JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF THE SEMANTICS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE MANAGING EDITOR: PETER BOSCH (IBM Germany) R E V 1 E W E D I T O R : BART GEURTS (IBM Germany)
EDITORIAL BOARD: PETER BOSCH (IBM Germany) SIMON C. GARROD (Univ. of Glasgow) BART GEURTS (IBM Germany)
PAUL HOPPER (SUNY Binghampton) LAURENCE R. HORN (Yale University) STEPHEN ISARD (Univ. of Edinburgh) HANS KAMP (Univ. of Stuttgart)
LEO G. M. NOORDMANN (Univ. of Tilburg) ROB A. VAN DER SANDT (Univ. of Nijmegen) PIETER A. M. SEUREN (Univ. of Nijmegen)
CONSULTING EDITORS: R. BARTSCH (Univ. of Amsterdam) D. S. BREE (Erasmus Univ., Rotterdam) G. BROWN (Univ. of Cambridge) 0 . DAHL (Univ. of Stockholm) G. FAUCONNIER (Univ. of California, San Diego) P. N.JOHNSON-LAIRD (MRC, Cambridge) SIR JOHN LYONS (Univ. of Cambridge)
J. D. MCCAWLEY (Univ. of Chicago) B. RICHARDS (Imperial College, London) H. SCHNEIXE (Ruhr Univ., Bochum) M. STEEDMAN (Univ. of Pennsylvania) Z. VENDLER (Univ. of California, San Diego) Y. WILKS (New Mexico State Univ., Las Cruces) J. VAN BENTHEM (Univ. of Amsterdam)
H. E. BREKLE (Univ. of Rcgcnsburg) H. H. CLARK (Stanford University) H.-J. EIKMEYER (Univ. of Bielefeld) J. HOBBS (SRI, Menlo Park) D. ISRAEL (SRI, Menlo Park) E. L. KEENAN (Univ. of California, Los Angeles) W. MARSLEN-WILSON (MRC, Cambridge)
H. REICHGELT (Univ. of Nottingham) A. J. SANFORD (Univ. of Glasgow) A. VON STECHOW (Univ. of Konstanz) D. VANDERVEKEN (Univ. of Quebec) B. L. WEBBER (Univ. of Pennyslvania) D. WILSON (Univ. College, London).
EDITORIAL ADDRESS: Journal of Semantics, IBM Germany Scientific Center, IWBS 7000-75, Postfach 800880, D-7000 Stuttgart 80, W . Germany. Phone: (49-711-) 6695-559. Telefax: (49-711) 6695-500. BITNET: boschQdsolilog. New Subscribers to the Journal of Semantics should apply to the Journals Subscription Department, Oxford University Press, Pinkhill House, Southfield Road, Eynsham, OX8 iJJ. For further information see the inside back cover. Volumes 1-6 are available from Foris Publications Holland, PO Box 509, 3300 Am Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Published by Oxford University Press
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ISSN 0167-5133
JOURNAL OF SEMANTICS Volume 7 Number i SPECIAL ISSUE O N PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF SEMANTICS Guest Editors: Gillian Brown, Simon C. Garrod
CONTENTS D. S. BREE, R. A. SMIT and J. P. VAN WERKHOVEN
Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
i
JENNIFER COATES
Modal Meaning: The Semantic-Pragmatic Interface
$3
PETER WRIGHT
Using Constraints and Making Reference in Task-Oriented Dialogue
65
S. B. BARTON and A J. SANFORD
The Control of Attributional Patterns by the Focusing Properties of Quantifying Expressions
81
GERARD HEYER
Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions Book Reviews
93 111
Editors' Preface This issue draws together four papers on what we have called practical aspects of semantics. In contrast to more traditional approaches to meaning, we see practical semantics as attempting to take into account the richness of language when used in real communicative contexts. Perhaps the most significant feature of these papers is that they deal directly with real as opposed to idealised language and so avoid the restrictions on the kinds of language structures and features which have tended to dominate linguistic theorizing. Such restrictions have taken several forms: the use of artificial or invented utterances to illustrate semantic phenomena, the written language bias in research and the low profile of work on interactional aspects of meaning in natural dialogue. The papers in this selection set out their various ways to go beyond these restrictions, and in doing so extend the scope of semantic enquiry. Quite apart from this theoretical benefit, such an approach may also yield results of real practical significance, for instance in the design of effective computer-based language processing systems which must by their very nature confront practical problems of language and its use in communication. Although the four articles share this common practical basis, they employ very different methodologies, and look at different forms of language use. The first paper by Bree, Smit and Van Werkhoven investigates the semantics of Dutch and English temporal prepositions. Its practical basis comes from two sources, first the overall motivation to produce an effective computational algorithm for translating between the prepositions and secondly from an extensive analysis of two actual texts and their translations. The second paper by Barton and Sanford is also concerned with written language, but in this case with the specific rhetorical effects of using different quantifiers and frequency adverbials. The experiments reported in the paper demonstrate that readers will draw different attributional inferences about who or what is responsible for an event as a function of the choice of semantically equivalent terms in its description. This is explained in terms of the way the different expressions focus the reader's attention onto different sets of individuals. The practical significance of such studies lies in extending considerations of the meaning of quantifiers into the rhetorical domain. The remaining two papers by Wright and Coates depend upon the analysis of natural dialogue and are both concerned with interactional contributions to meaning and interpretation. Wright discusses the extent to which conversants actually follow the linguistic strictures on the use of definiteness to signal shared knowledge of a referent His results indicate that there is still some way to go in relating established theories
iv Editors'Preface
of reference to actual conversational usage. The final paper by Coates addresses the very different area of modality in conversation. Her main conclusion is that consideration of how the two speakers interact is essential to a full analysis of modality. So this group of papers considers a wide spectrum of fundamental problems in semantics but all from a practical point of view. Looking to the future, such work raises the challenge of how to extend current semantic theory and formalisms so as to accommodate the richness of language in everyday use and the various ways communicators manage their interactions. We hope that practitioners of both this practical approach and the more traditional formal approach to semantics will be able to recognise the mutual significance of each others contributions. G. BROWN S. GARROD
Journal ofSemantics 7: 1-51
© N.I.S. Foundation (1990)
Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English1 D. S. BREE, R. A. SMIT and J. P. VAN WERKHOVEN
Abstract
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N Learning a second language presents many challenges. One of the most exacting is mastering the use of prepositions and subordinating conjunctions. Some are trivially easy, e.g. the Dutch translation of AFTER is almost always NA or, when it is used as a subordinating conjunction, NADAT. For others, there are simple rules, e.g. the Dutch translation of WHEN is TOEN for unique events in the past, and ALS otherwise. However, sometimes the choice between two such function words (preposition or subordinating conjunction) seems to be arbitrary, e.g. the English translation for ALS used temporarily (ALS has many other uses) may be WHEN or AS, but no clear-cut rule is available for choosing between the two. Sometimes both seem appropriate: And I did look like a stranger when/as I walked up their street.
but on other occasions one or other is infelicitous: When/as* I returned she was desperate As/when(?) I departed with my box, he told me. . .
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The decision trees for selecting the appropriate temporal conjunction or preposition in English and Dutch, developed in an earlier paper, are tested. Data are from the translations of parts of two books, one English and one Dutch, into Dutch and English respectively. The analysis of the data has led to the complete recasting of the original selection trees. The new trees are based on about a dozen different attributes that are needed to classify the normal, non-idiomatic use of almost all the temporal conjunctions and prepositions in both languages. Some of these attributes are: time point v. period; simultaneity v. order; relative order of the matrix and sub events; whether or not the Time of Discourse is used to mark the end of a period, etc. Among other details we have been able to show how the conjunction AS, in its temporal use, is not ambiguous between WHEN and WHILE as was originally thought. There is a large overlap between the selection trees for both languages, as well as some interesting differences. These trees have been specified in sufficient detail to be readily incorporated in natural language computer programs.
2 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
For other prepositions with multiple translations, native speakers have definite judgments about correctness, e.g. the Dutch translation for temporal AT depends on the noun phrase that follows: at eleven o'clock ->• otn elfuur at other times ofthe day -* op andere tijden van de dag at the end of the day —• aan het eind van de dag
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While such alternatives are offered in dictionaries, no rules for choosing between them are given—neither in dictionaries nor in grammar books. The general consensus is that no rules are to be found; non-native speakers have to go through a process of trial and error learning the uses of each such preposition as it is encountered. We believe, however, that rules can be found, although we expect them to be less simple than those for choosing, for instance, between TOEN and ALS. We propose to use decision trees, with choice criteria at their nodes and prepositions at their leaves, to represent the rules for selecting the function words in one language. The aim of our research programme is to establish such selection trees for both subordinating conjunctions and prepositions in any language, beginning with Dutch and English. Such trees can be tested against corpora, and in particular against the translations made of such prepositions by professional translators. Once established, the selection trees can be incorporated into any natural language translation program that is based on the principle of first 'comprehending' the original text before producing the translation. This restriction is necessary, as the criteria occurring at the nodes of the selection trees may be different for each language. Semantic information from the context of the function word may be required to determine which one to use in the translation. This information may well be different for the pair of languages under consideration, as we have just seen is the case for the translation of AT into Dutch. In this paper we propose selection trees for English and Dutch temporal positions and subordinating conjunctions. We begin by recalling an earlier model for the selection of temporal conjunctions and prepositions. Then we present some data on translations between Dutch and English with which we test this model. Lastly, we propose a revised version of our model.
Bree, Stnit and van Werkhoven 3
2. THE ORIGINAL SELECTION TREES
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Our aim in carrying out this research is to establish a description of the meaning of the temporal function words in such a way that these meanings can be included as part of the semantics of any natural language computer program. We needed a formalism that was precise but not one that was too restrictive, otherwise aspects could not be represented that would be needed for a particular application program. Furthermore, we looked for a representation that was aesthetically satisfying, and one that would provide an overview from which an explanation of why some of the possible temporal relationships were conveyed by words and others were not. The model that we previously presented (Bree & Smit 1987) was based on what we called selection trees, a variation on conventional decision trees. A selection tree is a tree with nodes and branches. There is one root node, which is the starting point for the processing required to select the function word appropriate for the task at hand. The leaf nodes represent the function words; all other nodes are choice nodes representing tests on what the speaker/writer wishes to convey about the time of the event or state described in the matrix clause. The links between nodes are labelled with the answers to the tests that are posed in the nodes. We have chosen selection trees rather than two other possible means of representing the meaning of temporal function words—semantic features and the first order predicate logic. Selection trees provide sufficient constraint on the representation to give structure to the process of finding an interesting pattern in the data. We ourselves (Bree, Smit & Schotel 1984) as well as others (Bennet 1975) have used semantic features for representing temporal function words. The use of semantic features brings with it one major problem: there are no words for some of the combinations of the features and there is no satisfactory reason why this is the case. The other serious alternative representation isfirstorder predicate logic, e.g. Rohrer (1977), Herweg (1987). One can translate most things into first order predicate logic. However, it does not give a very satisfactory overview of why some meanings are given names in the form of temporal words, and other possible meanings are not. In short, the first order predicate logic does not constrain the search for pattern at all. Furthermore, formalisms tend to require concentration on the precise details of the onset of the various events, but this aspect is not so carefully specified by the usual temporal function words (Heinamaki 1978). Schemes based on an a priori ideal of the different functions that temporal prepositions need to fulfil, as the one given in Quirk et al. (1985: 528), require
4 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
that the prepositions are used in more than one category, depending on the context in which they are found. For example, Quirk et al. propose the following categories: time position, forward span, backward span, duration, frequency and relationship. Many temporal prepositions fall into more than one such functional category, e.g.: — IN: position, frequency, — UNTIL: forward and backward span; — FOR: duration and forward span.
— extent: — dimension:
The Concordfliesto New York in three hours. The Concorde is departingfor New York at 5 o'clock.
This is a very simple distinction.
a. Extent oftime Working first along the extent branch, the first (uninteresting) distinction is whether the extent of time of the matrix stevent is the same or less than that of the extent of the sub stevent. The second distinction hinges on the nature of the matrix verb in the construction: — with accomplishment2 verbs use IN, e.g.: The Concorde flies to New York in 3 hours. — with activity verbs use FOR, e.g.: I amflyingto New Yorkfor 3 hours. In Dutch the same distinctions hold. However, there is also an extra distinction with accomplishment verbs: ones that indicate the accomplishment will be completed in a certain time from the here and now. In such cases, Dutch uses OVER instead of IJV.3
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We regard the classification of any preposition in more than one category as a mark of weakness for the categorisation method being used, although we ourselves have not always been able to avoid this (see Dutch VOOR in Tables i and 2). So we keep on using selection trees. Figure 1 shows the proposal made for English temporal function words, and Figure 2 shows the equivalent for Dutch (Bree & Smit 1987). These trees form the starting point of our analysis. After describing them in some detail, we will turn to our translation data to test their adequacy. We now go through these figures in some detail, using the English tree as base and pointing out the differences for the Dutch tree. The first distinction that we made was between extent of time and location on the time dimension. Either one wants to say how long an event or state (which we will call a stevent) lasts, or you want to put the stevent on the time axis, to assign it a place on the time dimension, e.g.
M ?S
-in a activity -for
-within event
s is
S gives
point
period dimension \
^ M ?S
^ 35
at around
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achievement Main verb
by states throughout y^
M ?S
point I
Sis -after order
border
-before
on/0
TOR update?
•^—during - in the
endt$\ both ends?
M S TOR
Main stevent time
——between... and ... other end ~ (TOR) | +
- from • since
Sub stevent time Time Of Reference
3
order other end (OTR)
6 -until
o
Figure I Selection tree for English temporal function words
I
S from
TOR
activity
+
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achievement Main verb
I 1 terwijl
5.
1 X 2a O 13 fn
both ends? M S TOR
Main stevent time Sub slevent time Time Of Reference
other endl ~
N, N
i
(TOR) 1 +
van (aQ sinds
order tot fdat)
Figjure 2 Selection tree for Dutch temporal function words
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 7
b. Point oftime Returning to the root of the tree, we now explore the dimension branch. Along this branch we find all the temporal function words which place the time of the matrix stevent on the time axis. The first choice that is to be made is whether the sub stevent gives: — a point on the time dimension, or — a simple ordering in time between the matrix and sub stevents, or — the ends of a range of time in which the matrix stevent must fall.
— the point is some kind of event, e.g. As theJones's were leaving ..., or — the point is a time point (sic), or — the point has some kind of extension, i.e. is a period. If it really is a time point, then it only remains to decide whether: — the matrix stevent occurs precisely at the same time as the sub-stevent (=), e.g. AT NOON, or
— roughly at the time time (-) as the sub-stevent, e.g. AROUND NOON, or — just before (<) the sub-stevent, e.g. BY NOON. If the 'point' is really a time period, then the matrix stevent may either: — occupy the whole of this period (=), e.g. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, or — fall entirely within the sub-stevent period (<), then the nature of this period determines the choice of temporal function word, either: — it is a state, as while theJones's were on holiday, or — it is a border, as ON SUNDAY, or — it is a container, as IN THE SUMMER. The Dutch and English selection trees are identical along this point branch. However, the label point is clearly infelicitous and will be changed in our revised selection trees.
c. Semi-range of time Returning to the node at the end of the dimension branch, we find that there is a simple choice to be made between the temporal order of the matrix and sub stevents. Either: — the sub stevent marks the beginning of the temporal semi-range in which the matrix stevent is to be located (s<m), e.g. AFTERNOON, or — the sub-stevent marks the end of a semi-range (m<s), e.g. BEFORE NOON.
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If we go down the point branch then we have different ways of specifying the point of time at which the matrix stevent is to befixed,either:
8 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
d. Range oftime If we go down the branch in which both ends of the range are to be specified, the first decision is simply whether the function words are to be used to mark both ends of the range (+), e.g. BETWEEN 5 AND 6, or only one of the ends (—). In the latter case, the order of the matrix and sub stevents needs to be decided, as above. Further, the remaining end of the range has still to be specified. This can either: — be left to another temporal preposition, e.g. FROM 5 TO 6, or — be implicidy specified by the time of reference of the on-going text, e.g. SINCE NOON, UNTIL SUNDOWN.
- Before the TOD: / hadn't seen him since the summer. Now he was looking much healthier. - After the TOD: We were not going to see each other again until the summer. So we parted sadly.
3. THE TRANSLATION DATA As we see from this brief review there are some infelicitous namings on the various decision branches. This can be taken care of. However, we wanted to have an empirical validation of these selection trees. For this purpose we chose parts of two books and their translations. The first is the second half of the Dutch book Turks Fruit by Jan Wolkers (1969: 108-81), and its translation by Greta Kilburn, Turkish Delight (Wolkers 1974); the second is most of the English book First love, last rites by Ian McEwan (197 s: 9-99), and its translation by Heleen ten Holt, Der Laatste dag van der zomer (McEwan 1975). Examples taken from these books are given identification numbers (<page>.
). The translations are indented. To take the first example from First love, last rites and its translation:
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The Dutch selection tree differs slightly at this juncture. Dutch does not make the distinction between TO and UNTIL, using ror for both. Note that using the Time of Reference (TOR) rather than the time of utterance avoids classifying temporal range prepositions as being both 'forward span' and 'backward span' (Quirk etal. 1985: 533-40). We will retain this in our further analysis but will refer to it as Time of Discourse (TOD) since the analysis has been carried out on stories. The TOD is the time that has been reached in the discourse. In the story, references can be made to events occurring both before and after the TOD, without altering the TOD: e.g.:
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 9
(9.04) .. . Connie. . .sitting on the edge ofthe bath weeping, while I filled the sink with warm water. .. (7.03) . .. Connie.. .opde rand van het bat zat te huilen, terwijl ik degootsteen Het vollopen met warm water. . .
VAN.
The results of this analysis are shown in Tables 1 and 2. In total there are more than 900 prepositions used temporally. Table 1 shows the number of rimes that an English temporal function word in First love, last rites, shown in the column headings, is translated into a particular Dutch word, shown by the row labels. Table 2 shows the number of times that one of the Dutch temporal function words in Turks Fruit, shown in the row labels, is given a particular English translation, shown by the column headings. What do these data say about the selection trees? First of all, many (58%) of the translations were as predicted. The translations of AS and WHEN in English were not given any Dutch equivalents. They should be translated by TOEN, ALS or WANNEER. More importandy, where predictions failed, then the alternative chosen was generally along the same sub-branch as the predicted word. But there were exceptions. These have led us to rearrange the order of the function words, for both Dutch and English, in a different way from the one that would be a logical consequence of the selection trees shown in Figures 1 and 2. By logically, we mean that words that appear close in the trees, appear close in the tables. We have chosen the order in the tables to indicate how the selection trees should be revised. This order is such as to group most of the nonzero entries around the main diagonal in both tables. Boxes have been drawn around these main diagonal clusters.
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Note that the temporal conjunctions are in bold. We looked at all the temporal prepositions and conjunctions in those two sample texts to see how they were translated. If our selection trees were perfect predictors then, for example, every time SINCE occurs in English, used temporally, SINDS should occur in the Dutch translation, and vice versa. However, we did not expect this degree of perfection in our predictions. The correct use of prepositions is notoriously difficult for non-native language speakers. What we did expect was that where the predictions failed, the alternative translation would be a word close to the correct word in the selection tree, i.e. if SINCE was not translated by SINDS, it would be translated by
io Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
Table I Number of occurrences of different translations from English temporal prepositions into Dutch, in First Love, Last Rites. From the English: A S
w
w
H E N
H I L E
3 25 77 2 65 5 20 2 33 1
ZODRA TOEN ALS WANNEER TERWIJL ZOLANG
3 1
2
0 N
I N
D U R I N G
F 0 R
A F T E R
5
s
F R 0 M
i N C E
1
1 1 16
1
TlJDENS
Bu
4 4 1 3
1
1 1
GEDURESDE VoOR* ...LANG AL
31 10 2
2
1
3 6 9 4
2
NA(DAT) DMRNA SlNDS SEDERT VAN VANAF
1
1 1
1 31 7
34 7 7
1 7 1
1
i
i.
1 1
2 4
TOTAL
>>
1 2 24 2 3 2 23
VOOR(DAT) EER(DAT) TOT(DAT)
Other* Nonec
39 15 7 4 5 6 9 6
3 1
6 3
2 4
1 8
1 1 29
45 16 24
57
8 55
16 2
58 160 37
2 1
In the duralive rather than order sense. Other word, not a preposition. Preposition not translated.
3 114 68 6 55 1 4 10 6 22 1
1
1
's
c
T 0 T A L
T 0
N T I L
3
1 1 5
3
IN
a
u
B E F O R E
1
3 7
OM AAN TEGEN OP OVER
B Y
1 3 45 li
14 3 2
1
45 59
1
47 26
26 3 26
2
593
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To the Dutch:
A T
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 11
Table 2 Number of occurrences of different translations from Dutch temporal prepositions into English, in Turks Fruit. To the English: A S
From
w
w
H E N
H I L E
ZODRA TOEN ALS WANNEER TERWIJL
1 7 80 2 23 1 7
0 N
3
1
7
1
1 N
D U R I N G
F 0 R
s
A F T E R
B E F O R E
1 N C E
2
N
t h
0
e r
n e
4
5 6 11
5
's BlNNEN TlJDENS ONDER BIJ VoORt ... LANG AL
1 1
3 2 17 4
1
1
1
1
9
5
5 3
i
1 1 1 2 2
1 1
NA NADAT DAARNA SlNDS VAN
1
1
1 2
1
1
1 15 3
4
3 1 2
23 5 6 1 1
1
1
23 12
23 10 1 25 54
337
21 1 15
7
Other word, usually not a preposition. Preposition not translated. In the durative rather than order sense.
28
5
6
26
1
35 9 0 3 2 6 1 2 18
3
1
19 106 11
2 0 0 22 2
7
1
TOTAL
1 103 33 1 26
7 1
VOOR(DAT) TOT(DAT)
T O T A L
b
3 2
7 2
IN
* >>
0
2
OM AAN TECEN OF OVER
c
U T N O T I L
16 i
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the Dutch:
A T
12 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
a. Simultaneous events The top left boxes in Tables i and 2 show the translations between temporal subordinating conjunctions that indicate the time of the matrix event is approximately the same as that of a sub event. The predictions were that: — WHILE is equivalent to TERWIJL; — WHEN with the past tense will be translated by TOEN; — WHEN with the present or future tense will be translated by ALS or WANNEER.
— WHILE was indeed translated by TERWIJL but TERWIJL was only sometimes translated by WHILE; — WHEN was indeed translated by TOEN, ALS or WANNEER and vice versa. The difference between TOEN and ALS is that TOEN is used for single events in the past and ALS and WANNEER are used for everything else which includes repetitive events in the past. Because of the low frequency of the occurrences of WANNEER, no analysis will be made of the difference with ALS and it will not be mentioned in the rest of this paper; — AS was translated not only by TERWIJL but also by TOEN. SO we need to determine the conditions for choosing between TERWIJL and TOEN; — AS SOON AS was always translated by ZODRA and vice versa. Looking at this global pattern we could conclude that:6 — AS in English is ambiguous between WHEN and WHILE;
— WHEN is equivalent to TOEN, ALS or WANNEER, depending on the tense of the matrix clause; — WHILE is equivalent to TERWIJL Problems in translation will come when choosing between: — TOEN/ALS or TERWIJL for the English AS; — AS or WHEN for the Dutch TOEN/ALS; — AS and WHILE for the Dutch TERWIJL. So we first examine the difference between WHEN and WHILE. (a) WHEN and WHILE Initially, the difference appears obvious; WHEN introduces a point in time at which the matrix stevent occurs, whereas WHILE introduces a period in time in which the matrix stevent occurs. As Quirk etal. (1985: 1083) point out, WHILE
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No prediction was made for the translation of AS, although the dictionary gave TERWIJL,4 and As SOON AS is clearly equivalent to ZODRA. If we look at the data we see that mainly:5
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 13
must govern a durative clause. While this difference is not obvious in all examples, e.g. the difference between / was robbed while I was on vacation. I was robbed when I was on vacation.
is marginal, there are clear-cut examples of the difference, e.g. in: (58.14) Jasmin came down the steps, and when he reached the stage he spoke softly. "Jasmin came down the steps, and while he reached the stage he spoke softly.
interpretation, unless the progressive form is used: When the tomatoesripened,they were plucked. PWhile the tomatoesripened,they were plucked. While the tomatoes ripened, the plums did not. (non-temporal) While the tomatoes were ripening, they were sprayed, (progressive)
Examples of the use of WHILE to refer to a non-conclusive durative situation (an activity) and state are, respectively: (10.38) While I stuffed into my many pockets a selection ofslim volumes of prestigious verse, Raymond was concealing on his person . . . (17.36) . . . I was pledged to look after my sister that eveningwhile my parents were at the Walthamstow dog track,. . .
In contrast to WHILE, WHEN is used for conclusive durative verbs and punctual verbs, e.g.: (91.22) . . . and when I could hear him no more I said.. . (conclusive durative) (28.08) But when I opened the door she was standing right in my way with a shoe in her
hand, (punctual) However, like WHILE, WHEN can also be used for states: (30.23) You didn't have nightmares whenyou were working. You didn't have nightmares while you were working.
Sometimes substituting WHILE for WHEN in clauses with stative verbs leads to a non-temporal interpretation, in particular with ages: (76.36) When I was seventeen my mother was just thirty-eight. ?While I was seventeen my mother wasjust thirty-eight.
The rule for choosing between WHEN or WHILE with statives is not clear.
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WHILE cannot be used, as reaching something is a punctual not a durative verb, i.e. WHILE cannot be given a temporal interpretation when it refers to a punctual situation. For conclusive durative verbs, it is difficult to give WHILE a temporal
14 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English Our present hypothesis about the difference between WHEN and WHILE is
that: — WHEN is used to refer to a time point, which may be indicated by either a punctual or conclusive durative or a state; — WHILE is used to refer to a time period, which may be indicated by a nonconclusive durative or a state.
