Officer-Involved Shootings and Use of Force: Practical Investigative Techniques, Second Edition (Practical Aspects of Criminal and Forensic Investigations)

8798_C000a.fm Page i Monday, April 30, 2007 11:34 AM

Officer-Involved Shootings and Use of Force Practical Investigative Techniques Second Edition David E. Hatch Randy Dickson

Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

8798_C000a.fm Page ii Monday, April 30, 2007 11:34 AM

CRC SERIES IN PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL AND FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS VERNON J. GEBERTH, BBA, MPS, FBINA Series Editor Practical Homicide Investigation: Tactics, Procedures, and Forensic Techniques, Fourth Edition Vernon J. Geberth The Counterterrorism Handbook: Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques, Third Edition Frank Bolz, Jr., Kenneth J. Dudonis, and David P. Schulz Forensic Pathology, Second Edition Dominick J. Di Maio and Vincent J. M. Di Maio Interpretation of Bloodstain Evidence at Crime Scenes, Second Edition William G. Eckert and Stuart H. James Tire Imprint Evidence Peter McDonald Practical Drug Enforcement, Third Edition Michael D. Lyman Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Third Edition Robert R. Hazelwood and Ann Wolbert Burgess The Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Practical Guide to Assessment, Investigation, and Intervention, Second Edition Seth L. Goldstein Gunshot Wounds: Practical Aspects of Firearms, Ballistics, and Forensic Techniques, Second Edition Vincent J. M. Di Maio Friction Ridge Skin: Comparison and Identification of Fingerprints James F. Cowger Footwear Impression Evidence, Second Edition William J. Bodziak Principles of Kinesic Interview and Interrogation, Second Edition Stan Walters Practical Fire and Arson Investigation, Second Edition David R. Redsicker and John J. O’Connor The Practical Methodology of Forensic Photography, Second Edition David R. Redsicker Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation, Second Edition David E. Zulawski and Douglas E. Wicklander

8798_C000a.fm Page iii Monday, April 30, 2007 11:34 AM

Investigating Computer Crime Franklin Clark and Ken Diliberto Practical Homicide Investigation Checklist and Field Guide Vernon J. Geberth Bloodstain Pattern Analysis: With an Introduction to Crime Scene Reconstruction, Second Edition Tom Bevel and Ross M. Gardner Practical Aspects of Munchausen by Proxy and Munchausen Syndrome Investigation Kathryn Artingstall Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology David R. Ashbaugh Practical Criminal Investigations in Correctional Facilities William R. Bell Officer-Involved Shootings and Use of Force: Practical Investigative Techniques, Second Edition David E. Hatch Sex-Related Homicide and Death Investigation: Practical and Clinical Perspectives Vernon J. Geberth Global Drug Enforcement: Practical Investigative Techniques Gregory D. Lee Practical Investigation of Sex Crimes: A Strategic and Operational Approach Thomas P. Carney Principles of Bloodstain Pattern Analysis: Theory and Practice Stuart James, Paul Kish, and T. Paulette Sutton Cold Case Homicides: Practical Investigative Techniques Richard H. Walton Practical Crime Scene Processing and Investigation Ross M. Gardner Practical Bomb Scene Investigation James T. Thurman Practical Analysis and Reconstruction of Shooting Incidents Edward E. Hueske

8798_C000a.fm Page iv Monday, April 30, 2007 11:34 AM

CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group 6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300 Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742 © 2007 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business No claim to original U.S. Government works Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 International Standard Book Number-10: 0-8493-8798-1 (Hardcover) International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-8493-8798-2 (Hardcover) This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reprinted material is quoted with permission, and sources are indicated. A wide variety of references are listed. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and the publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or for the consequences of their use. No part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access www.copyright. com (http://www.copyright.com/) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC) 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hatch, David E. Officer-involved shootings and use of force : practical investigation techniques / David E. Hatch. -- 2nd ed. p. cm. -- (CRC series in practical aspects of criminal and forensic investigations ; 45) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8493-8798-2 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-8493-8798-1 (alk. paper) 1. Police shootings. 2. Criminal investigation. I. Title. II. Series. HV8031.H38 2007 363.2’32--dc22 Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com and the CRC Press Web site at http://www.crcpress.com

2007002477

8798_C000b.fm Page i Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

Contents Series Editor’s Note Preface Acknowledgments About the Authors Chapter 1 Why Use a Model Policy?...............................................................1 Background................................................................................1 Homicide Investigation..............................................................3 Crime Scene ....................................................................4 Follow-Up Investigation..................................................3 Conclusion .......................................................................5 Chapter 2 Developing a Use-of-Force Policy ..................................................9 Introduction ...............................................................................9 Authority........................................................................10 Administrative Investigation .........................................10 Model Use-of-Force Policy.....................................................11 Critical Procedures ........................................................11 Use of Force ..................................................................11 Authorization to Carry Firearms and Nondeadly Weapons.........................................................................12 Parameters for Use of Nondeadly Force ......................13 Parameters for Use of Low-Lethality Force .................14 Parameters for Use of Deadly Force ............................14 Reporting and Investigative Requirements ...................16 Notifications...................................................................17 Definitions .....................................................................17 Model Policy ...........................................................................22 Use of Electromuscular Disruption Weapon (aka Taser®) ..................................................................22 Definitions .....................................................................22

8798_C000b.fm Page ii Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

General Order ................................................................23 Training and Certification .............................................24 Equipment Care and Handling......................................25 Patrol Division Only .....................................................25 Detention Bureau/Division............................................27 Post-Deployment ...........................................................28 Comments......................................................................29 Conclusion ...............................................................................29 Chapter 3 Assigning Investigative Responsibility ........................................31 Need for Investigative Guidelines...........................................31 Investigative Authority ............................................................31 Organizational Structure..........................................................31 Investigative Response ............................................................32 Supervisory Activities ...................................................32 Summary..................................................................................33 Chapter 4 Scene Investigation ........................................................................35 Introduction .............................................................................35 Duties of Incident Scene Investigators ...................................35 Incident Scene Investigation ...................................................37 Chapter 5 Handling Suspects .........................................................................43 Introduction .............................................................................43 Uninjured Suspect ...................................................................43 Injured Suspect........................................................................43 Deceased Suspect ....................................................................44 Chapter 6 Interviewing Witnesses .................................................................47 Introduction .............................................................................47 General Guidelines ..................................................................47 Preliminary Statements ...........................................................48 Opening Questions ..................................................................48

8798_C000b.fm Page iii Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

Questioning about Incident .....................................................49 Closing.....................................................................................50 Chapter 7 Interviewing Employees Involved in Incidents of Violence ......51 Introduction .............................................................................51 General Guidelines ..................................................................51 Protecting the Employee’s Welfare and Civil Rights .............52 Employee Interview.................................................................54 Information about Interview .........................................54 Information about Officer .............................................54 Information about Event ...............................................55 Information about Crime Scene....................................55 Information about Weapon and Ammunition ...............55 Identification..................................................................56 Injuries ...........................................................................56 Justification for Use of Deadly Force...........................56 Authority........................................................................57 Post-Interview Procedures.......................................................57 Summary..................................................................................57 Chapter 8 Documenting Incidents .................................................................65 Introduction .............................................................................65 Report Preparation...................................................................65 Use-of-Force Investigative Summary......................................66 Administrative Summary of Investigation Report Officer-Involved Shooting .......................................................68 Chapter 9 Investigating Forced and Assisted Suicides ................................91 Introduction .............................................................................91 Suicidal Actions.......................................................................93 Strategies for Crisis Negotiators and First Responders..........96 Investigating Suicidal Suspect Incidents.................................97 Employee Interview.................................................................98 Summary..................................................................................99

8798_C000b.fm Page iv Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

Chapter 10 Investigating In-Custody Deaths................................................101 Introduction ...........................................................................101 Investigative Guidelines ........................................................102 Notification ..................................................................102 Securing the Scene ......................................................102 Investigative Response ................................................102 Report Preparation.......................................................103 In-Custody Death Report ......................................................109 Officer’s Report — In-Custody Death..................................112 Incident File.................................................................118 Deaths Occurring during Arrest or Transport.......................118 Chapter 11 The Myth of Positional Asphyxia ..............................................121 Introduction ...........................................................................121 Excited Delirium ...................................................................122 Acute Excited States and Sudden Death ....................122 Agitated Sudden Deaths..............................................123 Recognizing the Symptoms ........................................123 Warning Signs .............................................................124 Less Lethal Weapons...................................................125 Conclusion ...................................................................126 Summary......................................................................126 Case Studies ..........................................................................126 Comments....................................................................128 Model Policy on Excited Delirium.............................129 Definition .....................................................................130 Procedure .....................................................................130 Excited Delirium Situations in Correction Center .....132 Chapter 12 Working with Incident Review Boards .....................................135 Introduction ...........................................................................135 Incident Review Boards ........................................................136 Model of Review Board........................................................136 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) ........................139

8798_C000b.fm Page v Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

Examples of Administrative Warnings..................................141 Supervisor’s Warning, Los Angeles Police Department ..................................................................142 Statement of Officer’s Rights, International Union of Police Associations .................................................142 LVMPD Officer Training Program .......................................143 Board Presentation for Use-of-Force Incidents ....................145 Introduction of Presenters ...........................................145 Synopsis of Event........................................................146 Officers Involved .........................................................147 Information about Suspect ..........................................148 Details of Incident .......................................................148 Case Status ..................................................................149 Alternatives to Use of Deadly Force ....................................149 Chapter 13 Use of Force by Tactical Units ...................................................151 Introduction ...........................................................................151 Liability Issues ......................................................................151 Responsibilities of Tactical Units .........................................152 Documentation of Training and Operations .........................153 National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) ...................154 Investigations Involving Tactical Unit Officers ....................154 Chapter 14 Multijurisdictional Investigations ..............................................157 Introduction ...........................................................................157 Implementation of Multijurisdictional Team ........................157 Model Policy .........................................................................158 Definitions ...................................................................159 Investigative Response ..........................................................159 Venue Determination and Legal Representation ........160 Composition of Team ..................................................160 Scene Preservation and Evidence Retention...............160 Witness Interviews ......................................................160 Documentation of Incident..........................................161 Presentation of Case to Prosecutor .............................161

8798_C000b.fm Page vi Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

Administrative Review ................................................161 Summary................................................................................161 Chapter 15 Handling the Media and Politically Charged Situations ........163 Introduction ...........................................................................163 Dissemination of Information ...............................................164 Office of Public Information.......................................164 Officer-Involved Shootings .........................................165 Politically and Press-Motivated Incidents ..................165 Case Studies ..........................................................................166 Stress Factors...............................................................168 Summary................................................................................169 Chapter 16 The Individual Impact of Officer-Involved Shootings ............171 Perceptions, Reactions, and Reality......................................171 The Body’s Response..................................................174 The Mind’s Response..................................................175 Measuring the Occurrence Rate: Perceptions, Responses, and Distortions ...................................................183 Summary................................................................................185 References .............................................................................186 Chapter 17 Post-Incident Officer Support ....................................................187 Introduction ...........................................................................187 Pre-Incident Preparation and Education: Mechanics and Mindsets.......................................................189 The Role of the Peer Support Officer...................................192 Peer Support Team Development ...............................194 Peer Support Personnel Recruitment ..........................195 Peer Support Training .................................................195 Psychological Services ................................................196 Policies ........................................................................198 Mental Health Service Providers ................................200 Mental Health Professionals and the Bigger Picture.... 201

8798_C000b.fm Page vii Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

Summary................................................................................201 References .............................................................................204 Appendix: Checklists and Sample Forms.................................205 Introduction ...........................................................................205 Incident Roster ......................................................................205 Crime Scene Checklist ..........................................................214 Command Post and Media Staging Area .............................215 Details of Event and Aftermath ............................................215 Photographs ...........................................................................216 Weapons.................................................................................216 Personnel at Scene ................................................................216 Evidence ................................................................................217 Witnesses ...............................................................................217 Communications....................................................................217 Index .............................................................................................219

8798_C000b.fm Page viii Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

8798_C000b.fm Page ix Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

Series Editor’s Note This textbook is part of a series entitled, “Practical Aspects of Criminal and Forensic Investigation.” This series was created by Vernon J. Geberth, a retired New York City Police Department Lieutenant Commander, who is an author, educator, and consultant on homicide and forensic investigations. This series has been designed to provide contemporary, comprehensive, and pragmatic information to the practitioner involved in criminal and forensic investigations by authors who are nationally recognized experts in the respective fields.

8798_C000b.fm Page x Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

8798_C000b.fm Page xi Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

Preface In recent years, police agencies nationwide have been the objects — justifiably and unjustifiably — of criticism and intense scrutiny by the news media, special interest groups, and the general public, arising from the use of deadly force by law officers. No agency faces a greater threat to its morale and reputation than the involvement of one of its officers in a shooting or use-of-deadly-force incident perceived by the public as unwarranted use of force or firepower. The news media and other segments of society are eager to criticize the investigations that inevitably follow such incidents unless such investigations are proven to be unbiased and comprehensive. One of the intents of this text is to provide investigators and agency administrators with a model policy and investigative protocol that will enable them to conduct an effective investigation after a high-profile incident that attracts great public interest occurs. A police agency should have a clear policy that ensures the conduct of a thorough, unbiased, and totally documented investigation and shows an established policy that guarantees uniform treatment of all parties involved in use-of-deadly-force incidents and in-custody death cases. It is worthwhile for an agency to examine its existing policies and procedures to make sure that its investigative practices will not create problems of commission or omission if it becomes involved in one of these types of cases. Another intent of this book is to provide practical guidance to those responsible for conducting such investigations. It is intended to serve as an easy-to-use reference volume that covers all aspects of investigations, including interviewing suspects and witnesses and working with review boards and the media. The last chapter contains checklists and sample forms that can be used in the form provided or adapted to an agency’s particular needs. This book is not a statistical analysis of officer-involved shootings and in-custody deaths. Whether an agency has faced a single incident or hundreds of them, the important issue is the efficacy of the investigation based on detailed written guidance. The 1991 adoption of

8798_C000b.fm Page xii Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s investigative policy as the suggested model protocol of the National Law Enforcement Policy Center of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is validation of the department’s efforts to produce and follow a balanced approach to these sensitive types of investigations (see IACP Investigation of Officer-Involved Shootings Concepts and Issues, August 1999). This book is based on valid, proven investigative practices — not on theory. I have investigated officer-involved shootings and in-custody death cases for more than 20 years and have been actively involved in training and policy development since 1986. After training officers in the United States and Canada, I have become aware of the policies and practices of other agencies concerning use-of-force investigations. The information compiled in this text provides the basis for a model policy for any agency regardless of its size and jurisdiction. I hope it will assist investigators and agency administrators in preparing and implementing policies and investigative procedures that will enable them to properly address incidents involving agency personnel. A nonadversarial, open approach is the best method. I encourage those who read this text to compare the suggested protocol with the policies of their agencies and others when they attempt to develop workable model policies that apply to their own department’s needs. The need for a model policy that ensures fairness and consistent handling of these types of sensitive cases is critical to every police agency. Keep in mind that developing the policy is only part of the job. Implementing it requires intensive training. A policy that gathers dust on a shelf will be of no help when an officer-involved case arises. The men and women who pin on their badges and place their lives on the line every day certainly deserve balanced reviews from those commissioned to investigate incidents involving the interactions of staff and suspects. The public is entitled to thorough investigation and honest reporting of findings. A fair and thorough investigation can be achieved only by unbiased pursuit of all the facts. My final admonition is to fearlessly present honest and accurate findings to a public, administrative, or judicial forum. David E. Hatch Las Vegas, Nevada

8798_C000b.fm Page xiii Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Lieutenant Commander Vernon Geberth (Ret.) of the New York Police Department for having enough faith in my writing abilities to encourage me to write this text as a volume in his Practical Investigation Series published by CRC Press. Recognition is also due to the architects who developed the finest investigative protocol in the nation. They are all retired members of the Las Vegas Municipal Police Department who represent 150 years of police experience at every level, most of those years in investigative areas: Undersheriff Eric Cooper, Deputy Chief John L. Sullivan, Deputy Chief Kyle Edwards, Detective Sergeant Bill Keeton, and Detective Al Leavitt. Captain Dennis Cobb, Lieutenant Tom Monahan, and my coworkers with the Las Vegas Municipal Police Department performed critical reviews of this book and provided helpful suggestions. Finally, I want to thank Becky McEldowney, senior editor at CRC Press, and her staff for support and advice throughout the writing phase. David E. Hatch

When David invited me to contribute to the second edition of his book I was flattered and grateful, but responded by respectfully offering him the names of several prominent police psychologists. After some discussion, I ultimately accepted his invitation, emphasizing that the content would be heavily steeped in the works and words of a select group of professionals. This group is comprised of individuals who continue to contribute to a greater understanding of the personal impact of the use of deadly force, and to efforts designed to mitigate the impact of these events. They are set apart from a growing population of experts in the field by their professional experiences, by the validity of their research, and, more importantly, by their passion. That being said, I am extremely grateful to Dr. Alexis Artwohl, Dr. Frances Douglas, Dr. Dan Dworkin, Dr. Sherry Harden, Dr. Audrey Honig, Dr. David Klinger, and Dr. Bill Lewinski for their

8798_C000b.fm Page xiv Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

time and contributions. Although I sought to keep my interactions with these busy professionals brief, there were virtually no short conversations. Each was more than willing to contribute and to refer me to others, ultimately increasing the depth of the pool of resources used to compile my chapters. Additionally, there were a number of law enforcement professionals who contributed to this effort. I am indebted to Sergeant Mike Conti with the Massachusetts State Police; Officer Mike Hanson with the Madison, WI Police Department; Lieutenant Mike Holt with the Jackson, TN Police Department; Sergeant Steve Outlaw with the Tallahassee, FL Police Department; Commander Albert Rodriguez with the Texas Department of Public Safety; and Sergeant Jimmy Toler with the Tyler, TX Police Department. Scores of other officers have offered insight, suggestions and encouragement, and while they are too many to name, I am nonetheless grateful. I cannot adequately express my appreciation to the officers who have offered me the gift of their insight for the past 15 years, and for allowing some of their accounts to be included here. There is no greater compliment than to be entrusted by a peer with such profoundly personal substance. Finally, my gratitude to David Hatch for his confidence, his friendship, and for the privilege and opportunity to stand on the same soapbox with one of the country's most respected cops. Randy Dickson

8798_C000b.fm Page xv Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

About the Authors Det. David E. Hatch (Ret.) spent more than 27 years with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD). Since his retirement in 1997, he has been busier than ever with law enforcement and writing and teaching activities. Hatch joined the department in 1969 after discharge from the U.S. Marine Corps. His initial assignments with LVMPD were patrol and traffic enforcement. He soon advanced to the rank of detective and became involved in felony investigations. He joined the homicide section in 1980. Over the ensuing years, he investigated more than 400 homicides and 125 officer-involved shootings. He has earned a number of instructor certifications and endorsement as an expert witness in the Fifth Judicial District of Utah. Hatch’s postretirement activities include the investigation of LVMPD’s cold case files with an eye to reactivating them, and conducting 30 training courses for LVMPD and a number of other state and county law enforcement organizations. He also prepared several investigative protocols for LVMPD — an assignment that uniquely prepared him to write this book. Det. Hatch’s record has a number of commendations including a letter from William Sessions, then FBI Director, for his work in investigating the death of an FBI agent. He was named B’nai B’rith Police Officer of the Year (1984), American Legion Police Officer of the Year (1985), and Optimist Club International Police Officer of the Year (1999). Paul M. Conner, formerly with LVMPD and now Chief of Police of Round Rock, Texas, calls Hatch “a cop’s cop.” Jerry Keller, President of the Major Cities’ Police Chiefs’ Association, can “think of no one else better qualified to write” about investigating officerinvolved shootings and police-related deaths. Lt. Craig Dodd of the Fort Collins Police Department states that his agency practices many of the philosophies and protocols developed by Hatch over the years. Based on such statements by peers and Hatch’s remarkable record with LVMPD, Series Editor Vernon J. Geberth persuaded Hatch to

8798_C000b.fm Page xvi Monday, April 30, 2007 11:57 AM

write this book. Hatch’s hope is that it will prove a valuable training adjunct for continuing education classes and a ready reference for both administrative staff and officers in the field. Since 2003, Randy Dickson has managed a law enforcement training group based in Austin, Texas. His clientele includes local, state and federal law enforcement agencies and associations, and he has traveled throughout the United States providing training and consultation on a variety of critical topics. He has co-presented numerous courses with the primary author, David Hatch, on the topic of officer-involved incidents. While David focuses on the investigation of these incidents, Randy addresses the administrative response, the utilization of peer support officers, and the role of mental health professionals. A former law enforcement officer, Randy has served as a responder and trainer in the field of critical incident response for over fifteen years. During this time, he worked within the Austin Police Department’s Crisis Response Unit and as training specialist and law enforcement training coordinator with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In the latter role, Randy served on the steering and curriculum committees for the agency’s statewide post-trauma staff support program, and as a trainer in the program during and after its implementation. Through his work locally and with national organizations, Randy has assisted hundreds of officers and emergency responders in the aftermath of critical incidents and largescale disasters. Randy is a graduate of the University of Texas Southwest Medical Center at Dallas, and is a licensed instructor with the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education. He has written articles, developed lesson plans and curricula, and authored handbooks for state, regional and national associations and publications. Randy resides near Austin with his wife and 13-yearold son.

8798_C001.fm Page 1 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

1

Why Use a Model Policy? BACKGROUND

In 1989, the Las Vegas Municipal Police Department (LVMPD) began a 2-year study of investigative policies of agencies throughout the United States in order to develop a departmental investigative protocol that would reflect the best policies of all other agencies. Unfortunately, LVMPD discovered that most major departments basically had no documented policies or procedural guidelines in place to address officer-involved-in-shooting incidents. It was apparent that the policies of most police departments, LVMPD included, were more the products of evolution than of research and review. Committees were formed to represent the agency and the employees to ensure that all interests were served. The structured policy that LVMPD eventually adopted could serve as a model for almost any agency. Before 1991, LVMPD, like most other agencies, charged its homicide section with a criminal investigation of an incident. The Internal Affairs Bureau then conducted a separate administrative investigation. The county prosecutor then reviewed the matter to determine whether to institute criminal charges. In the event of a death occurring at the hands of the police, a coroner’s inquest was held or a grand jury summoned to review the employee’s actions to determine whether the use of deadly force was justified under state law. As result of several high-profile and controversial shootings, LVMPD discovered that parallel investigations were part of the problem. Incidents that become very public do not lend themselves to internal investigations. In November 1988, a shooting involving an officer changed the department’s view of the proper manner in which to conduct such investigations.

1

8798_C001.fm Page 2 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

2

Officer-Involved Shootings

CASE STUDY In November 1988, an off-duty police officer entered a convenience store near his home to make a purchase. While he was in the store, several boisterous youths entered and proceeded toward the beer coolers. The officer noted their demeanor, warned the clerk that a “beer skip” was about to occur, and advised her to call the police. The officer did not realize that an intoxicated adult male standing nearby was with the group and was the father of one of the boys. The man warned the teens, and they immediately attacked the officer and forced him out of the store. As the officer attempted to enter his pickup truck, the suspects repeatedly kicked the door, pinning him between the door and frame. He could not retrieve his duty weapon from his vehicle or enter the vehicle for safety. He had a .22 caliber handgun in his pocket, and after identifying himself several times as a police officer, he drew the weapon. The suspects ignored both his warnings and the brandished weapon and continued their attack. In desperation, the officer deliberately fired one round at the adult male and shot him in the upper leg. The officer later said that he thought shooting the adult suspect in the leg would cause the group to retreat. Instead, they became more violent and continued the attack. The officer was cornered near the store’s gas pumps. Fearing for his life and about to lose consciousness, he fired one round at the nearest suspect, striking him in the head. By then, several uniformed police units had arrived and were able to apprehend all suspects as they attempted to flee. The adult who was shot in the leg, the injured officer, and the teen suspect who was shot in the head were all transported to nearby hospitals for emergency medical care. The teen was pronounced dead on arrival at the trauma center. The adult was treated and admitted for surgery to remove the bullet from his upper thigh. The officer was treated and admitted for observation due to numerous blows to his head.

Upon arrival at the scene, homicide and internal affairs investigators observed the normal chaos of an officer-involved shooting. Crime scene personnel and uniformed officers attempted to secure what they thought to be the scene and segregated the suspects from two civilian

8798_C001.fm Page 3 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Why Use a Model Policy?

3

witnesses. Initial information indicated that one witness was reporting the incident via a pay phone and a store clerk had triggered the robbery alarm. The suspects accused the off-duty officer of being intoxicated and causing the incident. They said that they had been defending themselves from a “rogue cop.” The witness using the phone described the incident and said he had heard the officer identify himself as a policeman and repeatedly warn the suspects to stop as he retreated from their attack. The clerk was not qualified to serve as a witness. The news media made much of the incident and interviewed the juvenile suspects, the deceased teen’s mother, the wounded father, and their attorneys, all of whom accused the officer of several criminal acts and the department of a “cover-up.” Conflicting press releases issued by several sections of the department caused confusion and added to the impression that the department was covering up the incident. After a cursory investigation, internal affairs investigators concluded that the off-duty use of deadly force may not have been justified and may have been criminal in nature. Administrators then assigned a sergeant and four investigators from the homicide section to complete the criminal investigation. They approached the incident in the same manner as they would have proceeded to investigate a crime against a person or a homicide. Crime scene investigators and additional staff conducted a briefing. Follow-up investigative assignments were then made.

HOMICIDE INVESTIGATION CRIME SCENE The initial shooting-scene investigation was conducted during the evening hours and was then secured by marked police units until the following day to allow a broader and more detailed search during daylight hours. The scene was photographed and diagrammed, and all evidence recovered was well documented. An expanded search of the area was completed, and two possible weapons were recovered in the desert area behind the store. These possible weapons were a 4-foot-long piece of wood and a miniature baseball bat that appeared

8798_C001.fm Page 4 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

4

Officer-Involved Shootings

to be stained with blood. The scene was on the corner of a well-traveled intersection, with vacant desert on three sides and a large county sports park on the fourth corner. The entire area was searched thoroughly.

FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATION With only the store clerk, a nonhostile witness, and several hostile witnesses/suspects known to investigators, it was obvious that a search for additional witnesses had to be conducted immediately. In an effort to locate witnesses, a press release requested public assistance in locating anyone who may have witnessed anything related to the incident that evening. Investigators returned to the scene at the same time the next day that the incident had occurred and logged the license numbers of vehicles traveling through the area. They contacted the registered owners via telephone to determine whether they traveled through the area daily and may have witnessed anything. The county recreation department was asked to produce game schedules for the ballparks, and all players on all teams playing the night of the shooting were contacted, as were family members and friends who may have been spectators. Copies of all credit card receipts from the convenience store were obtained to attempt to locate witnesses. Videotapes from surveillance cameras were seized. Police dispatch tapes of all incoming calls and dispatch logs of reports of the incident were reviewed. The following week on the same day and time of the incident, investigators and uniformed police officers stopped all vehicles at the intersection and distributed bulletins soliciting public assistance. A complete record search of each participant in the attack was conducted and reports involving these youths were examined to obtain the names of associates. Criminal records were reviewed for information about prior acts of violence. Police located a victim who had been attacked in the same manner, including the smashing of a vehicle window, by some of these same suspects earlier in the year at a recreational area near Las Vegas. As a result of this follow-up, a total of 60 people who had witnessed portions of the attack and shooting were located. When their reports were organized in chronological order, they revealed the following facts:

8798_C001.fm Page 5 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Why Use a Model Policy?

5

• The officer was attacked inside the store near the front doorway. As he retreated to his vehicle, the suspects were observed striking him with 40-oz beer bottles and a small club (miniature baseball bat). As the attack progressed, the suspects were observed kicking in the hood and window of the officer’s vehicle, forcing him to retreat into the street where the suspects pulled 2  2 in  4 ft wooden political campaign signs out of the ground and beat him with them. • The ballplayers from the sports complex ran to the officer’s aid at almost the same time that he shot and killed the teen suspect. They were ordered from the scene by police who did not realize that they were witnesses to the crime. All statements of all witnesses and participants were tape-recorded, and every aspect of the investigation was well documented. A comprehensive investigative report was then prepared, after which a criminal presentment charging the juvenile suspects with several offenses, including battery with a deadly weapon, was directed to the district attorney. The adult suspect was charged with several crimes, including contributing to the delinquency of minors. Since he was the principal instigator of these felony crimes against the officer that led to the death of one suspect, he was charged with the homicide because it occurred during the commission of a felony crime. All suspects involved were convicted for their involvement in this incident. The facts surrounding the death of the teenager were presented to a coroner’s jury in December 1988. The officer was cleared of any wrongdoing, and his actions were deemed justifiable and in self-defense.

CONCLUSION The department administration concluded that a single all-inclusive investigation of high-profile incidents like this one was preferable to the former policy of conducting two separate parallel investigations by two sections of the department. The preparation of a single report eliminated duplication of efforts and conflicting reports from multiple sections. The need for a standard use-of-force review process was also realized. The public nature of an officer-involved-shooting case

8798_C001.fm Page 6 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

6

Officer-Involved Shootings

required civilian representation on review boards formed to deal with such cases. In the 1980s, justification for the use of deadly force changed drastically when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a police officer could no longer use “all means necessary to effect a felony arrest including deadly force” unless an obvious threat to the public or the officer existed. TENNESSEE V. GARNER, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) This case had a profound effect on policies surrounding the use of deadly force. No longer could a police officer utilize deadly force merely because it was authorized by state statute. A Tennessee statute provided that an officer “may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest” if, after he or she has given notice of intent to arrest a criminal suspect, the suspect flees or forcibly resists. Acting under the authority of this statute, a Memphis police officer shot and killed Garner after Garner had been told to halt and fled over a fence in the backyard of a house that he was suspected of burglarizing. The officer used deadly force although he was ”reasonably sure” that the suspect was unarmed. He thought the suspect was 17 or 18 years old and of slight build. Garner’s father subsequently brought an action in federal court, seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of his son’s constitutional rights. The district court held that the officer’s actions were constitutional. The court of appeals then reversed the lower court.

The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force against, as in this case, an apparently unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect. Such force may not be used unless necessary to prevent the escape, and the officer must have probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious injury. Apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. To determine whether such a seizure is reasonable, the extent of the intrusion on the suspect’s rights under that amendment must be balanced against governmental interests in effective law enforcement. This balancing

8798_C001.fm Page 7 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Why Use a Model Policy?

7

process demonstrates that, notwithstanding probable cause to seize a suspect, an officer may not always do so by killing him. The use of deadly force to prevent escapes of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. The Fourth Amendment, for purposes of this case, should not be construed in the light of the common-law rule allowing the use of whatever force is necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon. Changes in legal and technological contexts mean that the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally applied. Whereas many felonies were formerly capital crimes, some are no longer treated as felonies. Many crimes formerly classified as misdemeanors are now felonies. Also, the common-law rule was developed at a time when weapons were far less effective than they are today. In light of the varying rules adopted by states that indicate a long-term trend away from common-law rule, particularly in police departments, the rule is a dubious index of the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute. There is no indication that holding unreasonable a police practice such as that authorized by the statute will severely hamper effective law enforcement. While burglary is certainly a serious crime, the officer in this case could not reasonably have believed that a suspect who was young, slightly built, and unarmed posed a threat. The fact that an unarmed suspect breaks into a dwelling at night does not automatically mean that he is dangerous. The Garner decision is cited in nearly every wrongful death lawsuit filed against an officer or law enforcement agency. Excessive or unreasonable use of deadly force is always an issue, and such cases always attract relentless and usually negative media attention for the agencies. As a result of court decisions and public pressure, it was inevitable that agencies were required to develop use-ofdeadly-force policies that ensured fairer treatment of all parties and were more in line with legal and public concerns.

8798_C001.fm Page 8 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

8798_C002.fm Page 9 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

2

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy INTRODUCTION

The Las Vegas Municipal Police Department (LVMPD) realized that it had a genuine need to develop and implement a policy that would enable it to effectively handle use-of-force cases. Under the direction of the sheriff, committees were formed and given specific goals. Assignments to committees were based on the expertise of the parties involved, with the understanding that final approval of recommended policy changes lay with the sheriff and undersheriff. The internal affairs supervisor and undersheriff constituted the Administrative Policy Committee. The deputy chief of investigative services and homicide supervisors formed the Investigative Policy Committee to ensure unbiased investigation of use-of-force incidents. Police Union representatives sat on the Employee Representation Committee for purposes of dealing with involved employees and their supervisors. The department’s legal counsel handled liability and legality issues. After reviewing the department’s existing policy, the policies of other jurisdictions, and the recommendations of the various committees, the written policy that appears below was adopted. It requires a complete criminal investigation of each use-of-force event, including the circumstances surrounding the use of deadly force and full details of the crime that precipitated the incident. Another requirement is the conduct of an administrative investigation that allows the department to use corrective measures if required. One of the first matters to be determined is the authority of the employee involved in the incident.

9

8798_C002.fm Page 10 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

10

Officer-Involved Shootings

AUTHORITY The case study that was previously cited concerned an off-duty policeman who killed a suspect in an attempt to save his own life. He was cleared after a thorough investigation based on accusations of intoxication, instigation of the incident, and acting as a “rogue cop.” An officer’s authority to act will be one of the first issues that the agency must consider. A number of vital questions must be asked to determine the scope of the employee’s authority to act under the circumstances: 1. Was the employee responding to a call for assistance? 2. Did the employee act on the authority of a search or arrest warrant? 3. Was a crime (bank robbery, assault) in progress? 4. Was the employee acting on orders, for example, in a tactical situation in which deadly force was ordered or authorized? 5. Was the employee reacting to actions of a suspect as a result of contact that the employee had initiated, for example, a traffic violation stop or field observation? 6. What crime precipitated the use of deadly force? 7. Did the employee’s use of deadly force comply with existing state laws and current court decisions?

ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION The purpose of an administrative investigation is to determine whether an employee’s actions complied with department policy. The results of a complete investigation will result in a review of the employee’s actions by a supervisory- or department-impaneled Board of Review to determine whether corrective measures are deemed necessary. Note that potential corrective actions can apply to the employee or the department. Such actions include changes in departmental training policies, remedial training of the employee, and punitive action (ranging from reprimand through suspension and termination) against the employee. The department’s legal counsel will then be in a position to assess any civil liability that may arise from the incident.

8798_C002.fm Page 11 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

11

MODEL USE-OF-FORCE POLICY CRITICAL PROCEDURES Critical procedures are intended to apply to high-risk incidents that require immediate action and present the greatest potential for loss of human life. Personnel are required to maintain a thorough knowledge of these procedures as they pertain to their areas of assignment and be ready to use them upon little or no notice. It is incumbent upon supervisors to ensure subordinate familiarity through reviews and testing processes during annual performance evaluations. To facilitate documentation of testing, a Critical Procedures Training Log has been developed for supervisors to note when an employee passes each designated section of critical procedures training and testing. The form will be maintained in the bureau personnel file until all relevant sections are passed by the employee. At that time, the form will be forwarded to the training bureau’s In-Service Training Detail so that notation can be made in the employee’s permanent training file. This training must be completed annually by each affected employee. Completed test materials also should be filed in the bureau personnel file until replaced by a subsequent test the following year. The In-Service Training Detail will be responsible for updating and distributing the tests to all sergeants by the second week in January of each year. No training credit will be given for this training and testing process. It is imperative that a training policy be instituted to guarantee that each employee is currently trained on all policy and procedural orders because lack of training and lack of proper supervision can become critical liability issues in civil litigation.

USE

OF

FORCE

This department has a mission to accomplish police work as efficiently and unobtrusively as possible. The department has the highest regard for the dignity and liberty of all persons and it places minimal reliance upon the use of force and authority. In vesting members with the lawful authority to use force for the public welfare, a careful

8798_C002.fm Page 12 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

12

Officer-Involved Shootings

balancing of all human interest is required. Department members shall use only that force reasonably necessary to bring an incident under control while protecting the lives of citizens and other department members. Any force used will be that which is minimally necessary to accomplish a lawful police task.

AUTHORIZATION WEAPONS

TO

CARRY FIREARMS

AND

NONDEADLY

Department members authorized to carry firearms and nondeadly, low-lethality weapons will be instructed in the policies described herein and provided with the necessary training. New department members will be provided with copies of this order and thoroughly trained and tested for proficiency before being authorized to carry firearms and nondeadly weapons. The inability to qualify with a duty weapon should be grounds for termination from the academy or field training program due to the obvious liability issues involved when an employee cannot meet minimum marksmanship standards. Members authorized to carry firearms shall be armed while on duty, whether in uniform or civilian attire. Nonuniformed commissioned personnel below the rank of captain are required to carry either oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray or an expandable straight baton unless the requirement is waived by a bureau or area commander. Weapons and ammunition not authorized by the department are expressly prohibited at all times. Any employee not carrying low-lethality weaponry (e.g., OC spray or an expandable baton) who utilizes deadly force when other alternatives exist could create a severe civil liability for the employee and the agency, not to mention possible criminal charges if the use of force is deemed excessive. The carrying of firearms while off duty shall be at the discretion of authorized employees. Unarmed off-duty officers are not subject to disciplinary measures for failure to take action; however, if a need for police services arises when an off-duty officer is present, he or she shall request that on-duty police respond. The following personnel are prohibited from carrying firearms while off duty: 1. Probationary police and corrections officers who have not completed police academy or corrections academy training.

8798_C002.fm Page 13 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

13

2. Commissioned corrections personnel in uniform (except those authorized to carry weapons on duty). 3. Noncommissioned personnel armed by the department who do not possess valid permits to carry concealed weapons. 4. Members under suspension and those failing to qualify consistent with minimum police officer student training standards. Off-duty officers who anticipate consuming alcoholic beverages are advised not to carry firearms. Any department member found intoxicated and carrying a weapon shall be subject to disciplinary action. If the need for police services arises while an off-duty member is consuming alcoholic beverages, the member shall request response by an on-duty police officer. Off-duty members who use deadly force while exercising their police powers shall be subject to all provisions of this order.

PARAMETERS

FOR

USE

OF

NONDEADLY FORCE

When force is required, a department member should assess the incident to determine, based on training and experience, which options in the force continuum will best de-escalate the situation and bring it under control in a safe and prudent manner. Members are permitted to use department-authorized nondeadly force techniques (including physical force) and equipment for resolution of the incident to: 1. Protect themselves 2. Restrain or subdue resistant suspects 3. Bring unlawful situations safely and effectively under control A department-approved baton, pursuit immobilization technique (PIT), canine restraint, aerosol OC defensive sprays, lateral vascular neck restraint (LVNR), low-lethality devices, electronic RegisterEnforced Automated Control Technique (REACT) belts used by sheriff’s deputies for court restraint, and pyrotechnic devices used by Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams are the only departmentauthorized nondeadly weapons and tactics. The use of a flashlight as

8798_C002.fm Page 14 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

14

Officer-Involved Shootings

a nondeadly weapon is discouraged. If it is necessary to use a flashlight for defensive purposes, it is to be used in the same manner as a baton. Officers are to avoid striking a suspect on the head, neck, sternum, spine, groin, or kidneys, unless they are confronted with deadly force situations. The use of LVNR to restrain a suspect should be carefully considered, and extreme caution should be followed when an officer implements this very dangerous method of incapacitation. Numerous injuries have occurred during training and during struggles with combative suspects. The medical cause of death resulting from LVNR use is asphyxiation due to manual strangulation.

PARAMETERS

FOR

USE

OF

LOW-LETHALITY FORCE

The low-lethality shotgun will be used only against persons who are armed with weapons. Excluding firearms, which could cause serious injury or death, this group includes edged weapons, clubs, pipes, bottles, bricks, etc. SWAT and detention personnel are exempt from these provisions. This exemption is necessary because those units are trained to utilize force in alien or unusual circumstances. The low-lethality shotgun is cited in both levels 5 and 6 of the force continuum. Two officers are required to be present when a lowlethality shotgun is deployed. This weapon is to be used as an option to counter deadly force only when the circumstances allow the officers involved to bring an incident to a safe conclusion without unnecessary risk. Two officers should be considered the minimum number required for deploying low-lethality weaponry. Low-lethality weapons will not be used in civil unrest situations unless authorized by a patrol lieutenant. Remember that no weapon is nonlethal and some weapons are less lethal. Low-lethality weapons should be deployed only as a last resort prior to the use of deadly force.

PARAMETERS

FOR

USE

OF

DEADLY FORCE

Department members are not authorized to draw or display their firearms, except during training at the firearms range, unless circumstances warrant the necessity of using firearms in conformance with this order. Before using firearms, department members shall,

8798_C002.fm Page 15 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

15

whenever feasible, identify themselves and state their intentions to shoot by shouting, “Police! I’ll shoot!” Members are to fire their weapons only to stop an assailant and incapacitate him, so as to prevent him from completing a potentially deadly act. A shot should be directed to the center of body mass for maximum stopping effectiveness and minimal danger to innocent bystanders. The use of a vehicle to stop or apprehend a suspect (ramming, for example) and using PIT may be considered uses of deadly force. Forcible stopping may produce unpredictable movements of the vehicles involved, thus creating an immediate danger to suspects, police, and bystanders. Officers using such tactics may be held accountable for unintentional damages or injuries to bystanders resulting from their actions. The investigation of vehicular use of deadly force should be handled with the assistance of experts from an agency’s traffic accident investigative unit. If the agency does not have this specialized type of expertise available, the state police vehicular homicide unit may be needed to assist with the investigation or act in an advisory capacity. The state police units usually have the expertise required to reconstruct an accident or incident. Department members are authorized to use deadly force to: 1. Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm. 2. Prevent the escape of a fleeing felon who the officer has probable cause to believe will pose a significant threat to human life if escape should occur; the justification must be clear and immediate. 3. Justifiably kill an animal: a. In self-defense. b. To prevent substantial harm to an officer or someone else. c. When an animal is badly injured and humane treatment requires its relief from further suffering. A seriously wounded animal may be destroyed only after all attempts have been made to request assistance from the responsible agency that handles the disposal of animals (humane society, animal

8798_C002.fm Page 16 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

16

Officer-Involved Shootings

control unit, game warden, or conservation officer). The destruction of vicious animals should follow the rules set forth for destroying an animal in self-defense or ensuring the safety of others. Department members are not authorized to discharge their firearms: 1. 2. 3. 4.

To fire warning shots. If it appears likely that an innocent person might be injured. From a moving vehicle, except as a last resort. At a moving vehicle, unless it is absolutely necessary to do so to protect against imminent threat to the life of officers or others. An officer should not: a. Remain in the path of an oncoming vehicle rather than discharge his or her firearm. b. Intentionally remain in the path of an oncoming vehicle and attempt to disable the vehicle by discharging a firearm. c. Discharge a firearm at a fleeing vehicle or its driver.

Every officer must exercise reasonable care and caution in the safe handling of a firearm. A firearm can be considered accidentally discharged for only the following reasons: (1) mechanical failure, (2) faulty ammunition, and (3) unintentional discharge not resulting from negligence.

REPORTING

AND INVESTIGATIVE

REQUIREMENTS

The department will investigate all use-of-force incidents to determine whether the use was justified and to correct any identifiable training deficiencies. An officer will notify his or her supervisor immediately when: 1. A firearm is discharged outside the department’s firearm range, excluding discharges occurring during hunting and competitive shooting. 2. The use of force results in death, injury, or complaint of injury.

