On Innateness: A Reply to Cooper Noam Chomsky; Jerrold J. Katz The Philosophical Review, Vol. 84, No. 1. (Jan., 1975), pp. 70-87. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28197501%2984%3A1%3C70%3AOIARTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z The Philosophical Review is currently published by Cornell University.
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DISCUSSION
ON INNATENESS: A REPLY T O COOPER
I
N a number of publications, we have suggested that "it is historically
accurate as well as heuristically valuable to distinguish . . . two very different approaches to the problem of acquisition of knowledge," one expressing leading ideas of empiricism, the other of rationalism, noting further that "It is not, of course, necessary to assume that empiricist and rationalist views can always be distinguished and that these currents cannot cross." T o repeat briefly the central point of this effort at rational reconstruction, "empiricist speculation has characteristically assumed that only the procedures and mechanisms for the acquisition of knowledge constitute an innate property of the mind," whereas "rationalist speculation has assumed that the general form of a system of knowledge is fixed in advance as a disposition of the mind, and the function of experience is to cause this general schematic structure to be realized and more fully differentiated." We have argued that empirical study of the grammatical structure of natural languages bears on this issue, and generally amplifies, supports, and in .part modifies the rationalist approach, so understood. O u r point is that "Particular empiricist and rationalist views can be made quite precise and can then be presented as explicit hypotheses about acquisition of knowledge, in particular, about the innate structure of a languageacquisition device."l Repeatedly, we have emphasized the diversity within each of these general approaches and the problem offormulating precise empirical hypotheses within these approaches.2 We have emphasized that the issue is not one of innateness: rationalists and empiricists alike attribute innate structure and principles to the mind. As just noted, however, there is a significant difference of approach with regard to what is attributed. T o consider one important case, "the principles which are accorded innate status by empiricists do not place any substantive restrictions on the ideas that can qualify as components of complex ideas or any formal restrictions on the structure of associations which bond component ideas together to form a com-
I Quotes are from Chomsky, Aspects of the Theoiy of Syntax (Cambridge,Mass., 19651, P P 47 ff-. E.g., op. cit., p. 53; Chomsky, Cartesian' Linguistics (New York, 1966),p. 2 and n. 3, pp. 75-76.
O N I N N ATENESS
plex idea."3 Rather, empiricists construe "the innate principles [as] purely combinatorial devices for putting together items from experience," "machinery for instituting associative bonds," "enumerative techniques of inductive generalization from frequently repeated instances of contiguously occurring items in experience." In contrast, "rationalists claim that the principles of mental operation with which man is innately equipped place quite severe restrictions on what a simple idea can be and on what ways simple ideas can combine with one another and with complex ideas in the production of complex ideas" and hypothesize that "a system of innately fixed conceptual forms . . . sharply limit the set of those ideas which the mind is capable of acquiring to a very small subset of the set of all logically possible ideas." Within each of these positions, there are divergent and sometimes conflicting views: "Empiricists differ among themselves about the sort of things that are represented as simple ideasH;*"The controversy is, then, whether some uersion of [the rationalist] hypothesis or the empiricist's weaker one best explains how a conceptual system of the sort that mature humans possess is acquired on the experience they have a c c ~ m u l a t e d . "Both ~ of us have emphasized, repeatedly, that we are attempting to extract certain leading ideas from traditional debate and to reformulate them as empirical hypotheses with regard to the nature of human intellectual capacities and structures. ~ E. Cooper undertakes "to show that In a recent a r t i ~ l e ,David Chomsky and Katz considerably exaggerate the similarities between their innateness hypothesis and the old one" and to correct what he sees as our "biased selection and misinterpretation of older writings" and our "equivocal" use of crucial terms. He has, however, completely misrepresented \vhat we have said and seriously confused the issues. O u r purpose here is not to add anything new to the discussion, but to set the record straight. Cooper's major poi'nt is "that there is no single, uniform, or coherent doctrine of innateness among the rationalists" and that we are guilty of attributing "both a uniformity and a coherence to their views which these views simply did not possess." This is a curious allegation, since This and the following quotes are from Katz, Phzlosophy of Language (New York, 1966), pp. 241 ff. Op. czt., p 241. Similarly, in Aspects, reference is made to the variety of views taken to be generally empiricist in character; cf. pp. 51 f. Katz, op. cit., p. 245 (emphasis added),. "Innateness: Old and New," Philosophical Review, LXXXI (1972), 465483.