(b) Ambiguous AS
Table 3 Substituting WHEN and WHILE for AS, and vice versa
Original
Translation
Substitutable by: None
Total
WHEN
24
0
1
25
0
13
7
20
77
AS
TOEN
—
AS
TERWIJL
-
WHEN
TOEN
WHILE
TERWIJL
Total
WHILE
AS
18
3
—
12
77 33
18
27
13
97
153
0
—
The most striking fact about these substitution data is that whereas AS can always be replaced by WHEN or WHILE, WHEN and WHILE cannot always be
replaced by AS, contrary to expectations, e.g.: (27.34) Iwas sitting in the bathroom one evening writing . . . when suddenly she was outside, rapping on the door. . . *I was sitting in the bathroom one evening writing . . . as suddenly she was outside, rapping on the door. . . (68.03) I made her wait outside while I went in the shop and bought her what she wanted, *I made her wait outside as I went in the shop and bought her what she wanted,
One of the reasons is that AS cannot be used temporally to refer to a state. As with a state is given a causal interpretation, e.g. replacing WHILE by AS in 17.36:
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We now introduce AS into this scheme. As is said to denote 'merely simultaneity' (Quirk et al. 1985: 1083), so we begin with the hypothesis that AS is the super-ordinate of both WHEN and WHILE. T O test this, we have taken all the AS, WHEN and WHILE sentences from First love, last rites and made some substitutions. It should be the case that AS should be substitutable by WHEN or WHILE and that WHEN and WHILE should be substitutable by AS. The results of these substitutions are given in Table 3.
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 15 ~ .. .1 was pledged to look after my sister that evening as my parents were at the Walthamstow dog track,. . .
More importantly, AS is used in those cases where the sub stevent is an event that logically follows, or is very close to, the previous Time of Discourse (TOD), e
-g-
(28.16) Maisie was in the bathroom about ten minutes and as she came out I caught her neatly and squarely on the top of her head.
By contrast WHEN is used to move the TOD to a new time point as in 27.34 above. Our hypothesis is:
There is no corresponding choice in Dutch. As is almost always translated by TOEN (when) or TERWIJL (while). Summary The rules for choosing between these temporal conjunctions can now be summarised. First for English: — if the TOD is not to be shifted to a new point, use AS; — to refer to a point of time, use WHEN, with a punctual, conclusive durative or stative verb; — to refer to a period of time, use WHILE, with a non-conclusive durative or stative verb. And for Dutch: — to refer to a point of time that: — is a single occurrence in the past, use TOEN, — is in the present or is repeated in the past, use ALS/WANNEER, in both cases with a punctual, conclusive durative or stative verb; — to refer to a period of time, use TERWIJL, with a non-conclusive durative or stative verb.
(c) Refinements and exceptions The translation data show that there are certain refinements and exceptions to these general rules. Here we will list these and briefly account for the more important ones. As -» ZODRA, always as a translation of AS SOON AS. —• ALS, for repetitive past events.
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— use AS if the TOD is only to be advanced to the next event rather than be moved.
16 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English — OP HET OGENBLIK DAT, literally ON THE EYE-BLINK (MOMENT) THAT, for JUST AS.
-» Other, idiomatic: (15.31) . • .as soon as possible. -* zospoedig mogelijk. (as speedily as possible). (91.10) As the weeks passed. .. -* Naarmate (in the measure that). — Not translated, because the sub clause becomes either a matrix or a relative clause.
— Other, by DAT (that) in expressions as THE DAYS WHEN; by EN DAN (and then),
i.e. setting up a second matrix clause. —• not translated, because the temporal clause is transformed into a noun phrase, e.g. (79.13) There were days when ...-*•
Sommige dagen . . . (Some days).
While
-*
(as long as), for a conditional use of WHILE: (63.80) . . . and while he touched me he had the power. —• TIJDENS (during), when the sub-clause is replaced by a phrase so that a preposition is required rather than a conjunction: (34.07) It had stood in his study while he lived. (39.22) Het had tijdens zijn leven in zijn studeerkamergestaan. —• Not translated, by using the gerundive, WHILE I SUPPORTED -• SUPPORTING ; the whole sentence dropped. ZOLANG
Toen7
-* WHILE, in all cases with stative verbs in the sub-clause (cf. WHEN -» TERWIJL). — AT, again replacing the sub-clause with a phrase: (120.30) .. . toen de vacantie om was. (95.10) .. .at the end of the vacation. —• AFTER, again dropping the perfect aspect in the original (see WHEN — NADAT above) — Other, mainly with -ING verb form: (147.24) Of toen hij een keer terugkwam . . ., (or when he one time came back...) (117.22)
Or once coming
back...
—• Not translated, either by making a gerund, or making the clause into a noun phrase or a matrix clause.
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When — TERWIJL, both cases referring to a stative stance, e.g. SITTING, LOOKING, for which both TOEN and TERWIJL may be used -• NA(DAT), for a perfect aspect in the WHEN clause, and dropping this in the NADAT (after) clause. This is an option that occurs in both directions, but an explanation would take us beyond the scope of this paper.
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 17
Als — AS, this being a story, ALS was most frequently used temporally for repetitive events in the past rather than with the present or future tense, and AS is not normally appropriate in these circumstances. However, when it was used it was appropriate: (167.18) . . . ah ze's ochtends kwam dat ze haar op degang tegemoet stormden . .. (... when she in the morning came that they her in the passage up to stormed) (134.27) As she arrived in the morning they would storm up to her. . .
— AFTER, again with the dropping of the perfect aspect (see WHEN — NADAT above).
— not translated, instead using an -ING verb form or making the temporal clause into a matrix clause or a noun phrase. The refinements which we see are: AS SOON AS
*±
JUST AS
Ji
ALL THE WHILE J±
ZODRA OP HET OGENBLIK DAT INTUSSEN
Some general rules which emerge from these exceptions are: — dropping the perfect aspect from the sub-clause requires a different temporal preposition, e.g. WHEN + perfect -» AFTER; — a sub-clause may be replaced by a prepositional phrase, requiring that the subordinating conjunction be replaced by a preposition; — the preposition may be dropped altogether when the temporal clause is made into either: — an -ING construction; — a separate matrix clause; — a relative clause within a noun phrase in the matrix clause.
b. Simultaneous points in time We now turn to the prepositions that set the time of the matrix stevent. All these prepositions, with one exception—DURING—are also used as locatives. In order for them to be given a temporal meaning the phrase that follows them must be clearly temporal in itself. Note that this was not the case with temporal subordinating conjunctions, as we have just seen and as we will see again in the section on temporal order conjunctions.
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Terwijl — AT A TIME WHEN,
18 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
First we look at prepositions that indicate the point in time at which the stevent occurs. The predictions that we had made here were that — AT is equivalent to OAT, — AROUND is equivalent to BOND; — BY is equivalent to TEGEN. Neither AROUND nor ROND occurred in the original texts. But our translation data play havoc with the other predictions. (a)
AT
?±
OM
Table 4 Number of occurrences of different translations of AT From: at with clock time at the time (. . .) at that time/moment at any time/moment at the same time at one time at the beginning/end of at the end a lfirst at last at high/low tide at night at meals
To: with preposition 3 3 3
om toen (. ..) op dat tijd/ogenblijk
no preposition
2 2
4 1
7 1
4
aan het begin/eind van ah het klaar was in het begin
6 1
3 4 1
29
toendertijd elke/ieder ogenblik tegelijk(ertijd)/meteen vroeger
eerst/aanvankelijk eindelijk
bij hoog/laag water 's nachts/'s avonds tijdens maaltijden 16
From this sample it is not possible to give more than an indication of a possible system. Clearly OM is only used with specific clock times in Dutch. If the word TIME is specifically mentioned in the AT phrase, then there are several options in Dutch: — if the rime has already been or is going to be specified, use TOEN (then); — if the rime is open, use OGENBLIK (moment) governed by either OP DAT (at that) or ELK/IEDER (any). OP (on) is also used for days of the week—see below. For border rimes, i.e. beginnings and ends, Dutch uses AAN, which is also used for locative edges, e.g. AAN ZEE (at the seaside). The use of AT in AT NIGHT is
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For the predicted equivalence between AT and OM we find that, while the only two occurrences of OM are translated by AT, only 3 of the 4 5 ATS are translated by OM. We will now examine the different translations of AT.
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 19
peculiar to English; the Dutch 's NACHTS is in line with the use of's with other periods of the day, e.g. 's AVONDS for IN THE EVENING. The '5 represents the word DES, genitive form of the article, a usage which is now archaic, but still found in modern German. A similar pattern emerges from the translations into AT of various Dutch prepositions, as can be seen in Table 2. (b) B Y *± TEGEN
Table 5 Number of occurrences of different translations of BY8 From
To: with preposition
by without time by + year by the end of. . .
5
tegen omstreeks (about) aan het eind van . . .
by the time. . . . . .,by which time. . . by this time by now
5
1 1
1
no preposition
toen. . . wanneer. . .
13
1
MM
1
al
2
We see again: — the use of AAN for beginnings/ends. — the incorporation of the word TIME, to give in Dutch either: — a subordinating conjunction: TOEN, WANNEER (when), or — an adverb: AL (already), NU (now).
(c) Conclusion The general conclusion that we can cautiously draw from this analysis of the translations of the prepositions indicating simultaneous points in time is: — for a clock time: at ^ om; — for beginnings/ends of an event: at/by the beginning/end of — before a time: by
n aan het begin/eind van I* tegen;
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TEGEN did not occur in the Dutch original text, so no analysis is possible. Only 5 of the 16 occurrences of BY are translated by TEGEN. Most of the remainder had the word TIME in the phrase. See Table 5 for details.
20 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
— from English THE TIME clauses: at/by the time •* toen;9 — from English AT . . . TIME phrases, use the corresponding adjective + TIJD/ OGENBLIK (moment); e.g.: at any time -~ elk ogenblik at the same time -* tegelijk (ertijd) at that time — op dat ogenblik.
— the same as (AT) or — up to and including (BY) the point on the time axis indicated by sub-event. In Dutch the time line is two dimensional. Clock time is one dimension. But on this dimension are mounted events. These events can be referred to in the prepositional phrase in two ways, either by taking an event cross-section against time or by taking a two dimensional time-event chunk. So in Dutch we get the time of the matrix event being located either:10 — around a clock time point using OM, which means AROUND in its locative use, — on an event time slice using OP, which means ON in its locative use, — supported by an event-time box using AAN, which in its locative use means functionally next to, e.g. for ON in 'a painting hanging on the wall' one uses AAN in Dutch, cf. the functional interpretation of AT in English, or — up to and including an event-time slice using TEGEN, which means in its locative use oppositionally against, e.g. for ON in 'John is leaning on the wall' one uses TEGEN in Dutch. Following this schema, in Dutch: — clock times are zero-dimension points on the time axis; — moments, as in THAT TIME, are one dimensional event slices out of the eventtime space; — beginnings and ends of events are two dimensional event-time objects.
c. Simultaneous time selectedfrom a series In our original proposal (Figures i and 2), we postulated that a period of time could be a state, border or container. Here we examine only the time border.
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While the details still remain to be worked out, it is clear that the English and Dutch simultaneous point of time prepositions do not have a one-to-one correspondence. We suggest that English and Dutch have different ways of viewing the time line in this respect. In English the time line is a single axis. To locate an event at point on that axis there are only two possibilities: either the time the event occurs is:
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 21
The idea of a rime border is borrowed from a space border, e.g. customs posts are on borders, ships are on the surface of the sea. In English, days are the only rime borders, e.g. ON SUNDAY, ON MAY 5TH. In Dutch spatial borders and days both require OP. SO the simple prediction was made that ON and OP were equivalent. In both languages the preposition is optional, i.e. the ON/OP can be dropped. So the ON-OP equivalence should turn out to be only partially the case.
Otlfi- op
THIRTEENTH BIRTHDAY.
Only some of the translations of OP were to ON. However, for most cases of OP followed by a specific day ON was the chosen translation." This leads to the revised hypothesis that ON and OP are both used for particular days or parts of days from a series, e.g. days of the week/month, the Nth morning/afternoon/ evening/night. ON is not obligatory for days, as in: John's coming Sunday Thefactory will be ready 5 May. (NB not fifth May)
In these examples OP is not generally used. And neither ON nor OP are permitted when the (part of the) day is governed by a quantifier, as in: ~ We hoped to see Veronica on one/next/last Monday.
Indeed, for the translations of ON + a day of the week there was no preposition. O N -• something other than OP
The other cases in which ON with a day was not translated by OP all refer to repeated events, e.g.: (15.06) . .. rest up on S u n d a y . . .
-• . . . zondags uitrusten . . . (on Sunday resting out)
There were also two cases in which ON was used without a specific (part of a) day in a series. In the firsc (34 -15)
• on lonely n i g h t s . . .
— . . .gedurende (during)
eenzame nachten . . .
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Most of the translations of ON were to OP. In some cases (5) the time referred to was a day of the month; in other cases (6) to a particular day or part of a day in a series, e.g. ON THE THIRD MORNING. The use of ON with a part of a day is regarded by Quirk et al. (1985:688) as exceptional. We would rather see it as generic. ON picks out one day or part of a day from a series, which is frequently the days of the week or the days of the month, but may also be birthdays, e.g. ON HIS
22 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
it is possible that in English a LONELY NIGHT is a night in a series of nights, whereas in Dutch OP requires an ordinal number of nights. In the other: (15-15)
• • on special occasions...
— . . . bij
bijzonderegelengheden
it is not clear whether this is a temporal use of ON. There is a whole category of such expressions in which ON is translated by BIJ, namely for types of weather condition, e.g.: On clear mornings At low water
->• Bij heldere ochtenden. -* Bij laag water.
OP -* something other than ON
— AT used for (153.09)
OP ..
. MOMENT where
MOMENT
Op hetzelfde moment...
is translated by TIME/MINUTE (2):
-<• at the same time. . .
In Dutch one could argue that OP is appropriate as it is being used to select a particular moment from a series of moments. We saw this with OP DAT OGENBLIKZS the translation of AT THAT MOMENT. — IN/AFTER are used for certain expressions: (128.29) . . . midden op diezomerdag (130.19) op klaarlkhte dag. . . (166.06) .. .opdenduur. .. (16j.io) . . . op oudere leeftijd. . .
-*. . .in the middle of that summer's day . . . -* in broad daylight. . . —•. . . after a while. . . ->•... late in life.. .
OP is dropped for indefinite expressions as: op een keer op een dag op een ochtend op een avond op een nacht
one time one day one morning one evening one night
Summary We see that the scope for the use of temporal OP is broader than that for temporal ON, in contrast with the scopes of spatial OP and ON (Bowerman, in press), although it does not include all the scope of ON. In summary we propose that: ON
is used to pick out a definite day or part thereof from a series of days, usually the days of the week or month, but also a (part of a) day in a
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Turning now to the many different translations of OP, aside from ON, we find:
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 23
OP
constructed series such as the days of an event. It may also be used for habitual events occurring upon all such days. is used for both definite and indefinite (parts of) days. Moments are considered to be parts of days. Habitual events are excluded. In addition, OP is used in certain expressions: MIDDEN OP, OP KLAARLICHTE DAG, OP DEN DUUR, etc., for which we have no explanation.
d. Simultaneous to a period of time: durative prepositions
— a period of rime on the rime axis, e.g. JANUARY 1989, and — a duration of rime not attached to the word time axis, e.g. A MONTH, — a duration attached to time axis, usually at the Time of Discourse (TOD), to indicate a period of rime, e.g. LAST MONTH. Note that a period is not a duration but has a duration, e.g. the period JANUARY has a duration of one month. In analysing the translation data we have found that our original proposals for classifying durative prepositions were not satisfactory. First we present three classification schemes that we considered before making our choice: — the time of the matrix stevent is either: — a point in the period of the sub stevent, or — a period that is less than or equal to the period of the sub stevent; — the duration of the matrix stevent is less than, equal to or (less than or equal to) the rime of the sub stevent; — the sub stevent is or is not explicitly temporal. In choosing a scheme we are looking at differences between IN, DURING and FOR, in particular at examples in which the one gives a meaning to a sentence different from the other. The difference between DURING and FOR is relatively straight forward, e.g.: (77.04) I would see them in town during the day. .. *I would see them in town for the day. . . I would visit them in town for the day. . .
FOR places the rime duration of the matrix stevent as being equal to diat of the sub stevent; DURING simply indicates that the duration of the matrix stevent is less than, or equal to, that of the sub stevent.
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So far we have dealt with locating the time of a matrix stevent at a point in time or at one time in a series of times. We now turn to locating this time in a time period and/or to setting its duration. We will need to distinguish rather carefully between:
24 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
The difference between DURING and IN is more difficult to pinpoint, as the reader may care to check for himself at this point.12 If IN is introducing a period on the time axis, then it can be replaced by DURING. (But if IN is introducing a rime duration, whether or not this is attached to the TOD, then it cannot be replaced by DURING, for the simple reason that DURING cannot be used with time durations.) On die other hand, DURING cannot always be replaced by IN, e.g.: (8y 1 o) There was a bloke who used to climb on his chair during/*in meal times...
In general, DURING cannot be replaced by IN if a non temporal interpretation can be given to the sub stevent, c£:
In the DURING case the children were in the audience, whereas with the IN case they were part of the cast. This supports the thesis that IN should be used when the sub stevent can only be given a temporal reading. Now while some of the DURING examples (5/8) have sub stevents which would be interpreted nontemporally if DURING was replaced by IN, this is not always so. DURING may take an explicitly temporal noun phrase, e.g.: (13.15) had I not seen heaped couples in all corners of the park during the long summer evenings. ..?
This suggests that IN is used in English unless the sub stevent can be given a non-temporal meaning or emphasis is to be given to the temporal aspect of the sub stevent. The difference between FOR and IN is clearer. Mostly, FOR cannot be replaced by IN, cf: (96-37) Fora moment I felt my grip loosen on the poker. . . In a moment I felt my grip loosen on the poker. ..
The IN sentence results in the loss of grip on the poker, whereas with the FOR sentence this loss is only for 'the moment'. The instances in which FOR can be replaced by IN all involved negation in the matrix clause: (68.01) No one had touched me like thatfor/in a long time, not since I was a child
Thus IN cannot be used to indicate that the matrix stevent has the same rime duration as the sub stevent, which is the function of FOR. So we will use three sub-categories for the analysis: — the rime duration of the matrix stevent is less than or equal to that of the sub stevent and the sub stevent does not have a non-temporal interpretation;
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The children whisphered during the opera. The children whispered in the opera.
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 25
— the time duration of the matrix stevent is less than or equal to that of the sub stevent and the sub stevent has a non-temporal interpretation; — the time duration of the matrix stevent is equal to that of the sub stevent.
(A) Matrix duration ^ sub duration and sub stevent could be non-temporal To indicate that the duration of the matrix stevent is less than or equal to that of the sub stevent DURING is used in English when there is any possibility of the sub stevent being given a non-temporal interpretation.
She spoke during the meeting. (i.e. some of the time) She slept during the whole of the meeting. (i.e. all of the time)
Note that unlike IN and FOR, neither DURING nor its Dutch translations can be used to introduce a time duration, either pure or attached to the time axis at the TOD: (52.2g) It's all over in an hour. *lt's all over during an hour. (^5-37) And I had spoken to no one in several days. *And I had spoken to no one during several days. TUJDENS/BIJ/ONDER
There are several different possible Dutch translations for DURING, namely TIJDENS, BIJ, ONDER. The normal translation is TIJDENS. However, if the sub stevent is a non-conclusive durative (an activity) than ONDER may be used to indicate that the matrix stevent is NOT an integral part of the sub stevent: (123.21) Onder het eten, kwam dan vaak de aap uit de mouw. (98.02) It would often come out during dinner (160.24) Onder het nippen van haar bitter haalde ze het papier te voorschijn,.. . (128.30) # Sipping herbitter drink she produced the paper. . .
BIJ, on the other hand, indicates that there is not merely a temporal but also a causal connection between the matrix and sub stevents. The two events are not only temporally but also causally intertwined: (129.09) Stiekem oefende ik. .. bijmijn ochtendgymnastiek (120.18) . . . I practised on the sly during my morning exercises.
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DURING
By default DURING X indicates that the matrix stevent does not occupy the whole of the time of the sub stevent X. This is a conversational implicature, as it can be denied (Quirk etal., 1985:689), c£:
26 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
(94.30) That same afternoon wefilledthe traps and rowed out into mid-channel at low tide to lay them on the river bed (i49-33) • ••bijlaagtij...
If afiniteverb is introduced into the sub clause, then TIJDENS and BIJ cannot be translated by DURING, as it is a preposition, so AS, WHEN or WHILE, being conjunctions, are used: bij het optuigen van het kerstboom...
(165.22)
• • bij het bedstoeien
(152.0$)
En tijdens die worsteling van dat dier
-» as we rigged the little Christmas tree... —•... when we were frolicking on the bed. —• While this. . . animal wrestled...
The other few translations given for DURING were AAN and GEDURENDE, but no pattern emerges. Summary In conclusion we propose a rule to situate a matrix stevent in a period using a sub stevent that may also be given a non-temporal interpretation: — in English use DURING; — in Dutch use TIJDENS, unless: — the sub stevent is physically related to the matrix stevent, then use BIJ, or — the sub stevent is only an incidental activity to the matrix stevent, then use ONDER.
(B) Matrix duration ^ sub duration and sub stevent is temporal When the duration of the matrix stevent may be less than or equal to the duration of the sub stevent and the sub stevent is clearly temporal, IN is used in both Dutch and English. However, the two do not have equal scope. Uses of IN in English IN, in the English original text, is almost always used to indicate a definite time period: (81.36) In the late afternoon he let me out.
It can also be used with an indefinite time duration: (15.1?) . . . a good afternoon's work in the bookshop earned more than they scraped together in a week.
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(169.22)
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 27
In the sample text occurrences of an indefinite time duration were usually attached to the T O D to give a time period. This period could either begin at the TOD, as in: (77.07) .. .in two months I had a lifetime's growing up to do. where the 'growing up' is to occur in a period beginning at the T O D and of two months' duration. Or ending at the TOD, when the matrix clause has a perfect aspect (30.29) You've read twelve pages in a month.
Table 6 Uses of durative prepositions Dutch:
English: Use:
DURING IN
Time period Time duration but ending at TOD but beginning at TOD
8
TOTAL
8
47 3
FOR
TIJDENS ONDER BIJ
IN
's
VOOR AL
5 7
2
28
9
I
3
6
4
11
3
313
32
4
57
55
10 10
3
2
6
35
8
9
1
18
In English it is also possible for the matrix stevent to be an accomplishment which occurs at a point of time given by the T O D plus the duration of the sub stevent, e.g. in: (59.11) Clear off, back in halfan hour. the writer of the note is promising to be back at a point in time equal to T O D + ( i / 2 hour).' 4 This use is not permitted in Dutch, as we see from the translation data (see Tables 1 and 2). IN
ri
IN
About half of the occurrences of IN in English, were translated as IN in Dutch and vice versa. Most of these indicate a definite time period, e.g. IN MY LIFE. (12.23) . . . where once Raymond, in his earlier, delinquent days had fed glass splinters to the pigeons, A few give a pure time durataion, e.g. A MONTH,
TWO YEARS:
(15.17) • •. I knew that a good afternoon's work in the bookshop earned more than they scraped together in a week.
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The frequency of occurrence in the sample text of these different uses to which temporal IN can be put are shown in Table 6. The same uses are also found with other durative prepositions, in both Dutch and English.
28 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
or a duration which may begin (see 77.07 above) or end at the TOD: (30.29) You've read twelve pages in a month.
The occasions in which IN is not translated to IN in Dutch are shown in Table 7. The most frequent alternative translation, '5, was always used for parts of the day and seasons:15 (26.32) In the afternoons Maisie used to bring me tea. . . (30.10) 's Middags bracht Maisie mij altijd thee. . .
Table 7 IN in English not translated by IN in Dutch Nr. 10
English
Dutch
Transcription
IN THE MORNING/EVENING
's MORGENS/AVONDS AAN/TEGBS HET EIND
for habitual events at the beginning/end during since long e.g.: 59.11
2
IN THE LATE . . .
2
IN . . .
TIJDENS
I
IN A VERY LONG TIME
SEDEPT LANG
a time point occurring at a duration X after the TOD
OVERX
IN . . . LIFE
no preposition
(80.06) never in his life
nog nook
1
4
e.g.: yet never
20
Table 8 IN m Dutch not translated by IN in English Nr.
Dutch
English
7
IN HET BEGIN
AT FIRST
1
IN DE LOOP DE . . .
OVER THE . . .
1
IN EEN NACHT
OVERNIGHT
1
IN HET VERVOLG
FROM THEN ON
1
N KEER IN EEN X
N TIMES A X
4 15
no temporal preposition
Notes in the course of
e.g. twice a week matrix verb changed
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The use in Dutch of OVER to indicate a moment occurring at a time after the TOD, where IN is used in English, is a well-known pitfall for native English speakers of Dutch. The few occurrences of OVER in the Dutch text do indeed indicate a period of time from the TOD before the matrix event would occur. They were all translated by IN A. OVER seems a more appropriate choice than IN, seeing that OVER is used in a locative sense to indicate length or distance, whereas locative IN indicates containment. The remaining translations in Table 7 may be treated as idiomatic. The occasions in which Dutch IN is not translated to IN in English are shown in Table 8. The most frequent alternative is IN HET BEGIN (in the beginning) -•
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 29 AT FIRST. We
have seen the reverse translation above in examining AT. This and the other translations in Table 8 will be treated as idiomatic, with one exception. Sometimes a change of the matrix verb was called for which led to no temporal preposition being used: (174.10) Toch had ze het in korte tijd volputjesgetrapt
(All-the-same had she it in short time full pits kicked.) (141.09) All the same it hadn't taken her long to pit the linoleum with her high heels This meta reason falls outside the scope of this analysis.
Most of the occurrences of 's with a time of day or season in Dutch were translated by IN. The major exception is 's NACHTS —• AT NIGHT (cf. Table 4). On some occasions there is no preposition in the translation, either because the temporal information is ignored or because parts of the day, like days (cf. ON above), do not require a preposition in English: (169.22) En'savonds laat.. . (94.13) Late that evening. .. WITHIN •* BINNEN
For a time duration that is less than the duration of the sub-stevent WITHIN is used. Like IN, WITHIN is a locative preposition and so requires a temporal phrase to receive a temporal interpretation. If the matrix stevent is durative and conclusive (process or accomplishment), then the duration is attached to the time axis beginning at the TOD. Compare the above pure durative use with the attachment use: — duration Anne can complete the trimming course within an hour. — T O D + Anne will he back within an hour. Using the perfect aspect in the matrix sentence to have the matrix stevent occurring in a time period ending at the TOD, as with IN, is unnatural: ?Anne has left within an hour. (i.e. before the TOD) The way to achieve this is to use a definite temporal phrase, turning the sub stevent into a period on the time axis rather than a time duration: Anne has left within the (last) hour. Neither WITHIN nor its Dutch equivalent, BINNEN, were present in their temporal use in the sample texts nor in the translations, so no data are available to test our ideas on their use.