8798_C002.fm Page 17 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

17

3. A nondeadly weapon or low-lethality tool is used on a person. 4. An optional rifle is deployed for any reason. 5. Another action, including intentional traffic collision and forcible stopping, resulted in death or injury. 6. PIT was used to terminate a pursuit. Examples of optional rifles are shoulder weapons other than shotguns, i.e., sniper, semiautomatic, and fully automatic rifles (M-16, AR-15, Mini-14, MP-5). Deployment of these weapons requires documentation from supervisory staff.

NOTIFICATIONS The senior on-duty patrol supervisor should be summoned to take control of a use-of-force scene until relieved by investigative personnel when (1) a firearm is discharged outside a training environment, (2) the use of force results in death or serious injury, or (3) a citizen or arrested suspect complains that an injury has been inflicted as the result of a police activity. The senior patrol supervisor should ensure that the communications section has made the appropriate notifications to: 1. Investigative personnel (crime lab staff, detectives, risk manager, administrative-level officer) 2. An employee associate representative or crisis counselor

DEFINITIONS Authorized weapon — Weapon that meets department specifications. Officers are trained in proficiency and safety related to handling authorized weapons. Deadly force — Any force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. Force continuum — System of categorizing force into six groups of identifiable escalating stages of intensity. The categories are commonly identified as presence, verbal commands, restraint/control, chemical agents, temporary incapac-

8798_C002.fm Page 18 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

18

Officer-Involved Shootings PRESENCE VE

L

Standing Walking Running Whisper

ROPOLIT ET S VEGA A

U N T Y, N E

V

LE

YI RAR

Propelled

L

AC AP

5

NC

VE

HandThrown

IT AT I

Handheld (Chemical Agent)

ON CH

Empty Hand Pepper Spray Impact Tool Handcuffs LVNR PIT

TR L E AI V E L NT 3 /C ONT R

R

CO

AD

A

L CLA

TEMPO

K

POLIC E

LVNR Impact Tool Empty Hand L/L Shotgun

Shout

AN S

M

Normal Voice Tone

OL

Firearms Impact Tool Empty Hand PIT L/L Shotgun

S AND MM CO 2 AL EL RB EV

DEA DL Y LEV FOR EL CE 6

LEVEL 1

RE

S

L E VEL 4

E MIC

AL AGENTS

FIGURE 2.1 Use-of-force continuum.

itation, and deadly force. The six groups and their subgroups are shown in Figure 2.1. Low lethality — Any degree of nonlethal force used to achieve a desired outcome. The force may range from restraint to blunt trauma and may include chemical aerosol projectors, impact munitions, impact tools, and other means. Nondeadly force — Any force other than force considered to be deadly. Probable cause — The facts and circumstances known to a department member that would warrant a prudent person to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person accused of the crime committed it. Pursuit immobilization technique (PIT) — A very dangerous forced rotational technique applied to a suspect vehicle that spins the vehicle to a stop.

8798_C002.fm Page 19 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

19

Pursuit termination strips — Strips of spikes utilized to deflate tires on a suspect vehicle. The strips are placed on a road surface and puncture tires that pass over them. Ramming — An intentional violent collision that may cause major damage to all vehicles involved and may result in injury or death to occupants and bystanders. Reasonable belief — The facts or circumstances that a department member knows or should know would cause an ordinary and prudent person to act or think in a similar way under similar circumstances. Reportable force — The use of force that results in death, injury, or complaint of injury; any intentional traffic collision or forcible stopping; any discharge of a firearm outside a departmental firing range, excluding off-duty pursuits, such as hunting or participating in competitive shooting. Serious bodily injury — A bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, causes serious permanent disfigurement, or results in a long-term loss or impairment of the functioning of any bodily member or organ. Regardless of how your agency chooses to organize an investigative unit to handle the investigation of use-of-deadly-force incidents, it is imperative to adopt an established written policy that guarantees that all such incidents are handled in a uniform, fair, and organized manner. Accidental discharges involving property damage, disposal of animals, and injuries occurring during training may be investigated by the supervisors of the officer involved in the incident. The deliberate use of deadly force should always require immediate and consistent investigative response. The immediate supervisor of the officer or officers involved is responsible for relieving them of duty. The supervisor is also responsible for preparing and delivering written notice of relief from duty or suspension pending completion of investigation. These duties are not functions of investigators. An officer should be issued a loaner weapon if his or her weapon is impounded. The investigative unit (homicide section, crimes-against-persons bureau, internal affairs unit, etc.) tasked with investigating use-ofdeadly-force and officer-involved shooting incidents should have

8798_C002.fm Page 20 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

20

Officer-Involved Shootings

written authority to investigate all deaths and serious injuries resulting from the use of force (including in-custody incidents) and incidents involving intentional shooting at human beings. The unit should submit its written report to the sheriff or chief of police. The supervisor or director of the investigative body is in command of all investigations. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): Defined excessive force (deadly or not) in the course of arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen under the Fourth Amendment. In 1984, Dethorne Graham sued Officer Connor of the Charlotte Police Department in North Carolina to recover damages for injuries sustained when officers used force during an investigatory stop. During a diabetic reaction, Graham’s involuntary actions caused Officer Connor to perceive possible criminal activity. Graham’s erratic behavior and resistance resulted in serious injuries during his arrest. He alleged that his Fourth Amendment (prohibits unreasonable search and seizures) rights had been violated. He was released after determination that no crime had been committed.

The court held that all claims that law enforcement officials used excessive deadly or nondeadly force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen are properly analyzed under the “objective reasonableness” standard of the Fourth Amendment rather than under the substantive due process standard. The court rejected the notion that all excessive force claims brought under the 1983 decision are governed by a single generic standard. Instead, courts must identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force and then judge the claim by reference to the specific constitutional standard that governs that right. In other words, litigants must be specific rather than simply allege violations of the Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment. Claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of a free citizen are most properly characterized by invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their persons … against unreasonable seizures,” and must

8798_C002.fm Page 21 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

21

be judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. The inquiry arising from the standard is whether an officer’s actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him without regard to his underlying intent or motivation. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, and it must allow for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation. The court stated that the Johnson v. Glick test applied by the lower courts was incompatible with a proper Fourth Amendment analysis. (See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 [2d Cir. 1973].) The suggestion that “malicious and sadistic” inquiry is merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively unreasonable under the circumstances was rejected. Also rejected was the conclusion that because individual officers’ subjective motivations are of central importance in deciding whether force used against a convicted prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment (prohibits excessive bail or fines; cruel and unusual punishment), it cannot be reversible error to inquire whether force used against a suspect violates the Fourth Amendment. The “cruel” and “punishment” terms included in the Eighth Amendment clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of mind, whereas the “unreasonable” term cited in the Fourth Amendment does not. Moreover, the less protective Eighth Amendment standard applies only after the state has complied with constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. Graham was remanded to the lower court. The recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court that the police officers in the Graham case had to make split-second decisions in the applying of force, acted in good faith without malicious or sadistic intent to cause harm, attempted to maintain or restore order, and were justified in their actions is of major importance in determining the necessity for applying the use of deadly force. Additional cases that concern the use of force are Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) and Sacramento County v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 No. 96-1337 (1998).

8798_C002.fm Page 22 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

22

Officer-Involved Shootings

MODEL POLICY USE

OF

ELECTROMUSCULAR DISRUPTION WEAPON (AKA TASER®)

In this politically correct world, we tend to apply less provocative labels to controversial topics. Less lethal is now nonlethal, police batons/billy clubs are now impact tools, tear gas/pepper sprays are now aerosol incapacitating sprays, and shotguns are painted pink and loaded with bean bags and suddenly become less lethal. Paintball guns once used for recreation are now used for crowd control. All of the above are potentially lethal weapons and require training and clear guidelines in their deployment and use. No matter what titles we use, we must remember that humans are fragile and everything used to physically subdue them is inherently dangerous. Not the least of these types of devices is the Taser. The most effective of all the less-lethal arsenal is also the most controversial; therefore, we must have very thorough training in its use and very clear use of force policy in its deployment. The following model policy meets Commission of Accredited Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) Accreditation Standards. The Taser falls into level three of the use-of-force continuum and is considered a nonlethal use-of-force option.

DEFINITIONS Taser® — An electromuscular disruption weapon that disrupts the body’s ability to communicate messages from the brain to the muscles, causing temporary motor skill dysfunction to a subject. Drive Stun — A secondary function of the Taser is to stun a subject by making direct contact with the body after the air cartridge has been expended or removed. Air Cartridge — A replaceable cartridge for the Taser, which uses compressed nitrogen to fire two barbed probes on thin connecting wires sending a high voltage/low current signal into a subject.

8798_C002.fm Page 23 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

23

GENERAL ORDER Department members are not authorized to draw or display the Taser except for training, unless the circumstances create reasonable belief that it may be necessary to use it. The Taser is to be handled in the same manner as a firearm and must be secured prior to entering any detention facility. There are three types of Taser applications: 1. Spark Display — A noncontact demonstration of the Taser’s ability to discharge electricity. This is conducted only when the cartridge has been removed from the weapon. The purpose of this display is to convince the subject to comply with a lawful order and avoid the Taser’s deployment in probe or drive stun mode. 2. Drive Stun — Contact is made by pressing the front of the Taser (cartridge removed) into the body of a subject resisting lawful orders and activating the Taser. The drive stun causes significant localized pain in the area touched by the Taser but does not have significant effect on the central nervous system. The drive stun does not incapacitate a subject but may assist in taking the subject into custody. If a Taser is fired using the cartridge at a distance less than 3 feet, the effect will be similar to the drive stun. 3. Probe — The Taser is most effective when the cartridge is fired and the probes/darts make direct contact with the subject. Proper application will result in temporary immobilization of the subject and provide the officer with a window of opportunity to take the subject safely into custody. Optimum range for the probe deployment is 7 to 15 feet, with a 21-ft maximum distance. Deployment of a Taser cartridge at a distance of less than 3 feet will not result in temporary immobilization or central nervous system disruption. The Taser is one of the options available to officers, but like the baton, OC spray, or empty hand techniques, it may not be effective in every situation. Officers must assess the effectiveness of each application and determine whether further applications are warranted

8798_C002.fm Page 24 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

24

Officer-Involved Shootings

or a different tactic should be employed. The decision to use a Taser will be dependent on the actions of the subject, the threat facing the officer, and the totality of circumstances surrounding the incident. The Taser may be used when the subject is displaying active, aggressive, or aggravated aggressive resistance to an officer attempting to conduct legal law enforcement activities as defined in Use-ofForce Policy. The Taser will not be used: 1. When the officer knows a subject has come in contact with flammable liquids or is in a flammable atmosphere. 2. When the subject is in a position where a fall may cause substantial injury or death. 3. Punitively for purposes of coercion or in an unjustified manner. 4. When a prisoner is handcuffed. 5. To escort or jab individuals. 6. To awaken unconscious or intoxicated individuals. 7. When the subject is visibly pregnant, unless deadly force is the only other option. Also, the Taser should not be used in the following circumstances (unless there are compelling reasons to do so, which can be clearly articulated): 1. When subject is operating a motor vehicle. 2. When the subject is holding a firearm. 3. When the subject is at the extremes of age or physically disabled. 4. In a situation where deadly force is clearly justifiable unless another officer is present and capable of providing deadly force to protect the officers and/or civilians as necessary.

TRAINING

AND

CERTIFICATION

Defensive tactics personnel who have been certified as Taser instructors will be the only authorized persons to provide Taser instruction. Training will be conducted in accordance with department protocols.

8798_C002.fm Page 25 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

25

Officers authorized to use a Taser must successfully complete an initial training course, which includes written and practical tests. Once certified, officers must attend annual re-certification training. All patrol officers under the rank of lieutenant must obtain certification training and carry the Taser when in uniform.

EQUIPMENT CARE

AND

HANDLING

Officers will use only authorized Taser equipment issued by the department’s supply section. The Taser will be inspected for damage and cleanliness, and batteries and cartridges replaced when required by the officer. The battery display will be checked on the central information display gauge (CID) at the beginning of each shift. A reading of 20% or less will require the DPM/battery pack to be changed. The pack will not be removed from the Taser except when the reading is 20% or less or when conducting a data download. The Taser will never be stored for more than 48 hours without the DPM/battery pack attached. When an officer is off-duty, his/her Taser must be stored in a climate-controlled area, not in a vehicle. Officers must conduct a spark check at the beginning of each shift to ensure the Taser will function properly. A spark check is an equipment check conducted outside of public view to ensure the Taser is operable. It is conducted by removing the cartridge, test firing the weapon, and observing the electrical arc. The spark check does not require a report. Uniformed officers will carry the Taser in a department-issued holster, which is attached to the duty belt on the opposite side of the duty firearm. The cross-draw position is optional. Nonuniformed officers are required to follow these regulations in the same manner. Officers have the option of carrying the DPM or the X-DPM models. The X-DPM is the extended version that is capable of carrying a spare Taser cartridge.

PATROL DIVISION ONLY Patrol Officer 1. Gives a warning, when practical, to the subject and other officers before firing the Taser at the subject.

8798_C002.fm Page 26 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

26

Officer-Involved Shootings

2. Center of body mass should be the target area, particularly the center mass of the back, as clothing tends to be tighter on this part of the body. 3. When encountering subjects wearing heavy or loose clothing on the upper body, the legs should be considered as a target. 4. Avoids hitting the subject in sensitive tissue areas, such as head, face, neck, groin, or female breast area; however, probes penetrating these areas will be removed by medical personnel at a medical facility. 5. Ensures that the probes are removed from the subject’s skin by a Taser-certified officer. 6. Use of drive stun is discouraged except in situations where the probe deployment is not possible and the immediate application of drive stun will bring the subject displaying active, aggressive, or aggravated aggressive resistance safely under control. Multiple drive stuns are discouraged and must be justified and articulated on the Use-of-Force Report Form. If initial application is ineffective, an officer will reassess the situation and consider other available options. 7. Notifies detention medical personnel, at the time of booking, that the subject/arrestee has been struck with Taser probes or received a drive stun. An examination will be conducted by them to determine whether the individual has suffered any injury, either directly from the Taser discharge or indirectly, such as by falling after incapacitation. 8. Makes notification to immediate supervisor whenever the Taser has been used. Communications 1. Makes notifications as directed. Immediate Supervisor 1. Responds to the scene when a Taser has been used. 2. Notifies the area lieutenant/or watch commander when a Taser has been used.

8798_C002.fm Page 27 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

3. Ensures photographs are taken of the probe impacts and any related injuries and attached to the Use-of-Force Report. Dash camera videos should be secured. Watch Commander 1. Responds to the scene if serious injury resulted from the use of the Taser or other circumstances dictate.

DETENTION BUREAU/DIVISION Corrections Sergeant or Corrections Emergency Response Team (CERT) Officer 1. Responds to scene with at least two cartridges. 2. Considers other alternatives to resolve the incident before deploying the Taser. 3. Ensures sufficient backup officers are present prior to use. 4. Gives a warning, when practical, to the inmate and other officers before targeting and firing the Taser at an inmate. 5. Center mass of body should be primary target area particularly center mass of the back, as clothing tends to be tighter on this part of the body. 6. When encountering inmates wearing heavy or loose clothing on the upper body, the legs should be considered as a target. 7. Attempts to avoid hitting the inmate in sensitive tissue areas, such as the head, face, neck, groin, or female breast area; however, probes that do penetrate these areas will be removed by medical personnel. 8. Ensures the probes are removed from the inmate by a Tasercertified officer. 9. Videotapes nonemergent deployments pursuant to division procedures. 10. Use of drive stun is discouraged except in situations where the probe deployment is not possible and the immediate application of the drive stun will bring an inmate displaying active, aggressive, or aggravated aggressive resistance safely under control. Multiple drive stuns are discouraged and must

27

8798_C002.fm Page 28 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

28

Officer-Involved Shootings

be justified and articulated on the Use-of-Force Report/Form. If initial application is ineffective, an officer will reassess the situation and consider other available options. 11. Notifies watch commander and medical staff to respond to scene. 12. Ensures photographs are taken of the site of the probe impacts and any related injuries. Ensures that video surveillance tapes are properly secured. DSD Medical Staff 1. An examination will be conducted by medical staff to determine whether the inmate has suffered any injury, either from the Taser discharge or indirectly, such as by falling after incapacitation.

POST-DEPLOYMENT Police and Corrections Officers 1. Handle the probes the same as contaminated needles and sharps in accordance with department biohazard disposal procedures. 2. Complete Use-of-Force reports. 3. Present Taser to supervisor for data download prior to end of shift if a reported use-of-force incident occurs. 4. Forward a Use-of-Force Report to the Bureau Commander. Supervisor 1. Ensures the officers complete reports and required photographs are taken. 2. Verifies the probes are disposed of properly and arranges for replacement cartridges. 3. Downloads the data record of the Taser prior to end of shift in which a reported use-of-force incident occurs and saves data for appropriate file.

8798_C002.fm Page 29 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

Developing a Use-of-Force Policy

29

Command Supervisor 1. Ensures download of data and all reports are completely accurate and forwarded to Internal Affairs/Professional Standards Bureau.

COMMENTS It is no longer enough to merely have a training policy on use of force. We must have a comprehensive written uniform use-of-force policy. In this litigious society, we need clear policy on the use of these tools of our trade. We need digital cameras to document incidents with all officers, along with all the necessary tools we already carry in our daily duty. The Unit charged with investigating use of force where substantial injury occurs should be well trained in the use and function of these weapons. Proper maintenance and uniformed policy on the carry and use of these weapons eliminates the mistakes that can occur when we exercise our own discretion in how to carry and when to display these weapons. Care should be taken in understanding that drive stun, when used to excess, will be termed as excessive or torture by some groups. Pain compliance is a very subjective term.

CONCLUSION The model use-of-force policy presented above and patterned after the LVMPD policy can serve as a template for establishing a written policy that is tailored to the needs of the individual agency. Highprofile incidents, such as the shooting at Ruby Ridge and the Waco Branch Davidian standoff, led the Department of Justice to develop a rules-of-engagement policy that effectively standardized policies for all the department’s agencies. It is unfortunate that policies and protocols for handling critical incidents are developed in a reactive manner after an incident occurs. Agencies would be wise to act proactively and develop such policies and protocols so that they are ready to respond when a high-profile, sensitive incident occurs. Agency staff should be trained intensively and be ready to act promptly and efficiently when called to deal with

8798_C002.fm Page 30 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:22 AM

30

Officer-Involved Shootings

a critical case involving agency personnel. That can be accomplished only if they can rely on a protocol they understand. The “circle the wagons” attitude of handling such matters is no longer acceptable. Law enforcement agencies are challenged daily by the media, special interest groups, citizen review boards, and individual citizens who demand accountability. Congressional reviews and grand juries have forced federal and local agencies to develop policies that are more in tune to the public’s demands. Lack of documentation, circulation of confidential memos and reports, conducting closed investigations, and the lack of accountability are no longer acceptable practices. In order to meet the challenges of the new century, we must accept change and assume responsibility for our actions, many of which have led to the public distrust to which all police agencies are now subjected. The development and implementation of uniform and fair use-of-force policies is the first step to dissipating that distrust. Those charged with investigating use-of-force incidents must have a clear standard to guide them through all such investigations.

8798_C003.fm Page 31 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

3

Assigning Investigative Responsibility

NEED FOR INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES Due to the unique nature and high profile of use-of-force investigations, written guidelines are required in order to guarantee consistency and continuity of all such investigations. A set of consistently applied guidelines will also serve to diminish staff, media, and public criticism of the manner in which such cases are investigated and documented. The investigative procedures discussed below can be used as a format for investigations and can be adapted to suit the circumstances of a specific incident under investigation.

INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY Departmental policy covering the use of deadly force should grant the required authority for staff members to investigate deadly-force incidents. Policies detailing critical procedures may also come into play. As noted in the previous section, all administrative and field personnel should be familiar with critical procedures and be ready to respond upon a moment’s notice.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE The organizational structure shown below is intended to serve as an example. Obviously, every law enforcement agency will develop its own investigation team to deal with officer-involved shootings, useof-force incidents, in-custody deaths, and other sensitive, high-profile events. Team members can be permanently assigned or team makeup can vary, depending on type of incident. A team involved in investi31

8798_C003.fm Page 32 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

32

Officer-Involved Shootings

gating a death incident should include a number of members from the homicide section. The chain of command for a team formed by a large municipal agency might consist of the following: Deputy chief of investigative services division (team leader) Captain of crimes-against-persons bureau Lieutenant, homicide section Sergeant, homicide section Two investigators (per team), homicide section

INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSE SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES A section supervisor and at least two investigators respond to all incidents involving the use of deadly force. Additional investigative personnel can be requested if needed. The investigative team should respond to the scene or established command post and obtain a briefing from on-scene supervisors or personnel directly involved in the incident before assigning investigative tasks. After the briefing, investigation assignments can then be distributed (hospital, scene of incident, interviews of witnesses, etc.). The team leader should: 1. Confirm that all appropriate notifications have been made, for example, to the sheriff or chief and the supervisor of the employee involved in the incident. 2. Schedule a meeting with all investigative and support personnel within 24 hours of the incident for purposes of briefing and distributing investigative assignments. 3. Coordinate the investigation and dissemination of information to ensure the proper utilization of personnel and timely follow-up of all investigative leads developed. 4. Act as a liaison among all department units involved. 5. Ensure that after each investigative assignment has been completed by the team members, the information developed is shared and all parties involved are kept abreast of all new developments.

8798_C003.fm Page 33 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

Assigning Investigative Responsibility

33

It is imperative that all investigative personnel are continually advised of information as it develops. Frequent briefings should be conducted via cellular phones to ensure that all investigative personnel are apprised of new information. This allows investigative personnel to obtain up-to-date information at any time from any location. Additionally, the team leader should act as a temporary repository for audio and video evidence. He or she should secure communication tapes and logs and arrange transcription. Videos from police dashboard cameras and surveillance videos from businesses should be obtained if available. A critical aspect of the team leader’s work as liaison with other department units is ensuring that all assignments and reports are completed and forwarded to investigators in a timely manner. Another critical task is supervision of team activities. The team leader should always be available to provide guidance to team members.

SUMMARY Consistent investigation of use of force and other incidents involving agency personnel will minimize criticism within the agency and from outside parties. This can be accomplished only by following written guidelines in every case. Investigative responsibility should be borne by a team of supervisory and field employees who have the required expertise and are trained in critical procedures. The team leader’s role is a mixture of communication and coordination. He or she must be prepared to give guidance, follow up to ensure that deadlines are met, and adhere to agency policy covering handling of officer-involved incidents.

8798_C003.fm Page 34 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

8798_C004.fm Page 35 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

4

Scene Investigation INTRODUCTION

Investigating the scene of an officer-involved incident, particularly one that involves a death, requires that on-scene investigative team members arrive promptly, assume control, gather as much information as possible, secure the area, and control access to the scene and the employee involved, while not tainting evidence or allowing anyone else to do so. Evidence must be gathered and documented. All parties’ civil rights must be protected, and the media access to the scene and agency employees must be carefully controlled.

DUTIES OF INCIDENT SCENE INVESTIGATORS Upon arrival at a scene, an investigator should be thoroughly briefed and receive his or her assignments. Investigators must assume control of the scene, witnesses, and police employee involved in the incident and prevent unauthorized access by the media. Among the early tasks to be accomplished are: 1. Protection of the evidence. 2. Determination of the boundaries of the scene if possible and securing the entire area. A double perimeter is preferable: a taped and secure inner scene and a much larger barricaded or taped outer area that will serve to keep the public, media, and nonessential personnel away from forensic evidence and people involved in the incident. 3. Removal of the employee involved in the incident from public and press scrutiny. He or she and a peer, supervisor, or union representative should be removed from the scene 35

8798_C004.fm Page 36 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

36

Officer-Involved Shootings

after explaining to investigators how the incident occurred and walking through the scene. Limit the number of people who have access to the employee. Interviews with the employee should be conducted only by team investigators. Before removing the involved employee from the scene, it is crucial that he or she accompany investigators through the scene and briefly describe how the incident occurred. This allows investigators to determine the parameters of the scene and obtain information about the incident that will enable them to organize the scene investigation and assign tasks. The walk-through of the scene soon after the incident is of critical importance. Walking through every part of the scene will risk contamination of the evidence. It is sufficient for the employee to stand at a location that will allow him or her to point to critical areas and describe the circumstances surrounding the incident. Do not videotape the walk-through. The employee’s ability to recall the details and proper order of events may be affected by the extreme stress caused by the trauma of the event, and videotaping may exert additional stress. The purpose of the walk-through is to gather information for the ensuing crime scene investigation. The employee should be photographed at the scene in the attire worn at the time of the incident (uniform, plain clothes, specialized unit togs). It is not usually necessary to disarm the employee at the scene unless the weapon is required for investigative purposes. The impounding and countdown of the weapon should occur out of public view. All weapons, including backups, in the possession of the employee at the time of the incident should be impounded even if not used. Any impounded weapons should be test-fired, examined, and returned to the employee as soon as possible unless they must be retained as evidence. In that case, a temporary duty weapon should be issued to the employee. Depending on the circumstances of the shooting or other type of incident, it may be necessary to impound all of the employee’s clothing and gear, for example, in a close-quarter combat situation in which blood or other body fluids may have been deposited on the employee’s clothing and equipment. If a suspect was shot at close range, blood may be present on the employee’s weapon. If the weapon was holstered, blood may have transferred to the inside of the holster.

8798_C004.fm Page 37 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

Scene Investigation

37

Arrange to have all witnesses and participants transported from the scene to a location where they can be interviewed and taped statements can be obtained. Assign personnel to specifically care for these witnesses and ensure that their needs and comfort (access to restrooms, telephones, water fountains, etc.) are addressed.

INCIDENT SCENE INVESTIGATION All use-of-deadly-force and officer-involved-shooting scenes should be investigated with the same care and thoroughness that would be applied at a murder scene. Investigation of a deadly-force or officerinvolved shooting is never routine. On the contrary, any incident involving a police officer automatically assumes a high profile and garners intense media scrutiny. A cursory examination is certainly inadequate for a murder and is equally inadequate for a case involving an officer and a police agency. Investigators should have digital cameras at their disposal upon arrival at the scene. Witnesses, bystanders in the area, the condition of the scene, and evidence should be photographed immediately. Digital photographs can be used in briefings and incorporated into case presentations. Standard photographic documentation, diagramming, taking of aerial photos, evidence searches, and impounding and cataloguing of all evidence should be done by or in the presence of the investigating officers (Figure 4.1). The number of staff involved and the methods used to process a scene depend on the resources available to an agency. If an agency is large enough to have a criminalistic bureau and a number of crime scene investigators, the crime scene group should work as a team with shooting team investigators. In smaller jurisdictions, an investigator may gather, photograph, and document evidence; for example, the police vehicle portrayed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Every aspect of every scene should be scrupulously examined and photographed. Measurements should be taken for use in preparing trajectory diagrams. Such diagrams should also show the locations of suspects, witnesses, police officers, and bystanders if present in order to show from what angles and locations they may have witnessed the incident or interacted.

8798_C004.fm Page 38 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

38

Officer-Involved Shootings

FIGURE 4.1 Merging photos with diagram is an effective way to illustrate a scene.

Keep in mind that what appear to be conflicting statements may be observations from different angles and locations that produce differing perceptions of what occurred. That is why proper documentation of the locations of all parties present is extremely important.

8798_C004.fm Page 39 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

Scene Investigation

39

In any major crime investigation, an officer should document everything and assume nothing. There are no excuses for sloppy investigative work. A careful and thorough crime scene investigation should be conducted. After the initial search and gathering of evidence, a second search should then be conducted over a much broader area beyond the established scene to find any evidence that may have been missed earlier. If an incident occurs at night, regardless of lighting conditions, secure the scene and return to conduct a complete search in daylight hours. It is advisable to return to the scene during daylight as soon as possible after the incident, then re-canvass the scene at a later date. The entire scene and the area beyond it must be canvassed thoroughly. Outdoor areas should be checked for installations of video cameras — for example, at automatic teller machines, in parking lots, and inside convenience stores — because such cameras may yield footage of part of the incident or the activities of the suspect before or after the incident. Also, watch the local media for reports of the incident. Television stations often buy video footage taken by private citizens. Remember, a video taken by a bystander sparked all the events surrounding the Rodney King case. Another reason to watch local media reports is that witnesses to incidents and friends and family members of people involved often talk to the media instead of the authorities. When requesting video materials from television stations, always request complete copies of interviews and all unaired videos. Stations are sometimes hesitant to surrender unaired videos, so you may need a court order to obtain it. Team members are held accountable for the progress of their investigations. Regular briefings to discuss progress should be scheduled. After the scene investigation is completed, a meeting of investigators, supervisors, and administrators should be held for the purpose of briefing all interested parties on the progress of the case and information gathered to date. All physical evidence recovered should be reviewed and evaluated. Trajectory diagrams, blood spatter diagrams, and their analyses should be discussed. The evidence should then be processed in order of importance, and follow-up investigations and tentative leads should be discussed so that the overall investigation can proceed to the next stage.

8798_C004.fm Page 40 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

40

Officer-Involved Shootings

(a)

(b)

FIGURE 4.2 Photograph, diagram, recover any evidence that might be lost in transport, then transport vehicles to a secure location (a), showing (b) exit trajectory from passenger side of vehicle, and (c) entry trajectory from driver side of vehicle.

8798_C004.fm Page 41 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

Scene Investigation

41

(c)

FIGURE 4.2 (CONTINUED)

73 (Dash) 74

83 I

75 II

76 79

82 III

IV 78 77

(Rear Inside Deck) 81

(Trunk Lid) 80

FIGURE 4.3 A trajectory diagram of a scene is crucial to scene reconstruction.

8798_C004.fm Page 42 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:23 AM

8798_C005.fm Page 43 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:24 AM

5

Handling Suspects INTRODUCTION

Whether a suspect is uninjured, injured, or deceased has a bearing on how investigators approach this phase of an investigation. Different approaches are required for all three situations despite the fact that they have certain similarities.

UNINJURED SUSPECT If possible, standing photographs of the suspect should be obtained before booking and all clothing should then be impounded and searched. (While booking suspects, LVMPD has recovered a holster that held a weapon used from inside a suspect’s trousers, found blood from co-defendants, and identified powder residue on clothing in a case when no weapon was recovered.) Every item that has the potential to serve as or yield evidence should be impounded, searched, and documented. A suspect should be photographed in order to document the absence of injuries. An attempt to obtain a videotaped or audiotaped statement should be made, even if only to confirm that the suspect declined to issue a statement. A suspect who has no visible injuries should still be subjected to a medical examination in order to document the absence of injuries and preclude allegations of brutality after apprehension. Blood samples should be obtained for purposes of alcohol and controlled substance analysis. This may require immediate application to the court for a search warrant or court order.

INJURED SUSPECT An officer must accompany a wounded suspect who is transported to a hospital. In addition to providing security and controlling access 43

8798_C005.fm Page 44 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:24 AM

44

Officer-Involved Shootings

to the suspect, the officer should witness and document any statements made by the suspect, including a dying declaration. Arrangements should be made to recover blood for analysis before treatment by hospital personnel, particularly before administration of any type of blood transfusion that would compromise the results of analysis. This is an important issue because the presence or absence of controlled substances and alcohol in a suspect’s body may have impacted his or her state of mind at the time of the incident. Most hospital emergency rooms obtain blood samples before providing emergency care. It is a simple matter to direct hospital staff to retain the blood until a search warrant can be issued that will enable the department to impound the blood. Photograph the suspect and take custody of all clothing, personal property, projectiles, etc., found on his or her person. Make every effort to interview the suspect on videotape or audiotape. Document any injuries, the names of attending physicians and paramedics, medical treatment administered, tests done, time of admittance to the emergency room, suspect’s condition, and any other relevant details. If the suspect is subsequently admitted to a medical or surgical unit, the same type of information should be documented.

DECEASED SUSPECT A person, whether alive or deceased, is a source of evidence and should be protected as conscientiously as any other item of evidence. The decedent’s hands should be bagged for future examination and possible testing. The body should be wrapped in a new sterile bedsheet before it is placed in a new body bag for transport from the scene. Photographs of the removal of the bed sheet from its wrapping should be taken to document its unused and uncontaminated condition. The use of new wrappings is critical. It ensures that no foreign material is transferred to the body by the bag or sheet during transport. Photographs at the scene and measurements should be completed before removal of the body. It is not advisable to search the body at the scene. Doing so will expose it to possible contamination caused by nearby investigative activities, and any body fluids present may constitute health hazards to police in the area. The optimum time to search the body is just before medical examination or autopsy. Draw blood samples in addition to those drawn by the medical examiner. The samples should be stored with and without preservatives. If

8798_C005.fm Page 45 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:24 AM

Handling Suspects

45

the suspect was transported to a hospital before he or she was declared dead, every effort should be made to obtain uncontaminated blood from the hospital. However, if this is not possible, the pathologist who performs the autopsy should be directed to obtain samples of the vitreous fluid of the eye during autopsy. Document the names of any persons in contact with the deceased and times of contact, along with time of death, names of attending physicians, names of paramedics, and names of medical examiner staff members. Impound all clothing, jewelry, and personal effects of the decedent. The importance of a blood toxicology examination is obvious to every investigator who has experience with violent crimes. Most violent crimes involve controlled substances, illegally obtained prescription drugs, alcohol, or combinations of all three chemicals. Being under the influence is not a defense for one’s actions, and most states do not recognize it as a diminished-capacity defense. However, because the actions of a suspect and his mental condition relate to state of mind, the presence or absence of a mind-altering chemical can be of crucial importance. Handle these officer-involved incidents as violent crimes and take the same steps to preserve the evidence (see Figure 5.1) that you would follow in a violent case not involving a department member.

FIGURE 5.1 Documenting the contact nature of a wound will assist in proving that it was self-inflected. This deceased suspect committed suicide as officers attempted to order him from his vehicle during a felony stop.

8798_C005.fm Page 46 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:24 AM

46

Officer-Involved Shootings

CASE STUDY A suspect committed suicide as officers attempted to order him from his vehicle during a felony stop. Because the officers had their weapons drawn when the suspect committed suicide, witnesses who heard the gunshot thought that the officers had shot the man. Documenting the contact nature of the wound, photographing the blood spatter on the suspect’s hand, swabbing the barrel of his weapon for blood and tissue, and recovering projectile fragments from his brain allowed the police department to acquire enough scientific evidence to prove without question that the man’s death was a suicide. Examination of the vitreous fluid of the man’s eyes confirmed that he had been under the influence of cocaine at the time of his suicide.

Analyzing the witnesses’ descriptions of the distances, angles, and conditions under which they had heard the gunshot enabled investigators to show that the witnesses were mistaken when they said that the officers had fired their weapons. The perception of an incident is often far different from the reality. This point was made in the Japanese movie Rashomon. The story concerned a number of people who witnessed a murder, and the wide difference in their perceptions of the same event. For that reason, strong scientific evidence and complete documentation are crucial for proving the reality.

8798_C006.fm Page 47 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:24 AM

6

Interviewing Witnesses INTRODUCTION

Interviewing witnesses is an important aspect of any crime investigation. Ideally, an interview should be conducted in a relatively quiet place and be free from interruption. A tape recorder with a microphone and good-quality tape are required. All witness interviews must be recorded and transcribed verbatim. Taking notes of an interview and then dictating a report based on the notes are not acceptable practices for the simple reason that a report based on an investigator’s notes will reflect the views of the investigator and may distort or edit the witness’s statements. Witnesses are not adverse parties, so questioning should not be hostile. A witness who feels defensive will not speak freely. An interview should focus on facts, not opinions.

GENERAL GUIDELINES Witness interviews should be conducted as soon after an incident as possible, while the witnesses clearly recall the events and their impressions. Any delay in obtaining witnesses will impact the accuracy of the witnesses’ recall. Witnesses may be influenced by friends and family members, and such influence may be reflected in statements made to investigators. The person conducting the interview should be proficient with the equipment he is using. Attempts to reload, restart, or repair a recording device will divert the witness’s attention, and mishandling the recorder or tape can cause the loss of recorded material. A high-quality recorded statement that includes questions of the investigator followed by answers of the witness will eliminate misinterpretation. A witness statement should be exactly that: a statement 47

8798_C006.fm Page 48 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:24 AM

48

Officer-Involved Shootings

made by a witness. It should not be a statement of what the investigator thought the witness said or a paraphrase of what the witness said. Both the witness and the investigator should speak clearly to ensure that every word is picked up by the microphone. If the recorder must be turned off for any reason, the interviewer should record the reason for and duration of the interruption. Any other method of taking a witness statement may be subject to impeachment in court by the defense.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS After a check of the equipment and tape supply, the interviewer should first record certain basic information: 1. Name, job title, and agency of the interviewer 2. Date, time, and location of the interview 3. Name of the interview subject, his or her address, phone number, date of birth, social security number, employer, and a short physical description 4. Names and titles of others present at the interview 5. Subject of the interview (for example, the shooting death of Joseph Martin inside the Quickie Shop convenience store at Third and Elm Streets, Oakdale, on April 12, 2002, at 10:30 P.M.)

OPENING QUESTIONS The questions with which the investigator opens the interview should be general inquiries. Specific details should be discussed later in the interview, after the groundwork has been set with questions such as: 1. Are you aware that we are tape-recording this interview? 2. Do you understand that we are investigating (a robbery, an officer-involved shooting, an auto theft, etc.)? 3. Were you a witness to this incident? 4. Do you know or are you related to any party involved in this investigation?

8798_C006.fm Page 49 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:24 AM

Interviewing Witnesses

49

QUESTIONING ABOUT INCIDENT Allow the witness to answer the questions in his or her own words. Do not interrupt the witness. Do not prompt the witness or suggest answers if the witness pauses. Ask very specific questions about what he or she saw and heard from what specific location and at what point during the incident. Distances from victims, suspects, other people, and objects such as vehicles, doorways, and alleys should be discussed. The witness should be asked about obstructions to his or her view. The nature of the incident will dictate the type of questions to be asked, for example, you should obtain details of highway and weather conditions, road signals such as red lights and stop signs, and traffic load if you are questioning a witness about a vehicle-caused death or injury. Ask open-ended questions in order to obtain more detail. Answers to open-ended questions will sometimes suggest new areas of questioning. Open-ended questions require explanatory answers, for example: 1. What else did you see? 2. What happened after that? 3. Do you recall anything else about the incident? Remember: you are interviewing a witness, not interrogating a suspect. Do not speak in an adversarial voice or ask questions in a hostile manner. Interviewing and interrogating both involve questioning. Webster’s Dictionary distinguishes interviewing by specifying that interviewing is done to obtain information, for example, from a witness in a criminal investigation. It defines interrogation as questioning with the force of emphatic affirmation or denial. This type of question is reserved solely for suspects. Take brief notes for your own use only. Do not allow note-taking to distract your attention from what the witness is saying. Review the notes quickly during the interview so that you can then ask questions to confirm what the witness has already related or to clarify any unclear statements:

8798_C006.fm Page 50 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:24 AM

50

Officer-Involved Shootings

1. Did you actually observe the entire incident, or was your back turned when you heard gunfire? Did you turn and and witness the shooting? 2. Can you describe events that preceded the shooting? 3. Did you hear anything said by the parties to the incident? What did the officer say? What did the suspect say? 4. Was anyone else present? 5. What is your estimate of your distance from the incident? 6. From what angle or vantage point (front, side, behind, above, etc.) did you witness the incident? Handwritten witness statements and investigator notes of an interview are not acceptable for use in court, and they will probably not produce leads or information that will further your investigation. A taped statement allows an investigator to ask questions to clarify areas of interest to the investigation and pursue any new information presented by the witness. A verbatim transcript will serve as a valid account of the witness’s observations or knowledge of the incident.

CLOSING Note the end of the interview and the time on the tape. Remove the tape from the machine and label it with relevant information. Be sure to thank the witness for speaking with you. Present your business card and ask the witness to call you if he or she recalls any additional details of the incident. Retain the tape as required by department policy because it will serve as documentary evidence.

8798_C007.fm Page 51 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

7

Interviewing Employees Involved in Incidents of Violence INTRODUCTION

The employee interview surrounding an officer-involved shooting, death-in-custody case, or other violent incident involving an officer may be the most important phase of an investigation. The practice of some agencies of interviewing the employees involved and then instructing them to prepare a report describing the incident and their actions is unacceptable. Never allow an employee to prepare a report of his or her own interview. The report may be self-serving and lack objectivity. Important facts may be omitted or distorted. An interview report written by an employee involved in a violent incident will probably not withstand scrutiny by the courts or the media.

GENERAL GUIDELINES The natural tendency of administration and field staff to concentrate on the incident or use of force itself and not focus on the total event requires that reports prepared by investigators be objective, comprehensive, and relevant to all aspects of the incident. Investigators should consider the employee’s walk-through of the scene a preliminary fact-finding session. They should ask questions and take notes. The employee involved in the incident should then be released to supervisors or crisis counselors. He or she should be driven to an interview location out of public view. The employee should be photographed, if necessary. He or she should be placed on administrative leave, and weapons, clothing, and equipment should be impounded. Taping of a formal statement should be scheduled.

51

8798_C007.fm Page 52 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

52

Officer-Involved Shootings

Some agencies require that interviews be conducted as soon as practical after an incident. Most agencies schedule such interviews within 48 to 72 hours after the incident.

PROTECTING THE EMPLOYEE’S WELFARE AND CIVIL RIGHTS An employee involved in a traumatic event should be allowed time to calm down after the initial interview. He or she must be able to organize thoughts and prepare for the taped interview. The trauma of a violent incident can cause an employee to forget critical aspects of the incident or the order in which related events occurred. Allowing the employee time to think about the incident should enable him or her to describe in correct order and sufficient detail the actions of all parties to the incident. Homicide investigators have learned from experience that participants in traumatic events should be interviewed and important areas of investigative interest should be addressed initially, and a more detailed interview should be conducted at a later date after the shock of the crime has been absorbed. The employee then should be able to provide a detailed account of what happened. The employee interview should be scheduled after all other witnesses have been interviewed, the shooting scene has been processed, and the follow-up investigation is in progress. This will allow the investigator time to gather as much information as possible to guarantee that an informed and thorough interview can be conducted. The more facts of the case that are known to investigators at the time of these crucial interviews, the better the chance of obtaining valuable information. Some critics will allege that allowing an employee time to gather thoughts and seek the counsel of union representatives or an attorney will lead the employee to produce a “varnished” version of the incident. This criticism is totally without merit if an investigator interviews the employee at the scene and obtains a full description of the shooting. A subsequent interview simply memorializes the details of the incident on tape and allows the investigator to ask more pointed questions based on additional information obtained after the incident.

