On Analogy: An Essay Historical and Systematic (Europaische Hochschulschriften Reihe Xxiii, Theologie)

European University Studies

Ralf M. W. Stammberger

Europaische Hochschulschriften Publications Universitaires Europeennes

Series XXIII

On Analogy

Theology Reihe XXIII Serie XXIII Theologie Theologie

An Essay Historical and Systematic

VoI.IBd. 540

~

PETER LANG

PETER LANG

Frankfurt am Main· Berlin· Bern· New York· Paris' Wien

Europll.ischer Verlag der Wissenschaften

Die Deutsche Blbliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Stammberger, Ralf M. W.: On analogy: an essay historical and systematic 1 Ralf M. W. Stammberger. - Frankfurt am Main; Berlin; Bern; New York; Paris; Wlen : Lang, 1995 (European university studies: Ser. 23, Theology; Vol. 540) ISBN 3-631-48909-9 NE: Europiiische Hochschulschriften 123

ISSN 0721-3409 ISBN 3-631-48909-9 US ISBN 0-8204-2903-1

© Peter Lang GmbH Europalscher Verlag der Wissenschallen Frankfurt am Main 1995 All rights reserved. All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits 01 the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, Is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies In particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing In electronic retrieval systems. Printed In Germany 1 2 3 4 5

7

To my parents

f

7

I

Contents

CONTENTS:

\

i I \,

PREFACE

9

i i l

I. ANALOGY IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY

11

I

II. ANALOGY IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

20

f

III. ANALOGY IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE lWENTIETH CENTURY

36

IV. AN ATTEMPT AT A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ANALOGY

56

BIBLIOGRAPHY (OF WORKS CONSULTED):

70

I

i

I, tI I '. r

, r

• II Greek Philosophy

I. Analogv in Greek Philosophv In this chapter I wish to establish that analogy is a basic notion both for Plato and Aristotle, the difference being that while for Plato it is a principle posited by the supreme being, the Good itself, ontologically, for Aristotle it is basic as a logical principle. It seems that the earliest traceable occurrence of a treatment of analogy is to be found in a fragment on music by the Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum. I He uses both the terms IlEcrm and <xv<XAoytm interchangeably, thus reflecting the mathematical approach to music of Pythagoras and his school. The mathematical understanding of analogy was to prevail until Plato introduced a specifically philosophical use of analogy in his treatment of

I 47 B 2; Diels / Kranz 1951, pp.435[ C[ Track 1978, pp.630; Lyttkens 1953, p.16 and Mondin 1963, p.1 who probably misunderstands it. It seems that Track relies heavily on

Lyttkens, who appears to ignore the fact that Archytas' remarks aTe on music not mathematics, although the two were of course related for the Pythagoreans. Archytas distinguishes apte~lTt'tKa, ye(J)~ll1fpt1ca and

\)1tEva,VtlKa, av KaAEOVtl ap~IOVIKav.

TIle first two will appear again in Aristotle's treatment of analogy (and are also caned the

continuous and the discrete proportion because of their respective fonn) as a principle of justice in the Nicomachean Ethics, and can be caned strictly mathematical (e.g. for the continuous proportion a : b : c we could fill in the arguments 2: 4 : 8 => 2 : 4 = 4 : 8 => a: 2a = 2a : 4a => I = I or for the discrete proportion a : b :: c : d the arguments =

2:4

3 : 6 => a : 2a = a : 2a => I = I [Note that the transition involved in this example from

"::" - the symbolism is taken from Dalferth 1981; cf also Burrell 1973, p.IO - to U=" holds true only for mathematical proportions; on the problem see also Mascall 1949, pp.10lff; esp. pp.l08f, n.2]). TIle third describes what in Greek music was considered to be an hannonious accord, but was not strictly mathematical, and duly forgotten in the ensuing debate on analogy (e.g. 3: 4 : 6 => 3: 4 = 4 : 6 =>a : a + 1/3a = 2a - 1/3 2a : 2a => 1 = -I !). It nevertheless seems quite interesting to compare it with the division of the world into two fundamentally distinct realms in Pannenides and Plato.

12

13

Ol/Analogl'

Greek Philosophy

avaAoYla as the OEO"IlOJV KaAAI0"<0~2 that explains the connection of the four elements 3 The most difficult aspect of the passage in the Timaios is probably his remark that analogy is the "OEO"IlOJV [... j KaAAlo"
2 cf. nmaios 3 Jc. The passage deals with creation as "teo yap KClAA.ll'JtW Kat KCltCl 7tUVta. ttAS(l) ~laA.tO"ta

'HOV

VOOWlEvmv

aUlOV" (30d) and the fOUT elements are

deemed necessary for this utmost intelligibility. Fire makes things visible and earth tangible. 11le other two elements bind together the "oupavov opaTOV Kctl UtttoV "

(3Ib), exemplified by fire and earth, by analogy.

"Ott1tEP

nup npo<;

aEpa, 1"OUtO aEpa

vouO" as principle of unity within the realm of the OO~at Ilpo<Elal. Therefore the search for unity in the AEYEIV or the ovollai;uv respectively is the principle of unity of both realms. Plato, in his division of the world into "the world of tme being - the world of ideas -, and the visible - material - world, where 'being' is an illusory existence"6 has a similar division, but sees that the link between the two is not only somehow given, but lies precisely in the fact that there is this correspondence, this analogy, between them? This could be considered a kind of transcendental reflection on the condition of the possibility: What is basic is that there is a link between the different realms. "ouo OE flOVOJ KaAOJ~ ~uvIO"
Il

]tpoe; vBmp, Kat on a11P 1tpOC; vomp, uorop npoC; Y'lV (ibid.). Precisely because the elements are to account for the intelligibility of the world the

role of analogy is 110t only of

importance for cosmology, but for the whole of philosophy as reflection on the intelligible.

6 Lyttkens 1953, p.22.

3 cf ibid .• 31bff and also Lyttkens 1953, p. 19; Mondin 1963. p.1. Track even describes

7 Interestingly Aristotle, who saw "relation" as a category, saw metaphysical tenns as

analogy as a "kosmisches Strukturprinzip" (1978, p.63 I), although it is not quite clear

analogically applied, presumably because they are by definition beyond category (cf also

where the structure comes in. Burrell (1973) in his lengthy treatment of Plato elucidates

Hesse 1965, pp.334ff). For him too then analogy was basic: cf below.

very well how Plato's dialectical style is adequate to express the analogy of the Good "that

8 Timaios 31 h.

specifies subject as well as object in an inquiry" (p.67) and the fact that transcendental

9 111e distinction of different ways of lIsing analogy that Lyttkens and Track make (e.g.

expressions systematically elude univocal definition, but fails to relate this to Plato's

"Feststellung einer Analogie der Beweisfiihrung", "dreigliedrige Proportion, urn in seinen

explicit treatment of analogy.

Ausfiihnmgell zur Kosmologie im Timaios die Ordnung der Welt aufzuzeigen" and the

4 ibid .. 31c.

"viergliedrige 'getrennte' Proportion"; Track 1978, p.631) seems to me to rely on the

5 Jiingel 1964, p.18. See also Molinaro '987, who sees in Jiingel's treatment an attempt

above mentioned modem distinction oflangl.lage and world that is alien to Plato's thought.

to force the concept of analogy of proportionality onto Pannenides to whom this concept

1111S does not of course make them wrong, but does not enlighten Plato's own

were alien.

understanding.

14

IS

0" Analog),

I think this becomes clear when one considers the parable of the cave. It is said explicitly to correspond to what has been argued before about the relation of the Good and the world,1O with the only difference that it describes the ascent of man to higher knowledge, whereas before the opposite movement from the idea of the Good to the sun and visible things, intelligence and intelligible objects \I had been described. The point is that "Tomov TOlVUV, 1]v O'EYOl, "'aVat liE AEYEIV TOV TO!) ayaBo!) "KYOVOV, ov

tayO-Sov EYEVV110"EV a vaAOYO V EUU'tID, 0 n m~p auto tV to) vorrrm t07W) 1lpOt;TE VOUV Kat Ta VO!)I1EVa, TOUTO TOUtOV EV tOl opatOl 1lpOt; tE OIjlIV Kat ta OpOlIiEva." 12 The Good itself has established the primary analogy that then serves in the parable of the cave to illustrate the degrees of our knowledgeD Everything ultimately derives from the Good and is, insofar as it exists at all, in an analogical relationship to it - a relationship that has been established by the Good itself.14 Here we have in nllce Plato's whole ontology. It is common to distinguish in Aristotle between his use of analogy in his scientific writings (principally the Organon) and in the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean Ethics.I 5 Lloyd has furthermore pointed out that, although in the Prior Analytics l6 he had defined the criteria for a valid analogy - i.e. that it necessitates "(1) a careful induction to establish the general rule and (2) a

Greek Philosophy

deduction applying the rule to a further particular case ... ," 17 he does not himself in his scientific writings live up to this rigid standard. 18 Or contrariwise one could say that he has not given due attention to the "heuristic function of analogy" .19 Mary Hesse has questioned this strict distinction 20 by pointing out that common properties are only one aspect of scientific analogies and that they have to be amended in practice by similarities of relations. 2 I These she considers to be basic to the "metaphysical analogies": "analogy proper, it may be argued, is not reducible to identities and differences" 22 As metaphysics goes beyond the genera that provide the common properties it has to rely on the second aspect: "En OE Ta I1EV Kat' aplBliov Ecrnv EV, ta OE Kat' ElOOe;, ta OE Ka,a yEvoe;, m OE Kat' ovoAoytOv ... 1!23

As in Plato, analogy appears to be the ultimate principle of unity 24 And as in Plato the categorisation of the various uses of analogy in Aristotle that is pursued by some authors is interesting but ultimately not illuminating

17 1966, p.413.

18 "Yet ifin the Organon analogy is compared very un favourably with the syllogism, in the physical, biological and psychological treatises Aristotle uses analogies far more often than syllogistic arguments ... "(LJoyd 1966, pAI2). For a list of Aristotle's uses of analogical argument in science, see Bourgay 1957.

------------

19 Lloyd 1966,p.414. 20 1965.

10 RepublicS 17 alb.

21 c[ ihid., p.330. Typically these have not been seen as proper analogies and the above

11 cf. note 29 in Adam 1907, p.60 for the fidllist of the relations involved.

mentioned criticism of Aristotle's inadequate use of analogy resulted. This is to be

12 Republic 508 b/e. D cf. ibid., 514 a.

distinguished from Lyttkens' peculiar category of the npot;

EV

statements (c( 1953,

pp.53ff) that might find its historical explanation in Cajetan's (1498) first class of

14 cf'. also Phaidon 69b. From these thoughts the Neoplatonists took their ideas about the

statements, the analogy of inequality, that relies heavily on "dici per prius et posterius"

emanation of what is from God in whose mind the ideas were then located. TIlis scheme

(ibid., n.7) which he considers an "abusio" to designate as an analogy; cf also below.

was taken lip by Pseudo-Dionysos the Aeropagite in the Christian context and led to the development of the teaching about the ana/ogia entis. 15 But I must admit that I do not see what warrants Burrell's division into three classes

22 1965, p.333.

23 Metaphysics V,6; 1016 b 3 Iff. 24 cf Hesse 1965, p.334: "T]ms analogy is called in here precisely where its previous

and five styles; cf 1973, p.78ff.

definition breaks dovlln, that is, not to define a higher genus, but where there is

16 B24;68b38-69a 19.

gen"s, ... ".

110

higher

16

17

On Aflology

Greek Philosophy

as far as the intentions of these thinkers themselves are concemed 25 Perhaps this is one reason why Greek thought on analogy in general and Aristotle in particular are widely ignored in the contemporary discussion. 26 But there is one major difference from Plato. Aristotle takes care not to foil into the trap of creating a super-genus that would then again allow univocal application of the principle as ontological and epistemologicaI.27 In MetalJhysics Xf\,4; 1070 a 31 ffthis is systematically developed: Ta 8' atTla Kat at apxat aAAa aAAOJv EmtV OJ<;, EO"n 0' O}<;, av Ka(loAO\l AEYl1 n~

Kat KaT'

aVO-Aoytav, 'taUta naV'uov. ctnOPl1UEtE yap av "['1<:;

non-:pov Elf-pat 11 at autat apxat Kat aT01XEta teOV DUenO)\! Kat 'to)\! 1tpO~ n, Kat

1<:0.9'

etA}...' (lT01WV £1 taUTU nuvttHV: EK nov aUllOV yap EOtat "tU npoc; 't1 Kat 11 Duena. Tl auv TOUT' EateU; (0") OUK €ocr-tty apa naV'troy tau'tu cr't01XEtet. EKeta'tllv

Dll

tOOV KUtllYOPWJV OJl010l<:;.

In other words all metaphysical terms can only be applied analogically. There is no ultimate principle of unity: "atna Kat apXat aAAa aAAOJv EO"nv", but nevertheless we can say "Kat' avaAoytav" that they are the same for all. Only the AEYEtV brings them together. This would fit well with the famous remark "To OE ov AEYEtat IlEV 1toAAa~0l<;,"28 were it not immediately followed by "aAAa 1tpo<; EV Kat Iltav nva ~\l(l"(v."29 It seems that this is one of the strongest points in favour of Lyttkens' category of the !lpo<; EV statements and the subsuming of "being" under them 30 But the Greek text leaves open the possibility of relativising the importance of the 1tpo<; EV that

seems to make of substance a kind of super-genus that provides a common property for the different cases of application of the term. As the ways of application of ov enumerated in Metaphysics IV, 2; 1003 b 5-11 correspond to the categories, i.e. are of necessity trans-categorical and hence do not enjoy a common property, it would seem a very obvious contradiction31 Interestingly, Aristotle uses uytEta as an example to illustrate how causes are different in different things 32 and also uses it here in what according to Lyttkens would have to be a case of a statement according to a common principle (1tpoO" EV). But Aristotle says precisely "Kat O\lX of10}VU1l0}<; aAA' OJ(J"nEp Kat to UytEtvov

unav npoc; uytEtav,

'to OE J.1EV $U].,UtEtV, to OE

no

nOtEtV, to BE t(() O11J.1EtOV EtVat tllC; uytEtac;.rr 33

The various cases refer to the same ~uO"t~, but only analogically s034 flpo~ tV statements should thus not be considered a separate category35 Finally we should look at Aristotle's usage of analogy in the Nicomachean Ethics.3 6 Aristotle distinguishes the avaAoyta YEO}IlEtptK1']37

31 c[ Putnam 1981, p.53: " .. we must observe that 'of the same kind' makes no sense apart from a categorial system which says what properties do and what properties do 1I0t

count as simi1arities. In some ways, after all, anything is 'of the same killd as' anything else. "

32 cf. Metaphysics XII, 4; 1070 b 28ff. 33 ibid., IV, 2; 1003 a 34[ If one takes Tredennick's remark in the introduction to the

Metaphysics (Aristot1e 1933, p.xxxii) into consideration, that book XII was probably an

earlier work, this argument from the now later passage to the understanding of the present one becomes even more plausible, although it does not rely on it.