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I N ^ 'S
30 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
Summary We propose the following rule of usage in English/Dutch:
In addition, a number of expressions which are more or less idiomatic shown in Table 9; more or less, since more examples may bring to light a pattern in these apparent idiosyncrasies. Table 9 Some idiomatic expressions using IN/IN English
Dutch
Transcription
IN THE LATE . . .
AAN/TEGEN HET EIND . . .
AT FIRST/LAST
IN HET BEGIN/EIND
against the end in the beginning/end
IN . . . LIFE
no preposition
OVER THE . . .
IN DE LOOP DE . . .
N TIMES A X
N KEER IN EEN X
FROM THEN ON
IN HET VERVOLG
in the course of N times in a X in the following
(C) Matrix duration = sub duration We turn now to ensuring that the duration of the matrix stevent is as long as the duration of the sub stevent, using FOR in English.
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— use IN/IN to place the time of the matrix stevent inside a time given by a sub stevent having only a temporal interpretation, in order either: — to indicate a time period, except — in Dutch for sub stevents that are periods of the day or seasons of the year, then use 's; — to indicate a time duration given by an indefinite sub stevent but one that may be attached to the time axis: — beginning at the TOD; — ending at the TOD, but then give the verb in the matrix clause a perfect aspect. — use IN/OVER to place the time of a matrix accomplishment at the end of a time period which begins at the TOD and extends for a duration given by the sub stevent. — use WITHIN/B/JVNEIV to give the matrix stevent a maximum possible duration which may be attached to the time axis either: — beginning at the TOD, or — ending at the TOD, but then give the verb in the matrix clause a perfect aspect.
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 31
Uses of FOR in English In our original selection trees the translation of FOR was predicted to be nothing in Dutch, e.g. FOR A WEEK would be translated by # EEN WEEK, as in: The schools are closedfor a week. De scholen zijn # een weekgesloten. However, Donaldson (1984) proposes that temporal FOR is translated in Dutch either by:
These alternatives are indeed found in the data, but not in the conditions postulated by Donaldson. Looking first at all the original FOR sentences in the English corpus, we see in Table 6 that FOR, just as IN, can be put to several uses. It usually introduces a period on the time axis: (89.34) • • • I told her about the rowing-boat that someone was lendingusfor the summer, It is also used to introduce a pure time duration not attached to the time axis: (25.10) My great-grandfather livedfor sixty-nine years. However, the length of time is usually attached to the time axis, either beginning or ending at the TOD, e.g. in: (36.10) For the next three days my grandfather hardly pausedfrom his reading of. . . the story has come to a certain time (the TOD) and from that time, during a length of three days, 'grandfather hardly paused from his reading'. If the matrix verb has a perfect aspect then the time duration ends at the TOD: (84.15) . . . they had been watching mefor some time. ..
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— VOOR, optionally, if the matrix stevent is in the future: I'm going therefor two weeks. Ikga er (voor) twee weken naar toe. — nothing, if the matrix stevent is in the past / was therefor two weeks. Ik ben er # twee weken geweest. — AL, if the matrix stevent began in the past but continues to the present: I've been living herefor two weeks. Ik woon hieral twee weken.
32 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
Durations ending at the TOD can also be indicated by a non-finite verb form: (45.14) . . .feeling guilty about having Alice on her lapfor such a long time.. . (77.12) To have someone screamingfor seventeen years and.. .
While we have found this rule for detecting time periods ending at the TOD, there does not appear to be a simple rule for distinguishing between the use of FOR to indicate a pure length of time versus a time period beginning at the TOD. FOR •* #
(28.18) She stood perfectly stillfor a moment. . . (32.11) # Eenogenblikhleefzijdoodstilstaan..
.
But pure time durations in the past are also found: (25.10) My grandfather livedfor sixty-nine years. (28.15) Mijnovergrootvaderheeft # negenzestigjaar geleefd." FOR *£#...
LANG
In some cases, also mostly time durations that are to begin at the TOD, the word LANG (long) is added, e.g.: (51.24) No one speaksfor a while,. . . (83.21) Een tijd langzegt niemand iets,. . .
Why is LANG used? This is difficult to ascertain because in all cases in which is used, it may be dropped. In the cases that it has not been used it can usually be added, although not always. The instances when it cannot be added are: LANG
7X when the sub stevent is A MOMENT (EEN OGENBLIK) and a moment is not usually long! 3X LING is already used as an adjective qualifying the noun, as the translation of FOR A LONG TIME — EEN LANGE TIJLr,
3X when the sub stevent is a specific period rather than a duration, e.g.: (71.18) F o r the next quarter ofan hour
— Het volgende kwartier
FOR *t GEDURENDE
The few translations to GEDURENDE seem not to differ in any way from those in which FOR is not translated.'8
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Turning now to the translations given to temporal FOR, in half of the cases no preposition was used. We assume this to be normal. In most instances, a time duration is given which is assumed to begin at the TOD, e.g.:
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 3 3
FOR ^ VOOR
did not occur with a temporal use in the original Dutch sample text. The translations from FOR to VOOR should, according to Donaldson, be in the future. Moreover, there was also a sense of purpose (purpose being another use VOOR
of FOR/ VOOR):
(89.34) Itold her about the rowing-boat that someone was lending us for the summer,. . . (143-13) Ik verteld haar over de roeiboot die iemand ons voor de zomer had geleend,.. .
if onlyfor for that short period
-» al was het maar voor (literally was it but for) —• voor dat korte ogenblik
VOOR could be dropped. So VOOR is only necessary when purpose is involved. Purposes are usually in the future, which explains why Donaldson thought that VOOR should be used optionally in future situations.
*± AL The few translations to AL had a matrix verb with perfect aspect and all indicated a time duration ending at die TOD, as Donaldson claims, e.g.: FOR
(33.22) We haven't made lovefor nearly two weeks now. (38.31) We hebben al bijna twee weken nietgevrijd.
Summary We conclude with the rule for indicating that the duration of the matrix stevent is equal to that of the sub stevent: — in English use FOR, and: — to situate the matrix stevent in a period use a definite sub stevenr, — to indicate a duration use an indefinite sub stevenr, this duration may be either: — not attached to the rime axis, — attached, beginning at the TOD, or attached, ending at the TOD, signalled by putting the matrix verb into the perfect aspect (or into a non-finite form); — in Dutch no preposition is required (but lang may be added unless the sub stevent is a moment or already contains the word LANG) unless: — the duration ends at the TOD, thus use AL with the perfect aspect,
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In such cases VOOR could not be dropped. In the other examples not having a purpose, such as:
34 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English — the sub stevent also indicates the purpose of the matrix stevent, then use VOOR.
(D) Summary To bring the strands of this together, we propose the following rules for selecting English and Dutch prepositions for indicating that a matrix stevent has a duration that is circumscribed by the duration of the sub stevent.
— equal to or less than the duration of the sub stevent then: — if the sub stevent is clearly temporal, use IN, — otherwise, use DURING; — less than the duration of the sub stevent, use WITHIN — equal to the duration of the sub stevent, use FOR. Note that both IN and FOR can introduce either a period on the time axis or a time duration. If IN, FOR or WITHIN introduce a time duration indicated by the use of an indefinite temporal phrase, then this duration may be attached to the time axis at the TOD, either: — beginning at the TOD, or — ending at the TOD by giving the matrix verb a perfect aspect. For Dutch If the matrix stevent has a duration that is: — equal to or less than the duration of the sub stevent then: — if the sub stevent is clearly temporal, use IN, unless: — the sub stevent is a part of the day or a season of the year, then use 'y, — otherwise use TIJDENS, unless: — the sub stevent is incidental to the matrix stevent, then use ONDER, — the sub stevent is a causally related to the matrix stevent, then use my, — less than the duration of the sub stevent, use BINNEN; — equal to the duration of the sub stevent, use no preposition (adding LANG to the end of the sub phrase to emphasise its length) except: — for a time duration ending at the TOR, then use AL with the matrix clause having perfect aspect; — if sub stevent also indicates the purpose of the matrix stevent, then use VOOR.
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For English If the matrix stevent has a duration that is:
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 3 5
If either IN, BINNEN or VOOR introduce a time duration, then this duration may be attached to the time axis at the TOD, either — beginning at the TOD, or — ending at the TOD by giving the matrix verb a perfect aspect. These rules are summarised in Tables 10 and 11. Note that the most serious remaining problem is that no rule has been provided to distinguish a pure duration from a duration attached to the time axis beginning at the TOD, for the simple reason that we have not yet been able to detect this rule, which may well mean that it does not exist.
Condition side condition
Rule
period duration beginning at TOD ending at TOD
definite sub stevent indefinite sub stevent indefinite sub stevent indefinite sub stevent + perfect aspect in matrix clause
Table 11 Overview of choice of time period prepositions matrix-sub time duration: + side conditions
English
Dutch
IN
IN
DURING
T1JDENS
matrix ^sub
sub clearly temporal otherwise unless (Dutch only) sub activity is incidental to matrix sub is causally related to matrix
ONDES
BIJ
matrix < sub
WITHIN
matrix — sub
FOR
to emphasize longness unless (Dutch only) for a period ending at TOD sub state is purpose of matrix
B1NSEN # . . . LANG
AL VOOR
e. Temporal ordering We now turn to the temporal prepositions that are used to order the time of the matrix stevent against that of the sub stevent. The arrangement of these prepositions in the original Figures 1 and 2 has not been retained in Tables 1 and 2. BEFORE has been moved to be with TO and
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Table 10 Rules for indicatingrimeperiod v. duration
36 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English to be with FROM and SINCE. This brings the non-predicted translations closer to the main diagonal. The ordering prepositions have been arranged in three groups according to the time order of the matrix and sub stevenc
UNTIL; AFTER
— matrix time > sub time: AFTER DARK, SINCE DAWN; — matrix time < sub time: BEFORE DARK, UNTIL DUSK; — sub time i < matrix time < sub time 2: BETWEEN DAWN
AND DUSK.
In each of the first two groups there is a distinction to be made between the prepositions that indicate:
BEFORE/AFTER indicate that the time of the matrix stevent must fall in one half of the time axis, the part that is later/earlier than the time of the sub stevent, respectively. However, they usually also imply that the time of the matrtix stevent is close to the sub stevent. UNTIL and SINCE, on the other hand, use the sub stevent to fix one end of a time range; the other end is usually the TOD (Bree&Smit 1985).
(A) Matrix rime > sub rime As we have just said, there are two possibilities for placing the time matrix stevent later than that of the sub stevent, either: — in a semi-range, beginning at the sub stevent, using ATTER/NA(DAT), DAARNA; — in a period beginning at the sub stevent and ending at the TOD, using SINCE/ SISDS, SINDSDIEN. AFTER *± NA(DAT)
Where English uses temporal AFTER, Dutch has two different possibilities: AM, SADAT. The difference between NA and NADAT is that the former is a preposition: (110.30) Naeenpoos. . . NADAT
—• After a while.. .
is a subordianting conjunction requiring a sub clause verb with perfect
aspect: (130.05) De eerste keer dat ze weer bij me aankwam nadat ze me verlaten had, zei ze: (The first time that she again by me visited after she me left had, said she:) (103.07) Thefirsttime that she visited me after she went away, she said: The suffix DAT (that) enables NA to take a clause. So the criterion for choosing between NA and NADAT is simply: for clauses use NADAT, otherwise NA
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— a semi-range of time: AFTER, BEFORE; — one end of a time period: UNTIL, SINCE.
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 37
Considering for a moment just the clauses, we find two translations for AFTER: NADAT and TOEN. The translations to NADAT ai\ have either an -ING clause, which is turned into a finite verb form, e.g.: (26.27) After hours ofcrouching they turn hack,. . . (30.05) Nadat zij daar uren hebbengezeten,gaan zij weer terug. . . (After-that they there hours had sat,...) or an adjunct qualifying AFTER, e.g. LONG AFTER, ONLY AFTER. hand, cannot take these adjuncts. AFTER J±
TOES', WHEN *±
TOEN,
on the other
NADAT
AFTER THAT -* DAARNA —• THEN DAARNA, literally THERE AFTER, is used to translate AFTER THAT in English, i.e. when the sub stevent is pointed to by THAT. The THAT may be implicit, AFTER being used as an adverb:
(77-3o) First time he just nodded when my mother introduced me to him and after he never said a word to me. 0 However, the translations from
DAARNA
were to THEN rather than to AFTER THAT.
(181.10) Daarna verdween ze tussen de mensen (146.29) Then she disappeared in the crowd. So as not to clutter up our scheme, we assume that DAAJW/I^THEN is a rule of this translator, not a general rule. In English, AFTERWARDS can be used instead of AFTER THAT. This occurs only once in the samples, as the translation of ER NA (there after). NlET NADAT SS NOT BEFORE
An idiosyncratic translation is that between
MET NADAT
(not after) and
NOT
BEFORE, e.g.:
(124.24) Niet nadat hij. . . vijftiggulden op deprijs had afgedongen. (98.29) Not, however, before bringing the price down byfiftyguilders,.. .
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We have noted above both that WHEN with a perfect aspect sub clause is translated by NADAT, dropping the perfect aspect, and that TOEN with a perfect aspect sub clause is translated by AFTER. While there is a clear difference between NAiMrand TOEN, corresponding to the difference between AFTER and WHEN, these AFTERS TOEN and WHEN?*NADAT translations show that diere are some situations in which both seem appropriate, i.e. when the time of the matrix stevent is close to that of the sub stevent. We think the difference on these occasions is that: WHEN/TOEN set the T O D but AFTER/NADAT do not. There are too few data in the samples to test this.
38 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
Here there is a sale that takes place only after (or not before) the price has been reduced. The Dutch expression seems illogical in this case. SINCE a SINDS
To indicate the range of time from the sub stevent to the TOD, SINCE and SINDS are used. In English the matrix clause has to take perfect aspect as this distinguishes temporal from inferential SINCE (Bree & Smit 1985). The Dutch SINDS is less common than SINCE." However, SINCE was almost always translated by SINDS. Exceptions were: —
used as an adverb being translated by NA DIE TIJD (after this time): (20.jp) . . . smiles which I have never seen since. (23.11) . . .glimlach die ik na die tijd nooit meer hebgezien. An alternative could have been SINDSDIEN (since then). — EVER SINCE — VANAF NET OGENBLIK DAT (from the moment that); — SINCE -• SEDERT, which is a synonym of SINDS (Geerts et al. 1984: 652), now usually considered old-fashioned or formal. SINCE
The rule for ordering the time of the matrix stevent after that of the sub stevent is simple. To place the matrix stevent: — in the semi-range of time later than the sub stevent, with the implicature that the time difference will be small, use AFTER/NA(DAT), except: — if the sub stevent is being pointed to, use AFTERWARDS/DAARNA — in the range between the sub stevent and the TOD, use SINCE/SINDS with the matrix clause having perfect aspect, except: q — in Dutch, if the sub stevent is being pointed to, use SINDSDIEN.
(B) Matrix time < sub time There are also two possibilities for placing the time of the matrix stevent earlier than that of the sub stevent, either: — in a semi-range, ending at the sub stevent, using BEFORE/ VOOR(DAT). — in a period ending at the sub stevent and beginning at the TOD, using UNTIL/ TOT(DAT). BEFORE ?± VOOR(DAT)
Just as with AFTER, there are two translations for BEFORE: VOOR and VOORDAT. However, while VOORDAT is always used as a subordinating conjunction, VOOR can be either a preposition or a conjunction.
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Summary
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 39
Almost all translations of VOOR and VOORDAT are to BEFORE, and almost all the prepositional or conjunction uses of BEFORE are translated by VOOR or VOORDAT. We look briefly at some of the exceptions. BEFORE —• EER
a word that is not frequently spoken, can be used in Dutch instead of VOOR, usually with a negative matrix clause (Geerts etal. 1984: 650). This was also the case with the translations, not in a strict sense, but by implication, e.g.:
EER,
(79.22) It was a long time before I saw what he was getting at. (58-35) Het duurde een hele tijd eer ik begreep wat hij bedoelde.
BEFORE ?± TOT TOT, like UNTIL, is frequently used when the sub stevent is the cause of the matrix stevent stopping (Bree & Smit 198 5), so it is not surprising to find BEFORE translated by TOT when this is the case, e.g.:
(82.21) He was screamingfor twenty-five minutes before the doctor came and gave him morphine. (62.2Q) Hij bleef vijfentwintig minuten gillen tot de dokter kwam en hem morfinegaf. BEFORE
used as a n a d v e r b
BEFORE can be used as an adverb. There were several (13) examples in the English text, mostly translated by EERDER (earlier) or EERST (first):
(26.04) I had it once before. (2Q.14) Ik heb hem aleen keer eerdergehad. (65.02) . . . sweater I was wearing before. (94.04) . . . truidie ik eerst hadgedragen. In translating the combination of NEVER with adverbial gets dropped:
BEFORE,
the
BEFORE just
(63.07) I found a bottle ofcologne I had never opened before. (91.25) Ik vond eenfles eau de cologne die ik nooit had opengamaakt. Note that
AFTER
and
SINCE,
but not
I had it once after (that). I have had it once since (then). I have it until then. *I have it until
UNTIL,
can also be used as adverbs:
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We did not search the Dutch original sample for EER.
40 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
Both could be regarded as introducing a deictic THAT/THEN. Dutch has specific words for this, formed by affixes, again with the exception of TOT (until): AFTER THAT/AFTERWARDS
daarna, nadien
SINCE THEN
sindsdien
BEFORE THEN
daarvoor, voordien
UNTIL THEN
*tOtdietl
(UN)TILL *± TOT(DAT)
or VOOR(DAT):
(75.24) Do you know, I didn't learn to speak properly properly till I was eighteen. (53.29) Weet u wel dat ikpas behoorlijk heb leren praten toen ik achttien was?
Differences between UNTIL and SINCE It should be pointed out that UNTIL/TOT(DAT) differ from SINCE/S/JVDS (Bree & Smit 1985). With UNTIL, the matrix stevent must be a non-conclusive durative so that it can hold for the whole of the time range. SINCE, on the other hand, permits the matrix stevent to be punctual as well as durative. Nor does the range have to begin with the TOD, but its beginning can be explicitly specified using FROM/ VAN(AF): (88.02) From the beginning of summer until it seemed pointless. . . (141.01) Vanafhet begin van derzomer tot hetzinloos leek. . .
This option is not available for SINCE. Summary The rule for ordering the time of the matrix stevent before that of the sub stevent is also simple. To place the matrix stebvent: — in the semi-range of time earlier than the sub stevent, with the implicature that the time difference will be small, use BEFORE/ VOOR(DAT), except in Dutch: — if the sub stevent is being pointed to, use HIERVOOR, — if the matrix clause is a negation, EER may be used; — as a non-conclusive durative in the range between the TOD and the sub stevent, use UNTIL/TOT(DAT), except: — in Dutch, if the matrix clause is negative, then find another construction.
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To begin with, no difference will be made between UNTIL and TILL. Both are almost always translated by TOT(DAT) and vice versa. Just as with VOOR, it is not necessarily the case that ror is a preposition; it can also take a clause. However, TOT(DAT), unlike UNTIL, is not used with a negative matrix clause. The UNTIL in negative matrix clauses is translated otherwise, e.g. by TOEN (then)
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 41
(C) Sub rime i < matrix time < sub time 2 To place the rime of a matrix stevent in a range in which both ends are specified, rather than just one end, both BETWEEN . . . AND and FROM . . . TO can be used. BETWEEN . . . AND indicates that the matrix stevent occurs somewhere in the range, whereas FROM . . . TO indicates that the matrix stevent lasts for the whole of the range. Neither BETWEEN . . . AND nor its Dutch equivalent TUSSEN ... EN, were present in the sample texts. There is only one example of FROM . . . TO/VAN(AF) ... TOT. (84.22) . . .from Monday to Thursday -* . . . van maandag tot donderdag
(D) Summary Pulling these threads together would be comparatively easy if it were not for the differences between SINCE and UNTIL (the latter can only be used with nonconclusive duratives). We have opted for a scheme in which the initial decision follows the breakdown into three that we have used in this analysis. The rule we propose is: — if the sub stevent time gives the bginning of the time range in which the matrix stevent takes place, then: — if the end of this range is the TOD: — in English, use SINCE, — in Dutch, use SINDS unless the sub stevent is deictic, then use SINDSDIEN; — otherwise: — in English, use AFTER, — in Dutch: — if the sub clause is a phrase use NA — otherwise use NADAT, unless the sub stevent is deictic, then use AFTERWARDS/DAARNA; — if the sub stevent time gives the end of the rime range in which the matrix stevent takes place, then: — if the beginning of this range is the TOD: — in English, use UNTIL, — in Dutch: — if the sub clause is a phrase use TOT — otherwise maybe use TOTDAT,
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Note that Dutch uses TOT for both UNTIL and TO. In English temporal TO is always used with FROM; in Dutch TOT can also mark the end of a rime range which starts at the TOD, just like UNTIL.
42 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English — otherwise: — in English, use BEFORE,
— in Dutch: — if the sub clause is a phrase use VOOR
4. THE REVISED M O D E L The analysis of these translation data has led us to propose a new pair of trees for the selection of English andDutch temporal function words. These are shown in Figures 3 and 4. We now describe the major branches of these trees. We first describe the English selection tree and then the Dutch one.
a. The selection treefor English temporalfunction words The first and main distinction is whether or not the time of the matrix stevent is being equated to that of the sub stevent: — if it is, then the nature of the sub stevent is considered. If the sub stevent is: — an event, then: — use AS, or AS SOON AS, if emphasis is to be placed on the matrix stevent only taking place at the moment when the sub event occurs; — unless this event shifts the TOD, then: — if the sub event is a period, use WHILE, — otherwise, use WHEN; — a state, then: — if it is a time point, then: — use AT,
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— otherwise may use VOORDAT, unless the sub stevent is deictic, then use AFTERWARDS/DAAJWA; — if the matrix stevent falls in a range given explicitly by the times of two sub stevents, then: — if the matrix stevent is to last for the whole of the time period from the first to the second sub stevent: — in English, use FROM . . . TO/UNTIL — in Dutch, use VAN ... TOT, — otherwise: — in English, use BETWEEN . . . AND — in Dutch, use TUSSEN ... EN.
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before
M
Main stevent time
M,S Duration of M,S
S Sub stevent time
Q
TOD
Time of Discourse
Open choice
Figure 3 Selection tree for English temporal function words (revised)
— during
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a.
13 09
a
1a. o
s 3 a J/lang
sindsdien
begin TOD M Main stevent time
—r- tot (dat) _ M is a negation
S Sub stevent time
S is deicitic +
voor (dat) +
i — daarvoor/voordien
eer
TOD Time of Discourse
M,S
Duration of M,S
Figure 4 Selection tree for Dutch temporal function words (revised)
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 45
There are certain results that we have not shown in the selection tree, to avoid clutter: — IN with a non-definite time duration can also be used to indicate, not a time period of that duration beginning at the TOD, but rather a point in time which is located on the time axis at a point given by the TOD plus this duration; — OVER, in expressions like OVER THE WEEKEND is not shown. This use of OVER is an alternative for AT or IN, depending on whether weekends etc. are to be regarded as time points or time periods.
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— unless the matrix stevent can take place at a time earlier than the sub state, then use BY: — if the sub state is selected from a series of states, then use ON; — if the sub state has a duration, then: — if the duration of the matrix stevent is to be equal to that of the sub state, then use FOR; — if the duration of the matrix stevent is to be less than that of the sub state, then use WITHIN; — otherwise, use IN, — unless the sub state can also be given a non-temporal interpretation (usually locative), then use DURING; — if the time of the matrix stevent is not to be made approximately the same as that of the sub stevent, then the order of the matrix and sub stevents needs to be considered. If the matrix stevent is to fall in a period that: — is to follow the sub stevent, then: — if the other end of this period is to be the TOD, then use SINCE — otherwise use AFTER, unless the sub stevent is deictic, then use AFTERWARDS; — is to precede the sub stevent, then — if the other end of this period is to be the TOD, then use UNTIL — otherwise use BEFORE; — is to be sandwiched between two sub stevents, then — if the matrix stevent is to last for the whole of the period between the two parts of the sub stevent, then for the first sub stevent, use FROM, and for the second: — use TO — unless the second is an event, then use UNTIL; — otherwise use BETWEEN . . . AND.
46 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
b. The selection treefor Dutch temporalfunction words A similar rule holds for selecting Dutch temporal prepositions and conjunctions. Again the first and main distinction is whether the time of the matrix stevent is being equated to that of the sub stevent or nor. — if it is, then the nature of the sub stevent is considered. If the sub stevent is: — an event then: — if the sub event is a period, use TERWIJL — otherwise: — if the TOD is in the past and the matrix stevent is one off, then use TOEN
— use ALS (or WANNEER)
— unless emphasis is to be placed on the fact that the matrix stevent only takes place at the moment that the sub event occurs, then use ZODRA; — a state, then: — if this state is a point in time, then: — if it is a clock time point, then use OM, — if it is an event-time slice, then use OP, — if it is at one end of an event-time box, then use AAN, — unless the matrix stevent can take place at a time earlier than the sub state, then use TEGEN; — if the sub state has a duration, then: — if the duration of the matrix stevent is to be equal to that of the sub state, then: — use nothing, adding . . . LANG for emphasis. — unless the sub state is a period ending at the TOD, then use AL, or — unless the sub state indicates the purpose of the matrix stevent, then use VOORT, — if the duration of the matrix stevent is to be less than that of the sub state, then use BINNEN; — otherwise, use IN unless the sub state is a time of day or a season of the year, then use 'y, — unless the sub state can also be given a non-temporal interpretation (usually locative), then: — if the sub state is also the cause of the matrix stevent, then use BIJ,
— if the sub state is incidental to the matrix stevent, then use ONDERT,
— otherwise use TIJDENS.
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— otherwise:
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 47
— if the time of the matrix stevent is not to be made approximately the same as that of the sub stevent, then the order of die matrix and sub stevents needs to be considered. If the matrix stevent is to fall in a period that — is to follow the sub stevent, then: — if the other end of this period is to be the TOD, then: — use SINDS
— use VOOR.
— unless the matrix clause is negative, then EER may be used, or — unless the sub stevent is an event, then VOORDATmay be used, — or, unless the sub stevent is deictic, then use DAARVOOR/VOORDIEN; — is to be sandwiched between two sub stevents, then — if the matrix stevent is to last for the whole of the period between the two parts of tlie sub stevent, then for the first sub stevent, use VAN, and for the second use TOT — otherwise use TUSSEN .. . EN. There is one result that we have not shown in the selection tree, to avoid clutter: — OVER, with a non-definite time duration, is used to indicate a point in time which is located on the time axis at a point given by the TOD plus this duration.
c. Periods versus temporal duration One point in common to both the Enghsh and the Dutch temporal function words is that while most of them can only be used to indicate a point or period on the times axis, a few can also be used to indicate a duration of time. These few are some of the preposirions that are used to indicate that the time of the matrix stevent falls within a time duration (see Table 6): — in English: IN, WITHIN and FOR, — In Dutch: IN, BINNEN and AL.