8798_C007.fm Page 53 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Interviewing Employees Involved in Incidents of Violence

53

The immediate supervisor of an employee involved in a violent incident shares a vicarious liability for his or her subordinates’ actions. For this reason, the supervisor should be directly involved in the interview process and be kept apprised of subsequent investigative findings. It is not necessary to administer Miranda or Garrity warnings to the employee during the investigative stages of a use-of-deadly-force investigation. Miranda* warnings are custodial in nature (“Anything you say can be used against you.”). Garrity** warnings apply only to administrative investigations of employees and are coercive in nature. Neither warning is necessary in the investigative stages following an incident. Any agency administering Miranda or Garrity warnings to an employee as a matter of policy during the investigation of an officerinvolved shooting is in serious error and should consult with the prosecutor’s office for legal advice on the issue. The voluntary nature of any statement made by an employee involved in a violent incident will always be a matter of legal challenge and court interpretation. High-profile incidents always engender a coercive atmosphere. An employee involved in such an incident feels duty-bound to cooperate. That opens to challenge the issue of the voluntariness of any statement made under these circumstances. It is not this author’s intention to address these areas. The important matter is the establishment of a standard investigative protocol that ensures accuracy and protects the rights of all parties in employee-involved cases. The fact that Will Aitichison’s book, The Rights of Law Enforcement Officers, is in its fourth edition clearly indicates that United States courts are constantly amending regulations and setting new case law pertaining to police conduct and the use of force. Due to the unique nature of each use-of-deadly-force incident, it is virtually impossible to make a list of questions that would be all-inclusive; however, the following is a list of questions and areas of investigative interest that should be covered on all use-of-deadlyforce investigations.

* Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). ** Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).

8798_C007.fm Page 54 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

54

Officer-Involved Shootings

EMPLOYEE INTERVIEW No two incidents involving employee use of force are the same. The interview format presented below is merely a guide to be used when interviewing an employee involved in a traumatic situation. A taped statement from the employee will become a vital piece of evidence and should clearly reflect his or her actions, state of mind, and intent. The room in which the interview and taping are held should contain enough chairs to seat all participants. The equipment should be checked for correct operation before the interview, and ample tape should be on hand. Take notes and be prepared to ask very direct questions. Remember that traumatic events affect people. An employee under stress may start his account with “I responded …” and move immediately to “I shot …” and omit crucial details between the two events. Only a thorough step-by-step interview can reveal all critical material. Be prepared to ask about lighting conditions, background, distances, terrain, witnesses, and the employee’s state of mind before the incident. General material to be covered in an interview is listed below. Questions specific to the case can be added as needed. If an incident took place at a bank, the employee should be questioned about customers and staff. Questions related to an incident that occurred outdoors should cover nearby roads, buildings, foliage, etc.

INFORMATION

ABOUT INTERVIEW

1. Date, time, and location of interview; description of incident, including time and place 2. Names and titles of all persons present

INFORMATION

ABOUT

OFFICER

1. Name, rank, duty assignment, date of employment 2. Work background of involved officer, including previous experience, attendance at police academy, commendations, reprimands, and specialized training 3. Duty status (on or off duty at time of incident), duty hours, days off, and last shift worked

8798_C007.fm Page 55 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Interviewing Employees Involved in Incidents of Violence

55

4. Description of attire; whether the officer was in uniform, plain clothes, or specialized gear (bike patrol, etc.) 5. Was badge displayed? On what part of body? 6. Was employee wearing a ballistic vest?

INFORMATION

ABOUT

EVENT

This is the most important phase of the interview. The employee should be allowed to present an uninterrupted narrative account of his or her actions and observations and the actions of suspects and other parties involved in the confrontation. Questions should be open-ended, to elicit as much detail as possible from the employee. Avoid the use of police codes, police terminology, and slang if possible. If the employee uses such terms, ask him or her to explain them. This part of the interview should cover: 1. A detailed chronological sequence; how or why the employee arrived at the scene; who was present 2. Whether the officer was in fear of his or her life or the lives and safety of others in the vicinity of the incident

INFORMATION

ABOUT

CRIME SCENE

1. A detailed description of all components of the scene; whether the scene was altered in any manner by police or emergency personnel 2. Was the weapon moved? Was any evidence disturbed or removed?

INFORMATION

ABOUT

WEAPON

AND

AMMUNITION

1. Description of weapon used (make, caliber, whether department-issued, department-authorized, or optional weapon) 2. Magazine capacity; whether weapon was fully loaded; how many rounds were in the weapon 3. Ammunition used (manufacturer, caliber, description, whether department issued or department-authorized); type of bullet (hollow point, full metal jacket)

8798_C007.fm Page 56 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

56

Officer-Involved Shootings

IDENTIFICATION 1. Did the employee identify himself or herself as a police officer prior to the use of deadly force? 2. How many times? How loudly? 3. Was it necessary for the employee to identify himself or herself? 4. If the employee was in uniform, could the suspect see the officer? 5. Did the employee have time to identify himself or herself?

INJURIES 1. Was anyone injured? 2. If so, describe injuries to all parties 3. How were the injuries sustained?

JUSTIFICATION

FOR

USE

OF

DEADLY FORCE

1. What crimes, actions, or perceived acts of aggression precipitated the use of deadly force? 2. What elements of the crime were known by the employee? 3. Was the crime in progress, did the situation appear suspicious, or did the employee initiate the event (field observation or traffic stop)? 4. What were the suspect’s actions and demeanor prior to the incident? 5. Did the suspect exhibit aggressive or erratic behavior or appear under the influence of drugs or alcohol? 6. Was the suspect armed? If so, describe the weapon and where the employee observed it (in the suspect’s hand or elsewhere). 7. What was the level of aggression that motivated the employee to react with deadly force?

8798_C007.fm Page 57 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Interviewing Employees Involved in Incidents of Violence

57

AUTHORITY 1. Was the employee responding to a call for assistance? 2. Was the employee acting on authority of a search or arrest warrant? 3. Was the employee acting on orders? Was he or she in a tactical situation in which deadly force was authorized or ordered; for example, a barricaded suspect or a hostage rescue?

POST-INTERVIEW PROCEDURES A verbatim transcript of the interview should be prepared. The training and duty assignment records of the employee involved in the incident should be attached to the transcript for purposes of documenting the employee’s training and experience at the time of his or her use of deadly force or involvement in a shooting, because training and experience are always issues in these types of cases. The employee should review the transcript for accuracy and proper sequence of events. If he or she wishes to make corrections or additions, any changes should be made in the form of an addendum to the transcript. The initial statement should not be altered in any manner.

SUMMARY The importance of obtaining an accurate taped statement from the employee involved in a violent incident cannot be stressed enough. The employee’s actions, state of mind, and intent can best be documented by one comprehensive interview. Requiring an employee to undergo multiple interviews and prepare his own report is unfair to all parties and is not an effective method of gathering evidence even in a minor case, and could have catastrophic consequences in a highprofile death case.

8798_C007.fm Page 58 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

58

Officer-Involved Shootings

SAMPLE VOLUNTARY STATEMENT PERSON GIVING STATEMENT: OFFICER RICHARD, P#0000 Patrol Division/Southeast Area Command Specific Crime: Officer-involved shooting Date Occurred: 04-18-02 Time Occurred: 1654 hours Location of Occurrence: Maryland Parkway between Desert Inn Road and Karen Avenue, City of Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada The following is a transcription of a tape-recorded interview conducted by Detective D.H., P#1111, LVMPD Homicide Detail, on 04-18-02 at 2213 hours. Persons present during interview were Officer Richard, P#0000; Detectives D.H. and J.M.; Homicide Detail Sergeant R.W., P#0000, SWAC; Sergeant T.H., P#0000, PEAP (crisis counselor); and E.A., P#2222 (employee union representative). Q. Officer Richard, are you aware that I’m tape-recording this interview? A. Yes, I am. Q. Officer Richard, the purpose of this interview is to determine your actions and the actions of the suspect in this incident. Do you understand this? A. Yes, I do. Q. Officer Richard, how long have you been a police officer with LVMPD? A. Since July 3, 1989. Q. What is your present duty assignment? A. Uniform Division, Southeast Area Command. Q. What weapon was used in this incident? A. My personal weapon, department authorized Glock .45 caliber, Model 20, serial number 0000. Q. Do you carry a backup weapon? A. No. Q. Were you using department-issue ammunition? A. Yes, Winchester silvertip.

8798_C007.fm Page 59 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Interviewing Employees Involved in Incidents of Violence

59

Q. We’d like to have you, in your own words, tell how you came about effecting a traffic stop of a suspect identified as Daniel Jamez near Sunrise Hospital earlier this evening. And we’d like to have you describe the events that transpired after this traffic stop. A. C.W. and I were working as 7-Mary tonight. We were eastbound on Desert Inn Road at Maryland Parkway when a gray vehicle cut in front of us into the turn lane. We were going to turn northbound on Maryland Parkway. I, uh, recognized the driver as Daniel Jamez. We were looking for him. He has a suspended license and is usually wanted every time we come in contact with him. He was 413 (armed). We effected a stop on him on Maryland at the hospital. When we were approaching the vehicle, we observed shotgun shells and a box of .25 ammo on the back seat. Due to him usually having weapons, we asked him to get out of the vehicle. As we did, uh, ran a check on him, we confirmed that he had a suspended license and no insurance. We were going to write him tickets. We called for a tow truck and C.W. began an inventory search of the vehicle. I cuffed him [Jamez] and put him in my vehicle. C.W. found two guns, a 40 cal. H&K and a .25 auto hidden under the dash. Both were loaded and ready to go. C.W. brought them back to me and returned to the vehicle. I unloaded the guns, and Jamez kept asking me to give him a break, “let me go, cut me a break.” C.W. found a bag of dope (rock cocaine). The tow truck arrived and C.W. was having the tow driver sign the impound. I had the guns and was putting them in the trunk of my car when I heard the door slam — they were both open. I look up and don’t see him, then I see him behind the steering wheel with no cuffs. He was trying to take off, I heard the engine in neutral revving up, then he tried to take off in the patrol car. I yelled to C.W. and jumped into the passenger seat and grabbed — grabbed him with my left hand around his head and tried to pull him away and put the car in park. Uh, he kept hitting me with his elbows and I kept calling for C.W. and I kept striking with my fist into his side, uh, so he would, you know, comply with me. Uh, at which time he got it in gear and took off northbound on Maryland Parkway with me hanging half in and half out of the patrol car while I was holding onto him. He took off — floored it — over across the median into the southbound traffic lane and headed straight for Denny’s that’s on the parkway. Numerous times I asked him to stop and he told me, “Screw you.” He kept striking me and trying to push me out of the car. He was driving straight at Denny’s. He wouldn’t stop, so I let go of him to grab the steering wheel. I turned it real sharp away from Denny’s and over the median east. We crossed the median again and we were heading for a light pole and I asked him please stop. He said, “F… you.”

8798_C007.fm Page 60 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

60

Officer-Involved Shootings

He was hitting me and I yanked the steering wheel away from the light pole and then I saw pedestrians on the sidewalk so I — my whole body went across the seat and turned the wheel again, causing the patrol car to do a U-turn and come to a semi-complete stop. I mean the whole time this was happening I was thinking he’s going to kill me. I’ve dealt with him so many times I know what he’s like. I composed myself a little and then drew my gun. I said you’ve got to stop. You’re going to kill us. He said, “F… you,” grabbed my gun, and stomped on the gas. I was hanging out of the car, being dragged. I fired two rounds and while we were struggling the gun was pointed at me. I got my arm free and fired two rounds point blank and he said something. Then he said, “You f…in’ shot me.” He gunned it [the engine] again and I lost hold of him and was dragged out of the car. I fired one more round outside the car, rolled away from the rear wheel as he took off. I then saw he was going around. While I was laying on the ground, he took off over the median and did a U-turn and started to drive the vehicle towards me. I stood up. I aimed down on him with the weapon; there were too many people and too much traffic by the hospital. He kept coming at me, I ran towards the store next to Denny’s for cover. He saw me as I peeked around the corner of the building. He turned away and then traveled northbound on the parkway. I collapsed. I was hurting. My leg was banged up and I was pretty shook up. Citizens came from across the street and from Denny’s to help me. I had lost my radio. They took me across the street to the hospital emergency room. There was numerous witnesses and they helped me, and that’s basically it. Q. Officer Richard, is there any doubt in your mind that when he turned the patrol car around and came back toward you that he intended to run you down? A. No, there was no doubt that he was going to run me over. Q. Were the weapons that you recovered from the suspect’s vehicle still in the car? A. Yes, and the ammunition. Q. Okay, can you describe your assigned vehicle? A. It’s a marked police vehicle, black and white Ford. Q. And both you and your partner, Officer C.W., are uniformed police officers? A. Yes. Q. Were you operating in your assigned area? A. 7-Mary. Yes.

8798_C007.fm Page 61 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Interviewing Employees Involved in Incidents of Violence

61

Q. Other than the suspect’s weapons, were there any other weapons in the vehicle? A. Yes. My partner’s backup .38 was in the bag behind the front seat. Q. What speed do you feel that the suspect had attained while you were struggling with him? A. Approximately 60 to 65 miles per hour. Q. Officer Richard, from the acceleration skid marks it appears that the suspect traveled over the median into the southbound lanes of traffic and turned abruptly after striking a newsstand in front of Denny’s. Do you feel that had you not turned the steering wheel that the vehicle would have struck the Denny’s Restaurant? A. Yes, no doubt. He never hit the brake. He had the gas pedal floored. Q. When the vehicle came back onto the parkway, were you still traveling northbound? A. Yes. We were back into the northbound lane traveling in the proper lane. Q. When the vehicle flipped around, were you inside or hanging out of the vehicle? A. I was hanging out of the vehicle. My legs were outside the vehicle. Q. And during this incident you were asking him to stop? A. Yes. Repeatedly. Q. And during this time he was striking you repeatedly and attempting to push you from the moving vehicle? A. Yes, he did. Q. Was there any doubt that he was trying to knock you out of the vehicle so he could escape? A. No doubt. That’s what his intentions were. Q. In your and your squad’s prior contacts with this suspect, has he resisted and attempted to escape? A. Yes, he’s had several arrests and pursuits with us. Q. Would you describe him as quite a violent person? A. Yes. Q. Can you describe him? A. Yes, he’s a Hispanic male, 5’10” or 5’11”; large muscular build, approximately 200 pounds, always wears baggy gang clothes. Q. Do you have direct knowledge of prior weapons-related arrests? A. Yes.

8798_C007.fm Page 62 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

62

Officer-Involved Shootings

Q. Officer Richard, is there anything that you’d like to add to this statement that might assist us in our investigation of this incident? A. No, not that I can think of. Q. Officer Richard, we know that this has been a long day, that you’ve been injured, and we appreciate your patience tonight. It may be necessary to interview you again at a later date. Do you understand this? A. Yes. Q. Do you understand that if there is anything you remember about this incident at a later date, that you can contact us and an addendum to this statement will be made? A. Yes, I do. Q. Sergeant W., is there anything you’d like to ask Officer Richard? A. No, but I’d like to add that I know of two incidents involving this suspect and both involved weapons. Q. Is this suspect targeted as a gang member or career criminal? A. No, not that I know of. His gang activities, narcotics, and gun possession is known. Q. President A., do you have any questions? A. No. Q. Sergeant H., do you have any questions? A. No. We need to schedule counseling and cover PEAP matters after this statement. Okay, we’ll end this interview. Time: 2228 hours. Same persons present. I have read this statement consisting of ___ pages and affirm the truth and complete accuracy of the facts contained herein. This statement completed at LVMPD on 00-0-00, 2228 hours. Person giving statement _________________________________________________ Witness ______________________________________________________________ Witness ______________________________________________________________

8798_C007.fm Page 63 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Interviewing Employees Involved in Incidents of Violence

63

CASE STUDY An off-duty officer and his wife were awakened one morning by screams of a woman being attacked and sexually assaulted in the front yard of their neighbor’s residence. The officer immediately called 911, advised the police dispatcher of the crime in progress, then armed himself to stop this act of violence. Around the time of the officer’s 911 call, several other neighbors called to report the incident. They said that they saw the officer run to assist the victim. One witness said, “Oh, it’ll be all right. My neighbor’s a cop and he’s out there.” The witness then exclaimed, “Oh, sh…. He shot him.” The witness indicated that the officer was immediately attacked when confronting the suspect, causing the officer to shoot at close range, killing the suspect.

Through the initial interview of this 25-year-veteran officer, the investigators discovered that the officer had repeatedly ordered the suspect to stop the attack. The suspect ignored the officer’s orders and continued to attack the victim by choking and sexually assaulting her. The suspect pulled up his pants and turned his attention to the officer. He lunged at the officer, who then fired two rounds in rapid succession and mortally wounded the suspect. The investigators estimated that the maximum distance between the officer and the suspect at time of shooting was 3 feet or less. The investigators observed also that the officer was dressed in denim trousers and a T-shirt and had not verbally identified himself as a police officer prior to the use of deadly force. The lack of police identification such as a badge and the officer’s failure to verbally identify himself were definite areas of concern for the department. Two witnesses confirmed the officer’s version of the incident. The officer revealed during his initial interview that he had been assigned to the traffic division as a motorcycle officer for more than 20 years and would not have been conditioned to verbally identifying himself. He had always worn a uniform during his working contacts with the public. He had never been in a work situation where his identity was not obvious. The victim had been brutally sexually assaulted and choked until she lost consciousness. The suspect had acted erratically, but

8798_C007.fm Page 64 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

64

Officer-Involved Shootings

toxicological examinations of his blood revealed that he had not been intoxicated or under the influence of controlled substances when he attacked his victim and the off-duty officer. Witnesses said that the incident had occurred rapidly. They said that the suspect had suddenly lunged toward the officer and the officer never had an opportunity to take control of the situation. Members of the coroner’s jury who reviewed the incident ruled that the suspect’s death had resulted from justifiable action on the part of the officer and commended the officer for his actions. The resulting civil lawsuit rendered the same results. This case clearly shows the need for obtaining thorough statements from all witnesses and parties to an incident. It also shows how details like attire and duty assignments can have important impacts in such cases. This case had the potential to create a great number of problems for the department. In its simplest terms, it involved a killing of a suspect by an off-duty officer who did not identify himself to the suspect. In fuller terms, the suspect was confronted in the course of committing a violent crime and his lunge toward the officer caused the officer to kill him in self-defense. The corroboration of the officer’s statement by a number of witnesses cleared the officer and the department and completely defused what could have become a very controversial case.

8798_C008.fm Page 65 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

8

Documenting Incidents INTRODUCTION

Properly documenting the incident is probably the most important aspect of investigating a use-of-force case, officer-involved shooting, or other type of violent incident in which a police officer or employee is involved. Thorough documentation of an incident lays the groundwork for an effective investigation that will meet the departmental standards for thoroughness, fairness, and clarity. The ability to write an effective report is an important measure of investigative ability. If a criminal proceeding or civil suit results from an officer-involved incident, documentation of the incident will play an important role on behalf of the officer and the department.

REPORT PREPARATION This chapter includes two sample report formats that should serve as general guides only. They can be adapted to any type of incident. The first format is a Use-of-Force Investigative Summary. In essence, it serves as a checklist and guarantees that all information required to conclude a successful investigation is covered in a methodical manner. The second format is titled Use-of-Force Incident: Administrative Summary of Investigation Report. It is far longer and more detailed than the investigative summary. Some agencies use the administrative summary phrase in the title in an attempt to designate such reports as internal documents and prevent their release to the media and to the public.

65

8798_C008.fm Page 66 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

66

Officer-Involved Shootings

Brackets are used on both formats to suggest the type of information that should be included in each category or to provide examples. The officers’, suspects’, and witnesses’ names have all been altered to preserve their privacy. Note that both types of reports can be illustrated with photographs and diagrams. All photographs and diagrams should be fully described.

Use-of-Force Investigative Summary Officer-Involved Use of Deadly Force Check one:

Injury 

Noninjury 

Death 

Division Reporting: Division of Occurrence: Date and Time of Occurrence: Location of Occurrence: [Note street address, apartment, suite, or floor number if applicable, municipality, county, and state.] Investigators: section.]

[Include name, rank, personnel number, unit name, and

Employees Involved: [Include name, rank, personnel number, age, date of hire, present assignment, shift, and duty status (on duty, off duty, or backup). If the employees were injured as a result of the incident, briefly describe the injuries. Weapons Used: [Individually describe the weapons used by each officer. Note make, model, serial number, caliber, magazine capacity, whether each weapon is department-issued or authorized (optional).] Ammunition Used: [Note manufacturer, caliber, type (full metal jacket, hollow point, semijacketed). Note whether ammunition was departmentissued or department-authorized. A record of each officer’s training history and duty assignments should be attached to individual statements or this report. Weapons qualification information should be stated.*] * No agency should allow an officer on duty or off duty to carry a weapon for which he or she has not qualified.

8798_C008.fm Page 67 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

67

Other Officers Present: [List names, ranks, personnel numbers, and duty assignments of all officers who were present when the incident occurred but were not directly involved in the use of force; for example, officers involved in a pursuit, officers searching for suspects, officers searching perimeter areas, etc. Summarize their locations and reasons for being in the area of the incident.] Department Vehicles Involved: [Note makes, models, years, whether marked or unmarked, unit numbers, license numbers, and vehicle identification numbers.] Suspect Information: [List names, addresses, dates of birth, social security numbers, races, and physical descriptions of all suspects. Include complete criminal histories and identification numbers if applicable. Indicate whether suspects are in custody, injured, transferred to a hospital, or deceased.] Suspect Vehicles Involved: [Note makes, models, years, license numbers, title status, registration numbers, vehicle identification numbers, and condition (intact, damaged, or wrecked). If stolen, note NIC number.] Witnesses: [List all persons interviewed. Include addresses, telephone numbers, places of employment, employment phone numbers, social security numbers, and brief physical descriptions (e.g., 21-year-old Asian male).] Description of Scene: [Provide a detailed description of the scene, including address, cross streets, township, county, state. Indicate whether area is residential, commercial, industrial, unpopulated desert, etc. If the scene is in an unpopulated rural area and has no address, use global positioning systems and aerial photographs to indicate location.] Chronology of Incident: [Provide a complete chronology or detailed timeline of the incident, starting with arrival at the scene and leading to the violent event. All circumstances precipitating the incident and events during the incident should be completely documented (time of dispatch, time of arrival, broadcast of shots fired, etc.).] Evidence: [Record a complete list of all evidence recovered and results of all forensic analyses. The list should detail crime scene photographs, aerial photographs, dispatch tapes and logs, photographs of employees

8798_C008.fm Page 68 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

68

Officer-Involved Shootings

involved, photographs of suspects, diagrams, and physical evidence (firearms, latent prints, etc.).] Witness Interviews: [List the witnesses in order of their importance to this investigation. Present a synopsis of information that each witness can provide regarding the incident and related crimes. The synopsis should note the witness’s relationship with any parties involved and details of witness interviews (dates, locations, persons present, persons conducting interviews). Record where each witness was during the incident and what he or she was doing before, during, and after the incident.] Summary of Investigation: [This section should be a summary of the entire investigation, including charges pending against suspects, case status, employee status, etc.]

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT USE-OF-FORCE INCIDENT ADMINISTRATIVE SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION REPORT OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING Event Number: Investigating Officers: [List names, ranks, personnel numbers, and sections of all officers assigned to investigation.] Officer Involved in Shooting: [Show name, date of acceptance as cadet, date of assignment as police officer, and current duty assignment.] Weapon Used: [Describe the weapon. Note make, model, serial number, caliber, magazine capacity, whether department-issued or authorized (optional).] Ammunition Used: [Note manufacturer, caliber, type (full metal jacket, hollow point, semijacketed). Note whether ammunition was departmentissued or department-authorized.]

8798_C008.fm Page 69 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

69

Investigative Services Detectives: numbers.] Crime Scene Analysts:

[List names, ranks, and personnel

[List names, ranks, and personnel numbers.]

ISD General Assignment Detectives at Scene and Hospital: [List names, ranks, and personnel numbers.] Uniform Division Officers at Scene: nel numbers.]

[List names, ranks, and person-

Traffic Section Fatal Investigations Unit Personnel: [List names, ranks, and personnel numbers.] Attending Physician for Suspect: pital or other medical facility.]

[List full name of physician and hos-

Attending Physician for Officer Involved in Incident: of physician and hospital or other medical facility.] Administrative Personnel at Scene: numbers.]

[List full name

[List names, ranks, and personnel

Suspect: [Include all personal information available: name, date of birth, social security number, LVMPD identification number, sex, race, height, weight, hair color, eye color, aliases, home address.] Suspect’s Criminal History (Nevada): [Detail arrest date, charge (larceny, resisting a police officer, burglary, etc.), event or case number, jurisdiction, and disposition (released on bail, pending, etc.) for every incident.] Suspect’s Criminal History (Other States): [Detail state, arrest date, charge (larceny, resisting a police officer, burglary, etc.), event or case number, and disposition (released on bail, pending, etc.) for every incident.] Suspect’s Fugitive Status: [List any warrants for failure to appear, charge, date of arrest, and issuing agency.] Investigative Chronology: [Full text of this and the following sections are included to illustrate the type of detail that should be covered in a chronology and other sections of the administrative summary report.]

8798_C008.fm Page 70 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

70

Officer-Involved Shootings

On December 29, 1995, at 4:54 P.M., LVMPD unit 7-Mary Officers M.R. and C.W. had occasion to be in the area of Desert Inn Road and Maryland Parkway when they observed a 1981 two-door Buick, gray in color, bearing Nevada license 739GGK, occupied by an individual known to them as Daniel Jamez. Officers recognized this individual. Knowing that this individual was driving on a suspended or revoked driver’s license, they effected a traffic stop on Maryland Parkway in front of Humana Hospital Sunrise. The driver, the sole occupant of the vehicle, was removed from the vehicle and handcuffs placed on his wrists to ensure officer safety. Officers issued this individual a Class II citation for operating a motor vehicle on a suspended driver’s license (suspension dating from August 16, 1995 for an indefinite period) and a citation for failing to provide proof of insurance. Officers then requested a tow truck to have the vehicle towed for safekeeping. The officers advised that they were Code 4 (all secure) at 4:58 P.M. The tow was requested at 5:01 P.M. Quality Tow Service was en route. While awaiting tow service, Officer W. and Officer R. conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, recovering two handguns and a quantity of suspected controlled substance. Officers, in conducting the inventory search, paid particular attention to possible weapons after they observed shotgun shells and ammunition in the back seat of the vehicle. At 5:57 P.M., reports of shots fired were broadcast via radio by Officer W. The suspect apparently slipped out of his handcuffs and commandeered a police vehicle in an effort to escape. At 6:00 P.M., the suspect vehicle was stopped in the northbound lane of Maryland Parkway at Karen Avenue and a Code Red (clear the channel for emergency traffic) indicated that a suspect had been shot and an officer had been injured per responding LVMPD units. The communications bureau was advised via radio at 6:02 P.M. that the suspect had been shot and that paramedics and ambulance were requested. At 6:06 P.M., responding officers identified three separate scenes requesting that units respond to the area of Sunrise Hospital, the area of the Bowmer & Berry’s Showkase furniture store, and the area of Karen Avenue and Maryland Parkway. At 6:07 P.M., the suspect was transported to University Medical Center Trauma Unit by Mercy Ambulance Service; the officer was transported to Humana Hospital for medical care; and the Code Red was changed to Channel Clear. At 6:10 P.M., homicide investigators, watch commander, PEAP, REACT units, and criminalistics units were requested.

8798_C008.fm Page 71 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

71

Description of Scene: The officer-involved shooting occurred on the roadway at the front of Bowmer & Berry’s Showkase, adjacent to the Denny’s Restaurant in the 3000 block of South Maryland Parkway. The suspect was able to flee in the stolen police unit to the area of Karen and Maryland Parkway where the vehicle was run off the roadway by citizens. The suspect was apprehended and transported to University Medical Center for emergency medical care. The officer-involved shooting consisted of three separate crime scenes, all of which were on the roadway in the 3000 block of South Maryland Parkway. Interview of Officer Involved in Incident: Officer M.R. has been employed by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department for 6 years. He was hired as a cadet on July 3, 1989 and was assigned to the Police Academy as a Police Officer I on August 3, 1991. He has worked as an officer of the uniformed division since graduating from the academy. Before obtaining a taped statement from Officer R., investigators interviewed him while he was undergoing emergency medical care at Humana Hospital. They confirmed that Officer R. was the sole officer involved in this shooting incident. Officer R., at the time of this shooting, was working in a 2-man patrol vehicle with his partner, Officer C.W. Both officers were working as uniformed officers in a marked police vehicle at the time of the incident. On December 29, 1995 at 10:13 P.M., a taped statement was obtained from Officer R. Present during this interview were the following: Homicide Investigator: Detective D.H. Homicide Investigator: Detective J.S. Patrol Supervisor: Sergeant R.W. PEAP Representative: Sergeant T.H. LVPPA Representative: President E.A. As a result of obtaining the statement from Officer R., investigators were advised that on December 29, 1995, Officer R. and Officer W. had occasion to be in the area of Desert Inn Road and Maryland Parkway when they observed a gray vehicle cut in front of their vehicle and travel into a turn lane to proceed northbound on Maryland Parkway. Officer R. immediately recognized the driver of the vehicle as a subject known to him as Daniel Jamez. The officers had been looking for this individual to obtain intelligence information on him. Because they knew that the individual had been armed on prior contacts and was known to have a suspended driver’s

8798_C008.fm Page 72 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

72

Officer-Involved Shootings

license, the officers made a vehicle stop on the suspect vehicle on Maryland Parkway just north of Desert Inn Road. The vehicle came to a stop at the front of Humana Hospital Sunrise. Officer R. stated that as they approached the vehicle, they peered inside and saw shotgun shells and a box of .25 caliber ammunition in the back seat area. The driver, the sole occupant of the vehicle, was removed from the vehicle and placed in handcuffs for officer safety while a Class II citation was prepared (Class II citations require processing and booking). The officers issued a citation to Daniel Jamez for having no proof of insurance and for operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license. The officers requested a tow to have the vehicle removed to storage because the driver was placed under arrest and was in custody. Officer W. conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, paying particular attention to areas where weapons could be concealed. He recovered two handguns from the vehicle, a .40 caliber H&K semiautomatic handgun and a .25 caliber Beretta semiautomatic handgun. Officer W. also discovered a bundle containing a suspected controlled substance. The officers removed the controlled substance and the weapons from the suspect’s vehicle and placed them in the police vehicle. While the officers completed the inventory of the suspect’s vehicle and prepared for the arrival of the tow truck, the suspect apparently slipped from the handcuffs while he stood at the front of the police vehicle. The tow truck had just arrived and was in the process of attaching to the vehicle when, according to Officer R., the suspect opened the driver’s door of the police vehicle, jumped into the vehicle, and attempted to place it in gear. The suspect had some difficulty getting the vehicle in gear because the brake pedal had to be stepped on to allow disengagement of the transmission from park mode. The delay allowed Officer R. time to jump from the rear passenger seat area of the vehicle to the front seat and grab the suspect and attempt to take him into custody. The suspect struggled violently with the officer, was able to place the vehicle in gear, and accelerated away from the vehicle stop area at a high rate of speed, traveling northbound on Maryland Parkway. While the suspect and officer struggled, the suspect struck the officer several times. The suspect attempted to push the officer from the vehicle. The front passenger door was open and the lower part of the officer’s body was partially out of the vehicle. The suspect drove the police vehicle over the center median and into oncoming traffic in the southbound lanes of Maryland Parkway. He drove the vehicle directly toward the Denny’s Restaurant located on the west side of Maryland Parkway. Officer R. said during his interview that he was

8798_C008.fm Page 73 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

73

fearful for the safety of the occupants of the restaurant. He abruptly grabbed the steering wheel and caused the vehicle still in the southbound lanes to swerve to the north. Officer R. drew his weapon and ordered the suspect to stop. The suspect refused to do so, and a fight then ensued over control of the officer’s weapon. The weapon discharged twice. Officer R. indicated that he was fearful that pedestrians would be shot by the suspect in an attempt to escape. Officer R. was also in extreme fear for his own safety and expected to be thrown from the vehicle or propelled through the windshield of the vehicle in an impact. While struggling for the weapon, the officer was able to free his arm from the suspect’s grip and fired his weapon twice at point-blank range at the suspect’s midsection. The suspect then screamed, “You f...ing shot me.” The suspect again accelerated the vehicle, and the officer was then thrown from the vehicle. As he fell, he fired another round at the suspect, then rolled away from the vehicle, fearing that he would be run over by the rear tires. The suspect then made a complete U-turn and drove the vehicle directly toward Officer R. As the officer stood in the roadway, he drew his weapon because the suspect was obviously attempting to run him down. The suspect then swerved, allowing the officer time to run into the parking lot of the Bowmer & Berry’s Showkase adjacent to Denny’s Restaurant. The officer said that his leg was “pretty sore” and that he was shaken up. His radio was missing, and several citizens ran to his aid. The officer stated that these citizens were also witnesses to this incident. Officer R. was very definite about the fact that he was fearful for the safety of others and his own safety during the attempt to escape by a very combative suspect. He utilized deadly force in an effort to stop the suspect’s flight, and he was well aware that two or more weapons were inside the police vehicle with the suspect. If the suspect had successfully escaped, he would have been armed with the weapons removed from the police vehicle and a .380 handgun belonging to Officer R.’s partner. Officer R. named the suspect and also described him in great detail. He had personal knowledge that the suspect had been armed on prior occasions and had been involved in pursuits by police officers. Officer R. was well aware of the suspect’s prior criminal history with LVMPD. Interviews of Witness Officers: [Each officer’s full name, rank, and personnel number should be noted at the start of the interview.] Officer C.W., P0000 Officer W. was working with his partner, Officer M.R., in the area of Desert Inn Road and Maryland Parkway. While driving eastbound on Desert Inn Road just west of Maryland Parkway, they were cut off by a gray Buick

8798_C008.fm Page 74 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

74

Officer-Involved Shootings

Regal. They saw the plate on the vehicle and recognized the driver as Daniel Jamez. They initiated a vehicle stop on the car in question and pulled the vehicle over in the vicinity of Maryland Parkway, just north of Desert Inn Road. During the initial stop, while waiting for the traffic light to change, they confirmed through dispatch that the driver’s license of Daniel Jamez was, in fact, suspended. During the interview, they asked Jamez whether he had any guns in the vehicle and he answered that he did not. They then asked if they could check his vehicle and he said, “No problem, there’s nothing in there.” Officer W. then found several boxes of ammunition in the vehicle and upon looking further found a .40 caliber H&K and a .25 caliber Beretta under the dashboard. Further investigation revealed 4 to 6 grams of what appeared to be cocaine. The subject was placed in handcuffs to ensure the officers’ safety. Several more grams of cocaine were found in the trunk during the vehicle inventory. Officer W. was in the back seat of the suspect’s vehicle when he heard his name shouted five times by Officer R. As Officer W. jumped out of the suspect’s vehicle, he saw a struggle inside the patrol car. The suspect was on the driver’s side of the patrol car. The car suddenly accelerated at a high rate of speed, across the median in a northbound direction in the northbound lanes of Maryland Parkway. Officer W. then commandeered a citizen’s Dodge Ram Charger and gave pursuit. The patrol vehicle then veered back into the northbound lanes of Maryland Parkway and the suspect turned across the median into the southbound lanes of Maryland Parkway heading toward Denny’s and the Bowmer & Berry’s Showkase. At that point, Officer W. said that he heard four or five shots fired in front of that location. He had no idea whether the shooter was the suspect or Officer R. Officer W. became concerned that his partner had been shot as the patrol vehicle continued in a northerly direction on Maryland Parkway. The patrol vehicle finally came to rest at or near the 2700 block of Maryland Parkway, right across from Lucky’s Shopping Center. Within minutes, other officers arrived at this location. Officer W. and the other officers had the suspect at gunpoint in the patrol vehicle and ordered him to exit the patrol vehicle. He did not comply, so the officers extracted the subject from the patrol vehicle. He was handcuffed and medical assistance was summoned for him. Officer W. said that he had no idea how the suspect had removed the handcuffs. He does not know whether the suspect had a hidden key. When the subject was removed from the vehicle, he was wearing only one cuff.

8798_C008.fm Page 75 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

75

Sergeant R.J., P0000 Sergeant J. heard on Channel 2 a dispatcher’s broadcast of a vehicle stop involving an officer and shots fired at Desert Inn Road and Maryland Parkway. Only seconds after that broadcast, the call was changed to “officer needs help, shots fired, officer down.” Sergeant J. responded to the intersection of Vegas Valley and Maryland Parkway. As he turned northbound onto Maryland Parkway, he observed flashing lights on a patrol car that had crashed into shrubbery in the 2700 block of Maryland Parkway. He further observed Officer W., Officer H., and a third officer surrounding the patrol car at gunpoint. He saw a large Hispanic male sitting in the driver’s seat of the patrol car. Sergeant J. asked Officer H. what had happened. Officer H. said that the suspect in the vehicle had just shot an officer near Sunrise Hospital. Sergeant J. ordered Maryland Parkway shut down at Karen and Vegas Valley and began to treat the suspect in the patrol car as a barricaded suspect. Officer W. then started to give the suspect verbal commands to exit the vehicle and said, “Let me see your hands.” He received no physical or verbal response and noted no movement from the suspect in the patrol vehicle. He then decided to approach the vehicle and challenge the suspect. Sergeant J. and Officer H. approached the patrol vehicle and extracted the subject from it. Sergeant J. said that he could see the suspect’s hands and only the right hand was cuffed. As they placed the suspect on the ground, Sergeant J. noticed what appeared to be a gunshot wound to the back. Sergeant J. requested medical assistance. The subject was conscious and moaned. He would not respond to any questions or commands and did not say anything that could be understood. Officer W.H., P0000 Officer H. was working with Officer E. in the vicinity of Tropicana and Maryland Parkway when they heard fellow officers in Unit 7-Mary give a Code 4 right after a traffic stop. They also heard via the radio that several weapons had been found in the vehicle. They continued in the direction of Desert Inn Road and Maryland Parkway. As they approached the police vehicle in front of Sunrise Hospital, they asked the other officers whether they were all right. Officers W. and R. responded that everything was okay, “just finding guns all over this guy.” Officers H. and E. then left the area, and as they drove westbound on Desert Inn Road, they initiated a pedestrian stop. About 3 minutes later, they heard a call of “shots fired” and proceeded to the front side of Sunrise Hospital. As they approached Sunrise Hospital, they observed Officer M.R., who was hobbling and appeared to be hurt. He screamed, “He went that way!

8798_C008.fm Page 76 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

76

Officer-Involved Shootings

He went that way! He’s in my police car!” Officer R. was on the west side of Maryland Parkway, just across the street from Sunrise Hospital. Officer H. then traveled northbound on Maryland Parkway and immediately saw the crashed police car on the side of the road in bushes and shrubbery across from Lucky’s Shopping Center. He also noticed Officer W. behind another vehicle, keeping the subject in the police car at gunpoint. After several attempts to have the suspect exit the vehicle with negative results, Officer W. made the decision to extract the subject from the vehicle. Officers H. and E. assisted in pulling the suspect from the vehicle. The suspect moaned but said nothing. The suspect was recuffed, and medical assistance was summoned for him. Officer D.E., P0000 Officer E. was working with his partner, Officer H., in the vicinity of Tropicana and Maryland Parkway when they monitored Unit 7-M making a vehicle stop. They also heard 7-M request that a gang unit go to another channel and relay some information. They also went to Channel 8 and heard 7-M mention something about seizing guns and drugs from an individual and request response from the gang unit. Officer E. said that he and his partner drove by Unit 7-M in front of Sunrise Hospital. The suspect was handcuffed and standing in front of the patrol car, and Officers R. and W. were doing paperwork. Officer E. and his partner immediately turned onto Desert Inn and proceeded a few blocks and stopped a pedestrian near Swenson. A few minutes later, they heard a broadcast indicating that shots had been fired from 7-M. They drove to the location in front of Sunrise Hospital, and they noticed that one of the officers appeared to have a leg injury. Another unit arrived to stay with the injured officer. Officer E. and his partner drove northbound and observed the patrol vehicle that had run off the road. The lights were still on. They noted Officer W. taking cover behind a little white car. Officer E. could see someone inside the patrol vehicle in the driver’s seat, and moments later he could see the hands of the suspect. Nothing was in the suspect’s hands. Officer W. approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and opened the door. With the help of other officers, the suspect was extracted from the police vehicle. According to Officer E., only one wrist of the suspect was handcuffed; his left wrist was free. They placed the suspect on the ground and recuffed him. They then summoned medical assistance. Witness Interviews: [Witnesses should be listed in their order of priority for the investigation. Complete information about each witness should be included (full name including middle initial, brief description such as white

8798_C008.fm Page 77 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

77

male adult or Hispanic female child, social security number, address including zip code, and telephone number).] 1. J.A.B. White male adult DOB: 12/8/00 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XXXX Amarillo Street Las Vegas, NV XXXXX Phone: 732-XXXX J.A.B. was interviewed at the scene and a taped statement was obtained by Detective D.T. on December 29, 1995, at 7:27 P.M. Mr. B. advised Detective T. that he had been traveling southbound on Maryland Parkway in the area of the Regency Car Wash at the intersection of Maryland Parkway and Vegas Valley Drive when he observed a marked police car traveling north in an extremely erratic manner. Mr. B. said that the vehicle swerved as it traveled northbound. He observed an occupant of the vehicle hanging from the passenger side door. The witness could not advise whether the occupant on the passenger side was a police officer or suspect. He continued watching the police vehicle and observed the man roll out of the car onto the pavement. Mr. B. said that he realized that the man who had fallen from the vehicle was a police officer in uniform. Mr. B. saw the police vehicle return and veer directly in the direction of the officer. It appeared to Mr. B. that the suspect driving the vehicle was attempting to run over the officer. Mr. B. observed the vehicle veer to the north and continue in a very erratic manner. Mr. B. made a U-turn and followed the suspect vehicle northbound on Maryland Parkway until it came to a stop at Maryland Parkway and Karen Avenue. Mr. B. then contacted LVMPD by calling 911 on a pay phone and requested assistance for the police officer. Mr. B. said that the vehicle was driven in a very erratic and dangerous manner, in his opinion. He was certain that the suspect had attempted to run the officer down. Mr. B. observed the officer fire at the vehicle and said that the officer was 2 to 3 feet from the vehicle, with gun pointing directly at the windshield. Mr. B. observed the officer run out of the path of the vehicle and heard the officer fire three shots. This witness was of the opinion that the officer was firing at the vehicle as it came at him. The witness said that several police vehicles arrived at the scene and took the driver out of the vehicle and into custody shortly after the shooting incident.

