was consideredright and naturalby virtuallyeveryonefor women of all classesand racesto bearthe sole responsibility for domestic labor. Utopian socialist theoriesand communitiesdid not affect the mainstreamof American life, and even amongQuakersthere were some distinctions made on the basis of sex in the responsibilitiesof women and men. With the continuing difficulties of reconciling the demands of motherhoodwith the goalsof liberation,it wouldseem that Bartlett'scharacterizationof Grimke as ambivalenttowardwomen's domestic and maternal roles derived more from the ambiguitiesof women's lived experiencesthan from inconsistencies in Grimke'sphilosophy. To say that Grimke believes that women have domesticresponsibilitiesis not quite the sameas sayingthat she adoptsthe male view of "womenas domesticservantsratherthan as persons" (Bartlett 26). In fact, Grimke'smajorlegacies to feminist thought are her arguments for sexual equality and the equal moral responsibility of women and men to change the world, both of them basedon her belief in female autonomyand agency. But differencesin interpretationaside, Bartlettconveys the excitement of encountering Grimke's vision. Given the roles of middle-classAmerican women in the 1830's, what is breathtakingin SarahGrimke'swritingsis her courage in challenging the assumptionsabout women's nature by the most educated and powerfulmen in the country. She allied God's intentions to equalityof the sexes, thus arrogatingto women the God-givenrightto define their own standardsof moralityand act on them in personaland publicways. She used the concept of oppressionto describewomen'sstatusunderthe law, by custom, and as a result of socialization(Letters,passim);to demonstrate what she regardedas women'ssexual subjugationin marriage("Marriage"in Bartlett 141-53); and to exhort women to self-reliance("Sistersof Charity" in Bartlett 156-64). Despite Grimke'sown upper-classorigins, Bartlettaccurately portraysher deep and lasting concern for all classes of women, slave and free, typical of the best of later feminist thought. Historically, women like Sarah Grimke were deviants and paid a heavy price for their intellectual pursuits (Crovitz & Buford, passim;Labalme, passim).She refusedmarriagein an era when it was virtuallywomen'sonly alternativeand when they could not supportthemselvesbecauseof lack of educational and employmentopportunities.The anomalyof her life of domesticity as an adjunctto Angelina'sfamilycoupledwith her brillianceexemplified GerdaLerer's conclusion that "... the historyof women is the historyof their ongoing functioningon theirown termsin a male-definedworld"(Lerner 1986, xxvii).

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REFERENCES Cooper, JamesL. and Sheila MclsaacCooper, eds. 1975. The rootsof American feministthought.Boston: Alleyn and Bacon. Crovitz, Elaine and Elizabeth Buford. 1978. Courageknowsno sex. North Quincy, Mass.: The ChristopherPublishingHouse. Dunn, Mary Maples. 1979. Women of Light. In Womenof America, ed, Carol Ruth Berkin and Mary Beth Norton, eds. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth. 1987. Women and the Enlightenment. In Becoming Visible: Women in EuropeanHistory. Renate Bridenthal, Claudia Koonz and Susan Stuard, eds. 2nd rev. ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 251-77. Labalme,PatriciaH., ed. 1984. Beyondtheirsex: Learnedwomenof theEuropeanpast. New York & London:New YorkUniversity Press. Lerner, Gerda. 1967. The Grimkesistersfrom SouthCarolina:Pioneersfor woman'srightsand abolition.New York:Schocken Books. Lerer, Gerda. 1986. The femaleexperience:An Americandocumentary.1st printing, 1977. New York:The MacmillanCo. Schneir, Miriam, ed. 1972. Feminism:The essentialhistoricalwritings.New York:Vintage Books, 35-48.

Notes on Contributors

MARYCATHARINE BASEHEART,S.C.N., is DistinguishedProfessorof Philosophyat Spalding University in Louisville, Kentucky. She earned her Ph.D. at Notre Dame Universitywith a dissertationon EdithStein's philosophy. She has publisheda numberof articleson Stein; a book entitled Person to thePhilosophy in theWorld:An Introduction of EdithSteinis nearingcompletion. LINDA A. BELLis a professorof philosophyat GeorgiaState University in Atlanta. She worksin the areasof existentialism,ethics, and feministtheory. Her edited anthologyof philosophers'views of women, Visionsof Women,was published by The Humana Press, and a book on Sartreanethics is forthcoming fromThe Universityof AlabamaPress.She is presentlyworkingon a book on feminist ethics. LINDA DAMICO earned her Ph.D. in philosophyfrom FloridaState University. She has taught philosophyat the University of South Floridaand is currentlyteaching at Seattle University. Her book TheAnarchistDimensionof Liberation Theologywas publishedby PeterLangPublicationin 1987. She is a memberof the AdvisoryCommittee of the Women'sSkills and ResourceExchange in Seattle. R. M. DANCY received his Ph.D. from HarvardUniversityand has taught at Princeton University, The University of Pittsburgh,and Corell UniverA Studyin Aristotle, sity. Majorpublicationsinclude Senseand Contradiction: on Aristotle's about in substances The Review, Philosophical papers thoughts and on Plato's metaphysicsand epistemology(AncientPhilosophy,Philosophical Topics). He is presentlyProfessorof Philosophyat FloridaState University. JANE DURAN received her Ph.D. in philosophyfrom RutgersUniversity. She is the authorof numerouspublishedarticlesin epistemologyand philosophy of science. She is currentlyworkingon the naturalizationof epistemic justificationtheoryand has forthcominga book on the topic, Epistemics,from University Pressesof America. In addition she has a strong interest in the possibilityof finding an intersectionbetween analyticepistemologyand feminist theory. MAUREENEGAN is an Associate Professorof Philosophyat the College of Our Ladyof the Elms in Chicoppee, MA. Her recent researchhas been on nineteenth century feminist intellectual history of the United States. She