N. CHOMSKY A N D J . KATZ we have taken pains, repeatedly, to stress the diversity of views \vithin each of the general approaches that we have outlined. Still, it is possible that we were inconsistent or imprecise. Consider then the evidence that Cooper presents to establish his claim. Cooper cites the following t\vo passages: ( I ) It seems to me that the conclusions regarding the nature of language acquisition, discussed above, are fully in accord with the doctrine of innate ideas, so understood, and can be regarded as providing a kind of substantiation and further development of this doctrine.? (2) T h e theory of language . . . makes up for the vagueness of classical rationalist attempts to put forth their doctrine. Thus the principle defect of the rationalist position is r e m ~ v e d . ~
In these passages, Cooper alleges, "we see confident references to the doctrine of innate ideas, or the rationalist position," though even "a cursory glance at rationalist writings reveals no single, uniform doctrine of innateness." These are the only citations that Cooper presents in support of his first and major criticism. Consider first the narrow question whether Cooper's tlvo citations lend any support to his thesis. Plainly, they do not. The first contains no "confident references to the doctrine of innate ideas." Rather, it refers to "the doctrine of innate ideas, so understood." The phrase here emphasized refers to the immediately preceding paragraph, the sole paragraph dealing with traditional doctrines. The paragraph takes note of Descartes's theory of perception of geometric figures and Leibniz' discussion of (unconscious) innate principles and "ideas and truths" that are "innate as inclinations, dispositions, habits, or natural potenit is obvious .~ tialities," elicited but not formed by e ~ p e r i e n c e Surely
' Chomsky, "Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas," Synthise (1967); reprinted in R. S. Cohen and M. \V. LVertofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in Philosofihy o f Science, vol. I11 (New York, 1968; rmphasis added). This article, as noted there, is a "summary of oral presentation" in a Symposium on Innate Ideas. Chomsky has rarely used the term "innate ideas" in reference to modern work, generally referring rather to innate structure, mechanisms, and principles. \Vhere he has referred to "innate ideas," it is in discussing traditional doctrines, and then frequently in a context which makes clear that we face "the problem of clarifying this issue and sharpening our understanding of its many facets" (Aspects, p. 59). Katz, op. cit., p. 270. For some illuminating remarks on the comment cited from Leibniz and other related notions of his, and the relation of these views to current work on language, see Alan Gewirth, letter, N e w , York Review o f Books (22 February 1973). AS Gewirth notes, John Searle is in error when he states ("Chomsky's
0 N INNATENESS
that these specific references-the only ones given-imply no belief that there is a uniform, coherent doctrine which is "the doctrine of innate ideas."1° As to the citation (2), it refers to "classical rationalist attempts" and to the differences between old and new doctrines. Again, as the context (cited earlier) makes clear, there is no confident reference here to "the rationalist position," nor any support for Cooper's claim that \ve exaggerate the similarity of our "innateness hypothesis and the old one." As already noted, Katz here poses the question "whether some version of [the rationalist] hypothesis or the empiricist's lveaker one best explains how a conceptual system of the sort that mature humans ~ ~is possess is acquired on the experience they have a c ~ u m u l a t e d . "He explicitly adopting the point of view outlined above: empiricist and rationalist hypotheses are formulated as general approaches to the problem of constructing a theory of acquisition of knolvledge and belief,12 each of which can be (and has been) developed in conflicting and incompatible versions. He is explicit in rejecting the position that Cooper attributes to him. Katz in citation (2) uses the phrase "the
linguistics," ibid. [2g J u n e 19721) t h a t i f t h e concept o f innateness is as C h o m s k y proposed, " t h e n a t least some o f t h e dispute b e t w e e n C h o m s k y a n d t h e e m p i ricist learning theorists will dissolve like so m u c h mist o n a h o t m o r n i n g [since] m a n y o f t h e fiercest partisans o f empiricist a n d behaviorist learning theories are willing t o concede t h a t t h e child has i n n a t e dispositions, inclinations, a n d natural potentialities." B u t Searle has misunderstood t h e issue as C h o m s k y presented i t , since, as already n o t e d , i t is repeatedly a n d explicitly emphasized t h a t t h e various empiricist a n d behaviorist approaches mentioned postulate innate principles a n d structures ( c f . Aspects, pp. 47 f.). W h a t is a t issue is n o t whether there are i n n a t e principles a n d structures, b u t rather w h a t is their character: specifically, are t h e y o f t h e character o f empiricist or rationalist hypotheses, as there construed? Furthermore, t h e sentence following t h e o n e Cooper quotes reads: " O f course, such a proposal [viz., t h a t t h e conclusions regarding language acquisit i o n relate t o t h e doctrine o f i n n a t e ideas understood i n t h e specific m a n n e r briefly m e n t i o n e d ] raises nontrivial questions o f historical interpretation." T h i s statement terminates t h e discussion o f possible relations b e t w e e n t h e traditional doctrine a n d t h e recent theories sketched. Several references are cited where t h e matter is further discussed, w i t h o u t , however, a n y h i n t o f t h e position t h a t Cooper attributes t o us. R a t h e r , this position is consistently rejected. l1 Op. cit., p. 245 (emphasis a d d e d ) . l 2 AS w e h a v e repeatedly n o t e d , t h e problem o f distinguishing knowledge a n d belief does n o t arise i n t h e specific case o f language acquisition t h a t w e discuss.