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— unless the sub stevent is deictic, then use SINDSDIEN — otherwise: — use NA — unless the sub stevent is an event, then use NADAT — or unless the sub stevent is deictic, then use DAARNA/NADIEN; — is to precede the sub stevent, then — if the other end of this period is to be the TOD, then: — use TOT — unless the sub stevent is an event, then TOTDAT may be used; — otherwise:
48 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
The following rule for interpreting their function is: — if the preposition takes a definite noun phrase, e.g. FOR THE SUMMER, then it indicates a time period already bound to the axis; — if the preposition takes an indefinite noun phrase, e.g. FOR FIVE MINUTES, then it introduces a time duration. This duration may or may not be attached to the time axis. If it is attached, then the duration can either: — begin at the TOD, or — end at the TOD, which is indicated by the matrix clause having a perfect aspect.
d. The rulefor Dutch point in time prepositions We have handled the classification of the point of time prepositions differently for English and Dutch. One of the reasons that led to the decision to do this was that AT has many different translations in Dutch. The scheme for Dutch, with points of time (clock time), event-time slices and event-time boxes, is put forward tentatively, pending testing on more substantial data.
e. Some comments on the translations Aside from the word-for-word translations indicated in Figures 3 and 4, there are a few general rules which emerge from the analysis: — a perfect aspect in the sub clause may be combined with the meaning of the temporal conjunction to yield a different translation, e.g.: after they had left -*• toen zij weg waren (when they were away); — introducing a verb into the sub noun phrase will require a conjunction instead of a preposition; — sometimes the matrix and sub clauses are switched, resulting in a completely different conjunction; — there are some occasions on which we have had to conclude that a particular expression was idiomatic, e.g.: atfirst in het begin not in . . . life nooit (never); — sometimes an effect appears to be achieved in an illogical way in either English or Dutch, e.g.: in 5 minutes (from now) over 5 minuten not before niet nadat (not after!).
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Using this meta rule has enabled us to remove a whole branch from the original selection trees.
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 49
5. C O N C L U S I O N What do we learn from this in general? There are a few items that you need to consider in order to represent the meaning of temporal conjunctions:
The collection of thirteen attributes which we have used to classify temporal function words, is far larger than one would expect at first, and contains more examples than, for instance, Bennett (1975) used. However they do not result in 213 different temporal function words! By using a selection tree it is only the more fundamental attributes, e.g. simultaneity versus order, that split the possible function words into two almost equal groups. The majority are used for minor refinements. It is in making these final refinements that we have tended to go out on a limb, out beyond what our data could support. We do this in die hope that others may be able to bring greater amounts of data to bear on these refinements. Our data came from only two translators. It is possible that some of the distinctions that we have made are peculiar to these translators. (We even rejected the consistent translations of one item on the grounds of it most probably being peculiar to that translator.) This may be true once again for some of the refinements, but we believe that the general line of the trees will prove comparable with other translators. It is also possible that our writers or translators made 'mistakes'. This occurred, although infrequently. There are several questions that one might ask now if one were to accept these results as being grosso modo correct. For example: to what extent do people in fact select and interpret temporal function words using this tree? These trees are similar to the Elementary Perceiver and Memorizer (EPAM) theory developed by Feigenbaum and Simon (1964). So there are a priori grounds for
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— states versus events, — time periods versus time durations, — time points versus time periods, — simultaneity versus order, — order of the matrix and sub stevents, — using the TOD to mark an end of a period or not, — moving the TOD or not, — if a duration, then whether or not it is attached to the time axis at the TOD, and if so whether at the beginning or the end, — whether the sub and matrix stevents are just temporally related or whether they also have a causal connection, — whether the sub stevent needs a clause or preposition, — whether the sub stevent can be pointed too (deictic).
50 Translating Temporal Prepositions between Dutch and English
supposing that such a structure could develop in the minds of Dutch and English people. Stronger evidence could come from language development studies. The most intriguing question is whether the attributes that we have used are universal of the mind, or peculiar to the Dutch and English cultures. Rotterdam School ofManagement Erasmus University POB1738 NL 3000 DR Rotterdam The Netherlands
Empirischen Sprachwissenschaft (KdBES), 2, Bennett, D. C. (1975), Spatial and Temporal Uses of English Prepositions, London, 33Longman. Heinamaki, O. (1978), 'Semantics of English Bowerman, M. (in press), 'Learning a setemporal conjunctions', reproduced by mantic system: what role do cognitive Indiana University Linguistics Club. predispositions play?', in M. Rice & R. L. McEwan, Ian (1975), De laatste dag van de zomer, Translation of McEwan (1976) by Schiefelbusch (eds.), The Teachability of Heleen ten Holt, Amsterdam, De HarLanguage, Baltimore, Brookes. monie. Bree, D. S. (1985), 'The durative temporal subordinating conjunctions: SINCE and McEwan, Ian (1976), First Love, Last Rites, Picador edition, London, Pan. UNTIL', Journal ofSemantics, 4, 1-46. Bree, D. S. & Smit, R. A., 'Temporal relations', Miller, G. A. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1976), Language and Perception, Cambridge, Journal ofSemantics, 5, 345-83. Cambridge University Press. Bree, D. S., Smit, R. A. & Schotel, H. P. (1984), Rohrer, C. (1977), 'How to define temporal 'Generation and comprehension of Dutch conjunctions', Linguistiche Berichten, 51, subordinating conjunctions by computer', 1—11. in T. O'Shea (ed.), Proceedings of the 6th Quirk, R., Greenbaum, S., Leech, G. & European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Svartvik.J. (1985), A Comprehensive CramAmsterdam, Elsevier, 205-8. mar of the English Language, London, Donaldson, B. C. (1984), Dutch Reference Longman. Grammar, Leiden, Nijhoff. Feigenbaum, E. A. & Simon, H. A. (1964), 'An Wolkers.Jan (1969), Turks Fruit, Amsterdam, Meulenhoff. information-processing theory of some effects of similarity, familiarization, and Wolkers.Jan (1974), Turkish Delight, Translation of Wolkers (1969) by Greta Kilburn, meaningfulness in verbal learning', Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 3, New York, Dell. 385-96. Geerts, G., Haeseryn, W., de Rooij.J. & van NOTES den Toom, M. C. (1984), Algemene Nederlanise Spraakkunst, Groningen, Wolters1 Some parts of this paper were originally Noordhoff. presented as The essence of timing at the Herweg, M. (1987), 'Zur Semantik temporInternational Workshop on Discourse aler Konjunktionen', Kolner Berichte zur
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REFERENCES
Bree, Smit and van Werkhoven 51 Processing and the Representation of Coherence, held at the University of Brabant, Tilburg; September 1988. Our thanks to Wendie Shaffer for her painstaking editing of this paper. 2 In the Figures this branch was abusively labelled 'achievement'. Here we follow the terminology for situation types given by Quirk etal. (1985: 201). 3 It is a common mistake of native English • speakers of Dutch to use IN instead of OVER, e.g. the correct translation of IN 5 MINUTES is OVER 5 MINUTEN.
AS is translated by ONDER. She sang as she scrubbed onder't schrobben.
5
6
7
8
—• Zij song
We have ignored this construction for the moment. In this first look at the data we ignore infrequent translations (i.e. less than 5 occurrences) and translations by nonprepositional constructions. These will be taken up below. There is one data point that appears not to be accounted for by this conclusion: AS is hardly ever translated by ALS or WANNEER. TOEN is also used as a conjunct in the sense of THEN, and is usually so translated (23) or dropped (9). This meaning is not included in these data. The one time that BY was not translated was in the expression BY THIS TIME which was (mis)translated as DEZE KEES—this
time. 9 Note that this is a one-way rule from English to Dutch. It is clear that it could be symmetric, but our Dutch to English translator did not use this construction. A larger sample would be required to enable a rule to be developed for choosing between WHEN and AT/BY THE TIME, as
translations of TOES.
18 The one case of FOR THE EVENING -» 's
AVONDS fails to capture the idea of purpose, i.e. an evening out. 19 Only one occurrence was found in the sample text.
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4. The English-Dutch van Dale dictionary also gives an example in which temporal
10 This image is due to Claire Bree. 11 The only two exceptions were: (170.01) . .. ikop kerstochtend een verassing voorhaarhad. (136.26) . . . I had a surprise for her for Christmas day. in which ON could have been used, but FOR indicates purpose; and (111.20) Maar een keer, op zo'n benauwde augustusdagdat. .. (88.04) One time—it was the kind of sultry August day when. . . where the OP phrase is made into a matrix clause using IT WAS. 12 Quirk et al. (1985, pp. 688-9) provide little help: 'In or, less commonly, during is used for periods longer or shorter than a day.' 'During the summer could be used . . . with the same meaning as in, although during usually suggests duration.' 13 One ofthese is 59.11, in which IN is used to indicate a point in time at the end of a period which starts at the TOD, rather than the period itself. 14 This use of IN should be classified under point rather than period of time. The use of IN in English seems somewhat illogical in this respect. 15 With one exception which has a complex temporal prepositional phrase: . . . even at this time in the summer —• zelfs in deze tijd, in dezomer. 16 While usual (7/10), this translation is NOT required. Also found are: in the beginning, during thefirst part of. 17 An overgrootvader is a great-grandfather, not a grandfather!
Jeumal ofSemantics 7:53-63
© N.I.S. Foundation (1900)
Modal Meaning: The Semantic-Pragmatic Interface JENNIFER COATES Roehampton Institute 1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
2. MODAL MEANING I shall focus on modal meaning, using examples drawn from a corpus of spontaneous conversation between equals. Traditional accounts of modality
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The spontaneous talk produced by real people in natural situations is an enormous challenge to any theory of meaning. It is at the same time more complex (in terms of the multiple conversational implicatures potentially borne by a single statement) and more simple (in terms, for example, of syntax and the use of ellipsis) than the examples that regularly appear in textbooks. In order to say what such talk 'means', we need to draw on both semantic and pragmatic theories of meaning. In this paper, I shall take the position that semantics is concerned with sentence-meaning, and that pragmatics is concerned with utterancemeaning (see Leech 1983; Levinson 1983). A sentence is an abstract category defined within a theory of grammar; an utterance is a chunk of real live talk (which may or may not be a syntactic sentence). A semantic analysis of the sentence it's cold in here would be concerned with its 'literal' or 'referential' meaning—in other words, the sentence would be taken as expressing the speaker's assessment of the temperature at the moment of speaking in the location where the sentence was uttered. As such, the sentence can be labelled as true or false, depending on the actual state of the weather at that time and in that place. It is pragmatics, however, which enables us to explain why the use of this sentence as an utterance in a particular context can result in the addressee switching on the gas fire. A further characteristic of sentence-based theories of meaning is their orientation to an isolated speaker. In fact, most branches of linguistics have until recently focused on speakers in isolation, and have treated discourse as a sollipsistic product. But talk by its very nature normally requires more than one speaker. The dyadic nature of spoken interaction needs to be emphasized: meanings are created jointly by speaker and hearer. Talk is dialogue, not a sequence of monologues.
54 Modal Meaning: the Semantic-Pragmatic Interface
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rely heavily on sentence-based models of meaning (e.g. Hermeren 1978; Palmer 1979; Coates" 1983; Perkins 1983). Such accounts concentrate on the referential meaning or truth value of isolated propositions. They have serious limitations when applied to an interpretation of utterances. Moreover, they are unhelpful to the student of everyday talk in at least two further ways:first,the terms and categories traditionally used (e.g. aletheutic, epistemic, deontic) are opaque and intimidating; secondly, modal logical emphasizes objective modality at the expense of subjective modality. I shall give an account of modal meaning and then consider each of these drawbacks in turn. Modality has to do with notions such as possibility, necessity, ability, volition, obligation. It can be explained in terms of our ability to conceptualise parallel worlds: in so far as humans can imagine things being otherwise, they express this awareness using forms whose essence is that they qualify the categorical. Many languages rely on the mood of the verb to express modal meaning, that is, on contrasts between indicative, subjunctive, imperative, etc. In English, the chief exponents of modality are the modal auxiliaries: can, could, will, would, shall, should, may, might, must, ought, need, dare, and other lexical items to do with possibility, necessity, volition, etc., such as perhaps, possible, allow, able, willing. While most of the terms used in traditional modal logic are irrelevant to the description of natural spoken discourse, two terms—epistemic and deontic—refer to categories which are salient to such a discussion. Epistemic meaning is expressed by those linguistic forms which indicate the speaker's confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed in the utterance. In the example Perhaps she missed the train, the use of the word perhaps indicates lack of confidence in the proposition 'she missed the train'. Lexical items such as perhaps, may, must, possible, I think, as well as certain prosodic and paralinguistic features, are used in English to express epistemic modality. Deontic meaning is expressed by those forms which indicate obligation and permission. If someone says You must fill in thisform, the use of the auxiliary must indicates to the addressee that filling in the form is obligatory. In English, forms like must, should, may, can,permission, obliged, express deontic modality. This distinction is useful because it allows us to talk sensibly about the ambiguity of expressions like she may come tomorrow. Where may expresses the speaker's lack of confidence in the truth of the proposition (epistemic modality), we can interpret the example above as meaning roughly 'I think it's possible that she will come tomorrow'. Where may expresses permission (deontic modality), the meaning is something like 'she is allowed to come tomorrow'. May is not untypical of the English modal auxiliaries: their polysemy is presumably one of the reasons that they have been so widely studied. However, the semantic range of the modals should not blind us to their
Coates 55
consistency, all modal forms in some way or another qualify what is said. Furthermore, in everyday spoken usage, modality is essentially linked with what has been called 'the subjectivity of utterance' (Lyons 1981: 220). Traditional accounts of modality describe modal meaning in logical terms which focus on objective meaning. For example, in an earlier work (Coates 198 3:20), I demonstrated the inter-relationship of necessity and possibility with the following examples: (a) (b) (c) (d)
Paul must be in Liverpool Paul can't he in Liverpool Paul may be in Liverpool Paul may not be in Liverpool
nee p (~poss~p) nec~p (~poss p) poss p (~nec~p) poss~ p(~nec p)
3. THE S E M A N T I C - P R A G M A T I C INTERFACE In the previous section, I gave a brief account of modal meaning and pointed to some of the limitations of the traditional approach. This approach was essentially tied to sentence-meaning, and thus its limitations only become apparent when it is applied to utterances. Pragmatic accounts of modal meaning are rare (but see Stubbs 1987). Work that has appeared in this field
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These examples are typical of textbook discussions of modality: they demonstrate sentence-meaning, not utterance-meaning. Example (a) above (Paul must be in Liverpool) is glossed as 'nee p', that is 'it is necessarily the case that Paul is in Liverpool'. When we talk, we hardly ever express objective meaning of this kind. Speakers very rarely assert facts about the external world as if they were disconnected from them. Speakers are not neutral observers: they are participants in the world, and when they speak, they express attitudes to what is under discussion. As Stubbs puts it 'Whenever speakers (or writers) say anything, they encode their point of view towards it' (Stubbs 1987: 1). Epistemic modal forms in particular are used to express speakers' attitudes. If I say Paul must be in Liverpool, I communicate to the addressee my confidence in the truth of the proposition; the meaning is roughly 'I'm sure/I confidently assume that Paul is in Liverpool'. Similarly, if I say she may come tomorrow (our earlier example), I communicate to the addressee my lack of confidence in the proposition 'she will come tomorrow'. These two examples illustrate subjective meaning, meaning which is speaker-based rather than reference-based. Subjectivity and modality are closely linked in speech. In relaxed conversation, one of the things speakers are doing is expressing themselves. Selfexpression, or subjectivity, is encoded by speakers in many ways—lexically, prosodically and paralinguistically—but modal forms appear to be the chief lexical exponents of subjectivity.
56 Modal Meaning: the Semantic-Pragmatic Interface
deals with individual forms rather than with modality in general (e.g. Holmes 1984; Coates 1987), or has commented on modal meaning tangentially (e.g. Brown & Levinson 1987). In this section, I want to illustrate the way modality is used by speakers in spontaneous conversation. I hope to show that the utterances of real speakers in real situations can only be fully explicated if we move beyond the semantic. The following examples are all taken from a conversation between friends, recorded surreptitiously by me in July 1984 as one of a series of recordings of this pre-existing friendship group. All participants were informed subsequently that recordings had been made, and they agreed to this material being used for research purposes.1 Thefirstexample to be examined involves the quasi-modal (1) in order to accept that idea, you're having to completely review your view of your husband Have to is a useful resource for speakers who want to express obligation but at the same time want to make clear that they themselves are not the authoritative source of this obligation. The example discussed earlier, you mustfill in thisform, expresses not just obligation but also the involvement of the speaker (subjectivity). The difference between must and have to inheres crucially in the involvement or non-involvement of the speaker: You must fill in this form You have to fill in this form In the first sentence, the speaker directly imposes an obligation on the addressee, while in the second, the speaker informs the addressee of an obligation but distances him/herself from the authority source. So example (1) above means 'external circumstances oblige you to completely review your view of your husband'; the syntactic subject is the semantic object. We also need to comment on the aspect of the verb. True modal auxiliaries are invariable in form, but the quasi-modals behave like other verbs, modifying their form to express tense and aspect distinctions. Having to denotes progressive aspect and expresses the notion that the process of completely reviewing your view of your husband takes place over an extended period of time, rather than at one fell swoop. Let's look now at a fuller version of example (1): (ia) [Discussion of child abuse] C:I mean in order to accept that# you're having to = D: = yes = C: r completely change your 2 D: = yes# E: = completely review your view of L your husband =
I
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have to.
Coates 57
C:view of your husband = D: E: = that's rightf
(2) [you're having to completely change your view of your husband]
and to have him become a person who can do . the undoable# The modal auxiliary can expresses Possibility as its unmarked meaning; the meanings of Permission and Ability are linked to Possibility through gradients of restriction and inherency respectively (see Lyons 1977: 828 ff; Leech & Coates 1980; Coates 1983: 88 ff). The distinctions involved are shown in the following triad: lean do it — Permission — human authority/rules and regulations allow me to do it
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This utterance is produced by two speakers, C and E, with the active support of a third. E completes C's initial statement, C restates E's completion with slighdy amended wording, and E acknowledges C's version. Such joint production of text does not occur by chance; conversation between friends frequendy involves completion of others' turns and thus overlapping speech, and such overlaps (as in line 2 of example (la)) cannot appropriately be called 'interruptions'. In public domains where the norm is that one speaker speaks at a time, and where the goal of participants is to grab speakership, then interruption is a strategy for gaining the floor. In private conversation between equals, on the other hand, where the chief goal of interaction is the maintenance of good social relationships, then the participation of more than one speaker at any one time is iconic of joint activity: the goal is not to take the floor from another speaker, but to participate in conversation with other speakers. (For further discussion of this point, see Coates (1989).) In example (ia), speakers C and E work together to express the meaning that for a woman to consider that her husband might be abusing their child, she would be obliged to change the way she saw her husband. The speakers exploit the subtleties of the English modal system, using have to rather than must to indicate that external circumstances are the source of the obligation; they mark the modal form aspectually to add the meaning of continuous time; but most importantly their jointly produced utterance marks their commitment to working together to produce shared meanings. In other words, an account of this fragment of conversation can only be achieved by analysing not just what the speakers say, but also by analysing how they say it and what they are trying to do by saying it in this way. Speakers' sensitivity to the totality of discourse is also illustrated in the following two examples. The first of these follows straight on from example (:a):
58 Modal Meaning: the Semantic-Pragmatic Interface
I can do it — Possibility = external circumstances allow me to do it I can do it = Ability = inherent properties allow me to do it In example (2), the speaker is drawing on the ability meaning of can, and her utterance can be glossed as 'a person capable of doing the undoable'. But we can't look at can in isolation here. The speaker skilfully creates an utterance where the semantic components able and do are combined in a complex whole: [subject] + able + do + negative + do + able
(3) but it's basically saying you must watch your child twenty-four hours a day# you shouldn't go to bingo # you shouldn't have a job# you shouldn't wash up in the kitchen when he's putting the kids to bed# (...) and so you must watch your child all the time#
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The suffix -able in the word undoable is modally harmonic with the auxiliary can. (Lyons (1977: 807) introduces the term 'modally harmonic' to describe those combinations of modal auxiliary plus another modal form where both forms express the same degree of modality.) Ochs (1979), in her analysis of the features of unplanned discourse, describes such phenomena as 'lexical touchoffs': she argues that when speakers have not previously organised their discourse, the use of one lexical item may trigger another lexical item having a complementary or opposite meaning. In this example, can and able are clearly complementary. In example (3) below (which is again taken from the discussion of child abuse), we have another example of complementary lexical touch-offs, with must and should being used in sequence.
In this example, the speaker retains the same syntactic structure over several clauses, i.e. you + modal auxiliary + lexical verb + x (where x represents a variety of forms). This is again a normal feature of unplanned discourse. In this case, the repetitive patterns occurring simultaneously at lexical, semantic and syntactic levels serve to emphasise the speaker's sense of outrage at the point of view being discussed. The speaker here chooses should not rather than must not in the clauses where she expresses negative obligation. This is a good example of everyday usage confounding semantic theory. Pragmatically, there is little doubt that the speaker gets her meaning across: she presents a list of actions which have got to be done or which have got to be avoided. In terms of constructing discourse, she varies lexical exponents (must/should) while holding other aspects of formal structure constant, at the same rime establishing the pattern that should is used
Coates 59
in negative clauses, must in non-negative clauses. It is certainly not the case here that should is used to express a less strong sense of obligation. I want to move on now to some examples which illustrate the way modality is used by speakers to encode their point of view towards what is being talked about. The following two examples illustrate the way speakers can express confidence or doubt. (4) I'm absolutely sure they'll c o m e # (5) I mean it's just that someone's meant to be here aren't they#
(4a) I A: I'm absolutely sure they'll come but I mean fin fact |E: Lyeah I A: it won't make any odds but I think I . would be IE: A: . [ha] hurt and angry if they hadn't E: it'll be nicer for you (if they didn't) The epistemic modal forms I mean and I think in the latter part of this utterance reveal speaker A as more doubtful; she moves from saying I'm sure they'll come to
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In example (4), the epistemic modal form I'm sure, strengthened by the intensifier absolutely, conveys the speaker's confidence in the truth of the proposition they will come. In example (5), the epistemic modal forms / mean, just, and the tag question aren't they? all mitigate the force of the proposition someone's meant to be here and thus convey the speaker's doubt. An analysis of these two utterances in terms of the speaker's encoding of confidence or doubt doesn't go far enough. By looking at the function of such utterances in the larger context, we can see that their composition reflects other needs of speakers. Example (4) is uttered by speaker A during a long discussion about whether it is taboo to miss your mother's funeral. Speakers B and C have both recounted anecdotes which hinge on not attending a parent's funeral. At this point, A asserts that although her brothers and sister will have to travel a long way, she is confident that when the time comes they will all make the journey to her mother's funeral. We should bear in mind that whatever the force of the modal forms selected, their use essentially qualifies the proposition. In other words, A's use of I'm absolutely sure is a qualification; only naked assertions imply total commitment to the truth of the proposition. In the hght of our knowledge of the real world, we can assume that A is in fact anxious about the attendance or non-attendance of her brothers and sister at her mother's funeral; she uses the form I'm sure in an attempt to convince herself and the others present that she won't be alone at that sad moment in the future. This interpretation is supported by her subsequent comments (I quote the passage in full):
6o Modal Meaning: the Semantic-Pragmatic Interface
it doesn't matter if they come or not to /'// be hurt if they don't come. When talking
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about their own feelings, speakers' points of view can fluctuate like this, and speakers draw on modal forms to express these shifting points of view. Notice how speaker E tries to help A as she works towards self-expression. As I said earlier, such overlapping speech does not constitute interruption; speaker E's utterances are essentially supportive and are not a bid for the floor. Example ($) is taken from the section of the conversation where speaker D is describing her arrangements for moving house. She is beginning to realise that her friends are unhappy about these, largely because they involve her in accepting the help of her ex-husband. An interpretation of (5) needs to take this context into account. The speaker is not just expressing doubt in the truth of the proposition someone's meant to be here. (The phrase is meant to is itself modal and could be paraphrased by ought or should; it expresses the meaning 'it is advisable'.) Because of her growing awareness of her friends' uneasiness, D here openly seeks their support through her use of the tag question aren't they? What she says, roughly, is: 'I'm not sure if someone should be here; what do you think?'. The speaker is avoiding taking up a strong position, and this can be seen as a face-saving strategy. She uses modal forms both to indicate her own point of view (her doubt), and to mark her tentativeness in relation to her addressees, since she anticipates their disagreement over some aspects of her arrangements. I will take up the issue of face and the idea of addressee-orientation with my final two examples. Any discussion of utterance-meaning needs to bear in mind that speakers do not talk in isolation—conversational speech always involves at least two participants. As example (1) illustrated, in a very concrete sense talk is often JOINTLY produced by speakers. But in the following examples I want to show how, even when co-participants are silent, their presence influences discourse. In other words, speakers modify what they say in the light of who they are talking to. This is, of course, a common sense comment, but the notion of addressee-oriented meaning is still relatively new in discourse studies. Bell (1984) calls the phenomenon of addressee-orientation 'Audience Design'. He is concerned with sociolinguistic variation, more specifically with what sociolinguists call stylistic variation in phonology and syntax. Stylistic variation refers to intra-speaker fluctuations in usage: speakers control a range of styles, and are able to use different styles in different contexts as appropriate. Bell argues that such intra-speaker variation is in large part governed by the audience to whom the utterance is addressed. The concept of audience design seems to be useful not just in explaining certain aspects of sociolinguistic variation, but also in accounting for speakers' use of modality. We've already seen, in examples (2) and (3), that modal forms often co-occur harmonically. Such patterning may be a function of speakers' spontaneous construction of discourse; but patterns such as these also facilitate
Coates 61
addressee comprehension. The following two examples illustrate another aspect of audience design: speakers' sensitivity to the needs of addressees. This phenomenon is clearly also explicable in terms of Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness (Brown & Levinson 1987). They argue that many conversational strategies can be explained in terms of the face needs of speaker and addressee. Face needs comprise the need not to be imposed on (negative face) and the need to be approved of (positive face). In the first of my examples, speaker D has been describing her arrangements for moving house, which involve accepting the help of her ex-husband Peter. (6) A: can you [ks] I mean can you bear it that Peter actually moving?
