On the Relation of Universals and Particulars

Russell B. "On the Relation of Universals and Particulars" PAS, New Series, v. Xll. 1912 pp. 1-24. Reprinted by Gourtesy of the Editor of the Aristotelian 1912 wlnrw.aristotel iansoci ety.org. uk.

Society:

PAPERSRBAD BEFORETHE SOCIETY, 1911-1912_

I.-OI{

THE

RELATIONS

OF UNIVERSALS PARTICULARS.*

AND

3y BonrneNo Russrr,r,. Tnn purpose of the following paper is to consiclerwhether there is a fundamental division of the objects with rvhich metaphysics is concerned into lwo classes, uni'r'ersais and particulars, or rvheiher there is any method ol overcoming bhis dualism. My own opinion is that the dualism is ultimate ; ou the other hand, many men rvith whom, in the rnain, I am in close agreement, hold that ib is not ultimate. I do not feel the grounds in favour of its ultimate nature to be very conclusive,and in what follorvs I should lay stress rather on the distinctions and considerations introduced during the argument than on the conclusion ab which the argumenb arrives. It is impossible to begin our discussionwith sharp definitions of universals and particulars, though we nray hope to reach such definitions in the end. At the beginning, rve can only roughly indicate the kind of facts that we wish to analyze and the kind of distinctions that rve wish to examine. There are several cognate distinctions rvhich produce confusion by intermingling, * The thesis of the present paper is closely similar bo that of lfr. Moore's paper "fdentity," read before this Society iu 1900-1901. Ify chief reasonfor thinking that the questiolrdemandsa fresh discussion is thab the statement of the grounds for bhe thesis appears to require some examination of the nature of sensiblespaceas opposedto physical space. A

2

SERTITAND RUSsELL.

and whicb ib is importanb bo disentangle before advancing into the heart of our problem. The firsr disbinction thab concerns us is the distincriou between percepbsand concepts,i.e.,betrveen ob.jecbs of acts of pelcepbion and ol-,,jects of acts of conception. If there is a rlislirrr,l,i,rrr lrctwccn parbicularsand universals,perceptsrvill be rrnrorrglrilticulars, rvlrile concepts rvill be among universals. ( )l rl r or r r r r lsof r r r ri v o l s a l ss, u c h a s B e rk e l e y a nd H unre, rvi l l rrriirrl,;r.irr I lurt uorrccpLsuro clcrival.rlefronr pelcepts, as fainb l o l r ir s , or ir r s or r rt o tl rrrr rv a y . ()p l ro n e n tso f parti cul arsrvi l l rru rinl. ir .llr ir rr r { .t , lr r rL l l rp i i rrn p i , a rl i c u l i rri b yo f p e rceptsi s i }l usorl -, rLrrrll,lr:rL,tlrouglr flrc ucl of pcrceptioll may differ from the act ol' corrctrlrlirnr, yct ils olrjecls differ only by their greater cornplc.xity, ir.rrtl are really composedof conslituents rvhich arer ol' ruight be, concepts. Bub the clistinction of percepts and coucepts is too psychological for an ultimate rnetaphysical distinction. Percepts ancl conceptsare respectivelyfhe, relata of two different relations, perception and conception, and there is nothing in their definibions to sholv whether', or how, they differ. Moreover, the distinction of perceptsand concepts,in ibself,is incapalile of beirrg extended to eutities rvhich are not objectsof cognilive acbs. llence we require sorne obherdistinction expressingthe intrirrsic clifferencervhich we seenrto feel belrveetrpercelrlsand concepts. A cognate distinction, which effecrlspar:bl,t, lcas[ of rv]nll rve lv ant , is t he d i s ti n c ti o n b e trv e c rrth i u ts rvl ri cl r t.xi sl i rr ti me and bhingsr v l ri c l id o rro t,. Irr r,rrrl eto r tv oi rl i i rry rl rrr,sl ,i ,rrr a ,s to' r v het her t it n e i s rc l a t,i v c o r rrl rs o l u tc\\ , ' r) l u;r,)' si Lyl ,l rrrl i rn c nlit y a " ox is ts i rr ti rrro" 1 ,rr,v i d r:rl .r i s rro l ,i t,scl fl r,l nol rrcnl , rrr pr Llt of t ir ne, r rrtrls < ' rrrcs u c l r p l o l ro s i ti o rrrrs " ,i : i :; l ,r,fl l r, .r/ o r s it r r r r lt ar t eous r v i L h 1 7r-r13' .f5 g 1y " i s trrrc o i' .r' . ( l l , ri rr,' (, t.rrl x t as s r r r t r t 'llt d rl b ,' fo r,'s, i n tu l l a .ttc u tts tu ,tl trf' l r' t.rLl r.trrrrlrr:rl l t tr.rc lr t s iv:e if r ] ra s d u ra ti o n , tl u ry w i l l rr' 1 , l rr, ri ' .) l ' , , r,t,i a per c epb e x i s b s i rl ti rn e , i rr tl rc r;,,1r;r,, l rl ro t'r, \rl rrl ,. i L J)tc io,

ON TIIIi

ttl :,L^'fl oN i i ol r l l N l Vl i l l l )i A I.Il ,\N l r l ' A l { l l t

col l cel l ti d0es troL' w i tl r

the

act, of

seerus i ndi ffcretrb

1'l rtl .l rj rl t'l ' l crcrrl rt,i orr, Lo l l rc

{ )f l x ' l (' trl )l ' l "tt

rv l ri l r'

l ,i l ntr,rf

l ' l tI

i l l ' A l (rr

'l

l :t

"tl t' ttl l ' Il rr' ' rl i l r' l ' .;' ' r' l ' ol r:{ rl l t' r' l rl l l )l l

trottc oi v i tr;i

rLtr,l 1,,, rrl l

l ' i trtrr'

tl i s t' i rrc Tl ns, Ttri trtd l tac'i r:, tvr: l ti Lvo l ttrt' rt 1l l rr trott-1rs l t' l r,rl trf i 11111 l l rrl bl r0 s rurtc (l ol tLruv e rs i es ti on of w hi C h rve w erc i l l scurcl r .

rrtrrlcortcopls. The will break out &s in lhc caso of 1x:t'tlolrLs man who reduces conuepts to perccpts rvili say that nothing is really out of time, and thab the appearance of this in the The man rvho reduces percepts case of concepts is illusory. bo conceplsmay either, like mosb idealists,deny that anything is in bime, or, like some realists, maintain thab concepts can and do exist in time. In addition to bhe above disLincbion as regards time, there is a distinction as regards space which, as we shall find, is very important in connection wibh our preseut question. Put as vaguely as possible, tiiis is a distinction which divides entities into lhree classes: (a) those which are not in any place, (b) those which are in one place at one tine, bub never in more than one, (c) those which ar-e in nrany places at once. To make this threefold division precise, rve should have to discuss what we mean by a place, lvhat we meon by " in," and horv the different kinds of space-visual, tactile, physical -produce different forms of this lhreefoltl tlivisiorr. lir-rr the present I rvill merely illustrato wlrrlb f rnctrt by exirtttpLrs. Relations, obviously, do nof trxisb :rttyrvlreroitr space. Ortr bodies,lve think, cxist irr ottt, plrrrxtrlb ir Littttr,lrrtbttob itr tlttlre olt t lt Q cot t t t r ll ir s t vlr iLt r t t t lss, than otre. (]crtcrl ,l ,1rrrr.l i t,itst's, n r a y b c s l L i t l t , , r l r t : i t t IIl i tl ) y l ,l i t( '( l s l tt, o l l ( i ( ) : w c l D a y s a l ', i r r i t r s e l r s o , t l r l L Lr v l r i L t 'r r c s si s i tr r r vtl t';' l ,l r ttl r l l vl r cr c tl te r e trlry,

is l, rvhile tlrirrg.

'f l r i s r l i v i s i,r r r o l o tr t,i l i tr s l vi l l l ,tr tl i sctr ssctl

l r r t c r ; f , , t ' L l r c 1 r t 'c s t t t t ,I I r r t 'r t , l )' u i sr l rt,o i l r r l i tr :r L tll l r l r l i L r cr l r ti tt:J t 'x r u r r i t r L t , i , i l t . l r r r L , l , l i l , i o r rt , o L l t t l t l t t t v t l 1 ,s1 ','l ttr l o g i t:i il ll ttr l tttct,r tl r l tl 'si tr l tl , l i r ; li r r l l , i o r r s , l , l r r r t r r l l r '( ) l , t t 'o l ,r ;i i r ,r tl r l i st i tr ct.i o tr s l vl r i t'l r t!r ( : r l l r '\ ': r l r l , i n t , l r r l r l 'r ') i {: l l l t, r t r r l t t i tl '.

I r r l l r r : l i tr r l , 1 ,l l tr :c,l l r r :tr : i s A'

I i l,lll' f lir \ N I I

IiUr is I,ll,l,.

