Non-military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security

Non-Military Security and Global Order The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security

Peter Chalk

Non-Military Security and Global Order

Also by Peter Chalk WEST EUROPEAN TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: The Evolving Dynamic

Non-Military Security and Global Order The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security Peter Chalk National Security Research Division RAND Corporation Arlington, Virginia

First published in Great Britain 2000 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0–333–77373–X First published in the United States of America 2000 by ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, LLC, Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 0–312–23167–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chalk, Peter. Non-military security and global order : the impact of extremism, violence, and chaos on national and international security / Peter Chalk. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–312–23167–9 (cloth) 1. Internal security. 2. Security, International. I. Title. HV6419 .C53 2000 363.3'2—dc21 00–021169 © Peter Chalk 2000 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. 10 09

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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Contents List of Tables

vi

List of Illustrations

vii

Preface

ix

List of Abbreviations

xi

Introduction

1

1

Terrorism

15

2

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade

37

3

Contemporary Maritime Piracy

57

4

Environmental Degradation

77

5

The Transnational Spread of Disease

95

6

Mass Unregulated Population Flows

115

Conclusion Appendix 1:

135 Statistical Tables

149

Appendix 2: Major International Conventions against Terrorism, Illicit Drugs Production and Trafficking, Piracy and Environmental Degradation

152

Appendix 3: The Maastricht Third Pillar of Judicial and Home Affairs Co-operation

155

Notes

159

Select Bibliography

210

Index

217

v

List of Tables A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6

International and Domestic Terrorist Incidents, 1968–88 International and Domestic Terrorist Incidents by Geographic Location, 1989–96 Casualties Caused by International and Domestic Terrorism, 1990–96 Costs of Fighting Drug Abuse in the US, 1997–98 Pirate Attacks by Geographic Location, 1991–98 Violence Committed to Crew During Pirate Attacks, 1991–98

vi

149 149 150 150 151 151

List of Illustrations Ch. 1 Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 Terrorist suicide kit: plastic explosive and ball-bearing belt worn around the upper torso and triggered by electronic detonator. Fig. 1.3 The reality of modern-day terrorism. The aftereffects of an LTTE ‘Black’ suicide bomber. Fig. 1.4 With the threat of nuclear and radiological smuggling on the increase, many ports are now forced to deploy added security when loading and off-loading freight. Ch. 2 Figs. 2.1 and 2.2 Double UO-Globe, commonly found on heroin importations into Australia, Canada and the US (courtesy of the Australian Northern Territory Police, through the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence). Fig. 2.3 Heroin block arrives in Australia (courtesy of the ANTP, through the ABCI). Fig 2.4 Drugs packaged on the street (courtesy of the ANTP, through the ABCI). Fig 2.5 The Bahari-314 was used to import heroin into Australia. About 123 kg of block heroin was recovered from this vessel in July 1994 (courtesy of Australian Customs Service, through the ABCI). Fig 2.6 The Teh Sun, again used import block heroin. About 21 kg were recovered in July 1995 (courtesy of the Australian Customs Service, through the ABCI). Ch. 3 Fig 3.1 The Anna Sierra, hijacked in a phantom ship attack in Southeast Asia (courtesy of the Regional Piracy Centre in Kuala Lumpur, through the International Chamber of Commerce, London). Fig 3.2 The ‘crew’ who brought the ship to the port of Bei Hei, southern China (courtesy of the RPC, through the ICC, London). vii

19 30

34

40 42 45

49

49

63

64

viii List of Illustrations

Ch. 5 Fig 5.1

Fig 5.2

Fig 5.3

Section through lung (naked eye appearance) showing numerous white nodules from a fatal case of tuberculosis (courtesy of Professor Jeremy Jass, Department of Pathology, University of Queensland, Australia). 97 Microscopic sample obtained from an ulcerated area in the large intestine showing Entamoeba histolytica, the protozoan parasitical cyst responsible for amoebic dysentery (courtesy of Professor Jeremy Jass, Department of Pathology, University of Queensland, Australia). 100 Bubo in the left ingunial region of a Vietnamese woman. Needle aspiration subsequently revealed numerous microorganisms which were confirmed as Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of bubonic plague (courtesy of Professor Robin Cook and Dr Geoffrey Bourke, Royal Brisbane Hospital, Australia). 101

Preface This book represents the culmination of four years’ research into the evolving nature of national and international security in the post-Cold War era. It is predicated on the belief that, in many ways, the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union has become more dangerous and unpredictable, involving threats and destabilising influences that lack the relatively clear and precise nature of the conventional influences with which the world was concerned during the height of US and USSR ideological confrontation. Threats in the contemporary era are diffuse, insidious, interrelated and only very occasionally part of the strategic power-plays of specific state actors. The period of large-scale conventional war and nuclear Armaggedon is gone. It has been replaced with a new era of insecurity, one that is, arguably, even more threatening than the age that preceded it. It is to an examination of the dimensions of this global disorder, and how the international community might best deal with it, that this study is devoted. The extensive array of published and unpublished information used in the preparation of the text is a testament to the number of people who have played a crucial role in the preparation of this book. I would, however, like to extend my particular gratitude to the following for their input, insights and logistical help: Eric Ellen and Jayant Abyankar of the International Maritime Bureau, London; Allen Nugent, the former Counsellor for Narcotics Affairs with the US Embassy in Bangkok; Rohan Gunaratna, British Chevening Scholar at the University of St Andrews; Bruce Hoffman, Director of the RAND Corporation’s Washington office; John McFarlane, Visiting Fellow with the Australian Defence Studies Centre; Douglas Ranmuthugala, Senior Analyst with the Australian Federal Police; Vice-Admiral Nitz Srisomwong, former Director of the Thai Institute of Advanced Naval Studies; John Martin, former Far East Manager of the Malaysian Regional Piracy Centre; Gavin Greenwood, Senior Asian Analyst with the Control Risks Group; Tony Davis, Specialist Correspondent with Jane’s Intelligence Review; Mohan Samarsinghe, Head of Public Information at the Sri Lankan High Commission in Ottawa; Hazel Lang, Research Assistant with the Australian National University’s Research School of Asian and Pacific Studies; Tex Enemark, Public Policy and Government Affairs Consultant in Vancouver; Hugh Barber, ix

x Preface

Senior Data Analyst with Pinkerton’s Risk Assessment Services, Washington D.C.; Mayer Nudell, Specialist Security Consultant, Virginia; Bob Thomas, Senior Liaison Officer with the Australian Federal Police in Manila; James Cooney, Director of Sustainable Development, Placer Dome Inc., Vancouver; and Alan Dupont, Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra. In addition, I would like to thank all those who were willing to talk to me but who, for various reasons, have preferred to remain anonymous. Needless to say, the thoughts contained herein are my own and I consequently take full responsibility for any errors or faults that might occur in the text. I am also grateful to Pinkerton’s Risk Assessment Services, the International Maritime Bureau, the Control Risks Group, the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, the Australian Federal Police and the US Embassy in Bangkok for their provision of statistical and visual data. Grateful thanks are due to the Strategic Defence Studies Centre, Taylor and Francis, Jane’s Information Group and Carfax, the publishers respectively of the Canberra Papers series, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Jane’s Intelligence Review and the Australian Journal of International Affairs, for permission to use some material from articles and monographs that I had previously written for these journals and magazines. Peter Munro was tireless in his editing assistance. The University of Queensland’s Government Department provided administrative and financial backing. Thanks, too, to the staff at Macmillan, particularly Karen Brazier, my commissioning editor, who made the publishing of this book possible. Finally, but by no means least, a special expression of thanks must be extended to my wife, Tasha. This project could not have been realised without your consistent love, support, encouragement and understanding and it is to you that I dedicate this book. PETER CHALK Brisbane, Australia

List of Abbreviations ACDA ADB AFP AIDS ANM BfV BIMCO C18 CFC CIA CMASS CMC CRG CSIS DEA ELN EU FAO FARC GAP GIA HIV HLH ICC IMB IMO IPCC KLA LLAR LTTE MCHJ MLAR MTA NBC NCIS PKK

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Asian Development Bank Australian Federal Police Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Aryan Nations Movement Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutzamt Baltic International Maritime Council Combat 18 Chloroflurocarbon Central Intelligence Agency Counterdrug Modelling and Simulation System Crisis Management Centre Control Risks Group Canadian Security Intelligence Service Drug Enforcement Agency National Liberation Army European Union Food and Agriculture Organisation Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia Grey Area Phenomena Armed Islamic Group Human Immunodeficiency Virus Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan International Criminal Court International Maritime Bureau International Maritime Organisation Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Kosovo Liberation Army Low Level Armed Robbery Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Major Criminal Hijack Medium Level Armed Robbery Mong Tai Army Nuclear, Biological, Chemical National Criminal Intelligence Service Kurdish Workers Party xi

xii List of Abbreviations

RPC RPG SAM STD TB UNHCR ViCLAS WHO

Regional Piracy Centre Rocket-Propelled Grenade Surface to Air Missile Sexually Transmitted Disease Tuberculosis United Nations High Commission for Refugees Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System World Health Organisation

Introduction

With the collapse of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s/early 1990s it appeared that the international system could be on the threshold of an era of unprecedented peace and stability. Politicians, diplomats and academics alike began to forecast the imminent establishment of a new world order, increasingly managed by democratic political institutions. These, it was believed, would develop within the context of an integrated international economic system based on the principles of the free market. 1 As this new world order emerged, it was assumed that serious threats to international stability would decline commensurately. However, the initial euphoria that was evoked by the end of the Cold War has now been replaced by a growing sense of unease that threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum may soon assume greater prominence. Such concern has been stimulated largely by the remarkable fluidity that now characterises international politics in which it is no longer apparent exactly who can do what to whom and with what means. Moreover, it appears that in this new world ‘order’, violence and the readiness to risk and inflict death are increasingly being used by the ‘weak’, not so much as a means of expressing identity, but as a way of creating it.2 As Richard Latter observes, such dynamics are likely to reduce inter-state conflict only at the expense of an increase in pandemic threats that fall below the level of conventional war.3 Stated more directly, the geo-political landscape that now faces the global polity lacks the relative stability of the linear Cold War division between East and West. There is no large and obvious equivalent to the Soviet Union or the United States against which to balance. Indeed, few of today’s dangers have the character of direct military aggression emanating from a clearly defined sovereign source. By contrast, secu1

2 Non-Military Security and Global Order

rity, conflict and general threat definition have become more diffuse and opaque, lacking the simple dichotomies of the Cold War era. The challenges which will face the global community as it approaches the new millennium are likely to evolve as ‘threats without enemies’, with their source internal, rather than external, to the political order that the concept of ‘national interest’ has traditionally represented. 4 In commenting on this new strategic environment, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director James Woolsey has remarked: ‘We have slain a large dragon, but now we find ourselves living in a jungle with a bewildering number of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.’5 Making sense of these changes will require a holistic, non-linear approach to security that goes beyond the relatively parsimonious assumptions of realpolitik that informed international politics for so many years. Traditional spatial notions of security, of national stability defined purely in terms of territorial sovereignty – reflected on a larger scale by the containment doctrines of the Cold War – simply do not work in today’s more complex geo-strategic environment. Such statecentric paradigms are clearly unable to deal with issues that originate within national borders but whose effects transcend international boundaries and jurisdictions. 6 Tomorrow’s world will be the world of grey area phenomena (GAP), a setting in which standard, militarybased conceptions of power and security will have, at most, only limited relevance.

The notion of Grey Area Phenomena GAP can be loosely defined as threats to national and international security and stability by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organisations. 7 While many GAP problems come to involve violence, not all do. Those that manifest themselves in an aggressive manner are typically associated with the activities of nonstate actors such as international crime syndicates, drug trafficking organisations and terrorist groups. Non-violent GAP forces are more generally related to the threat posed by non-governmental processes and influences such as uncontrolled or illegal immigration, famine and the transnational spread of diseases such as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and cholera. Whenever GAP influences are associated with violence and aggression, however, such conflict is generally organised, employed for either political or economic purposes, and characteristically falls short of major conventional warfare.8

Introduction 3

All GAP issues, whether violent or not, represent a direct threat to the underlying stability, cohesion and fabric of the modern sovereign states system. However, unlike the challenge posed by traditional security concerns such as overt external aggression, the GAP threat is of a somewhat more transparent and insidious nature. This is because it typically stems from a context that exists outside formal state structures and only occasionally from an origin that can be directly linked to, or identified with, another polity, power faction or global ethnoreligious bloc.9 As Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha observe, this characteristically gives rise to an ‘ooze factor’ situation whereby the effects of GAP are often ignored or, when recognised, only factored into a viable political policy action equation once they have reached a major crisis destabilising stage within the state(s) concerned.10 Grey area phenomena are not new. Problems such as famine, disease, drugs trafficking, terrorism and organised crime have all existed for many years. What has changed, however, is the geostrategic setting that now surrounds these influences. The current states system is one that is particularly conducive to the occurrence and growth of threats that are neither directed by governments nor deterred by the traditional defences which states have erected to protect themselves and their citizens. Three factors, in particular, have helped to transform the post-Cold War international environment in this manner: dollarisation, the resurgence of atavistic forms of identity and globalisation. The ‘dollarisation’ of the globe The economic success of capitalism and its accompanying system of materialism have led to the so-called ‘dollarisation’ of the globe. Today in both the developed and particularly the developing world, to possess dollars is to possess power and influence; it is the mark of success. This has not only served to provide powerful motivating rationales for enhancing financial wealth – often by whatever means possible – it has also allowed non-state actors to acquire treasuries and, hence, power, of sufficient magnitude that their influence now matches or even surpasses that of many sovereign states.11 The dollarisation of the international system is essentially a consequence of the permeation of Western commercial values throughout the globe via electronic communications and widespread travel. Through television, the movies and enhanced transnational mobility, relatively unsophisticated and discontented audiences around the world have been increasingly exposed to the quasi-political distortion

4 Non-Military Security and Global Order

of materialism that is inherent within the Western/capitalist socioeconomic value system. Personal meaning and satisfaction have, as a result, come to be defined in terms of driving a ‘flashy’ car, wearing designer clothes, owning expensive jewellery, living in exotic surroundings – in short, having access to and enjoying the very best that Western consumerism and commercialism can offer.12 The quickest and easiest way to such riches, and the satisfaction they appear to engender, is through crime. This is especially true in regions where relative deprivation 13 is perceived to be especially great and legitimate economic opportunities are lacking (something that applies to most of the non-Western developing world). In these instances the possession of wealth and power have become far more important than considerations of the means used to acquire them. 14 The result has been the emergence of so-called ‘black dollar’ groups, organisations seeking material wealth on the back of sustained criminal activities which can cover anything from arms and narcotics trafficking, to gem smuggling, piracy and even the illicit trade in human body parts. One other aspect of dollarisation that carries significant implications with respect to GAP is its effect on heightening institutional prerogatives for economic development. Particularly in the Asia Pacific, governments have increasingly staked their internal legitimacy on achieving industrialisation and high rates of growth as quickly as possible. In many cases, this has come at the expense of broader environmental concerns such as nurturing biodiversity, conserving natural resources and generally managing the rate of development. Degradation, pollution and rapid, unsustainable urbanisation have been the inevitable consequences of this growth imperative, resulting in major ecological crises, the spread of disease and the displacement of a whole new category of so-called ‘environmental refugees’. 15 Accompanying these problems has been the growth of huge megapolises (such as Jakarta, Manila, Rio, Bangkok, Mexico City, Lagos, Karachi, Delhi), many of which have been characterised by lawless suburbs that have escaped any real degree of police or local security force control. As Xavier Raufer observes, it is here that ‘you find the joint presence of gangsters, terrorists and drug traffickers, trading in human beings, arms and illegal substances’.16 The resurgence of atavistic forms of identity Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a major resurgence of religious fundamentalism (Islamic and others) and other atavistic forms of identity such as ethnicity. This particular feature of the

Introduction 5

present international system is helping to sustain, and in certain instances create, highly destabilising sub-national communal conflicts, many of which have involved armed factions that are prepared to utilise terrorist strategies as either a primary or secondary mode of struggle. Such effects have been felt on a truly global scale. States throughout Western and Central Europe, Africa, Central Asia, South Asia and East Asia have literally been torn apart as a result of political terror instigated by armed groups justifying their actions on the basis of a self-proclaimed right to national or religious self-determination.17 While ethno-religious communal conflict is hardly new (many internal insurgencies during the Cold War had specific ethnic or religious overtones), there are at least two interrelated factors that are working to amplify primal conflict in the present international system. First has been the perceived failure of regimes that have defined themselves on the basis of unifying secular belief systems such as Communism, PanAfricanism and Pan-Arabism. Unable to adapt to rates of change that today come in minutes, days and months, not years or decades, and failing to satisfy the increasingly diverse demands of rapidly expanding populations, governments throughout the developing world (and in certain instances, the developed world) appear to have failed. The resulting discontinuity, disequilibria and apparent chaos have stimulated demands for alternative models of development while, at the same time, people have sought new frameworks of personal meaning to replace the obsolete universalist doctrines of the Cold War era. The combined effect has been a resurgence of nativistic ideology, with groups increasingly turning to primordial identities based on religion and ethnicity (or an amalgamation of the two) as a way of ameliorating both their frustration and discontent.18 Second, the disintegration of the imposed order of the Cold War has allowed ethno-religious forces to take on greater freedom and autonomy in their own right. No longer concerned by global ideological imperatives, neither Washington or Moscow has an interest (and at least in Russia’s case, the capability) in containing regional hostilities – conflicts which, in many cases, were deliberately engineered as part of their respective national security policies (see above). The lifting of the superpower ‘lid’ in this fashion has lent an unprecedented ‘fluidity’ to world politics, unleashing a whole variety of ethnic, religious and territorial tensions which had, hitherto, been effectively capped or at least controlled.19 This particular effect of the post-Cold War era has been felt most acutely in multi-ethnic states that have had no previous experience of

6 Non-Military Security and Global Order

ethnic accommodation. In such instances, nationalism has typically drawn upon ethnicity20 as a relational concept, creating boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ which have been further entrenched and radicalised by the calls of politicians, nationalists and demagogues to cleanse and purify their particular ‘ethnies’ from all contaminating and alien influences.21 ‘Globalisation’ The present international system is now more globally interdependent than at any other time in history. Today one can physically move from one part of the world to another in the same time (if not more rapidly) that it used to take to journey from one city or county to another, with such international travel being largely open to all.22 If the word ‘physically’ is removed from the above sentence, the world is reduced to mere seconds and even micro-seconds. Real-time events happening on one side of the globe can be observed from distant locations simply by accessing CNN or the BBC via a generator. Money moves even faster, with an estimated US$1 trillion being electronically transferred around the globe each day (compared with an annual trade of US$155 billion between the US and Japan).23 Whether measured on the basis of information flows, foreign investment, financial transactions, the total volume of world trade, government-to-government contact or people-to-people links, the figures all show major increases, especially over the last twenty years.24 While it is not necessary to spell out these developments in terms of specific statistics – the trends are both clear and well known – the consequences for GAP do require some elucidation.25 Globalisation can have many positive effects. The intermingling of cultures, the growth of economic exchange, the sharing of information and the promotion of universal norms can be mutually rewarding and certainly do contribute to peaceful inter-state relations. However these same forces also provide opportunities for more insidious non-governmental influences like infectious disease and pollution to spread. In addition, they provide new incentives and capabilities for non-state actors to traffic narcotics, coordinate terrorist activities, buy arms, shift capital and generally move and operate on a genuinely global scale. 26 In today’s global world, GAP players have the potential to operate with the same speed, precision and international dimension as decisionmakers in advanced nation-states.27 Indeed, given the fact that borders and jurisdictional frontiers continue to be viewed as sacrosanct by most polities in the present international system, it could be argued

Introduction 7

that GAP actors are actually able to function more effectively than governments. As Cherif Bassiouni observes: These phenomena which transcend national boundaries are not hampered by political and diplomatic considerations, nor do they suffer from the impediments created by bureaucratic divisions among the national organs of law enforcement and prosecution. The international response to phenomena which know no national boundaries [has thus been] piecemeal, divided, and more frequently than not, divisive of any effective efforts at international cooperation.28 States, at least in the realist paradigm of Cold War politics, were defined as individual sovereign units that acted in their own self-interest and sought to maximise their security through power. The great game of nations was seen as one that was wholly distributive or zerosum in nature: one state could only gain at the expense of another. Threats, when they occurred, typically arose from relative power differentials between the system’s major actors. For stability to occur, a balance of power was required.29 Today’s problem is far more complex. Globalisation has created a transnational web in which states can no longer view themselves as individual, territorially self-defined units. More problematically it has expanded mobility and communication in such a way that novel and unanticipated threats can quickly arise. 30 Who could have foreseen, for instance, that modern jet airliners would provide an ideal vector for the transmission of deadly infectious diseases? Or that the development of modern electronic banking systems would enable an Islamic zealot hiding out in the mountains of Afghanistan to finance and coordinate attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania?

The proliferation of light weapons and small arms One final issue that deserves special mention in the context of exacerbating the threat posed by violent GAP actors is the proliferation of light weapons and small arms. We are currently living in an age where organised violence has become a tool that is increasingly available to sub-state actors and groups. The basic division between the government, army and people – the bedrock of the trinitarian concept of conventional warfare – has collapsed as a result of the production and diffusion of armament technology.31 This destructuring, rooted in the mass production and proliferation of basic and more advanced light

8 Non-Military Security and Global Order

weapons, has made it increasingly difficult for governments to monopolise violence in its own hands, transforming what was, for many years, an immutable power balance matrix between state and non-state actor. In so doing, it has given discontented and criminal elements an enhanced ability to not only inflict considerable damage but also the means by which to attain a real degree of empowerment vis-à-vis the government.32 Indeed in certain cases, a state’s security forces might even find themselves facing weapons that are equally as powerful as those that they, themselves, have access to. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the LTTE has been able repeatedly to frustrate security force offensives in the north of the country as a direct result of the sophisticated standoff mortar capacity that the group has managed to build up over the last few years.33 The terms ‘small arm’ and ‘light weapon’ are really a misnomer as many of these munitions retain a phenomenal capacity to kill and inflict chaos and mayhem. 34 The globally spread Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle, for instance, can fire up to 30 rounds in less than three seconds, with each bullet lethal up to a range of half a kilometre. At close quarters, the Heckler and Koch AM 180 sub-machine gun is even more devastating, having a cyclic rate of fire of 1500 rounds per minute. The Russian-made RPG-7 can penetrate 330 mm-thick armour at distances of up to half a kilometre, while the US-made Claymore landmine is able to propel up to 700 steel balls in a 60 degree arc and is lethal up to 50 metres.35 Small and light arms are commonly accepted to have a number of characteristics that lend themselves to rapid and frequent movement, both across borders, between organisations and amongst individuals. They are, by definition, light. This facilitates cheap and easy transportation and covert movement. Arms caches have been sent to insurgent groups by boat, in trucks, on the back of camels and even by post. Light weapons are also cheap, which opens up a very large potential buyer’s market, even in the poorest parts of the world. Finally, light weapons are extremely durable, requiring only a minimum level of field maintenance. They rarely break down and do not require an extensive inventory of spare parts.36 Many of the light weapons currently in circulation originate from Russia and Eastern Europe. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, impoverished conscripts from the former Red Army have become increasingly prepared to sell off their weapons in order to supplement poor (and sometimes, non-existent) pay. This, together with the greatly reduced size of the Russian army, has meant that there is now

Introduction 9

in existence a huge surplus of light weapons ready to be exploited by the growing number of Russian organised crime rings that deal in armaments.37 Reflecting this, between 1992 and mid-1994, the Russian military lost 14 400 assault rifles, hand and sub-machine guns, as well as seventeen shoulder-launched anti-tank weapons. An additional 2300 firearms were illegally diverted from stocks owned by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the first six months of 1994 alone.38 The collapse of the Soviet Eastern bloc has also contributed to small arms proliferation from Eastern Europe. The dissolution of the Volksarmee in East Germany, to take just one example, rendered surplus more than 295 000 tons of munitions, including one million handguns and 26 346 rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). 39 As Latham observes, ‘because controls were lax and economic incentives high, many of these weapons were [subsequently] stolen and sold to various combatant parties in ex-Yugoslavia and elsewhere’.40 The need for foreign currency to buttress financial and commercial sectors faltering in the difficult transition from centrally planned to open economic systems is a further factor that has impacted on small arms proliferation from Eastern Europe. A number of governments in the region have realised that one of the best ways to augment dwindling reserves of dollars, sterling and francs is through the trade of one of their most profitable exports – weapons.41 While these countries do not overtly trade with sub-state extremist and criminal groups, they often deal with ‘middle men’ that do. In 1997, for instance, Ben Tsoi, a prominent arms sub-contractor whose company, L. B. J. Military Supplies, is licensed by the Israeli Defence Department, arranged a huge consignment of 32 400 mortar bombs to be delivered to the Tamil Tigers from Croatia.42 Two years earlier, a British sub-contractor, Peter von Kalkstein-Bleach, purchased 77 cases of Bulgarian-made weapons for a Danish client who was, in turn, working on behalf of the Ananda Marga, a militant Hindu fundamentalist group based in India. According to Donald Manross, the Director of Interpol’s Firearms and Explosives Division, deals like this are being brokered for groups all over the world every day of the year.43 Notwithstanding the importance of Russia and Eastern Europe, it is the legacy that has been left by the Cold War that is the main factor accounting for the proliferation of small and light arms throughout the international system. During the 1970s and 1980s, the US and USSR both made extensive use of ‘war by proxy’44 as a way of indirectly pursuing their global objectives. In a number of instances, the adoption of client armies involved the transfer of extensive armouries to areas of

10 Non-Military Security and Global Order

intense East–West rivalry and it is here that the majority of light weapons currently come from. The most important parts of the world in this regard include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Cambodia. Pakistan Following the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US set up a major munitions pipeline through Pakistan to ensure that Mujahideen rebel forces had access to sufficient firepower to mount a concerted resistance against the Soviet army. Throughout the 1980s, tens of thousands of tons of weaponry and ammunition flowed through the pipeline, with estimates of the total amount of money allocated by Washington to the supply of light arms between US$6 billion and US$8 billion. Many of these weapons were diverted by Pakistan’s InterService Intelligence (ISI) Department, which controlled and monitored the pipeline. The extent of this leakage is unknown, although a former head of ISI claimed in 1993 that the organisation still had access to three million AK-47s, all packed and greased.45 Since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, Pakistan has become awash with weapons. The bulk of these originated in the Afghan pipeline, although replicas of originals produced by small-scale producers in back-street factories have also been an important source of supply. Booming arms bazaars have sprung up throughout the Northwest Frontier region, particularly around Peshawar where ‘vendors’ are known to sell anything from assault rifles to entire antiaircraft systems. Many of these have since found their way to militant organisations operating in other parts of Pakistan as well as groups in India, Sri Lanka and the southern Philippines.46 Afghanistan Afghanistan itself has also emerged as an important source of weapons in South Asia. While many of the weapons intended for the Mujahideen never made it to the front line, a substantial number did, including, most notably, US-made Stinger SAMs. These awesome weapons are lethal for all aircraft up to an altitude of 3.5 kilometres and are capable of attaining speeds up to 2600 kilometres an hour. During the Afghan war they achieved a remarkable kill ratio of 79 per cent. The US is known to have transferred 900 Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen during the 1980s; of these, only 340 have so far been accounted for. It is widely rumoured that the remainder are being traded in the arms bazaars along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border.47

Introduction 11

In addition, Afghanistan has emerged as an important source of AK-47s, RPGs and sniper rifles, most of which were captured by Mujahideen forces from the Soviet occupying army. Ammunition for these weapons is freely available and, in the case of rifles, tends to be sold by the kilogram.48 Southern Africa During the Cold War, post-independence conflicts in Namibia, Angola and Mozambique provided ample opportunity for states such as the US, Soviet Union and South Africa to influence events through the supply of military hardware to proxy actors. Now that these Cold War conflicts have ended, a huge surplus of weaponry has been created in southern Africa. Much of this has fallen into the hands of sub-state rebel and criminal groups, either for immediate use or for sale on the black market. The situation in Mozambique is particularly serious. Largely due to the disarmament failures of UNOMOZ, 49 at least six million AK-47 assault rifles remain outside some form of official administrative control, some of which are known to have been sold to South African arms dealers for as little as US$14. Smuggling of these weapons is relatively easy due to the exceptionally porous border between Mozambique and South Africa: security posts are both understaffed and underfunded and even the Norex Fence is frequently breached as it no longer carries a lethal current. Overall, it has been estimated that some 40 per cent of RENAMO’s arms caches were never verified by the UN Ceasefire Commission, while FRELIMO soldiers only surrendered weapons of poor quality, keeping back the majority of those in better condition.50 Cambodia Arms trafficking has emerged as a particularly lucrative ‘business’ in Cambodia, due to a lack of internal governance, the massive availability of munitions and the state’s strategic location in the heart of Indochina. Between 1992 and 1993 UNTAC 51 retrieved no more than 300 000 weapons from Cambodia, a fraction of the total amount that is believed to have been transferred to the country during the 1980s by the Chinese, Americans and Soviets.52 This has provided a ready-made stockpile that groups such as the Khmer Rouge have been quick to seize on. One notable arms consignment arranged in 1993 demonstrates the considerable weapons quantities that appear to be available from the Cambodian bazaars. The shipment, which was made to the United Liberation Front of Assam, included 775 AK-56 assault rifles,

12 Non-Military Security and Global Order

65 general-purpose machine guns, 10 RPGs, 100 anti-tank weapons, 50 pistols and thousands of rounds of rifle ammunition.53 Playing out the Cold War in this manner has ensured that there is now not only a global supply of arms useful to GAP actors, but also the knowledge of how to foment, organise and sustain insurgency. Such technological and intellectual diffusion has provided GAP practitioners with the means to match and, in certain instances, surpass the capabilities of nation states. As Steven Metz observes, the full effects of this particular legacy of the Cold War have still to be realised.54

The aim and structure of the book The influences of dollarisation, heightened atavism, globalisation and small arms proliferation have helped to provide an international setting that is particularly conducive to the growth of GAP influences. Although traditional military security issues will remain relevant in many parts of the world, particularly in regional ‘hot spots’ such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia, it is the so-called ‘soft’, non-military dimension of security that will have most salience for global stability into the twenty-first century. The purpose of this book is to examine six key issues, many of which are interrelated, that are likely to form an integral part of this new security agenda. The first half of the text will deal with three influences that have manifested themselves in a violent manner: political terrorism; the production and trafficking of heroin and cocaine; and maritime piracy. The second part of the book will examine three challenges, which, in themselves, do not directly involve violence: environmental degradation; the transnational spread of disease; and mass population flows. All of these threats have benefited, in their own way, from the general forces of dollarisation, atavism, globalisation and arms proliferation outlined above. However, in order to gain a true understanding of their overall dimension, a more nuanced, case-by-case approach is needed that takes into account variables specific to particular threat issues. The chapters that follow aim to fulfil this objective. Chapter 1 examines the evolving dynamic of terrorism in the postCold War era. Two main trends are discerned. First, the incidence of terrorism has increased since the end of the Cold War, with a greater number of groups now resorting to such tactics ranging from fully organised groups to individual persons. Second, terrorist attacks have become more lethal and effective during the 1990s, with individual

Introduction 13

strikes often resulting in mass casualties and wholesale destruction. The chapter links these developments to factors such as the resurgence of atavistic forms of identity (particularly those with an ethno-religious dimension), advances in digital communications technology and the diffusion of weapons. Chapter 2 analyses the scope and impact of global production and trafficking in illicit drugs, focusing on the trade in heroin and cocaine. It briefly discusses the main production/refining areas, trafficking routes and statistical trends, before going on to examine the specific nature of the threat that is posed by the heroin and cocaine trade. The chapter also analyses the growing nexus between the drug trade and two other threats to international stability – terrorism (in the form of ‘narco-terrorism’) and ‘white collar’ financial crime (in the form of money laundering). Chapter 3 looks at maritime piracy. The main types of piracy that are currently occurring in global waters are differentiated, as are the principal areas of piratical activity and dangers of attack. The growth and lethality of piracy is analysed in the context of increased maritime commercial traffic, the withdrawal of a superpower naval presence in many parts of the world (particularly in Southeast Asia) and weapons proliferation. Additional compounding factors that are examined include alleged Chinese sponsorship of Southeast Asian gangs and the difficulty of effectively patrolling large tracts of coastal and international waters. Chapter 4 examines environmental degradation. It first makes the case that environmental degradation can be considered a security threat before going on to examine the main ecological concerns currently facing the global community. As with the AIDS epidemic, many of these issues are presented as threats that are truly pandemic in nature, having the potential to affect virtually every corner of the planet. The increasing problem of environmental degradation is linked to pollution and the strains being placed on finite resources as a result of both unsustainable population growth (particularly in the AsiaPacific) and excessive consumption. Chapter 5 analyses the transnational spread of disease. The main diseases of concern are highlighted including pandemic retroviruses such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and AIDS, re-emerging illnesses such as tuberculosis, virulent bacterial infections such as bubonic and pneumonic plague and newly emerging haemorrhagic fevers such as ebola. The transmission of disease is then analysed and discussed as a consequence of war, unsustainable urbanisation,

14 Non-Military Security and Global Order

environmental degradation, changes in social behaviour, globalisation and, potentially, terrorism. The chapter concludes by looking at the direct and indirect costs of the spread of pathogens and viruses and how these impact on human, state and international stability. Chapter 6 looks at the challenge posed by the unregulated movement of refugees and others forcibly displaced from their country of origin. These mass population flows are discussed as a product of interstate war, internal conflict, economic dislocation, natural and humanmade disasters and persecution. The chapter focuses particularly on the strategic consequences of mass population flows and how these contribute to inter-state tensions and the reduced viability of both sending and receiving countries. The final, concluding chapter focuses on policy prescriptions for controlling GAP influences. At the national level, the need for integrated comprehensive inter-agency operations that cross both civilian and military jurisdictions is argued to be of prime importance. The necessity of recognising the complex interrelationship between social and security responsibilities is also emphasised, particularly in relation to fostering viable community-oriented programmes that provide both employment and infrastructure. At the international level, it is posited that the world has now approached, to use Emmanuel Adler’s words, a ‘season of common security’ 55 – but only in terms of threat, not response. Considerable stress is therefore placed on the need for a fully integrated and comprehensive code of global inter-state cooperation, particularly with regard to institutionalising governmental and nongovernmental action through formal consultative and regulatory mechanisms.

1 Terrorism

Terrorism1 is not new to the international system. Over 900 years ago, Al-Hassan ibn-al-Sabbah led a particularly savage band of rebels whose distinctly terroristic-type tactics were instrumental in giving him influence over territory that stretched from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.2 More recently, terrorism surfaced as part of the anarchist movement that swept across Europe during the nineteenth century, becoming particularly marked in Russia where several writers developed nihilist doctrines proclaiming the virtues of terror in pursuit of anarchist ideals.3 Terrorism was also integral to many of the anticolonial struggles of the mid-twentieth century, with national liberation movements in Algeria, Aden, Indochina, Cyprus, Palestine and Kenya all prepared to work according to the principle of ‘kill one, frighten a thousand’.4 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, extremist political violence had become a truly prominent feature of the international system. Indeed, it is essentially from this time that modern terrorism, as it is popularly conceived today, dates. Facilitating factors included the proliferation of militant New Left ideologies in Western Europe and the US, the rise of Palestinian extremism abroad, ethno-nationalist and religious imperatives that became gradually more fanatical in nature and increasingly frequent state sponsorship. 5 During the 1980s, worldwide terrorist activity continued to be fuelled by the success of the Palestinian ‘model’ of revolutionary warfare. As Bruce Hoffman observes: The success achieved by the PLO in publicising the Palestinian’s plight through the ‘internationalisation’ of its struggle with Israel … served as a model for similarly aggrieved ethnic and nationalist minority groups everywhere. [In particular, it demonstrated] how 15

16 Non-Military Security and Global Order

long-standing but hitherto ignored or forgotten causes can be resurrected and dramatically thrust on to the world’s agenda through a series of well-orchestrated, attention-grabbing acts.6 Despite this fairly comprehensive historical track record, however, it has really only been during the last few years that terrorism has taken on greater relevance as a major security issue in its own right. As this chapter will discuss, two main factors lie behind this escalating threat potential. First, the incidence of terrorism has increased since the end of the Cold War, with a greater number of groups now resorting to such tactics ranging from fully organised groups to individual persons. This quantitative change can be connected to the continuing high levels of ethno-religious and nationalist inspired terrorism throughout the international system, an increase in militant Islamic inspired extremism and the emergence of new, ad hoc ‘amateur’ forms of political violence. Second, terrorist attacks have become more lethal and effective during the 1990s, with individual strikes often resulting in mass casualties and wholesale destruction. This qualitative change stems from variables of both rationale and instrumentality.

The increased incidence of terrorism during the 1990s Between 1968 and 1988, 35 150 acts of international and domestic terrorism were recorded around the world, representing an incident rate of approximately 1673 attacks per year (see Table A1 in Appendix 1). By comparison, 30 725 incidents were recorded for the years 1990–6 alone. This total equates to an average of roughly 4389 attacks a year, a 162 per cent increase on the figures recorded during the Cold War years (see Table A2 in Appendix 1). There are at least three factors that account for this proliferating activity: a continuing high level of ethnonationalist and separatist based terrorism; the rise of extremist Islamic fundamentalist inspired terrorism; and the emergence of so-called ‘ad hoc’ terrorism. 7 The continuing high level of ethno-religious and nationalist terrorism As the Introduction notes, one of the more enduring features of the contemporary international environment is the renewed and increased focus that has been placed on ethno-nationalist and religious issues as a result of the resurgence of primordial identity since the end of the Cold War. One effect of this has been to sustain, and in certain cases

Terrorism 17

exacerbate, sub-communal conflict as old animosities are both revived and reinforced. Political terror unleashed as part of these ethnic, religious and nationalist struggles has, consequently, remained a significant feature of the post-Cold War geo-political landscape.8 In more specific terms, it is possible to identify two main effects that have occurred. First has been the outbreak of new conflicts in multi-ethnic states that have had no real prior experience of ethnonationalist accommodation. Second has been the intensification of long-standing nationalist and separatist wars which have been able to draw on the continued and heightened focus that has been placed on ethnic and nationalist identity creation during the 1990s. One of the more pertinent features that has characterised post-Cold War politics in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and central Asia are the particularly nasty civil wars that have accompanied the break up of the Yugoslav Federation and the Soviet Union. 9 Here savage tribal wars have been fought by irregular paramilitary groups that have carried out repeated massacres against civilians in an attempt to terrorise whole opposing ethnic groups into submission. 10 In terms of terrorist violence, five areas have been especially affected: Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovo enclave in Serbia, Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Between 1992 and 1995, numerous violent terrorist attacks were carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina by Croat and Bosnian Muslim paramilitary organisations, some of which were directly trained by Iranianbacked Hizbollah guerrillas,11 as well as Serb extremist groups.12 One of the most violent was a Serbian unit known as the Tigers. Acting through a specially created terror squad created by the infamous Zelijko ‘Arkan’ Raznjatovic, this group targeted Croats and Muslims in Europe and is still believed to have been responsible for the massacre of thousands of civilians in the Bosnian town of Brcko during 1992.13 In Kosovo, terrorism, particularly against Serbian police, has been integral to the enclave’s ongoing independence campaign since 1993. Most acts have been carried out by the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), an underground militant Albanian organisation formed in 1996.14 The extremism of the UCK was particularly fuelled during 1998 as a result of a vicious onslaught by the Belgrade government designed to eliminate the independence aspirations of the local Albanian population.15 In Russia, there have been repeated outbreaks of ethno-nationalist inspired terrorism, particularly in the restive southern republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia. To date, the most serious instances have occurred in Chechnya, including kidnappings,

18 Non-Military Security and Global Order

car bombings, and attacks against public trains, rail stations and subways.16 Ethnic tensions have also produced a multitude of Chechen rebel threats to attack Russian cities, release nuclear and radiological materials and even expand their war against Russia to Europe.17 In Georgia, numerous acts of terrorism have come to surround the secessionist struggle in Abkhazia. This has emanated both from Abkhaz militants seeking to assert their independence from the Tbilisi government as well as Georgian refugees, acting through a group calling itself the White Legion, who are impatient with the failure of Eduard Shevardnadze to restore order in the region.18 Finally in Azerbaijan, an ongoing separatist war has been waged by Armenians in the disputed enclave of Nagorno Karabakh. This struggle has come to embrace terroristic violence as a ‘logical’ part of the militant martyrdom that is common to many Armenian groups fighting for legitimacy and validation within the Middle East and wider central Asian diaspora. 19 The Azerbaijan capital, Baku, was subjected to a particularly serious wave of bombings between 1993 and 1994, which killed 34 and injured over 130.20 In addition to these new conflicts, violence associated with longstanding communal ethno-religious and separatist wars has continued to act as a major source of terrorism in the contemporary era. These struggles have all drawn ‘inspiration’ from the increased focus on primordial identity in the post-Cold War era, with a number becoming increasingly entrenched and embittered along deeper and more polarised ethnic, religious and nationalist divisions. In addition, the major groups involved in many of these conflicts have proven remarkably resilient, adapting to changes in their operational environment as and when required. Some of the more notable ‘hot spots’ in this regard have included: the Basque provinces of northern Spain; 21 the Kurdish regions of Turkey;22 the Moro Islamic enclaves of the southern Philippines;23 Northern Ireland;24 and the Israeli Occupied Territories (although this latter conflict has taken on a distinctly Islamic orientation since the end of the Cold War – see below).25 Perhaps most reflective of this source of terrorism in the post-Cold War era, however, are the ethno-religious conflicts in South Asia, particularly those taking place in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In each of these three states, there has been a substantial hardening of the perceived ethnic and religious divide since the end of the Cold War, with communal violence and associated bombings, drive-by shootings, kidnappings and suicide attacks (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2) becoming an almost daily occurrence.26 As Rohan Gunaratna, an internationally acknowl-

Terrorism 19

Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 Terrorist suicide kit: plastic explosive and ball-bearing belt worn around the upper torso and triggered by electronic detonator.

20 Non-Military Security and Global Order

edged expert on South Asian security, observes: ‘At the end of the twentieth century, South Asia ranks among the most insecure regions of the world. The overwhelming feature of the region is its vulnerability to [ethno-religious] armed conflict … In the absence of an ethic against the use or abuse of religion to advance political goals, both ethnicity and religion have been deployed as effective politicising as well as mobilising tools.’27 Statistically, this assessment is more than borne out. Between 1990 and 1996, India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan suffered a total of 3929 terrorist attacks, which represents roughly 13 per cent of the entire global total for the seven years. Indications become even more apparent when casualty figures are examined. During 1995 and 1996 alone, for instance, a staggering 4275 people were killed in sub-communal political violence in these three states, with a further 5871 injured. 28 These totals (which respectively equate to 31 per cent and 23 per cent of the 1995–6 worldwide share), graphically illustrate the enormous human toll that has been wrought by the forces of ethno-nationalism in this part of the world since the end of the Cold War. The rise of militant Islamic-inspired terrorism In addition to high levels of ethno-religious and nationalist separatism, the increased incidence in terrorism since the end of the Cold War can be attributed to a dramatic rise in fundamentalist Islamic-inspired extremism. These groups have become progressively more violent and appear increasingly willing to strike at Western, US, Israeli and other secular targets around the world. In the post-Cold War era, their influence has been the primary driving factor behind savage civil conflicts and violence in places as far afield as Algeria, Egypt, the Israeli Occupied Territories, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, India and the southern Philippines. Islamic fundamentalists have also carried out some dramatic international attacks during the 1990s. These have included, among others, the 1993 bombing of the New York World Trade Centre (6 dead, 1000 injured);29 the 1994 bombing of a Jewish Community Centre in Argentina (95 dead, over 200 injured); 30 the 1996 bombing of the US Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia (19 dead, more than 500 injured);31 the 1997 Luxor tourist massacre in Egypt (67 dead, 25 injured);32 and the 1998 twin bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (240 dead, 1700 wounded).33 The popular perception of Islamic fundamentalism being intrinsically violent and synonymous with terrorism is far from accurate.

Terrorism 21

Islam is neither a single, unified religion, nor is it necessarily fundamental in nature. Furthermore, just because one is an Islamic fundamentalist, it does not necessarily follow that one is also a holy warrior willing to die, if necessary, as a martyr to the faith. It is only possible to equate the use of terrorism with a militant, anti-accommodative version of Islam. This sect rejects modernisation as a force responsible for the wholesale and systematic corruption of the Islamic ideal. It calls for a revolutionary transformation of society, through the al-jihad al-saghir, and a complete rejection of Western modernisation.34 Three main factors have driven the force of militant Islamic fundamentalism since the end of the Cold War: provision of sponsorship by Iran and Sudan; the legacy left by the Afghan War; and the fall-out from the Palestinian–Israeli peace process. The first consideration relates to the support that extremist organisations have received from Iran and Sudan, two Islamic states driven by a millenarian vision so strong that each does regard violence as a legitimate means to an end. Since coming to power, both the Teheran and Khartoum fundamentalist regimes have taken a ‘rhetorical’ leap beyond other Islamic organisations, adopting the concept of the al-jihad al-saghir35 as an integral component of their domestic and foreign policy. It has essentially become a raison d’être – a way of defining their regimes in terms of the hostility they perceive (and encourage) in the outside world.36 Iran and Sudan are now thought to have established strong financial and operational links with numerous extremist Islamic groups in the Middle East, North Africa and Asia. US intelligence sources have estimated that Iran supplies as much as US$30 million a year in training, cash and arms to extreme Muslim groups around the world. In addition, at least eleven ‘military’ camps have been identified in Iran as locations used to train foreign groups who are sympathetic to the Iranian Islamic cause. An estimated 5000 volunteers pass through these camps every year, of whom about 500 are believed to receive extensive training in a wide range of terrorist skills.37 Equally, Sudan, thanks largely to considerable financial backing from Teheran, has been able to develop a beach-head for Islamic militant radicalism in Africa. US officials believe this country currently serves as one of the main external havens for groups opposed to the Middle East peace process and Arab regimes backed by Washington. It is also alleged that the ‘spiritual’ leader of the Sudanese governing party, Hassan al-Turbai, is a close ally of Osama bin Laden, the Saudi renegade who is believed to have financed the twin attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. American intelligence sources

22 Non-Military Security and Global Order

maintain this link was vital in allowing bin Laden to use Sudan as a logistical staging post for the 1998 bombings, which, together, constitute one of the most deadly anti-US attacks yet to have been carried out.38 The legacy that has been left by the Afghanistan war is a further factor that has amplified the contemporary force of militant Islamic fundamentalism. With the successful entry of the Mujahideen into Kabul in 1992, thousands of volunteer guerrilla fighters, who were as anti-West as they were anti-Soviet, literally became ‘rebels without a cause’. Lacking any effective outlet for their religious zeal and military expertise, many left Afghanistan to take up the ‘cause’ within the ranks of other Islamic organisations, targeting a new enemy: liberal Arab governments and their allies in the West.39 The influence of the Afghans is fostering not only the development of insurgent skills in many places of Islamic unrest around the world; it is also providing a necessary ideological framework for the growth of fundamentalist extremism.40 As Hamid Gul, a retired Pakistani general, observes: The Afghan jihad…became an ideological obsession among Islamic youth that were studying in the United States and Europe. They had liberal ideas, but they saw that Western liberalism was not the answer for what they were looking for. They tried to discover themselves. The instrument of discovery was the jihad.41 According to both Western, Middle Eastern and Asian intelligence officials, it is the influence of the Afghans that is behind the growing violence of some of the most extreme fundamentalist movements currently operating in the international system. Their training, militantism and experience have been identified as having a particularly marked effect on internal instability in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, the Israeli Occupied Territories, Pakistan and the Philippines.42 The third factor that is driving the contemporary force of militant Islamic fundamentalism is the current Israeli–Palestinian peace process, which essentially provides for the phased establishment of Palestinian self-government in Gaza and the West Bank. While the various agreements that make up the contemporary peace process43 do mark a major watershed in Palestinian–Israeli relations, they have also unleashed a tidal wave of rejectionist violence from Islamic extremists who regard the agreements as little more than a de facto capitulation to the dictates of Tel Aviv.

Terrorism 23

From the perspective of militant Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab/Palestinian–Israeli dispute is essentially seen in terms of an eternal battle between Muslims and Jews. The ultimate objective is, and can only be, the complete destruction of the Israeli state. 44 The Covenant of Hamas, the principal group opposed to Israel in the Occupied Territories, is explicit on this point: ‘Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it … Proposals, initiatives and international conferences and peace agreements are all a waste of time and vain endeavours.’45 The Iranian-backed Islamic Jihad is just as emphatic: ‘The war is open until Israel ceases to exist and until the last Jew in the world is eliminated … Israel is all evil and should be wiped out of existence.’46 Because the present peace process specifically (and necessarily) recognises Israel’s right to exist, militant fundamentalists have rejected it as tantamount to a wholesale betrayal of Islamic interests. Regarding Arafat as little more than a puppet of Tel Aviv, groups such as Islamic Jihad and Izz al-Din al-Qassam (the military wing of Hamas) have responded with a wave of extremist violence, seeking to destroy the Oslo Accords through sustained bombing, shooting and suicide attacks.47 Further compounding this extremism have been the actions of certain radical Jewish messianic groups in Israel. For instance, it was largely in reaction to the 1994 massacre of 29 Muslims at the Tomb of the Patriarchs by Baruch Goldstein, a member of Kahane Chai, that the decision was first taken to start launching suicide strikes in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.48 Overall, in excess of 460 acts of terrorism have been carried out in Israel and the Occupied Territories since 1993. These attacks have claimed more than 265 Israeli lives, causing a further 5000 casualties. As Louis Beres notes, ‘this represents the largest number of Israeli dead from terrorism in any comparable period since the birth of the State in 1948’. 49 The emergence of ad hoc, amateur terrorism The final factor associated with the rise of terrorism in the post-Cold War era has to do with the emergence of ad hoc, amateur terrorism. In the past, those that typically utilised terrorist tactics were recognisable as individuals belonging to an organisation with a well-defined command and control apparatus and who: • had been previously trained in the tactics of terrorism (typically in camps run by foreign governments); and • engaged in conspiracy and subversion as a full-time ‘vocation’.50

24 Non-Military Security and Global Order

Over the last few years, however, the notion of a ‘professional’ terrorist operating within the context of a clearly defined group setting has begun to break down. The terrorist perpetrator of today is more likely to be an ‘amateur’, probably belonging to what are only transient, or at least loosely structured, organisations.51 The emergence of these amorphous groups has much to do with developments in communications technology, which have allowed like-minded individuals to group themselves and orient towards one another without geographic constraints. In a sense, terrorism has become ‘networked’, increasingly carried out by people who act and communicate together, not so much physically, but rather through the process of global digital integration. Compounding this process of ‘devolution’ is the fact that information on the means and methods of terrorism is now widely available, either through bookstores, mail order firms, CD-ROM or the Internet.52 A prime example of this is the Terrorists’ Handbook, a three-part electronic ‘how to’ manual that is published by Chaos Industries and ‘Gunzenbombz’ Pyro-Technologies, and which can be accessed and downloaded directly from the Internet. 53 More disturbingly, a variety of websites exist which contain ample reference material for any reasonably well-educated individual to construct a low-level biological or chemical weapon.54 As Bruce Hoffman observes, ‘[S]uch commercially published or otherwise readily accessible bomb-making manuals and operational guides [has ensured that] terrorism [is now] arguably … accessible to anyone with a grievance, an agenda, a purpose or any idiosyncratic combination of the above.’55 The characteristics and attendant assumptions of this new ad hoc, amateur terrorism have, perhaps, been most apparent in Western Europe and North America with the rise of transient extreme rightwing groups and militias. In both areas, a number of amorphous white supremacist, neo-Nazi, single issue, paramilitary and millenarian cultist organisations have sprung up. These groups have variously targeted immigrants, foreigners, Jews, abortion clinics, ‘harmful’ or ‘exploitative’ development projects and, at times, what are seen as ‘overbearing and intrusive’ governments. Many of these organisations communicate, recruit and operate through the Internet, with individuals rarely (if ever) actually physically coming together. Acts of terrorism tend to be more the result of individual initiative than part of a centrally planned campaign of violence (although they are always justified according to some shared political belief). Examples include Combat

Terrorism 25

18 (C18), the German People’s Union, the Nationalist Front and the Animal Liberation Front in Western Europe; and the Aryan Nations Movement (ANM), the Patriot Militia Movement, the Army of God and the Earth Liberation Front in North America. The Army of God, which has claimed responsibility for several abortion clinic killings in the US, provides a good example of the emergence of ad hoc, amateur terrorism. The organisation is believed to run a website, which lists the names of abortion providers and features anti-homosexuality and anti-government manifestos as well as photos of aborted foetuses. Doctors and abortion caregivers targeted for elimination appear on the web page with a line drawn through their name. This is then posted to all ‘interested’ persons, often with a message proclaiming any and all actions are justified in order to prevent ‘serial murderers taking the lives of unborn babies’. A string of shooting attacks, typically carried out by lone snipers, have occurred in the US following web postings such as these, in what are now being referred to as North America’s ‘abortion wars’. 56 As Cameron Stewart observes, ‘a small band of militant pro-lifers is [now] following the example set by other home grown extremists who have adopted domestic terrorism as their weapon of choice’.57 However, it was the 1995 bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City that provides perhaps the most graphic example of this type of terrorism at work. Principally orchestrated by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols who used explosives constructed from homemade C4 (plastic explosive) books, the attack claimed the lives of 168, injuring a further 500. Although a definitive rationale for the bombing has yet to emerge, it is clear that inspiration for the attack drew heavily on anti-government, anti-internationalist and white supremacist sentiment that is reminiscent of a number of small, but extreme US Christian identity and underground militia movements.58 In many respects, the emergence of ad hoc, amateur terrorism poses as much of a threat as that which is carried out by more professional, well-established groups. As the Oklahoma tragedy vividly demonstrated, attacks carried out by these ‘part timers’ can be just as effective and destructive as ‘Provo’ and Tamil Tiger bombing campaigns. Moreover, given the transient and amorphous nature of these groups, they will necessarily lack the ‘footprints’ and track records of more established groups, making it harder for law enforcement authorities to build a complete and accurate picture of their dimensions, intentions and capabilities.59

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The increased lethality of terrorism during the 1990s The growing lethality of terrorism has also contributed to the increased focus on this mode of violence during the 1990s. According to the RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, at least one person was killed in 29 per cent of terrorist incidents in 1995. This represents the highest ratio of fatalities to incidents recorded in the chronology since 1968.60 Although telling, the trend toward increased lethality becomes most apparent when statistics over time are analysed and compared. Between 1990 and 1996, for instance, a total of 59 070 people were killed in domestic and international terrorist attacks around the world. This more than doubles the 28 110 who lost their lives in the fourteen years between 1970 and 1983. With respect to injuries, the figures are even more dramatic. The 69 833 injured between 1990 and 1996 more than triples the figure of 18 925 recorded between 1970 and 1983, with the annual average rising in excess of factor seven, from 1351.78 (1970–83) to 9976.14 (1990–6) (see Table A3 in Appendix 1). The reasons for terrorism’s growing lethality are complex and varied, but generally relate to variables of rationale and instrumentality. Rationale variables For many years, it was confidently proclaimed that ‘simply killing a lot of people has seldom been a terrorist objective’.61 The assumption was that terrorism sought to change the world through highly visible, but ultimately, symbolic acts of political violence, with perpetrators working according to the dictum: ‘kill one, frighten a thousand’.62 Today, however, it appears that many terrorists are no longer prepared to draw the line at limited, restricted acts of violence. By contrast, their actions have become progressively more extreme and bloody with self-engorging and indiscriminate killing now more the rule than the exception. In many ways, this change in the terrorist mindset can be connected with the same factors that have fuelled terrorist acts in general during the 1990s. Of particular importance have been the prevalence of militant religious (especially, though not exclusively, Islamic) imperatives and the emergence of ad hoc, amateur terrorism. Contrary to its depiction in the Western media, terrorism motivated by a religious imperative is not confined simply to the radical Islamic Arab dimension. Indeed, many of the basic ‘violence-legitimating’ features of the extremist organisations found in the Middle East are also apparent among messianic Zionist movements in Israel, militant underground

Terrorism 27

Christian groups in the US, millenarian cults in Switzerland, North America and Japan and some of the more radical Hindu, Sikh and Islamic separatists in South and Southeast Asia.63 The prevalence of radical religious imperatives such as these has significant implications for the lethality of terrorism. For the religious zealot, there is essentially no reason to show restraint in the perpetration of violence. The main objective is to inflict as much pain and suffering as possible, with the enemy typically denigrated as fundamentally evil and beyond all redemption.64 Terrorism is thus regarded as a sacramental, divine duty, its perpetration assuming an almost transcendental dimension. As Samuel Peleg observes: Religion, according to the extremists…is a creed to fight the apostates and obliterate them…All perpetrators of violence in the name of the holy causes are armed with the absolute conviction that they confront the demons of disorder. The collision between harmony and discord turns into a war that is the real generator, as well as the justification of religious violence. This titanic clash of two gestalts is bound to be violent, since there is no compromise in Armageddon.65 Many apocalyptic millennialist cults, for instance, demonstrate a proclivity towards unrestrained, unmitigated violence, with murder often portrayed as a means of achieving spiritual enlightenment. Perhaps the best example of this is the Aum Shinriyko Supreme Truth Sect. Inspired by the paranoid messianic delusions and sociopathic beliefs of their leader, Shoko Asahara, members of the sect are known to have engaged in a multitude of ultra-violent acts that included self-abuse, torture, assassination, multiple murder and the capstone Sarin nerve gassing of the Tokyo subway in 1995.66 Islamic fundamentalists also provide a most graphic illustration of the effects of terrorism motivated by an extremist religious imperative. From Saudi Arabia, Israel, Algeria and Egypt to the US and the southern Philippines Islamic fundamentalists have demonstrated a repeated willingness to engage in wanton acts of death and destruction. In most cases, violence is directed against Western states and their (perceived) secular allies in the Arab and Asian world that are regarded as either morally corrupt or intent, under the aegis of the US, on global cultural and geo-political supremacy. Algeria provides an especially pertinent case in point. Since the outbreak of a fundamentalist Islamic insurgency in 1992, the country has witnessed some horrendous acts of mass murder and terror. 67 Thus far,

28 Non-Military Security and Global Order

most violence has occurred during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan when the country’s main insurgent group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), has become particularly active. The GIA is more ‘purist’ in its advocacy of unbridled violence, generally justifying terrorism as a ‘divine offering to God’. Some of the acts attributed to the group have been especially bloody. In one notable attack that occurred during 1998’s month of Ramadan, 400 civilians were slaughtered in three co-ordinated attacks 250 km southwest of Algiers. Most of those killed had their throats cut and were then decapitated with their heads placed on stakes as a ‘warning to others’. Others were either set alight as human torches or dismembered while still alive. Even babies were not spared, with a number killed by being smashed to death against walls.68 The emergence of ad hoc terrorism also carries significant implications with regard to terrorism’s growing lethality. In particular, while less control from some central command structure may indeed be exerted, the loss of organisational constraints may well result in fewer inhibitions on committing mass, indiscriminate murder, as actions can be justified on a purely individualistic basis. This is especially true of those ad hoc groups whose defining ‘philosophy’ includes an overtly religious, messianic or millennialist dimension.69 The US-based ANM provides a good example. This loosely structured right-wing milieu groups together an amalgam of militant white supremacists that define themselves according to a virulently antiSemitic ideology. A number of these radicals have openly justified the use of extreme violence to exterminate the Jewish population of the United States as part of the overall drive to create a pure, unadulterated Aryan Republic.70 Most of these extremists find individual justification for their deeds and beliefs in the cosmotheist philosophy of William Pierce, a self-proclaimed ‘race separatist’ prominent among American fringe right and neo-Nazi groups. In 1978, Pierce wrote the Turner Diaries, a violent futuristic novel that many believe served as the inspirational source for the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing – the most destructive act of terrorism ever carried out on US soil. 71 Certainly, there is much in Pierce’s work that is suggestive of the use of extreme violence to purge what is seen as a wholly corrupt and spiritually bankrupt American society: We do not need to reason with the monster; we need to put a bullet into its brain and hammer a stake through its heart. If that means blood and chaos and battling the enemy from house to house in

Terrorism 29

burning cities throughout our land – then, by God, is better that we get on with it now than later.72 Instrumental variables Further impacting on the growing lethality of terrorism are instrumental variables relating to weaponry. Of particular importance has been the dissemination of armaments from munitions stocks left over from old Cold War conflicts, a factor that has been further compounded by the ‘leaky arsenals’ of the former states of the Soviet Union (see Introduction). This increased weapons availability has allowed terrorists to operate on a far more sophisticated and destructive level as well as encouraged a growing involvement in criminal activities such as drugs trafficking (see Chapter 2) to help pay for large arms consignments. As Medd and Goldstein point out, one of the more significant factors accounting for the higher number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the 1990s is the fact that lethal conventional weapons and other supporting technologies have become increasingly sought after, available and affordable.73 The extent and type of weaponry currently available to terrorists is truly enormous. Originating from a variety of sources in Africa, Asia and Europe, it includes, inter alia, assault rifles; machine and submachine guns; rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs); shoulder-launched surface to air missiles (SAMs); mortar bombs; and a variety of explosives, anti-personnel landmines and other demolition material. Groups have exploited and developed various supply channels to access munitions such as these, though most involve one or other of the following methods: covert transfers by governments or commercial dealers; black market sales; or the theft of state and privately owned arms and weapon stores.74 While many of the smuggling methods adopted by extremist organisations are far from sophisticated, some do exhibit an exceptional degree of complexity and professionalism. The LTTE provides a case in point. Coordinated by Tharmalingam Shanmugham, alias Kumaran Pathmanathan (or simply ‘KP’), the Tigers’ arms procurement network is global in scope and meticulous in operation, providing the group with a constant supply of explosives and essential war-related material that cannot be indigenously produced. One of the most important arms consignments that Kumaran put together for the LTTE took place in August 1994. The deal involved 60 tons of RDX and TNT explosives, which were purchased from the state-owned Rubezone Chemicals plant in Ukraine. The transaction had been arranged through Carlton

30 Non-Military Security and Global Order

Fig. 1.3 The reality of modern-day terrorism. The after-effects of an LTTE ‘Black’ suicide bomber.

