Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice (Cass Series: Naval Policy and History)

Operational Warfare at Sea

This new volume provides a comprehensive analysis of both the theory and practice of operational warfare at sea. The book is unique in using diverse sources and examples to present a comprehensive topical description and analysis of the key components of operational warfare at sea today. It opens with a survey of the emergence of operational warfare at sea since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, going on describe and analyze the objectives of naval warfare at the operational level and methods of employment of naval forces for accomplishing these objectives. The book explains the specifics of operational functions in a maritime theater, discusses the personality traits and professional education required for successful naval operational commanders, and explores naval operational command and control in both peacetime and war, closing with predictions for the future of operational warfare at sea. This book serves as a primer of how to plan, prepare, and execute major naval operations and campaigns for naval commanders and their staffs, but will also be of interest to advanced students of naval history, strategic studies, and military history in general. Milan Vego is Professor of Joint Military Operations at U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI.

Cass series: Naval policy and history Series Editor: Geoffrey Till ISSN 1366–9478

This series consists primarily of original manuscripts by research scholars in the general area of naval policy and history, without national or chronological limitations. It will from time to time also include collections of important articles as well as reprints of classic works. 1 Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy, 1904–1914 Milan N. Vego 2 Far-Flung Lines Studies in imperial defence in honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman Edited by Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy 3 Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars Rear Admiral Raja Menon 4 The Royal Navy and German Naval Disarmament 1942–1947 Chris Madsen 5 Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas Milan N. Vego 6 The Pen and Ink Sailor Charles Middleton and the King’s Navy, 1778–1813 John E. Talbott 7 The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940 Robert Mallett 8 The Merchant Marine and International Affairs, 1850–1950 Edited by Greg Kennedy 9 Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia Geo-strategic goals, policies and prospects Duk-Ki Kim 10 Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean Sea Past, present and future Edited by John B. Hattendorf 11 Stalin’s Ocean-going Fleet Soviet naval strategy and shipbuilding programs, 1935–1953 Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail S. Monakov

12 Imperial Defence, 1868–1887 Donald Mackenzie Schurman; edited by John Beeler 13 Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond Edited by Phillips Payson O’Brien 14 The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons Richard Moore 15 The Royal Navy and the Capital Ship in the Interwar Period An operational perspective Joseph Moretz 16 Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power Thomas M. Kane 17 Britain’s Anti-submarine Capability, 1919–1939 George Franklin 18 Britain, France and the Naval Arms Trade in the Baltic, 1919–1939 Grand strategy and failure Donald Stoker 19 Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century An international perspective Edited by Christopher Bell and Bruce Elleman 20 The Road to Oran Anglo-French naval relations, September 1939–July 1940 David Brown 21 The Secret War against Sweden US and British submarine deception and political control in the 1980s Ola Tunander 22 Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939 Planning for a war against Japan Andrew Field 23 Seapower A guide for the twenty-first century Geoffrey Till 24 Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919 Eric W. Osborne 25 A Life of Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham A twentieth-century naval leader Michael Simpson 26 Navies in Northern Waters, 1721–2000 Edited by Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen 27 German Naval Strategy, 1856–1888 Forerunners to Tirpitz David Olivier

28 British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900–2000 Influences and actions Edited by Greg Kennedy 29 The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic, 1921–1940 Gunnar Aselius 30 The Royal Navy, 1930–1990 Innovation and defence Edited by Richard Harding 31 The Royal Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century Edited by Ian Speller 32 Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland The question of fire control John Brooks 33 Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910–1919 Zisis Fotakis 34 Naval Blockades and Seapower Strategies and counter-strategies, 1805–2005 Edited by Bruce A. Elleman and Sarah C.M. Paine 35 The Pacific Campaign in World War II From Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal William Bruce Johnson 36 Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I British naval aviation and the defeat of the U-boats John J. Abbatiello 37 The Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1944–49 Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones 38 The Development of British Naval Thinking Essays in memory of Bryan Ranft Edited by Geoffrey Till 39 Educating the Royal Navy Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century education for officers H.W. Dickinson 40 Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century The turn to Mahan James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara 41 Naval Coalition Warfare From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom Edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine 42 Operational Warfare at Sea Theory and practice Milan Vego

Operational Warfare at Sea Theory and practice

Milan Vego

First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2009 Milan Vego All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vego, Milan N. Operational warfare at sea : theory and practice / Milan Vego p. cm. – (Naval policy & history) Includes bibliographical references. 1. Naval tactics. 2. Naval strategy. 3. Operational art (Military science) I. Title. V167.V44 2008 359–dc22 2008014921 ISBN 0-203-88995-9 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0-415-77004-1 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-88995-9 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-77004-0 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-88995-4 (ebk)

Contents

List of figures List of abbreviations Preface 1 Introduction

viii ix xii 1

2 The objectives

21

3 Methods

49

4 Maritime operational functions

69

5 Naval operational planning

99

6 Operational design

119

7 The operational idea

137

8 Preparations and execution

172

9 Operational leadership

184

10 Operational thinking

202

The future

220

Notes Select bibliography Index

232 248 260

Figures

1 2 3 4

Objectives of naval warfare in a high-intensity conflict Sea control dynamics Major naval operation and its main elements Design for a maritime campaign/major naval operation

26 36 63 119

Abbreviations

AA AAD AAW ABDA AOA A/S ASCM ASM ASUW ASW BEF BMD C2 C2W C4 CBI CCD CFACC CFLCC CFMCC CFSOCC CG CINC CINCPAC CINCPac CINCPOA CJTF CNO COA COMINCH COMJTF COMSOPAC COMUSMACV

Antiaircraft Antiair defense Antiair warfare Australia–Britain–Dutch–America Amphibious objective area Antisubmarine Antiship cruise missile Air-to-surface missile Antisurface warfare Antisubmarine warfare British Expeditionary Forces Ballistic missile defense Command and Control Command and control warfare Command, control, communications, and computers China-Burma-India Cover, concealment, and deception Combined force air component commander Combined force land component commander Combined force maritime component commander Combined force special operations component commander Commanding General Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area Combined/joint task force Chief of Naval Operations Course of action Commander-in-Chief, the United States Fleet Commander, Joint Task Force Commander, Southern Pacific Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

x

Abbreviations

CONOPS EC ECOA EMP EU EW FTP GRT HF/DF HUMINT IJN INFOSYS IO ITO I&W IW-D JCS JFACC JFLCC JFSOCC JMFCC JOA JTF KTO LCT LSD LST MCM MEZ MIO NATO NCW NEI NFZ OKW OMFTS OOB OPLAN OPORD OPSEC PEO PKO POA PSYOP RAF

Concept of operations Enemy capability Enemy course of action Electromagnetic pulse European Union Electronic warfare Fleet Training Publication Gross Register Ton High frequency/Direction Finding Human intelligence Imperial Japanese Navy Information systems Information operations Iraqi Theater of Operations Indications and warnings Defensive information warfare Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint force air component commander Joint force land component commander Joint force special operations component commander Joint force maritime component commander Joint operations area Joint Task Force Kuwaiti Theater of Operations Landing craft, tank Landing ship, dock Landing ship, tank Mine countermeasures Maritime exclusion zone Maritime intercept operation North Atlantic Treaty Organization Network-centric warfare Netherlands East Indies Nonflight zone Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht Operational Maneuver from the Sea Order of battle Operation plan Operation order Operations security Peace enforcement operations Peacekeeping operations Pacific Ocean Area Psychological operations Royal Air Force

Abbreviations RCT RDF RF ROE SAS SIGINT SOPAC SSBN STOM SW SWPA TBM TEZ TF TG UAV UN WEU WMD

Regimental Combat Team Radio direction finding Radio frequency Rules of engagement Special Air Service Signal intelligence Southern Pacific Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine Ship-to-objective maneuver Short wave Southwest Pacific Area Tactical ballistic missile Total exclusion zone Task Force Task Group Unmanned Aerial vehicle United Nations West European Union Weapons of mass destruction

xi

Preface

Operational warfare at sea is not new; its roots go back to the era of sail when the fleets of the day operated in the furthest corners of the world’s oceans. However, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the rudiments of the modern operational level of war at sea emerged. Afterward, all major wars at sea were fought at the tactical, strategic and operational levels of war. Yet despite all the experience, too many naval officers believe that operational warfare applies only to war on land, but not at sea. This is clearly wrong, because in each medium – land, air, and sea – one’s combat forces have to accomplish tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. These, in turn, determine the levels of war at which one’s forces fight. The main purpose of this work is to present description and analysis of the most important aspects of the theory and practice of operational warfare at sea. Another purpose is to provide naval officers with a reference work for understanding both the theory and practice of operational warfare at sea. Although the focus is on conventional high-intensity conflict at sea, many aspects of operational warfare at sea are fully applicable in the employment of maritime forces in peacetime and in operations short of war. Operational warfare has played an irreplaceable and critical role in orchestrating physical combat for the accomplishment of strategic and operational objectives through the planning, preparation, and conduct of maritime campaigns and major naval operations. This will not change in the near future. The gap between tactics and strategy is too large to be bridged by physical combat only. While full mastery of tactics is, and will remain, fundamental for success in combat, there is no greater error than to assume that technology and tactics alone are sufficient for winning the nation’s wars. The excessive focus on tactics of naval platforms and their weapons/sensors invariably degrades all combat at sea to simple targeting and shooting. This work comprises ten numbered chapters plus one unnumbered chapter entitled “The future.” Chapter “Introduction” provides a broad description of the evolution of both practice and theory of operational warfare since the midnineteenth century. The chapter “Objectives” explains the meaning of the terms sea control and sea denial, choke point control, and basing/deployment area control. It also describes and explains the levels of war at sea. Chapter

Preface xiii “Methods” analyzes the main methods of combat force employment for accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in war at sea; the focus is on major naval operations. Theaterwide or operational functions (command structure, intelligence, command and control warfare, logistics, and protection) are discussed in some detail in chapter “Operational functions.” Chapter “Operational planning” explains in some detail the process of conducting estimate of the situation and the decision and planning for a maritime campaign/major naval operation. Chapter “Operational design” describes both the theory and practice of designing a maritime campaign/major naval operation. The next chapter explains in some details the elements of the operational idea, which is the heart of any sound design for a maritime campaign/major naval operation. Chapter “Preparations and execution” describes briefly preparations and then in more detail execution of the operation plans with the focus on major naval operations. Chapter “Operational leadership” describes in some detail the key personality traits for a successful naval operational commander, type of decisions, and tenets of operational leadership. The last chapter explains the importance and the key characteristics of operational thinking and the methods how it can be acquired by a future naval operational commander. The final chapter “The future” provides some random thoughts about the possible trends in war at sea at the operational level. This sequence of chapters is arbitrary; it is not intended to convey that some components or aspects of operational warfare at sea are more important than others. The primary consideration in their arrangement was to present material in a logical sequence and thereby facilitate the reader’s understanding. The author’s views and interpretations of operational warfare at sea have evolved over many years based on research and study of operational warfare in general and in-depth study of military/naval history. My views on operational warfare at sea have changed over the years based not only on the changes in my views but also through many discussions I had with students at the Naval War College and members of the Joint Military Operations (JMO) faculty. This work would not have been possible without the cooperation and help of many people. I am greatly indebted for a superb job to Ms. Sally Quinn who copy edited the manuscript. Also, I am grateful to Ms. Allie Waite, production editor, Wearset Publishing Services. Finally, many thanks for a great patience and understanding to Mr. Andrew Humphreys, Senior Editor, Literary, Strategic and Security Studies Routledge.

1

Introduction

Modern warfare at sea has shown that although successes can be achieved by force-on-force combat or attrition and relying primarily on advanced technologies, such cases are rare. To have any lasting value, naval tactical successes must be achieved as part of a larger and broader framework determined by strategy and policy. However, the strategic framework is too large to properly orchestrate tactical actions at sea to accomplish the aims of policy and strategy. At the same time, the tactical framework is too narrow to bridge the gap separating it from strategy. Therefore, another field of study and practice must exist to properly synchronize or orchestrate all available sources of military and nonmilitary power in order to accomplish the ultimate strategic objective through a series of intermediate objectives. This third component of military art (alternatively called here operational art and operational warfare) occupies an intermediate position between policy and strategy on the one hand and tactics on the other. Operational art serves both as a bridge and as an interface between these two areas of study and practice. Strategy today is not concerned, as it was until the end of the nineteenth century, directly with the employment of one’s combat forces in combat, but operational art and tactics are. The results of tactical actions are useful only when linked together as part of a larger design framed by strategy and orchestrated by operational art. By themselves, technological advances, numerical superiority, and brilliant tactical performance have proved to be inadequate to achieve ultimate success in war. A sound, coherent strategy combined with an operational excellence were the keys to winning wars in the past and will remain so for the near future. Yet for all the well-documented and proven importance of operational art most attention today by major navies is to technology and tactics (and, to a lesser degree, strategy), as it was prior to 1914; while operational art – the key piece spanning these two – is given short shrift. Moreover, many naval officers believe that operational art is useful only for warfare on land. Yet this cannot be further from the truth. While the full richness and complexity of application of operational art is in war on land, its main tenets are equally applicable to all other physical mediums, that is, at sea and in the air. In generic terms, operational art can be defined as a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and

2

Introduction

sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives in a given theater. This definition might change in the future if strategic objectives can normally be accomplished by planning and conducting major joint/combined operations instead of campaigns. The term “maneuver warfare” is often used by Western theoreticians and practitioners when referring to modern warfare at sea. The U.S. Marine Corps defines this term as a warfighting philosophy that “seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.”1 “Maneuver warfare” as a way of warfare has in fact (although its proponents are apparently unaware of it) many features of operational warfare. There are both commonalities and some significant differences in the ways services employ their forces. These distinctions are largely due to the features of the physical medium (land, air/space, and sea/ocean) in which each service predominantly operates, and consequently to the service’s unique weapons platforms. Hence, it is possible to make distinction between operational art common to all services, and the one with a predominantly or exclusively naval (or maritime), air force, or ground forces flavor. Optimally, each service should be concerned with developing the theory and practice of planning, preparing, and conducting its respective major operations, which, in turn, are an integral part of land or maritime campaigns. The theory and practice of operational warfare at sea are intertwined and mutually dependent. The practice normally has preceded the theory; afterward, theory has then paved the way for the practice of employing one’s sources of power according to the tenets of operational warfare. A sound theory should always ensure that it is not disconnected from the operational realities; otherwise, it cannot provide the sound basis for a successful application of the tenets of operational warfare at sea. At the same time, one should not overemphasize either theory or practice, because that would invariably result in a general weakening of the knowledge and understanding of both. The value of the theoretical aspects of operational warfare at sea cannot be adequately emphasized. Without mental preparation it is very difficult to devise effective methods of employing one’s maritime forces once the hostilities begin. Theoretical knowledge and understanding of a given aspect of naval warfare will make improvisation easier in wartime when the time and resources on hand are scarce. Neglecting or ignoring theoretical aspects of operational warfare at sea will invariably result in time lost and, more importantly, unnecessary losses in personnel and materiel. In this case, the employment of forces at the operational level will be primarily guided by trial and error of a few naval leaders, who might or might not be up to the task. The neglect of theory in peacetime also adversely affects the allocation of budgetary resources for a particular warfare area and therefore leads to serious deficiencies in force structure. For example, the U.S. Navy grossly paid little attention to mine warfare both prior to, and in the aftermath, of World War II.

Introduction

3

Also, it was ill prepared to organize the defense of the maritime trade off the East Coast in 1941–1942 in spite of its experiences with the German U-boats in World War I and the cooperation with the Royal Navy in keeping open the Atlantic shipping lanes in 1940–1941. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) made a similar mistake in its attitude toward the less glamorous but highly important areas of defense and protection of shipping and maritime air reconnaissance. The main components of operational art are the military objectives and the corresponding levels of war, methods of combat forces employment, operational factors of space, time, and force, theaterwide or operational functions, operational decision-making and planning, operational leadership, and operational education and training. The operational commanders and the planners need to have full knowledge and understanding of all these components to successfully apply tenets of operational warfare in planning for and executing maritime campaigns and major naval operations. Yet the field of theoretical study and practical application of operational art is too large and too diverse to be neatly arranged into a “system” of thinking. Nor is there any particular order or sequence in which these components should be studied or applied. The various elements that comprise any given component of operational art are grouped together because they are related to each other and it makes it easier to discuss them and develop theory.2 In general, the theory of operational warfare provides both a framework and a direction for the development of service and joint doctrine. Theoretical knowledge and understanding of a given aspect of naval warfare make improvisation easier in wartime, when both time and resources are in short supply. Theory also greatly improves precision in using various key operational terms, facilitating communication between theoreticians and practitioners. Operational warfare at sea provides a larger and broader framework within which naval tactical actions are conducted. Without that framework war would be a series of randomly fought naval battles or engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure. Operational art helps the commander focus on the given operational or strategic objective instead of on targets to be destroyed, annihilated, or neutralized. The objectives are determined top-down, thereby ensuring that they are accomplished in a logical and coherent manner. The larger objectives provide an overarching framework for the accomplishment of subordinate objectives. Operational warfare can be applied across the entire spectrum of conflict at sea, from peacetime competition, to operations short of war such as insurgency and counterinsurgency and peace operations, to high-intensity conventional war. However, because of the predominantly nonmilitary content of the strategic objective to be accomplished in operations short of war compared to conventional high-intensity war, the application of tenets of operational art is much more complicated. Obviously, the full richness of operational art can only be appreciated in the framework of large-scale conventional operations; because it is there that all its aspects can be fully applied. Operational warfare at sea is not tied to any specific command echelon or a certain force’s size.3 What matters is

4

Introduction

whether a given maritime force has sufficient combat potential to accomplish an operational or strategic objective. The single biggest challenge for the operational commander is to prevent attrition from becoming a predominant feature of the war at sea. The knowledge and skillful application of operational art greatly enhance the prospects for a highly capable, well trained, and skillfully led force, guided by a sound and coherent strategy, to defeat a much stronger opponent. The very essence of operational art is to win decisively in the shortest time possible and with the least loss of human lives and materiel. The operational commander should apply the tenets of operational warfare at sea to properly sequence and synchronize the individual naval tactical actions that together accomplish the objectives determined by military or theater strategy.4 A series of disconnected naval tactical actions may ultimately result in an operational or even strategic success, but over a longer time and with more losses to friendly forces than if these actions had been an integral part of a major naval operation or maritime campaign. The skillful application of operational art ensures obtaining and then maintaining the initiative. The employment of two or more services in a maritime theater can greatly neutralize the disadvantages of one service by using the advantages of other services. Operational art highlights the need for commanders and their staffs to fully comprehend not only military but also nonmilitary (diplomatic, political, economic, financial, social, religious, etc.) aspects of the situation in a given maritime theater when they plan, prepare, and execute maritime campaigns or major naval operations. It also impresses upon one that in modern times, national (or theater) strategic objectives cannot be accomplished without the properly sequenced and synchronized employment of multiservice and often multinational forces. This, in turn, requires the highest degree of cooperation among the services and services of the allies or coalition partners. The lack of such cooperation can have serious consequences for the successful employment of one’s maritime forces. A knowledge and understanding of operational art are essential for subordinate naval tactical commanders’ success as well. To act in accordance with the operational commander’s intent, they must understand a broader – that is, operational – picture of the situation. By understanding operational art, they can make decisions that will greatly contribute to the accomplishment of the ultimate operational or strategic objective. The study of past maritime campaigns and major naval operations improves greatly the quality of naval officers’ professional education. Among other things, the study of history of operational warfare at sea underscores the fact that all fundamental warfare areas are critical to success and, in particular, emphasizes that it is invariably wrong to artificially divide certain naval warfare into “offensive” and “defensive” categories. Operational art provides a framework for writing operational doctrine. The application of operational warfare at sea has several complications that have to be overcome by the operational commander and his subordinate tactical

Introduction

5

commanders. Among other things, the strategic or operational objective cannot be accomplished without the closest cooperation among the diverse combat arms of two or more services. This is especially true in the conduct of littoral warfare where two or more services would be normally employed. Therefore, the command structure and command and control process are much more complex than at the tactical command echelon. With the vast amount of information that needs to be collected, processed, evaluated, and transmitted to users, information overload is potentially an enormous problem. Today operational planning is far more complex and time consuming than planning for naval tactical actions. Likewise, the logistical support and sustainment of multiservice and especially multinational forces present great challenges for the operational commanders and his planners. Because of the differences in doctrine and weapons and equipment, there are inherent problems with interoperability in planning and execution. Successful operational planning and execution of maritime campaigns and major naval operations require not just a high degree of cooperation among the services but also close interagency planning and coordination, which are extremely difficult to achieve even under the best of circumstances.

The beginnings The rudiments of operational warfare at sea can be traced to the era of sail when sailing ships transited long distances from their home bases to their operating areas. However, the operational level of war at sea emerged during the Crimean War (1854–1856) when several British and French steam-powered ship squadrons operated in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Far East. For the first time, shore headquarters was able to exercise strategic control over the fleet deployed in distant areas due to the invention of the undersea telegraph. For example, a message relayed from the British Admiralty through the European telegraph system, thence by special undersea cable to the Crimea could reach the British fleet commander within 24 to 48 hours. In contrast, the low priority dispatches sent by messenger and fast steamship required between 16 and 24 days.5 The main factors in the emergence of the operational warfare at sea were some dramatic naval technological advances and the great changes in the character of war in general combined with changes in society, industry, and international relations. However, in contrast to war on land, the effect of nationalism and public opinion and other societal changes on war at sea was less profound than was the impact of the significant changes in naval organization and advances in naval technology. The most revolutionary impact on war at sea were the introduction of steam propulsion (in 1807), the breech-loading gun (1860), armored turret (in 1868), smokeless powder (in 1888), and the invention of the electric telegraph (in 1844), undersea cable (in 1850) telephone (in 1876), and wireless radio (in 1897). By the late nineteenth century, the steady improvement in the performance of the ship’s steam propulsion plants and the invention of internal combustion engine (in 1876) had made it possible to install powerful engines in even small

6

Introduction

ships. This, in turn, led to proliferation of small warships of all types and classes. The advent of mines (in 1855) and torpedoes (in 1866) led to the design of new smaller warships capable of posing a serious threat to the survivability of large surface warships. By the end of the last decade of the nineteenth century, the steady improvements in the range and lethality of shipboard combined with much improved hull design transformed a battleship into a blue-water gun platform. The advances in gunnery allowed battleships to engage effectively targets at four times longer range than their armorclad predecessors. Great advances in naval communications enabled the fleet commanders to disperse elements of their forces over large areas of the sea/ocean and then concentrate them again at an opportune time to engage the enemy fleet. By the turn of the twentieth century, the cumulative effect of naval technological advances was a considerable change regarding the fleet’s size, composition, organization, and tactics. Major navies of the day consisted of not only battleships and cruisers, but also large number of destroyers, torpedo craft, gunboats, and auxiliaries. For example, in 1900, the Royal Navy had in its inventories 205 warships (45 battleships, 126 cruisers, and 34 torpedo gunboats). In contrast, the French Navy had in service about 90 warships (33 battleships, 38 cruisers, and 21 torpedo gunboats).6 The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was the first conflict at sea in which diverse naval actions were conducted almost continuously. These actions occurred over large parts of the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and parts of the Pacific Ocean.7 In retrospect, the battle of Tsushima in May 1905 was the last “decisive” naval battle in history. Yet this was not realized by the theoreticians or practitioners of the day. Up to the beginning of World War I, all the world’s major navies planned to seek a decisive battle (also called “general fleet action”) and thereby obtain command of the sea in a single clash of battle fleets. In the last decade before the outbreak of World War I, the major navies continued to build both large and small naval vessels in great numbers. For example, by 1914 the Royal Navy had in service 542 warships, including 68 battleships, 110 cruisers, and 218 destroyers. The French Navy consisted of 357 ships (21 battleships, 30 cruisers, 83 destroyers, 153 torpedo boats, and 70 submarines), the Imperial German Navy, 301 ships (37 battleships, 48 cruisers, 142 destroyers, 47 torpedo boats, and 27 submarines), the Imperial Russian Navy, 177, and the Austro-Hungarian Navy 105 warships.8 By 1914, the size of the potential naval battlefield had been considerably increased due to the introduction of the new battleship dreadnought (in 1907) and battle cruisers (in 1909) with much longer range and endurance than their predecessors. The introduction of the first submarines and aircraft (in 1903) added second and third dimensions to the battlefield. The fleet commanders controlled the movements and actions of subordinate force elements over many hundreds of miles out to sea by using wireless radio. Radio became essential for controlling large fleet elements during a battle. The cumulative effect of all these changes was that blue-water navies had the capability to conduct naval actions almost continuously and over large areas of the sea/ocean and by using diverse

Introduction

7

fleet forces. Under the influence of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan’s theories, most of the major navies planned to fight general fleet action aimed to destroy or annihilate the major part of the enemy fleet and, thereby, obtain command of the sea. However, wireless radio was unable to ensure secure and reliable command and control of naval forces spread over a large ocean/sea area. In addition, the sheer size of major navies of the day with their widely dispersed home bases/installations made it increasingly difficult if not impossible to achieve decisive results by fighting a general fleet action. World War I signaled the final demise of the decisive battle as a means of obtaining command of the sea in a given part of maritime theater. War at sea demonstrated that operational objectives in a theater could be accomplished primarily by a series of related major and minor naval tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in time and place and linked with a common idea – or in modern terms by conducting a major naval operation. Deployment of one’s naval forces, the clash of opposing battle forces, pursuit, and withdrawal/ redeployment were meshed to constitute a seamless whole. The entire naval operation was planned, prepared, and conducted by a single commander. Several large-scale fleet-versus-fleet actions took place in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea. The Battle of Jutland, fought on 31 May to 1 June 1916, came closest to what can be considered a major naval operation. It consisted of several gunnery duels between the main forces and a series of minor actions aimed to provide combat support to the respective battle fleets.9 Both the Germans and the British battle fleets intended to accomplish an operational objective in the North Sea theater of operations. The German High Seas Fleet tactically won the Battle of Jutland, but operationally it was clearly a British victory. The battle did not affect the British command of the North Sea, and Germany did not improve its overall position at sea. Admiral John Jellicoe, due partly to his concern over the possible future attitude of the United States, said that there was a necessity for leaving nothing to chance in a fleet action because the British fleet was the only factor that was vital to the existence of the Empire, and indeed to Entente’s cause. The British had no reserves except their battle fleet if their margin of superiority over the German High Seas Fleet disappeared.10 The first major naval operation against the enemy coast was conducted by the Austro-Hungarian fleet, a day after Italy declared war against the Entente Powers on 23 May 1915. The main objective of that operation was to disrupt and delay the movement and transport of mobilized Italian troops by rail along the Adriatic’s western coast. Another objective was to create fear and possibly panic among the Italian populace who lived in the coastal area.11 During World War I, the first major joint naval operations also emerged: the Entente’s amphibious landing at Gallipoli in April 1915 and the German landing on the Latvian coast in October 1917. The main objectives of the Gallipoli landing operation were to take Turkey out of the war; open a direct link with their embattled ally in Russia; force the Germans to shift troops from the Russian front; and influence Greece to openly side with the Entente Powers.12

8

Introduction

The landing at Gallipoli eventually failed because of the poor cooperation between the army and the navies and stiff Turkish resistance on the coast. Another, but more successful, major joint naval operation was the German amphibious landing in the Gulf of Riga (Operation Albion) in October 1917. The operational objective of the landing was to open the Gulf of Riga and thereby threaten the rear of the Russian 12th Army, defending the Baltic coast. The Germans achieved complete surprise, and the entire operation was a resounding success. The Russian 12th Army was destroyed, and the threat to the flank of General Oskar von Hutier’s 8th Army was eliminated.13 World War I also witnessed the emergence of the first maritime campaign to attack the enemy’s or defend/protect friendly merchant shipping. The Germans conducted a maritime campaign aimed to cut-off the Allied maritime trade, while the Allies fought a defensive maritime campaign to protect their maritime trade. The German campaign was conducted primarily by U-boats but surface commerce raiders took part as well. The U-boats sunk some 14,350 tons of the Allied and neutral shipping. The largest losses inflicted on the Allied shipping were after 9 January 1917 when the Germans declared unrestricted U-boat warfare. From January 1917 through October 1918, the German U-boats sunk 9.8 million tons (of which 6.6 million were sunk in 1917). By 11 November 1918, the Germans lost 178 U-boats at sea; five were destroyed when their bases in Flanders were abandoned and 11 U-boats were lost at the Austro-Hungarian naval base at Cattaro, Dalmatia after they were ordered to return home 176 Uboats were handed over to the Allies and interned upon the end of the hostilities. The Germans also lost 5,410 U-boat crewmembers (including 515 officers) or about 30 percent of the U-boat’s personnel strength.14 The first rudiments of operational reconnaissance and intelligence emerged during World War I. For example, the Royal Navy established a net of coastal direction finder (DF) stations to intercept German radio communications. The Admiralty’s Room 40 routinely decoded German naval radio messages giving the Royal Navy timely warning of the German fleet movements and actions. This relieved the Home Fleet of constant patrol duty in the North Sea. Both battle fleets maintained radio silence while under way, relying exclusively on visual communications. The Battle of Jutland showed that tactics had surpassed the abilities of naval commanders to command and control their far-flung forces from a flagship.15 Between 1919 and 1939, naval theoreticians of the day studied closely the experiences and lessons of World War I at sea. Some useful lessons were learned, but some were either mislearned or ignored. For example, the U.S. Navy remained focused on the need to build and maintain a battle fleet. The majority of U.S. admirals and their civilian counterparts were materiel oriented. They firmly (but erroneously) believed smaller surface ships, such as destroyers, could be constructed quickly in an emergency. The focus of the U.S. Navy’s tactics was to prepare to fight a decisive battle similar to the Battle of Jutland with the Japanese fleet somewhere in the Western Pacific. Hence, the Battle of Jutland was studied in detail at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode

Introduction

9

Island, and lessons learned were based on Mahan’s teachings. In fleet maneuvers and at the Naval War College, Mahan’s ideas on fighting a decisive battle were studied in excruciating detail and rehearsed. The U.S. Navy’s tactical doctrine envisaged using carriers to sink or disable enemy carriers, while carrier-based aircraft would be used as gun spotters for the battle line that would engage the Japanese battle fleet in a Jutland-like decisive battle.16 The Japanese navy had views almost identical to the U.S. Navy’s about the nature of the potential conflict in the Pacific; high-ranking Japanese admirals were also disciples of Mahan. Thus, it was not surprising that in the interwar years, capital ships remained a centerpiece of the Japanese navy. Aircraft carriers and submarines were considered auxiliaries to the battle fleet. In contrast to most Japanese admirals, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884–1943), the future CINC of the Combined Fleet, believed that the aircraft carrier was the ship of the future. He and a small group of believers were not influential enough, however, to change naval doctrine prior to the start of the war in the Pacific in December 1941.17 The German Reichsmarine (1919–1935) used war experiences to lay sound theoretical foundations for the technical and tactical development of its U-boats. It also derived the proper lesson that in the future naval planning must be coordinated with the army’s plans and that war at sea must be centrally conducted. At the same time, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s (1849–1930), concept of the battle fleet and the decisive battle was restored after 1928, when Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), was appointed chief of the Marineleitung. Raeder remained the CINC of the navy until his resignation in January 1943. He had a dominant influence on the development of German naval thinking during that era. In the 1930s, the Germans resumed the construction of battleships and battle cruisers.18 Although U-boat warfare achieved the greatest material successes in World War I, its possibilities were underestimated by the Reichsmarine and the new Kriegsmarine (after 1935) until well into the 1930s. The German naval high command remained convinced that the key to victory at sea was the battle fleet and the decisive battle. Therefore, the main weight of effort was on the construction of battleships, while U-boats remained auxiliary weapons. However, these views changed radically after September 1939 and in the course of World War II.19 In the interwar years, the Royal Navy apparently forgot the lessons learned the hard way and with much sacrifice in World War I – specifically, the critical role convoys had played in blunting and eventually defeating the German U-boat offensive in 1917–1918. In the interwar years, British naval planners refused to recognize that the convoy lay at the heart of any successful effort to control the threat posed by enemy submarines. They regarded the convoy as a purely defensive measure and noted that in World War I escorts sank only 20 Uboats out of 178 boats destroyed.20 The lessons of World War I also showed that escorts were more effective than offensive methods such as hunting and patrolling. In fact, the U-boats avoided convoys because of possible encounters with escorts. Experience also showed that if the U-boats persisted in an attack,

10

Introduction

the resulting counterattack by escorts had a higher probability of success than did the one-on-one attacks carried out by hunter–killer groups.21 In the interwar years, the Royal Navy opposed convoying in the case of a major war by insisting that convoying involved a grave loss in combat power and compared poorly to independently routed ships. The Royal Navy also did not realize that although the number of ships sailing in convoy steadily increased in 1917–1918, the number of ships sunk in convoy actually decreased, except for one quarter.22 Not until 1937 did the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force (RAF) agree that convoys should be adopted if the Germans initiated unrestricted U-boat warfare against British shipping; at the same time, the Admiralty concluded that the Germans would most likely fail to observe international prohibitions against such a mode of warfare. This decision enabled Britain to create a necessary worldwide shipping control organization, which was put into effect shortly after Britain declared war on Nazi Germany in September 1939.23 Still, the Royal Navy continued to believe until 1939 that unrestricted submarine warfare had been effectively eliminated by a series of international agreements since World War I.24 It also erroneously believed that the successes of the German U-boats in the last two years of World War I were solely due to the unrestricted nature of warfare by U-boats. From this, it was not difficult to think that restricted U-boat warfare would not pose a serious problem and could easily be countered by patrolling, independent sailing, routing, arming of ships, etc.25 The U.S. Navy played a pivotal role in the defeat of the German U-boats in World War I. Yet it paid scant attention to the task of protecting and defending maritime trade in the interwar years. Likewise, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) neglected the less glamorous but highly important area of the defense and protection of shipping. In the interwar years, the Japanese navy was indifferent to this problem. Like their British and U.S. counterparts, the Japanese focused almost exclusively on studying the lessons of the Battle of Jutland, not the German U-boat attack against the Entente’s maritime shipping. The Japanese navy acknowledged the problem of the protection of merchant shipping in time of war. However, it did not take any concrete measures to make such protection effective. Among other things, the Japanese did not link commerce protection with antisubmarine warfare (ASW) requirements. They contemplated employing its relatively large submarine force solely against enemy surface combatants. One reason for this was that the Japanese high command assumed that U.S. submarines would be employed the same way. This was, in fact, an accurate reading of U.S. submarine doctrine prior to 1941. The Japanese navy also had given almost no thought to the possibility of U.S. submarines operating in Japanese home waters. The results of this neglect were predictable. At the beginning of the war, the Japanese had very little in the way of organization, platforms, weapons, tactics, or training to deal with convoys and ASW.26 Hence, during the war, defense and protection of Japanese shipping, including convoying, were improvised as the need arose. In the interwar years, the Royal Navy envisaged using its submarines only as an adjunct to the battle fleet. In a typical case of mirror imaging, it believed that

Introduction

11

because British submarines had difficulties in coordinating their attacks, it was unlikely that the potential opponent would use groups of submarine in attacking enemy merchant shipping. The British also dismissed the possibility that the enemy might use its submarines on the surface against merchant ships.27 Underestimation of the submarine as a serious threat to one’s merchant shipping was not limited to the Royal Navy in the interwar years; neither Japan nor the United States gave much attention to preparations for protecting its shipping against submarine or air attack in case of war.28 A U.S. admiral stated in 1927 that the submarine was not well adapted to lawful war on commerce.29 By 1939, the lessons learned in protecting maritime trade during World War I were almost forgotten. They had to be relearned at a high cost during the ensuing Battle for the Atlantic.30 By 1938, the U.S. Navy was steadfast in its belief that the primary task of the submarine was to attack heavy enemy ships, such as battleships, battle cruisers, and aircraft carriers. The U.S. Navy’s instructions reflected the then prevailing view that the submarines should be employed not in attacks on seaborne commerce but against enemy warships in combination with the surface forces. The main mission of U.S. submarines remained the defense of Pearl Harbor, scouting, and fleet operations, especially against enemy warships.31 By the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the introduction of large aircraft carriers and more capable battleships and cruisers, submarines, and naval aircraft and their associated sensors (sonar, radar, etc.) significantly increased the capabilities of major navies to fight far from friendly shores and over the large part of a given maritime theater. The size of the sea and ocean area in which a potential combat was to take place had been increased enormously with the advent of carrier-based aviation and longer-range submarines. Aircraft carriers, land-based air, and submarines emerged as the first truly “operational” platforms capable of theaterwide employment. The advent of short wave (SW) radio in the 1920s allowed secure and reliable control of movement of fleet units and individual ships at distances up to several thousand nautical miles from the shore. High-frequency/direction finder (HF/DF) techniques were further refined in the 1920s and 1930s. The experiences gained in World War I led all the major navies to study the problems of theaterwide command and control, deployment, and concentration of the major part of the fleet forces in a maritime theater. By the early 1930s major navies began to move the theater- or numbered fleet headquarters from the sea to the shore. Initially, these changes in command and control were made during large-scale exercises, but by the late 1930s, the theater fleet headquarters were established ashore on a permanent basis. In the interwar years, the most influential naval thinkers in the West were German vice admiral Wolfgang Wegener and French vice admiral Raoul Castex. However, both Wegener and Castex were more concerned with naval strategy than with what can be considered operational art. In contrast, the Soviets focused on developing a theory of naval operations as part of their then emerging theory of operational art. Their theories were incorporated into the Red

12

Introduction

Navy’s doctrine. The Soviet Field Manual of 1930 (BU-30) was the first doctrinal document to spell out the rudiments of joint operational employment of naval forces and ground troops. Afterward, the Soviets developed the theory of what they called “naval operations” – specifically, reconnaissance, amphibious landings and antiamphibious operations, and operations on sea lines of communications. Five years later, the Soviet navy adopted the new Combat Manual of Naval Forces (BU-MS-37). Here for the first time was presented an elaboration of “naval operations” and “day-to-day (routine) activities” as the principal methods by which the combat employment of naval forces and aviation would accomplish operational objectives. The new manual envisaged a dozen types of naval operations including those aimed to destroy an enemy fleet at sea, operations against coastal “objects” (installations), operations on sea communications and blockade/counterblockade, landing operations, anti-landing operations, and operations in support of the army flank. The so-called day-to-day activities of the fleet forces were aimed to accomplish operational objectives by establishing what the Soviets called a “favorable operational regime” in their coastal waters and deployment areas.32 The Soviet views on the nature of modern warfare at sea and operational art were incorporated into the Provisional Manual on Conduct of Operations (NMO-40), issued in 1940. However, the Soviet theory of naval operations was very poorly applied during the country’s war with Nazi Germany. Major Western navies generally paid less attention to theory than the Soviets, instead focusing on the practical application of operational art through planning, war-gaming, and exercises at sea. The U.S. Navy War College adopted for the first time in addition to “strategical” and “tactical” problems, the study of “operational” problems in 1927. This practice continued in the 1930s and 1940s. In addition, the U.S. Navy repeatedly tested its plans for operational employment of fleet forces in a hypothetical war with Japan in the 1930s in the war games held at the Naval War College. In the late 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. Navy was highly successful in using lessons from its major annual exercises, called “fleet problems,” to develop and improve naval aircraft, aircraft carriers, and, perhaps even more important, new tactical procedures and operational concepts for the employment of its emerging carrier forces. For example, based on the experiences with Fleet Problem XI in April 1930, it was recommended that semipermanent task forces be organized, each composed of one large aircraft carrier, a division of cruisers, and a division of destroyers. Lessons learned during Fleet Problem XIII, held in 1932, emphasized that in case of a war in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy should have more aircraft carriers in service. Fleet Problem XIX, conducted in 1938, showed the high vulnerability of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s main base, Pearl Harbor, to enemy carrierbased air attack and indicated the great difficulties for the defender in solving this problem. In Fleet Problem XX, held in the Caribbean and off the northeast part of South America in 1939, the U.S. Navy practiced the employment of fast carriers in defending convoy and surface ships against enemy air attack.33 In the aftermath of World War I, the British devoted a great deal of attention

Introduction

13

to the experiences of the Gallipoli landings. Yet the more they studied, the less optimistic they became about amphibious landings. They assumed (wrongly, as it turned out) that future amphibious landings had to be smaller and simpler and take place only after dark or at dawn. Moreover, they concluded that the advent of aircraft, modern artillery, and machine guns made opposed landings on the enemy shore next to impossible.34 The U.S. Marine Corps, in contrast to the British, drew different and, as events proved, correct lessons from the failed Gallipoli landing. The U.S. Marine Corps used a series of exercises in the 1920s to refine and improve its concept of amphibious landings on the opposed shore. In an exercise off the Panama Canal Zone in 1924, the Marines came to the important conclusion that resourceful and well-trained amphibious landing forces could penetrate conventional beach defenses. The U.S. Marines also drew negative conclusions from a landing exercise, attended by both marines and naval officers, off Pearl Harbor in 1925. That exercise, in which U.S. Marines tested the British concept for amphibious landing, convinced key officers of both the Marines and the U.S. Navy that the United States did not have the doctrine necessary to carry out a basic Pacific war plan. The Marines abandoned the British concept of landing operations in favor of their own concept, which made amphibious development a naval mission.35 The U.S. Marines also studied in detail the highly successful German landing at the Gulf of Riga in October 1917. The U.S. Marine Corps decided to make an all-out effort to write a manual on how to conduct amphibious landings; in doing so they relied almost entirely on the lessons learned during World War I and exercises conducted in the 1920s. The entire faculty and the students of the Marine Corps School at Quantico, Virginia, spent the full 1932–1933 academic year on amphibious studies. They analyzed the Gallipoli landing in detail. The result was the first U.S. manual for amphibious warfare, published as Tentative Manual for Landing Operations in 1934. This manual was the most comprehensive and detailed effort at thinking through numerous problems involved in amphibious landings. A year later, this document became the authoritative guide within the Navy Department for future amphibious exercises, as well as for research and development. The manual was refined and adopted as Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP 167) in 1938. Three years later, the U.S. Army issued a similar document as its basic manual (Field Manual 31–35) for amphibious landings. These two publications served as the basic planning and training for U.S. forces in their conduct of amphibious landings in World War II.36 The German navy was probably the leader among all the navies in its understanding and application of operational warfare at sea in the 1930s. The key operational terms, specifically “operations,” “operational,” “operational reconnaissance,” etc. were properly understood. By the early 1930s, the Germans also began to play “operational” in addition to strategic and tactical war games. One result of these games was that the German Naval High Command became convinced of the need to seize parts of the southern Norwegian coast and the French Atlantic coast to escape constraints imposed by the geography of the North Sea

14

Introduction

and to operationally employ German naval forces in the Atlantic. The German concept of employing U-boats in groups or screens (popularly called “wolf packs” in the West) had its rudiments in the last few months of World War I. The tactical concept of using U-boats at night and on the surface was first described in 1922 in a study by two German naval officers. Their ideas were refined during war games in the early 1930s and became part of the U-boat doctrine in 1935.37 The SW radio made it possible for the first time for the U-boat command to direct the movements and coordinate the attacks of several groups of U-boats from a headquarters onboard a ship or ashore. This concept was first tested in practice during the Wehrmacht maneuvers in the fall of 1937. The commander of the U-boats, Commodore Karl Doenitz, controlled his boats, deployed in the Baltic, via SW radio from the submarine tender at naval base Kiel. Based on exercises conducted in 1937, Doenitz requested that a command ship equipped with the latest means of communications be built for command and control of U-boats in case of war. After other large-scale exercises, held in the North Sea in May 1939, U-boats conducted an exercise in group tactics off Cape Finisterre and in the Bay of Biscay. In July 1939, Doenitz (by then promoted to rear admiral) conducted a similar exercise in the Baltic. All these exercises proved to Doenitz that his concept of using U-boats in groups was well founded. Nevertheless, the German naval high command continued to believe that in the next war U-boats would be employed individually, not in groups.38 Doenitz also used lessons learned from the winter exercise of 1938–1939 to argue that a successful campaign against British maritime trade would require a force of at least 300 U-boats – mainly 517- and 750-ton boats.39 The employment of carrier-based aircraft in the war against China in 1937–1941 greatly influenced Japanese naval thinking prior to the war with the United States. This limited war demonstrated the tremendous offensive power of naval aircraft. Japanese naval medium bombers were highly successful in attacking distant targets, such as airfields and aircraft on the ground. This showed the Japanese that carrier-based aircraft could contribute to the projection of naval power ashore. Another lesson learned by the Japanese concerned the use of large formations of attack aircraft, escorted by fighter aircraft, in attacking targets ashore. The newly created carrier-based air groups were gradually replaced by combined air groups and then air fleets. The new tactical organization was successfully applied in the first months of the Pacific war, when the Japanese navy launched massive blows against Allied naval forces and facilities.40 In contrast, the Japanese mislearned some important lessons on the employment of their submarines based on their exercises in the 1930s. Japanese submarine doctrine prior to World War II focused on the destruction of large surface combatants. Although a series of exercises demonstrated many problems with the doctrine, these lessons were essentially ignored. The Japanese were not unaware of the value of submarines in attacking enemy merchant shipping. For example, in maneuvers held in October 1940, several Japanese submarines were deployed to patrol critical straits in home waters. The submarines also simulated attacks on Japanese commercial vessels. Because of inadequate antisubmarine

Introduction

15

defenses and lack of attention by convoy escorts, Japanese submarines were successful in these simulated attacks. Yet the Japanese top naval officials took the wrong lesson from these maneuvers, ignoring the offensive potential of submarines to attack enemy maritime trade. They focused narrowly on the submarines’ vulnerability to enemy detection by radio direction finding (RDF). Exercises by the Sixth Fleet (submarines), conducted between February and April 1941 in the waters between Honshu¯ and Micronesia, again showed great difficulties in successfully employing submarines against enemy warships, specifically in contact-keeping and pursuit. Nevertheless, the Japanese ignored their own post-action reports and real lessons learned from that exercise and continued with their false doctrinal beliefs. The Japanese also derived some wrong lessons from these exercises. They became convinced of the great value of submarines and aircraft in defending Japanese island strongpoints in the Western Pacific. The ensuing conflict in the Pacific demonstrated, however, that the Japanese submarines could be used only for bringing in supplies, not for the defense of such isolated garrisons.41 Operational warfare at sea was applied by all major navies during World War II and in all theaters. A dozen maritime campaigns and numerous major naval operations were conducted in the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans and the Mediterranean. In the aftermath of World War II, Western military theoreticians believed (as it turned out quite erroneously) that the time of large-scale conventional operations had passed due to the advent of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Moreover, they were convinced that any major conventional conflict would soon become a global war fought with nuclear weapons. Another reason for the neglect of operational art in general was the Western fixation on fighting counterinsurgencies. This, in turn, led many naval theoreticians and practitioners to believe that the time of major naval operations and maritime campaigns were the things of the past. Since 1945 only a few major naval operations have been conducted. One reason is that most regional wars did not involve a clash between strong opponents at sea. The most important examples of major naval operations were the UN blockade of North Korea’s coast during the Korean War (1950–1953) and the U.S. blockade of the South Vietnamese coast from March 1965 through December 1972 (Operation Market Time). The U.S. Navy focused almost exclusively on tactics and strategy and neglected operational art. Hence, it was not surprising that the U.S. Navy missed several opportunities to plan for and conduct major naval operations in several regional crises. For example, in the early phase of the Vietnam War a major naval operation aimed at closing all of North Vietnam’s major ports and naval bases, combined with attacks against naval forces, would have a significant impact on Hanoi’s ability to sustain the Vietcong’s insurgency in the south. Such results were in fact achieved after the main North Vietnamese port Haiphong and some smaller ports were mined by U.S. carrier aircraft in May 1972 (Operation Pocket Money). Also, the U.S. Navy could have eliminated the recurrent threat of Iranian mining in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf in 1987–1988 if it had conducted a major operation to destroy or

16

Introduction

neutralize a substantial part of the Iranian navy by attacking its bases and ships at sea. However, because of political considerations, the United States chose to respond tactically, not operationally, to numerous Iranian provocations. The Israelis planned and conducted what can be considered a major naval operation to obtain local sea control off the Egyptian and Syrian coasts during the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War of October 1973. The British recapture of the Falklands in 1982 (Operation Corporate) was a major naval operation aimed to accomplish a limited strategic objective. The operations of the coalition naval forces in the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and in war against Iraq in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom) to establish and maintain control of the northern part of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf was a major combined naval operation. In contrast to the armies, most of the Western navies and air forces continue to give a short shrift to both the theory and practice of operational warfare. The main reason for this highly unfavorable situation is excessive focus bordering on blind belief that the new technologies are panacea for all the problems of modern warfare at sea. Hence, almost all the attention is given to naval tactics and tactics of weapons in particular.

Relationships All three components of military art are closely related. Their mutual relationships are highly dynamic. There is no clear-cut line separating strategy and operational art, tactics and strategy, or operational art and tactics. Actions and events at the tactical level often affect strategy and policy in the most profound way. Operational art considerably influences both strategy and policy on the one hand and tactics on the other. The strategy and policy framework dominates operational art, and the latter, in turn, dominates tactics. Problems ensue when the smaller framework begins to encroach on the larger framework, either by intent or by default. In general, strategy guides operational art by determining the ultimate objectives to be accomplished and allocating necessary military and nonmilitary resources. Strategy also defines and imposes limitations on the use of one’s combat forces and imposes conditions on tactical combat. To be successful, major operations or campaigns must be conducted within a framework of what is operationally and strategically possible.42 The accomplishment of one’s operational and strategic objectives depends on the results obtained by tactics. Strategy, for its part, while considering the limitations imposed by tactics, must ensure that naval tactical combat is conducted under conditions favorable for accomplishing strategic objectives. Bad tactics can invalidate a good strategy. Therefore, a sufficient level of tactical competence is always required to accomplish strategic or operational objectives. For example, the U.S. Navy did not match tactical skills with the Japanese during the protracted struggle for Guadalcanal (August 1942 to February 1943). However, the Allies ultimately won because they matched means and ends at the operational and strategic levels better than the Japanese did. Defeats in a major

Introduction

17

battle, the Japanese suffered at the Battle of Midway (June 1942), not only can doom the entire major operation, but also invariably have an immediate and profound effect on the strategic situation in a given theater. Naval tactics can be described as both the art and science of planning, preparing, and employing individual ships, submarines, aircraft, and individual naval combat arms to accomplish assigned major or tactical objectives. Naval tactics should create the prerequisites for operational or strategic success, which the operational commander must then exploit.43 It must ensure that results are in harmony with operational art and strategy. Normally, a tactical action should not be fought unless it is part of the operational design and directly contributes to the accomplishment of operational or strategic objectives. Naval tactical victories are meaningless if they are fought outside of the operational framework For example, in the Battle for Leyte, Admiral William F. Halsey (1882–1959), Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, won a tactical victory in the battle off Cape Engano over a much smaller and weaker Japanese carrier force on 25 October 1944. However, that victory also almost led to the failure of the entire supporting major naval operation. This battle was not imposed by the Japanese but was actively sought by Halsey. It was fought outside the operational framework, which was to provide effective distant cover and support to the Allied forces that landed on Leyte. Only Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s decision to turn north and leave the scene of action when his force was on the verge of defeating the U.S. forces in the battle off Samar on 25 October saved the Allies from suffering an ignominious defeat at the hands of a much weaker force. Perhaps the worst situation is to confuse tactics with strategy and strategy with the conduct of war, as the Imperial Japanese Navy did in the prewar years. The Japanese were fixated on the single decisive battle, after the manner of the Battle of Jutland in June 1916. That preoccupation guided their tactical doctrine and ship designs. However, this resulted in a powerful surface force that was both one-dimensional and brittle.44 Tactics should never be allowed to significantly influence, much less dominate, strategy, either by design or by default. If this occurs, strategy will be defined by tactical or operational considerations, or even applied as an afterthought.45 The ever-increasing reliance on advanced weaponry and sensors, coupled with the reluctance to accept unnecessary casualties in a conflict involving no vital national interests, has created a situation in which targeting has become a de facto substitute for sound strategy. Poor application of operational art can lead to tactical defeats, which, in turn, may have not only operational but also strategic consequences. The Japanese Combined Fleet suffered a decisive defeat in the Battle of Midway because of a flawed operational plan, despite the overwhelming Japanese superiority in forces. This example perhaps best demonstrates how the superiority of one’s forces can easily be squandered when operational thinking on the part of operational commanders is seriously lacking. Tactical brilliance rarely can overcome poor operational performance. No

18

Introduction

number of tactical victories can save one’s forces from ultimate defeat. A lack of operational thinking invariably results in wasting the fruits of tactical victories.

Characteristics The main characteristics of operational warfare at sea, as compared with tactical actions, are larger dimensions of forces, time, and space. The principal reason for these differences is the scale of an operational or strategic objective compared to a tactical objective. Major naval operations and maritime campaigns are conducted in a large part of the theater; in contrast, naval combat is conducted in a much smaller part of a given maritime theater. Maritime campaigns and major naval operations require much more time to plan, prepare, execute, and complete than do naval tactical actions. A naval battle or engagement can be concluded in a matter of hours, while a major naval operation is conducted over several days or even weeks. A maritime campaign can last from several months to several years as the Battle for the Atlantic in 1939–1945 illustrates. The accomplishment of operational or strategic objectives requires the employment of larger and more diverse naval forces than does the accomplishment of tactical objectives. In the past, large naval forces usually participated in a maritime campaign or major naval operation. This is not necessarily the case today, where a relatively small force can be employed to accomplish an operational or, in some special cases, even a limited strategic objective. What counts most is not the numerical strength of one’s forces but their combat potential. But even in the past, there were a number of cases in which relatively small forces were able to accomplish an operational objective at sea. For example, the forces employed in May 1941 in the ill-fated German attempt to interrupt British shipping in the Atlantic north of the equator (Operation Rheinuebung) were organized into a combat group (Kampfgruppe) composed of a single 45,000-ton battleship (Bismarck) and a heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen).46 In the modern era, the application of operational warfare at sea is predominantly a multiservice (joint) and often a multinational (combined) effort. A maritime campaign or major naval operation encompasses several major overlapping phases, while a naval tactical action usually does not include any clear break in fighting. The operational commanders make planning assumptions about a number of military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation in the maritime theater, projecting several weeks or even months into the future. With this wider perspective and increased uncertainty comes an increase in the risks the operational commanders and their staffs must take. Another distinction compared with tactical combat is that planning for and execution of a maritime campaign and often for a major naval operation requires synchronized use of both military forces and nonmilitary sources of power. Because of the increased scope of objectives to be accomplished and, consequently, the larger force involved, planning for a maritime campaign or major naval operation is far more complex and requires more time than planning for a

Introduction

19

naval tactical action. They are planned using “regressive” (inverse) methods, in which the ultimate (strategic or operational) objective is determined first and from that a series of intermediate objectives (operational or major tactical) is determined. In contrast, naval tactical actions are planned using a forward, or “progressive,” method, in which the next or immediate major or minor tactical objective is assigned. The deployment of one’s forces taking part in a maritime campaign or major naval operation encompasses a much larger physical space and requires far more time to complete than deployment for a naval battle or engagement. More important, errors in deploying one’s forces into a maritime theater can fatally affect the initial phase and even the outcome of a major naval operation or maritime campaign. Force deployment directly influences not only the accomplishment of the next operational objective but also the subsequent decisions made in combat. Because of the relatively long duration of maritime campaigns and major naval operations and the diversity of participating forces, the logistical support and sustainment are more complex to organize and execute than they are for battles or engagements. The naval operational commander is normally vested with the responsibility for organizing and controlling logistical support and sustainment, while a naval tactical commander uses logistics but does not control them.

Prerequisites Success in the practical application of operational warfare at sea is not possible unless several key prerequisites are met. The conduct of a maritime campaign or major naval operation requires sufficient physical space for one’s forces to maneuver freely. This is not a problem in a war on the open ocean but can be a limiting factor in an enclosed or semienclosed sea. The operational commander’s mastery of tactics in his chosen specialty is a key prerequisite for success at the operational and strategic levels of war. The operational commanders and their staffs have to think broadly and far ahead – or to think operationally vice tactically. Among other things, they have to evaluate properly not only military but also nonmilitary aspects of the situation and its trends in a given part of the maritime theater. They should have comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the levels of war at sea and their mutual relationships. They also need to know and fully understand the linkage between strategy and policy and the interrelationship of strategy, tactics, and operational art. Success in planning and conducting maritime campaigns and major naval operations cannot be achieved unless there is agreement on the key aspects of operational warfare or a common operational outlook. The operational commanders and their staffs should use commonly accepted and understood operational terms; otherwise, communications within a service and among services become difficult, if not impossible. It does little good to recognize a problem and to formulate an approach to it if the language with

20

Introduction

which it is discussed is confused or uncertain. As the late Henry E. Eccles (professor at the U.S. Naval War College) so eloquently wrote: strict accuracy should regulate our use of language. Thoughts should be expressed with perspicuity and correctness. False logic, disguised by specious phraseology, too often gains the assent of the unthinking multitude, disseminating everywhere the seeds of prejudice and error. A misapplied or misapprehended term is sufficient to give rise to fierce and interminable disputes.47 Operational warfare at sea is the only means of orchestrating and tying together naval tactical actions within a larger design that directly contributes to the objectives set by strategy. A tactical concept for the employment of one’s maritime forces cannot lead to victory if it is not an integral part of a broader operational concept. Sound sequencing and synchronization of all military and nonmilitary sources of power are necessary to accomplish strategic or operational objectives in a given maritime theater through planning and execution of maritime campaigns and major naval operations. Sound application of operational art is the key to winning decisively in the shortest time and with the least loss of men and materiel. All past wars were won or lost at the strategic and operational levels, not at the tactical level. Technological advances have considerably affected and will continue to influence both the theory and the practice of operational art. However, in contrast to some popular views, technology will not eliminate operational art as the intermediate component of military art. There were a number of dramatic technological advances in the past, and in each case operational art adjusted to the new capabilities. This is not likely to change in the future. The history of past wars at sea has shown that neither superior technology nor superb tactics can, by itself, ensure victory. A predominant, or even worse, an exclusive focus on technology or tactics, is likely to result in time consuming and costly attritional warfare against a strong and resilient opponent. Moreover, relying solely on better technology would rob warfare of its “art.” It would make one’s forces vulnerable to an opponent who, while technologically inferior, thinks better and faster and uses his smaller forces more creatively, perhaps asymmetrically.

2

The objectives

War at sea is an integral part of war as a whole. It has never taken place alone but has been conducted in conjunction with war on land and, in the modern era, with war in the air. The objectives of naval warfare have been and continue to be an integral part of war’s objectives. These, in turn, are accomplished by the employment of all the services of a country’s armed forces. In contrast to war on land, the objectives in war at sea are usually physical in character. The principal strategic or operational objective for a stronger side is to obtain sea control in the whole theater or a major part of it, while the weaker side tries to obtain sea denial. Normally, a relatively strong but initially weaker side at sea aims to ultimately obtain sea control for itself. When operating in an enclosed sea theater, a blue-water navy would aim to obtain choke-point control, while the weaker side would conduct counter-choke-point control. Another operational objective for both the stronger and weaker sides at sea is to establish, maintain, and, if possible, expand control of their respective basing and deployment areas for their naval forces and aircraft, thereby creating prerequisites for planning, preparing, and executing major operations. Navies are also for accomplishing diverse objectives in low-intensity conflict and operations short of war. These objectives might range from sea control or sea denial in support of an insurgency or counterinsurgency, to the enforcement of a ceasefire and arms embargoes in peace operations.

Strategic offensive vs. defensive One’s navy can generally be on a strategic offensive or defensive. Depending on the course of the war, a strategic offensive could be followed by a strategic defensive or vice versa. Whether a war at sea is conducted primarily offensively or defensively depends upon, among other things, the country’s geostrategic position on land and at sea, the initial balance of strength at sea and in the air, and the overall war objectives to be accomplished. The progress of the war on land, however, ultimately determines whether one’s navy is employed predominantly offensively or defensively. Such a decision cannot be made without full consideration of the factors of space, time, forces and their combinations, and how they relate to the accomplishment of the overall war’s objectives.

22

The objectives

A country on a strategic offensive on land usually acts offensively at sea, as Japan did in its war with Russia in 1904–1905. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) went on the strategic offensive at the outbreak of hostilities with the United States and the Allies in the Pacific in December 1941. Seven months later, the Japanese suffered a heavy defeat in the Battle of Midway, and from then on, they were forced onto the strategic defensive. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet went on the offensive once the ground forces started their long-awaited offensive against the Wehrmacht in the aftermath of the battle of Stalingrad in February 1943. Likewise, the Soviet Baltic Fleet took the offensive after the Soviet forces lifted the siege of Leningrad and began their advance southward along the Baltic coast in September 1944. One great advantage of the offensive is that – if one’s real objective is not prematurely disclosed or too transparent – the defender may sometimes be induced to divide his strength to protect several positions that seem equally threatened. The attacker usually has the initiative, and hence he often may force the defender to conform to his plans. For example, in the Seven Years War (1756–1763), England used its superiority at sea to conduct repeated raids by small expeditionary forces upon the French coast. This forced France to maintain a larger number of troops scattered among several positions at home, so they could be used neither to reinforce the French army operating against Prussia on the continent nor to reinforce the French garrisons in Louisburg and Quebec.1 An inferior fleet, or one lacking the key elements of strength to challenge the stronger fleet, normally assumes a strategic defensive in one or, perhaps, all theaters. However, when on the defensive, the weaker force should not be entirely passive, because an attacking enemy invariably opens itself up and thereby presents many opportunities for a tactical offensive that cumulatively may pay important dividends. The greatest danger in remaining on the defensive for too long – in order to conserve one’s strength for a future counteroffensive – is that it may kill the spirit of dash and daring so necessary for military success. From the morale standpoint alone, the side on the defensive should always try to achieve minor tactical successes that constantly engage the attention of the enemy and inflict losses upon him, thereby cumulatively accomplishing the larger objective.2 Normally, a stronger fleet should not be on the defensive both in home waters and overseas, but it should apply the principles of the offensive and economy of effort. For example, the Royal Navy violated the principle of the offensive during the American Revolutionary War by being on the defensive everywhere. It remained on the defensive in home waters (which was prudent), but at the same time it tried to defend all the vulnerable points in the Americas. The result was predictable: England lost not only the North American colonies but also much of the West Indies, and Minorca (Balearics) in the Mediterranean as well. Even the security of Gibraltar and England itself was endangered by the French. In home waters, too, it was indecision and the defensive-mindedness of the

The objectives 23 French rather than British actions that saved England from an invasion from across the sea.3 A weaker but relatively strong side at sea might be forced on the strategic defensive until the balance of forces turns in its favor. Such a turn does not take place unless a weaker side possesses the offensive spirit and embarks on a series of tactical actions aimed at attriting the stronger side over time. For example, the German High Seas Fleet was on the strategic defensive in the North Sea in World War I. Its principal task was to protect the army’s flank against possible British or Russian landings on the coasts of the North Sea or the Baltic. The influence of the German army was also decisive in tying the navy’s hands during the assumed transit of the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) to France. The German generals were confident that the German army could destroy the British forces after they landed. Therefore, the Germans did not want to risk the High Seas Fleet to accomplish the same objective. The German navy’s final operations order for war in 1914 envisaged that the main objective would be to inflict damage on the British patrolling and blockade forces in the Heligoland Bight by a mine and U-boat offensive extending to the British coast. After the balance of forces had changed in their favor, the Germans planned to engage the British Grand Fleet under favorable circumstances in a general fleet action.4 The British Grand Fleet, although much superior, was also on the strategic defensive. The fact that the opposing fleets remained essentially on a strategic defensive throughout the war was probably the main reason for the lack of decisive results in the North Sea for either of the great protagonists.5 In their war with Nazi Germany in June 1941 the Soviets, despite their rather great margin of superiority in naval strength over the German–Finnish forces in the Baltic, decided to be essentially on the defensive. They focused on the defense of the Gulf of Riga and complete closure of the Gulf of Finland from Hangö to Odensholm-Reval. Submarine and air warfare would be conducted in the central part of the Baltic. Cruisers and destroyers would be used for mining, while heavy and older ships would defend the straits off the eastern coast of the Baltic.6 Except for occasional forays by its submarines into the open waters of the Baltic, the Soviet Baltic Fleet was on the defensive until the summer of 1944, when the advance of the Red Army along the Baltic coast allowed the fleet to play a more prominent role. A stronger force that distinctly lacks the offensive spirit usually pursues defensive strategic objectives. For example, in World War I the Italian navy, although superior to the Austro-Hungarian navy, remained passive in the Adriatic for most of the war.7 In 1940, the Italian navy limited its role to defending the country’s coast and protecting sea routes to Libya.8 In another example, the Iraqi navy failed to operate offensively against the Iranian navy in the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988, and instead chose to retreat to its bases at Umm Qasr and Basra and the Khor Abdullah waterway during the first days of the war. Moreover, it never deployed in significant force in the Gulf until after the 1988 ceasefire.9 A stronger navy facing serious threats in two adjacent maritime theaters

24

The objectives

would normally maintain a combination of offensive and defensive postures as long as the threat in the principal theater is not sufficiently neutralized or eliminated. Afterward, one maritime theater would be the theater of main effort and would receive the major part of one’s forces, while the other would be considered the theater of secondary effort. Depending on the strategic objective, such a fleet might take an offensive posture in the main theater and be on the defensive in the secondary theater; or, in some cases, strategic defensive objectives would be pursued in both maritime theaters. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, the Japanese fleet assumed the strategic offensive with the objective of obtaining control of the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan, which was contested by the Russian Far Eastern Squadron. After the defeat of that squadron, the Japanese assumed the strategic defensive and awaited the arrival of the Russian Second Pacific Squadron, which eventually was decisively beaten in the Battle of Tsushima.10 The Imperial German Navy’s tasks, as they evolved over the course of World War I, were a combination of both defensive and offensive. The principal tasks included securing the western and central parts of the Baltic and especially the vital iron ore traffic from Sweden; protecting the North Sea’s coast; and, under favorable conditions, whittling down the British fleet through offensive mining and the employment of U-boats.11 Likewise, the principal tasks of the Kriegsmarine in the Baltic in 1941 included protecting Germany’s coast; preventing Soviet naval forces from operating on the open waters of the Baltic; and defending and protecting Germany’s maritime traffic, particularly the ore traffic from Sweden.12

Command of the sea In the past, the principal objective of a stronger fleet was to obtain and maintain what is commonly called command of the sea in a certain part of the open ocean or the sea. This term was probably first used in Elizabethan England during the sixteenth century. In the strict definition of the term, command of the sea meant complete, absolute, and permanent control of a specific part of the ocean or sea area, thereby ensuring one’s free use of sea communications and full denial of it to the adversary. In practice, however, command of the sea has never meant literally seizing, capturing, or securing a certain sea area through the permanent presence of one’s fleet. In its narrow definition, command of the sea was understood to be nothing more than command of sea routes.13 It meant to create, through the destruction of the opposing fleet, such a situation in a given sea area that one’s fleet did not have to fear serious opposition. In addition, one’s command of the sea would create the prerequisites for the solution of one’s navy’s main tasks.14 In practical terms, command of the sea was obtained when one side possessed superiority over its opponent in a given theater or parts of the theater, securing the uninterrupted flow of one’s shipping; interrupting or cutting off the enemy’s overseas maritime trade; and, if necessary, projecting power onto the

The objectives 25 enemy’s shore. Command of the sea on the open ocean has never meant control that was either complete in degree or unlimited in space. It has always been incomplete and imperfect. Even if one side obtained control of an entire ocean or a major part of it, that did not mean control of all the marginal seas, and it meant even less control of adjacent semienclosed and enclosed seas. Complete command of the sea was relative and limited in terms of space and time.15 In the past, command of the sea did confer upon the victor a significant advantage to which there was no counterpart in war on land. The side that obtained “command” not only enjoyed practically complete immunity from an invasion from the sea but also was able to seriously threaten its opponent with all conceivable forms of attack against his territories. In contrast, on land the weaker opponent not only can carry on the struggle, but also can hope to eventually turn the tables on its stronger opponent. In naval warfare, the side that lost the power to dispute the “command” was essentially helpless against the attacks of its enemy and was without much hope of changing the situation.16

Sea control In the aftermath of World War I, the term command of the sea was gradually replaced in the West by the term sea control, while the Soviets (and the Russians today) continued the use of the equivalent of the older term “sea mastery” (gospodstvo na more). The use of the term sea control was a result of the gradual realization that the new technological advances, specifically mines, torpedoes, submarines, and aircraft, made it difficult, even for the stronger navy, to obtain full command of the sea for any extended time over a large part of the theater. In fact, the term sea control more accurately conveys the reality that in a conflict between two strong opponents at sea, it is not possible, except in the most limited sense, to completely control the seas for one’s use or to completely deny their use to an opponent. It essentially means the ability of one’s fleet to operate with a high degree of freedom in a sea or ocean area, but only for a limited time. In theory sea control and “disputed” (or contested) sea control can be strategic, operational, and tactical in their scale (see Figure 1). Strategic sea control pertains to the entire maritime theater, while control of a major part of a maritime theater represents “operational” sea control. Tactical control refers to control of a maritime combat sector or zone but sometimes can encompass a maritime area of operations. However, in practical terms, the focus should be on strategic or operational sea control or disputed control, not tactical sea control. The Soviets also differentiated among strategic, operational, and tactical sea mastery. Strategic sea mastery would be obtained within a large timeframe and in the entire “military theater” (TV – or theater of war in Western terms). In contrast, to Western terms, operational and tactical sea mastery was tied to a specific method of combat employment of naval forces. Operational sea mastery would be obtained within the timeframe of a single (major) naval operation in a specific part of the oceanic or sea military theater. Tactical sea mastery pertained

26

The objectives Stronger side

Establishing, maintaining, and expanding basing/ deployment area control

Weaker side

Scale

Operational

Establishing, maintaining, and expanding basing/ deployment area control

Objectives

Sea control

Choke point control

• Strategic • Operational • Tactical

Operational

Sea denial

Choke point control denial

Figure 1 Objectives of naval warfare in a high-intensity conflict.

for a timeframe of an operational mission and in a fixed area.17 The Soviets clearly confused the objectives of war at sea with methods of accomplishing these objectives. In strategic terms, obtaining or losing sea control on the open ocean would have an indirect effect on the war situation on land. This effect is far more direct and immediate in enclosed or marginal seas, where, in many cases, the loss of sea control can lead to the collapse of one’s front on land, and thereby can considerably affect the outcome of the war as a whole. The opposite is also true; obtaining or losing sea control in the marginal sea or enclosed/semi-enclosed seas is considerably influenced by the course of events in the war on land.18 In contrast to the open ocean, sea control in a typical narrow sea usually cannot be obtained and then maintained without the closest cooperation among all the services. Even when the navy is the principal force, it should be directly or indirectly supported by the other services. In addition, one’s naval forces would have a relatively higher degree of independence in carrying out tasks to obtain sea control.19 Sea control is a highly dynamic process that can undergo drastic changes throughout the war. From time to time one side in the war can have sea control over definite areas for a considerable period, while at other times neither side has control. Sir Julian S. Corbett (1854–1922) wrote that a common error is in believing that if one side loses the command of the sea it passes at once to the other side. In his view, the most common situation in war at sea was that neither side had the command. The normal state was not of a commanded sea, but of an uncommanded sea.20

The objectives 27 The shift in control of certain sea or ocean areas was a typical occurrence in the past, and will be in the future as well. There could be a case where after one side obtained sea control, the weaker side could make that control increasingly difficult and ultimately obtain control for itself. Even in the areas where a stronger side at sea possesses a substantial degree of control of surface and subsurface, the weaker side can still operate under certain conditions provided that it enjoys a certain level of sea control through air superiority.21 At the outbreak of a war, sea control by one’s fleet actually exists only over the waters in the immediate vicinity of the fleet’s points of concentration. As the opposing naval forces begin their deployment to those parts of the sea/ocean that are initially the most important for them, each side starts to extend its control over additional sea/ocean areas. When the opposing naval forces come into contact, the contest for securing sea control begins. An ocean or sea area may be considered under control when one’s naval forces are able to operate freely and conduct seaborne traffic. At the same time, the enemy is unable to carry out similar undertakings in that area except at considerable risk. Having control in one area does not ensure the complete safety of all operations by one’s fleet but merely of a large part of them. The enemy is then restricted to disputing that control by conducting sporadic actions of limited duration.22 In general, sea control can encompass control of only the surface, subsurface, and airspace or any combination these three physical mediums. In the era of sail, command of the sea was limited to command of the surface. After the advent of the submarine and aircraft, two other dimensions emerged: subsurface and airspace. The degree of overall control of a given sea area depends on the degree of control of each of the three dimensions.23 Experience shows that, during war between two strong opponents at sea, it is difficult to obtain or maintain control of all three physical media (surface, subsurface, and the air) to the same degree or for extended times. History provides many examples where one side controlled the sea area to different degrees. For example, in World War II, the Germans contested Allied control of the northern Atlantic almost exclusively with their U-boats, while in the English Channel and the North Sea Allied control was disputed by the German light forces, mines, and the Luftwaffe. In the Arctic, the Germans disputed Allied control with their heavy surface forces and the Luftwaffe based in northern Norway. The Allies, for their part, tried to obtain control of the Atlantic by using their surface escorts and land-based aircraft and, later in the war, by escort aircraft carriers. Because of the rather large differences in the size of the physical environment and the proximity of the continental landmass, there is a considerable difference between obtaining sea control on the open ocean and in the littorals. Obtaining sea control in the littorals is highly dependent on one’s ability to obtain air superiority. Because of the ever-increasing range, endurance, and speed of modern aircraft, ever-larger sea and ocean areas are becoming the areas of employment for both naval forces and land-based aircraft. For the first time control of the airspace played a decisive role for obtaining sea control in World War II. In fact, control of sea and control of the air became inseparable.