ON TH X R E LA TION S OF U N IY E IIS A LIj A N I) I' r\l i ' fl (i l l l ,A l i s .

l l rrr rl i< 1, ; t t , ' , , ior lr cr t ,rv r:c rr l ' o l i rti r)u s a n rl c rrt,i t,i c rvl s i i cl r al e rrof l r:l :rl , i, r r s . ll, lr ; r s lr.rrl t c l rs trl u i u .)'l i )r l rl ri l o s ,l r l rersto i gtrore o r rr,. jc r l,r ' r r lll, ior rsrr,rrrl , s l rr:rl i :rs i f a l l e rrti ti es n' ere t' i tl rcr sttl r,j lr : lr,i, t l, t c t I ic ir t,t,s . l l rrt, t.l ri s C rrs tg rrri S Op t]re tl ecl i rrt, :r.rr,lI : , lr : r ll ils s nlllr ,u ' i t.l ro rrf I' rrl t,l rc irn ' g r.l l n c n t l rat therc url ' r,rrr:l rr r r lil, r c s; r . slr , ltl ,i o n s . J ' l ri l o s o p l ryl ri l s ,s o fi i t. as I l < norv, l r) r'( ' r ilnlor rr r ; r r r ilrI o I rL l l c rrl ,i l i c s rv h i c l r a re rtot rel ati ons.

hatrcd i nto one rvhol e,& nd so on. A lclr r , t iot ris t lisLir r gr r islr r : r l as tlrriil,triple, quadruple, etc., or d1'rxlio,frit'lit:, ilrtrLrdic,olc., accol'(lirrgto the number of terms rvlrich iL rrttibos in the sirnplest couiplexes in rvhich it occurs. Thus in the above exanrple.s, hatred is a dual lelation and belief is a quadruple relation. The capaciby for cornbining terms into a single conrplex is the defining chalacteristic of what I call oarbs. llhe

;\.r..r1 r r r r r ' lr . r r t , i1, i r.s rr,r' r: i rr.l rrrl t:rlrro bo rrl .va l l ti re ti ri rrgs that, rr',rrr lr lr r ; r l, r r r ' : r llyl,c c i L l l o tl l )a rti c u l a rs , b u t i l l so al I the rrrri vr, r ' s r rl,lrlri r r ,lr l,lr il o s o l rl rr:r'asre i n th e h a l ri t o f consi deri ng u 'l rcrr t , lr r , - r ' r lis r r r rs t,lsu : rc l i l ti u rr o f p a rti c u l a l s t o urri versa)s, l'ur urivr:r'sir,lsrrnr gr:rrerallyct_rnceivetl as coutrnon properties of pariiculars, irr l'rrct, as predicates. tr'or our prurposeit is hardly 'ivorth whilr to invent a technicai terru nd hcrc; f sliall

question no\r arises: Are there complexes rvhich ct,rrsistol' o sirigle term and a verb ? " A exists " mighi servc trs rtlr exan)pleof rvhat is possibiy such a cornplex. It is tlrtr 1,ossii(, bility that thero rnay be complexesof this kind rvhich rrtu,litrs irnpossible to decide off-hand bhat verbs are tlte ettttc ils relafious. There may be verbs rvhich are philosopltically ts

lherefole speak uf crrlitics rvhicli are not reiaiions sirnpiy as ttott-rt.IaI'iort s. The secondlogical tlistinctiori *'hich rve requir-eis one rvhich mav or may nob be itlerrbicirlin extension with lhab bebween relabions and non-relatiorrs,but is certainly not identical in irrtensiol. I0 rrral' be cxl.rressctlas the rlistinction betrveen verlis iurrl substanlivcs,()l', rrrot'cool.reclly,behveen the objects tlcnok,rl Ly vcrbs rutl Llrtr olrjucls rlcnoteri by substanlir.es.x (Si rrc c l, lr is r r r or o c o rrc c t r.rx p te s s i oirr s l o rrg a trd cnrrrl rrous,I sl ra l l gt . r r r , r ' r Lll1' rtrs c s l ro rtt' r'l ri rta s eL o n i e i rn i h e sarnetLi l g. l re 'l 'l rrrs,r r lr r , t r I s pt ' r l i o f v e r' l rs I, rn rrL nth e o l rj e c tsderi oted by t l l l ,s , r r r r r l s ir r r ilr r l l y l i rl s u b s t,rrn ti v c s .)' J l l rtrnrrLrrreoi thi s rl i sl ,i r r c l, ior( 'rlllol' l{ (,s fl o rrr tl rrr rr,rrrrl ;' srrI i s c o trrl rl cxes. Irr rrrosb r',,1 1 11r lc xilc sr,r ot ,ir r l rl l , rL c c rL l ri rrrrrrrn b r,l .otli i l l crerrt,t,rrti bi es :u ,, r',r r r l, ir r r , ir r l r t , or r s i rrg l t' r' rrt,i l ,.i , Irrl rt,trs o l rr,r' t' l rLti otr." r\,s l r,\' fr;r.l r r r rIl, r ' 1i, " li, r ' c x i rrrrl ,l c , i s l r c o rrl rl c x i rr rvl ri r' l r l ttrl t.,tl ('{)n rlr ir r ,A : i : r r r r l li irrt,oo trt.rrl ro l r,;" (l ' s I' r,l i t,l1 l r:r1,.\l r:r1r' sl i " ir; rt

r',')rfl l fr'\

x ' l'l ri r l r l i . r v . r ' tt

i tr

rr'l r r llr

i s tl r,r rl i sl i rr,l i,r lr l /,ttt,J,* :u r,l

i f l f l f l o l ) fr:tl f'.

l '[-

ltr ' lir ' /' t' r ttlltilr n;

r ylr i,lr

rt,) ) t' t,l,l,r t l,tr l

I

,,\

rrrrrl

f,r r tr r r r tl- t' r lr i) l\' r

li

( ) f;r s

llr , sr . l.r ,t tr lr r r o lr ) nllr .t l 't1 tr, t1,1,,s,,1 .ll,tth' //i,r 1is, ) ] .lli.

r r tr r l

( ';r r r r l

l l r r .r l i r l i r r ,l i ,,r r l r .r .l r

l ,r

rrr.

well as grammatically intlansitive. Such verbs, if they exist, may be calledpredicates,and the plopositions in rvhich they are attlibubed may be called subject-predicabeploposiiions. If t)rere are no such verbs as those rvhose possibility we havc l..,eenconsidering, i.e., if all verbs are relations, it will foliorv that subject-predicate propositions, if there are any, will express a relotic)1lof subjecb to predicate. Such propositions rvill then be definable as those that involve a ceriain relation calledpred,iccttion.Even if there are subject-predicateproposibions iu rvhich bhe predicate is the ver-b,there rvill sbill be equivalenb proposirionsin rvhich the predicate is lelated to the subject; rhus " A exists," for exarnple, wili be equivalent to " A has existence." Hence the question whether predicates are verbs of not becomesunimporbsnt. The more irnportant question is rvhethel there is a specific lelation of predication,or lYhether rvhat are gramrnaticallv subject-predicate proposibionsare really of nrzurt'cliffercnt liinds, no one of which has the chatacteristics one rriiLurally tssociatcs lvitli sutrject-predicatepropositions. 'I'lrisrlrrcstiorris one to whicli rve shall return ab a later stage. ' l ' l rrl i rl urvrrl ,rgi rl rl rl i sl i trct,ior rlllr s ) t olevit lr bt o ot r r enr lt t ir y i l , i :; rr;rl .rrr' :ll ,,r l I' r' grrrlt lr r ul ilr t lr r , t sr t s r r r r t , it icsr vlr iclr l ,r' r.:rrrrrr. r.i t,tl r)nl y'

llr

r;rtl r1,'r:ts ol '

t,r:t'l rrs of

tr,l rtl i ons ,

rttr,l c l ttttrrl l

llo

6

nERTRAND nussELL.

ON

predicates or relations. A particular. is nabulally conceived as a tJtis or something inbrinsically anaiogousto a tli,s; and such an entity seems incapable of being a predicate or a lelation. A universal, on this view, will be anything that is a predicafe or a relation. But if there is uo specific relation of predicabion,so thab there is no class of entities which can properly be called predicates,then the above method of disbinguishiug particulars and universals fails, The question whethel philosophy must recognise two ultimately distinct kinds of entities, particulars and universals,turns, as we shall see rnore fully later on, on the question whether non-reLations are of two kinds, subjects and predicates,or lather ierms which can only be subjects and terms which may be eiiher subjects or predicates. And this question lurns on tvhether there is an ultimate simple asymmetrical reiation which may be called predication, or whether all apparent subject-predicabe propositions are to be analysed into propositions of o[her forms, which do nob require a radical difference of nature between the apparent subject and the apparent predicate. The decision of the question rvhether there is a simple relation of pleciication ought per.hapsto be possibleby inspectiorr, bub for my part I am unable to come to any decisionin Llrisway. I think, however, thab it can be decided in favour ol' lrlrrrlir:lt,ionlry tlrc analysis of things and by considerations :ts t,o spir,t,io-tcrnlloraldivelsity. TIris arrlr"lysisilrrd these co rrsi rlc r ; r t , iorr rvsill al s o s l ro w tl ru rv rl y i rr rv l ri c l r orrr purei y n lr o rrrrrlu 1 r rv i tl r tl ro o L l re r rl u esl i orrsas to l ,,rl i r:r,l( lll{ ) s t , ir )is s l ri t,l r I rl l i s r,rIl rl ti rc l rr,gi trni rrg of lrrtl ,i r:tt l; r nir t n, l r r r r iv e l s rrl rv l,l ri s1 r:r lr r : r ' . 'l 'l rc r : or r r r r r on- s {!rn i r l ,i o rro f l l ri n g s l rrr,l t.l r,,i rrl rr:rl i l i ,,ri rro i s, I

s t t l'lro l i r ' , I , l r l n o t r r ' , t , o l

t,lr r : ( ' r tr ( ' r .l) l,io tt ll

sr r lr .jr lr,t,:rtrrl l rl l rl i r: rt lrt , t t t t r l t , l r t t r : t s , r t r n' lr y lr r ,r llr r :1 1 1 r is r ;o l;r .r ' g ,,l.ylrtri r.rl .rr l i ri ri trt t t t t : t '1r t , i o t t . is

rt . l, ir u u t u i

l l r r l , I , l r c tlr ir r 1 1 , lili,'

o tlr r l

co tn r r r r ) n r r lnl \r, rrrrl i rrrrr,

l r r r , l l l t r ';r tl,r ' r l tr tcl,lr lr lr l' r iici,

r vlr i,' lr

trl tl ,l rr'1

lt t t rlrt r l t t t , : t t r o t ' 1 1 i v r,r t tt. lr ,r r ;r l,lr : lr .l' li,,l,lr tr ,ilr iu r l .