N. CHOMSKY AND J . KATZ
rationalist position" as one might use the phrase "the position of transformational grammar" without thereby denying that this position can be developed (as it has been) in conflicting ways in various theories of transformational grammar. In fact, as noted earlier, Katz suggests that "there is no definite rationalist hypothesis, but just a general notion about the character of such a hypothesis." I t should, then, be clear that Cooper's allegation receives no support from the citations he gives to establish it. But quite apart from the misinterpretation of the passages he cites, Cooper has misunderstood the general point that we have consistently been making. Empiricism and rationalism, as we construe them, are theories about the character of theories about acquisition of knowledge and belief. One might think of these general approaches as metatheories. There are many ways of constructing particular explicit theories of mind within the broad outlines of these two contrasting approaches, one of which concentrates on procedures for acquiring systems of knowledge and belief, and the other, on the structure of the resulting systems, conceived as an innate schematism that determines the scope and limits of knowledge of languages and, we speculate, other cognitive systems. Thus "one might even say that there is no definite rationalist hypothesis, but just a general notion about the character of such a hypothesis,"13 just as there are divergent empiricist theories. Our primary interest has been to develop and to demonstrate the correctness of a theory of acquisition of knowledge of language which has "an essentially rationalist cast" (Aspects, p. 53), and to show the inadequacy of approaches of an empiricist character. "The rationalist position," as we understand it and have explained it, is a metatheory expressing the common structure of diverse theories of acquisition. Accordingly, Cooper's central criticism is entirely without foundation. Cooper's only further argument in this regard is his assertion that "Chomsky, indeed, devotes a whole chapter of his book, Cartesian Linguistics, to establishing just this affinity with the old doctrine." He is referring to a section entitled "Acquisition and Use of Language" (pp. 59-71). But no effort is made in this section to establish "this affinity," such as it may be. Rather, the discussion reviews certain ideas "as to how language is acquired and used'' that were developed in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries and that "are once again beginning to receive the attention that they deserve." Among the
l3 Katz,
ob. cit., p. 248,
0N INNA TENESS
approaches sketched are some that reappear, often in a revised form, in current work, and some that are specifically rejected.14 Not until the final paragraph is there any comment on the "affinity" to which Cooper claims the section is devoted; this is in accordance with the general aim of this essay-namely, to sketch some earlier and neglected work "with no explicit analysis of its relation to current work that seeks to clarify and develop these ideas" (p. 2 ) . The final paragraph merely states that "contemporary research in perception has returned to the investigation of the role of internally represented schemata or models [and that] in this respect, too, it would be quite accurate to describe current work as a continuation of the tradition of Cartesian linguistics15 and the psychology that underlies it." Again, Cooper's conclusions receive no support from the passages he cites.16 Nor could he find more convincing evidence, for, as noted earlier, we were quite explicit, repeatedly, in rejecting the position he attributes to us. T o emphasize again the main point, we have suggested (i) that rationalism and empiricism can be construed as specific doctrines as to the character of acquisition of knowledge and belief. We have at the same time insisted (ii) that within each of these general approaches there is much diversity. Plainly there is no incompatibility between (i) and (ii). Cooper has erroneously claimed that we denied (ii) (citing
l4 E.g., failure t o distinguish i n a principled manner between perception and learning, discussed o n pp. 65 f. ( c f . also Asbects, p. 51). Other fundamental differences are noted o n p. 58 and elsewhere. See below. l6 A long footnote ( n . 3, pp. 75-76) explains how Chomsky intends the term "Cartesian linguistics" to b e understood-namely, t o characterize a certain "constellation o f ideas and interests" that appear i n a variety o f conflicting and often antagonistic traditions during the three centuries o f work under discussion. T h e qualifications are explicit, and overlooked i n Cooper's account. l6 A minor point i n the same connection is Cooper's claim that w e have resorted t o "highly selective editing" t o "lend a n air o f coherence t o the views o f Descartes and Leibniz." T o show this, he quotes passages from Leibniz which, h e says, " d o not square with" those w e cite: namely, Leibniz' remark that Plato's theory o f reminiscence is sound w h e n "purged o f t h e error o f preexistence" and his belief that " t h e soul always thinks," though i n a confused manner. Cooper omits t h e fact that Chomsky cites and discusses t h e very passage Cooper quotes o n Plato's theory o f reminiscence (Cartesian Linguistics, p. 6 3 ; n . I I I, p. I O ~ ) ,n oting also that Cudworth took a similar view, and further quotes Leibniz' view that " t h e mind at every m o m e n t expresses all its future thoughts," although confusedly. Evidently, t h e problem is not our "highly selective editing."