(7) well isn't there a theory that that it, I mean I think it was your theory wasn't it that that it runs in families In example (7), the speaker hedges her attribution of the theory she mentions in case the addressee does not want to accept responsibility for it. This is a very clear case of negative politeness. Linguistically, the strategy is realised through the use of the epistemic modal forms / mean and I think and the tag question wasn't it? Speaker E's hedging here serves another function: she is talking to four addressees, not just the one who (possibly) introduced the theory referred to, and all four may have something to add to the discussion of child abuse. In friendly discussion of this kind, it is very important not to take up a hard and fast position; speakers design their contributions to maximise the possibility of
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It is clear from subsequent discussion that D's friends think she is unwise to rely on her (notoriously unreliable) ex-husband. But it would be inappropriate for anyone to baldly state this. Instead, speaker A questions D's feelings. The inference of can you bear it here is it's unbearable. Not surprisingly, A is tentative about making such an emotionally dangerous utterance; she feels as a friend that she must comment on D's potentially unwise arrangements, but she is aware that she must tread carefully. D is vulnerable both because she is being criticised at a practical level, but more importantly because the subject of her relationship with her ex-husband is very sensitive. A chooses the modal form can, focusing on POSSIBILITY and the existence of alternative worlds, and also on ABILITY, that is, D's own strengths and weaknesses. Can you bear it simultaneously conveys the meaning is it possiblefor anyone to bear it and the meaning are you able to bear it. The epistemic modal forms I mean and actually mitigate the force of A's question, thus protecting D's face. Example (6) is thus a good example of a negative politeness strategy. The speaker's stumbling delivery is further evidence of her sensitivity to the topic and to the addressee's face-needs. Example (7), which comes from the discussion of child abuse, illustrates another aspect of negative politeness.
62 Modal Meaning: the Semantic-Pragmatic Interface
other, possibly divergent, opinions emerging. Since the chief goal of friendly interaction is the maintenance of good social relations rather than the exchange of information, speakers aim at consensus. They express a tentative point of view to enable them to modify it later, if necessary, in the light of subsequent discussion. This protects their own face, as well as being sensitive to the need not to come into conflict with addressees. In example (7) then, the speaker designs her utterance to meet the needs both of her immediate audience (the you of your theory) and of the wider audience of her other three friends. The modal forms used play an important role in meeting her need to design her utterance for specific addressees.
I have no rabbits to produce out of hats to explain why utterances mean what they mean and how speakers understand each other. On the contrary, one of my aims in writing this paper has been to challenge the complacency of tidy explanations. Tidy explanations survive as long as all that has to be explained is the meaning of sentences invented by armchair linguists. As soon as we shift our attention to the utterances of real speakers engaged in natural conversation, we are forced to acknowledge the limitations of neat semantic models of meaning. In this paper I have discussed briefly both semantic and pragmatic approaches to meaning, and have intimated the significance of insights gained from interactional sociolinguistics. I have analysed in some detail seven examples of modal meaning, all taken from one spontaneous conversation between friends. Drawing on these examples, I have tried to demonstrate the range of meanings deployed by speakers, and the many complex functions which discourse serves. Speakers are sensitive to their own face needs and to the face needs of others; they are also constrained by the need to construct coherent text. Participating in conversational interaction involves the speaker both in acts of identity, in so far as talk is self-expression, and in acts of solidarity in so far as friendly talk is a demonstration of friendship and connection. The task for linguists is to develop ways of describing natural spoken discourse which capture the multi-faceted nature of human talk Most existing models are partial, capturing some facets and ignoring others. There is a dangerous tendency for such models to become straitjackets—if we fail to recognise that they only partially explain the evidence, then application of such models distorts reality. The drive to generalise can tempt us to deal only with material which lends itself to tidy generalisations. Naturally occurring spoken discourse is not tidy and has been largely ignored by linguists. But it is only
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4. SPOKEN DISCOURSE AND MEANING
Coates 63
through accepting the challenge of such complex data that we will arrive at" truly explanatory models of meaning. Roehampton Institute 24 April 1988
•»
REFERENCES Lyons, J. (1977), Semantics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Lyons, J. (1981), Language, Meaning and Context , London, Fontana. Ochs, E. (1979), 'Planned and unplanned discourse', in T. Givon (ed.), Discourse and Syntax, New York, Academic Press. Palmer, F. (1979), Modality and the English Modals, London, Longman. Perkins, M. (1983), Modal Expressions in English, London, Frances Pinter. Stubbs, M. (1987), '"A matter of prolonged fieldwork": notes towards a modal grammar of English', Applied Linguistics, 17, 1-2.5-
NOTE I would like to place on record my gratitude to this group of friends for allowing me to use this material for my research.
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Brown, P. & S. Levinson (1987), Politeness, Some Universals in Language Usage, C a m bridge, Cambridge University Press. Coates, J. (1983), The Semantics of the Modal Auxiliaries, London, Croom Helm. Coates, J. (1987), 'Epistemic modality and spoken discourse', Transactions of the Philological Society, 110-31. Coates, J. (1989), 'Gossip revisited: language in all-female groups', in J. Coates & D. Cameron, Women in their Speech Communities, London, Longman. Hermeren, L. (1978), On Modality in English, Lund, C. W. K. Gleerup. Holmes, J. (1984), 'Hedging your bets and sitting on the fence: some evidence for hedges as support structures', Te Reo, 27, 47-62. Leech, G. (1983), Principles of Pragmatics, London, Longman. Leech, G. & J. Coates (1980), 'Semantic indeterminacy and the modals', in S. Greenbaum el al. (eds.), Studies in English Linguistics, London, Longman. Levinson, S. (1983), Pragmatics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
© N I -S- Foundation (1990)
Journal ofSemantics 7: 65-79
Using Constraints and Reference in Task-oriented Dialogue1 PETER WRIGHT 2 Dept. ofLanguage and Linguistics, University ofEssex
Abstract
1. INTRODUCTION l.l
Traditional views on referential skills
This paper is concerned with characterising some important aspects of referential skills in a simple task-oriented dialogue. The task in question is the 'map task' described by Brown (1986, 1987). In this task two people co-operate to complete a 'treasure island map'. In a typical version of the task, one person (A) has a map with landmarks and a footpath drawn on it. His partner (B) has a similar map but some of the landmarks are missing and so is the footpath. In addition, B may have some landmarks that are missing off A's map. The aim of the task is for A to describe his map in such a way as to facilitate B's correct updating of his map. This A does by describing verbally the route taken by his footpath and any landmarks drawn on his map. B uses this information to draw the footpath and missing landmarks on his own map. This fairly naturalistic task contrasts markedly with more traditional tasks for studying referential skills. Much of this work is done with young children, and the typical paradigm is one in which the child is asked to pick out some object, from an array of similar objects, by the use of a sufficiently elaborate noun phrase. For example, a child might be given a set of drawings of men which differ in terms of certain key attributes (e.g. +/— tall, +/— fair-haired, +/— smiling etc.). In a simple version of the task the array of drawings is such
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This paper presents an analysis of linguistic data that stems from a task-oriented dialogue. We demonstrate that certain referring expressions used in this setting are potentially ambiguous and indeterminate but do not lead to referential errors such as under- or over-population of the discourse representation. Three studies are reported which show that it is the skilled use of non-linguistic constraints, present in the task which facilitates successful reference. When these non-linguistic constraints are removed, skilled speakers are able to make a compensatory adjustment in the precision of their referring expressions. The ability of people to make this compensatory adjustment is an aspect of referential skill not revealed by more traditional taskoriented assessments.
66 Using Constraints and Reference in Task-Oriented Dialogue
that the child can uniquely identify a target referent using a simple expression such as: the tall man
As the task becomes more complex the child is required to use a more complex expression such as: the tallfair-haired smiling man
*
1.2 More recent approaches to reference The success of a communicative act does not depend solely on the information that can be gathered from the spoken message alone. Recent work on demonstrative reference (Clark et al. 1983) has shown that non-linguistic aspects of the situation of utterance provide important clues for the listener as to the likely interpretation of demonstrative expressions. Unlike the objects in the experiments described above, the objects referred to in a normal discourse situation do not constitute an uncontoured landscape in which any object is as likely to be referred to as any other. Some objects are more prominent than others and are more likely to be referred to than others. If I am in a crowded room and I say: that's the Vice Chancellor
my interlocutor is not going to consider every person in the room as a possible referent. On the contrary he will assume I am referring to the person who is most salient, perhaps because that person is standing at the podium or perhaps because he has just walked into the room. Thus it seems that achieving reference, at least on the part of the listener, involves manipulating and comparing information from several different sources each of which help to constrain the possible interpretations of referring expressions. In a situation of utterance that is informationally rich, speakers will only proffer a minimal amount of linguistically encoded information, maybe only a pronominal term, because they rely on their interlocutor to exploit other sources of information. The traditional paradigm offers no insight into this aspect of referential skill.
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in order to uniquely refer (see e.g. Dickson 1981). In this paper we argue that the use of such paradigms has led to a quite erroneous view of the nature of referential skills. In particular, it encourages the view that the problem of successful reference is one of tailoring linguistic expressions to provide the listener with a fully determinate and totally unambiguous guide to the intended referent. In everyday communication this is not a necessary condition for the successful use of referring expressions.
Wright 67
The skill we are discussing here is the ability of a listener to use interactively several different sources of information in order to facilitate successful communication. The question that arises in the case of co-operative dialogue is whedier or not die speaker modifies his choice of referring expression to reflect the richness of information available to his interlocutor from odier sources. Marslen-Wilson et al. (1982) sum up this question very well: If the interactive properties of the listener's comprehension system allow for a compensatory balancing berween different sources of information-relative here, to the perceptual goal of determining the intended referent—then does the speaker regularly exploit this? That is does he systematically adjust the referential devices he is using to the informational conditions in which they occur?
In the map task described above, a substantial proportion of people's referring expressions are taken up with making reference to landmarks on die map. These items may or may not be present on the odier person's map and furthermore there may be several items on the other person's map diat could fit the description. For example, speaker A may have a windmill on his map to which he may refer with a simple referring expression such as, the windmill
but B may not have a windmill on his map, or he may have a windmill drawn in a different place. He may even have more than one windmill drawn on his map. Such mismatches of information between the two maps lead to two specific forms of referential failure which we refer to as UNDER- and OVERpopulation. These are defined below. Consider two discourse participants A and B. We say diat B's discourse representation becomes UNDER-POPULATED when some referring expression used by A, and intended to refer to some object which is not represented by B, is taken by B to refer to some object which is already represented by him. Conversely, we say that B's discourse representation becomes OVERPOPULATED when some referring expression used by A, and intended to refer to some object which B has represented, is taken by B to refer to some object which he does not have represented. Under- and over-population result from referential failure on die part of the interlocutors and an analysis of their occurrence in dialogue can provide insights into referential skills. In tie context of the map task, the occurrence of such failures is very easily observed through the participants' actions of adding items to their maps, searching their maps, or through their speech as diey ask for clarification of die intended referent.
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1.3 Under- and over-population in the map task
68 Using Constraints and Reference in Task-Oriented Dialogue
Under- and over-population can be avoided in the map task if the speaker is careful to furnish his partner with a precise description of the whereabouts of an intended referent, for example by saying: there is a house two centimetres above the wood or ifyou go up four centimetres from where you are now there is a large house with four windows.
right you go straight up to the house
This occurs when A is fully aware that the house in question may not even be drawn in B's map or when A himself has more than one type-identical house on his own map. Yet such imprecision in A's referring expression seldom result in under- or over-population. Consider the following taken from our corpus: A and B are in the middle of completing a map. A has two windmills drawn on his map. B began the task with neither windmill, but they have already successfully fixed the location of the first windmill for B. A now approaches the second windmill. He does not know whether B has this second windmill but he does know that B has the first windmill because of their previous discussion. A's first reference to the second windmill is: and then you go to the windmill.
In theory such a referring expression could lead to an under-population of B's discourse representation because he may take A to be referring to the first windmill; indeed on some accounts of definite and indefinite reference this is what B ought to do given A's use of a definite noun phrase. Nevertheless B correctly assumes A to be referring to a second windmill which B does not have drawn on his map. There are several explanations as to how under-population is avoided in this situation but the most appealing is this: Although A does not know whether B has the second windmill, by studying his own map he can see that the first windmill is over the other side of the map, separated from B's current position by several other items. Thus A has good grounds for supposing that even if B does not have the second windmill B is unlikely to assume that he (A) is referring to the first windmill because it is not located on the area of map currently under scrutiny. In short, A is assuming that B is able to use characteristics of the situation of utterance as constraints on underpopulation.
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However this kind of precision is not characteristic for the map task data we have collected from our population (see study reported below for details). Typically speaker A will mention an item for the first time using definite noun phrases and without regard to first locating the item for B. So for example A may, on first mention of a house which he has on his map, refer to it by saying:
Wright 69
This explanation is of interest because it not only presupposes a notion of FOCUS (Grosz 1981, Sanford and Garrod 1981, Sidner 1983) which limits B's search for likely referents, but also it suggests that A ACTIVELY DEPLOYS knowledge of focus constraints in his choice of referring expression. If this explanation is correct, it suggests that if the two windmills had been closer together on the map, A would have had to be more specific with his description. Our view of referential skills then suggests that skilled speakers take account of constraints available to their interlocutor in their choice of referring expression. This issue is investigated in an empirical study which uses three versions of the map task in order to manipulate the information available to A and B from the situation of utterance.
The study reported here comprises three map-task conditions designed to assess two questions. Firstly, we wished to ascertain whether the high incidence of indeterminate referring expressions in the dialogues are a reflection of the strategic response of speakers to an informationally rich situation of utterance. Secondly, we wished to ascertain the extent to which interlocutors are able to make a 'compensatory balancing between different sources of information' as suggested by Marslen-Wilson et al. (op. cit.). Each of the three pairs of maps in this study contained the same number of landmarks including four type-identical pairs of items, but the maps differed according to the presence or absence of certain informational constraints.
2.1 Subjects and procedures The 32 subjects examined here (16 male and 16 female) were 4th formers (14-15 year olds) from a local comprehensive school. Subjects formed 16 pairs. The members of each pair were the same sex and were friends from the same class. The 16 pairs were chosen to cover a range of academic abilities. Each of the pairs solved a map task under each of the three conditions described below. The time taken to complete the three maps was about 30 minutes. During this time the two subjects faced each other but the use of angled drawing boards prevented them from seeing each other's maps. They were however allowed to compare maps after completing each map. Everything that the subjects said during the session was recorded using a 'UHER' 4000 reporter monitor and transcribed for analysis at a later date.
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2. THE STUDY
70 Using Constraints and Reference in Task-Oriented Dialogue
2.2 Condition 1: exploiting information about the sharedness of items
2.2.1 Analysis In order to assess this question, we examined FIRST MENTION noun phrases. These are the noun phrases that a speaker uses when an item is being referred to for the very first time in a dialogue (i.e. it has not been mentioned previously by either interlocutor). Clearly it is this first mention that is crucial because once an item has been mentioned then the colour coding system is not die only source of information about sharedness. The use by a speaker of a definite referring expression such as: the windmill
has often been taken to indicate that the speaker is treating the referent as a shared item of information. In contrast if an indefinite expression such as: a windmill
is used this has been taken to indicate that the speaker is treating it as unshared (cf. Brown and Yule 1983 for a critique). There is evidence in our previous work
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In this condition there were some items that were common to both A and B maps, but the A map had some extra items drawn on it that were not present on the B map and the B map had some items that were not present on the A map. The items drawn on the maps were clustered together and there were relatively large distances between these clusters of items. The footpath drawn on A's map visited at least one of the items in each of these clusters. In addition, in this condition only, the maps included a colour coding system. All items on both maps were coloured either red or black. Anything drawn in red was present on both maps, anything drawn in black was present only on one map. Each subject had this colour coding carefully explained and was shown how he could use it to work out whether an item he could see on his own map was present on his partner's map. This we shall refer to as SHAREDNESS information. It was argued that if A was able to use information from the situation of utterance strategically in order to make a co-operative choice of referring expression, then this sharedness of information would be of great importance to him. If A is aware that B's map does not contain a particular item then he should be careful about the way in which he refers to that item, choosing an expression that compensates for B's lack of information. In contrast if A knows an item to be present on both maps then he can afford to be less careful in his choice of expression.
Wright 71
with the map task that this analysis is inadequate. For example speakers referring to an item on first mention often produce an utterance such as: Have you got the bridge Here the use of the interrogative form clearly indicates that the speaker is not treating the item as a shared item yet he is using a definite expression. Conversely, we observe the use of indefinites when the form of the utterance indicates that the speaker is not treating the item as unshared. For example: you go up to a house
(1) have you got NP where NP -• (def)/(indef) + noun or (2) do you have N P where NP -»(def)/(indef) + noun or as part of a deictic statement such as: (3) there's NP where NP -» indef + noun In (1) and (2) the aim of the communication is to ascertain the sharedness of the item and thus it is clearly being treated as not shared. In (3) the aim is to locate the item for the listener and thus once again it is being treated as unshared. In contrast, we take a speaker to be treating an item as SHARED when it is used as part of a declarative in which it serves to indicate where on the map the listener should move to: (4) you go (+ directional ADVERB) to (+ NP) where NP - (indef)/(def) + noun or (s) you go to (+ NP) where NP - (indef)/(def) + noun The 'first mention noun phrases' for each item on the map were categorised according to this schema. The maps were then examined to determine whether the items that were treated as shared were those items that the speaker knew
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Thus the occurrence of definite and indefinite articles is not a reliable indicator as to whether a speaker is treating an item as shared or not. Consequently, in this analysis different criteria are used. We take a speaker to be treating an item as UNSHARED if it occurs embedded in phrase forms such as:
72 Using Constraints and Reference in Task-Oriented Dialogue
were present on both maps and whether those items he treated as unshared were present only on his own map. The results of this analysis are given below. Across subjects in this condition there were a total of 256 first mention references; 149 of these were references to items that were marked as present on both maps; 70% (105) of these treat the item as if it were shared, taking the form, for example, of: you go to that windmill
The other 107 references were to items that were indicated as absent from one of the maps. Ninety-five per cent (102) of these treated the item as if it were unshared, using, for example, expressions such as:
Overall, then, 81% (207) of the first mention referring expressions used in this condition were tailored to match the known status of the referent with respect to sharedness. There is one exceptional case in the data; this subject consistently checked all the items to ascertain whether they were present on his partner's map, using, for example, expressions such as: have you got a house
It seemed from observation of this subject that he had been made aware of the importance of sharedness information by the introduction of colour-coding but was unable to use the information effectively. It might be expected on the basis of these findings that when the colourcoding is removed subjects would resort to a much more cautious approach like the exceptional subject described above. This possibility was investigated as part of condition 2 described below.
2.3 Condition 2: exploiting the structure ofthe map In this second condition our subjects were given a different map, map 2. Structurally the map was identical to map 1; the clustering of items was the same and the number of items on each map was the same, the correspondence between items present and absent on the maps was the same, and the distribution of type-identical items was the same. The only differences were that the sharedness information (colour coding) present on map 1 was removed, the identification of the items was different (i.e. what was on map 1, a windmill, became on map 2 a house and so on) and the orientation of the footpath and landmarks on the paper was rotated through 90 degrees (i.e. where the footpath began in the bottom left corner of map 1 and ended in the top right, in map 2 it began in the top left and ended in the bottom right). The
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there's a lake just there
Wright 73 changes to the orientation and identification were carried out simply to avoid the subjects recognising that they were dealing with structurally identical maps (and thereby inferring which items would be missing on these new maps). The removal of the sharedness information was the only significant manipulation. The analysis is presented below.
2.31. Analysis
you go to the cactus
when in fact he has two cacti and his interlocutor has only one—the one to which the speaker is not intending to refer—then under-population might occur. In this condition, there were four type-identical pairs. Pair 1 consisted of two cacti. Both cacti were on A's map and both were on B's map. Only one of them was actually visited by the footpath, clustered as it was with several other items. The other was some distance from the footpath standing alone by the edge of the paper. Pair 2 consisted of two ambulances. Once again they were both present on both maps but this time they were together in a cluster and the footpath passed between them. Considering pair 1, 9 out of 16 A-role subjects did not explicitly state which of the two cacti they were referring to, nor did they indicate that there were two cacti. The speaker simply treated the cactus on the footpath as a shared item: from there you go to the cactus
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In this condition there were a total of 224 first-mention references to items on the maps. Fifty-one per cent (114) of these treated items as shared despite the fact that the map contained no explicit information about sharedness. This figure represents an 8% increase over condition 1 where this information was available. Clearly subjects were not adopting the cautious approach of checking for the sharedness of items. Most often they would assume an item to be shared thus risking the possibility of under-population. Subjects may be adopting this 'high-risk' strategy because they have certain expectations about the degree of sharedness in the maps based on their previous experience in condition 1. Since in this condition the number of shared items is the same as condition 1 and the number of unshared items referred to is relatively low, this assumption proved to be largely valid; only 14% (31) of expressions that treated items as shared referred to unshared items. These 14%, however, represent a large increase compared with condition 1 where the frequency was only 5%. The use of this strategy might be expected to lead to error particularly in those cases in which the unshared item referred to is one of a type-identical pair. For example, if the speaker treats an item as shared by saying:
74 Using Constraints and Reference in Task-Oriented Dialogue
The B-role subjects in this situation did not query A about which cactus he was referring to; nevertheless, all subjects correctly updated their maps at this point. There were no cases of under-population. In consideration of pair 2, the clustered ambulances, 12 out of 16 A-role subjects explicidy indicated which ambulances they were referring to. This took the form of a modified indefinite such as: a second ambulance or another ambulance
you go to the church
A might utter this sincerely believing it to be singularly referring since he has no other churches on his map. B on hearing this would plausibly assume that the church on his map was the intended referent, otherwise A would have explicidy differentiated two churches. Only if A uses an expression such as: you go to the church just above the bridge
could we expect B to recognise the need to add a new church to his map. Thus B is totally dependent on the precision of A's linguistic expression if he is to avoid under-population. In the light of what we have said about the imprecision of A's expression in these informationally rich contexts it is perhaps unsurprising that there is a high degree of failure at this point in the map task. Only 23% of B-role subjects correctly updated the maps at this point. The rest preferred to take the route down to the church on their own map rather than add a second church. There are some surprising results, however. There is evidence that some B-role subjects fail to update their map correcdy EVEN WHEN A has quite precisely
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It appears from this analysis that subjects are able to exploit constraints afforded by the spatial layout of the map when assigning referents to formally ambiguous referring expressions, and that speakers will avoid using such ambiguous referring expressions in situations where these constraints do not exist. The third pair of type-identical instances were two churches. In this case each subject only had one of the pair. A had a church near a bridge visited by the footpath. B had the bridge but he did not have the church on his map. Instead, he had a second type-identical church some distance from the bridge and from the route of the footpath. In contrast to the other two pairs we have discussed, neither A nor B have the necessary information available which would allow them to recognise that the church on their map was not the intended referent of a simple expression such as:
Wright 75 specified the distance and direction of the missing church. For example, one A-role subject says: you go diagonally up to the church
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yet B goes diagonally down to the church on his own map rather than add a second church in the correct place. It seems that in situations where the information received by B from A conflicts with the information on B's own map then B is more likely to assume an error in the linguistic information than change his map to make it consistent with the linguistic information. Such a bias testifies to the power of the non-linguistic aspects of the situation of utterance. It is also reminiscent of reasoning biases identified by Wason and others (Johnson-Laird and Wason 1971, Nisbett and Ross, 1980) in which subjects tend to be over-receptive to confirmatory evidence and unreceptive to evidence which contradicts their hypodieses. This finding raises important issues concerning the reliance subjects place on different information sources and also about factors which affect how much a subject is prepared to reorganise his discourse representation in order to make it congruent with incoming information. It is important to note that in map condition 1 (colour-coding) there was little evidence of error at this point. This was because for both subjects, their item (in this case a house) was marked as unshared. Thus A never treated the item as shared. Pair 4, thefinalpair of type-identical items on this map were a pair of casdes. A only had one of these items marked but it did serve as the endpoint of the footpath. B, on the other hand, had both casdes and they were clustered close together on his map. In this case A will not explicidy differentiate the two items for B, but we would expect B to ask A which of the two items he is referring to. Surprisingly only 56% of our B-role subjects asked for such an explicit differentiation; the rest simply guessed which one of the two A was referring to. This failure may be because the casdes were the last items on the map and the subjects were keen to finish. Alternatively, it may represent the subjects' realisation of the asymmetry between A and B roles. In this version of the task, A tends to be the information-giver since he has the footpath and the majority of the landmarks on his map. B is usually the receiver of information drawing in the footpath and the missing landmarks. But in die case of fixing pair 4 on this map these roles are reversed. It seems dien that map conditions 1 and 2 provide us with some evidence for the use of information, contained in the maps, to constrain the assignment of referents to referring expressions. Firsdy, we have been able to show mat subjects can and do exploit what they know about the sharedness of items on their map. Secondly, in the absence of sharedness information, the spatial structure of items provides information concerning the probability that an item
76 Using Constraints and Reference in Task-Oriented Dialogue
is the speaker's intended referent. In situations where such information is not available then a good A-role subject will compensate by adjusting his choice of referring expression. The importance of spatial structure as a source of constraint is further emphasised by the way in which some B-role subjects wrongly assign referents when linguistic and structural information conflict. It follows from this that removal of this spatial structuring should make the map task much more difficult for subjects, placing a heavier burden on the ability of A to furnish B with precise information about his intended referents. This hypothesis was tested in map condition 3.