25 of Lyttkens 1953; Bourgay 1957; Lloyd 1966; Track 1978 for examples.

34 Tredennick's translation (" ... , but with reference to one central idea and one definite

26 cf. e.g. Palmer 1973. 27 For the relationship of the two see also Berti 1987, who otherwise does 1I0t contribute much to the question of the role of analogy in Aristotle.

characteristic, and not merely as a common epithet. Thus as tile term healthy... ") attempts

28 Metaphysics IV, 2; 1003 a 33. 29 ibid. 30

1953. p.53. Burrell (1973, p.83) is wrong in ascribing the identification of this

to buttress the altemative (Slid would therefore commend Lyttkens' interpretation) by separating with a full-stop where the original clearly adds a qualification with ()}um:p, and by rendering q,um<; as "definite characteristic". 35 c( also Berti 1987, p.95. ll1ere are other points where I would disagree with Lyttkens,

but they are not particularly important in this context.

category to 1. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelia" Metaphysics, Toronto

36 c( esp. Track 1978, pp. 632[ Note that his references for the Nicomacheall Ethics are

1963.

wrong; cf. also Mclnemy 1961, pp. 136ff

18

19

Of) Analogy

Greek Philosophy

that is to be employed in the case of the distributive justice that applies when communal goods are to be distributed,38 and the avaAoyta apISIlEnK'l39 that is to be employed in the case of the corrective justice that applies "EV TOI<; auvaAAaYllam Kat TOI<; EKoumol<; Kat tOI<; aKOUatot<;"40 and establishes "to IlEaov s'lllta<; Kat KEpoou<;,"41 The latter is therefore not of interes1 for our purpose: it simply restores the loss by taking away the gain and vice versa. The former on the other hand is quite interesting, as we here have to do with the relation of two proportions: "avaYKIl apa TO OtKalOV EV EAax)aTOt<; EtVat TETTapmv: 01<; OE yap OtKatoV tUnaVEI OV OUO Eanv, 1
This finding fits our observation that what Aristotle considers to be an analogy is a proportion that cannot be rendered in a univocal form of any kind. It is strictly basic 46 Mary Hesse probably draws the right conclusion from this observation - given the presuppositions of this distinction - when she asks "whether it is not in the concept of univocity rather than analogy that obscurity remains,"47 but of course she also rightly poin1s out that for the case of Aristotle this "would have little effect, since he in any case presupposes analogical predication. "48 I shall argue in what follows that this is not only specific to Aristotle, but that in one way or another we all have to presuppose it. It is not by abandoning univocity as the criterion of proper predication and replacing it with analogy that we can overcome possible problems, but by abandoning the whole scheme of dividing language into univocal, equivocal and analogical predication. But before arguing further for that thesis, we shall first look at the most profound protagonist of this scheme, namely St. Thomas Aquinas, who ingeniously employs both the ontological and the logical dimensions attributable to the principle of analogy, and at the contemporary debate.

37 Nicomachean Ethics 3; 1131 b 13ff.

38 39 40 41 42

cf ibid., Y, 2; 1130 b 30ft: ibid., Y, 4; 1132 a 2. ibid., Y, 4; 1131 b 25ft: ibid., Y, 4; 1132 a 19. ibid., Y, 3; 1131 a 19ft:

43 ibid., V, 3; 1131 b 16f This one would expect to he possible in the above mentioned

case (person (1) ~ person (2», as then a relation of object (1) :: person (1) ~ object (1) :: person (2) => object (1) :'. person (1) ~ person (2). [For the symbolism see note 1]. 44 ibid. In our example the II::" between the object and the person and the II",," between two persons are indissolubly different. We cannot ronn a continuous proportion according to the nile "too yap

EVI 00<;

object (I) :: person (1)

=

oum XP'ltat

Kat

151<; A.EYEt" (V, 3; 1131 b If), The fonn

person (I) :: person (2) is not correct.

4S ihid., V. 3; 1131 a 30f.

46 Cf. also his treatment of metaphor in Poetics 21 1457 b.

47 1965, p.33? 48 ibid., p.340.

20

21

0" Analogy

II. Analogy in St. Thomas Aquinas

The aim of this chapter is to show precisely what St.Thomas' systematic account of analogy consists of and what its presuppositions are. We will see that when he goes beyond the strictly logical he has to rely on a further principle, namely the similarity of cause and 'effect which then in turn, at closer inspection, is found to demand an analogical interpretation; thus again making analogy a basic principle, but with much more precise contours than his Greek predecessors had envisaged. While Plato had seen analogy as an ontologically founded principle and Aristotle had to presuppose it as basic logical principle, St.Thomas goes a step further and relates the analysis of the logical dimension of analogy to ontological distinctions. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council had declared "inter creatorem et creaturam non potest similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda. "49 This declaration could be seen as the background for St. Thomas' teaching on analogy 50

Sf. Thomas Aquinas

Although Mclnerny 51 is right to insist that analogical predication is primarily a logical affair, the distinctions St. Thomas draws within the category of analogical predications can only be explained on the epistemological and ontological level 52 On the logical level we can distinguish univocal and equivocal predication of a common name. A name is predicated univocally of different things if the predication is according to the same ratio and equivocally if the rationes are different. 53 This relies on the scholastic epistemology that describes our imposition of names as signifying not the res but a conception (ratio) of it formed by an act of understanding by the intellectus agens from the intelligible species received from our senses. 54 not thoroughly consistent in trus) that are "indispensable to language" as opposed to the traditional view that it is a question of usage. I will deal with his suggestions in more detail itl the next chapter. Dalferth (1981, p.631) has rightly criticised the focusing on transcendentals in the discussion on analogy, although I do not see who ~ apart perhaps

I

4Q DS 806. It is worthwhile citing the previous sentence as well, as it treats the subject of

from Davies (1982 and 1992) - might fall under that criticism. The class of the perfection-

perfection. which will be of great importance in St. Thomas' treatment of the Divine

predicates - which Dalferth ignores completely - is wider than that of the transcendentals.

names: "alibi Veritas ait: 'Estote .. , perfecti, sicut et Pater vester caelestis perfectus est'

'n,e discussion about the unity of St. lllOmas' account is I)artly based on the question of

[Mt. 5,48], ae si diceret manifestus: 'Estote perfecti' perfectione gratiae. 'sieul PHter vester

his use of examples. He has mainly three standard examples: "being" as used of substance

caelestis perfectus est' perfectione naturae, utraque videlicet suo modo: quia inter

and accidents; '11ealthy" - the example taken from Aristotle - and words applied to

creatorem ... "; cf. also belown.74.

creatures and Creator. I believe that this is a strong indicator of the unity of his teaching,

50 cf. also Mascall 1949, p.1 00, 11.2. I go along with McInerny (1961) that St. nlOmaS

as opposed to Mondin (1963; e.g. p.31) and others who believe rather that he uses the

has only one account of the subject. This view is shared by: Patterson (1933) - who

underlines chiefly the opposition to Maimonides' negative theology in which St. Thomas'

same examples to illustrate at different occasions different types of analogy; c[ also below. 51 1961.

teaching stands; Copleston (1955); White (1956) . who for some reasOIl (cf. p.26) holds

52 Indirectly McInerny admits that himself when in the chapter on nThe Division of

that St. °nlOmas' solution is Aristotle's; Montagnes (1963); Mondin (1963) - who holds the

Analogy" he ascribes all the distinctions beyond the twofold logical distinction to

s;une for Cajetan (cf p.51) and who focuses only on the theological use (cf. p.34);

differences in the rerum 11mum, i.e. considers them to he ontological differences.; cf also

Nicoletti (1987); Davies (1992) - who believes Aquinas' teaching to be easy (probably

Montagnes 1963, p.22, n.21. For the relationship oflogic and metaphysics in St. lllOmas

nobody shares that belief with him) and for some obscure reason holds Cajetan's

see also Colish 1968, I'p. , 15f I do not see how he can Jlossibly list Montagnes along with

slraightfoT\vard threefold division to he difficult (cf. p.70). TIle position that there is no ultimate consistency in the work of st. TIlOmas is held by: Colish 1968; Burrell (1973 and

e.g. McIllel11Y among those who COl1sider analogy to be "logical rather than metaphysical" (ibid. p.264).

1979); Track (1978) and Dalferth (1981). Burrell's account suffers from the fact that he

53 c[ McInemy 1961, pp.67ff TIle distinction derives from Aristotle1s Categories la.

helieves analogy to be a question of a certain class oftenns (cf 1973, p.21: although he is

54 cf Q.D. de I'ot., q. 8. a. I; cf. also S.n.. I" q. 12, a. 3.

22

23 St. Thomas AqUinas

0" A l1alogy

The equivocal predications can be further distinguished according to whether the different rationes are totally unrelated (pure aequivoce) or whether they bear some relationship. If there is a relationship, it can be either multomm ad unum or unius ad allemm. 55 Strictly speaking these are not diverse types but two aspects of one type. 56 So it is on the logical level really only one type of analogy that we have in St. Thomas. In both of the above cases we have the distinction of the ratio propria of "the thing which has the quality from which the word is imposed to signify, and normally we will take the word to mean that thing,"57 and the ratio communis by which several things are subsumed under a nomen commune. This ratio communis is also what makes us apply a common name univocally, only that in the latter case the ratio communis is shared equally by all instances, 58 while in the case of analogical predication we have a prime instance (to which the ratio propria applies) to which the other instances are related secundum prius et postelius 59 Purely equivocal predications do not share a ratio communis. If we now compare 60 one expression to the one that exemplifies the ratio propria we have a relationship unius ad allel7lm, if we compare two others amongst themselves a relationship multomm ad unum. 61

Thus far I have been dealing with the logical aspect of the doctrine of analogy that remains on the descriptive level of the usage of nomina for the Ihings as known by us. The confusion about the division of analogy in St. Thomas usually arises when his epistemological and ontological considerations come into the picture. Cajetan 62 in his attempt to unify the doctrine of analogy insisted that it is altogether metaphysical 63 and divided it into four classes that seemed to fit quite well with Thomas' distinctions in I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1. They are analogia inaeqllalitatis, analogia attribution is and analogio propOitionalitalis. The latter is subdivided into propriae and metaphorice. 64 Only the analogia proportionaiitatis propriae is considered to be analogy in the proper sense 65 Although immensely influential,66 this division is now commonly considered to be inappropriate at least as a rendering of St. Thomas' teaching,

pp.IO Iff for the example. He upholds the distinction, although Fig. 4 on p.l] 3 illustrates

57 Mcinerny 1961, p.81.

clearly that he probably means the same thereby, if perhaps only in the case of attribution oftenns that can apply properly to God. Cf also Montagnes 1963, p.80: la distinction en question apparait comme nne analyse plus precise de la dite theorie. En eifet Ie TemMe

58 They are usually members ofa genus.

et la nouniture sont appeles sains parce qulils Tetablissent on con servant la sante de

59 For the distinction see: Q.O. de malo, q. 7, a.I, ad I and also Mcinerny 1961, pp.67ft'

llanimal qui est comme un troisieme terme par rapport

55 cf. S.1ll. la, q. 12, a. I, ad 4; la, q. 13, a. 5. 56 "Pour S. TIlOmas, Ie rapport ad !Ullin! d6finit l'analogie" (Montagnes 1963, p.61 ).

60 It is Dalferth (1981, p.628) who has mtderlined "wie aus def Bedeutung von 'Analogie'

If •••

aeux, mais 011 pent aussi envisager Ie rapport direct de la cansatite qui relie directemellt Ie remede a la sante de I'animal. "; c[

mehreren GroBen, '" Es ist folglich 1m Ansatz verfeh1t [cf Burrell as an example],

also ibid., p.62, albeit his drawing the distinction within the analogy of being there somewhat blurs the picture.

Analogie als Begriffseigenschaft hzw. semantisches Merkmal von Ausdrticken verstehen

62 1498.

zu wollen. Sie ist vielmehr als Charakterisiemng einer besonderen ReT.iehung zwiscllen

63 cf Mclnemy 1961,1).2.

als 'propoltio' bervorgeht, handelt es sich bei ihr urn ein Verhiiltnis zwischen zwei oder

zwei Fallen der Priidikation desselhen Ausdmcks, hzw. zwischen zwei Verhaltnissen 7weier Pradikationen 7.lJ begreifen. If

61 In the recuning example of health (cf e.g. 8.111. la, q. 13, a. S; unfortlmately altered in the translation by McCabe), where health has its ratio propria in the animal, "healthy" as predicated of the diet and the animal would be a case of 1I11ius ad alterum, while when predicated of the diet and urine it would be nll/llorum ad unum.; c( Mascall 1949,

64 cf. Cajetanus 1498. Cf also Mcinerny 1961, pp.3ff; Track 1978, p.636 and Oalferth 1981, (lp.635ft' 6S and hence applicable to the problem of the Divine names.

66 cf. e.g. Patterson 1933, pp.24 Iff; White 1956, p.30f; Ross 1969 and 1981; Palmer 1973.

25

24

St. 7710mas Aquinas

0" Analogy

although for varied reasons,67 and accordingly many alternatives have been presented. 68 My own suggestion for the interpretation of St. Thomas' doctrine is the following: There is always in analogical predication on the logical level an instance of the ratio propria in relation to which the ratio communis of the other instances stand. This leads to a common form. The form being that one nomen is applied to different rationes of which none or one is an instance of the ratio propria and of which accordingly one or more others display a ratio communis secundum prius et posterius to that instance or to the ratio propria not instantiated in one of the instances considered 69 We can then within that basic fonn of the logical level further divide analogical predications according to the different possible relations that hold, not between the concepts, but between the res to which they refer. As we relate here the relation of the rationes to the relation of the res we have a relation of relations or proportionality.

In other words: On the level of logic I hold the analogy of attribution per prillS et posterius to be the only form of analogy. Proportionality is given when the ontological and the logical level are related,70 as we then have the relation of two rationes related to the relation of two res.