28

The objectives

Without control in the air, one’s naval forces were able to operate with great difficulties if at all.24 Today, no part of the littoral is beyond the reach of landbased attack aircraft. Land- or carrier-based aircraft play an extraordinary important role in obtaining sea control in the littorals. Without air superiority, sea control simply cannot be obtained. Depending on their capabilities, one’s naval forces can take part in the struggle for air superiority. Yet they are not the main means of accomplishing that objective, especially in the sea areas within effective range of one’s land-based aircraft. If one side at sea possesses air superiority, then it can be difficult for the other side to utilize some aspects of sea control for its own purposes. Air superiority over a given sea or ocean area can compensate for those aspects of sea control that naval forces failed to obtain. Nevertheless, for all its value, air superiority cannot replace one’s control of the surface and subsurface.25

Purpose In contrast to the war on land, sea control is not obtained by occupying or capturing a certain ocean or sea area. It is not obtained through permanent presence of one’s fleet. There are no frontlines at sea and no fortified positions by which one can control the territory. The sea or ocean area is usually abandoned by the victorious side regardless whether the opponent was defeated or not. Sea control is not the ultimate objective. By obtaining sea control, the stronger side would create favorable conditions for the solution of other important tasks at sea. In the ancient era sea mastery played a decisive role in the war on land. Yet even sea mastery was not end in itself and the ultimate objective. Command of the sea created the prerequisites for transport of friendly troops, preventing the enemy transporting friendly troops, providing support to the army flank, and bringing in vital merchant convoys. In short, sea mastery was intended to create favorable preconditions for one’s military or commercial interests.26 Among other things, by obtaining sea control one’s fleet can project power on the opposite shore in the littorals or far away from the home’s territory, carry out diverse tasks in support of a friendly army operating on the coast, pose a threat of and carry out amphibious assault on the enemy shore, weaken the enemy military-economic potential through attack on the enemy’s maritime trade, and defend and protect friendly maritime trade. Without sea control, one’s army may exist off the country, as for instance, Hannibal did in the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) but not for too long. Ultimately, the lack of sea control would doom any army. For example, control of the sea by the Royal Navy during the Peninsular War provided additional security to Wellington’s army. The loss of the control of the sea ruined Hannibal and also the French in Egypt in 1798–1799.27 Sea control allowed the Japanese to operate successfully in Korea and Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–1905. Initially, the Russians tried to seize Korea and prevent Japanese landing there. The operational task of the Russian fleet was to obtain command of the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. To destroy the Japanese battle fleet and

The objectives 29 prevent Japanese landing, a close cooperation between the Russian fleet and the army was the necessity.28 For the Japanese, command of the Yellow Sea was a prerequisite to successfully land their troops in Korea. In the night of 9 February of 1904, they carried out a surprise torpedo attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. The same day some 65,000 Japanese troops landed at Chemulpo. The Russian fleet suffered great losses and was forced onto the defensive. This, in turn, allowed the Japanese to obtain command of the Yellow Sea. Afterward, the Russian fleet remained on the defensive. The Japanese were successful in maintaining their command of the sea and thereby able to reinforce their army besieging Port Arthur. The Russo-Japanese War illustrated the value of having command of the sea and the extent to which events on the land front depend on the situation at sea. The Japanese control of the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan created favorable conditions to maintain sea transport to Korea and Manchuria without significant problems.29

Degrees of sea control In general, sea control cannot be expressed in quantitative terms but it can be recognized only in its effects. Sea control is always relative in spatial terms. It pertains only to the specific part of the theater in which a certain degree of control must be obtained. Sea control is also relative in terms of the factor of time. Once sea control is obtained, it must be continuously maintained. It is also relative in terms of the factor of force. The relatively strong enemy has always the ability to dispute the sea control obtained by the much stronger side.30 In the sailing era, command of the sea was limited to control of only the sea surface. It was obtained by defeating the enemy fleet in a single or several decisive battles. The naval battle was the main method for obtaining command of the sea. However, even after the decisive battle, the victorious side did not enjoy absolute command of the sea. The loser tried to renew the struggle for command of the sea, while the stronger side tried to blockade an inferior fleet at its bases.31 Complete command of the sea was not, however, possible even for the strongest fleet; command of the sea was and remains relative. In other words, it was usually limited in terms of space and time.32 By the late nineteenth century, the ability of a stronger fleet to obtain command of the sea was increasingly more difficult because of the advent of torpedoes and mines. In the decade prior to World War I, submarine and aircraft made that tasks even more complicated. Corbett already pointed out that command of the sea “may exist in various states or degrees, each of which has its special possibilities and limitations.” The degree of sea control can vary greatly in terms of the factors of space, time, and force. Degrees of sea control cannot be quantified but are expressed only in broad terms. In terms of the factor of space, sea control can be general or local. Corbett defined general and permanent control such that the enemy cannot

30

The objectives interfere with our maritime trade and oversea operations so seriously as to affect the issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his own trade and operations except at such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of practical strategy.33

In modern understanding of the term, general sea control is that the stronger side can carry out its main operational tasks in terms of time and place without significant challenge from its opponent.34 In order to have general control over an ocean or sea area, it is not necessary that control be obtained over all parts of it.35 The degree of general sea control varies from one to another part of the respective maritime theater. Also, the degree of control of the surface, subsurface, and air can differ greatly at any given time. General sea control on the open ocean has usually been a decisive factor in a war against an opponent heavily dependent on maritime commerce or vulnerable to naval blockade. On the open ocean one’s control has rarely, if ever, been complete. It has usually meant only that one side has control of sea communications. Because of the vast size of the ocean area, the boundaries of the stronger side’s control and the extent to which that control is disputed by the weaker side was difficult to determine precisely. In contrast, control of a semienclosed or enclosed sea can be obtained because of the much smaller physical space. Both the stronger and weaker fleets usually relatively easily maintain control of the ocean or sea areas near their coasts. The depth of these areas has been greatly extended due to mines, submarines, shore-based antiship missile systems, and land-based aircraft. A blue-water navy may possess general command of all the oceans, but not the contiguous narrow seas, as the examples of the Royal Navy during the Seven Years War, the wars with Revolutionary France (1792–1802), and the Napoleonic Wars (1804–1815) illustrate. In World War I, the Entente Powers controlled the surface of every ocean and all the strategically important narrow seas except for the Black Sea, the Baltic, and the southeastern rim of the North Sea.36 In World War II, the Allies did not control the Baltic despite their general control of the major part of the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, control in the central part of the Mediterranean was in dispute in 1940–1943, while Axis control of the Adriatic, Tyrrhenian, and Aegean seas was never seriously challenged by the Allies until after 1943. Local sea control exists when one side possesses superiority in the part of the sea or ocean area that is operationally significant for executing one or several specific tasks. Sometimes local control of such an area must be obtained to conduct amphibious landings or to bombard the enemy’s coastal installations/ facilities. Drastic changes to a situation are a common occurrence. In general, local sea control is usually temporary in nature, except in some very favorable geographical conditions. It is often liable to interruption from other theaters so long as the enemy possesses an effective naval force.37 The British Grand Fleet had local control of the northern and southern part of the North Sea and thereby maintained the distant blockade of Germany. The

The objectives 31 German U-boats and extensive use of mines prevented the British from conducting a close blockade. At the same time, the German High Seas Fleet had local control of the Heligoland Bight and general control of the western Baltic. Its bases were within striking distance of the Kattegat thereby preventing the Grand Fleet from conducting offensive actions within the Baltic in support of Britain’s besieged ally, Russia. For example, in the Leyte operation (17 October to 25 December 1944) the Allies encountered steadily stubborn Japanese resistance on the ground because of their inability to prevent the flow of troop reinforcement and materiel to Leyte from Luzon and Mindanao and other adjacent islands. The Allies had general control of the open ocean adjacent to the Philippines but lacked the sufficient degree of local control of the western approaches to the island of Leyte.38 The main reason for the Allied inability to obtain local sea control was a lack of ships smaller than destroyers and an insufficient number of aircraft capable of attacking enemy ships at night. In a war between two strong opponents at sea, local sea control is progressively more contested as one moves away from the center of the stronger force’s hub of power. For example, the Germans during their invasion of Norway in April 1940 exercised a fair degree of control in the narrow waters of the Skagerrak and Kattegat. This control progressively became more uncertain, however, the further north German ground forces advanced. In the archipelago type of coast, local sea control can be obtained by seizing a series of important, usually tactical, island positions. However, control of a stretch of the mainland coast is usually necessary to control the adjacent sea and offshore islands for any length of time. For example, in May 1941, Admiral Raeder, CINC of the German navy, considered the Greek mainland and the islands of Crete, Límnos, and Melos to be critical to the Axis’s further conduct of the war in the eastern Mediterranean. Germany’s ultimate objective was to eliminate the British position in the area, including in Egypt’s major ports of Alexandria and Suez, through the close cooperation of all available forces combined with the use of the newly created strategic positions.39 In the past a stronger fleet operating in a part of the open ocean or narrow sea would obtain general control in one part of a narrow sea, but that control would be disputed in another part of that sea. For example, in World War I, the Germans indirectly exercised general control in the western part of the Baltic. However, their control in the eastern and central parts of that sea was in dispute because of the presence of a relatively strong Russian fleet. Likewise, the Germans possessed a general control of the Baltic Sea in 1941–1944, while only Soviet submarines disputed that control by their sporadic attempts to break through the Gulf of Finland to reach the open waters of the Baltic. In terms of the factor of time, sea control can be either permanent or temporary. Permanent sea control exists when the stronger side completely dominates a given theater, either because the other side does not have any means to deny that control or because its fleet has been destroyed. In practice, however, it is more common that the weaker side still has some means at its disposal to

32

The objectives

challenge the stronger side’s control. Permanent sea control does not mean that the opponent can do nothing, but rather that he cannot interfere with one’s shipping or amphibious landings in such a way as to seriously affect the course of the war.40 Expressed differently, permanent sea control means that one’s adversary cannot use his shipping or carry out maritime expeditions except at an unacceptably high risk. Temporary sea control often results from the inability of either side to obtain a decision. When one side loses the initiative, for whatever reason, the abandonment may be permanent or temporary. The weaker side at sea then usually falls back on the defensive and keeps a major part of its fleet in their bases, avoiding any decisive action at sea. If a weaker opponent succeeds in obtaining superiority in the air, this in itself could be sufficient to allow him the use of the sea for a specific purpose and for a limited time. Lack of sea control for even a relatively short time has doomed many plans for large-scale invasions. For example, Napoleon I’s plan to invade England was abandoned for good because the combined Franco-Spanish fleet was decisively beaten in the Battle of Trafalgar in October 1805, destroying all of the hopes that the French navy could obtain even temporary control of the English Channel. Likewise, Germany’s inability to obtain local control in the Channel in the summer of 1940 was one of the main reasons that the Germans abandoned their plan to invade England (Plan Seeloewe). In 1940, not only the RAF but also British light forces based at Harwich, Dover, and Portsmouth patrolled the waters night and day. These efforts convinced the Germans they could not obtain an adequate degree of local sea control to ensure that their slow-moving convoys could survive even a short sea passage. In terms of the factor of force, sea control can range from absolute to contested. It can also mean the free use of particular types of ships but not others. Absolute sea control means, in practice, that one’s fleet operates without major opposition while the enemy fleet cannot operate at all. It aims in general to obtain sea control of the entire theater, or the major part of the theater, so that one can employ one’s fleet whenever and wherever required without threat from the enemy. In other words, absolute sea control equates to maritime supremacy or maritime mastery. The weaker side then cannot employ its submarines, aircraft, or sometimes even mines. In practice, control of large ocean or sea areas cannot be absolute in terms of either space or time in the presence of an undefeated and strong opponent. The exception is when one side possesses a fleet and the other does not and has no other means to dispute control. Occasionally, one side in a conflict does enjoy absolute command of the sea, as Britain did during the Boer War of 1898–1902, when the rebels had no navy whatsoever. In theory, absolute but temporary sea control exists if one side, for only a short duration, enjoys superiority over its opponent in the entire theater; yet this situation is rare. Absolute control on the open ocean usually means control of the surface and, to some extent, of the air, while control of the subsurface is difficult or impossible to obtain. In a typical narrow sea, however, because of its small size and, hence, more favorable space–force ratio, a blue-water navy can

The objectives 33 obtain almost absolute and permanent control of the sea surface and airspace, and possibly control the subsurface as well. For example, in the Gulf War, the coalition’s naval forces obtained almost absolute control of the northern part of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf on the surface and in the air in the first two weeks of the air offensive in January 1991. Yet, although the Iraqis did not have submarines, they were able to contest control of the subsurface by laying a large number of mines off the Kuwaiti coast.41 Limited sea control (also called conditional or working control) is usually the consequence of the drastic shift in the operational or strategic situation when the initiative passes from one side to the other. Then one side in the conflict has a high degree of freedom to act while the other operates at high risk. The side that has lost the initiative, however, still may be strong enough to inflict significant losses upon the stronger side. Limited sea control is inherently transitory and, hence, unstable.42 This term can also describe a situation where only one type of ship can operate without undue risks, while other types of ships operate at high or unacceptable risks. For example, in World War I, the Royal Navy held command of the North Sea only as far as battleships were concerned. Yet the Germans effectively employed their battle cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, and U-boats. Thus, no matter how tight the blockade was, the Royal Navy still had to provide direct defense to Allied shipping and to defend the coastline behind the blockading line. In a case where absolute control cannot be obtained, the stronger side would usually try to secure temporary control of limited sea or ocean areas for conducting operations necessary to the successful progress of the war on land. Such control can be exercised to the extent in space and time that one’s contemplated operations may be planned and executed without fear of interference from the weaker force. The weaker side can then conduct mostly minor actions, but at considerable risk.43 Disputed (or contested) sea control is usually the principal objective of a weaker but relatively strong navy in the initial phase of a war at sea. Corbett observed that when the command is in dispute the general conditions might give a stable or unstable equilibrium. Then the power of neither side preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the command lies with the opponent.44 The objective then can be strategic, encompassing the entire theater, or operational, when control is disputed in a major part of the theater. Disputed sea control occurs when the opposing sides possess roughly equal capabilities and opportunities to obtain sea control in a theater as a whole (or in one of its parts) and there is no significant change in the ratio of forces, nor a change of the initiative to either side.45 Once disputed control is obtained, the initially weaker side can possibly try to obtain sea control of its own. Denying the use of the sea to an opponent has often been regarded as the opposite of sea control, but this is an oversimplification. If a weaker side denies control of the sea to a stronger opponent, this does not mean that it necessarily obtains control itself.46 Sea control and sea denial are often complementary objectives. Sea denial may be used to help secure one’s use of the sea, either in the same

34

The objectives

geographical area or elsewhere. A fleet operating in one or more enclosed or marginal seas might opt for, or be forced by circumstances to accomplish, a combination of objectives – general sea control in the enclosed sea theater and contested control in a semienclosed sea or parts of the adjacent oceans. For example, the German navy adopted this course of action in both world wars. Likewise, the IJN after 1943 focused on maintaining general control of the Inland Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Yellow Sea while disputing Allied control of ocean areas elsewhere in the Pacific. Disputed sea control often occurs in the initial phase of a war and is characterized by an almost continuous struggle for obtaining control of certain sea or ocean areas. Once control is obtained, however, it is usually not maintained for a long time, but may be lost from time to time and then regained. In coastal or offshore waters, sea control by a stronger fleet can be disputed even if the major part of a weaker fleet is destroyed. When control is in dispute, both sides usually operate at high risk, because their strength is approximately in balance. One side usually controls one or more parts of a given theater, while its opponent controls the remaining part. Each side’s control of a specific sea area is usually limited in time. In the littorals, however, contesting sea control is primarily carried out by one’s submarines, land-based aircraft, small surface combatants, coastal missile/gun batteries, and mines. For example, in World War II, the British and the Germans fought almost uninterruptedly to obtain full control of the English Channel. For most of the war, however, that control was elusive for both sides: the British and the Germans each successfully contested control by the other. The last action of British coastal forces took place off Boulogne and Calais on 1–2 October 1944. Afterward, the British inshore patrols shifted the weight of their efforts to the Belgian and Dutch coasts. Although maritime traffic from Britain to the Belgian and French Channel ports continued to be heavy, the Germans disputed control of the channel by occasional attacks by U-boats and laying mines.47 Disputed control of the sea existed in the major part of the Mediterranean in 1940–1943. The British fleet based at Alexandria and Gibraltar, controlled large parts of the eastern and all of the western Mediterranean, while the Italians and the Germans held general control of the central Mediterranean. Yet control was never complete for either side. The Axis submarines contested Allied control at both ends of the Mediterranean. The British submarines and aircraft based on Malta did the same in the central part of the sea. This did not prevent either the Allies or the Axis from using the sea to route convoys when and where needed. The tracks of the Allied and Axis convoys crossed each other at almost right angles. The Axis used the sea more frequently than the Allies did because their lines of communications were so much shorter; Allied sea routes were longer, and thus more vulnerable to attack. To use these routes, however, the Allies needed only to obtain temporary control of a “moving zone” in which the ships sailed. They were denied the use of a direct sea route through the Mediterranean except for the passage of occasional military convoys from Alexandria to Malta,

The objectives 35 which they wanted to use as a base to attack Italian convoys to Libya. The British surface forces were unable, however, to base there regularly. To successfully attack Axis communications in the central Mediterranean, the joint employment of Allied light forces, submarines, and aircraft was a prerequisite – and that was not accomplished. In addition, British submarines were too large to work safely and effectively in the Mediterranean.48 The state of divided control of the surface also prevailed in the Black Sea in 1941–1944. Largely because of the surprising passivity of the Soviets, the Axis forces controlled the western part of that sea while the Soviets controlled the eastern part. The Axis forces were small and weak, except for six 280-ton coastal U-boats. At the same time, German U-boats and Soviet submarines and land-based aircraft contested for control. This situation also came about partly because of the great lack of air support for the Soviet surface ships.49 A temporary but contested sea control existed at the sea approaches to Guadalcanal in 1942–1943. The outcome of the struggle for that island depended on whether the Americans or the Japanese could establish control of the adjacent seas to supply and reinforce their respective ground troops, contending ashore for mastery. After the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in September 1942, a virtual exchange of local sea control took place every 12 hours: the Allies dominated the waters around the island from sunrise to sundown, but at night the Japanese socalled “Tokyo Express” transported troops by destroyers and light cruisers. Japan rarely attempted daytime raids; the Allies interfered more often with the night surface express, although the interference proved to be expensive.50 In general, one’s naval forces can carry out operations aimed to secure control of the sea areas, operations in areas not under command, and operations in the sea areas under command.51 Obtaining, maintaining, and exercising sea control are related but not identical terms. They differ in terms of time and the efforts of one’s naval forces. Sea control is obtained primarily by the employment of one’s naval forces in the form of major naval operations. In the littorals, these operations will be joint or combined, that is, not only naval forces, but combat arms/branches of other services will take part (see Figure 2). The result of one’s sea control should ensure that one’s forces can carry out their main tasks without significant interference by the opponent. After sea control is obtained, it must be maintained. In operational terms, this phase equates to consolidation of strategic or operational success. The navy’s main operational tasks should determine the degree of one’s sea control to be obtained and maintained. Exercising sea control is carried out through a series of operational tasks aimed to exploit strategic or operational success. The successful execution of operational tasks should expand and reinforce the degree of one’s sea control obtained in a certain sea or ocean area in terms of time and space.

Choke-point control The struggle for control of the straits and narrows, or “choke points,” is a unique feature of war for control of a typical narrow sea. For a blue-water navy, general

36

The objectives Factor of time Theater of main effort Obtaining sea control

Maintaining sea control

Exercising sea control

Expanding

Establishing and maintaining control of one’s own basing and deployment area

Base of operations

Strategic

Sea Control Or operational

Accomplishing operational or strategic objective

Consolidating operational or strategic success

Exploiting operational or strategic success

Factor of space

Figure 2 Sea control dynamics.

sea control is hardly possible without establishing not only control on the open ocean but also direct or indirect control of several critical passages of vital importance to the world’s maritime trade, or by obtaining control of a given enclosed or semienclosed sea theater. The objective for a weaker side is, then, just the opposite: choke-point control denial. In either case, but particularly for a weaker side, this objective would normally require the highest degree of cooperation among naval forces and combat arms of other services. The military importance of choke points varies depending on their geographic location and position. There are several thousand straits in the world’s oceans, but only about 200 have international importance. Such straits are both the hubs and the most vulnerable segments of sea communications linking enclosed or semienclosed seas with other sea or open ocean areas. They also can be used to effectively block the exit or entry of hostile naval forces or the transit of an enemy’s merchant ships. In addition, control of a sea’s only exit can be

The objectives 37 used to move one’s naval forces from one sea or ocean area to another. Control of one shore, or preferably both shores, of a strait/narrows in peacetime significantly enhances one’s ability to obtain control of the adjacent sea or ocean areas shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Control of an important strait or narrows is usually of critical importance for the movement or transit of one’s forces for either offensive or defensive operations on the opposing shore. For example, the UN control of the Tsushima Strait in July 1950 allowed the transport of the U.S. 25th Division, followed by the 24th Division, across to Pusan. Straits often serve as the main highways for large-scale invasions. For example, the Japanese used the Strait of Korea to transport troops in their invasion of Korea in 1588. The war had been caused by the refusal of the King of Korea to assist the Japanese warlord Hideyoshi in attacking Korea’s suzerain, the Ming Emperor of China. The Japanese dispatched some 240,000 men in 4,000 small vessels to invade Korea. The Koreans were taken by surprise and the Japanese landed unopposed at Pusan. They then advanced overland, seized the capital of Seoul, and quickly overran the entire peninsula. However, the Japanese ultimately were forced to leave Korea after their navy suffered a crushing defeat in the Tsushima Strait. A new Japanese army landed unopposed in 1597. After initial setbacks, the Koreans were able to ambush the Japanese fleet and destroy it and thereby forced the Japanese in 1598 to evacuate their armies from the peninsula.52 Control of a strait or several straits can cut off or isolate enemy forces in an adjacent maritime theater. The occupation of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 secured Germany’s full control over the Baltic Sea’s exits and completely cut off British access to the Baltic. The Germans also used the economic resources of the Scandinavian countries for the duration of the war. The Japanese High Command believed that it was essential to establish control over the Strait of Malacca to isolate the British forces in the Indian Ocean from the U.S. forces in the Pacific. The loss of control of an important strait or narrows on whose shores a land campaign is in progress is often fraught with danger for one’s fleet forces. For example, in late August 1914, the German advance threatened the Channel ports of Ostend, Boulogne, and Le Havre. The serious consequences of a possible British defeat in the battle at Mons on 23 August led Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (1859–1935) to warn that the Grand Fleet would shift its bases in case the Germans seized Calais and thereby obtained control of one shore of the Strait of Dover. Also, as a direct result of a possible major defeat on land, the British were faced with the prospect of a drastic redistribution of their fleet. The British Admiralty began to prepare plans to withdraw from the fleet all stores not immediately required by the army. Cherbourg was favored by the War Office as a new base because of the ease with which the Cotentin Peninsula could be made impregnable, so long as the British had command of the Channel. For that, however, it was critical that the Flemish ports did not fall into German hands. Therefore, the Admiralty, while pushing all preparations for transferring the base, did not want to abandon the more easterly Channel harbors, specifically Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne.53

38

The objectives

Basing/deployment area control One of the principal and most important tasks of any navy is to obtain and maintain control of its own basing and deployment areas: otherwise, it is difficult, if not impossible, to prepare and execute major naval operations. This objective is especially critical for naval forces operating in an enclosed or semienclosed sea. It is aimed to obtain a sufficient degree of security for traffic both in coastal waters and ashore and create preconditions for the successful deployment of one’s naval forces.54 Yet despite the importance of this aspect of war at sea, its theoretical factors are generally not well appreciated in the U.S. Navy and other Western navies.55 Basing/deployment area control is an integral part of a broader task, operational protection in a given maritime theater. Control of one’s own basing and deployment area is an operational objective in war. The ultimate purpose is to ensure the safety of one’s naval and other forces at their bases and deployment areas from enemy attacks on the sea, the air, and the ground. This is accomplished principally through sound command organization; effective coastal surveillance and reporting of the enemy’s movements and activities in the area; defense of the coast, and naval bases, airfields, and ports in particular; defense against enemy submarines, combat craft, mines, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD); protection of coastal sea routes; airspace control and air defenses; defense of the rear area; and, finally, conducting measures of cover, concealment, and deception. All these and similar actions and measures are essentially defensive in character. One’s basing/deployment area control is normally organized within a respective fleet’s area of responsibility.56 Optimally, control of one’s basing and deployment areas should be established and maintained in peacetime. The extent of that control is limited only by the maritime interests of other countries. Control of one’s basing and deployment areas must then be maintained in wartime. The physical scope and extent of this control depend on the degree of sea control obtained in a given sea or ocean area. Without sea control, one cannot maintain control of basing and deployment area. At the same time, one’s actions to obtain sea control are so much easier if one’s forces operate from secure basing and deployment areas. This does not preclude one obtaining sea control in an area where control of one’s basing and deployment area does not exist. This is especially true in the operations of one’s naval forces in the enemy-controlled sea areas. Then, one’s basing and deployment area is gradually extended by establishing new bases and facilities on the conquered territories.57

Objectives in operations short of war The navies of major and medium powers are often employed in conducting diverse actions in low-intensity conflict such as support of an insurgency or counterinsurgency or so-called counterterrorism. Only rarely would such employment require planning for and execution of a major naval operation

The objectives 39 aimed to accomplish an operational objective. Such a situation occurs in supporting an insurgency or during a counterinsurgency campaign. An example is the U.S. Navy’s blockade of North Vietnam’s coast and actions to prevent the North Vietnamese from sending men and supplies into South Vietnam, March 1965 to December 1972 (Operation Market Time). Currently, the navies are employed extensively in what can be arbitrarily called, for lack of a better term, “operations short of war.” The latter encompass combat employment of one’s forces in all situations except for high- and lowintensity conflict. Specifically, one’s naval forces can be employed in crisis prevention or resolution and peace operations. These operations are in many ways much more complex than those conducted in a high- or low-intensity conflict. The main reason for this is a great difficulty in determining a proper military objective in support of policy and strategy. For one thing, political, economic, social, and other aspects are often much more important than the military aspect of a given strategic objective. Therefore, the application of military sources of power is more complicated. Determination of military-strategic objectives in a low-intensity conflict is more difficult than in a regional conflict or global war. Because of the much more restrictive political environment and many legal constraints, the use of military force is more restrictive and hence far less decisive than in a high-intensity conflict. A campaign in a low-intensity conflict predominantly consists of a series of related and smaller tactical actions, and rarely does it include major operations. One’s naval or air forces can sometimes be required to plan for and conduct major operations in support of an insurgency or in a counterinsurgency campaign in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. Naval forces are better suited than other forces for crisis prevention and peace operations, and for such less-complicated tasks as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and search and rescue. Naval forces might be involved in planning and conducting major operations as part of conflict prevention, protection of one’s shipping, enforcement of freedom of navigation and overflight, and peace operations. Conflict prevention includes diverse military activities conducted either unilaterally or collectively under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and aimed at preventing escalation of disputes into armed conflict or at facilitating resolution of armed violence. These actions range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of naval forces. The main purpose of the forward presence of U.S. naval forces in the Western Pacific, the Arabian Sea and the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and the Mediterranean is to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities that might affect the national interests of the United States and of its allies or friends. Naval forces deployed in forward areas should be of sufficient size and combat power to defeat opposing forces quickly and decisively. Optimally, conflict prevention under the UN Charter should be conducted with strict impartiality, because all sides in a dispute have to agree to involve other countries as mediators. One’s naval forces can be deployed in the proximity of a country where hostilities threaten to break out. Naval forces, especially aircraft carrier groups and amphibious task forces, have more chance for success

40

The objectives

in disputes among nation-states than in ethnic conflict or civil war. To be effective, such a deployment should be accompanied by a clear willingness on the part of the international community to use overwhelming force if necessary. Otherwise, preventive deployment of naval forces, regardless of their size and capability, will rarely produce the desired effect. A state or territory ruled or controlled by a radical regime and situated close to maritime trade choke points might attempt to harass shipping, requiring the response of naval forces. Protection of merchant shipping requires coordinated employment of surface, air, and subsurface forces, as well as a suitable command structure both ashore and afloat. In general, protection of merchant shipping should envisage preemptive or retaliatory strikes or raids against selected targets at sea or ashore. A major operation in protection of shipping would require the execution of diverse tasks to protect merchant vessels from unlawful attack in international waters. This broad task can be accomplished through, among other things, the escort of merchant ships (sometimes of individual ships, for a specific purpose), coastal sea control, harbor defense, and mine countermeasures (MCM). Freedom of navigation and overflight is aimed to assert or reassert one’s rights to freely navigate sea or air routes. Normally, a riparian state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea; international law, however, establishes the right of innocent passage of ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters. Passage is considered innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal nation. In addition, aircraft’s freedom of navigation through international airspace is a well-established principle of international law. Threats to aircraft through the extension, whether by nations or groups, of airspace control zones beyond international norms can be expected to result in measures acceptable under international law to rectify the situation. One’s naval forces are extensively employed in various peace operations – military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. These actions are conducted in conjunction with diplomacy to eventually negotiate a truce and resolve a conflict. Peace operations are tailored to each specific situation and may be initiated in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the conflict. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are the principal types of peace operations. Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are designed to contain, moderate, or terminate hostilities between or within states, using international or impartial military forces and civilians to complement political conflict-resolution efforts and restore and maintain peace. These actions can take place after the sides in a conflict agree to cease hostilities; impartial observers are normally sent to verify the implementation of the ceasefire or to monitor the separation of forces. Peace enforcement operations (PEO) involve diverse tasks as authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter.58 The objective is then to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions that have been adopted to maintain or restore peace or order. The tasks of peace enforcement include implementation of sanctions,

The objectives 41 establishment and supervision of exclusion zones, intervention to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerents. The aim is to establish an environment for a truce or ceasefire. In contrast to peacekeeping, peace enforcement operations do not require the consent of the warring factions in a conflict. When used for peace enforcement, one’s naval forces should have at least limited power projection capabilities and be ready to engage in combat if necessary. Exclusion zones, in the air, at sea, or on land, are often required in peacekeeping operations. They are usually aimed to persuade a nation or group of nations to change its/their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body, rather than face continued sanctions or force. The sanctions are designed to create economic, political, military, or other conditions to that end. An exclusion zone is usually imposed by the UN or some other international body, but it may be applied even by individual countries. As part of peacekeeping operations, NATO navies took part in the enforcement of the “no-flight zone” (NFZ) (Operation Deny Flight) during the war in Bosnia in 1993–1995. Maritime intercept operations (MIO) for sanction enforcement employ naval forces, but often with the participation of land-based aircraft. These operations normally are aimed to interdict the movement of designated items into or out of a nation or a specific sea or ocean area. The political objective is to compel a country or group of countries to conform to the objectives of the initiating body. One method used is to establish a selective barrier, allowing only authorized goods to pass. Enforcement of sanctions normally requires action by some combination of surface and air forces. One’s naval forces may also be involved in expanded peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. These operations are larger than peacekeeping operations, involving perhaps 20,000 men or more. The consent of the sides in conflict is usually nominal, incomplete, or nonexistent. These operations include more assertive mandates and rules of engagement (ROE), including the use of force under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Expanded PKO and PEO are conducted with strictly limited objectives, such as protecting safeflight or no-fly zones or relief deliveries. If too intrusive, they are likely to draw multinational forces into open hostilities; the naval forces would then have to be either pulled out or committed to full-scale combat. PKO and PEO are difficult to plan separately; the usual practice has been to combine them. The activity of NATO and West European Union (WEU) naval forces in support of UN forces in Bosnia prior to the Dayton Agreement of 1995 (Operation Sharp Fence/Sharp Guard) was a combination of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.59

Levels of war The scale and complexity of the military objective to be accomplished determine the level of war to be conducted in a given maritime theater. The larger the military objective, the higher the level of war. In general, three basic levels of war exist: strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level of war can be

42

The objectives

divided into two sublevels: national-strategic and theater-strategic. The nationalstrategic level of war is conducted in all three mediums for a country, or for groups of countries of both sides in a war. The theater-strategic level of war is conducted in a specific theater (of war). In the case of a global conflict several campaigns can be conducted sequentially and/or simultaneously in a given theater of war. Normally, the highest politico-military leadership would assign to each theater-strategic commander a single national or alliance/coalition strategic objective. The theater-strategic commander would then translate that objective into several theater-strategic objectives and take appropriate actions and measures to accomplish them. For example, in World War II, the China–Burma–India (CBI) theater, the Pacific Ocean Area (POA), and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) represented theater-strategic levels of war, in today’s understanding of the term. The operational level of war takes place in a formally (or informally) declared theater of operations. Then a campaign is normally conducted to accomplish a single military or theater-strategic objective. Normally, the accomplishment of a theater-strategic objective would require the sequenced and synchronized employment of military (land, sea, and air/space) and nonmilitary sources of national power in a given theater of operations. For example, the operational level of war was conducted in the northern, central, and southern Pacific Ocean areas in World War II. Similarly, the operational level of war took place in New Guinea (Papua) and adjacent sea areas in 1942–1944 and in the Philippines in 1944–1945. The operational level of war was conducted by both sides in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982; in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (KTO) in the Gulf War of 1990–1991; in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 (Operation Enduring Freedom); and in the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Operation Iraqi Freedom). The tactical level of war is conducted in a small part of the theater, ranging from a combat zone or sector to an area of operations. This is the level of war at which one’s and enemy forces are engaged to accomplish their respective major or minor tactical objectives through the conduct of battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, and other tactical actions. These actions take place in all three physical mediums. Although related, levels of war and levels of command are not identical. The first nominally exist only in time of war and deal with the employment of one’s sources of military and nonmilitary power to accomplish specific military objectives. Normally, levels of command exist in times of peace and in war. They are only prerequisites for conducting war at a given level of war. Yet if the respective commander does not apply the tenets of operational art in the employment of his forces and instead focuses on tactics or, even worse, pure targeteering, he does not conduct war at the operational or theater-strategic level. Normally, levels of command are clearly differentiated from each other, while levels of war are not. The reason is that the outcome of combat actions often has effects beyond the boundaries of a particular level of war. For example, a major tactical defeat can result in the failure of a major naval operation and thereby

The objectives 43 adversely affect the situation at the operational level, and in some cases even at the strategic level. The boundaries between individual levels of war are often not constant, but they may overlap, sometimes considerably. The relationship between the levels of war may differ depending upon the unique circumstances of a particular war. Levels of war are not clearly delineated from each other. Distinctions among the levels are greatest in a highintensity conflict. It is there that the stratification of levels tends to be most complete and the levels’ individual characteristics most evident. The more the nonmilitary aspects of the strategic objective predominate, as in the case of an insurgency or counterinsurgency, the less need there is for the use of one’s sources of military power; the opposite is equally true. Hence, the scope of the operational level of war in a low-intensity conflict is comparatively smaller than the scope of the strategic and tactical levels. In low-intensity conflict each level exists, but it is more difficult to isolate key events and decisions associated with each level.60 In a physical sense, there are, of course, no “levels,” but only different sizes of physical space and mediums (land, sea, and air/space) in which friendly and enemy forces operate. The levels of war refer to the actual employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish assigned military objectives in a specific part of a theater or in the theater as a whole. They provide a framework for command and control; they are very useful tools for analysis of politico-military activity before, during, and in the aftermath of hostilities. They provide a means of achieving a coherent picture of force in different ways, at different levels, in pursuit of strategic objectives. Force can be applied offensively at one level and defensively at another level. A thorough knowledge and sound understanding of the levels of war are critical for selecting the proper methods of combat employment of one’s forces. The levels of war determine the nature of the decisions to be made, the type of planning process (i.e., progressive vs. regressive), and the plans’ execution. Without the understanding and knowledge of what constitutes a given level of war, it is hard to understand the true differences in the concepts of critical factors and centers of gravity, culmination point, and maneuver, to name just a few elements of operational warfare. The higher the level of war, the more important the role each of these elements plays in the planning and execution of a given military action. The higher the level of war, the more complex the situation that the military commanders and their staffs must understand, evaluate, and synthesize. Both military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation are critical for success at the operational and strategic levels across the spectrum of conflict. This is not necessarily the case at the tactical level, except in the post-hostilities phase of a campaign or operations other than war. Errors made at the operational and strategic levels of war can be overcome only with great difficulty, if at all. Levels of war are not, as is often erroneously believed, identical to the respective components of military art. Each component of military art encompasses the fields of study and practice, while the levels of war encompass only the field of practice. To complicate the matter, strategy and operational art spans

44

The objectives

several levels of war. Operational art is mainly applied from the operationaltactical to the theater-strategic levels of war. Likewise, strategy is applied at the operational, theater-, and national-strategic levels. All the levels of war are interrelated; actions and activities at each level affect the other levels. In a low-intensity conflict, the levels of war are often hard to distinguish from each other because of the inherent complexity of the objectives to be accomplished. Then, decisions made at the tactical level have a considerable and sometimes significant impact on events at the operational and even strategic levels of war. Sometimes a tactical action could cause a significant ripple effect at the operational and strategic levels of war.

Theater structure A maritime theater is usually divided into smaller parts to ensure the most efficient use of subordinate forces in both peacetime and war. This can be done formally and/or informally. In general, the smaller the part of the theater the less the need to formally delineate its boundaries. Optimally, the division of the available space should be based on the scale and number of the military objectives to be accomplished by subordinate levels of command. Obviously, the larger the assigned military objectives, the larger the source of power required, and, therefore, the larger the physical environment required to deploy, concentrate, and maneuver the force, and the larger the infrastructure needed to support the employment of one’s forces. A maritime theater can comprise one or more maritime theaters of operations; and each of these in turn can encompass several maritime areas of operations. The latter in turn usually encompass several undeclared naval (or maritime) combat zones (sectors). A maritime theater encompasses the entire surface of a given ocean or sea, as well as the subsurface area, adjacent littoral areas, islands, archipelagoes, and the airspace above. The national or alliance political–military leadership normally determines the boundaries of the theater. Today, a theater (of war) also encompasses the pertinent parts of cyberspace. Maritime theater is established to ensure free use of the seas and the associated airspace, both for the forward defense of the nation and for strategic reach to resources, friends, and enemies. Military actions in a maritime theater may vary from limited use of one’s forces for peacekeeping and nation assistance, to major naval joint operations and campaigns. In the case of a war or national emergency, the maritime theater is transformed into a maritime theater of war. In a general conflict, or in the case of two or more regional conflicts, one theater of war will be, based on their strategic importance, selected as the principal or main theater of war; all others are secondary. Normally, the primary theater of war is also called the “theater of main effort.” Such a theater receives the highest priority in regard to assigning forces and resources; a secondary theater of war will get lower priority. For each military or theater-strategic objective in case of a regional conflict

The objectives 45 or global war, the theater commander (or national authority) can establish a maritime theater of operations. The boundaries of a maritime theater of operations are arbitrarily determined and expressed in terms of longitude and latitude or some distinctive geographic feature of the area. They are not identical for both sides in a conflict. A given maritime theater of operations should be of such a size as to allow the deployment and maneuver of one’s forces and to accommodate a base of operations and supporting infrastructure large enough to accomplish a given strategic objective. For each operational objective in a maritime theater of operations, a certain space, called a maritime area of operations, should be available for the employment of one’s forces to accomplish such an objective. The size of a maritime area of operations should be large enough for the subordinate commander to accomplish his mission and protect his forces. Such an area is formally declared for routine patrols and other tactical actions in wartime and aimed to protect and defend a certain part of the coast and its seaward approaches. In that case, the commander that establishes a maritime area of operations also determines its lateral and rear boundaries. A maritime area of operations could also exist de facto if one or both sides in a conflict formally declare a maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) or total exclusion zone (TEZ), expressed in miles from a certain geographic reference point. For example, the British declaration of such a zone around the Falklands in April 1982 was de facto a maritime area of operations. In case of a major naval operation, the area envisaged for the employment of one’s main and supporting forces might require a formal declaration of a maritime or joint maritime area of operations. In some cases, such an area might not be formally declared. In a major operation, most combat usually takes place in a given area of operations, while forces are deployed and redeployed over a large part of the theater. A joint maritime operations area (JOA) can be declared when two or more services act jointly to accomplish an operational, or sometimes even a strategic, objective in a certain part of the theater in a situation short of war. A joint area of operations encompasses land and adjacent sea and ocean areas and the airspace above them. In generic terms, each area of operations can arbitrarily be subdivided into combat sectors zones.62 They are usually established to delineate the employment of single-service, tactical-size forces. Therefore, land, maritime, and air combat sectors or zones can be differentiated. Naval (or maritime) combat sectors/zones may not always be precise, but a major or minor tactical objective and the need to employ tactical-size forces to accomplish it imply their existence. In U.S. terms each militarily organized space encompasses an arbitrarily determined area of interest (AOI). For a maritime theater commander, such an area encompasses adjacent geographic areas where political, military, economic, or other events and actions have an effect within his respective theater. Likewise, for each subdivision of a maritime theater there is corresponding area of interest – a part of adjacent three-dimensional physical space in which events

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and potential hostile actions could have a significant influence on the current and future operations of one’s forces. In practical terms, the outward boundaries of an area of interest determine the ultimate size of the physical space for intelligence gathering by one’s forces. Each operational-tactical and tactical commander determines his own area of interest. The size of the area used by both sides in a conflict can arbitrarily be called “fluid” (or “transitory”), for lack of a better term, because its size varies depending on the dynamics of the combat and the forces’ size/mix. In the proper meaning of the term, maritime battlefield refers to a part of the theater in which naval tactical actions are planned or conducted. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the battlefield was single-dimensional. It was a place where decisive naval battles took place. However, the advent of submarines and aircraft added two new dimensions to the battlefield: subsurface and airspace. The size of the battlefield depends on the size and mix of one’s forces, and the enemy’s surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, the effective range of weapons and sensors, the geographic features of the theater, the duration of the mission, and the intensity of combat. The older term battlefield and the increasingly used new term battlespace, properly understood, pertain to that part of physical space in which a major tactical action is conducted. A maritime battlespace is not part of the permanent or semipermanent theater structure. In generic terms, maritime battlespace pertains to a three-dimensional physical space plus a corresponding part of cyberspace in which a naval tactical commander sets the term of a battle or engagement. A battlespace is usually larger than a maritime area of operations, and it can overlap the battlespace of other friendly commanders. It expands and contracts depending on the dynamics of combat and the capabilities of forces on both sides.

Conclusion Naval warfare differs in some significant respects from war on land or in the air. These differences should be understood so that one’s naval forces can be employed most effectively. At the same time, war at sea cannot be considered in isolation from war on land and in the air. No service can conduct war alone or accomplish political strategic objectives by its efforts alone. Strategic objectives assigned to each service must be complementary to each other to ensure that the war’s overall objectives are accomplished. Whether a war at sea is conducted offensively or defensively normally depends on the operational or strategic objectives to be accomplished on land. Yet that in itself does not preclude employing one’s naval forces offensively while ground forces are on strategic defensive and vice versa. A stronger navy operating in a narrow sea could be on the defensive from the outset of hostilities because the army was forced to undertake a hasty retreat and the adversary also possessed superiority in the air. In a typical enclosed/semienclosed sea, besides naval forces, land-based aircraft play an extraordinarily important role in obtaining control of the surface,

The objectives 47 the subsurface, and the air. Sometimes land-based air can be predominantly employed to accomplish the main objectives in a given maritime theater, with a relatively small contribution from one’s naval forces. In contrast to war in the open ocean, not only ground forces but also coastal defense forces can be used to obtain absolute, but often temporary, local control of straits or river estuaries. Strategic objectives in war at sea are predominantly physical in nature. They are expressed in terms of control or disputed control of a theater or some part of it. There are some serious difficulties, however, in using the terms sea control and sea denial. Sea control properly refers only to control of some strategically or operationally important ocean or sea area. For a stronger navy, obtaining sea control in a theater or its major part should be the first and principal objective in any conflict at sea, while the weaker but still relatively strong fleet would initially aim to deny an enemy sea control. In a large narrow sea, it has usually been difficult to obtain permanent and absolute sea control in modern times. Control of a typical narrow sea requires close cooperation among all the services of the country’s armed forces. In a narrow sea, a stronger side can sometimes find itself contesting command with a much weaker force that occupies more advantageous geostrategic positions. A weaker side can sometimes blockade the sea’s only exit or the exit from the main basing area. On the open ocean, and even in a large narrow sea, a weaker side can successfully contest for control with the stronger navy. This is a much more formidable task in a narrow sea. A stronger navy can relatively easily blockade the sea’s only exit and exercise strategic control of a given enclosed sea. This task is more complicated in a semienclosed sea because of the relatively open passages to the adjacent ocean. To exercise control, a blue-water navy must operate within the confines of a narrow sea. That, in turn, will provide even a small coastal force the opportunity to challenge a blue-water navy. Landbased aircraft, small surface combatants, and mines are ideal means for a weaker side to contest control of the stronger opponent at sea. Also, a side guarding one or, even better, both shores of a strategically important waterway can use all the services of its armed forces to make it difficult, if not impossible, for a bluewater navy to obtain any degree of control within a given narrow sea. The role and importance of straits and narrows in war at sea will steadily increase in the future because of the considerable expansion of the world’s ocean and sea shipping, especially for the transport of oil and its derivatives and other strategic raw materials. Control of one’s basing and deployment area is an operational objective that has to be accomplished regardless of the fleet’s strategic posture. Without it, no struggle for sea control or disputed sea control can be conducted, much less won. Control of one’s basing and deployment area is established and maintained in peacetime. Once the hostilities at sea start, this control should not only be maintained but also, if possible, expanded outward from one’s own shores. The physical extent of the control of the basing and deployment area generally determines the degree and duration of sea control close to one’s coast. The higher the degree of one’s sea control, the more stable and secure the basing and

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deployment area control. The actions and measures to establish and maintain the desired degree of control of one’s basing and deployment area should be planned and executed as an integral part of this critical operational objective. The objectives of naval warfare in low-intensity conflict and operations short of war are usually smaller in scale and less complex to plan and execute. The need to accomplish operational objectives at sea might arise in the course of a campaign in support of insurgency or in counterinsurgency. Such objectives can include control of a certain part of the ocean or sea and be aimed to isolate the hostile government forces or insurgents from outside help in bringing in fresh forces and/or materiel. However, the majority of the objectives in such campaigns are tactical in scale. Peace enforcement and expanded peacekeeping/ peace enforcement might also require the employment of naval forces to establish control of a relatively small area of the ocean or sea against one or all parties in a conflict. Comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the activities and actions at each command echelon and level of war are prerequisite to understanding the full complexity of relationships among strategy, tactics, and operational art. No mastery of operational art is really possible without understanding each level of war and the mutual relationships among the levels. Because of the difference in the scope of the military objectives to be accomplished, each level of command and level of war require commanders and their staff to have a different perspective. The higher the level of command, the broader that perspective. The narrowest perspective, in terms of both physical space and the elements of the situation, is at the tactical level. The military organization of maritime theater is closely linked to the determination of the military objectives and the command echelons to be established. Without a proper understanding of the concept of the theater and its structure, it is difficult to comprehend the concept of levels of war, methods of combat force employment, and various elements of operational warfare. The concepts of the theater of war and theater of operations emerged because of the need to employ large forces most effectively to accomplish operational or strategic objectives. Concurrently, the subdivisions of the theater also emerged. This, in turn, led to the establishment of several command echelons in a given theater. The new and increasingly used term battlespace unnecessarily obscures the commonly accepted concept of the theater and its structure. The conventional three-dimensional concept of the theater proved its practical value over many decades and is still a viable concept. In contrast to conventional threedimensional space, the concept of battlespace is not based on the military objectives in a certain part of the theater, but rather on the capabilities and actions of one’s forces’ in combat. Thus, the physical size of the battlespace varies greatly. In addition, the term battlespace itself implies a tactical, not operational or strategic, level of war. A more serious problem is that the use of similar terms reinforces the false notion that war essentially is a matter of tactics alone, not of strategy and operational art and tactics.

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Methods

Naval tactical actions, major naval operations, and maritime campaigns are the main methods of combat employment of naval forces and aviation. Which method of combat employment will be applied depends on the scope and complexity of the military objective to be accomplished in a given part of a maritime theater. The larger the military objective, the larger and more diverse the forces usually employed to accomplish them. The operational and strategic objectives at sea are principally accomplished by conducting major naval operations and maritime campaigns, respectively.

Maritime campaign In generic terms, a campaign consists of a series of related combat actions conducted sequentially and/or simultaneously and combined with the use of selected nonmilitary sources of power and synchronized in terms of place and time to accomplish a strategic objective in a given part of the theater. A campaign can be conducted in high-intensity conventional war or low-intensity conflict. Normally a campaign is conducted according to a common idea and plan and is controlled by a single commander. Today, campaigns are conducted with two or more services of the armed forces, that is, they are a joint effort. Very often campaigns are also conducted with multinational forces. Depending on the nature of the military or theater-strategic objective, a campaign can be offensive or defensive. In a war, a land campaign can be aimed either to defend one’s territory or to seize control of the enemy’s territory. A maritime campaign can be conducted with the main objective of destroying the enemy’s or protecting one’s sea-based strategic forces; seizing an enemy-held large island or archipelago chain; or attacking the enemy’s or protecting and defending one’s maritime trade. For example, the Germans conducted an offensive campaign aimed at cutting off Allied trade in the Atlantic in 1939–1945, while the Allies conducted a defensive campaign. Depending on the predominant nature of the physical space or physical environment (or “medium”) in which combat takes place, land (continental) and maritime campaigns is differentiated. A land campaign consists of a series of related major land (ground) and air operations, while a maritime campaign

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encompasses mostly major naval and air operations. A blue-water navy or coastal navy bordering an enclosed or semienclosed sea will conduct major operations or tactical actions as a part of a land campaign, as was the case with the German and Soviet navies in the Baltic and Black seas in World War II. Allied navies also took part in a land campaign, fought in Italy in 1943–1945. Maritime campaigns aimed to defend or seize control of an enemy-held large island archipelago are usually planned. For example, the Allies planned campaigns to seize the Solomons, New Guinea (Papua), the central Pacific, and the Philippines in World War II in the Pacific. However, a maritime campaign can also be seen as such only in retrospect. This happens when a stronger sea power declares a naval blockade to which the weaker opponent responds with a counterblockade; if the resulting conflict at sea becomes protracted, the actions of both sides can in retrospect be seen to have been maritime campaigns. An example of such a campaign was the German effort to cut off Allied maritime trade in the Atlantic (and adjacent sea areas) in 1939–1945 while the Allies conducted a defensive campaign aimed at protecting their maritime trade. Both sides conducted numerous tactical actions of varying intensity throughout the theater; a relatively small number of major operations were conducted. The most notable exceptions were the Allied convoys to northern Russia in 1942–1943 and the large convoy operations in 1940–1942 to relieve the British-held island of Malta in the Mediterranean. The Germans also conducted several major naval operations with their heavy surface ships and U-boat screens in the north and central Atlantic. Normally, each military or theater-strategic objective would require planning and executing a single campaign in a given theater of operations. In general conflict, two or more campaigns can be waged sequentially or almost simultaneously in a given theater of war. For example, the Allies started the Central Pacific Campaign in November 1943, when the Solomons campaign was almost completed in the Southern Pacific Area (SOPAC). In generic terms, a campaign consists of three major phases: pre-major combat, major combat, and post-major combat phase. The major combat phase can, in turn, encompass an initial defensive phase followed by an offensive phase. In the case of a global war, several campaigns might be required to accomplish the ultimate national or alliance/coalition strategic objectives in a given theater of war. Then, only the last campaign in a given theater of war would have a post-hostilities phase; all others would end with the post-major combat phase. Also, in case of a major regional conflict, the last phase of a campaign that ends hostilities would have a post-hostilities phase. In such a case, the post-hostilities phase is separated from the major combat phase by a relatively short war termination phase. The post-hostilities phase ends with so-called transition phase – the handover of authority to the legitimate indigenous government or an international body. A campaign’s duration depends on many factors, but principally on the scope and complexity of the strategic objective, the factors of space–time–force, and the enemy’s will to fight. A campaign on land in a developed theater normally

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lasts longer than one in an undeveloped theater. Initial campaigns usually last longer than those in the final phases of a war. The Allied New Guinea (Papuan) campaign lasted some 27 months (June 1942 to September 1944), while the Philippine campaign lasted only about ten months (October 1944 to August 1945). Maritime campaigns to attack the enemy’s or protect one’s trade are conducted for the duration of the war; hence, they can be quite long. For example, the German attack on Allied trade in the Atlantic and the Allies’ protection of their trade lasted more than five-and-a-half-years (September 1939 to May 1945).

Major naval operations There is no common agreement in the United States or the West on a definition of what constitutes a major naval operation. The term “naval operation” so often used by the U.S. Navy and other Western navies is too broad and imprecise. For example, “naval operation” is explained in the U.S. military as pertaining to “a naval action or the performance of naval missions, which may be strategical, tactical, logistical, or training.” This definition clearly does not make any distinction between objectives to be accomplished at sea and corresponding methods of combat force employment. It confuses the issue by mixing the combat employment of naval forces with logistics and training. An alternative meaning of the same term is “the process of carrying out or training for naval combat to gain the objective of any battle or campaign.” The absence of the term “major naval operation” is a clear proof of the lack of a coherent theory of operational warfare at sea. In comparison, the former Soviet navy devoted extraordinary efforts to developing a theory of what it called “naval operations” in the early 1930s and through the 1980s. Naval operations constituted the very heart of the Soviets’ naval operational art. Yet the Soviets were distinctly unsuccessful in applying their theories in practice during the war with Nazi Germany, 1941–1945. From 1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviet navy was never involved in real combat. Hence, one can only speculate whether its actual performance would have been any better than it was during World War II. In one of the many Soviet definitions of the term, a naval operation (morskaya operatsiya) was described as a series of naval battles, engagements, and strikes coordinated in terms of objective, place, and time and conducted in an assigned area (zone) of an oceanic or sea theater of military action (TV, in the Russian acronym, theater of war in Western terms). It is carried out by specially established groups, independently or in cooperation with formations, forces, or troop units of other services, according to a common idea and plan for accomplishing a single and especially important operational or operational-tactical task. Naval operations are controlled by a fleet commander.1 In generic terms, a major naval operation can be understood as a series of related major and minor naval tactical actions conducted by diverse naval

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forces and combat arms of other services, in terms of time and place, and aimed to accomplish an operational (and sometimes limited strategic) objective in a given maritime theater. Major naval operations are planned and conducted in accordance with an operational idea (scheme) and common plan. They are normally an integral part of a maritime or land campaign, but they can sometimes be conducted outside of the framework of a campaign. The best (and proven) way of avoiding attrition at the operational level is by planning and executing major naval operations. With a major naval operation, the stronger side at sea can defeat the weaker in a place and at a period of its own choosing. Major naval operations are normally planned and conducted when decisive results have to be accomplished as quickly as possible and at the least loss.2 Purpose In terms of its principal purpose, a major naval operation can be offensive or defensive. Offensive major naval operations are normally conducted by the stronger side at sea, but they also can be planned on the defensive. The stronger side would mount a single major naval operation or several in succession to obtain and then maintain sea control. Such operations can also greatly reduce or eliminate threats posed by numerically larger forces and thereby facilitate operations in other parts of a maritime theater, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 illustrates. An offensive major naval operation can also be planned as part of a defensive campaign, as was the Japanese commitment of a major part of the Combined Fleet in defense of the Philippines in October 1944. Major naval operations against enemy maritime trade and amphibious landing operations are inherently offensive in their purpose. A major naval operation with an offensive purpose is usually planned and conducted in the initial phase of the war to obtain sea control and afterward in exercising sea control. It can be also conducted when one side has only local and temporary control, as Allied amphibious landings in the Pacific in World War II illustrate. Major naval operations in enclosed and semienclosed seas can be conducted within either a strategically offensive or a strategically defensive framework. For either one, limited, temporary sea control should be obtained first. Major naval operations aimed at protecting maritime trade can be conducted even when one’s sea control is in dispute of the subsurface, and the air in the proximity of a large convoy. For example, the Royal Navy mounted several major operations in 1942 to supply the besieged island of Malta, although Axis forces possessed overwhelming strength in the air. The Allies suffered extremely high losses in these operations from Axis land-based aircraft and submarines. It is also possible to conduct a major naval operation when friendly forces control only the air and the subsurface, as the Germans did in capturing the key bases and ports in the initial phase of their invasion of Norway in April 1940. A major defensive naval operation is usually planned and executed when one side is forced onto the defensive at sea by permanent or temporary weakness.

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Then, the weaker side may conduct major defensive naval operations to prevent attacks on its naval bases and anchorages, enemy amphibious landings and attacks on coastal installations or facilities, and to carry out major evacuation of friendly troops and civilians. Both sides in a war at sea will occasionally mount major naval or joint operations in defense and protection of maritime trade. A major naval operation is conducted as an integral part of a maritime, and since 1945 a land, campaign. It is aimed at bringing about a radical or drastic change in the operational situation in a maritime theater; if a major naval operation is only partially successful, the operational situation is likely to remain as it had been, as the Battle of Jutland in June 1916 illustrates. A major naval operation can also have a strategic effect as well. This usually occurs when a surprise attack on a major part of the enemy’s fleet is carried out at the very onset of hostilities. For example, the operational objective of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was to destroy enough of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to prevent it from interfering with the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. However, the unintended and highly adverse (for Japan) effect was to shift American public opinion from isolationism to unequivocal support for complete victory over Japan. A war at sea predominantly consists of a large number of tactical actions conducted in coastal waters, on the high seas, and also on the open ocean. In general, major and minor tactical actions can accomplish specific operational objectives, but only over time. However, the key to ultimate success in war at sea is avoiding situations in which objectives must be accomplished predominantly – or even worse, exclusively – through force-to-force encounters or attrition. Attrition warfare not only results in much higher losses, even for the stronger side, in terms of lives and materiel but is inherently protracted. One’s forces are tied down, and until given operational objectives are accomplished they cannot be employed for other urgent tasks in other oceans or sea areas. This happened to the Allies in the struggle for Guadalcanal between August 1942 and February 1943. The initial major naval operation – the amphibious landing on Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower) on 7 August 1942 – was highly successful. Afterward, however, the Allies became progressively involved in a series of small but costly tactical actions with Japanese forces on land, at sea, and in the air. This included seven major naval battles, most of them fought in the night, and numerous smaller tactical actions at sea.3 The U.S. Navy lost most of these battles, because the Japanese were much more proficient in night gunnery and torpedo tactics. However, both sides lost approximately the same number of ships.4 This attrition phase lasted almost seven months before the Japanese decided to give up their attempts to regain control of Guadalcanal. By then, the Allied operational tempo had been considerably slowed; no further major landings up the Solomons chain had been possible with Guadalcanal not yet secure. A good argument can be made that had the Allies been able to conduct a consecutive major naval or air operation to consolidate initial operational success, the struggle for Guadalcanal would have ended much earlier and with far fewer losses in ships, aircraft, and personnel for the Allies.

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Types Based on the degree of participation of various services and arms, naval, joint (multiservice), and combined (multinational) major naval operations can be differentiated. A major naval operation, as such, is conducted predominantly by a navy, although air or even ground forces can take part as well. Examples of major operations conducted by naval forces are the battles of Cape Matapan (March 1941), Coral Sea (May 1942), Midway (June 1942), and the Philippine Sea (June 1944). A major naval operation is planned and conducted by forces of the navy but with substantial participation by other services. In a maritime theater encompassing a large ocean or sea area, major naval operations would involve significant air forces, and ground forces maybe as well. In contrast, major naval operations in littoral waters would require participation of all three services. All major amphibious landing operations are inherently joint, as are major operations against enemy maritime trade or in defense and protection of maritime trade in the littorals. A major naval/combined operation is conducted with two or more navies or services of the armed forces of two or more countries. Today, major combined operations constitute a frequent method of employing naval forces in lowintensity conflict. A major amphibious landing operation is sometimes combined, as was the case in the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) in July 1943, the landing in Normandy (Neptune) in June 1944, and the UN amphibious landing at Inchon (Chromite) in September 1950. Sometimes several major naval operations can take place in a single maritime theater of operations. Such a situation would occur in the initial phase of a new campaign when several operational objectives must be accomplished sequentially or simultaneously. In that case, the one aimed at the most important operational objective will be the main or principal operation, and the others will be supporting (ancillary) operations. For example, the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte on 20 October 1944 was the main or principal major naval operation. The actions of Task Force (TF) 38 as operational cover and support between 17 October and 27 November constituted a supporting major naval operation. In terms of their timing, one can distinguish between initial, successive, and preliminary major naval operations. The initial major operation is planned and conducted to accomplish the first, and most operational, objective in a campaign. For example, the Japanese Operation MI (that is, the Battle of Midway) was the initial major naval operation in a projected maritime campaign in the Central Pacific. The Allied invasion of the Gilberts in November 1943 (Galvanic) was the initial major element in a series of major operations within the Central Pacific Campaign (November 1943 to September 1944). A successive (or consecutive) major operation normally starts during or shortly after the initial major operation. Its purpose is to consolidate or expand the operational success of the preceding major operations. For example, the Allied invasions of the Marshals

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(Operations Flintlock and Catchpole) and the Marianas (Forager) are examples. A preliminary major naval operation is usually planned to isolate a maritime area of operations in which a new campaign or major operation would be conducted. The purpose is often to prevent the arrival of the enemy reinforcements in troops, aircraft, or materiel. Another aim might be to deceive the enemy as to the intended sector of main effort. For example, TF-38’s series of air strikes and other actions against the Ryukyus, Formosa, and Luzon between 10 and 17 October 1944 constituted a preliminary major naval operation – that is, with respect to the invasion of Leyte. Major naval operations can be conducted on the open ocean or in the littorals. Most major naval operations were conducted fairly close to continents, large islands, or oceanic archipelagos. Many have taken place in enclosed or semienclosed seas. Today, because of enormous advances in the range and lethality of weapons, even coastal navies composed of small surface ships, submarines, and land-based aircraft can conduct major naval operations. Operations in the littorals are generally more complicated to prepare and execute than those on the open ocean, because they involve diverse forces and assets of all services of the country’s armed forces. They also differ from major naval operations on the open ocean because of the much smaller operational space involved and the smaller forces employed. The initial position used by one’s forces in the initial phase of a major naval operation often considerably affects the course of the operation as a whole, sometimes even the outcome. In general, the force can operate from a central or exterior position. In case of the employment of multiservice or multinational forces in the same operation, some forces can operate from central positions, others from exterior positions. Each position has some advantages and some disadvantages in respect to the employment of naval forces and aviation. It would be a mistake to believe that a central position is inherently more advantageous than an exterior one. Experience shows that not only victories but also defeats ensued for forces operating from a central position. Major naval operations in war In generic terms, the main purposes of a major naval operation today in the case of a high-intensity conflict at sea can be to: • • • • • • • •

destroy the enemy fleet at sea or in its bases; conduct an amphibious landing on the opposed shore; destroy enemy coastal installations and facilities; attack enemy maritime trade; defend and protect friendly maritime trade; destroy enemy sea-based strategic nuclear forces; protect one’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces; support friendly ground forces on the coast.

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A major operation aimed at destroying an enemy fleet at sea or in its base is the quickest and most effective – but most difficult – way to establish sea control in a given maritime area of operations. These operations can be conducted on the open ocean or in narrow seas. Historically, several major operations have been aimed at destroying an enemy fleet at sea or in its bases or shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. Most fleet-on-fleet encounters in World War II took place when one fleet provided distant cover and support of a major amphibious landing, as happened at Leyte in October 1944, or when the stronger fleet used the landing to lure an inferior force into a “decisive” battle, as the Japanese Combined Fleet attempted in Operation MI, which led to the Battle of Midway in June 1942. A major naval operation to destroy an enemy fleet might be necessary when the attacker provides support of the flank to his forces operating in the coastal area or when the enemy fleet is forced to operate in a certain sea or ocean area. If the stronger side at sea attempts to isolate certain sea/ocean areas, then the objective could be the destruction of the major parts of the enemy fleet forces. Likewise, a numerically weaker side might decide to plan a major operation to destroy the enemy fleet at sea in order to weaken or lift a blockade. In a typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, such an operational objective could be accomplished by massive strikes by surface combatants, submarines, and land-based aircraft. Preparation time would be short because of rapid changes in the situation at sea and in the air. Such an operation would most likely encompass a single phase, with one or several synchronized strikes by naval forces, aircraft, and coastal missile or artillery batteries.5 Major naval operations in distant ocean areas are not likely to be conducted in the near future, because there are no longer two or more major potential opponents at sea. A more likely scenario is a conflict between the navies of riparian states in an enclosed or semienclosed sea, or between a blue-water navy and a small navy operating in the littorals. Hence, attacks on naval bases or anchorages, combined with attacks at sea, seem to be the most likely method open to a stronger navy to destroy or neutralize a smaller fleet. A prerequisite for success in a major naval operation to destroy an enemy fleet in its bases is usually local, and temporary sea control. However, this is not always necessary. In the past, the best results were achieved by striking from beyond the effective range of the enemy’s defenses. Today, nuclear-powered attack submarines, modern conventionally powered submarines, land- and carrier-based aircraft, and surface ships armed with long-range antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) are the most effective platforms for destroying enemy ships in their bases. Attack submarines armed with antiship missiles or land-attack cruise missiles can strike enemy naval bases from several hundred nautical miles away. For example, in the first few days after the start of the air offensive against Iraq on 17 January 1991, American carrier-based aircraft and attack submarines deployed in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf and the Red Sea repeatedly struck Iraqi naval installations near Umm Qasr and Basra with “smart” bombs and Tomahawk missiles.6

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Air strikes against enemy naval bases in an enclosed sea, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, can be far more effective than those mounted from the open ocean, because of the much shorter distances and the larger number of landbased aircraft that can be used. These strikes can be conducted with high intensity and repeated at short intervals. In some instances, not only fixed-wing aircraft but also missile-armed helicopters can be effectively employed. In the initial phase of a war in an enclosed sea theater, the principal objective of a major naval operation would be to obtain a desired degree of sea control, thereby creating favorable conditions for carrying out other operational tasks, such as, supporting friendly ground forces on the coast and protecting friendly maritime trade. A key prerequisite would be obtaining air superiority in the maritime theater.7 Initially, the objectives would be accomplished by destroying the enemy’s surface forces, submarines, and aircraft; suppressing or destroying enemy air defenses; and suppressing or interfering with command posts and electronic surveillance. In the second phase of the operation, the fleet forces would conduct strikes against enemy forces at sea and their bases and airfields in the sea’s only exit and its approaches.8 Amphibious landing operations are the most effective method of projecting power on an enemy shore. Their objective can be to seize a large island or group of islands, one or both shores of a strait. A major amphibious landing operation can be also aimed at capturing a large part of the enemy coast and thereby creating preconditions to seize some objectives deep into the enemy’s littoral area. Major amphibious operations are also extremely complex to plan and execute. They are inherently joint in their character, regardless of their purpose or the size of forces involved. Amphibious assault landings within enclosed or semienclosed seas would take place across much shorter distances and are usually smaller than those mounted against coasts on open oceans. Sometimes, however, an invasion mounted across a narrow sea can exert a strategic influence, in case of the opening of a new front as was true of the Allied Normandy invasion of June 1944, or causing a radical change in a strategic situation, as was in the case of the UN landing at Inchon in September 1950. Today, a large-scale amphibious landing in a typical narrow sea would be difficult to execute if the defender effectively uses land-based aircraft, submarines, and combat craft in combination. Amphibious landings are aimed at seizing an area of enemy-controlled coast that gives access to an operational objective inland; at speeding the advance of one’s troops along the coast or the end of the war itself; eliminating or taking control of a large naval base or port; preventing the adversary from seizing a base or port; cutting off an enemy army’s avenue of escape; and countering enemy evacuation efforts across the sea. A credible amphibious capability may also help to tie a sizable enemy force to the defense of a large stretch of its mainland coast or offshore islands. In U.S. terms, the emerging doctrine of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) developed by the Marine Corps represents the application of operational art in planning and conduct of amphibious landings. The tactical component of this concept, the ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM) envisions moving Marine air-ground task

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forces directly to the assigned operational objective deep in the enemy’s rear. Such an action will be carried out without stopping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones. However, STOM is predicated on the existence of a sea base deployed in international waters.9 A major naval operation aimed to destroy enemy coastal installations and facilities can be conducted as a preliminary to an amphibious landing or as an integral part of a naval blockade. Such major operations can be conducted with naval and/or air forces. The primary purpose of attacks can be destruction or neutralization of the enemy naval or commercial ports, airfield and airports, shipbuilding and ship-repair industries, rail and road traffic, and shore/offshore oil and gas production, and refining industries. For example, the main purpose of TF-38’s attacks in mid-October 1944 was to destroy Japanese ports, shipyards, and airfields in the Ryukyus and on Formosa and Luzon. Today, longer-range and more capable carrier- and land-based aircraft, armed with cruise missiles and “smart” bombs, make it possible to attack the enemy coastal installations and facilities on the enemy coast and far into the depth of his defenses. Major naval operations on the open ocean and in littoral waters are conducted to interrupt or cut off enemy maritime trade or to defend and protect one’s own maritime trade.10 Maritime trade is conducted almost continuously for the duration of a war at sea. Each convoy or independent sailing ship represents only a fraction of the traffic volume in a maritime theater at a given time. Correspondingly, most naval actions attacking the enemy’s, or defending and protecting friendly, maritime trade will be tactical in scope. Major naval operations will be conducted sporadically and then only in certain parts of the sea or ocean. When a major effort must be mounted to attack or protect a large convoy, its objective is an operational one. To be effective, actions against the enemy’s military–economic potential should be conducted systematically over a relatively large area and against all the elements of the enemy’s maritime trade. Specifically, this encompasses attacks on enemy convoys, independent sailing ships, ports, and cargo loading and offloading facilities; rail and road junctions in the littoral area; shipyards and ship-repair facilities; and shipping-related industries. In enclosed seas, attacks on enemy maritime trade and defense/protection of one’s own are usually conducted with the full participation of not only one’s naval forces but also landbased air and, in some cases, coastal defense forces and ground forces. Such a major operation would usually consist of a single phase, but it would be conducted with high intensity. Some such operations could be divided into phases, with short pauses between. A major naval operation aimed to interrupt or cut off enemy maritime traffic would be conducted when sea control is in dispute or the enemy has slight superiority. It would consist of a series of massive missile, torpedo, air, and artillery strikes, plus offensive use of mines. Some theoreticians claim that enemy maritime traffic can be considered interrupted when the traffic volume in a certain area is reduced by 20 to 25 percent, while cutting off maritime traffic means dropping the total volume by 40 to 50 percent.11

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An attack on the enemy’s maritime traffic in the littorals would consist primarily of minor naval tactical actions conducted over relatively large areas of the maritime theater and over time. Such actions would be aimed at interrupting enemy shipping traffic to such a degree as to have an effect on land-front combat. A major naval operation would be usually planned and executed when there is significant enemy traffic in a certain area. It could also be aimed against ships carrying raw materials. It would encompass several phases. The prerequisite for the success of such an operation is comprehensive knowledge of all elements of the enemy’s maritime trade. Land-based aircraft, submarines, special forces, and coastal defense forces would take part in such an operation.12 One of the most effective methods of preserving the maritime component of one’s military–economic potential is by conducting a series of major naval operations to defend and protect maritime trade. They would be aimed at preventing interruption or cut off of shipping carrying troops, weapons, military equipment, or strategic raw materials. In some cases, they can be intended to protect friendly shipping lines in coastal waters.13 Normally a major naval operation to defend and protect maritime trade would consist of a single phase. Its duration depends on the length of the shipping routes, how long ships stay in ports and anchorages, and convoy-assembly time.14 Today, only large navies have the capability to mount major operations aimed at destroying the enemy’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces – that is, ballistic-missile submarines (nuclear-powered) (SSBNs) and their supporting elements. Such major operations might be focused on destroying enemy SSBNs either in their basing areas, in their patrol zones, or in transit between them. Likewise, a major naval operation might be conducted to protect one’s seabased strategic nuclear forces. Such major operations would most likely be conducted predominantly by naval forces, specifically nuclear-powered attack submarines in the open ocean and patrol aircraft overhead. However, in areas closer to friendly or the enemy’s coast, such operations will probably be more joint, because air forces will be expected to take part. Major naval operations in support of ground forces on the coast are conducted both in marginal seas of oceans and in semienclosed or enclosed seas. They may become most frequent in the seas bordering continents (e.g., the Black Sea, the Baltic, or the Persian Gulf). Tactical actions are a dominant method by which fleet forces and air support ground forces on the coast. However, a major naval operation can be planned to destroy a hostile fleet threatening one’s troops operating along the coast; to seize, by an amphibious landing, a major island, strait, or part of the enemy-held coast; to defend friendly coast against an amphibious landing; to attack the enemy’s or protect one’s maritime trade; to conduct a large-scale evacuation of troops or civilians; and so on. One’s naval forces would play the principal role in major antiamphibious operations. Such operations would be carried out against enemy landings regardless of the ratio of forces. Success would depend on timely detection of the enemy movement to land, activation of coastal defense systems, and deployment of one’s forces. A major antiamphibious operation would normally consist of

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four main phases: strikes against the assembly areas of the enemy invasion forces; actions to destroy enemy forces at sea; the battle for the bridgehead; and engagements in the depth of the landing objective area.15 Major naval operations vs. naval tactical actions Major naval operations differ considerably from naval tactical actions in terms of the level of command that plans, prepares, and executes them, the decisionmaking and planning processes, force composition, the size of the sea or ocean area in which combat takes place, its duration, and the scale of combat support. Normally major naval operations should be planned, prepared, and conducted by the naval component or functional commanders (e.g., in U.S. terms, numbered fleet commanders and joint/combined maritime force component commanders, or JMFCC/CMFCC) subordinate to a theater commander. Sometimes an operationaltactical commander (or joint task force commander) and staff can plan and conduct major naval operations. Unlike a tactical commander, the operational commander also has overall responsibility for logistical support and sustainment. The decision to fight a naval tactical action is based upon a short-term estimate of the situation, while a major naval operation is planned based on what is known as a “long-range estimate.” In preparing that estimate, the operational commander must take into account all aspects of the situation in a given theater – military, political, economic, sociological, ethnic, and climatic – projecting them for several weeks or months. Because of the resulting, much wider range of uncertainty and the larger scope of a major naval operation, in comparison to a naval tactical action, a long-range estimate of the situation will necessarily contain more planning assumptions. The more assumptions, in turn, a plan contains, the more likely it is to require alteration, modification, or radical changes, or even have to be abandoned during the execution phase. In contrast to a naval tactical action, major naval operations are invariably planned. They are normally prepared, except for the initial phase of a war at sea, when forces have at least local superiority over their opponent, whereas tactical actions can be conducted regardless of the ratio of forces. Major naval operations are planned using a “regressive” method, in which the ultimate operational objective is determined first and then, working backward, several major tactical and some minor tactical objectives are determined. A major naval operation normally requires larger and more diverse forces than a naval tactical action. For example, in the Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Japanese Combined Fleet employed four separate elements totaling 165 warships.16 The U.S. forces that took part in the Battle of Midway consisted of 76 warships and about 110 land-based Army, Navy, and Marine aircraft based on the island of Midway.17 However, some major naval operations in World War II involved fewer ships and aircraft. In the “Bismarck Chase” (Rheinuebung, for the Germans) the Germans directly employed the combat group Bismarck (Bismarck, Prinz Eugen), six escort tankers, and one supply ship; three destroyers, two patrol ships, two “obstacle breakers” (Sperrbrecher), one minesweeper

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flotilla, 13 U-boats, one Italian submarine, and three Luftwaffe air groups were also used, in support.18 For its part, the Royal Navy employed directly or indirectly five battleships, three battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, 11 cruisers, 33 destroyers, and eight submarines to defeat Combat Group Bismarck.19 Enormous increases in mobility and in the range and lethality of weapons allow operational objectives today to be accomplished with much smaller forces than would have been possible only a few decades ago. Major blue-water navies possess far fewer ships than they did during World War II or the early 1950s. In general, a major naval operation in littoral waters will include more small ships and land-based aircraft than would those on the open ocean.20 A major naval operation requires the employment of diverse naval combat arms and often of air forces; in the littoral waters, such operations would also require ground forces. Forces taking part in a major operation on the open ocean are deployed over a large part of a theater of operations, even though the majority of its constituent tactical actions take place in a single maritime area. For example, the forces that took part, in some way, in the Battle of Midway operated from the Japanese home islands to the American West Coast and from the Aleutians to the Central Pacific. The Battle for Leyte, covered an area of about 432,000 square miles (including the 85,000 square miles of the Philippines) and encompassing a major part of the Western Pacific and smaller sectors of the central, southern, and southwestern Pacific. The actual fighting, however, encompassed only about 110,000 square miles.21 Major naval operations in the future would most likely take place in enclosed or semienclosed seas, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf or in such peripheral waters as the South China Sea. Yet a blue-water force like the U.S. Navy would deploy its forces, other than those already deployed forward, from bases in the continental United States or other maritime theaters. A major naval operation lasts considerably longer than a naval tactical action. While a naval battle or engagement can last up to several hours, a major naval operation can last several days or even weeks. In general, a major naval operation in a high-intensity conflict lasts longer if the distance between the base of operations and the operating area is great or if the opposing force is difficult to destroy or neutralize because of its size or peculiarities of the physical environment. Characteristics The main characteristics of a modern major naval operation are the complexity of its planning, preparation, and execution; the involvement of several naval combat arms and often combat arms or branches of other services; diversity of tactical actions conducted in a relatively large part of the theater; high intensity of combat and high losses in personnel and materiel; extensive use of electronic warfare (EW); and the complexity of combat support. The objective of a major naval operation has to be accomplished within a relatively short time. Hence, one’s forces must act aggressively and decisively.22

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A major naval operation on the open ocean will be characterized by its large spatial extent and participation of nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers, heavy surface combatants, and long-range land-based aircraft. The long distances between the home bases and the operating area would require long transit times. The critical task would be to overcome the enemy air defenses and ASW defenses.23 In contrast, physical features in narrow seas greatly affect the employment of naval forces. The coast in a typical narrow sea is usually highly indented and fronted by a large number of islands and islets. This, in turn, greatly restricts the maneuverability of surface ships, especially major surface combatants and submarines. In shallow waters, large surface ships have to reduce their speeds sharply. Navigational conditions in narrow seas are often difficult because of shoals, reefs, strong tides, and currents. In a typical narrow sea the combat will take place on the surface, subsurface, on the coast, and in the air. Diverse combat arms of the navy and other services will be extensively employed. Covertness of action and the opportunities for achieving surprise are considerably enhanced by the combination of long-range and highly lethal weapons, such as antiship cruise missiles and torpedoes, and nature of the physical environment. One of the main features of modern naval combat in a narrow sea will be quick and frequent changes in the operational situation. Electronic warfare techniques will cause great difficulties in using one’s sensors and guided weapons, even make it impossible. The high speed of modern ships and aircraft and their ability to combine maneuver with “fires” will allow one’s side to achieve surprise as well as to gain superiority in place and time. Combat actions in enclosed or semienclosed seas will occur by choice largely at night or in bad visibility. That necessarily means fighting at close range, making the deployment, redeployment, and maneuver of one’s naval forces more difficult. In a typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, land-based aircraft will be one of the most effective means for striking enemy transports, warships, or enemy forces on the coast. Elements In generic terms, a major naval operation will comprise three major phases: deployment, combat employment, and post-combat. Depending on the initial bases of operations, one’s naval forces can conduct operational deployment or, in some cases, strategic deployment (see Figure 3). If one’s forces are forwardly deployed, as are U.S. Navy forces currently in the Western Pacific and in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, then they would need to conduct only an operational or even just tactical deployment. Because of the generally much smaller sea area, naval forces deployed in a typical narrow sea would conduct tactical and, rarely, operational deployment as part of a major naval operation. The combat phase of a major naval operation would consist of one or more phases, each differing in its duration. Normally, the area in which combat

Methods

Post-combat phase

Combat employment phase

Pre-combat

Maritime Enemy’s area of operational center of gravity operations Base of operations

Main

force

s

Operational objective

Series of major tactical actions Sector of main effort

Withdrawal or redeployment

Sector of secondary effort Series of minor s e tactical actions c r o f ing por t Operational p u S deception

Strategic/ operational deployment

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Operational Concentration maneuver or dispersal

Accomplishing the operational objective

Pursuit and destroying the remaining enemy forces Operational pause

Consolidating operational success

Figure 3 Major naval operation and its main elements. Note This figure depicts elements of a major naval operation in generic terms only.

would take place is divided into a sector of main effort and one or more sectors of secondary effort. The major part of one’s forces, arbitrarily called “main forces,” would be employed in the sectors of main effort, while the rest of the forces – “supporting forces” – would operate in the sector(s) of secondary effort. The first phase encompasses the concentration of one’s forces in the assigned ocean/sea area, followed by a series of maneuvers of individual force elements aimed to obtain a favorable position against the enemy’s forces. The main forces would destroy or neutralize the enemy’s operational center of gravity through a series of related major and minor tactical actions. Supporting forces would try to tie down part of the enemy forces and thereby facilitate and ensure the success of the main forces. Deception would be focused on one of the sectors of secondary effort. The cumulative effect of the actions of the main and supporting forces should lead to the accomplishment of the assigned operational objective. Afterward, one’s operational success must be consolidated by destroying the remaining enemy forces through pursuit. The shift from the combat phase to the pursuit phase should be seamless. In a major offensive naval operation operational pause might be required after the end of pursuit to

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regenerate the combat potential of one’s forces that took part in the operation. After operational success is consolidated, one’s forces might withdraw to their base of operations or be directed to redeploy, to carry out other tasks in a given part of the same or adjacent theater. Content Tactical actions in a major naval operation are not just a random collection of various combat actions but are all related to each other. They can be fought on the surface, subsurface, in the air, or, in some cases, on the coast. They are all connected by and conducted within a given operational framework; otherwise, they would not contribute to the accomplishment of the assigned operational objective and would therefore represent a waste of one’s resources and sorely needed time. Naval tactical actions can range from actions in which weapons are not used (such as patrolling and surveillance) to attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and naval battles. As the term implies, they are aimed at accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given part of a maritime theater. In some cases, a series of diverse tactical actions conducted over time can lead to the accomplishment of an operational objective. The lowest and the most frequently conducted naval tactical action using weapons is a naval attack, a combination of tactical maneuver and weapons used to accomplish a minor tactical objective. It is usually an integral part of a strike. A naval attack can be conducted by a single or several types of platforms. It is usually aimed to destroy or neutralize a single enemy platform, or tactical groups, or a target ashore. Attacks can be distinguished by the type of weapons used – missile, gun, torpedo, bomb, depth charge, or a combination thereof.24 A naval attack can be conducted independently or as part of a strike or raid. The success of a naval attack depends largely on the surprise achieved, the degree of skill in maneuvering a platform or several platforms to obtain positional advantage, and the range, lethality, and precision of the weapons used. An example of a naval attack was the action by the U.S. submarines Darter and Dace on 23 October 1944 during the opening phase of the Battle for Leyte. This attack resulted in the sinking of two Japanese heavy cruisers (Atago and Takao).25 The actions of U.S. motor torpedo boats and destroyers in the battle of the Surigao Strait on the night of 24–25 October are examples of naval attacks conducted by single-type platforms. In the Battle of Samar on 25 October, U.S. destroyers conducted torpedo counterattacks against Japanese heavy surface ships of the 1st Diversionary Attack Force. With the advent of missiles and other long-range, highly precise, and lethal weapons, it became possible to destroy the enemy force at sea or on the coast at much longer range than they could be with guns or torpedoes. The long-range missiles and smart bombs can be fired or dropped by a single or several ships, submarines, or aircraft and in quick succession. A new method of combat force employment, called “strike,” gradually replaced the naval battle and engagement

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as the principal method in accomplishing not only major tactical but sometimes even an operational objective in war at sea and in the air. A well prepared strike is difficult to repulse. By using longer-range, more lethal weapons, the attacking forces can achieve success without suffering significant losses.26 Depending on the scale and importance of the target to be destroyed or neutralized, strikes can be differentiated as tactical, operational, or strategic. However, destruction or neutralization of these targets is not identical to accomplishing the corresponding military objective. A naval strike is usually conducted by two or more platforms of a single type of force – for example, missile armed surface combatants, submarines, or attack aircraft (helicopters). On an island-studded, archipelago-type coast, missile- or torpedo-armed surface combatants can conduct strikes from ambush against much stronger hostile forces. A strike can be carried out using conventional weapons (missiles, torpedoes, guns, bombs, etc.) or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For example, during the Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War of 1973, the Israeli navy conducted several successful strikes against the Egyptian and Syrian ships at sea. A force of five Israeli missile craft struck a group of Syrian ships off Latakia on the night of 6–7 October, sinking three Syrian missile craft, one torpedo boat, and a minesweeper.27 Usually, in a strike conducted with several weapons, longer-range weapons are used first, to weaken the enemy’s defenses; then short-range weapons finish off the target. Thus, in a strike by missile- and torpedo-armed surface combatants, antiship cruise missiles would be fired followed after a certain time interval by firing of torpedoes to finish off the enemy’s ships damaged by missiles. A broader form of strike is a naval raid – conducted by a single or several naval combat arms to accomplish a major tactical objective as a part of a major offensive or defensive naval operation. The aim is usually to deny temporarily some position or to capture or destroy an enemy force, coastal installation, or facility. One’s temporary or local control of the sea is not a prerequisite for success of a naval raid. The stronger fleet can also conduct raids to divert the enemy’s attention or force the enemy to react in a secondary sector of effort. A naval raid is usually conducted against an objective that the enemy considers so valuable that its loss or serious degradation could not be ignored. A larger purpose of a naval raid is to accomplish some temporary advantage and also pose a threat of future repetition. Besides destroying installations, facilities, or forces on the coast, a naval raid can be aimed to enhance one’s own morale or diminish that of the enemy. A naval raid can range in scale from very small to very large; a large-scale raid can have many features of a major naval operation. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, a landing party from a U.S. frigate seized Jazirat Qurah Island in the northern part of the Arabian Gulf.28 A day later, a landing party and helicopter from another U.S. frigate captured the oil platforms in the Durah oil field.29 In contrast, the Dieppe raid (Operation Jubilee), conducted on 19 August 1942, can be considered a significant military effort; some 6,100 troops, mostly Canadians, and 252 ships were employed. The main purpose of

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the Dieppe raid was to test German coastal defenses. After heavy fighting in which the Allies, especially Canadian troops, suffered heavy casualties (about 1,180 killed and 2,190 taken prisoner), the operation ended in unmitigated disaster for the Allies; the entire effort was abandoned.30 The effect of a raid, like that of surprise, is usually transitory. However, depending on the enemy’s reaction, the consequences of a well executed raid can be much greater than initially planned. For example, the raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942, popularly known as the “Doolittle Raid,” carried out by 16 B-25 medium bombers launched from the carrier Hornet (CV 8) of Task Force 16 (TF-16), was an example of a naval raid that resulted in strategic consequences. It was launched about 670 miles from Tokyo, had a tremendous psychological impact on the Japanese, and greatly lifted American morale. A more important consequence of the raid was that the Japanese navy thereafter won the internal Japanese debate on whether to expand its defense perimeter in the Pacific.31 This led to the Japanese decision to initiate a new campaign in the central Pacific, of which Operation MI was the initial major naval operation. In the end, the Japanese suffered a disastrous defeat in the Battle of Midway in June 1942, which, in retrospect, was a turning point in the war in the Pacific. In the past, a naval engagement consisted of a series related strikes/counterstrikes and attacks/counterattacks conducted by main forces and aimed to accomplish the most important tactical objective in a naval battle. For example, the clashes of opposing carrier forces in the Coral Sea in 1942, the Battle of Midway, and battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 were examples of naval engagements. A naval battle was until relatively recently the main method of accomplishing a major tactical objective as a part of a major naval operation. It consisted of a series of related attacks, counterattacks, strikes, and counterstrikes coordinated in time and place. It was characterized by relatively long duration – several hours or even longer.32 Several naval combat arms, and often the combat arms of other services (e.g., air force, or troops defending the coast) participated in a naval battle. In World War II, numerous naval battles took place in almost all ocean or sea areas. The battle of Savo Island on 9 August and of Tassafaronga on 30 November 1942, fought between the Japanese and the Allies surface ships, are examples of naval battles. In the past, defeat of the enemy fleet in a naval battle sometimes resulted in not only operational but also limited strategic victory. To complicate the matter, however, a naval battle can be tactically won but represent nonetheless an operational failure. Also it can be tactically won but operationally lost, as happened to the U.S. Navy in the battle of Santa Cruz Islands on 26–27 October 1942 in the lower Solomons, and to the Japanese in the battle of Guadalcanal between 12 and 15 November 1942. Today, large naval battles are unlikely to be fought because most of the actions would take place between a blue-water and coastal navies and in relatively a small sea area close to the landmass.