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serveson the ExecutiveCommittee of the SoutheasternNineteenth Century Studies Association. LOIS FRANKELreceived her Ph.D. from the University of Californiaat Berkeleyin 1980, and is currentlyAssistant Professorof Philosophyat the Universityof Coloradoat ColoradoSprings.Her primaryresearchinterest is earlymodem philosophy,with most of her publishedarticlesfocusingon Descartesand Leibniz.She will have chapterson Mashamand on Anne Conway in later volumesof A Historyof WomenPhilosophers, ed. MaryEllen Waithe. Recentlyshe directeda conferenceon women and spiritualityat UCCS. Currently she is workingon a book on the development and change of causal models and metaphorsin the 17th and 18th centuries, and she hopes to incorporatefeminist insights into the historical study. JOAN GIBSON is Assistant Professorof Humanitiesat Atkinson College, YorkUniversity, in Ontario, Canada. She is a contributorto the second volume of A Historyof WomenPhilosophers (forthcoming)and is currentlyworkof use of the metaphorof mental concepon a the history ing philosophical tion and on the historyof mental languagein Medievalepistemology.She is the recent chair of a committee proposing a Graduate Programme in Women's Studies at York. LINDA LOPEZMcALISTERearned degrees in philosophyat Barnardand Cornell, and is Professorof Women's Studies and Philosophyat the University of South Florida. She wrote the chapter on Gerda Walther and coauthored(with MaryCatharineBaseheart)the chapteron EdithStein in the She is on the ExforthcomingVolume IV of A Historyof WomenPhilosophers. ecutive Committee of the Society for the Studyof Women Philosophers.Her paper"FeministSaint?The Feminismof EdithStein" is forthcomingin Florida InternationalUniversity'sOccasionalPapersin Women'sStudies. MARGARETMcFADDENteaches Women's Studies and Women'sHistory at AppalachianState University, Boone, North Carolina,where she also coordinates the Women's Studies Program.Her Ph.D., from EmoryUniversity'sInstituteof the LiberalArts, emphasizedphilosophyand literature.She has written "Anatomy of Difference: Toward a Classification of Feminist Forum,7 (6): (1984) and is currently Theory,"Women'sStudiesInternational Sisterworkingon an historicalmonograph,tentatively entitled International hood:The Developmentof FemaleNetworksin theAtlanticCommunity,17891860. URSULE MOLINARO is the authorof 11 novels (the latest one forthcoming with The Women's Pressin England),about 100 short stories(a new col-

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lection, 13, forthcomingwith McPherson),plays, non-fiction, and fictionalizedhistory. Her piece on Hypatiain this issue is one of 29 wordportraitsin A Full Moon of Womento be publishedby E. P. Dutton in 1989. JUDITH OCHSHORN, Professorof Women's Studies and formerProgram Directorat the University of South Florida,transmutedher training in history and philosophy into a study of women'shistory and feminist theology. Her workon gender, power and female sexualityin religion, The FemaleExperienceand theNatureof theDivine,was continued in subsequentessays,e.g., "The Contest Between Androgynyand Patriarchyin the EarlyWesternTradition," in FeministVisions.Currently,she is workingon a book on the possible sourcesand functions of the concept of women as existentiallyevil and what the feministresponseto that represents,sometimesa puzzleto her three sons. MARY ELLENWAITHE earnedher undergraduatedegreein philosophyat CUNY and her Ph.D. from the Universityof Minnesota. She teaches ethics at the University of Minnesota and foundedThe Projecton the Historyof Women in Philosophyin 1981. She is editorof the fourvolume series,A Historyof WomenPhilosophers. MARY ANNE WARREN teaches philosophy at San FranciscoState University. She is interestedin feminist philosophyand medical ethics and has publishedarticles in these areas. Her book The Natureof Womenwas published by Edgepress,Inverness,CA in 1980, and Gendercide: The Implications Sex Selection Littlefield in Adams 1985. of by BEATRICEH. ZEDLERis a ProfessorEmeritaof Philosophyof Marquette University, where she taught for forty years after receiving her Ph.D. from FordhamUniversity. She has publishedmany articlesin the areasof American philosophyand MedievalChristianand Islamicphilosophyand morereedited by MaryElcently has contributedto A Historyof WomenPhilosophers, len Waithe. Her book publicationsincludeHow Philosophy Begins(1983) and translations of Thomas Aquinas' On the Unity of the Intellectagainst the Averroists(1968) and of Gilles Menage'sThe Historyof WomenPhilosophers (1984).