70 With this claim I hold the direct opposite of what is implied in Bochefiski's (1948) account in which be assigns causality a role only in the two fonns of analogy of attribution. (Feys (1949, p.265) confinns tllis obselVation.) But he does see their close relatedness in the same fashion as I do: "llle second kind of analogy of attribution is c1early derived from the first" (1948, 1).435). It could of course be that what he means by "causality" is not the same as what lllOmism usually associates with that idea, i.e. an ontological relation, but his example on p.435 (taken from st. Thomas) points to the opposite. For fhrther considerations about the ontological level as warranting the relationship of the two levels and about the presupposed epistemology see below. If one

67 cf Lyttkens 1953, pp.218ff; McInemy 1961; Mundin 1963, pp.35ff; Burrell 1973,

goes along with Colish's (1968, pp. I 42ff; esp. n.127) grouping of the interpreters of SI.

pp. t I off.

lllOmas into the Suarezians, who favour the analogy of attribution as the one and only

68 I cannot treat them in detail here. I hold that McInerny's treatment is stiU the most

va1id fonn of analogy, as opposed to the Cajetanians, who hold the same for the analogy

detailed and conclusive. Mondin divides Aquinas' work into an earlier and later stage and

of (proper) proportiona1ity, then by holding the above view I go counter to the "almost

distinguishes per prius et posterius from Im;us ad a/lerum, identifYing the fonner with the

universal agreement" (ibid .• p.144) that there is only one fonn of analogy in St.11lOmas

theological use, a distinction I do not share (see above). He suggests a fourfold division

and also against those positions that want the two fol1t1s somehow to balance each other's

(cf pp. 51 ff) the two basic categories of which are extrinsic and intrinsic attribution. J

deficiencies on the same level (cf ibid.; for an example see Mascall 1949). 111is does not

consider this to be a confusion of the logical and the ontological level that I am unwilling

mean that I subscribe to Colish's own sweeping criticism of almost all the work in the

to ascribe to St. Thomas. Montagnes distinguishes analogy of predication, which he

field, especially as he comes to a similar· rather superficial - conclusion as the last group,

identifies with the example usually given for what is commonly referred to as analogy of

i.e. that analogy of attribution is useful for stressing the similarities of God and creatures,

attribution, i.e. "being" as predicated of substance and accidents, and transcendental

while proportionality rather stresses the difference (cf. ibid., p.145). Analogy has to he

analogy, which he identifies with the example usually caned analogy of proportionality, i.e.

convincing as a general concept before it can be applied to predication about God. It

the names used of God and creatures. He completely ignores the fact that st. Thomas

cannot he that it is convincing only in the latter field. And even there Colish's position

consistently only talks about "dicere". Track even divides St.'nlOmas' teaching into three

seems rather to describe the problem of analogical predication about God -than answer it,

phases. Burrell in 1973 largely accepts the findings of the earlier writers and uses them in

or at least show how St. 1110mas tries to answer it. I of course strongly reject Burrell's

his own way. In 1979 he distinguishes "(1) by reference to one focal meaning (attribution).

claim that there are two approaches and that they are essentially conflicting (cf 1979,

and (2) by an ordered relationship among different uses (proportionately)"(p.55). As

p.57) for similar reasons, although Burrell tries to give his own account and tries to solve

mentioned above I consider these two types to be two aspects of single one.

on the pragmatic level (cf 1973) the previously unsolved - and by 11is definition insoluble:

69 cf n.61.

cf below.

27

26

Sf. 7110111a8 Aquiflas

011 Analogy

The distinction that follows results in three classes: There is an order pel' prillS et postenus either (I) in the rationes and not in the res, or (2) only in the res and not in the rationes, or (3) in both. This coincides with the distinction in I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad I: "Ad primum igitur dicendum quod aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter:" (I) "vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse; et hoc est quando una intentio refertur ad plura per prius et posterius, quae non habet esse nisi in uno .. ,"71 (2) "vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus communis, sed in illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus ... II (3) "vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentioni communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habet aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed differens secundum majoris et minoris perfectionis .. ,II All the while we have to keep in mind that we cannot derive from the order of names anything about the order of things or vice versa.72 Furthermore the order of understanding is still different from both. Sometimes it follows the order of naming - as often in the case of ordinary analogy, sometimes it is just the opposite - as in the case of metaphor 73

But we can see how the teaching about the ana/ogia entis could have arisen from the last category where difTerent degrees of perfection on the side of the res are expected to hold that are not said to correspond to the degrees of similarity between the rationes, though subsequent Thomistic thought presumed such a correspondence 74 Thereby it blurred the distinction of the logical and ontological levels. It is nevertheless true that "I'analogia predicamentale trova la sua fondazione in quella trascendentale"75 although not in the sense that Nicoletti proposes, who identifies the latter with the unius ad aite17lm as opposed to the level of predication where the duomm ad tertium (muitol1lm ad unum) can also hold 76 and sees the former as warranting the latter77 because of their same structure, but in a much more precise sense.

74 Especially because the example given is the relation of creature and Creator. I think it is 1I0t unlikely that with major e/ minor perfectio St. Thomas simply had ill mind the distinction of the COlUlCii between perfection by nature and by grace. TIle latter is of course by degrees; cf. also Masca1l's account of allalogia emis in 1949, pp.99f. He rightly caUs it Thomist 01' scholastic and does not (at least explicitly) ascribe it to St. 1110mas himself. 75 Nicoletti 1987, p.128. In MOlltagnes 1963, p.33 this same distinction is made within the analogy of being. lllat leads to difficulties in properly relating the logical and the olltologicalleve1. Despite his clear analysis of causality he comes therefore to the obscure claim that the proportionality by which we call God metaphorically is one of the two ways

71 The opposite case that the esse is in the posterior cases or in none of them is also

by which we resemble God, the other being the resemblance to the attributes of the

conceivable.

Divine nature (cf pp. 52f). To my mind it would be appropriate rather to see in the two

72 cf. Mcinerny 1961, p.161. The discussion about the remarks on analogy in De Veritale

types of Divine names the expression of two movements from opposite sides but relying

(q. 2, a. 11) which appear to be the most difficult to relate to the rest, can be summarised

on the same resemblance that is solely estabJished by God. Cf S. Th. la, q. J3, a. 6: "Sic

by consideration of their context (cf Montagnes 1963, pp.81ff). TIle emphasis is clearly 011 r~iecting the univocity of predicates about God and creatures that would warrant such

ergo omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicnntur, per prius de creaturis dicllntur

derivations. TIlis leaves equivocity as the only alternative, but not necessarily pure

creaturas. "

equivocity. "l1le text of De Veritate does not deny that there is a proportion

76 cf Nicoletti 1987, p.169.

1Ini1lS

ad

a/ferll111 in names common to God and creatures" (McInerny 1961, p.S?). It can therefore

be brought into line with Aquinas' other statements (cf ibid., pp.85fJ). 73 C.l f 'b'd 1 .,

p. 151 .

quam de Deo, quia dicta de dea nihil aliod significant quam simititudines ad tales

77 IlIn virtu del rapporto analogico trascendentale

epossibile, allora, estendere in qualche

modo [how 1] la nostra conoscenza anche al mistero dena natura di Dio e, di consequenza,

epossibile portare tale mistero allingllaggio" (p.169).

28 Oil

29 Sf. Thomas Aquinas

Analogy

It is not only in the special case of predication about God that St. Thomas has to show where the bridge lies between the res, the rafiones and the /lamina. The bridge for him is the form. All knowledge ttlr St. Thomas comes through the senses. Our infellecfus agens relates to the species infe/ligihiles impressa and then actively abstracts from them the form that individual things have maferialiter78 and forms an immaterial concept of them 79 Truth is the correspondence of this intellectual form to the form in rerllm natura. 80 The dimculty in St. Thomas' account is that he believes this correspondence has to be checked by comparing the concepts and the objects to which they are supposed to relate 81 This is only possible because for St. Thomas "intelligibility is a property of things in themselves"82 and the light of the intellect, the intel/eetlls agens, is seen as distinct from the contents of the mind, the rationes. As the active intellect is participated from God,83 the bridge between the res and the rationes relies on the inner teaching of God \\'ho is the emcient cause of both and fully comprehends them 84 Man's understanding is of course only incomplete as his relationship to God is by degrees and of necessity imperfect. Nevertheless, as God is the emcient cause of res and rationes their forms share in the same source and can

For analogy our main interest is the specific rationes about the relations among the res. Now relations in nature are primarily causal relations of various kinds 85 and causal relations are relations of forms relying on the continuity of matter. 86 If we have relation of forms in things we can also have knowledge about them, as for St. Thomas being is, as we have seen, by nature intelligible 87 But what about the special case of Divine names? All the above causes are for st. Thomas secondary causes. The primary cause is God who imparts existence to all of them 88 "He confers upon them at the same time their foml, their movement and their efficacy."89 Because he confers form on them, and because forms are intelligible we can get a formal knowledge of a cause of the effects.90 This conferring of form establishes a "proportio creaturae ad DeUlll ut causati ad causam. "91 85 St. 1110mas takes their classification from Aristotle.

86 cf. Gilson 1957, p.I79. 8? Colish 1968, I>p.118ff points out that this is not the same as to affim that it is fota/~~'

intelligible! (cf. esp. 11.19). 88 also called efficient as opposed to natural causes.

89 Gilson 1957, p.I82. Cf. also I Sent., d. 48, q. I, a. I; d. 19, q. I, a. 2; II Sent., d. 15,

therefore be said to be really related.

q. 1,3. 2, ad 4. TIlese may be matched to the fourth, the first and the fifth Way and all of these to the second!

78 For 8t. TIlOmas matter is the principle of individuation.

90 "Aquinas believes that a cause is responsible not only for the being of the effect (esse

79 80 81 82

e!Jeellls) but also for its fonn (forma e!Jecllls)"(Mondin 1961, p.87). Cf. also: " La

cf. I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. I. cf. Mclnemy 1961, p.46. cf. Colish 1968, pp.I20-122. Cf. also Mascall 1949, pp.53ff Colish 1968, p.I21.

relation de participation

aDieu dans I'odre de I'existence est d'une extreme simplicite dans a cause ... "(E. Gilson, La

la doctrine de S. TIlOmas. Ene se reduit au rapport d'effet

possibiliM philosophique de ta philosophie chr€tielJlle, RevSR 32 (1958), p.170; cit. in:

83 cf De al/imG, a. 5, ad 6. Cf also Colish 1968, p. 123.

Montagnes 1963,1'.60,11.98). This is expressed in the principle It omne agens agit simile

84 111is is reflected in the double status of truth that is not only "epistemological

sibi"(cf Mondin 1961, pp.86ff). Ifwe restrict ourselves to the fact that He is the cause,

condition" but also Itmetaphysical transcendent", Furthennore, as relation to God is a

we could apply all names to Him, as He is the cause of everything. Because of the

l11ora1 affair related to will, tmth is also a virtue as t1le relation to God is the basis for

difference of first and secondary causes (God transcends all genera) aU our names signity

proper understanding of His world (cf. Cotish 1968, p.I23!). It seems that Burrell (1973,

imperfectly with regard to Him ("omne nomen cum defectus est"; cf. McInerny 1961,

pp.141fl) does not see this precise rOle of the will in relation to knowledge in the

I'p·I56fl). 91 Exp. de Trin., q. I, a. 2, ad. 3; cf. also CG. III, 54, a. 6; S.11l. la, q. 12, a. I, ad. 4; cf. furthennore Montagnes 1963, p.S8.

understanding of God. On the difference of knowledge and ad 6.

win

see S:I1I. la, q. 19. a. 3,

30

31

011 Analogy

St. Thomas A quilloS

What all these effects share is of course the transcendentals ens, unum, vemnt, bonum and, as the cause is conceived as superior to the effects, the cause must also be so with respect to the possession of these 92 They are the predicates of perfection. But St. Thomas also gives other examples as well, such as wisdom 93 Presumably these others are revealed. In any case all tilese names are instances of our third ontological class,94 as opposed to metaphorical predicates about God where only the ratio - or more precisely some accidental aspects of it - is common 95 For them it holds that "omnium perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi."96 In God all the perfections fall together. The predicates of perfection are therefore a prime example for the difference of the orders of knowing and of being. Perfections in the created order participate in the perfection of God, but Thomas is careful to keep the two orders distinct and not to derive from the unity in the order of being one in the order of knowing and naming: UDeum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso, quae quidem perfectiones in Deo sunt secundum eminentiorem modum quam in creaturis. Intellectus autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas secundum quod sunt in creaturis, et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina. In nominibus igitur quae Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare,

scilicet perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut bonitatem, vitam, et hujusmodi, et modum significandi. "97 What the creatures have accidentally and by participation, God IS essentially: "unum quod participative habet formam, imitatur iIIud quod essentialiter habet. "98

It remains for me to give an evaluation of St. Thomas' accoltnt: (1) One main difficulty with it could be seen to lie in his epistemology, as here God is evoked to warrant the correspondence of res and rationes. But similar problems can be found in all non-solipsistic epistemologies and often these are even less elegant 99 97 S.l11. la, q. 13, a. 3. Cf also S.Th. la, q. 13, a. 4: "Ratio enim quam significat nomen est conceptio intellectus de re signifieata per nomeu.

Intellectus alltem noster, cum

cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones proportion3tas perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturis. Quae quidem perfectiones in Oeo praeexistunt lmite et simpliciter, in creaturis veTO recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sieut igitur

diversis

perfectionibus

creaturanlln

respondet

unum

simplex

principium

repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum varie et multipliciter, ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus intellectus nostri respondet ullum omnino simplex, secundum hujusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Oeo attributa, licet significent llnam rem, hunen quia significant eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, lion SUllt

92 cf

s:n,. la,

13, a. 6.

synonyma." This passage - especially the last sentence - also shows very well the strict distinction ofthe level of the res and the rationes.

93 cf ibid. 94 cf I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, •. 2., ad I.

98 Sent I, d. 48, q. 1, a. I. Note the use of forma to indicate what the participated consists oil C( also Sent. II, d. 16, q. I, a. 2, ad 5.

95 Note that metaphor for St. Thomas is a case of analogy (against Burrell 1979, p.63).

99 Cf e.g. Descartes, Meditat;ol1 Tl'oisiimle 32, where, relying on the same principle as

{Cf. S.