8798_C008.fm Page 78 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

78

Officer-Involved Shootings

2. W.C.K. White male adult DOB: 4/20/00 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XXXX East Carson Street Las Vegas, NV XXXXX Phone: 382-XXXX W.C.K. was interviewed at the scene and a taped statement was obtained by Detective P.B. of the Homicide Section on December 29, 1995 at approximately 7:30 P.M. Mr. K. advised Detective B. that he had been traveling northbound on Maryland Parkway when he observed a patrol car swerving erratically and had to slam on his brakes to avoid a collision with the vehicle. Mr. K. said that he saw an officer fall from the vehicle. As soon as he heard the shots fired, he stopped and shielded the passenger in his vehicle. After realizing that the gunfire had ended, he grabbed his weapon, exited his vehicle, and ran to the assistance of the police officer. Mr. K. helped the injured officer to the sidewalk area and helped him sit down. The police officer was concerned about his radio because he had to make a call. Mr. K. shouted to witnesses in the area to call 911. Mr. K. could not provide further information about the circumstances of the shooting. 3. C.H. Black female adult DOB: 1/10/00 SS#: 500-XX-XXXX C.H. was interviewed by Detective T. on December 29, 1995 at 8:59 P.M., and her taped statement was obtained. C.H. was an employee of the Cytology Department at Sunrise Hospital. She was looking outside when she observed a police vehicle in front of the hospital and a handcuffed suspect in front of the police car. The suspect appeared agitated and appeared to be arguing with the police officers. C.H. indicated that the suspect was standing at the front of the vehicle for approximately an hour. She then saw the suspect jump into the police car and drive off. A police officer was also in the car. C.H. said that the second police officer standing outside of the vehicle pulled his gun out, and she ran to the phone and called 911. She said that a tow truck was also parked at that location when the incident occurred. She was looking out the window of her office. She said that the suspect

8798_C008.fm Page 79 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

79

walked around the front of the vehicle toward the police officer every few seconds. The officer kept telling the suspect to turn around and return to the front of the car. C.H. said that the suspect yelled at the officer, but she could not hear the argument. She described the suspect as a Latin male about 5'10" tall, with dark brown hair and wearing a green shirt and blue pants. This witness could observe the police officer and the suspect struggling when the officer jumped into the police vehicle, but could not determine who drove the vehicle. The driver swerved erratically. C.H. said that the front and rear doors on the passenger side were open. She did not see or hear the shooting. 4. A.M. Latin male adult DOB: 10/12/00 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XXXX Lucky Street Las Vegas, NV XXXXX Phone: 432-XXXX Mr. M. was the driver of the Quality Tow Service truck that arrived at the scene in response to a call from Officers R. and W. requesting a tow of the suspect’s vehicle. Mr. M. was interviewed at the scene at 8:38 P.M. by Detective T., and his taped statement was obtained. Mr. M. said that he was exiting his truck to contact the officer and complete the necessary paperwork. He saw the officer find two handguns in the vehicle near the steering column and observed the officer remove them from the suspect vehicle. A.M. said that the officer took the weapons recovered from the suspect’s vehicle and placed them in the back seat of the patrol car. Mr. M. assisted in opening the trunk and witnessed the officers’ inventory and search of the vehicle. He also saw the officers remove the “white stuff” (a controlled substance) from the suspect vehicle. This witness did not see the suspect jump into the police vehicle. He heard one of the officers call out for help. Mr. M. saw the suspect and officer in the vehicle and observed the vehicle traveling erratically on Maryland Parkway. The witness was present when the shooting occurred, but could not see the shooting.

8798_C008.fm Page 80 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

80

Officer-Involved Shootings

5. L.A.B. White female adult DOB: 2/20/00 SS#: XX-XX-XXXX XXX Sky Road Indian Springs, NV XXXXX Phone: 879-XXXX L.A.B. was interviewed by Detective P.B. at the scene, and a taped statement was obtained from her on December 29, 1995 at approximately 8:30 P.M. The witness observed the police car take off as the car in which she and her boyfriend (Witness 6, G.E.M.) approached it on Maryland Parkway. The witness said that she saw the police vehicle swerving all over the roadway and then she heard gunshots. An officer ran past her and asked her and G.E.M. to get out of the truck (Officer W. commandeered their vehicle). The uniformed officer then pursued the suspect in the commandeered vehicle. L.A.B. heard gunfire and observed the police vehicle driving all over the roadway. 6. G.E.M. XXX Sky Road Indian Springs, NV XXXXX Phone: 879-XXXX G.E.M. was interviewed at the scene by Detective P.B. on December 29, 1995 at approximately 9:00 P.M. G.E.M. said that he and his girlfriend, L.A.B., had been traveling on Maryland Parkway near Sunrise Hospital when they observed a police vehicle take off in a northerly direction in a very erratic manner. They were then flagged down by a uniformed officer, who commandeered their vehicle and went in pursuit of the suspect vehicle. G.E.M. heard the gunfire and saw the police vehicle U-turn and travel over the median, proceeding southbound in the northbound lanes. The vehicle traveled about half a block to the area of the Denny’s Restaurant where the driver made another erratic U-turn and drove over the median. The vehicle then turned, made a quick U-turn, and proceeded northbound past the Bowmer & Berry’s Showkase at a very high rate of speed. G.E.M. witnessed the passenger in the patrol vehicle roll or fall from the police vehicle and assume a half-crouch position. At that point, G.E.M.’s vehicle was commandeered by the uniformed officer. G.E.M. said that he

8798_C008.fm Page 81 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

81

heard the gunfire; it happened very quickly, and he could not say at what time or where the shooting occurred during the incident. 7. C.D.S. White female adult DOB: 01/23/00 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XXX East Desert Inn Road Las Vegas, NV XXXXX Phone: 792-XXXX C.D.S. was interviewed by Detective B. at the scene on December 29, 1995 at approximately 9:15. A taped statement was obtained. C.D.S. observed a police vehicle parked on Maryland Parkway. She said that she was leaving the Lucky’s grocery store and was passing Vegas Valley Drive when she observed the vehicle stopped with red lights on. As she looked up the roadway 20 to 30 yards, she could see a police officer. C.D.S. heard gunfire and observed a police officer with a large-caliber (a .9 or .45) handgun in his hand. She is of the impression that the officer was firing from the roadway at a suspect in the police vehicle. She observed the marked police vehicle flee from the uniformed officer on the street, then pursued the vehicle in her late model red Corvette. She reached for her weapon, but it was not in her vehicle. She pursued the suspect fleeing in the black police vehicle and attempted to ram the police vehicle and run it off the roadway to prevent the suspect from escaping. C.D.S. was present when the suspect was taken into custody by the police and was of the impression that the suspect had shot the police officer before escaping in the police vehicle. 8. K.J.P. Latin female adult DOB: 2/3/00 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XX Wardelle, Apt. X Las Vegas, NV XXXXX Phone: 385-XXXX K.J.P. was interviewed by Detective P.B. at the scene on December 29, 1995 at approximately 9:25 P.M. Her taped statement was obtained. She and her husband (Witness 9, G.J.P.) were traveling on Maryland Parkway when they heard gunshots. They stopped their car when they observed a

8798_C008.fm Page 82 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

82

Officer-Involved Shootings

police car moving in circles. K.J.P. and her husband initially thought the police were chasing someone down Maryland Parkway. As the police vehicle passed them, the witness and her husband realized that the window had been shot out, and they assumed that the police officer was still in the car when it crashed into the shrubbery at Maryland Parkway and Karen Avenue. She and her husband ran toward the vehicle, assuming that the driver was a police officer. When they saw that the driver was not a police officer, they immediately backed away and awaited the arrival of police. K.J.P. heard the gunshots and observed the “doughnut” pattern made by the vehicle. She did not witness anything further. 9. G.J.P. Latin male adult DOB: 5/00/00 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XXX Wardelle, Apt. X Las Vegas, NV XXXXX G.J.P. was interviewed by Detective P.B. at the scene on December 29, 1995 at approximately 9:30 P.M., and his taped statement was obtained. Mr. P. said that he and his wife had been traveling northbound on Maryland Parkway when they observed a police vehicle driven erratically. They saw it crash into the shrubbery near the intersection with Karen Avenue. When they observed the police vehicle “go flying by,” they thought the police were chasing someone and saw that the vehicle window had been shot out. After the crash, G.J.P. and his wife ran to the aid of what they assumed to be a police officer. When they discovered that the driver was not a police officer, they retreated and awaited arrival of police. G.J.P. and his wife did not observe the shooting. They heard the gunfire, saw the vehicle driven in an erratic manner, and saw it crash into the shrubbery.

8798_C008.fm Page 83 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

83

10. R.E.M. White male adult DOB: 7/4/00 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XXX Troy Avenue Las Vegas, NV XXXXX Phone: 247-XXXX R.E.M. was interviewed by Detective D.T. at the scene on December 29, 1995 and his taped statement was obtained. He saw a police vehicle driving “crazy” after leaving the curb and proceeding onto Maryland Parkway. The witness heard gunfire and saw a police officer fall from the vehicle near the Color Tile store. The witness could not determine who drove the vehicle. He noted that the passenger door was open as the vehicle sped by his vehicle. R.E.M. described the vehicle as driven erratically. He did not know whether the officer was thrown or fell from the vehicle onto the ground at the front of the tile store. He did not observe any obvious attempt on the driver’s part to run over the officer after he fell from the vehicle. R.E.M. observed a tow truck parked near the police vehicle when the police vehicle sped away, sliding back across the median. The vehicle then turned around and headed back in the opposite direction. R.E.M. heard gunfire and observed the officer on the ground. He had nothing further to add about the circumstances of the shooting. 11. R.J.S. White female adult DOB: 10/00/00 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XXX East Carson Avenue Las Vegas, NV XXXXX Phone: 382-XXXX R.J.S. was interviewed by Detective D.T. at the scene on December 29, 1995 at approximately 9:45 P.M. She and W.C.K. (Witness 2) were in their car in the area of Humana Hospital Sunrise when they observed a police vehicle travel across the roadway in front of their car. The vehicle proceeded in the opposite direction of traffic, and a car door on the passenger side was open. R.J.S. could not say how many people were in the vehicle. She saw the police officer “fly” out of the vehicle. She and W.C.K. were in their vehicle in the middle section of the roadway when they saw the officer fall

8798_C008.fm Page 84 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

84

Officer-Involved Shootings

from the vehicle and heard the gunshots. W.C.K. exited the vehicle and ran to the aid of the officer. The patrol vehicle was traveling northbound in the right traffic lane. W.C.K. ran to the officer who was on the roadway. The patrol vehicle fled the scene in a very reckless manner. R.J.S. could not say who had fired the shots. 12. H.J.S. White male adult DOB: 0/27/00 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XXX Roxbury Avenue Las Vegas, NV XXXXX Phone: 733-XXXX H.J.S. was interviewed by Detective D.T. at the scene on December 29, 1995 at approximately 9:50 P.M., and his taped statement was obtained. He and his wife (G.L.S., Witness 13) were northbound on Maryland Parkway when he observed a black and white police vehicle heading north. The police vehicle traveled in a very erratic manner and turned in circles two or three times at the intersection in front of Sunrise Hospital near Denny’s Restaurant. H.J.S. heard gunfire. He observed a police officer on foot near a tow truck at the front of Humana Sunrise Hospital. He did not see the officer fall from the police vehicle. The police officer stood on the roadway and was holding his leg. H.J.S. assumed that the officer had been shot in the leg. The witness could not advise who had fired the gunshots. He only observed the erratic driving and heard the gunfire. He reported his observations initially by calling 911. 13. G.L.S. White female adult DOB: 09/09/59 XXXX Flamingo Rd. Las Vegas, Nevada XXXXX Phone: 568-XXXX G.L.S., her husband, and child were in their vehicle traveling north on Maryland Parkway when they observed a police vehicle and a tow truck parked along the roadway. She saw the police vehicle drive erratically away from that location and travel in circles. As the vehicle was making U-turns, they heard gunfire. The police vehicle then traveled northbound at a high rate of speed. It turned in a couple of complete circles on Maryland Park-

8798_C008.fm Page 85 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

85

way. G.L.S. heard about four rounds of gunfire and observed an injured police officer on the edge of the Maryland Parkway roadway. She could provide no further information. 14. R.F. White female adult DOB: 9/00/26 SS#: XXX-XX-XXXX XXXX Mountain Vista Las Vegas, NV XXXXX Phone: 898-XXXX R.F. was interviewed by Detective J.M. on January 1, 1996, at 6:13 P.M. She is an employee of the CAT bus system. On December 29, 1995, she had been operating a bus on Maryland Parkway. She initially drove past a police vehicle on Maryland Parkway around 4:00 P.M. and observed the police officers and a vehicle stopped at that location. She returned to the area about an hour later and saw the police vehicle “zigzagging all over the place.” She said that the vehicle made “dramatic” turns and that she expected the vehicle to roll over. She was very concerned and feared that the police vehicle would strike other cars or pedestrians on the roadway. She did not observe the shooting incident. She saw only part of the suspect’s attempt to flee the scene. Physical Evidence Summary (see Figures 8.1a and 8.1b): The following is a description of evidence recovered from the three separate locations of this incident, from 2770 South Maryland Parkway through the 3300 block of South Maryland Parkway. 1. Photographs of the scene, including aerial photographs obtained during daylight hours. 2. Photographs of Officer M.R. at the scene and at emergency room of Humana Hospital Sunrise. They depict the officer’s uniform and injuries. 3. Glock Model 21 semiautomatic handgun, Serial ABRXXXUS, registered to Officer M.R. 4. Glock magazine removed from Officer M.R.’s weapon. Contains eight live Winchester .45 caliber cartridges. One round was removed from the chamber. A total of nine live rounds were recovered from the officer’s duty weapon.

8798_C008.fm Page 86 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

86

Officer-Involved Shootings

(a)

(b)

FIGURE 8.1 Proper documentation of scene and participants is crucial, especially in this type of high-profile incident.

8798_C008.fm Page 87 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

5. A green long-sleeved button-down LVMPD issue uniform shirt removed from Officer R. with a paint transfer or smudged area across the front. 6. One pair of LVMPD issue tan uniform trousers with brown stripes down the sides. 7. One black mock turtleneck LVMPD issue undershirt. 8. One pair of black Reebok athletic (authorized) shoes removed from Officer R. 9. Photographs of 1993 Ford vehicle bearing Nevada license EX22174. It has LVMPD markings. It was towed to the Criminalistics Bureau for evidence search and additional processing. 10. Photographs of suspect vehicle, a 1981 Buick, bearing Nevada license 739GGK, vehicle identification number G4AJ47A5BZ108101. 11. One Beretta Model 950BS, .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol, serial number BER63174V; magazine containing nine .25 caliber CCI brand cartridges. 12. One H&K Model USP .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol, serial number 22–4269, containing six live cartridges in magazine (two Remington Peters .40 caliber cartridges and four Winchester .40 caliber S&W cartridges). 13. One wooden club, weighted head, approximately 28 inches in length. 14. One Motorola M2–1000 two-way radio (LVMPD property tag 24397), broken in three separate pieces with clip-on microphone attached. Device shows areas of blood-like substance. Radio recovered from roadway of Maryland Parkway. Ballistic Evidence Recovered: 1. Four Winchester Western .45 caliber shell casings recovered from pavement west of curb at 3061 South Maryland Parkway. 2. One Winchester Western .45 caliber shell casing, recovered from patrol vehicle. 3. Ten pieces of projectile fragments recovered from interior of LVMPD police vehicle at various locations (see criminalist’s evidence impound report).

87

8798_C008.fm Page 88 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

88

Officer-Involved Shootings

Forensic Evidence Examinations: 1. A white paper folded around three small, knotted clear plastic bags that contained a white rock-like substance. The bags were removed from the police vehicle after they were initially recovered from the suspect vehicle and secured in the police vehicle prior to the incident. The forensic laboratory report of examination revealed that the rock-like substance was cocaine. Package 1 contained 12.6 grams; Package 2 contained 3.46 grams. 2. Uncontaminated blood samples of suspect Daniel Jamez. A search warrant was obtained via the Clark County District Attorney’s Office authorizing officers to seize a blood panel from University Medical Center. The blood panel was drawn upon arrival of the suspect at the trauma unit. The forensic laboratory revealed that the suspect’s body contained no controlled substances or alcohol at the time of the incident. Numerous other items were recovered and impounded by LVMPD criminalistic officers. These items are listed and itemized in the criminalist’s evidence impound reports. Most items were contents of the suspect’s vehicle and his personal effects that were of no investigative value. Investigative Summary: On December 29, 1995 at approximately 4:54 P.M., Unit 7-M Officers M.R. and C.W. operating in uniform in a marked police vehicle, had occasion to stop a subject known to them as Daniel Jamez. The suspect was driving a 1981 Buick bearing Nevada license 739GGK. In effecting a traffic stop, the officers confirmed that Jamez was operating the vehicle on a revoked license. They issued Jamez a Class II citation requiring impound of the vehicle and processing of the suspect at Clark County Detention Center. While Officers R. and W. were conducting an inventory search of the vehicle, they recovered two handguns and a quantity of what appeared to be a controlled substance. While awaiting a tow for the vehicle, the suspect was ordered to stand at the front of the LVMPD vehicle. The suspect acted in a very agitated manner, continually speaking with the officers and moving toward them as they conducted the vehicle search and inventory while awaiting the tow truck and before transporting the suspect to the detention center. At 5:57 P.M., the suspect slipped one handcuff off his wrist and bolted toward the driver’s side of the police vehicle. Upon entering the vehicle, the suspect attempted to shift the vehicle into drive and flee the scene.

8798_C008.fm Page 89 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Documenting Incidents

89

Officer R., who was in the back seat of the vehicle securing the suspect’s weapons, saw the suspect sit behind the steering wheel, called to his partner, C.W., and then jumped into the passenger side of the vehicle as the suspect sped away from the traffic stop location. Officer R. was partially in the vehicle. The passenger door was open. The officer was involved in a struggle with the suspect, and he repeatedly ordered the suspect to stop. The suspect refused to do so and struck Officer R. in the face with a closed fist. Officer R. drew his weapon in an effort to force the suspect to stop the vehicle. Officer R. did so in fear for his own safety and that of pedestrians and citizens in vehicles in the area. The suspect then grabbed for Officer R.’s weapon and a struggle ensued while the vehicle traveled northbound in the southbound lanes in the 3000 block of Maryland Parkway. During the struggle, the weapon discharged twice. Officer R. was able to pull the weapon from the suspect’s grasp and fired two rounds in rapid succession directly at the suspect, striking him in the chest area. Officer R. fired an additional round as he fell from the vehicle onto the roadway. The additional round struck the door of the marked vehicle. The suspect screamed an obscenity, made a complete U-turn, and attempted to run down Officer R. This caused the officer to bring his weapon to bear directly on the suspect. The suspect then made an abrupt turn to the left (east), made another U-turn, and attempted to flee the area southbound on Maryland Parkway. The suspect and LVMPD marked vehicle were pursued by witnesses who later returned to the scene to describe the incident as they had witnessed it. The witnesses heard the gunfire and observed the officer with weapon in hand, but their accounts differ about when the officer fired the weapon and what they observed. The suspect was taken into custody at 2770 South Maryland Parkway near Karen Avenue, was recuffed prior to receiving emergency medical care at the scene, and was transported to University Medical Center where he underwent emergency surgery for multiple gunshot wounds to the chest. Officer R. was transported to Sunrise Hospital’s trauma emergency unit to be treated for trauma to his knee, ankle, and right hand. In conducting a background investigation on the suspect, investigators discovered that he had been arrested and was a fugitive after his release on bail in California after being charged with larceny and carjacking. He was due to return to court on January 2, 1996 for a status check required by the governor’s warrant issued in Nevada on December 26, 1995. The suspect was to be remanded to custody and extradited to California. The background check also revealed a prior incident. The suspect had been armed with a handgun and fled LVMPD officers in the area of an

8798_C008.fm Page 90 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

90

Officer-Involved Shootings

apartment complex at Maryland Parkway and Desert Inn Road a month earlier. The suspect was charged with attempted murder of a police officer, resisting a police officer, escape, grand larceny auto robbery, and use of a deadly weapon by the Clark County District Attorney’s office. After review, the District Attorney filed additional charges: possession of stolen property (an H&K .40 caliber handgun recovered from Jamez’s vehicle was reported stolen in the jurisdiction), possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell (based on the positive test result of the rocklike substance found in Jamez’s vehicle).

8798_C009,fm Page 91 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

9

Investigating Forced and Assisted Suicides INTRODUCTION

All too often, a police officer is an unwilling participant in a forced or assisted suicide — a death pejoratively called “suicide by cop.” A suspect may take deliberate actions to force the police to be part of his or her assisted suicide. The method is convenient for individuals who do not have the courage to take their own lives or want to take others, including police officers, with them. In essence, they seek police response to an incident, act in a threatening manner, endanger lives of officers and bystanders, and force police to use deadly force. These types of incidents are very difficult for police officers to understand and accept. The correct designation is law enforcement-forced suicide or law enforcement-assisted suicide. This type of suicide is planned and deliberate. It should not be confused with an incident in which a suspect’s actions were suicidal as a result of other events that led to an armed confrontation with officers. A 1998 article appearing in the Annals of Emergency Medicine published by the American College of Emergency Physicians details a 10-year study of officer-involved shootings in the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department’s jurisdiction. The article provides a statistical analysis of this unfortunate societal phenomenon. The study confirmed what police agencies have always suspected: that a notable percentage of deadly-force confrontations are the deliberate acts of principals who force officers to kill them either in self-defense or to protect others. 91

8798_C009,fm Page 92 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

92

Officer-Involved Shootings

The percentage of these types of suspect suicides may be greater than the study noted due to inaccurate reporting and documenting by police agencies. The study used four criteria to identify such events: (1) evidence of suicidal intent, (2) evidence that the suspects wanted the officers to shoot them, (3) evidence that the suspects possessed lethal or what appeared to be lethal weapons, and (4) evidence that the suspects intentionally escalated the encounters and provoked the officers to shoot them. The results of this 10-year study revealed that suicides involving police officers accounted for 11% of all shootings reviewed and 13% of all officer-involved justifiable homicides. The criteria used in the Los Angeles County study should be followed when investigating these events. The causes of death may vary, but the manner of death will always be homicide because death occurs at the hands of another. Officers are forced to use deadly force by shooting the suicidal individual in self-defense or to protect the civilian populace. CASE STUDY In late 1998, sexual assault investigators were involved in a child molestation case. The suspect in the sexual assault of a 14-year-old female was her grandfather. Investigators attempted to locate and interview the suspect without success. The suspect then called the sex crimes unit and asked to speak with the case officers. Neither investigator was in the office, and the suspect became very irate and threatened to go to the intersection of Tropicana Avenue and Rainbow Boulevard and kill the first person he encountered. Several officers responded to that location and discovered the suspect standing in a vacant lot and brandishing a very large knife. Responding officers approached the suspect in a manner intended to prevent him from exiting the vacant lot and attempted to reason with him. Crisis negotiators responded to the scene to deal with what had become a very agitated and threatening suspect. After approximately 45 minutes, the suspect charged an officer, causing other officers to use very high-pressure pepper spray to subdue the suspect. He retreated briefly and then lunged at the nearest officer, impelling the officer to use deadly force by shooting the suspect three times in the chest and

8798_C009,fm Page 93 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Investigating Forced and Assisted Suicides

93

head and killing him instantly. This “suicide by cop” was videotaped by a witness from a nearby apartment complex.

Follow-up investigation revealed that the suspect had a prior conviction for lewdness with a minor. He knew that he faced a mandatory life sentence on conviction of the second offense, and thus chose suicide. Figures 9.1a, b, and c are still photos of video showing the suspect’s deliberate suicidal attack. The supervisor at scene (female) in center directs her subordinates to lower their weapons, allow the negotiator (plainclothes officer in yellow jacket) to attempt to calm the suspect and talk him into surrendering his weapon. Officers observed the 21-ft rule in dealing with edged weapons. Note that the suspect closed ground rapidly, causing the officer to kill him at about 10 ft. The 21-ft rule is a very valid rule in dealing with edged and bludgeoning-type weapons.

SUICIDAL ACTIONS “Suicide by cop” is basically a form of assisted suicide involving an unwilling participant — a police officer. However, another form of suicide occurs far more frequently than the officer-assisted suicides described above. These deaths occur when officers attempt to arrest a suspect who, in spite of overwhelming police presence, resists with deadly force in a suicidal effort that also kills the officers. The frequency of such suicides increased after the revision of the so-called three-strikes-and-you’re-out laws aimed at habitual criminals. The laws have long been on record, but state legislatures in recent years rewrote the laws to require mandatory life sentences for career criminals with multiple felony convictions, thus removing the court’s discretionary powers in sentencing and eliminating the prosecutor’s ability to negotiate pleas. Some career criminals feel that if they face life sentences, the reason may as well be for killing police, and that has led to the inevitable increase in armed confrontations with police. From 1994 through 1996, the SWAT unit of LVMPD executed nearly 500 high-risk entries to serve search and arrest warrants. The entries led to four armed confrontations involving the use of deadly force. Two shootings were fatal and two produced near-fatal wounds of the suspects. Three tactical officers sustained minor wounds dur-

8798_C009,fm Page 94 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

94

Officer-Involved Shootings

(a)

(b)

(c)

FIGURE 9.1 Still photos from video showing deliberate suicidal attack by suspect.

8798_C009,fm Page 95 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Investigating Forced and Assisted Suicides

95

ing the armed confrontations. The two suspects in the fatal confrontations made statements about not wanting to return to prison. Their suicidal actions precipitated their deaths and confirmed the validity of their threats. CASE STUDY Narcotics officers obtained a search warrant covering a residence at which their investigation revealed a large methamphetamine laboratory in full production. All suspects were known to be armed, and criminal histories of the occupants revealed multiple felony arrests and convictions. The tactical unit was ordered to achieve entry and secure the scene for investigators who would then search, seize, and arrest the suspects. After the tactical briefing, the officers made a highrisk entry into the residence. Three occupants were arrested in the living room, and the officers then proceeded to search the remainder of the residence. As the officers walked through a hallway, two nude females ran from a bedroom midway down the hall. They looked terrified. Suddenly a nude male exited the bedroom with a large caliber handgun in hand. He screamed and fired at the officers. Three of the tactical officers returned fire, striking the combatant several times in the chest, back, and head. During the gun battle, three tactical officers were slightly wounded from suspect and friendly fire (shrapnel from the officers’ rounds struck the officers’ legs after bouncing off the concrete floor). The suspect died at the scene. Through interviews of the arrested subjects and associates of the deceased, officers learned that the suspect, a methamphetamine cook with four felony convictions, had made numerous statements and threats related to not going back to prison for a mandatory life sentence. Such behavior is not uncommon, and although this case was not an officer-assisted suicide, the suspect’s actions were definitely suicidal in nature.

These types of incidents should also serve to remind agencies of the importance of assigning properly trained tactical units the responsibility of executing high-risk and search warrants. The old buy-and-bust method that left officers very vulnerable is no longer

8798_C009,fm Page 96 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

96

Officer-Involved Shootings

acceptable. Having narcotics officers make entry is at best a questionable practice. A suicidal habitual felon who killed a policeman would only have to allege that he thought that he was being cheated by drug dealers with whom he had prior dealings. He could claim that his action was self-preservation, when in fact he was trying to kill police and would then face life in prison at the least or the death penalty at the most. This is why officers working the suspect should never be members of an entry team. Our ability to document the suspect’s intentions or state of mind is as important as determining the state of mind of the officer involved at the instant that he or she used deadly force. Whether the suspect’s actions were suicidal and whether the suspect intended to involve the police are important issues, and all evidence related to the suspect’s state of mind should be well documented. Suicide and Law Enforcement, by Donald Sheehan and Janet Warren of the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit (2001), is an excellent source of information for those interested in learning more about this dynamic.

STRATEGIES FOR CRISIS NEGOTIATORS AND FIRST RESPONDERS The wish to kill, the wish to be killed, and the wish to die are the three elements identified by Dr. Karl Menninger in his 1938 study of self-destructive and self-annihilistic persons, and are designated the Menninger Triad. The law enforcement profession is very familiar with the Menninger Triad. Lieutenant Tom Monahan of LVMPD suggested certain tactics for dealing with suicidal suspects: Since the development of crisis negotiations in the early 1970s, law enforcement has been increasingly willing to resolve situations involving individuals who are emotionally disturbed with patience and nonviolence. While many suicide-by-cop situations are highly volatile and dynamic, requiring life-or-death decisions in microseconds, others are more protracted, allowing for the response and assistance of trained crisis negotiators. Regardless of the amount of crisis intervention training, certain strategies can be applied by first-responding police officers and crisis negotiators. The primary goals of establishing a rapport with the subject, assessing the violence and suicidal poten-

8798_C009,fm Page 97 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Investigating Forced and Assisted Suicides

97

tial, and instilling hope within the subject should always be pursued. Directing the subject away from suicide by cop and toward suicide is a strategy that can be employed. As the commitment to suicide by cop subsides, then the officer can begin traditional suicide intervention techniques.

Because suicidal suspects are on the increase and represent a continual problem for law enforcement agencies, officers must be intensively trained to handle such situations and document them properly. Street survival training should cover crisis intervention to enable officers to recognize a potential suicide involving police. If possible, officers should retreat and attempt to defuse these dangerous situations if they can do so without risk to life. When observations reveal that suicide is the motive for a suspect’s actions, an officer must make every effort to decelerate the chain of events and remain focused on saving lives through negotiation and not through deadly force.

INVESTIGATING SUICIDAL SUSPECT INCIDENTS If investigators understand a suspect’s thinking in these types of situations involving the potential for deadly force and investigate such confrontations properly, they can be of tremendous assistance to the employee involved in the incident and the agency. The employee can better understand that he or she was put in a situation that was literally beyond his or her control and that the actions of another dictated the outcome. The agency can justify the employee’s actions in such situations by conducting an open and thorough investigation and assuring the public that the police were justified in their actions and public safety was their prime concern. One can assume that a suspect who was suicidal was mentally disturbed at the time of a fatal confrontation. While no criminal charges may ensue as a result of a complete investigation, the possibility of civil litigation based on lack of training and supervision of officers and use of excessive force by officers should certainly be considered during conduct of the investigation. Investigators should make a diligent effort to document the following facts. The suspect:

8798_C009,fm Page 98 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

98

Officer-Involved Shootings

1. Committed a deliberate criminal act to elicit a police response 2. Communicated a desire to be killed by police 3. Preplanned his or her death 4. Made no effort to escape the situation that led to death 5. Made statements about “going out in a big way,” said that he or she would not return to prison, or indicated that “they won’t take me alive” 6. Had a history of violence and confrontations with police 7. Left a recent will or had his or her affairs in order It is advisable to obtain taped statements from any witnesses who have information about the suspect’s state of mind around the time of the incident. Investigators should also attempt to learn whether the statement contained any prior death threats.

EMPLOYEE INTERVIEW It is critical for investigators to ask direct questions during interviews of employees after they use deadly force or when they witness a coworker do so. Despite the difficulty that employees will face when answering such pointed questions, the information to be gained will be invaluable to the investigation and may add to the information available about the suspect’s state of mind. Examples of the types of questions are as follows: 1. Did the employee have any alternatives? What were they? 2. Could the employee have reacted differently? 3. Did the suicidal actions of the suspect leave the employee any other method of handling the situation? 4. Could the employee have retreated? 5. Were civilian lives in jeopardy? 6. Was the employee trained to handle crisis negotiation? 7. Did he or she have time to call crisis negotiators? 8. Did he or she feel that deadly force was the only answer? 9. Could he or she have safely deployed less lethal weaponry?

8798_C009,fm Page 99 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

Investigating Forced and Assisted Suicides

99

SUMMARY A deceased suspect may be deemed a suicide victim in medicological terms. For purposes of a police investigative report, he or she is a decedent, combatant, or other appropriate term chosen, but he or she is not a victim. The officer involved in the incident is the true victim because he or she must deal with the consequences of the suspect’s death and the psychological effects resulting therefrom.

8798_C009,fm Page 100 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:25 AM

8798_C010.fm Page 101 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

10

Investigating In-Custody Deaths INTRODUCTION

Second only to deaths arising from the use of deadly force by a police officer, in-custody deaths are the most controversial incidents that an agency must face. Because such cases frequently gather unfavorable and unfair attention from the media and the public, they should be approached with the same care and thoroughness applied to homicide investigations. High-profile events, such as suicides or homicides that occur during incarceration or in the course of transport, require attention to detail in handling evidence, open communication both inside and outside the department when possible, and complete documentation. Cursory, incomplete investigations and compromise are unacceptable. The investigation process must be objective and effective from inception through completion. Deaths that occur at the hands of police and deaths of prisoners and suspects in custody are always subject to intense public scrutiny. Additionally, the civil liability arising from such incidents can be extreme. The investigative unit assigned to examine such incidents must determine: 1. Whether the death of a suspect in custody or inmate of a prison resulted from brutality, neglect, or institutional misconduct. 2. Whether the death occurred at the hands of other inmates (murder or assisted suicide). 3. The exact manner and means of death (suicide, homicide, drug overdose, accident, etc.).

101

8798_C010.fm Page 102 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

102

Officer-Involved Shootings

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES Investigators assigned to examine a death in custody must conduct thorough criminal and administrative investigations, document all facets of the event in an impartial manner, and report their findings in a manner totally free of bias. While every investigation of an incustody death is unique, certain general guidelines and standard protocols apply.

NOTIFICATION The on-duty supervisor, upon learning of the death or serious injury of an inmate or suspect in custody, should ask questions and gather as much information as possible before contacting the division commander to provide a briefing on the incident. The division commander will then notify investigative personnel, who will start their investigation by going to the prison or other location where the incident occurred.

SECURING

THE

SCENE

If a suspect or inmate or anyone else is injured, the first step is to arrange for medical care. At least one officer should accompany injured suspects, inmates, and bystanders to ensure security, whether they are treated onsite or removed to a hospital. Detention supervisors must ensure that the scene is secured and all witnesses are separated, secured, and supervised. They should order that the scene be under lockdown status (sealed and secured). Access to the area should be strictly limited to essential officials and investigative team members.

INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSE Because all scenes of in-custody deaths must be processed in the same manner as homicides and major felonies, the protection and preservation of physical evidence are utmost priorities. Every officer on the scene should be well trained in evidence-handling procedures. An in-custody death scene is not a place to acquire training. Responsibility for the scene, witnesses, and overall investigation will be released to the investigative personnel as soon as they arrive.

8798_C010.fm Page 103 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

Investigating In-Custody Deaths

103

Detention personnel will then assist the investigation as directed by the supervisor of the investigative group. Team members will then: 1. Obtain taped statements from all witnesses, including inmates, civilian employees, commissioned officers, and anyone else in the area when the incident leading to the death occurred. 2. Obtain copies of the decedent’s inmate file, including records of arrests, disciplinary actions, medical treatments, evaluations, etc. 3. Obtain a list of all inmates, including trusties and all other individuals who may have had access to the area where the death occurred. The list should include all inmates housed on floors or cellblocks near the scene. 4. Obtain taped statements from all inmates regardless of what they claim they did or did not witness. Retain the tapes for possible impeachment purposes at a later date. 5. Conduct a complete death scene search and document the scene with photographs, diagrams, and videotapes (see Figure 10.1 through Figure 10.3). 6. Search the scene for any letters, notes, drawings, marked books, or anything else that would indicate the inmate’s state of mind regarding suicide or problems with other inmates. 7. Check outgoing mail for any letters that the inmate may have sent that have not left the facility. All personnel should be aware of their assignments and deadlines. Oral and written reports should be provided in a timely manner. The primary investigator should review all evidence, contacts with witnesses, laboratory records, and other information for inclusion in the final report.

REPORT PREPARATION Clarity is an essential component of all reports and most particularly those generated as results of high-profile investigations. Persons mentioned in the report should be completely identified. Sentences should be of manageable length — a report that is supposed to be unbiased

8798_C010.fm Page 104 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

104

Officer-Involved Shootings

(a)

(b) FIGURE 10.1 This inmate attempted suicide by placing a pencil to his temporal area and slamming it into his skull (a). Note that the pencil head is flush with the side of the head (b). The pencil was removed (c) and the inmate was returned to custody. The pencil deflected into his sinus cavity and did very little damage.

8798_C010.fm Page 105 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

Investigating In-Custody Deaths

105

(c) FIGURE 10.1 (CONTINUED)

(a) FIGURE 10.2 Always compare ligature marks with actual ligature for angle (a). Look for marks on the neck (scratches, bruising). Bag the hands and photograph the entire body if possible before leaving the facility. Examine and photograph the area where the inmate hanged himself (b). Never cut through the knots on the neck or at the point where the ligature is anchored. Remove the noose and take it to autopsy for examination by the Medical Examiner (c).

8798_C010.fm Page 106 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

106

Officer-Involved Shootings

(b)

(c) FIGURE 10.2 (CONTINUED)

8798_C010.fm Page 107 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

Investigating In-Custody Deaths

107

(a)

(b) FIGURE 10.3 Death can occur when a subject places a plastic bag over his head, tightens it around the neck, then lies down and breathes normally until the oxygen in the bag is replaced with carbon dioxide, causing loss of consciousness and death. This inmate (a), after being sentenced for murder, removed a garbage liner bag from the court area and smuggled it into his cell to use in his suicide. All mail, notes, drawings, etc. should be checked for any writings that would indicate suicidal intentions (b). The Iliad and scriptures are significant (c). The instrument used for suicide (d, e) should be processed at the scene if possible.

8798_C010.fm Page 108 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

108

Officer-Involved Shootings

(c)

(d)

FIGURE 10.3 (CONTINUED)

(e)

8798_C010.fm Page 109 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

Investigating In-Custody Deaths

109

should not contain exaggerations or any language that could be construed as subjective. Remember that any such report could come into possession of the media. For that reason, it should be critically reviewed before release to ensure that no language appears even slightly biased. The sample report included in this paragraph should serve as a general guide. It contains the basic detail that should be included in every report and can be adapted to a particular agency’s needs. Any photographs and diagrams included in the report should be fully described. Brackets are used below to suggest the type of information that should be included under each heading. The names cited in sections of the report that contain great amounts of text have been altered to preserve privacy.

IN-CUSTODY DEATH REPORT Case Number: [Insert assigned case number] Reporting Division: [Insert proper division name] Division of Occurrence: [Insert proper division name] Date and Time of Occurrence: Location of Occurrence: [Provide name of facility and detailed location within facility] Dictating Officer and Location: Deceased: [Provide full name and date of birth of deceased] Inmate Number: Social Security Number: Residence Address: [Include city, county, state, and country if applicable] In-Custody Charges:

8798_C010.fm Page 110 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

110

Officer-Involved Shootings

Synopsis: On February 28, 2001, at approximately 10 P.M., investigators were dispatched to the county detention center in response to an inmate death [or in-custody death]. The decedent was identified as E.J.S., a white male adult, 24 years of age. Death occurred in the isolation unit of the center. Investigating Officers: [Include names, ranks, personnel numbers, unit names, and sections.] Inmates Interviewed: [Include names, inmate numbers, and housing information (cell numbers, block numbers, and floor numbers).] Medical Services: [Detail treatment of decedent, including names of paramedics, nurses, technicians, etc.] Attending Physician: [Insert name and office address.] Time and Date Pronounced Dead: Medical Examiner: [Insert name and office address.] Pathologist Conducting Autopsy: [Insert name and office address.] Details of Investigation: [This section is the body of the report that fully describes the investigation. Include all information not already included under other headings of this report.] Interviews of Inmates: [Include inmate names, inmate numbers, social security numbers, dates of birth, status (criminal charges pending or convicted and sentenced), and housing locations (cell numbers, block numbers, and floor numbers). List information obtained from inmates and refers to taped statements.] Interviews of Corrections Personnel: [Indicate whether officers’ taped reports or written reports were requested. Refer to them by officers’ names, tape numbers, dates, or other identifiers. Insert a summary of the reports obtained from employees in this section.] Follow-Up Investigation: [Describe interviews of family members and friends of inmate and any information obtained outside the scene.

8798_C010.fm Page 111 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

Investigating In-Custody Deaths

111

Indicate whether interviews were taped. Include names, addresses, phone numbers, and relationships to decedent.] Autopsy Date, Time, and Place: Persons Attending Autopsy: addresses.]

[Insert names, titles, and office

Cause of Death: Suggested Questions for Witness Interviews The circumstances of the death dictate the direction of questioning. The list of questions below is intentionally very general, but should be helpful in cases of in-custody death. 1. Are you aware that we are recording this interview? 2. Are you aware that we are investigating the death of E.J.S., an inmate at the correction center? 3. Do you know the deceased? [Show the witness a photograph and request positive identification.] 4. Were you present when the incident occurred? [Confirm the inmate’s location at the time of the incident.] 5. Did you see what happened? 6. Can you tell us in your own words what happened? 7. Did you have any conversations with Mr. S.? What was your relationship with him? 8. Did you associate with Mr. S. outside this facility? Please describe that association. 9. Do you know any other inmates who may have information about Mr. S.’s death? 10. Was Mr. S. having problems with other inmates, guards, or other parties? The questions above establish the witness’s whereabouts during the incident and relationship with the decedent. Having that information will enable you to ask detailed questions about the incident — what the witness did or did not see and what he or she observed

8798_C010.fm Page 112 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

112

Officer-Involved Shootings

before, during, and after the incident. Repeat the answers on tape before proceeding to other areas of interest.

OFFICER’S REPORT — IN-CUSTODY DEATH Event or Case Number: [Insert assigned case number.] Reporting Division: [Insert proper division name.] Division of Occurrence: [Insert proper division name.] Date and Time of Occurrence: Location of Occurrence: [Provide name of facility and detailed location within facility.] Dictating Officer and Location: [Provide name, rank, personnel number, and section or division.] Deceased: [Provide full name and date of birth of deceased.] Inmate Number: Social Security Number: Residence Address: [Include city, county, state, and country if applicable.] In-Custody Charges: Synopsis: On February 28, 2001, at approximately 12:30 A.M., homicide investigators were dispatched to the University Medical Center Trauma Unit and to the county detention center in response to an inmate death [or in-custody death]. The decedent was identified as E.J.S., a white male adult, 24 years of age. Investigating Officers: [Include names, ranks, personnel numbers, unit names, and sections.]

8798_C010.fm Page 113 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

Investigating In-Custody Deaths

113

Criminalistics Personnel: [Include names, ranks, personnel numbers, unit names, and sections.] Detention Services Division: [Include name, rank, personnel number, unit name, and section.] Clark County Fire Department Paramedics: number, unit number, and paramedics’ names.]

[Include rescue

Medical Services: [Detail treatment of decedent, including names of paramedics, nurses, technicians, etc.] Attending Physician: [Insert name and office address.] Time and Date Pronounced Dead: Medical Examiner: [Insert name and office address.] Deputy Coroner: [Insert name and office address.] Pathologist Conducting Autopsy: [Insert name and office address.] Persons Present at Autopsy: [List names, titles, personnel numbers (if applicable), office addresses.] Inmates Reporting Incident: [Include inmate names, inmate numbers, social security numbers, dates of birth, status (criminal charges pending or convicted and sentenced), and housing locations (cell numbers, block numbers, and floor numbers).] Inmates in Holding Cell 000 at Time of Incident: [List inmate names, inmate numbers, social security numbers, dates of birth, status (criminal charges pending or convicted and sentenced), and housing locations (cell numbers, block numbers, and floor numbers).] Details of Department Investigation: [This section is the body of the report that fully describes the investigation. Take into account all information not already included under other headings of this report.] On February 28, 2001 at approximately 12:35 A.M., homicide investigators were dispatched from their residences to University

8798_C010.fm Page 114 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

114

Officer-Involved Shootings

Medical Center’s trauma unit and Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) in response to an in-custody death. Responding investigators were advised that the inmate was pronounced dead on arrival at the trauma unit at approximately 11:15 P.M. Detective A.B.L. was dispatched to University Medical Center; Detective D.H. was dispatched to CCDC to conduct a death investigation. On arrival at CCDC, Detective H. was briefed by General Investigations Detective D.W. and Corrections Supervisor Lieutenant P.K. as to circumstances surrounding the discovery and reporting of this event. The inmate was booked into the facility on December 24 at approximately 7:30 P.M. on a felony warrant for battery with a deadly weapon. The arresting and transporting officers were Officer T.M., P#0000, and Officer D.W., P#0000, both of SWAC. The inmate was arrested without incident according to the arrest report. After booking and processing, the inmate was medically screened and placed in holding cell Z-14 (booking stamp dated December 24, 2003 hours). The inmate had not indicated during screening that he had any medical problems other than stiffness from a minor motorcycle accident a day earlier. He was placed in a holding cell until he could be transported to a permanent housing area of the detention center. At approximately 9:30 P.M., the inmate was transferred to the 2C11 section of the medical facility because he had suffered some type of seizure in the holding cell. Two inmates in the holding cell had reported the seizure by beating on the window and alerting corrections personnel. The inmates advised that the ill inmate had been vomiting into the urinal and drinking large amounts of water. At 11:07 P.M., the inmate was transported by fire department paramedics to the hospital per request of CCDC staff. He arrived at the hospital at 11:25 P.M. and was pronounced dead at 11:35 P.M. Hospital Investigation: Detective A.B.L., in responding to the University Medical Center trauma unit confirmed that the incarcerated inmate, E.J.S., was pronounced dead on arrival at 11:31 P.M. by on-duty medical personnel. The attending physician was Dr. Conti. The deceased was then removed from the emergency room to a secure area to await the arrival of the coroner and investigative personnel.