Trading, an LTTE front company located in Dhaka and was approved by the Ukrainian government after a forged user-end certificate was produced showing the Bangladeshi military as the approved recipient. The explosives were transported to Sri Lanka on board the MV Swanee, an LTTE-owned deep-sea-going ocean freighter, and subsequently used in the devastating 1996 truck bomb attack against the Central Bank building in Colombo – widely recognised as one of the most devastating terrorist assaults in history.75 Due to the highly secretive nature of both the licit and illicit weapons trade it is extremely difficult to accurately gauge the true extent of the range of arms that are finding their way to extremists. However, if quantities of munitions that have been captured are any indicator, it is extensive. Between 1991 and 1992, for example, the following extensive inventory of munitions was seized from militants operating in Kashmir: • 8 258 AK-47 assault rifles • 1 014 131 rounds of ammunition • 10 247 grenades

Terrorism 31

• • • • • •

495 machine guns 1002 surface-to-surface rockets 476 rocket launchers 750 pistols 219 guns 3317kg of explosives76

Equally as illustrative was Operation Rachel III, undertaken in mid1997 and centred upon existing arms caches in Mozambique, many of which were thought to be facilitating political (and criminal) violence both in South Africa and further afield. This particular sweep yielded: • 5550+ machine guns, sub-machine guns and assault rifles, including 1177 AK-47s • 78 pistols • 518 anti-personnel mines • 336 hand grenades • 153 detonators • 3726 mortar bombs • 79 rocket and mortar launchers/tubes • 2340 projectiles, including 158 RPG-7s • 3 million rounds of ammunition • 3674 magazines77 Interceptions of light weaponry from Eastern Europe have been just as extensive. In November 1993, a container load of armaments from Poland was impounded at Teesside in a joint operation conducted by British Customs officers and agents from the Security Service (MI5, the UK’s primary counter-intelligence responsible for anti-terrorist organisations). Hidden beneath a concealing cargo of ceramics were more than 300 AKM78 assault rifles, pistols, thousands of rounds of ammunition, hundreds of hand grenades and more than two tons of military explosive, complete with detonators. The total value of the consignment was put at 350 000GBP.79 A seizure by German authorities two years earlier netted an even larger cache, this time from Russia, including 1 500 000 rounds of ammunition and 3000 AK-47 rifles. It is believed that these weapons were destined for militants in Azerbaijan, via through southern Germany, Croatia, the Balkan Corridor and Iran.80 Weapon inventories such as these would certainly be sufficient to allow a group to carry on a highly destructive campaign of terrorism over the short to medium term, providing tactical options that are

32 Non-Military Security and Global Order

likely to bring particularly violent results. A case in point was the infamous 1993 Halloween attack by two Protestant paramilitaries on a predominately Catholic bar in Northern Ireland. Significantly, one of the gunmen was able to expend a whole magazine of ammunition (30 rounds), reload, fire again and still have time to escape – completing the whole ‘exercise’ in less than a minute. As Chris Smith observes, had the terrorists been equipped with less sophisticated weapons, they would probably only have managed a handful of shots into the crowd, perhaps less than five each, and possibly not had time to escape. As it was, the automatic assault rifles allowed the paramilitaries to fire somewhere in the vicinity of 90 rounds before anyone really knew what was going on, thus greatly augmenting both the actual and perceived magnitude of the attack.81 In addition to conventional arms, there is a growing concern that terrorism’s lethality will soon attain the level of mass destruction as a result of the introduction of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. The attraction of such munitions stems from their awesome ability to kill, not in tens and hundreds, but in ten of thousands and possibly even millions. It has been estimated, for instance, that a couple of pounds of a dry ‘hot’ biological agent correctly dispersed in favourable conditions over New York City could be expected to cause at least 10 000 deaths, with a top range possibly as high as 2–3 million deaths. Equally, an amount of botulinum toxin (commonly referred to as ‘bot tox’) the size of the dot above an ‘i’ would be sufficient to easily kill ten adult males.82 In the hands of secular groups, these unthinkably destructive weapons would provide the perfect tool for political blackmail of the highest order; in the hands of religious fanatics, an ‘ideal’ means for ridding the world of its infidels.83 Apart from physical casualties, mass destruction attacks would also have broad repercussions for a state’s economy, its strategic position in world affairs, its socio-political stability and possibly even its ability to sustain itself as a strong and viable polity. Some of the more probable general consequences to flow from a nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) attack would be: • Contamination and vital infrastructural collapse. Depending on the type of weapon used, an NBC attack could render the immediate area affected unlivable for an extended period of time, requiring a costly and, possibly, dangerous decontamination programme. The ramifications of an act of terror involving a biological agent that is contagious in human-to-human transmission are especially

Terrorism 33

great. The first people to die in such an assault would be caregivers and the first responders, the population of doctors, nurses, firemen, ambulance crews and police. A relatively small attack could, consequently, leave a city without any vital health and social infrastructure at all, except for that which could be flown in by the military. • Panic. An NBC attack against a civilian population would almost certainly cause mass pandemonium, triggering an uncontrolled exodus from the affected area. In addition, it could well lead to a major surge in psychosomatic ailments, with hospitals and other health infrastructures becoming dangerously overburdened by people simply fearing contamination or infection. • Economic damage. A large NBC attack would almost certainly negatively affect the national economy of a state, contaminating workplaces, destroying infrastructure and eliminating human capital. An attack could also trigger a run on international financial markets, especially if the target has economic significance, setting in train a possible regional, or even global, recession. • Loss of strategic position. An NBC attack could deter a state from intervening in regional crises that have direct implications for its own national interests. If directed against a state’s command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) facilities, it could also paralyse a government into inaction, possibly leading to its complete collapse. • Social-psychological damage and loss of underlying democratic identity. An actual, mass casualty attack would definitely have a profound psychological impact on the target population and, in the case of a democratic society, possibly the make-up of its underlying identity. Public terror in the aftermath of a major NBC explosion would be at least as intense as the abstract Cold War fear of nuclear war, causing foreign policy to fall victim to powerful competing forces such as xenophobia, paranoia, isolationism and vengeful fury. Domestically, electorates would certainly demand draconian counter-measures, many of which could involve the curtailing of those civil liberties and freedoms that form the basis of a modern liberal democratic society.84 The prospect of mass destruction terrorism has become more credible in the last decade for a number of reasons.85 First, terrorism, itself, has

34 Non-Military Security and Global Order

demonstrated an increasing trend towards growing lethality and selfengorging violence (for the reasons noted above), suggesting a potential escalation spiral that could culminate in the indiscriminate use of weapons of mass destruction. 86 Second, acquisition of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological agents has become easier (Fig. 1.4). Chemical and biological agents can be relatively easily obtained either directly from state actors, 87 by legitimate means from commercial outlets or by theft from civilian stockpiles and research facilities. 88 Equally, the acquisition of radiological agents has been greatly facilitated as a result of a proliferating Russian black-market in nuclear material.89 Between 1991 and 1993, for instance, German authorities had investigated 370 cases of suspected nuclear smuggling from the former USSR. Although 118 of these turned out to be swindles (people trying to sell material they did not have), 123 were for real. 90 There are currently four main organised Russian groups thought to be involved in the trafficking of nuclear and radiological material out of the former Soviet Union: the Dologopruadnanskaya, the Chechens, the Ukranians and the Georgians. In each are soldiers, some with experience of serving at atomic weapons sites during the Cold War, from the greatly

Fig. 1.4 With the threat of nuclear and radiological smuggling on the increase, many ports are now forced to deploy added security when loading and off-loading freight.

Terrorism 35

disbanded Red Army and the much reduced former Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (KGB).91 Third, the knowledge on how to construct weapons of mass destruction has become more widely available. This has been facilitated both by developments in information technology (particularly the Internet) and the increased willingness of Russian scientists to sell their expertise to compensate for lost income opportunities in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 92 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a precedent for mass destruction terrorism has now been set, thanks to the Tokyo subway Sarin nerve gas attack carried out by the Aum Shinriyko Supreme Truth Sect in 1995. Although this incident only killed twelve people, it injured more than 5000. 93 Of greater significance, it represented the first widely known attempt by a nonstate group to use a weapon of mass destruction with the specific intent of causing mass casualties and disruption.94 As one leading terrorism expert, Brian Jenkins, put it: ‘It breaks a taboo and has psychological import. Others will ask whether such tactics should be adopted by them. It is now more likely that at least some of them will say yes.’95 Should a major act of mass destruction terrorism occur, it would mark the most significant development in ‘low intensity’ conflict this century. It would shatter forever the conceptual mindset that continues to see this mode of violence as exclusively a weapon of the weak and drastically alter realpolitik theoretical assumptions concerning the over-riding importance of state actors in international politics. Moreover, it would almost certainly usher in a new age of violence where any semblance of restraint, limitation and, indeed, humanity, both by aggressors and victims, would be lost. As the Economist observes, if states such as the US are prepared to send missiles against conventionally armed terrorists and their sponsors (such as the 1998 strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan), how ruthless would they become if faced by adversaries equipped with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons?96 Far from being made redundant by the end of the Cold War, terrorism remains the favoured instrument of the weak and politically disaffected. Indeed in many ways, the practice has become even more complex, multi-faceted and lethal. It continues to affect many regions of the world, particularly in the third world, repeatedly demonstrating its ability to undermine the normal course of socio-political interaction. In chronically affected states such as Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan and Algeria it is, arguably, one of the most important contributing factors to the wholesale breakdown of effective societal functioning.

36 Non-Military Security and Global Order

The use of terrorism has also widened in the 1990s, devolving down to the level of the amateur and part timer. As the 1995 Oklahoma bombing vividly demonstrated, this type of ad hoc terrorism can be just as effective and deadly as that carried out by more established, ‘professional’ groups. Finally as a mode of violence, terrorism has become progressively more violent and self-engorging, appearing, in certain instances, to be almost an end in itself (rather than a rational and limited means to an end). All of this suggests a disquieting trajectory for the future, not least in terms of the ‘ultimate’ nightmare scenario of a major act of mass destruction terrorism. It is certainly unfortunate that just as the international system is approaching the end of the millennium and all the apocalyptic connotations this implies, terrorism has come of age as a threat, which while somewhat vague about its long-term aims, is utterly ruthless in its short-term intentions.

2 The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade

The end of the Cold War has brought greater freedom of movement opportunities for people and goods in many countries, particularly those of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the economic success of capitalism and its accompanying system of materialism has led to the so-called dollarisation of the globe, whereby to possess money is now also to possess power, success and influence. These effects of liberalisation and financial imperative have led to a huge increase in legitimate transnational commercial enterprises. However, they have also helped to fuel a parallel underground international drug economy whose annual profits are now believed to be in the area of between US$200 billion and US$400 billion. Few areas of the world have been untouched in recent years by the illicit trade in narcotics. Its impact has been felt throughout Australasia, Europe, North America, South America, Africa and Asia, contributing to such corrosive effects as AIDS, social instability, a lack of economic performance, official corruption and the growing force of organised crime. This chapter will assess the scope and impact of the global production and trafficking in two prominent drugs of abuse: heroin and cocaine. It will first briefly outline the main characteristics and effects of these two narcotic substances, before going on to give an overview of their main statistical trends, production areas and trafficking routes. The nature of the threat posed by the illicit trade in heroin and cocaine is then examined, particularly in relation to its impact on social, economic and political stability. Having set the dimensions and impact of the global trade in these two drugs in context, the chapter finally looks at the growing nexus between heroin and cocaine trafficking and two 37

38 Non-Military Security and Global Order

other threats to international stability and security: money laundering and terrorism.

Major production areas and trafficking routes Heroin Heroin is one of several highly addictive drugs that is derived from the dried milk of the opium poppy. It is typically found in one of two forms. The first is Number 4 heroin. This is essentially pure percentage heroin, although absolute purity levels do vary. In this state the narcotic has a fine white powdery appearance, and because it is water soluble, tends to be injected intravenously. The second is Number 3 heroin. This is a variation where heroin is mixed with morphine and codeine. In this state the narcotic looks like semi-refined brown sugar. It is usually smoked by heating the heroin on tin foil. This causes the drug to liquefy and give off fumes, which are then inhaled by the user, a process commonly known as ‘chasing the dragon’. In action, heroin slows people down, giving them a feeling of warmth and detachment. The drug also depresses brain activity, widens blood vessels, lessens the desire to eat, and blocks out both physical and mental pain. Street heroin is often ‘cut’ with other substances such as talcum powder and glucose. This, in itself, is dangerous as it makes it difficult to know how big a dose is actually being taken. Overdose can thus become a real risk which, if it occurs, typically results in coma and death. Physical withdrawal symptoms are very unpleasant and similar in nature to flu: aches, sweating, chills and shaking. While these may subside after about a week, mental cravings last considerably longer and are the biggest obstacle to curing addiction on a permanent basis.1 There are two main production areas for heroin: the Golden Crescent of Southwest Asia; and the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia.2 Opium bound for the European market is produced principally in the Golden Crescent of Southwest Asia, an area comprising southern Afghanistan, northern Pakistan and eastern Iran. In 1997, Afghanistan and Pakistan3 collectively cultivated a total of 43 250 hectares of opium poppy, generating a potential yield of 1350 metric tons of dry opium gum. The main producer country in the Golden Crescent is Afghanistan, accounting for roughly 93 per cent of all opium that is cultivated in the region. In 1997, Afghanistan produced 1265 tons of opium gum, a 3 per cent increase on 1996’s yield. This translates into an approximate heroin output of 120 metric tons, most of which is refined in laborato-

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade 39

ries located along the Afghan–Pakistani border.4 Information obtained by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) liaison officer in Islamabad suggests that the Afghan opium yield in 1998 is likely to continue to grow. This is largely due to the continuing high levels of political instability in the country and the Taliban’s own willingness to fund its civil war on the back of heroin proceeds.5 Most of the heroin that is produced in the Golden Crescent is smuggled to Europe by sophisticated trafficking organisations operating out of Quetta. These groups place orders with Afghani producers and arrange for trans-shipments of refined heroin to either Iranian, Turkish or Kurdish buyers who then move it into the European market. Considerable use is made in this regard of the so-called Balkan Corridor, a trafficking network that distributes heroin to major West European cities via one of two runs: northwards from Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Republics; or westwards through Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia. The main transit countries once in Western Europe are Austria and Germany for the northern route and Italy for the western route.6 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia is also playing an increasingly pivotal role in the distribution of Southwest Asian heroin. As the US State Department observes: Criminal organisations that had successfully operated under the Soviet regime entered the post-Cold War era with the necessary expertise, contacts, smuggling, and distribution networks already in place. Using heroin sources established during the USSR’s war with Afghanistan, ethnically based gangs, many from the Caucasus, have burgeoned into major players in the European drug trade.7 A secondary, increasingly used trafficking route run by Russian organised crime has thus emerged. This makes use of a distribution channel that runs from Afghanistan through refining centres in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan8 and Kazakstan to Moscow and from there to destinations in the Baltics and western Europe. 9 So prolific is this secondary refining and trafficking route becoming that certain analysts are now referring to the four Caucasus states that comprise Central Asia as the second ‘Golden Crescent’.10 The second main production area for heroin is the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia, a region comprising the Shan hills of eastern Burma, the mountain crests of northern Thailand and the high plateau of northern Laos. The vast majority of refined opium that is produced in

40 Non-Military Security and Global Order

this area is exported to North America (principally Canada) and Australia (Figs. 2.1 and 2.2), though significant quantities are also trafficked to Africa. In 1997, the Golden Triangle countries collectively cultivated approximately 184 950 hectares of opium poppy, generating a potential yield of 2600 metric tons of opium gum.11 In global terms, the Golden Triangle presently accounts for approximately 66 per cent of all known illicit opium production, fuelling an underground industry that is now thought to be worth at least US$160 billion.12 The main producer country in the Golden Triangle is Burma, currently accounting for roughly 91 per cent of all opium that is generated in the region. According to the US State Department, the area under poppy cultivation in Burma increased from 92 300 hectares in 1987, through 154 000 hectares in 1995 to 155 150 hectares in 1997. The potential heroin output from this crop soared from 54 metric tons in 1987 to 197 metric tons in 1997, enough to satisfy the US market many times over.13 According to a 1996 report issued the US Embassy in Rangoon, the exports of opiates alone from Burma now appear to be worth in excess of all legal exports combined!14 The principal heroin warlord in Burma for many years was Chang Chifu, more commonly known as Khun Sa. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s he developed an increasingly powerful opium-heroin ‘empire’ thanks largely to the backing he received from both the Rangoon Government and CIA. By the 1980s, over 50 per cent of the heroin that was produced in the country was refined by Khun Sa (the

Figs. 2.1 and 2.2 Double UO-Globe, commonly found on heroin importations into Australia, Canada and the US.

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade 41

remainder being largely accounted for by Chifu’s main rival, Lo Hsiung-Han, who also benefited from Burmese and US backing). He used the extensive profits from his drug trade to finance his own private militia (the 15 000 strong Mong Tai Army/MTA) as well as a thriving Shan ‘capital’ in Ho Mong.15 In January 1996 Khun Sa was reported to have surrendered to the Burmese government, raising hopes that a key player in the Golden Triangle’s heroin nexus had been ‘neutralised’.16 However, the surrender is unlikely to have any discernible effect on heroin movements coming out of the region for two main reasons. First, it now appears that, far from giving himself up, Khun Sa has actually struck a deal with the Burmese junta. According to Western observers in Rangoon, Khun Sa has agreed to end the MTA separatist war only on the condition that he be allowed to remain in charge of his current drug operation and trafficking routes.17 Second, Khun Sa no longer dominates the heroin trade in the Golden Triangle in the way that he previously did. Since 1989 he has progressively lost ground to a new generation of more influential and better connected traffickers located in the Kokang area of northern Shan State on the Burma-southern Chinese frontier. According to US and Thai intelligence agencies, Chao Nyi Lai, Yawd Serk, Lin Mingxian and Zhang Zhiming are now the main players in the Golden Triangle’s opium trade. Chao Nyi Lai heads the United Wa Army and works in conjunction with the Wei brothers, two traffickers who operate a network of smuggling routes along the Burmese–Thai border. Yawd Serk is the current leader of the MTA, although he has repeatedly denied allegations of being involved in the drug trade. Lin Mingxian and Zhang Zhiming are two former Red Guards who control several refineries in eastern Shan State.18 Certainly there is, as yet, no sign of Khun Sa’s surrender leading to any significant reduction in the supply of heroin from the Golden Triangle. Intelligence data gathered by the US State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Enforcement Affairs, for instance, indicates that 1997’s harvest yielded only slightly less heroin than that produced in 1996 (largely due to unfavourable weather conditions in Burma) and 6 per cent more than that refined in 1995.19 A large amount of the heroin that is produced in the Golden Triangle is smuggled across the Burmese–Thai border, transported to Bangkok, Malaysia or Singapore, and trafficked from there to Australia, Canada or the US in shipping containers or on board commercial and passenger flights (Fig. 2.3). A secondary, increasingly used, route makes use of Laos as a transit point for shipments bound for Cambodia and

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Fig. 2.3

Heroin block arrives in Australia.

Vietnam. The Cambodian heroin is exported to international markets either in shipping containers from the southwestern port of Koh Kong or by human couriers from Phnom Penh’s Pochentong international airport. Most of the Vietnamese heroin is trafficked north through the southern Chinese provinces of Yunan and Guangxi to Guandong and then taken either overland or by boat to neighbouring Hong Kong where local triad gangs operate sophisticated transit routes to Asia and North America.20 A final route makes use of Nigeria as an intermediary trans-shipment point for heroin bound for both Africa (most of which goes to South Africa) and the US. Rampant corruption at virtually all levels of government administration have ensured that this country is now playing an increasingly pivotal role in the international distribution of Southeast Asian heroin, especially to the North American market.21 Cocaine Cocaine is a white powder that is derived from coca paste, a base that is formed from the leaves of the coca plant. The narcotic is usually snorted through the nasal passages, though it can also be injected intravenously. ‘Crack’ is a particular derivative of the drug that first began to appear in the 1990s. It is made by mixing cocaine with baking powder, soda and water to form a ‘cake’ that is then cooked until a hard substance is formed. This is then broken down (‘cracked’) to reveal crystals of pure cocaine hydrochloride that are processed into small crystals about the size of raisins which are then smoked (known as ‘freebasing’).22 Cocaine belongs to a class of drugs known as stimulants, which tend to give a temporary illusion of limitless power, alertness, exhilaration, strength, well-being and energy. The psychotropic and physiological effects of cocaine and crack cocaine are the same, but the intensity and

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade 43

duration of each can differ. Crack always gives a fast, intense high, sometimes lasting only a few minutes. Cocaine, when taken intravenously, gives an intense high similar to that of crack. However, when it is snorted, the high is less intense, though of longer duration. High does of either cocaine or crack cocaine can result in paranoia with users becoming edgy, irrational and aggressive. Overdoses usually result in death. As with heroin, cocaine and crack are both highly addictive. However, the ‘crash’ from a cocaine and (especially) crack high tends to be of far greater severity, with some users resorting to heroin to soften the blow. Common withdrawal symptoms typically include loss of appetite, a chronic feeling of depression, sleeplessness and weight loss.23 Virtually all of the world’s cocaine originates from the Andean region of South America. The main producer countries are Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. In 1997, these three countries collectively produced 194 100 hectares of coca leaf, generating a base of sufficient quantity to yield a potential output of 650 metric tons of refined cocaine. Despite concerted crop eradication programmes in Peru and Bolivia, 24 1997’s figures only represented a modest decline of 5 per cent from 1996’s total coca cultivation. This is because reductions in Peru and Bolivia were offset by a major increase of 18 per cent in Colombian coca production.25 The majority of the coca that is grown and cultivated in South America is processed in Colombia – the world’s leading producer and distributor of refined cocaine. As a result of crop eradication programmes in Bolivia and Peru, Colombia is now also the world’s leading producer of coca leaf, making this country the Andean equivalent of Burma and Afghanistan for the cocaine trade. In 1998, US officials estimated the total size of Colombia’s drug plantations at roughly 78 400 hectares, considerably more than either Bolivia or Peru. Overall, up to three-quarters of all known illicit cocaine is currently thought to originate from Colombia, generating an illegal economy of between US$3 and US$5 billion.26 Prior to 1994, the Cali and (especially) Medellin cartels dominated virtually every aspect of cocaine refining and trafficking in Colombia. However, since the killing of the Medellin drug kingpin Pablo Escobar in December 1993 as well as the capture of leading members of the Cali ‘inner circle’ in 1996,27 control of the country’s cocaine trade has become somewhat more fragmented and dispersed. In particular, newer, smaller organisations based to the north of Cali, as well as the ultra-leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination

44 Non-Military Security and Global Order

(CGSB),28 now appear to be in the ascendant – a trend that is expected to accelerate over the coming years.29 Most of the cocaine produced in Latin America is trafficked to markets in North America and Western Europe. Shipments intended for the North American market are smuggled out of Colombia by light aircraft, flown up the Pacific Coast of Central America to Mexico where it is transported to the US, either overland either from Tijuana, Chihuahua or Monterrey, by sea from Tampico, or by air from Guadalajara. To facilitate the land export of cocaine into America, considerable use is made of Mexican crime syndicates. These groups have both experience and expertise in running sophisticated smuggling operations across the heavily guarded southern US border, most of which has been gained as a result of trafficking illegal aliens into Texas and California (see also Chapter 6). Overall, drug enforcement agencies estimate that 70 per cent of all the cocaine that enters the US from Colombia first passes through Mexico.30 Cocaine bound for Europe (the majority of which is handled by the Sicilian Mafia or Cosa Nostra) is exported largely by sea, mainly from ports in Venezuela, Argentina and Brazil. Most is concealed in legitimate shipping cargo destined for European ports such as Rotterdam, Genoa, Barcelona and, increasingly, northern coastal locations on the Baltic Sea. A secondary route runs via territories with British, French or Dutch links in the eastern Caribbean. In this instance, the cocaine is first smuggled from Latin America on board small, privately owned ships and yachts to a variety of ports in the Lesser Antilles such as Dominica, St Kitts, St Lucia, the Virgin Islands, Martinique, Guadeloupe and Aruba. It is then off-loaded onto larger commercial vessels (particularly European-based fishing trawlers) for the final trip across the Atlantic.31 According to Western intelligence sources, the Russian mob is becoming increasingly involved in these various trafficking operations, distributing up to 50 tons of cocaine a year to Europe and operating in an arc that now encompasses southern Florida, the Caribbean, Brazil and Argentina.32 As with the heroin trade, West Africa has also emerged as an increasingly used trafficking trans-shipment point. This alternative route makes use of Nigerian and Ghanaian couriers who smuggle cocaine directly from the Andean countries, via West Africa, to major West European capitals as well as secondary destinations in Southern Africa (such as Johannesburg, Durban and Capetown).33 These human mules typically ‘carry’ their product internally in cocaine-filled condoms, earning on average about US$2000 per trip.34

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade 45

Heroin and cocaine addiction Hardly surprisingly, the huge quantities of heroin and cocaine that are currently being trafficked around the world have resulted in a growing global addiction problem. This has affected not only the developed countries of Western Europe, North America and Australasia, where most of the drugs are consumed. It has also impacted on producer and transit countries, many of which have suffered substantial rises in recent years. The following figures are merely some of the more dramatic examples that could be used to illustrate the extent of cocaine and heroin addiction around the world: • By 1994, Colombia had an estimated 600 000 cocaine addicts. • Approximately 1.5 million Americans are currently believed to regularly use cocaine (of which 420 000 use crack cocaine), with a further 548 000 addicted to heroin. • Experts believe that at least 250 000 people are addicted to cocaine in Canada. • In Italy, approximately 140 000 people are addicted to either heroin or cocaine. • Roughly 500 000 people are addicted to heroin in Thailand. • In 1998, the Government of Iran stated that the number of heroin addicts in the country was 500 000; non-official estimates, however, run to as high as one million (although these statistics often fail to distinguish between ‘users’ and ‘addicts’).

Fig. 2.4

Drugs packaged on the street.

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• Anecdotal evidence suggests that the official figure of 520 000 heroin addicts in China significantly underestimates the scale of the problem in this country. • It is believed that the number of heroin addicts in Pakistan is now as high as 3.5 million. • According to official figures, there are presently over 2 million drug users in Russia, significant proportions of which are believed to be hard-core heroin addicts. • In Australia, law enforcement authorities estimate annual heroin consumption to be 1.6 tonnes, although criminologists believe that this underestimates the domestic market by at least several tonnes.35

The threat posed by the global heroin and cocaine trade The threat posed by global trade in heroin and cocaine covers at least four dimensions. First, and most visibly, it contributes to growing social instability by fuelling high rates of crime. This emanates both from users struggling to finance their habit as well as traffickers and distributors striving to gain control of a greater share of the narcotics market. Drug related arrests in the Chinese province of Guandong jumped nearly 50 times on account of the Southeast Asian heroin trade between 1990 and 1996. In general it is estimated that heroin addicts are now responsible for 80 per cent of all crimes that are committed in the southern Chinese provinces. 36 Figures in the Czech Republic are even more dramatic. In 1997, the country’s main anti-drug squad, the Nardoni Proti-Drogovy Central, reported a staggering 300 per cent increase in drug-related crime, with street-level violence linked to the heroin trade becoming a virtual day-to-day occurrence in Prague.37 In the US, cocaine and crack sales fuel much of the country’s drug violence as gangs compete for lucrative sales territory and addicts steal to feed their habit.38 In early 1993, a wave of violence exploded over Colombia as a result of inter-syndicate fighting between the Medellin cartel and a rival Cali group calling itself Pepes.39 In one month, Pepes killed over twenty Escobar loyalists and carried out eleven dynamite attacks, causing approximately US$8 million worth of damage to properties owned by the Escobar family.40 Colombia currently remains one of the most violent countries on earth primarily as a result of the narcotics trade. In 1996, the country suffered a total of 26 142 homicides, the overwhelming majority of which were linked in one way or another to drug-related crime. 41 The period since 1990 has witnessed highly destabilising drug turf wars in Russia, with most bloodletting

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade 47

connected to the attempts by the Mafiya to eliminate new threats from the bespredel’chiki, a younger, newer generation of narcotics criminals.42 In Australia, it has been estimated that more than A$312 million is raised each year by heroin users and dealers engaging in various forms of property crime,43 while in 1994, over 2000 Albanians were being held in Swiss jails on heroin-related offences.44 Virtually all countries that have been assailed by cocaine and heroin use in recent years have suffered from similar patterns of endemic crime and violence. In certain inner city ghettos such as those of Peru, Brazil and Mexico, the problem has become so great that any notion of civil society has largely disappeared. As John McFarlane, Special Adviser for the AFP Office of the Deputy Commissioner, observes, in these instances crime is not only seen as the fast track to success; it is often regarded as the only path to survival. 45 The ensuing instability encourages yet more crime, thus perpetuating the problem. The end result is an extreme case of societal dislocation where life, in the words of Thomas Hobbes, is ‘brutish, nasty and short’. Second, intravenous heroin and cocaine use is helping to foster the spread of one of the most lethal diseases of our time – AIDS. The west coast of Canada has been especially hard hit in this regard. The prevalence of HIV among injecting drug addicts in Vancouver, for instance, increased from 2 per cent to 15 per cent between 1994 and 1997 as a direct result of users sharing ‘dirty’ needles. Southeast Asia is another area where the problem has been particularly marked. According to the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) in Bangkok, Thailand currently has to administer at least 50 000 confirmed heroin addicts, the majority of whom are also HIV positive as a result of their habit. 46 Similarly Burma, which was free of AIDS only a few years ago, currently has an estimated 200 000 people carrying the HIV virus, 74 per cent of whom are tested intravenous heroin users. 47 And in China, the increased incidence of AIDS throughout the southern border regions – some of which has reached epidemic proportions – is widely accepted to be a consequence of the high concentration of injecting opium addicts in provinces such as Yunan.48 Third, the costs associated with trying to control the global cocaine and heroin trade are contributing to a lack of economic performance in source/transit and consumer states. As production and trafficking of these narcotics increase, so more and more resources have to be diverted to treat addicts through detoxification, health and rehabilitation programmes, as well as to finance the clinics to treat those afflicted with AIDS on account of their habit. Moreover, the violence,

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crime and organised illicit activities that have come to surround heroin/cocaine addiction and (especially) trafficking means that public resources also have to be channelled into law enforcement – further reducing the availability of funds to stimulate economic productivity.49 The true extent of the finances needed to control the drug trade is well exemplified by the United States. In February 1998, President Clinton allocated almost US$16 000 million to fund the country’s antidrug effort. Over the last ten years, the US government has spent, at the federal level, US$110 000 million to fight drugs. If one includes monies allocated by state and local governments in addition to out of pocket efforts by businesses, communities, schools and private individuals, the total rises to an incredible US$500 000 million. Every year, the US anti-drug effort consumes the overwhelming majority of federal state funds as well as the resources allocated by state, local and private groups. On average, this amounts to more than US$30 000 million annually.50 As Table A4 in Appendix 1 illustrates, 1998 looks as though it will be every bit as costly, at least at the US government level (figures are federal allocations quoted in US$ million). Fourth, drug money from the illicit trade in cocaine and heroin is playing a key role in weakening and undermining already weak and vulnerable regimes by encouraging officials in government and military circles. The money and profit margins involved in the sale of illicit narcotics are truly colossal, and all the more so because they are not taxed. The wholesale price for one kilogram of heroin in Thailand, for instance, is estimated to be between US$3400 and US$5600. It is believed that the same kilogram would cost a British wholesaler up to US$51 000, with the price rising to US$100 000 in Australia and as much as US$195 000 in the US, depending on purity levels. The current cost of a single ‘hit’ of heroin (less than 1 gram) in London is around £stg10, while the street price for a whole kilogram sold in New York is estimated to be well over fourteen times the purchase price in Yunan.51 The potential profits from the cocaine trade are just as dramatic. As the US State Department observes: Assuming an average retail price street price of US$100 dollars per gram, a metric ton of pure cocaine has a retail value of US$100 million on the streets of a US city – two or three times as much if the drug is cut with adulterants. By this measure, the 100 or so metric tons of cocaine that the US Government typically seizes each year are theoretically worth as much as US$10 billion to the drug trade, more than the gross domestic product of many countries.52

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade 49

Fig. 2.5 The Bahari-314 was used to import heroin into Australia. About 123 kg of block heroin was recovered from this vessel in July 1994.

Fig. 2.6 The Teh Sun, again used import block heroin. About 21 kg were recovered in July 1995.

Russia, Colombia, Mexico, Thailand and Italy all provide examples of states where the problem of drug-induced corruption has been especially serious. In Russia, none of the country’s main institutions has escaped allegations of links with the Mafiya, including the Prime Minister’s office, the civil service, armed forces, big business, regional authorities and the Duma.53 In 1996, 43 high-ranking officials in Colombia were detained in a series of narcotics-related investigations, including members of President Samper’s cabinet (Samper, himself, was exonerated of corruption charges by the Colombian Congress); an additional 2000 policemen suspected of corruption were removed from their positions.54 Drug investigations in Mexico have repeatedly touched on high-ranking military and police officers, as well as senior members of the government. In 1998, for instance, an undercover operation conducted by US Customs agents implicated the

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country’s powerful Defence Minister, General Enrique Cervantes, in a US$1.15 billion money laundering scheme that he was allegedly running in conjunction with the Colombian and Mexican underworld.55 Several other well-known public figures have also been tainted by drug-related corruption in Mexico, including Raul Salinas, the brother of former President Carlos Salinas de Gortari.56 In Thailand, a report issued by the ONCB in 1999 tied a staggering 300 government officials to either direct or indirect involvement with the Golden Triangle’s drug trade. Several senior Thai MPs have been similarly ‘fingered’ by the US government, including Vatana Asavaname, a former deputy interior minister and deputy leader of Chart Thai and Narong Wongwan, leader of the prominent Justice and Unity Party.57 And in Italy, over 3000 executives, politicians and government personnel were implicated in a pervasive corruption network that was revealed as part of a major crackdown against the Sicilian Mafia between 1992 and 1993.58

Money laundering Because heroin and cocaine profits derive from an illegal source, producers and traffickers need to launder their proceeds to make them appear clean. Only then can they be re-invested (either in legal or illegal activities) without leaving a telltale paper trail. Money laundering, a criminal process that is defined as any transaction that disguises illegal proceeds as legitimate revenues, thus has three basic stages: accumulation, transformation and re-investment. The process typically involves corrupt accountants, bankers and lawyers whose job is to invest drug-related funds in companies, banks and financial safe havens known for their prestige and integrity.59 The extent of these money laundering schemes can be extremely large. In one notable case that occurred in Australia, for instance, it was discovered that US$16.5 million which had been invested in Sydney real-estate operations originated from a US$1 billion heroin trade between Thailand and New York. Estimates by the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre put the total illegal proceeds that have been generated by drug-related money laundering in Australia alone (most of which is connected to heroin from the Golden Triangle) at between A$1 billion and A$4.5 billion. This is significant since Australia is believed to have amongst the tightest cash reporting laws of any state in the world.60 In 1995, the United Nations estimated that at least US$500 billion worth of drug money

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade 51

is laundered each year, roughly equivalent of 2 per cent of global GDP.61 The banking system remains one of the most important vehicles for laundering money. A variety of methods are used, typically involving the physical transformation of cash through banking bearer instruments such as money drafts, cheques, telegraphic transfers and the establishment of loan back schemes.62 However, the banking system is not the only means by which drug-related profits are laundered. Other favoured means include: • the exchange of small-denomination bank notes for gambling chips or winning lottery tickets; • transfer payments through the use of company trade accounts in more than one country; • bulk smuggling of cash in courier-carried luggage and its investment in offshore bank accounts; • investment of money in front/shell companies; • invoice manipulation, which generally involves the falsification of shipping documents and invoices through the over-valuing or under-valuing of imports and exports; • the Internet, particularly via the creation of virtual banks and currency exchange outlets.63 An additional method that is principally used to launder heroin profits from Southeast and Southwest Asia is the underground banking system. This procedure relies entirely on trust between families, secret societies or ethnic groups who are often located many thousands of miles apart. The system has two main advantages. First, as it completely bypasses conventional financial channels, it is extremely hard to detect. Second, it is faster than that used by official banks – hundreds of thousands of dollars can be transferred to another country in a matter of hours.64 Allen Nugent, Counsellor for Narcotics Affairs at the US Embassy in Bangkok explains how the system works: Suppose a heroin dealer (‘A’) in Hong Kong wants to wire some of his proceeds to Bangkok. ‘A’ goes into a pawn-broker in Hong Kong (usually run by a family member) and informs the owner of his intentions. The pawnbroker notifies a sister company in Bangkok and issues ‘A’ with a chit authorising him to collect the funds on arrival. ‘A’ then leaves the equivalent sum with the pawnbroker in Hong Kong, which is deposited into a bank account nominated by

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the sister company in Bangkok. ‘A’ travels to Bangkok, shows his chit, and receives his money.65 Money laundering poses a major problem for the global polity. Not only does this form of ‘white collar’ crime directly enhance the economic and political power of drug syndicates; it also works to undermine the stability of local and international financial systems. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) scandal provides a good example of the type of macro-economic damage that can be caused by such illicit financial activities. Following a two year undercover operation codenamed C-CHASE, it was revealed that the BCCI had been involved in a variety of money laundering schemes, including those of the Abu Nidal Organisation (a radical Palestinian terror group), the Colombian Medellin cartel and Manuel Noriega (the ‘drug-tainted’ former leader of Panama). The scandal led directly to the demise of the world’s seventh largest private bank, an event which had significant international repercussions in both the developed and (especially) developing world (by the time of its closure, the BCCI had assets in excess of US$23 billion, conducting operations in 73 countries). The affair also raised serious questions concerning the responsibilities and role of auditors and bank regulators, revealing a stream of endemic corruption in many countries where the bank had operated.66

Narco-terrorism A final dimension of the illicit trade in heroin and cocaine that is eliciting growing concern has been the development of the so-called narcoterrorist phenomenon.67 In several parts of the world, drug lords have been prepared to employ terrorist-type tactics for specific political purposes, generally in the context of trying to force advantageous (or curtail disadvantageous) changes in the law. To date, most narcoterrorism of this sort has taken place in Colombia where both the Medellin and Cali cartels have resorted to various acts of random violence in response to government anti-narcotic and extradition efforts. By the end of 1993, drug-related violence had cost the country the lives of an attorney general, a justice minister, three presidential candidates, more than 200 judges, 30 kidnap victims, at least 1,000 policemen and countless civilians.68 Some of the acts of terrorism carried out in Colombia have been especially destructive, particularly those perpetrated by the Medellin cartel.

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade 53

In 1989, the syndicate took responsibility (under the name of the ‘Extraditables’) for the mid-air destruction of a Colombian Aviancia jet which resulted in the deaths of all 107 aboard. The attack was intended to dissuade the government from extraditing the country’s twelve most wanted drug lords to the US. More recently, in February 1993, the late Pablo Escobar publicly announced a campaign of violence to pressure the government into granting immunity to drug traffickers. Immediately following the declaration, a series of attacks were carried out in several Colombian cities (claimed by the Antioquia Rebel Movement – another flag of convenience for the Medellin cartel), including three car bombings in Bogotá and Medellin which left 20 people dead (including five children) and 60 others seriously wounded.69 Despite the gradual demise of the Medellin and Cali Cartels since 1994, the threat of organised narco-terrorism emanating from these two syndicates has not dissipated. Indeed in March 1999, evidence emerged of a ‘narco terror fund’ that had been created by several jailed drug lords comprising over US$9.6 million. Intelligence sources now believe that the money had been earmarked for a campaign of violence involving car bombings, assassinations and random shootings to coerce the country’s President, Andres Pastrana, into reversing his 1997 decision to lift the ban on extradition for Colombian nationals wanted overseas.70 Russia and Italy provide two further examples of states that have been seriously afflicted by terrorism emanating from drug syndicates. In Russia, the Mafiya have been implicated in numerous acts of terrorism since 1992, including several civilian bombings and at least 16 killings of high-profile businessmen, politicians and journalists. They have also been tied to a significant proportion of the 1009 police deaths that have occurred since 1994, many of which were carried out with a specific political rationale in mind.71 Drug-related political violence in Italy has been just as problematic with major bomb attacks being the typical response to increased government anti-narcotic efforts. Following the introduction of tough crime legislation in 1992, for instance, a wave of Mafia-instigated terrorism swept the country. Included in the group’s attacks were the assassination of the country’s two leading anti-Mafia prosecutors, Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, as well as the bombings of several historic sites and galleries in Rome, Florence and Milan (which collectively killed 10 people and injured another 40).72 One particularly disturbing feature of the narco-terrorism carried out in Italy and Russia is its alleged interconnectedness. Authorities in

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Rome have long suspected that drug-related political violence in the country has been aided by certain ‘outside’ forces with such claims being especially prominent following the Rome, Florence and Milan bombings. More ominously, are suggestions pertaining to the existence of a joint Russian/Italian narcotics death squad made up of ex-KGB agents and equipped with the latest weapons of the former USSR. 73 While such allegations have yet to be conclusively proven, they should not be dismissed lightly. Compared to the paltry salaries currently on offer by the Russian state (estimated at approximately US$136 a month), employment in the service of the drug trade would doubtless represent a highly tempting and lucrative alternative for many exmembers of the Russian security services. Such a development would not only qualitatively increase the geo-political spread of violence available to drug cartels in both Italy and Russia; if left unchecked, it could also mushroom into a security threat of significant proportions. There are fears that Southeast Asia, too, may degenerate down the narco-terrorist path already followed by Colombia, Italy and Russia. Largely as a result of increased US pressure on Indochinese states to step up their anti-narcotic efforts, opportunities for taking advantage of official corruption in the region are being curtailed (or at least reduced). Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and even Burma74 have all stated a willingness to work in conjunction with US DEA crop eradication, alternative development and production interception programmes, as well as to participate in DEA-organised workshops designed to enhance up-to-date anti-drug techniques and procedures. Despite the obvious value of such international initiatives, the concern is that they could very well spark the type of violent reaction already seen in states such as Colombia and Italy. Indeed, a number of analysts believe a spate of terrorist attacks carried out in the southern Thai border districts between August and December 1997 (which collectively led to the deaths of 20 people), were the work of drug racketeers beginning to feel the pressures of increased government narcotics suppression efforts. Since 1995, Cambodia has also seen a surge of assassination attempts and grenade attacks – including the August 1997 bombing of a packed night club in Phnom Penh – as local heroin syndicates have attempted to derail plans to introduce more effective narcotics and money laundering measures. 75 However, it is in Burma where the real danger of Southeast Asian narco-terrorism lies. Virtually all of the Golden Triangle’s heroin production takes place in this country. Moreover the various syndicates that exist in the region (such as the Wa) have all been able to build up fairly substantial private

The Global Heroin and Cocaine Trade 55

militias over the years on the back of lucrative drug-running operations. Given these factors, any moves by the Burmese government to crack down on opium production activities would almost certainly be met with a violent reaction.76 Another aspect of the narco-terrorist phenomenon is the use of the drug trade by terrorist organisations as a way of financing their activities. Again, it is in Colombia where problems of this sort have been greatest. In 1992, the former President, Cesar Gaviria, was forced to declare a state of emergency in the country, introducing measures that were specifically aimed at the ‘heart and cheque book’ of the ELN and FARC. Topping his list of narco-terrorists were the groups’ respective leaders, Manuel Perez and Manuel ‘Crackshot’ Marulanda. 77 There is no doubt that the extensive profits derived from narco-related activities is one of the main reasons these two organisations have been able to sustain their rural-based insurgency against the Bogotá government for so long. The ELN, for instance, is known to earn around US$140 million every year from the trafficking of heroin and cocaine, while at least since the mid-1980s, most of FARC’s operating budget has been made up of protection taxes procured from local drug producers and traffickers.78 Several other liberation organisations that rely on terrorism as a primary mode of struggle have also turned to the drugs business as a way of generating capital. Among the more significant have been Shining Path (SL) in Peru, the LTTE of Sri Lanka and the PKK, whose groups operate throughout Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. At the height of its existence, SL was sustained entirely by the cocaine trade, guarding drug producers in the Huallaga Valley in return for a share of their profits.79 The PKK has developed an extremely lucrative business trafficking Southwest Asian heroin into Western Europe, particularly through the Balkan Corridor via Romania.80 And the LTTE is currently known to be sponsoring at least two drug gangs in the greater Toronto metropolitan area: VVT and AK Kanan.81 According to Canada’s Asian Crime Task Force, these local ‘Tiger gangsters’ have been instrumental in raising millions of dollars every year to support the Tamil struggle through extortion and heroin trafficking.82 Given the enormous profits that are involved in the drugs trade, it is hardly surprising that terrorist groups have become involved in narco-activities. Moreover, when one considers the overall compound growth of drug money, an increasingly intimate relationship between terrorism and narcotics has to be expected. By 2004, the Financial Action Task Force believes the financial value of narcotics will reach

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US$15 billion (equivalent to today’s value of global gold stocks) and, by 2014, will top the GDP of the US. 83 While bank robberies, kidnappings and state support, the traditional means by which terrorists have supported themselves, will doubtless remain important as useful capital generators, drug profits and margins of this extent obviously provide a far quicker and more reliable means by which to raise money. The global heroin and cocaine trade constitutes a highly important GAP influence that has had a far-reaching, corrosive and insidious impact on national and international security in the post-Cold War era. In one form or another, production and trafficking of these two narcotic substances have undermined individual and collective well being, reduced economic performance, fuelled political violence, encouraged official corruption, contributed to social breakdown and exacerbated human misery, suffering and death. In short, they have negatively affected nearly every dimension of viable human and state existence in a geographic arc that spans virtually the entire international system. Of all grey area phenomena, the heroin and cocaine trade is one that very much can be viewed as a threat to security in its widest possible sense.

3 Contemporary Maritime Piracy

Maritime piracy1 has been endemic to the international system for many hundreds of years. Indeed the narratives of Shih Fa-Hsien, a Buddist monk from Ceylon, record cases of raiding, robbing and other instances of marauding in the waters of the Malacca Strait and South China Sea as early as 414 AD. 2 Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the Mediterranean was infested by maritime violence, with rulers on both sides of the Moslem–Christian divide sponsoring raiders operating out of the Barbary states of Tunis, Tripoli and Algeria, on the one hand, and Rhodes and Malta on the other. Buccaneers based in Jamaica were extremely active during the seventeenth century, encouraged in many respects by London’s continuing undeclared war against Madrid following the end of formal Spanish–British hostilities in 1603. Harbour raids and attacks against ships at anchor have been equally as endemic, particularly around West Africa and along the Arabian coast as well as in the Thames between London and the English Channel.3 Echoes of privateering continued well into the twentieth century. Sea raiding, thought to be condoned by Indonesia, was a factor that the Commonwealth naval forces had to take into account during the Malayan Emergency (1948–60) and Sukarno’s subsequent policy of ‘Confrontation’ against the newly created Malaysian Federation between 1963 and 1966.4 Moreover, during the 1970s, numerous attacks against Vietnamese boatpeople fleeing the Communist regime in Indochina were documented, with many of the assaults carried out in the Gulf of Thailand by Malaysian and Thai raiders. 5 Despite these instances, for much of the later twentieth century the issue of piracy was essentially sidelined in importance to the wider East–West ideological struggle that was taking place between the superpowers and their respective blocs. However, with the end of that conflict and the 57

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somewhat artificial constraints that this placed on regional security, piracy is once again emerging as a prominent issue of concern, in terms of incident, lethality, complexity and scope.

The scope and scale of contemporary maritime piracy in the international system Types of piracy currently taking place in global waters It is possible to identify at least four types of piracy that are currently occurring in waters around the world: 1. Harbour and anchorage thefts/attacks. This is a form of piracy that has been encouraged by the relatively relaxed security procedures of many small and not so small ports. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) defines these type of assaults as Low-Level Armed Robbery (LLAR) – an opportunist attack on a ship, mounted close to land by small high speed craft, crewed by criminal ‘maritime muggers’ normally armed with knives. Their targets are usually cash and portable high-value personal items with an average theft of between US$5000 and US$15 000.6 2. Ransacking and robbery of vessels on the high seas or in territorial waters. This is a more common form of piracy and one that, if carried out in narrow sea-lanes, has the potential to seriously disrupt maritime navigation. This is especially true in cases where vessels are out of control because the crew has been detained or locked up. The IMB defines these types of assault as Medium Level Armed Assault and Robbery (MLAR) – violent attacks of robbery involving serious injury or murder by well organised gangs, usually heavily armed and working from a ‘mother’ ship.7 3. Hijacking of vessels to convert them for the purposes of illegal trading – the so-called phantom ship phenomenon. This type of piracy follows a typical pattern. Vessels are first seized with their cargoes off-loaded into lighters at sea (such merchandise either being kept by the pirates themselves or sold off to private bidders). The ships are then fraudulently re-registered and issued with false documents to enable them to take on board a fresh payload. The new cargo is never delivered to its intended destination but transferred to another vessel and taken to an alternate port where it is sold to a pre-arranged buyer who more often than not is a willing participant in the whole venture. 8 The IMB defines these types of assault as a Major Criminal Hijack (MCHJ) – well resourced and

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planned international criminal activity, using large gangs of highly trained and heavily armed operatives fully prepared to use firearms.9 4. Yacht piracy. These attacks take place against private vessels, targeting both cash and readily saleable personal items. The US coastguard has put together a profile of the typical type of vessel likely to be involved in a ‘yachtjacking assault’. Generally attacks take place against boats that have the capacity to undertake long journeys; are well stocked with provisions; are known to carry a large sum of money on board; and are crewed by members with a questionable identity. Yachts that departed from their last known port of call without being observed are also especially vulnerable. Attacks on private yachts can occur virtually anywhere in the world, though most tend to take place in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.10 The post-Cold War statistical incidence of global piracy As Table A5 in Appendix 1 illustrates, a total of 1321 incidents of piracy were registered around the world between 1991 and the end of 1998. Although attacks showed a slight declining trend during the first part of the decade, this has been more than offset by a dramatic escalation in activity since 1994, with 1997 registering the highest number of attacks so far recorded. Regionally, the most severely affected part of the world has been Southeast Asia, accounting for, on average, 61 per cent of all attacks worldwide since 1991. Other high-risk areas include the Americas (particularly the waters around Brazil), the Indian subcontinent (particularly the ports and territorial waters of India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) and the Horn of Africa (particularly around Somalia and Djibouti). The actual problem of piracy in global waters is undoubtedly far more serious than the above figures suggest. According to Eric Ellen, Executive Director of the International Chamber of Commerce’s Commercial Crime Division and Director of the IMB, only incidents which occur on the high seas are registered with the Malaysian-based Regional Piracy Centre (RPC), with perhaps less than half of these attacks actually reported in the first place. Ellen maintains that most shippers are reluctant to report piracy attacks both because of the delays that subsequent investigations will necessarily entail11 as well as the fear that it will serve to merely increase insurance premiums and stimulate demands for extra pay. 12 Indeed, according to the RPC’s former Far East manager, John Martin, in many cases it is actually

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written into shipping associations’ manuals of procedures that attacks on ships should specifically not be reported to any law enforcement or information gathering body, official or not.13 Most experts believe that the number of pirate attacks that are actually reported represents only the ‘tip of the iceberg’. Ellen, for instance, asserts that at least 143 attacks of piracy that took place in Philippine waters in 1993 (and which resulted in the loss of at least 30 lives) were never recorded with either the IMB or the RPC. Martin alleges that as many as one-third of the shipping companies in Singapore have a de facto policy of only privately conceding to attacks against vessels registered in their name. Equally Wulf Steinworth, who co-ordinates piracy responses at the International Transport Workers’ Federation in London, estimates that under-reporting of cases could miss at least 50 per cent of all attacks that take place against merchant shipping.14 The general increased incidence of global piracy in the post-Cold War era can be related to two main factors. First, is the massive increase in international commercial maritime traffic that has occurred in the 1990s, which has provided a ready supply of potential targets. Due to advances in technology, many of these merchant vessels are now able to operate with little more than a skeleton crew, making the pirates’ task of gaining control of the ship that much easier. Second, is the reduced superpower naval presence around the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a factor that has left vast stretches of both territorial and international water effectively unpoliced.15 These two influences have especially impacted on Southeast Asia. Due to the prevalence of highly important sea lanes of communication,16 Southeast Asia is one of the most heavily travelled in the world in terms of maritime traffic. Estimates of the number of ships passing through the Malacca and Singapore Straits, for instance, vary between 150 to as many as 500 a day.17 Moreover, the ‘peace dividend’ between Washington and Moscow has led to a massive reduction in the military navies of the US, Russia and the UK, greatly diminishing the deterrent effect on pirates operating in this part of the world.18 Two additional factors have further compounded the problem in Southeast Asia, which, together with the influences outlined above, account for the especially high incidence of piracy in this particular region. The first is a growing indication that pirate rings and syndicates have benefited from Chinese material and financial support, with Beijing using such ‘third parties’ as a way of indirectly exerting expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea. 19 According to the IMB

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and its parent organisation, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), sponsorship of this sort has been critical in allowing pirates to undertake far more daring and sophisticated attacks in the region, particularly around the Hong Kong, Hainan and Luzon (HLH) areas (see below).20 The second compounding factor is the Asian currency crisis that first broke with the forced devaluation of the Thai baht in mid-1997. This has exacerbated the overall threat potential of Southeast Asian piracy in at least two respects: • a stronger pull factor – with more people drawn to maritime (and other) crime due to falling wages, higher food prices and job losses; • a stronger push factor – with littoral states having less disposable income to finance effective anti-piracy maritime patrols in their waters.21 These effects have been particularly marked in Indonesia, one of the most severely affected Southeast Asian states in terms of the fall out of the Asian currency crisis. Since 1997, the value of the rupiah has dropped by at least 70 per cent, resulting in widespread social violence and a spiralling crime wave, including opportunistic pirate attacks, as individuals struggle to come to grips with falling wages and rampant inflation.22 What potentially makes the crisis in Indonesia of even greater importance, however, is the fact that members of its armed forces have already developed a reputation for becoming directly involved with, or at least protecting, maritime marauding activities precisely due to economic imperatives such as supplementing low incomes.23 As Jon Vagg observed back in 1995: [E]conomic development [has]…meant that prices and incomes fell from 1989/90 on. This could have provided an incentive for piracy for civilian and basic-grade military personnel alike, and the rise of piracy that took place from early 1990 on. In addition, in as much as the armed forces hold a substantial degree of [power], it is possible that they condoned, assisted and ‘taxed’ non-military pirates just as they would other illegal enterprises.24 Should the government of President Wahid be unable to reverse the country’s economic fortunes over the short–medium term, such illicit activity is likely to become rampant in Indonesian territorial waters, further exacerbating what is already a serious problem.