'nl.

la, q. 13, a. 5 and 6, where a diligent reading will reveal that the discussion of

St. 1110mas "c'est une chose manifeste par la lumiere naturelle, qu'if doit y avoir pour Ie

metaphor in article 6 is a further specification of the general case exposed in article 5. This

moins autant de realte dans la cause efficiente et totale que dans

means thllt not all cases of analogy are cases of literal usage (against Davies 1992, p.70).

the line of Anselm's ontological argument that the idea of God could not have come from

I.ater discllssion has given lip this classification and seen metaphor and analogy as separate

himself as a finite being: "Or ces avant ages sont si grands et si eminents, que plus

classes: one literal and the other figurative (d e.g. Soskice 1985, pp.67fl). It is this later

attentivement je les con sid ere, et moins je me persuade qu l'idee que j'en 3i puisse tirer son

S011

eifet", he argues in

rlistinction that Alston (1989, pp.39ff) has in mind, when he argues for the I)ossibility of

origine de moi sen!. Et par consequent if faut necessairement conc1ure de tout ce que j'ai

literal speech about God.

dil auparav3nt, que Dien existe" (ibid., 36). In the following meditations it is precisely this

96 S.'111. la, q. 4, a. 2. Cf Montagnes 1963, p. 56.

God who guarantees that one does not ultimately misconceive the world.

32 ()11

33

Analogy

Sf. Thomas Aquinas

(2) A more serious challenge to his thesis would he one directed against his claim that there is always a primary instance of the ratio propl1a

position we could judge that these are similar. If the primary cause is the ratio propria that only means that we have analogical predication. We do not know

to which the others are related. His easy examples tend at first sight to hide this prohlematic, especially as two of them (substance and accidents; God and creatures) rely on a specific metaphysical bias that was at his time commonly shared, but was later to be questioned. And is not morc said even in Aristotle's old example, health, than one could safely say without leaving the purely logical level? When the ratio propria is held to be present in the case of the animal - as opposed to diet or urine - does that not imply some precise ideas about causal relations between the various instances, in other words some ideas about the relations on the ontological level ? And does StThomas not in a way again represent the basicality of analogy that we have already found in Aristotle when he says: ".. 10

into which ontological subclass it falls. And in fact there is no way of knowing it in St. Thomas' system, as all knowledge relies on the relation holding between God and creatures, as we have seen above.' 03 Perhaps one might object that St. Thomas has appropriately established the existence of God by rational argument in the preceding S.Th. la, q. 2, a. 3. But a closer inspection of the five ways will show that these rely on the principle of the similarity of cause and effect, omne agens agit simile sibi, as well. 104

praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primuln non univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens," 100 thus questioning the whole strict division of these two types of predication? (3) A further major difficulty lies on the ontological level. We have seen that all is based on the fact that the primary cause, God, as a universal cause imposes form on all things. Now what kind of cause is the primary cause? S.Th. la, q. 13, a. 5, ad I states: "Causa igitur totius speciei non est agens univocum. Causa autem universalis est prior particulari. [There is, in other words, a relation per prius et posten·us.] Hoc autem agens universale,

lieet

11011

sit univocum, non tam en est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non

faceret sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogi cum " Burrell summarises the problem very well when he states: ".. the justification for analogous usage and the line of argument distinguishing it from the 'merely symbolic' theories ( ... ) itself depends on an analogous use of 'causel,fllOI Now even if we take simile as only referring to the secondary causes,102 we would still have the problem of having to ask from what tOO s.n. la, q. 13, a. 5, ad I. tOI 1973, p.132. Cf also Emmet 1940-41, p.36. 102 cf. ibid., p.236: "Aquinas will insist that God is the cause of each thing being a

cause,,,"

Today it is not only doubts about this principle as such (in the aftermath of Hume) that makes St. Thomas' account insufficient. The scepticism goes deeper. The knowability of God itself is first required to be established, and arguments for it cannot plausibly rely on a principle that is to hold univocally in the realm of creatures and between creatures and Creator. 105 Philosophers of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, with its background of empiricism and more recently Neo-Positivism especially have claimed that, as tbeological discourse belongs to the realm of statements that cannot be verified, I06 it cannot claim to have any information value. St. Thomas could still rule out

103 ef also Mase.1I 1949,1'.79. 104 cf. esp. the second Way and also Kenny 1969 and Geaell 1973, pp.l09ff, whose insistence on considering the relations of God and the world "as a wholeu goes well with our distinction of the relationship of the first cause to the secondary causes as such, as

opposed to their relations among themselves. 105 c[ Mascall 1949, p.94: "111el'e is, unfortunately, a recurrent tendency among

philosophers, in analysing the mental activities of human beings in general, to assume that until their analysis and criticism have been satisfactorily completed, nobody has the right to make any affinnations at alt; .. ," 106 In discussion in the philosophy of language the emphasis changed from verification to falsification and from there to the issue of having a method for falsification. See Dalferth 1981 for a lengthy discussion of the debate. Cf as an example for the quest for verification ralmer 1973, p. \34f.

35

34

St. Thomas A Q"iI10S

0" Analog),

such deep going agnosticism 107 by pointing on the one hand to the fact that f"cts about God, namely His existence, had indeed been rationally proved and on the other hand by pointing to the testimony of Scripture: "Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Oeo, nec demonstrari, sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra Apostulum dicentem, 'Invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, Dicendum est igitur quod hujusmodi nomina dicuntur de Oeo et creaturis secundum analogi am, idest, proportionem." 108

fields - theology being only one of them - indispensable,IIO so that the challenge of religious language is in turn deprived of sense. I II While the discussion following St.Thomas had been mainly about the ontological and metaphysical, in the 20th century it turned back to the logical and predicational. 112

110 cf Burrell 1973, p. 125: "The more aware we become of the wealth of uses of

Because St.Thomas' system was so systematic as to rely ultimately only on the principle of the similarity of cause and effect in an analogical interpretation, it was clear that one could easily lever it out by a criticism of that principle. The resulting lack of a convincing account of the rationality of religious language about God was eventually noticed and it was then charged as being ultimately meaningless.

'similar' or 'analogous to' already in our possession, the better able we shan be to delineate

In the next chapter I hope to show how recent discussion challenged the critics of religious language by using their own means against them. Had religious language been declared to be meaningless 109 the answer is now to try to show that use of analogy is not only in principle legitimate, but in many

(Colish t968, p.148).

their admittedly unusual employment in elucidating the ways we speak about God." Cf also p.243: "My strategy has been to expose the attitudes and convictions embedded in our ordinary usage, ... 111at strategy has aimed to create a climate in which our use of analogies in manx domains may be considered a respectable as well as an accepted fact.1I III This has the side-effect that the focus is on actual language use. This suits the

investigation of analogy well, as it is about just that. tlAnalogies ." are not heuristic" C(

Dalferth t98t, p.633: "Analoge Pradikation ... setzt spezifische

Erfahrung voraus WId versucht diese verstandlich kommunizieren;

WId

Zit

artikulieren uud damit anderen zu

diese Vorgangigkeit einer Erfahrung, die in illr zur Sprache komrnt,

unterscheidet sie von der Metapher." Cf also Mascall 1949, p.49: "In spite of all that has been said by positivists, logical and other, we do in fact find ourselves talking about God, and talking about him in a way that is significant." 112 A noteworthy exception is of course the discussion about the analagio elltis and the

analagio fidei by Przywara and Barth; cf. von Balthasar 1944 and 1976; Gertz 1969; Evans 1970; Mechels 1974; Zeitz 1982. The present study llfesupposes - against Barth107 His

O\V11

position has repeatedly been described as pnadellt middle-way between

pantheism and agnosticism. Cf e.g. MascaJl 1949. p.2S; Gilson 1957,1'.107.

that a philosophical approach to God, more specifically to language about God, is not only possible, but also necessary. It is precisely the immense gap between creature and Creator, that accounts of analogical predication about God struggle to bridge (and that Barth's own

108 S.Th. la, q. 13, a. 5.

theology has so effectively wlderIined) that Barth in practice ignores as a fundamental problem of the foundation of theological discourse and dissolves

109 cf Masca1l1949, p.97. See e.g. Camap 1932, Ayer 1936.

theological problem.

into an internal

36

37 Twentieth Celltru:J

On Analogy

III. Analogy in the Discussion of the Twentieth Century I shall focus in this chapter exclusively on the debate in the Anglo-Saxon context, as it seems to me that only here has the challenge of contemporary philosophy found an adequate response and led to a new paradigm in the debate of theological issues as well. ! !3 The first signs of the change can be found in the works of Mascall!!4 and Emmet. I 15 Dorothy Emmet gives a thorough criticism of Thomism in which she effectively points out the problem of the analogy of the First Cause. 116 Even if one accepts the principle that the effect resembles the cause, I 17 on which it is based, it does not solve the problem of warranting

113 cf. Wuchterl 1981, p.343; 111e situation Oil the Continent is slowly beginning to change - the work of l. U. Dalferth has been very important in that respect (cf. Wuehterl ibid. and Fischer 1990, pp.225f) - but no major effort has yet been made in the field of

analogy as a problem of religious discourse.

114 1949. 115 1945. 116 cf. ibid .. p. 188: "There may yet he some fimdamelltal relation or relations of finite actuality and absolute reality transcending it. But to describe this relation as that of things

talk about God, as it presupposes a common "universal structure of Being" II 8 that allows for an analogical predication about God despite His wholly otherness. Emmet sees the main difficulty with Thomism in the "problem of the objective reference of ideas." 119 In other words she rejects the epistemology of St. Thomas outlined above. Her formulation concerning the transcendentals shows the change very well: "And since we do not know how the divine attributes are realised in the divine existence, the Analogy of Proportionality in efTect tells us no more." 120 For St. Thomas it was sufficient to know fhaf they were realised. Knowledge of essence and existence for he .. cannot be separated. Maseall rightly criticises her for no! discussing Thomist epistemology: "in consequence her exposition and criticism of the Thomist use of analogy is left altogether hanging in the air." 121 Unfortunately he also fails to give a critical discussion of it. But before I tum to Mascall's account I shall briefly discuss the alternative presented by Emmet. "Experience ( ... ) grows out of situations of relatedness" 122 to the "otherness of existence ( ... ) beyond Ollr owr experience." 123 It is interpreted "through symbolic forms." 124 These arE organised in patterns about which we can communicate 125 and which arE integrated into scientific models. This process in turn can be reflected on ane brought under metaphysical models. 126 On every level the relations of th,

to a 'First Cause' will not do, unless more explicit recognition than we find in St. Thomas' Five Ways is given to the fact that the word 'cause' can here only be used analogically. And if the word 'cause' is here only used analogically, can it define the relation in virtue of which we draw analogies ?" 117 Palmer (1973, p.57) has pointed out that this is "a basic principle of thought. that is

118 Emmet 1945, p. 188. 119 ibid.

t ... ) olle which can hardly itself be established or refhted by further argument." 111at might

120 ibid., p.187; emphasis mine.

be the reason why Astley (1978, ppA21 f) finds no convincing arguments for it. It could be

121 122 123 124

seen as a more sophisticated version of the simple idea that the greater cannot come from the lesser (cf Mascall 1943, p.37ft). Certainly it is particularly appropriate in a metaphysics that is based on the distinction of actuality and potentiality and must not be

1949,p.l77. 1945,p.19!. ibid., p.190. ibid., p.19!.

shared by those whose metaphysics operates on a different basis. Nevertheless I doubt that

125 "... the fact of communication indicates some degree ofresemblance of the structura

more than ad hominem arguments could be put forward against it. 'ne 1110mistic system

patterns ofthe experience of one observer and that of another" (ibid., p.192).

as such is self-consistent (cf. also Ross 1981. pp.23falld Emmet 1940-41 on metaphysical total assertions; esp. pp.39fI).

126 TIle whole upyramid of different levels of abstraction" (ibid., p.192) has six levels: (3 variations in the physical wor1d; (b) variations in the physiological responses; (c

38

39

all Analogy

Twentieth Centw}'

lower level are brought into a new unity. This whole concept could be described as an "analogical account of experience" as on each level we have a structural proportion to the lower level. 127 We do not get to the experienced world as such apart from OUT ways of organising OllT experience. We have no way of establishing that these are correct either. In a sense the separation of God and creatures is here repeated, as that hetween concepts and the physical world and the bridging principle is the same: analogy. The account also shares the traditional deficiencies: If we don't know what the world essentially is, how do we know OUT concepts about it to be adequate? 128 What is left for knowledge about God is only the possibility of "some revelation ab extra" 129 which leaves open the question of how this is to transcend experience. Emmet seems to prefer to point to "basic experience of awareness" and the IIjudgements of ,importance III in the drawing of "likenesses

------.~.~---

..

-

psychological sensatiOtis; (d) perceptual objects; (e) theoretical interpretations in physical

science; (I) metaphysical models (cf. ibid., p.193). 127 " .. this does not give us knowledge of the intrinsic nature of events in the external \\lorld. independent of our perceptual experiences, and is, it seems, a limit we must accept.

and distinctions." 130 These seem to me to be related to what Ramsey calls 'disclosures' and I will treat these in more detail below. If the "creative awareness!! that "seems to come of grace"131 is supposed to warrant our analogies and models, then the problem of Thomist epistemology, which Emmet had pointed out herself, "the objective reference of ideas", is only reiterated and ultimately solved in the same fashion: by appeal to a higher power. Mascall proposes to avoid these difl1culties, at least for predication about God, by locating the doctrine of analogy not before but after the establishment of God's existence.132 In other words he goes back to the Thomist distinction of the knowledge of existence and essence that Emmet had rejected. But of course he shares with her the background of postDescartian and post-Kantian modem philosophy that was so intensely concerned with the generation of OUT concepts. I assume that this is what leads him to postulate that "In saying 'God exists' and 'God causes the existence of finite beings', all that we mean by God is 'that which exists selfexistently'. God is not defined by fanning a concept of him, but by affirming his mode of existence, and existence is not conceptualizable." 133 I consider this to be strange epistemology and a confusion of the orders of the logical and the ontological, as the whole argument relies on a certain concept or definition of God, namely "that which exists self-existently". We cannot "afl1rm the mode of existence" of something without knowing anything else about it, at least what makes it a something. If existence is not

We can. however, say that if we can establish structural relations within perceptual

experience and fonnulate them accurately, there are likely to be stmctural relations in the ext ental world which they do not necessarily repeat, but to which they bear some

130 ibid., p.213. Cf. also 1940-41, p.30: "His [the metaphysician's] system is a

systematic proportion" (ibid., p.192; emphasis mine).