8798_C010.fm Page 115 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

Investigating In-Custody Deaths

115

To accurately depict the condition of the body, it was photographed at the University Medical Center. All the decedent’s clothing was retained by the coroner. The body was placed in a sterile sheet and inserted into a new body bag. The bag was sealed and transported to the Clark County Medical Examiner for autopsy. [See coroner’s report 0000-95.] Clark County Detention Center Investigation: After briefing as to the circumstances of arrest and events occurring prior to their arrival, investigating officers proceeded to conduct a complete investigation of the inmate’s death. Corrections Officer C., P0000

Officer C. was assigned to the booking area at the time of the incident. He documented the names of all inmates in the holding cell at the time of the incident and secured the inmates in an adjacent holding cell until they could be interviewed by investigators. Copies of the deceased inmate’s medical screening report, inmate observation sheet, and booking card were then released to investigators by Officer C. Corrections Officer W., P0000

Officer W. was assigned to Cell Block 2C (medical ward) and directed to check inmate E.J.S. at 15-minute intervals. Officer W. noted that the inmate was lying on his back and trembling at 9:35 P.M. At 11:00 P.M., Officer W. asked medical staff to examine the inmate because the inmate was in distress. After examination by medical personnel, he was transported by Clark County Fire Department paramedics to the University Medical Center’s trauma unit. The paramedics were dispatched at 11:05 P.M., arrived at the detention center at 11:12 P.M., and left the center at 11:25 P.M. Arrival at the trauma unit was at 11:35 P.M. Officer W. provided investigators with a copy of the inmate watch log. Nurses C. and K., Clark County Detention Center Medical Services

After examining the inmate, the nurses determined that he should be transported immediately to the University Medical Center’s trauma unit for emergency care. He was semiconscious and trembling violently. Nurses C. and K. were instructed to complete their patient notes and forward them to the homicide section.

8798_C010.fm Page 116 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

116

Officer-Involved Shootings

Nurse S., Clark County Detention Center Medical Services

Nurse S. provided a taped statement concerning her medical screening of E.J.S. on his admission to the center. A copy of the screening report was used as a reference during the interview. Nurse S. confirmed that the inmate had made no reference to illness or injury except for complaining of stiffness from a minor motorcycle accident. The inmate appeared rational and coherent. Nurse S. noted no visible problems. The inmate had a slightly elevated heart rate and blood pressure. He signed his medical screening report (see screening report attached). Interviews of Inmates in Holding Cell: Investigators obtained copies of all booking cards of inmates in the holding cell with inmate E.J.S. All of the inmates listed above were interviewed separately, and their taped statements confirmed the following: E.J.S. was not the victim of any type of assault in the holding cell. Other inmates observed that he drank large amounts of water and vomited into the urinal. As the vomiting became more violent and frequent, inmates C.C. and D.B. alerted the corrections personnel at the booking desk by knocking on the window of the holding cell. E.J.S. appeared very ill and was taken from the holding cell (see individual statements of inmates). Follow-Up Investigation: Investigators obtained records of the decedent’s criminal history. They noted that he had an extensive narcotics-related arrest history along with several local felony arrests (as an adult) for property crimes and crimes of violence. Inquiries of all appropriate agencies in the area produced no report of the motorcycle accident mentioned by E.J.S. during his medical screening at the detention center. On March 3, 2001, investigators interviewed C.C., a stepbrother of E.J.S., and his taped statement was obtained at LVMPD’s homicide section. The stepbrother advised that E.J.S. had a drug and alcohol abuse problem and was in the company of a fugitive (D.J.), who provided false information to officers to avoid arrest. D.J. subsequently absconded with E.J.S.’s truck. C.C. described the fugitive and filed a theft report for the truck. C.C. also demanded the $88 and miscellaneous property of E.J.S. then in county custody. C.C. was not concerned about his

8798_C010.fm Page 117 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

Investigating In-Custody Deaths

117

stepbrother’s death, and only wanted the truck and property immediately released to him. C.C. was referred to the coroner’s office to discuss the property issue. An ATL was broadcast concerning recovery of the missing vehicle (see theft report, same case number). C.C. knew of E.J.S.’s minor motorcycle accident, but was not aware of any injury sustained by E.J.S. A copy of the declaration of arrest for E.J.S. was obtained and reviewed. The arresting and transporting officers were interviewed in the presence of Sergeant C.J., their immediate supervisor, and they advised the following: They were aware of the issue of a felony warrant for the arrest of E.J.S. The officers were assigned to locate and arrest him as part of their assigned duties with the Community Policing Unit at Southwest Area Command. The subject was observed in his pickup truck in the area of U.S. 93 and Flamingo Road. He was accompanied by a second individual unknown to arresting officers. A felony stop was effected and the suspect was taken into custody. A records check of his companion was made and yielded negative results. At the request of E.J.S., the vehicle was released to his companion. E.J.S. was taken into custody without incident and transported to CCDC where he was booked per the felony warrant [see the arrest report]. Autopsy: On March 1, 2001, an autopsy was conducted by the Clark County Medical Examiner on a deceased white male adult identified as E.J.S., who had died while in police custody. [See list of persons attending autopsy presented earlier in this report.] Photographs, fingerprints, nail scrapings, and hair samples were obtained prior to autopsy. All clothing and personal effects of the deceased were impounded. Description of Deceased: The deceased was a white male adult 24 years of age; height: 6 feet, weight: 200 pounds. The deceased has brown eyes and long curly brown hair. He has no identifiable scars or tattoos. An external examination, including close examination of the scalp by the medical examiner and investigators, revealed no visible signs of trauma. A complete autopsy revealed no internal injuries or obvious cause of death. Blood and urine samples were obtained for forensic analysis and toxicological examinations.

8798_C010.fm Page 118 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

118

Officer-Involved Shootings

Cause and Manner of Death: On March 1, 2001, results of a toxicological examination of the deceased’s blood revealed that his system contained methamphetamine in an amount sufficient to cause death. Summary: It is the concurred opinion of the investigators named above that E.J.S., an incarcerated inmate, died as the result of ingesting a quantity of methamphetamine prior to his arrest in an attempt to conceal the controlled substance from arresting officers. The bag of methamphetamine may have burst in his stomach. The deceased was observed drinking large amounts of water, possibly trying to dilute the methamphetamine and purge it from his system by vomiting repeatedly before the substance would exert its effects. The deceased made no effort to alert medical staff or corrections personnel that he was in danger. Case Status: Closed. E.J.S. died of an accidental overdose of methamphetamine.

INCIDENT FILE An in-custody death investigation report represents only one part of a complete file on the event that includes the coroner’s report, evidence impound reports, corrections center logs, booking statements, medical records, photographs, diagrams, audiotapes, videotapes, toxicology reports, and pathology reports. All files, including original tapes, should be retained for 3 years.

DEATHS OCCURRING DURING ARREST OR TRANSPORT Deaths of suspects or inmates that occur outside correctional facilities (e.g., while individuals are taken into custody or during transport) are of particular concern even though they may not involve the use of deadly force. The most common causes of these types of deaths are suffocation as a result of neck restraint while struggling or fighting with arresting officers, and cocaine- or methamphetamine-agitated

8798_C010.fm Page 119 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

Investigating In-Custody Deaths

119

sudden death. The same investigative principles used to examine other types of in-custody deaths are applied and the same types of reports are required.

8798_C010.fm Page 120 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

8798_C011.fm Page 121 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

11

The Myth of Positional Asphyxia INTRODUCTION

For over a decade, the law enforcement community has labored under the burden of the flawed medical opinion of a pathologist named Dr. Donald Reay, the medical examiner of King County in Washington State. Dr. Reay was of the opinion that the hog-tying of combative suspects could result in death from a condition that he designated positional asphyxia. Hog-tying prisoners was alleged to interfere with their breathing, thus causing death. Dr. Reay’s theory was that oxygen levels in the blood drop after exertion (struggling or fighting with arresting officers), then the restraints prevent the levels of oxygen to return to normal and death follows. Dr. Reay testified repeatedly as an expert witness about this alleged cause of death. Through the efforts of the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office and the University of California’s San Diego Medical Center, research that focused on positional asphyxia revealed the inaccuracy of Dr. Reay. His opinion about positional asphyxia as a cause of death did not withstand clinical research. Research conducted by the medical school showed that hog-tying did not cause death. The primary causes of death in hog-tying situations usually relate to lifestyle rather than restraints applied by police. For example, a suspect with a history of alcohol or drug abuse is far more susceptible to sudden death during restraint than an obese individual. The cause of death in cases of cocaine- or methamphetamine-induced sudden death is terminal arrhythmia. This cause of death was documented as early as 1980 in the American Journal of Forensic Medicine.

121

8798_C011.fm Page 122 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

122

Officer-Involved Shootings

In 1998, a federal opinion issued by the Southern District of California effectively dismissed positional asphyxia as a basis for wrongful death lawsuits in the United States. Under cross-examination, Dr. Reay retracted his opinion about the condition and conceded that the University of California’s research was superior to his opinion. (See Price v. County of San Diego, 990 F. Supp. 1230 [S.D. Cal. 1998].) District Judge John Rhodes rejected the arguments of Daniel Price’s family members that Price’s death 2 days after struggling with sheriff’s deputies was the result of positional asphyxia. Judge Rhodes found that Price’s death resulted from methamphetamine-induced toxic delirium and cardiac arrest. The deputies were found to have reasonably used the restraint of hog-tying. The judge also found that hog-tying restraint is not an excessive use of force. Deputy District Attorney Ricky Sanches cited, in his arguments to the court, a study proving that hog-tying does not induce death. The study was published in the September 1997 issue of Annals of Emergency Medicine. Positional asphyxia does not occur as the result of hog-tying. It can occur if officers pile on top of a combative suspect or inmate in an effort to subdue him or her. The officers’ collective body weight on top of a suspect or inmate may be sufficient to produce suffocation. Asphyxiation can occur from manual strangulation if a chokehold, such as the lateral vascular neck restraint, is applied during a struggle. To apply the restraint, an officer places his or her arm around the neck of a combative suspect or inmate to control his or her actions. The maneuver is extremely dangerous and its use borders on application of deadly force.

EXCITED DELIRIUM ACUTE EXCITED STATES

AND

SUDDEN DEATH

No matter what title we use, these types of deaths impact individual officers and law enforcement agencies greatly and are occurring on a regular basis internationally. Law enforcement, in general, has suffered under the yoke of defending themselves from erroneous allegations of misconduct and unreasonable force when a sudden death occurs. Wrongful death lawsuits routinely follow this type of incident. Public interest and media coverage are intense; therefore,

8798_C011.fm Page 123 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

The Myth of Positional Asphyxia

123

we must address these high-profile incidents in a thorough and public manner to protect law enforcement agencies and the public’s trust.

AGITATED SUDDEN DEATHS In this chapter, I would like to address the most common sudden death scenarios and assist officers in recognizing the warning signs of excited delirium/agitated sudden deaths. Sudden deaths are not new, but research into the “Custody Death Syndrome” is fairly recent. Our least favorite calls are unknown trouble calls involving someone acting in a bizarre manner. Reports of someone creating a disturbance and acting in a manner that would suggest he/she could be high on coke or meth (methamphetamine) heighten police response. Responding police and emergency medical personnel often find the suspect stripped nude, incoherent, sweating profusely, and acting very bizarre. When emergency responders attempt to intervene, the panicked suspects react violently. The suspects often have superhuman strength and react with such violence as to cause them to be OC (oleoresin capsicum) pepper sprayed, Tasered®, struck with an impact tool (PR-24 or baton), physically subdued, shackled, or taped to a gurney where they can suddenly stop breathing and die. In some instances, they collapse days later and die. Autopsies can be of little help. We tend to think that an autopsy can answer all questions, but, in some cases, some people just die with no physical markers, no anatomical change, and no damage, such as a ruptured heart and/or aneurysm; they “just die.” In the past, we erroneously called these deaths “positional asphyxia,” when, in fact, it is a combination of causes, such as druginduced agitated death or acute excited sudden death. Cardiac arrhythmia is the most common cause of death. The deceased’s lifestyle is the culprit in his/her death, not police abuse. Obesity, alcohol abuse, controlled substance abuse, prescription drug abuse, and psychological problems can all be contributors.

RECOGNIZING

THE

SYMPTOMS

Depending on the research an agency chooses to cite as their source of information in adopting a policy in responding to an excited delirium event, it appears that cocaine abuse accounts for over 40% of all incidents. Chronic psychological histories account for another

8798_C011.fm Page 124 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

124

Officer-Involved Shootings

40%, including schizophrenia, manic depression, and other psychotic behaviors. Medication abuse or failure to take medication as prescribed may contribute also. The remaining 20% can be a combination of drugs, alcoholism, alcohol abuse, and obesity. Cocaine, methamphetamine, phencyclidine, and LSD-induced psychotic states increase heart rate and cause violent reactions, hallucinations, and delusional behavior that produce the excited delirium that precipitates these confrontations with emergency responders.

WARNING SIGNS 1. Shouting 2. Destroying property 3. Irrational speech: All three of the above are examples of excited delirium — a state wherein the subject exhibits irrational, violent, and aggressive behavior. 4. Disrobing: This behavior is caused by the subjects feeling of increased body temperature, making them remove clothing to cool off. The clothing causes them discomfort. 5. Profuse sweating (hyperthermia): Elevation in body temperature leads subjects to take off their clothes even in colder temperatures, causing them to sweat profusely and making it harder to hold on to them when they struggle. 6. Self-destructive behavior (self-mutilation): Self-inflicted wounds and any attempts to harm themselves. 7. Increased strength: Whether drug-induced or psychotic, the suspects can become far stronger than their size and physical condition would normally allow. Note: As soon as possible after the suspect has been restrained, check vital signs for body temperature, heart rate, and respiration. This excited state can cause high temperature to shut down the brain and bodily functions. An increased heart rate can cause an erratic heart rate, resulting in cardiac arrhythmia and death. Confirming vital signs can assist the medical examiner in determining cause of death. Suspects react violently when intervention is attempted. When police officers are called to the scene of a naked man who is cutting

8798_C011.fm Page 125 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

The Myth of Positional Asphyxia

125

himself with a knife and threatening to kill himself and others, there’s a good chance he has crossed the threshold of excited delirium and is on an irreversible course that could end in his death. Police officers like to think they are in charge, but it is the suspect that determines how most of these events end. Officers must be trained to recognize the symptoms and act accordingly. A violent, out-of-control suspect exhibiting the above warning signs/symptoms should be examined by medical personnel as soon as practical. Police are in the life-saving business and shouldn’t leave themselves open to lawsuits for wrongful death or reckless indifference. Reckless indifference occurs when police show a callous disregard for the suspect’s well-being by ignoring these warning signs and not providing the proper medical care needed in a timely manner.

LESS LETHAL WEAPONS Use of deadly force is and should be the final option in these incidents. Our profession is constantly looking for less than lethal alternatives to the last resort of deadly force. OC (pepper spray) and Tasertype devises are being adopted by agencies to deal with these incidents. Shotguns with beanbags, PR-24®, and telescoping batons are impact tools and rarely work in excited delirium incidents. Beating the suspect into submission is not practical. Hands-on physically subduing can be dangerous for the officer and the combatant suspect. According to the National Center for Health Statistics, 11,766 deaths occur each year as a direct result of drug overdoses. If 20% of these individuals exhibit excited delirium symptoms prior to these deaths (per Taser International, April 5, 2004), then we can understand the effect these incidents have on law enforcement as a whole. The superhuman strength and violence exhibited result in injuries for all parties involved. Taser-type devices can and do reduce the incidences of injury and death and do not appear at this time to precipitate or accelerate death of these combative suspects; there is no medical research to date indicating the electric current will affect or accelerate the biochemical reactions that lead to death. OC sprays can be a problem for individuals with breathing difficulties, such as asthma and severe allergies. The psychotic state of

8798_C011.fm Page 126 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

126

Officer-Involved Shootings

an excited delirium suspect seems to diminish the potency of these sprays. All force is potentially lethal. Our alternatives are limited but any less lethal device is preferable to deadly force. O.C. spray and Tasers remain the best alternatives. Caution: Drive stun mode on electrical devices is a pain compliance technique, and an agency should research its use to avoid allegations of excessive force/torture.

CONCLUSION Most police officers have responded to an excited delirium incident and witnessed the tragic results or have read about these sudden deaths. Only through training can the police force protect themselves and the public from these inevitable incidents. Only through proper investigation and documentation of these deaths and making them medical emergencies instead of crimes can lives and careers be saved. First, get the suspect medical care and then charge him/her with any crimes he/she committed. If death is inevitable, then let it happen in a medical facility, not in custody.

SUMMARY In-custody/sudden custody deaths are always controversial. Investigations of custody deaths require the same diligence, skill, and lack of bias required in investigating a murder case. Thorough documentation of every aspect of the investigation is required. The potential civil liability that may arise in such cases must also be considered. The sample reports included in this chapter are intended to serve as general guides. Keep in mind that photographs, diagrams, and other attachments included in the investigative report should be fully described.

CASE STUDIES In 2004 and 2005, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department responded on a total of seven fatal excited delirium incidents. LVMPD is the 10th largest police department in the nation and serves over 2 million residents and several thousand tourists daily. This

8798_C011.fm Page 127 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

The Myth of Positional Asphyxia

127

sheriff/ police combined agency has a jurisdiction of nearly 8000 square miles. The two cases reviewed were presented to the Clark County Coroner Office for Coroner Jury review and are a matter of public record. Two were ruled justified and one ruled excusable. CASE HISTORY NO. 1 In December 2004, officers responded to a residential neighborhood after receiving a call from a female who advised that her male roommate was acting erratic and threatening to shoot her. The female left the home, and responding officers set up a perimeter, declaring this a “barricaded suspect” situation. The suspect was incoherent and threatening to shoot unknown persons with a 10-gauge shotgun. No weapon was seen, but he was observed armed with a sword. The suspect could be observed wandering around the residence in a very agitated condition. An interior and exterior arrest team was deployed. A crisis intervention officer attempted to negotiate with the irrational suspect without results. The suspect was ultimately Tasered by officers through an open window. The suspect immediately fell to the floor, and the interior arrest team entered the bedroom to take him into custody. The suspect ripped the probes from his body, stood up, and was brandishing a very large knife in his left hand. The arrest team was charged by the suspect, who was wielding a knife, thus causing the officers to Taser the suspect again; however, one probe missed, rendering the Taser ineffective. The nearest officer to the armed suspect then fired three rounds from his .45-caliber handgun, striking the suspect. The suspect died en route to a trauma center. The officers’ best efforts to take the suspect into custody using less lethal force failed and the suspect’s actions precipitated his death. This incident illustrates that an individual in an excited delirium state has superhuman strength and even the power of a Taser to incapacitate sometimes cannot be enough. Medical Examiner’s Ruled Cause of Death

The suspect died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. He had a combination of cocaine and prescription drugs in his system.

8798_C011.fm Page 128 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

128

Officer-Involved Shootings

CASE HISTORY NO. 2 In August 2004, police officers were dispatched to a residential neighborhood at the request of a resident advising that his roommate was in the bathroom using narcotics and was pounding on the walls screaming and “trashing” the residence. Responding officers discovered the suspect in the bedroom. The rooms were in a state of disarray and the suspect was screaming, “Tony is coming to get me.” The suspect was on his bed thrashing about and, as the officers approached him, he suddenly lunged at one officer, kicking him in the side repeatedly. A violent struggle ensued, during which one officer attempted to Taser the suspect. The Taser malfunctioned (officer error). The officer then used “drive stun” to attempt to control the suspect, without apparent results. The suspect was struck across the shoulders and on the abdomen with a PR-24, also without any visible effect. The officer using drive stun mode on the Taser ultimately did subdue the suspect. While immobilized, the suspect stopped breathing. Officers provided CPR and requested medical assistance. The suspect was pronounced dead at a trauma center. In October 2004, at a public hearing, the Coroner Inquest ruled the officer’s actions excusable. (A homicide is ruled excusable when it is committed by a person doing a lawful act, who doesn’t have any intention of killing anyone.) Medical Examiner’s Cause of Death

The medical examiner (ME) determined the cause of death to be “cardiac arrest during restraint procedures.” He said cocaine and other drugs contributed to this suspect’s death, and the use of a Taser and baton were contributing factors. The ME could not advise which and what percent of these factors had the most effect. The mere presence of officers on the scene can be a contributing factor because their actions are interfering with the suspect’s psychotic event.

COMMENTS As usual, this death and a similar one a few months prior generated a great amount of publicity, causing a complete review of all LVMPD use-of-force policies.

8798_C011.fm Page 129 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

The Myth of Positional Asphyxia

129

The media repeatedly cite incidents in several other jurisdictions; however, they never attempted to research how many lives are saved yearly with less lethal alternatives and how lethal confrontations in most jurisdictions have dropped dramatically. Prior to OC sprays, baton rounds, paintball guns, and Tasers, a knife-wielding suspect would have been shot. Denver, Phoenix, and the Los Angeles Police Departments have all published research on this subject. I am not a spokesperson for Taser International or any other organization and have never dealt with them in any manner. I recognize the fact that, until something better comes along, we must use what works most of the time. The above two case histories illustrate how violent and dangerous these events are for everyone. “As long as people continue to take illegal, dangerous drugs in toxic doses, people will continue to die in police custody regardless of how police subdue them,” commented Rick Smith, CEO of Taser Int’l., Inc. As a result of these highly publicized events, it became apparent that agencies must have workable excited delirium and electromuscular disruption weapon (Taser) policies.

MODEL POLICY

ON

EXCITED DELIRIUM

In 2004, a committee consisting of personnel from the Training Bureau, the Professional Standards Bureau, and the Homicide Section reviewed police response to these incidents and, in February 2005, the following was approved and became official policy. (As with all model policies in this book, CALEA Accreditation Standards apply.) The policy states: Identify a subject displaying symptoms of excited delirium (ED) and de-escalate the situation with care, consistent with provided training, ensuring that the person receives a response that is appropriate to his/her needs and protects the safety of all concerned. Persons in excited delirium states are considered to be in medical crisis. They typically have an elevated body temperature, increased heart rate, and may be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, which can lead to sudden death.

8798_C011.fm Page 130 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

130

Officer-Involved Shootings

DEFINITION Excited delirium (aka agitated delirium) is a state of extreme excitation, usually associated with illicit drug use and manifested by behavioral and physical changes that may result in sudden and unexplained death. Signs of this condition typically include some or all of the following: Excessive body temperature Profuse sweating Dilated pupils Uncontrollable shaking Talking incoherently Screaming Yelling Paranoia Extreme aggression toward objects Violent resistance/struggling Inappropriate shedding of clothing Self-inflicted injuries

PROCEDURE Communications/Dispatch 1. Receives a call for service involving a person who may be exhibiting the signs of excited delirium as described above. Ensures possible ED is noted in comments of the event. 2. Dispatches officers, as appropriate, and notifies their respective supervisor to respond on calls where the call-taker has defined the situation as a possible ED. Broadcasts the call details, noting the ED signs, to responding officers. 3. Requests medical personnel when the original nature of the call dictates or when advised by arriving officers on the scene. 4. Dispatches the nearest CIT (crisis intervention) trainer officer as well as sufficient back-up units to contain the subject and scene.

8798_C011.fm Page 131 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

The Myth of Positional Asphyxia

131

Responding Patrol Officer 1. Assesses the situation and confers with other onsite responders in an attempt to determine if the person is mentally ill or suffering from ED. 2. If excited delirium is suspected, requests medical personnel, supervisor, and CIT officer to respond immediately. 3. Establishes a containment area. 4. Formulates a custody plan prior to making physical contact with the subject. The object of plan is to de-escalate the situation, calm the individual, and gain control of the person, as practical. This can include verbal communication, request of CIT-trained officers, or other levels of the force continuum as are reasonable. 5. Closely observes the subject prior to the arrival of medical personnel and shares observations with medical upon their arrival. 6. Once sufficient officers are present and if determination has been made that physical force is necessary, the custody plan must be executed quickly to prevent the escalation of the excited physical state of the person and increase in distress. If possible, do not execute the custody plan until medical personnel has arrived. 7. Considers the options available to help reduce the physical and mental distress that the subject is experiencing. Such options include, but are not limited to: (a) Using two sets of handcuffs to avoid further discomfort, (b) assisting the subject in sitting upright or on his/her side in a comfortable position that facilitates relaxed breathing, (c) talking to the subject in a calming manner, telling the subject that medical personnel are en route and everything will be alright. 8. A subject who suddenly becomes quiet or no longer offers resistance should be immediately assessed to ensure adequate breathing and the presence of a pulse. 9. Coordinates the transfer of custody to medical personnel and assists them in any way possible to facilitate transport to a medical facility.

8798_C011.fm Page 132 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

132

Officer-Involved Shootings

10. Responds to the medical facility to complete paperwork, including request for psychiatric evaluation. If crimes are committed, then a hold for the agency should be placed on the subject or necessary paperwork for warrant or summons should be completed. Absentia booking or citation should be completed as required. 11. If physical force was used, completes a report as to circumstances of the incident, ED symptoms observed, and force used (Taser, impact tool, pepper spray, etc.). Supervisor 1. Responds to the scene to supervise/advise, ensures sufficient back-up is available and appropriate decisions are made as to the custody plan. 2. Ensures reports are completed as required.

EXCITED DELIRIUM SITUATIONS

IN

CORRECTION CENTER

Corrections Officer 1. Assesses situation and determines if ED is suspected. 2. Ensures containment of area and relocates uninvolved inmates. 3. Summons and confirms that supervisors, backups, and medical and psychological staff are en route. 4. Formulates a plan to de-escalate the situation, calm the individual, and maintain control of the area, as practicable. Initiates verbal communication and CIT response. Determines if use of force is required and what force level to be used. 5. Avoids unnecessary physical contact. Does not struggle with the inmate. 6. Coordinates with on-scene medical personnel to arrange the transfer to a medical facility when custody plan is implemented. 7. Documents physical force used and confirms that surveillance videos are secured.

8798_C011.fm Page 133 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

The Myth of Positional Asphyxia

133

Note: Approach these incidents as medical emergencies and ensure that the subject receives medical care after custody. Death can result in spite of the police officers’ best efforts. Medical personnel and communications personnel must receive the same training as the officers, and everyone must work as a team.

8798_C011.fm Page 134 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:26 AM

8798_C012.fm Page 135 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

12

Working with Incident Review Boards INTRODUCTION

As stated in previous chapters, nothing engenders more controversy in the law enforcement field than a death or serious injury arising from use of force by a police officer or a death that occurs while a suspect or inmate is in custody. Unless police agencies conduct thorough and objective investigations and communicate their findings openly to the media and the community, the controversy and criticism surrounding such cases will continue. As professionals in public service agencies, police officers, whether administrative or field staff, must make every effort to assure the general public that we are not above the laws that we enforce, that we do not deserve special treatment in highly sensitive cases, and that we have every intention of fulfilling our responsibilities of protecting the public. Some type of citizen review board has been a component of government for hundreds of years. Coroners’ inquests that were intended to determine manners, means, and causes of deaths existed under early common law and were convened long before the United States had a bill of rights or constitution. For centuries, grand juries granted citizens the power to review evidence and exonerate or indict persons accused of criminal offenses. Coroners’ inquests and grand juries are only specialized types of citizen reviews. Police agencies have utilized both forums when reviewing officerinvolved shootings and use-of-deadly-force incidents. Such incidents are also subject to review by prosecutors who determine whether incidents are lawful and justified or constitute criminal acts.

135

8798_C012.fm Page 136 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

136

Officer-Involved Shootings

INCIDENT REVIEW BOARDS Whether called incident review boards, citizen review boards, useof-force boards, or other designations, panels consisting of agency members and nonpolice members are now fairly common. Police agencies are accountable for their actions, and that accountability is called into question every time a high-profile case involving a suspect or inmate occurs. It is only a matter of time before legislators mandate the use of such boards, and agencies would be wise to establish such boards and train their staffs in the workings of such boards before they are forced to do so in the glare of a cause célèbre.

MODEL OF REVIEW BOARD A review board should be established to provide the community and police administration with an advisory panel to assist the community and the agency in reviewing use-of-force incidents involving department members. The review by both citizens and employees is intended to foster stability, consistency, fairness, and the release of timely information about the use-of-force concerns of the community and the department. The community has a right to know about incidents involving confrontations of police and suspects or inmates. The agency has an obligation to present the facts of these high-profile incidents in a uniform and unbiased manner. A review board should be a nonadversarial administrative body. Its meetings should be closed to the public and the media. A board is authorized to review all department records, evidence, and other items pertaining to the incident to aid in disposition of the case. After reading reports, hearing testimony, and reviewing evidence concerning the case under review, the board will render a decision as to the employee’s compliance or noncompliance with department policies and procedures. If the board finds a violation, it will recommend to police administration the type and extent of corrective action to be administered to the employee. The following list represents suggestions for members of a review board. One absolutely vital component is ample representation of the community on the board. The suggested membership includes:

8798_C012.fm Page 137 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Working with Incident Review Boards

137

1. Police chief or the chief’s administrative designee who will serve as chairman (an alternate chairman will be designated) 2. Three citizens from the department’s service population 3. Two department members (captain rank or equivalent) 4. Internal affairs bureau commander or training bureau commander 5. One peer member from the ranks of the member involved in the incident 6. Union representative (optional) 7. Legal counsel (optional) 8. Employee’s bureau commander (a nonvoting member who monitors the proceedings and advises the hearing board when the review board finds a violation; does not examine witnesses) 9. Secretary to take attendance and record meeting minutes Some agencies prefer to document hearings by videotape or audio recording. However, most agencies prefer simply to document the reviews and dispositions of matters. It is certainly advisable to have an agency’s legal counsel review any reports generated by the board and provide guidance to board members if necessary. The board should review only cases that lead to sustained complaints. The board should have access to all departmental disciplinary action reports and testimony concerning the past conduct of the employee involved in the incident at issue in accordance with department policy. The employee whose actions are the topic of the board review must have the right to be present at all hearings so that he or she may have the opportunity to hear the testimony of witnesses, view the evidence, and present his or her own testimony. The employee may have legal counsel or a union or police association representative attend hearings. However, adversarial challenges of testimony or evidence are not permitted. The employee may, at the direction of the board, be directed to testify and provide evidence at the conclusion of the body of the hearing, before the board deliberates.

8798_C012.fm Page 138 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

138

Officer-Involved Shootings

The employee should be admonished of his right to decline testimony or receive a Garrity warning compelling him or her to answer questions (see section on Garrity later in this section). The department must give the employee at least 10 working days’ notice of the hearing. The notice must specify the time, date, and location of hearing; the specific incidents or actions to be reviewed; the names of potential members of the board of review; a list of witnesses who will testify; and a copy of the review board’s guidelines. Whether an agency requires or allows testimony of nonpolice witnesses or whether an investigator will present evidence and statements by nonpolice witnesses is a matter to be considered by an agency developing a board of review policy. Most agencies require investigators to present evidence and provide documentation of statements made by witnesses without hearing witness testimony. After reviewing testimony and evidence, the chairman will have the hearing room vacated of all nonvoting board members. The board will then deliberate and a vote will be taken to determine whether the employee violated department policies or procedures. Board members should be well versed in department policies and procedures, including training policies. Any questions concerning policies or procedures should be addressed during deliberations. Questions about the legality of an employee’s actions should be answered before any voting on the matter before the board. If the majority of the board votes to sustain a violation of policies or procedures, the board will reconvene and hear testimony to assist members to determine the appropriate corrective action. Training bureau staff can testify about training policies. The bureau commander, for example, may testify about department policies and procedures. Other personnel may testify about other areas about which the board is concerned. Upon approval by the chief of police or sheriff of the recommended corrective action, the employee’s division chief will receive the original adjudication of the complaint and ensure that the corrective action mandated by the review board is implemented. An employee must file an appeal for binding arbitration or other action through established department process; for example, a civil service board, not through the board of review. Negative disposition

8798_C012.fm Page 139 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Working with Incident Review Boards

139

(sustained violations, negative sanctions) will be recorded in the employee’s personnel file. Failure to sustain the violation, exoneration, or other disposition need not be entered in the employee’s file. If board review determines that an incident may have occurred as the result of lack of training or training policy, the division chief or training bureau will be responsible for correcting the noted deficiencies.

GARRITY V. NEW JERSEY, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) The Garrity decision profoundly affected investigation of police agency employees’ use of deadly force. Garrity addressed whether an officer or employee can or cannot be compelled to make a statement against his or her own interest and whether threat of termination can cause transactional immunity questions to arise as a result of coerced testimony. A certain coercive atmosphere exists during all interviews of employees involved in incidents of violence because they feel duty-bound to explain their actions. However, it should be obvious to prosecutors and police that investigators should not utilize the Garrity warnings during the investigative stages following an incident. Use of Garrity warnings is appropriate only during a use-offorce board review at which the employee is required to be present and may have to answer questions. The Garrity suit had its inception in a corruption-related investigation conducted when New Jersey police officers were suspected of traffic ticket “fixing” and were required to give statements or forfeit their jobs. The officers made incriminating statements that were subsequently used against them in criminal proceedings. As a result of the pressure on the part of the state that led them to make statements against their own interests and because they were threatened with losing their jobs, the incriminating statements made by the officers were deemed coercive and inadmissible in state criminal proceedings. The following types of warnings were developed as a result of the court’s decision in Garrity. Self-Incrimination — The department is compelling you to answer questions under threat of termination. Your truthful statement or any information or evidence gained through such questioning cannot be used against you in any subsequent criminal proceedings

8798_C012.fm Page 140 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

140

Officer-Involved Shootings

as provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Garrity. This notice is being provided whether or not a criminal issue has been raised as part of the investigation. Truthfulness — As part of an internal investigation, you are required to give a statement and answer questions truthfully. The scope of the questions asked of you will be related to the alleged misconduct being investigated. If you are not truthful in your statements or answers to questions, you will be subject to termination as provided in department policy. Truthfulness statements came about as the result of criminal investigations of police officers. The intent was to ensure that all employees understood that silence about or knowledge of suspected employee criminal activities had to be reported and that the code of silence would not be tolerated. The agency has the responsibility to properly train employees in policy and procedure issues. The employees are responsible for honoring their responsibilities as professionals. It is important to clearly distinguish between criminal activities, for example, ticket fixing, and noncriminal activities that lead to violence. Cases involving the use of deadly force and incustody deaths arise from the actions of employees in performance of their duties — not intentional criminal acts. CASE STUDY In December 1996, two off-duty rookie officers of LVMPD were celebrating an officer’s birthday with several coworkers. After consuming large amounts of alcohol, the two officers decided to leave the party and travel to another bar. En route to the bar, they decided to drive through an area of the city known for its gang and drug activities. The area is in the shadow of the Las Vegas Strip and contains numerous cul-de-sac streets where drug customers were known to park their cars and make their purchases. The dealers would approach the cars to transact business. Police arrests in this area sometimes resembled military operations. The two officers decided to harass the gang members and drug dealers. They pulled into a cul-de-sac, stopped their vehicle, and waited for someone to approach. They then challenged the approaching individuals, screamed obscenities, and threw beer at them. That caused the individuals to charge at the police officers in anger.

8798_C012.fm Page 141 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Working with Incident Review Boards

141

The passenger, Officer M., drew his weapon and fired over the heads of the approaching individuals. The driver, Officer B., then sped away from the scene. The next morning the officers discovered that Officer M. had shot one of the charging individuals in the forehead and killed him instantly. Homicide investigators initially thought the death was gang or narcotics related. After interviewing several witnesses and obtaining descriptions of two males in a four-wheel-drive pickup truck, the investigators questioned the motive and wondered who had in fact committed the murder. Some witnesses were emphatic about their observations and said that the murder suspects looked more like police officers than gang members or narcotics users or dealers. Two days after the murder, Officer B. and his father, also a police officer, contacted investigators, and Officer B. revealed his knowledge of this crime. Officer M. had initially denied all knowledge of the crime at a briefing, and after investigation was arrested for murder. Officer B. was not charged by the county or state for the crime because he did not know that Officer M. was going to commit it. The U.S. attorney was directed to conduct a civil rights investigation of the officers.

During the investigation of the murder, FBI agents discovered a pattern of abuse on the part of the two officers and a pattern of silence on the part of their coworkers. Officer B. pleaded guilty to violating the civil rights of the victim and was sentenced to federal prison. Officer M. was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. During the civil rights investigation, the U.S. attorney discovered that these officers referred to their nocturnal sprees as “marauding.” The crime was not an officer-involved shooting or an officer-involved homicide. It was simply a senseless murder.

EXAMPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE WARNINGS History will show the 1990s as a turbulent and controversial decade for the law enforcement community. A number of high-profile cases reflected badly on police departments, for example, the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles. As a result, police departments and unions

8798_C012.fm Page 142 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

142

Officer-Involved Shootings

developed an “us against them” attitude that was not the answer to the negative perceptions of law enforcement agencies prevalent then. In an effort to prevent violations of the civil rights of suspects, inmates, and officers and restore agency reputations, several police departments, unions, and other organizations developed administrative warnings for use in cases involving violence. Two examples follow.

SUPERVISOR’S WARNING, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT Officer, I am ordering you to give me a public safety statement. Due to the immediate need to take action, you do not have the right to wait for representation before answering these limited questions. 1. In what direction did you fire pistol rounds? 2. If you know of anyone who was injured, what is his or her location? 3. If any suspects are outstanding, what are their descriptions? 4. What was their direction of travel? 5. How long have they been gone? 6. What crimes are they wanted for? 7. What weapons are they armed with? 8. Does any evidence need protection? 9. Where is it located? Officer, in order to prevent the contamination of your statement, I order you not to discuss this incident with anyone, including other supervisors or staff officers, prior to the arrival of the assigned investigators, with the exception of your legal representatives.

STATEMENT OF OFFICER’S RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF POLICE ASSOCIATIONS Part 1, Admonition Shooting investigations should always be viewed as criminal investigations, and the officer involved should speak with only an attorney about the circumstances of the shooting. If a fellow officer is involved in a shooting, you may assist the officer by lending emotional support

8798_C012.fm Page 143 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Working with Incident Review Boards

143

and otherwise attending to personal needs, but do not discuss the incident. No legal privilege will prevent the discoverability of such conversations. However, officers should relate information relating to suspect descriptions, directions of travel, directions of shots, etc., and any other information important to officer and public safety. Obtain legal counsel through the member association. Part 2, Constitutional Protection Statement On [date, time] at [location], I was ordered to submit this report by [name, rank]. I submit it at [his or her] order as a condition of my employment. In view of possible job forfeiture, I have no alternative but to abide by the order. It is my belief and understanding that the department requires this report solely and exclusively for internal purposes and will not release it to any other agency. It is my further belief that this report will not and cannot be used against me in any subsequent proceedings. I authorize release of this report to my attorney or designated union representative. I retain the right to amend or change this report upon reflection and to correct any unintended mistakes without subjecting myself to a charge of untruthfulness. For any and all other purposes, I hereby reserve my constitutional right to remain silent under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and any other rights prescribed by law. Further, I rely specifically upon the protection afforded me under the doctrines set forth in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) and Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), should this report be used for any other purpose of whatsoever kind or description. I have requested legal counsel prior to completing this report but have been refused such counsel by [name, rank].

LVMPD OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM Whether such warnings are necessary or effective will be a matter of opinion and much discussion for many years, but one thing that cannot be challenged is the necessity to train employees in use-offorce policy and investigative procedures. If they clearly understand

8798_C012.fm Page 144 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

144

Officer-Involved Shootings

their rights and what is expected of them as set forth in department policy and existing case law, they will have no doubts about how to protect themselves legally. The need for these types of warnings can be debated; the warnings are easily administered and represent only minor inconveniences to investigators. They provide little protection in certain situations and in no way prevent investigators from completing their assigned tasks. In 1991, LVMPD made arrangements to properly train the entire agency about its new officer warning and protection policy. The first step was publishing an article detailing the policy in the department’s training magazine. Mandatory briefings were conducted at all substations. Every academy class was required to attend a 2-hour presentation, and two training sessions per year were scheduled through the department’s in-service training bureau. LVMPD has grown dramatically and more than doubled its size since 1991. It is now the 12th largest police agency in the nation. Its remarkable growth and innovative spirit led Sergeant Kevin Manning, a homicide supervisor, to prepare and distribute a training video that described in detail the responsibilities of all parties involved in high-profile incidents. The training video was informative and also allowed investigators to gain valuable information from officers interviewed during preparation of the video. Sheriff Jerry Keller introduced the video and explained its purpose. The next part of the film was a shooting scenario. The narrator then explained the mechanics of an investigation and carefully explained that employees would be treated as victims of traumatic events and said that all possible steps would be taken to investigate a shooting incident in a courteous, professional, and objective manner, keeping the rights of the officers in mind. Officers involved in prior shooting incidents were interviewed, and they shared their fears and feelings about having to use deadly force and how they felt about being investigated. The video has proved to be an effective training aid. The officers involved in shooting incidents were visibly moved as they described their experiences. The investigators discovered that the officers wanted to tell everyone what had happened. They were initially uncomfortable about appearing in the film and were reassured that

8798_C012.fm Page 145 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Working with Incident Review Boards

145

their actions were correct. They were not deprived of their weapons. Their needs and concerns were addressed by counselors, union representatives, and supervisors. They understood that they were in fact victims rather than suspects and that the department’s support network was available to them 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. A viewing of the training video, a use-of-force test, firearms training system (FATS) training, a truthfulness statement, and policy review for every weapons-carrying employee of the department are required annually and documented in employee files.

BOARD PRESENTATION FOR USE-OF-FORCE INCIDENTS Some type of structured format must be adopted by an agency to ensure consistency in use-of-force board presentations. Visual aids (slides and materials prepared with the use of PowerPointTM software) are valuable additions to presentations because they allow presenters to clearly illustrate important points (see Figure 12.1). The following material can serve as a guide for developing and making a presentation. Brackets are used to indicate the type of information to be listed. Where an explanation is required, full text is included. Names have been altered to protect privacy.