passages that he has misread), but he never deals with our actual proposal (i). That is, he makes no effort to show that we are wrong in proposing that there are two very general approaches, within each of which there is variety and conflict, and that "it is historically accurate as well as heuristically valuable to distinguish [these] approaches" (with the qualifications explicitly stated). Cooper's second major point is that "seventeenth-century discussions of innateness were paradigmatically philosophical"; "The motivation behind rationalists' postulation of an innate component . . . derives from considerations concerning the logical status of various truths and principles which men know," and this "concern with the logical status of propositions . . . explains why rationalist discussions of innateness were paradigmatically philosophical." But, Cooper argues, we have formulated the central issues as empirical ones, and have developed the notion of an innate schematism that is brought to bear in acquisition of a grammar (that is, a system of rules and principles that specifies the sound, meaning, and structure of the sentences in a language). As Cooper observes, we have been concerned with how "children can come to have learned such truths" as that "Sentence S is ambiguous," given the limited data available. But when rationalists "speak of experience being insufficient they seem to mean . . . that experience cannot explain knowledge of universal truths, necessary truths, or truths concerning unobservable entities" (such as a person, as distinct from his surface). Thus Cooper concludes that there is no "affinity" such as he believes we claim. There are a number of difficulties in Cooper's analysis. In the first place, he falls into the very error that he mistakenly attributes to usnamely, disregard of the variety in rationalist theories and concerns. I n fact, rationalist speculation was by no means uniform and restricted in the manner he indicates. The notion "idea" was used much more ~~ broadly, not being restricted to "truths" or " p r o p ~ s i t i o n s . "Furthermore, the specific proposals discussed in the references that Cooper cites do not fall within the limits he sets. Thus Chomsky discussed the suggestions of Descartes and Cudworth as to why one sees a presented figure as a triangle rather than as "the more complex figure of the l7 Cf. Cartesian Linguistics, n. 50, and elsewhere. Theories of innate ideas have surely been regarded by many philosophers since Plato as a contribution to the explanation of how truths are learned, not merely to the establishment of their logical status. Are these concerns "paradigmatically philosophical," in Cooper's sense ?
0 N INNA TENESS
triangle drawn on papern-the reason offered is that "we already possess within us the idea of a true triangle" and thus our judgments have their source in the "rule, pattern and exemplar" generated by the mind as an "anticipation."18 Other examples are then cited and discussed, illustrating the role of the "cognoscitive power" in perception (compare Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 67-69). Recall that it was specifically these theories to which Chomsky drew attention in commenting on the relationship of new and old doctrine. But these theories do not fall within Cooper's paradigm, nor do many of the other ideas that Chomsky discussed in a review of work on the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, in varied and often conflicting traditions (see note 15). Cooper nowhere explains what he means by "paradigmatically philosophical," apart from his incorrect claim that concern was limited to "the logical status of propositions."lg Perhaps he means that those whose work Chomsky reviewed were not concerned with questions of empirical science, but rather with the analysis of concepts. If he does mean this, it is surely a curious reading of the litera~ure.True, there is a sense in which many of those whose work was discussed (not, we stress again, limited to the seventeenth century) regarded their work as "philosophical." Thus Hume likened his task (namely, to discover "the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations") to that of the "philosopher" who seems, "from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed."20 As for the theories of perception advanced by Descartes and Cudworth, they can be reconstructed as (in our sense) empirical theories; we could, for example, design a device that operated in the manner they suggest (or some different manner), and could search for neurophysiological structures that operate in this or some other
Ibid., pp. 68-69. If, indeed, this is the way he wishes to be understood in stating that "Rationalist arguments typically take the form of showing why a certain type of proposition is independent of empirical testing" and this explains "why rationalist discussions of innateness were paradigmatically philosophica1"i.e., "Concern with ,the logical status of propositions is philosophical if anything is." If this is not what Cooper intends, then, as noted, his comments on this matter simply have no bearing on our discussion a t all. 20 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human ,Understanding, in L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles o f Morals by David Hume (Oxford, 1902; 2nd ed.), p. 14. l8
l9
N. C H O M S X Y A N D
3. X A T Z
manner.z1 The same is true of other aspects of the physics, physiology, and psychology22of Descartes. To be sure, the philosopher who believed that he had demonstrated by reason alone the existence of a God who does not deceive us, and who stated in his Principles of Philosophy that "there is no phenomenon of nature which has not been dealt with in this treatise,"Z3 would have seen the matter differently. But surely Descartes could not have answered the question whether he was a "scientist" or a "philosopher" in the sense of these terms that is required to confer relevance on Cooper's remarks. Furthermore, it is incorrect to claim that Descartes's doctrine of innate ideas is solely an effort to account for knowledge of necessary truths, in the sense that Cooper seems to give to the notion "necessary truth." Similarly, Hume's study of the operations of the mind, and many other ideas that we reviewed, are not "paradigmatically philosophical" in the sense that Cooper seems to have in mind (assuming that his remarks have some relevance to the work of ours that he is criticizing). And it seems to us quite appropriate to offer a contemporary reformulation of certain of the critical issues of earlier debate as empirical hypotheses about "the secret springs and principles, by which the mind is actuated in its operations." It is also quite appropriate to raise the question whether empiricists were correct in arguing that experience "is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge"; and, more specifically, to ask whether Hume was right in arguing that only certain "instincts" such as "the experimental reasoning . . . that acts in us unknown to ourselves" constitute the "many parts of [knowledge] which [animals] derive from the original hand of natureuz4 (and humans as well), or z1 One might argue that recent neurophysiological research has given a corroboration of this general approach, to be sure, in different terms. See the references of Aspects, ch. I , n. 27, p. 205. 22 Of course, other arguments are brought to bear in the case of what we might call "Descartes's psychology." For some discussion in a related context, see Chomsky, Language and Mind, ch. I . We do not, incidentally, mean to imply below that Descartes considered every true judgment to be necessary. 23 E. S.Haldane and G.R.T.Ross, The Philosophical Worksof Descartes, I, 296. 24 Hume, ob. cit., pp. 164, 108. In his introductory paragraph, Cooper associates "the old theory that men are equipped with innate knowledge" with I 7th- and 18th-centuryrationalism. But Hume too attributed innate knowledge to men (and animals). The issue with regard to innate knowledge is similar to the issue with regard to innate principles and structures mentioned in n. 9: not whether it exists, but what it is. A further question arises as to the appropriateness of the term "knowledge" in the cited passage from Hume.