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Phantom ship attacks In terms of type of assault, one of the most disturbing trends that has emerged in recent years is an increase in MCHJ/phantom ship attacks. The IMB estimates that on the basis of current trends, this form of piracy could soon create problems comparable with those caused by the Italian Mafia. Already the practice is believed to be costing more than US$200 million per year in stolen cargoes alone.25 These assaults are also becoming increasingly violent in nature, with heavily armed perpetrators often showing little compunction in using force if challenged by a captured ship’s crew.26 Phantom ship attacks involve a number of serious associated crimes, including hijacking and the fraudulent registration of vessels. According to the IMB, ships can be hijacked to order in states such as the Philippines, with each ‘transaction’ costing roughly 300GBP. In some cases, the theft of vessels has also been arranged between international syndicates and shipowners to defraud hull insurers. Ships are then fraudulently re-registered, with submissions typically made by ‘Shipping Assistance’, ‘Shipping Bureau’ or ‘Marine Corporations’ to officials in states such as Panama, Liberia, Honduras, Belize and St Vincent. This greatly compounds the difficulty of actually investigating phantom ship occurrences, largely because vessels can be registered under several names with different particulars, which obviously makes the task of tracking a phantom ship extremely difficult.27 What makes the phantom ship phenomenon of particular significance is the involvement of organised criminal syndicates in the theft of vessels and the subsequent disposal of cargo. Most of the groups involved are either Chinese or of Chinese origin, belonging to either Cantonese, Shanghai or Fuken gangs, who rely on intelligence gathered from operators and brokers located in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Korea. This data provides the syndicates with accurate, up to date information about all relevant activities taking place in the shipping market such as contracts, cargoes, ships, routes and buyers. It also ensures that they are kept abreast of any action that industry or law enforcement authorities intend to take to counter their activities. Many of these syndicates are thought to retain close links with, or at least have access to, government officials, particularly in China.28 The case of the Anna Sierra provides a good example of this style of contemporary piracy (Fig. 3.1). The case is significant in that it was the first time that a pirated ship had been found intact, with the perpetrators still on board. Sailing under a Cypriot flag, the Anna Sierra was

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Fig. 3.1

The Anna Sierra, hijacked in a phantom ship attack in Southeast Asia.

attacked on 13 September 1995 while en route from Thailand to the Philippines. On board was a cargo of 12 000 metric tons of sugar with a value of US$5 million. Thirteen pirates hijacked the ship, all armed with sub-machine guns, who intended to steal both the Anna Sierra and its payload. The crew were subjected to intimidation and physical assault before being forced overboard into life rafts. No further word was heard from the ship. On 16 September, the ship’s Master (who had been rescued by a Vietnamese fishing trawler) informed the Anna Sierra’s owners of the attack who, in turn, alerted Interpol, the IMB and local American regional search and rescue authorities. The IMB immediately launched an extensive search for the ship, circulating a detailed description of the Anna Sierra, together with its photograph, to Harbour and Master shipping agencies throughout Southeast Asia. On 5 October, information was received that the Anna Sierra was in the southern Chinese port of Bei Hai. IMB officials were dispatched to verify the information and on 8 October made a positive identification of the ship. By the time the vessel was discovered, however, it had been re-registered in Honduras and was sailing under the new name of Artic Sea. Further investigations revealed that the original cargo of sugar had been illegally sold to a Chinese trader in Bei Hai (the deal had actually been arranged before the Anna Sierra was attacked) and that a fresh payload had since been taken on in Brazil intended for Indian buyers. Although the IMB presented irrefutable evidence showing that the Artic Sea was, in fact, a ‘phantom ship’, the Bei Hai authorities never-

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theless released all the ship’s ‘crew’ (Fig. 3.2). Moreover, the Chinese Public Security Bureau (PSB) impounded the Brazilian cargo, refused to release the Artic Sea/Anna Sierra before a ‘finder’s fee’ of US$400 000 was paid and, in 1997, attempted to illegally sell the ship’s merchandise to a local buyer at a price well below the market value. 29 Overall, the losses suffered by the Anna Sierra’s shipowners and related cargo interests ran into the millions.30 The Anna Sierra case has been interpreted by many commentators as providing further evidence of possible Chinese involvement in Southeast Asian piracy. As Jayant Abyankar, Deputy Director of the IMB observes: The main question remains – is the … Anna Sierra case the result of inefficiency and infighting amongst the seemingly inept Chinese authorities concerned, or part of a deeper plot to cover up China’s participation in criminal activity? This is not the first time the ports of Beihai and Fengcheng have been used to shelter hijacked vessels. Local officials have been involved in earlier criminal activities. Despite China’s protestations that she is keen to crack down on piracy, why, given this ideal opportunity to do something positive

Fig. 3.2 China.

The ‘crew’ who brought the ship to the port of Bei Hei, southern

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and achieve a public relations coup, has there been nothing but delay and confusion?31 The lethality of attacks The lethality of piratical attacks also appears to be on the increase. Although the data is somewhat patchy in this regard, there are certain indications that do suggest that serious violence has often been used. In 1998, for instance, the RPC documented a total of 467 acts of serious violence that had occurred in recorded pirate attacks around the world. These included 238 cases of hostage-taking and intimidation; 60 physical assaults; 35 injuries; and 67 deaths. 32 Indications of violence become even more apparent if one examines trends over time. Between 1991 and 1998, for instance, with 1321 separate acts of piracy recorded, 1560 crew were either taken hostage or threatened, 112 physically assaulted, 111 were injured and 173 murdered. As Table A6 in Appendix 1 illustrates, these various acts of violence have steadily increased during the 1990s, rising from a total of 42 in 1991 to 631 in 1997. Although there were fewer overall acts of violence in 1998, the numbers of injuries and deaths committed during the year are the highest currently on record. There have also been several eyewitness accounts and confessions, which have detailed attacks of an especially violent nature. The sole surviving member of a Philippine registered fishing trawler, the MN3 Normina, gave one notable testimony in February 1996. The individual in question described how he and his nine crew mates were rounded up and systematically shot to death one by one (he escaped with a wound to the head) simply for the cargo of their ship, a few tons of fish.33 In a more recent incident that took place in 1998, pirates who were apprehended for the hijacking of the MV Cheung Son, a Panamanian-flagged bulk carrier, subsequently confessed to authorities that they had killed all 23 members of the ship’s crew. According to the testimonies, the victims had been gathered together on the upper deck, weighted, bound and gagged and then shot and thrown overboard. Six bodies were later recovered in the nets of Chinese fishing boats off the southern port of Shantou.34 One of the principal factors accounting for the increased lethality of international piracy is a ready supply of high-tech munitions. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a quantum leap in the violence potential threshold of sub-state criminals and insurgents who are now able to take advantage of a huge array of weaponry left over from Cold War wars as well as from the former Eastern bloc. 35 These armaments

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are truly extensive and can be expected to include anything from pistols, machine guns and explosive devices to heavy-calibre rifles, SAMs, anti-ship mines and ordinance, hand-held mortars and RPGs. The increased availability of munitions such as these has been reflected in pirate assaults that are now both more sophisticated and lethal than was previously the case. Gone are the days of sporadic, and largely ineffectual, incidents simply involving petrol bombs, knives, axes and machetes. Today, attacks can be expected to involve extensive and highly destructive armouries with the potential to de-mobilise and cripple the very largest ocean-going vessels.36

The main dangers posed by maritime piracy The actual danger posed by contemporary piracy covers a number of dimensions. At the most basic level, it constitutes a direct threat to the lives and welfare of the citizens of a variety of flag states. As NUMAST, a British trade union that represents 20 000 masters, officers and cadets, observes: The necessities of normal diplomacy should not obscure the fact that British nationals are being threatened with extreme violence. The present intolerable situation should be approached by the UK Government just as firmly as if British tourists were being attacked whilst holidaying in a particular country.37 Quite apart from the risk of physical death and injury, many seafarers that have been subjected to a pirate attack suffer considerable mental trauma. Many do not fully recover from the experience and even though the chances of a repeat attack may be slight, never go to sea again.38 Despite this, the human cost involved in pirate attacks is something that rarely receives the attention it deserves, largely because assaults are directed against less than visible targets. Again NUMAST: ‘If you had civilian aircraft being threatened or bazookas being fired at train drivers there would be a public outcry. Because it’s shipping, it’s out of sight, out of mind and nothing is done.’39 A reputation for vulnerability to piracy will also do little for the international standing of a trading country and could lead to a boycott of its port facilities. Between 1992 and 1995, for instance, Hong Kong gained a reputation as a port of ‘extreme danger’ with both NUMAST and the Japan Shipowner’s Association threatening to reduce and

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redirect trade until maritime surveillance and security was substantially increased. Equally, many international shipowners have repeatedly threatened to boycott Brazilian ports due to the high incidence of robbery and violence that have taken place against ships anchored at Rio and (especially) Santos during the 1990s.40 If carried out, threats of this type obviously have the potential to seriously affect any maritime state or territory that relies on its anchorage facilities in terms of income generation. Certainly this has become a major consideration for badly affected ports such as Hong Kong, Colombo (Sri Lanka), Surabaya (Indonesia) and Santos.41 Finally acts of piracy have the potential to cause major environmental and pollution damage, particularly if they take place in crowded sea-lanes traversed by heavily laden petroleum tankers. In many instances, pirates will either tie up or throw overboard crew members after raiding their vessels. Known as ‘rogue ships’, these uncontrolled craft obviously have enormous implications with respect to the safety of maritime navigation, greatly increasing the possibility of a highly damaging mid-sea collision. The nightmare scenario is a major crash involving an oil tanker. The resulting discharge of petroleum would not only cause irreparable damage to maritime life and other offshore resources; if left to drift, it would also seriously degrade large tracts of fertile coastal low land.42 In March 1989, the world was appalled at the ecological and environmental destruction caused by the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska. Although not caused by piracy, the catastrophe graphically illustrated what can happen when a major oil discharge occurs. Conservative figures have since estimated that up to 1800 miles of coastline were affected, some of which may never fully recover. 43 Luckily, much of this area is sparsely populated. However, transpose the Exxon Valdez experience to a similar incident occurring in the extremely congested Southeast Asian Philip Channel as a result of a deliberate pirate attack, and you have the potential for an environmental disaster of the highest order. According to the IMB, any oil spill in this particular region of Southeast Asia: [W]ould extend well into the Malacca Strait, eastwards to well beyond the Horsburgh Lighthouse and, given the necessary combination of wind and tide … could completely surround Singapore … as well as the multitude of islands which form this part of Indonesia. Quite apart from the pollution consequence, there is

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every possibility that the seaway would have to be temporarily closed to shipping and the fishing in the area would be ruined for many years, if not permanently.44 The Malacca Strait has already witnessed some notable ‘near misses’ in this regard. The most spectacular incident was a collision that occurred in September 1992 between the supertanker Nagasaki Spirit and a container ship Ocean Blessing at the northern end of the Malacca Strait. Ocean Blessing, which collided with the oil tanker, was apparently a ‘rogue ship’, zigzagging across shipping lanes and possibly under the control of pirates. The collision resulted in a fire that killed all aboard Ocean Blessing and twenty members of Nagasaki Spirit. Although 13 000 tons of oil were spilled as a result of the incident, most of it quickly evaporated, and therefore did not spread, due to favourable weather conditions that day.45

The geographic distribution of global piracy Southeast Asia Although Southeast Asia, as a whole, must be considered the most pirate prone region of the world (for the reasons noted above), the specific distribution of attacks in this part of the world has shown some interesting changes during the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1992 the IMB identified the waters between the Malacca and Singapore Straits as the most dangerous for piracy attacks both regionally and internationally.46 This East–West seaway is crowded with conventional cargo vessels, container ships and tankers with the Malacca Strait in particular often credited with being the busiest waterway in the world. Moreover, the seaway is subject to the formation of sudden sand banks and rain squalls; is beset by numerous shallow points and wrecks; and at its narrowest point is only 1.3km wide.47 These factors necessarily force ships to reduce speed, sometimes to less than 10 knots, to ensure safe passage. This makes the many vessels that travel these waters extremely vulnerable to attacks by pirates, most of whom use small, easily manoeuvrable craft that are capable of speeds up to 18 knots.48 Between 1991 and 1992, assaults in the vicinity of the Malacca and Singapore Straits, including incidents reported off Bintan Island just to the south of the Singapore Straits, accounted for roughly half of all piracy attacks that took place in Southeast Asia for the two years.49

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Between 1993 and 1995, however, there was a significant shift in the focus of piracy in Southeast Asia, away from the Malacca and Singapore Straits and towards three distinct regions: • the South China Sea; • the territorial waters around Hong Kong and Macau; • an extended zone bounded by Hong Kong, Luzon (the Philippines) and Hainan Island (China) – the so-called HLH ‘terror triangle’. Between 1993 and 1995, a total of 122 separate attacks were recorded in these three areas, representing 51.7 per cent of all assaults that took place in Southeast Asia during this period.50 A variety of reasons have been put forward to explain this shift in regional focus. According to Ellen and Gavin Greenwood, senior Asian analyst, for the highly respected UK-based Control Risks Group (CRG), the change was largely a function of two factors: • Chinese complicity in officially sanctioned piracy/’anti-smuggling’ rings as a way of forcibly asserting Beijing’s sovereignty over the South China Sea; • the initiation of effective littoral anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca and Singapore Straits by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.51 John Martin offers a slightly different interpretation. The former RPC Far East Chief does acknowledge the importance of the joint Indonesian, Singaporean and Malaysian anti-piracy initiatives in reducing attacks in the Malacca Straits. However, he specifically rejects the argument that the emergence of piracy in the South China Sea, Hong Kong and HLH regions had to do with a deliberate policy of Chinese state-sanctioned piracy. Martin asserts that Beijing, as a maritime trading state, would simply have nothing to gain by engaging in actions of this sort, adding, further, that there is, as yet, no incontrovertible proof to even support the idea of a ‘Chinese conspiracy’ theory. At best, he maintains the evidence is circumstantial. Martin does concede, however, that corrupt elements of the southern Chinese bureaucracy have become increasingly active and difficult to control in recent years. He argues that it is this, rather than a deliberate policy on the part of the Beijing government, which accounts for the surge in piracy in the South China Sea/Hong Kong/HLH areas between 1993 and 1995.52

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The question of official Chinese complicity in piracy remains a contentious issue. While the IMO, IMB and the vast majority of shipping associations that operate in Southeast Asia remain convinced of direct involvement by the Beijing government, others such as the RPC’s John Martin, the Thai Institute of Advanced Naval Studies and Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs are more circumspect. However, the 1994 publication of a confidential position paper on piracy in the South China Sea (not to mention the 1995 Anna Sierra affair) does seem to suggest that there has been at least some official Chinese complicity in the past. The report, which was first prepared by the Hong Kong government in 1993 but only released a year later, 53 details clear official Chinese involvement in the instances of piracy that took place on the South China Sea between September 1992 and May 1993. Indeed, certain eye-witness accounts identify customs, naval and police officers right down to the serial numbers of patrol vessels.54 Since 1995, however, there has been a dramatic drop in the number of incidents reported in these regions, with the RPC’s data base recording only 34 attacks between 1996 and 1998. 55 Reasons for the decline again vary. The IMB maintains that it is simply due to a lack of reporting from the ports in China, Hong Kong and Macau. By contrast, the CRG believes it has more to do with a conscious decision on the part of decision-makers in Beijing who now believe they are able to underscore their sovereignty demands over the South China Sea without the use of force.56 According to the statistics, the seas off Indonesia are currently the most ‘pirate prone’ in Southeast Asia, especially around Subaraya, Gresik, Jakarta, Belawan and the Gelasa Straits. In 1998 59 attacks were recorded in Indonesian territorial waters, representing 62 per cent of the global tally registered for the year. Although most of these incidents simply involved thieves creeping aboard at night, a significant number did consist of more serious assaults including armed boardings, hostage taking, and physical attacks launched against crew members.57 Explanations for the high incidence of piracy around Indonesia essentially relate to the extreme difficulty of effectively monitoring the state’s extremely large and diverse coastline. Indeed according to some experts, even a state as ‘advanced’ as the US would have difficulty in mounting effective littoral surveillance over a maritime territorial expanse as large as that covered by Indonesia. Problems in this regard have certainly been made no easier by the East Asian economic recession since 1997. This has not only greatly reduced Jakarta’s ability to finance more effective coastal patrols of its elongated coast-

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line; it has also unleashed a spiralling wave of crime and violence, threatening both food and commodity distribution as well as general ship safety (see above). The Americas The majority of the piracy that takes place in the Americas occurs in Brazilian waters. Between 1991 and 1998 attacks within this particular vicinity accounted for half of all acts within the region, with the overwhelming number taking place at two ports: Santos and Rio. 58 The main factor that has encouraged piracy in these areas is the lack of port security due to official apathy.59 As Menefee observes: Brazil appears to have turned a blind eye to problems, the Brazilian naval attaché in London at the time [saying] that the authorities saw these ‘occurrences in the Port of Santos as acts of pure robbery, and I see no need whatsoever to explain their attitudes to you’.60 International shipowners and maritime organisations have consistently complained of the total lack of security at Brazilian ports, with many referring to Santos and Rio as a ‘pirate’s den’. 61 Most of these assaults target specific cargo and vessels. This has led certain shipping companies to speculate that there may be more sinister motives for attacks other than simply economic gain. Milton Tito, Director of the Rio de Janeiro Syndicate of Shipping Agencies, for instance, has repeatedly claimed that the sophistication, complex and specific nature of piracy in Brazilian waters is strongly suggestive of highly organised criminal activity, possibly involving such merchandise as drugs and arms. 62 Although there has, as yet, been no concrete evidence to confirm or deny such a link, the targeting of specific cargoes and containers has raised concern among certain international shipping and law enforcement oragnisations. Attacks in the vicinity of Brazilian waters have shown a declining trend in 1998. During the year, for instance, only nine acts and attempted acts of piracy were registered by the IMB in this particular region, a substantial drop from the 15 incidences that were recorded during 1997.63 However, the IMB maintains that, in common with the HLH region, the decline is merely the result of under-reporting due to the fear that investigations will simply lead to delayed journeys and additional costs.64 Following one incident that took place at the port of Rio in June 1998, for instance, a petrol tanker was faced with the cancellation of its outward journey by an entire week as well as US$3800

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in additional costs and other expenses related to the subsequent investigation. Drawing on this experience, agents for vessels operating in Brazilian waters have, in conjunction with the Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO), specifically advised owners and ship masters against reporting pirate attacks to the Brazilian authorities lest they result in similar delays and costs.65 In view of this, a number of international shipping companies have sought the agreement of Brazil’s port and government authorities on three specific points: • to improve port security standards at ports such as Santos and Rio, which are still deemed to be amongst the most lax anywhere in the world; • to ensure that vessels reporting attacks will not be delayed in their outward journey and allowed to sail on schedule; • to ensure that the owners of such vessels will not face additional costs when incidents are reported to the authorities.66 It remains to be seen whether the Brazilian government will, in fact, act on these demands. Without concerted action, however, the problem is likely to increase and could possibly spread to other ports in the country. This will have a devastating impact on local maritime trade, almost certainly causing freight rates to rise as shipowners become less willing to put their seamen at risk and fewer vessels become available for transport to and from Brazil.67 As Luciano Oliveira da Silva sums up: Our main concerns are ship crews and the negative effect this will have on trade…What is lacking in Brazil is a proper coast guard. There is no policing whatsoever [at the country’s] ports. The Federal Police and port authorities have no staff, no boats, no equipment and no training to ensure security.68 One other aspect of the piracy phenomenon in the Americas that has caused some problems are attacks against yachts in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. Accurate statistics on the actual number of vessels that have been seized are difficult to come by. However, US authorities believe that in the areas most severely affected, especially around the Bahamas, scores of people may have disappeared over the last ten years. Attacks have been encouraged by the difficulty of effectively monitoring and enforcing maritime traffic in the region, itself a

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product of the large and growing number of yachts sailing in this part of the world. Many of the assaults also appear to be connected to the narcotics trade, with smugglers seizing and stealing yachts to facilitate the shipment of drugs out of Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia (see also Chapter 2). Those on board attacked vessels are generally kidnapped or killed, while the yachts themselves tend to be disposed of after one trip to minimise the risk of tell-tale trails being left for police and maritime authorities to follow.69 The Indian sub-continent In terms of violence at sea, the Indian sub-continent is probably known more for sea terrorism than piracy, particularly with respect to the maritime sabotage activities conducted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) off the Jaffna peninsula.70 Nevertheless, piracy has been a recurrent problem in the region, especially at the ports and in the territorial waters of Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. Between 1991 and 1998, 110 attacks were recorded in these three regions, 89 per cent of all instances recorded in the Indian sub-continent and Persian Gulf areas.71 Most of the piracy that occurs in Sri Lanka takes place at the port of Colombo. The main factor encouraging the practice is a lack of effective port-side security, with most attacks conforming to the LLAR pattern of ad hoc assaults targeting cash, ships’ stores and portable, high-value items belonging to crew members.72 In addition, the LTTE is also known to have engaged in occasional opportunist attacks against merchant ships, although, as noted above, such practices have tended to be overshadowed by the Sea Tiger naval campaign against the Colombo government. Most of these attacks take place against ships travelling off the Sri Lankan northeast coast, much of which continues to remain under the group’s effective control. In 1998, for instance, the Princess Kash, a Belize-registered vessel carrying cement, food, motor cycles and tractors for private traders, was hijacked while berthed in waters near to Mullaitivu, the LTTE main base.73 It has been speculated by security and intelligence analysts that a number of the ships which make up the LTTE’s ocean-going merchant fleet, known as the Sea Pigeons, are possibly vessels that have been seized in this manner and then re-registered under Honduran, Liberian or Panamanian flags.74 Port thefts have also been a recurrent problem in Bangladesh which, according to John Martin, is a legacy of virtual non-existent port-side security compounded by official apathy in terms of response preparedness and innovation.75 In addition, a number of particularly vicious

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attacks have taken place against fishing trawlers and ferries in recent years. In one noteworthy incident that occurred during the first quarter of 1995, a group of 30 pirates boarded the fishing vessel Aliya, near Barguana, forcing the crew over the side. No less than 14 of the fishermen subsequently drowned.76 In the absence of higher economic growth to finance more comprehensive surveillance and repression along the Bangladeshi coastline, not to mention a higher degree of political will to actually act, one can expect to see such attacks continue for the foreseeable future. Finally in India, piracy has plagued several parts in recent years, particularly at Kandla, New Mangalore and Tuticorin. Most attacks appear to be the work of individual gangs operating against ships in anchorage areas. The problem has been of sufficient seriousness to cause BIMCO to take up the issue of port security directly with the Indian authorities on several occasions. Of particular concern to the Council has been the frequency of attacks involving heavily armed thieves operating from motor boats. 77 Although the relevant port authorities have pledged to augment security measures, a significant reduction in attacks has yet to occur. Indeed by September 1998, India had already recorded its highest annual piracy total since 1991.78 The Horn of Africa The occurrence of attacks around the Horn of Africa appears to be connected to the breakdown of central authority in the northwest of the region, particularly in the secessionist Republic of Somaliland. This has left vast stretches of water off the Horn of Africa effectively unpoliced, allowing armed groups a virtual free hand against the numerous cargo vessels that use this particular maritime route to the Indian Ocean and Far East.79 Most attacks appear to occur at the time of the southwesterly monsoon (roughly April to October), particularly against vessels carrying diesel oil, although other cargoes have been targeted including relief supplies and cars. It has been alleged that piracy in the region is dominated by a number of pirate rings operating out of the Berbera and Socotra areas, possibly acting with some sort of paramilitary or shoreside support. Certainly when one considers the quality of weaponry that is typically used in attacks – including machine guns, mortars and assault rifles – piracy of a quasi-military nature cannot be ruled out.80 Between 1991 and 1998, attacks within the vicinity of Somali and Djibouti waters accounted for slightly under a quarter of all instances of piracy that took place in Africa during the eight years. 81 Violence

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associated with these attacks has been amongst the most serious anywhere in the international system. Of the 238 crew taken hostage worldwide during 1998, for instance, 79 (33 per cent) were abducted in waters around the Gulf of Aden.82 The lawless seas off the Horn of Africa have attracted increasing concern from international shipping bodies, not least because of the heavy weaponry that is often used in pirate attacks. Indeed agencies such as the IMB now regard all areas within 200 miles of the Somali coast as ‘no-go’ zones, to be avoided unless exceptional precautions are first taken.83 However, given the importance of this particular sea-lane of communication in terms of connecting the Mediterranean and Middle East with the Indian Ocean, there will probably not be a decisive reduction in maritime traffic in the near future. In the absence of massive littoral economic growth or strict repression of piracies already ‘in place’, neither of which shows any sign of quickly eventuating, such trade is likely to remain extremely vulnerable to opportunistic attack. In light of these circumstances, there is every reason to expect the Horn of Africa to maintain its status as one of the world’s main piracy hot spots, at least for the short to medium term. Piracy in international law One final issue compounding the overall problem of global piracy is the fact that the present international legal framework that has been initiated to deal with piracy does not fully address the problem as it has been manifested in the contemporary era. The Law of the Sea Convention, which inherited article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, for instance, defines piracy as an act(s) that in some way endangers the safe navigation of a ship on the high seas. Most acts of piracy that occur throughout the world, however, take place in territorial waters and are, thus, not specifically covered by the Convention or its stipulations.84 It is estimated that as many as 80 per cent of the attacks that occur in Southeast Asia, for example, are dismissed as common ‘raiding’ simply because they take place in the archipelago waters or Exclusive Economic Zones of a particular state.85 The whole issue of maritime jurisdiction is certainly something that has worked to the advantage of pirates operating in Southeast Asia, especially with respect to the constraints it has placed on the right of hot pursuit. Municipal law enforcement, which gives a coastal state the right to stop a ship in violation of its laws and, if necessary, pursue it onto the high seas, is a privilege that ceases the moment a suspect vessel enters into another sovereign sea – unless legitimised by a

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specific legal agreement. 86 Given the sensitivities in Southeast Asia regarding maritime jurisdiction and sovereignty, there has, thus far, been a conspicuous absence of such arrangements between the region’s coastal states. On a number of instances, pirates have used this legal gap to their advantage, deliberately fleeing to territorial/archipelago waters, or areas of contested jurisdiction, where it is more risky for naval vessels to operate unilaterally.87 A case reported in May 1992 clearly illustrates the type of difficulties that can arise in this regard. The Royal Malaysian Police Marines were pursuing a stolen trawler that had been preying on other vessels around Sabah. However, the Malaysians were forced to call off the chase when the suspect vessel entered Philippine waters. No agreement of posse comitatus had been signed between Manila and Kuala Lumpur (largely due to tension arising from the ongoing dispute over Sabah) – something which clearly worked to the advantage of the fleeing trawler (although it did subsequently run aground in Philippine waters).88 There can be little doubt that modern-day piracy is rapidly emerging as a multi-faceted, complex security threat in the international system – involving highly organised, well-armed gangs that often have little compunction in using violence in pursuit of their objectives. Attacks not only have significant implications for the safety of shipping in one of the most important maritime corridors in the world, they also have the potential to trigger major environmental disasters. All present indications suggest that the level of global piracy will continue to grow, its incidence and lethality fuelled by a ready supply of potential targets, a proliferation of sophisticated weaponry and, at least in the case of Southeast Asia, what amounts to effective state sponsorship. As one commentator has observed: ‘Today the traditional “pirate party” image belies a vicious reality of sea piracy and armed attack…hazarding sea trade and involving not only robbery but also hijack and murder.’89

4 Environmental Degradation

While there has been an increasing awareness about the declining state of the global environment since the 1970s, there has been a general reluctance to view this particular issue as a security threat in its own right. Analysts such as Daniel Deudeny, for instance, question the assumption that environmental degradation can lead to serious environmental harm and maintain that it is extremely difficult to identify specific links between environmental problems and major threats to security.1 This chapter rejects these arguments on the grounds that environmental change and resource depletion directly affect the basic unit upon which all conceptions of security are based: human existence. The utility of establishing a causal link between environmental degradation and state and international (in)security depends on two factors: firstly, the extent to which it serves to undermine drastically the quality of life for people living in the state concerned; and secondly, the extent to which it serves to narrow rapidly the range of policy options available to the government of the state concerned. 2 Because environmental security, like many other securities, is relative in this manner, many aspects of ecological change will probably not manifest themselves as a direct threat to the security of the state. It is questionable, for instance, whether degradation of coral reefs can be legitimately embodied into a wider concept of security as this carries implications for neither the state nor its citizens, at least in terms of quality of life or policy options. However, there clearly are sources of environmental change that do have an impact on the state’s ability to support and sustain viable human existence. Typically, these will include any that: • are extensive, rapid and unsustainable; 77

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• negatively interact with other structural or political weaknesses within the state and cause social and political turbulence as a result; • serve to undermine state sovereignty; • prevent the state from attaining other important values such as economic growth and development.3 A good specific example of how environmental factors can have ramifications for state security is provided by the 1995 rice crisis in the Philippines. Long a staple crop in the country, Filipinos were stunned by an acute shortage of rice in September 1995 when production levels suddenly fell to some 500 000 tons below the annual average. The shortfall, caused by soil erosion as a result of unsustainable development practices, led the price of rice to rise by a staggering 32 per cent in a seven-month period. This, in turn, caused the rate of inflation to increase throughout the country. As a consequence, many Filipinos found that they no longer had the ability to either buy staples such as rice or other basic consumer products which, hitherto, they had been able to afford. The result was widespread street demonstrations and riots against a government which had, previously, been fairly popular.4 There are at least five contemporary anthropogenic changes to the global biosphere that are likely to impact on human and state activities and cause insecurity as a result. These include deforestation, global warming, ozone depletion, localised atmospheric pollution and contamination of fresh water supplies. This chapter will discuss each of these in turn, emphasising, where necessary, their interconnections and the way in which they impact on state and international security. The chapter also briefly looks at food scarcity, analysing this particular problem as one that can also, in many instances, be traced back to environmental degradation.

Major environmental dangers Deforestation Deforestation has emerged as a major global environmental problem. In 1995, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated that as much as 12 million hectares of natural rainforest had been destroyed every year during the 1980s.5 Nearly 50 per cent of Southeast Asia’s forest cover has already been destroyed, with the World Bank estimating the annual rate of loss in the wider Asia-Pacific region at approximately 1.4 per cent.6 In the tropics, generally, ten trees are cut down for every one that is planted. In Africa, the ratio is a staggering 29 to 1.7

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In some countries, the rate of deforestation has already reached crisis proportions. According to one study, Indonesia, one of the most severely affected countries in the world, loses up to 50 per cent more logs than can be sustained in the medium term. 8 The extent of the problem in the Philippines can be measured by the fact that in 1900, 70 to 80 per cent of the country was forested, compared to only 20 per cent by the 1990s.9 Equally as telling is India. Seventy-five years ago, forests covered half the country; today coverage has been reduced to less than 14 per cent.10 Deforestation is essentially a product of economic and social modernisation. Logs are used as fuel for both commercial and private purposes, with timber and hardwood also being exported as a means of earning foreign revenue. Twenty per cent of household income is spent on firewood in Addis Ababa, while in the Gambia and Tanzania each household spends more than two-thirds of worker days each year gathering timber from forests. Moreover, for many years developing states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brazil and Madagascar were actively encouraged by the north to fully exploit their rainforests in order to maximise economic growth for the repayment of foreign debts.11 In many countries, forests are additionally cleared to make way for agricultural and mining operations as well as new urban areas. The rate of deforestation in the Indonesian provinces of Kalimantan, Sumatra, Irian Jaya and Sulawesi, for instance, has increased markedly in the 1990s following the government’s decision to significantly increase indigenous palm-oil production. Since 1985, the area of land given over to this particular industry has grown from 600 000 hectares (ha) to 2.2 million ha. A further 3.3 million ha is scheduled to be planted by 2000.12 Deforestation has a number of extremely important implications for the environment. While many of these are significant ecological issues in their own right, a number have particular relevance for state and human security. First, it can lead to both water shortages and flooding by disrupting hydrological circles as well as delicate balances in major river basins. The disastrous floods that hit China in late 1998, for instance, have been directly linked to the loss of forest cover over the Yangtze River basin. In the words of the President of the Washingtonbased World Watch Institute, Lester Brown: ‘The … basin has lost 85 per cent of its original … cover. The forests that once absorbed and held huge quantities of monsoon rainfall are largely gone … Such suicidal actions must be stopped before it is too late’.13

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Deforestation additionally carries serious implications for soil erosion, desertification and the silting of rivers. Soil erosion in the Philippines, owing mainly to deforestation, has been estimated at between 10 and 20 times the sustainable rate. 14 An equally disturbing study carried out by the Royal Society, a major international antilogging group, in 1995, found that after just five months of intensive logging in the Penan region of central Borneo, siltration of rivers was a staggering 18 times the normal rate. Thus far about 4000 Penan have been dispossessed from their land as a result of logging operations in the region, with another 4500 struggling to maintain their traditional lifestyle due to the erosion of river systems.15 Deforestation has also been directly linked to increased production levels of carbon dioxide – forests playing a key role in photosynthesis and the biological process of converting carbon dioxide to oxygen. This has provided an additional focus of concern for environmentalists concerned about changes in the earth’s temperature: about 60 per cent of the extra (i.e. human-made) greenhouse effect is attributed to increases in carbon dioxide brought about by fuel combustion and deforestation (see below).16 Increased climatic fluctuations as a result of carbon dioxide emissions is likely to push more people onto marginal lands in search of the means of sustenance, thereby further aggravating degradation.17 As Mitchell and Ericksen observe, if anticipated climate changes make extreme events such as flooding and drought more likely, it is these vulnerable populations that will be the prime victims.18 Global warming Global warming has been a major environmental concern ever since the US’ ‘hot’ summer of 1988 when the Mississippi River shrank to a fraction of its normal size and farms throughout the Midwest suffered prolonged drought conditions. 19 According to the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which involves 2500 leading scientists from 30 countries, on the basis of current trends, world temperatures could rise by as much as 3 degrees Celsius during the next century.20 Global warming is essentially a function of the so-called ‘greenhouse effect’. This is a term used to describe the effect on solar and heat radiation of those trace gases within the atmosphere that are relatively transparent to incoming solar energy but are good absorbers of outgoing heat radiation. The effect is caused by the collection of gases in the atmosphere which act like the glass in a greenhouse: they allow

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solar radiation in but reflect it back when it tries to exit again, resulting in a gradual increase in core temperature. Most of the greenhouse effect is perfectly natural. Indeed, without its warming effects, the average surface temperature of the Earth would be about –18°C, a figure more comparable with Mars than the present 15°C, producing conditions in which life would be impossible.21 Anxiety over global warming relates to the concern that humanbased activities, particularly the burning of fossil fuels, are serving to increase the atmospheric concentration of those gasses that contribute to the greenhouse effect, so-called ‘greenhouse gases’. These include nitrous oxide, methane chlorflurocarbons (CFCs), and especially carbon dioxide.22 The assumption is that, as the levels and concentrations of these gases rise, average temperatures in the lower atmosphere and at the Earth’s surface will increase. Global warming is thus seen to be a consequence of the enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect by human beings.23 The principal gas that contributes to the greenhouse effect is carbon dioxide, levels of which have risen by 25 per cent since the beginning of industrialisation. The average concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is currently increasing at a rate of 0.4 per cent a year. The main factor accounting for this rise is the combustion of fossil fuels, although deforestation, which has caused an imbalance between the absorption and release of carbon dioxide by vegetation, has also been a significant contributor. On the basis of current trends, the overall concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will be double the pre-industrial level by the middle of the next century.24 A number of significant impacts are likely to result from global greenhouse warming. First, and most obviously, would be a general rise in the Earth’s surface temperature. As noted above, the IPCC estimates that this could be as much as 3°C into the next century. The consequences of such a warming have been widely debated in scientific circles, by governments and in the media. Some researchers believe that biospheric temperature rises will cause the world’s cropgrowing regions to shift, affecting regional economic and demographic patterns. Others predict that it could lead to a redistribution of flora and fauna and, possibly, a reduction in biodiversity as species and plants fail to cope with higher temperatures. It has also been suggested that global warming will help to transform the globe into a giant incubator, fostering and facilitating the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria, meningitis, meliodosis and Ross River Virus (see Chapter 5).25

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Another concern is the potential threat that global warming poses for worldwide coastal civilisation. Ice budget estimates for the Greenland polar region under the warmer conditions expected in the twenty-first century show a decrease in ice mass leading to a 13–58 cm rise in mean global sea level due to the release of meltwater. Moreover, because of the slow process of heat transfer from the atmosphere to the ocean (and the very long response times of polar ice), even if global warming stopped abruptly, global sea level would continue to rise for many decades, if not hundreds of years.26 Sudden ocean level changes would be disastrous to island states and low-lying areas, particularly if they lacked extensive systems of coastal levees. Worst-case scenarios predict outright flooding. A 1992 study conducted under the auspices of the UN’s Environmental Program on the likely impact of global warming on Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, for instance, concluded that significant coastal areas in all three countries would be permanently flooded. Most severely affected would be Bangkok and the equally densely populated coastline of northern Java.27 Another report prepared in 1995 by the Beijing government and World Bank found that a sea-level rise of between 40 and 100 cm would likely inundate 48 Chinese cities, including Shanghai. The projected flooded area was expected to take in 14 cities from the Pearl River Delta and Guangzhou, as well as 34 cities in the east of the country, covering an estimated 92 000 square kilometres. 28 Only slightly less problematical would be the destruction of coastal floodplains and severe inundation caused by repeated high tides. It has been suggested, for instance, that a sea-level rise of only 30 cm would cause 15–30 metres of erosion in the northeast US; 30–300 metres in Florida; and possibly as much as several kilometres in the wetlands of Louisana. The financial impact of such effects would be extensive. Some estimates put the costs of replenishing major tourist beaches alone at US$14 billion.29 Global warming is also liable to have extremely serious impacts on local weather and hydrological patterns, leading to both flooding and drought. The precise magnitude of these changes is not known. However, it is generally agreed that the future greenhouse world is likely to be one that will have significantly more rainfall than today in some areas, with substantially less in others. On the basis of historical comparisons, analysts have concluded that the frequency of tropical storms could increase by as much as 40 per cent in the event of surface sea temperatures rising by just 1.5°C above the norm, depending on wind patterns in the upper atmosphere.30 On the other side of the coin, it is

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speculated large areas that currently have only marginal rainfall could well become far more arid, particularly in areas such as the African Sahel and the American Midwest.31 Already indications of these sorts of regional disruptions are becoming evident. In the Asia-Pacific, for instance, freak weather patterns in 1998 triggered devastating floods in Bangladesh and southern China while the arid plateaus of northern Thailand and Laos were subjected to prolonged drought. These effects had a particularly serious impact on Asian cereal production, causing rice yields in 1998 to drop by 16 million tonnes from 1997 levels.32 This last point leads to one further consideration: the possibility of the effects of global warming falling disproportionately on the developing parts of the world. As some analysts have been quick to point out, it is not at all clear that increases in temperature over the coming century will have overall negative impacts on northern regions such as North America and Western Europe, where crop growing seasons could well be lengthened.33 If this does in fact occur, it will almost certainly exacerbate global inequities between rich and poor, replacing the 1980s North–South economic divide with a more pressing and, arguably, more serious cleavage based on perceived environmental injustices. Destruction of the ozone layer Ozone depletion is another environmental issue that is eliciting growing concern. This gaseous layer consists of a form of oxygen and exists in the upper atmosphere. It is essential to human life as it screens out the harmful ultraviolet rays from the sun. Indeed, it is generally held that terrestrial life, that is, life on land, was impossible prior to the appearance of the ozone layer about one billion years ago. In its natural state, atmospheric ozone occurs in a layer that has a maximum concentration at about 25 kilometres above the Earth’s surface. Scientists agree, however, that the density of this atmospheric oxygen shield has been gradually thinning for several years now, creating ‘holes’ that could have potentially devastating consequences both for human health and the environment in general. They are particularly concerned about gaps that have appeared over Antarctica where depletion is now thought to be reaching crisis proportions: in 1998, the ozone hole in the Southern hemisphere was estimated at a staggering 26 million square kilometres – three times the size of Australia.34 The main factor accounting for ozone depletion is the discharge of CFCs. For many years, these were considered to be the ideal chemical for many industrial and consumer applications. Being inert, cheap and

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non-toxic, they became almost indispensable for refrigeration, foam blowing, aerosol propellants, fire extinguishers and as solvents. However, it is now known that when these chlorine compounds decompose in the atmosphere, they initiate an ozone-destroying chain reaction. It has been estimated that 100 grams of CFC (the amount used in a typical spray can) has the potential to eventually destroy over three tons of ozone. Although CFC production is down significantly from the peak emission year of 1988, 35 the durability of these gases is considerable, with scientists calculating their ‘atmospheric life cycle’ to be at least 80 years. Given the millions of tons of CFCs that have already been released into the atmosphere, it is likely that they will continue to impact on the ozone for at least the next 200 years.36 Reduced levels of atmospheric ozone essentially mean that far greater than normal doses of ultraviolet radiation in the B band (Uvb) are now able to reach the Earth’s surface. Studies show that for every 1 per cent depletion in total ozone, Uvb penetration at ground level increases by an average of 2–3 per cent. The health and environmental effects of such increases are likely to be considerable. Uvb radiation is known to affect living organisms by attacking molecular cell structures, particularly DNA strands, resulting in cellular dysfunctions, mutations and the formation of toxic chemical species. Excessive exposure to ultraviolet light, as a result of ozone depletion, is now regarded as the principal cause of skin cancer in humans, particularly among fairskinned people living (and holidaying) in the ‘sun belts’ of the southern US, Australia, Caribbean and Mediterranean. Uvb radiation is also believed to be a primary cause of premature ageing of skin, cataracts, degeneration of the cornea, retinal damage and weakened immune systems.37 Today, hats, sun cream and sunglasses are considered by many to be as vital to their daily existence as sleep, food and water. Humans are not the only organisms at risk from Uvb radiation as a result of ozone depletion. Plants, animals and insects are all susceptible to damage. Living micro-organisms such as phytoplankton and plants are particularly vulnerable, having no way to hide from excessive ultraviolet radiation but still requiring light to live. Insects and mammals that have a visual spectral response oriented towards the ultraviolet spectrum are also especially at risk. Increased Uvb exposure suffered by these life forms is likely to carry a number of important carcinogenic consequences for the environment. Among the more significant are: • Distortions in the marine food chain; • Increased levels of carbon dioxide absorbed into the world’s oceans;

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• Impaired plant productivity; • Reduced agricultural crop yields, affecting global food supplies; • Changes in the spatial orientation and behaviour of certain animal species.38 Further complicating the situation is growing evidence that the two problems of global warming and ozone depletion are interconnected. Thus even if CFC emissions were to be eliminated, and their ongoing impacts neutralised, further ozone depletion could, nevertheless, result from continued thermal disturbances in the stratosphere. As Dr Susan Solomon of the US-based National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, one of the world’s leading research centres in this field, observes: ‘While greenhouse gasses cause warming at the earth’s surface, in the stratosphere … they cause cooling … [increasing] the rate of ozone destruction. [Moreover], because the chemistry of the stratosphere is so sensitive, even a temperature drop of a few degrees could have a drastic effect…Basically, the ozone hole is not going to be going away for many decades to come’.39 Localised air pollution Localised air pollution, by definition, does not impact on the international polity in the same way as do global warming and ozone depletion. However, its effects are significant, and potentially devastating, at the national and regional levels. The air quality in all the world’s major urban centres has greatly deteriorated over the past 20 years, particularly with regard to existing and potential ‘megacities’ such as Mexico City, Los Angeles, Bangkok, Manila, Jakarta, Shanghai, Beijing, Seoul, Calcutta, Bombay, Tokyo, Karachi and Lagos. The Mexican capital is one of the most heavily polluted cities in the world. According to Dr Ruben Shturman of the Centre for Allergies and Respiratory Diseases, at least 20 per cent of the sprawling metropolis’ residents suffer from some pollution-related respiratory problem. It has been conservatively estimated that such effects cause up to 5000 people a year to die prematurely in the city, with many exhibiting the equivalent degree of lung degeneration as someone who smokes 40 cigarettes a day.40 As Linden observes, ‘to live in Mexico City … is to live in a place where the basic elements of life – air, water and soil – have been inimical to health’.41 Collectively, however, it is with the Asia Pacific that the greatest problem lies. The region’s urban population is currently running at 1.1 billion. By 2025 it is expected to have risen to a staggering

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3.8 billion. These people will be squeezed into just twenty cities, most of which will live under a constant blanket of toxic smog emitted from factories, smokestacks and vehicle exhausts. 42 Many of the cities in China, for instance, have five to ten times the levels of sulphur dioxide and particulates (dust and soot) found in the air of First World cities. One sampling taken in Guangzhou in the mid-1990s revealed concentrations of these pollutants among the highest ever recorded anywhere in the world. According to the World Heath Organisation (WHO), nine of the fifteen cities with the highest particulate concentrations in the world, and six of the fifteen worst affected by sulphur dioxide are currently located in the Asia Pacific. 43 As a whole, Asia is projected to account for more than 50 per cent of the world’s incremental growth of carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide by the turn of the century. 44 Heavily influenced by these forecasts, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) designated the wider Asia-Pacific in 1997 as ‘the world’s most polluted and environmentally degraded region’.45 A variety of environmental and health problems have been linked to atmospheric pollution stemming from the infamous industrial ‘pea soupers’ of the modern age. Lead pollution is believed to have reduced the mental capacity of children living in cities such as Bangkok, Manila, Mexico City and Jakarta. In Japan, there has been a major surge of respiratory ailments resulting from sulphur dioxide emissions, including outbreaks of Yokkaichi asthma as well as the infamous ItaiItai and Minamata diseases. On a larger scale, acid rain has emerged as a major problem largely due to the continuing prevalence of fossilbased combustion, not least in contemporary megacities such as Beijing and Seoul. This particular problem not only causes corrosion of buildings and structures; it also contributes to the acidification of lakes, the impairment of ecosystems, the destruction of crops, the degradation of forests and the killing of aquatic life.46 The issue of atmospheric pollution was perhaps most vividly reflected by the numerous problems caused in Southeast Asia during the latter part of 1997 and early 1998 by uncontrolled Indonesian forest fires. Fire is an intrinsic part of the life-cycle of Indonesia’s forests, with farmers typically employing slash and burn cultivation techniques to clear land for palm oil plantations. 47 Normally the fires are extinguished by the annual monsoon. However, in 1997 the rains did not come (largely attributed to the El Niño effect) and, as a result, the fires were soon burning out of control. Smoke from the fires, which was heavily laced with life-shortening hydrocarbons, spread for more than 3200 kilometres, covering parts of at least five Southeast Asian

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countries, northern Australia and perhaps as many as 70 million people.48 Further aggravating the situation was the fact that the smoke trapped pollution from industry and transport in many cities, creating a toxic smog that reduced air quality levels to extremely dangerous levels.49 These effects were particularly marked in Singapore and Malaysia, with both countries recording their highest ever levels of atmospheric pollution.50 The following travel advisory issued by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade at the height of the crisis illustrates just how serious the problem became: Those who are pregnant, suffer from illness, especially heart or respiratory conditions, or are accompanied by young children, should monitor the situation and, if air quality remains at current levels, consider deferring travel until it improves. Intending visitors or residents should note that pollutants can act as irritants and they should limit their exposure to seriously polluted areas by remaining, as far as possible, in air-conditioned environments, by using face masks outside and refraining from outdoor activities, particularly strenuous exercise.51 While the full effects of the Southeast Asian smoke crisis will probably not manifest themselves for many years, there has already been a significant fall-out, socially, environmentally, agriculturally and economically. Socially there has been an unprecedented increase in respiratoryrelated diseases such as asthma and bronchitis. Environmentally, huge areas of natural rainforest have been destroyed, threatening regional biodiversity, micro-organisms and wildlife. Agriculturally, reduced sunlight has impeded the growth of both cash and staple crops including palm oil, fruit, vegetables and rice. Economically, the direct costs of the disaster have been felt in terms of lost revenue from tourism, reduced agricultural and industrial production, increased health-care costs and trade disruption resulting from sea and airport closures. The financial impact of these effects for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore alone has been conservatively estimated at US$6 billion, equivalent to 2.5 per cent of their combined gross domestic product.52 The political implications of the crisis were just as high, causing a breakdown of regional relations with Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore severely criticising Indonesia for not doing enough to control the situation. Discontent deepened as the smog worsened. Malaysia’s environ-

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ment minister publicly chided Indonesian officials for their lack of effective action. Opposition leader, Lim Kit Sinag, followed this up by moving an emergency parliamentary debate on Indonesia’s failure to put out the fires. Thailand’s The Nation daily newspaper directly blamed the crisis on Jakarta’s policy of providing logging companies with subsidies to clear forests. 53 And Singapore’s health and environment minister, Yeo Cheow Tong, politely but pointedly expressed the hope ‘that the current scale of the problem would have brought the message home very clearly to the Indonesians … [of the need] to control the fires when they are small’.54 Of all the alarm bells on the global environmental scene, degradation of the atmosphere is the one that rings most loudly, largely because it is literally changing the air that we breathe. In what will probably be its one constructive consequence, the Indonesian forest fire crisis provides a telling reminder of the magnitude of this particular problem and just how vulnerable human and state agents are to its effects. Water shortages According to Wally N’Dow, Secretary-General of the United Nations’ Conference on Human Development, water is likely to follow oil as the next source of major conflict between states. 55 Water is, arguably, the most critical of all renewable resources because humankind depends on continuous access to supplies, not only for drinking and food production, but also for energy, transport and industry. 56 Global water use doubled between 1940 and 1980 and is expected to double again by the year 2000.57 However, water supplies have remained relatively unchanged and are, as a result, becoming seriously depleted in many parts of the world. In 1996 the FAO specifically warned that ‘human demands are about to collide with the ability of the hydrocycle to supply water’. 58 This warning was given added force by a 1997 report in which the UN estimated that as much as a third of the world’s population would be suffering from chronic water shortages by 2025. 59 Indeed, already 20 per cent of urban families living in the developing world have to buy their water from vendors because they have no access to municipal systems.60 Four factors are serving to enhance the discrepancy between water availability and its supply. First are the increasing demands that are being placed on scarce water supplies by commercial, agricultural and industrial production as well as rapidly rising populations.61 The rate of

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decline of global freshwater ecosystems is currently running at 6 per cent a year, with over half the accessible supplies being used by humans, double the amount in 1960. 62 Second is the fact that the world’s supply of water is limited and unevenly distributed. Fresh water constitutes less than 3 per cent of global water resources, most of which is locked away in glaciers and permanent snow cover.63 Third, increasing amounts of fresh water are being lost as a result of dysfunctional hydrological dispersal systems. Studies carried out for the UN’s Conference for Human Settlements, for instance, estimate that up to 60 per cent of drinking water supplies in the developing world are lost simply due to leakage through rusted pipes. 64 Finally, existing water supplies are being continually degraded as a result of unsustainable human, industrial and environmental practices. Of particular importance in this regard has been the pollution of water tables by the discharge of raw and partially treated sewage and industrial waste, as well as the silting and salinisation of major river systems through over-logging and deforestation.65 Water shortages remain a particularly serious problem for the states and inhabitants of the world’s dry and desert regions. In the Middle East, for instance, there are currently disputes between Turkey, Syria and Iraq over access to the Euphrates River; between Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria over the headwaters of the Jordan River; and between the nine riparian states of the Nile. 66 Difficulties stemming from recurrent and prolonged drought also frequently affect the arid and semi-arid regions of north, east and southern Africa; central Asia; southern Latin America; north-eastern Indochina; the south-western tracts of the continental United States; and central Australia.67 One additional region of the world that is beginning to experience serious water shortages is East Asia. As Dupont observes, ‘judging by the frequency and severity of the region’s wet season, [this part of the world] would seem to suffer from too much water, rather than too little’.68 East Asia is, however, beginning to experience the qualitative and quantitative limitations that other, drier, parts of the world have encountered for many years.69 Indeed, in a 1996 poll conducted by the ADB, water pollution and freshwater depletion were already being ranked as by far the most important environmental issues facing policy-makers in the region.70 Over the last 20 to 30 years, rapidly rising populations, industrialisation and more intensive agricultural irrigation techniques have placed an increasingly heavy burden on existing fresh water supplies in East Asia. In rice-dependent states such as the Philippines and China, as

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much as 87 per cent of water goes to agriculture, with 5000 kilograms needed to produce just one ton of rice.71 Asia as a whole has the greatest percentage of land under irrigation, its overall food production depending on well-hydrated crop paddies and fields to a far greater extent than other regions of the world.72 Further compounding the strain on regional water supplies has been hydrological pollution as a result of the uncontrolled discharge of human effluent and industrial waste. Rivers in East Asia are ranked as amongst the most polluted anywhere in the world, with those in Manila, Bangkok and Jakarta thought to carry three to four times the world levels of raw sewage, household garbage, construction debris and market waste.73 According to data put out by the FAO, the two factors of demand-use and degradation have combined to more than halve per capita water availability throughout the greater Asia-Pacific region since 1950.74 The World Bank estimates that unless immediate action is taken, most states in the region will be suffering from serious water shortages due to these problems within the next 25 years. Indeed, a number of areas are already experiencing serious problems: • In Jakarta, the Indonesian water utility supplies only 50 per cent of the city’s needs, and then guaranteeing only that the water will not be murky, not that it is necessarily safe to drink. In north Jakarta, research carried out by the Japanese-based International Cooperation Agency found that 73 per cent of shallow wells were contaminated by human waste, while 13 per cent were found to contain ammonia and traces of mercury. 75 • In Manila, safe drinking water is expected to become a scarce commodity in as little as three to five years unless more homes are linked to proper sewage treatment systems. Currently, little more than 30 per cent of waste water in the Philippine capital is treated.76 • In Malaysia, the deaths of many thousands of people have been linked to the poisoning of water systems as a result of the excessive discharge of nitrates and pesticides in major river systems.77 • In China, it is estimated that up to 300 cities are facing water shortages due to rapidly rising urban, agricultural and industrial demands.78 A number of important implications for national security are likely to ‘flow’ from water shortages. Most immediately, it is likely to affect

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adversely the ability of states to feed themselves. Globally, agriculture accounts for two-thirds of fresh water use, with a number of countries heavily reliant on intensive irrigation schemes to sustain their socalled ‘green revolutions’.79 As supplies begin to dry up it is obviously going to become more and more difficult to maintain this inordinately high water usage. In addition, declining availability may well generate social unrest as a result of competing demands between the agricultural and industrial sectors. The Philippine-based International Rice Research Institute has specifically warned of this danger occurring in the rice-dependent, but industrially committed states of the Asia Pacific.80 Water shortages are also likely to lead to large displacements of people, both internally and across national borders. Such flows have the potential to exacerbate domestic structural weaknesses as well as wider regional political tensions, generating, in the process, both internal and inter-state violence and instability.81 Finally, access to disputed fresh water sources could prompt competing states to engage in various illicit and destabilising actions in an attempt to increase their overall bargaining position. This has been particularly evident with regard to the Euphrates River conflict between Turkey and Syria. One way by which Damascus has repeatedly attempted to elevate its negotiating position vis-à-vis Istanbul has been to allow the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which constitutes the main threat to Turkish internal security, safe haven in Syria. This has provided President Assad with a relatively powerful bargaining tool: termination of external Syrian safe haven in exchange for the conclusion of more beneficial access rights to the Euphrates.82 Because human life is utterly dependent on water and because such supplies are limited, any shortages that arise in this vital resource are bound to have serious ramifications for state security. Domestically, they will aggravate socio-economic and political unrest while internationally they have the potential to prompt wider regional conflict and tensions.83 As Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister, pointedly summed up in 1997: The bottom line is water is a strategic resource … It’s not like air, which you can have for free. It’s not like fuel for buses or cars which you can always import any amount of … it is something which is limited. When you run out you are up against, if not a brick wall, at least a very, very steep slope.84

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Environmental degradation and food shortages Nearly two centuries ago, Thomas Malthus predicted that the world’s population would eventually outstrip its capacity to produce enough food to sustain its growing numbers. 85 Thus far this has not occurred largely because the world’s food output has grown at a rate not forecast by Malthus as a result of advances in agricultural science and innovations in technology. The clearest indicators of this are those of food availability and the relative price of food in international markets. Today’s 5.8 billion people have 15 per cent more food than the world’s 4 billion had two decades ago. Equally, real international food prices fell by 60 per cent between 1960 and 1990, reflecting that absolute food supply has greatly outstripped demand: if the world’s demand for food were growing faster than its supply, prices would have risen.86 Despite this, secure food availability – defined as the access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life87 – is beginning to assume heightened importance in a number of states around the world. In 1996, the FAO reported that at least 840 million people still suffered from malnutrition, with per capita food production declining in over 70 states since the mid-1970s.88 It has been estimated that without determined action, 680 million people will be without sufficient food to meet their basic nutritional demands by 2015.89 While population increases in many developing parts of the world undoubtedly account for some of the strains that are being felt on the global food regime, there is strong evidence to suggest that environmental degradation is playing a central role. In one form or another, deforestation, destruction of the ozone layer, global warming, atmospheric pollution and water shortages have all had a major negative impact on food production. Soil erosion and desertification as a result of deforestation have led to the steady disappearance of productive farmland. Destruction of the ozone layer has contributed to lower agricultural yields due to excessive ultraviolet radiation. Smog and atmospheric toxic hazes produced by the world’s ‘megacities’ have affected rice and fruit crops by diminishing necessary sunlight. Cereal production in many parts of the world has been severely disrupted by drought and flooding, which many believe to be a consequence of altered evapotranspiration patterns brought about by global warming. And water shortages due to excessive pollution and the insatiable demands of urban dwellers and industry are reducing available supplies for essential agricultural irrigation schemes.90

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The North Korean example North Korea provides a graphic example of what can happen when environmental degradation negatively impacts on a state’s ability to produce food. Although the origins of Pyongyang’s food crisis can be traced back to poorly planned and inept collectivisation programmes, self-inflicted environmental disasters have certainly played a major contributing role. Large-scale and uncontrolled deforestation and land clearance have been of particular importance, causing soil erosion, desertification and flooding. Excessive use of chemical fertilisers in an attempt to compensate for resulting losses in land fertility has merely compounded problems, exhausting soils to the point that many parts of the country are no longer agriculturally viable. 91 During the 1990s, North Korea has experienced a progressively worsening food crisis.92 By 1996, the country was having to deal with a grain shortfall of approximately one million tons, half its projected needs.93 In 1997, Pyongyang made the unprecedented move of appealing to the UN and other donors for food aid. By the year’s end, the situation had become so bad that, according to one UN body, most city dwellers were in receipt of only 15 per cent of the daily food ration given to refugees in camps in Africa.94 International aid agencies see no early end to the crisis, with 1998’s grain yield producing only three million tons, two-thirds of North Korea’s minimum need. 95 Conservative estimates of the death toll so far wrought by this disaster currently run between 2 and 2.8 million, significant for a country with a population of 20 million people.96 It has been suggested that, somewhat ironically, the North Korean food crisis has been instrumental in strengthening the Pyongyang regime’s grip on power by allowing it to extract greater political and financial concessions from the international community. Washington, in particular, has expressed the view that the North Korean government is playing on the sympathies brought about by its humanitarian crisis to renegotiate the terms of the 1994 October Agreed Framework,97 the deal which was supposedly designed to permanently freeze the country’s (suspected) nuclear weapons development programme.98 While there is doubtless an element of truth in this assertion, most experts agree that the current food crisis in North Korea poses a major threat to the ongoing survival of the regime.99 Indeed, it is difficult to believe that any state would be able to survive such a precipitous decline in its food producing capacity over the medium to long term. In this regard, North Korea should be seen as a salutary example of how the stability of a state can be undermined by food

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shortages brought about by human-instigated environmental degradation. In the final analysis, all human life depends on a functioning, balanced and ecologically stable global biosphere. While the Earth has yet to reach an environmental crisis of apocalyptic proportions, significant changes are underway, which, in the words of Jim MacNeill, are literally ‘skinning the planet alive’.100 Already in many parts of the world, issues such as deforestation, pollution, water and food shortages and ozone depletion have had significant and profound impacts. The ramifications of these effects for national, regional and international security should not be underestimated. In the headlong pursuit for greater economic wealth and material development, humankind has effectively made war on its only habitat – the natural environment.101 In so doing, we are engaging in practices that might ultimately threaten our very survival.