INTRODUCTION

OF

PRESENTERS

The chairman of the review board should introduce the presenters (name, rank, years of service, years of investigative experience, and years in present assignment). Alternatively, the presenters can discuss their own backgrounds: My name is D.H. I have been a police officer for 27 years. I was assigned to the detective bureau in 1972 and have 23 years’ investigative experience. I am presently assigned to homicide section and have 17 years’ experience in this assignment. I have investigated over 400 murders and 93 officer-involved shootings. I will be presenting the use-of-force investigation summary this evening.

8798_C012.fm Page 146 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

146

Officer-Involved Shootings

FIGURE 12.1 PowerPointTM presentations incorporating diagrams and animation can make a complicated scene simple to describe.

SYNOPSIS

OF

EVENT

This part of the presentation should be a brief summary of the facts of the event. State the date and time of the incident, the division of unit involved, the name, age, race, and sex of the subject, and the location of the incident: On January 1, 2001 at approximately 9:15 P.M., an armed confrontation led to the firing of shots during the apprehension of an armed robbery suspect. A robbery section investigator was involved. The suspect, a 19-year-old white male identified as John Doe, was wounded in the incident. The robbery occurred at the Dunes Hotel at 3300 Las Vegas Boulevard in Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada.

8798_C012.fm Page 147 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Working with Incident Review Boards

147

OFFICERS INVOLVED List the following information for all officers involved in the incident: Names Personnel or badge numbers Duty assignments Hire dates Previous duty assignments Other career information Weapons used (makes, models, calibers, serial numbers, and whether issued or authorized by the department) Ammunition used (brand, caliber, type, and whether issued or authorized by the department) Number of rounds fired during incident; number of rounds remaining Last dates of qualification Marksmanship ratings (expert, sharpshooter, etc.) The officers involved in the incident as participants have been identified as Detectives J.B. and J.D. They are assigned to Investigative Services Division, Crimes Against Persons Bureau, Robbery Section. Detective B. is a 15-year veteran of this agency and has been assigned to Robbery Section for 2 years. Prior to his present duty assignment, he worked at the Vice and Narcotics Bureau for 4 years, worked at the Training Bureau for 3 years, and spent 6 years as a uniformed officer working on various patrol-related assignments. Detective B.’s duty assignment record and training history are attached to this use-of-force investigative summary. Detective B. last qualified as a sharpshooter with his duty and offduty weapons. It has been determined through investigation and forensic ballistic analysis that Detective B. fired five rounds during the incident. Projectiles removed from the deceased suspect have been matched to Detective B.’s weapon, a Glock model 4423 .40 caliber pistol, serial number 0000000000.

8798_C012.fm Page 148 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

148

Officer-Involved Shootings

INFORMATION

ABOUT

SUSPECT

Include available biographical information about the suspect: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Name Sex Race Date of birth Social security number Physical description Residence address Criminal history, including disposition (conviction, dismissal, etc.) Weapons used (makes, models, calibers, serial numbers) Ammunition used (make, caliber, type) Number of rounds fired Vehicle description (year, make, model, vehicle identification number, color)

DETAILS

OF INCIDENT

Details of the incident should be listed chronologically starting with recordings of 911 calls and dispatch tapes. Use videotapes, photographs, and diagrams to describe in detail how the armed confrontation occurred. Include the following information: A description of the actions that led to the use of deadly force A description of the force used A summary of information from witnesses and participants A description of all items of evidence recovered and their locations; describe the results of forensic analysis All information that will assist the board in understanding how the incident occurred and the findings of the follow-up investigation

8798_C012.fm Page 149 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Working with Incident Review Boards

149

CASE STATUS Provide a complete explanation of charges pending against the suspect along with findings of the coroner’s inquest and the results of review by the district attorney’s office.

ALTERNATIVES TO USE OF DEADLY FORCE It is not uncommon for the civilian review boards, the media, and the general public to question the use of deadly force and inquire about the possibility of using less lethal alternatives. Many nonlethal devices have the potential to be lethal, for example, a pencil can be a lethal weapon if used to stab a victim. However, police agencies have alternatives to the deployment of deadly force. Examples are pepper sprays, laser-type devices (stun guns), shotguns equipped with nonlethal rounds, and batons. Departments should consider the possibilities of training and equipping officers with low-lethality weapons in an effort to minimize fatalities in attempts to arrest, transport, and incarcerate suspects. CASE STUDY In the early 1990s, police units responded to several disturbance calls from a low-income housing project. Several callers reported that a male in his forties had brandished a knife and chased residents through the area. The police also received a domestic violence call concerning the same suspect and his erratic behavior. Two marked police units responded to the area. They observed the suspect standing between two buildings and attempted to make contact with him. As two officers exited their vehicle, the suspect immediately charged them and brandished his knife. The officers retreated back into their vehicle. The suspect was then confronted by two other officers, and he retreated against a building. The officers were able to contain him. Additional officers arrived, and the building and a large area around it were cleared.

8798_C012.fm Page 150 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

150

Officer-Involved Shootings

The officers then made repeated efforts to have the suspect lay down his weapon. The man was very agitated. His answer to the officers’ demands to drop the knife was to scream, “Go ahead. Shoot me.” A canine unit arrived while the officers attempted to reason with the suspect. The dog’s barking seemed to aggravate the situation and caused the suspect to become more aggressive and threatening. After a few minutes of repeated threats, the suspect lunged at the officers and caused two officers to fire simultaneously and kill the man instantly.

An investigation revealed that the suspect had been high on drugs for more than 4 days. An autopsy revealed a near-lethal amount of crack cocaine in his system. A coroner’s inquest found that the death was justifiable. However, the family of the deceased filed a wrongful death suit against the officers and the police agency, alleging lack of training, lack of supervision, and use of improper tactics. The civil suit basically alleged that no supervisor had been at the scene to direct the officers, that no officer had received training in hostage negotiations, that the canine unit should not have been deployed because it had a negative effect on the agitated suspect, that the officers had no training in the use of low-lethality weaponry, and that no low-lethality weapons were available to them. After settling the suit, the agency implemented an extensive program to train its employees in the use of low-lethality weapons. They were taught when and under what circumstances to deploy such weapons. All marked police vehicles were equipped with low-lethality weapons such as shotguns equipped with beanbags and large oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray) aerosol devices, and all employees receive specialized training in negotiations with violent individuals.

8798_C013.fm Page 151 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

13

Use of Force by Tactical Units INTRODUCTION

Tactical units dealing in high-risk entries and specialized operations are held to higher standards of liability than nonspecialized uniformed officers. Therefore, officials who supervise tactical units must plan and implement specialized training requirements that will raise skill levels of unit members and aid the municipalities in question to effectively defend all civil suits that arise from the actions of tactical units. Many factors distinguish tactical unit officers from uniformed and nonuniformed officers. One is the high percentage of time spent in specialized training even by very experienced officers. Two others are the requirement for tactical officers to maintain optimum physical condition at all times and their use of sophisticated equipment and weaponry. All these factors contribute directly or indirectly to the greater potential for a fatal incident involving citizens of the community and the higher standards of liability faced by government agencies that employ tactical units.

LIABILITY ISSUES Any agency that has a tactical unit should ensure that its training requirements exceed the minimum standards set by the National Tactical Officers Association. If that is not possible, the agency should disband its unit. The public dangers and liability issues are too great for a department to maintain a half-trained tactical unit. Inadequate training, inadequate supervision, and improper tactics are the most common allegations in civil actions against police agencies in general and against Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) tactical units in

151

8798_C013.fm Page 152 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

152

Officer-Involved Shootings

particular. The unusual and dangerous nature of their duty assignments places tactical unit employees in far greater personal danger and risk of civil lawsuits and administrative actions. Documented specialized training and effective planning are absolute requirements for all tactical operations groups. Tactical unit supervisors should maintain scrupulous records of all training activities and statistics on all aspects of tactical responses, including the results of the operations. In fact, a clear, concise written policy detailing responsibilities and authorities of tactical units should be in place before a department even considers implementing a training program for unit members. Adequate training before an incident involving a death or injury caused by a tactical unit member is the most effective tool for dealing with the investigation that ensues after an incident happens. The mere fact that a tactical unit is requested indicates the existence of a high-risk, high-liability environment. When citizens need help, they call the police. When the police need help, they call a tactical unit.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF TACTICAL UNITS The first SWAT team in the nation was formed by the Los Angeles Police Department in the 1960s. Since then, nearly every local, state, and national law enforcement agency has fielded some type of tactical unit to deal with extremely dangerous and high-profile incidents, including: 1. Hostages and barricaded suspects 2. High-risk search or arrest warrant services 3. High-risk arrests, random acts of violence, snipers, and armed and dangerous suspects 4. Responding to and protecting the community from acts of violence by terrorists 5. Major incidents of civil unrest (riots and violent demonstrations) 6. Officer rescues 7. Dignitary and VIP protection

8798_C013.fm Page 153 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Use of Force by Tactical Units

153

It is the policy of most agencies to maintain dedicated SWAT or tactical teams to support their members and handle certain highly dangerous situations. Members of the tactical team must be highly trained and continue to train throughout their careers. They must have certain specialized skills and maintain them. They must use special equipment and stay abreast of technology. SWAT teams should maintain unit integrity. Requests for assistance should seek the entire team, not individual members. Training and working as a team are crucial elements that ensure a disciplined and coordinated response to a high-risk operation. Any officer who has worked closely and effectively with a partner understands this concept. Once a tactical unit is dispatched, its supervisor assumes total control of the scene upon arrival. Crisis negotiators, perimeter control officers, paramedics, and all other medical and law enforcement professionals at the scene report to the SWAT supervisor. A tactical response is an “all or nothing” situation — the officers must have no question about who is in charge. SWAT teams are dispatched only to high-risk or potentially dangerous situations. That means that the probability of the use of deadly force is far greater than it is on a routine patrol. An agency that includes a SWAT team may have to justify the team’s actions and must certainly minimize its liability. Thorough training will not eliminate lawsuits completely, but it will minimize an agency’s liability.

DOCUMENTATION OF TRAINING AND OPERATIONS A tactical unit should maintain scrupulous training records showing every session of training for every employee. Each employee should maintain his or her own personal training records. Statistics covering all aspects of tactical actions (weapons deployed, response times, etc.) should be maintained and analyzed. Factors such as the nature of calls for assistance (hostage situation, barricaded suspect) and disposition of incidents (number of warrants successfully served, number of arrests without incident or use of force) should be tracked. In addition to allowing the agency to review the effectiveness of its tactical unit, such records can help substantiate requests for funding

8798_C013.fm Page 154 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

154

Officer-Involved Shootings

and aid in defense of civil suits that may result from the activities of the unit. Every department that employs a tactical force should develop and follow a detailed plan of action that includes diagrams, equipment lists, officer assignments, authority for assignment (search or arrest warrant, etc.), provision for briefings, and comprehensive contingency plans that cover situations that go awry. Especially hazardous situations such as crisis entries and dealing with snipers may not allow adherence to the plan of action, but adequate and continual training can ensure that sudden and dangerous assignments like these can be properly handled. A unit’s plan of action should be used as a training tool, and copies should be readily available to all members.

NATIONAL TACTICAL OFFICERS ASSOCIATION (NTOA) NTOA, based in Doylestown, PA, is to SWAT team members what the American Medical Association is to the medical profession. NTOA was established by and for law enforcement professionals involved in handling critical incidents. It sets the standards for tactical units nationwide, provides an information clearinghouse and training in specialized areas like crisis negotiation, publishes a quarterly journal titled The Tactical Edge, and evaluates tactical operations. NTOA standards require a part-time tactical unit to participate in a minimum of 16 hours of training per month. A full-time unit should dedicate 25% of its duty time to training. If an administrator of any police agency is not prepared to dedicate the manpower and money required to train and equip this type of elite police unit properly, the unit should be disbanded.

INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING TACTICAL UNIT OFFICERS Police officers are held to a higher degree of accountability than any other profession because their actions have profound effects on the communities they serve. Elite units like tactical groups face greater potential for involvement in violence with suspects and inadvertent harm to bystanders. As a result, they are held to stricter standards of

8798_C013.fm Page 155 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Use of Force by Tactical Units

155

conduct. The investigation of violent incidents involving tactical officers should be pursued with the same diligence, thoroughness, and objectivity used to examine high-profile incidents arising in the course of routine traffic patrols. The optimum time to deal with such incidents is before they occur — through comprehensive policies covering conduct of operations, detailed records of all activities, and continuous training.

8798_C013.fm Page 156 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

8798_C014.fm Page 157 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

14

Multijurisdictional Investigations INTRODUCTION

Throughout the nation, law enforcement agencies have formed multijurisdictional task forces to combat crime more effectively within their respective jurisdictions. The pooling of resources, availability of federal funding, and ability to operate without jurisdictional boundaries have made these multiagency teams very attractive to administrators, particularly in light of the budget constraints and escalating payroll and equipment costs that each jurisdiction faces individually. Narcotics, fugitive, gang, and organized crime task forces are the most common types, but major crime units specializing in dealing with murders, sexual assaults, armed robberies, and other offenses against persons are gaining popularity as a means of specializing and pooling investigative resources of several agencies within an area. The agencies that form these task forces should have common and specific goals in mind, and they should be careful to structure such units in a manner that ensures bias-free operation and the protection of the interests of all parties. The same care should be taken to establish investigative guidelines and distribution of responsibilities if an officer-involved shooting or use-of-deadly-force event occurs.

IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL TEAM Open and extended discussions of goals and expectations and the assets that each agency is willing to dedicate to a multijurisdictional team should be the first steps. Written contracts among the agencies involved are critical, and negotiations should include legal counsel for every agency and union representatives if appropriate to ensure adequate protection of all parties. Among other issues, such agree157

8798_C014.fm Page 158 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

158

Officer-Involved Shootings

ments should cover responsibilities, contributions of manpower and funds from each agency, equipment sharing, allocation of liability, provisions for conflict resolution, and other vital matters. Thorough discussion and planning and subsequent execution of detailed written agreements will help prevent confusion and conflict that could arise as a result of a use-of-deadly-force incident. The intra-agency bickering and administrative posturing that marked certain high-profile officer-involved incidents in the past must not be tolerated. The best way to prevent that problem is a clear contract that delineates the responsibilities for handling such incidents. A task force composed of federal, state, and local agency personnel, while working an undercover operation, became involved in an armed confrontation with suspects that resulted in a gun battle between the suspects and task force members. Rounds were fired by a local officer and a federal agent. An investigative team from the jurisdiction where the officer-involved shooting occurred responded to the incident and conducted an investigation. The agencies involved immediately began posturing about who would investigate the incident and how the investigation would be conducted. The heads of the agencies involved immediately clashed in a policy dispute. The lack of cooperation among the agencies jeopardized the quality of the investigation and nearly caused the unit to disband. Parallel multijurisdictional investigations with different priorities and investigative protocols can create an air of suspicion and confusion that produces hostile environments within and among the agencies involved in an incident. Infighting among agencies can be a public relations catastrophe, and that type of negative activity has a way of becoming public. A protocol covering an agreed-upon set of priorities will serve to eliminate these problems and allow a single investigative body to focus on an incident.

MODEL POLICY In order to eliminate the confusion and conflicts that can occur among individuals and agencies based upon their different interests, duties, and policies, a written agreement covering the investigation of useof-deadly-force incidents should clearly explain guidelines for the investigative protocol to be instituted in the event of a fatal or nonfatal

8798_C014.fm Page 159 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Multijurisdictional Investigations

159

incident. The protocol will be followed when a use-of-deadly-force incident (as described below) occurs.

DEFINITIONS Use of deadly force — Infliction during a multijurisdictional operation involving members of a fatal or serious bodily injury as a result of: 1. Intentional shooting, including tactical operations involving SWAT teams acting in behalf of the task force 2. Intentional or accidental use of a dangerous or deadly weapon that causes serious injury or death 3. Assaults on employees while engaged in task force operations 4. Activities of team members while effecting arrests or transporting prisoners (in-custody deaths) 5. Vehicular collisions occurring during pursuits, as a result of intentional ramming, or at roadblocks Life-threatening injury — An injury that is likely to lead to death. Serious bodily injury — Bodily injury that, at the time of injury or later, involves substantial risk of death, permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body, fracture, or second- or third-degree burn.

INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSE The criminal investigation of a use-of-deadly-force incident or officer-involved shooting is of utmost priority and will cover the most aspects of an administrative investigation. The incident investigative team will be called out and will assume responsibility for the scene. The team should be representative of the total task force but not include task force members in order to ensure impartiality. Representatives of the agencies involved should be assigned as required in the written agreement among the agencies or other doc-

8798_C014.fm Page 160 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

160

Officer-Involved Shootings

ument detailing the makeup of the investigation team. The investigation should cover all aspects of the incident, including the actions leading to the incident, the events that precipitated the use of force, the incident itself, and all consequences of the incident.

VENUE DETERMINATION

AND

LEGAL REPRESENTATION

The jurisdiction where the incident occurs (also known as venue) shall have primary investigative responsibility. The jurisdiction of the employee or employees involved will have secondary investigative responsibility. Any jurisdiction involved in a violent injury or death has a vested interest in its investigation due to obvious liability and culpability issues and should have its interests represented accordingly.

COMPOSITION

OF

TEAM

A team should consist of at least four investigators: two assigned to the incident scene and two assigned to the follow-up investigation, including contacts with the witnesses and employees involved. A supervisor from the involved task force and a supervisor from the agency of the involved employee should act as liaisons and coordinate the entire investigation. Additional personnel can be called on to assist in the event of multiple scenes and witnesses, requirements for searching suspect ATLs, etc.

SCENE PRESERVATION

AND

EVIDENCE RETENTION

The same precautions should be followed in preserving the scene and preventing contamination as would be observed with any felony investigation. This includes preventing access to anyone not required for the investigation. Any evidence uncovered should be protected, documented, and maintained by the personnel conducting the evidence search regardless of their jurisdiction.

WITNESS INTERVIEWS All witness interviews should be tape-recorded regardless of the policy of recording witness interviews followed by the agency involved in the incident. Additionally, two investigators should be

8798_C014.fm Page 161 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

Multijurisdictional Investigations

161

present during all interviews. See the sections concerning interviewing witnesses and employees for detailed procedural steps.

DOCUMENTATION

OF INCIDENT

A single, all-inclusive investigative report summarizing the entire event (events preceding event, scene investigation, interviews, followup steps, etc.) should be prepared by the investigative team. This report should cover both the criminal and administrative aspects of the investigation.

PRESENTATION

OF

CASE

TO

PROSECUTOR

The entire investigative file, including the report, should be presented to the prosecutor who has jurisdiction for the crimes alleged. Investigators should be prepared at that time to make a thorough presentation (including visual aids if required) to the prosecutor and to the heads of the agencies involved.

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW The presentation of the results of the investigation should be made to the body responsible for the review of such incidents in accordance with the policy of the agency involved (department board of review, civilian review board, administrative review). Whether the incident involved a multiagency task force or was simply a multiple-agency incident occurring outside an agency’s jurisdiction, the protocol cited in this chapter should be considered when investigating the use of deadly force.

SUMMARY A detailed contract among multiple agencies that field a combined task force to fight crime should clearly detail responsibilities for manpower, funding, equipment, procedures, and particularly the handling of investigations required if a dangerous situation leads to injury or death of a suspect, inmate, or bystander. It is no longer acceptable for agencies to disagree about who will or will not be responsible for such investigations. Such bickering can become a public relations

8798_C014.fm Page 162 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:27 AM

162

Officer-Involved Shootings

disaster and negatively impact the morale of agency employees and the overall conduct of an investigation. Only a single, cohesive, and open investigation involving all agencies will avoid public distrust and criticism of police investigations of their own employees. State bar and medical associations investigate and regulate their members, and the law enforcement community must do the same. We must make every effort to assure the public that every investigation will be conducted with complete impartiality and without regard for personalities or perceived loyalties.

8798_C015.fm Page 163 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:28 AM

15

Handling the Media and Politically Charged Situations INTRODUCTION

The news and print media are important aspects of modern society, and we are accustomed to constant communication. The law enforcement community would probably like to totally avoid media coverage of certain high-profile events and politically charged situations because coverage can hamper investigations and bias the public. However, radio and television stations dedicated to news 24 hours a day, the presence of the Internet in huge numbers of American households, and real-time coverage of events as they happen (for example, the Bronco chase involving O.J. Simpson) have created an insatiable need for news — particularly sensational stories involving notable show business and political figures or allegations of police violence. Conversely, media coverage can be a positive force, for example, for seeking witnesses to a crime or missing persons. A premature inaccurate press release can cause public distrust and treat conjecture as fact. Slanted media coverage can erroneously transform a witness into a suspect or a policeman into a killer. For these reasons, every effort must be made to control the flow of information during the investigation of a high-profile incident or one involving officers. The intent is to have one knowledgeable person deal with the media and reveal only confirmed facts as authorized by the head of the agency.

163

8798_C015.fm Page 164 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:28 AM

164

Officer-Involved Shootings

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION Most agencies have offices of public information or staff-level administrators assigned to deal with the media. The employees assigned this task must understand the importance of releasing only information authorized by the chief or other top administrator and the investigators and supervisors charged with investigating and reporting high-profile incidents. Other employees and administrators must understand that they are required to refer calls from the media to the appropriate office or official for handling. A public information officer or staff performs a vital function for a police agency. An effective public information officer will maintain cordial relations with the media but remember that he or she is an employee of the agency when it is necessary to resist the intense media pressures exerted in high profile cases. He or she should be a credible spokesperson for the agency and have the respect of the agency employees and the media. Administrators should seriously consider restricting the preparation and distribution of press releases to command-level personnel only in situations where an agency has no public information department or official. Information should be released only in written form after adequate review by management, and no additional information should be revealed. An oral statement released by a department representative who is under pressure and has no time to consider ramifications can be impossible to retract or correct. A constant flow of information from the investigators to administrators about investigatory activities is desirable. Briefings to the media should be frequent, timely, and to the point. Do not allow discussion to wander into peripheral or irrelevant areas. Every press release should include a request for public assistance in locating witnesses, suspects, and parties with information that might be of assistance.

OFFICE

OF

PUBLIC INFORMATION

The office of public information should report directly to the sheriff, chief of police, or other agency head. The manager or director of the office is responsible for informing the community and news media of events that are handled by or involve the department.

8798_C015.fm Page 165 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:28 AM

Handling the Media and Politically Charged Situations

165

By providing the news media and the community with information on department administration and operations, the department can foster a relationship of mutual trust and cooperation. This office should assist other department personnel with releases of newsworthy information, prepare and distribute press releases, deal effectively with media and community groups even in negative situations, and remain constantly aware of events within and outside the department that can impact the department’s relationships with the community it serves. A competent public information office should: 1. Promote employee programs to stimulate understanding and knowledge of department and civic activities 2. Promote community programs to encourage citizen support and involvement with the department 3. Mesh community needs with the responsibilities, plans, and capabilities of the department to foster community strength and harmony Readers should not infer that a public information office or official should be the sole source of information for media releases. The sheriff or chief of police should establish a policy that specifies who is authorized to handle press releases related to critical or high-profile incidents.

OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS The name of any officer or employee involved in a use-of-deadlyforce incident should be withheld from the public and the press for 48 hours. The delay is intended to prevent undue pressure on the employee, his or her family, and the family of the deceased. All releases of information should be made through the deputy chief of the investigative unit assigned to investigate the incident. Any material released should be free of opinion and bias.

POLITICALLY

AND

PRESS-MOTIVATED INCIDENTS

Those who serve the community by enforcing the law are constantly made aware that they are subject to public and press scrutiny. Early in a police officer’s career, the instructors at the police academy talk

8798_C015.fm Page 166 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:28 AM

166

Officer-Involved Shootings

about that. Actions of police officers are often second-guessed. Despite the nonpolitical nature mandated for law enforcement agencies, politics can exert some influence on department operations. In recent years, the law enforcement community has been criticized by the media, civil rights leaders, and organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union for allegedly racially profiling suspects. Some of this criticism is certainly justified. The Rodney King beating on the West Coast and the Abner Luima beating on the East Coast did little to improve the professional image of the police officer and gave the impression that the use of excessive force by police was the norm rather than the exception. Protest marches, riots, and contempt for police were the by-products of these incidents. Police are and should be held to higher standards, but their rights to fair investigations and their abilities to function should not be compromised by negative publicity. If an officer involved in an incident can be shown to have no criminal intent and if his actions did not disregard the lives and safety of others to the point of constituting criminal negligence, he should not face criminal prosecution. Police can make mistakes, as shown by the case studies described below.

CASE STUDIES The national media criticized two police actions and developed the phrases “racial profiling” and “driving while black.” One incident occurred in New York City in February 1999, and the other occurred in April 1998 on the New Jersey Turnpike. This chapter includes brief summaries of both incidents from an investigative view. AMADOU DIALLO

AND THE

NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT

Amadou Diallo was an immigrant who falsified his Immigration and Naturalization Service application in order to enter the U.S. He died as a result of an attempt by police to stop and question him because he purportedly matched the description of a rape suspect. The officers involved were members of an elite street crime unit that had been criticized by civil rights advocates due to aggressive crime suppression tactics.

8798_C015.fm Page 167 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:28 AM

Handling the Media and Politically Charged Situations

167

Trial testimony revealed that Diallo’s actions appeared very suspicious. This prompted the officers to approach him. He attempted to flee and enter his apartment building. As the officers approached, Diallo reached into his clothing and removed something that one officer thought was a gun. The officer called out “gun” to alert the other officers, then fired his weapon. The other officers also fired. A total of 41 rounds were fired. Nineteen struck and killed Diallo. The number of rounds fired, the reputation of the special crimes unit, and the possibility of racial profiling became social causes. Media personalities, civil rights activists, and political figures demanded prosecution before an investigation could be organized. Dual investigations (criminal and administrative) were mounted. County prosecutors’ press releases indicated that they planned to take the incident to a grand jury. The prosecutors attempted to direct the investigation and the prosecution and ultimately indicted the officers. Because defendants are not permitted to testify before grand juries, the officers had to plead their cases before a trial jury. The trial was held outside the New York metropolitan area. The actions of the officers, their perceptions of Diallo’s actions, and the perceived threat to their lives were made public. The defense was well prepared and effectively presented the officers’ cases. The officers were acquitted, and 24 “not guilty” verdicts were handed down. The prosecution was unable to prove criminal intent. The charges of murder, manslaughter, and reckless endangerment were not proved. The unfortunate fact that the officers made a tragic and irreversible mistake was never truly addressed by the media or otherwise. This case shows clearly that much editorializing may be hidden in what appear to be news articles.

RACIAL PROFILING

AND THE

NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE

In April 1998 two New Jersey state troopers wounded three young men — two blacks and a Hispanic — in a shooting incident that became one of the most publicized use-of-force incidents of the 1990s. Around the same time, a lawsuit filed in Maryland by 11 blacks alleged racial profiling. The American Civil Liberties Union claimed that state troopers who increased efforts to arrest drug couriers along the interstate highways and turnpikes of New Jersey, Maryland, and other states targeted blacks by illegally relying on racial characteristics

8798_C015.fm Page 168 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:28 AM

168

Officer-Involved Shootings

rather than relying on criminal profiling to identify drug and gun smugglers operating along these busy travel corridors. Two troopers operating on the New Jersey Turnpike stopped a van occupied by two blacks and a Hispanic. The van backed up or rolled backward toward the troopers. The troopers fired on the van and wounded the three young men. Two separate investigations and two grand juries were impaneled to review the troopers’ actions. The investigations revealed a possible pattern of racial profiling and questioned the reasonableness of the officers’ use of force. Investigators questioned whether the troopers had overreacted because of the racial considerations. One grand jury prematurely issued an indictment, and the indictment and subsequent media coverage politicized the incident. The state court dismissed the case in a strongly worded opinion. The presiding judge wrote that the prosecution was politically motivated, and the state attorney general was publicly chastised for his involvement. This incident clearly shows why an investigation of officers should be conducted by trained officers who follow the same procedures used when a homicide or other crime of violence is investigated, after which the case is reviewed by prosecutors who will decide whether to file criminal charges. Prosecutors cannot act as legal counsel for a police agency, direct an investigation, force possible defendants to provide information that may be used against them, then prosecute the alleged offenders without conflicts of interest.

STRESS FACTORS No mention was made in the Diallo case, the New Jersey case, or another case in which officers fired in response to the noise made by shattering glass, about the physical and psychological effects of the stress that accompanies armed encounters or the sensory reaction of an officer when he or she reacts to a perceived threat. In the latter case, the officers feared that they were not hitting their target and then continued to fire. Human responses to stress were contributing factors in all three incidents. It is unfortunate that the agencies involved in these incidents failed to educate the public about physical

8798_C015.fm Page 169 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:28 AM

Handling the Media and Politically Charged Situations

169

and mental reactions to extreme stress. In the past, agencies mistakenly distanced themselves when employees were involved in shootings or other violent incidents. An incident that escalates to serious injury or death is one of the most difficult situations that officers will ever have to face. They should be able to rely on their agencies to pursue fair investigations and present all sides of an incident.

SUMMARY A public forum for reviewing such incidents is preferable to a secret grand jury proceeding that fosters suspicion on all sides, particularly on behalf of the media. The use of civilian review boards, including nonpolice members from the community, may be one solution to this difficult problem. Whatever material is disseminated to the media, the process should be timely, orderly, and thorough. Every agency should have a protocol for release of information, whether through a single officer, a public information agency, or otherwise. The important issue is to determine the most effective method and follow it. Information released by an agency should not be tainted by opinion or bias. Every fact released should be verifiable.

8798_C015.fm Page 170 Thursday, April 26, 2007 9:28 AM

8798_C016.fm Page 171 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

16

The Individual Impact of Officer-Involved Shootings Randy Dickson

PERCEPTIONS, REACTIONS, AND REALITY Faulty adj. 1. Containing a fault or faults; defective, blemished, imperfect, or erroneous.

A faulty taillight provided the officer with an opportunity to enforce the state’s vehicle equipment laws and to break the 4 A.M. boredom. Calling in the stop and the license plate, the officer waited for the registration return before activating his lights. The high-end sports car immediately pulled to the right and stopped. As the officer approached the car, the driver opened the door and began to emerge. At this point, the officer’s mind began to race, while time, it seemed, began to move very slowly. These reactions were brought about by the officer’s realization that the soon-to-be-deceased was holding a nickel-plated Colt Python in his right hand. The officer recalls studying the detail of the signature vent rib barrel and mentally noting that the driver not only had good taste in cars, but also in the weapons he carried. By now the officer’s own weapon was in his hand and rising toward his target, although something about his grasp of the gun felt very unfamiliar, almost as though he was wearing heavy gloves. He was screaming, “Drop the gun,” or something, but his own voice seemed all but inaudible. The suspect’s hand and the 171

8798_C016.fm Page 172 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

172

Officer-Involved Shootings

weapon it held were also rising, an act that served to accelerate the speed at which the officer’s mind was now attempting to process this profoundly unbelievable event. Before either weapon was aligned with its respective target, the officer had time to begin moving for cover, to briefly pray and to momentarily feel a sense of concern for his wife and children. The first round fired by the officer caused a distinct pair of concentric, circular ripples in the suspect’s shirt. The suspect fired at precisely the same moment, and the officer vividly recalls seeing the seemingly small muzzle flash, wondering if he’d been hit. He remembers thinking also that the sound of his weapon discharging seemed muffled, and that it must have audibly cancelled out the sound of the suspect’s weapon. The suspect was still poised in a half crouch, holding the weapon in his hand just above waist-high and parallel with the top of the door of the sports car. The officer recalls that the door of the car was open just enough for the suspect to stand between it and the door frame, and that the window was down. The officer was moving as he fired at the suspect a second, third, fourth, and fifth time, but recalls a sensation of “floating” rather than taking steps, getting no feedback from his feet as they impacted the pavement. At some point, the officer’s peripheral vision diminished to the extent that he could see nothing but the suspect lying face down on the pavement, though he has no recollection of the man falling. Standing over the man with his weapon still on target, all sound had disappeared except for the faint voice of someone in the distance saying, “Oh, Jesus … Oh, Jesus.” Gradually, he became aware of someone saying his name, telling him to do something. “Lower you weapon,” he finally understood him to say. He looked toward the voice and visually attached it to his former field-training officer, dispatched to the location as his backup for the traffic stop. Lowering his weapon, he watched as the senior officer handcuffed the suspect, grabbed the mic at his shoulder and began to inform dispatch of the need for EMS, a supervisor, and a shooting team. He recalls that, as the senior officer asked him if he was hurt, he seemed to be scanning his body, looking for any sign of injury. It was then that he wondered if he had been injured, remembering the muzzle flash from the weapon of the now-dead suspect. He was thinking that he needed to be doing something,

8798_C016.fm Page 173 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

The Individual Impact of Officer-Involved Shootings

173

assisting the senior officer in some way; he just couldn’t think of what that might be. The early stages of the investigation pointed to an obviously justifiable shooting. But, a potentially damning fact emerged very quickly when the suspect’s weapon and the officer’s dash cam video told identical stories that contradicted the officer’s statement: The suspect had never fired his weapon. The dash cam recording also informed the officer that it was his own voice saying, “Oh, Jesus,” in the moments after the shooting, and that his “all but inaudible” command to drop the weapon was actually a very loud command to “drop the ground …drop …,” the fractured marriage of the two commands, “drop the gun,” and “get on the ground.” The digital witness also challenged another element of the officer’s account, showing that his first round — the one that had caused the ripples in the suspect’s shirt — actually struck the pavement about 4 feet in front of the suspect. The second, third, fourth, and fifth rounds had found the suspects left thigh, lower abdomen, and chest as well as the left rear quarter panel of the car. The officer insisted that there must be some mistake because he certainly hadn’t imagined the muzzle flash from the suspect’s weapon. He could understand not hearing the blast. After all, he and the suspect had fired at the same instant. But, he adamantly assured investigators that his eyes had not deceived him. Although the actual firing of the suspect’s weapon was an entirely immaterial point in measuring the justification for the shooting, a critical element of the officer’s account of the event had been disproved; a troubling development for the officer, for the investigation, and for the department. Ultimately, a veteran investigator was able to pull together the pieces that would explain the discrepancy. He pursued a notion based on the officer’s account of the two shots — the officer’s and the suspect’s — that were fired simultaneously. Recreating the event, the investigator demonstrated that the “seemingly small” muzzle flash the officer had seen was actually produced by his own weapon reflected in the sideview mirror of the car. The dash cam video depicted that, as the officer fired, the suspect’s hand and forearm were almost perfectly aligned with the officer’s line of sight to the mirror. The officer had actually observed a flash and, because of its proximity and his anticipation of the suspect firing, there could be only one

8798_C016.fm Page 174 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

174

Officer-Involved Shootings

explanation as to its source. His memory of the suspect firing was based on his perception of the event, which was, of course, faulty. Although the event described above is hypothetical, no single aspect of the scenario is fictional. Each element has been drawn either precisely or in concept from the personal accounts of officers who have been involved in shootings, and from the files of their respective investigations. This collection of potential perceptions, responses, and reactions has been packaged in an analogical event in order to examine not only their basis, but their significance to the individual officer and to the investigation.

THE BODY’S RESPONSE As the officer initiated the traffic stop, he was already physically and mentally “gearing up” for the contact. He probably had little insight into the subtle but complex systems that were engaging within his brain and body. Upon initiating the stop, a set of stimuli had been fired from the sensory cortex of his brain, through the thalamus, and into his brain stem, resulting in the officer becoming more attentive to his environment and watchful for any threat that might present itself. In essence, the fight or flight response, also known as the acute stress response, had been called up and “staged,” awaiting further instructions. When the threat (observing the weapon) presented itself, a more intricate series of physiological responses occurred. The fight or flight system was initiated by the sympathetic nervous system, and a cocktail of natural chemicals, such as adrenaline (epinephrine), norepinephrine, dopamine, and cortisol were “dumped” into the officer’s system. Immediately, his heart rate increased, his breathing became rapid and shallow, his liver unloaded additional sugar for energy, and his circulation was altered to accommodate the blood and oxygen needs of the skeletal muscles. The system literally robbed his body of its peripheral circulation in order to accommodate these muscles and, in doing so, made the officer less prone to blood loss if he were wounded. The system then tapped into the circulation intended for the internal organs, again redirecting this blood to the muscles that he would need to either fight or flee. But, with this reallocation of blood and with the release of natural analgesics to help numb the pain associated with any injury the officer might receive, the system

8798_C016.fm Page 175 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

The Individual Impact of Officer-Involved Shootings

175

sacrificed a significant portion of the officer’s fine and complex motor skills. His recall of the weapon feeling “unfamiliar” in his hand, and his description of feeling as though he was wearing heavy gloves may be attributed to this element of the response.

THE MIND’S RESPONSE While these physiological responses were underway, the officer’s cognitive and sensory capacities were being impacted as well. “Altered sensory perception” refers to any number of perceptual distortions occurring during a state of hyperarousal. It includes the perceptions associated with all the senses, and with time, space, and the environment. Often folded into this group of distorted perceptions is the concept of dissociation. Simplified, dissociation refers to the degree to which we emotionally and cognitively “separate” ourselves from the reality of a traumatic event. This psychological response has been sorted by its varying degrees into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary.1 Primary dissociation, on the minimal end of the scale, may involve the failure to integrate various elements of the event into memory. Tertiary dissociation, on the extreme end of the scale, may involve perceptions and recollections that include a sense that the individual was observing the event, often in a dream-like state, as though it were happening to someone else. The following excerpts from the scenario, indicative of the various perceptions and responses experienced by the officer, are followed by a description of the response. The prevalence of these responses and experiences has been studied, and some of these findings will be discussed later in the chapter. It should be noted, however, that these are potential responses, and not every officer will experience each of the elements described. The individual reactions and responses to these incidents are as unique as the incidents themselves. At this point, the officer’s mind began to race, while time, it seemed, began to move very slowly.

Tachypsychia, a Greek term meaning “swift mind,” has been experienced by many officers who have been involved in deadly force confrontations and other traumatic events. The term is often used very generally to describe any mental aspect or perception associated

8798_C016.fm Page 176 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

176

Officer-Involved Shootings

with the acute stress response. It may also be applied specifically to describe distortions of elapsed time. In many situations, the event will be described as though it were happening in slow motion, while others have sensed that time elapsed very quickly and in a blur. Witnesses to traumatic events, crime victims, victims of traffic accidents, and others have described this distorted sense of elapsed time. The officer recalls studying the detail of the signature vent rib barrel …

Experiencing some degree of visual clarity is often reported by officers who have been involved in shootings and other high-intensity events. The darkened areas of a scene may suddenly seem more lighted, distant objects may seem closer and more vivid, and a single element or object within the scene may draw an unusual degree of the officer’s attention or focus, often for what seems to be an inordinate amount of time. One of the physical elements within the acute stress response is the manner in which the eyes react and adapt within a state of arousal. Under normal conditions, the ciliary muscles of the eye are constantly shaping the lens, contracting to make the lens rounder for close vision and relaxing to flatten the lens for distant vision. In a state of arousal, the lens flattens and the pupil dilates, bringing about the increased clarity often described. Sensing that an object has “locked” the officer’s attention may be more perceptual than actual, although the eyes, in fact, may linger on one particular object longer than on another. It is possible that, upon observing a weapon or other threat, the officer may take a longer or second look in order to confirm the visual information. It is not unusual, however, for the object to represent something entirely benign, such as a ring on the suspect’s finger or an otherwise irrelevant item. … his first round — the one that had caused the ripples in the suspect’s shirt — actually struck the pavement about 4 feet in front of the suspect.

The specifics of a traumatic event may not be remembered as a linear, sequential set of components. Instead, the event may be comprised of fragmented concepts, some of which fall into logical order and sequence and others that do not. Generally, memory is divided into three distinct processes: encoding, storage, and retrieval. It is

8798_C016.fm Page 177 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

The Individual Impact of Officer-Involved Shootings

177

widely accepted that, in the midst of a traumatic event, the process by which sensory input (sight, sound, etc.) is encoded and stored may be altered. Therefore, the ability of the individual to later retrieve that information also may be affected. Among psychologists and neuroscientists, there is a lack of consensus as to the exact anatomical, physiological, and cognitive processes involved in the memory of traumatic events. There is consensus, however, that the old analogy of the eyes, ears, and mind working together as a “video recorder” is highly erroneous. In an emotionally charged or high-intensity situation, the movement of the eyes transitions from a smooth, gliding motion to one that is rapid and jerky, continually moving and stopping, gathering raw visual data at each stop. Very little visual data actually may be stored during the movement phase. Unlike the video recorder analogy, this type of saccadic movement provides a set of snapshots at each “stop.” The incoming data are prioritized according to the task at hand and matched against prior learning and understanding. If the data are deemed significant or if matched with prior information, data then may be stored accordingly. If not, the data may not be stored at all. Consider a walk through a large, crowded airport. Traveling from gate B-1 to gate B-43, you could pass by more than 2000 people. But arriving at gate B-43, you would be hard-pressed to recall many specifics or details about the people you passed along the way. Even with the enhanced skills of observation that most officers attain; the rest of the people you passed represent a nondescript mass. One of the reasons for this is that only about 4% of the visual field (that within foveal or focal vision) processes information consciously. The rest of the visual field (the ambient or peripheral vision) is collecting data, cues and clues, and immediately discarding all that is deemed insignificant. Closely related to this is the concept of inattention blindness. First introduced in 1998,2 the term pertains to the exclusion of elements or objects within the visual field due to a narrow focus of attention to a particular task. An individual’s focus may be narrowed to a specific activity, sight, or sound, or even other thoughts. Simply put, the mind is only capable of processing a certain amount of data at any given moment. When a specific activity or input consumes an

8798_C016.fm Page 178 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

178

Officer-Involved Shootings

abundance of that computing space, other incoming information may be discarded. More recently, these experiences have been associated with traffic accidents that occur as drivers are engaged in cell phone conversations, the premise here being that drivers are so focused on the conversation that they don’t “see” objects within the visual field that would have otherwise been obvious.3 Dr. Bill Lewinski, Director of the Force Science Research Center at Minnesota State University/Mankato, has explored this phenomenon and its relevance to officer-involved shootings.4 Lewinski and the study’s co-author note that, in an emotionally charged situation, the “window of attention” is significantly reduced, potentially excluding other environmental information. With this in mind, consider again the airport scenario and assume that you are there looking for a particular suspect that you know by sight. Both the task prioritization and your focus of attention have changed as you study virtually every face you can, looking for the visual clues that will connect the actual appearance of the suspect to your specific memory of his appearance. The training for officers and other security professionals involved in protective details usually includes the concept of visually sorting through individual faces, features, gestures and movements that offer clues that something is amiss or that require further consideration or assessment. In essence, this is the process of drawing various elements into the focal field. It is not only a visual focus but a cognitive focus as well. Assume now that you see the suspect. As you begin to move toward him, he sees you and begins to run. You chase him some 50 yards through the long terminal, eventually tackling him and taking him into custody. Now, describe some of the people you passed in the terminal while chasing the suspect. At one point during the foot chase, the suspect grabbed a luggage cart and tossed it behind him into your path. In front of which gate did this occur? A gate-change announcement for a particular flight was made over the PA system during the chase. What airline, flight number, and gates did the announcement pertain to? Was the announcement made before or after the suspect pulled the luggage cart into your path? At every gate you passed along the

8798_C016.fm Page 179 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

The Individual Impact of Officer-Involved Shootings

179

way, televisions were tuned to the same news network. What was the nature or topic of the news story being covered? Obviously, it may be difficult or impossible for you to provide answers to these questions. Your attention and focus, not only of vision, but of virtually all sensory input and cognitive functioning were dedicated to the task of grabbing the suspect. The sequence of events eludes you, since you can’t remember if the cart was thrown into your path before or after the gate change announcement. You could “hear” the gate-change announcement, but the sensory input wasn’t stored; it didn’t pertain to the prioritized task. The same applies to the televisions you passed, as the details of the broadcast were lost in the same sensory triage or prioritization. When an officer is involved in a deadly force encounter, many of these same processes and perceptual limitations may come into play, but to a far greater degree. Because of this, expectations that the officer will be able to provide a seamless, accurate account of the event are unrealistic, failing to acknowledge a scientific truth: The officer can’t attest to what happened if he doesn’t know what happened. Various details simply may not be available to him because the environmental information was not stored in memory. Having never been stored, the information can’t be retrieved. By now the officer’s peripheral vision had diminished to the extent that he could see nothing but the suspect lying face down on the pavement, though he has no recollection of the man falling. He then recognized the sound as that of a voice saying his name, telling him to do something … He looked toward the sound and visually attached it to his former field-training officer …

In events in which an officer is reacting to a situation that could literally bring about his own demise, the extent to which these perceptual alterations influence cognitive processing and memory can be enormous. One officer, who was slashed twice with a knife before he shot and killed his attacker, was still holding the corpse at gunpoint when his first backup arrived. Walking toward the injured officer, the backup officer was yelling, “Get away from him,” addressing the citizens standing beside the wounded officer, holding towels to his wounds. The injured officer was entirely unaware of their presence

8798_C016.fm Page 180 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

180

Officer-Involved Shootings

until this point. If an officer’s focus and attention can be so narrowed that he is oblivious to people standing beside him, actually touching him, it is easy to see how any number of situational facts pertaining to a lethal confrontation may be unavailable to recall. Recreating the event, the investigator demonstrated that the “seemingly small” muzzle flash the officer had seen was actually produced by his own weapon, reflected in the sideview mirror of the car.