Announcements Hypatia'sExecutive Boardof Associate Editorsannouncesa call for nominations for Editorof Hypatia,to serve for a term of five yearsbeginningJuly 1, 1990. Candidatesshouldhave a recordof publicationin feministphilosophy, an academic affiliation, some experience in editing, administrationor business, and an abilityto workwith the variousphilosophicalorientationsrepresented by contemporaryfeministphilosophy.Nominations for a joint editorship will be considered.Self-nominationsareencouraged.If self-nomination, enclose a c.v. If nominatinganother, includecompleteaddressand reasonfor nomination. Qualifiednominees will receive guidelinesfor developing a full proposal.Proposalswill be evaluatedand rankedby the ExecutiveBoardwith assistancefrom membersof the Society for Women in Philosophy. Final selection will be made by the Executive Board in consultation with Indiana University Press. Nominations should be sent to Hypatia,Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville,Edwardsville,IL 62026-1437. Deadline for receipt of nominations is May 1, 1989. Foradditionalinformationcontact the Editor, MargaretSimons, at (618) 692-2185 or (618) 656-9569. Newsletteris sponsoredby the APA Committee The Feminismand Philosophy on the Status of Women in Philosophy. Its purposeis to publishinformation about the statusof women in philosophyand to make more widely available the resourcesof feminist philosophy. The Newsletterwill contain discussions of recent developmentsin feminist philosophyand relatedwork in other disciplines. It will include literatureoverviewsand book reviews,suggestionsfor eliminatinggenderbias in the traditionalphilosophycurriculum,and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It will also keep the professioninformedabout the work of the Committee on the Status of Women in Philosophy. The Newsletterwill provide a forumfor queriesand informaldiscussionsof topics relevantto feministphilosophyand also to the statusof women in the profession. The editor invites contributionsto the Newsletter. All submissionsmust be limited to ten manuscriptpages and must follow the APA guidelines for gender neutral language (APA Proceedings).Essays should be submitted in duplicate with the author'sname only on the title page for the anonymousreviewingprocess. Manuscriptsmust be typed double-spacedand referencesmustfollow Chicago Manualstyle. Pleasesend articles, comments, suggestions,and all other communicationsand inquiriesto: Nancy Tuana, Arts and Humanities,JO 3.1, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson,TX 75083-0688. Scheduleof Topics: September 1, 1989; Topic: Feminismand Aesthetics;editors: LaurieShrage and Nancy Tuana; deadline for submissionof manuscripts:May 1, 1989.

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February1, 1990; Topic: Open Issue: all topics welcome; editor: Nancy Tuana; deadline for submissionof manuscripts:October 1, 1989. May 1, 1990; Topic: Feminismand MoralTheory;editors:Betty Sichel and Nancy Tuana; deadline for submissionof manuscripts:January1, 1990. editors:KarenJ. September 1, 1990; Topic: Feminismand the environment; Warrenand Nancy Tuana; deadline for submissionof manuscripts:May 1, 1990. The September, 1989 issue of the American Philosophical Association's Feminismand PhilosophyNewsletter, edited by Laurie Shrage and Nancy Tuana, will focuson Feminismand Aesthetics. Submissionson feministliterary theory, film criticism, art criticism, and feminist theories of art and aesthetic judgement are welcome. Also welcome are book reviews, literature surveys, ideas for mainstreamingfeminist aesthetic theory in philosophy courses,and short commentarieson (1) the writingsof women aestheticians, (2) the politics of art reception and production, (3) feminist aesthetics and theories of meaning and representation.All submissionsmust be limited to ten manuscriptpages. Essaysshould be submittedin duplicatewith the author's name on the title page only. The deadline for submissionsis May 1, 1989. Send manuscriptsto Nancy Tuana, Arts and Humanities,JO 3.1, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson,Texas 75083-0688. Callfor papers:Papersaresoughtfor an anthologyof CriticalFeministEssaysin the Historyof WesternPhilosophyto be publishedby the SUNY press in its "FeministPhilosophy"Series. The anthology will have two parts:one addressingancient Greek philosophy;and the other, modem philosophy. Papers for the first part should focus on some aspect of Plato's or Aristotle's work. Papersfor the second part should focus on some aspect of Cartesian philosophyor Hobbes', Locke's,Hume's, Mill's, Rousseau's,Kant's,Hegel's, Marx'sand Nietzche's work. Critical overviews of a philosophicalfield or trendsand their developmentsduringthe two periodsare also welcome. Send proposals,draftsand inquiriesto: Bat-Ami Bar On Departmentof Philosophy, SUNY College at Oswego, Oswego, NY 13126. The Institutefor Women'sPolicyResearch(IWPR) is a recently formed independent nonprofitresearchinstitutededicatedto conductingand disseminating researchthat informspublicpolicy debatesaffectingwomen. IWPRseeks to bridge the communicationgap between scholarlyresearchers,state and federalpolicymakers,and advocates. In it first year, IWPR has focused on economic justice issuesaffectingwomen (welfarereform,familyand medical leave, and child care). Projectedareasof researchincludehealth careand intemational relations. In all its work, IWPRseeks to addressissuesof ethnic-