1'11',11

rr. r, rrl rl .1

THE

R ELAT ION S

OIr

Il N l Vl i l ts ,\

l,:i

A N tr

t'

l i l l ( t rl , i \ l i i i

i

r ,r r r l, n ' {,1, behi nd the datr. A tl ri ng, oI l , lr r , , . 1, 1. 1'1r l; r . \ jr strtuted by a bundl e of srrtrsi l rl rl rrtt r r . lt l, ilr l, r, l, , r r ; '1r rlr; ir r ir r , 'ul senses, but supposedal l to t:o-cxi s l,i11or r cr ''r r r lnlu( r u:lrr{, l, r r(,tl 0f spa,ce. Il ut the col nl rtorrsl r:rrurl vlr ir lr slr or r l, rl : 'r r l, ; lirlr r , r l, lr vi sual and tacti l e qual i l i cs i s rroLl , lr r ,sl, ir crol', r 'il, lr cl visr uilot ' tacti l e percepti on: i t i s a corrshrrcl, cr l" r 'cr r"l syr ; lr , o, lr clicl in rvhich has, I suppose,been gorrcrtlctI lry rrssocirrtiorr.And in crude fact, the visnal and taclilc rluu.liLicsof whicli I lr,nr sensibleare not in a comnrt'rnspircc,lrrrl el,clrirr.ibsown spuce. Hence if the thing is to be irnpartial as Letrveen sight arrtl touch, ib must cease to have the actual clualitiesof wirich we are sensible, and become their commoD causo or origin or \yhatevervaguer rvord can be fourrd. Thus the road is opclre(l to the melaphysical theories of science antl to the rnetaphysical theories of philosophy: the thing may be a number of electric charges in rapid mobion,or an idea ilr the rnind ol God, but it is certainly not v/hat bhe sensesperceive. The argument against things is trite, and I rreednot labour it. I introduce ib here only in order to illustrate a consequence which is sometimes ovellooked. Realists who reject particulars are apb to regard a thing as reducible to a nunrber of qualibiesco-existing in one place. But, aparb frorrr otlrer objections bo tbis view, i! is doubtful whether blre dillcrrrrrl qualities in question ever do co-exisb in one place. lf t,lro qualities are sensible,the place must be in a sensiblcspr\co; but this mahes iL necessarythat Lhe qualities should belorrg tcr only one sense, and it is not clear that genuinely difl'erenb quaiities belonging to one senseever co-exist in a singlc pl:rce irr a yrerceptualslrilce. If, on the other hand, we consider what trlry lrc crrllcrl" rerrl" sl)ru,e,,i.e. Lbe inferred space contaiuing " ol ' j ,' cl srvl ti cl r rre su1)posof o be t hc causesol' t . , ur l ,l rr" ' tr' ;t.l v at is t lr e na, t ur eof t lr t ) l ,l l (' n\\' {f Il () l ,rrrgct' l i ttir rlvlt l r' t(r' l ' l i {} n:1, rl rrrrl rtrr.rr, , ri cl r cxi sl i rr 1, lr i:"; r 'e: ll" slr ace,anr l it is rl rrrl .\' rvl trrrl rrrrrll , r' r.1,1;rl r,l ,l lrr, ,trrrrl l r,ol ' , 1r r r r . lit , ir lr:y. slr , collccLiot tof (,f ,rlut llur l, r 't isl, ir r \\l rrl cvl l rrr;rl l r.r' l t:tvi rr;1 t , :ltscst : icr r co of I,tr.(' (

I]EITTRAND RUSSELL.

ON

T IIE

l tl tl Al 'l 0N l j

Ol ,' l l N l \'l r l l il i r\ l . r;

,\lilr

l,\lillr

| 1 . . \ l r. i

1l

the moment may prescribe. Thus in any case the bundlc of co-existirrg rl.alities in the same place is not an athnissible substitutc for tho thing. tr'or our pruposes, the ,. real " objecb by which scieuce or philosophy replaces the thing is not importanr. \lre lrave rathcr to considerthe relations of sensible objects in a single scrrsiblospace,say that of sight. 'Ilhe theory of sensible qualities which dispenses rvith lxr,rticulars will say, if the same shade of colour is found in

The gerrel i l l l ur,nrc" rvl ri l ,c,"i rr l ,l rir rvi( , \ \ , ,r r rr lr . lr r r , ',1, 1 , 111, , 11, . , , persol l ati i gi vctrl trorrrr,trt,l rl ' tr1r ; r . r . l, r , , r r llr r . 1r ; r rl,lrr r. lr , l lr r , . lr l, ., lr he sees or i ttti tgi trcs;l i rrol ,l rrl 1r: r r , lr :ir lrr r '; r llr , r lr vlr lr , r l il, lr : r ; exact l i kortossi tt col orrr l ,o l ,l rc sllur r llr r . r1r l ; r l, r lr . lr r or ', lr . rt., o avoi rl tnal < i rrgthc coLrrrri l rrrri vcr . st l, r vr : lr r r vol, osr r lr ; r r isrt ,rlr lr L " exacb l i keness" i s a si rrrl ,l u n: lr r t , ion,r r oL ir r r illl, sir lr lrinlo r cotnmuni ty of predi ctl es; rrror eovol',il is t r ot llr r . golr er . al relation of likeness tlrat we rcquirc, brrt itr lrr()ro sltecirtl relation, thab of colour-likeness,sirrce tlvo paLolicstrrighb i-'r-l

bwo different places, that whab exists is the shade of colour itsclf, and that rvhat exists in the one piace is identical rvith rvhat exists in the other. The theory which admits particu).ar.s will say, on the contrary, that two numerically clifferent ,instanccsof the shade of colour exisb in the trvo places : in this vierv, the shade of colour itself is a nniversal and a predicate of both the instances,but tbe universal does not exist in spaceancl time. Of the above trvo viervs,the first, rvhich doesnot iutroduce particulars, dispensesaltogebher rvibh predicirlion as a fundamental relabion: according to tliis vicrv, tvheri \re say " tlris tlring is white," the funcltrrnentalfa,ct is that rvhiteness exists here. Accolding to the ttther vierv, rvlrich adntits particulars, what exists here is somethirrgof which rvhiteness is a preclicate-not, as for common sense,thc lhiug rvith rnany ollier qualities,but an instance of whiteness,a prLrlicular.of which whiteness is the only predicate except shape antl

exactly alike in shapeor size bub different in colour. TIms, in order to nrake the theory of Berkeley and Hunre workal_rle, rve must assurnean ultimate relation of colrut'-likeness, rvlrich holds between trvo patclies lvirich rvoulrl ct,rnruonlyi,tl srr,itlto have lhe sarte colour'. Nolr., prirrtti ./irr,i,',tlris rclrr,Littnof col our-l i l tenessrvi l l i tsel f be i t r r nivr , r 'sr ror l r u , , r lr st r act i dea," and tl .rusw e shal l sti l l l ri r "r 'rI 'ir ilr , ,lo l r r , ioir tl r uivcr sr ls. B ut rve nl av appl y the si nnrrl rrrLl; , sisl, o lolonr . - lilir lllss. Wc

brightness and whabever else is necessalily corrnecled u,ibh whiteness. Of the above trvo theories, one aclnrit,sorrl.y rvlrirt,rvoukl naturally be called universals, while thu .LIrur ltrlrrrits lr.th universals and particulars. Ileforo oxa,rrrirrirrg t,lrcrrr,it, rrrir,r, lre a s we l l t o ex anr ine a n d ti i s rrri s stl ro tl rro r,yu ' l ri r.l rrrrl rrri t,s orrl 1. p a rti c ular s ,ant l dis p e rrs easl to g r:tl ru rrv i l ,l r rrrri v t :r' s:rl s. ' l ' l ri s i s tl tc th eor y adv oc ut cdl ry Il c rk e l c y ,,rrrl I l u rrr. i rr l l r.i r. 1r,l * rrri r: i l g i r,i r r s"t alt s t r ac t id c u s ." W i L l ro rrt,l ,f i rrg o rrrs r,l \' { .s rl ,r\vn to t,l rci r s L: r t c t nc t r tlc s ,t u s s .c ,,v l rn Lr:l rrrl rt. rrrtrl r,,,t l l ri ri Il rr.r,r.r,

may bake a sbandal tlparLi . crrl l L r . clt srol'r : , ol, r ut lili, , r r lss,r Lr r r l sav that anytl ri ng el se i s to l rc clLllcr lir r , , r lr r utlr l\ r , r r r lr r l r l ir r exactl y l i ke our starrdri ,r'oast:. rl I t , is olr vious,lr 'r r r , r 'r , r ',t lr : r l, such a processl eads to arr cl rrllcssr ( jljt . r ss:r vc r xlr l; r . it r Llr , , l i kenessof trvo terms as consi sti ' g ir r t , lr . lili. r r . ss r vlr i, . lrl, lr . i' l i kenessbears to the l i kerressol lr vo ot , lr crt , cnr r s,; r . n,rl , r r lr , :r regressi s pl ai nl y vi ci ous. Li ken ess ab lea, sl,t , lr cr . t : lor rr,r,r r r : il, be admitted as a universal, aud, having adniittctl orrr_lrrrrivcrsll, we have no longer any reason to rcject olhers. 'I'hus Llrt: lvhole comphcated theory, rvhicli hacl no motive exceprt kr avoicl universals, falls bo the ground. Whether or nob thcrc are par'liculars, there must be relations rvhich are universirls irr lhe sensethat (a) they are concepls, not percepbs; (l) tlre,r'do not exist in time; (c) they are verbs, not substantives. Ib i s tl ue that tl re above arg um ent does not pr ove t hat tl rurci l l . rrrri vrrrslrl l rrl rl i l i csas op poscr lt o univer . salr . r lat ior Ls. ()rr tl r. o()l l l ,t.l ' .\'i l,, sl rrrvs t,l r;Ltru r iv. r 'sr r r, llr r lr li( , it tc, s r r r ,s{rf r t r rt:1l ,r,-,i c Il i l t

l i l tr)\!', l rr: t..'l rl l r..orl l rv .,x ttr:1, l i l i r.ttr:s s .s

of

V i tr.i 0rts

10

llltltl' llAN I) IlIlsSIr ll,l,.