0 N ZNNA TENESS
whether the sources of our knowledge lie elsewhere in structures of the mind. Surely one cannot object to this investigation on the grounds that classical empiricist speculation was "paradigmatically philosophical," if the latter term is understood to exclude contingent issues. Furthermore, it is not true that we have made no effort to consider the epistemological issues relating to our empirical theories concerning the acquisition of language. T o cite only the most obvious case, in the one work by Katz that Cooper cites, Katz tries to sketch an argument, along Kantian lines, to the conclusion that there are a priori propositions concerning the properties of linguistic phenomena deducible from the theory of the innate principles that specify the general features of knowledge of language and the manner in which these principles organize linguistic e ~ p e r i e n c e Thus . ~ ~ if Cooper means to imply that the seventeenth-century (and later) discussions to which we referred did not deal with empirical issues in our sense, he is misreading- the tradition; and if he means further to imply that we do not concern ourselves with "the logical status of propositions" and other epistemological issues, he is misreading the work he is criticizing. If neither conclusion is intended, then Cooper's remarks on the "paradigmatically philosophical" character of earlier as distinct from more recent work simply have no bearing on anything under discussion. Thus we see no merit at all in Cooper's two major points. The remainder of his discussion is devoted to specific objections, but again, we see no force to his comments. A few examples will illustrate. Cooper claims that Chomsky is "guilty of lumping together rationalists' arguments which are dissimilar and sometimes incompatible with one another," citing pages 49-50 of Aspects where passages from Arnauld (actually, from the Port-Royal Logic) and Leibniz are quoted. Cooper objects to the statement that Leibniz argues "in the same vein" as Arnauld (Cooper, p. 468). The statement, however, is quite accurate. The context is a discussion of the theory that innate ideas and principles "remain latent when their corresponding objects are not present, and even disappear and give no sign of their existence" and "must be deemed not so much the outcome of experience as principles without which we should have no experience at all" (Herbert), that ideas of the mind "must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself" although "the cogitations of them be often occasionally invited from the motion or appulse of sensible objects without made upon our bodies." It is then noted that in the Port-Royal Logic, "the same point 25
Cf. Katz, op. cit., pp. 279 f. See also nn. 31, 35. 79
JV. C H O M S K Y Ah'D J . K A T Z
is expressed," as when it is "affirmed that no idea which we have in our minds has taken its rise from sense, except on occasion of those movements which are made in the brain through sense, the impulse from sense giving occasion to the mind to form different ideas which it would not have formed without it, though these ideas have very rarely any resemblance to what takes place in the sense and in the brain" while many ideas cannot "be referred to sense." And in the same vein, Leibniz argues that "the senses, although necessary for all our actual knowledge, are not sufficient to give it all to us, since the senses never give us anything but examples, i.e., particular or individual truthsnz6 Surely it is fair to say that with respect to the point at issue in this discussion, the remarks cited from the Logic and from Leibniz are "in the same veinH-no closer "affinity" is asserted. Cooper further claims that Leibniz' "implication that only some truths are innate is incompatible with what Arnauld says"-namely, "that all our ideas are innate since none of them resemble what the senses come in contact with." \>Vedo not think that the passages are i n c ~ m p a t i b l eArnauld .~~ holds that "no idea which we have in our minds has taken its rise from sense, except on occasion of those movements which are made in the brain through sense." This assertion does not in itself contradict Leibniz' contention that "the senses never give us anything but examples, i.e., particular or individual truths." Cooper gives only one additional example in support of his charge that Chomsky "lumps together" dissimilar arguments. Cooper argues 26 Cooper states: "nowhere in rationalist writings do I find a hint of the view that experience serves to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses framed in accordance with innate categofies or forms." In the same citation, Chomsky also quotes Leibniz' observation that one way to "learn ideas and innate truths" is "in verifying them through experience." Note that Leibniz is discussing necessary truths and particular examples furnished by the senses, the Logic the formation of ideas by the mind on the impulse of sense (which may lack resemblance to the formed idea). Thus their statements are not identical, though they are, in the respects relevant to Chomsky's discussion, "in the same vein." Leibniz is speaking of the innate general principles that are "as necessary [to our thoughts] as the muscles and sinews are for walking, although we do not at all think of them." 27 Though if they were, it would not affect the thesis of Aspects that the passages are "in the same vein" in the respects there discussed. Recall that contrary to Cooper's claims, the sources he cites were explicitly not attempting to show that there is a single coherent rationalist doctrine, but rather to extract from the tradition important leading ideas, of contemporary relevance; and they explicitly and repeatedly noted that there are points of conflict among the views surveyed.