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Prerequisites The success of a major naval operation is highly dependent on synchronization of theaterwide or operational functions. Sound theater command organization, then, is perhaps one of the most important prerequisites for the success of a campaign as a whole and of its subordinate major operations. All elements of operational functions are integral parts of the maritime theater command organization. Other prerequisites for the success of a major naval operation include operational intelligence, operational command and control warfare, operational “fires,” operational logistics, and operational protection. However, support of a major naval operation would require proper synchronization of only a relatively small part of the theaterwide functions. Specifically, they would include reconnaissance and surveillance, air defense, anticombat craft defense, defensive mine counter measures (MCM), electronic warfare and defense against weapons of mass destruction.

Conclusion The term campaign is overused today, all too often without regard to its true meaning. Sometimes any large military effort is defined as a campaign, regardless of whether it might be more appropriately styled a major operation or even a battle or engagement. Campaigns are the most complex of all the methods of combat force employment. A maritime campaign encompasses the entire spectrum of methods of combat force employment, ranging from the smallest naval tactical action, such as an ambush or a raid, to a major naval/joint operation. It is invariably aimed to accomplish a military or theater-strategic objective. A maritime campaign usually requires the employment of multiservice and often multinational forces. A major naval operation is the principal method of accomplishing operational objectives in a maritime theater. It is the most effective way to achieve decisive results within a given time frame, results bringing about a drastic change in the situation in a theater. The only alternative is attrition warfare, which should be avoided even when an operational commander enjoys numerical superiority. Nonetheless, Western naval theoreticians and planners have generally neglected major naval operations as an area of study in operational art. Too much emphasis is given instead to the tactical employment of naval forces and tactics of platforms in particular. The absence of any serious threat at sea today should not delude anyone into believing that naval forces will never be required to plan and conduct major operations in the future. Major naval operations are categorized by their main purposes, the sea or ocean areas in which they are predominantly conducted, their timing, and the degree of participation by other services. Certain types have arisen from advances in naval technology and the evolution of warfare at sea. While naval forces will always play the most critical role in accomplishing operational or limited strategic objectives at sea, other services will increasingly participate.

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This will be especially true in littoral waters, where the proximity of a landmass allows not only land-based aircraft but ground forces to take part. Therefore, not only amphibious landings but also major naval operations against enemy maritime trade and in defense of friendly trade will become increasingly joint or even combined activities. Because of the enormous increase in the combat potential of naval platforms, major naval operations of the future are likely to be highly intense indeed. This will be especially true in a littoral environment, because of the small area and correspondingly short distances. For that reason, in major naval operations today extremely high consumption rates of fuel and ammunition should be expected. The focus of theory should be on the type of major naval operation most likely to be conducted. However, this does not mean that the other types of major naval operations should be neglected. For example, because of the absence at present of major opponents at sea, major naval operations to destroy enemy fleets at sea are not likely in the near future; nevertheless, it would be wrong for theoreticians to ignore them. Likewise, no blue-water navy, focusing on major naval operations in littoral waters, should neglect meanwhile the possibility of encounters on the open ocean.

4

Maritime operational functions

For maximum effectiveness in the employment of one’s naval forces at the operational level of command/war, a number of supporting structures and activities, arbitrarily called “operational functions,” should be fully established already in peacetime. They need to be properly sequenced and synchronized for ensuring successful employment of one’s military and nonmilitary sources of power in times of peace, operations short of war, and in war. In generic terms, the key operational functions are command organization (or command structure), intelligence, command and control warfare (C2W), fires, logistics, and protection. For a successful outcome of a maritime campaign, all operational functions should be properly sequenced and synchronized. Because of the much smaller scale of the objective, a major naval operation requires support of only selected tactical elements, collectively called combat support. They are, in turn, an integral part of a respective operational function.

Operational command organization Theaterwide command organization is the principal means by which a maritime theater commander orchestrates the use of military and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish assigned strategic objectives in time of regional or general conflict. Operational command organization binds together all other functions with the joint forces deployed in a maritime theater. Its main purpose is to integrate maritime forces and forces of other services into effective teams. At the same time, the organizational integrity of each service component should be preserved and maintained in order to use their unique capabilities. Command organization at the theater-strategic and operational levels is usually area or geographically based. It can encompass the entire maritime theater (of war) or a major part of it. The principal factors in establishing such a command organization are the potential strategic threats in peacetime and strategic objectives to be accomplished in time of war, the physical nature of the environment in which friendly forces will operate, the size and capabilities of the potential enemy (or enemies), and the time available. Political, diplomatic, economic, ethnic, and, in some cases, psychological factors should be fully taken into account in establishing a theater command and determining its boundaries.

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Intermediate levels of command Normally, a sound command organization requires the existence of an intermediate level of command to ensure decentralized command and control (C2) and thus allows the necessary delegation of authority by the theater commander. Theater-strategic commanders have large responsibilities that encompass both military and nonmilitary aspects of a situation. Thus, they should not be generally involved in the tactical aspects of the situation within their area of responsibility. Whenever possible, they should delegate authority to subordinate area-based or service or functional component commanders. The lack of an intermediate theater command, might be a major reason for lack of success, in a maritime campaign or major naval operation. For example, the Allies did not establish a joint force command for the Southern Pacific Ocean Area (SOPAC) in time for the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. The nearest operational commander was Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (1885–1966), Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area/Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPOA/CINCPac) in Pearl Harbor, more than 4,000 nautical miles away. Despite the operational success in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Allies’ lack of an intermediate command echelon between the tactical commander in the Coral Sea and the theater-strategic commander adversely affected their preparation for and conduct of that operation. In some cases, an intermediate level of command can be formally established but be ineffective in practice because of services’ parochialism or poor command relationships. This was the case for the Argentines in the Falklands/ Malvinas conflict. At the beginning of that conflict on 2 April, the junta established an intermediate operational level of command, Malvinas Theater of Operations (TOM – Teatro de Operaciones Malvinas). However, its life was short; it was replaced by a local military command at Port Stanley, East Falklands. On 5 April, the Malvinas Theater of Operations was relocated to the mainland, to Comodoro Rivadavia. Only two days later, this command was replaced by the Southern Atlantic Theater of Operations (TOAS – Teatro de Operaciones del Atlantico Sur), led by Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo, with headquarters at Comodore Rivadavia.1

Service/functional component commands In U.S. practice, directly subordinate to the area-based commanders are service and functional component commanders. A service component command, as its name implies, is composed of all the forces, organizations, and installations/ facilities of a single service. It is headed by the respective service component commander. Among other things, a naval component commander advises the higher commander on the proper employment of his subordinate forces. He selects and designates specific units of the parent service component for assignment to other subordinate forces. He is responsible for combat training and the readiness of the forces under his command. The component commander should

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timely inform the maritime theater commander of the planned changes in logistic support for his forces. He is responsible for internal administration and discipline and for logistic functions of subordinate forces. Functional component commands are established by the theater-strategic and subordinate theater of operations commanders to most effectively employ all the forces operating in the same physical medium. Such commands are normally (but not necessarily), composed of forces of two or more services. They may be established in time of peace or war to perform particular missions, which may be of short duration or may extend over time. In U.S. terms, the following functional component commanders may be appointed by a theater commander: joint (combined) force land component commander (JFLCC/CFLCC), joint (combined) force air component commander (JFACC/CFACC), joint (combined) force maritime component commander (JFMCC/CFMCC), and joint (combined) force special operations component commander (JFSOCC/CFSOCC). The functional component commands can be established in peacetime or in wartime to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over time. The JFMCC/CFMCC like other functional component commanders may be assigned a wide range of responsibilities regarding the employment of forces under his command. In case of a maritime and often land campaign, JFMCC/CFMCC would be responsible for planning, preparing, and executing respective major naval operations. Among other things, he would have the authority for planning, allocation, tasking, and coordination among subordinate tactical commanders. He would be normally given full tactical and operational control over all assigned and attached maritime forces taking part in a major naval operation. Provisional operational-tactical commands In time of conflict or war, a theater commander might establish provisional multiservice or multinational forces. In U.S. practices, a joint or combined task force (JTF/CJTF) is usually formed when a mission has a limited objective but does not require centralized overall control and logistics. The mission assigned to such a force would require the execution of responsibilities involving two or more services on a significant scale, as well as close integration of effort. A joint or combined task force is normally dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been accomplished. A joint/combined task force can be established on a short notice. It can be tailored according to the mission to be accomplished. Its chain of command is simple and effective. The size and mix of forces can be changed quickly. A joint/combined task force is not burdened with administrative and logistical responsibilities. The main deficiencies of such a type of command organization is that service capabilities are often duplicated. Sometimes interoperability is confused with interchangeability. Communications among various service components are sometimes difficult. Another major problem is that the staff lacks

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the necessary knowledge and familiarity of the area in which a joint/combined task force will operate. The commander of the joint task force does not have authority over logistical support and sustainment. Often staffs are also too large and members have rarely or never worked together. The maritime theater commander in establishing a joint/combined task force assigns the mission and determines its area of operations in terms of geography and the time of its activation. In coordination with the commander of the joint/ combined task force, he determines the forces required for accomplishing the mission and allocates or requests these forces. Tenets To ensure the most effective employment of one’s maritime forces in the accomplishment of their assigned objectives or tasks, certain cardinal rules or tenets should be followed in establishing the command organization. These tenets are not a checklist that can be applied fully, or in a rigid manner. Military, political, geographic, economic, ethnic, or logistical circumstances may require that some of these tenets be modified, not observed, or even violated. A sound operational command organization should above all be simple. Simplicity requires that the chain of command be clear and straightforward. The responsibilities and authority of the operational commander and subordinate commanders should be clearly delineated. There should be no overlapping responsibilities or authority. Ideally no subordinate should be responsible to more than one higher commander at any given time. Each service’s capabilities should be integrated to accomplish a common objective but without degrading the combat effectiveness of individual force elements. Operational command organization is flexible when it can expand or contract with changing conditions without serious loss of effectiveness. Organizational flexibility is achieved by decentralizing command and control, delegating specific and well-defined functions and responsibilities, and quickly deploying forces to meet specific situations. Without decentralized command and control, it is difficult for a maritime force to be effective when it is faced with a situation demanding quick and timely action. A too-rigid command organization limits the subordinate tactical commanders’ freedom of action. Unity of effort is one of the main prerequisites of successful performance at any level of command. It can be achieved either through unity of command or through cooperation. Normally, the highest degree of effectiveness is ensured by having unity of effort through unity of command. This method is applied in the command of national or alliance forces. Unity of command means having a single commander control all the forces assigned to a particular mission. It is achieved principally by the establishment of clear-cut divisions of responsibility, interservice and intraservice integration, cooperation, and interoperability. Unity of command ensures that at every level of command there is only a single source of authority. All efforts are directed toward ensuring that guidance and orders flow from the established authority. In

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general, unity of command greatly enhances the effectiveness of planning because all the functions are centralized. Unity of command also ensures clear delineations of the responsibility for each staff function. Failure to establish unity of command results in a state of divided command. The higher the level of command, the more detrimental to one’s combat performance is the lack of unity of command. Divided command has been the cause of many defeats and disasters in war. For example, one of the reasons contributing to the initial Japanese success in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was the lack of a single U.S. operational commander in Hawaii. There was little coordination and no integration of Army and Navy forces and their efforts in defense of Hawaii. Air reconnaissance was divided among three Navy flag officers and two Army generals.2 In their campaign against Allied maritime trade in the Atlantic in World War II, the Germans would have been more successful if a theater command had been created to integrate the efforts of the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe. In World War II, the Japanese command organization was usually divided, with a few notable exceptions. For example, in their defense of the Philippines in the fall of 1944, the Japanese never appointed a single commander to control all ground, naval, and air forces in the theater. For the Japanese naval forces involved in the operation, the chain of command ran from the Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters to Admiral Soemu Toyoda, CINC Combined Fleet. In addition, command relationships were poorly defined, except for army and navy land-based aircraft. Toyoda’s headquarters was at Hiyoshi, near Tokyo, about 1,700 miles from Manila. The Japanese also had trouble controlling their far-flung forces, due to poor communications and the long distances involved. Throughout World War II in the Pacific, the U.S. and Allied forces had no single commander for the theater. Instead, for parochial and political reasons, two de facto theaters of war were established: the Pacific Ocean Area, under Nimitz in Hawaii, and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), under General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964), initially in Brisbane, Australia. On 8 May 1942, Nimitz was CINCPOA in addition to being CINCPac. He was in command of all land, sea, and air forces in the Pacific Ocean Area except for the land defense of New Zealand. On 18 April 1942, MacArthur became the Supreme Commander of SWPA. Both Nimitz and MacArthur recruited their staff predominantly from their own services. This solution was a compromise, because the U.S. Navy refused to place the Pacific Fleet under the command of anyone but a naval officer. With two commands in the Pacific, control of the entire theater was vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). No single individual was able to resolve conflicting claims for troops and supplies, assign priorities, shift forces between commands, or concentrate the resources of both commands on a single strategic objective. Not surprisingly, the result was continuous competition for resources and a frequent need for the JCS to resolve disputes – even, at times, for President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s intervention.3 The division of Army and Navy forces in the Pacific was more a means of satisfying

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interservice rivalries and personal egos than an example of sound military practice. MacArthur believed that perhaps one of the most inexplicable decisions of the entire war was not to unify command in the Pacific. In his view, that decision could not be defended in logic, theory, or even common sense. It resulted in divided effort, waste and duplication of resources, and the consequent extension of the war, with added casualties and cost.4 One of the contributing factors in the disastrous U.S. experience in Vietnam was poor and fragmented theater organization. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), established on 8 February 1962, was responsible only for military operations within the boundaries of South Vietnam. The Army and the air forces insisted that the MACV should be a theater unified command. However, the U.S. Navy objected to that proposal and contended that all military operations in Vietnam should be controlled by the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). The Navy won the argument, and the MACV became subordinate to CINCPAC.5 However, COMUSMACV did not control all the forces in the area. The combat employment of Task Force 77 (TF-77) in the Tonkin Gulf was directed by CINCPAC. However, CINCPAC had only nominal control over the B-52 strategic bombers employed in Vietnam. U.S. Marine Corps aircraft operated virtually independently of the U.S. Air Force until 1968, when they were placed under the control of the Deputy to COMUSMACV.6 In coalition warfare, unity of effort is normally accomplished through cooperation. Because of the political sensibilities, differences in military culture, psychological considerations, and even the personalities of the coalition commanders do not allow the establishment of an organization based on unity of command. In establishing a maritime coalition command structure, differences in military style and traditions and national differences and sensitivities should be taken fully into account. All key political decisions should be resolved before the maritime theater command organization is established. The strongest member of the coalition should treat other members as equal partners in a common cause. Optimally, a single maritime theater commander should be appointed, with authority and responsibility over all the subordinate multinational forces of all services. The naval operational commander of the strongest member of a coalition should also be the most senior officer in rank. Normally, an operational commander and his staff should not occupy two or more positions simultaneously; in such a case, there is a great danger of placing intolerable burdens on the commander and staff, thereby endangering the accomplishment of their main mission. In a coalition, a subordinate operational commander should not have the right to bypass the chain of command and report directly to the highest national or coalition/alliance authority. A sound operational command organization should provide for integration throughout the chain of command; otherwise, command elements at the operational level can be a source of great weakness in a command’s performance. A fragmented operational command structure considerably slows the decision-

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making cycle. It also often causes confusion. This is an especially great problem when the information reporting cannot keep pace with the fast-changing situation on the battlefield. Integration in a theater organization should be vertical, so that it is fully responsive to the operational commander’s will. It should also be integrated laterally, so that the actions of individual force elements can be synchronized.7 The operational commander should also provide for a coordinating body that ensures smooth and effective coordination among command elements throughout the entire force. Command, control, communications, and computers (C4) Command and control cannot be successful without a well developed, highly efficient, and survivable theaterwide command, control, communications, and computers (C4) system. Intelligence, fires, logistics, and protection all depend on responsive C4. A C4 system should provide timely and adequate data and information to plan, direct, and control activities at subordinate command echelons, including administration, intelligence, logistics, personnel, planning, and operations. The automated information systems equipment and procedures have greatly increased the need for compatibility of equipment and standardized procedures. Command authority is received by, and information conveyed to and from, a commander by way of communications. Therefore, communications not only are conduits for information, but also bind all the elements of a force together in a cohesive whole. They typically parallel the lines of hierarchy in a given theater.8 Communications are critically important for ensuring a reliable, continuous, and, above all, timely information exchange between the command echelons in a given theater. This is especially critical in large maritime theaters such as the Pacific or Atlantic oceans. An uninterrupted chain of communications should extend from the national-strategic level to the lowest naval tactical commanders. In the Battle of Midway in June 1942, both the United States and Japan suffered from poor communications. Tactical communications between Nimitz’s headquarters and the fleet at sea were never good.9 However, the U.S. fleet had the advantage of operating close to its base and having the undersea cable between Hawaii and Midway. In the Leyte operation in October 1944, Allied communications were satisfactory overall, but an unprecedented volume of urgent and operational-priority messages caused considerable delays in transmission at critical moments during the operation. The commander of the Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, had to issue an order prohibiting administrative radio traffic and requiring such traffic to be sent by airmail. Because of atmospheric conditions and the long distances involved, there were considerable difficulties in the reception of major Third Fleet broadcasts in the west and southwest Pacific. An analysis of dispatches for 17–23 October showed that it took, on average, 30 minutes to one hour for delivery of a message to the addressee. If the messages were long and an intermediate station had to be used, urgent messages required about three hours for delivery.10

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Operational intelligence In general, the role and importance of intelligence in planning, preparing, and executing any military action are very often the key factors for success. The higher the level of war, the more the produced intelligence should represent a synthesis of the situation rather than just a collection of information; otherwise, intelligence would be of little use to the decision-makers. Intelligence is prepared for the use of combat forces of each service; hence, army, air, naval, and special forces intelligence can be differentiated. At the operational and higher levels of command, intelligence should be an inherently multiservice activity. At each level of war at sea, a specific intelligence picture is needed to provide support in the employment of one’s maritime forces. A corresponding intelligence organization should be established at each level of command in peacetime and fully developed. Intelligence should be conducted continuously both in times of peace and war. It is also essential that naval operational commanders integrate intelligence into the other operational functions. Yet intelligence is only one – and not necessarily the most important – factor in making a sound decision and then preparing and executing plans. Tactical intelligence, as the name implies, supports the planning, preparation, and execution of naval tactical actions. In terms of the factor of space, it is focused on collecting, processing, evaluating, and distributing information for a given naval tactical commander. It also deals predominantly with the physical or tangible factors of a naval situation. Strategic intelligence supports the national leadership or theater-strategic commander. It provides input for the formulation of national policy, national security, and military strategy or theater strategy. Operational intelligence is used to support the planning, preparation, and execution of a major naval operation or maritime campaign. It should anticipate events several weeks or even months ahead. In contrast, tactical intelligence is concerned with events that take place over a day, or several days at the most (there are, of course, exceptions to this). Operational intelligence is a product of the fusion of tactical and strategic intelligence.11 One of the principal tasks of intelligence officers is to depict the operational situation by taking a vast amount of information on the tactical situation and meshing it with information obtained by the national-strategic or theater-strategic level of command. A good example of a successful fusion of strategic and tactical intelligence was the U.S. Navy’s preparation for what was later popularly called the Battle of Midway, in June 1942. U.S. strategic intelligence broke the Japanese naval codes and hence was able to read messages that provided an accurate picture of the enemy intentions and order of battle. However, because of inadequate tactical intelligence, on the eve of the battle the U.S. fleet was still in the dark as to the precise movements of the Japanese fleet.12 Nevertheless, Admiral Nimitz not only accepted the intelligence picture but also acted upon it at once.13 Without reading the Japanese codes, Nimitz would most likely have failed to concentrate the U.S. Navy’s much smaller forces in time to meet the much-superior Japanese forces.

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Operational intelligence should provide the naval operational commander with timely, accurate, and relevant information about the enemy maritime forces’ order of battle (OOB) and capabilities, and the enemy’s critical strengths and weaknesses. It should be concerned with the patterns of deployment of the enemy’s forces in a given maritime theater and probable trends in the situation for several weeks or months in the future. In contrast to tactical intelligence, operational intelligence in a maritime theater is concerned with many hard-to-quantify aspects of the situation, such as the quality of the enemy’s naval operational leadership, soundness of doctrine, combined arms tactics, effectiveness of joint employment of the enemy maritime forces and forces of other services, morale and discipline, and combat readiness of the enemy maritime forces. Specifically, the naval operational commander should have information on the personal traits of the enemy’s counterpart, his leadership skills and experience, and his relationships with subordinate and higher commanders. Operational intelligence should also determine and identify ways a naval operational commander can get inside the enemy’s decision-making cycle. A naval operational commander should know how the enemy’s opposing commander visualizes the maritime theater, what courses of action are open to him, and which of these he is most likely to adopt. As opposed to naval tactical intelligence, which is concerned primarily with immediate and near-term enemy capabilities, naval operational intelligence focuses on the enemy’s intentions over time. Naval operational intelligence should – in contrast to tactical intelligence – view and analyze the naval situation in a broader context and for a longer span of time and consider how those actions affect the enemy’s future decisions. Political, economic, informational, social, religious, legal, environmental, and other factors could considerably affect the enemy commander’s operational decisions; hence, the naval operational commander should have such information on which to base his own decisions. This information is most often provided only through strategic intelligence. The principal tasks of operational intelligence in peacetime and in war can arbitrarily be called intelligence preparation of the maritime theater. This process consists of sequential and simultaneous actions to continuously monitor and evaluate all aspects of the operational or strategic situation. Operational intelligence prepares threat area evaluation and analysis. It is responsible for identifying and determining the enemy’s critical factors and operational and strategic centers of gravity. It can also contribute significantly to naval operational commander’s actions to conceal the true center of gravity of friendly forces. Another related task of operational intelligence is determining the enemy’s possible actions against friendly centers of gravity. Operational intelligence should provide adequate indications and warnings (I&W) of the potential enemy’s hostile action. All three levels of intelligence in a maritime theater are intertwined and mutually dependent. Good tactical intelligence can significantly enhance one’s chances at the operational level. Poor or inadequate tactical intelligence

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adversely affects planning for a major naval operation or even maritime campaign. In addition, deficiencies in information collection at the tactical level affect operational intelligence and possibly strategic intelligence as well. For instance, in the Allied amphibious landing on Tarawa, in the Gilberts, in November 1943 (Operation Galvanic), poor tactical intelligence almost led to a costly operational setback. The U.S. photoreconnaissance of Betio Island was very good; an estimated 90 percent of all Japanese defensive positions were pinpointed before the landing on 20 November. However, hydrographic data were lacking, and that complicated the planning for the landing. The charts of the island and its approaches were a century old. The general pattern of tides for the area was known, but detailed information was missing. The U.S. planners were faced with the problem of whether to delay landing for a month and land at spring tide or, based on inadequate information, to land on the scheduled date, when the neap tide coincided with the scheduled H-Hour. Delaying the landing by one month would derail the entire Central Pacific Campaign schedule and give the Japanese additional time to fortify the islands. Thus, that option was rejected. The planners decided that landing in late November was feasible.14 This decision had almost fatal consequences for the Marines who landed on the three- by one-and-a-half-mile Betio Island on 20 November. As it happened, on that day a highly irregular low “dodging” tide occurred. A high dodging tide would have allowed sufficient depth for the landing craft to negotiate the reefs fronting the landing beaches. To make the situation worse, there was no way to predict whether the tide would be high or low in the next six hours. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, commander of the U.S. amphibious forces, refused to postpone the landing until 22 November, when the irregular tides would have passed. This decision led to great losses on D-Day, because two assault waves were unable to negotiate the reef. Some 1,500 Marines died that day.15 In the planning of the UN amphibious landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950 (Operation Chromite), the U.S. tactical intelligence picture was grossly inadequate. Although U.S. forces had occupied South Korea in the aftermath of World War II, and Inchon had been one of the main harbors, information regarding the harbor was almost totally lacking. Photographs were poor, maps were entirely inadequate, and there was little information on the condition of the mudflats, the height of the seawalls, and the tractional qualities and gradient of the mudflats.16 Because the strategic framework is so much larger and more critical for ultimate success, a failure of strategic intelligence invariably has highly adverse consequences at the operational and tactical levels. Errors in anticipating events and assessing enemy actions and possible reactions at the strategic level cannot usually be overcome by intelligence at the tactical and operational levels. For example, prior to the Falklands/Malvinas conflict on 2 April 1982, the British lack of strategic and operational intelligence was largely due to the low priority (level four, the lowest) they gave to collecting information on Argentine political leaderships and armed forces. The British had very little information about

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such intangible elements as the readiness of the Argentine air, ground, or naval forces. Surprisingly, the British also lacked up-to-date maps of the Falkland Islands; nor did they have the capability for aerial and satellite photography to alleviate the problem.17 Throughout the conflict, intelligence on terrain features and the Argentine dispositions and movements on the islands was primarily obtained by SAS/SBS patrol units. Once the hostilities started, most of the initial intelligence assessments were based on information available in the public domain. Other sources of intelligence were organizations and individuals who had contacts with the Argentine military prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Because of the lack of time and insufficiently reliable sources, initial intelligence assessments of Argentine capabilities were often misleading and erroneous. The British turned for help to the United States, France, and Germany for obtaining accurate information on Argentine weapons and sensors, because these three countries were the main suppliers of the Argentine military.18 In the course of the conflict, the United States provided substantial strategic and tactical intelligence to the British political leadership and highest military headquarters. Especially valuable was real-time tactical intelligence provided by the United States.19 Operational intelligence is rarely successful without an operational perspective on the part of intelligence officers, commanders, and their staffs. Such a perspective should provide a different appreciation for the physical environment than is found at either the strategic or tactical level. Planning a major naval operation and maritime campaign, requires a proper understanding of the effects of climate, rather than weather conditions on the employment of one’s forces. Intelligence officers acquire operational perspective through education and training in peacetime – that is, well before one’s forces become involved in hostilities.20 One of the most challenging tasks of intelligence at any level of war is to acquire and properly evaluate intangible aspects of the enemy’s situation, such as his true combat capabilities, morale and discipline, will to fight, quality of operational leadership, and soundness of service or joint doctrine. Modern technology cannot satisfactorily find the answers in evaluating such and similar aspects of the situation. The soundness of the enemy’s doctrine can be assessed only after long and painstaking efforts in collecting information on the enemy’s battle experiments, exercises, and maneuvers in peacetime and properly evaluating the enemy’s lessons learned. Today, very often too much emphasis is given to technical means of information collection and to intelligence concerning the tangible factors of a situation, while human intelligence (HUMINT) is given short shrift. Hard-to-quantify aspects of the situation, such as the enemy’s leadership skills, personality traits, possible intentions, and actions or reactions cannot be obtained through technical collectors. If HUMINT is neglected for too long, it is not easy or cheap to restore; rebuilding a network of agents and informers takes a long time. HUMINT-gathering efforts should be broadly based. Moreover, they should be tailored to regional political traditions and society, cultural nuances, language, and local mindset.

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To be effective, operational intelligence should be believable to naval operational commanders and their staffs. Sometimes the biggest problem is a naval operational commander who wants to be his own intelligence officer. He might feel more comfortable with his own experiences and be prone to ignore changes in the situation that might make that experience irrelevant. Alternatively, he might have strong cultural, political, or other biases that would cause him to reject accurate intelligence presented by the intelligence officer. He might also choose to ignore valuable intelligence or to accept such intelligence too late.

Operational C2W The concept of command and control warfare (C2W) is not new; it has existed in various forms and applications since the beginning of warfare. However, in recent years, capabilities for conducting C2W have grown significantly because of ever-greater advances in weapons, sensors, and communications. C2W is understood as the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, all supported by intelligence to influence, degrade, deny information to, or destroy the enemy’s command and control capabilities while protecting one’s command and control against such actions. It is applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict. Each of these components is supported by intelligence operations security, defensive elements of electronic warfare, psychological operations, and deception are at the same time integral parts of another function, operational protection. Each component of C2W can be used to supplement the effect achieved by other elements; often, however, the use of one component conflicts with the use of other components. Thus, proper planning of C2W entails considerable difficulty. In U.S. terms, C2W can be offensive (C2-Attack) or defensive (C2-Protect), and is often both at once. To be fully effective, C2W must be fully integrated into the commander’s operational idea and synchronized with other actions. C2W should be planned and conducted by all naval levels of command and war. Depending on the objectives to be accomplished, distinctions are made among tactical, strategic, and operational C2W. Tactical C2W is planned by the tactical level of command for the conduct of diverse tactical actions. Strategic C2W is aimed to support national strategic objectives in peacetime or in war. It is planned and executed by the highest national military command echelon. Operational C2W is planned and conducted by operational commanders in support of a campaign or major operation. In some cases, it can be planned and conducted by commanders of a joint task force (COMJTF). Its main offensive purpose is to disrupt the enemy’s decision cycle and, if possible, decapitate his command structure from the main body of his maritime forces. Operational C2W is also designed to prevent the enemy operational commander from deducing one’s forces’ real intentions. C2W is especially important at the operational level because of the ability it gives the operational commander to synchronize resources of two or more services in their offensive and defensive use of information.

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Offensive C2W is designed to disrupt the enemy’s decision-making and planning process by denying information to the enemy operational commander so that he cannot obtain an accurate picture of the situation. This would greatly affect his estimate of the situation. The purpose is to disrupt the enemy operational commander’s decision cycle and thereby slow the enemy’s tempo of operations. Offensive C2W is also aimed to disrupt, and optimally to sever, the connection between the enemy operational commander and his subordinate forces. Electronic warfare is a principal tool for degrading the enemy’s key points for command and control, while physical destruction severs those links more permanently. Offensive C2W is of little use unless it supports the naval operational commander’s plan. Properly planned and executed, it should force the enemy to be reactive, and induce the enemy’s operational commander to employ his forces at the wrong time and place. Electronic warfare (EW) plays a critical role in offensive C2W. Traditional methods in attacking enemy command and control, such as jamming, and new methods, such as cyber attacks, are used in conducting electronic attacks today. EW also supports many other elements of offensive C2W. Among other things, it enhances operations security effectiveness by neutralizing the enemy’s reconnaissance and surveillance. Electronic attacks and electronic support are used extensively as part of military deception. EW supports psychological operations by making it difficult or impossible for the enemy to observe and report conflicting information. Electronic support provides information on the enemy’s C4 nodes and other targets for physical destruction. An electronic attack could possibly limit one’s option to deceive the enemy by denying or degrading the use of certain parts of the enemy’s C4 systems. Psychological operations could be even more complicated, because an electronic attack might deny to the enemy the use of certain frequencies and thereby restrict one’s ability to target or reach the audience for the psychological operations themes. Likewise, an electronic attack could limit the application of available combat potential against enemy command and control because of the need to leave some enemy systems operable so psychological operations themes could be conveyed. Physical destruction in offensive C2W is aimed at destroying enemy electronic sensors, and automated data storage and analysis, communications, and command posts. The enemy’s information capabilities can be neutralized or destroyed by destroying the key nodes and links. This method is most effective when the enemy naval operational commander relies on certain C2 functions or when the focus is on resource-intensive and hard-to-constitute targets. Physical destruction supports operations security by degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s reconnaissance and surveillance of one’s forces. In the execution of military deception, very often, some elements of the enemy’s force must be physically destroyed or the enemy’s ability to observe and report severely degraded or completely prevented. Physical destruction could separate the enemy’s operational commander from his forces at critical times and thereby enhance the chances of deception. Likewise, physical destruction enhances the chances of success in conducting psychological operations by degrading or

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neutralizing the enemy’s ability to evaluate the situation or by isolating the targeted enemy’s audience from conflicting information. Defensive C2W is designed to maintain one’s effective C2, or to neutralize the enemy’s efforts to deny information to or influence, degrade, or destroy one’s command and control. Failure to adequately protect one’s C2 can lead to the loss of the initiative and thereby freedom to act. Defensive C2W is also a part of operational protection, because it is used to protect one’s information. Despite the term “defensive,” it contains both offensive and defensive components. Offensive actions usually protect elements of offensive C2W, while defensive actions and measures are aimed to reduce one’s C2’s vulnerability to enemy attack. The main purpose of protecting friendly C2 is to ensure uninterrupted collection, processing, and evaluation of information; obtaining an accurate picture of the operational or strategic situation; and maintaining continuous and reliable communications between operational commanders and subordinate tactical commanders. This purpose is achieved by drastically or completely reducing the enemy’s ability to attack one’s C2. Defensive C2W is aimed to reduce one’s C2 vulnerabilities by applying various protective measures. Another purpose is to reduce interference with one’s C4 systems throughout the electromagnetic spectrum. Operations security is an essential element for protecting one’s command and control. It must protect not only C4 elements’ current locations, but also techniques and procedures of informational systems. It can help identify those decisions critical to one’s operations and initiate appropriate measures to minimize the enemy’s ability to react preemptively. Psychological operations are used to induce the enemy forces not to use their counter-C2, or to use it improperly. EW in defensive C2W is used to degrade and destroy enemy information systems. Signal intelligence (SIGINT) data, in the form of signal security monitoring to identify potential sources of information for an enemy about friendly C4 systems, can be used when an enemy attack on one’s C4 nodes is impending. Deception is used to neutralize or exploit the enemy’s counter-C2 by misleading the enemy’s operational commander about one’s capabilities or limitations, thereby causing him to misallocate his forces and assets. Deception in defensive C2W is designed to give the enemy commander a false picture and thereby degrade his ability to make appropriate command decisions. One of the most effective methods of protecting one’s C4 system is to use cover and concealment. Physical destruction in defensive C2W involves the enemy’s means of affecting friendly C2. It requires targeting units, weapons systems, reconnaissance elements, and intelligence collection.21 Targeting enemy counter-C2 directly enhances the survivability of one’s C2. One of the prerequisites for effective operational C2W is timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence. Intelligence support of C2W analyzes the enemy command and control structure and determines enemy C2W capabilities.22 Therefore, it is critical to the planning and execution of C2W. Intelligence

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supports C2W through the collection, evaluation, analysis, and integration of all available information concerning the enemy’s capabilities. Capabilities to collect, evaluate, analyze, and transmit intelligence information have increased exponentially with the development of surveillance sensors, computers, and communications. Space-based systems and other national intelligence resources provide a far more accurate picture of the enemy than was ever possible in the past. The overall effectiveness of intelligence support is heavily dependent on all-source, timely, and relevant intelligence. Signal intelligence is perhaps the most important source of information on the enemy’s electronic order of battle. Intelligence is also responsible for disentangling intelligence from counterintelligence operations, because simultaneous or sequential activities can interfere with one’s C2W efforts. Counterintelligence supports C2W by conducting investigations, collection, analysis, and production of foreign intelligence. It also evaluates the enemy’s vulnerabilities to military deception.

Operational fires Operational fires were in the past often one of the main factors for the success of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. To be fully effective they must be sequenced and synchronized with other operational functions, particularly intelligence and logistics. In general, the distinction can be made among tactical, strategic, and operational fires in terms of their main purpose. Tactical fires are aimed to a decisive impact on the course and outcome of a naval tactical action. They are conducted within a given maritime area of operations or naval sector/zone, concurrently with or shortly before a naval battle or engagement. Strategic fires are intended to achieve a major effect on the course and outcome of a maritime campaign or, in some cases, even a war as a whole.23 They are planned by theater-strategic commanders and their staffs. Strategic fires usually take place outside the boundaries of a given maritime theater of operations where a maritime campaign or major naval operation would start or is in progress. Operational fires in a maritime theater are designed to have a decisive impact on the course and outcome of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. They represent today an inherently joint function. They are not fire support; hence, the success of an operational maneuver is not necessarily dependent on these fires. However, they can positively affect an operational maneuver.24 They are conducted in the operational and strategic depths of the enemy’s defenses.25 In contrast to tactical fires, operational fires are planned to accomplish an operational objective. Sometimes their purpose is to force the enemy commander to react operationally – for example, forcing him to commit his forces earlier than planned or deceiving him as to one’s sector of main effort or point of attack. The intensity of fires might even lead the enemy to misinterpret events and mistakenly react on the strategic level, as the Japanese did in October 1944. The ferocity of the attacks and strikes by Task Force 38 (TF-38) of the U.S. Third Fleet against Japanese airfields and other air installations, ports, shipping,

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and warships on Formosa and in the Ryukyus was a direct cause of the Japanese decision on 10 October to issue alert orders for the defense of Formosa (Sho-2 Plan) and the Philippines (Sho-1 Plan). These orders, in turn, led to a decision to transfer aircraft from four carriers and two half-converted battleship carriers to land bases on Formosa.26 Two principal types of operational fires can be differentiated: lethal and nonlethal. Lethal fires are designed to delay, disrupt, destroy, or degrade enemy operational forces or critical functions and facilities. They are conducted using conventional weapons such as missiles, bombs, guns, and rocket launchers. Unconventional operational fires are the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – biological, nuclear, or chemical. They can be used to strike targets in the enemy’s operational and strategic depths. However, the practical utility of unconventional fires despite their destructiveness is rather low, because in addition to the threat they pose to one’s forces, numerous political, military, legal, and ethical factors severely limit their use. Nonlethal fires are aimed to impair, disrupt, or delay the employment of enemy combat forces and operational functions. They can usually require more time and effort than lethal fires to be effective. They are also rather diffuse in nature and difficult to focus on a specific enemy force. Thus, nonlethal fires are usually not used in combination with lethal fires. The two most important types of nonlethal fires are electronic warfare (EW) and psychological operations. Theaterwide electronic warfare can deceive the enemy as to one’s forces’ impending actions, destroy or neutralize his electronic sensors and facilities, locate his forces and assets, intercept his communications, or disrupt his command and control. Aspects of EW not directly linked with the destruction of electronic equipment or personnel are considered nonlethal fires. In a maritime theater, PSYOP has generally much less role than they have in war on land. Yet they can be used to some effect in case of major naval operations conducted in the littorals. PSYOP can be possibly effective in influencing the enemy naval operational commander’s decision-making process over time. They can be also used as part of an integrated plan for lethal and nonlethal operational fires. Operational fires in maritime theater are usually delivered by aircraft, surface combatants, and submarines. Identical weapons platforms can be used for operational and tactical fires; however, the longer the range of the weapons platform the more suitable it is for conducting operational fires. For example, air-based fires not only offer longer range than other types of fire but also are highly lethal and precise. Carrier groups, large surface combatants, and submarines are capable of sustained employment throughout the depth of a maritime theater. Groups of heavy surface combatants and submarines armed with long-range land-attack cruise missiles can deliver fires to destroy or neutralize targets in the operational depth of the enemy’s defenses. In addition, offensive mining aimed at preventing the movement of enemy naval forces, troop reinforcements, or material to a given maritime area of operations is considered a form of operational fire.

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Operational fires are normally conducted beyond a declared (or undeclared) maritime area of operations in which the initial major operations of a maritime or land campaign are planned to take place. In the case of major amphibious operations, operational fires are conducted beyond the assigned amphibious objective area (AOA), which is usually smaller than an area of operations. In terms of timing, operational fires are often conducted well before the beginning of a major naval operation or the opening of a new maritime campaign. Once a major naval operation or campaign is under way, operational fires are often combined with tactical fires. Tactical fires, in contrast, start shortly before the start of a major naval operation and reach their full intensity while the operation is underway.27 In some cases, there is no clear distinction between operational and tactical fires in terms of timing and forces employed, because the same platforms can conduct operational and tactical fires. Methods of combat force employment in conducting operational and tactical fires may differ considerably. Operational fires can be planned (or seen in retrospect) as a major naval operation. This is usually the case when they are used in opening a new front or a new maritime campaign, as the Normandy invasion in June 1944 and the landing at Leyte in October 1944 illustrate. Constituting both a preliminary major naval operation (in the then newly opened Philippines campaign) and operational fires was TF-38’s series of massive strikes against the Japanese airfields, air facilities, ports, and shipping in the Ryukyus, on Formosa, and on Luzon prior to the landing at Leyte. From 27 October to 27 November, TF-38 also delivered operational fires in support of the Leyte Operation, attacking Japanese airfields and shipping on the island of Luzon. In a maritime theater, operational fires can be planned and conducted to accomplish one or more of the following purposes: isolate or shape the battlefield/ battlespace; facilitate friendly or prevent the enemy’s operational maneuver; interdict the enemy’s uncommitted forces; destroy or neutralize the enemy’s critical installations/facilities; disrupt or cut off the enemy’s logistical support and sustainment; deceive the enemy as to the place and time of a major naval operation or maritime campaign; weaken the enemy’s morale; and protect the development of new bases. One of the most common purposes of operational fires is to isolate or shape the battlefield/battlespace by preventing the arrival or slowing down the movement of enemy troop, air, or naval reinforcements or operational reserves in the area where one’s major naval operation or maritime campaign will be conducted or is already in progress. This can be accomplished by denying, disrupting, or depleting the enemy’s uncommitted forces.28 For example, in the preliminaries for the Allied landing on Sicily (Operation Husky) in the last two weeks of June 1943, Allied heavy and medium bombers conducted massive bombing of various targets along Italy’s western coast and on Sicily to prevent the movement of troop reinforcements and supplies to Sicily. Most of the Allied attention was focused on the port of Messina, which then served as the main terminal for Axis troop reinforcements and supplies from Italy’s mainland. These attacks were complemented by attacks on Reggio di Calabria and San Giovanni (across

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the strait of Messina). In addition, between 12 June and 2 July Allied bombers attacked a wide range of targets between Naples and Leghorn on Italy’s western coast and on Sardinia.29 In preparing the invasion of Normandy (Operation Neptune), the Allies planned, among other things, to cripple the German ability to operate in the air by destroying airfields both near the beaches and farther beyond the landing area. The plan for the operation envisaged the use of Allied bombers to reduce German air power – specifically air fighter strength – and to provide the maximum possible assistance to the ground forces preparatory to the actual assault, particularly affecting the enemy’s movements and troop concentrations.30 There were approximately 100 German airfields within 310 miles of the landing beaches.31 By the beginning of May 1944, Allied planners contemplated attacks on 40 German airfields within a 130-mile radius from Caen. The Royal Air Force (RAF), the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, and the U.S. Eighth Air Force carried out these attacks. The second area contained some 60 airfields and extended about 350 miles from Caen, reaching into Germany and the Netherlands. The U.S. Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force, based in Italy, attacked some of these; not all the airfields in this second area were attacked.32 Most of the German airfields in France were significantly damaged by the time the landing in Normandy took place. The air component plan for Operation Neptune also involved destroying enemy radar installations between Ostend and the Channel Islands, to deny their use in support of German night fighters and coastal guns and ships.33 Allied operational fires conducted before the Normandy landing on 6 June 1944 was largely successful in delaying the movement of German operational reserves toward the landing beaches. The destruction of the rail system west of Paris and of the bridges across the Seine and Loire rivers forced the Germans to make long marches, with many detours, under continuous aerial attacks. The Germans virtually abandoned daylight road movement, and their night movements were restricted by the short (six-hour) summer nights. This greatly inhibited their ability to concentrate enough combat power to destroy the Allied bridgehead in Normandy.34 The Allied efforts to isolate the Philippines before landing at Leyte were considerably expanded and intensified in October 1944. In addition to the TF-38 fast carrier groups, the Allies extensively employed their land-based heavy and medium bombers from four theater commands to isolate the central Philippines – in particular, the island of Leyte. Allied air forces essentially blockaded all air and sea approaches to the Philippines. The U.S. Third Fleet’s task was to prevent the arrival of Japanese air reinforcements from the home islands, the Ryukyus, Formosa, or mainland China.35 On 10 October, TF-38 attacked the island of Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyus.36 Carrier groups attacked Formosa from 12 to 14 October to prevent the Japanese from using the island as a staging base for their air reinforcements to the Philippines. The main targets were Formosan airfields and shipping.37 On the second day, sorties were again flown against Japanese airfields on Formosa and were supplemented by attacks

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on the Takao area by about 110 B-29s of the Army XX Bomber Command in China.38 The XIV Army Air Force agreed to bomb Japanese air installations within 1,000 miles of Kunming; these included Hong Kong, Hainan, and those in the Gulf of Tonkin.39 In addition, on 16 October 50 B-24s and B-25s of the XVI Army Air Force, based in China, struck shipping and waterfront installations in the Hong Kong area.40 The first waves of aircraft bombed, strafed, and fired rockets at three airfields in the Ryukyus, merchant shipping, and harbor facilities on 17 October.41 Operational fires can be used to facilitate the operational maneuver of friendly forces. Then the timing of fires should approximately coincide with the movement of forces from their concentration or staging areas toward their assigned operational objectives. For example, long-range, land-based bombers facilitated the maneuver of the Allied amphibious forces to land on the Gilberts on 20 November 1943. The operational fires started on 13 November, or seven days prior to the landing, when 18 B-24s of the 11th Group of the U.S. Seventh Air Force, based on Funafuti Atoll (Tuvalu, some 450 miles northwest of Western Samoa), bombed a variety of targets in the Marshalls. The Japanese bases there posed a threat to the Allied forces approaching Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts. The following day the U.S. heavy bombers hit Jaluit, and on 15 November (D-5) they struck Mille; a day later, they hit Kwajalein and Maloelap. Tarawa and Mille were again bombarded on 18 November (D-3), when bad weather forced bombers headed for Wotje to drop their loads on these islands.42 Operational fires can continue after a new major naval operation or maritime campaign starts. Then one of the principal objectives is to prevent the possible movement of enemy troop reinforcements and supplies into the area of operations. Interdiction of logistical sustainment can disrupt the enemy’s actions and hasten his arrival at the culminating point. For example, after the landing on Sicily (Operation Husky), the Twelfth Air Force attacked airfields in southern Italy around the clock between 17 and 23 July. Allied heavy and medium bombers attacked railroad junctions and facilities in the Rome and Naples areas. All rail traffic between northern and southern Italy, with the exception of that routed from Bologna to Foggia and Bari, passed through Rome. During the last three weeks of fighting on Sicily, Allied bomber attacks were directed against airfields from which enemy fighters and bombers might reach Sicily and Allied communications in the central Mediterranean. Between 8 and 15 August 1943, Allied strategic bombers conducted strikes against the Axis lines of communications and airfields in Italy, specifically in the Naples area, along the Tyrrhenian coast, in Rome, and in Bologna.43 Operational fires can be intended as part of a plan to deceive the enemy as to the place and time of a new major naval operation or maritime campaign. Because of the long operational reach of land-based bombers, carrier groups, and submarines, it is possible to attack a large number of targets within a given theater of operations and thereby make it difficult for the defender to correctly deduce the time and place of a major operation or campaign. In World War II, as

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part of the deception effort, Allied air forces were used on many occasions to attack a variety of targets over a large part of a theater. One of the most successful applications as a part of a deception (Plan Fortitude South) preceded the invasion of Normandy. For several weeks before the landing, Allied air forces carried out intensive strikes on rail networks in the area east and north of the Seine River. The destruction of the bridges across the Seine west of Paris convinced the Germans that the Allies wanted to cut off supplies toward the Pas de Calais area, where they expected the landing to take place. About 40 percent of the Allied bombing missions on D-3 and D-2 were conducted in the Pas de Calais area. The main targets of these attacks were the German coastal defenses and road and rail communications in the area.44 Operational fires can be also effective in protecting newly acquired naval bases and airfields or their development. They can also be conducted to prevent enemy forces from leaving a theater. This usually occurs after the major ground operation starts. In the aftermath of the Allied invasion of the Gilberts, during the remainder of November and most of December 1943, Seventh Air Force bombers staging through Baker and Nanomea Island (Tuvalu) from their bases at Canton Island (Kiribati today) and in the Ellices continued to bomb Nauru, Mille, Jaluit, and Maloelap in the Marshalls. These attacks were intended to protect the base development in the Gilberts and to prepare for the landing on Eniwetok.45

Operational logistics Logistics is one of the most important operational functions. Without an adequate and effective theaterwide logistical infrastructure, a campaign or major operation cannot adequately be logistically supported and sustained. In the course of a campaign or major operation, adequate sustainment is crucial to preserving and regenerating one’s combat potential so that the point of culmination is not reached or crossed before the assigned operational or strategic objective has been accomplished. Tactical, strategic, and operational logistical support and sustainment can be differentiated by the scale of military action. Tactical logistics is concerned with planning for and providing support and sustainment of battles, engagements, strikes, and other tactical actions. Strategic logistics deals with planning, preparing, and providing resources in support of the country’s armed forces as a whole. Specifically, it provides logistical support to industrial base mobilization, installation base support, consumer logistics, intertheater strategic concentration, and acquisitions and construction of facilities, services, and host-nation support. Strategic logistics is the bridge between the national economy and the combat forces. Operational logistics encompasses logistical organization in a formally declared or undeclared maritime theater of operations. It links strategic logistics to tactical logistics. Its main purpose is to ensure that one’s actions are continuous through all phases of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Thus,

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effective operational logistics should balance current consumption with the need to build up logistics support for subsequent operations. It should provide for lengthening the lines of communications and staging logistics support forward to maintain the desired operational tempo. Logistical support and sustainment are perhaps two of the most critical factors for the success of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Failure to establish sound logistical organization in the theater, a lack of readily available supplies of all kinds, and an inability to provide protection both to the elements of logistical organization and the lines of communications will lead to major setbacks and often to defeats. For example, logistics played a critical role in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982. This was especially true for the British, who faced the almost insurmountable problem of supplying their forces deployed at a huge sea distance between the home base in the United Kingdom and the Falklands/Malvinas and South Georgia islands. Furthermore, a logistical infrastructure was completely lacking in southern Atlantic. Nevertheless, the British achieved smooth cooperation and synchronization among the services and industry, selected a good staging area at Ascension Island, and properly used logistics intelligence.46 Without adequate logistical support and sustainment, the British recapture of the Falklands would not have been possible. Inadequate operational logistics was the main reason the Japanese Combined Fleet divided forces in its plan to defend the Philippines in October 1944. Because fuel inventories in the home waters were too low, it was necessary to base the heavy surface ships at Lingga Anchorage (some 90 miles southeast of Singapore), where oil was abundant. However, the Japanese were forced to keep their carrier forces in the Inland Sea, because that area offered better conditions for training pilots and obtaining replacement aircraft. It was planned that the fast carrier forces would join the remainder of the fleet once the pilots had been trained. Logistics should be fully integrated into the plan of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. At the same time, too much focus on logistics can unduly restrict options for the operational commander; hence, a proper balance should be found between the requirements for adequate logistical support and sustainment and purely operational requirements. In World War II, the Allies gave perhaps too much emphasis to logistical requirements in their operation planning. For example, in their planning for the invasion of Normandy (Operation Neptune), logistics dominated the determination of the objectives, the choice of landing sites, the size of the assault forces, and the plans for building up initial forces and the subsequent push inland.47 In both the invasion of Sicily and that of Normandy, the Allied overemphasis on logistics and the corresponding need to secure geographic objectives, as opposed to destroying enemy forces, was one of the main reasons that it took longer than it should have to defeat the German army. Logistics considerably affects the operational reach of one’s maritime combat forces – the distance over which their combat potential can be massed and employed decisively. This goes beyond merely conducting reconnaissance

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or strikes at a distance. Operational reach is affected by the effective range and endurance of one’s combat forces, and the length and degree of protection of one’s lines of supplies. It is influenced by the intervening physical environment separating the two sides. It can be extended by establishing new bases and deploying one’s forces into forward areas, increasing the effective range of weapon systems, extending the operational range and endurance of combat and combat support forces, improving the effectiveness of lines of communications, and improving the transportation network. Operational logistics has a finite range beyond which a logistics system cannot support combat forces; at that point, the offensive becomes logistically overextended – the force reaches the culmination point.48 For the Allies, the war in the Pacific in 1941–1945 essentially revolved around seizing the Japanese island positions from which to threaten the remaining enemy positions. The U.S. forces greatly extended their operational reach by seizing the Japanese-controlled Gilbert Islands in November 1943. By then, the U.S. operational logistics in the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) extended all the way from the Solomons in the southern Pacific to the Gilberts in the central Pacific and, via Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to the U.S. West Coast. The main logistics center was in the San Francisco area, with warehouses in Alameda and Oakland. The largest storage depot was built at Clearfield, Utah. The distance between Pearl Harbor and the Gilberts is about 2,000 miles – a 4,000-mile round trip for supply ships. Advanced bases were established to store supplies for the fleet. Some of these bases were indispensable, but the war in the Pacific could not have been won without mobile logistical support. Logistics is a function of command. For each naval level of command, there should be a respective level of logistical support in peacetime and in time of war. Operational logistics is inherently a multiservice and often a multinational effort. The naval operational commanders and their staffs bear the prime responsibility for all aspects of logistical support and sustainment of all subordinate forces in a theater. All too often, they believe that their supply officer or logistician alone is responsible for logistics. Yet a naval operational commander has sole responsibility for the planning and execution of logistical support and sustainment of all subordinate forces. All logistical levels are interrelated. Shortcomings or deficiencies at any level invariably affect logistics at other levels. Unity of command is essential to seamless linkage between operational logistics and strategic and tactical logistics. A single operational commander can properly sequence and synchronize all logistical elements in a given maritime theater. Optimally, logistical organization should be well established in a given maritime theater before the hostilities start. Logistical responsibilities and authority should be clearly defined. A simple, straightforward logistical structure that is focused, effective, and flexible should be established in a maritime theater. Centralized logistics can ensure proper selection of logistics priorities and the most efficient use of mode of transportation. However, a highly centralized logistics organization can become too rigid and therefore unresponsive to the needs of combat forces. In contrast, multiple

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logistics command organizations in a maritime theater inherently detract from effectively achieving unity of effort. The need for a logistical build up prior to the start of a campaign or major operation poses significant problems for keeping one’s true intentions concealed from the enemy. The movement of logistical supplies to ports and airports of debarkation can reveal one’s intentions unless they are coupled with a sound deception plan. Intelligence has a critical role in the logistical preparation of the theater. Operational logistics intelligence can be defined as that information necessary to plan and conduct the deployment and sustainment of military forces during a major naval operation or maritime campaign in a theater.49 Among other things, it includes the detailed analysis of terrain; number and characteristics of ports, airports, and airfields; status and capacity of seagoing and air traffic; road and railway networks; inland waterways; riverine shipping, and pipelines. Logistics intelligence also evaluates geography, efficiency of transportation, throughput capacity and enhancements, infrastructure protection, echelonment of support, and assignment of responsibilities.

Operational protection Protecting one’s naval forces from a wide range of threats in peacetime, crisis, and war is one of the most important responsibilities of a naval operational commander. While at the tactical level the naval commander focuses almost entirely on protection of ships at sea or in port, the operational commander’s responsibility encompasses the major part or the entire maritime theater. It includes protection of not only naval forces and shore installations/facilities but many elements of civilian infrastructure and population in the littoral area. The range of possible threats in a maritime theater is rather large, while one’s ability to provide full defense and protection is usually limited. Hence, naval operational commanders must make some hard choices in determining which forces and which part of the maritime theater infrastructure need more protection than others. The key to success at any level is unity of command. Only a joint force commander can successfully integrate and then synchronize all aspects of defense and protection in a given part of a maritime theater. In generic terms, a distinction can be made among tactical, strategic, and operational protection in a maritime theater. Tactical protection pertains to the defense and protection of naval forces deployed in a maritime area of operation or naval combat zone/sector. Strategic protection is organized in a given maritime theater of war. Broadly defined, the term operational protection pertains to a series of synchronized actions and measures conducted in peacetime, crisis, and war intended to preserve the effectiveness and survivability of military and nonmilitary sources of power deployed within the boundaries of a given maritime theater. Operational protection is organized in the case of regional conflict or general war, when maritime theaters of operations would be established. It can be also established in case of a counterinsurgency campaign in the littoral area.

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Optimally, operational protection in a maritime theater should encompass the following elements: collecting of intelligence for indications and warnings (I&W); air defense; sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) and airspace control; antisubmarine warfare (ASW); anticombat craft defense; and defensive mining and mine countermeasures (MCM), defense of the coast and coastal waters, defense of naval bases/ports, naval airfields, rear area defense, protection of information systems; protection of logistics infrastructure; defense against weapons of mass destruction; cover, concealment, and deception (CCD), operations security (OPSEC); and defense against terrorist acts. Collecting intelligence for I&W is aimed at analyzing and synthesizing information concerning the probability of hostile actions and measures. An effective I&W should provide timely warning so that a maritime theater commander has sufficient time to preempt, counter, and neutralize these threats. I&W deals primarily with the enemy’s situation in a given part of the maritime theater and how it might indicate more drastic changes in the near future – namely, capabilities and intentions to commit hostile acts, mobilization preparations and status, changes in combat readiness and deployment patterns. The air defense component of operational protection is conducted theaterwide, so the term operational air defense is often used. It involves protecting friendly forces and installations/facilities from air attack (including attack from or through space), through both direct defense and the destruction of the enemy’s air-attack capability, in the air and the ground. Air defense in a maritime theater is primarily concerned with protecting maritime forces at sea and in their bases/ports, land and air forces deployed in the littoral area and associated installations/facilities. Maritime theater commander should integrate sea-based and land- and air-based air defenses in the littoral area. Air defense in a maritime theater is established to prevent enemy attacks from the air on one’s naval forces at sea or at their bases. This includes conduct of air reconnaissance and surveillance, providing timely warning and alert to friendly maritime forces, destroying or neutralizing enemy aircraft and antiship missiles, and direct defense and protection of maritime forces. Air defense in a maritime theater is conducted by naval forces and in close cooperation with other services. This is particularly the case in enclosed and semienclosed seas.50 Forces of the fleet and coastal defense should be also employed for air defense. Successful air defense in a maritime theater requires comprehensive and effective reconnaissance of the enemy’s airfields, timely detection of aircraft and airto-surface missiles (ASMs), warning of one’s naval forces at sea and in their bases and forces of coastal defense, destroying enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air. Successful air defense would require extensive measures of cover, concealment, and deception (CCD) and EW. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is an integral part of operational air defense. Its primary purpose is to provide defense of military forces, political–economic centers, and population in the littoral area against the threat of the enemy theater ballistic missiles. An effective BMD not only is operationally important but also can be one of the key elements of regional stability.51 This task is too complex to

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be resolved by a single service. Active defense measures are aimed at destroying the enemy’s ballistic missiles in various phases of flight. Passive measures are designed to minimize the effects of an enemy ballistic missile attack and reduce the vulnerability of one’s forces, theater infrastructure, and civilian population to such an attack. Offensive actions are conducted to destroy the enemy’s research centers, ballistic missile production facilities, and launchers, with associated sensors and supporting structures. Because all services and many multinational forces use airspace, there should be theaterwide airspace control to ensure close coordination among airspace control, air traffic control, and air defense elements. To be truly effective, airspace control should be integrated throughout the chain of command. Its objective is to ensure combat effectiveness of ground, air, and naval forces in the course of preparing and conducting major operations and campaigns. Another purpose is to eliminate (or at least reduce) the chance of fratricide during the employment of one’s forces and assets. Combat airspace control’s requirements must be identical to those of air defense for identification of friend or foe. Accordingly, combat airspace control, air defense, and supporting C4 systems must have a high degree of interoperability and must be mutually supporting. Operational reconnaissance is one of the most critical factors for planning and execution of a major naval operation. A naval operational commander can make a sound decision by having a comprehensive and accurate picture of the situation. To obtain current and timely information on the enemy, reconnaissance should be conducted continuously. At the same time, the covertness of preparation of one’s maritime forces should be ensured. Operational reconnaissance should provide accurate, timely, and relevant information about the enemy forces at sea and at their bases and those deployed in the littoral area, facilities/installations on the coast, enemy shipping traffic, and oceanographic hydrographic and weather conditions. At the same time, one’s operational reconnaissance should not prematurely reveal the objective of the operation and status of friendly forces.52 The main purpose of antisubmarine defense in the basing and deployment area of one’s naval forces is to prevent attacks by enemy submarines against one’s forces during the deployment and execution of major naval operations. Specifically, this task consists of a search, detection, tracking, pursuit, and destruction of the enemy submarines trying to penetrate into the area of operations of one’s naval forces.53 The main purpose of anticombat craft defense, especially in enclosed and semienclosed seas is defense of one’s surface forces on coastal installations against enemy combat craft-missile and torpedo and their minelaying. Optimally, the enemy combat craft should be detected and attacked prior to sailing out from their bases or anchorages. This requires an effective surveillance of the enemy coastal waters and naval bases/ports in order to detect enemy combat craft before they sortie out. Mine defense or mine countermeasures (MCM) is especially important in shallow water and narrow seas. MCM is critical for the success of a major naval

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operation conducted in the littoral waters. The main aim is to destroy or neutralize enemy minelaying platforms, timely detection of enemy mines in the operational area, warning, keeping main lanes free of mines for operation of friendly forces and creating auxiliary routes.54 In crisis or war, a maritime theater commander will be responsible for establishing and maintaining security in the rear so that combat forces can be protected while preparing and conducting maritime campaigns and major naval operations. The purpose of rear area defense is to create a secure environment for the movements of combat forces and their logistical support and sustainment. Another objective is to ensure the smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the economy and other activities for the needs of one’s forces and the civilian population in the littoral area. The maritime theater commander should be responsible for the defense of all air, army, and naval bases/ports within his area of responsibility. The subordinate naval tactical commanders are responsible for the defense of the base or bases in their respective areas of responsibility. Maritime theater commanders are responsible for integrating the defense of all naval bases/ports, air bases, and army posts within their area of responsibility. Because resources are finite, not all bases can be defended equally well. Therefore, the maritime theater commander needs to determine which basing area must be protected better than another. One way of integrating defense and security measures is to divide the entire rear area into several clearly delineated rear areas of operations, with a single commander having sufficient responsibility and authority for all security measures. The maritime theater commander establishes command relationships and, if necessary, liaison officers between one’s commanders and the host nation’s military and civilian authorities. Logistics infrastructure in a maritime theater should be protected at all times. This is accomplished by assigning adequate forces to the theaterwide protection of one’s key elements of logistical support and sustainment – specifically, main and intermediate bases of operations, supply depots and distribution points, transportation nodes, and lines of communications. Passive measures of protection include decentralization of logistical infrastructure and dispersal of logistical installations and facilities; cover, concealment, and deception; and physical protection of personnel and equipment. Maritime forces and their shore establishment are increasingly vulnerable to hostile actions against their information systems (INFOSYS), across the operational continuum. The theater commander is responsible for employing defensive information warfare (IW-D) against asymmetrical attacks on information systems, infrastructure, and other critical areas vulnerable to nontraditional means of attack or disruption within his area of responsibility. IW-D is aimed at providing tactical warning, attack assessment, emergency response, and infrastructure restoration. Threats to the theaterwide information infrastructure are potentially worldwide in origin and hence know no geographic boundaries. The globalization of networked communications has resulted in vulnerabilities because of the increased access to one’s information infrastructure from points around the world. Types of attacks against elements of one’s information infrastructure can

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range from unauthorized access to physical destruction. Unauthorized access can be aimed either at gaining information or at inserting false or misleading information. Malicious software might be inserted to cause a computer to operate differently than its user intended. Various viruses can be inserted to alter or corrupt data or to make it misleading or useless. Some viruses are designed to bypass protective programs. Other types of hostile attacks against information systems include collecting intelligence, jamming, broadcasting false signals, and generating an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Jamming and deceptive transmission can be used to attack commercial communications systems. Physical destruction can be used as a way of degrading or destroying military communications and controlling networks or civilian systems. A well planned and coordinated infrastructure attack can be serious. However, it requires an adversary with seriousness of purpose and with some sophistication and organization. Operations security (OPSEC) is not only a component of C2W but is established theaterwide as an integral part of the much broader operational protection. It is defined as the process of identifying critical information and then analyzing one’s actions so they can be protected from anticipated hostile actions and measures. This process includes three main steps: identifying actions of one’s forces that the enemy can observe; determining indicators that the enemy can interpret these actions; and deciding what measures are needed to reduce or eliminate one’s vulnerabilities to the enemy’s actions. Actions considered most likely to be observed by the enemy are better protected than others. One of the most important tasks of OPSEC is to obtain and maintain the highest degree of secrecy about the capabilities and intentions of one’s forces. As part of operational protection, OPSEC should be concerned not only with the enemy’s current dispositions but also with those several weeks or months in the future. To be successful, OPSEC measures must be applied equally to all operational functions within a given maritime area or theater of operations. No major naval operation or campaign can ultimately be successful without an appropriate, effective, and soundly executed OPSEC. Defense and protection against WMD poses unique problems for theater commanders and is difficult to organize on a theaterwide basis. Passive and active measures of avoidance are one of the main methods in the defense against WMD. Passive measures include dispersion, hardening, and cover and concealment. Warning, detection of contamination, and reporting are the main active measures of avoidance. Protection of personnel includes special clothing, protective masks, collective protection shelters, and medical treatments. After the use of WMD, various decontamination methods should be used to restore combat potential and prevent additional casualties. In today’s environment, terrorist acts are a constant threat to one’s forces, facilities, and civilian populace. These acts can be directed against naval ships and installations/facilities, personnel, and their dependants located far beyond the boundaries of a given maritime theater. The maritime theater commander should presume that civil authorities and host governments will take a major part of the responsibilities for antiterrorist actions and measures; however, he should

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be responsible for coordinating those measures aimed specifically at protecting naval facilities, equipment, personnel, and family members. Closely connected to protection of naval bases/anchorages against terrorist threat is protection of commercial ports in a given maritime theater. There is a wide range of potential threats to port security. Attacks from the sea surface can include seizing control of a large commercial cargo ship to ram an important bridge or to hit an oil refinery near the waterfront; sinking or damaging a warship at a pier or at anchorage; and sinking a large commercial ship in a major shipping channel, thereby blocking all traffic to and from the port. Another scenario might include an attack on a super crude oil or liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker to cause a massive in-port explosion. Such an attack could possibly disrupt the world’s oil trade and cause large-scale environmental damage. Terrorists might also try to seize control of a large ferry or cruise ship, at sea or in a port, and then threaten to kill all or some passengers if certain demands are not met. Commercial cargo containers can possibly be used to smuggle terrorists; nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; or other dangerous materials. Attacks using submersibles and swimmers can be aimed to destroy or damage ships at the pier or anchorage. Underwater swimmers can covertly deliver explosives or a chemical or biological agent. Terrorists can infiltrate a port from the land side and then try to destroy or damage a ship at the pier, a major port installation, or a bridge or refinery near the waterfront. Port security cannot be effective without having a single source of authority responsible for coordination of the work of various government and nongovernment agencies, the shipping industry, and the business community. The security of each port cannot be ensured unless it is an integral part of the broader maritime security in a coastal area. The necessary degree of coordination among all the actors involved in maritime security at the regional and the local level can be considerably enhanced by having a consultative body composed of the representatives of both civilian authorities and naval/military commands involved in maritime security. Maritime security plans should be coordinated with the plans for operational protection in a given maritime theater. No component of operational protection stands alone; to be entirely effective, each must be fully integrated with other elements. For example, OPSEC is an integral part of all components of operational protection, as is physical security. Likewise, the protection of information systems should encompass the entire maritime theater of operations but is also an integral part of air defense, airspace control, and many other components. In peacetime, the threats to one’s naval forces tend to come from terrorist groups and to be more nonconventional – for example, acts against naval personnel or civilians, attacks on information systems, and use of biological, chemical, or possibly even nuclear weapons. In crisis and war, threats to one’s forces multiply, because the enemy can use both conventional and nonconventional means against one’s forces deployed in the maritime theater, the civilian population, and important military–economic installations/facilities. The intelligence element of protection is obviously conducted continuously in peacetime and in crisis and war.

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Conclusion Operational command organization is perhaps one of the most critical and at the same time all-encompassing of all operational functions. It is the principal means by which the naval operational commander sequences and synchronizes the actions and activities of both military and nonmilitary sources of national power in a given theater. Sound operational command organization should be simple and flexible enough to allow for the full application of the principle of centralized control and decentralized execution. It should provide for unity of effort through unity of command. It should allow the application of the principles of objective and mass when needed. The responsibilities of each command echelon should be clearly established and delineated. There is no greater error for a naval operational commander than unduly interfering with the actions and decisions of a subordinate tactical commander. Good intelligence is one of the most important prerequisites for making a sound decision and then preparing a sound plan and skillfully implementing it. The importance of good intelligence should be neither overestimated nor underrated. Intelligence is relatively more important at the operational and strategic levels of war because of the much larger objectives to be accomplished and the correspondingly greater factors of space, time, and force. However, tactical intelligence is often a critical factor for achieving tactical victories. Hence, intelligence in a theater must be fully integrated; otherwise, deficiencies at one level can seriously undermine the effectiveness of intelligence at other levels of command. The new information technologies are no great help in obtaining and then properly assessing hard to quantify elements of the situation, despite what their most enthusiastic proponents assert. While these technologies have greatly improved and will continue to improve the operational commander’s knowledge and understanding of the physical aspects of the theater, not much progress is being made in improving his knowledge of the intangible elements of the situation in a theater. There is no substitute for the human element, in both intelligence collection and analysis, in the near future, to resolve this critical and integral part of war. C2W has emerged as an increasingly critical component of operational functions. The operational commander is the only one who can properly sequence and synchronize the use of C2W in support of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. C2W can also be quite effective in operations short of war and in time of crisis. Among C2W’s greatest advantages are its diversity and flexibility, compared with the use of physical destruction. Any of the five components of C2W can be used individually or in combination, depending on the assigned objectives and the situation. Each component can supplement the effects of other elements, but they can also be in conflict with each other. Therefore, the employment of several components of C2W in support of a maritime campaign or major naval operation requires judicious balancing of oftencontradictory requirements. C2W planning and its incorporation into plans for a

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maritime campaign or major naval operation are extremely complex and require the highest degree of knowledge and skills on the part of the naval operational commanders and their staffs. Operational fires are an important method for enhancing the chances for a successful outcome of a major naval operation or maritime campaign. They differ considerably from other fires in their main purpose, timing, and duration, the area in which they are conducted, and the command echelon that plans and conducts them. They are intended to have an operational or even strategic impact on the enemy. Logistics is one of the most important operational functions in support of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. It is more complex and more vulnerable to a wider range of hostile actions than logistics in a typical land theater. The ultimate purpose of logistics is to extend operational reach or to prevent the enemy from extending operational reach for its own forces. Many major naval operations have failed because of inadequate or poor logistical support and sustainment. Naval operational commanders should have full authority over logistics for their subordinate forces; otherwise, it is difficult to synchronize various logistical elements with operations during the planning, preparation, and execution phase of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Operational protection in a maritime theater is inherently a joint responsibility. It is organized, planned, and conducted by the respective maritime theater commander. This requires an operational rather than tactical perspective on the part of the naval operational commander and staff. Optimally, all sources of power, both military and nonmilitary, should be fully protected on a theaterwide basis. Realistically, however, this is impossible, even in a developed theater: because one’s resources are limited, the maritime theater commander cannot adequately protect all forces under his command on a theaterwide basis. Therefore, he must find a delicate balance between what is necessary and what is possible. Most often, protection of one’s forces in a given maritime theater is given higher priority than protection of nonmilitary sources of power. An increasing problem for a maritime theater commander is how to effectively protect the information systems in his theater. This highly complicated issue defies easy, fast, or cheap solutions. The problem is further complicated when some critical elements of the information infrastructure are physically located not in a given maritime theater but hundreds or even thousands of miles away. The maritime theater commander, is often faced with difficult choices because of competing demands between force protection in the entire theater and the protection of friendly centers of gravity. No maritime theater commander can go wrong if he decides to fully protect his center of gravity while temporarily weakening the protection of other forces deployed in the maritime theater. To do otherwise means taking inordinately high risks that might, in the end, doom the entire major naval operation or even maritime campaign.

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The decision-making and planning process for a maritime campaign or major naval operation is based on using the same techniques and procedures as for a land campaign and other major operations. However, there are also some significant differences because of the nature and characteristics of war at sea compared to war on land or in the air. The operational decision-making and planning process is usually complex and time-consuming. Yet without detailed planning it is hard to employ one’s maritime forces successfully. The more detailed the decision-making and planning process, the easier is to modify, alter, or even radically change plans once a maritime campaign or major naval operation is under way.