Weltanschauung, that is an intuition of and response to the world from the standpoint of

128 Cf also Mascall 1949, p.178, who criticises Emmet on the ground of self-

some particular kind of intellectual or spiritual experience. It

applicability: "It is difficult to criticise [Miss Emmet's doctrine of the relation of the

131 ibid.

contents of mind to extra-mental reality] directly, but it is perhaps valid to suggest that it is

132 1949, p.95: "We can arrive at the existence of God without explicit recourse to

difficult to see how the tmth of this doctrine is compatible with the knowledge ofits truth.

analogy, while it is impossible to think about the divine nature without conceiving it as

Ifan our perception is inevitably distorted, how can we become aware of this distortion." I

equivocal, univocal or analogical to our own."

personally would 110t rely only on this argument, as almost any philosophical theory could

133 ibid., p.88. The passage continues: "God is, of course, given to us in a concept, but

he shown to have its weak point in that respect.

not in a concept of God; he is given to us in the concept of finite being, which declares its

129 1945,1'.211.

dependence faT existence on a transfinite cause. II

Twentieth ('em",)'

On Analogy

conceptllalizable, as Mascall repeatedly affirms, we really don't know anything if we "define God ... in terms of his self-existence." 134 Mascall's argument leads him to postulate the
existence of a self-existent being that is held to be non-conceptual, but "no statement ahout him can remain in the essential or conceptual order: it passes over imlllediately into the order of existence and judgement." 136 In this Illanner he believes that "analogical knowledge abo lit God and ( ... ) analogical discourse about him can be maintained. II 137 What was distinct for St. Thomas comes together for Mascall: " ... the two sides of the formula [of an analogy between goodness in a finite being and in God] are held together by that analogy of attribution which asserts, not merely in the conceptual but in the existential order, that finite being can exist only in dependence upon God." 138 The principle that everything relies on, the relation of God and creatures, is of course the same as in St. Thomas, but how the analogy of attribution can assert anything in the existential order remains open.139 Predication is a matter of concepts. Mascall does not explain what

affirmations without concepts could be and he fails to give an epistemology to explain the relation of predications, concepts and realities. 140 Ramsey's philosophy of religious language is in many respects similar, but different in some important aspects. God for him is the 'more' of the

universe and as that is given in experiences of revelation I disclosure: "there is no possibility that the word 'God' might have no reference." 141 This leads to a distinction where Mascall insis1ed on non-distinction: ".. statemen1s concerning God involve I(lf Ramsey an incorrigible element ('God exists') and a corrigible, descriptive clement" 142 But in order to be appropriate, the descriptive element has to conform to the fact that God is considered to be the 'more' of the universe. This is accomplished by Ramsey's talk of models and qualifiers. 143 While the models are taken from the universe, the qualifiers are thought to accomplish anew the disclosure of a 'more' by stretching a model to a point where it can become obvious (for whomever "the penny drops" and "the light dawns") that what is really aimed at is not a quantitative extension of the model, but a qualitative difference. t44 Thus, for example, "infinitely good" 145 is not a member of a series of good beings, each of which could be thought to be still better, but is beyond that series. If this logical structure is given through an appropriate qualifier, every model can be applied to 'God'. "This is only saying of course, in another way, that in principle God may be discovered at every point in his creation." 146

134 ibid. 135 ibid. 136 ibid .. p.119. Cf also p.170: "Each of the arguments lellds simultaneously to an

140 This is particularly unsatisfactory in view of the fact that in 1943, ch.4 and 1971, ch.3

affinnatioll of God's existence as self-existent being and to an analogical knowledge of some of his attributes." TI1is milTors St. TIJOrnas' idea that in God all His attributes are one

he has clearly underlined that he agrees - over against Hartshome - with a distinction of

as His essence, but St. 1110mas certainly never thought that

reflects the deficiencies of the ontological argument he explicitly criticises himself 141 Evans 1971b, p.135. 142 ibid., p.137.

there is an "existential

element in all our affirmations about God" (ibid., p.119), a fact that can be i11ustrated by his rejection of the ontological argument. Cf Gilson 1924, p.4 1: "TIlere is therefore no contradiction in assel1ing that God does not exist." If one were to follow Mascall's account that would have to be the case. 137 ibid. 13R ibid .. p.120. 139 Mascall is unfortunately not the only one to maintain this confiIsioll. Cf e.g. Nicoletti 1987.

logical and ontological necessity (cf 1971, p.49). His argument therefore somewhat

143 cf 1957, pp.49ff. Examples in 1957 are first (qualifier) cause (model) (cf pp.61f!); illfillitely wise (cf pp.65f); illfillitely good (cf pp.66f!); creation ex lIihilo (cf pp.71f!) etc.. In later works Ramsey collapses the two categories, speaking of "disclosure models." 144 Evans (1971b, p.127) lists eight types of examples for a disclosure ofa 'more'. 145 1957, pp.66ff. Cf also Evans 1971b, p.219. 146 1957, p.SO.

42

43 7\t'entieth Century

0" Analogy

Ramsey is aware of the inherent danger of such a position, namely that any word could then be used of God. 147 He discusses it using 'evil' as an example.! 48 He remarks that he sees the threat in the close similarity of the logical structure of the word 'devil' to that of the word 'God' that threatens to break the 'more' of the universe into a dualism. He then goes on to present four possible ways of dealing with the problem. What he does not do is explain why there is for him a problem and why it comes in this precise form. Why does the 'more' have to be a unity and why would admitting 'infinitely evil' without further qualifications destroy that unity? I-Ie cannot have it both ways. Either 'God' is simply the 'more' and hence void of any informational content or he is not. If the disclosure event can take place with any model and has no inherent structure, I cannot see how legitimately "models of God can be and always are being [that I willingly grant] taken away, criticised, graded and ordered, It 149 But there is another problem with Ramsey's suggestions. It is again to do with the distinction of the logical and the ontological. Disclosures are certainly an experiential alTair and if one follows Ramsey's definition of 'God' they can reveal 'God'150 But this only says something about facts of experience. [t is in no way clear why this should lead to a unique status for Ihe word 'God'.151 Again of course Ramsey claims this only to be the case in

connection with a qualifier, but the qualifier is itself only a word or concept. Ramsey himself repeatedly admits l52 that his account of the structure of the qualified models is only one possible version. Certainly a convincing one, but a product of his modeJ-making, not an explanation of an inherently given logic. The whole could still be justified, but only if an analogy of the relation of I and particular disclosures, and God and the universal disclosures, is presupposed 153 - and that is precisely the question. The most devastating recent critique of analogy comes from Humphrey Palmer. He focuses on the difficulties for argumentative theology 154 that he believes to arise from the lack of clarity of argmnents involving analogous tenns. IS5 This derives from his strict requirements for argument that do not allow for any unspecified qualification of terms 156 This must be taken

152 Cf formulations like: "Let us see how this phrase can be given a structure .. ,"(1957, p.65; emphasis mine); IIIInfinite good' is to be given the same kind of logical structure ... "

(ibid., p.68; emphasis mine); cf. also ibid., p. 71; p.75 etc. -----._-----

153 cf Evans 1971b, p.140: "How does the transcendence of God transcend the

147 ibid.: "In fact there is no word which, in principle, cannot lead to a story which might

transcendence of I ?"

evoke the characteristic situation in which God is known. It

154 cf. 1973, p.1I0.

148 cf. ibid .. pp.81ff. 149 1965, p.89. Cf. also Mascall 1971, p.36 on the danger of "minimal definition[sJ of

ISS cf ibid., p.141: " I say that analogy is ahnost as bad for argument as is outright

nature. "

ambiguity"; cf also e.g. p.84. t S6 cf ibid., p.131ff, where he discusses the objection that unspecified qualification occurs in science as well. He obviously believes that metaphorical (and therefore

150 Evans (1971 h, p.139) points out that it is tlot quite clear how particular 'mores' and

unspecifically qualified) elements of scientific theories are only an intemlediate state

God in arguing for hjs existence and a much more ample definition in discussing his

the universal 'more' are related. This could be seen as an indication of the continuing

("TIlese ladders can be thrown away once we are standing on the wall" (p.133». TIlis

impact of Ramsey's early idealist orientation. Cf Astley I 984b, p.167: "It is when Ramsey

presupposes that fonnalising a theory so that it "can be cashed at any timeH (ibid.) means that it changes to the status of ultimate certainty. It seems that the Wlitings of Mary Hesse

occasionally slips back to his old Idealist ways that his later philosophY of religion lays itself most open to criticism." 151 cf e.g. IQS7, p.66: " ... the qualifier 'infinite' has now a second function. It claims for 'God' a distinctive logical placing, a presidential position over the whole language route."

(1963 and 1967), and more recently Janet Martin Soskice (1985), have shown the opposite to be true. How else could we account for the revisability of scientific theories? It is precisely their metaphor-rich models that alter in the process.

44

45

011 Analogy

Twentieth Century

together with his demand that the principle of inference is to hold l57 I believe that this shows that he disregards the classical and scholastic distinction of demonstrative and dialectical argument. He only considers the former. But as even some proponents of analogy as valid argumentative principle share in this view, I shall first see whether his claims cannot be rejected on the basis of his own standards. The most notable effort in this direction has been made by Joseph Maria Bocheiiski. He formalises the relation of two linguistic tokens into an octadic relationship of two signs (a,b) for two contents (f,g) of two things (x.y) in two languages (I,m).158 The difference of language is disregarded and the signs are to be the same so that we come to four possibilities:

"No. a,b

I,m

I.

l[somorphicJ=

2.

I

f,g

respectively. 161 Analogy can therefore only be a subclass of one of these two. Bocheiiski (with Aquinas) reasonably opts for the equivocal. Everything therefore rests on how the contents f and g are related. For analogy they have to be somehow similar. The interesting part is the analogy of proportionality. 162 Bocheiiski considers two accounts of it. In what he calls the "alternative theory", which he attributes to Cajetan,163 there is an "analogatum commune, namely, the alternative of f and g, symbolically f u g."164 Syllogismsl65 that involve analogous terms are not valid on this view if they involve more than one analogous term, as then the one remaining univocal term can no longer eliminate the one alternative content that in a specific case does not hold,166 as is the case when only one term is analogous. But in theology and metaphysics there are two analogous terms

x,y

3.

4. No. I. is the description "of names which are semantically identical in spile of being (physically) two names."160 In No.3. again the things are the same and we refer to them with the same sign, only in a different mode. Only 2. and 4. remain, and these are the univocal and equivocal cases

161 Bochenski goes to the trouble of proving that there can be no third between them (cf ibid., pp.430fi), so that the following remark is necessary. 162 Analogy of attribution is "based on the relation of cause and effect" (Feys 1949,

p.265) which is "a pentadic relation between two things, two contents and a peculiar

dyadic relation between the things." (Bochefiski 1948, p.435), so that the relation of the contents is based on a not further specifiable relation of things: ItAt[tribution, analogy of] (a,b,I,f,g,x,y) . ~ Of . Ae[quivocity] (a,b,l,f,g,x,y) . (3R) . C (f,',R,g,y) v C (g,y,R,f,x)" (ibid.) for the ana/ogio

UlZ;IIS

ad offerum or UAt[tribution, analogy of] m[any to one]

157 cf ibid .. p.S3. The principle of inference is of course itself very much under

(a,b,I,f,g,x,y) .

discussion til the philisophy of science today (cf. e.g. Putnam 1981, pp.113ff, Feyerabend

ona/ogio mll/torum ad unum.

1975). 158 S (a,l,r,,) and S (b,m,g,y) => R (a,b,l,m,f,g,x,y); cf 1948,1',425; cf .Iso Feys 1949

J63 cf ibid., p.436. I believe this is the SAme theory as the one Ke.rney (J974, pp.232fl)

for an excellent summary. The elements Bocheiiski enumerates of course strongly reflect

his Thomistic background and its presuppositions could be criticised. ll1is is, however, not

~ Of .

(3 c,h,z) . At (a,c,I,f,h,x,z) . At (b,c,J,g,h,y,z)" (ibid.) for the

discusses as Utheory of'analogous concepts',!!

164 ibid., p,437. 11lis gives rise to the definition: "An[an.logy of] p[roportion.lity] (a,b,I,f,g,x,y)' ~ Of· Ae (.,b,J,f,g,x,y)' (3 h)· f~ [g u hl" (ibid.).

significant in the present context, as what we are looking for is simply a possible

165 Bocheflski points out what Palmer seems to ignore: "... all tenns used in current

alternative position to Palmer's.

Fonnal Logic are univocal symbols. Here, however, the situation is different, as we have

159 Bochefiski 1948, p.428. 160 ibid.

to deal with analogical names" (ibid.).

166 cf ibid., pp,437ff

46

17

0" Analogy

]\J'enlielh Celll1lr),

involved. 167 On the isomorphic theory, which Bochenski attributes to St. Thomas, there is "an identity, not between the contents meant by both analogical terms, but between some relations holding between the first (I) and its thing (x) on one side, the second (g) and its thing (y) on the other." 168 This identity is more precisely a formal one, an "isomorphy of these relations" 169 The proof of the validity of a syllogism involving analogous terms is now easy, but everything relies on "C .. ) P C· R . Q C· R . REForm. By 'Form' we mean the class of all formal relations ... ," 170 i.e. the isomorphism. The problem with this is that the isomorphy of the relations P and Q "might be [and is] treated as an argument of 'Anp'."171 This mirrors the traditional claim that analogy is itself analogical, which is probably on that account not to be doubted, but seems a bit flimsy when it is involved in the proof of the validity of Boehenski's isomorpohism-account of analogy. 172 Self-application is not a sound procedure in logic. Feysl73 and Dalferth l74 have made a similar objection by demanding further specification of the isomorphy, thus bringing up the dilemma that "Mit

Hilfe des Isomorphiebegriffs gelingt es Bochefiski den in der analogen Priidikation durchgehaltenen univoken Kern des Analogon als die strukturellen Eigenschaften der ins Verhiiltnis gesetzten Relationen zu bestimmen,"175 but it was precisely univocity that Bochefiski had set out to avoid and had in fact excluded by proving analogy to be a subclass of equivocity.176 Interestingly Palmer does not give a reason for his claim that "To this IBochefiski's] cure some may prefer the disease," 177 and one understands why Ross believes it "Needless to say, he [Palmer] does not understand the classical analogy theory as it has been interpreted here [by Bochefiski]. And he is entirely unaware of the importance of analogy and equivocation to philosophy oflanguage." 178

God is good' not only 'being' but also 'good' must be analogical" (ibid., p.441).