This map condition contained the same number of items on each map and the same number of type-identical pairs. The distribution of items between the two maps was the same. But the actual location of items was determined at random; items were not clustered nor was any attempt made to locate them near the footpath. The shape of the footpath on A's map was the same as before but now it did not visit so many of the items, instead appearing to wander through the landscape. The orientation of the footpath on the paper was once again rotated through 90 degrees. Because of time constraints, only 11 of 16 subject pairs completed this condition. The removal of the spatial structuring had a marked effect on performance. There were a total of 143 first-mention expressions in this condition. Of these only 23% (33) treated items as shared (compared with 43% in condition 1 and 51% in condition 2). Seventy-seven per cent (no) of expressions treated items as unshared in this condition. It appears that the lack of structure in this map promotes a very cautious approach, 10 out of 11 pairs partially or totally abandoned the 'high risk' strategy of assuming all items to be shared, preferring instead to check for the sharedness of most items. In consideration of type-identical pairs, there was a much higher incidence of explicit differentiation despite the fact that pairs were never clustered together. About 61% of all pairs were explicitly differentiated in this condition compared with 43% of unclustered pairs in condition 2. This seems to indicate that subjects scan a much wider area of the map in their search for possible referents than in the structured condition. Despite the lack of structure in this condition, the standard of completed maps was little different from condition 2. Considering just type identical pairs, (for example) in condition 2 the incidence of correct updating was 50%. In this condition it was 4$%. It seems that the increased precision with which the
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2.4 Condition y. removing spatial structure
Wright 77
speaker locates and identifies items in this condition compensates to a large extent for the loss of spatial structuring. It is interesting to note, however, that in condition i, where the sharedness information was explicit, the incidence of correct updating was 68%. This marked increase over the other two conditions shows that subjects do not seem to be able to compensate entirely for the loss of what is a very salient constraint. It also emphasises the difficulties they encounter in attempting to establish sharedness in the standard versions of the map task where the information is not explicit.
Compared with written text, the analysis of spoken dialogue has received little attention. While this study has nothing to say about aspects of spoken dialogue such as intonation and stress, it does identify a broader issue of some importance. It is clear from the analysis presented here that one of the most important differences between this and other genres is the simple, if often overlooked, fact that spoken discourse occurs in a SITUATION OF UTTERANCE. In the analysis of written text it is conventional to talk about the role of CONTEXT in the interpretation of referring expressions. But here context is interpreted as the information provided either by the preceding or succeeding text, or the more 'ephemeral' context provided by the reader's wealth of background commonsense knowledge. But our consideration of the 'INFORMATIONAL CONTEXT' of situated language (cf. Barwise and Perry 1983) allows us to consider equally important aspects of discourse processing and provide a fuller understanding of referential skills. Using a constrained task environment (i.e. the map) we have shown how it is possible to provide an objective definition of the 'REFERENTIAL DOMAIN' (the information drawn on the maps), and also how this can be systematically manipulated to affect the nature of the information exchange between interlocutors (the dialogue). Contrary to some approaches, the referential domain in this analysis is a language-independent domain of worldly objects to which speaker and listener have independent access. It is not a mental scenario triggered solely by the analysis of incoming text (cf. Sanford and Garrod 1981). By externalising the referential domain in this way, we as analysts are able to gain some hold on determining the pragmatic links between language and the world. The approach emphasises the cross-modal nature of the 'discourse representation'. In talking of a 'mental representation' of spoken dialogue, it is clear that this is not just a representation drawing solely on the input language as a source, nor upon background knowledge somehow activated by language
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3. SOME CONCLUSIONS
78 Using Constraints and Reference in Task-Oriented Dialogue
Dept ofLanguage and Linguistics University ofEssex Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ
REFERENCES Barwise, J. & J. Perry (1983), Situations and participants' knowledge', in J. Monaghan, Attitudes, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. Grammar in the Construction of Texts, Brown, G. (1986), 'Investigating listening London, F. Pinter. comprehension in context', Applied Brown, G. & G. Yule (1983), Discourse Linguistics, 7, 3, 284-303. Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge UniverBrown, G. (1987), 'Modelling discourse sity Press.
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input. Rather it is an interpretation of INFORMATION that comes to us via the language as only one of many channels. It is INFORMATION that is the cornerstone of discourse representation and a discourse is COHERENT only when die listener can posit some plausible information structure that could give rise to the set of utterances constituting the language of the discourse. This view of language, emphasising the centrality of information has much in common with recent approaches in other fields (cf. Barwise and Perry op. cit.; Evans 1982, Sperber and Wilson 1986), wherein language understanding is seen as part of a broader notion of communication. If this view is correct it suggests two areas for further study. Firstly we need a fuller understanding of the structure of the real-world referential domain over which language operates and the constraints which that domain affords for effective language use, and indeed language learning. This is an analogy here with the work of Marr (1982) and others in machine vision. This work showed how an understanding of the constraints inherent in the input to the visual system makes the problem of designing an algorithm for the interpretation of 2D images tractable. Secondly we must consider more carefully the non-linguistic and prelinguistic precursors of language use and how these shape our needs language as users. In particular, what are the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to individuate and highlight certain aspects of the referential domain which serve as the referents for our language terms? Finally, in consideration of referential skills, it seems that there is much to be said for Marslen-Wilson's (op. cit.) position. It does indeed seem that more skilled users of the language are able to tailor the referential expressions they use to the informational conditions in which they occur. Our notion of context is much broader than that of Marslen-Wilson's, and we have shown that speakers take account not only of information in the referential domain, but also of their hearer's state of knowledge of that domain.
Wright 79
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Clark, H. H., R. Schreuder & S. Buttrick & R. C. Berwick (eds), Computational (1983), 'Common ground and understandModels of Discourse, Cambridge, Mass., MIT ing demonstrative reference', Journal of Press. Verbal Learning and Behaviour, 22, 245-88. Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1986), Relevance: Dickson, W. P. (1981), Children's Oral Compre- Communication and Cognition, Oxford, hension Skills, New York, Academic Press. Basil Blackwell. Evans, G. (1982), Varieties of Reference, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Grosz, B. J. (1981), 'Focusing and description in natural dialogues', in A. K. Joshi, B. L. Webber & 1. A Sag (eds), Elements of Discourse Understanding, Cambridge, CamNOTES bridge University Press. 1 The work reported in this paper was Johnson-Laird, P. N. & P. C. Wason (1977), supported by the ESRC as part of the Thinking, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 'Maintaining comprehension' project (grant number C00232060) held by Prof. Marr, D. (1982), Vision, San Francisco, Freeman. Gillian Brown at the University of Essex. I Marslen-Wilson, W., E. Levy & L. K. Tyler would like to thank Gillian Brown for her (1982), 'Producing interpretable discourse: assistance in the preparation of this paper establishing and maintaining reference', in and for her guidance in the development R. J.Jarvella & W. Klein (eds), Speech, Place of the studies reported. Special thanks also and Action, Chichester.J. Wiley. go to Barry Smith, my colleague on the Nisbett, R. & L. Ross (1980), Human Inference: project. The data reported here were Strategies and Shortcomings ofSocialJudgment, collected jointly by him and myself, and he New York, Prentice-Hall. made a substantial contribution to the Sanford, A J. & S. C. Garrod (1981), Underthinking that motivated the analysis prestanding Written Text: Explorations Beyond the sented here. Sentence, Chichester.J. Wiley. 2 The author is now at the Dept. of PsychoSidner, C. L. (1983), 'Focusing in the comprelogy, University of York, Heslington, York hension of definite anaphora', in M. Brady YOi sDD.
Journal of Semantics 7: 81-92
© N.I.S. Foundation (1990)
The control of attributional patterns by the focusing properties of quantifying expressions S. B. BARTON and A. J. SANFORD Department ofPsychology, University of Glasgow
Abstract
The analysis of the meaning of quantifiers has by-and-large followed a course of extrapolation from logical quantification. Thus problems of scope tend to dominate the literature, and although there have been attempts to tackle the knotty problems of the semantics of nonlogical quantifiers (e.g. Barwise and Cooper 1981), most analyses have concerned logical quantifiers, which have properties that are allegedly constant over situations. Indeed, even within psychology, the above statements hold. The work ofJohnson-Laird (e.g. 1983) and his intellectual antecedents have concentrated almost exclusively upon logical quantifiers. Although there has been some work in psychology on the function of nonlogical quantifiers, this has largely centred on questions such as the proportions which quantifiers might denote (e.g. Many of might be 6 $-80%; a few might be 10-30%, and so on. See Bass, Cascio, and O'Connor 1974 for an illustration of this approach).
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Recent evidence has shown that certain quantifiers {few, only a few) and quantifying adverbs (seldom, rarely) when used tend to make people think of reasons for the small proportions or low frequencies which they denote. Other expressions single out small proportions or low frequences, but do not lead to a focus on reasons (e.g. a few; occasionally). In the present paper, these observations are applied to the attribution of cause in short two-line vignettes which make reference to situations, and where subjects have to say what is special in bringing about the state of affairs depicted. The procedure is standard in the area of social psychology known as attribution theory, but the present experiment is concerned with the role of quantifying descriptions in the process. Two theories are contrasted. Thefirst,the frequency signalling theory, ascribes the peculiarity of an action to the frequency of that action in an individual versus the frequency of it in the population at large. The second, the focus control account, says that contrasts are only important if one or more of the quantifiers focuses attention on cause (i.e. serves as a comment on the frequency or proportion which is denoted). The results support the second hypothesis, and suggest that frequency signalling alone is not enough to generate attributional patterns. Apart from indicating an important boundary condition on attributional effects, the results show the important consequences of the non truth-functional aspects of the meaning of quantifiers previously reported in Moxey and Sanford (1987). The attributional effects are clearly dependent upon linguistic phenomena, a point largely ignored by attribution theorists until recently.
82 Control of Attributional Patterns by Focusing Properties of Quantifying Expressions
(1) John kicks the dog. Why did John do this? It could be that one would choose to explain it in terms of some property ofjohn. For instance, he may have a malicious character (a trait), or may be momentarily angry (a transient state ofaffairs), both actor attributions. Or one might suppose that the fault lay with the dog: for instance, it may have attacked him (a so-called stimulus attribution). Of course, which attribution one chooses to make will be influenced by the presence of other information. In the literature (e.g. Kelley 1967), three kinds of information have been considered in some detail. The first is actor consistency, which holds if the answer is 'yes' to the question 'Does Fred habitually kick this dog?'. The second is consensus over actors in the face of the stimulus. This is signalled by an affirmative answer to the question: 'Do other people kick this particular dog?'. The third is stimulus distinctiveness: 'Does Fred kick dogs in general?'. If the answer is 'no', then there is something distinctive about the dog. While there are problems with this classical set of variables (cf. especially Hilton and Slugoski 1986; Hilton 1988), it is known tliat they influence the attributional conclusions which people draw (e.g. MacArthur 1972). For instance, in the case above, a low consensus, high consistency, low distinctiveness
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While proportion might be an aspect of the meaning of nonlogical quantifiers, it is certainly only one aspect. Recent research by Moxey (i 986) and her colleagues has shown that quantifiers not only provide proportion information, but control those aspects of a quantified statement to which people attend (Moxey and Sanford 1987). In the present paper, we report an application of this discovery to the nature of attributional effects induced by vignettes containing nonlogical quantifiers. While it may be supposed that the effects discussed below are more rhetorical than purely semantic, Moxey (1986) has argued that the focus phenomena to be discussed are a true part of the meaning of quantifiers, since quantifiers can be thought of as operators on mental representations. The paper will begin with a discussion of pertinent attribution phenomena, followed by an indication of the relevance of the focusing properties of quantifiers. In the Social Cognition literature, there has been considerable interest in the explanations provided for events, and the conditions which influence the patterns of explanation, a research area known as Attribution Theory. Most of the experiments carried out in this area use simply vignettes, or collections of statements, in order to achieve adequate experimental control (cf. Hilton 198 5). For this reason, the results of attribution experiments have as much to do with the force of various types of description as they have to do with anything else. In the present paper, we show how attributional properties depend upon quantifying expressions. Consider the following simple event:
Barton and Sanford 8 3
configuration will lead one to suppose that the reason for the event is that there is something special about John. In the event of less complete information, when information is presented in the form of simple descriptions, subjects still tend to draw predictable conclusions. For instance, consider the following: (2) John listens to the local Jazz band whenever they are playing. Hardly anyone else listens to the local Jazz band whenever they are playing. Intuitively, the impression is that there is something special about John. Perhaps he is a real afficionado, or perhaps he is tone-deaf. By contrast, (3) leads to the conclusion that there is perhaps something special about the band:
Finally, the following seems to lead to no particular conclusion: (4) John listens to the local Jazz band whenever they are playing. A few other people listen to the local Jazz band when they are playing. The justification for drawing such conclusions is not logical necessity, of course. Rather it is based on an implicit acceptance of Gricean principles: the reader assumes that the writer is giving relevant information, and not withholding anything that is also relevant. The present paper is specifically concerned with the fact that such statements have their messages carried by quantification. If the intuitive analysis of (2), (3), and (4) is acceptable to the reader, then it will be of interest to note that the only difference in the versions is in the quantifying expressions hardly any, most, and a few used to introduce the critical information. The contrast between what a target individual does and what is some norm can be expressed in a number of ways. What is required is an assessment of the likelihood that other people do the same thing, for instance. Provided that there are no good a priori grounds for having expectations about baseline frequencies, such information can be provided by the explicit statement types indicated above. But the question arises as to how quantifiers signal information about norms. At this point, we wish to introduce two theories about this: the first we shall call Frequency Signalling, and the second Focus Control. It may be argued that if Fred does something with a high frequency, but only a small proportion of other people do this thing, then it signals something unusual about Fred. It is the smallness of the proportion in one case versus the high frequency in the other which is the difference that the attributor has to take into account. Under the frequency signalling account, then, any expression signalling an equivalent frequency should have the same impact on the attributional process. Any two quantifiers used to indicate equivalently small proportions
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(3) John listens to the local Jazz band whenever they are playing. Most odier people listen to the local Jazz band when they are playing.
84 Control of Attributional Patterns by Focusing Properties of Quantifying Expressions
(such as few and a few) should have equivalent effects (see Moxey 1986 for data showing the extent to which these expressions can be used interchangeably with respect to proportion). In contrast, the focus control explanation adds something else. Some expressions, such as few and only a few not only serve to single out a small proportion: they also draw the reader's attention to the fact that the proportion is indeed small, and invite the reader to think of reasons why the proportion is so small. In an earlier study, Moxey (1986; Moxey and Sanford 1987) asked subjects to continue sentences of the following type: (4) Few/A few of the fans attended the match. They...
like afew; rarely and seldom behave likefew, and only occasionally like only a few, as
indexed by continuation types (Moxey, Sanford and Barton 1989). Thus it appears that certain expressions cause the attention of the reader to focus upon reasons relating to the quantified assertion, while others do not. In terms of the present analysis, the focus control theory of attribution would suppose that focus on cause is a necessary condition for the contrasts appropriate to causal attribution to be determined by the reader. Intuitively, this seems plausible. Compare (5) and (6): (5) John goes to the dentist twice a year. A few other people go twice a year. (Intuition: nothing special here) (6) John goes to the dentist twice a year. Few other people go twice a year. (Intuition: John goes more often than other people) The experiment described below addresses such intuitions. Before describing the study, we wish to point out that in conventional attribution experiments, the main protagonist is usually described as carrying out some single action, but in the present tense, such as John buys somethingfrom Lewis's when he is in town. These
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There were two main features of the results. First, vnthfew, about half of the continuations took They to refer to those fans who did not attend the meeting (the complement set), as in: They watched it on TV instead. This never happened with afew. The second point was that many of the continuations withfew were reasons why the fans did not attend, as in the example above. The expression only a few falls into this scheme: it seems to allow compset references, but they only appear in continuations when the connective because intervenes between the first sentence and the pronoun. Furthermore, only afew does cause focus to fall on reasons, but this time upon reasons why those who were at the match attended. Similar observations concerning the elicitation of causal continuations have been observed with the frequency adverbials occasionally, only occasionally, rarely, and seldom. The last three of this list generate causal patterns which correspond to those produced by the quantifiers described above. The term occasionally behaves
Barton and Sanford 85
statements can be modified quantificationally, of course, as in John rarely buys anythingfrom Lewis's when he is in town. In the experiment described, the principal action is sometimes modified in this way, since it clearly constitutes another way of making a contrast.
METHOD Materials and design
Table I A typical two sentence material, with the sixteen possible options. The'—' sign depicts the control condition in which a quantifier was not used. John
a few only a few few
— rarely only occasionally occasionally
enjoys walking his dog.
other people enjoy walking their dogs.
Sixteen scenarios were constructed, each depicting an event which was relatively neutral with respect to expected frequency. For instance, going to the local cinema is something about which we expect people not to hold strong views of baseline frequency over a population. In contrast, wearing shorts and a teeshirt in winter is something which would have a very low baseline expectation. Neutral scenarios were chosen so that the stated baseline information in the materials would be potentially informative, and would not violate strong existing expectations. In the experiment, a given subj ect served in all 16 conditions, but never saw the same scenario more than once. By using 16 subjects, it was possible to have each subject and each material produce one datapoint per condition.
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There was a total of 16 different conditions, derived from the combination of three possible frequency adverbs referring to the frequency of an individual's activities plus the null case, with three possible quantifying adjectives, referring to the norm for a population, plus the null case. The null case is simply a condition in which there is no explicit quantification. An example material, along with all of the options, is shown in Table 1.
86 Control of Attributional Patterns by Focusing Properties of Quantifying Expressions
Subjects The 16 subjects were students at the University of Glasgow, and had no experience of similar studies.
Procedure Each subject received two sheets of paper, one with the 16 materials, and one with a corresponding answer grid. The answer grids were continuous lines,fiveinches long, marked with the subject in question at one end, and the object in question at the other. The word 'neither' appeared at the centre of the line. Consider the
RESULTS The distance of each mark on the line provided was measured and summarised as a point on a 13-point scale, with 'o' representing extreme subject abnormality, and '13' representing extreme object abnormality. Attributions of'neither' were represented by the central value. These numbers enable a conventional analysis of variance to be carried out, which would not have been possible with simple categorical data using repeated measures. The mean scale values obtained for each condition are shown in Table 2. A 4 X 4 analysis of variance was carried out on the scale values obtained, and revealed significant effects of adverb (F = 16.2, with df = 3,45; p < .001), quantifier (F — 10.25, widi df = 3,45; p < .001), and an interaction between the two (F — 14.96, with df — 9,315; p < .001). Clearly, all variables are having an effect on the pattern of attribution. The results of this analysis not only indicate reliability over subjects, but indicate simultaneous reliability by materials, since each subject saw different materials under each condition. In order to separate the effects of individual combinations, additional analyses were carried out. The findings are best understood in diagramatic form, as shown in Figure 1.
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target statement, Mary occasionally buys ice-creamfrom the local cafe. One end of the
line would be labelled 'Mary', the other 'the local cafe'. The subjects' task would be to decide whether the whole vignette said something special about Mary, in which case the subjects should mark the scale at the end labelled 'Mary', or something special about the cafe, in which case a mark at the cafe end was required. Strength of conviction that it had more to do with one than the other was to be indicated by the distance the mark made from the midpoint. An example was given at the outset, when the instructions were given. Subjects were also asked to write a brief description of why they made the choices they did, in each case. Subjects were tested individually.
Barton and Sanford 87
Table 2 Mean scale values for all conditions ADVERBS null occas. ADJECTIVES null few a few only a few
only occas.
6.12 6.76
8.24 4.00 5.36
7-71 6.09
3-95
seldom
2.98
2.64
9-51 7.89 9.98
10.33 8.00 10.17
Seldom
10 '
/
—
'
Only occasionally
—
^ , Occasionally
- • A. ~
6 -
t:
4 -
'VN
/•
Control
S.
2 -
1
1
1
l
Control
A few
Only a few
Few
Figure 1
A simple effects analysis was carried out on these data, and showed that all main effects were significant at p < .001, except for occasionally, which was not reliable (F < 1, df — 3,45), and afew, which was somewhat lower (F — 4.67, df— 3,45, p < .01). Further pairwise comparison tests (under the Newman-Keuls procedure) reveals an outcome pattern shown in Table 3. All further discussion relies upon the simple effects and paired comparison data. It is clear from the figure that seldom and only occasionally have similar effects, and are clearly different from occasionally, a claim supported by the data in Table 3. Thus focus-control would appear to be a major determinant of the processes of contrast underlying attribution; the mere denotation of a low frequency is not sufficient for this purpose. As a corollary of this, occasionally shows an attributional pattern which is relatively impervious to the quantifier
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•
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n o
o. p
Table 3 Pairwise comparisons using the Neuman-Keuls procedure. Upper triangle: .05 level; Lower triangle: 0.1 level
b. c. d. e. era
f. h. i. jk. 1. m. n. 0.
P-
null, adj null, adj only a few few a few only a few null, adj few a few a few a few null, adj few only a few only a few few
seldom only occas. null, adv null, adv null, adv occas. occas. occas. occas. only occas. seldom null, adv only occas. only occas. seldom seldom
—
—
—
—
—
X
k s s s s — — — — _ —
—
—
—
—
—
—
X
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
— — — — — X
s s s s
—
-
-
-
—
-
-
X
n s s s s s s s s _ — _ — -
s s s
s s s
—
—
—
—
—
—
X
s s s s s s s s _ — — — — —
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
X
— — — — —
—
-
-
—
—
-
—
-
X
—
d b c — — — — — X — — X
—
—
_
X
e s — — —
—
—
_
—
X
f s s — — —
s
—
—
—
—
X
s s — — — —
s s
—
—
—
—
—
X
h s s — — — — —
—
—
_
—
X
X —
s
s s s s s s s
s s s s s
s s s s
s s s s s s s s
_
s
s s s s s s s
era
a a.
i s s s s — — — —
j s s s s — — — —
X
1 s
s s s — — — —
m s s s
s s s
s —
0
p s s s s s s s
cr
a. o
s 2.
3 H 3
o c
Key:
s significant — non-significant
x
Barton and Sanford 89
with which it is paired (simple effects data), while seldom and only occasionally are heavily influenced by the quantifier with which they are paired. While the control condition only allows for implicit quantification, as might be expected, an assertion like 'John goes to the cinema when he's in town' is taken as a statement of what is the normal state of affairs. Thus, when the control is on die individual, and the statements are pitted against the quantifiers, then the pattern which is revealed is a (slighdy attenuated) mirror image of that obtained for seldom and only occasionally.
It was argued diat pairing statements about the frequency of a behaviour of an individual with statements about its typicality with respect to the population at large would produce a contrast pair that could be used to make attributional judgements. In this experiment, the contrast pairs all resulted from the quantification of behaviours about which there would not be any strong expectations of baseline frequencies for the population. This expedient means that all of the information which can be used for making an attribution decision must be derived from the quantifiers themselves, rather than from comparison with an implicit norm, for example. Within certain established conditions, for contrast pairs of this type, if bodi the individual and the population at large do something infrequently, then subjects suppose that there is somediing wrong with the thing, producing object attributions. If the individual does something infrequently that everyone else does a lot, then the attribution goes towards mere being something noteable about the individual (person attributions). If there is something which the individual does a lot, but which the population at large do infrequendy, then there is something odd about the individual once more. Finally, if both the individual and the population at large do it often, then there is a tendency to suppose that the explanation is due to the object properties. The latter tendency is weak (c(. Figure 1), and cannot be a contrast effect. It presumably has its origins in Gricean relevance ('why was the object mentioned if it is not important?'). The important feature uncovered in the present study is that these frequency contrasts rely upon the quantifiers leading to a focus on reasons. As was discussed earlier, occasionally and a few do not focus the reader's attention on reasons why the frequency represented is as it is, while few, only a few, only occasionally and seldom all signal a comment about low frequency, resulting in the tendency to seek a reason for the frequency. The claims concerning the attribution patterns derivable from contrast pairs are true only if the quantifying expressions in question perform this 'comment-signalling' function.
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DISCUSSION
90 Control of Attriburional Patterns by Focusing Properties of Quantifying Expressions
In the study reported in this paper, we invited subjects to make explicit artributional responses. Obviously, the attribution paradigm, widely prevalent in the social cognition literature, is but one case where the rhetorical aspects of the meaning of quantifying expressions play a major role. There are other situations: for example, in questionnaires, quantifiers and quantifying adverbs are frequently employed as check-items, in which the subject is invited to reveal views about the frequencies of behaviours, etc. While validation techniques may make questionnaires useably consistent, the question arises as to what the individual answers correspond to. It can be argued that terms like rarely and seldom will be ticked when the behaviour in question is considered by the subject to have either an abnormally low frequency, or a desirably low frequency and when it is considered necessary by the subject to assert this notably low frequency by using a marked term. In contrast, occasionally or very occasionally will be preferred if the response is simply to denote low frequency, without any indication as to normality or desirability. In short, it is not mere frequency which is at issue, but notability and abnormality as well. There are other examples of this sort worth exploring, particularly where frequency and abnormality relate to attribution and justification. It is clear that in order to produce a good description of the conditions of use of quantifiers and quantifying frequency adverbs, it is necessary to investigate the way choice relates to baseline frequency, desirability and mutual knowledge levels of expectation. A study of just this sort has been undertaken by Moxey (in preparation), and reveals that quantifiers do convey information about mutual expectation. While such problems have tended to be skirted around by
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Without it, occasionally and a few fail to contrast substantially with themselves or other expressions. These findings make sense in relation to the focus effects of quantifiers (Moxey and Sanford 1987, Moxey, Sanford and Barton, in press). Rather than mere frequency signalling, it is focus control which appears to license the appropriate contrast behaviour. In this way, the focus control account is supported by the observation that occasionally and afew appear to be relatively stable across contrast pairs, and do not mediate differential attribution patterns. If 'John occasionally does X', he is not judged abnormal whether 'other people do X', or whether^m other people do X. Preliminary work (Barton 1988) suggests that while subjects judge the frequency signalled by occasionally to be low, the range of other possible frequencies for which the adverb remains an appropriate signal is much larger than for other low frequency signalling adverbs. Occasionally almost appears to have stretchable conditions of applicability. Much the same can be said oiafew. Indeed, Moxey (1986) has shown that while afew is typically taken to denote a small proportion, in the same range as only afew and^ew, it is accepted as a true description of a much wider range of values than the other two.