In lay terms, the mind hates to be left out of anything in which the body has been involved. Given that the perceptual distortions noted above are quite capable of creating “blanks” in the involved officer’s memory, the mind may, to some degree, attempt to construct a reasonable, continuous framework of the event. In fact, the inability to fill these blanks can be a significant factor in the overall stress experienced by officers in the wake of a shooting. The individual’s response to this dilemma may be to both consciously and subconsciously attempt to connect the dots by way of presumptive reasoning. Remember that sensory input is comprised of raw data. The data are processed or analyzed, matched with prior learning and understanding, and “reality” is then based on the interpretation of the data. The process of organizing the data into a logical framework may occur either instantaneously, based on perceptual factors as the event is unfolding, or after the individual has had the opportunity to ponder the various components of the event, based on a process of reasoning and analysis. Once the “presumed” pieces are put into place and the individual has had a couple of opportunities to offer the patched account, the new construct of the event can become factually solidified. Dr. Lewinski notes that this process very quickly can create a recollection of the event that is so well established in memory that the individual may easily pass a polygraph as to its veracity.5 This in no way implies that officers are intentionally inventing details of an incident, nor does it suggest that any discrepancy in the officer’s account should be dismissed solely upon this premise. What is referred to here is a natural, analytical process in which the mind seeks to establish continuity in the recollection of the event. In the scenario, the muzzle flash was in the immediate proximity of the suspect’s weapon. The officer’s reasoning was based on his spontaneous analysis of the sensory input, leading him to immediately

8798_C016.fm Page 181 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

The Individual Impact of Officer-Involved Shootings

181

conclude that the suspect had fired. The officer had no reason to attempt to deceive investigators, since the justification for the use of force was established by the suspect’s presentation of the weapon in a threatening manner. However, these types of discrepancies may cause investigators to assume that the officer is being less than truthful about the facts of the incident. Again, the perceptual alterations described here should be considered before changing the course or focus of the investigation based on that assumption. The officer recalls studying the detail of the signature vent rib barrel and mentally noting that the driver not only had good taste in cars, but also in the weapons he carried. Before either weapon was aligned with its respective target, the officer had time to begin moving for cover, to briefly pray, and to momentarily feel a sense of concern for his wife and children.

For psychologists, researchers, and involved officers, one of the more intriguing elements of the acute stress response is the mind’s tendency to briefly jump to a thought or thought process that seems to be intrusive, irrelevant, or both. In the scenario, the officer’s mental course of action relating to his own survival was interrupted by a sense of concern for his wife and children. Considering the situation, this certainly would be a relevant thought, though the officer might be troubled by the emergence of the thought at that particular moment. But, he also mused that the suspect had good taste in cars and weapons, a thought process that, to the officer, seemed entirely irrelevant. The subject matter of these thoughts may seem somewhat bizarre to the officer, given the situation in which they occur. One officer, during a protracted exchange of gunfire, suddenly remembered that he had not picked up his uniforms at the cleaners on his way to work. The reason for these thoughts and thought processes remains theoretical, and their occurrence may have no bearing whatsoever on the specifics of the incident or its investigation. Nonetheless, the fact that the involved officer has experienced these types of thoughts may arise during the interview. Investigators then may take the opportunity to acknowledge, name, and normalize this element of the stress reaction.

8798_C016.fm Page 182 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

182

Officer-Involved Shootings

He was thinking that he needed to be doing something, assisting the other officer in some way; he just couldn’t think of what that might be.

Immediately following a deadly force confrontation, the officer will continue to be subjected to the physiological impact of the acute stress response. The systems associated with the response do not instantly turn themselves off when the threat has diminished. Additionally, the officer may be deeply engaged in an effort to mentally process and make sense of the event. These incidents often happen very abruptly and without warning, and they are by their very nature well beyond any semblance of normal. Again, sensory input and environmental information is matched against previous learning and understanding. But when the information associated with something as extreme, out of the ordinary, and as unexpected as shooting another person is introduced, the information may ricochet around the brain for some time as the mind attempts to find correlating information or to establish an understanding. In the moments following a shooting incident, the officer may seem dazed, stunned, or confused and may not engage in deliberate actions, such as notifying dispatch, handcuffing the suspect, or other tasks associated with the incident. Communicating with the officer can be difficult at this point, since he may be unable to fully understand questions or even articulate a response. The officer may assume what is often referred to as a “1000-yard stare,” a blank expression much like that usually associated with daydreaming. Observing this, responding officers might address the officer by name in order to gain his attention and make certain that eye contact is maintained when conversing. At this point, communication with the officer should be very concrete and specific in terms. Euphemisms, metaphors, and multipart questions require abstract reasoning to fully comprehend. The officer’s capacity for abstract reasoning may be significantly diminished in the wake of a shooting incident. On the other end of the spectrum of potential post-incident reactions, the officer may be highly energetic, agitated, or even angry. He may speak very quickly or in a louder-than-usual voice and may be compelled to discuss the incident in detail with every arriving officer, something that should be firmly, but tactfully, discouraged. Again, the fight or flight response does not turn itself off immediately

8798_C016.fm Page 183 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

The Individual Impact of Officer-Involved Shootings

183

after the event, and the officer may experience what has been referred to as the “all dressed up and no one to fight” syndrome. Regardless of the officer’s demeanor or reactions following an incident, a well-trained peer support officer should make contact with the involved officer as soon as possible. Whether it involves assisting an officer who essentially has been immobilized by the event in moving from point A to point B, or helping to calm an officer whose emotions or energy have reached an extreme level, the services offered by these officers can be extremely beneficial, not only to the involved officer but to investigators as well. The role of the peer support officer will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. It also should be noted that, in the moments following a shooting incident, it is possible that the officer may be oblivious to injuries he may have received during the incident. It is not unheard of for an officer to go about the process of securing the suspect and the scene and attending to other matters before suddenly becoming aware of the fact that he has been shot or otherwise injured. When assessing an officer for injuries, note that there is a difference between the questions, “Are you hurt/injured?” and “Are you okay/all right?” The former question is specific and concrete and requires the officer to conduct a self-assessment for injury, while the latter is more general and abstract.

MEASURING THE OCCURRENCE RATE: PERCEPTIONS, RESPONSES, AND DISTORTIONS The following tables were derived from two comprehensive studies conducted by Dr. David Klinger 6 and Dr. Alexis Artwohl.7 The Klinger study examined 113 officer-involved shootings, while the Artwohl study incorporated data from 157 incidents. Table 16.1, from the Klinger study, measures the occurrence of specific thoughts and feelings experienced by the officers at any time during the event. Note that nearly half of the officers surveyed indicated a sense of disbelief associated with the incident. In some cases, “stunned disbelief” has been associated with “freezing” or a failure to immediately act as the mind attempts to comprehend the extreme reality of the event. In her study, Dr. Artwohl found that 7% of the

8798_C016.fm Page 184 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

184

Officer-Involved Shootings

TABLE 16.1 Thought/Feeling

Klinger Study

Disbelief Fear for Self Fear for Others Need to Survive Adrenalin Rush Intrusive Thoughts Other

42% 41% 60% 30% 55% 14% 33%

Source: Klinger, D., Police Responses to Officer-Involved Shootings, Final report to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 2001.

officers felt that they had “frozen” prior to acting. She also notes that, because time is often perceived as moving slowly, the duration of the “freeze” may actually be shorter than what is recalled. She adds that this is likely the typical lag time between action and reaction. Regarding the “fear for self” and “fear for others” categories, Klinger clarified in the report that the majority of officers interviewed expressed that they felt that the actions of the suspect placed their lives or the lives of others in immediate danger, but they did not feel the emotion of fear. The occurrences of intrusive thoughts noted earlier in this chapter were reported at a rate of 14%, although the study made no mention of the subject matter of the thoughts. According to Klinger’s report, “other” thoughts and feelings included being angry with the suspect, wondering if their shots were justified, concern that the suspect did not go down immediately, and confusion over what was happening because they did not realize that they had fired. Table 16.2, comparing the Klinger study with the Artwohl study, measures specific perceptual distortions experienced during the incident. Interestingly, the Artwohl study shows a greater percentage of distortions in all but two categories. In her report, Dr. Artwohl speculates that this is likely due to differences in data-gathering methodologies. The extent to which both diminished sound and tunnel vision are reported is significant. Note that these percentages are compiled from

8798_C016.fm Page 185 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

The Individual Impact of Officer-Involved Shootings

185

TABLE 16.2 Distortion Tunnel Vision Visual Detail Diminished Sound Intensified Sound Slow Motion Fast Motion Other Distortion

Klinger Study 51% 56% 82% 20% 56% 23% 13%

Artwohl Study 79% 71% 84% 16% 62% 17% unknown

Source: Klinger, D., Police Responses to Officer-Involved Shootings, Final report to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 2001; and Artwohl, A., FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Oct. 2002, p.18 – Research Forum, (IACP Net document No. 564080).

the officers’ accounts as they occurred “at anytime during the event.” The Klinger study went a step farther to narrow the occurrence to a specific point at which the officers realized the altered perception. Diminished sound, for instance, was reported at 42% prior to firing but reported at 70% while firing. As in the earlier scenario, officers often report that the sound of their weapon seemed muffled, or they may not have heard it at all. One of the more common distortions within the “other” category, according to Klinger, pertained to distance, such as the distance between the suspect and the officer, etc. In many cases, the officers realized the discrepancy when they had the opportunity to view photographs or sketches or during their walk-through of the scene.

SUMMARY In the overwhelming majority of officer-involved shootings (OIS) cases, the officer acts to protect his life or the lives of others and does so according to law and policy. Although he likely will shun the label, he, in fact, has become the victim of a violent crime and is due all consideration and accommodation accordingly. Like so many aspects of this profession, the post-incident role of the involved officer has changed considerably, especially in the past several years. The officer’s actions are more closely scrutinized and his accountability has increased, not only to his department, but also to his community. The laws and policies governing deadly force never have

8798_C016.fm Page 186 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:35 AM

186

Officer-Involved Shootings

been as rigid and, by some accounts, have never been more subjective. While most officers are aware of the rigors of today’s OIS investigation, the potential outcry from the community and the legal processes associated with such incidents, there is no way to adequately armor an officer for the personal impact of these incidents. However, there is much that can be done to lessen that impact, and these efforts will be discussed further in the following chapter. The techniques associated with interviewing and statement-taking are discussed at length in other areas of this text and include guidelines and considerations that take into account the unique situation of the involved officer. The process of mining the memory of any witness, especially following a high-intensity or traumatic incident, requires equal portions of skill, insight, and patience. Recognizing and acknowledging the potential responses and reactions experienced by officers serves not only to enhance this interactive process but to mitigate the impact of the event as well.

REFERENCES 1. van der Kolk, B., van der Hart, O., and Marmar, C., Dissociation and information processing in posttraumatic stress disorder, Traumatic Stress, van der Kolk, B.A., McFarlane, A.C., and Weisaeth, L., Eds. New York: Guilford Press, 1996. 2. Mack, A. and Rock, I. Inattentional Blindness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998. 3. Strayer, D.L., Drews, F.A., Johnston, W., William, A. Cell phone induced failures of visual attention during simulated driving, J. Exp. Psych.: Appl., 2003, 9:1, 23–32. 4. Lewinski, B., Force Science Research Center, Force Science News, No. 54, September 22, 2006. 5. Lewinski, B., Personal communication, 2006. 6. Klinger, D., Police Responses to Officer-Involved Shootings, Final report to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 2001. 7. Artwohl, A., FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Oct. 2002, p. 18 – Research Forum, (IACP Net document No. 564080).

8798_C017.fm Page 187 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

17

Post-Incident Officer Support Randy Dickson INTRODUCTION

Seventy percent of officers involved in shootings will leave the force within 7 years of the event.1

Officer A experienced a highly introspective moment while sitting alone in an office waiting to speak with an investigator. A short time earlier, the first-year officer had shot and killed a suspect when a “routine contact” quickly escalated into a deadly confrontation. “I was by myself and, of course, my mind was running a hundred miles an hour,” he remembers. “Then I started thinking about what they told us in the academy about post-shooting trauma. I thought, ‘Well, that’s it: I’m going to have nightmares for the rest of my life; I’m going to become an alcoholic; my wife’s going to leave me.’ You know, things like that.” In a proactive manner consistent with the training programs of many law enforcement agencies, officer A had been warned of the potentially devastating psychological impact of officer-involved shootings. He may have been warned that two thirds of officers involved in shootings suffer moderate to severe reactions to the event.2 He may also have been provided with the “70% attrition” fact noted above. With all due respect for the work of the noted authors, recent research has not substantiated this bleak picture. A Los Angeles County study, for instance, examined shooting incidents involving 540 officers. Of these, no officers had retired as a result stress-related

187

8798_C017.fm Page 188 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

188

Officer-Involved Shootings

disability.3 Additionally, a random look at 39 shootings involving 50 officers within four separate agencies revealed that only two officers had taken disability retirement, though it is not known if these retirements were related to the shooting incidents. Excluding officers who had reached retirement eligibility and officers who resigned to take positions with other law enforcement agencies, the survey found only five officers who had left the profession within 7 years of their respective shootings.4 This number seems to be in line with normal attrition rates. The purpose of this chapter, however, certainly is not to dismantle previous research or to challenge the practices or findings of any group or individual. But an objective overview of the current literature and research associated with post-OIS officer support compared to various aspects of the research findings that emerged more than 20 years ago will undoubtedly bring about some cause for reconsideration. Within the profession, it is widely acknowledged that the procedures and techniques associated with everything from ticket writing to tactical operations have evolved over the past 20 years. As a specialized profession, police psychology has evolved as well. A broad assortment of pertinent issues have explored by some of the most highly regarded clinicians and researchers in the field, and their findings continue to shed new light on a subject matter that historically has been difficult to study. Many of these esteemed professionals have either emerged from the ranks of street officers or have devoted their entire careers to assisting law enforcement personnel with the unique challenges faced only by those within this profession. Within many progressive departments, the provision of psychological services represents one element of a comprehensive effort to mitigate the personal impact of officer-involved shootings. These multifaceted programs vary in structure and utilization but generally consist of three basic components: pre-incident preparation and education, peer support, and direct psychological services.

8798_C017.fm Page 189 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Post-Incident Officer Support

189

PRE-INCIDENT PREPARATION AND EDUCATION: MECHANICS AND MINDSETS Some of the most beneficial instruction offered to law enforcement officers includes information or insight that can be utilized in numerous aspects of the job. Hostage negotiators, for instance, have noted that the interactive skills they learned in negotiator training also enhanced their ability to communicate with crime victims and others involved in high-intensity situations. Officers who have received tactical training can attest to how the instruction benefited them in their patrol duties. And, while firearms instruction should focus on defense and survival, a secondary benefit of this training may be to better prepare the officer for the personal impact of a deadly force encounter. Most law enforcement instructors will agree that a broad curriculum containing a significant portion of hands-on, dynamic, or interactive instruction is always preferable to “conceptual” courses. However, scores of officers have been trained in the mechanical aspects of standing flat-footed, looking down their sights at an adequately lighted silhouette target while they punch holes in paper. This practice teaches the basic mechanics of shooting but does little to prepare the officer for a gunfight. In reality, both the officer and the suspect will likely be moving, lighting may be minimal, and the officer may not use his sights during the shooting. In target shooting, the officer shoots actively. In reality, the officer shoots reactively in most situations. As one instructor has said, “Punching holes in silhouettes is to gunfights what driver education is to racing in the Daytona 500.” However, departments throughout the country are increasingly moving toward reality-based firearms training. Interactive video and simulator training, the use of Simunitions® in lifelike scenarios, and other programs have taken this training from the unrealistic range to more realistic formats. Going a step farther, many agencies have developed firearms training programs that incorporate the concept of “stress inoculation.” In these types of programs, exercises are infused with stress inducers that push the officer toward the experience of the acute stress response. Theoretically, the officer develops a calculated response to the threat and makes decisions while under the influence of the “chemical dump” associated with acute stress. Thus,

8798_C017.fm Page 190 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

190

Officer-Involved Shootings

in a real-world situation, the officer is more likely to overcome the negative effects of the stress response, acting more quickly, more decisively, and with greater efficacy. The mastery of any skill is developed through repetitive practice, whereby the skill is over-learned. This degree of proficiency comes about when the skill has been practiced or rehearsed so many times that both the mind and the body “remember” each element of the task. In one training course, officers are asked to imagine that they are seated in their patrol cars. They are then asked to put their keys in the ignition and start the car. Without fail, each officer will reach around the steering wheel (that isn’t there) and insert the key in the ignition. The mind and the body are both aware of the steering wheel’s presence and position, and it is negotiated accordingly. The exercise continues as officers are asked to engage in a number of tasks, such as turning on the radio, reaching for the mic, buckling the seat belt, etc. For many of the officers, the actual tasks are carried out dozens of times per shift, and the physical acts associated with the tasks have been over-learned. The objective of the exercise is to demonstrate the officers’ taskoriented familiarity with the interior of their cars. The questions are then asked: Are you this familiar with your weapon and other gear? Have you practiced clearing a jam so often that you are certain you will use the technique “automatically” when the need arises? Can you retrieve and load an extra magazine in the dark while rounds are flying at you, with the same efficacy as you found the ignition? Confidence is a byproduct of proficiency, and officers who have mastered the skills necessary for their survival will be more confident and more efficient when those skills are needed the most. This may serve as a significant factor in minimizing the post-incident stress associated with such incidents. Although this level of proficiency involves both physical and cognitive elements, an often-overlooked aspect of training pertains to the individual mindset of the officer. Regardless of the reality factors incorporated into training, shooting another person is an extreme, if not abnormal, concept. Establishing a mental framework in which this concept is normalized may not only enhance an officer’s ability to effectively react to a threat but may also help him to integrate the event into his life in the wake of the incident. While it

8798_C017.fm Page 191 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Post-Incident Officer Support

191

is primarily up to the officer to develop this mindset through mental rehearsal and visualization, the officer’s training should incorporate the same processes. In some agencies, the use of “if” has been replaced by “when” in virtually all firearms and defensive tactics training. Although this may seem to be a matter of mere semantics, the use of “when” tends to take the training to a more concrete level, while “if” allows the element to remain conceptual. Closely associated with the development of this mindset is an awareness and understanding of the elements of the acute stress response. In many ways, to understand a reaction is to gain a greater control of it. Tunnel vision, for instance, may be minimized by scanning the environment from side to side. Other elements of the stress response may be diminished with the use of autogenic breathing, also known as Chi breathing or combat breathing. The benefit of these and related techniques will not be realized by simply knowing what they are and how to use them. However, incorporating the techniques into all aspects of firearms and defensive tactics training increases the likelihood that they will be utilized when needed. The only thing that’s bothering me is the fact that it’s not bothering me.

Officer A, who was willing to accept that his life was about to take a drastic downward turn, had been provided a laundry list of negative potentials associated with the use of deadly force. Because no other balancing perspective had been offered, these negative potentials became the norm, and the officer expected the worst. Having been warned of the devastating personal impact of shootings, some officers have questioned their own moral constitutions and have wondered if they were being cold-hearted and calloused when their experiences were not as negative as they had heard described. In providing training and insight related to officer-involved shootings, a balanced perspective should include the fact that the majority of involved officers will suffer no long-term difficulties associated with the event.5,6 This is not to dismiss or discount the potential for significant short-term reactions or to ignore the fact that the psychological trauma resulting from a shooting may be serious and longterm for some officers. But blanketing the topic with negative generalizations may actually contribute to or exacerbate the difficulties an officer may experience following a shooting incident.

8798_C017.fm Page 192 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

192

Officer-Involved Shootings

THE ROLE OF THE PEER SUPPORT OFFICER In the late 1970s, officer B was involved in a shooting in which one suspect was killed and another was wounded. A few days after the incident, a senior officer who had been involved in two prior shootings met with officer B for lunch. “We talked about my personal reactions, how my family and friends might perceive the incident, what I could expect from the other officers, and things like that,” the officer recalls. Much of what the senior officer predicted would come to pass in the weeks ahead. “There were some things that happened afterward that really didn’t set well with me,” the officer remembers. “It might have bothered me more, but I just kept thinking, ‘Yeah, it’s just like [the senior officer] said.’ In some ways it was actually kind of funny.” What the veteran officer provided in this situation is the essence of post-incident peer support. Because of his personal insight, the senior officer was able to predict and normalize some of the officer’s reactions to the incident and to help him prepare for what lay ahead. He also served as a sounding board for the officer, allowing him to express his frustrations and concerns. More importantly, the senior officer was highly respected within the department and had a reputation as that of a stand-up officer, a family man, a teacher, and a leader. Not only had he survived two shootings, but his marriage, his career, and his mental health had remained intact as well. Since that time, the concept of peer support has expanded and evolved into a multimillion-dollar industry. Law enforcement and emergency services entities throughout the world now offer various forms of formalized peer support, many of them subscribing to the teachings of the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (ICISF). Although the Foundation offers instruction on a variety of intervention methods, the most notable and widely utilized of these is the Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD). In recent years, however, the CISD has become the subject of debate and considerable controversy. Some have asserted that the CISD is not only ineffective, but that it may actually impede the recovery from psychological trauma.7 The ICISF has countered that the model is effective and that research interpretations, to the contrary, are flawed.8

8798_C017.fm Page 193 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Post-Incident Officer Support

193

It is not within the scope of this chapter to weigh in on this controversy. However, a number of police psychologists either no longer utilize the CISD following officer-involved incidents or they have offered precautionary notations pertaining to the practice.9–12 For the most part, this position is not based on the current debate regarding the effectiveness of the CISD but rather on the appropriateness of utilizing the model within the realm of officer-involved shootings. Within its guidelines for the response to officer-involved shootings, the Psychological Services Section of the International Association of Chiefs of Police offers the same precautionary note, stating that it is “often not advisable” for involved officers to participate in group interventions unless they “truly desire it.”13 One of the primary concerns here is that, in the midst of an investigation, involved officers are asked to discuss details of the incident in an environment in which there may be no provision of confidentiality. Although a few states have passed legislation that deems these interactions confidential or privileged, in most states there is no such legal protection. In many agencies, processing an incident within a group setting is a fundamental element in the overall response to a critical event. The various formats utilized in these efforts range from strict adherence to ICISF protocols to group discussions that are more logistical or tactical in nature. It is important that the line that distinguishes the difference between a stress debriefing and a tactical debriefing not be blurred. As the name implies, the CISD, which, by protocol, should be co-facilitated by a peer and a mental health professional, focuses on the experiences of the involved individuals (thoughts, reactions, symptoms, etc.). A tactical or logistical debriefing serves more as a learning opportunity and as an assessment of the event and the response to it. Both may provide officers with a greater understanding of the intricacies of the incident as well as an opportunity to gain insight from the accounts and perspectives of the others involved. But they are unique in their purpose and should remain separate. In many agencies, these sessions are not conducted until all statements have been taken or until a grand jury or coroner’s inquest has ruled on the case. Mental health professionals and department administrators are encouraged to work together to establish policies and guidelines pertaining to the utilization of group debriefings.

8798_C017.fm Page 194 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

194

Officer-Involved Shootings

PEER SUPPORT TEAM DEVELOPMENT Many law enforcement peer support teams exist today because a few officers recognized the need, enlisted the support of administrators and others, and sought the necessary training. These programs have been sustained through continued education, policy-based administrative support, active recruitment, and adequate oversight by mental health professionals. In other departments, though, peer support teams have been short-lived and ineffective, in many instances because the above elements were not in place. The role of the peer support officer, the peer support team structure, and other aspects of the teams vary considerably from one department to another. In the majority of departments, the teams are comprised of volunteers, though some have now established full-time positions for these officers. Regardless of the variables, these officers are positioned to provide a valuable service to the department and to the officers they assist. Immediately following an officer-involved shooting, peer support officers may respond to the scene to provide direct support, assistance, and information to the involved officer. Considering the sensitive nature of the investigation and the information that may be exchanged at this point, the peer support officer should provide this assistance within the scope of a well-defined policy. Peer-support providers and involved officers should be aware of the various boundaries that exist within this role and should strive to operate within them. The peer support officer may accompany and assist the involved officer throughout the early stages of the investigation. This may include providing transportation, assisting with phone calls, attending to family matters, and other duties. Within some agencies, the peer support officer may be allowed to be present at the time the officer is interviewed or during a walk-through of the scene, though this is usually a matter of administrative discretion and should be established within the department’s policies. Although the peer support officer may serve as a liaison between the involved officer and department administrators, information pertaining to directives or decisions affecting the involved officer should come directly from administrative sources. In the days and weeks following a shooting incident, the peer support officer may follow up with the involved officer on a number

8798_C017.fm Page 195 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Post-Incident Officer Support

195

of occasions. While the involved officer may appreciate the contact, peer support personnel should be careful not to become a nuisance or to overstay their welcome. The guidelines related to follow-up efforts should be established within the team’s policies and procedures.

PEER SUPPORT PERSONNEL RECRUITMENT In many departments, the position of peer support officer is open to virtually any officer who has completed the training requirements. In others, the role is more formalized, and those who wish to serve in this capacity must apply for the position or be nominated by their peers and supervisors. This process may include an interview with designated administrative personnel, a meeting with a panel of current peer support personnel, and an assessment or interview with a licensed mental health professional. Serving as a member of the team should be conditional, and the team’s policies should state the requirements for remaining in good standing as a team member. Likewise, the policies should be very specific as to conditions and situations that would bring about exclusion or dismissal from the team. The attributes of the ideal candidate for this role include a high level of respect among peers, maturity, a relatively clean disciplinary record, and demonstrated leadership abilities. Additional attributes may include prior training, education (especially in psychology, counseling, etc.), and life experiences. The specific duties of the peer support officer may vary depending on the level of training the officer has received, his experience or time served on the team, and other factors. In some departments, the duty of providing this service to officers who have been involved in shootings is limited to team members who have also been involved in a shooting. The personal perspectives and experiences of peer support officers may be significant factors in their ability to “connect” with the involved officer.

PEER SUPPORT TRAINING The training for peer support team members should be comprehensive and ongoing. The assistance offered to officers by these groups typically is not limited in scope to critical incidents, nor should the peer

8798_C017.fm Page 196 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

196

Officer-Involved Shootings

support officer’s training be limited to this topic area. Instead, the team members should be offered training that coincides with their duties as defined by the team’s mission and policies. A wide range of topics should be covered in the initial and ongoing training and may include issues related to confidentiality, alcohol and drug abuse, family and marital matters, domestic violence, grief, and others. The training also should include skill development in interactive techniques, communication, suicide assessment, and conflict resolution, to name a few. For peer support officers who may respond to officerinvolved shootings, training should include specific elements of the department’s policies related to such incidents, legal considerations, and information regarding the personal impact of deadly force incidents. The Psychological Services Section (PSS) of the International Association of Chiefs of Police has developed a set of guidelines for the development and deployment of peer support teams. The guidelines may be downloaded from the IACP Web site: www.theiacp.org. The PSS is listed under “sections” on the home page and the documents may be found within the section’s pages. A difficult subject area and one that is often not included in the training for peer support officers is that of line-of-duty death and/or serious line-of-duty injuries. Because of their impact on the department, these incidents may neutralize the peer support team. It is impossible for a peer support officer to provide effective assistance when he is in need of assistance himself. The extent of this neutralization may not be as great in larger departments as it is in smaller ones, but it may nonetheless require the agency to consider a mutual aid plan in which outside resources are utilized. An excellent source for training on this topic is the organization Concerns of Police Survivors (COPS). The organization’s staff and volunteers are well versed in the response to these types of incidents and have served as a valuable resource for law enforcement agencies, officers, and their families. Information on training and resources may be found at the COPS Web site: www.nationalcops.org.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES Following officer C’s shooting, his chief scheduled an appointment for the officer with a counselor. The officer worked in a small,

8798_C017.fm Page 197 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Post-Incident Officer Support

197

remotely situated community, and the counselor’s office was some 90 miles from the officer’s home. The chief apologized for asking the officer to drive his personal vehicle to the meeting, citing some ambiguous policy regarding the use of city vehicles while on administrative leave. The chief went on to say that he knew that the officer was “okay,” but that he needed to attend the meeting for “liability reasons.” The officer admits that by the time he reached the counselor’s office he had worked himself into a mood that was not conducive to, in his words, being analyzed. The officer remembers that the meeting was mercifully short. “I don’t think she knew what to make of me. I wasn’t real polite. I wasn’t disrespectful or anything, but I left there worrying about what she was going to put in her report to my chief.” According to the officer, what the counselor “put in her report” was that the officer denied experiencing any remarkable difficulties associated with the shooting. He admitted that the shooting was frequently on his mind and that for the first day or so afterward he was “pretty hyped,” but he insisted that he was not troubled by sleeplessness, remorse, or excessive anxiety. Her assessment, again according to the officer, was that he had not come to terms with the shooting and that he was obviously repressing his feelings and reactions associated with the event. She also noted a significant degree of defensiveness and an underlying hostility. In her words, he was a “time bomb.” Not knowing what to do with the officer, the chief simply left him on administrative leave for almost 2 more weeks. After literally pleading with the chief, the officer was allowed to return to work, initially in an inside, administrative capacity, but eventually to full duty. Today, 20 years later, the officer is a highly respected assistant chief in a different department. Officer D also met with a psychologist following a shooting. Unlike officer C, officer D had known the department’s psychologist for several years, having been previously involved in a shooting and through his role as a peer support team member. Officer D knew that the mandatory visit with the psychologist was a matter of policy, but he also knew that the meeting did not represent or consist of a returnto-duty or a fitness-for-duty evaluation. In his department, the mandatory meeting is focused on education and support, and there is no

8798_C017.fm Page 198 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

198

Officer-Involved Shootings

requirement or expectation that officers “unload” on the psychologist. With the standard exception of concern for harm to self or others, it is understood that all communications within this meeting are confidential, and no report is submitted to administrators other than to acknowledge that the officer attended the meeting as required. This model of psychological assistance has become more prevalent in recent years and coincides with the guidelines offered by the Psychological Services Section of the IACP.14 The differences in the utilization of mental health professionals in the two cases are obvious and represent not only a change in the approach to offering these services, but in the officers’ perspectives and regard for the providers. Some of the differences, however, may be attributed to the size and available resources of the departments. Officer C’s department is small and remotely situated. In fact, the number of sworn personnel in officer D’s department is greater than the population of the city in which officer C worked. But the size of the department should not be a factor in whether or not an officer is provided access to a qualified mental health professional following a shooting. In one region, for instance, a number of small agencies have entered into agreements with a large metropolitan department. Not only is the department’s staff psychologist available to officers from the surrounding departments, but the agencies collaborate on training and peer support efforts as well. In another region, a psychologist in private practice serves several small agencies and oversees a regional peer support team that serves each of the local agencies.

POLICIES Regardless of the size of the agency, policies relating to the use of mental health professionals should outline the types of incidents or situations in which these professionals will be utilized, the means of accessing these services, the time frame in which the services should be utilized, and whether or not the department views this interaction as a service provided to the officer or as a fitness-for-duty or returnto-duty evaluation. The policy should serve as a consistent blueprint in the response to officer-involved incidents and should be presented to officers during their initial training and through in-service trainings.

8798_C017.fm Page 199 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Post-Incident Officer Support

199

As law enforcement administrators work to develop policies in this area, two of the most commonly asked questions pertain to the mandatory aspect of the meeting with a mental health professional and whether or not the meeting should consist of a fitness-for-duty or return-to-duty evaluation. As for making the meeting mandatory or voluntary, a couple of good arguments can be made for either side of the debate. If the meeting is voluntary, the officer may appreciate the opportunity to make a decision in the matter, especially considering that he may feel he, until this point in the ordeal, has been entirely responsive to the department while decisions were made for him. However, the reluctance of officers to initiate this contact is widely acknowledged, and this may result in a missed opportunity to address certain difficulties before they become larger problems. In one department, 60% of the officers who attended a one-toone psychological debriefing with a mental health professional stated that they would not have attended the meeting had it not been mandatory.15 Interestingly, nearly 100% of the officers surveyed afterward stated that the meeting was a valuable element in coping with the incident. Within the law enforcement culture, there continues to be a stigma associated with seeking psychological assistance. Given the option, officers may decline this opportunity and critical needs may go unaddressed. The second question, pertaining to the fitness-for-duty or returnto-duty evaluation, typically reflects the department’s liability concerns. Officer C’s chief was very upfront about this; in essence, stating that the officer’s meeting with the counselor was nothing more than a CYA effort on the part of the department. In one training course provided to law enforcement command staff, participants are asked to complete the following statement: Failure to require a fitness-for-duty evaluation may result in __________. Two qualifiers are applied to the participants’ potential responses. First, they must be able to cite actual instances in which the situation has occurred. Second, the matter must represent something that would not otherwise be covered, discovered, or addressed in a mandatory, confidential one-to-one meeting with a mental health professional. To date, the blank remains blank. As noted earlier, officer D’s department requires officers who have been involved in shootings to attend a psychological debriefing. For

8798_C017.fm Page 200 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

200

Officer-Involved Shootings

all intents and purposes, the department’s CYA objective is achieved here. Additionally, the department’s supervisors are trained to be attentive to changes in the officer’s emotional status or job performance that might indicate that the officer is experiencing difficulties, and the supervisor may request a fitness-for-duty evaluation if there are concerns in this area. Should the need for a fitness-for-duty evaluation arise, it should not be conducted by the same mental health professional that initially provided the officer’s psychological debriefing. In a psychological debriefing, the officer is the client. In a fitness-for-duty evaluation, the department is the client.

MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE PROVIDERS The term mental health professional (MHP) pertains generally to individuals who are certified or licensed by a governing entity to provide mental health services to the public. As with other professions, these individuals may attain additional licensing or certification in a particular field or specialty area. In seeking a professional to assist law enforcement officers, a number of attributes and qualifications should be considered. First, the provider should be in good standing with the governing authority in his/her particular discipline. Most of these entities, including state licensing boards, have established requirements for the maintenance of licensure, including continuing education. Second, the provider should have experience in the treatment of psychological trauma. This is a unique specialty area in which a number of treatment modalities may be available to the affected person. The mental health professional’s résumé and credentials should reflect a level of insight and proficiency in these areas. Third, the MHP should have an adequate understanding of the law enforcement profession and culture. Officer C described the counselor that he met with as “the epitome of new age.” According to the officer, the counselor’s office was filled with a variety of affirmations to this effect. “I kept expecting her to tell me about the healing power of crystals or something,” he recalls. More telling is the officer’s perception. “I don’t think she knew what to make of me.” For most officers, perceptions and credibility are enormous factors in establishing or building a relationship. For the relationship between the officer and the MHP to be beneficial, the

8798_C017.fm Page 201 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Post-Incident Officer Support

201

officer must perceive that the provider has some insight into the world of law enforcement and that he or she does know what to make of the officer.

MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

AND THE

BIGGER PICTURE

In many departments, the services offered by the MHP in the aftermath of a shooting represent a single component of a much broader scope of services. Increasingly, these professionals are called upon to contribute to training in the areas of hostage negotiations, mental health crisis intervention, crisis communications, crime victim assistance, and others. They have also been responsible for the development and implementation of stress management and wellness programs that have been well received by officers and other departmental staff. These professionals also understand that the impact of officerinvolved shootings extends well beyond the individual officer. The tentacles of these incidents reach into the department, into the involved officer’s family, and into the community. In many departments, the involved officer’s peers, witnesses to the incident, and especially family members are included in the outreach and assistance efforts of the MHP. Additionally, mental health professionals have taken an active role in educating the public, city and county government leaders, prosecutors, defense attorneys, the media, and others as to the personal and departmental intricacies of deadly force incidents. Not only do these professionals represent a beneficial, credible source of information and assistance for the department and the community, but they also may serve as a conduit or liaison, bridging opposing factions or connecting individuals with needed resources. For many officers, however, they represent nothing less than a lifeline.

SUMMARY “Coping” may be one of the most widely used terms among mental health professionals. Coping strategies, coping skills, and coping mechanisms are incorporated into efforts to address any number of life’s challenges. Law enforcement officers have used a somewhat synonymous phrase for many years: “Deal with it.” In the days,

8798_C017.fm Page 202 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

202

Officer-Involved Shootings

weeks, months, or even years after being involved in a shooting, “dealing with it” becomes a relative phrase. For some officers, efforts to deal with it may include withdrawing from friends and family, the abuse of alcohol and drugs, and engaging in behaviors and activities that negatively impact the officers’ health, marriage, family relations, and career. On the other end of the spectrum, dealing with it may involve talking with peers, processing the event and reactions with a mental health professional, learning more about psychological trauma, and directing energy and efforts toward activities that improve the officer’s overall health and well-being. Knowing that the correlation between healthy bodies and healthy minds has been well established, a veteran tactical officer has said, “The choice is the officer’s. He can go to the store and get a six-pack, or he can go to the gym and work on his six-pack.” In considering the concept of dealing with it, officer B notes the differences in the overall response to his shooting that occurred in the late 1970s, and those that occur in this era: “There were a few rough spots, but all I really had to deal with was the shooting itself. The department was behind me 100%; the community was behind me, the district attorney was behind me, and there was no controversy to speak of.” Now as a law enforcement instructor, the former officer says that there was never a mention of mental health services in the wake of his shooting. “Back then, in my department, you didn’t see a shrink unless there were major problems. And, of course, nobody ever had any major problems, at least none that they were willing to admit to.” Generally, the collective response to officer-involved shootings has changed since that time, in many ways giving the officer even more to deal with. The investigations into these incidents are more comprehensive, in some ways creating a greater imposition upon the involved officers. Immediately following an officer-involved shooting, the demands of community factions routinely include everything from the immediate termination of the officer to the levying of criminal charges. In the opinion of some, the media then fan the flames of discord through biased reporting and by making many of the same demands within its respective editorial pages, very often before the investigation is completed. These are the external issues placed before the officer to “deal with,” and they are stacked upon the internal

8798_C017.fm Page 203 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Post-Incident Officer Support

203

issues, in many cases including the officer’s efforts to come to terms with the profound fact that he/she has brought a human life to an end. Officer D has now been involved in five shootings. Following the most recent, community groups demanded that the officer be fired or assigned to an administrative role where he would not be in a position to use deadly force. To these community members, the fact that each of his shootings had been indisputably justified was irrelevant. In considering ways to appease the public, the department’s brass discussed assigning the officer to a patrol district that was not as “hot” as the one in which he had been working for 18 years. The officer expressed his opposition to this plan and was ultimately allowed to return to his beat. “By now, I know how the public and the media are going to react, and I expect that. What was less predictable, early on, was what [the department] would do with me,” he says. The officer acknowledges that there have been changes in the department’s OIS policies and investigative practices over the years. “What we have now is probably one of the most officer-friendly policies in the country,” he says. “The investigation is comprehensive, it’s transparent, and it’s the same every time for every officer. Plus, our officersupport services are excellent.” For officer D, there is an enormous difference in his department’s response to his first shooting and its response to his fifth. He attributes this, for the most part, to solid policies, a supportive administration, and readily available resources. As discussed earlier, the impact of officer-involved shootings is experienced to varying degrees not only by the officer and his family, but also by the officer’s peers, investigators, department administrators, mental health professionals, the community, and others. While it is a crucial element, the investigation of these incidents represents only one component of what should be a comprehensive contingency plan. Each professional involved in this multifaceted effort will be presented with opportunities to mitigate the personal and departmental impact of the event, and they should approach their respective roles with the tools and insight that will allow them to capitalize on those opportunities. Undoubtedly, this will involve the investment of additional time, additional resources, and additional training. But, considering what is at stake, the return on this investment is immeasurable.

8798_C017.fm Page 204 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

204

Officer-Involved Shootings

REFERENCES 1. Sewell, J.D., Ellison, K.W., and Hurrell, J.J., Stress management in law enforcement: where do we go from here? The Police Chief, October, 1988, pp. 94–98. 2. Solomon, R.M. and Horn, J.H., Post-shooting traumatic reactions: a pilot study. In Reese, J.T. and Goldstein, H.A. (Eds.) Psychological Services for Law Enforcement Officers. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986. 3. Honig, A.L. and Sultan, S.E., Reactions and resilience under fire: what an officer can expect, The Police Chief, December 2004. 4. Dickson, R., Author’s unpublished research, 2006. 5. Klinger, D., Police Responses to Officer-Involved Shootings, Final report to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 2001. 6. Honig, A.L., Personal communications, 2006. 7. McNally, R.J., Bryant, R.A., and Ehlers, A., "Does early psychological intervention promote recovery from posttraumatic stress?" Psychol. Sci. Pub. Interest, 2003. 8. Mitchell, J.T., CISM research summary. Retrieved from: http://www.icisf.org/ articles/cism_research_summary.pdf 9 Supra note 5. 10. Supra note 6. 11. Artwohl, A., Personal communications, 2006. 12. Blum, L.N., Force under Pressure: How Cops Live and Why They Die, New York: Lantern Books, 2000. 13. Officer-Involved Shooting Guidelines, ratified by the IACP Psychological Services Section, Los Angeles, CA, 2004; retrieved from: http://www.theiacp.org/div sec com/sections/OfficerInvolvedShooting.pdf 14. Ibid. 15. Supra note 3.