ON INNA TENESS
that in Cartesiarz Lingz~istics(pp. 66-67) Chomsky incorrectly attributed similar ideas to Descartes and CudTvorth. However, the statement in Cartesian Linguistics that "Rather similar ideas are developed by Cud~vorth" is quite accurate (for example, Descartes: "extraneous things transmitted [through the organs of sense something Tvhich gave the mind occasion to form these ideas" ; Cud~vorth:the function of sense is "the offering or presenting of some object to the mind, to give it an occasion to exercise its own activity upon"; and so forth). Cooper disagrees, on the grounds that Cud~vorthis referring only to the "point that since sight informs us only of the surfaces of things, the ideas of the things themselves have been 'actively exerted from within (the soul).' This is false, holvever, as the discussion in Cartesia?~Linguistics to which Cooper refers makes clear. This discussion cites many other examples to illustrate Cud~vorth'sconcept of the active and innate "cognoscitive powers" whereby men "are enabled to understand or t received from without by sense," including, inter alia, judge of ~ v h a is Cudworth's further development of the Cartesian theory of perception of regular figures, noted earlier. Cooper objects to Chomsky's attempt "to defend Descartes and Leibniz against the Lockean 'caricature'-in his replies to some of Goodman's criticisms." It is, he feels, "a most peculiar tactic to spend some time seeking affinity with earlier w.riters, defending them against critics, and then to turn around and say little is at stake in their being correct or not." Cooper's discussion at this point is hopelessly confused. The reference to "little being at stake" has nothing to do with the defense of Descartes and Leibniz, as his own formulation makes abundantly clear.29Rather, the reference here is to the question whether we should apply the term "knotvledge" to the innate principles that serve (Chomsky suggests) as the basis for the acquisition of k n o ~ v l e d g e . ~ ~ 2s Even the one example that Cooper arbitrarily selects from Chomsky's discussion does not serve to distinguish Cudnorth's views from those of Descartes, since Descartes makes a very similar observation, as noted in Cartesian Linguistics, p. 68, n. "7. Cooper's claim that Cudn-orth's views are not similar to Descartes's in this respect is particularly curious, since he later notes (without mentioning Chomsky's reference to this point) that Cudworth and Descartes gave essentially the same argument, in this respect (p. 379). 29 "Chomskv. , , indeed. has said that when it comes to formulating " his own thesis, no more is at stake than a decision to apply the term 'knonledge' in a rather obscure area." Clearly, the reference here is to Chomsky's thesis, not to Descartes, Leibniz, and Locke. 30 AS for Chomsky's concern to refute Goodman's criticism, there is nothing "peculiar" in this. Goodman claims that Locke had proven the doctrine of
N. C H O M S K Y AND J . K A T Z Cooper further claims that "it is arguable that philosophical interest in the issues concerns precisely such questions as to how to apply the term 'knowledge' in a rather obscure area, whether to call something 'actual' or 'dispositional,' or whether we can speak of unconscious propositional thought, and so on." He does not explain what he means by "philosophical interest," but it may be that he has in mind what is suggested by his (also unexplained) term "paradigmatically philosophical" (see above). If Cooper takes "philosophical interest" to include, say, Hume's concern for discovering "the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations," then evidently it does not matter (for determining "philosophical interest") whether the term "knowledge" is applicable in the areas under discussion. In some narrower sense (say, that of some contemporary epistemology), it may indeed be correct that "philosophical interest in the issues concerns precisely" the applicability of the term "knowledge." We incidentally believe that it is arguable whether and how the term is applicable in the case of the innate principles that we have been discussing; these questions are being argued.31 Similar innate ideas to be "false or meaningless," so that there would be little point (were this correct) in giving a revised formulation of it. But, as Cooper seems to agree, Goodman & mistaken in believing that Locke's critique refutes Descartes's doctrine (Cooper adds the irrelevant comment that some passages in Leibniz and Descartes may be subject to these strictures). Goodman, incidentally, persists in the belief that Locke showed that any intelligible version of the doctrine of innate ideas is "either trivially true or obviously false" ("The Emperor's New Ideas," in S. Hook [ed.], Language and Philosophy [New York, 19691, p. 138). It follows, then, that in Goodman's view Descartes's theory of perception of triangles, e.g., is either unintelligible, trivially true, or obviously false; it was, incidentally, this specific example on which Goodman originally commented, stating that Locke made "acutely clear" that the doctrine is "false or meaningless" (cf. Cohen and Wartofsky, op. cit., p. 89, where this single example is cited, and p. 107, where Goodman responds). But surely it is evident that this proposal is quite intelligible (we could program a computer to behave in this way; that Descartes, for other reasons, might have rejected this approach is not to the point) and possibly (though not trivially) true, though Goodman's irrelevant reformulation may well be subject to Locke's critique. It is, incidentally, hardly true that Locke's arguments on innate ideas were motivated strictly by the kinds of "paradigmatically philosophical" concerns that Cooper seems to have in mind, as is clearly demonstrated in the work by John Yolton that Cooper cites (J.Y. Yolton, John Locke and the W a y of Ideas, [Oxford, 19561) Cooper's own citations (p. 468) suffice to establish this. 31 The issue of the appropriateness of the term "knowledge" is discussed in several references that Cooper does not 'mention: among others, Chomsky, "Knowledge of Language," Times Literary Supplement ( I5 May 1969; excerpted