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ity, race, and class as well as gender by recognizing the full diversity of women'ssituations. For furtherinformation,contact: Institutefor Women's Policy Research, 1400 20th Street, NW Suite 104, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 785-5100. Callfor Papers:SUNY Pressannouncesa new book publicationseriesRadical SocialandPoliticalTheory.The editorsseek new, controversial,and outstanding worksof radicalsocial and political theory, workswhich challenge existing societal structures.Manuscriptswhich extend morefamiliarradicalideologies such as Marxism,feminism, civil disobedience,and black liberation,as well as worksdevelopinga new bodiesof thought and practicein areassuch as ecology, greenpolitics, liberationtheology, and deconstructionarewelcome. The following are of particularinterest: * Analyses of currentsocial problemsfrom a radicalperspective, e.g., economic development, AIDS, gender violence, and political power * Unmasking the cultures of domination in the family, the media, the workplace,leisure, sexuality, art, and spirituality. * Studies in particularlyAmerican radicalism:What are the fundamental contradictionsof contemporaryAmericansociety?What arethe radicalresourcesof our own culture and politics? All inquiriesabout the series and all manuscriptsand book proposalsshould be sent to: Peggy Gifford, Editor, SUNY Press, State University Plaza, Albany, NY 12246-0001. TheGustavusMyersCenterfor theStudyof HumanRightsin theUnitedStatesis requestingnominationsfor books publishedin 1988 (will also considerbooks publishedearlier).The Center was foundedto continue the researchinto tolerance in the United States inauguratedby GustavusMyersin his Historyof Bigotryin the UnitedStates.The specific purposeof the Center is to identify, reward,and publicizeoutstandingbooks about all kinds of intolerancein the United States. Winners will be announcedon December 10, Human Rights Day. FirstPrizecarrieswith it a $1000 cash award.Address:ProfessorJames R. Bennett, Director,GustavusMyersCenter, KH234, Universityof Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, (501) 575-401,442-400. The Historyof WomenReligiousNetworkis sponsoringa Conference on the Historyof Women Religious,at The College of St. Catherine, St. Paul, Minnesota, Sunday,June 25, throughWednesdaymorning,June 28, 1989. Special emphasiswill be placedon assessmentof past research,setting an agenda for the future, sources, and networking. For further information contact KarenKennelly, CSJ, 1884 RandolphAvenue, St. Paul, MN 55105.

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NationalCoalitionAgainstSexualAssaultAnnualConferenceJuly 18-21, 1989 at the WyndhamFranklinPlazaHotel, Philadelphia,PA. NCASA Conference keynote speaker:SandyButler;Author, Feminist,Therapist.Women of Color Institute keynote speaker:Angela Davis; Author, Feminist, Activist. Registrationand Room Rates:$165 NCASA Members,$195 Non-Members (rates include Women of Color Institute). $25 Women of Color Institute Only. $80 ngle Room, $85 Double Room, $90 Triple Room, $95 Quad Room. Fee Waivers Available for Members/ Child Care and Babysitting Available. Formore informationCall 1-800-692-7445 (in PA) or (717) 2326745. Associationannounces the The Boardof Officersof theAmericanPhilosophical TenthBiennialMachettePrizeCompetition.The prizeis awardedbiennially to the authorof a book of outstandingphilosophicalmerit publishedsince the closing date of the last competition. Eligibilityfor this competition is restrictedto books bearingan imprintof 1987 or 1988. Authors must have been underthe age of forty at the time of the book'spublication. To be consideredfor the prize, a book mustbe nominatedby one member of the APA other than the author. Lettersof nomination need not address the meritsof book but need only state the title and publisherof the book and the date of birth of the author. Nominatorsshould notify the authorsof the book in question;authorsare responsiblefor ensuringthat two copies of the book are sent to the National Office for review by the prizecommittee. Authors can submit their own books for consideration,providedthey obtain a supportingnomination from another APA member. The amount of the prize is $5000. The deadline for receipt of letters of nomination and copies of nominatedbooks for the tenth competition is September 1, 1989. Lettersfor nomination and booksfor considerationshouldbe sent to: Shirley Anderson, Assistant Director,AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation, Universityof Delaware,Newark, DE 19716, (302) 451-1112. Societyfor Womenin Philosophy.For informationon membershipin regional divisions which include programannouncementand a subscriptionto the national SWIP Newsletter, as well as a subscriptionto Hypatia,contact: PacificSWIP:ExecutiveSecretaryRita Manning, UC San Jose State, San Jose, CA 95192. TreasurerRuth Doell, San Francisco State University, Dept. of BiologicalScience, 1600 HallowayAve., San Francisco,CA 94132. MidwestSWIP: Executive SecretaryJean Rumsey, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Steven'sPoint, Steven's Point, WI 54481. TreasurerCarol Van Kirk, 1401 N. 58th St., Omaha, NE 68106. EasternSWIP: Executive Secretary Libby Potter, Dept. of Philosophy,