Iti rr r lslr c t r v c c npo rti c l l l trs . ' l ' l ri s v i c w l ra s , s o frr as I knorv, rro l, lr ir r gt , o lec on u n e rrrli t l rtry o n di ts Io g i c a l possi bi l i ty. IrrLrt l 'r'o r r Llr r r lur ilr L o f v i c w o f t)rr: p t' o b l e rrrtv l r et,herthere l ue 1 r;r ll, ic r r lir it r s ,has n o l re a ri n { o n th e a rg u rn e nt. It i s rt vi erv rv) r i. lris . r ily pos s i b l ei f l i r.re i l rc [)a rti c ' ]a rs,ancl i t cl ernri rrLl s orrly arr easy re-staternenbof sulrject-prcrlicateprolto-sitiorrs : insteaclof s.rying that an entity has such and suclr a prcrlicate, we shail have to say bhat lhere are entilies to tvlricL it has such and such a specific lil<eness. I shall therefore in future ignore this view, rvhiclr in any case assurnesour tnain thesis, namel)', the existenceof particulars. To the grounds in favour of this thesis we must now return. When we endeavoured to state the trvo theories as to sensible qualities, we had occasion to consider trvo rvhite patches. On the view which denies particulars, whiteness itself exists in both patches : a numerically single entity, whiteness, exists in all places that are white. Nevertheless, we speak of two white patches, and it is obvious tliat, in some sense,the patches are tlo, not one. It is this spabial pturality which makes the difficulty of the theory that deniesparticulars. Withoub atternpting, as yet, bo introduce all the necessary explanations and distinstions,we may state the argument for. particulals roughly as follows. Ii is logically possible for trvo exacbly similar patches of whibe, of the same size and shape, to exist simultaneously in differenb places. Norv, whabever may be the exact meaning of " existing irr dillerent places,"it is seif-evident thal, in such a case, thero rr,r'cbrvo tliflbrenl patches of white. Their diversity mighr, if rvc rrrlolrterltire bheory of absolute position, be r'eganleri as lrr:Lrrrgirrg, nob lo th e whit e it s elf w h i c h e x i s ts i n tl rc trv rr l rl rrt:es,l rrrt,to the co m plex es" wliib c n c s si n l l ri s l rl rr,c"trrrrrrl" wl ri t,t:rrr:ss i rr tl uLt p l ac e. " ' lllt is r v o rrl ,lrl r:r' i v ct,l rr:i rrl i v rrs i t,l 'fl rrr rrl l rt: rl i vrr.si l t,of th is lr lr r c cilr r r lt , l l L t,l rl rrt:e; i trrtls i rrc cl rl i tr:r,s r,: rrrtrrll,,rrsul rl rosctl l ,o r lillir r lLs Lr r r l rrrr,l i l ,i tst,l , ri s rv o rrl rl r.r:,1 rr i rrt,l rrt, Ll rr,l rl rrttrs sl t or t lr l lr r . 1r ; t lt , i ,rrrl rt.r.l r. i l \!{ ,r.r..1 i ,{rrl l trrt, .1ri , ,,l rrtl l )r)}i rl i r)n, ll,

oN TH E R E LA 'I'ION S OF U N I V I:tc i ,\t,l l

A N tr t,.\t{ i l r' rl ,l t,

tl

t t r t l. \ t . , lr r r I 't vp 11111'11111'11 w i l l becomei mp6ssi bl trt,9rl i st, ir r gr r ir rllt r vlt t l, cr r lt t tll{, it . t l unl ess each, i rl g[oatl of l rt' i rr g llt t 't lt t ivr lt r lt r l 1'lr rl,r lvot r liglr L of w l ti tttttess. It trri glr tlr r rl, lr , , r r glrl,l lr r Ll, i ttsto" nce r lr r r r , lit , it r s ol ' ot , lt ct ' ir r Llr r rsr t t t t tl.r r lace by tn(l al )s be di sti ngui shed j tr r lr r ct ras l, lr o ot , lr r lr . Tlr is, tl tc stt , t t t tlr as the one but rrob however, presupposesthat, tlrc trvrr lriLtrllttrstlr,' rLh'eadydisLinguishedas nunterically divr:rsc,sirtrrtroblterrvisewhat is in the sarne place as bhe one Inusb be irr bhe sa,nteplace as the other. Thus the facb that it is logically possible for preciscly sirnilar things to co-exisi in two different places,but that tliings in diffelenb places at the sir.metilt)e cannot be numericully identical,forcesus to admit that it is particulars,i.e.,ittstances of universals,tirat exist in places,and not universals tlietliselves. The above is the outline of our argument. But valious points in it have to be exarnined and expanded before ib can be consideredconclusive. In the firsb place,it is not necessaryto assertthat there ever are two exactly similar existenbs. It is only necessaryto perceive Lhat out jtrdgmcnb thaL this and fhat are two diffelent existents is uot rtccessalilybasetlon ally diffcrence ott tlillirt'clrceof sltilliiLlltosil,iort of qualities,but may be br.Lsed wlt t r llr r r l'{) l' t r r ) 1,ll, r r al one; and that di fl ' et' entto f r lr r r Llil, ics, rrrr r r r clict rl lill, 'r cr r lo,is r r ol,log'ir '1111. 1' al w aysi n fact accomparri es 'r 'nr :u'lr , r r , r 'rI ,' lr r lr , r r r nrr r r r cr i, 'lr, lilli'r l i n otcl eri o i rrsru.rt D eC eS sary l i ,,tr. of sl rati rrl1r,rsi di tl ' erence A g a i u , i L i s l r o t t 'r t s y [ o sttr l ,c t'xr r r .l ,l y r vi r r l l , r to tl , o l ;r ;'r lr tr tl i n l r t r r
distdbution plurality.

B e f o r t t w ( ! ( 'i r , r l t rs( ) sl ) ;t( 't! i l r l r l l l tl .l ':l l l r r r 'l l l l ,'t

r r ' r r .r 'r r r r p a r t i c u l a r s , w e n i t t s t [ r : t : l t 'l l r 6 tr l ']r i s l r ,i r r l ,. \l ',' 'r l r r r i r t l ttr r a tr i t,n ttr t{, tomed to concedc tha"t t l t i ttg 1 r l ;t.r 'r ;;tf 0nce, bll, stated, will

t l r i s c o m n i u n - s e l r s o l r l l r .r r r r r , r i l r l ( 'ss vr ,r '.\'r 'r r r r 'l i l l l l ' l e a d u s i n t o i r r e xt,r i t:;r l r l o r l i l l i r r r r l l i cs. ( ) r r r l r r ;i l .

busiuess. therefore. is to firrd oul lr)w

t,r r st,r r t,ot,l r i s r u :r r r r r r

i n u t t t t t t , , l r i c c ti o r r a b l e f r t r m . l r t , r t t i o r r r r l , 1 1 'r r t l n i c s ,w l r c r r r r vc i Ir r ] ( ,r ) r ) ( ,r r - n o l,lvi l ,l r r r l r l ,t,r ,r '

ll

ON

I T B I iT RANI) RUSSEL L .

r l r { l " r' { , r1" sl,rurc,t,lrtrrrrxir n t } r nt r r ot lr ing c an be in t r v o l r l a c e s rrl, is l,rr,krrrligitll,v, r t r r t l r Lt r yr r lr , t Lc r oc c upl' ir ) g r r ) o r e t l t a n ' r rlr. r r .1 r. irrt,ol :;lrrcc is lt:g rrlrLr r l r r s r t L lc lr s b bir eor et ic ally r l i v i s i b l e . ( l rrl ' \ ' rvlr;rl, ,ru .r1Pir,srr lri r r ' , , 'f h i s lr oir r b is s ir nplc anr l s ingl c . r ' i , , rv r.i sl,r' rr.iglrl,lo lnrrlr[, irr r r l lr r is r : s r r o r lit lic u] t ic s as r l, l r l i c t l t o " t r ' :rl" s1,:trc. lirrl, rrs lL lrlrlir,rl h r lxr lc r r iv c r l s l, it c c , s r t c r h a v ier v i s r l n i t , e it t : rrlrrririsilrlr,. il'lro irrrrr,,,lir Ll, rolr : jc c l of ( s r r y ) v is uai pe r c ( , p t i o n is i r . lrvrrl' sol' lirril,c lxlcrrl,.

I f r v c s r r ppos e ib t o be, l i l i e t h e

It t i t l lct ' rrolrrsyrorrrlirlg Lo it , in " r ' eal " s pac e, c or npose c l o l

a

c, l l r: cl,iorr of rrrrtitics, o rrc f ol eac lr lr oint wlr ic li is nob e n r p t y , rvc slrLll lrirvc to sul)l)ose trvo things, both of rvhich seem in c rcdiblc, na rncly: (1) that ev er y inr m ediat e obiec t o l v i s u a l ( o r taotile) p erccp tion is inf init ely

c om plex :

( 2) t ha t e v e r y

such object is always courposecl of parts which are by their very nature inrperceptible. inrmediate object of

It seems quibe impossible that

Hence we must suppose lfrab an indivisible perception

may occup)' a finite extent

shorL, we must, in

dividing

number

sr:ns'ibilt:,rvhich

plurality

finite

exbenb.

contains

irnrnediate

no

Yisual space nay,

object

attention

of

objecb of visual visual space.

any complex

perception, r'each, after a finite

tl'i,t,isiltle,for, by

the

percepiion should have these prolerties.

in

object of

Li

visual

of sbeps,a rttini.nttttrt altliouch a sense, bc

it

is

of

irrlirritcly

alone, or by the ruicroscolie, the

of perception

rvhich introduces complexity

can be cliangerl in a

where lblnrorll'

lva)'

thcnr rvas sinr-

plicity I and to this process no clear liurit crrrr bo -qct,. Liut th i s is a pro ce ss rvh ich s ubs t it t r t t ' s a I low ir r r r r t c t liiL t r ro l r i e c t in place o f the o ld o ne , and

t , lr c r r c r v olr , jc c t , ,t , lr or r s l r r n o r o

s u b d ivided th an th e old onc , r v ill s t , ill t ' ot t s ir ; L. I r , r r l t 'r r l i r r i t e tru m ber of pa rts.