O N INNATENESS
remarks apply to his other candidates for "philosophical interest." In any event, if Cooper means to suggest that the "paradigmatically philosophical views of three hundred years ago" may have been restricted to the questions that he seems to feel are of "philosophical interest," we must disagree, for reasons already stated. And our concern, again, was with the classical ideas and their contemporary importance, not with Cooper's notion of "philosophical interest," whatever that may be. Cooper notes further that "All the seventeenth-century writers in question seem to have meant that universal acquaintance is a mark of the innateness of a truth in the sense that all men will immediately assent to the truth once it is clearly presented to them," whereas we do not. He fails to add that we have always insisted on precisely this difference. T o cite one instance, Cartesian Linguistics (p. 58) notes the "totally unwarranted assumption that a deep structure is nothing other than an arrangement of simple sentences," which "can be traced to the Cartesian postulate that, quite generally, the principles that determine the nature of thought and perception must be accessible to introspection and can be brought to consciousness with care and attention," one of the many Cartesian principles that are explicitly rejected in that work.32 It is surely, in Cooper's phrase, a "peculiar tactic" to accuse us of exaggerating the similarities between our "innateness hypotheses and the old one," on the basis of an "ingredient [that] is completely missing from the new hypothesis," while omitting to mention that we have insisted that the "old hypothesis" is distinct (and must be rejected) on this score. Cooper then notes a second point of difference between old and new doctrines-namely, with regard to the notions "universal" and "necessary." We take the "necessary" and "universal" principles to be those that are "required for learning to take place," so that particular universal elements might be lacking in some language, and our innate from a lecture which will appear in full in K. Gunderson and G. Maxwell [eds.], Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. V I ) ;Problems of Knowledge and Freedom (New York, 1g71),ch. I ; Graves, Katz, et al., "Tacit knowledge," Journal of Philosophy (7 June 1973). 32 See also Chomsky, Language and Mind (New York, 1968), p. 22: "The greatest defect of classical philosophy of mind, both rationalist and empiricist, seems to me to be its unquestioned assumption that the properties and content of the mind are accessible to introspectidn." Incidentally, this claim about accessibility to introspection in rationalist theory, which Cooper virtually repeats, may be too strong. The question deserves a closer study.
JV. CHOMSKY AND
3.
KATZ
elements "are only empirically necessary." I n contrast, rationalists normally were concerned with "Knowledge of universal (that is, nonparticular) truths, concepts, principles, and so forth," and understood by "necessary," "what is not contingent," not "that which is required for." M'here they did use the latter sense, they had in mind "innate principles . . . logically required for further knowledge." P\'e do insist that it is a contingent hypothesis that the principles required for acquisition of knowledge (of language) are as we suggest; a different organism might employ different principles and acquire different systems of knolvledge and belief on the basis of the evidence available to humans (or acquire no systems, or acquire cognitive systems under conditions that ~vouldnot suffice for humans). As noted above, Descartes, for one, might disagree, in part because he believed that he had demonstrated the necessity of all phenomena of nature. Clearly, 1i.e reject this demonstration, lvhile recognizing that certain of his specific theories (for example, of perception) can be reformulated quite intelligibly as empirical hypotheses. It is unclear what Cooper thinks he is accomplishing when he reiterates our clearly expressed intention to give a modified version of leading ideas that appeared in the rationalist tradition, rejecting the proof that there is a God who does not deceive us, the belief that the contents of the mind are open to introspection, and certain other features of traditional doctrines, and a t the same time developing further the very important and suggestive idea that there is a system of innate principles, an innate schematism, that determines the general form and character of the cognitive systems that can be acquired, given the data of sense, by this particular organism. IVe are thus attempting to show that these ideas provide a n appropriate framework for the investigation of the "operations of the mind," a framework which is, as we noted, sharply at variance with leading ideas in the empiricist tradition. Putting aside Cooper's repeated misrepresentations, several already discussed, this seems a n entirely reasonable enterprise, whether or not our conclusions are correct. It relates to traditional debates in just the way we have discussed, so far as we can see.33 Quite apart from his misrepresentation of our views, Cooper's discussion is marred by simple errors of reasoning. Consider, for example, his argument that "Chomsky's universals are not universal in the old 33 I\ie have argued as well that this enterprise and the conclusions reached relate as well to current philosophical discuision, but since Cooper does not raise the point, we will not pursue the matter here.