5 The Transnational Spread of Disease

Environmental degradation is not the only non-governmental GAP process impacting on national, regional and international security in the post-Cold War era. Another extremely prominent issue is the spread of disease. The bubonic plague that swept across Europe during the Middle Ages, the smallpox that was carried to the Americas by the Spanish, the influenza outbreak of 1918, which killed 21 million people in a matter of months alone, and the AIDS epidemic that wreaks so much havoc today all bear witness to the enormous damage that infectious diseases can have on a vulnerable society. Through international travel, changing social and behavioural patterns, accelerating urbanisation and ecological destruction, people are inadvertently exposing themselves to a Pandora’s box of emerging microbial threats. More ominously, the growing spectre of biological terrorism highlights the appalling potential of disease organisms being manipulated by political extremists for their own vile ends.1 Human beings constitute only one species on this planet that must compete with 5000 kinds of viruses and more than 300 000 species of bacteria. Moreover, in the twenty or so years it takes humans to produce one new generation, bacteria can replicate themselves a million times over. These disparities clearly work to the advantage of pathogens, enabling ever more virulent strains to evolve that quickly outstrip human responses to them. 2 In Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, the Red Queen tells Alice that she will need to run faster and faster just to sit in the same place. 3 As this chapter aims to show, preventing the spread of illness and disease has the potential to be every bit as elusive.

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The main diseases4 AIDS and HIV This is one of the most deadly diseases of our time. HIV is a retrovirus, which attacks the white T cells that make up a key part of the human body’s immune response system. Full-blown AIDS occurs when the body is weakened to such an extent by the HIV virus that it can no longer fight off micro-organisms that it would normally be able to resist. The incubation period for HIV can last for as long as ten years. However, once diagnosis is confirmed, death normally results within one year, although the time frame can be much shorter than this. The early symptoms of HIV disease typically include chronic fatigue or weakness, severe and sustained weight loss, extensive and persistent swelling of the lymph glands, diarrhoea and severe deterioration of the central nervous system. Fully developed AIDS is characterised by the onset of viral, bacterial, fungal or parasitic secondary infections caused by pathogens that the immune system can no longer control. Death is caused not so much from the HIV virus itself as the overall debilitation it causes.5 HIV is present in virtually all countries of the world, existing in epidemic6 proportions in many of them. It has been estimated that, today, more than 33 million people across the planet carry the virus, half of whom are under 25 years of age. In 1997, another 5.8 million people were diagnosed as being HIV positive, while a further 2.3 million died of full-blown AIDS. Present projections are that if an effective vaccine is not developed, an estimated 40 million teenagers and adolescents will have contracted HIV by 2030.7 Tuberculosis Tuberculosis (TB) affects many organs in the body but usually manifests itself as a disease of the lungs (Fig. 5.1). It is a contagious disease and, like the common cold, is transmitted through the air. The incubation period varies but is usually between four and twelve weeks. It is acquired by inhaling Mycobacterium tuberculosis bacilli, which are generally suspended in the respiratory droplets of infected people. Symptoms of the disease include fever, weight loss and persistent coughing, often with blood. TB is one of the main opportunistic diseases that affects people infected with HIV. One-third of the increase in disease over the last five years can be attributed to this virus; by the turn of the century, an estimated 15 per cent of all TB cases will be linked to HIV.8

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Fig. 5.1 Section through lung (naked eye appearance) showing numerous white nodules from a fatal case of tuberculosis.

According to Dr Mario Raviglione of the WHO infectious diseases unit, roughly one-third of the world’s population carries the TB bacterium, a tenth of whom are likely to contract the disease. 9 Although TB is treatable, either by chemotherapy or the drug thiacetazone, the disease still claims as many as 3 million lives every year, including 100 000 children. It is estimated that between now and 2020, an additional one billion more people will be infected by TB, 200 million of whom will become sick and 70 million of whom will die. Overall, TB accounts for more than a quarter of all preventable deaths in developing countries.10 Other respiratory tract infections These are airborne diseases and include pneumonia, measles, influenza, bronchitis, chickenpox, mumps and meningitis. Pathogens enter the respiratory tract and are then spread in droplets when a patient or carrier talks, laughs, coughs or sneezes. Some organisms survive after the droplets fall to the ground where they mix with dust and can spread, causing infection through inhalation.

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Of these infections, the two that are most virulent and likely to lead to death (particularly among children) are measles and pneumonia. Measles is found globally and is a highly infectious viral disease. Symptoms include fever, conjunctivitis, coryza cough and Koplik spots on the buccal mucosa. A characteristic red blotchy skin rash generally breaks out on the third to seventh day of the infection with additional complications such as encephalitis, diarrhoea and gastroenteritis also often appearing. Measles is particularly prevalent in Africa, where, due to malnutrition, many cases result in death (up to 30 per cent). Pneumonia, which is caused by the bacterium Streptococcus pneumoniae, exists in 80 identifiable subtypes and tends to be most severe among children (the fatality rate can be as high as 60 per cent in developing countries) and the elderly. The incubation period is generally one to three days after initial exposure, with common symptoms including chills, fever, chest pain, difficulty in breathing and a chronic, gradually worsening cough.11 Cholera Cholera is an acute enteric disease of the gastrointestinal tract, caused by the bacterium Vibrio cholerae and generally characterised by watery diarrhoea. Onset of the disease is usually rapid, varying from a few hours to between four and five days. Rapid dehydration always results and can be fatal if the patient is not rehydrated with fluids and electrolytes. In severe untreated cases, death may result within a few hours. The disease is generally transmitted by ingestion of contaminated food or polluted water through municipal supplies, ice made from that water, foods and beverages bought from street vendors and vegetables irrigated with fresh sewage. Research into previous outbreaks of cholera and other epidemiological investigations also suggest that raw or undercooked seafood is important in the transmission.12 Cholera is particularly prevalent in developing parts of the world that lack adequate sanitation and water treatment facilities. It is also liable to occur in any state that has had its vital public health infrastructure destroyed by war, floods or earthquakes. In 1993, a total of 376 845 cases and 6781 deaths attributed to cholera were reported to WHO. The most severely affected regions included Africa, Asia and the Americas. A particularly serious outbreak of the disease is currently occurring in Latin and Central America. Since the first cases were recognised in Peru in 1991 (see below), the disease has spread to affect more than 1 million people throughout Ecuador, Columbia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and Mexico.13

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Typhoid fever Typhoid fever is another enteric disease. It is caused by Salmonella typhi, which only affects humans and typically causes serious systemic illness. The disease is transmitted in the faeces and urine and can become endemic where drinking water becomes infected; food and milk can also act as vehicles. Typhoid fever generally develops about 14 days after initial exposure. Symptoms include head and other aches, a dry cough, rising temperature and fever. If left untreated, the disease will result in internal haemorrhaging and intestinal perforation. Between 2 and 5 per cent of typhoid cases become chronic, of which 16 per cent will result in death in the absence of appropriate antibiotic therapy.14 The incidence of typhoid fever is very low in industrialised countries, largely due to the existence of safe drinking water and proper sewage treatment plants. Approximately 190 cases are reported each year in the US, most of which are contracted overseas. The disease remains far more prevalent in less developed countries, particularly in Latin America,15 Africa16 and throughout India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The annual incidence of typhoid fever is estimated at about 17 million cases with approximately 600 000 deaths each year.17 Dysentery Dysentery is a further gastrointestinal disease that is marked by blood in the stool. It typically occurs in one of two forms: amoebasis (amoebic dysentery) and shigellosis (bacillary dysentery). The amoebic variety is present worldwide but occurs mostly in the tropics. The main causative agent is a protozoan parasitical cyst that is excreted in human faeces (Fig. 5.2). The disease is transmitted mainly by the ingestion of faecally contaminated food or water containing amoebic cysts, which are relatively chlorine resistant. A mild case of amoebasis would manifest itself in the form of abdominal discomfort with intermittent diarrhoea and constipation. A more serious case would be characterised by fever, chills and frequent fluid stools, which often contain blood or flecks of mucus.18 Shigellosis is an acute infection of the large and distal small intestine that is caused by the Shigella bacterium. The disease is present worldwide, though it is especially prevalent in areas with low sanitary standards and poor living conditions. Transmission occurs mainly by consuming food and liquid that has been faecally contaminated, either by flies or by people who have failed to clean their hands after defecation. The symptoms of shigellosis appear abruptly and include a short

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Fig. 5.2 Microscopic sample obtained from an ulcerated area in the large intestine showing Entamoeba histolytica, the protozoan parasitical cyst responsible for amoebic dysentery.

period of headache, tiredness, fever, loss of appetite and abdominal discomfort. This is then followed by the onset of diarrhoea, which in typical cases will contain blood and mucus resulting from internal liver microabscesses. Convulsions may also be an important complication in young children.19 The chief danger of both amoebasis and shigellosis is dehydration and loss of vital bodily fluid, which in the absence of a proper treatment programme can cause death. Fatality rates tend to be higher for shigellosis, primarily because of its higher incidence among young children (especially under the age of five). It is estimated that roughly 600 000 deaths per year are caused by this particular variety of dysentery. 20 Plague Plague is an infection caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis (Fig. 5.3) and is transmitted mainly by the bites of infected fleas carried by ground rodents. The incubation period is between one and six days after initial exposure. Skin infections from the bites of infected fleas cause bubonic plague, which is marked by fever, vomiting and the

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Fig. 5.3 Bubo in the left ingunial region of a Vietnamese woman. Needle aspiration subsequently revealed numerous micro-organisms which were confirmed as Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of bubonic plague.

development of bleeding lesions over the body of the sort seen during the Black Death. Once a person is infected, a progressive illness generally results, leading to blood and, eventually, lung infection. At this point the disease is termed pneumonic plague and is characterised by the development of an overwhelming pneumonia with high fever, cough, bloody sputum and chills. Primary pneumonic plague can be transmitted directly through the expulsion of respiratory droplets (generally by coughing) from an infected person, which are then inhaled into the lungs of a third party. The incubation period of pneumonic plague is one to three days and generally results in a death rate of more than 50 per cent. 21 Worldwide, between 1000 and 2000 cases of plague are reported every year. During the 1980s, the disease consistently reached epidemic proportions in Africa, Asia and South America. Statistics compiled by WHO show a total of 18 739 cases of plague between 1980 and 1994, resulting in 1852 fatalities – an overall death rate of just under 10 per cent.22

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Yellow fever Yellow fever is a viral infection that (currently) occurs only in parts of Central and Equatorial Africa and South America, though the number of cases reported in these two regions has risen over the past 20 years. The disease is caused by the yellow fever virus, which belongs to the flavivirus group, and is transmitted to susceptible hosts (essentially monkeys and humans) by two varieties of biting mosquitoes, the Aedes and Haemogogus. Any region populated by these mosquitoes can potentially harbour the disease. Incubation for yellow fever is generally three to six days, after which two distinct symptom phases appear. The first stage is characterised by fever, muscle pain (especially in the back), headaches, shivers, loss of appetite, nausea and vomiting. After three to four days, most patients improve and their symptoms disappear. However, 15 per cent enter a secondary ‘toxic’ phase within 24 hours. Fever reappears and several body systems are affected. The patient develops jaundice, internal bleeding occurs, kidney function deteriorates leading, eventually, to complete failure. Half of the patients that enter the toxic stage of the disease will die within 10 to 14 days.23 Malaria Malaria is a protozoal infection that is caused by parasites of the genus Plasmodium, four of which can produce the disease. It is transmitted through the bite of infected mosquitoes and has an incubation period of several days after initial exposure. Symptoms of malaria include chills, headaches, nausea and fever, followed by gastrointestinal symptoms such as diarrhoea, vomiting and anaemia. If left untreated, death can result in two to three weeks, although this period will be considerably shorter if the victim is affected by cerebral malaria. In this highly virulent strain of the disease, infected red cells obstruct blood vessels in the brain and other vital organs, leading, ultimately, to systemic breakdown of bodily function. Even if the patient survives, future relapses of the disease are common.24 Approximately 3 million people are currently known to have the disease, although in endemic regions where transmission is high, infections are continually occurring. Roughly 2 million people die from malaria every year. The disease is particularly prevalent in the poorer tropical areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America, where control is hampered by inadequate health structures and poor socio-economic conditions. Aggravating the situation over the last few years has been increased resistance of the Plasmodium parasite to drugs normally used to combat the disease, particularly in Southeast Asia.25

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Ebola virus Ebola, which is also known as haemorrhagic fever, is a member of the RNA family of filoviruses. It is one of the most virulent diseases known to human kind, causing death in 70 to 90 per cent of clinical cases. Transmission occurs largely as a result of coming into contact with infected blood tissue or other bodily fluids; there is, as yet, no clinical evidence to suggest that the disease, at least for humans, is airborne. Currently, there is neither a cure to treat those infected, nor a vaccination available to prevent future outbreaks from occurring. Symptoms, which generally appear 4–16 days after initial infection, include sudden fever, muscle pain, headache and sore throat. As the disease progresses, victims begin to suffer from vomiting, diarrhoea, rash, chest pain, external bleeding and internal haemorrhaging. Death eventually results from the complete breakdown of all major organs.26 To date, four major strains of ebola virus have been identified, each named after the geographical location of its initial outbreak: ebola Zaire, ebola Reston, ebola Sudan and ebola Côte d’Ivoire. Of the four, only ebola Reston is non-contagious to human beings, so far being confined to monkeys. This is extremely fortunate as this particular strain is airborne.27

The spread of diseases As noted above, the immediate transmission of diseases depends on the nature of the specific infectious agent we are talking about. However, in terms of the wider geographic spread of disease, there are a number of vehicles that play a pivotal role in facilitating so-called ‘microbial traffic’. These include, inter alia, war and conflict, the international movement of people, global warming, changes in human social and behavioural patterns, rapid, unsustainable urbanisation and, possibly, terrorism. War and conflict No human behaviour impacts so directly and abruptly on public health as war. The effect on disease and its spread is no exception. Indeed, history has revealed time and time again that the Three Horsemen of the Apocalypse – Famine, Pestilence and War – often gallop together. Armed conflict invariably involves destruction and the mass internal displacement of people. These factors, when combined with the breakdown of the state’s public health measures infrastructure, not to mention the adverse effects of stress and malnutrition, set the scene for the appearance of disease on a mass scale.28

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Without adequate garbage disposal and water purification and sanitation plants, a state will become highly susceptible to outbreaks of gastrointestinal diseases such as typhoid, dysentery and cholera. This problem became acute in Iraq during the Gulf War. The bombing of one of Baghdad’s two main sewerage facilities not only negatively impacted on water supplies in the capital; it also resulted in the discharge of raw sewage directly into the Tigris River, polluting the drinking water as far south as Al Bashrah.29 If a state’s communications infrastructure is destroyed in the course of battle, there will be no way to distribute food and other relief supplies. This will increase the possibility of malnutrition and the ensuing weakening of the body’s natural defence system will heighten the vulnerability of a population to disease. Conflicts continue to significantly threaten food supplies in a variety of war-torn societies throughout the world, including Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan and the Kurdish regions of Turkey, Iran and Iraq.30 When housing is destroyed and bombed, people are forced to live in overcrowded and (often) inadequate refugee camps and other forms of temporary shelter. This inevitably works to increase the incidence of both enteric and airborne diseases. The Gulf War again provides a case in point. This conflict resulted in nearly 2 million refugees (mainly Kurds), most of whom fled into camps in Turkey and Iran. According to the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the main causes of death among this displaced population were respiratory and intestinal diseases, with the Commission estimating fatality rates in 1991 at between 7 and 12 per 10 000 per day.31 Finally if political strife should lead to the destruction of a state’s health system, there will be no way to either treat those infected with diseases or otherwise contain outbreaks of potentially fatal viruses and pathogens. Anti-government rebels often directly target hospitals, clinics and other medical facilities in an attempt to reduce central administrative control and support. Such destruction has caused widespread problems in terms of hindering the effective implementation of disease prevention and control programmes, particularly throughout sub-Saharan Africa, Central Europe and South Asia.32 The overall impact of war and political unrest on the spread of disease is well illustrated by the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia. In Somalia, where civil violence continues to cause the internal displacement of large segments of the population to overcrowded and ill-equipped refugee camps, mortality rates among children as high

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as 70 per 10 000 have been reported, with enteric diseases such as Shigella being particularly virulent. The ethnic clashes in BosniaHerzegovina have been equally catastrophic, reverting the territory back to developing country status in terms of sanitation and properly treated water. This abrupt change in ecology has since led to unprecedented outbreaks of diarrhoeal illnesses and typhoid fever, often in epidemic proportions.33 The international movement of people The role of transport and the international movement of people have long been associated with the spread of disease. Trading ships carried the Black Death from Asia to Europe, while it was Spanish emigrants who were primarily responsible for the introduction of smallpox and TB to the Americas. Columbus and his fellow global explorers have often been blamed for the introduction of syphilis into the Old World. In 1793, 10 per cent of the population of Philadelphia succumbed to yellow fever imported from colonial expansion to the tropics. And in 1875 the son of a Fiji chief came down with measles after a ceremonial trip to Australia; within four months, 20 000 Fijians were dead from the imported disease.34 As Armelagos aptly observes, while microorganisms might not be very good at travelling far on their own, they are expert ‘hitchhikers’.35 In today’s highly interdependent world, the volume and speed of international travel have undoubtedly facilitated the transnational spread of disease. No part of the planet remains inaccessible to human penetration, with current estimates of the number of people crossing international frontiers on board commercial flights at more than 500 million every year. If one includes land and sea-based travel, a staggering 1 million people are thought to cross borders every day.36 Thanks to developments in transport technology, this movement has also become extremely rapid, to the point that individuals returning from far-off infected regions can return home while still incubating a disease acquired abroad. In 1991, for instance, over 1000 cases of imported malaria were reported for the UK and US, with most outbreaks occurring in people living close to major metropolitan airports. Equally, legionnaire’s disease in these two countries not uncommonly develops in people who acquired the infection while overseas. 37 As Laurie Garret points out: In the age of jet travel, a person incubating a disease such as Ebola can board a plane, travel 12,000 miles, pass unnoticed through

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customs and immigration, take a domestic carrier to a remote destination, and still not develop symptoms for several days, infecting many other people before his condition is noticeable.38 Compounding the problem is the fact that overcrowded, poorly ventilated, (sometimes) unsanitary aircraft offering pre-cooked and packaged meals constitute ideal environments for the transmission of viruses and bacteria, particularly on long-haul flights. Cases of cholera, for instance, have been documented in passengers returning to the US infected from in-flight meals contaminated in South America. Equally, new travel-health guidelines issued by WHO specifically refer to the possibility of catching in-flight infectious TB as ‘realistic’, particularly on routes over eight hours long. While there have, as yet, been no cases of people actually catching TB, WHO has documented instances where individuals travelling on planes with other TB-infected passengers have caught the bacterium that causes the disease.39 One disease that has certainly reached pandemic proportions as a result of the international flow of travellers is HIV. 40 Studies in Africa have tracked the progress of HIV along trucking routes, with major roads acting as principal corridors of virus spread between urban areas and other proximal settlements.41 In one study of 68 lorry drivers and their assistants, 35 per cent were found to be HIV positive. 42 Further epidemiologic research revealed a wide travel history for these drivers, involving seven different countries served by the Port of Mombassa, including Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda.43 Tourism, especially sex tourism, has also played a major role. The global spread of HIV has certainly been encouraged by the substantial patronage of the Asian sex markets by the equally prolific number of international travellers who visit countries such as Thailand, India and the Philippines every year.44 Global warming Over the past three decades, humanity has drilled, polluted, engineered, paved, planted and deforested at an unprecedented rate, changing the global biosphere in deep and complex ways. One important effect of such actions has been a gradual increase in the Earth’s core temperature (see Chapter 4), an ecological change that many scientists now believe has the potential actively to contribute to the transnational spread of disease. According to the IPCC, on the basis of current trends, the world’s temperature is expected to rise by as much as

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3° Celsius during the next century. Global warming of this magnitude could expose millions of people for the first time to malaria, sleeping sickness and other insect-borne illnesses. In the US, for instance, a slight increase in overall temperature would allow the mosquitoes that carry dengue fever to survive as far north as New York City. Equally, the insects that carry the Plasmodium parasite, which causes malaria, thrive in the warm climates of the tropics. Increased temperatures in more temperate areas could, conceivably, provide a habitat suitable for the increased distribution of these anopheline vectors.45 Of more immediate concern are the studies that have been made linking global warming and its associated effects on climate change to outbreaks of diseases that have already occurred in several parts of the world. Outbreaks of malaria in Madagascar, India, Ethiopia and Peru have been attributed to sudden increases in anopheline densities resulting from higher rainfall patterns in arid and semi-arid regions.46 Epidemics of cholera, typhoid and dengue fever in Venezuela, Peru and Bangladesh and plague in India have similarly been linked to major shifts in vector and infectious agent distributions caused by altered weather patterns.47 Global warming and climate change also carry important implications for the spread of disease in terms of increasing the incidence of natural disasters such as landslides, storms, hurricanes and flooding. Like war and conflict, these events invariably lead to the destruction/ disruption of vital communication, health and sanitation infrastructure as well as the displacement of people into overcrowded makeshift shelters and camps. Such consequences are extremely likely to have direct adverse effects on public health (see above), transforming a disaster area into a potential ‘epidemiological time bomb’.48 Hurricane Mitch, which struck Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador in 1998, provides a particularly pertinent case in point. The desolate landscapes left in the wake of the storm quickly degenerated into disease-ridden slums with children swimming in rivers contaminated by putrefying bodies and flood debris and famished survivors eating animals that had fed on rotting flesh. Cholera and other enteric diseases became especially endemic, their spread facilitated by the lack of clean drinking water, appalling sanitary conditions, and overcrowded shelters. Compounding the problems were impassable roads, wrecked bridges and poor communications, making the provision of aid and essential medical relief supplies virtually impossible. The catastrophe is, without doubt, the worst natural disaster to have hit Central America in 200 years.49

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Changes in human social behaviour patterns Changes in human social behaviour have been a major contributing factor in the spread of at least one infectious illness – HIV. Although the precise ancestry of HIV is uncertain, early transmission of the virus was undoubtedly facilitated by greater acceptance of multiple sexual partners and permissive homosexuality, particularly in states such as the US. Today, almost 1.4 million people are living with HIV throughout North America and Western Europe, with some cities such as New York amongst the most prevalent anywhere in the world. 50 While the rate of new infections in the developed world has stabilised somewhat during the 1990s – largely due to the initiation of campaigns that have dramatically increased condom use among casual sexual partners – the disease continues to decimate Africa and Asia, where sexual education is far less developed. By the end of 1996, a total of 14 million adults and children were living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa; a further 5 million had already died from full blown AIDS. Botswana and neighbouring Zimbabwe have been particularly badly affected. The two countries share the unenviable reputation of being the AIDS capitals of the world. In both states, 25 per cent of adults aged between 15 and 49 are infected with either HIV or AIDS, with unprotected (and frequent) sex by far the main mode of transmission.51 In Thailand and India, thriving sex industries have served to compound already serious problems stemming from greater sexual promiscuity. Based on the current available data, it is estimated that there are 450 000 HIV-infected persons in Thailand, 0.8 per cent of the entire population.52 If this rate of transmission continues, most of which originates with female prostitutes working in areas such as Chiang Mai and Bangkok,53 there will be approximately 2 million cumulative HIV infections by the year 2000.54 India has been just as seriously affected. In Poona, 26 out of every 100 female sex workers attending sexually transmitted diseases (STD) clinics in 1994 were tested as HIV positive, while in Bombay the prevalence was a staggering 51 per cent, up from just 1 per cent in 1990. 55 Overall, roughly 3.5 million people are currently thought to be living with the disease in India, a rate of infection that owes much to commercial sex and the high levels of STDs in the country. These figures give serious cause for concern. Indeed, with more than twice the number of sexually active adults than sub-Saharan Africa, the country can now quite literally be referred to as the ‘sleeping giant’ of AIDS.56 The increasing prevalence of intravenous drug misuse has also been extremely important in encouraging the spread of HIV, especially

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in East and Southeast Asia. Thailand currently has to administer at least 50 000 confirmed heroin addicts, the majority of whom are also HIV positive as a result of sharing needles. 57 Similarly Burma, which lies at the heart of the infamous Golden Triangle and which was free of HIV only a few years ago, now has an estimated 200 000 people carrying the virus, 74 per cent of whom are tested intravenous drug users.58 In 1994, the northeastern Indian state of Manipur, which borders Burma, had an estimated 30 000–40 000 heroin addicts, many of whom have since developed full-blown AIDS on account of their habit.59 China has been especially hard hit. The Beijing government freely admits that the outbreak of an AIDS epidemic in the south of the country is directly related to drug addicts sharing needles to inject heroin. Indeed Ruili, a border town in the southwestern province in Yunnan with one of the highest concentrations of opium addicts in the country, is now in the unenviable position of also being the AIDS capital of China. As the Far Eastern Economic Review observes, AIDS and drug addiction are very much symptomatic of the internal disintegration and chaos that many of these countries are now having to deal with, virtually on a daily basis.60 Rapid and unsustainable urbanisation in the developing world In the early 1900s, between 90 and 95 per cent of the population of most states, particularly in the developing world, lived in rural areas. By 2000, the proportion of people living in cities will exceed that of outlying regions. Most of this urban growth is taking place in the developing world. In 1950, there were just 78 cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America with more than 1 million residents. By 1970, the number had risen to 241, further increasing to 536 20 years later. By 2015 an anticipated 1353 cities will have sprung up, representing a seventeenfold increase in 65 years. The rate of urbanisation has been far less dramatic in Europe and North America, increasing from 113 cities in 1950, through 194 in 1970, to 246 in 1990. By 2015, an expected 304 cities will exist in these two regions, slightly over double 1950’s total.61 The reasons for the high rate of rural–urban migration in the developing world are varied but typically incorporate such factors as drought, flooding and other natural disasters; an excess of agricultural labour; socio-political unrest caused by civil war; and rural banditry. Fleeing such conditions, millions of dispossessed workers have moved to squalid shanty towns on the outskirts of third world cities, swelling urban populations and overloading already inadequate water, sanitary,

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medical, food, housing and other vital infrastructural services. These urban conglomerations are proving to be excellent breeding grounds for the growth and spread of infectious diseases. 62 According to one study, lack of clean water, sanitation and hygiene in overcrowded and inadequately serviced cities are directly responsible for an estimated 7 per cent of all deaths and diseases that occur globally.63 Asia has been particularly hit by the negative interaction between unsustainable city growth and disease spread. The region’s urban population is currently running at 1.1 billion. By 2025 it is expected to have risen to a staggering 3.8 billion, by which time Asia will contain half the world’s population, 53 per cent of which will live in urban areas. There are already nine megacities64 in Asia, including Beijing, Calcutta, Jakarta, Mumbai (formerly Bombay), Osaka, Seoul, Shanghai, Tianjin and Tokyo. Within the next few years, they will be joined by Bangkok, Dhaka, Karachi and Manila. Many of these cities lack the infrastructure funding necessary to provide proper roads, sewers, housing and sanitation systems – all essential if productivity and a minimal standard of living are to be sustained. 65 According to the ADB, thirteen of the world’s fifteen most polluted cities are currently located in Asia, some of whose rivers are thought to carry up to three to four times the world level of faecal pollutants.66 The infectious consequences of this have been inevitable, with widespread outbreaks of typhoid, malaria, dengue fever, dysentery and cholera a common occurrence, particularly in rapidly expanding cities such as Mumbai, Dhaka, Karachi Jakarta and Manila. 67 As Linden observes: Advances in sanitation and the discovery of antibiotics have given humanity a respite from the ravages of infectious disease. But many epidemiologists [now] fear that this period is drawing to a close as urban growth outruns the installation of sanitation in the developing world and resilient microbes discover opportunities in the stressed immune systems of the urban poor.68 Unsustainable urbanisation is also helping to transform oceans throughout the developing world into breeding grounds for microorganisms. Epidemiologists have repeatedly warned that toxic algal blooms, fed by sewage, fertilisers and other industrial and human contaminants from coastal cities in Asia, Africa and Latin America, contain countless viruses and bacteria. Mixed together in what amounts to a dirty ‘genetic soup’, these pathogens can undergo countless mutations,

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engendering new, highly virulent antibiotic strains. Nautical traffic can carry these ocean viruses far and wide. The devastating cholera epidemic that broke out in Latin America in 1991, for instance, occurred after a ship from Asia unloaded contaminated ballast water into the harbour of Callao, Peru. The epidemic, which originated from a resistant strain of the El Tor serogroup, has since spread relentlessly to neighbouring countries, infecting more than 320 000 people and killing 2600.69 Terrorism Finally, diseases could conceivably be spread through a deliberate act of biological terrorism (see also Chapter 1). These weapons of mass destruction are even more devastating than chemical weapons. This is due to their virulence; their ability to quickly spread through a target population; their symbolic value as weapons of extreme terror; and their availability. A single virus particle70 trapped in the lungs is sufficient to cause a fatal infection in three days, while bacteria can be weaponised in something as simple as a modified home brewing kit. 71 Likely biological agents that a terrorist group might try to disperse include the influenza virus, brain viruses, bubonic and pneumonic plague, anthrax,72 haemorrhagic fever (including ebola virus, which is highly infective when freeze-dried) and monkeypox.73 Whereas normal diseases typically begin in small pockets and then spread slowly through natural processes of contagion, an act of biological terrorism would immediately release a large quantity of infectious organisms against a specific target population. The result would be a massive, largely simultaneous outbreak of disease after an incubation period of only a few days, causing widespread casualties and panic and, at least in the cases of unprepared states, contributing to the wholesale breakdown of vital public health and response capabilities. Because pathogenic organisms are able to multiply inside their hosts, only minute quantities would be needed to cause such widespread effects.74 The biggest single obstacle in constructing a biological weapon is manufacturing an effective dissemination system that is capable of releasing the weaponised pathogenic agent in the form of a respirable spray. The most efficient way to do this, and reliably guarantee a high casualty rate over a wide area, is through aerosolisation. However, fabricating such a system would require considerable technical expertise and probably remains beyond the reach of most conceivable state and non-state actors. Nevertheless, a number of less efficient dispersal methods are available that could still kill or incapacitate thousands of

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people, particularly if agents were freeze-dried and directed against large indoor populations in properly ventilated settings, such as subways or sports stadiums.75 The potential fall-out from an act of biological terrorism is truly frightening. A 1993 study conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment, for instance, concluded that a single aircraft delivering 1 kg of anthrax spores by aerosol on a clear, calm night over Washington DC area could kill between 1 million and 3 million people. This represents 300 times as many fatalities as an aircraft delivering sarin gas, which was used by the Aum Shinriyko cult in Tokyo in 1995,76 in amounts 10 times larger. 77 Such potency in relation to the size of the human body – which is, on average, 10 17 the size of the typical bacterium – is akin to a single flea being able to derail a fully laden freight train travelling at full speed. The spectre and potential dangers of biological terrorism were brought home to the US in February 1998 when a member of the ANM was arrested on suspicion that he was about to launch a biological attack on the New York subway. The suspect, Larry Harris, was apprehended carrying three phials of bubonic plague, which he had managed to acquire by producing a fraudulent pharmaceutical order form stating that the germ was needed for medical research purposes. The same person had recently boasted that he could manufacture any number of biological agents in his own kitchen and was prepared to hail in his own version of the Apocalypse using cultures obtained either commercially78 or naturally from surrounding high-ground.79

The consequences of the spread of diseases The most immediate consequences of the spread of diseases are human casualties. In total, 11.7 million people have died from AIDS since the beginning of the current epidemic, including 2.7 million children under the age of 15. 80 About 3 million children die every year from diarrhoea connected with gastrointestinal diseases, 4 million from respiratory infections and 3 million from a combination of malnutrition and vaccine-preventable illnesses, especially measles. Malaria kills between 1 and 2 million people a year, 80 per cent of them children. 81 Other mosquito-borne diseases, such as dengue and yellow fever, affect millions more each year and are on the rise. There are also about half a million maternal deaths every year in the developing world due to communicable diseases, many of which – leaving infants motherless – are followed by the deaths of uncared-for offspring.82

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A secondary consequence of the spread of disease is the need to divert scarce resources to pay for such things as medicines, research for vaccines and provision of specialised hospital and quarantine facilities. According to the Global AIDS Policy Coalition at Harvard University, the estimated direct (medical) costs of the disease will be between US$125 and US$225 billion by the year 2000. In the UK alone, the drug bill for treating HIV and AIDS is expected to grow to 300 million GBP by 2002. In the US, the cost of treating TB has already topped US$1 billion, while in Latin America, it has been estimated that over $200 billion will be needed to contain outbreaks of cholera over the next decade.83 The cost of containing and treating diseases in the developing world (where many of the world’s most serious outbreaks have occurred) is especially great, placing a considerable burden on health systems that tend to be chronically underfunded. 84 It has been estimated that hospitalising a child with AIDS in Zaire, for instance, is the equivalent of three months’ salary while the cost of the funeral will be approximately one year’s salary.85 In addition to direct economic costs, the spread of disease will inevitably incur indirect costs. These generally arise from the loss of economically active members of society and reduced production hours/years caused by illness and death. It has been estimated that the indirect cost of an AIDS death, for instance, is between 65 and 75 per cent of total costs, 90 per cent of which is accounted for by premature death rather than disability or morbidity.86 Additional indirect outlays that are often overlooked are the replacement costs of recruiting and training new employees as well as possible higher labour charges should substantial reductions in the most economically active age group occur. This would be particularly likely with a disease such as AIDS, given its prevalence among 20- to 30-year-olds.87 A third impact of the spread of disease is the negative psychological effect it can have on a severely infected population. Serious epidemics are typically accompanied by widespread grief, despair, fear and panic. In instances where a state’s public health system is unable to cope with the fall-out of a major outbreak of illness, such emotions are liable to degenerate into mass hysteria, with the public – many of whom may be suffering acute but purely psychosomatic symptoms – besieging local hospitals and demanding treatment. This will inevitably place enormous pressure and strain on doctors, nurses and other health providers to the point where they may eventually require care and counselling themselves. Epidemics may also lead to forms of post-traumatic stress. A number of studies have been undertaken of the psychological

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effects on long-term refugees who have been continually subjected to poor sanitary conditions and outbreaks of disease. These consistently document the extreme emotional trauma suffered by these people and the difficulty of integrating them back into ‘normal’ society.88 Finally, the spread of disease is likely to stimulate mass population movements across national boundaries. Quite apart from encouraging the further dissemination of pathogenic viruses and micro-organisms, mass migration and refugee flows pose a number of significant problems in themselves. Population movements are often used as strategic pawns in the power plays of neighbouring states and, thereby, have the potential to severely destabilise bilateral and multilateral relations. In addition, they can exacerbate strains on already overburdened social systems in receiving states, fostering increased intolerance, xenophobic sentiments and extremist violence.89 Medical science has come a long way in improving our basic understanding of the origin and effect of most infectious diseases affecting humans. Nevertheless, we have proven far less adept in effectively dealing with the factors that facilitate the spread of this particular GAP influence.90 Through such things as war, international travel, changes in social and cultural behaviour, accelerating urbanisation and environmental degradation, humanity has approached what Armelagos refers to as the ‘twilight of the antibiotic era’. 91 Compounding the problem has been complacency, some would say arrogance, that is born of a blind faith in technology’s ability to control infectious diseases. As this chapter has shown, not only are we having trouble in containing ageold problems like TB, cholera, dysentery and malaria, new, previously unimagined illnesses and viruses such as HIV and ebola have emerged with a vengeance. Without perpetual vigilance and a recognition that infectious diseases pose as much of a threat to national and international stability as would another Hitler, the Bible’s apocalyptic vision of deadly plagues, disease and pestilence scouring the Earth may yet come to haunt humankind.

6 Mass Unregulated Population Flows

A third non-governmental GAP influence that is emerging as a major issue of concern is the unregulated and forced flow of refugees and migrants.1 For a variety of multi-dimensional and inter-related reasons large sections of humanity are currently on the move. In 1951, the year that the UNHCR was first established, there were approximately 1.5 million refugees around the world. By 1975, the figure was 2.4 million, increasing to 8.2 million by 1980. In early 1997, the UNHCR estimated that there were roughly 13.2 million refugees globally, representing an increase of 880 per cent over 44 years. Added to this are the millions of people that are either internally displaced within their own country of origin each year or forced to flee across national boundaries for reasons other than political, racial, ethnic or religious persecution (who are not considered refugees under international law – see note 1). Overall, the UNHCR estimated the total population of concern in 1998 at 22.4 million people, a figure that includes refugees as well as those driven from their homes (either internally or externally) by famine, war, natural disasters, environmental degradation and general societal breakdown.2 Mass movements of people are connected to problems of national and international security and the conduct of international relations in general in a number of ways. Not only do large-scale migrations create and exacerbate conflict between states; they also have the potential to challenge the integrity of both sending and receiving states. Refugees have been used as pawns in the armed and political power plays of competing regional states while displaced diasporas have, on occasions, formed a crucial overseas support network for insurgencies and terrorist movements. Mass migrations also send powerful messages to the international community regarding the political legitimacy of 115

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sending states and can, if left unchecked, feed into suspicion, resentment and outbreaks of xenophobic violence in receiving states. This chapter concludes the section of the book dealing with nongovernmental GAP processes and influences by examining the many ways in which unregulated migrant and refugee flows impact on national and international security. While concern with mass population movements is not new, most work that has been done has tended to look at the issue either within a narrow national context or as a strictly humanitarian problem.3 As Gil Loescher observes, the question of how refugee and migrant flows are linked to wider geo-strategic considerations remains largely unexplored.4 If one is to gain a true appreciation of the extent, nature and dimension of security issues facing policy-makers in the contemporary era, it is vital that this analytical lacuna is filled. The chapter begins by examining the chief causes of contemporary refugee and migration flows, focusing especially on war and conflict, environmental degradation, the effects of natural disasters, economic dislocation and persecution. It then goes on to provide an overview of the consequences of this displacement for both sending and receiving states as well as international security in general. Throughout, the focus of the chapter will be on people who have been forcibly uprooted due to violence, persecution or disaster, irrespective of whether they are recognised as refugees under international law or the governments of their home or host countries.

Factors that contribute to mass refugee and migration flows War and conflict There can be little doubt that war and conflict have been at the root of most population displacements since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the International Committee of the Red Cross has gone so far as to argue that the prevention of population movements corresponds ‘essentially to the prevention of armed conflict and … abuses during armed conflict’.5 Most of the new and ongoing conflicts in the postCold War era have been notoriously bitter and difficult to control, involving deliberate assaults on defenceless civilian populations. Typically termed as complex humanitarian emergencies, these have combined either inter- or intra-state war with large-scale displacements of people, mass famine, and environmental destruction (see below).6 Three types of conflict have been associated with generating population flows since the end of the Cold War. The first and most

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‘traditional’ has been inter-state war, of which the 1990/91 Persian Gulf War was perhaps the best example. The number of people uprooted by this conflict may have numbered as many as 5 million, most of which occurred in three distinct stages. First, in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s invasion in August 1990, came a mass flight of 865 000 migrant Arab and Asian guest workers from Kuwait and Iraq into Jordan and neighbouring countries together with the forced expulsion of 800 Yemenis from Saudi Arabia.7 Second, following the outbreak of hostilities between Baghdad and the Allied Coalition, there was a wartime exodus of at least 650 000 foreign nationals who had remained in Iraq and Kuwait, with most fleeing to Jordan, Syria, Iran and Turkey. Finally, Iraq’s brutal suppression of rebellions in the north and south of the country during mid-1991 caused a further displacement of up to 2 million Kurds and Shi’a, many of whom massed on the Turkish and Iranian borders in miserable conditions awaiting entry into those two countries. This forced mass migration is certainly one of the largest population displacements that has occurred in recent times and possibly one of the most far-reaching, in terms of countries affected, since the end of the Second World War.8 The second and most common forms of refugee-producing conflict have been those associated with the reversal of the state formation process, namely state disintegration. 9 The essence of these internal wars is the fragility and decay of governmental institutions, particularly with respect to functioning as effective systems of resource distribution and control compounded by the wholesale failure of entire cultures to peacefully coexist, ethnically, religiously, linguistically or nationally.10 In many instances, these states had survived only as a result of the artificial order created by superpower rivalry during the Cold War. The former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Liberia, Ethiopia, Algeria, Zaire, Afghanistan and Yemen all provide examples of these failed states, each of which has been associated with outbreaks of mass violence and refugee migrations. Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo provide especially pertinent cases in point. At least 2.4 million refugees and displaced persons were created by the Bosnian civil war; as of early 1998, only 600 000 of these had been returned home or permanently re-settled in a third country.11 The figures in Rwanda are even more telling. Between April and June 1994, an estimated 1 million Tutsis were slaughtered in the country by Hutu extremists.12 Fear of revenge attacks following the establishment of a Tutsi government under Paul Kagame led to a stampede of over 1 million Hutu citizens into the Kivu province of Zaire, sometimes at a

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rate of 15 000 per hour.13 Population flows from Kosovo have been just as dramatic. By January 1999, fighting had driven at least 200 000 people, one-tenth of the enclave’s population, from their homes, 81 000 of whom have since sought refugee status in western and southeastern Europe. During one particularly bad weekend in mid1998, 5000 refugees fled to Albania from the town of Decani, a town of 20 000 that has since been more or less completely destroyed by repeated Serb onslaughts and shelling.14 Finally, there are several long-standing social order conflicts which remain a source of instability in the post-Cold War era (see also Chapter 1). These continue to create refugee-producing situations and problems, though generally of lesser immediate magnitude than the state disintegration wars noted above. Sub-communal struggles in South and East Asia have been particularly noteworthy for their ongoing ability to generate population movements. During the 1990s, embattled minorities in Burma fled across international borders to Thailand (predominately Karens) and Bangladesh (predominately Arakanese Muslims). Ethnic conflicts in Indonesia (East Timor, Aceh, Irian Jaya), China (Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang) and the Philippines (Mindanao) have produced equally problematic forced migrant flows throughout Southeast Asia.15 In India, increasingly indiscriminate ethno-religious violence in Punjab and Kashmir has led to large-scale internal displacements of members of the Hindu majority.16 And in Sri Lanka, the entrenched Tamil–Sinhalese ethnic crisis in the north and east of the country continues to galvanise significant population movements, internally as well as externally both to the west and, especially, to India. Following the twin defeats of the LTTE in Jaffna and Killinochchi between 1995 and 1996, for instance, some 13 000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees reportedly arrived on the Rameswaram coast of Tamil Nadu.17 Presently, there are thought to be at least 117 camps in southern India sheltering approximately 63 000 Tamil refugees.18 Environmental degradation, natural disasters and disease Biospheric degradation, disasters and disease have also played a key role in stimulating mass population flows in the post-Cold War era. As Chapters 4 and 5 showed, there are a variety of human- and naturallyinduced environmental changes that are currently serving to threaten traditional habitats. These have created a whole new class of displaced persons in search of safe living conditions – so called ‘environmental refugees’.19 The term is typically used to describe those people who

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have been forced to leave their traditional homelands, either temporarily or permanently, as a result of a marked environmental disruption (natural or triggered by humanity) that has jeopardised their existence or seriously affected their quality of life.20 Three types of environmental refugee are generally distinguished. The first comprises those temporarily displaced as a result of a sudden environmental change that is largely reversible. This would include those fleeing industrial accidents (including oil spills), floods, earthquakes, disease outbreaks and other natural disasters. The second group consists of those who have been permanently displaced through longterm environmental change and degradation stemming from things such as sea-level rise, dam construction and desertification. The final category embraces those who migrate in search of a better quality of life due to the adverse effects of, for example, pollution, water shortages, salinatian of the soil and deforestation.21 Accurate data are still unavailable on exactly how many people migrate primarily because of natural or human-induced environmental change, largely because most governments tend to take little formal account of this unconventional category of displaced persons. Rough estimates put the number of environmental refugees today at around 10 million, compared with the 12 million officially recognised refugees. Most experts believe, however, that this figure is almost certainly an underestimate and that the true number is more likely to be around 25 million (10 million recognised, 15 million unrecognised).22 The majority of the world’s environmental refugees currently consist of those fleeing short-term, catastrophic disasters and associated outbreaks of disease. The various mudslides, hurricanes and floods that hit China, Bangladesh, Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua during 1998 provide good examples of how quickly people can be displaced by such occurrences.23 In Bangladesh, for instance, severe rains, which started falling in mid-1998, deluged two-thirds of the country, leaving up to 25 million people homeless or marooned with hundreds of thousands of others suffering from outbreaks of cholera, diarrhoea and typhoid. Many of these fled the small state, with most seeking refuge across the border in neighbouring India.24 In terms of the future causes of environmental refugee flows, however, it is with long-term environmental harm that most concern now lies. Global warming, in particular, has been emphasised as a potential time bomb for stimulating mass migration. For example, experts concur that should the world’s oceans rise by just one metre on account of climate change, millions of people will almost certainly

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have to be permanently relocated, particularly those living along densely populated coastlines or on densely populated deltas of major rivers.25 Desertification, too, is often stressed. Conditions similar to the North American dust bowl of the 1930s have been especially highlighted as a potential future generator of mass refugee flows, particularly in Africa where an estimated 135 million occupy lands that are well on their way to desertification.26 An additional factor that is often overlooked when considering environmental refugees is war. Often, ecological destruction, change and associated migratory flows occur as a direct result of armed conflict.27 Indeed, it is one of the salient features of the complex humanitarian crisis that has become so endemic in the modern era. Studies have shown, for instance, that famine-related displacement often tends to occur in countries affected by war and civil strife. 28 As Dupont observes, it is no accident that Africa, the continent most severely affected by conflict and environmental destruction, is also one of the world’s leading sources of refugees and migrant flows.29 Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola and Mozambique are just some of the cases where human-initiated environmental disasters and conflict have combined to stimulate large-scale movements of people in search of food, potable water, shelter and arable land. The complexity of the relationship between environmental change, forced migration and conflict can also be illustrated by rapacious governmental exploitation of food and environmental resources in areas occupied by indigenous peoples. On a number of occasions, these have been linked to deliberate state ethnocide or counter-insurgency campaigns directed against minority separatist groups. A particularly pertinent case in point are the estimated 500 000 people who have been forcibly uprooted in southern Sudan as a result of famine caused by drought and deliberate government policies aimed at pressurising the Christian Sudan People’s Liberation Army. 30 Other examples of these types of population flows include migrations from the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, refugees from Kareni regions along the Thai/Burmese border and forced Papuan and Achenese displacements from Irian Jaya and Northern Sumatra (both of which were further galvanised by Indonesian transmigration policies).31 Most commentators agree that the environmental factor is likely to emerge as one of the main factors promoting refugee flows in the coming years. Indeed, it has been suggested that by the early years of this century, those displaced by ecological factors will exceed the number of refugees from all other causes by at least a factor of six.32 As

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Norman Myers, chief coordinator of the New York-based Climate Institute project on environmental refugees, somewhat grimly remarks: Already the issue of environmental refugees is becoming prominent in the global arena. In the future, however, it could become one of the biggest crises to assail humankind. Due to [natural and humaninstigated disaster], the present total of roughly 25 million environmental refugees could readily swell to 50 million by the year 2000 or shortly thereafter. When global warming starts to make itself felt, the ultimate total could surge to several times as many. Whereas the present 25 million environmental refugees make up 0.4 per cent of the world’s population, a total of, say 200 million in the year 2050 would amount to a full 2 per cent of the 10 billion people expected to be on Earth.33 Economic dislocation Economic dislocation is a further issue that has stimulated mass population flows, reflected by the enormous number of illegal or undocumented migrants seeking improved working conditions and lifestyles in more affluent parts of the globe. Dollarisation (see Introduction), together with advances in telecommunications and transportation, have combined to make the inhabitants of underdeveloped parts of the world more aware of international differentials in income and standards of living, while making it possible to attain those levels by travelling across national borders. 34 As Dirks observes, these economic ‘refugees’ do not see emigration merely as a desirable option; often they regard it as one of the few available options to escape the consequences of overpopulation and diminishing employment opportunities.35 East Asia, Western Europe and the US have been especially affected by increased migrant labour flows during the 1990s. Spectacular economic growth has led to a tenfold increase in cross-border migrant labour throughout East Asia, particularly to Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. All of these states support a substantial number of foreign guest workers, many of whom are illegal migrants from Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma and China. Officials in Malaysia, for instance, believe that up to half of the 1 million undocumented workers in the country originate from Indonesia, with most of the remainder coming from the Philippines. Equally, most of the illegal migrants that make up Taiwan’s informal economy are currently thought to come from the Philippines, Indonesia and China,

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with these three states also accounting for the ‘lion’s share’ of South Korea’s undocumented workforce (estimated at 85 000 in 1993).36 In Western Europe, large-scale socio-economic migration followed the collapse of the Soviet eastern bloc. In 1989, almost 1.3 million people left Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, almost half of them resettlers and economic migrants seeking new opportunities in the West.37 Many of these failed to gain proper employment and/or immigration documentation and have since remained illegally, constituting a substantial Eastern European and Russian ‘shadow’ workforce. Western Europe’s wealth has also encouraged many people from the developing world to try and gain permanent access by claiming refugee status. Indeed, it has been suggested that more than 75 per cent of refused asylum seekers continue to remain illegally. 38 Weak immigration controls and geographical proximity to North Africa have also made southern Europe a prime location of illegal economic migration, creating large informal economies in Spain, Portugal, France and Italy.39 Estimates of the overall extent of illegal migration into Western Europe are difficult to obtain or verify. However, the International Labour Organisation believes it could be as much as 14 per cent of the total foreign population, with the most affected countries being Germany, France, Italy and Spain.40 Economic dynamism and an underlying ‘state ethic’ strongly in favour of individual advancement, materialism and capitalism have also made the US a favoured target of legal and illegal economic migration. ‘Overstayers’ – students and visitors on temporary visas – make up an important component of the country’s illegal workers, as do third country nationals who cross into the country via the relatively open northern US–Canadian border. A large informal economy, combined with a long frontier that is relatively difficult to monitor have also made the southern US a prime location for illegal migration, particularly from Mexico (much of which takes place in the form of organised people smuggling – see below). As with Western Europe, the true extent of illegal migration into the US is difficult to assess with any real degree of accuracy. However, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) estimated that, as of 1996, there were roughly 5 million undocumented aliens resident in the country with numbers increasing at an average rate of about 275 000 per year between 1992 and 1996.41 During these years, it is estimated that nearly 1200 Mexicans died, mainly from drowning, trying to enter the US illegally.42 One factor that has considerably exacerbated illegal migration has been the involvement of groups dealing in ‘people smuggling’;