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HarverfordCollege, Haverford, PA 19041. Co-Executive SecretaryJoan Ringelheim,Apt. la, 150 W. 74th St., New York,NY 10023. TreasurerJana Sawicki, Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Maine, Orono, ME 04469. The Directoryof Women in Philosophyis availablefromthe ExecutiveSecretaryin Cach division. Cost is $2.00. The Societyfor thePhilosophy of SexandLoveannouncesa call for papersto be two at the meetings:with the American Philosophical following presented Association, EasternDivision, December 1989; and with the APA, Central Division, April 1990. Papersmay be on any issue within the philosophyof love and sex. Twelve to thirteen pages maximum, excluding footnotes; standardspacingand margins.Preparefor blind reviewing,puttingname and affiliationonly on cover letter. Send two neat and clean copies of the paper, and returnpostage if desired. Deadlines: EasternDivision, April 15, 1989; CentralDivision, September1, 1989. Send to: ProfessorAlan Soble, Philosophy Dept., Universityof New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148 (504-2866257). was foundedin April 1988 to proThe Societyfor Lesbianand Gay Philosophy mote philosophicalinquiryinto lesbianand gay issues.The Gay and Lesbian Caucuswas foundedat the same time to give a distinct voice to gay and lesbian proctical concerns within the American Philosophical Association, such as discriminationin hiring, promotion, tenure, or salary,and the need to integratethe resultsof responsibleresearchinto the curriculum.Professors ClaudiaCardand John K. Pugh are co-chairsof both organizationsfor 198889. The Society will provide forumsfor the presentationof researchin lesbian and gay studies. The Caucuswill receive complaintsregardingdiscrimination and will issue newslettersregardingactivities of the Society and Caucus at appropriateintervals. The mailing lists of these organizationswill remain confidential. Those interestedin submittingpapersfor the Spring 1989 CentralDivision APA meetings, and other interestedparties,may inquirefromeither: Professor Claudia Card, PhilosophyDept., University of Wisconsin, 600 N. Park St., Madison, WI 53706, or ProfessorJohn Pugh, Philosophy Dept., John CarrollUniversity, University Heights, OH 44118. was foundedin Dec., 1987 at The Societyfor theStudyof WomenPhilosophers the annualconferenceof the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation. The Society is open to women and men from all disciplinesand is constitutedaround the following purposes: 1. The firstpurposeof the Society for the Studyof Women Philosophersis to create and sustaina "Republicof Letters,"in which women are both

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citizens and sovereigns. To that end, we shall commemorate women philosophersof the past as well as of the present by engaging their texts, whether critically or appreciatively, in a dialogical interchange. In this way, both we and our sisters from the past can also become interlocutors for our sisters in the future. 2. The second purposeof our Society is to examine the natureof philosophy, specifically in light of women's contributionsto the discipline. Thus, papersare welcome which reflect on the methodologyand style of women philosophers themselves, or which compare the texts of women with those of men. 3. Furthermore,since philosophical method may be distinguishedfrom philosophical understanding,it is possible that philosophical understandingcould be reached in a varietyof ways. The Society, therefore, will also explore the nature of philosophy by comparingthe worksof women philosopherswith those of women thinkersof other types, such as poets, mystics,novelists or biographers.We thus hope to enlargeand enrigh the resourcesof everyonewho is concernedwith the centraland most basic questionsof human life. The following people will serve on the Executiveboardfor 1988-90: Veda Cobb-Stevens, University of Lowell; Linda LopezMcAlister, University of South Florida; Elizabeth Kamarck Minnich, Scripps College; Petra von Morstein,Universityof Calgary;BeverlySchlackRandles,EmpireState College; MargaretSimons, University of Southern University; Cecile Tougas, University of Lowell. Anyone who would like to become a memberplease send name, address, and institutionalaffiliation along with a check for $10.00 to cover dues for the calendaryear to: Beverly Schlack Randles, 311 JeffersonSt., Saratoga Springs,NY 12866. The SecondAnnual LesbianSeparatistConferenceand Gatheringwill be held June 15 through 18, 1989 near Milwaukee,Wisconsin. The four-dayconference will provideLesbianSeparatiststhe opportunityto exchange ideas, present papers,participateon workshopsand discusions,play, expand Separatist networksand sparknew friendships.The sliding scale registrationfee of $85 to $150 coverseverything, includinglodgingand meals. A limitednumberof work exchange slots are available. For more information,contact: Burning Bush, P.O. Box 3065, Madison, WI 53704-0065, USA. "FeministTransformations,"the EleventhAnnualConferenceof the National Women'sStudiesAssociation,will be held at Towson State UniversityJune 1418, 1989. The conference will include over 250 sessionson feminist theory and practice;community activism and social/political issues;issues of race, gender, class, and ethnicity; and crossculturalresearchand globalfeminism.