8798_C018.fm Page 205 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Appendix: Checklists and Sample Forms INTRODUCTION This section includes a detailed incident roster to be used for major incidents, a log for listing individuals who enter and leave a crime scene, and an incident checklist for use when an officer is involved in a shooting or other type of serious incident. The forms are intended to be used as general guides. They ensure that all relevant information pertaining to a scene is gathered in a thorough and methodical manner, and they can be easily adapted to an agency’s particular needs. An excellent source of investigative checklists is Vernon J. Geberth’s Practical Homicide Investigation: Checklist and Field Guide, CRC Press, Boca Raton, Florida (1997). Brackets are used to offset comments, suggestions, and examples of information to be included. Any photographs and diagrams attached to these and other forms provided in this volume should be fully described.

INCIDENT ROSTER An incident roster should be prepared for every major incident. It is foolish to rely on handwritten notes on scraps of paper that are easily lost or destroyed. The first responding officers should start an incident roster as soon as possible after they arrive at a scene to ensure that no information is lost. Officers should be trained to obtain contact and other vital information from everyone at a scene to ensure that all possible witnesses are sufficiently identified. Any officer who uses the roster should first complete information about the suspects, their vehicle(s), and their weapons while the information is fresh in his or her mind or is readily available. The

205

8798_C018.fm Page 206 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

206

Officer-Involved Shootings

form covers information about two suspects, a single vehicle, two witnesses, and two victims. The reverse sides of the sheets may be used for listing additional parties.

8798_C018.fm Page 207 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Appendix: Checklists and Sample Forms

207

INCIDENT ROSTER Case Number: ____________________________________________________________ Date: _____________________________

Time: ___________________________

Crime: __________________________________________________________________ Location: [Indicate street address, floor number if applicable, city, county, state.] ________________________________________________________________________ Related Cases: [List all related crimes that may have precipitated the incident described in this roster.] ________________________________________________________________________ SUSPECT 1 Name: __________________________________________________________________ Moniker: ________________________________________________________________ Sex: _______

Race: __________________

Social Security Number: __________________ Hair Color: _________________________

Date of Birth: _______________ Height: ________ Weight: ______

Eye Color: ______________________

Clothing Worn: ___________________________________________________________ Home Address: ___________________________________________________________ Home Telephone Number: __________________________________________________ Work Telephone Number: ___________________________________________________ Gang Association: Yes ______

No _______

Identifiable Scars, Marks, and Tattoos: ________________________________________ SUSPECT 2 Name: __________________________________________________________________ Moniker: ________________________________________________________________ Sex: _______

Race: __________________

Social Security Number: __________________ Hair Color: _________________________

Date of Birth: _______________ Height: ________ Weight: ______

Eye Color: ______________________

Clothing Worn: ___________________________________________________________ Home Address: ___________________________________________________________ Home Telephone Number: __________________________________________________

8798_C018.fm Page 208 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

208

Officer-Involved Shootings

Work Telephone Number: ___________________________________________________ Gang Association: Yes ______

No _______

Identifiable Scars, Marks, and Tattoos: ________________________________________ SUSPECT VEHICLE Year: __________

Make: ____________________

Model: __________________

Color: _________

License Number: ______________________

State: _________

Vehicle Identification Number: _______________________________________________ Registered Owner: ________________________________________________________ Address: ________________________________________________________________ Identifiable Features of Vehicle: ______________________________________________ WEAPONS Make: ____________________

Model: ____________________

Color: ____________________

Serial Number: _____________________________

Recovered: Yes _______

No ______

Stolen:

Yes _____

Caliber: ______

No _____

Number of Case Covering Stolen Weapon: _____________________________________ WITNESS 1 Name: __________________________________________________________________ Sex: _______

Race: __________________

Social Security Number: __________________ Hair Color: _________________________

Date of Birth: _______________ Height: ________ Weight: ______

Eye Color: ______________________

Clothing Worn: ___________________________________________________________ Home Address: ___________________________________________________________ Home Telephone Number: __________________________________________________ Work Telephone Number: ___________________________________________________ Gang Association: Yes ______

No _______

Identifiable Scars, Marks, and Tattoos: ________________________________________ Statement Obtained:

Yes _______

No ______

Comments: [Use this section to note information such as a relationship between the witness and the suspect, for example.]

8798_C018.fm Page 209 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Appendix: Checklists and Sample Forms

209

WITNESS 2 Name: __________________________________________________________________ Sex: _______

Race: __________________

Social Security Number: __________________ Hair Color: _________________________

Date of Birth: _______________ Height: ________ Weight: ______

Eye Color: ______________________

Clothing Worn: ___________________________________________________________ Home Address: ___________________________________________________________ Home Telephone Number: __________________________________________________ Work Telephone Number: ___________________________________________________ Gang Association: Yes ______

No _______

Identifiable Scars, Marks, and Tattoos: ________________________________________ Statement Obtained:

Yes _______

No ______

Comments: [Use this section to note information such as a relationship between the witness and victim, for example.] VICTIM 1 Name: __________________________________________________________________ Sex: _______

Race: __________________

Social Security Number: __________________ Hair Color: _________________________

Date of Birth: _______________ Height: ________ Weight: ______

Eye Color: ______________________

Clothing Worn: ___________________________________________________________ Home Address: ___________________________________________________________ Home Telephone Number: __________________________________________________ Work Telephone Number: ___________________________________________________ Gang Association: Yes ______

No _______

Identifiable Scars, Marks, and Tattoos: ________________________________________ Statement Obtained: Injury:

Yes _______

Yes _______

No ______

No ______

Description of Injuries: _____________________________________________________ Comments: [Use this space to indicate whether the victim died or was transported, whether he or she was cooperative or uncooperative, next of kin, etc.]

8798_C018.fm Page 210 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

210

Officer-Involved Shootings

VICTIM 2 Name: __________________________________________________________________ Sex: _______

Race: __________________

Social Security Number: __________________ Hair Color: _________________________

Date of Birth: _______________ Height: ________ Weight: ______

Eye Color: ______________________

Clothing Worn: ___________________________________________________________ Home Address: ___________________________________________________________ Home Telephone Number: __________________________________________________ Work Telephone Number: ___________________________________________________ Gang Association: Yes ______

No _______

Identifiable Scars, Marks, and Tattoos: ________________________________________ Statement Obtained: Injury:

Yes _______

Yes _______

No ______

No ______

Description of Injuries: _____________________________________________________ Comments: [Use this space to indicate whether the victim died or was transported, whether he or she was cooperative or uncooperative, next of kin, etc.] PATROL RESPONSE Unit Number: ________

Officer: ________________________

P Number: _____

Officer: ________________________

P Number: _____

Time of Dispatch: ____________________ Unit Number: ________

Time of Arrival: __________________

Officer: ________________________

P Number: _____

Officer: ________________________

P Number: _____

Time of Dispatch: ____________________

Time of Arrival: __________________

[The dispatch and arrival times and the order in which units arrive may become critical issues in the course of a subsequent investigation or trial. Confirm all times before noting them on the form.] CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATOR RESPONSE Unit Number: ________

Officer: ________________________

P Number: _____

Officer: ________________________

P Number: _____

Time of Dispatch: ____________________ Unit Number: ________

Time of Arrival: __________________

Officer: ________________________

P Number: _____

Officer: ________________________

P Number: _____

Time of Dispatch: ____________________

Time of Arrival: __________________

8798_C018.fm Page 211 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Appendix: Checklists and Sample Forms

211

SUPERVISORS Division: ________

Officer: _____________________

Time of Dispatch: ____________________ Division: ________

P Number: ___

Time of Arrival: __________________

Officer: _____________________

Time of Dispatch: ____________________

Rank: ____

Rank: ____

P Number: ___

Time of Arrival: __________________

PARAMEDIC/FIRE RESCUE PERSONNEL Unit: _______________

Paramedic _______________

Time of Dispatch: ____________________ Interviewed: Yes _______ Unit: ________________

Fire Rescue ____________

Time of Arrival: __________________

No _______ Paramedic _______________

Time of Dispatch: ____________________ Interviewed: Yes _______

Fire Rescue ____________

Time of Arrival: __________________

No _______

[Always interview emergency responders and those transporting injured parties to determine what they heard or saw. Paramedics and firefighters may not understand the importance of information that they learn in the course of providing aid, and you cannot assume that they will volunteer it.] CORONER STAFF Unit: ________________

Time of Dispatch: _________

Time of Arrival: ________

Name of Medical Officer: ___________________________________________________ Name of Decedent: ________________________________________________________ Date and Time Pronounced Dead: ____________________________________________ Coroner Case Number: _____________________________________________________ Names of Attendants Transporting Body: ______________________________________ Time of Removal of Body from Scene: ________________________________________ VEHICLE TOW INFORMATION Name and Address of Facility: _______________________________________________ Telephone Number of Facility: _______________________________________________ Suspect Vehicle: Yes _________

No ________

Victim Vehicle: Yes _________

No ________

Hold Vehicle for Evidence Processing:

Yes ______

No ________

Tow Driver Name: ________________________________________________________ Tow Driver Phone Number (if Different from Facility Number): ________________________________________________________________________ Time of Removal of Vehicle from Scene: ______________________________________

8798_C018.fm Page 212 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

212

Officer-Involved Shootings

CRIME SCENE ACCESS LOG The moment that control of a scene has been established, a crime scene access log should be started. Every person entering and exiting the scene should log in and out to guarantee scene integrity. Department rank and curiosity do not entitle anyone to enter a crime scene. Only those critical to the security or investigation of the scene should be permitted to enter. Digital photographs or a videotape can be used to brief administrators at a command post without compromising the scene by unnecessary access or unauthorized handling of evidence items. The crime scene access log should be kept at a prominent location at the entrance to the scene. A uniformed officer should be assigned the duty of ensuring that every entrant to the scene, without exception, has a reason to be present and signs in and out on the log sheet. Log sheets should be retained in the incident file.

8798_C018.fm Page 213 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Appendix: Checklists and Sample Forms

213

CRIME SCENE ACCESS LOG All personnel entering this crime scene must log in and out below. Date: _______________

Case Number: ______________

Crime: __________________________________________________________________ Location: ________________________________________________________________ INVESTIGATING OFFICERS Name: ____________________________________

Unit: ______________________

Name: ____________________________________

Unit: ______________________

Entry Log Date and Time IN

Date and Time OUT

Name

Rank

Unit

8798_C018.fm Page 214 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

214

Officer-Involved Shootings

CRIME SCENE CHECKLIST This checklist is intended to ensure that all relevant information is collected at a crime scene and that all required actions are taken. Of course, it can be used to take notes, but relevant information about a major incident or crime should also be noted on a detailed incident roster like the one included at the beginning of this chapter.

IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATIONS        

Conduct briefing by units at scene Determine locations of suspects Note conditions of suspects (wounded, deceased, in custody, etc.) Determine locations and approximate number of witnesses Determine need for additional personnel to assist Note locations and number of employees involved Describe conditions of scene (static or dynamic) Secure scene

NOTIFICATIONS        

Crime scene investigators Internal review board or other departmental investigators Homicide unit Supervisors and chief of unit involved in incident Chief of investigative unit Coroner PEAP counselor Union representative

8798_C018.fm Page 215 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Appendix: Checklists and Sample Forms

215

COMMAND POST AND MEDIA STAGING AREA           

Supervisor assigned to manage command post Officer assigned to determine and record incident times Briefing of all investigative and scene personnel Confirmation of perimeter security Initiate crime scene access log Press briefing by ranking administrator at scene Determine need for specialized units; contact specialized units Traffic control measures (barricades, rerouting of traffic, etc.) Contact air support for aerial photos and search Arrange for lighting equipment to illuminate scene Arrange transport of witnesses and employees to interviews

DETAILS OF EVENT AND AFTERMATH              

Determine chronological order of events Note date and time of incident Note location of incident Note type of incident (officer-involved shooting, etc.) Describe related events Obtain names, ranks, and personnel numbers of all employees involved in incident Obtain data on duty assignments of all employees involved in incident Record times of arrival of all responding personnel in dispatch log Record times of all departures (witnesses, coroner, etc.) in dispatch log Describe nature of deadly force (weapon) used Describe department vehicles involved (whether marked or unmarked, unit to which assigned, year, make, model, etc.) Describe suspect vehicles involved (year, make, model, registered owner, owner’s address, license number, etc.) Document scene. Note locations, measurements. Arrange for still photographs, aerial photographs, videotapes. Describe background, lighting conditions, positions of employees, suspects, and witnesses Prepare timeline of incident

8798_C018.fm Page 216 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

216

Officer-Involved Shootings

PHOTOGRAPHS  Photograph employees immediately after incident  Photograph suspects; show condition (presence or absence of injuries) and clothing  Photograph police vehicles; show damage if related to incident  Photograph suspect vehicles; show damage if related to incident  Obtain proofs of still photos

WEAPONS  Describe employee weapons (department-issued or departmentauthorized, make, model, caliber, whether discharged, rounds fired, rounds remaining, whether impounded)  Describe backup weapon (department-authorized, make, model, caliber, whether discharged, rounds fired, rounds remaining, whether impounded)  Describe suspects’ weapons (whether registered or stolen, make, model, caliber, whether discharged, rounds fired, rounds remaining, whether impounded)

PERSONNEL AT SCENE  List names of all personnel at scene (names should appear in crime scene log)  List name, rank, and duty assignment of first supervisor on scene  Note time of arrival and departure of first supervisor on scene  List names, ranks, and affiliations of all other individuals at scene (officers, paramedics, firefighters, witnesses, etc.)  Describe all suspects (names, addresses, social security numbers, birth dates, physical descriptions, identifying marks and tattoos, parole and probation status, open warrants, etc.)

8798_C018.fm Page 217 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

Appendix: Checklists and Sample Forms

217

EVIDENCE  Compare notes with those of crime scene personnel to ensure that no evidence has been overlooked  Document all evidence; describe fully and note locations where recovered  Request appropriate evidence processing (fingerprints, blood samples, clothing, DNA, etc.)  Prepare written direction to accompany all impounded evidence; request that it be retained a minimum of 3 years  Note whether vehicles were processed as evidence; if impounded, note hold or release status

WITNESSES  Obtain full information about each witness: name, address, home telephone number, work telephone number, birth date, social security number, employer and address, physical description, criminal history, relationship to officer involved in incident or suspect, name and telephone number of contact person if the witness moves

COMMUNICATIONS  Clear all units after crime scene is secured  Request copies of all tapes related to event (calls to 911, dispatch broadcasts, calls reporting the event, etc.)  Request verbatim transcriptions of all tapes; arrange retention of the original tapes for at least 3 years  Schedule a meeting of investigators, supervisors, evidence, and crime scene personnel within 24 hours of incident to review and discuss status of investigation and assign tasks for follow-up investigation  Schedule daily briefings with supervisors to ensure continuity of investigation and update supervisors on new developments

8798_C018.fm Page 218 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:36 AM

8798_index.fm Page 219 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

Index A Accident reconstruction, state police expertise in, 15 Accidental discharges, of weapon, 16, 19 Accountability, of police, 30, 135–136, 154 Administrative investigations, for use-offorce incidents, 1, 10 Administrative personnel, at scene, documentation of, 69 Administrative posturing multijurisdictional strategy against, 158, 161–162 Administrative review of multijurisdictional investigation, 161 of use-of-force incidents (See Incident review boards) Administrative summary reports, as incident documentation, 65, 68–89 Administrative warnings, by incident review boards, 141–143 Admonition, in review board warnings, 142–143 Aftermath checklist, 215 Air cartridge, Taser, 22 Alcoholic beverage consumption officer weapon authorization and, 13 suspect analysis protocol for, 43–45 Ammunition employee interview questions on, 55 incident documentation of, 66, 68 Animals justification for killing, 15–16 restraint parameters for, 13 Appeal, of review board decisions, 138 Apprehension, by deadly force, 6–7 Arbitration, binding of review board decisions, 138 Arrest, deaths, occurring during, 118–122 Asphyxia, positional, 121–122

Assisted suicide. See Suicides Audiotapes of employee statements, 51–52, 54 of suspect statements, 43–44 of witness statements, 5, 37, 47–48 Authority, of officers interviewing questions on, 57 in use-of-force policy, 10–11 Authorization, to carry weapons, 12–13, 17 Autopsy(ies) for in-custody deaths, 110, 113, 117 of suspects, 44–45

B Ballistic evidence, documentation of, 87 Batons, expandable, 12, 14, 149 Bedsheets, sterile, for body wrapping, 44 Bias, preventing in investigations, 157, 163 Bickering, intra-agency, multijurisdictional strategy against, 158, 161–162 Binding arbitration, of review board decisions, 138 Blood, scene investigations of, 36, 39 Blood samples, of suspects, 43–45 Blood toxicology, on suspects, 43–45 Blood transfusions, impact on investigations, 44 Bodily injury(ies) employee interview questions on, 56 life-threatening, 159 serious, 19–20, 159 of suspects, protocol for handling, 43–44 Body bags, 44 Body response of officer, 171–186 Boundaries, securing at scene, 35 Briefing. See Information briefing Bulletins, witness location through, 4 Bystanders 219

8798_index.fm Page 220 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

220

Index

handling at scene, 37 inadvertent harm to, 154, 161

C CALEA. See Commission of Accredited Law Enforcement Agencies Accreditation Standards Canine restraint, parameters for, 13 Cars. See Vehicles Case law on civil rights during investigation, 53 on internal affairs investigations, 6–7 on police conduct, 53 review boards and, 139–141 on use-of-force, 20–21, 53 Case study(ies) of employee interviews, 63–64 on forced suicide, 92–93 of handling suspects, 46 of incident review boards, 140–141, 149–150 of internal affairs investigations, 2–3 of racial profiling, 166–169 Cause of death, with in-custody deaths, 110, 118 CERT officer. See Corrections emergency response team officer Certification, in Taser instruction, 24–25 Chain of command, for investigative team, 32 Choke hold, death from, 121–122 Chronology, of incident, documentation of, 67, 69 “Circle of wagons” attitude, in use-of-force policy, 30 CISD. See Critical incident stress debriefing Citizen review boards accountability demands from, 30, 135–136 media bias vs., 169 Civil liability allocation with multijurisdictional teams, 158, 160 of in-custody deaths, 101 of tactical units, 151–152, 154 of use-of-force incidents, 10, 65, 150 Civil rights

of employees during hearings, 137, 139–141 during interviewing, 52–53, 139 of victims, police violation of, 141 Coercion, in employee interviews, 53 Command post, checklist for, 215 Commission of Accredited Law Enforcement Agencies Accreditation Standards, model policy for Taser use, 22–29 Communications, incident checklist for, 33, 217 Community representation, on incident review boards, 137 Connor, Graham v. (1989), 20–21 Constitutional protection for reasonable seizure, 6–7, 20–21 from review board warnings, 143 Contamination of evidence, 36, 44 of statements, 51, 57, 142 Controlled substances, suspect analysis protocol for, 43–46 Coroner and coroner staff historical perspectives, 135 in in-custody deaths, 110, 113 incident roster data on, 211 suspect handling by, 44–45 Corrections emergency response team officer, Taser use, 27–28 Corrections officers corrective actions (See Disciplinary actions) in in-custody death investigations, 102–103, 115 weapon authorization for, 12–13 Corrections sergeant, Taser use, 27–28 Counseling, for police Credit card receipts, witness location through, 4 Crime scene access log for, 213 checklist for, 214 documentation forms form, 205–217 employee interview questions on, 55 investigation protocol for (See Scene investigations) in officer-involved incidents, 3–4 Crime scene analysts, documentation of, 69

8798_index.fm Page 221 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

Index

221

Crime scene investigator response, data on, 210 Criminal act, use-of-force vs., 140 Criminal history with in-custody deaths, 103 of suspect, 69 Crisis counselors, for employees, 51 Crisis negotiation strategy, for forced suicide, 96–97 Critical incident stress debriefing, 192–193 Critical procedures, in use-of-force policy, 11 Culpability, multijurisdictional teams and, 160

D Deadly force alternatives to, 149–150 definition of, 17, 159 interviewing for justification of, 56 use-of-force policy on, 14–16 Deaths suicidal (See Suicides) while in custody (See In-custody deaths) Deceased suspects, protocol for handling, 44–46 Deliberations, during review board hearings, 138 Delirium, excited, 122–133 case studies, 126–128 model policy, 129–133 symptoms, 123–124 warning signs, 124–125 Detectives, general assignment, 69 Detentions personnel. See Corrections officers Diallo, Amadou, as high-profile case, 166–167 Digital cameras, for scene investigations, 37 Diminished-capacity defense, 45 Disciplinary actions for intoxication, 13 for use-of-force incidents, 10, 19 Documentation of crime scene, sample forms for, 205–217

of in-custody deaths, 103–118 of incidents, 65–89 (See also Incident documentation) of review board hearings, 137 of tactical unit training and operations, 153–153 Drive stun, Taser, 22–23 Drugs, illegal, suspect analysis protocol for, 43–46 Duty suspension, pending investigation completion, 19

E Education for post-incident officer support, 189–191 Eighth Amendment, on reasonable seizure, 21 Electromuscular disruption weapon, use of, 22–29 Electronic belts, parameters for, 13 Emergency room visits, for injured subjects, 43–44 Emotional stress Employee interviews, 51–64 authority information in, 57 case study of, 63–64 civil rights protection during, 52–53 crime scene information in, 55 documentation of, 51–52, 54, 73–76 for forced suicide, 98 general guidelines for, 51–52 identification information in, 56 for information in, 55 information to be covered in, 54–57 injury information in, 56 interview information in, 54 justification of use of force questions, 56 key points regarding, 51, 57 officer information in, 54–55 post-interview procedures, 57 sample voluntary statement, 58–62 timing and scheduling of, 52 weapon and ammunition information in, 55 welfare protection during, 51–53 for witness officers, 73–76

8798_index.fm Page 222 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

222

Index

Employee(s), in incident documentation of, 66, 68, 73–76 handling of at scene, 35–36, 51 identification questions for, 56 interviewing protocol for, 51–64 involvement in review board hearings, 137–138 legal counsel for, 52, 137, 142–143 trauma impact on, 52, 54 union counsel for, 35, 52, 137 Entry(ies) high-risk, 93, 95, 151–152, 154 Event(s). See Incident entries Evidence ballistic, 87 contamination of, 36, 44 documentary (See Interviewing) documentation of, 67–68, 88 forensic examination of, 88 physical (See Physical evidence) during review board hearings, 137–138 Excessive force, case law defining, 20–21 Excited delirium, 122–133 case studies, 126–128 model policy, 129–133 symptoms, 123–124 warning signs, 124–125 Experience, as case issue, 57 Eye fluid samples, of suspects, 45

F FATS (firearms training system), 145 Felony(ies), misdemeanors vs., 7 Fifth Amendment, employee silence and, 143 Fire rescue personnel, incident data on, 211, 216 Firearms, authorization to carry, 12–13, 17 Firearms training system (FATS), 145 First responder strategy, for forced suicide, 96–97 Flashlight, as weapon, parameters for, 13–14 Force continuum, definition of, 17–18 Forced suicide. See Suicides Forensic evidence examinations, documentation of, 88

Fourteenth Amendment, employee silence and, 143 Fourth Amendment, on reasonable seizure, 6–7, 20–21 Fugitive status, of suspect, 69

G Garner, Tennessee v., (1985), 6–7 Garrity v. New Jersey (1967), 53, 139–141 Garrity warnings during investigation, 53, 139 during review board hearings, 137, 139 Glick, Johnson v. (1973), 21 Graham v. Connor (1989), 20–21

H High-profile incidents impact on law enforcement community, 141–142 during incarceration, 101, 109 information control for, 35–36, 65, 163–169 nature of, 37, 53 rules of engagement for, 1, 5–7, 29–30 High-risk search and entry, 93, 95, 151–152, 154. See also Tactical units Hog-tying, of prisoners, 121–122 Homicide investigations, of officerinvolved-in-shooting incident, 3–5 Hospital care in in-custody deaths, 110, 113–114 for injured subjects, 43–44, 69 Hospital personnel documentation of involved, 68–69 in suspect handling, 44–45

I ICISF. See International Critical Incident Stress Foundation Illegal drugs, suspect analysis protocol for, 43–46

8798_index.fm Page 223 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

Index Impact of officer-involved-shootingincident, on officer, 171–186 Impounding, in scene investigations, 36, 43–45, 51 In-custody deaths, 20, 101–122 during arrest, 118–121 cause of death in, 101–122 criminal history in, 103 department reports on, 109–111, 113–114, 118–121 during incarceration, 101–122 introduction to, 101 investigative focus of, 101 investigative guidelines for, 31, 51, 101–122 officer’s report on, 111–118 report information samples, 109–118 report preparation on, 102, 109 during transport, 118–121 witness interviews for, 103, 111, 116 Incarceration, deaths occurring during. See In-custody deaths Incident chronology, documentation of, 69 Incident description checklist for, 215 employee interview on, 55 in presentation to review boards, 146, 148–149 report formats for, 65–89 Incident documentation, 65–89 administrative summary report, 65, 68–89 for in-custody deaths, 103–118 introduction to, 65 investigative summary report, 65–68 in multijurisdictional investigations, 160–161 report preparation, 65 sample forms for, 205–217 Incident location documentation of, 66, 71 with in-custody deaths, 109, 112 Incident review boards, 135–150 accountability demands from, 30, 136 administrative warnings by, 141–143 alternatives to use of deadly force, 149–150 appeal of decision, 138 case law impact on, 139–141

223 case studies of, 140–141, 149–150 civil rights of employee and, 137, 139–141 documentation of hearings, 137 employee involvement in hearings, 137–138 Garrity decision impact on, 137, 139–141 introduction to, 135 media bias vs., 163, 169 membership recommendations for, 136–137 model of, 136–139 objectives of, 136 officer training impact of, 143–145 preparation of presentations to, 145–149 for use-of-force, 5–6, 10 Incident roster, for major incidents, 205–217 Incident scenes. See Scene investigations Infighting, agency, multijurisdictional strategy against, 158, 161–162 Information briefing checklist for, 215, 217 for investigative team, 32–33, 164 to media, 163–164 in scene investigations, 39 Information dissemination, to media for high-profile incidents, 163–169 responsibilities for, 35–36, 65, 163, 165 Injury physical (See Bodily injury(ies)) psychological (See Traumatic events) Inmates, in in-custody death investigations, 103, 110, 113, 116 Internal affairs commander, on review boards, 137 Internal affairs investigations assigning responsibility for, 31–33 case law on, 6–7 case study of, 2–3 checklists and sample forms for, 205–217 documentation summaries for, 65–89 employee interview protocol for, 51–57 in homicide investigations, 3–5 model policy for, 1 parallel investigations vs., 1, 5, 158

8798_index.fm Page 224 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

224 scene investigations for, 37–41 suspect handling in, 43–46 in use-of-force (See Use-of-force policy) witness interview protocol for, 47–50 International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, 192–193 International Union of Police Associations, on officers’ rights, 142–143 Interpretation of employee statements, 53 of witness statements, 47 Interrogation, interviewing vs., 49 Interviewing of employees (See Employee interviews) interrogation vs., 49 of suspects, 43–44, 49 of witnesses (See Witness interviews) Intoxication. See Alcoholic beverage consumption Intra-agency conflict, multijurisdictional strategy against, 158, 161–162 Investigation summaries, for officerinvolved use of deadly force, 65–68 administrative sample, 57, 68–89 Investigative authority, for use-of-force incidents, 19–20, 31 Investigative protocol for forced suicide, 97–98 for handling suspects, 43–46 for in-custody deaths, 31, 51, 101–122 for incident scenes, 35–41 multijurisdictional, 157–162 for officer-involved-in-shooting incidents (See Internal affairs) for statements (See Interviewing) for tactical unit incidents, 154–155 for use-of-force incidents (See Use-offorce policy) Investigative response data on, 66, 210 to in-custody deaths, 102–103 in multijurisdictional investigations, 159–162 supervision of, 32–33 Investigative responsibility assigning authority in, 31 for in-custody deaths, 102–103 at incident scenes, 35–37

Index in multijurisdictional teams, 157–162 need for guidelines, 31 organizational structure for, 31–32 during response, 32–33 supervisory activities, 32–33, 35, 51 Investigative summary report, as incident documentation, 65–68 Investigative team(s) authority of, 31 documentation of, 66, 68 for in-custody deaths, 102–103, 112 multijurisdictional, 157–158, 160–162 organizational structure for, 31–32 supervision during response, 32–33 for use-of-force incidents, 15, 19–20, 29, 31, 37

J Johnson v. Glick (1973), 21 Justification for killing, self-defense as, 10–11, 15, 91–92 of use-of-force, 6–7, 11–12, 14–16, 56

K Klein, Spevack v. (1967), 143

L Las Vegas Municipal Police Department administrative summary of investigation report, 68–89 model policy development by, 1, 9, 29 review board impact on training, 143–145 Laser-type devices, 149 Lateral vascular neck restraint (LVNR), 13–14 Law enforcement community high-profile incidents’ impact on, 141–142 racial profiling by, 166–169 self-regulation of, 162 Legal counsel for employees, 52, 137, 142–143

8798_index.fm Page 225 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

Index

225

for multijurisdictional teams, 157, 160 on review boards, 137 Liability civil (See Civil liability) of supervisors for subordinates’ actions, 53 of tactical units, 151–152, 154 Liaison, for investigative team, 32–33 Life-threatening injury, definition of, 159 Lighting conditions, in scene investigations, 39 Loaner weapons, during investigations, 19 Location of occurrence documentation of, 66, 71 with in-custody deaths, 109, 112 Los Angeles County forced suicide study in, 91–92 high-profile cases of, 39, 142, 163, 166 as tactical leader, 152 Low-lethality force definition of, 18 potential to be lethal, 149–150 use-of-force policy on, 13–14 Luima, Abner, as high-profile case, 166 LVMPD. See Las Vegas Municipal Police Department LVNR (lateral vascular neck restraint), 13–14

M Mail, in in-custody death investigations, 103 Mandatory sentencing, 93 Manual strangulation, 14 Measurements, in scene investigations, 37 Media, challenges from, 30 Media coverage accountability demands from, 30, 154 bias in, 163, 169 of in-custody deaths, 101, 109 as motivation for incident, 165–166 of multijurisdictional investigations, 160–161 of officer-involved incidents, 1, 3–4 prevention of, 35–36 of racial profiling, 166–169 strategies for handling, 163–169, 215

witness location through, 3 Media staging area, checklist for, 215 Medical examination, of suspects, 43 Medical examiner. See Coroner and coroner staff Medical services. See Hospital care Menninger Triad, 96 Mental health providers, for officer involved in shooting, 200–201 Mental response of officer, in officerinvolved shooting incident, 171–186 Miranda warnings, during investigation, 53 Misdemeanors, felonies vs., 7 Model policy for internal investigations, 1–7 for multijurisdictional investigations, 158–159 for use-of-force, 11–30 Multijurisdictional investigations, 157–162 administrative review of, 161 definitions for, 159 evidence retention in, 160 guidelines for, 159–162 incident documentation with, 161 introduction to, 157 legal representation in, 157, 160 model policy for, 158–159 presentation to prosecutor, 161 scene preservation with, 160 summary of, 161–162 team composition for, 160 team implementation for, 157–158 venue determination for, 160 witness interviews with, 160–161

N National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA), 154 Negative disposition, with review board decisions, 138 Negotiation strategy for forced suicide, 96–97 for violent individuals, 150 New Jersey, Garrity v. (1967), 53, 139–141 New Jersey State Police, racial profiling by, 167–169

8798_index.fm Page 226 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

226

Index

New York Police Department, racial profiling by, 166–167 News. See Media coverage Nondeadly force definition of, 18 potential to be lethal, 149 use-of-force policy on, 13 Nondeadly weapons, authorization to carry, 12–13 Notetaking in employee interviews, 51 in witness interviews, 47, 49–50 Notification requirements for in-custody deaths, 102 in use-of-force policy, 17, 214 NTOA (National Tactical Officers Association), 154 Nurses, in in-custody death investigations, 115

O Objectiveness, of employee interviews, 51, 57, 142 OC (oleoresin capsicum) spray, 13, 150 Off-duty officers, weapon authorization for, 13 Office of public information chain of command, 165 interaction with media, 163–169 objectives of, 164–165 Officer authority interviewing questions on, 57 in use-of-force policy, 9–10 Officer-involved shooting incident documentation on, 66, 68, 73–76 impact on officer, 171–186 investigation summaries for, 65–68 administrative sample, 68–89 investigative protocol for (See Internal affairs investigations) investigative responsibility for, 31–33 post-incident officer support, 187–204 presentation to review boards, 147 release of name of, 35, 58, 165 scene investigations for, 35–41 statements on (See Interviewing) suspect handling in, 43–46

Officer training as case issue, 57, 138–139, 150 review board impact on programs for, 143–145 on use-of-force policy, 11 Officer(s) in assisted suicides, 91–93 handling at scene, 35–36, 51 incident documentation of, 67–69 interviewing of, 54–56, 73–76 tactical, 13, 93, 95 trauma impact on, 52, 54 weapon authorization for, 12–13, 17 as witnesses, 73–76 Officer’s rights, statement of, 142–143 Oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray, 12, 150 Open-ended questions, for witness interviews, 49 Organizational structure, for investigative team, 31–32

P Paintball guns, use of, 22 Parallel investigations internal affairs investigations vs., 1, 5 multijurisdictional investigations vs., 158 Paramedic(s) in in-custody deaths, 113 incident data on, 211 in suspect handling, 44–45 Paraphrasing, of witness statements, 47–48 Peer counseling Peer support officer, in post-incident officer support, 192–201 Peer support team, for officer involved in shooting, 194–195 Peer support training, for officer involved in shooting, 195–196 Pepper sprays, 18, 22, 149–150 Perceptions, in scene investigations, 38, 46 Perceptual response of officer, in officerinvolved shooting incident, 171–186 Personnel at scene, checklist for, 216

8798_index.fm Page 227 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

Index Personnel recruitment, peer support team, for officer involved in shooting, 195 Photographs of employees involved in incidents, 36, 51 of in-custody deaths, 104–108 incident checklist for, 216 in scene investigations, 36–38, 40–41 in suspect handling, 43–44 Physical evidence documentation of, 67, 85–87 handling in scene investigations, 35–37, 39 of in-custody deaths, 102–103 incident checklist for, 217 preserving from suspects, 43–46 preserving in multijurisdictional investigations, 160 documentation of involved, 44–45, 69Physicians, attending in in-custody deaths, 113 PIT. See Pursuit immobilization technique Political situations, strategies for handling, 165–166 Positional asphyxia, 14, 121–122 Post-incident officer support, 187–204 PowerPoint™ software, for presentations, 145–146 Pre-incident officer-involved shooting, post-incident officer support, preparation, 189–191 Presentations of use-of-force to prosecutor, 161 of use-of-force to review board, 145–149 case status, 149 details of incident, 148 introduction of presenters, 145 officers involved, 147 PowerPoint™, 145–146 suspect information, 148 synopsis of, 146 Press-motivated incidents, 165–166 Print media. See Media coverage Proactive policy, for use-of-force, 29 Probable cause, in use-of-force policy, 18 Probationary police, weapon authorization for, 12

227 Probe, Taser, 23 Prompting, in witness interviews, 49 Prosecutor, multijurisdictional investigation presentations to, 161 Psychological services, for officer involved in shooting, 196–198 Public information officer, interaction with media, 163–169 Public relations, through media. See Media coverage Pursuit immobilization technique (PIT) definition of, 18 parameters for, 13, 18 Pursuit termination strips, definition of, 19 Pyrotechnic devices, parameters for, 13

R Racial profiling by law enforcement, 166 New Jersey case of, 167–169 New York case of, 166–167 stress factors of, 168–169 Ramming, as use-of-force, 15, 19 REACT (Register-Enforced Automated Control Technique), 13 Reactive policy, for use-of-force, 29 Reasonable belief definition of, 19 as seizure requirement, 6–7, 20–21 in use-of-force policy, 11–12, 14–16, 21 Recreation schedules, witness location through, 2, 4 Recruitment of personnel, peer support team, for officer involved in shooting, 195 Register-Enforced Automated Control Technique (REACT), 13 Reportable force definition of, 19 use-of-force policy on, 16–17 Reports, on incidents. See Incident documentation Review boards citizen (See Citizen review boards) for incidents (See Incident review boards)

8798_index.fm Page 228 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

228

Index

Right to silence, review board warnings and, 143 Rodney King case, as high-profile case, 39, 141–142, 166 Ruby Ridge, as high-profile case, 29 Rules-of engagement, for high-profile incidents, 1, 5–7, 29–30

S Scene description, documentation of, 67, 71 Scene investigations, 35–41 for in-custody deaths, 103 introduction to, 35 investigator duties, 35–37 of officer-involved-in-shooting incident, 3–4 protocol for, 37–41 walk-through component, 36, 51 Scene investigators, duties of, 35–37 Scene preservation with forced suicides, 44–46 with in-custody deaths, 102 with multijurisdictional investigations, 160 suspect considerations of, 43–46 tactical team responsibilities for, 152–153 Search(es) high-risk, 93, 95, 151–152, 154 with in-custody deaths, 103 in scene investigations, 37, 39 of suspects, 43 Security of scene (See Scene preservation) for suspects, 43–44 Seizure, reasonableness requirement of, 6–7, 20–21 Self-defense, as justification for killing animals, 15–16 suspects, 10–11, 43, 91–92 Self-incrimination, in review board hearings, 139 Self-regulation, of law enforcement community, 162

Serious bodily injury, definition of, 19, 159 Shotguns, low-lethality, 14, 149–150 Silence, right to, review board warnings and, 143 Simpson, O.J., as high-profile case, 163 Snipers, 154 Spark display, Taser, 23 Special interest groups, accountability demands from, 30 Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, 13, 93, 151–155. See also Tactical units Spevack v. Klein (1967), 143 Split-second decisions, in use-of-force, 21 State police, accident reconstruction expertise of, 15 Statements. See Interviewing Strangulation, manual, 14 Stress as racial profiling factor, 168–169 Stun guns, 149 Suffocation, of prisoners, 109 “Suicide by cop,” 91, 93 Suicides, forced and assisted, 91–99 case studies on, 92–93 crisis negotiation strategies, 96–97 criteria to identify, 91–92 dynamics of, 93–96 employee interview with, 98 first responder strategies, 96–97 frequency of, 92–93 introduction to, 83–85, 99 investigation protocols for, 97–98 physical evidence preservation, 44–46 victims of, 99 Supervisor(s) employee interview involvement of, 53 incident data on, 211, 216 investigative responsibility of, 32–33, 35, 51, 217 liability for subordinates’ actions, 53 review board warnings to, 142 Support for officer, post-incident, 187–204 Surveillance tapes handling in scene investigations, 39 investigative responsibility for, 33, 212, 217 witness location through, 4

8798_index.fm Page 229 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

Index

229

Suspects, 43–46 case study of handling, 46 deceased, 44–46 incident data on, 67, 69, 207, 216 injured, 43–44 introduction to handling, 43 presentation to review boards, 147 statements of, 43–44, 49 suicidal (See Suicides) uninjured, 43 SWAT teams. See Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams

T Tactical units, use of force by, 151–155 documentation importance, 153–153 examples, of, 13–14, 93, 95–96 introduction to, 151 investigations of, 154–155 liability issues, 151–152, 154 national association standards, 151, 154 responsibilities of, 152–153 training for, 152–154 Taser, use of, 22–29 Task forces, multijurisdictional, 157–162 Team leader, of investigative team, 32–33 Tennessee v. Garner (1985), 6–7 Testimony, during review board hearings, 137–138 Three-strikes-and-you're-out laws, 93 Ticket fixing, 139–140 Traffic logs, witness location through, 4 Traffic section fatal investigations, documentation of personnel, 69 Training of police officers (See Officer training) Trajectory diagrams, in scene investigations, 37–41 Transport, deaths occurring during, 118–122 Traumatic events impact on employee, 52, 54 Truthfulness, as review board impact, 140, 145

U Uninjured suspects, protocol for handling, 43 Union representation for employees, 35, 52, 137 for multijurisdictional teams, 157 for officer's rights, 142–143 on review boards, 137 Use of force as continuum, 17–18 criminal act vs., 140 justification of, 6–7, 11–12, 14–16, 56 policy for (See Use-of-force policy) by tactical units, 13–14, 95–96, 151–155 Tennessee statute on, 6–7 Use-of-force incident(s) documentation of, 65–89 multijurisdictional investigations of, 159–161 presentation to review boards, 145–149 scene investigations for, 37–41 split-second decisions in, 21 standard review process for, 5–6 Use-of-force policy, 9–30 for accidental incidents, 16, 19 administrative investigation component, 10 case law on, 20–21 “circle of wagons” attitude and, 30 critical procedures for, 11 current challenge of, 30 deadly force parameters, 14–16 definitions in, 17–19 essence of, 11 firearms authorization, 12–13 investigative personnel for, 17, 19–20, 31–32 investigative requirements for, 16–17, 31 investigative response for, 32–33 investigative responsibility for, 20, 31–33 low-lethality force parameters, 14 LVMPD development of, 1, 9, 29 model for, 11–30

8798_index.fm Page 230 Monday, April 30, 2007 11:37 AM

230

Index

need for developing, 9, 29–31 nondeadly force parameters, 13–14 nondeadly weapons authorization, 12–13 notification requirements, 17, 214 officer authority in, 9–10 proactive vs. reactive, 29 reporting requirements, 16–17 training policy for, 11, 14–16

V Vehicles documentation of involved, 67 handling in scene investigations, 38, 40–41 suspect, incident roster data on, 208, 211 as weapon, parameters for, 15–16, 18–19 Verbatim transcript of employee interviews, 57 of witness interviews, 47, 50 Victim(s) civil rights violation of, 141 incident roster data on, 209–210 of suicide incidents, 99 Video materials of employee walk-through, 36, 51 for officer training, 144–145 in scene investigations, 39 as surveillance (See Surveillance tapes) of suspects, 43–44 Vitreous fluid samples, of suspects, 45 Voluntariness in employee interviews, 53

W Waco Branch Davidians, as high-profile case, 29 Walk-through, of incident scene, 36, 51 Weapon(s) authorized, 12–13, 17 deadly (See Firearms) employee interview questions on, 55 incident documentation of, 66, 68, 216 nondeadly (See Nondeadly weapons) officer training on, 144–145, 150 in scene investigations, 36 Wish to be killed, 96 Wish to die, 96 Wish to kill, 96 Witness interviews, 47–50 closing, 50 documentation of, 5, 37, 68, 73–85 general guidelines for, 47–48 impeachment of, 48 with in-custody deaths, 103, 111, 116 introduction to, 47 in multijurisdictional investigations, 160–161 opening questions, 48 paraphrasing of, 47–48 preliminary statements, 48 questioning about incident, 49–50 as review board testimony, 138 Witness(es) handling in scene investigations, 37, 39 incident data on, 67, 208–209, 217 locating techniques, 3–4 of officer-involved incidents, 3–4 officers as, 73–76 statements of (See Witness interviews)