Barton and Sanford 91
REFERENCES Barton (1988), MA Thesis, Dept. of Psychogrounding Background, Lund (Sweden), logy, University of Glasgow. Doxa. Barwise.J. & R. Cooper (1981), 'Generalized Hilton, D. (1988), Contemporary Science and quantifiers and natural language', LinguistNatural Explanation: Commonsense Concepics and Philosophy, 4, 159-219. tions of Causality, Brighton, Harvester Bass, B. M., W. F. Cascio & E. J. O'Connor Press. (1974), 'Magnitude estimations of fre- Hilton, D. J. & Slugoski, B. R. (1986), quency and amount', journal of Applied 'Knowledge-based causal attribution; The Psychology, 5 9 , 313-20. abnormal condition focus model', PsychoFiedler, K. (1988), 'The dependence of the logical Review, 93, 75-88. conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983), Mental Modeb: factors', Psychological Research, in press. Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Hilton, D. (1985), 'Casual beliefs: from attriInference and Consciousness, Cambridge, bution theory to cognitive science' in Cambridge University Press. J. Allwood & E. Hjelmquist (eds), Fore- Kahneman, D., P. Slovic & A. Tversky (1982),
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researchers interested in quantification and descriptions of die uncertain, it is becoming increasingly clear that lack of research in this quarter may lead to an unbalanced picture of the functions of the expressions. This situation must be rectified if we are to understand their conditions of use. By way of final comment, we should point out that many aspects of cognition, apart from language itself, are studied using natural language vignettes and questionnaires. For example, the vast literature on on reasoning under uncertainty (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982). As social and cognitive psychologists become more aware of work in semantics and pragmatics, so they are more able to assess the influence of the exact wording of descriptions on the results which obtain. There is not only a growing trend towards the interpretation of many tasks within a Gricean framework (e.g. Turnbull and Slugoski 1988), but there is rather more specific work showing that what were previously taken to be errors of reasoning are judgements dependent on specific word-choice. Thus Fiedler (1988) showed that the presence of the so-called conjunction fallacy (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982) depends upon questions being cast in terms of frequency rather than probability. Until then, these forms had been treated as variants of the same underlying notion. Both the Fiedler study and the present experiment illustrates the dependence of phenomena taken as reflecting cognitive and attributional biases on language. It may be important to separate social attribution in a nonlinguistic setting from that generated with verbal communications (see also Hilton 1985 for further evidence for this general argument).
92 Control of Attributional Patterns by Focusing Properties of Quantifying Expressions Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Kelley, H. H. (1967), 'Attribution in social psychology', Nebraska Symposium on Mo-
tivation, 15, 192-238. MacArthur, L Z. (1972), 'The how and what of why: some determinants of causal
quantifiers', to appear in K.J. Gilhooly, M. Keane, R. H. Logie & G. Erdos (eds), Lines of Thought, Chichester, John Wiley. Turnbull, W. & Slugoski, B. (1988), 'Conversational and linguistic processes in causal attribution', in D. Hilton (ed.), Contemporary Science and Natural
Explanation,
Brighton, Harvester Press.
attribution', Journal ojPersonality and Social Psychology, 22, 171-93.
fiers and focus', Journal of Semantics, 5, 189-206.
Moxey, L. M., A. J. Sanford & S. B. Barton (in press), 'The control of attentional focus by
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND NOTE Thanks are due to Linda Moxey whose research provided the stimulus for the present application, and to Dennis Hilton who tried to teach the second author about attribution theory. The research was partially supported by ESRC grant R000231493 to the second author. Reprint requests to A. J. Sanford.
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Moxey, L. M. (1986), 'A psychological investigation of the use and interpretation of English Quantifiers', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow. Moxey, L. M. (in preparation), 'Expectation and the interpretation of quantifiers'. Moxey, L. M. & A.J. Sanford (1987), 'Quanti-
Journal ofSemantics T- 93~i'°
© N.I.S. Foundation (1990)
Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions GERHARD HEYER Olivetti Research at TA TRIUMPH-ADLER AG, Niimberg
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N 1 Downloaded from jos.oxfordjournals.org by guest on January 1, 2011
Prominent current research on Formal Semantics, in my estimation, is theorydriven in the sense that the definition and discussion of a formal framework for semantic representation proceeds more on the basis of its comparison with the formal properties of other frameworks than it is motivated by a detailed evaluation of the empirical data and the theoretical implications of explaining them in a particular way. The present state of research on generic reference reflects this tendency: almost every formalism proposed for semantic representation during the last decade and a number of approaches from research on Artifical Intelligence have been applied to the problem of generic reference without covering in a satisfactory way all central phenomena related to generic reference and without making explicit the systematic links between these phenomena that any approach worth being called a 'theory' of generic reference needs to explain. The discussion of generic reference in this respect can best be characterised by the tendency that the analysans substantially determines the analysandum. The selection of one set of examples as the paradigmatic cases of generic reference in practice prejudices a certain theoretical approach; this implies that an alternative treatment of those cases considered less paradigmatic will accordingly be considered less plausible. For instance, taking generic descriptions as a paradigmatic case of generic reference gives an approach based on objects a certain plausibility, while including habitual statements among the phenomena relating to generic reference makes an approach based on events more plausible. What the present discussion is lacking, however, is an appreciation of the consequences of choosing one or the other approach, both with respect to a delineation of the paradigmatic cases of generic reference and the theoretical implications of any such choice. The discussion on generic reference is increasingly suffering, moreover, from mixing genuine semantic issues widi approaches from Artificial Intelligence such as knowledge representation. While semantics in the tradition of Montague Grammar aims at describing the truth-conditions of sentences,
94 Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions
2. GENERIC REFERENCE Generic reference generally is considered to extend to the following linguistic phenomena (cf. Krifka 1987): I. Singular definite NPs 1. The horse occasionally mates with the donkey. II. Plural definite NPs 2. The horses have a flowing mane and tail. III. Singular indefinite NPs 3. A horse occasionally mates with a donkey. IV. Plural indefinite NPs (bare plurals) 4.. Horses occasionally mate with donkeys.
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and thereby also at describing the referents denoted by a sentence, the goal of knowledge representation is to provide a framework for modelling on a computer knowledge that enters into cognitive processes such as natural language understanding, and common-sense reasoning. As a semanticist, I am satisfied when I have described what the truth-conditions of a statement are, irrespectively of how this information is being used; conversely, as a researcher on Artificial Intelligence, I am primarily interested in how the meaning of a sentence is represented and how the different knowledge sources contribute to understanding the meaning of a sentence. Of course, both considerations are closely related. There remains, however, a basic difference, highlighted by the discussion on generic reference, between reference and expectation. Considering a generic statement like 'The Scotsman drinks Whisky', it is one thing to attempt a description of the truth-conditions of that sentence; but it is quite another thing to describe how this sentence enters into common-sense reasoning as a generic generalisation, and how it results in a more or less plausible expectation on other people's behaviour. Again, it is important to become aware of die consequences that one's choice of framework has for the detailed analysis of generic reference. In what follows I first want to clarify the notion of generic reference on a pre-theoretic level by collecting some of those paradigmatic cases as they have been proposed in the literature, and by mapping out some of their systematic interrelations. This will lead to a characterisation of desiderata for a theory of generic reference. I shall then sketch a semantics of generic descriptions along the lines of Heyer (1985 and 1987), and show how this approach can be accommodated into a frame-based extension of standard Discourse Representation Theory. Finally, the proposed semanatics of generic descriptions is related to their use as default rules in common-sense reasoning.
Heyer 95
V. Mass terms 5. Gold is a precious metal VI. Quantified NPs 6. Some cats, namely the lion and the tiger, are beasts of prey, 7. Noah saved all animals in his Arch. VII. Habituals 8. John smokes.
If 'det N' is a singular or plural generic expression, then so is 'a N', where the determiner has been replaced by the singular indefinite article (assuming a corresponding change with respect to number of the respective noun when necessary).
Conversely, generic expressions involving reference to kinds—henceforth called kind generics for short—in general do not allow for this substitution.2
Examples Kind generics 9. The horse came to America with the early Spanish explorers, 10. Not women did he love, but the woman, 11. Dinosaurs are extinct. Default generics 12. Lions are beasts of prey, 13. The Scotsman drinks Whisky,
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While there is a certain tradition including habituals in this list (Lawler 1973; Carlson 1982), this inclusion is prima-facie not obvious and certainly needs further justification. I shall return to this point as it marks an issue of major significance in the delimitation and analysis of generic reference. The inclusion of mass terms is justified on the basis of the intuition that both, generic NPs involving count nouns (including quantified NPs) and generic NPs involving mass nouns may involve a reference to certain kinds. Independent from these semantic intuitions, some syntactico-semantic tests for verifying a generic reading of bare plurals (Carlson 1978) and generic descriptions (Heyer 1985) have been proposed. Although the notion of generic reference expresses a natural intuition, it must be noted that generic expressions do not constitute a semantically homogeneous group (Heyer 1985; Krifka 1987). There appear to be two basic aspects of generic reference, one related to reference to kinds and the other to reference to default representatives, or typical representatives, of a kind. In general, generic expressions involving a reference to the default representatives of a kind—called default generics for short—allow for the following substitution (given that the sentential predicate does not require a collective reading).
96 Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions 14. A mammal suckles its young, 15. The antilopegathers near waterholes.
3. GENERIC DESCRIPTIONS Kind reference and default reference, the two aspects of generic reference presented above, allow for subtle differences in the meaning of generic descriptions. I will present some of the most prominent cases (cf. Heyer 1987; Krifka 1987): Kind reference Kind predicate 16. The lion is a species, 17. The dodo is extinct,
Dynamic predicate 18. The musk-rat was imported into Europe in igo6, Avant-garde interpretation 19. Man setfoot on the moon in 1969,
Default reference Essential property 20. The lion is a beast of prey,
Typical property 21. DerHund belli (The dog barks), Stereotype 22. The Scotsman drinks Whisky, 23. The Frenchman eats horsemeat,
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It must be noted that this distinction between kind generics and default generics not only applies to bare plural constructions as in (11) and (12), but also to definite generic NPs as in (9), (10), and (13) and (15). The proposed distinction therefore does not simply correspond to the distinction between definite and indefinite generic NPs, but has to do with the logic of generic expressions in general. In what follows, the main question that I want to focus on concerns the problem of a unified treatment of generic descriptions. Given that generic descriptions allow for a reference to kinds reading as well as a reference to default representatives reading, it is an open question whether we can still meaningfully assume a syntactically and semantically unified category called 'the generic definite article', or whether we need to distinguish between (at least) two substantially different uses of the generic definite article. An equivalent question can be raised about the bare plural. The fundamental issue at stake is the question of whether or not we need to trace kind generics and default generics to the same root.3
Heyer 97
Representative object 24. (Father and son, visiting a zoo, standing in front of a lion, father) This is the lion, Collective property 25. The German customer bought 83 000 BMW's last year.
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As has been pointed out by Carlson (1980, 1987), one of the most prominent features of generic generalisations has to do with the fact that they allow for exceptions, as is evident from statements like (21) or (22). Recently, this phenomenon has also been related to research in Artificial Intelligence Research on nonmonotonic and default logics (Krifka 1988), i.e. logics that describe a reasoning system that will change its beliefs intelligently in the face of new information. Both considerations are closely related, for when a generic generalisation is understood as a default rule, and not as a universal statement, it naturally must allow for exceptions. However, bodi considerations can be seen as taking different perspectives on generic generalisations. While the analysis of the fact that generic generalisations allow for exceptions poses a problem of how to describe the truth-conditions of generic generalisations, the analysis of generic generalisations as an expression of useful default rules poses a problem of how to represent and evaluate common-sense knowledge. An important difference between the two perspectives consists in the fact that for the semantics of natural language it is reasonable to aim at a compositional semantics of the respective linguistic phenomena, while for the representation of common-sense knowledge and reasoning taking into account context dependency and interdependency of knowledge is inescapable. In what follows, the primary goal, therefore, is to sketch a semantic analysis of generic descriptions. In order to describe the truth-conditions of a statement, it is established practice to consider the logical consequences that can be drawn from it. Thus, let us consider what can be concluded from each of these statements (i6)-(25) with respect to a particular individual of the respective kind (cf. Heyer 1985, 1987). Statements (16) and (17) do not license a descent to any particular lion or dodo for logical reasons: predicating 'is a species' of any particular lion would amount to a category mistake. This is only true for kind predicates, however, as is evident from (18) and (19). Both, (18) and (19), imply that the predicated event is true for at least one representative of the kind, but with the lack of further knowledge nothing can be inferred concerning any particular musk-rat or man. The difference between (18) and (19) can be seen in the fact that for the avantgarde interpretation of a generic description it is sufficient if only one representative of the respective kind fulfils the predicated property, which in general has to be exceptional or significant for the kind (Krifka 1987); in this respect it resembles the traditional reference pars pro toto.
98 Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions
18. The musk-rat was imported into Europe in 1906,
as an example for the first point, and statement (22), 22. DerSchotte trinkt Whisky, (The Scotsman drinks/is drinking Whisky),
as an example for the second point. The German statement (22) can in fact be read infour ways: individual and eventlike, individual and dispositional, generic
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Statement (20) is the only case which permits a straightforward descent to an individual representative of the kind, in this case a lion: if Leo is a lion, then he is a beast of prey. Predication of a typical property does not license this conclusion as there might be abnormal representatives of a kind, and without further knowledge we just do not know whether a particular individual belongs to the class of typical representatives of a kind. Assuming, however, that in the case of (21) we do know that a particular dog, say Fido, is a typical dog, then we can of course conclude that Fido barks. Lack of this information entitles us to assume (in the sense of a plausible guess), but not to conclude (in the sense of a logical consequence), that Fido barks. The difference between (21) and (22)7(23), i n m y intuition, consists in the fact that we cannot even assume that a particular Scotsman drinks Whisky, or that a particular Frenchman eats horsemeat. This has to do with the fact that the kinds denoted by 'Scotsman' and 'Frenchman' are not natural, but nominal. Generic reference to nominal kinds in cases like (22) and (23) defines a stereotype; this stereotype can be changed, but it cannot be refuted. For natural kinds the situation is reverse: statements about natural kinds can be refuted, but they cannot be changed (Schwartz 1980). If Leo is the lion referred to in the context defined for (24), then it follows that Leo is (in the sense of subsumption) a lion, but it does not follow that Leo is a typical lion (we just don't know) nor that he is identical to the kind lion. Finally, nothing can be inferred from collective generic statements like (25): certainly no individual German customer (not even a typical one) has bought 83 000 BMW's in 1987. Once a singular definite NP has a generic interpretation, different readings of generic descriptions can be distinguished by way of referring to the logical category of the sentential predicate. It is doubtful, however, whether the sentential predicate can in any stronger sense be said to determine whether a statement containing a singular definite NP has a generic interpretation or not. Although there is evidence that generic sentences in most languages tend to belong to the least marked contexts with respect to tense and aspect (Dahl 1988), and that conversely strong episodic markings tend to indicate a nongeneric reading of the singular definite NP (e.g. in English, 'The dog is barking'), the happening reading of a predicate does not, in general, seem to preclude a generic interpretation of the sentence, and a dispositional reading of a predicate does not always induce a generic interpretation of the singular definite NP. Consider statement (18).
Heyer 99
and disposirional, and generic and eventlike (cf. Heyer 1985). As the last case may be arguable, imagine New Year's Eve in Edinburgh and somebody saying 'Now the Scotsman is drinking Whisky'. In my intuition, statement (22) then refers to all typical Scotsmen—generalising, as it were, over persons—while the predicate refers to a particular event of whisky-drinking. Mixing non-generic with generic readings of a singular definite NP in one sentence is not possible, as can be seen from (26) and (27). 26.? This is the lion and he lives in Africa, 27.? Man setfoot on the moon in 1969 and he is called Neil Armonstrong
28. The dodo lived in Mauritius and (it) became extinct in the 18th century. 29. The tiger, undisturbed in the wilderness, is a majestic sight as it walks along aforest path or strides through a meadow ofgrassAt is the largest cat in the world. As is evident from (28) and (29), anaphora can also refer to generic objects previously introduced by generic NPs. In this respect, there is substantial similarity between generic and non-generic uses of singular definite NPs. This similarity also holds with respect to anaphoric uses of the definite article. Assuming that the use of a definite NP indicates the presupposition on the side of the speaker that a suitable reference object exists in the shared knowledge of speaker and hearer, or the intention that the hearer update his shared knowledge accordingly, the definite article in statement (30b) refers to the individual introduced by the sentential subject in statement (30a) on the basis of the same principles as in (31b) and (32b): 30a. 30b. 31a. 31b. 32a. 32b.
The dog barks. The animal is hungry. The musk-rat was imported into Europe in 1906. The rodent has since been spreading widely. The tiger eats whatever it can catch. The cat spends most of its timefinding a meal.
More complicated cases of anaphoric uses of the definite article are also possible, as is evident from a piece of discourse like (33a) and (33b), where the expression 'the fur' refers to the generic fur of the generic musk-rat: 33a. The musk-rat was imported into Europe in 1906. 33 b. Thefur has since been changing colour. Knowledge about such things as dogs, musk-rats, and tigers of the kind that dogs are known to be animals, that musk-rats are known to be rodents and have
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However, once a singular definite NP is assigned a generic interpretation, both, kind reference and default reference, are possible in one sentence, as is exemplified by (28) and (29),
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Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions
fur, and that tigers are known to be cats, can adequately be called conceptual knowledge. Once an object is introduced by a singular definite NP, apparently also all the conceptual knowledge about this object is activated and can be used for further reasoning in the process of anaphora or ellipsis resolution. And this is independent from whether the singular definite NP has a generic (kind or default generic) or non-generic interpretation. Summing up the above discussion, any theory of generic reference would have to deal with the following four points:
4. SEMANTICS OF GENERIC DESCRIPTIONS It has been argued by Carlson (1982), Krifka (1987) and others that default generics need to be treated essentially the same as habitual sentences. The basic argument draws on the fact that default generics can in general be paraphrased by adding an adverb like 'typically', 'usually', or 'always' without change of meaning just as in the case of habitual sentences. Thus, a statement like (22) can be paraphrased by the addition of'typically'just as an habitual statement like (8): 22. The Scotsman drinks Whisky, 22' Typically, the Scotsman drinks Whisky, 8. John smokes, 8' Typically, John smokes.
The claim is that default generics serve to record or assert the generality of certain cases (Lawler 1972; Biggs 1978); the semantics of a generic sentence is then thought to contain an adverb of quantification, and it is in the function of
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(1) Kind reference and default reference of generic descriptions must be distinguished, and the different kinds of logical consequences available for kind generics and default generics must be explained, while at the same time the basic similarities between the kind reference and default reference use of generic descriptions in contrast to non-generic uses of singular definite NPs must also be explained. (2) With the exception of kind predicates, generic interpretation of a singular definite NP is independent from the interpretation of the sentential predicate. (3) Non-generic and generic uses of a definite singular NP must be impossible to mix in one sentence, while mixing of kind generics and default generics in one sentence must be possible. (4) Basic similarities between generic and non-generic uses of the definite article with respect to anophora and ellipsis resolution must be explained.
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that quantificational adverb that the genericness- of that sentence is to be located. In the outstanding analysis of generic bare plural constructions by Carlson (1978), the similarity between habitual and generic statements is explained by tracing both to episodic readings and deriving the habitual or generic interpretation by introducing a generic operator Gn (for gnomic) that operates on an episodic (non-generic) predicate and transforms it into a generic one. Hence, in the case of (8) and (22) above, Carlson's analysis would deliver the following derivations (where 'R' is a relation between a kind individual and one of the kind's instances, ignoring for the time being Carlson's distinction between individuals and stages):
smoke(john) 8b. John smokes.
Gn(smoke)(john) 22a. The Scotsman is drinking Whisky.
tx[R(x, the-Scotsman) & drink-Whisky(x)] 22b. The Scotsman drinks Whisky.
Gn(drink-Whisky)(the-Scotsman) Carlson's analysis has, among others, been charged on the consequence that it results in assuming two different semantics for every non-stative predicate, one for the generic interpretation and one for the non-generic intepretation of a statement, in order to substantiate the claim that it is the sentential predicate of a sentence that determines whether or not a statement has a generic reading. This consequence meets with difficulties when confronted with generic statements that none the less contain an episodic predicate as (18) and (19) above, and is related to the fact that Carlson's analysis does not explicitly distinguish between kind and default generics (Heyer 1987). From a more general perspective, the proposal to analyse generic generalisations on the same model as habitual statements runs into the difficulty that it evidently does not work for kind generics, as a generalising adverb of quantification in such cases clearly is inappropriate, as is exemplified by (34) and (35), 34.? Man always/often/usually/rarely/neversetfoot on the moon in 1969, 35.? The lion always/often/usually/rarely/never is a species.
It is not surprising, therefore, that nobody has in fact proposed also to treat kind generics on the basis of a quantification over events or cases. In consequence, an approach like Krifka's (1987) submits to deal with kind generics and default generics by two different, and completely unrelated analyses. But what is the cost of this approach? In view of the facts presented
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8 a. John is smoking.
102 Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions
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above, any approach that cannot explain the similarities between the generic and non-generic use of the definite article, and the similarities between the kind generic and default generic reading of a generic use of the definite article, slices up our semantic intuition of a 'singular definite N F into something like three unrelated uses of the definite article. Given that there are substantial arguments in favour of a unified analysis of the definite article (Hawkins 1978; Loebner 1985), this is unacceptable, I think. In a sense, therefore, we have a choice of either giving up a unified analysis of the generic readings of singular definite NPs and gaining, maybe, a unified analysis of default generics and habituals, or insisting on a unified analysis of the generic readings of singular definite NPs (and bare plural NPs for that matter) andrisking,maybe, a unified analysis of default generics and habituals. In particular, this choice is relevant to the treatment of mixed kind and default generic readings as in (28). In what follows, I will take up the second alternative and present the sketch of a theory of generic descriptions as it has been elaborated in Heyer (1985, 1987). As a starting point, we assume that generic descriptions refer to generic individuals. Thus, a description refers individually, if it denotes an individual object, while it refers generically, if it denotes a generic individual. The argument draws on the fact that, first, generic descriptions behave syntactically like proper names (with respect to Carlson's 'so-called'-test, behaviour under negation, etc.),4 and, second, that attempts to treat generic descriptions as nondenoting expressions cannot explain all phenomena noted about generic descriptions, in particular, phenomena relating to kind generics and their behaviour with respect to anaphora. In consequence, we claim that the generic interpretation of a description is (with the exception of kind-predicates) independent from the interpretation of the sentential predicate, as is examplified by statements like (18) and (22) above. However, once a description is interpreted generically, it does depend on the sentential predicate whether the description has a kind generic or default generic reading. We attempt a unified analysis of generic descriptions on the assumption that generic individuals, basically natural and nominal kinds (as explained above), are thought to have two kinds of properties: those that apply to the kind itself (kind-level and event predicates), and those that determine certain properties of the representatives—as representatives—of that kind (dispositions). Kind reference of a generic description is then explained as reference to a generic individual in the context of a predicate that only allows (in that context) the predication of the property to the generic individual itself. Default reference of a generic description is explained on the basis oikind reference in the context of a disposition. The idea is that representatives of a kind have certain dispositional properties because they are representatives of that kind. (Vice versa, being a representative of a kind determines which dispositional properties the
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36. The peacock lays whitish eggs,
can then be said to be true, and the generic description 'the peacock' can be said to refer to the typical representatives of the species peacock, even though that statement strictly refers only to female peacocks (and in that sense can be considered as elliptical), since the set of typical representatives of the species peacock comprises both the set of typical male and typical female peacocks. World knowledge of this kind about the disjunctive make-up of the set of typical representatives of a kind substantially enters into determining the proper reference set of a generic generalisation.
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individual representative of a kind can have.) Those representatives of a kind that have the characteristic properties of a kind are called the typical representatives of that kind. Thus, default reference of a generic description is explained as a reference to the typical representatives of a kind. For the semantics of generic descriptions it is important to realise that the exact extension of the set of typical representatives of a kind need not be known to a speaker by way of a general division of linguistic labour, die extension of a generic term will in general be fixed by the experts on the particular domain (Putnam 1975). To decide die question whether or not a particular individual is contained in the set of typical representatives of a kind may therefore require further knowledge and reasoning. The above sketch of a semantics for generic descriptions employs a realist notion (in the philosophical sense) of typicality. The idea is that typicality of the representatives of a kind is defined on the basis of the characteristic dispositions of that kind. A representative that exhibits all characteristics of its kind can then be considered a typical representative. Since not all representatives of a kind exhibit all the kind's characteristics but are in varying degrees deviant relative to the set of the kind's typical representatives, it is assumed that the set of all representatives of a kind is structured by way of similarity circles5 relating the different kinds of deviant representatives to the typical representatives of the kind. Thus, it is assumed that kinds are inherendy structured with respect to typicality.6 A general difficulty with typicality conditions (in the sense of a biological phenotype) consists in the fact that for many species the phenotype varies with respect to sex, age, surroundings, etc. For example, the male peacock typically has blue feathers, and the female peacock typically lays whitish eggs. But there is no common phenotype for both male and female peacocks. The idea that generic terms in distributive contexts refer to the typical representatives of a kind must hence be extended to allow for cases where the set of typical representatives consists of disjunctive and mutually exclusive sets. Thus, a typical peacock can either be male or female; if it is male it has blue feathers, and if it is female it lays whitish eggs. A generic statement like (36),
104 Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions
The approach sketched above is congenial to the treatment of definites in Discourse Representation Theory, and can be easily accommodated into this framework. Since definite descriptions are being taken, contrary to Russell's analysis, as referring expressions, a discourse like (30a) and (30b), 30a. The dog barks, 30b. The animal is hungry, would adequately be represented by a DRS like the following: x,y
y - the_animal(ind)
x-y hungry(y) In order to correctly derive the identity 'x — y' the representation obviously needs to be complemented, among other things, by a meaning-postulate of the following kind: Meaning postulate X
dog (x)
animal
M
In a similar fashion, a piece of discourse, like (37a) and (37b), 37a. The dog barks, 37b. It is Fido. could be represented as follows:
This DRS licenses the conclusion that Fido barks (i.e. 'barks(f)'). However, in order to derive that Fido is a dog (i.e. 'dog(f)'), we also need a meaning-postulate
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x - the_dog(ind) barks(x)
Heyer 105
stating that anything that satisfies a description necessarily falls under the respective concept used in that description: Meaning postulate (2)
F(x)
38 a. The lion is a species, 38b. Leo is a lion.
Our approach would result in the following DRS:
Notice that by this representation it cannot be deduced that Leo is a species, as the kind-predicate 'species' (marked with a subscript 'K') only applies to kinds (marked in the above example with any superscript larger than i),7 and cannot be passed on to any individual (marked with superscript 1) representing a kind (as denoted by the representation relation 'r').