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The conference will include a Writer'sSeries featuringJune Jordan,Hattie Gossett, Melanie Kay/Kantrowitz,Cherry Muhanji, Shirley Geoklin Lim, and others;a Film SeriesfeaturingAnou Banouand the Americanpremiereof three films from the CanadianFilm Board;and additionalculturalevents including theatre, dance, comedy, and music. For registrationinformation, please contact NWSA '89, Towson State University, Towson, Maryland 21204 (301-321-3681). Call for Papers:SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS.The next conferenceof the Society for the Studyof Women Philosopherswill be held in conjunction with the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Atlanta, GA), December, 27-30, 1989. Papers are welcomed on the following topics: 1) any aspect of the thought of a woman philosopher (where "philosopher"is traditionallydefined); 2) other women thinkers (e.g., poets, novelists, diarists,mystics);3) the nature of philosophyspecificallyin light of women'scontributionto the history of thought. Papersshould be no longer than 15 pages, double spaced. Since they will be anonomouslyreviewed, please attach two cover sheets. On the first, put the title and yourname, addressand social securitynumber.On the second, put the title and your social securitynumberonly. Send six copies of the paper to: Linda Lopez McAlister, Women's Studies Program,University of South Florida,SOC 107, Tampa, FL 33620. Deadline for receipt of papers: September1, 1989.

SubmissionGuidelines Hypatiasolicits paperson all topics in feministphilosophy.We regularlypublish generalissuesas well as special issueson a single topic, or comprisingthe proceedingsof a conference in feminist philosophy. All papersshould conform to Hypatiastyle using the Author/Datesystemof citing references(see the ChicagoManualof Style). Papersshould be submittedin duplicatewith the author'sname on the title pageonly for the anonymousreviewingprocess. EcologicalFeminism.Many feministshave begun to explore the interconnections - theoretical, historical, and symbolic- between the dominationof women and the domination of nonhuman nature. Ecologicalfeminists(or, ecofeminists)claim that feminist theory and practice must include an ecological perspective, and solutions of environmentalproblemsmust include a feminist perspective, if either is to constitute an adequateresponse to the twin dominations of women and nonhuman nature. This special issue of Hypatiawill focus on a wide range of philosophicalissuesgermaneto ecological feminism. Suggestionsof topics that might be developed include the following: 1. The natureand desirability/undesirability of ecological feminism(e.g. for feminist theory, environmental ethics, the science of ecology, environmentalism,or development policies). 2. Challenges of ecofeminism to environmental ethics, particularlyto deep ecology and animal liberationism. 3. The relevanceof ecofeminismto the analysisand solution of pressing environmentalissues (e.g. deforestationand forestry,potable water, species preservation,natural resourceconservationand use, sustainable agriculture,food production and consumption, domestic pets, wildlife, use of animals in experimentation). 4. Ecofeminismand history (e.g. the historiesof Westernphilosophy,of environmentalproblems,of imperialistaggression). 5. Ecofeministpolitics, global activism, and the peace movement. 6. Ecofeminism,post-modernism,and critical theory. 7. Ecofeminismand bioregionalism. 8. Ecofeminismand the conception of nature. 9. Ecofeministspirituality. 10. Ecofeministart and aesthetics. 11. Ecofeminismand science, technology, and industry.

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12. Ecofeminismand women in development. Papersshouldbe submittedin duplicateto the guest editor:KarenJ. Warren, Department of Philosophy, Macalester College, 1600 Grand Avenue, St. Paul, Minnesota, 55105 (612) 696-6172. (Pleaseput yourand addresson a detachabletitle pageonly. If you wish return of the manuscript,include a self-addressed,stampedenvelope with your submission). Deadline: March 15, 1990. The HypatiaBook Review Section aims at increasingthe visibilityand readershipof books in feministphilosophy.At present, three generalbook review guidelineshave been developed: 1. To promote dialogue between books, reviewersare asked to discuss, when possible, more than one book in feminist philosophy. Several books might be clusteredaround a theme, or a single book might be highlightedand its relationto other books in feministphilosophymight be mentioned in brief. 2. Book reviewersare askedto discussthe majorclaims of the book(s) reviewed and to present the reviewer'sown reflections. 3. Book reviews will be either Short Reviews or Review Essays: ShortReviewswill be two to three text pages, that is, three to fourtyped double-spacedpages in length. ReviewEssayswill be approximatelyeight to twelve text pages,or ten to twenty typed double-spacedpages in length. Books which will be the subjectof Review Essaysshouldbe proposedin advanceto the Book Review Editor. For furtherinformation,contact the HypatiaBook Review Editor:Jeffner Allen, Departmentof Philosophy, SUNY Binghamton, Binghamton, New York 13901.