Further amendments are made by Track, 179 who introduces "formale Eigenschaften" that describe not only - as Bochefiski's "strukturelle Eigensehaften" - the logical relationships of terms, but also how they are introduced "in bestimmter gleicher Weise in unseren Sprachzusammenhang." 180 Dalferth correctly observes that "Die gesuchte Gemeinsamkeit zwischen den Analogaten wird damit als univoker Fortbestand von Teilintensionen eines Ausdrucks in verschiedenen Priidikatioflen bestimmt,q 81 In other words the problem is still the same as for Boeheftski.

168 ibid .. p.442. 169 ibid. "The definition becomes: ( ... ) An (a,b,I,(g,x.y) .

But would not the wlivocal core be the thing that Palmer at least is looking for? He is not impeded by the strict alternative of univoeity and

167 "For

II

syllogism of these sciences has not only analogical middle terms, but also

analogical major teons; e.g. when we write 'if every being is good and God is a being, then

~

D[ . Ae (a,b,l,f,g,x,y) . (3

PJ») . fPx . gQy . PsmorQ" (ibid.) where the capital letters for the relations indicate that they peltain to a higher level. 170 ibid .. p.445. 171 ibid.

172 It seems to me that a IIcorrect fonnulation tr of the assertion Ittltat the name 'analogy' is

174 1981, p.64Iff. 175 ibid., p.642. 176 c[ 1948, pp.430ff.

an analogical name" (ibid., p.433) could also involve set-theoretical problems, namely that of a class being member of itself, unless understood in the sense that "analogical name" is a descriptive term on a meta-level. But it would then have to be itself univocal if it is to

means to "reduce [a word] almost to vacuity." This could perhaps be the kind of criticism Palmer has in mind.

comprise all cases of analogous names. If his "exact definition" (ibid., pA2S) is intended to be just that, then I fail to see how he can still call "analogy" an analogous name without pointing to the markedly different use of the term in the second instance.

173 1949, p.266.

177 1973, p.180. Kearney (1974, p.236) claims BocbeHski's focussing on formal terms

178 179 180 181

1981, p.214. 1978, p.646[ ibid., p.646. 1981, p.643.

48

49

all Analngv equivocity, and holds analogy to be a third in the middle,182 so one would Ihink this should suit him, But apart from the difficulty of Bocheflski's selfreferent proof, mentioned above, it is Palmer's conviction that "if a teml in the premise of an argument is used in a special sense, we must ensure that it is used in precisely the same sense throughout or the argument will fail for ambiguity," 183 He thereby rules out any account that would try to prove the validity of an argument involving temlS that vary in a systematic fashion simply because they vary at aiL 184 Due 10 the dialectical characler of argument in theology and metaphysics the failure to provide such an account does not necessarily mean that the theory of analogy has failed, Palmer himself considers possible alternative accounts, namely ttcontextual detennination of meaning," 185 "family resemblance"186 and "borrowing,"187 I have already considered the last, where he argues that science were distinct from e,g, theology in that it could "cash" its models, His arguments against a language-game-account of

182 cf 1973,1',15, 183 1973, p.17; emphasis mine.

184 Keamey (1974, pp.227ff), who also argues that liTo the extent, therefore, that a

secondary meaning is not further detennined (... ) no specific inference at all is justified" (ibid .. p.227f) because it means "to be completely ignorant which inferences actually are vl1Jid" (ibid., p.22?), proposes that they can be specified by applying the "Principle of Maximum Univocitylt (cf ibid., p.23?), hut I doubt that this would convince Palmer.

Although it specifies the analogy by including into its implicit definition the denials that are characteristic of an analogy (e.g. the "total denial of any materiality or imperfection in the

Twentieth Century

analogy is simply a reiteration of his criticism of the classical account of analogy: "As arguments become doubtful if ambiguous it is necessary to limit each term in them to a single sense," 188 The possibility of this is of course precisely what the family-resemblance theory denies, What Palmer seems not to understand is that this is not intended as a normative theory but is held to be a description of how language in fact works,189 Asking for a different nonn as counter argument will therefore not work. At this point two groups will simply have to part ways: Those who want to reflect on actual use and then as a second step try to explain how it works - this is what almost everybody does, and those who - like Palmer - want to see a most rigid criterion fulfilled first (and drop the whole thing if actual use does not live up to it), But there is another difficulty with the language-game account of analogy as presented above following Palmer's description of it It completely neglects the insight that lies behind accounts such as Bocheiiski's, namely that the similarities between two analogical occurrences of a linguistic token are not simply fortuitous, Palmer, in his chapter on "contextual definition of meaning," himself accepts that "It is true that 'the meaning is in the use.' It is not often true, as a matter of linguistic history, that the meaning in one type of context has arisen quite independently of the usage of that same word elsewhere, (",) Even if a specialised meaning is learnt independently, as though it were a new word, the best way to explain it to others is usually by modification of the general meaning found in ordinary use," 190 This seems to be sufficient reason for him to measure the specific use (of e,g, theology) against the ordinary use as normative, and reject it if it cannot be clearly translated back. By this he

attributes of God" (ibid.», it remains open why "whatever is entailed by the primary predication ora word is also entailed by a secondary predication" (ibid.) should be a valid principle. We know (by the "Principle of Maximum Univocity") what elements are to be

188 ibid" p, 130,

excluded. Bllt how do we know that these are all the (relevant) elements? Moreover, is an

189 cf. Wittgenstein PI 67: "fch kann diese Ahnlichkeit nicht besser charakterisieren als

analogous word really adequately described as being constituted ofullivocal and equivocal

durch das Wort 'Familienahnlichkeiten" ( ... ) Wenn aber einer sagen wollte: 'Also ist allen

elements?

185 ibid" pp, 113fT.

diesen Gebiiden etwas gemeinsam, -namlich die Disjunktioll aller dieser Gerneinsamkeiten' so wiirde ich antworten: hier spielst du nur mit einem Wort."; cf also PI 72: "Das

186 ibid., pp.125ff.

Gemeinsame sehen. "

187 ibid" pp, 131 fT.

190 1973,p,123,

50

51

0" Analog)'

confounds historical and logical orders. 191 He would have to show that the specific use is always a subclass of the ordinary use for the argument to hold. Even if this were the case (as it is obviously not) he would be in trouble, as then his argument against analogy on the grounds that it lacks the common features that would make an argument involving it valid would collapse, as a subclass must by definition share in the features of its general class. It would appear that considerations of this kind have inspired Ross to his sophisticated account of how analogy works. l92 He leaves out all considerations of historical genesis. 193 His basic model is that of preNc\\10nian physics: Everything is normally at rest and what has to be explained is any change of that situation. In the case of language this means thai a word is univocally the same, indifferent to a number of possible predicate schemes (linguistic inertia),194 unless its context forces it to change, i.e. to be limited to certain schemes or some members of some schemes or both (linguistic force),195 The predicate scheme consists of the words that could be substituted for a given token without changes of environment l96 and are meaning-relevant for that word. 197 These are typically near synonyms,198 contraries, intermediates, opposiles, privatives, elc. 199 With this model, analogy of meaning can be described as systematic

Twem;eth Century

overlap of two predicate schemes 200 from which some meaning-relevant near synonyms can be taken and used to replace the analogical token without, by the resulting differentiation III the environment, becoming merely equivocal 201 These near synonyms are of course what warrants the validity of an argument. That the replacement sentences are to have "roughly the same meaning" means that we have to do with a descriptive theory or rather a method for description. We have to consider every single case and then judge whether this is the case. In other words, there is an implicit appeal to the pragmatic in Ross' account 202 This is a drawback, especially with regards to the theological debate, as undoubtedly some would argue that the dominance 203 of expressions such as "God" is so strong that the schemes of the words under their influence are so much restricted that only mere equivocation 204 can result.

ibid.), as he does not employ them to explain his definitions of analogy. ] assume that fhrther investigation into them could deliver some of the reasons why predicate schemes differentiate in a certain manner.

200 cf ibid., DeflV-2, p.95£ -

...

--.~-----~

20 I The resulting sentence will still have approximately the same meaning.

1q I I am not saying that certain proponents of the language-game theory would not see

202 Ross' account is at this point not completely consistent, as a judgement would involve

them as interrelated, Wittgenstein himself would be a case in point, but Palmer had

the subjective predicate schemes (cf ibid., Def 111-13, p.83) and not the objective ones

rejected their account.

(d ibid., Def 111-5 and 111-6, I'p.62f). So we could only get at subjective analogies as

192 Although he never explicitly revised his views expressed in 1969b, I believe his more recent exposition to be far superior, also because it does not claim to be an analysis of

well, leaving open the possibility that something is only thought to be an analogy while it is in fact a mere equivocation (cf ibid., Def IV-I, p.88). It is hard to see how on Ross'

St. Thom8s' account.

account a case of this sort could be detected (unless he accepts a consensus-theory of

193 194 195 196 197 198

truth). I believe this problem is what Quine also refers to, although in a different context,

cf cf cf cf cf cf

1981, p.25. ibid., p.3. ibid. ibid., Def 111-4, p.59. ibid., Def 111-9, p.68. ibid., Def 111-14, p.84.

199 cf. ibid" pp. 40ff. I leave out his interesting remarks on predicate mode (pp.l31 f) that

also differentiale meaning and are probably nol independent of the predicate schemes (cf

when he states: "Interchangeability salva veri/ate [I take it that this is precisely what is going on in the test of Itreplacements with roughly the same meaning U ] is meaningless ,mtil relativized to a language whose extent is specified in relevant respects" (1953, p.30). What the "relevant respects" are is of course "interest-dependent," as Putnam would say, i.e. subjective.

203 cf. ibid., Def III-II, p.S2. 204 c[ibid., DefIV-t, p.SS.

52

53

On Allalogy

So again it seems that we have an opposition of descriptive and normative accounts. I think it would be in accordance with the thrust of Ross' argument to reject such an argument by pointing out that if one accepts a replacement sentence as not merely equivocal where another does not, thIs onlv means 205 that the context environment they consider relevant differs. SOJ;,ebody who claims equivocity for all religious statements would need to hold that the extent of the discourse environment is unlimited,206 as any word C will be affected by "mandatory or exclusive syntagmatic relations"207 wherever it occurs if certain religious tenms are meaningrelevant for it in any caSe. This presupposes a unifonmity of language, but of a dillerent kind fro~ that envisaged by Ross, as for him a meaning-relevant word has to be co-applicable 208 If this were the case, the mere-equivocityproponents would have effectively lost their case, as further insistence on it would mean a division of language into two levels: the ordinary one and a "wholly other" one that is dominated by certain tenms such as "God" in such a wav th'at it is completely equivocal in every respect to the first. It would then 31.,;, be completely unintelligible from the point of view of the first 209 But this is not the case. Ross himself gives the necessary clue why it cannot be so: meaning differentiation is "caused by contrasting dominating

Twe11tieth Century

environments. "21 0 These comprise more than the remaining part of the sentence which Ross explores,211 and include not only the actually occurring tenms and their predicate schemes, but also a whole array of other relevant infonmation.212 Richard Swinburne has pointed out as relevant for the discussion of analogy that cultural presuppositions fonm an essential part of the meaning of a sentence 213 Although he relies on Ross' predicate schemes for his description of analogy,214 he does not work out how this

210 1981, oer 11-2, p.50. 211 He of course does not say that they are that limited. 212 Let me give an example (I purposeful1y fillther simplifY Ross' example from p.IOS. Interestingly alf his examples for analogy are verbs (cf. below ch.JV. for a possible explanation)): uCol1ects" 1n (I) "He coffecfs mends" and (2) "He coffeets barnacles" are to be our two analogical terms. 11le differentiation of the predicate schemes of "collects" can only be - according to Ross' account - through the dominance of the accusatives, namely ufriends" and "barnacles." 11lat "collects" in (1) as opposed to (2) does not involve "takes into his possession" does 110t have to do with some invariant meaning of "friends" and "bamac1es." We could well imagine it to be the case that fiiends can he possessed (e.g. bought as slaves). The difference has to do with the cultmal environment, the knowledge

-

-----_._---

20S according to oer III-IO, p.76. 206 cf ibid" oer 111-3, p.59. 207 ibid. 208 cf. ibid .. Oef 111-9, p.68.

of which lets us exclude this consequence for the collection of friends. (Cf. also Dalferth 1981, p.646 on the relevance of inter-cultural differences and Ebeling 1971, p.56:" .. sich bewuBt machen, da8 jedes Wort seinen Kontext hat, von dem es zwar zu unterscheiden ist, mit dem es abeT eine lehendige Einheit bildet. II) J will argue in chapter IV for fiuther inner-cultural differences.

209 I believe a radical Barthian position would have to result in such a position. The

2 J3 cf. J992, e.g. p.31:

classical idea of God as the ralio lormatis of theology (cf Ebeling 1971, pA3) points into

presuppositions of a whole culture, are what lead a typical speaker to convey infonnation

II ' . '

not merely the assumptions of speaker and hearer, but the

a similar direction, because it effectively assumes the dominance of 'God' in the whole of

by means of a sentence ... "

theological discourse. Cf also Luther's "Spiritus saoctus habet suam grammaticam" (WA

214 cf. ibid., ppAOff. His remarks on p.42 nevertheless throw some doubt on whether he

39.2; I 04.24. cit. in: Ebeling 1971, p. J57f). In fact any non-cognitivist account of theology

means the same as Ross, as he there introduces the further criterion of "saying something

has this problem. (See below for Palmer himself.) Negative or apophatic theology cannot

similar of' to determine whether something is an analogy. His example is the traditional

avoid this consequence either, as its general claim - tbat we cannot describe God as He is,

"healthyll; " ... although there is a connection of meanings, one is not saying something

is not really circumvented by applying negations, as they also involve a positive knowledge

similar of urine and the diet in describing both as 'healthy'" (ibid., p.42). I am not clear how

of God. namely of what He is not. Negations do not have a different epistemological

this is to square with Ross' accoU11t of analogy as "overlapping predicate schemes" (ibid.,

status from affirmations.

pAO), which Swinburne accepts, as we clearly have that overlapping here.