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Meaning Postulate (2) only holds for individual descriptions, and not for generic descriptions, as that would imply that any predicate corresponding to a kind name would also apply to the kind denoted by that kind name, which is unacceptable; e.g. the kind denoted by lthe_lion^en)' is not a lion. A more general principle corresponding to Meaning Postulate (2) would have to state that for any kind there exists a corresponding concept applying to the representatives of that kind. Assuming slight amendments to standard DRT, the same approach can now be taken for representing discourse involving generic descriptions. A modelstructure for kinds based on the ideas sketched above can easily be given on the basis of Heyer (1987); the respective syntactic extension of DRT and the definition of how these extended DRSs can be embedded in this modelstructure are straightforward. Consider the following statements (38a) and (38b),
106 Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions
Further kinds of contexts for generic descriptions can be treated accordingly. Thus, the representation of a discourse like (21a) and (21b), 21 a. The dog barks, 21b. Fido is a dog,
would result in the following DRS:
Without further knowledge about Fido we know that Fido just represents the natural kind named dog. If we knew, however, that Fido is a typical representative of that kind, we could conclude that Fido barks, based on the fact that 'barks' is taken to mean a disposition (marked by die subscript 'D') and the following Meaning Postulate (3): Meaning postulate (3) x,y' F(y') 1
y trx
5. GENERIC DESCRIPTIONS, FRAMES AND DEFAULTS So far the analysis presented above has exclusively focused on the referential semantics of generic descriptions attempting to describe the truth-conditions of generic statements involving a generic description in view of the fact that generic statements can allow for exceptions. I finally want to link up the semantics of generic descriptions with Ai considerations on how generic generalisations can enter into common-sense reasoning. In order to explain how generic generalisations give rise to particular expectations concerning the typical representatives of a kind, it is assumed that to every kind name, i.e. a generic description, there exists a corresponding concept that encodes all information about die respective kind that is known or believed to be known, and that applies to die individual representatives of the kind. Thus, corresponding to the proper name for die kind 'the lion' there is the
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x2 - the_dOg(gen) barksD(x2) f' - fido rx 2
Heyer 107
21. The dog barks,
the claim is that nothing can be inferred from this statement about any particular dog, but that by relying on the kind of conceptual information sketched above we can expect a particular dog, say Fido, to bark. Considering the statement (21a) and (21b) as a piece of discourse, 21a. The dog barks, 21b. Fido is a dog,
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corresponding concept 'is a lion' that applies to individual lions, and that encodes information about lions such as that they are mammals and carnivores, that they live in Africa and India, but can also be found in zoos, that they have a mane and tail and are of yellow colour, etc. Rather than using Meaning Postulates, the information encoded by the corresponding concept of a kind, i.e. the concept corresponding to an individual constant denoting a kind in the DRT framework, can in general more adequately and more efficiently be described by a frame-like structure. The notion of a frame has been introduced by Minsky (1974) in order to capture the idea that 'when one encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in one's view of the present problem), one selects from memory a structure called a frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary' (Minsky 1974). In Ai research, a frame is commonly understood to be a data-structure following the object-attribute-value paradigm where the attributes are called 'slots', and values can be assigned 'default assignments'. Frames can be structured to fit into a frame-hierarchy where attributes of more general frame-objects can be passed down, or bequeathed, to more specific frame objects, sometimes called 'terminals'. In more complicated frame systems slots may contain sub-frames as values, or they may be complemented by procedures for calculating values that cannot be fixed once and for all. The notion of a frame system can be easily applied to the representation of concepts (Heyer et al. 198 8). Thus, associated with the concept dog, for example, we can think of a number of slots that describe, amongst other things, the superordinate concepts), the kinds of relations into which the concept dog can get involved by assuming a certain role, information about typical locations of the kind dog and its individual representatives, information about obligatory or facultative parts of dogs, information about associated concepts (e.g. that dogs typically have an 'owner'), and information about the typical properties, i.e. characteristics, of dogs (e.g. that dogs 'bark'). The complete description of a concept, and in particular its interrelations with other concepts, can get very involved and need not be discussed here any further. Considering now a generic statement like (21) again,
108 Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions
If barkD(dog2), and represent(fido, dog2), and not_abnormal(fido, barking), then bark(fido). Generic generalisations allow for exceptions. This is an important feature of how generic generalisations enter into common-sense reasoning. But we should also be aware that a description, such as the one sketched above, of how generic generalisations give rise to expectations does not by itself provide us with a semantics of generic statements, unless we are willing to blur the distinction between semantics and knowledge representation, or between reference and expectation.
REFERENCES Biggs (1978), 'Generic generalizations', Akten aspect systems', in Krifka (ed.), Genericityin des XII Kongresses fur Linguistik, Wien, Natural Language, Proceedings of the 1988 pp. 169-72. Tubingen Conference, SNS-Bericht 88-42, Carlson (1978), Reference to Kinds in English, Tubingen. Bloomington; repr. 1982, N.Y. Hawkins (1978), Definiteness and Indefiniteness: Carlson (1982), 'Generic terms and generic A Study in Reference and Grammaticality sentences', Journal ofPhilosophical Logic, 11, Prediction, London, pp. 145-81. Heyer (1985), 'Generic descriptions, default Carlson (1987),'Exceptions to generic generreasoning, and typicality', Theoretical Linalizations', in J. Pelletier (ed.), Materials for guistics, 12, pp. 33-72. Li 230: Directed Studies on Generics, Palo Heyer (1987), GenerischeKennzeichnungen.Zur Alto. Logik und Onlologie generischer Bedeutung, Dahl (1985), Tense and Aspect Systems, Oxford. Miinchen und Wien. Dahl (1988), 'The expression of the Heyer, Ovenhausen & Luther (1988), A episodicgeneric distinction in tenseFrame-Extension ofDRSfor Supporting Con-
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the reason may have to do with the fact that if there were information to the contrary, say, because Fido is a mute, hiding this information would constitute a violation of the conversational maxime to be complete.8 However, assuming we knew that Fido is a typical dog, we could again infer that Fido barks. Recent work in the area of default reasoning attempts to formalise the logic behind such expectations (see Morreau 1988 for further references), which for obvious reasons only can occur with default generic statements. Our approach can best be fitted into McCarthy's Circumscription Theory (McCarthy 1980), an attempt to formalise common-sense reasoning that makes use of a 'rule of conjecture' as to what objects have a given property. On this scheme it is assumed that an extrapolation of expectations is permitted provided that the number of abnormal objects reasoned about is minimised. In the case of the two statements (21a) and (21b) we can therefore capture the expectation that Fido barks as follows (employing the same notation as above):
Heyer 109 ceptual
Reasoning,
ESPRIT
Project
ACORD, Deliverable T5.6, TRIUMPH-ADLER AG, Niirnberg.
TA
Krifka (1987), An Outline of Genericity, SNS-
Bericht 87-25, Tubingen. Krifka (1988), The relational Theory of Genericity', in Krifka (ed.), Genericity in Natural Language, Proceedings of the 1988 Tubingen Conference, SNS-Bericht 88-42,
Intelligence, 13, pp. 27-39.
Morreau (1988), 'Default formalisms in generics: a consumer report', in Krifka (ed.), Genericity in Natural Language, Proceedings of the 1988 Tubingen Conference,
SNS-Bericht 88-42, Tubingen. Ovenhausen (1988), 'Algorithmen zur Referenzauflosung von Deskriptoren', Diplomarbeit, EWH Koblenz and TA TRIUMPH-ADLER AG, Koblenz and Niirnberg. Putnam (1975). 'The meaning of meaning', in Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge.
Schwartz (1980), 'Natural kinds and nominal kinds', Mind, 89, pp. 182-95.
NOTES 1 Research on this topic has been supported by the Commission of the European Community under ESPRIT project P393, ACORD. I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers ofyS for their comments on the first draft of this paper that have helped me to state my ideas more clearly. 2 Krifka (1987) distinguishes between D-generic and I-generic expressions on the
('The lion is extinct'vs. '?A lion is extinct'), 2.
Dynamic Predicates always require a D-generic reading (The rat reached Australia in 1770' vs. '?A rat reached Australia in 1 77°\ 3- Accidental Properties always require a D-generic reading (The mad-
rigal is popular' vs. '?A madrigal is popular'),
4. Bad Kinds always require an I-generic reading ('?T/i« lion with three legs is ferocious' vs. 'A lion with three legs is
ferocious'). (Test (4) is slightly modified: Krifka refers to it as a context for wellestablished kinds; however, for wellestablished kinds neither the definite nor the indefinite article is filtered out, e.g. 'The lion is ferocious' and 'A lion is ferocious' are both possible; hence, only passing a context for bad kinds guarantees an I-generic reading.) In essence, therefore, these tests are equivalent to the substitutability-criterion with respect to the indefinite article as presented above. Heyer (1985, 1987) has used the substitutability-criterion for distinguishing between two readings of generic descriptions; they are equivalent to the notion of kind reference and default reference presented here. For historical reasons, kind reference has been called 'simple' or 'absolute', whereas default reference has been called 'personal', taking up the scholastic distinction between suppositio personalis, i.e. reference to indi-
viduals (hence personal), and suppositio simplex, i.e. reference to kinds (which to the medieval realists were ontologically prior and hence simple); for further details on the historical aspect of generic reference cf. Heyer (1987). 3 This problem is similar to Carlson's (1978) of how to present a unified analysis of the bare plural. However, while Carlson attempted a unified treatment of 'generic' and 'existential' readings of the bare plural, the problem presented here concerns a unified treatment of kind reference and default reference. (In case of the definite
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Tubingen. Lawler (1973), 'Studies in English generics', Dissertation, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor. Loebner (1985), 'Definites', fournal of Semantics , 4, pp. 279-326. Minsky (1974), 'A framework for representing knowledge', Artificial Intelligence Memo 306, MIT Lab, Cambridge, Mass. McCarthy (1980), 'Circumscription: a form of non-monotonic reasoning', Artificial
basis of the following tests: 1. Kind Predicates always require a D-generic reading
i io Semantics and Knowledge Representation in the Analysis of Generic Descriptions 5 A similarity circle is a set such that with respect to a relation R (i) every pair of elements of that set is a similarity pair (Rpair), and (2) for no element outside that set the relation R holds for every element in that set. Similarity circles based on a similiarity relation R can overlap. 6 See Heyer (1987, ch. 6) for details. 7 Using natural numbers as indices of natural kinds may appear as an unacceptable restriction. It results, however, in a rather natural representation of the traditional genus-species distinction. 8 I am grateful to Prof. Schnelle for pointing this out to me.
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article, Carlson's problem would mean to present a unified treatment of definite and generic descriptions.) 4 Consider the following examples: 'Smarty is so-called because he is so smart', 'The musk-rat is so-called because it smells of musk'. As is well known, sentential negation always attaches to the sentential predicate, except in quantified statements, where negation attaches to the quantifier expression. (This is the reason why Frege calls quantifiers second-order predicates.) Again, according to this criterion, generic descriptions behave like proper names, and not like quantifiers.
Journal of Semantics 7: 111-113
© N.I.S. Foundation (1990)
Book Review
Graeme Hirst, Semantic Interpretation of the Resolution of Ambiguity. Studies in
Natural Language Processing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987. ISBN 0521 322030. xv + 263 pages.
Hirst's book is based on his 1983 doctoral dissertation. Readers who are familiar with the dissertation will find that the book version follows the same layout, chapter for chapter, sub-section for sub-section. The material is revised, but the book does not present significant new research results beyond the thesis work. However, Hirst does a good job of discussing the related work that has appeared in the intervening four years, and he adds a new chapter of unanswered questions, speculations, and exercises for the reader. Some of the jokes have been removed, and the result is perhaps a little more 'scholarly' in tone, while still maintaining an interesting and amusing style. Hirst says his work is 'Montague-inspired', and he uses Transformational Grammar, but nothing rests on the details of either the grammar or the semantic representation language. His arguments should be applicable to a wide range of theoretical orientations, and should not be dismissed out of hand by those who count themselves in different camps. Hirst divides the problem of semantic interpretation into three parts, which are reflected both in the organisation of the book, and in the computer implementation he has built. First he addresses the overall problem of interpretation, laying out six desirable qualities. He describes his system, named Absity, which he claims meets five of the six criteria. Absity uses strict composition of well-formed semantic objects. It is driven by syntax, and maintains a strict correspondence between syntactic and semantic types, but it allows for interaction between parser and interpreter. The second part of the book is devoted to lexical disambiguation. This part, like the other two, consists of two chapters, the first describing the problem, and the second oudining a solution. The review of the psycholinguistic literature in the 'problem' chapter is particularly good. Hirst's solution is to use 'Polaroid words': fake semantic objects which eventually develop into real ones. I have always found the concept of Polaroid words to be an apt and compelling metaphor, but Hirst should make clearer the distinction between metaphor and implementation. As a technical term 'Polaroid words' is equivalent, as far as I
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PETER NORVIG
112 Book Review
(1) A good secretary can type quickly written reports. (2) *A good secretary can type quickly reports. The faulty argument goes as follows:
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can tell, to the less evocative term 'disjunction'. ('Developing' a Polaroid word is equivalent to eliminating a disjunct, and sharing of pictures is equivalent to the destructive unification commonly used in unification grammars.) Part three addresses structural disambiguation. Again, the introduction to the problem is good, with many interesting examples, but the solution is less satisfying. Hirst proposes a 'semantic enquiry desk' which can be asked questions about the existence or plausibility of proposed interpretations. Unfortunately, the implementation only handles two types of ambiguity; prepositional phrase attachment, and gap finding in relative clauses. Furthermore, as the name 'semantic enquiry desk' suggests, Hirst takes a wholly semantic view of structural disambiguation, ignoring the fact that certain syntactic constructions may be more frequent than others, or that pragmatic factors may influence the interpretation. For me, the most serious problem is a lack of commensurability, and indeed a lack of interaction between the various interpretation and disambiguation components. For example, the table on page 174 gives a decision algorithm for the attachment of a restrictive PP. The algorithm combines the principles of referential success, plausibility, verb expectations and reference failure avoidance, but it does so in a completely serial, binary fashion. The principles are strictly ordered in importance, and there is no way for them to interact, nor any way to express, for example, degrees of plausibility. Furthermore, there is no provision for interaction between two different ambiguities as posed to the semantic enquiry desk (although there is a mechanism for allowing Polaroid words to communicate with each other). Recent work in semantic interpretation such as Charniak (1983) and Hobbs (1983) addresses just these problems; it is not clear how limited Hirst's approach is without these capabilities, nor how easy it would be to extend his approach. Hirst is unusually candid in characterising what his system can and cannot do, but he does not do a very good job at showing us examples, or providing statistics. It is certainly useful to know that Absity can do X and Y but not Z, but the reader would get a better feel for the strengths and weaknesses of the system if Hirst would add '... and it successfully interprets N% of a 100-sentence corpus of text, taken from...'. While the level of argumentation is usually high, there are a few logical breakdowns. One that particularly irks me is found on page 135. In discussing the ambiguity of the attachment of the adverb 'quickly' in (1) below, Hirst uses the ungrammaticality of (2) to argue that the 'type-quickly' reading of (1) must also be ungrammatical.
Book Review 113 The error is that in general an adverb may not be placed between a verb and its object NP; any adverb in such a position must in fact be part of the NP, if that is at all possible, and sentences in which it is not, such as [3], are best marginally well formed: [3] *? Nadia closed rapidly the stopcock' (pp. 135-6)
University of California at Berkeley Computer Science Division Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
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But of course Hirst's preconception that any NP can be substituted for any other without affecting grammaticality is simply false, as Ross (1973) has convincingly shown. Ross shows many examples where a heavier NP (like 'written reports') allows or prefers preposed modifiers where a lighter NP (like 'reports') takes a postposed modifier. In each of the books's three parts, I find myself preferring the 'problem' chapter over the 'solution' chapter. The discussion of the various problems tend to be broad yet reasonably comprehensive, with good examples chosen for illustration. However, Hirst often jumps from the data to a solution without adequately considering other possible solutions. This is appropriate for a Ph.D. thesis, but is less so for a book. As a result, the reader gets the impression that Hirst knows the subject matter very well, but the conclusions can only be accepted as a matter of faith in his experience. For example, on page 43 Hirst justifies his choice of a compositional system by saying 'Compositionality is clearly a desideratum'. While this may be largely true, there are also cases (idioms, metaphors, certain grammatical constructions) where noncompositionality is a desideratum. Hirst, not unreasonably, chooses a completely compositional approach, but he does not tell us how to handle the difficulties, nor does he tell us what an alternative choice might entail. The end result is that the book gives the reader an excellent introduction to some problems in semantic interpretation and a good description of one approach to the problems, but no compelling arguments for accepting that approach.
REFERENCES RossJ. R(i973),'Nouniness', inO. Fujimura Charniak, Eugene and Robert Goldman, A (ed.), Three Dimensions of Linguistic Theory, logic for semantic interpretation, Proceedings of TEC, Tokyo. the 26th Meeting of the ACL 87-9+, Buffalo, Hobbs, Jerry R., Mark Srickel, Paul Martin NY, 1983. and Douglas Edwards. Interpretation as abduction, Proceedings of the 26th Meeting of the ACL, 95-103, Buffalo, NY, 1983.
Journal ofSemantics 7:115-119
© N.I.S. Foundation (1990)
Book Review
Laurel J. Brinton. The Development ofEnglish Aspectual Systems. Aspectualizers and Post-Verbal Particles. Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-521-35016-6. xii + 307 pages. OSTEN DAHL Downloaded from jos.oxfordjournals.org by guest on January 1, 2011
To understand the title of the book under review, it is necessary to explicate a terminological subtlety introduced by the author. One of the main points he makes is the need for making a clear distinction between the two concepts 'aspect' and 'aktionsart'. Noting that 'there is no cover term encompassing both aspect and aktionsart' (p. 4), he says that he 'will use aspectual in this inclusive sense, reserving aspect for the simple category' (ibid.). The expression 'aspectual systems' in the title thus should be understood as including both 'aspect systems' and 'aktionsart systems'. Indeed, of the two areas studies in the book, what Brinton calls 'aspectualizers' (i.e. verbs like begin, stop, continue—\ shall refer to them as 'phasal verbs') and 'post-verbal particles' (e.g. up in drink up), the former expresses aspect and the latter aktionsart, according to Brinton. The book consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 is called 'Aspectual studies in English: trends and problems': this is maybe too narrow a characterization of its contents, since many of the authors cited have treated the problem of aspect/ aktionsart also in other languages than English. Considerable space is devoted to discussions of 'verb typologies' (e.g. Vendler's well-known taxonomy of situations) and the 'compositional' nature of aspect, i.e. the ways in which the aspectual character of verb phrases and sentences depends on various features of their consituents. Chapter 2 and 3 are devoted to the first of the two problem areas, 'phasal verbs': Chapter 2 discusses their status and function in Modern English whereas Chapter 3 treats their historical development, in particular the process by which they develop out of verbs with spatial meanings (this also includes a general discussion of the concept of 'grammaticalization'). In a similar way, Chapter 4 is concerned with verb particles in Modern English and Chapter 5 with their history—how the prefixing system of Old English developed into the post-verbal particle construction of Modern English. Here, too, the author finds a general semantic development from spatial to aspectual meanings. Finally, in Chapter 6, the results of the investigation are summed up. As noted in the preface, the book originated in the author's dissertation on 'The development of aspectualizers in Germanic and in Old and Middle
n 6 Book Review
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English'. (It could perhaps be said that the book is maybe in some places still slightly too 'dissertation-like'.) With respect to data, Brinton bases himself mainly on secondary sources such as concordances and dictionaries. I do not feel competent to comment on his treatment of Old and Middle English but shall restrict the ensuing discussion to problems of a more general kind. Let me start with the distinction already mentioned, that between 'aspect' and 'aktionsart'. Many scholars have insisted on the importance of this distinction, although they have been less unanimous on how to make it. Brinton notes that 'the differentiation of aspect and aktionsart has, in fact, been approached from a number of different directions: in terms of the contrasts "grammaticar vs. "lexical" aspect, "subjective" vs. "objective" aspect, aspect vs. "character" . . . and "viewpoint" vs. "situation" aspect' (p. 3). The problem is of course that depending on which of these contrasts one focuses on, the distinction can apply in rather different ways to concrete cases. In my view, the term 'aktionsart' should be avoided, since it is actually open to so many interpretations, something which is often reflected in the difficulties people have to use it consistently. Brinton turns out to be no exception in this regard. As I have already said, he claims that verbs like begin, stop, and continue, phasal verbs, express aspect rather than aktionsart. The question, is, however, whether the criteria mentioned by Brinton himself would not rather indicate the opposite. Thus, one important contrast between aspect and aktionsart would be that in aspect, 'the speaker chooses a particular viewpoint' on a situation,1 whereas aktionsart concerns 'the inherent nature of the situation portrayed'. Brinton often talks of the 'phasal verbs' as 'focusing' on a certain part of a situation (the beginning, the end, etc.): this choice of words is of course consonant with regarding them as expressing 'viewpoint'. An alternative view, however, is that verbs like begin and cease do something more than focus on a part of a situation: that a situation takes its beginning is in itself an event and is thus a situation in its own right. Consider the verb die, a paradigm example of what Brinton calls 'punctual aktionsart' ('achievement' in Vendler's terms), paraphraseable as 'cease to live'. It seems rather far-fetched to say that die and live denote the same situations although they focus on different phases of it. But if begin and cease do introduce new situations, they should be regarded as pertaining to aktionsart. In fact, Brinton sometimes expresses himself in a way that suggests such a view. Thus, he says on p. 91 that 'though it is possible to think of beginnings and endings as having limited duration, they are usually considered punctual situations . ..'. Consider now another contrast associated with the aspect/aktionsart distinction, that between grammar and lexicon. Brinton says (p. 3): 'Aspect is grammatical because, broadly speaking, it is expressed by verbal inflectional morphology and periphrases, aktionsart by the lexical meaning of verbs and verbal derivational morphology'. However, when we look at the 'aspects'
Book Review 117
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connected with Brinton's phasal verbs—ingressive, egressive and continuative— we find that they are rather seldom expressed morphologically at all in the world's languages, and if they are, it is by derivation rather than inflection (cf. the discussion of'inceptive aspect' in Bybee 1985). The assumption that 'phasal verbs' should be regarded as grammatical rather than lexical items is essential for the treatment of their development, since he wants to look at the transition of e.g. verbs of motion into 'phasal verbs' as a process of grammaticalization. His discussion of the grammatical status of 'phasal verbs' centres around the question whether they should be regarded as auxiliaries rather than main verbs, his conclusion being that although according to traditional syntactic criteria (the so-called 'NICE tests') they would be main verbs, they are equivalent to auxiliaries from the semantics and functional point of view. Thus, 'phasal verbs have all the semantic, but not all the syntactic, features of auxiliaries in Modern English' (p. 94). Further, 'the development of the appropriate semantic and functional qualities of auxiliary-hood seems to be immediate, but... acquisition of the requisite syntactic forms proceeds slowly' (ibid.). I am not sure if this should be taken as a prediction to the effect that in a few hundred years or so the 'phasal verbs' will become true auxiliaries in English: they will drop the 3rd person singular ending, will not need dosupport, etc. I do not know of any good examples of parallels to such a development elsewhere, and it thus remains a conjecture of Brinton's, which in my opinion makes it rather difficult to draw any conclusions about grammaticalisation in general. Brinton repeatedly emphasises the need to consider the semantic aspects of grammaticalisation. It is certainly possible to agree with this, but I find it harder to label as grammaticalisation a semantic change with no or little morphosyntactic consequences (that is, consequences that are observed rather than predicted). One thing that this seems to presuppose is that we have an independent way of distinguishing grammatical and lexical meaning. Certain formulations in the book also suggest that Brinton thinks that this is the case.Thus, he says that it is significant that in none of the three extant analyses of the semantics of phasal verbs—'in terms of "change-of-state calculus", abstract predicates, and presupposition/consequences'—'is recourse had to lexical meaning' (pp. 75-6) and that 'the possibility of analysing phasal verbs in logical or relational terms alone constitutes further evidence for their status as grammatical markers' (ibid.). But there is no reason to assume that the meaning of lexical items cannot sometimes be analysed in logical and relational terms—whatever that means. Let me now turn to a rather different problem, viz. Brinton's treatment of the notion 'perfectiviry'. Brinton accepts one of the current definitions of 'perfective aspect', viz. that it denotes a situation 'seen as a complete whole' (p. 62). At the sametime,he claims that the simple (non-progressive) verb forms in English are in general markers of perfective aspect. The problem with such a
[ 18 Book Review
University ofStockholm Linguistics Institute 5-10691 Stockholm Sweden
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claim is of course that the simple forms are typically used of states and habits, and in the majority of languages whose tense-aspect systems are commonly taken to include a perfective/imperfective distinction, states and habits go with the imperfective aspect. Brinton argues that in English those 'are generally seen as wholes'. Thus, 'states are by necessity viewed perfectively since, being nondynamic and in a sense complete, they are incompatible with the imperfective aspect' and habits, generic situations, etc. 'are viewed perfectively since equivalent expressions in the imperfective express single ongoing situations' (pp. 16-17). The problem of other languages is taken up in a footnote (p. 256) where it is said that 'the use of imperfective forms with habitual meaning ... does not necessarily point to a natural affinity... between the two categories. It seems just as natural to view habits as wholes (perfectively) as to view them imperfectively. In fact, English most frequently uses a perfective form (i.e. the simple present) to indicate a habit.' By invoking the perfective nature of the English simple present in this way Brinton comes dangerously close to circular reasoning. In any case, even if one need not agree with the classification of habituality as a subcategory of imperfective, Brinton's treatment obscures the typologically rather important distinction between 'progressive', which typically excludes states and habits, and 'imperfective', which typically includes them. (It should be added that in the languages which arguably use perfective forms for habits—e.g. some Slavic languages—it is not the habit as such that is regarded as wholes but rather each separate action by which the habit is manifested (Monnesland 1984). Finally a brief comment on Brinton's discussion of what he calls 'phrasal verbs' or verbs with post-verbal particles such as drink up, carry through: I would agree with his conclusion that the particles in those constructions in English do not function as markers of perfective aspect in the proper sense, and that regarding them as expressing aktionsart distinctions is reasonable on most understandings of the concept of aktionsart. From a cross-linguistic point of view, it would have been valuable to make a comparison with the Slavic languages, where the corresponding morphemes (verbal prefixes) are commonly taken to play a role in the aspect system. Brinton's book is well written and well edited. It contains informative surveys of earlier research and a lot of empirical material from Old and Middle English, to which I certainly have not done justice in this brief review. The same goes for much of the theoretical discussion, some points of which I would like to return to in another context. The critical remarks above should be seen in the light of my own bias, emanating from my interest in the typological study of tense-aspect systems and their development.
Book Review 119
REFERENCES Bybee, J. L. (1985), Morphology: A Study of the Relation Between Meaning and Form,
Amsterdam, John Benjamins.
Monnesland, S. (1984), 'The Slavonic frequentative habitual', in de Groot & Tommola (eds).
Comrie, B. (1976), Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Groot, C. de & H. Tommola (eds) (1984), Aspect Bound: A Voyage into the Realm of Germanic, Slavonic and Finno-Ugrian As-
1 Like Brinton and Comrie (1976), I use 'situation' as a cover term for states, events, processes, etc.
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pectology, Dordrecht, Foris Publications.
NOTE