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estimates of the extent of this illicit trade range between 1 and 4 million people a year, with most syndicates targeting Western Europe, North America and Australia. 43 These gangs range from small-time, local operators geared to making a ‘quick buck’ to well-financed and globally networked international syndicates such as the European Scafisti, Mexican cartels, the Japanese Yakuza and the Chinese Triads.44 Many of these organisations operate in tandem. Mexican cartels, for instance, have co-operated with Triad groups smuggling Chinese across the southern US border. 45 This ‘trade’ has resulted in what the Los Angeles Times described as a ‘clandestine corridor linking the villages of Fujian, the shores of Mexico and Central America and suburban safehouses in [the] heavily Chinese enclaves of the San Gabriel Valley’.46 The Triads have also worked in conjunction with North American crime groups involved with the trafficking of Chinese and other Asian immigrants into the US, via Canada, particularly across Indian reservations that straddle the New York–Ontario border. 47 Canada is rapidly emerging as an especially favoured trans-shipment point for the illicit trafficking of Chinese (and other) migrants into North America. This is largely because the country lacks comprehensive legislation against organised crime; is characterised by lenient asylum policies; 48 and possesses a financial sector that can be relatively easily manipulated to launder money.49 The extent of the number of Chinese moved by the Triads via this conduit first began to become apparent in 1996 when Canadian police uncovered a syndicate responsible for smuggling up to 40 people a month into the US from New York.50 Overall, it is believed that at least 5000 people have been smuggled into the US, through Canada, since 1994.51 Dupont offers the following insight into how the trade in human smuggling is managed and controlled, drawing on the specific example of the movement of Chinese illegals, via Thailand, to other destination countries. Potential Chinese migrants … contact brokers who may be Thai or Chinese. These brokers use a down payment from the intending migrants to arrange the forging of visas, passports and other travel documentation, and to obtain tickets. Customs, immigration and airline staff in the pay of the brokers ensure that the documentation of the illegal migrants is not thoroughly checked and generally facilitate their movement through the barriers designed to protect against illegal entry. Residences and hotels in Bangkok and outlying areas are used by the brokers as temporary holding areas, where the

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illegal migrants can be safely kept until it is time for them to depart for their destination country. In some instances, legitimate travel documentation may be obtained from corrupt officials. In other cases, illegals may enter Thailand as tourists and then melt into the local community, while coopted immigration officers feed false departure data into computer records.52 It is difficult to assess the full extent of this illegal trade. However, it is believed that the Scafisti will charge up to US$1000 per person merely to ferry undocumented migrants from Albanian ports across the Adriatic to southern Italy – one of the favoured gateways to Western Europe.53 Asians are known to have paid a similar amount to be smuggled from Romania into Germany. 54 The Australian trade in human smuggling is thought to be approximately US$7 billion a year, with illegals paying anything from US$5000 to US$10 000 to be smuggled into the country via transit points in Bangkok, Beirut, Hong Kong, Manila and Guanzhou.55 Estimates for the Chinese trade are just as extensive, running between US$3.5 and US$8 billion a year, 56 with individual charges varying according to destination. Arranging a clandestine passage to Taiwan or Japan, for instance, is believed to cost, on average, US$3000 while journeys to the US could be as expensive as US$40 000.57 Moreover, it is possible to discern what the reality of the illicit trade in human migrants actually entails for its ‘customers’ from a few typical incidents. In 1993, the Golden Venture ran aground off New York, with the loss of eight lives. Subsequent investigations revealed that nearly 300 illegal Chinese immigrants had spent five months on board in execrable conditions. In 1995, the Jung Sheng 8 was intercepted by the US Coast Guard about 800 miles south of Hawaii. Many of the 147 Chinese ‘passengers’ aboard had been beaten and sexually abused, with most also suffering from skin and urinary tract infections caused by dehydration and unsanitary conditions. In yet another case, three passengers aboard the Xing Da described living in the ship’s squalid cargo hold for 54 days, sleeping on straw mats spread out on sand. No bathroom or eating areas were provided, with twice-daily meals consisting of fried rice and dried turnips to be shared by ten people.58 The troubles for illegal migrants are not necessarily over when they arrive in the target country. In the event that outstanding balances cannot be immediately settled, which is generally the case, the ‘client’ is held in a ‘safe house’ (read ‘house arrest’) until final payment is

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made. If relatives (or clients) are late with payments/part payments, interest charges are imposed, which can be as high as 10–20 per cent per week. If the client is unable to fulfil his/her financial obligation, they are either killed or sold into de facto slavery and made to work off the outstanding balance.59 As the Economist observes, traffickers are able to ruthlessly exploit illegal immigrants in this way simply because such people are not able (or at least not likely) to turn to the authorities for redress. In one infamous case reported in 1997, 52 deaf adult Mexicans who had been smuggled into the US were found in two apartments, working in conditions described as virtual slavery; some of them had been held prisoner for as many as five years.60 Persecution Political oppression and persecution remain persistent causes of population movement. Indeed, when governments carry out or condone acts that threaten the physical and emotional well-being of specific segments of society, escape may appear the only available option. 61 Most commonly, persecution is based on religious, ethnic, political or racial intolerance. In extreme cases where this leads to a well-founded fear of imprisonment, torture or even death, persons may try to flee from their habitual country of residence in search of temporary or permanent sanctuary in a neighbouring or distant state. Under international law, those displaced by such circumstances are considered refugees and entitled to the right of asylum and protection from forcible return (principle of non-refoulement) in their chosen state of refuge.62 The vast majority of the world’s refugees originate from the developing world where persecution is often an inevitable by-product of internal war and civil strife. Most refugees also seek shelter in the developing world, lacking the ability to travel to more distant lands. 63 Reflecting this, by the end of 1997 Asia and Africa accounted for a full 69 per cent of the world’s 13.2 million (‘officially’ recognised) refugee population, with the largest influxes during the year occurring in Tanzania (189 000) and Thailand (105 000), followed by Guinea (64 000) and the Congo (59 000). Currently, one in seven of the world’s refugees, some 1.4 million Afghanis and 600 000 Iraqis, are located in one state, Iran.64 Developing countries are particularly ill-equipped to absorb such large numbers as most tend to be characterised by low rates of economic growth, weak or collapsing socio-political and physical infrastructures, chronic internal divisions and rapidly rising populations. As

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Loescher observes, ‘there is no doubt that sudden and large-scale refugee influxes can endanger … stability in countries already suffering from economic underdevelopment, unstable political systems and ethnic or other social cleavages’.65 Not all the world’s political refugees seek shelter in or originate from developing countries, however. Due to improved air transport, a new era of refugee ‘jet people’ has evolved, enabling displaced political aliens to travel direct to industrially advanced states from all quarters of the world.66 The European Union (EU) today is faced with a third world refugee problem of significant proportions and is now the principal region of immigration intake within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) area. The countries most affected by these flows have been Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, France and Sweden, although, as noted above, the vast majority of third world refugees still remain in the developing world itself. Principal source countries include Algeria, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, India (especially Sikhs) Pakistan and Turkey.67 With the end of the Cold War, the EU has also become the target of an unprecedented increase in asylum applications from Eastern and Central Europe. Initially most of these originated with refugee flows from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Applications rose from an average of 30 000 per year in the 1980s to a peak of 680 000 in 1992.68 Since 1993, however, most of those applying for refugee status in Western Europe have been those fleeing the persecution and ethnic and religious cleansing that has accompanied the break-up of the former Yugoslav Federation, particularly the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. It is acknowledged that distinguishing between persecution and other factors stimulating cross-border movement is not always easy. In many cases those persecuted on political, ethnic and religious grounds are also poverty stricken, particularly if they are fleeing general conditions of societal breakdown. Moreover, as the cases of Bosnia, Rwanda and Kosovo all bear witness to, it is often very difficult to distinguish between those attempting to escape generalised violence and those in fear of individual persecution (although policy-makers in many industrialised states are increasingly attempting to do so – see below). It is precisely for these reasons that this chapter has adopted the more inclusive terminology of unregulated population movements, a conceptual approach which aims to encapsulate the combined effects of refugees, displaced persons and unregulated labour migration flows on national and international security.

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Strategic consequences of mass population movements Refugees and displaced populations as a source of inter-state tension and conflict There have been a number of instances where refugee and displaced populations have been used as strategic instruments in the power plays of competing regional states. Typically this has occurred when neighbouring states have employed or even instigated military activity within displaced migrant communities in pursuit of their own national security objectives or regional hegemony.69 For example Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania have all been prepared to use asylum and assistance as a form of surrogate support for armed rebel movements in one another’s states.70 Damascus has used displaced Kurds in Syria as a way of extracting concessions from Turkey over water rights and access to the Euphrates River.71 Shi’ite refugees have been repeatedly employed by both the Beirut and Teheran governments in an attempt to force Israel out of its self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon.72 New Delhi has attempted to fulfil its border demarcation objectives with China by training and arming exiles from Tibet. Pakistan has employed Kashmiri refugees in much the same way against India.73 And Malaysia has often been accused by both the Philippine and Thai governments of deliberately fomenting separatism in Mindanao and Pattani by allowing support and arms to be channelled to displaced Islamic communities in Sabah and Kelantan.74 Hardly surprisingly, such activities have not been particularly conducive to generating harmonious regional relations and have, on occasions, served as a source of international conflict. Indeed, displaced migrant camps and settlements are often the target of military attacks and reprisals precisely because they are believed to ‘house’ refugee warrior communities.75 Israel, for example, has periodically shelled Shi’ite settlements in southern Lebanon on the grounds that they are used by Hizbollah for rest, medical treatment, recruitment as well as staging posts for planning and launching guerrilla attacks against Jewish settlements in the north of the country.76 Border skirmishes in Central Africa’s Great Lakes region have been a frequent occurrence, not least because refugee camps are perceived as providing safe houses for anti-government rebels. The Burmese government has carried out numerous raids against Karen refugee camps located inside Thailand, while Kashmir has been the flash point for three separate wars between Pakistan and India.

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Even if host states do not directly exploit displaced migrant communities for their own strategic purposes, such populations can still act as a source of inter-state tension if they are allowed to otherwise engage in activities that are deemed inimical to the interests of source countries. Displaced migrant and refugee diaspora communities are especially likely to act as a source of indirect inter-state tension when they are permitted to engage in propaganda and finance-related activities that support irredentist, separatist or national liberation movements fighting in their homelands.77 The political and propaganda-related operations of expatriate Tamil communities living in Canada, the UK, Australia, Norway and Switzerland, for instance, have been a significant factor complicating Sri Lanka’s bilateral relations in Western Europe and North America.78 Washington’s willingness to allow (and encourage) internal political representation on behalf of exiles seeking to topple the Castro regime has equally strained US–Cuban relations, greatly compounding what is an already hostile relationship stemming from the latter’s pro-Communist orientation. 79 It should be noted that population movements can also destabilise regional relations if they are used as, or at least deemed to be, a strategic tool of sending states. Refugees can, for example, be exploited as a bargaining chip to extract concessions in international trade and aid negotiations.80 Albania has attempted to use this tactic as a way of brokering increased emergency assistance packages from the EU, as have the successor states of the former Soviet Union.81 In other instances, regional states may believe that mass population movements are deliberately encouraged or permitted as a way of establishing overseas ‘fifth columns’ for espionage and other clandestine activities. Certainly this perceived fear is one of the factors that continues to undermine Sino-Southeast Asian relations in the modern era. Finally, migrant populations can act as a source of inter-state tension when host states attempt to repatriate illegal workers to unreceptive home states. Generally such problems occur in times of major recession when source countries are unwilling to absorb the social and economic costs of reintegrating their nationals back into the workforce. 82 Tensions of this kind have begun to surface in Southeast Asia, particularly since the onset of the Asian currency crisis in mid-1997 – the effects of which fell disproportionately on the two major exporters of regional illegal migration, Indonesia and the Philippines.

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Displaced populations and risks to the integrity of sending and receiving states 1. Risks to sending states Population movements, particularly refugees, can be a source of political embarrassment to sending states, not least because they send powerful symbolic messages regarding political legitimacy. By their very presence, refugees demonstrate fear and loathing of ruling administrations in their homelands, which can, in certain instances, feed into international perceptions of repressive and undemocratic styles of governance.83 Burma, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Angola, Sri Lanka and Sudan are all good examples of states whose international standing has been adversely affected by political refugees fleeing alleged persecution and discrimination. At least with respect to Turkey and Sri Lanka, this has occurred despite the existence of anti-government rebels generally recognised, themselves, as extremist and illegitimate (the PKK and LTTE respectively). Indeed in the case of Turkey, perceived state repression against its indigenous Kurdish population has been of sufficient seriousness to prevent the country’s accession into the EU.84 On a more direct level, refugees can form the basis of extensive overseas diaspora networks that can provide crucial logistical support for indigenous insurgent movements. As noted above, displaced migrant communities often carry out political and other propaganda-related activities in their host states. However, they may also engage in less innocuous actions in support of military-oriented operations against the governments of their countries of origin. As Gabriel Sheffer observes: Diasporas [may] engage in a myriad of activities which may affect the security [and integrity] of those regarded as opponents. [Such communities can be used] to support irredentist, secessionist or national liberation movements. [These] trans-state networks can be used to transfer … resources such as fighters, weapons, military intelligence and money. [Such uses make it an] easier task in launching major … attacks on their host countries.85 Sri Lanka provides a case in point. During 1995, the LTTE has confronted the Colombo government in an escalating insurgent war for control of the Jaffna peninsula as well as the country’s northeastern provinces. The group has had a profound impact on the internal stability of the country, inflicting devastating losses on the armed forces,

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carrying out highly destructive acts of terrorism in the heart of Colombo and generally contributing to the deterioration and militarisation of Sinhalese/Tamil ethnic politics throughout Sri Lanka. One of the main factors sustaining the LTTE’s struggle is the sophisticated international support structure that the group has built up over the last fifteen years, a network that is itself based on the overseas Tamil diaspora that mushroomed following anti-Tamil riots and massacres in 1983. Most analysts concur that without the crucial backing provided by this support structure, there would be virtually no way for the LTTE to continue with its insurgency. 86 In general, it is estimated that as much as 95 per cent of the group’s war budget is currently raised from Tamil donations, remittances and financial transfers made overseas, particularly from expatriate communities in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, Scandinavia and Switzerland.87 If population displacements occur on a mass, sustained scale, they can also serve to threaten the social, economic, political and even sovereign viability of the sending state. Indeed East Germany’s collapse following the dismantling of the Berlin Wall owed itself, in a large respect, to the mass exodus of the country’s workforce to West Germany.88 One state that many commentators are currently keeping a close watch on in this regard is Indonesia. With one of the largest populations in East Asia and in the midst of a major and unprecedented political, economic and ethno-religious crisis, 89 a real danger exists that many will flee the country for the relative stability of neighbouring states. The nightmare scenario is that this will be of ‘East German’ proportions, resulting in a possibly ‘fatal’ internal rupturing of the entire Indonesian republic. Such an event occurring would have profound ramifications, not only for Southeast Asia but also the wider Asia-Pacific as a whole. 2. Risks to receiving states Migrant and refugee movements also carry significant ramifications for the security of receiving countries. Sudden population influxes can, for instance, inhibit the integrationist effectiveness of host states by over-burdening existing socio-economic infrastructures. This may, in turn, encourage established diaspora and expatriate communities to confront governments over issues pertaining to real or perceived deprivation in areas such as unemployment, small businesses, housing, education and other welfare services. 90 Periodic clashes and localised protests/riots staged by Muslims in France, Turks in Germany and Gypsies in Romania are all indicative of residual

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tensions of this sort that have taken place in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On a more direct level, migrant communities can play an important role in encouraging organised criminal activity in their adopted societies. Canada has emerged as a prominent hub in the Asian underground banking system – a highly secretive network that is used extensively for money laundering – largely due to influxes of political refugees and asylum seekers over the last decade. In Germany, Poles and Chinese have jointly carved up the illegal market in Hamburg while Russian, Chechen, Azeri, Tajik and Armenian groups have increasingly come to dominate the underworld in an arc that stretches from the UK to Uzbekistan. Equally, many of the most lucrative heroin trafficking routes from Afghanistan are run by Kurds operating out of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. 91 These same ethnic groups have established links with co-patriots overseas, creating a transnational web of such proportions that any question of a purely unilateral state response is largely ruled out. Migrants and refugees can also pose significant risks in terms of political extremism and terrorism. Should a host country adopt a policy position that is deemed at odds with a particular irredentist or separatist agenda, a sympathetic diaspora may consider taking action of some sort. Certainly the potential threat of reprisal attacks from the 600 000 Kurds living in Germany was instrumental in influencing Bonn’s decision to refuse Italy’s 1998 request for a trial of Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, to take place on its soil. 92 Moreover, as the Canadian Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence observes, large-scale migration can provide the stream in which a few terrorists could ultimately gain entry into a particular state to organise acts of violence, either internally or against other countries.93 Of particular concern to Ottawa have been the activities of Sikh and Tamil extremists, many of whom have managed to gain entry to the country by claiming refugee status. Two particularly serious acts of violence that these expatriate communities have been implicated in include: • The 1985 mid-air destruction of an Air India Boeing 747 en route from Canada to the UK. It is widely believed by Western security services that Sikh militants resident in Vancouver carried out the bombing, partly to avenge the Indian army’s 1984 storming of the Golden Temple – Sikhism’s holiest shrine.94 • The 1996 suicide bombing of the Central Bank building in Colombo, a devastating attack of terrorism that left 91 people dead

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and over 1400 injured. Sri Lankan and Canadian intelligence sources now believe that the money used to purchase the explosives was raised by LTTE front organisations in Toronto.95 As Bauer observes with regard to Canadian national integrity: When terrorists who have obtained Canadian citizenship tithe their ethnic communities and extort a large proportion of the welfare payments to provide arms for killing and maiming in their countries of origin, Canada is complicit in their crimes. When terrorists based in Canada place bombs on airlines and murder hundreds of their former countrymen, Canada must share responsibility … Large scale evasion of normal immigration procedures by … fraudulent refugee claimants has serious implications for Canadian society. Genuine refugees and legitimate immigrants pay a price in delay or even refusal. Canadian security is threatened when terrorists to whom we have given sanctuary use [the country] as a base for carrying on their killings here and in their own countries … Canadian law is looked upon with contempt by those who so easily achieve … citizenship by fraud and deceit and by the failure of governments to apply their law fairly, effectively, and consistently.96 Finally, mass population movements can pose an indirect threat to receiving states by encouraging the growth of violent xenophobic sentiments. Such attitudes generally stem from the perceived effect that influxes of migrants and refugees are seen to have on underlying social, economic and cultural stability. In many cases, ‘arrivals’ are viewed as direct competitors for local resources and as a force liable to drive down wages, create unemployment and increase the cost of housing and other goods. In other instances, the attempts of migrants to preserve their own cultural heritage are vehemently rejected on the grounds that they represent a direct challenge to the underlying identity of the receiving state.97 Whilst such sentiments have mostly been reflected by electoral shifts to mainstream right-wing political parties, 98 they have also fed into a growing sub-culture of support for far more extreme, militant antiimmigrant organisations, particularly in the developed West. These hate groups typically demonise migrants as a deviant and threatening force, justifying the use of violence and terror against foreigners in the name of upholding the status quo and defending the national interest.

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Prominent examples include: l’Assaut in Belgium; the People’s Extra Parliamentary Opposition in Austria; Troisième Voie in France; Golden Dawn in Greece; C18 in the UK; and the ANM in the US.99All of these groups have engaged in organised and sporadic acts of racist violence in response to migrant influxes over the past few years. As Wilkinson points out, it is no longer possible to assess the danger from the far right purely in electoral terms. The xenophobic extremist groups of today pose as much a threat to democratic society as the radical leftwing organisations of the 1970s and 1980s.100 The most severely affected state in terms of xenophobic violence, however, has unquestionably been Germany. Given the obvious historical parallels, it is also within this country that the rise of rightwing extremism is causing the most concern. Of all West European states, it is Germany that has had to shoulder the vast majority of refugee immigration from the third world and Eastern Europe – essentially a legacy of the country’s post-war and, until 1993, constitutional readiness to grant automatic sanctuary to any fleeing political persecution.101 In 1991, Germany received 256 100 requests for asylum (up from 120 000 applications the previous year). The number rose dramatically to 440 000 in 1992, with a further 100 000 entering the country during the first five months of 1993 in search of refuge. 102 Although Germany has exhibited increasing sentiments of compassion fatigue since mid-1993 – reflected best by constitutional changes to its asylum laws103 – the country continues to play host to more refugees than any other state in the EU, accounting for approximately 41 per cent of all asylum applications made in the EU. 104 According to the UNHCR, there were 1.3 million refugees in Germany in 1998 (including 140 000 Albanians displaced from Kosovo) which equates to about 10 per cent of the global total.105 Reactions to these influxes have been marked by increasing xenophobic intolerance and violence, particularly in the less affluent eastern states. According to the German Internal Security Agency, the Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutzamt (BfV), there were over 7000 racistrelated offences in the country during 1996, including murders, attempted murders and arson attacks. 106 In one particularly brutal assault, several petrol bombs were hurled into an immigrant hostel, setting off a fire that eventually led to the death of ten people. The attack was the deadliest act of anti-foreigner violence to take place on German soil since the Second World War.107 Overall, the BfV estimates that the ranks of right-wing extremists in the country grew by 7 per cent in 1998 to 48 400. Of these, roughly 7600 are hard-core activists

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that are known to have been stockpiling weapons and who are deemed capable of violence and terrorism.108 In the 1990s, population flows have emerged as an increasingly real challenge to both international and domestic stability. For a variety of complex and inter-related reasons, people are abandoning their homes for new destinations on an unprecedented scale, both in terms of absolute numbers and as a percentage of population. While traditional stimuli such as war, persecution and intolerance continue to galvanise individuals and communities to flight, they have been compounded and complicated by other factors such as the spread of disease and environmental degradation. These influxes have impacted on interstate relations as well as imposed significant costs on both sending and receiving countries. It is clear that population movements, along with terrorism, drug trafficking, piracy, environmental degradation and the spread of disease, do not readily ‘fit’ with the realpolitik paradigm and its emphasis on the military dimension of security. However, as the last six chapters have argued, these various forces and influences all retain a capacity to undermine national and international stability in a manner that is no less fundamental than the challenge posed by threats of a more traditional military nature. As the global states system moves into a new millennium in which such phenomena look set to prosper and proliferate, it is vital that policy-makers recognise this reality and incorporate it into their operational doctrine. It is to this latter issue that the Conclusion finally turns.

Conclusion: Policy Prescriptions for a Brave New World

If the various threats and influences outlined in the previous six chapters are taken seriously, then it is evident that notions of national and international security will have to be reformulated and extended beyond the strictures of conventional political thinking. As noted in the Introduction, traditional spatial conceptions of security – defined in terms of territorial sovereignty and a clear internal/external, military/non military ‘division of labour’ – simply do not work in response to the GAP challenges of today. Threats are often internal but typically have external ramifications. They tend to cross military, law and order and civilian jurisdictions and, in many cases, have debilitating effects that directly feed off one another. Heroin and cocaine syndicates, for instance, have become progressively terroristic in nature as Colombia, Russia and Italy all bear witness to while groups such as the PKK and LTTE have been prepared to finance their activities through the narcotics trade. Small weapons proliferation has impacted on the lethality of terrorists, pirates and drug traffickers, dramatically altering internal balances of power that have, for so long, defined the critical relationship between state and non-state actors. Global warming and deforestation have resulted in changing weather patterns which have, in turn, caused natural disasters and associated outbreaks of disease and population displacements. Refugee and migrant movements have caused backlashes in terms of xenophobic extremism, while unscrupulous crime groups have been prepared to profit off the trade in human beings. Increased heroin use has directly contributed to the spread of AIDS, while piracy continues to carry extremely significant consequences for global and regional economic and environmental security. Terrorism has led to mass population movements in chronically affected states such as Algeria, 135

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Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka and could yet come to involve an Armageddon act of mass biological contamination. Responding to such a milieu will require responses that are equally as complex and multi-dimensional. Such a state of affairs will only be achieved through innovative thinking at the level of national planning and organisation combined with an increased commitment to real, integrated co-operative action at the international level.

National planning Creation of integrated crisis management centres (CMCs) One of the prime requirements at the level of national planning is the need for effective crisis management centres (CMCs) that are able to bring military, law enforcement, public and health authorities under one overarching framework as and when required. Grey area issues such as drugs, terrorism and disease distort traditional distinctions between the military/non-military, internal/external dimensions of security. They therefore require counter-measures that integrate the expertise and skills culled from a range of security forces, non-governmental organisations, as well as relevant representatives from business, industry and the academic world. 1 If contemporary GAP influences are to be effectively challenged, it is vital that policy-makers fully appreciate the nature of the specific threat with which they are faced and the context within which it operates. CMCs are vital to this process of understanding, providing a centralised mechanism through which a particular threat can be assessed and the parameters and requirements of a response set. In short, they play a critical role in helping to develop common agreement on the ends, ways and means of resolving a given crisis. Operationally this is extremely important. Planning of this sort will enable states to develop and store information, which can be brought immediately to bear when a crisis occurs. Any institutional gaps that might be apparent will be highlighted (and dealt with). And all participants dealing with a disaster will have a clear picture of what other response teams are doing and plan to do, thereby avoiding confusion, competition and duplication of effort.2 Once CMCs are established they should not only be maintained but also continually refined and adapted. This will ensure against bureaucratic lethargy and redundancy. In addition, it will allow CMCs to act as effective early warning systems, giving states a proactive capacity to

Conclusion 137

anticipate and contain threats before they reach the point of severe societal disruption. In this way, governments would be able to level the operational ‘playing field’ and avoid costly, purely reactive responses. One of the reasons why environmental degradation has reached the proportions it has, for instance, is because states have not been able (or willing) to develop contingency plans to deal with future possible occurrences and crises.3 One of the biggest obstacles to establishing comprehensive CMCs arises from the bureaucratic competition and jurisdictional jealousy that afflicts many of the world’s security establishments. This division has served to obstruct seriously and, at times, paralyse national response strategies, with military and law enforcement agencies at best failing to communicate with one another, at worst actively engaging in all out ‘turf wars’.4 Further aggravating the situation is the fact that civilian and military aspects of most national response strategies tend to be planned in isolation from one another. Invariably the former is left behind (or deliberately ignored) as a result of the latter failing to recognise that it is part of a larger, holistic pattern of events. The inevitable consequence of these various operational disequilibria has been the manifestation of policy decisions that are erratic, discontinuous and generally characterised by a pervasive ‘quality’ of inertia.5 Policy-makers and analysts in certain parts of the world have, to a certain extent, begun to recognise the magnitude of responding to GAP influences. In the US, for instance, General George Joulwan, the former Commander-in-Chief of the US Southern Command, has been instrumental in the development of a so-called Counterdrug Modelling and Simulation System (CMASS). CMASS utilises computer programs to simulate the way drug traffickers, terrorists and other insurgents operate. The system provides possible responses to a ‘pro-US’ side that includes representatives from the National Security Agency, the DEA, the Defense Department, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the State Department and the National Security Council. According to intelligence sources in Washington, CMASS ‘games’ have provided numerous ideas on how best to deal with given situations and emergencies and they predict they will come into wider use by security planning officials over the next few years.6 Even in the US, however, national crisis planning continues to be viewed through heavily tinted traditionalist ‘glasses’. In particular, it retains very much a militaristic focus that often fails to appreciate the relative importance of non-violent GAP influences such as disease and environmental degradation. Moreover, in most cases the role of

138 Non-Military Security and Global Order

civilian agencies in dealing with phenomena that do have a violent dimension is neither fully appreciated nor drawn upon. The bureaucratic and institutional make-up of CMASS readily reflects this reality as does Washington’s continued preference for allowing the military to take the lead role in dealing with such influences as drugs and trafficking. If the US is to develop future GAP response strategies that are to be genuinely effective, it is vital that these preconceptions and phobias are both recognised and dealt with. Centralised and appropriate intelligence If CMCs are to function effectively, they need to have at their disposal accurate, up to date and relevant information. If this is to proceed efficiently, a centralised and integrated intelligence function has to be in place that is able to collate, analyse and disseminate appropriate data for both strategic and tactical analysis. In developing such structures, two main obstacles stand out, both of which are reflective of the same sorts of problems outlined above. First, is the issue of integrating the work of the various agencies that states typically employ to gather intelligence information. Second, is the question of having these bodies operate in terms that go beyond the narrow strictures of traditional security thinking. Most states rely on three types of security intelligence: national, military and police. The agencies involved in each of these areas tend to exist as separate entities, usually for different purposes and with their own specific objectives, training and modus operandi. National intelligence is generally outward-looking, concentrating on broad strategic trends and patterns. Military intelligence focuses on up-to-the-minute tactical information that is primarily intended to give a clear picture of enemy operations and orders of battle. Finally police intelligence tends to involve the gathering of criminal information to define a particular operational environment and/or bring a conviction in a court of law.7 Clearly strategic, tactical and operational intelligence all have a role to play in national state GAP responses. Strategic information will help strategy planners to contextualise grey area phenomena within a larger, overall picture, providing a means to forecast future developments and priorities. Tactical and environmental information will facilitate efforts aimed at establishing profiles of particular GAP influences and, at least in the case of non-state threats, distinguishing between enemies of the state and the population at large. The problem is that bureaucratic competition and institutional rivalry frequently exist between intelligence agencies, serving to inhibit effective

Conclusion 139

co-ordination. The best way to counter this is through the creation of a centralised information ‘clearing house,’ which links all intelligence agencies to one, nationally based system. In a few states, mechanisms are already in place that could conceivably fulfil this integrative function. In Canada, a Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System (ViCLAS) has been set up by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which links all major police forces in the country. It is designed to disseminate profiles of crimes and criminals in order to assist in linking offences committed in different police jurisdictions.8 A similar system, known as the National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS), exists in the UK. Set up in 1992, this system provides centralised intelligence on serious crime and its perpetrators to all police forces throughout the UK’s nine regional crime squads. The NCIS itself gathers intelligence from local police forces, liaison officers stationed abroad as well as from disclosures made under the Drug Trafficking Offences, Criminal Justice and Prevention of Terrorism Acts.9 Presently, both ViCLAS and NCIS are confined to the co-ordination of police intelligence only. However, there is no reason why a strategic and tactical dimension could not also be added by allowing national and military intelligence agencies to both access and contribute to the systems. The Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence in Canada has already made recommendations in this regard, advising in its 1999 report that the CSIS be given access to ViCLAS.10 Moves in this direction should be encouraged and further fostered. It is no use having integrated CMCs in place if there is no parallel structure to coordinate and integrate the environmental, tactical and strategic information that is so important to a full understanding of contemporary GAP influences. This consideration leads to the second and, arguably, more problematic obstacle in setting up centralised intelligence systems: the need to involve agencies in activities that go beyond the traditional ambit of national security. Traditionally, national security has focused on threats that challenge either the territorial integrity or national institutions of a particular state. For the most part, these have been defined as either internal dangers emanating from subversives, or externally based acts of aggression originating with other states.11 The purpose of intelligence agencies is to provide information to help the state protect itself against such threats. As this book has argued, thinking along such an internal/external dichotomy does not equate well to the contemporary challenge posed by GAP influences. Not only do many of these threats blur the internal/external dimension of security; a number also

140 Non-Military Security and Global Order

involve influences that have never been considered part of the legitimate ambit of national intelligence agencies. In today’s world, information is needed on threats that are neither clearly internal nor external; that manifest themselves in both a conscious/violent and unconscious/non-violent manner; and which can involve specific nonstate actors as well as amorphous non-governmental processes. This has significant implications for security, requiring a drastic reformulation of how it is defined and exactly what needs to be secured in the pursuit of ‘national security’.12 As the Introduction argued, security in the modern world has become increasingly multi-dimensional and uncertain, with commitments and values in many ways anchored in a more specific human dimension. Security is defined as more than simply the absence of a military threat, depending, rather, on the existence of a fully functioning and stable civil society.13 If intelligence agencies are to contribute to such a state of affairs, they need to think of threats as being neither internal nor external but transnational in nature (such as terrorism and organised crime). Moreover, they need to be involved in activities that go beyond the ambit of traditional security concerns, embracing such influences as mass migration, environmental disruption and infectious diseases.14 All of this will require substantial institutional reform on the part of intelligence and security services. Agencies will need to incorporate a strategic and tactical outlook that no longer stresses an internal/external division of labour. They will need to draw on a wider, genuinely multi-disciplinary information and expertise base. And they will have to become familiar with new ways of gathering, handling and analysing data and intelligence. As Allan Goodman observes: Most threats are more subtle today than they were in the Cold War when the projection of communist power in virtually any location and in any form was a matter of grave strategic concern. Increasingly, threats with which the intelligence community is involved in monitoring stem from the actions of groups and forces that are identified with no particular state and promise to be even more transnational in character tomorrow … Improved performance [against such dangers] will have to come from a deeper understanding of the process by which intelligence is collected, analysed, and used, as well as the nature and dynamics of the emerging structure of world politics. This will involve intensive lesson-learning … [designed to develop] different methods and new paradigms for analysis.15

Conclusion 141

Is it realistic to expect intelligence agencies to adapt their operational procedures to such an extent? Maybe, maybe not. However as Dalby points out, what better social agency is there for long-term thinking about threats to society, if not a security and intelligence service? While the institutional reform noted above might be an operational anathema to vintage Cold War security agencies, it is absolutely essential if intelligence services are to play a meaningful role in actualising policy responses to the GAP challenges of the contemporary world.16 Building and consolidating credibility and public trust The final requirement at the level of national planning is the need for credibility and public trust. This is especially important given the need for intelligence and crisis management co-ordination and integration outlined above. Particularly in liberal democratic states, which tend to stress restricted and limited forms of governance, overly centralised security apparatuses are liable to raise visions of unacceptable Orwellian state control.17 If such perceptions are to be avoided, it is essential that the general populace believe from the outset that any internal security actions being initiated are both necessary and likely to be effective in producing results. The best way to achieve this is by ensuring that clear lines of communication are maintained between the state and population at large. A lack of public debate will not only promote the idea that governments are trying to hide something that will not be particularly popular with the electorate; it will also make it extremely difficult for political leaders to show that their actions are required and in the people’s best interest. Indeed, the more decisions are made behind ‘closed doors’, the more one can expect to see a gradual decline in the public’s confidence and trust in what the government is actually doing.18 Irrespective of how great the need is for the GAP national response measures outlined above, they will ultimately not succeed if they do not have the support of the general population. In 1993, for instance, it was discovered that Swiss authorities were planning to create a centralised database, known as AUPER2, to register all foreigners, refugees and asylum seekers arriving in the country. The system was intended to facilitate the fight against fraud and illegal immigration, particularly by extremists and other criminals. However, no public information had been given to explain why the system was being created or what mechanisms were in place to protect the rights of those included on its database. The result was a public rejection of AUPER2, with the Kommittee Schlus mit dem Schuffelstaat, a prominent

142 Non-Military Security and Global Order

Swiss pressure group, slamming the initiative on the grounds that it had no legitimate purpose and had been developed merely to enhance police powers of surveillance over immigrants.19 A fundamental aspect of the state’s national planning process must, therefore, involve an active ‘legitimising’ campaign, which is sensitive to public concerns over potential civil liberties infringements and restrictions, particularly with respect to intelligence and surveillance. The electorate’s interests should be discerned and responded to early on and, thereafter, continually gauged and monitored. Moreover, the invocation, use and continuance of all strategic and operational measures should be made subject to constant parliamentary supervision and independent judicial oversight. Indeed, in order to strike a balanced response that is not perceived as unduly restrictive or abusive of individual rights and freedoms, it is absolutely essential that the state is held publicly accountable for its actions and that adequate mechanisms exist for the redress of grievance. Response measures should therefore be formulated according to clear, precise and consistent rules so that all concerned can make an adequate assessment of their respective powers, duties and obligations.20 The following comments by Hoffman, made here in the specific context of counter-terrorism, apply just as well to response imperatives in the more generalised GAP field: Building solid relations with the public is one of the keys to a successful counter-terrorist campaign … [G]ood relations give the authorities a margin for error that can buy critical time. Public relations thus become a serious battleground. Governments must take the struggle for public sympathy and support as seriously as any other. Measures [initiated in this regard] should begin early in the campaign and be continued without respite.21

International co-operation International regulatory regimes and an international criminal court (ICC) Given their transnational nature, purely nationally based responses will be insufficient to counter GAP threats. States must also be prepared to undertake concerted action at the international level. In particular, political leaderships must be prepared to mobilise resources and develop strategies in unison with other states, which attack, disable or at least contain the vital pressure points that serve to sustain destabil-

Conclusion 143

ising grey area influences and processes.22 The best way to achieve this would be through the creation of formal international regulatory regimes designed to counter and control specific threats such as piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking and environmental degradation. Although there is no universal consensus over what exactly constitutes a regime, Stephen Krasner’s definition has endured as the standard reference. According to Krasner, regimes are ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge’.23 Prohibition regimes are generally used to connote formalised and long-term institutional arrangements that are designed to monitor, control and, ultimately, eliminate dangers that are recognised as threatening to the stability and viability of their member states. Such a form of co-operation suggests a higher degree of inter-state co-ordination than that found in most international agreements and conventions, the majority of which tend to be reactive and limited in scope. On a broad level, it is possible to identify at least six benefits that this type of security collaboration would yield. • First, it would help to improve the quality and dissemination of information relating to GAP issues areas, thereby assisting states in understanding their bases for accord. • Second, it would help to reduce the ‘transaction costs’ of collaborative action through the convening of multilateral meetings and allowing for the creation of accepted frameworks within which to negotiate agreements. • Third, it would help to facilitate agreements by making it easier to negotiate trade-offs among competing security-issue areas. • Fourth, it would help to assist with the enforcement of accords by promoting the transparency of policies, increasing the importance of reputations with regard to upholding international commitments and legitimising the imposition of sanctions against transgressors. • Fifth, it has the potential to alter the priority that states attach to their basic values, particularly in the sense of changing conceptions of instrumental self-interest from competitively to mutually reciprocated based behaviour. • Finally, it would provide a patchwork of clearly defined international interdependencies through which to co-ordinate and integrate responses to GAP threats in general (particularly important given the interconnection that exists between such dangers as environmental degradation, disease spread, terrorism and drugs).24

144 Non-Military Security and Global Order

In more specific terms, regulatory regimes would provide states with a single normative framework against which to draft, implement and refine (as and when necessary) international agreements designed to promote collective resilience against GAP threats. This would not only greatly facilitate the process of proactive long-term planning; it would also help with the development of comprehensive, institutionalised and codified forms of international co-operation and governance. As Ethan Nadelmann observes: International prohibition regimes … provide an element of standardisation to cooperation among governments that have few other law enforcement concerns in common. And they create an expectation of cooperation that governments challenge only at the cost of some international embarrassment. In these respects, international prohibition regimes amount to more than the sum of the unilateral acts, bilateral relationships and international conventions that constitute them.25 The creation of an ICC to deal with violent GAP influences, such as terrorism, piracy and narcotics trafficking, would also be a useful addition. There have been a number of proposals by non-governmental organisations and academics specifying the possible structure of such a body. Most envisage the establishment of a multilateral tribunal that has jurisdiction over a lengthy list of international crimes and which operates in conjunction with an elaborate subsidiary court structure including a procurator, public defender, commission of inquiry, prosecutor, board of clemency and parole and, possibly, even a jail.26 The major advantage of an ICC is that it would reduce the necessity of states having to confront major GAP actors unilaterally, assisted only by their own internal criminal justice resources. This is an especially important consideration in relation to countries such as Colombia, Mexico, Italy, Russia and Cambodia where weak judicial and law enforcement structures have become particularly vulnerable to bribes, extortion and other forms of violent intimidation. Moreover, an international court would obviate common problems associated with extradition. These typically include obstacles raised by the existence of divergent national legislative standards and codes as well as general concerns over political persecution and judicial fairness in requesting states.27

Conclusion 145

International co-operation and state sovereignty Both regulatory regimes and the idea of an international criminal court obviously confront and challenge the key issue of sovereignty that underscores the present states system. Certainly one of the major difficulties with realising the type of integrated and rationalised co-operation suggested here is the unwillingness of states to enter into formal arrangements that serve to significantly reduce their freedom of action and political autonomy in international life. Those limited international measures that have been instituted to deal with GAP-like issues readily reflect this reality. For instance a number of international conventions and agreements have been enacted against drug trafficking, terrorism, piracy and environmental degradation (see Appendix 2). However, these measures tend to be minimalist in nature, addressing only certain aspects of the problems they have been enacted to counter and, even then, have been neither ratified nor vigorously implemented. Many also suffer from serious legal loopholes. The major conventions dealing with terrorism exclude offences that are carried out for political purposes. The agreements against piracy restrict their ambit to acts carried out on the high seas only. And the 1997 Kyoto Framework Convention on Climate Change allows, or at least does not prevent, states from reneging on their commitments to reduce carbon dioxide emission through the practice of ‘carbon trading’.28 Equally, although the UN agreed to set up a permanent ICC in 1998, the proposed structure will be both limited and lacking in independence. The mandate of the tribunal has been restricted to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and will almost certainly be subject to the power of veto, particularly from the permanent members of the Security Council.29 Even the measures agreed to by the EU through the so-called Maastricht ‘third pillar’, which collectively represent by far the most concerted inter-state action that has yet been undertaken to deal with GAP-like issues, have been subject to difficulties arising out of a concern for national sovereignty. Terrorism, for instance, largely continues to be subject to national provisions, with key EU states such as the UK, Ireland, France and Spain opposed to sharing information in centralised bodies such as Europol. Moreover, many of the Conventions critical to the third pillar structure have been neither ratified nor implemented, with most not expected to come ‘on line’ until at least 2003 (see Appendix 3). The relatively hesitant acceptance of a more integrated and coordinated approach to security planning stems from the familiarity

146 Non-Military Security and Global Order

that most states feel towards bilateral co-operation and gradually strengthening modalities through piecemeal negotiation only. The efforts of those who have attempted to spur a more multilateral approach have been repeatedly frustrated due to the perception that national sovereignty might thereby be potentially limited.30 However, if the challenges of the new century are to be effectively countered, it is vital that these near-sighted and inward-looking sentiments are overcome. As Bassiouni observes, concerns and an overriding preoccupation with state sovereignty have resulted in reactive, partial and ad hoc international responses that, as yet, lack any real degree of proactive, long-term planning.31 Such a state of affairs is completely at odds with the complex and interdependent reality of GAP – forces and influences that neither recognise nor respect formal frontiers and borders. International efforts aimed at enhancing co-operation against GAP threats would undoubtedly benefit from acceptance of two fundamental principles. First, is the recognition that the security threats of the contemporary era are not ones that can be adequately dealt with on a purely unilateral or even bilateral basis. Second, is the acceptance that security itself increasingly embraces issues and influences that fall outside the traditional paradigm of militaristic, state-oriented threat perceptions. International epistemic communities, networks of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain, have an especially important part to play in this endeavour. The importance of these groups lies in their ability to shed light on the nature and interlinkages between issue areas and on the potential chain of events that might proceed either from the failure to take action or from instituting a certain policy.32 The potential impact epistemic communities can have with respect to encouraging states to enact formalised modes of inter-state coordination is well exemplified by the EU and its third pillar of judicial and home affairs co-operation. Although this particular structure remains far from perfect (see above), it still represents the most ambitious attempt that has yet been made to establish an effective system of regional preventive co-operation against GAP issues and influences. Much of the substance of the third pillar reflects the recommendations of academic experts, security specialists and professional analysts concerned with how the evolving geo-strategic landscape of the post-Cold War era was likely to impact on the stability of EU member-states, particularly in the context of a frontier-free Europe. 33 Similar networks of professionals exist in other parts of the world, which could (and

Conclusion 147

should) be brought equally to bear on facilitating coalition-building processes among like-minded states. The US also has an important role to play in facilitating international co-operation. Although Washington is losing its relatively predominant position in world affairs, it undoubtedly retains enormous influence in promoting multilateralism, both regionally and internationally. Prohibition regimes and institutions such as an ICC would undoubtedly benefit from an unqualified commitment on the part of the US to enjoin its (still considerable) resources with those of other states pursuing similar objectives.34 The White House has repeatedly expressed its support for more effective, international action against issues such as environmental degradation, AIDS, transnational organised crime and terrorism, with the country’s 1994–99 Defence Planning Guidance Plan specifically emphasising ‘sustained cooperation among democratic powers’. 35 It is vital that this rhetoric and diplomatic language is matched by concrete policy pledges and action that do not succumb to the same fiscal isolationist tendencies that have so severely impacted on other areas of post-Cold War security multilateralism, such as UN peace-keeping operations.36 One obvious obstacle that the US faces in adopting such a leadership role is the American public. It has been suggested that the electorate at large would be unlikely to support an agenda of this type given the costs involved and the fact that domestic priorities are in competition for the same dollars. Such a contention, however, is, as yet, largely unproved, with certain polls actually showing considerable support for US involvement in world affairs.37 Moreover, the expense of sustaining US leadership against GAP influences should not be overstated. Defence spending as a proportion of GNP, approximately running at 4 per cent, is lighter than at any time since before the Korean War and will shrink further as the country’s economy expands. Finally, global leadership and the establishment of a peaceful and stable world fits well with American idealism, seen by many as a key defining attribute of the modern US state and its citizens.38 An overall assessment of the international system’s future security prospects must, in the final analysis, remain a matter of speculation. However, as this book has argued, seeds of instability have very definitely been sown in the guise of an extended security agenda that now incorporates issues as diverse as terrorism, piracy, refugee movements and disease. It is clear that, at present, both national and international preparedness against these and other GAP threats remains inadequate. At the national level, a more holistic and integrated

148 Non-Military Security and Global Order

approach to security planning needs to be enacted, legitimated through active and open interaction with the population at large. At the international level, more attention needs to be devoted to further developing and rationalising existing forms of collaboration, particularly with respect to creating formalised strategic networks and mechanisms that are able to genuinely regularise and control destabilising transnational phenomena and influences. All of this requires political will and active state input. The crucial issue thus revolves around whether national and international political leaderships are prepared to adapt to the demands and challenges of their post-Cold War security environment. It is still too early for a definitive answer to be given to this central question. What is clear, however, is that in the absence of a firm commitment to develop more effective means to deal with the various threats outlined in this book, history will likely record the end of the Cold War as an episode that created far more problems than it actually solved.

Appendix 1: Statistical Tables Table A1 International and Domestic Terrorist Incidents, 1968–88 1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

00

293

278

206

311

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

388

572

727

1257

1511

2585

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

2773

2701

2492

2838

3525

3010

1986

1987

1988

2860

3089

3734

00

Total for period 1968–88: 35 150 Average annual incident rate in the 1970s: 812.8 Average annual incident rate in the 1980s: 3002.7 Source: Risks International Inc., cited in Alex Jongman, ‘Trends in International Terrorism and Domestic Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968–88’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 4/4 (1992): 33.

Table A2 International and Domestic Terrorist Incidents by Geographic Location, 1989–96 Location

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Nth America Latin America Europe M/East, Nth Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Asia TOTAL

04 1427 446 537 450 1105 3969

01 2126 844 645 287 964 4867

10 1545 988 1270 590 1001 5404

35 1087 769 1281 722 1060 4954

29 702 774 1094 532 699 3830

51 527 486 626 261 2112 4063

32 805 710 406 210 1475 3638

Source: Pinkerton’s Risk Assessment Services (PRAS), Terrorism 1989–1996 (Washington D.C.: 1997).

149

150 Appendix 1 Table A3 1990–96

Casualties Caused by International and Domestic Terrorism,

Year

Numbers Killed

Numbers Injured

Total Casualties

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

7245 8659 10 069 10 526 8685 6613 7273

6093 7707 11 034 12 176 7629 14 535a 10 659

13 338 16 366 21 103 22 702 16 314 21 148 17 932

Source: PRAS, Terrorism, 1990–1996. These figures can be compared with those recorded for the period 1970–83: Total numbers killed: 28 110 Total numbers injured: 18 925 Total casualties: 47 035 a Includes 5500 hospitalised in the Tokyo Sarin nerve gas attack carried out by the Aum Shinriyko Supreme Truth Cult.

Table A4

Costs of Fighting Drug Abuse in the US, 1997–98

Drug Function

FY97

FY98

Law Enforcement Treatment Prevention International Interdiction Research/Intelligence TOTAL

$7835 $2808 $1648 $450 $1638 $723 $15 102

$8126 $3003 $1916 $487 $1609 $831 $15 972

Source: US Electronic Information Agency.

Appendix 1 151 Table A5

Pirate Attacks by Geographic Location, 1991–98

Location

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

S.E. Asia Far East South/Central Asia Americas Africa Rest of World Location Unknown TOTAL

102 – – – – – 5 107

69 1 5 – – – 31 106

75 10 3 5 8 – 2 103

62 8 3 11 6 – – 90

116 2 24 21 21 4 – 188

139 2 26 31 26 4 – 228

108 3 40 36 46 14 – 247

95 3 22 31 38 3 – 192

Source: IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report (London: ICC, January 1999): 3.

Table A6

Violence Committed to Crew During Pirate Attacks, 1991–98

Types of Violence

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Crew taken hostage Crew threatened Crew assaulted No. of crew injured No. of crew killed Not stated TOTAL

33 3 2 4 – 1 43

18 9 12 16 3 4 62

6 1 4 3 – – 14

11 8 – 10 – – 29

320 59 2 3 26 – 420

193 56 9 9 26 – 290

419 119 23 31 51 – 643

238 67 60 35 67 – 467

Source: IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report: 6.

Appendix 2: Major International Conventions against Terrorism, Illicit Drugs Production and Trafficking, Piracy and Environmental Degradation

Terrorism • The Tokyo Convention (1963), the Hague Convention (1970) and the Montreal Convention (1973). These are aimed at countering aviation hijacking and sabotage. • The Hostages Convention (1970). This aims to counter hostage-taking. • The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Convention and Protocol (1988). Together, these aim to counter terrorism against maritime shipping and fixed platforms at sea, such as oil rigs. • The Convention on Protected Persons (1973). This aims to counter attacks on internationally protected persons, including diplomats. Crimes covered under the Convention include murder, kidnapping and deliberate assault. • The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST) (1977). This imposes obligations on contracting states to extradite all fugitives who have committed offences covered by Article 1 of the Convention, or, failing that, to submit them to stand trial in their own courts – the principle of ‘aut dedere aut judicare’ (extradite or try). These offences include: (a) Those within the scope of the Tokyo, Hague, Montreal, Hostage and Protected Persons Conventions. (b) Those which involve the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter/parcel explosive if such use endangers the lives of civilians and non-combatants. (c) All attempts to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence. All of the above conventions exclude offences that are carried out for political purposes, which all terrorist offences, by definition, are. Such a caveat exists largely because of the general sensitivity in the international community to the dangers inherent in political persecution.

Illicit drugs production and trafficking • The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961). This aims to control the provision of supplies of narcotic drugs for medical and scientific purposes and to 152

Appendix 2 153 prevent their diversion into the illicit market. The 1972 Protocol to the Convention calls for increased efforts to prevent illicit production of, traffic in, and use of narcotics. • The Convention of Psychotropic Substances (1971). This extends the provisions of the 1961 Convention to include synthetic drugs, covering hallucinogens (such as LCD), stimulants (such as amphetamines and barbiturates), euphorics (such as ecstasy and prozac), hypnotics, sedatives and anxiolytics. • The Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). This intensifies efforts against the illicit production and manufacture of narcotic and psychotropic substances by calling for strict monitoring of the chemicals often used in their production. It also aims to provide for strengthened mechanisms for extradition, mutual legal assistance, the transfer of criminal proceedings and tracing, freezing and confiscating the proceeds of crime.

Piracy Two major international conventions have been adopted against piracy: The Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958) and The UN Law of the Sea Convention (1982). Both conventions make direct references to piracy in their respective provisions, defined as attacks that take place on the high seas, and each specifically obliges signatories to take concerted action to combat this form of maritime violence.

Environmental degradation • The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) and The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Together, these agreements provide for a 50 per cent reduction in CFC use by the year 2000. An amendment to the 1987 Protocol was adopted in 1990, which required cessation of all CFC use by 2000 in industrialised states and 2010 in developing countries. These deadlines were advanced to 1996 and 2006 respectively in 1992. • The Convention on Biodiversity (1993) and The Convention on Desertification (1994). Both of these agreements were adopted following the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNECD, commonly referred to as the Earth Summit), which was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The first aims to preserve the world’s immense variety of plant and animals species, particularly those threatened with extinction. The second seeks to establish a legal framework to counter the degradation of the world’s major drylands. • The Kyoto Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCC) (1997). This is an extension of the earlier 1994 FCC that sought to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. Under the terms of the 1997 agreement: (a) 38 industrialised countries agree to cut their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 per cent on 1990 levels by 2012 or earlier. Australia, Sweden and Norway are all exempted from this requirement, with each given the right to limited increases in their emissions from 2000. (b) Developing states are given the option to set voluntary reduction targets for their greenhouse gas emissions.

154 Appendix 2 (c) The Convention targets carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and certain halocarbons that are used as substitutes for CFCs. Sources: John Murphy, ‘The Need for International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism’, Terrorism: An International Journal, 13 (1990): 383–8; Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: the Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996): 123–4; John McFarlane, ‘Controlling Narcotics: Opportunities for Bilateral Cooperation and Multilateral Regime Building’, appendix to paper presented before the ‘Illicit Drugs and Australian Democracy’, one day conference, Brisbane, Australia, 8 December 1996; Peter Chalk, ‘Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21/1 (1998): 103; ‘The United Nations Environment Programme – UNEP’, The Europa World Year Book, 1998 (London: Europa Publications, 1999): 42–3; ‘Coup for Australia on Global Gas Limits’, The Courier Mail, 12 December 1997; Derek McDougall, Australian Foreign Relations (Melbourne: Longman, 1998): 71–3.

Appendix 3: The Maastricht Third Pillar of Judicial and Home Affairs Co-operation In 1992, several internal security agreements were signed by the member states of the European Union (EU) as part of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU). These form the basis of what has since become an integral component of EU integration: the Third Pillar of Judicial and Home Affairs Co-operation. Specifically, these provisions cover, on an inter-governmental basis (meaning that they are not subject to the formal structures of EU competence, including the European Commission, the European Parliament and European Court of Justice), the following areas of common interest: • asylum policy; • rules governing the crossing of EU external borders; • immigration policy and policy with regard to nationals of third countries, including: (a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on EU territory; (b) conditions of residence by nationals of third countries on EU territory, including family reunion and access to employment; (c) combating unauthorised immigration, residence and work by nationals of third countries on EU territory; • combating fraud; • combating drug addiction; • judicial co-operation in civil and criminal matters; • customs co-operation; • Police co-operation to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and other international organised crime, including, if necessary, certain aspects of Customs. Such co-operation is to proceed in connection with the organisation of a union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office (Europol). The first step in establishing Europol was taken in June 1993 when the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) was created, the headquarters of which were opened in The Hague in February 1994. Following the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, it was resolved that Europol should aim to commence operations by 2003. Until then, the EDU will operate as the main co-ordinating body for criminal intelligence between EU police forces. In December 1994, the ambit of the body was extended from an exclusive focus on drug trafficking to a number of other areas, including nuclear crime, illegal immigration networks, vehicle trafficking and associated money laundering operations. A further responsibility was added in July 1996: the sex trade, especially with respect to the sexual exploitation of children. 155

156 Appendix 3 Thus far, there has been reluctance to include the sensitive nature of terrorist intelligence in the overall ambit of the EDU/Europol. The UK, Ireland, France and Spain, in particular, have all expressed reservations about entrusting antiterrorism intelligence to either body on the grounds that the information will be compromised, or even destroyed, in the process of international exchange by ‘untrustworthy’ police officers from certain EU states. In general these states prefer the informal exchange of intelligence that currently takes place between their respective counter-terrorist liaison officers (CTLOs). Overseeing the third pillar’s areas of common interest is an executive coordinating committee of senior officials, known informally as the ‘K4 Committee’ (after article K4 of the TEU which first established the body). This structure represents the real power within the third pillar. The committee will have three steering groups, each with a number of working parties: • Immigration and Asylum – working parties on asylum, immigration, visas, control of external frontiers and clearing houses on asylum and immigration. • Judicial Co-operation – working parties on civil and criminal matters. • Security, Law Enforcement, Police and Customs – working parties on counterterrorism, public order, combating serious crime, Europol, customs and drugs. In addition to a strict co-ordinating role, the K4 Committee also has a fair degree of latitude with regard to initiating executive decisions. Under the terms of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the Committee is empowered to: • give opinions for the attention of the Council of Justice and Interior Ministers, either at the Council’s request or on its own initiative; • contribute to the preparation of the Council of Justice and Interior Minister’s discussions and decisions in any area dealing with police and judicial cooperation in the third pillar. Membership of the K4 Committee is made up with one official from each EU state, plus one from the European Commission. Central to the process of harmonising the rules governing the crossing of EU external borders is the implementation of the External Borders Convention, signed by the (then) twelve in June 1991. Its main provisions include: • sanctions for the crossing of external borders other than at authorised times and places; • ‘effective surveillance’ of all external frontiers by member states; • rigorous controls (by visa and other requirements) on the entry of third country nationals; • carrier sanctions for airlines and other passenger carriers that fail to ensure third country nationals have the required travel documents and visas; • a common list of countries whose nationals require a visa to enter the EU; • the establishment of a joint computerised list, contained within a European Information System (EIS, an EU-wide computer system covering immigration, asylum, security and policing), of inadmissible third country nationals who are to be refused entry into the Union; • Limited ‘visiting rights’ of re-unification with respect to family members of third country nationals already resident within the Union.