55 Twentieth Century

could afteet the account of what is to be considered an analogy. Apparently one would have to allow for more room for the impact of cultural contingencies. I presume that an intuition of this fact was the reason why Palmer and

llurre1l 215 go back to the pragmatic level. Only their views of analogy dilTer widely here. For Palmer "A religion ( ... ) provides a language for making ultimate cOlllmitments in C.. ) It neither describes another world nor rcdescribes the one in which we live. It is nondescript. So it is not subject to analogy "216 I consider this to be a version of the wholly-otherness-account with the further disadvantage of not even having an internal logic by which internal modifications could be made to suit those who engage in it 217 Burrell thinks that "If we could find anything identifiably common, analogy would be superfluous."218 I do not quite see how Dalferth can reject this on the grounds that it could be possible "eine semanlische /somOlphie zwischen beiden Analogaten aufzuweisen, indem eine Gemeinsamkeit von semantischen Eigenschaften zweiter Ordnung zwischen ihnen konstatiert wird."219 Transferring the problem to a higher level does not do the trick, unless we have a theory of meaning that would make clear how the semantic properties determine the meaning. Burrell admits that "the semantic structure of analogous terms alone of course, could never warrant the statements."220 But, as opposed to Palmer, Ihat does not lead him to despair of analogy. If it is not sufficient, then it is at least a "necessary condition"221 and the remaining gap is closed by a leap to the pragmatic. He in fact turns around Palmer's argument according to which the language-game-account is an alternative to the classical theory of analogy

and states "Nothing shows quite so clearly that 'language is a form of life' as does our recourse to analogous expressions,"222 and" ... the ways in which we find ourselves employing analogous expressions exhibit something of the manner in which we participate in our language and in the world ... "223 This seems like a very enlightened move: Analogy is not a problem, but simply an outcome of how our lives and our language are related. But I doubt that this would convince many. It sounds rather too much like restating the problem and pretending it to be the answer. The question would reasonably have to be: What is it in our manner of "participating in our language and in the world" that makes us resort to analogy?

215 1973, Jl.215ff 216 1973,1'.160. 217 I fhrthermore wonder how PRimer lives with the fact that descriptivists have shaped

the foml of religion that he deprives himself orthe means of criticising.

218 1973,1'.19. 219 1981,1'.643. 220 1973,1'.237. 221 ibid.

222 ibid., p.244. 223 ibid., p.267.

57

All Attempl a/ a New PerspecUl'e

011 Alla/ogr

IV. An Attempt at a New Perspective on Analogy

So far no account of analogy has really been able to satisfy us, but that does nol mcan Ihat our enquiry has not furthered any results. It could mean that our st'mdards arc wrong. Beforc exploring whether the laUer is the case let me first bricfly summarise our findings. We discovered that both for Plato and for Aristotle analogy was a basic notion. For Plato it was that which brings (and holds) things together and was ontologically posited by the Good itself. For Aristotle - who remained with the logical - it was just simply the description of the fact that things are similar. or beUer that we observe similarities in the world. With St.Thomas things became far more complicated. On the logical level analogy (as a subclass of the equivocal) was due to the fact that some lerms exemplified a ratio propria in which others were shared derivatively. Such a dependency was again thought to hold on the ontological level between the res, but St.Thomas did not assume a direct correspondence of these relations. They could well differ. We found both dependency-relations questionable. Nevertheless at first sight they seem basic, and therefore no possible inconsistency could result. But at least the principle of ontological dependency was found in tum to rely in the end on analogy, thus again making it a basic notion. Although the modem accowlts have the same claims to universality, at closer inspection some of them (notably the earlier authors Emmet, Mascall and Ramsey) claim special status for some parts of the discourse without giving an epistemology that could warrant this claim. Bochefiski's formal account (like Track's extended version) have been found to suffer from the inconsistency of implicitly looking for a univocal core of analogy while in fact relying on an "analogical interpretation of analogy." The other strictly semantic account, presented by Ross, has been found to be too limited, excluding the importance of culture and world for meaning. Finally Burrell again considered analogy to be (pragmatically) basic. Surprisingly, a rigid criticism of analogy, by Palmer, has not been any more convincing then the aUempts at positive versions.

So what we seem to have is the alternatives of either: (I) simply accepting analogy as basic: or (2) improving the (religious) epistemology so that the claim for a special status of religious language would become convincing: or (3) expanding Ross' predicate-scheme-model so as to include culture and world as meaning-relevant. I will mle out (2) on the grounds that to succeed in that undertaking would be to prove that there are epistemological reasons why religious language does not fall within the scope of ordinary language. This would involve the logical problem that this claim would have to be presented in ordinary language in order to convince. In that case ordinary language would function as meta-language for religious language (and itself). Now, if that is so, i.e. that we can refer to both ordinary and religious language in ordinary language (as meta-language), there is no reason why we should not also be able to compare (in ordinary language as meta-language) the meaning of words in ordinary and religious language. That would mean we would still have the problem of the analogy of religious terms to ordinary tenns. In other words: an epistemology (in ordinary language) that could explain speCial language could only explain it as a subclass of ordinary language, not as a completely distinct super class. I will show that (I) is an admissible, albeit trivial, option because working out Ross' proposal according to (3) will reveal "our manner of participating in our language and in the world"224 to be such that analogy is not a problem for predication, which, of course, does not mean that relatedness is not afact both in predication and the world as we see it. I have pointed out before that what Ross presents is a method to test two terms for analogy. The problem I observed in his predicate-scheme model was that he asks us to compare the predicate-schemes of two identical linguistic tokens. The implied difference of predicate-schemes he explains by what he calls dominance. 225 Certain members of a predicate-scheme are excluded if "A sentence frame P, (in E) is semantically resistant to some members w, of the schemes for a completion expression t, just in case 224 cf ahove p.42. 225 cf 1981, Def III-II, p.82.

59

58

An Attempt at a New Perspective

0,1 Analogy

substituting w for I produces a replacement unacceptable in E. "226 The crllcial part for my purpose is the expression "unacceptable in E." What is to be considered unacceptable is to be decided by the one who tests for analogy. And here the strictly semantic character of the theory, its being related only to "linguistic structure,"227 is no longer given. If on page 527 of a novel the sentence IIDido wagged his tail" occurs, and Dido was never mentioned before ami nothing whatsoever has been said about human anatomy,228 I still assllme any reader will (probably rightly) believe "Dido" to refer to a dog. What lead~ him to that judgement is his knowledge about the world, i.e. about the environment, but not about the linguistic environment. It is just simply not part of the linguistic meaning of "to wag" or of "tail" or of both combined that human beings (the common bearers of proper names) do not have tails, and hence "Dido" cannot be a human being (and is thus probably a dog, i.e. a member of the class of living things with the second-highest probability of being referred to with a proper name). It could nevertheless be part of the meaning if one goes along with Putnam's description of meaning as being composed of syntactic markers, semantic markers, stereotype and extension229 The latter two represent the dimensions we alluded to before, namely the culture and the world respectively. The stereotype is a bit

ambivalent: as it is subjective it differs from speaker to speaker,230 but it is certainly a product of cultural knowledge or prejudice. 231 Now if this is correct, and Putnam has a strong case I believe,232 Ross' method seems successful only because of exclusion of further dimensions (beyond the semantical and syntactical - that Ross implicitly presupposes) of meaning. If that is the case, it is no longer an account of analogy of meaning, but only of analogy on the semantic level,233 That is clearly unsatisfactory. The extension of Ross' model mentioned above will therefore consist in

230 For some specialists it might even be identical with the actual extension, e.g. H20 for "water." 231 I personally acquired my stereotype of Putnam's favourite example "tiger" with the help of plastic animals ~ i.e. extra-linguistical cultural products. 232 TIle argument for the meaning-relevance of the extension is roughly that if we gave up "the idea that meaning detennines extension" (1975, p.245) our stereotype could tum out to apply to two or more classes of things ("Water" could be H2O here and XYZ on some other planet otherwise identical). I would add that in that case one could not even say that it is really a class-tenn for the class of expressions we need to invent for our findings ("water" as the class of "H20" and "XYZ" like "Coke" for uCoca Cola," "Pepsi Cola, II etc.) as this presupposes that the subclass-tenns still detennine extension. The fact that stereotypes are relevant ("In ordinary parlance a 'stereotype' is a conventional ( ... )

226 ibid .. Def. IlI-12, p.82.

idea ( ... ) of what an Xlooks )ike or acts like oris." (ibid., p.249» is shown by the fact that

227 ibid., p.2.

what counts as a successful use ofa term is detennined by whether they apply ("".there is

22R One could extend this further and assume that there is no description of human

one stereotype of tigers (he [the user] may have others) which is required by the linguistic

anatomYalwwhere, only, say, pictures. So even if the linguistic environment were to have

community as such." (ibid., 1'.250)). What Davidson (e.g. 1984, 199ff) says about the

the largest possible extension the ascription of a certain meaning could still originate from

necessity of shared beliefs for communication mirrors Putnam's ill sight in other ternlS. To

outside. How else could language have come about in the first place?

know the stereotype is not the same as knowing the extension. (E.g. the question "Is this a

according to Putnam - he known by

tiger ?" ~ pointing at an elephant - is a sign of not knowing the stereotype, while the same

the individual. or indeed any, speaker. Despite the focusing of the discussion on nouns,

question - pointing at an albino tiger - might simply be a sign of doubt about extension, i.e.

especially natural-kind tenns, Putnam intends his account not to hold only for them (cf.

the necessary criteria for being a tiger.)

229 cf 1975,1'.269; The actual extension need

110t -

ihid., p.242). He explicitly mentions verbs as another class (cf. ibid., p.244); I believe this

233 The tests Ross suggests (c( 1981, pp.42ff) - although often less than lucidly - make it

fulfils Shell)"s requirement of "making a careful distinction between the sense of words on

clear that the possible replacement tenns have to display the same semantic features as the

the onc hand and the circumstances of their acquisition and the objects to which they

tenn they are to replace. lllese features are what Putnam refers to as "semantic markers."

1I01ln:llly refer on the other" (1976, p.442).

It is doubtless Ross' achievement to have provided a method for uncovering them.

6t

60

An Attempt at a New Perspective

Oil A"alogy

adding the two further dimensions of the cultural (stereotype) and the world (e,tension) and seeing what effect this will have for the theory of analogy. It is clear that we will have to look at least at complete sentences, otherwisc we exclude the dominance-phenomena observed by Ross. But "It is perfectly consistent to hold that a theory is testable only at the level of sentences while explaining the features of sentences on the basis of an inner structure. "234 Now the most important !linneT structure" of a sentence is its

syntactical structure and the most important features of the syntax of a sentence are the subjects and predicates. I hold that the subject, unless it is not sufliciently well defined, will a/IVa)'s have the strongest linguistic force and will hence dominate the other parts of the sentence 235 This rellects Aristotle's claim of the primacy of substance. Subjects are some kinds of entities. Predicates are properties of these entities and further elements are properties either of the subjects or the predicates. 236 There are different types of subjects of sentences. The first type I would like to consider are merely indexical (I, this, she, etc.). These are either context-dell ned and then fall (indirectly) into one of the other categories, or 214

Davidson 1984, p.236. Putnam's argument against working

011

they are ambivalent with regard to the wider context and will then be determined by the other elements of the sentence-context 237 The second type are proper names. They refer either to spaciotemporal entities (persons, places, dogs, etc.) in the actual world or to comparable entities in it or some possible or impossible other world 238 For all of these I believe Kripke's causal 239 theory of reference to be a convincing account. "A rough statement of the theory might he the following: An initial 'baptism' takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is 'passed from link to link,' the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it."240 The reason why I hold this to be a sufficient account of reference not only for the actual world, but also for possible and impossible worlds is that only those worlds that are somehow related to us are of any interest to us and for these the actual world is always the necessary point of reference. It is we, the inhabitants of the actual world, that describe possible (and impossible) worlds 24 t Because of this link to the actual world proper names in all worlds have a reference and hence extension and meaning 242 The "author"

sentence-level

certainly isn't too strong: "It is noteworthy that the procedure that Quine and Davidson

237 I will leave out the question of nonsensic81 sentences. The ambivalellce-restliction

claim is the only possible one - going from whole sentences to individual words - is the

applies to 811 classes and will not be mentioned again. In any case ambivalence is not

opposite of the procedure upon which every success ever attained in the study of natural

analogy.

langnage has heen based" (1975, p.262). I believe that dominance makes it quite clear why

238 By "impossible worldll I mean a world that is conceivable, but not logically possible

an account of the meaning of a word outside a given context differs from almost any

because some a posteriori necessities (like water being H20 - if it is) do not hold (cf

actual meaning in context. For natural-kind words e.g. it should usually not make any

Putnam 1975, p.233). I do not believe a world that is opposed to a priori necessities is

difference, but it is the context that detennines whether it is really the natural-kind-

conceivable. How - for example - is one to conceive a world in which the law of non-

meaning of a word that is at stake.

contradiction does not hold?

235 In om example above if "Dido" were clearly a person from the context, he would

239 Alston (1989, p.107) argues that "reat" would be a better tenn to render Kripke's

dominate the rest and make it a figurative expression. This is in line with the principle that

intentions.

"smtellces make what sense they call" (Ross 1981, Il.ll) - or should we not rather

240 Kripke t 972/1980, p.96. 241 cf Putnam's "Brains in a vat" (198 J, pp.l ff):

fonnulate "we make of sentences what sense we can" ? 236

I have in mind adjectives and adverbs. Further elements like conjunctions,

11111 ere

is a 'physically possible world' in

which we are brains in a vat - what does this mean except that there is a description of

prepositions, etc. could be fimctionally defined as indicators of the relations of other

such a state of affairs which is compatible with the laws if physics 111 (ibid., p.15)

elements and do not really pose a problem for meaning- theory, nor for the theory of

242 Reference is of course 1I0t sufficient for meaning for all types of words, but for

analogy.

proper names it is.