Making a decision One of the principal responsibilities of commanders at any level of command is to make decisions for the combat employment of their forces. The most common method of making a decision is by conducting a thorough assessment or estimate of the situation – a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the factors affecting a military situation to determine a course of action to accomplish a given mission. The commander has to analyze and compare several friendly courses of action and enemy capabilities in order to identify the course of action that offers the best chances of accomplishing the mission. The estimate of the situation should be solely the responsibility of the commander. His personal involvement is driven by the time available for the estimate, his personal preferences, and the experience and accessibility of his staff. The larger the scale of the situation, the broader the aspects of a given naval situation that the commander and his staff must evaluate. Intangible elements of the situation play a much more important role in the operational commander’s estimate than in the tactical estimate. The estimate conducted by the operational commander is supplemented by the estimates of the various sections (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil–military affairs, information operations, C4, etc.). These staff estimates (or supporting estimates) are subordinate to the estimate conducted by the operational commander and his staff. Staff estimates provide an assessment

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of the situation and an analysis of the course of action the commander is considering. Each staff estimate includes a conclusion and a recommended course of action for the respective functional area. Staff estimates are conducted concurrently with the commander’s estimate. Selected parts of each supporting estimate should be evaluated by the commander and his staff and then adopted or modified or even rejected. The final estimate of the situation should reflect the commander’s best assessment of the strategic or operational reality at the time of the plan’s execution. The principal elements of the operational commander’s estimate of the situation are the mission, the situation, the commander’s intent, enemy capabilities (or courses of action), friendly courses of action, and the decision. The methods these elements are arranged and integrated into the estimate process vary from military to military and from service to service, and even from commander to commander. There is also no commonly agreed method of conducting the estimate of the situation. In generic terms, the commander’s estimate encompasses the following steps: mission analysis, estimate of the physical/human environment, the enemy situation and the friendly situation, analysis of the opposing courses of action, comparison of friendly courses of action, and the decision. The mission analysis is the first and most critical part of the estimate of the situation at any level of command. The result of this step of the estimate is a restated mission; the commander’s planning guidance, and a tentative commander’s intent. All the subsequent steps of the estimate should be consonant with the commander’s restated mission and initial intent. The mission analysis process provides the direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand. The operational commander is solely responsible for analyzing the mission and restating it for subordinate commanders to begin their own estimate of the situation, making a decision and planning. He and the planners should also take fully into account the missions of the neighboring friendly commanders during their mission analysis. The larger the objective, the more complex the military situation in terms of space, time, and force. The maritime situation is characterized through the status and actions of opposing forces, terrain; oceanography/hydrography state of weather/climate and time of day and year, and other conditions.1 It encompasses three overlapping situations; ground, naval, and air(space). The operational commander and his planners should analyze each component of a military situation individually and then collectively to create a picture of the situation from a multiservice and/or multinational perspective. The estimate of the situation encompasses the estimate of the three distinctive but interrelated and overlapping situations: the friendly situation, the enemy situation, and the physical (including human) environment. It might also be necessary to estimate the situation of neutrals. In generic terms, estimating the situation means analyzing the causality of all its elements and their influence on the accomplishment of one’s mission. For that purpose, the operational commander should divide the situation into its constituent parts and determine how each part affects the employment of both the enemy and friendly forces. He also

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should determine how to make maximum use of favorable factors in the situation for the employment of friendly forces while at the same time accounting for those elements that can potentially preclude or weaken one’s combat actions. The analysis of the physical/human environment differs significantly at each level of command. A naval tactical commander is concerned with those aspects of the physical environment that affect the course and outcome of a naval tactical action. Hence, he has to focus on those aspects that affect the employment of individual ships, submarines, and aircraft, tactical-size units, and naval combat arms. A naval tactical commander has to assess the physical environment in terms of oceanographic/hydrographic conditions, characteristics of the immediate coastal area, and the weather. He is also concerned with the human aspects of the coastal area. In contrast, the maritime operational commander needs to analyze operational features of the environment, that is, those that affect the employment of several naval combat arms and forces of other services taking part in a maritime campaign or major naval operation. This task requires proper synthesis of the tactical information on the physical environment to create an operational picture of the situation. The human factor can either facilitate or restrict the employment of naval forces in the littoral area. Hence, the possible effects of population, urbanization, ethnicity, religion, domestics, and foreign policy on the employment of friendly and the enemy naval forces should be properly evaluated. The proper analysis of the physical/human environment by the maritime operational commander should include its advantages and disadvantages for friendly and enemy C2. A general description of the geography/terrain and oceanography/hydrography should be followed by an assessment of their specific aspects and then a conclusion for each. Advantages and disadvantages of the physical environment for both friendly and enemy maritime forces should be evaluated in some detail. In the conclusion, the operational commander should highlight in which way the geography/terrain and weather/climate is favorable for one’s operation – conditionally favorable or unfavorable. The estimate of the enemy’s situation is an important part of the operational commander’s estimate of the situation. In general, the operational commander and his staff can focus on either the enemy’s capabilities (ECs) or the enemy’s intentions (ECOA, or enemy course of action). The method of relying on the enemy’s capabilities should be used at operational and higher levels of command, while reliance on an estimate of the enemy’s intentions offers more advantages at the tactical level, where speed and energy in action are relatively much more important.2 The most important advantage of relying on the enemy’s capabilities is that the operational commander and his staff would cover the full spectrum of what the enemy can physically do in a given situation. Hence, the risk of being surprised by overlooking some enemy capability is relatively low. Among the disadvantages of this method is that the enemy commander’s intent is not taken into account. The estimate of the enemy’s capabilities is the heart of the estimate of the enemy situation. The term “enemy capabilities” (EC) refers to the actions of

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which the enemy is physically capable that, if adopted, would affect the accomplishment of one’s mission.3 The U.S. term “enemy courses of action” (ECOA) clearly implies that one has reasonably accurate knowledge of what the enemy will do. Hence, this term should not be used in the estimate process unless one has accurate and reliable sources of information on what the enemy’s real intentions are; in that case, it would be foolhardy to ignore such information. For instance, Admiral Nimitz and his staff obtained through the Magic intercepts accurate and reliable information on what the Japanese plan was prior to the Battle of Midway in June 1942. They used that information to concentrate available carrier forces off Midway. The enemy’s intentions are the actions that he might or might not adopt. Enemy intentions are rarely known with any confidence without knowing the enemy’s mission – and that information is unlikely to be known to the commander. Even if such information was available, the enemy could change or feign his intentions. No enemy capability should be dismissed or overlooked because it is considered unlikely or uncommon. Perhaps the worst thing to do is to determine an enemy capability by using “mirror imaging” – thinking that the enemy will not do certain things because one would not do them in a similar situation. Generally, the enemy’s intentions are subject to change with little or no warning. Hence, the naval operational commander should focus on the enemy’s capabilities, not his intentions. The exception to this is if the enemy’s intentions are known and based on accurate and relevant intelligence. The enemy’s ability to change his doctrinal procedures and techniques based on lessons learned should be considered as well. The operational commander should be interested in everything the enemy can do that can materially influence his course of action.4 The main input on the enemy’s capabilities should be provided by the intelligence staff estimate. The naval operational commander and his staff, not the intelligence section/division, should be the ones who make the final determination of the enemy’s capabilities (or courses of action). Intelligence analysts tend often to rely more on the enemy’s intentions than on his capabilities. This viewpoint is more likely to result in fewer potential enemy courses of action, because many options are – intentionally or unintentionally – omitted from consideration. Generally, in estimating enemy forces, the naval operational commander should focus on those forces that can be employed against friendly forces. Among other things, this includes information on the enemy’s overall strength, combat effectiveness, and combat activity up to the time of the estimate. It should also include some time calculations regarding the effect of geography/ terrain and weather/climate.5 The process of determining the full range of the enemy’s capabilities is often time consuming. The operational commander has to possess complete information about the enemy, and the enemy situation needs to be comprehensively estimated. This method is also more difficult to learn.6 The method of relying on the enemy’s intentions in assessing the enemy’s situation is much faster. It is also easier to learn by the commander and his staff. It favors quick and energetic

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action. However, the disadvantage is that not all information on the enemy is collected and evaluated. Thus, the risk of omitting some enemy capability is correspondingly higher than in using other methods. This method can also be misused to justify a decision based on the enemy’s favorable posture for friendly forces.7 Subordinate functional/service component commanders in conducting their estimate of the situation should use the enemy’s capabilities developed by the naval operational commander as the basis for developing the enemy capabilities pertaining to their respective forces. Then each of the enemy’s service/functional components would become the main or supported force, while other components would act in support. The same logic should be applied in developing courses of action for friendly forces. In estimating the friendly situation the operational commander and his staff should have accurate and reliable knowledge of where the friendly forces are; which of them can be employed immediately and which will become available; and which forces of the adjacent commanders can be counted on or must be supported by one’s forces.8 This part of the estimate should be focused on the key elements of the factor of force: order of battle (OOB), combat training and readiness, leadership qualities, state of morale and discipline, and logistical support and sustainment. The naval operational commander should ask himself what the solution is for accomplishing his mission, which one solution is possible, and which one appears desirable.9 He should also evaluate the effect of the factor of time on the employment of friendly forces, and he should draw certain conclusions from the estimate of friendly forces.10 In developing each friendly course of action, the naval operational commander and his staff should envision the employment of friendly forces and resources as a whole, taking into account planning assumptions determined in the mission analysis step of the estimate, externally imposed limitations, the military situation, and the previously reached conclusion on the physical features of the operating environment. He also has to consider the effect of ROEs on the employment of friendly forces. The emphasis should be – and this is often forgotten – on the entire mission.11 The naval operational commander and his staff should make sure that each friendly course of action encompasses the phases within a specific major phase of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The first task in developing the friendly course of action is to determine whether the mission’s purpose (objective) is offensive, defensive, or a combination of the two. Afterward, the naval operational commander and his staff should identify friendly regular forces (ground, naval, air, special forces, and other) one to two command echelons down. Major force elements should be expressed in generic terms thereby leaving the subordinate functional/service component commanders to assign force elements with their proper designation. At the operational level, the focus should be on the force that would accomplish the main objective of the pending operation. In a multiservice employment of one’s forces, the outcome of the entire operation is normally on land. Hence, each friendly course of action should provide more details on the actions of land forces and express only in very broad terms the actions of the subordinate

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functional/service components. Afterward, a respective functional/service component commander in conducting his estimate should use friendly courses of action developed by the operational commander as the basis and develop his course of action in more detail. A functional/service commander would also focus on those force elements that would accomplish the main objective in their respective physical medium (land, sea, air). Each friendly course of action should be fundamentally different than all others; otherwise, the operational commander and staff will waste time developing a larger number of friendly courses of action than warranted by the mission and the situation. Similar to the process of developing the enemy’s capabilities, the variability or distinctiveness of a course of action is ensured by varying the employment of friendly combat forces in terms of the factors of space, time, and forces. Taken together, the courses of action should exhaust the possibilities for meaningful action by the friendly forces. If these criteria are met, then the friendly courses of action are considered collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive. A friendly course of action developed by the operational commander should include deployment of a force as a whole, followed by possible actions against enemy forces, by answering the questions who (service/functional component or force element), what (type of action), and where (location of action). This step of the estimate process, it should not include when (the time) or how the particular task should be carried out. The temptation to use too many words in describing a friendly course of action should be avoided. The more concise the statement of the possible courses of action, the more clearly distinctions among them can be recognized. All the friendly courses of action developed during the estimate process, except the final one, are only tentative solutions to the problem at hand.12 The analysis of friendly COAs and the enemy’s capabilities (or courses of actions) is one of the most important parts of the entire estimate process. This is the first time friendly courses of action are compared with enemy capabilities (courses of action). The main purpose of this dynamic interaction is to eliminate those friendly courses of action least likely to accomplish the mission. This analysis should include considerations of the weather/climate, terrain, oceanography/hydrography and friendly and enemy forces; relative strength; composition and dispositions; logistic support; and requirements for future operations. Very often, the naval operational commander should fully consider the effects of nonmilitary aspects of the situation on the maritime campaign or major naval operation. The naval operational commander and his staff need to analyze and compare both the enemy’s capabilities (or courses of action) and friendly courses of actions in a dynamic setting. This part of the estimate can be very complex because many intangible elements fall within the scope of the analysis. The naval operational commander’s judgment and experience are critical in selecting which friendly course of action should be retained and which discarded. The key to making this determination is reliable and thorough knowledge of both the

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enemy’s and friendly capabilities in terms of such hard-to-quantify factors as leadership, doctrine, morale and discipline, unit cohesion, and degree of jointness. The naval operational commander and his staff might use some quantifiable methods in evaluating combat potential for each friendly course of action and enemy capability (or course of action).13 At the same time, the naval operational commander should not allow mathematical computations to drive his analysis. He and his planners should fully take into account the human factors, such as the enemy’s intentions, will to fight, morale and discipline, etc. These calculations are of limited usefulness because of the inherent difficulties in properly assessing and anticipating the results of the highly dynamic interactions between the physical elements of the situation and its human aspects. In conducting the comparison of friendly COAs the naval operational commander and his staff make a list and consider the advantages and disadvantages of each retained friendly course of action, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility and acceptability, weigh the relative merits of each friendly course of action, and then select one that offers the greatest chances of accomplishing the mission. Because the advantages and disadvantages of any particular friendly course of action can be quite lengthy, one method is to concentrate on factors that “govern” the outcome of the visualized interactions with the enemy. The governing factors are those aspects of the situation or externally imposed considerations that the commander deems decisive to the successful accomplishment of his mission. They can range from selected principles of war (surprise, mass, offensive, economy of effort, security, etc.) to command and control, logistics, protection, deception, potential losses for friendly forces, some feature of terrain, oceanography/hydrography, a geographic position, and lines of operations. They might also include factors that facilitate or ensure the success of future operations. However, the true effectiveness of this method is suspect, because the selection of governing factors and their respective numerical weights is almost entirely arbitrary. After identifying advantages and disadvantages for each of the retained friendly courses of action, the operational commander and his staff should identify what actions to take to minimize the disadvantages. These can include some novel method of employing one’s forces, deception, or requesting additional forces or air support. This process is applied to each of the retained friendly courses of action. A final test of feasibility and acceptability should be conducted before the final determination is made as to the optimal and secondbest friendly courses of action. The naval operational commander relies heavily on experience in making the final selection of a friendly course of action. If none of the friendly courses of action are adequate or acceptable, the operational commander should present them, along with supporting facts, to the higher commander. He should point out what can be accomplished under the circumstances and estimate what additional forces would be required to accomplish the original mission. It is then the responsibility of the higher commander to either direct that the selected course

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of action be carried out despite the consequences or change the original mission statement. The operational decision is the final and most important step in the operational commander’s estimate of the situation. It must clearly show the commander’s will to win.14 It should be a clear, logical, concise statement of the operational commander’s intentions. His subordinates should never be in doubt about what they are asked to do. The decision should spell out what the command as a whole must do and should provide some details on the who, when, where, how, and why. The operational commander may decide to adopt a course of action without modification or altering the best friendly course of action to overcome disadvantages; develop a new course of action by combining favorable elements of multiple courses of action; or discard all courses of action and repeat the mission analyses and course of action development. The decision determines the effectiveness of the resulting action. Its soundness depends on a high degree of professional judgment, fortified by knowledge and founded on experience, on the part of the naval operational commander. The naval operational commander’s professional judgment is inherently strengthened by mental exercise in applying a logical process to the solution of military problems. A written decision should contain three main elements: the decision statement, the commander’s intent, and the operational idea (scheme). The decision statement should express in broad terms what the force as a whole has to do and why. It should be expressed in the first person. It should be written clearly, concisely, and in commonly accepted and understood doctrinal terms. Before issuing the decision, the operational commander and his staff should review the initial intent and, if the situation has changed, modify and refine it before issuing it. The naval operational commander’s intent establishes the framework for the initial planning for the staff and subordinate commanders. The intent is one of the most critical tools of successful C2. It is not simply a restatement of a mission.15 The intent is also not the desired strategic end state, which is issued by the highest politico-military authority. In its simplest terms, the commander’s intent is a concise description of the military conditions (or military “landscape”) the commander wants to see after the specific mission as a whole is accomplished. The intent is an expression of the naval operational commander’s vision. It provides a link between the mission and the operational idea (scheme). The naval operational commander should consult with his chief of staff and other members of the staff before issuing his intent to subordinate commanders.16 It should be issued to subordinate commanders two levels down.17 The naval operational commander’s intent should inform subordinate commanders what needs to be done if the initially issued orders become obsolete because of unexpected changes in the situation.18 The intent should provide an insight into why the naval operational commander is embarking on a particular course of action.19 Ideally, the naval operational commander’s intent should define mission success in a way that provides commonality of purpose and unity of effort. It should allow the subordinates to exercise the initiative if the original plan or order no longer applies or unexpected opportunities arise.20

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In the intent, the naval operational commander clarifies but does not restate the purpose (the why) of the mission. He rather focuses on the situation beyond the purpose of the immediate phase of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. This helps subordinate commanders pursue the mission without further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned.21 The broader the commander’s intent, the larger the framework and the greater the room for the subordinate commanders to exercise freedom of action in accomplishing the assigned mission. The naval operational commander should not include in his intent the method by which subordinate tactical commanders should accomplish their assigned mission; otherwise, this would violate the intent’s very purpose. Such details invariably limit subordinate tactical commanders’ ability to act creatively in accomplishing the assigned mission. Moreover, they prevent subordinates from exercising the initiative in reacting to sudden and unexpected changes in the situation. The intent should also not include an operational idea for the pending maritime campaign or major naval operation. The naval operational commander’s intent should be clearly expressed in its entirety in the execution part of a plan/order. His intent should be written in the first-person singular using compelling language. It should fully reflect the personality of the commander issuing it. Intent should tell subordinates what they must do and why. In addition, it should define success in terms that are executable.22 The naval operational commander’s intent should be concise so the subordinate commander can remember it.23 It should be no longer than four or five sentences. The commander’s intent should not contain verbiage that can cause ambiguity and misinterpretation. It should ensure that priorities are defined. Precise and commonly understood doctrinal terms should be used whenever possible. The main purpose of developing an operational idea is to further clarify the naval operational commander’s restated mission and intent. The operational idea should explain in some detail when, where, how, and why each service functional component (for a maritime campaign) or combat arm (for a major naval operation) would be employed to accomplish the mission. It should include sufficient detail to allow the planners to draft operation plans and orders – but not too many details, which might limit flexibility during the subsequent planning process. In drafting the tentative operational idea, the naval operational commander and his staff should express in broad, clear terms the tasks and objectives to be accomplished by each major force element for each phase of the forthcoming operation. However, the focus should be on the first phase of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The operational idea should clearly state in geographic terms the sectors of main and secondary effort and the point of main attack (defense). It should also indicate the sequencing of tasks and the tentative time frame for each. After a decision is made the next tasks are organization of forces carrying out

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operational deployment and direct preparation of forces and units for the start of combat actions. These tasks are extremely difficult to effectively resolve in a narrow sea due to the size of a theater and the existence of modern means of all types of reconnaissance. This requires all-encompassing measures of operational cover, concealment, and deception so to lead the opponent in false directions or sectors.

Planning In general, operational planning is concerned with preparing, testing, and executing plans for specific campaigns and major operations by using tenets of operational art. It is conducted continuously, both in peacetime and in time of conflict or war. It is necessarily much broader in terms of the factors of space and force, and it looks much further ahead than tactical planning in terms of the factor of time. In generic terms, the basic types of planning are sequential, parallel (or concurrent) and collaborative. In sequential planning, the higher commander and his staff conduct planning first; this is followed by planning by subordinate tactical commanders. It is usually detailed and methodical. It minimizes the risk that subordinate headquarters will receive an obsolete estimate of the situation and plans. At the same time, the entire planning process takes a relatively long time to complete. In parallel planning, the naval operational commander and the subordinate commander start the planning process simultaneously or almost simultaneously. This type of planning results in great savings of badly needed time. It is highly suitable in a contingency and when the time available for planning is short. Today, parallel planning is facilitated by continuous information sharing between higher and subordinate headquarters. In addition, early, continuous, and rapid sharing of planning information among subordinate and adjacent forces allows subordinate commanders to start planning concurrently with higher headquarters. This is facilitated by issuing a warning order and planning guidance. In the collaborative planning process, there is a real-time interaction among the commands and staffs of two or more echelons developing plans for a single maritime campaign or major naval operation. Collaborative planning greatly speeds up the entire process. It allows subordinates to provide the higher commander with their current assessment and status and apprise him of how they are postured for various operations. It is made possible by information technologies that allow the real-time exchange of information by voice and video. It greatly enhances the understanding of the commander’s intent and planning guidance throughout the force. It also considerably reduces the time required for all echelons to complete a plan. Collaborative planning is a dynamic process. Information sent by the higher commander might change often. This, in turn, can cause a lot of confusion for subordinates. Commanders might be inhibited in meeting the needs to adjust planning by a concern that subordinate commanders will think plans are changed too often. Additionally, there is a great danger of a disconnect between the higher commander’s and subordinate commanders’ plans.

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Planning responsibilities Maritime campaigns and major naval operations should be planned, prepared, and executed by a single joint force commander who has the necessary authority to sequence and synchronize the employment and sustainment of national multiservice or multinational forces. In case of a regional or general war, a maritime theater of operations command should be established to accomplish a single strategic objective. Each of subordinate service and/or functional component commanders would normally plan and execute major operations as an integral part of a campaign. For the time being, major naval operations will be planned as part of a land campaign conducted in the littoral area. A maritime campaign will be planned and conducted only in case of a major conflict between the strong opponents at sea.

Planning considerations In planning a maritime campaign or major naval operation, the naval operational commanders must consider a number of military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation in a given maritime theater. In planning a maritime campaign the operational commander should thoroughly evaluate the effect employment of friendly forces would have on the nonmilitary aspects of the strategic situation in the theater. While foreign policy or purely domestic politics should not dominate the entire operational planning process, the naval operational commander and his planners should never neglect or willfully ignore the foreign policy ramifications of a certain course of action. A maritime campaign or major naval operation cannot be planned without fully considering the legal aspects of the use of one’s maritime forces. A sound operation plan must conform to the law of armed conflict and the law of the sea. The national political leadership should resolve the issue of how one’s forces can be most effectively employed while observing international law and the law of armed conflict. Rules of engagement (ROE) should be carefully and opportunely drafted to guide the naval operational commander and his staff during the planning and execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. One’s forces have an inherent right to individual and unit self-defense. Rules of engagement must be clear, tailored to the situation, and reviewed for legal sufficiency. At the same time, operational commander should avoid the other extreme: crafting too-strict rules of engagement that might make it extremely difficult for friendly forces on the battlefield, or might even preclude success. A plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation should be based on a number of operational considerations, arbitrarily also called operational design (for details see Chapter 6). Plans for a maritime campaign and those for a major naval operation have some commonalities, but they also differ significantly in terms of their ultimate objectives and corresponding factors of space, time, and force. A sound operational design should ensure that one’s forces are employed in a logical and coherent manner and focused on the assigned opera-

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tional or strategic objectives. The operational planners should contemplate several time- and space-related phases. They should firmly lay down required resources and direct these toward the accomplishment of the assigned ultimate objectives.24 The basic plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation contains, in rudimentary form, only the most important elements of an operational design. Other elements are provided in detail in the annexes to the basic operation plan and the plans of subordinate land, sea, airspace, and special forces component commanders. In generic terms, the design of a maritime campaign or major naval operation should envisage all the actions and measures required for the deployment, combat employment, and redeployment of one’s forces. In operational terms, the heart of the operational design is the operational idea (or scheme) (for details see Chapter 7). During the planning process, the provisionally drafted operational idea in the naval operational commander’s decision should be refined and, if necessary, modified to satisfy possible changes in the strategic or operational situation. Normally, it is the responsibility of the national or alliance/coalition leadership to decide when a new maritime campaign should start. However, the operational commander and his staff should provide input to the strategic leadership concerning the optimal time, in terms of the day of the year and the time of day, to start the campaign. The key issues pertaining to the factor of time that should be satisfactorily resolved include the anticipated duration of a maritime campaign or major naval operation; time for planning and preparation; mobilization time; and time for deployment of maritime combat forces into the theater. One of the most critical steps in designing a maritime campaign or major naval operation is to determine the tentative time frame required for the accomplishment and then consolidation of the ultimate strategic or operational objective. Afterward, the tentative length of each major phase of a maritime campaign should be determined. Major phases Strategy and policy provide an overarching framework for planning a maritime campaign. Both are conducted uninterruptedly through all phases of a maritime campaign. Role or strategy and policy in the major combat phase are obviously less pronounced than in the other major phases of a maritime campaign. A maritime campaign provides the operational framework for subordinate service and functional component commanders in planning respective major operations. In generic terms, a war can be divided roughly into three distinct but overlapping phases: pre-hostilities, hostilities, and post-hostilities. The corresponding phases for a maritime campaign are the pre-major combat, major combat, and post-major combat phases, respectively. In the case of a global war, several maritime or land campaigns might be required to accomplish the ultimate national or alliance/coalition strategic objectives in a given maritime theater of

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war. Then only the last campaign in a given theater of war would have a post-hostilities phase; all others would end with the post-major combat phase. Also, in case of a major regional conflict, the last phase of a campaign that ends hostilities would encompass a post-hostilities phase. A campaign in a conventional high-intensity war is usually preceded by a crisis in which one or both sides might conduct a series of political, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other actions aimed to resolve the crisis, prevent further escalation, or create prerequisites for the successful employment of one’s combat forces. During this phase, mobilization, predeployment, and strategic/ operational deployment takes place. The strategic objective of a maritime campaign is accomplished during the major combat phase. Afterward, strategic success must be consolidated in the post-major combat phase. In a campaign designed to end hostilities, there are two additional and relatively short phases: the war termination phase, between the end of the major combat phase and the post-hostilities phase; and the socalled transition phase, between the end of the post-hostilities phase and the handover of authority to the legitimate indigenous government or an international body. All phases of a maritime campaign must be considered a seamless whole; otherwise it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to synchronize all required sources of military and nonmilitary power and thereby ensure final strategic success. Experience conclusively shows what the negative consequences are when planners ignore the post-hostilities phase. Planning for each major phase of a maritime campaign should be the responsibility of the operations section/division of the operational commander’s staff. Each of these plans requires very different expertise. Hence, one solution is to have four planning cells within the operations section/division tasked with developing their respective plans. Each of these plans should be continuously reviewed and modified once a campaign is under way. A major naval operation is an integral part of a maritime or land campaign. Regardless of its purpose, it comprises three main phases: deployment, combat employment, and postcombat. Reconstitution of one’s naval forces might be necessary in case the losses in ships, aircraft, and personnel are so high that units or elements are not capable of conducting their assigned combat mission. Reconstitution involves two distinctive tasks, reorganization and regeneration of combat potential. Specifically, the naval operational commander has to restore combat-attrited units under his command to a level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and the availability of resources. This includes cross-leveling or replacing personnel, supplies, and equipment; reestablishing command and control; and conducting essential training. Perhaps the most critical step in planning a maritime campaign or major naval operation is to determine the tentative time frame required for the accomplishment and then consolidation of the ultimate strategic or operational objective. Then the tentative length of each major phase of a major naval operation should be determined.

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Relations with media The operational commanders must also consider media impact during the planning and execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Planning should facilitate the interaction between the military and national and international press organizations. Relations with the media are another important area that requires constant attention of the operational commander and subordinate commanders and their staffs. The naval operational commanders should integrate into their plans the effects of media coverage of their operations. Also, relations with media should not be the sole responsibility of the public affairs officer.25 The public affairs officer should be actively involved in the planning process. The public affairs should be used to reduce the adverse impact of information flow on the course of the operation. Today, the instantaneous nature of information dissemination provides means to the naval operational commanders to modify their decisions and actions very quickly. The information flow can be managed through careful and synchronized issuance of releases designed to shape the information battlefield.26 Control and coordination The operational commander and his staff should also make the necessary arrangements for control and coordination. These include determination of the boundaries of the surface area, to facilitate coordinating and deconflicting operations. In war at sea, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent naval units and formations are defined. Lateral, rear, and forward boundaries can be used to define areas of operations for air, land, and naval forces. Various fire coordination lines must also be precisely delineated. Air sorties are not constrained by surface boundaries in a general sense. However, the naval operational commander should deconflict the multiple uses of airspace. In addition, the delivery of air weapons inside surface boundaries normally requires coordination with the surface force commander. Interagency cooperation/coordination One of the most critical, yet also most difficult, problems to resolve satisfactorily in planning and executing a maritime campaign or major naval operation is ensuring smooth and effective interagency coordination. This entails comprehensive cooperation between the naval operational commander and his subordinate naval tactical commanders and other naval organizations. Interagency coordination essentially involves actions aimed at harmonizing political and military objectives of national and alliance/coalition political authorities, and actions between ambassadors in theater and host-nation authorities in support of the planned campaign. Coordination of the campaign plan with national or alliance/coalition strategy and coordination with adjacent operational commanders and supporting commanders are obvious necessities. In addition, the naval

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operational commander should plan for coordination with various nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations, especially in situations short of war. Coordination is especially critical for one’s success in war termination in the post-major combat phase of a campaign. Basic plans and orders In generic terms, the planning process ends with the completion of the basic operation plan (OPLAN). Because a maritime campaign can last several weeks or even months a sound operation plan should contemplate possible changes in the situation on both sides within a given time frame. The further ahead one projects, the less certain and detailed a plan should be. Therefore, the plan describes the initial phase of a maritime campaign or major naval operation with some certainty. Normally, for the first phase of a major naval operation, an operation order (OPORD) is written. An OPLAN is based on a number of planning assumptions developed or modified during the operational commander’s estimate of the situation process. The basic OPLAN also contains a number of annexes to deal with specific parts of the plan that require elaboration (e.g., task organization, operations, intelligence, IO/C2W, logistics, personnel, public affairs, civil affairs, C4, etc.). The basic operation plan should be presented graphically on the nautical chart. The graphic presentation serves primarily as an overview of the plan. The key part of the graphic presentation should be a broad outline of the operational idea for the entire maritime campaign or major naval operation and for each of their main phases. The main body of the plan should be written clearly and concisely. At the same time, the plan should provide sufficient detail for subordinate component commanders to write their own plans and orders. The less directive and detailed the plan, the more freedom of action is allowed to subordinate commanders. The plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation should reflect the commander’s operational vision. It should highlight the ultimate objective to be accomplished. It should ensure the proper sequencing of objectives or tasks and synchronize the employment of all sources of power. It should describe in some detail the overall concept and the naval operational commander’s intent, a tentative sequence of phases and operational or tactical objectives that would lead to success, and general concepts for key supporting functions. A sound plan should focus on defeating or neutralizing the enemy center of gravity. Yet neither the plan nor an operation order should explicitly spell out what the respective operational or strategic center of gravity is. It is even worse when the operational commander and his staff determine tactical centers of gravity in their campaign plan. These and similar tactical details are best left to subordinate commanders. The basic operation plan should be as complete as possible; otherwise, its execution will invariably end as a series of improvisations and cause significant loss of time and resources. In general, the planning process should be based on a

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few essential tenets of operational warfare. The simplest things are usually the most successful. A plan should be flexible in case something goes wrong during its accomplishment. In war, there are always unforeseen circumstances that require often-drastic changes in existing plans. Hence, operational commanders and their staffs should be able to adjust their plans quickly without benefit of making the proper estimate of the situation and thorough planning. The timely strategic or operational deployment of one’s combat forces into the theater should be based on sound planning. The deployment plan is closely related to mobilization and logistics plans. All these plans should be approximately in harmony. There is no greater error than having several commanders and their staffs plan deployment, especially when headquarters are physically separated by large distances. Only the naval operational commander can properly plan and execute deployment for a maritime campaign or major naval operation. He normally controls diverse and complementary modes of transport and therefore can adjust deployment flow based on the resources available and can control movements of personnel and materiel in a theater or area of operations. The deployment concept developed during the naval operational commander’s estimate of the situation is the basis for deployment naval planning. His decision should describe in some detail the deployment sequence of subordinate service/functional components. Afterward, the subordinate tactical commanders should sequence the deployment of their major force elements on the basis of the operational commander’s sequencing timetable. The naval operational commander and subordinate component commanders should evaluate the time required to complete the deployment, the timing of the deployment, force protection, and logistical sustainment requirements. One’s maritime forces should be deployed in a timely manner because the course of the entire maritime campaign or major naval operation is profoundly affected by the initial deployment of one’s forces. The operational commander and his staff should develop a provisional organizational concept during the estimate of the situation process. This includes, among other things, the proposed boundaries of the maritime theater and its subdivisions, command relationships, and forces’ subordination. Optimally, the naval operational commander should delegate authority and responsibilities to subordinate component commanders so they can exercise sufficient freedom of action. During the planning phase, the provisional concept of task organization is further refined and included as an annex to the OPLAN. Task organization should not be confused with the operational command structure, task organization is established for a specific mission and situation. It is a product of the naval operational commander’s estimate of the situation. The determination of task organization depends principally on the missions assigned to the force; the nature and scope of the military and, often, nonmilitary actions; the geographic characteristics of the area; the assigned forces – friendly and those of the potential opponents; and the time available. Ideally, task organization should not

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undergo major changes in the first phase of a maritime campaign or in the course of a major naval operation. The only exception is when one’s forces have been so attrited that they must be reconstituted. Supporting plans One of the most important supporting plans for a maritime campaign or major naval operation is the logistical concept developed concurrently and in harmony with the commander’s operational idea. The logistics plan is critical for supporting and sustaining one’s maritime forces in all phases of the pending maritime campaign or major naval operation. It should provide a rough outline of the logistical requirements during the deployment of one’s maritime forces, the major combat phase, and the post-major combat phase. Plan for logistical support and sustainment should be fully integrated with the basic plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The naval operational commander is primarily responsible for developing the plan to use these resources to support the operational idea. In addition, the naval operational commander coordinates the logistic part of the plan with the international and national organizations, service components, and other commands supporting a maritime campaign. The logistics plan should be flexible and make provisions for anticipated changes. Logistics planners should prepare plans for support and sustainment for all anticipated major phases of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The deception plan is an integral part of the basic operation plan. It requires early and detailed planning. Deception planning should result in developing a plausible, realistic plan within the limits of the resources available. It should outline the methods selected for conveying the deception story to the target. Deception plan and its distribution must be kept secret; otherwise the entire deception effort might end in failure and even undermine the success of the basic plan. Sometimes a deception plan may be drafted in the course of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The basic operation plan should never be based on the success of a deception plan. However, a sound deception plan should help the execution and ultimate success of the basic plan considerably. A deception plan entails a certain degree of risk to the success of the basic plan. The operational commander and his staff should properly evaluate the degree of that risk during the planning process. Deception planners should consider how the planned deception effort fits not only the operational but also the political and diplomatic schemes as well.27 Plans for a maritime campaign or major naval operation sometimes require a separate scheme for conducting operational fires. The main purpose of operational fires is to establish favorable terms for the initial major operations in a maritime campaign. Properly planned, operational fires can have a devastating effect on enemy forces. They are one of the best means available to the operational commander to define and shape the battlefield/battlespace. A failure of

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operational fires would require readjustments or even alterations in the plan for a campaign. The operation plan should provide for proper sequencing and synchronization of operational and tactical fires. A plan for operational intelligence should be prepared as an integral part of planning for a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Without solid intelligence support, it is difficult to develop sound plans for mobilization, deployment, combat employment, and redeployment. Intelligence plays an especially critical role in the preparation of operational deception plans. Intelligence support should be continuous during the entire planning process. The basic operation plan should contemplate timely and effective intelligence preparation of the maritime theater and effective dissemination of intelligence throughout the chain of command. The rapid and systematic exchange of intelligence information is essential. A particularly difficult task is to have available data on the enemy’s intentions and possible reaction to one’s actions. A plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation today should be supported by a plan for operational IO/C2W. Properly planned and executed, C2W can decisively weaken the enemy’s information structure at the outset of hostilities. An IO/C2W plan has an essential role in the targeting process for the entire force. Electronic warfare and PSYOP consume much time and resources, so preparations for IO/C2W should begin well before the start of the planned maritime campaign or major naval operation.28 Planning offensive C2W depends on the assigned mission, the commander’s intent and operational idea, and synchronization with the plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The purpose is to seize and maintain the initiative by degrading the enemy’s informational systems and forcing the enemy to react. Offensive C2W requires sound balancing and integration of all its components. The planners should also consider the effect that degradation of the enemy command and control may have on ongoing efforts to influence the enemy operational commander’s actions. Sometimes degrading the enemy C4 links too severely adversely affects these efforts.29 To attack the enemy C4 systems, planners should understand how the nodes within that system fit together to make the enemy system work. Within a C4 system, one or more nodes may be of such critical importance that their destruction immediately degrades the functioning of the entire system. To provide a viable target, the C4 node should be not only critical, but also vulnerable; it should be susceptible to degradation or have an exploitable weakness. It should be accessible – that is, there should be some way to reach it – and degrading it should be feasible; optimally, targeted C4 nodes are both critical and vulnerable.30 The naval operational commander and his staff should also synchronize selected elements of operational protection to enhance the successful conduct and outcome of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Because one’s resources are finite, the operational commander should find a balance between the forces and assets required for force protection and those for the protection of friendly operational and strategic centers of gravity. He also should try to do

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everything possible to adequately protect selected elements of the logistic infrastructure in the theater, C4 nodes, information systems, naval and air bases, shipyards and ship repair facilities, and various civilian installations and facilities. The list of what should be protected is a long one. This is especially the case in a developed theater. Yet the naval operational commander’s ability to provide adequate protection is usually limited. Hence, it is an art to determine what needs to be protected and to what extent and then to distribute the available forces and assets judiciously to do the job. Operational commanders must integrate operations security (OPSEC) measures into the planning process to protect the plans from the enemy’s attempts to obtain information on its details and the time of its execution. This requires a series of security measures conducted over time throughout the chain of command. Effective OPSEC minimizes the signature of the joint force and helps to avoid set patterns. When these patterns cannot be changed, various cover and concealment measures should be used to deceive the enemy.

Synchronization of operational functions Operational commanders and their staffs should also make necessary and timely arrangements for synchronization of operational functions in support of a maritime campaign. Because of the much smaller scale of the ultimate objective, a major naval operation would require synchronization primarily of combat support and some elements of each operational function. The operational command organization is the key element that can either facilitate or derail synchronization of all other operational functions. Hence, the higher politicomilitary leadership must ensure that the operational command organization is timely and properly established. Security and timeliness of information is also influenced by successful functioning of naval communications. Limited dimensions of a typical narrow sea provide especially favorable conditions for conduct of effective electronic warfare. This can seriously threaten not only security of communications but also the entire information display system.

Conclusion The estimate of the situation is the bedrock on which the operational commander’s decisions are made. It does not guarantee a sound decision, but it ensures that all elements of the situation are addressed and certain conclusions drawn. It is in the estimate process that the naval operational commander must show his ability to think broadly and not be concerned with tactical details. He relies on the input of many staff officers and subordinates to obtain the best possible knowledge of the situation. This is why he must insist on qualities such as personal integrity and good judgment in selecting his chief of staff and subordinate commanders. The estimate of the situation should follow a logical and common sense path. It should ensure that no principal element of the situation with a bearing on the

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decision is omitted. The key prerequisites for making a sound decision are the naval operational commander’s knowledge and understanding of all the elements of the estimate of the situation. The process leading to a sound decision is largely an art rather than a science. The commander’s professional knowledge and judgment are key to making a sound decision. Planning for a maritime campaign or major naval operation is both an art and a science. Many elements of planning – for instance, combat forces’ capabilities, techniques and procedures, deployment planning, and logistical planning – can be expressed in quantifiable terms. The art part of planning encompasses the naval operational commander’s knowledge and understanding of the complexity of the dynamic relationship between the friendly and enemy forces. It also includes balancing one’s ends, means, and ways throughout the planning process. It involves determining the ultimate and intermediate objectives, allocating one’s resources among competing and often contradictory requirements, identifying the enemy’s and friendly center of gravity, selecting forms of maneuver, planning deception, establishing a sound task organization, and many other elements of sound plans. The operational commander’s willingness to accept high but prudent risks is also the art part of the planning process. Planning for a maritime campaign or major naval operation should result in a plan with built-in flexibility. The initial clash with enemy forces would require from the naval operational commander to adjust, modify, or completely rewrite his plan. The enemy cannot be made to conform to one’s will, at least not initially. This fact, combined with the inherent problems of execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation, will result in a continuous fog of war and friction until the assigned operational or strategic objectives are accomplished.

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Operational design

Operational design is a loose collection of diverse elements that the naval operational commander and his staff should consider in developing the basic plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operations. In generic terms, design for a maritime campaign and major naval operation may contain the following elements: desired strategic end state; the ultimate and intermediate objectives; force requirements; balancing operational factors against the ultimate/intermediate objectives, identification of the enemy and friendly centers of gravity; initial geostrategic positions and lines of operations; directions/axes; the operational idea; and operational sustainment (see Figure 4). Because of the much larger

Desired strategic end state

Initial geostrategic position

Initial lines of operation

Ultimate/ intermediate objectives

Force requirements Main elements

Operational idea (scheme)

Determining the enemy and friendly strategic/ operational center of gravity

Balancing operational factors vs. objectives

Operational sustainment

Figure 4 Design for a maritime campaign/major naval operation.

Direction/axis

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scope of the objective to be accomplished and the corresponding differences in the factors of space, time, and force, the main elements of design for a maritime campaign differ qualitatively from those for a major naval operation. For example, the desired strategic end state is not normally part of the design for a major naval operation, but it can be an element of design for a maritime campaign. The initial geostrategic position plays a major role in designing a maritime campaign, while the initial lines of operations are the key element in planning a major naval operation.

Desired strategic end state A maritime campaign planned to end hostilities requires a clear statement of the desired strategic end state – the political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, ethnic, humanitarian, and other conditions – the highest political leadership wants to exist after the end of hostilities. In terms of the factor of space, the desired strategic end state encompasses the major part of the entire maritime theater of operations plus adjacent and an undefined ocean/sea and/or land area. In terms of the factor of time, the desired strategic end state can be short, medium, or long term. Obviously, the longer the timeline the more difficult it is to plan for and achieve such a desired strategic end state. Any major and undesirable event in the aftermath of hostilities can significantly complicate, if not completely deny, the accomplishment of the desired strategic end state articulated prior to the start of hostilities. The highest national leadership should, by properly defining the desired strategic end state, correctly visualize strategic effect once the strategic objective is accomplished and then consolidated. The desired strategic end state should be an integral part of strategic guidance. In general, the larger the scope and complexity of the desired strategic end state, the more resources and time one would need to accomplish it. Also, the further ahead the political leadership projects the desired strategic end state, the more difficult it is to achieve it in practice. The operational commander responsible for planning and executing a maritime campaign should be consulted on military aspects of the desired strategic end state.

The ultimate objective The first and the most important step in designing a maritime campaign or major naval operation is to properly determine and articulate the ultimate and intermediate objectives. In general, determination of the proper military objective seems a simple and straightforward process. However, several factors must be properly evaluated by the operational commander and the planners in order to determine militarily achievable objectives. Among other things, the naval operational commander must properly assess the enemy’s factors of space, time, and force from the enemy’s perspective. In general, the larger the scale of the objective to be accomplished, the larger these factors are and more difficult it is to properly

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evaluate them. The naval operational commander needs to evaluate the physical size and operational features of a given sea/ocean and adjacent land areas, the distances from the given physical objective to the staging/deployment area of friendly maritime forces, and the time required for the enemy’s forces to be deployed, concentrated, and reinforced. The process of determining the objective in a littoral area would also require considering some nonmilitary aspects of the situation. In determining the ultimate objective the intangible elements of the enemy’s factor of force may play a far more critical role than the purely physical elements. For a maritime campaign, the ultimate objective is military or theaterstrategic in scale. It is usually physical in its character. For example, the ultimate objective of the Solomons Campaign, August 1942 to January 1944, was to obtain control of the Solomons Archipelago and thereby prevent the Japanese from further expansion in the southern Pacific, plan defense of the sea lanes of communications between the U.S. West Coast/Panama Canal and Australia/New Zealand. In the Allied Central Pacific Campaign (November 1943 to September 1944), the ultimate objective was to seize control of the key archipelagos in the central Pacific and cut off the Japanese shipping routes to the southern Pacific. Specifically, the Allies decided to occupy and control the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, and Western Carolines and neutralize the central Carolines archipelago. A maritime campaign to cut off enemy maritime trade or defend and protect friendly maritime trade, as was the Battle for the Atlantic, September 1939 to May 1945, is also predominantly physical in character. The attacker’s objective is to destroy or damage merchant ships at sea and shipping-related facilities/ installations and industries in the littoral area. In a maritime theater containing a relatively large population and infrastructure, the ultimate objective of a maritime campaign is usually combination of the tangible and intangible elements. For example, the ultimate objective of the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) in December 1941 to February 1942 was to physically occupy the area, defeat American–British– Dutch–Australian (ABDA) forces, gain firm control over the population, and the area’s natural resources, and cut off NEI’s links with the rest of the Allied controlled area in south and southeast Asia. Because a major naval operation is an integral part of a maritime or land campaign, its ultimate objective is operational in its scale. For example, the main objective of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (Operation Hawaii) was to destroy a major part of the Pacific fleet based on Oahu, aircraft on the ground, and associated naval facilities. The ultimate objective of the UN major naval operation, amphibious landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950 was to cut off logistical supply lines to the North Korean troops besieging the UN forces at the Pusan perimeter and thereby force them to retreat and fight on a reverse front. Sometimes the ultimate objective of a major naval operation might comprise two operational and some major tactical objectives. For example, the Allied invasion of the Marianas in June 1944 (Operation Forager) the ultimate

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objective comprised two operational objectives: capturing the island group Saipan, Tinian, and Aguijan; and the island of Guam plus one major tactical objective (island of Rota).

Intermediate objectives Normally, the ultimate objective of a maritime campaign or major naval operation cannot be achieved with a single action. Hence, the ultimate objective should be divided into several tasks that collectively will accomplish a given ultimate objective. Intermediate objectives are, in turn, transformed into the objectives to be accomplished by subordinate commanders. The operational commander and his planners should determine several intermediate objectives that needs to be accomplished sequentially and/or simultaneously to collectively achieve a given ultimate objective. For a maritime campaign, intermediate objectives are usually operational in scale, while for a major naval operation, intermediate objectives are usually major tactical. In selecting intermediate objectives, the naval operational commander and his staff should avoid being either too rigid or too predictable; both would make it easier for the enemy of taking a timely counteraction. Normally, intermediate objectives should not be pursued simultaneously or in too rapid a sequence; a maritime campaign or major naval operation might be unnecessarily prolonged or the entire effort may fail. Too many intermediate objectives would result in slowing down the tempo and wasting sorely needed time and resources. On the other hand, too few objectives would entail a risk of reaching the point of culmination before the specific intermediate objective is accomplished. Hence, the planners should find a way to avoid both extremes. The intermediate objectives provide a path toward the accomplishment of the ultimate objective. Their number and sequence in which they are accomplished should not be rigidly laid out. Among other things, the degree of the enemy resistance or new intelligence on the enemy force would require change in the number and/or scale of intermediate objectives; some of them might be substituted with the new ones or might be bypassed. Also, not all intermediate objectives might require to be neutralized instead of being destroyed or captured. The number and scale of the intermediate objectives affect considerably the forces’ size/mix, the time required for accomplishing a given ultimate objective, and hence the tempo of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. For example, in their invasion of Denmark and Norway in April–June 1940 (Weseruebung), the ultimate objective was occupation of Norway and Denmark and destruction or surrender of their armed forces, and imposition of the German rule in these two countries. This, in turn, required accomplishment of four intermediate objectives on land: seizing control of the Jutland Peninsula and the adjacent major islands (Sjaelland, Fuenen); southern Norway; central Norway; and northern Norway. The Luftwaffe had to obtain and maintain air superiority for each of the intermediate objectives on land. In addition, it was tasked to obtain control of the airspace and surface over the Norwegian Sea

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because the Kriegsmarine was too weak to obtain sea control by its efforts alone. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in their directive for the offensive in the south Pacific, issued on 2 July 1942, for the projected campaign in the southern Pacific specified that the ultimate (theater-) strategic objective was the capture of New Britain–New Ireland–New Guinea area. Initially, the joint planners in Washington, DC specified three intermediate (operational) objectives (erroneously called “Tasks”) for the new campaign: Task 1: seizing Guadalcanal; Task 2: capturing the remainder of the Solomons, Lae, and Salamau, and the northeast coast of New Guinea; and Task 3: capturing Rabaul and adjacent positions. The initial operational objective was accomplished on 7 August 1942 after the Allies landed on Guadalcanal and seized Tulagi. However, the strong Japanese resistance on land, at sea, and in the air prevented the Allies from consolidating their operational success until the end of January 1943 when the Japanese evacuated their last troops from Guadalcanal. After Guadalcanal was secured, and before reaching Rabaul, New Britain (neutralized jointly with the forces of Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) and Southern Pacific (SOPAC)), two intermediate operational objectives had to be accomplished: seizing the islands of New Georgia and Bougainville and their adjacent positions.1 In the course of the struggle for Guadalcanal, the Allied planners changed their original schedule. The capture of Lae, Salamau, and the northeast coast of New Guinea became part of SWPA’s New Guinea (Papua) Campaign, and the Solomons Campaign became the exclusive responsibility of the SOPAC theater commander. The execution of the original “Task 2” and “Task 3” of the Solomons Campaign was transferred to SWPA’s commander General Douglas MacArthur. In March 1943, MacArthur issued the plan Elkton in which these two “tasks” were broken up into five major operations. They were as follows: seizure of the airdromes on the Huon Peninsula (New Guinea); capturing Munda Point as well other airdromes on New Georgia; seizing airdromes on New Britain and Bougainville; and capturing of Kavieng (New Ireland) and the isolation of Rabaul; and capture of Rabaul.2 Sometimes, bypassing or changing one or more intermediate objectives can complicate considerably the execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. For example, MacArthur’s decision to bypass Wewak and the Hansa Bay and make a 275-mile jump directly to Hollandia-Aitape shortening the timeline for the entire New Guinea campaign. At the same time, it also required the larger amphibious force for Hollandia-Aitape Operation than for any other previous operation of that nature. This, in turn, greatly complicated logistical planning. SWPA’s lack of adequate organic naval support required the employment of the fast carrier forces of Nimitz’s Pacific Fleet. In designing a major naval operation, several major tactical and some minor tactical objectives have to be determined. For example, the Allied amphibious landing on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 (Operation Watchtower) encompassed three major tactical objectives: seizing the beachhead and the adjacent airfield (later renamed Henderson Field); obtaining control of airspace over

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Guadalcanal and adjacent positions; and obtaining control of the sea around Guadalcanal and the adjacent sea area. For each of these objectives there were several minor objectives. The ultimate objective of the Allied invasion of New Georgia (Operation Toenails) on 20 June 1943 was to seize control of the island of New Georgia in the central Solomons and adjacent island positions and control of the sea approaches and adjacent airspace. The initial intermediate (major tactical) objective of the operation was to obtain control of the island of Rendova, Viru Harbor, Wickham Anchorage, and Segi Point. In the Allied amphibious landing at Anzio in January 1944 (Operation Shingle), capture of the towns of Anzio and Nettuno represented a major tactical objective, while seizing control of the three smaller towns (Campoleone, Carroceto, and Aprilia) were minor tactical objectives. In the course of the operation, holding the control of the seven miles deep and 15 miles long lodgment was an operational objective for the Allies.3

Force requirements An important element of operational design is calculation of the overall size and mix of the forces for the entire campaign or major naval operation. This process is an art rather than a science (although quantifiable methods can play a significant role). The operational commander’s judgment and experience are often decisive in making the final determination on the size and composition of one’s forces to take part in a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The principal factors in this process are the type of the operation, combat potential of friendly and the enemy’s forces, the number and scale of intermediate objectives and their sequencing, the distances between the base of operations and the prospective operating area, and weather and climatological conditions. In addition, intelligence and logistics play a significant role in determining the size and composition of one’s forces in a maritime campaign or major naval operation. In general, the more capable one’s forces, the fewer ships/submarines or aircraft or troops will be required to accomplish a given objective. The employment of multiservice forces asymmetrically would generally require fewer forces as would good intelligence, deception and surprise. The timeline for a maritime campaign or major naval operation can be considerably shortened if the intermediate objectives are accomplished simultaneously or nearly simultaneously. However, then one’s forces must be significantly larger than if the same objectives are accomplished in sequence. The Allied amphibious landing at Anzio almost failed because the ultimate objective of the operation was in a serious disconnect with the forces assigned to its execution. Only two divisions, the U.S. 3rd and the British 1st Infantry Division plus the U.S. 504th and 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 2nd British Special Service Brigade with two Commando battalions and the U.S. 6615th Ranger Force (Provisional) totaling some 24,000 men were assigned to the initial assault. This force would be eventually increased to 110,000 by assigning

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some additional divisions and associated units from the British Eighth Army.4 However, the key for success was sufficient combat strength at the beginning of the operation, not after the German defenders were able to move significant forces to the lodgment area. Additionally, there was barely sufficient numbers of landing craft for a two-divisional lift, plus supporting troops. Only seven days of supplies would be disembarked on the beaches and after that, LSTs had to be withdrawn and sent to England for the pending invasion of Normandy. Another major problem was uncertainty whether the weak landing forces would be able to resists German attacks because the Fifth Army was pinned down on the main front and did not have much chance of linking with the Allied forces at Anzio ten days after their landing.5

Balancing operational factors vs. the objective After determining the ultimate and intermediate objectives of a maritime campaign or major naval operation, the operational commander and the planners must also balance friendly factors of space, time, and force against the ultimate objective. Afterward, the similar process should be applied for each intermediate objective. The naval operational commander should assess friendly factors of space, time, and forces individually and then balance them in combination against the respective ultimate or intermediate objective. For a maritime campaign, the mutual relationships of the factors of space, time, and force should be arranged in such a way that they collectively enhance the naval operational commander’s ability to act freely within the given framework determined by policy and strategy. In contrast, balancing of operational factors vs. objective in a major naval operation is determined by the framework of a maritime or land campaign. Any serious disconnect or mismatch between the ultimate or intermediate objective and the corresponding space–time–force factors might greatly complicate and possibly endanger the outcome of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. If the imbalance cannot be resolved, then one’s objective should be changed or scaled down and brought into harmony with the operational factors. This process is complicated and time consuming. It is more an art than a science. In practice, operational factors will rarely be completely, or even approximately, in harmony with one another or with the assigned ultimate or intermediate objective. In harmonizing friendly operational factors against the respective objective, all considerations should start with quantifiable factors – that is, space and time.6 The factor of time is more dynamic and changeable than the factor of space. Normally, the factors of space and time can be calculated with a high degree of confidence. However, the factor of force is often difficult to evaluate properly because of the presence of many hard to or impossible to quantify elements. A significant change in any of these factors will invariably disturb the overall balance and require a reassessment of all the factors. In the course of the execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation, the naval operational commander should periodically balance the

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operational factors against one’s objective. The higher the intensity of combat, the more often the situation will change. This, in turn, will require harmonizing one’s operational factors with one’s objective. Also, a change in one’s objective will require quick reevaluation of the pertinent operational factors and their balancing with the newly determined objective. The naval operational commander should also fully take into account the effect of information on the factors of space, time, and force individually and then collectively.7 The factors of space and force in a maritime theater can be balanced by reducing the number and/or scale of the objectives to be accomplished, as for example limiting efforts to obtain sea control to a much smaller sea/ocean area or to a single or two physical mediums (e.g., surface and air but not subsurface); increasing the number and/or combat potential of one’s naval forces, or reducing the size of friendly forces deployed in the secondary theater of effort. For example the factors of space and time can be brought into balance operating from shorter lines of operations, employing highly mobile forces, deploying one’s maritime forces closer to the scene of potential conflict, prepositioning weapons/equipment and logistical supplies, reducing the size of the operating area, limiting one’s efforts to obtain local and/or temporary instead general sea control in a given sea/ocean area, achieving operational surprise, conducting operational and/or strategic deception or reducing the forces assigned for operational protection.

Identification of the enemy/friendly centers of gravity After determining the ultimate objective the naval operation, the operational commander and his planners should determine a corresponding enemy’s and friendly center of gravity. Both the enemy’s and friendly center of gravity should be identified for each pending intermediate objective. The determination of the proper centers of gravity is one of the most important factors for having the clarity of purpose. A sound design for a maritime campaign or major naval operation should be normally focused on destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s strategic or operational center of gravity. At the same time, the friendly center of gravity must be adequately protected; otherwise, the accomplishment of the respective objective will require far more time and resources than available – or the entire expedition may even end in failure. In generic terms, center of gravity8 can be understood as a source of massed strength – physical or moral – or a source of leverage whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy’s or one’s ability to accomplish a given military objective. In military terms, “mass” should not be understood literally. What matters most is the “massed effect,” not whether available combat potential (prior to combat) or combat power (generated in combat) is physically concentrated in a certain place. Because of modern weapons’ long range, lethality, and accuracy, centers of gravity in naval warfare do not necessarily have to be

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physically massed in a specific area; they may be dispersed throughout a rather large part of a theater. One’s courses of action focused on the enemy’s proper center of gravity will have the best chances of accomplishing the assigned objective in the shortest time and with the fewest losses in personnel and materiel. One’s deception and counterdeception efforts will be hardly successful if the focus of one’s efforts is directed against the wrong enemy center of gravity. The principal factors in determining a solution for any military problem are the objective to be accomplished and the corresponding military situation. The size and complexity of the objective determine the scope of the situation in terms of the factors of space and time. Hence, the tactical, operational, and strategic situations are differentiated. In general, any military situation encompasses a number of both physical and so-called abstract military and nonmilitary elements. Physical elements are tangible and are usually easy to quantify. Abstract or intangible elements are hard or even impossible to quantify with any degree of confidence. The starting point for determining a center of gravity is to reduce the complexity of a situation by focusing on those elements that are absolutely essential or critical for the accomplishment of the enemy’s and friendly objective. The critical factors should be divided into two major groups: critical strengths and critical weaknesses. Critical strengths can be understood as friendly or enemy capabilities considered essential for accomplishing a given or assumed military objective. In military terms, critical strengths are primarily sources of physical or moral potential/power or elements that integrate, protect, and sustain specific sources of combat potential/power. In contrast, critical weaknesses are those sources of one’s power that although essential for the accomplishment of the objectives are grossly inadequate to perform their intended function or task. Some critical weaknesses are converted into critical vulnerabilities if they are open to enemy attack, control, leverage, or exploitation. In most cases, the enemy’s or friendly critical vulnerabilities are related to critical weaknesses. However, the problem becomes more complicated because in some cases a critical strength can be turned into a critical vulnerability if it structurally or organizationally lacks sufficient protection or support. For example, one’s information system can be both a critical strength and critical vulnerability because it is inadequately protected and open to enemy attack. What is critical or less critical is often difficult to determine with any degree of precision. It is all essentially a matter of the naval operational commander’s good judgment and experience. The operational commanders and their staffs should evaluate only those critical strengths and weaknesses that potentially might affect accomplishment of the enemy’s or one’s objective; to do otherwise would lead to waste of time and resources. Critical strengths and weaknesses can differ considerably depending on the scope of the military objective and the corresponding levels of war at sea. In general, the higher the level of war, the more critical for ultimate success the critical factors are. In the case of military sources of power, what constitutes a

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critical strength at the tactical level can become a critical weakness if the required resources are inadequate to ensure the favorable outcome of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. For instance, one’s logistical support and sustainment can be a critical strength at the tactical level, but it can become a critical weakness at the operational level because of one’s inability to properly protect elements of logistical infrastructure, or because of insufficient logistical resources to support and sustain friendly forces engaged in a maritime campaign or major naval operation. In generic terms, a critical strength is composed of the main source of power (military or nonmilitary) and those elements designed to integrate, protect, and support or sustain it. In regard to a center of gravity, the main source of power can be arbitrarily called the “inner core,” while all other elements can be grouped as the “outer core.” The critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities are usually found in the outer core of a center of gravity. In practical terms, the outer and inner cores of a center of gravity represent a whole. The problem of what constitutes a center of gravity can be quite complicated because of the relationship between those elements of the outer core having attributes of firepower and maneuver and the inner core. For example, air defense or antisubmarine defense can be an element of protection for the inner core of the operational center of gravity, but it can become part of the inner core of the tactical center of gravity. A similar situation can exist in the case of some elements of support, as, for example, ground or naval fire support and air support. In naval warfare, a center of gravity can range from a direct screen of a convoy, a surface strike group, carrier group, surface action (or strike) group, or amphibious task force, or a major part of surface forces in the numbered and theater fleets. Likewise, a center of gravity can be the element of a force of combat aircraft that has the highest combat potential/power, such as a fighter or attack aircraft or bomber squadron, or the entire force of fighters and groundbased air defenses or bombers deployed in a given part of a maritime theater. In the netted forces, computer networks might also comprise a major part of the enemy or friendly operational or tactical center of gravity. Computer networks are fundamentally different from traditional centers of gravity, in part because they lack attributes of firepower and maneuver. The key components of a computer network are potentially highly vulnerable to an enemy’s disabling attack. In some cases, an operational center of gravity may be located beyond the boundaries of a maritime theater of operations in which a new maritime campaign is to begin. For instance, the Japanese plan for the invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 contemplated the destruction or neutralization of the major part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet – the operational center of gravity for the Japanese Combined Fleet – based in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, prior to the attack on the Philippines itself. The Japanese aim was to cripple a major part of the U.S. Pacific battle fleet and thereby prevent it from interfering with the landings in the Philippines. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in the early hours of 7 December, and the Philippines’ U.S. air and naval bases one day later.

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A center of gravity should not be determined in isolation from the corresponding objective to be accomplished. The military objective provides the larger framework within which the respective center of gravity is determined. The objective and the center of gravity should be roughly in harmony with each other. A major change in the objective would result in a change of the situation. This, in turn, would require a partial or complete reevaluation of friendly and enemy critical strengths and weaknesses and resulting in modified or even new center of gravity. In war at sea, this problem is relatively easier to resolve properly than in land warfare because the objective is often (not always) physical in character. The number of potential centers of gravity is directly related to the number of objectives to be accomplished by one’s forces. Hence, at the national-strategic and alliance/coalition levels there exist a single national-strategic objective and a single national-strategic center of gravity. The number of operational centers of gravity at the operational level of war is directly related to the number of operational objectives to be accomplished simultaneously or sequentially in a maritime campaign. Depending on the enemy or friendly military strength, these centers of gravity can exist in each medium, that is, on the ground, in the air, and at sea. Sequencing of the accomplishment of the operational objectives determines the order in which corresponding operational centers of gravity have to be attacked or protected. At the tactical level of war at sea, there are many major and minor tactical objectives to be accomplished. In theory, each of them requires a determination of the respective tactical center of gravity. However, the smaller the objective, the smaller the practical utility of the corresponding center of gravity. At the same time, the process of determination becomes much simpler, because smaller and less diverse forces are involved. At the lowest tactical level, because one’s force is reduced to a single-type force facing the same or a similar enemy force, the usefulness of the center of gravity is very low. It is only when dealing with major tactical forces and higher levels that the commanders and their staffs have to apply the analytical process leading to the determination of the proper center of gravity. In a maritime campaign, for each intermediate objective there is a corresponding center of gravity. These centers of gravity are separated in terms of space and time. They have to be attacked, simultaneously and/or sequentially, to ultimately defeat or neutralize a given military or theater-strategic center of gravity. In a campaign conducted in two or three physical mediums (land, sea, airspace), not all operational objectives are equally important. Hence, there is a significant difference in the importance of the corresponding centers of gravity. The objectives at sea and in the air are the prerequisites for accomplishing the principal operational objective on land. In the outcome of a land campaign, the most important operational center of gravity is the one that encompasses the most mobile and powerful enemy force on the ground. That center of gravity must be neutralized or destroyed by the efforts of two or more services. The protracted nature of maritime trade warfare (attack on and defense/ protection of maritime trade) is largely a consequence of the fact that each side

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in a conflict do not mass forces at the operational level. Hence, in maritime trade warfare the principal methods of combat employment of naval forces are major and minor tactical actions. The operational and ultimately strategic objectives are then accomplished over time. Sometimes, what constituted a proper center of gravity at the beginning of the war or during the major part of it, can change due to the cumulative effect of the successes achieved by one’s forces. Normally, in a fleet vs. fleet operation the enemy’s center of gravity is a part of the fleet with the highest combat potential. For example, in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, and the Battle of the Philippines Sea, the fast aircraft carrier groups were the proper operational center of gravity for both the Japanese and U.S. side. However, in the Leyte operation, the commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, Admiral Halsey, apparently believed that the most serious threat – in modern terms, the operational center of gravity – to his Task Force 38 (fast carrier forces) was posed by the Japanese Mobile Force, Main Body (fast carrier force), not battleships and heavy cruisers of the First Diversionary Attack Force. One can contend that Halsey’s judgment was clouded by his obsession with fighting a decisive naval battle against enemy aircraft carriers, coupled with purposely vague orders from his superior, Admiral Nimitz, Obviously Halsey did not sufficiently account for the declining performance of Japanese pilots after the Battle of Midway. By October 1944, the Japanese carriers did not represent as large a threat to U.S. forces at Leyte as did Kurita’s heavy surface force. The enemy’s center of gravity can also shift as the major naval operation enters into a new phase. This is normally the case in the execution of a major amphibious landing operation. During the transit phase at sea, the initial main task is defense and protection of one’s amphibious task force. Thus, the operational center of gravity for one’s forces in the transit phase is the force of distant cover and support. Once the amphibious force starts landing ashore, the main task shifts to defeating the enemy forces and then securing the initial lodgment ashore. Then the attacker’s center of gravity shifts to that part of the landing force that has the highest combat potential, usually armor and/or mechanized forces. In most cases, a carrier group or heavy surface ship task force is an operational center of gravity during the initial phase of an amphibious landing operation. Very often, it is argued that the amphibious task force is the proper center of gravity for the defender – if that force is destroyed, then the attacker cannot conduct the planned amphibious assault. Among other things, the attacker would not plan an amphibious landing unless he firmly believed that he had sufficient combat potential to overcome the defender’s resistance. Normally, the attacker would deploy his amphibious task force and the force for distant cover and support to be within mutually supporting distances at all times. Moreover, the amphibious task force at sea cannot threaten an enemy’s operational center of gravity on land, but the operational covering force can. Thus, for the defender, the primary objective initially is to destroy or neutralize the attacker’s force of distant cover and support, as the U.S. Navy did in the Battle of the Coral Sea

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and the Battle of Midway in May and June 1942, respectively. In both cases, the respective Japanese commanders intuitively knew that the planned amphibious landing could not proceed, because even if the amphibious force landed, no naval force that remained available would be sufficiently strong to successfully defend and sustain the landing force ashore. In the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982, the proper operational center of gravity for the Argentines, prior to the British landing on the Falklands, was the two British carrier forces (Hermes, Invincible). Without these carriers and accompanying escorts, the British could not have landed. While the loss of the 13,000-gross-register-ton (GRT) container ship Atlantic Conveyor, with its embarked aircraft (ten Wessex and four giant Chinook helicopters) and all the tentage for the landing force, on 25 May was a serious blow to the British effort, that ship was not a center of gravity for the Argentines, but one of the British critical weaknesses/vulnerabilities.9 The troops and equipment could be replaced relatively quickly, but not the aircraft carriers. After the landing, the British 3 Commando Brigade (despite its relatively small size) was the proper operational center of gravity for the Argentine defenders. For the British, the enemy’s operational center of gravity was not the Argentine carrier group, but the land-based fighter-bombers armed with Exocet missiles. After the landing, the operational center of gravity for the British forces shifted to the Argentine troops defending Port Stanley. If the attacker lacks sufficient strength at sea, then the operational center of gravity might be represented by the land-based fighter aircraft providing cover to the amphibious forces at sea. For example, in the German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940, the Luftwaffe’s fighters, not the German heavy surface forces, were the proper operational center of gravity for the Allies.

Initial geostrategic position The initial geostrategic position used by one’s forces has a considerable effect on the planning and the initial course of a maritime campaign. It determines the direction/axis of advance, integration of the logistical support and sustainment, and operational reach of friendly forces. The operational commander and the planners should evaluate fully the advantages and disadvantages of the geostrategic position occupied by friendly forces and the enemy’s positions. Depending on whether a maritime campaign is offensive or defensive, the ratio of forces on both sides, and the theaterwide supporting structure, the naval operational commander has to decide how to maximize the advantages of the position his forces occupy, and minimize or drastically reduce the value of the position the enemy forces occupy. For example, in their invasion of Denmark and Norway in April–June 1940, the Germans initially occupied an exterior geostrategic position for the employment of their naval forces and the Luftwaffe against Norway. Conversely, Norway occupied a central geostrategic position against German naval or air forces trying to invade the country. After the Germans seized Norway and Denmark, their ground forces and the Luftwaffe

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operated from a central geostrategic position against any Allied force trying to land there. However, the German navy operated from an exterior geostrategic position in regard to the British positions in the northern Atlantic. In the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941, the Philippine Archipelago as a whole occupied a central geostrategic position in regard to the Japanese naval air forces operating from their jumping off positions in Palau (Western Carolines) and Formosa, while the Japanese forces operated from the exterior position. In the Solomons Campaign 1942–1944, the Allied forces operating from New Caledonia, the Fiji Islands, Samoa, Australia, New Zealand, or Hawaii/U.S. West Coast occupied an exterior geostrategic position relative to the Japanese forces operating in defense of the Solomons. In contrast, the Japanese naval forces and aircraft based in the Bismarck Archipelago (eastern part of New Guinea–New Britain–New Ireland area) occupied a central position in respect to the adjacent islands and sea/ocean area. Also, the Japanese forces deployed on Guadalcanal, New Britain, New Ireland, Bougainville, and New Georgia each occupied a central position in respect to the adjacent islands and sea/ocean area. However, Japanese naval forces and land-based aircraft based in Rabaul operated from an exterior position in engaging Allied naval forces operating around Guadalcanal just prior and in the aftermath of landing on 7 August 1942.

Interior vs. exterior lines The initial geostrategic position determines whether one’s forces will operate along the interior and shorter lines of operation or along the exterior and longer lines of operations. The naval operational commander and the planners need to properly evaluate both advantages and disadvantages of each in designing the initial major naval operations. The interior lines of operations originate from a central position. One’s force moving on interior lines, can be interposed between two or more parts of the enemy force, and a part of the enemy force can be possibly contained in a secondary sector. A major part of the friendly force would then attempt to concentrate as quickly as possible in the sector of main effort to destroy the bulk of the enemy force. In general, operations on multiple and interior lines favor the employment of smaller but highly mobile naval forces. A major naval operation conducted along exterior lines consists of converging movement of various force elements from several directions toward a common physical objective. One of the requirements for successful use of exterior lines is that one’s forces possess higher mobility than the opposing forces. Optimally, they should be kept within mutually supporting distances to avoid being defeated in detail. The movement of one’s forces along exterior lines also requires sound synchronization of movement and actions. This is not easy to do especially if the distance between one’s base of operations and the physical objective is too long. Operations from the exterior position also demand that the operational commander act with the initiative.10 For example, in the initial phase

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of their invasion of Norway in 1940, the German ships with embarked troops and heavy surface forces moved along few exterior lines of operations from their bases in the estuary of the Elbe and the Weser rivers to their destination points in Norway. These lines ranged from those at Oslo Fiord to all the way to Narvik. In some cases, a part of one’s forces can operate along interior lines, while other forces operate along exterior lines. For example, in the Battle for Leyte on 24–27 October, all the Japanese surface forces operated along exterior and converging lines of operations. In contrast, the Japanese naval aircraft based on Luzon’s airfields operated along the interior and diverging lines of operations. The U.S. Third Fleet’s Task Force-38 (TF-38) (fast carriers) deployed east of Luzon occupied a central position and hence its aircraft also operated along interior and diverging lines.

Direction (axis) An important element of a design for a maritime offensive campaign or major offensive naval operation aimed to seize control of a part of the coast, large island, or archipelago is a direction or axis – a swath of land and sea/ocean area and airspace above it extending from one’s base of operations to the ultimate physical objective via selected intermediate objectives. According to the scale of the ultimate objective, tactical, operational, and strategic directions or axes can be differentiated. A maritime campaign aimed to capture successive island positions or archipelagos can be conducted depending on the extent of the base of operations for friendly forces along a single strategic or several operational axes. A strategic axis extends from one’s base of operations via several intermediate, usually operationally significant, positions to the last intermediate objective in a projected maritime offensive campaign. A strategic axis contains, in turn, several operational axes, and each of these in turn, consists of several tactical axes. One of the advantages of using a single strategic axis of advance is that it makes it easier to synchronize logistics and operations. By capturing successive island positions, one’s operational reach is extended. This, in turn, allows for consolidation of operational success and timely preparation for seizing the next objective. A disadvantage is that the enemy can easily discern the path of intermediate advance toward the ultimate objective and therefore prepare and carry out timely counteractions. For example, each of the Allied campaigns in the Pacific in World War II was conducted along a single strategic axis. In the Solomons campaign of 1942–1944, the strategic axis extended from the base of operations in Fiji and New Caledonia through the Solomons Archipelago–New Britain–New Ireland. It consisted of four consecutive operational axes: Fiji and New Caledonia to Guadalcanal, from there to New Georgia, then to Bougainville, and finally to the New Britain–New Ireland area. In the Central Pacific Campaign, 1943–1944, the Allied line of advance extended from the main base of operations in Hawaii to the Western Carolines via five intermediate operational objectives: the Gilbert Islands, the Marshalls,

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the Marianas, the Central Carolines, and the Western Carolines. The operational axes roughly coincided with the general line of advance and extended from one to another intermediate operational objective. The other strategic axis of advance was in the southwest Pacific, along the north coast of New Guinea and into the islands between New Guinea and the Philippines.

Operational idea The operational idea (or scheme) is the very heart of a design for a major naval operation. It should be developed in a rudimentary form during the operational commander’s estimate of the situation and then expanded and refined during the planning of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. It should express in broad and succinct terms the purpose, place, and sequence of actions by each force element to take part in the operation. Normally, the operational idea for a maritime campaign should be developed first. The larger strategic objective always dominates the operational objective. The operational idea for a maritime campaign provides a framework for the operational idea of each subordinate major operation. The naval operational commander should make sure the subordinate operational ideas in each phase of a maritime campaign are consonant with his own operational idea. Afterward, the naval/maritime component commander should develop the operational idea pertaining for the employment of his forces. In case a major naval operation requires substantial participation of the air force and/or land forces in the littorals, the naval operational commander should include the employment of these forces as part of his operational idea.

Operational sustainment A maritime campaign or major naval operation cannot be successful unless it is logistically supported and sustained in combat. In general, sustainment is the extension of logistical support from the start of combat actions until the assigned ultimate objectives are accomplished. The early identification of critical logistical constraints for the planned maritime campaign or major naval operation is indispensable for a strategic or operational success. Logistically, the maritime force should be as self-contained as possible. Choices of logistics base sites and lines of communications are critical and should be timely made by the operational commander in relation to the decisive points. Operational sustainment is required to support combat forces throughout all phases of a major naval operation or maritime campaign. Depending on the location of the theater of operations, this may require simultaneous employment of land, air, and sea lines of communications. Then the primary limiting factors on the operational commander’s freedom of action are the availability of transportation assets and the commander’s ability to protect these lines of communication from enemy action. In general, the adequacy of operational logistics is measured by its ability to

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perform its sustainment function and the distribution of supplies inherent in that function.11 Sustainability is a measure of the capability to maintain logistics support for all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operations; long-term support is the logisticians’ great challenge. For example, the U.S. Third Fleet had an excellent logistical support and sustainment during the Leyte operation in October–December 1944. Operational sustainment for the Third or Fifth Fleet was the responsibility of the At-Sea Logistics Service Group – composed in October 1944 of 34 fleet oilers, 11 escort carriers, 19 destroyers, 26 destroyer escorts, and a number of seagoing tugs. This force was divided into ten to 12 task units to fuel the fleet in echelons. A group of nine to 12 tankers was deployed near the Third Fleet’s TF-38, refueling one carrier group after another. About every three or four days, a task unit of three oilers with escorts joined this refueling group to relieve those that were almost empty. These tankers then transferred the remainder of their oil to other tankers that were partly full and returned to Ulithi to take new fuel loads from the commercial tankers. Each of these groups was accompanied by an escort carrier carrying replacement aircraft and pilots from Eniwetok, Guam, and Manus Admiralties. Combat air patrols and antisubmarine (A/S) patrols for the oiler groups were conducted by a group of eight escort carriers with their escorts. Rescuing damaged ships was the responsibility of two fleet tugs accompanying each refueling group.12 The TF-38 – composed of four carrier groups with nine heavy and eight light carriers, six battleships, three heavy and six light cruisers, three AA light cruisers, and 58 destroyers – were regularly replenished at sea by TF-30 logistics ships.13 Fast carrier forces were at sea for 13 of 16 weeks; this was possible only because of excellent logistical organization.14

Conclusion A maritime campaign or major naval operation can be successful provided that operational commanders and their staffs have comprehensive knowledge and understanding of both military and nonmilitary considerations in operational planning. A plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation should be based on a proper determination of the ultimate and intermediate objectives. The naval operational commander and the planners should avoid selecting multiple intermediate operational objectives even when friendly forces are superior to the opponent’s. The time factor cannot be accurately predicted. The accomplishment of multiple objectives usually requires a much longer time than originally anticipated. This, in turn, can derail the schedule of an entire operation and ultimately slow the operational tempo or even court disaster from a stronger and more agile opponent. The ultimate objectives of a maritime campaign or major naval operation should be clearly defined and should be achievable with the resources on hand or becoming available. It should not be changed unless the strategic or operational situation changes so drastically that ultimate objective must be abandoned or altered. In formulating ultimate objectives, overly broad and ambiguous terms

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should not be used. There should always be a rough balance between one’s ends and means. In the absence of harmony, the ultimate or intermediate objective should be either changed or scaled down, or additional forces should be assigned. The operational design should focus on the enemy’s operational or strategic center of gravity. The determination of the wrong center of gravity would lead to more friendly losses and would require more time to defeat the enemy, and in some cases, it can be fatal. Generally, the smaller the margin of superiority, the more important it is to properly determine the enemy’s center of gravity and to defeat the enemy quickly, decisively, and with the fewest losses of one’s forces. Otherwise, the pace of the campaign or major operation will most likely degenerate into attrition warfare, which is neither militarily nor politically acceptable. It is also critical to determine the center of gravity of friendly forces, in order to take measures and actions to protect it from enemy action. The design for major naval operations is sometimes given short shrift, with almost all the attention given to the design for a maritime campaign. However, a campaign cannot be successful if subordinate major operations are improperly designed. In addition, without a design for major operations, the tactical employment of forces cannot be effective. The importance of major naval operations is likely to increase in the future, as new technologies will allow smaller forces to accomplish operational and even strategic objectives. Warfare, by its very nature, is a series of trade-offs. Designing a maritime campaign or major naval operation requires time, imagination, hard work, and, above all, sound military thinking and common sense on the part of both the naval operational commanders and their staffs. The main purpose of operational design is to make this exhaustive effort a coherent one.

7

The operational idea

The operational idea is the very heart of any sound plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation. In its essence an operational idea is identical to what is commonly called “concept of operations” (CONOPS) or sometimes “scheme of maneuver.” In general, the operational idea should describe in broad terms what friendly forces have to do, where, and when. It should clearly state the type of actions by multiservice or multinational forces and the sequence of accomplishing a given strategic or operational objective. The operational idea for a campaign should provide the framework for the operational idea of a major naval operation; otherwise, no real synergy in the employment of one’s naval forces can be achieved. The operational idea should be presented graphically on a chart and by using operational symbols.