Back IssuesAvailable

Volume1, Number1, Spring1986 Antigone'sDilemma:A Problemin PoliticalMembership,by ValerieA Hartouni,Women Wider,How Philosophersin the Ancient GreekWorld;Donningthe Mantle,by Kathleen ManyFeministsDoes It Take to Makea Joke?:SexistHumorand What'sWrongwith It, by MerrieBergmann,The Politicsof Self-Respect:A FeministPerspective,by DianaT. The Wayfor a FeministPraxis,by AndreaNye, RomanticLove, AltruMeyers,Preparing ism, and Self-Respect,by Kathryn PaulyMorgan,OppressionandResistance;Fry'sPolitics and Reality,by ClaudiaCard,Comment/Reply,by LauraM. Purdyand NancyTuana Volume1, Number2, Fall 1986 Motherhoodand Sexuality, edited by Ann Ferguson,Motherhoodand Sexuality:Some FeministQuestions,by Ann Ferguson,Foucaultand Feminism:Towardsa Politicsof DifContraChodorowand Dinnerstein,byJanice ference,byJanaSawicki,FemaleFriendship: Raymond,Woman:Revealedor Reveiled?,by CynthiaA. Freeland,The FeministSexuality Debate:Ethicsand Politics,by CherylH. Cohen,Feminismand Motherhood:O'Brien vs. Beauvoir,by ReyesLazaro,PossessivePower,by JanetFarrell-Smith, The Futureof Mothering:ReproductiveTechnologyand FeministTheory,by Ann Donchin,Should a FeministChoose a Marriage-Like Relationship?,by Marjorie Weinzweig Volume2, Number1, Winter 1987 Connectionsand Guilt, by SharonBishop,WrongRights,by Elizabeth Wolgast,Througha GlassDarkly:Paradigms of Equalityandthe Searchfora Woman'sJurisprudence, byLinda J. Krieger,Is EqualityEnough?,by Gale S. Baker,The Logicof SpecialRights,by Paul Green, PregnancyLEave, ComparableWorth, and Concepts of Equality,by Marjorie Weinzweig,Women, Welfareand the Politicsof Need Interpretation,by Nancy Fraser, The FeministStandpoint:A Matterof Language,by TerryWinant,Bodiesand Souls/Sex, Sin and the Senses in Patriarchy: A Studyin AppliedDualism,by SheilaRuth,Improper Behavior:ImperativeforCivilization,by Elizabeth Janeway,The New Men'sStudies:From FeministTheoryto GenderScholarship,by HarryBrod Volume2, Number2, Summer,1987 and Loving Perception,by MariaLugones,Sex-Role Playfulness,"World"-Travelling, and Degradation,byJudith Stereotypesin Medicine,by MaryB. Mahowald,Pornography M. Hill, Do Good FeministsCompete?,by VictoriaDavion,A (Qualified)Defenseof Liberalism,by SusanWendell,The Unit of Language,byAndreaNye, The Lookin Sartreand Rich, byJulienS. Murphy,How Bad is Rape?,by H. E. Baber,On Conflictsand Differences Among Women, by LuisaMuraro,The Politics of Women'sStudiesand Men's Women'sStudies?,by Studies,by MaryLibertin,DoesManningMen'sStudiesEmasculate HarryBrod,Celibacyand Its Implicationsfor Autonomy,by CandaceWatson Volume2, Number3, Fall, 1987 FeministScholarshipin the Sciences:WhereAre We Now and When Can We Expecta TheoreticalBreakthrough?, by Sue V. Rosser,The MethodQuestion,by SandraHarding, The Gender/ScienceSystem:or is Sex to Genderas Natureis to Science?,by EvelynFox Keller,Can ThereBe a FeministScience?,by HelenE. Longino,Le sujetde la scienceest-il sexue?/Isthe Subjectof Science Sexed?by LuceIrigaray,translatedby CarolMastrangelo Bove,UncoveringGynocentricScience, by RuthGinzberg, JustifyingFeministSocial Sci-