Appendix 3 157 Given the urgency of the matter, visa policy was made an immediate area of Community (that is, not intergovernmental) responsibility in 1992 (article 100c of the TEU). Decisions as to which third country nationals will require a visa to enter the EU will be taken by the Council of Ministers (acting on proposals made by the Commission and after consulting the Parliament) on the basis of unanimity. In an emergency, however, it may act by qualified majority vote (QMV) which, since the end of 1996, has become the rule. To facilitate customs co-operation, the third pillar provides for the establishment of a Customs Information System (CIS). Based on the existing encrypted message system, SCENT (Systems Customs Enforcement Network), it will link Community customs officials through 300 terminals allowing them to exchange information and intelligence on drugs, fraud and current smuggling techniques. The third pillar also includes provisions on asylum policy, police co-operation and extradition. Although it proved impossible to agree on a common asylum policy at Maastricht, the (then) twelve did, nevertheless, stipulate it as a priority issue – committing themselves to the harmonisation of certain aspects of their asylum policies by the end of 1993. Following the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU member states resolved to have a fully harmonised asylum policy in place within five years (i.e. before 2002). Central to this objective is implementation of the Dublin Convention, signed in 1990. It applies the ‘first safe country’ principle whereby asylum seekers have to make their application for political asylum in their first ‘safe’ country of origin. This ensures that applications are, in theory, processed by only one of the fifteen so as to prevent the phenomenon commonly known as ‘asylum shopping’. To facilitate this process, the feasibility of setting up a European automated fingerprint recognition system (EURODAC), allowing for the detailed exchange of information on asylum seekers with other EU states, is being considered. With respect to police co-operation, the member states have also confirmed their endorsement of the general principles governing such collaboration by agreeing to consider the adoption of practical measures on information exchange and experience. Under the terms of the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, these are taken to include: • operational co-operation between the competent authorities of the member states in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences; • the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, including data held by law enforcement agencies of reports on suspicious financial transactions; • co-operation and joint initiatives in forensic research, the use of equipment, the exchange of liaison officers and secondments; • the common evaluation of particular investigative techniques with regard to the detection of serious forms of organised crime. Finally, to further strengthen judicial co-operation in criminal matters within the third pillar an EU Extradition Convention was adopted in September 1996. The main objective of the Convention is to supplement and improve the functioning of both the 1957 European Convention on Extradition and the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST). The major aspects of the Convention include:

158 Appendix 3 • a lower threshold for extraditable offences. Once the Convention has been fully ratified, any person committing an offence punishable by a prison sentence of twelve months in the requesting state and six months in the requested state can be extradited. • a specification of those offences for which extradition may not be refused, including those: (a) classified as a conspiracy or an association to commit offences under the law of the requesting state (even if the law of the requested state does not provide for the same classification); (b) classified as a conspiracy or an association to commit terrorist acts; (c) classified as a conspiracy or an association to commit offences in certain other sensitive fields such as drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime and/or acts of violence. • provision that if extradition is refused by a requested state for any of the above offences, the state in question must provide in its own national legislation means by which to punish and prosecute such offences (the principle of ‘extradite or try’). • an easier means to extradite those charged with offences regarded as political. As a general principle, the Convention affirms that no offence may be regarded by the requested state as a political offence. Although member states may make reservations to this general principle, they may not do so in the case of any terrorist offence or conspiracy to commit such an offence. • provision that extradition may not be refused on the grounds that the person claimed is a national of the requested state. Those member states whose Constitutions prohibit the extradition of one of their nationals have the right to reserve extradition in this area for five years following the enactment of the Convention. On the expiry of this period, such reservations may be renewed (again for a period of five years), amended so as to ease the conditions of extradition, or terminated. • an easier means to extradite those charged with fiscal and amnesty offences. • inclusion of facilitative provisions to cover lapse of time (i.e. when a person would be statute-barred according to the law of the requested state, reextradition to another state, transit and exchange of information. The Convention will come into force 90 days after it has been fully ratified by all fifteen EU states. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam affirms that common action on extradition is now to be an integral part of the third pillar’s activities. Sources: Peter Chalk, ‘The Maastricht Third Pillar: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Fernando Reinares ed., West European Democracies Against Terrorism: Government Policies, Societal Responses and Supranational Cooperation (Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing, 1999); Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. The Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996), Chapter 5; ‘Amsterdam Treaty: Full Text’, Statewatch, bacdoc: June 1997 [http://www.poptel.org.uk]; ‘The Treaty on European Union (TEU)’, International Legal Matters, 31/2 (March 1992); ‘The Treaty of Maastricht: What It Says and What It Means’, The Independent on Sunday, 11 October 1992.

Notes

Introduction 1. A detailed survey of these proposed changes was provided by the World Economic Outlook (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1991). See especially pp. 26–7. 2. See, for instance, ‘Terrorism and the Warfare of the Weak’, The Guardian, 27/10/93. 3. Richard Latter, Terrorism in the 1990s. Wilton Park Papers No. 44 (London: HMSO, 1991): 2. 4. See David Abshire, ‘US Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: the Need for an Agile Strategy’, The Washington Quarterly, 19/2 (1996): 42–4; Simon Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’, Intelligence and National Security, 10/4 (1995): 186; and Gwyn Prins, ‘Politics and the Environment’, International Affairs, 66/4 (1990): 711–30. 5. Quoted in John Ciccarelli, ‘Preface: Instruments of Darkness: Crime and Australian National Security’, in John Ciccarelli ed., Transnational Crime: a New Security Threat? (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996): xi. 6. Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’: 186; Alan Dupont, ‘Regional Security Concerns Into the 21st Century’, in Ciccarelli ed., Transnational Crime: a New Security Threat?: 72–3. 7. This conceptualisation is based on a paradigm first developed by Jim Holden-Rhodes and Peter Lupsha in 1992. See Jim Holden-Rhodes and Peter Lupsha, ‘Gray Area Phenomena: New Threats and Policy Dilemmas’, Criminal Justice International, 9/1 (1993): 11–17 and ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder’, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, 2/2 (1993): 212–26. 8. Peter Chalk, Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism. Canberra Paper on Strategy and Defence No. 123 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1997): 5. 9. See, for instance, Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh, ‘Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities’, Security Dialogue, 29/2 (1998): 163. 10. Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ‘Gray Area Phenomena’: 12. 11. Ibid., 15; ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse’: 219–20. 12. Steven Metz, ‘Insurgency After the Cold War’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 5/1 (1994): 71–2. See also Andrew Scott, The Dynamics of Interdependence (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); and Ronald Dore, ‘Unity and Diversity in Contemporary World Culture’, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 159

160 Notes 13. It was Ted Gurr who first developed the idea that relative deprivation could serve as a powerful motivating influence for aggression. For further details see Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 14. Metz, ‘Insurgency After the Cold War’: 70. 15. See, for instance, ‘Environmental Refugees: a Crisis in the Making’, People and the Planet, 3/4 (1994); and Stuart Leiderman, ‘Environmental Refugees Require Restoration, Not Development’, paper presented during the 24th Annual Third World Conference, Session B-3: ‘Paradigmatic Shifts for Dealing with International Crises’, Chicago, 18–21 March 1998. 16. Xavier Raufer, ‘New World Disorder, New Terrorisms: New Threats for Europe and the Western World’, paper delivered before the ‘Future Developments in Terrorism’, Conference, Cork, Ireland, March 1999: 3. 17. Chalk, Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: 7. 18. Metz, ‘Insurgency After the Cold War’: 66–71; Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse’: 217–18. 19. Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: the Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996): 65; Metz, ‘Internal Insurgency After the Cold War’: 70. 20. Whereas civic conceptions of the nation regard it as a community of shared culture, common laws and territorial citizenship, ethno-nationalism conceives the nation as a vernacular community of genealogical descent. See Anthony Smith, ‘The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism’, Survival, 35/1 (1993): 55. 21. See, for instance, David Welsh, ‘Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, 35/1 (1993): 63–80; Smith, ‘The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism’: 48–62; Ted Gurr, ‘Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System’, International Studies Quarterly, 38 (1994): 347–77; Ted Gurr, ‘Communal Conflict and Global Security’, Current History (May 1995): 212–17; Donald Horowitz, ‘Ethnic and Nationalist Conflict’, in M. Klare and D. Thomas eds., World Security. Challenges for a New Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994): 175–87; and Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985). 22. Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ‘Gray Area Phenomena’: 13. 23. Official US trade statistics compared with figures from market surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England. Cited in International Monetary Fund, ‘International Capital Markets: Part I. Exchange Rate Movements and International Capital Flows’, World Economic and Financial Surveys (April 1993): 4. See also Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse’: 217; ‘Currency Markets Resisting Powers of Central Banks’, The New York Times, 25/9/92; and ‘A Survey of International Financial Markets’, The Economist, 21/7/90. 24. Kal Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1995): 71. 25. Mark Zacher has done some detailed and useful work on the growth in international interdependence in recent years. For a particularly good source of statistical information see ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance’, in James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempeil eds., Governance Without Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 58–101. 26. Matthew and Shambaugh, ‘Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal’: 164–5.

Notes 161 27. Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse’: 217. 28. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Effective National and International Action against Organised Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activities’, Emory International Law Review, 4 (1990): 36. 29. Dupont, ‘Regional Security Concerns into the 21st Century’: 71. For three good overviews of realist thought see Kenneth Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, International Affairs, 44 (1990); Ole Holsti, ‘Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and its Challenges’, in Charles Kegley ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); and Joseph Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of International Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, International Organisation, 42 (1988). 30. Matthew and Shambaugh, ‘Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal’: 165. 31. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) estimates that the annual value of the legal trade in small arms is between US$3 billion and US$6 billion, rising to US$10 billion if illegal transfers are included. The London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that between 55 and 72 million assault rifles were produced in the period between 1945 and 1990 and that currently 300 manufactures, in 70 countries, are involved in the light weapons industry. See ‘Tackling the Problem of Light Weapons: the “Micro-Disarmament” Policy Debate’, IISS Strategic Comments, 4 (1998): 1; Michael Klare, ‘An Avalanche of Guns: Light Weapons Trafficking and Armed Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee eds., New Wars: Restructuring the Global Military Sector (London: Pinter, 1997): 67; Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993–94 (Washington D.C.: ACDA, 1995): 91; and Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War’, Arms Control Today (August/September 1998): 17. 32. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 1. See also Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991): 192–3; and Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ‘Gray Area Phenomena’: 12; Chris Smith, ‘The Impact of Light Weapons on Security: a Case Study of South Asia’, SIPRI Yearbook 1995 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995): 583–4. 33. Personal correspondence between the author and Mohan Samarsinghe, Counsellor, Sri Lankan High Commission, Ottawa, July 1998. Similar views were expressed to the author by the Chief Weapons Analyst of the US Defence Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Office of Counterterrorism, Washington D.C., July 1998. 34. There is no precise, formal definition for light weapons and small arms. However, for the purposes of this chapter, they will refer to direct fire armaments that can be carried by an individual, animal or small vehicle, and which have a secondary capability to defeat light armour and helicopters. Excluded are those arms that are generally understood to encompass major conventional weapons systems such as tanks, large calibre artillery, planes, attack helicopters, ships and armoured combat vehicles. See Robert Bedeski, Andrew Andersen and Santo Darmosumarto, ‘The Small Arms Trade and Proliferation in East Asia: Southeast Asia and the Russian Far East’, Institute

162 Notes

35. 36.

37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43.

44.

45. 46.

of International Relations Working Paper No. 24, University of British Columbia (September 1998): 2; Smith, ‘The Impact of Light Weapons on Security: a Case Study of South Asia’: 583; Prashant Dikshit, ‘The Proliferation of Small Arms and Minor Weapons’, Strategic Analysis, 17/2 (1996): 189; and Andrew Latham, ‘The Light Weapons Problem: Causes, Consequences and Policy Options’, in Andrew Latham ed., Multilateral Approaches to Non-proliferation. Proceedings of the 4th Canadian NonProliferation Workshop (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, 1996): 34. Dikshit, ‘Proliferation of Small Arms and Minor Weapons’: 189–91; ‘Editorial’, International Herald Tribune, 30/11/93. Chris Smith and Alex Vines, Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa, London Defence Studies Paper 42 (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1997): 9–10; Chris Smith, ‘The International Trade in Small Arms’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 7/9 (1995): 429; Latham, ‘The Light Weapons Problem: Causes, Consequences and Policy Options’: 35–6; Boutwell and Klare, ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War’: 16–17. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 86; Boutwell and Klare, ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War’: 17; Chris Smith, ‘Light Weapons – the Forgotten Dimension of the International Arms Trade’, Brassey’s Defence Yearbook, 1994 (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1994): 274. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27/10/95: 1–2. Quoted in FBIS-SOV-95-224S, 21/11/95. As reported in The International Herald Tribune, 08/2/94. Latham, ‘The Light Weapons Problem: Causes, Consequences, Policy Options’: 41. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: 86; Smith, ‘Light Weapons – the Forgotten Dimension’: 274. Peter Chalk and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Support Structure’, unclassified report prepared for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), December 1998: 1. See also Mike Winchester, ‘Ship of Fools: Tamil Tiger’s Heist of the Century’, Soldier of Fortune, 23/8 (1998): 36; ‘The Arms Trade’, The New York Times, 07/3/98; ‘Mortar Ship Mystery Still Baffles Defence Officials’, The Sunday Times, 27/6/97; ‘What Happened to Ship Carrying 32,400 Mortar Bombs?, The Mystery Letter that Deals a Death Blow to Intelligence Setup Reveals All’, The Sunday Times, 20/7/97; ‘Arms Ship Mystery Deepens, Possibility of LTTE Ploy: Zimbabwe Official Here for Probe’, The Sunday Times, 3/8/97; and ‘A Tamil Tiger Primer on International Arms Bazaar’, International Herald Tribune, 10/3/98. ‘Legal Loopholes Make Arms Shipments Easy’, The Globe and Mail, 15/7/98; Jonathan Karp, ‘Cache of the Day: Illegal Fights and Arms Traffic Cause Security Concern’, The Far Eastern Economic Review, 11/1/96. War by proxy is defined by the US Army as ‘the use of military capabilities up to, but not including, sustained combat between regular [national] forces.’ See TRADOC pamphlet, US Operational Concept for Low Intensity Conflict (Department of the Army, Ft. Monroe, Virginia, No. 524–44): 2. Smith, ‘The International Trade in Small Arms’: 428; Smith, ‘Light Weapons – the Forgotten Dimension of the International Arms Trade’: 280. Ibid. See also Boutwell and Klare, ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War’: 18.

Notes 163 47. Dikshit, ‘Proliferation of Small Arms and Minor Weapons’: 191, 195. 48. Smith, ‘The Impact of Light Weapons on Security: a Case Study of South Asia’: 586. 49. United Nations Operation in Mozambique. 50. Smith and Vines, Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa: 13–20; Smith, ‘The International Trade in Small Arms’: 428–9; ‘Guns Threaten Our HardWon Freedom’, The Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 30/4/95; ‘Underpaid, Underfed and Unruly’, Africa Confidential, 36/17 (1995): 7. 51. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. 52. Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 303 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996): 18–20; Chalk, Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: 19. 53. Tara Kartha, ‘The Proliferation and Smuggling of Light Weapons Within the Region’, paper presented before the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group on Transnational Crime, Manila, May 1998: 6–7. 54. Metz, ‘Insurgency After the Cold War’: 67. See also Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse’: 218. 55. Emmanuel Adler, ‘Seasons of Peace’, in Emmanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford eds., Progress in Post War International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991): 128–73.

1. Terrorism 1. For the purpose of this chapter, terrorism will be defined as the systematic use of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors as a means of achieving specific political objectives, these goals differing according to the group concerned. It is an inherently psychological tactic that seeks to spread fear-inducing effects in a target group wider than the immediate audience through the actual or feared use of indiscriminate violence against noncombatant victims and property. See Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: the Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996): 22. 2. James Adams, Secret Armies (New York: Bantam Books, 1989): 72. 3. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 46. 4. An especially good account of terrorism associated with these struggles can be found in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998), Chapter 2. 5. For further details see Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Chapter 2; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Chapter 3; and Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan, 1979), Chapter 29. 6. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism: 68–9. 7. It should be noted that while radical left-wing ideologies, a prominent cause of terrorism and political violence during the Cold War, were dealt a fatal blow by the collapse of the USSR, Marxism-Leninism continues to act as a major source of instability in at least one state, Colombia. Here two main groups remain locked in a bitter struggle against the Bogotá Government: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). FARC, the military wing of Colombia’s Communist Party, was founded in 1949, and places land reform, local governance and

164 Notes

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

military reform high on its agenda. The ELN, founded by pro-Cuban university students in 1965, opposes oil extraction and investment by foreign multinational companies. In 1996, there were 3086 political killings in Colombia, 27 per cent of which were carried out by one or other of these two groups. However, even in Colombia, Marxism-Leninism appears to be losing its broad appeal. Both the ELN and FARC have suffered from declining support in recent years, losing practically all backing from the urban middle class, university students and intellectuals, once a mainstay of their political strength. This declining support has been reflected in an increased willingness by the ELN and FARC to engage in exploratory peace talks with the Colombian government, although at the time of writing, no conclusive peace settlement had yet been arranged. It has also been mirrored in an increased tendency for both groups to become more actively involved in non-political violent activities such as drug trafficking, embezzlement, extortion and kidnapping. For further details see ‘Colombia’s Escalating Violence’, IISS Strategic Comments, 3 (1997): 1–2; ‘Colombia Rebels Set Timetable for More Peace Talks’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 12/10/98; ‘Red Cross Says 90 Dead in Colombia Rebel Onslaught’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 3/11/98; and ‘Colombian Rebels Break off Peace Talks’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 16/2/99. In many ways this correlates with the argument made by Huntington in his, now famous, Clash of Civilisations. In this, Huntington suggests that the fundamental sources of future conflict will ‘not be primarily ideological or economic in nature, but, rather, the result of fault lines between civilisations. See Samuel Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilisations’, Foreign Affairs, 72/3 (1993) and the subsequent book, The Clash of Civilisations: The Remaking of the World Order (London: Touchstone Books, 1997). Other regions where significant ethno-nationalist civil conflicts have surfaced in the post-Cold War era include Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, South Africa, Mexico (Chiapas) and Indonesia (Aceh, Ambon, Kalimantan). See, for instance, Paul Wilkinson, ‘Terrorism in Europe – Retrospect and Prospect’, Jane’s Intelligence Yearbook, 1994/95 (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1995): 59–60. Two examples include the Crna Legija (Black Legion) and the Hrvatska Revolucionarna Armija (Croatian Revolutionary Army). For a good analysis of Middle Eastern links to Bosnian extremist groups see Magnus Ranstorp and Gus Xhudo, ‘A Threat to Europe? Middle East Ties with the Balkans and their Impact Upon Terrorist Activity throughout the Region’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 6/2 (1994): 196–223. At least 83 paramilitary groups were identified in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1994, many of which engaged in indiscriminate acts of terrorism and crimes against humanity. See ‘Special Forces’, Annexe III A, Annexes to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, UN Document S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I) (28 December 1994), para. 14. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 82–3. See also Terrorism 8/4 (October 1993): 23–4; Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Organised Crime and

Notes 165

14.

15.

16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

New Wars’, in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee eds., New Wars. Restructuring the Global Military Sector (London: Pinter 1997): 42; and ‘An Outlaw in the Balkans is Basking in the Spotlight’, The New York Times, 23/11/93. See, for instance, ‘Curse of Balkans Comes Home to Roost in Kosovo’, The Australian, 5/3/98; ‘The World Shudders as Kosovo Quakes’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 7/3/98; ‘Kosovo Militants Vow to Fight On’, The Australian, 12/3/98; ‘Kosovo Guerrillas Flock to the Flag’, The Sunday Times (UK), 22/3/98; ‘Albanian Gangs Lend Firepower to Kosovo Rebels’, The Times (UK), 26/3/98; and ‘Muslim Aid for Albanians “a Threat to Peace”’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 16/5/98. See ‘Refugees Accuse Serbs of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 30/5/98; ‘Serbian Forces Accused of Targeting Civilians’, The Globe and Mail, 18/7/98; and ‘Albanian Turmoil as Serbs Capture Key Kosovo Towns’, The Times (UK), 14/8/98. Dennis Pluchinsky, ‘Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union: a Primer, a Puzzle, a Prognosis’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21 (1998): 125–6. Reuters News Service, 14/3/95; Reuters News Service, 12/2/96. Pluchinsky, ‘Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union’, 134; INTERFAX, 18/2/97. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 85. For an excellent account of the general cultural roots of Armenian terrorism and militant martyrdom see Khachig Toloyan, ‘Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion and Symbolic Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora’, in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989): 89–103. Pluchinsky, ‘Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union’: 137. Main group being Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA). Main group being the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK). Main groups being the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Main groups being the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the Real IRA (RIRA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). It should be noted, however, that there has been a substantial reduction in ethno-religious instigated terrorism in Northern Ireland since the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Peace Accord. At the time of writing, all the main sectarian groups involved in this conflict had declared ceasefires and stated their intention to achieve their objectives through legitimate political means. Nevertheless, fierce antagonisms continue to exist between the Province’s Catholic and Protestant communities – perhaps best reflected by the tension and violence that typically comes to surround the annual Protestant Order marches. Moreover, problematic issues, particularly the question of whether Sinn Fein representatives should be allowed to take up elected positions within the Northern Irish Assembly (part of the Good Friday Accord) prior to PIRA disarmament, had still to be resolved. See ‘In Ulster, Still Horror, Still Hope’, The New York Times, 19/7/98; ‘Sinn Fein Warns of Weapons Crisis’, The New York Times (Internet edition), 14/2/99; ‘More Bumps Yet on the Road to Peace’, The Sydney Morning Herald,

166 Notes

25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

34. 35.

36.

37.

38.

13/2/99; ‘Irish PM Suggest Bann on Sinn Fein’, The Australian, 15/2/99; ‘Peace Will Not Come. There’s Evil Out There’, The Times (UK), 5/3/99; ‘No IRA Hand-Over Ahead of Assembly’, The Independent, 1/3/99. Main group being Hamas. Ethno-religious and nationalist-inspired terrorism in these three states revolves around the following main separatist struggles: (1) India: the Sikh insurgency (main group groups being Dashmesh, Dal Khalsa and the Kalistan Liberation Force); the Kashmiri insurgency (main groups being the Hizbul Mujahideen, Al-Faran and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front); and the Andra-Pradesh insurgency (main group being the People’s War Group); (2) Pakistan: the Urdu insurgency in Karachi (main group being the Mohajir National Movement); (3) Sri Lanka: the Tamil insurgency (main group being the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). Personal correspondence between author and Rohan Gunaratna, British Chevening Scholar and LTTE specialist, St Andrews University, February 1998. Pinkerton’s Risk Assessment Services (PRAS), Terrorism, 1990-1996 (Washington D.C.: 1997). See, for instance, ‘US Portrays Wide Network of Terror in Bomb Plot Case’, The New York Times, 6/5/94; and ‘Pieces of Terrorism: Accounts Trace the Trade Center Explosion’, The New York Times, 26/5/93. See, for instance, ‘Iranians Named as Suspects in Car-Bombing of Jewish Centre’, The Vancouver Sun, 11/8/94; ‘Iranian in Argentine Blast: Tinker, Refugee, Liar, Spy?’ The New York Times, 29/7/94. See, for instance, ‘Saudis Arrest Six Over US Bombing’, The Australian, 28/10/98. See, for instance, ‘Massacre Won’t Be the Last, Warn Militants’, The Courier Mail, 19/11/97. See, for instance, ‘Prime Suspect’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15/8/98; and ‘Militant Leader Was a U.S. Target Since the Spring’, The New York Times, 6/9/98. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 74–5; Martin Kramer, ‘Islam vs. Democracy’, Commentary, 95/1 (1993): 36 Islamic literature distinguishes between the al-jihad al-kabir, which emphasises the pursuit of the jihad through peaceful means, and the al-jihad alsaghir, regarded as the lesser jihad, which advocates legitimate forms of strife with other human beings. For further details see Richard Martin, ‘Religious Violence in Islam: Towards an Understanding of the Discourse on Jihad in Modern Egypt’, in Wilkinson and Stewart eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism: 59. Peter Chalk, Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia. Piracy, Drugs Trafficking and Political Terrorism. Canberra Paper on Strategy and Defence No. 123 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1997): 9–10. See also ‘Sudan: Jihad’, The Economist, 7/8/93. ‘Iran’s Scramble for Africa’, The Sunday Telegraph, 9/3/97; ‘Iran Builds Up Network of Terror Schools’, The Sunday Telegraph, 7/7/96; ‘Bagdad Raid a Warning to Zealots’, The Sunday Times (UK), 4/7/93; and ‘Tempting Array of Strike Targets for Pentagon’, The Sunday Telegraph, n.d.a. ‘Prime Suspect’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15/8/98; ‘Militant Leader Was a U.S. Target Since the Spring’, The New York Times, 6/9/98; ‘US Fears Sudan

Notes 167

39.

40. 41. 42.

43.

44.

45.

46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

Becoming Terrorists’ New Lebanon’, The Washington Post, 31/1/92; ‘Sudan: Jihad’, The Economist, 7/8/93; and ‘Sudanese Support for Islamic Militants Puts Region on Alert’, The Weekend Australian, 31/8/96. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 75–6. See also ‘Soldiers in Search of a War’, The Economist, 5/6/93; and ‘Baghdad Raid a Warning to Zealots’, The Sunday Times, 4/7/93. Steven Metz, ‘Insurgency After the Cold War’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 5/1 (1994): 77. Hamid Gul, cited in Metz, ‘Insurgency after the Cold War’: 77. Jeff Builta, ‘The Origins and Future of Terrorist Acts’, Criminal Justice Europe 3/5 (September–October 1993): 6; ‘Islamic Terrorism Network Tied to Pakistani University’, The New York Times, 20/3/95; US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism (Department of State Publication 10321, April 1996); and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar, ‘Special Issue: Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East’, Terrorism and Political Violence 8/2 (1996). These agreements include: (1) The Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed in 1993. (2) The Cairo Agreement, signed in 1994. (3) The Oslo Interim Agreement, signed in 1995. (4) The Hebron Pact, signed in 1996. (5) The Wye River Memorandum, signed in 1998. (6) Collectively, these agreements have turned over approximately 45 per cent of the Occupied Territories to Palestinian self-rule, although the Israelis remain in control of all Jewish settlements and key military installations. Outstanding issues that still need to be settled (supposedly by May 1999) include: (1) The question of full Palestinian statehood. (2) The status of occupied East Jerusalem. (3) Responsibility for the security of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. (4) The extent of further Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank. Harold Cubert, ‘The Militant Palestinian Organisations and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 4/1 (1992): 32. See also Louis Beres, ‘Israel, the ‘Peace Process’, and Nuclear Terrorism: Recognising the Linkages’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21/1 (1998): 59–86. Quoted in ‘The Same Goal’, The Middle East Intelligence Digest, 3/6 (1993): 3. See also ‘The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)’, trans. Raphael Israeli, Israel Affairs, 2/1 (1995): 273–93. Quoted in ‘Islamic Jihad Vows More Attacks on Israel’, Reuters, 23/3/92. See, for instance, Menachem Klein, ‘Competing Brothers: The Web of Hamas-PLO Relations’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 8/2 (1996): 119–27. See, for instance, ‘Hamas Stock Soars After Massacre’, The New York Times, 10/3/94; ‘2 Gunmen Taped Plan for Suicide Mission’, The Vancouver Sun, 11/10/94; and ‘The Menacing Face of Hamas’, The Daily Telegraph, 21/10/94. PRAS, Terrorism 1990–1996; Beres, ‘Israel, the “Peace Process”, and Nuclear Terrorism’: 86 (n. 64). Bruce Hoffman, ‘The Contemporary Terrorist Mindset: Targeting, Tactics and Likely Future Trends’, Intelligence and National Security, 11/2 (1996): 173. Ibid. Bruce Hoffman, ‘The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 9/2 (1997): 4. See http://www.avalon.net/~matrix/text/journal/tth/tth.html

168 Notes 54. James Campbell, Excerpts from Research Study ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 9/2 (1997): 28. 55. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism: 203. 56. ‘Sniper Murders Abortion Doctor’, The Australian, 26/10/98; ‘Slain Doctor Off Web Hit List’, The Australian, 27/10/98; and ‘A Matter of Life or Death’, The Australian, 9/11/98. 57. ‘A Matter of Life’, The Australian, 9/11/98. 58. ‘McVeigh Shows No Remorse as Death Sentence Imposed’, The Courier-Mail, 16/8/97; ‘Militias Find a Martyr’, The Australian, 4/6/97; and ‘McVeigh Essay: US Has Double Standard’, The Associated Press, 29/5/98. 59. Hoffman, ‘The Contemporary Terrorist Mindset’: 176; Hoffman, ‘The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism’: 5–6. 60. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism: 201. 61. Brian Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-7119, July 1985): 6. 62. See, for instance, Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 13-14; and Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16/3 (1978): 388. 63. Hoffman, ‘The Terrorist Mindset’: 171. For an excellent overview of the phenomena and implications of religious terrorism see Bruce Hoffman, ‘Holy Terror’: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, P-6450, 1993). 64. ‘The New Terrorism: Coming Soon to a City Near You’, The Economist, 15/8/98. 65. Samuel Peleg, ‘They Shoot Prime Ministers Too, Don’t They? Religious Violence in Israel: Premises, Dynamics and Prospects’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20 (1997): 243–4. 66. Campbell, Excerpts from Research Study ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors’: 42. 67. For good overviews of this conflict see William Lewis and Judith Yaphe, ‘Islamic Radicalism in North Africa’, Strategic Forum, 88 (October 1996); Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, ‘The Islamic Challenge in North Africa’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 8/2 (1996); Robert Mortimer, ‘Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: the Second Algerian War’, The Middle East Journal, 50/1 (1996); Robert Mortimer, ‘Algeria: the Dialectic of Elections and Violence’, Current History (May 1997); Shirley, Edward. ‘Iran’s Present and Algeria’s Future’, Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995); and Viorst Milton, ‘Algeria’s Long Night’, Foreign Affairs (November–December 1997). 68. See, for instance, ‘EU Delegates Fly Out on Algerian Savagery’, The Australian, 22/1/98; ‘Ill Wind Masked Noise as Death Stalked Village’, The Australian, 22/1/98; ‘Carnage Stokes Up Cauldron of Terror’, The CourierMail, 5/1/98; ‘Algeria’s Insurgency Enters 7th Year Amid Brutal Killings’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 10/1/98; and ‘400 Slaughtered: Algeria Rings to Cries of Genocide’, The Australian, 5/1/98. 69. Hoffman, ‘The Contemporary Terrorist Mindset: Targeting, Tactics and Likely Future Trends’: 175–6. 70. ‘Iraq Revenge Fears as Extremists are Held’, The Daily Telegraph, 20/2/98; and ‘Anthrax Terror Plot Failed in US’, The Daily Telegraph, 20/2/98.

Notes 169 71. For an excellent account of Pierce’s work and his influence on the American far right see Brad Whitsel, ‘Aryan Visions for the Future in the West Virginia Mountains’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 7/4 (1995): 117–39. 72. William Pierce, ‘Why Revolution?’ in The Best Attack! And National Vanguard Tabloid (Hillsboro, WV: National Vanguard Books, 1978), No. 6, 1971. 73. Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein, ‘International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20 (1997): 297. 74. See, for instance, Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War’, Arms Control Today (August/September 1998): 17; Michael Klare, ‘An Avalanche of Guns: Light Weapons Trafficking and Armed Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Kaldor and Vashee eds., New Wars. Restructuring the Global Military Sector: 67–70; and Chris Smith and Alex Vines, Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa. London Defence Studies Paper 42 (London: Defence Studies Centre, 1997): 26–8. 75. Peter Chalk and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The International Support Structure of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’, unclassified report prepared for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Ottawa, December 1998: 10. See also Mike Winchester, ‘Ship of Fools’, Soldier of Fortune, 23/8 (1998): 41; and Tony Davis, ‘Tiger International’, Asiaweek (July 26, 1996): 34. The attack left 100 people dead and another 1400 injured. 76. Prashant Dikshit, ‘Proliferation of Small Arms and Minor Weapons’, Strategic Analysis, 17/2 (1994): 198. 77. Smith and Vines, Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa: 33; and ‘Arms Caches in Mozambique – Operation Rachel III’, South African Communication Service, 11/8/97. 78. The AKM, which is manufactured both in Hungary and Poland, is an updated and much improved version of the Soviet-made AK-47 assault rifle. It can fire up to 600 rounds a minute and bullets can kill from shock alone. 79. It is believed that these weapons were intended for the UVF in Northern Ireland who believed that they were being excluded from a peace process that they felt entitled to participate in. According to Northern Ireland observers, had the Teesside consignment reached the resentful UVF, an almost certain bloodbath would have followed. 80. Brian Freemantle, The Octopus. Europe in the Grip of Organised Crime (London: Orion, 1995): 40–1. 81. Chris Smith, ‘Light Weapons – The Forgotten Dimension of the International Arms Trade’, in Brassey’s Defence Yearbook (London: Brassey’s 1994): 274–5; Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 71. 82. Richard Preston, The Cobra Event (London: Urania, 1997): 125, 188; ‘Germ Wars: the New Threat’, The Weekend Australian, 24/1/98; ‘The New Arms Race’, The Weekend Australian, 13/6/98. Bot tox is roughly 100 000 times more toxic than Sarin nerve gas. Following the 1990/91 Gulf War, Iraq confessed to having made approximately 9000 cubic metres of highly concentrated weapons-grade bot tox at its French-built Al Manal chemical facility. In theory, this would have been enough to kill all life on earth a thousand times over. In a practical military sense, it was enough to eliminate all human life from Kuwait. 83. Medd and Goldstein, ‘International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium’: 292.

170 Notes 84. Richard Falkenrath, ‘Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism’, Survival, 40/3 (1998): 48–50; Preston, The Cobra Event: 193. 85. It should be noted that a number of commentators reject the possibility of NBC terrorism. At the ‘Future Developments in Terrorism’ conference, held in Cork in March 1999 and attended by some of the foremost authorities in the field, the following general reasons were put forward as to why terrorists would not proceed to this level: (1) If anything, the Aum experience demonstrates just how difficult it is to carry out an effective act of mass destruction terrorism. The group had enormous financial resources at its disposal, had access to numerous scientists and was protected from state surveillance by the Japanese Constitution (which bans interference with religious organisations). Yet the group failed on numerous occasions, prior to 1995, to actually carry out an NBC attack, and when it finally did so in Tokyo, only 12 people were killed. If Aum was unsuccessful with all these advantages, the likelihood of other groups being more successful is extremely low. (2) While it may be relatively easy to obtain chemical and biological agents, actually transforming these into effective weapons is far more difficult. Ensuring effective dissemination is particularly problematic, requiring both skills and resources of a magnitude that most groups lack. (3) Terrorist groups, by and large, have shown remarkably little tactical innovation over the years. Today’s weapons are essentially the same as those used by the anarchists of the nineteenth century: the gun and the bomb. Why would terrorists want to experiment with new, potentially problematic technologies, when they can continue to inflict enormous damage through conventional means (such as the 165 people killed in the 1995 Oklahoma bombing and the 100 people killed in the 1996 Colombo Central Bank Building explosion)? (4) An act of NBC terrorism would greatly increase the stakes for the group that carried it out. Terrorists are neither mad nor irrational. They would calculate that any escalation to this level would be counterproductive in the sense that any benefits would be greatly outweighed by the costs, both in terms of loss of popular support as well as the likelihood of attracting massive national and international reprisals. (5) At least with respect to biological terrorism, attacks would lack the ‘kaboom’ and immediate destruction of a conventional explosion. A biological attack would only become apparent about a week after it was carried out, and then only gradually. Rather than the carnage wrought by a massive bomb explosion, all that would be apparent is a lot of people getting sick. In other words, a biological act of terrorism lacks the drama and immediacy that terrorists crave and which is generally guaranteed by more conventional means. This is important as biological terrorism is often argued to be the most likely form of mass destruction terrorism, given the ease of access to, and relative cheapness of, pathogenic and infectious agents. (Opinions expressed to the author, Cork, Ireland, March 1999.) 86. Campbell, Excerpts from Research Study ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors’: 28.

Notes 171 87. A number of ‘rogue’ states that have sponsored terrorism in the past are believed to have extensive quantities of chemical and biological weapons in their arsenals, including Libya, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Syria. 88. Ron Purver, ‘The Threat of Chemical/Biological Terrorism’, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Commentary, 60 (August 1995): 5. 89. The possibility of nuclear material being illegally smuggled out of Russia has arisen primarily because of two factors: (1) The breakdown in the country’s internal security structure; and (2) the growing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) that are being created by the country’s nuclear dismantling programme. It has been estimated that as weapons are reduced, six tonnes of plutonium and as much as 30 tonnes of HEU will have to pass through the ‘rickety’ and insecure bureaucracy of Russia every 12 months for the next 15 years. Given the unpredictability that is present within the country (not to mention the fact that a proper inventory count has almost never taken place), the danger of nuclear theft has clearly grown. One of the more frightening cases of illicit smuggling that has so far occurred took place in 1992. The incident involved over 2 kilos of what was described as ‘highly enriched uranium of weapons-graded strength.’ The material had originated in Lithuania and been routed through Romania and Poland before reaching Germany. According to subsequent scientific assessments, the amount was almost 10 per cent of that necessary to make a basic atomic bomb, and more than enough to poison the entire water supplies of several cities. See Freemantle, The Octopus: 28–9. See also ‘Russia Treasures Plutonium, But US Wants to Destroy It’, The New York Times, 19/8/94; and ‘How to Steal an Atomic Bomb’, The Economist, 5/6/93. 90. See ‘Smugglers Sell Stolen Nuclear Materials’, The Washington Post, 29/11/92; ‘For Sale: Nuclear Contraband’, The Washington Post, 29/11/92; and ‘Germans Suspect Russian Military in Plutonium Sale’, The New York Times, 16/8/94. So alarmed has Germany become over the amount of nuclear material being smuggled through its borders that Bonn has established two intelligence units specifically dedicated to this problem: K14 at Kiel and the Organised Crime Bureau in the Federal Police headquarters in Wiesbaden. 91. Freemantle, The Octopus: Europe in the Grip of Organised Crime: 23. 92. Campbell, Excerpts from Research Study: ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism’: 28; ‘Moonlighting by Modem from Russia’, US News and World Report, 17/4/95; ‘Syria Builds Nerve Gas Arsenal’, The Sunday Times (UK), 17/11/96; ‘Pentagon Readies for Germ Attacks’, The Guardian Weekly, 21/7/97. 93. See, for instance, ‘Tokyo Cult Discussed Ebola Weapons’, The Globe and Mail, 24/5/95; ‘Cult Leader Maintains Innocence’, The Globe and Mail, 20/5/95; ‘Cult Evidence Overwhelms Tokyo Police’, The Daily Telegraph, 11/4/95; ‘5 Packs of Nerve Gas Seized, But Attack Motive Unknown’, The Vancouver Sun, 21/3/95; and ‘US Intelligence Officials Baffled Over Possible Motives’, The New York Times, 21/3/95. 94. Campbell, Excerpts from Research Study: ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism’: 29. 95. Brian Jenkins, quoted in Purver, ‘The Threat of Chemical/Biological Terrorism’: 9. 96. ‘The New Terrorism’, The Economist, 15/8/98.

172 Notes

2.

The global heroin and cocaine trade

1. Peter Chalk, Heroin and Cocaine: a Global Threat, Jane’s Intelligence Review Special Report No. 18 (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1998): 5–6. See also ‘A Deadly Shot of Moralism’, The Weekend Australian, 6/2/99. 2. It should be noted that another, increasingly prominent, heroin production area is now emerging: Colombia. According to the US Bangkok Embassy’s former Counsellor for Narcotics Affairs, Allen Nugent, Colombian cocaine syndicates have been moving to diversify into the heroin trade since the early 1990s, largely as a result of the saturation of the global cocaine market. According to Nugent, latest US government figures show that at least 15 per cent of the heroin that is now trafficked to the US comes from Colombia (though in global terms, Colombia still accounts for only about 2 per cent of overall world production). Information relayed to author during interviews conducted in Bangkok, February 1998. 3. Current statistics for Iran are unavailable. However, in 1992, the US State Department estimated that the country had cultivated approximately 3500 hectares of opium, representing a potential yield of between 35 and 70 metric tons of opium gum. 4. See US State Department (USSD), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau for International Narcotics and Enforcement Affairs, 1998). See also UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Trends in International Drug Trafficking (Ottawa: British Information Services, 1995): 2. 5. Paddy Mahony et al., Trends and Developments in Illicit Drugs in Australia: Highlights from the Australian Illicit Drug Report 1996–97 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, 1997): 14. 6. USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997. See also Alison Jamieson, Drug Trafficking After 1992. Conflict Studies No. 250 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992): 5; Eastern Europe’s Drug Routes, Economist Intelligence Unit Foreign Report 1 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991); and ‘Pervasive Heroin Trafficking Putting Pakistan at Risk’, The Washington Post, 29/4/93. 7. USSD, International Narcotic Control Strategy Report 1997. 8. Kyrgyzstan is also rapidly developing a relatively prolific heroin industry of its own, with most production taking place in the Chu and Fergana Valleys. For many of these communities in these two regions, drugs production has emerged as the only viable economic activity. Indeed, in 1993, the Kyrgyz government even briefly considered legalising poppy growing as a means of supplementing state revenue. See ‘Central Asia’s Narcotics Industry’, IISS Strategic Comments, 3 (1997): 1–2; and Brassey’s, ‘The International Drug Trade’, IISS Strategic Survey 97/98 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998): 250. 9. See, for instance, Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Organised Crime and New Wars’, in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee eds., New Wars. Restructuring the Global Military Sector (London: Pinter, 1997): 46–7; ‘Red Alert Over Poppy Peddler’, International Police Review (March/April 1998): 15; UK FCO, Trends in International Drug Trafficking: 2–3; USSD, International Narcotic Control Strategy Report 1997; Joseph Serio, ‘Organised Crime in the Former Soviet

Notes 173

10.

11. 12.

13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23.

Union: New Directions, New Locations’, Criminal Justice International, 9/5 (1993): 15–21; and ‘Pervasive Heroin Putting Pakistan at Risk’, The Washington Post, 29/4/93. An estimated 100 kg of processed opium flows along the Old Silk Road to Osh in Kyrgyzstan every week. Most of this continues either north to the Chu Valley, or east to Uzbekistan, where it is sold for transportation into Russia. The trafficking of drugs through the Central Asian states is believed to have an annual turnover of anywhere between US$1 billion and US$14 billion. For further details see Sumita Kumar, ‘Drug Trafficking as an International Security Problem’, Strategic Analysis 19/2 (1996): 213; Graham Turbiville, ‘Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia: a New Colombia’, Military Review (December 1992); and ‘Central Asia’s Narcotics Industry’: 1–2. USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1997. Peter Chalk, Gray Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 123 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1997): 42–3. See USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997; and US General Accounting Office (GAO), ‘Drug Control: US Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast Asia’, Burma Debate 3/2 (1996): 24. Bertil Lintner, ‘Narcopolitics in Burma’, Current History, 95/605 (1996): 435–6. See, for instance, ‘The Shan Connection’, The Economist, 6/1/96; ‘Burmese Lead in Heroin Supply and US Tries to Respond’, The New York Times, 12/2/95; ‘Former MP Turned Over to US on Drug Charges’, The South China Morning Post, 27/1/96; and ‘Drug Lord’s Retirement Plan’, The Courier-Mail, 6/9/95. See, for instance, ‘The Shan Connection’, The Economist, 6/1/96. Personal correspondence between author and Gavin Greenwood, Senior Asian Analyst of the Control Risks Group, London, January 1997. Personal correspondence between author and Allen Nugent, Bangkok, February 1998. See also ‘Fighting for His Life and State’, The Bangkok Post, 11/1/99; ‘Khun Sa is Hard Up, Junta Claims’, Bangkok Post, 12/2/98; GAO, ‘Drug Control: US Heroin Program Encounters Many Problems in Southeast Asia’, 25–6; Bertil Lintner, The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia, Jane’s Intelligence Review Special Report No. 5 (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1995): 4, 15–22; and ‘The Golden Triangle’s New King’, The Economist, 4/2/95. USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997. Chalk, Gray Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: 43. See also Lintner, The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia: 13; China’s Own Drug Crisis, The Economist Intelligence Unit Foreign Report No. 2417 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995): 5; ‘Slaying the Dragon’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17/10/98; ‘Medellin on the Mekong’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23/11/95; and ‘The Golden Triangle’s Blooming Threat’, The Los Angeles Times, 24/7/90. See USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997. Brian Freemantle, The Octopus. Europe in the Grip of Organised Crime (London: Orion, 1995): 57. Chalk, Heroin and Cocaine: a Global Threat, 9–10. The intensity of the euphoria produced by a cocaine high is truly staggering. Treatment specialists

174 Notes

24.

25. 26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32. 33.

34.

maintain that addiction can become pronounced after just two sessions, with total dependency measured in terms of just one week. One intelligence assessment has claimed that ‘the compulsion to use [cocaine and] crack is so strong that it is widely considered to be an addiction that cannot be cured’. See Freemantle, The Octopus. Europe in the Grip of Organised Crime: 57. By the end of 1998, coca cultivation had dropped by 55 per cent in Peru and 20 per cent in Bolivia. See ‘Progress Reported in War on Illegal Drugs’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 20/2/99. Ibid. See also Mahony et al., Trends and Developments in Illicit Drugs in Australia: 32–3. USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997; ‘Colombia Seizes 30 Per cent More Cocaine, Heroin in 1998’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 19/12/98. Those apprehended included the cartel’s leader, Helmer Herrera, as well as two original founders of the syndicate Gilberto and Manuel Rodriguez Orejula. In November 1998, Herrera was assassinated in prison by Rafael Angel Uribe Serna, a lone gunman since identified as an ex-employee of the Cali cartel. Police believe the killing was in reprisal for the former leader’s testimony against 35 fellow traffickers, which was given as part of a complex plea-bargain arrangement made after Herrera’s arrest in 1996. The CGSB is essentially an umbrella guerrilla group, combining the ELN and FARC and using profits from the drug trade to finance the continuing rural insurgency against the Bogotá government. Ibid. See also Control Risks Group (CRG), Business Security Outlook 1996 (London: Control Risks Group Ltd. 1997): 117; and Kumar, ‘Drug Trafficking as an International Security Problem’: 211. See Mahony et al., Trends and Developments in Illicit Drugs in Australia: 32; Phil Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Organisations: Strategic Alliances’, in Brad Roberts ed., Order and Disorder After the End of the Cold War (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995): 243; Silvana Paternostro, ‘Mexico as a Narc-Democracy’, World Policy Journal, 12/1 (1995): 43–4; and Brassey’s ‘The International Drug Trade’: 249. See USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997; UK FCO, Trends in International Drug Trafficking: 3; ‘Cocaine Czechs In’, Forbes Informer, 149/11 (1992). ‘Russian Mafia Linked to Colombian Drug Cartel’, The Vancouver Sun, 7/7/97. According to Nugent, West Africans (especially Nigerians) are playing an increasingly pivotal role in global heroin and cocaine trafficking. Nugent asserts that extremely sophisticated smuggling rings are now being run from capitals such as Lagos where human mules are supplied with everything from false identification documents to counterfeit money. Nugent argues that in terms of the illicit trafficking of narcotics, West Africans probably now pose one of the greatest threats of any group in the world. Personal correspondence between author and Allen Nugent, Bangkok, February 1998. USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997. See also ‘Drugs Courier Dies After Swallowing 500g of Cocaine’, The Independent, 10/11/92.

Notes 175 35. See, for instance, USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997; UK FCO, Trends in International Drug Trafficking: 5; Congressional Research Service (CRS), ‘Drug Abuse: a US Concern for Over a Century’, Global Issues, 2/3 (1997): 30; Chalk, Gray Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: 47; Mahony et al., Trends and Developments in Illicit Drug Use in Australia: 32; ‘Iran’s Muscle-Flexing Slows Taliban Drug Trade’, The Australian, 8/9/98; ‘Slaying the Dragon’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17/10/98; and Lintner, The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia: 5. 36. Chalk, Gray Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: 47. See also China’s Own Drug Crisis: 6; and Lintner, The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia: 16. 37. Steven Slatem, ‘The Drug Busters’, International Police Review (March/April 1998): 40. 38. USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997. 39. Pepes was a paramilitary group that was created by the former leader of the Cali cartel, Helmer Herrera, in 1990. Herrera established the organisation following the massacre of 18 of his men by gunmen working for the rival Medellin syndicate. Pepes, an acronym that stands for People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar, was instrumental in violently dismantling the Medellin cartel and establishing Herrera’s primacy over the Colombian cocaine trade between 1993 and 1996. 40. See, for instance, ‘Clear and Present Danger’, The Independent, 25/11/98; ‘In a “Dirty War”, Former Drug Allies Are Terrorising Escobar’, The New York Times, 14/3/93. Colombia still has the reputation of being one of the most violent states on earth, a ‘status’ that owes much to the prolific drugs business within the country. In 1996, for instance, there were 26 142 homicides in Colombia, which is amongst the highest anywhere in the world. See ‘Colombia’s Escalating Political Violence’, IISS Strategic Comments 3 (May 1997): 2. Statistics drawn from the Colombian Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Colombian Law Commission, Bogotá. 41. Colombian Bureau of Criminal Investigation and Colombian Law Commission, Bogotá. See also ‘Colombia’s Escalating Violence’: 2. Of the 26 142 violent deaths that took place in Colombia during 1996, only 3086 were associated with political violence. The country currently has an overall homicide rate of 75 per 100 000, which ranks as among the highest in the world. 42. Mark Galeotti, ‘The Mafiya and the New Russia’: 10, unpublished paper. 43. John Broome, ‘The Impact of the Drugs Trade on Social and Political Life in Australia’, paper presented before the ‘Drug Trafficking and Australian Democracy: the Search for New Directions’ One Day Conference, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 8/12/97. 44. ‘Crime and Corruption Foster Calls for Greater Police Power’, Criminal Justice Europe, 4/1 (1994): 10. 45. John McFarlane, ‘Transnational Crime as a Security Issue’, paper presented before the 2nd Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Transnational Crime, Bangkok, 10–11 October 1997. 46. Personal correspondence between author and officials from the Thai Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), Bangkok, July 1997. 47. Lintner, The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia: 19.

176 Notes 48. ‘A Deadly Shot of Moralism’, The Australian, 6/2/99; Lintner, The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia: 16. 49. Chalk, Gray Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: 48. 50. Senator Charles Grassley, ‘The US Effort to Fight Drug Abuse’, Global Issues, 2/3 (June 1997): 10–11. See also Barry McCaffrey, ‘Dealing with Addiction’, Global Issues, 2/3 (June 1997): 5. 51. See China’s Own Drug Crisis: 6; Alison Jamieson, Global Drug Trafficking, Conflict Studies No. 234 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990): 23–4; ‘Colombia Seizes 30 Per cent More Cocaine, Heroin in 1998’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 19/12/98; ‘Slaying the Dragon’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17/10/98; and Serio, ‘Organised Crime in the Former Soviet Union’: 20. These profit margins were confirmed both by Gavin Greenwood and Allen Nugent during interviews conducted in London and Bangkok, January 1997 and February 1998. 52. USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997. 53. Galeotti, ‘The Mafiya and the New Russia’: 6. See also Traci Attanasio, ‘The Emergence of Russian Organised Crime’, The Narc Officer (May/June 1994): 91–3. It is generally accepted, even by Russian government officials, that as much as 40 per cent of the Russian economy is directly controlled by the Mafiya. 54. USSD, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997. 55. See ‘Top Mexican Off-Limits to US Drug Agents’, The New York Times (Internet Edition), 16/3/99. In the event, the undercover operation was shut down before charges could be laid against Cervantes. US Customs officials have castigated the decision, claiming that Washington was prepared to sacrifice the investigation for the sake of maintaining cordial relations with Mexico in order to preserve the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 56. Chalk, Heroin and Cocaine: a Global Threat: 16; ‘US Is Brushing Off Mexico’s Drug Data’, The New York Times (Internet Edition), 14/2/99; ‘Putting an End to Mob Rule’, The National Post, 9/1/99. Following his arrest, it was discovered that Raul had a total of US$233 million under his control, held in various Swiss banks. At the time of writing, Raul had yet to be charged. However, he has been incarcerated while under investigation for a variety of crimes, including murder and extortion. 57. See Lintner, The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia: 11; Kumar, ‘Drug Trafficking as an International Security Problem’: 219; ‘Thai Minister Says 300 Officials Suspected of Drug Ties’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 21/1/99; ‘Former MP Turned Over to US on Drugs Charges’, The South China Morning Post, 27/1/96; and ‘Smells in High Places’, The Economist, 28/5/94. According to Lintner, drug induced corruption in Thailand has much to do with the country’s long established practice of vote buying: ‘In every election, millions of dollars are spent on securing votes for powerful candidates [as much as 20 million baht/ US$1 billion in the November 1996 general election]. Only a tiny fraction of this money actually goes to paying off voters. The bulk is spent on financing gangsters who enforce the will of the politicians and make sure the people vote for the “right” candidate. Money rules politics in Thailand’s provinces and in cities like Chiang Rai the fastest and easiest money comes from the local drugs trade’.

Notes 177 58. See ‘Italy in Furore as “Mata Hari” Talks of Military Plot’, The New York Times, 19/10/93. 59. Jamieson, Global Drug Trafficking: 24; ‘Putting an End to Mob Rule’, The National Post, 9/1/99. 60. John Walker Consulting Services, Estimates of the Extent of Money Laundering in Australia (Sydney: AUSTRAC, September 1995): 39. See also ‘World Class Crime’, The Australian, 18/12/95. 61. Quoted by Peter Quirk, Chief of the Exchange Regime and Economic Operations Division of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Financial Action Task Force Plenary Meeting, January 1995. The same figure has also been quoted in L. Raine and F. Cilluffo, Global Organised Crime: the New Empire of Evil (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1994). 62. Rick McDonald, ‘Money Laundering Methodologies and International and Regional Counter-Measures’: 3, paper delivered before the 2nd meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Transnational Crime, Bangkok, 10–11 October 1997. 63. See, for example, US Department of Justice, ‘Asian Money Laundering Methods’, Burma Debate, 2/1 (1995): 34–5; Jamieson, Global Drug Trafficking: 24–6; and ‘Interpol Leap on Fake Bank’, The Australian, 16/3/99. 64. Ibid. 65. Personal correspondence between author and Allen Nugent, Bangkok, February 1998. 66. See Kumar, ‘Drug Trafficking as an International Security Problem’: 216–17; McDonald, ‘Money Laundering Methodologies and International and Regional Counter-Measures’: 9–10; Baytoram Ramharack, ‘Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering in the Caribbean “Mini” States and Dependent Territories: the US Response’, The Round Table (July 1995): 332; Nikos Passas, ‘Structural Sources of International Crime: Policy Lessons from the ABCI Affair’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 20 (1993): 294; Shiraz Mahmood, ‘Current Developments in the BCCI Affair’, Journal of Financial Crime, 3/2 (1995): 152; and ‘Abu Nidal’s Quest to Sell “Peace”’, The Globe and Mail, 13/8/91. 67. Some interesting work has been done on the narco-terrorism phenomenon. Two good accounts include R. Ehrenfeld and M. Kahan, ‘The Doping of America: the Ambivalence of the Narco-Terrorist Connection and a Search for Solutions’, in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart eds., Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989); and Peter Lupsha, ‘Towards an Etiology of Drug Trafficking and Insurgent Relations: the Phenomenon of Narco-Terrorism’, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice (1988/89). 68. McFarlane, ‘Transnational Crime as a Security Issue’: 24; ‘Jailed Colombia Drug Lords Said Preparing for War’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 8/3/99. 69. See ‘Newsweek Investigation’, The Bulletin, 14/12/93; ‘The Ten Worst Acts of Aircraft Sabotage’, Terrorism, 6/4 (October 1991): 2; and ‘3 Bombs Explode in Colombia Cities’, The New York Times, 1/2/93. 70. See ‘Jailed Colombia Drug Lords Said Preparing for War’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 8/3/99. 71. Galeotti, ‘The Mafiya and the New Russia’: 5; Mark Galeotti, ‘Stark Choice Facing Russia’s Police’, International Police Review (March/April 1998): 17;

178 Notes

72. 73.