Features In general, a sound operational idea should be simple and flexible. It should be innovative, bold, and provide for speedy execution. The simpler the operational idea, the higher the chances of its successful execution. It should be sufficiently broad to accommodate changes in the situation in the course of its execution. It should avoid patterns used in the past. It should ensure the decisive employment of one’s forces. A well-conceived operational idea present the enemy with multiple threats that he cannot successfully counter. It should present the enemy with multidimensional threats that he has little or no chance of countering successfully. It should surprise and deceive the enemy, making it difficult for him to counter one’s actions. Most important of all, the operational idea should be directed at the destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s strategic or operational center of gravity.1 For example, the German operational idea for the invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 was innovative; never before had anyone attempted to seize positions separated by a wide sea area without obtaining command of the sea first. The Germans contemplated simultaneous and multiple thrusts by sea, air, and ground elements to quickly seize the southern part of Norway and then move northward under the protective shield of the Luftwaffe. The operational idea was also bold, because the Germans took rather high risks to mount such a

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large-scale effort in the face of the Allied superiority at sea. The Germans’ multiple simultaneous attacks had the additional advantage of ensuring that a failure of the offensive at one or more points would not endanger the ultimate outcome of the campaign.2 At the same time, the Germans maintained a high degree of operational security, using deception and concealment.3 The Allied campaigns in the Pacific in World War II were innovative. The Allies focused on the Japanese weaknesses and avoiding their strengths. The tempo of the Allied campaigns was significantly accelerated by neutralizing instead of capturing the enemy’s strongpoints or bypassing them. This so-called “leapfrogging” (castling move) method was exemplified by the JCS Directive on 12 March 1944 to General MacArthur to the Kavieng operation. The JCS directed MacArthur to complete neutralization of the Japanese strongholds at Rabaul and Kavieng by using minimum forces, and accelerate the development of air and naval bases in the Admiralties. MacArthur was directed to capture Hollandia on 15 April and bypass the Japanese garrisons at Wewak and Hansa Bay. In the same directive, Admiral Nimitz was directed to cancel the Truk operation and to speed up neutralization of Truk and Woleai, and other Japanese bases in the central and eastern Carolines. The Marianas would be invaded on 15 June and the Palaus on 15 September.4 The Allies were not as nearly so innovative in planning and execution of their major amphibious landing operations in both the Pacific and the European theaters. In both theaters, the Allies used similar and highly predictable operational ideas for their amphibious landings. This made it considerably easier for the enemy to properly deduce Allied intentions. None of these landings failed, largely because the Allies had enormous superiority in the air, at sea, and on the ground in most of the landings, they conducted. MacArthur’s decision to land at Inchon in September 1950 was bold and extremely risky because it envisaged landing of about 70,000 UN troops about 150 miles behind the North Korean forces besieging the U.S. Eighth Army within the Pusan perimeter. It also required weakening of the U.S. forces at Pusan. The operational idea for the landing at Inchon contemplated seizing the port of Inchon, rapid advance inland to seize the airfield of Kimpo, crossing the Han River, seizing and occupying Seoul, and occupying blocking positions north, northeast, and east of Seoul.5 Specifically, one Marine battalion would land on the Wolmi-do island (GREEN beach) at L-Hour (0630) on D-Day (15 September) followed by the main landings on the three beaches (RED, YELLOW, and BLUE) by the First Marine Division (less one RCT) at Inchon at H-Hour (1700) on D-Day. The beachhead would be expanded to seize Kimpo airfield and the Han River line west of Seoul followed by the rapid advance to seize and secure the city of Seoul, and then seizing the terrain commanding Seoul’s approaches and an area to the south. The second and third echelon of the amphibious force composed of the Seventh Infantry Division reinforced and Tenth Corps troops would land administratively to carry out combat operations as directed by the Commanding General (CG) of the Tenth Corps. Bombardment and fire support would be provided by cruisers and destroyers. Air cover,

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strikes, and close support would be provided by fast carrier and escort carrier aircraft within the objective area.6

Elements An operational idea encompasses a large number of elements that are common to both a maritime campaign and a major naval operation. However, the operational idea for a maritime campaign pertains generally to the strategic, and those for a major naval operation deals with operational aspects of the situation. Some elements are on the other hand applied only for the design for a major naval operation but not for a maritime campaign. One of the main reasons for these distinctions is that a maritime campaign is conducted in a maritime theater of operations, while a major naval operation is conducted largely within a given maritime/joint area of operations. The elements of the operational idea common to both a maritime campaign and major naval operation are as follows: selected principles of war; method for defeating the enemy; the sectors of main and secondary efforts, concentration in the sector of main effort; protection of the friendly center of gravity; anticipation of the point of culmination; deception; sequencing and synchronization; branches, sequels; phasing, operational tempo, and reserve. In addition, a major naval operation would also include a point of main attack (defense), operational maneuver and fires, main and supporting forces, tactical maneuver, operational pause, and regeneration of combat potential. The application of all or most of these elements would be an antithesis of simplicity and thereby significantly reducing the chances of success in the execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Hence, it is incumbent on the part of the naval operational commander and his planners to select only those elements that will ensure success quickly and with the fewest losses for his forces. In fact, the fewer elements that comprise the operational idea, the better. The simplicity of the operational idea is a prerequisite for drafting and executing simple and flexible operation plans. Selected principles of war An operational idea should provide for the application of only a few principles of war. Not all principles are equally important for one’s success. Hence, the operational commander and the planners should make a choice which principles of war should be observed and which ones can be unobserved or even violated. Principles of war are rarely clearly stated in an operational idea but are rather implied through selection of the objectives, sectors of effort, deception, and sequencing of actions by one’s combat forces. Some operational ideas have been highly successful although they did not include the application of some of the most important principles of war. For instance, the German invasion of Norway in April 1940 (Weseruebung) violated every principle of war except for objective, offensive, surprise, and security. The

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invasion, while not unexpected in terms of objectives, found the British and French unprepared in terms of time – and more important, unprepared as well for the method used by the Germans. The Germans moved quickly and occupied key points on the coast and the interior of Norway by a simultaneous employment of naval, air, and ground force elements. Their plan was detailed, the date of attack was kept secret, and the selected axis of attack was unexpected.7 Likewise, the Japanese, in their campaign to seize southeast Asia in December 1941 to April 1942, violated the principles of mass and simplicity but observed the principles of objective, offensive, surprise, and security. The Germans achieved both strategic and operational surprise in their invasion of Norway in April 1940, thanks largely to their excellent operational intelligence. Lack of good intelligence was the reason the Royal Navy did not sail out and attack German transports while they were on their way across the Skagerrak to southern Norway. The British were taken by surprise not only by the German plans and the effectiveness of their execution but also by matters of topography and local practice, about which they had had many opportunities to acquire information. There was also sheer miscalculation on the part of the British, who did not foresee the Germans’ use of heavy surface ships. The British underestimated the daring and performance of all three German services, and overestimated those of their own. In another example, the UN forces’ landing at Inchon, Korea, in September 1950 (Operation Chromite) was highly successful because it achieved operational surprise. MacArthur had only 30 days to plan this complex and highly risky operation. The landing was a complete success and led to the advance of UN forces to the Yalu River.8 The objective is the most important of all principles of war; its violation more often than not would cause the failure of the entire operation. For example, the Japanese Combined Fleet CINC, Admiral Yamamoto, failed to observe the principle of objective by trying to accomplish several operational objectives simultaneously in Operation MI (Battle of Midway) in June 1942. He also misapplied the principles of mass and economy of effort. Despite superiority over the much smaller U.S. force, the Japanese suffered a devastating defeat. Likewise, Admiral Halsey, Commander, U.S. Third Fleet (and de facto commander of the fast carrier force TF-38) violated the principles of objective, economy of effort, and security in his decision to move north in the evening on 24 October with three fast carrier groups, leaving San Bernardino Strait unguarded. At the same time, he applied the principles of mass and offensive too literally. This was the main reason Vice Admiral Kurita, commander of the First Diversionary Attack Force, to his great surprise, had free passage to the Leyte Gulf. Only Kurita’s subsequent decision in the Battle off Samar to turn away when on the verge of victory over the weak U.S. escort carrier group saved the U.S. Navy from suffering a humiliating and largely psychological defeat at the hands of a much weaker force. The sound application of the principles of objective and unity of effort was one of the main reasons for the successful redeployment of two German battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) from

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naval base Brest, Brittany, to Kiel through the English Channel in February 1942 (Operation Cerberus). The entire operation was brilliantly planned and executed. The Germans achieved a complete surprise by timing the passage of their ships though the Strait of Dover during daylight and not during the night as the British believed. The Germans calculated that transit though the strait during the day would increase chances of success because the German ships would be better prepared to defend themselves against the expected massed attacks by the British aircraft and light force by using shipboard AA defenses and having fighter cover by the Luftwaffe’s aircraft. The alternative of passing the Strait of Dover during the night would require sailing out from Brest in the forenoon and steaming though the Channel during broad daylight and thereby giving ample warning time to the British. The Germans also maintained an extremely high degree of secrecy of the operation. Only Admiral Otto Ciliax, commander of the entire force, his chief of staff, all three commanding officers of the heavy ships and destroyer force commander knew about the details of the plan for the operation. They also used six code names for the operation to confuse British agents. The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe cooperated smoothly and almost flawlessly. In contrast, the British overestimated the flexibility of their air power while underestimating the high effectiveness of the Luftwaffe. The Royal Navy virtually left the entire operation to the RAF, and the warships it provided were quite incapable of stopping the German ships. Moreover, cooperation among bomber, fighter, and coastal commands of the Royal Air Force (RAF) was quite poor.9 Application of one’s sources of power In designing a maritime campaign or major naval operation, the operational commander can apply his forces symmetrically and/or asymmetrically. A symmetric attack generally aims to avoid the enemy’s strength while attacking his vulnerabilities. It often requires substantial numerical superiority and/or much more advanced weapons to achieve success and minimize friendly losses or casualties. In contrast, the employment of dissimilar forces can be extremely lethal, especially if the enemy forces are unprepared to defend themselves. Among the principal advantages of major naval operations in the littorals is the possibility to employ land-based aircraft and in many cases also ground forces in an asymmetric attack. For example, the employment of one’s landbased aircraft against the enemy fleet or maritime trade is also an asymmetric attack. Likewise, the employment of ground forces to seize the enemy’s basing areas and ports and the use of coastal missile/gun batteries against enemy ships are forms of asymmetric methods. In general, major naval operations with participation of other services offer a wider range of options than those conducted with only naval combat arms. Multiservice capabilities allow an innovative naval operational commander to combine joint capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures in asymmetrical as well as symmetrical ways.10 For example, the Japanese by closely observing and analyzing the Allied amphibious landings in the Pacific, changed their method of conducting antiamphibious defense from

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defending the beaches to digging in and establishing several defensive lines farther from the beaches. In that way, the Japanese countered the superior U.S. firepower and maximized their advantages. After U.S. troops landed on Okinawa in April 1945 (Operation Iceberg), the Japanese offered stubborn resistance in the interior of the island. By the time the last resistance on the island ended in late June 1945, the Japanese had lost 110,000 men in combat, but they had inflicted very heavy losses on the attacker: the U.S. battle casualties were about 49,000, including some 12,500 men killed or missing.11 Sequential vs. simultaneous attacks The operational idea should clearly describe how available combat potential is applied in terms of time – sequentially, simultaneously, or combined. Which method will be applied depends on the character of the ultimate objective and the non-military limitations imposed on the use of one’s military forces. The most decisive and usually quickest results are achieved by the simultaneous application of overwhelming force. The incremental use of military power has invariably proven less effective or even highly detrimental, whether it is used against a strong enemy or an inferior one. Such an approach gives a resourceful enemy time to recover from one’s blows. It usually prolongs the duration of a campaign or major naval operation and therefore results in unnecessary losses for friendly forces. Method of defeating the enemy A sound operational idea should in broad terms describe methods for defeating the enemy. In general, while most of one’s efforts should be aimed at destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s center of gravity, other elements of enemy power must be attacked as well. Obviously, methods selected for destroying the enemy’s center of gravity should be consonant with the operational or strategic objective to be accomplished. The operational idea should envision direct and/or indirect action to destroy or neutralize the enemy’s strategic or operational center of gravity. In most cases, if the operational commander has overwhelming forces available, the quickest and most effective approach is to attack a major part of the enemy’s forces directly. A direct attack means attack by one’s strengths against the enemy’s strengths. In a major amphibious operation, most efforts should be normally directed to quickly defeat or neutralize the enemy’s operational center of gravity. However, if the attacker is inferior in some critical aspect of combat power or he lacks the necessary prerequisites to ensure logistical sustainment in the initial phase of the operation, he has to initially occupy some physical objectives such as key ports/airfields before he can attack the enemy’s operational center of gravity, directly or indirectly. For example, the Germans in planning their invasion of Norway (Weseruebung Nord) directed their efforts on seizing selected ports and

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airfields before attacking the enemy’s center of gravity – the Norwegian troops defending the capital of Oslo, and the forces defending the central and northern parts of Norway. In a major naval operation, the use of feint or deception to influence the enemy’s operational commander to move his forces and operational center of gravity from a certain sea or land area can be used to indirectly attack the enemy’s other critical strength. For example, in preparing its Sho-1 plan for the defense of the Philippines, the Combined Fleet Headquarters prepared a plan that contemplated the use of its much-weakened Mobile Force, Main Body (carrier forces) to act as bait for Halsey’s TF-38 carrier forces. The Japanese plan worked as anticipated: Halsey decided to move all of his three carrier groups north and join another carrier group and then try to destroy the Japanese carrier force. In the process, he left the San Bernardino Strait unguarded and thereby allowed the damaged but still powerful First Diversionary Attack Force to exit the strait and continue its advance undisturbed toward the Leyte Gulf. Decisive points and center of gravity The enemy’s center of gravity can be defeated or neutralized by using physical, cybernetic, or informational sources of one’s power to attack a series of the enemy’s decisive points. Identifying the correct decisive points and properly analyzing the enemy’s center of gravity are the most important prerequisites for success. A decisive point may have readily identifiable physical characteristics, or it may be composed of imponderable features. Determining and attacking an incorrect decisive point may sometimes prove fatal to the design and execution of the basic plan, even if the correct center of gravity has been identified.12 If the enemy’s center of gravity is difficult to attack directly, because either its physical strength or its essential elements are well protected or concealed, the indirect method of attack should be used. Indirect method is also often suitable in degrading or neutralizing intangible elements of the enemy’s center of gravity. Indirect methods of destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s center of gravity are aimed to identify and then exploit the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and, sometimes, even critical strengths. An enemy’s vulnerability is most valuable when it contributes to the elimination or serious degradation of the enemy’s center of gravity. Such vulnerabilities are found in the enemy’s physical, moral, and cybernetic domains. In applying an indirect approach against the enemy’s center of gravity, the naval operational commander should seek to attack the enemy force from an unexpected direction or at an unexpected time. Then one’s forces can avoid the enemy’s strengths by exploiting his vulnerabilities. Decisive points can be used as the keys to unlock the enemy’s center of gravity. The destruction, annihilation, neutralization, or serious degradation of the selected decisive points can possibly generate a “cascading” (or ripple) effect on other parts of the outer core of the respective center of gravity. In some cases, by attacking decisive points, one can defeat the center of gravity without ever having to attack it directly.13

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The naval operational commander and the planners should identify all potential decisive points to determine which of them offer the best options for eventual attack on the enemy’s center of gravity. In general, a decisive point can be located in the physical proximity of center of gravity, or some distance away from each. For instance, a decisive point in the enemy’s computer network can be located on land or in space several hundreds or thousands of miles away from the physical objective or the enemy’s center of gravity. A decisive point is usually an enemy’s critical vulnerability. However, in some cases, it can also be one of the enemy’s sources of strength or even a critical strength. If such a decisive point is exclusively or predominantly physical in nature (commanding height, railroad/road junction, port/naval base, airport/ airfield, C4 node, supply depot, computer “server farm,” etc.), then it can be subjected to a direct physical attack. For example, in the initial phase of the German invasion of Denmark in April 1940, six ports for debarkation of the German troops (Copenhagen, Korsor, Nyborg, Middelfart, Esbjerg, and Tyboron) were decisive points for the planners as were seven ports (Oslo, Kristiansand, Arendal, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik) in the invasion of Norway. In the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942 (Operation Watchtower) the islands near Guadalcanal (Tulagi, Florida, Russels, Malaita, San Cristobal, etc.) and the sea passages between each of them, could be considered as geographically oriented decisive points. The Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal, the seaplane base at Tulagi, and their air defenses could be considered as force-oriented decisive points. In the UN landing at Inchon in September 1950, the oyster-shaped island of Wolmi-do was in operational terms a decisive point because it controlled the approaches to port of Inchon only some 800 yards away. The island was connected to the port by a narrow causeway.14 For a naval force at sea, a decisive point can be a single or groups of ships for underway replenishment. For example in the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, the U.S. fueling group (TG 17.2) composed of two tankers (Neosho, Tippecanoe) and two destroyers (Sims, Worden) were a decisive point.15 The destruction of one or both tankers would have major impact on the ability of the U.S. fast carrier group (Yorktown, Lexington) and accompanying cruisers and destroyers of the Task Force 17 (TF-17) to sustain their operations against the Japanese carrier force. For a U.S. carrier strike group or expeditionary strike group today, the decisive point can be a nuclear submarine or large surface combatant providing the key defense against an enemy submarine or early warning and defense against the enemy aircraft. If the enemy relies extensively on computerized systems for command and control, intelligence, or airspace control, it is possible to indirectly attack the enemy’s center of gravity through an attack against his cybernetic-oriented decisive points. Computer networks are in many ways similar to a transportation network or electricity grid. The planners might select a method of attack that focuses on critical or key nodes whose destruction or annihilation would have a ripple effect on the functioning of the network as a whole.

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Protection of the friendly center of gravity A sound operational idea includes some details on forces and the method of protecting a friendly center of gravity. The key is to know and fully understand the enemy’s perspective on what a friendly center of gravity is because the enemy might use a different approach and methods in determining the friendly center of gravity.16 Optimally, the naval operational commander should have sufficient forces to ensure full protection of all the forces deployed in a maritime theater and including coastal installations/facilities. However, this is rarely the case, because one’s resources are indefinite. Therefore, the naval operational commander should balance competing demands for resources to accomplish the principal objectives while also having sufficient forces to conduct operational fires and provide operational protection. The naval operational commander should do everything possible to provide adequate protection for the friendly center of gravity while at the same time avoiding the danger of overprotecting the wrong center of gravity for friendly forces.17 In general, a highly capable but not overly strong force should be assigned to the protection of the friendly center of gravity; otherwise, one could open oneself to a devastating enemy attack. When the naval operational commander and planners have included protection of one’s center of gravity as part of the operational idea, the operation has usually been successful. In contrast, some major naval operations failed or were only partially successful because the commander paid inadequate attention to protecting his own center of gravity in the course of pursuing a beaten enemy force. For example, during the battle for Leyte in October 1944. The Japanese failed to adequately protect the operational center of gravity of their surface forces First Diversionary Attack Force during its movement from Borneo via the Sibuyan Sea and then through San Bernardino Strait southward to Tacloban anchorage. Kurita sent several urgent requests for support to Vice Admiral Shigeru Fukudome, commander of the Japanese land-based aircraft – Fifth and Sixth Base Air Force – on Luzon. Fukudome repeatedly declined calls for help. He later justified his decision because of the difficulties inherent in land-based aircraft providing air cover to a constantly moving surface force. In Fukudome’s view, sending fighter aircraft and scouting planes to search for enemy submarines would seriously weaken the offensive power of his forces. He contended that the best protection he could provide to Kurita’s force was to concentrate the entire strength of the Base Air Forces on attacking enemy carrier forces then deployed east off Luzon. However, owing partly to bad weather these attacks were not successful. Base Air Force aircraft attacked two carrier groups, hitting and heavily damaging the light carrier Princeton.18 After the war, Admiral Toyoda, CINC of the Combined Fleet explained that one reason the Base Air Forces failed to provide adequate protection to Kurita’s force was that their strength had been sorely depleted after the air battle off Formosa and in the air battle for the Philippines. However, in his view, the main reason was the “lack of unity between tactical and operational thinking.” In addition, the Base Air Forces and surface forces had not been well

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enough trained in cooperation.19 However, Toyoda as the fleet commander had not only the authority but also responsibility to directly order Fukudome to cooperate. Sectors of effort In designing a maritime campaign or major naval operation, the operational commander and his staff have to decide early on, which part of the theater or area of operations will be the sector of main effort (thrust) and which will be the sectors of secondary effort.20 A sector of main effort is usually selected in a sea/ocean area where the principal objective must be accomplished. Often, the enemy would deploy or concentrate his main forces in that sector. For example, for both the Germans and the allies, the northern Atlantic was the main theater of operations in attack on the enemy and defense and protection of friendly maritime trade from September 1939 to May 1945. Within that theater, the sector of main effort for the German U-boats varied depending on the threat posed by the enemy aircraft. For example, the sector of main effort for the U-boats in the first phase of the Battle for the Atlantic (September 1939 to June 1940) were southwest approaches to the British Isles. The designation of a sector of main effort is critical for focusing the major part of one’s efforts to destroy or neutralize the enemy’s center of gravity. By designating the proper sector of main effort, the operational commander directs his planners to which friendly forces should receive the greatest attention in planning operational and tactical fires and logistical sustainment. Prior to the beginning of a maritime campaign or major naval operation, one’s sector of the main effort should be kept secret from the enemy. In a major naval operation, a serious error in determining the enemy’s proper center of gravity would result in a wrongly selected sector of main effort. If the error is corrected in time, the naval operational commander should shift the sector of main effort to another part of the theater to compensate for the error. This shift can also be caused by a change of one’s plans due to some unexpected opportunity to inflict higher losses on the enemy. A shift in the sector of main effort would normally require a change in support priorities among one’s naval forces. Thus, flexibility in shifting the main effort should be an integral part of the operational design.21 For example, Admiral Karl Doenitz (1891–1980) requested on 9 December 1941 from the German naval high command to deploy 12 1,100-ton Type IXC U-boats off the U.S. East Coast shortly after the United States entered the war. However, this request was reduced to only six U-boats. However, three large U-boats were directed to the Mediterranean and three others were deployed to patrol the area between Gibraltar and the Azores. Doenitz was still able to concentrate by mid-January 1942 seven smaller Type VII (750-ton) in the area off Newfoundland.22 These U-boats eventually mounted an offensive against Allied shipping off the U.S. East Coast in February 1942. From January to July 1942 the U-boats’ sector of main effort shifted to the U.S. East Coast while another sector of main effort was created in the Caribbean.

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Sector of main effort can be also changed because of the unexpectedly strong enemy’s resistance to one’s actions. For instance, the Allied threat from the air forced the Germans to shift the sector of main effort for their U-boats operating in the northern Atlantic. In the second phase (July 1940 to March 1941) of the Battle for the Atlantic, the sector of main effort of the U-boats shifted to Western Approaches. There was no discernible sector of main effort in the third phase (April–December 1941) because the U-boats’ sinking of the Allied merchant ships was spread over the major part of the northern Atlantic and eastern part of the Central Atlantic. After August 1942 and until May 1943 (Phase V) the great majority of the Allied ships were sunk in the central part of the northern Atlantic. Between June 1943 and until the end of war, the U-boats were unable to mass their attacks on the Allied shipping in even relatively smaller parts of the northern Atlantic because they were essentially defeated by the Allied ASW defenses. The sector(s) of secondary effort encompasses the area in which the enemy’s supporting forces would operate. It is characterized usually (but not always) with smaller depth and width than the sector of main effort. One’s actions in the sector of main effort can hardly be successful unless supported by other friendly forces in a sector of secondary effort. For example, in a major conflict in an enclosed sea theater such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf or the Baltic or the Black Sea, the sea’s only exit and its approaches would be most likely initially the sector of main effort for both the attacker and the defender, while the remaining part of the respective sea would be the sector of secondary effort. Point of main attack (defense) An important element of the operational idea for a major naval operation is the selection of the point of main attack (or point of main defense) – a part of the sector of main effort where the most important actions of one’s main forces will take place. By properly selecting the point of main attack, the attacker can obtain relative superiority over the enemy, even if the overall ratio of forces is unfavorable. Good tactical and operational intelligence is critical in the selection of the point of main attack. Effective employment at the point of main attack also requires preparation of the deception plan. Points of main attack (defense) for a major naval operation are often difficult to determine because of the inherent fluidity and fast changes in a situation at sea. The exceptions are amphibious or antiamphibious landing operations. Then, the point of main attack (or defense) is usually selected among decisive points offering an indirect approach for attacking the enemy’s center of gravity. For an amphibious landing, the point of main attack is usually the least defended part of the coast or the beach and at the same time offers the best opportunities to advance inland. It can be a part of the coast allowing the most favorable conditions to indirectly attack the enemy’s center of gravity, or a port or gulf/bay whose capture is critical for logistical sustainment. For example, in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982, San Carlos on East Falkland Island

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was selected as the site or point of main attack for the British landing. It offered a good anchorage, which could be protected against submarine attack and was an area known to be lightly defended and difficult to be rapidly reinforced; the low surrounding hills of the inlet afforded good protection against Exocet missile attacks.23 In a maritime campaign or major naval operation against the enemy’s maritime commerce, the selection of the point of main attack is usually influenced exclusively by the shipping density in a certain sea or ocean area such as the focal point of shipping – specifically, approaches to larger ports, channels, narrows, and international straits or canals. For example, in the German campaign to cut off Allied trade in the Atlantic in 1939–1945, points of main attack for their U-boats included the English Channel and its approaches, the Bristol Channel, and the Strait of Gibraltar. In other cases, large ports or shipyards and ship-repair facilities whose destruction would cripple maritime trade in a certain area could be selected as points of main attack. For the defender, such points should obviously will be considered as main points of defense. Main vs. supporting forces The sectors of effort also dictate where the main forces and supporting forces should be concentrated or employed in a major naval operation. Normally the actions of one’s naval forces will be focused on the enemy’s main forces in the sector of main effort whose destruction or neutralization would lead to the accomplishment of the principal objective of the entire operation. To achieve a success in the main sector, one’s supporting forces should be capable of destroying or neutralizing the enemy covering or supporting forces from interfering with the actions of main forces in the main sector of effort.24 Another purpose of supporting actions is to neutralize enemy ASW in the theater, weaken the enemy’s theaterwide air defenses, and destroying or neutralizing his C4 nodes.25 These actions would be usually conducted simultaneously with the actions of main forces in the sector of main effort. The greatest problem is in finding a balance between the forces’ size/mix employed in the sector of main effort and those employed in the sector(s) of secondary effort. In general, a more mobile and lethal force allows more flexibility in shifting the sector of main effort. Allocation of one’s combat forces and their forces of combat support between the sector of main effort and the sectors of secondary effort is an integral part of the commander’s estimate process.26 It calls for the operational commander’s good judgment and experience. Sometimes the sectors of effort are properly selected but the distribution of forces is not. For instance, in the Japanese major naval operation that led to the Battle of Midway on 4–6 June 1942 (Operation MI), the sector of main effort was a rather large ocean area around the island of Midway, while the Aleutians (Operation AL) was the sector of secondary effort. However, the Japanese made a mistake by assigning too large a force for a diversionary effort in the north, instead of strengthening their forces in the sector of main effort at Midway.

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Operational maneuver and fires An operational maneuver is conducted within the boundaries of a given maritime theater of operations and is aimed at having a decisive impact on the outcome of a major naval operation either by securing the advantage of a position before attacking the enemy’s operational center of gravity or by striking at some critical vulnerability. The outcome of a maritime campaign might depend on the success or failure of the operational maneuver for the initial major naval operations. In land warfare, an operational maneuver is normally conducted in the part of the theater that one’s forces largely control, while such a maneuver at sea or in the air usually takes place within a space that is either disputed or controlled by enemy forces. A ground force conducting the maneuver moves from its base of operations along several lines of operations, via selected geographic decisive points, to obtain a favorable position or area from which to attack the enemy’s center of gravity or some critical vulnerability. An operational maneuver on land consists of a series of successive tactical maneuvers and movements, with some breaks in the movement of one’s forces. It is usually supported with both tactical fires but also with operational fires. In contrast, an operational maneuver at sea or in the air is conducted almost uninterruptedly and with little or no enemy opposition, until a position or area is reached from which the final assault can be launched. The latter phase involves tactical maneuver. For example, in the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Japanese fast attack carrier forces conducted an operational maneuver from Etorofu (the Kurils) across the north Pacific to a point between 200 and 230 nautical miles north of Pearl Harbor.27 The flight of the carrier aircraft from that position to their target area on Oahu constituted a tactical maneuver. The operational maneuver at sea can be conducted to destroy the enemy fleet at sea or at its bases or some important enemy coastal installations/facilities, and for major amphibious landing operations. In an amphibious landing operation, the movement of amphibious forces and forces of close and distant (operational) cover from the initial base of operations to the line or area from which landing craft or helicopters would move inland is an example of an operational maneuver at sea. Forces that took part in the Allied amphibious landing on Leyte in October 1944 (Operation King II), conducted an operational maneuver by eight separate force elements from their staging areas at Hollandia, New Guinea, and Manus Admiralties until they reached the positions off the Suluan, Homonhon, and Dinagat islands fronting the landing beaches.

Concentration in the sector of main effort The operational idea should provide for quick and, if possible, covert concentration of one’s forces in a sector of main effort and at the point of main attack (defense). In general, concealed and rapid concentration of one’s naval forces is a critical factor for the successful outcome of the initial tactical actions. It is

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especially critical for success of numerically inferior forces. The larger one’s maritime force, the more critical is its timely concentration. A force is said to be concentrated when all its elements are within supporting distance of each other, or in other words, when adjacent elements of the force can apply their full strength in coordination, against a respective part of the enemy force.28 Concentration of naval forces is usually conducted in the sea/ocean area open to enemy attack or in areas where control is in dispute.29 The concept of concentration should not be interpreted literally. Today, one’s forces, especially if they are netted, do not necessarily need to be physically massed in a certain area to be “concentrated.” The high-speed, precision, and ever-longer range of weapons and surveillance sensors allow a force today to be “massed” even when its various parts are dispersed over a large part of the theater. What counts most is not the “mass” but the “massed effect,” and that can be achieved through maneuver with fires. For example, on the open ocean or in the littoral waters fronting the open ocean, one’s netted forces can be geographically widely separated but still capable of generating massed effect because of the long range of their weapons and sensors. Depending on its purpose and scope, concentration can be tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical concentration is aimed to mass one’s naval forces prior to a naval tactical action and it takes place in a given naval combat zone or sector. Operational concentration is planned and conducted as a part of a major naval operation. Normally, it takes place in a given maritime area of operations. Strategic concentration is aimed at creating superior naval strength in a given maritime theater of operations or theater of war. It pertains to concentration of the entire fleet or its major part. Tactical maneuver Closely related to the operational maneuver and concentration at the point of main attack is tactical maneuver or sometimes called “spreading out” – a movement of individual force elements toward their assigned attacking positions within the effective range of their weapons. This type of maneuver is an element of the operational idea for a major naval operation aimed to destroy the enemy fleet at sea or its base, or the one aimed to destroy enemy merchant shipping at sea. In a major amphibious landing operation, the tactical maneuver encompasses the movement of amphibious forces from their line of departure to the landing beaches. Their maneuver is usually supported by tactical fires of surface ships and aircraft. The key considerations for planning a tactical maneuver include the number of force elements, selection of the basic and reserve routes, cruising formation, methods of conducting maneuver and required time, sequence of actions of the force elements, measures of combat support, and cover and concealment. The operational commander and the planners should select cruising formation that allows the most favorable possibility for using one’s weapons, force protection, and mutual support. This is especially critical for the success of forces assigned

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to the sector of main effort.30 In littoral waters, one of the preconditions for the successful execution of tactical maneuver is to obtain and maintain sufficient degree of basing/deployment control. Tactical maneuver should be conducted if possible during the night or in bad weather. The coastal defense should be alerted to provide fire support to friendly forces during the execution of tactical maneuver in littoral waters. Strategic/operational deception A sound design for a maritime campaign or major naval operation should include a plausible plan for strategic or operational deception, respectively. In general, deception is aimed to mislead the enemy about one’s real intentions, future decisions, and friendly courses of action. It can be aimed to confuse and disorient the enemy about the time and place of an attack, thereby achieving surprise. It can also be designed to create an illusion of one’s strength where weakness exists, or to paint a picture of weakness where one’s strength exists. It can be intended to induce the enemy to direct his attention and concentrate his forces in the wrong place and thereby violate the principle of concentration of forces in terms of the factor of space.31 Another purpose of deception can be to cause the enemy to waste his resources in terms of time by concentrating his forces at the wrong time and on preferably nonexistent objectives.32 A friendly center of gravity can be protected by using deception to conceal, or mislead the enemy about, one’s type of forces or their actual location. Deception can also mislead an enemy about the deceiver’s capabilities, either by creating an exaggerated perception of his numerical strength and the quality of his forces. Deception is often intended to surprise the enemy and thereby considerably enhance the success of one’s forces in the initial phase of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Deception can also be intended to overload the enemy’s collection and analytical capabilities or to deny him vital information. This, in turn, can prevent the enemy from having an accurate and timely picture of an operational situation. Successful deception invariably introduces “noise” into the collection and analytical work of the enemy’s intelligence and weakens the clarity of the signals received. Deception efforts differ in terms of objective, size of the physical space in which they take place, duration, and resources involved. Therefore, differences are considerable among deception efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In a naval context, tactical deception is designed to deceive the enemy’s naval tactical commander about the time, place, and details of a planned naval battle or engagement or some other tactical action. For example, Allied planners prepared four tactical deception plans in support of the Normandy landing. In a plan called Operation Titanic, the dropping of dummies and some Special Air Service (SAS) teams was designed to divert German attention from the real airborne drops in the Normandy area on the night of the invasion. Two airborne drops (Titanic-1 and Titanic-2) – north of the Seine and inland of

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Cap d’Antifer, and at Dives-sur-Mer (northeast of Caen) – were intended to draw German reserves away from the Allied assault objectives and delay the reserves’ westward movement, respectively. The third drop (Titanic-3) was timed with the drop of the British 6th Airborne Division, to divert the German counterattack to the south and west of Caen. The fourth drop (Titanic-4), in the St. Lo area, coincided with the landing of the 101st Airborne Division to the north of Saint-Lô.33 Strategic deception is planned and conducted at the national or alliance/coalition level and military or theater-strategic levels. Deception at the nationalstrategic level is primarily designed to conceal from the enemy one’s intentions concerning whether or not to fight and when and where to open hostilities. Political and diplomatic actions and misinformation are the primary tools of strategic deception. Strategic deception is used in peacetime as well as in wartime. It can be designed to hide one’s weaknesses or greatly exaggerate one’s military or economic strength in peacetime, to conceal one’s preparations or intentions to go to war, or to open hostilities. It can also be used to induce one’s opponent to open a new front or initiate a new campaign. It encompasses a wide array of actions, ranging from political, diplomatic, and informational measures to the threat of use or actual use of military forces. For example, in planning the crossChannel invasion in January 1944, the Allies adopted a master strategic deception plan, code named Bodyguard. This plan aimed to deceive Hitler and the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) about the place and time of the planned invasion of Western Europe. Bodyguard, encompassing three subordinate deception plans, was coordinated by the British chiefs of staff. The heart of the Allied deception effort was the plan Fortitude, designed to pose the threat of an Allied landing from the French Atlantic coast to northern Norway. Fortitude’s planning and execution were the responsibility of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces. The plan Zeppelin was designed to ensure the success of the Normandy landing by preventing the Germans from moving timely reinforcements from the eastern Mediterranean to northern France. The planners wanted to induce the Germans to believe that the Allies would attack Crete or western Greece and the Dalmatian coast and would conduct further landings on the Greek mainland. To ensure the plan’s success, Allied strength in the Mediterranean had to be greatly exaggerated.34 The Soviets agreed to support this effort by mounting a fictitious amphibious landing against the Bulgarian naval base of Varna. To reinforce the plausibility of the Allied deception plan against Norway, the Soviets also planned an actual attack against the German forces deployed on the Kola Peninsula.35 As part of Bodyguard, the Allies prepared two deception plans, code named Vendetta and Ferdinand, for the western Mediterranean. Vendetta was intended to pin down German forces in southern France by presenting a plausible threat of an Allied landing there shortly after the Normandy landing. At the same time, Ferdinand was aimed to convince the Germans that the Allies would not land in southern France, as they actually intended to do on 15 August 1944. Thus, the threat of an Allied landing was posed against the northwestern part of Italy’s coast, with a dual aim: to reduce the readiness of German forces deployed along

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the southern coast of France and to draw German forces away from the central part of their frontline along the Gothic Line in Italy. The Allies also prepared plan Copperhead, a fictional trip by General Bernard L. Montgomery to Algiers shortly before the Normandy landing, to convince the Germans that there was no immediate threat of an invasion of northwestern France. The plan Ironside, a fictional attack against the Bordeaux area on the French Biscay coast, was designed to support the landings in Normandy and in southern France by tying up German troops in southwestern France. This plan was executed, but it was a complete failure; the forces involved in the effort were so small that the Germans did not believe the Allied deception story.36 Another purpose of Bodyguard was to convince the Germans that a manpower shortage had forced the British Army to resort to cannibalization because several of their large formations lacked administrative and supply units. The plan was also aimed to convince the Germans that the Allied divisions were fewer than indicated; that the U.S. divisions arriving in the United Kingdom had not yet completed their training; and that the personnel of some British divisions in the Mediterranean were relieved by fresh troops from the United States. The intent was to convince the Germans that there was a shortage of landing craft because of the Pacific operations and that the required number of landing craft could not be made available until summer 1944. In addition, the Allied deception planners wanted the Germans to believe that the Allied forces in the Mediterranean – particularly the eastern Mediterranean – were larger than they actually were; that French forces were supposedly taking over the responsibility to defend North Africa, thereby freeing Anglo-American forces for operations elsewhere in the spring of 1944; and that certain British divisions and landing craft were being transferred from India to the Middle East, while fresh divisions from the United States were expected to arrive in the Mediterranean.37 The Allies also prepared a series of elaborate diplomatic deceptions in support of Bodyguard’s subordinate deception plans. Among other things, they tried to exploit German fears that some of the neutral countries, specifically Sweden, Spain, and Turkey, might start cooperating with the Allies. Plan Graffham was designed to make the Germans believe that Sweden was about to join the Allied cause. The ploy was to use Sweden to convince Hitler and the OKW that the Allies would attack Norway. The Swedish government would be then confronted with a series of demands, such as the right of Allied aircraft to operate over or land in Sweden’s territory. The plan Royal Flush was intended to mislead the Germans, via diplomatic channels in the leading neutrals that the Allies would not pressure Sweden to reduce its ore shipments to Germany. This part of the deception plan was also aimed to convince the Germans that the Allies would not interfere with Spain’s overland shipments of wolfram ore. The overall objective was to impress on Hitler and the OKW that the Allies did not intend to launch an invasion of the continent any time soon. Another part of the deception story was that after the Allies secured firm lodgment on the continent, the leading neutral European countries would have little to fear from German reprisals and might even take some action in support of the Allied cause.38

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Theater-strategic deception is a subset of national-strategic deception. It should normally be developed for each theater of war. It is aimed to deceive the enemy commander about the objectives, place, and time of an initial major operation in a new campaign. Deception is usually conducted in two or more theaters of operations or a major part of the theater of war. For example, in the spring of 1944, the Allies activated the theater-strategic plan Fortitude, aimed to convince Hitler and the OKW to make faulty strategic dispositions in northwestern Europe before the Normandy invasion by presenting military threats to Norway and the Pas de Calais area in France.39 The main purpose was to pin down German forces as far as possible from the Normandy beaches and to induce the Germans to believe that the invasion would not start until late summer.40 The plan’s scope encompassed the Western European and northern theaters of operations. Fortitude consisted of two subordinate deception plans. Fortitude North was aimed to convince the Germans that the Allies planned to attack southern Norway on 1 May 1944 and invade northern Norway two weeks later, in conjunction with a Soviet attack. As soon as the Allies were established in southern Norway, an assault would be launched against Denmark.41 This plan envisioned simultaneous landings in northern Norway of assault forces notionally held in readiness in Scotland, Iceland, and Northern Ireland. Specifically, in the northern assault, two divisions would land at Narvik and advance along the rail line to Gallivare in Sweden, where they would link with Soviet forces advancing overland from Petsamo. A southern assault near Stavanger, Norway, would be conducted with one infantry division, supported by airborne troops. After consolidating their positions, these forces would advance toward Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim by conducting a series of mutually supporting amphibious landings. Once Norway had been secured and basing rights obtained from Sweden, the Allies would land in Denmark, thereby threatening Germany from the north.42 At the same time Allies increased their fictitious threat in the Pas de Calais area, where the German Fifteenth Army was deployed. The intent was to tie down that army before and after the Allied landing in Normandy. The deception story for Fortitude South was that the main Allied landing would take place in the Pas de Calais area 45 days after the Normandy landing. The latter would be merely a “diversion” to draw German reserves from the adjacent area. Once these reserves were committed, about 50 Allied divisions would launch the main attack in the Pas de Calais area.43 The deception plan Fortitude was highly successful. The fictional order of battle contributed materially to the establishment of the Allied lodgment on the continent. The German Fifteenth Army remained in the Pas de Calais area from 6 June (D-Day) until late July. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, CINC of the West, did not believe that the Allies would land only in Normandy. Not until 25 July did the first divisions of the German Fifteenth Army start to move southward in a belated attempt to reinforce the crumbling Normandy front.44 The Germans were paralyzed by the purported existence of the Fortitude South army, believing that it could invade the Pas de Calais area.45

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In the fall of 1943, the Allies conceived a theater-strategic plan for the Pacific designed to induce the Japanese to send troop reinforcements to the Kurils and not to the central Pacific, where a new Allied campaign would begin in November. Until then, Japanese attention was principally directed to the Allied advance in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). The Japanese failed to hold their positions in the Aleutians, seized in June 1942, and evacuated the remaining troops in August 1943. However, the Japanese remained very concerned with any Allied activity near the Kurils. Hence, the Allied planners wanted to further increase Japanese apprehensions in that area. This resulted in the origin of the deception plan code named Wedlock. As part of that deception effort, the Allies announced a conference between Admiral Nimitz and General Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General (CG) of Alaska, to be held in San Francisco on 14 March 1944. Another piece of evidence in support of the deception story, conveyed to Tokyo by “intelligence channels,” concerned the creation of the new 17th Naval District, which included the Aleutians. All troops embarking from Seattle were issued Arctic clothing and equipment. The Navy built a fullfledged dummy air base at Holtz Bay, on the island of Attu (Aleutians), and appropriate activities were carried out at the base. There were planned leaks of selected information to personnel embarking on westbound ships. The planners also arranged for newspaper and magazine articles on Alaska and the Aleutians. Starting in the fall of 1943, intelligence channels leading to Tokyo were progressively fed selected inferential details of the deception story.46 Special means and planned leaks were used to relay the “postponement” and then “abandonment” of the fictional deception plan Wedlock. However, the Allies continued to maintain their notional threat to the Kurils until April 1945. For that purpose, a series of tactical deception plans, code named Husband and Bambino, were drafted to exaggerate U.S. strength in the Aleutians. Husband was activated in late June 1944 and ended on 30 October, corresponding roughly with the Allied invasion of Leyte. It was succeeded by Bambino, which ended in January 1945, coinciding with the Allied landing on Luzon.47 Plan Wedlock was extremely successful in deceiving the Japanese about the real threat they faced in the northern Pacific. Before the deception started in January 1944, the Japanese strength in the Kurils was 25,000 troops and 38 aircraft, while the Allied strength in the Aleutians was about 100,000 men and about 350 aircraft. By June 1944, when the Allied invasion of the Marianas took place (Operation Forager), the Japanese had increased their forces in the Kurils to 70,000 men and 590 aircraft, while the Allies had reduced their troop strength in the Aleutians to 64,000 men (air strength was only slightly reduced). More important was the Japanese estimate of the enemy strength in the Aleutians, because that influenced their decisions whether or not to reinforce their own strength in the Kurils. In January 1944 the Japanese estimated the Allied strength at 100,000 men and 330 aircraft – a pretty accurate assessment. However, because of the Allied deception effort, the Japanese were wide of the mark in their estimate of Allied strength in June 1944. They believed that the Allies then had some 400,000 men and 700 aircraft in the Aleutians. By the time

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of the Allied landing at Leyte in October, the Japanese still had 80,000 troops in the Kurils, while U.S. forces had only 58,000 troops in the Aleutians. The Japanese retained their troop strength until the spring of 1945, while U.S. strength was progressively reduced to about 38,000 men.48 In the strict definition of the term, an operational deception pertains to one’s actions and measures to deceive the enemy as to the time, place, and details of a planned major operation conducted as part of a maritime campaign or a major joint/combined operation with a limited strategic objective. A successful operational deception is aimed to protect the operational commander’s intent from the enemy’s intelligence-gathering sources and reinforce the enemy’s expectations and preconceptions about one’s force. One’s actions might surprise the enemy if the deceiver creates an impression of routine activities by gradually conditioning the enemy to a certain repetitive pattern of behavior. This method was used by the Germans in preparing the operational redeployment of two battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) from Brest through the English Channel in February 1942 (Operation Cerberus). The Germans increased the intensity of their radar jamming over time so that the British became acclimated to it and did not realize that it had become so intense that British radar was almost useless.49 A deception plan is unlikely to succeed if the objective of the real operation is too transparent to the enemy. For example, the deception plan for the Allied convoy operation from Gibraltar to Malta on 10–15 August 1942 (Operation Pedestal) failed because the Germans and the Italians were not deceived by a diversionary movements of the Allied forces in the eastern part of the Mediterranean (Operation MG.3). The aim was to draw the enemy’s attention away from Malta. The MG.3 operation envisaged two groups of British ships to sail from Haifa and Port Said, respectively, to the longitude of Alexandria. The intent was to lure the Italian squadron at Navarino and to keep down German aircraft on Crete. A convoy of three merchant ships (M.W. 12) under cover of a task force of two cruisers and five destroyers would sail from Port Said to a position some 100 miles west-south-west of Crete. Two British submarines would be deployed in the same area to prevent any intervention of Italian naval forces based at Tarent. Another British submarine would be deployed off Navarino to watch the movements of the Italian 8th Division.50 As part of the preparations for the pending Allied landing at Leyte on 20 October, Admiral Ernest J. King (1878–1956), COMINCH/CNO, requested from the British to attack the Nicobars (west of Thailand) in the hope that this would mislead the Japanese into expecting the main Allied attack in Malaya or the NEI and thereby tie down the major part of their fleet near Singapore. British carriers and surface ships were slated to attack the Nicobars on 17 October (Operation Millet).51 On 17 October, Combined Fleet Headquarters received a report from Commander, Ninth Base Air Force, in Singapore about the presence of an enemy task force of eight ships some 250 miles south of Car Nicobars Island. Another report received shortly afterward indicated that two enemy carriers, two battleships and cruisers each, and eight destroyers had bombarded the island,

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while ten enemy aircraft had attacked the island of Nancowry. The Japanese were clearly underwhelmed by the enemy action off the Nicobars. They correctly concluded that the British raid on the Nicobars was intended to distract them. Toyoda and the high command in Tokyo left local army and navy commanders to deal with the British raid.52 The operational deception should be coordinated with the strategic deception. Any disconnect between these two would invariably create difficulties in their execution and can even endanger the success of the entire operation. For example, the deception plan in support of the Allied landing on Sicily, code named Barclay, depended on the successful execution of Mincemeat. The actual planning for Mincemeat was vested in the British “Force A” in Cairo. A team from Force A was sent to Eisenhower’s headquarters in Algiers to serve as a deception planning staff.53 The general objective of Barclay was to convince the Germans and Italians to give priority to maintaining and reinforcing sizable forces in the Balkans and in southern France, thereby limiting the German ability to reinforce Sicily.54 The original broad outline of that plan envisaged fictional attacks between 26 May and 6 June by the notional British 12th Army on western Crete, the Peloponnesus, and the islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, and by the U.S. Seventh Army on Sardinia, Corsica, and southern France. However, on May 15, Force A (which was in charge of Barclay) decided to postpone all these fictional assaults, leak that news to the Germans and Italians in late May, and revive the same threats two months later. The revised Barclay envisaged the same sequence of events, but these fictitious attacks would peak some 12 days after the actual landing on Sicily (10 July), and 11 days later the fictional assault on southern France would take place.55 The Allies also planned a naval feint, code named operation Fracture, as part of the overall deception effort for the landing on Sicily. This action was planned for the early morning on D-2 Day and the night between D-2 and D-3 days in the area of Marsala-Mazzara. The Allied forces assigned to operation Fracture consisted of one battleship and cruiser division each; a force of coastal craft would present the enemy defenders with the threat of landing by bombarding the town of Marsala and the island of Marettimo and would conduct a demonstration with coastal forces off Marsala.56 The Allied planners tried to convince Hitler and the OKW that a landing on Sicily was merely preliminary and a subordinate part of a major Allied effort that included the capture of Sardinia and Corsica and the invasion of the southern Balkans.57 As it turned out, the Germans sent substantial forces to the Balkans, and their forces were divided among Sardinia, Sicily, Corsica, and the mainland of Italy. Yet not all Axis commanders were deceived; sufficient signs – such as a concentration of Allied landing craft and ground troops in North African ports, and increased air activity – unmistakably pointed out that the next Allied objective was Sicily.58 Italian intelligence was accurate in its assessment on 24 June that the Allied exercise near Oran was a rehearsal for a paratroop drop on Sicily. A week later another Italian intelligence report correctly pointed out that the next Allied objective would be Sardinia or Sicily, but most likely

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Sicily. However, the higher authorities in Rome and Berlin did not believe these reports. The Allied landing on Sicily achieved complete operational surprise. Naval tactical feints kept some Axis forces away from the landing beaches on Sicily. The Allies were also successful in making the defenders believe that their amphibious convoys were moving toward Greece, because the convoys’ routes converged in the general area of Malta; then their direction changed, and they approached Sicily under cover of darkness.59 Sometimes operational deception must be maintained after the initial major operation in a new campaign has been executed but while one’s forces are still threatened by enemy forces within striking distance. In that case, the initial deception plan must be modified or completely rewritten. The Allies were faced with such a situation after their landing in Normandy on 6 June 1944. Because of stiff German resistance, the lodgment on the continent was tenuously held for several weeks after the landing. The Allies activated deception plan Fortitude South–II, aimed to persuade Hitler and Rundstedt that there was a continuing Allied threat to the Pas de Calais area. This threat was maintained by a large notional force, composed of the First U.S. Army Group and U.S. XIX Tactical Air Command, on the eastern and southeastern coasts of England. The threat was substantiated by considerable radio activity and about 250 landing craft, tank (LCT) dummies deployed in the harbors and estuaries of eastern and southeastern England.60 Fortitude South–II used forces similar in size to those used in Fortitude South. The big difference was that notional forces were used instead of real ones. The fresh U.S. troops had to be sent as reinforcements to Normandy. Notional forces were composed of two divisions from the 14th U.S. Army and one division from the British 4th Army. They also “carried out” intensive amphibious exercises.61 Sequencing One of the main preconditions for the successful execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation is sound sequencing of intermediate objectives. The main purpose then is to arrange events in such a progression that collectively they lead to the accomplishment of the assigned ultimate objective in the shortest time possible and with the least loss for friendly forces. In the naval context, tactical sequencing is planned for naval battles, engagements, or strikes or some other naval tactical actions. It determines the objectives and tasks to be accomplished by one or several combat arms. Strategic sequencing deals with sequencing campaigns, in two or more theaters of operations, within a single theater of war, or in adjacent or widely separated theaters of war. An example of strategic sequencing was a series of operations, code named Cartwheel (formerly Elkton III), agreed on between General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), and Admiral Halsey, CINC of South Pacific Area (SOPAC). This plan, drafted in April 1943, envisaged the seizure and occupation of the Lae–Salamaua–Madang–Western New Britain–Solomons area by sequencing and synchronizing the employment of forces in the two adjacent

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theaters of operations – New Guinea (not formally declared a theater of operations) and SOPAC. In the summer of 1943, U.S. planners drafted a tentative schedule of operations through the end of 1944 in three theaters of war: the Pacific Ocean Area, SWPA, and China, Burma, and India.62 Operational sequencing is aimed to arrange the sequence of major tactical or operational objectives/tasks in the course of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. It can be planned for each major phase of one’s combat force employment – from mobilization, to post-hostilities, and demobilization. However, the focus is normally on the sequencing of events during combat force employment phase. Operational sequencing provides the path for synchronization of one’s combat forces in accomplishing each of these intermediate objectives. Another purpose of sequencing is to develop a force list for the forthcoming operation by calculating how many and what type of one’s forces are required to accomplish each intermediate objective or main/partial task and then identifying the forces’ shortfalls. One’s task organization should be based on the force list derived from the combat forces’ sequencing. For example, the Allies applied operational sequencing in their plans for what later evolved into the Solomons Campaign and the New Guinea Campaign. The U.S. JCS made a strategic decision on 2 July 1942 to start a new offensive in the southern Pacific, conducted by the two adjacent theaters SWPA and SOPAC. The initial operational objectives (misnamed “tasks”) were as follows: Task 1 – seizure and occupation of the Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and “adjacent positions”; Task 2 – seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomons and of Lae, Salamaua, and the northwest coast of New Guinea; and Task 3 – seizure and occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Britain–New Ireland area.63 The execution of Task 1 was assigned to SOPAC and the two remaining tasks to SWPA. The initial boundary between these two theaters was changed on 1 August to place the entire area for Task 1 (Tulagi, Guadalcanal, Florida, the Russels, Malaita, and San Cristobal) within the SOPAC area. In general, operational sequencing can be arranged in terms of objectives, tasks, time, or a combination of these. Objective-oriented sequencing aims to selectively concentrate friendly forces in time and space, to create conditions that will translate operational or tactical success into operational or strategic advantage. The planning should start with determining the ultimate objective and then identify the required series of intermediate objectives.64 In war at sea intermediate objectives are often the enemy force or force-related elements. The linkage between an objective and the options to accomplish it provides a framework for planners to sequence a series of events.65 An example of successful objective-oriented operational sequencing is the German planning for the occupation of Norway and Denmark in April 1940. As their initial objectives, the Germans decided to seize selected ports and airfields and obtain air superiority over Skagerrak, Kattegat, and southern Norway by simultaneously carrying out naval, air, and land major operations. Likewise, the Japanese in their invasion of the NEI in December 1941 simultaneously and

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consecutively attacked selected major ports and airfields on the islands of Borneo, Sumatra, and Celebes as part of their preliminary moves to seize the island of Java. In a maritime campaign designed to occupy a series of island or archipelago positions, sequencing is usually objective oriented. For example the initial sequencing for the Solomons Campaign in the summer of 1942 was objective oriented. MacArthur used a similar sequencing method in the New Guinea Campaign, 1942–1944, as did Nimitz in the Central Pacific Campaign, 1943–1944. The campaign plan Granite II, issued on 15 January 1944, encompassed four major operations to be conducted by the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) forces. The tentative sequence and timing (later changed several times) of these operations were as follows: capture of Kwajalein, Marshalls (Operation Flintlock), 31 January; strikes on Truk, Carolines (Operation Hailstone), 24 March; capture of Eniwetok, Marshalls (Operation Catchpole), 1 May; capture of Truk (Operation Gymkhama), 24 March; and capture of Tinian, Saipan, and Guam (Operation Forager), 1 November 1944.66 Task-oriented operational sequencing is based on arranging the order for accomplishing main tasks derived from the ultimate objective of the pending operation. This method offers more flexibility during the execution because main tasks can be modified or canceled if unanticipated events occur but the ultimate objective would remain unchanged until it is accomplished. A drawback of this method is its complexity. For each operational objective a number of main tasks (each of which consists of a number of partial tasks must be carried out. Too many tasks will lower operational tempo and possibly fragment one’s efforts. On the other hand, too few tasks would not lead to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective of the operation. Generally, operational sequencing should not encompass tactical tasks either during the planning process or, in the course of the execution of the operation. Not only would their inclusion unnecessarily complicate the entire process, these tasks might in fact become more important than the operational tasks and even derail the entire sequencing timetable. Among other things, this was a major reason for the Japanese failure in Operation MO (which led to the Battle of the Coral Sea) in May 1942. The Japanese Striking Force was tasked to ferry 18 Zero fighter aircraft from Truk to Rabaul. However, unforeseen events caused this simple additional task to disrupt the timetable for the entire operation.67 Everything went according to plan until 2 May, when the Striking Force reached a position about 240 miles northeast of Rabaul. That day and the next, the Japanese commander tried to launch nine Zero fighter aircraft to Rabaul; both attempts failed because of bad weather, which also prevented the Japanese carriers from refueling at sea. Thus, precious time was lost and the entire sequencing schedule was disrupted; moreover, the Japanese carrier force could not be within range to protect Tulagi until 5 May, too late to have any real impact.68 One’s means should always match the ends; otherwise, no objective or task can be accomplished easily, if at all. By understanding relationships between

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ends and means, planners can decide whether events should occur sequentially or simultaneously.69 The basic sequencing plan should be adhered to unless some extraordinary event requires a change in the sequencing schedule. A change in the original timetable might be warranted if the enemy abandons his positions or areas; if a new intelligence estimate shows a drastic change in the operational or strategic situation; if the enemy’s resistance is unexpectedly weak or unexpectedly strong; if additional transportation assets became available; if attrition of friendly forces is lower or higher than expected; or for some other reason. For example, MacArthur decided to accelerate the tempo of his operations in SWPA in the spring of 1944 as a result of the unanticipated absence of Japanese troops on the Admiralties. The originally approved plans called for simultaneous invasion of Kavieng (New Ireland) and Manus (the Admiralties) on 1 April 1944. However, after finding out from aerial reconnaissance that no Japanese troops remained on the Admiralties on 23 February, MacArthur decided to send elements of the 1st Cavalry Division to Los Negros at once, to conduct reconnaissance in force. Afterward, the rest of the division was deployed to capture the entire Admiralties group. Likewise, Nimitz’s campaign for the central Pacific was accelerated after January 1944 because of the unexpected ease of seizing Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshalls, and the occupation of Majuro in the eastern archipelago without Japanese opposition. This, in turn, provided a surplus of uncommitted Allied troops. Thus, Nimitz sped up the tempo of operations by invading Eniwetok on 17 February, two months ahead of schedule.70 At the Second Quebec Conference, 11–16 September 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff changed the timetable for the Allied operations in the Pacific. MacArthur was directed to seize Morotai, and Nimitz would capture Peleliu, the Carolines, in September. In October, Nimitz would seize Yap in the Western Carolines and Ulithi, and then move into Talaud in the Philippines. In November, MacArthur would seize Sarangani Bay, Mindanao, and in December MacArthur and Nimitz would jointly seize Leyte and then land on Luzon or Formosa.71 This schedule was drastically changed at the end of the conference because of events in the Pacific. On 7 and 8 September, aircraft from the U.S. Third Fleet struck Yap and the Palau Islands (Western Carolines) and, for the next two days, Mindanao. Admiral Halsey, the Third Fleet commander, reported to Nimitz that few serviceable Japanese aircraft were left in the Philippines, the bulk of the Japanese oil supplies had been destroyed, there was no shipping left to sink, and the area was wide open for Allied attack. Halsey also informed Nimitz that one of his downed pilots had been told by his Filipino rescuers that no Japanese troops were deployed on Leyte. He recommended that the Peleliu, Morotai, Yap, and Mindanao operations be canceled and that the Pacific Fleet and the Seventh Fleet jointly assault Leyte on 20 October, two months ahead of schedule. Nimitz believed that the time had come to accelerate operations in the Pacific, and he strongly recommended that intermediate operations against Yap, Talaud, and Sarangani Bay be canceled. In his view, Leyte could be seized relatively easily, without any intermediate operations. The Third Fleet could cover

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the initial landings until land-based aircraft could be staged ashore. The force intended for the occupation of Yap could be made available to MacArthur.72 On the night of 15 September, the JCS received MacArthur’s consent to this acceleration of the schedule, and in one-and-a-half hours they decided that MacArthur and Nimitz would invade Leyte on 20 October and that Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson’s amphibious force, already embarking to take Peleliu and Yap, would join them after taking Peleliu.73 Synchronization Success of synchronization is contingent on the sound sequencing of operational or major tactical objectives. Improper sequencing of objectives or tasks usually dooms synchronization. Operational functions, especially intelligence, fires, and logistics, should be synchronized with the actions of one’s combat forces. The commander’s intent or operational idea is insufficient to ensure the required degree of synchronization without a simple and flexible plan for synchronization. Tactical, strategic, and operational synchronization are differentiated by scale. Tactical synchronization is applied in planning and executing naval tactical actions. Sound and effective synchronization of one’s forces at the tactical level is one of the prerequisites for the success of operational and sometimes even strategic synchronization. Strategic synchronization deals with the employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power at a theater-strategic or national-strategic level. It is applied in the conduct of two or more campaigns in a given theater of war or two adjacent theaters of war. In World War II, the Allies often synchronized their campaigns within a given theater of war or adjacent theaters of war. For instance, the Allied campaign in New Guinea was synchronized with the Solomons Campaign in 1942–1943, and subsequently with the Central Pacific Campaign in 1943–1944. Operational synchronization pertains to arranging actions in time, space, and purpose for the planning and execution of maritime campaigns and major naval operations. The naval operational commander has to synchronize many concurrent actions and activities at several levels of war. He also needs to synchronize operational functions in a maritime theater during the major phases of combat force employment. In a major naval operation synchronization involves several simultaneous or sequential attacks against targets in the sector of main effort; the aim is to neutralize in a timely way the enemy’s ability to interfere with one’s own actions in the main sector. These actions may include sweeping certain sea or ocean areas for mines, deploying submarines, or lay mines to restrict the maneuver of the enemy’s forces. Precise synchronization in terms of space and time is needed between strikes by the main forces and supporting actions meant to create favorable conditions for the main task.74 In their invasion of Norway in April 1940, the Germans developed a plan for synchronized employment of all three services of the Wehrmacht. The plan envisaged a quick occupation of the Jutland Peninsula and the island of Fuenen by surprise and then proceed to the occupation of Zealand. In Norway the first

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task was to seize important points on the coast by surprise landings from the sea and air. The plan was daring and original. The troops would be transported to several points by destroyers and with their artillery, equipment, and supplies being carried in transports disguised as cargo ships. Airborne troops would be used in Oslo and Stavanger. Almost the entire German surface fleet divided into seven groups was required for the operation. The naval part of the initial operation envisaged a covert movement of seven so-called “Export Echelons” composed of warships and merchant ships to seize control of seven ports in Norway. Specifically, ten destroyers carrying 2,000 mountain troops of the Third Mountain Division to Narvik would be accompanied until near its destination by the two battle cruisers (Gneisenau and Scharnhorst), which would break off at an agreed point and create a diversion in the Arctic. A group carrying 1,700 troops and escorted by one heavy cruiser and four destroyers would reach Trondheim; some 1,900 troops embarked on two light cruisers, the auxiliaries, two torpedo craft, and five fast patrol craft also headed for Trondheim; the group for Kristiansand and Arendal consisted of 1,100 troops carried by one light cruiser and auxiliary ship each, three torpedo craft, and seven fast patrol craft; about 2,000 troops escorted by one pocket battleship, heavy cruiser, and light cruiser each, three torpedo craft, two armed whalers, and eight minesweepers would disembark at Oslo; while 150 troops on board four minesweepers would head for Egersund. In addition, the Tanker Echelon of eight ships carrying fuel for Narvik, Trondheim, and Stavanger would sail ahead of the Export Echelons. The arrival of all groups was so timed that they would reach their assigned positions off Norway’s ports at W(-eser) hour. Another group of 15 transports of the First Sea Transport Echelon would arrive at Oslo, Kristiansand, Bergen, and Stavanger later in the day (9 April). Subsequent transport echelons would be directed only to Oslo.75 Another example of a successful operational synchronization plan was the Japanese two-phased campaign plan at the outbreak of the hostilities in December 1941. The plan was very complex. It required precise coordination of the movements and actions of multiservice forces spread over an enormous area of the Pacific and the adjacent sea and land area. The Japanese plan called for simultaneous or almost simultaneous attacks against the U.S Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and occupation of Malaya, Hong Kong, the Philippines, British Borneo, NEI, Siam (Thailand), Burma, Guam, and the Bismarcks. Specifically, the landings in Malaya would be conducted at several places almost simultaneously after preliminary air strikes. On the same day, air strikes from Formosa and Palau would begin against U.S. forces and installations in the Philippines. By X-1 Day, amphibious landings would be carried out at Aparri, Vigan, Laoag, Legaspi, and Davao, followed by the occupation of the Jolo Island as rapidly as possible. In the NEI, Japan’s principal objective was to seize a series of islands near the main island of Java. The 16th Army would land at Bandung, Batavia, Surabaya, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Banjermasin (Borneo), Ambon (Celebes), Kupang (Timor), and the key points on Banka Island and Palembang (Sumatra), while elements of the 25th Army would land on Medan and occupy Achin and

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then Sabang (North Sumatra), while the Navy seized Menado (North Celebes) and Makassar.76 In contrast, the Japanese synchronization plan for the Sho-1 plan that led to the Battle of Leyte was seriously flawed. The planners envisaged the First Diversionary Attack Force sailing out from Lingga Archipelago (southeast of Singapore), advancing via the San Bernardino Strait toward Leyte Gulf while destroying any enemy surface forces opposing it, and then attacking the Allied transports in the Leyte Gulf. In coordination with this attack, the Mobile Force, Main Body (carriers) would lure the enemy north and attack elements of his forces at the most favorable opportunity. The Second Diversionary Attack Force would come under the command of Southwest Area Fleet (with headquarters in Manila) and would cooperate with the army in conducting a counterlanding on the western coast of Leyte. The Base Air Force would concentrate in the Philippines for an all-out attack on the U.S. fast carrier groups. The Advance Force (submarines) would attack damaged enemy vessels and amphibious convoys with all the forces under its command. The First Diversionary Attack Force would execute its attack against the enemy invasion forces at the landing point on X-Day. The Mobile Force, Main Body would advance to the area east of Luzon on X-1 or X-2 Day.77 The main problem with the Japanese synchronization plan was that its success depended on precise coordination. This is difficult to achieve even under the best of circumstances. For example, it was essential that Admiral Toyoda, the CINC of the Combined Fleet, had accurate information on the movements of the Allied forces five to six days in advance, to have sufficient time to coordinate the movements of the Mobile Force and First Diversionary Attack Force. However, even this advance warning would not have been enough, because by then the Allied transports would have been unloaded in the Tacloban anchorage. Surprisingly, the Japanese did not station their submarines off the Allied ships’ most likely departure points from Manus and Hollandia, so they missed the opportunity to obtain additional warning time; these bases were also inadequately reconnoitered by the Japanese land-based aircraft.78 In addition, the space factor adversely affected the synchronization plan. The distance between the Bungo Suido (one of the two southern exits of the Inland Sea) and Singapore is about 2,500 miles, and the Philippines lay approximately halfway between these two points. Moreover, the Japanese should have known that their perennially poor communications would not allow synchronization of the movements of the far-flung Japanese forces. Clearly, the synchronization schedule was too rigid, because it made no provision for unforeseen events, such as U.S. submarine or carrier aircraft attacks on the Japanese surface forces in Philippine waters. Kurita’s First Diversionary Attack Force lost about four-and-a-half hours avoiding U.S. carrier aircraft attacks in the Sibuyan Sea, and this delay by itself derailed the initial synchronization schedule.

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Branches The operational commander should not be bound to a single course of action in planning for a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Sufficient flexibility should be built into the basic plan to preserve one’s freedom of action. The operational commander accomplishes this by anticipating and planning branches – options built into the basic operation plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation. They are contingencies within a given phase of the operation.79 Branches allow the operational commander to anticipate future enemy actions that might lead to the need to drastically modify his basic plan. Such a situation could arise from unexpected action by the enemy, nonavailability of one’s forces, or even a change in the weather within the operational area. As conditions change, the operational commander should be prepared to maintain the continuity of the operation by redeploying major friendly forces in the theater. Sequels In designing a maritime campaign or major naval operation, the planners should envisage one or more successive major operations or major/minor tactical actions – sequels – after the preceding intermediate objective was accomplished. Sequels and branches are related but not identical in their purpose and meaning.80 In contrast to branches, sequels follow the conclusion of a given phase of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. They are the means of allowing the commander to exploit tactical or operational success.81 A failure to plan sequels, because of a lack of foresight, has often had serious consequences for the course and even outcome of a major naval operation. Sequels are prepared in a rudimentary form – usually as an outline – in advance, so that subordinate tactical commanders are fully familiar with them. The forces that would carry out a sequel should be identified, and the sequel’s objective clearly determined.82

Phasing The ultimate objective is normally accomplished by spacing a maritime campaign or major naval operation into several phases related in time and space. In general, a phase is the time between the accomplishments of the two successive intermediate objectives. Phases can be planned to take place simultaneously or sequentially. Their main purpose is to stagger a maritime campaign or major naval operation into several parts; otherwise, one’s forces can approach or overshoot the point of culmination before the next intermediate objective is accomplished. For example, the Central Pacific Campaign was conducted in three main phases: Phase I from 23 November 1943 (end of the resistance on Tarawa, Gilberts) to 31 January 1944 (landing on Kwajalein and Roi-Namur, Marshalls); Phase II from 19 February (fall of Eniwetok, Marshalls) to 15 June (landing on Saipan, Marianas); and Phase III from 3 August (fall of Tinian, Marianas) to

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15 September 1944 (landing on Peleliu, Western Carolines). During each phase, the Allied carriers and land-based heavy bombers attacked a variety of targets throughout the Central Pacific. Most offensive major naval operations will be conducted in a single phase but with the employment of all available forces and at high intensity. The exception is amphibious and antiamphibious landing operations, and major operations against enemy maritime trade or in defense and protection of friendly maritime trade. While a tactical action may consist of several phases, they usually overlap each other; hence there is no clear break in fighting. Phases in a major naval operation are, in contrast, usually longer and are marked by clear breaks in the intensity of fighting. A major naval operation in littoral waters will be shorter in duration than that conducted elsewhere and is more likely to encompass a single phase.83 Because of the high intensity of action, high consumption of fuel and ammunition is to be expected; hence, sustained logistical support is critical for success. In narrow seas, there will be considerable difficulty in regenerating combat potential, because operational pauses will be few, and of much shorter duration than in operations on the open ocean. Another problem is much higher vulnerability of friendly forces to enemy strikes. Normally, the change of objectives/tasks – not a timeline – should determine the phasing of a major naval operation. Other factors include the distance from the main or intermediate base of operation, logistical resources, and protection of one’s logistical lines of supplies, terrain, oceanography, and weather, to name a few. The individual phases gain significance only in the larger context of the operation. The most critical for success are the links between two consecutive phases of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The planners should clearly define the conditions to be created for a transition from one phase to another. It is also important to hide from the enemy when that transition actually occurs. This can be achieved by concurrently intensifying one’s actions in a false direction or conducting deception. Distinctions between consecutive phases should be made by their separation in time or space, by a difference in the objectives to be accomplished, or by the forces assigned. Hence, each phase should aim at some intermediate objective that is necessary to achieve the ultimate objective. Phases are planned by identifying transition points between successive major tactical actions, or by identifying changes in tempo within a particular combat action. Anticipating the point of culmination The naval operational commander and his planners should evaluate those elements of the operational idea that most directly affect the arrival at the culminating point. Specifically, ultimate and intermediate objectives and their sequencing, phasing, reserves, surprise, deception, and protection of friendly center of gravity are closely related to the point of culmination. A culminating

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point can be prevented by determining the number of intermediate objectives and their sound sequencing. It can also be prevented by planning an operational pause after a given intermediate objective has been accomplished but before starting actions to accomplish the next intermediate objective. General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) was the first military theoretician who explained in some detail the concept of culmination. He defined the culminating point (Kulminationspunkt) as “the point where the remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace.” Clausewitz also implied that once the culminating point is passed, the chance of victory is foreclosed unless the enemy yields from fear without engaging in decisive combat. If the enemy were to choose to fight it out, he would prevail.84 In generic terms, a culmination can be understood as a point in terms of time and space reached by the attacker or the defender, after which his stated objectives cannot be accomplished and continued effort to reach them will significantly heighten the chances of failure or even defeat. The concept of the culminating point is often misunderstood, and any defeat of friendly or enemy forces is attributed to overshooting a point of culmination. This is not necessarily the case, because in many instances the attacker has won a decisive victory, or the defender has decisively beaten the attacker, without approaching or arriving at their respective culminating points. There is probably no aspect of operational art as complex as the concept of culmination. Hence, the highest art of an operational commander is to timely anticipate or sense his own or the enemy’s arrival at the point of culmination and then take proper and effective actions to take advantage of the newly created situation and bring about a decision. The naval operational commanders and their staffs should evaluate all aspects of a situation in order to plan for and then anticipate the point of culmination in the execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The inherent uncertainty of war due to friction and “fog of war” further complicates this problem. A culminating point in combat is reached when the relative combat power shifts between two sides.85 It is the point beyond which the difference in relative combat power begins to decrease rapidly.86 Theory does not say that if a commander continues beyond the culminating point he will face a defeat. It only warns that the risks of setback and even defeat will be pretty high if he does so. In practice, a commander might well gamble and continue his attack beyond the point of culmination, after weighing all the pertinent elements in the situation, and be ultimately successful in accomplishing the assigned objective. Clearly, if a commander goes beyond the culminating point and suffers unacceptable losses and even defeat, then he has gambled too much. Solid operational intelligence is critically important for planning a point of culmination for one’s forces. Reliable and continuous sustainment is another critical factor if the effects of culmination are to be overcome. The logisticians should accurately predict one’s support and supply requirements in conjunction with the effects caused by combat losses, time and distance factors, status of lines of communications, weather and terrain, oceanography, and repair and

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replacement capabilities. With the assistance of intelligence officers, logisticians can help target the enemy’s critical logistics elements, which may cause an enemy offensive to reach a culminating point before reaching its objectives.87 Operational pauses In a major amphibious or antiamphibious landing operation or in a major operation against enemy maritime trade and in defense and protection of friendly maritime trade it is necessary to plan for relative breaks in fighting. Periodic slackening, or even the stopping of one’s forces – called operational pauses – should be part of a sound plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Properly understood, the term “pause” means a major part of the main forces slackens or even drastically reduces its efforts while the supporting forces intensify their pressure on the enemy’s main forces. Time between consecutive phases of a major naval operation would vary in length depending on one’s losses and logistical sustainment capabilities. Operational pauses should be used to bring up new forces or regroup existing ones, replenish and refuel, and provide rest to personnel. A series of small, almost continuous tactical actions should be conducted by other forces during these pauses to establish a favorable operational situation in a given area of operations and lay the foundations for the conduct of a successive major naval operation.88 Pauses are highly useful for arranging sound sequencing and synchronization of major tactical actions within a major naval operation. Their main purpose is to allow sufficient time to regenerate one’s combat potential and avoid arriving at or overreaching the point of culmination. An operational pause can also be planned to shift one’s forces from one sector of effort to another. The naval operational commander might intentionally and temporarily cede the initiative to the enemy to prepare a major naval operation in some other part of the theater or to deceive the enemy about his real intentions. An operational pause should be planned by taking the anticipated point of culmination into account, so that the enemy cannot seriously threaten one’s forces while they temporarily reduce the intensity of their actions. Operational tempo The operational tempo refers to the pace of a maritime campaign or major naval operation toward the accomplishment of its ultimate objective. In general, a force can move only as fast as its force elements’ tactical rate of advance. The higher the operational tempo, the better the chance of maintaining one’s initiative. To achieve success in a maritime campaign or major naval operation, it is necessary to obtain and maintain the initiative. The initiative is largely a product of maintaining a high tempo, or rate of progress toward the completion of the assigned objective. It is also understood as the rate or rhythm of one’s activity relative to the enemy’s activity within a specific military action. It includes the capability of one’s forces to make a successful transition from one posture to

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another – that is, from offense to defense or vice versa. In practical terms, the tempo is the distance to be covered divided by the amount of time it takes to cover it.89 An essential factor in maintaining a fast operational tempo is operational agility – the ability of one’s forces to act or react faster than the enemy. Agility depends on the speed of the decision-making cycle. It can also be enhanced by spatially dislocating the enemy’s forces, through either maneuver or feints. A high operational tempo can be achieved by conducting major operations simultaneously, rather than in sequence. In addition, operational tempo is greatly increased by decentralized C2 through mission command. Operational reserves The operational idea should also address in broad terms the forces’ size and mix and the location of the operational reserve. An operational reserve is a force of such size and combat potential as to have a decisive impact on the outcome of a campaign or major operation. In land warfare, it is usually composed of the most mobile and combat ready combined-arms force, prepared and ready for employment at short notice on the order of the operational commander. An operational reserve is usually a one-time-use force.90 It is aimed to ensure and consolidate operational success.91 The operational idea for a major amphibious operation might contemplate using part of the landing force as a reserve after the first-wave troops have landed. Such a reserve can be committed to battle ashore in case of unexpectedly strong enemy resistance or the appearance of other enemy forces in the area. It can also be used for conducting a feint or demonstration to distract the enemy’s attention or tie down his forces along a certain part of the coast. The size of the reserve would vary, but it is generally much smaller than an operational reserve for a major land operation. However, it is not the size but the potential impact on the outcome of the landing operation that determines the force’s size. In some Allied landings in World War II, reserves were the size of one reinforced division. Some forces were embarked on the ships in the proximity of the landing beaches, and some were on-call reserves assembled at some distance from the landing objective area. In the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 (Operation Husky), both the British Eighth Army and the U.S. Seventh Army had what would be considered an operational reserve. The U.S. Seventh Army’s reserve consisted of four distinct and widely separated parts: the 2nd Armored Division (minus Combat Command A), reinforced by the 18th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the 1st Division and deployed with amphibious forces; the 82nd Airborne Division, on call after H-Hour; the 39th RCT of the 9th Division, plus the 9th Division Artillery in North Africa, ready to move at any time after D-Day; and the remainder of the 9th Division.92 The Allied plan for the invasion of Leyte (Operation King-II) on 20 October 1944 (A-Day), envisaged simultaneous landings by the X Corps (1st CavDiv

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and 40th ID) and the XIV Corps (24th and 37th ID) in the Dulag area. One RCT of the 25th ID would make preliminary landings on A-2 Day to secure the islands at the entrance to Leyte Gulf. The 25th ID would serve as a floating reserve, ready to reinforce either corps with one RCT by A+2 Day and with the remaining RCT by A+4 Day.93 Regeneration of combat potential The operational design for a maritime campaign or major naval operation should include ways and procedures to regenerate one’s forces’ combat potential. Phasing and operational pauses are primarily used to plan for sufficient time to regenerate combat power. After evaluating the enemy’s strength, the operational commander can determine his relative combat power and calculate where his forces are in relationship to their culminating point. This information can be used in sequencing tactical actions, in pausing at the most opportune time, or, when on the defense, in designing actions that will lead to the opponent’s culmination.94 Because of the high intensity of actions, high consumption of fuel and ammunition is expected. Hence, the sustained logistical support is critical for success. In narrow seas, there will be great difficulties in regenerating combat potential because there will be few if any operational pauses. In addition, such pauses will be much shorter than in the operations on the open ocean. Another problem is much higher vulnerability of one’s forces to the enemy strikes. After the ultimate objective of a major naval operation is accomplished and operational success is consolidated, one’s forces are usually redeployed to another area of operations, either in the same or adjacent theater of operations. The purpose can be to obtain a new, more advantageous base of operations for a subsequent major operation, or to consolidate further the gains of the preceding one.

Conclusion The operational idea is the very heart of any operational design. The larger the military objective, the broader the operational perspective should be. Therefore, the scope of the operational idea for a maritime campaign and the one for a major naval operation are different in terms of space–time–force factors. The fewer elements an operational idea has, the less complicated it is and the more quickly it can be executed. However, none of the elements should be discarded without due analysis of the mission and the situation. The operational idea should be written in free form; various shortcuts and buzzwords should be avoided. It should express in clear and commonly understood operational terms how the operational commander intends to sequence and synchronize all available sources of power to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objective in the shortest possible time and with the fewest friendly losses. The operational idea for a maritime campaign is developed first, because the strategic objective always dominates the operational objectives. It also provides a framework for the operational idea of each subordinate major operation.

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Regardless of its purpose, an operational idea should be written concisely and clearly but at the same time should ensure the accomplishment of the assigned military objectives. Ideally, it should surprise the enemy and impose one’s will and initiative. The first employment of forces in a campaign is usually the most decisive. The naval operational commander and his planners should make judicious choices, from among all possible elements, of which ones are to become part of the scheme.

8

Preparations and execution

After the planning for a maritime campaign or major naval operation is completed and the basic and supporting plans are written, the next phase is preparations. Obviously, the more time available for preparation the higher the likelihood of the successful execution of the plan. The successful execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation depends largely on the skill and experience of the naval operational commander, his staff, and subordinate commanders. Maritime campaigns are not likely to be planned and executed in the foreseeable future. Hence, the focus here is on preparations and execution of major naval operations.

Preparations Preparations for a major naval operation is much more complex and time consuming than for a naval battle or engagement because of the large size and diversity of participating forces. One of the most important tasks in the preparatory phase is organization of comprehensive combat support. Another task is to collect, process, and analyze data on all the aspects of the operational situation, but especially on the intentions and actions of the enemy forces deployed in the sector of main effort. Reconnaissance of the enemy forces at sea and their bases should be conducted uninterruptedly, although at various degrees of intensity, in peacetime, crisis, and during the hostilities. In general, reconnaissance of the enemy forces in an enclosed sea theater will be more effective than on the open ocean. At the same time, coastal waters make continuous surveillance very difficult especially in the archipelago type of coast. Offensive mine fields can be laid covertly by using innocuous commercial or fishing vessels as part of preparations for the initial major naval operation. Likewise, defensive minefields can be laid and prepared for activation before the outbreak of the hostilities. Properly laid mines can greatly limit the freedom of movement for the enemy forces. At the same, the faulty use of mines can sometimes considerably limit the movement of friendly naval forces in the course of a major naval operation. The entire major naval operation and its segments should be thoroughly rehearsed in a series of planning games and/or war games. Based on the lessons learned from these games corresponding changes should be made in the basic

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and supporting plans. In addition, various parts of the operation plan should be tested by individual force elements at sea.

Execution The execution phase of a major naval operation starts with the issuance of an alert order and ends by the return of participating forces to their home bases or redeployment into another part of a maritime theater. The execution of the operation is greatly affected by whether its objective is offensive or defensive or a combination of these two, the type of weapons used, prevailing geographic conditions and weather/climate, method of combat employment of one’s naval forces, and the complexity of the situation in the theater. The chances of success in the operation are enhanced by having the highest degree of cooperation between one’s naval forces and forces of other services; by maintaining the high combat readiness of friendly forces; by focusing one’s efforts against the most important part of the enemy forces; by the timely execution of the main and supporting strikes; having a reliable air cover for forces taking part in the operation; and by protecting the most important naval bases/airfields from enemy air strikes.

Phases Today, most major naval operations would comprise a single but relatively long phase. The exception will be amphibious and antiamphibious landing operations because they are conducted at sea and ashore. Hence, they normally comprise two or more related phases. Phases of a major naval operation invariably differ from the initial basic plan, both in the time of occurrence and in duration. They might change because the enemy offers stronger or weaker resistance, change or modification of the intermediate objectives, arrival of additional forces, or a shift in the sector of main effort. A series of almost continuous smaller tactical actions will be conducted during an operational pause and thereby to create favorable conditions for the execution of a consecutive major naval operation.

Segments The execution of a major naval operation encompasses several interrelated and often overlapping segments: deployment; concentration/dispersal, maneuver; actions of one’s forces in the main and secondary sectors of effort; the accomplishment of the operational objective; consolidation and exploitation of the operational success; and withdrawal to home base/operational redeployment to another part of the respective maritime theater.