1, lr l s 1 , ; t , ',t:, f tr\re lnu s t llr r lr c f or r : r r r lr r r il,1, lr : Ll,

p e rcept ion is rtob infirrite ly r iiv idt l, l, : t lt , l t l, , t ' s t r ot , , ,, t t s i s l , , r l po i nbs, but is corn lroso,l oI a lir r it c Llr or r glr t ' ot t s lr t t r l' l. yv r r .lti t r t 1 n rt t t t lrcr oi

stu fllce s o f v, r lt llr r r , s , c ot t t , ir r t t r Llll' l, t lr r hir r ; 1 u l r r ) r '

jo i rrin, l t ogc t,lrel ilccotrlittg l, o t ' lt c llt t c t , r t : t t , ior rrli, l r r lllr r l , t , , t r

ll

T IIIi I

l l l ,l l ,A'l 'l oN l l

( )lf

l r N l \ l ':l i r i /\ |

t h e r e i s l t " t c i r l " l l c o t t r r l r i , '; t l r r 1 , r t , ', '

ANlr

| \ti

1 , , \ t i l l r' l

l,o

r

L I rr' rl , ; rr' rr

p , r' , rt t t r' l t r, rt l r' i l l t l \ ' i l r

l l rr.

penrei vcrI s1rruu,. It, l i rl l ou' s ftotrr l ,l ri s l l url ,, i l \vr l iur . l. r r ; r ; , ) 11, , 111, i ttttnt:ti i ttt,tt ol rj ccl sol l rtt' ,' r,1rl ,i r,tr l ,l rrrtrrr r r ir r rllr r r l,n. llr r r r ; 'r ': r t nr ol, " 1,1rr,' ,." l re i rt t,w ' ol tl i trtrrsi 1[,ol rr:r,,;r, l rrr : ; 1,lr . l, lr o I , lr lr r . rllr lr r . i i , l )oi tl b,l rttt trrttsNIrtt l rl i r' tt Lo l rtt I,lt r rr : t l, r 't r l,{) {r 'll, r r . r llr y ll si ngl e obj r:trl of 1rt' t' ct,1rl i ,rn.,\ w l r ilr r : , lr r , cl,r , l l'r . lr . r '.I 'r l 1, , nr ; ul exal npl err)l l i y l )e seon { rs l l si trgl c rrrrr livir lr r rolr l . jr : r :ol obj ectconsi sti ngof tw o l ral ts, i ttr rrJ)l )orir nr l l l, , r vcr 'or 'r lr l, lr l, hand and a l eft hand I)aI' L,rl r rLgi ti rtrts lr n olr jr r cl,r r or r sirin; r l ' ll' four parts, atttl so on. Jf tve otr tl ri s lr , t : r r ourcor r l, r siir lr rl, lr r . l. , even w hel t tl re shcet i rppo{ rr{ias d i l tt rtttr livit L't lolr jcll, ,il, s r r 1'1', , r ' an(l l ow er hal vesw el e i n cl i fl ' el errtl rLrces,llr on lvc slr r r ll lr r r , r 'c to say that lhe uriclivided object wirs ilr lroIh tLese plucrrs rLl ouce. But it is better to say bhab,rvherr Lhe sheet a,ppeared{rs an undivided object, this object occupied only one " piace," thouch the place corlespondedto rvhat were afterwards two places. 'Ihus a " place" ruay be defined as tlie space occupied by one undi vi ded obj ecr uf percepl i on. \Yibh this definition, the maxim that a tiiing cannor be in trr-oplaces at once nrighb seern to leduce to a tautology. But this rnaxirn, though iL may need re-wording, rvill still have n substantial significance,to l.rederiveclflom tlie consitleratiorrot' spatiai relalions. Ib is obvioLrsthat perceiverlsprrlial lelttiorrs cannot hold betrveenpc-rints, but tnusbhold betrvcenLiroptrts of a,single complex ob,jectof perception. lVhen the sheet of pr1,cr ls perceivedas consist,ingof t$'o halves, an upper ancl a lorver, the,qetrvo halves are combined into a comlrlex whole lry l)reilns of a spatial relatiou rvhich holds directly betrveen the ts'o Lrrlr-es,not bebrveensupposed smaller subdivisions whicii in il.cl rlo not exisb in lhe immediabe objecb of percel)tiou. Ilrrcrivcrl sptrtial relabions, therefore, must have a ccr'lirirr I'ottglrnt'ss,unL the rreab srrr,.rt-rblr propcrbies of geornetliclLl

tt

I}I'IITIIANI)

RUSSEI,L. ON

r'{'l.li()'s lr.t,rvr.rr lxrints. what, for exarnple,shall we say of rIir r l; r r r r?: . ' l' lr . r l i s r,' rr.eb e trv e e . tw o s i rrru l t aneousl y percei ved .l r; r ' r ' r 1r r v ill lr r r ' . t,, l r, rl c ri ' c tl l ry th e p e rc e i v edobj ectsbetw een l l r, ' r r r; ir r r lr r r ' ; rs rr L w , ,l rj r:c fsrv h i c h to u ch,ri ke tl re t* ,. 'f Irt lr ' , ' r rol llr r r s lr r,rl ,,f' , l rrrl rc r, tl rl r.e i s n o d i s ta n cebet,w eelthem. \\'lr ; r l, r . , ' r r r : r . ir, lr.ls i rri l ,,:i s ;i c t:rta i ^ o rd e r; b y nreans of ri ght :rrr r ll, ' 11,r ,r ; r : r r r r,ll rrr' ., l i rrrls ,.rr, i h e p .rl S o f a C Ompl exObj eC t .l 1r . r ' r ' r ' 1, ( ,rj,t .r r l l l i ' trrr s l rrrri i Lol rtl e r,rv h i c h i s def i te, ttrouch rrr l,' i. lli( ' ( ' r 'r , , r lu i tt: L l ro s a r' e l a l v s a s g e o rn e tri calorder. rhe rrr : r r ir rtr. lr r rt,rL,Llr i n g c t,,,n .t b e i n tt' o p l a ,c e sat once w i l t then li('('{rrr('tlre ruaxirn tlrat every spatial implies diversity rrf ifs terrns,,i.e.,that nobhi'g is to the'elation righb of ibself,or above itself, and so on. In that case,given iwo ,rvlritepatches, one of which is to the righb of the other, ic wiil follorv that there is not a single thing, rvhiteness,which is to the right of itsetf, but thab there are two different things, instances of rvhiteness, of which one is to the right of the other. In this wa.your maxim will supporb the conclusion that there must be particulars as well as universals. But the above outline of a,n argunrent needssrnre anrplificationbefore ib can be consideredconclusi'e. f,ct rrs l,lrtreforecxtrrrine,one by one,the stepsof the argument. Lr,l, rr.ssrlll)osr, frrr the sake of definiteness,that witliin .rrrr li. lr l r , l' v is i, rr rv ,: l ru rc e i v e tw o s e p a r ated.patches of rvl r il, r '. r r 1r gr ' - r ' rrl ,,i l rl ri ,c l r. It rrra yti re a b e take' as qui te ('r't' l: llll l, lr ; Ll,t , lr . t,rv , 1 ' r,tt:l r.si tro tw o a n d not one. The rl rr' : il. io,r s : ( lr r r rv . trri i i rrl ,i r,itlrr rl rt th e re a rc trvo i f w habexi sts Itt r' ; t llr is Llr sr r r r i v l r' s ;r,l rv l ti L t.rr.s?s ll ; t lr t t . lt t l,t*lr l r.r, i q trrl trri l t,t.,rl w c, c a n r_ rfc o urse say that i t i rr l l r, , , lr ll, ' r ' r , r r . ,. l ' ;rl :r.. t,l ' 1 1r', l l l i t:s th e p a tches trvo; there ri * ' lr r llr r , . : l.ilr i t lr is l ,l rl g t' l,l l rrl rv l ri tc rrg s si n th a b pl ace. Ii r.' t Il rr, lr , ir r l, , , 1'v i, ' r ' ,l ,r' . ,rri , rv l i i cl r i s l rs t, Il rc 1 rt.,rL L :rrr, r'\i s lr r lt c r :, r l' 1r ; rt r, i c rrl ;rr.s , l rrr v i c w rv o rrl rl s rrc Ir rovc orrl t,l rl si s, r'i tr, ' r . llr ir ;1, 1; 11. r r .rrri (} .1 1 1 l r. .r. , ' l l rl rl , l ,l l [(,{w i r1 11111. r 1r;r.r.l i .rrl :rr.s ('r)lr:i l . t l , l r li t r l - ' r r . l , s , r lr tlr , sl) lt( r ,. " rt t

lir r l, lt.o r r r llr r , lr oi rrl , ol . r,i l ty ol . is r ,.r .r .llr .r l r'rrl r r,l rrrrrl rl y

i r r r r r r r ' , l i r r l ' , ' 1 r r ' ,,1 ,1 ,' r r r , wlr i.lr

T l l !l

ItELA'l 'ION S

ol r

l l N I\'l r l l i s A L ri

r\ N l r

l'Alt'l'lr

I 1 . . \ l i r: .

1.,

i n percei vedspace,\A ' otrrLy' tc.jt cl, t lr c lr lr r r vr 'lit r vot r llr c r jt ot t t r , l ci r. sr t t 'it , lt"t c; r l " s1, ; r lr ',1, ,t r 'r 'ivr ', 1 that, rvhatel ' errl l i l )' i rc tl rc . . r '.r,r bsolr r t rlrr ilsit ir r r r iu( spacei s certai nl y troL i r,bst.rl u tte, s ' nill, anrong obj ects ot' l rerr:cpl i oIr. I 'lr us t lr c n'lr it er r cssI r cr r ir , r r l the whiteness there cannot be distinguished as courplcxes,-'f whicli this place and that place are rcspect,ivelyconsbibuerrts. Ol course the rvhilenessesmay be of different shapes,say one round and one square,and bhen they could be disbinguislicd Ly their shapes. It will be observed thab, wibli lhe viuv adopted above as to the naLure of perceivetl spiure , it is periectly possiblefor a simple object of pelception fr.r )rrvr^ ;r shape: the shape v'ill be a qualit'y lil<e another. Sirrcc ri si mpl e obj ect of' percepti onmay be of f init e ext er r t ,t lr cr c is n, r reasonto supposethat a shape rnnst imply spatial divisibilit,-y in the objecb of perception. Hertce ortr trvo patclrcs rruiy l,ir respectively rounC and square, and 1'et not be spltially' divisible. Ir is obvious, however, that this method of distinguisliing the two patches is altogeLher inadequabe. The two patchesare just as easily distinguishedit' bottr are square or both are round. So long as rve can see both at once,no deqreeof Iikenessbetrveenbirerncauses tlie siighbest difficulty i n percei vi ng that there are trvo of t hcr r r . Tir us r iif f eLcnceof shape,rvhether it exists or nol, is trot rvlru,lrrrrrlicsthe patches tq'o entities instead of one. . r l1' It may be sai d that the Lrvo lir r t , clr csr r , r cr list , ir r gr r islr ,1, the di fferencei n thei r rel ati orrst o oLlt cl t lr ir r , ls. l, '( ) r( '\ ir r nlr l( : , i t may l i appen bhat a potch of r cr l is t , t , lr c r iglr t , , l' rrrrrl 'r r . to the l eft of the other. l l ut t ) r is t lt r r : sr r ol, ir nlr l. yt , lr r r .l,t ,lr l patcl i esare trvo unl essrve ktroi v t lr t I ot r c t ] r it t g cat r t r ot],, t , lr i, llr to the ri ght and to bhe l eft of anot her . 'l'lr is, il nr islr t , llr said, is obviously false. Suppose a surface of blacli rvilir ir, rvliite spacein the nridrlle. Then the rvhole of the bliclt srrrrrLl rrrrry forrn only one simple objecb of perception, and lvoul,l sl.rrr Lo lrr: lroth to the riglrt anrl bo the ieft c.rftlre lvhite space rvl ,i ,l r i t crrti l cl y surrourrcl s. I bhink it t voult l be nr olc t nr e

I l;

l i l ,Itt.ti ^ Ntr l (t,s s ti l ,l ,.