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Traence, by LindaAlcoff,JohnDeweyand EvelynFoxKeller:A SharedEpistemological dition, by LisaHeldke Volume3, Number1, Spring,1988 Introduction,by NancyTuana,Science, Facts,and Feminism,by RuthHubbard,ModelPotter,The WeakerSeed:The Sexist Bias ing the GenderPoliticsin Science, by Elizabeth of ReproductiveTheory,by NancyTuana,The Importanceof FeministCritiqueforConSyntemporaryCell Biology,by The BiologyandGenderStudyGroup,The Premenstrual drome:Dis-easingthe FemaleCycle, byJacquelyn N. Zita,Womenandthe Mismeasure of Thought,by JudithGenova,Dreamingthe Future,by HilaryRose,FeministPerspectives ImberandNancyTuana,ReviewEssay/ACriticalAnalysisof Sanon Science, by Barbara draHarding'sThe ScienceQuestionin Feminism,by Jacquelyn N. Zita Volume3, Number2, Summer,1988 Dyke Methods,by JoyceTrebilcot,Recipesfor TheoryMaking,by LisaHeldke,Working TogetherAcrossDifference:Some Considerations,by UmaNarayan,DoesWomen'sLiberationImplyChildren'sLiberation,by LauraM. Purdy,Womanas Metaphor,by Eva FederKittay,Anarchic Thinking, by Gail Stenstad,Poems, by Uma Narayan,Poetic FePolitics:How the AmazonsTook the Acropolis,byJeffnerAUen,ReviewSymposium: maleFriendship: WithoutIndiSeparationsandContinua,by ClaudiaCard,Individuality vidualism:Reviewof JaniceRaymond'sA Passionfor Friends,by MarilynFriedman,Response,byJaniceG. Raymond,Forum:WelfareCutsandthe Ascendanceof MarketPatriOn Nancy Fraser's"Women,Welfareand archy,by MarilynFriedman, Comment/Reply: the Politics of Need Interpretation,by BruceM. Landesman,DesperatelySeekingApproval:The Importanceof DistinguishingBetweenApprovaland Recognition,by Linda TimmelDuchamp,Competition,Recognition,and Approval-Seeking, by VictoriaDavion, BookReviews:Genderand History:The Limitsof SocialTheoryin the Age of the Family, by LindaNicholson(KathrynS. Russel),Philosophyand FeministThinking,by Jean Grimshaw(JaneDuran),LesbianPhilosophy:Explorations,by JeffnerAllen,Sexes et parentes, by LuceIrigaray(EleanorH. Kuykendall),Intercourse,by AndreaDworkin(MelindaVadas),Women'sWaysof Knowing:The Developmentof Self, Voice andMind,by andJillMattuckTarule Clinchy,NancyRuleGoldberger, MaryFieldBelenky,BlythMcVicker (MonicaHolland) Volume3, Number3, Winter, 1989 A. Introduction,by NancyFraser,Two Interviewswith Simonede Beauvoir,by Margaret SorSimons,Introductionto "SorcererLove,"by LuceIrigaray,by EleanorH. Kuykendall, The HiddenHost:Irigaray cererLove:A Readingof Plato'sSymposium, by LuceIrigaray, and Diotimaat Plato'sSymposium, by AndreaNye, "Essentially Speaking":LuceIrigaray's and FrenchFeminism: Languageof Essence,by DianaJ. Fuss, LacanianPsychoanalysis Towardan AdequatePoliticalPsychology,by DorothyLeland,The BodyPoliticsof Julia PhallocraticEnds",by Kristeva,by JudithButler,Introductionto Kofman's"Rousseau's KelNancyJ. Holland,Rousseau'sPhallocraticEnds,by SarahKofman,Comment/Reply: ler'sGender/ScienceSystem:Is the Philosophyof Science to Scienceas Science is to Nature?,by KellyOliver,The Gender/ScienceSystem:Responseto KellyOliver, by Evelyn FoxKeller,DoingJusticeto Rights,by CarlWelman,A Replyto CarlWellman,by ElizabethWolgast,Book Reviews:Feminismand Methodology,by SandraHarding,Women's the LiberalArts Curriculum,by MarilynR. Schuster Placein the Academy:Transforming and SusanR. Van Dyne Back issueseach: $10/indiv. and $20/insti. JournalsManager,IndianaUniversityPress, 10th and MortonStreets, Bloomington,IN 47405.

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Since 1890, a resource of contemporary, interdisciplinaryperspectives Ethics is devoted to the study of the ideas and principles that form the basis for individual and collective action. Contributors examine and debate the full scope of ethical issues in moral philosophy, political theory, public policy, jurisprudence, and the social sciences. Publishing about L000 pages each volume, Ethics presents about 30% more material than many other philosophical journals, and has the largest circulation of scholarly journals in social philosophy. Ethics' international editorial board consists of scholars from all relevant disciplines: psychology, theology, anthropology, social choice theory, philosophy political science, and law. Tbgether they provide you with the interdisciplinary exposure and synthesis of knowledge so necessary to your work. Ethics frequently publishes symposia and special issues, which bring concentrated attention to subjects of particular interest. Count on Ethics to engage you in today's significant intellectual controversies. Ethics reviews more books than any other joural in the field, bringing you incisive coverage of about 200 new publications in each volume. Choose the next additions to your collection from Ethics' complete source.

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