Deployment Deployment of combat forces taking part in a major naval operation is perhaps the single most important factor in its successful outcome. It is not an exaggeration to say that the errors in the initial deployment of one’s combat

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forces cannot be easily, if at all, corrected in the course of the operation. Deployment can be described as the movement of individual force elements out of their basing areas toward assigned sectors/zones in which the main actions of a major naval operation will take place. A deployment can be conducted in the time of tension or crisis with only a part of friendly forces or with all forces available. The main purpose of deployment is timely and covert concentration of one’s force elements in the assigned part of the maritime theater while at the same time ensuring their maximum combat potential.1 The initial base of operation dictates the position, directional orientation, and length of lines of communications for one’s naval forces. Normally, the direct route between a given base and the assigned physical objective is the shortest and the best. However, often a circuitous route has to be used to avoid a strong enemy position on the mainland coast/island or enhance the element of surprise. Deployment of one’s naval forces taking part in a major naval operation can be operational or tactical in scale. In a major naval operation on the open ocean, one’s forces would sortie out from several bases spread sometimes over several hundred nautical miles and hence would conduct an operational deployment. However, if one’s naval forces are forwardly deployed, as are U.S. Navy forces currently in the Western Pacific and in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, they would conduct tactical deployment because the distance to the scene of combat is much shorter. Likewise, naval forces based in the littorals would usually also conduct a tactical rather than an operational deployment. This is especially true in a narrow sea endowed with a large number of offshore islands and islets. On the open ocean, one’s naval forces would conduct their deployment in the waters either under the enemy control or where control is in dispute. In contrast, a small navy will deploy its forces within coastal waters largely under its control and sometimes to the area disputed by the enemy forces. Prior to the execution of the deployment out one’s naval forces should have a sufficient degree of the basing/deployment area control. In an enclosed sea theater, tactical maneuver should be if possible conducted during the night and/or bad weather. To ensure survivability of friendly forces, one’s coastal defenses should be maintained at the highest degree of combat readiness. In addition, special groups for securing flanks of friendly forces can be created. One’s forces participating in a major naval operation should be deployed in a timely fashion to their respective sectors of main and secondary efforts. The main factors for the timely tactical maneuver of friendly forces is continuous and reliable reconnaissance and surveillance of the enemy forces, selection of the proper routes of movement and correct calculation of the speed of movement, and determining sufficient reserve time for maneuver of friendly forces. Other elements include overcoming interference by the enemy forces; maintaining high readiness of forces, and their timely concentration in advanced bases and airfields.2 Sequence of deployment of one’s force elements should include speeds of advance and transit routes. Cruising formation should offer the best chances for using one’s weapons and mutual support in defense against possible enemy attack.

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Sequencing of deployment of force elements would depend on the time required to reach assigned positions, their capabilities, and geographic conditions. Normally, submarines will be deployed almost immediately after they sortie out of their bases, while naval aircraft and surface ships would be first predeployed to their waiting area or preparation area and only then deployed.3 Deployment should be if possible conducted covertly and quickly. Covertness of movement of one’s naval forces can be greatly enhanced by precluding the enemy’s reconnaissance and surveillance of the friendly basing/deployment area, the use of night and bad weather conditions, by shifting routes of movement for friendly forces to the area where the enemy would have greater difficulties in detecting and monitoring their movements, and by conducting feints or full-scale operational deception. Deployment of one’s naval forces should be supported by a series of diverse actions such as strikes against enemy ASW forces, suppressing or neutralizing enemy air defenses, destroying enemy surveillance and reconnaissance forces, and disorganization of the enemy command and control.4

Concentration The success of a major naval operation hinges on how quickly and covertly one’s forces are concentrated (or built up) in the sector of main and secondary efforts. A force is said to be concentrated when all its elements are within supporting distance of one another. In the past, fleet concentration took place in a relatively small area of a maritime theater. Today, netting of one’s forces taking part in a major naval operation conducted on the open ocean or littorals might pose some dangers for the stronger side. Among other things, individual force elements might be separated beyond the mutually supporting distances and thereby become vulnerable to the enemy’s attack. In a typical narrow enclosed sea, the smallness of the area and short distances would require physical concentration rather than a dispersal. In both concentration and dispersal the key is to bring greater combat potential than the enemy and synchronizing actions of one’s forces in time and place to create a mass effect. In general, concentration of one’s naval forces participating in a major naval operation should ensure the accomplishment of the assigned operational objective. It should include forces assigned to the main sector for destroying the enemy surface ships and submarines. It should also include forces for conducting supporting actions aimed to destroy enemy ASW forces at sea and at their bases, and neutralizing or destroying enemy tactical air and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.5 Two basic methods can be used in effecting concentration of one’s naval forces: on the battlefield or off the battlefield. Concentration on the battlefield involves the movement of individual force elements from an exterior position and along converging lines of operations, to the objective area. In general, concentration on the battlefield makes it difficult for the enemy to deduce where the next blow will come from until it is too late for him to react. However,

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concentrating one’s forces on the battlefield requires meticulous planning and precise coordination in the movement of all forces taking a part in the operation. This is an especially difficult task if one’s forces have to transit a long sea distances where one’s control is in dispute. Also, an enemy operating from a central position has the opportunity to defeat the converging forces in detail, especially when timing, bad weather, or some other factor delays the advance of some elements of the converging forces. Concentration on the battlefield is a typical feature of major amphibious landing operations. For example, the Japanese concentrated their forces on the battlefield in seizing the Philippines, Malaya, and the NEI in December 1941 to April 1942. They spread their multiple thrusts continuously, but never extended beyond the range of their land-based aircraft unless they had an aircraft carrier. The distance of each advance was determined by the radius of fighter aircraft from the airfields under their control, and generally it was less than 400 miles. The Japanese made these short hops in surprisingly quick succession. The Australia-American-Britain-Dutch (ABDA) command, in contrast, dissipated the Allied strength in various directions and through many unnecessary missions.6 However, the Japanese had the habit of dividing their forces, and this cost them dearly later in the war, when they no longer possessed the overwhelming superiority at sea that they had in the first months of the war. This was one of the reasons for their defeat in Operation MO (the Battle of the Coral Sea) in May 1942 and Operation MI (the Battle of Midway) in June 1942. Concentration off the battlefield is normally conducted from a centrally located base of operations. Then, one’s forces move along short but diverging lines of operations toward their assigned objectives. It has just the opposite advantages and disadvantages than concentration on the battlefield. In the past, concentration off the battlefield was applied prior to the decisive naval battle as was the case with the German High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte) in the Battle of Jutland in June 1916. Also, most major operations conducted by the navies bordering an enclosed or semienclosed theater are conducted by concentrating forces off the battlefield. A blue- water navy projecting power into a littoral will predominantly concentrate its forces on the battlefield.

Maneuver Normally, a major operation mounted across the open ocean would consist of an operational maneuver followed by a tactical maneuver. In contrast, one’s forces deployed within an enclosed or semienclosed sea theater, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf would conduct usually only a tactical maneuver upon completing their tactical deployment. For example, in the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Japanese fast attack carrier forces conducted an operational maneuver from Etorofu (the Kurils) across the North Pacific to a point between 200 and 230 nautical miles north of Pearl Harbor.7 The flight of the carrier aircraft from that position to their target area on Oahu constituted a tactical maneuver. Also, in an amphibious landing operation, the movement of amphibious

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forces and forces of close and distant (operational) cover from the initial base of operations to the line or area from which landing craft or helicopters would move inland is an example of an operational maneuver at sea.

Actions in the sectors of main/secondary efforts The most decisive phase of a major naval operation is the action of one’s naval forces in the sector of main effort. The most complex problem to resolve is to determine proper targets for missile or torpedo strikes, and the area and the time of actions of the main forces. The ultimate success of the entire operation will depend largely on one’s ability to obtain and maintain the initiative. Thus, the initial missile strikes should be massed and conducted repeatedly. At the beginning of the operation, the sector of the main effort should be kept secret from the enemy, and if possible feints should be conducted in false directions.8 One’s naval forces should conduct strikes against the enemy’s forces operating in the main sector. The purpose should be to create favorable conditions to resolve the main task of the entire operation. Success of the initial strikes will be heavily dependent on organization and execution of reconnaissance/surveillance of the enemy forces in their basing and operating areas. In a surface-to-surface engagement, the most potent weapons are antiship missiles and torpedoes fired by submarines and/or surface ships combined with strikes by fighter-bombers and attack aircraft. In some cases, coastal antiship missile/gun batteries can take part in such an engagement in the littoral waters. In an attack against enemy amphibious forces or convoys on the open sea, missile and/or torpedo strikes against the main enemy forces should be conducted simultaneously or nearly simultaneously to achieve the greatest effect on the enemy forces.9 However, if conducted at a wrong time and place and against false targets, such strikes can considerably undermine the very purpose of the operation. Results of these strikes should be followed with the destruction of the remainder of the enemy forces and thereby accomplish the operation’s main objective. To achieve a success in the main sector, it is necessary to neutralize or prevent the enemy’s other forces from interfering with the actions in the main sector of effort. These actions can be conducted prior to and/or concurrently with the actions of the forces in the sector of main effort. One of the most difficult problems is synchronizing strikes conducted jointly by surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. Whenever possible strikes should be conducted in a quick succession and thereby reduce the time available to the enemy to organize effective ASW and AA defenses. In a joint employment, forces armed with the longer-range weapons should strike first to create preconditions for the success of other platforms. Operational success The principal purpose of a major naval operation is to destroy or neutralize as quickly as possible a major part of the enemy main forces as the U.S. Navy did

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in the Battle of Midway in June 1942 when all four Japanese fast aircraft carriers were sunk. In some cases, the operational success can be achieved although the operational objective of the operation was improperly chosen. For example, the Japanese, in their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, inflicted heavy losses (five battleships sunk and three damaged, three light cruisers damaged, and three destroyers and several other ships sunk) but not a mortal blow on the U.S. Pacific Fleet, since by coincidence two U.S. fast aircraft carriers plus seven cruisers, 14 destroyers, and four submarines were at sea. In addition, two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, 24 destroyers, four destroyerminelayers, eight fast minesweepers, five submarines, and numerous auxiliary ships were undamaged.10 Nevertheless, the Japanese achieved an operational success that allowed them to complete the conquest of the Philippines without interference from the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Sometimes the attacker will come close to operational success but either through poor intelligence or sheer lack of will, fails to grasp the opportunity. For example, in the Battle for Leyte, the Allies achieved an operational success in the battle of Surigao Strait – by preventing the Japanese Second Diversionary Attack Force/Section C (of the First Diversionary Attack Force) from attacking Allied troops and supplies ashore in the Leyte Gulf. The Japanese missed a great opportunity to accomplish operational success because the commander of the First Diversionary Attack Force, Admiral Kurita, failed to exploit his tactical success in the Battle off Samar on 25 October 1944. Operational pursuit Once the operational success is achieved it should be followed quickly with the actions aimed to exploit that success; otherwise, the victory will remain incomplete. Also, if the enemy is not decisively beaten, he might restore his combat potential and endanger the success already achieved. In case of a major offensive naval operation, the operational success should be consolidated by pursuing and destroying the remaining enemy forces. The shift from the major combat phase to pursuit should be seamless. However, in some cases an operational pause after the end of pursuit might be required to regenerate one’s combat potential. During the pursuit, the strikes and attacks should be conducted against the enemy’s retreating main and supporting forces. The need of achieving surprise, obtaining and maintain initiative would require decisive and continuous actions of one’s naval forces in this phase of the operation. This would be accomplished by having reliable air cover over the friendly forces at sea, timely restoration combat readiness of friendly surface ships and submarines, dispersed basing of one’s forces, and by conducting measure of protection against the enemy weapons of mass destruction.11

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Exploiting operational success The operational success should be quickly exploited either by carrying out other operational tasks either in the same part or some other part of a maritime theater; otherwise, the enemy might gain valuable time and regenerate his combat potential. For example, the U.S. Navy achieved a great operational success in the Battle of Midway on 3–6 June 1942. However, that in itself would not have been sufficient to reverse the tide of war in the Pacific had it not been followed by an offensive operation to consolidate success at Midway. Thus, after some debate between the U.S. Army and Navy, on 2 July 1942 the invasion of Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower) began, and with the start of what later emerged as the Solomons campaign.12

Return to home bases/redeployment After the ultimate objective of a major naval operation is accomplished and operational success is consolidated, friendly forces usually return to their home bases or are redeployed to another area of operations, in the same or adjacent maritime theater for a subsequent operation or for regenerating their combat potential. The need to obtain and maintain the initiative in the war at sea requires continuous and energetic execution of combat actions without a long pause between operations. In determining basing ports for returning forces not only restoration of their combat capability should be taken into consideration but also the need to have a base in the proximity so that they can be deployed for the next operation.

Command and control The principal responsibilities of the operational commander in the course of a major naval operation include conducting a running estimate of the situation; supervising and influencing subordinate tactical commanders’ actions; changing intermediate objectives; changing command relationships and forces’ subordination; consolidating operational or strategic success; and preparing for the next phase of a major naval operation. After the initial commander’s estimate of the situation is completed, the decision made, and plans and orders prepared and executed, the naval operational commander and his staff must continue monitoring the situation in all its aspects. If the situation has been changed in some important ways, then a quick so-called running estimate of the situation should be completed and the new decision made. This, in turn, would usually require modifications or changes in the existing plan or orders. This is critically important, because modern combat is highly dynamic and any estimate of the situation will undergo constant and sometimes drastic changes. In the course of the operation, the naval operational commander influences accomplishment of the missions by his subordinate tactical commanders by

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modifying or changing their tasks, reallocating or reassigning main and supporting combat forces from one sector/area to another, changing the subordinate commanders’ responsibilities, or, if necessary, relieving subordinate commanders from their duties. The naval operational commander’s intent should provide operational vision and thereby enable subordinate tactical commanders to clearly understand what actions they need to take in the accomplishment of the commander’s overall objective. The naval operational commander’s intent should ensure sufficient freedom of action for subordinate tactical commanders in the accomplishment of their assigned missions. In exercising initiative, subordinate tactical commanders should act in consonance with the higher commander’s intent. The naval operational commander’s freedom of action is greatly enhanced through the large degree of initiative allowed to subordinate naval tactical commanders. In many cases, the naval operational commander will be physically far removed from the subordinate tactical commanders. The greater this separation, the greater the danger that his decisions will lose energy and that his intent will not be passed down through the lower levels of the chain of command. The naval operational commander should be mentally prepared to modify, change, or even abandon his plan because of unexpected events after a major naval operation starts. At the same time, while retaining the operational flexibility he should never lose sight of the main objective. The advantages of a situation cannot be fully utilized if subordinate commanders wait on orders. The employment of one’s naval forces can be successful if commanders at all levels are competent and accustomed to independent action – hence the need in time of peace to instill in subordinate commanders the habit of acting independently. Only then, can the operational commander hope that subordinates will carry out his intent. When in doubt, it is preferable to act, and obtain and maintain the initiative, than to react to the enemy’s actions.13 The naval operational commander should supervise his subordinate tactical commanders however he should not unnecessarily interfere with their decisions and actions except when they could potentially put in danger the outcome of the entire operation. The naval operational commander is often physically removed by hundreds, or even thousands, of miles from the scene of combat. He should have great confidence in the skills and abilities of his subordinate operationaltactical and tactical commanders. The greater the distance, the greater the possibility that his decisions will reach subordinate commanders too late or that those decisions will not correspond to a fast-changing situation. Therefore, he should act with speed and energy to make sure that his intent and orders are clearly understood and carried out. In some situations, a subordinate naval tactical commander should modify or even abandon the assigned mission if such an action would still satisfy the operational commander’s intent. The subordinate commander should seek approval first, but if that is not possible, he should take full responsibility for his decision. Afterward, a subordinate tactical commander should explain and justify, to the

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operational commander’s satisfaction, why he took such an action.14 He should also make every effort to maintain contact with his operational commander. A subordinate tactical commander should keep the operational commander fully informed of any significant change in the situation while exhibiting initiative and energy in resolving problems within his area of responsibility. He should be encouraged to propose changes in orders and directives based on his own assessment of the situation.15 The successful execution of the plan of a major naval operation can be considerably enhanced by conducting a series of well integrated actions and measures to shape the battlefield/battlespace, conducted before and during the initial phase of combat. This is accomplished principally by destroying or degrading the enemy’s critical capabilities; delaying or preventing the deployment or movement of enemy forces into the theater; manipulating the enemy’s perceptions; degrading the enemy commander’s ability to make decisions; and obtaining and maintaining one’s freedom of action. The destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s critical capabilities can be accomplished by attacking a wide range of targets in the theater, such as C4 nodes, elements of logistical support and sustainment, tactical air support, and air defenses. Command and control warfare (C2W) is one of the potentially most effective ways to shape the theater by destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s ability to obtain an accurate picture of the situation and make sound and timely decisions. The operational commander should use both lethal and nonlethal operational fires as appropriate to isolate the area of operations in which a new major naval operation would start. Lethal operational fires remain for the foreseeable future the most effective way of preventing the enemy’s forces and follow-on forces from arriving in the theater, interdicting or cutting off enemy forces from their sources of supply. The naval operational commander should pursue the ultimate objective of the operation with all determination. He should not be distracted by some relatively insignificant event and shift or even abandon his original objective. However, often in a dynamic combat situation, rigid adherence to the original objective can lead to a major setback, or even the failure of the entire operation. The naval operational situation might change because drastic changes in any of the factors of space, time, and force require reestablishing the balance or scaling down the objective. In some cases, unexpectedly weak enemy resistance can lead to a reassessment of the original objective, resulting in the selection of some other, objective. The enemy’s initial center of gravity should be reassessed constantly throughout the major naval operation.16 This evaluation should focus on significant changes in the strategic or operational situation. A significant change in the naval operational commander’s objective should lead to a reevaluation of the enemy’s critical strengths and weaknesses and determination of the enemy’s center of gravity. The naval operational commander should not rigidly adhere to the original operation plan. He should be ready to change or modify the plan if

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the situation warrants it. When the situation demands, he should conduct a quick estimate of the situation and then make a new decision. The successful use of operational deception can manipulate the enemy commander’s perceptions. The ultimate purpose of these efforts should be to deceive the enemy as to one’s intentions or capabilities, or both. Specifically, operational deception should be aimed to preserve secrecy of the objective and character of the forthcoming operation. It should deceive the opponent and enhance the effectiveness of friendly forces, and minimize one’s losses. This involves timely destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.17 The naval operational commander should respond to unanticipated threats or opportunities by shifting forces from less threatened sectors to the main sector of effort. This could occur because intermediate objectives or their priorities change. A shift in the main sector of effort can result from entirely new objectives. The naval operational commander should carefully reevaluate the situation in the theater and avoid being fixated on some spectacular enemy tactical action, thereby missing larger trends in the situation. One of the naval operational commander’s most difficult tasks is to timely anticipate and identify the culminating point and whether it has been reached or exceeded. Hence, it is critically important that the naval operational commander timely and accurately senses or anticipates the approach to, or arrival at, the point of culmination, so that the ultimate objective can be accomplished. A culmination point for one’s naval forces in a major naval operation is extremely difficult to anticipate in practice. The naval operational commander’s ability to prevent culmination of friendly forces while causing the enemy to reach his is one of the keys to operational success. This can be accomplished only by having a clear and solid knowledge of friendly and enemy combat power at all times – a hard thing to have. The naval operational commander may sometimes have larger forces than available logistic resources can adequately support. This is especially true in major joint/combined operations, when the demands for logistic resources may be highly competitive. While a major naval operation is in progress, the operational commander should continuously balance current logistical requirements with the need to build up logistical support for subsequent actions. A failure to properly plan for logistical sustainment will invite premature culmination.

Conclusion Preparation and execution of a major naval operation is the culmination of the entire planning process. An operation plan is rarely if ever executed as originally envisaged because the enemy would not act the way one thinks he would. The fog of war and the factor of friction will make actions on both sides highly unpredictable. Hence, only a highly flexible plan and mental agility of the naval operational commander would ensure ultimate success of a major naval operation. He should quickly adjust the operation’s objectives and methods of their

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accomplishment to the corresponding changes in the operational situation. Once the operation starts, the naval operational commander should closely monitor changes in the situation, conduct quick running estimates, and make appropriate decisions. The key for success in the execution phase of a major naval operation is uninterrupted reconnaissance/surveillance and good intelligence on the enemy’s situation, a high state of combat readiness and training of friendly forces. Moreover, command and control process should ensure a centralization in planning but at the same time allows sufficient freedom to act for subordinate tactical commanders.

9

Operational leadership

Leadership is one of the most critical yet most complex aspects of warfare. The quality of one’s leadership cannot be measured; it is essentially intangible. No weapon, no impersonal piece of machinery ever designed can take its place.1 The higher the level, the more important leadership of the highest quality and effectiveness is. In contrast to leadership, management deals with the allocation and control of resources whether human, material, or financial in order to achieve the objectives of an organization. Good management skills require neither over-abundance nor a shortage of resources.2 Operational leadership refers to those levels of command responsible for accomplishing, through the application of operational art, strategic objectives assigned by the national or alliance/coalition leadership. In a naval context, operational leadership ranges from the joint task force, numbered fleet, theater fleet, maritime theater of operations to maritime theater-strategic command.

Personality traits All successful military commanders possess certain character traits and professional knowledge and experience that distinguish them from less capable commanders. In general, they should have the wisdom, good judgment, and emotional balance to make critical decisions based on ambiguous information. The requirements for successful naval operational commanders are not identical for ground, air, and naval commanders. Generally, naval commanders have less opportunity than air or ground commanders for getting forward and speaking personally to subordinates; the character of war at sea and the nature of the decisions are also different, as reflected by the difference between moving ships at sea and moving large bodies of men and equipment on a limited road network. In contrast to that of a tactical commander, the personality of a naval operational commander is felt indirectly rather than directly, through the chain of command. A naval operational commander should have intellectual qualities that range from mastery of his profession to imagination and culture. He should also know the basic technical aspects of warfare.3 He should have an analytical mind and be able to solve the problems that he constantly faces.4

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In general, a naval operational commander should have strength of character, high intellect, creativity, and boldness. These qualities are developed throughout his life and military career, and through self-study.5 Character, judgment, authority, and understanding of men, in that order, are often considered to be the qualities a true commander should possess.6 For example, Admiral Nimitz was humble, polite, and gentle with both subordinates and superiors, but he was also a very determined and decisive leader. Nimitz left subordinate commanders alone, believing that looking over their shoulders would only inhibit them. At the same time, he made recommendations via radio messages if it appeared that they were overlooking opportunities for success. He also did not hesitate to intervene and, if necessary, fire a subordinate commander who did not perform well.7 A commander has strength of character when he sticks to his convictions regardless of the consequences.8 A strong personality is exemplified by the ability to think clearly, speak forcibly, and act quickly. The ability of the commander to direct all his efforts to the mission’s accomplishment is a function of his strength of will. Strong will is one of the naval operational commander’s most important prerequisites for success. Will power is based on moral courage, even more than on physical courage.9 One of the most successful U.S. admirals in the war in the Pacific, Admiral Richmond K. Turner was known as the man of iron determination in the face of adversity. He worked up to 18 hours a day.10 The German U-boat commander and CINC of the navy in World War II, Admiral Doenitz had some great leadership qualities. He had an iron will power, the goal oriented certainty, unwavering toughness, and calm. He had an inner enthusiasm for his profession and absolute reliability.11 A naval operational commander should be a person of great personal integrity. The real test of leadership comes in adverse situations; a failure of integrity at these times will result in the rapid loss of his men’s confidence. Personal integrity means that the naval operational commander truthfully informs the higher headquarters about the situation in his area of responsibility concerning both friendly and enemy forces. For example, Nimitz was friendly and accessible, courteous and considerate. He was also perhaps obsessively discrete.12 Nimitz was extremely dedicated and displayed an uncommon decisiveness and fearlessness. He also showed an unswerving loyalty to seniors and subordinates alike. These traits won him lasting respect and affection from all but a few who ever served with him.13 Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (1886–1969) was shy and reticent, and avoided publicity. He paid great attention to details. Reportedly, he envied no man, regarded no one as a rival, won the respect of all with whom he came into contact, and went ahead in a quiet way, winning victories for his country.14 A naval operational commander should be a person of high intellect. High intelligence is not necessarily linked to formal education. The higher the rank, the less stupidity can be tolerated and the more damaging is a lack of intelligence in the commander.15 Courage is another personality trait of a successful naval operational

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commander. Clausewitz differentiated between two kinds of courage: courage in the face of personal danger, and the courage to accept moral responsibility. Physical courage is a permanent condition and is a prerequisite for any military leader.16 Courage to accept responsibility in the face of moral danger is an act of temperament. A high intellect should arouse that quality of courage, which then supports and sustains the intellect in action.17 For a naval operational commander, moral courage means standing by his convictions and imposing his decisions upon his subordinates. He should have patience in carrying out of his orders, as well as determination that they will be carried out; he should also have sufficient physical courage to keep himself informed of the progress of a battle by close contact and to set a good example for subordinates.18 For example, the British Admiral Andrew Cunningham (1883–1963), CINC of the Mediterranean Fleet in the summer of 1940 firmly opposed suggestions from the British government to use force against the French fleet in Alexandria. He believed that such requests were entirely unjustifiable. Cunningham was confident that given time and patience, he could reach a satisfactory solution by negotiations. Hence, he stood out firmly and persisted in these beliefs without regard to the possible consequences. In the end, his efforts were crowned with success. He received congratulation of a government that had done its best to move him in the opposite direction. Cunningham displayed repeatedly great moral courage. He resisted the pressure from the top civilian leadership in London to make certain decisions which if carried out would have been entirely mistaken. 19 A naval operational commander should be bold. Boldness implies confidence in the success of an action about which others are uncertain, or willingness to take a calculated risk when others are less willing to do so.20 The more experienced the commander, the more self-control he possesses, and the more likely that he will choose a calculated risk. Admiral Halsey made his military reputation for calculated risks, dedication to duty, decisiveness, utter fearlessness, and unswerving loyalty to seniors and subordinates.21 Closely related to courage, and essential for naval operational commanders who literally control the lives of thousands of people, is presence of mind. The analytical and reasoning process should not stop in times of stress and adversity.22 The real test of naval operational commanders is in the execution of their plans and combat. For example, Spruance had a brilliant mind and cool judgment. He was self-effacing and a clear thinker. Nimitz said that Spruance was cool under stress but at the same time he had fighter’s instincts.23 A naval operational commander must show high degrees of flexibility, foresight, creativity, initiative, resoluteness, and determination. Flexibility of mind is the ability to change a mental outlook under pressure but without confusion of purpose. The naval operational commander at sea should always be ready to act flexibly when the situation requires it. Changes in the naval situation might be sudden and rapid. The naval operational commander who can turn the unexpected quickly to his own advantage will be usually successful. The Japanese naval commanders in World War II were generally conspicuously inflexible. They would follow their plans even after changes in the situation had rendered

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these plans obsolete.24 Foresight is essential in a naval operational commander. Without foresight, the commander’s actions will be limited to reacting to the enemy’s actions.25 A naval operational commander should not wait for events and then limp after them.26 He should be tough-minded and act decisively and independently in situations where contact with superiors is impractical or impossible. This requires a high degree of moral courage, self-reliance, and self-confidence. It also involves a willingness to assume responsibility and to take risks to do the right thing at the right time. At the operational level, the risks are much higher, and the tactical propensity to charge ahead may result in a catastrophic defeat.27 Creativity is an essential requirement for a naval operational commander. It refers to the ability to find workable, novel solutions to problems – to be innovative and adaptable in fast-moving, potentially confusing situations. All exceptional leaders have had a large measure of creative skills.28 A creative intellect allows a naval operational commander to surprise his enemy counterpart and thus render him impotent.29 Professional education and training do not necessarily stimulate creativity in future naval operational commanders. They only deepen one’s knowledge and understanding of the art of war at sea. Education and training can produce superior technicians, but they alone can never produce an artist of warfare.30 A naval operational commander who is technologically creative is not usually innovative as an operational artist. For instance, Admiral Hyman Rickover (1900–1986), the “father” of the U.S. nuclear navy, was highly talented and innovative in harnessing new nuclear technologies. However, it is unlikely that he would have been as successful as a fleet commander. A naval operational commander should know how to articulate his plans and orders; he should use clear, concise language in drafting them. In contacts with subordinates, he should be able to impress them with the plan’s importance by words, manner, and acts of execution. One cannot lead without being communicative. Hence, it is critically important for a naval operational commander is able to obtain his subordinates’ enthusiastic commitment to accomplishing his vision. He should make them understand the basic direction of his vision so that he can allow them adequate latitude and still be confident that the actions will not be at cross purposes.31 For example, Nimitz at the planning sessions acted like the chairman of the board. He made the final decision despite contrary advice he got from his subordinates. However, he listened to suggestions first from others and then weighed them carefully.32 The best naval operational commanders are not only good and effective speakers but also skillful persuaders.33 Doenitz’s main strengths were his personal charisma, undaunted devotion, and unquenchable optimism. It was not in his nature to take a negative view.34 Reportedly, Doenitz sought discussion with everyone who had an opinion without regard to rank. Anyone who had no opinion he soon left aside. Doenitz often provoked his discussion partners in order to learn the contrary arguments. Then he made the decision.35 A naval operational commander should possess a solid judgment – one’s

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ability to soundly assess information and determine a practical course of action. Judgment based on knowledge and experience.36 The naval operational commander should recognize and properly assess the relative importance and value of all the various elements of a situation. He should reject all irrelevant and unimportant matters and concentrate on the essentials. Good judgment should combine imagination, keen intelligence, and practical good sense. It should be exercised in such a way as not to dampen initiative but to temper and shape it so that it is usable.37 Reportedly, Nimitz had a marvelous combination of tolerance of the opinion of others, wise judgment after he has listened, and determination to carry things through.38 A naval operational commander should be both trustworthy and trusting, faithfully adhering to the superior commander’s intent in exercising the freedom of action he is given. As a superior, he must trust subordinates, allowing them as much freedom of action as possible and encouraging them to exercise initiative at their level.39 He should avoid the impression of favoring one subordinate commander over the others. Admiral King was tough and often harsh in dealing with subordinates. Many considered King cool, aloof, and humorless. He was completely intolerant of stupidity, inefficiency, and laziness. King could be ruthless to the point of firing people on the spot.40 Yet reportedly King did not interfere in the responsibilities of subordinate flag officers. He also disciplined himself not to press his combat commanders for information while the operation was in progress. King would not send communications; as he put it, “he would not interfere, because they (combat commanders) needed all the communication they could use in order to coordinate their work effectively.”41 Nimitz could match any man on his staff in ability to work hard and put in long hours. He refused to let himself get involved in details that others could handle.42 Spruance never let himself become harassed. After he got instructions from Nimitz he passed them quickly down the chain of command. Like Nimitz, Spruance was a master organizer. He was adept in picking men and delegating authority and then leaving them alone to perform.43 In contrast, Admiral Raeder was a fanatic of correctness and demanded absolute loyalty from his subordinates. Like Admiral Tirpitz (1849–1930), he regarded anyone who disagreed with him as his personal enemy. Raeder listened carefully to what his colleagues had to say and then imposed his decisions in an authoritarian manner. He tried to suppress any critic of his policies or any unfavorable aspect of Germany’s naval history. In his view, the German officer corps has to think as one. He alone would be responsible for all evaluation, decisions, and orders. Arguments contrary to his view, were either modified without discussion or he would remove the person who had contrary views from his office.44

Professional knowledge A naval operational commander should have a high degree of professional knowledge and experience. He should also have extraordinary physical and

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psychological sturdiness.45 Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758–1805) was well known for his capacity to absorb knowledge and to continue the process of selfeducation. Reportedly, he read everything with his whole mind.46 Another British admiral, Sir Bertram H. Ramsey (1883–1945) had unrivaled knowledge of the conduct of war and also the staff work.47 A naval operational commanders should also have a broad knowledge of foreign policy, diplomacy, geopolitics, the international economy, ethnicity, religions, and other issues that shape the situation in a given theater. He should have deep knowledge of other countries’ history, society, and culture. A naval operational commander must have a certain degree of social sophistication because he has to closely interact with international political figures such as heads of state, ambassadors, and international organizations.48 The fluency or even working knowledge of a foreign language is a definite advantage for a naval operational commander. A naval operational commander should possess a thorough knowledge and understanding of the theory and practice of operational art.49 He also needs to have a keen understanding of the relationship between strategy and policy, on the one hand, and operational art and strategy on the other. This consists of mastering all the aspects of the employment of large multiservice and often multinational forces to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in the theater. Success will come because of weighing, judging, and balancing ends, ways, and means.50 A naval operational commander should be an expert in his own specialty. At the same time, he must have solid knowledge and understanding of the operations of the sister services.51 A naval operational commander should possess a mastery of the tactics of his own combat arm/branch and service. He also needs to have a solid knowledge and understanding of tactical capabilities of individual arms/branches of other services. He does not necessarily need to know in detail the tactics or all the minutiae pertaining to the capabilities of weapons and equipment. Operational warfare at sea is war on the chart. All successful naval operational commanders have had a solid knowledge of geography and an appreciation of the operational and tactical features of the oceans/seas and the littoral terrain. Without these, a naval operational commander cannot make an accurate estimate of the feasibility and risk involved in a particular operation.52

Command style Command style varies depending on the naval operational commander’s personality. Commanders can lead by example, by directive, or both. The most effective leadership, however, is by example. This is of course much more difficult for naval operational commanders; they are often physically hundreds, if not thousands, of miles away from the scene of combat. The power of the naval operational commander’s personality – his character, his decisiveness, his boldness – is a potent force. A naval operational commander should be responsible for developing the

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leadership character traits and professionalism of his subordinate tactical commanders. He should teach them how to act on their own and how to make quick, sound decisions. He should educate subordinate commanders, not what to think but how to think. A naval operational commander should spend as much time as possible with his staff and subordinate commanders during professional development, war games, and exercises to discuss various problems. All officers, no matter the rank, should be encouraged to express their views frankly without negative consequences to their career. No organization can improve itself without this self-correcting mechanism. Moreover, an honest relationship between the naval operational commander and his subordinate tactical commanders cannot help but improve the understanding of each other’s thoughts and actions. This will allow the naval operational commander to determine with more certainty how much latitude to give the subordinate commanders.

The decisions The highest art of operational leadership is to make timely and sound decisions. The decision provides the basis for the subsequent development of the operation plan or order. The act of exercising command consists of making decisions and ordering their execution.53 The most important factors in making a decision should be the mission and the situation. The decision can also be based on the task or tasks derived in the course of the decision’s execution. Actions conducted on one’s own initiative also require a new decision.54 The much larger perspective at the operational level of command requires a more complex and challenging decision-making process than at the tactical level. Because maritime campaigns and major naval operations are conducted over a much larger area and involve considerably larger and more diverse forces than tactical actions, the naval operational commander should evaluate the situation in all its complexity several weeks or even months ahead. The resultant decision will be often made on incomplete and false information and in a time–space window that is very different from that of the tactical commander. Also, the naval operational commander has to make a decision without having all the information available.55 These decisions are more likely hypotheses, because they are based on courses of action developed using many assumptions. In contrast to a naval tactical commander, a naval operational commander has more time to make decisions. Because of steadily compressed time–space relationships, not only must operational decisions be made within the short time, but their impact will almost immediately affect the actions of friendly forces over a major part of a given theater. Often the commander must base his decisions on his own instinctive judgment and without a careful weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative course of action. Optimally, a naval operational commander should conduct a quick estimate of the situation, adopt a sound course of action, and execute it promptly and decisively. Speed is usually far more important than precision in making a

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decision. Normally, a good plan carried out immediately is much better than a superb plan carried out much later.56 At times, the need to act swiftly and decisively will require a naval operational commander to assume greater risks, and to do so both willingly and enthusiastically. The naval operational commander’s decision should be made by considering fully political, diplomatic, informational, and other relevant elements of the situation. The chief of staff normally prepares a proposed course of actions for the naval operational commander based on the estimate of the situation. Other staff members might brief the commander on some details within their area of expertise; however, and this cannot be adequately emphasized, it is the commander who makes the decision and is fully responsible for its consequences. A naval operational commander should not make a decision by committee.57 The timing of the naval operational commander’s decision is another critical element in the process. In general, it is a mistake to make a decision too early or too late.58 However, commanders usually cannot choose the time at which to make a decision. In addition, the enemy has considerable influence on the commander’s decisions. Most decisions at the operational level are made under conditions of great uncertainty.59 There is no ideal solution for any military problem; therefore, the naval operational commander should not necessarily strive for one. He should not wait to collect more information to reach a perfect decision, or even the best decision. The number and importance of the decisions to be made vary for each level of war. In general, the higher the level of war, the fewer the decisions that must be made and the larger the time window for making them. A naval operational commander makes fewer decisions, but the impact of his decisions is much greater than those made at the tactical level. The key for making sound operational decisions is to have an accurate picture of the operational situation. This cannot be obtained by simply collecting a vast amount of tactical data or information. The operational situation should be built as a synthesis of strategic and tactical information pertaining to the naval operational commander’s area of responsibility plus his area of interest. It deals with both military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation. A naval operational commander should also make his decisions by fully taking into account the trends in the operational situation several weeks or even months into the future. In contrast, a naval tactical commander is concerned with the developments of the tactical situation, from a few hours to several days ahead. A naval operational commander makes three basic types of decisions: organizational, informational, and operational. Organizational decisions are aimed at establishing and maintaining sound command organization and determining command relationships, and force subordination. One of the most important organizational decisions prior to the planning of a maritime campaign or major naval operation is to determine the areas of responsibility for the subordinate commanders. Organizational decisions are also made regarding the information flow, both vertically and horizontally, within the chain of command and ensuring that combat decisions are carried out quickly and effectively. Other

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important organizational decisions deal with the establishment and maintenance of other theaterwide functions (intelligence, C2W, fires, logistics, and protection), determining the boundaries of subordinate commands, and appointing or relieving subordinate commanders. Informational decisions are intended to facilitate access to information resources required to support sound decision-making. The naval operational commander should identify sources of information and establish sound informational relationships. He should ensure that he receives a wide range of information from both internal and external sources. Making informational decisions is enhanced by properly organizing information flow, by identifying the organizations that obtain information, and by structuring the flow of information to and from the naval operational commander. Combat decisions is an arbitrary term for the decisions made by any command echelon that directly or indirectly deal with the employment of one’s combat forces across the spectrum of conflict. Strategic, tactical, and operational combat decisions are differentiated in terms of their importance. The highest national or alliance/coalition leadership is solely responsible to make strategic decisions, that is, those intended to influence the course and outcome of the conflict or war as a whole. Decisions to start hostilities, go on the offensive or defensive, order the cessation of hostilities, or stop fighting are examples of strategic decisions. Likewise, opening a new front or starting a new campaign also requires a decision by the highest strategic leadership. A theater commander may sometimes make such decisions, but only with the prior approval of the political authorities. Tactical decisions are normally made by tactical commanders. They are aimed to make a major impact on the planning, preparation, and conduct of one’s tactical actions. A tactical commander has to make many decisions with little or no time available and often in a situation of great mental stress or even fear. However, the importance of tactical decisions and their potential impact are much smaller than those of decisions at the operational and strategic levels. Also, errors made can usually be overcome. Operational decisions are made by operational or operational-tactical commanders. They are intended to have a major effect on a major naval operation or maritime campaign during its planning, preparation, and execution phases. The naval operational commander’s most important operational decisions in the course of combat pertain to changes in the original objectives, shifts in the sector of main effort or point of main attack (defense), concentration/counterconcentration, maneuver/countermaneuver, use or nonuse of tactical or operational fires, change in sequencing of the accomplishment of the objectives/tasks, synchronization, shift in phases, ordering of operational pause, commitment of operational reserves, shift from offensive to defensive, and consolidation of operational/strategic success. Other operational decisions are intended to change, alter, modify, or rescind decisions made by subordinate tactical commanders. The temptation to accomplish a strategic objective that is beyond one’s operational capabilities cannot be met by relying on tactical shortcuts unless there is a cooperative enemy – a dangerous thing to count on.60

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The nature of an operational decision does not change if the highest political or military-strategic authorities make decisions that directly or indirectly affect the planning or execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. In general, the top political leadership should not meddle and make operational decisions; such decisions should be made by the naval operational commander who is vested with the authority and responsibility to make them. However, in practice, operational and even the most basic tactical decisions are all too often made by the highest political or military-strategic leadership. Sometimes such decisions do not harm the operation under way, but more often than not they do a lot of damage. Even if such decisions prove to be sound, that does not justify forcing such decisions on the naval operational commander. A more serious problem is when strategic leadership either directs or bypasses the naval operational commander and issues tactical decisions, grossly interfering with the responsibilities of subordinate tactical commanders and unnecessarily restricting freedom to act throughout the chain of command. For example, in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet made a number of decisions that were operational or even tactical in nature. On 20 March, Thatcher made a tactical decision to send Endurance and 24 Marines from Port Stanley to South Georgia. The War Cabinet made three other decisions that should have been made by the naval operational commander: to select San Carlos as the landing site and to land 3 Commando there (19 May); to attack Argentine forces at Goose Green (23 May); and not to risk LSDs or frigates in the reinforcement at Fitzroy (7 June). The British War Cabinet made a tactical decision on 2 May to sink the Argentine cruiser Belgrano outside of the British Naval Exclusive Zone. However, this decision was justifiable, because Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, commander of Task Group 317.8, had requested a change in the rules of engagement so that the commanding officer of the submarine Conqueror got authorization to attack and sink Belgrano.61 Sometimes a tactical decision by a naval tactical (or operational) commander can endanger, or even result in the failure of, an entire major operation. For example, Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher’s decision on 8 August 1942 (D+2 Day), during the invasion of Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower), to withdraw his carrier force (then off the northwestern tip of San Cristobal) to a distance of about 120 miles from Savo Island, beyond the supporting distance of the Marine forces on Guadalcanal, was a tactical decision with potential adverse consequences for the entire major operation. This decision forced the amphibious force commander, Rear Admiral Turner, to choose between two bad alternatives: leaving the Marines ashore without food and ammunition, or risking an attack by Japanese aircraft reinforced with heavy bombers based at Rekata (Rakata) Bay (Santa Isabel Island).62 Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander Southern Pacific (COMSOPAC), should have reversed that decision, but he failed to do so. That same night a powerful Japanese surface force under Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa approached Guadalcanal. In the ensuing Battle of Savo Island on 8–9 August, the Allied forces suffered heavy losses, although

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they prevented the enemy ships from reaching the transports.63 That the worst did not happen does not absolve Vice Admiral Fletcher of the blame for that fateful decision. In the Battle for Leyte in October 1944, Admiral Halsey’s decision, made shortly before 2000 on 24 October, to sail north with all four fast carrier groups of TF-38 to meet and attack the Japanese Mobile Force, left San Bernardino Strait unguarded. This allowed Kurita’s First Diversionary Attack Force to enter the Philippine Sea unobserved on its way south to the Leyte Gulf. Only Kurita’s unexpected decision during the ensuing Battle off Samar to turn north instead of proceeding on the southerly course toward the Leyte Gulf prevented this situation from resulting in a humiliation and a disaster for the U.S. Navy. Halsey defended his decision by contending that Ozawa’s carriers represented a greater threat than either Kurita’s heavy surface force or the Second Diversionary Attack Force. He believed that Kurita’s force was so heavily damaged that it was not a viable force, and that Vice Admiral Kinkaid, Allied Naval Forces Commander, SWPA and commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, could contain it. He rejected, for one reason or another, a course of action to either defend the San Bernardino Strait entrance with his entire force or leave only the TF-34 Battle Force, and chose a third course of action: to sail north with the entire force. In his view, that was the best solution, because it ensured the principles of mass and surprise and left the initiative in his hands. The main reason for Halsey’s decision was his apparent misconception that his mission was offensive. He explained that his task was to gain air supremacy over the Philippines, to protect the landings, to maintain unremitting pressure against Japan, and to apply maximum attrition by all possible means in all other areas.64 In fact, based on General MacArthur’s written orders, Halsey’s mission as the commander of the U.S. Third Fleet was much narrower: to provide distant cover and support to the Leyte Gulf–Surigao Strait operations.65 Confusing the issue further, Halsey also received a mission from his superior, Admiral Nimitz, that in addition to directing him to cover and support SWPA’s forces, also stated that “in case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offers or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task.”66 This mission, in fact, was the key element in Halsey’s decision to temporarily abandon his position guarding the entrance to San Bernardino Strait and thereby jeopardize the success of the entire operation.

Tenets Success in combat is considerably enhanced when the naval operational commander uses certain tenets in applying operational art. These tenets have some similarities with but are not identical to the principles of war. Tenets of operational leadership are usually derived from the operational outlook of specific services and the country’s armed forces as a whole. They are not universally applicable. Yet, regardless of national differences in the conduct of operational warfare, experience has shown that failing to observe or violating the selected

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tenets of operational leadership greatly complicates the planning and execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation and often leads to its failure. In contrast to the principles of war, tenets of operational leadership can be applied without necessarily conflicting with each other. Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan in referring to the principles of war wrote that the tendency to accept principles without hesitation and often with too little reflection is a source of the greatest danger. In his view, once “embedded in naval instructions or army field regulations these so-called principles bound the minds of officers in unbreakable bonds.”67 The application of operational art requires the highest degree of imagination and creativeness on the part of naval operational commanders and their staffs. The naval operational commander should plan and execute a maritime campaign or major naval operation according to the mission and the situation. He should find a proper balance in which tenets should be applied, and to what degree, to ensure the highest chances of success. The most important tenets of operational leadership are as follows: the unconditional acceptance of absolute primacy of policy and strategy, firm and unwavering focus on the objective, balancing ends, ways and means, focus on the enemy center of gravity, indirect approach, protection of the friendly center of gravity, obtaining and maintaining freedom to act, exercising the initiative, taking high but prudent risks, selecting a proper sector of main effort, concentration in the sector of main effort, application of overwhelming power at a decisive place and time, acting unpredictably and avoiding patterns, creativeness, and jointness. The employment of one’s maritime sources of national power across the spectrum of conflict is dictated by the requirements of policy and strategy. Naval operational commanders should accept absolute primacy of policy and strategy in planning their maritime campaigns and major naval operations. Policy dominates strategy, and strategy governs operational art and tactics. It determines the objectives of national or alliance/coalition strategy and military strategy. The political leadership should assign the political strategic objectives and define the desired strategic end state. It allocates adequate resources for accomplishing the assigned strategic objectives. Policy also determines and defines political, diplomatic, legal, and other limitations on the employment of one’s naval forces. Any combat action at sea should be directed against a certain objective. Also, the use of one’s forces must be justified by the objective.68 The larger the objective, the greater the consequences of not accomplishing it. Therefore, the naval operational commander should at all times have a firm and unwavering focus on the accomplishment of the ultimate objective of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Hence, all one’s efforts should be devoted to that end.69 The objective, once selected, should be adhered to until accomplished. However, the initially selected objective should be changed, modified, or even abandoned if the situation changes so that the objective cannot be accomplished with the resources on hand or becoming available.

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Normally, the principal objective at sea should be to destroy or annihilate a major part of the enemy naval forces. One has to impose one’s will on the enemy and to break his main source of strength.70 However, single-mindedness in pursuing one’s objective can sometimes adversely affect the naval operational commander’s creativity and also reduce the number of options.71 There is probably no greater mistake than to formulate and pursue several objectives simultaneously. This, in turn, can often unhinge the entire balance of the factors of time, space, and forces. Such a course of action can be taken only if one’s forces possess overwhelming power against any conceivable combination of the enemy forces. The naval operational commander will not accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objectives if the ends and means are not in harmony and the ways are inappropriate or ill timed to achieve the given ends. He must properly balance ends, means, and ways; otherwise, he might suffer a serious setback or even defeat. Whenever the means available or becoming available are inadequate to achieve the given ends, a state of disconnect exists. This can be resolved either by having additional means or by scaling down, modifying, or even abandoning the ends to be accomplished. A mismatch between the ends and means exists if the means are adequate but there is unwillingness on the part of the political leadership to bring the means into harmony with the stated ends. A serious disconnect or mismatch between the ends and the means will usually lead to the failure to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objectives. The naval operational commander, in employing his combat forces against a strong enemy, should avoid a frontal or direct attack on his center of gravity. The indirect approach – attacking the enemy’s vulnerabilities to destroy, neutralize, or degrade the enemy’s center of gravity – is often the quickest and most effective way to destroy or neutralize the enemy’s center of gravity and thereby accomplish an assigned operational or strategic objective. One of the most, if not the most, critical factors for the naval operational commander’s success is obtaining and maintaining freedom of action – one’s ability to act effectively at any time in meeting threats.72 Without freedom to act, the commander’s ability to exercise the initiative is lost.73 Through freedom of action, the commander can use effects of surprise to achieve victory over the numerically much stronger enemy forces.74 Freedom of action means that in accomplishing an assigned mission the naval operational commander can employ both military and nonmilitary sources of power at a place and time he has freely determined. The framework of the naval operational commander’s actions should be large enough to give him several options from which to choose. Conversely, the naval operational commander should try to obtain and maintain freedom of action and reduce the enemy’s freedom to act from the very outset of war.75 In exercising his freedom to act, the naval operational commander must first and foremost properly balance the given operational factors – space, time, and force.76 This means, among other things, that a deficiency or disadvantage in one factor or element must be roughly balanced by surpluses or advantages in other

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factors. Bringing these factors into harmony with the objectives requires a thorough knowledge and understanding of the situation. It is an art rather than a science. The most successful naval operational commanders consistently showed a high ability to harmonize the factors of space, time, and forces against the objective in planning and executing their campaigns or major operations. The assigned objectives are the most critical factors determining the boundaries within which the naval operational commander is allowed to act freely. The more general the objective, the fewer the limitations the higher commander gives, and therefore the greater the freedom of action is enjoyed by the subordinate commanders. Scaling down the original strategic or operational objective or changing the sequence of objectives/tasks may result in greater freedom to act for the naval operational commander. The use of mission-command vice directive orders to subordinate tactical commanders will enlarge their freedom to act. Too-rigid command and control (C2) invariably reduces the commander’s freedom to act. Likewise, too many or too few command echelons restricts the naval operational commander’s freedom of action. In addition, a poor command climate can reduce freedom of action for subordinate commanders. Hence, it is critical that the naval operational commander establishes a command structure that clearly defines overall command responsibility, as well as command responsibility for each phase of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. After determining the command structure, the commanders should give subordinates as much authority as they need to discharge their responsibilities. The subordinate commanders should make instantaneous decisions. Clear and simple orders, combined with a solid understanding of the commander’s intent, enable subordinates to exercise initiative and flexibility. Overly prescriptive service/joint doctrine invariably limits the commander’s freedom to act, whereas flexible doctrine increases it. Hence, a sound doctrine should not prescribe the number and names of phases in a campaign, deployment and logistical support and sustainment of one’s combat forces, and organizational options. It should provide only broad guidance, leaving details to the naval operational commander. Good operations security (OPSEC) also contributes to the commander’s freedom of action. A plan for a maritime campaign or major naval operation should include security measures. Good OPSEC enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to enemy surprise. A thorough knowledge of the enemy can improve security and reduce vulnerability to surprise. However, advanced information technology available to news organizations and the nature of modern war reporting have made the task of preserving OPSEC and achieving surprise more difficult today than it was in the past. Initiative and freedom of action are inextricably linked. Freedom of action creates the conditions for exercising initiative on the part of subordinate commanders, while their initiative enlarges the higher commander’s freedom of action. The more freedom of action given to subordinate commanders, the more room they have to exercise initiative. The freedom to act is an absolute prerequisite for exercising the initiative.

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The initiative is closely linked to the factor of surprise and concentration at the weight of effort.77 The initiative can primarily be achieved through agility of C2 and also through preemptive actions and the decisive exploitation of operational surprises.78 By exercising the initiative, the naval operational commander can dictate the terms of combat to his enemy counterpart and thereby prevent him from exercising the initiative. The initiative requires flexibility in thought and action, an ability to act and react faster than the enemy.79 Initiative is the ability to set or change the terms of combat through action; it requires that commanders maintain an aggressive spirit. It means that, when an opportunity presents itself, the commander may depart from planned actions to speed up mission accomplishment. To do this without jeopardizing the higher plan, the commander must understand and act within the intent of the commander two levels up. The higher the command echelon, the larger the area of uncertainty, and the higher the risks the commander has to take. Despite all the advances in information technologies, there will always be a rather large area of uncertainty in any given operational or strategic situation at sea. This will be particularly the case in the littorals where the physical environment is intermingled with the human space. Among other things, the naval operational commander rarely, if ever, has complete knowledge of the intangible factors in a situation. Very often he must make operational decisions without waiting for complete information. The uncertainties regarding the enemy’s intentions are much greater at the strategic and operational levels than at the tactical level.80 At the same time, the consequences of a failure at the operational level are much more severe than at the tactical level. And they cannot be overcome easily, if at all. Once the naval operational commander has developed a plan, he has to assess the risk involved in the operation and then must make a decision to execute the plan despite the risk.81 Willingness to take prudent risks means making operational decisions in varying degrees of uncertainty. Such decisions are critical for success, especially when the naval operational commander’s forces are numerically weaker than those of the enemy. They are not gambles, but carefully made, calculated decisions. In general, there is never enough time or enough resources, and most choices involve some risks. There are no certainties in war.82 One of the most critical elements in the employment of one’s combat forces in a maritime campaign or major naval operation is the selection of the proper sector of main effort and point of main attack. This task is the naval operational commander’s main means of ensuring decisive action. Surprise is one of the most important factors in this regard.83 Concentration of one’s combat forces in the sector of main effort requires the naval operational commander’s willingness to take high risks to weaken friendly forces in other sectors in favor of the sector of main effort.84 All available forces should be concentrated against the part of the enemy force where the decision is being sought.85 The naval operational commander should clearly determine

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where the most forces should be concentrated in order to achieve superiority over the opponent.86 The naval operational commander should not arbitrarily decide what forces’ size and mix should be employed to accomplish the assigned operational or strategic objective. In general, there is simply no such thing as being strong enough.87 To reach a decision, the naval operational commander should not assign too much force for accomplishing secondary tasks. One must be stronger than the enemy at the decisive point by using speed, surprise, and deception.88 A naval operational commander should try to use all the sources of military and nonmilitary power available or becoming available.89 One is never too strong in war if the aim is to achieve a quick and decisive victory.90 Hence, the mass or “massed effect” of one’s forces should be brought to the decisive sector at the decisive point.91 The commander who tries to be strong everywhere or who wastes his forces on secondary tasks acts contrary to this basic rule.92 A naval operational commander should strive to achieve operational and tactical surprise to ensure success in the sector of main effort and the point of main attack (defense). He should change the pattern and the ways he employs. He should try to achieve surprise by attacking the enemy at unexpected times and places. He should never give the enemy enough time to prepare and carry out countermeasures. He should be also prepared for the possibility that the enemy might achieve surprise. Deception, cover, and concealment are often key prerequisites for achieving surprise.93 A naval operational commander should possess a high degree of creativity in his thinking and a readiness to take risk.94 Creative thinking and mental agility refer to one’s ability to see the whole picture from its individual parts. This also requires a mastery of combat with combined arms, exploitation of the possibilities of command and control warfare (C2W), and, in the employment of multinational forces – knowledge of multinational structures and procedures, and understanding of other nations’ culture, history, traditions, and society.95 A naval operational commander should be both bold and innovative; he should not use forces in a traditional manner. This means not being fixated on the mechanical or schematic employment of one’s combat forces. He should never act according to a stereotyped scheme.96 He should surprise the enemy. Nothing is more disconcerting for an enemy than facing a situation for which there is no answer. Whenever possible, the naval operational commander should use friendly forces asymmetrically and plan for operational/strategic deception. To preserve versatility and variability of decisions, the naval operational commander should not act according to conventional views and preconceived notions. The art of warfare rests on the freest application of its fundamentals under constantly changing conditions.97 In the modern era, operational or strategic objectives in a theater can normally be accomplished only by joint employment of the combat arms of several services. Individual service forces should be selected because of their utility, required capabilities, expertise, combat readiness, and functions – not equity. For simplicity and economy, if a single service force or forces from a single

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military department are all that is required, only those forces should be employed. In addition, if detaching elements of a service force would disrupt the operational integrity of that force, the detachment should be avoided. The complexity of joint operations demands training forces jointly and rehearsing operation plans. Joint training and rehearsals are facilitated by organizing in peacetime for joint operations during war. Today, operational or strategic objectives in a theater can normally be accomplished predominantly by joint employment of the combat arms of several services or the country’s armed forces.

Conclusion Several command echelons, from operational-tactical to military and theaterstrategic, are involved to varying degrees in planning, preparing, and conducting major operations and campaigns. The naval operational commanders control large forces and thousands of soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Their responsibility also extends to the protection of civilian populations and civilian-related installations and facilities. The failure of a single major naval operation or maritime campaign can have an immediate and extremely adverse effect on the war as a whole. This means that only commanders who exemplify the highest personal and professional requirements should be selected for operation-level commands. The principal requirements for a successful operational leader are high intellect, strong personality, courage, boldness, and will to act, combined with extensive professional knowledge and experience. The naval operational commanders should have a solid knowledge and understanding of all aspects of operational art. They should know and understand the relationship among operational art, strategy, and tactics. They need to have solid knowledge of the tactical capabilities of friendly forces. They should also have a broad knowledge of political issues, diplomacy, international economy, geopolitics, social issues, and other issues of importance in their respective theaters. The tenets of operational leadership should not be applied like dogma. They are based on logic, common sense, and lessons learned. Because war is a political act, the primacy of policy and strategy should be ensured at all times. This should not lead to an imbalance in which policy reigns absolute, making it very difficult or even impossible to use military forces effectively and decisively. The naval operational commander should at all times be focused firmly on the ultimate objective of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. In determining the objective, the factors of space, time, and forces should be weighed and soundly balanced. At the same time, having constancy of purpose does not mean pursuing an objective that is clearly unattainable with the military means currently available or becoming available. The means, ways, and the ends should be roughly in harmony; otherwise, no maritime campaign or major naval operation can be successful. Evaluating this is a continuous task for naval operational commanders and their staffs. As the situation changes, some factors in the situation change as well. They should be brought into balance with other factors so that the assigned objectives can be accomplished.

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Naval operational commanders should first have as much freedom as possible to act within the framework set by policy and strategy. Then they should obtain and then maintain and enlarge their freedom to act in the course of a campaign or major operation. This is principally accomplished when the naval operational commander and his subordinate tactical commanders exercise initiative. Proper selection of the sector of main effort and concentration of combat forces are prerequisites for achieving operational or strategic success. Naval operational commanders should be ready to take high risks in planning and conducting a campaign or major operation. They should be bold and innovative. Perhaps the worst mistake is to act in a highly predictable and stereotyped way. Creativeness and innovation are not only desirable but also necessary for the naval operational commander who wants to achieve swift and decisive victories. Finally, jointness should become second nature to naval operational commanders. Today the complexity of strategic objectives requires employment of the forces of several services, and often services of other nations’ armed forces. The enemy should be presented with threats in several dimensions simultaneously. Sister services are not competitors; rather, they bring capabilities that one’s own service lacks.

10 Operational thinking

One of the principal requirements for success at the operational and strategic levels of command is to think broadly and have a broad vision.1 Such ability, which the Germans aptly call “operational thinking” (operatives Denken), is usually not an innate trait of a commander.2 Operational thinking is a result of considerable conscious efforts over many years on the part of the future operational commander. Although operational thinking is one of the most critical factors for success, whether in peacetime or time of war, many operational commanders have remained essentially captives of their narrow tactical perspective. To think tactically is easy; it is an area in which all commanders feel comfortable, because this is what they have done for most of their professional careers. History provides numerous examples in which a commander’s inability to think broadly and far ahead resulted in major setbacks or even in the failure of a maritime campaign or major naval operation.

What is operational thinking? The term “operational thinking” can be understood as thinking broadly and far ahead of the current events. In a naval context it means that the commander has an operational rather than tactical perspective in exercising his numerous responsibilities in peacetime and across the entire spectrum of conflict. In purely physical terms, the operational perspective encompasses the entire maritime theater plus an arbitrarily defined area of interest. The perspective of a naval tactical commander is narrow, because he is focused on planning and executing actions and measures aimed at accomplishing tactical objectives in a given naval combat zone or maritime/joint area of operations. The broadest perspective is at the theater- and national-strategic levels of command. Among other things, the strategic perspective requires the operational commander’s ability to translate the national or alliance/coalition strategic objectives into achievable military- or theater-strategic objectives and then orchestrate the use of military and nonmilitary sources of power to achieve these objectives. The strategic perspective encompasses a single or multiple theaters (of war). The naval tactical commander is normally not concerned with using nonmilitary sources of power, but operational and strategic commanders are. The exception is in the post-

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hostilities phase of a maritime campaign and the employment of military power in low-intensity conflicts, where tactical actions usually predominate. The naval operational commander is unlikely to be successful unless he has full knowledge and understanding of the mutual interrelationships and linkages between strategy and policy on one hand and strategy, operational art, and tactics on the other. They must also fully comprehend the distinctions among the levels of war at sea and how decisions and actions at one level affect events at other levels. In sequencing and synchronizing the use of military and nonmilitary sources of power, operational commanders must have the ability to focus on the big picture and not be sidetracked by minor or unrelated events. Operational commander should have extensive knowledge and understanding of political, diplomatic, economic, ethnic, religious, legal, and other aspects of the situation in his theater; otherwise he would not be successful in accomplishing his primary responsibilities in peacetime and in time of war. In contrast to a naval tactical commander, a naval operational commander must properly sequence and synchronize the employment of all sources of power in the conduct of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. Sound operational decisions must be made, although the knowledge and understanding of some essential elements of the situation are far from satisfactory and uncertainties abound. Generally, a commander can more easily evaluate the risks of an action or nonaction at the tactical level than at the operational level.3 The larger the scope of the objective, the more uncertainties that fall within the scope of the commander’s estimate of the situation. The operational commander must have the ability to correctly anticipate the enemy’s reaction to his own actions and then make decisions to respond to the enemy’s actions. He also must often make operational decisions without having a solid knowledge of the essential elements of the situation. When the initiative has been lost, all the operational considerations are ultimately based on the commander’s correct appreciation of or hypotheses regarding the enemy’s future intentions. In contrast to the tactical commander, a naval operational commander must evaluate the features of the physical environment in operational rather than tactical terms. This means, among other things, properly evaluating characteristics of oceanography, hydrography, physical terrain, and human factors in a given point of maritime theater and their effect on the course and outcome of a maritime campaign or major naval operation rather than naval tactical actions. The operational commander is also far more concerned with the effects of climate, rather than weather, on the employment of multiservice or multinational forces taking part in the operation. Thinking operationally means that the naval commander clearly sees how each of his decisions and actions contributes to the accomplishment of the ultimate strategic or operational objective. Optimally, all the decisions and actions of the naval operational commander should be made within the given operational or strategic framework; otherwise, they will not contribute to ultimate success and might actually undermine it. As in a game of chess, the player who views the board as a single interrelated plane of action and each move as a prelude to a series of further moves is more likely to be

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successful than an opponent who thinks only a single move at a time. The naval operational commander should think of how to create opportunities for the employment of his forces while at the same time reducing the enemy’s future options.4 One of the most important attributes of a higher commander is his ability to see the situation through the enemy’s eyes. To a large extent, this ability is intuitive.5 A naval commander thinks operationally when he can properly visualize his own and the enemy actions and counteractions beyond the domain of physical combat and for some time into the future. The greater one’s sphere of command, of course, the further ahead one should think.6 By correctly anticipating the enemy’s reaction to his own actions, the naval operational commander can timely make a sound decision, counteract, and then prepare to make another decision to respond to the enemy’s counterreaction. The key is to operate within the enemy’s decision cycle. Without this ability, the naval operational commander cannot seize and maintain the initiative; and without the initiative, his freedom of action would be dictated by the opponent. The operational commander should also have the ability to properly evaluate the impact of new and future technologies on command structure, intelligence, logistics, protection, command and control, and planning and execution of major naval operations or maritime campaigns.

Importance Operational thinking is one of the main prerequisites for the naval commander’s judicious use of military and nonmilitary sources of power in accomplishing strategic or operational objectives. It is especially critical for the naval commander who controls numerically inferior forces. Operational thinking helps the commander to employ friendly forces in such a way that each action directly or indirectly contributes to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective. This means that the naval operational commander must have the ability to differentiate between events that are essential for the accomplishment of the ultimate objective and those that are outside the framework of a given maritime campaign or major naval operation. The naval commander who does not think operationally may eventually accomplish an operational or even strategic objective, but at substantially heavier costs for friendly forces in terms of personnel, materiel, and time than the commander who skillfully applies the tenets of operational leadership. However, there is always a risk that a weaker but much more skillful enemy commander who thinks operationally could inflict large losses on, or even defeat, larger but poorly led forces. Often, a predominant or exclusive focus on tactics leads to major setback or even defeat at the operational and strategic levels. For instance, the Japanese, U.S., and the Royal Navy were too narrowly and tactically focused in the interwar years. All three navies were literally obsessed with fighting a decisive battle like the one at Jutland. Such a battle would be fought with all combat arms, but the battleship would have a central and the most decisive role. The leadership of

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all three navies (and Germany’s navy as well) neglected to consider the critical role submarines would have against commercial shipping in a future war at sea.7 The lack of operational thinking is exemplified by the targeteering approach to warfare, in which almost the entire focus is on the selection of and attacks against specific target sets and individual targets – not on the objectives to be accomplished. Targeteering also leads to excessive centralization of the command and control process. Subordinate commanders’ freedom to act and initiative are then greatly limited, with all the attendant adverse consequences for the forces’ effectiveness. The targeteering approach to warfare also makes it much harder to determine whether and when a certain objective is accomplished; it also leads to considerable waste of time and resources. It almost invariably leads to a war of attrition at the operational and strategic levels. This might not be important in a war against a weak and/or incompetent enemy, but it is a very different proposition in fighting a much stronger and skillful opponent.

Acquiring operational thinking The operational commander’s ability to think “operationally” is a result of the influences of many factors. The societal and cultural framework determines to a large degree the nature of military institutions, and hence also professional education and training. The most important direct influence in shaping the naval commander’s ability to think broadly is the exercise of the operational level of command in both peacetime and time of war. In peacetime this includes participation in planning games, war games, and large-scale exercises and maneuvers. However, the most important of all direct influences on acquiring operational thinking is combat. Indirect influences include the naval operational commander’s professional education at the naval/joint staff colleges and, perhaps even more important, the commander’s consistent efforts at self-education over the course of his entire career. Operational thinking is only in some very rare cases the result of a commander’s inherent predisposition to think big and far ahead of current events. Military institutional influences shape the broader environment within which any naval operational commander exercises his authority and responsibilities. Thus, the commander’s operational thinking is a product of the national way of warfare as a whole and the common operational outlook of the armed forces or a particular service. Maritime campaigns and major naval operations cannot be successfully conducted unless the naval operational commanders and their staffs have a common view of the fundamentals of operational warfare at sea. Also, there should be some agreement within a naval service and among sister services about the meanings of key operational terms; otherwise, it is difficult to write sound service or joint doctrine. The absence of such agreement also complicates the planning, preparation, and execution of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The lack of common terms, the abuse of commonly understood terms, or the use of existing terms interchangeably also greatly complicates discussion among theoreticians of various aspects of operational warfare at sea.

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One should be aware that embracing a common operational outlook also has pitfalls. There is an ever-present danger that education may become indoctrination and end in certain rigidly held beliefs on some key aspects of operational art. In the process of uncalculating common views on the character of the future war at sea there is an ever-present danger of going to the extreme and stifling any creativity on the part of subordinates.

Operational education The main purpose of the professional naval education of future naval operational commanders should be to enhance mental agility, creativity, and innovative thinking.8 Such an education should start early in a career. Only through mastery of naval/military history and theory can naval officers gain the wide frame of reference necessary to sound planning and directing of maritime campaigns and major naval operations. Education in operational art should be general for many and individualized for a select few. The basic concepts of operational art should be used to promote informed discussion of related topics.9 The educational process for the future naval operational commander should encourage the development of initiative, flexibility, decisiveness, and willingness to take responsibility; mistakes should be corrected without condemnation.10 Stereotyped and universal solutions to a given operational problem should be avoided. Every situation is unique, and no scenario can possibly encompass all of its aspects; hence, officially approved or “school” solutions should not be used in educating future naval operational commanders. Normally there are several viable solutions to a problem. A critique of a subordinate’s actions should focus on the rationale for an action taken; the aim should be to broaden the knowledge, analytical skills, and experience of the future naval operational leader. Critiques should be open and frank but not personal or overly harsh. Mistakes made in finding a solution to a military problem should be considered a part of the normal process of learning. In other words, the emphasis should be not on errors and mistakes but on progress made. It is critically important that future naval operational leaders have a healthy self-confidence and self-esteem (based on real accomplishments); otherwise it will not be possible to develop the character traits and military skills so necessary for success at the operational level. Indirect experience in acquiring operational thinking is infinitely wider than any direct experience. Even in the most active career, the scope and possibilities of direct experience are extremely limited. Direct experience is also inherently limited to form an adequate foundation either for theory or for its application. At best, it creates an atmosphere that is of value in drying and hardening the structure of thought. The greater value of indirect experience lies in its greater variety and extent.11 Naval/military history is inherently broader, deeper, and more diverse than the study of any other area of human activity.12 The study of naval/ military history provides a commander with a core of background knowledge

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and understanding that allows him to form and reform his vision of the battlefield beyond the realm of his combat experiences.13 All too often, history is considered the exclusive preserve of professional historians. However, nothing could be further from the truth. History is the broadest of all studies. It encompasses every aspect of the experience of humanity. History serves as a foundation of education by showing how mankind repeats its errors and what those errors are. It is the story of universal experience.14 Critical study of past wars as a whole and maritime campaigns, and major naval operations in particular, is a major source for developing the operational perspective of future naval operational commanders. Warfare does not have its own logic, but it has its own grammar, and the grammatical rules are deduced from studying naval/military history. Because very few naval commanders have experience in commanding forces at the operational level, the best way to educate them to think operationally is through the study of the successes and failures of great naval leaders. Some of the greatest naval leaders were also great students of history. Operational commanders should be students of history, not historians – a big difference exists between the two. The better educated the commander, the more he understands the big picture and the better he will perform his functions (provided that the commander has the essential qualities of character).15 A proper study of naval/military history helps to derive general principles of leadership through a critical reading of the biographies and memoirs of the great military leaders of the past. It also helps in determining the reasons for their successes and failures.16 The knowledge of psychological and moral factors in military history must be based on the study of naval/military history.17 The study of naval/military history is the best way of impressing on future operational commanders the point that warfare is not a science, as proponents of various information warfare theories apparently believe. Warfare was in the past and will always remain more an art rather than a science. A full understanding of the relationship between policy-makers and operational commanders can be obtained by studying naval/military and political history. The future naval operational commander should fully understand the political context of the military objective and strategy before he can start to understand various aspects of operational art. That understanding and knowledge can essentially be acquired only through the critical study of operational aspects of past wars and major operations and campaigns.18 The study of history provides a broad perspective on events and gives a sense of proportion in relation to time, place, and circumstances.19 Methods of accomplishing operational or strategic objectives used in the past might be obsolete today, however, the fundamentals of strategy or operational art are essentially unchangeable. Experience is the raw material of imagination, and history is a great source of experience.20 The study of history shows how the obstacles and hardships of warfare are magnified by human mental responses. If men know that other men have overcome similar or worse conditions, they may be persuaded that they can do so as well.21

208 Operational thinking To have the greatest value, naval/military history must be accurate. The most useful naval histories are those written from an operational perspective. Unfortunately, such histories are sorely neglected and relatively few have been written. To be of any use, naval/military history must be factual and frank. A propagandistic or censored history is very dangerous. In fact, such a history is not history at all, and it can provide no sound lessons or basis for intellectual and professional training. It leads to false conclusions, and it fosters one of the worst failings – self-deception.22 Naval/military history should be studied in width, depth, and context. By studying warfare in width – that is, over a large time frame – one can discern and learn the discontinuities in naval/military history. The study of naval/ military history should focus on the history of the art of war, which shows how and why the art of war has changed from era to era.23 Such a study should not be limited to a certain age or a certain area. The greatest danger in studying naval military history is in trying to cover too broad a field. It would seem to be much better to cover a limited number of events thoroughly than to give students a superficial picture of the greatest possible number of occurrences.24 Therefore, naval/military history should be studied in depth. In practical terms, it is much better to focus on a single maritime campaign or major naval operation and analyze it thoroughly than to scan several of them. Clausewitz believed that one single event, thoroughly analyzed, may be much more instructive than ones that are superficially treated. The danger in a superficial treatment lies in the fact that, in most cases, he who acts in such a manner has never mastered the events he cites – therefore, such superficial, irresponsible handling of history leads to hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing.25 Naval/military history should also be studied in a context. Wars are conflicts of societies; therefore, the nature of the societies must be understood. The roots of a victory or defeat are often among a multitude of social, political, economic, social, religious, and other factors. Naval/military history must be more than a logical, factual record or account of events. After the facts have been synthesized, they have to be analyzed, conclusions must be made, and then, in the final step, based on those conclusions, some operational lessons learned should be derived. One might add that there is very little utility in studying naval/military history without trying to derive some lessons learned from past events. However, there are also pitfalls in the process. Conditions in the past cannot be dogmatically transferred to the present or future. One thing is always unchangeable: all conditions of a given situation can never be reproduced.26 The study of past wars should be methodical and long term. All sources should be used, from primary sources to official histories, biographies and memoirs, and even historical novels. In studying naval/military history, it is more valuable to focus research and analysis on a single area than on a very broad area. Generally, it is more useful to know a single campaign in detail than several campaigns superficially.27 Clausewitz insisted that ancient historical examples should not be considered – only those from modern military history,

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insofar as it is properly known and evaluated. In more distant times, conditions and ways of waging war were different; they therefore bear fewer practical lessons for our time. The further back one goes, the less useful military history is. Also, with the passage of time these historical examples are bound to lose a mass of essential minor elements and details, and the picture becomes less accurate.28 However, this is only true in regard to tactical and technological lessons deduced from naval/military history. The value of the human and psychological aspects of warfare is not limited to any particular era or historical event; they are timeless – and Clausewitz, for one, might also agree.

Operational training Operational training in peacetime should accompany education as a means of preserving and improving the skills necessary for the successful application of operational art at sea. Among other things, exercises should serve as laboratories for validating ideas imparted during education.29 Sound naval service and joint doctrine are extremely important for the training of future naval operational commanders. Doctrine should be descriptive, not prescriptive, to allow the greatest degree of flexibility in its application and, hence, an innovative approach in resolving naval/military problems on the part of the future operational commanders. Service and joint doctrine are the principal means of promoting a common outlook on the character and all aspects of warfare. The need for the closest cooperation among the services – jointness – should be emphasized. Yet the identity of the individual services should be preserved. The features and peculiarities of campaigns and major operations conducted in different physical environments and by forces of various services should be taught and understood. Additionally, the services should jointly define and use key operational terms, in order to facilitate a common approach and enhance jointness. This means that military terminology should be standardized, precise, and widely understood. This common perspective will facilitate issuance of concise, yet clear, directives and the brief communication of intent. Another purpose of operational training is to develop traits of self-reliance and initiative. Initiative, once developed, should be continuously practiced as well. Leaders who act on their own initiative will better face the uncertainties of a fast-changing situation. This is especially true when a decision must be made in a matter of minutes, sometimes even at the operational level. Also, commanders who act on their own initiative will exert more energy in carrying out their decisions than they might in executing decisions made at a higher level. Commanders who are self-reliant feel more pride and satisfaction in their work, and that feeling can only further strengthen force cohesion.30 Obviously, combat is the best opportunity for broadening the perspective and application of operational art. However, opportunities to acquire such direct experience are relatively few, because major wars are rare; hence the need to acquire such experience in peacetime, through participation in large-scale exercises/maneuvers, various planning/war games, and field trips.