74.

75.

76. 77. 78.

79. 80.

81. 82.

83.

3.

Richard Allan, ‘New World Order Brings Chaos in Many Countries’, Criminal Justice International, 9/3 (1993): 16; ‘Yeltsin’s Anti-Crime Campaign Flopping’, The Globe and Mail, 14/6/95; and ‘Top Echelon of Mobsters Pose Threat’, The New York Times, 23/8/94. See ‘Bombers Target Italy’s Reforms’, The Daily Telegraph, 29/7/93. See Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein, ‘International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20 (1997): 284–5; Galeotti, ‘Stark Choice Facing Russia’s Police’: 18; and ‘Death Squads of the Ex-KGB?’ Foreign Report, 2360, 20/8/95. For an overview of the growing threat of the Russian Mafiya in this regard see Claire Sterling, Thieves’ World: the Threat of the New Global Network of Organised Crime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994): 16–65, 94. It should be noted, however, that the US government remains somewhat circumspect over Burma’s overall commitment to eradicating heroin production in its borders. See Yonah Alexander, ‘Narco-Terrorism: Future Threats’, INTERSEC 5/11–12 (1995): 429; ‘Anti-drugs Chief Flees into Exile’, The Australian, 17/3/98; ‘Scope of Narcoterrorism Link with Khun Sa Viewed’, The Bangkok Post, 12/6/95; and ‘Medellin on the Mekong’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23/11/95. Personal correspondence between author and Allen Nugent, Bangkok, February 1998. ‘n.t.a’, The Independent, 10/11/92. ‘Colombia’s Escalating Political Violence’: 2; Bassiouni, ‘Organised Crime and New Wars’: 46; The President’s Commission on Organised Crime, ‘America’s Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime’, Report to the President and Attorney General, Washington D.C., March 1986. David Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism (New York: Free Press, 1990): 117. Personal correspondence between author and Mircea Gheordunescu, Deputy Director Romanian Intelligence Service, Cork, March 1999. See also Bassiouni, ‘Organised Crime and the New Wars’; 46. Personal correspondence between author and Mohan Samarsinghe, Head of Public Information, Sri Lankan High Commission, Ottawa, July 1998. Personal correspondence between author and representatives from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Ottawa, July 1998. See also ‘The Canadian Tiger – A Menacing Reality’, Lankaweb News, 17/3/98. Xavier Raufer, ‘New World Disorder, New Terrorisms: New Threats for Europe and the Western World’, paper presented before the ‘Future Developments in Terrorism Conference’, Cork, Ireland, March 1999: 4.

Contemporary maritime piracy

1. For the purposes of this chapter, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) definition of piracy will be adopted. This conceptualises piracy as ‘any act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other crime and with the capability to use force in furtherance of the act’. This definition is wider than the delineation adopted by the United Nations (UN), which is

Notes 179

2.

3. 4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12.

13. 14.

problematical largely due to the fact that it restricts itself to attacks that take place purely on the high seas. The definition also excludes acts of violence committed at sea for purely political purposes. Such maritime ‘terrorism’ is treated as a separate issue under international law (political violence at sea is covered by the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation) and has, in any event, been uncommon largely because land targets are more accessible. See F. Moorhead, A History of Malaya and Her Neighbors (Kuala Lumpur: Longmans of Malaysia, 1957): 134 and H. Giles, The Travels of Fa-hsien, 399–414 AD (London, 1956). M. Peterson, ‘An Historical Perspective on the Incidence of Piracy’, in Eric Ellen ed., Piracy at Sea (Paris: ICC Publishing SA, 1989): 41–59. Michael Pugh, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Problems and Remedies’, Issues of Low Intensity Conflict, 2/1 (1993): 2. Jack Roberts, ‘Piracy in the Far East’, INTERSEC 1/5 (October 1991): 160. For a detailed account of piracy in the Gulf of Thailand during this period see Pascal Boulanger, ‘The Gulf of Thailand’, in Ellen ed., Piracy at Sea: 83–97. Edward Fursdon, ‘Sea Piracy – or Maritime Mugging?’ INTERSEC, 5/5 (May 1995): 166; Stanley Weeks, ‘Law and Order at Sea: Pacific Cooperation in Dealing with Piracy, Drugs and Illegal Immigration’, in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates eds., Calming the Waters. Initiatives for Asia-Pacific Maritime Cooperation (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1996): 44. Fursdon, ‘Sea Piracy – or Maritime Mugging?’: 166. See Robert Redmond, ‘Phantom Ships in the Far East’, INTERSEC, 6/5 (1996): 168–9; Pugh, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea’: 9; ‘Phantom Vessels the Latest Tactic in Asian Piracy’, South China Morning Post, 21/7/94; ‘Pirates Employ New Tactics in Asian Waters’, New Straits Times, 1/9/94; and ‘Terror on the High Seas’, The Australian, 21/11/95. Fursdon, ‘Sea Piracy – or Maritime Mugging?’: 166. Sam Menefee, ‘Sharks of the Sea’, in Eric Ellen ed., Shipping at Risk (London: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 1997): 37–8. A modern container ship operator can easily lose US$25 000 to US$50 000 a day for each day his/her vessel is detained for law enforcement purposes. See, for instance, Douglas Stevenson, ‘The Human Cost of Piracy’, Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) Special Bulletin: Piracy, Stowaways and Drug Smuggling (London: BIMCO, 1998): 12. Personal correspondence between author and Eric Ellen, Executive Director, International Maritime Bureau, London, January 1997. See also Stevenson, ‘The Human Cost of Piracy’: 13; ‘Piracy Becomes World Threat’, Sunday Telegraph, 25/5/97; and ‘Piracy Reports Seen as a Waste of Time’, South China Morning Post, 12/5/93. Personal correspondence between author and John Martin, former Far East Manager, Regional Piracy Centre, Kuala Lumpur, April 1997. Information relayed to author during interviews conducted at the International Maritime Bureau, London, February 1998 and the Regional Piracy Centre, Kuala Lumpur, April 1997. See also, ‘Piracy Becomes World Threat’, The Sunday Telegraph, 25/5/97; and ‘High-Tech Pirates Are Thriving on High Seas’, The Washington Times (National Weekly Edition), 23/11/97.

180 Notes 15. International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: a Special Report (London: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 1997): 4–5. 16. Many of the SLOCs in Southeast Asia are extremely difficult to monitor and patrol, particularly in the South China Sea, the locus of many of the attacks that are currently occurring in the region. This body of water covers some 2400 kilometres by 1800 kilometres at its widest point and is bounded by thousands of miles of coastline, much of which is tree-lined and, thereby, conducive to covert movement. Land-based radar of so large an area is impossible, while mounting regular aerial patrols would be prohibitively expensive. Much thus depends on the naval resources of the region’s coastal states – but here, too, problems exist. Thailand currently has only 60 coastal patrol/combatant craft, Indonesia 57, the Philippines 54, Malaysia 37, and Singapore 19 with which to cover their respective territorial waters. Moreover, as Jack Roberts observes, as a general rule of thumb no more than a third of these craft can be on station at any one time. While most maritime Southeast Asian states are moving to increase and modernise their naval capabilities, attention is being focused on building up large patrol craft such as frigates, anti-submarine warfare corvettes and missile-equipped surface combatants. Such craft will have little, if any, relevance for antipiracy operations, most of which tend to take place in shallow in-shore waters. For further details see Roberts, ‘Piracy in the Far East’: 161. See also Walters, ‘Coastal Patrol Boats’: 54–6; and Amitav Acharya, A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era, Adelphi Paper 279 (1993): 66. 17. G. Naidu, ‘The Strait of Malacca and the Straits’ States: A Malaysian Perspective’, paper delivered before the International Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century, Kuala Lumpur, 14–15 June 1994: 11–12. 18. ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: a Special Report: 5. 19. Most allegations of this sort are directed against China in the belief that Beijing is involved in some sort of deliberate exercise of extra-territorial sovereignty through a de facto exertion of expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea. Such accusations are based on the belief that China is seeking to fill the post-Cold War vacuum left by less frequent Russian and US naval movements in the region and have been backed up by numerous reports of PRC officials firing on and seizing ships far from the Chinese mainland. 20. Personal correspondence between the author and Eric Ellen, Director, International Maritime Bureau, London, February 1998. 21. Personal correspondence between author and Gavin Greenwood, Control Risks Group, London, February 1998. 22. Peter Chalk, ‘Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 10/2 (1998): 130; International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report, 1998 (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1999): 20. 23. Peter Chalk, ‘Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21/1 (1998): 94–5.

Notes 181 24. Jon Vagg, ‘Rough Seas? Contemporary Piracy in Southeast Asia’, British Journal of Criminology, 35/1 (1995): 64. 25. Personal correspondence between author and Eric Ellen, Director, London, January 1997. 26. Redmond, ‘Phantom Ships in the Far East’: 168; ‘The Virtual Immunity Enjoyed by Pirates’, Lloyd’s Shipping Economist (November 1996): 6–7; ‘Shipowners Deny Piracy is a Problem’, Commercial Crime International, 14/8 (January 1997): 1; ‘Unfurl the Skull-and-Crossbones?’ Foreign Report (11 July 1996); ‘Every 48 Hours…Piracy and Fraud Proliferate’, Fairplay, 23/1/97; ‘Case of the Disappearing Cargo’, Shipping Times, 10/4/97; ‘In Asian Waters, Sea Pirates Eschew Eye Patches, Steal Ships Via Internet’, The Christian Science Monitor, 13/6/96; ‘Phantom Vessels the Latest Tactic in Asian Piracy’, South China Morning Post, 21/7/94; ‘Probe into Stolen Ship Racket Leads to HK Firm’, South China Morning Post, 25/7/94; ‘Two-Day Talks on “Phantom” Ships and Piracy’, New Straits Times, 10/7/94; ‘Pirates Employ New Tactics in Asian Waters’, New Straits Times, 1/9/94; and ‘Tracking Down the “Phantom Ship”’, New Straits Times, 17/10/94. 27. See Jayant Abhyankar, ‘Phantom Ships’, in Ellen ed., Shipping at Risk – the Rising Tide of Organised Crime: 69–70. 28. Ibid., 71–2. 29. In the event, the sale was aborted following intense pressure against the PSB from the Indian Embassy, the IMB and representatives of the cargo’s legitimate buyers. 30. Personal correspondence between author and Eric Ellen, London, February 1997. See also IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. A Special Report: 33–9. 31. Jayant Abyankar, ‘The Case of the Anna Sierra’, in Ellen ed., Shipping at Risk: 279. 32. International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1998 (London: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 1999): 6. 33. Personal correspondence between author and John Martin, Kuala Lumpur, April 1994. 34. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1998: 10; ‘Beware the Jolly Roger’, Foreign Report (11 March 1999). 35. Personal correspondence between author and Eric Ellen, London, January 1997. Similar views were also expressed by Chief of Staff Chart Navavichit during interviews conducted at the Thai Institute of Advanced Naval Studies, Bangkok, July 1997. 36. Chalk, ‘Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’: 93. 37. NUMAST Telegraph, 25/7 (July 1992, piracy supplement): i. 38. Eric Ellen, ‘Piracy’, in Ellen ed., Shipping at Risk: 49–50. 39. Captain Graeme Hicks, Secretary of NUMAST. Cited in ‘Those in Peril on the Sea’, The Economist, 9/8/97. 40. Samuel Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence: a Special Report (London: Jane’s Information Group, July 1996): 106. 41. See, for instance, Robert Beckman, Carl Grundy-Warr and Vivian Forbes, ‘Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) Maritime Briefing (1994): 4; Kazuo Takita and Bob Couttie, ‘ASEAN Pressured to Act against Pirates’, Lloyds List, 29 (May 1992):

182 Notes

42.

43. 44. 45.

46.

47. 48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

3; Pugh, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea’: 11; Brian Walters, ‘Coastal Patrol Boats’, The Asian Defence Journal 5 (1993): 56; and ‘Port’s Reputation Attacked by Seamen’, South China Morning Post, 6/11/92. See, for instance, Acharya, A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era: 38; Michael Grey, ‘Piracy – a Hazard of our Times’, BIMCO Bulletin, 2 (March–April 1992): 23; ‘Piracy Becomes World Threat’, The Sunday Telegraph, 25/5/97; and ‘Terror on the High Seas’, The Australian, 21/11/95. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: a Special Report: 32. Beckman, Grundy-Warr and Forbes, ‘Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits’: 10–11. W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek, ‘Maritime Piracy in Asia’, in W. Carpenter and D. Wiencek eds., Asian Security Handbook. An Assessment of Political Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996): 81. See, for instance, Acharya, A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era: 37; Weeks, ‘Law and Order at Sea: Pacific Cooperation in Dealing with Piracy, Drugs and Illegal Immigration’: 46; and Beckman, Grundy-Warr and Forbes, ‘Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits’: 13–14. G. Naidu, ‘The Strait of Malacca and the Straits States: a Malaysian Perspective’: 11–12. See Acharya, A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia: ASEAN in the Post Cold War Era: 37–8; Beckman, Grundy-Warr and Forbes, ‘Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits’: 14; and M. Vatikiotis, ‘Raiders of Riau’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 2/7/92. See Beckman, Grundy-Warr and Forbes, ‘Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits’: 13–14; International Maritime Bureau, Piracy Annual Report 1996 (London: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 1997): 3; and International Maritime Bureau, Piracy Annual Report 1992 (London: ICCInternational Maritime Bureau, 1993): 4. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report 1996: 3. See also ‘Piracy Hotspot Shifts to Triangle of China, Philippines and Hong Kong’, Shipping Times, 25/5/93; ‘Piracy Still a Threat Despite Fewer Attacks in the Region’, Business Times, 3/2/94; ‘Piracy Increase in Far East’, Straits Shipper, 24–30 January, 1994; ‘South China Sea Piracy at Record Levels: Bimco’, New Straits Times, 26/11/93; ‘S. China Sea Haven for World Piracy: UN’, Straits Times, 13/3/94; ‘HK-Luzon-Hainan Triangle Still Prone to Pirate Attacks’, Business Times, 18/5/95; ‘Piracy on the Rise in HK-Luzon-Hainan Area’, New Straits Times, 22/5/95; ‘Upsurge in Piracy Attacks’, Shipping Times, 25/2/93; and ‘Piracy Takes a Dip but Shippers Warned of a Resurgence’, New Straits Times, 31/5/93. Personal correspondence between author and Gavin Greenwood, London, January 1997. See also Weeks, ‘Law and Order at Sea’: 46; Beckman, Grundy-Warr and Forbes, ‘Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits’: 13–20; and ‘Unfurl the Skull and Crossbones?’ Personal correspondence between author and John Martin, Kuala Lumpur, April 1997. Similar views with respect to the lack of central control by Beijing over its southern provinces were expressed by Vice Admiral Nitz

Notes 183

53.

54.

55. 56.

57.

58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69.

70.

Srisomwong and Chief of Staff Chart Navavichit during interviews conducted at the Thai Institute of Advanced Naval Studies, Bangkok, July 1997. It has been widely speculated that the delicate situation in Hong Kong in preparation for the Chinese takeover in 1997, and the related desire of the UK government not to unduly antagonise Beijing, was behind the initial pressure to withdraw the paper. See ‘HK Daily Reports Chinese Officials Joined in Piracy’, The National, 18/3/94; ‘Hong Kong Govt Accuses Chinese Officials of Piracy’, New Straits Times, 17/3/94; ‘HK Exposes China Piracy’, South China Morning Post, 16/3/94; ‘China Accused of Piracy’, Lloyds List, 11/3/94; ‘HK Report on Piracy Toned Down’, South China Morning Post, 27/5/93; and ‘Withdrawing Piracy Report “Not Political”’, South China Morning Post, 1/7/93. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1999: 3. Personal correspondence between author and Gavin Greenwood, London, January 1997. See also Control Risks Group, Business Security Outlook 1996 (London: Control Risks Group, 1996): 88. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1999: 3; ‘Piracy Becomes World Threat’, The Sunday Telegraph, 25/5/97 ‘Every 48 Hours…Piracy and Fraud Proliferate’, Fairplay, 23/1/97; ‘Piracy Prospers in Indonesia and Brazil’, Trade Winds, 31/1/97; and ‘In Asian Waters, Sea Pirates Eschew Eye Patches, Steal Ships Via Internet’, The Christian Science Monitor, 13/5/96. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1999: 3. Personal correspondence between the author and Captain Abyankar, Deputy Director, International Maritime Bureau, London, November 1998. See also ‘Piracy Prospers in Indonesia and Brazil’, Trade Winds, 31/1/97. Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence: 104. Simona de Luga’, Pirates Plunder at Will in Brazil’, Journal of Commerce, 31/12/97. Ibid. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1999: 3. Personal correspondence between the author and Captain Abyankar, London, November 1998. Lloyds List Casualty Report, 2/2/98. ‘Rio de Janeiro – Port Security’, BIMCO Weekly News, No. 36, 2/9/98; ‘BIMCO Plea on Growing Piracy’, Lloyds List, 7/9/98; and ‘BIMCO Appeals to Brazilian Authorities’, BIMCO Press Release, 7/9/98. See, for instance, ‘Santos Anti-Piracy Fees Anger Port Users’, Lloyds List, 10/2/98. Quoted in de Logu, ‘Pirates Plunder at Will in Brazil’: 2B. P. Birnie, ‘Piracy Past, Present and Future’, in Ellen ed., Piracy at Sea: 142–3; Pugh, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Problems and Remedies’: 10; ‘Pirates Return to Prowl Caribbean Waters’, South China Morning Post, 1/7/94; ‘Piracy Becomes World Threat’, The Sunday Telegraph, 25/5/97. The LTTE is one of the few insurgency movements in the world to have had at its disposal a fully fledged ‘naval force’. Known as the Sea Tigers, this amphibious unit has carried out numerous attacks against the navies of both Sri Lanka and India and is, arguably, more proficient than both. Since 1995, most of these operations have been aimed at disrupting government

184 Notes

71. 72.

73.

74.

75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

84. 85. 86.

maritime supply routes to Jaffna, the ultimate aim of which is to logistically sever the peninsula from the rest of the country. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1999: 3. Personal correspondence between author and Captain Abyankar, London, November 1998. See also Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence: 52; and ‘Débâcle in the Port’, The Island, 24/9/98. International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 1 January – 30 September 1998 (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1998): 10; ‘Tamil Tigers Hijacked Merchant Ship, Say Officials’, The Star, 15/8/98; and ‘Terror in the Sri Lankan Skies?’ Jane’s Intelligence Review Pointer (November 1998): 10. Personal correspondence between author and Rohan Gunaratna, British Chevening Scholar and LTTE specialist, St Andrews University, February and November 1998. Similar views were expressed to the author during interviews with personnel from the US Defence Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) Office of Counterterrorism, Washington D.C., July 1998. It should be noted that the IMB remains sceptical of such claims, maintaining that there is no definitive evidence to support allegations and supposition of this sort. The Bureau believes the LTTE has managed to build up its deep-sea fleet by legitimately purchasing vessels through the many front organisations that the group runs. Personal correspondence between author and Captain Abyankar, London, November 1998. Personal correspondence between author and John Martin, Kuala Lumpur, April 1997. Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence: 51–2. BIMCO, Piracy, Stowaways and Drug Smuggling: 39; Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence: 50–1. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 1 January – 30 September 1998: 3. Personal correspondence between the author and Captain Abyankar, London, November 1998. See also ‘Turkish Ship Attacked by Pirates’, New Straits Times (Shipping), 15/2/94; and ‘Terror on the High Seas’, The Australian, 21/11/95. Menefee, Trends in Maritime Violence: 45–8; and Sam Menefee, ‘Sharks of the Sea’, in Ellen ed., Shipping at Risk: 37. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report, 1999: 3. Ibid.: 6. See, for instance, ‘Terror on the High Seas’, The Australian, 21/11/95; ‘Piracy Becomes World Threat’, The Sunday Telegraph, 25/5/97; and ‘Those in Peril on the Sea’, The Economist, 9/8/97. Weeks, ‘Law and Order at Sea’, 43–5. See also Beckman, Grundy-Warr and Forbes, ‘Acts of Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits’: 5–6. See Pugh, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea’: 5–6. D. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 1075–8; and Weeks, ‘Law and Order at Sea’: 44–5. See also A. Lowe, ‘Some Legal Problems Arising from the Use of the Sea for Military Purposes’, Marine Policy, 10/3 (1986): 171–84; and B. Kwiatkowska, ‘Military Uses in the EEZ: a Reply’, Marine Policy, 11/3 (1987): 249–50.

Notes 185 87. Personal correspondence between the author and Vice Admiral Nitz Srisomwong, Bangkok, July 1997. See also Pugh, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea’: 7. 88. Takita and Couttie, ‘ASEAN Pressured to Act Against Pirates’: 3. 89. Fursdon, ‘Sea Piracy – Or Maritime Mugging?’: 166.

4.

Enviromental degradation

1. See Daniel Deudeny, ‘The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 19/1 (1990). 2. R. T. Maddock, ‘Environmental Security in East Asia,’ Contemporary Southeast Asia, 17/1 (1995): 24–5. See also R. Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, International Security, 8/1 (1983): 133. 3. Maddock, ‘Environmental Security in East Asia’: 25. See also Simon Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’, Intelligence and National Security, 10/4 (1995): 176; and The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford: WCED, 1987): 43. 4. See Jose Alampay, ‘Revisiting Environmental Security in the Philippines’, Journal of Environment and Development, 5/3 (1996): 33–335. See also ‘Broken Rice Bowl’, Asiaweek, 1/9/95; The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), EIU Country Forecast: the Philippines (London: Economist Intelligence Unit 1996, 1st Quarter); ‘Myopia in Manila,’ The Far Eastern Economic Review, 28/9/95; G. Porter, ‘Environmental Security as a National Security Issue’, Current History, 94/952 (1995): 218–22; and ‘Rice Crisis in Asia’, Foreign Report, 2378, 30/11/95. 5. See Charles Southwick, Global Ecology in Human Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): 253. 6. Maddock, ‘Environmental Security in East Asia’: 28; Alan Dupont, The Environment and Security in the Asia Pacific, Adelphi Paper 319 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies 1998): 62. 7. Jim MacNeill, ‘The Greening of International Relations’, International Journal, 45/1 (1989–90): 6. 8. Maddock, ‘Environmental Security in East Asia’: 28. 9. Peter Dauvergne, ‘Globalisation and Deforestation in the Asia-Pacific’, Research School of Asia Pacific Studies (RSAPS) Working Paper No. 1997/7, The Australian National University, November 1997: 12. 10. MacNeill, ‘The Greening of International Relations’: 6. 11. Anne Murray, ‘Population: A Global Accounting’, Environment, 27 (July– August, 1985): 10. 12. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 12. John McBeth, ‘El Nino Gets Blamed’, The Far Eastern Economic Review, 9/10/97. 13. ‘Deforestation Blamed as Epidemic Threatens’, The Australian, 24/8/98. 14. Maddock, ‘Environmental Security in East Asia’: 28. 15. ‘Pennan’s Last Stand Against Timber Industry Pirates’, The Guardian, 10/1/92.

186 Notes 16. Neville Brown, Climate Change: a Threat to Peace, Conflict Studies 272 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994): 16. 17. Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’: 181. 18. James Mitchell and Neil Ericksen, ‘Effects of Climate Change on WeatherRelated Disasters’, in M. Mintzer ed., Confronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 127–40. 19. Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’: 177. 20. ‘Changing Climate’, The Australian, 15/7/96. 21. John Maunder, Dictionary of Global Climate Change (London: UCL Press, 1994): 120; Ian Whyte, Climate Change and Human Society (London: Arnold, 1995): 65; Brown, Climate Change: a Threat to Peace: 16. 22. Scientific General Circulation Models (GCMs) have predicted that, depending on the base year (a.k.a. the ‘initial conditions’), temperature equilibrium increases, consequent upon a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalence, would likely range between 1.9°C and 5.2°C. Brown, Climate Change: a Threat to Peace: 18. 23. Peter Read, Responding to Global Warming: the Technology, Economics and Politics of Sustainable Energy (London: Zed Books, 1994): 33; Whyte, Climate and Human Society: 65–6; Mark Zacher, ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple’, in James N. Rosneau ed., Governance without Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 67–8; Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’: 177. 24. Maunder, Dictionary of Global Climate Change: 121; Richard Turco, Earth Under Siege: From Air Pollution to Global Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 199): 368; Whyte, Climate Change and Human Society: 71–7. 25. Turco, Earth Under Siege: 386–7; Whyte, Climate Change and Human Society: 141–51; ‘Changing Climate’, The Australian, 15/7/96. 26. Turco, Earth Under Siege: 387; Maunder, Dictionary of Global Climate Change: 208–9; Whyte, Climate Change and Human Society: 119. See also R. Warrick and G. Farmer, ‘The Greenhouse Effect, Climate Change and Sea Level Change: Implications for Development’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 15 (1990): 5–20. 27. Alan Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: A New Security’, Pacific Review 9/1 (1997): 16. 28. ‘Cities in Danger as Warming Raises Sea Levels’, The Australian, 31/3/95; Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: a New Security’: 17. 29. Whyte, Climate Change and Human Society: 124. 30. Brown, Climate Change: a Threat to Peace: 18–19. See also George Mavel, Climatic Change in the Intra-Americas Sea (London: Edward Arnold, 1993): Chapter 5. Working from the same general principles noted above, scientific GCMs have predicted that rainfall precipitation equilibrium increases, consequent upon a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalence, would likely range between 3°C and 15°C.

Notes 187 31. Turco, Earth Under Siege: 388; Whyte, Climate Change and Human Society: 155–9. See also N. W. Arnell et al., The Implications of Climate Change for the National Rivers Authority (London: HMSO, 1994); and R. L. Whyman, Global Climate Change and Life on Earth (London: Routledge, 1991). 32. ‘Asian Food Stock Faces Lean Times’, The Australian, 18/2/99. 33. Zacher, ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple’: 68; Narottam Gaan, ‘Environment and Conflict: the South’s Perspective’, Strategic Analysis, 18/6 (1995): 833; Whyte, Climate Change and Human Society: 171. 34. Turco, Earth Under Siege: 407; Maunder, Dictionary of Global Climate Change: 187; Zacher , ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple’: 67; Whyte, Climate Change and Human Society: 82–3; Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’, 177–8. ‘Ozone Hole Grows to Record Size’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 1/10/98. 35. CFCs have been replaced with halogenated hydrocarbons (HCFCs), some containing chlorine (HCFCs), others not. These gases are not thought to directly affect ozone concentrations. They also have a shorter life than CFCs – generally less than 20 years. As such, their atmospheric concentrations will be lower than those of CFCs. 36. See, for instance, Mark Crawford, ‘Landmark Ozone Treaty Negotiated’, Science (1987): 1557; Peter Morrisette, ‘The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion’, Natural Resources Journal, 29 (Summer 1989): 793–820; and Maunder, Dictionary of Global Climate Change: 187. 37. Maunder, Dictionary of Global Climate Change: 187; Turco, Earth Under Siege: 418–20. 38. Zacher, ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple’: 67; Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’: 178; Read, Responding to Global Warming: 36–7; Turco, Earth Under Siege: 421. 39. Quoted in ‘Ozone Hole Grows to Record Size’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 1/10/98. 40. ‘Mexico City Smog Threatens Lives But Data Lacking’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 24/5/98; ‘State of the World Population’, UN Chronicle, 19 (July, 1985): 79. 41. Eugene Linden, ‘The Exploding Cities of the Developing World’, Foreign Affairs, 75/1 (1996): 57. 42. ‘Rise of the Megacity’, The Australian, 21/4/97; ‘Chinese City Portrays Good and Bad of Rapid Growth’, The Bangkok Post, 12/10/97. 43. Linden, ‘The Exploding Cities of the Developing World’: 57. 44. Gautam Kaji, ‘Challenges to the East Asian Environment’, The Pacific Review, 7/2 (1994): 211; Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 13; Maddock, ‘Environmental Security in East Asia’: 28. 45. ‘Southeast Asia’s Year of Reckoning’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 6/10/97. 46. See, for instance, Maddock, ‘Environmental Security in East Asia’: 29; Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’: 178; Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 13–14; Robert Bedeski, ‘Unconventional Security and the Republic of Korea’, CANCAPS Papier 8 (1995): 9; Douglas Murray, ‘American Interests in China’s Environment’, The Pacific Review, 7/2 (1994): 216; and Charles Kegley and Eugene Whittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation (London: Macmillan, 1989): 288.

188 Notes 47. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 9. 48. ‘Where There’s Smoke There’s Serious, Long Term Damage’, The Australian 6/10/97; ‘Jakarta Spells Out More Measures to Halt Fires in Sumatra, Kalimantan’, The Sunday Times (Malaysia), 14/9/97. 49. ‘Where There’s Smoke There’s Serious, Long-Term Damage’, The Australian, 6/10/97; ‘Economic Worries Deepen as Pollution Casts Pall Over Tourism’, The Australian, 7/19/97. 50. ‘The Haze Worsens’, The Straits Times, 15/9/97. 51. Quoted in ‘Economic Worries Deepen as Pollution Casts Pall Over Tourism’, The Australian, 7/10/97. 52. ‘Where There’s Smoke There’s Serious, Long-Term Damage’, The Australian, 6/10/97; ‘Economic Worries Deepen as Pollution Casts Pall Over Tourism’, The Australian, 7/10/97; ‘Indonesian Fires Could Cost US$6 Billion, Experts Say’, The Jakarta Post, 18/3/98. 53. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 12–13; ‘When an Archipelago isn’t an Island Entire of Itself’, The Australian, 9/10/97; ‘Indonesians Blame Killer Smoke Haze on Weather’, The Australian, 29/9/97; ‘Haze Battle a Litmus Test for ASEAN Ties’, The Australian, 10/7/97; and ‘Forest Fires an Act of Environmental Terrorism’, The Nation, 29/9/97. 54. Quoted in ‘Haze Battle a Litmus Test for ASEAN Ties’, The Australian, 10/7/97. 55. ‘Rival Demands Leave Asia Thirsty Despite Heavy Rain’, The Vancouver Sun, 16/12/96. 56. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 59. 57. Neville Brown, ‘Climate, Ecology and International Security’, Survival, 31/6 (1989): 124. 58. Vera Haller, ‘Water an Issue at Food Summit’, The Jakarta Post, 11/11/96. 59. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia; See also ‘United Nations Environment Programme-UNEP’, Europa World Yearbook (London: Europa Publications, 1997): 42. 60. ‘Demands Leave Asia Thirsty Despite Heavy Rain’, The Vancouver Sun, 16/12/96. 61. Lorraine Elliot, ‘Environmental Degradation as a Human Security Issue’, paper given before the Korea-Australia Joint Workshop on ‘Human Security and Regional Cooperation: Preparing for the 21st Century’, Canberra and Brisbane, September 1998. 62. ‘How We’re Speeding Up the Destruction of Our World’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 3/10/98. 63. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 59–60; ‘Only 0.0007 Percent of World Water Found Useable’, The Jakarta Post, 10/3/97. 64. ‘Rival Demands Leave Asia Thirsty Despite Heavy Rain’, The Vancouver Sun, 16/12/96. 65. ‘Factors That Contribute to River Pollution’, The New Straits Times, 13/4/97; ‘The United Nations Environment Programme – UNEP’, Europa World Yearbook: 42; 66. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 60. 67. ‘World Relationships: Climate’, Hammond Atlas of the World (Michigan: Hammond Inc., 1992): 30–1; Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’: 179; and Peter Glieck, ‘Effects

Notes 189

68. 69. 70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82.

83. 84. 85.

of Climate Change on Shared Fresh Water Resources’, in Irving Mintzer ed., Confronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 127–40. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 60. Ibid. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Ranking of Environmental Issues by Asian Policy Makers (Harvard : Harvard Institute for International Development, 1996). The perceived importance of water pollution and freshwater depletion were indexed at 16 on a scale of 0–20. This compares to 9 for air pollution and deforestation; 8 for solid waste; 7 for soil erosion; 6 for biodiversity loss; and 3 for wildlife loss, fish depletion, desertification and climate change. ‘India and Bangladesh: Sweeter Waters’, The Economist, 16/11/96; ‘Water Wars’, The Australian, 15/1/96. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 65. ‘Cleaning Up in Asia’, The Australian, 19/5/97; ‘Factors That Contribute to River Pollution’, The New Straits Times, 13/4/97 Food Agricultural Organisation (FAO), The State of Food and Agriculture, 1993 (www.fao.org). ‘Rival Demands Leave Asia Despite Heavy Rain’, The Vancouver Sun, 16/12/96. Ibid. ‘Factors That Contribute to River Pollution’, The New Sunday Times, 13/4/97. ‘Rival Demands Leave Asia Thirsty Despite Heavy Rain’, The Vancouver Sun, 16/12/96. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 65. ‘Rival Demands Leave Asia Thirsty Despite Heavy Rain’, The Vancouver Sun, 16/12/96. See, for instance, Peter Chalk, ‘The International Ethics of Refugees’, The Australian Journal of International Affairs 52/2 (1998): 154–5; Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992); and Alasdair Stewart, Migrants, Minorities and Security in Europe, Conflict Studies 252 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992). For further details see N. Beschorner, Water and Instability in the Middle East, Adelphi Paper 273 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992/93); J. Isaac and L. Hosh, ‘Roots of the Water Conflict in the Middle East’, [http://www.arij.org/water/pub/roots.htm 1992]; and N. Myers, ‘Environment and Security’, Foreign Policy (Spring, 1989): 23–41. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 73. Quoted in ‘Singapore Seeks a Solution to Dependence on Imported Water’, Asia Times, 11/6/97. Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (London: Dent, 1914). For a more contemporary perspective of Malthusian views see Paul Erlich, The Population Bomb (London: Pan/Ballantine, 1972); and Donella Meadows et al., Limits to Growth: a Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (London: Pan Books, 1974).

190 Notes 86. ‘Hungry for Growth’, The Australian, 21/11/96. 87. Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and Transformation (London: Macmillan, 1989, 3rd Edition): 295 88. ‘Why More Food Hasn’t Helped the World’s Hungry’, The Jakarta Post, 26/10/96. 89. ‘Realism To Be Hallmark of World Food Summit’, The Jakarta Post, 9/11/96. 90. It should be noted that unregulated irrigation can also contribute to the degradation of agricultural land by increasing underground water levels and creating salination. 91. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 49. 92. Adverse weather conditions, particularly between 1995 and 1997, greatly compounded the country’s food crisis with droughts and flooding decimating already critically low agriculturally yields. 93. ‘With a Bit of Ingenuity, North Koreans Find Food’, The International Herald Tribune, 10/6/97. 94. ‘Desperate N. Korea Pleads for Food Aid’, The Australian, 4/2/97. 95. ‘UN: For N. Koreans, Worst Is Still To Come’, Reuters, 28/10/97; ‘Caritas Warns Famine in N. Korea far From Over’, Reuters, 22/10/97; ‘UN: North Korea’s Food Crisis Far From Over’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 14/6/98; ‘Starving N. Korea Resorts to Grass, Acorn Additives’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 11/11/98. 96. ‘South Korean Agency Claims that More Than Two Million People Died from Starvation in North’, The Irish Times, 4/3/99; ‘2.8 Million North Koreans Died From Natural Calamities’, Agence France-Presse, 20/1/98; ‘Famine May Have Killed 2 Million in North Korea’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 19/8/98. 97. The Agreed Framework offers certain incentives to Pyongyang that are essentially designed to entice the regime into voluntarily giving up its nuclear ambitions. Under the terms of the Agreement, North Korea agrees to: (a) dismantle its existing nuclear infrastructure; (b) fully disclose all its past nuclear activities; and (c) place all its nuclear facilities under full International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards and control. In return, the Pyongyang regime is guaranteed: (a) two modern, proliferation-proof light water reactors (LWRs); and (b) the annual provision of 500 000 tons of heavy fuel oil until the LWRs are up and running (set for a target date of 2003). A multilateral consortium known as the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) will bear the costs of installing the LWRs and providing the heavy fuel oil. For further details see Joseph Bemudez and Gerry Segal, North Korea: The Final Act, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 2 (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1995); Robert Galluchi , ‘The Agreed Framework: Advancing US Interests with North Korea’, US Dispatch 5/50 (1994) ; and Gerry Segal and David Mussington, ‘North Korea – Where to From Here?’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (August 1994). 98. See, for instance, Shawn Crispin and Shim Jae Hoon, ‘Broken Promises’, The Far Eastern Economic Review, 22/10/98; and ‘Invisible North Korea Famine Isn’t Always What It Seems’, The New York Times (Internet Edition), 12/10/97. 99. Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia: 48.

Notes 191 100. MacNeill, ‘The Greening of International Relations’: 6. 101. Stewart Firth, Australia in International Politics (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1999): 253.

5.

The transnational spread of disease 1. Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh, ‘Sex, Drugs and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities’, Security Dialogue, 29/2 (1998): 167; George Armelagos, ‘The Viral Superhighway’, The Sciences, 38/1 (1998): 24–5. 2. Indicative of this was the emergence of a Hong Kong ‘supergerm’ in 1999. A derivative of the staphylococcus aureus bacteria, the germ proved resistant to vancomyin, an antibiotic known as the ‘silver bullet’, which doctors use as a last resort to treat infections when all other recourses fail. It is believed that part of the reason for the emergence of such mutations is an over-willingness to prescribe antibiotics for routine illnesses that could be cured by people’s natural immune systems. See ‘AntibioticResistant Germ Kills Woman, Hong Kong Officials Say’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 22/2/99. 3. Armelagos, ‘The Viral Superhighway’: 25–6. 4. There are many other potentially fatal diseases in addition to those listed, including dengue fever, Mediterranean spotted fever, African horse disease, hepatitis B and C, smallpox (though this has been more or less eradicated since 1980), Ross River virus, monkeypox, camelpox, sleeping sickness, legionnaire’s disease, Japanese encephalitis, oncherciasis, lassa fever, marburg fever and Rift Valley fever. 5. D. FitzSimons and A. W. Whiteside, The AIDS Epidemic: Economic, Political and Security Implications, Conflict Studies 251 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992): 1–4. 6. The World Health Organisation defines an epidemic as a localised outbreak of disease affecting more than 50 people per 100 000. When disease spreads across the world, the term pandemic is used. Thus, the spread of HIV and AIDS can correctly be termed as both epidemic and pandemic in proportions. 7. World Health Organisation (WHO), International Travel and Health. Vaccination Requirements and Health Advice (Geneva: WHO, 1998): 65; ‘Young Bear the Brunt as Aids Spreads Though the World on a Biblical Scale’. The Independent, 25/11/98; World Health Organisation (WHO), UNAIDS: Global Estimates (Geneva: WHO, 1998). 8. See, for instance, J. Watson, ‘Tuberculosis in Britain Today’, British Medical Journal, 306 (1993): 221–2; Norman Grist et al., Diseases of Infection: an Illustrated Textbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): 229–41; Guy Youmans et al., The Biological and Clinical Basis of Infectious Diseases (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1985): 348–67; D. W. FitzSimons and A. W. Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health, Conflict Studies 276 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, Nov.–Dec. 1994: 18; and Mark Earnest and John Sbarbaro, ‘A Plague Returns’, The Sciences, 33/5 (1993): 14–19.

192 Notes 9. ‘WHO Cites TB Air Travel Risk’, The New York Times (Internet Edition): 17/12/98. 10. World Health Organisation (WHO), ‘Tuberculosis’, WHO Fact Sheet No. 104 (Geneva: WHO, February 1998): 1. 11. FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 17–18; Abram Benenson ed., Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, 16th edn (Washington D.C.: American Public Health Association, 1995): 293, 358. 12. FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 16; Grist et al., Diseases of Infection: 342–3; 13. Centre for Disease Control (CDC), Cholera Information for Travellers [http://www.cdc.gov/travel/cholera.htm], 18/12/98: 1; Benenson, ed., Control of Communicable Diseases: 95. 14. FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 17; Youmans et al., The Biological and Clinical Basis of Infectious Diseases: 501–2; Health Canada, ‘Statement on Overseas Travellers and Typhoid Fever’, Canadian Medical Association Journal, 151 (1994): 989. 15. With the exception of Argentina, Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela, where the disease is moderately prevalent. 16. With the exception of South Africa. 17. Health Canada, ‘Statement on Overseas Travellers and Typhoid Fever’, 989; Benenson ed., Control of Communicable Diseases: 503. 18. FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 16; Benenson ed., Control of Communicable Diseases: 10. 19. Travel Health Online, ‘Dysentery – Summary Information’, [http://www. tripprep.com/quicksum/qsdyse.html], 18/12/98: 1–2; Benenson ed., Control of Communicable Diseases: 422. 20. Benenson ed., Control of Communicable Diseases: 422. 21. Grist et al., Diseases of Infection: 212. See also Adam Indikt, ‘What Saddam Has Hidden…For Now’, The Review, 22/16 (1997): 9; Sir Joseph Smith, ‘The Ellison-Cliffe Lecture: The Threat of New Infectious Diseases’, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 86 (1993): 374; and Benenson ed., Control of Communicable Diseases: 353. 22. World Health Organisation (WHO), ‘Plague Prevalence’, WHO Weekly Epidemiological Record, 71/22 (1996). 23. World Health Organisation (WHO), ‘Yellow Fever’, WHO Fact Sheet No. 100 (Geneva: WHO, August 1998): 1; World Health Organisation (WHO), International Travel and Health: 10–15; Benenson ed., Control of Communicable Diseases: 519–20. 24. FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health, 16. See also Grist et al., Diseases of Infection: 327–84; and Youmans et al., The Biologic and Clinical Basis of Infectious Diseases: 705–15. 25. World Health Organisation (WHO), Malaria Prevention and Control [http://www.who.int/ctd/html/malaria.html], 18/12/98: 2; World Health Organisation (WHO), International Health and Travel: 67–71. 26. Jan Rodolfo, ‘New and Emerging Infections: Ebola’, [http://www.bact. wisc.edu/science/ebolawpd.html], 17/09/98; Center for Disease Control (CDC), ‘Ebola Virus Haemorrhagic Fever: General Information’, [http://www. uct.ac.za/microbiology/ebcdcinf.html], 17/9/98.

Notes 193 27. Benenson ed., Control of Communicable Diseases: 160; Frederick Murphy and C. J. Peters, ‘Ebola Virus: Where Does it Come From and Where is it Going?’ in Richard Krause ed., Emerging Infections (New York: Academic Press, 1998): 378–9. 28. Ruth Dircks ed., Disease and Society. A Resource Book (Canberra: Australian Academy of Science, 1989): 12–15. 29. I. Lee and A. Haines, ‘Health Costs of the Gulf War’, British Medical Journal (1991): 303. 30. FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 27. 31. Lee and Haines, ‘Health Costs of the Gulf War’: 303. The effects of overcrowding on the spread of TB have been particularly well documented in a study on Danish concentration camp prisoners during the Second World War. In the worst of the so-called ‘KZ’ camps, pulmonary TB may have afflicted as many as 20 to 40 per cent of the inmate population, possibly accounting for as much as 40 percent of all deaths. For further details see P. Helweg-Larsen et al., Famine Disease in German Concentration Camps: Complications and Sequels (Acta Med. Scand. Supplement 274): 330–61. 32. Smith, ‘The Threat of New Infectious Diseases’: 375; FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 16. See also Lee and Haines, ‘Health Costs of the Gulf War’; and D. Itavyar and L. Ogba, ‘Violence, Conflict and Health in Africa’, Social Sciences Medicine, 28/7 (1989). 33. Myron Levine and Orin Levine, ‘Changes in Human Ecology and Behaviour in Relation to the Emergence of Diarrhoeal Diseases, Including Cholera’, in Bernard Roizman ed., Infectious Diseases in an Age of Change (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995): 34; Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 41 (1992): 913–17. 34. Smith, ‘The Threat of New Infectious Diseases’: 376; FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 24; Armelagos, ‘The Viral Superhighway’: 25. 35. Armelagos, ‘The Viral Superhighway’: 28. 36. Derek Yach, ‘The Globalisation of Public Health I: Threats and Opportunities’, American Journal of Public Health, 88/5 (1998): 737; Armelgos, ‘The Viral Superhighway’: 28. 37. Smith, ‘The Threat of New Infectious Diseases’: 376; A. Kondrachine and P. Trigg, ‘Global Overview of Malaria’, Indian Journal of Medical Research, 106 (1997): 39–53; Karen Day, ‘Malaria: a Global Threat’, in Krause ed., Emerging Infections: 484. 38. Laurie Garrett, ‘The Return of Infectious Disease’, Foreign Affairs, 75/1 (1996): 69. 39. Smith, ‘The Threat of New Infectious Diseases’: 376; ‘WHO Cites Air Travel Risk’, Associated Press (AP), 18/12/98. 40. FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 24; Mark Zacher, ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance’, in James Rosenau ed., Governance Without Government (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992): 69; Thomas Quinn, ‘The AIDS Epidemic: Demographic Aspects, Population Biology, and Virus Evolution’, in Krause ed., Emerging Infections: 331.

194 Notes 41. Thomas Quinn, ‘Population Migration and the Spread of Types 1 and 2 Human Immunodeficiency Viruses’, in Roizman ed., Infectious Diseases in an Age of Change: 81. 42. J. Bwayo et al., n.t.a., East Africa Medical Journal, 68 (1991): 425–9. 43. J. Bwayo and J. Muere, n.t.a., East Africa Medical Journal, 68 (1991): 714–19. 44. Quinn, ‘Population Migration and the Spread of Types 1 and 2 Human Immunodeficiency Viruses’: 90; FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 24. 45. Armelagos, ‘The Viral Superhighway’: 28; Day, ‘Malaria: A Global Threat’: 484–5; Smith, ‘The Threat of New Infectious Diseases’: 376; ‘Changing Climate’, The Australian, 15/7/96. 46. See, for instance, A. Kondachrine, ‘Mission Report on Malaria Epidemics in Rajasthan’, unpublished World Health Organisation (WHO) Report, 1996; A. Kondachrine, ‘Malaria in Peru’, unpublished World Health Organisation (WHO) report, 1997; J. Lepers et al., ‘Transmission and Epidemiology of Newly Transmitted Falciparum Malaria in the Central Highland Plateau of Madagascar’, Annals of Tropical Medicine, 85 (1991): 297–304; A. Teklehaimanot, ‘Travel Report to Ethiopia’, unpublished World Health Organisation (WHO) report, 1991. 47. Day, ‘Malaria: A Global Threat’: 485; ‘Changing Climate’: The Australian, 15/7/96; ‘Raining Misery: Millions Marooned in Bangladesh’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 19/9/98; ‘A Needy Nation Struggles with Disaster’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 19/9/98. 48. See, for instance, James Logue, ‘Disasters, the Environment, and Public Health: Improving Our Response’, The American Journal of Public Health, 86/9 (1996): 1207–10; M. Gregg ed., The Public Health Consequences of Disasters (Atlanta: CDC, 1989); M. Lechat, ‘The Epidemiology of Health Effects of Disasters’, Epidemiological Review, 12 (1990): 192–8; A. McMichael, ‘Global Environmental Change and Human Population Health: A Conceptual and Scientific Challenge for Epidemiology’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 22 (1993): 1–8; and P. Epstein, ‘Emerging Diseases and Ecosystem Instability: New Threats to Public Health’, American Journal of Public Health, 85 (1995): 168–72. 49. ‘Disease Threatens Survivors’, The Australian, 9/11/98; ‘They Survived Mitch –- To Live in Misery’, The Sunday Times (Singapore), 15/11/98. 50. Whiteside and FitzSimons, The AIDS Epidemic: 7; ‘Young Bear the Brunt as AIDS Spreads Through the World on a Biblical Scale’, The Independent, 25/11/98; Garrett, ‘The Return of Infectious Disease’: 72. 51. ‘Young Bear the Brunt as AIDS Spreads Through the World on a Biblical Scale’, The Independent, 25/11/98; ‘HIV City -– Where One in Four is Infected’, The Independent, 25/11/98. 52. B Weniger et al., AIDS, 5 (Supplement 2, 1991), S71–S75. 53. See, for instance, R. Bollinger et al., ‘The Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic in India and Thailand’, Medicine, 74 (1995): 97–106. 54. World Health Organisation (WHO), Weekly Epidemiological Report, 68 (1993): 74–7; Thomas Quinn and Anthony Fauci, ‘The AIDS Epidemic: Demographic Aspects, Population Biology and Virus Evolution’, in Krause ed., Emerging Infections: 337.

Notes 195 55. UNAIDS, HIV/AIDS. The Global Epidemic (Geneva: UNAIDS Publication, December 1996); UNAIDS, The Status and Trends of the Global HIV/AIDS Pandemic (Geneva: UNAIDS Publication, July 1996). 56. Quinn and Fauci, ‘The AIDS Epidemic’: 336; Whiteside and FitzSimons, ‘The AIDS Epidemic. Economic, Political and Security Implications’: 7. 57. Personal correspondence between author and officials from the Office of Narcotics Control Board, Bangkok, July 1997. 58. Peter Chalk, Low Intensity Conflict in Southeast Asia. Conflict Studies, 305/306 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1998): 12. 59. Bertil Lintner, The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia, Jane’s Intelligence Review Special Report No. 5 (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1995): 17. 60. Noted in Whiteside and FitzSimons, ‘The AIDS Epidemic. Economic, Political and Security Implications’: 30. 61. John Last, Public Health and Human Ecology (Stamford: Appleton and Lange, 1998): 347; United Nations Statistical Office [Population Division], Population Statistics and Projections (New York: United Nations, 1995); Eugene Linden, ‘The Exploding Cities of the Developing World’, Foreign Affairs, 75/1 (1996): 53. 62. Last, Public Health and Human Ecology: 347–8; Armelagos, ‘The Viral Superhighway’: 28; Garrett, ‘The Return of Infectious Disease’: 71. 63. ‘Polluted Environment Causing Worldwide Illness and Deaths’, The Manila Times, 24/5/98. 64. A megacity is defined as one whose population exceeds 10 million residents. 65. ‘Rise of the Megacity’, The Australian, 21/4/97; ‘Chinese City Portrays Good and Bad of Rapid Growth’, The Bangkok Post, 12/10/97. 66. ‘Cleaning Up in Asia’, The Australian, 19/5/97. 67. See, for instance, Smith, ‘The Threat of New Infectious Diseases’: 375; Last, Public Health and Human Ecology: 348–50; ‘Indonesian Capital at Bursting Point’, The Bangkok Post, 12/10/97; ‘Chinese City Portrays Good and Bad of Rapid Growth’, The Bangkok Post, 12/10/97. 68. Linden, ‘The Exploding Cities of the Developing World’: 56. 69. Armelagos, ‘The Viral Superhighway’: 28; Benenson ed., Control of Communicable Diseases Manual: 96; Linden, ‘The Exploding Cities of the Developing World’: 57. For a good account of the origins and causes of cholera see Eric Rubin, Matthew Waldor and John Mekalanos, ‘Mobile Genetic Elements and the Evolution of New Epidemic Strains of Vibrio Cholerae’, in Krause ed., Emerging Infections: 147–61. 70. A typical virus particle is a thousand times smaller than a living cell. To give an idea of its comparative size, if a virus particle were an object about an inch across, a human hair would be a thousand feet across. 71. Bacteria and viruses are weaponised in different ways. A bacteriological weapon is grown in a fermenter tank, which tends to give off either a yeasty or meaty smell, somewhat like beer, or meat broth. Viruses, however, cannot cause fermentation when they grow and, as such, are not made in fermenter tanks. A virus typically converts a population of living cells into more virus, a process known as amplification. The machine that amplifies a virus is called a bioreactor. As nothing ferments inside the tank, no gases are given off, which means there is no smell.

196 Notes 72. Anthrax is transmitted via highly resistant spores produced by Bacillus anthracis, a bacterium related mainly to livestock disease. It is extremely virulent, typically affecting the skin, oropharynx and lower respiratory, mediastinum or intestinal tracts. 73. Roger Medd and Frank Goldstein, ‘International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20 (1997): 294–5; Richard Preston, The Cobra Event (London: Orion, 1997): 48–9; Kirill Babievsky, ‘Chemical and Biological Terrorism’, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, 6/2 (1997); Smith, ‘The Threat of New Infectious Diseases’: 374; ‘Germ Weapons: Deadly But Hard to Use’, The New York Times, 21/11/97; ‘Need a Biological War? Labs Sell Anthrax Germs By Mail Order’, The Sunday Times, 22/11/98; and James Campbell, Excerpts from Research Study ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 9/2 (1997). 74. Richard Falkenrath, ‘Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism’, Survival, 40/3 (1998): 45–6. 75. Falkenrath, ‘Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism’: 47. See also Ron Purver, ‘The Threat of Chemical/Biological Terrorism’: Canadian Security Intelligence Service Commentary, 60 (1995): 6–7; ‘Germ Weapons: Deadly But Hard to Use’, The New York Times, 21/11/97; and generally the special issue on the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, Politics and the Life Sciences, 15/2 (1996). 76. The Tokyo sarin nerve gas attack represents the first bone fide act of terrorism involving a weapon of mass destruction. Although only 12 people were killed in the assault, 5000 were injured. 77. ‘Germ Wars: The New Threat’, The Weekend Australian, 24/1/98; ‘The New Arms Race’, The Weekend Australian, 13/6/98; Garrett, ‘The Return of Infectious Disease’: 75–6. 78. Biological agents such as anthrax and plague can be purchased on the open market relatively cheaply. One laboratory in Indonesia, for instance, offered undercover reporters from the UK’s Sunday Times Insight Team samples of anthrax, plague and brucella for just US$1000, including shipping. A second outlet in the Czech republic agreed to sell the reporters the toxin Clostridium botulinum, which causes botulism, for as little as US$33 a sample. The Indonesian and Czech labs are among 450 commercial germ collectors worldwide. 50 trade in anthrax, 34 sell the botulinum bacteria and 18 specialise in plague. See ‘Need a Biological War? Labs Sell Anthrax Germs by Mail Order’, The Sunday Times (UK), 22/11/98. 79. ‘Iraq Revenge Fears As Extremists Are Held’, The Daily Telegraph, 20/2/98; ‘Anthrax Terror Plot Foiled in the US’, The Daily Telegraph, 20/2/98; ‘Plague Wars’, Four Corners, ABC, 17/08/98; ‘The Germ Genie’, The Cutting Edge, Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), 1/7/97. 80. World Health Organisation (WHO), UNAIDS: Global Estimates (Geneva: WHO, 1998); ‘Young Bear the Brunt as AIDS Spreads Through the World on a Biblical Scale’, The Independent, 25/11/98. Africa has been particularly badly hit by the AIDS epidemic. Indeed, according to the US Census Bureau, so many people have been killed by the disease on the continent, that five states, Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe,

Notes 197

81.

82.

83.

84. 85.

86.

87.

88. 89.