84
sense." This follows, Cooper alleges, from the fact that Locke was accurate in ascribing to his opponents the view that "T\'hatsoever is innate must be universal in the strictest sense; one exception is a sufficient proof against it." Thus universals, "in the old sense," must be exceptionless, whereas, "Chomsky . . . stresses that various grammatical universals need not be found in each and every language." Thus "It follows that Chomsky's universals are not universal in the old sense." Cooper's argument requires that we identify "exception to a universal" with "failure of a universal to apply." But the t ~ v onotions are entirely different. Thus, in Jakobson's theory of phonetic universals, which Cooper cites in this connection, it is held that the phonological system of each language is drawn from a fixed universal system of features ~ v i t hparticular laws of combination. An exception (counterexample) to his theory would be a language ~ v i t ha phonological structure that violated the laws or that used features not in the postulated universal set. But, .Jakobson holds, such universals as a given phonological feature need not be found in each and every language; that is to say, one universal feature may simply b e missing from the inventory in some language, and some law of combination may simply have no instances. Evidently, this state of affairs is not to be confused with a n e x ~ r p t ; ~ to i : the Jakobsonian theory. Thus Cooper's argument collapses. What is more, the possible inapplicability of universal principles, contrary to what Cooper states, is entirely consistent with the dispositional theories of innate ideas of Descartes and others. Tl'hile it is perfectly true that such theories cannot tolerate exceptions, it is a n essential property of such theories that some innate ideas may be missing in a particular "inventory." T o recall Descartes's image, ideas are innate in us in the sense that "in some families generosity is innate, in others certain diseases like gout or gravel, not that on this account the babes of these families suffer from these diseases in their mother's womb, but because they are born with a certain disposition or propensity for contracting them" (cited in Aspects, p. qg) ; and if these babes do not contract the diseases, the disposition or propensity is no less innate. But it is in the latter sense that universals of grammar "tolerate exceptions," as Cooper's very citations make clear. Cooper notes that, for most rationalists, "~vhatis innate determines the possible shapes that experience can take. . . . TVhereas, for Chomsky, one cannot determine a priori what shapes linguistic experience will take on." \Ye have indeed suggested that the principles of universal grammar (linguistic theory) "comprise a hypothesis concerning the inborn capacity for language acquisition [and] describe a
N. CHOMSKY AND
3. K A T Z
device that determines what can count as genuine linguistic exper i e n ~ e . "These ~ ~ principles, "we may speculate, are a priori for the species-they provide the framework for the interpretation of experience and the construction of specific forms of knowledge on the basis ~ ~ far as we can determine, our discussion of the of e ~ p e r i e n c e . "As similarities and differences of our views to those of earlier discussion are clear and accurate. We cannot find in Cooper's critique any indication to the contrary. Cooper "find[s] it impossible to relate" Descartes's theory of perception of regular geometrical figures, mentioned earlier, to Chomsky's "thesis in any significant manner." The relation, however, is quite simple, and we have discussed it several times. Descartes held that "we already possess within us the idea of a true triangle, and it can be more easily conceived by our mind than the more complex figure of the triangle drawn on paper [so that] we, therefore, when we see that composite figure, apprehend not it itself, but rather the authentic triangle."36 Introducing a distinction between perception and learning which (as explicitly noted) seems foreign to Descartes, we suggest that humans "already possess within us" the schematism for grammar; and when presented with data of sense, the mind applies this schematism to determine linguistic experience, and produces ultimately a specific, fully articulated realization of this schema, a grammar, which expresses a person's knowledge of language. I t is difficult to debate the issues of how significant this relation is; to us it seems interesting, and becomes still more so ~vhenwe consider the great range of other classical proposals surveyed in the same reviews, but ignored in Cooper's comments. When rationalist and empiricist approaches are interpreted as metatheories, in the manner we have suggested, it is possible and we think fruitful to regard each in its full potential generality as a metahypothesis about the acquisition of all knowledge and belief. That is, each metatheory can be understood as specifying a form of explanation that holds for each domain in which knowledge and belief are acquired. So interpreted, each metatheory spans such diverse areas as perception, language, culture, politics, and so on. A priori, it is possible that human 34 Katz, op. cit., p. 281. In this discussion, Katz relates these considerations to the question of synthetic a priori knowledge. See above. 35 Problems of Knowledge and Freedom, p. 44. See also Language and Mind, ch. 3, where some relevant suggestions by Lorenz are cited. 36 Reply to Objections V. Cited, with some discussion, in Cartesian Linguistics, pp. 68-69; "Recent Contributions . .
. ."
0 N INNA TENESS
cognitive systems in some of these domains are developed on the basis of experience along the lines postulated by empiricist theories, while in others they result from the differentiation, articulation, and realization of innate schemata in the manner postulated in our reconstruction of rationalist ideas. It seems to us proper to interpret classical rationalism and empiricism (in accordance with our proposed reconstruction) as denying this possibility. Both metatheories, then, are taken in full generality with the claim that acquisition of knowledge and belief proceeds in the same manner in each domain, that there is only one kind of process of development of cognitive structures with one specific kind of biological or genetic basis. So construed, these metatheories become part of a metasubject-namely, the theory of theories of human nature. Again, Cooper's consistent misunderstanding of our position with regard to the metatheoretic character of rationalist (and empiricist) conceptions prevents him from seeing the very obvious sense in which work in perception, language, and possibly other domains falls within the same general rationalist framework, and from appreciating the fact that this framework gains its intellectual interest from its status as a theory of human nature.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