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The value of direct experience in peacetime can vary greatly, and no naval exercise or war game can realistically simulate the effect of friction in real combat or the sense of physical danger. Yet experience shows that future naval operational commanders can be properly prepared for their wartime responsibilities in time of peace. There is a danger, during a long time of peace, that the future operational commander might either overrate or ignore the effect friction has on the employment of both friendly and enemy forces. Hence, it is critical that future commanders be properly trained in how to overcome the effects of friction.31 Peacetime naval/joint exercises and maneuvers can be highly useful in training future commanders to conduct a quick estimate of the situation, make sound decisions, and then execute their plans and orders. They are also an excellent method of preparing future commanders for properly coordinating the movements and actions of diverse combat arms, and for transmitting messages. A lack of large-scale naval exercises and maneuvers can be one of the main reasons for setbacks or even defeats on the battlefield. One of the potential problems in peacetime is the lack of large formations for exercises and maneuvers. This cannot but have a detrimental effect on the development of future operational commanders. In the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. Navy was very successful in using lessons from its major annual exercises, called “fleet problems,” to develop and improve naval aircraft, aircraft carriers, and, perhaps even more important, new tactical procedures and operational concepts for the employment of its emerging carrier forces. Fleet Problem I, held in the Panama Canal area in 1923, demonstrated the vulnerability of vital parts of the canal to enemy attacks from the air. The official report from that exercise recommended that the canal’s defenses be strengthened and that aircraft carriers be employed for both scouting and attack. Perhaps the most important lessons were learned from Fleet Problem IX, conducted off the Panama Canal in 1929, in which the then-largest of the world’s carriers, Lexington and Saratoga, participated. The lessons learned from that exercise marked the emergence of the concept of fast carrier forces, later tested and refined during fleet problems conducted in the 1930s.32 In Fleet Problem X, conducted in the Caribbean in March 1930, U.S. carriers operated with cruisers and destroyers as a self-contained, high-speed striking force. This exercise demonstrated to high U.S. naval officials that the use of carrier-based aircraft could determine the outcome of a naval battle.33 Fleet Problem XI, conducted in April 1930, also took place in the Caribbean. It was intended to further investigate the limitations of carrier-based scouting aircraft. At the conclusion of the exercise it was recommended that semipermanent task forces be organized, each composed of one large aircraft carrier, a division of cruisers, and a division of destroyers. This force would be trained as a unit in frequent exercises. Lessons learned during Fleet Problem XIII, held in 1932, emphasized that in case of a war in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy should have more aircraft carriers in service. Fleet Problem XIV, conducted in 1933, demonstrated the vulnerability of vital U.S. industrial, military, and mobilization

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centers along the coast to enemy attacks from the air in the course of preparations for escorting expeditionary forces overseas. Fleet Problem XIX, conducted in 1938, showed the high vulnerability of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s main base, Pearl Harbor, to enemy carrier-based air attack and indicated the great difficulties for the defender in solving this problem. In Fleet Problem XX, held in the Caribbean and off the northeast part of South America in 1939, the U.S. Navy practiced the employment of fast carriers in defending convoy and surface ships against enemy air attack.34 The U.S. Marine Corps used a series of exercises in the 1920s to refine and improve its concept of amphibious landings on the opposed shore. In an exercise off the Panama Canal Zone in 1924, the Marines came to the important conclusion that resourceful and well trained amphibious landing forces could penetrate conventional beach defenses. The U.S. Marines also drew negative conclusions from a landing exercise, attended by both marines and naval officers, off Pearl Harbor in 1925. That exercise, in which U.S. Marines tested the British concept for amphibious landing, convinced key officers of both the Marines and the U.S. Navy that the United States did not have the doctrine required to carry out a basic Pacific war plan. The Marines abandoned the British concept of landing operations in favor of their own concept, which made amphibious development a naval mission.35 Sometimes major exercises reveal significant gaps in, or potential problems with, current doctrine. However, institutional rigidity, unwillingness to make necessary changes, and, all too often, personalities can result in proper lessons being either not learned or learned well but later ignored. Japanese submarine doctrine prior to World War II focused on the destruction of large surface combatants. Although a series of exercises demonstrated many problems with the doctrine, these lessons were essentially ignored. Exercises by the Sixth Fleet (submarines), conducted between February and April 1941 in the waters between Honshu¯ and Micronesia, showed great difficulties in successfully employing submarines against enemy warships, specifically in contact-keeping and pursuit. Yet the Japanese ignored their own post-action reports and real lessons learned from that exercise and continued with their false doctrinal beliefs.36 The Japanese also became convinced of the great value of submarines and aircraft in defending Japanese island strongpoints in the Western Pacific. The ensuing conflict in the Pacific demonstrated, however, that the Japanese submarines could be used only for bringing in supplies, not for the defense of such isolated garrisons.37 In the interwar years, the Japanese were unaware of the value of submarines in attacking enemy merchant shipping. For example, in maneuvers held in October 1940, several Japanese submarines were deployed to patrol critical straits in home waters. The submarines also simulated attacks on Japanese commercial vessels. However, because of inadequate antisubmarine defenses and lack of attention by convoy escorts, Japanese submarines were successful in these simulated attacks. Nevertheless, the Japanese top naval officials learned the wrong lesson from these maneuvers, ignoring the offensive potential of

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submarines to attack enemy maritime trade. They focused narrowly on the submarines’ vulnerability to enemy detection by radio direction finding (RDF).38 Despite their inherent artificiality, planning/war games can be quite useful for deriving some valuable operational lessons. Planning or war games can be used to develop new tactical and operational concepts that can then be tested in exercises or maneuvers. The Germans often did this in the interwar years. The German concept of employing U-boats in groups or screens (popularly called “wolf packs” in the West) had its rudiments in the last few months of World War I. The idea of employing large numbers of U-boats in groups and on the surface was revived during naval war games in the early 1930s. The shortwave (SW) radio made it possible for the first time for the U-boat command to direct the movements and coordinate the attacks of several groups of U-boats from a headquarters onboard a ship or ashore. This concept was first tested in practice during the Wehrmacht maneuvers in the fall of 1937. The commander of the U-boats, Commodore Doenitz, controlled his boats, deployed in the Baltic, via SW radio from the submarine tender at naval base Kiel. Based on that exercise, Doenitz also requested that a command ship equipped with the latest means of communications be built for controlling U-boats in case of war.39 After further large-scale exercises, held in the North Sea in May 1939, U-boats conducted an exercise in group tactics off Cape Finisterre and in the Bay of Biscay. In July 1939, Doenitz (by then promoted to rear admiral) conducted a similar exercise in the Baltic. All these exercises proved to Doenitz that his concept of using Uboats in groups was well founded. Nevertheless, the German naval high command continued to believe that in the next war U-boats would be employed individually, not in groups.40 Doenitz also used lessons learned from the winter exercise of 1938–1939 to argue that a successful campaign against British maritime trade would require a force of at least 300 U-boats.41 In the interwar years, the Japanese navy used both fleet maneuvers and map exercises to derive lessons concerning technological improvements and new tactical concepts of its fast carrier forces. In 1936, lessons learned from an exercise with three aircraft carriers at sea and a map exercise convinced the Japanese high naval officials that carrier forces should sail dispersed but all carrier aircraft should be concentrated in the air for their attacks against enemy forces at sea. The combination of lessons derived from the fleet exercises, map exercises, and the first year of the war with China in 1937 led the Japanese to focus on massing attack aircraft for both bombing and defense of the aircraft carriers. The Japanese also concluded that bombers were effective if they were massed and protected by substantial fighter air cover, which, in turn, led to the conclusion that Japanese carrier forces must be concentrated in carrying out an operation.42

Operational vision At any level of command, the commander’s vision of the situation that will exist after the assigned mission is accomplished is the very heart of the commander’s intent. The commander’s vision also provides a military organization with a clear

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sense of direction, a sense of mission. It is critical that the operational commander imparts to all his subordinates his personal vision of victory and the conditions and methods for obtaining it. The vision is a combination of the commander’s personality traits, education and training, and experience. The higher the level of command, the further into the future the commander must look in order to achieve the desired combat success. And the larger the scope of the military objective, the more complex the situation and the more difficult it is to correctly contemplate the military end state and the unfolding of events leading to it. At the theater-strategic and operational levels, it is operational thinking that is the very foundation for what is arbitrarily called “operational vision.”43 The two are inseparable. It is hard to see how the operational commander can have operational vision without proper operational thinking. Operational vision is the commander’s ability to clearly and correctly envision the military conditions that will exist after the mission is accomplished. It also refers to the commander’s ability to correctly anticipate and foresee the effect of his actions on the enemy’s counterpart and then take timely and proper counteractions. Operational vision is narrower in its scope than is operational thinking. In terms of the factor of time, it is limited to the anticipated duration of a campaign or major operation. A naval operational commander should understand quickly what is happening in the course of a maritime campaign or major naval operation. He should conduct a quick running estimate of the situation and make a quick but sound decision. The challenge of bringing about strategically or operationally significant results from tactical actions demands more than just an accurate perception of reality; it calls for an artful conceptualization or vision of possible and desirable future conditions. This does not lend itself to textbook solutions.44 A naval commander should possess operational vision so that he can envisage all the phases of the planned maritime campaign or major naval operation. Without proper operational vision, the commander cannot translate the strategic objective assigned by the highest politico-military leadership into a military- or theater-strategic objective.45 No maritime campaign or major naval operation can be coherently planned and executed without a vision of how it should end. Among other things, operational vision helps the naval operational commander focus his actions on defeating the enemy forces. It also allows the commander to accurately predict what set of military conditions, or “landscape,” should be created after the given ultimate objective is accomplished. In other words, the commander’s intent will not be sound unless it is based on sound operational vision.46 Operational vision is a main factor in contemplating the sequence of events that will accomplish the ultimate strategic or operational objective. The naval operational commander must visualize how naval tactical actions relate to one another and how they fit into a large operational framework. He must also correctly anticipate the enemy’s reaction to his actions and then devise a timely and proper counterreaction. The naval operational commander should foresee how

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his decisions and actions will affect the decisions of the political leadership in achieving ultimate victory. This, in turn, requires that the naval operational commander possess at least an approximately accurate picture of the situation several weeks or even months into the future The naval operational commander is constantly tempted to become engrossed in day-to-day tactical events. A predominant or, even worse, exclusive focus on tactics, as one finds today in network-centric warfare (NCW) advocates, is bound to obscure the naval commander’s operational vision. At the same time, his operational vision will be seriously deficient if he neglects the importance of tactical combat. Only with at least solid tactical performance can the operational commander have real choices regarding how to sequence tactical actions to achieve a successful outcome in a maritime campaign or major naval operation. The operational commander may have an excellent operational vision, but that in itself will not lead to success if his forces suffer tactical defeats in the field. Therefore, the operational commander should find a balance between these two extremes – not an easy task. Imagination helps the commander make decisions and act in a situation full of uncertainty, where information is ambiguous or incomplete or both. By properly visualizing what can occur before a major naval operation or maritime campaign starts, the commander can reduce uncertainty, filling information voids by using events he envisions as possible. This, in turn, allows the naval operational commander to make bold decisions.47 Anticipation is one’s ability to predict or to have foreknowledge or intuition. The naval operational commander who has imagination has an inquiring mind supported by wide experience. At the same time, controlling the imagination is critical; the commander should not see doom and gloom in every report or action. Intuition consists of three core elements: calm, comprehensiveness, and inquisitiveness. Calm is most closely compared to patience: it is exemplified in a commander who remains stoic while others panic. The truly calm leader knows when to become more directive, how long to wait before committing a reserve, and how to exploit success. Comprehensiveness refers to the naval operational commander’s ability to think both broadly and in great depth about the military problem at hand. This is one of the prerequisites to correctly envisioning the course of an entire maritime campaign or major operation. Inquisitiveness is a state of mind that closely resembles curiosity. It is in essence an ever-present desire to acquire new information and then knowledge and understanding. It is a personality trait that prevents intellectual complacency. A commander with an inquiring mind is never satisfied with the simple meaning or course of events in a confusing situation.48 The naval operational commander must have the ability to deduce operational features of the physical environment in which a campaign or major naval operation will be conducted. He must not only understand the geometry of the theater but also have a full understanding of the factor of distances in the combat employment of his forces. He must also appreciate the factor of time.49

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Operational thinkers and practitioners Compared to land warfare, there were only a few naval commanders who were both operational or strategic thinkers and practitioners. The others displayed too narrow and tactical perspective and not surprisingly failed to perform well at the operational level of command. Perhaps one of the leading naval strategists in World War II was Admiral J. King, Commander in Chief (COMINCH), United States Navy and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). King had a well deserved reputation for brilliance as a strategic thinker. He became an ardent proponent of amphibious warfare in general and Marine Corps techniques in the conduct of amphibious landings in particular. In contrast to many of his peers, he firmly believed that aircraft carriers should be used independently and not be tied to traditional battle lines. King was also deeply interested in land warfare; in that respect he was rare among the naval officers of his time. He reportedly studied all the great wars and strategists. King also had a special interest in the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War.49 King consistently pushed for the Pacific strategy in World War II. He did not dispute the need to hold Great Britain, and he supported the proposed Allied strategy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. However, King had to continuously fight American and British strategists concerned only with the European theater.50 In retrospect, King made a highly risky but sound decision by directing Admiral Nimitz, in the aftermath of the Battle of Midway in June 1942, to prepare to seize Tulagi in the Solomons by amphibious assault. He, in fact, intruded into MacArthur’s area of responsibility without consulting the JCS or President Roosevelt. On 25 June he presented the JCS with a fait accompli and then asked boldly for concurrence that Nimitz should attack Tulagi.51 Subsequently, the decision was made to make the main landing on Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower). Admiral Nimitz earned a reputation in the war as a superb strategist and practitioner of operational art. He would usually state the objective of what he would like to have accomplished, and give certain timelines and a broad idea of what the operation would consist of. However, he would not say how to do something. Nimitz generally left the fleet commanders at sea full freedom of action on how to accomplish their assigned objective missions.52 Admiral Spruance served as Commander, Fifth Fleet under Nimitz. He was a man with a precise mind. Spruance was a careful planner and had great presence of mind.53 Spruance played the key role in the Allied victory in the Battle of Midway in June 1942 and also in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944. Forces under his command carried out the majority of the amphibious landings in the central Pacific from November 1943 through June 1944. Spruance and his Fifth Fleet also took part in the landing at Iwo Jima in January 1945, and in the landing at Okinawa three months later. Spruance was a brilliant operational artist. His planning was so thorough and so well thought out that the unexpected seldom happened in his operations, which usually proceeded like well planned drills.54 Spruance was one of the rare commanders who fully appreciated the value and importance of logistics. He said that

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Admiral Cunningham was one of the outstanding naval leaders of the past century. His strength was not administration but dynamic leadership. Cunningham was successful in getting the best out of those who were experts at organization. He was also well known for his ability to delegate authority.56 Cunningham was a student of history. He learned the art of war through experience, and careful reading of history. He impressed upon his staff that a war is won by defeating the enemy in his mind.57 His instructions to the fleet were always written out, simply, clearly, and briefly, often by the Master of the Fleet. He never accepted typed drafts.58 The fact that a commander performs admirably at the operational or theaterstrategic level of command does not mean that he will perform as well in commanding an operational-tactical or major tactical force. For example, Admiral Halsey’s performance as the operational commander in the southern Pacific (COMSOPAC) was nothing short of outstanding. Nimitz wrote that Halsey was professionally competent and militarily aggressive without being reckless or foolhardy. In Nimitz’s view, Halsey had a rare combination of intellectual capacity and military audacity. He was an excellent operational thinker during his time as COMSOPAC. Halsey repeatedly argued for bypassing the Japanese strongholds in the Solomons in 1943 and attacking their weak points instead.59 In 1944, for more than eight months Halsey tried to persuade, although unsuccessfully, both admirals Nimitz and King to bypass Peleliu and Yap and thereby avoid unnecessary losses.60 He was also well known as one of the chief proponents of close cooperation among all the services, or what in modern terms is called “jointness.”61 Halsey is also an example of a commander who performed very well at the operational level but not as nearly as well at the operational-tactical and tactical level. As a fleet commander, Halsey was essentially a tactician. He had difficulties properly using fast carrier forces, amphibious forces, and surface forces. In some opinions, Halsey was not a good carrier commander, either. One reason for his difficulties was his absence from the carrier forces for almost two years before he took command of the Third Fleet in September 1943. Much had changed in the U.S. carrier forces since Halsey conducted the famous Doolittle Raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942. He needed much advice and help from his more experienced carrier group commanders to catch up with new technological advances in the carrier force. Yet he thought of himself as a true carrier commander and had little interest in the advice of other carrier admirals.62 In the battle for Leyte in October 1944, the Allies came very close to a

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humiliating defeat at the hands of a numerically much inferior and poorly led Japanese naval force because of several wrong decisions that Halsey made as de facto commander of TF-38 (a fast carrier force). Because of his narrow tactical perspective and his obsession with destroying the enemy carrier force, Halsey left the San Bernardino Strait unguarded and went north with three carrier groups in search of the Japanese Main Body, Mobile Force, led by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa. He eventually defeated that force in the battle off Cape Engano on 25 October 1944. However, in the meantime, the powerful heavy surface force, the First Diversionary Attack Force, led by Admiral Kurita, entered the Philippine Sea through the San Bernardino Strait and then continued on its way toward the weakly defended Leyte Gulf. It was only Kurita’s decision, on the morning of 25 October, to turn north when on the verge of defeating the Allied escort carrier force, in the Battle off Samar that saved the Allies from a defeat. Halsey’s actions show the danger of achieving a victory when one’s effort does not contribute to the ultimate objective of the operation. In Halsey’s case, the victory over Ozawa’s force off Cape Engano was achieved outside of the operational framework – that is, providing distant cover and protection to the Allied forces in Leyte Gulf and therefore essentially useless. Admiral Yamamoto, CINC of the Japanese Combined Fleet, was highly respected by both friends and foes for his skills as a fleet commander. The naval side of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) was brilliantly planned and executed. However, Yamamoto’s performance as operational commander both in the attempt to seize Port Moresby from across the sea and at Midway revealed that he was actually too tactically oriented. The Combined Fleet suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of a much smaller but better-led force in the Battle of Midway (Operation MI) in June 1942. On 3 June, Yamamoto’s forces were dispersed in ten groups in the central and northern Pacific. Two of his carriers, which might have provided the margin needed for victory, were sent north to attack Dutch Harbor and seize Attu and Adak in the Aleutians. The Japanese forces in the Midway area were deployed beyond mutual supporting distances.63 The U.S. Navy would not have achieved victory at Midway, regardless of its knowledge of Japanese intentions and the brilliant handling of forces by Nimitz and his subordinate carrier group commanders, if Yamamoto had kept his forces concentrated and not violated the principles of objective, mass, and economy of effort.

Conclusion To be successful, the future naval operational commander must think broadly and beyond the domain of physical combat. Operational thinking is the very foundation of the commander’s operational vision: an ability to think far ahead of current events, accurately anticipate the enemy’s actions and reactions, make quick but sound decisions, and then energetically execute plans and orders. A naval operational commander should fully comprehend both the military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation. The lack of operational thinking not only

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leads to setbacks in combat but also might fatally undermine the prospect of a decisive and quick victory. Many naval operational commanders have possessed the highest intellect, strength of character, courage, and boldness, and yet failed, simply because they never raised their sights beyond tactics. Tactical excellence has not been in the past, nor will it be in the future, a substitute for operational thinking. Future naval operational commanders must fully understand the highly dynamic relationship among three components of military art. They need to know and understand the distinctions among the levels of war; and how decisions and actions at one level affect the other levels. They also must properly evaluate the operational features of the physical environment in which a campaign or major operation will be conducted. The outcome of a maritime campaign or major naval operation depends considerably on the synchronization of the available military and nonmilitary sources of power. Hence, future operational commanders must properly evaluate both the military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation in a theater. Operational thinking is not inborn. To acquire that broad perspective, future naval operational commanders must exert great and consistent efforts over most of their professional career. Military institutions, as well as societal and cultural influences, both provide a framework and shape the naval commander’s operational thinking. The opportunities to acquire an operational perspective in war is relatively rare for any officer. It is even rarer for commanders who hold the operational level of command in peacetime. Hence, education and training are the principal means of acquiring operational thinking. The more diverse and comprehensive the training, the more opportunities it will present to the future operational commander to acquire that broad perspective necessary for success at the operational and strategic levels of command. One of the principal sources of indirect experience is the study of military history. Future naval commanders should read widely and in great depth on all aspects of naval warfare. The focus should be on the study of campaigns and major operations. The study of history is of little utility for the future operational commander unless he tries to derive from it some operational lessons learned. Experience shows that overemphasis on technology at the expense of operational thinking cannot produce success against a strong enemy who, though not having the most advanced weapons and equipment, has developed superior operational concepts. In a war between two strong opponents, victory will go to the side that thinks better and acts faster and with greater determination. This, of course, does not deny the need for weapons and equipment that are more advanced than those of one’s opponent. However, it cannot be overemphasized that superior thinking is far more critical than technology, no matter how advanced. Operational vision is a combination of the commander’s personality traits, professional education and training, and experience. It is based on the much broader and more durable operational thinking. In contrast to operational thinking, operational vision is more a product of innate personality traits and

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experience than just an ability to think operationally. However, the naval operational commander is unlikely to be successful without both thinking operationally and having operational vision. Proper operational vision is absolutely necessary for the commander to first determine what military conditions he wants to see after the mission is accomplished and then correctly envision which sequence of events would bring those conditions to reality. In contrast to a naval tactical commander, an operational commander requires a much greater ability to quickly grasp the essential elements of the situation in a relatively large part of the theater, make a decision, and then energetically strive to accomplish strategic or operational objectives by using all available sources of power. Imagination, anticipation, intuition, coup d’oeil, inner perspective, and historical perspective are the key elements. Perhaps the rarest trait is coup d’oeil; few high commanders have had that ability to make quick and sound decisions in a situation full of ambiguity and uncertainty. Coup d’oeil is perhaps more an innate trait than one that can be acquired though self-education and combat experience. Naval history is replete with examples of operational commanders who did not fully measure up to the high demands of their office. Only relatively few commanders were both brilliant operational thinkers and practitioners. Many excellent thinkers fell short as practitioners because of defects in character or because they lacked some key personality traits necessary to successfully convert their knowledge of operational art into practice. Other commanders were promoted above their true abilities. They did not perform well at the operational level of command because they lacked the necessary education or character for such high levels of command. Many naval operational commanders performed poorly because they were unable or unwilling to think beyond the domain of physical combat. Other naval commanders had a mixed record; they showed a remarkable ability to think and act operationally at some point in their career but then performed poorly either through an inability to delegate authority to their subordinate tactical commanders or by trying to be both operational and tactical commanders. Naval military history cannot, of course, provide a clear answer as to what are the key prerequisites for successful performance at the operational level of command. However, a future naval operational commander should be both a thinker and a practitioner. He should possess a rare combination of high professional education, diverse training, combat experience, and the great character traits necessary for success at the operational level of command.

The future

It will be better to offer certain considerations for reflection, rather than make sweeping dogmatic assertions. Alfred T. Mahan

The future of naval warfare at sea is closely related to the most likely trend in the character of war on land. The outcome of war as a whole is invariably decided on land where the humans live not at sea or in the air. The navies traditionally played a critical yet subordinate role to the armies in winning the nation’s wars. The likelihood of global conventional conflict looks remote today. However, the threat of major regional wars, especially in southwest Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Korean peninsula, will remain for the near future. The causes of war in the future will range from expansionist ideologies, such as religious totalitarianism, to aggressive nationalism. Transnational terrorist networks as represented by al Qa’ida will for the near future remain a major threat to moderate governments in the Islamic world and liberal societies in the West. This struggle will take a long time, and ultimate victory can be achieved only by the skillful and synchronized use of both military and nonmilitary sources of power and the close cooperation of many nations. Virulent nationalist ideologies will also represent a potential source of war in some parts of the third world. Some theoreticians even believe that wars between civilizations may become the main form of conflict in the twenty-first century.1 Other sources of potential conflict and war will be boundary disputes; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the struggle to control oil, gas, and water resources; overpopulation; and a combination of these and similar causes. Shortages of water supplies in the future will most likely increase the danger of conflicts or even wars between neighboring countries. The future war at sea will most likely take place predominantly in the littorals rather than on the open ocean. The political, economic, and military importance of the littorals has been steadily increased over the past few decades. Some 80 percent of all countries border the sea and approximately 95 percent of the world’s population lives within 600 miles from the sea. About 60 percent of the politically significant urban areas around the world are located within some 60

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miles from the coast and 70 percent live within 300 miles.2 About 80 percent of the world’s capitals lie within 345 miles from the shore. The world’s urban population is expected to double, from the present 2.5 billion to about 5.0 billion by 2025. By then, 60 percent of world’s total population will live in cities, most of which will be in a littoral area. Littorals are economically significant because all seaborne trade originates and ends there. The sea is still the main conduit for the world’s trade: 96 percent of all the world’s trade by weight is still carried by ships. Naval warfare in the littorals has much in common with that conducted on the open ocean. Yet considerable differences also exist, because littorals present a complex, dynamic, and cluttered environment. The littoral areas are characterized by the presence of the enemy’s and friendly forces, and neutrals. War in a typical narrow sea, such as the Baltic or the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, will differ greatly from that on the open ocean because of the smallness of the maneuvering space and the proximity of the continental landmass. In many narrow seas, highly indented coasts are often endowed with numerous islands and islets that restrict the maneuverability of one’s major surface combatants and submarines. Narrow seas also often have numerous shoals, reefs, strong tides, and currents that make safe navigation very difficult. Given the high mobility of naval forces and the long range and lethality of modern weapons, both sides in a conflict will conduct naval combat at high intensity. The littoral environment is highly complex. One’s naval forces must operate in a diverse and highly variable environment above, below the water’s surface, and over the land. The many hiding places make the enemy’s ships difficult to detect. In many narrow seas, it is difficult to differentiate between friend and foe because of the large number of commercial vessels and craft of all kinds. The spectrum of threats is broad and diverse. The threat is especially acute within and in the proximity of the world’s international straits, such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Some of the enclosed and semienclosed seas, such as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, offer weaker opponents the ability to seriously challenge control by blue-water navies such as the U.S. Navy. Asymmetric threats can reduce or block a blue-water navy’s access to key areas for exercising control at sea and projecting power in the littorals. The primary antiaccess capabilities in the littorals derive from land-based fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters; quiet, conventionally powered submarines; small surface combatants armed with torpedoes, guns, antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs); mines; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); coastal missile/gun batteries; and tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs). In addition, small stealthy surface craft armed with low-technology small-caliber guns, short-range rockets, or even suicide boats can threaten not only one’s commercial shipping but in some cases even larger surface combatants. One of the main features of naval combat in a typical narrow sea will be frequent and drastic change in the tactical and operational situation. The extensive use of electronic warfare can make the use of one’s sensors and guided weapons

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very difficult, if not impossible. Because of the extended range of modern weapons, high maneuverability, large radius of action, and endurance of naval platforms, combat actions in a typical narrow sea will often encompass a large sea and coastal area. Air power in a typical narrow sea will have a decisive influence on the outcome of war at sea. A high degree of combat readiness and maneuverability enables aircraft to concentrate their strikes against enemy naval vessels and merchant shipping. Cooperation between aircraft and one’s naval forces is most effective in the proximity of the coast. The ever-present threat from the air will greatly complicate the problems of survivability of one’s large surface combatants and merchant vessels. The littorals also require the closest cooperation among the services. In many cases, a blue-water navy will require the active participation of the allied or coalition navies. This poses some challenges because of considerable interoperability problems in the employment of multinational naval forces. The challenge is to field a network-centric system that can work with friendly ground forces and air forces. Another growing problem is data linkage among multinational forces.3 The employment of network-centric warfare (NCW)-capable ships, aircraft, and submarines is potentially more rewarding in the waters off a relatively open continental landmass, such as the coast of Africa, or in the Indian Ocean. Because of the generally small size of the enclosed or semienclosed seas and the correspondingly short distances, one’s naval forces are relatively concentrated rather than dispersed. This facilitates their protection, because single units or forces are operating within mutually supporting distances. At the same time, the weaker side has less difficulty in detecting, tracking, and subsequently conducting air or missile strikes against a stronger force. Hence, dispersing one’s surface forces may in fact make them more, not less, vulnerable to the enemy’s attack, especially from the air and by coastal missile batteries. The weaker opponent may not operate in the way one thinks he would, and he may use asymmetric responses to neutralize or even nullify the advantages normally enjoyed by a stronger navy. Ironically, it might happen that the weaker side at sea could obtain greater benefits by using rudimentary NCW capabilities to link its seagoing and shore-based forces and obtain a real- or near-real-time picture of the situation in the initial phase of the hostilities. Obviously, not all smaller navies could establish such network-based defenses as the Royal Swedish Navy. Perhaps the single greatest benefit of netting of one’s naval forces is having a shared tactical and operational picture of the situation in a large part of the maritime theater. Netting one’s forces can significantly enhance the effectiveness of antisurface warfare (ASUW) and amphibious warfare in the littorals. However, NCW appears to favor those warfare areas that inherently demand highly centralized command and control (C2). This primarily pertains to antiair defense (AAD), ballistic missile defense (BMD), defensive mining, defensive mine countermeasures (MCM), and defense of one’s coast. Also, netting forces could be very effective in obtaining a continuous, commonly shared picture of the tac-

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tical and operational situation when conducting an attack on the enemy’s maritime trade and in the defense and protection of friendly maritime trade. The Gulf War of 1990–1991 illustrated significant benefits from netting diverse and geographically dispersed maritime forces conducting maritime interception operations. Netting diverse forces can be of the greatest benefit in conducting antisubmarine warfare (ASW), specifically in conducting forward-area, openocean, and littoral operations.4 The most challenging ASW is in the littorals, due to the smallness of the sea area and the prevailing difficult oceanographic and weather conditions. Many naval theoreticians contend that emerging technologies will drastically change the nature of war at sea. Supposedly, one’s forces will be able to identify virtually everything of importance, in real time, in any kind of weather, at any time. The experience shows, however, that new technological advances changed the methods of one’s combat force employment but not the very essence of war. The advent of neither of steam propulsion, combustion engine, electric telegraph, undersea cable, mines, torpedoes, wireless radio, submarine, aircraft, nor missile changed the essential nature of war at sea. What did change is the character of war at sea and methods of combat employment of one’s naval forces. The future will not be that much different in that respect than it was the past. In fact, the advent of any radically new naval technological development in the past led many observers to believe that it would make all the then existing technologies essentially obsolete. And in each instance, whether it was the introduction of some new naval platform or weapon system, the changes in the conduct of war were far less than the weapon’s proponents had predicted. Experience shows that naval developments are largely evolutionary rather than revolutionary. In the past, major increases in capabilities usually came through the integration of several known and often rather mundane inventions. The extent of these new capabilities was rarely reflected in obvious physical changes. For instance, the advent of the Dreadnought battleship in 1906 was the result not of any particularly new technology, but of a successful integration of the then-existing technologies. In contrast to other battleships, the Dreadnought obtained greater combat power by mounting uniform 12-inch guns as the main armament, combined with a state-of-the-art fire control system; heavier armor with better protection against gunfire, torpedoes, and mines; and greatly improved watertight integrity. This first all-big-gun ship was also the first battleship fitted with steam turbines, providing a top speed of 21 knots and longer endurance. The existence and increasing importance of the fourth dimension – cyberspace – will further blur the boundaries of the theater. Some critical elements of one’s sources of power that rely on computer networks will be physically located many hundreds or thousands of kilometers away, whether in outer space or on the ground. This, in turn, will make it exceedingly difficult for naval operational commanders to ensure proper sequencing and synchronization of these functions in support of maritime campaigns and major naval operations. In the future, the factor of time will be further compressed. Naval combat

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actions and decision cycles will be much shorter than they are today.5 Changes in the dimensions of space and time will considerably increase the tempo of events at sea.6 Tomorrow’s blue-water navies will be probably smaller, but would comprise multiple purpose ships with greater combat power than they are today. A trend toward increased volume and precision of fire will continue, with the introduction of high-energy weapons, electromagnetic rail-gun technology, superconductivity, and yet-to-be-identified technologies.7 The leading proponents of NCW assert that new technology will allow a shift from the massing of forces to one based upon a massing of effects. Sensors and shooters can now be in a position to engage many different targets without having to maneuver.8 They will be geographically dispersed over large parts of the maritime theater. They will maneuver more quickly and communicate over long distances.9 Supposedly, effectiveness of one’s naval forces will depend not on numbers but on quality. Hence, in the future, the factor of force must be increasingly evaluated on qualitative factors.10 NCW enthusiasts also assert that traditional platform-centric warfare generates only ‘combat power,’ while network-centric warfare generates ‘increased power.’11 In their view, power in the information era comes from information, access, and speed, while in the industrial era it came from mass.12 However, the gain in one’s combat potential/power due to the new information technologies is very hard to measure with any degree of confidence. The traditional elements of combat potential/power with the exception of the human element are physical or tangible. Hence, firepower and mobility are relatively easy to quantify and properly evaluate than are such elements as accuracy and reliability or relevancy of information. In a networked force, one’s gains in combat potential/power can be considerably reduced and even nullified by excessive centralization of C2, micromanagements by the higher commanders, and the reliance on the directive orders. Also, poorly educated forces and incompetent commanders and staffs can considerably reduce combat potential/power of one’s naval forces regardless of how advanced are one’s information technologies. The belief of the leading NCW advocates that in naval warfare advanced information technologies can be a substitute for the numbers of naval platforms is based on sheer ignorance and the lessons of naval history. Above all, it is based on misplaced confidence in the powers of technology.13 Among other things, the geographic positions and the distances had in the past and will continue to have in the future a significant role in conduct of naval warfare. A ship or submarine no matter how powerful cannot be in two places at once. A bluewater navy such as the U.S. Navy must project power many thousands of miles away from its home bases in the continental United States (CONUS). For example, the sea distance from San Diego, California, to Manila is about 6,600 nautical miles. The distance from Norfolk, VA, to Dakar, Senegal, is 3,400 nautical miles, and to Cape Town, South Africa, 6,800 nautical miles, respectively. The distance between the Cape of Good Hope and the Strait of Hormuz is more than 4,600 nautical miles. The true measurement of one’s naval forces is the available combat potential

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that can eventually be employed to obtain and maintain sea control in a selected part of the world’s oceans. Also, the forces’ size and mix must ensure that one’s naval forces are capable of actually accomplishing their numerous and diverse tasks in both peacetime and time of crisis and conflict or war. All this, in turn, requires that one’s naval forces must have not only high combat potential/power but also must have large number of ships; otherwise, they will be unable to successfully carry out diverse tasks across the entire spectrum of conflict at sea. The enormous advances in information technology in recent years have elevated information as a common link among the factors of space, time, and force. Some military theoreticians and practitioners go even further and claim that information has emerged as a fourth factor in addition to the three traditional operational factors.14 Information will increasingly affect each of these factors, both individually and in combination. Information should be fully considered by commanders at all levels.15 In fact, it can be plausibly argued that information today is an integral part of one’s combat potential/combat power and hence a part of the factor of force. In the future, the importance of information will increase exponentially. Information will have a new quality and will significantly change the traditional factors of space, time, and force. Although it will not have the same quality as these three factors, its influence could be decisive for the success of a military effort at any level. Therefore, information should be fully considered by commanders at all levels of command.16 Yet information is essentially useless unless it contributes to sound decision-making in combat.17 The new information technologies will have the capability to absorb, evaluate, use, transmit, and exchange large volumes of information at high speeds to multiple recipients. Many information warfare advocates believe that the information age will make the factor of distance less relevant, because information and the resulting decisions can travel almost instantaneously to the place where they are needed. Yet this is only partially true. Distances and geography in a maritime domain still matter greatly in the employment of one’s naval forces. The forces of a blue-water navy such as the U.S. Navy have to traverse thousands of miles from their home bases to their forward operating areas close to the shores of potential opponents. The information warfare advocates assert that the rapid development of technology has considerably increased the critical roles of the factors of time and information. The side that wins the struggle for time and has the information dominance will be in a position to surprise the enemy and obtain the initiative. Supposedly, information dominance will ensure an advantage in terms of time and achieving freedom of action.18 New information technologies allow a significant and, in some cases, drastic reduction in the time required to plan, prepare, and execute military actions. The emphasis on obtaining a complete picture of the situation is not realistic. Such a picture is not only difficult but in most cases impossible to achieve. Impressing a naval operational commander with the need to have information dominance would most likely breed caution and, at worst, unwillingness to take

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high but prudent risks. One of the distinguishing traits of the successful commander is the ability to act quickly on incomplete knowledge of the situation and, in the process, be willing to take some high but prudent risks. This is especially the case at the operational and higher levels, where one’s commanders are forced to make assumptions about not only the current situation but also trends several weeks or even months ahead. The naval operational commander will rarely have the luxury of waiting for perfect knowledge of the situation, but will be forced to seize fleeting opportunities – or the enemy will force his hand. It is also apparently forgotten that information superiority is relative, not absolute. What one commander might consider less than full knowledge, his opponent might consider more than sufficient to take action. Netting of one’s naval forces could also drastically increase the effectiveness of the theaterwide or operational functions. Among other things, it can significantly facilitate command and control by dispersing various elements of a higher headquarters; they do not need to be collocated. Proponents of information warfare believe that the compression of the factors of space and time has eliminated the clear separations among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.19 However, the levels of war exist because the accomplishment of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives requires different methods in the employment of one’s combat forces. As long as distinctions among these objectives are not blurred or erased, corresponding levels of war will exist as well. The ever-longer range, precision, and lethality of weapons, the new information technologies, and so on, will bring great changes in the scope of actions conducted at a given level of war at sea. These and similar developments will erode the current boundaries between the levels of war at sea. The upper boundaries of the tactical level will be expanded in the future, encompassing a relatively large part of what is today considered the operational level, while the lower part of the military or theater-strategic level will encompass part of what is today the operational level. The national-strategic level’s lower end will include part of what is today the theater-strategic level. Technological advances will probably have the greatest effect on the methods of combat employment of one’s naval forces. In a high-intensity conflict, longerrange, more lethal, and highly precise weapons will further enhance the importance of strikes, which will most likely replace naval battles or engagements as the principal methods of force employment to accomplish major tactical and even operational objectives at sea. Netting will allow one’s forces to carry out a series of massive strikes by geographically widely dispersed platforms against targets many hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Major naval operations in the littorals will be normally conducted by multiservice and multinational forces. The information age has also transformed the content of combat potential. Computer networks and their associated sensors and communications links will emerge, as potential centers of gravity at all levels of war. For highly sophisticated naval forces, the sources of power have shifted from what is considered the inner core (firepower, mobility, leadership) of one’s combat potential to the outer core (integration, protection, and support). Expressed differently, the

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integrative element of one’s combat potential – of which command, control, communications, and computers (C4) is the most critical part – has evolved as one of perhaps the most important of one’s critical strengths. In the future, one’s center of gravity could become the single greatest source of both critical strength and critical vulnerability. Unlike traditional centers of gravity, computer networks do not possess the ability to physically destroy or neutralize the enemy’s corresponding center of gravity. The protection of one’s computer networks will be a very difficult problem to resolve satisfactorily. Among other things, unless well protected, the links connecting netted forces could be open to devastating physical or electronic attack. As in the past, traditional maritime operational functions will remain indispensable in ensuring the success of maritime campaigns and major naval operations. The new technological advances will significantly influence the way military forces are organized for combat. Operational command echelons will be the most critical link for planning, preparing, executing, and sustaining major naval operations and maritime campaigns. At the same time, technological dependence on modern C2 and information systems also creates vulnerabilities and sources of disruption. The new technological advances will substantially increase one’s ability to obtain accurate, timely, and perhaps relevant intelligence regarding the enemy’s physical capabilities – both military and nonmilitary. However, one’s ability to know, with any degree of certainty, the enemy’s intentions or actions will not be improved any time soon. In the past, increases in the volume of information led to further decentralization of intelligence, because the lower command echelons did not have either the resources or the time to digest the vast volume of information necessary for the commander to make decisions. The problem of accurately evaluating intangible factors of the enemy’s situation, such as the will to fight, soundness of doctrine, operational leadership qualities, combat motivation, unit cohesion, and morale and discipline, is not likely to be resolved, regardless of technological advances. Computers, no matter how capable, will not be able to resolve all the uncertainties in the actions and interactions of either side in a conflict. In the future, the need to have accurate, timely, and relevant human intelligence (HUMINT) will be significantly increased. The role and importance of C2W in support of a maritime campaign and major naval operation will be significantly enhanced in the future war at sea. The physical destruction component of C2W will probably remain the most critical for success, especially in the initial phase of the operation. In the future, the greatly increased range, lethality, and precision of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft will allow naval operational commanders to plan and more effectively use fires in shaping the battlefield/battlespace. Tomorrow’s naval operational commanders will have a greater number of options in planning and conducting tactical and operational fires. Maritime operational logistical support and sustainment will be more complicated because forces will be so widely dispersed. The real- or near-real-time

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knowledge of the status of all aspects of logistics in the theater will greatly facilitate the planning and execution of logistics support and sustainment. Operational protection will require steadily greater resources because of the need to protect not only military forces and facilities in a given theater, but also the civilian population. One of the increasingly difficult problems will be protection of information, because the range of capabilities available to hostile states and groups, or even individuals, is bound to increase in the future. This problem will be quite complex and complicated, because the operational commander will find it extremely difficult to protect elements of information systems located at great distances from his theater. The new information technologies could potentially increase the effectiveness of operational planning considerably. Staffs can be much smaller than they are today and still be more effective. Various staff sections could be geographically dispersed and thereby less vulnerable to enemy attack. Staff elements need not be collocated, so they would have a smaller footprint. The time gained can be used for more compressive planning. Some theoreticians assert that information technologies will result in greatly reduced staff size while eliminating much of the noise and human errors. However, staff size needs to be increased, not reduced, if intermediate levels of command are abolished as information warfare enthusiasts predict. During the planning and execution of the operation, the selection of forces and assets should be evaluated, not only in terms of their military suitability and purposefulness, but also in terms of the possible political consequences. Sometimes a tactical success accomplished with unsuitable forces in a sensitive area or at a wrong time can endanger or even doom an entire major operation.20 The C2 process in littoral warfare is more challenging than in war on the open ocean. Because of the small size of the area and the high intensity of action on both sides, changes in the tactical and operational situation are rather sudden and drastic. This implies that C2 should be highly decentralized, giving maximum freedom of action to subordinate tactical force commanders and individual ship commanders. NCW enthusiasts assert that the new information technologies will further compress and greatly speed up the decision cycles for commanders at all levels. This, in turn, will significantly accelerate the tempo of fighting, requiring more decentralized decision-making. In U.S. practice, however, the trend is clearly toward ever-greater centralization of C2. The theater-strategic commanders and their component commanders all too often make purely tactical decisions and, in the process, unnecessarily interfere with or bypass the subordinate tactical commanders. The result is that the tactical commanders manage information flow while the higher operational level of command is involved in excessive detail.21 If not properly and timely resolved, the problem of excessive centralization of C2 might prove the weakness of the entire NCW concept. This problem can in fact largely nullify any possible gain that shared awareness brings to one’s combat power. NCW can reach its full potential only if the tenets of centralized command and decentralized execution are firmly adhered to. The main factor for success

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will be the commander’s freedom to act through exercising the largest possible degree of local initiative. Decentralized C2 is best exercised through the issuance of German-style mission-command style orders (Auftragstaktik). The higher commanders should use the new information technologies to intervene in the actions of subordinates when and only if their mission is in danger of not being accomplished. Centralized C2 is also necessary in a crisis or post-conflict or stabilization phase, and in peace operations when the errors of subordinates simply cannot be allowed, either because they might lead to unwanted escalation or because they might have highly adverse political consequences. However, in combat, higher commanders should not interfere with or, even worse, bypass their subordinates. Otherwise, the morale and motivation of the subordinates are bound to suffer, resulting in the subordinates’ unwillingness or inability to take the initiative. Another serious problem that may defy solution is the ever-growing collection of all kinds of information that cannot be either processed or transmitted in a timely manner. This information overload can result when there is too much information for the commander and his staff to timely process and put into the proper context. It can also result when technical systems cannot timely and quickly transmit relevant information to users. Among other things, one’s commanders can be overwhelmed by a vast flow of information, especially if they are not properly trained.22 The greatest challenge that needs to be resolved is not to overwhelm the user with vast volumes of raw data and unprocessed information. The most difficult problem is sorting out relevant from unimportant information.23 The situation is even more serious if networks are used primarily to pass data instead of processing it into information. In that case, the sheer amount of data that the diverse sources collect and transmit to users will most likely overwhelm the processing capability of lower command echelons. The network-centric environment has a number of technical and human limitations that have the potential to significantly and adversely affect the employment of one’s naval forces in combat. The entire NCW concept is based on the collection, processing, and dissemination of vast volumes of information. Hence, its success is predicated on having an extremely complex network of interoperable subnets and systems working well. Reliance on network information could slow one’s tempo, because incoming traffic can considerably slow down decision-making. Information overload could also slow the tempo, by overwhelming processing capabilities. Radio frequency (RF) bandwidth is another limiting factor today that can considerably reduce the rate of information transmission. This problem is easier to resolve than that of the limitations of the human brain. Among other things, limitations in bandwidth can be solved by using powerful space-based lasers and terrestrial fiber-optics communications. An increase in situational awareness is limited by the human ability to process data. A human brain can be overwhelmed by the amount of information received.24 As technological advances proceed at an extremely rapid pace, a vast amount of information will be generated within an ever-decreasing time window. So far, the human decision-making cycle has not kept up with advances

230

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in technology. The human factor can, in fact, become the weakest link in the decision-making process. This problem can possibly be resolved if appropriate and timely actions are taken to adopt advanced techniques in processing and displaying information to be assimilated by the commander and his staff. Otherwise, technology will increasingly become a problem, not a solution. As a result, the new information technologies can actually increase, not reduce, the fog of war and friction.25 The naval operational commanders and planners will operate in an increasingly diverse and complex environment; the commander’s freedom to act (and hence his ability to exercise the initiative) will be reduced because of everexpanding political, legal, and environmental limitations. The increased scope of the theater will make it more important than ever to make sound operational decisions. The effect of the operational commander’s decision will be felt almost immediately over large parts of the theater. In the future, the greatest challenge for operational commanders will be to make sound decisions quickly. Subordinate tactical commanders will have even less time to make quick decisions based on the higher commander’s intent. Modern C4 means do not make mission command obsolete; just the opposite. The enormous increase in the volume of information makes it necessary, not to centralize, but to further decentralize command and control throughout the chain of command. Successful operational leadership will continue to depend on freedom of action, the moral courage to make decisions, and command and control through mission-command style orders. In the future, shaping the theater in preparation for a maritime campaign or major naval operation could become the naval operational commander’s most important task. Decision cycles for naval commanders at all levels will be further compressed and greatly sped up. This, in turn, will significantly accelerate the tempo of fighting and will require more decentralized decision-making. However, highly integrative technologies and information gathering may create a false belief that centralized decision-making will result in greater effectiveness. Such a trend needs to be avoided, because highly centralized C2 unnecessarily restricts the freedom of action of subordinate naval tactical commanders. An increase in information volume has historically been best resolved through decentralized, not centralized, command and control. In the future, the greatest challenge for naval operational commanders will be to make sound decisions quickly. Subordinate naval tactical commanders will have even less time to make quick decisions based on the higher commander’s intent. Decisions will be made using ambiguous or even completely false information. The arguments of information warfare enthusiasts that technology will allow precision attacks with near-perfect clarity of information do not rest on either scientific or historical foundations. In the future, the space–time relationship will be further compressed. Thus, operational warfare will encompass larger areas of what today constitutes the tactical level of war; and the importance of logistical support and sustainment will be further increased. The reduced size of maritime forces and armed forces

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as a whole, increasing political constraints, and the pressure of public opinion will dictate avoidance of protracted conflicts and great losses. Only by skillful application of tenets of operational warfare will it be possible to avoid attritional warfare at the operational and strategic levels. It can be avoided only by using overwhelming force decisively and quickly. The principal prerequisite for the effective conduct of operational warfare will remain the mastery of tactics. Finally, a broad or operational perspective and the ability to calculate and balance the factors of space, time, and force will remain the keys to success in planning and conducting maritime campaigns and major naval operations. One’s predictions about the true character of the future war at sea can be only tentative. No one has a magic lamp that can illuminate accurately how current and the emerging technologies and tactical and operational concepts will affect naval warfare as whole and its individual aspects. The trend over the past two decades was clearly in shifting the focus from the open ocean to operations in the littorals. The blue-water navies are becoming smaller but more capable in terms of their ability to operate further from their home bases and project power far into the interior of the littorals. The new and yet not known technological advances will considerably enhance the blue-water navies’ capabilities in all fundamental warfare areas. At the same time, the new technologies will allow the weaker side in the littorals much greater antiaccess capabilities than in the past. The blue-water navies will not find it easier, but more difficult to operate successfully in some parts of the littorals because of the ever-increasing threats posed by the enemy quiet submarines, antiship cruise missiles, and mines.

Notes

1 Introduction 1 Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1–0, Marine Corps Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), Appendix F: Glossary, p. 13. 2 Luvaas (1986), p. 34. 3 Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, “Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraeften” (October 1993); Arbeitspapier, “Operative Fuehrung” (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p. 1. 4 Stephen E. Runnels, “A Different Approach,” Military Review 10 (October 1987), p. 47. 5 A Guide to U.S. Navy Command, Control, and Communications, Santa Fe Corporation, 1 July 1979, p. 11. 6 St. John (1971), p. 74. 7 Feil (1989), p. 11. 8 St. John (1971), p. 74. 9 Feil (1989), p. 11. 10 Staff Presentation (1938), p. 17. 11 Potter and Nimitz (1986), p. 433. 12 Agnew (1979), p. 53. 13 Ibid., p. 56; Schuster (1993), pp. 56–57; Kugler (1989), p. 35. 14 Terraine (1989), pp. 119, 141–142. 15 Potter and Nimitz (1986), p. 451. 16 Bowling (1980), pp. 308–310. 17 Ibid., pp. 310–311. 18 Dieter Haag, Kriegserfahrung und Kriesgvorbereitung. Zur Bedeutung der Kriegserfahrung des Ersten Weltkrieges bei der Entwicklung von Technik, Operationsplanung und Erziehung der Reichsmarine bis zum Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, October 1985), p. 24. 19 Wolf-Dietrich Kriesel, Weltkriegserfahrung und Kriegsvorbereitung: Die militaerischen Lehren des 1. Weltkrieges und deren Umsetzung bei der Vorbereitung des 2. Weltkrieges (Hamburg:Fuehrunbgsakademic der Bundeswehr, October 1983), pp. 11–12. 20 Holger Herwig, “Innovation Ignored: The Submarine Problem; Germany, Britain, and the United States, 1919–1939,” in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, ed., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 243–244. 21 Bowling (1980), p. 256. 22 Grove (1997), pp. 3–5. 23 Roskill (1962), p. 152.

Notes 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

233

Bowling (1980), p. 326. Grove (1997, pp. 3–5. Evans and Peattie (1997), pp. 110, 434–435, 437–438. MacGregor (1992), p. 605. Bowling (1980), p. 326. Herwig (1998), p. 255. MacGregor (1992), p. 603. Herwig (1998), pp. 255–256. The manual was written by a group of instructors of the Naval Academy led by Captain 1st Rank S. Stavitskiy. The final version of the manual was written by a commission headed by Captain 1st Rank I.S. Isakov. Gakkel (1976), p. 15; Basov (1980), pp. 50–52. Scott MacDonald, “Flattops in the War Games,” Naval Aviation News 8 (August 1962), pp. 35–38. MacGregor (1992), pp. 608, 610. Russell (1955), pp. 20–21. Allan R. Millet, “Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars; The American, British, and Japanese Experiences,” Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 75. Herwig (1998), p. 234. Doenitz (1990), pp. 21, 32. Herwig (1998), p. 239. Evans and Peattie (1997), p. 341. Ibid., pp. 430–431, 429. David Jablonsky, “Strategy and the Operational Level of War,” The Operational Art of Warfare Across the Spectrum of Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1987), p. 14. Arbeitspapier, “Operative Fuehrung” (1992), pp. 17–18. Evans and Peattie (1997), p. 515. Handel (2001), p. 355. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–1945 (1990), p. 201. Eccles (1965), p. 5.

2 The objectives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Staff Presentation (1938), p. 21. Ibid., pp. 22–23. Till (1984), p. 116. Lambi (1984), p. 422. M.G. Cook, “Naval Strategy,” 2 March 1931, Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field, VA, 1930–1931, Strategic Plans Division Records, Series, Box 003, Naval Operational Archives, Washington, DC, p. 9. Meister (1958), p. 11. Marde (1965), p. 330. Pack (1971), p. 181; Salewski (1970), pp. 228, 341. Cordesman (1987), p. 102. Cook, “Naval Strategy,” p. 8. Marder (1965), p. 45. Salewski (1970), pp. 366–367. Otto Groos, Seekriegslehren Im Lichte Des Weltkrieges. Ein Buch fuer den Seemann, Soldaten und Staatsmann (Berlin: Verlag von E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1929), p. 43. Poeschel (May 1982), p. 41. Ibid., p. 41.

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Notes

16 Herbert Rosinski Command of the Sea (Newport, RI: Naval War College) p. 6. Reprinted from Brassey’s Naval Annual 1939. 17 Feil (1989), pp. 44–45. 18 Poeschel (May 1982), p. 41. 19 Ibid., pp. 41, 45. 20 Corbett (1918), p. 77. 21 Poeschel (May 1982), p. 42. 22 Staff Presentation (1938), pp. 8, 4–5. 23 Poeschel (May 1982), p. 42. 24 Poeschel (1978), p. 62. 25 Poeschel (May 1982), p. 43. 26 Poeschel (1978), pp. 12–13, 29. 27 Mahan (1911), p. 59. 28 Poeschel (1978), p. 32. 29 Ibid., pp. 33–34. 30 Ibid., p. 80. 31 Ibid., p. 30. 32 Poeschel (May 1982), p. 41. 33 Corbett (1918), pp. 90–91. 34 Guenther Poeschel, “Ueber die Seeherrschaft (II),” Militaerwesen (East Berlin) 6 (June 1982), p. 72. 35 Staff Presentation (1938, pp. 7–8. 36 Sprout and Sprout (1939), pp. 351–352. 37 Corbett (1918), p. 90. 38 Cannon (1954), pp. 101–102; USSBS Interrogation No. 506, Major General Toshio Nishimura, Lieutenant Colonel Matsumae, Commander Otani, Tonosuke, Folder G-44, Box 9, Record Group 23, World War II, Battle Evaluation Group, 1946–1956, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI, pp. 6, 2, 8; Charles R. Anderson, Leyte (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, CMH Pub 72–27, 1994) p. 30; Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s Ultra. Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942–1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991), p. 178. 39 Salewski (1970), p. 336. 40 Corbett (1918), p. 91. 41 “MCM in the Gulf – More Information Comes to Light,” NAVINT, The International Naval Newsletter (London) 3, no. 8 (26 April 1991), p. 1. 42 Poeschel (June 1982), pp. 71–72. 43 Staff Presentation (1943), p. 4. 44 Corbett (1918), p. 91. 45 Poeschel (June 1982), p. 71. 46 Simpson (1977), p. xix. 47 Roskill (1961), p. 137. 48 Roskill (1954), p. 305. 49 Woodward (1966), p. 217. 50 Morison (1975), pp. 113–114. 51 R.K. Turner, “Background of Naval Strategy” (lecture delivered before the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, VA, 16 February 1938), p. 8. 52 Macintyre (1972), pp. 53–54. 53 Julian S. Corbett, Naval Operations: To the Battle of the Falklands, December 1914, Vol. 1, Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents (London: Longmans, Green, 1920), p. 96. 54 Zonja (1972), p. 33. 55 The Soviets laid the theoretical foundations of what they call a “favorable operational regime,” which roughly corresponds to basing/deployment area control; H. Metschke,

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235

“Die Aufrechterhaltung eines guenstigen operativen Regimes auf dem Seeschauplatz,” Militaerwesen (East Berlin) 7 (July 1988), p. 24. 56 Metschke 91988), p. 26. 57 Poeschel (June 1982), p. 74. 58 The most important is Article 42 which reads as follows: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. 59 60 61 62

Petrole (1991), pp. 6–8. Ibid., p. 8. Krauspe (1980), p. 13. From the Greek “zone” and Latin “zona”; originally meant the earth’s belt; later used in the military as combat zone or communications zone; Bernd Weber, “Operationsgebiet,” in J. Gerber, ed., Landkriegfuehrung: Operation-Taktik-Logistik-Mittel (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1992), pp. 545–546.

3 Methods 1 Feil (1989), p. 24. 2 Engelmann (1980), p. 69; Filonov (1977), p. 24. 3 The following naval battles were fought: Savo Island (9 August 1942), Eastern Solomons (24 August), Cape Esperance (11–12 October), Santa Cruz Islands (26–27 October), Guadalcanal (12–15 November), Tassafaronga (30 November), and Rennell Island (29–30 January 1943). The U.S. Navy suffered tactical defeats in the battles of Savo Island, but the Japanese were unable to reach Allied transports; it won a tactical victory in the battle of Eastern Solomons, although the Japanese managed to land 1,500 additional troops on Guadalcanal. The U.S. Navy won a tactical victory in the battle of Cape Esperance, but the Japanese succeeded in their main objective of bringing fresh troops on the island. In the battle of Santa Cruz, the U.S. Navy inflicted larger losses than did the enemy, but the Japanese accomplished their main objective. The U.S. Navy suffered greater losses in terms of the ships sunk in the three-day battle of Guadalcanal but achieved an operational success because the U.S. forces went from the defensive onto the offensive. In the battle of Tassafaronga, the U.S. Navy suffered a severe defeat at the hands of an inferior but excellently trained and skillfully led Japanese force; it also suffered a tactical defeat in the last surface in the struggle for Guadalcanal, off Rennell Island. Morison (1975), pp. 63–64, 107, 171, 286, 313–315, 363. 4 The Allies lost 24 warships with 126,240 tons (two aircraft carriers, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 14 destroyers). The Japanese lost 24 warships with 134,839 tons (two battleships, one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, 11 destroyers, and six submarines). Morison (1975), p. 372. 5 Bolfek (1978), p. 992. 6 Marolda and Schneller (1998), pp. 181–182. 7 Upotreba Strategijskih Grupacija (n.d.), p. 97. 8 Regner et al. (1981), pp. 4–5). 9 U.S. Navy Dept., Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003: Assured Access and Power Projection . . . from the Sea (Washington, DC: 2003), p. 48. 10 The term “maritime trade” is used instead of the more widely used “sea lines of communications” (SLOC), and the associated anti-SLOC and pro-SLOC, because it accurately describes the real purpose of such major naval operations – destruction, neutralization, or protection of all elements of maritime trade, not only the merchant

236

11 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31

32

Notes

ships at sea. SLOC, in contrast, implies abstractions – imaginary lines along which the shipping moves. Bolfek (1978), p. 991. Kolec (1985), pp. 755–756. Ibid., p. 757. Bolfek (1978), p. 993. Ibid., p. 986. Including 11 battleships, four large and four light aircraft carriers, four seaplane tenders, 18 heavy and eight light cruisers, 55 destroyers, 23 transports with 6,500 landing troops embarked, 13 tankers, 20 submarines, several smaller vessels, and about 250 carrier-based aircraft. Including three fleet carriers with about 250 embarked aircraft, four heavy cruisers, 15 destroyers, two oilers, and 19 submarines; Morison (1984b), p. 76. Rohwer and Huemmelchen (1992), p. 63. Muellenheim-Rechberg (1980), pp. 264–267. Bolfek (1977), pp. 765–766. Fioravanzo (1970), p. 203. Feil (1989), pp. 31–32. Regner (1981), p. 141. Tietze (1983), p. 48. Morison (1984a), p. 170. Tietze (1983), p. 48. Jablonsky (1974), p. 654. Albert Lord and Klaus Toppeser, “Rolle und Beitrag der Seestreitkraefte,” in Hartmut Zehrer. ed., Der Golfkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse und Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), p. 197. Arthur and Pokrant (1991), p. 86. About 5.000 Canadian troops, 1,075 British personnel, and 50 U.S. Rangers, organized in 13 groups landed on a ten-mile-wide front near the French port of Dieppe in the English Channel; “Dieppe Raid,” in Dear (1995), pp. 298–299; Rohwer and Huemmelchen (1992), p. 158. TF-16, under the command of Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, consisted of two aircraft carriers (Enterprise and Hornet), with their air complements, plus 16 Army Air Corps B-25 bombers, on board, as well as four cruisers, eight destroyers, and two oilers. Morison (1948), pp. 392–394, 398. Tietze (1983), p. 49.

4 Maritime operational functions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Burden (1986), p. 15. Morison (1948), p. 134. Burden (1986), p. 15. Barlow (1994), p. 76. Thomas A. Cardwell III, Command Structure for Theater Warfare: The Quest for Unity of Command (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1984), p. 18. Paul B. Stares, Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 63–64. Ibid., p. 61. Ibid., pp. 19–20. Ibid., p. 41. Allied Communications Arrangement, CINCPOA, COMSOWESPAC, COMTHIRDFLT, and COMSEVENTHFLT, Record Group 23, Special Projects Department, Naval Historical Collection Division, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI. Porter (1986), p. 5.

Notes 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

237

Stares (1981), pp. 36, 39. Prange (1982), p. 393. Isely and Crowl (1951), pp. 207–208, 211. Morison (1984c), pp. 151–152, 168. Cagle and Manson (1957), pp. 87, 105. Train et al. (1986), p. 63. Freedman (2006), pp. 70–72. Ibid., pp. 379–380. Porter (1986), pp. 8–9. Hurst (1996), p. 40. Ibid., p. vi. Leonard G. Tokar, U.S. Doctrine for Command and Control of Operational Fires (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 1996), pp. 8–9. Thomas A. Kolditz, Exploring the Conditions for Decisive Operational Fires (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1993), p. 3. Reece (1989), pp. 7, 10. Morison (1984d), p. 91. Crowl and Love (1989), p. 54. David M. Annen, Joint Interdiction: The Gray Area (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), p. 6. Craven and Cate (1949), pp. 435, 437. “Directive 17 April 1944, Supreme Commander to U.S.S.T.A.F. and Bomber Command for Support of Overlord during the Preparatory Period,” Sir Charles Webster, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939–1945, Vol. 4 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), pp. 167–168. William J. Rice, Operational Fires: What’s in a Name? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1990), p. 19. Gundelach (1959), p. 316. Rice (1990), p. 19. Madden (1990), pp. 15–16. Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 8, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1953), p., 133. Appleman et al. (1948), p. 44. Morison (1984b), pp. 92–93. Ibid., p. 94; Craven and Cate (1983), p. 355. Ibid., p. 350. Morison (1984b), p. 105. Appleman et al. (1948), pp. 44–45; Ministry of Defence (Navy) (1995b), p. 61. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 4, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan; August 1942 to July 1944 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 300–301. Ibid., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Pointblank (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 463, 474–475. Jerry D. Garrett, Strategic Airpower as Operational Fires: Integrating LongRange Bombers into Campaign Design (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1991), p. 18. Craven and Cate (1950), p. 303. Fontaine (1989/1990), pp. 21–22. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775–1953 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 523.

238 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Notes

Wheelock (1997), pp. 131–132. Moore (1990), p. 12. Regner (1981), p. 84. Fallon (1994), p. 33; McDowall (1993–1994), p. 82. Regner (1981), p. 69. Ibid., p. 91. Ibid., pp. 93–94.

5 Naval operational planning 1 Group of Authors, Methodik der Entschlussfassung durch den Fliegerkoammandeur (Dresden: Militaerakademie Friedrich Engels, November 1971) (translated from Russian Metodika prinyatiya resheniya aviatsonnym kommandirom, Moscow: Ministry of Defense, 1970), p. 21. 2 Maximilian Thomas, “Modelle zur Lagebeurteilung. Ihre Entwicklung und Weiterentwicklung,” Truppenpraxis 1 (January 1982), p. 8. 3 Jack D. Nicholas, George B. Pickett, and William O. Spears, The Joint and Combined Staff Officer’s Manual (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1st edn., February 1959), pp. 132–133. 4 U.S. Naval War College, Sound Military Decision (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1942), p. 140. 5 Eike Middeldorf, Handbuch der Taktik fuer Fuehrer und Unteroffizier (Berlin/Frankfurt: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1957), p. 64. 6 Ibid. 7 Thomas (1982), p. 8. 8 Middeldorf (1957), p. 57. 9 Helmuth Greiner and Joachim Degener, Taktik im Rahmen des verstaerkten Infanterie-Batallions (Berlin: Verlag, Offene Worte,“ 1937), p. 26. 10 Rainer Oestmann, Dazu Befehle Ich . . .! Handbuch fuer Militaerische Fuehrer (Regensburg/Bonn: Walhalla, 1998), p. 2,402. 11 Nicholas et al. (1959), p. 110. 12 U.S. Naval War College (1942), p. 88. 13 Norman M. Wade, The Battle Staff (Savannah, GA: Lightning Press, 2nd revd. edn., 2005), pp. 2–28. 14 Beuningen (1959), p. 525. 15 R.W. Glenn, “The Commander’s Intent: Keep It Short,” Military Review (August 1987), p. 51. 16 Anderson (1998), p. 47. 17 Glenn (1987), pp. 52–53. 18 Shattuck (2000), p. 67; Edward J. Filiberti Developing a Theory for Dynamic Campaign Planning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1988), p. 56. 19 Petrole (1991), p. 14; Anderson (1998), p. 47. 20 Anderson (1998), pp. 46–47. 21 Ibid., p. 47. 22 Ibid., p. 47. 23 Filiberti (1988), p. 55; Glenn (1987), pp. 52–53. 24 Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr (1993), p. 2. 25 Derik W. Crotts, “Operational Implications of Public Affairs – Factors, Functions, and Challenges of the Information Battlefield,” IOsphere (Winter 2006), p. 15. 26 Ibid., p. 13. 27 Savoia (1986), p. 5. 28 Engelmann (1980), p. 71. 29 Hurst (1996), pp. 22–23. 30 Ibid., pp. 20–21.

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6 Operational design 1 Miller (1989), pp. 16–17. 2 Miller (1990), p. 13. 3 Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 9, Siciliy-Salerno-Anzio: January 1943–June 1944 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1954, reprinted 1984), p. 346. 4 Allen (1988), p. 96. 6 Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraeften, (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p.2. 7 Singh (Winter 1995–1996), p. 56. 8 In the strict definition of the term, center of gravity is defined as “that point of an object around which its weight is evenly distributed or balanced; center of mass; point of equilibrium”; Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition (New York: World Publishing, 1960), p. 237. 9 Hastings and Jenkins (1983), p. 227. 10 Hermann Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften, vol. 1, Wehrpolitik und Kriegfuehrung (Berlin/Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1936), p. 206. 11 Ted O. Kostich, Operational Sustainment in an Immature Theater: Considerations for Planning and Sustaining a Campaign in a Mid- to High-intensity Conflict (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), p. 4. 12 Morison (1984d), p. 76. 13 Carter (1953), p. 249. 14 Morison (1984d), pp. 74–75. 7 The operational idea 1 Vanderbeek (1988), p. 39. 2 Center for Military History, U.S. Army, CMH Pub 104-5, Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1951, facsimile printing 1982, 1986), p. 8. 3 Desarzens (1988), p. 173; Derry (1952), p. 232. 4 John Ehrmann, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, August 1943–September 1944 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 450–451, pp. 11–12. 5 Heinl (1968), p. 49. 6 Cagle and Manson (1957), pp. 83–84. 7 Desarzens (1988), p. 173; Derry (1952), p. 232. 8 Richard Betts, “Strategic Surprise for War Termination: Inchon, Dienbienphu and Tet,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., Strategic Military Surprise Incentives and Opportunities (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983), p. 153. 9 Robertson (1958), pp. 52, 54–55, 175; Roskill (1956), p. 160. 10 Vitale (1995), p. 27. 11 Appleman (1991), p. 473; some sources cited put U.S. casualties at 65,631 killed or wounded, while the Japanese lost 70,000 men and an equal number of civilians; Scales (1999–2000), p. 8. 12 Vanderbeek (1988), pp. 34–35. 13 Wells (2001), p. 4. 14 Cagle and Manson (1957), p. 80. 15 Bates, et al. (1947), Appendix II, p. v. 16 Giles and Galvin (1996), p. 19. 17 Griswold (1986), p. 28; Giles and Galvin (1996), p. 19. 18 Potter and Nimitz (1986), p. 187; “The Naval War in the Pacific,” Interrogation of

240

19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Notes

Shigeru Fukudome, VADM, IJN, Interrogation NAV No. 115, 9–12 December 1945, USSBS (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, Vol. II, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 504. “SHO Operations and Taiwan Air Battle,” (excerpts from Admiral Soemu Toyoda, The End of the Imperial Navy Tokyo: April 1950), Folder G-14, Box 7, Record Group 23: World War II, Battle Evaluation Group (BEG), 1946–1959, Naval Historical Collection (NHC), U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, p. 8. Engelmann (1980), p. 69. Peter J. Palmer, Operational Main Effort and Campaign Planning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), pp. 9–10. Roskill (1956), pp. 94–95; Karl Doenitz, Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage (Bonn: Athenaeum-Verlag, 1958), pp. 195–197. Nott (1983), p. 121. Engelmann (1980), p. 69. Navoytsev (1986), p. 21. John W. Foss, “Command,” Military Review 5 (May 1990), p. 4; Palmer (1991), p. 8. Goldstein and Dillon (1993), p. 100. Dupuy et al. (1992), p. 15. Bernhardi (1913), pp. 361–362. Vojnopomorski Skolski Centar (1970), pp. 44–45. Michael Handel, “Intelligence and Deception,” Journal of Strategic Studies (March 1982), p. 126. Michael Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1989), pp. 314–316. “Operational Deception,” presentation at the Naval War College, Newport, 7 March 1947, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; “Deception Evaluation Report Number Two,” 30 April 1947, Command File, World War II, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, pp. 17–19. Cruickshank (1979), pp. 146–147. “Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),” presentation prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 August 1947, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder #2, p. 18. Cruickshank (1979, pp. 160, 165, 96, 158–160. Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Plan Bodyguard,” 20 January 1944, Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 531, pp. 7–8. Cruickshank 91979), pp. 125–127, 138–139. Sexton (1983), p. 112. Cover and Deception Report ETO, “Cover and Deception, Synopsis of History,” Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 549, p. 6. “Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),” p. 20. Sexton (1983), p. 112. “Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),” p. 21. Ibid., p. 24; Cover and Deception Report ETO, “Cover and Deception, Synopsis of History,” p. 8. Cover and Deception Report ETO, “Cover and Deception, Synopsis of History,” p. 8. “Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),” pp. 5–7. “Summary of Activities by the U.S. Navy Cover and Deception Organization in World War II,” 10 July 1946, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder #2, p. 11. “Military Cover and Deception (Strategic),” p. 9. Handel (1989), p. 314.

Notes

241

50 Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare (USM) (1970), p. 356. 51 Bates et al. (1953), p. 19; Morison (1984d), p. 61. 52 Japanese Naval Intelligence, October 1944,” p. 7; Richard W. Bates et al. The Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 1944: Strategical and Tactical Analysis, Vol. II, Operations from 0715 October 17th until October 20th (D-Day) (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1955), p. 72; Morison (1984d), p. 61. 53 Cruickshank (1979), p. 51. 54 Garland and Smyth (1970), p. 65. 55 Cruickshank (1979), pp. 51–52. 56 Commander in Chief Mediterranean, Memorandum “Operation Fracture,” 27 June 1943, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch, Box 543. 57 “Military Cover and Deception During World War II,” Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 531, pp. I-11 and I-12. 58 Garland and Smyth (1970), p. 60. 59 Cruikshank (1979), p. 65. 60 SHAEF, “Plan Fortitude South II, 19 July 1944,” Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 531, p. 13. 61 Cover and Deception Report ETO, “Cover and Deception, Synopsis of History,” p. 9. 62 Matloff (1973), pp. 206–207. 63 Miller (1989), pp. 16–17. 64 Johnson (1991), p. 4. 65 Dixon (1994), p. 5. 66 Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Campaign Plan Granite, 15 January 1944, Strategic Plans, Box 138, Naval Operational Archives, Navy Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 7. 67 Bates et al. (1947), p. 15. 68 Lundstrom (1976), pp. 98–99. 69 Dixon (1994), p. 34. 70 Crowl (1989), p. 15. 71 Samuel E. Morison The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1963), p. 422. 72 Cannon (1987), pp. 8–9. 73 Morison (1963), p. 423. 74 Filonov (1977), p. 25. 75 Hans-Martin Ottmer “Weseruebung.” Der deutsche Angriff auf Daenemark und Norwegen in April 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1994), pp. 37–41, 52–56, 79–84; Walter Hubatsch “Weseruebung.” Die deutscheBesetzung von Daenemark und Norwegen 1940. Nach amtlichen Unterlagen dargestellt mit einem Anhang: Dokumente zum Norwegenfeldzug 1940 (Goettingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 2nd revd. edn., 1960), pp. 42, 49. 76 Ministry of Defence (Navy) (1995a), pp. 135–136. 77 GHQ, SWPA, General Douglas MacArthur’s Historical Report on Allied Operations in Southwest Pacific Area, Vol. II, Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Areas, 8 December 1941 to 2 September 1945 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), Chs. 8–14, p. 340ff. 78 Bates et al. (1953), pp. 459–460. 79 William S. Pennypacker, Sequels: Thinking About the Future (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 7 May 1988), p. 34. 80 A sequel is anything that follows or is in continuation. It also refers to a result or consequence; William Morris, ed., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New York: American Heritage, 1973), p. 1,182.

242

Notes

81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

Pennypacker (1988), p. 4. Holder 1985), pp. 4–5. Vilovic (1976), p. 213. von Clausewitz (1952), p. 777. Taddonio (1986), p. 18. Duncan (1995), p. 4. Benjamin (1986), pp. 26–27. Filonov (1977), p. 24. Johnson (1991), pp. 7–9. Turner (1988), p. 22. Bullington (1986), p. 3. Garland and Smyth (1970), pp. 97–98. Craven and Cate (1983), p. 348; Sixth Army HQ, Sixth United States Army, Report of the Leyte Operation, 17 October 1944–25 December 1944 (28 November 1945), p. 17. 94 Cowan (1987), p. 24. 8 Preparations and execution 1 Manfred Arnold Der Durchfuehrung von Kampfhandlungen der Seestreitkraefte (Dresden: Friedrich Engels Military Academy, 1971), p. 23. 2 Goldstein and Dillon (1993), pp. 112–113. 3 Arnold (1971), p. 22. 4 Goldstein and Dillon (1993), p. 114. 5 Regner (1981), p. 33. 6 Morison (1948, reprinted 1982), p. 292. 7 Goldstein and Dillon (1993), p. 100. 8 Engelmann (1980), p. 70. 9 Feil (1989), p. 41. 10 Rohwer and Huemmelchen (1992), p. 104. 11 Regner (1981), pp. 131–132. 12 Miller (1989), pp. 16–17. 13 Hughes (1993), pp. 132–133. 14 Nelsen (1986), p. 10. 15 Ibid., p. 11. 16 Giles and Galvin (1996), p. 18. 17 Engelmann (1981), p. 70. 9 Operational leadership 1 Omar N. Bradley, “On Leadership,” in Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds., The Challenge of Military Leadership (London: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers; published under the auspices of the U.S. Army War College Foundation, 1989), p. 3. 2 Cited in Brian Howieson and Howard Kahn, “Leadership, Management and Command: The Officer’s Trinity,” in Peter W. Gray and Sebastian Cox, eds., Airpower Leadership: Theory and Practice (London: Stationery Office, 2002), p. 23. 3 Banisch (1987), p. 53. 4 Collins (1990), p. 37. 5 Banisch )1987), p. 60. 6 Ibid.; Walter Krueger, Command (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 12 September 1925), Naval War College Historical Collection, Record Group 4, Box 28, Folder 1165, p. 12. 7 Richard P. Harrison, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz: The Right Man for the Times

Notes

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

243

(Toronto: Canadian Forces College, Advanced Military Studies Course 2, December 1999), p. 7; Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2nd printing, 1988), p. 173. Carl von Clausewitz On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976; 8th printing, 1984), p. 107. Slim (1953), p. 148. Tuohy (2007), p. 169. Peter Padfield Doenitz. The Last Fuehrer. Portrait of a Nazi War Leader (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984), p. 268. Potter (1985), p. 33. Ibid., p. 33. Cited in Buell (1988), pp. xiii–xiv. Richard L. Connolly, “Exercise of Command,” Naval War College Review 11 (November 1955), p. 8. Edmund A. Gibson, “Leaders and Leadership,” Proceedings 3 (March 1954), p. 304. Clausewitz (1984), p. 102. Connolly (1955), p. 8. Cited in Stephen W. Roskill The Art of Leadership (London: Collins, 1964), p. 47. Zais (1985), p. 55. Potter (1985), p. 257. Zais (1985), p. 61. Tuohy (2007), p. 81. Slim (1953), p. 148. Connolly (1955), p. 7. Friedrich von Boetticher The Art of War: Principles of the German General Staff in the Light of Our Time, P-100, ZA/1 2019 May 1951, Studien der Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Branch, BA-MA, p. 12. Dail (1988), p. 31. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 22–103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 21 June 1987, p. 30. Zais (1985), p. 49. James Mrazek, The Art of Winning Wars (New York: Walter, 1968), p. 119. Black (1988), pp. 9–10. Elmer B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976, 7th printing 1987), p. 225. Black (1988), p. 10. Peter Padfield, Doenitz. The Last Fuehrer. Portrait of a Nazi War Leader (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 244. Cited in ibid., p. 227. Brinkley (1986), p. 5. Connolly (1955), p. 8. Tuohy (2007), p. 205. Nelsen (1986), pp. 18–19. Cited in Gary I. Barnes Great Warriors of World War II: Admiral Ernest J. King and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, March 1984), p. 7. Buell (1980), p. 199. Potter (1987), p. 228. Ibid., p. 119. Cited in Keith Bird Erich Raeder. Admiral of the Third Reich (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. 75–76. Vad (1998), p. 130. Roskill (1964), p. 98.

244 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

70 71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Notes

Chalmers (1959), p. 40. Todd (1994), p. 8. Slim (1953), p. 149. Banisch (1987), p. 50. Gardner (1987), p. 33. Ibid., p. 24. Blumenson (1993), p. 42. Rendulic (1967), p. 50. Rendulic (1967), p. 51. Nelsen (1986), pp. 7–8. General J.F.C. Fuller observed: “The common deficiency in command is . . . calling conferences in order to pick the brains of subordinates and lack of originality which often leads to doing something which the enemy expects in place of what he does not look for” (Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine, Army Code No. 71451, prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, 1989, p. 46). Porter B. Williamson, Patton’s Principles (Tucson, AR: Management and Systems Consultants, 1979), p. 116. von Rabenau (1935), p. 3. Donald E. Kirkland, Rommel’s Desert Campaigns, February 1941–September 1942: A Study in Operational Level Weakness (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 21 May 1986), p. 30. Woodward and Robinson (1992), pp. 156–158. Morison (1975), p. 31. Ibid., pp. 27–28, 63. Halsey (1952), pp. 490, 487. GHQ Operations Instructions, number 70, 21 September 1944, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, in Cannon (1987), p. 371. Operation Plan, CINCPOA No. 8–44, 27 September 1944; Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington Yard, Washington, DC, Box 33. Puleston (1939), pp. 297–298. Eike Middeldorf Fuehrung und Gefecht: Grundriss der Taktik (Frankfurt, a.M.: Bernard & Graefe, Verlag fuer Wehrwesen, 1968), p. 51. W. Hiller Vergleich und Bewertung der in der HDv 100/100 (TF/G) und in der Anweisung fuer Fuehrung und Einsatz 700/108 dargestellten Fuehrungsgrundsaetze (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 15 November 1985), p. 5; Stanger (1884), pp. 13–14. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 6. N. Hanisch Untersuchen Sie die operativen Ideen Manstein hinsdichtlich Schwerpunkt-bildung, Ueberraschung, Initiative und Handlungsfreiheit an den Beispielen Westfeldzug 1940 (Sichelschnitt-Plan) und Operation Zitadelle (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 15 January 1988), p. 2. Christian Leggemann Die taktisch/operativen Ideen Mansteins hinsichtlich Schwerpunktbildung, Ueberraschung, Initiative und Handlungsfreiheit (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 4 January 1989), p. 2. Stanger (1884), p. 17; Hanisch (1988), p. 3. Arbeitspapier (1992), p. 18. Middeldorf (1968), p. 51. Hanisch (1988), p. 3. Ibid., p. 29. RisCassi (1993), p. 23. Arbeitspapier (1992), p. 18.

Notes 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

245

Gardner (1987), p. 21. FM 22–103 (1987), p. 33. Daeniker (1944), pp. 30–31. Friedrich von Boetticher, “Feldherrnturm und Generalstab: Grundsaetze und Geist,” Wehrkunde 9 (September 1964), p. 455. von Boetticher (1951), p. 9. Ibid., p. 10. Arbeitspapier (1992), p. 17. Middeldorf (1968), p. 51. Hughes (1993), p. 219. Stanger (1884), p. 15. Ibid., p. 18. Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, eds., On the German Art of War: Truppenfuehrung (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 22. Middeldorf (1968), p. 52. Arbeitspapier (1992), p. 18. Vad (1998), p. 132. Arbeitspapier (1992), p. 18. Von Bernhardi (1914), p. 413.

10 Operational thinking 1 David Jablonsky, “Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I,” Parameters (Spring 1987), p. 71. 2 Operational thinking is not identical to what the information warfare advocates call “situational awareness” (SA) – a term used in training one’s pilots; in its strict definition, situational awareness refers to the degree of accuracy with which one’s perception of his current environment mirrors reality; situational awareness does not necessarily also mean an understanding; it is purely a tactical, not operational or strategic, term; the extensive use of the term situational awareness in the U.S. and other militaries is perhaps one of the best proofs of the predominance of a narrow tactical perspective among information warfare advocates. 3 Christian Leggemann Die taktisch/operativen Ideen Mansteins hinsichtlich Schwerpunktbildung, Ueberraschung, Initiative und Handlungsfreiheit (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 4 January 1989), p. 2. 4 RisCassi (1993), p. 24. 5 Blumenson and Stokesbury (1975), p. 3. 6 Jablonsky (1987), p. 72; Erich von Manstein Lost Victories (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 409. 7 Evans and Peattie (1997), p. 212. 8 Hermann Foertsch Auswahl, Erziehung und Ausbildung zum Generalstabsoffizier. Eine kritische Betrachtung der deutschen Verhaeltnisse vordem 2. Weltkrieg, MS # P-031b, ZA/1 1856, Studien der Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, BA-MA, p. 30; Wilhelm Speidel Der Weg zum Generalstab, Auswahl, Erziehung u. Ausbildung des deutschen Generalstabsoffiziere, P-031a/26 Teil II, ZA/1 1875, German General Staff, Project #6: Training and Development of German General Staff Officers, vol. XXVI, Part II, Foreign Military Studies, Historical Division, HQ US Army, Europe, BA-MA, p. 31. 9 L.D. Holder, “Educating and Training for Theater Warfare,” Military Review (September 1990), pp. 87, 89, 91. 10 Charles G. Sutten, “Command and Control at the Operational Level,” Parameters (Winter 1986), p. 19. 11 Liddell Hart (1954), pp. 23–24. 12 Richmond (1934), p. 279.