62

63

On Allolog)'

of the worlds - other that the actual - is free to baptise characters therein; the "actual chain of communication"243 of their reference is an element of the actual world 244 If we have rigid designation 245 we do not have problems of analogy of meaning. For proper names this is not surprising. They have always been considered to be univocal. But for a third group of nouns it means a step forward. I am thinking of natural-kind tenns. If we can rigidly designate them we rule out analogy for them as well. By their nature this cannot include the impossible worlds, as these are defined as not being in line with the (a posteriori) necessary features of the actual world as opposed to the possible worlds. This might at first sight look like a drawback and a limitation of our undertaking. It is not. Although they are only conceivable, while physically (actually) impossible, still they are conceivable and this means that their features are defined in the terms of whoever might conceive them; i.e. according to his definition. Communication about them is still a fact of the actual world. I will therefore not consider the impossible worlds any longer. We can always refer to them rigidly. I still have to indicate why I believe natural kind tenns capable of rigid designation. My argument is really Putnam's: "... 'we use the name rigidZv to refer to whatever things share the nature that things satisfying the description normally possess. "246 Now things are primarily the material objects around 247 For chemical elements and molecular structures, as well as for U5

An Attempt at a New Perspective

biological species differing in genetic code, we can probably quite easily find out what their nature is, i.e. what their a posteriori necessary properties are 248 The question is whether this would be possible (at least in principle) for all material entities. What is the natllre of a chair? Or rather: by what scientific procedure could we possibly find out? To ask the question is to reject it. A visit to the relevant department of a museum for cultural history will quickly convince the reader that there are really 110 features (necessarily) shared by all instances of what we call "chair." We might of course develop a notion like "an object used for one person to sit on," but this is too vague. Any stone of a certain size would fit the description - and indeed are not stones the first instances of chairs? The point to be made is of course that a chair is a cultural object and that cultural objects are culture-related. We will not get further than the stereotype. This does not mean that there is no extension to tenns for cultural objects, only that there are no neeessm}' criteria shared by that c1ass 249 But again what at first sight looks like a drawback is really an advantage. We might find ourselves arguing about the necessary features of what constitutes an AIDS-virus, we are unlikely to disagree whether a given object is a chair 250 We produce what I called problem of re-identification other than by describing individuals in all respects similar to material objects with the only difference of denying them "real" existence. In that case "real" would be a teon borrowed from material-entities-accepting-theories. Within their own theory no difference would be perceivable/describable.

243 Kripke 1972/1980, p.93.

248 cf. Kripke 1972/1980, p.125: "... statements representing scientific discoveries about

244 Aldous Huxley's "Brave New World" is certainly not the actual world and perhaps

what this stuff is are not contingent truths but necessary truths in the strictest possible sense."

not even a possible one. Bernard Marx, the Savage, etc. can nevertheless be rigidly referred to by us ill the actual world, namely as such and such a character in the above mentioned novel contained in a book on my shelf.

249 What counted as a chair in the Stone Age will probably not count as such today any more; specialists in Stone Age furniture excepted. Here the fact that there are specialists is

215 cf Kripkc 1972/1980, pAS: "Letts call something a rigid deSignator if in every possible world it designates the same object."

not a case of the sharing of linguistic labour that Putnam has in mind, when he mentions

246 1975,1'.238.

specia1ist can detennine is what a Stone Age chair is, not what is to count as a chair for liS. 250 For some sophisticated cultural objects we might sHU need the specialists to clarifY

2... 7 cf Quinton 1973, p.43. 'ne acceptance of things - in the sense of material objects as

specialists for detennining what is gold (cf. e.g. 1975, PIJ.227ft). All the Stone Age

basic pal1iculars - probably is not the only possible way to avoid solipsism, as Kaminsky (1969, p.37f) has pointed out against Strawsoll (1959), but I doubt that idealism of the

for

Berkleyan t}ve (the other way Kaminsky considers as an alternative) can solve Strawson's

made the object) will agree.

liS

e.g. whether something is, say, a satellite. I might not know whether a given object

in front of me is a satellite or not, but in all likelihood tbe specialists (at least those who

64

65

A n Attempt at a New Perspective

A" Anology

cultural objects to perfonn certain functions in tenns of which they can easily be defined within a given culture for which they perfonn these functions. The chairs might differ from one culture to another, but an expert who calls what to me looks like a stone "chair," is not using that word analogously. What difTers are neither the semantic features, nor any independent extension, but the stereotype and that is culture-related. Unless [ hold the Stone Age to be al1alogous to our culture a Stone Age chair will not be analogous to our chairs and the word "chair" (our word chair) is used in the same sense of both. I believed such a stone not to be a member of the class of chairs. That only shows that my stereotype doesn't include Stone Age chairs, as someone's tiger-stereotype might not include albino-tigers25I I have the stereotype my cuiture expects me to have. Cultural objects could of course be conceived as being different in possible worlds, but, as with physical objects in impossible worlds, it is we - the actual beings - who define them so. Two classes of entities remain to be considered: abstract entities and persons. Now [ hold that while cultural objects are culture-dependent, abstracl entities are theory-dependent, the difference being that cultural objects. being material objects, can survive their culture, while abstract enlities live and die with the theory to which they pertain, unless taken up by another. "Entity" is of course used here in a very wide sense that includes slich diverse things (in a broad sense) as tlmetaphysics," "insomnia,n "God!! and ""inter." And the term "theory" is of course just as wide. The type of theory that deals with "winter" is quite distinct from the one that deals with "insomnia." But in both cases they fonn part of a wider theory about what the world is Iike 252 For our problem of analogy this means that if a word referring to an abstract entity occurs in two instances, what we have to do is see whether it is used in tenns of the same theory, i.e. whether the same stereotype is being employed. 253 (I don't see what possible role the extension could have for abstract entities apart from postulating some kind of extension;

but of course I'm not a Platonist.) Either it is, or it is not. [n both cases there is no problem. The first is trivial and in the second case the reason for holding that there is a difference is precisely that we can point to differences in the theory. Again analogy does not occur. This does not mean that [ don't think that the meanings of words in one theory and another are not related, and this not only in the basic sense that if they were not related we could not see the differences but in the more specific sense that one theory presupposes others. If Putnam defines "meaning" in a certain way, he presupposes what others have said about the problem and tries to show where the differences lie, but all of the philosophers that deal with meaning will rely on the reader's (and themselves') having some very general stereotype of what "meaning" is. Even if Putnam then proposes - as he likes to do - a counter-intuitive account of meaning, and if there were no intuitive stereotype of meaning, he wouldn't be able to give a new account. He would be introducing a completely new notion, but this again he could only do by relying on what we already share. He cannot reinvent [anguage 254 Furthennore, [ do not suppose there to be no link between the class of material and the class of abstract entities. The material worlds in which the notions "insomnia" or "winter" wouldn't exist would be materially different

from the actual one 255 The link are of course persons. This last class is in many respects the most difficult to deal with for philosophy, but fortunately not for a theory of analogy. The other-minds-problem is not a problem of the analogous use of the tenn "person." If the sense in which we use the tenn differed from person to person (or at least from me to all other "persons") the problem could not even be stated as such. So at least for nouns and indexicals as potential subjects I hope to have shown that a problem of analogy does not exist. But what about the other parts of the sentence? Ross only uses verbs as examples for analogous terms. As I pointed out before, usually the subject dominates the other elements and now we can safely add that all nouns and

251 Similarly a child might not recognise the elaborate Louis XIV-object it sees in a glass-case as a chair before it is told that this too is one. 2S2 Being all attempt at a description orthe actual world is what distinguishes a theory

254 I'm not, of course, intending to say that he pretends to do so.

fonn

of all abstract entities, because they are necessarily linked to material phenomena such as

tl

Jlossible or impossible world.

2S] Say. irKatz and Putnam talk about "meaning," do they meall the same or not?

255 In some sense this is - as far as we as material beings are concerned - necessarily tme script and sounds or brain-states.

66

67

all Analogy

AnA ttempt at a New Perspective

indexicals in the sentence add to its disambiguating effect. The examples Ross presents 256 certainly display analogy on the semantic level, but only because the sentence-context dominates the predicate-schemes of the example-words and we can then compare the individual example-words with the help of his replacement-method and the dominance of the sentenceenvironment then accounts for the different possibilities of replacements with synonyms, antonyms, opposites, etc. What he does not (at least explicitly) consider is that if it is the sentence-context that accounts for the difference of meaning. then there is no apparent use for a theory of analogy of individual words il1 sentences. In other words: If the sentence-context differs in relevant aspects it is only to be expected that dominance will cause difTerence of meaning of individual words, but every such difference will be explicable on the sentence-level with the help of the differences of meaning of the dominating words. If meaning is sentence-context-dependent we have to look at it at the sentence-level. Now if nouns and indexicals are, as I hope to have shown, always either univocal or equivocal (either merely equivocal or distinct in a very . . I1 Sh erry ca II s "systema t'IC equlvoca . t'IOn "257) precise and speCIfiable way wh,c and dominating, I hold that this means that the dominated verbs, adjectives and adverbs (the other potential candidates for analogy) will display the same features 258 What remains are the ambiguous cases where the subject is not 2'6 1981,

pp.93ff.

257 1976. p.445. 2~8 In general I would see more candidates for univocity than Ross. For example in "The

\\OTeck collected bamac1es and seaweed

011

the sand" and ill "The omithologist collected

specimens of birds lt (examples for analogy from Ross 1981, p.1 05) I cannot perceive a

sufficiently defined. In these cases the words with the next-strongest linguistic force will step in and exercise their disambiguating dominance. Possibly a metaphor might result. But contrary to St.Thomas I believe figurative discourse to be a separate problem. Certainly the arguments that might be based on it have a different epistemological status. If the whole sentence still remains ambiguous, this still doesn't mean that some words in it could still turn out to be analogous. They would simply be just as ambiguous as the sentence itself. As I mentioned before: ambiguity is not analogy. Now what does all this mean for religious language? It will have been noted that I listed "God" among the abstract entities. This should not cause sleeplessness to the defenders of His reality; I listed "insomnia" in the same class. Saying of something that it is an abstract, theory-dependent, entity 259 does not imply that it is not real 260 Theoretical tenlls of abstract entities can refer although they cannot refer independently of a given theory, i.e. rigidly. This does not imply that they can refer only in one theory or that a change of the theory (one theory being changed into another) means that the reference necessarily changes completely. It is usually only further specified. So, for example, adherents of various religions/denominations usually agree, if on little else, that with the tenm 'God' they refer to the same entity and although Christianity describes God quite differently from Judaism, there is usually (Marcion et al. excepted) no doubt that we still talk or disagree about the same God. 261 "Reference, then, of the kind that interests us is social and is concerned with [epistemic J access. "262 The reason for this is that we have a first approximation in our stereotype, and we have certain socially agreed methods of testing and thus further improving it or rejecting its existence. This is why Ebeling perceived that between competing theories (different

difference of predicate-schemes, even though I know that wrecks generally coJlect in a different fashion from omithologists, I do not see what effect this has for the verb "collect." My stereotypes and the semantic features of "wreck" are different from my

"that Scotus' approach often anticipates contemporary work, that it causes many

stereotypes and the semantic features of "omithologist," but I believe my stereotypes and

Supposedly 'a"alogical' tenllS to ran away ... " (ibid., p.441).

the semantic features ofllcollect lt are the same in both instances. For similar considerations

259 or "non-obselVational theoretical tenn" (Soskice 1985, p.119). 260 cf. ibid., p.124.

see Shell"), (1976, pp.439ft) where he cites Quine as saying "that the reason why we cannot say 'the chair and the questions were hard' is the dissimilarity of the two things

261 For examples from science c[ ibid., pp.12Sff.

ralher than the ambiguity of 'hard' (WO/'d alld Object, ~ 27)" (ibid., p.440) and points out

262 I'b'd I ., p. 13 2.

69

68

All Attempt af a New Perspective

On Analogy

languages) there is an "ontologische Sprachdifferenz."263 Quine's approach to "decide what ontology a given theory or form of discourse is committed to", namely that "a theory is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order that the affinnations made in the theory be true,"264 seems to be the best test available for the ontological commitment of a theory265 But, as Kaminsky has pointed out, "this does not in and of itself give us a way of favouring one system of ontology against some other."266 And he shows that Quine's Il'ominalism can only bear conviction if in addition to the test the additional premise "predicates are not allowed to be quantified"267 is introduced. This brings about further difficulties for Quine's nominalism, which need not concern uS here,268 but it is clear that we need not sbare this premise if we want only to use the test and hence allow abstract entities to be nonreduciblc. I do not agree with Soskice that "the critical realism we are advocating docs not commit us to viewing certain theories as privileged accounts of the world as it is."269 The notion of "the world as it is," that is fundamental to 263 197t, p.94. 264 1953, p.13[ 265 c[ Soskice 1985, p.123: ", .. we are filmlshed with vindications orthe realist thesis

that scientific practice itself can only be understood as realist in intent and ontological in presumption. "

266 t969. "".53[ 267 ibid .. p.55. 268 For the discussion see ibid" pp.55ff 269 1985. p. 131. Cf. also Putnam 1981, pp.119ff on "why relativism is inconsistent,"

",here he argues that it is self-refuting, as it cannot explain why relativism should be itself a prcrcrahlc account or the world. 'l1lOUgh I would

110t

realism, itself seems to me to exclude this. Theoretical entities might be debatable and theory-dependent, but that does not mean that all entities are. It is simply a self-rcfuting hypothesis that a theory that does not take into account our sense-experiences is just as good as one that doesn't. If this were the case, not only would a realist position be impossible, as the claimed "epistemic access" would then be a void concept, but so also would an idealist position, as it takes all the thrust it might have precisely from the fact that sense-experience is irreducibly given for us. But it is not only senseexperience that is a criterion for theories. In order to be acceptable as theories they also have to confonn to the rules of logic, and a more consistent theory will sensibly be preferred (all else being roughly the same). The idea of the unity of the world - as Kant noticed - is basic to our intellectual activity. I believe that this is the reason why analogy bears conviction as a basic concept for philosophy: the unity of the world implies the relatedness of the things that make the world. So what I propose is that religious language is not in any significant way different from any other language that involves positing certain abstract entities, and that on a full-scale account of meaning analogy of predication is no problem either for it or for any other type of discourse. 270 Furthennore I hold that on a critical realist, non-relativist, view this need not involve any reduction of religious discourse as it is. It only does away with fruitless debates on presumed difficulties of meaning that arise from any type of a priori justification for religious discourse. But after all theology has always claimed that God's essence is unknowable to us. On this account it might only tum out that He shares this privilege with other entities, but fortunately the unknowability of His essence is not His only characteristic if one is to believe tradition. And characterisations are even encouraged on this account, as is indeed their criticism.

generally he so confident as

Putnam seems to he about asking for self-applicability as a test for philosophical theory, in

This seems an appropriate way to approach the God who is the ultimate truth.

this instance it seems well justified as a level-distinction (relativism as a meta-theory) that might prm'e a way out ofthe dilemma is not compatible with most relativists intentions - a way (lut for them is no way out. TIle question is whether the argument could possibly

270 I dare believe that on the basis of my account adequate responses to most traditional

cOI~vince a hard-line relativist. Are we 110t imposing our nonns on him? Relativism has

problems of the theory of analogy could be given, although I do not, unfortunately. have

quite clearly a political motivation.

the space to prove that here.

70

71

Oil AUn/()!!.l'

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Conference Paper, SOCiety for the Study of The%gy, 1993 C01iferenee, Cardiff 29 March - J April.

HO

HI

On Analogy

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Hermeneutik