S ) l'Ali.t'l{ lr l. ^lt '1. li' ON Tl Ifl l l l l l ^' fl oN s O[ tl N tVl, ] l( sAl,ANI

l ,o1 1111, t t r l, lr irrr. lt .tr\, l l u rl , l .l t,, l rl rrr,l i s rrc i t,l rr:r, to tl rc r.i gl rt nor l '1 , 1111 l1' 11, , ' l r , lr*w l rrr,r,. l rrrt, r.i g rrt,rrrrrl l .l [:r ro (j ornpl i c,.tc(l tr'l rr lr r r r r ir : rr v r , lv ir ri 'r,l r. l r,rl 1 '.I r,l r* | t.r' r:i P i .rrr. L.t us tal i e r1 r) r r r { r . l, l*r . nir r r l ,l r.r.r.rrl i rl ,is ,rr, rry l ,l r;L t.f s ' r, r.,rrrrtl i rrg, rv}ri ah t,l r. lr l*t : li s r r ' l' r u rrrl r* s t,, t,l rrl rv l ri t,o orr. i rr exarrrl rl e. l rrrtc h srrppr r s .w. lr ilv . .rr.L l r.r' rv l ri t,r y rrrtc l r,.f e xl rctl y tht: si r,r' e si zc ar r r l s lr apr : ,er rti ..l y s rrr..rrrrrl c rl L y re d . Tl rcrr, i b ruay bc said, the two patchcs of rvhite are tlisii'g.islietl try tlifferc'ce of relation' since one is surro*nded by black arcr tlie other by red. But if this ground of distinction is to be varid, rve 'i*st know bhab it is impossible for one e'bity to be both rvhol)y and immediately suuounded by black and rvholly and immediately surrounded by red. f do not mean to deny thab we do know this. But trvo things deserve notice_first, that ib is nob an analytic proposiLion; second,that it ptesupposes the numer.icaldiversity of our two patchesof white. We are so accustomed to regarding such relatiorrs as " iuside " and ,, outside" as incompaiible that ib is easy to suppose a log,icali'compatibility, although in fact the i.com_ patibility is a characteristic of space,not a rcsult ,f iosic. r do not k'orv whab are the .nurrirll'salrlcslrurirrlrrlut,iors of objects of perceptio', whctht:r visulrl ,L tactilc, but rvliatever th e y ar e t hey r u' st l rrv . th c k i rtl o f c l r.r.ct.ri sti cs rvhi ch are required in ur,ler t, gr,rrt,r.rrLc arr .rrlt,r. Tlrc,t,,or sorucof b h cr n,r ' us [ be r s y rr' rr.t,ri .rrl , i .r,.,g rr.l r tl rl t l ,l rr,yare i ncol n_ ,,i nsi de,' p rrl ,ilr lcwit , lr t , lr r r ir'o ()n v { l ' s l r.r : l ' o r c x l r.rrrl rlsr,, rrl r l ros.i rrg or r r , ol' trr l ro l, lr r r rrr, rr, l ,l ri rr1 rr.l 1 ri r.l ri s i rrs i rl ci rrrri t,l rcr.trrrrst rrot, t t ls o

' l' 1 ,,.t. ,,r . Bo lr r r , ll

Ixr ortl,r.irlr, it.

I , r'rrrl i i l , r v r ' , i . r ' . , n u ' l r tttttt,l,'.', l,lrtt

,r' lr

l, ro1s , " u r r r r r l r r "

llr tl,1 ,,r . ltr r l,lr .

lo

tlr t,r r r , trrrrsl , i tl s,, l rrt r .r r r .r r r 1 r lr ,,il .r , is ir rsi ,l r, .4;rrrri .i 7 i rr

lllr lr e liilr ' ,

lir r . l,lr .,r rl i r,,l

rl l rrrrl ,ar

lr r r 1 1 1 1 1 ,r 1 1[r1ttr ' r lr r r r r r .tr l.r r l r ;1 ,rrli ;rl

rr,l j rl r,,l rj r

i t r r 1 l t \ l r r r l .lr ,,r l' t' r l,r .r ltr ,r r \\r ll 1 ,,.;,.,,r tttr.r1. l ,1l l l rr...,, t t l, lr. n ' r l , r r t r , r ' r l r . r r l r,r l, r r ' t tr .\r ' r ,l I lr ,, lr r ,,l I lr r r l I l rr.rr. 1r ,j rt, l ! i l I ' r, ' l, .r l , l y

I , lt t t t l' r u r

l t y r r r l t r r l t r ' 1,' r

lt t t t rl, t t i l r ' t r l r t l

r r 1 ' l qlli rl

ll

l,,ll,' r tr r

tr ,ln l tr r tt;r | | r il,il

tlr .r l

1 ,lr r .;lt

1 ,, r r r r , lr

1,.:r t ,,1 tl r,

r r i l 1, r.trl rl r , ,rrr

have to i tstrl f. It, i s i rrrl ccrIscll''r 'vir lot rl,l,lr Ll,s1r ; r liirtlr 'lr r l'r , , t r r r r t t t , lil, iot t:sI r '{rlr r ) tr lt r t t t r t lt ful fi l thcsc contl i l i otrs. Il trt, l ,l r t 'stct Llt c; ' it r c syr r llr ct it r strabl e b1' purel y l ogi ctl r:r,trsir lcr it t i, , t t s: properbiesof perceivedspirtitl telttiotrs. Ib is irr virtue of these self-eviclenbproperlies thal lho nurnericaldiversity of the trvo patches of rvliite is self-evidentThey have lhe reiation of being ouisic'leeach obher,aud this requires that they should be two, not one. They may or may not have intrinsic clifferences-of shape,ot size,or brightness, or any other cluality-bnt whether they have or not they are two, and it is obviously logically possible that they shouid have no intrinsic differences whatever. It follows froni this that the terms of spatial lelations cannot be uuiversals or collections of univelsals, bu[ must be particulals capable of being exactiy alil<e and yeL nurnerically diverse. It is very desirable,in such discussionsas that on rvhich \r'eare al present engaged,to be able to talk of "places" arrd of things or clualifies " occupying" places, without irnplying absolute position. It must be understood thab, ou the vierv which adopbs relabive position, a " place " is uot ir, precise noti on. B ut i ts usefui nessari s es as iollows: - Snlr lr ost t r i seb of objects,such as Lhe lvalls and furniture of il lootrt, to tct,rr-irr theil spatial reiations unchanged for a certain lengtlr ol' t,irrrc, rvhile a successionof olher objects,say peolrlelvlto sttcr:r'ssivt'l.y sit in a certain cliair, have successivelya givrrn scl of s1rrt,l,irr.l relations to the relatively fixed objects. 'I'lrorr tlrc lrcolrltr h*vc, one after ihe other, a given set of properties,consistirrg 'Whatever in slrilfial relabiorrsbo the rvalls and furrribure. l rl s tl ri s gi verr sel of properti esat a given m om enbis said t o " .ccul r]" ' rr crrl ti ri rryrl rrce,bhe " place" it self beinq m er ely a l t' l rrt.i onst,o cer t ilir t ohject s wt r osespabt al l i xr,rlri r.t,,rl sl rrr.l ,i rrl n.l rrl r,'rri

l ,r r.rrrl r ol ,l rct' rl o ttot, c l l l ttl j t:

Irrrrr r',rr;rrrl r.r',.r1 I'r, l t

'l 'l rtttt rvl rctr \!('s rty

,,1,. 1,1.r,r. ;rl orrr, l ,i l rr'. \\(t tnt' l tl

.,1 ,,1 rrl ,:rtt,rl tIl rrl t"tri t

;Ll tl rrtl c i al l l v rl rrl i rrg t,l ti Lt, ttttr' l tl ri rtg

tl rc

c rl rr onl y

t,l r:t1,i l , t' i rtt ottl .\' l ttl t' tt ttttc l

l 0 i l I'l \'r'l t r.rl l r,l o),j Ir' l S i tl i l l l I

ti l l te.

IU

It rrright btr arguerl th:rb, since rve ]rave adrnibted that a sir rrl ,l co l rj c c t r r l' per c ep ti o rrl n a v b e o f l i n i L e e x te n t, rve have arlrrrill,rtlfhat it rnay be in nrany places at once,and therefore rnay bc outside itself. This, holvever, rvould be a rnisurrderstandinq. In pcrceived space,the finite extent occupied by a simple object of perceptionis uot divided into manv place$. It is a single place occupied by a single thing. Tirere are trvo different rlays in rvhich this place may' " correspond" to manv places. First. if bhere is such a thing as " real " space rvith geometrical proper[ies, the one place in perceived space wiil correspond to an infinibe number of points in " real " space,and the single entity which is the object,of perception wili correspond to many physical entities in " real " space. Secondly, there is a more or less partial correspondencebetween perceived space at one time and pelceived space al another. Suppose that we attend closely to our white patch, and meanwhile no olher noticeable changesoccur in the field of vision. Our rviiite pabch nray,and ofbendoes,changeas the result of attention-we rr"rayperceive differences of shade or other diffelentiations, or, witht,ub differences of quality, we may melely observe pilrls iIt it which make it cornplex ancl.introduce divcrsitv irttrl sirrLliirl rolrrti r.rrrwit s hin it . W e c o n s i d e r,Ira tu ra l l y , t,l ri tt w ' r' rrt' t'strl l a n, d tl ra t tt' l trtLu ' rrs(' ('tl (,\! I ooki trgtL Lhes ar net hing a s b e fc -rre w ;Ls t lt t : rt si tn lrLr

ull

T l r ttg

along.

rv lr i t , c l x r l t t l r

wts

we

tlo tttlltt,lt

L ltlL l, r ,tlt

tto t' r t' ir ll.Y sir r r ltlr ' .