90. 91.

have an average lifespan of less than 40 years. Ethiopia, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda are currently faring only slightly better, with life spans cut to less than 45 years by the virus. Overall, sub-Saharan Africa currently accounts for the 21 highest AIDS death rates in the world. See ‘Life Span Plummet in AIDS Hot Spots’, The Courier-Mail, 20/3/99. Yemen has been particularly badly affected by malaria. Roughly 10 per cent of the population (approximately 1.5 million people) are currently thought to be suffering from the disease. Between 1997 and 1999, 15 000 people died from malaria, with most fatalities caused by a virulent new strain of the disease known as falciparum. See ‘Minister Says 10 Percent of Population Has Malaria’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 29/3/99. J. D. Fellmann, ‘Spatial Patterns of Disease and Health: One World or Two?’ in J. Norwine and A. Gonzalez eds., The Third World. States of Mind and Being (Sydney: Unwin Hyman, 1988): 117–18; C. Bellamy ed., State of the World’s Children 1996: Annual Report of UNICEF (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Last, Public Health and Human Ecology: 348; ‘Polluted Environment Causing Worldwide Illness and Deaths’, The Manila Times, 24/5/98. FitzSimons and Whiteside, The AIDS Epidemic: 11–13; Garrett, ‘The Return of Infectious Disease’: 72–3, 76; ‘Young Bear the Brunt as AIDS Spreads Through the World on a Biblical Scale’, The Independent, 25/11/98; ‘Changing Climate’, The Australian, 15/7/96. It has been estimated that average expenditure per capita on health in the developing world is US$5 or less. S. Foster and S. Lucas, Socioeconomic Aspects of HIV and AIDS in Developing Countries: a Review and Annotated Bibliography, Public Health Policy Departmental Publication No. 3 (London: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 1991): 31. See also James Rupert, ‘Help Least Likely Where Most Needed’, Washington Post Foreign Service, 4/9/97. Jonathan Broomberg, Malcolm Steinberg, Patrick Masobe and Graeme Behr, The Economic Impact of AIDS in South Africa, Centre for Health Policy Paper No. 23 (Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand, 1991): 42. G. Trotter, ‘AIDS and Human Capital’, AIDS Analysis Africa, Southern African Edition, 2/3 (1991); Whiteside and FitzSimons, The AIDS Epidemic: 14–15. FitzSimons and Whiteside, Conflict, War and Public Health: 28; ‘The New Terrorism: Coming Soon to a City Near You’, The Economist, 15/8/98. See, for instance, Peter Chalk, ‘The International Ethics of Refugees’, The Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52/2 (1998): 154–5; Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992); Alasdair Stewart, Migrants, Minorities and Security in Europe, Conflict Studies 252 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992); and Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: the Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996): 78–82. Bernard Roizman and James Hughes, ‘Preface’ in Roizman ed., Infectious Diseases in an Age of Change: v. Armelagos, ‘The Viral Superhighway’: 24.

198 Notes

6

Mass unregulated population flows 1. Unregulated population flows are defined here as the mass, unsanctioned movement of people across national borders due to war, conflict, persecution environmental degradation or economic dislocation. This conception is wider than the formal international legal definition of refugee status as specified under the terms of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 protocol. These two documents define a refugee as any person who is ‘outside their own country, owing to a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country.’ Such a conception is problematic largely because most mass movements of people in the contemporary era result from conditions other than persecution. For further details see Peter Chalk, ‘The International Ethics of Refugees’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52/2 (1998): 154; Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper 268 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992): 56; and Alan Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: A New Security’, Pacific Review, 9/1 (1997): 2–3. 2. Chalk, ‘The International Ethics of Refugees: a Case of Internal or External Political Obligation?’: 149; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR (Geneva: UNHCR Statistical Unit, July 1998): section V. See also UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: a Humanitarian Agenda (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Alan Dupont, ‘Illegal Migration: a New Regional Security Dilemma’, International Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Trends, 73/1 (1996): 1; Laurie Garrett, ‘The Return of Infectious Disease’, Foreign Affairs, 75/1 (1996): 70; and Peter Stalker, ‘Refugees and Migration: Global Flows’ [http://www.oneworld.org/guides/migration/index.html], n.d.a. 3. Some of the more notable exceptions include Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: A New Security’; Myron Weiner, ‘Security, Stability and International Migration’, International Security, 17/3 (1992/3); Michael Teitelbaum, ‘Immigration, Refugees and Foreign Policy’, International Organisation, 38/3 (1984); Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security; Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity. International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Leon Gordenker, Refugees in International Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1992). 4. Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 3. 5. Cited in Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and Impartiality in a Policy Vacuum, Adelphi Paper 305 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996): 13. 6. Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: 13. 7. The Yemenis were expelled virtually overnight from Saudi Arabia as a rebuff for Yemen’s support of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 8. Nicholas Van Hear, ‘Mass Flight in the Middle East: Involuntary Migration and the Gulf Conflict, 1990–91’, in Richard Black and Vaughan Robinson eds., Geography and Refugees: Patterns and Processes of Change (London:

Notes 199

9. 10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16. 17.

18. 19.

Belhaven Press, 1993): 64–70; and Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 11. See also L. McHugh and S. Epstein, Kurdish Refugee Relief and Other Humanitarian Aid Issues in Iraq, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Brief (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1991); US General Accounting Office (GAO), Persian Gulf Crisis: Humanitarian Relief Provided to Evacuees from Kuwait and Iraq (Washington D.C.: GAO/NSIAD91-160, March 1991); and Nicholas Van Hear, ‘Forced Migration and the Gulf Conflict, 1990-91’, The Oxford International Review 3/1 (1991): 17–21. Astri Suhrke, ‘A Crisis Diminished: Refugees in the Developing World’, International Journal, 48 (1993): 226. See, for instance, Michael Dziedzic, ‘Policing the New World Disorder: Addressing Gaps in Public Security During Peace Operations’, in Max Manwaring and John Fishel eds., Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder (London: Frank Cass, 1998): 134–7; Robert Dorff, ‘The Future of Peace Support Operations’, in Manwaring and Fishel eds., Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: 162–7; and Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: 11. See Mary Kaldor, ‘Introduction’ in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee eds., New Wars: Restructuring the Global Military Sector (London: Pinter, 1997): 8; Michael Moodie, ‘Tragedy in the Balkans: a Conflict Ended – Or Interrupted’, in Manwaring and Fishel eds., Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: 25; International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey, 1996–97 (London: Oxford University Press, 1997): 137; and ‘Refugee Influx Threatens Delicate Balance’, The Australian, 10/3/98. For a graphic account of the organisation and implementation of the Hutu genocide against the Tutsis see Feilip Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 9/3 (1996). Walter Clarke, ‘Waiting for the “Big One”: Confronting Complex Humanitarian Emergencies and State Collapse in Central Afric’, in Manwaring and Fishel eds., Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: 76. ‘Refugees Accuse Serbs of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 2/6/98; ‘Kosovo Refugees Take Perilous Trek to Freedom Across the Adriatic’, The Los Angeles Times, 15/1/99. Albania and Italy are the favoured destinations of those fleeing fighting in Kosovo: Albania due to proximity and ethnic affinity; Italy because the government grants shortterm aid and visitors’ permits to war refugees while they apply for asylum. Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: A New Security’: 8. See also Tedd Robert Gurr, ‘People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System’, International Studies Quarterly, 28/3 (1994): 352–3. Suhrke, ‘A Crisis Diminished: Refugees in the Developing World’: 230. Partha Ghosh, Cross-Border Population Movements and Regional Security in South Asia, Conflict Studies 303 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1997): 4. ‘Sri Lankan Tamil Refugees in Tamil Nadu’, The Hindu, 28/7/97. Dupont, ‘Illegal Migration: A New Regional Security Dilemma’: 1; Gerald Dirks, ‘International Migration in the Nineties: Causes and Consequences’, International Journal, 48 (1993): 200.

200 Notes 20. See, for instance, E. El-Hinnawi, Environmental Refugees (Nairobi: United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP, 1985); Jonas Widgren, ‘International Migration and Regional Stability’, International Affairs, 66/4 (1990): 759; Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: a New Security’: 15; Jodi Jacobson, Environmental Refugees: a Yardstick of Habitability (Washington D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, 1988); Neville Brown, Climate Change: a Threat to Peace, Conflict Studies 272 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994): 14; and C. Tickell, ‘Climate Change Could Cause World Refugee Crisis’, British Overseas Development, 7 (1989). 21. JoAnn McGregor, ‘Refugees and the Environment’, in Black and Robinson eds., Geography and Refugees: 158. 22. Norman Myers, ‘Environmental Refugees: a Crisis in the Making’, People and the Planet, 3/4 (1994): 1; Stuart Leiderman, ‘Environmental Refugees Require Restoration, Not Development’, paper presented before the 24th Annual Third World Conference, Sesion B-3 ‘Pardigmatic Shifts for Dealing with International Crises’, Chicago, 18–21 March, 1998: 2. 23. See, for instance, ‘Disease Threatens Survivors’, The Australian, 9/11/98; ‘They Survived Mitch – To Live in Misery’, The Sunday Times (Singapore), 15/11/98; ‘Fetid Mud Hides Full Extent of Disaster’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 19/9/98; and ‘That Was a Diaster of a Year’, The Australian, 31/12/98. 24. ‘Raining Misery: Millions Marooned in Bangladesh’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 19/9/98. 25. Areas that have been emphasised in this regard include Bangkok, northern Java, parts of Malaysia and the deltas of the Nile, Mekong, Ganges and Pearl Rivers. 26. Jacobson, Environmental Refugees: a Yardstick for Habitability: 7–9; Dirks, ‘International Migration in the Nineties: Causes and Consequences’: 200; ‘Nations Environmental Programme’, Europa World Year Book (London: Europa Publications, 1998): 43. 27. McGregor, ‘Refugees and the Environment’: 158–60. See also the study conducted under the Environmental Change and Acute Conflict Project, the results of which were published in Thomas Homer-Dixon et al., ‘Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict’, Scientific American, 268/2 (1993). 28. M. Duffield, ‘The Internationalisation of Public Welfare: Conflict and the Reform of the Donor/NGO Safety Net’, paper presented before the Institute of Social Studies Workshop on the Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in the Horn of Africa, The Hague, February 1991. 29. Dupont, ‘Unregulated Populations Flows in East Asia: A New Security’: 16. 30. ‘Better I Die Here Than Return Home’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 25/4/98; ‘Sudan Denies Blocking Aid to Starving South’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 30/4/98. 31. McGregor, ‘Refugees and the Environment’; 159–60; A. Gray, ‘Indigenous Peoples as Refugees: What Conditions for Return?’ Refugee Participation Network, 11 (1991): 9. 32. Dupont, ‘Illegal Migration: a New Regional Security Dilemma’: 15; Dirks, ‘International Migration in the Nineties: Causes and Consequences’: 200; Jacobson, Environmental Refugees: a Yardstick for Habitability; and The Globe and Mail (n.t.a.), 5/4/90.

Notes 201 33. Myers, ‘Environmental Refugees: a Crisis in the Making’: 2. 34. Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: a New Security’: 7. 35. Dirks, ‘International Migration in the Nineties: Causes and Consequences’: 195. 36. Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: a New Security’: 7; ‘Malaysia a Magnet for Migrants’, Jakarta Post, 22/2/96; ‘Malaysia Needs More Skilled Workers from RI’, Jakarta Post, 18/5/95; ‘Toilers of the East: Newly Rich Asian Countries Act as a Magnet for Region’s Workers’, The Far Eastern Economic Review, 2/4/92; Ching-lung Tsay, ‘Taiwan’, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 12/2 (1995): 180–1; Young-bum Park, ‘Korea’, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 12/2 (1995): 165. 37. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 21–2. 38. Alasdair Stewart, Migrants, Minorities and Security in Europe, Conflict Studies 252 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992): 6; W. Bohning, ‘Integration and Immigration Pressures in Western Europe’, International Labour Review, 130/4 (1991). 39. Martin Baldwin Edwards, ‘Immigration after 1992’, Policy and Politics, 19/3 (1991): 199–211; Martin Baldwin Edwards and Martin Schain, ‘The Politics of Immigration: Introduction’, West European Politics, 17/2 (1994): 4–5. 40. Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, ‘The Politics of Immigration: Introduction’: 5; Bohning, ‘Integration and Immigration Pressures in Western Europe’. 41. See, for instance, ‘United States General Accounting Office (GAO), Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed’, Letter Report, 12/11/97. 42. ‘1,185 Illegal Immigrants Died at US Border in 3 Years’, Associated Press, 12/8/97. 43. International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey 1994/95 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995): 28; ‘New Arrivals’, The CourierMail, 20/3/99. 44. Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: A New Security’: 12. 45. Phil Williams, ‘Transnational Criminal Organisations: Strategic Alliances’, in Brad Roberts ed., Order and Disorder after the Cold War (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995): 243. 46. ‘Smugglers Use Mexico as Gateway for Chinese’, Los Angeles Times, 21/6/93. The scale of this joint Triad-Mexican operation first became clear in 1993 when the US Border Patrol arrested over 500 Chinese, mostly in San Diego, and acknowledged that for every captured illegal alien, at least two others escape detection. 47. Margaret Beare, ‘Framework paper: Illegal Migration’, paper presented before the 3rd CSCAP Study Group on Transnational Crime, Manila, May 1998: 28; ‘US, Canadian Officials Bust Alleged International Smuggling Ring’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 10/12/98. Two favoured reservations in this regard include the Akwanese Reserve and the St Regis Mohawak Reserve. 48. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that claiming refugee status is a standard part of the elaborate people smuggling system. Indeed, one of the major baits which traffickers use to draw migrants is the assurance that, if they are detected after they slip into the country, simply claiming ‘refugee status’ will protect them from deportation for months, years and, in most cases, for ever.

202 Notes 49. William Bauer, ‘Refugees, Victims, or Killers’, International Journal (Autumn 1997): 681–2. 50. See ‘Canada a Pipeline for Smuggling Aliens’, The Ottawa Citizen, 7/11/96. 51. ‘Dragons of Crime: Climbing the Golden Mountain’, Australian Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) documentary, 19/4/96; Bauer, ‘Refugees, Victims or Killers’: 684. 52. Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: a New Security’: 13–14. 53. ‘Kosovo Refugees Take Perilous Trek to Freedom Across Adriatic’, Los Angeles Times, 15/1/99. 54. ‘18 Tamils Found Dead in Lorry’, The Electronic Telegraph, 17/7/95; ‘The New Trade in Humans’, The Economist, 5/8/95. 55. See ‘Australia Smashes Illegal Iraqi Immigrant Racket’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 15/3/99; and ‘New Arrivals’, The Courier-Mail, 20/3/99. 56. This is significant as immigrants from China are believed to represent only 20 per cent of those in the overall human trafficking ‘pipeline’. 57. See Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: a New Security’: 13; Bauer, ‘Refugees, Victims or Killers’: 680; Dupont, ‘Illegal Migration: a New Regional Security Dilemma’: 1; ‘Days of Desperation’, The CourierMail, 20/3/99; Paul Smith, ‘The Strategic Implications of Chinese Emigration’, Survival, 36/2 (1994): 62; and Charlotte Wong and Peter Unsinger, ‘Illegal Migration’, in Eric Ellen ed., Shipping at Risk (London: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 1997): 254. 58. Bauer, ‘Refugees, Victims, or Killers’: 680–1; ‘One Way, $28,000 – Why Smuggling Aliens into America is a Boom Business’, US News and World Report, 14/04/97; ‘Three Convicted in Immigrant-Smuggling Case: Passengers Described Squalor, Abuse’, The Boston Globe, 16/5/97. 59. See Beare, ‘Framework Paper: Illegal Migration’: 44–6.; Bauer, ‘Refugees, Victims, or Killers’: 680. 60. ‘The New Trade in Humans’, The Economist, 5/8/95; ‘N.Y. Police Find 52 Deaf Mexicans in “Virtual Slavery”’, The Washington Post, 20/7/97; and Ko-Lin Chin, ‘Safe House or Hell House?’ in Paul Smith ed., Human Smuggling – Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s Immigration Tradition (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997): 189. 61. Dirks, ‘International Migration in the Nineties: Causes and Consequences’: 199. 62. Chalk, ‘The International Ethics of Refugees’: 153 ; Loescher, Beyond Charity, 139. It should be noted, however, that states which have not signed the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees reject the idea they are legally bound to provide sanctuary to those who arrive at their borders seeking asylum. 63. Ibid. 64. UNHCR, Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR, Section V. See also ‘Refugees: UNHCR and USCR’, Migration News Resources, 5/2 (1998): 1. 65. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 11. 66. Chalk, ‘The International Ethics of Refugees’: 154, n. 4. 67. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 17; ‘Europe in Harmony Against Asylum Seekers’, The Australian, 16/1/96; ‘Europe in Harmony Against Asylum Seekers’, The Australian, 16/1/96; ‘Italy Could

Notes 203

68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73.

74.

75. 76.

77. 78.

Open Door to Invasion of Migrants’, The Weekly Telegraph (UK), 29/10/97; ‘Western Europe Closes the Door on Immigrants’, The Australian, 13/12/95; and ‘UK Steps Up Attack on Bogus Asylum Seekers’, The Australian, 13/12/95. Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: the Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996): 79. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 43. See, for instance, Clarke, ‘Waiting for the “Big One”’; and Ben Barber, ‘Feeding Refugees, or War?’ Foreign Affairs, 76/4 (1997): 10–11. For further details see N. Beschorner, Water and Instability in the Middle East, Adelphi Paper 273 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992/93); J. Isaac and L. Hosh, ‘Roots of the Water Conflict in the Middle East’, [http://www.arij.org/water/pub/roots.htm, 1992]; and N. Myers, ‘Environment and Security’, Foreign Policy (Spring, 1989): 23–41. See, for instance, Eyal Zisser, ‘Hizballah in Lebanon –- At the Crossroads’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 8/2 (1996): 106–7. Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Illicit Transfer of Conventional Weapons: the Role of State and Non-State Actors in South Asia’, paper presented before the Third Intersessional Workshop of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, Kathmandhu, 22–3 May, 1997: 9, 10–11, 13. See also Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist. Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast (New Delhi: Viking-Penguin, 1994); Chris Smith, The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan and North India (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1993); and ‘Kashmir’s Vale of Tears’, The Courier-Mail, 25/5/96. See Peter Chalk, Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia. Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 123 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1997): 60; Trevor Findlay, ‘Turning the Corner in Southeast Asia’, in Mike Brown ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996); ‘Manila Dubious on Muslim Rebels’, The International Herald Tribune, 19/4/95; ‘PULO Lures Southern Muslims into its Fold’, The Sunday Post, 22/1/95; ‘March of the Militants’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9/3/95; ‘Malaysia Denies Thai Terrorist Claims’, The Australian, 5/1/98; and ‘Is It So Hard to be a Good Neighbour?’ The Bangkok Post, 21/1/98. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 50. Israeli pressure on the civilian population in southern Lebanon reached its peak in 1996 with the killing of 107 Shi’a refugees that were sheltering in a UN camp near the village of Qana. See Al Hayat, 29/4/96; Reuters News Service, 03/05/96. See, for instance, Kaldor, ‘Introduction’: 14–15. It should be noted, however, that legislative changes initiated in the US, Canada and the UK since 1997, aimed at curbing Tamil fund-raising and propaganda activities deemed to be contributing to terrorism or otherwise facilitating the LTTE insurgency in Sri Lanka have served to ameliorate this particular source of tension. The change in official attitudes in North America and Western Europe has much to do with the increasing willingness of the LTTE to launch major bomb attacks in heavily populated civilian areas and can essentially be dated

204 Notes

79. 80. 81.

82.

83. 84.

85. 86.

87.

88. 89.

90. 91.

92.

back to the destruction of the Colombo Central Bank building in January 1996. Gabriel Sheffer, ‘Ethno-National Diasporas and Security’, Survival, 36/1 (1994): 76. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 32–3. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 33. See also Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, 1991); and ‘Walesea Warns of “Albanian Threat” if West Fails on Aid’, International Herald Tribune, 19/3/91. See, for instance, Dupont, ‘Unregulated Population Flows: a New Security Threat’, 20; and ‘ASEAN May Use Force on Refugees’, The Australian, 15/1/96. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 43. See, for instance, ‘The European Union –- EU’, Europa World Year Book (London: Europa Publications, 1998): 175; ‘EU Invites Neighbours in from Cold East’, The Australian, 15/12/97; and ‘Turkey Taken Off the EU Members’ Menu’, The Guardian Weekly, 21/12/97 Sheffer, ‘Ethno-National Diasporas and Security’: 64–5. Peter Chalk and Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The International Support Structure of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’, unclassified report prepared for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), December 1997. Overall, the LTTE are thought to raise between US4 million and US$6 million a month from their overseas diaspora. Switzerland, Canada, Australia, the UK, the US and Scandinavian countries all figure very prominently in this regard: In Switzerland, an estimated US$800 000 is collected; in Canada, an estimated US$600 000 is collected; in Australia, an estimated US$250 000 is collected; in the UK, an estimated US$390 000 is collected; in the US, an estimated US$200 000 is collected; in the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark), an estimated US$500 000 is collected. Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 43. See, for instance, ‘Disintegrating Indonesia’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9/1/99; ‘Moderates Fear Politicians Plan to Exploit Religious Divide’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5/12/98; ‘Indonesian Financial Crisis Breeding Civil Unrest’, The Globe and Mail, 24/7/98; ‘Army Appears Powerless to Halt Disorder’, The Vancouver Sun, 23/7/98; and ‘Indonesian Unrest Widens As Economic Crisis Sets In’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 3/2/98. See, for instance, Sheffer, ‘Ethno-National Diasporas and Security’: 74. See Peter Chalk, Heroin and Cocaine Trafficking: a Global Threat, Jane’s Intelligence Review Special Report No. 18 (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1998): 6–7; Stewart, Migrants, Minorities: 16; and Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Organized Crime and New Wars’, in Kaldor and Vashee eds., New Wars: 45–7. Ocalan was arrested in Rome after arriving from Moscow with a false passport. He applied for asylum after the Turkish government demanded his return on charges of treason and the murder of thousands of innocent civilians. The Italian government refused the extradition request on the grounds that, if convicted, Ocalan could be sentenced to death (Rome’s constitution bans returning suspects to countries where they could face

Notes 205

93.

94.

95.

96. 97.

98.

99.

100. 101. 102.

103.

the death penalty). Despite this, the Foreign Minister, Lambero Dini, said that his office would be prepared to deport Ocalan to stand trial in Germany, which also has an outstanding warrant for the PKK leader’s arrest. Bonn refused to submit a request for extradition, however, fearing that if it did, the Kurdish war for independence would spread to its soil. For further details see Daniel Mandel, ‘Moral Chaos: Mass Murder and Other Unsettling Matters’, The Australia/Israel Review, 24/1 (January 1999): 24–5; ‘Violent Protests Across Europe Over PKK Arrest’, The Independent, 18/11/98; ‘Bonn Resists Call For Extradition of Rebel Kurd’, The Times (UK), 26/11/98; ‘Kurd Rebel Ocalan Says Giving Up Armed Conflict’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 13/12/98; and ‘Italy Faulted For Letting Kurd Leave’, The Washington Post, 18/1/98. The Hon. William Kelly and the Hon. John Bryden, The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence (Ottawa: Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1999): 33. See Terrorism,6/4 (October 1991): 1–2; Salim Java, The Death of Air India Flight 182 (London: Star, 1986); ‘Crown to Join Air India Case’, The Vancouver Sun, 23/07/98; ‘Charges May Be Laid in Air-India Bombing’, The Globe and Mail, 22/07/98; and ‘Canadian Prosecutors Probing Air India Evidence’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 16/10/98. Chalk and Gunaratna, ‘The International Support Structure of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’; See also Gunaratna, ‘The Illicit Transfer of Conventional Weapons: the Role of State and Non-State Actors in South Asia’: 29; ‘Tamil Expatriate Funds Finance LTTE Terror’, Daily News, 8/6/98; and ‘A Tamil Tiger Primer on International Arms Bazaar’, The International Herald Tribune, 10/3/98. Bauer, ‘Refugees, Victims, or Killers’: 685, 694. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 79; Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security: 48; Geoffrey Dabelko and Stacy Vandeveer, ‘European Insecurities: Can’t Live With ’Em, Can’t Shoot ’Em’, Security Dialogue, 29/2 (1998): 180–2. See, for instance, ‘Battle Over Europe’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 7/3/98; ‘The French Malaise’, The Australian, 15/4/97; ‘In Europe, the Right Also Boils Over’, The New York Times, 14/11/94; and ‘Fed Up Voters Back Far Right at Ballot Box’, The Vancouver Sun, 11/10/94. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 79–80; Brian Freemantle, The Octopus. Europe in the Grip of Organised Crime (London: Orion, 1997): Chapter 14; ‘“Mad Dogs” Swell Ranks of Militias’, The Sunday Times (UK), 22/3/98. Paul Wilkinson, ‘Violence and Terror and the Extreme Right’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 7/4 (1995): 88–9. The German 1949 Constitution included a clause that guaranteed an automatic right of asylum to any person persecuted on political grounds. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: 80. See also Coping with the Rising Tide of European Immigration (Library of Congress, Washington D.C.: United States Government Document Expediting [DOCES] Project, 1993). See ‘German Lawmakers Vote to Restrict Asylum Seekers’, The New York Times, 27/5/93 ; and ‘Europe in Harmony Against Asylum Seekers’, The

206 Notes

104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

Australian, 16/1/96. Under the new legislation, which was approved on 28 May 1993, any person that arrives in Germany from a country which the government feels is free of persecution will immediately be sent back. Because Germany is entirely surrounded by countries that are now reckoned to be ‘safe’, no one arriving by land is any longer considered to be a bone fide asylum seeker. ‘Europe in Harmony Against Asylum Seekers’, The Australian, 16/1/96. ‘Refugees: UNHCR and USCR’: 1. ‘Neo-Nazis “Liberate” German Zones to Keep Out Foreigners’, The Guardian Weekly, 21/12/97 ‘Neo-Nazis Released After Foreigners Die in Hostel Fire’, The Australian, 20/1/96 ‘German Far Right Building Up Weapons Supply’, CNN Interactive Worldnews, 27/5/98; ‘Mega Troops Declare War on Germany’s Neo-Nazis’, The Guardian, 26/2/98.

Conclusion 1. Peter Chalk, Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and Political Terrorism, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 123 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1997): 83; Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh, ‘Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities’, Security Dialogue, 29/2 (1998): 172. 2. See, for instance, Walter Clarke, ‘Waiting for the “Big One”: Confronting Complex Humanitarian Emergencies and State Collapse in Central Africa’, in Max Manwaring and John Fishel eds., Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations (London: Frank Cass, 1998): 96. 3. See, for instance, Simon Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’, Intelligence and National Security, 10/4 (1995): 189–90. 4. A prime example of this was the 1996 boycott of a federally organised anti-terrorism conference in Australia on the grounds that it encroached on Sydney’s mandate for overall responsibility of the 2000 Olympic Games’ security. 5. John Mackinlay, ‘Beyond the Logjam: a Doctrine for Complex Emergencies’, in Manwaring and Fishel eds., Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: 119; Chalk, Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: 85; and J.F. Holden-Rhodes and Peter Lupsha, ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder’, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, 2/2 (1993): 218. 6. See ‘Anti-Terrorist and Drug “War Games”’, Intelligence Newsletter, No. 265 (June 1995): 2. 7. Bruce Hoffman, ‘A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism’, paper delivered before the international workshop on ‘European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies, Societal Responses and Supranational Cooperation in the Face of an Evolving Challenge’, International Institute for Law, Onati, Spain, 2–3 May 1996: 18.

Notes 207 8. The Hon. William Kelly and the Hon. John Bryden, The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence (Ottawa: The Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1999): 62. 9. Personal correspondence between author and Graham Head, Principal Liaison Officer, NCIS, Cork, Ireland, March 1999. See also ‘Policing: The National Criminal Intelligence System – NCIS’, Statewatch, 2/2 (1992) and Brian Freemantle, The Octopus. Europe in the Grip of Organised Crime (London: Orion, 1995): 33–4. 10. Kelly and Bryden, The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence: 62. 11. Didier Bigo, ‘Borders, Security, State, Transnational’, paper presented before the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Session of Workshops, Madrid, Spain, 17–22 April 1994: 7. 12. Dalby, ‘Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global Environment’: 187. 13. See, for instance, Ramesh Thakur, ‘From National to Human Security’, in Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack eds., Asia-Pacific Security. The Economics-Politics Nexus (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997): 52–4; and Sung-Han Kim, ‘Human Security and Regional Cooperation: Preparing for the 21 st Century’, paper presented before the Korea–Australia Joint Workshop on ‘Human Security and Regional Cooperation: Preparing for the 21st Century’, Canberra and Brisbane, September 1998: 1–2. 14. Matthew and Shambaugh, ‘Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal’: 171–2. 15. Allan Goodman, ‘Shifting Paradigms and Shifting Gears: a Perspective on Why There is No Post-Cold War Intelligence Agenda’, Intelligence and National Security, 10/4 (1995): 5–7. See also the observations made by Roy Godson in ‘Somalia Mission to Test Sharing of Intelligence’, The Washington Times, 08/12/92. 16. Dalby, ‘Intelligence, the National Environment and the Global Environment’: 189, 192. 17. Hoffman, ‘A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism’: 17. 18. Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996): 150–1. 19. See ‘Switzerland: AUPER2 Computer’, Statewatch, 3/1 (1993): 9. 20. Ibid.: 114. 21. Hoffman, ‘A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism’: 9. 22. Chalk, Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: 86, 90; Matthew and Shambaugh, ‘Sex, Drugs and Heavy Metal’: 172. 23. Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Organisation, 36/2 (1982): 2. 24. These benefits essentially stem from the general importance that international regimes are seen to have in helping states to recognise and realise their mutuality of interest. For further details see Mark Zacher, ‘Multilateral Organisations and the Institution of Multilaterlism: the Development of Regimes for Nonterrestrial Spaces’, in J. Ruggie ed., Multilateralism Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992): 399–439; Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew, ‘Liberal International Theory: Common Threads’, paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 3–6 September, 1992: 44;

208 Notes

25. 26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31. 32.

33.

Robert Keohane and L. Martin, ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’, International Security, 20/1 (1995): 39–51; and, generally, Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (London: Cornell University Press, 1982). Ethan Nadelmann, ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society’, International Organisation, 44/4 (1990): 481. See, for instance, John Murphy, ‘The Need for International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 13 (1990): 391; Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena in the New World Disorder’: 224; and Cherif Bassiouni, ‘A Comprehensive Strategic Approach on International Cooperation for the Prevention, Control and Suppression of International and Transnational Criminality’, Nova Law Review, 15/356 (1991). Murphy, ‘The Need for International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism’: 398; Paul Wilkinson, The Lessons of Lockerbie, Conflict Studies 226 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1989): 20–1; Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: 118–19. See also Sharon Williams, ‘Extradition to a State that Imposes the Death Penalty’, Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 117 (1990); and Matthew Lippman, ‘The Political Offender Exception in International Extradition Law: Terrorism v. Human Rights’, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 13/2 (1989). Under the practice of carbon trading, each country is allocated a quota for the yearly amount of carbon dioxide that it is allowed to release into the atmosphere. If a state does not use up all of its quota, another country is allowed to ‘buy’ the rights to the difference as credits to its own emissions, thereby allowing it to effectively produce more carbon dioxide than its allocation. The US has already sought to buy the carbon dioxide rights of Russia and the Ukraine, both of whom, due to the closure of factories, are not emitting as much of the gas that they are technically allowed to. See ‘Global warming Inspires Trade in Hot Air’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 25/4/98. See, for instance, ‘Muscle to World Court’, The Australian, 17/6/98; and ‘Campaign to Establish an International Criminal Court’, Human Rights Watch Factsheet [http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/icc-fct.html], December 1998. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Effective National and International Action Against Organised Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activities’, Emory International Law Review, 4 (1990): 36; Chalk, Grey Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: 89–90. Bassiouni, ‘Effective National and International Action Against Organised Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activities’: 36. Sung-Han Kim, ‘Human Security and Regional Cooperation: Preparing for the 21st Century’: 8. For a good analysis of epistemic communities and their contribution to national and international policy formulation see Peter Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organisation, 46/1 (1992). Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Chapter 6. See also Peter Chalk, ‘The Maastricht Third Pillar: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, in Fernando Reinares ed., West European Democracies Against

Notes 209

34.

35.

36.

37. 38.

Terrorism. Government Policies, Societal Responses and Supranational Cooperation (Hampshire: Dartmouth, 1999). See, for instance, Alberto Coll, ‘Power, Principles, and Prospects for a Cooperative International Order’, in Brad Roberts ed., Order and Disorder after the Cold War (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995): 390. Holden-Rhodes and Lupsha, ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder’: 221. See also ‘Pentagon Drops World Dominance Plan’, Albuquerque Journal, 24 (May 1992): 3. The US is currently the largest single debtor nation with regard to UN peacekeeping. Although Clinton has pledged to act on Washington’s debt, he has also repeatedly called for new agreements for sharing the costs of maintaining peace, suggesting that the US’ share of peacekeeping should be reduced from 30.4 per cent to 25 per cent. A further indication of Washington’s general unwillingness to forcefully commit itself to UN peacekeeping operations was the announcement in 1994 of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). This essentially questions the wisdom of placing US combat troops under UN command, spelling out strict guidelines that must now be satisfied, or at least considered, before Washington will agree to participate in any peacekeeping venture. See, for instance, ‘Times Mirror Center for People and the Press’, The People, Press and Politics (21 September, 1994): 37. Zalmay Khalizad, ‘Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War’, in Roberts, Order and Disorder After the Cold War: 75–6.

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212 Select Bibliography Dupont, Alan. ‘Regional Security Concerns into the 21st Century’. In John Ciccarelli ed., Transnational Crime: a New Security Threat? (Canberra: The Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1996). Dupont, Alan. ‘Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: a New Security’. Pacific Review, 9/1 (1997). Dupont, Alan. The Environment and Security in the Asia Pacific. Adelphi Paper 313 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998). Dziedzic, Michael. ‘Policing the New World Disorder: Addressing Gaps in Public Security During Peace Operations’. In Max Manwaring and John Fishel eds., Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder (London: Frank Cass, 1998). Ellen, Eric ed. Shipping at Risk – The Rising Tide of Organised Crime (London: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 1997). Epstein, P. ‘Emerging Diseases and Ecosystem Instability: New Threats to Public Health’. American Journal of Public Health, 85 (1995). Falkenrath, Richard. ‘Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism’. Survival, 40/3 (1998). FitzSimons, D. and A. Whiteside. The AIDS Epidemic: Economic, Political and Security Implications. Conflict Studies 251 (London; Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992). FitzSimons, D. and A. Whiteside. Conflict, War and Public Health. Conflict Studies 276 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1994). Foster, S. and S. Lucas. Socioeconomic Aspects of HIV and AIDS in Developing Countries: a Review and Annotated Bibliography. Public Health Policy Departmental Publication No. 3 (London: London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 1991). Freemantle, Brian. The Octopus. Europe in the Grip of Organised Crime (London: Orion Books, 1995). Galeotti, Mark. Mafiya: Organised Crime in Russia. Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 10 (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1996). Galeotti, Mark. ‘Stark Choice Facing Russia’s Police’. International Police Review (March/April 1998). Garrett, Laurie. ‘The Return of Infectious Disease’. Foreign Affairs, 75/1 (1996). Ghosh, Partha. Cross-Border Population Movements and Regional Security in South Asia. Conflict Studies 303 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1997). Goodman, Allan. ‘Shifting Paradigms and Shifting Gears: A Perspective on Why There is No Post-Cold War Intelligence Agenda’. Intelligence and National Security 10/4 (1995). Gregg, M. ed. The Public Health Consequences of Disasters (Atlanta: Center for Diseases Control, 1989). Grist, Norman et al. Diseases of Infection: an Illustrated Textbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Gurr, Tedd. ‘People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System’. International Studies Quarterly, 28/3 (1994). Haas, Peter. ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’. International Organisation, 46/1 (1992). Hoffman, Bruce. ‘The Contemporary Terrorist Mindset: Targeting, Tactics and Likely Future Trends’. Intelligence and National Security, 11/1 (1996). Hoffman, Bruce. ‘The Confluence of International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism’. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9/2 (1997).

Select Bibliography 213 Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998). Holden-Rhodes, Jim and Peter Lupsha. ‘Gray Area Phenomena: New Threats and Policy Dilemmas’. Criminal Justice International, 9/1 (1993). Holden-Rhodes, Jim and Peter Lupsha. ‘Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray Area Phenomena and the New World Disorder’. Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, 2/2 (1993). International Institute of Strategic Studies. Strategic Survey, 1996–97 (London: Oxford University Press, 1997). International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: a Special Report (London: ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 1997). International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report, 1998 (ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 1999). Jamieson, Alison. Global Drug Trafficking. Conflict Studies No. 234 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990). Jamieson, Alison. Drug Trafficking After 1992. Conflict Studies No. 250 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992). Kaji, Gautam. ‘Challenges to the East Asian Environment’. The Pacific Review 7/2 (1994). Kaldor, Mary. ‘Introduction’. In Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee eds., New Wars: Restructuring the Global Military Sector (London: Pinter, 1997). Kelly, William and John Bryden. The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence (Ottawa: Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence, 1999). Klare, Michael. ‘An Avalanche of Guns: Light Weapons Trafficking and Armed Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era’. In Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee eds., New Wars: Restructuring the Global Military Sector (London: Pinter, 1997). Krasner, Stephen ed. International Regimes (London: Cornell University Press, 1982). Kumar, Sumita. ‘Drug Trafficking as an International Security Problem’. Strategic Analysis, 19/2 (1996). Last, John. Public Health and Human Ecology (Stamford: Appleton and Lange, 1998). Latham, Andrew. ‘The Light Weapons Problem: Causes, Consequences and Policy Options’. In Andrew Latham ed., Multilateral Approaches to Non-Proliferation. Proceedings of the 4th Canadian Non-Proliferation Workshop (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, 1996). Latter, Richard. Terrorism in the 1990s. Wilton Park Papers (London: HMSO, 1991). Lechat, M. ‘The Epidemiology of Health Effects of Disasters’. Epidemiological Review, 12 (1990). Linden, Eugene. ‘The Exploding Cities of the Developing World’. Foreign Affairs, 75/1 (1996). Lintner, Bertil. The Drug Trade in Southeast Asia. Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 5 (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1995). Loescher, Gil. Refugee Movements and International Security. Adelphi Paper 268 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992). Loescher, Gil. Beyond Charity. International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Logue, James. ‘Disasters, the Environment and Public Health: Improving Our Response’. The American Journal of Public Health, 86/9 (1996).

214 Select Bibliography Luga, Simona de. ‘Pirates Plunder at Will in Brazil’. Journal of Commerce (31 December 1997). Mackinlay, John. ‘Beyond the Logjam: a Doctrine for Complex Emergencies’. In Max Manwaring and John Fishel eds., Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder (London: Frank Cass, 1998). Maddock, R. ‘Environmental Security in East Asia’. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 17/1 (1995). Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. ‘The Islamic Challenge in North Africa’. Terrorism and Political Violence, 8/2 (1996). Mahony, Paddy et al. Trends and Developments in Illicit Drugs in Australia: Highlights for the Australian Illicit Drug Report, 1996–97 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, 1997). Matthew, Richard and George Shambaugh. ‘Sex, Drugs, and Heavy Metal: Transnational Threats and National Vulnerabilities’. Security Dialogue, 29/2 (1998). Maunder, John. Dictionary of Global Climate Change (London: UCL Press, 1994). McMichael, A. ‘Global Environmental Change and Human Population Health: a Conceptual and Scientific Challenge for Epidemiology’. International Journal of Epidemiology, 22 (1993). Medd, Roger and Frank Goldstein. ‘International Terrorism on the Eve of a New Millennium’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20/1 (1997). Menefee, Samuel. Trends in Maritime Violence: a Special Report (London: Jane’s Information Group, July 1996). Metz, Steven. ‘Insurgency after the Cold War’. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 5/1 (1994). Mitchell, James and Neil Ericksen. ‘Effects of Climate Change on Weather-Related Disasters’. In M. Mintzer ed., Confronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications and Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Moodie, Michael. ‘Tragedy in the Balkans: a Conflict Ended – Or Interrupted?’ In Max Manwaring and John Fishel eds., Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder (London: Frank Cass, 1998). Mortimer, Robert. ‘Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: the Second Algerian War’. The Middle East Journal, 50/1 (1996). Murphy, John. ‘The Need for International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 13 (1990). Myers, Norman. ‘Environment and Security’. Foreign Policy (Spring 1989). Myers, Norman. ‘Environmental Refugees: a Crisis in the Making’. People and the Planet, 3/4 (1994). Nadlemann, Ethan. ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society’. International Organisation, 44/4 (1990). Pinkerton’s Risk Assessment Services. Terrorism, 1990-1996 (Washington D.C.: Pinkerton’s Risk Assessment Services Inc., 1997). Pluchinsky, Dennis. ‘Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union: a Primer, a Puzzle, a Prognosis’. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21/2 (1998). Preston, Richard. The Cobra Event (London: Urania, 1997). Prins, Gwyn. ‘Politics and the Environment’. International Affairs, 66/4 (1990). Purver, Ron. ‘The Threat of Chemical/Biological Terrorism’. Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Commentary, 60 (August 1995). Redmond, Robert. ‘Phantom Ships in the Far East’. INTERSEC, 6/5 (1996).

Select Bibliography 215 Roizman, Bernard ed. Infectious Diseases in an Age of Change (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995). Scheffer, Gabriel, ‘Ethno-National Diasporas and Security’. Survival, 36/1 (1994). Smith, Chris. ‘The Impact of Light Weapons on Security: a Case Study of South Asia’. SIPRI Yearbook 1995 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995). Smith, Chris. ‘The International Trade in Small Arms’. Jane’s Intelligence Review, 7/9 (1995). Smith, Chris and Alex Vines. Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa. London Defence Studies Paper 42 (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1997). Smith, Joseph. ‘The Ellison-Cliffe Lecture: the Threat of New Infectious Diseases’. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 86 (1993). Smith, Paul. ‘The Strategic Implications of Chinese Emigration’. Survival, 36/2 (1994). Smith, Paul ed. Human Smuggling – Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America’s Immigration Tradition (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997). Sterling, Claire. Thieves World: the Threat of the New Global Network of Organised Crime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). Stewart, Alasdair. Migrants, Minorities and Security in Europe. Conflict Studies 252 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992). Suhrke, Asti. ‘A Crisis Diminished: Refugees in the Developing World’. International Journal. 48 (1993). Thakur, Ramesh. ‘From National to Human Security’. In Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack eds., Asia-Pacific Security. The Economics-Politics Nexus (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997). Turbiville, Graham. ‘Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia: a New Colombia’. Military Review (December 1992). UNAIDS. HIV/AIDS. The Global Epidemic (Geneva: UNAIDS Publication, 1996). United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Trends in International Drug Trafficking (Ottawa: British Information Services, 1995). United States General Accounting Office. ‘Drug Control: US Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast Asia’. Burma Debate, 3/2 (1996). United States State Department. ‘Asian Money Laundering Methods’. Burma Debate, 2/1 (1995). United States State Department. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1997 (Washington D.C.: Bureau for International Narcotics and Enforcement Affairs, 1998). Vagg, Jon. ‘Rough Seas? Contemporary Piracy in Southeast Asia’. British Journal of Criminology, 35/1 (1995). Whyte, Ian. Climate Change and Human Society (London: Arnold, 1995). Widgren, Jonas. ‘International Migration and Regional Stability’. International Affairs, 66/4 (1990). Wilkinson, Paul. ‘Terrorism in Europe – Retrospect and Prospect’. Jane’s Intelligence Yearbook, 1994/95 (London: Jane’s Information Group, 1995). Wilkinson, Paul. ‘Violence, Terror and the Extreme Right’. Terrorism and Political Violence, 7/4 (1995). Williams, Phil. ‘Transnational Criminal Organisations: Strategic Alliances’. In Brad Roberts ed., Order and Disorder After the End of the Cold War (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995).

216 Select Bibliography Winchester, Mike. ‘Ship of Fools: Tamil Tiger’s Heist of the Century’. Soldier of Fortune, 23/8 (1998). Yach, Derek. ‘The Globalisation of Public Health I: Threats and Opportunities’. American Journal of Public Health, 88/5 (1998). Youmans, Guy et al. The Biological and Clinical Basis of Infectious Diseases (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1985). Zacher, Mark. ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple’. In James N. Rosenau ed., Governance Without Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Zacher, Mark. ‘Multilateral Organisations and the Institution of Multilateralism: the Development of Regimes for Nonterrestrial Spaces’. In John Ruggie ed., Multilateralism Matters (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

Index Abu Nidal Organisation, 52 ad-hoc terrorism, 23–5, 28 Afghan pipeline, 10–11 Afghanistan, 10–11, 22, 38–9, 131 AIDS, 47, 96, 106, 108–9, 112, 113, 135, 147, 196–7 (fn. 80) air pollution Asia Pacific and, 85–6 impact of, 86 Mexico City and, 85 Southeast Asian smoke crisis and, 86–7 Algeria, 27–8 amoebic dysentery, 99 Anna Sierra, 62–5 anthrax, 111, 112, 196 (fn. 78) Arkan (Zelijko Raznjatovic), 17 Army of God, 25 Aryan Nations Movement, 28, 112 Asian financial crisis, 61, 128 atavism and GAP, 4–6 and terrorism, 16–20, 26–9 Aum Shinriyko Supreme Truth Cult, 27, 35, 112 AUPER-2, 141–2 Azerbaijan, 18 bacillary dysentery, 99–100 Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO), 72, 74 Bangladesh, 73–4, 118, 119, 120 BCCI scandal, 52 Bin Laden, Osama, 21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17, 104–5, 117 botulism, 196 (fn. 78) brain viruses, 111 Brazil, 71–2 brucella, 196 (fn. 78) bubonic plague (Black Death), 100–1, 105, 111, 112 Burma, 41–2, 47, 54–5, 109, 118, 120, 121, 127

Cali cartel, 43, 46, 174 (fn. 27) Cambodia, 11, 54, 144 Canada, 123, 130, 131–2 carbon trading, 145, 208 (fn. 28) Central Bank bombing (Colombo), 30, 131–2 cerebral malaria, 102 China, 47, 60–1, 70, 79, 82, 86, 89–90, 109, 118, 121, 127, 128 chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), 81, 83–4 cholera, 98, 104, 106, 107, 100, 111, 113, 114, 119 cocaine addiction and, 45–6 Cali Cartel and, 43, 46, 174 (fn. 27) characteristics of, 42–3 Colombia and, 43–4, 46, 49, 52–3, 55, 144 corruption and, 48–50 crack, 43 crime and, 46–7 economic costs associated with, 47–8 FARC and 43, 55 Medellin cartel and, 43, 46, 52–3 National Liberation Army (ELN) and, 43, 55 Pepes and, 46 profits associated with, 48 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and, 43, 55 Shining Path (SL) and, 55 smuggling of, 44 Cold War, 1, 5–6, 9–10 Colombia, 43–4, 46, 49, 52–3, 55, 144 complex humanitarian crises, 116, 120 conflict, changing nature of, 1–2 Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 153 Convention on Biodiversity, 153 Convention on Desertification, 153 217

218 Index Convention on Protected Persons, 152 Convention on Psychotropic Substances 153 Counterdrug Modeling and Simulation System (CMSS), 137 Crisis Management Centres (CMCs), 136–8 Customs Information System (CIS), 157 deforestation, 80, 135 causes of, 79 implications of, 79–80 India and, 79 Indonesia and, 79 Philippines and, 79 dengue fever, 107, 110, 112 diasporas, 128, 129–30 disease AIDS and HIV, 96, 106, 108–9, 112, 113, 114 anthrax, 111, 112, 196 (fn. 78) cholera, 98, 104, 106, 107, 110, 111, 113, 114 consequences of, 112–14 dengue fever, 107, 110, 112 dysentery, 99–100, 104, 110, 114 ebola virus, 103, 105–6, 111, 114 forced population flows and, 118–21 global warming and, 106–7 human social behaviour patterns and, 108–9 Hurricane Mitch and, 107 international movement of people and, 105–6 legionnaires disease, 105 plague, 100–1, 107, 111, 112, 196 (fn. 78) respiratory tract infection, 97–8 sex industry and, 106, 108 terrorism and, 111–12, 195 (fn. 71) tuberculosis (TB), 96–7, 106, 113, 114 typhoid fever, 99, 104, 107 urbanisation and, 109–11 war and conflict and, 103–5 yellow fever, 102, 112 dollarisation, 3–4, 37, 121

dysentery, 99–100, 102, 112 ebola virus, 103, 105–6, 111, 114 environmental degradation air pollution and, 85–8 as a security issue, 77–8 deforestation and, 78–80 destruction of the ozone layer and, 83–5 food shortages and, 92–5 forced population flows and, 118–21 global warming and, 80–3 international conventions and, 145, 153–4 spread of disease and, 106–7 water shortages and, 88–91 environmental refugees, 121–2 epistemic communities, 146–7 EURODAC, 157 European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST), 152, 157 European Union (EU), 126, 128, 129, 133, 145, 146, 155 European Union Convention on Extradition, 157–8 Europol, 145, 155 External Borders Convention, 156–7 Exxon Valdez disaster, 67 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 78, 88, 90, 92 food shortages extent of, 92 environmental degradation and, 92 Thomas Malthus and, 92 North Korea and, 93–4 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 153 Germany, xenophobic extremism and, 133–4 global warming greenhouse effect and, 80–1 implications of, 81–3, 135 links to ozone depletion, 85 links to transnational spread of disease, 106–7

Index 219 Golden Crescent, 38–9 Golden Temple, storming of, 131 Golden Triangle, 39–42, 109 Goldstein, Baruch, 23 grey area phenomena atavism and, 4–6 definition of, 1–2 dollarisation and, 3–4, 121 epistemic communities and, 146–7 globalisation and, 6–7, 105–6 intelligence and, 138–41 international cooperation and, 142–8 light weapons proliferation and, 7–12 role of US in countering and, 147 Gulf War forced population flows and, 117 spread of disease during, 104 Hague Convention, 152 Hamas, 23 heroin addiction and, 45–6 AIDS and, 47, 108–9, 135 characteristics of, 38 China and, 42, 47 corruption and, 48–50 crime and, 46–7 economic costs associated with, 47–8 Golden Crescent and, 38–9 Golden Triangle and, 39–42 Khun Sa and, 40–1 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and, 55 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and, 55 profits associated with, 48 smuggling of, 38, 41–2 HIV, 47, 106, 108–9, 113, 114 Hizbollah, 17, 127 Hong Kong, 66–7, 69 Hong Kong–Luzon–Hainan (HLH) Terror Triangle, 61, 69 Hostages Convention, 152 Hurricane Mitch, 107 illicit drugs conventions against, 145, 152–3 costs associated with, 150

India, 74, 79, 108, 109, 118, 119, 127 Indonesia, 61, 70, 79, 118, 90, 120, 121, 128, 130 intelligence coordination problems associated with, 138–9 expanding ambit of, 139–41 public trust and, 141–2 types of, 138 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 80, 106–7 International Criminal Court (ICC), 144, 145, 147 International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 70, 71 International Maritime Organisation (IMO), 61, 70 International Maritime Organisation Convention and Protocol, 152 Interservice Intelligence (ISI) Department (Pakistan) Iran, 21, 38, 127, 131 Islamic extremism, 20–3 Islamic Jihad, 23 Israel, 127, 22–3 Italy, 50, 53–4, 144 K4 Committee, 156 Kahane Chai, 23 Kenya, US Embassy bombing in, 21–2 Khun Sa, 41–2 Kosovo, 17 Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), 17 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), 55, 129, 131, 135 Kyoto Framework Convention on Climate Change, 145, 153–4 Law of the Sea Convention, 75, 153 Lebanon, 127 legionnaires disease, 105 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 8, 9, 29-30, 55, 73, 118, 129–30, 131–2, 135, 183–4 (fn. 70), 184 (fn. 74), 203–4 (fn. 78), 204 (fn. 87) light weapons Afghanistan and, 10–11 Cambodia and, 11–12

220 Index light weapons continued characteristics of, 8, 161 (fn. 34) collapse of USSR and, 8–9 Eastern Europe and, 9 extent of, 161 (fn. 31) Mozambique and, 11, 31 Pakistan and, 10 proliferation of, 7–12, 135 southern Africa and, 11 terrorism and, 29–32 Maastricht Third Pillar, 145, 146, 155–8 Mafiya, 44, 53 Malacca Straits, 60, 68–9 malaria, 102, 107, 110, 112, 114, 197 (fn. 81) Malaysia, 90, 121, 127 mass destruction terrorism, 32–5 measles, 105, 112 Medellin Cartel, 43, 52–3 Mexican crime syndicates, 44, 122, 123 Mexico City, 44, 49–50, 144 money laundering, 130 BCCI scandal and, 52 methods of, 50-2 monkeypox, 111 Montreal Convention, 152 Montreal Convention on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 153 Mujahideen, 10–11, 22 narco-terrorism, 135 Colombia and, 52–3 Italy and, 53–4 Kurdish Workers Party and, 55 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and, 55 National Liberation Army and, 55 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and, 55 Russia and, 53–4 Shining Path and, 55 Southeast Asia and, 54 National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS), 139 National Liberation Army (ELN), 43, 55

non-refoulement, principle of, 125 Noriega, Manuel, 52 North Korea food shortages in, 93–4 October Agreed Framework and, 93, 190 (fn. 97) Ocalan, Abdullah, 131, 204–5 (fn. 92) Oklahoma bombing, 25, 28 organised crime, 4, 122–5, 131, 147 ozone depletion extent of, 83 implications of, 84–5 links to global warming, 85 reasons for, 83–4 Pakistan, 10, 38, 127 Palestinian peace process, 22–3, 167 (fn. 43) Pepes, 46, 175 (fn. 39) Philippine rice crisis, 78 Philippines, 78, 89–90, 118, 121, 127, 128 piracy, 135, 147 Anna Sierra incident and, 62–5 Asian financial crisis and, 61 Bangladesh and, 73–4 Brazil and, 71–2 Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico and, 72–3 China and, 60–1, 62, 63–5, 70, 180 (fn. 19) dangers posed by, 66–8 history of, 57–8 Hong Kong and, 66–7, 69 Hong Kong–Luzon–Hainan (HLH) Terror Triangle and, 61, 69 Horn of Africa and, 74–5 incidence of, 59, 151 increased lethality of, 65–6 India and, 74 Indonesia and, 61, 70 international conventions against, 145, 153 international law and, 75 Malacca and Singapore Straits and, 68–9 phantom ship attacks and, 58–9, 62–5

Index 221 piracy continued right of ‘hot pursuit’ and, 75–6 Southeast Asia and, 60, 180 (fn. 16) Sri Lanka and, 73 types of, 58–9 under-reporting and, 59–60 pneumonic plague, 101, 111 population, unregulated and forced flows of as source of inter-state tension, 127–8 economic dislocation and, 121–5 extent of, 115 people smuggling and, 122–5, 135, 201 (fn. 48) persecution and, 125–6 risks to receiving states and, 130–4 risks to sending states and, 129–30 war and conflict and, 116–18 xenophobia and, 132–4 prohibition regimes, 143–4, 147 realism, 2, 7, 35, 134 refugees, 114, 133, 147 Convention Relating to Status of, 198 (fn. 1) economic refugees, 121–5 environmental refugees, 4, 118–21 non-refoulement principle and, 125 persecution and, 125–6 Regional Piracy Centre (RPC), 59, 60, 65, 70 respiratory tract infections, 97–8 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 43, 55 right-wing extremism, 24–5 Russia, 17–18, 34, 49, 53–4, 144 Rwanda, 117–18 Scafisti, 123, 124 Shining Path (SL), 55 Singapore Straits, 60, 68–9 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 152–3 Somalia, 105 Southeast Asian smoke crisis, 86–8 Southern Africa, 11 sovereignty, problems associated with, 146–7

Sri Lanka, 73, 118, 129–30 Sudan, 21–2, 120 Syria, 89, 91, 127, 131 Systems Customs Enforcement Network (SCENT), 157 terrorism ad-hoc, 23–5, 28 Afghanistan and, 22 Algeria and, 27–8 Armed Islamic Group and, 28 Army of God and, 25 Aryan Nations Movement (ANM) and, 28 atavism and, 16–20, 26–9 bin Laden and, 21 Bosnia-Herzegovina and, 17 Central Bank (Colombo) bombing, 30 Colombia and, 53, 163–4 (fn. 7) development of, 15 diaspora communities and, 131–2 drugs and, 52–6, 135 Georgia and, 18 Halloween massacre (Northern Ireland) and, 32 incidence of in 1990s, 16–20, 149 international conventions against, 142, 145 Iran and, 21 Islamic extremism and, 20–3 Kosovo and, 17 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and, 131 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and, 29–30, 131–2, 203–4 (fn. 78) light weapons proliferation and, 29–32 mass destruction and, 32–5, 111–12, 170 (fn. 85) Oklahoma bombing and, 25, 28 on-going conflicts and, 18 Palestinians and, 15–16, 22–3, 167 (fn. 43) right-wing extremism, and 24–5 Russia and, 17–18, 34 South Asia and, 18–20

222 Index terrorism continued Sudan and, 21–2 Tanzania, US Embassy bombing in, 21–2 Tigers (Bosnia) and, 17 Tomb of Patriarchs massacre, 23 xenophobia and, 132–4 Thailand, 50, 54, 108, 109, 120, 121, 127 Tokyo Convention, 152 Triads, 123 tuberculosis (TB), 96–7, 105, 106, 113, 114 Turkey, 89, 91, 127, 129, 131 Turner Diaries, 28 typhoid fever, 99, 104, 105, 107, 110, 119 underground banking system, 51–2 United High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 104, 115, 133 urbanisation air pollution and, 85–6

extent of, 85–6, 109–10 spread of disease and, 109–11 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 153 Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System (ViCLAS), 139 water shortages causes for, 88–9 East Asia and, 88–9 Euphrates River and, 89, 91, 127 extent of, 88 implications of, 90–1 water pollution and, 90 World Health Organisation (WHO), 86, 97, 98, 101, 106 xenophobic extremism, 132–43 Yakuza, 123 yellow fever, 102, 105, 112 Zimbabwe, 108