246

Notes

13 John McDonald General Walter Krueger: A Case Study in Operational Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 5 May 1989), p. 11. 14 B.H. Liddell Hart Why Don’t We Learn From History (London: Allen & Unwin, 1944), p. 7. 15 Richmond (1934), pp. 285, 288–289. 16 Paul M. Robinett, “History and the Military Profession,” Military Review (May 1954), p. 21. 17 Ebbe Gyllenstierna, “What Can the Study of the Art of War Teach Us?” Ny Militar Tidscrift, no. 2–3, 1956; translated by Military Review (August 1956), p. 104. 18 Robinett (1954), p. 22. 19 James A. Huston, “The Uses of History,” Military Review (June 1957), p. 27. 20 Ibid., p. 28. 21 Ibid., p. 27. 22 Robinett (1954), p. 22. 23 Gyllenstierna (1956), p. 105. 24 Ibid., p. 104. 25 Wallach (1986), p. 74. 26 Huston (1957), p. 26. 27 Max Kemmerich, “Gedanken ueber die eigene Kriegsgeschichtliche Weiterbildung der Offiziere nach Verlassen der Kriegsakademie,” May 1939, Freiburg, i.Br.; RH 16/v. 95, Bundesarchiv-Milituerarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg, i.Br., p. 7. 28 Wallach (1986), p. 74. 29 Holder (1990), p. 93. 30 Nelsen (1986), p. 9. 31 Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, Die Macht der Persoenlichkeit im Krieg. Studien nach Clausewitz (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1911), p. 82. 32 Scott MacDonald, “Flattops in the War Games,” Naval Aviation News 8 (August 1962a), pp. 30, 32–33. 33 Ibid., “Evolution of Aircraft Carriers: Last of the Fleet Problems,” Naval Aviation News 9 (September 1962b), pp. 34–35. 34 MacDonald (1962a), pp. 35–38. 35 Russell (1955), pp. 20–21. 36 Evans and Peattie (1997), pp. 430–431. 37 Ibid., p. 429. 38 Ibid., pp. 430–431. 39 Doenitz (1990), p. 32. 40 Ibid., pp. 21, 32. 41 Holger H. Herwig, “Innovation Ignored: The Submarine Problem; Germany, Britain and the United States, 1919–1939,” in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 239. 42 Evans and Peattie (1997) pp. 333, 347. 43 Hamilton (1991), p. 2; vision in general can be understood as one’s ability to perceive through mental acuteness or keen foresight something not actually visible; Gallagher (1998), p. 2. 44 Quirk (1986), p. 2. 45 Hamilton (1991), p. 3. 46 John E. Schlott Operational Vision: The Way Means Reach the End (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12 May 1992), p. 23; Hamilton (1991), p. 3. 47 Schlott (1992), p. 8. 48 Caraccilo and Pothin (2000), p. 5. 49 Tallant (1994), p. 8.

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247

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Cited in ibid., p. 10. Buell (1975), p. 200. Tuohy (2007), p. 249. Forrestel (1966), p. viii. Ibid., p. xiii. Ibid., p. 77. Warner (1967), p. 91. Ibid., p. 107. Ibid., p. 110. Potter (1985), pp. 249–250. John F. Shortal, Forged by Fire: General Robert L. Eichelberger and the Pacific War (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1st edn., 1987), pp. 104, 116, 136. 61 Ibid., p. 84. 62 Potter (1985), p. xii; Reynolds (1978), pp. 256–257. 63 Alexander (1962), p. 31. The future 1 Reinhard Herden, “Die neue Herausforderung (1). Die Wesen kuenftiger Konflikte,” Truppenpraxis/Wehrausbildung 2 (February 1996), p. 72. 2 Murphy (1993), pp. 3–4. 3 Friedman (2000–2001), p. 28. 4 Fitzgerald et al. (1998), p. 94. 5 Fredi Buentemeyer, “Information als entscheidende Dimension der Auseinandersetzung im 21. Jahr-hundert. Sicherheites- und militaerpolitische Auswirkungen moderner Informationstechnologies,” Soldat und Technik 9 (September 1996), p. 558. 6 Alberts et al. (1999), p. 21. 7 Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, “Land Warfare in the 21st Century,” Military Review 9 (September 1993), p. 23. 8 Alberts et al. (1999), pp. 90–91. 9 Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, “Land Warfare in the 21st Century,” Military Review 9 (September 1993), pp. 22–23. 10 Buentemeyer (1996), p. 558. 11 They claim that the reason for this is that, according to Metcalfe’s Law (named after Robert M. Metcalfe, the inventor of Ethernet), the power (value) of a network increases as the square of the number of nodes in the network (N2). 12 Paula R. Kaufman, ‘Sensors Emerge as More Crucial Weapons Than Shooters,’ IEEE Spectrum Online, 16 July 2003. 13 Jeremy J. Blackham and Gwyn Prins, ‘The Royal Navy at the Brink,’ R.U.S.I. Journal no. 2 (April 2007), p. 12. 14 Millotat (1996), p. 59. 15 Buentemeyer (1996), p. 558. 16 Ibid., pp. 555, 558. 17 Paul van Riper, “Information Superiority.” Statement before the Procurement Subcommittee and Research and Development Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee, 20 March 1997, p. 3. 18 Scherz and Hodouschek (1999), p. 751. 19 Alberts et al. (1999), pp. 70, 88. 20 Widder (2002), p. 10. 21 Ibid., p. 10. 22 “The Doctrine of Digital War,” Business Week, April 7, 2003, p. 37. 23 Forgues (2000), p. 6. 24 Ibid., p. 10. 25 Bérubé (2002), p. 5.

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Books Alberts, David S., Garstka, John J., and Stein, Frederick P. Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1999). Allen, William Lusk Anzio: Edge of Disaster (New York, NY: Elsevier-Dutton, 1978). Appleman, Roy, Burns, James M., Guegler, Russell A., and Stevens, John United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: Okinawa; The Last Battle (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1948, CMH Pub 5-11; reprinted 1991). Arps, Th., Gadow, R., Hesse, H., and Niedermayer, D. Ritter von Kleine Wehrgeographie des Weltmeeres (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1938). Basov, A.V. Flot v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne 1941–1945. Opyti operativnostrategicheskogo primeneniya (Moscow: Nauka, 1980). Bates Richard et al. The Battle of the Coral Sea: May 1 to May 11 Inclusive, 1942; Strategical and Tactical Analysis (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1947). Bates, Richard W. et al. The Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 1944: Strategical and Tactical Analysis, vol. 1, Preliminary Operations Until 0719 October 17th, 1944 Including Battle off Formosa (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1953). Bernhardi, Friedrich von On War Of To-Day, Vol. II: Combat and Conduct Of War translated by Karl Donat (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1914). Blumenson Martin and Stokesbury, James L. Masters of the Art of Command (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1975). Buell, Thomas B. Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston, MA/Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), p. 200. Burden, Raymond A. Falklands: The Air War (London, New York, NY: Arms and Armour Press, 1986). Cagle Malcolm W. and Manson, Frank A. The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957). Cannon, M. Hamlin Leyte: The Return to the Philippines; United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1954; reprinted 1987). Carter, Worrall Reed Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1953). Chalmers, W.S. Full Circle. The Biography of Admiral Sir Bertram Home Ramsey (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1959).

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Clausewitz, Carl von Vom Kriege, edited with comments by Dr. Werner Hahlweg (Bonn: Duemmlers Verlag, 16th edn., 1952). Corbett, Julian S. England in the Seven Year War: A Study in Combined Strategy, Vol. 1 (London: Longmans and Green,1918). Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans and Green, 1918). Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iran–Iraq War and Western Security 1984–87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options (London: Jane’s Publishing, 1987). Craven Wesley F. and Cate, James L. The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 2, Europe: Torch to Pointblank (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1949). Craven Wesley F. and Cate, James L. The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1944 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, reprinted 1983). Creswell, John Sea Warfare 1941–1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, rev. edn., 1967). Crowl, Philip A. Campaign in the Marianas: United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1960; reprinted 1989). Crowl, Philip A. and Love, Edmund G. Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific, Vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989). Cruickshank, Charles Deception in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979). D’Este, Carlo Fatal Decision. Anzio and the Battle for Rome (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1988). Daeniker, Gustav Raum, Kraft Und Zeit In Der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung (Frauenfeld, Switzerland: Verlag von Huber, 1944). Dear, I.C.B. ed. The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995). Derry, T.K. The Campaign in Norway (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1952). Desarzens, Olivier Nachrichtendienstliche Aspekte der “Weseruebung” 1940 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988). Doenitz, Karl Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, translated by R.H. Stevens (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990). Dupuy, R. Ernest, Dupuy, Trevor N., and Braim, Paul F. Military Heritage of America, Vol. 1 (McLean, VA: Dupuy Institute, 1992; Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 3rd edn., 1992). Eccles, Henry E. Military Concepts and Philosophy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965). Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe (New York, NY: DaCapo; 3rd printing, July 1986). Evans, David C. ed., The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2nd edn., 1986). Evans David C. and Peattie, Mark R. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997). Feil, Adolf ed. Grundlagen der Theorie der operativen Kunst der SSK, translated by Dieter Foerster and Bernd Kulbe (Dresden: Friedrich Engels Military Academy, March 1989).

250

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Fioravanzo, Giuseppe A History of Naval Tactical Thought (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1970). Foertsch, Hermann The Art of Modern Warfare, translated by Theodore W. Knauth (New York: Veritas Press, 1940). Forrestel, E.P. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN: A Study in Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966). Freedman, Lawrence The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. 2, War and Diplomacy (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005, reprinted 2006). Freedman, Lawrence and Gamba-Stonehouse, Virginia Signals of War: The AngloArgentine Conflict of 1982 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990). Fuller, J.F.C. The Conduct of War 1789–1961 (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, reprint of the 1961 edition). Garland, Albert N. and Smyth, Howard M. History of U.S. Army in World War II, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1970). Giamberardino, Oscar di Seekriegskunst, translated by E. Mohr (Berlin: Verlag ‘Offene Worte, 1938). Goldstein, Donald M. and Dillon, Katherine V. The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans (Washington, DC/New York/London: Brassey’s, 1993). Goltz, Colmar von der The Nation in Arms: A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War, translated by Philip A. Ashworth (London: Hugh Rees, 5th German edn., 1906). Goltz, Colmar von der The Conduct of War: A Short Treatise on Its Most Important Branches and Guiding Rules, translated by G.F. Leverson (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Truebner, 1908). Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernard E. The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston, MA/New York, NY: Little, Brown, and Company, 1995). Gray, Peter W. and Cox, Sebastian eds., Airpower Leadership: Theory and Practice (London: The Stationary Office, 2002). Grove, Eric J. The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939–1945, rev. edn. of the Naval Staff History Volumes 1A and 1B (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, Navy Records Society, 1997). Gwyer, J.M.A. Grand Strategy, Vol. 3, June 1941–August 1942, Part I (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1964). Handel, Michael I. Masters of War. Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass, 3rd and expanded edn., 2001). Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon The Battle For The Falklands (New York, NY/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983). Heinl, Robert Debs Jr. Victory At High Tide. The Inchon–Seoul Campaign (Philadelphia, PA/New York, NY: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1968). Hughes, Daniel J. ed. Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), p. 219. Isely, Jeter A. and Crowl, Philip A. The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, Its Theory, and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951). Jomini, Antoine Henri de The Art of War, translated by G.H. Mendel and W.P. Craighill

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(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1971, originally published in 1862 by J.P. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, PA). Khalilzad, Zalmay M. and White, John P. eds. Strategic Appraisal: The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999). Knorr, Klaus ed., Strategic Military Surprise Incentives and Opportunities (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983). Kugler, Randolf Das Landungswesen in Deutschland seit 1900 (Berlin: Oberbaum Verlag, 1989). Lambi, Ivo N. The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862–1914 (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1984). Liddell Hart, B.H. Why Don’t We Learn From History (London: Allen & Unwin, 1944). Liddell Hart, B.H. Strategy (New York, NY: F.A. Praeger, 2nd print 1954). Lundstrom, John B. The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941–June 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976). Macintyre, Donald Sea Power in the Pacific. A History from the 16th Century to the Present Day (London: Military Book Society, 1972). Mahan, Alfred T. Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911). Marder, Arthur J. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1914–1919, Vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). Marolda, Edward J. and Schneller, Robert J. Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, 1998). Marr, John E. War in the Falklands: Perspectives British Strategy and Use of Air Power (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College Research Report, Air University, 1988). Matloff, Maurice Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943–1944, The War Department, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959; reprinted 1973). Matthews, Lloyd J. and Brown, Dale E. The Challenge of Military Leadership (London: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers; published under the auspices of the U.S. Army War College Foundation, 1989). Meister, Juerg Der Seekrieg in den osteuropaeischen Gewaessern 1941/45 (Munich: J.F. Lehmans Verlag, 1958). Miller, John United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific; Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1st printed 1949, CMH Pub 5–3, reprinted 1989). Miller, John Jr. United States Army in World War II. The War in the Pacific Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, first printed 1959, reprinted 1990). Ministry of Defence (Navy) War with Japan, Vol. 1, Background to the War (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995a). Ministry of Defence (Navy), War with Japan, Vol. 6, The Advance to Japan (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1995b). Morison, Samuel E. The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939 – May 1943, Vol. 1, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, reprinted 1984a). Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 3, The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931–April 1942 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1948).

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Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 4, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, May 1942–August 1942 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, reprinted 1984b). Morison, Samuel E. The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942–February 1943, Vol. 5, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1975, first published 1949). Morison, Samuel E. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 8, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1951, reprinted May 1984c). Morison, Samuel Eliot History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 12, Leyte: June 1944–January 1945 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, reprinted 1984d). Muellenheim-Rechberg, Burkhard von Battleship Bismarck: A Survivor’s Story (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1980). Neumann, J. Grundzuege der Strategie. Ein Leitfaden fuer das Studium der Kriegsgeschichte (Vienna, 1870). O’Connell, D.P. The Influence of Law on Sea Power (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975). Pack, S.W.C. Sea Power in the Mediterranean: A History from the Seventeenth Century to the Present Day (London: Arthur Barker, 1971). Potter, Elmar B. Bull Halsey (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985). Potter, Elmar B. and Nimitz, Chester W. eds., Seemacht. Eine Seekriegsgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Hersching: Manfred Pawlak Publisher, revd. edn., 1986; originally published as Sea Power. A Naval History, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 1960). Prange, Gordon W. Miracle at Midway (Hightstown, NJ: McGraw-Hill, 1982). Puleston, William D. Mahan: The Life and Works of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S.N. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939). Rabenau, Friedrich von Operative Entsschluesse gegen einen an Zahl ueberlegenen Gegner (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1935). Regner, Gerhard et al., trans. Operative Kunst der Seestreitkraefte, Teil II/1: Seeoperationen und gemeinsame Handlungen der Flottenkraefte und Truppen der Front in Kuestenrichtung (Dresden: Friedrich Engels Military Academy, 1981; originally published as Operativnoye iskusstvo voyenno-morskogo flota, Leningrad: A.S. Grechko Naval Academy, 1975). Regner, Gerhard Operative Kunst der Seestreitkraefte, Teil I/2, translated from Russian by Heinz Engelmann et al. (Dresden: Friedrich Engels Military Academy, 1981). Rendulic, Lothar Grundlagen militaerischer Fuehrung (Herford/Bonn: Maximilian Verlag, 1967). Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy (Huntington, NY: R.E. Krieger, 1978). Richmond, Herbert National Policy and Naval Strength and Other Essays (London/New York/Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1934). Robertson, Terence Channel Dash. The Fantastic Story of the German Battle Fleet’s Escape Through the English Channel in Broad Daylight (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958). Rohwer, Juergen and Huemmelchen, Gerhard Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2nd and revd. edn., 1992).

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Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. 1, The Defensive (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1954). Roskill, Stephen W. The War At Sea 1939–1945, Vol. 2, The Period of Balance (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956). Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea 1939–1945, Vol. 3, The Offensive, Part 2, 1st June 1944–14th August 1945 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961). Roskill, Stephen W. The Strategy of Sea Power: Its Development and Application (London: Collins, 1962). Salewski, Michael Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Vol. 1, 1935–1941 (Frankfurt a. M.: Bernard & Graefe, 1970). Sprout, Harold M. and Sprout, Margaret T. The Rise of American Naval Power 1776–1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939). Stanger, Wilhelm Grundzuege der Lehre von der Strategie. Studienbehelf fuer die K.K. Kriegsschule, Vol. 1, Theorie mit kuerzeren Beispielen (Wien: Verlag der K.K. Kriegschule, 1884). Terraine, John The U-Boat Wars 1916–1945 (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1989). Till, Geoffrey with contribution from John B. Hattendorf Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2nd edn., 1984). Tuohy, William America’s Fighting Admirals (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007). Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare (USM) La Marina Italiana Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. V, Le Azioni Navali In Mediterraneo Dali Aprile All 8 Settembro 1943 (Roma: Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare, 1970). Wallach, Jehuda L. The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT/London: Greenwood Press, 1986). Warner, Oliver Cunningham of Hyndhope: Admiral of the Fleet (London: John Murray, 1967). Wegener, Wolfgang The Naval Strategy of the World War, translated by Holger Herwig (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989). Woodward Sandy with Robinson, Patrick One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992). Woodward, David The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). Zehrer, Hartmut ed. Der Golfkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse und Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992).

Monographs Benjamin, David J. Prerequisite for Victory: The Discovery of the Culminating Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 13 May 1986). Bérubé, Gilles Technology and Decision Making (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, NSSC4/CESN 4, 2002). Black, Charles M. Leadership at the Operational Level (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 17 March 1988). Blacker, David, Skowronski, Cathy, and Cooper, Geoffrey Operational Evaluation of the Middle East Area of Operations (Adelaide: Land Warfare Conference 2003, October 2003).

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Bowling, Alfred R. The Negative Influence of Mahan on the Protection of Shipping in Wartime: The Convoy Controversy in the Twentieth Century (Ann Arbor, MN: University Microfilms International, unpubl. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maine, 1980). Brinkley, Phillip L. The Naval Operational Commander’s Will: An Intangible Element in Victory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986). Bullington, Terry W. Considerations for the Organization and Employment of an Operational Reserve (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986). Coomler, James D. The Operational Culminating Point: Can You See It Coming? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986). Cowan, David M. The Utility of the Operational Pause in Sequencing Battles to Achieve an Operational Advantage (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1987). Dail, Robert T. Does the U.S. Army Really Understand Operational War? A Logistics Perspective (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2 May 1988). Dixon, Richard J. Operational Sequencing: The Tension between Simultaneous and Sequential Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994). DuBois, Edmund L., Hughes, Wayne P. Jr., and Low, Lawrence J. A Concise Theory of Combat (Monterey, CA: Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis, 2nd print, October 1998). Duncan, Stephen C. Intelligence and Defensive Culminating Point – Piercing the Fog (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995). Fehling, Juergen Das Problem der Uebertraegbarkeit taktisch/operativer Erfahrungen aus der Kriegsgeschichte (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, January 1988). Feil, Adolf ed. Grundlagen der Theorie der operativen Kunst der SSK (translated from the Russian Operativnoye iksusstvo voenno-morskogo flota) (Dresden: Military Academy Friedrich Engels, Study Material, 13 March 1989). Fontaine, Yves J. Operational Sustainment in an Immature Theater (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Second Term AY 1989/1990). Forgues, Pierre Command In a Network-Centric War (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, ASMC 3/CSEM 3, December 2000). Franklin, Charles D. Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Culminating Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 28 April 1988). Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, “Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraeften” (October 1993); Arbeitspapier, “Operative Fuehrung” (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992). Gallagher, Barry B. Vision – The Strategic Leader Imperative (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998). Gardner, Gregory C. Generalship in War: The Principles of Operational Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and Staff College, 4 May 1987). Giles, Phillip Kevin and Galvin, Thomas P. Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis,

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and Application (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 31 January 1996). Griswold, Myron J. Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy’s Center of Gravity (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 14 May 1986). Hamilton, William W. Operational Vision – An Essential Trait for Army Operational Commanders (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 10 May 1991). Hurst, Elizabeth A. Shaping the Battlefield With Command and Control Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 7 June 1996). Johnson, John D. Sequencing Operations: Considerations for the Operational Planner (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 20 May 1991). Krauspe, Rolf Der Kriegschauplaetz-seine Klassifizierung und Unterteilung. Die Kriegschauplaetzs eines moeglichen Kernwaffenkrieges unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der europaeischen Kriegschauplaetze (Dresden: Military Academy, Friedrich Engels, 1980). Kriwanek, Thomas M. The Operational Center of Gravity (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986). Madden, Robert W. A Thousand Points of Light: Integrating Operational Fires into Campaign Design (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1990). Meisner, Bruce L The Culminating Point – A Viable Operational Concept or Some Theoretical Nonsense? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, March 1986). Moore, T.D. Logistics Intelligence: The First Step in Operational Sustainment (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990). Nelsen, John T. Where to Go from Here? Considerations for the Formal Adoption of Auftragstaktik by the US Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 1986). Noer, John H. Southeast Asian Chokepoints: Keeping Lines of Communications Open (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, December 1996). Petrole, Gary P. Understanding the Operational Effect (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 8 May 1991). Poeschel, Guenther Die Rolle und Bedeutung der Seeherrschaft in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Analyse der theoretischen Aussagen zum Begriff der Seeherrschaft (Dresden: Militaerakademie “Friedrich Engels,” 1978). Porter, Lanning M. Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12 May 1986). Quirk, Richard J. III The Artist’s Approach to Military Decision-Making at the Operational Level (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986). Reece, Ralph G. Operational Fires (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1989).

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Rodriguez, Joseph Jr. How to Maximize the Advantages of Interior Lines at the Operational Level (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987). Rowe, Edward V. Technology’s Impact on the Operational Level of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 26 April 2000). Savoia, Thomas A. Deception at the Operational Level of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986). Seebens, Dieter Grundlagen, Auffassungen und Plaene fuer eine Kriegfuehrung in der Ostsee 1935–1939 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1971). Simpson, B. Mitchell III The Development of Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977). Spillman, Kurt R. and Wenger, Andreas eds., Information Age Conflicts: A Study of the Information Revolution and a Changing Operating Environment, Zuercher Beitraege zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung no. 85 (Zurich: Forschungsstelle fuer Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zuerich). Springman, Jeffrey A. The Relationship Among Tasks, Centers of Gravity, and Decisive Points (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 21 May 1998). Staff Presentation Operations for Securing Command of Sea Areas (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 8–9 July 1938). Staff Presentation Excerpts from Operations in Sea Areas Under Command (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 16 October 1943). Taddonio, Frank T. The Concept of the Culminating Point of Attack (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986). Tallant, Shawn R. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King: Strategist, Leader and Clausewitzian (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, Spring 1994). Todd, Maurice L. Soldier, Statesman, Scholar: A Study of Strategic Generalship (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 27 May 1994). Train, Harry et al. The Falklands Islands Campaign: Understanding the Issues, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1986). Turner, Albert F. Jr. The Operational Reserve: What Should It Be Used For? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 6 April 1988). Upotreba Strategijskih Grupacija (Privremeno Uputstvo) (Belgrade: Yugoslav Navy, n.d.). Vanderbeek, Walter A. The Decisive Point: The Key to Victory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 1988). Vojnopomorski Sˇkolski Centar, Skripta Iz Operatike RM, V Lekcija (Projekt) Zajednicˇke Operacije Vidova (Split, 1970). Wells, Gordon M. The Center of Gravity Fad: Consequence of the Absence of an Overarching American Theory of War (Arlington, VA: AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare, March 2001). Zais, Mitchell M. Generalship and the Art of Senior Command: Historical and Scientific Perspectives (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1985).

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Articles Agnew, James B. “From Where did our Amphibious Doctrine Come?” Marine Corps Gazette (August 1979). Alexander, Richard G. “Command and Decision,” lecture at Naval War College on 1 May 1962, Naval War College Review (June 1962). Anderson, Walter N. “Commander’s Intent – Theory and Practice,” Armor 3 (May–June 1998). Arthur, Stanley R. and Pokrant, Marvin “Desert Storm at Sea,” Proceedings/Naval Review (May 1991). Banisch, Werner W. “Leadership at the Operational Level,” Army 8 (August 1987). Barlow, Jason R. “Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific,” Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1994). Beuningen, Konrad von „Vom Auftrag zum Entschluss,” Truppenpraxis 7 (July 1959). Blumenson, Martin “Eisenhower Then and Now: Fireside Reflections,” Parameters 2 (1991). Blumenson, Martin “Essence of Command: Competence, Iron Soul,” Army 3 (March 1993). Boetticher, Friedrich von “Feldherrnturm und Generalstab: Grundsaetze und Geist,” Wehrkunde 9 (September 1964). Bolfek, Tomislav “Pomorske Operacije – oblik borbenih dejstava nase Ratne mornarice,” Mornaricˇki Glasnik (Belgrade) 5 (September–October 1977). Bolfek, Tomislav “Rasprava o podeli i osnovnim karakteristikama operacija na JPV,” Mornaricˇki Glasnik (Belgrade) 6 (November–December 1978). Bolfek, Tomislav “Principi pomorske operativne vjestine,” Vojno Delo (Belgrade) 1–2 (January–February 1980). Caraccilo, Dominic J. and Pothin, John L. “Coup d’oeil: The Commander’s Intuition in Clausewitzian Terms,” Air and Space Power Chronicles (16 February 2000). Collins, J. Lawton “Leadership at Higher Echelons,” Military Review 5 (May 1990). Duffner, Robert W. “Conflict in the South Atlantic: The Impact of Air Power,” Air University Review2 (March–April 1984). Engelmann, H. “Die Sicherstellung von Seeoperationen,” Militaerwesen (East Berlin) 3 (March 1980). Fallon, Willard G. “Combating the Ballistic Missile Threat,” Proceedings 7 (July 1994). Felde, Hans and May, Peter “Auftragstaktik oder Befelhstaktik? – Kriterien fuer die Auswahl eines Fuehrungsprinzips,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 2 (February 1978). Filonov, S. “Morskaya Operatsiya” Morskoy Sbornik 10 (October 1977). Fitzgerald, James R., Christian, Raymond J., and Manke, Robert C. “Network-Centric Antisubmarine Warfare,” Proceedings 9 (September 1998). Friedman, Norman “A Network-Centric Solution. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf,” Joint Force Quarterly 4 (Winter 2000–2001). Gakkel, A. “The Soviet Art of Naval Warfare in the Period between the Wars (1921–1941),” Morskoy Sbornik 10 (October 1976). Gibson, Edmund, A. “Leaders and Leadership,” Proceedings 3 (March 1954). Gundelach, Karl “Drohende Gefahr West,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 6 (June 1959). Halsey, William F. “The Battle for Leyte Gulf,” Proceedings 5 (May 1952). Holder, L.D. “A New Day for Operational Art,” Army 3 (March 1985).

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Index

Admirals 7–10, 17, 19, 31, 37, 70, 76–7, 130, 138, 140–1, 146, 155, 157, 159, 161, 164, 178, 185–9, 194, 215–18; Rear Admirals 14, 78, 193–5; Vice Admirals 11, 17, 75, 145, 193–4 Admiralties 5, 8, 10, 37–8, 135, 138, 150, 161 air combat 11, 23, 45, 86, 112, 146, 176 air defense 15, 38, 67, 92–3, 96, 128–30, 145, 177, 223; enemy 148, 175, 181 air force 39, 60, 66–7, 93, 207, 222; drops 152; friendly 222 air superiority 27, 28, 32, 46, 57, 122, 138, 194 aircraft 6, 12–13, 25–31, 35, 46, 62, 74, 85, 93, 121, 124, 132, 139, 150–9, 156, 177, 210–13, 227; Allied 153; British 34, 141; carrier-based 9, 11, 14, 56, 58; carriers 39, 61–2, 130–1, 135, 149, 176–7, 212, 215; employment of 101; enemy 93, 144, 146; land-based 28, 30, 34–5, 41, 46–7, 55–8, 60, 61–3, 68, 73, 131–2, 141, 145, 162, 164, 221; patrol 59; replacement 89 airfields 86, 91, 116, 123–4, 138, 142–3; defense of 38; destruction of 86; enemy 93 airspace 33, 45–6, 112; control 27, 50, 92–3, 122–3, 145 alert order 173 Aleutians 155–6, 218 alliance/coalition 129, 152; leadership 192; strategy 196 Allied forces 17, 73, 86, 152, 164; amphibious landings 124–5, 138, 150; troops 157, 161 Allied invasion 55, 86, 88, 121, 124, 144, 154–5, 169; of Sicily 157–8, 169 Allied navies 35, 50; superiority at sea 138

Allied strength 156; dissipated 176 Allies 4, 22, 30–1, 34, 53–4, 68, 70, 87–9, 121, 124, 131, 146–7, 153; campaigns 121, 155; control of North Atlantic 27; planners 123, 152, 158; trade 49, 148 ambassadors 112, 189 Americans 35; civil wars 22, 215 ammunition consumption 68, 166, 170 amphibious forces 123–4, 130, 138, 151, 162, 170, 194, 217; capability 57; commander 193; enemy 177; task force 40, 128, 150 amphibious landing 8, 12–13, 32, 53–9, 68, 78, 121, 124, 131, 141, 148–51, 154, 166, 168–9, 173, 176–7, 215–16; British concept 211; fictitious 152; objective area 85, 150 analysis 43, 76–7, 82–3, 91, 97, 100–1, 103–6, 191, 209, 226; analytical skills 206 anchorages 53, 56, 59, 94, 99, 145, 148 antiamphibious operations 12, 59, 141, 148, 166, 168, 173 anticipation 79, 139, 214, 218–19 antiship missiles 30, 56, 62, 68, 93, 177, 221 antisubmarine warfare 10, 61, 92, 147, 177, 223; defenses 93, 135, 212; enemy 148, 175–6 Arabian Gulf see Persian Gulf archipelago 31, 44, 50, 55, 121, 132, 160–1, 163 Argentine forces 78, 131 artillery batteries 56, 59, 162; modern 13 assault 154; Allied objectives 152; fictional 157; notional formations 158 asymmetric attack 141–2, 199, 222 At-Sea Logistics Service Group 135 Atlantic Ocean 49–50, 73, 146; control of 30

Index 261 attack 66, 99, 139, 145, 154; Allied 88, 157; amphibious 28; combined or sequential 142, 160; coordinated 14; date 140; electronic 227; multiple simultaneous 138; nontraditional means 95; positions 150; simultaneous 140, 142, 160, 163, 177; strategic axis 133–4; unexpected 144 attacker 22, 143, 147, 178; distant cover 131 attrition warfare 1, 3, 4, 20, 53, 67, 114, 136, 194, 231; combat-attrited units 112 Austro-Hungarian Navy 6–8, 23 authority 109, 207; delegation 114; politico-military 107 aviation 12, 49, 55, 59 Axis 30–1; commanders 157; communications 35, 87; submarines 34; troop reinforcement 86 Balkans 157–8 ballistic missiles 15, 59, 221; defense 92–3, 222 Baltic Sea 23–4, 30–1, 37, 50, 59, 147, 212, 221 base of operations 45, 62–3, 124, 133, 150, 170, 177 basing and deployment area 39, 47, 174; advanced 90; control 38, 48; enemy 59, 141; friendly 175; ports 179 battle 101; cruisers 6, 11, 23, 33, 61, 130, 156, 162; fleet 10; lines 215 Battle events 17, 22–3, 66, 130–1, 140, 176, 178, 193; for the Atlantic 18, 121, 146–7; Coral Sea 54, 66, 70, 130, 144, 150, 160; Eastern Solomons 35; Jutland 7–10, 17, 53, 176, 205; Midway 54–5, 60–1, 75, 76, 102, 130, 148, 178–9, 215, 217; Philippines 143, 215; Trafalgar 32; Tsushima 6, 24 battlefield 46–8, 75, 150, 175, 207, 210; defined 115; isolation 85; maritime 6, 46 battleship 11, 61, 130, 157, 166, 177, 205, 224; construction 9; Dreadnought 6, 223–4 battlespace 46, 48, 85, 115, 180 Bay of Biscay 14, 212 beachhead 58, 123, 138, 151; defenses 13, 211 Bismarck 18, 60 Black Sea 30, 35, 50, 59, 147 blockade 12, 15, 23, 29–31, 33, 50, 58; zone 45

blue-water navy 6, 21, 24, 30, 32, 36, 47, 50, 56, 61–2, 66, 68, 176, 221–2, 224–5, 231 Bodyguard 152–3 bombardment 138, 157, 213 boundary 112; disputes 129 branches 165 bridgehead 60, 86, 155 British 7, 78, 89; Admiralty 5, 37; Naval Exclusion Zone 193; political leadership 78; shipping 18 British forces 34–5; Army 153, 169; Expeditionary 23; Grand Fleet 23, 30–1, 37; Royal Air Force 32 Buckner, Simon B. 155 campaigns 42, 49, 67, 89, 91, 93, 99, 170, 209, 213, 215; successful 66–7, 69, 136; synchronized 162 carrier forces 12, 28, 66, 89–90, 102, 124, 130, 135, 140, 143, 194, 210, 212; enemy 145, 211, 217; Japanese 17 carriers 9, 84, 87, 128, 131, 135, 139, 144–5, 213; Allied 166; British 157; commanders 217; enemy 156 Castex, Raoul 11 castling move 138 ceasefire 40, 192; enforcement 21 center of gravity 43, 77, 118, 126, 128–31, 135–6, 144, 195, 227–8, 239n8; enemy 113, 126, 136, 137, 142–5, 146–7, 181, 197; enemy operational 63, 143; friendly 98, 151, 166; operational 131; protection 116, 139 Central Pacific Campaign 50, 54, 78, 133, 160, 164–5 chain of command 71–3, 74, 93, 116–17, 191–2, 207, 230 change of plan 113, 118, 146, 180, 193 changes in the situation 148, 164, 181, 186–7, 201, 222, 229; monitoring 118, 179, 182 changing conditions 72, 75, 137, 200 Chief of Staff 191; Combined 161 China 37, 42, 87, 159; Sea 61, 221; war with Japan 14, 213 choke point 40, 148; control 21, 26, 36 Ciliax, Otto 141 civilian 94, 99; authorities 96; infrastructure 92 Clausewitz, Carl 167, 186, 208–9 coastal defenses 38, 45, 47, 59, 92–3, 141, 151, 174; German 66 coastal forces 60, 157; navy 50, 55, 66

262

Index

coastal installations 12, 57, 68, 91, 94, 117, 145; enemy 30, 53, 55, 58, 68, 83, 150 coastal waters 34, 53, 59, 172, 174; enemy 94; traffic 38, 157 codes 77, 155; decoding 8 combat 73, 139, 150, 205, 210; actions 43, 62, 64, 101, 195; air patrols 135; aircraft 128; airspace control 93; capability restoration 179; decisions 191; dynamics 46; effectiveness 93, 102, 112, 226; enemy capabilities 79, 101; intensity 46, 126; motivation 228, 230; success in 194; support 150 combat arms 61, 62, 66, 68, 108, 159; joint employment 200; movements 210; tactics 189 combat employment 12, 39, 43, 49, 62, 74, 99, 112, 115, 130, 215; of naval forces 26, 173, 226 combat forces 94, 174, 179; allocation 149; capabilities 118; concentration of 198, 201; employment 16, 48, 64, 67, 85, 159, 198–9, 226; maritime 89, 113; support 61, 69, 117, 134, 151, 172 Combat Manual of Naval Forces 12 combat potential 18, 105, 124, 127–8, 131–2, 176, 196, 224, 227; restoration 99, 170, 178 combat power 90, 125, 130, 166–7, 196–7, 224, 226; inferior 143; regeneration 111 combat readiness 92, 103, 169, 173, 175, 178, 183, 222 combat sectors 42, 45; maritime 25, 39 combat training 103; in peacetime 209 command, control, communications and computers (C4) system 75–6, 82, 93, 227; enemy 116; nodes 117, 148, 181 command 75, 91, 190; centralized 228; decentralization 72, 230; deficiency 244n57; divided 73; echelon 48, 70, 81, 96–7, 98, 104, 109, 192, 197, 198, 200; framework 43; organization 38, 70, 225; relationships 48, 95, 114, 179; rigid 72; structure 5, 40, 69, 197–8, 204; style 189–90; training 71 command and control (C2) 81–2, 105–6, 179, 183, 204, 222, 225, 227–8; agility 207; centralization 205, 228; decentralized 230; enemy 81–2, 116; reestablishing 112; rigid 197 command and control warfare (C2W) 13, 23, 67, 69, 80–1, 95–6, 97, 112–13, 116,

181, 199, 223, 225, 227–8; defensive or offensive 81–2; planning 98 command of the sea 24–5, 27, 29 commanders 6, 44, 49, 60, 73, 74–5, 129, 217, 225, 230; area-based 70; component 99; enemy 154; friendly 100; intent 106–9, 116, 179–80, 188, 207–9, 230; naval 71, 134, 184, 215; officers 141; operational vision 113–14; strategic 202; theater-strategic 42, 71, 76, 83 Commandos 124, 131, 193 communications 14, 19–20, 24, 30, 35, 37, 72–5, 80, 82, 188, 212, 230; disrupted 82; links 226; naval 117; networked 94; poor 164; security 117; tactical 75; visual 8 computer networks 128, 144, 224–6, 227, 230; enemy 144–5; protection 227; threats to 95 concealment 108, 172, 199 concentration of forces 63, 149–50, 173–5, 193, 198, 212; on or off the battlefield 175–6; tactical 150 concept of operations (CONOPS) 137 conflict 90, 94, 108–9, 220, 225; global 15, 42; major regional 111; prevention 39; regional 44, 91; resolution 41; at sea 3, 50 control 121; centralized 97; disputed 31; flexible 199; tactical and operational 71 convoy 9–10, 32, 34, 50, 58–9, 128, 211; Allied 156; amphibious 158, 164; defense 12; enemy 58, 177; escorts 15, 212; Italian 35; military 35 cooperation 4–5, 22, 72, 74, 89, 93, 112, 141, 146, 209, 220, 222; among services 26, 31, 36 coordination 93, 96, 112, 150–1, 157, 163–4, 176 Corbett, Julian S. 26, 29, 30, 33 counterinsurgency 15, 39, 43, 48, 91 coup d’oeil 219 cover, concealment and deception (CCD) 38, 92–3, 95–6, 108, 199 creativity 187, 199, 201, 206 critical strengths and weaknesses 127–9, 131, 143, 226–7; enemy 144, 181–2 critical vulnerability 227; enemy 143–4, 149, 196 cruisers 138, 144, 156, 163, 178, 211 culmination point 44, 90, 165–8, 170, 182 Cunningham, Andrew 186, 216 cyber attacks 81, 143

Index 263 cybernetics 144 cyberspace 44, 46–8, 223 data saturation 227 Dayton Agreement 41 debarkation areas 91, 150 decentralization 70, 94, 169 deception 63, 86, 92, 95, 105, 108, 118, 124, 126–7, 137, 139, 143, 151–6, 166, 199; counterdeception 127; of the enemy 82, 88; military 81–2; nationalstrategic 154; notional force 158; operational 63, 115, 151, 156–8, 175, 182; strategic 152, 199; tactical 152, 155; theater-strategic 154 deception plan 115, 152, 154; Allied 152, 156- 7; modified 158; subordinate 153 decision 93, 106, 114, 179, 184, 190–4, 210, 218; quick 112, 191, 213, 230; statement 106; tactical 193–4, 229 decision cycles 75–6, 169, 224, 229–30; enemy 77, 97, 204 decision making 99–100, 188, 190–2, 214, 225, 228, 230; enemy 81, 85; operational 198 decisive action 6–7, 9, 24, 40, 149; avoided 32; restricted 39 decisive battle 46, 56, 135, 167, 201, 204, 218; naval 130, 176 decisive points 134, 143–5, 148–9; speed 190, 199 defeat 55, 66, 73, 140, 167, 204–5, 210, 217–18; enemy 142; tactical 17, 42, 214, 235n3 defense 22, 92–4, 147; network-based 222 defensive 22, 24, 32, 113; campaign 49–50; information warfare 94; measures 9, 38; operations 37, 52; strategic 23, 46 delegation 70, 72, 188, 207, 216 deployment 11, 62, 114, 136, 173–4; area 38, 121; of combat forces 115, 173; of enemy forces 180; operational 108; patterns 92; phase 112; redeployment 179; timely 113, 175; design 133–4, 136–7, 141, 146 desired strategic end state 119–20 destroyers 23, 31, 33, 35, 60, 64, 135, 138, 144, 156, 163, 178, 211 diplomacy 39–40, 152–4, 189, 203, 229 direct attack 142–4 direct experience 207, 210 direction 133, 174; centralized 70; finder stations 8, 11

disconnect 108, 125, 157, 196, 231 diversionary movements 156, 162 Doenitz, Karl 14, 146, 185, 187–8, 212 Doolittle Raid 66, 216 dummies 151, 155, 158 duration 19, 66; anticipated 111; prolonged 142 Eccles, Henry E. 20 Education 206; peacetime 79 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 152 electronic warfare (EW) 61–2, 67, 75, 80–2, 84, 116–17, 221, 227; enemy 175 elements 114, 170–1, 175, 188, 203 enclosed seas 19, 21, 25–6, 30, 34, 36–8, 46–8, 50, 55–9, 61–2, 92–3, 147, 172, 174, 176–7, 221–2 ends and means 161, 195, 196, 201 enemy 105, 117, 127, 137–8, 145, 162; action 99, 101–2, 136, 157, 165, 169, 182, 203, 218; action disrupted 88; capabilities 81, 100–5, 227, 230; coast 57–8, 60; counteraction 122, 133; culmination 182; cybernetic domain 143; decisions 180–1, 230; hostile action 78; informational systems 117; intentions 77, 101–3, 105, 198, 203, 227; knowledge of 207; logistics elements 168; maritime forces 225; perspective 120–1, 145, 180, 204; resistance 122, 161, 169, 173, 181; shipping 59, 62, 93, 164, 222; strength 144, 156; vulnerabilities 141, 196 enemy air defenses 57, 61; aircraft destroyed 93 enemy attack 38, 127, 143, 145, 228; from the air 211; disabling 129 enemy commander 181; intent 101 enemy fleet 55, 141, 172, 213; defeat of 66, 68, 149–50 enemy forces 57, 63, 85, 100, 114, 121, 124, 130, 132, 150–1, 158, 162, 175, 177–8, 213, 221; clash with 104, 118; cut off 37; deployment 77, 99; destroyed 68, 115, 177, 196; employment 210; estimates of 102; intentions 172; interference 175; invasion 60 enemy reaction 149, 203, 218; anticipated 204, 214 enemy situation 79, 92, 100, 103, 182, 230; estimate of 101–2; intangible factors 227 engagement 46, 64, 101, 159, 162, 172, 226; naval 66; surface-to-surface 177

264

Index

English Channel 27, 32, 34, 141, 148, 156; ports 37–8 Entente Powers 7–8, 10, 30 environment 44, 48–9, 61–2, 79, 105; damaged 96; evaluation 203; physical/human 100–1; secure 94 errors and mistakes 206; in deployment 19, 174; repeated 207 escalation prevention 39, 111 escort 9, 27, 40, 135; counterattack 10 estimate 99–100, 102–4, 106, 114–15, 117, 133, 179, 189–91; long-range 60–2 estimate of the situation 101; running 179, 213 exclusion zones 41, 45 exercises 211; amphibious 158; large-scale 205, 209; naval 210 exploiting success 35, 165, 173 Falklands/Malvinas conflict 16, 42, 70, 78, 89, 131, 147; exclusion zone 45 fast carrier forces 12, 87, 89, 124, 130, 132, 135, 139–40, 144, 163, 176, 194, 210–12, 216; Japanese 149, 178 feints 143, 175, 177; naval 157 Field Manual of 1930 12 fighter aircraft 141, 145, 160, 176; bombers 85–7, 128–9, 131, 166, 177, 194 firepower 128, 226; lacking 129 fires 139, 150, 162, 222–3, 228; control 224; coordination lines 112; naval 128; strategic 83; support 139, 151; tactical 85, 98, 116, 146, 151, 193 fleet 11; commanders 216; concentration 175; destroyed 56; maneuvers 7, 9 Fleet Problems 12, 210–11 Fleet Training Publication 167, 13 Fletcher, Frank J. 193 flexibility 72, 96–7, 118, 137, 149, 160, 165, 180, 186, 198, 206, 209; overestimated 141 flexible plans 113, 115, 182 floating reserve 170 fog of war 118, 167, 182, 229–30 force 2, 108, 128, 144–5, 148, 168, 225; adjacent 109; armed 21, 74, 78, 195, 230; available 135; capabilities 48, 99, 169, 200; converging 150; deployment 7, 45, 72, 104; dispersal 117, 173, 176; elements 150–2; employment 45, 71, 136, 147, 158, 204, 213; enemy 163; land 103; international 54; numerically inferior 150, 177, 217; protection 45,

114, 116, 150, 207; redeployed 170; requirements 119, 124; at sea 92, 173; shortfalls 159; surface 94, 217, 222; unavailable 164; unsuitable 228 foreign policy 101, 109, 189 foresight 186–7; lack of 165 forward deployment 45, 62, 90, 174, 225 framework 137, 205, 218; operational 17, 64, 111, 214; strategic 1, 79, 203 freedom of action 107, 113–14, 125, 164, 180, 181–2, 188, 195–6, 201, 204–5, 215, 225, 229; reduced 193, 207 freedom of navigation 40, 45 friction 210, 229, 230 friendly courses of action 103, 105 friendly forces 100, 103–4, 114, 118, 124, 132, 137, 145–6, 151, 159, 164, 172, 174, 182, 191, 204, 221–2; concentration 160; courses of action 104–7; defensive 168; employment of 103, 109, 210; losses 136, 142, 170; maneuver 174; maritime 121, 178; prevention of culmination 182; support 149; training 183 fuel 89, 163, 220; consumption 68, 166, 170; oil 135–6, 161; refueling 144, 161, 168 Fukudome, Shigeru 145 functional component command 71, 111 Gallipoli 7–8, 13 Generals 123, 138–40, 152–5, 158, 161, 167, 194, 215–16 German 8, 23, 27, 30–4, 38, 50, 61, 73, 86, 138, 140, 146, 148; coastal defenses 66; defeat 90; defenders 125; forces 132, 152, 155; invasion of Norway and Denmark 31, 52, 122, 131–3, 137–9, 142–3, 159, 162; Nazis 10, 12, 23, 153, 157; occupation 37; offensive campaign 49; operational idea 137–8; planning 160; resistance 158; rule 123; transports 140; troops 23, 132, 144, 153–4, 163 German airforce 156; night fighters 86 German navy 9, 13, 34, 50, 132–3, 188; battle cruisers 140; High Seas Fleet 7, 23, 31, 176; Imperial Navy 6, 24; Naval High Command 13, 146, 212; surface fleet 141, 163 Ghormley, Robert L. 193 global war 39, 45, 50, 67, 111 graphic presentation 113, 137 Greece 7, 31, 152, 158

Index 265 ground forces 12, 68, 149; fire support 128; friendly 55–6; support 59 Guadalcanal 16, 35, 53–4, 66, 123, 132–3, 144, 159, 179, 193, 215 Gulf of Riga 8, 13, 23 Gulf War 16, 33, 68, 223 gun batteries 6–7, 53, 141, 177, 221 Halsey, William F. 17, 130–1, 140, 143, 158, 161, 186, 194–5, 216, 236n31 helicopters 68, 131, 150, 177, 221; missilearmed 57 high-intensity conflict 39, 43, 49, 58, 61, 68, 111, 165, 202, 221, 229; at sea 55, 221 high risks 33–4, 103, 118, 138, 195, 198, 225 history 189; naval/military 206–9, 219 home base 173, 179 home waters 22–3 hostilities 39, 79, 91–2, 98, 111, 136, 152, 163, 192; anticipated 95; ending 120; prevention 40 human factors 101, 105 human intelligence (HUMINT) 79, 97, 227 independent action 180, 198 indirect approach 195, 197 indirect attack 142–3, 145 information 93–4, 101–3, 117, 126, 152, 164, 191, 215, 226, 228–9; ambiguous, false or incomplete 140, 146, 214; collecting 78–80, 81–2, 151; distribution 75–6, 108, 112; enemy 93; false 190; flow 191; infrastructure 98; operations (IO) 99, 113, 116; overload 5, 151, 227; sources 143; technologies 108, 198, 225, 228, 230; timely 94, 117; warfare 225–6, 230; information systems 94, 116, 128; protection of 92, 96 infrastructure 44–5, 93, 121; attack 95 initial geostrategic position 21, 119–20, 132–3 initial phase 50, 112 initiative 4, 22, 61, 116, 168, 177, 179, 182, 188, 194–5, 197–8, 201, 205–6, 209, 225, 229; loss of 32–3, 82 innovation 137–8, 142, 201, 206, 209 installations 12, 68, 92, 99, 116, 121, 163; base support 89; civilian 116; destruction 88; enemy 86; Japanese 87; logistical 95; military-economic 96 insurgency 15, 43, 48; support 21, 39 integration 72, 74–5, 80, 92, 94, 115, 226

intelligence 8, 48, 69, 75–8, 80, 91, 96, 99, 113, 116–17, 122, 124, 144, 162, 183, 204, 225, 227; analysts 102; channels 155; deficiencies 97; enemy 151, 156; gathering 46, 92, 156; Italian 157; logistics 89; misleading 79; new 161; officers 76, 79–80, 168, 181; poor 178; signal 82; support 116; tactical 76, 147 interdiction 41, 86, 88, 181 intermediate objective 1, 19, 118–20, 122–5, 133, 135, 158, 159, 165–7, 179, 182 international organizations 10, 40, 115, 189 invasion 32, 57; cross-Channel 152; enemy forces 164; large-scale 37; of Sicily 54, 90 Iran 16, 23–4 Iraq 16, 23–4, 33; naval installations 23, 56 Israeli navy 16, 68 Italy 7, 34; bombing of 86; intelligence 158; navy 23, 156 Japanese 17, 22, 28–9, 35, 66, 73, 121, 130, 140, 155–6, 160, 176, 178; airfields 83, 85, 144; amphibious defense 142; bases 87; center of gravity 145; commanders 131, 186; failure 160; High Command 37; high naval officials 211–12; plans 129, 163–4; resistance 31, 123, 142, 161; shipping routes 121; troops 156, 161; war with China 213; weaknesses 138 Japanese aircraft 86, 161, 194; land-based 176 Japanese Base Air Force 145, 164; pilots 130 Japanese fleets 8, 157; Combined Fleet 9, 17, 22, 28, 56, 61, 89, 128, 140, 143, 146, 150, 164, 217–18; First Diversionary Attack Force 64, 130, 140, 145, 164–5, 178, 194, 217; Mobile Force 130, 194, 217; Second Diversionary Attack Force 178, 194 Japanese invasion 121, 150, 159; Korea 28, 37; the Philippines 53, 128, 132, 217 Japanese navy 14, 66, 73, 204, 212; battle fleet 9, 29, 193; Imperial Navy 3, 10, 17, 22, 34; major operation 149; naval air forces 132–3; codes 76; commanders 187; submarines 14–15, 163–4, 211–12; ships 64, 212, 194 Jellicoe, Sir John 37

266

Index

joint capabilities 141–2 Joint Chiefs of Staff 74, 215–16 joint employment of forces 49, 77, 177 joint operations 12, 49, 53, 56, 61, 67, 200; major 55; naval 7–8, 45 joint task force 58, 80, 117, 184; commander 60 jointness 195, 201, 209 key events 43–4 key operational terms 206, 209 key points 113, 140, 143 Kincaid, Thomas C. 75, 194 King, Ernest J. 157, 188, 215–16 knowledge and experience 184, 188–90 Korean War 15, 29 Kriegsmarine 24, 73, 123, 141 Kurita, Takeo 17, 130, 140, 145–6, 164, 178, 194, 217 land campaign 49–50, 85, 99, 112, 129, 133 land warfare 45–6, 129, 141, 149, 170, 215 landing craft 125, 150, 153, 157, 177 landing operations 12, 165; British concept 13 law of the sea 109 leadership 78, 105, 207, 226; by example 190; national 109, 120, 192; politicomilitary 42, 44, 106, 117, 213; qualities 103, 185; strategic 193 leapfrogging method 138 lethality of weapons 6, 55, 61–2, 64, 85, 127, 221, 226, 227 level of command 42, 44, 73, 76, 80, 90, 104, 213, 216, 225, 228; intermediate 70; lower 227; naval 101; operationaltactical 44; theater-strategic 48, 92, 152, 162, 202, 216, 226 levels of war 41–2, 44, 47–8, 162, 191, 203, 218, 226; at sea 19, 76, 128, 226; strategic 43, 205, 231; tactical 91, 190 Leyte 130, 150, 162; Allied amphibious landing 54–6, 150, 155, 156, 169; Battle for Leyte 17, 61, 64, 133, 145, 164, 178, 194, 216; Gulf 140, 143; operation 31, 75, 85–6, 130, 135 light cruisers 163, 177 lines of communications 89, 90, 133–4, 167, 174 lines of operation 119–20, 126, 132, 149, 177 littorals 27–8, 34–5, 45, 54–61, 68, 92–3,

101, 121, 141, 150, 151, 166, 176–7, 189, 203, 220–3, 226, 231; warfare 228 logistical infrastructure 87, 92, 97, 114, 116, 128; lacking 89, 91; resources 80, 115, 128, 166, 182 logistical support 19, 88–90, 94, 98, 103–5, 115, 134–5, 166, 181, 230; lacking 125; maritime operational 227; sustained 146–8, 170 logistics 90–1, 98, 100, 105, 113, 115, 124, 162, 204, 216, 223, 227–8; base sites 134; strategic 89; synchronization 133; tactical 89 longer range weapons 62, 65–6, 85, 150, 177, 226, 228 losses 62, 64, 78, 135, 159, 167, 217, 231, 235n3; Allies 193; casualties 17, 74, 99; civilian 44; enemy 146; heavy 33, 68, 111, 178, 194, 204; minimized 127, 141, 182; shipping 53–4, 147, 177; troops 8, 54, 68, 142 low-intensity conflict 21, 38–9, 43–4, 48–9, 54, 67, 203 Luftwaffe 27, 61, 73, 122, 131, 137, 141 MacArthur, Douglas 73, 123, 138, 140, 158–62, 194, 215 Magic intercepts 102 Mahan, Alfred T. 7, 9, 195, 220 main forces 62, 148 major combat phase 50, 111, 115 major naval operation 3, 7, 11–12, 18–20, 26, 35, 38–9, 45–6, 49, 51–3, 56, 58–60, 63–4, 66–7, 69, 76, 79, 85–9, 93–6, 97–104, 107–10, 115–29, 131–8, 139–52, 158, 161–2, 165–71, 173–83, 190–1, 195–8, 203, 205–7, 214, 226–8, 231; execution phase 173; phases 62, 110–11, 113; plan 172; timing 54–5; planning 204 major operation 91, 93, 134, 150, 170, 196, 209, 213, 215; endangered 229; failure of 193; plan 113; successive 55 maneuver 44–5, 62, 63, 79, 118, 128, 151, 173, 177, 222; large-scale 205, 209; operational 85, 87, 139, 149; scheme of 137; at sea 58, 149- 50, 177; ship-toobjective 57; tactical 139, 149, 150–9; warfare 2 maneuverability 222 marginal seas 25–6, 34, 60 Marine Corps 138, 215 maritime area of operations 25, 44–6, 56 maritime campaign 3–4, 15, 18–20, 49,

Index 267 53–5, 69, 71, 76, 79, 85–9, 94, 97–104, 107–11, 113, 115- 19, 120–2, 125–6, 128–9, 133–41, 145–52, 158, 160, 162, 165, 168, 170, 190, 195, 197–8, 203- 7, 214, 227–8, 231; offensive 131–3; phases 50, 111; planning 113, 119, 204 maritime forces 20, 41, 72, 91, 94–5, 126, 134, 146, 221, 225, 230; deployment 19, 115; employment 69, 76; enemy 77; friendly 225; protection of 91–2; operations 41; security 96 maritime/joint area of operations 139, 202 maritime theater 4, 7, 11, 18–25, 29–30, 34, 38, 42, 43–9, 61, 67–9, 75, 77, 84, 88, 90–1, 95, 120–1, 126, 129, 145, 162, 173–5, 178, 223–4; boundaries 114; commander 45, 69, 72, 74, 92–6, 98–9; operations 44–5, 54, 92, 109, 128, 139, 149, 150, 184 maritime trade 8, 10–11, 24, 30, 40, 49, 53–5, 58–9, 68, 121, 141, 168, 221, 235n10; Allied 50, 73, 132; British 14, 212; enemy 15, 25, 28, 59, 68, 130, 148, 166; friendly 146; German 24; warfare 129; world 36 maritime traffic 27; British 34; enemy 58 media relations 112 Mediterranean 31, 34–5, 50, 87, 146, 152; Allied strategy 152–3, 215; control in 30, 34 mental agility 199, 206, 213 merchant shipping 11, 40, 87, 121, 156, 162, 205, 222; Allied 147; enemy 14, 37, 150, 212 Mikawa, Gunichi 193 military 18–19, 218; conditions 107; economic potential 59; history 207, 218; institutions 205; leader 186; problems 206, 215; situation 99–100, 127; skills 207; strategy 76, 196; strength 129; terminology 209; theater 25 military and nonmilitary sources of power 16, 20, 39, 42, 48–9, 69, 91, 96–8, 111, 120, 128, 196, 199, 202–4, 218, 220, 226; aspects 43, 70, 109, 114, 127, 135, 191, 217; employment of 43, 162; organizations 112 military art 1, 43, 218 military forces 18, 142, 200; defense of 93; deployment 91; impartial 41 military objective 3, 39, 41–4, 49–50, 67–8, 126–9, 203, 207, 213; determination 48, 129; operational 58; strategic 48

mines 2, 6, 15, 23–5, 29–34, 38, 47, 58, 84, 92, 162, 172, 223; countermeasures 40, 67, 93, 222 minesweepers 60, 68, 163 missiles 58, 68, 93, 141, 177; air-tosurface 92; batteries 34, 56, 222; cruise missiles 56, 84; Exocet 131, 148; strikes 177 mission 104, 114, 194; accomplished 107, 185, 213, 218; analysis 100; command 230; requirements 112; restated 108; statement 106 mobilization 89, 92, 111, 113, 115, 199, 226 Montgomery, Bernard L. 153 morale 22, 103, 105, 228, 229–30; American 66; enemy 77, 79, 97; weakened 86 motivation to fight 229–30 movement 150, 174; auxiliary routes 94; converging 132; coordinating 210; enemy forces 180 multinational forces 4, 5, 18, 49, 55, 67, 91, 100, 109, 137, 161, 199, 203, 222, 226 multiservice forces 4, 5, 18, 55, 67, 91, 100, 103, 109, 137, 141, 203, 226; asymmetrical employment 124 Napoleonic Wars 30, 215 narrow seas 26, 30–2, 36–7, 46–8, 55, 61–2, 94, 108, 117, 148, 174, 221–2 national-strategic level 92, 129, 162, 226; of war 42, 48; of command 202 NATO navies 41 naval aircraft 175 naval bases 57, 96, 116; defense of 38 naval battle 18–19, 29, 46, 62, 66, 152, 159, 162, 172, 222, 224, 226, 235n3; air warfare 128; campaign 196 naval combat arms 68–9, 101, 141 naval combat zone 150, 202; undeclared 45 naval forces 12, 26–8, 38–9, 46–7, 67, 91–2, 111, 114, 124, 131–2, 144, 149–50, 175; Allied 14, 132; combat employment 137, 223; deployment 40, 174; enemy 30, 45, 85; raids 66–7 naval operational commander 74, 76–7, 80–1, 90–2, 96, 103–4, 106–8, 114, 117, 125, 131, 171, 184, 190–202, 213–14, 219, 226, 228; character 185–90; enemy 77, 82; innovative 141; intent 180

268

Index

naval service 209; organization 5, 11; superior strength 150 naval tactical actions 4, 7, 16–20, 49, 51, 59–61, 76 naval tactical commander 4, 101, 152, 190–1 naval warfare 4, 21, 46–7, 128, 220, 221 Nelson, Horatio 189 netting forces 220, 223, 226–8 network-centric warfare 214, 222–3, 229–31 New Guinea Campaign 160, 162 Nimitz, Chester W. 70, 73, 76, 102, 123, 130, 138, 155, 160–2, 175, 185–8, 194, 215–18 no-flight-zone 41 nonmilitary aspects 18, 19, 43, 105, 121 Normandy landing 57, 85–6, 90, 152–5, 158 North Korean troops 121 North Sea 13–14, 23, 27, 30, 132 nuclear technologies 187 nuclear weapons 15, 55, 96; enemy 59 numbered fleets 11, 60, 128, 184 numerical strength 141, 151, 197 objectives 18–21, 28, 42, 45–7, 104, 120, 127–9, 139–41, 145, 148, 180, 182, 195–6; assigned 197; changed 126, 135; complementary 34; consolidation 111; military-strategic 214; minor tactical 124; multiple 135; of naval warfare 26, 130; non-military 61; principal 146; scale of 121; sequencing of 161; tactical 19, 67–9, 98, 124, 159, 202–3, 226; theater–strategic 50, 67, 170, 214 offensive 23–4, 31, 37, 49, 123, 138, 165, 207; phase 50; strategic 21–2 open ocean 31, 33, 37, 47, 53, 55, 57–8, 61–2, 68, 150, 166, 172, 174, 177, 221, 228 operation 145; combined 67; failure 140; order (OPORD) 112–13; plan (OPLAN) 182, 190; plan tested 173 operation plan 113, 115–16 operational art 1–4, 11, 16, 19–20, 43–4, 48, 58, 108, 167, 184, 189, 195, 200, 203, 206–7, 216, 219; practical application of 12; at sea 209 operational command 67, 127, 207; echelons 227; organization 69, 72, 74, 96–7, 117; structure 114, 227 operational commander 3–4, 19, 43, 46, 60, 67, 72, 74–5, 80, 82, 90–2, 99–105,

111–13, 114–23, 125–6, 132–7, 139–42, 144–6, 151, 156, 162–8, 170, 179–82, 192, 202–7, 210, 214–20, 225, 229–30; enemy 81–2, 97, 143; estimate 99–100, 148, 183; judgment and experience 124, 128, 172, 190 operational concepts 121, 212; agility 169; air defense 92–3; axis 133; cover 108, 150–1 operational decisions 99, 106, 117, 191–2, 198, 230; enemy 77 operational design 109, 119, 120, 135 operational factors 125–6, 196, 225; friendly 125 operational fires 83–7, 98, 116, 145, 193, 225, 228; lethal and nonlethal 85, 181; protective 88 operational functions 69, 225; inadequate 159 operational idea 107, 113–16, 119, 134, 137, 142, 145, 149–50, 169, 170–1, 175, 177; elements 139; predictable 138; subordinate 134 operational intelligence 67, 76–7, 97, 140, 147, 167; plan 116 operational leadership 184, 190, 200, 227; enemy 79 operational lessons 209, 218 operational level 190, 205, 226, 231; failure 198; of war 42, 44, 205 operational level of command 216, 218–19 operational logistics 67, 88–91, 225; support 182 operational maneuver 149; from the sea 57 operational objective 16, 18, 20, 21, 38, 39, 45, 47–9, 53–4, 57, 60–1, 65, 67, 83, 113, 123, 130, 133, 159, 162, 173, 176–7, 189, 196–7, 199–200, 203–4, 208, 226 operational pauses 165–8, 170 operational perspective 202, 207, 231 operational plan 5, 108–9, 114, 118, 135, 228; flawed 17; rehearsing 200 operational protection 38, 80, 82, 91–2, 95–7, 98, 117, 126, 225, 228 operational reach 89, 98 operational reserves 86, 169–70, 207 operational situation 62, 82, 127, 172, 192; changed 135; naval 76 operational thinking 2, 204, 205–6, 213, 218–19, 245n2; thinkers and practitioners 215, 217, 219 operational vision 107, 212–14, 218–19

Index 269 operational warfare 1, 3, 5, 16, 18, 20, 43, 48, 189, 194, 205, 231 operations 3, 12, 21, 38–9, 45–6, 48, 67, 69, 112, 113–14, 202; security 80, 82, 95–7, 117, 207 Operations 41, 55, 86, 156–7, 160, 166, 170; Albion 8; Cartwheel 158; Cerberus 141; Chromite 140; Forager 121, 155; Galvanic 54, 78, 91; Hawaii 121; Husky 54, 85, 87, 90, 169; Iceberg 142; Iraqi Freedom 16; Jubilee 68; King II 149, 169; Market Time 15, 39; MI 55- 6, 176, 218; MO 160, 176; Neptune 89; Rheinuebung 18, 60; Shingle 124–5; Titanic 151; Watchtower 53, 123, 179, 193, 215 order of battle 77, 103; fictional 155 overflight 39–40, 153 overwhelming force 195–6, 201, 231 Ozawa, Jisaburo 217 Pacific fleet 121, 123, 128 Pacific Ocean 22, 42, 50, 55, 66, 73–4, 121, 138, 149, 155–6, 163, 212; Allied campaigns 133, 161; southern 123; war 90, 140, 179, 210–11; Western 39, 61–2 Pacific Ocean Area 90; forces 160; South 50, 70, 123, 158–9, 193, 216; Southwest 73, 75, 134, 194; strategy 215; theater 155 Panama Canal Zone 13, 210–11 patrol units 64, 79, 148, 163 pattern 156; avoidance 137, 195 peacekeeping 20, 39–42, 44–5, 48 peacetime 2, 38, 44, 69, 71, 80, 91–2, 96, 108, 152, 200–5, 210, 218 Pearl Harbor 11–13, 53, 70, 73, 90, 121, 128, 149–50, 163, 176–8, 211 Persian Gulf 15–16, 23, 33, 39, 56, 59, 62, 68, 174, 176, 221 personnel 2, 8, 54, 75, 84, 95–7, 99, 111, 113–14, 127, 153, 155, 168, 204 phase 50, 111, 113, 166–71, 173, 214; post-hostilities 43, 203; major 110–11; post-major combat 62, 115, 114; pursuit 63 Philippines 73, 145, 161, 163, 176, 178, 194; campaign 85; defense of 89, 150; isolation of 86; sea 217 pilots 135, 194; downed 161 planners 3, 5, 67, 78, 108, 115–17, 120, 122, 125–6, 131–2, 135, 139, 144, 153, 160–1, 163, 165–6, 171, 216, 230;

Allied 86, 151, 157; joint 123; multiple 113; naval 9 planning 60–2, 67, 71, 75–6, 80, 90, 97, 99, 108–9, 111–13, 116–19, 150, 160–1, 176, 205–6, 225, 228; assumptions 103, 112; campaigns 196; centralization 183; enemy 81; framework 106; games 173, 210, 212; guidance 100; logistical 124; offensive C2W 116; phase 114; process 161, 182; quality enhanced 73; regressive 19, 122; sessions 187 plans 113, 114–15, 155, 164; classified 115; Fortitude 152–4, 158; modification 118; for operational IO/C2W 116; Royal Flush 153; Wedlock 155 platforms 2, 6, 10, 11, 57, 61, 64–5; combat potential 68; naval 61 point of main attack or defense 108, 147–8, 150, 192, 198, 201 policy 19, 111, 189, 195–6 political 109, 112, 152, 229; activity 43; adverse effects 44; authorities 193; centers 93; consequences 228–9; constraint 231; direction 208; environment 39; factors 77; key decisions 74; leadership 120, 193, 195, 214; limitations 142, 230; objective 41; situation 203; population 101, 121; population controlled 229; world 221 ports 58, 91–2, 142, 144, 147; Flemish 38; Norwegian 163; security 96–7 principles of war 105, 139–41 protection 38, 48, 89–91, 96, 116–17, 128, 134, 136, 145–8, 165, 168, 178, 195, 204, 223, 226- 7; of civilians 200; by deception 151; of information 228; in the maritime theater 98; passive measures 94; tactical 91 Provisional Manual on Conduct of Operations 12 psychological operations (PSYOP) 80–5, 116 radio 5–8, 75, 158, 185, 229; direction finding (RDF) 15, 212; frequency (RF) bandwidth 227, 229; shortwave (SW) 11, 14, 212 Raeder, Erich 9, 31, 188 Ramsey, Sir Bertram H. 189 ratio of forces 33, 61, 131, 147 reconnaissance 12, 46, 67, 90, 92, 108, 140, 172, 174, 177, 183; air 3, 73; enemy 81–2, 175, 182; operational 8, 93 reconstitution 111

270

Index

reinforcements 31, 85–6; enemy 55, 87 resources 94, 116, 145; allocation 118; available 112–18, 114–15, 135; competition for 74; control of 220; nonmilitary 16, 18; synchronized 81, 97; waste of 151 responsibility 90–1, 97, 99, 105, 181–2, 186–8, 191–3, 207, 200, 202–3, 206, 215; area of 227; for decisions 180; divisions of 72; wartime 210 Rickover, Hyman 187 risk 18, 22, 32, 98, 122, 167, 187, 198, 203; estimate 189 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 73, 215 Royal Air Force 10, 86, 141 Royal Navy 3, 6, 8–11, 22, 28, 30, 33, 61, 140–1, 204 rules of engagement 41, 72, 99, 103, 109; changed 193, 207 Rundstedt, Gerd 155, 158 Russia 7–8, 22; navy 6, 31; RussoJapanese War 24, 28–9 San Bernardino Strait 140, 143, 145, 164, 194–5, 217 sanctions 40–1 Scandinavia 37; navies 222 sea control 6, 21, 24–5, 27–31, 37–8, 47–8, 56–7, 122–3, 126, 137, 149; absolute 32; coastal 40; disputed 33–4, 150; dynamics 35–6; enemy 39, 58, 174; loss of 26, 28 sea mastery 25–6, 28 sea routes 121, 144; command of 24; maintained 29 secrecy 99, 140–1, 146, 177, 181 sector of main effort or thrust 149, 162, 172–3, 177–8, 182, 193, 195, 198, 201 sectors of main and secondary effort 43, 62–3, 68, 108, 139, 146–50, 151, 173–4 security 117, 140; effectiveness 81; monitoring 82; operational 138; in the rear 94 segments 173 self-reliance 209–10 semienclosed seas see enclosed seas sensors 17, 46, 61, 62, 80, 150, 221, 224, 226; Argentine 79; electronic 81; radar 11, 86, 156 sequencing 20, 43, 107–8, 113–16, 124, 129, 134, 139, 158–62, 166, 168, 174, 203, 224; tactical actions 170 service component 70–2, 108, 115; enemy 103

service/joint doctrine 207 Seven Years War 22, 30 shaping the battlefield 85, 181, 228, 230 shipping 32, 85, 86, 117, 124, 144, 228; Allied 33, 146; defense 2–3; density 148; enemy 93; protection 11, 39, 40, 91; routes 59, 174; sunk 8, 10; world 47 simplicity 113, 118, 137, 139 situation fast-moving 180, 210 situational awareness 229, 245n2 smart bombs 56–7, 64 Solomons Campaign 54, 121, 123, 132–3, 159–60, 162, 179, 215–16 sources of power 1–2, 44; allocation 141; employment of 43, 113; synchronization 170 South Korea 78 Southeast Asia 121 Soviet Russia 11–12, 25–6, 35, 152, 234n55; Army 23; attack 153; forces 154; navy 22, 24, 50; submarines 31, 35 Spruance, Raymond 185–6, 188, 215 staff 4, 18–19, 43–4, 48, 60, 72–5, 79–80, 84, 91, 98–116, 122, 127, 129, 135–6, 146, 167, 172, 179, 191, 206, 228, 230; estimates 99; officers 117 statement of intent 106–7 straits 36–7, 47, 57, 94, 140, 143, 148, 195, 221; Dover 141; Gibralter 148; Malacca 221 strategic objective 3, 5, 18, 20–1, 24, 33, 39, 42–3, 45, 47–8, 49–50, 69, 111, 123, 133, 170, 184, 189, 196–7, 199–200, 203–4, 208, 214, 226; limited 16 strategic situation 31, 33, 109, 127 strategy 1, 16–17, 19, 44, 48, 111, 189, 195–6, 203, 206 strike force 161; high-speed 211 strikes 56–7, 59–60, 62, 65–7, 90, 139, 144, 159, 162–3, 177–8, 222, 226; enemy 170; retaliatory 40; surface 128 stronger force 23, 32–4, 53, 56, 68, 135, 196 submarine 6, 9, 14–15, 25, 27, 29–30, 33, 46, 55- 7, 59, 61–2, 64–5, 84, 124, 148, 162–4, 175, 177–9, 193, 205, 212, 221, 227; British 11, 34–5, 156; employment of 101; enemy 38, 93, 144–5, 176; nuclear-powered 56, 59, 61, 144; offensive potential 212; warfare 10, 23 subordinate commander 72, 74, 82, 103–4, 106–9, 111, 115, 180, 122, 193, 201, 205, 213; bypassed 229 success 72, 76, 78, 89, 92, 94, 98, 105,

Index 271 107, 112–13, 116, 151, 162, 218; chance of 139, 141, 173, 195; consolidation 35, 53–4, 63, 133, 173, 179, 192; critical factors 125, 202; exploitation of 165, 214; failure to exploit 178; Japanese 73; jeopardized 115, 194; operational 54, 63–4, 160, 178–9, 206; strategic 35, 111; tactical 1, 22, 160, 178, 228; undermined 204 support 67, 89, 226; lack of 35; long-term 134 surface combatants 10, 14, 34, 47, 56, 61–2, 68, 85, 211, 221–2 surface ships 151, 175, 177–8, 211, 228; enemy 176; maneuverability 62 surprise 53, 62, 64–5, 73, 102, 124, 140–1, 150–9, 156, 158, 166, 178, 187, 194, 197–200, 222, 225; the enemy 137; landings 162, 239n8 surveillance 64, 67, 92, 172, 174, 177, 183; coastal 38; enemy 46, 81–2, 175 symmetric attack 141–2 synchronization 20, 66–7, 89, 116, 132, 139, 158, 168, 180, 175, 193, 203, 218, 224; of combat forces 159; operational 115, 117; plan 164; tactical 162–3 tactical actions 18, 39, 45–6, 53, 59–61, 67, 189 tactical commander 19, 46, 60, 70, 184, 190, 192, 202, 218; subordinate 71–2, 97, 112, 114, 172, 180–1, 183, 190, 230 tactics 1, 16, 17, 19, 48, 195, 203, 214; exclusive focus on 204 target 17, 64, 87, 116, 150, 162, 165, 177, 224; destruction of 68; false 177; range 6 targeteering 205 task force 54, 74, 130–2, 150, 211; enemy 157; joint or combined 71–2 task organization 112, 114, 159 technology 1, 7, 20, 204, 218, 224, 229; advances 5–6, 25, 67, 187, 212, 226–7, 230, 231; capabilities 95; naval 67, 223; new 16, 79 tempo of operations 53, 81, 89, 122, 135, 138–9, 161–2, 168–9, 224; changed 166; slowed 229 tenets 72; operational leadership 194–5, 200; operational warfare 114, 231 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations 13 terrorist acts 92, 96–7; counterterrorism 39, 43; Thatcher, Margaret 193

theater 48, 121, 160; command 67, 69, 73; commander 43, 60, 71, 95, 98, 123; of operations 42, 50, 61, 89, 95, 134, 146, 159; organization 66–7, 70, 74–5; structure 44–6 theater of war 48, 50, 73, 111, 150, 154, 158, 162 third world 220 threat 87, 90–2, 141, 146, 155, 182, 201; Allied landing 152–3; area evaluation 77; fictitious 154; to infrastructure 95; of landing 157; multiple 137; at sea 67, 96 thrust 146 time 103–4, 125, 135, 141, 170, 223–4; available 114; frame 108, 110–13 timeline 120, 123–4, 151, 216 Tirpitz, Alfred 9, 188 Tokyo Express 35 torpedo 6, 25, 29, 59, 62, 64–5, 93, 177, 221, 223; craft 163; strikes 177–8; tactics 53 Toyoda, Soemu 145, 164 training 210; jointly 200; friendly forces 182 transparency 156 transport 28, 35, 59, 114, 134; of materials 47; network 62, 90–1, 145 troops 57, 66, 124, 131, 139; airborne 162; Canadian 66, 236n30; landing 138; Norwegian 143; reinforcements 31, 155; scattered 22 Turner, Richmond K. 78, 185, 193 U-boat 3, 8–10, 24, 27, 31, 33–5, 50, 61, 146–8; commander 185; tactical use 14; warfare 10, 23; wolf packs 14, 212 ultimate objective 16, 28, 31, 110, 113, 117–22, 124–2, 129, 133, 136, 142, 159–61, 166, 168, 170, 179, 181–2, 196, 200, 203, 214, 222 undersea cable 5, 75 unexpected events 113, 164, 180 United Nations Charters 39–41 United Nations forces 121, 140; in Bosnia 41 United States 22, 40, 79, 146; Air Force 86–7; aircraft carriers 164, 211; Army 13, 74, 170; battle casualties 142; blockade 15; carrier aircraft attacks 164; defensive campaign 49; escort carriers 134–5, 139–40, 217; firepower 142; Marine Corps 2, 13, 57, 74, 211; photoreconnaissance 78; planners 159; vulnerability 210

272

Index

United States forces 61, 73, 78, 90, 163; Joint Chiefs of Staff 73, 123, 159, 215; troops 142, 153, 156, 158 United States Navy 2–3, 8, 11, 15–17, 38, 53, 61, 66, 68, 73–4, 76, 83, 86, 130, 133–5, 140, 179, 194, 204, 210–11, 217, 225; blockade 39; forces 40, 62, 174; naval officials 211; nuclear 187; Pacific Fleet 53, 73, 178; submarines 10, 64; War College 9, 12, 20 unity of command 72–3, 90–1, 96, 118 unity of effort 72–4, 91, 96, 107, 140 urban areas 101, 220 variability 104 victory 55, 167, 197, 201, 218; chance of 167, 199; decisive 4, 20; naval tactical 17; operational or strategic 66; tactical 97; ultimate 214 Vietnam 15, 74; North Vietnam 39 vision 187, 202, 207, 213 war 3, 14, 21, 27–8, 54, 69, 83, 92, 94, 96, 108, 147, 220, 225; in Bosnia 41; initial phase 34, 57; on land 1, 5, 26, 190; level of 230; in the Pacific 12, 210; past wars 207, 209; phases 111; regional 67; theater 37 war at sea 27, 46–7, 53, 67, 97, 99, 112, 150, 159, 179, 184, 187, 206, 222–3, 228, 231; between strong opponents 31; history of 20; initial phase 61; tactical level 129 war games 12–14, 172, 190, 205, 209, 212

warfare 136, 199, 205, 207–8, 223; amphibious 215, 222; coalition 74–5; evolution 68; human aspects 209; technical aspects 184 warning 99; advance 164; timely 92–3 warships 6, 61, 141, 162; enemy 15, 211 wartime 71, 152; responsibilities 210 water supplies, shortage 220 weaker force 21, 23, 25–6, 27, 30, 32–4, 47, 50, 53, 204, 221–2; objective 36 weapons 5, 82, 90, 218; advanced 17, 80, 141; Argentine 79; platforms 21, 84 weapons of mass destruction 38, 68, 67; defense against 92, 99; enemy 178; proliferation of 220 weather conditions 79, 87, 93, 100–2, 104, 105, 124, 146, 150–9, 161, 164, 166–7, 173–6, 203, 223 Wegener, Wolfgang 11 Wehrmacht Supreme Command (OKW) 152–3, 158; maneuvers 14, 212; three services 162 Western navies 41, 67–8 Wilkinson, Theodore S. 162 Woodward, Sandy 193 world oil trade disruption 96 World War I 3, 6–12, 14, 23–4, 29–33, 212; aftermath 25; lessons from 13 World War II 2, 9–10, 13–15, 27, 30, 34, 42, 50, 56, 61, 66, 73, 78, 87, 89–90, 133, 138, 162, 169, 185–6, 211, 215 Yamamoto, Isoroku 9, 140, 217–18 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War 16, 68