;t;,1,:rt,'trl l v

lir tt,, tr r l rr, l . Il rr'

itst'l{ is rr
r 'r .t'l l r l .

l l t,'l r '

N tl r ,r l ,l t,'1,':r r t, l l r ,,l ',,l r ,

l ,' l 1l l, lrr' . s ir r r r r : i s t , l r c 1 , l r . yn ic:r l o lr it.r ' 1 , r r r r l' 1 r o r u ,,ll, ( r ' ltr .r,l "'trl ' l' lr is ,l I t'|rrl 'r'. l l rr' , rlrjlt ' t , o l ' l r l l c l l r l , i o t t . l,lr lsit' ;1 1 ,,i' .1 r ' ,1 lr r . , \ r r , l t , l r u l ) t ' l t t ll,t,lu tt r T l,i, lr t,' r r r r llr r It,,ttl ir llr 'rl l l "l r \\rl l r:orrrlrllt . 1,,. it r onr, r{ ' n : ( , t u o t ( ' { ' r t t t (' ( ' l llr :r tr llr ltl tr ' ltt, lt 1 ' r ' tlltr r ' ,1 ,r',ttrr1,l '

,\

rl tlli, rI rrt lt t r r i l t li (l1tt

t,' \' ,' ltllt

l l t r , " r ' r ' r r 1 ",,1 ,.;r ,, 1 t!lr t, ll,'tr,,'

1r'tlt'lrl.trrtt l,l\,(.;r

: t l l Ittll0 tt

r r r t r y 1 , , , :r ,,r r r r r r r ,.,i lllr l

rl i llirr, , t r, , . ri . t l

lrrrrtr.

lrloltrrrtltrrtt

lllr'

lr ,' r tt' tr l' i,tt' lr l,' llr ,,, 1,|r',I

l'r'tr'r';rltltt ;1l,,,rrl

r 'l 111111"11' lr tr ' \' l( ' llr r l\ llr r ,r r . r r r i, "' tt.r l ,,,rrl rrr,

(lr''

" tlrrl

"

rll'

llllrr

lr'illllrrtl'

ll

ltl[\ ,lrt,

l ,,l

t,.r tl t,,r l 'r t

tt,ttr l tttttl

/tt'r r s0

l ,l r r ,t.r .l ot.r ,,

r' l' 1r 1 r r u . 1 r l i 6 t t i S r r 6 l t,lr tt SlL ltt( ' it.s i1 , r v;tli I' r ' l' ,r t.r '; tr'l ttrl trrl 1 1 1l r . j1r'1,

(|l r 1r, r'1. , lt t, t ' ; t t t l t , , , l f

ttl t

l ;t.l

l :t l l ol l l l tl j '1'r tl

r tt't'tttr t

l l r ,',,tt,'tr l :l l l l ,, l t' l

t

l ) ttl

I

lllttr

tlrr

f"ttr

llt''

'l tr i l tl r ;i r tt" l r 1'l r r l ;r

l l r l t r'

llrlrl l l r ''

"llrlr "l

" 'tttl 'l ''r

ri l t ' t t t t l ' l l t t t t

u t ' r' l ' l t rl

i l ' l rr (l ()t t -

l r| l t I l : l

l ,l t,'i l l r ;r 'r 'l ':t,,1'l , l rI i t

'tl l r l rt

:tl t ' l

'r t'

t ' l t r: o { ' l t r' t '

ltottt ' rt t l ; t ' 1 1 ' (' w o (' l l l l l l (' $ ' l r' ' l t r' l

l l rl

ll

o t l (' ol'ltlt'

lltl

tvlttt'lt

r r' l rt ' l r r' r' l t l r' l l l l l l l l

tt'tl

, irll trrtl\

r r r l r ,l , ur r 'n

l rt l l l i l l rl r

l r r ' l l l { ' l (' l r' , l t ; t t : t t

. ,11111 l i l l I r r ,,r r l ,l ,,1

,'l'1,,

ll)

A N I) t"rtt' fttl tl t' ntts

ON TH E R E LA TTON S OF U N MI|S A LS

BnR'l'RANr) nussnt,t,.

l lt l , ;'r r tt , ' t l rl

, rl

l r l l l l (' (l

1 1 t ' l l t ' r' l l l

l r\ ' l rr' t t t ' t ' o

l rt rl t r: l ' r:

l , t t t t rl

1,,',,,ttt,,

t'1

t ' rt l l rt

, 1 t t : t l t l l l ' ri .

{ ' l ' )'

lltilt' l l rrr

N l o t { ' (t \ ' 1 ' t I.i

'

:i0

oN TI{E nE LA I'ION s ol " LrN I\Il ll as A LS A N l r

IjERTRANTT riUssELL.

Ir.u' *v . f lr : r . r . \ ' ( ll rrrl i t,i arv s e a rl rl , i t' e n )i ri l rs p ossi bl e th.i tl re ,l ,l r r . t 's r r lr . j. r .rt t r il ya l s r, l ra v c th e ,r; l rc n c e tl u a l i Li escarrnotbe * 'l r: r . 1, r ' or r s t ,rit r t . s tl re ti i v e rs i b ' o f th e s ' b j e cts. The onl v l"slrr':'t irr rvlrir'lr t,'r'o different suLjects rnttst iiffer i.s iu tlieil t. fo . e x a mp l e , e a c h ri .i l l har.e to l he 'r'l :r , t ir r r s lr lr t ic rrl rrrs : ,l ,l r. r ' r ' . lir lir ir r s r v h i c h h e d .e s rro t h a v e to hi msel f. B ut i t i s Irol logic r r lly i mp o s s i b l c ti ra t e v c r.y tj ri n q concerni rrg,r1yg .f the sub.iectsand orhe.rviseorily concerning nniversals nright be tr.e of the other s*bject. Hence, e'err rv]ren clifferences i' regtrtl to such propositions occur, ib is not these clilferences that constiture the divelsity of the tivo su\jects. The suLjects, therefole, m.st be regarcleclas pa'ticulars, aud as radically different frorn any collection of those general qualities rvhich may be predicatedof them. It rvill be obser'ed that, accorclincto the general principles rvhich musL govern any co.r'espondenceof real things ivith objects of pe.ception, any p'inciple which introd'ces tli'ersit,r, amoug objects of perception must introcluce a corresponding diversity among real things. I am not llow concer'etl to a'g'e as to what gro.nds exist for assunringa co*esponclr:rtre, lrrrt,if there is such a correspondence,it musL be supposed that diversity in the effects-i,.e., the perceived objects_ir'plies diver.sity in the canses-zl.c.,the real objects. Hence if I perceive two objects in the lield of vision, rve must suppose tlrLt rt least trvo real objects are conce'reci in ca.sinE mv Ix)l 'col, t ion. 'l'lr. .sso'biirl cltaracte'isticof pa,rticulars,as they appear in , tl ra t th c y c a n n o bb e i n trv o pl acers;rterr0e. l r.r'r : r ' i' . r ls y , ir . r 'is l i rrl ' llr is is r r r rr r r s n ri s f;rc t.ry w a y o f s ta ti n g tl re rnt[tcr' ,.rvi rrg t,, l ,l r r r l, r r r lrrt r, . s1, ,rv l ' rt,ri ,,p l i l e c ,,i s . T h e rl o re ..r.1.r,.1 sl ,l rl r,_ tttl ttl, is I lr r r l, r r l l trri rr J re rt' c l rti l rl es p a ti a l re l i l Ii ,,rrs i rrr1,l 1, rl i vtrs il, . i', , f llr lil r ,r' r' rrrs : l o l c x l ,rrrl rl ci,f ,e i s rl bovor7,.r.i ur(l ,// rrrrrsl , l r . , l i l l , r l r l r r l r , rr l,il i,.s.

So l,r r r q , lr o tv( _ ) V( ,ra, s i L i s l l l rrl l r.sl l ,rri

l, lrlrl, l , l r i s i r t l l r ; r l , i r i r r r r .r r r r l,,r lo 1 1 1 1 1 .1is,, r lltr c t , lrlLl,r L I , l r i r r ; ' ( i t n l t l t ,

l,r ' r r r | \r ' '

lr lr r r .r ,:rr r .t,o lr lr ,,

lr y tl rr,strrl ,r,rrrl rrl

ti st I' ,.' ttt' t' tr;tl t,.'

f l

We may Dow return bo the questioll of parbiculars atrd universalsrvith a better hopc of being able to state precisely the nabure of the opposition be[ween them. It will be rememberedthat we began with three different opposibions: (1) that of percepband.concept, (2) ttrat of entities existing in time ancl eutities nob existing in time, (3) that of subsbantives anil verbs. But in the course of our discussion a differenb opposition developed itself, namely, (4) thab between entities rvhich can be in one place,but not in more than one, at a given time, and entities rvhich either cannot be anywhere or can bc in several places at one time. Whab makes a parbicular patclt of white part,icular, rvhereas rvhiteness is universal, is tlie fircL that,the particular patch cannot tre in trvo piacessitnultarrtlottsly. rvhereasthe lvhiteness,if it exists at all, exists wherever tlttlttr are whife things. This opposition,as stated, nrighb bo lrclrl rrof to apply to thoughts. we nrighr reply tliab a lDarr'sllrt-rughls are in liis head ; btr.trvithout going inbo this quesliorr,we trray observethat there certainly is some relation betweetrir lrtiltt's thoughts and. his head (or som.epirrb of it) rvhich tltcr0 is ttob bet,weenhis thoughts and obher things in space' We ruay exterrd our tlefinibionof particuiars so as to cover this IcLltion. We may say that a man's thoughb " belongs Lo" tltc lrltcc where his head is. \\re may then define a parlicrrlill irt ,rttt' fourth seDseas an entity which caunobbe irr or' belorrq t,tttrttt|t: than one pl ace at one ti me, and a univer sal as llt r t r t r lit , yr vlr i|lr ei thercannot,be i D orbei ong bo a ny plnce,or calt llc it r , r t l, r 'l, , t r g s l cer t Dit tr r llir r it , irrrvillr to many pl acesat ouce. Thi s oppo sibiorhas rvl r iclrr nust be t lxlr t t t ilt t lr l. the three earl i cr ()1t1l r,si ti ous, t' l te a' l trti ssi o lr, f f it r t ict r lat 's it t ot t r f , r r t t lr (l ) {)rvi rrt to :rl l (l S r'l l S o,Wo Oi trttItti tl i tt i Ltt l tl rS ol rttC 'rl i V i S i ,rrr l rOLrv ec tt l )t:l t' trl )Ls 'l 'l rc rrtri vr.t'sl l l rvl ri t,e tttl s s i s i L rl rl ttr:t:pl , w l tt:tt:l rs i r col l {.{)l )t,s. i s i r l rtrtt:tr1rt,. I i rv c l ri l rl ttot, rt,l trri t,l i :,1 l ,l rr.l i crrl ri l rvl ri tc l ri rl t:l r s(,nso , l )ol ' 1i r1l Ls l v ortl ,l l t;l v c l rt:utt i l r {)ul .frrrrr.tl r l ,i rrl i l rrl i rrs i rl ''rrl ,i t:;rl rvi l l l r:,'t tl ri Ir t'ottl r'1rl 's' t,-l ) Ir'rrI t,l rtl sl tl ttr:

l ('l Ist)l l , \\' { r l tl (r

l tl rl tl l ' o s i ty

l ' l ttl l

s rtc l t

ON

BERT RAND RUSSEL L .

Ijencral qualities as whiteness never exist in time, whereas the things thab do exist in time are all particulars in our fourih sense. The converse,that aii particulars irr our fourth seuse e-xisbin tirne, holds in virtue of their definiLion. Heuce the second and fourth sensesof the opposition of parliculars and rrniversalsare co-exierlsive. (3) The third opposition, that of substantives and verbs, plesents rnore difficulties, owing to the cloubt rvhether predicates are verbs or nofi. In order to evade this cloubt,we lnay substitute another opposition,which rvill be co-extensivewith subsbantivesand verbs if predicales are velbs, bui nob obherwise. This obher opposibionputs predicabesand relations on one side,ancl everything else on the other. tr\rhat is not a predicate or lelation is, accordingto orie tladifional delinition, a substance. It is true thab, when subsLancewas in vogue, it rvas suppc.'sed thai a subsLaucernusl, be intlcstruclible,and this cluality will not belong io our suLrstances.For example, rvhab a man sees when he sees a flasli of liglrtrrirrg is a substancein our sense. But the inrpcilbanceof indestructibiliby was metaphysical, noi logical. As far as logical 1n'opelties tre concerned, our subsLances rvill l-re fairly rLnul,-,gous to Lraditional substauces. Thus rve have the opposit,irrnof subst&nceson bhe oue hand antl pledicatesarrcirelations , )n t,lro other hand. The bheory which rejects particulars :rll,rrvsonliLics conrtnonly classetlas pledicates-c.!J. tvhiteI. r , x is t;, l, lr r r st lr t r tl i s t,i rrc ti o nb e trv e e ns u b s tancesand predi ,:r1 , , : iir ; ol, lit c lr r l ,rr,li ry L l ri s th c o ry . O u r t heory, on tl i e .,rs111111. In th e rvorl d rve knorv, l) r '1' { ,,s ,\ ,' (r ' q I,l rrrrl i s t,i rrc t.i o rr. r;l l l , r r l; r t r lr r, ri r c r r l .trl ,i r:r.l rv i l ,l r l rrtl ti c rtl rrrs i n o ttr fourth sense, lr rrr| 1 , r r . r i r l r r l , r ; l r r r , l r ' ,' l:ll,io tr s w il,lr ttttivt,r .sr tls. It. u rll l,r. rllrr l, , rrl r , r r l r r r , , l , l r , ' r l

llr ;r t, ;r lt,r ' r liu 1 1 1 o llr t r r :r

i l ssul nes

r ( lr r ' (tli{ ' tr .l;r l,ir r tr ,' { ' s1 1 lr .j t:tttt.o pretl i <'l tl t',

rrrrl, , r , r r r r . . r , l , , l ' l l , l rI r tIr r ll, rl . , l , 1 , , , , , 1 l l t r ' , , ,'

t,ltr :o t' 1' rvl i i ch

( ,tililr lr ' r Ir l

llr ,r l ' ,,llr tili' r t

;llr ilr ' r ' itt tt0ttttttt'Li 0tt rV i l l t r ,' tl:tll,l,' ,lr tl tl i l i cs

l ttrl l |l tl l t'

\r ;.rrrrri nl l l .l ri ri vr,.rv

THE

IIELA'| l ( ) N s

( ) 1,' tl N l Vl l l is A L s

ANt)

l'Alil't{

l rl , A l i : i ,

:l.i

to be fal se,ordi narv sensi l rl orl trtlilics r vill lr c ; r t lr lir : ; r . lrol' 's llr r ' parti cul arsw hi ch are i nst,tttccgof t lt cr r r . 'l'lr l sr r r sil, l, r , 1r r r r . lil, i, 'l themsel ves do not exi st i n ti l rrc ir r t , lr csr r r r r cscr r scir r r vlr ir : lrl, lr r . i nsi ancescl o. P l edi cati on i s a rellbion ir r volvir r ,rl l 1\ r r r , lr r r r r , 'r r l. ; r l l ogi cal di fference bet,rveeni ts t r vr t t t r lt r t s. l't . r lir '; r l, r 'st r r r r . I ' i lr t r 'r li. r r l, r ': r themsel veshave predi cates,but t lr c pllr lir : r r . l, ':ol l r r t r l, 'r l, : r r r r ', 'r i. w i l l be radi cal l y di fferent frtttn t lt e 1r t 't r r lir r r l,rr,'s The predi cate,on thi s vi cw , i s I r cv. l' l) : t ll, . f l, lr r .st r lr ilcl,r r r r r l pr oposit , ior is r r r r r r r , lll, i, , .I 'r 'o thus no tr11s gl l l rj ect-pretl i cate posi ti onsof bhe forrn " A l l A is B " ir , r 'ttrr ot , I 'r 'r r ll. i'sr t lr ir r r '1, predi cateproposi ti ons,but exp r ess r clir Liot r sol lr tcr lir ': r 1,;r 's l r l'r r sior r suchproposi ti onsrnay be anal yti c, bub [ he t r r r r lil, ior urt 'or of them rvith true sub,ject-predicatelrroposiliorrslrLs lr.r:rr t disgracetr-,forural logic. The theory s'hich rejects particulars, and tssunles tlrrt, ,.g.,whibenessitself exists wherever (as conlmon-ser)servoulcl say) there are white things, clispensesaltogether with predication as a fundamental lelation. " This is rvhite," rvhich, on the other vieiv, e\presses a relation between a par'licular arrd rvhiteness,rvill, wheu particulars are rejected,really state tlrrt whitenessis one of the ilualities in this place,or has certain spatialrelalions to oertain other clualitics. Ihus the qricsbiou rvhelhel preciication is an ultimale simple relation uray lro taken as dislinguishing the trvo bheories; ib is ultirrrale if tlrcrc are particulars, but not otherrvise. Antl ii lrlcrlir:aliorris irrr ultimate relation, the best clc{initionof palticulars is t)rLt t,lrry ale entities rvhich can only )re subjects r-,fpretlicat,csor t,r,r'rrrs of rel ati ons,2.r., that they are (i r r t he Lr gicill sr : t t sc)sr t l'st , r r r lls. *1, r r , , , r' ' t , ir r r r ', Thi s defi ni ti on i s pl eferabi e Lo rit r t rir r Lt or lt t , 'inX trecausespace arrd l i rrrc l n' e l ct'it lr r r l; Ll clr r r ': r r '1. r 'ri's 'islol t , lr ir rvorl rlrvi t,l rrvl ri ch rvc l uL1,;,r.rr r rl,r l t lr r , r 'i. l'olr r to lr r r r . r : r lur r int ,lrr 'r rrtr' ,l r,sl ,i 1,rr1,,r,f l ,l rt n{,(' (,r" i sru- }'r t t r ivr . r 'r lr lil. . r 'lr r , l, 1,, r rlrgir r ;'11' 1 r r lr l ogi l rrI cl r.l l got i t's. \\',. l r;rvr. Il rrrrr rr. ,l i vi :i i ,,rr (l ) 1'rrrl t, rtl ;rtr. trl rt, l r l t,l l t

,,1 ;rl l url l

c rrl i l i l s

i rrl ,r

l ,' ntl rl r' \r,:i ,,trl \'

I\\' ,) c l l rs ri { ' s :

,r' , l l rr rul rj r,r' 1,,r

2+

.) i

oN T r r E I aI ) LAT I0 NoSF U N IV r:trs l r,s A N I) l ,A ti ,t.tcut,A l ts.

o f p r et lic at esor bire te rn rs o f rc l a ti rrrs ,* rrrl , i f l l rr:,r.l r.l ,rrrgl ,r th e w or ld of whic h w e h a v o e x l rc r.i c rrc ct,x , i s t,i rr l i rrrt,,rrrr,l ca n n ot oc c upy r uor e th a ri o u c p l l c c a L ,rrtr l i rrru irr Ll r. s1rrl ..t, wliich they belong; (2) urriversuls,wlriclr Lrir.noccur irs l)rr)dicales or relaliorrsin cornplexcs,tlo rr'L r:xisLirr tinre, lrrrtrhur.,r: no relation to one placo wlriclr l,hoy rrriiy nob simultanr:ously have to a.rrother. The grriurrtl l(,r r'('gr(r(ii.gsucri a di'isiorr as urravoidableis the self-evirlerrtfuct that cerbainspatial relations iurply diversity of their tcrnrs, trgebhor wirh tLe self-eviclent facbthat it is logically possible frr errtities haviug such spatial relations to be rvholly indistingrrislralrler.rsto predicates.

II.-A N IMIS M

,\N I)

' I' III.] I)OTJ'|RI }I E O F ENEI TG Y. 'F

^/iii 'l'. Pnucy NLrNli. THE auton,rml' of the special sciences is, rvithoub doubt, a soundand important principle. Spcal